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PER CURIAM: ¶ 1 We granted review in this case to consider whether A.R.S. § 13-707(33) requires a repeat class 1 misdemeanor conviction to be both classified and sentenced as a class 6 felony. We have jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and AR.S. § 12-120.24. ¶ 2 Here, Gulley pleaded guilty in 2012 to one count of disorderly conduct in violation of A.R.S. § 13-2904(A), a class 1 misdemeanor. See A.R.S. § 13-2904(B). Then, in 2013, a jury convicted Gulley of two counts of disorderly conduct, also class 1 misdemeanors in violation of § 13-2904(A)(1). At sentencing, the trial court classified each 2013 count as a “class 6 felony” pursuant to § 13-707(B). Under § 13-707(B), a person “shall be sentenced for the next higher class of offense than that for which the person currently is convicted” if the person “stands convicted of any misdemeanor” and “has been convicted of one or more of the same misdemeanors ... within two years next preceding the date of the present offense[.]” Because Gulley was convicted of the same class 1 misdemeanor in both 2012 and 2013, the trial court classified the 2013 convictions as class 6 felonies and imposed two concurrent and enhanced 3.75-year prison terms. ¶ 3 On appeal, Gulley argues that the trial court committed fundamental error when it designated his 2013 disorderly conduct convictions as class 6 felonies and sentenced him as a category three repetitive felony offender. According to Gulley, § 13-707(B) only pertains to the sentence imposed because the phrase “stands convicted of [a] misdemean- or” requires that the current conviction be classified as a misdemeanor in order for § 13—707(B) to apply. In response, the State counters that if a felony sentence is imposed pursuant to § 13-707(B), then a defendant’s current class 1 misdemeanor conviction must be (re)classified as a felony conviction because an offense is classified under Arizona law according to the type of sentence imposed. ¶ 4 After considering the briefs and oral arguments, the Court vacates paragraphs 23-29 of the court of appeals’ opinion. See State v. Gulley, 240 Ariz. 580, 586-87 ¶¶ 23-29, 382 P.3d 795, 801-02 (App. 2016). Instead, we approve of the interpretation of § 13-707(B) as set forth in paragraphs 4-10 of State v. Ceasar, 241 Ariz. 66, 383 P.3d 1140 (App. 2016). As Ceasar explains, Section 13-707(B) only concerns the imposition of sentencing enhancements for repeat misdemean- or convictions. The phrase “stands convicted of any misdemeanor” dictates that the current conviction must be classified as a class 1 misdemeanor in order for the trial court to impose a class 6 felony sentence. Thus, the trial court committed fundamental error when it (re)classified Gulley’s 2013 disorderly conduct convictions as class 6 felonies and sentenced him as a category three repetitive felony offender. See State v. Smith, 219 Ariz. 132, 136 ¶¶ 21-22, 194 P.3d 399, 403 (2008) (finding fundamental error when trial court improperly used a conviction to enhance a prison sentence). ¶ 5 Accordingly, as requested by the Attorney General and Gulley before the court of appeals, we modify Gulley’s disorderly conduct convictions and designate them as class 1 misdemeanors. We vacate Gulley’s sentence and remand to the trial court for resentenc-ing within the range for first-time class 6 felonies.

OPINION MILLER, Judge: ¶ 1 First Citizens Bank appeals the trial court’s ruling dismissing its breach of contract action as to the spouses of three guaranty signatories. It argues the court erred by applying Arizona law to the guaranties rather than California law, which led the court to dismiss the action, It also argues the court abused its discretion by denying its request to amend the complaint. We conclude the court correctly applied Arizona law and amending the complaint would not have changed the result. We affirm. Factual and Procedural Background ¶ 2 “On appeal from a motion to dismiss, we consider the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, and we view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether the complaint states a valid claim for relief.” Mintz v. Bell Atl. Sys. Leasing Int'l Inc., 183 Ariz. 550, 552, 905 P.2d 559, 561 (App. 1995), In 2010, Sun Sky Hospitality, LLC, borrowed $3,737,000 from First Citizens’ predecessor-in-interest, United Western Bank, to purchase real property in Cochise County, and executed a promissory note, loan agreement, and deed of trust. On January 31, 2012, Dilip Shah, Chandrakant Patel, and Bharat Morari each executed personal guaranties for one hundred percent of all amounts owing from Sun Sky to First Citizens. Sun Sky defaulted on its obligations in November 2012, and First Citizens sued Sun Sky and the personal guarantors for breach of contract. First Citizens also sued the personal guarantors’ spouses despite the absence of personal guaranties by them. The guarantors and their spouses are residents of California. First Citizens attached guaranties to the complaint (“the attached guaranties”) and incorporated them by reference. ¶ 3 The non-signatory spouses jointly moved to dismiss First Citizens’ complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ariz. R. Civ, P. They argued First Citizens had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted as to them because they had not signed the attached guaranties as A.R.S. § 25-214(C)(2) requires. In its response, First Citizens argued California law applied instead, and asserted California law requires the signature of only one spouse in order to bind a marital community, First Citizens included in its response three additional guaranties not alleged in or attached to the complaint (“the supplemental guaranties”). The supplemental guaranties contained California choice of law provisions, but like the attached guaranties, were not signed by the spouses. ¶ 4 At the conclusion of the hearing on the motion to dismiss, First Citizens orally requested leave to amend the complaint to include the supplemental guaranties if their absence was a “turning point.” The trial court issued an under-advisement ruling dismissing the action with prejudice as to the spouses and denying First Citizens’ request to amend the complaint. The court also denied First Citizens’ subsequent motion for reconsideration. The court issued a final judgment as to the spouses pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ariz. R. Civ. P., and we have jurisdiction over First Citizens’ appeal pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-2101(A)(1), Motion to Dismiss ¶ 5 We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, ¶¶ 7-8, 284 P.3d 863, 866-67 (2012). Dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is appropriate if, as a matter of law, the “plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts susceptible of proof.” Id. ¶ 8, quoting Fid Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. State Dep’t of Ins., 191 Ariz, 222, ¶ 4, 954 P.2d 580, 582 (1998). The court should dismiss if the plaintiff has pled facts revealing a legal bar to recovery. See Moretto v. Samaritan Health Sys., 190 Ariz. 343, 346, 947 P.2d 917, 920 (App. 1997). In our analysis we will “look only to the pleading itself,” including any exhibits thereto. Coleman, 230 Ariz. 352, ¶ 9, 284 P.3d at 867, quoting Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 218 Ariz. 417, ¶ 6, 189 P.3d 344, 346 (2008); see also Ariz. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (copy of written instrument as exhibit to pleading is part of pleading). We will assume the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations and accept all reasonable inferences from those facts. Coleman, 230 Ariz. 352, ¶ 9, 284 P.3d at 867. ¶ 6 Here, the question of whether the complaint reveals a legal bar to recovery depends on which state’s law applies. Compare § 25-214(C)(2) (requiring joinder of both spouses to bind marital community to guaranty or suretyship), and Rackmaster Sys., Inc. v. Maderia, 219 Ariz, 60, ¶ 15, 193 P.3d 314, 317 (App. 2008) (both spouses must actually sign guaranty), with Cal. Fam, Code § 910(a) (marital community liable for debt incurred by only one spouse during marriage unless otherwise provided by statute), and Lithe O’Farrell, LLC v. Tipton, 204 Cal. App.4th 1178, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 548, 550 (2012) (same). Thus, we begin with a choice of law analysis. We review conflict of laws issues de novo as questions of law. Swanson v. Image Bank, Inc., 206 Ariz. 264, ¶ 6, 77 P.3d 439, 441 (2003). Arizona courts apply the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) (“Restatement”) to determine the applicable law in a contract action, Cardon v. Cotton Lane Holdings, Inc., 173 Ariz. 203, 207, 841 P.2d 198, 202 (1992); cf. Pounders v. Enserch E & C, Inc., 232 Ariz. 352, ¶ 9, 306 P.3d 9, 11 (2013) (Restatement applied in determining choice of law for wrongful death claim). ¶7 Section 194 of the Restatement provides: The validity of a contract of suretyship[ ] and the rights created thereby are determined, in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties, by the law governing the principal obligation which the contract of suretyship was intended to secure, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the transaction and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied. See also id. cmt. b (“In situations where there are several sureties and several contracts of suretyship, the convenience of having all these contracts determined by the law which governs the principal obligation becomes even more apparent.”). ¶8 The attached guaranties contain no choice of law provision alleged to apply. Given the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties in the attached guaranties, the trial court first determined which law governed the principal obligation between Sun Sky and United Westem/First Citizens. See Restatement § 194. The loan agreement between Sun Sky and United Western provides: “This agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the state of Arizona and the laws of the United States applicable to transactions within such state.” Parties generally have the power to determine the terms of their contractual engagements except as to issues such as capacity, formalities, and validity. See Swanson, 206 Ariz. 264, ¶ 12, 77 P.3d at 443, citing Restatement § 187 cmt. d. First Citizens does not dispute the enforceability of this choice of law provision as to the principal obligation. And indeed, even without a choice of law clause, the principal obligation would be governed by the law of Arizona, where the subject real property is located, the borrower is domiciled, and the deed of trust was recorded. See Restatement § 189 (governing contracts transferring interests in land). The court correctly determined that Arizona law governs the principal obligation. ¶ 9 Because the principal obligation is expressly governed by Atizona law, we apply the law of another state only if it has a more significant relationship to the transaction and parties. See Restatement §§ 6, 194. Restatement § 194, comment c, addresses the significant relationship analysis in this situation: On occasion, a state which is not the state whose local law governs the principal obligation will nevertheless, with respect to the particular issue, be the state of most significant relationship to the suretyship contract and the parties and hence the state of the applicable law.... A sufficient relationship to justify application of the law governing the principal obligation would, however, exist if the state whose local law governs the obligation was (1) the state where the creditor extended credit to the principal or otherwise relied upon the surety’s promise ..., or (2) the state where the contract of suretyship was to be performed, or (3) the state where the negotiations between the surety and creditor were conducted or where the surety delivered the contract to the creditor, or (4) the state of domicile of either the creditor or the surety. Presumably, there are still other relationships which will suffice. We have previously held that “any one” of these four relationships “would be sufficient to apply the law governing the underlying obligation to the guarantfy].” Phx. Arbor Plaza, Ltd. v. Dauderman, 163 Ariz. 27, 29-30, 785 P.2d 1215, 1217-18 (App. 1989). ¶ 10 We agree with the trial court that the first of these relationships is present here. The complaint alleges that creditor United Western extended credit to principal Sun Sky in order to facilitate acquisition of a hotel located in Cochise County, Arizona. The promissory note attached to the complaint was signed in Sierra Vista, Arizona. And the deed of trust, also attached to the complaint, was recorded in Arizona and lists Arizona mailing addresses for both trustor Sun Sky and trustee Fidelity National Title, This relationship is sufficient to warrant application of Arizona law to the attached guaranties. See id. First Citizens does not argue that the principles of Restatement § 6 dictate a contrary result. In sum, the court did not err in applying Arizona law to the attached guaranties pursuant to Restatement § 194. Cf. New England Merchs. Nat’l Bank v. Rosenfield, 679 F.2d 467, 471-72 (6th Cir. 1982) (under Restatement § 194, law governing principal obligation would also govern guaranties that had no choice of law clause); L&L Oil Co. v. Hugh Mac Towing Corp., 859 F.Supp. 1002, 1004-05 (E.D. La. 1994) (applying Louisiana law to guaranty by Florida trust where guaranty effected “to facilitate performance of a Louisiana transaction”). ¶ 11 Arizona law requires joinder of both spouses in order to bind the community in “[a]ny transaction of guaranty, indemnity or suretyship.” § 25-214(C). The complaint does not allege, and its attachments do not reveal, that the spouses ever signed any guaranty. This is a legal bar to recovery against them under Arizona law for breach of a contract of guaranty; therefore, the trial court did not err by granting the motion to dismiss as to the spouses. See Moretto, 190 Ariz. at 346, 947 P.2d at 920. Motion to Amend Complaint ¶ 12 First Citizens argues in the alternative that the trial court erred by denying its oral request to amend the complaint to include the supplemental guaranties. We review a court’s denial of a request to amend the pleadings for an abuse of discretion. Carranza v. Madrigal, 237 Ariz. 512, ¶ 13, 354 P.3d 389, 392 (2015). A court does not abuse its discretion by denying a request to amend if the amendment would be futile. See Tumacacori Mission Land Dev., Ltd. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 231 Ariz. 517, ¶ 4, 297 P.3d 923, 925 (App. 2013); Bishop v. State, Dept. of Corr., 172 Ariz. 472, 474-75, 837 P.2d 1207, 1209-10 (App. 1992). Granting the motion to amend would be futile if the supplemental guaranties would not support a cause of action against the spouses. ¶ 13 First Citizens relies on Restatement § 187, which sets forth the circumstances in which “[t]he law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties” will be applied. Restatement § 187(1) (emphasis added). Such reliance is misplaced. As our precedents indicate, Restatement § 187 does not apply to a spouse that did not execute a guaranty contract and is not party to that contract. ¶ 14 In Lorenz-Auxier Financial Group, Inc. v. Bidewell, Leslie Bidewell, an Oregon resident, leased certain electronic equipment from Lorenz-Auxier and signed the lease agreements both in his individual capacity and as president of Infotel Arizona, Inc. 160 Ariz. 218, 219, 772 P.2d 41, 42 (App. 1989). Leslie executed the leases in Arizona. Id. Leslie’s wife, Sandra, also an Oregon resident, neither signed the leases nor approved them or assumed responsibility for them in any way. Id. When the lessees defaulted, Lorenz-Auxier sued both Leslie and Sandra, and the trial court granted summary judgment for Lorenz-Auxier. Id. The court reversed summary judgment as to Sandra, applying the law of Oregon, a non-community-property state that “protects a wife’s separate earnings and property from subjection to the payment of her husband’s separate debts.” Id. at 221-22, 772 P.2d at 44-45. The fact that the leases Leslie had signed contained an Arizona choice of law provision did not change the result. Id. The court found “this provision d[id] not bind her, as she was not a party to the leases, made no personal choice of law, and could not be bound by the terms, including the choice of law terms, of contracts she did not sign.” Id. Even if Leslie agreed he would be bound by Arizona law, the court concluded, “he did not thereby bind his wife.” Id. ¶ 15 Later that year, the court of appeals decided Phoenix Arbor Plaza, Ltd. v. Dau-derman, which the trial court here referred to as “[t]he controlling case.” In Dauderman, an Arizona partnership leased space in an Arizona shopping center. 163 Ariz. at 28, 785 P.2d at 1216. California resident Jerry Dau-derman executed a personal guaranty of the lessee’s performance. Id. Following the lessee’s default, the lessor’s successor-in-interest sued Jerry and his wife, Roberta, also a California resident. Id. Roberta moved for summary judgment on grounds she had never signed the guaranty and Arizona law prevented liability as to her and as to the Dau-dermans’ community assets. Id.-, see § 25-214(C). The trial court granted her motion. Dauderman, 163 Ariz. at 28, 785 P.2d at 1216. On appeal, the Daudermm court first observed that an Arizona choice of law provision in the lease agreement “[was not] binding on Roberta because she did not sign the lease.” Id. at 29, 785 P.2d at 1217, citing Lorenz-Auxier, 160 Ariz. at 221, 772 P.2d at 44. In addressing Roberta’s liability, the court concluded Restatement § 194 applied because factors set forth in comment c of that section were present. Dauderman, 163 Ariz. at 29-30, 785 P.2d at 1217-18. The court applied Lorenz-Auxier to require an Arizona court to refuse enforcement of “a unilateral promise by the husband to bind his wife to a promise which would jeopardize property rights provided by her state of domicile.” 163 Ariz. at 30-31, 785 P.2d at 1218-19, Because Arizona law provided Roberta more community property protections than California, the court affirmed summary judgment for Roberta and the marital community. Id. ¶ 16 Here, even had the trial court granted First Citizens’ request to amend the complaint to include the supplemental guaranties, the complaint still would have been fatally deficient. In one respect, both Lorenz-Auxier and Dauderman are on point: the spouses could not be bound by guaranty contracts they had not signed, including any choice of law provisions therein. See Dauderman, 163 Ariz. at 29, 785 P.2d at 1217; Lorenz-Auxier, 160 Ariz. at 221, 772 P.2d at 44. In another respect, Dauderman is on point and Lorenz-Auxier is distinguishable. Like in Dauderman, and unlike in Lorenz-Auxier, Arizona law affords the spouses broader property protections than the law of their domicile. Dauderman, 163 Ariz. at 30-31, 785 P.2d at 1218-19; see also Vance-Koepnick v. Koepnick, 197 Ariz. 162, ¶¶ 5-6, 3 P.3d 1082, 1083 (App. 1999) (purpose of § 25-214(0(2) is “to protect one spouse against obligations undertaken by the other spouse without the first spouse’s knowledge and consent”). Attaching the supplemental guaranties to the complaint would have been futile and would not have overcome First Citizens’ legal bar to recovery. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying the request to amend. Tumacacori Mission Land Dev., 231 Ariz. 517, ¶ 4, 297 P.3d at 925. Attorney Fees ¶ 17 We deny First Citizens’ requests for attorney fees and costs under A.R.S. §§ 12-341.01 and 12-342 because it is has not prevailed on appeal. First Citizens also requests attorney fees and costs under a provision of the supplemental guaranties. Even assuming for the sake of argument that such provision could apply to a non-signatory spouse, by its terms it only requires a fee award for “the prevailing party,” and we therefore deny the request. ¶18 We grant the spouses’ requests for attorney fees and costs pursuant to §§ 12-341 and 341.01 upon compliance with Rule 21, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. Disposition ¶ 19 We affirm the trial court’s ruling. . Other defendants also joined the motion to dismiss, but as relevant to this appeal the motion was granted only as to the non-signatory spouses: Renu Shah, Vaishali Patel, and Nayana Mor-ari. (Pursuant to First Citizens’ concession below, the trial court also granted the motion to dismiss as to Ramila Shah, the spouse of another guarantor; First Citizens does not challenge this ruling and thus Ramila Shah is not a party to this appeal.) Hereinafter, any references to "the spouses” will refer only to the non-signatory spouses. . There is no relevant difference between surety-ship and guaranty for purposes of choice of law analysis. See Phx. Arbor Plaza, Ltd. v. Dauderman, 163 Ariz. 27, 29, 785 P.2d 1215, 1217 (App. 1989), citing Restatement § 194 cmt. a. . The attached guaranties include a choice of law clause providing that federal law applies in the event that the guaranties and promissory note are held by the United States Department of Agriculture’s Rural Business Cooperative Service (“RBS”), but the complaint does not allege that RBS held the guaranties or note at any relevant tíme. The guaranties contain no alternative choice of law provision. .The trial court suggested that by citing Arizona attorney fees statutes in its complaint, First Citizens had ”acknowledge[d] that Arizona law applies to the cause of action alleged" therein, including the attached guaranties. As First Citizens recognizes in its reply brief, we reached the opposite conclusion in Ciena Capital Funding, LLC v. Krieg’s, Inc., 242 Ariz. 212, 216-17, ¶ 13, 394 P.3d 39, 43-44 (App. 2017). Assuming for the sake of argument that California law applies, California regards the issue of attorney fees as procedural for choice-of-law purposes. See, e.g., ABF Capital Corp. v. Grove Props. Co., 126 Cal.App.4th 204, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 803, 815 (2005). Thus, the law of the forum would govern that issue. Ciena Capital Funding, 242 Ariz. at 216-17, ¶ 13, 394 P.3d at 43-44. First Citizens' citation of Arizona attorney fees statutes in the complaint does not undermine or contradict its contention that California law applies. Id. Nevertheless, this error is not reversible because the court’s conclusion that Arizona law applies was correct for the other reasons discussed herein. See Gnatkiv v. Machkur, 239 Ariz. 486, 488, ¶ 1, 372 P.3d 1010, 1012 (App. 2016) (court of appeals may affirm judgment if legally correct for any reason); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 61 (court must disregard error not affecting party’s substantial rights). . Although denial of a motion to amend a complaint generally is not an appealable order, see Dollar A Day Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Superior Court, 107 Ariz. 87, 89, 482 P.2d 454, 456 (1971), it is appealable in this case because a final judgment has been entered, see Walls v. Ariz. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 170 Ariz. 591, 596-97, 826 P.2d 1217, 1222-23 (App. 1991). . The spouses, invoking the principle that this court will affirm the trial court's ruling if legally correct for any reason, argue the court’s ruling denying the request to amend was legally supportable on procedural grounds. They note First Citizens did not proffer a copy of the proposed amended pleading as they contend was required by Rule 15(a)(4), Ariz. R. Civ. P„ and further argue the motion to amend was untimely or unduly delayed. We need not address these assertions because even assuming for the sake of argument that the request to amend was procedurally proper, the court correctly ruled that amendment would have been futile, as explained below.

OPINION JOHNSEN, Judge: ¶ 1 We address in this case the effect of broadly written subordination agreements a landowner executed in support of deeds of trust that secured loans made to the owner of some commercial condominium units situated on the owner’s land. We conclude the subordination agreements functioned as conveyances of the landowner’s interest in the encumbered property, and vacate and remand the superior court’s judgment to the extent it is inconsistent with that conclusion. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶ 2 In January 1974, Duane P. Alternan, on behalf of Du Paul Ltd. (“Du Paul”), conveyed by warranty deed a fee-simple interest in land located in Tempe to Arizona Title Insurance and Trust Company (“Arizona Title”). In 1976, Arizona Title then teased a portion of the land to Duane P. Alternan, acting on behalf of Southern Desert Medical Center, Inc., “Phase II” (“SDMC Inc.”). ¶ 3 The 50-year tease stated that SDMC Inc. could use the land “only for the purpose of operating and maintaining offices for medical and dental and related services.” SDMC Inc. was to pay all taxes and assessments and rent of $1,250 per month. Additionally, the tease provided it was “UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that the lease-hold interest of the Lessee may be enrolled in a Horizontal property Regime” pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 33-561 (1976). The tease specified that SDMC Inc. could convey “Units” of its leasehold estate under such a horizontal property regime. Each such conveyance would include a proportionate interest in the “Common Areas” of the horizontal property regime. The tease provided that Unit owners would be responsible for their respective shares of rent, taxes and assessments due under the tease. The tease further set out remedies available to Arizona Title as lessor in the event of a breach by a Unit owner. Among other things, Arizona Title could “terminate this Lease as to that portion of the premises on which the leasehold estate is owned by such [Unit owner].” ¶4 The tease also addressed respective rights and obligations with respect to security interests. First, SDMC Inc. agreed that its leasehold interest would be subordinate to any mortgage or deed of trust placed on Arizona Title’s interest in the property, with the proviso that the tease would remain in full force and effect notwithstanding any default. The tease also addressed the possibility that an owner of a Unit might want to post its interest as security for a loan: Lessor may, in its sole discretion, but it shall not be obligated to, subordinate its interest in portions of the real estate to the lien of a mortgage or Deed of Trust granted of [sic] the grantee of the leasehold estate in one or more Units under a Declaration of Horizontal Property Regime. In such event, however, the subordination shall be only as to the property upon which the leasehold estate is owned by such grantee, and appurtenant interest in the Common Areas. ¶ 5 On the same day it entered into the lease with Arizona Title, SDMC Inc. established a horizontal property regime on the parcel. The Declaration that established the regime recited that Arizona Title was the owner of fee-simple title to the land and that, pursuant to its lease, SDMC Inc. was “the owner of the leasehold estate in and to the aforedescribed property, subject to the provisions of said Lease.” The Declaration further recited that SDMC Inc. was constructing on the parcel a professional building project that was to be known as Southern Desert Medical Center, Phase II, which “shall be held, sold and conveyed” subject to the Declaration. The regime was to last until the 50-year lease from Arizona Title expired. ¶ 6 As provided in the Declaration, SDMC Inc. was to divide the project into “Units” and “Common Elements.” The Declaration defined “Unit” to mean “a separate leasehold estate, consisting of the space bounded by and contained within the perimeter walls, floors, ceilings and windows of each Unit.” The Declaration specified that “Common Elements” and “Common Area” were “synonymous,” and meant “each multi-office structure, except for the Units, the earth upon which the structure is located and the air space above, the interior surface of the ceiling of the structure,” and, inter alia, all bearing walls, roofs, ceilings, floors, foundations, storage spaces, patios, lobbies, carports, parking spaces, pipes, wires. Further, ownership of a “condominium" within the meaning of the Declaration would include “the leasehold interest in a Unit,” along with an undivided interest in the Common Areas. Finally, the Declaration specified that each condominium was “a separate parcel of real property which may be conveyed, transferred and encumbered in the same manner as any other parcel of real property, independently of all other parts of the property, subject only to the provisions of this Declaration and the underlying Lease.” ¶ 7 On June 28, 1977, Duane P. Alleman, acting on behalf of SDMC Inc., conveyed to Duane P. Alleman, in his personal capacity, two suites of condominiums under the regime, designated as numbers 1 through 34 of Building “G” and numbers 40 through 59 of Building “I.” The warranty deed described the real property to be conveyed as the Units, “TOGETHER with an undivided ... interest in and to the Leasehold Estate in and to the subject Real Property, and TOGETHER with [an undivided] interest in the common areas,” all as set forth in the Declaration. Two days later, to secure financing for tenant improvements, Alleman granted a lender a security interest in each of the two suites through identical deeds of trust. The same day, Arizona Title, as owner/lessor, and SDMC Inc., as lessee, executed two identical Subordination Agreements. The particulars of the Subordination Agreements are set out infra ¶¶ 15, 23, 25, 29. ¶8 Two years later, Arizona Title conveyed to Du Paul by special warranty deed its fee-simple title in and to the land that was subject to the lease between Arizona Title and SDMC Inc. On the same day, Du Paul conveyed the same interest to Southern Desert Medical Center Partners (“Partners”) by warranty deed. At that point, therefore, Partners became the owner/lessor of the parcel of land, subject to whatever rights, benefits or obligations were imposed or granted by the Subordination Agreements. ¶ 9 In July 1997, the lender foreclosed on the deeds of trust securing construction of Alleman’s two suites of Units. The condominiums were sold at a trustee’s sale, and later conveyed to a second entity, which, on November 7, 2001, conveyed the Units by war ranty deed to appellee, Earle Investments, LLC (“Earle”). ¶ 10 Even though it was an owner of Units ostensibly subject to the Lease, Earle paid no rent to Partners, the owner/lessor, until 2012, when it agreed to pay six years’ back rent of $35,481.07 for Units 1 through 34 of Building “G” and $20,871.21 for Units 40 through 59 of Building “I.” Thereafter, Earle made rent payments for several months, then stopped, asserting that, under the Subordination Agreements and as a result of the foreclosure sales in July 1997, it held a fee simple interest in the land occupied by the Units. It argued that when the lender foreclosed, the owner/lessor’s fee-simple interest in the land on which the Units were situated was extinguished. ¶ 11 In November 2013, Earle filed a complaint against Partners, asking the court, among other things, to quiet title in favor of Earle. In due course, the superior court granted Earle’s motion for summary judgment, finding Earle had “good and valid and inclusive of full fee simple title” in “Units 1 through 34, inclusive, of Building G, and Units 40 through 59, inclusive, of Building I.” The court also ruled that Earle’s title to the Units was not subject to the Lease, and therefore “enjoined, estopped, and barred [Partners] from asserting any claim, estate, right, title, or interest whatsoever in or to the land or premises, or to any part thereof, adverse to ... Earle.” ¶ 12 Partners timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-2101(A) (2017). DISCUSSION A. Legal Principles. ¶ 13 Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party against which judgment was entered. Corbett v. Manorcare of Am., Inc., 213 Ariz. 618, 621-22, ¶ 2, 146 P.3d 1027 (App. 2006). ¶ 14 The interpretation of a contract is a matter of law, which we review de novo. Rand v. Porsche Fin. Servs., 216 Ariz. 424, 434, ¶ 37, 167 P.3d 111 (App. 2007). In interpreting a contract, our purpose is to determine and enforce the parties’ intent. US W. Commc’ns, Inc. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 185 Ariz. 277, 280, 915 P.2d 1232 (App. 1996). In determining the parties’ intent, we “look to the plain meaning of the words as viewed in the context of the contract as a whole.” United Cal. Bank v. Prudential Ins., 140 Ariz. 238, 259, 681 P.2d 390 (App. 1983). B. Subordination Agreement or Deed of Trust. ¶ 15 Each of the two Subordination Agreements expressly provided that the related deed of trust “shall unconditionally be and remain at all times a lien, charge, and encumbrance upon the Property prior and superior to any right, title, or interest in or to the Property of Owner or Lessee.” Earle argues the Subordination Agreements effectively conveyed the owner/lessor’s fee-simple interest in the Property; as the current owner/lessor, Partners argues the Subordination Agreements encumbered only the leasehold estate. ¶ 16 Our analysis is informed by a handful of cases from other jurisdictions, the first being Old Stone Capital Corp. v. John Hoene Implement Corp., 647 F.Supp. 916 (D. Idaho 1986), which addressed a question very similar to the one here. As here, the lessee had granted a lender a deed of trust on its lease interest in some commercial property, and, at the lessee’s request, the owner/lessor executed a subordination agreement. After the lessee defaulted and the lender sought foreclosure, the question was whether the owner/lessor had subordinated her fee interest or only her lease interest in the property subject to the deed of trust. Id. at 917. The owner/lessor argued she agreed to subordinate only her leasehold interest in the property, “as that was the only interest which was the subject of the leasehold mortgage” that the lessee had executed. Id. As in this case, the owner/lessor’s argument was that “the subordination agreement could only prioritize the interest which [the lender] had, and the only interest which it had was in the leasehold.” Id. ¶ 17 The court agreed with the owner/lessor. It explained that “the nature of a subordination is such that the beneficiary of the subordination must have a competing interest which, after the subordination, becomes senior to that which, before the subordination, was the senior interest.” Id. at 919. As applied, the only interest the security agreement granted the lender in that case was in the lessee’s leasehold. After the subordination, therefore, the lender’s interest in the lease became superior to the owner/lessor’s interest in the lease. Id. But “[b]y its very nature, the vehicle of subordination could not be used to grant [the lender] an interest in the fee.” Id, Significantly for our purposes, however, the court observed that the lender might have acquired an interest in the owner/lessor’s fee if the owner/lessor had executed what amounted to a mortgage or a deed of trust, Id. There was no dispute in that case that the subordination agreement lacked the formalities state law required for a mortgage or deed of trust. Id. ¶ 18 Applying the same logic, the court in Republic National Life Ins. v. Lorraine Realty Corp., 279 N.W.2d 349, 357 (Minn. 1979), held that an agreement that “[t]he interest of the Lessors in the leased premises ... shall be junior and subordinate to the interest of [the lender]” did not subordinate the owner/lessor’s fee interest. The court explained, “Ground lessors manifestly intended to retain their fee interest, and only if they themselves mortgaged the fee would the lessee’s mortgagees have priority over the fee.” Id. at 355. ¶ 19 In Matthews v. Hinton, 234 Cal.App.2d 736, 44 Cal.Rptr. 692 (1965), the court addressed the same issue but held for the lender because it concluded the owner/lessor had joined in the deed of trust. The court began its analysis by describing the economics of the situation: “The lessees or subles-sees might have attempted to put up their tenancy for years as security for construction loans. A fee simple estate would be far more attractive security to a lender.” Id. at 741, 44 Cal.Rptr. 692 (citation omitted). While the relevant security agreements in Old Stone and Lorraine did not purport to convey the owner/lessor’s fee interest, the deed of trust in Matthews did just that: By expressly joining with the lessees as “trustor,” the owner/lessor “contracted directly with the lender, exposing [its] reversionary interest to direct liability independently of auxiliary collection attempts against the borrowers.” Id. ¶ 20 The court in Travelers Ins. v. Holiday Village Shopping Center Ltd. Par., 280 Mont. 217, 931 P.2d 1292 (1996), applied a similar analytical framework in reversing summary judgment entered in favor of the lender. The subordination agreement in that case recited that the lender was “unwilling to make said loan or advance funds thereon unless it is assured that the [mortgage granted by the lessee] shall be a lien upon the [owner/lessor’s] fee simple title in the hereinbefore described real property....” Id. at 1295. The agreement continued: WHEREAS, the undersigned [owner/lessor] is willing to subordinate its fee simple title to said real property to said mortgage and is willing to give such assurance, NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the making of said loan ... the undersigned hereby subordinates all of its right, title and interest in and to said real property to the lien of said mortgage and agrees that said mortgage shall continue to be a first lien upon said property prior and superior in right to any right, title and interest of the undersigned in and to said real property. Id. at 1295. ¶ 21 The Montana Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the lender, holding that the agreement was ambiguous. Id. at 1296. In explaining the ambiguity, the court noted that although the subordination agreement recited that the owner/lessor’s fee interest was to be “subordinated,” it contained no language purporting to mortgage the property to the lender as security. Id. The court explained, “A subordination agreement only dictates the priorities between existing inter ests, for example lien holders—it does not mortgage an interest in the property. A mortgage ‘is a contract by which specific property is hypothecated for the performance of an act, without the necessity of a change of possession.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). ¶ 22 Applying the principles of these decisions to this case, the first question is whether the two Subordination Agreements functioned as mortgages or deeds of trust that conveyed the owner/lessor’s fee interest in some property. We say “some property” because the somewhat awkward wording of the Subordination Agreements requires our analysis to proceed in stages. ¶ 23 To begin with, the “whereas” clauses at the beginning of each of the Subordination Agreements broadly describe facts leading up to execution of the document. In particular, the fourth such clause recites that “it is a condition precedent to making said loan that the Deed of Trust shall unconditionally be and remain at all times a lien, charge, and encumbrance upon the Property prior and superior to any right, title, or interest in or to the Property of Owner....” But the dis-positive language is paragraph (2), which states: The Deed of Trust and the Note, and renewals or extensions thei'eof, shall unconditionally be and remain at all times a lien, charge, and encumbrance on the Property prior and superior to any right, title, or interest therein of Owner.... For the purpose of giving effect to this subordination, Owner ... consents] to and join[s] in the Deed of Trust and hereby grant[s], transferís], and assign[s] to the Trustee of the Deed of Trust all right, title, and interest of Owner ... in and to the Property, in trust pursuant to the Deed of Trust vAth the power of sale, it being understood that such power of sale shall be exercised only in connection with the enforcement of the Deed of Trust. (Emphasis added.) ¶24 Guided by the authorities discussed above, we hold that by agreeing to this provision, the owner/lessor did more than subordinate the leasehold to the lender; it conveyed all of its right, title and interest, namely its fee interest, “in and to the Property” in trust as security for debt. That is the effect of the owner/lessor’s joining in the deeds of trust and expressly “grant[ing], transfer[ring], and assigning]” all of its “right, title, and interest” to the trustee. ¶ 25 Partners argues this conclusion disregards the provision in Exhibit A to the sub-ordinations that the conveyances in the deeds of trust shall be “SUBJECT TO” the lease. Reading the body of the Subordination Agreements together with the property description, however, the owner/lessor’s joinder in the deeds of trust supersedes the “subject to” provision in the property description. That is, Exhibit A acknowledges that the property the Unit owner is conveying as security is subject to the lease; by joining in the deeds of trust and conveying all of its “right, title, and interest” in the property, the owner/lessor conveyed its fee-simple interest in the described property. ¶ 26 Partners further argues that the Subordination Agreements cannot be construed as deeds of trust because they lack a sufficient legal description. As Earle points out, however, Exhibit A to the Subordination Agreements contains a legal description of the property conveyed. Those documents describe the property by reference to the Declaration of Horizontal Property Regime and specify the docket and page number on which the description is recorded. The Subordination Agreements therefore adequately described the property. See Wang Elec., Inc. v. Smoke Tree Resort, LLC, 230 Ariz. 314, 324, ¶ 33, 283 P.3d 45 (App. 2012). ¶27 For these reasons, we hold that by executing the documents labeled “Subordination Agreement,” the owner/lessor conveyed its fee interest “in and to the Property,” in trust as security for the Unit-owner’s debt. C. The “Subject Real Property.” ¶ 28 The conclusion that the Subordination Agreements effectively conveyed the owner/lessor’s fee interest “in and to the Property” leaves open precisely what “Property” was conveyed. Earle argues the superi- or court correctly ruled that when the lender foreclosed, it took fee title to the land beneath the Units that secured the debt. The cases cited above do not answer this question because they involved simple commercial leases, not commercial condominiums as are at issue here. ¶ 29 Returning to the language of the Subordination Agreements, the key provision is, as we have said, the owner/lessor’s consent and joinder in the deeds of trust so as to “grant, transfer, and assign to the Trustee of the Deed of Trust all right, title, and interest of Owner ... in and to the Property, in trust pursuant to the Deed of Trust....” The Subordination Agreements define “the Property” to mean the property described in an attached “Exhibit A.” In turn, Exhibit A to each of the Subordination Agreements describes the Property as: (1) the specified “Units” as recorded in the Declaration; (2) “TOGETHER with an undivided ¡fractional] interest in and to the Leasehold Estate in and to the subject Real Property,” and (3) “TOGETHER with a [fractional] interest in the common areas and facilities as set forth in said Declaration.” (Emphasis added.) ¶30 None of the three elements of the described “Property” includes the ground beneath any particular Unit or Units. Earle argues that the second item—the “interest in and to the Leasehold Estate in and to the subject Real Property” means the land beneath the Units it owns. But that interpretation unduly stretches the language of the property description: The interest specified in Exhibit A is an undivided fractional interest in “the Leasehold Estate in and to the subject Real Property.” Thus, when the lender foreclosed, it received (1) the Unit-owner’s interest in the Units (as defined by and subject to the Declaration), (2) an undivided fee-simple interest in the leasehold estate “in and to the subject Real Property,” and (3) an undivided fee-simple interest in the Common Areas and facilities, as set forth in the Declaration. ¶31 In support of the superior court’s ruling that the lender took fee-simple title to the land beneath the Units subject to the deeds of trust, Earle points to the provision in the lease, supra ¶6, stating that the owner/lessor “may ... subordinate its interest in portions of the real estate” to a Unit-owner’s lender. As Earle notes, the lease continues, “In such event, however, the subordination shall be only as to the property upon which the leasehold estate is owned by such grantee, and the appurtenant interest in the Common Areas,” ¶82 The lease provision Earle cites reserves the owner/lessor’s right to subordinate on certain terms, but does not preclude the owner/lessor from agreeing to subordination on terms less favorable to a lender. Under the circumstances, we cannot construe the lease provision to broaden the express terms of the Subordination Agreements. If the parties had intended that the owner/lessor would subordinate its interest in “the property upon which the leasehold estate is owned” by a Unit-owner, we presume they would have so stated in the Subordination Agreements. The reference in Exhibit A to an “undivided interest,” which is incorporated into the Subordination Agreements by the Subordination Agreements’ references to the exhibit as defining the encumbered property, cannot be read to refer to a fee-simple interest in the land on which any specific Units are situated. ¶ 33 In summary, we conclude that in executing the Subordination Agreements, the owner/lessor conveyed to the lender, in trust as security for repayment of the loan to the Unit-owner, an undivided fractional fee-simple interest in the entire parcel of property that was the subject of the Lease. In foreclosing on the Deed of Trust, the lender therefore succeeded to an undivided fractional fee-simple interest in that property, and after foreclosure, the lender owned the relevant Units and the associated undivided fractional fee-simple interests in the leasehold and “Common Areas” and facilities. Since its fee-simple interest was free and clear of the owner/lessor’s interest in the leasehold, the lender and its assigns were not subject to the lease or any rent obligation. But they did not gain a fee-simple interest in any particular portion of the land subject to the Lease; instead, their interest is an undivided fractional fee-simple interest in the entire subject property. Moreover, just as the owner/lessor’s interests were subject in the first instance to the Declaration, the interests to which the lender took title (and which now are owned by Earle) remain subject to the Declaration. Accordingly, Earle is subject to the obligations spelled out in the Declaration (other than the obligation to pay rent under the lease). D. Ratification. ¶ 34 We have held that upon foreclosure, the lender obtained a fee-simple interest in the property, unencumbered by the lease. Partners argues, however, that Earle ratified the lease by making rent payments. But the cases on which Partners relies do not support the proposition that a lease obligation may be created in the first instance by payments denominated as rent. See All-Way Leasing, Inc. v. Kelly, 182 Ariz. 213, 217, 895 P.2d 125 (App. 1994) (rejecting contention that wife had ratified contract executed by husband, so as to bind the community); Young Mines Co. v. Citizens’ State Bank, 37 Ariz. 521, 528-29, 296 P. 247 (1931) (ratification is “subsequent approval by a principal of a previous unauthorized act by one claiming to act as an agent”). Partners also cites Restatement of Contracts (Second) § 380 (1981), but that provision concerns acts by which one may ratify a contract that is voidable. See id. (“Loss of Power of Avoidance by Affirmance”). As we have said, upon the lender’s foreclosure, the lease was not voidable as to the lender and its assigns, but void. CONCLUSION ¶ 35 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment to the extent it provides that Earle owns the Units and an undivided fractional fee-simple interest in the property identified in the Lease and is not subject to the obligations of the Lease. We otherwise reverse and remand the judgment to the superior court so that it may enter a revised judgment consistent with this opinion. Because neither side has substantially prevailed in this appeal, we deny both sides’ requests for fees and costs. See A.R.S. §§ 12-341.01 (2017), - 342 (2017). . Consistent with the Declaration, ownership of a condominium generally means ownership of a horizontal layer of cubic content space, subject to the owner's exclusive control, together with a fractional interest held in common with other unit owners in the common elements. Makeever v. Lyle, 125 Ariz. 384, 386, 609 P.2d 1084 (App. 1980), citing former A.R.S. § 33-553(3). The common elements include “the land, the foundations, floors, the exterior walls of each [unit], ceilings and roofs, and in general all that portion of the property other than that which is subject to the exclusive ownership and control of an individual [unit] owner.” 125 Ariz. at 386, 609 P.2d 1084, citing former § 33-551(6). . Absent material revision after the relevant date, we cite a statute's current version. . Given the passage of time, neither party offers any extrinsic evidence of the intent of the parties to the Subordination Agreements; nor does Partners argue there are disputed issues of fact as to their meaning. . Our decision to address the ratification issue on the merits renders moot Partners’ contention that the superior court erred by declining to consider Partners' reply in support of its second motion for reconsideration.

JUSTICE GOULD, opinion of the Court: ¶ 1 We hold that, pursuant to Arizona Rule of Ciiminal Procedure 11.4(b), a defendant who asserts an insanity defense and voluntarily undergoes a mental health exam must disclose a complete copy of the expert’s examination report, including any statements made by the defendant concerning the charges against him. Accordingly, we disapprove the holding in Austin v. Alfred, 163 Ariz. 397, 788 P.2d 130 (App. 1990) to the extent it permits a defendant to redact such statements under Rule 11.4(b). BACKGROUND ¶ 2 Defendant Josh Rasmussen was indicted for armed robbery and felony murder. After the charges were filed, his attorney consulted with several mental health experts regarding a possible insanity defense. Based on their opinions, defense counsel filed a supplemental notice of defenses listing insanity, or guilty except insane, as a defense. A.R.S. § 13-502(A). ¶ 3 Rasmussen eventually retained a psychologist to testify in support of his insanity defense. The State and Rasmussen also agreed to an examination by a joint expert. Both experts prepared reports that included statements Rasmussen made about the pending charges. ¶ 4 The State requested copies of the experts’ reports. Defense counsel produced copies, but redacted Rasmussen’s statements. The State moved to compel, seeking disclosure of complete copies. Rasmussen objected based on Austin, 163 Ariz. at 400, 788 P.2d 130, and the superior court denied the State’s motion. Cf. Austin, 163 Ariz. at 400, 788 P.2d 130 (stating that Rule 11.4(b) implicitly allows a defendant to redact his statements from a mental health expert’s report). The State then petitioned the court of appeals for special action relief. ¶ 6 The court of appeals accepted jurisdiction and granted relief, reversing the superior court’s order. State v. Hegyi, 240 Ariz. 261, 266-67 ¶¶ 21-22, 378 P.3d 428, 433-34 (App. 2016). Departing from Austin, the court held “that a defendant who is examined by a non-court-appointed expert cannot, after giving notice of the guilty-except-insane defense ... redact his statements from his expert’s report under Rule 11.4(b).” Hegyi, 240 Ariz. at 266 ¶ 18, 378 P.3d 428. ¶ 6 We granted review to resolve whether Rule 11.4(b) requires a defendant to disclose his statements contained in a mental health expert’s report. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24. DISCUSSION ¶ 7 We review de novo the interpretation of constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules. State v. Hansen, 215 Ariz. 287, 289 ¶ 6, 160 P.3d 166, 168 (2007). ¶ 8 Rasmussen argues the statements he made during his mental health exams are privileged under the Fifth Amendment and, as a result, are not subject to disclosure under Rule 11.4(b). U.S. Const, amend, V. ¶9 The Fifth Amendment applies to statements made by a defendant during a court-ordered mental health examination. Es telle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462, 468, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981); Phillips v. Araneta, 208 Ariz. 280, 282 ¶ 7, 284 ¶ 14, 93 P.3d 480, 482, 484 (2004). A defendant is not required to disclose statements made during a court-ordered exam, and such statements are not admissible at trial. Smith, 451 U.S. at 462, 468, 101 S.Ct. 1866; Araneta, 208 Ariz. at 284 ¶ 14, 93 P.3d 480. ¶ 10 However, when a defendant asserts an insanity defense, he waives his self-incrimination privilege. Kansas v. Cheever, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 596, 601, 187 L.Ed.2d 519 (2013); State v. Schackart, 175 Ariz. 494, 500-01, 858 P.2d 639, 645-46 (1993); State v. Tallabas, 155 Ariz. 321, 324-26, 746 P.2d 491, 494-96 (App. 1987). Such waiver is analogous to the rule that a defendant who chooses to testify at trial may not invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege to avoid cross-examination. Cheever, 134 S.Ct. at 601; Schackart, 175 Ariz. at 500-01, 858 P.2d 639; Tallabas, 155 Ariz. at 324-26, 746 P.2d 491. Additionally, fairness requires the State have access to a defendant’s statements to “rebut the evidence [of insanity] presented by the defendant.” State v. Druke, 143 Ariz. 314, 318, 693 P.2d 969, 973 (App. 1984); see Cheever, 134 S.Ct. at 601 (same). ¶ 11 In contrast to a court-ordered exam, a defendant may request a mental health exam. In such cases, a defendant’s statements to the examiner are not compelled. Thus, because the Fifth Amendment only applies to compelled statements, the privilege is not implicated. See Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 422-23, 107 S.Ct. 2906, 97 L.Ed.2d 336 (1987) (when a defendant requests a psychiatric exam or presents expert testimony in support of a psychiatric defense, he has no Fifth Amendment privilege against the admission of statements made during the psychiatric exam); State v. Mauro, 159 Ariz, 186, 195, 766 P.2d 59, 68 (1988) (holding that “the [F]ifth [Amendment protections ... are inapplicable” when a defendant asserts an insanity defense and requests the court appoint an expert to examine him); State v. Smith, 131 Ariz. 29, 34, 638 P.2d 696, 700 (1981) (“Since the appellant was examined at his own request, the exposure which was invited was a clear waiver of constitutional guarantees.”). ¶ 12 Consistent with these principles, Arizona’s rules and statutes governing mental health exams preserve a defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination. Cf. Hansen, 215 Ariz. at 289 ¶ 7, 160 P.3d 166 (stating that when possible, rules, statutes and constitutional protections should be harmonized). Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.7 is “grounded in the [Fjifth [A]mendment,” and provides that, absent waiver, a defendant’s statements to a mental health expert are not admissible at trial. Tallabas, 155 Ariz. at 323, 746 P.2d 491. Similarly, A.R.S. § 13-4508(A) states that “[t]he privilege against self-incrimination applies to any [mental health] examination that is ordered by the court pursuant to this chapter.” ¶ 13 Arizona’s rules and statutes also provide that a defendant may waive his self-incrimination privilege if he asserts an insanity defense. Rule 11.7(a) prohibits admission of a defendant’s statements “unless the defendant presents evidence intended to rebut the presumption of sanity.” Similarly, Rule 11.7(b)(1) provides that a defendant’s statements about the pending charges are not admissible “without his [ ] consent.” See State v. Fitzgerald, 232 Ariz. 208, 217 ¶ 44, 303 P.3d 519, 528 (2013) (stating defendant waives privilege contained in Rule 11.7(b)(1) by placing his mental health at issue; by doing so “defendant consent[s] to” admission of his statements “for purposes of [Rule 11.7(b)(1) ]”); Tallabas, 155 Ariz. at 325-26, 746 P.2d 491 (holding that a defendant who has an expert testify regarding an insanity defense thereby “consents” to the use of his statements for rebuttal under Rule 11.7(b)(1)); see also A.R.S. § 13-4508(B) (defendant’s statements obtained during an examination are not admissible “unless the defendant presents evidence that is intended to rebut the presumption of sanity”); A.R.S. § 13-3993(D) (requiring disclosure of a mental health expert’s complete report “[i]f any mental disability defense is raised”). ¶ 14 Finally, Rule 11.4 addresses disclosure of a defendant’s statements made during court-ordered and noncompulsory exams. Compare Rule 11.4(a) (referring to “Reports of Appointed Experts”), with Rule 11.4(b) (referring to “Reports of Other Experts”). Under Rule 11.4(a), when a defendant undergoes a court-ordered exam, his statements to the examiner “shall be made available only to the defendant.” In contrast, Rule 11.4(b), which applies to noncompulsory exams, provides that each party “shall make available to the opposite party ... all written reports or statements made by them in connection with the particular case.” Id. (emphasis added). ¶ 15 Relying on Austin, Rasmussen argues that to safeguard his privilege against self-incrimination, the redaction provision contained in Rule 11.4(a) should be read into Rule 11.4(b). Austin, 163 Ariz. at 400, 788 P.2d 130. We reject Rasmussen’s argument. Rule 11.4(b), by its terms, does not refer to redacting a defendant’s statements. The fact that such language is contained in Rule 11.4(a) but not in Rule 11.4(b) suggests the omission was intentional. See City of Flagstaff v. Mangum, 164 Ariz. 395, 398-99, 793 P.2d 548, 551-52 (1990) (“Where the legislature uses a term within one statute and excludes it from another, the term usually will not be read into the provision from which it was excluded.”). ¶ 16 Rasmussen also contends that Rule 11.7(b)(1) prohibits disclosure of his statements. We disagree. Here, Rasmussen waived the privilege contained in Rule 11.7(b)(1) by asserting an insanity defense. See supra at ¶13. ¶ 17 Rasmussen also argues that, as a policy matter, compelling defendants to disclose statements under Rule 11.4(b) will force defense counsel to make an untenable choice. On the one hand, if counsel seeks to investigate whether a defendant has a viable insanity defense, and retains an expert to assist in investigating that possibility, the defendant’s potentially incriminating statements must be disclosed to the state. On the other hand, if counsel foregoes investigating an insanity defense in order to protect a defendant’s incriminating statements from the state, the defendant may be deprived of asserting a viable defense. Cf. Austin, 163 Ariz. at 401, 788 P.2d 130 (stating that “counsel’s duty to investigate the charges and prepare for trial are seriously impeded as a consequence of disclosing the names and reports of retained experts”). ¶ 18 These concerns are unwarranted. The work product privilege protects disclosure of a defendant’s statements to an expert retained solely for the purpose of trial preparation. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.4(b)(1) (work product privilege); see also Ariz. R. Civ. Proc. 26(b)(4)(B) (“[A] party may not discover facts known or opinions held” by an expert retained for trial preparation “and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial.”). However, when a defendant asserts an insanity defense and lists a mental health expert as a trial witness, the work product privilege is waived, and his statements to the expert must be disclosed. State ex rel. Corbin v. Ybarra, 161 Ariz. 188, 191-93, 777 P.2d 686, 689-691 (1989); see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.2(c)(2) (requiring defendant to disclose the names and examination reports of trial experts). ¶ 19 Although we hold that disclosure is required under Rule 11.4(b), this does not mean that all of Rasmussen’s statements are admissible at trial. Such statements are only admissible to rebut his insanity defense, and are not admissible to prove his guilt. AR.S. § 13-4508(B); Cheever, 134 S.Ct. at 601; Buchanan, 483 U.S. at 422-23, 107 S.Ct. 2906; Tallabas, 155 Ariz. at 323-25, 746 P.2d 491; cf. Ariz. R. Evid. 403. We recognize there may be overlap between Rasmussen’s statements about the offense and those relevant to his insanity defense. Tallabas, 155 Ariz. at 326, 746 P.2d 491. Nonetheless, the superior court must ensure that the State’s use of Rasmussen’s statements is “closely tailored” to rebutting his insanity defense. Fitzgerald, 232 Ariz. at 216-17 ¶¶ 39, 45, 303 P.3d 519; see Cheever, 134 S.Ct. at 603 (holding that a defendant’s statements to an examiner are only admissible for the limited purpose of rebutting defendant’s insanity evidence); Tallabas, 155 Ariz. at 325, 746 P.2d 491 (distinguishing between the admissibility of “statements relating to the issue of insanity from [inadmissible] statements wholly unrelated to that issue but tending to prove guilt”). ¶ 20 We therefore hold that under Rule 11.4(b), a defendant who asserts an insanity defense and voluntarily undergoes a mental health exam must disclose a complete copy of his trial expert’s report, including any statements made about the pending charges. Accordingly, we disapprove of Austin to the extent it holds that such statements must be redacted under Rule 11.4(b). CONCLUSION ¶ 21 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the opinion of the court of appeals, reverse the superior court’s order denying the state’s motion to compel, and remand the case to the superior court for further proceedings.

JUSTICE TIMMER, opinion of the Court: ¶ 1 The Arizona electorate approved Proposition 206, “The Fair Wages and Healthy Families Act,” in the November 2016 election, thereby increasing the minimum wage and establishing earned paid sick leave. Petitioners ask us to declare that Proposition 206 violates the Arizona Constitution’s Revenue Source Rule, Separate Amendment Rule, and Single Subject Rule. We decline to do so, holding instead that Proposition 206 does not violate these provisions. BACKGROUND ¶ 2 The Arizona Constitution, article 4, part 1, section 1(2), empowers qualified electors to propose by initiative laws for the voters’ approval. Proposition 206 is one such initiative. Upon voter approval, Proposition 206 was codified as A.R.S. §§ 23-363 and 23-371 to -381. It increases Arizona’s minimum wage incrementally over a three-year period and then requires annual increases tied to the consumer price index. A.R.S. § 23-363. It also requires employers to provide mandatory sick leave of one hour for every thirty hours worked. Id. §§ 23-372 to -373. The State of Arizona, the United States, and certain small businesses are exempt from Proposition 206’s requirements. See A.R.S. § 23-362(B). The Proposition’s minimum wage provisions went into effect on January 1, 2017, and the sick leave provisions went into effect on July 1, 2017. ¶ 3 Petitioners filed suit seeking a declaration that Proposition 206 violates the Revenue Source Rule (Ariz. Const, art. 9, § 23), the Separate Amendment Rule (Ariz. Const, art. 21, § 1), and the Single Subject Rule (Ariz. Const, art. 4, pt. 2, § IS). They also sought to preliminarily enjoin implementation and enforcement of the Proposition. After the superior court denied a preliminary injunction, Petitioners sought special action relief with this Court, ¶ 4 We previously accepted jurisdiction of the petition for special action, rejected Petitioners’ constitutional challenges, and denied relief noting a written opinion explaining our decision would follow. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section (6), of the Arizona Constitution. DISCUSSION I. The Revenue Source Rule ¶ 6 The Revenue Source Rule was referred to voters by the legislature and passed in the November 2004 election. Ariz. Const, art. 9, § 23, Historical and Statutory Notes. It provides: A. An initiative or referendum measure that proposes a mandatory expenditure of state revenues for any purpose, establishes a fund for any specific purpose or allocates funding for any specific purpose must also provide for an increased source of revenues sufficient to cover the entire immediate and future costs of the proposal. The increased revenues may not be derived from the state general fund or reduce or cause a reduction in general fund revenues. B. If the identified revenue source provided pursuant to subsection A in any fiscal year fails to fund the entire mandated expenditure for that fiscal year, the legislature may reduce the expenditure of state revenues for that purpose in that fiscal year to the amount of funding supplied by the identified revenue source. Ariz. Const, art. 9, § 23. Any challenge to an initiative or referendum under the Revenue Source Rule must be made after the measure passes. League of Ariz. Cities & Towns v. Brewer, 213 Ariz. 667, 662 ¶ 26, 146 P.3d 58, 63 (2006). ¶ 6 Proposition 206 does not explicitly propose a mandatory expenditure of state revenues, establish a fund, or allocate funding. And because Proposition 206 does not apply to state employees, the state’s payroll is unaffected. Petitioners, the Arizona Chamber of Commerce & Industry and others, nevertheless assert that Proposition 206 “proposes a mandatory expenditure of state revenues” as contemplated by the Revenue Source Rule because (1) the Industrial Commission of Arizona (“ICA”) is required to implement the sick leave provisions, and (2) other state agencies will be forced to increase their expenditures to third parties “[t]o comply with federal law, contract provisions, and reality.” Petitioners argue that Proposition 206 does not provide an independent revenue source to cover these costs, and the measure therefore violates the Revenue Source Rule. ¶7 Real-parties-in-interest, the State and intervenor Arizonans for Fail* Wages and Healthy Families Supporting Prop 206, counter that the Revenue Source Rule applies only to initiatives and referendums that directly require expenditures and does not apply when such measures merely cause revenue expenditures or require state agencies to act. They contend that Proposition 206 does not explicitly require a mandatory expenditure of state revenues and therefore complies with the Revenue Source Rule. A. Meaning of the Revenue Source Rule ¶ 8 Resolution of this dispute turns initially on the meaning of “proposing] a mandatory expenditure of state revenues” as used in the Revenue Source Rule, § 23(A). Before deciding this issue, we address real-parties-in-interest’s argument, adopted by the superior court, that even if Proposition 206 violates § 23(A), the provision remains valid because § 23(B) would relieve the state from expending revenues to fund the measure. We disagree. By its terms, § 23(B) is triggered only when an “identified revenue source [is] provided pursuant to subsection A” If that revenue source fails to fully fund a mandated expenditure for a fiscal year, the legislature may reduce funding in the amount equal to the shortfall. Section 23(B) does not apply, however, if § 23(A) requires an independent funding source and one is not provided. In that case, the initiative or referendum would be rendered unconstitutional as a whole unless valid parts of the measure could be upheld under the severability doctrine. See Randolph v. Groscost, 196 Ariz. 423, 427 ¶ 13, 989 P.2d 761, 766 (1999) (discussing the sev-erability doctrine). ¶ 9 We construe § 23(A) “to ascertain and give effect to the intent and purpose of the framers and the people who adopted it.” Brewer v. Burns, 222 Ariz. 234, 239 ¶ 26, 213 P.3d 671, 676 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To do so, we give the words used “their natural, obvious and ordinary meaning” unless the context suggests otherwise. Id. We apply the provision as written if it is subject to only one reasonable meaning. See Ariz. Early Childhood Dev. & Health Bd. v. Brewer, 221 Ariz, 467, 470 ¶ 10, 212 P.3d 805, 808 (2009). But if the provision is unclear, “we can consider the history behind the provision, the purpose sought to be accomplished by its enactment, and the evil sought to be remedied.” Cain v. Horne, 220 Ariz. 77, 80 ¶ 10, 202 P.3d 1178, 1181 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 10 We conclude that “proposing] a mandatory expenditure of state revenues” occurs whenever an initiative or referendum explicitly requires either an expenditure of state revenues or state actions that themselves inherently require expenditure of state revenues. A mandatory expenditure of state revenues does not occur if an initiative or referendum only indirectly causes an expenditure of state revenues. ¶ 11 First, § 23(A) by its terms provides that the Revenue Source Rule applies whenever the initiative or referendum itself affirmatively requires an expenditure of state revenues. Cf. Farris v. Advantage Capital Corp., 217 Ariz. 1, 2 ¶ 5, 170 P.3d 250, 251 (2007) (stating that courts look first to statutory text as the best indicator of intent). Specifically, the Rule calls for an independent funding source whenever an initiative or referendum “propose[s]” a mandatory expenditure of state revenues, “establishes” a fund, or “allocates” funding. Nothing in § 23(A) suggests that the Rule applies whenever the initiative or referendum merely causes increased state spending. Cf. League of Ariz. Cities & Towns, 213 Ariz. at 562 ¶ 26, 146 P.3d at 63 (stating in dicta that the initiative at issue likely does not violate the Revenue Source Rule because “[a]ny expenditure of state general funds ... depends on the legislature’s actions” rather than a mandate of the initiative). Tellingly, § 23(A) addresses “cause” only in the context of addressing a sufficient independent funding source, which suggests that the referring legislature and voters intended “mandatory expenditure” and “cause” to mean different things. See Ariz. Const, art. 9, § 23(A) (providing that if an independent funding source is required, it “may not ... cause a reduction in general fund revenues”). ¶ 12 Second, even if we assume § 23(A) is ambiguous, interpreting the Revenue Source Rule as applying whenever an initiative or referendum indirectly causes an expenditure of state revenues would severely hamper the initiative process. Cf. Ariz. Early Childhood Dev. & Health Bd., 221 Ariz. at 470 ¶ 10, 212 P.3d at 808 (stating that when an initiative-created statute is ambiguous, courts may consider the consequences and effects of alternate constructions). It is implausible that qualified electors who seek to propose an initiative measure could successfully scour the state’s innumerable dealings to anticipate and provide a funding source for any conceivable expenditures of state revenues that a ballot measure might indirectly cause. For example, electors would have to account for the costs to train affected employees, contract for goods and services, or even to publish the new law itself. Our construction of § 23(A) avoids this cumbersome consequence and preserves an initiative and referendum practice that has been a tool of direct democracy for more than a century. Cf. Whitman v. Moore, 59 Ariz. 211, 218, 125 P.2d 445, 452 (1942), overruled, in part, on other grounds by Bench v. Superior Court, 66 Ariz. 320, 327, 187 P.2d 656, 663 (1947) (stating that whether to include initiative and referendum in our constitution “was a burning issue” at statehood and both the delegates and the voters considered its inclusion “among the most important” provisions). ¶ 18 We reject, however, the real-parties-in-interest’s assertion that the Revenue Source Rule, § 23(A) applies only when an initiative or referendum explicitly directs an expenditure of state revenues and not when it directs state action that itself inherently requires such an expenditure. If we were to adopt this construction, the Rule could be easily circumvented. For example, rather than directing the legislature to spend one million dollars to establish a new agency, an initiative could simply direct the legislature to establish the agency. This would result in the type of unfunded mandate the Revenue Source Rule sought to remedy. Cf. Smith v. Ariz. Citizens Clean Elections Comm’n, 212 Ariz. 407, 410 ¶ 6, 132 P.3d 1187, 1190 (2006) (“We construe constitutional provisions in light of the purpose of the enactment and the evil sought to be remedied.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, fairly read, the Revenue Source Rule also applies whenever an initiative or referendum expressly requires state action that inherently requires a non-discretionary expenditure of state revenues. ¶ 14 Our view aligns with the Nevada Supreme Court’s interpretation of its corollary to the Revenue Source Rule. See Herbst Gaming, Inc. v. Heller, 122 Nev. 877, 141 P.3d 1224 (2006). The Herbst court held that an initiative that expanded a statutory list of public places in which smoking is banned did not “require the expenditure of money” merely because the measure would increase enforcement costs. Id. at 1232-33. Because the measure “[did] not, for example, compel an increase or reallocation of police officers to enforce its provisions,” but left enforcement mechanics and budgeting discretion entirely with government officials, the court was persuaded that a revenue-generating provision was not required. Id. at 1233; cf. State ex. rel. Card v. Kaufman, 517 S.W.2d 78, 79-80 (Mo. 1974) (holding that a proposed initiative to require University City to pay its firefighters salaries equal to that paid by St. Louis deprived University City officials of budgeting discretion and was therefore “an appropriation” that violated Missouri’s version of the Revenue Source Rule). ¶ 15 We next turn to the parties’ arguments concerning Proposition 206. We review the constitutionality of Proposition 206 de novo. See In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 19 ¶ 9, 59 P.3d 779, 783 (2002). We also presume it complies with the Revenue Source Rule. Cf. Gallardo v. State, 236 Ariz. 84, 87-88 ¶ 9, 336 P.3d 717, 720-21 (2014) (discussing presumption of constitutionality generally afforded to legislative enactments). B. The ICA ¶ 16 Proposition 206 authorizes the ICA to “coordinate implementation and enforcement” of earned paid sick time and requires the ICA to “promulgate appropriate guidelines or regulations for such purposes.” A.R.S. § 23-376. The Proposition also provides that the ICA “shall create and make available to employers .,, model notices” for employers’ use in providing written notice to employees about Proposition 206’s earned paid sick time provisions. Id. § 23-375(D). ¶ 17 We agree with Petitioners that the provisions requiring the ICA to promulgate guidelines or regulations and to create model notices constitute a “mandatory expenditure of state revenues,” as contemplated by the Revenue Source Rule, § 23(A). The ICA has no discretion to ignore these provisions or to refuse to allocate state revenues to accomplish the required tasks. And, unlike the case in Herbst, Proposition 206 does not merely expand application of an existing ICA program but requires the ICA to take specific actions to implement new earned paid sick leave provisions. The Revenue Source Rule, § 23(A) therefore requires that Proposition 206 provide an independent funding source for these tasks. ¶ 18 Proposition 206 provides a funding source for the ICA tasks by amending A.R.S. § 23-364(G) to permit the imposition of civil penalties on employers that fail to pay earned sick time to employees. Section 23-364(G) also provides that “[c]ivil penalties shall be retained by the agency that recovered them and used to finance activities to enforce this article,” which includes the earned paid sick time provisions. See also A.R.S. § 23-364(A) (“For purposes of this section ... ‘article’ shall mean both article 8 [minimum wage] and article 8.1 [earned paid sick time] of this chapter.”). Enforcement of the earned paid sick time provisions embraces the ICA’s mandate to issue guidelines or regulations and to provide model notices to employers. Section 23-376 plainly states that the guidelines and regulations are to be used to implement and enforce the sick time provisions; And providing model notices promotes enforcement by educating employers and employees about their respective obligations and rights under the statute. ¶ 19 Petitioners assert that § 23-364(G)’s fine provisions are insufficient to fund the ICA mandate because the ICA must act before any fines can be collected. But any insufficiency would not invalidate Proposition 206 or the ICA mandate. The Revenue Source Rule, § 23(B) provides the remedy when a revenue source is provided but proves insufficient: the legislature can reduce the expenditure of state revenues used for creating the ICA guidelines, regulations, or model notices in a fiscal year to the amount of funding supplied by the fines. ¶ 20 In sum, Proposition 206 complies with the Revenue Source Rule, § 23(A) by providing a revenue source to fund the ICA’s mandate to implement and enforce the earned paid sick time provisions. If the fines collected to fund the ICA mandate are insufficient, § 23(B) would apply to relieve the state from funding the shortfall. C. Other state agencies ¶ 21 Petitioners next argue that Proposition 206 “mandates] expenditure of state revenues” without providing an independent funding source in violation of the Revenue Source Rule, § 23(A), because the minimum wage and earned paid sick time provisions caused the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System (“AHCCCS”), the state Medicaid program, to raise the payment rates for nursing facilities and home and community based service providers. ¶ 22 After Proposition 206 passed, several providers informed AHCCCS they would have to curtail services or terminate their contracts unless AHCCCS raised its rates. These providers were already under financial stress due to increased costs caused by federal mandates and rate reductions AHCCCS had made during the economic downturn. For all these reasons, AHCCCS chose to raise certain rates effective January 2017 to ensure it maintained a sufficiently robust provider pool, as required by the Medicaid Act. See 42 U.S.C, § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (requiring state plans for medical assistance to make provider payments that “are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services are available under the plan at least to the extent that such care and services are available to the general population in the geographic area”); A.R.S. § 36-2903(M) (stating that provider contracts must contain terms “as necessary .., to ensure adequate performance and compliance with all applicable federal laws”). According to AHCCCS, nothing, including Proposition 206, required it to increase rates merely because a provider’s labor costs increased. ¶ 23 Petitioners similarly argue that Proposition 206 requires the expenditure of state revenues because the state may be required to cover increased labor costs for contractors that provide goods and services. Petitioners do not point to any contract requiring the state to increase payments under existing contracts. Nevertheless, they assert that, “if there is even one cost-reimbursement contract that requires the State to automatically pay a contractor the minimum wages of the contractor’s employees due to the enactment of the Proposition, the expenditure violates the Revenue Source Rule and the Proposition is unconstitutional.” ¶ 24 Proposition 206 will likely impact the state’s coffers, despite the state’s exemption, due to its dealings with entities that are required to comply with the Proposition. (As real-parties in interest and some amici point out, the state may also gain tax revenues and perhaps other financial benefits from the increase in the minimum wage.) But Proposition 206 itself does not require the state to increase rates for AHCCCS providers or reimburse increased labor costs to other state contractors. And increasing the minimum wage and providing earned paid sick time for non-state workers does not inherently require the state to expend revenues. Such expenditures of state revenues, even if prompted by Proposition 206, stem from the state’s discretionary policies and spending decisions or third-party contracts. Proposition 206 does not require these expenditures, and therefore the Revenue Source Rule, § 23(A) does not apply. ¶ 26 The flaw in interpreting the Revenue Source Rule as applying whenever an initiative or referendum indirectly causes an expenditure of state revenues is highlighted by considering the consequences if Proposition 206 had provided an independent funding source to cover any expenditures of state revenues due to increasing wages and benefits for non-state workers. If that source was insufficient, the Revenue Source Rule, § 23(B) would have been triggered to avoid the consequences of a partially unfunded mandate—the increase in the minimum wage and the provision of earned paid sick time. But unlike applying § 23(B) to reduce funding to relieve the ICA from promulgating guidelines, regulations, and model notices, § 23(B) could not relieve the state from paying the increased wages and benefits required by Proposition 206 because the state does not pay wages and benefits to non-state workers. And even if § 23(B) authorized the state to reduce payments to AHCCCS provider's and other state contractors, the minimum wage increase and earned paid sick time benefit for non-state workers—the subject of Proposition 206⅛ mandate—would be unaffected. The remedial provisions of § 23(B) only make sense when applied to mandated direct state expenditures rather than to indirectly caused expenditures. Section 23(B)’s inapplicability shows that the Revenue Source Rule was not intended to require an initiative or referendum to provide a dedicated funding source for costs indirectly caused but not required by a measure. ¶ 26 In sum, Proposition 206’s minimum wage increase and the provision of earned paid sick time for certain non-state workers does not constitute a “mandatory expenditure of state revenues.” The Revenue Source Rule, § 23(A) does not apply. II. The Separate Amendment Rule ¶27 The Separate Amendment Rule provides: Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in either House of the Legislature, or by Initiative Petition.... If more than one proposed amendment shall be submitted at any election, such proposed amendments shall be submitted in such manner that the electors may vote for or against such proposed amendments separately. Ariz. Const, art. 21, § 1. The provision was “intended to prevent the pernicious practice of ‘log-rolling’ ” which bundles separate and distinct propositions into one proposed amendment so that voters favoring one proposition must vote for all. Kerby v. Luhrs, 44 Ariz. 208, 214-15, 36 P.2d 549, 555-56 (1934); see also Ariz. Together v. Brewer, 214 Ariz. 118, 120 ¶ 3, 149 P.3d 742, 744 (2007) (stating that the Separate Amendment Rule ensures that voters are permitted “to express their separate opinion as to each proposed constitutional amendment” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). ¶ 28 Petitioners argue that Proposition 206 violates the Separate Amendment Rule by addressing two separate topics: minimum wage and earned paid sick time. We disagree. By its plain terms, the Separate Amendment Rule only applies to proposed constitutional amendments, whereas Proposition 206 proposed statutory changes. Cf. Jett v. City of Tucson, 180 Ariz. 115, 119, 882 P.2d 426, 430 (1994) (concluding that when the language of a constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous, “we generally must follow the text of the provision as written”). ¶ 29 Petitioners nevertheless ask us to extend application of the Separate Amendment Rule to initiatives because the Voter Protection Act “put[s] statutory initiatives on par with constitutional ones” by limiting the legislature’s authority to modify laws enacted by voters. See Ariz. Const, art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(6). But erecting barriers to changing initiative-created laws does not embed those laws in our constitution. The Separate Amendment Rule does not apply. III. The Single Subject Rule ¶ 30 The Single Subject Rule provides: Every act shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title; but if any subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be embraced in the title. Ariz, Const, art. 4, pt. 2, § 13. Like the Separate Amendment Rule applicable to proposed constitutional amendments, the Single Subject Rule was intended to prevent “logrolling” by sparing an individual legislator from having to vote for a disfavored proposition to secure enactment of a favored one. See Bennett v. Napolitano, 206 Ariz. 520, 528 ¶ 37, 81 P.3d 311, 319 (2003). Similarly, the provision frees the governor from having to veto an entire bill, including provisions he approves, to prevent disfavored provisions from becoming law. See id. ¶ 38 (“A governor presented with a multi-subject bill inevitably faces a ‘Hobson’s choice.’ ”). ¶ 81 This Court has long recognized that the Single Subject Rule applies only to acts by the legislature; it does not apply to initiatives. See Citizens Clean Elections Comm’n v. Myers, 196 Ariz. 516, 525 ¶ 36, 1 P.3d 706, 715 (2000); Iman v. Bolin, 98 Ariz. 358, 365, 404 P.2d 705, 712 (1965); Barth v. White, 40 Ariz. 548, 555-56, 14 P.2d 743, 750-51 (1932). Initiative petitions are governed by the Arizona Constitution, article 4, part 1, § 1, which, as relevant here, requires only that a proposed measure have some title and some text. See Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(9); /tocto, 98 Ariz. at 365, 404 P.2d at 712; Barth, 40 Ariz. at 556, 14 P.2d at 751. ¶ 32 Petitioners ask us to reconsider our prior decisions. They point out that Barth, the genesis for the line of precedent, involved an initiative-proposed constitutional amendment, and other states now favor applying provisions similar to the Single Subject Rule to such initiatives. We decline to revisit our decisions. ¶ 33 The Barth line of cases did not turn on the substance of the initiatives at issue. Indeed, the initiative measures at issue in Citizens Clean Elections Commission and Iman proposed statutory amendments, not constitutional amendments. See Citizens Clean Elections Comm’n, 196 Ariz. at 618 ¶ 2, 1 P.3d at 708; Iman, 98 Ariz. at 362, 404 P.2d at 709. This Court’s prior decisions are further supported by the Single Subject Rule’s language and placement within the constitution. The Rule applies to “aet[s],” which are enacted by the legislature, and does not address initiative or referendum petitions. Cf. Barth, 40 Ariz. at 556, 14 P.2d at 751 (recognizing that an initiative petition is not an “act”). And the Single Subject Rule is set forth in article 4, part 2 of the constitution, which addresses “The Legislature.” ¶34 The Single Subject Rule does not apply. CONCLUSION ¶ 35 We grant review of this special action petition but deny relief. Proposition 206 does not violate the identified provisions in the Arizona Constitution.

OPINION VÁSQUEZ, Judge: ¶ 1 In this negligence action, Maricruz Zu-luaga appeals from the trial court’s judgment in favor of Bashas’, Inc. and the denial of her motion for a new jury trial. On appeal, Zulua-ga argues the court erred by unreasonably limiting the scope of voir dire. Zuluaga also contends the court erred by giving a curative instruction after plaintiffs counsel referred during opening statements to the manner and timing of Bashas’ disclosure of certain information. For the following reasons, we affirm the court’s judgment. Factual and Procedural Background ¶2 “We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to upholding the jury’s verdict.” Romero v. Sw. Ambulance, 211 Ariz. 200, ¶ 2, 119 P.3d 467, 469 (App. 2005). On June 2, 2011, six-year-old Zuluaga and her parents were shopping at a Food City location, operated by Bashas’. While in the store, Zuluaga briefly separated from her mother and went to the produce department. At the same time, a Food City employee, Carlos Martinez, passed through the produce department on his way to the back of the store. The two collided, and Zuluaga fell and sustained a skull fracture and subdural hemorrhage. ¶ 3 Zuluaga’s mother brought this action on her behalf in July 2012, claiming Zuluaga suffered damages because of Martinez’s negligence, for which Bashas’ was vicariously liable. During the seven-day trial, the parties disputed whether Martinez had been running or walking through the produce department and whether he ran into Zuluaga or she ran into him. The jury returned a defense verdict in favor of Bashas’. The trial court denied Zuluaga’s motion for a new trial, and this appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-2101(A)(1), (5)(a). Scope of Voir Dire ¶4 Zuluaga argues the trial court “unreasonably limited her voir dire by refusing to allow questions about grocery store employment.” We will not overturn a trial court’s ruling on the scope of voir dire absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Burns, 237 Ariz. 1, ¶ 19, 344 P.3d 303, 314 (2015). In addition, we will not reverse a judgment unless the error was prejudicial. See Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 27; United Cal. Bank v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 140 Ariz. 238, 295, 681 P.2d 390, 447 (App. 1983). ¶5 The trial court conducted the initial portion of voir dire in this case, asking prospective jurors if they, a close family member, or a close friend “work[ed] for Bashas or Food City.” One juror responded affirmatively and was later dismissed for cause. During Zuluaga’s portion of voir dire, counsel asked a similar, but broader, question: ‘Who here, or a family member, or a close Mend, has ever worked in a grocery store? This could be 30 years ago, checkout clerk; cashier manager; surveillance.” Five jurors responded affirmatively, and the first four briefly explained their connections. The court stopped Zuluaga’s counsel before he could address the fifth juror, however, and the following exchange occurred: The Court: You’re getting to some areas here that are so long and I don’t know how helpful it is. I’m surprised you haven’t asked who hasn’t worked at a grocery store because that’s such a common way of kids to advance to adults. It doesn’t really matter whether somebody has worked at a grocery store or has a good friend that has. You can ask for similar specific areas, but I’m going to ask you to be more explicit asking the questions and move things along. [Zuluaga’s counsel]: Your Honor, thank you. For the record, this case involves the actions of a grocery store with [an] em ployee and a manager, and whether or not their testimony is reasonable under the circumstances and upon the evidence the jury is going to hear, I believe it’s very important to know which jurors have worked in that environment of a grocery store.... And I’m not going into this to each individual person. I’m trying to get answers and the jurors saying yes, and then I’ll move past that. And I’m entitled to do that. The Court: Well, ... you’re not going to be able to evaluate until somebody views the witness and until that witness takes the stand. So, really, I think you’re getting too specific here. You’re going to find people that are candid and people who are less than candid. Ultimately, the jury is going to use their collective common sense in deciding what’s credible or not, so I’m going to ask you to move on. [Zuluaga’s counsel]: To clarify the Court’s ruling, the Court is preventing me [from] finishing this line of questions with the panel in respect to which members of the panel have worked in grocery stores or can remember— The Court: Right. You can ask them, is there anything about their experience or experiences of a family [member] or friend that might [a]ffect [their] ability to fairly weigh the credibility of the witnesses in this case, whether they worked in a grocery store or not. So that’s really the question here. So get on with it. ¶ 6 In turn, Zuluaga’s counsel asked the following question: With respect to those of you who have had experience yourself in a grocery store or a close friend or family member, is there anything about those associations in your life or those people in your life, anything about conversations with them or knowledge about their jobs that would make it more likely, in this case, for you to start off favoring the grocery store or its employees in terms of credibility? No jurors responded to the question. Of the five jurors who initially stated they, or someone close to them, had some experience working at a grocery store, two ultimately sat for trial, including the fifth juror who never disclosed the nature of that experience. ¶ 7 Rule 47(b)(3), Ariz. R. Civ. P., provides that, “[u]pon the request of any party, the court shall permit that party a reasonable time to conduct a further oral examination of the prospective jurors.” Although the court “may impose reasonable limitations with respect to questions allowed,” id., it cannot restrict questions “to the grounds of challenge for cause,” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 47(d). Instead, voir dire “may extend to any legitimate inquiry which might disclose a basis for exercise of a peremptory challenge.” Id; see A.R.S. § 21-211 (listing grounds for challenge for cause); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 47(c) (same); Evans v. Mason, 82 Ariz. 40, 46, 308 P.2d 245, 249 (1957). For parties to “intelligently exercise these rights of challenge, they are privileged to examine prospective jurors as to their qualifications.” Wilson v. Wiggins, 54 Ariz. 240, 241-42, 94 P.2d 870, 871 (1939); see also State v. McMurtrey, 136 Ariz. 93, 99, 664 P.2d 637, 643 (1983). ¶ 8 In denying Zuluaga’s motion for a new trial on this issue, the trial court explained that it had intended to “instruct [Zu-luaga] to ask specific questions to determine who on the panel could not be fair.” But as explained above, voir dire is not limited to grounds of challenges for cause, such as “bias for or against” a party. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 47(c)(5), (d). And although the court may have intended to encourage more specific questions, it explicitly told Zuluaga’s counsel to ask whether the jurors’ experiences would affect their “ability to fairly weigh the credibility of the witnesses” and “to move on.” But merely asking jurors whether they subjectively believe they can be fair and impartial is not sufficient for counsel to make an informed decision about making a peremptory strike. See State v. Naranjo, 234 Ariz, 233, ¶ 17, 321 P.3d 398, 405 (2014); see also Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 639 (9th Cir. 1968) (bias “should not be adjudged on that juror’s own assessment of self-righteousness without something more”). Because Zuluaga’s line of questioning was relevant to the factual issues in dispute, see Evans, 82 Ariz. at 46, 308 P.2d at 249, the court abused its discretion by limiting the scope of voir dire, see Burns, 237 Ariz. 1, ¶ 19, 344 P.3d at 314. ¶ 9 We nonetheless will not reverse the judgment unless the error was prejudicial. See United Cal. Bank, 140 Ariz. at 295, 681 P.2d at 447. “The test is whether prejudice seems affirmatively probable[,] and prejudice will not be presumed, but must appear probable from the record.” Catchings v. City of Glendale, 154 Ariz. 420, 422-23, 743 P.2d 400, 402-03 (App. 1987), quoting Hallmark v. Allied Prods. Corp., 132 Ariz. 434, 441, 646 P.2d 319, 326 (App. 1982). In other words, Zuluaga must show “not only that the voir dire examination was inadequate, but also that, as a result of the inadequate questioning, the jury selected was not fair, unbiased, and impartial.” Naranjo, 234 Ariz. 233, ¶ 24, 321 P.3d at 406, quoting State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, ¶ 95, 94 P.3d 1119, 1146 (2004). ¶ 10 Zuluaga did not attempt to meet this burden. She seems to argue, however, that we should presume prejudice in this case because of the gravity of the trial court’s error. We acknowledge that other jurisdictions will presume prejudice when “the trial judge so limits the scope of voir dire that the procedure used for testing does not create any reasonable assurances that prejudice would be discovered if present.” United States v. Baldwin, 607 F.2d 1295, 1298 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Fietzer v. Ford Motor Co., 622 F.2d 281, 286 (7th Cir. 1980). This approach has been utilized where “the specific circumstances suggest a significant risk of prejudice and if examination or admonition of jurors fails to negate that inference.” United States v. Gillis, 942 F.2d 707, 709-10 (10th Cir. 1991); see, e.g., Babcock v. Nw. Mem’l Hosp., 767 S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tex. 1989) (voir dire regarding “lawsuit crisis”). ¶ 11 But we have found no authority suggesting Arizona has applied this rule, either in the civil or criminal context. See State v. Detrich, 188 Ariz. 57, 65, 932 P.2d 1328, 1336 (1997) (“[Sjpeculation is insufficient to meet defendant’s burden of proving that he was not provided a fair and impartial jury.”); cf. Richtmyre v. State, 175 Ariz. 489, 490-91, 858 P.2d 322, 323-24 (App. 1993) (motion for new trial based on juror bias requires affidavit from juror); Catchings, 154 Ariz. at 422, 743 P.2d at 402 (“party must show that a correct response would have resulted in a valid challenge for cause”). And Zuluaga does not assert that there were special circumstances surrounding the factual issues in this case to cause a specific concern regarding juror bias. See Gillis, 942 F.2d at 709-10. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court committed reversible error by limiting the scope of voir dire. See United Cal. Bank, 140 Ariz. at 295, 681 P.2d at 447. Curative Instruction ¶ 12 Zuluaga argues the trial court erred when it determined that a curative instruction was warranted to address her counsel’s reference, during opening statement, to the manner and timing of Bashas’ production of an incident report written shortly after the accident. She also argues the instruction given to the jury was “misleading.” Because the court “is invested with great discretion in the conduct and control of [a] trial,” we review its decision to use a curative instruction for an abuse of discretion. Higgins v. Ariz. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 90 Ariz. 55, 69, 365 P.2d 476, 486 (1961); see Miller v. Palmer, 143 Ariz. 84, 88, 691 P.2d 1112, 1116 (App. 1984). ¶ 13 The issue presented here arose from a discovery dispute. In September 2012, in response to Zuluaga’s discovery requests, Ba-shas’ asserted it had no “written or recorded statements” from the incident, and, although an “in-house incident report submitted to Bashas’ Risk Management Department” existed, the report was “privileged.” Zuluaga requested the legal and factual basis for the privilege the following month and, in January 2013, filed a motion to compel disclosure of the incident report. Bashas’ filed a response to the motion, and the court scheduled oral argument for March 2013. ¶ 14 Meanwhile, in February, Zuluaga deposed Bashas’ employee, Martinez, as well as the manager on duty during the incident, Antonio Guerra. Martinez and Guerra both asserted that Zuluaga had ran or walked into Martinez in the produce department, causing the accident. Guerra had not witnessed the incident, however, and he stated he did not recall ever speaking to Martinez about it. Instead, Guerra testified that he spoke to Zuluaga’s father and mother and that he generated the in-house report afterwards using the information provided by the parents. ¶ 15 After the initial depositions, and following oral argument on Zuluaga’s motion to compel, the trial court ordered Bashas’ to provide it with a copy of the incident report for an in camera inspection. In a subsequent order, the court noted that the report contained a statement by Martinez about the incident and that it was “unclear to the Court that th[e statement] should be protected by the work product privilege.” Before further oral argument on the issue, Bashas’ disclosed the entire document. In the report, Guerra wrote that Martinez had “called him to the floor area to explain what happened.” He also stated in the report that Martinez “was walking quickly to look for an item for a customer and walked into the young girl and she fell backwards to the floor,” When Zulua-ga deposed Guerra again after the disclosure, Guerra acknowledged that the report contradicted his earlier statements. ¶ 16 During opening statements, Zuluaga’s counsel highlighted the contradictory statements and the manner in which the incident report was produced: [A]fter they gave these under oath statements, something really important happened in this case. And what you’re going to hear is that after they gave these under oath statements, an incident report surfaced. And the incident report that was filled out the night that this happened is a very important piece of evidence that you’re going to be shown in this case. And we will ask you to compare what’s in the incident report that the Food City manager ... filled out the night that this happened versus what they’re going to tell you here in court. (Emphasis added.) Bashas’ did not object to this statement. ¶ 17 On the third day of trial, Zuluaga read the transcript of Guerra’s first deposition to the jury. Before she read the second deposition transcript, however, Bashas’ counsel raised the following objection: [M]y concern is that the jury has already been led through opening comments and opening statement to believe that [the report] suddenly surfaced, as if to say that it was withheld or perhaps lost or they’re being left to speculate as to why it’s not been produced.... But the delay related to mostly practice communication.... ... [W]e’ve been overruled on [whether it was privileged], obviously it’s been produced and ... admitted ..., and the jurors will be led to believe that it was withheld, perhaps, wrongfully, Bashas’ then requested an instruction to explain that “the basis for the delay had nothing to do with some wrongful actions by Bashas.” The court ordei'ed the parties to confer regarding a possible curative instruction, explaining that “when you say the report surfaced, it does make it sound as though it was lost or, worse yet, that it was withheld.” The court gave the following instruction at the close of Zuluaga’s case-in-chief on the fifth day of trial: Ladies and gentlemen, at this time I’m going to give you one special instruction .... Members of the Jury, we have received in evidence a copy of the [incident] report. In the opening statement reference was made to the timing of the production of this report. And that it was important since the report surfaced after ... Guerra had been deposed once, but before he was deposed a second time. You are instructed that the timing of the production of the ... report was the result of a ruling of the Court. You are not to draw any negative inference with respect to any party, as a result of the timing of the production of the ... report. ¶ 18 Opening statements “give [the jurors] a general picture of the facts and the situations, so that they will be able to understand the evidence.” State v. Burruell, 98 Ariz. 37, 40, 401 P.2d 733, 735-36 (1965), quoting State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285, 313 (1941). To that end, parties have “considerable latitude” in crafting their opening. Id., quoting Erwin, 120 P.2d at 313; see Ariz. R. Civ. P. 39(b). Of course, the trial court also has “discretion in controlling the conduct of a trial.” Rancho Pescado, Inc. v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 174, 188, 680 P.2d 1235, 1249 (App. 1984). And if misconduct occurs during opening statements, the court may sustain an objection, “admonish the jury to disregard improper remarks by counsel,” Higgins, 90 Ariz. at 69, 365 P.2d at 486, or, if appropriate, order a mistrial, Porterie v. Peters, 111 Ariz. 452, 458, 532 P.2d 514, 520 (1975). If the court elects to give a curative instruction, however, it must not “express[] ‘an opinion as to what the evidence proves,’ in a way that interferes “with the jury’s independent evaluation of that evidence.’ ” State v. Dann, 205 Ariz. 557, ¶¶ 49-51, 74 P.3d 231, 245 (2003), quoting State v. Rodriguez, 192 Ariz. 58, ¶ 29, 961 P.2d 1006, 1011 (1998); see Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 27. ¶ 19 In denying Zuluaga’s motion for a new trial on this issue, the trial court explained that it “was concerned that the use of the term ‘surfaced’ ... unfairly implied that [the report] had been lost or concealed by [Bashas’].” The record below and on appeal supports the court’s concern. When Ba-shas’ first raised the issue during trial, Zu-luaga responded that the timing of the report was “very important ... because the report contradicts many things that [Guerra] just testified to.” But Zuluaga further stated that “we don’t intend to [insinuate or argue] that there was misconduct with respect to the timing of the disclosure.” However, in the motion for a new trial and in her opening brief on appeal, Zuluaga took a far different position. In the motion for a new trial, she argued Bashas’ was “wrongfully withholding Martinez’s statement” and its claim of work product was “disingenuous.” And in her opening brief, Zuluaga argues she “would have been entitled to use much stronger language to describe the late disclosure of the [incident] report.” She maintains Bashas’ “concealed” the report and “engaged in a long course of deceptive conduct when it repeatedly misrepresented in disclosure and discovery that it did not possess an incident report or witness statements.” ¶ 20 But even though Zuluaga did not express this position during trial, the court interpreted counsel’s use of the term “surfaced” consistent with that position, and it apparently determined the jury could have as well. The court “had the unique opportunity to hear the [opening statement], observe its effect on the jury, and determine through [its] observations that the trial had been unfairly compromised.” Cal X-Tra v. W.V.S.V. Holdings, L.L.C., 229 Ariz. 377, ¶ 92, 276 P.3d 11, 39 (App. 2012). As this court pointed out in Cal X-Tra, “in contrast, we have only a cold record, which does not convey voice emphasis or inflection, or allow us to observe the jury and its reactions.” Id. We therefore cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by giving the curative instruction to address its concern that Zulua-ga’s “use of the term ‘surfaced’ with respect to the report unfairly implied that it had been lost or concealed by [Bashas’].” See Higgins, 90 Ariz. at 69, 365 P.2d at 486. ¶ 21 Zuluaga also argues the curative instruction violated Arizona’s constitutional prohibition against judges commenting on the evidence. Our constitution directs that “[j]udges shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, nor comment thereon, but shall declare the law.” Ariz. Const, art. VI, § 27. It is the jury’s burden alone to weigh the credibility of witnesses and draw inferences from the evidence presented at trial. See Estate of Reinen v. N. Ariz. Orthopedics, Ltd., 198 Ariz. 283, ¶ 12, 9 P.3d 314, 318 (2000); Dietz v. Waller, 141 Ariz. 107, 111, 685 P.2d 744, 748 (1984). Zuluaga maintains the trial court essentially instructed the jury not to consider the basis and significance of Guerra’s contradictory statements, which “were a result of the timing of the production of the [incident] report.” We disagree. ¶22 “To violate Arizona’s constitutional prohibition against commenting on the evidence, the court must express an opinion as to what the evidence proves” or “interfere with the jury’s independent evaluation of that evidence.” State v. Rodriguez, 192 Ariz. 58, ¶ 29, 961 P.2d 1006, 1011 (1998). Here, the trial court did neither. Zuluaga asserts correctly that she was entitled to inform the jury that Guerra had given two contradictory statements about the incident—one under oath at his deposition and the other in the incident report prepared within days of the accident. But, as the court implicitly concluded, Zuluaga was not entitled to imply unfairly that Bashas’ had concealed the existence of the report. As we stated above, the curative instruction addressed what the court perceived as Zuluaga’s improper characterization of how the report ultimately was produced. The instruction did not express an opinion about Guerra’s contradictory statements or interfere with the jury’s ability to evaluate that evidence independently. See id. Disposition ¶ 23 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment in favor of Bashas’. . Because the pertinent rule of civil procedure uses language that is substantially similar to that found in the corresponding criminal rule, we rely in part on cases reviewing the scope of voir dire in the criminal context. Compare Ariz. R. Civ. P. 47(b)(3) (court "shall permit that party a reasonable time to conduct a further oral examination of the prospective jurors” and "may impose reasonable limitations with respect to questions allowed during a party's examination of the prospective jurors”), (d) (questioning "may extend to any legitimate inquiry which might disclose a baste for exercise of a peremptory challenge”), with Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.5(d) (court "shall permit that party a reasonable time to conduct a further oral examination of the prospective jurors” and "may impose reasonable limitations with respect to questions allowed during a party’s examination of the prospective jurors, giving due regard to the purpose of such examination”), (e) (examination "limited to inquiries directed to bases for challenge for cause or to information to enable the parties to exercise intelligently their peremptory challenges”). . Bashas' argues Zuluaga "abandoned]” this issue by failing to "request further questioning” and by passing the panel at the end of voir dire. Generally, parties are not permitted to raise a post-hoc challenge based on juror bias if they failed to thoroughly question the jurors during voir dire. See Brooks v. Zahn, 170 Ariz. 545, 550, 826 P.2d 1171, 1176 (App. 1991). But "an objection made during voir dire is sufficient to preserve [a challenge to the scope of voir dire], and the error is not waived simply by agreeing to pass the panel.” State v. Shone, 190 Ariz. 113, 116, 945 P.2d 834, 837 (App. 1997). Therefore, Zuluaga properly preserved the issue here. . The Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure were revised effective January 1, 2017. See Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order No. R-16-0010 (Sept. 2, 2016). We cite the version of the rules in effect at the time of trial. . Zuluaga also asserts that in Evans our supreme court reversed a judgment because ”[t]he line of interrogation objected to might well have produced answers that would have induced counsel to exercise his rights of peremptory challenge.” 82 Ariz. at 46, 308 P.2d at 249. But Zuluaga misconstrues the procedural posture of that case. In Evans, the trial court permitted the line of questioning, and our supreme court affirmed the lower court's ruling when challenged on appeal. Id. . The trial court’s denial of Zuluaga's motion for a new trial incorrectly states the instruction was given “to the juiy as part of the final instructions.” . Bashas’ asserts incorrectly that this new argument was first raised in Zuluaga’s opening brief. In any event, we generally will not consider an argument raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial, Conant v. Whitney, 190 Ariz. 290, 293, 947 P.2d 864, 867 (App. 1997), or on appeal, Trantor v. Fredrikson, 179 Ariz. 299, 300, 878 P.2d 657, 658 (1994), because the trial court and opposing counsel were not afforded an opportunity to address them below. But see Parra v. Cont'l Tire N. Am., Inc., 222 Ariz. 212, n.2, 213 P.3d 361, 363 n.2 (App. 2009) (considering new arguments in motion for new trial because plaintiffs appealed from denial of new trial motion). .We refer to Zuluaga’s arguments only because they appear to validate the trial court’s concern that Zuluaga had used the term "surfaced” to "unfairly impl[y]” that Bashas’ wrongfully withheld the incident report. But as Bashas’ points out, Zuluaga never sought, much less obtained, a court order sanctioning Bashas' concerning the production of the report. We therefore do not otherwise address the merits of the arguments.

OPINION SWANN, Judge: ¶ 1 This special action requires us to decide the constitutionality of A.R.S. § 13-3961(A)(4) and the corresponding portion of Ariz. Const, art. II, § 22(A), which provide that a person in custody must be denied bail if he or she is charged with molestation of a child under the age of fifteen and the proof is evident or the presumption great that he or she is guilty. ¶ 2 The petitioner, Thomas Jonathan Chantry, is being held without bail under § 18-3961(A)(4). He seeks special-action relief from the superior court’s refusal to consider his entitlement to bail under the standard prescribed by § 13-3961(D), which imposes a higher burden on the state. We accepted jurisdiction by earlier order because the issue is one of first impression and statewide importance, and Chantry has no adequate remedy by appeal. Inzunza-Ortega v. Superior Court (State), 192 Ariz. 558, 560, ¶ 7, 968 P.2d 631 (App. 1998); Costa v. Mackey, 227 Ariz. 565, 569, ¶ 6, 261 P.3d 449 (App. 2011). ¶ 3 The supreme court recently held, in Simpson v. Miller (“Simpson II”), that § 13-3961(A)(3) and the corresponding portion of Ariz. Const. art. II, § 22(A), are facially unconstitutional. 241 Ariz. 341, 349, ¶ 31, 387 P.3d 1270 (2017). Section 13-3961(A)(3) is identical to § 13-3961(A)(4) in all respects except that the former statute pertains to those charged with sexual conduct with a person under the age of fifteen, rather than molestation of a person under the age of fifteen. Molestation of a person under the age of fifteen is a lesser-included offense of sexual conduct with a person under the age of fifteen. State v. Ortega, 220 Ariz. 320, 328, ¶¶ 24-25, 206 P.3d 769 (App. 2008). Both the greater and the lesser offense “can be committed by a person of any age, and may be consensual.” Simpson v. Miller, 241 Ariz. at 349, ¶ 27, 387 P.3d 1270. Because Simpson II holds that bail cannot be denied under the standard prescribed by § 13-3961(A) for the greater offense, the statute is a fortiori invalid with respect to the lesser offense, In view of Simpson II, we must hold that § 13-3961(A)(4) and the corresponding portion of Ariz. Const. art. II, § 22(A), are facially unconstitutional. ¶ 4 Consistent with Simpson II, Chantry may be held without bail under § 13-396RD), which provides that a person charged with a felony may be held without bail if, after a hearing, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that the person committed the offense, that the person poses a substantial danger to another person or the community or engaged in conduct constituting a violent offense, and that no condition or combination of conditions of release may be imposed that will reasonably assure the safety of the other person or the community. 241 Ariz, at 349-61, ¶¶ 29, 31,387 P,3d 1270. ¶ 6 Though the state contends that the court already made the requisite findings, our review of the record reveals otherwise. The court, in denying Chantry’s motion for reconsideration of the denial of his request for a hearing under Simpson II, did indicate at one point that the state had proved dangerousness in the initial bail hearing by clear and convincing evidence. But the court then clarified that dangerousness was “still subject to litigation” because it “wasn’t on the table at th[e] time” of the initial healing and Chantry therefore might have additional evidence to present. Further, the court stated that it had no evidence and therefore made no finding regarding whether release conditions could reasonably assure the safety of others and the community. ¶ 6 For the foregoing reasons, we grant relief. Chantry cannot be held without bail absent compliance with the procedures and the entry of the findings contemplated by § 1B-8981(D).

OPINION JONES, Judge: ¶ 1 In 1996, Congress enacted two federal statutes intended to restrict welfare and public benefits for aliens. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) defines which aliens qualify for eligibility to receive state and local public benefits. Although PRWORA also generally allows the states to define alien eligibility for public benefits, part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) does not allow any state to provide non-qualified aliens with postsecond-ary education benefits based upon their residence within the state. Ten years later, Arizona voters passed Proposition 300 (Prop 300) which, in relevant part, incorporates IIRIRA’s prohibition on providing the quintessential residence-based, postsecondary education benefit—in-state tuition—to non-qualified aliens. ¶ 2 In 2012, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through a lawful exercise of its prosecutorial discretion, elected to defer deportation of unauthorized aliens who entered the country as children, a departmental policy otherwise known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). Congress permits DHS to issue employment authorization documents (EADs) to DACA recipients but has not specified whether DACA recipients qualify for in-state tuition or other state and local public benefits. Thereafter, the Maricopa County Community College District (MCCCD) began accepting EADs from DACA recipients as evidence that they qualified for residence-based, in-state tuition benefits. The Arizona Attorney General (AAG) objected, but the trial court upheld MCCCD’s actions in a subsequent declaratory action, ¶ 3 The AAG now appeals the trial court’s orders denying its motion for judgment on the pleadings and granting summary judgment in favor of MCCCD and partial summary judgment in favor of Abel Badillo and Bibiana Vazquez (the Students). In reconciling federal and Arizona law, we hold DACA recipients are not eligible to receive in-state tuition benefits and therefore reverse the court’s orders and remand with instructions. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 4 In June 2012, DHS initiated the DACA policy, which allowed DHS to defer the removal of certain unauthorized aliens and redirect immigration enforcement resources away from those individuals who lacked unlawful intent in entering the United States and have since demonstrated productive use of their time. See generally Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, DHS, to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Patrol, Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., and John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enft (Jun. 15, 2012), https://www.dhs. gov/xlibrary/assets/sl-exercising-prosecutorial-diseretion-individuals-who-eame-to-us-as-ehildren.pdf (N apolitano Memo). DACA originally applied to unauthorized aliens who: (1) came to the United States under the age of sixteen; (2) had continuously resided in the United States for at least five years preceding DACA’s institution; (3) were not older than thirty before June 2012; (4) were currently in school, had graduated from high school or received a GED, or had been honorably discharged from the U.S. military; and (6) had not been convicted of a felony or significant or multiple misdemeanors. Id. Individuals qualifying for deferment under DACA are required to apply for an EAD from the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (US-CIS). See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.l2(c)(14). ¶ 5 Shortly after the implementation of DACA, MCCCD began accepting EADs from DACA recipients as evidence of residency for purposes of receiving in-state tuition benefits. In 2013, the AAG filed a declaratory action, seeking a determination that MCCCD’s policy violates Atizona law and an injunction prohibiting MCCCD from allowing DACA recipients to obtain subsidized tuition rates. The Students, two DACA recipients attending MCCCD colleges and benefiting from in-state tuition benefits, successfully intervened and asserted constitutional defenses in addition to MCCCD’s statutory defenses. ¶ 6 Both MCCCD and the Students filed motions for summary judgment. After briefing and oral argument, the trial court concluded that, under the relevant federal and state law, DACA recipients are “lawfully present” and therefore eligible for in-state tuition benefits. Because it granted Appel-lees’ motions on statutory grounds, the court did not decide the constitutional claims presented in the Students’ motion. The AAG timely appealed. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1). DISCUSSION 1. The AAG’s Authority to Bring Suit ¶ 7 As an initial matter, MCCCD argues the trial court’s orders must be affirmed because the AAG had neither statutory nor constitutional authority to initiate its suit. Whether a party has standing to sue presents a question of law we review de novo. Pawn 1st, L.L.C. v. City of Phx., 231 Ariz. 309, 311, ¶ 11, 294 P.3d 147, 148 (App. 2013) (citing Ctr. Bay Gardens, L.L.C. v. City of Tempe City Council, 214 Ariz. 353, 356, ¶ 15, 153 P.3d 374, 377 (App. 2007)). ¶ 8 The AAG’s powers derive solely from the Arizona Constitution or Arizona statutes. State ex rel. Woods v. Block, 189 Ariz. 269, 272, 942 P.2d 428, 431 (1997) (quoting Fund Manager, Pub. Safety Pers. Ret. Sys. v. Corbin, 161 Ariz. 348, 354, 778 P.2d 1244, 1300 (App. 1988), and citing Ariz. State Land Dep’t v. McFate, 87 Ariz. 139, 142, 348 P.2d 912 (1960)). In asserting its authority to pursue this litigation, the AAG relies upon A.R.S. § 41-193(A)(2), which states “[a]t the direction of the governor or when deemed necessary by the attorney general, [the AAG shall] prosecute and defend any proceeding in a state court ... in which the state or an officer thereof is a party or has an interest.” This section “does not permit the Attorney General, in the absence of specific statutory power, to initiate an original proceeding.” McFate, 87 Ariz. at 140, 146, 348 P.2d 912. ¶ 9 We find no law, however, prohibiting the chief executive of Arizona from directing a lesser executive officer to enforce a statute. Indeed, Arizona’s governor is tasked with supervising the official conduct of all State officers and “is obligated and empowered to protect the interests of the people and the State by taking care that the laws are faithfully executed.” Yes on Prop 200 v. Napolitano, 215 Ariz. 458, 470, ¶ 35, 160 P.3d 1216, 1228 (App. 2007) (quoting McFate, 87 Ariz. at 148, 348 P.2d 912); see also Ariz. Const. art. 5, § 4; A.R.S. § 41-101(A)(1). Therefore, “the governor’s order is the highest executive voice within this state and may not be ignored by a lesser officer of the executive branch.” Id. (quoting State v. Hooker, 128 Ariz. 479, 481, 626 P.2d 1111, 1113 (App. 1981)). ¶ 10 Here, after the AAG filed this action, then-Governor Jan Brewer directed the AAG to take “all legal actions” to enforce the laws regarding aliens’ eligibility for in-state tuition benefits, which she interpreted as proscribing students without lawful immigration status from receiving in-state tuition benefits or other financial aid, and to continue this litigation to its conclusion. The Governor had an interest in the outcome because, by virtue of her position, she was obligated to protect the public’s interest by ensuring the laws were faithfully executed. With that interest in mind, the Governor directed the AAG to “prosecute” the current proceeding within the meaning of AR.S. § 41-193(A)(2). ¶ 11 Contrary to MCCCD’s contention, there is no evidence the Governor used the take-care clause of the Arizona Constitution, see Adz. Const, art. 5, § 4 (“The governor ... shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”), to create statutory standing for the AAG, thereby making a legislative decision in violation of her executive authority, see Litchfield Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 79 v. Babbitt, 125 Adz. 215, 220, 608 P.2d 792, 797 (App. 1980) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-88, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952)). Pursuant to her constitutional and statutory authority as chief executive, the Governor ordered the AAG to serve as her proxy in enforcing Arizona’s laws. The AAG, therefore, had a legal right, derived from the Governor’s command, to seek a judicial determination that MCCCD acted unlawfully. We conclude the AAG had standing to bring the underlying declaratory and injunctive actions against MCCCD. II. DACA Recipients’ Eligibility for InState Tuition ¶ 12 The AAG argues the trial court erred in interpreting state and federal law in a manner that permits DACA recipients to qualify for in-state tuition benefits. We review the interpretation and application of statutes de novo. See John Munic Enters., Inc. v. Laos, 235 Ariz. 12, 15, ¶ 5, 326 P.3d 279, 282 (App. 2014) (citing First Credit Union v. Courtney, 233 Ariz. 105, 107, ¶ 9, 309 P.3d 929, 931 (App. 2013)). A. PRWORA. IIRIRA and Prop 300: Defining Aien Eligibility for Welfare and Public Benefits ¶ 13 A brief examination of the history and content of the relevant federal and state statutes is instructive. ¶ 14 In 1996, Congress passed PRWORA, Pub. L. No. 104-193, tit. IV, §§ 400-51, 110 Stat. 2106, 2260-77 (1996) (partially codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601 to -1646), and IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 605,110 Stat. 3009, 3681 (1996) (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1623). PRWORA was generally enacted “to remove the incentive for illegal immigration provided by the availability of public benefits,” 8 U.S.C. § 1601(6), and specifically delineates which aliens are eligible for state and local public benefits, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1621(a), 1641(b)-(c). In relevant part, PRWORA defines state and local public benefits as: [A]ny retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing, postsecond-ary education, food assistance, unemployment benefit, or any other similar benefit for which payments or assistance are provided to an individual ... by an agency of a State or local government or by appropriated funds of a State or local government. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(e)(1)(B). ¶ 16 Under PRWORA, unless an alien is “(1) a qualified alien ,.., (2) a nonimmigrant ..., or (3) an alien who is paroled into the United States” for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit, he or she is not eligible for state or local public benefits, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1621(a), 1641(b). “Qualified aliens” are statutorily defined to include: (1) aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence; (2) aliens granted asylum; (3) refugees; (4) aliens whose deportations are withheld because removal would threaten the alien’s life or freedom; (5) certain Cuban and Haitian entrants; (6) certain battered aliens, or their spouses or children; and (7) certain victims of sex trafficking. 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b)-(c). For ease of reference, we refer to these groups, collectively, as qualified aliens. We likewise refer to aliens who do not fit within these specifically defined groups as non-qualified aliens. ¶ 16 Although the individual states retain the authority under PRWORA to enact a statute that would affirmatively provide “an alien who is not lawfully present” eligibility for state and local public benefits “for which such alien would otherwise be ineligible under [8 U.S.C. § 1621(a)],” 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d), this general grant of authority is limited by IIRIRA, which provides: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an alien who is not lawfully present in the United States shall not be eligible on the basis of residence within a State (or a political subdivision) for any postsecondary education benefit unless a citizen or national of the United States is eligible for such a benefit (in no less an amount, duration, and scope) without regard to whether the citizen or national is such a resident. 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a). IIRIRA has been interpreted as applying to in-state tuition benefits. See Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 50 Cal.4th 1277, 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 359, 241 P.3d 855, 865 (2010) (“[Section 1623(a) ] provides that illegal aliens are not eligible for in-state tuition rates at public institutions of higher education”) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 240 (1996) (Conf. Rep.)); see generally Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2007) (presuming in-state tuition is a benefit governed by IIRIRA but concluding the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue a claim). ¶ 17 Ten years after PRWORA and IIRI-RA were enacted, Arizona voters approved Prop 300 to ostensibly prohibit unauthorized aliens from receiving in-state tuition or educational financial aid derived from publicly appropriated funds. See generally Public Program Eligibility, 2006 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Sen. Cone. Res. 1031 (2d Reg. Sess.). Thus, pursuant to A.R.S. § 15—1803(B): In accordance with [IIRIRA], a person who [i]s not a citizen or legal resident of the United States or who is without lawful immigration status is not entitled to classification as an in-state student pursuant to [A.R.S.] § 16-1802 or entitled to classification as a county resident pursuant to [A.R.S.] § 15-1802.01. Section 16-1825(A) similarly prohibits a student seeking postsecondary education in Arizona “who is not a citizen of the United States [or] is without lawful immigration status” from receiving “tuition waivers, fee waivers, grants, scholarship assistance, financial aid, tuition assistance or any other type of financial assistance that is subsidized or paid in whole or in part with state monies.” Section 15-1825(B) further requires each community college and university to report the total number of students not entitled to educational financial aid because they are “not lawfully present.” ¶ 18 In sum: (1) PRWORA grants eligibility for state and local public benefits only to “qualified” aliens who are “lawfully present,” but separately permits the states, individually, to extend state and local public benefits to non-qualified aliens; (2) IIRIRA restricts the states’ authority to extend a specific public benefit—residence-based, in-state tuition—to aliens “not lawfully present”; and (3) Arizona statutes, adopted at the direction of Arizona voters, affirmatively deny in-state tuition benefits to persons “without lawful immigration status.” Whether DACA recipients are eligible for in-state tuition benefits turns on whether they are “lawfully present” within the meaning of the above statutes addressing eligibility for state and local benefits. B. Defining “Lawful Presence” 1. A Coherent Statutory Scheme ¶ 19 MCCCD first argues that IIR-IRA is the more specific statute relative to in-state tuition and thus controls over PRWORA’s general provisions for state and local public benefits. MCCCD therefore contends we should disregard any discussion defining “not lawfully present” found in PRWORA. Basic principles of statutory interpretation instruct that “specific statutes control over general statutes,” and, “when a general and a specific statute conflict, we treat the specific statute as an exception to the general.” Mercy Healthcare Ariz., Inc. v. AHCCCS, 181 Ariz. 95, 100, 887 P.2d 625, 630 (App. 1994) (citing City of Phx. v. Superior Court (Derickson), 139 Ariz. 175, 178, 677 P.2d 1283, 1286 (1984), and Kearney v. Mid-Century Ins., 22 Ariz.App. 190, 192, 526 P.2d 169 (1974)). But we should only disregard PRWORA, as MCCCD asks us to do, if it truly conflicts with IIRIRA or the two cannot in any way be read together. See Berndt v. Ariz. Dep’t of Corr., 238 Ariz. 524, 528, ¶ 11, 363 P.3d 141, 145 (App. 2015) (citing Baker v. Gardner, 160 Ariz. 98, 101, 770 P.2d 766, 769 (1988)). We do not find that to be the case here, especially given our duty “to harmonize, whenever possible, related statutory and rule provisions.” Metzler v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 235 Ariz. 141, 145, ¶ 13, 329 P.3d 1043, 1047 (2014) (citing State v. Hansen, 215 Ariz. 287, 289, ¶7, 160 P.3d 166, 168 (2007)). ¶ 20 IIRIRA can be construed within the entire statutory scheme as a restriction on PRWORA’s general decree authorizing states to enact statutes granting state or local public benefits to non-qualified aliens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d). First, the parties here do not dispute that the restriction within IIRIRA applies to in-state tuition benefits. See supra ¶16. And because in-state tuition is financial assistance provided by a postsec-ondary educational institution, such as a community college district or other local government agency, see Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining a “local agency” as “[a] political subdivision of a state,” including “counties, cities, school districts, etc.”); see also McClanahan v. Cochise Coll., 25 Ariz. App. 13, 17, 540 P.2d 744 (1975) (“We hold that a community college district is a political subdivision of the state.”), in-state tuition benefits fit within PRWORA’s definition of a state or local public benefit, see supra ¶14; see also Martinez, 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 359, 241 P.3d at 866 (analyzing, with regal’d to PRWORA, a state statute exempting certain unauthorized aliens from paying out-of-state tuition); Ruiz v. Robinson, 892 F.Supp.2d 1321, 1330 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (construing PRWORA as encompassing IIRIRA). ¶ 21 This construction is consistent with IIRIRA’s placement within the general statutory scheme outlining eligibility for state and local public benefits. “When statutes relate to the same subject matter, the later enactment, in the absence of any express repeal or amendment therein, is held to have been enacted in accord with the legislative policy embodied in [t]he earlier statute.” Desert Waters, Inc. v. Superior Court, 91 Ariz. 163, 171, 370 P.2d 652 (1962) (citing Frazier v. Terrill, 65 Ariz. 131, 134, 175 P.2d 438 (1947), and then United States v. Arizona, 295 U.S. 174, 191, 55 S.Ct. 666, 79 L.Ed. 1371 (1935)), MCCCD has not identified any divergent legislative policy that would justify reading IIRIRA outside of the general context of PRWORA. To the contrary, both IIRIRA and PRWORA reflect a general policy to encourage aliens to be self-reliant and reduce their burden on the public benefits system in accordance with national immigration policy. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1601. ¶ 22 By its subsequent enactment of IIRI-RA, Congress was clarifying that PRWORA’s eligibility provisions applied to in-state tuition benefits, while at the same time removing residence-based, in-state tuition from the class of public benefits a state may offer, under PRWORA, to non-qualified or unlawfully present aliens. Because we reject MCCCD’s argument that the provisions of IIRIRA supplant the provisions of PRWORA, we examine the meaning of “lawfully present” within the statutory scheme as a whole. 2. Chevron Step 1: Congress Has Defined “Lawfully Present” for Purposes of Alien Eligibility for State and Local Public Benefits. ¶ 23 Because this case involves DHS’s policy regarding statutes it administers, we must first ask “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise questions at issue.” See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)). If Congress has done so, we will give effect to Congressional intent and do not consider the agency’s interpretation. Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778). “In determining whether Congress has specifically addressed the question at issue, a reviewing court should not confine itself to examining a particular statutory provision in isolation” because the meaning of certain phrases “may only become evident when plaeed in context.” Id. (citing Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118, 115 S.Ct. 552, 130 L.Ed.2d 462 (1994)). ¶24 The phrase “lawfully present” is only used twice within the statutory subchapter involving state and local public benefits and in-state tuition. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1621(d), 1623(a). “A term appearing in several places in a statutory text is generally read the same way each time it appears.” Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141—43, 114 S.Ct. 655, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994) (construing the term “willful” as it appears in different sections of the same subchapter) (citing Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 479, 112 S.Ct. 2589, 120 L.Ed.2d 379 (1992)). Although 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a), within IIRIRA, provides little guidance as to the meaning of the phrase, 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d), within PRWORA, equates aliens who are “not lawfully present” with non-qualified aliens—or those ineligible for benefits under 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a). See supra ¶¶15-16, Reading the statutes together, we conclude that only qualified aliens are “lawfully present” for purposes of receiving state and local public benefits, ¶25 Qualified aliens include alien-beneficiaries of some forms of discretionary and deferred-action relief. See supra ¶15. How ever, not all persons benefitting from discretionary and deferred-action relief are qualified aliens, as defined within 8 U.S.C. §§ 1621 and 1641; rather, discretionary and deferred-action relief recipients who are also defined as qualified aliens are emblematic of statutorily recognized groups who have suffered or will imminently suffer from violence or the effects of an emergency situation. Nor are the beneficiaries of discretionary and deferred-action relief necessarily “lawfully present.” See Deferred Action Op., 38 Op. O.L.C. at 20 (describing deferred-action programs as “the toleration of an alien’s continued unlawful presence”). ¶ 26 DACA recipients have not been specifically recognized by legislative enactment and do not share these same acute humanitarian concerns. See id. at 18 n.8 (noting DACA is “predicated on humanitarian concerns ... less particularized and acute” than those underlying other deferred-action programs). They are more aptly described as beneficiaries of an executive branch policy designed to forego deportation of those who lacked unlawful intent in entering the country and have, since their arrival, led productive lives. However, even accepting DACA recipients’ positive societal attributes, Congress has not defined them, or deferred-action recipients generally, as “qualified aliens” who are “lawfully present” and thereby eligible to receive in-state tuition benefits. ¶27 Appellees nonetheless urge us to adopt a definition of “lawfully present” buried within an unrelated immigration statute addressing alien eligibility to receive visas, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii). This section states: Por purposes of this paragraph, an alien is deemed to be unlawfully present in the United States if the alien is present in the United States after the expiration of the period of stay authorized by the [Secretary of DHS] or is present in the United States without being admitted or paroled. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii). By its own terms, this definition is specifically limited to the phrase “unlawfully present” as used within paragraph (9). Id.; see also Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 60-62, 125 S.Ct. 460, 160 L.Ed.2d 389 (2004) (explaining the hierarchical scheme used by Congress to subdivide statutory sections). And paragraph (9) does not address in any manner an alien’s eligibility for state and local public benefits, providing only that aliens who have previously been removed from the United States, after defined periods of unlawful presence, are ineligible to gain reentry for a certain period. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9); see also Estrada v. Becker, 1:16-CV-3310-TWT, 2017 WL 2062078, at *6 (N.D. Ga. May 15, 2017) (holding the “temporary reprieve from prosecution” afforded DACA recipients “does not change a recipient’s status and make them eligible for otherwise unavailable benefits”) (citing Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 167 (5th Cir. 2015), and Ga. Latino All. for Human Rights v. Governor, 691 F.3d 1250, 1258 n.2 (11th Cir. 2012)). The definition contained within 8 U.S.C, § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii) was proffered for a narrowly defined immigration purpose and does not render a DACA recipient lawfully present for all puiposes that might arise throughout the entirety of the immigration statutes, particularly where a meaningful and consistent definition is clear when the relevant provisions are read as a whole. ¶ 28 Moreover, to apply a blanket definition to the phrase “lawfully present” in disparate sections of a body of law as complex and extensive as immigration law would give “unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.” Yates v. United States, — U.S.-, 135 S.Ct. 1074, 1085, 191 L.Ed.2d 64 (2015) (applying “the principle of noscitur a soci-is—a word is known by the company it keeps—to ‘avoid ascribing to one word a meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying words’ ”) (quoting Gustafson v. Attoyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575, 115 S.Ct. 1061, 131 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995), and citing United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 294, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008)). This is particularly true where Congress has expressly granted the states authority to determine alien eligibility for state and local public benefits. Congress would not simultaneously delegate this policy decision to an agency, such as DHS, where it would guarantee unremitting conflict between the two. See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 133, 120 S.Ct. 1291 (“[W]e must be guided to a degree by common sense as to the manner in which Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of such economic and political magnitude to an administrative agency.”) (citing Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231, 114 S.Ct. 2223, 129 L.Ed.2d 182 (1994)); see also Estrada, 2017 WL 2062078 at *5 (citing Texas, 809 F.3d at 183). ¶ 29 Furthermore, two of the most recent Congressional acts designed to repeal IIRI-RA and institute a pathway to legal permanent resident status for certain unauthorized student-aliens have failed to pass. See Andorra Bruno, Cong. Research Serv., RL33863, Unauthorized Alien Students: Issues and “DREAM Act” Legislation 5-8 (2012); Stephen L. Nelson, Jennifer L. Robinson & Anna M. Bergevin, Administrative DREAM Acts and Piecemeal Policymaking: Examining State Higher Education Governing Board Policies Regarding Du-State Tuition for Undocumented Immigrant Students, 28 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 555, 566-68 (2014). This provides further evidence of a lack of Congressional intent to extend postsecondary education benefits beyond those defined as qualified aliens within 8 U.S.C. §§ 1621(a) and 1641(b)-(c). See Texas, 809 F.3d at 185 (citation omitted). 3. DHS Has Avoided Defining “Lawfully Present” for the Purpose of Determining Eligibility for State and Local Public Benefits. ¶ 30 Congress has directly addressed the issue of alien eligibility for state and local public benefits, and DHS has not encroached upon that Congressional intent through its enunciation of the DACA policy. Congress charged DHS, at the time of its creation, with the administration and enforcement of all laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1). Within that enforcement authority, DHS has near-absolute prosecutorial discretion to enforce immigration law, because it is unable to “act against each technical violation” and must be free to prioritize the policy goals upon which the agency will spend its limited resources. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985) (creating a general presumption of unreviewability of an agency’s refusal to take enforcement action) (citations omitted). Indeed, “[a] principal feature of the removal system” is DHS’s broad discretion with regard to admissibility and removal procedures set forth by Congress. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 394, 132 S.Ct. 2492. ¶ 31 DHS is not free, however, “to disregard legislative direction in the statutory scheme that the agency administers.” Heckler, 470 U.S. at 833, 105 S.Ct. 1649. Congress has granted DHS some discretion to define which aliens may physically remain within the country, but, of those aliens authorized to stay, Congress has exclusively and particularly delineated which of them may receive specific public benefits. And Congress, not DHS, retains the right to define the path to citizenship and other recognized forms of immigration status. See Brewer, 855 F.3d at 971; see also infra ¶¶54-55. In the context of deferred-action policies, DHS has recognized this limitation for over a decade. See Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm’r, INS at 3 (Nov. 17, 2000) (“Prosecu-torial discretion does not apply to affirmative acts of approval, or grants of benefits, under a statute or other applicable law that provides requirements for determining when the approval should be given.”); Napolitano Memo at 3 (noting an exercise of prosecutorial discretion “confers no substantive right, immigration status or pathway to citizenship. Only the Congress, acting through its legislative authority, can confer these rights.”); Deferred Action Op., 38 Op. O.L.C. at 2; USCIS Manual ch. 40.9.2(b)(3)(J) (“Deferred action is, in no way, an entitlement, and does not make the alien’s status lawful.”). ¶32 DHS has similarly acknowledged its limited ability to deem an alien “lawfully present” for specific immigration purposes. DHS may exercise its discretion to forego removal of a DACA recipient, but the effect is only to suspend the alien’s unlawful presence for purposes of future admissibility. See Deferred Action Op., 38 Op. O.L.C. at 2; see also Estrada, 2017 WL 2062078 at *6. US-CIS distinguishes between “unlawful status” and “unlawful presence” for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B), advising: [T]here are situations in which an alien who is present in an unlawful status nevertheless does not accrue unlawful presence. As a matter of prosecutorial discretion, DHS may permit an alien who is present in the United States unlawfully, but who has pending an application that stops the accrual of unlawful presence, to remain in the United States while that application is pending. In this sense, the alien’s remaining can be said to be “authorized.” However, the fact that the alien does not accrue unlawful presence does not mean that the alien’s presence in the United States is actually lawful. USCIS Manual ch. 40.9.2(a)(2) (emphasis added). ¶33 Indeed, it would be incongruous to communicate to DACA recipients that they are permitted to remain in the country and later penalize them for that same period of residency if they attempted to admit themselves lawfully. DHS would similarly not be able to effectively exercise its prosecutorial discretion had Congress not also authorized it to grant work authorization via EADs; otherwise, aliens granted deferred action as low enforcement priorities would be forced to support themselves through illegal means, thereby defeating the reason DHS chose to exercise its prosecutorial discretion in the first place. ¶ 34 Still, there is a fundamental distinction between basic benefits—such as the abilities to work, drive, or attend public school— afforded to those physically present in the United States for the sake of social order, and those secondary benefits commensurate with the assistance afforded citizens, legal permanent residents, or certain alien-victims of acute humanitarian concerns. PRWORA itself makes this distinction, prohibiting states from restricting any alien’s access to public benefits related to emergency and medical assistance. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(b). The ability to obtain financial assistance for post-secondary education, however, is not synonymous with emergency assistance; nor does access to postsecondary education impose an obligation upon taxpayers to offset the cost. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78-79, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-22, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982). ¶ 35 In sum, Congress has specified those aliens who are “lawfully present” such that they are eligible to receive in-state tuition and other state and local public benefits. These “qualified aliens” include some deferred action and other discretionary relief recipients whom Congress has statutorily authorized based upon acute humanitarian concerns. DACA recipients are not defined as “qualified aliens.” To effectively exercise its prosecutorial discretion, DHS is authorized to deem classes of aliens “lawfully present” for specifically articulated purposes, such as admissibility and work authorization, that do not include eligibility for state and local public benefits, with determinations as to those benefits being left to the individual states. Accordingly, we conclude that DACA recipients are not automatically eligible for in-state tuition benefits, but rather must look to Arizona’s statutory provisions regarding alien eligibility for in-state tuition benefits. III. Preemption and Equal Protection ¶ 36 The Students argue the AAG’s refusal to treat DACA recipients as “lawfully present” for in-state tuition either violates equal protection or is preempted. We review statutory and constitutional issues de novo. Pedersen v. Bennett, 230 Ariz. 556, 558, ¶ 6, 288 P.3d 760, 762 (2012) (citing Ross v. Bennett, 228 Ariz. 174, 176, ¶ 6, 265 P.3d 356, 358 (2011)). A. Preemption of A.R.S. §§ 15-1803 & - 1825 ¶ 37 The Students argue Arizona’s statutes codifying Prop 300 are preempted by federal law. But in fact, Congress has expressly declined to preempt states’ regulation of alien eligibility for state and local public benefits. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1621(d), 1622; Martinez, 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 359, 241 P.3d at 867, We thus consider whether IIRI-RA’s “[limitation on eligibility for preferential treatment of aliens not lawfully present on [the] basis of residence for higher education benefits,” 8 U.S.C. § 1623, preempts Arizona’s statutes. ¶ 38 Juxtaposed against their federal counterparts, the Arizona statutes relevant in this case—A.R.S. §§ 15-1803 and -1825—can only be preempted if they provide aliens who are “not lawfully present”—those who are non-qualified—with residence-based, postsec-ondary education benefits. The only two questions that remain, therefore, are: (1) whether Arizona law, pursuant to PRWORA, intended to provide postsecondary education benefits to aliens who are not Congressionally defined as qualified or “lawfully present”; and, if so, (2) whether Arizona law, pursuant to IIRIRA, avoids providing such aliens with residence-based, in-state tuition. ¶ 39 Because AR.S. §§ 15-1803 and -1825 both derive from Prop 300, our primary purpose in statutory interpretation is to effectuate the intent of the state’s electorate that adopted it. Calik v. Kongable, 195 Ariz. 496, 498, ¶ 10, 990 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1999) (quoting Jett v. City of Tucson, 180 Ariz. 115, 119, 882 P.2d 426, 430 (1994)). “The best indicator of that intent is the statute’s plain language, and, if that language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it as written.” State v. Liwski, 238 Ariz. 184, 186, ¶ 5, 358 P.3d 605, 607 (App. 2015) (citing State v. Matlock, 237 Ariz. 331, 334, ¶ 10, 350 P.3d 835, 838 (App. 2015)). If ambiguity exists, however, “we attempt to determine legislative intent ... considering] ‘the statute’s context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose.’ ” Calik, 195 Ariz. at 500, ¶ 16, 990 P.2d 1055 (quoting Aros v. Beneficial Ariz., Inc., 194 Ariz. 62, 66, 977 P.2d 784, 788 (1999)). Furthermore, the publicity pamphlet for, and stated purpose of, an initiative such as Prop 300 are indicative of legislative intent. Id. ¶40 Together, A.R.S. §§ 15-1803 and - 1825 describe four groups that are eligible to receive in-state tuition: (1) citizens; (2) “legal resident[s]”; (3) those with “lawful immigration status”; and (4) those “lawfully present.” The trial court correctly noted the two statutes “use the four terms interchangeably and without meaningful difference,” although it is clear these terms were to be construed “in accordance with” federal law, specifically IIRIRA. See AR.S. § 15-1803(B). As we have stated, IIRIRA prohibits states from offering residence-based, in-state tuition benefits to aliens who are “not lawfully present,” which, in the context of a state or local public benefit such as in-state tuition, are those aliens deemed non-qualified under federal law. We must now determine whether Arizona intended to mirror the federal definition of qualified aliens. ¶41 No language in either statute evidences an intent to stray from the provisions of PRWORA or IIRIRA regarding alien eligibility for in-state tuition or other state and local public benefits. Furthermore, the legislative history of Prop 300 is consistent with our interpretation. The bill’s sponsor specifically stated “[i]t [wa]s not any change in federal law,” see H. Comm, on K-12 Educ., 47th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess., at 13 (Ariz. Mar. 29, 2006) (statement of Sen. Dean Martin), and another proponent declared the “resolution does not change the [federal] law, but enforces eligibility standards already in the law,” see H. Comm, on Appropriations (P), 47th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess., at 15 (Ariz. Mar. 29, 2006) (statement of Chairman Russell Pearce). ¶ 42 In considering the plausible interpretations of a statute, we must be mindful of “the effect of different interpretations,” Bell v. Indus. Comm’n, 236 Ariz. 478, 480, ¶ 7, 341 P.3d 1149, 1151 (2015) (citing Baker v. Univ. Physicians Healthcare, 231 Ariz. 379, 383, ¶ 8, 296 P.3d 42, 46 (2013)), and “[i]t is our duty to uphold statutes, if their language will permit, even though the statute may not be artfully drawn,” State v. Book-Cellar, Inc., 139 Ariz. 525, 528, 679 P.2d 548, 551 (App. 1984) (quoting State v. Grijalva, 111 Ariz. 476, 478, 533 P.2d 533, 535 (1975)). Because A.R.S. § 15-1803(B) incorporates the residency or domiciliary requirements of AR.S. §§ 15-1802 and -1802.01, see Webster, 123 Ariz. at 365, 599 P.2d 816 (citation omitted), the statute would be preempted by IIRIRA if it extended in-state tuition to aliens who are non-qualified under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1621(a) and 1641(b)-(c). Thus, we conclude Arizona’s scheme incorporates the qualified alien distinction drawn by PRWORA and IIRIRA, and is therefore consistent with, and not preempted by, federal law. B. Equal Protection ¶43 The Students also assert the AAG has singled out DACA recipients for disparate treatment, as compared to other deferred-action recipients, in violation of the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. Had the AAG done so, its classifications would likely be heavily scrutinized and overturned. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (noting “[state] classifications based on alienage ... are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny5’ and holding provisions of state welfare laws conditioning benefits upon citizenship were violative of equal protection). But the AAG has not classified aliens for the purpose of receipt of state and local public benefits; Congress did, through its plenary power to do so. See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 78-80, 96 S.Ct. 1883. Because unauthorized aliens are not a suspect class and education is not a fundamental right, Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223-24, 102 S.Ct. 2382, Congressional classification of aliens is subject to rational basis review, Mathews, 426 U.S. at 82-83, 96 S.Ct. 1883. ¶ 44 In addressing whether a rational basis exists for the challenged classifications, the legislation is “accorded a strong presumption of validity,” and the burden is upon the party challenging the legislation to show the absence of “any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993) (quotations and citations omitted). And the U.S. Supreme Court has already determined “Congress has no constitutional duty to provide [a]U aliens with the welfare benefits provided to citizens .... [I]t is unquestionably reasonable for Congress to make an alien’s eligibility depend on both the character and the duration of his residence [because] neither requirement is wholly irrational.” Mathews, 426 U.S. at 82-83, 96 S.Ct. 1883. ¶45 Congress has clearly defined what constitutes “lawful presence” for purposes of receiving state and local public benefits, and DACA recipients are not qualified aliens for this purpose. Although the DACA policy protects its recipients from accruing unlawful presence for the purpose of determining future admissibility and permits the issuance of EADs so recipients may lawfully sustain themselves while in this country, these benefits do not translate into the recipients’ eligibility for in-state tuition or other state and local public benefits. This legislative distinction is ostensibly borne of acute humanitarian concern for certain classes of unauthorized aliens, of which DACA recipients are not included. As stated in Part 111(A), Arizona law is consistent with Congressional classifications of aliens eligible for state and local public benefits. The Students have therefore not met their burden of proving the AAG subjected DACA recipients to disparate treatment by doing nothing more than accepting those federal classifications. CONCLUSION ¶ 46 Congress has not defined DACA recipients as “lawfully present” for purposes of eligibility for in-state tuition or other state or local public benefits. Congress has, conversely, authorized each state to determine whether aliens, otherwise non-qualified under federal law, should be granted state or local public benefits. Arizona’s statutory scheme for postsecondary education benefits does not demonstrate an intent to create that eligibility for DACA recipients. Although DACA recipients are “lawfully present” for the specific purpose of obtaining EADs, these documents do not automatically confer eligibility for in-state tuition. Considered together, federal and state law therefore prohibit MCCCD from granting in-state tuition benefits to DACA recipients. As a result, MCCCD may be enjoined from offering instate tuition to DACA recipients. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s orders granting Appellees’ motions for summary judgment and remand with instructions to enter a judgment enjoining MCCCD from granting in-state tuition to DACA recipients. ¶47 MCCCD and the Students request attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and -348.01. Because they were not successful, we deny the requests. However, as the prevailing party, the AAG is entitled to its costs incurred on appeal upon compliance with ARCAP 21(b). . Unauthorized aliens are those who "enter[] a country at the wrong time or place, elude[ ] an examination by officials, obtain[ ] entry by fraud, or enter[ ] into a sham marriage to evade immi gration laws”; we use the term "unauthorized” as a substitute for "illegal” because the latter term has developed a pejorative connotation. Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). . Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite a statute’s current version. 3. Nonimmigrants are legal temporary residents of the United States, the most common of which hold student or work visas. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15). . Congress also permitted the states to restrict the eligibility of qualified aliens for state public benefits, within certain limitations. See 8 U.S.C. § 1622; see also Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 183 L.Ed.2d 351 (2012). . Should a state extend residence-based, in-state tuition benefits to non-qualified aliens, IIRIRA requires the benefit be extended to all U.S, citizens and nationals, including those residing out-of-state, see infra ¶58, thereby defeating the state’s ability to distinguish between students based upon their residency. . The Department of Justice, through the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), was originally responsible for enforcing the immigration laws, but that responsibility has since been transferred to DHS. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 374 n.1, 125 S.Ct. 716, 160 L.Ed.2d 734 (2005). . DACA and other DHS deferred-action policies are exercises of administrative discretion in which immigration officials temporarily defer the removal of unauthorized aliens. See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 483-84, 119 S.Ct. 936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999); DHS's Auth. to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the U.S. & to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op. O.L.C. 1, 12-13 (2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/20/2014-11-19-auth-prioritize~removal.pdf (Deferred Action Op.). Deferred action is one of multiple forms of discretionary relief; other forms of discretionary relief include parole, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); asylum, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A); cancellation of removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229b; and temporary protected status, see 8 U.S.C. § 1254a. See also Arizona, 567 U.S. at 394, 132 S.Ct, 2492; Deferred Action Op., 38 Op. O.L.C. at 5, 12 n.5. Although deferred action developed without express statutory authorization, see Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination, 525 U.S. at 484, 119 S.Ct. 936 (citation omitted); USCIS Adjudicator's Field Manual ch. 40.9,2(b)(3)(J) (last updated Nov, 23, 2016), https;//www.uscis. gov/ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1. html (USCIS Manual), some deferred action policies have been codified by Congress, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(T), (U), 1154(a)(1)(A), (D); Deferred Action Op,, 38 Op. O.L.C. at 13, 15. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledges deferred-action policies represent a valid extension of the federal power over immigration and an agency's discretion to use scarce enforcement resources in an effective manner. See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 394, 132 S.Ct. 2492; Deferred Action Op., 38 Op. O.L.C. at 13, 20. . Appellees also rely on a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, which considered the definition of "lawfully present" found in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9), to support their position. See Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 855 F.3d 957, 974 (9th Cir. 2017). This case is not persuasive, however, because the Ninth Circuit was interpreting the definition of a different phrase—"authorized presence”—and in a different context—-to determine an alien's eligibility to apply for a driver’s license. Id. at 963. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit did not adopt the definition contained within 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii), but referenced the statute only to illustrate how the state’s position was inconsistent with the federal immigration classification scheme, and thereby preempted. See id. at 974-75. In the present case, the AAG "did not create a novel immigration classification,” but ”[r]ather, .., permissibly borrowed from existing federal classifications” in an attempt to distinguish those aliens who have attained a more concrete legal status—and are therefore eligible to receive state and local public benefits—from those who have not. Id. at 975 (quoting LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 410 (5th Cir. 2005)); see infra Part 11(B)(3). Moreover, the evidence presented indicated there was no basis to believe that DACA recipients' ability to obtain driver’s licenses would otherwise facilitate their access to public benefits to which they were not entitled. Id. at 969. . The Students argue that deferred-action recipients’ eligibility to receive specific federal public benefits is evidence that Congress intended DACA recipients to be eligible for state and local public benefits. Although non-qualified aliens are generally ineligible for federal public benefits, 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a), Congress created an exception for "an alien who is lawfully present in the United States as determined by the [Secretary of DHS]" to receive Social Security benefits, 8 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(2) (emphasis added). Because Congress attached additional qualifying language to the phrase "lawfully present” in discussing Social Security monies, we presume it intended a different meaning than the unqualified phrase used in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1621(d) and 1623(a). See DePierre v. United States, 564 U.S. 70, 83, 131 S.Ct. 2225, 180 L.Ed.2d 114 (2011) ("[W]henthe legislature uses certain language in one part of the statute and different language in another, the court assumes different meanings were intended.”) (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711 n.9, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 159 L.Ed,2d 718 (2004)). Moreover, the federal regulation interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(2) includes "[a]liens currently in deferred action status" as "lawfully present” for purposes of receiving Social Security benefits, but defines them separately from those "qualified alien[s] as defined in 8 U.S.C. [§ ] 1641(b),” thereby unequivocally limiting those aliens' eligibility solely to federal Social Security benefits. See 8 C.F.R. § 1.3(a)(1), (4)(vi). And, although DACA recipients may be eligible for Social Security benefits, they are specifically precluded from receiving federal postsecondary education assistance under 8 U.S.C. § 1611 and 20 U.S.C. § 1091(a)(5). See also Mashiri v. Dep’t of Educ., 724 F.3d 1028, 1032-33 (9th Cir. 2013). These statutes further undermine the Students’ suggestion that Congress generally intended non-qualified aliens to be eligible for education benefits. . In discussing minor children and basic education, Plyler afforded every alien equal protection to access public primaiy and secondary schools. 457 U.S. at 230, 102 S.Ct, 2382; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(2). Similar unfettered access to postsecondary education, however, has not been conferred constitutional protection. In fact, several states prohibit unauthorized aliens from receiving higher education. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 31-13-8; S.C. Code Ann. § 59-101-430; see also Estrada, 2017 WL 2062078 at *1. . Other states have generally construed IIRIRA as preempting state laws that grant in-state tuition rates to unlawfully present or non-qualified aliens solely upon the basis of residence. See Martinez, 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 359, 241 P.3d at 863-64. In the context of in-state tuition benefits, residence is most often defined as physical presence and an intention to remain, analogous to domicile. See Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 330-31, 103 S.Ct. 1838, 75 L.Ed.2d 879 (1983); Webster v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 123 Ariz. 363, 365, 599 P.2d 816, 818 (App. 1979) (declaring students seeking to prove domicile must show, by clear and convincing evidence, physical presence and intent to remain permanently). But see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(33), 1641(a) (defining "residence” for purposes of PRWORA and IIRIRA as a person's "place of general abode” or "his principal, actual dwelling place in fact, without regard to intent”). To avoid preemption, some state laws permit non-qualified aliens to receive instate tuition on the basis of high school attendance and graduation. See, e.g., Cal. Educ. Code § 68130.5(a); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 23-7-110; N.M. Stat. § 21-1-4.6(B). . Indeed, as the Concurrence adroitly points out, early drafts of Prop 300 that based eligibility for in-state tuition benefits on other factors, such as high school attendance and parental tax filings, were rejected. See infra ¶62. . To the extent the Students argue the AAG treats those with EADs disparately under A.R.S, § 1-502, we are unconvinced. First, A.R.S. §§ 1-501(A) and-502(A) "specifically authorize agencies to accept an Arizona driver license or non-operating identification license as acceptable proof of lawful presence.” Op. Ariz. Att'y Gen. 110-008, at 16. Although "[t]his identification may establish lawful presence, ... it does not establish whether a person is a qualified alien, nonimmigrant, or an alien who is paroled into the United States!,] • • • which are the eligibility requirements in 8 U.S.C. § 1621,” id., and, as set forth in Part II, supra, form the prerequisite for eligibility for postsecondary education benefits. Section 1-502 was merely enacted to respond to PRWORA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1625 (authorizing each state “to require an applicant for State and local public benefits (as defined in section 1621(c) of this title) to provide proof of eligibility”). Second, because the AAG is accurately enforcing federal legislation governing alien eligibility for state and local public benefits, there is no equal protection violation. . The AAG did not request its attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal. In its complaint, the AAG requested a fee award under A.R.S. § 12-348.01. On remand, the trial court may consider the AAG’s request for fees under this statute but only for its work in the trial court. We express no opinion on whether the trial court should award the AAG fees under this statute.

JUSTICE BRUTINEL, opinion of the Court: ¶ 1 During Mark Haskie, Jr.’s trial on felony charges arising from an incident of domestic violence, Dr. Kathleen Ferraro, testifying as an expert witness, described general behavioral tendencies of adult victims of domestic abuse. Haskie argues that Dr. Ferraro’s testimony should have been excluded as impermissible profile evidence. Because the testimony helped the jury understand the victim’s behavior and was more probative than prejudicial, the trial court did not err in admitting it. I. BACKGROUND ¶ 2 Haskie assaulted his girlfriend, P. J., at a Flagstaff motel after searching through messages on her phone and threatening her, “I told you I would kill you if you cheated on me.” That same day, P.J. wrote a statement for the police explaining that Haskie had beaten and strangled her. Physical evidence from the motel corroborated her statement, Haskie was arrested nearly a year later. Shortly after his arrest, P.J. wrote two letters to the prosecutor recanting her earlier statements to the police, claiming instead that her injuries were from a bar fight she could not remember and that Haskie was innocent. ¶ 3 Before trial, the State filed a motion in limine to admit testimony by Dr. Ferraro as a “cold” expert on domestic violence to help the jury understand why P.J. had “continued her relationship with the defendant,” “given conflicting statements while the case [was] pending,” and why she was “reluctant to testify.” The State’s motion was accompanied by a list of questions the prosecutor intended to ask Dr. Ferraro. Haskie objected to Dr. Ferraro’s proposed testimony, arguing it would not assist the jury and that it would constitute improper profile evidence and vouching, Following a hearing, the trial court limited Dr. Ferraro’s testimony to the list of questions. ¶ 4 At trial, the State presented recorded phone calls Haskie made from jail, including several to P.J. before she recanted. In these conversations, Haskie dictated to P.J. an exculpatory story for her to tell police, apologized to her, and promised to marry her when he was released. During one call, P.J. responded, “[W]ell maybe you shouldn’t have tried to kill me..,. You know exactly what you did.” At trial, however, P.J. testified that she did not remember who had beaten her because she had been drinking, and that although she initially blamed Haskie for her injuries because she was jealous, she had in fact cheated on him. ¶ 5 At trial, Dr. Ferraro testified that she was a “cold” or “blind” expert, meaning she had not reviewed any case-specific evidence and was not going to testify about any of the events in the case. The prosecutor asked her a series of questions regarding characteristics of domestic violence victims to help the jury understand behaviors that might otherwise seem counterintuitive to jurors unfamiliar with domestic violence. When asked, “[I]s it unusual for someone who has been hurt by an intimate partner to return to that relationship?” Dr. Ferraro responded, “It’s not unusual. It is very common.” She continued, “There are many reasons [why,] and they vary by the individual, of course, and the type of relationship.” Dr. Ferraro explained that some victims of domestic violence return to their abusers out of fear, retaliation, or threats, while others do not leave their abusers because of pressure from extended family or the victim’s own shame. Dr. Ferraro further testified that chemical dependency and alcohol abuse complicate the decision to leave an abusive relationship. ¶ 6 The prosecutor then asked, “[D]o victims ever tend to blame themselves for what happened?” Dr. Ferraro responded: Yes. That’s a very common response of victims of domestic violence. [P]art of it has to do with the manipulation of an abusive partner themselves because that’s a very common dynamic of domestic violence, ... the abusive partner will turn the violence around and say that if you hadn’t done this or you had done that as I told you to do, this never would have happened, so it’s your fault. And if you would just behave or comply with my wishes and my commands, then this wouldn’t happen. The prosecutor also asked, “Is it unusual for victims to later change their story?” Dr. Ferraro answered, “No, that is very typical,” adding that victims recant or change the details of their account for many of the reasons that might also make a victim reluctant to leave the relationship. In addition, she explained, the victim may be afraid of violent repercussions; may feel pressure from the abuser or friends and extended family; may be intimidated to discontinue prosecution; and may be emotionally and psychologically manipulated. ¶ 7 Then the following exchange took place: Q. [H]ave you ever seen efforts made to assist their partner in terms of getting them out of trouble or trying to make something go away, avoid accountability? A. Yes, often. Q. ... Are those factors the same in terms of why women do that? A. They are very often the same. I’ve actually seen women go to jail and take the responsibility for a crime that their abusive partner has committed. And in part that is related to the psychological manipulation ... where the abusive person will have them convinced that they’ll get a much lighter sentence, that they maybe won’t get a sentence at all. ¶ 8 During closing arguments, the prosecutor did not mention Dr. Ferraro or compare any aspect of her testimony to the facts of Haskie’s case. Before jury deliberations began, the trial court instructed the jurors that they were not bound by any expert opinion and should give an opinion only the weight they believed it deserved. The jury found Haskie guilty of two counts of aggravated assault (domestic violence), five counts of aggravated domestic violence, two counts of influencing a witness, and one count of kidnapping. ¶ 9 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Dr. Ferraro's testimony did not constitute impermissible profile evidence. State v. Haskie, 240 Ariz. 269, 273 ¶ 18, 276 ¶ 34, 378 P.3d 446 (App. 2016). ¶ 10 We granted review to consider whether Dr. Ferraro’s testimony constituted impermissible offender profiling. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 6(3) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24. II. DISCUSSION ¶ 11 We review a trial court’s admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion, which can include errors of law. State v. Ketchner, 236 Ariz. 262, 264 ¶ 13, 339 P.3d 645 (2014); see also State v. Cheatham, 240 Ariz. 1, 2 ¶ 6, 375 P.3d 66 (2016). We review interpretation of court rules de novo. State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 592 ¶ 4, 325 P.3d 996 (2014). ¶ 12 Initially, we note that in Salazar-Mercado, a case involving child victims, we held that Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 permits the admission of “cold” expert testimony that educates the fact-finder about general principles without applying those principles to the particular facts of the case. 234 Ariz. at 591 ¶ 1, 325 P.3d 996. Salazar-Mercado’s rationale applies equally to cases involving adult victims. ¶ 13 In Ketchner we precluded testimony that “implicitly invited the jury to infer criminal conduct based on the [cold expert’s descriptions of] characteristics,” relying on Ryan v. State, 988 P.2d 46, 56-57 (Wyo. 1999). 236 Ariz. at 265 ¶¶ 17, 19, 339 P.3d 645 (holding that the cold expert’s testimony constituted impermissible profile evidence). We now elaborate. ¶ 14 “Profile evidence tends to show that a defendant possesses one or more of an informal compilation of characteristics or an abstract of characteristics typically displayed by persons engaged in a particular kind of activity.” Id. at 264 ¶ 15, 339 P.3d 645 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Describing evidence as “profile” evidence is a shorthand way of saying that the evidence is offered to implicitly or explicitly suggest that because the defendant has those characteristics, a jury should conclude that the defendant must have committed the crime charged. ¶ 15 The state may not offer “profile” evidence as substantive proof of the defendant’s guilt. See id. at 264-65 ¶¶ 15-19, 339 P.3d 645. The rationale for this rule is evident: “[Pjrofile evidence may not be used as substantive proof of guilt because of the ‘risk that a defendant vrill be convicted not for what he did but for what others are doing.’ ” Id. ¶ 15 (quoting State v. Lee, 191 Ariz. 542, 545 ¶ 12, 959 P.2d 799 (1998)). ¶ 16 Conversely, expert testimony that explains a victim’s seemingly inconsistent behavior is admissible to aid jurors in evaluating the victim’s credibility. See State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 381, 728 P.2d 248 (1986) (citing State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 474, 720 P.2d 73 (1986)). Although expert testimony about victim behavior that also describes or refers to a perpetrator’s characteristics has the potential to be “profile” evidence, it is not categorically inadmissible. Rather, its admissibility is determined by the rules of evidence. The burden of establishing admissibility lies with the proponent of the testimony—in this case, the State. Like all evidence, such testimony must be relevant to be admissible. See Ariz. R. Evid. 401 (“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”); Ariz. R. Evid. 402 (“Relevant evidence is admissible unless any of the following provides otherwise: the United States or Arizona Constitution; an applicable statute; these rules; or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.”). ¶ 17 If relevant, such evidence may still be excluded if the prejudice created by its admission substantially outweighs its probative value. See Ariz. R. Evid. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”). Thus, evidence of offender characteristics may be admissible, subject to a Rule 403 analysis, if it is relevant for a reason other than to suggest that the defendant possesses some of those characteristics and therefore may have committed the charged crimes. See Lee, 191 Ariz. at 546 ¶ 19, 959 P.2d 799 (“[T]here may be situations in which drug courier profile evidence has significance beyond the mere suggestion that because an accused’s conduct is similar to that of other proven violators, he too must be guilty.”). ¶ 18 The outcome of this analysis will, of course, vary from case to case. “Deciding whether expert testimony will aid the jury and balancing the usefulness of expert testimony against the danger of unfair prejudice are generally fact-bound inquiries uniquely within the competence of the trial court.” Moran, 151 Ariz. at 381, 728 P.2d 248. The more “general” the proffered testimony, the more likely it will be admissible. See State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 292, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Goudeau, 239 Ariz. 421, 469 ¶ 154, 372 P.3d 945 (2016). In addition, the more the testimony is tied to the defendant’s characteristics, rather than to those of the victim, the more likely the admission of such testimony will be imper-missibly prejudicial. See id. ¶ 19 The danger of “cold” evidence describing the interaction between offenders and victims is that it may stray into prejudicial and potentially improper profile evidence. Ketchner provides an example of such evidence. The expert witness (also Dr. Ferraro) in Ketchner testified about “characteristics common to domestic violence victims and their abusers,” and “described risk factors for ‘lethality' in an abusive relationship.” 236 Ariz. at 264 ¶ 14, 339 P.3d 645. This Court held the testimony was inadmissible because, in addition to explaining victim behavior that otherwise might be misunderstood by a jury, it described an abuser’s reaction to loss of control in a relationship, inviting a comparison with the defendant’s actions. Id. at 265 ¶ 19, 339 P.3d 645. Importantly, in Ketchner, the victim’s actions were not at issue and the expert’s testimony did not explain victim behavior: “There was no reason to elicit this testimony except to invite the jury to find that Ketchner’s character matched that of a domestic abuser who intended to kill or otherwise harm his partner in reaction to a loss of control over the relationship.” Id. In other words, the expert testimony in Ketchner was simply not relevant to explaining the victim’s behavior. ¶ 20 Here, the victim’s behavior and inconsistent statements were squarely at issue. Dr. Ferraro’s testimony was limited to questions designed to help the jury understand the sometimes counterintuitive behaviors of domestic violence victims. Although a few of her general statements referred to an abuser’s characteristics, such as, “the abusive partner will turn the violence around and say that if you hadn’t done this or you had done that as I told you to do, this never would have happened, so it’s your fault,” each statement primarily served the purpose of explaining victim behavior. Thus, the testimony was relevant to help the jury understand PJ.’s behavior. ¶ 21 The trial court considered the admissibility of Dr. Ferraro’s testimony at the hearing on the State’s motion in limine. At that hearing, Haskie neither objected to Dr. Ferraro’s testimony on Rule 403 grounds nor argued prejudice. The trial court found that the testimony was relevant and granted the motion. ¶ 22 Based on this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Dr. Ferraro’s testimony. Any prejudice from her testimony was minimal and did not outweigh the testimony’s probative value. The evidence revealed some characteristics of domestic violence abusers mentioned by Dr. Ferraro. As the court of appeals recognized, “[I]t is not surprising—indeed it is expected—that the jury will hear evidence that the victim has behaved to a greater or lesser extent in accord with the testimony of a ‘cold’ and ‘blind’ expert such as Dr. Ferraro.” Haskie, 240 Ariz. at 274 ¶ 23, 378 P.3d 446. Our case law has recognized that “just because expert testimony about behavioral characteristics is exceedingly persuasive does not mean it is unfairly prejudicial.” Moran, 151 Ariz. at 384, 728 P.2d 248 (emphasis in original) (holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting such testimony under Rules 403 and 702). Dr. Ferraro’s testimony was not directed at establishing that Haskie possessed “one or more of an informal compilation of characteristics” typically displayed by domestic violence abusers; rather, it was introduced to explain the impetus for the victim’s counterintuitive behavior. Ketchner, 236 Ariz. at 264 ¶ 15, 339 P.3d 645. She neither explicitly nor implicitly invited the jury to infer criminal conduct based on the described conduct. See id. at 265 ¶ 17, 339 P.3d 645 (citing with approval Ryan, 988 P.2d at 55 (warning that even testimony that only implicitly invites the jury to infer criminal conduct on the part of the defendant based on described characteristics demands close scrutiny under the character evidence rules)). Dr. Ferraro never made comparisons between general characteristics of an abusive relationship and the facts of this case. During closing arguments, the prosecutor never mentioned Dr. Ferraro or related any aspect of her testimony to P. J. or Haskie. ¶23 The State proposes a standard for identifying when profile evidence is imper-missibly prejudicial. It argues that to violate the prohibition against using profile evidence as substantive proof of guilt, the prosecution must offer testimony (1) establishing the existence of a common profile for perpetrators of a certain criminal activity, (2) enumerating the profile’s component characteristics, and (3) expressly comparing the defendant against each component characteristic to establish guilt by showing that he “matches” the profile in most or all respects. But requiring an explicit mention of a “profile” or a direct comparison of the defendant with the expert’s testimony leaves too much room for prejudice and ignores the real possibility that an expert could create a profile without ever explicitly describing it as such. ¶ 24 We conclude that the trial court should consider the prejudicial effect of the expert’s testimony as a whole, as well as that of each individual statement offered. See State v. Steinle, 239 Ariz. 415, 419 ¶ 14, 372 P.3d 939 (2016) (stating that Rule 403 issues “are highly contextual—they necessarily depend on assessments of not only the evidence in question, but also the other evidence in the ease”). But piecing together statements, none of which make direct comparisons to the defendant’s conduct and all of which are.relevant to explaining a victim’s behavior, does not necessarily establish that the evidence is more prejudicial than probative. ¶ 25 Although admission of Dr. Ferraro’s testimony in this case was not error, we note that trial courts should exercise great caution in screening, admitting, and limiting this type of evidence. Evidence describing the characteristics of offenders, even as part of a description of victim behavior, could imply that a defendant is guilty. This potential for undue prejudice requires that trial courts carefully scrutinize such evidence. ¶ 26 If such testimony is admitted, the defendant is entitled to a limiting instruction under Rule 105 of the Arizona Rules of Evidence to explain to the jury the limited purpose and scope of such testimony. Cf. Woodson v. State, 30 Ariz. 448, 455, 247 P. 1103 (1926) (“[W]hen evidence [that when considered as a whole is highly prejudicial and is bound to engender hostility toward the defendant] is admitted it is the duty of the trial court to use extraordinary care in instructing the jury and in seeing that no improper matter is allowed to get before it.”). Additionally, although testimony about offender or victim characteristics from a “cold,” “blind” expert is not categorically inadmissible, that does not mean a trial court should automatically admit it, Rather, trial courts should filter such proffered evidence through the screens of Rules 401, 402, 403, and 702 of the Arizona Rules of Evidence. Furthermore, we caution trial courts to limit “cold” and “blind” testimony from expert witnesses to matters within the scope of their expertise. Such experts should not be allowed to speak in broad, categorical terms about supposedly “common” or “usual” occurrences without empirical support. III. CONCLUSION ¶ 27 We vacate paragraphs seventeen through twenty-three of the court of appeals’ decision and affirm Haskie’s convictions and sentences. . The court of appeals held that certain portions of Dr. Ferraro’s testimony constituted impermissible vouching, State v. Haskie, 240 Ariz. 269, 274-75 ¶¶ 24-28, 378 P.3d 446 (App. 2016), but concluded that admitting those statements amounted to harmless error, and affirmed Ha-skie’s convictions and sentences. Id. at 276 ¶¶ 33-34, 378 P.3d 446. We did not grant review of that issue.

OPINION NORRIS, Judge: ¶ 1 Jonathan and Carrie Woods, Defendants/Appellants, appeal the superior court’s judgment in favor of Carrington Mortgage Services LLC, Plaintiff/Appellee, in this forcible entry and detainer (“FED”) action. The principal issue in this appeal is whether Car-rington’s FED action accrued when Carring-ton’s predecessor in interest purchased property owned by the Woodses at a trustee’s sale in 2010 or when Carrington served the Woodses with written demand of possession in 2016. We hold Carrington’s FED action accrued when Carrington served the Woods-es with written demand of possession in 2016. Thus, we agree with the superior court that Carrington’s FED action was not time barred. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment in Carrington’s favor. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 2 In 2008, the Woodses executed a promissory note secured by a deed of trust on real property located in Gilbert, Arizona. On February 16, 2010, BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP FKA Country Wide Home Loans Servicing LP (“BAC”) purchased the property at a trustee’s sale, and Recontrust Company, N.A., the duly appointed trustee, conveyed the property to BAC through a trustee’s deed. BAC recorded the trustee’s deed in the Office of the Maricopa County Recorder on February 22, 2010. Subsequently, Bank of America, N.A. (“Bank of America”) acquired BAC and became the owner of the property. ¶ S On September 9, 2014, Bank of America executed a limited power of attorney (“LPOA”) appointing Carrington as its “true and lawful attorney-in-fact.” Among other things, the LPOA authorized Carrington to “[ejxecute or file quitclaim deeds or, only where necessary and appropriate, special warranty deeds or other deeds causing the transfer of title to [Carrington as] Servicer or a third party, in respect of property acquired through a foreclosure or deed-in-lieu of foreclosure,.,.” On February 3, 2016, Carrington, pursuant to the LPOA and on behalf of Bank of America, conveyed the property to itself through a grant deed, ¶ 4 On March 2, 2016, Carrington served the Woodses with a written “Notice to Vacate” the property. On April 18, 2016, Car-rington sued the Woodses for forcible de-tainer after a trustee’s sale. The Woodses answered and, in separate motions argued, first, Carrington’s action was time barred and, second, Carrington had not established a superior right of possession to the property. The superior court denied the motions. After a bench trial, the court entered judgment in favor of Carrington, finding the Woodses guilty of forcible detainer. DISCUSSION I. Time Bar ¶ 6 The Woodses argue Carrington’s FED action accrued when BAC recorded the trustee’s deed in 2010 and not when Carring-ton served them With written demand of possession in 2016. Accordingly, they argue that, under the two-year statute of limitations applicable to FED actions, Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-542(6) (2016), Carrington’s 2016 action for forcible detainer was time barred. Exercising de novo review, we reject the Woodses’ argument. See Cook v. Town of Pinetop-Lakeside, 232 Ariz. 173, 175, ¶ 10, 303 P.3d 67, 69 (App. 2013) (appellate court reviews question of law concerning statute of limitations, including when a cause of action accrues, de novo) (citation omitted). ¶ 6 Sections 12-1171 to -1183 (2016) govern FED actions. “In Arizona, a forcible detainer action is a summary, speedy and adequate statutory remedy for obtaining possession of premises by one entitled to actual possession.” Casa Grande Tr. Co. v. Superior Court ex rel. Pinal Cty., 8 Ariz.App. 163, 165, 444 P.2d 521, 523 (1968) (citations omitted). ¶ 7 The statutory scheme for FED actions variously defines what acts constitute forcible detainer. Applicable here, A.R.S. § 12-1173.01(A)(2) provides: [A] person ... who retains possession of any land, tenements or other real property after he [or she] receives written demand of possession may be removed through an action for forcible detainer ... if the property has been sold through a trustee’s sale under a deed of trust..,. ¶ 8 Under A.R.S. § 12-542(6), an action for forcible detainer must be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues. Section 12-542(6) also states a cause of action for forcible detainer accrues “at the commencement of the forcible entry or detainer.” ¶ 9 Here, on March 2, 2016, Carrington served the Woodses with written notice demanding possession of the property. After the Woodses did not surrender possession, Carrington sued for forcible detainer on April 18, 2016—well within the two years set out by A.R.S. § 12-542(6). By the plain language of both AR.S. § 12-1173.01(A)(2) (person can be removed through an action for forcible detainer “after he [or she] receives written demand of possession”) (emphasis added), and A.R.S. § 12-542(6) (action accrues “at the commencement of the forcible entry or detainer”), Carrington’s action for forcible detainer did not accrue until it served written demand of possession on the Woodses in March 2016. Therefore, Carring-ton’s action was timely. Cf. Fenter v. Homestead Dev. & Tr. Co., 3 Ariz.App. 248, 252, 413 P.2d 579, 683 (1966) (acknowledging, although not deciding, that action for forcible entry and detainer was timely under A.R.S. § 12-542(6) when plaintiff commenced action within two years of written demand of possession). II. Possession ¶ 10 The Woodses argue Carrington did not present the superior court with evidence it had a superior right of possession to the property because the LPOA failed to, first, authorize Carrington to transfer the property and, second, specify the Carrington officers who were entitled to execute grant deeds. Exercising de novo review, see supra ¶ 5, we reject both ai’guments. ¶ 11 The “only issue” in a FED action “shall be the right of actual possession and the merits of title shall not be inquired into.” A.R.S. § 12-1177(A); see also Cu/rtis v. Morris, 186 Ariz. 534, 535, 925 P.2d 259, 260 (1996) (litigating title in FED action “would convert a forcible detainer action into a quiet title action and defeat its purpose as a summary remedy”). f 12 At trial, the parties introduced into evidence certified copies of the trustee’s deed and grant deed from the official records of the Maricopa County Recorder. A Carring-ton representative also testified that the Car-rington employee who executed the grant deed on behalf of Bank of America was authorized to execute deeds pursuant to the LPOA The Carrington representative further testified Carrington owned the property and had been paying taxes on and insurance for the property. Based on this evidence, Carrington established it had a superior right of possession to the property. ¶ 13 Further, at its core the Woodses’ argument simply challenges Carrington’s title to the property. As discussed, see supra ¶11, parties may not litigate the validity of title in a FED action. Curtis, 186 Ariz. at 535, 925 P.2d at 260. CONCLUSION ¶ 14 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the superior court. Carrington requests attorneys’ fees on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01 (2016), which applies to “any contested action arising out of a contract, express or implied.” Attorneys’ fees are not available in FED actions under A.R.S, § 12-341,01(A), however. RREEF Mgmt. Co. v. Camex Prod., Inc., 190 Ariz. 75, 80, 945 P.2d 386, 391 (App. 1997) (citations omitted). Therefore, we deny Car-rington’s request for attorneys’ fees. As the prevailing party on appeal, we nonetheless award Carrington its costs on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341 (2016), contingent upon its compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21. . After BAC purchased the property at the trustee's sale, the Woodses became tenants at sufferance. See Grady v. Barth ex rel. Cty. of Maricopa, 233 Ariz, 318, 321, ¶ 12, 312 P.3d 117, 120 (App. 2013) (although not a trae landlord-tenant relationship, tenant in possession after trustee’s sale becomes tenant at sufferance) (citations omitted).

OPINION CATTANI, Judge: ¶ 1 Wade Cole Dickinson challenges on double jeopardy grounds his convictions and sentences for fraudulent schemes, forgery, taking the identity of another, and theft. He argues that because the convictions resulted from a second trial following a trial in which the superior court sua sponte ordered a mistrial over his objection, the second trial violated the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Arizona Constitutions. We agree because the mistrial did not result from a “manifest necessity” and was not essential to the ends of public justice. Accordingly, we vacate Dickinson’s convictions and remand with instructions to enter a judgment of dismissal. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶ 2 The charges arose from the theft of a high-end mountain bike from a home in Cornville in March 2010, and its sale a few days later by Dickinson on Craigslist. During opening statements in the first trial (which began in August 2013), defense counsel told the jury that the mountain bike Dickinson had sold on Craigslist was not the bike stolen from Cornville, as evidenced by the difference between the serial number for the stolen bike and the serial number on the bike Dickinson sold. ¶3 Later, while cross-examining the person who bought the bike from Dickinson, Dickinson’s counsel learned that the buyer’s wife had recently given Prescott police officers a scrap of paper on which she had written two numbers that the Cornville theft victim told her had been on his mountain bike, one of which the buyer indicated matched a number on the bike he purchased from Dickinson. The buyer’s wife apparently had the note for three years before giving it to the police two weeks before trial, and neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel was aware of the contents of the note until the buyer mentioned it during cross-examination. ¶ 4 After a lengthy discussion about possible ways to address the surprise testimony and the lack of timely disclosure of the note, the superior court asked the parties if they wanted a mistrial. Dickinson’s counsel initially noted that one possible resolution was a mistrial, which would allow him to start over with a new opening statement and cross-examination “fully appri[s]ed of the evidence.” But counsel made clear that he preferred instead to proceed with the same jury, without any further reference to the scrap of paper. ¶ 5 The prosecutor argued that dismissal with prejudice was not appropriate, and sug gested that empaneling a new jury was an option, or that alternatively the court could preclude further evidence of the note. The prosecutor concluded by noting that the State “can proceed forward with the exclusion of this evidence. It’s not the State’s first priority, because all facts should go to the jury. But, however, it’s an option for the Court.” ¶ 6 After again indicating his preference to go forward with trial, Dickinson’s counsel indicated he would not move to strike the surprise testimony, because he believed doing so would emphasize it. Finally, Dickinson’s counsel told the court that if it deemed a mistrial necessary, he would seek a dismissal with prejudice. ¶ 7 After the court declared a mistrial, Dickinson’s counsel did not file a motion to dismiss with prejudice, and the second trial proceeded six months later, resulting in the convictions detailed above. ¶8 The court sentenced Dickinson to a total of 19.5 years in prison, to be served consecutively to a 5-year term imposed on revocation of probation in another case. Dickinson timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 13-4033. DISCUSSION I. Double Jeopardy. ¶ 9 Dickinson argues that he did not consent to the mistrial and, because the mistrial was not manifestly necessary, the second trial was precluded by principles of double jeopardy. Although Dickinson did not move to dismiss the charges on double jeopardy grounds below, “the prohibition against double jeopardy is a fundamental right that is not waived by the failure to raise it in the trial court.” State v. Millanes, 180 Ariz. 418, 421, 885 P.2d 106 (App. 1994). ¶ 10 Under the Double Jeopardy Clause, a person may not “be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S, Const, amend. V. The Arizona constitution provides similar protection. See Añz. Const, art. II, § 10 (“No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to ... be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.”). ¶11 The Double Jeopardy Clause not only protects a defendant’s right to be free from multiple prosecutions, but also “embraces the defendant’s “valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.’ ” Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978) (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689, 69 S.Ct. 834, 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949)). Nevertheless, a defendant’s right to a single trial “must in some instances be subordinated to the public’s interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments.” Wade, 336 U.S. at 689, 69 S.Ct. 834. ¶ 12 “As a general rule, if the defendant successfully moves for or consents to a mistrial, retrial is not barred on double jeopardy grounds.” State v. Minnitt, 203 Ariz. 431, 437, ¶ 28, 55 P.3d 774 (2002). But if the court declares a mistrial over the defendant’s objection, retrial is only permitted if “taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.” Washington, 434 U.S. at 506 n.18, 98 S.Ct. 824 (quoting United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580, 9 Wheat. 679, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824)). We review claimed double jeopardy violations de novo, see State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 437, ¶ 18, 94 P.3d 1119 (2004), but we review a court’s decision to grant a mistrial and its ruling on manifest necessity for an abuse of discretion. McLaughlin v. Fahringer, 150 Ariz. 274, 277, 723 P.2d 92 (1986). A. Consent. ¶ 13 The State argues that Dickinson consented to the mistrial because he (1) initially suggested it as a possible remedy, (2) affirmed that any other resolution would be unfair, (3) did not move to dismiss the case with prejudice (despite the superior court’s repeated invitations to do so), and (4) requested that the trial be reset less than a week after the mistrial had been declared. We disagree. ¶ 14 Dickinson’s counsel initially noted that a mistrial would be one possible resolution of the issue, and would allow him to start over with a new opening statement and cross-examination “fully appri[s]ed of the evidence.” But he clearly indicated his preference to proceed without further reference to the untimely disclosed evidence. Although Dickinson’s counsel equivocated somewhat and at one point observed that because of the late disclosure, “it sounds like the State of Arizona has put me in the position of moving for a mistrial at this point,” counsel concluded by stating: I just hesitate to do that for numerous reasons; one of which is we seated a jury, I have made my presentation, I have showed my hand, I have played my hol[e] cards and now we are supposed to impanel a new jury at the detriment to my client. It’s just not fair. Again, Judge, I’d ask that the scrap of paper not be admitted and no one make any reference to it any further. The only reason, just for the record, I am not asking the court to strike [the witnesses testimony in that regard is because it simply emphasizes the error that is made and every attorney is always in a difficult position when they ask for a motion to strike. It just emphasizes the errors. So I am not making a motion to strike but I would request we keep this jury, proceed with the testimony with no reference to that scrap of paper. ¶ 15 The State notes that Dickinson’s counsel’s conduct after the court declared a mistrial—failing to move for dismissal with prejudice and requesting that the second trial be reset—suggests that Dickinson implicitly consented to the mistrial. But counsel’s failure to do something after the mistrial was granted did not revoke his prior objection to the mistrial. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Dickinson adequately conveyed his objection to the mistrial. B. Manifest Necessity. ¶ 16 Because Dickinson did not consent to the mistrial, principles of double jeopardy bar retrial unless the mistrial resulted from a showing of manifest necessity such that the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. There is no rigid formula for determining whether manifest necessity requires a mistrial. The United States Supreme Court has noted, however, that the power to declare a mistrial “ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes.” Wade, 336 U.S. at 690, 69 S.Ct. 834. In exercising discretion in deciding whether to grant a mistrial, “the trial judge must recognize that the defendant has a significant interest in deciding whether to take the case from the jury and ‘retains primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error.’ ” Jones v. Kiger, 194 Ariz. 523, 526, ¶ 9, 984 P.2d 1161 (1999) (citing United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976)). ¶ 17 As explained by the Supreme Court, there are varying degrees of “necessity,” and “we require a ‘high degree’ before concluding that a mistrial is appropriate.” Washington, 434 U.S. at 506, 98 S.Ct. 824. “The question whether that ‘high degree’ has been reached is answered more easily in some kinds of cases than others.” Id. at 507, 98 S.Ct. 824. At one extreme are cases in which a prosecutor requests a mistrial to allow the State to buttress weaknesses in the State’s evidence; at the other extreme are cases in which a mistrial is granted because a jury has been unable to reach a verdict. Id. at 508-09, 98 S.Ct. 824. ¶ 18 Courts apply the “strictest scrutiny ... when the basis for a mistrial is the unavailability of critical prosecution evidence, or when there is reason to believe that the prosecutor is using the superior resources of the State to harass or to achieve a tactical advantage over the accused.” Id. at 508, 98 S.Ct. 824. In contrast, if a mistrial is based on conduct by the defendant or defense counsel, or on a jury’s inability to reach a verdict, reviewing courts accord “great deference” to the trial judge’s decision. Id. at 509, 98 S.Ct. 824. This is because when conduct by the defendant or defense counsel leads to a mistrial, the defendant should not benefit from that conduct, and “the trial judge’s determination is entitled to special respect.” Id. at 610, 98 S.Ct. 824. And the trial judge is best positioned to assess whether further deliberations would be helpful to jurors who have been unable to reach a verdict, and “fail[ure] to discharge a jury which is unable to reach a verdict after protracted and exhausting deliberations” creates “a significant risk that a verdict may result from pressures inherent in the situation rather than the considered judgment of all the jurors.” Id at 509, 98 S.Ct. 824. ¶ 19 Here, although the mistrial did not result from a prosecution attempt to buttress weaknesses in the State’s evidence or to achieve a tactical advantage, the mistrial falls closer to that end of the spectrum than to cases involving a jury’s inability to reach a verdict or improper conduct by the defendant or defense counsel. Neither Dickinson nor his counsel contributed in any way to the alleged need for a mistrial, and even assuming there was no malfeasance by the prosecutor, the fact remains that favorable evidence for the State was presented without having been disclosed to the defendant. Accordingly, the superior court’s decision regarding manifest necessity for the mistrial is not one to which we will accord great deference. See also State v. Aguilar, 217 Ariz. 236, 242, ¶ 26, 172 P.3d 423 (App. 2007) (“ ‘[Ajlong the spectrum of trial problems which may warrant a mistrial and which vary in their amenability to appellate scrutiny,’ the failure of a prosecutor to discover and disclose evidence requires an exacting inquiry. Under such circumstances, we are required to strike the balance in favor of the defendant.”) (citations omitted). ¶ 20 The superior court’s decision to grant a mistrial does not survive scrutiny, particularly in light of Dickinson’s opposition to the mistrial and the prosecutor’s avowal that the State could “proceed forward with the exclusion of the evidence.” Most significantly, the court failed to recognize Dickinson’s interest in retaining primary control over the course to be followed after the jurors learned about information prejudicial to Dickinson but that had not been disclosed prior to trial. See Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 609, 96 S.Ct. 1075; Kiger, 194 Ariz. at 526, ¶ 9, 984 P.2d 1161. ¶ 21 In Kiger, this court reversed the superior court’s denial of a motion to dismiss with prejudice after a prosecution witness disclosed arguably prejudicial hearsay evidence during cross-examination. 194 Ariz. at 525, 528, ¶¶ 3, 16, 984 P.2d 1161. Defense counsel asked the court to dismiss with prejudice if it believed that fundamental error had occurred. Id. at 525, ¶ 6, 984 P.2d 1161. After the court denied the request to dismiss with prejudice, defense counsel “insisted that the hearsay testimony was not prejudicial to his ease and requested that the trial continue.” Id. Nevertheless, the court sua sponte granted a mistrial, finding that the hearsay was of “the type that I would never ever allow” and that in “just watching the response of the jurors to that testimony, that ... they all changed their facial features and looked as it was, as I interpreted, had [sic] a significant impact on them.” Id. ¶22 This court rejected the superior court’s approach, noting the importance of allowing the defendant to retain control under such circumstances; [The defendant] may believe that any error in admitting improper evidence can be cured by a motion to strike or a request for admonition, or can be refuted by impeachment of the witness or contrary defense evidence. Indeed, even when a palpably prejudicial error has been committed a defendant may have valid personal reasons to prefer going ahead with the trial rather than beginning the entire process anew, such as a desire to minimize the embarrassment, expense, and anxiety mentioned above. These considerations are peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, not the judge, and the latter must avoid depriving the defendant of his constitutionally protected freedom of choice in the name of a paternalistic concern for his welfare. Id. at 526, ¶ 9, 984 P.2d 1161 (quoting Curry v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.3d 707, 87 Cal.Rptr. 361, 470 P.2d 345, 361 (1970)). ¶23 Here, the superior court reasoned that prejudicial information had inadvertently been presented to the jurors, and further concluded that the jurors would be confused without more explanation. Although juror confusion is a valid consideration in determining whether to grant a mistrial, any assessment of whether the jurors would have been unable to reach a verdict was premature. Cf. State v. Walton, 159 Ariz. 571, 578, 769 P.2d 1017 (1989) (“First, speculation about ‘potential confusion among jurors’ is insufficient to establish actual jury confusion.”). Moreover, the allegedly confusing information was clearly prejudicial to Dickinson, rather than the State. But Dickinson did not view the information to be of such a prejudicial nature or to be so confusing as to deny him his right to a fair trial, and his assessment of the need for a mistrial (or lack thereof) carries considerable weight. See Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 609, 96 S.Ct. 1075; Kiger, 194 Ariz. at 526, ¶ 9, 984 P.2d 1161. In fact, defense counsel may have had tactical reasons for wanting to go forward with trial, including that a mistrial would simply result in delay and an opportunity for the prosecutor to further develop the reliability of the briefly-referenced note. See Kiger, 194 Ariz. at 527, ¶ 11, 984 P.2d 1161 (“Defense counsel wanted to continue with the trial, not only because he did not find the hearsay testimony prejudicial, but also because the State would then have a second opportunity to present potentially damaging testimony that it had been precluded from introducing in the first trial.”). ¶ 24 In Aguilar, this court noted a general rule that “the state’s inability to use a piece of evidence does not constitute manifest necessity for a mistrial.” 217 Ariz. at 240, 172 P.3d 423 (citing cases from other jurisdictions). It follows, then, that the State’s inability to further mention evidence that was prejudicial to the defendant and that was inadvertently presented to the jurors similarly does not constitute manifest necessity for a mistrial. Accordingly, and because there potentially was a tactical reason for Dickinson’s decision to proceed with trial notwithstanding the damaging information disclosed during cross-examination, the superior court abused its discretion by finding manifest necessity for the mistrial. CONCLUSION ¶ 25 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse Dickinson’s convictions and sentences and remand with instructions to dismiss the charges with prejudice. . Absent material revisions after the relevant date, we cite a statute’s current version.

OPINION NORRIS, Judge: ¶ 1 In 2007, Plaintiff/Appellant, Mark R. Gordon, purchased a house from the Estate of George Brooks. After the sale closed, Gordon sued Defendants/Appellees, the Estate and the personal representatives of the Estate, Sheri Sanbome and Maribel Maza, both in their representative and individual capacities, and, as relevant here, asserted claims against them for various alleged defects and deficiencies in the house. The superior court dismissed Gordon’s complaint. On appeal, Gordon does not take issue with the superior court’s dismissal of his claims against the Estate or against Sanborne and Maza in their representative capacities. Instead, he argues the superior court should not have dismissed his claims against San-bome and Maza in their individual capacities. We agree. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with our instructions. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 2 On January 31, 2007, the probate court appointed Sanborne and Maza as personal representatives of the Estate of George Brooks. While administering the Estate, Sanbome and Maza listed Brooks’ house for sale. On May 19, 2007, Gordon presented Sanborne and Maza with a written offer to purchase the house. Sanborne and Maza accepted Gordon’s offer the following day. ¶ 3 The purchase contract listed the seller as “George Brooks,” and Sanborne and Maza signed them names under the “seller’s signature” section of the contract. The purchase contract did not state or otherwise indicate that Sanbome and Maza were acting on behalf of the Estate or serving as personal representatives of the Estate. ¶ 4 On June 11, 2007, Gordon sent a letter to the escrow agent alleging Sanborne and Maza had breached their contractual obligations to cure several alleged deficiencies in the house. Nevertheless, Gordon submitted the final payment required to close the sale of the house to the escrow agent. The following day, on June 12, 2007, Sanborne and Maza recorded a warranty deed with the Office of the Maricopa County Recorder conveying the house to Gordon. The warranty deed, which the Recorder mailed to Gordon, identified Sanborne and Maza as the grant ors acting as “Co-Personal Representatives of the estate of George W. Brooks, deceased. Maricopa County Superior Court Probate No. 2007-000389.” ¶ 5 On February 27, 2012, Sanborne and Maza filed closing statements in the probate proceeding and represented the Estate had been fully administered with all claims resolved. In June 2013, Gordon moved to reopen the Estate, alleging he had outstanding claims against the Estate. Specifically, Gordon asserted Sanborne and Maza, as personal representatives of the Estate, had breached express and implied warranties under the purchase contract because warrantied items “were not then in working condition,” The probate court denied Gordon’s motion. Gordon appealed. This court affirmed the probate court’s denial of Gordon’s motion to reopen the Estate, see In re Estate of Brooks (“Gordon 7”), 1 CA-CV 13-0592, 2015 WL 898743, at *5, ¶ 13 (Ariz. App. March 3, 2015) (mem. decision), and held Gordon had failed to present any cognizable claims against the Estate pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 14-3804(1) (2012) (requiring claim against an estate to be presented in writing, “indicating its basis, the name and address of the claimant and the amount claimed”). ¶ 6 On May 17, 2013, before Gordon moved to reopen the Estate, Gordon filed this case. As discussed below, in his complaint, as amended, Gordon asserted claims against the Estate and Sanborne and Maza, both in their representative and individual capacities. San-bome and Maza moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing Gordon’s claims were time-barred by the probate code because they had closed the Estate and precluded by the doctrine of claim preclusion. The superior court agreed with Sanborne and Maza’s arguments and granted their motion to dismiss. DISCUSSION I, Gordon’s Claims ¶ 7 As relevant here, in his amended complaint, Gordon alleged nine causes of action against Sanborne and Maza: count 1, failure to disclose various defects in the home; count 2, breach of warranties in the purchase contract regarding the condition of the property; count 3, breach of the purchase contract by failing to take curative action as required under the contract and by forcing Gordon to close the escrow; count 4, breach of the purchase contract by failing to have the refrigerator/freezer and irrigation systems properly repaired; count 5, breach of the purchase contract by keeping the Estate open to avoid having to participate in alternative dispute resolution as required by the contract; count 6, abuse of process by failing to comply with their statutory obligations regarding their administration of the Estate and in closing the Estate without paying or settling his claims; count 7, estoppel by refusing to comply with their contractual obligations and promises; count 8, breach of their fiduciary duty to the Estate and its creditors to pay and resolve creditor claims against the Estate; and count 9, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing owed to him under the purchase contract by failing to disclose and repair defects to the house and by administering the Estate in such a manner as to avoid having to pay his creditor claims against the Estate. ¶ 8 As reflected by the foregoing summary, Counts 5, 6, 8, and 9 (in part) were grounded on allegations the Estate had failed to pay Gordon’s creditor claims or that Sanborne and Maza had failed to properly administer the Estate by failing to settle and pay Gordon’s creditor claims against the Estate (the “Estate Claims”). In contrast, Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, and 9 (in part) were grounded on allegations that Sanborne and Maza were personally liable to him under the purchase contract for alleged defects and deficiencies in the house (the “Personal Liability Claims”). ¶ 9 On appeal, Gordon acknowledges that this case “is not about probate administration nor about me being a creditor with probate claims against the Estate; that was the previously decided Probate Matter. This Civil Suit at-bar is against the remaining defendants, Appellees, as individuals....” Given this acknowledgment, we do not need to decide whether the superior court properly dismissed the Estate Claims, and we deem Gordon to have abandoned the Estate Claims. See DeElena v. S. Pac. Co., 121 Ariz. 563, 572, 592 P.2d 759, 768 (1979) (issues not argued on appeal are deemed abandoned); see also Torrez v. Knowlton, 205 Ariz. 650, 552 n.1, ¶ 3, 73 P.3d 1285, 1287 n.1 (App. 2003) (appellate court deemed appellant to have abandoned any argument that superior court improperly granted summary judgment on one claim when, on appeal, appellant only challenged summary judgment on a different claim). ¶ 10 Gordon has not, however, abandoned the Personal Liability Claims against San-bome and Maza. On appeal, Gordon argues the superior court should not have dismissed those claims because Sanborne and Maza are individually liable on the purchase contract and the Personal Liability claims are neither time-barred nor barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. Reviewing the superior court’s ruling under the applicable standards of review, we agree with Gordon. II. Sanborne and Maza as Parties to the Purchase Contract ¶ 11 Gordon argues that because Sanborne and Maza failed to identify the Estate in the purchase contract, they cannot be shielded from personal liability as personal representatives of the Estate pursuant to A.R.S. § 14-3808(A) (2012). At common law, an estate was not liable on contracts entered by its personal representative in administering the estate even if the contracts were for the benefit of the estate. See Vance v, Myers’ Estate, 494 P.2d 816, 818 (Alaska 1972). This rule of personal liability was grounded on the notion that an estate was not a legal entity. 14 Amy M. Hess et al, Bogert’s Trusts and Trustees § 712 (3d ed., Sep. 2016) (similar to personal representative of an estate, trustee was the only legal entity who promised to perform a contract), This rule applied even when the personal representative disclosed to the other contracting party that he was acting on behalf of the estate in entering the contract. In this situation, assuming the contract benefited the estate, the personal representative could recover from the estate based on reimbursement or indemnity theories. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 246 cmt. a (1969) (trustee personally liable upon contracts made by him; if liability properly incurred by him, trustee entitled to indemnity from trust estate). ¶ 12 This was a harsh rale. Thus, beginning in the last century, courts and legislatures began to carve out exceptions to the rule. See generally Durden v. Century 21 Compass Points, Inc., 641 So.2d 1264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989), The Uniform Probate Code (“UPC”), which Arizona has adopted, has dispensed, in part, with the rale of personal liability. Thus, a contracting party with a claim against an estate may bring that claim directly against the estate by suing the personal representative of the estate in his fiduciary, that is, representational, capacity. See A.R.S. § 14-3808(C) (claim based on contract entered into by personal representative in his or her fiduciary capacity may be asserted against estate by proceeding against personal representative in his or her fiduciary capacity, whether or not personal representative is individually liable); see also Ader v. Estate of Felger, 240 Ariz. 32, 39, ¶ 22, 376 P.3d 97, 104 (App. 2016) (estate is a collection of decedent’s assets and liabilities and does not have capacity to bring or defend a suit; it can only sue and be sued through its personal representative) (citations and quotations omitted). Nevertheless, depending on the circumstances, a contracting party may also assert a direct claim against the personal representative in his or her personal or individual capacity. A.R.S, § 14-3808(B) (personal representative individually liable for obligations arising from control of estate in the course of administration of estate but only if personal representative is personally at fault). ¶ 13 Further, under the UPC, a personal representative may avoid personal or individual liability on a contract entered into in his or her fiduciary capacity if he or she makes certain disclosures in the contract. Section 14-3808(A), which is modeled after UPC § 3-808, provides: Unless otherwise provided in the contract, a personal representative is not individually liable on a contract properly entered into in his fiduciary capacity in the course of administration of the estate unless he fails to reveal his representative capacity and identify the estate in the contract. (Emphasis added.) Although no reported Arizona appellate decision has interpreted this provision, the Nebraska Supreme Court interpreted this provision, under facts similar to the facts presented here, and concluded a personal representative was not entitled to the protections afforded by the statute when the personal representative failed to comply with the statutory requirements. ¶ 14 In Purbaugh v, Jurgensmeier, 240 Neb. 679, 483 N.W.2d 757 (1992), the defendant, a personal representative of an estate, sold property belonging to the estate to the plaintiffs. The defendant signed the purchase contract in his own name followed by the initials “P.R.” Id. at 760. The contract did not disclose or otherwise indicate the property was property of the estate. Id. The plaintiffs subsequently sued the defendant for breach of the purchase contract. Id. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, concluding the plaintiffs had sued the wrong party because they had notice the defendant was acting in his capacity as personal representative for the estate. Id. at 761. ¶ 15 The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Id. at 764. It held the defendant had failed to comply with Nebraska’s version of UPC § 3-808, which is identical to A.R.S. § 14-3808(A), The court determined the initials “P.R.” after the defendant’s signature, without more, failed to put the plaintiffs on notice the defendant was acting for a particular estate: The initials “P.R,” which [the defendant] added to his signature may have been sufficient to inform a layperson that he or she was dealing with a personal representative, but there was nothing in the documents or dealings set forth in the record which would indicate what or whom [the defendant] represented.... Id. at 763 ¶ 16 Here, as in Purbaugh, Sanborne and Maza did not disclose in the purchase contract they were acting as personal representatives of the Estate, or that the Estate was the actual seller of the house. Thus, they failed to comply with the disclosure requirements of A.R.S. § 14-3808(A), and were not entitled to the protections against individual liability afforded by that statute. ¶ 17 Nevertheless, Sanborne and Maza argue Gordon had notice they were acting in a representative capacity because the purchase contract listed the seller as George Brooks and they signed their own names under the “seller’s signature” section of the purchase contract. But, even if we assume their signatures could have put Gordon on notice they were acting for a George Brooks, to trigger the protections afforded by A.R.S. § 14-3808(A), they were required to “reveal” both their “representative capacity and identify the estate in the contract.” A.R.S, § 14-3808(A) (emphasis added). The undisputed record before us reflects they failed to comply with the latter requirement. That the purchase contract identified “George Brooks” as the “seller” is insufficient, without more, to provide notice that Sanborne and Maza were acting on behalf of the Estate. Compare Myers-Leiber Sign Co., 2 Ariz.App. at 536, 410 P.2d at 493 (disclosure of tradename insufficient identification of principal), with Empire Office Machines, Inc. v. Aspen Trails Assocs. LLC, 374 Mont. 421, 322 P.3d 424, 426-27 (2014) (disclosure of tradename sufficient when parties had longstanding business relationship). ¶ 18 Sanborne and Maza also argue the warranty deed, which ■ they signed as the personal representatives of the Estate and which Gordon received after the sale closed, see supra ¶4, placed Gordon on notice they were acting in a representative capacity. We reject this argument. Section 14-3808(A) requires the personal representative to “reveal his representative capacity and identify the estate in the contract.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, a personal representative’s post-contractual disclosure that he was acting for an estate when he executed the contract is, sim ply put, too little, too late. ¶ 19 The court in Purbaugh also rejected a similar argument. Approximately one year after the parties had signed the contract, one of the plaintiffs wrote a letter to the defendant that referenced the existence of the estate. Purbaugh, 483 N.W.2d at 763. And, approximately three months later, the plaintiffs received a deed to the property that identified the defendant as the grantor, acting as the personal representative for the estate. Id. at 760, 763. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that neither the letter nor the deed demonstrated the plaintiffs had notice of the defendant’s status at the time the parties signed the contract because both were prepared after the parties had signed the contract. Id. at 763. ¶ 20 Here, Sanborne and Maza failed to comply with the disclosure requirements of A.R.S. § 14-3808(A). Accordingly, they are not entitled to the protections against individual liability afforded by A.R.S. § 14-3808(A). III. The Limitation Periods of the Probate Code ¶ 21 On appeal, as they did in the superior court, Sanborne and Maza argue Gordon’s claims were barred by various limitation periods set out in the probate code. Specifically, Sanborne and Maza argue A.R.S. § 14-3803(C) (2012), A.R.S. § 14-3933 (2012), and A.R.S. § 14-3936 (2012) all barred Gordon’s Personal Liability Claims. We address each statute in turn. A, A.R.S. § 14-3803(0 ¶ 22 Section 14-3803(0 provides time limits for “claims against a decedent’s estate that arise at or after” the decedent’s death. Under that section, all such claims are “barred against the estate [and] the personal representative” unless they are presented within the specified time periods. A.R.S. § 14-3803(C). On its face, this section only bars claims against an estate. It does not address claims against a personal representative in his or her individual capacity. The comments to UPC § 3-803, which is virtually identical to A.R.S. § 14-3803(C), make clear that the limitation periods specified in this provision apply only to claims against an estate: “The time limits stated would not, of course, affect any personal liability in contract ... of the personal representative....” Unif. Probate Code § 3-803 cmt. (amended 2010), 8 pt. 2 U.L.A. (2013). The comments continue, “Creditors of the estate and not of the personal representative thus face a special limitation that runs four months after performance is due from the personal representative.” Id. (emphasis added). Here, Gordon’s Personal Liability Claims are against Sanborne and Maza individually. Thus, A.R.S. § 14-3803(C) is inapplicable. B. A.R.S. § 14-3933 ¶ 23 Section 14-3933 addresses a personal representative’s use of a “closing statement” to close an estate. Section 14-3933(B) provides, “If no proceedings involving the personal representative[s] are pending in the court one year after the closing statement is filed, the appointment of the personal representative terminates.” Even if we assume this provision applies to a personal representative acting in his or her individual capacity, termination “does not discharge a personal representative from liability for transactions or omissions occurring before termination. ...” A.R.S. § 14-3608 (2012). Here, Gordon purchased the home before Sanborne and Maza filed the closing statements. Thus, A.R.S. § 14-3933 does not bar Gordon’s Personal Liability Claims. C. A.R.S. § 14-3935 ¶ 24 Section 14-3935 establishes a limitation period for claims against a person al representative for breach of fiduciary duty. It provides: Unless previously barred by adjudication ... the rights of successors and of creditors whose claims against the personal representative for breach of fiduciary duty have not otherwise been barred are barred unless a proceeding to assert the same is commenced within six months after the filing of the closing statement. A.R.S. § 14-3935. As we recognized in Tovrea v. Nolan, 178 Ariz. 485, 875 P.2d 144 (App. 1993), this six-month limitation period applies only to individuals who are acting in the capacity as a personal representative. ¶ 25 In Tovrea, the defendants were the personal representatives of a decedent’s estate and served as the trustees of a residuary trust created by the decedent’s will. Id. at 487, 875 P.2d at 146. The defendants provided an accounting to themselves in their individual capacities and as trustees of the residuary trust. Id. They refused, however, to provide the accounting to the trust’s remainder beneficiaries, the decedent’s children. Id. Well after the six-month limitation period of A.R.S. § 14-3935 expired, the children sued the defendants and accused them of breaching their fiduciary duties as the estate’s personal representatives and as trustees of the residuary trust. Id. The superior court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, ruling the six-month limitation period of A.R.S. § 14-3935 barred all of the children’s claims. Id. at 488, 875 P.2d at 147. On appeal, this court held the children’s claims against the defendants as personal representatives were subject to A.R.S. § 14-3935 and thus time barred. Id. at 489, 875 P.2d at 148. But, we concluded A.R.S. § 14-3935 was inapplicable to the children’s claims against the defendants as trustees. Id. ¶26 As Tovrea established, A.R.S. § 14-3935 does not apply to claims against a personal representative who acts in a capacity outside that of personal representative. Thus, the six-month limitation period of A.R.S. § 14-3935 is inapplicable to Gordon’s Personal Liability Claims against Sanborne and Maza. IV. Claim Preclusion. ¶ 27 Sanborne and Maza also argue the doctrine of claim preclusion bars Gordon’s Personal Liability Claims because the probate court rejected those claims when it denied his request to reopen the Estate. See supra ¶5. Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving the same parties or the parties’ privies bars a subsequent suit based on the same cause of action. Pettit v. Pettit, 218 Ariz. 529, 531, ¶ 4, 189 P.3d 1102, 1104 (App. 2008) (citation omitted). ¶ 28 Assuming, without deciding, that San-bome and Maza have established the first two elements of claim preclusion, an identity of claims and a final judgment on the merits, Sanborne and Maza have failed to establish the final element of claim preclusion, the same parties or the parties’ privies. Therefore, the superior court should not have dismissed Gordon’s Personal Liability Claims under the doctrine of claim preclusion. ¶29 Under the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 36(2) (1982), “A party appearing in an action in one capacity, individual or representative, is not thereby bound by or entitled to the benefits of the rules of [claim preclusion] in a subsequent action in which he appears in another capacity.” The comments to § 36(2) explain this rule applies to administrators of estates: “For [claim preclusion] purposes the determination as to his capacity in the transaction is binding on him only in the capacity in which he has participated in the litigation.” Id. cmt. b. ¶30 The court in Clark v. Amoco Prod. Co., 794 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1986), applied this Restatement provision. There, two heirs of a decedent sued an oil company seeking records to establish that the decedent had an interest in real property, and, thus, mineral rights in the property. Id. at 969. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Id. Then, in a second suit, after being appointed as the administrators of the decedent’s estate, the same individuals brought suit against the oil company seeking an accounting of minerals extracted from the property. Id. As with the first suit, the district court dismissed the second suit for fail ure to state a claim. Id. Citing the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 36(2), the Fifth Circuit reversed, explaining that claim preclusion “does not apply to a situation ... in which a party appears in one action in an individual capacity and in a subsequent action in a representative capacity.” Clark, 794 F.2d at 973; see also Brooks v. Arthur, 626 F.3d 194, 196-96 (4th Cir. 2010) (corrections officers not in privity with themselves in their official and individual capacities for purposes of claim preclusion). ¶ 31 The court in Jaramillo v. Burkhart, 999 F.2d 1241 (8th Cir. 1993), examined a grandmother’s differing capacities under the related doctrine of issue preclusion. There, a grandmother filed three diversity suits against a track driver who had fatally injured her daughter and injured her grandchildren in a car accident. Id. at 1243. The grandmother filed one of the suits as administrator of her daughter’s estate for wrongful death. Id. The grandmother filed the second and third suits as guardian of the grandchildren for personal injury. Id. The parties tried the wrongful death action to a jury, which returned a defense verdict. Id. The track driver then moved for summary judgment in the personal injury suits, arguing the suits were barred by issue preclusion. Id. The district court agreed and granted the track driver’s motion. Id. ¶32 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding the personal injury suits were not barred by issue preclusion because the grandmother appeared in the suits in different capacities: administrator and guardian. Id. at 1244, 1246. The court explained: A person acting in a fiduciary or representative capacity who litigates to judgment questions relating to his or her rights, duties, or liabilities in that capacity is not bound by that judgment in a subsequent proceeding with respect to his or her personal or individual rights connected with the same subject matter. Id. at 1244 (citation omitted). ¶33 Here, Sanborne and Maza argue “Gordon’s post hoc attempt to assert that the Amended Complaint was filed against the Co-Personal Representatives in their personal capacities is belied by a plain reading of the Amended Complaint, which defines San-borne and Maza as the Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate.” Therefore, they assert Gordon sued them only in their capacities as personal representatives of the Estate. Although Gordon alleged Sanborne and Maza had been the personal representatives of the Estate, he also alleged, in his amended complaint, that his claims were against San-borne and Maza personally and they were individually liable on the purchase contract. Therefore, Gordon alleged causes of action against Sanborne and Maza in their individual capacities. ¶ 34 Because Sanborne and Maza have appeared in this case, as related to the Personal Liability Claims, in a different capacity than they appeared in Gordon I, they are “not thereby bound by or entitled to the benefits of the rules of [claim preclusion]” in this case. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 36(2) (1982). CONCLUSION ¶ 35 For the foregoing reasons, the superi- or court should not have dismissed Gordon’s Personal Liability Claims against Sanborne and Maza. Because Gordon has abandoned the Estate Claims on appeal, we affirm the superior court’s dismissal of the Estate Claims and remand this case for further proceedings on, but only on, the Personal Liability Claims. On remand, the superior court shall dismiss any claims Gordon attempts to assert against the Estate or against Sanborne and Maza as personal representatives of the Estate which pertain in any way to their administration of the Estate. ¶ 36 Because Sanborne and Maza have not prevailed on Gordon’s Personal Liability Claims, we deny their request for attorneys’ fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01 (2016). As the prevailing party on appeal, we award Gordon his costs on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341 (2016), contingent upon his compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21. . Maribel Maza’s name also appears in the record as "Maribel Maza-Brooks” and "Maribel Brooks.” Consistent with the caption of this case, we refer to her as "Maribel Maza.” . We take judicial notice of the filings in the Estate's probate proceeding, In re Estate of Brooks, Maricopa County Cause No. PB2007-000389. See In re Sabino R., 198 Ariz. 424, 425, ¶ 4, 10 P.3d 1211, 1212 (App. 2000) (under Ariz. R. Evid. 201, appellate court may take judicial notice of anything superior court could take judicial notice of, even if superior court did not do so). . We use the modem terms of claim and issue preclusion rather than res judicata and collateral estoppel. See Circle K Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 179 Ariz, 422, 425, 880 P.2d 642, 645 (App. 1993) (the terms claim preclusion and issue preclusion are more descriptive, and thus less likely to cause confusion, than the terms res judicata and collateral estoppel). . In his opening brief, Gordon acknowledged two other causes of action, recording a false document and slander of title, were moot. . See Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, 355-56, ¶¶ 7-8, 284 P.3d 863, 866-67 (2012) (appellate court reviews a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim de novo and will affirm only if plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any facts susceptible of proof; appellate court reviews issues of law de novo) (citations and quotations omitted). . Gordon alleged in his amended complaint that Sanborne and Maza had "indicated” to him they "were relatives of Brooks” and authorized to negotiate and sign the purchase contract on his behalf. . The disclosure requirements of A.R.S. § 14-3808(A) mirror Arizona common law regarding the liability of an agent who executes a contract for a disclosed principal. See Cahn v. Fisher, 167 Ariz. 219, 221, 805 P.2d 1040, 1042 (App. 1990) (agent protected from personal liability on a contract if agent discloses he is acting as an agent for a third party and the third party’s identity); Myers-Leiber Sign Co. v. Weirich, 2 Ariz.App. 534, 536, 410 P.2d 491, 493 (1966) (agent who negotiates contracts on behalf of his principal may avoid personal liability on the contract if he discloses riot only his agency but also the identity of his principal). . This requirement also mirrors Arizona common law. See Myers-Leiber Sign Co., 2 Ariz.App. at 536, 410 P.2d at 493 (agent must disclose identity of principal to the other party at the time of the transaction; disclosure of identity of principal after contract executed will not relieve agent from liability on the contract). . This appeal arises out of the grant of a Rule 12(b) motion. We express no opinion as to whether Sanborne and Maza are entitled to protections against individual liability based on other legal principles, including whether Gordon had actual notice they were acting on behalf of the Estate. . On appeal, Gordon has also argued the superior court violated his due process rights in dismissing his amended complaint. That argument is frivolous and we reject it.

OPINION MILLER, Judge: ¶ 1 A jury found Jeremy Millis guilty of one count of intentional or knowing child abuse under circumstances likely to result in death or serious physical injury and one count of first-degree murder, both committed against a victim under age fifteen. Millis was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release for thirty-five years for murder, to be followed by a consecutive ten-year prison term for child abuse, On appeal, he contends the trial court erroneously precluded expert testimony about his autism, he was prejudiced by a duplicitous charge, and the court erred by allowing the victim’s mother to be accompanied at trial by a facility dog. We affirm for the following reasons. Factual and Procedural Background ¶ 2 “We view the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to upholding the jury’s verdict[s].” State v. Causbie, 241 Ariz. 173, ¶ 2, 384 P.3d 1253, 1255 (App. 2016). Millis and S.F. began dating in 2012 and after a few months they began sharing an apartment. Not long after that, the relationship ended and Millis moved out, but they remained on good terms with one another. In order to help offset the cost of the lease that S.F. now bore on her own, Millis agreed to watch S.F.’s two young sons one day a week while she was at work, ¶3 On the morning of January 24, 2013, S.F. changed the diaper of her eight-month-old son, C.K. He had no bruises on him. She later took some pictures of C.K. “having a lot of fun ,.. and being very smiley” in his bouncer, Millis arrived to babysit the boys and she left for work at around 2:00 p.m, Millis was the only person watching the boys while S.F, was at work. ¶4 S.F, arrived home around 11:00 p.m. She looked in on the boys and they appeared to be asleep. Millis told S.F. that C.K. had been coughing and choking earlier that night, but S.F. was not worried because she knew C.K. had a condition called tracheomalacia, a “floppiness” in the cartilage of the trachea that sometimes caused him to make choking sounds, cough, or wheeze. Millis left and S.F. went to bed. ¶ 5 C.K, woke up at about 2:30 or 3:00 a,m. and S.F. tried to feed him a bottle. He did not eat much, but seemed to go back to sleep after about fifteen or twenty minutes. Then at about 6:30 a.m., C.K. started crying in a way that “didn’t sound right. It wasn’t his normal cry.” S.F. picked him up but he would not open his eyes or respond to his name, and she had to hold his head up. ¶ 6 S.F, rushed C.K. to the hospital, which was across the street from her apartment, When they arrived at the emergency room, the staff took him right away, but he began having seizures. At 6:53 a.m., S.F, texted Millis and told him something was wrong with C.K.—he was crying “weird” and was nonresponsive, Millis replied that C.K. had been “a little weird when he did that cho[ ]Mng thing” the night before. She asked if C.K. had hit his head on anything, and Millis replied, “I don’t think so. Just from him sitting on the carpet and tip[p]ing over ... [b]ut nothing bad.” She told Millis C.K. was “seizing” and had a “head bleed,” to which Millis replied, “Oh my god. Maybe that’s what he was doing last night. I didn’t know what he was doing. I squeezed his neck a little [because] he was having trouble breathing. He cried a little then went back to sleep so I thought he was fine.” In a subsequent recorded confrontation call, Millis told S.F. he had found C.K. “stiff’ and making “gasping noises” at one point, and had responded by “squeezing] his neck” “firm[ly].” ¶ 7 C.K, had bilateral subdural hematomas, which caused bleeding on both sides of his brain, bruising, and swelling. Analysis of a CT scan indicated the head trauma had occurred within approximately the last twenty-four hours, and could not have been the result of C.K. merely falling back onto carpet from a seated position. His fontanel was also bulging, and in each eye he had “too many [retinal hemorrhages] to count” across all layers of the retina. C.K. also had bruises on his head, ears, neck, chin, upper arms, shoulders, and “wrap[ping] around” his chest and rib cage. Numerous medical professionals testified that C.K.’s injuries were not consistent with an accidental fall, but were consistent with blunt force head trauma, intentional choking, and violent shaking. ¶ 8 C.K. died on January 30, five days after he was admitted to the hospital. A forensic pathologist opined that the date of the injuries was five to six days prior to death. The pathologist ruled C,K.’s death a homicide and determined the co-equal and interrelated causes of death to be (1) blunt force trauma to the head, and (2) hypoxic ischemic injury, which is a lack of oxygen and blood to the brain. ¶ 9 S.F. was interviewed by investigating detectives the day C.K. was admitted to the hospital. She showed them her text message exchange with Millis. They located Millis, advised him of his Miranda rights, and he agreed to an interview. When they confronted him with information about C.K.’s head injuries, Millis told the detectives he had accidentally hit C.K.’s head on the oven door while he was talcing food out of the oven, even though he had denied any head injuries when he was texting with S.F. while she was at the hospital. He also told the detectives that C.K, had been “crying a lot” and that he had “choked [C.K.] with his hand, In a second Mirandized interview after C.K. died, Millis again admitted he had been “frustrated” with C.K., “just wanted him to stop crying,” and “chok[ed]” him to get him to quiet down, adding that he “just couldn’t take it anymore” and “I did what I did.” Millis also told his ex-wife in a recorded jail video call that “he [had] choked [S.F.’s] baby.” ¶ 10 At trial, Millis argued the blunt force trauma alone could have caused the brain swelling, which in turn could have choked off oxygenated blood to the brain, causing the hypoxic ischemic injury notwithstanding any strangulation. However, the forensic pathologist testified that the blunt force trauma alone could not account for certain injuries noted on an MRI. In closing, Millis argued that his choking the baby was not what killed him, that S.F, had inflicted the injuries that caused C.K,’s death after he had left that night, and that “shaking plus impact explains the [whole] universe of injuries that we have.” In the alternative, he argued he had choked C.K. recklessly or negligently, not intentionally. ¶ 11 The jury convicted Millis of all charges and he was sentenced as described above. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 18-4031 and 13-4033(A)(1). Preclusion of Expert Testimony ¶12 Millis argues the trial court erred by precluding a defense expert from testifying Millis suffers from autism spectrum disorder (ASD) when it concluded that the proffered testimony was diminished capacity evidence as opposed to character trait evidence. We review a ruling to admit or preclude expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. State v. Wright, 214 Ariz. 540, ¶ 5, 155 P.3d 1064, 1066 (App. 2007). Because Millis opposed the state’s motion to preclude the testimony and made an offer of proof, we review for harmless error. See Ariz. R. Evid. 103(a); State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, ¶ 18, 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005). ¶ 13 Before trial, defense counsel filed a motion to assess Millis’s competency pursuant to Rule 11.2(a), Ariz. R. Crim. P. Counsel attached to the motion the opinion of Dr. Pablo Stewart, who concluded in relevant part that Millis suffers from ASD without accompanying intellectual or language impairments. Relying on the testimony of two other experts who rejected that diagnosis, the trial court found Millis competent to stand trial. ¶ 14 Millis asked to continue the trial in order to accommodate Dr. Stewart’s schedule so that he could testify about the ASD diagnosis. The state moved to preclude any ASD testimony, which it characterized as evidence of diminished capacity. Defense counsel argued the ASD diagnosis would not be offered to show diminished capacity, but to show Millis had a character trait of “difficulty in understanding how to interact appropriately with others,” which could have made it “more or less likely that he formed the intent required in this particular ease.” After a heai’-ing at which Millis made an offer of proof, the trial court granted the state’s motion to preclude Stewart’s testimony, finding it was offered to support a diminished capacity defense and was not character evidence. The court also denied Millis’s motion to continue the trial. ¶ 15 Arizona does not recognize a “diminished capacity” defense, in which expert psychiatric evidence about a defendant’s mental incapacity is offered to negate mens rea. State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 540-41, 544, 931 P.2d 1046, 1050-51, 1054 (1997); see State v. Schantz, 98 Ariz. 200, 212-13, 403 P.2d 521, 529 (1965). Unlike insanity pursuant to AR.S. § 13-502(A)—an “affirmative defense that excuses, mitigates, or lessens a defendant’s moral culpability due to his psychological impairment”—the diminished capacity defense aims to rebut an element of mens rea. Mott, 187 Ariz. at 540, 931 P.2d at 1050. The court in Mott observed that our legislature declined to adopt a diminished capacity defense when given the opportunity, id. at 540-41, 931 P.2d at 1050-51, and instead confined “any consideration of characteristic behavior associated with mental disease” to its bearing on an insanity defense, Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 762, 126 S.Ct. 2709, 166 L.Ed.2d 842 (2006); Wright, 214 Ariz. 540, ¶ 15, 155 P.3d at 1069. ¶ 16 In Mott, our supreme court affirmed preclusion of evidence that “battered-woman syndrome” and low intelligence diminished the defendant’s capacity to decide to seek medical care for her child. 187 Ariz. at 544-45, 931 P.2d at 1054-55. Similarly, in State v. Buot, 232 Ariz. 432, 306 P.3d 89 (App. 2013), the defendant sought to introduce evidence that he had “behavior consistent with an intermittent explosive disorder and that his actions are reflexive and therefore impulsive and not the result of a conscious thought process.” Id. ¶ 11. We affirmed preclusion of the evidence because it was offered to rebut a knowing or reckless mens rea for a second-degree murder charge. Id. ¶20; see also § 13-502(A) (“impulse control disorders” cannot underpin insanity defense). And in State v. Lopez, 234 Ariz. 465, ¶¶ 20-23, 323 P.3d 748, 752 (App. 2014), we affirmed the preclusion of evidence of a defendant’s purported character trait of “acting impulsively under stress without being aware of the consequences of his actions,” reasoning that the only relevance of such evidence was for an impermissible diminished capacity defense. ¶ 17 Millis contends that Dr. Stewart’s testimony would not have rebutted an intentional or knowing mens rea, which he agrees would violate Arizona law, but instead would have established a lesser mens rea that would allow the jury to convict on reckless or negligent child abuse. Conviction for a lesser-included offense would also result in an acquittal on the felony murder charge. See A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(2). The state correctly notes the circular nature of this argument. Evidence that a person only acted with a mental state of recklessness or negligence necessarily means the person did not act knowingly or intentionally. See A.R.S. § 13-105(10). Millis acknowledged this purpose when defense counsel explained at the motion hearing the evidence would show “that being on the autism spectrum made Jeremy Millis less likely to be able to form certain intent.” Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Stewart’s proffered testimony was inadmissible diminished capacity evidence under Mott and its progeny. ¶ 18 Millis argues in the alternative that Dr. Stewart should have been allowed to present limited “observation evidence” about Millis’s character traits without mentioning the ASD diagnosis. See Clark, 548 U.S. at 757-58, 126 S.Ct. 2709 (defining “observation evidence” as “testimony from those who observed what [the defendant] did and heard what he said,” including “testimony that an expert witness might give about [the defendant’s] tendency to think in a certain way and his behavioral characteristics”); see generally Buot, 232 Ariz. 432, ¶ 13, 306 P.3d at 92; Wright, 214 Ariz. 540, ¶¶ 13-17, 155 P.3d at 1068-69. But he did not clearly present this argument to the trial court, nor did he cite Clark or its discussion of observation evidence below. To the contrary, his offer of proof specifically emphasized that Stewart needed to opine that Millis suffers from ASD. Cf. Clark, 548 U.S. at 757-60, 126 S.Ct. 2709 (distinguishing admissible “observation evidence” from inadmissible “mental-disease evidence,” i.e., “opinion testimony that [the defendant] suffered from a mental disease with features described by the witness”). We do not address an argument made for the first time on appeal. See State v. Flores, 160 Ariz. 235, 238, 772 P.2d 589, 592 (App. 1989). ¶ 19 Millis’s reliance on State v. Christensen, 129 Ariz. 32, 628 P.2d 580 (1981), is unavailing. In that case our supreme court held that expert testimony about the defendant’s purported character trait of impulsivity was admissible to rebut the premeditation element of first-degree premeditated murder. Id. at 34-35, 628 P.2d at 582-83. But subsequent cases have clarified that Christensen is only applicable in the context of premeditated murder. See Lopez, 234 Ariz. 465, ¶ 22, 323 P.3d at 752. Here, the jury was only instructed on felony murder, not on premeditated murder. Duplicitous Charges ¶20 Millis next contends duplicitous charges deprived him of his right to a unanimous jury verdict. Specifically, he argues some jurors could have concluded the child died from blunt force head trauma while others could have concluded he died from a lack of oxygen to the brain caused by choking. He did not object on this basis below; therefore, our review is limited to fundamental error. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, ¶¶ 19-20, 115 P.3d at 607-08. A denial of the right to a unanimous jury verdict constitutes fundamental prejudicial error. See State v. Delgado, 232 Ariz. 182, ¶ 19, 303 P.3d 76, 82 (App. 2013). ¶ 21 The right to a unanimous jury verdict is established in the Arizona Constitution. Ariz. Const, art. II, § 23. In the context of statutes describing offenses that may be committed in multiple ways—sometimes referred to as “alternative-means” or “single unified offense” statutes—the jury must be unanimous as to whether the charged criminal act has been committed. State v. West, 238 Ariz. 482, ¶¶ 13, 19, 362 P.3d 1049, 1055, 1056 (App. 2015). “However, ‘the defendant is not entitled to a unanimous verdict on the precise manner in which the act was commit ted’ ” as long as there is substantial evidence to support each of the charged means of commission. Id. ¶¶ 13, 15, quoting State v. Herrera, 176 Ariz. 9, 16, 859 P.2d 119, 126 (1993). The jury may reach a verdict “based on a combination of alternative findings.” Id. ¶ 13, quoting State v. Dann, 220 Ariz. 351, ¶ 79, 207 P.3d 604, 620 (2009). ¶ 22 First-degree murder is a single unified offense. See, e.g., State v. Tucker, 205 Ariz. 157, ¶¶ 50-51, 68 P.3d 110, 120 (2003), citing Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 643-45, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991); see also State v. Gomez, 211 Ariz. 494, n.3, 123 P.3d 1131, 1135 n.3 (2005) (affirming conviction where six jurors found first-degree felony murder and six found first-degree premeditated murder). It is unified because the harm the murder statutes seek to prevent is the same—the death itself. See State v. O’Laughlin, 239 Ariz. 398, ¶¶ 7-9, 372 P.3d 342, 345-46 (App. 2016) (distinction between statutes describing single unified offense rather than multiple offenses “often relies on the harm resulting from the crime”). Thus, jury unanimity is not required about the precise mechanism of death. See Schad, 501 U.S. at 631-32, 111 S.Ct. 2491, citing Andersen v. United States, 170 U.S. 481, 500, 18 5.Ct. 689, 42 L.Ed. 1116 (1898) (immaterial whether murder victim died by shooting or drowning; government need not charge these alternatively); see also State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, ¶ 81, 314 P.3d 1239, 1263 (2013) (“jury need not be unanimous as to the theory of first degree murder as long as all agree that the murder was committed”), quoting Gomez, 211 Ariz. 494, n.3, 123 P.3d at 1135 n.3. ¶ 23 Similarly, child abuse under circumstances likely to produce death or serious physical injury pursuant to AR.S. § 13-3623(A) is also a single unified offense. West, 238 Ariz. 482, ¶¶ 19-22, 362 P.3d at 1056-57. Although the crime can be committed in three different ways, the statute “focuses on a single harm to the victim.” Id. ¶ 21, quoting State v. Paredes-Solano, 223 Ariz. 284, ¶ 14, 222 P.3d 900, 906 (App. 2009); see Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, ¶¶ 80, 88, 90, 314 P.3d at 1262, 1263-64 (whether committed by failing to feed or failing to provide medical care, child abuse is “only one crime”). Thus, a child abuse defendant does not have a right to jury unanimity as to “the precise manner in which the act was committed.” West, 238 Ariz. 482, ¶ 30, 362 P.3d at 1059, quoting Herrera, 176 Ariz. at 16, 859 P.2d at 126. ¶ 24 Here, the trial court instructed the jury that in order to convict Millis of first-degree felony murder, the state was required to prove (1) the victim’s death occurred in the course of and in furtherance of the predicate felony (intentional or knowing child abuse under circumstances likely to produce death or serious physical injury), (2) “the death was proximately caused by the acts of the defendant,” and (3) “but for the defendant’s conduct, the death would not have occurred.” Millis is correct that some jurors may have concluded he intentionally or knowingly choked the child causing his death, while others may have concluded he intentionally or knowingly inflicted head trauma to cause death. But he was not entitled to a unanimous verdict as to the means of commission of child abuse, nor of first degree murder. Id. ¶ 46; see also Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, ¶¶ 88, 90, 314 P.3d at 1263-64. Furthermore, the state presented substantial evidence to support all three alternative means of child abuse. See West, 238 Ariz. 482, ¶ 30, 362 P.3d at 1059, citing State v. Forrester, 134 Ariz. 444, 447, 657 P.2d 432, 435 (1982). No duplicity error occurred. ¶ 25 Millis argues even if child abuse under § 13-3623(A)(1) is a single unified offense, he suffered a duplicitous charge pursuant State v. Klokic, 219 Ariz. 241, 196 P.3d 844 (App. 2008), because the state introduced evidence of multiple acts to support the child abuse charge that were not part of the same criminal transaction. In West, a recent case also dealing with fatal child abuse pursuant to § 13-3623(A), we considered and rejected this argument. 238 Ariz. 482, ¶¶ 31-39, 362 P.3d at 1059-61. We held the multiple-acts analysis in Klokic is generally inapplicable to cases involving a single unified offense such as child abuse under § 13-3623(A). See West, 238 Ariz. 482, ¶¶ 38-39, 362 P.3d at 1061. Here, as in West, the state had little choice but to allege the multiple acts because “it did not know the precise timing and nature of the injury leading to [C.K.’s] death.” Id ¶ 45. Moreover, as in West, even if the state alleged multiple acts to support the child abuse charge, these acts “‘only caused a single result’—[C.K’s] death—and were part of a ‘single criminal undertaking1 ” occurring over the course of a single afternoon and evening. Id, quoting Klokic, 219 Ariz. 241, ¶ 28, 196 P.3d at 850; see also Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, ¶¶ 88, 90, 314 P.8d at 1263-64 (child abuse “only one crime”; juiy unanimity not required as to whether offense committed by failing to feed or failing to seek medical attention). ¶26 Finally, even if a duplicity error had occurred, Millis has not met his burden of showing prejudice. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, ¶ 20, 115 P.3d at 607. First, as to the child abuse charge, regardless of whether the choking actually caused death, no reasonable juror could have failed to find that Millis knowingly or intentionally choked C.K. Cf. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, ¶ 90, 314 P.3d at 1264 (no reasonable jury could have failed to find defendant guilty of child abuse for failing to seek medical care). Millis repeatedly admitted choking C.K. so that he would stop crying, and the jury reasonably could have concluded that the bruises wrapping around C.K.’s neck were inflicted while Millis alone was watching him. And second, as to the first-degree murder charge, even if some jurors believed the choking Millis admitted was a but-for cause of death, while others believed the choking was not a cause of death but believed Millis knowingly or intentionally inflicted the blunt force trauma and that it caused C.K,’s death, Millis had no right to jury unanimity as to the means of commission of murder. See Schad, 501 U.S. at 631-32, 111 S.Ct. 2491. Victim’s Use of Facility Dog at Trial ¶ 27 Millis argues the trial court denied him due process and a fair trial by allowing a facility dog and its handler to sit beside S.F. during the trial. In keeping with the trial court’s “broad discretion” in managing trial conduct, State v. Cornell, 179 Ariz. 314, 332, 878 P.2d 1352, 1370 (1994), this court will not disturb a trial court’s ruling regarding the use of a facility dog absent an abuse of discretion, see State v. Dye, 178 Wash.2d 541, 309 P.3d 1192, ¶¶ 14-15, 19, 32 (2013) (en banc) (ruling allowing facility dog to accompany witness reviewed for abuse of discretion). ¶ 28 Following S.F.’s appearance at various pretrial hearings accompanied by a facility dog named “Blake,” Millis brought a motion in limine to preclude Blake’s presence at trial. He argued Arizona crime-victim law gives a victim a right to be accompanied by a support person, not a support animal, and that the dog would unfairly prejudice him by inviting the jury to base its decision on emotion or sympathy. The state argued Blake would not prejudice Millis, and would help S.F. testify in the midst of difficult circumstances. After a hearing, the trial court found that the dog’s presence would not unfairly prejudice Millis. Although the judge expressed a personal preference that Blake not be present, she saw no “legal basis” to exclude the dog and denied the motion. Millis moved for reconsideration, and the court denied that motion as well. Blake did not accompany S.F. while she testified, but only while she sat in the gallery. ¶ 29 The state argues we should review the due process aspect of Millis’s claim for fundamental error, citing Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, ¶¶ 19-20, 115 P.3d at 607-08. But Millis objected to Blake’s presence at trial in his motion in limine, and argued repeatedly that the dog would unfairly prejudice the jury against him. His motion and argument were sufficient to present the issue of trial fairness to the trial court, even if he never invoked the words “due process” or “fair trial.” See State v. Foshay, 239 Ariz. 271, ¶¶ 27-28, 370 P.3d 618, 624 (App. 2016). Accordingly, we review for harmless error. See Henderson, 210 Ariz. 661, ¶ 18, 116 P.3d at 607 (harmless error review places burden on state to prove beyond reasonable doubt error did not contribute to or affect verdict or sentence). ¶ 30 As Millis observed in his motion in limine, Rule 39(b), Ariz. R. Crim. P., gives a crime victim the right to be accompanied at interviews, depositions, and court proceedings by a parent, relative, or other “appropriate support person,” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 39(b)(8)-(9) (emphasis added), but is silent about whether the victim may be accompanied by a support animal. At the time of Millis’s trial, no Arizona statute discussed the use of a facility dog in the courtroom. Nor is there any Arizona case law on the subject. ¶31 Several other states, however, have considered the question and at least five have approved the use of dogs to accompany witnesses under appropriate circumstances. See People v. Chenault, 227 Cal.App.4th 1603, 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 9-12 (2014); People v. Spence, 212 Cal.App.4th 478, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 374, 404-06 (2012); State v. Devon D., 321 Conn. 656, 138 A.3d 849, 864-67 (2016); People v. Tohom, 109 A.D.3d 253, 969 N.Y.S.2d 123, 131-37 (2013); State v. Jacobs, 2015-Ohio-4353, ¶¶ 19-28, 2015 WL 6180908 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2015); Dye, 309 P.3d 1192, ¶¶ 17-32. ¶ 32 Millis first asserts that a dog accompanying a victim is “presumptively prejudicial” so as to jeopardize a fair trial in every case, and contends it “presentís] a nonevi-dentiary message” to the jury that the witness is an innocent victim. Other courts have rejected these arguments, as do we. See Chenault, 175 Cal.Rptr.3d at 10 (support dog not inherently prejudicial, just as support person not inherently prejudicial); Tohom, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 134 (no prejudice from “the eon-cededly unobtrusive presence of the dog in the courtroom”). Since the time of Millis’s trial, our own legislature has endorsed the use of facility dogs in certain circumstances. Section 13-4442, A.R.S., which came into effect after Millis filed his opening brief in this appeal, governs the use of such dogs for crime victims testifying in court. Among other things, it gives the court discretion to allow an adult crime victim to be accompanied by a dog. § 13-4442(B). Although § 13-4442 was not in effect at the time of Millis’s trial, it shows the policy of the State of Arizona to accommodate crime victims’ use of a dog. See Taylor v. Graham Cty. Chamber of Commerce, 201 Ariz. 184, ¶ 27, 33 P.3d 518, 525 (App. 2001) (“[W]hen .., the legislature has clearly spoken on a matter within its domain, its word constitutes public policy on that subject and controls, assuming no constitutional impediments exist.”). Moreover, there is no indication that this policy contaminates a fair trial in every case. Cf. Dye, 309 P.3d 1192, ¶¶ 29-30 (no indication in record that facility dog actually engaged in any prejudicial behavior; court would not “speculate about what might have happened at trial”). ¶33 Millis further argues the trial court failed to inquire into and weigh the appropriate factors to determine whether a facility dog was appropriate in this particular case and for this particular’ victim, in an abdication of its role in exercising discretion. See State v. Garza, 192 Ariz. 171, ¶ 16, 962 P.2d 898, 902 (1998) (failure to exercise discretion may constitute abuse of discretion). He notes that other jurisdictions typically allow facility dogs for children or developmentally disabled adult witnesses whose testimony might otherwise be unavailable, and argues the state made no particularized showing of why S.F.—an adult with no apparent disability— needed one. However, the record indicates that the court considered factors relevant to its discretionary balancing of potential benefits and potential prejudices from a dog. For instance, the court was informed that Blake would not accompany S.F. at the witness stand, but would only sit with her in the gallery. This supports the court’s finding that the use of the dog would not unfairly prejudice Millis, because the animal would have been less visible and prominent to the jury in the gallery than it would have at the witness stand. Cf. Devon D., 138 A.3d at 863 (trial court approved presence of dog at witness stand but ordered that dog be placed such that jury would not see it). The trial court also implicitly found that Blake would help prevent undue stress for S.F. during a difficult trial about the death of her infant son. See Ariz. R. Evid. 611(a)(3). The court did not abandon its duty to exercise discretion, nor did it abuse its discretion. Disposition ¶ 34 We affirm Millis’s convictions and sentences for the reasons stated above. . Although cases refer to victim/witness support dogs using many different terms, see, e,g., People v. Spence, 212 Cal.App.4th 478, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 374, 400 n.4 (2012) ("therapy dog" or "support canine"); State v. Jacobs, 2015-Ohio-4353, ¶ 19, 2015 WL 6180908 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2015) ("companion dog"); State v. Dye, 178 Wash.2d 541, 309 P.3d 1192, ¶ 1 (2013) (“comfort animal" or "facility dog”), we use the term "facility dog” in this opinion because that is the term our legislature elected to use in a newly enacted statute on the subject, see A.R.S. § 13-4442. . See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). . At another point, Millis told the detective that he had only "squeezed” C.K.’s neck because C.IC was having trouble breathing and Millis was trying "to see if there was something there, if he could move [the neck] around.” . This limitation comports with due process. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 769-71, 126 S.Ct. 2709, 165 L.Ed.2d 842 (2006). . Millis does not argue he faced a duplicitous indictment. See generally State v. Klokic, 219 Ariz. 241, ¶¶ 10-13, 196 P.3d 844, 846-47 (App. 2008) (distinguishing between duplicitous indictment and duplicitous charge). . The instruction went on to define proximate causation. . The knowing or intentional mens rea for child abuse under § 13—3623(A)(1) applies only to the defendant’s actions, not to the "under circumstances likely to produce death or serious physical injury” prong. See Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, ¶¶ 69-71, 314 P.3d at 1260-61. . In his motion for reconsideration, Millis argued in the alternative that he too should be allowed to have a dog with him during trial as a matter of equal protection. The state did not oppose Mil-lis’s request, but when the trial court asked Millis if having a dog with him at trial would actually comfort him, he said he did not think so and he did not need one. The court then denied Millis’s request. He does not challenge this ruling on appeal, nor does he raise an equal protection argument. . It is undisputed that S.F., as C.K.'s mother, is a "victim” under Arizona law. Ariz. Const, art. II, § 2.1(C); A.R.S. § 13-4401(19); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 39(a)(1). . Dye involved a developmentally disabled adult victim with an IQ of 65 and a mental age ranging from six to twelve years old who was "very scared" to testify about burglaries of his home. 309 P.3d 1192, ¶¶ 2-6, 9-10, 26. All of the other cases cited involved minor victims testifying about sexual abuse. .The statute also requires a jury instruction in cases involving a facility dog, in order "[t]o ensure that the presence of [the] facility dog ... does not influence the jury or is not a reflection on the truthfulness of any testimony” the witness offers. § 13-4442(C). . The factors the trial court considered in exercising its discretion in this case are not the only factors a court may properly consider in determining whether to allow witness accommodations, nor are they necessary considerations in every case.

THUMMA, Chief Judge: ¶1 Natasha S. appeals the superior court's order denying her motion for foster care payments. Because Natasha S. failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, the superior court lacked jurisdiction to consider her motion. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶2 For a time, Natasha S. was a licensed foster care provider for R.Y. in this dependency proceeding. While R.Y. was in her care, the Department of Child Safety (DCS) Office of Licensing and Regulation denied Natasha S.'s application to renew her foster care license. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (A.R.S.) § 8-506 (2019). Natasha S. challenged that denial administratively and continued to serve as foster placement for R.Y. When DCS affirmed the denial of her foster care license, Natasha S. did not challenge that final agency action in superior court. See A.R.S. § 41-1092.08 ; 12-901 to -914. ¶3 In December 2017, R.Y.'s guardian ad litem moved for an order requiring DCS to pay Natasha S. for foster care provided to R.Y. through November 2017. The superior court granted that motion and DCS paid the amount ordered; that order and payment are not part of this appeal. Later, Natasha S. moved for an order requiring DCS to pay her for foster care provided to R.Y. in December 2017. The superior court denied the motion, and Natasha S. timely filed this appeal challenging that denial. DISCUSSION ¶4 Natasha S. asserts appellate jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A) and 12-120.21(A)(1). DCS counters that Natasha S. is not an "aggrieved party" as required by A.R.S. § 8-235(A) and, alternatively, that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to consider her motion. Assuming (without deciding) that Natasha S. was an aggrieved party, the superior court lacked jurisdiction to consider her motion. ¶5 "[A]ppellate jurisdiction is derivative," meaning that "when jurisdiction is lacking in the trial court, it is lacking on appeal." Webb v. Charles , 125 Ariz. 558, 565, 611 P.2d 562 (App. 1980). This court "cannot consider an appeal from the superior court on the merits unless the superior court has jurisdiction." Riendeau v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 223 Ariz. 540, 541 ¶ 4, 225 P.3d 597, 598 (App. 2010). ¶6 The superior court has jurisdiction over juvenile proceedings brought under Title 8. See A.R.S. § 8-202. Title 8, however, does not grant that court jurisdiction to address foster care licensing or payment. Instead, those matters are first addressed administratively. See, e.g. , A.R.S. § 8-503(A)(4)(g) (granting DCS authority to "[e]stablish rules, regulations and standards for ... [u]niform amounts of payment for all foster homes according to certification"); Ariz. Admin. Code (A.A.C.) R21-1-301 to - 314 (setting forth such rules). An individual wishing to challenge an adverse decision by DCS on such matters may seek review by an Office of Administrative Hearings Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). See A.A.C. R21-1-301 to - 314 ; Ariz. Dep't of Child Safety, Policy and Procedure Manual ch. 4, § 9 (eff. Oct. 15, 2018), https://extranet.azdcs.gov/DCSPolicy/Content/04_Out_of_Home_Care/foster_care_rate.htm. When such review is requested, the ALJ issues a recommended decision after an evidentiary hearing. A.A.C. R21-1-313. After review of the ALJ's recommended decision, DCS issues a final administrative decision. Id. An aggrieved party may seek judicial review of a final administrative decision pursuant to Arizona's Administrative Procedures Act (APA). See A.R.S. §§ 12-901 to - 914; 41-1092.08(H); A.A.C. R21-1-314. ¶7 "[A] party must exhaust his administrative remedies before appealing to the courts." Minor v. Cochise Cty. , 125 Ariz. 170, 172, 608 P.2d 309, 311 (1980). A failure to do so means "judicial interpretation is withheld until the administrative process has run its course." Id. Natasha S. did not exhaust her administrative remedies before seeking a court order requiring foster care payments. Even if she had, any court challenge by Natasha S. to a final DCS administrative decision would be made under the APA pursuant to Title 41, not in this Title 8 case. See A.R.S. §§ 41-1092.08(H) ; 12-901 to -914. Accordingly, the superior court in this dependency proceeding lacked jurisdiction to consider her motion for foster care payments. CONCLUSION ¶8 Because the superior court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion for foster care payments, this court lacks appellate jurisdiction to consider the merits of that denial. See Riendeau , 223 Ariz. at 541 ¶ 4, 225 P.3d at 598 ; Webb , 125 Ariz. at 561, 611 P.2d at 565. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated. The court in this dependency ultimately appointed Natasha S. guardian for R.Y., A.R.S. §§ 8-871 to -874, a ruling recently vacated given a failure to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act, see Navajo Nation v. Dep't of Child Safety , --- Ariz. ----, 441 P.3d 982, 2019 WL 1723574 (Ariz. App. Apr. 18, 2019) (mem. dec.). Because the superior court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion, this decision is without prejudice as to any administrative remedies Natasha S. may have available to recover payment for foster care.

JUSTICE LOPEZ, opinion of the Court: ¶1 The issue in this case is whether the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System ("AHCCCS") statutory scheme, A.R.S. §§ 36-2901 to -2999.57, abrogates, or creates an exception to, Arizona's statutory physician-patient privilege, A.R.S. § 13-4062(4), in cases of suspected AHCCCS fraud. We hold that it does in two ways. First, the Arizona legislature's grant of broad authority to AHCCCS to investigate suspected fraud necessarily implies an exception to the privilege for internal AHCCCS investigations and proceedings. And, second, the AHCCCS statutes implicitly abrogate the privilege in the criminal investigation and prosecution of suspected AHCCCS fraud because the disclosure requirements in the AHCCCS statutes and the legislature's clear intent to support criminal prosecution of AHCCCS fraud preclude harmonizing the physician-patient privilege with the AHCCCS statutes. I. ¶2 Chalice Zeitner visited a Phoenix obstetrician for an abortion in early March 2010, claiming she had discovered she was pregnant after recently undergoing extensive radiation and chemotherapy treatments for cancer. The obstetrician referred her to a specialist, whom Zeitner told she had been diagnosed with a malignant uterine tumor and was undergoing chemotherapy. In late March 2010, Zeitner successfully applied for AHCCCS benefits, stating on her application that she had a serious chronic illness and her pregnancy was high-risk and life-threatening. ¶3 On March 31, the obstetrician received an email seemingly following up on a procedure the obstetrician had proposed to Zeitner. The email, signed by "Al Zeitner," emphasized the urgency of the procedure, claiming Zeitner would resume cancer treatments on April 9 and needed to have her tumor removed within four weeks. A few days later, Zeitner provided the obstetrician a letter purportedly written by a doctor at the out-of-state hospital Zeitner claimed had treated her for cancer. The letter recommended that Zeitner "receive an urgent [abortion] ... to relieve third term life-threatening certainties to the patient." The obstetrician, relying on this information, concluded that an abortion was necessary to protect Zeitner's health. Based on his opinion, AHCCCS authorized payment for the procedure, and the obstetrician performed the abortion on April 9. ¶4 While performing a caesarean section on Zeitner for another pregnancy nearly a year later, the obstetrician found no physical evidence to support Zeitner's previous claims of uterine cancer. Upon further investigation, he discovered the letter delivered by Zeitner in early April was not authored by the doctor whose name appeared on the letter. The obstetrician reported his suspicions about Zeitner to her health plan, which forwarded the matter to AHCCCS for investigation. ¶5 A grand jury eventually indicted Zeitner on eleven counts, including charges for defrauding AHCCCS, which generally does not cover abortions except when necessary to save a woman's life or to protect a woman's health. See A.R.S. § 35-196.02(A)-(B). The State alleged that Zeitner lied about having cancer so her abortion would fall within the exception to that rule. The State also alleged Zeitner committed identity theft and forgery by impersonating a doctor recommending that she receive her abortion. Zeitner pleaded not guilty to every charge and moved to preclude all information her physicians obtained from her, including records of her communications with the physicians and their examinations of her, arguing they were protected under Arizona's physician-patient privilege. The State opposed the motions, arguing the privilege was abrogated by statute, and the trial court denied the motions before trial. After an eleven-day trial, in which the court admitted Zeitner's medical records and allowed her physicians to testify, the jury convicted Zeitner on all charges. ¶6 Zeitner's sole argument on appeal was that the superior court erred by admitting her medical records and allowing her physicians to testify against her. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the AHCCCS statutes abrogated "the [physician-patient] privilege ... in cases of suspected AHCCCS fraud." State v. Zeitner , 244 Ariz. 217, 219 ¶ 1, 224 ¶ 28, 418 P.3d 990, 992, 997 (App. 2018). The court reasoned that while no common-law exception to the physician-patient privilege applies in Arizona, the legislature has created exceptions to the privilege. Id. at 222 ¶ 22, 418 P.3d at 995. The court noted that the AHCCCS statutes require health-care providers to report suspected fraud to AHCCCS, A.R.S. § 36-2918.01(A), and to turn over patient records to fraud investigators, A.R.S. § 36-2903(I). Id. at 222-23 ¶ 23, 418 P.3d at 995-96. Therefore, the court concluded, the AHCCCS statutes "abrogate the privilege by implication when fraud is suspected by imposing disclosure obligations on physicians that are entirely inconsistent with the privilege." Id. at 223 ¶ 24, 418 P.3d at 996. ¶7 We granted review because whether the AHCCCS statutory scheme abrogates Arizona's physician-patient privilege presents an issue of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution. II. ¶8 We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. In re Estate of Wyatt , 235 Ariz. 138, 139 ¶ 5, 329 P.3d 1040, 1041 (2014). We likewise review de novo whether and to what extent a privilege applies. Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Burke , 204 Ariz. 251, 253-54 ¶ 10, 63 P.3d 282, 284-85 (2003). ¶9 In 1965, Congress established the federal Medicaid program to provide medical care to qualified low-income individuals. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 to 1396w-5. States may voluntarily participate in the program and acquire federal funding by developing a medical-assistance plan, but state plans must satisfy the requirements established by the federal statutory scheme and accompanying administrative regulations. See id. § 1396a; 42 C.F.R. §§ 431.1 to 431.1010. A state's failure to comply with an approved Medicaid plan may result in a loss of federal funding. See 45 C.F.R. § 201.6(a). Arizona's AHCCCS program administers this state's Medicaid plan. See Sw. Fiduciary, Inc. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys. Admin. , 226 Ariz. 404, 406 ¶ 8, 249 P.3d 1104, 1106 (App. 2011). ¶10 Federal law, both by statute and regulation, requires state Medicaid plans to include specific procedures to ensure disclosure of patient records during fraud investigations. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(27), a state plan must provide for agreements with service providers to keep records of services provided and to furnish those records to the state Medicaid agency upon request. Although a state plan must provide safeguards "that restrict the use or disclosure of information concerning applicants and beneficiaries" to specific purposes, 42 C.F.R. § 431.301, those purposes include "[c]onducting or assisting an investigation, prosecution, or civil or criminal proceeding related to the administration of the plan," 42 C.F.R. § 431.302(d). ¶11 Federal law also requires state Medicaid agencies to support independent prosecutorial entities in their investigation and prosecution of fraud. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(61), states must operate fraud control units, independent of their Medicaid agencies, to prosecute fraud. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(q) (establishing the requirements and duties of states' fraud control units regarding fraud prosecutions). Furthermore, state Medicaid agencies must conduct internal investigations of any report of fraud, 42 C.F.R. § 455.14, and must refer suspected provider or beneficiary fraud to the state's fraud control unit or "appropriate law enforcement agency," respectively, 42 C.F.R. § 455.15. A state's fraud control unit must have "[a]ccess to ... any records or information kept by the agency or its contractors ... [or] by providers to which the agency is authorized access." 42 C.F.R. § 455.21(a)(2)(i), (iii). It must also "make available to [f]ederal investigators or prosecutors all information in its possession concerning fraud in the provision or administration of medical assistance under the [s]tate plan." 42 C.F.R. § 1007.11(e). ¶12 As evinced by these federal laws, the disclosure of patient information relevant to a law enforcement investigation and prosecution of fraud against a state's Medicaid agency is closely tied to the administration of a state's plan. See generally In re Grand Jury Investigation , 441 A.2d 525, 531 (R.I. 1982) ("The federal policy requiring disclosure of patient records for fraud investigations is very necessary to the continued viability of the Medicaid program."). ¶13 Arizona statutes and AHCCCS rules have implemented the same investigation and disclosure requirements mandated by federal law. Section 36-2903(H)"require[s] as a condition of a contract with any contractor that all records relating to contract compliance are available for inspection by [AHCCCS]." AHCCCS must "prescribe by rule the types of information that are confidential and circumstances under which such information may be used or released, including requirements for physician-patient confidentiality." § 36-2903(I). In compliance with this provision, AHCCCS provides that it "may release safeguarded information without the [beneficiary's] written or verbal consent, for the purpose of conducting or assisting an investigation, prosecution, or criminal or civil proceeding related to the administration of the AHCCCS program." Ariz. Admin. Code R9-22-512(A)(2). ¶14 Internally, AHCCCS must investigate every report of suspected fraud, § 36-2918.01(A), and it has broad authority to subpoena any witness or record necessary to support that investigation, A.R.S. § 36-2918(G). If the results of the investigation cause the AHCCCS director or the director's designee to believe that fraud has occurred, AHCCCS must refer the matter to the attorney general. § 36-2918.01(A). ¶15 Within the Attorney General's Office, Arizona has established the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit ("MFCU"), which is responsible for investigating and criminally prosecuting Medicaid provider fraud. See Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Office of Inspector Gen., OEI-07-15-00280, Arizona State Medicaid Fraud Control Unit: 2015 Onsite Review 1, 3-4 (2015) ("2015 Onsight Review "). If the MFCU requests a beneficiary's medical record during its investigation of suspected fraud, AHCCCS must release the record without the beneficiary's consent, "[n]otwithstanding any law to the contrary." § 36-2903(I). ¶16 Zeitner argues that the sole purpose of any release or disclosure to the attorney general is intended to further "an internal process for evaluating claims of fraud so that administrative [rather than criminal] measures can be taken." We disagree. Instead, we are persuaded by the court of appeals' conclusion that the legislature intended claims of fraud to be referred from AHCCCS to the attorney general for independent investigation and criminal prosecution. See Zeitner , 244 Ariz. at 223 ¶ 25, 418 P.3d at 996. The legislature has granted AHCCCS broad independent authority to pursue administrative and civil penalties against beneficiaries and providers engaged in fraud against AHCCCS without the attorney general's involvement. See A.R.S. §§ 36-2905.04(D), (G) and -2918(B)-(C), (F). More importantly, AHCCCS must provide medical records to the MFCU without a beneficiary's consent in cases of suspected fraud, § 36-2903(I), and the MFCU prosecutes only criminal Medicaid fraud cases, not civil cases, see 2015 Onsite Review 4. Although Arizona's MFCU prosecutes only provider fraud, the AHCCCS statutes provide that, "[i]n addition to the requirements in state law, the [M]edicaid fraud and abuse controls that are enacted under federal law apply to all persons eligible for the system." § 36-2905.04(C) (emphasis added). Thus, any disclosure requirements contemplated by the federal Medicaid scheme to control fraud, including those involving beneficiaries, are expressly adopted by the state Medicaid scheme. ¶17 For these reasons, we conclude that both the federal and state Medicaid schemes contemplate and require the disclosure of confidential patient information to assist in the criminal prosecution of providers and beneficiaries who engage in fraud against the Medicaid system. We next examine whether, despite these federal and state statutory and regulatory disclosure mandates, the physician-patient privilege prohibits such disclosure of confidential patient information. III. ¶18 Arizona's physician-patient privilege statute, applicable in criminal cases, prohibits the examination of "[a] physician or surgeon, without consent of the physician's or surgeon's patient, as to any information acquired in attending the patient which was necessary to enable the physician or surgeon to prescribe or act for the patient." § 13-4062(4). We have held that the privilege protects "[a]ll information obtained by the physician, whether from examination, testing, or direct communication," State v. Mincey , 141 Ariz. 425, 439, 687 P.2d 1180, 1194 (1984), and, although framed as a testimonial privilege, the privilege also protects patient medical records, see Tucson Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Misevch , 113 Ariz. 34, 37, 545 P.2d 958, 961 (1976) (citing Tucson Med. Ctr. Inc. v. Rowles , 21 Ariz. App. 424, 520 P.2d 518 (1974) ). ¶19 "The primary purpose of the physician[-]patient privilege is to protect communications made by a patient to his or her physician for the purpose of treatment." Mincey , 141 Ariz. at 439, 687 P.2d at 1194 (citing State v. Santeyan , 136 Ariz. 108, 110, 664 P.2d 652, 654 (1983) ). The privilege is also intended "to [e]nsure that [a] patient will receive the best medical treatment by encouraging full and frank disclosure of medical history and symptoms by a patient to his doctor." Lewin v. Jackson , 108 Ariz. 27, 31, 492 P.2d 406, 410 (1972). That purpose is served by "protect[ing] information obtained in the physician-patient relationship from disclosure to third parties." Samaritan Health Servs. v. City of Glendale , 148 Ariz. 394, 397, 714 P.2d 887, 890 (App. 1986). ¶20 But the physician-patient privilege is not absolute, and the legislature has imposed limitations when "the public good requires [the privilege to] give way to serve a greater good." See Martin v. Reinstein , 195 Ariz. 293, 320 ¶ 96, 987 P.2d 779, 806 (App. 1999) ; see also State v. Wilson , 200 Ariz. 390, 394-95 ¶ 11, 26 P.3d 1161, 1165-66 (App. 2001). In many instances, the legislature has created express exceptions to the privilege within the language of the applicable statutes. See, e.g. , A.R.S. § 46-453(A) ("[T]he physician-patient privilege ... shall not pertain in any civil or criminal litigation in which a vulnerable adult's exploitation, abuse or neglect is an issue ...."); A.R.S. § 23-908(D) ("[I]nformation obtained by any physician or surgeon examining or treating an injured person shall not be considered a privileged communication ...."). ¶21 In other instances, the legislature has created exceptions by merely mandating disclosure of information otherwise protected by the physician-patient privilege. See, e.g. , A.R.S. § 13-3806(A) (requiring physicians to disclose to law enforcement wounds which may have resulted from illegal activity); A.R.S. § 36-621 (requiring physicians to disclose to the health department evidence of contagious or infectious diseases). Collectively, "[t]hese [exceptions] indicate that the legislature has found certain societal interests sufficiently important to override the state's general interest in protecting confidential patient information from disclosure to third parties." Samaritan , 148 Ariz. at 397, 714 P.2d at 890 ; see also Johnson v. O'Connor , 235 Ariz. 85, 92 ¶ 29, 327 P.3d 218, 225 (App. 2014) ("The public policy of apprehending and prosecuting criminals often trumps the policy of the privilege.") (citing A.R.S. §§ 13-3620(A) and -3620(K)(1)); State ex rel. Udall v. Superior Court , 183 Ariz. 462, 463, 466, 904 P.2d 1286, 1287, 1289 (App. 1995) (holding that the physician-patient privilege did not shield the medical records of a mother charged with murdering her infant); Benton v. Superior Court , 182 Ariz. 466, 468, 897 P.2d 1352, 1354 (App. 1994) ("[T]he public's interest in protecting victims outweighs the privacy interest reflected in the physician-patient privilege."). ¶22 Although we acknowledge that abrogation by implication "is generally disfavored," we have concluded that "it is required when conflicting statutes cannot be harmonized to give each effect and meaning." Cave Creek Unified School Dist. v. Ducey , 233 Ariz. 1, 7 ¶ 24, 308 P.3d 1152, 1158 (2013) (citing UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Craig , 200 Ariz. 327, 333 ¶¶ 28-29, 26 P.3d 510, 516 (2001) ; Ariz. State Tax Comm'n v. Reiser , 109 Ariz. 473, 479, 512 P.2d 16, 22 (1973) ). Here, even absent an express exception, the statutory scheme reflects the legislature's intent to exempt AHCCCS from the comprehensive constraints imposed by the physician-patient privilege. Based on its purpose and scope, the privilege would generally prohibit the type of disclosures required by the AHCCCS statutes (i.e., disclosure of confidential patient information to a third party). Nevertheless, physicians providing AHCCCS services must report "any cases of suspected fraud," and AHCCCS must investigate these reports. § 36-2918.01(A). In conducting its investigations, AHCCCS may subpoena and "examine any person under oath" and "compel the production of any record ... necessary to support an investigation." § 36-2918(G). We cannot infer that the legislature, in granting such broad investigatory authority, intended the privilege to stand as a bulwark against AHCCCS fraud investigations. Accordingly, considering the nature of legislative exceptions to the privilege and the purposes those exceptions serve-the prosecution of crime or the protection of a "greater good"-we conclude that the provisions expressly granting AHCCCS the authority to compel disclosure of patient information to investigate reports of fraud- §§ 36-2903 and -2918(G)-create an exception to the privilege for internal AHCCCS investigations and proceedings. ¶23 We likewise conclude that the MFCU possesses authority to compel disclosure of patient information to investigate and prosecute fraud. It is illogical to believe that the legislature intended AHCCCS to withhold information relevant to a criminal investigation and prosecution of fraud after expressly mandating that all matters of suspected fraud be referred to the attorney general. See § 36-2918.01(A). The critical issue in a Medicaid beneficiary fraud case is whether the beneficiary lied to her physician to obtain AHCCCS coverage. This is particularly true, as here, where the beneficiary's fraud is designed to obtain AHCCCS coverage for services not generally covered by the program. We fail to see how the attorney general can fulfill his duty-and the legislature's intent-to prosecute beneficiary fraud, or how a jury can determine whether the beneficiary committed fraud against AHCCCS, without having access to the beneficiary's and physician's relevant communications. It is the very information contained within these communications that forms the foundation of the fraud charges. Because the physician-patient privilege would prohibit the same disclosures that the AHCCCS statutes require, we conclude that the privilege cannot be harmonized with the AHCCCS statutes "to give each effect and meaning." See Cave Creek , 233 Ariz. at 7 ¶ 24, 308 P.3d at 1158. Accordingly, we also hold that the AHCCCS statutes implicitly abrogate the privilege in the attorney general's investigation and prosecution of suspected AHCCCS fraud. ¶24 Zeitner contends that, even if the statutory scheme abrogates the physician-patient privilege as to AHCCCS, patient information disclosed to the attorney general (through the MFCU) remains subject to its protections. We are unpersuaded. In addition to lacking statutory support, this contention does nothing to advance the purpose of the privilege. After AHCCCS begins its internal investigation of fraud, the protective curtain of confidentiality-intended to promote full and frank disclosures between a patient and her physician-is already stripped away. And even if such an interpretation did somehow advance the privilege's purpose, the state and public's legitimate and substantial interests in deterring and prosecuting fraud and preserving the state's federal Medicaid funding carry the day over the patient's residual privacy interests. See generally Benton , 182 Ariz. at 468, 897 P.2d at 1354 (holding that in instances where a victim invokes the privilege to protect her abuser, "the public's interest in protecting victims outweighs the privacy interest reflected in the physician-patient privilege"). ¶25 Zeitner next argues that § 36-2903(I) distinguishes between the "use" and "release" of privileged information and only provides for the "release" of such information, thereby prohibiting the attorney general from introducing the privileged information at trial. We disagree. The basic statutory premise of Zeitner's argument is flawed. Section 36-2903(I), which contains the distinguishing language between use and release, requires the AHCCCS director to create rules governing the use or release of confidential information, which unquestionably includes information generally protected by the physician-patient privilege. These rules, however, govern only the actions of the agency and those who contract to provide services for the agency. See Ariz. Admin. Code R9-22-512(A) (limiting the release of safeguarded information by "[t]he Administration, contractors, providers, and noncontracting providers"). Consequently, after AHCCCS refers a matter to the attorney general for prosecution of beneficiary fraud, the agency's rules no longer apply, and the distinction between use and release is immaterial. ¶26 Furthermore, interpreting the AHCCCS statutory scheme as precluding the use of the very information that the statutes require to be released to support the investigation and prosecution of fraud would generate an absurd result. See, e.g. , State ex rel. Montgomery v. Harris , 237 Ariz. 98, 101 ¶ 13, 346 P.3d 984, 987 (2014) (noting that "[s]tatutes should be construed sensibly to avoid reaching an absurd conclusion"). Zeitner's position is untenable because it would defeat the purpose of those statutes and regulations which contemplate disclosure and prosecution-to deter and punish AHCCCS fraud by providers and beneficiaries. ¶27 Zeitner further argues that, even if the privilege is abrogated, it is only abrogated to the extent expressly contemplated by the AHCCCS statutes-the release or disclosure of patient medical records, not physician testimony. This argument, too, is unavailing. We agree with the court of appeals that "[i]t would serve little purpose, and would make little sense, for a patient to retain the power to prevent her physician from testifying when the physician can be legally compelled to release the patient's medical records." Zeitner , 244 Ariz. at 224 ¶ 26, 418 P.3d at 996-97. Arizona courts have expanded the physician-patient privilege beyond its original testimonial protections to include patients' medical records because "the privilege ... would be rendered meaningless if it were destroyed the moment that a physician transcribed communications from a patient or knowledge he has obtained from his examination of a patient into hospital records." Rowles , 21 Ariz. App. at 427, 520 P.2d 518. Applying that same reasoning in reverse, protecting the physician's testimony after compelling disclosure of a patient's medical records would not advance the privilege-the curtain of confidentiality has already been pulled aside. Thus, the only purpose served by restricting disclosure to medical records would be to impede the attorney general in his investigation and prosecution of AHCCCS fraud, a result wholly inconsistent with the AHCCCS statutory fraud control scheme. IV. ¶28 The comprehensive fraud control measures embodied in the federal and state Medicaid schemes, including sweeping patient record disclosure requirements, make clear that the physician-patient privilege must yield to the State's interest in combatting fraud where providers and beneficiaries are suspected of AHCCCS fraud. The legislature's express provisions in the AHCCCS statutes granting AHCCCS broad authority to investigate matters of suspected fraud- §§ 36-2903 and -2918(G)-necessarily imply an exception to the privilege for AHCCCS investigations and proceedings. These same provisions also exhibit an intent to provide law enforcement access to patient information when investigating and prosecuting AHCCCS fraud, thereby implicitly abrogating the privilege in the attorney general's investigation and prosecution of suspected provider and beneficiary AHCCCS fraud. ¶29 Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' opinion and affirm Zeitner's convictions and resulting sentences.

MORSE, Judge: ¶1 A conviction for a felony violation of a state controlled substance law can be a bar to becoming a dispensary agent under the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act ("AMMA"). In Arizona, preparatory offenses are distinct from, but defined by, a substantive offense. We consider whether a conviction for solicitation to commit possession of a dangerous drug for sale is a violation of a state controlled substance law. Affirming the superior court's judgment, we hold that it is. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 In June 2009, Mark Murro pled guilty to solicitation to commit possession of a dangerous drug for sale. The court suspended sentence and imposed probation, from which Murro was discharged in November 2011. In 2010, voters enacted the AMMA, which authorizes the Department of Health Services ("DHS") to approve a person to become a dispensary agent. State v. Gear , 239 Ariz. 343, 344, ¶ 2, 372 P.3d 287, 288 (2016) ; Ariz. Rev. Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 36-2804.01. In 2017, Murro applied for a dispensary agent registry identification card. In his application, Murro stated that he had not been convicted of an "excluded felony offense," and subsequently was approved for a dispensary agent registry identification card. After a few months, DHS discovered his conviction for solicitation to commit possession of a dangerous drug for sale. DHS sent Murro a Notice of Intent to Revoke Dispensary Agent's Registry Identification Card and Notice of Right to Request Administrative Hearing. The Notice alleged that Murro was convicted of an excluded felony offense and had knowingly violated the AMMA by submitting false information in his application and acting as a dispensary agent when he was not qualified to do so. ¶3 Murro requested a hearing with an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), and the ALJ upheld DHS's decision to revoke Murro's identification card. Murro appealed to the Director of DHS ("Director"), who adopted the ALJ's findings of fact and conclusions of law with minor revisions and revoked Murro's identification card. Murro appealed to the superior court, which affirmed the Director's decision. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-913 and -2101(A)(1). DISCUSSION ¶4 We will uphold the Director's decision unless it is "contrary to law, is not supported by substantial evidence, is arbitrary and capricious or is an abuse of discretion." A.R.S. § 12-910(E). Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. Id .; see also Compassionate Care Dispensary, Inc. v. Arizona Dep't of Health Services , 244 Ariz. 205, 211, ¶ 17, 418 P.3d 978, 984 (App. 2018). "[W]hen considering the voters' intent in enacting the AMMA, our task is to apply the law they have written." Parsons v. Arizona Dep't of Health Services , 242 Ariz. 320, 324, ¶ 15, 395 P.3d 709, 713 (App. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶5 A person convicted of an "excluded felony offense" is barred from becoming a medical marijuana dispensary agent under the AMMA, and DHS must revoke the identification card of a dispensary agent who is convicted of an excluded felony offense. A.R.S. §§ 36-2804.01(D), -2815(A). An excluded felony offense includes a felony "violation of a state or federal controlled substance law," with certain exceptions that do not apply here. A.R.S. § 36-2801(7)(b). The question is whether solicitation to commit possession of a dangerous drug for sale is a "violation of a state ... controlled substance law." ¶6 Solicitation, like Arizona's other inchoate offenses, does not inherently deal with any particular subject matter. See A.R.S. §§ 13-1001 (attempt); 13-1002 (solicitation); 13-1003 (conspiracy); 13-1004 (facilitation). Instead, solicitation is defined by the underlying offense, such that the elements of solicitation require proof that a person acted "with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission" of the underlying offense, and the classification of the underlying offense determines the classification of the solicitation offense. A.R.S. § 13-1002(A), (B). Because the crime of solicitation does not exist without incorporating other laws, solicitation is a law whose character or type depends wholly on the underlying substantive offense. ¶7 For that reason, the law which Murro violated-solicitation to commit possession of a dangerous drug for sale-is a controlled substance law. Its status as an inchoate crime does not change the subject matter of the law that was violated, and Murro's conviction was for an "excluded felony offense" as defined in A.R.S. § 36-2801. ¶8 Murro urges us to distinguish between completed and inchoate offenses. He argues that "solicitation" is part of a separate class of crimes, and therefore cannot be a controlled substance law. As support, he cites the general proposition that "[p]reparatory offenses are separate and distinct from substantive offenses." State v. Tellez , 165 Ariz. 381, 383, 799 P.2d 1, 3 (App. 1989). In Tellez , however, the only question before the court was whether solicitation was "a violation of any provision of this section." 165 Ariz. at 382-83, 799 P.2d at 2-3 ; A.R.S. § 13-3408 (prohibiting knowing possession, use, or manufacture of a narcotic drug). And Tellez only held that solicitation was not a violation of A.R.S. § 13-3408 because it was not one of the specific offenses listed in that section. Tellez , 165 Ariz. at 382-83, 799 P.2d at 2-3. ¶9 The statutory language at issue in this case does not support the conclusion that solicitation cannot be a controlled substance law. In contrast to Tellez , the relevant definition of "excluded felony offense" does not reference a specific statute, section, or chapter of the Arizona statutes and refers much more generally to the broad category of any "controlled substance law." A.R.S. § 36-2801(7). The separate and distinct nature of a solicitation offense does not change our conclusion that solicitation to commit possession of a dangerous drug for sale is a violation of a controlled substance law. ¶10 Murro also cites Coronado-Durazo v. I.N.S. , 123 F.3d 1322 (9th Cir. 1997). But unlike here, the federal statute at issue in that case provided "that any alien who is convicted of 'a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation ... relating to a controlled substance' may be deported." Id. at 1324 (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(B)(i) ). The court cited Tellez for the proposition that "solicitation is a generic offense under Arizona law," and noted that the language in the statute's parenthetical "limits convictions for generic crimes that may result in deportation to conspiracy and attempt. Simply put, solicitation is not on the list." Id. at 1325 (citing Tellez , 165 Ariz. at 383, 799 P.2d at 3 ). Because the statute expressly included only conspiracy and attempt, the court found that "the plain language" of the federal statute did not extend to other inchoate offenses such as solicitation. Id. ¶11 Even if Coronado-Durazo correctly interprets federal law, its analysis is inapplicable to this case. Unlike the federal statute at issue in Coronado-Durazo , Arizona statute does not define "excluded felony offense" to include or exclude generic offenses, but includes any violation of federal or state "controlled substance law." A.R.S. § 36-2801(7). Because solicitation is defined by reference to the subject matter of the underlying offense, the crime of solicitation to commit a controlled substance offense is a violation of a controlled substance law. ¶12 Murro also argues that the superior court erred in finding that he knowingly violated the AMMA because he "did not have a conviction for an excluded felony offense at [the] time that he applied to be a dispensary agent or while he worked as a dispensary agent." Because his conviction was for an excluded felony offense, we reject this argument. CONCLUSION ¶13 Because solicitation to commit possession of a dangerous drug for sale is a violation of Arizona's controlled substance law, Murro was convicted of an excluded felony offense. We therefore affirm the superior court's judgment. The exceptions are offenses whose sentence was completed ten or more years earlier and offenses that would be immune under A.R.S. § 36-2811, had it been effective at the time of the offense. A.R.S. § 36-2801(7)(b). But see Peters v. Ashcroft , 383 F.3d 302, 306-08 (5th Cir. 2004) (disagreeing with Coronado-Durazo's analysis and holding that an Arizona conviction for solicitation to transport marijuana for sale "on its face constitutes a violation of a law 'relating to a controlled substance' "); Mizrahi v. Gonzales , 492 F.3d 156, 163 (2d Cir. 2007) (following Peters and holding that solicitation to commit a drug crime was a deportable offense under federal law).

McMURDIE, Judge: ¶1 Bogdan and Jolanta Dabrowski appeal from a judgment granting David C. Bartlett a private way of necessity ("private condemnation") over the Dabrowskis' property. Bartlett cross-appeals, contending he was entitled to either express easement rights or an easement by implied way of necessity. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that: (1) an unactivated easement is subject to a merger; (2) a common law easement by implied way of necessity does not exist if the severance of the parcel did not cause the lot to lack a reasonable outlet; (3) unity of ownership for a merger may occur even if the parties are technically different; (4) in a private condemnation action, a finding that a more reasonable route exists through the subject property constitutes "bad faith, oppression, or abuse of power" under Solana Land Co. v. Murphey , 69 Ariz. 117, 125, 210 P.2d 593 (1949), precluding the condemnor from condemning its selected route; and (5) a private condemnation judgment must be satisfied before a final order of condemnation can issue and an easement recorded. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment on the easement claims and remand for the court to determine the route, scope, and cost of the private condemnation. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶2 The parties dispute whether Bartlett should have access to his five-acre lot in Cave Creek over the Dabrowskis' adjacent lot. Both lots were part of a larger parcel that was split into three lots in 1999, then identified as Parcels A, B, and C. In 2002, Parcel A was divided into three separate lots of approximately five acres each, which include the lots now owned by the Dabrowskis ("Lot 1") and Bartlett ("Lot 2") (collectively the "Lots"). ¶3 Until 2007, Rockaway Hills Drive (the "access road") was the only road on the land. On March 2, 2000, Jack Lewis, the owner of Parcels A and B, declared an easement that reached Lot 2 through Lot 1 (the "2000 Express Easement") and then sold the Lots in Parcel A. ¶4 In April 2001, Lewis conveyed Parcel B to Andrew C. Jacob in his capacity as trustee of the ACJ [Andrew C. Jacob] Declaration of Trust ("Jacob Trust"). On September 18, 2001, Lewis reacquired the Lots via a trustee's sale. ¶5 On September 18, 2002, the Town of Cave Creek approved a lot split ("2002 Lot Split"), which established the Lots as they currently appear. The survey that accompanied the 2002 Lot Split was prepared for Jacob and reflected an ingress, egress, and utility easement over Parcel B for the benefit of Lot 1, similar to the 2000 Express Easement, but did not extend to Lot 2. The month after the 2002 Lot Split was approved, Lewis conveyed Lots 1 and 2 to Jacob and his wife. ¶6 Cave Creek approved a second lot split of Parcel A on April 11, 2003, based on a separate survey ("2003 Lot Split") also prepared for Jacob. The 2003 Lot Split was recorded on April 12, 2003. The survey, depicted below, showed an easement over Parcel B reaching the midpoint of the eastern border of the Lots and did not encumber Lot 1 for the benefit of Lot 2. ¶7 The next month, Jacob and his wife sold the Lots to Bartlett ("Jacob-Bartlett conveyance"). In 2005, Bartlett conveyed Lot 1 to Michael Hiltner and Julie Mahon but retained Lot 2 in his capacity as a trustee of the JoshuaBleu Trust ("Bartlett-Hiltner conveyance"). Bartlett did not record an express easement in connection with the conveyance. The Jacob Trust sold Parcel B to Bryan Anderson in June 2005. ¶8 In 2007, Hiltner completed construction of a house and driveway located on Lot 1. Anderson began construction of his house on Parcel B in 2006, which was completed in 2014. The Dabrowskis acquired the house and property comprising Lot 1 via a trustee's sale in January 2012. A dispute arose shortly thereafter between the Dabrowskis and Bartlett regarding Bartlett's access to Lot 2, leading to the Dabrowskis filing suit to quiet title in 2013. Bartlett counterclaimed, alleging that he was entitled to an implied way of necessity, an implied easement of necessity, or in the alternative, a private condemnation across Lot 1. Bartlett later added a counterclaim alleging that he had express access rights via the 2000 Express Easement. At the time of trial, the land appeared as follows: ¶9 The superior court granted summary judgment to the Dabrowskis on Bartlett's express easement claim, finding that the 2000 Express Easement had terminated by a merger. The parties proceeded to a bench trial on the remaining claims. Following the trial, the court ruled that: [T]he 2003 Lot Split did not create a valid easement, there is no express easement, and there is no implied easement at this time over the Dabrowski property in favor of the Bartlett lot. The court further finds there is no other adequate alternative access to Bartlett's property. Accordingly, [Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section] 12-1202 allows a [private condemnation] under the circumstances presented in this case. The court allowed Bartlett to "select the route location and nature of the [private condemnation] ensuring the greatest amount of deference to the privacy and concerns of the Dabrowskis," ordered Bartlett to "compensate the Dabrowskis for the easement over their property," and requested simultaneous briefing regarding the values of the available routes, stating that it could not "provide a value based upon the testimony provided at the hearing." ¶10 In the post-trial briefing, the Dabrowskis submitted affidavits from a real estate appraiser, their trial expert, and Bogdan Dabrowski. They sought compensation ranging from $96,000 to $433,250 depending on Bartlett's choice of route. Bartlett objected, contending the affidavits had not been disclosed or offered at trial. The court overruled his objection and determined compensation for three potential routes as follows: "Graham #1" Easement = $37,200 "Graham #2" Easement = $36,000 "Slyder" Easement = $96,250 The considerably higher value assigned to the Slyder Easement reflected the increased burden the easement posed on the Dabrowskis' property. On Bartlett's motion for reconsideration, the court allowed him to present rebuttal evidence concerning value but affirmed its compensation determinations. ¶11 Bartlett submitted a proposed form of judgment. The Dabrowskis objected to the proposed judgment and asked the court to order Bartlett to compensate them when the easement was recorded, and to impose several new requirements on Bartlett, including: (1) indemnifying them for any liability resulting from construction; (2) repairing and maintaining their driveway following construction; (3) preserving unspoiled nature beyond 20 feet of the easement width; and (4) requiring Bartlett and his successors and assignees to equally share in future costs of the maintenance and repair of the shared roadway. The court rejected the Dabrowskis' requests and entered a partial final judgment ordering Bartlett to choose either the Graham #2 or Slyder Easement and to compensate the Dabrowskis before "constructing a roadway ... or by June 1, 2017, whichever is earliest." The judgment is silent on the timing of the recording. The court also ordered the parties to bear their attorney's fees and costs, ruling that Bartlett's statement of costs was untimely. ¶12 The Dabrowskis timely appealed, and Bartlett timely cross-appealed. DISCUSSION A. We Have Appellate Jurisdiction Over Some of the Claims Raised by the Parties and We Exercise Special Action Jurisdiction to Decide the Remaining Claims. ¶13 Although neither party has raised the issue, we have an independent obligation to determine whether we have appellate jurisdiction, Robinson v. Kay , 225 Ariz. 191, 192, ¶ 4, 236 P.3d 418, 419 (App. 2010), and we must dismiss an appeal over which we lack jurisdiction, Davis v. Cessna Aircraft Corp. , 168 Ariz. 301, 304, 812 P.2d 1119, 1121 (App. 1991). Because "[p]ublic policy is against deciding cases piecemeal," our jurisdiction over appeals generally is "limited to final judgments which dispose of all claims and all parties." Musa v. Adrian , 130 Ariz. 311, 312, 636 P.2d 89, 90 (1981) ; see also A.R.S. § 12-2101. However, Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) permits the superior court to enter an appealable final judgment on fewer than all claims in a case, Garza v. Swift Transp. Co. , 222 Ariz. 281, 284, ¶ 13, 213 P.3d 1008, 1011 (2009), when the judgment "dispose[s] of at least one separate claim of a multi-claim action," Davis , 168 Ariz. at 304, 812 P.2d at 1121. We review de novo whether the superior court has appropriately certified a judgment as final and appealable under Rule 54(b). Davis , 168 Ariz. at 304, 812 P.2d at 1121. ¶14 Here, the superior court included language from Rule 54(b) in the judgment, indicating portions of the judgment were not final but did not note which parts. The parties appealed and briefed the judgment in its entirety. "Certification under Rule 54(b), however, 'does not give this court jurisdiction to decide an appeal if the judgment in fact is not final, i.e., did not dispose of at least one separate claim of a multi-claim action.' " Grand v. Nacchio , 214 Ariz. 9, 16, ¶ 17, 147 P.3d 763, 770 (App. 2006) (quoting Davis , 168 Ariz. at 304, 812 P.2d at 1121 ). "[A] claim is separable from others remaining to be adjudicated when the nature of the claim already determined is 'such that no appellate court would have to decide the same issues more than once even if there are subsequent appeals.' " Cont'l Cas. v. Superior Court , 130 Ariz. 189, 191, 635 P.2d 174, 176 (1981) (quoting Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co. , 446 U.S. 1, 8, 100 S.Ct. 1460, 64 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980) ). Here, the quiet title action and the private condemnation action are severable. The judgment regarding the Dabrowskis' quiet title action and Bartlett's claims of an equitable interest through Lot 1 are final. Thus, we have appellate jurisdiction to review the quiet-title judgment. ¶15 Conversely, Bartlett's cross-claim for a private condemnation is not final. The final route has not yet been determined, the Dabrowskis have not been compensated, and the court has not entered the final order of condemnation. Therefore, we do not have appellate jurisdiction over those claims. See Nacchio , 214 Ariz. at 16, ¶ 17, 147 P.3d at 770. However, when parties mistakenly raise issues from a non-appealable order, we have the discretion to sua sponte accept special action jurisdiction and consider the merits of the claims. See State v. Bayardi , 230 Ariz. 195, 197-98, ¶ 7, 281 P.3d 1063, 1065-66 (App. 2012) (appeal treated as a special action when parties appealed from a superior court minute entry); Danielson v. Evans , 201 Ariz. 401, 411, ¶ 35, 36 P.3d 749, 759 (App. 2001) (after finding appellate jurisdiction lacking, court sua sponte accepted special action jurisdiction); see also A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(4) ; Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a). We accept special action jurisdiction here because the parties have fully briefed and argued the issues, the superior court has ruled on the claims, and the non-final issues would likely be raised on appeal after a final judgment. We also accept special action jurisdiction because the judge's order raises questions of first impression-which are particularly appropriate for special action review-concerning the application of Article 2, § 17 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-1126(B). See Chartone, Inc. v. Bernini , 207 Ariz. 162, 165-66, ¶¶ 8-9, 83 P.3d 1103, 1106-07 (App. 2004). B. In the Quiet Title Action, the Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Finding the Dabrowskis Proved That There Was Not an Easement Over Their Property-Either Express or Implied. ¶16 The Dabrowskis initially brought an action for quiet title under A.R.S. § 12-1101(A) : An action to determine and quiet title to real property may be brought by any one having or claiming an interest therein, whether in or out of possession, against any person ... when such person ... claims an estate or interest in the real property which is adverse to the party bringing the action. Bartlett's counterclaim asserted that he was entitled to either (1) an express easement; (2) an easement of implied necessity; or (3) an implied easement by way of necessity. ¶17 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo , viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. BMO Harris Bank, N.A. v. Wildwood Creek Ranch, LLC , 236 Ariz. 363, 365, ¶ 7, 340 P.3d 1071, 1073 (2015). For issues resolved at trial, we consider the evidence presented in the light most favorable to upholding the court's rulings. Town of Marana v. Pima County , 230 Ariz. 142, 152, ¶ 46, 281 P.3d 1010, 1020 (App. 2012). But we review the court's conclusions of law de novo and may draw legal conclusions from facts found or inferred from the judgment. FL Receivables Tr. 2002-A v. Ariz. Mills, L.L.C. , 230 Ariz. 160, 166, ¶ 24, 281 P.3d 1028, 1034 (App. 2012) ; In re Estate of Musgrove , 144 Ariz. 168, 170, 696 P.2d 720, 722 (App. 1985). To the extent the superior court's decision was based on an interpretation and application of the law, we review its decision de novo . Freeman v. Sorchych , 226 Ariz. 242, 247, ¶ 11, 245 P.3d 927, 932 (App. 2011). 1. The Court Did Not Err by Finding the 2000 Express Easement Terminated as to the Lots. ¶18 Bartlett claims the court erred by finding he did not have an express easement through Lot 1 via the 2000 Express Easement. The superior court determined that the 2000 Express Easement merged when the Lots came under common ownership between 2001 and 2003. Specifically, the superior court found that the Lots were under common ownership on three occasions: (1) under Lewis in 2001; (2) under Jacob in 2002; and (3) under Bartlett from 2003 until he sold Lot 1. ¶19 Merger applies, and an easement terminates, when one party obtains both the greater and the lesser interest in the same property without any intermediate interests in other hands. Flood Control Dist. of Maricopa County v. Paloma Inv. Ltd. P'ship , 230 Ariz. 29, 41, ¶ 39, 279 P.3d 1191, 1203 (App. 2012). In such cases, the lesser interest is extinguished. Id. ¶20 While Bartlett recognizes the general proposition, he argues that an express easement is not "activated" until the parcels are severed, and-as to portion of the easement granting Lot 2 access through Lot 1-the express easement did not merge because the Lots were not commonly owned at any time after the Bartlett-Hiltner conveyance that severed the parcels. He cites no authority, however, for the proposition that easements that have not been activated are not subject to a merger, and we decline to so hold. ¶21 As there is no Arizona authority directly on point, we look to the Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) ("Restatement (Third)"). See Paxson v. Glovitz , 203 Ariz. 63, 67, ¶ 21, n.3, 50 P.3d 420, 424, n.3 (App. 2002) ("In the absence of contrary precedent, Arizona courts look to the Restatement."). The Restatement (Third) does not exempt easements that have not been activated by separate ownership from the merger. The comments instead provide that merger applies "when the burdens and benefits are united in a single person, or group of persons" because "the servitude ceases to serve any function" and "no one else has an interest in enforcing the servitude." Restatement (Third) § 7.5 cmt. a. ¶22 The benefits and burdens of the 2000 Express Easement were unified during the three periods in which the superior court found common ownership. The fact that those benefits and burdens were later severed in subsequent conveyances did not by itself activate or recreate the easement. See Restatement (Third) § 7.5 cmt. b ("A subsequent conveyance of the property that results in separate ownership of the previously dominant and servient estates raises the question whether the parties can re-create the servitude that previously existed on the property without complying with the requirements set forth in Chapter 2. Under the rule stated in this section they cannot."). Indeed, an express easement could not have been reestablished without a writing that complied with the statute of frauds. A.R.S. § 44-101(6) (statute of frauds applies to "an agreement ... for the sale of real property or an interest therein"); Owens v. M.E. Schepp Ltd. P'ship , 218 Ariz. 222, 228, ¶ 24, 182 P.3d 664, 670 (2008) ("The statute of frauds enacts a clear legislative prohibition against enforcement of an oral agreement for the conveyance of land."); Restatement (Third) § 2.7. ¶23 Because Bartlett admitted he did not record any document creating an easement from the Bartlett-Hiltner conveyance, we conclude that the superior court correctly granted summary judgment on Bartlett's express easement claim because Lot 2 did not have access via an express easement through Lot 1. 2. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Finding Bartlett Was Not Entitled to an Implied Easement of Necessity Through Lot 1. ¶24 Lot 2 also does not have an implied easement of necessity through Lot 1. An implied easement of necessity requires: (1) a single tract of land arranged in a manner where one portion of the land derives a benefit from the other; (2) unity of ownership; (3) severance of the land into two or more parcels; (4) long, continued, obvious use of the subservient land, to a degree which shows permanency-by the dominate land-prior to the severance; and (5) the use of the claimed easement must be essential to the beneficial enjoyment of the dominate land. See Porter v. Griffith , 25 Ariz. App. 300, 302, 543 P.2d 138, 140 (1975). ¶25 When the Lots were severed in 2005, no road connected Lot 1 to Lot 2, nor did Lot 1 have a connection to the access road on Parcel B. See supra ¶ 3, Figure 1. Thus, Bartlett failed to show that at the time of the Bartlett-Hiltner conveyance there was a long, continued, and obvious use of Lot 1 for the benefit of Lot 2. 3. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Finding Bartlett Was Not Entitled to an Easement by Implied Way of Necessity Through Lot 1. ¶26 Bartlett contends that the Bartlett-Hiltner conveyance caused his lot to become landlocked, resulting in an easement by implied way of necessity. "Under the common law, where land is sold that has no outlet, the vendor by implication of the law grants ingress and egress over the parcel to which he retains ownership, enabling the purchaser to have access to his property." Bickel v. Hansen , 169 Ariz. 371, 374, 819 P.2d 957, 960 (App. 1991). The doctrine derives from the presumption that when a party conveys the property, it conveys "whatever is necessary for the beneficial use of that property and retains whatever is necessary for the beneficial use of the land he still possesses." Id. ¶27 Under the common law, to obtain an easement by implied way of necessity through Lot 1, Bartlett was required to prove: (1) both properties were under common ownership; (2) the properties were then severed; (3) there is no reasonable or adequate outlet for one of the properties; and (4) the need for reasonable access through the severed property existed at the time of severance. See Coll. Book Ctrs., Inc. v. Carefree Foothills Homeowners' Ass'n , 225 Ariz. 533, 541, ¶ 30, 241 P.3d 897, 905 (App. 2010) ; Bickel , 169 Ariz. at 374, 819 P.2d at 960. If an implied way of necessity exists, it may survive through multiple conveyances and is not affected by use or the lack thereof. Bickel , 169 Ariz. at 375, 819 P.2d at 961. As explained below, Bartlett failed to prove that he was entitled to the common law easement by implied way of necessity because he was unable to show that it was the severance of the Lots that caused his property to lack an adequate outlet. i. At the Time of Severance, the Lots Did Not Have an Express Easement Through Parcel B. ¶28 Bartlett argues that at the time of Bartlett-Hiltner conveyance, he had an express easement from Lot 1 through Parcel B to the access road-as evidenced by the 2000 Express Easement-giving the Lots a reasonable outlet and therefore the severance of the Lots caused his lot to lack an outlet. The Dabrowskis contend that the Lots' access through Parcel B terminated through merger when Jacob owned the Lots and Parcel B concurrently in 2002. Bartlett maintains that there was no unity of ownership because Jacob, as trustee for the Jacob Trust, owned Parcel B, while Jacob and his wife jointly owned the Lots. ¶29 In 2000, Lewis-the then owner of the Lots and Parcel B-recorded an express easement, providing access from Lot 1 through Parcel B to the access road. See supra ¶ 3, Figure 2. In March 2000, Jacob, as trustee of the Jacob Trust, purchased Parcel B. Jacob and his wife then purchased the Lots in December 2002. Before Jacob and his wife purchased the Lots, Allan Gray prepared a lot survey for Jacob showing the Lots' access through Parcel B, but not following the 2000 Express Easement. Jacob applied for and received certification for the 2002 Lot Split, and it was recorded. The month before selling the Lots to Bartlett, Jacob obtained another lot survey from Gray. Jacob again applied to the Town of Cave Creek to certify the 2003 Lot Split, which was done, and the 2003 Lot Split was recorded. See supra ¶ 6, Figure 3. ¶30 Arizona courts have not addressed the concept of merger relating to the unity of ownership when the parties involved share interests but are technically different. In this case, two technically different owners were involved: Jacob Trust owned Parcel B while Jacob and his wife owned the Lots. Other jurisdictions, however, have applied a control test to establish unity of ownership. See Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank v. Chicago Title & Tr. Co. , 7 Ill.2d 471, 131 N.E.2d 4 (1955) ; Houston Bellaire, Ltd. v. TCP LB Portfolio I, L.P. , 981 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. App. 1998). ¶31 In Houston Bellaire , the court, looking to Cosmopolitan , concluded that although "the ownership of the two lots was technically different, ... '[t]here was, in effect, common ownership of both properties sufficient to indicate the ability to arrange and adapt the property in a manner sufficient to satisfy rules of property in the establishment of easement by implication.' " Houston Bellaire , 981 S.W.2d at 920-21 (quoting Cosmopolitan , 131 N.E.2d at 7 ). The court concluded that the parties "with the power to arrange and adapt the properties" did arrange matters in a way that created an implied easement. Id. ¶32 As an owner of the Lots and the trustee of the trust that owned Parcel B, the evidence shows Jacob had the power to arrange and adapt the properties. First, Jacob commissioned the 2002 Lot Split when Parcel B was owned by Jacob Trust. Jacob and his wife purchased the Lots after the Town of Cave Creek approved the lot split, and the survey was recorded. Next, Ian Cordwell, the Director of Planning and the Zoning Administrator for the Town of Cave Creek, testified that Jacob applied for a building permit for Lot 2 on March 11, 2003. The town would not approve a building permit unless the owner of the property could show that each lot had access from a dedicated public right of way to the parcel itself. At the time of Jacob's application for the building permit, he indicated that Lot 2 lacked access. Subsequently, Jacob again commissioned Gray to create the 2003 Lot Split, which provided access to Lot 2 without burdening Lot 1. Jacob then applied for the lot split, which was approved and recorded. Cordwell, who accepted both lot splits, testified that he believed the 2003 Lot Split was intended to establish an access point for Lot 2 through Parcel B and served as a replacement to the 2002 Lot Split. ¶33 Jacob obtained and recorded lot splits that depicted access to the Lots through various access points in Parcel B immediately preceding Lewis's sale to Jacob and Jacob's sale to Bartlett. The 2002 and 2003 Lot Splits demonstrated that Jacob, as the trustee, exercised the control over Parcel B required to situate the land in a manner that benefited the Lots when Jacob and his wife purchased the Lots, and again as the seller of the Lots. As the Lots' seller, Jacob arranged access through Parcel B in a manner that was beneficial to the Lots, but detrimental to Parcel B, because of the proximity of the shared driveway to the location of the proposed home on Parcel B. Such control is sufficient to conclude that there was unity of ownership over the Lots and Parcel B. We conclude that Jacob's concurrent ownership extinguished any express easement that existed on Parcel B concerning the Lots. There was approximately a quarter mile between Lot 1's eastern boundary and the access road, for which the Lots did not have legal access-via an express easement-at the time of the Jacob-Bartlett conveyance. See supra, ¶ 3, Figure 1. Accordingly, the Lots did not have an express easement through Parcel B at the time of severance. ii. Bartlett Failed to Show Sufficient Evidence of the Need for Reasonable Access at the Time of the Bartlett-Hiltner Conveyance. ¶34 Without legal access, Bartlett was required to show that at the time of the Bartlett-Hiltner conveyance he lacked reasonable access to his property. Bartlett argues that Lot 2 does not have-and never has had-access through Parcel B. However, as noted above, immediately before selling the Lots to Bartlett, Jacob applied for a building permit concerning Lot 2 and recorded the 2003 Lot Split. The 2003 Lot Split was recorded before the Jacob-Bartlett conveyance and was listed as an exception in Bartlett's title report for the Jacob-Bartlett conveyance. ¶35 Michael Johnson, Bartlett's and Hiltner's architectural designer, testified that the 2003 Lot Split was provided to him when he began designing the Bartlett and Hiltner homes in 2006. He testified that there were "a lot of different discussions because of the confusion" of the two access points. Johnson stated that at some point Bartlett and Hiltner agreed to follow the entrance point through Lot 1 to cut costs and create less disturbance by sharing a driveway and utility site. With that plan, most of the disturbance fell on Lot 1, allowing Bartlett to build the larger home he wanted on Lot 2. Johnson also recalled that he wanted the driveway to conform with the 2003 Lot Split, but Bartlett refused. Ultimately, Johnson testified that Bartlett and Hiltner could not reach an agreement, and Hiltner built his driveway and home without Bartlett's assistance. ¶36 Although Bartlett asserted that he has always understood access to Lot 2 would be through Lot 1, he could not point to a recorded document to support that understanding. Bartlett insists that it was both his and Hiltner's intent that the shared driveway would follow the 2000 Express Easement. However, the completed Lot 1 driveway does not conform with the 2000 Express Easement; instead, it follows the 2002 Lot Split. Moreover, Bartlett failed to record an express easement granting access for Lot 2 through Lot 1 at the time of the Bartlett-Hiltner conveyance, although he stated that access through Lot 1 was the parties' intent. Bartlett, a mortgage broker at the time, failed to disclose his need for access through Lot 1 in the seller property disclosure statement, which he provided in connection with the Bartlett-Hiltner conveyance. The placement of the driveway and Bartlett's subsequent actions in connection with the Bartlett-Hiltner conveyance do not support Bartlett's contention that Lot 2's access was intended through the 2000 Express Easement. ¶37 There is conflicting evidence in the record regarding the intended access point for the Lots at the time of the Jacob-Bartlett conveyance. The superior court weighed the credibility of the witnesses along with the other evidence and concluded there was no implied way of necessity between the Lots. Given that the 2003 Lot Split indicates a reasonable access point for both lots, the superior court did not abuse its discretion by finding Bartlett failed to establish that Lot 2 lacked reasonable access in 2005 at the time of the severance. See Coll. Book , 225 Ariz. at 542, ¶ 32, 241 P.3d at 906 (failing to present evidence to establish a lack of an outlet at the time of severance prevents a party from prevailing in an action for an implied way of necessity). We defer to the superior court's resolution of the evidence presented. FL Receivables Tr. , 230 Ariz. at 166, ¶ 24, 281 P.3d at 1034. 4. The Dabrowskis Prevailed in the Quiet Title Action. ¶38 The Dabrowskis prevailed in the quiet title action because they proved title to the property and that Bartlett had neither an express or implied easement over the Lot 1. Therefore, the Dabrowskis contend the superior court erred by not awarding their attorney's fees and costs under A.R.S. §§ 12-1103(B) and 12-341.01(A). We review the court's decision declining to award fees for an abuse of discretion. Vicari v. Lake Havasu City , 222 Ariz. 218, 224, ¶ 23, 213 P.3d 367, 373 (App. 2009). ¶39 Because the Dabrowskis did not correctly request fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A), the superior court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to award them. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(g)(1) ("A claim for attorney's fees must be made in the pleadings or in a Rule 12 motion filed before the movant's responsive pleading."); Klesla v. Wittenberg , 240 Ariz. 438, 441, ¶ 13, n.2, 380 P.3d 677, 680 n.2 (App. 2016) ("Contractual attorneys' fees must be pleaded and proved like any other contract claim, as part of the proponent's case in chief."). ¶40 However, the superior court found that Bartlett was the prevailing party in the quiet title action because "[he] is entitled to an easement created by private condemnation." The court erred. The Dabrowskis originally sued for quiet title. The court concluded that Bartlett did not have a legal interest in Lot 1; thus, the Dabrowskis prevailed in the quiet title action. The Dabrowskis also requested attorney's fees under A.R.S. § 12-1103(B) and complied with the statutory requirements for such an award. Accordingly, we vacate the superior court's conclusion that Bartlett was the prevailing party and remand for the court to enter judgment for the Dabrowskis in the quiet title action, and-in the court's discretion-it may award attorney's fees under A.R.S. § 12-1103(B). See also Scottsdale Mem'l Health Sys., Inc. v. Clark , 164 Ariz. 211, 215, 791 P.2d 1094, 1098 (App. 1990) ("[T]he trial court may consider the same factors that are considered in determining whether to award attorney's fees pursuant to A.R.S. section 12-341.01."). C. The Court's Ruling that Bartlett Proved the Private Condemnation is Supported by the Evidence. ¶41 "Arizona law permits a landowner to engage in private condemnation when land 'is so situated with respect to the land of another that it is necessary for its proper use and enjoyment to have and maintain a way of necessity.' " Siemsen v. Davis , 196 Ariz. 411, 414, ¶ 9, 998 P.2d 1084, 1088 (App. 2000) (quoting A.R.S. § 12-1202(A) ). "A landowner seeking to condemn a private way of necessity over the lands of another must show a 'reasonable necessity' for the taking." Id. ¶42 With respect to the private condemnation action, the Dabrowskis claim the court erred by: (1) awarding Bartlett private condemnation through Lot 1; (2) finding that the Slyder easement was a viable easement choice; (3) failing to award the Dabrowskis additional compensation for the private condemnation; (4) not requiring that the one-time payment for the private condemnation be paid when the easement is recorded; and (5) not imposing additional conditions on Bartlett in connection with the private condemnation. 1. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Determining Bartlett is Entitled to a Private Condemnation. ¶43 The Dabrowskis argue that Bartlett is not entitled to private condemnation because the superior court erred by concluding that the 2003 Lot Split did not constitute an express easement, and the existence of the alternative route precludes Bartlett from seeking a private condemnation through their lot. We do not need to decide whether the 2003 Lot Split evidences a valid easement because the mere fact that an alternate legal outlet is available to Bartlett does not, as a matter of law, preclude him from condemning a way over Lot 1. See Solana, 69 Ariz. 117, 125, 210 P.2d 593 (1949) ("[T]he condemnor need not show an absolute necessity for the taking, a reasonable necessity being sufficient."). ¶44 When determining whether a reasonable necessity exists, the court looks to whether the proponent of the private condemnation has an alternative legal route that is both adequate and reasonable. See, e.g. , Tobias v. Dailey , 196 Ariz. 418, 422, ¶ 14, 998 P.2d 1091, 1095 (App. 2000). Because there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the superior court's conclusion that "[t]here is no other adequate alternative access" to Lot 2, the court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a private condemnation. ¶45 The route on the 2003 Lot Split may have been reasonable and adequate at the time of the Jacob-Bartlett conveyance. However, subsequent events show that it may no longer be a reasonable alternative. Anderson testified that at the time he purchased Parcel B, the land only contained the access road and a well. After acquiring Parcel B, Anderson constructed a home, and the access road now leads to his driveway and garage. The Town of Cave Creek requires a road or driveway that services more than one single-family residence to be 16 feet wide with shoulders on each side that are at least two feet wide. To obtain a building permit from the Town of Cave Creek, Bartlett needs a 20-foot-wide easement for the entirety of the easement through the Anderson property. The Anderson driveway is currently 11-12 feet wide and some portions of the driveway have no shoulder at all. Anderson's utilities are on the west side of the driveway, and there is solid rock to the east. In short, the current specifications of the driveway do not comply with the Rural/Metro Fire Department standards for a roadway servicing more than one residence. Civil engineer Christopher Wilson testified that the amount of disturbance that would result from building the road following the 2003 Lot Split would leave approximately 90 square feet available for the actual home on Bartlett's lot. ¶46 These facts support the superior court's finding that there is no other adequate and reasonable alternative access to Lot 2 and its conclusion that Bartlett is entitled to a private condemnation. i. Bartlett is Not Required to Seek Alternative Routes. ¶47 The Dabrowskis argue that Bartlett is not entitled to a private condemnation because Bartlett failed to establish both that "the Town of Cave Creek would not allow Bartlett to build a roadway to the west or south of Bartlett's Lot" and that he "could not obtain an easement to the west or south of his Lot." Thus, the Dabrowskis contend, Bartlett failed to show a reasonable necessity for the taking. The Dabrowskis do not offer legal authority for this contention. Bartlett was not obligated to explore alternative outlets for which he did not have legal access. See Solana , 69 Ariz. at 125, 210 P.2d 593 ("There is no merit to defendants' contention that [the statute permitting residents to petition to establish a highway], gives to plaintiff an appropriate and expedient method of obtaining a means of ingress and egress to its property by petitioning the board of supervisors for the establishment of a county highway.... [P]roviding for condemnation at the instance of a private party the framers of our constitution as well as the legislature affirmatively rejected such a contention."). The court found that Bartlett's potential legal access was inadequate, and thus correctly granted him a private condemnation through Lot 1. ii. The Evidence Does Not Show that Bartlett Voluntarily Landlocked Lot 2. ¶48 Finally, the Dabrowskis maintain Bartlett is not entitled to private condemnation because Bartlett voluntarily landlocked himself. For support, they cite to Gulotta v. Triano , 125 Ariz. 144, 608 P.2d 81 (App. 1980). In Gulotta , the owners severed their land into parcels, leaving the plot they intended to keep landlocked. Id. at 145, 608 P.2d at 82. The owners testified that the buyers would not have completed the sale with a permanent easement. Id. The owners entered into a contract with the buyers for a temporary easement through the property, which would terminate at the earlier of two years or upon the completion of a new road. Id. After completion of the road, the owners sought private condemnation through a neighboring parcel, which would grant them access to the new road. Id. The owners claimed they were landlocked, or alternatively, that even if the easement had not terminated, the access through the sellers' land was "so inadequate as to make the private right-of-way they seek reasonably necessary." Id. This court denied the private condemnation, stating: It is obvious from the terms of the agreement for the sale of the delicatessen property that [the owners] appreciated the danger of losing access to the property they retained. Whether they terminated or merely limited their right of ingress and egress in order to complete that sale, they did so voluntarily without first obtaining an alternative access way. The necessity, if any, for a right-of-way across defendants' property was created by their own voluntary act. For that reason alone they are not entitled to the extraordinary remedy afforded by § 12-1202. Id. ¶49 The Dabrowskis contend Bartlett "successfully maximized the marketability for the Dabrowski Lot and reaped the financial benefits of a higher purchase price ($440,000), only to thereafter invoke the protections of A.R.S. § 12-1202." They point to the fact that Bartlett did not disclose his need for an easement in the seller property disclosure statement when conveying Lot 1 to Hiltner. But unlike Gulotta , there is no evidence that Bartlett appreciated the danger of losing his access or voluntarily relinquished access to seek a private condemnation from the Dabrowskis. This is especially true because the 2003 Lot Split indicated a way to the access road through Parcel B. Therefore, we cannot say that the superior court abused its discretion by awarding Bartlett a private condemnation. 2. The Superior Court Must Ultimately Determine the Route of a Private Condemnation. ¶50 The Dabrowskis argue that the court erred by allowing Bartlett to choose among three routes and ordering him to "select the route location and nature of the private way of necessity ensuring the greatest amount of deference to the privacy and concerns of the Dabrowskis." After a court determines that a reasonable necessity exists, "the condemnor makes the initial selection and in the absence of bad faith, oppression or abuse of power its selection of route will be upheld by the courts." Solana , 69 Ariz. at 125, 210 P.2d 593. ¶51 Our courts have not opined on what constitutes "bad faith, oppression, or abuse of power" in a private condemnation action. In cases of private condemnation, the parties have competing interests, and ultimately it is for the court to settle such differences. See also Siemsen , 196 Ariz. at 417, ¶ 25, 998 P.2d at 1090 ("Such lawsuits, as we have indicated, engage strong competing interests and values. To resolve them calls for delicate judgment and a close consideration of all applicable facts."). We hold that absent an agreement, the condemnee may present evidence to the court-including evidence regarding the feasibility, cost, and other relevant details of a specified route-showing that under the circumstances, a more reasonable route exists. If the court determines that the condemnee's suggested route is more reasonable, the condemnee will have made a sufficient showing of bad faith, oppression, or abuse of power. Accord A.R.S. § 12-1115(A) (eminent domain statute) ("Where land is required for public use, the state ... may survey and locate the land, but it shall be located in the manner which will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury."); Queen Creek Summit, LLC v. Davis , 219 Ariz. 576, 580, ¶ 19, 201 P.3d 537, 541 (App. 2008) (condemnor in eminent domain action must show that it balanced the "greatest public good" and the "least private injury" when choosing the location, and condemnee can rebut the showing by establishing that the selection is "unnecessarily injurious"). 3. The Judgment Must be Satisfied Before a Final Order of Condemnation is Issued and the Easement Recorded. ¶52 The Dabrowskis raise several issues relating to the court's order concerning the route, timing of the payment, and terms of the private condemnation. The order provided Bartlett with two options and directed that payment be made before a specified date or before construction on the road begins, "whichever is earliest." The parties dispute whether the taking occurs at the time of judgment, payment, recording, or construction of the roadway. ¶53 Our constitution is clear: "No private property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation having first been made, paid into court for the owner [or] secured by bond as may be fixed by the court ...." Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 17 (emphasis added); see also A.R.S. § 12-1124 (in an eminent domain proceeding, the court "shall set aside and annul the entire proceeding[ ]" when the condemnee is unable to collect payment). "When the final judgment has been satisfied ... the court shall make a final order of condemnation, describing the property condemned and the purposes of the condemnation." A.R.S. § 12-1126(A). "The title to the land does not vest in the [condemnor] until 'the final order of condemnation' is made by the court ...." State ex rel. Morrison v. Helm , 86 Ariz. 275, 280, 345 P.2d 202 (1959) (quoting Pool v. Butler , 141 Cal. 46, 74 P. 444, 446 (1903) ). ¶54 A court's final judgment of condemnation must include the route, decided by the court if contested, and the amount of compensation for that route. The valuation of the property is determined as the value at the time of the taking. See City of Scottsdale v. CGP-Aberdeen, L.L.C. , 217 Ariz. 626, 634, ¶ 36, 177 P.3d 1198, 1206 (App. 2008) ("[W]hen the condemnee offers evidence of a gap in time between the summons date and the date of the taking during which the value of the property increased, the court must determine the date of the taking and whether the value of the property on that date is the same as the value provided for in the statute."). ¶55 Only after the judgment is satisfied, and the court issues the final order of condemnation, can the condemnor record "[a] copy of the order ... in the office of the county recorder of the county ... in which the property is located, and thereupon the property described shall vest in [the condemnor] for the purposes therein specified." A.R.S. § 12-1126(B). Accordingly, Bartlett has no rights to the land until after he compensates the Dabrowskis. ¶56 Finally, concerning the parties' contributions for maintenance, "the owners of the easement have the shared duty to repair and maintain the easement." Freeman , 226 Ariz. at 247, ¶ 13, 245 P.3d at 932. The parties should work together to agree upon terms for the final order that will minimize future litigation. To the extent that the parties cannot agree on the details of the private condemnation, Freeman addresses the parties' rights to contribution when neither the document creating the easement nor a separate agreement between the parties specifies otherwise. See id. at 250-51, ¶ 24, 245 P.3d at 935-36. ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL ¶57 Both sides request costs and attorney's fees incurred in this appeal and cross-appeal under A.R.S. §§ 12-1103(B) and 12-341.01(A). Although we affirmed the superior court's judgment entitling Bartlett to a private condemnation, we denied relief on Bartlett's cross-appeal and reversed the court's determination of the prevailing party in the quiet title action. Therefore, neither party was entirely successful, and we decline to award fees or costs to either party. CONCLUSION ¶58 We affirm the superior court's judgment that Bartlett is not entitled to a common law easement, but reverse and remand for the entry of judgment in favor of the Dabrowskis in the quiet title action. Accordingly, we vacate the denial of the Dabrowskis' request for attorney's fees, and remand for the court to reconsider the award of attorney's fees to the Dabrowskis as the prevailing parties. We affirm the superior court's determination that Bartlett is entitled to a private condemnation but vacate the portion of the order concerning the route, compensation, terms, and scope, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Because neither party raised the issue of whether granting a common law easement by implied way of necessity is proper under Article 2, § 17 of the Arizona Constitution and the legislature's prescribed remedy for landlocked property in A.R.S. § 12-1202, we assume without deciding that a conveyance that causes a property to become landlocked may be entitled to an easement by implied way of necessity. A.R.S. § 12-1103(B) provides: If a party, twenty days prior to bringing the action to quiet title to real property, requests the person, other than the state, holding an apparent adverse interest or right therein to execute a quit claim deed thereto, and also tenders to him five dollars for execution and delivery of the deed, and if such person refuses or neglects to comply, the filing of a disclaimer of interest or right shall not avoid the costs and the court may allow plaintiff, in addition to the ordinary costs, an attorney's fee to be fixed by the court. Bartlett appeals the court's allowance of post-trial evidence to determine the property's value. We decline to address the issue because the "taking" has not yet occurred and upon remand the court may admit additional evidence.

McMURDIE, Judge: ¶1 Sandra R. ("Mother") appeals the termination of her parental rights to her three children: M.R., born in 2008; F.M., born in 2015; and J.M., born in 2017. Sergio C. ("Father") appeals the termination of his rights to their two children in common, F.M. and J.M. We affirm the termination orders and hold: (1) the court committed harmless error by allowing the Department of Child Safety ("DCS") to introduce statements from scientific articles without meeting the foundation requirements of Arizona Rule of Evidence 803(18) ; (2) sufficient evidence supports the abuse finding related to the shaken-baby injury (nonaccidental trauma) even though the evidence did not prove which parent abused the child; and (3) under Alma S. v. DCS , 245 Ariz. 146, 425 P.3d 1089 (2018), the "constitutional nexus" requirement established by Linda V. v. ADES , 211 Ariz. 76, 117 P.3d 795 (App. 2005), is considered under the totality of the circumstances in determining whether termination is in the best interests of the child. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶2 In 2013, Mother and her five-year-old daughter M.R. began living with Father. Mother subsequently gave birth to F.M. and J.M. In April 2017, six-week-old J.M. slept most of the day and vomited "a lot" that evening. Mother noticed that J.M.'s arms began shaking at various times. Assuming it was a stomach issue, Father went to the store to buy tea for J.M. Meanwhile, J.M.'s condition worsened. J.M. turned pale, started moaning, could not fully open her eyes, and her arms became stiff. After Father returned from the store, Mother and Father took J.M. to an urgent-care center where they waited more than 40 minutes for the doctor to evaluate her. Upon examination, the doctor told Mother and Father to immediately take J.M. to Phoenix Children's Hospital ("PCH"). ¶3 At PCH, a scan revealed that J.M. had a large subdural hemorrhage on the left side of her brain and a smaller subdural hemorrhage on the right. She also had damage to her optic nerve and severe retinal hemorrhaging in both eyes. The hemorrhaging caused her brain to shift out of position and compress her brainstem. Because J.M.'s life was in danger, doctors had to perform emergency neurosurgery. After surgery, Dr. Melissa Jones, a pediatrician with a specialty in child abuse pediatrics, evaluated J.M. After ruling out possible medical causes, Dr. Jones determined the injuries resulted from abusive head trauma and Mother and Father provided no alternative explanation for the cause of J.M.'s injuries. PCH reported the injuries, and DCS took custody of all three children and filed dependency petitions. The juvenile court later established the case plan as severance and adoption. ¶4 In July 2017, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's rights to J.M., F.M., and M.R., and Father's rights to J.M. and F.M., under the abuse ground. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 8-533(B). Over seven months, DCS offered Mother and Father services, including hair-follicle testing to rule out drug abuse, psychological evaluations, individual counseling, and a parent aide during visits with the children. Although Mother and Father participated in services, in discussions with counselors, they continued to minimize J.M.'s severe injuries and provided no further explanation for how the injury occurred. ¶5 The juvenile court held a three-day termination hearing. Dr. Jones testified for DCS, opining that J.M.'s injuries resulted from nonaccidental trauma. Dr. Ruth Bristol, J.M.'s pediatric neurosurgeon, testified on the manner and extent of J.M.'s injuries. Mother and Father's expert, Dr. Joseph Scheller, a pediatric neurologist with specialties in pediatric neurology and neuroimaging, opined that J.M.'s injuries most likely resulted from an unusual complication of a birth injury. The court took the matter under advisement and later issued an order terminating Mother's rights to J.M., F.M., and M.R., and Father's rights to J.M. and F.M. Mother and Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and -2101(A)(1). DISCUSSION ¶6 To terminate a parent-child relationship, the court must find at least one statutory ground for termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B) by clear and convincing evidence. Kent K. v. Bobby M. , 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 22, 110 P.3d 1013, 1018 (2005). The court must also find termination is in the child's best interests by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. We review the court's termination determination for an abuse of discretion and will affirm unless no reasonable evidence supports the court's findings. Mary Lou C. v. ADES , 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8, 83 P.3d 43, 47 (App. 2004). The juvenile court "is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts." ADES v. Oscar O. , 209 Ariz. 332, 334, ¶ 4, 100 P.3d 943, 945 (App. 2004). A. The Court Committed Harmless Error by Allowing DCS to Cross-Examine Mother and Father's Expert Witness with Publications in His Field Without Laying Proper Foundation. ¶7 Mother and Father assert that DCS failed to lay proper foundation for the scientific articles it used to impeach Mother's and Father's expert witness, Dr. Scheller. Although we agree the court erred by not requiring DCS to lay the proper foundation for the publications, we conclude the error was harmless. See Monica C. v. ADES , 211 Ariz. 89, 94, ¶ 22, 118 P.3d 37, 42 (App. 2005) (harmless error applies in juvenile proceedings). ¶8 This court will affirm the juvenile court's evidentiary rulings "absent a clear abuse of its discretion and resulting prejudice." Lashonda M. v. ADES , 210 Ariz. 77, 82-83, ¶ 19, 107 P.3d 923, 928-29 (App. 2005). Abuse of discretion occurs when a court's decision is "manifestly unreasonable" or based on "untenable" grounds. Id. (quoting Quigley v. City Court of Tucson , 132 Ariz. 35, 37, 643 P.2d 738, 740 (App. 1982) ). ¶9 Arizona Rule of Evidence 803(18) governs the admission of hearsay statements from learned treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets. Rule 803(18) provides that statements from such publications may be read into evidence, but not received as an exhibit, if: (A) the statement is called to the attention of an expert witness on cross-examination or relied on by the expert on direct examination; and (B) the publication is established as a reliable authority by the expert's admission or testimony, by another expert's testimony, or by judicial notice. "The learned treatise exception to the hearsay rule stems from [the] ... independent guarantees of trustworthiness of such works." Rossell v. Volkswagen of Am. , 147 Ariz. 160, 173, 709 P.2d 517, 530 (1985). By requiring the proponent to elicit an expert's recognition of the publication's reliability, Rule 803(18)(B) provides the proper method to verify the statement's trustworthiness. See State v. West , 238 Ariz. 482, 500-501, ¶¶ 68, 70, 362 P.3d 1049, 1067-1068 (App. 2015). ¶10 Mother and Father argue DCS failed to lay the proper foundation before recounting statements from the scientific articles in the following two instances: [DCS Counsel:] Okay. In Jones' study, he concluded, again, that these are rare, but cannot be diagnosed unless nonaccidental head injury had been questioned thoroughly, do you agree with that statement? [Dr. Scheller:] Yes and no. It's sort of-it's a very complicated statement that he said. And I'm happy to explain why or I'll just say- * * * [DCS Counsel:] And you're familiar with the Feldman study that was published in September of 2001? [Dr. Scheller:] Yes, 2001. Because he's published a real lot of studies. * * * [DCS Counsel:] And [Feldman's] study found chronic or mixed chronic and acute subdural hematoma were found only in abused children in his study, that's what he found, correct? [Dr. Scheller:] Yes. Mother timely objected to each line of questioning, citing DCS's failure to establish that the publications containing the articles were reliable as required by Rule 803(18)(B). The court overruled each objection and found Dr. Scheller's knowledge of the studies provided adequate foundation to question him about the contents. ¶11 DCS asserts it was not obligated to follow Rule 803(18) 's foundation requirements during the cross-examination because it "did not seek to admit the articles into evidence." We reject this argument. By asking Dr. Scheller to confirm its paraphrased descriptions of the articles' findings, DCS put the truth of the findings themselves at issue. See Ariz. R. Evid. 801(c) (hearsay means an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement); Ariz. R. Evid. 802 (hearsay generally inadmissible); West , 238 Ariz. at 501, ¶ 71, 362 P.3d at 1068 (superior court properly sustained objection to prosecutor's reference to the findings of a "great deal of literature" in scientific journals); Sharman v. Skaggs Cos. , 124 Ariz. 165, 168-69, 602 P.2d 833, 836-37 (App. 1979) (discussion of a report's findings on cross-examination introduced hearsay statements from report). Thus, before recounting the articles' findings, DCS was required to first lay proper foundation concerning the reliability of the publications in which those articles appeared, or the reliability of the studies within the articles. DCS did not lay the required foundation, and the court erred by overruling Mother's and Father's objections to DCS's improper cross-examination. ¶12 Although the court should have required DCS to establish the publications' reliability before receiving evidence of the articles' findings, we nonetheless conclude that the error was harmless. Dr. Scheller conceded his familiarity with each authority, was able to answer DCS's follow-up questions, and at times challenged DCS's attempts to restrict his explanations of the articles' findings. While Mother and Father take issue with whether the referenced publications were current and credible, their respective counsel did not develop these arguments on redirect examination despite the opportunity to do so. And although the juvenile court ultimately rejected Dr. Scheller's opinion, it based that decision on the testimony of J.M.'s treating physicians and Dr. Scheller's concessions surrounding the cause of J.M.'s injuries, not whether Dr. Scheller's opinion was contrary to the weight of published authority. B. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Court's Order Terminating Mother's and Father's Rights Based on Abuse or Failure to Protect from Abuse. ¶13 Mother and Father argue insufficient evidence supports the court's termination order under the abuse ground. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2) provides: B. Evidence sufficient to justify the termination of the parent-child relationship shall include ... * * * 2. [t]hat the parent has neglected or wilfully abused a child. This abuse includes serious physical or emotional injury or situations in which the parent knew or reasonably should have known that a person was abusing or neglecting a child. If a parent abuses or neglects their child, the court may terminate that parent's rights to their other children on this basis, even if there is no evidence that the other children were abused. Linda V. , 211 Ariz. at 79, ¶ 14, 117 P.3d at 798. ¶14 Reasonable evidence supports the court's finding that J.M.'s injuries were caused by abuse. While in Mother and Father's exclusive care, J.M. suffered a large subdural hemorrhage on the left side of her brain and a smaller subdural hemorrhage on the right. She also had significant midline shift and herniation of her brain, meaning there was so much pressure in the brain that it started to shift out of its normal position. J.M. required emergency neurosurgery to relieve the pressure because it had become so great that her skull could no longer contain the brain and its contents without threatening her life. She also had diffused retinal hemorrhages (or bleeding) in all quadrants of the retina and all layers of the retina. Her head injuries negatively affected a multitude of systems in her body. Post-trauma, doctors diagnosed her with cerebral palsy because she had significant motor impairment. She also suffers from regular epileptic seizures and is blind. She now requires occupational therapy, feeding therapy, and 24-hour monitoring. Dr. Bristol testified that J.M. will likely require long-term, full-time care for the foreseeable future. ¶15 At the termination hearing, Dr. Jones opined that J.M.'s injuries occurred within a few days before her hospital admission and resulted from nonaccidental trauma. After reviewing the family's medical history and J.M.'s birth records, Dr. Jones found no alternative medical explanation for her injuries. Similarly, Dr. Bristol testified that J.M.'s injuries were most likely caused by recent trauma. Dr. Jones added that J.M.'s lack of external injuries did not rule out abuse. ¶16 Dr. Scheller disagreed and testified that J.M.'s injuries resulted from a subdural hematoma at birth that began spontaneously re-bleeding some weeks later, which in turn caused her retinal hemorrhages. Dr. Scheller conceded that this occurrence would be "an unusual complication" and that no other non-traumatic medical condition could have caused J.M.'s injuries. ¶17 Dr. Jones and Dr. Bristol opined on Dr. Scheller's conclusion, testifying that such an occurrence under the circumstances present with J.M. would be "very, very rare." Dr. Jones testified that "children [who] have spontaneous re-bleeding [also] have some other complicating factor with their brain." Dr. Bristol testified that in her experience as a pediatric neurosurgeon she had "not seen a spontaneous re-bleed to that degree." Dr. Jones opined that J.M.'s presentation and injuries did not correspond to Dr. Scheller's theory, particularly the diffuse nature of J.M.'s retinal hemorrhages, which was consistent with "massive trauma with acceleration and deceleration." Regarding J.M.'s eye injuries, Dr. Jones stated that: [T]here had to be [a] significant force that led to that pattern of retinal hemorrhages. You can get retinal hemorrhages from many different causes, but the only times we see [J.M.'s] pattern of retinal hemorrhages in the pediatric population is from abusive head trauma, severe motor vehicle collisions or there's some case reports of children who have fallen out of two or three story windows onto concrete. Dr. Jones specifically distinguished Dr. Scheller's theory, testifying that "when the pressure is high in the brain, you can get retinal hemorrhages," but they are typically "in the ... most recessed part of the retina ... surrounding the optic nerve," which was "not the same pattern that [J.M.] had." ¶18 Throughout the investigation, dependency, and termination hearings, Mother and Father maintained that J.M. had suffered no accidents or injuries that would explain her injuries. At J.M.'s first health checkup (a few weeks before her traumatic brain injury ), the doctor examining J.M. noted no concerns. Likewise, Mother and Father maintained that J.M. only began showing symptoms the evening they took her to the hospital. In sum, reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court's determination that J.M.'s injuries were the result of nonaccidental trauma. ¶19 Based on its conclusion that J.M.'s injuries were the result of nonaccidental trauma, the court also found that Mother or Father, or both, intentionally abused J.M. or knew or reasonably should have known that the other parent abused her, "as she was in their sole care when she suffered life-threatening injuries." The court also found that, despite the "timing, extent, mechanics and presentation of [J.M.'s] injuries," Mother and Father continued to deny that abusive conduct occurred, presented a "united front," and remained committed to each other and their relationship. And because neither parent had "shown a willingness to leave the other to protect the children from the other parent," the court concluded that "both parents have demonstrated their lack of protective capacities for all of the children, not only [J.M.]." ¶20 Mother and Father have consistently maintained that they were J.M.'s only caregivers since her birth. Mother and Father continuously denied J.M. was abused, even after they were confronted with PCH's medical assessments of J.M.'s injuries. Despite strong evidence that at least one of them caused J.M.'s injuries, Mother and Father made no attempt to distance themselves from one another. To the contrary, in the months following the incident with J.M., Mother and Father deepened their commitment to one another by marrying. Given this record, reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court's determination that: (1) one or both parents willfully abused J.M. by causing J.M.'s physical injuries; and (2) one or both parents failed to protect J.M. after they knew or reasonably should have known J.M. had been abused. See Maricopa County Juv. Action Nos. JS-4118/JD-529 , 134 Ariz. 407, 408-09, 656 P.2d 1268, 1269-70 (App. 1982) (where mother refused to obtain a divorce or otherwise separate herself from husband who had committed abuse, her "knowing failure" to protect her children from abuse by her husband justified termination of her parental rights); see also Mario G. v. ADES , 227 Ariz. 282, 287-88, ¶¶ 19-25, 257 P.3d 1162, 1167-68 (App. 2011) (finding a father's failure to protect one child from abuse justified termination of his rights to another child); Linda V. , 211 Ariz. at 79, ¶ 14, 117 P.3d at 798 (parents "who permit another person to abuse or neglect their children" may have their parental rights terminated). Once DCS established Mother and Father abused or failed to take steps to protect J.M. after the abuse occurred, the statutory grounds to terminate Mother's and Father's rights to the other children were also met. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2) ; Linda V. , 211 Ariz. at 79, ¶ 14, 117 P.3d at 798. Accordingly, reasonable evidence supports the court's finding that termination of Mother's rights to J.M., F.M., and M.R., and Father's rights to J.M. and F.M., was justified under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2). C. Alma S. v. DCS Requires Courts to Consider the Connection Between the Prior Abuse of One Child and the Risk of Future Abuse to the Other Children During the Best-Interests Inquiry. ¶21 Mother and Father argue insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that there was a "nexus" between the abuse of J.M. and the risk of abuse to F.M. and M.R. In the past, this court has expressly held that termination of parental rights to a child who has not been the direct target of abuse requires the party seeking termination of rights to show, at the statutory-grounds stage, "a constitutional nexus between the prior abuse and the risk of future abuse to the child at issue." Seth M. v. Arienne M. , 245 Ariz. 245, 248, ¶ 11, 426 P.3d 1224, 1227 (App. 2018) (quoting Tina T. v. DCS , 236 Ariz. 295, 299, ¶ 17, 339 P.3d 1040, 1044 (App. 2014) ); Mario G. , 227 Ariz. at 285, ¶ 16, 257 P.3d at 1165. This court recently revisited the constitutional nexus requirement, noting that it "first appeared in a footnote in the Linda V. opinion, although that opinion does not identify any legal source for such a requirement and it is not present in the statute itself." Seth M. , 245 Ariz. at 248, ¶ 11, 426 P.3d at 1227 (citing Linda V. , 211 Ariz. at 80, ¶ 17, n.3, 117 P.3d at 799, n.3 ). ¶22 The uncertainty expressed in Seth M. towards requiring this showing at the statutory-grounds stage was realized when our supreme court issued its decision in Alma S. v. DCS . In Alma S. , the supreme court held "the substantive grounds for termination listed in § 8-533(B) [are synonymous] with parental unfitness," and once the juvenile court finds a parent to be unfit, the best-interests analysis is triggered. 245 Ariz. at 150-51, ¶¶ 9, 12, 425 P.3d at 1093-94. Alma S. thus makes clear that, at the statutory-grounds stage, the juvenile court should only determine whether the party seeking termination has met its burden of proving a parent unfit under one of the grounds for termination. See Alma S. , 245 Ariz. at 154, ¶ 32-33, 425 P.3d at 1097 (Bolick, J., concurring in the result) ("However, the Court today holds that all that must be proven by clear and convincing evidence is that the parent engaged in one of the statutory grounds for termination, which by itself 'constitute[s] a finding of parental fitness.' " (alteration in original) (quoting id. at 150, ¶ 11, 425 P.3d at 1093 ). Considerations outside the scope of A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2) -such as whether a connection exists between a parent's abuse of one of their children and the risk of abuse to their other children-are left to the best-interests inquiry. This conclusion not only comports with Alma S. 's discussion of the two-step termination inquiry, but also Linda V. 's original application of a "nexus" requirement. See Linda V. , 211 Ariz. at 80, ¶ 17, n.3, 117 P.3d at 799, n.3 (addressing the need to demonstrate a nexus between prior abuse and the risk of future abuse in the court's best-interests analysis). D. Reasonable Evidence Supports the Court's Finding that Termination of Mother's and Father's Parental Rights Served the Children's Best Interests. ¶23 Once the court finds a parent unfit under at least one statutory ground for termination, "the interests of the parent and child diverge," and the court proceeds to balance the unfit parent's "interest in the care and custody of his or her child.... against the independent and often adverse interests of the child in a safe and stable home life." Kent K. , 210 Ariz. at 286, ¶ 35, 110 P.3d at 1020. "[A] determination of the child's best interest must include a finding as to how the child would benefit from a severance or be harmed by the continuation of the relationship." Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JS-500274 , 167 Ariz. 1, 5, 804 P.2d 730, 734 (1990) (emphasis omitted). Courts "must consider the totality of the circumstances existing at the time of the severance determination, including the child's adoptability and the parent's rehabilitation." Alma S. , 245 Ariz. at 148, ¶ 1, 425 P.3d at 1091. In cases where termination of a parent's rights to one child is predicated on the parent's abuse of another child, courts must also consider the connection between that abuse and the risk of future abuse to the child at issue. See Seth M., 245 Ariz. at 248, ¶ 11, 426 P.3d at 1227 ; Mario G. , 227 Ariz. at 285, ¶ 16, 257 P.3d at 1165 ; Linda V. , 211 Ariz. at 79-80 ¶¶ 14-15, 17, 117 P.3d at 798-99. "When a current placement meets the child's needs and the child's prospective adoption is otherwise legally possible and likely, a juvenile court may find that termination of parental rights, so as to permit adoption, is in the child's best interests." Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F. , 239 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 12, 365 P.3d 353, 356 (2016). Finally, "[t]he existence and effect of a bonded relationship between a biological parent and a child, although a factor to consider, is not dispositive in addressing best interests." Dominique M. v. DCS , 240 Ariz. 96, 98, ¶ 12, 376 P.3d 699, 701 (App. 2016). ¶24 Here, based on its finding that Mother or Father abused J.M. or that they failed to protect J.M. from abuse, the juvenile court found that it had "grave concerns about the parents' protective capacities in the future." Mother and Father argue that the risk of abuse to F.M. and M.R. is remote because J.M. was a vulnerable infant, unlike the older children. But the juvenile court rejected this argument and concluded that by failing to take steps to protect J.M. from the unidentified abusing parent, "Mother and Father have demonstrated they cannot or will not protect their children." The court specifically found that: Although [M.R. and F.M.] are no longer infants, [they] are young children who are vulnerable. [M.R.] has already been the victim of child abuse by Mother in the past.[ ] Mother and Father ... have not been forthcoming about the cause of [J.M.'s] injuries. The court also found that "given the parents' persistent denials that any abuse occurred," both J.M. and her older siblings remained at risk of future abuse. ¶25 Reasonable evidence in the record supports these findings. M.R. was nine years old at the time of the termination hearing and F.M. was almost three-both still dependent on Mother and Father to meet their needs. Both parents' actions after learning the nature of J.M.'s injuries demonstrated they could not recognize danger and keep the children safe. As J.M.'s primary caregivers, Mother and Father are the only ones in a position to explain how her injuries occurred. Mother and Father have refused to acknowledge abuse occurred or that at least one of them was responsible. Instead, they have remained together, and neither parent has taken steps to prevent the children from being returned to the same situation that led to J.M.'s near-fatal injuries. On this record, we conclude reasonable evidence supports the court's finding that the abuse to J.M. bore a substantial connection to the risk of future abuse to the other children in Mother's and Father's care. ¶26 Moreover, reasonable evidence concerning the children's adoptability supports the juvenile court's best-interests finding. The case manager testified that F.M. and M.R. were in a kinship placement that was meeting their needs and the foster parents wished to adopt them. Due to J.M.'s special needs, she was in a separate placement for a medically-fragile child that was providing her the specialized care she required. Although J.M.'s placement was not willing to adopt, DCS identified other potential adoptive placements for her. Considering the children's stability in their current placements, and the availability of adoptive placements, the case manager testified that termination would provide the children with "a safe, secure environment, where all of their needs will be met." Reasonable evidence supports the court's finding that termination was also in the children's best interests because of their adoptability. CONCLUSION ¶27 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court's order terminating Mother's rights to J.M., F.M., and M.R. and Father's rights to J.M. and F.M. M.R.'s father's parental rights were terminated in the same proceeding. He is not a party to this appeal. In 2011, while Mother went shopping, she left M.R., who was two years old at the time, unsupervised inside her car for 40 minutes. The temperature outside was 106 degrees. A police officer removed M.R. from the car before she suffered any serious injury, but Mother was arrested and subsequently pled guilty to child abuse.

CAMPBELL, Judge: ¶1 The State appeals the superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees, members of the Arizona House of Representatives and Senate who voted against passage of House Bill ("H.B.") 2579 (collectively, the "Legislators"), finding Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 23-204, as amended by H.B. 2579, unconstitutional because it violates the Voter Protection Act ("VPA"). For the following reasons, we affirm. BACKGROUND ¶2 In 2006, Arizona voters passed Proposition 202, an initiative measure commonly referred to as the "Raise the Minimum Wage for Working Arizonans Act" ("Minimum Wage Act" or "Act"). The Minimum Wage Act is codified at A.R.S. §§ 23-362, -363, and -364. The central provision at issue in this appeal falls under the enforcement provision, A.R.S. § 23-364, which empowers a county, city, or town to "regulate minimum wages and benefits within its geographic boundaries" as long as it does "not provide for a minimum wage lower than that prescribed in this article." A.R.S. § 23-364(I) (emphasis added). It goes on to state, "[t]his article ... shall not limit the authority of the legislature or any other body to adopt any law or policy that requires payment of higher or supplemental wages or benefits , or that extends such protections to employers or employees not covered by this article." Id. (emphasis added). ¶3 In May 2016, the legislature adopted H.B. 2579, which amended A.R.S. § 23-204 and preempted the field of nonwage benefits, removing from cities and towns the power to regulate nonwage benefits. H.B. 2579 passed with majority votes in both the House and Senate, but neither chamber received a three-fourths' majority vote. The relevant language of the bill provides: The regulation of employee benefits, including nonwage compensation, paid and unpaid leave and other absences, meal breaks and rest periods, is of statewide concern. The regulation of nonwage employee benefits pursuant to this chapter and federal law is not subject to further regulation by a city, town or other political subdivision of this state. A.R.S. § 23-204(A). ¶4 In June 2016, the plaintiffs sued the State in the superior court seeking declaratory relief, asking H.B. 2579 be found unconstitutional because it violated the VPA and the home-rule provision of the Arizona Constitution. The plaintiffs were comprised of three groups: (1) a labor union, United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 99 ("UFCW"); (2) five individual city councilmembers from three Arizona cities ("Councilmembers"); and (3) the Legislators who voted against H.B. 2579. The State moved to dismiss the home-rule claims by all three groups of plaintiffs and moved to dismiss the VPA claims by UFCW and the Councilmembers only. The superior court granted the State's motion to dismiss in full, leaving only the Legislators' VPA claim. ¶5 The State and Legislators filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the VPA claim. After briefing and oral argument, the court granted the Legislators' motion for summary judgment, ruling that H.B. 2579 impliedly repealed a portion of the Minimum Wage Act and therefore violated the VPA. The court also awarded the Legislators all attorney fees requested, including fees for opposing the motion to dismiss. This timely appeal from the State followed. DISCUSSION ¶6 We review grants of summary judgment and questions of statutory interpretation de novo. BMO Harris Bank, N.A. v. Wildwood Creek Ranch, LLC , 236 Ariz. 363, 365, ¶ 7, 340 P.3d 1071, 1073 (2015). "Our primary objective in construing statutes adopted by initiative is to give effect to the intent of the electorate." State v. Gomez , 212 Ariz. 55, 57, ¶ 11, 127 P.3d 873, 875 (2006). If the statute's language is unambiguous and is subject to only one reasonable meaning, we apply that meaning without resorting to other statutory interpretation methods. Id. ; see also J.D. v. Hegyi , 236 Ariz. 39, 40-41, ¶ 6, 335 P.3d 1118, 1119-20 (2014). Only if the language is ambiguous do we discern the electorate's intent by resorting to secondary interpretation methods, such as consideration of the statute's subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose. BSI Holdings, LLC v. Ariz. Dep't of Transp. , 244 Ariz. 17, 19, ¶ 9, 417 P.3d 782, 784 (2018) (citation omitted). I. Applicability of the VPA ¶7 The electorate shares lawmaking power with the legislature under Arizona's system of government. See Cave Creek Unified Sch. Dist. v. Ducey , 233 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 8, 308 P.3d 1152, 1155 (2013) (citation omitted). "[T]he people reserve[d] the power to propose laws and amendments to the constitution and to enact or reject such laws and amendments at the polls, independently of the legislature" through the initiative and referendum processes. Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1 (1). ¶8 In 1998, Arizona voters adopted the VPA as a constitutional amendment, limiting the legislature's power to amend, repeal, or supersede voter-approved laws. See Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1 (6)(B)-(C), (14). When the legislature addresses the subject of a voter-approved initiative, the constitutional limitations of the VPA apply and limit the legislature's otherwise plenary authority. See id. The VPA prohibits legislative repeal of initiative measures approved by the voters and permits a legislative amendment to an initiative only when the amendment "furthers the purposes" of the initiative and is passed by "at least three-fourths of the members of each house of the legislature." Id. ¶9 The VPA's constitutional limitations apply to the Minimum Wage Act because it was passed by voter initiative. Consequently, the legislature cannot repeal or supersede the Minimum Wage Act, and any amendment would have to further its purpose and be passed by three-fourths' vote in both chambers of the legislature. The parties do not dispute that H.B. 2579 was passed without the requisite three-fourths' vote. The dispositive question, therefore, is whether the legislature impermissibly amended or superseded a portion of the Minimum Wage Act in violation of the VPA when enacting H.B. 2579. II. Constitutionality of H.B. 2579 ¶10 H.B. 2579 did not explicitly repeal or supersede the Minimum Wage Act, cf. State Land Dep't v. Tucson Rock & Sand Co. , 107 Ariz. 74, 77, 481 P.2d 867, 870 (1971) (a statute expressly repeals another when it "nam[es] ... those [provisions] to be superseded"), but the parties disagree about whether H.B. 2579 impliedly amends or repeals provisions contained within the Act. To begin, we analyze the two statutes in light of the VPA. See Cave Creek Unified Sch. Dist. , 233 Ariz. at 7, ¶ 23, 308 P.3d 1152 ("Although [the house bill] did not expressly state that it repealed, amended, or otherwise changed [the initiative], we must consider its effect on the fundamental purposes underlying the VPA." (citation omitted) ). "The intent of the VPA, construed from its text and structure, was to limit changes to voter-approved laws." Id. ¶11 A statute can be impliedly amended or repealed through "repugnancy" or "inconsistency" with a more recent and apparently conflicting statute. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Craig , 200 Ariz. 327, 333, ¶ 29, 26 P.3d 510, 516 (2001) (implied repeal); Ariz. State Tax Comm'n v. Reiser , 109 Ariz. 473, 479, 512 P.2d 16, 22 (1973) (implied amendment). "An implied amendment is an act which purports to be independent, but which in substance alters, modifies, or adds to a prior act." Cave Creek Unified Sch. Dist. , 233 Ariz. at 7, ¶ 24, 308 P.3d at 1158 (quoting 1A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 22:13 (7th ed. 2012) ). ¶12 The Minimum Wage Act empowered counties, cities, and towns to "regulate minimum wages and benefits ," and authorized "the legislature or any other body to adopt any law or policy that requires payment of higher or supplemental wages or benefits, or that extends such protections to employers or employees not covered by this article." A.R.S. § 23-364(I) (emphasis added). H.B. 2579 explicitly removed from cities, towns, and other political subdivisions the authority to regulate "employee benefits, including nonwage compensation." A.R.S. § 23-204(A). H.B. 2579 defines nonwage compensation to include: [F]ringe benefits, welfare benefits, child or adult care plans, sick pay, vacation pay, severance pay, commissions, bonuses, retirement plan or pension contributions, other employment benefits provided in 29 United States Code § 2611 and other amounts promised to the employee that are more than the minimum compensation due an employee by reason of employment. A.R.S. § 23-204(C). Therefore, if A.R.S. § 23-204, as amended by H.B. 2579, amends or repeals the Minimum Wage Act, it will have done so in violation of the VPA. ¶13 The State argues the Minimum Wage Act does not apply to nonwage employee benefits and accordingly does not grant counties, cities, and towns the power to regulate them. The Legislators, on the other hand, argue that by its terms, the Minimum Wage Act demonstrably grants counties, cities, and towns the power to regulate nonwage benefits. Therefore, to discern the constitutionality of H.B. 2579, we must determine whether H.B. 2579 and the Minimum Wage Act can be harmonized. This analysis hinges on the meaning of the word "benefits" as used in the Minimum Wage Act. ¶14 The State contends that H.B. 2579 and the Minimum Wage Act can be read harmoniously because the term "benefits" has a different meaning in both statutes. H.B. 2579 defines "benefits" to include nonwage employee compensation. See A.R.S. § 23-204(A). Benefits is not defined in the Minimum Wage Act. See A.R.S. §§ 23-362, -363, -364; see also State v. Dann , 220 Ariz. 351, 368, 207 P.3d 604, 621 (2009) ("When a word in a statute is undefined, courts apply the ordinary meaning of the term."). The State argues "benefits" means "the advantage or privilege something gives" and in the context of the Minimum Wage Act, "benefits" means only the benefits provided under the Minimum Wage Act-namely, the enforcement rights provided in A.R.S. § 23-364. The Legislators conversely argue "benefits" includes any "non-wage compensation." The superior court found that "the meaning proposed by the State may be a permissible meaning of 'benefits' according to a dictionary definition of the word, [but] it is not a reasonable meaning in light of the context of the word." We agree. ¶15 In statutory interpretation, associated words bear on one another's meaning. "[A] statutory term is interpreted in context of the accompanying words." Estate of Braden ex rel. Gabaldon v. State , 228 Ariz. 323, 326, ¶ 13, 266 P.3d 349, 352 (2011). In the context of the Minimum Wage Act, "benefits" is used twice-both times in conjunction with the word "wages," forming the phrases "minimum wages and benefits" and "minimum wages or benefits," respectively. Therefore, the word "benefits" has an associated, but separate meaning from the word "wages." ¶16 When used together, the only reasonable interpretation is that "wages" and "benefits" are complementary parts of employee compensation as a whole. See Black's Law Dictionary 343 (10th ed. 2014) ("Compensation consists of wages and benefits in return for services" and "includes wages, stock option plans, profit-sharing, commissions, bonuses, golden parachutes, vacation, sick pay, medical benefits, disability, leaves of absence, and expense reimbursement." (citation omitted) ); see generally State v. Pena , 235 Ariz. 277, 279, ¶ 6, 331 P.3d 412, 414 (2014) ("Absent statutory definitions, courts ... may look to dictionaries."). "[T]he words of a statute are to be given their ordinary meaning unless it appears from the context or otherwise that a different meaning is intended." Ariz. ex rel. Brnovich v. Maricopa Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist. Bd. , 243 Ariz. 539, 541, ¶ 7, 416 P.3d 803, 805 (2018) (citation omitted). At oral argument in the superior court, the State conceded that "non-wage benefits received by an employee from an employer is the consistent historical meaning of the word 'benefits' when used in the syntactic setting of either 'minimum wages and benefits' or 'wages and benefits.' " It is clear from the text that by granting a county, city, or town the ability to "regulate minimum wages and benefits," the intent of the electorate was to grant these bodies the ability to regulate wages and nonwage benefits. The State's interpretation ignores the plain text of the statute and the association between the words "benefits" and "wages." ¶17 The State emphasizes that the other provisions of the Minimum Wage Act make no mention of benefits, including the substantive provision that sets the minimum wage. See A.R.S. § 23-363. Because the only provision that mentions benefits is the enforcement provision, § 23-364, the State argues "benefits" can only mean those benefits-i.e. , enforcement rights-that are provided under that provision. However, even considering the word "benefit" in the context of the Act-while not explicitly requiring the regulation of benefits in the substantive provision-it is reasonable that the electorate granted counties, cities, and towns the ability to further regulate minimum wages and benefits in the enforcement provision, as long as they do "not provide for a minimum wage lower than that prescribed in [the] article." A.R.S. § 23-363 sets a mandatory minimum wage, whereas the enforcement provision gives these bodies the option to further increase wages and benefits , rather than requiring them to do so. ¶18 The State further argues that the Minimum Wage Act uses "benefits" and "protections" interchangeably when it authorizes "the legislature or any other body to adopt any law or policy that requires payment of higher or supplemental wages or benefits, or that extends such protections to employers or employees not covered by this article." A.R.S. § 23-364(I) (emphasis added). First, the plain grammatical reading of this sentence is that "higher or supplemental wages" and "higher or supplemental ... benefits" both are protections that the legislature or other body can extend to employers or employees not covered by the Minimum Wage Act. ¶19 Second, the State's argument that this provision uses "benefits" and "protections" interchangeably-and "benefits" encompasses only the minimum wage protections provided in this section-is not well taken. The State proposes only one definition of "benefits" and does not argue that "benefits" has a different meaning each time it is used in the statute. See Obregon v. Indus. Comm'n , 217 Ariz. 612, 616, ¶ 21, 177 P.3d 873, 877 (App. 2008) ("It is a normal rule of statutory construction that identical words used in different parts of the same Act are intended to have the same meaning." (internal quotation and citation omitted) ). Equating benefit to mean protections under the statute would lead to an impossible grammatical difficulty. It is not logical for the statute to read: "A county, city, or town may by ordinance regulate minimum wages and protections within its geographic boundaries." It makes even less sense to say that the statute "shall not limit the authority of the legislature or any other body to adopt any law or policy that requires payment of higher or supplemental wages or protections ," because protections are not paid in the sense that wages and benefits can be paid. ¶20 Third, the State argues that interpreting benefits to mean nonwage benefits renders the "higher or supplemental" language of the Minimum Wage Act superfluous because "it does not make sense to say that municipalities are free to 'require[ ]' payment of 'higher or supplemental' fringe benefits when the [Minimum Wage Act] does not require payment of any fringe benefits at all." A grammatical reading of the sentence reveals that the phrase "payment of higher or supplemental" applies to both "wages" and "benefits." There is nothing inherently prohibitive of a city passing a new law requiring payment of higher or supplemental nonwage benefits-where payment of benefits previously was not required-because payment of some benefits is higher than payment of no benefits. Further, the payment of nonwage benefits could be supplemental in reference to the payment of required wages. ¶21 In contrast, the Legislators' proposed definition of "benefits"-nonwage benefits received by an employee from an employer-reflects the ordinary and common meaning of the term when it is used in conjunction with wages and when looking at its plain meaning as it is used in the Act. Thus, because the meaning of the word "benefits" can be discerned from the plain text of the statute, the word "benefits" is not ambiguous. ¶22 The State next asks us to look beyond the statutory text itself, urging us to look at the title of the voter initiative and the title of the substantive provision in the Act, A.R.S. § 23-363, to conclude that the Act's purpose is to regulate wages, not nonwage benefits. The title and headings of statutes are permissible indicators of meaning but cannot override the text. See State v. Eagle , 196 Ariz. 188, 190, ¶ 7, 994 P.2d 395, 397 (2000) (noting that where an ambiguity exists, the title of a statute may be used to aid in its interpretation, although headings are not part of the law itself). Because we determine the text is not ambiguous, we need not turn to the titles of the initiative or provisions to aid in interpreting the Minimum Wage Act. ¶23 The State argues the superior court erred by not considering other secondary methods of statutory construction beyond the ordinary meaning of "benefits." When interpreting a statute, courts first look to the statute's plain language as "the most reliable indicator of its meaning." Harris Corp. v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue , 233 Ariz. 377, 381, ¶ 13, 312 P.3d 1143, 1147 (App. 2013) (citation omitted). When read in that fashion and the meaning of the statute is clear, our analysis ends. See State ex rel. Romley v. Hauser , 209 Ariz. 539, 541, ¶ 10, 105 P.3d 1158, 1160 (2005) ("When the plain text of a statute is clear and unambiguous there is no need to resort to other methods of statutory interpretation to determine the legislature's intent because its intent is readily discernable from the face of the statute." (citation omitted) ). The State urges the court to look at the legislative history of the Minimum Wage Act, to interpret the Act to avoid ERISA preemption issues and constitutional law difficulties, and to interpret the Act in a way that will not impermissibly change the law. Again, we need not address these secondary methods of statutory interpretation; because the text of the statute is unambiguous, our statutory interpretation stops at the plain meaning of the words. We look no further than the language of the statutes to conclude H.B. 2579 impliedly amends and repeals a portion of the Minimum Wage Act. ¶24 We are aware that the finding of an implied repeal of statutes is not favored, UNUM Life Ins. Co. , 200 Ariz. at 333, ¶ 28, 26 P.3d at 516, but it is required when, as here, "conflicting statutes cannot be harmonized to give each effect and meaning." Cave Creek Unified Sch. Dist. , 233 Ariz. at 7, ¶ 24, 308 P.3d at 1158. H.B. 2579 explicitly stripped the ability of counties, cities, and towns to regulate nonwage employee benefits. A.R.S. § 23-204(A). The Minimum Wage Act specifically empowered counties, cities, and towns to regulate benefits, which we have found to mean nonwage benefits. H.B. 2579 explicitly prohibits what the Minimum Wage Act permits, and thus, the two statutes cannot be harmonized. Because H.B. 2579 impliedly amends and repeals a portion of the Minimum Wage Act, it violates the VPA's express limitations on legislative changes to voter-approved laws. III. Attorney Fees ¶25 The Legislators requested attorney fees in the amount of $33,450 under the private attorney general doctrine. The affidavit for attorney fees included time expended representing the Councilmembers and UCFW on the VPA claim, representing all three groups of plaintiffs for the home-rule claim, and opposing the State's motion to dismiss. The court ultimately dismissed the entire home-rule claim and the VPA claims brought by Councilmembers and UCFW. ¶26 We review an award of attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine for an abuse of discretion. Arnold v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Services , 160 Ariz. 593, 609, 775 P.2d 521, 537 (1989). Attorney fees can be awarded under the private attorney general doctrine to "a party who has vindicated a right that: (1) benefits a large number of people; (2) requires private enforcement; and (3) is of societal importance." Id. "The purpose of the doctrine is to promote vindication of important public rights." Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). The superior court awarded the Legislators all attorney fees they requested. ¶27 The State acknowledges that our supreme court's adoption of the private attorney general doctrine is binding authority. The State contends, however, that the Legislators are not entitled to an award of attorney fees for work on arguments on which they did not prevail and that the court should have reduced the attorney fees to exclude fees for work on opposing the motion to dismiss, which the Legislators lost. We agree. ¶28 When the result sought in the litigation is accomplished, "fees should be awarded for time spent even on unsuccessful legal theories. Where a party has achieved only partial or limited success, however, it would be unreasonable to award compensation for all hours expended, including time spent on ... unsuccessful issues or claims." Schweiger v. China Doll Rest. Inc. , 138 Ariz. 183, 189, 673 P.2d 927, 933 (App. 1983). ¶29 Here, the Legislators accomplished the result they sought to achieve-declaring H.B. 2579 unconstitutional. However, the superior court awarded fees for time spent representing plaintiffs on unsuccessful claims that were ultimately dismissed. The Legislators are not entitled to attorney fees for time spent on the unsuccessful home-rule claim nor for time spent representing the dismissed plaintiffs, UCFW and the Councilmembers. However, the Legislators were ultimately successful on their VPA claim, and that claim meets the criteria to award fees under the private attorney general doctrine. ¶30 First, the resolution of the litigation benefits a large number of people in the state, including all employees and employers subject to the Minimum Wage Act. The right to regulate wages and benefits belongs to counties, cities, and towns; thus, its vindication benefits large numbers of Arizonans. The Legislators in this case "sought no recovery for themselves and achieved no personal gain or advantage; they did not act for their own benefit or for the benefit of a particular class or group, but instead acted to vindicate the interests of the entire citizenry of the state." Kadish v. Ariz. State Land Dep't , 177 Ariz. 322, 329, 868 P.2d 335, 342 (App. 1993). ¶31 Second, the vindication of the right the Legislators asserted required a legal challenge to a statute adopted by the legislature and could only have been privately enforced. See Ariz. Ctr. for Law in Pub. Int. v. Hassell , 172 Ariz. 356, 371, 837 P.2d 158, 173 (App. 1991). Finally, the vindication of the right asserted by the Legislators is of societal importance. The Legislators established the right of counties, cities, and towns to regulate nonwage benefits. By challenging the constitutionality of H.B. 2579, which took away this right, the Legislators ensured that these bodies could provide for regulation of nonwage benefits for a large number of employees within the state. The superior court erred in awarding attorney fees related to the home-rule claim as to all plaintiffs, the VPA claim as to the Councilmembers and UCFW, and related to the motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the Legislators are only entitled to attorney fees for time spent representing the successful group of plaintiffs on the VPA claim. CONCLUSION ¶32 We affirm the superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Legislators. We vacate the award of attorney fees in favor of the Legislators and remand for a redetermination of the amount of the award consistent with this opinion. We award the Legislators their fees on appeal upon their compliance with Rule 21 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure.

JONES, Judge: ¶ 1 Evelyn Spooner appeals from a judgment entered in favor of the City of Phoenix and Toni Brown (collectively, the City) on her civil claims arising from a purported wrongful arrest. Spooner argues the trial court erred by precluding her from using Brown's grand jury testimony to impeach Brown's credibility at trial and directing a verdict on her simple negligence claim. We affirm the preclusion of Brown's grand jury testimony and hold that a law enforcement officer is not subject to civil liability for simple negligence arising from an investigation into criminal activity. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 2 In 2009, Brown, a detective with the Phoenix Police Department, began investigating Spooner's financial relationship with ninety-five-year-old Mary B. At a 2011 grand jury proceeding, Brown testified about her investigation, and the grand jury indicted Spooner for three counts of theft from a vulnerable adult and one count of unlawful use of a power of attorney. The State later dismissed the criminal charges, and Spooner then filed suit against the City asserting purported constitutional violations, simple negligence, gross negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and malicious arrest. Spooner supported these claims with allegations that Brown lied to the grand jury, withheld exculpatory evidence, and failed to properly investigate Spooner's relationship with Mary. ¶ 3 After the close of evidence in an eight-day civil jury trial, the trial court entered judgment as a matter of law in the City's favor on Spooner's claims for simple negligence, malicious arrest, and constitutional violations. The jury then found for the City on the claims for gross negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Spooner timely appealed the final judgment, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1). DISCUSSION I. The Trial Court Acted Within its Discretion in Excluding Brown's Grand Jury Testimony for Use as Impeachment Evidence. ¶ 4 At oral argument on appeal, Spooner conceded that grand jury witnesses enjoy absolute immunity for claims arising from their testimony. See Green Acres Tr. v. London , 141 Ariz. 609, 613, 688 P.2d 617, 621 (1984) ; see also Rehberg v. Paulk , 566 U.S. 356, 369, 132 S.Ct. 1497, 182 L.Ed.2d 593 (2012). She argues, however, that the trial court deprived her of due process when it precluded her use of Brown's grand jury testimony for impeachment purposes at trial. The court precluded the testimony after finding both: (1) that "allowing introduction of the grand jury testimony ... would effectively operate to circumvent the absolute immunity of [a grand jury] witness," and (2) that the probative value of the testimony was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues-namely, "the appropriate scope of the use of the grand jury testimony relative to the remaining liability claims." ¶ 5 Spooner argues that evidence of Brown's purported false testimony to the grand jury is relevant to Brown's credibility, relying upon Marshall v. Randall , 719 F.3d 113, 116-18 (2d Cir.2013) (finding, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, no abuse of discretion in the admission of grand jury testimony to impeach law enforcement officers defending 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims arising out of purportedly false testimony where there was "no potential for jury confusion"). We do not reach the general issue of admissibility, however, because we find no error in the exclusion of the evidence under Rule 403. Even relevant evidence is subject to exclusion "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury." Ariz. R. Evid. 403. "Because 'probative value' and 'the danger of unfair prejudice' are not easily quantifiable factors, we accord substantial discretion to the trial court in the Rule 403 weighing process." Hudgins v. Sw. Airlines, Co. , 221 Ariz. 472, 481, ¶ 13, 212 P.3d 810, 819 (App. 2009) (citing State v. Gibson , 202 Ariz. 321, 324, ¶ 17, 44 P.3d 1001, 1004 (2002) ). The decision to preclude impeachment evidence is likewise reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Gasiorowski v. Hose , 182 Ariz. 376, 382, 897 P.2d 678, 684 (App. 1994) (citing Selby v. Savard , 134 Ariz. 222, 227, 655 P.2d 342, 347 (1982) ). ¶ 6 The record reflects that the trial court carefully considered the scope and purpose of absolute immunity in judicial proceedings, including warnings from both the U.S. Supreme Court and this Court against allowing parties to "circumvent" absolute witness immunity "by using evidence of the witness'[s] testimony to support any ... claim concerning the initiation or maintenance of a prosecution." Rehberg , 566 U.S. at 369, 132 S.Ct. 1497 ; accord Sobol v. Alarcon , 212 Ariz. 315, 318, ¶ 11, 131 P.3d 487, 490 (App. 2006) ("[I]t is necessary that the propriety of [a witness's] conduct not be inquired into indirectly by either court or jury in civil proceedings brought against them for misconduct in their position.") (quotation omitted). The court also reasonably determined introduction of grand jury testimony was unfairly prejudicial and likely to confuse the jury because it would constitute direct evidence of purported misconduct for which the City was absolutely immune. We find no abuse of discretion or due process violation here. II. The Trial Court Properly Entered Judgment as a Matter of Law for the City on the Simple Negligence Claim. ¶ 7 Spooner argues the trial court erred when it entered judgment for the City upon Spooner's claim for simple negligence. We review the entry of judgment as a matter of law de novo , "viewing the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." SWC Baseline & Crismon Inv'rs, L.L.C. v. Augusta Ranch Ltd. P'ship , 228 Ariz. 271, 292, ¶ 93, 265 P.3d 1070, 1091 (App. 2011) (citing Shoen v. Shoen , 191 Ariz. 64, 65, 952 P.2d 302, 303 (App. 1997) ). We likewise review the existence and scope of qualified immunity de novo . See Ochser v. Funk , 228 Ariz. 365, 369, ¶ 11, 266 P.3d 1061. 1065 (2011) (citation omitted). We will affirm the judgment if it is correct for any reason. Walter v. Simmons , 169 Ariz. 229, 240 n.9, 818 P.2d 214, 225 n.9 (App. 1991). ¶ 8 As a general rule, public entities and public employees are subject to tort liability for their negligence. See Ryan v. State , 134 Ariz. 308, 309-10, 656 P.2d 597, 598-99 (1982) ("[T]he parameters of duty owed by the state will ordinarily be coextensive with those owed by others.") (citing Stone v. Ariz. Highway Comm'n , 93 Ariz. 384, 392, 381 P.2d 107 (1963) ), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Tucson Unified Sch. Dist. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. , 174 Ariz. 336, 339, 849 P.2d 790, 793 (1993) ; see also Hogue v. City of Phoenix , 240 Ariz. 277, 280, ¶ 9, 378 P.3d 720, 723 (App. 2016) (citing Greenwood v. State , 217 Ariz. 438, 442, ¶ 14, 175 P.3d 687, 691 (App. 2008) ). Although our supreme court recognized the abolition of general sovereign immunity in Ryan , it nonetheless "hasten[ed] to point out that certain areas of immunity must remain." 134 Ariz. at 309-10, 656 P.2d at 599. Some remaining areas of immunity are prescribed by statute within Arizona's Governmental Tort Claims Act, see, e.g., A.R.S. § 12-820.02, but the legislature has directed that its statutory grant of immunity for certain acts "shall not be construed to affect, alter or otherwise modify any other rules of tort immunity regarding public entities and public officers as developed at common law." See A.R.S. § 12-820.05(A) ; see also Clouse ex rel. Clouse v. State , 199 Ariz. 196, 203, ¶ 27, 16 P.3d 757, 764 (2001) (acknowledging that common law immunity principles apply in the absence of statutory direction) (citations omitted). ¶ 9 Common law qualified immunity generally provides public officials, including police officers, limited protection from liability when "performing an act that inherently requires judgment or discretion." Chamberlain v. Mathis , 151 Ariz. 551, 555, 558, 729 P.2d 905, 909, 912 (1986) (applying the Ryan principles in concluding a state employee is protected by qualified immunity for discretionary acts); see also Portonova v. Wilkinson , 128 Ariz. 501, 503, 627 P.2d 232, 234 (1981) ("It has been recognized that in Arizona a police officer acting within the scope of his authority has at least a conditional immunity from civil liability.") (citing Patterson v. City of Phoenix , 103 Ariz. 64, 70-71, 436 P.2d 613, 619-20(1968) ); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895D (1979) ("A public officer acting within the general scope of his authority is not subject to tort liability for an administrative act or omission if ... he is [otherwise] immune because [he is] engaged in the exercise of a discretionary function."); id. at cmt. h (explaining no immunity attaches to a ministerial act "carr[ied] out [on] the orders of others or ... [done] with little choice as to when, where, how or under what circumstances"). This accommodation for discretionary acts exists because "officials should not err always on the side of caution" for fear of being sued. State v. Superior Court (Donaldson) , 185 Ariz. 47, 50, 912 P.2d 51, 54 (App. 1996) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant , 502 U.S. 224, 229, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) ); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895D cmt. b ("The basis of the immunity has been not so much a desire to protect an erring officer as it has been a recognition of the need of preserving independence of action without deterrence or intimidation by the fear of personal liability and vexatious suits."). The doctrine thus " 'gives ample room for mistaken judgments' by protecting 'all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.' " Donaldson , 185 Ariz. at 50, 912 P.2d at 54 (quoting Hunter , 502 U.S. at 229, 112 S.Ct. 534 ). ¶ 10 If qualified immunity applies, a public official performing a discretionary act "within the scope of [her] public duties" may be liable only if she "knew or should have known that [s]he was acting in violation of established law or acted in reckless disregard of whether h[er] activities would deprive another person of their rights." Chamberlain , 151 Ariz. at 558, 729 P.2d at 912 ; see also Grimm v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles , 115 Ariz. 260, 267-68, 564 P.2d 1227, 1235 (1977) (holding that members of the Arizona Board of Pardons and Paroles were liable "only for the grossly negligent or reckless release of a highly dangerous prisoner" but enjoyed "freedom from suit for reasonable decisions"). A public official's conscious disregard of the law or the rights of others constitutes gross negligence, see Noriega v. Town of Miami , 243 Ariz. 320, 328, ¶¶ 35-36, 407 P.3d 92, 100 (App. 2017) (citations omitted), and she remains liable for such conduct, Chamberlain , 151 Ariz. at 558, 729 P.2d at 912. But a public official performing a discretionary act encompassed within her public duties is shielded from liability for simple negligence. See Chamberlain , 151 Ariz. at 558, 729 P.2d at 912. ¶ 11 Criminal investigations involve the exercise of personal deliberation and individual professional judgment that necessarily reflect the facts of a given situation. By its very nature, investigative police work is discretionary and appropriate for exemption from suit for simple negligence. See Walls v. Ariz. Dep't of Pub. Safety , 170 Ariz. 591, 594, 826 P.2d 1217, 1220 (App. 1991) (acknowledging that decisions to investigate a crime or arrest a suspect "involve a judgment by a police officer"). Moreover: The public has a vital stake in the active investigation and prosecution of crime. Police officers and other investigative agents must make quick and important decisions as to the course an investigation shall take. Their judgment will not always be right; but to assure continued vigorous police work, those charged with that duty should not be liable for mere negligence. Landeros , 171 Ariz. at 475, 831 P.2d at 851 (quoting Smith v. State , 324 N.W.2d 299, 301 (Iowa 1982) ); see also Everitt v. Gen. Elec. Co. , 156 N.H. 202, 932 A.2d 831, 844 (2007) ("[L]aw enforcement by its nature is susceptible to provoking the hostilities and hindsight second-guessing by those directly interacting with police as well as by the citizenry at large.... The public simply cannot afford for those individuals charged with securing and preserving community safety to have their judgment shaded out of fear of subsequent lawsuits."). Accordingly, we conclude that public policy mandates that investigative police work, performed in the scope of an officer's public duty, is a discretionary act subject to qualified immunity. ¶ 12 Here, Spooner alleged Brown acted either intentionally or negligently to effectuate Spooner's arrest without the requisite probable cause. To the extent these actions violate clearly established law or reflect a reckless disregard of Spooner's rights, they are afforded no protection. The trial court properly permitted Spooner to proceed on these claims and properly instructed the jury that it could find in Spooner's favor if she proved gross negligence. But to the extent Brown's actions reflect the legitimate exercise of professional judgment, they are discretionary and protected by qualified immunity. Thus, the court rightfully entered judgment as a matter of law in the City's favor on the claim for simple negligence. CONCLUSION ¶ 13 The judgment in favor of the City is affirmed. As the prevailing party, the City is entitled to its costs incurred on appeal upon compliance with ARCAP 21(b). Spooner also alleged the City did not properly supervise and train its employees to prevent wrongful arrests, but she did not advance this theory at trial. Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite a statute's current version. Although Spooner suggests the grand jury testimony could have been admitted with a limiting instruction regarding its proper purpose, rather than excluded altogether, she did not request this remedy at trial and therefore waived her right to assert error on this basis. Cf. State v. Mott , 187 Ariz. 536, 546, 931 P.2d 1046, 1056 (1997). Spooner cites Austin v. City of Scottsdale , 140 Ariz. 579, 684 P.2d 151 (1984) ; Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix , 188 Ariz. 183, 933 P.2d 1251 (App. 1996), reversed on other grounds , 192 Ariz. 51, 961 P.2d 449 (1998) ; and Landeros v. City of Tucson , 171 Ariz. 474, 831 P.2d 850 (App. 1992), to support her argument that the City may be liable for simple negligence. None of these cases squarely discuss whether a law enforcement officer enjoys qualified immunity for discretionary decisions made in the course of a criminal investigation, and we do not find them instructive.

THUMMA, Chief Judge: ¶ 1 Aleise H. (Mother) challenges the superior court's order terminating her parental rights to her biological children A.W., J.H. and M.H. Mother argues the court improperly found termination was in the children's best interests and failed to make adequate findings. Because Mother has shown no reversible error, the order is affirmed. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 2 In August 2015, the Department of Child Safety (DCS) took A.W. (born in 2006), J.H. (born in 2014) and M.H. (born in 2015) into care. At that time, Mother and the children lived with Harry H., the father of J.H. and M.H.; Mother and Harry H. had a history of domestic violence. As to Mother, DCS' dependency petition alleged neglect and that she was unwilling or unable to provide proper and effective parental care and control. The court found the children dependent as to Mother in October 2015 and adopted a case plan of family reunification, with a concurrent case plan of severance and adoption for J.H. and M.H. ¶ 3 For a time, Mother engaged in services and was described as making progress. As a DCS case manager reported, however, in August 2017 Mother said she was going to Oregon "for a family death, or something like that. And she ended up not coming back." Ultimately, Mother returned to Arizona in December 2017, went back to Oregon after a week or two and then returned to Arizona in early 2018. While in Oregon, Mother had "minimal" contact with DCS and the children. As a result, the court changed the case plan to severance and adoption. DCS' motion sought termination based on abandonment, mental deficiency and 15-months' time-in-care, also alleging that termination was in the best interests of the children. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (A.R.S.) § 8-533(B)(1), (3), (8)(c) (2018). ¶ 4 Although Mother appeared at the initial termination hearing, she did not attend trial, which proceeded in her absence. The court heard testimony from a DCS case manager and a DCS case specialist and received exhibits . As relevant here, the case manager testified that termination was in the children's best interests, adding that termination and adoption by the current placement, a maternal aunt, would provide the children permanency and stability. The case specialist testified that the younger children had been with the placement their entire lives, the placement was meeting the children's needs and termination would provide needed stability. This same witness testified the children would suffer if parental rights were not terminated: "[t]hey would continue to be in a place where permanency was still not set for them ... [T]hey wouldn't know where they're going to be for the rest of their lives." The evidence also showed the children were adoptable even if the current placement was unable to adopt. ¶ 5 In granting the motion, the court found DCS had shown by clear and convincing evidence the three statutory grounds alleged. The court then found DCS proved by a preponderance of the evidence that termination was in the best interests of the children. The court noted that "all three children are placed together in a prospective adoptive home. This home has demonstrated its willingness and ability to meet all of the needs of the children. Adoption will provide each of these children with the permanence and stability that they otherwise lack." Noting the children had been in care for nearly three years, the court added that "the children will continue languishing in foster care for an indefinite period of time" absent termination. The court also found the children were adoptable. ¶ 6 In written findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court echoed these findings. As to best interests, the court found termination would provide the children with permanency and stability. The children are residing in an adoptive placement which is meeting all of their needs. The children are considered adoptable and another adoptive placement could be located should the current placement be unable to adopt. Continuation of the parent-child relationship would be a detriment to the children because it would delay permanency, leaving the children to linger in care for an indeterminate period since the children do not have parents who are able to care for them. This court has jurisdiction over Mother's timely appeal pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-2101(A) and 12-120.21(A) and Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 103 - 04. DISCUSSION ¶ 7 As applicable here, to terminate parental rights, a court must find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground articulated in A.R.S. § 8-533(B) has been proven and must find by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the children. See Kent K. v. Bobby M. , 210 Ariz. 279, 288 ¶ 41, 110 P.3d 1013, 1022 (2005) ; Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 196 Ariz. 246, 249 ¶ 12, 995 P.2d 682, 685 (2000). Because the superior court "is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts," this court will affirm an order terminating parental rights so long as it is supported by reasonable evidence. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 223 Ariz. 86, 93 ¶ 18, 219 P.3d 296, 303 (App. 2009). ¶ 8 Mother does not challenge the superior court's findings regarding the statutory grounds for termination, which are supported by the trial evidence. Rather, she argues the court erred in determining that termination was in the best interests of the children. Specifically, Mother asserts the court erred in (1) finding DCS proved either a benefit to the children by termination or a detriment if termination was not granted and (2) failing to "set forth case-specific findings of fact to support its best interests determination." I. Mother Has Shown No Error In The Superior Court's Findings That The Children Would Benefit From Termination And Be Harmed If Termination Was Denied. ¶ 9 When a statutory ground for termination has been proven, "the focus shifts to the interests of the child as distinct from those of the parent," Kent K. , 210 Ariz. at 285 ¶ 31, 110 P.3d at 1019, and "[o]f foremost concern ... is protecting a child's interest in stability and security," Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F. , 239 Ariz. 1, 4 ¶ 15, 365 P.3d 353, 356 (2016). "[T]ermination is in the child's best interests if either: (1) the child will benefit from severance; or (2) the child will be harmed if severance is denied." Alma S. v. Dep't of Child Safety , 245 Ariz. 146, 150 ¶ 13, 425 P.3d 1089 (2018). "It is well established in state-initiated cases that the child's prospective adoption is a benefit that can support a best-interests finding," Demetrius L. , 239 Ariz. at 4 ¶ 16, 365 P.3d at 356, recognizing the court "must consider the totality of the circumstances existing at the time of the severance determination," Alma S. , 245 Ariz. at 150-51 ¶ 13, 425 P.3d at 1093-94. The record is viewed in a light most favorable to upholding the best-interests findings, and findings of fact are to be affirmed "if reasonable evidence and inferences support them." Id. at 152 ¶ 21, 151 ¶ 18, 425 P.3d at 1095, 1094. ¶ 10 The superior court found that the children would benefit by termination because they were placed with a familial, potentially adoptive placement that was meeting their needs and would provide permanence and stability they were lacking. The court also properly found that the children would be harmed if termination was denied, because the children would remain in care for an indefinite period. Each finding would support best interests independently, and both are supported by the trial evidence. Mother has shown no abuse of discretion in the findings that the children would benefit by termination and be harmed if termination was denied. See, e.g., id. at 152 ¶ 21, 425 P.3d at 1095 ; Demetrius L. , 239 Ariz. at 6 ¶ 22, 365 P.3d at 358. II. Mother Has Waived Any Claim That The Superior Court Did Not Make Adequate Best Interests Findings. ¶ 11 Mother asserts that the superior court "did not set forth case-specific findings of fact to support its best-interests determination" as required. See A.R.S. § 8-538(A) ; Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 66(F)(2)(a). Citing Logan B. v. Dep't of Child Safety , 244 Ariz. 532, 422 P.3d 1072 (App. 2018), Mother claims this asserted failure means "the severance order is invalid." ¶ 12 Mother failed to raise this issue with the superior court, which issued the order she is challenging. As Logan B. recognized, "[g]enerally, failure to raise an argument in the [superior] court waives the issue on appeal." 244 Ariz. at 532 ¶ 11, 422 P.3d at 1072 (citing Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 214 Ariz. 445, 452 ¶ 21, 153 P.3d 1074, 1081 (App. 2007) ). Although ultimately "declin[ing] to find waiver," Logan B. noted that "[t]he waiver doctrine is not 'an unalterable rule' " and "the decision to find waiver is discretionary." 244 Ariz. at 532 ¶¶ 11, 9, 422 P.3d at 1072 (quoting and citing cases). ¶ 13 Because the decision to find waiver is discretionary, in the exercise of that discretion, on the record presented and to prevent avoidable delay, this court concludes that Mother has waived any claim she may have had that the superior court did not make adequate best interests findings. See, e.g. , Cecilia A. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 229 Ariz. 286, 289 ¶ 11, 274 P.3d 1220, 1223 (App. 2012) (applying waiver to due process argument); Antonio M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 222 Ariz. 369, 371 ¶ 6, 214 P.3d 1010, 1012 (App. 2009) (when party fails to object in superior court to " 'alleged lack of detail in the [superior] court's findings,' the issue is deemed waived when raised for the first time on appeal") (quoting Marco C. v. Sean C. , 218 Ariz. 216, 220 n.2, 181 P.3d 1137, 1141 n.2 (App. 2008) ); Kimu P. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 218 Ariz. 39, 44 n.3, 178 P.3d 511, 516 n.3 (App. 2008) (applying waiver to issues relating to "alleged procedural defects" first raised on appeal); Christy C. , 214 Ariz. at 452 ¶¶ 20-21, 153 P.3d at 1081 (applying waiver to issues relating to alleged insufficiency of findings first raised on appeal). CONCLUSION ¶ 14 Because Mother has shown no reversible error, the superior court's order terminating her parental rights to A.W., J.H. and M.H. is affirmed. Harry H.'s parental rights, as well as those of A.W.'s father, were terminated in 2018, and neither is a party to this appeal. Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated. In challenging the best interests findings, Mother's opening brief on appeal relied on Alma S. v. Dep't of Child Safety , 244 Ariz. 152, 418 P.3d 925 (App. 2017), which was later vacated by the Arizona Supreme Court. Alma S. , 245 Ariz. at 152 ¶ 21, 425 P.3d at 1095. This court allowed supplemental briefing to address the Arizona Supreme Court's opinion in Alma S.

JUSTICE BOLICK, opinion of the Court: ¶1 This case concerns whether a family court's award of joint legal decision-making that gives one parent final legal decision-making authority over certain matters necessarily gives that parent sole legal decision-making authority. We hold that final and sole have different meanings in this context. I. BACKGROUND ¶2 This question arises in the context of a family law dispute, which the family court aptly described as "a troubling and difficult case since its inception in September 2014," between the parents of a now eight-year-old girl. In a fifty-eight-page ruling, the court recounted the case history in painstaking detail, including allegations of domestic violence, child abuse, and medical neglect of the child. Based on extensive findings, including those addressing the child's best interests, the court made numerous orders regarding the parents' respective rights going forward. ¶3 Before us is the family court's order regarding legal decision-making authority. The court found that it was in the child's best interests to award joint legal decision-making to Mother and Father. The court ordered, in relevant part, as follows: Parental decisions shall be required for major issues in raising the child and in meeting on-going needs. When they arise, each parent shall give good faith consideration to the views of the other and put forth best efforts to reach a consensus decision.... If they cannot agree after making a good faith effort to reach an agreement, Father shall have the ability to make the final decision as to medical, mental health, dental, and therapy issues.... The court made other orders that are not before us regarding choice-of-school decisions. ¶4 The court of appeals affirmed some orders, vacated others, and remanded. Nicaise v. Sundaram , 244 Ariz. 272, 282 ¶ 35, 418 P.3d 1045, 1055 (App. 2018). However, although the issue was neither raised nor briefed by the parties, the court determined that by giving Father final legal decision-making authority over medical, mental-health, dental, and therapy issues, the family court "effectively create[d] orders for sole legal decision-making, carved out from a general order for joint legal decision-making." Id. at 278 ¶ 19, 418 P.3d at 1051. Construing A.R.S. § 25-401(2), the court determined that "[a]n award of joint legal decision-making that gives final authority to one parent is, in reality, an award of sole legal decision-making. ... Regardless of the labels used in a decree, when one parent has the final say, that parent's rights are superior and the authority therefore is not joint as a matter of law." Id. ¶ 18. ¶5 Mother sought review only of this portion of the court of appeals' opinion. Whether a parent's right to make a final decision following consultation converts joint into sole legal decision-making authority is an issue of first impression with statewide significance. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution. II. DISCUSSION ¶6 This case presents a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. State ex rel. DES v. Pandola , 243 Ariz. 418, 419 ¶ 6, 408 P.3d 1254, 1255-56 (2018). ¶7 We granted review on three questions presented by Mother: (1) whether the court of appeals' sua sponte determination to convert joint legal decision-making into Father's sole decision-making authority violated Mother's due process rights; (2) whether in so doing the court erred by not remanding the matter to the family court; and (3) whether the court of appeals' effective award of sole legal decision-making authority over certain matters to Father conflicts with the family court's findings relating to the child's best interests. Because we conclude that the court of appeals erred as a matter of law in equating final legal decision-making authority over certain matters as an award of sole legal decision-making, we need not reach those issues. ¶8 Section 25-401 sets forth definitions covering legal decision-making and parenting time. Section 25-401(3) defines legal decision-making as "the legal right and responsibility to make all nonemergency legal decisions for a child including those regarding education, health care, religious training and personal care decisions." Section 25-401(2) states that joint legal decision-making "means both parents share decision-making and neither parent's rights or responsibilities are superior except with respect to specified decisions as set forth by the court or the parents in the final judgment or order." Finally, § 25-401(6) provides that sole legal decision-making "means one parent has the legal right and responsibility to make major decisions for a child." ¶9 The court of appeals concluded that any order based on the exception in § 25-401(2) -providing that one parent has "superior" decision-making authority over certain matters-means that "one parent has the sole legal right to decide," which "is the essence of sole legal-decision-making" under § 25-401(6). Nicaise , 244 Ariz. at 278 ¶ 19, 418 P.3d at 1051. The court thereby essentially determined that any order vesting "superior" decision-making authority in one parent necessarily establishes sole legal decision-making authority. ¶10 That interpretation conflicts with the statutory scheme as well as precedent and practice. While an award of joint legal decision-making authority with one parent having the power to make final decisions in some contexts is similar to sole legal decision-making authority as a practical matter, there are significant differences between them and, more importantly, the legislature clearly directed that they are separate and distinct categories. ¶11 We interpret statutory language in view of the entire text, considering the context and related statutes on the same subject. State ex rel. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Hayden , 210 Ariz. 522, 523-24 ¶ 7, 115 P.3d 116, 117-18 (2005) ; see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 (2012) (noting a statute should be read "to consider the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and logical relation of its many parts"). A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous. See City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. , 209 Ariz. 544, 552-53 ¶¶ 31-34, 105 P.3d 1163, 1171-72 (2005). ¶12 Section 25-401(2) provides that joint legal decision-making "means both parents share decision-making and neither parent's rights or responsibilities are superior except with respect to specified decisions as set forth ... in the final judgment or order." (Emphasis added.) As noted above, the court of appeals read the italicized language as meaning that whenever one parent is given superior legal decision-making rights "the authority ... is not joint as a matter of law." Nicaise , 244 Ariz. at 278 ¶ 18, 418 P.3d at 1051. It concluded that the "exception" to joint legal decision-making authorized in § 25-401(2)"effectively creates orders for sole legal decision-making, carved out from a general order for joint legal decision-making." Id. ¶ 19. Under that view, therefore, the family court is only authorized to order joint legal decision-making or sole legal decision-making; it cannot, as the family court did here, order joint legal decision-making with one parent having final authority if they cannot agree to a decision. We disagree. ¶13 We interpret § 25-401(2) as meaning that one parent's joint legal decision-making authority is made superior in some circumstances, but the parents retain joint legal decision-making authority; the "tie-breaking" parent is not granted sole legal decision-making authority under subsection (6). In setting forth an option for joint legal decision-making, including an option for final decision-making authority on certain issues, subsection (2) does not reference subsection (6). That the legislature placed this exception to joint legal decision-making in a different subsection than sole legal decision-making suggests they were meant to be distinct. Further, transforming the subsection (2) exception into an award of sole legal decision-making would render the exception surplusage as subsection (6) already authorizes such awards. See City of Tucson , 209 Ariz. at 552-53 ¶¶ 31-34, 105 P.3d at 1171-72 (holding that this Court, if possible, must not interpret a statute in a way that would render a subsection within the statute superfluous). ¶14 And contrary to the court of appeals' assertion, the two categories, joint legal decision-making with final decision-making authority and sole legal decision-making authority, are different as a practical matter. Awarding joint legal decision-making authority with final decision-making authority over certain matters to one parent under subsection (2) creates shared legal decision-making with the possibility that one parent will exercise a superior right if the parents cannot reach a joint agreement in good faith. By contrast, an award of sole legal decision-making under subsection (6) creates unshared authority. The distinction is illustrated by the family court's order here conditioning the exercise of Father's final legal decision-making authority upon good-faith efforts to reach a consensus. Such orders are common and commendable and do not convert joint into sole legal decision-making. ¶15 In addition to allowing the courts to fashion hybrid orders providing shared and final legal decision-making authority over different matters and requiring good-faith consultation between the parents, subsection (2) also preserves some legal authority for the parent who does not have final legal decision-making authority. The definition of legal decision-making under subsection (3) includes the "legal right" to make nonemergency legal decisions for the child. Thus, a parent with joint legal decision-making authority who does not have final legal decision-making authority on an issue under subsection (2) would maintain the legal right, subject to consultation and the other parent's approval, to establish a bank account for the child, take the child to a doctor, and exercise other nonemergency legal authority on behalf of the child. ¶16 Arizona cases frequently provide for joint legal decision-making with one parent having final authority over certain matters. See, e.g. , In re Marriage of Friedman & Roels , 244 Ariz. 111, 113 ¶ 5, 418 P.3d 884, 886-87 (2018) ; In re Marriage of Worcester , 192 Ariz. 24, 25 ¶ 2, 960 P.2d 624, 624 (1998). The court of appeals' opinion unnecessarily injects uncertainty into a well-established practice and is inconsistent with the overall structure of § 25-401. CONCLUSION ¶17 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the first sentence of ¶ 1, the entirety of ¶¶ 17-19, the second and third sentences of ¶ 31, and the second sentence of ¶ 35 of the court of appeals' opinion, and we disapprove any language in ¶¶ 20-25 suggesting that the family court awarded sole legal decision-making authority to Father. In light of our decision, we do not address Mother's remaining issues. We affirm the family court's order. This superior decision-making authority has been commonly referred to as final legal decision-making authority by Arizona courts. See, e.g. , In re Marriage of Friedman & Roels , 244 Ariz. 111, 113 ¶ 5, 418 P.3d 884, 886-87 (2018).

HOWE, Judge: ¶ 1 JAI Dining Services (Phoenix), Inc. ("JAI") appeals a jury verdict finding it liable for negligently overserving alcohol to a patron who later drove while intoxicated and caused a collision that seriously injured Mark Dupray. JAI claims that the trial court erred in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law ("JMOL") because it did not breach its duty of care to Dupray, and even if it did overserve the patron, the patron's decisions to drive while intoxicated after safely leaving JAI's establishment were intervening and superseding causes that absolved JAI of liability for Dupray's injuries. JAI also claims that the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting a proposed jury instruction on intervening and superseding cause. ¶ 2 We vacate the jury's verdict. The trial court correctly denied the motion for JMOL because the jury was presented with sufficient evidence to support the verdict. But the court erred in failing to give JAI's proposed instruction on intervening and superseding cause. The instruction properly stated the law on the issue and the issue was critical to the jury's determination of liability. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 3 Pedro Panameno, who had been living in his car, spent the morning of August 5, 2013, at his girlfriend's house, the house he considered his "home." At 2:30 p.m., Panameno drove his girlfriend's brother to see their mutual friend, who lived about thirty minutes away. They stayed at the friend's house until 4:00 p.m., when the friend drove them to the mall in his car. On the way, they went to a drive-through liquor store and purchased a fifth of bourbon and two 16-ounce alcoholic energy drinks. Panameno had not yet drunk any alcohol that day. By the time they reached the mall, however, Panameno had drunk both alcoholic energy drinks and about half of the bourbon; his friend had one "swig" of the bourbon. ¶ 4 After a short stay at the mall, the friend drove them to Jaguars, a gentlemen's club JAI operated. On the way, Panameno drank the rest of the bourbon. Arriving around 5:00 p.m., the men ordered three or four buckets of beers, each containing eight 12-ounce bottles. Panameno drank eleven or twelve bottles of beer over the next three hours. Panameno became intoxicated and, by his own admission at trial, was in his "own little world." ¶ 5 The group left the club around 8:00 p.m. By that time, according to Panameno, "[e]verybody was probably pretty much toasted at that moment[,]" and "[e]verybody had more than their share, especially me." Panameno's friend drove them back to his house, about eight to ten minutes away. Panameno and his girlfriend's brother stayed at the friend's house for fifteen to twenty minutes, and then Panameno drove the brother back to his girlfriend's house. When they arrived at the house twenty to twenty-five minutes later, Panameno's girlfriend began arguing with him for bringing her brother home later than she had expected. She told Panameno that he looked intoxicated and should not be driving and tried to take his car key from him. Panameno became angry and drove off "a little aggressive[ly]." ¶ 6 A short distance away, Dupray was stopped at a red light on his "Vespa-type scooter." Panameno, traveling about forty-five miles per hour, rear-ended Dupray, severely injuring him. A police officer responding to the collision found three 12-packs of beer in Panameno's car, with two bottles missing or broken. When the police interviewed Panameno at the hospital, they observed signs of intoxication, including slurred speech, bloodshot and watery eyes, and a strong odor of alcohol on his breath. An officer drew Panameno's blood a few hours after the collision, and an analysis showed that his blood alcohol concentration at the time of the collision was between 0.210 and 0.274. ¶ 7 Dupray and his wife sued (1) Panameno for negligence and negligence per se for causing the collision and (2) JAI for "common law dram shop negligence" and negligence per se for overserving Panameno to the point of intoxication. JAI moved for summary judgment, asserting that it had met the standard of care as a matter of law and that Panameno's decisions to drive were intervening and superseding causes that relieved JAI of all liability as a matter of law. The trial court denied JAI's motion, and the matter proceeded to trial. ¶ 8 After the jury heard the evidence, JAI moved for JMOL under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 50. JAI argued that the Duprays had not presented sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that it breached its duty to the Duprays. JAI also claimed that Panameno's decisions to drive after returning to his friend's house and again after reaching his girlfriend's house were intervening and superseding causes destroying the chain of proximate causation. The court denied JAI's motion. ¶ 9 JAI then proposed a jury instruction that provided that the Duprays were required to show that JAI's acts or omissions produced their injuries "unbroken by any intervening and superseding cause[.]" The instruction also defined "intervening cause" and "superseding cause." The court rejected this instruction and stated it would give only a general causation instruction. The court did allow JAI's counsel to discuss intervening and superseding causes in closing argument, but also instructed the jury that "the lawyers' questions and arguments are not evidence." The jury found for the Duprays, awarding $3,503,494.58 in compensatory damages and allocating 60% of the fault to Panameno and 40% to JAI. The jury also awarded punitive damages of $400,000 against Panameno and $4,000,000 against JAI. ¶ 10 After the verdict, JAI renewed its motion for JMOL and in the alternative, moved for a new trial with an intervening and superseding cause jury instruction. JAI also argued that insufficient evidence supported the punitive damages award. The court denied JAI's motion, and JAI timely appealed. DISCUSSION 1. Judgment as a Matter of Law ¶ 11 JAI argues that the trial court erred in denying its JMOL motion because (a) it did not breach its duty of care to the Duprays and (b) Panameno's actions in driving away from his friend's house and then his girlfriend's house were intervening and superseding causes of the Duprays' injuries. We review the denial of the motion de novo but view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Duprays. See Crackel v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 208 Ariz. 252, 259-60 ¶ 20, 92 P.3d 882, 889-90 (App. 2004). A court may grant JMOL only when "a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for [a] party" on an issue that is necessary to the party's claim or defense. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 50(a). In considering a JMOL motion, the trial court "may not weigh the credibility of witnesses or resolve conflicts of evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom[,]" McBride v. Kieckhefer Assocs. Inc. , 228 Ariz. 262, 265 ¶ 11, 265 P.3d 1061, 1064 (App. 2011), but "must give 'full credence to the right of the jury to determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable conclusions therefrom[,]' " id . (quoting State v. Clifton , 134 Ariz. 345, 348, 656 P.2d 634, 637 (App. 1982) ). Because JAI failed to show that the jury could not reasonably find that it breached its duty of care to the Duprays or proximately caused their injuries, the trial court correctly denied the motion. a. Breach of the Duty of Care ¶ 12 A liquor licensee "is under a duty, imposed both by common law principles and statute, to exercise affirmative, reasonable care in serving intoxicants to patrons who might later injure themselves or an innocent third party, whether on or off the premises." Patterson v. Thunder Pass, Inc. , 214 Ariz. 435, 438 ¶ 13, 153 P.3d 1064, 1067 (App. 2007). Arizona's "dram shop" statute, A.R.S. § 4-311(A), provides that a licensee is liable for property damage or personal injuries if the licensee sold liquor to an obviously intoxicated person and that person's consumption of the liquor proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. "Obviously intoxicated" means "inebriated to such an extent that a person's physical faculties are substantially impaired and the impairment is shown by significantly uncoordinated physical action or significant physical dysfunction that would have been obvious to a reasonable person." A.R.S. § 4-311(D). A licensee also cannot serve liquor to an obviously intoxicated person or allow an obviously intoxicated person to remain on the premises longer than thirty minutes after the obvious intoxication becomes known or should become known. A.R.S. § 4-244(14). Nor can a licensee serve more than forty ounces of beer to one person at one time for that person's consumption. A.R.S. § 4-244(23). ¶ 13 The Duprays presented evidence that JAI did not exercise reasonable care in serving intoxicants to Panameno. Panameno testified that in the hour before he arrived at the club, he had drunk two 16-ounce alcoholic energy drinks and all but one "swig" of a fifth of bourbon. Once at the club, he drank eleven or twelve 12-ounce bottles of beer-between 132 and 144 ounces of alcohol in total-over the next three hours. He said that he became intoxicated and was in his "own little world." A forensic toxicologist testified that, based on an analysis of the toxicology reports of Panameno's blood after the collision, Panameno's blood alcohol concentration reached 0.10-the point at which a person would become visibly intoxicated-while he was at the club. The Duprays' expert on the standard of care for liquor licensees testified that based on Panameno's toxicology reports and the other evidence about Panameno's activities the night of the collision, Panameno was obviously intoxicated at the club, and club personnel did not comply with industry standards in serving alcohol to him. According to the expert, club personnel did not monitor Panameno's drinking to determine if he was or had become intoxicated, nor did they prevent him from causing injury to others in his intoxicated state. This evidence provided a legally sufficient basis for the jury to find that JAI breached its duty of care to the Duprays, which precluded the trial court from granting JMOL for JAI. ¶ 14 JAI presents two arguments to the contrary. First, it argues that the trial court should have granted JMOL because Panameno's testimony about how much alcohol he drank at the club was inconsistent with expert testimony that he could have reached the blood alcohol concentration he had at the time of the collision only by drinking after he had left the club. But a trial court ruling on a motion for JMOL cannot weigh witness credibility or resolve conflicts in evidence, McBride , 228 Ariz. at 265 ¶ 11, 265 P.3d at 1064 ; it can determine only whether sufficient evidence was presented for the jury to resolve the fact at issue. The jury had evidence that JAI overserved Panameno to the point of obvious intoxication, which was reason to deny the JMOL motion. ¶ 15 JAI argues second that it did not breach its duty because the evidence was undisputed that Panameno left the club safely. For this proposition, JAI relies on this Court's decision in Patterson . But Patterson does not support such a limited view of the scope of a tavern's duty. In that case, a tavern served alcohol to a patron who was obviously intoxicated. 214 Ariz. at 436 ¶ 3, 153 P.3d at 1065. When the patron attempted to leave the tavern, however, a tavern employee took the patron's car key from her and drove her home in a different car, gave the patron back her key, and returned to the tavern. Id. Within an hour after the tavern employee left and unbeknown to the tavern personnel, the patron made her way back to the tavern parking lot, retrieved her car, drove off, and subsequently caused a collision. Id. This Court affirmed summary judgment for the tavern because the tavern's employees "fulfilled their legal duty of affirmative, reasonable care to [the patron] and the public by separating [the patron] from her vehicle and arranging for, as well as subsequently providing, the safe transportation of [the patron] to her residence." Id. at 439 ¶ 16, 153 P.3d at 1068. ¶ 16 Here, by contrast, the evidence does not show that the club's personnel took any action to see that Panameno reached home safely. No evidence shows that the club's personnel were even aware of Panameno's presence at the club. The fact that Panameno was transported away from the club by a friend does not by itself absolve JAI from liability for failing to "exercise affirmative, reasonable care" in serving alcohol to Panameno. Thus, the trial court did not err by denying JAI's motion for JMOL on this issue. b. Proximate Cause ¶ 17 A plaintiff suing for negligence must prove, inter alia , a "causal connection" between the defendant's breach and the plaintiff's resulting injuries. Quiroz v. ALCOA Inc. , 243 Ariz. 560, 564 ¶ 7, 416 P.3d 824, 828 (2018). In this context, "cause" has two components: actual cause or "causation-in-fact," and proximate or legal cause. Ontiveros v. Borak , 136 Ariz. 500, 505-06, 667 P.2d 200, 205-06 (1983) ; Patterson , 214 Ariz. at 438-39 ¶¶ 13-14, 153 P.3d at 1067-68 ; Barrett v. Harris , 207 Ariz. 374, 378 ¶ 11, 86 P.3d 954, 958 (App. 2004). Actual cause exists if the defendant's act "helped cause the final result" and the result "would not have happened without the defendant's act." Ontiveros , 136 Ariz. at 505, 667 P.2d at 205. A defendant is liable even if his conduct contributed "only a little" to the plaintiff's injuries. Id. (citation omitted). An act that is the actual cause of injuries will also be the proximate cause unless an intervening event supersedes the defendant's liability for the injuries. Id . at 505-06, 667 P.2d at 205-06 ; Patterson , 214 Ariz. at 438-39 ¶ 14, 153 P.3d at 1067-68. An event that contributes to the injuries is intervening if it has an independent origin for which the defendant is not responsible. Patterson , 214 Ariz. at 438-39 ¶ 14, 153 P.3d at 1067-68. Such an event is superseding if it "was unforeseeable by a reasonable person in the position of the original actor" and "looking backward, after the event, the intervening act appears extraordinary." Ontiveros , 136 Ariz. at 506, 667 P.2d at 206. When the injuries are "produced by an intervening and superseding cause, even though the original negligence may have been a substantial factor in bringing about the injury," the defendant is not liable "because the necessary proximate causation is lacking." Patterson , 214 Ariz. at 439 ¶ 14, 153 P.3d at 1068 (quoting Herzberg v. White , 49 Ariz. 313, 321, 66 P.2d 253, 261 (1937) ). ¶ 18 The existence of proximate cause "requires consideration of all the facts," and "is usually a question for the jury, unless reasonable people could not differ." McMurtry v. Weatherford Hotel, Inc. , 231 Ariz. 244, 256 ¶ 38, 293 P.3d 520, 532 (App. 2013). This includes the question whether an intervening and superseding cause exists. See Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of Amer., Inc. , 163 Ariz. 539, 547, 789 P.2d 1040, 1048 (1990) (holding that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on issue of intervening and superseding cause). ¶ 19 The trial court here properly denied JAI's motion for JMOL because the jury had sufficient evidence to find that JAI's conduct was the actual and proximate cause of the Duprays' injuries. The jury heard evidence that Panameno became intoxicated at the club and, traveling forty-five miles per hour in an intoxicated state, rear-ended Dupray, severely injuring him. Of course, the jury also heard contrary evidence. JAI's expert testified that Panameno's blood alcohol concentration at and after the collision was inconsistent with the allegation that he left the club intoxicated. The jury heard testimony that Panameno was not driving when he arrived or left the club and that he voluntarily drove from his friend's house to his girlfriend's house and then away from his girlfriend's house until he finally collided with Dupray. But the existence of conflicting evidence precludes granting a JMOL. See McBride , 228 Ariz. at 265 ¶ 11, 265 P.3d at 1064. ¶ 20 JAI nevertheless argues that it was entitled to JMOL because Panameno's decision to drive after he had been driven away from the club constituted an intervening and superseding cause of the Duprays' injuries. It again relies on Patterson . In addition to holding that the tavern had fulfilled its duty to its patron and the public by separating the patron from her car and taking her home, this Court also held that the patron's decision to leave home and return to retrieve her car while intoxicated was an intervening and superseding cause. Patterson , 214 Ariz. at 440 ¶ 19, 153 P.3d at 1069. This Court held that the patron's decision was "unforeseeable and extraordinary" and "negated any negligence on the part of the tavern or its employees." Id. ¶ 21 JAI's argument-that Panameno's decisions to drive once he was safely away from the club constituted intervening and superseding causes that broke the chain of causation between JAI's negligence and the Duprays' injuries-does have some force. But this case is not like Patterson in two respects. First, unlike the tavern patron in that case, Panameno, who lived in his car, did not go to his own home after leaving the club, but went to the homes of others. Whether the homes of his friend or his girlfriend were places of repose, which might make unforeseeable his decision to leave them and continue driving, were factual questions for the jury, not the trial court, to determine. Second, the record contains no evidence that club personnel knew how Panameno arrived or departed from the club, where he was heading after he left, or where he was staying. Thus, a jury could have reasonably concluded that Panameno's collision with Dupray was foreseeable from JAI's perspective. Because JAI was not entitled to JMOL on the issue of causation, the trial court did not err in denying JAI's motion for JMOL. 2. Requested Jury Instruction ¶ 22 JAI also argues that the trial court erred by refusing to give a jury instruction on intervening and superseding cause. This Court reviews a refusal to give a requested jury instruction for an abuse of discretion and will not reverse if the requesting party cannot show resulting prejudice. Brethauer v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 221 Ariz. 192, 198 ¶ 24, 211 P.3d 1176, 1182 (App. 2009). We review jury instructions as a whole, A Tumbling-T Ranches v. Flood Control Dist. of Maricopa Cty. , 222 Ariz. 515, 533 ¶ 50, 217 P.3d 1220, 1238 (App. 2009), and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the requesting party, Anderson v. Nissei ASB Mach. Co., Ltd. , 197 Ariz. 168, 178 ¶ 39, 3 P.3d 1088, 1098 (App. 1999). "A trial court must give a requested [jury] instruction if (1) the evidence supports the instruction, (2) the instruction is proper under the law, and (3) the instruction pertains to an important issue, and the gist of the instruction is not given in any other instructions." Brethauer , 221 Ariz. at 198 ¶ 24, 211 P.3d at 1182 (quoting DeMontiney v. Desert Manor Convalescent Ctr. Inc. , 144 Ariz. 6, 10, 695 P.2d 255, 259 (1985) ). ¶ 23 Applying these factors, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the requested instruction. First, the parties presented evidence that would support a jury finding that JAI's overserving of Panameno was not the proximate cause of the Duprays' injuries because Panameno's conduct after leaving the club constituted an intervening and superseding cause. The evidence showed that after Panameno left the club with his friends, he drove from his friend's house to his girlfriend's house-the place he considered his "home"-and then away from his girlfriend's house, even though he was intoxicated and rejected his girlfriend's pleas that he was too intoxicated to drive. From this evidence, the jury could have concluded that although JAI's negligence in overserving Panameno was an actual cause of the collision, the chain of causation was broken by Panameno's two independent decisions to drive from both houses even though he was intoxicated and warned that he should not drive. ¶ 24 Second, the instruction properly stated the law. An act that causes injuries in a chain of events will be the "proximate cause" of the injuries unless an independent and superseding event breaks that chain. Ontiveros , 136 Ariz. at 505-06, 667 P.2d at 205-06 ; Patterson , 214 Ariz. at 438-39 ¶ 14, 153 P.3d at 1067-68 ; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 440 (1965) (A superseding event precludes the imposition of liability for injuries.). An event that contributes to the injuries is intervening and superseding if it occurred after, and was independent of, the original negligent act and was, looking back, extraordinary and unforeseeable by a reasonable person in the position of the original actor. Ontiveros , 136 Ariz. at 506, 667 P.2d at 206 ; Patterson , 214 Ariz. at 438-39 ¶ 14, 153 P.3d at 1067-68 ; see Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 440 (defining superseding cause), 441 (defining intervening force), 442 (identifying considerations in determining whether intervening force is a superseding cause). JAI's proposed instruction correctly tracked the law: Plaintiffs must show there was a natural and continuous sequence of events stemming from [JAI]'s alleged act or omission, unbroken by any intervening and superseding cause, that produced the injury, in whole or in part, and without which the injury would not have occurred. An "intervening cause" is an independent cause that occurs between the original act or omission and the final harm and is necessary in bringing about that harm. An intervening cause becomes a superseding cause, thereby relieving [JAI] of liability for any original negligent conduct, when the intervening force was unforeseeable and may be described, with the benefit of hindsight, as extraordinary.[ ] ¶ 25 Third, the instruction pertained to a critical issue in the case: whether Panameno's actions were intervening and superseding causes of the Duprays' injuries. If the jury decided that Panameno's two decisions to drive while intoxicated after leaving the club constituted intervening and superseding causes, JAI would not be liable for the Duprays' injuries and not subject to punitive damages. The trial court's general causation instruction did not address this issue: Negligence causes an injury if it helps produce the injury and if the injury would not have happened without the negligence. There may be more than one cause of an injury. ... Before you can find [JAI] at fault, you must find that [JAI]'s negligence was a cause of Plaintiffs' injuries. Without an instruction defining "intervening cause" and "superseding cause," the jury had no legal standard to apply to determine whether Panameno's acts were intervening and superseding causes. Although the trial court allowed JAI's counsel to argue that Panameno's acts were intervening and superseding causes, closing argument is a poor substitute for an instruction by the court, even if the trial court had not also instructed the jury that counsel's arguments were not evidence. The failure to provide the instruction to address the concept of intervening and superseding cause hampered JAI in arguing that it was not liable for the Duprays' injuries and hampered the jury in properly determining whether JAI was liable. ¶ 26 The Duprays argue that the general instruction was adequate and that an instruction on intervening and superseding cause was unnecessary. They rely on Ritchie v. Krasner , in which this Court held that a general instruction on causation without any specific instruction on intervening superseding cause was adequate in a medical malpractice case. 221 Ariz. 288, 299-300 ¶ 32, 211 P.3d 1272, 1283-84 (App. 2009). That decision, however, held only that an intervening and superseding cause instruction was unnecessary under the facts of that case, id. , and did not purport to hold that such an instruction would be unnecessary or improper in other cases. In this case, JAI proposed an instruction that accurately stated the law on proximate cause and intervening and superseding cause, and those concepts were critical to correctly resolving the case. ¶ 27 The Duprays also argue that JAI's proposed instruction did not matter because the jury found JAI substantially at fault and imposed significant punitive damages against it. But the jury's finding that JAI was substantially at fault was made without an instruction on intervening and superseding cause. Properly instructed, the jury may have absolved JAI from any liability because Panameno's decisions to drive while intoxicated after reaching his friend's house and then separately rebuffing his girlfriend's pleas to not drive were intervening superseding causes. And if the jury did find JAI not liable, JAI would not be subject to punitive damages. Thus, the Duprays' arguments fail. The trial court abused its discretion in denying JAI's proposed instruction on intervening and superseding cause. CONCLUSION ¶ 28 We vacate the jury's verdicts against JAI and remand the case to the trial court. Because we vacate the jury's verdict on this ground, we need not address JAI's claim that insufficient evidence supported the punitive damages award. This statute has since been amended to increase the limit to fifty ounces of beer. We infer "force" in the third paragraph of the proposed instruction to mean "cause." We also recognize that the instruction fails to note that foreseeability of the intervening cause is assessed from the defendant's standpoint. Ontiveros , 136 Ariz. at 506, 667 P.2d at 206 ; Patterson , 214 Ariz. at 439 ¶ 14, 153 P.3d at 1068. But because the issue of foreseeability in this case does not turn on this point, this omission is immaterial.

SWANN, Judge: ¶ 1 In this family-law case, the superior court entered orders requiring that the parent awarded sole legal decision-making provide a child with therapy from specified providers, and that both parents abstain from certain parenting choices, including the discussion of sensitive topics with the child. We vacate those orders. No statutory authority enabled the court to direct the sole decision-maker's choices regarding therapy, or to impose parenting-time limits that infringed the parents' constitutional rights to parent and engage in free speech. The court also entered orders conferring judicial immunity on the appointed therapists. We vacate those orders because a therapist is not accountable to the court. We also vacate the court's award of attorney's fees and costs to the appellee. The award was based at least in part on the court's erroneous determination that the appellant unreasonably opposed the therapist appointments. We remand so that the court can consider whether fees are warranted based on the parties' financial disparity alone. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 2 Paul E. ("Father") and Courtney F. ("Mother") married in 2004 and thereafter had three children together, including L., born in 2007. Father and Mother divorced in 2010. The decree of dissolution gave the parties joint legal custody of the children, with final legal decision-making authority awarded to Father with respect to L.'s and one of the other children's education, medical care, and dental care. Mother was awarded final legal decision-making authority with respect to the remaining child's education, medical care, and dental care. The parties were awarded equal parenting time with respect to all three children. ¶ 3 In February 2013, Mother permitted L., who was born male, to wear a skirt to school. She also sent a "Princess Boy" book for L.'s teacher to read to the class. Mother consulted with others (but no professionals) and notified L.'s school beforehand, but she failed to inform Father until after L. arrived at school. According to Mother, L. had long demonstrated a preference for stereotypically "female" items and would wear female clothing at home; Father reported no previous knowledge of L. wearing female clothing, and apparently did not observe any distinctive gender pattern in L.'s preferences. Soon after L. wore the skirt to school, Father made arrangements for L. to begin therapy with counselor Diana Vigil, who continued in that role throughout this case. ¶ 4 According to Father and Vigil, in 2013 the parents agreed, consistent with Vigil's recommendation, to limit L.'s access to female-oriented items; Mother disputed that the parties ever reached a firm agreement. In late 2013, Father filed a petition under A.R.S. § 25-411(A) to modify parenting time and legal decision-making with respect to all three children. Father alleged, as relevant to this appeal, that Mother, through various acts, was pushing a female gender identification on L. despite Vigil's failure to diagnose L. with gender dysphoria, defined in one source used at trial as "[p]sychological distress due to the incongruence between one's body and gender identity," with gender identity meaning "[a] person's internal sense of being male, female, or something else." Father requested, inter alia , that he be made L.'s primary residential parent and be awarded sole legal decision-making. Father further requested that the court immediately limit Mother's parenting time through temporary orders and injunctions. ¶ 5 On December 13, 2013, consistent with Father's requests, the court entered the following temporary orders: • Until further Court order, Mother shall not dress [L.] in female clothing, shall not purchase female or "girl" clothing for [L.], shall not to [sic] permit [L.] to dress in female clothing (including, but not limited to underwear, socks, shirts, dresses, skirts, etc.), shall not purchase female oriented toys or other items for [L.], shall not refer to [L.] in his presence or in the presence of any of the other children as "her" or "she," shall not refer to [L.] as a "girl" or by other female designation, and shall not encourage any of the parties' other children to do so, shall not to [sic] encourage or direct third parties to refer to [L.] as "her," as "she[,]" as a "girl," or as other female designation, or to treat him as such, and shall not to [sic] take any other actions that are inconsistent with the spirit of these orders. • Until further Court order, Mother shall remove from her home any female or "girl" clothing of or for [L.] and any female oriented toys or other items of or for [L.] Mother may store such items elsewhere for later use in the event the Court later modifies or vacates these orders. • Until further Court order, Mother also shall direct the parties' children not to refer to [L.] as "her," as "she," as a "girl" or as other female designation, or if Mother hears or becomes aware of any of those children doing so [sic]. • Until further Court order, Mother shall not refer to [L.] as "gender variant" or use such term or any related terms in [L.]'s presence or in the presence of the parties' other children. Mother further shall refrain from any discussion of gender related issues with [L.], with any of the parties' other children or in [L.]'s or any of the parties' other children's presence. • Mother shall not provide [L.] or any of the parties' other children with any materials addressing gender preference. • Mother shall not take any actions to frustrate or defy the spirit of any of the foregoing orders. ¶ 6 Vigil recommended that L. be assessed by a psychiatrist. In 2014, L. was evaluated by a series of professionals-a psychologist in July 2014, a physician in September 2014, and a psychotherapist in December 2014-each of whom diagnosed L. with gender dysphoria. Later, Vigil also diagnosed L. with gender dysphoria. ¶ 7 The temporary orders, however, remained in place. And Father, to whom the orders did not apply, did not afford L. access to "female" items during his parenting time. According to Father, he was never unwilling to provide L. the opportunity to engage in "gender exploration" but he and Mother believed that the temporary orders applied to both parents. Father reported that Mother was repeatedly noncompliant with the orders; Mother maintained the opposite. ¶ 8 In early 2015, L. made statements about dying, and either threatened or engaged in self-harm. Mother did not promptly notify Father when she took L. to the hospital in response to that behavior. Also in early 2015, Mother reneged on her promise to Father to take L. and another of the parties' children to a sacramental religious ceremony at Father's church. ¶ 9 In mid-2015, Vigil told the parties, and Father agreed based on a log he kept of L.'s statements and behaviors, that L. had become more comfortable with L.'s natal gender. Mother apparently informed L. of Vigil's conclusion, which caused L. to distrust Vigil. And, according to Father, Mother then significantly increased her violations of the temporary orders, and L. increasingly engaged in feminine behaviors. L. also assigned blame to Father for the temporary orders. ¶ 10 By stipulated order, the court appointed Dr. Paulette Selmi, a psychologist, to perform a custody evaluation. Dr. Selmi opined that the manner in which Mother responded to L.'s desire to wear a skirt to school did not take into account the need to protect L. Dr. Selmi further determined that Mother exposed L. to inappropriate information regarding sex reassignment, and failed to comply with the parties' 2013 agreement and the court's temporary orders. Dr. Selmi opined that Mother's conduct demonstrated a lack of foresight. Dr. Selmi conceded that the temporary orders had harmed L., but she concluded that a "social transition" was not in L.'s best interests because of L.'s young age, and "[i]t is best to take a slower approach to the situation." Dr. Selmi recommended that the temporary orders "be lifted at this time but not entirely," by remaining in place at Mother's home for at least six months to a year and being lifted entirely at Vigil's office and in Father's home for six months to a year. Dr. Selmi recommended that only Vigil discuss the change with L., "because [the parents] do not work well enough together to do this." Further, finding that Mother has "a proven track record ... of talking to [L.] about very inappropriate things i.e. hormones, sex change operations and the like," Dr. Selmi recommend that the court enter a " 'gag order' prohibiting Mother [and potentially Father as well] from discussing anything with [L.] related to this topic." Dr. Selmi opined that L. "must" continue therapy with Vigil, preferably on a "safe-haven" basis to restore and preserve L.'s trust in Vigil, and further stated that "there also needs to be a physician gender specialist who will follow [L.] along the way." ¶ 11 Father's petition to modify proceeded to a four-day trial in December 2015. By that time, the only question was legal decision-making-Father withdrew his request for a modification of parenting time, explaining that "kids need their mom" and he had not originally thought of managing his concerns regarding Mother's behavior via "the gag order that Dr. Selmi had advanced." The court notified the parties at the outset of the trial that the court intended to itself direct certain decisions regarding L.'s therapeutic care. The court stated that there is "a school of thought with some judges that [the court] say[s] ... somebody has legal decision-making[, t]hat person makes the call[,] ... [and t]he judge doesn't jump in the middle of it," but in view of "the history that you've got about not agreeing on things and the complexity that we've got with respect to [L.,] ... I'm likely going to address it," because "we've gotta address the rule [i.e., the temporary orders] and we've gotta address what's going to happen going forward and who's in place and who's not from a professional standpoint, and I intend to do that." Both at trial and thereafter, Father disputed the court's authority to make decisions regarding L.'s care. ¶ 12 At trial, Father and Mother agreed that L. would benefit from continued therapy and the care of a gender specialist. They disagreed, however, on how best to support L. Father advocated a conservative approach, in line with the recommendations of Dr. Selmi and the psychologist who diagnosed L. Mother had taken an active approach, more consistent with the views of the physician who diagnosed L. ¶ 13 Before the court ruled on the petition to modify, the parties sought guidance from the court regarding the role it envisioned for a court-appointed "gender expert." At a status conference on February 26, 2016, the court stated that it anticipated Vigil would continue as L.'s therapist. The court further stated, with respect to the gender expert, that: from the court's perspective, this [gender-expert] assignment is going to be as a treating professional, not serving the Court . I don't envision it as a forensic appointment. I envision it as a treating appointment. And let me say also ... from my perspective, I think philosophically, I'm looking at this not that the expert or Diana Vigil or anyone else really that's working with, whether it's [L.] or any of the kids, is really working so that they can provide information for me to resolve disputes. From my perspective, my hope is, is that after I issue the minute entry, I'm out of it and it's the parents who are making the decisions. And so this expert is working with the parents, who are the decision-makers, ... and I do not want, an expert that's reporting to me and then I'm refereeing disputes. I want the parents to resolve the issue, issues that come up. I want the parents to manage the interaction with the experts, and the parents to hopefully agree on a, on a course going forward. (Emphasis added). The court then stated that the term of the appointment would be left to the expert. And, to alleviate reluctance of potential experts to assume a role with no judicial immunity in a contentious case, the court expressed willingness to consider a "middle ground" approach under which the expert would be "designated as the Court's expert but their, their role and function is still as I envision, potentially more akin to a treating, treating professional." ¶ 14 Immediately following the status conference, the court issued a minute entry ordering "that Diana Vigil shall continue as a Safe Harbor Therapist for [L.]" and stating that "the Court believes that a 'therapeutic intervention' [under ARFLP 95(A) ] is necessary to guide the Court and the parties through gender identification issues." The court explained that it "intends to appoint a gender expert" and "considers the role of the gender expert to be a forensic one." It further explained that it expected the expert "to provide input and make [non-binding] recommendations to the Court, Diana Vigil and the parties regarding [L.]'s status, how to assess and interpret information, and potentially how to proceed," for a duration "dependent on [L.]'s situation." The court also ordered that the expert could "engage one or more additional individuals to assist the expert in his or her analysis." ¶ 15 Approximately a month later, the court ruled on Father's petition. It found that both Mother and Father were capable parents, but determined that all three children's best interests were served by awarding Father sole legal decision-making with an obligation to consult in good faith with Mother. The court then held that despite Father's sole authority, the circumstances empowered it to limit that authority under A.R.S. § 25-410(A). The court held that "[L.]'s gender dysphoria diagnosis and the parents' response to it has already caused [L.] emotional harm," and [t]he complexity of [L.]'s situation, the dynamics of the parties' relationship and the potential for harm if it is not managed correctly lead the Court to a conclusion that the child's physical health would be endangered and emotional development impaired if the Court did not establish some guidelines for the parents in addressing [L.]'s situation. ¶ 16 The court further concluded that "a therapeutic intervention [under ARFLP 95(A) ] is necessary to guide the parties and the Court through [L.]'s gender identification process." It ordered: • A "gender expert" shall be appointed to provide input to the Court and guidance to the parties regarding gender identification issues. The parameters set forth in the Court's [earlier] Minute Entry apply. The expert will be appointed by separate Court order. • Diana Vigil will continue as [L.]'s therapist and will operate on a "safe haven" basis. She will consult with and work cooperatively with the gender expert. Should Ms. Vigil have questions regarding this Order she may seek clarification from the Court. • Judge Viola's December 13, 2013 Order is vacated in part. The Rule [i.e., the temporary orders] is lifted as it relates to gender exploration by [L.] in Diana Vigil's office, Father's home and Mother's home. In all other places, it remains in effect. Neither parent shall discuss the lifting of Judge Viola's order with [L.], or permit gender exploration in their home until Diana Vigil discloses to [L.] that the order has been lifted. • Although [L.] will be free to explore in each parent's house, neither parent shall discuss gender identification issues with [L.] The parties should utilize a standard response as suggested by Dr. Selmi if [L.] asks to talk about gender identification issues, deferring the question or discussion to Diana Vigil. No person other than the gender expert (and his or her designee) and Diana Vigil shall discuss gender identification/exploration with [L.] The Court is open to allowing the parents to discuss gender identification issues in the future should such an approach be suggested by the gender expert. • Neither parent may, directly or indirectly, promote or discourage a specific view of gender identification for [L.] The court recognizes that the above orders may require fine tuning and the Court expects the parties to work with the gender expert and Diana Vigil to both follow these directives and address additional issues as they arise. The court found that "the parties are likely to remain in conflict" but declined to appoint a parenting coordinator under ARFLP 74 because Father did not consent, and declined to appoint a family law master under ARFLP 72 because no petitions remained pending. The court affirmed the original parenting-time schedule but warned that "the Court will consider a change to the number of parenting days allocated to Mother if the Court determines that Mother is not complying with this Order." The court did not set a review hearing. ¶ 17 Father timely filed a motion for new trial, and Mother filed a motion to modify. While those motions were pending, the court appointed Dr. Diane Ehrensaft as "the gender expert in this matter." In later, unsigned minute entries, the court denied Father's motion, granted Mother's motion in part, and set oral argument for the purpose of clarifying Vigil's role and appointment terms. ¶ 18 Vigil submitted a proposed appointment order, which the court observed "parroted almost word-for-word language that is straight out of standard minute entries that have been issued by many judges here." Father objected that the court lacked authority to enter any appointment order, and he further objected to many of the specific provisions in Vigil's proposed order. The court responded that "appointments like this have been made continually from the family court and while that, in and of itself, may not be a reason to, to continue it, it gives me comfort that the judicial or quasi-judicial immunity is routinely granted. I just, from my perspective, ... don't see the mischief in it." The court identified A.R.S. § 25-405(B) and ARFLP 95 as the bases for the appointment. ¶ 19 The court entered orders giving both Vigil and Ehrensaft "the applicable judicial immunity consistent with Arizona case law applicable to quasi-judicial officers of the Court as to all actions undertaken pursuant to the Court appointment." With respect to Vigil, the court further ordered that she was "a Court expert" with judicial immunity, from whom "[t]he Court may seek ... advice" to be shared with counsel "upon request, under such terms as the Court determines." The court gave Vigil exclusive authority to determine L.'s treatment process and to decide whether any other clinician would evaluate or treat L.; gave her authority to communicate with all court-appointed professionals; gave her access to all treatment records for L., Mother, and Father; and precluded either parent from subpoenaing her records, calling her to testify, or eliciting her opinions or findings. ¶ 20 At the oral argument regarding the appointment terms, the court indicated that it was "likely" and "inclined" to grant Mother's request for attorney's fees and costs regarding post-trial motions related to Vigil and Ehrensaft, but wished for Mother to submit a fee affidavit and for Father to file a response. Father's counsel asked whether the court was "making a finding that our positions were unreasonable." The court responded, "No. I am telling you that that is a distinct possibility." The court added that "from my perspective, some of, some of the positions taken by father have, in my view, been designed to frustrate the process," creating "a potential basis for attorney's fees based on the reasonableness of the positions." In its later minute entry, the court directed Mother to file an affidavit and concluded that a fee award was certain: "[b]ased on the reasonableness of the positions of the parties regarding certain post-trial motions relating to Diana Vigil and Dr. Ehrensaft, and due to the respective financial positions of the parties, the Court will award Mother attorney's fees, ... pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324." (Emphasis added.) ¶ 21 Mother filed an affidavit and application requesting approximately $42,000 in fees and costs. Father filed a response, in which he stated in a footnote that "[b]ecause there has been a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law in this case, it was incumbent upon Mother's Application to establish, and for the Court subsequently to find, that specific positions Father took were unreasonable." Finding "that Father's post-trial positions regarding the appointments of Dr. Ehrensaft and Diana Vigil were unreasonable and an award of fees is appropriate pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324(A)," the court awarded Mother $22,000 in fees and $679 in costs. The court held that the balance of the fees Mother sought did not relate to the appointment issues. ¶ 22 Father timely filed a notice of appeal from a November 2016 omnibus order incorporating the court's legal decision-making determinations into appealable rulings, and he timely filed a notice of appeal from the signed attorney's fees ruling entered in January 2017. Both of Father's notices of appeal are before us now. DISCUSSION ¶ 23 The superior court's award of sole legal decision-making to Father is not at issue on appeal. The central question is instead whether the court lawfully entered its "guidelines" restricting Father's exercise of the sole authority and both parents' exercise of their parenting time. I. THE SUPERIOR COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY DICTATING L.'S THERAPEUTIC CARE. A. The Court Had No Authority to Infringe on Father's Sole Legal Decision-Making. ¶ 24 Legal decision-making is "the legal right and responsibility to make all nonemergency legal decisions for a child including those regarding education, health care, religious training and personal care decisions." A.R.S. § 25-401(3). The court must determine legal decision-making, whether initially or on a motion for modification, based on "the best interests of the child." A.R.S. § 25-403(A). The court has broad discretion to determine the child's best interests. Orezza v. Ramirez , 19 Ariz. App. 405, 409, 507 P.2d 1017 (1973). But though "[c]ourts may do many things in the best interests of children, ... they cannot advance such interests by exercising jurisdiction that they lack. Every power that the superior court exercises ... must find its support in the supporting statutory framework." Fenn v. Fenn , 174 Ariz. 84, 87, 847 P.2d 129, 132 (App. 1993) ; see also Graville v. Dodge , 195 Ariz. 119, 128, ¶ 41, 985 P.2d 604, 613 (App. 1999) ("While we believe the trial court has inherent authority to issue orders as part of its duty to fashion a visitation plan that is in the best interests of the children, we believe that a court must confine its exercise of that authority within the limits of the statute."). We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Baker v. Meyer , 237 Ariz. 112, 116, ¶ 10, 346 P.3d 998, 1002 (App. 2015). ¶ 25 Title 25 of the Arizona Revised Statutes creates a framework for legal decision-making under which "[t]he court's statutorily prescribed role is not to make decisions in place of parents, but to decide which fit parent or parents shall make such decisions." Nicaise , --- Ariz. at ----, ¶ 27, ---P.3d at ----. Section 25-401 defines two forms of legal decision-making, both of which describe parental-not judicial-authority. See also A.R.S. § 25-403.02(C)(1) (requiring parents to designate, in parenting plans, whether legal decision-making should be "joint or sole as defined in § 25-401"). " 'Joint legal decision-making' means both parents share decision-making and neither parent's rights or responsibilities are superior," and " '[s]ole legal decision-making' means one parent has the legal right and responsibility to make major decisions for a child." A.R.S. § 25-401(2), (6) ; see also A.R.S. § 25-410(A) (confirming that in most cases "the parent designated as sole legal decision-maker may determine the child's upbringing, including the child's education, care, health care and religious training"). ¶ 26 Accordingly, though [a] court faced with uncooperative, recalcitrant parents might reasonably believe that a child's best interests would be served by an order that effectively resolves a disputed issue[,] ... in a family-law case, the court does not have plenary authority to make decisions in place of the parents when it deems them to be in a child's best interests. Rather, the court must be guided by the best interests of a child in assigning legal-decision-making authority. Nicaise , --- Ariz. at ----, ¶ 28, --- P.3d at ----. The reservation of decision-making to fit parents, rather than the judiciary, accommodates "the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children" under the Fourteenth Amendment. Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (2000) (plurality opinion); see also Goodman v. Forsen , 239 Ariz. 110, 112-15, ¶¶ 9-18, 366 P.3d 587, 589-92 (App. 2016) (discussing constitutional right to parent in context of third-party-visitation statute assigning "special weight" to parents' opinions). Of course, in choosing which fit parent or parents shall make the decisions, the court should consider each parent's proposed decisions and assess which parent's plans would serve the child's best interests. Nicaise , --- Ariz. at ----, ¶ 30, --- P.3d at ----. But the court generally has no say in the actual decisions of the chosen parent or parents. Even when an allocation of legal decision-making ultimately proves contrary to the child's best interests, the court may typically do no more than reallocate the authority between the parents. See A.R.S. § 25-411(A). ¶ 27 There is one narrow exception, set forth in § 25-410(A), that permits the court, on motion and after a hearing, to limit a sole decision-maker's authority. Section 25-410(A) provides: Except as otherwise agreed by the parties in writing ..., the parent designated as sole legal decision-maker may determine the child's upbringing, including the child's education, care, health care and religious training, unless, on motion by the other parent, the court, after a hearing, finds that in the absence of a specific limitation of the parent designated as the sole legal decision-maker's authority, the child's physical health would be endangered or the child's emotional development would be significantly impaired. (Emphasis added.) Section 25-410(A)"gives recognition to ... the firmly established principle that at all levels, at all times and in all forums, the welfare and best interest of the child is of prime and overriding importance as measured by the particular facts and circumstances of each case before the courts." Funk v. Ossman , 150 Ariz. 578, 581, 724 P.2d 1247, 1250 (App. 1986) (interpreting substantially similar predecessor statute). But the statute requires more than merely a best-interests analysis: it authorizes judicial limitation of a sole decision-maker's authority only when "the child's physical health would be endangered or the child's emotional development would be significantly impaired." A.R.S. § 25-410(A) ; see Egan v. Fridlund-Horne , 221 Ariz. 229, 239, ¶ 37, 211 P.3d 1213, 1223 (App. 2009) ("[W]e presume that when the legislature uses different wording within a statutory scheme, it intends to give a different meaning and consequence to that language."). The editors' comment to the uniform act underlying the statute makes clear that the heightened standard will be satisfied in only the most extreme of circumstances, and does not provide free license for the court to substitute its judgment for that of the decision-maker parent: [I]n the absence of parental agreement, the court should not intervene solely because a choice made by the custodial parent is thought by the noncustodial parent (or by the judge) to be contrary to the child's best interest. To justify such an intervention, the judge must find that the custodial parent's decision would "endanger the child's physical health or significantly impair his emotional development"-a standard patently more onerous than the "best interest" test. The standard would leave to the custodial parent such decisions as whether the child should go to private or public school, whether the child should have music lessons, what church the child should attend. The court could intervene in the decision of grave behavioral or social problems such as refusal by a custodian to provide medical care for a sick child. Uniform Marriage & Divorce Act § 408, Comment (emphases added). Section 25-410(A) therefore applies only in extraordinary circumstances, consistent with the court's authority to "regulate the well-being of children and thus restrict the control of parents" if necessary to prevent "abuse or neglect." See Egan , 221 Ariz. at 234, ¶ 16, 211 P.3d at 1218. We further note that it would be the rare circumstance indeed (at least in a case with two fit parents) in which a parent who requires judicial intervention under § 25-410(A) would remain qualified to serve as the sole decision-maker under § 25-403. ¶ 28 Even if § 25-410(A) applied, it nowhere authorizes the court to appoint a treating professional for the child. The statute provides that the court may impose a "specific limitation of the ... sole legal decision-maker's authority." A.R.S. § 25-410(A) (emphasis added). An order prohibiting the decision-maker from withholding therapeutic care would be a limitation on decision-making authority. But an order requiring care by a specific provider is more than a limitation-it is a directive. ¶ 29 We further hold that ARFLP 95(A) cannot expand the court's statutory authority. ARFLP 95(A) provides that "[i]n addition to conciliation services, the court may order parties to engage in private mental health services, including, but not limited to, counseling, legal decision-making or parenting time evaluations, mental health evaluations, Parenting Coordinator services, therapeutic supervision of parenting time, and other therapeutic interventions." ARFLP 95(A) describes mental-health resources that the court may employ, with respect to parties, in aid of its decisions under the statutory scheme. It does not create a super-statutory power enabling the court to make legal decisions regarding a child's professional care. See In re Marriage of Waldren , 217 Ariz. 173, 177, ¶¶ 20-21, 171 P.3d 1214, 1218 (2007) (holding that court-promulgated rules may address only procedural matters and may not abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive statutory rights even when exercising equitable powers); see also Foster v. Weir , 212 Ariz. 193, 195-96, ¶ 9, 129 P.3d 482, 484-85 (App. 2006) (holding that a procedural rule and statute dealing with same subject should be construed in harmony). ¶ 30 Here, the superior court erred as a matter of law by relying on § 25-410(A) to set "guidelines" for Father's exercise of sole legal decision-making. As an initial matter, the procedural prerequisites for § 25-410(A) were not present: the court was faced with a petition to modify legal decision-making, not a motion to limit sole legal decision-making. And § 25-410(A)'s substantive bar was not satisfied. This is not a case in which the parent awarded sole legal decision-making refused to secure necessary treatment for the child. In fact, long before the court's involvement, Father voluntarily secured therapy for L. and the therapy continued throughout the case, apparently to L.'s benefit. This is a case in which the parents agree that the child requires therapeutic intervention, but disagree about which therapeutic approach would be most beneficial. The court's imposition of "guidelines" to avoid "the potential for harm" posed by Father's exercise of sole legal decision-making reflects its legitimate concern that Father's view of L.'s situation may lead him to make less-than-ideal choices regarding L.'s care. The court made well-supported findings that Father "has been somewhat less willing to actively engage with [L.] on the gender identification issue," that his creation of the behavior-tracking log and his view that L. might be "in remission" suggest that "he may not be as open to allow exploration as the experts ... believe is appropriate," and that both his as well as Mother's "response[s] to [L.'s gender dysphoria ] has already caused [L.] emotional harm." But though the court was entitled to weigh such reasonable concerns when deciding how to allocate legal decision-making, it had no authority to ameliorate the concerns by managing Father's sole decision-making. B. The Court's Appointment of Vigil Was Impermissible Because it Directed L.'s Therapy. ¶ 31 The court's appointment of Vigil was an order for therapy. Vigil was L.'s longstanding, privately retained counselor, and the court expressly ordered that she continue in that role. The court's attempt to characterize Vigil's appointment as one made under A.R.S. § 25-405(B) does not withstand scrutiny. ¶ 32 Section 25-405(B) provides that [t]he court may seek the advice of professional personnel, whether or not employed by the court on a regular basis. The advice given shall be in writing and shall be made available by the court to counsel, on request, under such terms as the court determines. Counsel may examine as a witness any professional personnel consulted by the court, unless that right is waived. Based on the plain language of the statute, the role of a professional appointed thereunder is strictly advisory. The statute serves "to permit the court to make custodial and visitation decisions as informally and non-contentiously as possible, based on as much relevant information as can be secured." Uniform Marriage & Divorce Act § 404(b), Comment (explaining identical provision in uniform act). Because the professional acts to aid the court only, he or she is entitled to judicial immunity. See Acevedo v. Pima Cty. Adult Probation Dep't , 142 Ariz. 319, 321, 690 P.2d 38, 40 (1984) (holding that judicial immunity "is granted to those who perform functions 'intimately related to,' or which amount to 'an integral part of the judicial process,' " and extends to "a non judicial officer who is delegated judicial duties in aid of the court," such as court-appointed psychiatrists (citations omitted) ); see also Lavit v. Superior Court In and For County of Maricopa (Okken) , 173 Ariz. 96, 99-101, 839 P.2d 1141, 1144-46 (App. 1992) (holding that judicial immunity applied to psychologist who performed custody evaluation pursuant to stipulated order because psychologist performed court-ordered task). A treating therapist, by contrast, performs a nonjudicial function that does not justify immunity. See Awai v. Kotin , 872 P.2d 1332, 1336 (Colo. App. 1993) (holding that a court-appointed therapist's provision of "treatment, unlike reports or evaluations and recommendations, is not intimately related and essential to the judicial decision-making process" and is focused not on "aiding the court to separate truth from falsity" but "solely on the best interests of the patient," which creates a less compelling need for immunity). The court erred by conflating the roles of a therapist and a judicial advisor, and § 25-405(B) afforded it no authority to confer immunity. C. The Court's Appointment of Ehrensaft Was Impermissible Because The Appointment Was Unrelated to Any Judicial Function. ¶ 33 With respect to Ehrensaft, the court's orders requiring that she provide input to the parties and Vigil as well as the court, for a duration tied to L.'s needs rather than the court's needs, appear to define a treating appointment. But we need not resolve any arguable ambiguity in Ehrensaft's role, because even if Ehrensaft was appointed in a wholly advisory capacity, the appointment was impermissible because it was not related to any issue pending before the court. The court has no need for a professional's advice, and therefore no grounds to invoke § 25-405(A), when it has no issue to decide. To be sure, the court retains jurisdiction over legal decision-making and parenting-time matters. In re Marriage of Dorman , 198 Ariz. 298, 301, ¶ 7, 9 P.3d 329, 332 (App. 2000). And in many cases, as the court reasonably found here, the parties are "likely to remain in conflict." But in the absence of a pending motion or scheduled review hearing, the court has no grounds to invoke § 25-405(B). D. The Court Could Not Award Attorney's Fees to Mother on Reasonableness Grounds, But The Award May be Justified Based Solely on the Parties' Disparate Financial Resources. ¶ 34 The court's award of attorney's fees to Mother for the post-trial disputes regarding Vigil and Ehrensaft's appointments was based on A.R.S. § 25-324(A). Section 25-324(A) provides that: [t]he court from time to time after considering the financial resources of both parties and the reasonableness of the positions each party has taken throughout the proceedings, may order a party to pay a reasonable amount to the other party for the costs and expenses of maintaining or defending any proceeding under ... chapter 4, article 1 of this title [regarding legal decision-making and parenting time]. ¶ 35 The reasonableness of a party's position is evaluated by an objective standard. In re Marriage of Williams , 219 Ariz. 546, 548, ¶ 10, 200 P.3d 1043, 1045 (App. 2008). In view of our analysis in Sections I.A to I.C above, we cannot say that Father unreasonably opposed Vigil and Ehrensaft's appointments. But the court, in addition to finding unreasonableness, also stated that it might award fees based on the parties' respective financial positions. A disparity in income may support a fee award even when the party against whom fees are sought took a reasonable position. In re Marriage of Pownall , 197 Ariz. 577, 583, ¶ 29, 5 P.3d 911, 917 (App. 2000). We therefore vacate the fee award but remand so that the court may determine whether an award is justified based on financial disparity alone. II. THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY RESTRICTING MOTHER AND FATHER'S EXERCISE OF THEIR PARENTING TIME WITH L. ¶ 36 In addition to directing L.'s therapeutic care, the court imposed a number of limitations on Mother and Father's interactions with L.: the court prohibited them from speaking with L. about gender identification, and circumscribed their ability to provide L. with clothing, toys, and other items. To the extent that any of those restrictions could be construed as limits on legal decision-making, they were improper for the reasons set forth in Section I above. But we interpret the restrictions as applying to parenting time, not legal decision-making. Even when one parent has sole legal decision-making, the other parent, during his or her parenting time, "is responsible for providing the child with food, clothing and shelter and may make routine decisions concerning the child's care ." A.R.S. § 25-401(5) (emphasis added). "Parenting time" is therefore literally a time to engage in parenting. ¶ 37 The court may "restrict" parenting time only if "it finds that the parenting time would endanger seriously the child's physical, mental, moral or emotional health." A.R.S. § 25-411(J) (emphasis added). That is a higher bar than best interests, though written findings are not required. Hart v. Hart , 220 Ariz. 183, 187-88, ¶¶ 16-19, 204 P.3d 441, 445-46 (App. 2009). But the statute is not an invitation for the court to interfere with constitutional rights. See Petolicchio v. Santa Cruz Cty. Fair & Rodeo Ass'n , 177 Ariz. 256, 259, 866 P.2d 1342, 1345 (1994) ("Arizona's courts do not reach constitutional issues if proper construction of a statute makes it unnecessary in determining the merits of the action."). The statute cannot be read to give the court broad license to infringe on a parent's right to care for his or her child, see Troxel , 530 U.S. at 67-68, 120 S.Ct. 2054, or to infringe on the parent's or the child's free speech, see Nash v. Nash , 232 Ariz. 473, 481-82, ¶ 32, 307 P.3d 40, 48-49 (App. 2013) (parenting-time restriction that constitutes prior restraint on speech valid only under strict scrutiny test); see also Goodman , 239 Ariz. at 115 n.2, ¶ 18, 366 P.3d at 592 n.2 (noting that "any order restraining speech is constitutionally suspect"). "The court's authority to impose 'restrict[ions]' on parenting time sua sponte under § 25-411(J) is limited to placing conditions on the exercise of parenting time, such as supervision or geographical restrictions," Cruz v. Garcia , 240 Ariz. 233, 238, ¶ 18, 377 P.3d 1028, 1033 (App. 2016), and the standard should be no different when restrictions are requested by a parent or recommended by a custody evaluator. ¶ 38 Here, even assuming that the court's findings were sufficient to support application of § 25-411(J), the parenting-time limitations that the court imposed far exceeded the statutory authority. The limitations constituted severe micromanagement of Mother and Father's parenting and significantly restrained both the parties' and L.'s speech. CONCLUSION ¶ 39 For the reasons set forth above, we vacate the court's orders directing the exercise of Father's sole legal decision-making and the parents' parenting time. We also vacate the award of attorney's fees and costs to Mother, but we remand so that the court may determine whether the award is justified on financial-disparity grounds alone. We deny Father's request for attorney's fees and costs on appeal. Though the order recited that the parties agreed to allow and aid the therapy, and not to elicit information from Vigil, the record belies the notion of consent. In reality, Father already held sole legal decision-making with respect to the decisions for which the dissolution decree gave him final authority. See Nicaise v. Sundaram , --- Ariz. ----, ----, ¶¶ 18-19, ---P.3d ----, ---- (App. 2018). Father also does not challenge the court's requirement that he consult in good faith with Mother before making decisions. The court properly may require good-faith consultation when one parent is awarded sole authority. Id. at ---- n.3, ¶ 19, --- P.3d at ---- n.3. Fit parents are those who (like both parents in this case) adequately care for their children. Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57, 68, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (plurality opinion). Title 8, not Title 25, governs when parental fitness is at issue. Title 8 has no applicability here. The term "custodial" refers to the same concept now known as "legal decision-making" in Arizona. Mother contends that courts routinely appoint specific therapists under ARFLP 95(A). She cites Hays v. Gama , 205 Ariz. 99, 67 P.3d 695 (2003), DePasquale v. Superior Court (Thrasher) , 181 Ariz. 333, 890 P.2d 628 (App. 1995), and In re Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-7499 , 163 Ariz. 153, 786 P.2d 1004 (App. 1989). We find those authorities inapposite. Hays , which involved the appointment of a therapist to provide counseling and recommendations in the context of an initial petition to establish custody, predated ARFLP 95(A). 205 Ariz. at 100-01, ¶¶ 2-13, 67 P.3d at 696-97; see ARFLP 95, Credits (effective January 1, 2006). Further, Hays assumed that the therapist was a properly appointed court advisor under A.R.S. §§ 25-405(B) and -406, and did not address the import or propriety of the therapist's second role as a treatment provider. Id. at 102, ¶ 15, 67 P.3d at 698. DePasquale , a custody modification case, involved a court-appointed psychologist tasked with providing recommendations to the court. 181 Ariz. at 334-35, 890 P.2d at 629-30. Finally, JS-7499 was a severance case governed by Title 8, not Title 25. See 163 Ariz. at 156-57, 786 P.2d at 1007-08. We also need not address Father's contention that § 25-405(B) requires appointment of a professional who qualifies as an expert under Ariz. R. Evid. 702 and 706. Section 25-405(B) nowhere requires that the appointed professional qualify as an expert within the meaning of the rules of evidence. See Reilly v. United States , 863 F.2d 149, 154-55 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that district court's inherent authority to appoint an expert as a technical advisor is not subject to Fed. R. Evid. 706's requirements for the "more exclusive class[ of] 'expert witnesses' "). And here, it is obvious that the court and parties' use of the term "gender expert" was nothing more than a colloquialism meant to describe a medical specialty. We further reject Father's suggestion that § 25-405(B) requires the court to outline specific appointment terms and obligations. Similarly, the court may require supervised parenting time-which the court did not order here-only if the court "finds that in the absence of the [supervision] order the child's physical health would be endangered or the child's emotional development would be significantly impaired, and if the court finds that the best interests of the child would be served." A.R.S. § 25-410(B).

BROWN, Judge: OPINION ¶ 1 Andrew Muscat appeals the superior court's judgment rejecting his claims against Creative Innervisions, LLC, and its employee, Temitayo Akande (collectively, "Creative"). Because we conclude that Muscat's alleged harms arise solely from the consequences of his own criminal conduct and thus do not constitute legally cognizable injuries, we affirm the court's dismissal of his negligence claims. We vacate, however, the dismissal of Muscat's vulnerable adult claim and remand for further proceedings. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶ 2 Muscat is a "profoundly disabled person" whose disabilities make "impulse control considerably more difficult for him than it is for the typical person." Muscat was convicted of child abuse, a sexually motivated offense and class four felony, and placed on lifetime probation for inappropriately touching a child in a restroom stall in June 2008. In 2011, Muscat was placed into a group home owned by Creative Innervisions, LLC, and approved by ADES's Division of Developmental Disabilities ("Division"). Representatives from the Division and Creative met and developed an Individual Support Plan ("ISP") for Muscat, which required Creative to provide one-on-one supervision of Muscat at all times, whether in the group home or in the community. ¶ 3 In December 2012, Akande, the staff member assigned to supervise Muscat, drove Muscat to a local church to attend a theater production. Instead of accompanying him to the event, Akande dropped him off, leaving him unsupervised. Inside the church, Muscat followed a child into the restroom and inappropriately touched the child. Muscat was arrested in November 2013 and charged with aggravated assault and child molestation. ¶ 4 In December 2014, Muscat filed a complaint alleging negligence, negligent supervision/training/hiring, and violation of the Arizona Adult Protective Services Act ("APSA"). Muscat alleged that "as a result of [his] being left unattended and unsupervised" by Creative, the county attorney's office filed a petition to revoke Muscat's felony probation and charged him with molestation of a child as a repeat felony offender. ¶ 5 After filing the complaint, Muscat was declared competent to stand trial in the criminal matter, and later pled guilty to attempted child molestation and attempted kidnapping, each a class three felony. In December 2015, Muscat was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment for attempted molestation (with 751 days' presentence incarceration credit) and lifetime probation for attempted kidnapping. The sentencing judge found the eight-year sentence was "clearly excessive," thereby allowing Muscat to petition the clemency board for a commutation of sentence pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 13-603(L). The court recognized that Muscat's "conduct is extremely concerning and warrants a punitive sanction," but that given his "cognitive limitations and disabilities [he] has a diminished level of culpability." ¶ 6 That same month, Creative filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings in this case, asserting that Muscat's claims were barred by the "wrongful conduct rule" and his complaint failed to state a "cognizable claim" upon which relief could be granted. The superior court granted the motion, finding that "under the wrongful conduct rule and Arizona law, [Muscat] cannot maintain this action or seek the requested damages because it resulted from [his] own illegal conduct and cannot be established absent a showing that he has broken the law." This timely appeal followed. DISCUSSION ¶ 7 "A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to [ Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) ] tests the sufficiency of the complaint, and judgment should be entered for the defendant if the complaint fails to state a claim for relief." Giles v. Hill Lewis Marce , 195 Ariz. 358, 359, ¶ 2, 988 P.2d 143, 144 (App. 1999). We accept the allegations of the complaint as true, but review de novo the court's legal determinations. Id. We will affirm the court's disposition if it is correct for any reason. Logerquist v. Danforth , 188 Ariz. 16, 18, 932 P.2d 281, 283 (App. 1996). A. Negligence Claims ¶ 8 A plaintiff asserting negligence must prove: "(1) a duty requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of care; (2) a breach by the defendant of that standard; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury ; and (4) actual damages." Gipson v. Kasey , 214 Ariz. 141, 143, ¶ 9, 150 P.3d 228, 230 (2007) (emphasis added). Duty is an "obligation, recognized by law, which requires the defendant to conform to a particular standard of conduct in order to protect others against unreasonable risks of harm." Id . at ¶ 10. ¶ 9 Creative argues the "wrongful conduct rule" bars Muscat's claims because a wrongdoer should not be able to base a tort claim on his own wrongful actions. See, e.g. , Greenwald v. Van Handel , 311 Conn. 370, 88 A.3d 467, 472 (2014) (noting that the "generally articulated" wrongful conduct rule provides "that a plaintiff cannot maintain a tort action for injuries that are sustained as the direct result of his or her knowing and intentional participation in a criminal act"). As recognized by the parties, Arizona has never explicitly addressed the wrongful conduct rule, which has been adopted in several jurisdictions and rejected in others. The rule has been described by some as "slippery and vexing." See Joseph H. King, Jr., Outlaws and Outlier Doctrines: The Serious Misconduct Bar in Tort Law , 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1011, 1076 (2002). Notwithstanding Creative's attempt to narrowly define the wrongful conduct rule, given the following analysis, we need not decide whether it applies here. ¶ 10 Muscat alleged in part that Creative had a special relationship with him that imposed a duty to "prevent the foreseeable harm that could occur if [he] was left alone, unsupervised around children and/or around a public restroom." Muscat also alleged that the purpose of "having one-on-one supervision," including in public restrooms, was to "protect [him] from harm due to his lack of impulse control." As further explained by the sentencing judge, because Muscat was unable to participate in sex offender treatment or counseling given his mental disabilities, a protocol was established wherein Creative agreed "to insure lawful conduct by [Muscat] and prevent recidivism." As such, Creative was required to have a "one-on-one chaperone present when [Muscat] participated in day programs of the group home" and he was "not allowed to enter a public bathroom without his chaperone." ¶ 11 Whether a duty exists is a "threshold issue" because "absent some duty, an action for negligence cannot be maintained." Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 143, ¶ 11, 150 P.3d 228. Given the special relationship between Muscat and Creative, and the specific obligations Creative accepted or agreed to perform, Creative had a duty to properly supervise Muscat. Id . at 145, ¶ 18, 150 P.3d at 231-32 ("Duties of care may arise from special relationships based on contract, family relations, or conduct undertaken by the defendant."); DeMontiney v. Desert Manor Convalescent Ctr. Inc ., 144 Ariz. 6, 11, 695 P.2d 255, 260 (1985) (recognizing a special relationship exists "[w]hen an institution ... is charged with the care and custody of persons who it knows will be likely to harm themselves"). And on this record, Muscat has clearly alleged a breach of Creative's duty in that it left him alone and unsupervised at the church in violation of the ISP. However, for the reasons explained below, Muscat has failed to allege a legally cognizable injury. See Walker v. Mart , 164 Ariz. 37, 41-42, 790 P.2d 735, 739-40 (1990) (analyzing duty and injury as separate legal issues). ¶ 12 In Walker , our supreme court was confronted with whether Arizona recognized the tort of "wrongful life," an issue of first impression. 164 Ariz. at 38, 790 P.2d at 736. Analyzing the plaintiff's claim "under traditional principles of negligence law," the court found a duty existed and assumed a breach thereof. Id. at 41, 790 P.2d at 739. The court then turned to a narrower question: "[I]s birth, even in an impaired condition, a legally cognizable injury?" Id. Citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Restatement") (1965), the court explained that "[a]n injury is simply an invasion of some right possessed by the plaintiff." Id. Under this definition, the court acknowledged that "the ability to decide questions of conception or termination of pregnancy resides in the parents, not the fetus," and that the "law protects parents' rights to make decisions involving procreation." Id. at 42, 790 P.2d at 740. Thus, because "children suffer no legal injury when a parent, doctor, or other practitioner fails to prevent their birth," the court declined to extend the tort of negligence to include a child's claim of wrongful life. Id. at 43, 790 P.2d at 741. ¶ 13 The Restatement defines "injury" as "the invasion of any legally protected interest of another," and "harm" as "the existence of loss or detriment in fact of any kind to a person resulting from any cause." Restatement § 7. In contrasting these definitions, the Restatement's comments explain that although a "harm" may exist, that does not mean there has been an "invasion of a legally protected interest," and that "there may be an injury although no harm is done." Id. § 7 cmt. a; see also id. § 7 cmt. d (stating that harm is actionable "only when it results from the invasion of a legally protected interest"). ¶ 14 The parties do not dispute the alleged injuries arise only out of Muscat's incarceration, which resulted from his arrest and criminal prosecution. But as the parties acknowledged at oral argument, no court in any jurisdiction has concluded that a custodian may be found liable for negligence based solely on consequences that flow from the ward's commission of a crime. We must therefore determine, as in Walker , whether the alleged harm constitutes an injury that is recognized by law. ¶ 15 In his complaint, Muscat alleges that he suffered, inter alia , loss of freedom, loss of participation in life's activities, pain, suffering, distress, mental and emotional anguish, anxiety, and a decrease in the quality of life. Muscat did not allege that Creative caused him to suffer any physical harm. It is undisputed that Muscat was properly incarcerated, meaning he was sentenced to prison (with presentence incarceration credit) after he was found competent to stand trial and found guilty of the offenses set forth in the plea agreement. Given that his alleged injuries arise only out of a legally imposed incarceration, Muscat alleges no injury that is distinct from the consequences of his prison sentence. Criminal defendants have legally protected interests that may be affected during criminal proceedings, but no properly-convicted criminal has a legally protected interest in being free from the inherent consequences of the resulting sentence. See Levine v. Kling , 123 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Tort law provides damages only for harms to the plaintiff's legally protected interests, and the liberty of a guilty criminal is not one of them.") (internal citation omitted). And although "physical liberty" has been described as one of the "three broad categories of legal interests" protected by tort law, Dobbs et al., The Law of Torts § 3 (2d ed. 2011), we are unaware of any unintentional tort that protects this interest, see Restatement § 35 cmt. h (explaining that the tort of false imprisonment protects the "mere dignitary interest in feeling free to choose one's own location," but that this interest is legally protected against only intentional invasions). ¶ 16 Muscat's inability to pursue a negligence claim for alleged harm arising from his criminal prosecution is consistent with the rationale governing other torts that depend on the ultimate outcome of a criminal prosecution. See, e.g. , Glaze v. Larsen , 207 Ariz. 26, 32, ¶ 25, 83 P.3d 26, 32 (2004) (recognizing that an element of the cause of action for legal malpractice stemming from criminal litigation is that the conviction has been set aside); Slade v. City of Phoenix , 112 Ariz. 298, 300, 541 P.2d 550, 552 (1975) (noting the essential elements of malicious prosecution include a criminal prosecution that terminates in favor of plaintiff). ¶ 17 Moreover, recognizing the legal consequences of a ward's criminal conduct as a legally cognizable injury would distort the long-established public policy of personal accountability for criminal behavior. Muscat received lawfully imposed sentences based on his criminal conduct; thus, it would be inconsistent to allow him to recover damages for the harm he has suffered as a result of his criminal punishment. See A.R.S. § 13-101 (declaring that one of the purposes of the criminal code is to "impose just and deserved punishment on those whose conduct threatens the public peace"); Glazier v. Lee , 171 Mich.App. 216, 429 N.W.2d 857, 860 (1988) (explaining that to allow plaintiff, who was convicted of manslaughter, to bring a professional negligence action "would allow plaintiff to shift the responsibility for his crime from himself to defendant"); Holt v. Navarro , 932 A.2d 915, 923, ¶¶ 21-24 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (holding that plaintiff was barred from "benefitting in a civil suit flowing from his criminal convictions" where he committed crimes after escaping from a hospital's supervision). ¶ 18 Our analysis is consistent with decisions made by other courts that have considered the viability of tort claims arising solely from the consequences of a plaintiff's criminal conduct. See, e.g. , Burcina v. Ketchikan , 902 P.2d 817, 819, 821 (Alaska 1995) (precluding psychiatric patient convicted of arson for setting fire to mental health center from seeking compensation from psychiatrist and mental health center for injuries resulting from conviction and imprisonment); Greenwald , 88 A.3d at 472 (finding that trial court properly dismissed plaintiff's claim that his therapist's failure to treat him caused "emotional distress and other injuries due to potential criminal prosecution" related to "the illegal downloading, viewing and/or possession of child pornography"); Glazier , 429 N.W.2d at 858 (precluding former patient convicted of manslaughter from maintaining professional negligence action against psychologist for emotional and psychological injuries resulting from patient's criminal act); Holt , 932 A.2d at 923, ¶¶ 22-24 (holding that medical providers could not be held liable for the "collateral consequences" of the plaintiff's criminal convictions for robbery and assault). ¶ 19 Given these considerations, we hold that a person who has been properly incarcerated for a criminal conviction has not suffered a legally cognizable injury-for purposes of establishing a negligence claim-when the alleged harm flows solely from the incarceration. Therefore, the superior court properly determined that Muscat cannot recover from Creative based on his negligence claims. ¶ 20 Our holding does not offend the protection granted to tort victims under Arizona's anti-abrogation clause, which provides that "[t]he right of action to recover damages for injuries shall never be abrogated, and the amount recovered shall not be subject to any statutory limitation." Ariz. Const. art. 18, § 6 (emphasis added). Although this provision protects an individual's right to file a negligence action, Baker v. Univ. Physicians Healthcare , 231 Ariz. 379, 388, ¶ 39, 296 P.3d 42, 51 (2013), we are aware of no authority suggesting that "injuries" under the anti-abrogation clause should be interpreted differently than "injuries" recognized under tort law, see Samaritan Health Sys. v. Superior Court of State of Ariz. , 194 Ariz. 284, 293-94, ¶¶ 37, 44, 981 P.2d 584, 593-94 (App. 1998) (explaining that the founders' intent was "to limit the application of the anti-abrogation clause to tort claims"). Thus, the right to bring an action for damages is unaffected; indeed, no cause of action exists when a plaintiff does not allege a legally cognizable injury. See Romero v. Sw. Ambulance , 211 Ariz. 200, 205, ¶ 12, 119 P.3d 467, 472 (App. 2005) ("When a statute does not abrogate any viable right of action to recover damages, it does not violate article 18, § 6.") (internal quotation omitted); Perkins v. Ne. Log Homes , 808 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Ky. 1991) (explaining, in addressing Kentucky's open courts constitutional provision, that a negligence action does not exist until there is an injury). Similarly, if a plaintiff is unable to allege a prima facie case of negligence, a court's decision to grant judgment on the pleadings is not in conflict with the constitutional doctrines of contributory negligence or assumption of risk. See Ariz. Const. article 18, § 5 ("The defense of contributory negligence or of assumption of risk shall, in all cases whatsoever, be a question of fact and shall, at all times, be left to the jury."). ¶ 21 Nor are we persuaded that affirming the dismissal of Muscat's negligence claims runs counter to the intended application of A.R.S. § 12-712(A), which provides in part as follows: In any civil action the finder of fact may find the defendant not liable if the defendant proves that the claimant ... was attempting to commit, committing or immediately fleeing from a felony criminal act and as a result of that act, attempted act or flight, the claimant or decedent was at least fifty per cent responsible for the accident or event that caused the claimant's or decedent's harm. Muscat contends that under this statute, the trier of fact should determine whether he was more than 50% at fault. Section 12-712(A), like the constitutional provisions discussed above, does not apply unless the plaintiff alleged a prima facie case of negligence. B. Vulnerable Adult Claim ¶ 22 For his APSA claim, Muscat alleges he is a vulnerable adult and was injured by Creative's abuse and neglect. See A.R.S. § 46-455(B) ("A vulnerable adult whose life or health is being or has been endangered or injured by neglect, abuse or exploitation may file an action in superior court against any person ... that has assumed a legal duty to provide care or that has been appointed by a court to provide care to such vulnerable adult for having caused or permitted such conduct."). Creative did not address the APSA claim in its motion for judgment on the pleadings, and although the claim was briefly addressed in the response and the reply, neither of the parties engaged in any meaningful statutory analysis of the vulnerable adult statutes. Nor did the superior court separately analyze the APSA claim in its detailed ruling. Likewise, on appeal, the parties have not provided any helpful briefing on this issue, which cannot be resolved merely by relying on the analysis we have applied to the negligence claims. Whether Muscat has stated a viable claim under A.R.S. § 46-455(B) must be considered by the superior court in the first instance. CONCLUSION ¶ 23 We affirm the portion of the superior court's judgment dismissing Berman's claims and Muscat's negligence claims. We vacate, however, the dismissal of Muscat's APSA claim and remand for further proceedings. Marcie Berman, Muscat's mother and permanent guardian, also appeals the superior court's judgment. Because her claims depend on the success of Muscat's claims, we need not separately address them. We take judicial notice of the sentencing minute entry in Maricopa County Superior Court Case No. CR 2013-456757-001, which Muscat filed along with his opening brief. See Ariz. R. Evid. 201(b) (allowing courts to take judicial notice of facts that are not the subject of reasonable dispute). We do not address Creative's liability for injuries to the victim or any other party that is not part of this litigation. Nor do we consider whether Muscat has any viable negligence claims if his convictions are set aside. The authorities Muscat relies on are inapposite because the injuries claimed arose from physical harms suffered by the plaintiffs. See Sonoran Desert Investigations, Inc. v. Miller , 213 Ariz. 274, 275-77, ¶¶ 1, 6, 141 P.3d 754, 755-57 (App. 2006) (allowing wrongful death action to proceed to jury trial where plaintiff's husband died after being physically restrained and choked on suspicion of shoplifting); Tug Valley Pharmacy, LLC v. All Plaintiffs Below In Mingo Cty ., 235 W.Va. 283, 773 S.E.2d 627, 628, 636 (2015) (allowing plaintiffs to maintain tort claim against pharmacies and physicians for "negligently prescrib[ing] and dispens[ing] controlled substances," where the alleged injuries were addiction to and abuse of the controlled substances). As to Berman, she concedes that if we conclude that Muscat's negligence claims are not viable, then her claims cannot survive because they are derivative of Muscat's negligence claims. Thus, the superior court properly granted judgment on the pleadings as to Berman's claims. See, e.g., Barnes v. Outlaw , 192 Ariz. 283, 286, ¶ 8, 964 P.2d 484, 487 (1998) ("[B]ecause loss of consortium is a derivative claim, all elements of the underlying cause must be proven before the claim can exist.").

CAMPBELL, Judge: ¶ 1 Logan B. ("Father") challenges the juvenile court's failure to make written findings in its order terminating his parental rights to his children J.B. and I.B. We hold that even if the court makes oral findings of fact on the record, a written termination order that recites only conclusions of law regarding the statutory grounds for termination and best interests is insufficient as a matter of law. Such an order fails to comply with the requirement in both Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 8-538(A) and Arizona Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile Court 66(F)(2)(A) that a termination order must contain written findings. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶ 2 In July 2016 the Department of Child Safety ("DCS") filed a dependency petition alleging J.B. and I.B. (collectively, the "children") were dependent. DCS alleged substance abuse based on Father's use of heroin, marijuana, and morphine. DCS also alleged neglect because of Father's inability to provide the necessities of life for the children and because he cared for them while under the influence of drugs. The court later adjudicated the children dependent. ¶ 3 In April 2017, DCS moved to terminate Father's parental rights on the statutory grounds of abandonment, A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1), substance abuse, A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), and six months in an out-of-home placement, A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(b). DCS also alleged termination was in the children's best interests. ¶ 4 Father later failed to appear for a pretrial conference. The juvenile court found Father's failure to appear was without good cause and granted DCS's motion to proceed with the termination hearing in absentia. ¶ 5 After receiving exhibits and hearing testimony presented by a DCS case manager, the juvenile court made findings of facts and conclusions of law by oral pronouncement on the record at the conclusion of the hearing. The juvenile court found DCS failed to prove abandonment but did prove the grounds of chronic substance abuse and out-of-home placement by clear and convincing evidence, and stated relevant factual findings. The court also found by a preponderance of evidence that termination of Father's parental rights was in the children's best interests, again providing its factual findings orally. ¶ 6 The juvenile court later entered a final written order terminating Father's parental rights to the children. The final order read as follows: THE COURT FINDS by clear and convincing evidence that the State has proven the allegation of a history of chronic abuse of dangerous drugs and controlled substances with respect to [Father]. THE COURT FINDS beyond a preponderance of the evidence that it would be in the children's best interest[s] to sever the father's parental rights. The final order was devoid of any factual findings to support the legal conclusions about the statutory ground for termination or factual findings to justify that termination was in the children's best interests. ¶ 7 Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-235(A) and Arizona Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile Court 103(A). DISCUSSION ¶ 8 Father argues the juvenile court committed an error of law when entering a final order lacking any written factual findings in support of its conclusions of law. We agree. I. Purported Waiver ¶ 9 Father did not raise this argument in the juvenile court. Generally, failure to raise an argument in the juvenile court waives the issue on appeal. See Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 214 Ariz. 445, 452, ¶ 21, 153 P.3d 1074, 1081 (App. 2007). But the decision to find waiver is discretionary. See Marianne N. v. Dep't of Child Safety , 243 Ariz. 53, 56, ¶ 13, 401 P.3d 1002, 1005 (2017) (citing City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. , 209 Ariz. 544, 552 n.9, ¶ 33, 105 P.3d 1163, 1171 (2005) ) (decision to deem issue waived is "jurisprudential, not jurisdictional"). ¶ 10 DCS urges waiver here, citing Christy C. , 214 Ariz. at 452, ¶¶ 20-21, 153 P.3d at 1081. In Christy C. , this court concluded the parent had waived her argument that the court's final order did not comply with A.R.S. § 8-538(A) by raising it for the first time on appeal. 214 Ariz. at 452, ¶ 21, 153 P.3d at 1081. Christy C . is distinguishable. There, the final order contained some factual findings, albeit the parent argued those findings were insufficiently detailed. Id . Christy C. accords with this court's decision to apply the waiver doctrine when a party first raises the issue of insufficient findings on appeal and the order includes at least some statutorily required factual findings. See, e.g. , Antonio M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 222 Ariz. 369, 371, ¶¶ 5-6, 214 P.3d 1010, 1012 (App. 2009) (father waived argument raised for the first time on appeal that termination order should have made more specific factual findings); see also Banales v. Smith , 200 Ariz. 419, 420, ¶¶ 1, 6-8, 26 P.3d 1190, 1191 (App. 2001) (father could not newly challenge sufficiency of trial court's detailed order that contained numerous findings of fact and conclusions of law but omitted a required best interests finding under A.R.S. § 25-403 ). ¶ 11 In this case, Father raises an issue of law. That is, Father's argument is that the juvenile court's final written order is insufficient because it contains only conclusions of law without any factual findings. In similar circumstances, we have exercised our discretion, choosing not to find waiver. See Nold v. Nold , 232 Ariz. 270, 272-73, ¶¶ 7-10, 304 P.3d 1093, 1095-96 (App. 2013) (declining to find waiver when family court's custody order made no written factual findings regarding the statutorily mandated best interests findings; best interests of child trumps waiver doctrine); Reid v. Reid , 222 Ariz. 204, 207-08, ¶¶ 11, 14-20, 213 P.3d 353, 356-57 (App. 2009) (declining to find waiver; omission of statutorily required best interests findings in custody order demonstrated omission was not "mere oversight"; order merely stated court's custody determination was in the children's best interests and court had considered the relevant factors under A.R.S. § 25-403(A) ). The waiver doctrine is not "an unalterable rule." Reid , 222 Ariz. at 208, ¶ 16, 213 P.3d at 357. We are not dealing with a question of whether the court merely overlooked some factual findings; we are addressing an order devoid of any factual findings. See id . at 208, ¶¶ 15-16, 213 P.3d at 357. Moreover, Father raises an issue of great public importance that is likely to reoccur, thus providing an additional reason not to find waiver. See In re Leon G. , 204 Ariz. 15, 17 n.1, ¶ 2, 59 P.3d 779, 781 n.1 (2002) (noting exception to general rule of waiver when issue raised is of great public importance and likely to reoccur.) Because this is a reoccurring problem, we choose to exercise our discretion and will not find waiver in this limited circumstance. We therefore decline to find waiver, and address the issue on the merits. II. Written Findings ¶ 12 We review de novo issues of statutory interpretation and the interpretation of rules. Premier Physicians Grp., PLLC v. Navarro , 240 Ariz. 193, 194-95, ¶ 6, 377 P.3d 988, 989-90 (2016) (interpretation of statutes); Valerie M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec ., 219 Ariz. 155, 161, ¶ 19, 195 P.3d 192, 198 (App. 2008) (interpretation of rules). "When the text is clear and unambiguous, we apply the plain meaning and our inquiry ends." State v. Burbey , 243 Ariz. 145, 147, ¶ 7, 403 P.3d 145, 147 (2017) (citing Stambaugh v. Killian , 242 Ariz. 508, 509, ¶ 7, 398 P.3d 574, 575 (2017) ). ¶ 13 Before terminating a parent's parental rights, the juvenile court must find at least one statutory ground by clear and convincing evidence, A.R.S. §§ 8-533, -537(B), and find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that termination is in a child's best interests, Kent K. v. Bobby M ., 210 Ariz. 279, 288, ¶ 41, 110 P.3d 1013, 1022 (2005). If the juvenile court finds DCS has met this burden, the juvenile court is required to enter written findings terminating the parent-child relationship. A.R.S. § 8-538(A) (an order terminating the parent-child relationship "shall be in writing and shall recite the findings on which the order is based"); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 66(F) ("All findings and orders shall be in the form of a signed order or set forth in a signed minute entry."). ¶ 14 Importantly, under Rule 66(F)(2)(a) the juvenile court must "[m]ake specific findings of fact in support of the termination of parental rights and grant the motion or petition for termination." In Ruben M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , this court held that to comply with Rule 66(F)(2)(a), the order must specify the juvenile court's conclusions of law and "at least one factual finding sufficient to support each of those conclusions of law." 230 Ariz. 236, 240-41, ¶¶ 22, 25-26, 282 P.3d 437, 441-42 (App. 2012). The number of factual findings required will depend on the complexity of the issues but must be "sufficiently specific to enable the appellate court to provide effective review." Id . at 241, ¶ 25, 282 P.3d at 442. Although Ruben M. addressed a different issue (whether the juvenile court's summary written factual findings were sufficient), it is clear the court implicitly held it is an error of law to enter a final termination order that omits any factual findings. Id . at 241, ¶¶ 25-27, 282 P.3d at 442 (concluding court's summary findings were sufficiently specific as grounds for court's judgment were "simple" and "straightforward"). ¶ 15 Ruben M. set forth what is minimally required: at least one sufficiently specific finding to support each of the court's conclusions of law. Id . at 240, ¶ 22, 282 P.3d at 441. We recognize that the juvenile court is not required to list each and every fact relied upon in making its findings. Christy C. , 214 Ariz. at 451-52, ¶ 19, 153 P.3d at 1080-81. Nonetheless, written findings, including findings of fact, must include "all of the 'ultimate' facts-that is, those necessary to resolve the disputed issues." Ruben M. , 230 Ariz. at 242, ¶ 25, 282 P.3d at 443 (quoting Elliott v. Elliott, 165 Ariz. 128, 132, 796 P.2d 930, 934 (App. 1990) ). " '[U]ltimate facts' are at least 'the essential and determinative facts on which the conclusion was reached. They are the controlling facts, without which the court cannot correctly apply the law' in resolving the disputed issues in the case." Miller v. Bd. of Supervisors of Pinal Cty ., 175 Ariz. 296, 300, 855 P.2d 1357, 1361 (1993) (citing Star Realty Co. v. Sellers, 73 N.M. 207, 208-09, 387 P.2d 319 (1963) ) (order that omitted ultimate facts provided no basis for the court to determine whether trial court's legal conclusions were sound); see also Gilliland v. Rodriquez , 77 Ariz. 163, 167, 268 P.2d 334 (1954) ("The ultimate test of the adequacy thereof is whether they are pertinent to the issues and comprehensive enough to provide a basis for the decision."). ¶ 16 DCS argues the juvenile court made sufficiently specific findings as required by Rule 66(F)(2)(a) and within the meaning of Ruben M. , because the court made "detailed factual findings on the record." Detailed factual findings made orally on the record do not comply with the safeguards that the legislature, by statute, and our supreme court, by rule, have implemented to protect the due process rights of parents in a termination proceeding. Parents have a fundamental interest in the care, custody, and control of their children protected by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Mara M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 201 Ariz. 503, 507, ¶ 24, 38 P.3d 41, 45 (App. 2002) (citing Santosky v. Kramer , 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) ); Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000). That right is not absolute but there are "specified circumstances and procedures" that must be followed when terminating the parent-child relationship. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 196 Ariz. 246, 248, ¶ 12, 995 P.2d 682, 684 (2000). "Because of the fundamental right at stake in severance proceedings, the legislature has imposed significant procedural safeguards to ensure due process." Ruben M. , 230 Ariz. at 240, ¶ 21, 282 P.3d at 441. Those safeguards, as further implemented by Rule 66(F)(2)(a), require written factual findings when a court terminates parental rights. ¶ 17 We may not, as DCS suggests, ignore the requirement of written findings and simply search the record to uncover ultimate facts the court may have relied upon, or infer findings the court may have made, in reaching the decision to enter an order of termination. Cf. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Matthew L., 223 Ariz. 547, 549-50, ¶ 10, 225 P.3d 604, 606-07 (App. 2010) (when court denies a motion to terminate parental rights, A.R.S. § 8-538(A) does not require written findings; appellate court may look to the record to determine whether reasonable evidence supports court's denial of motion to terminate). To do so would nullify the requirement that the juvenile court enter a written termination order and "recite the findings on which the order is based," A.R.S. § 8-538(A), and render Rule 66(F)(2)(a) meaningless, see Brenda D. v. Dep't of Child Safety , 243 Ariz. 437, 443, ¶ 20, 410 P.3d 419, 425 (2018) ("We will not interpret statutes or rules in a manner that renders portions of their text superfluous.") (citing Bilke v. State , 206 Ariz. 462, 464, ¶ 11, 80 P.3d 269, 271 (2003) ); see also Parker v. City of Tucson , 233 Ariz. 422, 430, ¶ 20, 314 P.3d 100, 108 (App. 2013) ("We will not rewrite statutes to effectuate a meaning different than the one the legislature intended."). ¶ 18 We have long emphasized that the purpose of requiring written findings is to aid appellate review. See, e.g. , Ruben M. , 230 Ariz. at 240, ¶ 24, 282 P.3d at 441 ; Stein v. Stein, 238 Ariz. 548, 551, ¶ 10, 363 P.3d 708, 711 (App. 2015) ; Miller , 175 Ariz. at 299, 855 P.2d at 1360. But written findings also serve other important purposes, including "prompt[ing] judges to consider issues more carefully because 'they are required to state not only the end result of their inquiry, but the process by which they reached it.' " Miller , 175 Ariz. at 299, 855 P.2d at 1360 (quoting United States v. Merz, 376 U.S. 192, 199, 84 S.Ct. 639, 11 L.Ed.2d 629 (1964) ). ¶ 19 "As the trier of fact in a termination proceeding, the juvenile court 'is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts.' " Jennifer S. v. Dep't of Child Safety , 240 Ariz. 282, 286, ¶ 16, 378 P.3d 725 , 729(App. 2016) (quoting Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 223 Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18, 219 P.3d 296, 303 (App. 2009) ). As an appellate court, "[o]ur task for factual findings is solely to confirm that there is some reasonable evidence in the record to sustain them," not to reweigh the evidence. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O. , 209 Ariz. 332, 336, ¶ 14, 100 P.3d 943, 947 (App. 2004). Even when the court may have set forth some of its findings and conclusions on the record at the conclusion of the termination hearing, the requirement to state its findings in a written order allows the juvenile court to reflect on the record before memorializing its findings in writing. It is improper for this court to determine in the first instance what ultimate facts the juvenile court would have reduced to writing to support its conclusions of law. See Kelsey v. Kelsey , 186 Ariz. 49, 50-51, 918 P.2d 1067, 1068-69 (App. 1996) (when written findings are required, this court "may not affirm simply because we may find some possible basis for [the trial court's written] conclusion in the record"; rather, "[i]t must be clear [from the findings] how the court actually did arrive at its conclusions"). ¶ 20 In this case, Father failed to appear at a pretrial conference. After finding Father failed to appear without good cause, the juvenile court exercised its discretion to proceed with the termination hearing. Marianne N. , 243 Ariz. at 57-58, ¶¶ 19-22, 401 P.3d at 1006-07 ; Ariz. R.P Juv. Ct. 64(C). Father's failure to appear therefore resulted in a waiver of his legal rights, and he was deemed to have admitted the allegations contained within DCS's motion for termination of his parental rights. Marianne N. , 243 Ariz. at 57-58, ¶ 22, 401 P.3d at 1006-07 ; see also Brenda D ., 243 Ariz. at 445-46, ¶ 29, 410 P.3d at 427-28. Nonetheless the juvenile court, based on the limited record before it, was still required to find whether DCS had met its burden. To do so, the juvenile court was required to state in writing the ultimate facts on which it relied in reaching its conclusions of law. That is, the juvenile court was required to state what facts supported its conclusion that DCS had proven that Father had a history of chronic substance abuse, rendering him unable to discharge his parental responsibilities, and there existed reasonable grounds to believe his condition would continue for a prolonged indeterminate period within the meaning of A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3). The court was further required to state what ultimate facts supported its legal conclusion that DCS had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of Father's parental rights was in the children's best interests. Therefore, the juvenile court erred as a matter of law when it made findings of fact on the record, but then entered a termination order containing only conclusions of law. ¶ 21 Father also argues the juvenile court erred as a matter of law by omitting a written conclusion of law confirming the oral pronouncement that DCS had proven the ground of six months in an out-of-home placement. We agree that the juvenile court's on the record conclusions of law are inconsistent with the court's written order, which makes no reference to this ground of termination. See supra ¶¶ 5-6. ¶ 22 Accordingly, we vacate the juvenile court's termination order and remand for the limited purpose of allowing the juvenile court to enter its written factual findings and conclusions of law, based on the existing record. The lack of written findings is the sole issue Father raises on appeal. Therefore, on remand Father cannot later elect to raise additional issues on appeal. Rather, Father is limited to challenging the sufficiency of the juvenile court's written findings of fact. He may also challenge the court's conclusions of law and findings of fact regarding the six months in an out-of-home placement ground, which was not included in the juvenile court's termination order. All other issues are precluded by Father's failure to raise them in this appeal. See Bike Fashion Corp. v. Kramer , 202 Ariz. 420, 425, ¶ 20, 46 P.3d 431, 436 (App. 2002) (issues which should have been raised in the first appeal may not be raised nor considered by appellate court in a subsequent appeal). CONCLUSION ¶ 23 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the juvenile court's termination order and remand the matter to the juvenile court. On remand, we direct the juvenile court to enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law based on the existing record, as required by A.R.S. § 8-538(A) and Rule 66(F)(2)(a). Absent material revisions after the relevant date, we cite the current versions of statutes and rules. DCS alleged Father violated a safety plan that permitted the children to remain in the home with their mother and prohibited Father from returning to the home until he demonstrated 30 days of sobriety. The mother's parental rights were later terminated. She is not a party to this appeal. As later discussed, the juvenile court's order did not include any findings regarding the out-of-home placement ground. Infra ¶ 21. After the filing of a timely notice of appeal, and "for good cause," this court may suspend the appeal and revest jurisdiction in the juvenile court for the limited purpose of allowing the court to make the required written findings. See ARCAP 3(b) ; see also Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 103(B). We note that such procedures inject delay. We also note that under the Arizona Rules of Juvenile Procedure, an appellant has 15 days to file a notice of appeal after entry of the juvenile court's final order, Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 104(A), and the rules do not provide for any time-extending motions that extend the time to file a notice of appeal. As an appellate court we review the record before us, but we cannot disregard the requirements governing the entry of a termination order. Although we have held that "we will presume that the juvenile court made every finding necessary to support the severance order if reasonable evidence supports the order" and "[i]f the juvenile court fails to expressly make a necessary finding, we may examine the record to determine whether the facts support that implicit finding," Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 207 Ariz. 43, 50, ¶ 17, 83 P.3d 43, 50 (App. 2004), under our case law these principles have been applied only in cases in which the termination order contained written factual findings. See id. at 46-47, 49-50, ¶¶ 6, 14-18, 83 P.3d at 46-47, 49-50; Matter of Pima Cty. Severance Action No. S-2397 , 161 Ariz. 574, 576-77, 780 P.2d 407, 409-10 (App. 1989) ; Matter of Appeal In Pima Cty. Severance Action No. S - 1607 , 147 Ariz. 237, 238, 709 P.2d 871, 872 (1985); In re Maricopa Cty., Juvenile Action No. JS-3594, 133 Ariz. 582, 584-85, 653 P.2d 39, 41-42 (App. 1982). We have never held that we will do so absent any written factual findings.

BEENE, Judge: ¶ 1 Renee Loncar ("Loncar") sued the State of Arizona and its associated representatives (collectively, the "State") for discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Privileges & Immunities and Preferential Treatment of Employees Clauses of the Arizona Constitution. Loncar claimed the State discriminated against her based on her gender by offering state employee benefits to unmarried same-sex couples but denying those benefits to unmarried heterosexual couples. ¶ 2 We hold that the State did not violate Loncar's state or federal constitutional rights because Loncar and her male domestic partner were not similarly situated with same-sex couples who were legally prohibited from marrying. The State's action was based on marriage eligibility and rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. Accordingly, we affirm the superior court's dismissal of Loncar's sex discrimination claims. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 3 Loncar and her male domestic partner, Christopher Kutcher ("Kutcher"), had a long-term, committed partnership for several decades. They lived together, had two children together, and shared income and expenses, but they were not married. In 2006, Loncar was hired by the State. In 2008, the Arizona Department of Administration and Personnel Board enacted rules giving certain benefits for "domestic partners" of state employees, regardless of sexual orientation. See Ariz. Admin. Code R2-5-101(22) (2008). Because Kutcher was Loncar's domestic partner, she identified him as her dependent for state employee benefits, including coverage for life insurance. ¶ 4 In 2010, the Arizona Legislature enacted Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 38-651(O), defining "dependent," as relevant here, to mean "a spouse under the laws of this state," thereby invalidating Kutcher's previous designation as Loncar's dependent for purposes of receiving state employee benefits. Because same-sex couples were prohibited from marrying in Arizona at that time, their dependent designations for state employee benefits were also negated under A.R.S. § 38-651(O), and they sued for declaratory and injunctive relief. See Collins v. Brewer , 727 F.Supp.2d 797, 815 (D. Ariz. 2010). On July 23, 2010, before the statute's effective date, the United States District Court enjoined the State "from enforcing A.R.S. § 38-651(O) to eliminate family insurance eligibility for lesbian and gay State employees, and their domestic partners" and specifically ordered the State "to make available family health insurance coverage for lesbian and gay State employees ... to the same extent such benefits are made available to married State employees[.]" Collins , 727 F.Supp.2d at 815. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, see Diaz v. Brewer , 656 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2011), and the United States Supreme Court denied the State's petition for writ of certiorari, see Brewer v. Diaz , 570 U.S. 931, 133 S.Ct. 2884, 186 L.Ed.2d 932 (2013). Thus, as of July 2010, same-sex domestic partners were eligible to be dependents for the purposes of state employee benefits, but unmarried opposite-sex domestic partners were not. ¶ 5 On June 7, 2014, Kutcher died in a car accident. Because Kutcher was not Loncar's dependent under A.R.S. § 38-651(O), he had no state life insurance coverage, and Loncar received no insurance benefits following his death. The District Court then dissolved the preliminary injunction effective December 31, 2014, because, as of that date, same-sex couples could legally marry in Arizona and, if they chose to marry, would qualify for state employee benefits under A.R.S. § 38-651(O). ¶ 6 On April 21, 2016, Loncar filed a complaint alleging sex discrimination and seeking "a declaration that the distinction in State benefits between employees in same sex domestic partnerships and different sex domestic partnerships" violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Privileges & Immunities and Preferential Treatment of Employees Clauses of the Arizona Constitution. Loncar also sought the life insurance proceeds to which she would have been entitled if she could have designated Kutcher as her dependent. ¶ 7 The State moved to dismiss, arguing Loncar failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because, among other things, A.R.S. § 38-651(O) did not confer any privilege on unmarried same-sex couples that it withheld from unmarried heterosexual couples. Loncar countered that the State withheld benefits to unmarried heterosexual couples based solely on her sex as female, a protected class. After full briefing and oral argument, in March 2017, the superior court dismissed Loncar's claims. The court found that (1) "based upon the plain meaning of the term, 'sex' refers only to membership in a class delineated by gender, and not to sexual orientation;" (2) "[a]s [Loncar] conceded at oral argument, sexual orientation is not expressly included in the constitutionally protected class;" (3) Loncar "therefore does not fall within the protected class and may not bring a claim under the Preferential Treatment of Employees Clause for preferential treatment or discrimination based on sexual orientation;" (4) the State did not violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Privileges & Immunities Clause because it "had a reasonable basis in these circumstances for providing life-insurance coverage to unmarried same-sex couples" in complying with the District Court orders; and (5) as determined by the District Court, "same-sex domestic partners were not similarly situated with opposite sex domestic partners for purposes of application of A.R.S. § 38-651(O)... [since] insurance benefits were available to heterosexual couples because there was no legal impediment to such couples, including [Loncar and Kutcher], getting married." Loncar unsuccessfully moved to set aside the final judgment. ¶ 8 Loncar timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1). DISCUSSION ¶ 9 We review de novo the superior court's grant of a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim. Pivotal Colo. II, L.L.C. v. Ariz. Pub. Safety Pers. Ret. Sys. , 234 Ariz. 369, 370, ¶ 4, 322 P.3d 186, 187 (App. 2014). In reviewing the complaint's dismissal, we "assume the truth of the well-pled factual allegations and indulge all reasonable inferences therefrom," Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. , 218 Ariz. 417, 419, ¶ 7, 189 P.3d 344, 346 (2008), and will affirm "only if the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts pleaded in the complaint that are susceptible of proof," Albers v. Edelson Tech. Partners L.P. , 201 Ariz. 47, 50, ¶ 7, 31 P.3d 821, 824 (App. 2001). I. The State Did Not Violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution or the Privileges & Immunities Clause of the Arizona Constitution. ¶ 10 Loncar argues the State's grant of benefits to same-sex partners, but not opposite-sex partners, violated the state and federal guarantees of equal protection. Specifically, she asserts that the State treated "similarly situated" persons differently by favoring one group and discriminating against another, and the State's reason for distinguishing between those groups was only to save money by offering benefits to fewer people. ¶ 11 The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in pertinent part, "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the Unites States ... nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Likewise, the Arizona Constitution provides that "[n]o law shall be enacted granting to any citizen, class of citizens ... privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens[.]" Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 13. "The effects of the federal and state equal protection guarantees are essentially the same ... each generally requiring the law treat all similarly situated persons alike[.]" State v. Panos , 239 Ariz. 116, 118, ¶ 7, 366 P.3d 1006, 1008 (App. 2016) (citations and quotation omitted). Equal protection, however, "does not require that all persons be treated alike, only that individuals within a certain class be treated equally and that there exist reasonable grounds for the classification." State v. Navarro , 201 Ariz. 292, 298, ¶ 25, 34 P.3d 971, 977 (App. 2001) (citation omitted). If a suspect class or fundamental right is implicated, we apply a strict scrutiny review. Church v. Rawson Drug & Sundry Co. , 173 Ariz. 342, 349, 842 P.2d 1355, 1362 (App. 1992). But when neither a suspect class nor fundamental right is involved, we will uphold government action if it is "rationally related to a legitimate government purpose." Navarro , 201 Ariz. at 298, ¶ 25, 34 P.3d at 977 (citation omitted). ¶ 12 The rational basis test does not require the State to choose "the least intrusive, nor most effective, means of achieving its goals." State v. Hammonds , 192 Ariz. 528, 532, ¶ 15, 968 P.2d 601, 605 (App. 1998). "[A]bsolute equality and complete conformity of legislative classifications are not constitutionally required." City of Tucson v. Grezaffi , 200 Ariz. 130, 137, ¶ 18, 23 P.3d 675, 682 (App. 2001) (citation and quotation omitted). Thus, "[e]ven if the classification results in some inequality, it is not unconstitutional if it rests on some reasonable basis." Church , 173 Ariz. at 351, 842 P.2d at 1364. It must not, however, be arbitrary or irrational. Coleman v. City of Mesa , 230 Ariz. 352, 363, ¶ 43, 284 P.3d 863, 874 (2012). Instead, government action will violate equal protection "only if it is 'wholly irrelevant' to the achievement of a legitimate governmental objective." Hammonds , 192 Ariz. at 532, ¶ 15, 968 P.2d at 605 (citation omitted); see also Church , 173 Ariz. at 350, 842 P.2d at 1363 (noting courts may consider "either the actual basis on which the legislature acted or any hypothetical basis on which it might have acted.") (citation omitted). ¶ 13 Employing these principles, we conclude the State's action in offering benefits to same-sex couples, but not heterosexual couples was constitutional. First, as a heterosexual couple, Loncar and Kutcher were not "similarly situated" persons with same-sex couples. Loncar and Kutcher had the fundamental legal right to marry and could have obtained employee benefits, including insurance on Kutcher's life, as "a spouse under the laws of this state." Nothing in the State's decision to offer benefits to same-sex couples impeded or prevented Loncar from doing so at any time. In contrast, short of litigation, same-sex couples had no option to legally marry to obtain employee benefits. ¶ 14 Next, the State's extension of benefits to same-sex couples was reasonable and rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. The District Court specifically ordered the State "to make available family health insurance coverage for lesbian and gay State employees ... to the same extent such benefits are made available to married State employees[.]" Collins , 727 F.Supp.2d at 815. The State complied with the District Court's explicit directive by offering benefits to same-sex couples-a reasonable basis for distinguishing between same-sex domestic partners and heterosexual domestic partners and rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. ¶ 15 Loncar argues that the State's action did not serve a legitimate government purpose because "[s]aving money was the only excuse the State has ever proffered for not providing the same life insurance to unmarried different-sex domestic partners that it provided to unmarried same-sex domestic partners." She cites to Diaz , 656 F.3d at 1014, for the proposition that when "savings depend upon distinguishing between homosexual and heterosexual employees, similarly situated ... such a distinction cannot survive rational basis review." (Emphasis added). Again, Loncar and Kutcher were not similarly situated to same-sex couples because they could legally marry. We find that the State's strict compliance with the District Court's direct order was a legitimate government purpose for offering same-sex couples employee benefits. See Church , 173 Ariz. at 350, 842 P.2d at 1363. ¶ 16 Nevertheless, Loncar urges us to examine the State's action applying strict scrutiny review, rather than rational basis review, because she argues it implicates a classification based on a person's sex. As discussed, infra ¶ 20, the State's action was not based on Loncar's biological designation as female, but on her marriage eligibility as a heterosexual couple. It is undisputed that sexual orientation is not a suspect class and employee benefits do not involve a fundamental right. Therefore, we evaluate the State's action applying rational basis review. ¶ 17 Loncar next argues that "[f]orcing a person into marriage just to get insurance benefits available to other persons who are not married ... is an assault on personal choice and individual freedom." To support her assertion that she has the "right not to marry," Loncar cites to Obergefell v. Hodges , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2589, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015), for the proposition that the "right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of personal autonomy." In Obergefell , the United States Supreme Court stressed at length the "centrality of marriage to the human condition" and that "[f]rom their beginning to their most recent page, the annals of human history reveal the transcendent importance of marriage." Id . at 2593-94. The Obergefell petitioners, more than a dozen same-sex couples, however were denied the legal right to marry and participate in that most-important institution; they were suing for the right to share in the "privileges and responsibilities" attendant with marriage. Id . at 2594. Loncar has always possessed that right - the personal choice and individual freedom to marry (or not marry). But along with that personal right and choice flows the consequences of marital status, none of which are unconstitutional as a matter of law. As the Obergefell Court articulated, [W]hile the States are in general free to vary the benefits they confer on all married couples, they have throughout our history made marriage the basis for an expanding list of governmental rights, benefits, and responsibilities. These aspects of marital status include: taxation; inheritance and property rights; rules of intestate succession; spousal privilege in the law of evidence; hospital access; medical decisionmaking authority; adoption rights; the rights and benefits of survivors; birth and death certificates; professional ethics rules; campaign finance restrictions; workers' compensation benefits; health insurance; and child custody, support, and visitation rules. Valid marriage under state law is also a significant status for over a thousand provisions of federal law. The States have contributed to the fundamental character of the marriage right by placing that institution at the center of so many facets of the legal and social order. 135 S.Ct. at 2601 (citations omitted). ¶ 18 In sum, the State did not violate Loncar's federal or state equal protection rights. She would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts and dismissal of her complaint was proper. II. The State Did Not Violate the Preferential Treatment of Employees Clause of the Arizona Constitution. ¶ 19 Finally, Loncar argues that the State denied her employee benefits provided to same-sex domestic partners simply because biologically she is female and Kutcher was male; whereas partners who were both male or both female were eligible for benefits. Thus, Loncar contends the State committed sex discrimination. ¶ 20 Under the Arizona Constitution, the State "shall not grant preferential treatment to or discriminate against any individual or group on the basis of ... sex ... in the operation of public employment[.]" Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 36 (A). In her brief, Loncar spends a great deal of time explaining and defining "sex" to mean the classification of organisms into the two divisions of female and male. This, she argues, is the root of the issue (and the State's discrimination) and the superior court erred in "focus[ing] on irrelevant terms and concepts such as 'gender,' 'sexual orientation,' 'sexual preference,' and 'sexual affiliation.' " But Loncar's argument misses the mark. Here, as mandated by the District Court injunction, the State's action in offering employee benefits to same-sex couples and not to unmarried heterosexual couples was not based on the biological sex of either person in the couple; it was based solely on the distinction of marriage eligibility. At that time, same-sex couples were not eligible to marry, yet opposite-sex couples were. In other words, the couple's sexual orientation determined their eligibility to marry and obtain benefits; the State's action was based on that distinction alone. As Loncar concedes, sexual orientation is not a constitutionally protected class. Thus, the State did not violate the Preferential Treatment of Employees Clause of the Arizona Constitution and Loncar's claim fails as a matter of law. CONCLUSION ¶ 21 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court's dismissal of Loncar's claims. Without citation to authority, Loncar requests attorneys' fees and costs on appeal. We deny her request. Loncar also argues that (1) Arizona's Declaratory Judgment Act supports her claims because her rights were affected by a statute; (2) the one-year statute of limitations does not bar her claims because she is seeking declaratory and injunctive relief only, not monetary damages under a typical tort action; and (3) the State is not immune from liability under either a legislative or administrative function because she is not seeking damages and the State's action involved no exercise of discretion. Because we find the constitutional issues dispositive and affirm the superior court's dismissal on those grounds, we need not address Loncar's additional arguments. See Forszt v. Rodriguez , 212 Ariz. 263, 265, ¶ 9, 130 P.3d 538, 540 (App. 2006) ("We may affirm the trial court's ruling if it is correct for any reason apparent in the record."). Moreover, because the nature of Loncar's claims are ill-defined, we are unable to determine the applicable statute of limitations and rule on that issue. Although Loncar's complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief, it also sought the life insurance proceeds for a non-existent policy despite her contention that this is not an action for monetary damages. It is unclear if her claims are based on, for example, a breach of contract (i.e. , pursuant to her employment contract, she was eligible to purchase a life insurance policy and pay the premiums, thereby holding a policy in effect at the time of Kutcher's death) or tort (i.e. , money damages in the amount of the life insurance policy payout rendered void when Kutcher was no longer considered Loncar's dependent). Each cause of action, whether state or federal, involves different statute-of-limitations periods. Because we reach the merits and affirm the superior court's ruling on the constitutional issues, remanding to develop the record regarding the applicable statute of limitations would be futile.

ESPINOSA, Judge: ¶ 1 Joshua Redzinak seeks review of the trial court's order summarily denying his petition for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. In that petition, he had argued, amid other claims, that following his convictions for two related crimes, A.R.S. § 13-116 barred the court from ordering that a term of probation for one conviction begin after his release from prison for the other conviction. We will not disturb the court's denial of relief unless it abused its discretion. See State v. Roseberry , 237 Ariz. 507, ¶ 7, 353 P.3d 847 (2015). Redzinak has not shown such abuse here. Procedural Background ¶ 2 In 2012, Redzinak pled guilty to attempted sexual assault and kidnapping. The trial court sentenced him to a 3.5-year prison term for attempted sexual assault and, for kidnapping, suspended the imposition of sentence and ordered a consecutive, seven-year term of probation. In 2014, Redzinak sought to modify his sentence, arguing the consecutive probation term was improper. The court denied that motion, and we dismissed his subsequent appeal pursuant to Rule 17.1(e), Ariz. R. Crim. P., as well as his attempt to seek review of that ruling pursuant to Rule 32.9(c) because he failed to submit the trial court's ruling on the motion. Redzinak raised the same argument in a subsequent notice of and petition for post-conviction relief, which the court dismissed as untimely. This court denied relief on review. State v. Redzinak , No. 2 CA-CR 2015-0063-PR, 2015 WL 2231999 (Ariz. App. May 13, 2015) (mem. decision). ¶ 3 In 2015, Redzinak pled guilty to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and, as a result, the trial court found he had violated the terms of his probation. The court continued Redzinak on probation, imposing a seven-year term to commence after he completed a 6.5-year prison term imposed for aggravated assault. ¶ 4 Redzinak sought post-conviction relief from the disposition, and appointed counsel filed a notice stating she had reviewed the record but found no claims to raise under Rule 32. Redzinak then filed a pro se petition repeating his argument that the trial court was not permitted to order the new probation term for the kidnapping to be consecutive to his prison term for attempted sexual assault because the two crimes constituted a single act. He contended he was entitled to raise this claim as a "collateral[ ] attack" on the original judgment "after revocation of probation," because the "reimposition [of probation] or resentence begins the process anew." He also claimed counsel had been ineffective in failing to raise this argument when the court reinstated probation. ¶ 5 The trial court summarily denied relief, concluding that the revocation of probation does not extend the time to seek review of the "underlying sentence" and, thus, "the time to challenge the original conviction and sentencing under Rule 32 has long since passed." The court also concluded that Redzinak had not been resentenced, and the continuation of probation was merely "a continuation of the earlier sentence." This petition for review followed the court's denial of Redzinak's motion for rehearing. Discussion ¶ 6 On review, Redzinak repeats his argument that he is permitted to challenge the original imposition of a consecutive probation term. He reasons that his guilty plea for aggravated assault "automatically revokes probation" pursuant to Rule 27.8(e), Ariz. R. Crim. P., thereby allowing him to again challenge the original order imposing a consecutive term of probation which, he contends, violates the protection against double jeopardy. ¶ 7 We first observe that, although Redzinak characterizes his claim in terms of double jeopardy, that doctrine is not implicated because attempted sexual assault and kidnapping are distinct offenses with different elements. See State v. Eagle , 196 Ariz. 188, ¶ 6, 994 P.2d 395 (2000) ("[W]hen statutes describe different offenses, consecutive sentences are permissible without implicating the prohibition against double jeopardy"); see also A.R.S. §§ 13-1304, 13-1406. Instead, Redzinak's argument is best understood as a claim that the probation term imposed for kidnapping violates the prohibition against double punishment, see § 13-116, and, indeed, he characterized it as such in his petition below. Pursuant to § 13-116, "[a]n act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different sections of the laws may be punished under both, but in no event may sentences be other than concurrent." ¶ 8 Section 13-116, however, by its plain language, does not apply where, as here, only one sentence has been imposed. See State v. Lambright , 243 Ariz. 244, ¶ 10, 404 P.3d 646 (App. 2017) ("[W]hen interpreting a statute, we must give effect to the legislature's intent, which is best reflected in the statute's plain language."). " Section 13-116 's requirement of concurrent sentences does not prohibit a separate fine and prison sentence for the same illegal act, but does not allow more than one of each for that criminal act." State v. Cook , 185 Ariz. 358, 365, 916 P.2d 1074, 1081 (App. 1995). "Probation is not a sentence." State v. Muldoon , 159 Ariz. 295, 298, 767 P.2d 16, 19 (1988). As our supreme court explained in Muldoon , "A sentence is a judicial order requiring a defendant convicted in a criminal case to presently suffer a specified sanction such as incarceration, monetary fine, or both." 159 Ariz. at 298, 767 P.2d at 19. In contrast, "[p]robation is a judicial order allowing a criminal defendant a period of time in which to perform certain conditions and thereby avoid imposition of a sentence." Id. Thus, because probation is not a sentence, § 13-116 does not prohibit a trial court from ordering a term of probation to run consecutively to a sentence even if the underlying convictions are based on the same conduct. See Cook , 185 Ariz. at 365, 916 P.2d at 1081. Indeed, by law, a term of probation cannot run concurrently to a previously imposed prison term. "If probation is imposed on one who at the time is serving a sentence of imprisonment imposed on a different conviction, service of the sentence of imprisonment shall not satisfy the probation." A.R.S. § 13-903(E) ; see also State v. Ball , 157 Ariz. 382, 384, 758 P.2d 653, 655 (App. 1988). Disposition ¶ 9 Because Redzinak's term of probation does not violate double jeopardy or § 13-116, although we grant review, relief is denied. Because we conclude Redzinak's claim fails on its merits, we need not address the trial court's suggestion that he could not raise the claim because his probation had not been revoked, only continued. But see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 (permitting of-right proceeding by defendant "who had an automatic probation violation based on a plea of guilty or no contest"); State v. Jimenez , 188 Ariz. 342, 345, 935 P.2d 920, 923 (App. 1996) (assuming modification of probation appealable, pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4033(A)(3), as post-judgment order affecting defendant's substantial rights). Nor do we consider whether the automatic violation of probation that results from a guilty plea to an unrelated felony, see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 27.8(e), constitutes an "admission" to the violation, precluding review by direct appeal under § 13-4033(B). We express no opinion whether Redzinak would be permitted to challenge, under § 13-116, a sentence imposed as a result of his probation being revoked.

THOMPSON, Presiding Judge: ¶ 1 The Arizona Department of Revenue (Department) appeals from the tax court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Empire Southwest LLC (Empire). Because we conclude that the sale of Empire's fuel truck was exempt from transaction privilege tax, we affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 2 The facts in this case are undisputed. Empire is an equipment retailer operating in Arizona. In 2014, Empire sold a modified Caterpillar 777G WT truck (the Truck) to the Pinto Valley Mine (the Mine) for use in its open pit copper mining operation. Pinto uses the Truck to transport fuel and lubricants from the Mine rim to equipment located in the pit. ¶ 3 Empire added $121,777.68 in transaction privilege tax to the Truck's purchase price, but Pinto refused to pay the tax claiming the Truck was exempt from tax pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 42-5061(B)(2) (2018), which exempts equipment used directly in the process of extracting ores or minerals from the earth. Empire paid the tax itself and, thereafter, sought a refund, which the Department denied. ¶ 4 After an unsuccessful administrative appeal, Empire filed a complaint in tax court. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The tax court granted Empire's motion and denied the Department's motion finding that the Truck qualified for the tax exemption. The Department timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -170(C) (2016). LEGAL DISCUSSION ¶ 5 The sole issue on appeal is whether the Truck is exempt from transaction privilege tax pursuant to A.R.S. § 42-5061(B)(2). We review this issue of statutory interpretation de novo . See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue , 238 Ariz. 519, 520, ¶ 6, 363 P.3d 136, 137 (App. 2015). Because A.R.S. § 42-5061(B) creates a tax exemption, we strictly construe this provision and acknowledge a presumption against the exemption. See id. We will not, however, construe the exemption so strictly "as to defeat or destroy the [legislative] intent and purpose." State ex rel. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue v. Capitol Castings, Inc. , 207 Ariz. 445, 447, ¶ 10, 88 P.3d 159, 161 (2004) (citation omitted). ¶ 6 The Arizona transaction privilege tax is an excise tax on the privilege of conducting business within the state. See Ariz. Dep't of Revenue v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co ., 113 Ariz. 467, 468, 556 P.2d 1129, 1130 (1976). The retail classification imposes a tax on the gross proceeds or income derived from "the business of selling tangible personal property at retail." A.R.S. § 42-5061(A). ¶ 7 There are numerous exemptions to the retail transaction privilege tax, including the one at issue here, which permits taxpayers to deduct from their tax base: Mining machinery, or equipment, used directly in the process of extracting ores or minerals from the earth for commercial purposes, including equipment required to prepare the materials for extraction and handling, loading or transporting such extracted material to the surface. A.R.S. § 42-5061(B)(2) (emphasis added). As this court has previously explained, the legislative purpose of this exemption was "to encourage mining in this state so that the end product of that mining and metallurgical activity (sales of copper ) is itself subject to taxation under the transaction privilege tax." Duval Sierrita Corp. v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue , 116 Ariz. 200, 204, 568 P.2d 1098, 1102 (App. 1977) (citations omitted). The issue we must decide is whether the Truck was "used directly in the process of extracting ores or minerals from the earth." A.R.S. § 42-5061(B)(2). ¶ 8 Both parties have identified three Arizona cases to guide us in determining whether the Truck is "used directly" in the mining process. First, in Duval Sierrita , this court applied the use tax exemption applying to machinery or equipment used directly in mining and metallurgical operations. See Duval Sierrita, 116 Ariz. at 201, 568 P.2d at 1099 (applying A.R.S. § 42-1409(B)(1)-(2), since re-codified as § 42-5159(B)(1)-(2) (2018) ). The court determined that the following items were exempt from use tax: (1) spare and replacement parts for machinery and equipment, (2) a conveyor belt used to transport ore between crushers, (3) steel pipes used to transport slurry from the mill to flotation tanks, and (4) booster pumps needed to transport water to the mill. See id . at 205-06, 568 P.2d at 1103-04. In doing so, the court adopted the "integrated rule" test utilized by other jurisdictions. Id. at 205, 568 P.2d at 1103. Under the integrated rule test, a court must answer three questions: (1) Is the disputed item necessary to production? (2) How close, physically and causally, is the disputed item to the finished product? (3) Does the disputed item operate harmoniously with the admittedly exempt machinery to make an integrated synchronized system? Id . (citations omitted). ¶ 9 Twenty-seven years later, in Capitol Castings , our supreme court explained that the Arizona Legislature had embraced the holding from Duval Sierrita and the integrated rule test set forth therein. See Capitol Castings, 207 Ariz. at 449-50, ¶¶ 20, 23, 88 P.3d at 163-64. Applying the integrated rule test, the court determined that various items utilized by Capitol Castings, a company that manufactured grinding balls and custom-cast items for mining, were exempt from tax "because they were used directly in and were an integral part of a qualifying process." Id . at 451, ¶ 26, 88 P.3d at 165 (applying A.R.S. § 42-5159(B)(1) ). The exempt items included silica sand, chemical binders, exothermic sleeves, mold cores, mold wash, and hot topping. See id. Conversely, the court determined that cement and lime were not exempt because they "served the ancillary purpose of pollution control and therefore were not as integrally related to the process." Id . ¶ 10 The Capitol Castings court further explained that under the "integrated rule" test: Items essential or necessary to the completion of the finished product are more likely to be exempt. The prominence of an item's role in maintaining a harmonious "integrated synchronized system" with the indisputably exempt items will also directly correlate with the likelihood that the exemption applies. The closer the nexus between the item at issue and the process of converting raw materials into finished products, the more likely the item will be exempt. Id. at 451, ¶ 25, 88 P.3d at 165 (citing Duval Sierrita, 116 Ariz. at 205-07, 568 P.2d at 1103-05 ). More recently, in Chevron , this court applied A.R.S. § 42-5061(B)(2) to conclude that "industrial oils and greases used in mining and metallurgical operations ... are exempt from the transaction privilege tax." Chevron, 238 Ariz. at 520, ¶ 1, 363 P.3d at 137. ¶ 11 Here, the Department argues the Truck is not used directly in the process of extracting ore from the earth. Rather, the Department describes the Truck's use as fulfilling "the ancillary support or maintenance role of transporting fuel and lubricants to the exempt mining equipment." Following the lead of our supreme court in Capitol Castings , we apply the "integrated rule" test to evaluate the Department's contention. In doing so, we answer the three questions identified in Duval Sierrita . See Duval Sierrita, 116 Ariz. at 205, 568 P.2d at 1103. ¶ 12 First, the Truck is necessary to the Mine's production. See id. As explained in Empire's statement of facts below, the Truck transports fuel and lubricants from the pit rim to equipment located several hundred feet below, including shovels, drills, bulldozers, and front-end loaders. The drills and shovels require refueling every twelve hours of operation. The shovel would lose eight hours of production time if it had to be moved from the pit floor to the pit rim for refueling. Likewise, the drill would lose four hours of production time. Thus, by servicing the mining equipment in the pit, the Truck permits the equipment to operate twenty-four hours per day. ¶ 13 Second, the Truck is close, physically and causally, to the ore. See id. The Truck comes near the ore when it services the equipment in the pit. Moreover, the function of the Truck is causally related to the efficient extraction of the ore from the ground. ¶ 14 Third and finally, the Truck operates harmoniously with the admittedly exempt drills, shovels, loaders, and dozers as part of an integrated synchronized system. See id. As reflected in the record, the Truck "continuously services all of the Pit Equipment to keep it operating 24 hours per day." The Department itself agreed that "[w]ithout the Truck, the need to take the equipment to fueling and lubricating stations would result in significant periods of stoppage and severely limit copper production." ¶ 15 On appeal, the Department argues that the Truck "does not perform extraction activities as defined in the statute but instead supports the extraction equipment." In Duval Sierrita , this court found that steel pipes that transported slurry from the mill to the flotation tanks were used directly in copper mining. See Duval Sierrita , 116 Ariz. at 206, 568 P.2d at 1104. Likewise, the court found that booster pumps needed to transport water to the mill were exempt. See id. The Truck here performs a function similar to those pipes and pumps by transporting essential fuel and lubricants to the mining equipment. ¶ 16 After application of the integrated rule test, we conclude that the Truck is used directly in the process of extracting ore from the earth. Accordingly, the Truck is exempt from transaction privilege tax pursuant to A.R.S. § 42-5061(B)(2). CONCLUSION ¶ 17 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the tax court. Empire requests its attorneys' fees on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-348 (2017), which authorizes us to award attorneys' fees to parties who bring an action challenging the assessment, collection, or refund of taxes. See A.R.S. § 12-348(B)(1). In the exercise of that discretion, we award Empire its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs on appeal subject to the limitation imposed by A.R.S. § 12-348(E) and upon compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21. Arizona's use tax is complementary to the transaction privilege tax. See Ariz. Dep't of Revenue v. Care Comp. Sys., Inc. , 197 Ariz. 414, 420, ¶ 25, 4 P.3d 469, 475 (App. 2000). Notably, in Chevron , the Department conceded that the oils and greases were "used directly" in Freeport's mining and metallurgical operations. See Chevron, 238 Ariz. at 523, ¶ 20, 363 P.3d at 140. Empire requested that this court take judicial notice of certain Gila County Treasurer records reflecting property taxes paid by the Pinto Valley Mining Group. See Ariz. R. Evid. 201. Because we find these records unnecessary to our resolution of this appeal, we deny Empire's request. See Freeport McMoRan Corp. v. Langley Eden Farms, LLC , 228 Ariz. 474, 478, ¶ 15, 268 P.3d 1131, 1135 (App. 2011) ("[W]e do not ... decide unnecessary issues.").

THOMPSON, Presiding Judge: ¶ 1 Appellant Ryan Hanfelder challenges the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Appellee GEICO Indemnity Company on his request for a declaration that he was entitled to underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage under his GEICO Indemnity policy. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶ 2 Hanfelder was injured in a September 2013 motor vehicle accident. The other driver involved was insured through AAA Insurance Company (AAA). Hanfelder held two relevant insurance policies at the time: one through GEICO Casualty Company and one through GEICO Indemnity Company. GEICO Casualty is a wholly owned subsidiary of GEICO Indemnity. ¶ 3 AAA tendered its policy limits to Hanfelder. Hanfelder made a UIM claim on GEICO Casualty, and GEICO Casualty tendered its policy limits. Hanfelder then made a UIM claim on GEICO Indemnity. GEICO Indemnity denied coverage under the "Limit of Liability" provision in its "Motorcycle Policy Amendment-Underinsured Motorist Coverage" (the Amendment), which states: If separate policies or coverages with us are in effect for you or any person in your household, they may not be combined to increase the limit of our liability for a loss; however, you have the right to select which policy or coverage is to be applicable for the loss. ¶ 4 Hanfelder sued GEICO Indemnity seeking a declaration that he was entitled to UIM coverage under its policy. Following cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment for GEICO Indemnity, finding the Amendment limited Hanfelder's UIM coverage to policy limits of one of the two policies under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 20-259.01(H) (2017). Hanfelder timely appealed following the entry of final judgment. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1) (2018). DISCUSSION ¶ 5 We review de novo whether summary judgment is warranted, including whether genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the trial court properly applied the law. Dreamland Villa Cmty. Club, Inc. v. Raimey , 224 Ariz. 42, 46, ¶ 16, 226 P.3d 411, 415 (App. 2010). We construe all facts in favor of Hanfelder, the party against whom summary judgment was granted. Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Leija , 243 Ariz. 175, 182, ¶ 25, 403 P.3d 587, 594 (App. 2017). I. The Amendment Did Not Exclude UIM Coverage Under the GEICO Indemnity Policy. ¶ 6 Subsection (H) provides, in relevant part: If multiple policies or coverages purchased by one insured on different vehicles apply to an accident or claim, the insurer may limit the coverage so that only one policy or coverage, selected by the insured, shall be applicable to any one accident.... For the purposes of this subsection, "insurer" includes every insurer within a group of insurers under a common management. A.R.S. § 20-259.01(H) (emphasis added). We construe the UIM statutes, including A.R.S. § 20-259.01(H), liberally and in favor of providing coverage while construing policy exclusions strictly and narrowly. Taylor v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. , 198 Ariz. 310, 314, ¶ 11, 9 P.3d 1049, 1053 (2000). ¶ 7 Hanfelder does not dispute that GEICO Casualty and GEICO Indemnity are under common management. Subsection (H) thus authorized the "insurer," which included both companies, to limit coverage for the accident to one policy. Hanfelder contends the Amendment did not do so because it only applied to "separate policies or coverages with us ." GEICO Indemnity, on the other hand, contends "us" refers to "insurer" as it is defined in subsection (H). ¶ 8 We agree with Hanfelder's position. Neither the policy nor the Amendment defines "us," but Hanfelder points out that the policy uses "we" to refer to "the Company named in the declarations," which is GEICO Indemnity. Moreover, Subsection (H) is not self-executing; insurers must include policy language incorporating its limitations. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lindsey , 182 Ariz. 329, 331, 897 P.2d 631, 633 (1995). Neither the GEICO Indemnity policy nor the Amendment formally incorporates subsection (H)'s definition of insurer. It defies common sense to construe the word "us" to include GEICO Casualty, a non-party to the GEICO Indemnity policy, when the word "we" does not. See Colo. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Safety Control Co. , 230 Ariz. 560, 568, ¶ 28, 288 P.3d 764, 772 (App. 2012) ("We ... examine the policy's terms from the standpoint of one untrained in law or the insurance business"); see also Ranger Ins. Co. v. Phillips , 25 Ariz. App. 426, 432, 544 P.2d 250 (1976) ("Words of exclusion in insurance policies should be given small tolerance when insurance companies choose to use words of imprecision") (quoting Ranger Ins. Co. v. Culberson , 454 F.2d 857, 864 (5th Cir. 1971) ). ¶ 9 GEICO Indemnity contends Hanfelder knew he had purchased both policies from the same group of insurers because he received a "multi-policy" discount. Even assuming this is true, a premium discount would not place him on notice that his UIM coverage would be limited. GEICO Indemnity could have drafted the Amendment to apply to all separate policies or coverages purchased from any GEICO affiliate but did not do so. See Roberts v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. , 144 P.3d 546, 548-49 (Colo. 2006) (reversing summary judgment for insurer where "the policies ... clearly prohibited no more than the stacking of benefits provided in policies issued by the same company"). ¶ 10 GEICO Indemnity also contends it cured any defects in the Amendment by notifying Hanfelder of his right to choose one policy or coverage within thirty days of learning of the accident. Subsection (H) further provides: If the policy does not contain a statement that informs the insured of the insured's right to select one policy or coverage as required by this subsection, within thirty days after the insurer receives notice of an accident, the insurer shall notify the insured in writing of the insured's right to select one policy or coverage. A.R.S. § 20-259.01(H). This portion of the statute does not apply because the Amendment contained a statement informing Hanfelder of his right "to select which policy or coverage is to be applicable to the loss" among any "separate policies or coverage with us." In any event, GEICO Indemnity cites no authority suggesting subsection (H) permits insurers to amend their policy language in post-accident correspondence. II. Issues of Material Fact Remain as to Hanfelder's Damages. ¶ 11 GEICO Indemnity also contends we should affirm because Hanfelder presented no evidence that his damages exceeded the AAA policy limits. See Brown v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 163 Ariz. 323, 328, 788 P.2d 56, 61 (1989) ("Implicit in the nature of the UIM transaction ... is the concept that UIM insurance provided by the insured's own carrier will protect him or her over and above the other insurance that may apply in a particular accident."); see also Keggi v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. , 199 Ariz. 43, 46, ¶ 13, 13 P.3d 785, 788 (App. 2000) ("Generally, the insured bears the burden to establish coverage under an insuring clause"). ¶ 12 Hanfelder did not attempt to prove his damages, arguing he did not have to do so because he only sought declaratory relief. We need not decide that issue because GEICO Casualty's policy limits tender raises genuine issues of material fact as to whether Hanfelder's damages exceeded the AAA policy limits. We thus conclude the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to GEICO Indemnity and remand for further proceedings. III. Attorney Fees and Taxable Costs on Appeal ¶ 13 Hanfelder requests his attorney fees incurred on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A) (2018). Hanfelder is the successful party on appeal, and his claim clearly arises out of contract. See Assyia v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 229 Ariz. 216, 221, ¶ 13, 273 P.3d 668, 673 (App. 2012). We therefore will award him reasonable attorney fees and taxable costs upon compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21. CONCLUSION ¶ 14 We reverse the judgment, vacate the associated cost award to GEICO Indemnity, and remand for further proceedings.

ECKERSTROM, Chief Judge: ¶ 1 Alleging numerous errors, Wendy Todd appeals from her convictions and sentences for six counts stemming from an incident in which she fired a gun at a home. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. Factual and Procedural History ¶ 2 "We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the convictions." State v. Robles , 213 Ariz. 268, ¶ 2, 141 P.3d 748 (App. 2006). In December 2013, Todd became estranged from her friend, F.O., following a dispute over a "dolly and pickaxe" she had loaned him. In January 2014, F.O. telephoned Todd and asked her to come to his home to talk. During the visit, the two struggled over a gun that Todd had brought with her and, at another point, Todd broke the glass door on F.O.'s microwave by punching it. F.O. asked Todd to leave, and less than one minute after she left, a bullet penetrated his wall, shattering the glass of a picture frame. When deputies reviewed video footage captured by surveillance cameras that F.O. had installed on his property, they saw Todd had fired two shots as she rode by on a motorcycle. ¶ 3 After leaving F.O.'s house, Todd went to the home of another friend, M.O., where deputies found and arrested her. During the arrest, Todd became argumentative, began hitting the partition and window of a patrol vehicle, and spit in a deputy sheriff's face. Upon release after her arrest, Todd admitted to M.O. that she had fired a gun in the air as she drove by F.O.'s house. ¶ 4 Following trial, the jury found Todd guilty of two counts each of knowingly discharging a firearm at a residential structure, intentionally discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle at an occupied structure, and aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced Todd to a combination of consecutive and concurrent prison terms totaling 35.25 years. Todd appealed; we have jurisdiction. See A.R.S. §§ 13-4031, 13-4033(A)(1). Impeachment Evidence ¶ 5 Todd first complains the trial court erred by precluding certain impeachment evidence, arguing the credibility of F.O. and M.O. was central to the case. Specifically, she complains the court should have allowed evidence of M.O.'s "15-year-old conviction," should not have sanitized F.O.'s convictions, and should have allowed evidence of pending and potential charges against both men. We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, State v. Uriarte , 194 Ariz. 275, ¶ 21, 981 P.2d 575 (App. 1998), including the admissibility of prior convictions, State v. Beasley , 205 Ariz. 334, ¶ 19, 70 P.3d 463 (App. 2003). Fifteen-Year-Old Conviction ¶ 6 Todd argues the trial court should have allowed her to impeach M.O.'s testimony with evidence of his then-fifteen-year-old conviction for trafficking methamphetamine. Rule 609(a), Ariz. R. Evid., permits litigants to attack a witness's character for truthfulness with evidence of a criminal conviction. However, "if more than 10 years have passed since the witness's conviction or release from confinement for it, whichever is later," admissibility is more narrowly restricted. Ariz. R. Evid. 609(b). Such evidence is admissible only if its probative value "substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect," admission is "supported by specific facts and circumstances," and the proponent gives the adverse party reasonable written notice. Id. These requirements are "consistent with the notion that a criminal conviction's probative value regarding a witness' credibility declines as it becomes more remote in time." Joseph M. Livermore et al., Arizona Law of Evidence § 609:2, at 359 (4th ed. 2008). Consequently, " Rule 609(b) permits the admission of remote prior convictions 'very rarely and only in exceptional circumstances.' " State v. Green , 200 Ariz. 496, ¶ 20, 29 P.3d 271 (2001), quoting S. Rep. No. 93-1277, at 15. ¶ 7 Here, evidence of M.O.'s fifteen-year-old conviction does not meet the elevated requirements of Rule 609(b). First, the offense was of low probative value because it occurred over ten years before M.O. testified and the record does not contain specific facts or circumstances indicating the probative value of that conviction substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. See Ariz. R. Evid. 609(b)(1) ; Green , 200 Ariz. 496, ¶¶ 8-9, 29 P.3d 271. Also, the record does not indicate Todd served the state with written notice of her intent to impeach M.O. with that conviction as required. ¶ 8 On appeal, Todd maintains the trial court abused its discretion because it did not conduct the balancing required by Rule 609(b) and did not set forth on the record the reasons for its ruling. Although the court did not explicitly balance the probative and prejudicial value of the prior conviction, it is apparent that the court considered the age of the offense and whether it was particularly probative of M.O.'s character for untruthfulness. Given the apparently low probative value of M.O.'s fifteen-year-old conviction and the reasonable risk of wasting time and confusing the issues, we cannot say the court abused its discretion by precluding Todd from this line of inquiry. See Green , 200 Ariz. 496, ¶¶ 7-9, 29 P.3d 271. Sanitized Conviction ¶ 9 Todd next complains the trial court erred in sanitizing F.O.'s prior felony convictions. Whether to sanitize a witness's prior conviction is within a trial court's sound discretion, and "[o]ur case law has consistently approved of sanitization as a means of limiting prejudicial effect." State v. Montano , 204 Ariz. 413, ¶ 66, 65 P.3d 61 (2003). ¶ 10 Relying on the trial court's statements that receiving stolen property is a crime involving moral turpitude-and therefore, apparently one involving dishonesty-Todd insists she should have been allowed to question F.O. about the offense. But even assuming arguendo that a court is barred from sanitizing prior convictions that involve dishonesty, receiving stolen property is not such an offense. See A.R.S. § 13-1802(A)(5) ; State v. Malloy , 131 Ariz. 125, 127, 639 P.2d 315, 317 (1981) ("the phrase 'dishonesty or false statement' should be construed narrowly to include only those crimes involving some element of deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification," and not crimes such as theft or robbery); see also State v. Winegardner , 243 Ariz. 482, ¶ 17, 413 P.3d 683 (2018). Because F.O.'s prior convictions did not involve dishonesty or false statements and because-as Todd acknowledges-F.O.'s prior felony history "was discussed at length at trial," we cannot say the court erred by sanitizing his convictions. See Malloy , 131 Ariz. at 127, 639 P.2d at 317. Pending and Potential Criminal Charges ¶ 11 Todd also argues the trial court erred by precluding her from impeaching F.O. and M.O. with evidence of their pending and potential charges, respectively. She contends such evidence demonstrated each man's motive to fabricate with the hope that the state would show him leniency by cooperating against Todd. See Ariz. R. Evid. 607 ; State v. McElyea , 130 Ariz. 185, 187, 635 P.2d 170, 172 (1981). ¶ 12 As a general matter, criminal defendants are entitled to confront witnesses concerning their potential bias or hope of reward. See McElyea , 130 Ariz. at 187, 635 P.2d at 172. In our system of justice, "[c]ross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested." Davis v. Alaska , 415 U.S. 308, 315-16, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). Although trial courts retain broad discretion to preclude "repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation," the opportunity to impeach or discredit a witness, rather than merely test his perceptions and memory, is fundamental to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. Id. ¶ 13 Accordingly, some cross-examination regarding pending or potential charges should be allowed when circumstances demonstrate a witness's testimony may be influenced by a promise, hope, or expectation of leniency in his own case. State v. Reynolds , 104 Ariz. 149, 150, 449 P.2d 614, 615 (1969), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Harvill , 106 Ariz. 386, 391, 476 P.2d 841, 846 (1970) ; see State v. Little , 87 Ariz. 295, 300-01, 350 P.2d 756 (1960). Consequently, precluding cross-examination that would "clearly show" such a motive "is error and ... ground for a new trial." McElyea , 130 Ariz. at 187, 635 P.2d at 172, quoting State v. Holden , 88 Ariz. 43, 55, 352 P.2d 705 (1960). The test is one of relevance: whether the defendant has "been denied the opportunity of presenting to the trier of fact information which bears ... on the credibility of the witness." Id. , quoting State v. Fleming , 117 Ariz. 122, 125, 571 P.2d 268, 271 (1977). ¶ 14 Here, F.O.'s pending charge was relevant to whether he had a motive to fabricate because the very same agency prosecuting Todd had also brought a charge against him arising from an unrelated incident. This is especially so considering emails in the record between the prosecutor and F.O.'s attorney discussing both whether the state would bring additional charges and whether F.O. intended to plead the Fifth Amendment in response to any questions about his pending charge. Although we do not determine the level of detail to which the jurors should have been privy, at a minimum, they were entitled to know not only that F.O. was facing a charge, but also to hear directly from F.O. whether his testimony was animated by a promise, hope, or expectation of leniency in his own case. See id. Thus, the court erred by entirely precluding Todd from impeaching F.O. with his potential motivations. ¶ 15 However, because reliable evidence corroborating F.O.'s testimony predated his need for leniency, the probative value of those charges was surely minimal, and any error in precluding this line of cross-examination was therefore harmless. See State ex rel. Morrison v. Jay Six Cattle Co. , 88 Ariz. 97, 106, 353 P.2d 185 (1960) (precluding impeachment evidence with "slight probative force" harmless). Although F.O.'s testimony established Todd's charge for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, the record also establishes that F.O.'s statements at trial nearly duplicated statements he made well before charges had been filed against him; that is, before he had any need for leniency. In particular, F.O.'s statements at the time of the incident, captured on the 9-1-1 recordings, predate F.O.'s similar trial testimony that Todd had threatened him with a gun. ¶ 16 F.O. also testified regarding the charges arising from the shots Todd fired at his house. That testimony was corroborated by other evidence presented by the state: the 9-1-1 recordings confirm the fact and moment that shots were fired-less than a minute after Todd left by motorcycle. Furthermore, the video surveillance shows Todd leaving on a motorcycle and a motorcycle returning a minute later before two flashes are seen. Because F.O. had no motivation to fabricate at the time of his original statements to law enforcement, because his trial testimony closely tracked those statements, and because that testimony was strongly corroborated by direct and reliable evidence, no reasonable fact-finder would have doubted the substance of his testimony merely because he had acquired new charges in the interim for which he might have had a hope of leniency. See Jay Six Cattle Co. , 88 Ariz. at 106, 353 P.2d 185. ¶ 17 The state's other civilian witness in the case was M.O., who testified that Todd had acknowledged firing shots from her motorcycle as she passed F.O.'s house. Todd sought to confront M.O. with the possibility that his testimony was motivated by a hope that the state would not file certain charges against him. Indeed, the record establishes that sheriff's deputies had seized a number of firearms from M.O.'s house after it burned down eight months before trial. And, before testifying and outside the presence of the jury, M.O. admitted he was therefore worried about being charged as a prohibited possessor. ¶ 18 Accordingly, Todd argues that because the state could have brought prohibited-possessor charges against M.O., he may have believed he had a "sword of Damocles" hanging over his head, "which could certainly influence his testimony." In view of his admission about being worried, M.O. had a potential motive to fabricate. That M.O. denied that his testimony was influenced by the worry of prosecution does not resolve the issue. Because jurors weigh evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses, see State v. Cid , 181 Ariz. 496, 500, 892 P.2d 216, 220 (App. 1995), they should have had the opportunity to determine for themselves whether M.O.'s fear of being charged motivated him to fabricate. Thus, Todd should have been allowed to cross-examine him before the jury about that concern and whether it was motivating M.O.'s testimony. However, given the circumstances of this case, we determine the error was harmless. See State v. Henderson , 210 Ariz. 561, ¶ 18, 115 P.3d 601 (2005). ¶ 19 Even if we disregard M.O.'s testimony-that Todd had admitted to firing shots in the air as she rode past F.O.'s house-the remaining evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates not only that Todd fired the shots, but that she fired them at F.O.'s home. See State v. Dann , 205 Ariz. 557, ¶ 19, 74 P.3d 231 (2003). In particular, as already mentioned, the video surveillance captured Todd leaving F.O.'s house by motorcycle and, less than a minute later, showed the same, or a very similar, motorcycle driving past the house followed by two flashes-events contemporaneously described in the 9-1-1 recording. Furthermore, the caliber of spent bullets found in the home matched the caliber of the gun deputies seized from Todd's home. Finally, Todd admitted to a deputy after her arrest that she had argued with F.O. at his home. These facts all strongly corroborated M.O.'s testimony that Todd had told him she fired her gun as she rode past F.O.'s house, and the jury could not have reasonably doubted that she had done so. ¶ 20 Furthermore, even without recourse to the improperly precluded line of questioning, the jury was confronted with issues regarding M.O.'s credibility, which further reduced the importance of the precluded impeachment testimony in the context of the overall case. In particular, M.O. frequently offered elusive answers and could not independently recall Todd's statements, despite having repeated them to the prosecutor less than a week before trial. Rather than suggesting he was cooperating in the hope of obtaining favorable treatment, M.O.'s evasive responses indicated otherwise. In view of the unique facts of this case, we can confidently say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict. See Henderson , 210 Ariz. 561, ¶ 18, 115 P.3d 601. Willits Instruction ¶ 21 Todd next complains the trial court should have granted her request for a Willits instruction because the state "[l]ost [r]ecordings" of her interview with a deputy and did not produce DNA or fingerprint evidence from a gun deputies seized. We review the denial of a Willits instruction for an abuse of discretion. State v. Glissendorf , 235 Ariz. 147, ¶ 7, 329 P.3d 1049 (2014). "[W]hen a trial court refuses a jury instruction, we view the evidence on appeal in the light most favorable to the proponent of the instruction." State v. Almeida , 238 Ariz. 77, ¶ 2, 356 P.3d 822 (App. 2015). ¶ 22 "[A] defendant is entitled to an adverse-inference instruction when the state loses or destroys evidence that would have been useful to the defense, even if that destruction is innocent." Glissendorf , 235 Ariz. 147, ¶ 7, 329 P.3d 1049. To receive the instruction, a defendant must prove: "(1) the state failed to preserve material and reasonably accessible evidence that could have had a tendency to exonerate the accused, and (2) there was resulting prejudice." Id. ¶ 8, quoting State v. Smith , 158 Ariz. 222, 227, 762 P.2d 509, 514 (1988). Speculation will not suffice; "there must be a real likelihood that the evidence would have had evidentiary value." Id. ¶ 9. ¶ 23 Here, the deputy did not record his interview with Todd. He did, however, take notes and produce a written report memorializing that interview. Todd insists that, had her statements been captured, they "likely could provide some insight to the jury into her state of mind and her version of the events." But Todd has failed to describe any concrete exculpatory evidence that a recording would have contained and that the deputy's notes did not. Assuming arguendo that failure to record an interview equates with destruction of evidence, Todd has not demonstrated that any lost evidence had a tendency to exonerate her. See State v. Speer , 221 Ariz. 449, ¶¶ 40-41, 212 P.3d 787 (2009). ¶ 24 Similarly, the state's decision not to develop DNA or fingerprint evidence from the gun deputies seized does not constitute a loss or destruction of evidence. See State v. Ramirez , 178 Ariz. 116, 132, 871 P.2d 237, 253 (1994) (state does not have "constitutional duty to perform any particular tests"), quoting Arizona v. Youngblood , 488 U.S. 51, 59, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). Of course, Todd was entitled to examine and test the gun herself, see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1(e)(1)(A), but apparently elected not to do so. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying her request for a Willits instruction on these bases. Sentencing ¶ 25 Finally, Todd complains her sentences constituted "double punishment," arguing the court was required to impose concurrent sentences for each charge of knowingly discharging a firearm at a residential structure with its corresponding charge of intentionally discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle at an occupied structure. See A.R.S. § 13-116 ; State v. Gordon , 161 Ariz. 308, 314-15, 778 P.2d 1204, 1210-11 (1989). "We review de novo a trial court's decision to impose consecutive sentences in accordance with A.R.S. § 13-116." State v. Urquidez , 213 Ariz. 50, ¶ 6, 138 P.3d 1177 (App. 2006). ¶ 26 As the state observes, the trial court did not impose consecutive sentences as Todd suggests, but rather "grouped" convictions for "the first shot" and did the same with "the second shot." Although the sentencing transcript and minute entry are not models of clarity, the court unquestionably intended to impose a combination of consecutive and concurrent sentences totaling 35.25 years. This is consistent with the total length that results from imposing concurrent sentences for counts related to "the first shot," concurrent sentences for "the second shot," and imposing those sentences consecutively both to each other and to the sentences for Todd's aggravated assault convictions. ¶ 27 Todd also insists the trial court did not properly consider her "mental and physical health as mitigating factors that would have made a lower sentence appropriate." "As a general rule, 'sentencing is the responsibility of the trial judge and, absent an abuse of discretion, the sentence will not be altered.' " State v. Fillmore , 187 Ariz. 174, 184, 927 P.2d 1303, 1313 (App. 1996), quoting State v. Mincey , 141 Ariz. 425, 445, 687 P.2d 1180, 1200 (1984). On review, we may find an abuse of discretion when a sentencing decision is arbitrary or capricious, or when the court fails to adequately investigate relevant facts. Id. As the state observes, however, the court imposed minimum or mitigated sentences for six of Todd's convictions and the presumptive sentence on the seventh. Although the court could have shown greater leniency, it was not required to do so, and nothing in the record suggests the court acted arbitrarily or capriciously or failed to investigate any relevant fact. See id. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion. Disposition ¶ 28 For all the above reasons, we affirm Todd's convictions and sentences. Todd also pled no contest to one count of misconduct involving weapons. That count is not at issue in this appeal. In McElyea , our supreme court determined, under the particular facts of that case, that pending charges not yet the subject of a plea agreement lacked relevance to any potential motive the witness there might have had. The court, however, did not create a bright-line rule that pending charges are never relevant in the absence of a plea agreement. See 130 Ariz. at 187, 635 P.2d at 172. Rather, the particular facts of that case suggest the court viewed the pending charge as cumulative to a favorable plea agreement the witness had received in exchange for his testimony that was already in evidence. Id . at 186, 635 P.2d at 171 ; see Ariz. R. Evid. 403 (court may exclude relevant evidence if cumulative). Indeed, whether evidence is relevant necessarily depends on the individual facts of a case. State v. Gonzalez , 229 Ariz. 550, ¶ 1, 278 P.3d 328 (App. 2012). Relying on Rule 608(b), Ariz. R. Evid., the state argues the trial court properly precluded this line of cross-examination because "this evidence went to other acts that did not result in a conviction." Except for certain criminal convictions, Rule 608 prohibits attacking a witness's credibility concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness with extrinsic evidence. But Todd did not seek to impeach F.O.'s character; rather, she sought to impeach him with his possible motives to fabricate. Below, Todd alleged that F.O.'s new charges resulted from either having lied or having committed forgery in an application to the Department of Health Services for a license to grow marijuana. Arguably, this would have involved a false statement within the meaning of Rule 608(b) and, therefore, might have been admissible on that ground. But we have concluded that reference to the new offense was admissible at any rate and, to the extent the underlying nature of those charges would have allowed further questioning as to F.O.'s general honesty, Todd has abandoned this argument on appeal by failing to raise it. See State v. Carver , 160 Ariz. 167, 175, 771 P.2d 1382, 1390 (1989) (claims not argued on appeal are abandoned and waived). Below, Todd more forcefully argued that M.O. had recently fabricated his testimony. She alleged that despite having participated in four earlier interviews, M.O. only first mentioned Todd's inculpatory statements at a fifth interview, six days before trial. Todd also indicated that a deputy had threatened M.O. with a "prison mandatory prohibited possessor charge." But, Todd does not repeat these arguments on appeal; instead, she merely relies on the general impeachment value inherent to the possibility of facing charges. Although such facts, if true, would increase the likelihood that M.O. was motived to fabricate in the state's favor, they ultimately do not change our calculation in view of the overwhelming evidence of Todd's guilt. See Dann , 205 Ariz. 557, ¶ 19, 74 P.3d 231. State v. Willits , 96 Ariz. 184, 393 P.2d 274 (1964). Deoxyribonucleic acid. In her reply brief, Todd claims her sentence violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. This issue was not raised in Todd's opening brief. When an appellant raises a new substantive issue in a reply brief, this court may disregard that issue. State v. Aleman , 210 Ariz. 232, ¶ 9, 109 P.3d 571 (App. 2005).

STARING, Presiding Judge: ¶ 1 This appeal involves the termination of parental rights of Titus S., an out-of-state father, to T.S., his fourteen-year-old daughter and R.S., his thirteen-year-old son. In the unusual circumstances presented here, we conclude the court's best-interests finding was an abuse of discretion and, accordingly, we reverse the termination order. Factual and Procedural Background ¶ 2 In October 2015, T.S. and R.S. were living with their mother, Ariana E., and their stepfather, Donald M., when the Department of Child Safety (DCS) took them into temporary custody based on reports of domestic violence between the couple and allegations that Ariana was a methamphetamine addict. At the time, Titus was living in Nebraska, having left Tucson in 2011 or 2012. He had regularly sent Ariana financial support, as well as gifts for the children, before he suffered a work-related injury in the summer of 2014. ¶ 3 Since that injury, Titus has been unemployed, except for occasional "odd jobs," and his application for disability payments was still pending as of the adjudication hearing. He has seen the children only once since the injury, in the fall of 2014. He said he was aware of Ariana's history of drug abuse "years back," noting that the children had lived with him for six months while Ariana was in a drug rehabilitation program "eight to nine years" before the children's removal in 2015. But he maintained he was unaware of any substance-abuse issues when he left Arizona or when he last saw her and the children in 2014. According to a permanency report, once DCS became involved, "he asked if he could pick up the children now." But he did not have custody orders, and DCS reported a "safety concern[ ]" based on Ariana's statement that Titus used marijuana and Titus's report that he has had two DUI convictions and has a breathalyzer-controlled ignition device installed on his vehicle. The children were adjudicated dependent as to Titus in November 2015, after he admitted the allegations in an amended dependency petition. ¶ 4 In January 2016, DCS reported that Titus had participated in telephone calls with the children and had sent them Christmas gifts but had not responded to the DCS case worker and had not completed a referral, made earlier that month, for an initial drug screen. DCS had nonetheless begun completing an ICPC packet for Titus to seek approval as a placement. In a minute entry following a February dependency review hearing, the juvenile court noted the "attempts to locate a drug testing facility for [Titus]," found Titus "partially compliant" with reunification goals, and found DCS had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family. ¶ 5 Throughout the dependency, DCS reported Titus had "low" or "partial" participation in reunification services. In June 2016, the juvenile court found Titus "in substantial compliance with the case plan," but added, "[T]here is difficulty ascertaining his compliance based on his out of state status." By a September permanency hearing, an ICPC placement for Titus was "tentatively approved" pending a drug test and home preparations, and the children's attorney filed an objection to DCS's request to change the case plan to severance and adoption, stating, "If return to [Ariana] is not possible [T.S. and R.S.] want to be placed with [Titus]." In its minute entry, the court noted that the children were "agreeable with a guardianship" and that DCS had, at the hearing, recommended guardianship as a new case plan goal. The court did not change the case plan but "grant[ed] leave to all parties to file any motion they deem to be appropriate prior to the next hearing," which it scheduled for both initial guardianship and initial severance hearings. The court found Titus's compliance with his DCS case plan was "unclear ... as he lives out-of-state and the Court does not have adequate information." ¶ 6 In January 2017, DCS reported Titus had completed a parenting class but still had not completed baseline drug testing or a psychological evaluation, and DCS had deferred individual counseling services pending the evaluator's recommendation. Noting that no motion for termination or guardianship had yet been filed, the juvenile court granted Ariana's request for mediation, changed the case plan goal "to severance and adoption and permanent guardianship," and ordered DCS to "file a severance motion or a motion for appointment of a permanent guardian or both if no resolution is reached at the mediation." The court further ordered Titus to submit to a baseline hair follicle drug test. ¶ 7 At a status hearing the following month, DCS told the juvenile court that the children were unwilling to consent to an adoption and that, although T.S.'s placement was willing to adopt her, they were unwilling to serve as permanent guardians. Accordingly, DCS asked for additional time to identify an "appropriate" placement before filing a motion for permanent guardianship. Titus told the court he had completed his psychological evaluation and would be submitting to a hair follicle test, and the court scheduled a permanency hearing for May. ¶ 8 Before the May 2017 hearing, DCS reported a hair follicle test Titus completed in March had been positive for THC, and his urine test had shown the presence of Oxazepam, Nordiazepam, and Temazepam. Titus told DCS the THC result was caused by his recreational use of marijuana during a recent trip to Colorado and the other substances were related to prescription medication for his back injury. But, according to DCS, Titus had not responded to repeated requests for documentation of all his prescriptions. Nor had he provided DCS with documentation of his income. ¶ 9 In its report, DCS also confirmed that Titus had completed his psychological evaluation. Although "individual therapy was not a direct requirement" recommended in the "psycho-social assessment," the DCS case worker believed "individual counseling would be necessary to address substance use concerns as well as what DCS perceives to be anger management needs." DCS did not provide a referral for counseling, however, as Titus had announced plans of an imminent move from Nebraska to Missouri, where he would live in his mother's home. This move would require a new ICPC application, which DCS had initiated, as well as identification of services in a new state. ¶ 10 According to DCS, T.S. "did not want to be placed with her father," but also would prefer placement in a guardianship over adoption. And, as of February 2017, R.S. stated he would rather remain in Tucson with his current placement than be placed with Titus, although his first choice continued to be reunification with Ariana. Finally, DCS told the court it had recently required that all further telephone communications between Titus and the children be supervised, as the case worker had become aware of text messages to R.S. discussing the case "in [an] inappropriate context and us[ing] profanity." ¶ 11 At the permanency hearing, the juvenile court granted DCS's motion to change the case plan to severance and adoption, over the objections of both parents and the children. With respect to Titus's compliance with services, the court noted, "[He] is residing out-of-state, and seems to be doing what he can although progress is slow." Later that month, the attorney for the children informed the court of a potential conflict between them, and the court appointed new counsel for T.S. ¶ 12 DCS then filed a motion to terminate Titus's parental rights, alleging, pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2), that he had neglected the children by failing to protect them from Ariana's drug abuse, and also, pursuant to § 8-533(B)(8)(c), that despite "diligent effort[s]" by DCS "to provide appropriate reunification services," he had been unable to remedy the circumstances causing the children to be in an out-of-home placement for more than fifteen months and there was a substantial likelihood he would be unable to parent effectively in the near future. In July, before the termination hearing, T.S. joined R.S. in his non-licensed foster care/kinship placement. R.S. had been placed there since February 2017, and the placement was willing to either adopt both children or serve as their permanent guardians. ¶ 13 At a contested termination hearing in September 2017, the juvenile court granted the termination motion on the time-in-care ground but found neglect had not been proven. As to best interests, the court stated, Best interest is easily satisfied. These children need permanency, they need certainty, they are in an adoptive placement.... I think that severing [Titus]' s rights will help these two kids realize that they now do have permanency. I think it will open them up to the idea of adoption. At least I'm hopeful that it will. After announcing its ruling, the court ordered DCS "to make good faith efforts to figure out a permanent plan for these children, either adoption or guardianship," and it granted "all parties leave to file a guardianship motion if that is appropriate." ¶ 14 This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article VI, § 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and 12-2101(A)(1). Discussion ¶ 15 To terminate parental rights, a juvenile court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, at least one of the statutory grounds enumerated in § 8-533(B) and, by a preponderance of evidence, that termination will serve a child's best interests. See A.R.S. §§ 8-533(B), 8-537(B) ; Kent K. v. Bobby M. , 210 Ariz. 279, ¶ 41, 110 P.3d 1013 (2005). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the court's order. Denise R. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 221 Ariz. 92, ¶ 10, 210 P.3d 1263 (App. 2009). We will reverse a termination order only for an abuse of discretion or clearly erroneous findings of fact, Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 207 Ariz. 43, ¶ 8, 83 P.3d 43 (App. 2004), or upon a determination that, as a matter of law, no reasonable fact-finder could have found the evidence satisfied the applicable burden of proof, Denise R. , 221 Ariz. 92, ¶¶ 9-10, 210 P.3d 1263. Termination Pursuant to § 8-533(B)(8)(c) ¶ 16 In his opening brief, Titus challenged the juvenile court's ruling with respect to this ground, as well as its finding of best interests. At oral argument in this court, however, he conceded that a reversal on the time-in-care ground would require us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O. , 209 Ariz. 332, ¶ 14, 100 P.3d 943 (App. 2004). Accordingly, we will consider the court's ruling on this ground, and the evidence on which it rests, only in the context of the court's determination that severance is in the children's best interests. Best Interests ¶ 17 In In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-500274 , 167 Ariz. 1, 5, 804 P.2d 730, 734 (1990), our supreme court explained the "fundamental constitutional rights involved in severance cases.... can be overridden only by the combined elements of statutorily defined improper behavior by the parent and the child's best interests." In addition, "a determination of the child's best interest must include a finding as to how the child would benefit from a severance or be harmed by the continuation of the relationship." Id. ¶ 18 In that case, a mother had sought termination of a father's rights to the couple's three-and-a-half-year-old son on the ground of abandonment "so she could name her parents in her will as guardians.... [and because,] in case she married, she wanted her future husband to be able to adopt" the child. Id. at 3, 804 P.2d at 732. The court reversed the termination order, concluding these asserted benefits were "too speculative" to support a finding of best interests, as they did not confer "any present benefit" to the child as a result of terminating his parental rights. Id. at 7, 804 P.2d at 736. As examples of "affirmative benefit[s]" in support of termination, the court suggested a "petitioner might prove that there is a current adoptive plan for the child or that the child will be freed from an abusive parent," adding, "This reasoning reflects an unspoken assumption that a parent, even an inadequate one, is better than no parent at all unless the child can somehow benefit from losing his natural parent." Id. at 6, 804 P.2d at 735. Adoptive Placement and Adoptability ¶ 19 "It is well established in state-initiated cases that the child's prospective adoption is a benefit that can support a best-interests finding." Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F. , 239 Ariz. 1, ¶ 16, 365 P.3d 353 (2016). For example, in In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-501904 , the court stated that DCS "need not show that it has a specific adoption plan before terminating a parent's rights," but must "show that the children are adoptable." 180 Ariz. 348, 352, 884 P.2d 234 (App. 1994), citing In re Yavapai Cty. Juv. Action No. J-9956 , 169 Ariz. 178, 818 P.2d 163 (App. 1991)and In re Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-6520, 157 Ariz. 238, 756 P.2d 335 (App. 1988). And, in reliance on that statement, we have said the best-interests requirement may be met by proof "that the child is adoptable." Mary Lou C. , 207 Ariz. 43, ¶ 19, 83 P.3d 43. But, before Demetrius L. , courts had little guidance about what "adoptable" means and, when offered abruptly as the sole basis for a best-interests determination, it may sweep too broadly. See, e.g. , Alma S. v. Dep't of Child Safety , 778 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 24, ¶ 35 (Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2017) (suggesting, in best-interests context, "[a]doptability ... is not on its own sufficient to overcome a parent's constitutional rights"). If "adoptable" merely means that someone, somewhere, would be willing to adopt the child, then all children, given their unique dignity as human beings, and the unbounded capacity of some adults to accept and love any child, may be said to be "adoptable." If theoretical adoptability is sufficient to establish best interests, the inquiry becomes perfunctory. ¶ 20 Maricopa County No. JS-6520 was the first reported Arizona case to use the term "adoptable," but it used it in a negative context, reversing termination of a father's rights to his twelve-year-old son and eleven-year-old daughter who were "at best, questionable candidates for adoption." 157 Ariz. at 244, 246, 756 P.2d at 341, 343 (stating children had "adjusted to long term foster care" and their chances for adoption were "described as 'slim' "). Noting the enacted purpose of time-in-care provisions was to "free children for adoption," the court stated the children were neither "young" nor "adoptable," and it concluded "the provision[s] should [not] be used to allow a court, knowing full well that the child was unadoptable, to sever the parent-child relationship." Id. at 243-44, 756 P.2d at 340-42. ¶ 21 Similarly, in Yavapai County Juvenile Action No. J-9956 , the court did not suggest evidence of adoptability provided a sufficient basis for a best-interests determination. 169 Ariz. at 180, 818 P.2d at 165. Rather, citing Maricopa County No. JS-6520, the court stated, "As a threshold matter," when time-in-care grounds are alleged, "there must be evidence on the record that the children are adoptable" in order to terminate parental rights. Id. (emphasis added). ¶ 22 Thus, while courts have often referred to a child's "adoptability" or her "adoptive placement" in determining best interests, we conclude those findings, to be meaningful, must reflect a finding that adoption is not only possible, but likely. As our supreme court recently stated, "When a current placement meets the child's needs and the child's prospective adoption is otherwise legally possible and likely , a juvenile court may find that termination of parental rights, so as to permit adoption, is in the child's best interests." Demetrius L. , 239 Ariz. 1, ¶ 12, 365 P.3d 353 (emphasis added); see also In re Pima Cty. Juv. Action No. S-2460 , 162 Ariz. 156, 158, 781 P.2d 634, 636 (App. 1989) (noting "[t]he immediate availability of an adoptive placement obviously weighs in favor of severance, while the improbability of adoption, absent other factors, weighs against it"). Here, evidence of the children's persistent opposition to adoption renders it more improbable than likely. ¶ 23 DCS has argued consideration of the children's positions with respect to adoption is not required, because "it is not necessary for all of the prerequisites of an adoption petition to be satisfied at the time of termination." And we appreciate that, although the children's consent would be statutorily required for an adoption, A.R.S. § 8-106(A)(3), it is not statutorily required for termination of their father's parental rights, see § 8-533. We also agree with DCS that the benefit of a prospective adoption, for purposes of a best-interests inquiry, cannot depend on a "guarantee" that the adoption will occur, as prospective parents, as well as children, might have a change of heart. ¶ 24 In this unusual case, the juvenile court's findings in support of its best-interests determination were limited to the children's being "in an adoptive placement" and the court's hope that they will recognize the "permanency" of that home and will no longer withhold their consent to adoption. Our legislature has, however, determined that the consent of T.S. and R.S. is required for an adoption, and they have consistently stated their intent to withhold that consent with respect to any adoption proceeding. Although the court was "hopeful" that they would change their minds, in light of the children's ages and their apparent resolve, we conclude the evidence was insufficient for the court to find their adoption is "legally possible and likely," Demetrius L. , 239 Ariz. 1, ¶ 12, 365 P.3d 353, and was thus insufficient to establish the "present benefit" required to support a determination of best interests, Maricopa Cty. No. JS-500274 , 167 Ariz. at 6-7, 804 P.2d at 735-36. Permanency ¶ 25 At oral argument, DCS suggested this court should assume, for the purpose of argument, that the children continued to prefer guardianship over adoption after Titus's rights were severed. But DCS maintained termination nonetheless benefitted the children by "freeing" them for adoption, and permanency, in the event they change their minds. While Titus argues a permanent guardianship also provides permanency for the children, DCS contends it is "not as permanent" as adoption. According to DCS, were Titus's parental rights not terminated, he could later seek revocation of a guardianship pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-873. ¶ 26 Titus, on the other hand, argues the provisions of § 8-873 are sufficiently protective of the children's best interests to avoid any ill-advised revocation of a permanent guardianship, which appears to be the permanent plan. For example, the statute requires appointment of a guardian ad litem; proof, by clear and convincing evidence, of a "significant change of circumstances" that might relate to the parent's ability, or the guardian's inability, to care for the children; and consideration of the children's position if they are over the age of twelve. § 8-873(A)-(C). In a revocation proceeding, the juvenile court shall also consider "[a]ny other relevant factor," § 8-873(C)(3), which, in this case, might include Titus's testimony that, although he opposed termination, he would defer to the children's wishes and acquiesce in a guardianship. Cf. Hrudka v. Hrudka , 186 Ariz. 84, 92, 919 P.2d 179, 187 (App. 1995) (under doctrine of judicial estoppel, "a party who successfully asserts a particular position in one judicial proceeding will not be allowed to assert an inconsistent position in a subsequent proceeding"), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Myrick v. Maloney , 235 Ariz. 491, ¶ 8, 333 P.3d 818 (App. 2014). ¶ 27 At the termination hearing, Titus testified that he understood the children wanted to stay in Tucson, because "that's what they're familiar with," he "want[s] what's best for them," and he "wouldn't want to just uproot" them, "especially after everything they've been in." He said he would not be opposed to a guardianship, stating, "[I]t seems like that's kind of what the kids want. Doesn't sound like they want to be adopted, but, from what I gathered, that's the direction they're leaning." But Titus opposed severance, stating, I'd like to leave some kind of open area.... So at some point, say, down the road, you know, maybe a year, maybe two or three years from now, they decide, one of them decides they want to come out and stay with me, or something like that, it would be nice for them to have that option. And definitely I want to be able to remain in contact with them. ¶ 28 DCS has not disputed Titus's assertion that the permanent plan for the children is a permanent guardianship, rather than adoption. Rather, it emphasizes that, should the children later choose to be adopted, severance renders them immediately available to adoptive parents. Conversely, Titus argues termination is not presently required because, should the children later decide in favor of adoption, another termination proceeding could be initiated. See § 8-533(A) (any person having a "legitimate interest in the welfare of a child ... may file a petition for the termination" of parental rights). Further, he asserts that, in contrast to the children's position with respect to a permanent plan, which may change, termination of his parental rights, once ordered, is irrevocable. Noting that, like the parent in Maricopa County No. JS-6520 , the only statutory ground found was time-in-care, § 8-533(B)(8)(c), he contends "terminating [his] parental rights as a precursor to guardianship serves only to divest the children of available family resources should there be a significant change in their circumstances." ¶ 29 To a large extent, the assertions of both parties are correct. As DCS contends, termination frees the children to subsequently change their minds about adoption without impediment. But there is no question it also permanently severs their relationship to their biological father. "Severance of these rights is a permanent deprivation, not only on the right to custody but to all contact." In re Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-6831 , 155 Ariz. 556, 559, 748 P.2d 785, 788 (App. 1988). We have said that "[t]he combined effect of the fundamental character of a parent's right to his child and the severity and permanence of termination dictates that the court sever the parent-child relationship only in the most extraordinary circumstances, when all other efforts to preserve the relationship have failed." Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 193 Ariz. 185, ¶ 32, 971 P.2d 1046 (App. 1999), quoting In re Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JA 33794 , 171 Ariz. 90, 91-92, 828 P.2d 1231, 1232-33. In these circumstances, where there is no evidentiary basis to suggest adoption is likely, we conclude the severe and permanent consequence of termination is unwarranted. No Other Benefit or Detriment Found ¶ 30 In concluding the juvenile court's termination order must be reversed, we again emphasize that we are influenced by the specific circumstances in this case, including the court's reliance on prospective adoption alone, without any finding of an additional benefit from severance or a detriment to the children from continuation of the relationship. Moreover, at oral argument, DCS conceded there was no "direct evidence" of such a detriment, and we agree with Titus that the case worker's somewhat general description of Titus's "concerning behaviors" is insufficient to support such a finding. Cf. Alma S. , 778 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 24, ¶¶ 19-20 (case worker's testimony lacked expert witness foundation; found "not sufficient to defeat fundamental constitutional rights"). ¶ 31 Quoting Maricopa County No. JS-6831 , 155 Ariz. at 559, 748 P.2d at 788, DCS asserts, " 'In most cases, the presence of a statutory ground [for termination] will have a negative effect on the children,' and thus will warrant a finding that preserving the parent-child relationship would be detrimental." However, in Maricopa County No. JS-500274 , our supreme court rejected the suggestion that "the mere fact of abandonment could be considered sufficient to prove unfitness"; it instead concluded a separate "finding of best interest is always necessary," based on evidence "as to how or why it would be in [a child's] best interests to lose his father." 167 Ariz. at 5, 7, 804 P.2d at 734-36. We appreciate that the same evidence that proves a statutory ground may sometimes provide a basis for a best-interests finding, such as evidence that, as a result of termination, "the child will be freed from an abusive parent." Id. at 6, 804 P.2d at 735. But, as this court recognized in Maricopa County No. JS-6831 , "in some cases, this will not be true." 155 Ariz. at 559, 748 P.2d at 788. ¶ 32 To the extent Maricopa County No. JS-6831 involved similar facts, we find it instructive. In that case, a mother who lived in Illinois was found to have abandoned her two daughters, ages twelve and nine, who had been living with the twelve-year-old's father and his wife for over three years. 155 Ariz. at 557, 559, 748 P.2d at 786, 788. After awarding custody to the Arizona couple, the lower court found the ground of abandonment had been established, but it declined to find termination would be in the girls' best interests and, on that basis, denied severance. Id. at 557, 748 P.2d at 786. ¶ 33 This court affirmed, noting that, although evidence had been presented that the mother "had only limited and sporadic contact" with her daughters, "there was also evidence that there were extenuating circumstances which prevented [her] from retrieving her children." Id. at 559, 748 P.2d at 788. The court emphasized that the party seeking termination bears the burden of establishing best interests. Id. Considering a doctor's expert testimony that the girls would suffer "stress" if separated, the court concluded "[t]he 'stress' hypothesized by [the doctor] ... was not attributed to continuing contact with [the mother] but rather to the prospective relocation of [the younger daughter] to Illinois to live with her mother." Id. The court noted evidence that the children "had built a strong social and familial network in Arizona," but it wrote, "from the finding that the girls should live together and in Arizona ... it does not necessarily follow that the rights of [their mother] should be terminated." Id. ¶ 34 Similarly, here, the juvenile court did not find any detriment from the children continuing their long-distance relationship with Titus, and there appears to be no "present benefit" to terminating his parental rights "just in case " the children change their minds about adoption, Maricopa Cty. No. JS-500274 , 167 Ariz. at 7, 804 P.2d at 736, when the permanent plan for them is a permanent guardianship. This record does not support a finding that the children's prospect for adoption is "otherwise legally possible and likely," Demetrius L. , 239 Ariz. 1, ¶ 12, 365 P.3d 353, and the court's finding, contingent on its "hope[ ]" that the children will change their positions, is a "mere speculative potential benefit that might or might not materialize sometime in the future." Maricopa Cty. No. JS-500274 , 167 Ariz. at 7, 804 P.2d at 736. The finding is therefore insufficient to support the court's determination of best interests. See id. Disposition ¶ 35 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the juvenile court's order terminating Titus's parental rights. According to Titus, he "ruptured a disk in [his] back, in the L-4 vertebra[ ]. And then the L-3 above and the L-5 below are both bulging, due to the injury [he] sustained." Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children. See A.R.S. § 8-548. Section 8-106(A)(3), A.R.S., provides that a court "shall not grant an adoption of a child unless consent to adopt has been obtained and filed with the court from.... [a] child who is twelve years of age or older and who gives consent in open court." Tetrahydrocannabinol. The psychological evaluation report was not admitted as evidence and is not part of the juvenile court record. The children are placed with the parents of one of R.S.'s friends. The supreme court assumed the court's finding of the statutory ground of abandonment was reasonably supported by the record, as that determination was not challenged on review. Maricopa Cty. No. JS-500274 , 167 Ariz. at 4, 804 P.2d at 733. The enacting legislation provides, "The purpose of this act is to expedite the adoption of numerous children who remain in temporary foster care ... with no hope of being returned to their natural parents and, in so doing, promote a stable and long-term family environment for these children." 1986 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 205, § 1. The parties have not cited any authority defining "permanency." We note, however, that a juvenile court is required, at a "permanency hearing," to determine "[w]hether termination of parental rights, adoption, permanent guardianship pursuant to § 8-872 or some other permanent legal status is the most appropriate plan for the child." A.R.S. § 8-862(B)(1). Thus, both adoption and permanent guardianship appear to provide a "permanent legal status." Id. ; see also Jennifer B. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 189 Ariz. 553, 555-56, 944 P.2d 68, 70-71 (App. 1997) (legislative history of permanent guardianship statute indicates purpose "to provide 'permanency in the custodial relationship' of 'older children who are not suitable candidates for adoption' "), quoting H. Judiciary Comm. Minutes for H.B. 2062, 41st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., at 2 (Ariz. Feb. 3, 1994). Despite the juvenile court's repeated invitations to the parties to file a motion for permanent guardianship, it never ordered that one be filed, and none was pending at the time of termination. Ordinarily, we would not consider alternative permanency resolutions that were not before the court. Cf. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Stanford , 234 Ariz. 477, ¶¶ 10-13, 323 P.3d 760 (App. 2014) (juvenile court lacked authority to move sua sponte to establish permanent guardianship). We nonetheless conclude that potential resolution by guardianship is appropriately considered here because we agree with Titus that, at the time of severance, the permanency plan for the children appears to have been a permanent guardianship rather than adoption. See A.R.S. § 8-871(A) (court may establish permanent guardianship of dependent child in DCS custody if in the child's best interests, further reunification efforts would be unproductive, and "[t]he likelihood that the child would be adopted is remote or termination of parental rights would not be in the child's best interests"). Under Arizona's guardianship provisions, Titus's rights and responsibilities in a permanent guardianship would be limited to those set forth in the guardianship decree. A.R.S. § 8-871(D).

Justice Gould voted to grant review.

JONES, Judge: ¶ 1 Susan Jacobson appeals her conviction and sentence for first-degree murder. Jacobson argues the trial court erred when it precluded two experts from testifying she suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and a "cold" expert from testifying about the general hormonal effects of pregnancy. We hold the PTSD diagnoses and "cold" expert testimony were properly excluded and affirm the trial court's decisions. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 2 Late in the night of February 25, 2015, Jacobson fatally shot her live-in boyfriend, Marvin J., in the head while he was lying in bed. Jacobson then tried to clean up the scene, wrapped Marvin's body in a tarp, and moved it to a nearby window. Jacobson disposed of the bloody bed sheets and buried the gun before reporting the shooting to the police two days later. At the time, Jacobson was nine months' pregnant with Marvin's child. ¶ 3 When a deputy sheriff later interviewed Jacobson, she claimed she killed Marvin in self-defense. Jacobson said Marvin had been angry with her for a few days and, on the night of the shooting, he woke her up by kicking her in the stomach. Jacobson said Marvin yelled he was "sick of [her]," and did not want the baby. Jacobson said she left the bed, grabbed the gun, and shot Marvin believing "whoever [got] to the gun first [was] going to be saved." Jacobson said Marvin had kicked her in the stomach during her prior pregnancy as well. ¶ 4 The State charged Jacobson with one count of first-degree murder and three counts of tampering with physical evidence. A few days after her arrest, Jacobson gave birth to her second child. The children were then taken into State custody and the State sought to sever her parental rights. A psychiatrist, Dr. Chris Linskey, and a psychologist, Dr. Patricia Rose, evaluated Jacobson for purposes of the severance hearing and diagnosed her with PTSD. Both doctors then testified at the severance hearing and made clear that their opinions, consistent with the severance proceedings, related solely to Jacobson's ability to parent the two children. Throughout that process, and upon advice of counsel, Jacobson did not answer questions related to the shooting, and the doctors said they intentionally avoided discussing the events surrounding the shooting when evaluating Jacobson. ¶ 5 Before trial, the court granted the State's motion to preclude testimony about Jacobson's PTSD diagnoses. The trial court also granted the State's motion to preclude testimony about the general hormonal effects associated with third-trimester pregnancies that Jacobson sought to introduce through a "cold" expert. Jacobson was subsequently convicted on all counts, and sentenced to life in prison. Jacobson timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A). DISCUSSION I. PTSD Diagnoses ¶ 6 Jacobson argues the trial court erred when it precluded testimony regarding her post-arrest PTSD diagnoses. At issue is: (1) whether the PTSD diagnoses were admissible to show past acts of domestic abuse, and (2) whether the PTSD diagnoses may be used to address the mens rea element of first-degree murder. We review a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of expert opinions for an abuse of discretion. State v. Chappell , 225 Ariz. 229, 235, ¶ 16, 236 P.3d 1176, 1182 (2010) (citing State v. Chapple , 135 Ariz. 281, 297, 660 P.2d 1208, 1224 (1983) ). We review constitutional and legal issues de novo . State v. Ellison , 213 Ariz. 116, 129, ¶ 42, 140 P.3d 899, 912 (2006) (citing Lilly v. Virginia , 527 U.S. 116, 137, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999) ). ¶ 7 As a preliminary matter, Jacobson argued before the trial court that State v. Vogel , 207 Ariz. 280, 85 P.3d 497 (App. 2004), supports admission of the PTSD diagnoses, and on appeal again directs the Court's attention to the factual recitation in Vogel . There, a psychiatrist diagnosed a defendant with PTSD and testified he believed the defendant was a victim of domestic violence. Id. at 282, ¶ 15, 85 P.3d at 499. However, the propriety of the admission of the PTSD diagnosis was never questioned or addressed by the Court of Appeals. Thus, Vogel does not support the introduction of a PTSD diagnosis as proof of prior acts of domestic violence. A. Inadmissibility of PTSD Diagnoses as Proof of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence ¶ 8 Typically, juries consider a self-defense claim from the perspective of a reasonable person, see A.R.S. §§ 13-404(A), -405(A), but by statute, a self-defense claim by a victim of domestic violence is considered from the modified perspective of "a reasonable person who has been a victim of those past acts of domestic violence," A.R.S. § 13-415. To apply this modified reasonable person standard, the jury must first determine whether the victim perpetrated past acts of domestic violence against the defendant, and, if so, then determine whether a reasonable person who had been subjected to those past acts of domestic violence would have used physical force in self-defense. ¶ 9 Toward that end, a defendant may present evidence of the victim's past acts of domestic violence against the defendant to illustrate the application of A.R.S. § 13-415. She may also introduce a "cold" expert to explain the general characteristics and behavioral traits of people who have been abused in such a manner to assist the jury in understanding the modified standard. ¶ 10 Here, we consider whether a PTSD diagnosis may be used to prove that past acts of domestic violence occurred, such that the modified standard in A.R.S. § 13-415 would apply. Although no Arizona court has directly addressed this issue, another panel of this Court recently addressed the admissibility of a PTSD diagnosis in State v. Richter , 243 Ariz. 131, 402 P.3d 1016 (App. 2017). There, the defendant sought to introduce expert testimony that she suffered from PTSD to support her claim she kidnapped and abused her children while under duress. Id. at 134-35, ¶¶ 7-8, 402 P.3d at 1019-20. The trial court precluded the PTSD testimony, evidence of prior acts of domestic violence, and the duress defense. Id. at ¶¶ 6, 9-10, 402 P.3d at 1019-20. The defendant was subsequently convicted. Id. at 134, ¶ 5, 402 P.3d at 1019. On appeal, the Richter court vacated the conviction, holding the PTSD testimony was not inadmissible diminished-capacity evidence, but was, instead, admissible in support of a duress defense. Id. at 140, ¶ 32, 402 P.3d at 1025. ¶ 11 Richter does not elaborate under which circumstances a PTSD diagnosis might be admissible in support of a justification defense. See id. at 137, ¶ 19, 402 P.3d at 1022 ("Thus, even assuming some of [the PTSD] testimony could have been construed as diminished-capacity evidence, which would be inadmissible ... it was nevertheless admissible to show that she committed the charged offenses under duress.") (citing State v. Mott , 187 Ariz. 536, 541, 931 P.2d 1046, 1051 (1997) ; A.R.S. § 13-412(A) ; and Ariz. R. Evid. 401 ). We do not interpret Richter to mean that a PTSD diagnosis is always admissible as part of a justification defense. ¶ 12 A PTSD diagnosis is not admissible to support a justification defense where it is not relevant, sufficiently probative, or a proper use of expert testimony. See Ariz. R. Evid. 402 (providing for the admission of relevant evidence unless prohibited by constitution, statute, or rule), 403 (permitting the exclusion of relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury"), 702 (permitting experts to testify if it "will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue"). It has been long established that expert witnesses may not testify as to the credibility of another witness or defendant. See State v. Lindsey , 149 Ariz. 472, 475, 720 P.2d 73, 76 (1986) ("[W]e explicitly state at this time that trial courts should not admit direct expert testimony that quantifies the probabilities of the credibility of another witness.") (citing State v. Buell , 22 Ohio St.3d 124, 489 N.E.2d 795, 804 (1986) ); State v. Moran , 151 Ariz. 378, 385-86, 728 P.2d 248, 255-56 (1986) (collecting cases). In this case, the PTSD diagnoses only served to vouch for Jacobson's credibility and should thus be excluded. ¶ 13 As previously addressed, Drs. Rose and Linskey evaluated Jacobson solely for issues attendant to a severance case initiated following her arrest. Dr. Rose's evaluation of Jacobson was conducted over two days and was based primarily upon Jacobson's own statements that she was a victim of domestic violence. Parts of Dr. Rose's evaluation were self-administered, meaning Jacobson sat alone to answer the questions and had significant time to contemplate her answers before returning the questionnaire to Dr. Rose. Dr. Rose did not consider any physical evidence or third-party statements regarding Jacobson's otherwise unsubstantiated claims of having suffered domestic abuse. Based upon this information, Dr. Rose concluded in her report: [Jacobson] experiences PTSD, panic disorder, and an unspecified depressive disorder. Additionally, she has been the victim of psychological and physical spousal abuse, and has been exposed to extreme marital distress. ¶ 14 Dr. Linskey's evaluation lasted approximately an hour and a half, and his determinations were based solely upon Jacobson's own statements to him and the information contained within Dr. Rose's report. Limited to the identical information obtained and evaluated by Dr. Rose, Dr. Linskey diagnosed Jacobson with PTSD. As the State notes, both doctors took Jacobson at her word when she alleged to have been subjected to abuse from Marvin. At the severance hearing, Dr. Linskey testified Jacobson "seemed to be honest in her answers" and seemed "sincere." Dr. Rose testified Jacobson was "cooperative," took the evaluation "seriously," was "forthcoming," and "wanted to answer the questions accurately." ¶ 15 No Arizona case law discusses the admissibility of a diagnosis based solely upon a defendant's statements. However, we find the analysis in State v. Lupoli , 348 Or. 346, 234 P.3d 117 (2010), to be highly persuasive. In Lupoli , the state sought to introduce an expert's diagnosis that a child was the victim of sexual abuse. Id. at 123-24. The expert reviewed no physical evidence and relied solely upon the child's statements to the expert. Id. at 124-25. The Oregon Supreme Court held the diagnosis inadmissible because it was solely based upon the expert's "assessment of the child's believability." Id. at 125. The court recognized that portions of the expert's testimony may have been admissible, but because those portions were "inextricably bound up with portions that constituted clear 'vouching,' " the entire diagnosis was inadmissible. Id. ¶ 16 In this case, both doctors based their PTSD diagnoses solely upon Jacobson's post-arrest statements. The doctors did not consider any physical evidence of, or conflicting evidence regarding, abuse by the victim; nor did they interview any other witnesses. Accordingly, we find the PTSD diagnoses in this case inherently vouch for Jacobson's credibility. As such, their admission would allow expert testimony to usurp the jury's role as factfinder. Jacobson's PTSD diagnoses are therefore inadmissible as evidence of past acts of domestic abuse having been perpetrated against Jacobson by Marvin. ¶ 17 Not only did the doctors rely solely upon Jacobson's statements, but Jacobson omitted key information in providing those statements relevant to the eventual PTSD diagnoses. An expert's testimony is not admissible if the testimony is based upon insufficient facts or data. See Ariz. R. Evid. 702(b). During interviews with detectives, Jacobson reported having been sexually assaulted by her mother's boyfriend. When Jacobson reported the assaults to her mother, her mother did not believe her. Jacobson did not disclose anything having to do with this information to Drs. Rose and Linskey throughout the course of their evaluations, even when specifically asked to disclose any prior traumatic events. Thereafter, at the pretrial hearing, the State asked Dr. Linskey whether a PTSD diagnosis was necessarily associated with abuse stemming from a single relationship. Dr. Linskey, testified that unresolved prior traumatic events, such as sexual assault , could also cause PTSD. Given Dr. Linskey's testimony, and Jacobson's significant omission of clearly relevant traumatic history during the doctors' evaluations, the PTSD diagnoses were based upon insufficient facts or data to specifically attribute any PTSD Jacobson might suffer to the asserted abuse from Marvin. Accordingly, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it precluded the PTSD diagnoses. B. Inadmissibility of PTSD Diagnoses as Evidence of a Character Trait ¶ 18 Jacobson argues that even if the diagnoses were not admissible to prove prior acts of domestic violence, they were still admissible to illustrate she did not premeditate killing Marvin because the chronic anxiety and hypervigilance "inherent in [her] PTSD diagnosis" show a character trait for impulsivity. See State v. Buot , 232 Ariz. 432, 434, ¶ 9, 306 P.3d 89, 91 (App. 2013) (explaining "a character trait of impulsivity" may cause a defendant "to act reflexively rather than upon reflection"). Although a defendant cannot present diminished-capacity evidence to negate the mens rea element of the offense, see Mott , 187 Ariz. at 541, 931 P.2d at 1051, a defendant may present "observational evidence" about the defendant's "tendency to think in a certain way and his behavior characteristics," Clark v. Arizona , 548 U.S. 735, 757, 760, 126 S.Ct. 2709, 165 L.Ed.2d 842 (2006) (interpreting Mott ); see also State v. Christensen , 129 Ariz. 32, 35, 628 P.2d 580, 583 (1981) (concluding expert testimony that a defendant possessed a character trait for impulsivity would assist the jury in determining whether the defendant acted with premeditation). However, "a tendency to act impulsively in no way precludes a finding of legal premeditation." State v. Wood , 180 Ariz. 53, 64, 881 P.2d 1158, 1169 (1994). ¶ 19 Contrary to her own proffered evidence, Jacobson equates chronic anxiety and hypervigilance with a character trait for impulsivity. But, as Dr. Rose testified in the pretrial hearing, persons who are "hypervigilant about perceived dangers" as a result of PTSD "don't generally act out." Instead, "they're more likely to withdraw to protect themselves." Additionally, Jacobson's "cold" expert, Dr. Geffner, testified regarding the dynamics of domestic violence and general character traits of people who suffer from PTSD. Nothing in Dr. Geffner's testimony indicates victims of domestic abuse are generally impulsive, further suggesting the PTSD diagnoses were not admissible to show impulsiveness. In the absence of any testimonial support for the notion that a person with domestic violence-induced PTSD generally exhibits impulsivity, the PTSD diagnoses may have simply left jurors to believe Jacobson was suffering from diminished capacity and therefore was not capable of knowingly or intentionally committing the murder. See Clark , 548 U.S. at 775, 126 S.Ct. 2709 (noting that a mental health diagnosis may mislead jurors by suggesting that "a defendant suffering from a recognized mental disease lacks cognitive, moral, volitional, or other capacity, when that may not be a sound conclusion at all"); see also Ariz. R. Evid. 403 (permitting the exclusion of evidence whose "probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... confusing the issues"). ¶ 20 The Richter decision characterized PTSD testimony, including what appears to be a diagnosis, as "observational evidence" of a character trait, which is not precluded by Mott . See Richter , 243 Ariz. at 137, ¶ 20, 402 P.3d at 1022. We respectfully disagree. A PTSD diagnosis and testimony regarding an expert's observations of a person's character traits are not interchangeable. We hold that a PTSD diagnosis is "opinion testimony going to mental defect ... and its effect on the cognitive or moral capacities on which sanity depends," which, "under the Arizona rule, is restricted." Clark , 548 U.S. at 760, 126 S.Ct. 2709 ; see also Mott, 187 Ariz. at 544, 931 P.2d at 1054. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the rejection of this evidence. II. Pregnancy Testimony ¶ 21 Jacobson argues the trial court erred when it precluded Dr. Hibbert's "cold" expert testimony regarding the effect of increased cortisol levels in the late stages of pregnancy. The State contends Dr. Hibbert's testimony was merely an additional attempt to introduce inadmissible diminished-capacity evidence. In its ruling, the court stated: I do believe this would be improper expert testimony regarding the issues of hormonal changes when given that the defendant was about to give birth. ... Dr. Hibbert testified that there are hormonal changes during pregnancy that can affect cognition. And when she was asked to explain what she meant by that, that she said it could affect planning, thinking, mental state, judgment, insight, perception and memory. The Court believes that this ... would be improper evidence of potential diminished capacity. We agree with the trial court's assessment; the proposed testimony amounted to diminished-capacity evidence. Dr. Hibbert's remarks about cognition illustrate that the only purpose of introducing the testimony was to suggest to the jury that Jacobson acted with cortisol-driven diminished capacity at the time of the murder, prohibited by Mott. See supra ¶ 18. ¶ 22 Not only was the "cold" expert testimony inadmissible as diminished-capacity evidence, it was also not relevant to the self-defense claim. Self-defense claims, other than those arising under A.R.S. § 13-415, are evaluated on a "reasonable person" standard. See State v. Oaks , 209 Ariz. 432, 434, ¶ 9, 104 P.3d 163, 165 (App. 2005) ("By its very nature, the term ['reasonable person'] connotes an objective standard of conduct, not a subjective standard," which "does not take into account the individual characteristics of the accused.") (citing State v. Serrano , 145 Ariz. 498, 501, 702 P.2d 1343, 1346 (App. 1985), and then State v. Tuzon , 118 Ariz. 205, 209, 575 P.2d 1231, 1235 (1978) ). Jacobson's pregnancy is not relevant to either the reasonable person standard, or the reasonable victim of domestic violence, but instead is an individual characteristic entitled to no special consideration. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it precluded Dr. Hibbert's testimony. III. Due Process ¶ 23 Finally, Jacobson argues that by precluding the PTSD diagnoses, the trial court "left [her] with no vehicle to bolster her abuse claims," and thereby deprived her of a complete defense. It needs first be noted that it is not within the purview of the court to allow otherwise inadmissible evidence to "bolster" a defense. Further, the doctors, evaluating Jacobson solely for issues attendant to a severance proceeding, admitted having premised their diagnoses solely upon Jacobson's statements. Because Jacobson failed to provide essential, requested information to the doctors, she left them in the position of only being able to assess the incomplete history she provided, and such testimony would impermissibly vouch for Jacobson's credibility. See supra ¶¶ 16-17. Moreover, beyond anything the doctors were competent to contribute, Jacobson had sufficient opportunity to present further evidence of Marvin's past acts of domestic abuse. Jacobson presented testimony from her obstetrician and her family physician, who both testified Jacobson had reported physical abuse from Marvin before the shooting. Jacobson called both of Marvin's ex-wives, who testified he was emotionally abusive during their respective relationships with him. Finally, Jacobson called Dr. Geffner, to testify regarding the general attributes of domestic violence victims. Indeed, within her reply brief, Jacobson admits that she presented evidence to the jury that she was a victim of domestic abuse and that Marvin was the perpetrator of the abuse. ¶ 24 Jacobson had sufficient opportunity to prove Marvin committed acts of domestic violence against her, and the trial court gave the jury a detailed instruction related to the "reasonable victim of domestic violence" standard, including a list of what constituted past acts of domestic violence. Accordingly, we find no violation of Jacobson's due process rights to a complete defense. CONCLUSION ¶ 25 Jacobson's conviction and sentence for first-degree murder are affirmed. "We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury's verdict." State v. Randles , 235 Ariz. 547, 548 n.1, ¶ 1, 334 P.3d 730, 731 (App. 2014) (citing State v. Vandever , 211 Ariz. 206, 207 n.2, ¶ 1, 119 P.3d 473, 474 (App. 2005) ). Jacobson later told a detective there was no struggle for the gun and even admitted Marvin's head was "on the pillow" after she fired the gun. At trial, the State presented evidence showing the gun was fired from only four inches away. "Cold" expert testimony "educates the trier of fact about general principles but is not tied to the particular facts of the case." State v. Salazar-Mercado , 234 Ariz. 590, 595, ¶ 21, 325 P.3d 996, 1001 (2014) (noting that "expert testimony about general behavior patterns of child sexual abuse victims may help the jury to understand the evidence," including "possible reasons" for the victims' unusual behavior) (citations omitted). Jacobson only appeals her conviction and sentence for first-degree murder and therefore waives any claim of error as to her convictions and sentences for tampering with physical evidence. Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite a statute's current version. The modified reasonable person standard in A.R.S. § 13-415 is only available for claims of self-defense or defense of third persons. See A.R.S. § 13-415 (limiting standard to defenses arising under A.R.S. §§ 13-404, -405, and -406). Moreover, the modified reasonable person standard does not replace the objective perspective with a subjective perspective. See Vogel , 207 Ariz. at 285 n.4, ¶ 28, 85 P.3d at 502. Although the Richter court consistently refers to the expert's testimony in more general terms as "PTSD testimony," the defendant there expected the expert to testify "that she suffers from ... PTSD ... based on 'the many months, if not years, of abuse she suffered at the hands of [her husband].' " See Richter , 243 Ariz. at 134, ¶ 8, 402 P.3d at 1019-20. Although the trial court permitted Jacobson to call Drs. Rose and Linskey to testify regarding her general character traits at trial, she chose not to do so, and thus forfeited an opportunity to introduce the testimony she now argues was relevant to show she did not premeditate the killing.

SWANN, Judge: ¶ 1 Alma S. ("Mother") appeals from the severance of her parental rights to I.R. and J.R. We conclude that the record supporting the court's best-interests determination is insubstantial. We therefore vacate the severance order and remand for further proceedings. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 2 I.R. is the biological child of Mother and Esdras R. ("Father"), and J.R. is Mother's biological child from a previous relationship. ¶ 3 It is undisputed that Mother was away at work and I.R. was in Father's care on May 7, 2015. That day, Father sent Mother a Facebook message that I.R. had scratched his face while rolling around. That night, after Mother discovered the severity of I.R.'s injuries, Mother and Father argued because Father would not allow Mother to take I.R. to the hospital. Father then left the house for a few hours, but Mother failed to take I.R. to the hospital while he was away. The next morning, Mother asked her sister and cousin to take I.R. to the hospital while she was at work. Her sister asked Father if she could take I.R. to Chuck E. Cheese. Father agreed. Mother's sister and cousin then took I.R. to the hospital. ¶ 4 Hospital staff determined that I.R. had a healing rib fracture, a right-tibia fracture, a possible left-femur fracture (ultimately ruled out), and multiple bruises. The staff also observed bruises on J.R. They contacted the Department of Child Safety (the "Department") because they suspected abuse. Police found that though Father had a criminal history, there were no police or criminal records involving Mother. ¶ 5 The Department provided services to Mother and Father, and in early 2016 the parenting plan changed from reunification to severance and adoption. Mother complied with or successfully completed all services provided by the Department throughout this case, but in June 2016, Mother and Father were providing conflicting information about whether they were still dating. In July 2016-fourteen months after I.R.'s hospital admission-Mother completed a psychological evaluation, which diagnosed her with multiple drug dependency and personality disorders and concluded her prospects to successfully parent the children were "poor at best" and would continue to be so for "a prolonged and indeterminate period of time." Ordinarily, we would afford great deference to the juvenile court's review of such an evaluation. But the record here reveals that the evaluation was untethered to the evidence. ¶ 6 In November 2016, the court held a two-day evidentiary hearing concerning severance of Mother's and Father's parental rights. Father did not appear and communicated through counsel that he did not contest the severance. The court severed Father's rights to I.R. and E.C. (a child from his previous relationship) in absentia and heard testimony on severing Mother's rights. Father's severance is not at issue in this appeal. ¶ 7 During her testimony, Mother asserted her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent in response to questions related to her failure to bring I.R. to the hospital immediately, awareness of I.R.'s injuries, and Father's history of domestic violence. From her silence, the juvenile court drew negative inferences that she was aware Father caused I.R.'s injuries but did not report them and that she was aware of Father's domestic-violence history. The Department introduced the psychological evaluation and had the evaluator testify. The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence that Mother knew or reasonably should have known that Father abused I.R. and that she failed to protect I.R. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2) ; Linda V. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 211 Ariz. 76, 79, ¶ 14, 117 P.3d 795, 798 (App. 2005) (holding that it is not necessary that the child be abused only that a child be abused). The court also found that severance was in the children's best interests and severed her rights. Mother appeals, challenging only the best-interests finding. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶ 8 We review severance orders for abuse of discretion, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the juvenile court's findings. Xavier R. v. Joseph R. , 230 Ariz. 96, 99-100, ¶¶ 9, 11, 280 P.3d 640, 643-44 (App. 2012). "We will not disturb the juvenile court's order severing parental rights unless its factual findings are clearly erroneous, that is, unless there is no reasonable evidence to support them." Audra T. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 194 Ariz. 376, 377, ¶ 2, 982 P.2d 1290, 1291 (App. 1998). We review questions of law de novo and are not bound by findings that combine both facts and law. Wilmot v. Wilmot , 203 Ariz. 565, 568, ¶ 10, 58 P.3d 507 (2002). ¶ 9 We will not reweigh evidence, because the juvenile court is best positioned to "observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts." Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 223 Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18, 219 P.3d 296, 303 (App. 2009). But our review for "abuse of discretion" does not mean we look for culpable "abuse" by the court or imply that trial courts have an equal level of discretion in all situations. City of Phoenix v. Geyler , 144 Ariz. 323, 329, 697 P.2d 1073, 1079 (1985). "Abuse" of discretion occurs when a trial court's ruling is "clearly untenable, legally incorrect, or amount[s] to a denial of justice." Id. (citation omitted). When the court's decision is based on a faulty application of law or factual findings not logically supported by the evidence, we may afford a remedy on appeal under the abuse of discretion standard. Id. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT A BEST INTERESTS FINDING WITH REGARD TO MOTHER ¶ 10 The purpose of the state's initial involvement is not to sever parents' constitutionally protected rights to the care, custody, and association with their children, but to ensure that children are healthy and safe and to rectify the circumstances that led to the need for intervention. See Stanley v. Illinois , 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) ; A.R.S. §§ 8-451, -457; Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 207 Ariz. 43, 49, ¶ 15, 83 P.3d 43, 49 (App. 2004) ; Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 193 Ariz. 185, 192, ¶¶ 32-34, 971 P.2d 1046, 1053 (App. 1999). "The combined effect of the fundamental character of a parent's right to his [or her] child and the severity and permanence of termination dictates that the court sever the parent-child relationship only in the most extraordinary circumstances" and "only when concerted effort to preserve the relationship fails" or would be futile. Mary Ellen C. , 193 Ariz. at 192, ¶¶ 32, 34, 971 P.2d at 1053 (emphases added). ¶ 11 Parents must be given a fundamentally fair opportunity to rectify parenting problems before their parental rights may be terminated. See Mary Lou C. , 207 Ariz. at 49, ¶ 1 83 P.3d at 49 ; Mary Ellen C. , 193 Ariz. at 192, ¶¶ 32-34, 971 P.2d at 1053. Indeed, "[t]he extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss.' " Goldberg v. Kelly , 397 U.S. 254, 262-63, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) (citation omitted). As the United States Supreme Court held in Santosky v. Kramer : The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State. Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life. If anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs. When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures. 455 U.S. 745, 753-54, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (emphasis added). ¶ 12 If reunification is not possible, the state must show by clear and convincing evidence that a severance ground exists under A.R.S. § 8-533(B), and by preponderance of the evidence that severance is in the child's best interests. Kent K. v. Bobby M. , 210 Ariz. 279, 280, 288, ¶¶ 1, 41, 110 P.3d 1013, 1014, 1022 (2005). Here, the statutory ground exists-Mother failed for a brief time to protect her child from Father's abuse. But Mother was not the abuser, and Father's rights have been terminated. We therefore turn to the best-interests determination. ¶ 13 "Best interests" is a technical term that does not always carry its broad colloquial meaning. The best-interests determination does not invite a freewheeling inquiry by the government into what placement would be "best" for the child in the abstract. It is unconstitutional "to force the breakup of a natural family ... without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the child[ ]'s best interest." Quilloin v. Walcott , 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978). "In any severance proceeding, the material issue facing the court is whether a parent has the ability to properly parent his/her child...." Roberto F. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 232 Ariz. 45, 54, ¶ 42, 301 P.3d 211, 220 (App. 2013). Indeed, "[t]he State's interest in finding the child an alternative permanent home arises only 'when it is clear that the natural parent cannot or will not provide a normal family home for the child.' " Santosky , 455 U.S. at 767, 102 S.Ct. 1388 (citation omitted). "So long as certain minimum requirements of child care are met, the interests of the child may be subordinated to the interests of other children, or indeed even to the interests of the parents or guardians themselves." Reno v. Flores , 507 U.S. 292, 304, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993). ¶ 14 While the severance-ground inquiry focuses on the parent, the best-interests inquiry primarily focuses on the child. See Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F. , 239 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 15, 365 P.3d 353, 356 (2016) ; Kent K. , 210 Ariz. at 287, ¶ 38, 110 P.3d at 1021. Best interests is a fact-specific, case-by-case determination in which the court balances a parent's interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her child (diluted by the existence of a severance ground) against the child's interest in a safe and stable home life. Demetrius L. , 239 Ariz. at 4, ¶ 15, 365 P.3d at 356 ; Kent K. , 210 Ariz. at 286, ¶ 35, 110 P.3d at 1020. Though severance grounds usually have a negative impact on the child, the existence of a ground is not itself a basis for an adverse best-interests finding-something more is required. See In re Maricopa Cty. Juvenile Action No. JS-500274 , 167 Ariz. 1, 5, 804 P.2d 730, 734 (1990). A severance must affirmatively benefit the child or eliminate a detriment of the parental relationship. Dominique M. v. Dep't of Child Safety , 240 Ariz. 96, 98, ¶ 8, 376 P.3d 699, 701 (App. 2016). ¶ 15 Against this legal background, we examine the record in this case. DISCUSSION I. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT PRESERVATION OF MOTHER'S RIGHTS WOULD POSE A THREAT TO THE CHILDREN. ¶ 16 Though the Department does not argue that severance would prevent detriment to the children, the juvenile court found that if Mother's rights were severed, the children would each live in a home where they will be free from any risk of physical abuse. They will each have parents who are committed to protecting them from harm and who provide loving and nurturing homes. While Mother loves her [children], she chose to continue her own unhealthy, abusive relationship with [Father] rather than ending the relationship to protect herself and her children. The Court cannot find on the evidence presented that Mother won't make similar decisions in the future. (Emphasis added.) In finding grounds for severance based on abuse, the court stated: Only recently has Mother said that she is no longer with Father. However, Father has said otherwise to his therapist.[ ] Even if the Court accepts that Mother is being honest and she is no longer in a relationship with Father, it is literally too little too late to demonstrate that she is willing to protect her children from an abusive person. ¶ 17 We agree that if Mother were to expose the children to Father, the children's best interests would be jeopardized. Such a fact would weigh heavily in favor of severance. But the court did not find that Mother and Father were still in a relationship, nor did it find that the children would be subject to abuse by him (or anyone else) if they were in Mother's care. ¶ 18 Only two pieces of evidence could support the juvenile court's findings: the testimony of the Department's case manager and the psychologist's testimony and evaluation of Mother. Both are too fundamentally flawed to support severance. ¶ 19 In the summer of 2016, a new case manager was assigned. The new case manager testified at the severance hearing that she mistrusts Mother's judgment and ability to protect the children from future abuse. But opinion testimony can only provide the basis for a court's decision if it is based on fact. Cf. Adams v. Amore , 182 Ariz. 253, 254, 895 P.2d 1016, 1017 (App. 1994) (holding that an expert's opinion was inadmissible when a party "failed to lay the foundation that [the expert] based his opinions on facts or data 'of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in [his] particular field,' " as set forth in Ariz. R. Evid. 703 ). ¶ 20 The case manager testified that in reaching her conclusion she read several but not all of the parent-aide notes (which total 145 pages), never met with Mother outside of court hearings, only consulted with one of the service providers who worked with Mother, never attempted to confirm her suspicions that Mother and Father were still dating, never observed Mother with the children, and never visited or attempted to visit Mother's home to see if it would be safe for the children. Such a casual inquiry into the facts is not sufficient to meet even minimal professional standards, and such testimony is not sufficient to defeat fundamental constitutional rights. ¶ 21 The psychologist's conclusions are equally unfounded. Shortly after the new case manager was assigned, the Department referred Mother for a psychological evaluation. The only background information the Department provided the psychologist was a copy of the initial child safety plan and risk assessment saying that drugs and spoiled food were found in the house Mother and Father shared at the start of the case, and a version of the January 2016 progress report to the juvenile court, which included a recitation of the investigation after I.R.'s admission to the hospital, including a description of I.R.'s injuries and a notation about the initial challenges in finding Mother a domestic-violence counseling group. ¶ 22 From this information, an interview with Mother, and several personality tests, the psychologist prognosticated that Mother's ability "to demonstrate minimally adequate parenting skills [will be] poor at best" for "a prolonged, indeterminate period of time." The psychologist diagnosed Mother with (1) unspecified mood disorder; (2) personality disorder, unspecified (dependent traits) (principal); (3) cannabis use disorder, moderate, in sustained remission (per client's report); (4) cocaine use disorder, moderate, in sustained remission (per client's report); and (5) hallucinogen (ecstasy) use disorder, mild, in sustained remission (per client's report). The psychologist recommended Mother receive one year of doctoral-level therapy, family therapy, and group therapy; and further recommended specialized substance-abuse treatment, parenting classes, parent-aide services, and domestic-violence classes. ¶ 23 If these conclusions were supported by evidence, they would indeed be significant, but the evidence tells a different story. Conspicuously absent from the information the Department gave the psychologist is any reference to the 14 months of services Mother had successfully completed or was currently receiving. Mother had-without exception-tested negative for drug use; successfully closed out of her drug-testing service because of the lack of any positive test; closed out of drug rehabilitation because the service provider determined that no drug treatment was necessary; participated in domestic-violence counseling and group meetings; and successfully completed at least eight months of parent-aide services and supervised visitation, where she always came prepared and showed proper parenting skills. ¶ 24 At trial, the expert testified that he never received any information about these services. Nevertheless, he testified that Mother had benefitted "very little" from them and that the lack of a positive drug test did not detract from his conclusions on her drug dependence and need for treatment. He explained, "I was not looking ... [at] her training and as to being a parent, I was looking for a diagnosis." Because he neither considered the available information nor attempted to evaluate Mother's parenting skills, his conclusion that she is unable to successfully parent for the foreseeable future is not reasonable evidence of Mother's parenting ability. Indeed, the foundation for his opinion is so lacking that we question (though we do not here decide) its admissibility. See Ariz. R. Evid. 702 (expert witness's opinion testimony must be "based on sufficient facts or data" and reliable principles and methods "reliably applied ... to the facts of the case " (emphasis added)). Even assuming the psychologist's evaluation and testimony were admissible as an expert opinion that a parent with these diagnoses would generally not be able to successfully parent a child, it cannot be inferred from this record that Mother is an unfit parent. See Santosky , 455 U.S. at 767, 102 S.Ct. 1388 ; Roberto F. , 232 Ariz. at 54, ¶ 42, 301 P.3d at 220. ¶ 25 The psychologist's conclusions about the risks to the children from domestic abuse are equally unsubstantiated. The evaluation stated that Mother: has shown a pattern of being in destructive relationships where she is physically and emotionally abused and she has been unable to leave the situation. Maintaining a relationship, even when destructive, becomes more important than the safety of [her] children. It is noteworthy to mention that [Mother] also has built a pattern of choosing men with significant deficits, which include antisocial behaviors and severe substance use. The evaluation concludes that Mother failed to protect her children from abuse once and "without appropriate intervention, she may likely behave in this manner again." ¶ 26 These are persuasive words, but the minimal evidence of this pattern of Mother choosing abusive partners does not support an inference that Mother will fail to protect the children in the future. According to the psychologist's notes, J.R.'s father is currently in prison, and during his relationship with Mother he used drugs. Mother "adamantly denied" to the psychologist that he was abusive to her. A notation in the hospital notes from I.R.'s hospitalization states that there was "a history of domestic violence" between J.R.'s father and Mother. Such a notation, without any elaboration, explanation, attribution, or substantiation of any kind is insufficient to show that Mother habitually selects emotionally or physically abusive romantic partners who would pose a danger to the children. All evidence in the record shows that her relationship with J.R.'s father ended before J.R.'s birth. There were instances of domestic violence by Father against Mother, but the most recent incident of physical abuse was in 2014. And again, Father's rights have been severed. ¶ 27 Unless the Department can show that Mother is unable to protect the children from future abuse, severance cannot stand on a record that shows only that she was the victim of domestic violence at the hands of the person who abused the children-a person who is no longer present in the children's lives. To hold otherwise would be to punish the victim for the behavior of the abuser. It is true that Mother failed to take I.R. to the hospital immediately when she discovered his injuries, but her resort to artifice so that her relatives could take him the next day hardly reveals complicity in the abuse. It cannot be inferred from such a record that Mother chooses abusive partners and will be unable to protect the children from a future abuser. ¶ 28 To bolster the evidence of a pattern, the Department suggested two events of psychological abuse and emphasized a specific parent-aide note. But descriptions of the domestic-violence incidents were mostly provided by the Department's attorney, and few details were adopted by any witness or confirmed by other evidence. The first was when Mother called the police to their home, about a week before I.R. was taken to the hospital, because Father had taken her keys. The second was in August 2015 when Father took Mother's phone and broke it. The parent-aide note from February 2, 2016, upon which the Department relied, states in relevant part: [Mother and Father] welcomed me into their home. [Father] seemed a little on edge. [Mother] was a little bit more quiet at this parent meeting. I did notice that [Mother] did not talk as much and was looking down on the floor when [Father] was talking. I asked [Father] how he felt the last few visits went at the DCS office with him. His answer was "Fine. Good. What is it suppose it be?" [Father] was getting upset and started telling me that he did not know he was doing a bad job. I told [Father that he] was not doing a bad job and that he was taking what I was saying wrong. I explained that I was just trying to see how he was feeling with the visits and if he was feeling a little disconnected to [I.R.] [Father] told me that he can not be that "kind" of dad. I asked him what he meant, he said he would not play paddy cake or sing to him. [Mother] interrupted and told [Father] that she had noticed he was being a little rough with [I.R.], and that he needs to be gentle with [I.R.] that [I.R.] is just a baby, [and] not older like [J.R.]. [Father] became upset and left the meeting. [Mother] told me that she had noticed [Father] become different in the past few visits. [Father] came back into the apartment and told me he was sorry for leaving but is upset with how much is on his plate with DCS. (Emphasis added.) ¶ 29 This entry (one of dozens made over the course of eight months) is not proof of Mother's inability to protect the children. To the contrary, it shows that Mother was concerned with Father's treatment of I.R. and confronted him about it. Nor is there a single notation in 145 pages of parent-aide notes to suggest a pattern of selection of abusive partners by Mother, or abuse by Mother. According to the parent-aide provider's records, there was not a single instance of Mother failing to come prepared for a visit nor a single situation involving Mother that required the assistance of the parent aide. Every entry notes the love and affection Mother showed for the children. Parent-aide services ended three weeks after the February 2, 2016 parent meeting because the Department transferred the case to another parent-aide provider. But there is no reference to another service provider anywhere else in the record. It appears the Department never made a referral to a new provider nor attempted to continue the parent-aide service, despite the provider's repeated recommendations that the service continue. ¶ 30 The problems with the psychologist's evaluation are exemplified by its conclusions about Mother's drug use, which are not only contrary to the evidence in the record but also to the information in the psychologist's possession when he evaluated Mother. Mother never tested positive for drugs, and the service provider concluded that she needed no services to address drug abuse. Yet the psychologist opined that Mother was at a high risk of relapse and was only sober because "she sees herself in trouble." The evaluation said that Mother was evasive regarding using substances, indicated that her self-reporting was the only evidence of sobriety, and concluded that "[Mother] has shown significant lack of insight into how her psychological issues and substance use affect her functioning and how this places her children at risk." The evaluation stated that her behavior was consistent with the pre-contemplation stage of change, that she did not intend to rectify the situation in the foreseeable future, and that this category of person would choose to purchase drugs rather than food for her children and is more likely to act physically towards them. ¶ 31 According to the psychologist's own notes, Mother experimented with a variety of drugs before turning 21 and regularly used marijuana thereafter, but she ceased all drug use when J.R. was born (when she was 25) and had not used drugs for at least three years. The Department failed to inform the psychologist of Mother's negative drug tests and the treatment provider's determination that she did not need drug treatment-even the evidence he had did not support his conclusions about drug use. ¶ 32 Even if we were to accept the evaluation's diagnoses and make the dubious assumption that they would have been the same had the psychologist had all the available information, there must still be some reasonable evidence that diagnosed psychological traits will manifest themselves to the detriment of the children-their mere existence is not enough. Cf. In re Maricopa Cty. Juvenile Action No. JS-6831 , 155 Ariz. 556, 559, 748 P.2d 785, 788 (App. 1988) (holding that despite abandonment there would be no benefit from a severance or harm from the continuation of the parent's rights when there was a potential for a deeper relationship with the parent). ¶ 33 Based on this record, we hold that the psychologist's testimony, the evaluation's conclusions, and the case manager's testimony are not sufficiently rooted in the evidence to support the juvenile court's best-interests finding. And apart from these unsupported, conclusory opinions, the only evidence that severance is in the children's best interests is the fact that the children are adoptable. II. THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT MOTHER IS ABLE TO PARENT THE CHILDREN SAFELY AND SUCCESSFULLY. ¶ 34 In evaluating the children's best interests, the court found that both children were adoptable, that their respective placements are meeting their needs, and that they would gain permanency and stability through severance. The Department argues this is sufficient to establish best interests. We disagree. ¶ 35 Adoptability is a commonly proven benefit of severance, but it is not on its own sufficient to overcome a parent's constitutional rights. Lawrence R. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 217 Ariz. 585, 588, ¶ 11, 177 P.3d 327, 330 (App. 2008) (holding that adoptability does not equate to best interests); see also In re Maricopa Cty. Juvenile Action No. JS-500274 , 167 Ariz. 1, 7-8, 804 P.2d 730, 736-37 (1990) (holding that the fact a child has been abandoned and would be adoptable by the mother's hypothetical future husband and that the mother could nominate her parents as potential guardians if something should happen to her was not enough to show that severance was in the child's best interests); cf. Jose M. v. Eleanor J. , 234 Ariz. 13, 17-18, ¶¶ 19, 23, 316 P.3d 602, 606-607 (App. 2014) (vacating a severance for failure to prove abandonment but explaining that the child's day-to-day life would have to be affected to find that severance is in the child's best interests), overruled in part on other grounds by Demetrius L. , 239 Ariz. at 5, ¶ 18, 365 P.3d at 357. ¶ 36 The Department must show that there is a substantial likelihood that the parent will not be capable of parenting effectively in the near future, not that someone with better parenting skills may be able to care for the child. See Roberto F. , 232 Ariz. at 53, ¶ 38 n.11, 301 P.3d at 219 n.11. Otherwise, "it is irrelevant whether a child has a stronger attachment to their foster parents, whether foster parents are more 'nurturing,' or whether foster parents might be more capable or better parents than a natural parent." Id. at 54, ¶ 42, 301 P.3d at 220. ¶ 37 Mother required little or no counseling on how to improve her parenting skills and there is a bond between her and the children. At the close of the evidentiary portion of the hearing, the Department conceded Mother's successful compliance with services and the fact that Mother is bonded with the children. There also is evidence of a bond between I.R. and J.R. But no placement could take both children, so severance of Mother's rights permanently separates the siblings. Mother is employed and is living with her sister and niece in an apartment that would be safe for the children. ¶ 38 If a parent's ability to parent the children has been established by parent-aide services, there is a bond between the children and parent, and the parent has attained a safe and stable living situation, then the children's adoptability, household stability, and the ability of their current placements to meet their needs are subordinate to the fundamental rights of the parent in determining best interests, unless severance removes a detriment caused by the parental relationship. But neither Mother nor her current living situation pose any danger to the children. And the speculative finding that she might someday involve herself in a relationship with someone who would abuse the children is not an adequate basis to conclude that severance is now in the children's best interests. ¶ 39 A parent's rights should be preserved "when the parent grasps the opportunity [to reunify with a child] quickly, diligently, and persistently" and without failure. In re Pima Cty. Juvenile Severance Action No. S-114487 , 179 Ariz. 86, 101, 876 P.2d 1121, 1136 (1994). Mother did so here. If exemplary compliance with services and a strong parental bond are insufficient to avoid an adverse best-interests finding, then the services themselves serve no purpose except to delay an inevitable severance. Because Mother has a fundamental constitutional right to the "companionship, care, custody, and management of" and "associat[ion] with" her children, we cannot affirm a severance on such a thin record, even under our deferential standard of review. See Stanley , 405 U.S. at 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208 ; In re Maricopa Cty. Juvenile Action No. JD-5312 , 178 Ariz. 372, 374, 873 P.2d 710, 712 (App. 1994). CONCLUSION ¶ 40 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the severance of Mother's parental rights and remand for further proceedings. J.R.'s biological father is not a party to this appeal. His rights to J.R. were severed in May 2016. The Department argued that Mother and Father were still involved based on a statement Father made during his psychological evaluation on June 9, 2016, but the Department conceded that Father was "not the most reliable person." Mother testified that they broke up before July 2016 and that she is not in any direct or indirect contact with Father, and she explained in her psychological evaluation in August 2016 that she had given him many chances but was now "done with him." The Department made no effort to determine whether Mother and Father were in a relationship though the case manager testified it was "possible" they were. There was evidence that Mother delayed her participation in the evaluation. The evaluation names the former case manager as the referrer, but this referral was made about a month after the new case manager was assigned. However, the portions of the January 4, 2016, progress report reproduced in the evaluation omit any reference to the drug testing, rehabilitation, and parent-aide services provided to Mother-information that was in the copy of the progress report given to the court. The January progress report also makes no mention of Mother's attainment of stable employment and housing, but the Department's July progress report to the juvenile court-submitted two weeks before the referral for the evaluation-did include that information. The evaluator also stated that "records" indicated Mother has bipolar disorder. But there is no reference to any such records anywhere else in the evaluation (or the record on appeal). And the only records the evaluator claims he consulted were the progress reports provided by the Department. There is no other indication in the record that Mother is bipolar. The Department did not seek to sever Mother's rights on drug-addiction grounds. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3). The Department referred Mother for doctoral-level therapy, which commenced a few weeks before trial, and Mother consistently participated. In contrast Father tested positive on numerous occasions throughout the case. We recognize that a clear history of relationships with partners who engage in child abuse or in domestic violence that endangers the children might serve as a basis for finding that a parent is unable to protect the children from future abuse. But this case presents insufficient evidence of such a pattern.

BROWN, Judge: ¶ 1 Granada, LLC ("Granada") appeals the superior court's judgment in favor of Douglas Offerman ordering specific performance of an alleged option to purchase a home owned by Granada. Because the option was not sufficiently definite to support specific performance, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶ 2 Offerman leased a home from Granada from August 2012 through August 2014. Granada's principal Gilbert Houseaux, a licensed real estate agent, acted as the agent for both Offerman and Granada in the transaction. Before the lease began, Offerman expressed an interest in purchasing the property, but Granada declined to sell at that time. The parties, however, added the following language to their lease agreement, which Houseaux drafted: At the completion of the 24 month lease, the Tenant has the option to purchase [the] property ... for a sales price to be determined at that time by an independent appraiser acceptable to both Tenant and Landlord. (Terms and Conditions to be stipulated by both parties at such time). If the Tenant chooses to exercise his right to purchase this property at the end of the 2 year lease agreement, he shall be credited $200.00 of each $1900.00 of monthly rent paid towards purchase. The acceptable condition of the property when Tenant takes occupancy will be considered the condition Tenant agrees to accept at time of closing. All inspections and contingencies to be performed and satisfied prior to initial move-in. Property to be sold AS-IS. ¶ 3 As the end of the lease term neared, believing this language gave him an option to purchase the property, Offerman told Houseaux he intended to exercise the option and asked Granada to name an independent appraiser. Receiving no response from Houseaux, Offerman retained an appraiser who valued the property at $240,000 and shared the appraisal with Granada. Granada did not name an appraiser or obtain an additional appraisal. Instead, Granada sent Offerman a draft purchase contract with a proposed $350,000 sale price, which Offerman rejected. Granada later notified Offerman it would not renew the lease, but Offerman remained in the house, paying the monthly rent of $1,900 for several months after the original lease term ended. ¶ 4 Offerman sued Granada for breach of contract, alleging Granada had failed to agree on an independent appraiser, refused to respond to Offerman's efforts to exercise the option by proposing a "grossly inflated" cash purchase price, and served him with an eviction notice rather than engaging in the purchase process. Offerman asked the court to (1) order Granada to "specifically perform pursuant to the terms of the purchase option"; (2) set the purchase price at $240,000; (3) compel Granada to open escrow at a title company of Offerman's choosing and to "cooperate in the purchase process, the establishment and completion of escrow and the closing"; and (4) order all of the $1,900 payments Offerman made after September 1, 2014, be applied toward the purchase price. ¶ 5 After a bench trial, the superior court found that Offerman was entitled to specific performance of the option. The court then held an evidentiary hearing "on all issues" relating to the form of judgment. Following that hearing, the court entered judgment ordering Granada to sell the property to Offerman for $240,000. The court also, inter alia , named a title agency to hold escrow, determined the date for close of escrow, divided the various transaction fees between the parties, and ordered Granada to arrange for a property inspection. The court further directed the title agency to use the judgment "as the escrow instructions" and ordered Granada to "convey clear and unencumbered fee simple title to the Property to [Offerman] at close of escrow." ¶ 6 Granada moved for a new trial, arguing the option could not be specifically performed because it lacked numerous material terms. The superior court denied Granada's motion, awarded Offerman attorney's fees and costs, and entered final judgment. Granada timely appealed. DISCUSSION ¶ 7 Granada argues the superior court erred in ordering specific performance because the option did not contain sufficiently definite terms. Offerman counters that his timely exercise of the option created an enforceable contract. The court's interpretation of an agreement presents a question of law that we review de novo . United Cal. Bank v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. , 140 Ariz. 238, 257, 681 P.2d 390, 409 (App. 1983). ¶ 8 Specific performance is an equitable remedy. Shreeve v. Greer , 65 Ariz. 35, 39, 173 P.2d 641 (1946). A court may properly order "specific performance of an agreement for the sale of land if the agreement is in writing, signed by the parties to be charged, ... and is definite in its terms." Daley v. Earven , 131 Ariz. 182, 185, 639 P.2d 372, 375 (App. 1981). But a court may not order specific performance if the parties did not agree on one or more "important, essential or material terms." Id. ; see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts ("Restatement") § 362 (1981) ("Specific performance or an injunction will not be granted unless the terms of the contract are sufficiently certain to provide a basis for an appropriate order."); T.D. Dennis Builder, Inc. v. Goff , 101 Ariz. 211, 213, 418 P.2d 367, 369 (1966) (stating that essential terms include "identification of the parties, a description of the subject matter of the contract, the purchase price and the time and conditions of payment"). ¶ 9 An option does not require "completeness in every detail." Daley , 131 Ariz. at 185, 639 P.2d at 375. Nevertheless, "[t]he necessity for clearly defined terms is even more critical when an option is concerned." Christmas v. Turkin , 148 Ariz. 602, 603, 716 P.2d 59, 60 (App. 1986). "The more terms the parties leave open, the less likely it is that they have intended to conclude a binding agreement." Restatement § 33 cmt. c. In some circumstances, terms may be "certain enough to provide the basis for the calculation of damages but not certain enough to permit the court to frame an order of specific performance ... and to determine whether the resulting performance is in accord with what has been ordered." Restatement § 362 cmt. a; see also Restatement § 33 cmt. b (explaining that "greater definiteness may be required for an order of specific performance than for an award of damages"). Accordingly, the narrow issue we decide is whether the superior court properly ordered specific performance as a remedy for Offerman's breach of contract claim. ¶ 10 Offerman argues specific performance was proper under Restatement § 87(2), which states that "[a]n offer which the offeror should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a substantial character on the part of the offeree before acceptance and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding as an option contract to the extent necessary to avoid injustice." But Offerman cites no authority suggesting that action or forbearance based on an option whose terms are not definite, even if that action or forbearance is substantial, entitles a party to specific performance. See Restatement § 87 cmt. e (explaining that "[f]ull-scale enforcement of the offered contract is not necessarily appropriate" in cases falling within the scope of Restatement § 87(2)). ¶ 11 Offerman also contends, under Holaway v. Realty Assoc. , 90 Ariz. 289, 367 P.2d 643 (1961), that his option with Granada could be specifically performed because it established a clear method for determining a purchase price. Holaway involved an action for cancellation of an option contract in which the plaintiff asserted the option was void because it lacked a legal description of the property at issue. 90 Ariz. at 290, 367 P.2d 643. Our supreme court affirmed the superior court's order rejecting the plaintiff's claim, concluding the contract "furnished ample means to identify the particular real property intended to be charged." Id. at 292, 367 P.2d 643. The court explained that although the option failed to describe the parcels of land subject to the option, the parties "understood and agreed" that the descriptions were to be determined by a plat prepared by the defendants' agent. Id . ¶ 12 Holaway does not help Offerman's position. First, nothing indicates that the remedy of specific performance was at issue in that case. Second, the agreed-upon mechanism for establishing a legal description in Holaway is significantly different from this case. Although Offerman and Granada agreed on a mechanism to establish price by selecting an "independent appraiser," the selected appraiser had to be "acceptable to both Tenant and Landlord." The parties failed to provide an alternative method for selecting an appraiser for the impasse that ultimately occurred. Third, the parties did not establish a means to determine the many other remaining undefined terms. For example, the option is silent as to the timing of payment or closing, terms of payment (earnest money, down payment, financing, and allocation of closing costs), condition of title upon conveyance, method of conveyance, and whether escrow would be handled by a title agency. Unlike in Holaway , the option did not specify a method for determining these terms; instead, the option expressly deferred negotiating the "Terms and Conditions" to the end of the lease term. ¶ 13 The present case is more akin to the facts and analysis in Christmas . In that case, a landlord granted the tenant an option to purchase the leased premises for a set price during the first two years of the lease term and agreed to credit a portion of the tenant's rent payments toward the down payment. 148 Ariz. at 602-03, 716 P.2d at 59-60. The parties also agreed that "[t]he remaining terms of the option to purchase shall be negotiated between Tenant and Owner and memorialized in writing not later than March 1, 1985." Id. We held that the quoted language precluded specific performance because, based on the plain language of the lease, the purported option "was clearly an agreement to make an agreement." Id. at 603, 716 P.2d at 60. We distinguished cases where "the parties have purported to agree on a contractual provision and have done so in a vague and indefinite manner," which are inappropriate for specific performance, from "cases in which [the parties] have remained silent as to a material term" where "the reasonable conclusion is that [the parties] understood the law would imply the omitted term." Id. at 603-04, 716 P.2d at 60-61 (quoting Kidd v. Early , 289 N.C. 343, 222 S.E.2d 392, 403 (1976) ). ¶ 14 Here, as in Christmas , the parties did not expect that the law would imply the several remaining essential terms; their agreement specified they would determine those terms at "the completion of the 24 month lease." Further, at trial, Offerman confirmed that when he signed the lease, he intended to negotiate the option's additional terms and conditions at a later time, stating he anticipated an additional written purchase contract would be required to effectuate the sale of the property. Thus, given the absence of essential terms in the option language agreed to by the parties, an order of specific performance was not a proper remedy. See The Power P.E.O., Inc. v. Employees Ins. of Wausau , 201 Ariz. 559, 563, ¶ 22, 38 P.3d 1224, 1228 (App. 2002) (stating specific performance is unavailable if the contract "leave[s] any material or essential term for future negotiation"); see also Restatement § 362 cmt. b ("If specific performance or an injunction is to be granted, it is important that the terms of the contract are sufficiently certain to enable the order to be drafted with precision because of the availability of the contempt power for disobedience."). ¶ 15 Indeed, to fashion the order of specific performance, the superior court held a separate evidentiary hearing to determine not only the purchase price but numerous other "Terms and Conditions," including naming a title agency to hold escrow and determining how to divide the various transaction fees, such as taxes, insurance, home warranty, lot survey, homeowners' association, home inspection, termite inspection, lien release, and escrow fees. The court also directed the title agency to use the judgment "as escrow instructions," and ordered Granada to "convey clear and unencumbered fee simple title" to Offerman at close of escrow (on or before April 29, 2016). Of particular concern, some of the terms the court added are directly contrary to those specified in the parties' written agreement, including (1) directing Granada to arrange for a property inspection and provide disclosure statements and (2) permitting Offerman to cancel the contract if estimated repairs exceeded $5,000, even though the option stated the property would be sold in "AS-IS" condition as of the date Offerman took occupancy. ¶ 16 On a claim for specific performance, it is not within the superior court's authority to flesh out an option agreement that lacks certainty. See Savoca Masonry Co., Inc. v. Homes & Son Const. Co., Inc. , 112 Ariz. 392, 395, 542 P.2d 817, 820 (1975) ("[T]he court's role is not that of contract maker. While custom, usage and implications can be used to prove a contract's existence, they cannot be the basis for providing numerous essential elements of an agreement."); see also Cypert v. Holmes , 81 Ariz. 64, 66, 299 P.2d 650 (1956) (finding, in the context of an incomplete agreement, that "no court will ... make an agreement for the parties respecting those matters that have been left unsettled"). Therefore, we hold that the superior court erred in ordering specific performance of the option, but offer no opinion as to whether Offerman may yet pursue other remedies arising from his breach of contract claim. See Restatement § 362 cmt. a (recognizing that contract terms may be "certain enough to provide the basis for the calculation of damages but not certain enough to permit the court to frame an order of specific performance"). ¶ 17 Based on our reversal of the superior court's judgment ordering specific performance, we vacate the court's award of attorney's fees and costs. On remand, the court shall consider the parties' requests for fees and costs, including reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this appeal, based on the ultimate outcome of the case. We award costs incurred on appeal to Granada upon compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21. CONCLUSION ¶ 18 Based on the foregoing, we reverse the superior court's order directing specific performance of the option. We vacate the court's award of attorney's fees and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Granada also contends the option is unenforceable under the statute of frauds; however, because we hold the option is too indefinite to be specifically performed, we do not address whether it comports with the statute of frauds. Offerman also suggests that Houseaux breached his fiduciary duty and that Granada breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Offerman, however, did not name Houseaux as a defendant, nor did he allege a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against Granada. Thus, we do not address those assertions on appeal. Because it was not addressed by the parties on appeal, we do not decide whether the superior court could properly enter an order for specific performance (or an injunction) compelling Granada to engage in the agreed-upon process of selecting an independent appraiser to determine purchase price. See generally Restatement § 357 (explaining when specific performance is an available remedy).

HOWE, Judge: ¶ 1 Raymond R. Conklin, II and his wife Joanne M. Conklin appeal from the dismissal of their action against Medtronic, Inc. as preempted by federal law. We affirm as preempted the trial court's dismissal of the Conklin's product liability, breach of express warranty, and negligence causes of action. We vacate the trial court's dismissal of the Conklin's failure to warn, loss of consortium, and punitive damages claims because we hold that those claims are not expressly or impliedly preempted by federal law. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 2 Medtronic designed, manufactured, and marketed the Medtronic SynchroMed II 40 ml infusion pump and catheter, Model 8637-40 ("Medtronic Pain Pump"). The Medtronic Pain Pump is a Class III medical device the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") regulates under the Medical Device Amendments ("MDA") to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"). A Class III medical device is subject to the FDA's rigorous pre-market approval ("PMA") process. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. , 552 U.S. 312, 317, 128 S.Ct. 999, 169 L.Ed.2d 892 (2008). After PMA, a device manufacturer must comply with federal medical device reporting requirements. 21 U.S.C. § 360i(a)(1). Specifically, a manufacturer must report to the FDA any information reasonably suggesting that the device "[m]ay have caused or contributed to a death or serious injury" or that "[h]as malfunctioned" and that any recurring malfunction "would be likely to cause or contribute to a death or serious injury." 21 C.F.R. § 803.50(a). ¶ 3 In March 2008, a physician surgically implanted a Medtronic Pain Pump into Mr. Conklin to manage chronic pain. In February 2013, Mr. Conklin underwent hip surgery and later suffered permanent injury by drug over-infusion the Medtronic Pain Pump allegedly caused. The Conklins sued Medtronic alleging several Arizona common law tort claims, including product liability (design and manufacturing defect), failure to warn, negligence, breach of express warranty, and loss of consortium. The Conklins also sought punitive damages. ¶ 4 The Conklins alleged that before Mr. Conklin was injured, the FDA had sent warning letters to Medtronic, advising that the Medtronic Pain Pump was adulterated and misbranded and stating that Medtronic had failed to report adverse events to the FDA after PMA. The Conklins also alleged that before the February 2013 injury occurred, the FDA had issued two Class I recalls of the Medtronic Pain Pump. The Conklins further alleged that after Mr. Conklin was injured, the FDA issued another Class I recall of the Medtronic Pain Pump regarding the unintended delivery of drugs that could result in a drug overdose. The Conklins alleged that Medtronic's failure to report post-PMA adverse events to the FDA in violation of federal law gives rise to liability under Arizona common law. ¶ 5 Medtronic moved to dismiss for the failure to state a claim on the basis that federal law preempts the state-law claims. The trial court granted Medtronic's motion and dismissed the action with prejudice. Although the court found all claims preempted, it found additionally that the strict liability, breach of warranty, and derivative claims failed under Arizona law. The Conklins moved for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. The Conklins timely appealed. DISCUSSION 1. Preemption and Class III Medical Devices ¶ 6 We review de novo the trial court's order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Coleman v. City of Mesa , 230 Ariz. 352, 355-56 ¶ 7, 284 P.3d 863, 866-867 (2012). We assume the truth of the complaint's factual allegations and will uphold dismissal "only if as a matter of law plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts susceptible of proof." Id. at 356 ¶¶ 8-9, 284 P.3d at 869. ¶ 7 Congress has the power to preempt state law pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Congress may "withdraw specified powers from the States by enacting a statute containing an express preemption provision." Arizona v.United States , 567 U.S. 387, 399, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 183 L.Ed.2d 351 (2012). For federal questions such as preemption, United States Supreme Court decisions are binding, and we may look to circuit court cases as persuasive authority. See Weatherford ex rel. Michael L. v. State , 206 Ariz. 529, 532-33 ¶¶ 8-9, 81 P.3d 320, 323-324 (2003). ¶ 8 Medtronic has the burden to prove preemption. See E. Vanguard Forex, Ltd. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n , 206 Ariz. 399, 405 ¶ 18, 79 P.3d 86, 92 (App. 2003). While federal laws are presumed not to preempt state laws, courts do not invoke that presumption when the federal statute contains an express preemption clause. Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust , ---U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 1938, 1946, 195 L.Ed.2d 298 (2016) ; Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, LLC , 557 U.S. 519, 554, 129 S.Ct. 2710, 174 L.Ed.2d 464 (2009) ; Riegel , 552 U.S. 312, 128 S.Ct. 999, 169 L.Ed.2d 892 (analyzing the MDA's express preemption provision without presuming preemption). ¶ 9 The MDA expressly preempts certain state-law requirements concerning medical devices. The MDA states in pertinent part that no state "may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device ... any requirement (1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter." 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a). ¶ 10 For express preemption to apply, two conditions must be met: (1) the federal government must have established requirements applicable to the device at issue and (2) the plaintiff's common-law claims concerning the device must include requirements that are "different from, or in addition to" those federal requirements. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) ; Riegel , 552 U.S. at 321-23, 128 S.Ct. 999. If these two conditions are met, common-law claims challenging the safety or effectiveness of a medical device that received PMA from the FDA are expressly preempted. Id. In addition to express preemption, the MDA also impliedly preempts any action for the enforcement or restriction of violations of the FDCA because such actions can only be brought by or in the name of the United States. 21 U.S.C. § 337(a) ; see Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm. , 531 U.S. 341, 352, 121 S.Ct. 1012, 148 L.Ed.2d 854 (2001). ¶ 11 Despite these preemption restrictions, a plaintiff's state-law claim concerning a medical device may be viable if it is a "parallel claim," a claim based on state requirements that are "equal to or substantially identical to, requirements imposed by or under the act." Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr , 518 U.S. 470, 495-97, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996). Thus, a state-law claim is not preempted when it provides "a damages remedy for claims premised on a violation of FDA regulations; the state duties in such a case 'parallel,' rather than add to, federal requirements." Riegel , 552 U.S. at 330, 128 S.Ct. 999. As the Eighth Circuit explained in In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prod. Liab. Litig. : Riegel and Buckman create a narrow gap through which a plaintiff's state-law claim must fit if it is to escape express or implied preemption. The plaintiff must be suing for conduct that violates the FDCA (or else his claim is expressly preempted by § 360k(a) ), but the plaintiff must not be suing because the conduct violates the FDCA (such a claim would be impliedly preempted under Buckman ). 623 F.3d 1200, 1204 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Riley v. Cordis Corp. , 625 F.Supp.2d 769, 777 (D. Minn. 2009) ). Essentially, the state-law claim cannot exist "solely by virtue of the FDCA disclosure requirements." Buckman , 531 U.S. at 352-53, 121 S.Ct. 1012. 2. Claims Analysis ¶ 12 Because the Medtronic Pain Pump is a Class III medical device, as a matter of law the PMA process imposes federal requirements contemplated by § 360k(a) for express preemption purposes. Riegel , 552 U.S. at 322-23, 128 S.Ct. 999. The Conklins do not dispute that the Medtronic Pain Pump received PMA. As such, part one of the express-preemption test under Riegel is automatically satisfied. See id. ¶ 13 We must next analyze whether Arizona state law imposes on Medtronic a requirement different from or in addition to federal law or if the Conklins' state-law claims instead escape express and implied preemption. We address each claim in turn to determine if the claim is expressly or impliedly preempted, or if the claim is a viable parallel state-law claim. 2a. Product Liability-Design and Manufacturing Defect ¶ 14 The Conklins alleged that the Medtronic Pain Pump was defective when manufactured in design and formulation and when it dispensed an excess of narcotic drugs to Mr. Conklin. To the extent the Conklins pled a strict liability cause of action based on defective design and manufacturing, on appeal they do not challenge the trial court's finding that such claim is expressly preempted. Medtronic argues that the claim is expressly preempted absent an allegation that the Medtronic Pain Pump was designed or manufactured in any manner other than what the FDA required. We agree with Medtronic. ¶ 15 Success on these claims would require the jury to find that the design and manufacturing process the FDA approved through the PMA process was defective as a matter of state law, which would add requirements to the process that the FDA established and is thus expressly preempted. See Riegel , 552 U.S. at 325, 128 S.Ct. 999 ; In re Medtronic , 623 F.3d at 1206-07 (concluding that design and manufacturing defect claims were expressly preempted because they attacked "the risk/benefit analysis that led the FDA to approve an inherently dangerous Class III device"); Hughes v. Boston Scientific Corp. , 631 F.3d 762, 769 (5th Cir. 2011). 2b. Breach of Express Warranty ¶ 16 The Conklins further alleged that although Medtronic expressly warranted that the Medtronic Pain Pump was "safe and effective," the pump that Medtronic manufactured and sold "did not conform to these express representations because [it] caused serious injury ... when used as recommended and directed." On appeal, Medtronic argues that § 360k expressly preempts this claim because it "would inescapably impose different or additional requirements than those imposed by the FDA's premarket-approved design, manufacturing, and labeling specifications." The Conklins do not argue on appeal that their breach of warranty claim is a parallel state claim that survives preemption. Instead, the Conklins argue only that the trial court incorrectly found on alternative grounds that this claim was untimely due to lack of notice. ¶ 17 To succeed on their breach of express warranty claim, the Conklins must persuade a jury that the Medtronic Pain Pump was not safe and effective. Such a finding would be "contrary to the FDA's approval of the PMA" and is thus expressly preempted. See In re Medtronic, 623 F.3d at 1207-08. Because this claim is expressly preempted, we need not address the trial court's alternative basis for dismissing the claim. 2c. Failure to Warn ¶ 18 The Conklins contend that Medtronic violated federal law by failing to report post-PMA adverse events concerning the Medtronic Pain Pump to the FDA and others, which in turn violated its duty under Arizona law to use reasonable care to warn Mr. Conklin of the dangers inherent in using the defective Medtronic Pain Pump. Specifically, the Conklins allege that Medtronic violated 21 C.F.R. § 803.50, 21 C.F.R. § 820.198(a)(3), and 21 U.S.C. § 360i. Because the Conklins' failure-to-warn claim is not expressly or impliedly preempted, the trial court erred by dismissing this claim. ¶ 19 Relying on the Ninth Circuit's decision Stengel v. Medtronic Inc ., 704 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2013), the Conklins argue that their failure-to-warn claim is a permissible parallel claim. Medtronic, on the other hand, contends that the post-sale duty to warn claim is expressly and impliedly preempted and does not parallel federal requirements regarding post-approval reporting because "the federal duty to submit [adverse reports] to the FDA is not identical to the state-law duty to warn doctors or their patients." ¶ 20 Although Stengel involved a different Medtronic infusion pump, the plaintiffs there alleged, as the Conklins similarly do here, that Medtronic failed to report to the FDA adverse consequences involving its product post-PMA and that, because Medtronic "failed to comply with its duty under federal law, it breached its 'duty to use reasonable care' under Arizona negligence law." 704 F.3d at 1232. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Arizona "failure-to-warn" claim was not preempted because Arizona law "impos[es] a general duty of reasonable care on product manufacturers" and includes a cause of action for failure to warn. Id. at 1233 (citing Crouse v. Wilbur-Ellis Co. , 77 Ariz. 359, 272 P.2d 352 (1954) ; and Wilson v. U.S. Elevator Corp. , 193 Ariz. 251, 972 P.2d 235 (App. 1998) ). ¶ 21 In so doing, the Ninth Circuit noted that Arizona law requires a manufacturer to "warn of dangers which he knows or should know are inherent in its use. This duty may be a continuing one applying to dangers the manufacturer discovers after sale." Id. (quoting Rodriguez v. Besser Co. , 115 Ariz. 454, 565 P.2d 1315 (App. 1977), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Piper v. Bear Med. Sys ., 180 Ariz. 170, 883 P.2d 407 (App. 1993) ). In discussing whether an Arizona state-law failure-to-warn claim is preempted, the Ninth Circuit stated: If a more precise parallel were necessary, the Stengels have alleged it and Arizona law provides it. The Stengels' ... claim specifically alleges, as a violation of Arizona law, a failure to warn the FDA. Arizona law contemplates a warning to a third party such as the FDA. Under Arizona law, a warning to a third party satisfies a manufacturer's duty if, given the nature of the warning and the relationship of the third party, there is "reasonable assurance that the information will reach those whose safety depends on their having it." We do not decide whether plaintiffs can prevail on their state-law failure-to-warn claim. That question is not before us. But we do hold under Lohr , Buckman , and Riegel , that this claim is not preempted, either expressly or impliedly, by the MDA. It is a state-law claim that is independent of the FDA's pre-market approval process that was at issue in Buckman . The claim rests on a state-law duty that parallels a federal-law duty under the MDA, as in Lohr . Id. ¶ 22 The Stengel decision is based on the premise that a manufacturer's continuing duty to warn of dangers discovered after sale in Arizona can be satisfied by warning a third party such as the FDA. Id. at 1233. We agree with Stengel that Arizona law contemplates that a warning to the FDA could satisfy Medtronic's general duty of reasonable care to warn. See id. This is so because the FDA, in turn, could have notified Mr. Conklin's doctor, thus discharging Medtronic's duty. See Watts v. Medicis Pharm. Corp. , 239 Ariz. 19, 24 ¶¶ 13-14, 365 P.3d 944, 949 (2016) (adopting the learned intermediary doctrine as set forth in Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 6(d) as to prescription drug manufacturers and holding that a manufacturer satisfies its duty to warn end users by giving appropriate warnings to learned intermediaries). ¶ 23 The Conklins base their Arizona failure-to-warn claim on Medtronic's violation of the federal duty to report post-PMA adverse events to the FDA. "That requirement is not 'different from, or in addition to' the requirements imposed by federal law, because FDA regulations required Medtronic to file an adverse event report with the FDA if it learned of information 'reasonably suggest[ing]' that one of its devices '[m]ay have caused or contributed to a death or serious injury,' " which the Conklins alleged. See Stengel , 704 F.3d at 1234 (Watford, J., concurring). As such, this claim is not expressly preempted. ¶ 24 Moreover, the cause of action for failure to warn is not impliedly preempted because the Conklins are not suing to enforce the FDCA, but to recover under Arizona state law for Medtronic's alleged failure to warn of dangers discovered after sale. See Rodriguez , 115 Ariz. at 459, 565 P.2d at 1320 (continuing independent state-law duty); Buckman, 531 U.S. at 352, 121 S.Ct. 1012 (to avoid implied preemption, the claim must rely on "traditional state tort law which had predated the federal enactments in question"). To the extent that the Conklins allege a violation of any state-law duty to directly warn Mr. Conklin or his physicians, however, such claims are expressly preempted because those duties would be in addition to requirements imposed by federal law. See Stengel , 704 F.3d at 1234 (Watford, J., concurring). ¶ 25 Medtronic argues that the Conklins did not adequately allege a causal connection between the failure to report adverse events and Mr. Conklin's injuries. But that is incorrect. The Conklins sufficiently alleged a causal connection under Arizona's notice pleading standard because the complaint alleged that (1) Medtronic had a continuing duty to monitor the product after PMA and to report to the FDA any adverse events attributable to the product; (2) Medtronic breached its Arizona duty to use reasonable care because it failed in its duty under federal law to report adverse events to the FDA; (3) a recall occurred post-injury; and (4) Mr. Conklin was injured. We note, however, that the Conklins will ultimately also have to prove that "if Medtronic had properly reported the adverse events to the FDA as required under federal law, that information would have reached [Mr. Conklin's] doctors in time to prevent his injuries." See id. 2d. Negligence Causes of Action ¶ 26 The Conklins alleged several negligence causes of action, including (1) negligent manufacture and design and (2) negligence per se. The Conklins contend that Medtronic negligently "designed, manufactured, tested, assembled, labeled, supplied, marketed, sold, advertised and failed to warn against" the Medtronic Pain Pump. As discussed above, the Conklins may bring their failure-to-warn claim against Medtronic because that claim is not expressly or impliedly preempted. See supra section 2c. As to the remaining allegations of negligent manufacture and design, the Conklins do not argue on appeal that these claims were improperly dismissed as preempted. As such, we consider any argument to the contrary waived. Rice v. Brakel , 233 Ariz. 140, 147 ¶ 28, 310 P.3d 16, 23 (App. 2013) (failure to address basis of trial court's decision waives claim on appeal). ¶ 27 The Conklins argue next that Medtronic had a "continuing duty to monitor the product after premarket approval and to alert the FDA about complaints about the product's performance, including any adverse health consequences of which it became aware" pursuant to 21 C.F.R. § 820.198(a)(3) and to "submit medical device reports" to the FDA pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 360i and 21 C.F.R. § 803.50. According to the Conklins, Medtronic's failure to adhere to these regulations is negligence per se. ¶ 28 The Conklins contend that a federal statute or regulation may be adopted as a standard of conduct to support a negligence per se claim. Medtronic argues that a negligence per se claim is impliedly preempted because the failure to report adverse events is an attempt to enforce the MDA. We agree with the Conklins. ¶ 29 If a court decides to adopt a standard of care designed to protect the public safety that is set forth in a statute or regulation, a person who violates that statute or regulation is negligent per se. Brannigan v. Raybuck , 136 Ariz. 513, 517, 667 P.2d 213, 217 (1983). Arizona law sets forth a specific paradigm for determining whether a court should adopt a particular statute or regulation as the standard of conduct for a negligence per se cause of action. See Steinberger v. McVey ex rel. Cty. of Maricopa , 234 Ariz. 125, 139 ¶¶ 56-62, 318 P.3d 419, 433 (App. 2014). ¶ 30 As previously explained, see supra ¶¶23-24, the Conklins' failure-to-warn claim is not preempted. As such, nothing prevents the Conklins from requesting that the trial court apply the negligence per se doctrine to assist them in proving their failure to warn claim. See Hughes , 631 F.3d at 771-72 (concluding that "invoking the negligence per se doctrine to support a negligence claim that is otherwise parallel to federal requirements is not expressly preempted"). We express no opinion, however, on the trial court's ultimate resolution of that issue. 2e. Loss of Consortium and Punitive Damages ¶ 31 Because the Conklins' failure-to-warn claim is not preempted, the Conklins may proceed with their derivative claim for loss of consortium. Moreover, although the Conklins did not allege an "evil mind," "[c]laims for punitive damages carry no special pleading requirements[.]" Ezell v. Quon , 224 Ariz. 532, 538 ¶ 23, 233 P.3d 645, 651 (App. 2010). Thus, the trial court erred by dismissing these claims. 3. Leave to Amend Complaint ¶ 32 The Conklins argue that the trial court improperly failed to allow them to remedy any defect by amending their complaint. Although the Conklins sought leave to amend as part of their response to Medtronic's motion to dismiss and at oral argument, a request for leave to amend must be made by separate motion that complies with the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. See Blumenthal v. Teets , 155 Ariz. 123, 131, 745 P.2d 181, 189 (App. 1987). Moreover, a party who moves for leave to amend must attach a copy of the proposed amended pleading as an exhibit to a motion. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(4). The Conklins did not separately seek leave and the record does not contain a proposed amended complaint. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by impliedly denying leave. See Cagle v. Carr , 101 Ariz. 225, 227, 418 P.2d 381, 383 (1966). CONCLUSION ¶ 33 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the dismissal of the Conklins' product liability, breach of express warranty, and negligence causes of action. We affirm the denial of the Conklins' request to amend the complaint. We vacate the dismissal of their failure to warn, loss of consortium, and punitive damages claims, however, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision. The Conklins also allege that to the extent they are unable to prove specific acts of negligent manufacture and design, they will rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Because the claims for negligent manufacture and design are preempted, res ipsa loquitur is unavailable.

VÁSQUEZ, Presiding Judge: ¶1 Holly C. appeals from the juvenile court's dismissal of a private dependency petition filed by her mother, Elizabeth F., who sought temporary custody of Holly's six-year-old son, G.C. Because Elizabeth F. failed to appeal from the dismissal order, and because we conclude Holly, as a respondent in the dependency proceeding, has not been legally "aggrieved" by the dismissal, see A.R.S. § 8-235(A) ; Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 103(A), we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. ¶2 Like his father, Brian S., G.C. is an enrolled member of the Tohono O'odham Nation ("the Nation"). Before Elizabeth filed her dependency petition, Holly and Brian were involved in a custody proceeding in the Nation's tribal court. In October 2017, pursuant to a stipulation by both parents, that court entered a "final, appealable order" awarding Brian sole decision-making authority and primary parenting time. Based on the same stipulation, the court scheduled a review hearing for December 2017 to determine whether "criminal charges pending against [Holly]" had been resolved and "to see if [she] should be awarded supervised parenting time given the concerns over her mental state and ability to parent [G.C.]." On February 20, 2018, the Arizona Department of Economic Security (ADES) acknowledged Brian's physical custody of G.C. and filed a motion to terminate his previously ordered child support obligations. ¶3 On March 16, 2018, before the trial court granted ADES's motion, Elizabeth filed a dependency petition in Pima County Juvenile Court in which she alleged Brian had a history of violent behavior and was neglecting G.C. In a supporting affidavit, she also alleged that Holly "has a history of mental health issues that make it difficult for her [to] parent right now" and, also, "is on probation for a felony offense." In temporary orders entered pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-841(F), the juvenile court ordered the Department of Child Safety (DCS) to conduct an investigation, including "a safety check of the child(ren)'s home," but it declined Elizabeth's request that she be awarded temporary custody. ¶4 At the initial dependency hearing in April 2018, DCS told the juvenile court, "Our report documents that we do not believe that a dependency exists at this time," and, after confirming that there were no objections, the court granted DCS's request to be excused from further proceedings. At the same hearing, Brian entered a special appearance for the purpose of challenging jurisdiction and service and filed a motion to dismiss the dependency on those grounds. In it, he argued the Nation had "continuing, exclusive jurisdiction" over G.C.'s custody pursuant to both the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 - 1963, and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), A.R.S. §§ 25-1001 to 25-1067. The Nation also appeared and informed the court it had not yet been properly served with the dependency petition. ¶5 The juvenile court scheduled briefing on Brian's motion to dismiss and continued the hearing until May 15, 2018. On that day, after conferring with the tribal court judge who was presiding over the Nation's custody proceeding and entertaining argument by the parties, the juvenile court granted Brian's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. On May 29, 2018, Holly filed a timely notice of appeal from the court's signed minute entry, which was filed on May 18, 2018. Elizabeth did not. See Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 104(A) (notice of appeal from juvenile court "shall be filed with the clerk of the superior court no later than 15 days after the final order is filed with the clerk"). ¶6 This court has an independent duty to consider its own jurisdiction, see In re Reymundo F. , 217 Ariz. 588, n.1, 177 P.3d 330 (App. 2008) ; see also State v. Serrano , 234 Ariz. 491, ¶ 4, 323 P.3d 774 (App. 2014) (appellate court's "jurisdiction is provided and limited by law"), which, in this instance, is limited to appeals by any party "aggrieved" by "a final order of the juvenile court," § 8-235(A). "Parties cannot confer jurisdiction upon this court by agreement, by stipulation, or ... by invited error or forfeiture." Serrano , 234 Ariz. 491, ¶ 4, 323 P.3d 774 (citations omitted). ¶7 We recognize that Holly joined Elizabeth in opposing the dismissal of the dependency, but, because Holly is the respondent in a dependency proceeding filed against her and Brian, we conclude she has not suffered a legally cognizable grievance from the dismissal of that action. "To qualify as an aggrieved party, the judgment must operate to deny the party some personal or property right or to impose a substantial burden on the party." Jewel C. v. Dep't of Child Safety , 244 Ariz. 347, ¶ 3, 418 P.3d 1120 (App. 2018) (quoting In re Pima Cty. Juv. Action No. B-9385 , 138 Ariz. 291, 293, 674 P.2d 845 (1983) ). In this dependency action, the juvenile court entered no order affecting Holly's parental rights-it instead dismissed a proceeding filed by Elizabeth calling into question Holly's ability to parent G.C. ¶8 Although Elizabeth, as the only petitioner in the dependency proceeding, was aggrieved by its dismissal, she failed to file a timely notice of appeal that would have afforded this court jurisdiction on review. Because we lack jurisdiction to proceed, this appeal is dismissed. ADES's unopposed motion to terminate child support was granted on April 2, 2018. At an initial dependency hearing, Elizabeth told the juvenile court she had filed the dependency petition because she "believe[s] that neither [Brian] nor [Holly] is able or capable of having the care, custody, and control of the child at this time." The Nation supported Brian's motion to dismiss, and G.C. appeared to support the dismissal as well, telling the court, "At most," the juvenile court "might have emergency jurisdiction," but the Nation is "the primary jurisdictional court." Holly joined Elizabeth in opposing the dismissal. On September 4, 2018, more than three months after Holly filed her notice of appeal, Elizabeth filed a "Notice of Joinder" purporting to "join[ ] in Holly C.'s opening brief." Although Rule 104(C)(2), Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct., provides that "any party to the proceeding from which the appeal arises ... may file ... and serve ... a notice stating that the party ... does not intend to participate actively in the appeal and instead adopts and agrees in advance to be bound by the appellate positions, filings, representations, actions, and omissions" of another "specifically identified" party, that provision does not apply here. First, there is no evidence on this record that Elizabeth filed such a notice "[n]o later than 10 calendar days" after service of Holly's notice of appeal or filed it "with the clerk of the superior court," as required by that rule. Id. More critically, the rule expressly provides, "A notice under this subsection may not be used or relied upon as a substitute for a notice of appeal." Id. Elizabeth's belated notice of joinder thus had no effect on the question of our appellate jurisdiction. In other circumstances, a child such as G.C. might also be aggrieved by the dismissal of a dependency proceeding, giving rise to his right to appeal pursuant to § 8-235(A). In this case, however, G.C. is named as an appellee, and he urges this court to affirm the juvenile court's ruling.

ECKERSTROM, Chief Judge: ¶ 1 Victor Weaver appeals from his convictions and sentences for possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and resisting arrest. He contends the trial court committed structural error by denying his motion to represent himself. We agree, and for the following reasons vacate the decision of the trial court, vacate the convictions and sentences, and remand for further proceedings. Factual and Procedural History ¶ 2 "We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court's ruling." State v. Colvin , 231 Ariz. 269, ¶ 2, 293 P.3d 545 (App. 2013). In August 2015, early in the morning, Casa Grande police officers responded to an apartment complex following reports that an individual had been "loud and disturbing." An officer approached Weaver and saw he was holding an aluminum can with burn marks and a depression in the middle, something the officer recognized as a crude marijuana pipe. In response to the officer's request, Weaver dropped the can but then took a "boxer's stance" and began jabbing at the air, asking the officer if he "wanted to go for it." Two other officers approached Weaver from behind, and he assumed the same stance toward one of them. The first officer warned Weaver to "calm down or he would be Tased." Weaver nevertheless maintained his stance, and the officer deployed a Taser and arrested him. ¶ 3 On the morning of trial, before calling the first panel of jurors, Weaver stated he wanted to represent himself. When the trial court asked if he was prepared to begin trial that morning, Weaver said he was not and requested a continuance. After a brief recess during which the court reviewed the case file and certain reports pertaining to Weaver's competency, the court denied the request finding it "untimely and that it would cause a disruption or delay to the trial." A few minutes later, Weaver, through counsel, asked whether he would be able to participate in his case, and the court told him he would be able to testify if he so chose. ¶ 4 After a recess, but before the first potential jurors entered the courtroom, Weaver indicated "he still want[ed] to represent himself and [was] ready to go" without continuing the trial. The court stated it had "already ruled on that motion" and the trial was "moving forward." ¶ 5 Following lunch recess, the prosecutor notified the court that the denial might be an "appellate issue." The court reiterated that Weaver's request was not timely because, although his case had been pending for a year, he only raised the issue "literally five minutes before we brought the jury up." In the alternative, the court determined granting the request "would disrupt or delay the proceedings" because it believed Weaver's earlier statements that he was not prepared to proceed to trial over his later assertion that he was ready. On the second and final day of trial, the court made an additional record based on its reading of Arizona case law that a motion for self-representation is not necessarily timely if made before jury selection begins, but depends on "all the other factors" of the case. ¶ 6 After trial, the jury found Weaver guilty of all three counts as described above. The court suspended imposition of his sentence and placed Weaver on supervised probation for two years. Weaver appealed; we have jurisdiction. See A.R.S. §§ 13-4031, 13-4033(A)(1). Right to Represent Oneself ¶ 7 Weaver argues the trial court committed structural error by summarily denying his motion to represent himself. We review a decision denying a defendant's motion to proceed pro se for an abuse of discretion. State v. McLemore , 230 Ariz. 571, ¶ 15, 288 P.3d 775 (App. 2012). "[A]n erroneous failure to accord a defendant his properly asserted right to represent himself when he is competent to waive counsel in a criminal case is structural error requiring reversal without a showing of prejudice." Id. (collecting cases). Structural error is one that affects "the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself." State v. Torres , 208 Ariz. 340, ¶ 11, 93 P.3d 1056 (2004), quoting Arizona v. Fulminante , 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). ¶ 8 The right to self-representation is "necessarily implied by the structure of the [Sixth] Amendment," such that the state may not "constitutionally hale a person into its criminal courts and there force a lawyer upon him ... when he insists that he wants to conduct his own defense." Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806, 807, 819, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) ; see also U.S. Const. amend. VI ; Ariz. Const. art. II, § 24. To proceed pro se, a competent defendant must unequivocally invoke his right to self-representation, McLemore , 230 Ariz. 571, ¶ 17, 288 P.3d 775, and such invocation must be voluntary and knowing. State v. De Nistor , 143 Ariz. 407, 412, 694 P.2d 237, 242 (1985). When a defendant's request is untimely, whether to grant the opportunity to waive counsel is squarely within the court's discretion. Id. at 413, 694 P.2d at 243 (enumerating factors). However, when a defendant's request is timely, the court's discretion is more narrowly circumscribed; namely, the court may deny a competent defendant's motion if it determines he made it for the purpose of delaying or disrupting trial. McLemore , 230 Ariz. 571, ¶ 17, 288 P.3d 775. Request Must Be Timely ¶ 9 Generally, a request is timely if made "before meaningful trial proceedings have commenced." State v. Lamar , 205 Ariz. 431, ¶ 22, 72 P.3d 831 (2003), quoting Armant v. Marquez , 772 F.2d 552, 555 (9th Cir. 1985). Although some courts have indicated a defendant must invoke his right "somewhat in advance of trial," De Nistor , 143 Ariz. at 412-13, 694 P.2d at 242-43, citing State v. Sheppard , 172 W.Va. 656, 310 S.E.2d 173, 189 (1983), our supreme court has signaled such motion is timely if made before the jury is empaneled. Id. , citing Fritz v. Spalding , 682 F.2d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 1982) ; see also State v. Cornell , 179 Ariz. 314, 326, 878 P.2d 1352, 1364 (1994) ("[I]t is uniformly held that all motions [for self-representation] made after jury selection has begun are untimely...."); Barnes v. State , 258 Ark. 565, 528 S.W.2d 370, 372, 375 (1975) (request made in morning on first day of trial timely). ¶ 10 The state argues a majority of courts consider a motion made on the first day of trial untimely, see State v. Thompson , 190 Ariz. 555, 557 n.1, 950 P.2d 1176 (App. 1997), and invites us to adopt such a rule. Accordingly, they urge us to disregard as dictum our supreme court's approval of the approach in Fritz , which specifies that a request made before the jury is empaneled is timely. 682 F.2d at 784 ; De Nistor , 143 Ariz. at 412-13, 694 P.2d at 242-43. Likewise, the state insists a similar signal of approval for motions made on the first day of trial, issued by our supreme court in Lamar, is unavailing because the request there was made nearly a month before trial. See 205 Ariz. 431, ¶¶ 22-23, 72 P.3d 831, citing Armant , 772 F.2d at 555. Although Arizona has no binding precedent on this issue, what guidance our supreme court has provided favors the approach in Fritz , indicating that motions for self-representation made before a jury is empaneled are timely. Accordingly, we decline to adopt a rule to the contrary. See Alejandro v. Harrison , 223 Ariz. 21, ¶ 12, 219 P.3d 231 (App. 2009) (dicta not binding, but has persuasive value). Thus, although Weaver made his requests at the last possible moment before jury selection began, his requests were timely. See De Nistor , 143 Ariz. at 412-13, 694 P.2d at 242-43. Not for Delay ¶ 11 In Thompson , we concluded that a trial court retains discretion to deny a timely motion for self-representation if the record supports that it was made for the purpose of delay. 190 Ariz. at 557, 950 P.2d at 1178. There, the defendant had failed to appear for a previous trial date, could not explain why his motion had not been brought earlier, stated only that counsel "did not have enough time to do [his defense] like [he] would do it [him]self." Id. Also, despite assurances he was ready to proceed, the defendant stated he was "unsure that he was prepared to give an opening statement," but "with a little bit of time, ... could put together a better defense for [him]self." Id. ¶ 12 Here, the record demonstrates only that Weaver valued his right to self-representation over any desire to postpone the trial. Although he first stated he was not ready to proceed and requested a continuance, he withdrew that request and affirmed his readiness to proceed when the trial court denied his request for self-representation on the basis that a continuance would not be granted. And although the trial court stated its belief that Weaver was not prepared to try his case, neither the court nor the state cite any authority that a defendant's right to self-representation depends on his readiness, as opposed to ensuring his competence. See State v. Doss , 116 Ariz. 156, 160, 568 P.2d 1054 (1977) (court's "protecting duty" pertains to "whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused"); cf. Faretta , 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (defendant need not have "skill and experience" of a lawyer). But even assuming the court had a duty to evaluate Weaver's readiness, the court undertook no fact-finding to determine what had changed between Weaver's first and second request or whether it reasonably could have remedied any lack of readiness; for example, by appointing his attorney as "standby counsel." McKaskle v. Wiggins , 465 U.S. 168, 184, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) (court may appoint counsel over defendant's objection to explain and enforce courtroom protocol and overcome "routine obstacles"). ¶ 13 We do not doubt Weaver's self-representation would have extended the overall length of the trial given his naiveté in trial practice. Cf. Faretta , 422 U.S. at 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525 ("It is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel's guidance than by their own unskilled efforts."). But this is a feature of all trials involving self-represented litigants and therefore cannot alone be a plausible basis for denying the right. In the absence of an accompanying request for a continuance, the possibility of a longer trial coming to light before the initiation of the jury-selection process does not amount to delay that warrants denying a defendant his constitutional right to self-representation. See De Nistor , 143 Ariz. at 412-13, 694 P.2d at 242-43 (request for self-representation timely before jury empaneled). Accordingly, the record is bereft of any basis to conclude that Weaver's second request to represent himself was motivated to delay the trial. Not to Disrupt ¶ 14 Relying on United States v. Edelman , the state argues the trial court's ruling was proper in light of the "special facts of this case" indicating that granting Weaver's request would disrupt trial. 458 F.3d 791, 808-09 (8th Cir. 2006) (defendant's motion to proceed pro se accompanied by other "essentially frivolous" motions, demonstrating attempt to "disrupt or delay" start of trial); see McLemore , 230 Ariz. 571, ¶ 17, 288 P.3d 775. The state urges the court must have discretion to distinguish between "a sincere desire to dispense with the benefits of counsel" and a "manipulative effort to present particular arguments," Edelmann , 458 F.3d at 809, quoting United States v. Frazier-El , 204 F.3d 553, 560 (4th Cir. 2000). In this context, the state observes that Weaver initially articulated an intention to assert a "clearly frivolous" religious defense. ¶ 15 But Weaver responded that he still wished to represent himself even after the trial court alerted him that no such defense would be allowed. In context, that response suggests that Weaver accepted the trial court's limitation. Furthermore, the court made no finding that Weaver was asserting his right in order to make his religious argument, and nothing in the record suggests otherwise. Although the court repeatedly expressed concerns about "disrupt [ing]" trial, the record does not support that those concerns arose from an expectation that Weaver would persist in attempting to present a frivolous defense. Rather, the court failed to specify the cause for its concerns. We therefore understand the court's concerns about disruption as those typically arising in the context of any pro se litigant untrained in the law and courtroom procedure. Accordingly, we cannot say this concern justified denying Weaver's motion to represent himself. See McLemore , 230 Ariz. 571, ¶ 17, 288 P.3d 775. Disposition ¶ 16 Although trial courts retain considerable discretion over last-minute requests for self-representation, the court here did not sufficiently identify an adequate basis to deny Weaver's request and sufficient facts are not apparent from this record. See id. Thus, we determine the trial court committed structural error by denying Weaver's request to represent himself. See id. ¶ 15. We therefore vacate the decision of the trial court, vacate Weaver's convictions and sentences, and remand for further proceedings. "[C]ompetence to waive the constitutional right to counsel is the primary restriction on the free-exercise of self-representation." McLemore , 230 Ariz. 571, ¶ 17, 288 P.3d 775. Weaver underwent a competency evaluation before trial pursuant to Rule 11, Ariz. R. Crim. P., and the trial court reviewed the resulting report in response to his request to represent himself. The state suggests the denial "clearly reflect[ed] the court's finding that [Weaver] was not 'competent' " based on its unique position to observe his "demeanor and emotional presentation." The court, however, did not mention any concern with Weaver's competency or behavior at trial, much less make an express determination concerning either. Although we will uphold the court's ruling for any legally correct reason supported by the record, see State v. Childress , 222 Ariz. 334, ¶ 9, 214 P.3d 422 (App. 2009), we are reluctant to say the court made an implicit determination that he was incompetent to represent himself. The state argues that if Weaver's second statement that he was "ready to go" was true, then his first invocation, coupled with a continuance, must have been a delay tactic. Therefore, the state argues, the court had a proper basis to deny his last-minute request. While this might dispose of the first request as a delay tactic, it does not resolve the second. To be clear, the trial court was not obligated to grant Weaver's motion. Indeed, an eleventh-hour request for self-representation suggests a defendant may not be making an informed, intelligent decision. The court could have conducted a Faretta colloquy and denied the request if it determined Weaver had not "competently and intelligently" invoked his right to self-representation. Faretta , 422 U.S. at 814, 95 S.Ct. 2525. Alternatively, after he became aware of the "dangers and disadvantages of self-representation" during such hearing, Weaver may have been dissuaded from exercising his right. Id. The court could also have developed a record demonstrating that Weaver was not truly prepared to proceed and merely intended to delay the trial. See Thompson , 190 Ariz. at 557, 950 P.2d at 1178.

EPPICH, Judge: ¶ 1 Alfonso De Anda III, appeals his convictions and sentences for two counts each of aggravated driving under the influence and aggravated driving with a blood alcohol concentration of .08 or more. He argues the trial court should have suppressed the results of a test of his blood. Because we find no error, we affirm. Factual and Procedural Background ¶ 2 We review the evidence presented at the suppression hearing "in the light most favorable to sustaining the court's ruling, deferring to the court's determination of facts and witness credibility but reviewing de novo its legal conclusions." State v. Waller , 235 Ariz. 479, ¶ 5, 333 P.3d 806, 810 (App. 2014) (citation omitted). After a Tucson police officer stopped De Anda while he was driving, De Anda exhibited signs of alcohol impairment and was arrested. Pursuant to Arizona's implied-consent statute, A.R.S. § 28-1321, another officer advised De Anda as follows: Arizona law states that a person who operates a motor vehicle at any time in this state gives consent to a test or tests of blood, breath, urine or other bodily substance for the purpose of determining alcohol concentration or drug content. The law enforcement officer is authorized to request more than one test and may choose the types of tests. If the test results are not available, or indicate an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or above (0.04 or above in a commercial vehicle,) or indicate any drug defined in ARS 13-3401 or its metabolite without a valid prescription, then your Arizona driving privilege will be suspended for not less than 90 consecutive days. If you refuse, do not expressly agree to submit to, or do not successfully complete the tests, your Arizona driving privilege will be suspended. The suspension will be requested for 12 months, or for two years if you've had a prior implied-consent refusal within the last 84 months. Will you submit to the tests? De Anda agreed, and the officer drew his blood and submitted it for forensic analysis. De Anda was subsequently charged with the four counts described above. ¶ 3 Before trial, De Anda filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained from the blood test, contending that his consent to submit to the test had been coerced by the officer's advisement. Specifically, he argued the officer should have given him the option to submit or refuse testing prior to explaining the penalties associated with refusal. After a hearing, the trial court denied his motion and the results of the blood test were admitted at trial. De Anda was convicted of all four counts and sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment, the longest of which is four months, followed by concurrent, five-year terms of probation. We have jurisdiction over De Anda's appeal pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 13-4031 and 13-4033(A)(1). Implied Consent ¶ 4 The sole issue before us is whether the trial court erred in denying De Anda's motion to suppress. De Anda argues the procedure provided by statute and approved in State v. Valenzuela , 239 Ariz. 299, ¶ 29, 371 P.3d 627, 636 (2016), required the advising officer to give him an opportunity to consent to testing prior to advising him of the consequences of refusal. See § 28-1321(B). He further argues that the officer's failure to follow this procedure rendered his consent to the test involuntary. We review the court's denial of De Anda's motion "for abuse of discretion if it involves a discretionary issue, but review constitutional issues and purely legal issues de novo." State v. Gay , 214 Ariz. 214, ¶ 4, 150 P.3d 787, 790 (App. 2007) (citation omitted). ¶ 5 We recently determined Arizona's implied-consent statute does not require the state to follow the procedure De Anda suggests. Diaz v. Bernini , No. 2 CA-SA 2017-0081, 244 Ariz. 417, ¶ 18, 419 P.3d 950, ----, 2018 WL 1783113 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2018). We further concluded that the type of advisement given to De Anda does not violate Arizona law. Id. ¶¶ 2, 20. But Diaz dealt with a breath test, and we did not address the additional Fourth Amendment concerns associated with a blood test. Id. ¶¶ 6-7 & n.5 ; see also Birchfield v. North Dakota , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 2184-85, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016) (blood tests are physically intrusive and, unlike breath tests, do not fall within the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the general warrant requirement); Schmerber v. California , 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (blood test is a Fourth Amendment search). We therefore must determine whether the implied-consent advisement given to De Anda rendered his consent invalid under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte , 412 U.S. 218, 228, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) ("[T]he Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a consent not be coerced."). ¶ 6 "Although the Fourth Amendment generally prohibits warrantless searches, they are permitted if there is free and voluntary consent to search." Valenzuela , 239 Ariz. 299, ¶ 1, 371 P.3d at 629 (citations omitted). "[W]hether a consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances" surrounding the encounter. Schneckloth , 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041. ¶ 7 We conclude the advisement did not render De Anda's consent involuntary. Unlike Valenzuela , the officer in this case did not tell De Anda he was required to submit to a chemical test. See 239 Ariz. 299, ¶ 30, 371 P.3d at 636. Instead, the officer accurately advised De Anda of the terms of Arizona's implied-consent statute. See § 28-1321. The officer informed him not only of the administrative consequences of refusal, but also, implicitly, of his power to refuse. See Schneckloth , 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041 ("knowledge of the right to refuse consent" is a factor used in determining voluntariness). And, while the Valenzuela Court approved the procedure De Anda suggests, it also approved of the type of advisement given here, wherein a suspect is advised of the consequences of refusal prior to being asked for consent. See 239 Ariz. 299, ¶ 29, 371 P.3d at 636, citing South Dakota v. Neville , 459 U.S. 553, 555 n.2, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983). ¶ 8 Aside from the order of the advisement, De Anda does not identify any facts that suggest his consent was involuntary under the totality of the circumstances surrounding his encounter with law enforcement. See Schneckloth , 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding De Anda's consent voluntary and denying his motion to suppress. Disposition ¶ 9 De Anda's convictions and sentences are affirmed. In his opening brief, De Anda also argued the court erred in admitting evidence that a second tube of his blood had been drawn. However, he withdrew that argument in his reply brief. De Anda also suggests that, if the advisement rendered his consent involuntary, the good-faith exception to the general warrant requirement should not apply to these facts. Because we conclude De Anda's consent was voluntary, we do not consider whether the good-faith exception applies.

ESPINOSA, Judge: ¶ 1 In this special action, Petitioner Jorge Leon challenges the respondent judge's ruling affirming his conviction, following a jury trial in Pima County Justice Court, for driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle with an illegal drug or "its metabolite" in his body, in violation of A.R.S. § 28-1381(A)(3). Leon's appeal to the Pima County Superior Court argued the justice court "err[ed] as a matter of law in finding that benzoylecgonine [ (BE) ], an inactive metabolite of cocaine, satisfied the requirement of a metabolite of a drug as used in [ § 28-1381(A)(3) ]" and in its related instructions to the jury. The respondent judge affirmed Leon's conviction, and this special action petition followed. For the following reasons, we accept jurisdiction and grant relief. Jurisdiction ¶ 2 Special action review is highly discretionary. State ex rel. Romley v. Fields , 201 Ariz. 321, ¶ 4, 35 P.3d 82 (App. 2001). As an initial matter, we note that Leon has no remedy by appeal. See A.R.S. § 22-375 (with exceptions not relevant here, no appeal lies "from the judgment of the superior court given in an action appealed from a justice of the peace or a municipal court"); Ariz. R. P. Spec. Act. 1(a) (special action review not available "where there is an equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal"). Accepting jurisdiction is appropriate when the question raised is a purely legal matter of statewide importance, and one on which lower courts appear to require some guidance. See State ex rel. Montgomery v. Harris , 234 Ariz. 343, ¶ 7, 322 P.3d 160 (2014) (review granted "because whether § 28-1381(A)(3) applies to non-impairing metabolites presents a recurring issue of statewide importance"); Fields , 201 Ariz. 321, ¶ 4, 35 P.3d 82 (special action review appropriate to address recurring legal questions of statewide importance on which lower courts have rendered inconsistent judgments). Because the issue here engages the scope of Harris and appears to be a recurring one that warrants additional guidance, we accept jurisdiction of this special action. Factual and Procedural Background ¶ 3 The facts are undisputed. As set forth in the respondent judge's ruling, in May 2015, law enforcement officers were responding to a single-vehicle accident in the median of I-19 when they made contact with Leon, who was standing by his broken-down truck. After conducting field sobriety tests and suspecting impairment, the officers charged Leon with driving under the influence in violation of § 28-1381(A)(1) and (2) and conducted a blood draw. Leon's blood tests were negative for the presence of alcohol, but positive for two drug metabolites, Carboxy-THC and BE. The state eventually amended the charges to replace the count related to alcohol concentration, § 28-1381(A)(2), with a charge under § 28-1381(A)(3), which proscribes driving "[w]hile there is any drug defined in [A.R.S.] § 13-3401 or its metabolite in the person's body." Justice Court Proceedings and Jury Trial ¶ 4 Relying on Harris , 234 Ariz. 343, 322 P.3d 160, Leon filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the § 28-1381(A)(3) charge, arguing he could not be convicted for the presence of Carboxy-THC, a metabolite of cannabis, or BE, a metabolite of cocaine, because neither metabolite "can cause impairment" and they are instead "by-products of the breakdown of other substances." The justice court denied the motion as to BE, citing the lack of expert testimony "to suggest that a BE metabolite is non-impairing or at what rate it becomes non-impairing." ¶ 5 Leon renewed his argument just before trial, when the justice court was settling jury instructions. He asked the court to include the following instruction: "Metabolite," as used in these instructions, means only a metabolite that itself is capable of causing impairment. Thus, to prove a violation of A.R.S. § 28-1381(A)(3) based on metabolites of proscribed drugs, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any metabolite found in the blood of Jorge Leon while he was driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle is both a metabolite of a proscribed drug AND the metabolite is capable of causing impairment in and of itself. The state conceded that BE was a non-impairing metabolite, but it opposed any such instruction, arguing that § 28-1381(A)(3) is a "strict liability" statute and "that the Harris case is expressly limited to Carboxy[-]THC because of the nature of how it metabolizes, whereas cocaine, which is a very fast metabolizing drug, will metabolize very quickly in the system." The court agreed with the state and denied Leon's request, stating it would instruct the jury using the language of the statute, but modified, as urged by the state, to replace "any drug defined in § 13-3401 or its metabolite" with "[BE], a metabolite of cocaine." ¶ 6 At trial, a forensic scientist for the Arizona Department of Public Safety testified Leon's blood sample contained BE, "one of the main metabolites of cocaine." She explained that cocaine metabolizes rapidly, would remain present in someone's blood for "just a few hours," and continues to metabolize after blood is drawn. In contrast, she said BE, as a metabolite of cocaine, would be detectable for "about a day," or, in the case of "chronic heavy binges," "up to ... five days." She explained cocaine is a stimulant drug that has multiple effects; BE, in contrast, is "an inactive metabolite, which means it's not having any effect on the body." ¶ 7 In moving for acquittal pursuant to Rule 20, Ariz. R. Crim. P., Leon's attorney argued, "Because of the jury instruction on the [ § 28-1381(A)(3) charge], I must concede that there is substantial evidence to go to the jury," but added, "I would disagree with the jury instruction and I believe it doesn't accurately state the law[ ] that now stands." With respect to the § 28-1381(A)(3) charge, the justice court instructed the jury: The State has charged the Defendant with driving or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within the State while there is BE in the Defendant's body.... The central elements that the State ... must prove are: 1. The Defendant was driving [or in] actual physical control of a motor vehicle. 2. This occurred within Pima County, Arizona, at or near the vicinity and on ... or about the time alleged in the Complaint. 3. That at the time of the driving o[r] being in actual physical control of the vehicle, a drug [BE], a metabolite of cocaine[,] was in the Defendant's body. The jury acquitted Leon of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs while impaired to the slightest degree, see § 28-1381(A)(1), but convicted him of the § 28-1381(A)(3) charge. Appeal to Superior Court ¶ 8 Leon appealed from his conviction, again relying on our supreme court's decision in Harris . He argued the trial court had erred as a matter of law in rejecting his proposed instruction and "in ruling that a non-impairing metabolite of a drug satisfied the prohibition of [ § 28-1381(A)(3) ]," thereby resulting in his wrongful conviction under that section of the statute. In its answering brief on appeal, the state again characterized Harris as "a narrow decision addressing only Carboxy-THC." It argued BE is distinguishable because "[c]ocaine is quickly metabolized directly into BE" and Carboxy-THC "is a second metabolite of THC and can stay in a person's body for as many as twenty-eight to thirty days." ¶ 9 In affirming Leon's conviction, the respondent judge concluded the justice court had not erred in rejecting Leon's proposed jury instruction or "in ruling that the prohibition of the statute is satisfied by a non-impairing metabolite of a drug." The respondent further concluded the court's final jury instructions "did not misstate the law or the statute." Citing "distinctive" features of BE and this court's decision in State v. Werderman , 237 Ariz. 342, 350 P.3d 846 (App. 2015), the respondent reasoned "[t]he ruling in Harris is narrow as it pertains to Carboxy-THC, and cannot simply be extended to include" BE "despite it also being a non-impairing metabolite." ¶ 10 In his petition for special action relief, Leon argues the respondent judge "perpetuated [the] error" of the justice court by upholding his conviction, pursuant to § 28-1381(A)(3), for driving while BE, a non-impairing metabolite of cocaine, was present in his body. In response, no longer relying on the authorities it cited in the courts below, the state argues the holding in Harris "should not be extended to BE because of the numerous differences between BE and Carboxy-THC." Discussion ¶ 11 Special action relief is available for a respondent's abuse of discretion, Ariz. R. P. Spec. Act. 3(c), and a court abuses its discretion if it commits an error of law, City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. , 218 Ariz. 172, ¶ 58, 181 P.3d 219 (App. 2008). We review a decision to give or refuse a requested jury instruction for an abuse of discretion. State ex rel. Thomas v. Granville , 211 Ariz. 468, ¶ 8, 123 P.3d 662 (2005). But we review de novo whether a jury instruction accurately reflects the law, reading the instructions as a whole to determine whether the jury received the information needed to arrive at a legally correct decision. Id. Thus, we will not reverse a conviction for an erroneous ruling on jury instructions "unless we can reasonably find that the instructions, when taken as a whole, would mislead the jurors." State v. Rutledge , 197 Ariz. 389, ¶ 15, 4 P.3d 444 (App. 2000), quoting State v. Strayhand , 184 Ariz. 571, 587, 911 P.2d 577, 593 (App. 1995). ¶ 12 With limited exceptions, erroneous jury instructions are subject to either harmless or fundamental error review. See Neder v. United States , 527 U.S. 1, 8-15, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (jury instruction that omits element of the offense subject to harmless-error analysis); State v. Fullem , 185 Ariz. 134, 138, 912 P.2d 1363, 1367 (App. 1995) (failure to instruct jury on essential element of offense "is error," but "not fundamental error where there is no issue as to that element"). But when an erroneous jury instruction may have caused a jury to convict a defendant "for conduct that is not unlawful," the error cannot be found " 'harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' " McDonnell v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2355, 2375, 195 L.Ed.2d 639 (2016), quoting Neder , 527 U.S. at 16, 119 S.Ct. 1827. ¶ 13 The evidence is undisputed that BE is a non-impairing metabolite of cocaine, a point the state conceded in the justice court, the superior court, and its response in this court. The state argued, however, that BE was nonetheless a prohibited substance under § 28-1381(A)(3), and, as noted above, jurors at Leon's trial were instructed they could find Leon guilty of violating § 28-1381(A)(3) if they found he was driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle while "a drug [BE], a metabolite of [c]ocaine[,] was in [his] body." Because no other instruction offered an alternative means of convicting Leon of the § 28-1381(A)(3) offense, the jury, by its verdict, could only have found that Leon had BE, a non-impairing metabolite of cocaine, in his system while he was driving. But our supreme court held in Harris that "the 'metabolite' reference in § 28-1381(A)(3) is limited to any of a proscribed substance's metabolites that are capable of causing impairment." 234 Ariz. 343, ¶ 24, 322 P.3d 160. Accordingly, Leon persuasively argues he was convicted "for conduct that is not unlawful," McDonnell , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. at 2375. See also State v. Ontiveros , 206 Ariz. 539, ¶ 19, 81 P.3d 330 (App. 2003) (conviction could not be based on erroneous jury instruction that permitted jury to convict defendant "for a non-existent offense"). State ex rel. Montgomery v. Harris ¶ 14 In Harris , the defendant was charged with violating § 28-1381(A)(3) based on blood test results showing the presence of Carboxy-THC, a non-impairing metabolite of cannabis. 234 Ariz. 343, ¶¶ 2-4, 322 P.3d 160. The justice court had granted Harris's motion to dismiss, and the superior court affirmed that ruling on appeal. Id. ¶ 5. As described by our supreme court, the superior court reasoned the statute's use of "metabolite" was ambiguous, and it was "unconvinced that the legislature intended to include all possible byproducts-particularly those that are inactive and cannot impair the driver." Id. But this court had granted relief on the state's special action petition, concluding § 28-1381(A)(3)"must be interpreted broadly" to effect "the legislative purpose" for its enactment. Id. ¶ 6, quoting State ex rel. Montgomery v. Harris ex rel. Cty. of Maricopa , 232 Ariz. 76, ¶ 14, 301 P.3d 580 (App. 2013), vacated , 234 Ariz. 343, 322 P.3d 160 (2014). ¶ 15 Although Harris involved only Carboxy-THC, our supreme court's stated reason for its discretionary review was not limited to that substance; as noted earlier, the court "granted review because whether § 28-1381(A)(3) applies to non-impairing metabolites presents a recurring issue of statewide importance." Id. ¶ 7. The court found the statute's reference to "its metabolite" ambiguous, and it engaged in analysis to construe the statute "sensibly" and consistent with legislative intent. Id. ¶¶ 12-13. The court rejected the state's suggestion "that 'its metabolite' includes any byproduct of a drug listed in § 13-3401," finding that construction "leads to absurd results," "[m]ost notably" because it "would create criminal liability regardless of how long the metabolite remains in the driver's system or whether it has any impairing effect." Id. ¶¶ 14-15. And, citing a non-impairing metabolite that bufotenine, a proscribed substance, shared in common with "a legal serotonin supplement," the court further observed, "the State's interpretation would permit prosecution if the discovered substance is a metabolite of a proscribed drug even if the proscribed drug was never ingested," rendering the state's argument "untenable." Id. ¶ 17. ¶ 16 Nor did the court in Harris suggest the meaning of "its metabolite" was contingent on the length of time a metabolite remained in someone's system, whether twenty-eight days in the case of Carboxy-THC or the one to five days that, according to testimony at Leon's trial, BE remains in one's bloodstream after ingesting cocaine. Focusing instead on whether a metabolite was capable of causing impairment, our supreme court also rejected the defendant's suggestion that the statute's meaning was limited to a proscribed substance's "primary metabolite" "because there are drugs proscribed under § 13-3401 that have multiple primary or secondary impairing metabolites." Id. ¶ 23. ¶ 17 In its consideration of legislative purpose, the court further stated, "[I]n enacting the (A)(3) charge, the legislature sought to proscribe driving by those who could be impaired from the presence of illegal drugs in their body" by establishing "that a driver who tests positive for any amount of an impairing drug is legally and irrefutably presumed to be under the influence." Id. ¶ 22. But, the court continued, "Although the legislature could rationally choose to penalize the presence of any amount of an impairing metabolite, we do not believe that [it] contemplated penalizing the presence of a metabolite that is not impairing." Id. The court concluded, "Because the legislature intended to prevent impaired driving, we hold that the 'metabolite' reference in § 28-1381(A)(3) is limited to any of a proscribed substance's metabolites that are capable of causing impairment." Id. ¶ 24. Conclusion ¶ 18 In light of our supreme court's express holding, limiting the meaning of "metabolite" in § 28-1381(A)(3) to those "capable of causing impairment," id. , Harris cannot fairly be characterized as "narrow" or as "pertain[ing] only to Carboxy-THC" as the respondent judge suggested in his ruling and the state argues here. See also Dobson v. McClennen , 238 Ariz. 389, ¶ 16, 361 P.3d 374 (2015) ( Section 28-1381(A)(3)"requires the state to prove that the defendant has been driving or in control of a vehicle while any amount of the proscribed drugs or their impairing metabolites are present.") (emphasis added), citing Harris , 234 Ariz. 343, ¶ 24, 322 P.3d 160. Accordingly, Leon's conviction cannot stand. Disposition ¶ 19 For all of the foregoing reasons, we accept jurisdiction of Leon's petition for special action and grant relief. The respondent judge's ruling on appeal is vacated and Leon's conviction is reversed. Section 28-1381(A)(1) prohibits driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs if impaired to the slightest degree, and § 28-1381(A)(2) prohibits having a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more within two hours of driving when the alcohol concentration results from alcohol consumed either before or while driving. Carboxy-Tetrahydrocannabinol. The original charges had been dismissed in July 2015 but were refiled in March 2016 and subsequently amended. In Harris , our supreme court was "asked to determine whether the phrase 'its metabolite' includes [Carboxy-THC], a non-impairing metabolite of Cannabis," and it "conclude[d] that it does not." 234 Ariz. 343, ¶ 1, 322 P.3d 160. The state requested this modification, telling the court it was "only alleging the one metabolite." The state also repeated its reliance on State v. Werderman , a case involving BE in which this court concluded Harris was not "a significant change in the law," Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(g), entitling the defendant to post-conviction relief. 237 Ariz. 342, ¶¶ 2, 6, 11, 350 P.3d 846 (App. 2015). Unlike Leon, whose direct appeal was before the respondent judge, Werderman's convictions had been affirmed before Harris was issued, and her claim was asserted as a collateral attack under Rule 32. Id. ¶¶ 1-3 ; see also State v. Shrum , 220 Ariz. 115, ¶ 11, 203 P.3d 1175 (2009) ("Rule 32 ... streamlined Arizona procedure for collateral attacks on convictions."). Citing Shrum , we explained that Harris was not a "change" in the law but "merely the first case to address the ambiguity of the phrase 'its metabolite' " in § 28-1381(A)(3). Werderman , 237 Ariz. 342, ¶ 11, 350 P.3d 846 ; see also Shrum , 220 Ariz. 115, ¶¶ 20-21, 203 P.3d 1175. Werderman is thus limited to the post-conviction rule it addressed and has no applicability to Leon's appeal. As noted above, this court's Werderman decision is not applicable here. At trial and on appeal before the respondent judge, the state cited this court's decision in State v. McFadden , No. 1 CA-CR 14-0614, 2016 WL 3063764 (Ariz. App. May 31, 2016), arguing "while the mere presence of [BE] alone is insufficient to satisfy § 28-1381(A)(3), the presence of [BE], coupled with additional factors," such as evidence of impairment, "could be sufficient" "for reasonable jurors to find that a person had cocaine in his system at the time he was driving." See id. ¶¶ 7-9. We do not disagree, but McFadden is unavailing here. Unlike McFadden , the jury's verdict in Leon's trial was limited by the trial court's specific instructions. As a result, the verdict could only reflect the presence of BE-and not cocaine-in Leon's system, and the presence of BE, a non-impairing metabolite, is not prohibited by § 28-1381(A)(3). See Harris , 234 Ariz. 343, ¶ 24, 322 P.3d 160. In its response to Leon's petition, the state also argues the court's analysis in Harris "should not apply to cocaine" "[b]ecause cocaine metabolizes so quickly," apparently referring to evidence that cocaine metabolizes to BE in "just a few hours." But the court in Harris considered similar evidence-that an impairing metabolite of THC, Hydroxy-THC, does not "exist in the blood for very long" and is quickly converted to Carboxy-THC. 234 Ariz. 343, ¶¶ 4, 16, 322 P.3d 160. Notwithstanding that evidence, the court held a driver could not be convicted "based merely on the presence of a non-impairing metabolite" like Carboxy-THC. Id. ¶ 24.

Justice Gould voted to grant review.

JONES, Judge: ¶ 1 Appellant appeals the dismissal of his complaint seeking recovery for the quantum meruit value of legal services he provided pursuant to a non-written contingent fee agreement. We hold that, in the absence of a written fee agreement, an attorney may not recover the quantum meruit value of his services because unwritten contingent fee agreements are void as against public policy. Accordingly, we affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 2 This case arises from Appellant's representation of the Erhardts (the Clients) from 2011 to 2013 in a personal injury matter. The Clients were initially represented by Attorney Jerry Krumwiede, who then sought Appellant's assistance with an understanding that Appellant would ultimately become primary counsel. Appellant and the Clients never executed a written contingent fee agreement, and Appellant and Krumwiede never entered into a written agreement to divide fees. Following a falling out between Appellant and Krumwiede, the Clients dismissed Appellant as their attorney. Appellant asserts that while involved with the Clients' case, he engaged in "vigorous legal representation of [the Clients]" and performed 428.5 hours of work on their behalf. ¶ 3 The Clients eventually also fired Krumwiede and retained Appellee, Haralson, Miller, Pitt, Feldman & McAnally, P.L.C. (Haralson), to represent them. Haralson ultimately settled the Clients' claims. Appellant, who had previously notified all parties he had placed a charging lien against any recovery obtained as compensation for his work, then demanded payment. When Haralson refused, Appellant sued, alleging unjust enrichment and seeking quantum meruit damages. ¶ 4 Haralson moved to dismiss Appellant's complaint, arguing Appellant's claims failed as a matter of law because he: (1) did not allege the existence of a written contingent fee agreement with the Clients, in violation of the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct, see Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 42, ER 1.5(c) (providing that "[a] contingent fee agreement shall be in a writing signed by the client"), and (2) failed to allege the legal representation had been terminated without justification, which, Haralson asserted, was a prerequisite to recovery in quantum meruit . The trial court accepted the parties' stipulation to stay discovery pending resolution of the motion. ¶ 5 In response to the motion to dismiss, Appellant admitted he had no written contingent fee agreement but claimed he "entered into an oral agreement for a division of contingency fees recovered upon success of [the Clients'] suit." Appellant also argued that because his claims "sound in equity," they "survive irrespective of the validity or enforceability of any oral contract between himself and [the Clients]." At a hearing on the motion to dismiss, Appellant's counsel explained: [W]ell, the [C]lients knew about it and the other attorney obviously knew about it, but ... Mr. Krumwiede and [Appellant] were in the same office, they felt like there was a relationship that-that permitted their-to have a trusting relationship without, you know, without obviously informing the clients they knew that [Appellant] was one of their lawyers and they didn't go through the formality of putting it in writing. Appellant's counsel stated Krumwiede had a written fee agreement with the Clients and asserted Appellant "would have been operating under that as an associate counsel," but, again, "that part wasn't written, the fee-sharing part wasn't written." ¶ 6 The trial court dismissed Appellant's complaint, reasoning: (1) Appellant did not allege the existence of a written fee agreement with either the Clients or Krumwiede, and (2) Appellant's failure to comply with ER 1.5 barred recovery in quantum meruit as a matter of public policy. Although Appellant explicitly conceded in his pleadings and at oral argument that he had no written agreements, he then filed a motion for reconsideration alleging discovery would show Appellant "had Krumwiede's assurance that such written consent had been obtained." The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration and entered final judgment in Haralson's favor. Appellant timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1). DISCUSSION ¶ 7 We review an order dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim de novo . Coleman v. City of Mesa , 230 Ariz. 352, 355-56, ¶¶ 7-8, 284 P.3d 863, 866-67 (2012). We will affirm if the plaintiff would not, as a matter of law, be entitled to relief "under any interpretation of the facts susceptible of proof."Id. at 356, ¶ 8, 284 P.3d at 867 (quoting Fid. Sec. Life Ins. v. State, Dep't of Ins. , 191 Ariz. 222, 224, ¶ 4, 954 P.2d 580, 582 (1998) ). I. Appellant is Barred from Recovery in Quantum Meruit . ¶ 8 Appellant argues that, even in the absence of a written fee agreement, he may still recover the quantum meruit value of the legal services he rendered. Although "recovery under quantum meruit presupposes that no enforceable written or oral contract exists," 42 C.J.S. Implied Contracts § 62 (2017) ; see also W. Corr. Grp., Inc. v. Tierney , 208 Ariz. 583, 590, ¶ 27, 96 P.3d 1070, 1077 (App. 2004) (citing Blue Ridge Sewer Improvement Dist. v. Lowry & Assocs., Inc. , 149 Ariz. 373, 375, 718 P.2d 1026, 1028 (App. 1986) ), this does not mean the remedy is available in every circumstance where no contract exists. "[E]quitable relief is not available when recovery at law is forbidden because the contract is void as against public policy." Landi v. Arkules , 172 Ariz. 126, 136, 835 P.2d 458, 468 (App. 1992) ; see also Mousa v. Saba , 222 Ariz. 581, 587, ¶ 27, 218 P.3d 1038, 1044 (App. 2009) (denying the plaintiff recovery in unjust enrichment for performance of illegal broker services); Peterson v. Anderson , 155 Ariz. 108, 113, 745 P.2d 166, 171 (App. 1987) (denying recovery for a contract claim of an out-of-state attorney seeking payment pursuant to a fee-splitting arrangement that required him to practice law in a manner that was against public policy). ¶ 9 Appellant argues the principles of Landi and Peterson are inapplicable because the attorneys in those cases requested equitable relief after violating both ethical rules and relevant statutes. See Landi , 172 Ariz. at 131, 835 P.2d at 463 ; Peterson , 155 Ariz. at 111, 745 P.2d at 169. Appellant argues that because he only violated the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct, but not a statute, the unwritten fee agreements are not void as against public policy and he may still recover quantum meruit damages. We find that such an interpretation would create a distinction where there is no difference. ¶ 10 Public policy is derived from "[t]he collective rules, principles, or approaches to problems that affect the commonwealth or ... promote the general good; [specifically], principles and standards regarded by the legislature or by the courts as being of fundamental concern to the state and the whole of society." Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). The rules promulgated by our supreme court to regulate the practice of law establish a portion of the public policy of the state, "have the same force and effect as state statutes," and are "equally binding." Peterson , 155 Ariz. at 112-13, 745 P.2d at 170-71 (citing Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Meneghin , 130 Ariz. 119, 122, 634 P.2d 570, 572 (1981) ). ¶ 11 An attorney is permitted to provide services for a fee "contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service[s are] rendered." ER 1.5(c). However, "[a] contingent fee agreement shall be in a writing signed by the client and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined." Id. At the time Appellant provided legal services to the Clients, the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct allowed "[a] division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm," but "only if ... the client agrees, in a writing signed by the client, to the participation of all the lawyers involved." ER 1.5(e)(2) (2015). These provisions prohibit oral contingent fee and fee-splitting agreements. We will not disregard the clear and unambiguous direction of our supreme court, as promulgated through the ethical rules. ¶ 12 The Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct are designed to prevent harm and protect clients. See In re Zang , 154 Ariz. 134, 144, 146, 741 P.2d 267, 277, 279 (1987) (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n , 436 U.S. 447, 463-64, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978) ). An oral agreement for legal services may mislead, misinform, or confuse the client. See ER 1.5, cmt. 2 ("A written statement concerning the terms of the engagement reduces the possibility of misunderstanding."). Moreover, when an attorney fails to follow ER 1.5, one or both parties may later attempt to alter the terms of the representation and/or payment during the course of litigation. A client, dissatisfied with the outcome, may assert he was misled by an unscrupulous legal adviser and refuse to pay the agreed-upon amount, or an attorney may spend more time on a case than anticipated and attempt to increase his recovery to offset those additional expenditures. Such disputes devolve into self-serving recollections of how the agreement was formed and what the parties intended at the litigation's outset. As the disciplinary judge stated in the course of separate proceedings against Appellant in connection with this matter, ER 1.5"avoids precisely the chaos in the attorney client relationship [that Appellant] brought by seeking to obtain a division of the fees contrary to the ethical rules." See In re Levine , PDJ 2017-9033 (State Bar of Arizona disciplinary proceeding Aug. 25, 2017) (decision and order imposing sanctions), at *22. ¶ 13 Reducing a fee agreement to writing ultimately protects both the attorney and the client in the event of a fee dispute and seeks to avoid unnecessary litigation. Appellant did not embrace these protections when he undertook the Clients' representation. His actions violated the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct, and his reliance upon the asserted existence of oral contingent fee and division of fee agreements are void as against public policy. Therefore, recovery in quantum meruit is not available. ¶ 14 We are not persuaded by extra-jurisdictional case law that suggests an attorney is entitled to recover in quantum meruit even if he violated applicable ethical rules. See, e.g. , Huskinson & Brown, L.L.P. v. Wolf , 32 Cal.4th 453, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 693, 84 P.3d 379 (2004). Neither the interpretation and application of the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct, nor this state's public policy is subject to meaningful analysis by applying the law of other jurisdictions. And although Appellant argues that denying him restitution will lead to unjust enrichment, this is "a less weighty consideration than the policy of discouraging illegal bargains." Landi , 172 Ariz. at 136, 835 P.2d at 468 (quoting Dan B. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 13.5 (1973), and citing Restatement (First) of Restitution § 140 & cmt. a (1937) ). This is particularly true here, where the pitfalls Appellant now faces could have been avoided through simple compliance with the obligations of his profession. II. The Trial Court's Decision is Supported by the Record. ¶ 15 Appellant argues the trial court improperly "adopted the position" that he associated with Krumwiede without the Clients' written consent. This argument is premised upon his assertion, made for the first time within his motion for reconsideration, that further discovery would reveal evidence Krumwiede had assured him the Clients had "signed off" on Appellant's association. ¶ 16 Generally, arguments raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration are not preserved for appeal. See Evans Withycombe, Inc. v. W. Innovations, Inc. , 215 Ariz. 237, 240, ¶ 15, 159 P.3d 547, 550 (App. 2006) (citing Union Rock & Materials Corp. v. Scottsdale Conference Ctr. , 139 Ariz. 268, 272-73, 678 P.2d 453, 457-58 (App. 1983) ). Moreover, Appellant's argument directly contradicted his prior representations to the trial court, whereby he explicitly admitted, at least twice, that he had no written agreement as mandated by the ethical rules. See supra ¶5. The court assumed nothing; it took Appellant at his word and applied the specific language of ER 1.5 as written. Appellant's own admissions support dismissal, and we find no error. Cf. Adams v. Bear , 87 Ariz. 288, 294, 350 P.2d 751, 755 (1960) ("[A] party is bound by his judicial declarations and may not contradict them in ... subsequent proceedings involving the same parties and questions.") (citations omitted); Martin v. Wood , 71 Ariz. 457, 459-60, 229 P.2d 710, 711-13 (1951) (proscribing "the mischiefs" that would occur "from the destruction of all confidence in the intercourse and dealings of men, if they were allowed to deny that which by their solemn and deliberate acts they have declared to be true") (quoting Hatten Realty Co. v. Baylies , 42 Wyo. 69, 290 P. 561, 566 (1930) ); Miles v. Franz Lumber Co. , 14 Ariz. 455, 457, 130 P. 1112, 1113 (1913) ("[A party] should not be permitted to 'blow hot and cold' with reference to the same transaction, or insist at different times on the truth of each of two conflicting allegations according to the promptings of his private interest.") (quotation omitted). III. The Trial Court's Dismissal Was Not Procedurally Deficient. ¶ 17 Appellant argues the trial court's decision "was tainted by factual findings regarding matters outside the body of the complaint," suggesting the court effectively and improperly converted the motion to one for summary judgment before Appellant had time to conduct discovery. This argument is not well-taken. First, Appellant stipulated to the stay of discovery pending resolution of the motion to dismiss, suggesting he already had within his possession the materials and information necessary to adequately defend the motion. Second, a court may consider matters "central to the complaint," but outside the pleadings, when ruling on a motion to dismiss. Strategic Dev. & Constr., Inc. v. 7th & Roosevelt Partners, L.L.C. , 224 Ariz. 60, 64, ¶ 14, 226 P.3d 1046, 1050 (App. 2010) (citing Alt. Energy, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. , 267 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2001) ). Whether a written contingent fee or division of fee agreement existed was a matter central to the complaint. We therefore find no error in the court's handling of the motion. ¶ 18 Appellant also argues the absence of a written fee agreement is an affirmative defense, which he was not required to preemptively deny within his complaint. But because the record shows Appellant admitted he had no written contingent fee agreement, see supra ¶5, we need not address this contention. With this admission, Appellant foreclosed proof of any set of facts which would entitle him to relief. CONCLUSION ¶ 19 An attorney wishing to be compensated for his professional services on a contingency basis must have a written fee agreement signed by the client. In the absence of a written contingent fee agreement, an attorney should anticipate that work done in violation of ER 1.5(c) is being undertaken without any meaningful expectation of compensation. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. " 'Quantum meruit' literally means 'as much as he deserves,' " and contemplates recovery of a reasonable amount to avoid unjust enrichment. Murdock-Bryant Constr., Inc. v. Pearson , 146 Ariz. 48, 52 & n.4, 703 P.2d 1197, 1201 (1985) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1119 (5th ed. 1979) ). Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite the current version of rules and statutes. Effective January 1, 2016, ER 1.5(e)(2) was amended to permit a division of fees between lawyers not in the same firm if they obtained written consent from the client to both "the participation of all the lawyers involved and the division of the fees and responsibilities between the lawyers." ER 1.5(e)(2). Appellant also asserts the trial court improperly assumed he was terminated from the Clients' representation for cause. However, the court's ruling contains no such findings.

OROZCO, Judge: ¶ 1 Premiere Vacation Collection Owners Association, Inc. (the Association) appeals the superior court's rulings in favor of Norman Zwicky. For the following reasons, we affirm the summary judgment in favor of Zwicky enforcing his statutory right to inspect Association records but vacate the order modifying the protective order and directing the Association to send a notice to its members. We remand for further proceedings relating to the protective order. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶ 2 The Association is an incorporated association of members holding an interest in the Premiere Vacation Collection timeshare plan. See Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 33-2202(13) (defining timeshare plan). Zwicky is a member of the Association. ¶ 3 In 2004, Zwicky paid approximately $26,000 for his timeshare interest. See A.R.S. § 33-2202(11) (defining timeshare interest). After a subsidiary of Diamond Resorts Corporation acquired a substantial portion of the timeshare assets, Zwicky experienced a significant increase in his annual assessments. Zwicky alleges that the high assessments rendered his membership interest "essentially worthless." ¶ 4 Zwicky filed a lawsuit in superior court seeking "judicial enforcement of his right to inspect the books and records" of the Association pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 10-11602, 33-2209, and common law. See A.R.S. § 10-11602 (providing a statutory right of inspection for members of nonprofit corporations); A.R.S. § 33-2209 (providing a statutory right of inspection for members of timeshare associations). His stated purpose was to determine whether the Association's board "acted reasonably and in good faith in calculating and approving the assessments in question." ¶ 5 In response to discovery, the Association produced some documents. After reviewing the documents, Zwicky's counsel determined they were insufficient to "clearly ascertain and verify the basis for calculating Mr. Zwicky's annual assessments." Accordingly, Zwicky moved for summary judgment seeking inspection of additional documents. The Association cross-moved for summary judgment asserting that it had already provided the documents requested in the complaint and all documents to which Zwicky was entitled under A.R.S. § 33-2209. ¶ 6 Following oral argument on the cross-motions, the superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Zwicky. In a subsequent ruling, the court specified the documents Zwicky could inspect and issued a protective order stating they "shall be maintained in confidence" and disclosed only to Zwicky, his attorneys, accountants, and experts. Thereafter, the Association produced more than one thousand pages of documents, designating some as "confidential," claiming they contained "sensitive personal information, personnel records, trade secrets, proprietary business information, or other confidential research, development, financial, or commercial information." ¶ 7 After reviewing the documents produced, Zwicky moved to modify the protective order. He explained that the documents revealed a good faith basis for a federal class action lawsuit, and asked the superior court to permit him to "quot[e], refer[ ] to, or otherwise utiliz[e]" the documents in his proposed lawsuit. At the same time, Zwicky moved for an order requiring the Association to send a letter or notice to Association members informing them that the Association was under court order to produce records in conjunction with Zwicky's lawsuit. ¶ 8 After oral argument, the superior court granted Zwicky's motion and modified its prior order to authorize Zwicky and his attorneys to use the documents produced by the Association "in a complaint or other court filing in the proposed class action litigation." The court also ordered the Association to send a Notice of Court Order (Notice) to timeshare members, pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-2210, advising them of the document production and providing them with contact information for Zwicky's counsel. ¶ 9 Thereafter, the superior court entered final judgment, and the Association timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1). DISCUSSION I. Summary Judgment ¶ 10 The Association first argues the superior court erred in entering summary judgment on Zwicky's claim to inspect its documents. We review the court's grant of summary judgment de novo. See Price v. City of Mesa , 236 Ariz. 267, 269, ¶ 7, 339 P.3d 650, 652 (App. 2014). We also review questions of law de novo, including the court's interpretation of statutes. See id. ¶ 11 In 2005, the Arizona Legislature enacted the Timeshare Owner's Association and Management Act, A.R.S. §§ 33-2201 to -2211. See 2005 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 132 (1st Reg. Sess.). The Act grants timeshare owners the right to "inspect and copy all financial and other records of the association" that are "directly related to the timeshare plan." A.R.S. § 33-2209(A). Pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-2209(B), an owner's written request for records must be made "in good faith and for a proper purpose." A.R.S. § 33-2209(B)(2). A. Compliance with A.R.S. § 33-2209 ¶ 12 The Association argues that Zwicky's request did not comply with the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-2209. Our review of the record, however, reflects that Zwicky followed the statutory procedure in making his request. Before filing his lawsuit, Zwicky sent a letter to the Association asking for specific records as required by A.R.S. § 33-2209. When the Association did not produce all the records requested, Zwicky filed a lawsuit seeking judicial enforcement of his statutory inspection rights. ¶ 13 Contrary to the Association's assertion, the records the superior court ordered the Association to produce fall within the scope of A.R.S. § 33-2209. Specifically, the court ordered production of reports filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, property management agreements, profit and loss statements, annual budgets, occupancy rates, room rental revenue, and expense information. These documents qualify as "financial and other records of the association" that are "directly related to the timeshare plan." A.R.S. § 33-2209(A). ¶ 14 In addition, our review of the record supports the superior court's finding that Zwicky made his request "in good faith and for a proper purpose." A.R.S. § 33-2209(B)(2). The requirement of "proper purpose" dates back to territorial times when the Supreme Court of the Territory of Arizona applied it to a stockholder's request for corporate documents. See Hallenborg v. Cobre Grande Copper Co. , 8 Ariz. 329, 336, 74 P. 1052, 1054 (1904) ("[T]he courts of this territory are not loath to lend their aid ... to enable a stockholder to obtain access to the records of his corporation in a proper case, and for a proper purpose."). Also, in Tucson Gas & Electric Co. v. Schantz , 5 Ariz. App. 511, 428 P.2d 686 (1967), the Arizona Supreme Court addressed a shareholder's request for corporate records and explained that a proper purpose is one that enables a shareholder to "derive any information that will enable him to protect his interest." Id . at 513, 428 P.2d 686. ¶ 15 We hold that this definition of "proper purpose" applies to a timeshare owner's statutory right to inspect records under A.R.S. § 33-2209. "Proper purpose" means a desire by a timeshare owner to derive information that will enable him to protect his interest in the timeshare plan and that reasonably relates to his interest as a timeshare member. ¶ 16 Here, the stated purpose of Zwicky's statutory record request was: to determine whether the [Association's] Board acted reasonably and in good faith in calculating and approving the assessments in question ... and to determine whether [Diamond Resorts International (DRI) ] has been paying a fair, equitable and proportionate share of common expenses for units DRI owns, controls, and/or rents to the general public on a profit-generating basis.[ ] As more fully explained in later pleadings, Zwicky was attempting to determine why his annual assessments had roughly tripled to the point that his financial interest in the timeshare had become "worthless" and "specifically whether those problems [we]re due to improper management practices." ¶ 17 Zwicky's inquiry could enable him to protect his interest in the timeshare plan and was reasonably related to his interest as a timeshare member. Therefore, Zwicky has articulated a proper purpose for his record request. B. Mootness ¶ 18 The Association also argues that "[a]t the time Mr. Zwicky sought summary judgment, [the Association] had already provided all of the information and documents requested in Paragraph 20 of the Verified Complaint, rendering this action moot." ¶ 19 Paragraph 20 of Zwicky's complaint listed the information he had previously requested from the Association "to no avail." The list included: (1) the number of points in each resort held by private owners, DRI, the local resort association, and the Association, as well as the corresponding percentages of ownership those points represented, and (2) the amount paid by DRI or its affiliates to each local resort association and to the Association in the form of assessments or other contributions and how that amount was calculated or determined. ¶ 20 While the documents that the Association provided in response to Zwicky's discovery requests contain some of the information listed in Paragraph 20 of Zwicky's complaint, they do not fully explain how the Association calculated or determined annual assessments. Moreover, Zwicky's complaint sought an order both: (1) broadly recognizing and enforcing his inspection rights under A.R.S. § 33-2209, and (2) specifically requiring the Association to "produce, or make available for copying, the books and records described above," presumably in Paragraph 20. Accordingly, the court did not merely grant Zwicky an order authorizing his inspection of the information specified within Paragraph 20. Rather, the court enforced his inspection rights under A.R.S. § 33-2209 as those rights were defined by the superior court. ¶ 21 Accordingly, we affirm the superior court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Zwicky. II. Modification of the Protective Order ¶ 22 The Association next argues the superior court "erred in modifying the protective order without giving [the Association] the opportunity to submit argument and evidence showing why documents produced in reliance on the protective order were entitled to confidentiality." We review a ruling on a protective order for an abuse of discretion. See Blazek v. Superior Court , 177 Ariz. 535, 536, 869 P.2d 509, 510 (App. 1994). A court may abuse its discretion "if the record lacks substantial evidence to support its ruling." See Tritschler v. Allstate Ins. , 213 Ariz. 505, 518, ¶ 41, 144 P.3d 519, 532 (App. 2006), as corrected , (Dec. 19, 2006). ¶ 23 The superior court initially ordered Zwicky to maintain the documents produced by the Association "in confidence" and to disclose them only to his attorneys, accountants, and experts. The Association complied with this order by producing more than one thousand documents, some marked "confidential." Thereafter, Zwicky moved the court to modify its ruling and permit him to quote, refer to, and utilize the documents in filing his proposed federal class action lawsuit. Zwicky's motion did not specifically propose the use of the documents marked "confidential." ¶ 24 Over the Association's objection, the superior court granted Zwicky's motion and modified its protective order. This modification applied to all documents, including those marked "confidential." At oral argument on Zwicky's motion, counsel for the Association asked for an opportunity to submit supplemental briefing to establish why certain documents should continue to be protected as confidential. The court denied his request. ¶ 25 There is nothing in the record to suggest that the superior court reviewed the confidential documents produced by the Association to determine if they should remain subject to a protective order. The Association made an initial showing of why certain documents should be protected as trade secret, proprietary, and confidential. Because the relief requested by Zwicky's motion regarding the "confidential" documents was unclear, we think it appropriate to allow the Association an opportunity to establish why the protective order should continue to apply to these "confidential" documents. Accordingly, we vacate the superior court's ruling modifying the protective order and remand for further proceedings allowing the court to evaluate the need for a continued protective order covering the confidential documents. III. Notice to Association Members ¶ 26 Finally, the Association argues the superior court erred in ordering it to send the Notice to Association members pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-2210. We review this issue of statutory interpretation de novo. See Price , 236 Ariz. at 269, ¶ 7, 339 P.3d at 652. In doing so, "we look to the statute's plain language to determine its meaning." Id. (citation omitted). ¶ 27 Section 33-2210 provides in pertinent part: The association or other managing entity shall mail to those persons listed on the owners' list prescribed by subsection A any materials provided by any owner, on the written request of that owner, if the purpose of the mailing is to advance legitimate association business. A.R.S. § 33-2210(B) (emphasis added). ¶ 28 Here, the superior court ordered the Association to send the Notice, which included the following language: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that this Court has ordered the production, for the purpose of inspection, copying and investigation, of certain business records of Defendant Premier Vacation Collection Owners Association ... relating to the levying and apportionment of assessments, to Plaintiff Norman Zwicky, a member of the Association represented by Attorney Jon Phelps of the law firm of Phelps & Moore, PLC. ... Please do not contact the Court. The Court cannot answer any questions. You may, if you wish, contact the Plaintiff's attorney. The Court has made no ruling on any claim of improper conduct by the Defendant. The Court's role in this matter was strictly to enforce Mr. Zwicky's rights to inspect certain business records. The Notice also contained contact information for Zwicky's attorney. ¶ 29 In superior court, Zwicky stated his intent to file a federal class action lawsuit alleging "misfeasance and malfeasance in the conduct of this timeshare enterprise." The implicit purpose of the Notice is to allow other timeshare members to contact Zwicky's attorney, who in turn can advise them of the proposed class action lawsuit. ¶ 30 Applying the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-2210, we must determine whether the purpose of the Notice advances "legitimate association business." We conclude that it does not. Rather, the Notice benefits Zwicky and his lawyer in their efforts to amass a group of plaintiffs for their proposed class action lawsuit. Therefore, the superior court erred in ordering the Association to mail the Notice pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-2210. ¶ 31 Accordingly, we vacate the order directing the Association to mail the Notice to its members. IV. Attorneys' Fees ¶ 32 Zwicky requests attorneys' fees on appeal but provides no statutory basis or other authority for such an award. Contrary to Zwicky's assertion, a prevailing party on appeal is not entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees absent a valid basis. Accordingly, we deny his request. See ARCAP 21(a)(2). ¶ 33 Zwicky also requests attorneys' fees at the superior court level. The superior court, however, denied his request for fees, and Zwicky did not cross-appeal from that ruling. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review the court's ruling. CONCLUSION ¶ 34 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Zwicky. We vacate the court's order modifying the protective order and requiring the Association to mail the Notice to its members. We remand for further proceedings regarding the need for a continued protective order applying to the confidential documents. Because both parties partially prevailed on appeal, we decline to award costs. We cite to the current version of applicable statutes absent any change material to this decision. The Association filed a motion to stay execution of the final judgment pending this appeal, which this Court granted. The parties disagree about the relationship between the Association and DRI. Zwicky alleges the Association "is merely an arm or instrumentality of DRI" and that DRI controls the Association's board of directors. The Association disputes these allegations, acknowledging only that the Association has a management agreement with Diamond Resorts Management, Inc., an affiliate of DRI. We need not resolve that dispute in this appeal. The Association also argues that A.R.S. § 33-2209 grants the board discretion to limit the production and inspection. While we acknowledge that pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-2209(C), the Association's board is responsible for "determining the appropriateness" of an owner's records request, we conclude the statute does not prohibit a timeshare member from judicially challenging the board's determination. The Association also argues that "Zwicky's requests for documents are barred by the business judgment rule." That doctrine "precludes judicial inquiry into actions taken by a director in good faith and in the exercise of honest judgment in the legitimate and lawful furtherance of a corporate purpose." Shoen v. Shoen , 167 Ariz. 58, 65, 804 P.2d 787, 794 (App. 1990). The business judgment rule does not negate Zwicky's statutory right to inspect the Association's records under A.R.S. § 33-2209. Having determined that Zwicky was entitled to the records under A.R.S. § 33-2209, we need not address his rights under A.R.S. § 10-11602 or common law. See Freeport McMoRan Corp. v. Langley Eden Farms, LLC , 228 Ariz. 474, 478, ¶ 15, 268 P.3d 1131, 1135 (App. 2011) ("[W]e do not issue advisory opinions or decide unnecessary issues."). Subsection A of the statute prohibits an association from publishing the "owners' list or provid[ing] a copy of it to any owner or to any third party." A.R.S. § 33-2210(A). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 may provide Zwicky and his lawyer a means of notifying other potential plaintiffs. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (addressing notice to potential class members).

OROZCO, Judge: ¶ 1 Plaintiff Stephanie Jackson (Jackson) appeals the superior court's judgment in favor of Defendants Eagle KMC, LLC, Rachael Gabriella Hender, Werner Enterprises, Inc., and Drivers Management, LLC (collectively Eagle). Because the court erred in granting summary judgment, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 2 The facts in this case are not in dispute. Jackson, a South Carolina resident, was employed as a truck driver by Drivers Management, a Nebraska company. Drivers Management contracted with Eagle, an Arizona company, to train Jackson to drive a semi-tractor trailer. In February 2014, Jackson was riding as a student-passenger in the sleeper berth of a semi-tractor trailer in Golden Valley. Rachael Hender, an Eagle employee, was driving under Werner Enterprises' federal motor carrier USDOT number and authority. Jackson suffered serious injuries after Hender allegedly lost control and rolled the vehicle. ¶ 3 Jackson filed a workers' compensation claim against Drivers Management in Nebraska, as required by her employment contract. The workers' compensation claim was adjudicated in Nebraska. Drivers Management was self-insured for workers' compensation and had a subrogation claim against any third-party recovery. ¶ 4 In February 2016, Jackson filed this lawsuit against Eagle in Mohave County before the running of the two-year statute of limitations under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 12-542. Jackson included Drivers Management as a defendant solely for the "purpose of reimbursement, under the right of subrogation," as required by Nebraska law. ¶ 5 Eagle filed a motion to dismiss, later converted to a motion for summary judgment, alleging Jackson's complaint was time-barred by A.R.S. § 23-1023.B and Drivers Management was not a proper defendant under A.R.S. § 23-1022.A. Jackson's response explained Drivers Management was included as a defendant solely for subrogation purposes pursuant to Nebraska law, and because Arizona law did not apply to her workers' compensation complaint, the one-year time-bar under A.R.S. § 23-1023.B was inapplicable. In reply, Eagle argued that regardless of whether Jackson received benefits in Nebraska, she was still entitled to workers' compensation benefits in Arizona and thus, § 23-1023.B was applicable. ¶ 6 The superior court found there was no material fact at issue because Jackson's complaint was not filed within one year of the accident, and she did not receive a reassignment from Drivers Management as required under A.R.S. § 23-1023. Therefore, the court concluded that Eagle was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. ¶ 7 Jackson filed a motion for reconsideration, Eagle filed a response and oral argument was held. The superior court again granted summary judgment to Eagle and reiterated its original findings. Jackson timely appealed and we have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101.A. DISCUSSION ¶ 8 Entry of summary judgment is proper "if the moving party shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We determine de novo whether any genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the superior court erred in applying the law, and will uphold the court's ruling if correct for any reason. Logerquist v. Danforth , 188 Ariz. 16, 18, 932 P.2d 281, 283 (App. 1996). We construe the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Wells Fargo Bank v. Ariz. Laborers, Teamsters & Cement Masons Local No. 395 Pension Tr. Fund , 201 Ariz. 474, 482, ¶ 13, 38 P.3d 12, 20 (2002). ¶ 9 Issues of statutory interpretation and application are reviewed de novo. Pima Cty. v. Pima Cty. Law Enf't Merit Sys. Council , 211 Ariz. 224, 227, ¶ 13, 119 P.3d 1027, 1030 (2005). "We construe workers' compensation laws liberally, remedially, and in a manner ensuring that injured employees receive maximum available benefits." Oaks v. McQuiller , 191 Ariz. 333, 334, ¶ 5, 955 P.2d 971, 972 (App. 1998) (internal quotations omitted). The statutory language at issue must be considered in the context of the entire statutory scheme. Id . ¶ 10 Jackson argues the superior court erred in granting summary judgment by finding her claims were barred by A.R.S. § 23-1023. Jackson contends that because she sought and received workers' compensation benefits in Nebraska, and is not seeking additional workers' compensation benefits in Arizona, Nebraska law should control the subrogation claim for her employer. A.R.S. § 23-1023.B protects an employer or insurance carrier's interest in recovering benefits paid to an employee caused by a third party and reads in relevant part: If the employee who is entitled to compensation under this chapter or the employee's dependents do not pursue a remedy pursuant to this section against the other person by instituting an action within one year after the cause of action accrues ... the claim against the other person is deemed assigned to the insurance carrier or self-insured employer and all of the following apply ... The claim may be prosecuted or compromised by the insurance carrier or the person liable for the self-insured employer or may be reassigned in its entirety to the employee or the employee's dependents. After the reassignment, the employee who is entitled to compensation, or the employee's dependents, shall have the same rights to pursue the claim as if it had been filed within the first year. ¶ 11 This court has not interpreted A.R.S. § 23-1023.B as a statute of limitations. Moretto v. Samaritan Health Sys. , 190 Ariz. 343, 348, 947 P.2d 917, 922 (App. 1997). Instead, "it is part of a statutory scheme that requires tortfeasors to pay damages to those injured by their wrongs, that reimburses employers/carriers for their compensation liability, and that allows injured employees to receive the excess of the damage recovery over compensation but eliminates any double recovery." Id . The statutory scheme was not designed to create a trap for plaintiffs or shield tortfeasors from liability. Id . ¶ 12 Jackson relies on several cases holding that the time limit in A.R.S. § 23-1023.B does not apply when an employee has not applied for or accepted workers' compensation benefits, even if the employee could have filed for such benefits in Arizona. See Moretto , 190 Ariz. at 348, 947 P.2d at 922 ; Oaks , 191 Ariz. at 335, 955 P.2d at 973. Eagle correctly argues these cases are not analogous to the current case as Jackson did apply for and receive workers' compensation benefits. Unlike Oaks and Moretto where there was no employer or insurance carrier to reimburse, Drivers Management has a subrogation claim for the amount it paid Jackson. ¶ 13 Jackson acknowledges Drivers Management has a subrogation interest in her claim. She argues this interest should be controlled by Nebraska legal authorities as her workers' compensation claim against Drivers Management was adjudicated and awarded in Nebraska. Both Arizona and Nebraska law support this contention. "When compensation has been paid the law of the state of compensation should govern in third-party actions including the nature and extent of lien subrogation, and assignment rights." Quiles v. Heflin Steel Supply Co. , 145 Ariz. 73, 77, 699 P.2d 1304, 1308 (App. 1985). In this case, Jackson's workers' compensation benefits were adjudicated and paid in Nebraska. Therefore, Nebraska law governs subrogation, lien, and assignment rights in this action. Jackson satisfied Nebraska's subrogation law by naming Drivers Management as a defendant in her personal injury suit. See Revised Statutes of Nebraska section 48-118. Thus, we conclude the superior court erred in applying the one-year time-bar under A.R.S. § 23-1023.B to Jackson's third-party injury claim. CONCLUSION ¶ 14 Because we find the superior court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Eagle, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Eagle filed a motion to strike part of Jackson's reply pertaining to her employment contract with Drivers Management. Per Eagle, Jackson did not develop this argument in her opening brief. Although the argument was not as fully developed as the argument contained in her reply, Jackson did include and develop arguments pertaining to her employment contract in her opening brief. Therefore, Eagle's motion to strike is denied.

VÁSQUEZ, Presiding Judge: ¶ 1 Randall Smith seeks review of the trial court's order denying, after an evidentiary hearing, his petition for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. We grant review and, for the following reasons, grant relief. ¶ 2 After a jury trial, Smith was convicted of attempted production of marijuana of an amount less than two pounds. The trial court suspended the imposition of sentence and placed Smith on an eighteen-month term of probation. His conviction stemmed from the discovery, pursuant to a search warrant, of approximately 130 marijuana plants in his house. ¶ 3 Investigating detectives' initial application for a search warrant was rejected. That affidavit had alleged as a basis for probable cause that Smith's son had told detectives Smith was growing marijuana at the residence, detectives who had knocked at the front door smelled fresh marijuana, a drug-detection dog had alerted while outside the residence, detectives had seen three marijuana plants growing in the backyard, and Smith (who had stated he had a medical-marijuana card) then admitted both growing marijuana at the house and having "something" inside it that was "none of [the detectives'] business." A different judge granted a second warrant application, which included additional information that Smith's water usage was unusually high and that several windows of the house were covered in foam and plastic-like the residence of Smith's son, which also contained marijuana plants. ¶ 4 Smith filed a motion to suppress below, arguing the search warrant affidavit contained false statements concerning his water usage. The trial court denied the motion, finding the remaining information in the warrant affidavit was sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. ¶ 5 On appeal, Smith argued the trial court had erred by denying his suppression motion. In addition to repeating his argument concerning allegations of water usage, he further asserted, for the first time, that the use of the drug-detection dog and the detectives' entry into the curtilage of his home violated his Fourth Amendment rights. We rejected the argument regarding water usage, but we concluded the use of the drug-detection dog was improper under Florida v. Jardines , 569 U.S. 1, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013). We further concluded, however, that Smith had not shown resulting prejudice because the remaining information in the search warrant affidavit supported a finding of probable cause. As to the claim detectives had improperly entered the curtilage, we determined the record was not adequate to address that issue because Smith had not raised it below and, thus, could not demonstrate fundamental, prejudicial error on appeal. We affirmed his conviction and the imposition of probation. State v. Smith , No. 2 CA-CR 2013-0166, 2014 WL 1875572 (Ariz. App. May 7, 2014) (mem. decision). ¶ 6 Smith sought post-conviction relief, arguing his trial counsel had been ineffective in failing to argue in the motion to suppress that detectives had violated the Fourth Amendment by entering the curtilage. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing at which Smith's trial counsel testified that he had considered, but declined to raise, an argument based on the detectives' entry into the curtilage. As we understand his testimony, he stated he believed any information in support of probable cause obtained during that entry had been "rejected" by the denial of the first warrant application and the later issuance of a warrant only after detectives had provided additional information. Thus, counsel concluded that information was immaterial to the probable-cause finding and his strongest argument was, therefore, that the warrant affidavit contained false statements about Smith's water usage. Counsel further testified that he usually focused on the stronger available arguments, rather than "diluting" his case with what he perceived were weaker issues. ¶ 7 The trial court denied relief, concluding counsel had made a reasoned, tactical decision to raise what he believed to be the stronger argument in the motion to dismiss that the statements concerning his water usage were false. The court also observed that Smith had "provided no other evidence, such as an expert opinion to the trial court, that demonstrates [trial counsel's] decision ... fell below prevailing professional norms." Because the court determined Smith had not shown counsel's conduct was deficient, it did not address whether Smith had demonstrated prejudice. This petition for review followed. ¶ 8 On review, Smith argues the trial court erred by concluding counsel's conduct did not fall below prevailing professional standards. Smith contends that counsel's testimony demonstrates that he incorrectly believed the curtilage issue had already been decided and that he did not investigate that issue. To prevail, Smith "was required to demonstrate that counsel's conduct fell below prevailing professional norms and that he was prejudiced thereby." State v. Denz , 232 Ariz. 441, ¶ 6, 306 P.3d 98, 100-01 (App. 2013), citing Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). ¶ 9 There is "[a] strong presumption" that counsel "provided effective assistance," State v. Febles , 210 Ariz. 589, ¶ 20, 115 P.3d 629, 636 (App. 2005), which Smith must overcome by providing evidence that counsel's conduct did not comport with prevailing professional norms, see State v. Herrera , 183 Ariz. 642, 647, 905 P.2d 1377, 1382 (App. 1995). Moreover, tactical or strategic decisions rest with counsel, State v. Lee , 142 Ariz. 210, 215, 689 P.2d 153, 158 (1984), and we will presume "that the challenged action was sound trial strategy under the circumstances," State v. Stone , 151 Ariz. 455, 461, 728 P.2d 674, 680 (App. 1986). Thus, "[d]isagreements as to trial strategy or errors in trial [tactics] will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as long as the challenged conduct could have some reasoned basis." State v. Meeker , 143 Ariz. 256, 260, 693 P.2d 911, 915 (1984). Whether counsel "rendered ineffective assistance is a mixed question of fact and law." State v. Pandeli , 242 Ariz. 175, ¶ 4, 394 P.3d 2, 7 (2017), quoting Denz , 232 Ariz. 441, ¶ 6, 306 P.3d at 100-01. Thus, we "defer to the trial court's factual findings but review de novo the ultimate legal conclusion" whether counsel's conduct fell below prevailing professional norms and whether Smith was prejudiced. Denz , 232 Ariz. 441, ¶ 6, 306 P.3d at 100-01, quoting In re MH2010-002637 , 228 Ariz. 74, ¶ 13, 263 P.3d 82, 86 (App. 2011) ; see also Pandeli , 242 Ariz. 175, ¶ 4, 394 P.3d at 7. ¶ 10 As we noted above, counsel testified that he believed the issuing judge found probable cause based solely on the water usage and presence of window coverings. He further testified that this belief drove his decision to raise only the water-usage claim in the motion to suppress. But counsel's assessment is unsupported by the record, including counsel's own motion to suppress. Counsel stated in that motion that the probable-cause finding was based on all the information provided to the issuing judge. And nothing in the transcript of the warrant application suggests the issuing judge had restricted the basis of her probable-cause finding to the water usage and window coverings. Thus, we disagree with our dissenting colleague that our determination of counsel's ineffectiveness is based on hindsight. The record here demonstrates that counsel did not base his decision on a reasoned evaluation of the strength of the curtilage claim but, instead, on an unreasonable misunderstanding of the probable-cause evaluations. In these circumstances, we cannot agree counsel made a reasoned, tactical decision to forgo raising the curtilage issue. ¶ 11 As the trial court correctly noted, even if counsel's conduct fell below prevailing professional standards, Smith is not entitled to relief unless he shows a reasonable probability that a motion to suppress claiming detectives improperly entered his curtilage would have been granted. See Denz , 232 Ariz. 441, ¶ 20, 306 P.3d at 104. Because the court did not address this issue below, however, we decline to do so for the first time on review. ¶ 12 We grant review and relief, and we remand the case to the trial court to determine whether Smith has demonstrated resulting prejudice. We do not suggest that counsel falls below prevailing professional standards by deciding to forgo weaker but arguably tenable claims in favor of stronger claims. Clearly, the decision to focus the trial court on what counsel believes are the strongest arguments can be a reasoned, tactical decision that cannot form the basis of a claim of ineffective assistance. Cf. Febles , 210 Ariz. 589, ¶ 20, 115 P.3d at 636 (reviewing court defers to appellate counsel's decision to eliminate weaker claims). But counsel's stated basis for that decision, if one is provided, must be reasonable. Meeker , 143 Ariz. at 260, 693 P.2d at 915. Nor do we disagree with the trial court that, in some cases, a claim of ineffective assistance must be supported with an expert's opinion that no competent counsel would have acted as trial counsel did. However, where counsel has provided reasons for the decision and those reasons are contradicted by the record, such evidence is not necessary to establish counsel's performance was deficient. See id.

ECKERSTROM, Chief Judge: ¶ 1 Michael Burns appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his complaint that alleged violations of his rights under Arizona's relocation-assistance statutes. He argues those statutes imply a private right of action, that he was entitled to bring a negligence action to remedy his inadequate relocation-assistance award, and that the superior court should have exercised special-action jurisdiction. We affirm. Factual and Procedural History ¶ 2 On review of a motion to dismiss, "we assume the truth of all material facts alleged by [the plaintiff]." Phelps Dodge Corp. v. El Paso Corp. , 213 Ariz. 400, ¶ 8, 142 P.3d 708 (App. 2006). In October 2015, following condemnation of certain property belonging to Burns, an agent for the City of Tucson notified him that he was entitled to receive a total of $38,284.72 in relocation-assistance benefits. See A.R.S. § 11-963. In December, Burns filed an appeal with that agent claiming he was entitled to a larger benefit. The agent, with the concurrence of the Project Manager of the City's Real Estate program, affirmed the assistance award a month later. In July 2016, Burns served a notice of claim on the City and, in January 2017, brought suit, alleging negligence, a claim under the relocation-assistance statutes, and that the City had denied him due process. ¶ 3 The City filed a motion to dismiss asserting the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the relocation-assistance statutes do not provide for judicial review. Following a hearing, the trial court determined neither the relocation-assistance statutes nor the Administrative Review Act authorized judicial review and dismissed Burns's complaint with prejudice. See A.R.S. § 12-902(A). The court further declined to treat the complaint as a petition for special action. Burns appealed; we have jurisdiction. A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 12-2101(A)(1). Implied Right of Action ¶ 4 Burns argues our relocation-assistance statutes, see A.R.S. §§ 11-961 to 11-974, imply a private right of action in favor of displaced persons aggrieved by the amount of relocation-assistance benefits an acquiring agency offers. Whether a statute implies a private right of action is a question of law we review de novo. Gersten v. Sun Pain Mgmt., P.L.L.C. , 242 Ariz. 301, ¶ 8, 395 P.3d 310 (App. 2017). ¶ 5 In relevant part, our relocation-assistance statutes require a "displacing agency, as a part of the cost of the project, [to] make a payment to a displaced person ... for ... [a]ctual reasonable expenses in moving himself and his family, business, ... or other personal property." A.R.S. § 11-963(A)(1). Further, the statute provides that a "displaced person aggrieved by ... the amount of a payment, may have his application reviewed by the chief executive officer of the acquiring agency whose decision shall be final." A.R.S. § 11-967. ¶ 6 In determining whether the relocation-assistance statutes provide a private right of action, we begin with the statutory language, which is "the best and most reliable index of its meaning." Arpaio v. Steinle , 201 Ariz. 353, ¶ 5, 35 P.3d 114 (App. 2001). "[W]hen the statute is plain and unambiguous, we will not engage in any other method of statutory interpretation." City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. , 218 Ariz. 172, ¶ 13, 181 P.3d 219 (App. 2008). However, in the absence of express language, Arizona law more broadly implies a private right of action "when consistent with 'the context of the statutes, the language used, the subject matter, the effects and consequences, and the spirit and purpose of the law.' " Chavez v.Brewer , 222 Ariz. 309, ¶ 24, 214 P.3d 397 (App. 2009) (quoting Transamerica Fin. Corp. v. Superior Court , 158 Ariz. 115, 116, 761 P.2d 1019, 1020 (1988) ). ¶ 7 Here, the statute neither expressly confers nor forecloses a private right of action. Accordingly, we must consider not only the statutory language, but also its context, subject matter, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose. See Chavez , 222 Ariz. 309, ¶ 24, 214 P.3d 397. ¶ 8 With respect to its language, the statute provides for review "by the chief executive officer of the acquiring agency whose decision shall be final." § 11-967. This language of finality strongly indicates the legislature intended to limit review to the chief executive officer. Id. A private right of action would guarantee a third tier of review, rendering that decision other than final. Burns has not cited, and we are not aware of, any case in which our courts have found an implied right of action in the presence of language providing a level of review and expressing that the decision on review is final. ¶ 9 Nevertheless, Burns makes the non-trivial argument that the spirit and purpose of the relocation-assistance statutes support finding an implied right of action. See Chavez , 222 Ariz. 309, ¶ 24, 214 P.3d 397. In particular, he observes that relocation-assistance payments only inure to the benefit of displaced persons, of which Burns is one. See id. ¶ 28 (citing Transamerica Fin. Corp. , 158 Ariz. at 117, 761 P.2d at 1021 ). He correctly maintains that we have generally found this to be a strong factor suggesting a legislative intent to provide a private right of action. Id. ; Transamerica Fin. Corp. , 158 Ariz. at 117, 761 P.2d at 1021. ¶ 10 And, it is debatable whether a displaced person might find meaningful relief apart from an implied right of action considering that § 11-967 merely provides summary review by the senior-most official in the very organization making the initial determination. See Douglas v. Governing Bd. of Window Rock Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 8 , 206 Ariz. 344, ¶ 9, 78 P.3d 1065 (App. 2003) (no way of holding school districts accountable for misappropriation of funds apart from implied right of action); Sellinger v. Freeway Mobile Home Sales, Inc. , 110 Ariz. 573, 576, 521 P.2d 1119 (1974) (implied right of action "highly desirable in order to control fraud in the marketplace"). ¶ 11 Notwithstanding the less than independent or robust review provided in § 11-967, the legislature is free to establish such a scheme when, as in this circumstance, it creates a wholly new right against itself. See Guibault v. Pima County , 161 Ariz. 446, 450, 778 P.2d 1342, 1346 (App. 1989) (state free to define obligation and remedy "if any" when it creates rights against itself unknown at common law). Moreover, judicial review is not utterly foreclosed inasmuch as an aggrieved person may seek a writ of certiorari in the superior court in a special-action proceeding. See A.R.S. § 12-2001 ; Ariz. R. P. Spec. Act. 1. ¶ 12 Given that § 11-967 both provides an administrative review process and suggests that the process is final, we conclude that the legislature contemplated no private right of action in enacting that statute. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by dismissing Burns's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Negligence ¶ 13 Burns also urges that he is entitled to maintain a common-law claim for negligence against the City. However, the trial court did not reach the merits of this issue. Nevertheless, we address whether Burns may maintain an action for negligence under our relocation-assistance statutes because the question is purely one of law. See Liristis v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. , 204 Ariz. 140, ¶ 11, 61 P.3d 22 (App. 2002) ("If application of a legal principle ... would dispose of an action on appeal and correctly explain the law, it is appropriate for us to consider the issue." (quoting Evenstad v. State , 178 Ariz. 578, 582, 875 P.2d 811, 815 (App. 1993) ) ). ¶ 14 Arguing from Arizona's general rule that a plaintiff can pursue common-law damages against governmental entities, see Pritchard v. State , 163 Ariz. 427, 431, 788 P.2d 1178, 1182 (1990), Burns insists that nothing in the relocation-assistance statutes "clearly and unambiguously demonstrates the legislature intended to divest the superior court of general jurisdiction to hear Burns'[s] negligence claim against the City." Accordingly, he asserts the City breached its statutorily created duty to provide full relocation benefits. But in reaffirming the principle that governmental immunity is the exception in Arizona rather than the rule, Pritchard recognized that our supreme court invited the legislature to intervene and develop the boundaries of sovereign immunity. Id. Accepting that invitation, the legislature enacted the Actions Against Public Entities or Public Employees Act, see Glazer v. State , 237 Ariz. 160, ¶¶ 10-11, 347 P.3d 1141 (2015), which limits actionable injuries to those a "person may suffer ... if inflicted by a private person." A.R.S. § 12-820(2). ¶ 15 Here, the relocation-assistance statutes impose no duty upon any private person, and we decline to extend the statutory language or otherwise restrict sovereign immunity beyond the limits set forth by our legislature and recognized by our supreme court. See § 12-802(2); Pritchard , 163 Ariz. at 431, 788 P.2d at 1182 ("the state and its agents will be subject to the same tort law as private citizens" (quoting Ryan v. State , 134 Ariz. 308, 311, 656 P.2d 597, 600 (1982) ) ). Thus, Burns cannot maintain a claim for negligence with respect to the relocation-assistance statutes, and the trial court properly dismissed his complaint as to this count. Special-Action Jurisdiction ¶ 16 Finally, Burns argues that if the statutes do not imply a right of action and a petition for special action is his only avenue for relief, we "should require the [trial] court to hear [his] argument for such relief." We review a trial court's decision to decline special-action review for an abuse of discretion. Bilagody v. Thorneycroft , 125 Ariz. 88, 92, 607 P.2d 965, 969 (App. 1979). ¶ 17 When a party does not state facts sufficient to justify special-action relief, the trial court has the discretion to decline jurisdiction. See Coombs v. Maricopa Cty. Spec. Health Care Dist. , 241 Ariz. 320, ¶ 10, 387 P.3d 743 (App. 2016). Here, the trial court noted that Burns neither alleged facts sufficient to show the City had acted illegally, arbitrarily, or capriciously, see Ariz. R. P. Spec. Act. 3(c), nor did he request leave to amend his complaint to do so. Accordingly, the court determined it would not sua sponte treat his complaint as a petition for special action. We cannot say the court abused its discretion. See Coombs , 241 Ariz. 320, ¶ 10, 387 P.3d 743. Disposition ¶ 18 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. The City also argued below that the trial court lacked jurisdiction under the Administrative Review Act (ARA) because Burns had not timely appealed thereunder. See A.R.S. § 12-904(A). However, the court correctly determined the ARA did not apply because it specifically excludes municipal corporations. See A.R.S. § 12-901(1) ; Stant v. City of Maricopa Emp.Merit Bd. , 234 Ariz. 196, ¶ 10, 319 P.3d 1002 (App. 2014) ; see also Coombs v. Maricopa Cty. Special Health Care Dist. , 241 Ariz. 320, ¶¶ 6-9, 387 P.3d 743 (App. 2016). A few Arizona cases concern claims brought under the relocation-assistance statutes; they do not, however, address whether the statutes imply a private right of action. See, e.g. , Owens v. City of Phoenix , 180 Ariz. 402, 884 P.2d 1100 (App. 1994) ; Morgan v. City of Phoenix , 162 Ariz. 581, 586-87, 785 P.2d 101, 106-07 (App. 1989).

JOHNSEN, Judge: ¶ 1 Banner Health Network and several other hospitals ("the Hospitals") separately contracted with the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System ("AHCCCS") to serve AHCCCS members. In those contracts, the Hospitals agreed to accept payment from AHCCCS at rates below their customary charges and not to bill members for the balance. The plaintiffs in this case are a class of AHCCCS members ("the Patients") who received settlements or damage awards from third-party tortfeasors for the injuries that required medical treatment. The Patients sued to enjoin the Hospitals from enforcing liens on their tort recoveries for the balance between what AHCCCS paid and the Hospitals' customary charges. We hold that the Hospitals' contracts with AHCCCS incorporated federal law, which bars the Hospitals from enforcing the liens. Accordingly, we affirm the injunction the superior court entered and direct entry of judgment in favor of the Patients on their third-party claim for breach of contract. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶ 2 The Hospitals recorded their liens pursuant to two statutes, Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 33-931 (2018) and 36-2903.01(G)(4) (2018). The former is a general statute allowing a health-care provider to file a lien for its customary charges against a patient's tort recovery. The latter specifically applies when a hospital has served an AHCCCS member and allows that hospital to "collect any unpaid portion of its bill from other third-party payors or in situations" in which the general medical-lien statute applies. ¶ 3 The Patients alleged federal Medicaid law preempts the Arizona lien statutes in cases such as theirs, and sought an injunction barring the Hospitals from recording liens on their tort recoveries. The Patients argued the liens constitute impermissible "balance billing," a term describing a health-care provider's effort to collect from a patient "the difference in the amount paid by Medicaid, or a state plan like AHCCCS, and the amount" the provider typically charges. Abbott v. Banner Health Network , 239 Ariz. 409, 412, ¶ 9, 372 P.3d 933, 936 (2016). ¶ 4 Early in the litigation, the superior court dismissed a group of plaintiffs who had settled their lien claims with the Hospitals and entered partial final judgment as to those plaintiffs pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Those plaintiffs appealed, arguing their settlements lacked consideration because the Hospitals' liens were preempted by federal law. We accepted that argument, Abbott v. Banner Health Network , 236 Ariz. 436, 446, ¶ 30, 341 P.3d 478, 488 (App. 2014) (" Abbott I "), but the supreme court reversed, Abbott, 239 Ariz. 409, 372 P.3d 933 (" Abbott II "). The supreme court ruled the settlements were valid and made "fairly and in good faith" because the validity of the Hospitals' lien rights was not settled under Arizona law. Abbott II , 239 Ariz. at 413, 414, 415, ¶¶ 12, 18, 20, 372 P.3d at 937-39. ¶ 5 Meanwhile, the superior court certified the remaining plaintiffs as a class, and both sides moved for summary judgment on the preemption issue. The superior court ruled in favor of the Patients on their claim for a declaratory judgment under the Supremacy Clause that when a hospital has accepted payment from AHCCCS for treating a patient, a federal regulation, 42 C.F.R. § 447.15 (2018), preempts the hospital's state-law right to a lien on the patient's tort recovery for the balance between what AHCCCS paid and the hospital's customary charges. The court then enjoined the Hospitals from "filing or asserting any lien or claim against a patient's personal injury recovery, after having received any payment from AHCCCS for the same patient's care." The court granted summary judgment to the Hospitals, however, on the Patients' third-party-beneficiary claim, which alleged the Hospitals breached their contracts with AHCCCS by imposing the liens. Finally, the superior court awarded attorney's fees to the Patients under the private attorney general doctrine and denied both sides' motions for new trial. ¶ 6 The Hospitals appealed the preemption ruling and injunction, and the Patients cross-appealed the judgment against them on their contract claim. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) (2018) and -2101(A)(1) (2018). DISCUSSION A. General Principles. ¶ 7 A superior court "shall grant summary judgment if the moving party shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see also Orme School v. Reeves , 166 Ariz. 301, 309, 802 P.2d 1000, 1008 (1990). We review a superior court's grant of summary judgment de novo , viewing the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Sanders v. Alger , 242 Ariz. 246, 248, ¶ 2, 394 P.3d 1083, 1085 (2017). ¶ 8 The Hospitals argue the Patients' declaratory-judgment claim under the Supremacy Clause fails because the Supremacy Clause does not afford a private right of action. See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc ., ---U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 1378, 1383-84, 191 L.Ed.2d 471 (2015). We need not address that issue, because we conclude the superior court erred in denying summary judgment to the Patients on their contract claim. In addressing that claim, we conclude that (1) federal law preempts the Hospitals' rights under Arizona law to impose liens on the Patients' tort recoveries to recover the balance between what AHCCCS paid the Hospitals and the Hospitals' customary rates, (2) the Patients are third-party beneficiaries of the contracts the Hospitals entered with AHCCCS, and (3) those contracts require the Hospitals to comply with the preemptive federal law. B. Federal Law Preempts the Hospitals' Lien Rights. ¶ 9 Federal law may preempt state law in one of three ways: Express preemption, field preemption or conflict preemption. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 698-99, 104 S.Ct. 2694, 81 L.Ed.2d 580 (1984) ; White Mtn. Health Ctr., Inc. v. Maricopa County , 241 Ariz. 230, 239-40, ¶ 33, 386 P.3d 416, 425-26 (App. 2016). The issue here-conflict preemption-arises when state law stands as an obstacle to the achievement of Congress's full purpose, or when compliance with both federal and state laws is impossible. Crisp , 467 U.S. at 699, 104 S.Ct. 2694 ; White Mtn. , 241 Ariz. at 240, ¶ 33, 386 P.3d at 426. A federal regulation has the same preemptive effect as a federal statute. Crisp , 467 U.S. at 699, 104 S.Ct. 2694. Thus, a federal regulation may render unenforceable a state law that is otherwise consistent with federal law. City of New York v. F.C.C. , 486 U.S. 57, 63-64, 108 S.Ct. 1637, 100 L.Ed.2d 48 (1988). ¶ 10 Medicaid is a "cooperative federal-state program" that pays for health care for the needy and the disabled. Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of So. Calif., 565 U.S. 606, 610, 132 S.Ct. 1204, 182 L.Ed.2d 101 (2012) ; 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (2018). A state that chooses to participate must "comply with the Medicaid Act and its implementing regulations." Rehabilitation Ass'n of Va., Inc. v. Kozlowski , 42 F.3d 1444, 1447 (4th Cir. 1994). To receive federal funds under the program, a state must create a detailed plan that, inter alia , specifies "the nature and scope" of the medical services it will cover. Douglas , 565 U.S. at 610, 132 S.Ct. 1204 ; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (2018). The plan must be approved by the federal Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS"), a division of the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"), which determines whether the plan complies with federal Medicaid statutes and regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b) (plan approval by HHS secretary); 42 U.S.C. § 1316(a) (2018) (granting HHS power to withhold funds if changes to state plan do not comply with federal law); 42 C.F.R. § 430.10 (2018) (describing contents of state plan); see also Spectrum Health Continuing Care Group v. Bowling , 410 F.3d 304, 313 (6th Cir. 2005) ("state's plan must comply with federal statutory and regulatory standards"). ¶ 11 A fundamental principle of the program is that "Medicaid is essentially a payer of last resort." Kozlowski , 42 F.3d at 1447. Toward that end, patients must assign the state Medicaid agency their rights "to any payment from a third party that has a legal liability to pay for care and services available under the plan." 42 U.S.C. § 1396k(a)(1)(A) (2018) ; see A.R.S. § 36-2946(A) (2018) (patients must assign "all types of medical benefits"); Olszewski v. Scripps Health , 30 Cal. 4th 798, 811, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 69 P.3d 927 (2003). Accordingly, when a hospital submits a claim, the state Medicaid agency first tries to determine whether a third party (insurer, tortfeasor) may be liable for paying the hospital's fees. Olszewski , 30 Cal. 4th at 811, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 69 P.3d 927. If a third party is implicated, the agency rejects the claim and requires the hospital to determine the amount of the third party's liability. 42 C.F.R. § 433.139(b)(1) (2018). Once the amount of any third-party liability is established, the agency will pay the hospital the difference between the rate it has negotiated with the hospital and what the hospital will receive from the third party. Id. When third-party liability is unavailable or unknown, the state agency pays the hospital its negotiated rate for treating the patient. 42 C.F.R. § 433.139(c). If a third party's liability comes to light afterward, the state agency must seek reimbursement for itself from the third party when it is cost-effective to do so. 42 C.F.R. § 433.139(d). ¶ 12 Consistent with these rules aimed at limiting the costs that ultimately must be borne by a state Medicaid agency, Arizona law grants AHCCCS the right to a lien on a patient's claim against a tortfeasor to recover what AHCCCS pays to treat the patient. A.R.S. § 36-2915(A) (2018). Moreover, Arizona requires that a hospital that serves an AHCCCS member must seek payment from any liable third party (insurer, worker's compensation carrier, tortfeasor) before billing AHCCCS. See AHCCCS, Fee-for-Service Provider Manual at 9-1 (Mar. 2014 rev.) ("AHCCCS has liability for payment of benefits after Medicare and all other first- and third-party payer benefits have been paid. Providers must determine the extent of the first- and third-party coverage ... prior to billing AHCCCS."); see also Arizona Administrative Code ("A.A.C.") R9-22-1005 (requiring providers to identify and notify AHCCCS of potential sources of first- and third-party liability). If a third party pays the hospital more than AHCCCS's scheduled rate, AHCCCS will pay the hospital nothing. A.A.C. R9-22-1003 (AHCCCS pays no more than the difference between the scheduled rate "and the amount of the third-party liability"); AHCCCS, Fee-for-Service Provider Manual at 9-2 (Mar. 2014 rev.). ¶ 13 There is no dispute that under applicable federal and state law, if a tortfeasor's liability becomes apparent after AHCCCS has paid a hospital, AHCCCS may demand reimbursement from the tortfeasor. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(B). The issue here is whether federal law allows a hospital that has accepted payment from AHCCCS to use state lien statutes to recover additional monies from the tortfeasor. ¶ 14 The Patients argue the Hospitals' liens are invalid under 42 C.F.R. § 447.15, a regulation issued in 1980. See 45 Fed. Reg. 24889 (Apr. 11, 1980). Federal regulations dictate the relationship between a state Medicaid agency and the hospitals with which it contracts. As applicable here, § 447.15 mandates that a state may contract only with providers that agree to "accept, as payment in full, the amounts paid by the agency plus any deductible, coinsurance or copayment required by the plan to be paid by the individual." The regulation plainly bars a hospital that has contracted with AHCCCS from billing a patient for the balance between what AHCCCS has paid and the hospital's customary rates. We hold this regulation likewise bars a hospital from imposing a lien on the patient's tort recovery for the balance. ¶ 15 A lien is a means of securing a debt; without a debt, there can be no lien. See Matlow v. Matlow , 89 Ariz. 293, 298, 361 P.2d 648 (1961) ("In the absence of an obligation to be secured there can be no lien."). Once a hospital has accepted payment from AHCCCS for treating a patient, the patient owes the hospital nothing beyond a "deductible, coinsurance or copayment." 42 C.F.R. § 447.15. Because the patient does not owe the hospital the balance between what AHCCCS has paid and the hospital's customary rate, the hospital may not collect that balance by imposing a lien on the patient's property. The patient's property includes his or her recovery from the tortfeasor that caused the injuries requiring treatment. See Samsel v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 204 Ariz. 1, 7, ¶ 21, 59 P.3d 281, 287 (2002) (noting insured patient's "property interest in his or her tort claim and eventual recovery"); Bowling , 410 F.3d at 317 (once a judgment is entered against a tortfeasor or tortfeasor agrees to settlement, "proceeds are no longer the property of the tortfeasor," but belong to the patient.) Just as the hospital may not balance bill by seizing a patient's car or imposing a lien against his or her home, the hospital likewise may not use state lien laws to seize the patient's recovery from the tortfeasor. ¶ 16 Each court that has addressed the issue likewise has concluded § 447.15 bars a hospital from imposing a lien on funds due a patient from a tortfeasor. Bowling , 410 F.3d at 315 ("By accepting the Medicaid payment, the service provider accepts the terms of the contract-specifically that the Medicaid amount is payment in full ."); Taylor v. Louisiana ex rel. Dep't of Health & Hosps. , 7 F.Supp.3d 641, 644 (M.D. La. 2013) ("Congress did not intend for providers to receive Medicaid reimbursement for patient care and then intercept funds that the patient would otherwise receive."); Lizer v. Eagle Air Med. Corp. , 308 F.Supp.2d 1006, 1009-10 (D. Ariz. 2004) ( § 447.15 preempts right of provider that has accepted payment from AHCCCS to assert lien against patient's tort recovery under A.R.S. § 33-931 ); Mallo v. Pub. Health Trust of Dade County, Fla. , 88 F.Supp.2d 1376, 1387 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (provider may not balance bill by imposing lien on patient's tort settlement; "health care providers are not entitled to prey on an otherwise poor patient's change in economic status"); Olszewski , 30 Cal. 4th at 820, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 69 P.3d 927 (Medicaid statutes and regulations "are unambiguous and limit provider collections from a Medicaid beneficiary to, at most, the cost-sharing charges allowed under the state plan, even when a third party tortfeasor is later found liable for the injuries suffered by that beneficiary"); Pub. Health Trust of Dade County, Fla. v. Dade County Sch. Bd. , 693 So.2d 562, 566-67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (Medicaid preempts Florida regulation allowing provider to balance bill by imposing lien on patient's tort settlement). ¶ 17 The Hospitals argue that the reference in § 447.15 to "payment in full" limits a provider's right to payment from the state Medicaid agency or from the patient but does not apply to payments the provider might be able to intercept from a third-party tortfeasor. That interpretation, however, is contrary to the purpose of the regulation and the purpose of the Medicaid Act itself, which is not to "provide financial assistance to providers of care," but to aid the patients who receive care from the providers. Green v. Cashman , 605 F.2d 945, 946 (6th Cir. 1979) ; see also Lizer , 308 F.Supp.2d at 1009 ("The ... regulation was passed in order to ensure that this purpose was carried out by preventing providers from intercepting funds on the way to a patient."); Briarcliff Haven, Inc. v. Dep't of Human Resources of State of Ga. , 403 F.Supp. 1355, 1363 (N.D. Ga. 1975) ("The [M]edicaid program is not designed to protect providers from the consequences of their business decisions or from business risks."). ¶ 18 The Hospitals contend that "Congress has never articulated a federal interest in protecting the tort recoveries of Medicaid beneficiaries, and has acted as if the reverse were true." In support, the Hospitals point to the authorities discussed above that allow state Medicaid agencies to collect from tortfeasors that have injured plan members. E.g. , 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(H), -(45). The Hospitals cite no federal authority, however, supporting their contention that Congress intended that a provider that chooses to treat a Medicaid member may balance bill by intercepting a member's tort recovery. On the other hand, the Patients cite a 1967 Senate Report that stated, "As a matter of public policy, it would be best for all concerned ... if the reimbursement made by the State" constituted a provider's entire compensation. S. Rep. No. 744, at 187-88 (1967). ¶ 19 The Hospitals also point to two HHS documents they claim are inconsistent with our analysis. The first is a response by the Health Care Financing Administration to a comment submitted on a draft of a related regulation issued in 1990. See 55 Fed. Reg. 1423-02, at 1428 (Jan. 16, 1990) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 447.20 ). The new regulation required state plans to bar a provider from collecting from a patient "or any financially responsible relative or representative" of the patient when a third party's liability is equal to or greater than the plan's scheduled rate; the provider would not be able to collect anything more than a copay when the third party's liability is less than the scheduled rate. The comment expressed concern that by limiting what a provider could "collect ... from a representative" of a patient, the proposed regulation would bar a provider from collecting from a patient's insurer or from other "resources available to the" patient. Id. ; see also 42 C.F.R. § 447.20(a) (2018). In response, the agency explained that "[t]he intent of this provision is to protect the Medicaid recipient from being charged for a service in excess of the amounts allowed under the State plan after considering the third party's liability." Id. The Hospitals point to the agency's further comment that "[t]he provider is not restricted from receiving amounts from third party resources available to the recipient (or his or her legal representative."). Id. But in making that statement, the agency referenced 42 C.F.R. § 433.139(b)(1), under which a state Medicaid agency may pay a provider only "to the extent that payment allowed under the agency's payment schedule exceeds the amount of the third party's payment." Contrary to the Hospitals' assertion, the agency's comment was not directed to § 447.15 ; it was referencing a provider's right to seek payment from a third party before accepting payment from the state agency, not after. ¶ 20 The Hospitals also cite a 1997 letter from the Acting Director of the Health Care Financing Administration that they say construed § 447.15 to permit a provider that has treated a Medicaid patient to return the state agency's payment and seek its customary rates from the patient's tort recovery. But the letter does not constitute formal agency policy or even guidance. See Bowling , 410 F.3d at 318 (referenced letter "is neither listed on the [agency] website ... nor published elsewhere"). Moreover, the mechanism outlined in the letter is inconsistent with the reimbursement scheme of the Medicaid Act, which requires patients to assign the state agency their rights to payment from third parties for medical expenses. Id. at 320 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396k(a)(1)(A) ). ¶ 21 As applied to the Patients and the Hospitals in this case, the two Arizona lien statutes under which the Hospitals imposed their liens violate the federal regulation's ban on balance billing by an AHCCCS provider. As relevant here, A.R.S. § 33-931(A) states that a provider is entitled to a lien for the care and treatment or transportation of an injured person. The lien shall be for the claimant's customary charges for care and treatment [and] extends to all claims of liability or indemnity, except health insurance and underinsured and uninsured motorist coverage ..., for damages accruing to the person to whom the services are rendered ... on account of the injuries that gave rise to the claims and that required the services. The statute specifically applying to hospitals that serve AHCCCS members states: Payment received by a hospital from [AHCCCS] ... is considered payment by [AHCCCS] of [AHCCCS's] liability for the hospital bill. A hospital may collect any unpaid portion of its bill from other third-party payors or in situations covered by [ A.R.S. § 33-931 ]. A.R.S. § 36-2903.01(G)(4). These two statutes purport to allow a hospital that has accepted payment from AHCCCS to impose a lien on the patient's claim against a tortfeasor for the injuries that required the services for which AHCCCS paid the hospital. But under 42 C.F.R. § 447.15, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and the authorities cited above, these statutes are invalid to the extent that they allow a hospital to impose a lien on a patient's tort recovery for the balance between the hospital's customary rates and what it accepted from AHCCCS for treating the patient. ¶ 22 The Hospitals raise two final arguments in support of their contention that federal Medicaid law does not preempt their rights under the two Arizona lien statutes. They argue first that when CMS, the division of HHS that oversees Medicaid, approved Arizona's AHCCCS plan, it impliedly approved the two Arizona lien statutes and the rights they grant providers to intercept patients' tort recoveries. But the Hospitals cite nothing in the record, the AHCCCS plan or the law to support the premise that in approving Arizona's plan, CMS had the authority to review-or actually did review-any state statute that might bear in some way on the state's Medicaid program. Contrary to the Hospitals' contention, CMS determines only whether the plan a state submits conforms with the Medicaid Act and related federal regulations; Congress has not granted the agency the authority to determine the validity of state law. See 42 C.F.R. § 430.14 (2018) ; see also 42 C.F.R. § 430.10. And nothing in our record supports the proposition that Arizona's state plan includes or incorporates the two lien statutes at issue. ¶ 23 The cases the Hospitals cite offer no support for their contention that CMS approval of a state Medicaid plan signifies the agency's approval of all relevant state statutes. See Cmty. Health Care Ass'n of N.Y. v. Shah , 770 F.3d 129, 144 (2d Cir. 2014) (CMS review of provider payment schedules "as amendments to the state plan"); S.D. ex rel. Dickson v. Hood , 391 F.3d 581, 596 (5th Cir. 2004) (CMS's "review and determination definitively indicate whether it interprets a state plan or amendment to be in conformity with the [federal] statute.") (emphasis added); Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Thompson , 362 F.3d 817, 821-22 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (review of validity of state plan). In sum, contrary to the Hospitals' contention, CMS approval of a state Medicaid plan does not mean that the agency necessarily approved corresponding state statutes. See Olszewski , 30 Cal. 4th at 825, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 69 P.3d 927. ¶ 24 Second, the Hospitals argue that federal law must not preempt their rights under applicable state lien law because the AHCCCS plan allows providers to use liens to balance bill, and CMS approved the AHCCCS plan. But nothing in the Arizona plan addresses, let alone endorses, the right of a hospital to accept payment from AHCCCS, then impose a lien on a patient's tort recovery for the balance between the AHCCCS payment and the hospital's customary rates. ¶ 25 For their contention that the Arizona plan authorizes such liens, the Hospitals rely on a brief portion of "Attachment 4.19-A," a 66-page section of the AHCCCS plan titled "Methods and Standards for Establishing Payment Rates [for] Inpatient Hospital Care." In the definitions section, Attachment 4.19-A provides as follows: Prospective rates are inpatient hospital rates defined in advance of a payment period and represent payment in full for covered services excluding any quick-pay discounts, slow pay penalties, and third party payments regardless of billed charges or individual hospital costs. The Hospitals contend this language means that even after a hospital has accepted "payment in full" from AHCCCS for treating a patient, the Arizona plan allows it to impose a lien on the patient's tort recovery as a permissible "third party payment." ¶ 26 The brief reference in Attachment 4.19 to "third party payments," which does not mention the word "lien" and which is found in a section of the plan setting out rates AHCCCS will pay hospitals, does not constitute an endorsement of the right of a hospital to accept payment from AHCCCS, then balance bill by imposing a lien on the patient's tort recovery. As set out in ¶ 12, supra , because AHCCCS is the "payor of last resort," a hospital must determine whether a third party may be liable for the cost of treatment before the hospital bills AHCCCS; if it ascertains that a third party is liable, the hospital may bill AHCCCS only for the difference between what it has recovered from the third party and the AHCCCS scheduled rate. Given that, we understand the reference to "third party payment" in Attachment 4.19-A to refer to a payment made before the hospital accepts payment from AHCCCS, not after. ¶ 27 The Hospitals also point to A.A.C. R9-22-1007 as support for their contention that CMS approved balance billing when it approved Arizona's AHCCCS plan. The cited regulation is titled "Notification for Perfection, Recording, and Assignment of AHCCCS Liens." It requires that when a hospital has treated an AHCCCS member for an injury "reflecting the probable liability of a first-or third-party," the hospital must, within 30 days of discharging the patient, notify AHCCCS "under R9-22-1008" or mail the agency "a copy of the lien the hospital proposes to record or has recorded under A.R.S. § 33-932." A.A.C. R9-22-1007. The Hospitals argue the regulation effectively acknowledges a hospital's right to record a lien against a patient's tort recovery after accepting payment from AHCCCS. But read in context with A.A.C. R9-22-1008, which requires providers to notify AHCCCS of the "[a]mount estimated to be due for care of member," it is clear that the former regulation concerns a lien that would be recorded before AHCCCS determines what to pay the hospital, not after. See ¶¶ 11-12, supra . ¶ 28 The Hospitals' argument also disregards the mandate in A.A.C. R9-22-702(B) that a provider "must accept payment from [AHCCCS] or a contractor as payment in full." Beyond repeating the requirement prescribed by 42 C.F.R. § 447.15, the Arizona regulation goes on to specify limited circumstances under which a provider may demand payment from a patient. See A.A.C. R9-22-702(C), (D). As relevant here, the regulation allows a provider to pursue a patient only (1) to collect a copayment and (2) to collect "that portion of a payment made [to the patient] by a third party" that is subject to the patient's "statutory assignment of rights to AHCCCS." A.A.C. R9-22-702(D) ; see also A.R.S. §§ 36-2946(A) (patient's assignment of medical benefits), 36-2915(A) (AHCCCS lien on patient's tort claim). In other words, the only specified circumstance in which a hospital may demand that a patient turn over the proceeds of a tort recovery is when those proceeds are subject to an assignment or lien in favor of AHCCCS . There is no corresponding provision in the regulation allowing a hospital to demand that a patient relinquish a tort recovery to satisfy the hospital's lien rights. ¶ 29 In the context of these provisions and those discussed ¶¶ 12-13 supra , the provisions in the AHCCCS plan that the Hospitals cite are part and parcel of a provider's duty under the plan to "cost avoid" before it bills AHCCCS, not a license to accept payment from AHCCCS, then impose a lien against the patient's tort recovery for the balance between that payment and the provider's customary rates. Accordingly, when CMS approved the AHCCCS plan, it did not authorize the Hospitals to accept payment from AHCCCS, then enforce liens against patients' recoveries from tortfeasors. ¶ 30 In sum, and in accord with every other judicial decision we have located on the issue, we conclude that federal law, specifically 42 C.F.R. § 447.15, preempts Arizona's lien statutes to the extent they allow a provider to accept payment from AHCCCS, then impose a lien on the patient's tort recovery for the balance between what AHCCCS paid it and the provider's customary rates. C. The Patients' Claim for Breach of the Provider Agreements. ¶ 31 Federal law spells out the provisions that must be contained in the Participating Provider Agreements ("PPAs") that a state enters with providers to serve patients under Medicaid. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 434.1(b) (2018), 434.6(a) (2018). The Patients argue they are third-party beneficiaries of PPAs, signed by the Hospitals and AHCCCS between 1994 and 2010, which incorporate federal law preempting Arizona's lien laws. 1. Rights as third-party beneficiaries of the PPAs. ¶ 32 Under Arizona law, a contract may allow a claim by a purported third-party beneficiary only if (1) "an intention to benefit [the claimant is] indicated in the contract itself"; (2) "[t]he contemplated benefit [is] both intentional and direct"; and (3) "it ... definitely appear[s] that the parties intend to recognize the third party as the primary party in interest." Nahom v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ariz., Inc. , 180 Ariz. 548, 552, 885 P.2d 1113, 1117 (App. 1994) (quoting Norton v. First Fed. Sav. , 128 Ariz. 176, 178, 624 P.2d 854, 856 (1981) ). In Nahom we held that a patient was a third-party beneficiary entitled to enforce a hospital's agreement with the patient's insurer to accept the insurer's payment as payment in full. Id. at 550-51, 552, 885 P.2d at 1115-17. ¶ 33 Under Nahom , if the Hospitals' contracts with AHCCCS bar them from imposing liens on the Patients' tort recoveries, the Patients are third-party beneficiaries of those contracts. See id. at 553, 885 P.2d at 1118 (question is whether claimant is the beneficiary of the particular contract provision on which claim is brought). As in Nahom , the Patients are members of a class of individuals who would be the main beneficiaries of a contract provision barring a hospital from imposing a lien on a patient's tort recovery. See id. at 552, 885 P.2d at 1117. Thus, Nahom controls here: If the PPAs prohibit the Hospitals from balance billing by imposing the liens, the Patients are third-party beneficiaries who may sue to enforce that prohibition. Accord Linton v. Comm'r , 65 F.3d 508, 520 (6th Cir. 1995) (patients are third-party beneficiaries of providers' contracts with state Medicaid agency). 2. Incorporation of federal law. ¶ 34 Interpretation of the PPAs is a matter of law that we review de novo . Grosvenor Holdings, L.C. v. Figueroa , 222 Ariz. 588, 593, ¶ 9, 218 P.3d 1045, 1050 (App. 2009). A contract incorporates the law in force at the time of its execution. State ex rel. Romley v. Gaines , 205 Ariz. 138, 142, ¶ 13, 67 P.3d 734, 738 (App. 2003) ("Regardless of the language of a contract, it is always to be construed in the light of the law then in force.") (quotation and alteration omitted); Ward v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. , 123 Ariz. 208, 209, 598 P.2d 1027, 1028 (App. 1979) ("The law in force at [the date of execution] form[s] a part of each contract."). Therefore, "a valid statute is automatically part of any contract affected by it, even if the statute is not specifically mentioned in the contract." Banner Health v. Med. Sav. Ins. Co. , 216 Ariz. 146, 150, ¶ 15, 163 P.3d 1096, 1100 (App. 2007) (quoting Higginbottom v. State , 203 Ariz. 139, 142, ¶ 11, 51 P.3d 972, 975 (App. 2002) ). Similarly, contracts impliedly incorporate valid constitutional provisions and regulations affecting the rights of the parties at the time of execution. See, e.g. , Colman v. Button , 42 Ariz. 141, 144, 22 P.2d 1078 (1933) (constitution); Rehart v. Clark , 448 F.2d 170, 173 (9th Cir. 1971) (regulation); cf. Qwest Corp. v. City of Chandler , 222 Ariz. 474, 484-85, ¶ 34, 217 P.3d 424, 434-35 (App. 2009) (common law). ¶ 35 At the time the Hospitals entered the PPAs, the Arizona lien statutes at issue here, A.R.S. §§ 33-931 and 36-2903.01(G)(4), were in place; so was the federal regulation prohibiting balance billing, 42 C.F.R. § 447.15. As we have held, the federal regulation preempts §§ 33-931 and 36-2903.01(G)(4) insofar as those statutes allow a hospital that has accepted payment from AHCCCS to impose a lien on a patient's tort recovery for the balance between the AHCCCS payment and the hospital's customary rate. As incorporated by law into the PPAs, § 447.15 therefore invalidated any state-law rights the contracts otherwise might have afforded the Hospitals to impose the liens at issue here. See Maryland v. Louisiana , 451 U.S. 725, 747, 101 S.Ct. 2114, 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981) ("A state statute is void to the extent it conflicts with a federal statute."); AES Sparrows Point LNG, LLC v. Smith , 527 F.3d 120, 125-26 (4th Cir. 2008) (preempted state law "unenforceable under the Supremacy Clause"). ¶ 36 Two versions of express "compliance-with-law" clauses in the PPAs only bolster our conclusion that the contracts required the Hospitals to comply with 42 C.F.R. § 447.15. In the first version, the General Terms and Conditions included this term: 6. The Provider shall comply with all federal, State and local laws, rules, regulations, standards and executive orders governing performance of duties under this Agreement, without limitation to those designated within this Agreement. The like provision in the second version simply stated that the provider agrees "[t]o comply with all applicable Federal and State laws and regulations." ¶ 37 The Hospitals argue the PPAs do not encompass subsequent changes in the law. See, e.g. , Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. CSX Transp., Inc ., 42 F.3d 1125, 1130 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[S]ubsequent changes in the law that are not anticipated in the contract generally have no bearing on the terms of their agreement."); Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle , 295 Wis.2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408, 429-33 (2006) (post-contract amendment to statute not incorporated in parties' agreement). But the relevant law has not changed: HHS issued 42 C.F.R. § 447.15 in 1980-before the PPAs at issue here were executed-and the regulation has not materially changed since then. See 45 Fed. Reg. 24889 (Apr. 11, 1980). Nor does our decision that federal law preempts the lien statutes depart from Arizona common law. Excepting our earlier decision in Abbott I (later vacated, and which held the lien statutes were preempted), no Arizona appellate court has decided the issue. Abbott II, 239 Ariz. at 414, ¶ 17, 372 P.3d at 938, vacating Abbott I , 236 Ariz. 436, 341 P.3d 478. ¶ 38 The Hospitals argue otherwise, citing Arizona cases that refer to the medical-lien statutes and the rights they purport to grant AHCCCS providers. But none of the cases the Hospitals cite addresses (or even mentions) whether 42 C.F.R. § 447.15 or any other federal authority preempts a provider's right to balance bill under Arizona law. See , e.g. , Andrews v. Samaritan Health Sys. , 201 Ariz. 379, 384, ¶ 17, 36 P.3d 57, 64 (App. 2001) ; LaBombard v. Samaritan Health Sys. , 195 Ariz. 543, 549, ¶ 23, 991 P.2d 246, 252 (App. 1998). Nor does our supreme court's decision in Abbott II , 239 Ariz. at 414, ¶¶ 17-19, 372 P.3d at 938, reach the issue of preemption. Although the court stated that the preemptive effect of federal law on providers' lien rights "was not settled in Arizona," it made that comment in explaining that the parties' accord and satisfaction was valid because no Arizona appellate court had ruled on the issue. Id. ¶ 39 Finally, the Hospitals assert that the parties to the PPAs-the Hospitals themselves and AHCCCS-intended that the Hospitals would be able to enforce liens on patients' recoveries from tortfeasors. In support of this argument, the Hospitals cite A.A.C. R9-22-1007. As discussed, ¶ 27 supra , we do not accept the Hospitals' interpretation of that regulation. In any event, however, by agreeing in the PPAs to comply with federal law, the Hospitals agreed that a federal regulation preempting their state-law lien rights would trump any lien right allowed by AHCCCS regulation. ¶ 40 Accordingly, the Hospitals breached a duty owed to the Patients under the PPAs when they imposed the liens at issue here because those liens were invalid under federal law. We hold the superior court erred when it denied the Patients' motion for summary judgment on their claim for breach of the PPAs, and direct entry of judgment in the Patients' favor on that claim. D. The Breadth of the Injunction. ¶ 41 As noted, ¶ 5 supra , the superior court ruled on the Patients' claim under the Supremacy Clause that 42 C.F.R. § 447.15 preempts the Hospitals' state-law lien rights and ordered the Hospitals to discharge all liens they had recorded against the Plaintiffs' tort recoveries. At the same time, the court permanently enjoined the Hospitals from filing a lien against any patient's tort recovery after having accepted payment from AHCCCS for treating the patient. Having concluded that the Patients were entitled to entry of judgment on their claim for breach of contract, we hold the superior court did not err by ordering the existing liens discharged and enjoining the Hospitals from filing future liens in the same circumstances. ¶ 42 The Hospitals do not contend that general equitable principles bar the injunction the superior court entered. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) (class-action treatment when defendant "has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate for the class as a whole"); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 357(2) (1981) (court has discretion in contract action to enjoin breach of duty "of forbearance"). The Hospitals argue, however, that the injunction is overly broad in that it purports to extend to medical services not funded by AHCCCS. We review the superior court's grant of an injunction for abuse of discretion but review its application of law de novo . See Cheatham v. DiCiccio , 240 Ariz. 314, 317-18, ¶ 8, 379 P.3d 211, 214-15 (2016). The superior court abuses its discretion if it applies the incorrect substantive law or injunction standard or bases "its decision on an erroneous material finding of fact." TP Racing, L.L.L.P. v. Simms , 232 Ariz. 489, 492, ¶ 8, 307 P.3d 56, 59 (App. 2013). ¶ 43 In relevant part, the injunction the superior court entered permanently enjoins the Hospitals "from filing or asserting any lien or claim against a patient's personal injury recovery, after having received any payment from AHCCCS for the same patient's care." (Emphasis in original.) The Hospitals argue the reference to "any payment" may prevent a hospital from filing a lien to collect fees it is owed for services for which AHCCCS has not paid the hospital. The Hospitals contend there are situations in which only some of the services they have provided a patient are covered by AHCCCS, and they argue the injunction erroneously will bar them from seeking payment for services for which AHCCCS has not paid. ¶ 44 The Hospitals, however, do not point to anything in the record showing that such a situation actually has occurred, and we normally will not issue advisory opinions on issues not squarely before us. Sw. Barricades, L.L.C. v. Traffic Mgmt., Inc. , 240 Ariz. 139, 142, ¶ 17, n.3, 377 P.3d 336, 399, n. 3 (App. 2016). Should the situation the Hospitals posit arise, they "will be able, at that time, to apply to the superior court for appropriate modification." TP Racing , 232 Ariz. at 496, ¶ 25, 307 P.3d at 63 ; see also State v. Portland Cement Ass'n , 142 Ariz. 421, 425, 690 P.2d 140, 144 (App. 1984) (court of original jurisdiction has power to modify its own injunction when circumstances change). E. Attorney's Fees. ¶ 45 After prevailing on their claim based on the Supremacy Clause, the Patients sought attorney's fees under the private attorney general doctrine, and the court entered an award of $1,221,902. See generally Arnold v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs., 160 Ariz. 593, 609, 775 P.2d 521, 537 (1989) (private attorney general doctrine allows fees award to party that has vindicated an important public right). ¶ 46 On appeal, the Hospitals argue the private attorney general doctrine does not allow a fees award on a preemption claim brought under the Supremacy Clause. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. v. Wilderness Soc'y , 421 U.S. 240, 245-71, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975) (doctrine not applicable in challenge to federal agency action); Challenge, Inc. v. State ex rel. Corbin , 138 Ariz. 200, 206, 673 P.2d 944, 950 (App. 1983) (federal law governs availability of fees in claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ). We need not decide whether the doctrine applies in a preemption claim brought under the Supremacy Clause because we conclude the superior court had discretion to award fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A) (2018) to the Patients on their third-party claim for breach of contract. ¶ 47 As for the amount of the award, the Hospitals contend the superior court abused its discretion by failing to discount the fees the Patients sought for work performed (1) in a similar federal-court case they voluntarily dismissed before commencing this one; and (2) on issues pertaining to the group of Abbott plaintiffs who had settled their lien claims with the Hospitals. "We review the amount of the superior court's attorney fees and costs awards for an abuse of discretion." Lee v. ING Inv. Mgmt., LLC , 240 Ariz. 158, 161, ¶ 11, 377 P.3d 355, 358 (App. 2016). ¶ 48 The Hospitals argue that more than $485,000 of the fees awarded were incurred not in this case but in a federal lawsuit the Patients filed, then voluntarily dismissed, before refiling their claims in superior court. The Patients contend that those fees included the time spent in "vet[ting] hundreds of potential class representatives" for the claims, researching Medicaid plans across the country and interviewing expert witnesses. ¶ 49 The Hospitals cite Vicari v. Lake Havasu City , 222 Ariz. 218, 223-24, ¶¶ 18-21, 213 P.3d 367, 372-73 (App. 2009), for the proposition that the defendant is the prevailing party when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the complaint. The issue here, however, is whether a court abuses its discretion in awarding fees for legal work performed in connection with a prior case before dismissing it, when that work is integral to the claimant's successful prosecution of a subsequent claim. The superior court here did not abuse its discretion in declining to reduce its fees award to take into account work performed in the federal action. See First Nat. Bank of Ariz. v. Cont'l Bank , 138 Ariz. 194, 200, 673 P.2d 938, 944 (App. 1983) ("pre-complaint investigation and evaluation of the potential claim is part of the process and expense of litigation"). ¶ 50 The Hospitals finally argue that the superior court abused its discretion in awarding fees for work performed for the group of patients whose claims were dismissed in Abbott II . The Hospitals contend that $60,442 of the fees the Patients were awarded were incurred in connection with superior court proceedings involving those plaintiffs. ¶ 51 In determining the reasonableness of the number of hours expended by an attorney, the superior court must consider whether the claimed work "would have been undertaken by a reasonable and prudent lawyer to advance or protect [the] client's interest." Schweiger v. China DollRest., Inc. , 138 Ariz. 183, 188, 673 P.2d 927, 932 (1983). "Furthermore, time spent on unsuccessful issues or claims may not be compensable." Id. On the other hand, when a party has "accomplished the result sought in the litigation, fees should be awarded for time spent even on unsuccessful legal theories. Where a party has achieved only partial or limited success, however, it would be unreasonable to award compensation for all hours expended, including time spent on ... unsuccessful issues or claims." Id. at 189, 673 P.2d at 933 ; Orfaly v. Tucson Symphony Soc'y , 209 Ariz. 260, 266-67, ¶ 24, 99 P.3d 1030, 1036-37 (App. 2004). ¶ 52 When the superior court in this case ruled on the Patients' fee request in 2014, that court could not know that the supreme court ultimately would reject the Abbott plaintiffs' claims. Although the Hospitals addressed this issue in a motion for new trial filed after the case was reassigned to another division of the Maricopa County Superior Court, the judge newly assigned to the case declined to reconsider the fees award in light of the supreme court's decision in Abbott II . We remand the fees award to the superior court so that it may exercise its discretion to review the Patients' claim for fees incurred in connection with the claims brought by the Abbott plaintiffs. CONCLUSION ¶ 53 We hold the Patients are third-party beneficiaries of the contracts the Hospitals entered with AHCCCS to provide medical services to AHCCCS members. We further hold those contracts required the Hospitals to comply with federal law, including 42 C.F.R. § 447.15, which preempts A.R.S. §§ 33-931 and 36-2903.01(G)(4) to the extent those statutes allow a health-care provider that has accepted payment from AHCCCS to impose a lien on a patient's tort recovery for the balance between the AHCCCS payment and the provider's customary rates. Accordingly, we reverse the superior court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the Hospitals on the Patients' claim for breach of contract and direct entry of judgment in the Patients' favor on that claim. On this basis, and without addressing the judgment the superior court entered on the Patients' claim for declaratory relief under the Supremacy Clause, we affirm the injunction the superior court entered. We remand the attorney's fees award and direct the superior court to reconsider whether the Patients are entitled to receive the full amount of the fees incurred in the superior court in connection with the Abbott case. Finally, we award the Patients their costs on appeal and their attorney's fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A), contingent upon compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21. Absent material revision after the relevant date, we cite a statute's current version. The Patients argue our decision in Abbott I , which concluded that federal law preempts the lien statutes, see 236 Ariz. at 442, ¶ 18, 341 P.3d at 484, is the law of the case. In Abbott II , however, our supreme court reversed that decision (albeit on other grounds). See 239 Ariz. at 415, ¶ 20, 372 P.3d at 939. Assuming the law-of-the-case doctrine might otherwise apply, we decline to apply it here. See Powell-Cerkoney v. TCR-Montana Ranch Joint Venture, II , 176 Ariz. 275, 278-79, 860 P.2d 1328, 1331-32 (App. 1993) (court has discretion whether to apply law-of-the-case doctrine in favor of its own prior decision). See also Evanston Hosp. v. Hauck , 1 F.3d 540, 543-44 (7th Cir. 1993) (hospital could not return payment to state Medicaid agency and then assert lien against patient who won a tort judgment; hospital's claim would turn Medicaid "upside down by converting the system into an insurance program for hospitals rather than for indigent patients"); Smallwood v. Cent. Peninsula Gen. Hosp ., 151 P.3d 319, 326 (Alaska 2006) ("Medicaid recipients are the intended beneficiaries of the prohibition on balance billing. That intent is evident from the state and federal Medicaid statutes and regulations and from the terms of the provider agreement.").

JOHNSEN, Judge: ¶ 1 Chalice Zeitner was convicted of defrauding the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System ("AHCCCS") by lying to a physician to obtain coverage for an abortion. On appeal, she argues the superior court breached the physician-patient privilege by admitting her medical records and allowing her physicians to testify against her. We hold the privilege is abrogated by statute in cases of suspected AHCCCS fraud and affirm Zeitner's convictions. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶ 2 Zeitner went to a Phoenix obstetrician for an abortion in March 2010. She told him she just had discovered she was pregnant after recently undergoing extensive radiation and chemotherapy treatments for cancer. Zeitner said she wanted an abortion because she thought the radiation and chemotherapy likely had harmed her fetus. After examining Zeitner, however, the obstetrician concluded she was well-nourished and healthy, about 20 weeks' pregnant and in no acute distress. Accordingly, he proposed a course of care designed to avoid an abortion. He told Zeitner to obtain information from her cancer physicians about her treatments and referred her to a specialist in high-risk pregnancies in the hope that she could deliver a viable baby. ¶ 3 Zeitner met with the specialist a few days later. Examining Zeitner, the specialist grew suspicious. He thought it unusual that, although Zeitner told him she had a diagnosed malignant uterine tumor, the physicians treating her cancer had not removed her uterus. Zeitner told the specialist her main chemotherapy drug was acetaminophen-an over-the-counter pain reliever, not a chemotherapy drug. And Zeitner was unable to relate details of her cancer diagnosis or treatment, other than that she had been diagnosed at a hospital in Boston. From an ultrasound, the specialist saw no abnormalities that compelled an abortion. He reported his concerns about Zeitner's veracity to the obstetrician. ¶ 4 A few days later, Zeitner successfully applied for AHCCCS benefits. AHCCCS had turned down an application Zeitner had submitted just a month before, citing insufficient documentation. Although Zeitner's earlier application had said she had no serious or chronic illnesses, on the application she submitted in late March, Zeitner stated she had a serious chronic illness and said her pregnancy was high-risk and life-threatening. ¶ 5 On March 31, the obstetrician received an email signed "Al Zeitner" that seemed to be following up on behalf of Chalice Zeitner. Referencing Chalice in the third person, the email stated the author was waiting to hear back from the obstetrician about a "procedure" that he purportedly had proposed. The email suggested the procedure was urgent, stating: Chalice is scheduled to resume chemo and radiotherapy on April 9th. She must have the tumors removed in the next 4 weeks. She is on bedrest and supervised care in her home until notice from [the Phoenix obstetrician] of this procedure. ¶ 6 Shortly thereafter, Zeitner brought the obstetrician a letter dated April 1, purportedly written by a "Dr. McMahon" at the Boston hospital Zeitner claimed had treated her for cancer. The letter recommended that Zeitner "receive an urgent [abortion] ... to relieve third term life-threatening certainties to the patient." Attached to the letter was a list of chemotherapy and radiotherapy medications purportedly prescribed to Zeitner. (Although a physician named McMahon actually practiced at the Boston hospital at the time, he had never treated Zeitner and had not written the letter or created the list of medications Zeitner gave to him.) ¶ 7 Accepting the letter as authentic, the obstetrician concluded Zeitner urgently needed an abortion. Based on his opinion that an abortion was necessary to protect Zeitner's health, AHCCCS authorized payment, and the obstetrician aborted Zeitner's fetus on April 9. ¶ 8 Meanwhile, Zeitner launched a scheme to garner donations from friends and others to fund her purported cancer treatments. Using the name "Trinity McLaughlin," Zeitner sent a social media message to her boyfriend, informing him that "Trinity" and a few others had created a webpage to raise funds for Zeitner's cancer treatments and suggesting the boyfriend take over the fundraising effort. The next week, "Trinity" emailed the boyfriend fundraising materials for him to use, including a heartrending plea for donations detailing Zeitner's cancer, her costly painful treatments and her resulting financial hardships. ¶ 9 Acting on "Trinity's" request, the boyfriend posted on a fundraising website the story "Trinity" had sent him, forwarded "Dr. McMahon's" letter to the website to satisfy its request for proof that Zeitner actually had a medical condition, opened a bank account for donations, and solicited more than 600 social media friends to help pay for the purported cancer treatments. In response, more than 20 people donated a cumulative total of more than $2,000 to Zeitner's cancer fund via the website. ¶ 10 Several months later, Zeitner became pregnant again, and the Phoenix obstetrician delivered her child by caesarean section. During the procedure, the obstetrician saw no evidence that tumors had been removed from Zeitner's uterus or that she had undergone chemotherapy or radiation. By then highly suspicious about Zeitner's claimed cancer, the obstetrician contacted Dr. McMahon at the Boston hospital, who said he had not treated Zeitner nor authored the letter Zeitner had given him. The obstetrician reported his suspicions about Zeitner to her health plan, which forwarded the matter to AHCCCS. ¶ 11 A grand jury eventually indicted Zeitner on 11 charges. AHCCCS generally does not cover abortions; the indictment alleged Zeitner defrauded AHCCCS and stole public health benefits by lying about having cancer so that her abortion would fall within an exception to that rule. The State also alleged Zeitner defrauded the donors to her cancer fund, attempted to steal donations and committed identity theft and forgery. ¶ 12 After pleading not guilty to each of the charges, Zeitner moved to preclude all information her physicians obtained from her, including records relating to her communications with the physicians and their examinations of her, arguing they were protected under Arizona's physician-patient privilege, Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 13-4062(A)(4) (2018). The State opposed the motions, arguing the privilege was abrogated by statute and, in any event, Zeitner had waived it. The court denied the motions. ¶ 13 After an 11-day trial in which the court admitted Zeitner's medical records and allowed her physicians to testify, the jury found Zeitner guilty of all charges. The court sentenced her to concurrent prison terms, the longest of which was ten years. ¶ 14 Zeitner timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) (2018), 13-4031 (2018) and -4033(A)(1) (2018). DISCUSSION A. General Principles. ¶ 15 On appeal, the only argument Zeitner raises is that the superior court erred by admitting her medical records and allowing her physicians to testify against her. We review de novo whether a privilege applies. State v. Wilson , 200 Ariz. 390, 393, ¶ 4, 26 P.3d 1161, 1164 (App. 2001) ; see also State v. Herrera , 203 Ariz. 131, 136, ¶ 12, 51 P.3d 353, 358 (App. 2002) (reviewing de novo a statutory exception to a privilege). ¶ 16 Arizona's physician-patient privilege applicable in criminal cases provides: A person shall not be examined as a witness in the following cases: * * * 4. A physician or surgeon, without consent of the physician's or surgeon's patient, as to any information acquired in attending the patient which was necessary to enable the physician or surgeon to prescribe or act for the patient. A.R.S. § 13-4062(4). Although the privilege is framed as a testimonial privilege, it also protects patient medical records. Tucson Med. Ctr. Inc. v. Rowles , 21 Ariz.App. 424, 427, 520 P.2d 518 (1974) ; see State v. Mincey , 141 Ariz. 425, 439, 687 P.2d 1180, 1194(1984) (privilege protects "[a]ll information obtained by the physician, whether from examination, testing, or direct communication"). ¶ 17 "The purpose of the [physician-patient] privilege is to encourage 'full and frank disclosure of medical history and symptoms by a patient to [her] doctor.' " Phoenix Children's Hosp., Inc. v. Grant , 228 Ariz. 235, 237, ¶ 8, 265 P.3d 417, 419 (App. 2011) (quoting Lewin v. Jackson , 108 Ariz. 27, 31, 492 P.2d 406, 410 (1972) ). That purpose is served by protecting "communications made by the patient to [her] physician for the purpose of treatment." State v. Santeyan , 136 Ariz. 108, 110, 664 P.2d 652, 654 (1983). B. Common-Law Exception for Crimes or Frauds. ¶ 18 Under a common-law exception to the attorney-client privilege, that privilege does not protect statements a client makes to a lawyer in committing a fraud. See Buell v. Superior Court , 96 Ariz. 62, 68, 391 P.2d 919 (1964) ("A client who consults an attorney for advice that will serve him in the commission of a fraud will have no help from the law.") (quoting Clark v. United States , 289 U.S. 1, 15, 53 S.Ct. 465, 77 L.Ed. 993 (1933) ). The State argues the common law similarly constrains the physician-patient privilege. ¶ 19 This court already has ruled, however, that no common-law exception for crimes or frauds applies to the physician-patient privilege. See Wilson , 200 Ariz. at 395, ¶ 11, 26 P.3d at 1166. The defendant in Wilson was charged with workers' compensation fraud, and the State argued the superior court erred by precluding the defendant's treating physicians from testifying about the claimed injury. 200 Ariz. at 392-93, ¶¶ 2-3, 26 P.3d at 1163-64. As here, the State argued the privilege does not apply when the patient is accused of fraud. Id. at 394, ¶ 9, 26 P.3d at 1165. Rejecting that argument, we held that "[i]n the absence of any supporting authority," a fraud allegation, by itself, does not render the privilege ineffective. Id ."The state's mere charge of fraud against [the patient] and its alleged need for the otherwise privileged evidence at issue ... do not justify abrogating the privilege or broadly engrafting a common law 'crime-fraud exception' to the privilege in this particular context." Id. at 395, ¶ 11, 26 P.3d at 1166. ¶ 20 Wilson 's rejection of the asserted common-law exception arose out of the origin of the physician-patient privilege in Arizona. The common-law crime-fraud exception applies to the attorney-client privilege because that privilege is rooted in the common law: Both the attorney-client privilege and the exception to that privilege for crimes and frauds existed in the common law long before Arizona enacted an attorney-client privilege statute. See Buell , 96 Ariz. at 68, 391 P.2d 919 (quoting Clark , 289 U.S. at 15, 53 S.Ct. 465 (tracing history of the common-law attorney-client privilege to at least the time of Queen Elizabeth, and the common-law crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege to the 19th century)). Accordingly, by codifying the common-law attorney-client privilege, the legislature impliedly authorized the common-law exception to that privilege for crimes and frauds. ¶ 21 By contrast, because the physician-patient privilege did not exist at common law, the legislature's enactment of that privilege brought with it no crime-fraud exception. As Wilson stated, " '[b]ecause there was no [physician-patient] privilege at common law, the [physician-patient] statute must be strictly construed.' " Wilson , 200 Ariz. at 393, ¶ 5, 26 P.3d at 1164 (quoting State v. Morales , 170 Ariz. 360, 363, 824 P.2d 756, 759 (App. 1991) ). Because the physician-patient privilege was created by the legislature, it is up to the legislature, not the courts, to adopt any exception applicable in cases of crimes or frauds. Id. at 395, ¶ 12, 26 P.3d at 1166. C. Abrogation by Arizona's AHCCCS Statutes. ¶ 22 Although no common-law exception to the physician-patient privilege applies in Arizona, our legislature has created other exceptions to the privilege. Id. at 395, ¶ 11, n.3, 26 P.3d at 1166 n.3 (listing exceptions); see Martin v. Reinstein , 195 Ariz. 293, 320, ¶ 96, 987 P.2d 779, 806 (App. 1999) ("the legislature has, in several instances, determined that the public good requires that statutory or rule-based confidentiality give way to serve a greater good."). We agree with the State that the legislature likewise has created a statutory exception to the physician-patient privilege that applies when a patient lies to a physician in seeking treatment for which AHCCCS otherwise would not provide reimbursement. ¶ 23 By law, health-care providers must report "suspected fraud" to AHCCCS, and if the agency's resulting "preliminary investigation" gives rise to a belief that a fraud has occurred, AHCCCS "shall" refer the claim for prosecution: All contractors, subcontracted providers of care and noncontracting providers shall notify the [AHCCCS] director or the director's designee immediately in a written report of any cases of suspected fraud or abuse. The director shall review the report and conduct a preliminary investigation to determine if there is sufficient basis to warrant a full investigation. If the findings of a preliminary investigation give the director reason to believe that an incident of fraud or abuse has occurred, the matter shall be referred to the attorney general. A.R.S. § 36-2918.01(A) (2018). Further, when fraud is suspected, Arizona law requires a physician to turn over a patient's records to AHCCCS investigators: Subject to existing law relating to privilege and protection, the director shall prescribe by rule the types of information that are confidential and circumstances under which such information may be used or released, including requirements for physician-patient confidentiality.... Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, a member's medical record shall be released without the member's consent in situations or suspected cases of fraud or abuse relating to the system to an officer of the state's certified [AHCCCS] fraud control unit who has submitted a written request for the medical record. A.R.S. § 36-2903(I) (2018). AHCCCS may subpoena any record necessary to support an investigation and may subpoena any person to testify under oath. A.R.S. § 36-2918(G) (2018). ¶ 24 These provisions together demonstrate a plain directive by the legislature that the physician-patient privilege will give way when necessary to allow investigation and prosecution of suspected fraud against AHCCCS. Although the cited provisions do not explicitly constrain the physician-patient privilege, they abrogate the privilege by implication when fraud is suspected by imposing disclosure obligations on physicians that are entirely inconsistent with the privilege. In the normal case, the physician-patient privilege does not permit compelled disclosure of the physician's records concerning a patient. See Mincey , 141 Ariz. at 439, 687 P.2d at 1194 ; Rowles , 21 Ariz.App. at 427, 520 P.2d 518. But when fraud against AHCCCS is suspected, A.R.S. §§ 36-2903(I) and -2918(G) require physicians to release a patient's medical records without the patient's consent. Indeed, § 36-2903(I) explicitly trumps the physician-patient privilege in such cases by compelling a physician to release patient records to investigators "[n]otwithstanding any law to the contrary." ¶ 25 Zeitner argues that even though the cited statutes may compel physicians to report suspected fraud and release patient records in such cases, it does not follow that the State may use that information to prosecute a patient suspected of fraud. We are not persuaded. Under § 36-2918.01(A), when a preliminary investigation by AHCCCS "give[s] the director reason to believe that an incident of fraud or abuse has occurred," the director "shall" refer the matter to the attorney general. The purpose of such a referral, of course, would be for consideration of prosecution. See Ariz. Admin. Code R9-22-512(A)(2) (AHCCCS may "release safeguarded information ... without the [patient's] consent, for the purpose of conducting ... prosecution ... related to the administration of the AHCCCS program."). ¶ 26 Zeitner also argues that no statute or regulation allows a physician to be compelled to testify about a patient's medical care. But under § 36-2903(I), medical records relating to a suspected fraud must be disclosed; that abrogation of the privilege necessarily implies that a physician may be called to testify about statements the patient made relevant to the suspected fraud. Cf. Rowles, 21 Ariz.App. at 427, 520 P.2d 518 (although nominally a testimonial privilege, physician-patient privilege also shields records a physician maintains for his or her patients). It would serve little purpose, and would make little sense, for a patient to retain the power to prevent her physician from testifying when the physician can be legally compelled to release the patient's medical records-the confidences the privilege is designed to protect already will have been disclosed. ¶ 27 In construing statutes, we "apply constructions that make practical sense" rather than those that "frustrate legislative intent." State v. Hasson , 217 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 11, 177 P.3d 301, 304 (App. 2008). Construing the AHCCCS anti-fraud statutes to abrogate the privilege for records in which a physician recounts a patient's statements but not for the physician's testimony about those statements would frustrate the legislature's intent by impeding fraud prosecutions while failing to meaningfully protect a patient's privacy. Construing the reporting and disclosure requirements in §§ 36-2918.01(A) and -2903(I) to serve the purpose of investigating and prosecuting fraud, we hold that in cases of suspected fraud against AHCCCS, a physician may be required to testify about communications with a patient. CONCLUSION ¶ 28 In sum, as in Wilson , we decline to apply a common-law crime-fraud exception to the statutory physician-patient privilege. The reporting and disclosure requirements that AHCCCS imposes on physicians, however, distinguish a prosecution of suspected AHCCCS fraud from the workers' compensation fraud in Wilson . The reporting requirements that AHCCCS imposes on physicians and the requirement to disclose confidential patient information in cases of suspected fraud abrogate the privilege insofar as it otherwise might shield a patient's records and statements to a physician in such a case. Accordingly, the superior court did not err in declining to enforce the privilege and by admitting Zeitner's medical records and allowing the State to call her physicians to testify. We therefore affirm Zeitner's convictions and the resulting sentences. AHCCCS administers Arizona's Medicaid program. Southwest Fiduciary, Inc. v. Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System Admin. , 226 Ariz. 404, 406, ¶ 8, 249 P.3d 1104, 1106 (App. 2011). Medicaid is a federal program that funds medical care for qualified low-income individuals in participating states. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 to 1396w-5 (2012). Each participating state administers its own Medicaid program, which must conform to federal requirements. See , e.g ., Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 36-2901 to -2999.57 (2018). Unbeknownst to the obstetrician, from time to time Chalice Zeitner used "Al Zeitner" as an alias. Absent a material revision of a statute since the relevant date, we cite the statute's current version. As explained below, we conclude that the physician-patient privilege does not apply in cases of suspected fraud against AHCCCS. Zeitner does not argue that even if the evidence she challenges was properly admitted to show she defrauded AHCCCS, the jury should not have been allowed to consider that evidence on the other charges against her. Rowles involved A.R.S. § 12-2235 (2018), the physician-patient privilege applying to civil cases, 21 Ariz.App. at 427, 520 P.2d 518, but its analysis applies to A.R.S. § 13-4062(4). "Because the language of § 12-2235 'is not significantly different from' § 13-4062(4), 'there is no sound reason why the legal interpretation of the statutes should be any different.' " Wilson , 200 Ariz. at 397, ¶ 19, 26 P.3d at 1168 (quoting State v. Santeyan , 136 Ariz. 108, 110, 664 P.2d 652, 654 (1983) ). Those who report suspected fraud in good faith are protected from civil liability, while those who fail to report risk negative consequences. See A.R.S. § 36-2918.01(B)-(C) (one obligated to report AHCCCS fraud who fails to do so is subject to disciplinary action). Although not raised directly on appeal, other courts have held that the Supremacy Clause requires a state physician-patient privilege to give way when necessary to investigate and prosecute Medicaid fraud. See In re Zyprexa Prod. Liab. Litig ., 254 F.R.D. 50, 57 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), aff'd, No. 04-MD-1596, 2008 WL 4682311 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2008) ("The physician-patient privilege simply is not implicated when a state agency compels production of Medicaid records for use in connection with the agency's lawful functions; and to the extent that state law provides otherwise, it is trumped by the Supremacy Clause and by the state's obligations under the Medicaid regulations."); In re Search Warrant for 2045 Franklin, Denver, Colo. , 709 P.2d 597, 601 (Colo. App. 1985) ; People v. Ekong , 221 Ill.App.3d 559, 164 Ill.Dec. 25, 582 N.E.2d 233, 234-35 (1991) ; In re Grand Jury Investigation , 441 A.2d 525, 531 (R.I. 1982) ; cf. People v. Bhatt , 160 Misc.2d 973, 611 N.Y.S.2d 447, 452 (Sup. Ct. 1994) ("[A]n exception to the physician-patient privilege ... must be created to permit appropriate oversight of the Medicare program."). Given that we resolve this appeal based on state-law grounds, we need not consider the implications of the Supremacy Clause on the privilege. We may affirm the superior court's ruling for any reason supported by the record. See Gila River Indian Cmty. v. Dep't of Child Safety , 242 Ariz. 277, 283, ¶ 26, 395 P.3d 286, 292 (2017).

HOWE, Judge: ¶1 Buren Jarrett Burgess appeals his convictions and sentences for two counts of child prostitution. Among other issues, we address in this opinion whether A.R.S. § 13-3212(C), which provides that "[i]t is not a defense to a prosecution [for child prostitution] that the other person is a peace officer posing as a minor ..." is unconstitutional because it lacks a rational basis in a prosecution for in-person solicitation of a child prostitute. We also address whether A.R.S. § 13-703(L) 's mandate that a defendant's prior felony convictions for offenses "committed on the same occasion" be counted as only one conviction applies to a defendant subject to sentencing under A.R.S. § 13-3212. ¶2 We hold that A.R.S. § 13-3212(C) is constitutional and that it applies to all types of solicitation. We also hold that A.R.S. § 13-703(L) 's mandate does not apply when a defendant is sentenced under A.R.S. § 13-3212 because § 13-3212 does not include any limitation on how prior felony convictions are counted. We therefore affirm Burgess's convictions and affirm his sentences as modified. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶3 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the verdicts and resolve all reasonable inferences against Burgess. See State v. Causbie , 241 Ariz. 173, 175 ¶ 2, 384 P.3d 1253, 1255 (App. 2016). In November 2014, Burgess called and texted telephone numbers posted in online advertisements offering the services of two female escorts. The advertisements listed the escorts' ages as 18 and contained explicit sexual content. "Brittany" and "Jennifer" responded to Burgess's calls and texts and asked Burgess if he wanted the services of two girls; he answered that he did. Unbeknownst to Burgess, the two were undercover police officers posing as child prostitutes. ¶4 "Brittany" and "Jennifer" informed Burgess that they were 16 years old and that spending one-half hour with both would cost $160. Burgess confirmed with the "girls" that they were not police officers, but he hesitated and stated that he wanted an 18-year-old escort. Burgess ultimately agreed to meet the two "girls" at their hotel room to "hang out." Jennifer told Burgess that she would reduce the price if he brought cigarettes because "we're pretty young and obviously we can't buy cigarettes[.]" Burgess did so. ¶5 After Burgess arrived at the hotel room, the "girls" asked what he "wanted," and Burgess replied that he would like them to "do stuff to him." He paid Jennifer $150, handed her the cigarettes, and agreed to wear a condom once they "began having sex." As Burgess undressed, the "girls" went into the bathroom to change clothes. Police officers then stormed into the room and took Burgess into custody. ¶6 The State charged Burgess with two counts of child prostitution under A.R.S. § 13-3212(B)(2), class 2 felonies, alleging that he knowingly engaged in prostitution with the women, believing they were between 15 and 17 years old. Before trial, Burgess moved for a jury instruction on prostitution as a lesser-included offense of child prostitution. The prosecutor agreed that an instruction on "misdemeanor prostitution" was appropriate. After the court indicated that the instruction would be given, defense counsel requested guidance on how the parties should refer to the lesser-included offense because the prosecutor had referred to it as "misdemeanor prostitution." The court clarified that the classification should not be referred to and the prosecutor acknowledged that he "should not have referred to [the lesser-included offense] that way." ¶7 During Burgess's cross-examination of the undercover officer who posed as Brittany, counsel asked if she agreed that child prostitution was a more serious situation than adult prostitution, and she agreed. The officer also agreed that an act of prostitution occurred and that the only issue was whether the prostitution was child or adult prostitution. Counsel then asked, "do you understand that adult prostitution is a lesser-included offense of child prostitution[,]" and the officer responded that "[adult] [p]rostitution is a misdemeanor, and child prostitution is a felony." Counsel followed up by stating that prostitution with an adult "is just a misdemeanor" but "[i]s a felony" if done with a child; the undercover officer agreed. ¶8 After the close of evidence, the court instructed the jury that "[i]n deciding whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty, do not consider the possible punishment" and provided a lesser-included offense instruction. The jury found Burgess guilty as charged. During sentencing, the State argued that Burgess had two historical prior felony convictions from 1997 and therefore should be sentenced under A.R.S. § 13-3212(I)(3). The State contended that although the 1997 offenses occurred on the same date and involved the same victim, A.R.S. § 13-3212 did not contain "any language indicating that prior convictions for two or more offenses committed on the same occasion shall be counted as only one conviction." The court disagreed and determined that Burgess's two prior felonies amounted to only one historical prior felony under A.R.S. § 13-703(L), the repetitive offender sentencing statute. After finding that Burgess was on probation when he committed the current offenses, the court imposed consecutive presumptive sentences of 15.75 years' imprisonment. Burgess timely appealed and the State timely cross-appealed. DISCUSSION 1. Sufficiency of Evidence ¶9 Burgess argues that insufficient evidence supports his convictions because he "never agreed to engage in sexual activity until he saw the decoy prostitutes, who were 27 years old and looked it." He contends that although he was guilty of adult prostitution, he was not guilty of child prostitution. We review claims of insufficient evidence de novo. State v. West , 226 Ariz. 559, 562 ¶ 15, 250 P.3d 1188 (2011). The "relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at ¶ 16 (internal quotation marks omitted). "Reversible error based on insufficiency of the evidence occurs only where there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the conviction." State v. Soto-Fong , 187 Ariz. 186, 200, 928 P.2d 610, 624 (1996) (quoting State v. Scott , 113 Ariz. 423, 424-25, 555 P.2d 1117, 1118-19 (1976) ). ¶10 A person 18 years old or older commits child prostitution by knowingly "[e]ngaging in prostitution with a minor who the person knows or should have known is fifteen, sixteen or seventeen years of age." A.R.S. § 13-3212(B)(2). " 'Prostitution' means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual conduct under a fee arrangement with any person for money or any other valuable consideration." A.R.S. § 13-3211(5). "It is not a defense to a prosecution" under subsection (B)(2) "that the other person is a peace officer posing as a minor or a person assisting a peace officer posing as a minor." A.R.S. § 13-3212(C). ¶11 Sufficient evidence supports Burgess's child prostitution convictions. Burgess responded to advertisements suggesting sexual experiences with girls who were "youngsters" and who subsequently informed him that they were 16 years old. And by agreeing to purchase cigarettes for the "girls," Burgess demonstrably acted on his belief that they were under 18 years old and unable to purchase the cigarettes themselves. Further, although Burgess did not expressly discuss sexual activity with the "girls" on the telephone, the language contained within the advertisements, along with his agreement to pay them $160 for 30 minutes of their time, reasonably implies that his desire to "hang out" with the "girls" included engaging in sexual conduct. Burgess's asking if the "girls" were police officers bolsters this inference; such a question would be unnecessary if he truly intended his encounter with the putative underage "girls" to be nothing more than an innocent get-together. Accordingly, the jury could reasonably conclude that Burgess committed child prostitution by offering to engage in sexual conduct under a fee arrangement with "girls" that he believed were 16 years old. Because Burgess completed the offense when he agreed to pay for their services, he committed the offenses before he saw the "girls." Thus, whether they appeared to be over 18 years old when he saw them in person does not affect the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. 2. A.R.S. § 13-3212(C) ¶12 Burgess next argues that A.R.S. § 13-3212(C) is unconstitutional because it lacks a rational basis in a prosecution for in-person solicitation of a child prostitute because the "defendant can see for himself that the prostitute is an adult." We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. State v. Maestas , 244 Ariz. 9, 12 ¶ 6, 417 P.3d 774, 777 (2018). "When the statute in question involves no fundamental constitutional rights or distinctions based on suspect classifications, we presume the statute is constitutional and will uphold it unless it clearly is not." Id. Burgess bears the burden of overcoming the statute's presumed constitutionality by a "clear showing of arbitrariness or irrationality." State v. Hammonds , 192 Ariz. 528, 532 ¶ 9, 968 P.2d 601, 605 (App. 1998). Burgess cannot satisfy his burden. ¶13 Burgess challenges A.R.S. § 13-3212(C), which states, "[i]t is not a defense to a prosecution [for child prostitution] that the other person is a peace officer posing as a minor or a person assisting a peace officer posing as a minor." Under the rational basis test, we will uphold a statute when it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. State v. Navarro , 201 Ariz. 292, 297 ¶ 25, 34 P.3d 971, 976 (2001). The legislature need not choose the most effective or least intrusive means of achieving its goals. Hammonds , 192 Ariz. at 532 ¶ 15, 968 P.2d at 605. Burgess does not argue that the legislature lacks a legitimate government purpose in protecting children from child prostitution. Instead, he argues only that "it is irrational for a law to permit the police and prosecutors ... to convict people for child prostitution, when the defendant[ was] dealing face-to-face" with an undercover officer. ¶14 He is incorrect. We agree with the State that a rational basis exists to use undercover police officers to combat child prostitution, regardless whether the solicitation occurs online or in person. Using undercover police officers in sting operations helps ensure that the people soliciting child prostitutes are stopped. The legislature could have rationally believed that using undercover officers and other persons posing as minors would achieve its goal of protecting children from being sexually exploited. As such, Burgess has failed to make a clear showing of arbitrariness or irrationality. ¶15 Burgess contends that we need not address his constitutional challenge to A.R.S. § 13-3212(C) if we hold that it applies only to non-in-person solicitations. But as discussed above, the statute is constitutional. Notwithstanding our holding, Burgess's argument still fails because as a matter of judicial restraint and standard principles of statutory construction, we will not "judicially impose a requirement the legislature has intentionally chosen not to require." See Hart v. Hart , 220 Ariz. 183, 187 ¶ 17, 204 P.3d 441, 446 (App. 2009). Here, the child prostitution statute does not distinguish between in-person and other solicitations, reflecting the legislature's intent to treat the various modes of solicitation similarly even though the "child" is actually an undercover police officer. See State v. Peek , 219 Ariz. 182, 184 ¶ 11, 195 P.3d 641, 643 (2008) (statutory language is the best indication of the legislature's intent). Therefore, Burgess's argument is without merit. 3. Statement Regarding Adult Prostitution ¶16 Burgess argues that his convictions "should be reversed because a state witness disclosed that the lesser-included offense was a misdemeanor," which violated the trial court's decision not to refer to either offense's classification. He contends that the undercover officer's answer, "[p]rostitution is a misdemeanor, and child prostitution is a felony[ ]" amounted to fundamental error. Because Burgess did not object at trial, we review only for fundamental error. See Henderson , 210 Ariz. at 567 ¶ 19, 115 P.3d at 607. ¶17 No fundamental error occurred. During defense counsel's cross-examination of the undercover officer, he elicited the challenged testimony directly. Although counsel began by asking the undercover officer if child prostitution was more serious than adult prostitution, he did not stop there. He then asked the officer if she understood that adult prostitution was a lesser-included offense of child prostitution. When the officer answered that adult prostitution was a misdemeanor, Burgess not only failed to object to the testimony, but his follow-up questions emphasized the different classes of child and adult prostitution, thereby arguably inviting whatever error occurred. See State v. Stuard , 176 Ariz. 589, 601, 863 P.2d 881, 893 (1993) (holding that any error in witness's testimony was invited because of the "broad question posed to him" by defense counsel). ¶18 In any event, the court did not err, much less fundamentally so, by failing to sua sponte take some remedial action-which Burgess does not specify-in response to the challenged testimony. The witness simply replied to Burgess's questioning in the manner she had every reason to believe fully answered the question. Further, the court properly instructed the jury that adult prostitution is a lesser-included offense and admonished the jurors not to consider punishment during their deliberations. See State v. Blackman , 201 Ariz. 527, 543 ¶ 65, 38 P.3d 1192, 1208 (App. 2002) (noting that the trial court appropriately instructed the jurors that they were not to consider punishment in reaching their verdict); State v. Miranda , 198 Ariz. 426, 428 ¶ 9, 10 P.3d 1213, 1215 (App. 2000) ("A lesser-included-offense instruction is proper only if (1) the lesser offense is composed of some, but not all, of the elements of the greater crime so that it is impossible to commit the greater without committing the lesser offense, and (2) the evidence supports an instruction on the lesser offense."). Presuming, as we must on this record, that the jury followed its instruction to not consider punishment, see Blackman , 201 Ariz. at 543 ¶ 65, 38 P.3d at 1208 (jurors are presumed to follow the trial court's instruction not to consider punishment in deciding guilt), Burgess cannot satisfy his burden of establishing prejudice. Therefore, the court did not err and Burgess suffered no prejudice. 4. The State's Cross-Appeal: Sentences ¶19 The State, as it did at sentencing, argues that the court should have imposed 28-year sentences. According to the State, the court erred in determining that Burgess's two historical prior felony convictions constituted only one historical prior felony conviction for sentencing purposes. Questions of law such as this are reviewed de novo. State ex rel. Polk v. Campbell , 239 Ariz. 405, 406 ¶ 4, 372 P.3d 929, 930 (2016) ; State v. Hollenback , 212 Ariz. 12, 16 ¶ 12, 126 P.3d 159, 163 (App. 2005) ("Whether the trial court applied the correct sentencing statute is a question of law, which we review de novo ."). ¶20 The trial court erred in sentencing Burgess as if he had only one historical prior felony conviction. The trial court found that Burgess's two convictions in 1997 amounted to only one historical prior felony conviction under A.R.S. § 13-703(L), the repetitive offender sentencing statute, because the offenses were "committed on the same occasion[.]" See A.R.S. § 13-703(L) ("Convictions for two or more offenses committed on the same occasion shall be counted as only one conviction for the purposes" of sentencing under § 13-703.). Thus, the trial court sentenced Burgess under A.R.S. § 13-3212(I)(2) to consecutive presumptive sentences of 15.75 years' imprisonment for a person convicted of child prostitution who has one historical prior felony conviction. ¶21 This was error. Although A.R.S. § 13-703(L), the sentencing statute that applies generally to all repetitive offenders, requires that offenses "committed on the same occasion" be deemed as one prior felony conviction, the sentencing statute that governs child prostitution offenses specifically provides otherwise. Section 13-3212(I) states that if the minor is 15, 16, or 17 years old, child prostitution under A.R.S. § 13-3212(B)(2) is a class 2 felony and "the person convicted shall be sentenced pursuant to this section ...." (Emphasis added). This section provides that if a person with two or more historical prior convictions is found guilty of engaging in prostitution with a minor who is 15, 16, or 17 years old, the person faces a sentencing range of a minimum sentence of 21 years, a presumptive sentence of 28 years, and a maximum sentence of 35 years. A.R.S. § 13-3212(I)(3). Because A.R.S. § 13-3212(I)(3) specifically applies to persons convicted of child prostitution who have prior felony convictions and A.R.S. § 13-703(L) applies only generally to all repetitive offenders, A.R.S. § 13-3212(I)(3) governs Burgess's sentencing. See State v. Johnson , 240 Ariz. 402, 405 ¶ 13, 380 P.3d 99, 102 (App. 2016) (specific statutes control over general statutes). Section 13-3212 lacks any language indicating that prior felony convictions for two or more offenses committed on the same occasion shall be counted as only one conviction; therefore, the trial court erred in counting Burgess's two historical prior felony convictions as one. Burgess should have been sentenced under A.R.S. § 13-3212(I)(3) as a person with two or more historical prior felony convictions. ¶22 Burgess need not be resentenced, however. Burgess and the State agree that he must be sentenced to presumptive consecutive terms because Burgess was on probation when he committed the current offenses and the State did not prove any aggravating circumstances. See A.R.S. §§ 13-708(A) ; -701(C). Accordingly, pursuant to this Court's authority under A.R.S. § 13-4038, we amend the sentencing minute entry to reflect that Burgess is sentenced to presumptive consecutive terms of 28 years' imprisonment. CONCLUSION ¶23 For the foregoing reasons, Burgess's convictions are affirmed and his sentences are hereby modified as indicated. In 2017, the legislature amended the statute by changing the name of the offense to "child sex trafficking." 2017 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 167, § 10 (1st Reg. Sess.). In all other respects material here, the statute remains unchanged from the time Burgess committed the offenses in 2014. See 2014 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 151, § 7 (2nd Reg. Sess.). Accordingly, we cite the current version with the understanding that, for purposes here, "child sex trafficking" and "child prostitution" refer to the same criminal offense. Burgess served a 17-year prison term for one of the convictions to be followed by lifetime probation for the other conviction. He committed the offenses in this case seven months after he was released. Thus, given Burgess's intervening incarceration, his prior convictions fit within the time requirements to be considered historical prior felony convictions for sentencing purposes. See A.R.S. § 13-105(22)(b), (c).

STARING, Presiding Judge: ¶ 1 Alfred Shadid filed a petition for special action in superior court seeking an order compelling the director of the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC) to recalculate his term of community supervision under A.R.S. § 13-603(I)-(J). The trial court denied relief and Shadid appeals from that decision. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. Factual and Procedural Background ¶ 2 Shadid is an ADOC inmate who completed his terms of imprisonment for two felonies committed in 1996, but is now serving a term of community supervision in prison after violating the terms of his release. See A.R.S. § 31-402(C)(5)(b). In February and April 2017, Shadid filed two similar petitions for special action in the superior court, seeking a writ of mandamus compelling ADOC to recalculate his term of community supervision. The court consolidated the two actions, and ultimately concluded ADOC's calculations were correct and denied relief. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1). Discussion ¶ 3 Where the superior court exercises special-action jurisdiction, its denial of relief is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Files v. Bernal , 200 Ariz. 64, ¶ 2, 22 P.3d 57 (App. 2001). An error of law is an abuse of discretion. Id. ¶ 4 The law imposes a mandatory term of community supervision of one day for every seven days of a sentence imposed for a felony conviction. § 13-603(I). Shadid's term of community supervision is determined according to the version of the statute in effect in 1996, when he committed his offenses. See A.R.S. § 1-246. In 1996, § 13-603(J) provided in relevant part that "[t]he court shall round the term of community supervision imposed," expressing the term "only ... in increments of years or months," and that "all fractions of the month may be increased or decreased to the nearest month." 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 199, § 2. ¶ 5 Shadid argues on appeal, as he did below, that where the sentencing court is silent about rounding, ADOC does not have authority to "increase" a term of community supervision by rounding to the nearest month. He also argues that the "rule of lenity" requires rounding down under these circumstances, and that it violates his right to due process to make "the rounding decision" other than in "open court, ... subject to adversarial testing." We disagree. ¶ 6 We conclude that ADOC properly calculated Shadid's term of supervision imposed by the trial court. The version of § 13-603(J) in effect in 1996 unambiguously requires rounding to the nearest month, and uses the word "may" only in clarifying that fractional months "may be" rounded either up or down "to the nearest month." 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 199, § 2. We will not construe this term to contradict the surrounding statutory text. See State v. Superior Court (Kerr-McGee Corp. ), 113 Ariz. 248, 249, 550 P.2d 626, 627 (1976) (law interpreted to avoid rendering any text "superfluous, void, contradictory, or insignificant"). Because the plain language of the statute unambiguously leads to only one correct result, the rule of lenity is inapplicable. And, ADOC did not usurp any judicial authority in correctly and precisely calculating, by ministerial act, the term pronounced by the court where the court did not describe that term with exact precision. See A.R.S. § 31-201.01(A) (requiring ADOC to "hold in custody all persons sentenced ... under the law ... for the term directed by the court"); El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. State , 123 Ariz. 219, 221, 599 P.2d 175, 177 (1979) ("Judicial acts ... are ones of discretion or judgment, whereas ministerial acts leave nothing to discretion for the duty and manner of performance are described with certainty."). The superior court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying relief. Disposition ¶ 7 We affirm the superior court's order denying relief on Shadid's petition for special action. Although this provision has been amended and renumbered since Shadid committed his offenses, the revisions are immaterial to the disposition of this appeal. We therefore cite the current version of the statute. Shadid also filed a motion below challenging the imposition of a second filing fee, claiming the superior court misplaced his first petition for several months before filing it on the same day as his second petition. He filed a separate notice of appeal from the court's denial of that motion. On appeal, he briefly mentioned the duplicate fee in his factual recitation and requested relief in his reply, but did not cite any authority or develop any argument on this point. Accordingly, the issue is waived. See FIA Card Servs., N.A. v. Levy , 219 Ariz. 523, n.1, 200 P.3d 1020, n.1 (App. 2008) (failure to develop argument on appeal constitutes abandonment); Nelson v. Rice , 198 Ariz. 563, n.3, 12 P.3d 238, n.3 (App. 2000) (argument not raised in opening brief waived). The rule of lenity is a principle of statutory construction that requires resolving statutory ambiguity in favor of a defendant after all other methods of statutory construction have failed. State v. Bon , 236 Ariz. 249, ¶ 13, 338 P.3d 989 (App. 2014). Shadid also complains, in connection with his due process argument, that ADOC added thirteen days to the date his term was originally scheduled to end. Because he relied on this date in his calculations below, he is precluded from challenging it now. See Fendler v. Phx. Newspapers Inc. , 130 Ariz. 475, 478 n.2, 636 P.2d 1257, 1260 n.2 (App. 1981) (appellant precluded from raising argument for first time on appeal). To the extent Shadid contends the former statute itself was unconstitutional, this argument appears for the first time in his reply brief, and is thus waived. See Nelson v. Rice , 198 Ariz. 563, n.3, 12 P.3d 238, n.3 (App. 2000).

SWANN, Judge: ¶ 1 This is an appeal from an order of remittitur and conditional new trial on the jury's damages award in a wrongful death action. We reversed and remanded in Ahmad v. State ("Ahmad I "), 240 Ariz. 380, 379 P.3d 1011 (App. 2016). The supreme court vacated our decision in Ahmad I and remanded the case to us for reconsideration in view of Soto v. Sacco , 242 Ariz. 474, 398 P.3d 90 (2017). Applying the law of remittitur as articulated in Soto , we again reverse because the superior court failed to state with particularity the grounds for its order, and the record does not reveal substantial evidence to support the order. We remand for entry of judgment on the jury's verdict. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 2 During a pursuit by state and city law enforcement, a criminal suspect's vehicle struck and killed Shuja and Margaret Ahmad's son, Alex. The Ahmads brought a wrongful death action against the state on the theory that the pursuit was unnecessary and dispatchers failed to communicate essential information. ¶ 3 The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Ahmads, awarding them $30 million in damages and finding the state 5% at fault for Alex's death. The state moved for a remittitur or a new trial on damages. The state argued that the jury's award included unavailable punitive and compensatory damages. The superior court granted the state's motion, reducing the damages award to $10 million, thereby reducing the state's responsibility from $1.5 million to $500,000, and granted a conditional new trial on damages only. The court held: While courts generally loathe to alter a jury award, Rule 59 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure does permit a verdict, decision, or judgment to be vacated and a new trial granted if a damages award is excessive or insufficient. Based upon the evidence presented at trial and the damages recoverable in this action, the Court finds that the thirty million dollar award was excessive. Although the award by the jury was excessive, the Court acknowledges the findings of the jury. Based upon the evidence presented at trial, the Court finds that the reasonable value of damages is ten million dollars. Although this amount is on the high side of a reasonable and just damages amount, based upon the facts and law in this case and in deference to the jury's damages decision, the Court finds this amount appropriate. ¶ 4 The court denied the Ahmads' motion for a complete new trial on all issues and their motion for reconsideration, and, because the Ahmads declined to accept the reduced damages amount, ultimately ordered a new trial on damages. The Ahmads timely appealed, and we reversed and remanded in Ahmad I . We now reconsider that decision under Soto . DISCUSSION ¶ 5 Ariz. R. Civ. P. ("Rule") 59 authorizes the superior court, when it finds the jury's damages award excessive, to grant a new trial conditioned on the adversely affected party's rejection of a reduced damages award. Rule 59(f)(1)(A). As Soto held, the court thereby "plays a role akin to a 'thirteenth juror' (a ninth juror in a civil case)" and serves the "indispensable function" of acting as "the primary buffer against unjust verdicts." 242 Ariz. at 478, ¶ 8, 398 P.3d 90 (citation omitted); see State v. Fischer , 242 Ariz. 44, 392 P.3d 488 (2017) (discussing consideration of motions for new trial by the superior court and on appeal). But the court "should be circumspect in interfering with a jury verdict by carefully and sparingly exercising its discretion to reduce ... a jury's damage award." Soto , 242 Ariz. at 477-78, ¶ 7, 398 P.3d 90. The court "may not simply substitute its judgment for the jury's." Id. at 477, ¶ 7, 398 P.3d 90. Remittitur is proper only when the court "is firmly convinced" that the verdict "reflects an exaggerated measurement of damages" and "is contrary to the weight of the evidence." Id. at 478, ¶¶ 8-9, 398 P.3d 90 (citation omitted). ¶ 6 Soto held that the jury has no more discretion in wrongful death than personal injury actions, and that the foregoing remittitur standard is identical in both categories of cases. Id. at 481, ¶¶ 18-19, 398 P.3d 90. Soto further held that the superior court must state with particularity the grounds for a remittitur order. Id. at 479, ¶¶ 11-12, 398 P.3d 90 (construing materially similar provisions of 2016 version of Rule). To satisfy the particularity requirement, the court must do more than merely quote or paraphrase the Rule-the court must "describe why the jury award is too high or low" in "sufficient detail to apprise the parties and appellate courts of the specific basis for the court's ruling so that they may avoid speculation." Id. at 480, ¶¶ 13-14, 398 P.3d 90. In the absence of such a description, an appellee bears the burden to show that the order "was supported by substantial evidence and did not constitute an abuse of discretion." Id. at ¶ 15. ¶ 7 Here, the superior court recited the Rule and concluded, without elaboration, that the jury's award was excessive and should be reduced by two-thirds. In doing so, the court failed to satisfy the particularity requirement as articulated in Soto . Further, the state has not offered substantial evidence to support the reduced award, and we reject the state's arguments that we must nonetheless affirm. ¶ 8 The state first contends that the jury verdict was excessive because it was based on noneconomic damages alone. But the law neither requires that damages in wrongful death actions include pecuniary harm, nor imposes constraints on awards that lack an economic component. Wrongful death is a statutory cause of action, Walsh v. Advanced Cardiac Specialists Chartered , 229 Ariz. 193, 196, ¶¶ 7-8, 273 P.3d 645 (2012), and the statutory scheme provides "a very broad base for the measure of damages," City of Phoenix v. Whiting , 10 Ariz. App. 189, 196, 457 P.2d 729 (App. 1969). A.R.S. § 12-613 provides that [i]n an action for wrongful death, the jury shall give such damages as it deems fair and just with reference to the injury resulting from the death to the surviving parties who may be entitled to recover, and also having regard to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending the wrongful act, neglect or default. A survivor's "injuries 'resulting from the death' ... may include the decedent's prospective earning capacity; the loss of companionship, comfort, and guidance caused by the death; and the survivor's emotional suffering." Walsh , 229 Ariz. at 196, ¶ 8, 273 P.3d 645. The Ahmads presented considerable undisputed evidence that Alex's death caused them to suffer significant and profound emotional distress and a loss of companionship and comfort. Multiple witnesses testified that Alex shared a close, loving, and mutually supportive relationship with the Ahmads, and that his death caused them acute and continuing anguish. The "[t]ranslation into dollars of the loss of companionship, affection, and society, and the anguish the parents experienced as a result of their [child]'s death [wa]s peculiarly the jury's function." Hernandez v. State , 128 Ariz. 30, 32, 623 P.2d 819 (App. 1980). And nothing in the amount of the jury's award suggests that the jury exceeded its authority or acted out of passion or prejudice. Indeed, the $30 million sum for the two parents, combined with the attribution of 5% of the fault to the state, suggests that the verdict was the result of a temperate deliberative process. ¶ 9 The state nonetheless contends that a reduction was necessary because the Ahmads "requested only $10 million each." As an initial matter, the state's characterization of the Ahmads' position is factually incorrect-plaintiffs' counsel stated in closing argument that valuation of the Ahmads' damages was dependent on the jurors' "collective wisdom ... in coming up with whatever you think is fair and just compensation," and he expressed that he did not "think a verdict of anything less than $10 million per parent is fair and just compensation." (Emphasis added.) Moreover, even if the Ahmads had requested a certain sum, the jury would not have been limited by that request. The jury's authority to award "such damages as it deems fair and just" is not dependent on parties' damages estimations. See A.R.S. § 12-613. ¶ 10 With respect to the state's contentions that the jury was necessarily influenced by references to unavailable categories of damages, we acknowledge that plaintiffs' counsel potentially implicated punitive damages by suggesting that the jury was tasked with preventing future deaths. See A.R.S. § 12-820.04 (punitive damages unavailable against public entities and public employees acting within scope of employment). But the court considered the state's objection to the remarks (which objection was raised both before and after the Ahmads' closing argument), and determined that the jury instructions adequately limited the jury to compensatory damages. In view of that ruling, we are unpersuaded by the state's supposition that the court concluded in the remittitur order, by its reference to "the damages recoverable in this action," that the jury awarded punitive damages. Moreover, we hold that the jury was properly instructed that it could award damages for "[t]he loss of love, affection, companionship, care, protection, and guidance since the death and in the future," and "[t]he pain, grief, sorrow, anguish, stress, shock, and mental suffering already experienced, and reasonably probable to be experienced in the future." See supra ¶8. We presume that the jury followed the instructions, Elliott v. Landon , 89 Ariz. 355, 357, 362 P.2d 733 (1961), and the jury's conduct does not suggest otherwise. ¶ 11 Finally, we are unpersuaded by the state's contention that the damages were excessive in comparison to verdicts in other cases. Soto held that comparative-verdicts analyses are "only marginally relevant and the trial court should not treat other damage awards as conclusive in assessing whether the jury made a just award," because "cases may be unique and turn on fact-intensive determinations, and juries may view similar cases differently." 242 Ariz. at 482, ¶ 22, 398 P.3d 90. Even if we assume that the state's comparisons have some relevance, standing alone they are insufficient to establish justification for a remittitur. ¶ 12 We again conclude that the superior court's remittitur order constituted an abuse of discretion. CONCLUSION ¶ 13 We reverse the superior court's remittitur and remand for entry of judgment on the jury's verdict. We cite the current version of the Rule because no changes material to this decision have been made since the 2014 trial. Compare Ariz. R. Civ. P. 59(f), (i) (2018) with Ariz. R. Civ. P. 59(i), (m) (2014). Soto 's analogy must not, of course, be read to suggest that the juror-unanimity requirement of criminal cases pertains to civil trials. See Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 23 ; A.R.S. § 21-102. When the court finds that "the damage award is tainted by 'passion or prejudice,' or is 'shocking[ly] or flagrantly outrageous,' " the court must order a new trial without a remittitur option. Soto , 242 Ariz. at 478, ¶ 9, 398 P.3d 90.

EPPICH, Presiding Judge: ¶1 The state appeals the trial court's ruling suppressing evidence police found while searching Raymond Verbon Morris III's backpack after his shoplifting arrest. Because the court erred in concluding there was no probable cause to support Morris's arrest, we vacate its ruling and remand the matter for further proceedings. Factual and Procedural Background ¶2 In reviewing a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's ruling. State v. Peoples , 240 Ariz. 244, ¶ 7, 378 P.3d 421 (2016). On September 29, 2017, while monitoring surveillance video, a retail store's loss-prevention employee saw Morris select a pair of sunglasses from a display, cut off and discard the price tag, and put them on. The employee called police to report that Morris was shoplifting. She continued to watch Morris and saw him select a package of condoms and an energy drink from the store's shelves and put them in his shopping cart on top of his backpack, which he had placed there after wearing it into the store. Later, she saw Morris manipulate the backpack, and the condoms and energy drink were no longer visible; the employee believed Morris had placed the items into the backpack. When police arrived, the loss-prevention employee showed the officer video of Morris cutting the price tag off the sunglasses. She also told the officer she had seen Morris conceal items in his backpack and showed him the portions of the surveillance video she believed showed the concealment. ¶3 In that video, Morris selected two small boxes from shelves in the pharmacy and placed them in the cart with the backpack. One of the boxes-purple with a white side panel-was visible in front of the backpack as Morris later navigated through the toy department. Morris remained in view as he pushed the cart out of the toy department and down a main aisle to the electronics department. As he traveled through the electronics department for the next eighty seconds, Morris and the cart were obscured behind displays most of the time, and when the cart was briefly visible during that time, the view of the purple and white box was obscured. Morris then pushed the cart down an aisle towards the camera and came back into view; his hands were manipulating the backpack, and when the place where the purple and white box had been came into view, the box was missing. ¶4 Morris put several other items in the cart's basket during the two hours he was in the store, but he returned many of them to the store's displays before approaching the store's self-checkout registers. Once at a register, Morris scanned the items remaining in the cart but not the sunglasses, energy drink or condoms. He then attempted to pay for the items he had scanned, but the credit card he used was declined several times. While Morris was still at the register, police officers approached him, told him they suspected him of shoplifting and escorted him to the loss-prevention office. There, they formally placed him under arrest for shoplifting based on his failure to pay for the sunglasses and concealment of items in the backpack. ¶5 After a check of Morris's criminal history revealed previous convictions on similar charges, police decided to arrest Morris for a felony. They then searched the backpack and found the condoms and energy drink, and also narcotics, drug paraphernalia and a loaded handgun. A grand jury indicted Morris on counts of prohibited possession of a weapon, possession of methamphetamine, possession of heroin and possession of drug paraphernalia. ¶6 Morris filed a motion to suppress the items police had found in his backpack, arguing his arrest was unlawful and that, in any event, the search was not valid as incident to the arrest. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the motion to suppress, finding there had been no probable cause to arrest Morris for shoplifting and the evidence from the backpack was inadmissible as fruit of the unlawful arrest. The court stated: Defendant did not conceal the sunglasses, but instead, placed the sunglasses in plain view on his head. Furthermore, neither the deputies, nor the loss prevention officers, saw Defendant conceal the [condoms and energy drink], and therefore had not yet been able to determine if they were, in fact, concealed. In fact, it appears that loss prevention personnel took no steps to determine whether the [condoms and energy drink] were among the many items that Defendant had apparently returned to store shelves. Because Defendant was still at the point of sale, he had not yet taken the items from the store without paying the purchase price. In fact, he maintained the ability to pay for all of the items, return the items, or leave the items at the register when the debit card was declined. While he had removed a price tag, Defendant could have sought assistance to pay the purchase price, returned the glasses, or taken any other action that did not constitute theft. In short, because Defendant was detained before either leaving or attempting to leave the store with unpaid items, there was no probable cause to arrest him for shoplifting. ¶7 After the trial court granted the state's subsequent motion to dismiss the case without prejudice, the state timely appealed the court's grant of Morris's motion to suppress. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A) and 13-4032(6). Probable Cause ¶8 The state argues police had probable cause to arrest Morris for shoplifting the sunglasses and the items found in the backpack, contending that a person need not attempt to leave a store without paying to commit shoplifting. As to the sunglasses, the state notes that Morris cut off and discarded the price tag, put the glasses on his head, and attempted to pay for other items without paying for the sunglasses, and concludes that "[a] reasonable person, applying common sense, would understand" that Morris was shoplifting them. The state also argues it was reasonable to believe that Morris had committed shoplifting by concealing items in the backpack because the condoms and energy drink were in the cart, Morris was then seen doing something with his backpack, and the items were no longer there. ¶9 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against "unreasonable searches and seizures." State v. Dean , 206 Ariz. 158, ¶ 8, 76 P.3d 429 (2003). Thus, an arrest must be based on probable cause. State v. Superior Court , 149 Ariz. 269, 273, 718 P.2d 171, 175 (1986). In general, a police officer may arrest a person without a warrant only if the officer has probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and the person to be arrested is the offender. See A.R.S. § 13-3883(A) (codifying probable cause requirement for arrest). Probable cause is "information sufficient to justify belief by a reasonable man that an offense is being or has been committed," State v. Aguilar , 228 Ariz. 401, ¶ 14, 267 P.3d 1193 (App. 2011) (citing Ker v. California , 374 U.S. 23, 35, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963) ), and "requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity," State v. Sisco , 239 Ariz. 532, ¶ 15, 373 P.3d 549 (2016) (quoting Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) ). "Probable cause is something less than the proof needed to convict and something more than suspicions." State v. Aleman , 210 Ariz. 232, ¶ 15, 109 P.3d 571 (App. 2005) (quoting State v. Howard , 163 Ariz. 47, 50, 785 P.2d 1235, 1238 (App. 1989) ). The probable cause standard is objective, not subjective, and whether an officer believed there were sufficient facts to support an arrest is not material. State v. Turner , 142 Ariz. 138, 141, 688 P.2d 1030, 1033 (App. 1984). In applying the standard, we consider whether the collective knowledge of law enforcement officers at the time of arrest was sufficient to establish probable cause. Aleman , 210 Ariz. 232, ¶ 15, 109 P.3d 571. ¶10 The Fourth Amendment requires a court to suppress evidence that is the fruit of an unlawful arrest. State v. DeWitt , 184 Ariz. 464, 470, 910 P.2d 9, 15 (1996) (citing Maryland v. Macon , 472 U.S. 463, 468, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985) ). While in general we review rulings on motions to suppress for abuse of discretion, whether a probable cause determination comports with the Fourth Amendment is a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo. See State v. Cheatham , 240 Ariz. 1, ¶ 6, 375 P.3d 66 (2016) ; see also Miller v. Fenton , 474 U.S. 104, 113-15, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985) (discussing why de novo review is appropriate for certain constitutional mixed questions of fact and law). We defer, however, to the trial court's factual findings, including whether witnesses were credible and whether the inferences drawn by a police officer were reasonable. State v. Teagle , 217 Ariz. 17, ¶ 19, 170 P.3d 266 (App. 2007). ¶11 Arizona's shoplifting statute provides, in relevant part: A person commits shoplifting if, while in an establishment in which merchandise is displayed for sale, the person knowingly obtains such goods of another with the intent to deprive that person of such goods by: 1. Removing any of the goods from the immediate display or from any other place within the establishment without paying the purchase price; or .... 3. Paying less than the purchase price of the goods by some trick or artifice such as altering, removing, substituting or otherwise disfiguring any label, price tag or marking; or .... 5. Concealment. A.R.S. § 13-1805(A). ¶12 Here, police had probable cause to believe that Morris had concealed at least one of the store's items in his backpack. While the surveillance video does not clearly show that Morris stowed the purple and white box in his backpack, it disappeared from sight during an eighty-second span that ended with Morris manipulating the backpack. The fact that the box vanished from the cart within such a narrow time span increased the probability that Morris's manipulation of the backpack was related to its disappearance. Moreover, the fact that Morris cut the tag off the sunglasses, discarded the tag, put them on, and failed to include them among the items he presented for purchase strongly suggests that he intended to shoplift, markedly increasing the probability that the disappearance of the box was not innocent. See State v. Sabartinelli , 23 Ariz. App. 436, 440, 533 P.2d 1173 (1975) (probable cause may be based on "furtive gesture coupled with prior reliable information" which "give[s] a criminal connotation" to gesture). Under these circumstances, a belief that Morris had concealed the box was entirely reasonable. See Aguilar , 228 Ariz. 401, ¶ 14, 267 P.3d 1193 ; Sisco , 239 Ariz. 532, ¶ 15, 373 P.3d 549. ¶13 Morris joins the trial court in focusing on the fact that no one actually saw him conceal items in the backpack. But that the officer could not determine with certainty from the surveillance video that Morris was placing the store's items in his backpack did not vitiate probable cause or render the arrest unlawful. See Turner , 142 Ariz. at 141, 688 P.2d at 1033. And although the court found it compelling that no one had verified that Morris had not returned the box to a shelf in light of the fact he had done so with other items, a probable cause determination "does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities." State v. Espinosa-Gamez , 139 Ariz. 415, 417, 678 P.2d 1379, 1381 (1984) (quoting Gates , 462 U.S. at 231, 103 S.Ct. 2317 ). Police therefore did not have to eliminate every possible innocent explanation for the disappearance of the box to have probable cause to believe that Morris had concealed it. See State v. Pederson , 102 Ariz. 60, 65, 424 P.2d 810, 815 (1967) (probable cause for arrest does not require officer to "personally verify every bit of information"). ¶14 Morris next argues that regardless of any justification for believing he intended to shoplift, he simply had not completed the offense, and therefore there was no probable cause to arrest him for it. Morris asserts that "goods are only 'obtained' once the person passes the point of sale because it is at that point that the ownership interest in the property transfers to [the] customer." See § 13-1805(A) (requiring shoplifting offender to "knowingly obtain[ ]" goods); A.R.S. § 13-1801(A)(10) (defining "[o]btain" as "to bring about or to receive the transfer of any interest in property, whether to a defendant or to another"). Therefore, according to Morris, the customer must pass the point of sale to commit shoplifting under any of the alternatives in § 13-1805(A). Because Morris had not passed the point of sale, he contends police were only permitted to conduct a brief investigatory stop pursuant to Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), to address his "arguably suspicious behavior." ¶15 At least for shoplifting by means of concealment under § 13-1805(A)(5), we conclude otherwise: a person need not pass the point of sale to "obtain" concealed goods. The plain language of § 13-1805(A)(5) expressly contemplates a situation where "the person ... obtains ... goods by ... [c]oncealment." See State v. Williams , 175 Ariz. 98, 100, 854 P.2d 131, 133 (1993) (in interpreting statute, language is best and most reliable indicator of meaning). Nothing in § 13-1805(A)(5) suggests that any act other than concealment-such as passing the point of sale-is necessary to obtain concealed goods. We therefore interpret § 13-1805(A)(5) to mean that the crime of shoplifting is complete at the time of concealment. ¶16 The history of the shoplifting statute supports our interpretation. The crime of shoplifting by concealment under § 13-1805(A)(5) derives from common-law larceny, and the elements of the crimes are substantially similar. See Sulavka v. State , 223 Ariz. 208, ¶¶ 13-19, 221 P.3d 1022 (App. 2009). Under the common law, larceny is "the taking of the thing which is the subject of the crime from the possession of the owner into the possession of the thief; and ... an asportation thereof." Id. ¶ 14 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Pass v. State , 34 Ariz. 9, 10, 267 P. 206 (1928) ); see also Asportation , Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) ("[t]he act of carrying away or removing"). Removing an item from a store's display and concealing it satisfies larceny's asportation requirement. Sulavka , 223 Ariz. 208, ¶ 17, 221 P.3d 1022. Because asportation of a store's goods can occur only once the goods are possessed, other courts have concluded that larceny is complete when goods are concealed. See State v. Hauck , 190 Neb. 534, 209 N.W.2d 580, 583 (1973) ("The cases indicate that concealing the goods in a fashion sufficient to place them under the complete and exclusive control of the defendant may be sufficient asportation to constitute larceny, no matter what part of the store it occurs in."); Haslem v. State , 391 So.2d 389, 390 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (movement of goods within a store, coupled with concealment, can be sufficient to prove theft). And our interpretation of the current shoplifting by concealment statute is further buttressed by the absence of even the minimal asportation requirement of common-law larceny. See State v. Allen , 1 Ariz. App. 161, 163, 400 P.2d 589 (1965) (prior version of shoplifting statute clearly omits element of asportation). ¶17 Morris nonetheless contends that we should "read into" § 13-1805(A)(5) a requirement that a person must pass the point of sale. As support for this contention, Morris notes that § 13-1805(A)(1)-(3) all explicitly contemplate some deficiency in payment for goods, which, according to Morris, cannot be determined until the person passes the point of sale. He concludes that a point-of-sale requirement should therefore also be read into § 13-1805(A)(4) and (5). While Morris cites various rules of statutory construction in support of this contention, he does not explain why they support it, and we are unaware of any that do. If anything, the absence of payment language in § 13-1805(A)(5) expressly included in § 13-1805(A)(1)-(3) suggests that the absent language should not be read into § 13-1805(A)(5). See State v. Fragozo , 197 Ariz. 220, ¶ 5, 3 P.3d 1140 (App. 2000) (express provision in one statute indicated legislature did not intend provision to apply in another, related statute where provision absent). Moreover, reading such a requirement into § 13-1805(A)(5) would render it superfluous, because § 13-1805(A)(1) provides for guilt when a person passes the point of sale with unpurchased items, whether the items are concealed or not. See Ariz. State Univ. Bd. of Regents v. Ariz. State Ret. Sys. , 242 Ariz. 387, ¶ 7, 396 P.3d 623 (App. 2017) (statutes should be interpreted as to avoid rendering language surplusage). ¶18 Finally, Morris argues that if a customer's concealment of items constitutes shoplifting before passing the point of sale, any shopper who places items in a reusable bag while shopping would be guilty. See § 13-1805(B) (creating presumption that person acted with necessary intent to shoplift if person "[u]ses [a] ... container ... to facilitate the shoplifting"). Morris contends-and we obviously agree-that such a result would be absurd. See State v. Winegardner , 243 Ariz. 482, ¶ 32, 413 P.3d 683 (2018) (Lopez, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the result) (discussing shoppers' implied license to handle goods in retail stores). Morris's argument presumes, however, that any time a customer places an item in a shopping bag such that the item is out of view it must constitute "concealment" under § 13-1805(A)(5). While the word "concealment" can, in some contexts, simply mean removing an item from sight, it can also mean removing an item from notice or hiding it. Concealment , Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). A customer who uses a reusable shopping bag to carry his items from the display area to the point of sale is not hiding the fact that he has the store's merchandise in his bag, even if the individual items are not readily visible. We have no trouble distinguishing the conduct of such customers from Morris's conduct here: enclosing some of the store's goods in his own backpack containing his personal effects, in circumstances where he had no need to do so to carry the items within the store, as they were already in his shopping cart. Disposition ¶19 Because police had probable cause to arrest Morris for shoplifting by concealment under § 13-1805(A)(5), we vacate the trial court's ruling and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this decision. Because the other box is not distinct in the video, our analysis focuses on the purple and white box. While we generally defer to the trial court's factual findings, "[b]ecause the trial court [was] in no better position to evaluate the video than the appellate court, we have conducted an independent review of the video evidence." State v. Sweeney , 224 Ariz. 107, ¶ 12, 227 P.3d 868 (App. 2010). Although Sulavka addressed the right to jury trial, its discussion of larceny as the historical antecedent to shoplifting nonetheless supports our analysis. We need not decide whether the trial court erred in concluding police lacked probable cause to arrest Morris for shoplifting the non-concealed sunglasses.

McMURDIE, Judge: ¶1 Appellants Siete Solar, LLC ("Siete"), Mesquite Solar, LLC ("Mesquite"), and Perrin Ranch Wind, LLC ("Perrin") appeal from the tax court's dismissal of their complaint, and Arlington Valley Solar Energy II, LLC ("Arlington") appeals the court's grant of summary judgment for the Arizona Department of Revenue (the "Department"). We affirm the tax court's application of Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 42-14153(C) and hold that a statutory amendment enacted after the valuation date that changes the method of valuation requires retroactive application to apply to the corresponding tax year. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶2 The parties do not dispute the facts in this case. Siete, Mesquite, Perrin, and Arlington (collectively "Taxpayers"), operate electric generation facilities that use renewable energy equipment. As part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Taxpayers received either an investment tax credit or a cash grant in lieu of the credit (either referred to as "tax incentive") for a portion of the costs to build their respective facilities. ¶3 In February of each year, the Department provides a form to facility owners requesting information necessary for the valuation of property. A.R.S. § 42-14152(A). The Department then calculates the value of renewable energy equipment pursuant to A.R.S. § 42-14155 and A.R.S. § 42-14156 (collectively the "valuation method"). Before an amendment in 2014, A.R.S. § 42-14155(B) directed the Department to value renewable energy equipment at "twenty per cent of the depreciated cost of the equipment," but provided no definition of "cost." ¶4 In 2013, Siete, Mesquite, and Perrin (the "2014 Appellants") each submitted an annual report to the Department for the 2014 tax year reporting the cost of their facilities. The 2014 Appellants' respective reports calculated their cost of the energy equipment by subtracting the amount received in tax incentives from the actual cost. However, the Department disallowed the deducted tax-incentive amounts before applying the valuation method to determine the properties' full cash value (the "final valuation"). The Department's refusal to deduct the tax-incentive amounts from the actual cost increased the 2014 Appellants' tax liability. The 2014 Appellants appealed to the State Board of Equalization, which upheld the Department's final valuation. The 2014 Appellants appealed the Board's decision. ¶5 While the 2014 Appellants' appeal was pending in the superior court, the legislature enacted an amendment to A.R.S. § 42-14155 (the "2014 Amendment"). The 2014 Amendment altered the valuation method by specifically allowing taxpayers to deduct tax incentives from the cost of renewable energy equipment. See A.R.S. § 42-14155(C)(4) (2014). Because the 2014 Amendment did not contain an emergency provision or a retroactivity clause, it became effective on July 24, 2014, the general effective date for legislation enacted during the 2014 session. See Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1 (3). Eventually, the 2014 tax year dispute resulted in an appeal to this court. See Siete Solar, LLC v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue (Siete I ), 1 CA-CV 15-0126, 2015 WL 8620672 (Ariz. App. Dec. 10, 2015) (mem. decision). On appeal, the 2014 Appellants argued the 2014 Amendment should apply to their tax appeal because it became effective before the taxes in question were assessed. Id. at *3, ¶ 12. ¶6 In August 2014, while the dispute over the 2014 tax year valuations continued, the Department issued the final valuations for the 2015 tax year. Taxpayers had again reported their cost as the actual cost minus the tax incentives. The Department, applying the pre-amended version of A.R.S. § 42-14155, again disallowed the tax incentive amounts to be deducted from the actual costs before computing the Taxpayers' final valuations. Taxpayers timely appealed the 2015 final determination directly to the tax court pursuant to A.R.S. § 42-16204. Taxpayers moved for summary judgment, asserting the Department was obligated to use the valuation method prescribed in the 2014 Amendment for their final valuations. Because the 2014 Appellants' appeal was still pending, the tax court stayed the 2015 tax-year proceedings pending a decision in the prior case. ¶7 In Siete I , we concluded that the 2014 Amendment was not retroactive-nor was it a clarification of the law-and thus, it did not apply to the 2014 tax year. 2015 WL 8620672, at *4, ¶ 18. After the decision, the Department moved to dismiss the 2014 Appellants' complaint for the 2015 tax year based on issue preclusion and for summary judgment on Arlington's claims. The tax court denied Taxpayers' motion for summary judgment and granted the Department's motions. Taxpayers timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1). DISCUSSION ¶8 Taxpayers argue on appeal that the tax court erred by: (1) granting the Department's motion to dismiss the 2014 Appellants' claims based on issue preclusion and granting the Department's summary judgment motion against Arlington based on the decision in Siete I ; and (2) not applying the 2014 Amendment to the 2015 tax year, resulting in the improper denial of Taxpayers' motion for summary judgment on all claims. ¶9 We review the tax court's dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim, Zubia v. Shapiro , 243 Ariz. 412, 414, ¶ 13, 408 P.3d 1248, 1250 (2018), and grant of summary judgment, Sw. Airlines Co. v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue , 217 Ariz. 451, 452, ¶ 6, 175 P.3d 700, 701 (App. 2008), de novo . Although Taxpayers' appeal presents several procedural issues regarding the dismissal of the claims, we confine ourselves to the one substantive issue that is dispositive-whether the Department was required to calculate the 2015 tax year final valuations in accordance with the 2014 Amendment, which was enacted after the valuation date but prior to the date when the Department must determine the final valuation. Statutory interpretation raises questions of law and is reviewed de novo . Calpine Constr. Fin. Co. v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue , 221 Ariz. 244, 247, ¶ 12, 211 P.3d 1228, 1231 (App. 2009). ¶10 Taxpayers contend the tax court misapplied the law because: (1) the legislature intended for the 2014 Amendment to apply to the 2015 tax year; and (2) principles of retroactivity need not apply because the 2014 Amendment was enacted before the Department set the final valuations for the 2015 tax year. Taxpayers assert the Department was not required to apply the law as it existed on the valuation date. Instead, they contend, A.R.S. § 42-14153(C)"merely fixes the date the parties must use to determine full cash value." We understand the Taxpayers' argument to be that the legislature may change the valuation method at any time during the valuation year and the application of the new valuation method to property-as it existed on the valuation date-is not a retroactive application of the law. A. Unless the Legislature States Otherwise, the Law Governing the Valuation Method and Classification of Property is the Law in Effect on the Valuation Date. ¶11 The Department is charged with determining a property's full cash value in accordance with A.R.S. Title 42, Chapter 14. The applicable statutes read as follows: On or before August 31 of each year the department shall find the full cash value of the property of each [electric generation facility] that operates in this state. A.R.S. § 42-14153(A). [T]he department shall determine the full cash value of taxable renewable energy equipment in the manner prescribed by this section. A.R.S. § 42-14155(A). The valuations required by this section are the values determined as of January 1 of the valuation year. A.R.S. § 42-14153(C). "Valuation year" means ... the calendar year preceding the year in which the taxes are levied. A.R.S. § 42-11001(19)(a). Under these provisions, on or before August 31 of each year, the Department must determine the final valuation of taxable renewable energy equipment as it existed on January 1 of the same year, the valuation date. The final valuation is then used to assess the tax for the upcoming year-the tax year. ¶12 Taxpayers make several arguments to support their contention that the valuation date does not "set" the law in effect on that date, it is merely a point in time to base the valuation. We disagree for the following reasons. 1. The Final Valuation May be Altered Only Pursuant to Statute. ¶13 Taxpayers argue that because the final valuation may be altered after the valuation date, A.R.S. § 42-14153(C) does not require the Department to use the law that is in effect on that date. As support, they cite A.R.S. § 42-14004 and A.R.S. § 42-15105(1). But these statutes do not support Taxpayers' contentions. Although the legislature instructs the Department on the manner and method of valuation, it allows county assessors some discretion. Compare A.R.S. § 42-14155(A) ("[T]he department shall determine the full cash value of taxable renewable energy equipment in the manner prescribed by this section."), with A.R.S. § 42-13051(B)(2) (an assessor must determine the full cash value "using the manuals furnished and procedures prescribed by the department"), and Berge Ford, Inc. v. Maricopa County , 172 Ariz. 483, 485, 838 P.2d 822, 824 (Tax Ct. 1992) ("The criteria which the assessor applies are derived from applicable statutes, guidelines of the Department of Revenue, and policy from the assessor's own office. The statutory framework which provides for the assessment of property contemplates that the assessor will exercise much discretion in deciding classification and valuation."). ¶14 The Department values renewable energy equipment pursuant to statute. The legislature left no room for the Department to exercise its discretion when it determines the valuation of renewable energy equipment. Although Taxpayers' cited statutes do allow for an alteration of the final valuation, the legislature has only authorized specific tax officers to revalue property under certain circumstances. See A.R.S. § 42-14004 (the Department may only change the valuation to properly reflect the property's full cash value); A.R.S. § 42-15105(1) (the county assessor may change a property's classification and value if the nature of the property has changed). Taxpayers have not pointed to-nor have we found-a statute that authorizes the Department to revalue property to account for a change in the valuation method after the valuation date. 2. The Valuations Determined Pursuant to A.R.S. § 42-14153(C) Require the Department to Apply the Law in Effect on the Valuation Date. ¶15 Next, Taxpayers assert that the language "as of" in A.R.S. § 42-14153(C) permits the Department to apply a valuation method that came into existence after the valuation date. They attempt to separate the valuation method from the valuation characteristics of the property, which are used to classify and appropriately value the property under the applicable valuation method. See Aileen H. Char Life Interest v. Maricopa County , 208 Ariz. 286, 291, ¶ 8, 93 P.3d 486, 491 (2004) ("Four general elements comprise the formula by which Arizona measures a property tax: classification, valuation, assessment ratio, and tax rate."). Taxpayers contend that A.R.S. § 42-14153(C) does not fix the law as it exists on the valuation date but fixes the characteristics of the property (e.g., the age of the property) as they exist on that date. ¶16 "We construe related statutes in the context of the statutory scheme and strive to achieve consistency among them. We also strive to avoid an absurd result, which is defined as one 'so irrational, unnatural, or inconvenient that it cannot be supposed to have been within the intention of persons with ordinary intelligence and discretion.' " Ariz. Dep't of Revenue v. S. Point Energy Ctr., LLC , 228 Ariz. 436, 439, ¶ 12, 268 P.3d 387, 390 (App. 2011) (citation omitted) (quoting Perini Land & Dev. Co. v. Pima County , 170 Ariz. 380, 383, 825 P.2d 1, 4 (1992) ). Absent statutory definitions, courts apply common meanings to words and phrases used in a statute. S. Point Energy , 228 Ariz. at 440, ¶ 15, 268 P.3d at 391. ¶17 A.R.S. § 42-14153(C) states that the valuations required are the "values determined as of" the valuation date. Taxpayers argue that if the legislature intended to bind the parties to the law "as if it was" on January 1, it would have stated "on." However, "as of" generally means at or on a specific time or date. See United States v. Munro-Van Helms Co. , 243 F.2d 10, 13 (5th Cir. 1957) (" 'As of' means 'as if it were.' "). Moreover, substituting the word "on" in the statute would alter its meaning. To read the statute as Taxpayers suggest would require the Department to determine all property valuations on the date of January 1, which is not the case. The Department starts the valuation process on January 1, the final valuations must be completed by August 31. ¶18 Additionally, the "valuation" is the result of applying the valuation method for the property as classified. See A.R.S. § 42-11001(6), (17) (valuation means the value determined as prescribed by statute). Accordingly, the "values determined as of [the valuation date]" necessarily include not only the application of the legal classification criteria as if it were the valuation date, see e.g. , Phxaz Ltd. P'ship v. Maricopa County , 192 Ariz. 490, 492, ¶ 6, 967 P.2d 1026, 1028 (App. 1998) ("For tax year 1995, the Maricopa County Assessor took the position that as of the valuation date of January 1, 1995, the 213-acre golf course parcel did not constitute a 'golf course' for the purposes of A.R.S. section 42-146(G)." (emphasis added) ); SMP II Ltd. P'ship v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue , 188 Ariz. 320, 324, 935 P.2d 898, 902 (App. 1996) ("Taxpayer responds by acknowledging the rule that a valuation decision must be based solely on evidence in existence as of the assessment date." (emphasis added) ), but also the law as if it were the valuation date, see A.R.S. § 42-16257. ¶19 Likewise, to interpret "as of" to mean anything other than "as if it were" would lead to an absurd result. Taxpayers take the position that because the legislature did not expressly direct the Department to determine property valuation by the valuation method "in effect on the valuation date," as it did in A.R.S. § 42-16257, the valuation date was not intended to set the law applicable to the valuation method. However, A.R.S. § 42-16257 only bolsters the Department's interpretation. A.R.S. § 42-16257, which governs property valuation in the case of a correction, requires the Department to "use the valuation and legal classification criteria that were in effect on the valuation date for the tax year of the correction." If Taxpayers are correct that the Department must apply the 2014 Amendment to their final valuations-but when correcting an error for a similarly situated taxpayer, the Department is limited to the law in effect on the valuation date-it would yield an "absurd result" as it would violate our constitution. See Ariz. Const. art. 9, § 1 ("[A]ll taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of property...."). B. We Decline to Examine the Legislative Intent Because A.R.S. § 42-14153(C) Is Not Ambiguous. ¶20 Taxpayers additionally argue that as the primary goal in statutory interpretation is to give effect to the Legislature's intent, the legislature showed its intent for the 2014 Amendment to apply to the 2015 tax year by "expressly stat[ing] that the new law would be effective on the 'general effective date,' " (which was July 24, 2014) in the HB2403 Fact Sheet. And because the "primary intent of the amendment to § 42-14155 was to resolve the issue of how to handle cash grants and investment tax credits in the context of statutory valuation," Taxpayers maintain it would not be reasonable for the legislature to enact a statute to fix a problem, and "hold the statute in abeyance for over a year after it expressly decreed it would go into effect." ¶21 We decline to create ambiguity in order to allow us to examine the legislature's intent. "When the plain text of a statute is clear and unambiguous there is no need to resort to other methods of statutory interpretation to determine the legislature's intent because its intent is readily discernable from the face of the statute." State v. Christian , 205 Ariz. 64, 66, ¶ 6, 66 P.3d 1241, 1243 (2003); see also U.S. W. Commc'ns, Inc. v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue , 193 Ariz. 319, 322, ¶ 12, 972 P.2d 652, 655 (App. 1998). Taxpayers fail to identify any language within the statute that shows retroactive intent. See A.R.S. § 1-244 ("No statute is retroactive unless expressly declared therein."); see also Aranda v. Indus. Comm'n of Ariz. , 198 Ariz. 467, 470, ¶ 10, 11 P.3d 1006, 1009 (2000) ("Statutes must contain an express statement of retroactive intent before retroactive application may occur."); see also 2003 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 37, § 4 (1st Reg. Sess.) (amending the definition of "renewable energy equipment" in A.R.S. § 42-14155(C) for valuation purposes); id. at § 8 ("This act is effective retroactively to from and after December 31, 2002."); see also San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa , 193 Ariz. 195, 204-05, ¶ 14, 972 P.2d 179, 188-89 (1999) ("Declarations of intent may be helpful in interpretation, but the text of a measure must be considered first and foremost."). C. The Legislature May Change the Law Governing the Valuation Method After the Valuation Date, but for the Department to Apply the New Valuation Method to the Final Valuation for the Corresponding Tax Year, the Statute Must be Denoted as Retroactive. ¶22 Taxpayers assert that retroactive application of the 2014 Amendment is not necessary because applying a newly enacted valuation method is not a retroactive application of the law, so long as the law is enacted before the start of the tax year. ¶23 Previously, the 2014 Appellants argued that "the 2014 amendment applie[d] to their tax appeals because the amendment became effective before the taxes in question were assessed." Siete I , 2015 WL 8620672, at *3, ¶ 12 ; see also A.R.S. § 42-15051 ("[P]roperty is assessed for taxes levied under this title when its valuation is determined and lawfully placed on the roll."). In this appeal, Taxpayers maintain that because the 2014 Amendment was enacted before the subject tax year-rather than the date of assessment-retroactivity is unnecessary, and "[ Siete I ] does not, and could not, overrule or disapprove of" "the breadth of authority establishing that changes in valuation methods occurring during the valuation year are applied to the corresponding tax year without being retroactive." The one tax case Taxpayers cite for the "breadth of authority" is Waddell v. 38th St. P'ship , 173 Ariz. 137, 840 P.2d 313 (Tax Ct. 1992). ¶24 But, as before, "Taxpayers' reliance on Waddell ... is misplaced." Siete I , 2015 WL 8620672, at *3, ¶ 12. In Waddell , several taxpayers prevailed in appealing their final valuations for the 1991 tax year after this court announced the standard the Department was to use to classify certain property. 173 Ariz. at 138-39, 840 P.2d at 314-15 ; see also Hayden Partners Ltd. P'ship v. Maricopa County , 166 Ariz. 121, 123, 800 P.2d 987, 989 (App. 1990). Shortly thereafter, the legislature passed an amendment clarifying the standard. The amendment included an emergency provision and expressly provided for the statute to be retroactive to the 1986 tax year. Waddell , 173 Ariz. at 139, 840 P.2d at 315. The Department then sued the taxpayers who had succeeded in obtaining a different final valuation amount under the Hayden Partners standard for the 1991 tax year. Id. The taxpayers appealed, arguing the retroactive application violated their due-process rights. Id. at 140, 840 P.2d at 316. The tax court held that "[t]he legislature has the power to make changes in classification standards at any time. It may make such changes retrospective, so long as, in doing so, it does not impair a vested right." Id. at 141, 840 P.2d at 317. ¶25 Waddell does not support the Taxpayers' position that a change in the law enacted after the valuation date must apply to the corresponding tax year even without a retroactivity clause. Although the amendment in Waddell included a retroactivity clause, Taxpayers claim that the retroactive statement was not necessary. They argue that unlike in Waddell, where the legislature enacted the amendment during the subject tax year, here the legislature knew that it was enacting the statute before the Department set the 2015 (the subject tax year) final valuations. However, given our statutory scheme's prospective valuation process, for an amendment altering the valuation method enacted after the statutory valuation date to apply to the upcoming tax year, the amendment must be applied retroactively. See Daou v. Harris , 139 Ariz. 353, 357, 678 P.2d 934, 938 (1984) ("[W]e presume that the legislature, when it passes a statute, knows the existing laws."); see also Siete I , 2015 WL 8620672, at *4, n.4 ("Indeed, the legislature is aware of its power to make tax statutes retroactive, and has done so on many occasions when amending laws regarding the valuation of property. See, e.g. , 2009 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 169, §§ 1-2 (amending A.R.S. § 42-14403 ; relating to the valuation of telecommunications property, retroactively effective to December 31, 2008); 2002 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 234, § 3 (amendments relating to valuation of electric generation property and retroactively effective to January 1, 2002); 1994 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 271, §§ 2-3 (amendments relating to valuation of telecommunications property and retroactively effective to January 1, 1994)."). ¶26 Alternatively, Taxpayers argue we should "adopt the same position that [the Department]" did in Waddell , that "application of the statutory amendment is not a retroactive application at all." The Department's position in Waddell was that the amendment was a clarification of the law, not a change in the law. However, Taxpayers conceded in addressing the procedural issues in this case that the 2014 Amendment was a change in the law. Waddell represents a limitation on the legislature's power to enact a statute retroactively when it affects a vested substantive right. It does not, however, suggest that a statute that does not affect a vested substantive right is presumptively applied retroactively. ¶27 Finally, Taxpayers insist that because "a statute is considered retroactive when it affects a vested right," Gore v. Gore , 169 Ariz. 593, 595, 821 P.2d 254, 256 (App. 1991), and "taxpayers have no vested right in the factors used to determine the actual value of assessed property," Waddell , 173 Ariz. at 141, 840 P.2d 313 (quotation omitted), the application of the 2014 Amendment's valuation method should not be considered a retroactive application. They support their argument by focusing on the "completed events." See Aranda , 198 Ariz. at 471, ¶ 18, 11 P.3d at 1010 ("A property right 'vests' when every event has occurred which needs to occur to make the implementation of the right a certainty."). ¶28 We find Taxpayers' arguments do not apply. None of the cases address tax statutes. Nor do they concern a statute that specifically points to a date that the Department is required to base its final valuation. See Gore , 169 Ariz. at 595, 821 P.2d at 256 (legislature's amendment extending child support obligations from the age of majority to the child's completion of high school was not considered a retroactive application because the statute was enacted before the parent's right was vested on the child's 18th birthday); Harrelson v. Indus. Comm'n of Ariz. , 144 Ariz. 369, 370, 697 P.2d 1119, 1120 (App. 1984) (statute applied retroactively that prevented administrative law judge from considering an untimely petition). Taxpayers' mischaracterization of these cases, suggesting that the Department must apply a change in the law if it changes the method of valuation "at any time until the taxing process is complete" unless it affects a substantive vested right, is simply incorrect. See Aranda , 198 Ariz. at 470, ¶ 11, 11 P.3d at 1009 ("Enactments that are procedural only, and do not alter or affect earlier established substantive rights may be applied retroactively. Even if a statute does not expressly provide for retroactivity, it may still be applied if merely procedural because litigants have no vested right in a given mode of procedure." (emphasis added) ); In re Dos Cabezas Power Dist. , 17 Ariz. App. 414, 418, 498 P.2d 488 (1972) ("The rule is that any right conferred by statute may be taken away by statute before it has become vested." (emphasis added) ). Because a statute may be applied retroactively, does not mean it must be applied retroactively. ¶29 As explained above, and in Siete I : Valuations are set by the Department annually the year prior to the tax year; that valuation is then used to determine the full cash value of taxable property in accordance with statutory methods provided depending on the type of property. A.R.S. § 42-14151. The legislature has presumptively set the valuation date for property valued by the Department as "January 1 of the year preceding the year in which taxes are levied." A.R.S. § 42-11001(18). Thus, the valuation method employed by the Department in this case was statutorily mandated to be the method in place on [the valuation date] unless the legislature specifically provided otherwise. 2015 WL 8620672, at *4, ¶ 17. Taxpayers urge us to "avoid the temptation to rely on dicta from [ Siete I ]." We, nevertheless, reach the same conclusion. Because the language of A.R.S. § 42-14155 is unambiguous, and the amendment did not contain an express statement of retroactive intent, we reject the Taxpayers' argument that the Department improperly calculated Taxpayers' final valuation based on the version of A.R.S. § 42-14155 that was in effect on January 1, 2014. CONCLUSION ¶30 Accordingly, we affirm. As the Taxpayers have not prevailed, we deny their request for fees. Although A.R.S. § 42-14153(C) refers to January 1 of the "valuation year," A.R.S. § 42-11001(18) defines "valuation date" as "January 1 of the year preceding the year in which taxes are levied." We refer to January 1 of the valuation year as the "valuation date" for brevity and because there is no distinction between the two dates. Taxpayers argue in their reply brief and at oral argument that the Department selectively implemented portions of the 2014 Amendment by adopting depreciation tables. We decline to consider the argument as it was not raised in the opening brief. See ARCAP 13(a)(7) ; Stafford v. Burns , 241 Ariz. 474, 483, ¶ 34, 389 P.3d 76, 85 (App. 2017) (the failure to develop an argument in a meaningful way constitutes waiver).

THUMMA, Chief Judge: ¶1 Defendant Richard Allen Reed died while this appeal of a criminal restitution order entered against him was pending. The State then sought dismissal of his appeal pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 13-106(A) (2018), which states that "[o]n a convicted defendant's death, the court shall dismiss any pending appeal." Because that statute is constitutional as applied, this appeal is dismissed. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 The State charged Reed with voyeurism, a Class 5 felony, committed in January 2015. The victim hired an attorney to assist her during the criminal proceedings. The jury found Reed guilty; he was placed on probation and this court affirmed in a prior appeal. See State v. Reed , 1 CA-CR 16-0269, 2017 WL 1325647 (Ariz. App. Apr. 11, 2017) (mem. dec.). ¶3 Meanwhile, the State filed a motion requesting restitution, including the victim's attorneys' fees. After an evidentiary hearing, the superior court awarded the victim attorneys' fees and granted in part and denied in part other requested restitution. Reed timely filed this second appeal challenging that restitution order. See State v. French , 166 Ariz. 247, 248 n.3, 801 P.2d 482, 483 n.3 (App. 1990) (noting an "order of restitution is a separately appealable order"). ¶4 When Reed died while this appeal was pending, the State sought dismissal pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-106(A). Reed's counsel objected, claiming the statute was unconstitutional. The court allowed Reed's counsel, the State and others to file briefs on the constitutionality of Section 13-106 and the availability of any other forum to challenge a restitution order. DISCUSSION I. A.R.S. § 13-106. ¶ 5 Enacted effective July 24, 2014, A.R.S. § 13-106 states: A. On a convicted defendant's death, the court shall dismiss any pending appeal or postconviction proceeding. B. A convicted defendant's death does not abate the defendant's criminal conviction or sentence of imprisonment or any restitution, fine or assessment imposed by the sentencing court. A legislative fact sheet states the statute was a response to: (1) State v. Griffin , 121 Ariz. 538, 592 P.2d 372 (1979) (noting Arizona's common law abatement rule means a defendant's death "pending appellate review of a criminal conviction abates not only the appeal but also all proceedings had in the prosecution from its inception") and (2) State v. Glassel , 233 Ariz. 353, 312 P.3d 1119 (2013) (holding abatement does not apply to post-conviction relief proceedings after an appeal). See Ariz. Senate Fact Sheet, H.B. 2593, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2014). A brief history of the rule of abatement provides helpful background for this appeal. II. The Rule Of Abatement. ¶6 The rule of abatement, sometimes called "abatement ab initio ," is based on the common law principle that "all private criminal injuries or wrongs, as well as all public crimes, are buried with the offender." United States v. Daniel , 47 U.S. (6 How.) 11, 14, 12 L.Ed. 323 (1848). The concept has ancient roots, as evidenced by a British statute enacted in 1330 providing an exception to abatement. Torts. Right of Privacy. Survival of Action , 46 Colum. L. Rev. 315, 315 n.6 (1946) (citing authority). The "unanimous" approach in federal court is that "death pending direct review of a criminal conviction abates not only the appeal but also all proceedings had in the prosecution from its inception." Durham v. United States , 401 U.S. 481, 482-83, 91 S.Ct. 858, 28 L.Ed.2d 200 (1971). Federal courts have held that, "[i]f the sentence included a fine, this rule of abatement ab initio prevents recovery against the estate." United States v. Oberlin , 718 F.2d 894, 895 (9th Cir. 1983). As conceded in Durham , however, United States Supreme Court cases applying abatement "are not free of ambiguity." 401 U.S. at 482, 91 S.Ct. 858. ¶7 Four Arizona state court opinions have addressed abatement in criminal matters. The first, decided in 1976, dismissed an appeal when the defendant died, noting "[t]he generally conceded grounds for mootness are that in the event the judgment of conviction is affirmed, it is impossible of execution, and if the judgment is reversed, the accused is unavailable for a new trial." State v. Richards , 26 Ariz. App. 41, 41-42, 545 P.2d 1003 (1976). Richards , however, did not address "the effect of the dismissal of this appeal upon the underlying conviction appealed from," or "whether a fine or forfeiture of property based upon the prior conviction would require the same determination of mootness." Id. ¶8 Three years later, the Arizona Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant's "death pending appeal abates the appeal and the conviction" and remanded "with directions to dismiss the indictment." Griffin , 121 Ariz. at 539, 592 P.2d at 373. Griffin , however, left unresolved whether abatement "should include an order for reimbursement of the fine and restitution" defendant had paid before he died. Id. Although a civil case, In re Estate of Vigliotto stated that "a restitution order, albeit one that is an allocated portion of a fine, survives a defendant's death." 178 Ariz. 67, 69, 870 P.2d 1163, 1165 (App. 1993). ¶9 Twenty years later, Glassel held that abatement did "not apply when a defendant dies after his conviction is affirmed, but while postconviction relief proceedings are pending." 233 Ariz. at 353 ¶ 1, 312 P.3d 1119, 1119. Glassel , however, declined to address arguments by amicus curiae filed on behalf of victims that abatement violates victims' rights and that other states "have abandoned or modified the doctrine." Id. at 355 ¶ 12, 312 P.3d at 1121. The year after Glassel , the Legislature enacted A.R.S. § 13-106. ¶10 Given Reed's death while this appeal was pending, Section 13-106 directs that the appeal be dismissed and that his death "does not abate" his conviction, sentence "or any restitution, fine or assessment imposed by the sentencing court." A.R.S. § 13-106(A) & (B). Reed's counsel makes no argument to the contrary, arguing instead that Section 13-106 is unconstitutional for various reasons. Before addressing those arguments, the State's standing argument must be resolved. III. Standing. ¶11 The State argues Reed's right to appeal ended when he died and that his counsel "and third parties - including the personal representative of Reed's estate" lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section 13-106. In essence, the State argues that no one would ever have standing to challenge Section 13-106. The State concedes, however, that "standing is not a constitutional jurisdictional requirement in the state courts of Arizona." State v. B Bar Enters., Inc. , 133 Ariz. 99, 101 n.2, 649 P.2d 978, 980 (1982). Instead, Arizona's standing requirement is prudential. See Bennett v. Brownlow , 211 Ariz. 193, 196 ¶ 14, 119 P.3d 460 (2005). ¶12 Prudential standing under Arizona law requires "a distinct and palpable injury," which "sharpens the legal issues presented by ensuring that true adversaries are before the court and thereby assures that our courts do not issue mere advisory opinions." Sears v. Hull , 192 Ariz. 65, 69 ¶ 16, 71 ¶ 24, 961 P.2d 1013, 1017, 1019 (1998). In "exceptional circumstances," this prudential standing requirement has been waived, "generally in cases involving issues of great public importance that are likely to recur." Id. at 71 ¶ 25, 961 P.2d at 1019. ¶13 In Glassel and Griffin , the Arizona Supreme Court tacitly found appeals involving abatement are just such "exceptional circumstances" where standing is waived. See Glassel , 233 Ariz. at 354, 312 P.3d at 1120 (allowing defense counsel to brief petition for review and merits, and present oral argument, after defendant died while his post-conviction relief petition was pending); Griffin , 121 Ariz. at 538, 592 P.2d at 372 (allowing defense counsel to file petition for review and brief merits after defendant died while appeal was pending). For these same reasons, in this unique setting, the constitutional challenges pressed by Reed's counsel to the application of Section 13-106 do not fail for lack of standing. IV. Challenges To The Application Of A.R.S. § 13-106. ¶14 Reed's counsel argues Section 13-106 (1) abrogates a criminal defendant's appeal rights under the Arizona Constitution; (2) violates separation of powers principles; (3) violates due process and (4) is an improper bill of attainder. "When a state statute conflicts with Arizona's Constitution, the constitution must prevail." Dobson v. State ex rel. Comm'n on Appellate Court Appointments , 233 Ariz. 119, 124 ¶ 17, 309 P.3d 1289, 1294 (2013). There is, however, "a strong presumption supporting the constitutionality of any legislative enactment." State v. Tocco , 156 Ariz. 116, 119, 750 P.2d 874, 877 (1988). "[T]he burden of proof is on the opponent of the statute to show it infringes upon a constitutional guarantee or violates a constitutional principle." State v. Casey , 205 Ariz. 359, 362 ¶ 11, 71 P.3d 351, 354 (2003) (citation omitted). Using these standards, the court addresses these arguments in turn. A. The Right To Appeal. ¶15 Reed's counsel argues that Section 13-106"directly conflicts with the constitutional right to appeal by removing that right." Arizona's Constitution provides that, "[i]n criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have ... the right to appeal in all cases." Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24 ; accord A.R.S. § 13-4031 ("Right of appeal"); A.R.S. § 13-4033 ("Appeal by defendant"); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31 ("Appeals"). The argument that Reed was denied this right to appeal fails for several reasons. ¶16 Reed's counsel suggests that the right to appeal is, in essence, the right to a specific process or result on appeal. Not so. The right to appeal is not a right to a specific result or even a decision on the merits. See, e.g. , A.R.S. §§ 13-4036(A) (on appeal from conviction, court may "make any order which is consistent with ... justice and the rights of the state and the defendant"); 13-4039 ("If the appellant fails to prosecute the appeal, the appellate court shall dismiss the appeal."). Reed's counsel does not assert that Arizona's rule of abatement, in place before the enactment of Section 13-106, denied the right to appeal. Yet when applying that rule, Griffin declined to order reimbursement of restitution and fines paid before the appellant died. 121 Ariz. at 539, 592 P.2d at 373. Reed's counsel has not shown how Section 13-106 improperly deprives Reed of his right to appeal, as opposed to properly setting forth a rule of decision for the appeal. ¶17 Reed invoked his right to appeal when, before he died, he timely filed his prior appeal and then this appeal. As a result, the cases cited by Reed's counsel addressing waiver of the right to file an appeal, or the improper conditioning of that right, miss the mark. See State v. Goldsmith , 112 Ariz. 399, 400, 542 P.2d 1098, 1099 (1975) (rejecting, as "completely without merit," State's argument "that the appeal should be dismissed because [the defendant] had not been apprehended as of the date that his appeal was filed"); State v. Bolding , 227 Ariz. 82, 88 ¶ 20, 253 P.3d 279, 285 (App. 2011) (concluding statute prohibiting appeal based on defendant's absence at sentencing is constitutional if absence was "a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his constitutional right to appeal," but finding statute could not apply on facts of the case); State v. Freitag , 212 Ariz. 269, 271-72 ¶¶ 12-14, 130 P.3d 544, 546-47 (App. 2006) (striking, as unconstitutional, municipality's "assessment of a fee" on defendant as a condition "to pursue his criminal appeal"). Because Reed twice invoked his right to appeal, there can be no claim that he was denied that right. ¶18 Reed's counsel cites cases addressing various common law approaches used in other jurisdictions when a criminal defendant dies while an appeal is pending. See, e.g., Brass v. State , 130 Nev. 318, 325 P.3d 1256, 1257-58 (2014) (discussing jurisdictions: (1) applying abatement; (2) allowing the appeal to proceed and (3) dismissing the appeal and letting the conviction stand); State v. Carlin , 249 P.3d 752, 754 (Alaska 2011) (rejecting abatement; adopting rule where the "conviction will stand unless the defendant's personal representative elects to continue the appeal"); State v. Korsen , 141 Idaho 445, 111 P.3d 130, 135 (2005) (holding "criminal conviction and any attendant order requiring payment," including restitution, "are not abated, but remain intact"); State v. Webb , 167 Wash.2d 470, 219 P.3d 695, 698 ¶ 13, 699 ¶ 22 (2009) (noting court "ha[d] been presented with no authority holding that a deceased defendant's right to appeal mandates abatement of all convictions or all monetary obligations imposed" and adopting rule similar to Carlin ); see also Griffin , 121 Ariz. at 538-39, 592 P.2d at 373 (noting approaches used in other jurisdictions). Clearly, different jurisdictions treat the issue in different ways. But the existence of different approaches in other jurisdictions does not mean the approach adopted in Section 13-106 is unconstitutional. ¶19 Because Reed was not denied his right to appeal, application of Section 13-106 does not unconstitutionally deny him that right. B. Separation Of Powers. ¶20 Reed's counsel argues Section 13-106 is "an attempt by the Legislature to enact a procedural rule and to adjudicate cases" and is "a judicial act outside the authority of the Legislature." Arizona's Constitution provides: The powers of the government of the state of Arizona shall be divided into three separate departments, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial; and, except as provided in this constitution, such departments shall be separate and distinct, and no one of such departments shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others. Ariz. Const. art. 3. Although the Arizona Supreme Court has rulemaking power "relative to all procedural matters in any court," Ariz. Const. art. 6 § 5, the Legislature has "the authority to enact substantive and procedural laws to define, implement, preserve and protect the rights guaranteed to victims," Ariz. Const. art. 2 § 2.1 (D). ¶21 Reed's counsel asserts that "[t]his issue is controlled by State ex rel. Napolitano v. Brown , 194 Ariz. 340, 982 P.2d 815 (1999)." Brown struck, on separation of powers grounds, statutory time limits for post-conviction relief proceedings that conflicted with the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. 194 Ariz. at 344 ¶ 16, 982 P.2d at 819. The Brown analysis, however, was refined in State v. Hansen , which rejected a separation of powers challenge to statutory time limits for restitution payments that conflicted with the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. 215 Ariz. 287, 289 ¶ 8, 291 ¶ 18, 160 P.3d 166, 168, 170 (2007). Thus, Hansen provides the analysis applicable here. ¶22 The analysis in Hansen begins with addressing whether the provision is substantive or procedural. Id. at 289 ¶ 9, 160 P.3d at 168. If substantive, Section 13-106 presents no separation of powers issue. Id. at 289 ¶ 10, 160 P.3d at 168-69. However, recognizing "the procedural/substantive distinction is 'always elusive at the margins,' " Graf v. Whitaker , 192 Ariz. 403, 406 ¶ 10, 966 P.2d 1007 , 1010(App. 1998) (citation omitted), the court assumes, without deciding, that Section 13-106 is procedural, see Hansen , 215 Ariz. at 289 ¶ 10, 160 P.3d at 168-69. Based on that assumption, the inquiry focuses on whether the statute (1) "affects rights unique and specific to victims;" (2) was enacted to exercise the Legislature's authority to protect victims' rights and (3) advances victims' rights. Hansen , 215 Ariz. at 290-91 ¶¶ 14-16, 160 P.3d at 169-70. Applying Hansen , Section 13-106 does not exceed the authority granted to the Legislature by the Arizona Constitution because it affects "rights unique and specific to victims;" was enacted in response to Glassel (which noted concerns by amicus curiae filed on behalf of victims) and "advances victims' rights." See Hansen , 215 Ariz. at 290-91 ¶¶ 12-18, 160 P.3d at 169-70. ¶23 Reed's counsel also argues Section 13-106 improperly "affirms trial court judgments" and means "that all trial court decisions that disfavor criminal defendants are valid." Application of the statute, however, does not affirm the judgment. Instead, upon the death of a defendant, any pending appeal is to be dismissed, a result that does not affirm the superior court judgment. Finally, Reed's counsel has not shown how Section 13-106"could be read to usurp the judiciary" by "remov[ing] jurisdiction from this Court." For these reasons, Section 13-106 does not violate separation of powers. C. Due Process. ¶24 Reed's counsel argues Section 13-106 violates the due process clauses of the United States and Arizona Constitutions. To the extent this argument is based on the assertion that Reed was denied his right to appeal, it fails for the reasons discussed above. To the extent this argument asserts Section 13-106 means "[d]ue process has been removed" from restitution or gives the State a "right to fines or assessments without legal basis," the authority cited does not support that assertion. See Nelson v. Colorado , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1249, 1252, 197 L.Ed.2d 611 (2017) (when a conviction is reversed and will not be retried, due process requires the government to refund fees, costs and restitution paid without the defendant filing a civil proceeding); State v. Reese , 124 Ariz. 212, 214-15, 603 P.2d 104, 106-07 (App. 1979) (concluding, absent a plea agreement to the contrary, restitution could not be awarded for charges dismissed or never brought). Moreover, particularly given the various approaches in other jurisdictions when a defendant dies while a criminal appeal is pending, Section 13-106 cannot be deemed to embrace "conduct that 'shocks the conscience' or interferes with rights 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' " Martin v. Reinstein , 195 Ariz. 293, 313-14 ¶ 66, 987 P.2d 779, 799-800 (App. 1999). ¶25 Reed's counsel correctly notes that crime victims have alternatives, other than seeking restitution in a criminal case, to seek recovery from a criminal defendant. See A.R.S. § 13-807 ("An order of restitution ... does not preclude ... bringing a separate civil action and proving in that action damages in excess of the amount of the restitution order."); see also §§ 14-3801 to -3816 (procedures for creditors' claims against an estate). Those alternatives, however, were available before the enactment of Section 13-106. Cf. Griffin , 121 Ariz. at 539, 592 P.2d at 373 (noting "[t]here are adequate civil procedures" to resolve "collateral issues which may arise as a result of" abatement). Moreover, the existence of such alternatives does not mean Section 13-106 violates due process. ¶26 In the end, Reed's counsel asserts that Arizona's common law abatement rule, not Section 13-106, strikes a better balance. Absent a constitutional infirmity, however, it is for the Legislature to strike that balance. See Vo v. Superior Court , 172 Ariz. 195, 205, 836 P.2d 408, 418 (App. 1992) (noting "the wisdom or soundness of policy of legislative enactments ... are clearly addressed to the legislature, not to the courts"). Because Reed's counsel has not shown that Section 13-106 violates due process, both his facial and as-applied due process challenges fail. See Hernandez v. Lynch , 216 Ariz. 469, 472 ¶ 8, 167 P.3d 1264, 1267 (App. 2007) (noting, for facial challenge, "the party challenging the provision must demonstrate that no circumstances exist under which the regulation would be valid") (citing cases). D. Bill Of Attainder. ¶27 Reed's counsel argues that Section 13-106 is a bill of attainder. See Ariz. Const. art. 2 § 25 ("No bill of attainder ... shall ever be enacted."). A bill of attainder, however, is a "trial by legislature" that "inflict[s] punishment without a judicial trial." State v. Allie , 147 Ariz. 320, 325, 710 P.2d 430, 435 (1985) (citation omitted). Here, Reed had both a jury trial resulting in his conviction and a bench trial resulting in the restitution order. Accordingly, "none of the dangers identified with a traditional bill of attainder are present" and Reed "was not convicted by legislative act." Allie , 147 Ariz. at 325, 710 P.2d at 435. Section 13-106 is not a bill of attainder. V. Enforcement Of, And Third-Party Challenges To, The Restitution Order. ¶28 Apart from these constitutional arguments, Reed's counsel argues that a dismissal under Section 13-106 would not provide an "outcome of [the] appeal" under A.R.S. § 13-804(D), meaning the restitution order would "never become final and cannot be enforced." By statute, restitution payments "shall not be stayed" pending appeal, but "may be held by the court pending the outcome of an appeal." A.R.S. § 13-804(D). A dismissal under Section 13-106 provides "the outcome of" the appeal. Reed's counsel has not shown how a dismissal under Section 13-106 would mean that the restitution order would "never become final" and enforceable. Even under Arizona's common law rule of abatement, "a restitution order, albeit one that is an allocated portion of a fine, survives a defendant's death." Vigliotto , 178 Ariz. at 69, 870 P.2d at 1165. ¶29 Reed's counsel also asserts that "[t]here does not appear, at this time, to be a forum where Mr. Reed's family or others with an interest in his reputation or estate could dispute the validity of the restitution order." By statute, "[a] criminal restitution order may be recorded and is enforceable as any civil judgment." A.R.S. § 13-805(E). Reed's counsel speculates that, in a civil action, the restitution order "could only be voidable, not void" and that Section 13-106 would mean the order is "not 'subject to reversal.' " Ruiz v. Lopez , 225 Ariz. 217, 222 n.3, 236 P.3d 444, 449 (App. 2010). This argument, however, is based on the view that a dismissal under Section 13-106 is a decision on the merits of the appeal. The statute, however, directs that the appeal be dismissed without this court deciding the merits. ¶30 This argument also is based on Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 60, which governs relief from a final judgment or order in a civil case. This, however, is not a civil case. Accordingly, as noted in addressing an analogous argument in Griffin , "[w]hatever merit there may be in this contention, it should not be resolved in this case." 121 Ariz. at 539, 592 P.2d at 373. Resolution of such arguments would involve superior court proceedings, which apparently have not yet occurred and may never occur, governed by civil or probate procedural rules, applying substantive law other than criminal law and involving individuals not parties here. Accordingly, for now, the constitutionality of Section 13-106 "is the only matter which can be legitimately settled in this action." Griffin , 121 Ariz. at 539, 592 P.2d at 373. CONCLUSION ¶31 Having been informed of the death of appellant Richard Allen Reed, and having concluded that A.R.S. § 13-106 is constitutional, this appeal is dismissed. Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated. Recognizing this opinion is based on the "legal issues advanced by the parties themselves," Ruiz v. Hull , 191 Ariz. 441, 446 ¶ 15, 957 P.2d 984, 989 (1998), the court has received briefs from Lanna Mesenbrink, Reed's surviving spouse and personal representative; Arizona Voice for Crime Victims and the National Crime Victim Law Institute. Although Mesenbrink sought to intervene or be substituted as appellant, she provided no relevant authority supporting that relief, which was denied. Cf. State v. Griffin , 121 Ariz. 538, 539, 592 P.2d 372, 373 (1979) ("[T]here is no provision of statute or rule of court which provides for substitution of the estate as a party in a criminal case."). Mesenbrink also filed a "Motion for Clarification of State's Errors." Any relief requested in that motion is denied. For example, the majority in Durham vacated the conviction and remanded "with directions to dismiss the indictment," 401 U.S. at 483, 91 S.Ct. 858 ; three Justices would have dismissed the petition for certiorari as moot, id. at 484, 91 S.Ct. 858 (Marshall, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart, J.), while another would have dismissed the "petition for certiorari, rather than direct dismissal of the indictment," id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Dove v. United States , 423 U.S. 325, 325, 96 S.Ct. 579, 46 L.Ed.2d 531 (1976) (upon petitioner's death, dismissing petition for certiorari without remand or instructions, adding that "[t]o the extent" Durham "may be inconsistent with this ruling, Durham is overruled"). Nor are cases Reed's counsel cites regarding appellate resources dispositive here. See, e.g., Evitts v. Lucey , 469 U.S. 387, 393, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985) (counsel on appeal); Wilson v. Ellis , 176 Ariz. 121, 124, 859 P.2d 744, 747 (1993) (transcripts in postconviction relief proceedings).

McMURDIE, Judge: ¶1 Billy William Buckholtz ("Husband") appeals the decree dissolving his marriage to Mirta Elizabeth Buckholtz ("Wife"). We hold when a marital separation agreement is presented to the superior court under Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 25-317, the superior court must determine whether the agreement is enforceable, and if the agreement is enforceable, determine whether it is "unfair." We also hold that parties to a separation agreement may consider their sole and separate property when creating an agreement, and if they do so, the superior court also may consider the parties' sole and separate property in determining whether the agreement is unfair under A.R.S. § 25-317. We emphasize, however, that this is so only if they have acted with full knowledge of the nature of the property involved, including knowing whether the property at issue is a community or separate asset. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand the decree in this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶2 Husband and Wife were married in 1978. On June 3, 2013, after individually consulting with attorneys, they signed a Marriage Separation Agreement (the "Agreement") to divide their property and debts. The Agreement stated Husband "will remain" in their marital residence and the parties "agreed upon a division of all assets, owned or possessed by them as marital property or separate property ... [and] are in possession of all of those assets to which he or she is respectively entitled." The parties also agreed that any "debt accumulated as of the date of this Agreement is the debt of the individual party, regardless if the debt was incurred as a result of joint credit." The Agreement did not specifically reference any other assets or debts. ¶3 The parties have raised arguments regarding two significant assets. The first asset is the parties' home. Approximately one month before signing the Agreement, the house was appraised at $257,500. Around the time the Agreement was signed, Wife quit-claimed all right, title, or interest in the house to Husband. Husband refinanced the house, and the same day the parties signed the Agreement, Husband transferred $127,435 to Wife, approximately one-half of the house's equity. ¶4 The other significant asset is Wife's 401(k) account. After the parties married, Wife began working for an airline and in April 2013, her 401(k) was valued at $152,122. On June 3, 2013, in a separate document, Husband quit-claimed all right, title, or interest in Wife's 401(k) to Wife "as her sole and separate property." It is unclear why the parties used a "quit-claim deed" to transfer Husband's interest in Wife's 401(k), but Husband testified he knew that by signing the document he was giving up his rights to Wife's 401(k). ¶5 The Agreement, however, did not reference Wife's 401(k) account or the equity in the community home. The Agreement also did not reference a monthly benefit payment Husband receives from the military related to his service before the parties married. The parties and the superior court referred to Husband's military benefit as both a disability payment and a pension. Regardless of the type of military benefit, both parties agree on appeal the benefit is Husband's sole and separate property. ¶6 More than three years after Husband and Wife signed the Agreement and the "quit claim deeds," Husband petitioned for dissolution of the marriage. Neither party sought spousal maintenance and they do not have any minor children; therefore, the only issue before the court was division of the parties' assets and debts. In his petition, Husband admitted that the parties entered into the Agreement, but alleged that provisions of the Agreement were not fair and equitable. At an evidentiary hearing, Husband argued the Agreement unfairly and inequitably divided the parties' home and Wife's 401(k) because Wife received approximately half the equity in the house and all of her 401(k) account. Husband claimed he was entitled to fifty percent of the value of Wife's 401(k) as of the date the parties signed the Agreement, plus any increase in value he would have obtained from his share between that date and the termination of the community estate. ¶7 Following the evidentiary hearing, the superior court entered a decree of dissolution. The court found the parties freely, knowingly, and voluntarily entered into the Agreement, and that the Agreement was valid and binding and fairly and equitably divided the community property and debts as of June 3, 2013. The court then incorporated the Agreement into the decree. The court affirmed the house as Husband's separate property pursuant to the Agreement; affirmed the payment of $127,435 to Wife as her share of the community interest in the house; and awarded Wife her 401(k), with Husband having no claim to the account. The court confirmed Husband's "military pension" was his sole and separate property, with Wife having no claim to the benefit. The court also distributed the parties' community debts and other community assets, including household furnishings, cars, life insurance policies, and bank accounts. ¶8 Pursuant to Arizona Rules of Family Law Procedure 82 and 83, Husband moved to correct the findings of fact, for an amended judgment, and for a new trial. The court denied the motions. Husband timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1). DISCUSSION A. When a Marital Separation Agreement is Presented to the Court, the Court Must First Determine Whether the Agreement is Enforceable. ¶9 "To promote amicable settlement of disputes between parties to a marriage attendant on their separation or the dissolution of their marriage, the parties may enter into a written separation agreement containing provisions for disposition of any property owned by either of them." A.R.S. § 25-317(A). In a dissolution proceeding, the terms of a separation agreement "except those providing for the support, custody and parenting time of children, are binding on the court unless it finds, after considering the economic circumstances of the parties and any other relevant evidence produced by the parties, on their own motion or on request of the court, that the separation agreement is unfair ." A.R.S. § 25-317(B) (emphasis added). ¶10 A marital separation agreement is a contract, see Muchesko v. Muchesko , 191 Ariz. 265, 268, 955 P.2d 21, 24 (App. 1997), and when a property settlement agreement is incorporated into a decree, contract law governs the agreement, MacMillan v. Schwartz , 226 Ariz. 584, 588, ¶ 12, 250 P.3d 1213, 1217 (App. 2011). For an enforceable contract to exist, there must be "an offer, acceptance, consideration, a sufficiently specific statement of the parties' obligations, and mutual assent." Muchesko , 191 Ariz. at 268, 955 P.2d at 24 (citing Savoca Masonry Co. v. Homes & Son Constr. Co. , 112 Ariz. 392, 394, 542 P.2d 817, 819 (1975) ). The validity and enforceability of a contract is a mixed question of law and fact, which we review de novo . Armiros v. Rohr , 243 Ariz. 600, 605, ¶ 16, 416 P.3d 864, 869 (App. 2018). ¶11 "[B]efore a binding contract is formed, the parties must mutually consent to all material terms. A distinct intent common to both parties must exist without doubt or difference, and until all understand alike there can be no assent." Hill-Shafer P'ship v. Chilson Family Tr. , 165 Ariz. 469, 473, 799 P.2d 810, 814 (1990). Mutual assent is based on objective evidence, not on the hidden intent of the parties, and objective evidence includes both written and spoken words, as well as acts. Johnson v. Earnhardt's Gilbert Dodge, Inc. , 212 Ariz. 381, 384, ¶ 11, 132 P.3d 825, 828 (2006). A misunderstanding "must be reasonable before a court may properly find a lack of mutual assent." Hartford v. Indus. Comm'n , 178 Ariz. 106, 112, 870 P.2d 1202, 1208 (App. 1994). "Relief is proper if the writing evidencing the purported agreement is uncertain or ambiguous." Hill-Shafer , 165 Ariz. at 474, 799 P.2d at 815. But, "some extrinsic facts could create 'a latent ambiguity in otherwise clear and intelligible language.' " Id. (quoting Buckmaster v. Dent , 146 Ariz. 521, 523, 707 P.2d 319, 321 (App. 1985) ). ¶12 In this case, the superior court found the Agreement was valid and binding. Finding Wife's testimony about discussions between the parties to be credible, the court also found that "when the parties entered into the [Agreement], they had full knowledge of the community property in their respective possession. In addition, the totality of the evidence showed that the parties held deliberative discussions about the distribution of the community property." We agree that the evidence presented shows the parties had a binding agreement regarding the disposition of some assets listed in the decree, including their vehicles, life insurance policies, and bank accounts. However, the record does not support a conclusion that the parties had a binding agreement concerning Husband's payment of the home equity to Wife. ¶13 Based on the evidence in the record, we cannot say Husband and Wife shared a common understanding regarding Husband's home equity payment to Wife such that there was mutual assent. See Hill-Shafer , 165 Ariz. at 473, 799 P.2d at 814. Husband and Wife both testified it was their understanding Husband would "keep" the house and that Wife would keep her 401(k). And yet, Wife also received $127,435-approximately one-half of the house's equity. Husband testified he paid Wife one-half of the house's equity, not because that was what the parties agreed to, but because a mortgage advisor told him to do so for liability purposes. Wife, meanwhile, testified that she was not involved in Husband's refinancing of the house; when she was preparing the Agreement she was unaware of Husband's actions related to the house; and it was Husband's choice to pay her a share of the house's equity. ¶14 Consistent with Wife's testimony, she argues on appeal that Husband "gifted" her the equity in the house. Wife maintains that Husband's intent to gift her a portion of the equity in the home was outside the scope of the Agreement. Such an argument is inconsistent with the requirement that the parties had a common understanding regarding the distribution of the home equity when they entered into the Agreement. And here, the record does not reflect such a common understanding concerning distribution of the home's equity. ¶15 Relying on Muchesko , Wife alternatively argues the superior court's property distribution can be upheld based on the parties' performance of the contract. See 191 Ariz. at 268, 955 P.2d at 24. In Muchesko , a husband and wife prepared a property-settlement agreement three years before they filed for divorce. Id. at 267, 955 P.2d at 23. Although the wife did not sign the settlement agreement, the parties' conduct was consistent with the terms of the settlement agreement, and this court found a binding agreement existed. Id. at 268-71, 955 P.2d at 24-27. In the present case, for the reasons explained above, Husband and Wife's testimony and argument do not support that they had a binding agreement regarding the payment of some of the house's equity by Husband to Wife. ¶16 We remand to the superior court to consider the equity payment to Wife, as well as any other property owned by Husband or Wife that was not accounted for in the Agreement. The superior court must determine the community or separate nature of the asset, and any other outstanding assets, and make an appropriate distribution pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-318. See A.R.S. § 25-318(A) ("In a proceeding for dissolution of the marriage ... the court shall assign each spouse's sole and separate property to such spouse ... [and] shall also divide the community ... equitably, though not necessarily in kind...."). On remand, the court may revisit whether the parties had a binding agreement if they did not have a common understanding regarding the nature or disposition of the major assets of the community. B. If a Valid and Binding Separation Agreement Exists, the Superior Court Must Also Determine Whether the Agreement is Unfair. ¶17 Husband also challenges the court's finding that the Agreement was not unfair. See A.R.S. § 25-317(B). Because the court erred by finding the parties knowingly agreed on the distribution of the home equity to Wife, on remand the court must also reassess whether the Agreement as contemplated by the parties was unfair. We also address other arguments raised by Husband as the issues may occur on remand. See State v. Abdi , 226 Ariz. 361, 366, ¶ 18, 248 P.3d 209, 214 (App. 2011) (court to address issues likely to arise on remand); Dawson v. Withycombe , 216 Ariz. 84, 113, ¶ 98, 163 P.3d 1034, 1063 (App. 2007). ¶18 Husband argues that if the Agreement results in Wife retaining all of her 401(k) and half of the home's equity, then it was not equitable, which he equates to being equal. As an initial matter, we recognize several of our cases have stated in dicta that a separation agreement is binding unless the court finds the agreement is "unfair or inequitable." See, e.g. , Breitbart-Napp v. Napp , 216 Ariz. 74, 79, ¶ 14, 163 P.3d 1024, 1029 (App. 2007) ; Cohen v. Frey , 215 Ariz. 62, 67, ¶ 14, 157 P.3d 482, 487 (App. 2007) ; Sharp v. Sharp , 179 Ariz. 205, 210, 877 P.2d 304, 309 (App. 1994), superseded on other grounds by rule as recognized in Hutki v. Hutki , 244 Ariz. 39, 43, 417 P.3d 804, 808 (App. 2018) ; Keller v. Keller , 137 Ariz. 447, 448, 671 P.2d 425, 426 (App. 1983). However, as recently recognized by this court in Hutki , A.R.S. § 25-317"does not use the term equitable." Hutki , 244 Ariz. at 42, ¶ 16, n.5, 417 P.3d at 807. While often what is fair will also be equitable, it is plausible that a separation agreement could be inequitable or unequal, but not "unfair" under the specific facts of a case. See A.R.S. § 25-317(B) (when reviewing a separation agreement, the superior court should consider "the economic circumstances of the parties and any other relevant evidence produced by the parties"); Toth v. Toth , 190 Ariz. 218, 221, 946 P.2d 900, 903 (1997) (under A.R.S. § 25-318, when awarding community assets "[i]n most cases, ... an equal distribution of joint property will be the most equitable" but in some circumstances "equal is not equitable"); Sharp , 179 Ariz. at 210, 877 P.2d at 309 (court must consider all the evidence before it concerning the agreement, as well as the parties, their relation, ages, finances, opportunities, and contributions to the community estate). Moreover, had the legislature intended the superior court to determine if an agreement was "unfair or inequitable," it could have done so. See A.R.S. § 25-318(A) (requiring the superior court to divide community property "equitably, though not necessarily in kind"); Egan v. Fridlund-Horne, 221 Ariz. 229, 239, ¶ 37, 211 P.3d 1213, 1223 (App. 2009) ("[W]e presume that when the legislature uses different wording within a statutory scheme, it intends to give a different meaning and consequence to that language."). Accordingly, when a separation agreement is presented to the superior court under A.R.S. § 25-317, the court's obligation is to determine whether the agreement is "unfair." A.R.S. § 25-317(B). ¶19 Husband further argues the court erred by considering his military benefit, which is his sole and separate property, in finding the agreement was not unfair under A.R.S. § 25-317. He posits that there is no authority permitting the superior court to consider one spouse's sole and separate property in determining whether a separation agreement is unfair. We agree with Husband that his military benefit is his sole and separate property because his military service occurred before the parties' marriage. See A.R.S. § 25-213(A). However, we disagree with Husband's contention that the superior court cannot consider the parties' sole and separate property when a separation agreement is presented to the court under A.R.S. § 25-317. ¶20 We hold that when determining whether a separation agreement is unfair under A.R.S. § 25-317, the superior court may consider the parties' sole and separate property if the parties considered their sole and separate property as a basis for making the agreement. See A.R.S. § 25-317(B) (directing the superior court to consider "the economic circumstances of the parties and any other relevant evidence produced by the parties"). Husband is correct that the superior court may only "assign" each spouse his or her own separate property when it is distributing property in a divorce proceeding pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-318(A). However, A.R.S. § 25-317 does not limit parties who enter into a separation agreement to only considering community property. Rather, "[t]o promote amicable settlement of disputes between parties to a marriage attendant on their separation or the dissolution of their marriage," under A.R.S. § 25-317(A), "the parties may enter into a written separation agreement containing provisions for disposition of any property owned by either of them." (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, we hold a separation agreement may be based on one or both party's separate property if the parties intend to do so when arriving upon the settlement agreement, and the resulting agreement is not unfair. ¶21 Husband also argues the superior court erred by considering his military benefit based on A.R.S. § 25-318.01, which provides that when making a property disposition, a court cannot "[c]onsider any federal disability benefits awarded to a veteran for service-connected disabilities" pursuant to certain portions of the United States Code. We agree the superior court may not consider such federal disability benefits when it is distributing community property under A.R.S. § 25-318, but A.R.S. § 25-317 does not prohibit parties from considering such benefits when entering into a separation agreement nor does it limit the court from considering the parties' intentions when determining whether the agreement is unfair. ¶22 However, when entering into a separation agreement, as a "built-in safeguard[ ]," In re Harber's Estate , 104 Ariz. 79, 88, 449 P.2d 7, 16 (1969), parties must act with "full knowledge of the property involved and [their] rights therein," Wick v. Wick , 107 Ariz. 382, 384, 489 P.2d 19, 21 (1971). This necessarily includes knowing whether the property at issue is community or separate. See Sharp , 179 Ariz. at 210-11, 877 P.2d at 309-10 (remanding for the superior court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the fairness of a separation agreement in part because no evidence was presented regarding what property constituted community property and the wife "attested that she was unaware of the nature and extent of the community assets"). ¶23 In this case, the superior court expressly considered Husband's sole and separate property when determining whether the Agreement was unfair. Wife testified she and Husband discussed his military benefit and her 401(k) and that Husband thought it was fair for him to keep his military benefit and her to keep her 401(k) because that is Wife's only retirement account. The superior court noted this testimony and found "[i]t is quite likely that [Husband] will receive far more from his pension than [Wife] will receive from her 401k over the respective parties' lives. In fact, from June 3, 2013 to the time of trial, [Husband] has received approximately $143,000.00 solely from his military pension." ¶24 Husband and Wife could have believed it was "fair" for Husband to keep his military benefit in exchange for Wife keeping her 401(k) and could have agreed to such terms, despite Husband's military benefit being his separate property. However, on appeal Husband asserts he was unaware his military benefit was his sole and separate property until he hired an attorney and petitioned for dissolution, more than three years after he signed the Agreement. Wife testified at trial she understood that Husband's military benefit predated their marriage and was his sole and separate property. But there is nothing in the record showing Husband knew his military benefit was his sole and separate property when he and Wife entered into the Agreement or that he understood Wife did not have a community interest in his benefit. Accordingly, on remand the superior court must determine whether the Agreement was "unfair" considering the lack of agreement regarding the equity issue in the marital home, and whether Husband acted with full knowledge of his separate property rights in his military benefit. See A.R.S. § 25-317(B). C. The Superior Court Erred by Considering Equitable Defenses Not Raised by the Parties. ¶25 Husband also argues the superior court erred by finding that Wife had equitable defenses of laches, ratification, and detrimental reliance. The court found that Husband relied on the Agreement to relieve him of a tax debt that would have been a community debt but for the existence of the Agreement and waited more than three years to challenge the Agreement. The court further found that Wife relied to her detriment on the Agreement "by expending the majority of the funds she received [from the home equity payment] pursuant to the division of property and debts, as confirmed by the [Agreement], without any formal or legal objection to the [Agreement] for over three years." Without making any further findings, the court found the equitable defenses precluded Husband's claims. ¶26 The superior court erred to the extent it relied on equitable defenses. "Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, shall be asserted in the response if one is required." Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 32(B). Wife, however, did not assert or argue equitable defenses to Husband's claims before the superior court. Husband testified the parties operated under the Agreement for three-and-a-half years and that in a filing with the Internal Revenue Service he referenced some of the parties' actions around the time the Agreement was signed. But Husband's testimony did not establish that he received a benefit from, or that Wife relied to her detriment on, the IRS filing. Likewise, Wife testified about what she did with some of the home equity money she received, but the fact that she used the money to invest in certain assets does not establish an equitable defense. And, beyond that testimony, no other significant evidence was presented at trial regarding the elements of the equitable defenses found by the court. Therefore, the superior court erred by finding equitable defenses precluded Husband's claims. See Reed v. Hinderland , 135 Ariz. 213, 215, 660 P.2d 464, 466 (1983) ("An affirmative defense must be both pleaded and proven."); see also Diaz v. Bachelier , 2 CA-CV 2014-0136, 2015 WL 4169990, at *2, ¶ 12 (Ariz. App. July 9, 2015) (mem. decision) (citing In re Guardianship of Stanfield , 276 P.3d 989, 1001 (Okla. 2012) ) (superior court erred by sua sponte concluding a claim for relief was barred by laches). ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL ¶27 Husband and Wife both request attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324. In the exercise of our discretion, we decline to award either party attorney's fees. As the prevailing party, Husband is entitled to costs upon compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21. CONCLUSION ¶28 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decree of dissolution relating to the distribution of community property and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. The Arizona Rules of Family Law Procedure were amended on January 1, 2019. For this opinion, we cite to the prior version of the rules because they were in effect at the time the superior court entered the decree. Wife never raised the gift argument in the superior court. Therefore, we do not reach the issue of whether the home equity payment was a gift. Wife is free to properly raise and prove the issue on remand. See Bobrow v. Bobrow , 241 Ariz. 592, 595, ¶ 10, 391 P.3d 646, 649 (App. 2017) (the burden is on the party claiming an action was a gift to establish the claim by clear and convincing proof). We note the court in Muchesko based its finding that a binding agreement existed on contract principles, and neither the superior court nor this court analyzed whether the agreement was unfair under A.R.S. § 25-317(B). Muchesko , 191 Ariz. at 268, 955 P.2d at 24. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, on which A.R.S. § 25-317 was modeled, provides that the terms of a separation agreement are binding upon the court unless the court finds the agreement is "unconscionable." Unif. Marriage & Divorce Act § 306(b) (1973). The uniform act's unconscionability test imposes a more stringent standard on a party seeking to challenge a separation agreement than A.R.S. § 25-317(B) 's "unfair" standard. See In re Marriage of Pownall , 197 Ariz. 577, 580-81, ¶ 10, 5 P.3d 911, 914-15 (App. 2000) (factors indicative of substantive unconscionability of a premarital separation agreement are "contract terms so one-sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an innocent party," "as well as 'an overall imbalance in the obligations and rights imposed by the bargain' " (quoting Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc. , 184 Ariz. 82, 89, 907 P.2d 51, 58 (1995) ) ). We note that on remand, when determining whether the Agreement is unfair, the superior court must look at the time the Agreement was entered. See Nelson v. Rice , 198 Ariz. 563, 568, ¶ 14, 12 P.3d 238, 243 (App. 2000) (citing Maxwell , 184 Ariz. at 88, 907 P.2d at 57 ) ("Unconscionability is determined as of the time the parties entered into the contract."); see also A.R.S. § 25-202(C)(2) (the court looks at the time of execution when determining whether a premarital agreement is unconscionable). The only reference in Wife's pretrial statement that could arguably be viewed as raising an equitable defense is "WIFE relied on the parties' agreements." This reference is insufficient to raise and address the issue. See Manicom v. CitiMortgage, Inc. , 236 Ariz. 153, 160, ¶ 27, 336 P.3d 1274, 1281 (App. 2014) (reliance is just one element of the defense of estoppel and the party seeking estoppel must establish both actual reliance and that such reliance was reasonable); Contempo Constr. Co. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. , 153 Ariz. 279, 283, 736 P.2d 13, 17 (App. 1987) (pleadings insufficient to raise estoppel defense where party did not allege facts supporting every element).

PORTLEY, Judge: ¶ 1 Dana Engstrom ("Mother") and James McCarthy ("Father") both challenge the parenting time and legal decision-making terms of the decree dissolving their marriage. Because we find their Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure ("Rule") 69 agreement binding and no explanation in the record for any modification, we vacate the legal decision-making and parenting time orders and remand for further proceedings. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 2 The parties married in 2002 and have four children. Mother filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in 2014. ¶ 3 After trial, the family court dissolved the marriage, awarded Mother sole legal decision-making authority, and awarded the parties shared parenting time. We have jurisdiction over the cross-appeals from the July 2016 decree under Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 12-2101(A)(1). DISCUSSION ¶ 4 Both parents challenge the award of parenting time and legal decision-making. We will affirm the family court's order of parenting time and legal decision-making absent an abuse of discretion. Nold v. Nold , 232 Ariz. 270, 273, ¶ 11, 304 P.3d 1093 (App. 2013). An abuse of discretion results when the record is "devoid of competent evidence to support the decision," or when the court commits an error of law in the process of reaching a discretionary conclusion. Hurd v. Hurd , 223 Ariz. 48, 52, ¶ 19, 219 P.3d 258 (App. 2009). Moreover, we defer to the court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. See Alvarado v. Thomson , 240 Ariz. 12, 14, ¶ 11, 375 P.3d 77 (App. 2016). But "[c]onclusions of law and the interpretation of statutes and rules are reviewed de novo." Id. A. Rule 69 Agreement ¶ 5 Father contends that, because he and Mother had entered into a Rule 69 agreement before trial that was approved and adopted by the court as an enforceable order, the court "could not modify [the] final, existing order regarding legal decision-making and parenting time absent a showing of a substantial and continuing change of circumstances." Mother disagrees, and claims "the [family] court had authority to reject the parties' Rule 69 Agreement because it ha[d] discretion" to do so under Rule 69(B) and A.R.S. § 25-317. ¶ 6 In an October 2014 pretrial resolution management conference, the parties entered into a Rule 69 agreement in court. Mother and Father agreed to share joint legal decision-making authority and parenting time. The court found the agreement was "fair and equitable," and "in the best interest of the parties' minor children." Consequently, the court approved the agreement "as an enforceable order of th[e] Court." ¶ 7 At trial, Mother admitted she had voluntarily entered into the Rule 69 agreement in court, and that she did so with her attorney present. She claimed, however, that at the time she entered into the agreement she believed its provisions were only temporary. After reviewing the agreement and the "enforceable order," the court ruled that "the agreement for joint legal decision-making and equal parenting time was not temporary." Nevertheless, citing A.R.S. § 25-317 and Rule 69(B) as legal authority, the court said that "[n]otwithstanding the parties' binding agreement, this [c]ourt can reject an agreement if the [c]ourt, pursuant to its own discretion, finds a basis for rejecting an agreement." The court then modified the portion of the order granting Mother and Father joint legal decision-making authority, and granted Mother sole legal decision-making authority. ¶ 8 Under A.R.S. § 25-317(A), "parties may enter into a written separation agreement containing provisions for ... custody and parenting time" while their dissolution of marriage is pending. The agreement is "presumed to be valid and binding," but a court retains authority to "exercis[e] its independent discretion pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-317." Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 69(B). Under A.R.S. § 25-317(D), a court has discretion to reject a Rule 69 agreement if it is not "reasonable" as to custody and parenting time. But if the court finds that the agreement "is reasonable as to support, custody and parenting time of children, the separation agreement shall be set forth or incorporated by reference in the decree of dissolution." A.R.S. § 25-317(D) (emphasis added). ¶ 9 The family court erred by concluding that Rule 69 and A.R.S. § 25-317 vested it with authority to modify the agreement after it had previously found the agreement was reasonable, and had approved it "as an enforceable order." Although courts can, in the first instance, reject a Rule 69 agreement, neither the statute nor the rule vest courts with discretion to modify an agreement the court has adopted. Once the court determines that the provisions addressing "support, custody and parenting time of children" are reasonable, the statute states that the court "shall" set forth the provisions in the decree of dissolution or incorporate them by reference. ¶ 10 We do not suggest that an agreement that was approved and adopted as an enforceable order cannot be subsequently modified. See A.R.S § 25-317(F) ("Except for terms concerning the maintenance of either party and the support, custody or parenting time of children, entry of the decree shall thereafter preclude the modification of the terms of the decree." (emphasis added)); see also A.R.S. § 25-411(A) (discussing grounds on which legal decision-making or parenting time can be modified); Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 85(C). But the legal basis giving the court authority to modify the Rule 69 agreement is in other rules and statutes. A party may, for example, request a modification of legal decision-making or parenting time by satisfying the requirements of A.R.S. § 25-411. And "[i]n considering a motion for change of custody, the court must initially determine whether a change of circumstances has occurred since the last custody order." Pridgeon v. Superior Court (LaMarca) , 134 Ariz. 177, 179, 655 P.2d 1 (1982) ; see also A.R.S. § 25-411(L) (explaining that a court shall deny a motion "[t]o modify any type of legal-decision making or parenting time order ... unless it finds that adequate cause for hearing the motion is established by the pleadings"); cf. Burk v. Burk , 68 Ariz. 305, 309, 205 P.2d 583 (1949) (noting that a modification of custody requires "that a change of conditions and circumstances be shown, or new facts presented, which were unknown to the applicant at the time the decree was entered"). Here the parties disagree on whether a change of circumstances occurred, and both parties make reasonable arguments to support their positions. But the court did not consider any alleged change of circumstances after the Rule 69 agreement was adopted as an enforceable order because it relied solely on A.R.S. § 25-317 and Rule 69. And given the fact-intensive nature of the inquiry, this court is not the appropriate forum to first resolve the issue on appeal without the family court having done so. ¶ 11 As a result, we vacate the order changing decision-making authority to the extent it modified the approved Rule 69 agreement. We remand the case to the family court so it can determine in the first instance whether there was a change of circumstances after the court accepted the agreement warranting a modification of the original order, or whether there was another rule or statute allowing the court to modify the Rule 69 agreement. B. Domestic Violence Findings ¶ 12 The court declined to grant Father's request for an award of joint legal decision-making authority because, among other things, the court concluded Father had engaged in "significant domestic violence." See A.R.S. § 25-403.03(A) ("Notwithstanding subsection D of this section, joint legal decision-making shall not be awarded if the court makes a finding of the existence of significant domestic violence pursuant to § 13-3601 or if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that there has been a significant history of domestic violence."). Father does not attack the factual findings of the court, but argues the "findings do not establish the commission of domestic violence as defined under Arizona law." The court explained its findings by stating the following: [T]he domestic violence involved in this case is significant. It involves coercive control and using the parties' children to further traumatize Mother. While the court does not find sexual violence occurred, the Court does find Father exerted control over Mother by encouraging Mother to participate in online sexual activity, have sex with prostitutes, threatening to have affairs or leave Mother if Mother failed to gratify Father, and convincing Mother that she was the one who tried to "control" Father. Further, Father's actions in driving by Mother's workplace with the children in the car to ensure Mother was at work, buying clothing for the children with the same-sounding name as Mother's online porn name, exploiting his telephonic contact with the children, and otherwise trying to manipulate the children in order to further control (i.e., victimize) Mother is untenable and intolerable. In the spectrum of domestic violence, the acts in this case are significant. The factual findings, some of which occurred before the parties entered into their Rule 69 agreement, were supported by the record, and were consistent with the testimony of Mother's expert, who noted that, in her field, that behavior is characterized as domestic violence. ¶ 13 An expert's characterization of what he or she believes constitutes domestic violence is not, however, legally binding. Encouraging Mother to participate in certain activities, threatening to be unfaithful if Mother did not perform in the way Father wanted, and acting in a controlling manner might be distasteful, but those actions do not necessarily support the legal conclusion that he is a perpetrator of domestic violence. See A.R.S. § 25-403.03(A) (directing courts to consider "domestic violence pursuant to section 13-3601"); see also A.R.S. § 13-3601 (defining acts that constitute "domestic violence"); A.R.S. § 25-403.03(D) (defining "an act of domestic violence" for purposes of that subsection). It is the Legislature's job to define what conduct constitutes "domestic violence." See Loveland v. State , 53 Ariz. 131, 140, 86 P.2d 942 (1939) ("It is within the province of the Legislature in creating an offense to define it by a particular description of the acts constituting it, or to define it as an act which produces a certain defined or described result."). And the Legislature has defined domestic violence in Title 13 and Title 25. See A.R.S. §§ 13-3601(A), 25-403.03(D). ¶ 14 Mother contends that "[d]omestic violence is a nebulous concept that is constantly evolving and can take many forms." Although we do not question her assertion that domestic violence can take many forms, neither statutes nor case law define domestic violence as a nebulous concept subject to ad hoc facts, particularly where a parent's fundamental rights are at stake. See Kent K. v. Bobby M. , 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 24, 110 P.3d 1013 (2005) ("Parents possess a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their children."). Indeed, adopting Mother's position could likely raise due process notice concerns. Cf. State v. Phillips , 202 Ariz. 427, 436, ¶ 39, n.3, 46 P.3d 1048 (2002) ("[C]riminal provisions must clearly define the conduct prohibited and the punishment authorized to satisfy the notice requirements of the Due Process Clause."). ¶ 15 It may well be that some of Father's actions constituted domestic violence under the statute. The court, however, relied on many acts that do not statutorily constitute domestic violence, and did not explain why Father's actions amounted to "significant" domestic violence. As a result, we cannot determine whether the court would have reached the same conclusion had it considered only the acts that legally constituted domestic violence. Therefore, we find that the court erred by finding the existence of significant domestic violence, vacate the finding, and remand the issue back to the court. ¶ 16 On remand, we direct the family court to consider whether Father's conduct, after the entry of the order approving the Rule 69 agreement, amounted to domestic violence or "significant domestic violence" by relying on the § 13-3601(A) statutory definitions referenced in § 25-403.03(A), and not on the expert's own views. Similarly, if the court finds that Father committed "an act" of domestic violence against Mother under § 25-403.03(D), the court should make appropriate factual findings by looking at the definitions of domestic violence under § 25-403.03(D)(1)-(3). C. Parenting Time Analysis ¶ 17 Mother argues the court erred when, after finding that Father had committed domestic violence, it awarded him parenting time with the children without conducting an analysis pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-403.03(F). We agree. ¶ 18 If, on remand, the court finds a legal basis to modify the Rule 69 agreement and concludes Father committed "an act of domestic violence" after entry of the order adopting the Rule 69 agreement, see Burk , 68 Ariz. at 309, 205 P.2d 583, the court must determine whether Father has met his burden of proof "to the court's satisfaction that parenting time will not endanger the child or significantly impair the child's emotional development." See A.R.S. § 25-403.03(F). The court must then make specific findings explaining its reasoning and conclusions. Cf. Christopher K. v. Markaa S. , 233 Ariz. 297, 301, ¶ 18, 311 P.3d 1110 (App. 2013). "If [Father] meets [his] burden to the court's satisfaction, the court shall place conditions on parenting time that best protect the child and the other parent from further harm." A.R.S. § 25-403.03(F). It is within the court's discretion to determine which conditions are appropriate to protect the child, Mother, or any other household member. A.R.S. § 25-403.03(F)(1)-(9) (giving the court broad discretion on which conditions should be imposed). D. Testimony of Father's Expert ¶ 19 Mother also contends the family court erred by allowing Father's expert to testify. We disagree. ¶ 20 First, Mother argues Father's expert, Dr. Gaughan, "was not timely disclosed" before the June 27 trial, in violation of Rule 49(H). That assertion is meritless. ¶ 21 Rule 49(H) states that "[a] party shall not be allowed to call an expert witness who has not been disclosed at least sixty (60) days before trial or such period as may be ordered by the court." Father first disclosed his intention to call his expert in January 2016, when he filed an "Expedited Motion for Appointment of Psychologist to Perform Comprehensive Family Evaluation" that specifically and repeatedly identified Dr. Gaughan. In March, the court declined Father's request for a court-appointed advisor, but authorized him to retain an expert and directed Mother to "fully cooperate with any evaluation sought by Father," thereby putting Mother on further notice that Father intended to call Dr. Gaughan as his expert. Moreover, we note that although Mother was instructed to "fully cooperate" with Dr. Gaughan, the court found she had failed to do so, thereby diminishing any notice prejudice that could have resulted had there been a lack of disclosure. ¶ 22 Mother also claims that the admission of Dr. Gaughan's testimony violated Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 (" Rule 702"). "We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion." E.R. v. Dep't of Child Safety , 237 Ariz. 56, 60, ¶ 19, 344 P.3d 842 (App. 2015) ; see also State v. Chappell , 225 Ariz. 229, 235, ¶ 16, 236 P.3d 1176 (2010) (reviewing "evidentiary rulings on the admissibility of expert opinions for an abuse of discretion"). ¶ 23 To "testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise," an expert witness must be "qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." Ariz. R. Evid. 702. Moreover, (1) the expert's knowledge must "help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue," (2) the testimony must be both "based on sufficient facts or data" and "the product of reliable principles and methods," and (3) the expert must "reliably appl[y] the principles and methods to the facts of the case." Ariz. R. Evid. 702(a)-(d). No single factor is dispositive of the reliability of the expert's testimony, and not all factors will apply to all experts or to every case. State ex rel. Montgomery v. Miller , 234 Ariz. 289, 299, ¶ 25, 321 P.3d 454 (App. 2014). ¶ 24 Father offered Dr. Gaughan, a licensed psychologist, "as an expert witness in the area of custody evaluations and family court evaluations." Dr. Gaughan testified he had completed "domestic training every single year for at least since 1984." He said he had previously conducted "dozens and dozens and dozens of family assessments under court appointment." He added he had "taken [many] classes in custody evaluations." He explained he was on a court roster and had done between fifty and one hundred "evaluations, therapeutic intervention[s], family coordinator work, [or] psychological evaluations, among other things." He said he had never been excluded from testifying as an expert witness. And, after specifically recognizing Dr. Gaughan from previous dissolution cases, the court said it "[did not] have a problem finding that he's an expert." There was sufficient evidence establishing that Dr. Gaughan was a qualified expert. ¶ 25 Nor did the court abuse its discretion by allowing Dr. Gaughan to testify in the form of an opinion because his methodology did not violate Rule 702. Despite being retained by Father, Dr. Gaughan told the lawyers for both parents at the outset that he was "intending from start to finish to approach th[e] evaluation as a neutral party." He informed them he would first meet with both parents together, then individually with each parent, and finally "see the children with father and see the children with mother on separate days." He would then meet with the parties together to discuss the evaluation findings, and engage in a "back and forth exchange" with the parties to clarify any issues. ¶ 26 Dr. Gaughan subsequently had a two-hour appointment with Mother, a two-hour meeting with Father, and a session in which he interviewed the "children separately, each of the four of them by themselves." During the interviews, he extensively questioned both parents about their relationships with each other, as well as their relationships with the children. He asked the children about their relationships with their parents, and sought their views and opinions on the custody arrangements as they existed at the time. Although he explained he would have generally conducted a psychological evaluation of both parents, Mother refused to participate in the evaluation despite the court's previous instruction that she "fully cooperate with any evaluation sought by Father." And because he was trying to be "a neutral person" as much as he possibly could, he did not conduct a psychological evaluation of Father, noting that "if I don't do testing on one parent, I'm not going to do testing on the other." ¶ 27 The court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Father's expert to testify and give his opinions. Dr. Gaughan was a licensed psychologist who had undergone years of training and served as an expert witness in dozens of cases. Moreover, he interviewed all the relevant parties and reached his expert opinion based on the interviews he conducted and the facts he learned from those interviews. As a result, there was no abuse of discretion. CONCLUSION ¶ 28 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the family court's order as it relates to legal decision-making authority and parenting time and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision. Neither party presented the transcript of the Rule 69 proceeding that led to the adoption of the agreement. As a result, we must presume the record supports the court's conclusion. See Reeck v. Mendoza , 232 Ariz. 299, 302, ¶ 12, 304 P.3d 1122 (App. 2013). But the court can, for example, relieve a party from an order if the court finds fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct by an adverse party. Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 86(C)(1)(c). This was neither alleged nor demonstrated at trial. We address this issue because it will likely arise on remand. Mother concedes that these factual findings constituted the basis for the court concluding Father had perpetrated "significant" domestic violence. Because we are remanding this case, we direct the court to consider Dr. Gaughan's report only after receiving the written affirmations required by A.R.S. § 25-406(A).

JOHNSEN, Judge: ¶ 1 A grand jury indicted Edgar Alonzo Dominguez on a charge of first-degree murder. Dominguez asked the superior court to remand the charge for redetermination, arguing the prosecutor violated his due-process rights by failing to properly instruct the grand jury on premeditation. The superior court denied the motion. We accept jurisdiction of Dominguez's petition for special action and grant relief insofar as we hold that when a grand jury is considering a first-degree murder charge, the prosecutor may not instruct the jury on "premeditation" by simply reciting the statutory definition of that term. Instead, due process requires the prosecutor to instruct the jury as the supreme court mandated in State v. Thompson , 204 Ariz. 471, 479-80, ¶¶ 32, 34, 65 P.3d 420 (2003). We remand so that the superior court may determine whether the prosecutor so advised the grand jury in this case. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶ 2 On May 10, 2017, a grand jury indicted Dominguez on charges of first-degree murder and aggravated assault stemming from incidents in which he allegedly stabbed two men, killing one and seriously injuring the other. At the outset of the grand jury proceeding that day, the prosecutor instructed the grand jury as follows: This is the investigation of Edgar A. Dominguez. This investigation involves alleged first degree murder and aggravated assault, both of which occurred on or about May 1st of 2017 in Maricopa County, Arizona. To assist you in determining whether or not probable cause exists in this matter, the following statutes may be appropriate: ARS Section 13-105, 13-1105, 13-1101, 13-1203, and 13-1204. Each of these statutes has been previously read to the grand jury panel with all members present according to Maricopa County attorney records on February 6th of 2017. Copies of these statutes have been provided to all members of the grand jury. Are there any grand jurors who would like to have any of these statutes re-read or clarified at this time? I take it by your silence the answer is no. ¶ 3 Dominguez filed a timely motion to have the murder charge remanded to the grand jury for redetermination of probable cause. He argued the Arizona Supreme Court ruled in Thompson that due process barred the use in a first-degree murder trial of a jury instruction that merely recites the definition of "premeditation" in Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 13-1101 (2018). The court in that case held the superior court erred by instructing the jury using the statutory definition because that definition could mislead juries by "needlessly emphasiz[ing] the rapidity with which reflection may occur." 204 Ariz. at 479, ¶ 32, 65 P.3d 420. The court crafted a new instruction defining premeditation and directed that trial juries be given the new instruction rather than the statutory definition. Id. Here, Dominguez argued the same principles apply when a grand jury is considering whether to indict a suspect on first-degree murder; he argued the prosecutor violated his due-process rights by failing to give the Thompson instruction to the grand jury that indicted him. ¶ 4 The State opposed Dominguez's motion to remand, and after hearing oral argument, the superior court denied the motion. Dominguez then filed this petition for special action. ¶ 5 Although our special action jurisdiction is discretionary, State ex rel. Romley v. Martin , 203 Ariz. 46, 47, ¶ 4, 49 P.3d 1142 (App. 2002), aff'd , 205 Ariz. 279, 69 P.3d 1000 (2003), special action is a criminal defendant's only avenue for review of a denial of a motion to redetermine probable cause. See State v. Murray , 184 Ariz. 9, 32, 906 P.2d 542 (1995). Because Dominguez has no adequate remedy by appeal, and because his petition raises an issue of statewide importance, we exercise our discretion to accept jurisdiction of his petition. See Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(4) (2018) and Arizona Rules of Procedure for Special Actions 3, 4, and 7. DISCUSSION A. The Supreme Court's Ruling in Thompson . ¶ 6 By statute, Arizona law defines "premeditation" for purposes of a first-degree murder charge as follows: "Premeditation" means that the defendant acts with either the intention or the knowledge that he will kill another human being, when such intention or knowledge precedes the killing by any length of time to permit reflection. Proof of actual reflection is not required, but an act is not done with premeditation if it is the instant effect of a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. A.R.S. § 13-1101(1). ¶ 7 In Thompson , the superior court had instructed the jury at trial on the definition of "premeditation" solely by reciting the term's statutory definition. The defendant challenged his conviction, arguing that instructing the jury that "[p]roof of actual reflection is not required" relieved the State of its constitutional burden to prove premeditation and eliminated any meaningful distinction between first- and second-degree murder. 204 Ariz. at 473, 474, ¶¶ 1, 8, 65 P.3d 420. The supreme court agreed that instructing the jury that "proof of actual reflection is not required"-language taken directly from the statute-could relieve the State of the burden of proving reflection and thereby render the first-degree murder statute unconstitutional. Id. at 478, ¶¶ 26-27, 65 P.3d 420. Ruling that trial juries should not be instructed using the statutory definition, the court explained: Our decision today distinguishes the element of premeditation from the evidence that might establish that element. Although the mere passage of time suggests that a defendant premeditated-and the state might be able to convince a jury to make that inference-the passage of time is not, in and of itself, premeditation. To allow the state to establish the element of premeditation by merely proving that sufficient time passed to permit reflection would be to essentially relieve the state of its burden to establish the sole element that distinguishes between first and second degree murder. * * * In short, the passage of time is but one factor that can show that the defendant actually reflected. The key is that the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, must convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant actually reflected. Id. at 478, 479, ¶¶ 29, 31. ¶ 8 The court then announced an instruction that "trial judges should, in future cases" use to instruct juries: "Premeditation" means that the defendant intended to kill another human being [knew he/she would kill another human being], and that after forming that intent [knowledge], reflected on the decision before killing. It is this reflection, regardless of the length of time in which it occurs, that distinguishes first degree murder from second degree murder. An act is not done with premeditation if it is the instant effect of a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. Id. at 479, ¶ 32 (bracketed text in original). The court continued, "Only when the facts of a case require it should a trial judge instruct the jury, or may the state argue, that 'the time needed for reflection is not necessarily prolonged, and the space of time between the intent [knowledge] to kill and the act of killing may be very short."' Id. at 479-80, ¶ 32, 65 P.3d 420. B. Thompson 's Applicability to Grand Juries. ¶ 9 Thompson addressed an instruction given to a petit jury in a murder trial; Dominguez argues due process likewise requires that a grand jury considering a first-degree murder charge be given the expanded and clarified definition the supreme court mandated in that case. The State argues to the contrary, citing O'Meara v. Gottsfield , 174 Ariz. 576, 578, 851 P.2d 1375 (1993), for the proposition "that defendants in grand jury proceedings, due to the very nature of the grand jury, are not entitled to all the protections that are afforded defendants in jury trials." ¶ 10 It cannot be denied "that an accused is entitled to due process during grand jury proceedings." Crimmins v. Super. Ct. , 137 Ariz. 39, 41, 668 P.2d 882 (1983). Due process requires, inter alia , that the accused be afforded "a fair and impartial presentation of the evidence." Id ."The duties of fair play and impartiality imposed on those who attend and serve the grand jury are meant to ensure that the determinations made by that body are informed, objective and just." Id . Implicit in these duties is the requirement that prosecutors adequately inform grand jurors not only about the facts, but also about the relevant law. See id . The prosecutor therefore is required to "instruct the grand jury on all the law applicable to the facts of the case, even if the grand jury does not make any specific request for additional legal instruction." Trebus v. Davis , 189 Ariz. 621, 623, 944 P.2d 1235 (1997). ¶ 11 In O'Meara , the defendant challenged the Maricopa County Attorney's practice of reading "all relevant statutes to the grand jury at the commencement of its term, provid[ing] the grand jurors with a copy of all relevant statutes for reference, and ask[ing] the grand jurors if they later want statutes reread or clarified," without necessarily re-instructing the grand jury in any detail when it convenes later to consider a particular charge. 174 Ariz. at 576, 851 P.2d 1375. In that case, when the grand jury convened for the first time, the prosecutor gave the grand jurors a copy of the Criminal Code and read them specific statutory provisions; when the grand jury convened again more than a month later to hear presentation of evidence, the prosecutor reminded the jurors of the relevant statutes and asked if they wanted the statutes reread or clarified. Id. at 577, 851 P.2d 1375. The supreme court held this process satisfied a suspect's due-process right to have the grand jury properly instructed on the law: "Due process requires only that the prosecutor read all relevant statutes to the grand jury, provide them with a copy of those statutes to refer to during deliberations, and ask if they want any statutes reread or clarified." Id . at 578, 851 P.2d 1375. ¶ 12 The State offers no cogent reason why due process does not require a prosecutor to give a grand jury that is considering a first-degree murder charge the same expanded and clarified instruction that Thompson directed be given to a petit jury in such a case. The risk the Thompson court identified in the statutory definition of "premeditation" is that the words of the statute alone may allow "no meaningful distinction between first and second degree murder," thus "render[ing] the first degree murder statute impermissibly vague and therefore unconstitutional under the United States and Arizona Constitutions." 204 Ariz. at 478, ¶ 26, 65 P.3d 420. The same risk is present in the grand jury context: Improperly instructed using the language of the statute alone, a grand jury may hand down a first-degree murder charge without understanding that the crime requires proof "of actual reflection." Id. at 477, ¶ 23, 65 P.3d 420. Similarly, simply pointing grand jurors to the statute when they begin deliberating and asking them if they want clarification will not ensure that the grand jury is properly instructed as to the element of premeditation for first-degree murder. The result could be that a defendant is made to stand trial for first-degree murder when the charge is unsupported by probable cause. See O'Meara , 174 Ariz. at 578, 851 P.2d 1375 ("Because an indictment can have catastrophic consequences for those charged, considerable attention should be paid to the task of ensuring that grand jurors fully understand their unique role, and the law they are to apply.") (Zlaket, J., specially concurring). Cf. Korzep v. Super. Ct. , 172 Ariz. 534, 540, 838 P.2d 1295 (App. 1991) (remand for new finding of probable cause required when grand jury was not instructed on law that "could conceivably lead the grand jury to eschew an indictment"). ¶ 13 We therefore hold that due process requires that, when instructing a grand jury on the definition of "premeditation" for purposes of first-degree murder, the prosecutor must instruct the jury as Thompson requires and, consistent with O'Meara , 174 Ariz. at 578, 851 P.2d 1375, must provide the jurors a written copy of the expanded and clarified definition for their reference during deliberations. Further, when the grand jury is about to hear evidence on a first-degree murder charge and the prosecutor asks the jurors whether they want to have any statutes reread or clarified, when it comes to the term "premeditation," the prosecutor may not simply refer the jurors to the statutory definition, but must refer them to the expanded and clarified Thompson definition. ¶ 14 In its response to Dominguez's petition for special action, the State asserted for the first time that when the grand jury that indicted Dominguez first convened on February 6, 2017, the prosecutor did indeed provide the grand jurors with a definition of "premeditation" that satisfied Thompson's mandate. Dominguez disputes that the instruction satisfied the due-process concerns that Thompson addressed. The superior court has not had an opportunity to consider that issue because that court was not presented with a transcript of the February 6 proceeding in connection with the motion to remand. ¶ 15 Additionally, the transcript of the beginning of the May 10 proceeding at which the grand jury indicted Dominguez shows that the prosecutor referred the grand jury to a handful of statutes, including § 13-1101, without mentioning any expanded and clarified definition of "premeditation." See ¶ 2, supra. Although the transcript reflects that the prosecutor reminded the grand jurors that they had received written copies of the relevant statutes, including § 13-1101, the transcript does not reflect whether the grand jurors also were given written copies of any clarification pertaining to "premeditation" that the prosecutor provided to the grand jury when it first convened. Accordingly, on this record alone, we are unable to determine whether the prosecutor properly complied with Thompson and O'Meara. See Cespedes v. Lee , 243 Ariz. 46, ----, ¶ 10, 401 P.3d 995 (2017) (citing State ex rel. Thomas v. Granville , 211 Ariz. 468, 471, ¶ 8, 123 P.3d 662 (2005) (on review, "instructions to a jury are read as a whole, not in isolated parts, to ensure that a jury is properly instructed on the law") ). CONCLUSION ¶ 16 We accept jurisdiction of this special action petition. We grant relief in part, ruling that due process requires that a grand jury considering a first-degree murder charge may not be instructed on the definition of "premeditation" solely using the language of A.R.S. § 13-1101(1). Instead, to avoid the constitutional infirmities in the statutory definition, the prosecutor must give the grand jury an expanded and clarified definition of "premeditation" as set out in Thompson . We remand this matter to the superior court so that it can determine whether the instructions the prosecutor gave to the grand jury that indicted Dominguez complied with Thompson and O'Meara . Absent material revision after the relevant date, we cite a statute's most current version. Upon deciding to exercise our discretion, we issued an order accepting jurisdiction and granting partial relief to Dominguez, advising that an opinion would follow. This is that opinion. The State does not argue that any due-process violation here was harmless. See Pitts v. Adams , 179 Ariz. 108, 109, 876 P.2d 1143 (1994).

EPPICH, Presiding Judge: ¶1 William Mixton appeals his convictions for twenty counts of sexual exploitation of a minor under fifteen years of age, arguing police violated his federal and state constitutional rights by obtaining, without a warrant, information from two service providers identifying him as the sender of certain incriminating internet messages. He contends the trial court erred in failing to suppress evidence obtained as a result of that warrantless acquisition of information. We conclude that, although the information was obtained in violation of article II, § 8 of the Arizona Constitution, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. Accordingly, we affirm Mixton's convictions and sentences. Factual and Procedural Background ¶2 In March 2016, an undercover detective investigating child exploitation placed an ad on a popular internet advertising forum targeting offenders interested in child pornography and incest, inviting those interested to contact him to join a group chat on a messaging application known for minimal verification of its users' identities. Several people responded to the ad, including one who provided his messaging application screen name "tabooin520" and asked to be added to the group chat. In the days after the detective added this user to the group, the user posted several images and videos depicting child pornography. When the detective sent a person-to-person message to the user thanking him for the pictures, the user responded by sending the detective additional images of child pornography in personal messages. ¶3 At the detective's request, federal agents participating in the investigation served a federal administrative subpoena on the messaging application provider to obtain the user's IP address. Once the provider furnished the IP address, the detective was able to determine the user's internet service provider (ISP) by using publicly available information. Again, federal agents served a subpoena, and as a result, the ISP supplied the street address of the user to whom the IP address was assigned. Based on this information, the detective obtained a search warrant for that address. ¶4 Mixton lived in a room at that address. During execution of the search warrant, police seized from Mixton's room a cell phone, an external hard drive, a laptop computer, and a desktop computer, each of which contained numerous images and videos containing child pornography. In some of the folders containing these images and videos, police also found images of Mixton, and images the detective had sent to the user via the messaging application. ¶5 Based on images found on the devices in Mixton's room, a grand jury indicted Mixton on charges including twenty counts of sexual exploitation of a minor under fifteen years of age. The trial court severed counts for other offenses, and after a four-day trial for sexual exploitation, a jury convicted Mixton on all twenty counts. For each count, the court imposed a seventeen-year sentence, all to be served consecutively. We have jurisdiction over Mixton's appeal pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 13-4031 and 13-4033(A)(1). Motion to Suppress ¶6 Before trial, Mixton moved to suppress both the subscriber information obtained via the administrative subpoenas and all evidence collected as a result of that information including the evidence obtained during the search of his home. He argued that both the Fourth Amendment and article II, § 8 of the Arizona Constitution protected his reasonable expectation of privacy in the subscriber information, prohibiting law enforcement from obtaining that information without a warrant or other court order. After brief oral argument, the trial court denied the motion, ruling that Mixton had no recognized privacy interest in the subscriber information. ¶7 On appeal, Mixton reasserts his contention that both the Fourth Amendment and article II, § 8 protect the identifying information he transmitted to the service providers. We review de novo constitutional issues raised in a motion to suppress, considering only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's ruling. State v. Blakley , 226 Ariz. 25, ¶ 5, 243 P.3d 628 (App. 2010). Here, the parties did not present evidence at the motion hearing, however, arguing the motion on their filings. The relevant facts appear to be undisputed; we view them in the light most favorable to upholding the ruling. Cf. State v. Navarro , 241 Ariz. 19, n.1, 382 P.3d 1234 (App. 2016) (considering undisputed facts to decide suppression motion where no hearing held). ¶8 As a preliminary matter, Mixton urges us to address the issue under article II, § 8 before we address it under the Fourth Amendment in order to "honor[ ] the intent of the [state constitution's] framers to provide an independent and primary organic law, and ... ensure[ ] that the rights of Arizonans will not erode even when federal constitutional rights do." Clint Bolick, Vindicating the Arizona Constitution's Promise of Freedom , 44 Ariz. St. L.J. 505, 509 (2012). Our supreme court has held, however, that "decisions of the United States Supreme Court have great weight in interpreting those provisions of the state constitution which correspond to the federal provisions." Pool v. Superior Court , 139 Ariz. 98, 108, 677 P.2d 261, 271 (1984). While worded differently, article II, § 8 corresponds to the Fourth Amendment; both exist to protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. See State v. Ault , 150 Ariz. 459, 463, 724 P.2d 545, 549 (1986). Moreover, article II, § 8 "is of the same general effect and purpose as the Fourth Amendment, and, for that reason, decisions on the right of search under the latter are well in point on section 8." Malmin v. State , 30 Ariz. 258, 261, 246 P. 548 (1926). Very recently, our supreme court stated that "[t]he Arizona Constitution's protections under article 2, section 8 are generally coextensive with Fourth Amendment analysis." State v. Hernandez , 244 Ariz. 1, ¶ 23, 417 P.3d 207 (2018). Indeed, its interpretations of article II, § 8 have rarely departed from Fourth Amendment precedent, and never in a case that does not involve physical invasion of the home. See State v. Peltz , 242 Ariz. 23, n.3, 391 P.3d 1215 (App. 2017). Therefore, while "we cannot and should not follow federal precedent blindly" in interpreting our state constitution, Pool , 139 Ariz. at 108, 677 P.2d at 271, neither can we turn a blind eye to it. On the other hand, our independent interpretation of article II, § 8 would be of little assistance in analyzing the Fourth Amendment, an area of law in which decisions of our federal Supreme Court bind us. ¶9 For this reason, and because Mixton has also challenged his convictions under the Fourth Amendment, we analyze the issues here first under the Fourth Amendment. In doing so we follow the lead of our supreme court, which has taken this approach in deciding article II, § 8 challenges. See, e.g. , Hernandez , 244 Ariz. 1, ¶¶ 11-23, 417 P.3d 207 ; State v. Bolt , 142 Ariz. 260, 263-65, 689 P.2d 519, 522-24 (1984). We recognize our duty to independently interpret and give effect to our state constitution, however. See Pool , 139 Ariz. at 108, 677 P.2d at 271. To the extent we find rights in article II, § 8 beyond those that have been found under the Fourth Amendment, we may always exert our state sovereignty and avoid federal review through a "clear and express statement that [our] decision rests on adequate and independent state grounds." Michigan v. Long , 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 n.7, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) ; see also Ault , 150 Ariz. at 466, 724 P.2d at 552 ("We decide this case on independent state grounds."); Bolt , 142 Ariz. at 265, 689 P.2d at 524 (similar). Fourth Amendment ¶10 The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." "A 'search' under the Fourth Amendment occurs 'when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.' " State v. Welch , 236 Ariz. 308, ¶ 8, 340 P.3d 387 (App. 2014) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen , 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984) ). Before police conduct a search that infringes upon a person's subjective and objectively reasonable expectation of privacy, police generally must obtain a warrant supported by probable cause. Carpenter v. United States , --- U.S. ----, ----, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213, 201 L.Ed.2d 507 (2018). Evidence obtained in violation of this requirement may be subject to suppression, see Bolt , 142 Ariz. at 265-69, 689 P.2d at 524-528, but only the person whose rights were violated may claim the violation, see State v. Jeffers , 135 Ariz. 404, 413, 661 P.2d 1105 (1983) ; State v. Juarez , 203 Ariz. 441, ¶ 12, 55 P.3d 784 (App. 2002) (citing Rakas v. Illinois , 439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978) ). ¶11 In general, the Fourth Amendment does not protect information that a person reveals to a third party who then reveals it to the state, "even if the information is revealed [to the third party] on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed." United States v. Miller , 425 U.S. 435, 443, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976) (government's warrantless acquisition of customer's bank records held by bank did not violate Fourth Amendment); see also Smith v. Maryland , 442 U.S. 735, 744-45, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (warrantless collection of subscriber's phone calls via "pen register" did not violate Fourth Amendment). Federal courts applying this principle have consistently found internet users to have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their IP addresses or in their subscriber information (name, street address, etc.) voluntarily conveyed to third-party service providers. See, e.g. , United States v. Weast , 811 F.3d 743, 747-48 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 137 S. Ct. 126, 196 L.Ed.2d 99 (2016) ; United States v. Christie , 624 F.3d 558, 573-74 (3d Cir. 2010) ("Federal courts have uniformly held that 'subscriber information provided to an internet provider is not protected by the Fourth Amendment's privacy expectation.' " (quoting United States v. Perrine , 518 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2008) )), cert. denied , 562 U.S. 1236, 131 S.Ct. 1513, 179 L.Ed.2d 335 (2011) ; Perrine , 518 F.3d at 1204. Thus, an internet user has no recognized Fourth Amendment privacy interest in his IP address or the personally identifying information he or she submitted to his or her ISP to subscribe to its service. The third-party doctrine does not allow the government to obtain the contents of communications from a third-party communication technology provider, however. See Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 348, 359, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (striking down conviction based on warrantless surveillance of defendant's phone calls via electronic listening device); Smith , 442 U.S. at 741, 99 S.Ct. 2577 ("[A] pen register differs significantly from the listening device employed in Katz, for pen registers do not acquire the contents of communications."). Recently, the United States Supreme Court declined to extend the third-party doctrine established by Miller and Smith to "detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled" cell-site location records, but characterized its decision as a "narrow one" and expressly left existing application of Miller and Smith undisturbed. Carpenter , 138 S. Ct. at 2216-17, 2220. ¶12 Mixton nonetheless contends that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his identity because his conduct shows a calculated effort to maintain anonymity: He used a messaging application known for collecting little information from its users and communicated in that application using a pseudonym. But while a person must have a subjective expectation of privacy in order to invoke Fourth Amendment protection, it must also be "one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable' " for the Fourth Amendment to apply. Smith , 442 U.S. at 740, 99 S.Ct. 2577 (quoting Katz , 389 U.S. at 361, 88 S.Ct. 507 (Harlan, J., concurring)). As explained above, Smith and the federal circuit cases following it have established that an internet user has no recognized Fourth Amendment privacy interest in his or her identity. And while Mixton points out that he only shared his subscriber information with the service providers, this presumably was also true in the many federal cases that have found no reasonable expectation in such subscriber information. See, e.g. , Weast , 811 F.3d at 747-48 ; Christie , 624 F.3d at 573-74 ; Perrine , 518 F.3d at 1204. No reasonable expectation of privacy exists under the Fourth Amendment by virtue of this fact: The federal third-party doctrine has been applied even when information is shared with only one third party. See United States v. Caira , 833 F.3d 803, 806 (7th Cir. 2016). While Mixton notes that investigators obtained his IP address in addition to his identity, federal courts have not recognized a protected privacy interest in an IP address. See, e.g. , Caira , 833 F.3d at 806-07 ; Weast , 811 F.3d at 747-48 ; Perrine , 518 F.3d at 1204-05. Finally, Mixton reminds us we are not bound to follow the federal circuit cases, see State v. Montano , 206 Ariz. 296, n.1, 77 P.3d 1246 (2003), but we are bound by Smith , which dictated the result in those cases. ¶13 Because Mixton had no federally recognized privacy interest in his subscriber information or IP address, law enforcement did not need a warrant under the Fourth Amendment to obtain that information from Mixton's service providers. The trial court did not err in denying Mixton's Fourth Amendment claim. Article II, § 8 of the Arizona Constitution ¶14 Article II, § 8 of the Arizona Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law." Although article II, § 8 "is of the same general effect and purpose as the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States," "[w]e have the right [to interpret] our own constitutional provisions as we think logical and proper, notwithstanding their analogy to the Federal Constitution and the federal decisions based on that Constitution." Turley v. State , 48 Ariz. 61, 70-71, 59 P.2d 312 (1936). Pursuant to article II, § 8 's explicit mention of the home, Arizona courts have, on occasion, found protections from warrantless physical intrusions into a home not recognized in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See Ault , 150 Ariz. at 466, 724 P.2d at 552 (declining "to extend the inevitable discovery doctrine into defendant's home ... regardless of the position the United States Supreme Court would take on this issue"); Bolt , 142 Ariz. at 263-65, 689 P.2d at 522-24 (declining to follow United States Supreme Court case involving warrantless entry of home to "secure" it until search warrant obtained). ¶15 While Arizona's appellate courts have never extended article II, § 8 beyond the Fourth Amendment outside the context of the home, see Peltz , 242 Ariz. 23, n.3, 391 P.3d 1215, our supreme court "has never expressly held, based on considered analysis, that [ article II, § 8 's protections of "private affairs" are] coextensive with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of Fourth Amendment protections," Hernandez , 244 Ariz. 1, ¶ 30, 417 P.3d 207 (Bolick, J., concurring). Consistent with our prerogative to independently interpret our constitution, see Pool , 139 Ariz. at 108, 677 P.2d at 271, our supreme court has left open the possibility that article II, § 8 rights extend beyond those that have been found in the Fourth Amendment in circumstances other than warrantless physical intrusion into the home, see Hernandez , 244 Ariz. 1, ¶ 23, 417 P.3d 207 ("We are not persuaded that the scope of the Arizona Constitution's protections exceeds the Fourth Amendment's reach under the circumstances of this case ." (emphasis added)). ¶16 No published opinions address the third-party doctrine under Arizona's Constitution. We review de novo a matter of first impression regarding whether a particular expectation of privacy should be recognized under constitutional law. State v. Huerta , 223 Ariz. 424, ¶ 4, 224 P.3d 240 (App. 2010). ¶17 Mixton argues that because article II, § 8 explicitly grants protection to "private affairs" in addition to homes, its protection of private affairs must extend beyond the protections offered by the Fourth Amendment, as it does for homes. He urges us to follow Justice Bolick's view that article II, § 8 's protection of "private affairs" must differ from the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment because the language is different. See Hernandez , 244 Ariz. 1, ¶ 29, 417 P.3d 207 (Bolick, J., concurring) ("It is axiomatic, as a matter of constitutional or statutory interpretation, that where different language is used in different provisions, we must infer that a different meaning was intended." (citing Rochlin v. State , 112 Ariz. 171, 176, 540 P.2d 643, 648 (1975) )). ¶18 To determine whether a private affair has been disturbed, Mixton contends that we should focus on "the nature of the government's actions" rather than applying a reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test akin to that in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See State v. Campbell , 306 Or. 157, 759 P.2d 1040, 1044 (1988) (rejecting reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test under Oregon Constitution's search-and-seizure provision). But as Mixton acknowledges, Arizona courts have long applied the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test in analyzing the protections provided by both the Fourth Amendment and article II, § 8. See Juarez , 203 Ariz. 441, ¶ 16, 55 P.3d 784 (Arizona courts have "consistently" applied reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test in article II, § 8 challenges since 1980). That test is consistent with the term "private affairs," which we conclude refers to those affairs in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. See also Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 35 (1971) (defining "affairs" as "commercial, professional, or personal business"). We therefore apply a reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test in analyzing the issue here under article II, § 8. ¶19 Mixton next argues that internet users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their identity when communicating using a pseudonym on the internet. Noting growing public concern about government's ability to collect information from technologies such as the internet that are an indispensable part of modern life, he urges us to join "[a] growing number of states [that] have declined to import the third-party doctrine into their state constitutional search-and-seizure provisions." Zanders v. State , 73 N.E.3d 178, 186 (Ind. 2017), cert. granted, judgment vacated on federal grounds , --- U.S. ----, 138 S. Ct. 2702, 201 L.Ed.2d 1092 (2018). ¶20 As mentioned above in our discussion of the Fourth Amendment, the federal third-party doctrine generally holds that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information revealed to a third party, even "on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed." Miller , 425 U.S. at 443, 96 S.Ct. 1619. The doctrine has its roots in a line of cases in which the Court ruled that defendants had no protected Fourth Amendment interest in their conversations with a false friend (either a government informant or agent), even when the false friend records the conversation or allows others to listen in without the defendant's consent. See id. (citing United States v. White , 401 U.S. 745, 751-52, 91 S.Ct. 1122, 28 L.Ed.2d 453 (1971) (incriminating statements made in person to government informer, overheard by government agents informer allowed to eavesdrop in person and through electronic surveillance); Hoffa v. United States , 385 U.S. 293, 302, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966) (incriminating statements made in person to government informer); and Lopez v. United States , 373 U.S. 427, 83 S.Ct. 1381, 10 L.Ed.2d 462 (1963) (recording of defendant's conversation by person to whom defendant spoke)). In Miller , the Court ruled that a person had no reasonable expectation of privacy in their bank records held by their bank. Id. at 442, 96 S.Ct. 1619. The Court found that what the government obtained, including the defendant's financial records and bank slips, were "not confidential communications," as the records "contain[ed] only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business." Id. The Court concluded that a bank customer, like a person whose confidence is betrayed by a false friend, "takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the Government." Id. at 443, 96 S.Ct. 1619 (citing White , 401 U.S. at 751-52, 91 S.Ct. 1122 ). ¶21 In Smith , the Court concluded that the suspect had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed. 442 U.S. at 745-46, 99 S.Ct. 2577. There, police, without obtaining a warrant, requested the phone company to install a "pen register" to record the phone numbers dialed on a suspect's phone. Id. at 737, 99 S.Ct. 2577. The Court questioned whether phone users had even a subjective expectation of privacy in the phone numbers they dial: [W]e doubt that people in general entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial. All telephone users realize that they must "convey" phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is through telephone company switching equipment that their calls are completed. All subscribers realize, moreover, that the phone company has facilities for making permanent records of the numbers they dial, for they see a list of their long-distance (toll) calls on their monthly bills. In fact, pen registers and similar devices are routinely used by telephone companies "for the purposes of checking billing operations, detecting fraud and preventing violations of law." ... Telephone users, in sum, typically know that they must convey numerical information to the phone company; that the phone company has facilities for recording this information; and that the phone company does in fact record this information for a variety of legitimate business purposes. Although subjective expectations cannot be scientifically gauged, it is too much to believe that telephone subscribers, under these circumstances, harbor any general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret. Id. at 742-43, 99 S.Ct. 2577 (quoting United States v. New York Tel. Co. , 434 U.S. 159, 174-75, 98 S.Ct. 364, 54 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977) ). Therefore, according to the Court, even if a person takes steps calculated to keep the contents of the call confidential, such as calling from the privacy of their home, that conduct does not preserve any subjective expectation of privacy in the phone numbers dialed, which are necessarily shared with the phone company to complete the call regardless of the other circumstances of the call. Id. Further, Smith also found no expectation of privacy in the phone calls that society was prepared to accept as reasonable. Id. at 743-44, 99 S.Ct. 2577. Like in Miller , the Court reasoned that the defendant had voluntarily shared the information with a third party and assumed the risk the third party would share it with the government: When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and "exposed" that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed. Id. at 744, 99 S.Ct. 2577. ¶22 Federal courts have uniformly applied the third-party doctrine in Smith to information held by ISPs such as the subscriber information of a particular user, logs showing the user's internet activity through the IP addresses of websites a user has visited, and the email addresses of those who send and receive emails to and from the user. See, e.g. , Caira , 833 F.3d at 806-07 (IP address used to access email account and subscriber information associated with that IP address); Weast , 811 F.3d at 747-48 (subscriber information associated with particular IP address used to access the internet); Christie , 624 F.3d at 573-74 (same); Perrine , 518 F.3d at 1204-05 (same); United States v. Forrester , 512 F.3d 500, 509-10, n.4 (9th Cir. 2008) (to/from addresses of email messages sent and received and IP addresses of websites visited). In Forrester , for example, the Ninth Circuit explained that the reasoning in Smith applies directly to newer technologies: [E]-mail and Internet users have no expectation of privacy in the to/from addresses of their messages or the IP addresses of the websites they visit because they should know that this information is provided to and used by Internet service providers for the specific purpose of directing the routing of information. Like telephone numbers, which provide instructions to the "switching equipment that processed those numbers," e-mail to/from addresses and IP addresses are not merely passively conveyed through third party equipment, but rather are voluntarily turned over in order to direct the third party's servers. Second, e-mail to/from addresses and IP addresses constitute addressing information and do not necessarily reveal any more about the underlying contents of communication than do phone numbers. When the government obtains the to/from addresses of a person's emails or the IP addresses of websites visited, it does not find out the contents of the messages or know the particular pages on the websites the person viewed. At best, the government may make educated guesses about what was said in the messages or viewed on the websites based on its knowledge of the e-mail to/from addresses and IP addresses-but this is no different from speculation about the contents of a phone conversation on the basis of the identity of the person or entity that was dialed. Forrester , 512 F.3d at 510 (citation omitted) (quoting Smith , 442 U.S. at 744, 99 S.Ct. 2577 ). ¶23 The concerns Mixton raises regarding the third-party doctrine are not new: Justices Stewart and Marshall, both joined by Justice Brennan, raised the same general concerns in dissents in Smith . Justice Stewart noted the essential role of the telephone in private communications, and concluded that phone users were entitled to assume that the numbers they dialed were private just like the conversations. Smith , 442 U.S. at 746-48, 99 S.Ct. 2577 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Stewart rejected the notion that phone numbers did not have content, concluding that because that information "could reveal the identities of the persons and the places called," it could "reveal the most intimate details of a person's life." Id. at 748, 99 S.Ct. 2577. Stewart also noted that the information collected from a private phone call often "emanates from private conduct within a person's home or office"-places entitled to protection. Id. at 747, 99 S.Ct. 2577. For these reasons, Stewart believed phone users had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the phone numbers they dialed, notwithstanding the necessary involvement of the telephone company in transmitting calls and its ability by virtue of its position to record the numbers called. Id. at 746-48, 99 S.Ct. 2577. Justice Marshall attacked the opinion's assumption-of-risk rationale, remarking that "unless a person is prepared to forgo use of what for many has become a personal or professional necessity, he cannot help but accept the risk of surveillance. It is idle to speak of 'assuming' risks in contexts where, as a practical matter, individuals have no realistic alternative." Id. at 750, 99 S.Ct. 2577 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). He warned that allowing the government to discover where a person had placed phone calls without first showing probable cause risked more than just general harm to people's sense of security: For example, it could allow the government to discover the author of anonymous political speech or a journalist's confidential sources. See id. at 751, 99 S.Ct. 2577. ¶24 Many legal scholars have lodged similar criticisms and concerns. For example, one remarked: Privacy of information normally means the selective disclosure of personal information rather than total secrecy. ... A bank customer may not care that the employees of the bank know a lot about his financial affairs, but it does not follow that he is indifferent to having those affairs broadcast to the world or disclosed to the government. Richard Posner, The Economics of Justice 342 (1981); see also Wayne R. LaFave, 1 Search & Seizure § 2.7(c) (5th ed. 2018) ("The result reached in Miller is dead wrong, and the Court's woefully inadequate reasoning does great violence to the theory of Fourth Amendment protection the Court had developed in Katz ."); Avidan Y. Cover, Corporate Avatars and the Erosion of the Populist Fourth Amendment , 100 Iowa L. Rev. 1441 (2015) ("[T]he third-party doctrine proves unsupportable in the big data surveillance era, in which communicating and sharing information through third parties' technology is a necessary condition of existence, and non-content data, such as Internet subscriber information ..., provides an intimate portrait of a person's activities and beliefs."). ¶25 Many states have refused to adopt the third-party doctrine established in Miller and Smith under their state constitutions, concluding that people do have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information they must furnish to companies providing banking, phone, and internet service in order to use those services. See, e.g. , People v. Chapman , 36 Cal.3d 98, 201 Cal.Rptr. 628, 679 P.2d 62, 67 n.6 (1984) (rejecting the "fiction" in Miller and Smith that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in bank or phone call records); People v. Sporleder , 666 P.2d 135, 141-42 (Colo. 1983) (rejecting Smith and finding reasonable expectation of privacy in phone numbers dialed); Charnes v. DiGiacomo , 200 Colo. 94, 612 P.2d 1117, 1120-21 (1980) (rejecting Miller in construing state constitution's search-and-seizure provision); Shaktman v. State , 553 So. 2d 148, 151 (Fla. 1989) (person has reasonable expectation of privacy in phone number dialed); State v. Walton , 133 Hawai'i 66, 324 P.3d 876, 906 (2014) ( Miller and Smith "incorrectly rely on the principle that individuals who convey information to a third party have assumed the risk of that party disclosing the information to the government. In our times individuals may have no reasonable alternative."); State v. Thompson , 114 Idaho 746, 760 P.2d 1162, 1165 (1988) ("[I]n Idaho there is a legitimate and reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers that are dialed."); People v. DeLaire , 240 Ill.App.3d 1012, 183 Ill.Dec. 33, 610 N.E.2d 1277, 1282 (1993) ("We believe that citizens have a legitimate expectation that their telephone records will not be disclosed."); Commonwealth v. DeJohn , 486 Pa. 32, 403 A.2d 1283, 1289 (1979) ("As we believe that Miller establishes a dangerous precedent, with great potential for abuse, we decline to follow that case when construing the state constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures."); State v. Thompson , 810 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1991) (rejecting Miller ). But see State v. Clark , 232 W.Va. 480, 752 S.E.2d 907, 921 n.13 (2013) (declining to depart from Smith and citing cases in eight states that follow Miller and Smith ). ¶26 For example, in State v. Reid , the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's suppression of an internet user's subscriber information, holding that under that state constitution's search-and-seizure provision, internet users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their subscriber information, just as they do in their bank records and phone calls. 194 N.J. 386, 945 A.2d 26, 28, 32, 38 (2008). The court observed that internet use, like banking and phone use, is an essential part of modern life that necessarily involves a third-party service provider. Id. at 33. Despite the involvement of an ISP, however, the court in Reid found that internet users generally enjoy-and expect-anonymity in their internet use. Id. at 29, 33. The court noted that during typical internet use, an IP address, which is assigned to the user by their ISP and allows them to connect to websites, email, and other services, is ordinarily insufficient to identify the user; an IP address usually only identifies the ISP to which it is assigned, and only that ISP can match their customer's identity to an IP address. Id. at 29. When the government obtains the user's identity through his or her subscriber information, the government can learn intimate details of the subscriber's life, including the "stores at which a person shops, the political organizations a person finds interesting, a person's ... fantasies, her health concerns, and so on." Id. at 33 (alteration in original) (quoting Daniel Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law , 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1264, 1287 (2004) ). The court concluded that internet users are "entitled to expect confidentiality" in this information, and the fact that they have disclosed their identities to third-party internet service providers "does not upend the privacy interest at stake." Id. ¶27 For similar reasons, we conclude that internet users generally have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their subscriber information. We therefore join the several other states that have declined to apply the federal third-party doctrine established in Miller and Smith under their state constitutions in circumstances analogous to those before us. In the internet era, the electronic storage capacity of third parties has in many cases replaced the personal desk drawer as the repository of sensitive personal and business information-information that would unquestionably be protected from warrantless government searches if on paper in a desk at a home or office. The third-party doctrine allows the government a peek at this information in a way that is the twenty-first-century equivalent of a trip through a home to see what books and magazines the residents read, who they correspond with or call, and who they transact with and the nature of those transactions. Cf. Riley v. California , 573 U.S. 373, 393-95, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014) (discussing how mass transition from paper data storage to digital data storage has increased privacy interests in cell phones). We doubt the framers of our state constitution intended the government to have such power to snoop in our private affairs without obtaining a search warrant. ¶28 The state rests its argument in favor of the third-party doctrine on the rationales from Smith : It argues the information at issue here was "non-content" information that Mixton voluntarily submitted to the third-party service providers. But information that has been deemed as "non-content," such as a person's bank records, who a person calls or emails, what websites a person visits, or, as here, the identity behind anonymous communications, is part and parcel of a person's private affairs; access to it affords the government significant insight into a person's private activities and beliefs. Warrantless government collection of this information from an internet service provider or similar source thus constitutes a significant and unwarranted intrusion into a person's private affairs-an intrusion our constitution unambiguously prohibits. And we are not persuaded that a person gives up any reasonable expectation of privacy in this information because he or she "voluntarily" reveals his or her identity to an ISP to get service. The user provides the information for the limited purpose of obtaining service. It is entirely reasonable for the user to expect the provider not to exceed that purpose by revealing the user's identity to authorities in a way that connects it to his or her activities on the internet. Therefore, when the government compels the provider to release the internet user's identity in that way, and without a warrant, it invades the user's reasonable expectation of privacy. ¶29 We are especially troubled that the third-party doctrine grants the government unfettered ability to learn the identity behind anonymous speech, even without any showing or even suspicion of unlawful activity. An author's decision to remain anonymous, whether "motivated by fear of economic or official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of one's privacy as possible, " "is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment." McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n , 514 U.S. 334, 341-42, 357, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 426 (1995) (striking down state statute outlawing anonymous political leaflets). Even in benign exercise, the government's ability to identify anonymous speakers, if not meaningfully limited, intrudes on the speaker's desire to remain anonymous and may discourage valuable speech. At worst, the power may be wielded to silence dissent. ¶30 Even if the government obtains nothing more without a warrant than basic identifying information connected to specific internet activity, other cherished rights are endangered. The right of free association, for example, is hollow when the government can identify an association's members through subscriber information matched with particular internet activity. The importance of privacy in one's associations is illustrated by NAACP v. Alabama , in which the Court ruled that the state could not compel the NAACP to produce the names and addresses of its members even with a court order, ruling that the compelled disclosure violated the members' freedom of association. 357 U.S. 449, 453, 466, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958). The decision illustrates "the vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations": It is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute ... effective ... restraint on freedom of association. ... This Court has recognized the vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations. ... We think that the production order, in the respects here drawn in question, must be regarded as entailing the likelihood of a substantial restraint upon the exercise by [the NAACP's] members of their right to freedom of association. [The NAACP] has made an uncontroverted showing that on past occasions revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members has exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility. Under these circumstances, we think it apparent that compelled disclosure of [the NAACP's] Alabama membership is likely to affect adversely the ability of petitioner and its members to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly have the right to advocate, in that it may induce members to withdraw from the Association and dissuade others from joining it because of fear of exposure of their beliefs shown through their associations and of the consequences of this exposure. Id. at 462-63, 78 S.Ct. 1163. To allow the government to obtain without a warrant information showing who a person communicates with and what websites he or she visits may reveal a person's associations and therefore intrude on a person's right to privacy in those associations. ¶31 In his partial dissent, Judge Espinosa allows that suppression of evidence of such First Amendment-protected activity obtained through government investigation of an IP address may be warranted. But were we to adopt his conclusion that, absent some unidentified Herculean effort to maintain anonymity, citizens abandon any claim to privacy in their internet activities, we would be hard-pressed to find a reasoned basis upon which to do so. Moreover, the privacy protections afforded by our constitutions are not limited to the exclusion of evidence in criminal proceedings; rather, they prohibit abusive governmental intrusions in the first place. ¶32 As to the concern that our reasoning would unduly impair legitimate law enforcement investigation of crimes like Mixton's, as noted in Judge Eckerstrom's dissent, police could have easily obtained a search warrant in this case. Our courts have long recognized that such minimal burdens on law enforcement are justified in service of constitutional protections. See, e.g., Riley , 573 U.S. at 401, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (impact of warrant requirement on ability to combat crime the cost of privacy). We see no reason to forgo the warrant requirement merely because one's private affairs are conducted online. ¶33 We are mindful our supreme court has expressed a reluctance to depart from Fourth Amendment precedent in analyzing suppression issues under article II, § 8. See Bolt , 142 Ariz. at 269, 689 P.2d at 528 ("[E]ven though on occasion we may not agree with the parameters of the exclusionary rule as defined by the United States Supreme Court, we propose, so long as possible, to keep the Arizona exclusionary rule uniform with the federal."). But the federal third-party doctrine, at least as applied to obtain Mixton's identity here, is unsupportable in our view. We therefore decline to apply it on independent state law grounds. See Long , 463 U.S. at 1042 n.7, 103 S.Ct. 3469. Because the search warrant in this case was issued based upon identifying information obtained in violation of Mixton's rights under article II, § 8, we turn to the issue of whether the evidence recovered in execution of the warrant should have been suppressed. Good-Faith Exception ¶34 The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct. See Illinois v. Krull , 480 U.S. 340, 347, 107 S.Ct. 1160, 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987). However, when law enforcement officers act with an objectively reasonable belief that their conduct was lawful, deterrence is unnecessary and the exclusionary rule does not apply. State v. Valenzuela , 239 Ariz. 299, ¶ 31, 371 P.3d 627 (2016). The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to violations of article II, § 8 as it does to violations of the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Coats , 165 Ariz. 154, 158, 797 P.2d 693, 697 (App. 1990) (citing Bolt , 142 Ariz. at 269, 689 P.2d at 528 ). ¶35 Although the identifying information in this case was obtained by an administrative subpoena rather than a search warrant, we agree with the state's contention that the good-faith exception set forth in United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), applies here because the incriminating evidence obtained from Mixton's residence was ultimately obtained through execution of the warrant. And although Mixton argues the warrant was premised upon unlawfully obtained information, none of the exceptions recognized in Leon apply. See id. at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405. ¶36 Other factors support our conclusion that the detective's reliance on the warrant issued by a neutral magistrate was objectively reasonable. First, the detective was aware federal agents obtained the identifying information using subpoena authority recognized by federal law. Second, every federal circuit court that has considered the issue has concluded, based upon United States Supreme Court precedent, that there is no expectation of privacy in one's identifying information given to an internet service provider. And third, as noted above, no Arizona state appellate court has previously found such an expectation of privacy. Indeed, other than in situations involving physical intrusion into the home, see Ault , 150 Ariz. 459, 724 P.2d 545 ; Bolt , 142 Ariz. 260, 689 P.2d 519, the provisions of article II, § 8 have never expressly been held to afford greater protection than that afforded under the Fourth Amendment, see State v. Jean , 243 Ariz. 331, ¶ 45, 407 P.3d 524 (2018) (exception to exclusionary rule based upon objectively reasonable reliance on binding precedent under Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011), "requires good faith and reasonableness, not a crystal ball"). ¶37 While no binding appellate precedent specifically authorized the warrantless search here under article II, § 8, a significant body of appellate law, some of it binding, supported the practice as a reasonable search. In the circumstances here, it was objectively reasonable for police to rely on that precedent. See State v. Weakland , 246 Ariz. 67, ¶ 9, 434 P.3d 578 (2019) (good-faith exception does not require that binding appellate precedent specifically authorize police practice at issue; objectively reasonable reliance on binding precedent suffices). This is simply not a situation in which there appear to be ongoing violations of defendants' privacy rights as a result of recurring or systemic negligence by police that could render the good-faith exception inapplicable. See State v. Havatone , 241 Ariz. 506, ¶ 21, 389 P.3d 1251 (2017). ¶38 Finally, Arizona's statutory exceptions to the exclusionary rule weigh in favor of a finding of good faith. See A.R.S § 13-3925(B) (in suppression proceeding, "the proponent of the evidence may urge that the peace officer's conduct was taken in a reasonable, good faith belief that the conduct was proper" and the evidence should be admitted), (C) ("The trial court shall not suppress evidence that is otherwise admissible in a criminal proceeding if the court determines that the evidence was seized by a peace officer as a result of a good faith mistake or technical violation."). Disposition ¶39 Although the evidence used to convict Mixton was obtained in violation of his right to be free from government interference in his private affairs under article II, § 8 of the Arizona Constitution, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. We therefore affirm his convictions and sentences. ECKERSTROM, Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part: ¶40 The majority opinion comprehensively explains why article II, § 8 of the Arizona Constitution requires the state to secure a warrant under the circumstances here. That opinion observes correctly that a person's actions on the internet may expose "intimate details of the subscriber's life," over which a person would have a reasonable, societally recognized expectation of privacy. The opinion aptly identifies the analytical limitations of the third-party doctrine in describing the boundaries of reasonable expectations of privacy in this contemporary context. Were we to find no violation of article II, § 8 under these facts, we would render the specific guarantee of the Arizona Constitution-that "[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs ... without authority of law"-an empty promise. I join fully in that section of the opinion. I write separately because I would hold that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides the same protection. ¶41 As the majority observes, lower federal courts have consistently held that persons have no expectation of privacy in identifying information voluntarily conveyed to internet service providers. See Weast , 811 F.3d at 747-48 ; Christie , 624 F.3d at 573-74 ; Perrine , 518 F.3d at 1204. But my colleagues overlook that those cases pre-date, and have been overtaken by, the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Carpenter , 138 S. Ct. 2206. ¶42 In Carpenter, the Court addressed whether the government may, without a warrant, track a person's movements by use of cell-site location information (CSLI). Id. at 2220. There, as here, the government argued that, because the defendant/subscriber had knowingly exposed that information to the cellular service provider, he retained no reasonable expectation of privacy in it. Id. at 2219. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, declined to apply the third-party doctrine when the government secures "a detailed and comprehensive record of the person's movements" by capitalizing on that person's use of a technology that "is indispensable to participation in modern society." Id. at 2217, 2220. Although the majority specifically recognized that each new privacy domain created by evolving technology would require a discrete Fourth Amendment calculus, it lucidly articulated its criteria for weighing a defendant's privacy interests in those contexts. The Court's reasoning demonstrated that it would reject the third-party doctrine (1) when the societally recognized privacy interest is acute and (2) when the privacy domain cannot be accessed without the incidental disclosure of some private information to a third party. Id . at 2216-21. ¶43 That reasoning should be dispositive here. The privacy interest at stake is no less substantial. As the majority opinion explains, our actions on the internet expose our worries, fantasies, and political views at least as comprehensively as the sequence of our physical locations. Internet access has likewise become an integral part of participation in contemporary culture: it is a place we shop, converse with friends and romantic partners, seek information about medical conditions, and debate the issues of the day. And, as with cell-phone use, one cannot secure such access without exposing some private information to a vendor. See Carpenter , 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (questioning whether persons voluntarily "assume[ ] the risk" of exposing private actions under such circumstances (alteration in Carpenter ) (quoting Smith , 442 U.S. at 745, 99 S.Ct. 2577 )). ¶44 In fact, our expectation of privacy in internet use is arguably greater than any similar expectation we hold for our physical movements in public. A visit to an internet site is presumptively anonymous unless we choose to make it otherwise; our movements on public streets are presumptively visible to all we encounter. For this reason, the Court has required a warrant for the locational tracking of criminal suspects only when that tracking is sufficiently protracted to reveal private features of their lives. See, e.g. , id. at 2220 ; United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430, 132 S.Ct. 945, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012). By contrast, each discrete internet visit may expose an acutely private thought process and may do so in a context where the visitor has taken every precaution to retain his anonymity. Surely, if the government is required to obtain a warrant to track, through technology, a suspect's public physical movements, it should likewise need a warrant to expose a suspect's private digital behavior. ¶45 For these reasons, I can identify no principled basis to distinguish the instant case from the Court's holding in Carpenter . The United States Supreme Court's precedents are binding on this court as to federal constitutional matters. I would therefore follow Carpenter and hold that the Fourth Amendment required the state to secure a warrant to acquire Mixton's identifying information from his internet provider. ¶46 As Justice Roberts emphasized, the Court's application of the Fourth Amendment to evolving technologies involves no novel guiding principles. To the contrary, "it is informed by historical understandings" of "the privacies of life" in the founding era. Carpenter , 138 S. Ct. at 2214. As "technology has enhanced the Government's capacity to encroach upon areas normally guarded from inquisitive eyes," the Court has sought to protect those same privacies. Id. ¶47 Nothing about our opinion-which the majority bases exclusively on our state constitution and I would base on the Fourth Amendment as well-should prevent our law enforcement agencies from enforcing the rule of law. Indeed, as new technologies become primary conduits of human behavior, our police have no choice but to effectively conduct law enforcement activities in those realms. We merely hold here that our officers need appropriate legal cause, confirmed by a neutral magistrate, to invade traditional privacies that persons now exercise in new domains. "An IP address is a number assigned to each device that is connected to the Internet. Although most devices do not have their own, permanent ('static') addresses, in general an IP address for a device connected to the Internet is unique in the sense that no two devices have the same IP address at the same time." United States v. Vosburgh , 602 F.3d 512, 518 (3d Cir. 2010). The trial court ruled that the information obtained was not protected under the Fourth Amendment but did not separately address Mixton's claim under article II, § 8. Given that the court referred to article II, § 8, we assume it concluded that article II, § 8 's protections coextend with the Fourth Amendment under the facts of this case. Cf. State v. Bolt , 142 Ariz. 260, 269, 689 P.2d 519, 528 (1984) ("We ... do not propose to make a separate exclusionary rule analysis as a matter of state law in each search and seizure case."). Because the court in Carpenter expressly limited its holding to cell phone location tracking, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (decision is a "narrow one"), and affirmed the continuing viability of Miller and Smith , id. , we decline Judge Eckerstrom's invitation to apply it to the facts here. In State v. Welch , 236 Ariz. 308, n.1, 340 P.3d 387 (App. 2014), this court summarily concluded any expectation of confidentiality from an internet provider would be unreasonable. However, insofar as Welch had not asserted such an expectation of privacy, either below or on appeal, the court's observation was clearly dicta, which, for the reasons explained below, we decline to follow. Even though article II, § 8 derives from identical language in article I, § 7 of the Washington Constitution, we have not adopted Washington's interpretations of that provision. See Juarez , 203 Ariz. 441, ¶¶ 21-22, n.10, 55 P.3d 784 (notwithstanding wording similarities, "Arizona's interpretation and application of our right to privacy provision has not paralleled that of Washington's"). Washington courts have interpreted "private affairs" to mean "those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass." State v. Athan , 160 Wash.2d 354, 158 P.3d 27, 33 (2007) (quoting State v. Myrick , 102 Wash.2d 506, 688 P.2d 151, 154 (1984) ). Washington has expressly rejected the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test in analyzing whether a privacy interest is protected. See Myrick , 688 P.2d at 153-54. Instead, Washington courts examine "the historical treatment of the interest being asserted, analogous case law, and statutes and laws supporting the interest asserted." Athan , 158 P.3d at 33. While these considerations may inform the application of the reasonable-expectation test in a given case, we decline to adopt these formulations in lieu of that test. Justices Brennan and Marshall also dissented in Miller . 425 U.S. at 447-56, 96 S.Ct. 1619. Of course, Smith was decided long before the widespread use of mobile phone technology. The record in this case is devoid of evidence of the terms of any contract between the ISP and Mixton or any privacy policy the provider may have disclosed to him. We therefore have no occasion to consider the impact, if any, such terms may have on the reasonableness of a particular subscriber's expectation of privacy in a given case. Judge Espinosa posits that there can be no expectation of privacy in circumstances such as these because of the ease with which one's identity can be ascertained from an IP address. But if such identification is so easy, why did police need to resort to subpoenas to identify Mixton? The record contains no evidence that he could be identified other than through his ISP. Nor are we persuaded the risk of ISP security breaches renders an expectation of privacy from government intrusion any less reasonable than do the prospects of burglary in the context of the home. As noted by the state, four situations preclude the application of the good-faith exception under Leon : (1) when a magistrate is misled by information the affiant knew was false or would have known was false but for reckless disregard for the truth; (2) when the magistrate wholly abandons his or her judicial role; (3) when the warrant affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause to render belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; and (4) when a warrant is so facially deficient that executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405. The warrant in this case was issued before the Supreme Court decided Carpenter . And in any event, its narrow holding does not sufficiently call into question the continuing vitality of the lower federal court cases discussed above so as to render reliance on them unreasonable. Carpenter , 138 S. Ct. at 2220. As my dissenting colleague correctly observes, many people choose to use the internet for public activities, such as social media, wherein they consciously relinquish any expectation of privacy. But, as Judge Posner has explained, an expectation of privacy is not an expectation of total secrecy. Posner, supra ¶ 24, at 342. Rather, it is an expectation that a person has the power to selectively determine who may have access to a presumptively private domain. We do not waive our right of privacy in our homes simply because we occasionally choose to invite relatives, friends, or housekeepers to enter it. Similarly, we do not waive our right of privacy in all our internet activities simply because we choose to make some part of it public. I concur that the state's violation of Mixton's rights occurred in good faith. The Court did not issue Carpenter until June 2018, long after the search in question occurred. As the majority opinion correctly observes, all previous federal case law had applied the third-party doctrine to similar searches, finding no constitutional violation. Furthermore, until our opinion today, outside of the context of home searches, no previous Arizona court had held article II, § 8 of the Arizona Constitution to provide greater privacy rights than those enforced by the United States Constitution. See State v. Hernandez , 244 Ariz. 1, ¶ 23, 417 P.3d 207 (2018) ("Arizona Constitution's protections under article 2, section 8 are generally coextensive with Fourth Amendment analysis" except in context of law enforcement's warrantless physical entry into a home); State v. Peltz , 242 Ariz. 23, n.3, 391 P.3d 1215 (App. 2017) ("[T]he right of privacy under article II, § 8 has not been expanded beyond that provided by the Fourth Amendment, except in cases involving unlawful, warrantless home entries."). The warrant requirement would have posed no impediment to the investigation of the instant case. Mixton's e-mail correspondence with the undercover officer, together with the attachment of child pornography to that correspondence, provided ample basis to secure a warrant for Mixton's personal identifying information.

ECKERSTROM, Chief Judge: ¶1 Patrick Dansdill appeals from his convictions and sentences for first-degree felony murder and attempted armed robbery. We reject his claims that he was vindictively prosecuted and that the state presented insufficient evidence to support the charge of attempted armed robbery. However, the prosecutor presented an improper argument during his summation, and the state has not proven that error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore reverse Dansdill's convictions and sentences and remand this case for a new trial. Factual and Procedural Background ¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding Dansdill's convictions and sentences. State v. Delgado , 232 Ariz. 182, ¶ 2, 303 P.3d 76 (App. 2013). In early 2014, Dansdill loaned $ 300 to M.L., his long-time friend and former girlfriend. By May 2014, M.L. had not repaid the debt and became aware that Dansdill was looking to collect the money. ¶3 In the early morning hours of May 17, M.L. was home with her boyfriend, R.G., and her cousin, M.G., who was visiting. All three were using drugs, including methamphetamine. They heard a loud knock on the door and both M.L. and R.G. asked who was there. The person at the door first responded in a joking manner that he was "Julio." Then Dansdill, who had left a downtown bar shortly before, identified himself by name and said, "[Y]ou guys owe me money." M.L., who recognized Dansdill's voice, corrected him, saying only she owed him the money. R.G. opened the door and quickly closed it. Dansdill warned, "I could make this easy or it could be a problem." Dansdill then asked R.G. to open the door, indicated he came "in peace," and said he would "put it away." But then a gun was fired through the door. The bullet hit R.G. in his arm and traveled into his chest. He died at the scene from the wound. ¶4 Shortly after the incident, the state charged Dansdill with second-degree murder. Almost a year later, the state obtained a second indictment charging Dansdill with two counts: (1) first-degree felony murder, "or in the alternative," second-degree murder; and (2) attempted armed robbery. ¶5 After a jury trial, Dansdill was found guilty of felony murder and attempted armed robbery. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison for the felony murder conviction and a concurrent term of 7.5 years for the attempted armed robbery conviction. After moving unsuccessfully for a new trial, Dansdill timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A)(1). Prosecutorial Vindictiveness ¶6 Dansdill first contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for vindictive prosecution. In particular, Dansdill argues he made a prima facie showing that the first-degree felony murder charge in the second indictment raised a presumption of vindictiveness, and that the state should have been required to justify its actions. Dansdill asks us to vacate his convictions and dismiss all charges with prejudice, including the original indictment. "We review rulings on motions to dismiss for vindictive prosecution for an abuse of discretion." State v. Mieg , 225 Ariz. 445, ¶ 9, 239 P.3d 1258 (App. 2010). ¶7 "Prosecutorial vindictiveness," or governmental retaliation against a defendant for exercising a constitutional or statutory right, is a violation of due process. State v. Brun , 190 Ariz. 505, 506, 950 P.2d 164, 165 (App. 1997). Although it may be proven objectively where there is evidence of actual vindictive motivation, a defendant may instead "rely on a presumption of vindictiveness if the circumstances establish a 'realistic likelihood of vindictiveness.' " Mieg , 225 Ariz. 445, ¶ 11, 239 P.3d 1258 (quoting Blackledge v. Perry , 417 U.S. 21, 27, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974) ). "If a defendant makes a prima facie showing that the charging decision is 'more likely than not attributable to vindictiveness' by the prosecutor, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to overcome the presumption 'by objective evidence justifying the prosecutor's action.' " Id. ¶ 12 (citation omitted) (first quoting Alabama v. Smith , 490 U.S. 794, 801, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989), then quoting United States v. Goodwin , 457 U.S. 368, n.8, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982) ). ¶8 To make the requisite prima facie showing in the pretrial context, a defendant must do more than prove that the state increased charges after the defendant exercised a legal right. See Brun , 190 Ariz. at 507, 950 P.2d at 166 (quoting United States v. Meyer , 810 F.2d 1242, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ). Additional facts must also exist, id . at 507, 950 P.2d at 166, which, combined with the increased charges, "support a determination that the state's action is more likely than not explainable only as an effort to penalize [the] defendant for asserting his legal right[s]," Mieg , 225 Ariz. 445, ¶ 21, 239 P.3d 1258. ¶9 In this case, the state candidly explained on multiple occasions that it decided to obtain the second indictment in response to a defense theory that became apparent during pretrial interviews. In particular, the prosecutor stated that defense interviews had revealed "a theory or at least hints of a theory" that, although Dansdill had been at the door on the night of the incident, he was not the person who pulled the trigger. The prosecutor further explained that the way the case was initially charged "played to the strengths of that defense," so he made the strategic decision to obtain the felony murder indictment in order to eliminate the defense. ¶10 Although criminal defendants have a due process right to develop their defenses, including by confronting witnesses and conducting pretrial interviews, due process does not prevent the state from responding strategically when a defendant's pretrial efforts reveal a defense the state did not anticipate. See Goodwin , 457 U.S. at 382, 102 S.Ct. 2485 ("A prosecutor should remain free before trial to exercise the broad discretion entrusted to him to determine the extent of the societal interest in prosecution. An initial decision should not freeze future conduct" because "the initial charges filed by a prosecutor may not reflect the extent to which an individual is legitimately subject to prosecution."). ¶11 Dansdill asks us to ignore the state's explanations, insisting they are "specious" because any third-party culpability defense that would apply to the original second-degree murder charge would apply equally to the attempted armed robbery and felony murder charges in the second indictment. But the question of the prosecutor's credibility regarding his motivation was one for the trial judge, not for this court. See, e.g. , State v. Estrada , 209 Ariz. 287, ¶ 2, 100 P.3d 452 (App. 2004). Furthermore, the supervening indictment relieved the state of its burden of showing that the shooter possessed the mens rea to commit second-degree murder, under circumstances that suggest the possibility of an unintentional shooting. For this reason, the new charges provided the state a tangible strategic advantage. ¶12 Dansdill insists the charging decision raised the presumption of vindictiveness because no new evidence or procedural developments justified the increased charges. This argument fails. The reason the United States Supreme Court has declined to adopt an "inflexible presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in a pretrial setting" is that, before trial, "the prosecutor's assessment of the proper extent of prosecution may not have crystallized." Goodwin , 457 U.S. at 381, 102 S.Ct. 2485. As the Court recognized, a prosecutor can legitimately re-charge a defendant in the pretrial context for various reasons, including when "[i]n the course of preparing a case for trial ... he simply ... come[s] to realize that information possessed by the State has a broader significance." Id. ; see also Meyer , 810 F.2d at 1246-47 (prosecutors "often make their initial charging decisions prior to gaining full ... appreciation of the facts involved in a given case" and "before analyzing thoroughly a case's legal complexities," and "further factual investigation or legal analysis" can be a legitimate reason to increase charges). ¶13 Here, relying primarily on Mieg , the trial court found that the second indictment was not "presumptively vindictive or ... facially vindictive given the circumstances of this case." It implicitly found that Dansdill had failed to show "a realistic likelihood" that the state added the charges of felony murder and attempted armed robbery "motivated solely by a desire to deter and punish" Dansdill for exercising his rights to defend himself, rather than a desire to "strengthen its case." Mieg , 225 Ariz. 445, ¶¶ 17-19, 239 P.3d 1258. ¶14 We expect that a defendant will formulate defenses through pre-trial investigation, and "[i]t is unrealistic to assume that a prosecutor's probable response" to such efforts-which are "an integral part of the adversary process in which our criminal justice system operates"-will be "to seek to penalize and to deter." Goodwin , 457 U.S. at 381, 102 S.Ct. 2485. In this case, Dansdill's position has been that defense interviews "completely changed the posture of the State's second-degree murder case." In that context, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to accept the state's explanation that it had responded strategically to improve its chances of obtaining a conviction, not to penalize Dansdill or deter other defendants from aggressively defending themselves. See Brun , 190 Ariz. at 507, 950 P.2d at 166 (no presumption of vindictiveness because "unrealistic" to presume "routine assertion of procedural rights" prompted retaliation from the state). ¶15 Dansdill points to additional facts that he contends should have compelled the trial court to find a prima facie showing of vindictiveness. These include the state's failure to immediately dismiss the original second-degree murder indictment upon the issuance of the second indictment, the state's dismissal of the original indictment without prejudice after Dansdill raised the question of vindictive prosecution, and the prosecutor's attempt to proceed immediately to trial on the new first-degree murder charge using the date set for the initial second-degree murder charge. The trial court was best situated to determine whether these factors indicated vindictive motivation on the part of the prosecution or instead reflected a desire to bring the case to trial as expeditiously as possible. ¶16 Finally, Dansdill argues that, because the trial court repeatedly found that the increased charge "did have the appearance of vindictiveness to [Dansdill]," the court necessarily applied the wrong legal standard when finding no presumption of vindictiveness. We agree with the state that the court's mere acknowledgement of Dansdill's frustration does not reflect the application of an incorrect legal standard. Here, unlike in State v. Tsosie , the state's explanation for why it sought the increased charges provided an "objective indication that would allay a reasonable apprehension by the defendant that the more serious charge was vindictive." 171 Ariz. 683, 688, 832 P.2d 700, 705 (App. 1992). ¶17 For all these reasons, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of Dansdill's motion to dismiss for vindictive prosecution. Sufficiency of the Evidence ¶18 Dansdill next argues the state presented insufficient evidence to support his convictions for attempted armed robbery and felony murder with a predicate felony of attempted armed robbery. Specifically, he maintains there was no evidence that he intended to take "any property of another" as required under the robbery statutes. He urges us to vacate his convictions with prejudice. ¶19 The "question of sufficiency of the evidence is one of law, subject to de novo review on appeal." State v. West , 226 Ariz. 559, ¶ 15, 250 P.3d 1188 (2011). We must decide whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. ¶ 16 (quoting State v. Mathers , 165 Ariz. 64, 66, 796 P.2d 866, 868 (1990) ). In making this determination, "we view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, and we resolve all inferences against the defendant." State v. Davolt , 207 Ariz. 191, ¶ 87, 84 P.3d 456 (2004). We, like the trial court, "may not re-weigh the facts or disregard inferences that might reasonably be drawn from the evidence," and we may not find the evidence insufficient "when reasonable minds may differ." West , 226 Ariz. 559, ¶ 18, 250 P.3d 1188. ¶20 Dansdill maintains that, even according to the state's theory of the case, he attempted to use force only to regain $ 300 that M.L. indisputably owed him, which was not "property of another" as required for the commission of armed robbery as defined in A.R.S. §§ 13-1902(A) and 13-1904. His argument finds support in the reasoning of our supreme court that "a charge of robbery fails where the attempt is to collect a bona fide debt, since, to constitute that offense, there must be an animus furandi and this cannot exist if the person takes the property under a bona fide claim of right." Bauer v. State , 45 Ariz. 358, 363-64, 43 P.2d 203 (1935) ; see also State v. Hardin , 99 Ariz. 56, 59, 406 P.2d 406 (1965) (affirming Bauer 's dicta). ¶21 Since Bauer , however, our legislature revised the Arizona criminal code to reflect that "property of another" can include "property in which the defendant also has an interest." See A.R.S. § 13-1801(13) (revised 1978). Our supreme court "has not yet considered whether the claim of right defense as enunciated in Bauer v. State survived the enactment of [that portion of] the new criminal code." State v. Schaefer , 163 Ariz. 626, 629, 790 P.2d 281, 284 (App. 1990). And as Dansdill points out, this court has recognized the validity of the defense on multiple occasions since the 1978 revisions, without ever squarely addressing the statutory change. Most recently, in State v. Flores , we found it was appropriate for a trial court to instruct a jury as follows: If a person takes property from another, even by force, the person does not commit robbery thereby if he entertains a good faith belief that he has a claim of right to the property taken. That is, if the defendant believes he has a legitimate claim of right to the property, however ill advised this claim of right may be, by taking the property, even by force, he does not commit the crime of robbery or armed robbery. 140 Ariz. 469, 473, 682 P.2d 1136, 1140 (App. 1984). See also State v. Bonser , 128 Ariz. 95, 96, 623 P.2d 1251, 1252 (App. 1981) (citing Bauer as providing "the rule in Arizona" so long as amount claimed is not in dispute); State v. Lewis , 121 Ariz. 155, 157, 589 P.2d 29, 31 (App. 1978) (criticizing but following Bauer rule). ¶22 The state contends the claim-of-right defense has been abrogated in full, citing Schaefer , in which the court reasoned that the defense "encourages disputants to resolve disputes on the streets through violence instead of through the judicial system." 163 Ariz. at 629, 790 P.2d 281. But that dicta overlooks that violent efforts to collect a debt or one's own property, even if not robbery due to a lack of requisite intent, would still be punishable as assault crimes. See Lewis , 121 Ariz. at 157-58, 589 P.2d at 31-32 (quoting Edwards v. State , 49 Wis.2d 105, 181 N.W.2d 383, 387 (1970) ). ¶23 Moreover, we can readily pose scenarios in which a defendant's interest in the property is so complete and apparent that an effort to recover it, even by force, would defy any characterization as robbery. For example, if a defendant witnessed a thief stealing his bicycle and immediately secured its return at gunpoint, the state could conceivably charge the defendant with aggravated assault. But the defendant most certainly would not have committed robbery under § 13-1902(A) (force must be used to secure "property of another"). ¶24 We agree with the state, however, that the 1978 statutory change substantially narrowed the circumstances under which a defendant may assert such a claim-of-right defense to robbery. Section 13-1801(13) now defines "property of another" as "property in which any person other than the defendant has an interest on which the defendant is not privileged to infringe, including property in which the defendant also has an interest." In defining the scope of liability for a particular crime, we owe primary fidelity to the legislature's description of that crime. State v. Cheramie , 218 Ariz. 447, ¶ 9, 189 P.3d 374 (2008). For this reason, we adopt the logic set forth by our court in Lewis as more in conformity with the plain language of § 13-1801(13) : "Unless the accused can trace his ownership to specific coins and bills in the possession of the debtor, the debtor is the owner of the money in his pocket," and "the intent to steal is present when one at gun point or by force secures specific money which does not belong to him in order to apply it by such self-help to a debt owed to him." 121 Ariz. at 157-58, 589 P.2d at 31-32 (quoting Edwards , 181 N.W.2d at 387 ). We reject those decisions of our court that have implicitly held the state to a higher burden of showing "property of another" than that set forth in § 13-1801(13). ¶25 We must therefore determine whether the state presented evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that Dansdill was attempting to forcibly take property or money in which M.L. or another victim had an interest. By that standard, the state presented sufficient evidence to avoid a directed verdict on attempted armed robbery. ¶26 As the trial court found, the state presented evidence that Dansdill "pounded on the front door, demanded money of the victims, threatened them by stating that 'we can do this the easy way, or the hard way,' and ultimately shot the deceased victim through the closed door." We agree that this evidence, particularly the threat followed by the display of a deadly weapon, was sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to conclude that Dansdill attempted to take money or property in which one or more of the victims had an interest by the threatened use of force and that he therefore attempted "robbery" at gunpoint within the meaning of the statute. Improper Argument ¶27 Dansdill also contends the state presented improper argument during two portions of its summation. He contends these arguments, individually and cumulatively, denied him a fair trial and deprived him of due process of law. He argues the trial court erred in denying his motions for mistrial and for a new trial on this basis, and he urges us to reverse his convictions and remand for a new trial. "We review the denial of a motion for mistrial and a denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion." State v. Mills , 196 Ariz. 269, ¶ 6, 995 P.2d 705 (App. 1999). ¶28 "We 'will reverse a conviction for prosecutorial misconduct if (1) misconduct is indeed present; and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the jury's verdict, thereby denying [the] defendant a fair trial.' " State v. Gallardo , 225 Ariz. 560, ¶ 34, 242 P.3d 159 (2010) (alteration in Velazquez ) (quoting State v. Velazquez , 216 Ariz. 300, ¶ 45, 166 P.3d 91 (2007) ). "We separately 'evaluate each instance of alleged misconduct,' " and where a defendant objected at trial-as Dansdill did here-"we review for harmless error." Id. ¶ 35 (quoting State v. Morris , 215 Ariz. 324, ¶ 47, 160 P.3d 203 (2007) ). Were the Arguments Improper? ¶29 Although "[a]ttorneys, including prosecutors in criminal cases, are given wide latitude in their closing arguments," State v. Moody , 208 Ariz. 424, ¶ 154, 94 P.3d 1119 (2004) (quoting State v. Comer , 165 Ariz. 413, 426, 799 P.2d 333, 346 (1990) ), there are limitations. The jury is precluded from considering certain issues, and comments that call the jury's attention to those issues are improper. See State v. Williams , 169 Ariz. 376, 379-80, 819 P.2d 962, 965-66 (App. 1991) (citing State v. Hansen , 156 Ariz. 291, 296-97, 751 P.2d 951, 956-57 (1988) ). ¶30 We therefore first evaluate "whether the [challenged] remarks called to the jurors' attention matters that they should not consider." State v. Cropper , 223 Ariz. 522, ¶ 14, 225 P.3d 579 (2010) (quoting Morris , 215 Ariz. 324, ¶ 51, 160 P.3d 203 ). In so doing, we do not consider whether the prosecutor intended to call the jury's attention to forbidden matters or whether he was able, after the fact, to offer an arguably proper motivation for his comments. See State v. Ramos , 235 Ariz. 230, ¶ 14, 330 P.3d 987 (App. 2014) (finding statements improper irrespective of prosecutor's intent). Rather, we focus on whether reasonable jurors would understand the prosecutor's comments or gestures to be calling attention to matters not properly considered by the jury. See, e.g. , id. ¶ 13 (propriety depends on what jury would naturally perceive); State v. Still , 119 Ariz. 549, 551, 582 P.2d 639, 641 (1978) (reversing conviction based on what reasonable jury would conclude from prosecutor's comment and gesture). This is because "the touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor." Smith v. Phillips , 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982). ¶31 In evaluating the potential impact of a prosecutor's statements on a jury, we must be mindful that a prosecutor is the spokesperson for the state, an entity whose goal is to see justice done. For this reason, a prosecutor's remarks carry special prestige. See United States v. Phillips , 527 F.2d 1021, 1023 (7th Cir. 1975) (prosecutor's remarks "must be particularly scrutinized" as " 'great potential for jury persuasion ... arises because the prosecutor's personal status and his role as a spokesman for the government tend to give what he says the ring of authenticity' " (quoting Hall v. United States , 419 F.2d 582, 583-84 (5th Cir. 1969) )). Felony Murder as "Lesser" or "Less Serious" Form of First-Degree Murder ¶32 During summation, the prosecutor referred to felony murder as the "less serious form of murder" and the "lesser form of first degree murder," as compared to "the more serious form of premeditated murder." After Dansdill objected and reserved his motion, the prosecutor again referred to "this lesser form of first degree murder, felony murder." ¶33 After the conclusion of the state's closing, Dansdill moved for a mistrial, arguing the prosecutor had incorrectly insinuated to the jury that the penalty for felony murder is less serious than for premeditated murder. The trial judge denied the motion, finding-based on what "[she] interpreted at the time"-that the prosecutor's statements were not a comment upon possible punishment but rather on the fact that the state was not required to prove intent. ¶34 Dansdill raised the claim again in his motion for a new trial, which the court denied. Emphasizing the prosecutor's after-the-fact explanation about what he had meant by his comments, the court ruled that "the State did not imply that the 'lesser form' of murder had a meaning other than the difference he described as to intent or premeditation," and that there had been "no implication about penalty." ¶35 In reaching this conclusion, the trial court abused its discretion. Rather than focusing on the prosecutor's post-hoc explanation of his intention or what the judge herself interpreted his intentions to be, the court should have examined the challenged comments from the perspective of how a reasonable jury would have understood them. A juror would reasonably understand a prosecutor's remarks about the comparative "seriousness" of an offense as a reference to the state's perception of its comparative gravity. And although jurors are instructed not to consider punishment, they are certainly aware that any verdict they return will have important consequences to a defendant, which will depend on the seriousness of the conviction. In this context, the prosecutor's repeated characterization of felony murder as a "lesser" or "less serious" form of murder than premeditated murder would have led a reasonable jury to infer that the potential consequences for felony murder would be less than those for premeditated murder. We therefore cannot agree with the trial court that the prosecutor's comments involved "no implication about penalty." We struggle to find any other way the jury could have reasonably understood them. ¶36 That the terms "lesser" and "less serious" would be understood to refer to punishment also finds support in our jurisprudence. As our supreme court has explained, Arizona's homicide statutes "provide increased punishment for progressively more serious crimes." State v. Lua , 237 Ariz. 301, ¶ 9, 350 P.3d 805 (2015) (emphasis added). Indeed, one of the very purposes of the criminal code is "[t]o differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor offenses and to prescribe proportionate penalties for each." A.R.S. § 13-101(4). Certain crimes are classified as "lesser-grade felon[ies]" due to a policy that those who commit them "deserve a lesser punishment" than those who commit their more serious counterparts. Lua , 237 Ariz. 301, ¶ 9, 350 P.3d 805. ¶37 The prosecutor's references to punishment were also inaccurate and misleading. Felony murder is not, in any meaningful respect, a "less serious" or "lesser" offense than premeditated murder. Rather, under Arizona law, they are "simply two forms of first-degree murder." State v. Tucker , 205 Ariz. 157, ¶ 50, 68 P.3d 110 (2003). Both offenses effectively carry the same potential punishments-life imprisonment or capital punishment-the most serious potential punishments found in our criminal code. ¶38 We acknowledge the prosecutor was entitled to argue that the state bore no burden to show Dansdill intended to kill. But the state has failed to explain how remarks about the comparative "seriousness" of premediated and felony murder were logically pertinent to making that point. ¶39 In defending the propriety of his remarks to the trial court, the prosecutor maintained he gained no strategic benefit by characterizing felony murder as "less serious" than premeditated murder. The prosecutor's behavior during jury selection suggests otherwise: he chose to probe the venire on its willingness to convict a defendant of felony first-degree murder. In response, two potential jurors expressed confusion about the concept of felony murder. One of them concluded she could not convict a defendant of first-degree murder without a showing of intent to kill. By insinuating that felony murder was a less serious charge because it required no showing of intent, the prosecutor effectively addressed any juror's concern about the fairness of decoupling "intent to kill" from criminal culpability for homicide. ¶40 We conclude that any reasonable jury would have understood the prosecutor's repeated characterization of felony murder as "less serious" than premeditated murder as a reference to the potential consequences of conviction. In the context of a criminal trial, those comments could mean little else. The trial court erred when it failed to sustain the defense objection to those remarks. Reference to Dansdill's Decision Not to Testify ¶41 Dansdill chose not to testify at his trial. During summation, his counsel said the following regarding the state's evidence of calls from Dansdill's cellular telephone around the time of the incident: Where is the information as to who these calls go to? Where are those witnesses? Where's the witness that could say, well, yeah, Dansdill called me at this time ...? Where's that information on these outgoing calls? Where are any witnesses to say yeah, I got an outgoing call from Dansdill? Where is any of that information? Where did Dansdill say he was? Where is any of that information? There's none of that information. ¶42 In rebuttal, the prosecutor responded that, although "[t]here is never a point in the trial where the defendant has to present any evidence or put on any evidence," it is also the case that "[h]e can, he can present evidence." While saying this, the prosecutor angled his body and gestured with his right arm in the direction of the defense table. Dansdill objected and reserved his motion. After discussing other elements of the case, the state returned to the issue of the telephone calls: [D]efense counsel says where are the witnesses who say who the defendant called? And I want to point in the direction of several different ... instructions here. One is neither side is required to call all witnesses .... And the reason for that is because both parties are making choices about who they call and put on the stand. And each party is obligated to put the witnesses on the stand that prove their case. Or in the defendant's case, he's not obligated to do anything. But if he wants to argue to you about it ... if he wants to suggest it's in evidence, then he's got to put it on the witness stand. ... [A]nd, again, the burden is always on the State. Okay? ... It never shifts. But let me be perfectly clear. If any one of those people who-by the way, who was making the calls? Defendant. Who's making and receiving the calls? Defendant. So if any one of those people exonerated him, you could bet your bippy you would have been hearing about them from the witness stand. And by the way, there's another instruction that says don't guess or speculate about items outside of evidence[.] ... So to stand up and say, well, think about these other people. Maybe they would help us. Well, then maybe we would have heard from them; right? ¶43 After the rebuttal, the court instructed the jury that "defendant's not actually required to produce evidence of any kind, and not producing evidence is not any evidence of guilt in itself as has been explained." Having reserved his objection, Dansdill's counsel moved again for a mistrial immediately after the jury was dismissed. The judge denied the motion. ¶44 Dansdill argues on appeal that the prosecutor's comments both improperly shifted the burden of proof to Dansdill and punished him for invoking his Fifth Amendment rights. We reject his first contention that the prosecutor's argument improperly shifted the burden of proof. As the trial court correctly found: "The prosecution was entitled ... to rebut defense counsel's closing arguments about missing evidence and witnesses and the quality of the proof." ¶45 In response to Dansdill's Fifth Amendment claim, the state maintains that it made no comment on Dansdill's decision not to testify. Rather, it argues, its prosecutor exclusively addressed Dansdill's equal authority to call the witnesses in question, a proper topic of rebuttal. We agree that the majority of the prosecutor's comments addressed that proper topic. ¶46 However, one portion of those comments concerns us. The prosecutor repeatedly stressed that "Defendant" was the person who was "making the calls" and "receiving the calls" in question and would therefore know if those calls were exculpatory. The prosecutor then stated that, if any of the people on the other end of those calls could exonerate Dansdill, the jury "would have been hearing about them from the witness stand" (emphasis added). ¶47 The state contends this argument was designed only to emphasize that Dansdill stood in the best position to evaluate the evidentiary value of the potential witnesses. The prosecutor's preceding and subsequent remarks-which clearly focused on the capability of the defendant to subpoena such witnesses-do support that contention. For this reason, and in light of the trial court's superior position to personally assess the arguments and gestures in question, we conclude the trial court correctly found that these particular remarks would not alone justify granting the dramatic remedy of a mistrial. State v. Leteve , 237 Ariz. 516, ¶ 33, 354 P.3d 393 (2015) ("A declaration of a mistrial is the most dramatic remedy for trial error and should be granted only when it appears that justice will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged and a new trial granted." (quoting State v. Adamson , 136 Ariz. 250, 262, 665 P.2d 972, 984 (1983) )); see also State v. Jahns , 133 Ariz. 562, 567, 653 P.2d 19, 24 (App. 1982) (deferring to trial court's superior position to assess impact of counsel's arguments). ¶48 In so holding, we acknowledge that Arizona courts have been vigilant in scrutinizing prosecutorial comments that might direct the jury's attention to the defendant's failure to testify. Our supreme court has observed that "[t]he Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Article 2, Section 10, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. section 13-117(B) prohibit any comment, direct or indirect, by a prosecutor about the failure of a defendant to testify." State v. Rutledge , 205 Ariz. 7, ¶ 26, 66 P.3d 50 (2003) (citing Griffin v. California , 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) ). We have held that a comment need not be intentional to be unacceptable. See Ramos , 235 Ariz. 230, ¶ 14, 330 P.3d 987. Indeed, our supreme court has instead assessed such comments based on how they might be reasonably understood by the jury. State v. Parker , 231 Ariz. 391, ¶¶ 67-68, 296 P.3d 54 (2013) (argument improper if it "could also be interpreted" as comment on defendant's invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights). And, it has exhorted prosecutors to "refrain from venturing even close to commenting on a defendant's exercise of the significant rights protected by the Fifth Amendment." Id. ; see also State v. Bowie , 119 Ariz. 336, 341, 580 P.2d 1190, 1195 (1978) ("the state should scrupulously avoid any indication that the accused kept silent"). ¶49 In applying those standards here, we recognize that a segment of the prosecutor's argument-in isolation-could have been understood as directing the jury's attention to the defendant's failure to testify. Although the prosecutor's broader argument clearly focused on observing that the defendant was equally entitled to call witnesses, a reasonable jury could have understood that Dansdill himself was among the witnesses the defense could have called to testify. The prosecutor repeated that "Defendant" either received or made the calls and that Dansdill therefore best knew the content of the calls. This argument suggested that Dansdill would be the best witness of all. Then, rather than carefully redirecting the jury from this improper potential inference, the prosecutor continued in a fashion that suggested he might be referring to Dansdill in his capacity as a witness: "So if any one of those people exonerated him, you could bet your bippy you would have been hearing about them from the witness stand." (Emphasis added.) As the prosecutor had implied in the prior sentence, only one witness could testify comprehensively about the topic in question: Dansdill himself. ¶50 However, we do not assess arguments in isolation. Here, defense counsel-not the prosecutor-first focused the jury's attention on a topic that might logically cause it to consider Dansdill's failure to testify. He argued in summation that the state had failed to call certain witnesses whose identities and probable testimony were obviously known best to Dansdill. Thus, to the extent the jury might have understood the prosecutor's rebuttal argument to imply that Dansdill himself was the best possible witness, the defendant's own argument had already exposed the jury to that inference. Further, to properly rebut the defendant's argument, the prosecutor had no choice but to address a topic that necessarily triggered such inferences. When the defense has forced a prosecutor onto such dangerous terrain, we decline to characterize an isolated linguistic misstep, in the context of an otherwise wholly proper argument, as error. ¶51 Although we find no error under the specific circumstances of this case, we do not approve of any arguments-even if intended for a proper purpose-that have the effect of calling a jury's attention to a defendant's decision not to testify. We exhort prosecutors to exhibit special care where fundamental rights are at play and when proper argument, as here, must necessarily skirt improper topics. See Parker , 231 Ariz. 391, ¶ 68, 296 P.3d 54 ; Bowie , 119 Ariz. at 341, 580 P.2d at 1195. Was the Error Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? ¶52 Although we have concluded that the prosecutor argued improperly during summation when he repeatedly characterized felony murder as a "lesser" or "less serious" form of first-degree murder, we will nonetheless affirm Dansdill's convictions if the prosecutor's errors had no effect on the outcome of the case. State v. Bible , 175 Ariz. 549, 588, 858 P.2d 1152, 1191 (1993). When, as here, the defendant made timely objections to the errors, the state bears the burden of demonstrating their harmlessness. State v. Escalante , 245 Ariz. 135, ¶ 30, 425 P.3d 1078 (2018). "In deciding whether error is harmless, the question 'is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.' " Leteve , 237 Ariz. 516, ¶ 25, 354 P.3d 393 (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana , 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) ). ¶53 As our supreme court has explained, it may be appropriate for misconduct to be found harmless in cases "where the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and the prosecutor's comment did not contribute to the verdict." State v. Rhodes , 110 Ariz. 237, 238, 517 P.2d 507, 508 (1973) ; see also State v. Trostle , 191 Ariz. 4, 16, 951 P.2d 869, 881 (1997) (improper comment harmless given "overwhelming evidence of guilt"). ¶54 In this case, however, the evidence of attempted armed robbery was not overwhelming. The state's case relied primarily on the testimony of the two first-hand witnesses, M.L. and M.G. Both were intoxicated at the time of the incident. Both repeatedly refused to provide the state with the evidence it sought under oath. One of them faced mandatory prison time on unrelated drug offenses and had been offered probation if she testified. Although ample evidence placed Dansdill at the scene of the crime with a gun, the only evidence of what Dansdill said-and thus the only evidence that he intended anything more than a poor joke among friends-was the testimony of these two problematic witnesses. ¶55 The state's lone evidence that Dansdill issued a threat to secure repayment of money was the recorded statement of M.L. to detectives on the night of the incident. Yet, M.L. testified at trial (as at her deposition) that she did not recall any threats. None of M.G.'s recorded statements, which were played for the jury, made any reference to a threat. ¶56 While we have concluded that a jury could reasonably have credited M.L.'s first statement to detectives-which suggested that Dansdill threatened the victims to collect a debt-the jury could also have questioned the sincerity of that threat in the context of the other testimony. Notably, the witnesses recalled that Dansdill initially behaved in a joking manner and made remarks suggesting he "came in peace" and intended to put the gun away. These remarks, together with Dansdill's historically close friendship with M.L., would have allowed a jury to reasonably conclude the gun was displayed as the foolish jest of an intoxicated defendant. According to the state, Dansdill fled the scene immediately after his gun discharged through the door, rather than staying to collect any money or even determine if anyone had been hurt. Thus, the evidence could have raised a reasonable doubt about whether Dansdill truly attempted to rob the victims at gunpoint. Indeed, during summation, the prosecutor himself acknowledged that one reasonable interpretation of the evidence was that Dansdill "startled himself because he didn't mean to fire that shot." ¶57 Given the ambiguity of the evidence presented, the questionable reliability of the only first-hand witnesses, and the state's burden to prove Dansdill guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, this was a close case on each of the indicted counts. For this reason, we are not "confident beyond a reasonable doubt" that the prosecutor's improper statements "had no influence on the jury's judgment" in this case, or that the verdict of guilt was "surely unattributable" to his misconduct. Leteve , 237 Ariz. 516, ¶ 25, 354 P.3d 393 (quoting Bible , 175 Ariz. at 588, 858 P.2d at 1191, and Sullivan , 508 U.S. at 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078 ). ¶58 We have sometimes concluded that prejudice from improper argument has been "cured by the trial court's instructions." Gallardo , 225 Ariz. 560, ¶ 40, 242 P.3d 159. Even a comment that is "irresponsible, inappropriate, and inflammatory" may not warrant reversal if, for instance, it "was an isolated comment, was promptly objected to, and was rendered less harmful by instructions by the court." Moody , 208 Ariz. 424, ¶ 152, 94 P.3d 1119. Our courts have frequently found misconduct harmless on appeal when the trial court sustained the defendant's objection, immediately instructed the jury to disregard improper comments, or provided further instruction to the jury prior to deliberations in order to dull the impact of the misconduct. E.g. , id. ¶ 151 ; see also Parker , 231 Ariz. 391, ¶ 68, 296 P.3d 54 (objection sustained and comment stricken); Velazquez , 216 Ariz. 300, ¶ 53, 166 P.3d 91 (after objection, jury instructed to disregard); Williams , 169 Ariz. at 380, 819 P.2d at 966 (objection sustained, evidence overwhelming); State v. Puffer , 110 Ariz. 180, 181, 516 P.2d 316, 317 (1973) (objection sustained, instructions provided). ¶59 The trial court took none of these steps here. It did not sustain Dansdill's objection to the state's characterization of felony murder as somehow "lesser" or "less serious" than premeditated first-degree murder. Thus, far from striking or disapproving those remarks, the court allowed the jury to consider them. The court did remind the jury of the standard instruction that it should not "consider[ ] one way or the other what the punishment may or may not be." But, in light of the prosecutor's summation and the court's refusal to restrict or correct it, a reasonable jury might have been confused about whether, or how, arguments about punishment could be considered. ¶60 We may also consider the repetitive nature of the errors in evaluating the state's argument that the verdict was "surely unattributable" to those errors. As discussed above, the prosecutor's improper arguments about the "less serious" nature of felony murder were repeated and persisted after objection. That repetition not only renders it more likely that the jury gave the argument weight; it also suggests the prosecutor himself believed the improper argument was important rather than trivial to his case. ¶61 As previously noted, we must consider the impact of a prosecutor's remarks in their context. See Boyde v. California , 494 U.S. 370, 385, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990). The state characterized felony murder as a "lesser" and "less serious" form of murder after conceding it could not prove that the defendant even intended to fire the gun, much less that he intended to kill R.G. Those misleading comments had the effect of mollifying any jury concerns about clear weaknesses in the state's case, including whether Dansdill had been overcharged. Given the "alternative" charges in count one of the indictment before it, the jury in this case faced the unique task of distinguishing whether Dansdill committed second-degree murder, first-degree felony murder, or neither. In this context, the prosecutor's claim-that felony murder was "less serious" or a "lesser" offense because it did not require a showing of intent to kill-must have been especially confusing given that "intent to kill" is a necessary element of second-degree murder. ¶62 For all these reasons, this is not a case in which we "can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict." State v. Guerra , 161 Ariz. 289, 297, 778 P.2d 1185, 1193 (1989). We must therefore reverse and remand for retrial. Jury Instruction ¶63 Finally, Dansdill argues the trial court improperly instructed the jury in a manner that prevented proper consideration of the "alternative" second-degree murder charge in the first count of the second indictment. "We review de novo whether jury instructions correctly state the law, 'reading the jury instructions as a whole to ensure that the jury receives the information it needs to arrive at a legally correct decision.' " State v. Prince , 226 Ariz. 516, ¶ 77, 250 P.3d 1145 (2011) (citation omitted) (quoting State ex rel. Thomas v. Granville , 211 Ariz. 468, ¶ 8, 123 P.3d 662 (2005) ). ¶64 Dansdill is correct that the LeBlanc -style instruction provided to the jury was inappropriate in the context of alternative charges. See State v. Petrak , 198 Ariz. 260, ¶ 28, 8 P.3d 1174 (App. 2000) (citing State v. Kelly , 149 Ariz. 115, 117, 716 P.2d 1052, 1054 (App. 1986) ) ("where two ... offenses are charged in the same count of an indictment," jurors should be instructed "that they must unanimously agree regarding which offense was committed or that the defendant committed both ... of the offenses"); see also Lua , 237 Ariz. 301, ¶¶ 19-20, 350 P.3d 805 (indicating LeBlanc -style instruction is inappropriate for offense that is not a lesser-included and providing instead instruction affirmatively directing jury to consider "whether the circumstance differentiating [the crimes] is present, thus justifying a finding of guilt on the less serious offense"). This error was compounded by the prosecutor's statement to the jury that the alternative count "means ... first you consider felony murder. And only if you don't all unanimously agree on felony murder, then do you proceed to second degree murder." ¶65 We take no position on the propriety of bringing two charges in the same count because the defendant made no challenge to the indictment on that basis. In the event this case proceeds to a new trial on remand and "alternative" charges are at issue, we direct the court to provide the correct instruction. Disposition ¶66 For the foregoing reasons, Dansdill's convictions and sentences for felony murder and attempted armed robbery are reversed. We remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In his "Motion to Dismiss Due to a Presumption of Vindictiveness," Dansdill argued both actual bad faith retaliation and that the totality of the circumstances raised a presumption of vindictiveness, but he has abandoned his claim of actual vindictiveness on appeal. "In the less preferable alternative," Dansdill asks us to vacate his convictions under the second indictment and remand for trial on the original indictment. At trial, the prosecutor also indicated he returned to the grand jury to obtain the felony murder charge because he "wanted [Dansdill] to take a plea that was out at that time, and he wouldn't do it." Dansdill contends this statement was not true. Regardless, it is not improper for the state to threaten additional charges during plea negotiations and to follow through with such threats after a defendant decides not to plead. "[J]ust as a prosecutor may forgo legitimate charges already brought in an effort to save the time and expense of trial, a prosecutor may file additional charges if an initial expectation that a defendant would plead guilty to lesser charges proves unfounded." Goodwin , 457 U.S. at 380, 102 S.Ct. 2485. See also State v. Dominguez , 130 Ariz. 498, 498-99, 637 P.2d 300, 300-301 (App. 1981) ; Jeffers v. Lewis , 38 F.3d 411, 418 (9th Cir. 1994). The trial court's formulation of the threat does not appear to be supported by the record. The recording of M.L.'s police interview that was played for the jury included her report that Dansdill said, "I could make this easy or it could be a problem." The prosecution used this formulation twice in its opening statement. However, its formulation of the threat changed during the parties' conversations with the judge regarding jury instructions and in closing arguments, and the court seems to have adopted this second, inaccurate formulation. Although the differences in the formulations of the threat could be material in some contexts, either would be sufficient evidence of a qualifying threat in the context of a claim for insufficient evidence. Notably, Dansdill was communicating with the victims through a closed door. Consequently, there was no way he could have seen specific money or property to which he claimed an exclusive interest. From this, the jury was entitled to infer that he did not merely seek the return of his own property. Because a defendant need not show that a prosecutor intended to present an improper argument to be entitled to relief, we agree that Arizona courts' traditional reference to such claims as "prosecutorial misconduct" can be semantically misleading. Where possible, we therefore refer to them as "improper argument" claims. In so doing, we suggest no departure from the applicable law. Where a defendant did not object below, "we review only for fundamental error," a significantly higher bar for a defendant to clear. Gallardo , 225 Ariz. 560, ¶ 35, 242 P.3d 159. In its brief and at oral argument, the state suggested the prosecutor may have intended to convey that the "moral culpability" is "lesser" or "less serious" for felony murder than premeditated murder. Even if plausible, that would have directed the jury to the same improper and irrelevant basis for a verdict. The prosecutor insisted, "Felony murder carries a different penalty" because it "carries a discretionary punishment of either life without the possibility of parole until 25 years are served or natural life." Our criminal code does appear to make a subtle distinction in sentencing between premeditated first-degree murder and felony first-degree murder when the crime has not been capitally charged: in the former context, the trial court "shall impose a sentence of natural life," whereas a felony murder conviction allows the court to "determine whether to impose a sentence of life or natural life." A.R.S. § 13-752(A) ; see also § 13-751(A)(3) (unlike natural life sentence, life sentence may allow for release after twenty-five years if victim was over fifteen). However, in Arizona, the possibility that a life sentence may allow for release after twenty-five years is more theoretical than practical. Parole was eliminated for all offenses committed after January 1, 1994, leaving commutation or pardon as the only possibilities for release. See A.R.S. § 41-1604.09(I) ; see also State v. Rosario , 195 Ariz. 264, ¶ 26, 987 P.2d 226 (App. 1999). The likelihood of either is so remote that the mandatory noncapital life sentence for felony murder is constitutionally indistinct from the mandatory noncapital natural life sentence for premeditated murder. See State v. Vera , 235 Ariz. 571, ¶ 17, 334 P.3d 754 (App. 2014). Although the state argues that the prosecutor's references to the comparative "seriousness" of felony murder were-at most-inartful, inadvertent misstatements, we note that the statements were repeated, even after drawing an objection. Moreover, by the date of Dansdill's trial in early 2017, an appeal had already been filed and fully briefed in which another criminal defendant challenged similar statements made by this same prosecutor in a felony murder case. See State v. Urbina , No. 2 CA-CR 2016-0022, ¶ 39, 2017 WL 2664596 (Ariz. App. June 20, 2017) (mem. decision) (prosecutor's summation contrasted felony murder with premeditated murder, which he repeatedly characterized as "the more serious form of murder"). This suggests the remarks may have been a calculated strategy deployed by this prosecutor in felony murder cases. In response to the prosecutor's description of the felony murder rule, the prospective juror said, "Doesn't make sense to me." The state then moved to strike her for cause. At sidebar, after attempting to clarify felony murder law in Arizona, the court asked the prospective juror whether she thought she could follow the law based on instructions from the bench. She responded, "I don't think I can. I don't think I can follow that when it applies to murder," and she was excused. Dansdill contends his intention in his closing argument was to "challenge[ ] the State's proof that the calls had been made at all." However, it was reasonable for the state to respond to what it perceived as Dansdill's argument in closing regarding a lack of evidence, even if that perception was based on a misunderstanding of Dansdill's argument. See United States v. Robinson , 485 U.S. 25, 31, 108 S.Ct. 864, 99 L.Ed.2d 23 (1988) (accepting trial court's "reasonable interpretation" of defendant's ambiguous comments in summation despite defendant's insistence on appeal that interpretation was incorrect). When she was deposed, and when she was later interviewed by detectives from the attorney general's office, M.L. said she could no longer remember what she had previously reported about the incident. At trial, M.L. testified that she did not hear Dansdill threaten R.G. in any way, that her best recollection of what Dansdill said was that he came in peace and would "put it away," and that she did not remember talking to the police about Dansdill saying, "I could make this easy or it could be a problem." For his part, M.G. refused to testify at the trial, saying, "I just don't feel I'm a credible witness. ... I don't recall anything that happened that night." Similarly, at his deposition-part of which was played for the jury-M.G. said he did not remember the incident and that he "was so high [he didn't] remember" what he had reported to the police the night it occurred. Dansdill requested that the jury be instructed that premeditated murder and felony murder effectively carry the same penalty. No such corrective instruction was given. We do not address whether any such instruction would have been proper. We simply observe that the misleading features of the prosecutor's comments were never corrected. Dansdill argues the alternative indictment was duplicitous but acknowledges he forfeited the error by failing to timely object. Over Dansdill's repeated objection, the jury was instructed regarding the alternative second-degree murder charge as follows: "You may consider the offense of second-degree murder if either (1) You find the defendant not guilty of first-degree felony murder; or (2) After full and careful consideration of the facts, you cannot agree on whether to find the defendant guilty of first-degree felony murder." This is the instruction our supreme court has directed courts to use for lesser-included offenses. See State v. LeBlanc , 186 Ariz. 437, 439-40, 924 P.2d 441 (1996). And second-degree murder is not a lesser-included offense of felony murder. See State v. Murray , 184 Ariz. 9, 34, 906 P.2d 542 (1995). As the court explained in Lua , one of the underlying rationales for requiring a different instruction for provocation manslaughter, which is not a lesser-included offense of second-degree murder, is "afford[ing juries] a less drastic alternative than the choice between convicting and acquitting on the second-degree murder charge, and ensur[ing] the defendant has the full benefit of the reasonable doubt standard." 237 Ariz. 301, ¶ 13, 350 P.3d 805.

JOHNSEN, Judge: ¶ 1 Paul Roger Barron appeals from the dissolution decree ending his marriage to Shelly Rae Barron. We reverse and remand the decree's parenting-time provisions because they are the product of impermissible presumptions about equal parenting time and gender. We also reverse portions of the decree that violate federal law governing military retirement pay and vacate and remand the attorney's fees award. In all other respects, we affirm the decree. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶ 2 The parties ("Husband" and "Wife," respectively) were married in 2004 and have three children, all girls, born in 2006, 2008 and 2010, respectively. The family moved to Arizona in 2013, when Husband, a helicopter pilot on active duty with the United States Marine Corps, was transferred to Yuma. Wife filed a petition for dissolution in August 2015, but the couple remained together in the marital home until shortly after the superior court issued temporary orders in March 2016. ¶ 3 Following a three-day trial, the superior court entered a decree of dissolution in May 2017. Relevant to this appeal, the decree continued joint legal decision-making but reduced Husband's parenting time to 130 days a year, plus specified holidays and a summer vacation, and divided the community's interest in Husband's military retirement. The court declined both parties' requests for equalization payments and awarded attorney's fees to Wife. ¶ 4 We have jurisdiction of Husband's timely appeal pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 12-120.21(A)(1) (2018) and -2101(A)(1) (2018). DISCUSSION A. Parenting Time. ¶ 5 By agreement, the temporary orders had allowed Husband more parenting time than Wife because Wife was in training to become a firefighter/emergency medical technician. The parties shared joint legal decision-making, but temporary orders granted Husband parenting time every Thursday through Sunday until Wife finished her training and "bec[ame] employed." Wife completed her training within a few months but did not take a full-time job and did not petition the court for weekend parenting time. The dissolution decree, entered 14 months after issuance of temporary orders, reduced Husband's parenting time to one overnight a week plus every other weekend from Friday afternoon through Monday morning. ¶ 6 On appeal, Husband argues the superior court abused its discretion in failing to order equal parenting time. We review a parenting-time order for an abuse of discretion. Nold v. Nold , 232 Ariz. 270, 273, ¶ 11, 304 P.3d 1093, 1096 (App. 2013). An abuse of discretion occurs when the court commits legal error, Arpaio v. Figueroa , 229 Ariz. 444, 447, ¶ 7, 276 P.3d 513, 516 (App. 2012), or "when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's decision, is 'devoid of competent evidence to support' the decision," Little v. Little, 193 Ariz. 518, 520, ¶ 5, 975 P.2d 108, 110 (1999) (quoting Fought v. Fought , 94 Ariz. 187, 188, 382 P.2d 667 (1963) ). ¶ 7 As relevant here, A.R.S. § 25-403.02(B) (2018) requires the superior court to adopt a parenting plan that is "[c]onsistent with the child's best interests in § 25-403" and that "maximizes [each parent's] respective parenting time." Section 25-403 (A) (2018) requires the court to determine parenting time "in accordance with the best interests of the child." Further, § 25-403(A) states: The court shall consider all factors that are relevant to the child's physical and emotional well-being, including: 1. The past, present and potential future relationship between the parent and the child. 2. The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parent or parents .... 3. The child's adjustment to home, school and community. 4. If the child is of a suitable age and maturity, the wishes of the child as to legal decision-making and parenting time. 5. The mental and physical health of all individuals involved. ¶ 8 In findings and conclusions issued in support of the decree's parenting-time provisions, the superior court stated: The primary focus concerning parenting time is the best interest of the children and not the parents. If the interests of parents are more important than children, then children, like timeshares, would always be equally time-shared. A totality of circumstances tip the scales in favor of designation of [Wife] as primary residential parent. A. [Wife] has been the primary care provider for the children prior to this action. The children have historically spent more time with [Wife] than [Husband] since their birth. B. The children have not fully adjusted to equal parenting time during the pendency of the temporary orders. The court finds the children want and need to spend more time with [Wife]. C. The military duties of [Husband] often make him unavailable during his parenting time resulting in the children spending too much time with the paternal grandparents relative to time they could be with [Wife]. D. The children are girls who naturally will gravitate more to [Wife] as they mature. E. The experience during the temporary orders has been unreasonable occasionally.... The court finds [Husband] has been comparatively more unreasonable and inflexible than [Wife] [in agreeing to trade parenting time]. In particular, [Husband] has placed his interest over the best interest of the children in not allowing more frequent weekend parenting time by [Wife] regardless of the strict terms of the stipulated temporary order. F. It is unlikely the parties will both reside in Yuma during the minority of all the children. Significant geographical separation of the parties precludes equal parenting time. Changing equal parenting time now would be less disruptive than in the future. G. Children should have a primary home and bedroom where special items like collections, posters and private things are maintained as opposed to forcing children to equally divide their time and things and clothes equally between two homes. H. A primary residence promotes stability and continuity for children. ¶ 9 With one exception, we agree with Husband that the findings the court made in determining parenting time are contrary to law and not supported by the evidence. ¶ 10 First, the court legally erred by applying a presumption against equal parenting time. Nearly all of the court's findings disregarded the statute's starting point, which is that, when consistent with a child's best interests, each party's parenting time should be maximized. A.R.S. § 25-403.02(B). Wife offers no legal argument in defense of the court's broad generalization that "[c]hildren should have a primary home and bedroom ... as opposed to forcing children to equally divide their time and things and clothes equally between two homes." And no evidence in the record supports application of that principle here. By its nature, dissolution of a marriage compels children to divide their time between the homes of their two parents. That being the case, nothing in the law allows a court considering the best interests of the children to presume that one of those homes must be the children's "primary" residence. ¶ 11 At trial, Wife rejected the notion of equal parenting time, protesting without offering specifics that her "children need more consistency of staying in one place." But the court's broad finding that "[a] primary residence promotes stability and continuity for children" is supported neither by the law nor the evidence in the record. When each parent can provide a safe, loving and appropriate home for the children, there is no place in a parenting-time order for a presumption that "stability and continuity" require the children to spend more time in one home than the other. Here, Wife offered no evidence that Husband is not a good parent, nor that his home is inappropriate for the children. To the contrary, she testified Husband has the girls' best interests at heart, and, when asked to describe his strengths as a parent, she testified he is "very loving," plays with the girls and is good "at discipline." She also testified the girls enjoy spending time at Husband's home. ¶ 12 Second, the court erred by basing parenting time on its finding that the parties' three girls "naturally will gravitate more to [Wife] as they mature." The implicit premise of this finding is that, as a general proposition, girls need to spend more time with their mother than their father. Nothing in the law nor the record supports that proposition. ¶ 13 Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, gender-based presumptions by the government require an "exceedingly persuasive justification." United States v. Virginia , 518 U.S. 515, 531, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 135 L.Ed.2d 735 (1996). In this inquiry, "overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females" cannot suffice. Id. at 533, 116 S.Ct. 2264. The Arizona legislature has recognized this principle by mandating that in determining parenting time, a "court shall not prefer a parent's proposed plan because of the parent's or child's gender." A.R.S. § 25-403.02(B). ¶ 14 Wife argues it was "reasonable for the court to anticipate that the children's needs for a stable maternal influence would increase rather than decrease as they entered puberty." She cites no factual or legal authority, however, for that proposition. Nor does she offer any explanation for why an equal parenting-time plan would not allow her to maintain a "stable maternal influence" over her girls. Wife also argues the finding is supported by § 25-403(A)(2), which directs a court considering best interests to take into account "[t]he interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parent or parents." But there was no evidence before the court that Wife's relationship or interaction with the children was better than Husband's. By Wife's logic, all things being equal, the gender of the children necessarily would drive parenting time, a governing principle flatly inconsistent with principles of gender equality and § 25-403.02(B). ¶ 15 Third, the court erred by favoring parenting time for Wife over Husband based on the fact that Wife had been the children's primary caregiver during the marriage. Whether one or the other parent was the primary caregiver during the marriage used to be one of the factors the court was required to consider in deciding parenting time. See A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(7) (2005) ("Whether one parent, both parents or neither parent has provided primary care of the child."). But the legislature removed that factor in 2012 when it substantially revised the decision-making and parenting-time statutes. 2012 Ariz. Sess. Laws, Ch. 309, § 5 (2d Reg. Sess.). ¶ 16 Dissolution necessarily will disrupt the family dynamic whenever one parent has been the primary earner while the other has stayed home to care for the children. Upon dissolution, the wage earner usually must find child care and the stay-at-home parent must find work. To be sure, each parent's relationship with a child before dissolution is one of the factors a court must consider in determining parenting time. See A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(1) (court shall consider "past, present and potential future relationship between the parent and the child"). Absent evidence in the record that a parent will be unable to properly care for a child, however, the superior court errs when it presumes - as the court did here - that the child's best interests necessarily are served by affording more parenting time to the former stay-at-home parent than to the other. ¶ 17 Fourth, the court also erred by basing its parenting-time determination on a finding that, given it was unlikely that Husband and Wife would remain in Yuma until the children were grown, "[c]hanging equal parenting time now would be less disruptive than in the future." Over their 11-year marriage, Husband's various reassignments as a Marine required the couple to relocate a half-dozen times. Although the court did not err by implicitly finding that Husband may be reassigned again, no evidence in the record supports the pronouncement that it would be less disruptive to the children to reduce their time with their father now than to do so later. Indeed, as Husband argues, it belies logic to limit a military member's parenting time simply because he or she may be deployed in the future. If and when Husband is reassigned, A.R.S. §§ 25-408 (2018) and -411 (2018) will govern how parenting time is to be altered under the circumstances then presented. ¶ 18 Fifth, the court erred by limiting Husband's parenting time based on its finding that his military duties "often make him unavailable during his parenting time resulting in the children spending too much time with the paternal grandparents." Husband's parents sold their house in Oregon and moved to Yuma shortly before Wife petitioned for dissolution, and they now share a home with Husband so that they may care for the children when he is unable to do so. During the marriage, Husband's job took him away from home during a pair of seven-month overseas deployments and on training missions for a few weeks at a time. Husband testified, however, that since June 2016, his assignment in Yuma had allowed him to work "[b]anker's hours." At the same time, Wife testified that her work as a firefighter/emergency medical technician may require shift work long past regular business hours, including some nights and weekends. In short, both parents' jobs will require extended periods of child care, and Husband's parents have agreed to care for the children whenever either parent is unable to do so. Further, Father's proposed parenting plan included a "first right of refusal" under which each parent would offer the other the opportunity to care for the children when the first parent is unavailable for a period of four hours or longer. Mother, meanwhile, offered no criticism of the girls' grandparents as care providers, and in fact testified that she would be fine with them watching the girls after school in the afternoons if her work did not allow her to do so. Under these circumstances, the superior court abused its discretion when it found that Husband's use of his parents for child care weighed against his request for equal parenting time. ¶ 19 Sixth, the court also erred by denying equal parenting time based on its findings that the girls "have not fully adjusted to equal parenting time during the pendency of the temporary orders" and that they "want and need to spend more time with" Wife. Crafted to accommodate the demands of Wife's school and training regimes, the stipulated temporary orders granted Husband parenting time over what became a four-day weekend, from noon on Thursday through Sunday evening, week in, week out. On that schedule, the girls naturally missed being able to spend weekends with Wife. Although Wife testified the girls said they wanted to spend weekends with her, she acknowledged that was because they had been with Husband every weekend under the temporary orders. ¶ 20 The only other evidence supporting the court's finding that the children had "not fully adjusted" to equal parenting time during temporary orders was Wife's testimony in September 2016 that one of the girls complained of stomach pain and sleeplessness, issues Wife attributed to the child's unwillingness to leave Wife's home for Husband's. But by the time trial resumed two months later, Wife testified the girl's problems with sleeping were "getting better now." Further, both parents testified the girls were doing well in school. ¶ 21 On this record - and in the absence of testimony of a therapist, counselor or other expert - the evidence was entirely insufficient to support the court's implicit finding that the children would not be able to "adjust" to an equal parenting time schedule that afforded a fair measure of weekends to Wife. ¶ 22 As for the court's lone remaining finding in support of its parenting-time determination, Husband argues there was no evidence that he was more unreasonable and inflexible than Wife in negotiating trades of parenting time before trial. Husband contends he offered Wife additional parenting time on four occasions during the period of temporary orders even though Wife had more parenting time overall. He also contends Wife was more unreasonable regarding a summer vacation dispute and never responded to the equal parenting plan he offered in settlement. For her part, Wife testified Husband did not offer additional parenting time, but only offered weekend parenting time in exchange for an equal amount of her parenting time. She also recounted several instances in which Husband refused to allow her to pick up the children from school when he was working or take them overnight when he traveled. Although Husband was strictly following the temporary orders in these instances, the court properly could view his conduct as unreasonably inflexible. See A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(6) ("Which parent is more likely to allow the child frequent, meaningful and continuing contact with the other parent."). ¶ 23 We generally defer to the weight the superior court gives to conflicting testimony. See Gutierrez v. Gutierrez , 193 Ariz. 343, 347-48, ¶ 13, 972 P.2d 676, 680-81 (App. 1998). Although not every error in a parenting-time decision warrants a new hearing, given the several errors noted above, we reverse the parenting-time order and remand for a new hearing consistent with § 25-403(A). See Little, 193 Ariz. at 520, ¶ 5, 975 P.2d at 110 ; Hart v. Hart , 220 Ariz. 183, 188, ¶ 19, 204 P.3d 441, 446 (App. 2009) (vacating parenting-time determination when court's order showed it had applied incorrect legal standard). B. Military Retirement Pay. ¶ 24 As a Marine, Husband is entitled to receive military retirement benefits upon completing 20 years of service. See Howell v. Howell , --- U.S. ----, 137 S. Ct. 1400, 1402-03, 197 L.Ed.2d 781 (2017). Under federal law, state courts may treat the portion of a serviceperson's military retirement earned during marriage as community property, divisible upon divorce. See 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (2018) ; see also Edsall v. Superior Court , 143 Ariz. 240, 241-42, 693 P.2d 895, 896-97 (1984). Thus, and under Arizona community-property law, Wife is entitled to one-half of the military retirement benefits Husband earned during the marriage. Applying that principle, the superior court divided the community's interest in Husband's military retirement. It also ruled that if Husband voluntarily continues to serve after he becomes eligible to retire, he must pay Wife what she would have received from the government if he had retired. On appeal, Husband argues the court erred by effectively ordering him to indemnify Wife against a choice he might make to work more than 20 years. He also argues the court made other errors in addressing his military retirement. ¶ 25 The court has broad discretion in apportioning community property. Boncoskey v. Boncoskey , 216 Ariz. 448, 451, ¶ 13, 167 P.3d 705, 708 (App. 2007). We review the allocation for an abuse of discretion, view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the court's ruling and will affirm the allocation if reasonable evidence supports it. Id. 1. Mandatory payment to Wife at 20 years. ¶ 26 In Howell , issued just a week before the decree in this case, the Supreme Court held that state courts may not employ equitable principles to reach results that are inconsistent with federal statutes governing military retirement. 137 S. Ct. at 1405-06. The retired military member in Howell waived a portion of his retirement pay in exchange for disability benefits. Id. at 1402. Although the waiver garnered a tax advantage for the retired military member, it reduced his former spouse's monthly benefit, which was calculated based on his retirement pay. Id. at 1403-04. The Arizona Supreme Court upheld a superior court order requiring the military member to indemnify his former spouse for the consequences of his waiver. Id. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding the superior court's order was inconsistent with 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c), which allows division of military retirement pay but not disability benefits. Howell , 137 S. Ct. at 1403, 1405 (citing Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 589, 109 S.Ct. 2023, 104 L.Ed.2d 675 (1989) ). By its ruling, the Court rejected the state court's exercise of its equitable powers to grant the former spouse an interest that federal law did not allow. 137 S. Ct. at 1405-06. ¶ 27 Here, the same federal statute supports Husband's argument that, when a military spouse chooses not to retire after 20 years, a state court may not order him to indemnify his former spouse against the financial consequences of his decision to postpone retirement. Although § 1408(c)(3) allows state courts to treat retirement pay as community property in a dissolution, the statute specifically states that it "does not authorize any court to order a [military] member to apply for retirement or retire at a particular time in order to effectuate any payment under this section." Wife argues the superior court did not compel Husband to retire, but the order requiring Husband to pay Wife what she would receive from the government upon Husband's retirement is no different in principle from the equitable remedy Howell disapproved. ¶ 28 Wife nevertheless argues the superior court order is proper under Koelsch v. Koelsch , 148 Ariz. 176, 713 P.2d 1234 (1986). In that case, the Arizona Supreme Court addressed the division of a community property interest in public retirement benefits when the employee is vested but wants to continue working, thereby delaying the former spouse's receipt of retirement pay. Id. at 180, 713 P.2d 1234. The court held that in such a situation, the superior court may order the employee to indemnify the former spouse for what the former spouse would have received from the community's share of the retirement. Id. at 185, 713 P.2d 1234. ¶ 29 But Koelsch did not address the division of military retirement pay, a matter exclusively governed by federal law. Pre-Howell cases were divided in addressing whether a military spouse who wants to keep working may be ordered to indemnify the former spouse. Compare In re Marriage of Castle , 180 Cal.App.3d 206, 225 Cal. Rptr. 382, 387 (Cal. App. 1986), and Wilder v. Wilder , 85 Wash.2d 364, 534 P.2d 1355, 1359 (1975) (upholding indemnification), with Alvino v. Alvino , 659 S.W. 2d 266, 271-72 (Mo. App. 1983) ; Longo v. Longo , 266 Neb. 171, 663 N.W. 2d 604, 609, 610 (2003) ; and Kendrick v. Kendrick , 902 S.W. 2d 918, 929 (Tenn. App. 1994) (military retirement is payable to non-military spouse only upon the military spouse's retirement). ¶ 30 Notwithstanding the prior division of authority, the question now has been resolved by Howell , which holds that a state court may not do indirectly what 10 U.S.C. § 1408 directly forbids. The superior court here had no authority to order Husband to indemnify Wife in the event he does not decide to retire when eligible at 20 years. Although federal law allows a state court to award a former spouse a share of a military member's retirement benefits, it does not allow the court to order the military member to indemnify his former spouse if he decides to continue working past the date on which he could retire. 2. Survivor benefit premium. ¶ 31 The superior court also erred in ordering that Wife's share of the community's interest in Husband's military retirement cannot be reduced by payments he might make to buy a survivor benefit for a future spouse. ¶ 32 Pursuant to § 1408, the amount of military retirement pay that may be divided as community property does not include amounts "deducted because of an election under chapter 73 of this title to provide an annuity to a spouse or former spouse to whom payment of a portion of such member's retired pay is being made pursuant to a court order under this section." 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(A)(iv), (c)(1). The annuity the statute references is the Survivor Benefit Plan, which will make monthly payments to the surviving spouse of a military member to help make up for the loss of retirement benefits upon the member's death. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1447, 1448 (2018). When a military member buys the annuity for "a spouse or former spouse to whom payment of a portion of such member's retired pay is being made pursuant to a court order," the price of the annuity is deducted from the amount of his or her retirement pay subject to division as community property. See 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(A)(iv). ¶ 33 The decree adopts language Wife proposed that is contrary to the federal statute's treatment of survivor's annuity premiums. The decree states, "In the event [Husband] elects a ... survivor annuity in favor of any other person , such election shall not reduce" Wife's share of Husband's retirement pay. (Emphasis added.) By mandating that Wife's share of Husband's retirement pay will not be reduced by the cost of any survivor's annuity Husband might purchase, the decree disregards the statutory mandate that retirement pay subject to division as community property shall be reduced by amounts deducted for an annuity in favor of "a spouse or former spouse to whom payment of a portion [of military retirement] is being made pursuant to a court order." ¶ 34 Wife's defense of the decree's treatment of survivor-annuity premiums is based on its application to an annuity Husband might purchase for a new spouse if he remarries. Wife argues the statute mandates that the cost of an annuity for a current or former spouse shall be deducted from retirement pay only if the annuity is court-ordered. Thus, under her interpretation of the statute, if Husband were to remarry and voluntarily buy an annuity for his new spouse, Wife's interest in his retirement pay would not be reduced by the cost of that annuity. ¶ 35 We do not interpret the statute that way. In the normal case, there is no need for a court order requiring a military member to purchase an annuity for his or her current spouse - generally speaking, only payments on behalf of a former spouse require a court order. The text of the statute is consistent with that principle. The provision at issue applies when one receives a portion of a military member's retirement pay "pursuant to a court order under this section ." 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(A)(iv) (emphasis added). The "section" to which the text refers, of course, is § 1408 - which was enacted specifically to grant state courts the power to apply state law to divide military retirement pay upon dissolution of a military member's marriage. See 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(2) (" 'court order' means a final decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment or legal separation ..."); Howell , 137 S. Ct. at 1403 (describing § 1408 as Congress's response to McCarty v. McCarty , 453 U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 69 L.Ed.2d 589 (1981), which had held that federal law preempted community-property treatment of military retirement). The statute has nothing to say about an intact marriage; contrary to Wife's argument, its reference to one who receives a distribution of retirement pay "pursuant to a court order under this section" logically cannot refer to a current spouse because "this section" only applies in proceedings to dissolve or otherwise effectively end a marriage. ¶ 36 Accordingly, under § 1408(a)(4)(A)(iv), military retirement pay subject to division by a state court as community property is reduced by amounts a serviceperson pays for an annuity to (1) a spouse or (2) a former spouse when the payment to the former spouse is mandated by a court order. The decree here violates that provision by ordering that Wife's interest in Husband's retirement shall not be reduced by Husband's purchase of an annuity for "any other person." 3. Cost-of-living increases and REDUX/career status bonus. ¶ 37 Husband argues the superior court erred by awarding Wife a proportionate share "of any cost of living or other post-retirement" increase in his military retirement pay. Husband acknowledges that § 1408(a)(4)(B) allows division of certain specified cost-of-living increases, but argues the decree goes beyond the statute in dividing any "other post-retirement" increases. Husband is correct. Pursuant to § 1408(a)(4)(B), military retirement pay subject to division as community property includes expressly defined cost-of-living increases; the statute makes no reference to any other increases. On remand, the superior court shall remove the reference to "other post-retirement increases" from the decree. ¶ 38 The decree also provides that in the event Husband elects to receive retirement benefits pursuant to the Military Reform Act of 1986 ("REDUX benefits") and receives a Career Status Bonus ("CSB"), Wife shall be entitled to a proportionate share of these benefits. Husband contends the superior court erred in dividing these benefits because Wife did not make any claim to them in her pretrial statement or at trial. ¶ 39 Wife indeed did not ask the superior court to allocate these benefits, and the record contains no evidence as to how they are calculated. Nonetheless, because we are remanding the military retirement provisions of the decree, and REDUX and CSB may be retirement-type benefits in which the community is entitled to share, the superior court on remand shall determine how to allocate these benefits should Husband elect to receive them. C. Equalization Payment. ¶ 40 The superior court denied Husband's request for an equalization payment based on $36,539 in community expenses (mainly the mortgage, utilities and groceries) he paid after Wife served the dissolution petition. Husband paid more than $30,000 of the expenses at issue during the several months leading up to entry of temporary orders, when he was working but Wife had no full-time job and was without temporary spousal maintenance, and when he continued to live with her in the marital home. The superior court reasoned that, "in fairness," it could not grant Husband's request for an equalization payment without also retroactively modifying temporary orders, implying that, under the circumstances, Wife had an equitable right to financial assistance from Husband during the applicable period. At the same time, the court also denied Wife's request for an equalization payment for an additional $20,000 in property and private retirement savings accounts Husband received under the decree. ¶ 41 Husband argues the court erred as matter of law, citing Bobrow v. Bobrow , 241 Ariz. 592, 596, ¶¶ 15, 19, 391 P.3d 646, 650 (App. 2017), in which we held a spouse's post-petition payment of community expenses is not presumed to be a gift of sole funds to the community. Wife argues Bobrow is distinguishable, and, in any event, the overall property allocation was equitable. ¶ 42 The parties in Bobrow had a premarital agreement that Husband would not be obligated to pay community expenses after either party filed a petition for dissolution. 241 Ariz. at 594, 595-96, ¶¶ 5, 14, 391 P.3d at 648, 649-50. On that basis, the superior court found the husband's post-petition payments were voluntary and presumed to be a gift to the community. Id. at 594, ¶ 5, 391 P.3d at 648. On appeal, this court held the presumption that a spouse intends a gift to the community when he or she uses separate funds to pay community expenses does not apply to post-petition expenditures. Id. at 596, ¶ 15, 391 P.3d at 650. ¶ 43 In eliminating the gift presumption, Bobrow instructed courts to account for post-petition payments made from separate property in equitably dividing community property. Id. at 596, ¶ 19, 391 P.3d at 650. The superior court here did not apply a gift presumption and otherwise did not abuse its discretion in denying both parties' requests for equalization payments. Given the financial disparity between Husband and Wife at the time, the superior court had discretion to retroactively grant temporary spousal maintenance. See A.R.S. § 25-318 (2018); Maximov v. Maximov , 220 Ariz. 299, 301, ¶ 7, 205 P.3d 1146, 1148 (App. 2009) (citing Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 81(A) (authorizing court to direct entry of judgment nunc pro tunc as justice may require) ). The court's implicit finding that Wife would have been unable to share the expenses at issue absent spousal maintenance is supported by the record. ¶ 44 Because the overall property allocation was equitable, we affirm the court's denial of Husband's request for reimbursement. D. Attorney's Fees Award. ¶ 45 In awarding attorney's fees to Wife, the court found neither party was unreasonable, but because of the disparity in their incomes, Husband should pay a proportionate share of Wife's fees. See A.R.S. § 25-324(A) (2018). Based on their comparative earnings, the court found that Husband should bear 67 percent of the attorney's fees incurred in the case; Wife, 33 percent. But in applying those ratios to the parties' respective fees, the court reduced both parties' paralegal rates to $50 an hour (from $150 charged by Wife's lawyer and $175 charged by Husband's lawyer). ¶ 46 In moving for reconsideration, Husband's counsel, whose office is in Phoenix, argued that his paralegal had more than 20 years' experience in family law and avowed that an hourly rate of $175 is reasonable in most counties in the state. He repeats those arguments on appeal, and Wife, represented by Yuma counsel, does not argue to the contrary. We review an award of attorney's fees for an abuse of discretion. Magee v. Magee , 206 Ariz. 589, 590, ¶ 6, 81 P.3d 1048, 1049 (App. 2004). ¶ 47 Neither party objected to the other's paralegal rates nor the amount of time their respective paralegals incurred. Nevertheless, in reducing the rates, the superior court stated: The court finds that $175 and $150 an hour for paralegal time is unreasonable and without sufficient evidence of local practice. Such a rate approximates three times the hourly rate of a judge.... Many lawyers do not charge anything for so-called paralegal time and secretarial time. ¶ 48 The court abused its discretion by sua sponte reducing the paralegal charges to $50 an hour. The $150 rate charged by Wife's Yuma counsel, and her failure to object to Husband's $175 rate, belies the court's finding that the parties had offered no evidence of rates charged by Yuma practitioners for work done by paralegals. More broadly, the court's pronouncement that "[m]any lawyers do not charge anything for so-called paralegal time" is demonstrably incorrect. To the contrary, trained, experienced paralegals can be invaluable in providing efficient legal services to the clients of a law firm. See Ahwatukee Custom Estates Mgmt. Ass'n v. Bach , 193 Ariz. 401, 403, ¶ 9, 973 P.2d 106, 108 (1999) ("[L]egal assistant and law clerk services may properly be included as elements in attorneys' fees applications and awards because these individuals typically have acquired legal training and knowledge sufficient to permit them to contribute substantively to an attorney's analysis and preparation of a particular legal matter." (quotation omitted) ). And the court's reference to a judge's "hourly rate" is simply inapplicable. The effective hourly rates of judges - like those of public defenders, prosecutors and other government lawyers - are not evidence of a reasonable hourly rate in private practice. ¶ 49 As he did in the superior court, Husband also argues the court erred by finding that Wife did not act unreasonably in the litigation. He contends Wife was unreasonable in failing to make or respond to settlement offers and by providing untimely discovery responses. Wife, on the other hand, contends Husband failed to follow through with a settlement agreement reached early in the litigation and failed to provide requested discovery. The superior court was in the best position to consider these competing allegations of unreasonableness. See Gutierrez , 193 Ariz. at 347, ¶ 13, 972 P.2d at 680. The record supports the court's conclusion that attorney's fees were not warranted based on unreasonable conduct. ¶ 50 Husband does not dispute the superior court's finding that disparity in the parties' finances warranted an award of fees to Wife. We affirm that finding, but, for the reasons stated, reverse and remand the award because the court abused its discretion in reducing the parties' paralegal rates. E. Attorney's Fees and Costs on Appeal. ¶ 51 Wife requests an award of attorney's fees and costs on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324. In the exercise of our discretion, we decline to award attorney's fees to Wife. Husband did not take unreasonable positions on appeal and, after the award of spousal maintenance, the financial disparity between the parties is not great. We award Husband his costs on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-342 (2018). CONCLUSION ¶ 52 We reverse the parenting-time provisions in the decree and remand for a new hearing on parenting time. We reverse the decree's provisions concerning Husband's military retirement and the order awarding attorney's fees to Wife and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, we affirm the decree. Absent material change after the relevant date, we cite the current version of applicable statutes. Arizona law once required a presumption in favor of women with respect to the custody of young children. See A.R.S. § 14-846(B) (1956) ("[O]ther things being equal, if the child is of tender years, it shall be given to the mother. If the child is of an age requiring education and preparation for labor or business, then to the father."). See Dunbar v. Dunbar , 102 Ariz. 352, 354, 429 P.2d 949, 951 (1967) (applying "tender years" statute as "the declared policy of this state"). The legislature repealed the statute in 1973. 1973 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 75, § 3. When Father moved for reconsideration of the parenting-time order based in part on this finding, the court denied the motion, stating that "[t]he gender of the children and the parties was a very minor factor in the totality of circumstances." On the record presented and given the court's other erroneous findings, we cannot determine that its parenting-time ruling was unaffected by its improper gender-based presumption. Cf. Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution § 2.08 (American Law Institute 2002) (as a general matter, "court should allocate custodial responsibility so that the proportion of custodial time the child spends with each parent approximates the proportion of time each parent spent performing caretaking functions for the child prior to the parents' separation"). See also Maj. Michael H. Gilbert, A Family Law Practitioner's Road Map to the Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act , 32 Santa Clara L. Rev. 61, 77-78 (1992) (as a practical matter, such orders force a military spouse to retire). The ratio by which to derive the community's share of Husband's military retirement is (1) the number of months Husband and Wife were married while Husband was in the service divided by (2) the number of Husband's months in service for retirement purposes, as determined by the military. The amount of military retirement pay due a serviceperson (i.e., the number to which the ratio is applied) is a matter for the military to determine. Therefore, and because we reverse the superior court's order that Husband must indemnify Wife if he does not retire after 20 years of service, we will not address the parties' respective contentions about the specifics of the amount Wife ultimately may receive as her share of the community's interest in Husband's retirement. Cases interpreting the statute to the contrary do not address the significance of the provision's use of the phrase "under this section." See Fricks v. Fricks , 771 So. 2d 790, 793 (La. App. 2000) ; Neese v. Neese , 669 S.W. 2d 388, 391 (Tex. App. 1984). These benefits are similar to military retirement benefits that might be available to Husband after 15 years of service. See 37 U.S.C. § 354 (2018) ; Boedeker v. Larson, 44 Va.App. 508, 605 S.E. 2d 764, 771 (2004). After 15 years of service, servicepersons who entered the military after July 31, 1986 can opt for the CSB and REDUX retirement plan, under which a member is eligible to receive a $30,000 bonus upon reaching his or her fifteenth year of active service. If the member makes that election, however, his or her retirement is calculated at a reduced rate. See https://www.dfas.mil/retiredmilitary/plan/estimate/csbredux.html (last visited June 19, 2018).

BEENE, Judge: ¶1 Don Jacob Havatone appeals from his convictions and sentences for two counts of aggravated driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor ("DUI"), one count of aggravated assault, one count of endangerment, and four counts of misdemeanor assault. Because a Nevada statute at the time allowed a blood sample to be taken from an unconscious DUI suspect, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied, and the superior court did not err by denying Havatone's motion to suppress. Accordingly, we affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 In September 2012, Havatone's SUV swerved into oncoming traffic and collided with another vehicle near Kingman, Arizona. Havatone was taken to a hospital in Nevada for injuries sustained in the collision. A police officer in Nevada, without securing a warrant, obtained a sample of Havatone's blood drawn by the hospital's phlebotomist. A criminalist in Arizona tested Havatone's blood sample and it showed a blood alcohol concentration of 0.21. ¶3 The State charged Havatone with two counts of aggravated DUI, five counts of aggravated assault, and one count of endangerment. Before trial, Havatone moved to suppress the results of the warrantless blood draw. ¶4 At the suppression hearing, Officer Perea with the Arizona Department of Public Safety ("DPS") testified that he responded to the collision. He stated that the passengers riding with Havatone, as well as the driver of the other vehicle, were injured in the collision. He found Havatone lying behind his SUV with a head wound. Officer Perea smelled alcohol coming from Havatone, found alcohol containers in his vehicle, and Havatone admitted he was driving. ¶5 Based on his injuries, Havatone was taken by helicopter to a hospital in Nevada. Officer Perea contacted DPS dispatch and asked them to contact Nevada Highway Patrol ("NHP") to collect a blood sample. DPS dispatch contacted NHP, informed them that Havatone caused a collision in Arizona, the officer on scene suspected him of DUI, and requested Nevada law enforcement assist in the collection of a blood sample. ¶6 Officer Perea did not direct dispatch to explain how Nevada law enforcement should collect the blood sample or whether they needed a search warrant. Although Officer Perea testified at the suppression hearing that whether to obtain a search warrant was his "sole decision," he did not believe he needed to obtain a search warrant for an out-of-state blood draw and he never attempted to do so in prior cases. ¶7 NHP dispatch relayed Officer Perea's request to NHP Officer Reinmuth. Officer Reinmuth testified that he went to the hospital, obtained a sample of Havatone's blood from a phlebotomist, and completed a declaration form pursuant to NHP protocol. Havatone was unconscious at the time of the blood draw and the State stipulated that the blood sample was not collected for medical purposes. The officer sent Havatone's blood sample to Arizona DPS for testing. Both officers testified that they followed departmental policies and their law enforcement training regarding the taking of Havatone's blood. ¶8 After the suppression hearing, the superior court found that the officers were authorized under both Arizona and Nevada law to obtain a warrantless blood sample, and, even if a warrant was required, the good-faith exception applied. The court denied Havatone's request to suppress the blood test results and the evidence was presented at trial. A jury found Havatone guilty as charged in four counts and guilty of lesser included offenses in the remaining counts. The court sentenced Havatone to a total of 17.5 years' imprisonment. ¶9 In his first appeal, Havatone argued the superior court erred in refusing to suppress the blood test results because both states' "implied consent" laws authorizing officers to conduct blood draws from unconscious DUI suspects violated his Fourth Amendment rights. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 28-1321(C) (2011); Nev. Rev. Stat. ("N.R.S.") § 484C.160(1), (2) (2009). Citing Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. 141, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013), Havatone argued that the officers lacked exigent circumstances to obtain a warrantless blood sample and the good-faith exception did not apply under Arizona law. ¶10 The State argued McNeely was issued after the blood draw occurred in this case and the good-faith exception applied under both Arizona and Nevada law. This Court agreed, affirming the superior court's ruling. State v. Havatone , 1 CA-CR 14-0223, 2015 WL 6472357, at *8, ¶ 29 (Ariz. App. Oct. 27, 2015) (mem. decision). We added, "[r]egardless of whether we assess Arizona or Nevada law, statutes in both states explicitly authorized the particular police conduct at issue here." Id . at *5, ¶ 20 (citing State v. Mitchell , 234 Ariz. 410, 419, ¶ 31, 323 P.3d 69, 78 (App. 2014) ). ¶11 The Arizona Supreme Court granted review of the denial of the motion to suppress the blood test results. State v. Havatone , 241 Ariz. 506, 509, ¶¶ 9-10, 389 P.3d 1251, 1254 (2017). The Arizona Supreme Court held that the "unconscious clause" of Arizona's "implied consent" statute, as applied in this case, was unconstitutional and the good-faith exception did not apply under Arizona law. Id . at 508, ¶¶ 1-2, 389 P.3d at 1253 ; see A.R.S. § 28-1321(C). The Arizona Supreme Court vacated this Court's decision, reversed the ruling on the motion to suppress, and remanded the case to the superior court. Id . at 515, ¶ 37, 389 P.3d at 1260. On remand, the Arizona Supreme Court ordered the trial court to determine, in the first instance, whether Arizona or Nevada law applies. If the court concludes that Nevada law applies, it should determine whether the good-faith exception applies. If the good-faith exception does not apply, the trial court must vacate the convictions and sentences, suppress the blood-draw evidence, and order a new trial. Id . at 515, ¶ 36, 389 P.3d at 1260. ¶12 On remand, the superior court ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs on "whether Arizona or Nevada law should apply to the seizure of the blood in this case and, if Nevada law applies, whether the good-faith exception applies." The court found that Nevada law applied to the seizure of the blood, Nevada case law authorized the officer's conduct at the time of the seizure, and the good-faith exception applied. The court added, "Although the blood could not have been lawfully obtained in Arizona under the same procedures in place in Nevada, the blood was lawfully seized in Nevada. Imposition of the exclusionary rule would not serve its stated purpose of deterring police misconduct if the evidence was precluded." Thus, the court affirmed its prior refusal to suppress the blood test results. ¶13 Havatone filed a timely appeal from the superior court's ruling upon remand and we have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1). DISCUSSION ¶14 Havatone contends the superior court erred in applying Nevada law to the warrantless blood sample obtained through a draw conducted in that state and, in turn, erred in finding that the good-faith exception applied under Nevada law. Although Havatone argues that the court should have applied Arizona law, he asserts the good-faith exception does not apply under either Arizona or Nevada law. ¶15 We review a ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion. State v. Valenzuela , 239 Ariz. 299, 302, ¶ 9, 371 P.3d 627, 630 (2016). We review the superior court's legal conclusions as to issues of constitutional law and "the applicability of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule" de novo . Havatone , 241 Ariz. at 509, ¶ 11, 389 P.3d at 1254 ; State v. Booker , 212 Ariz. 502, 504, ¶ 10, 135 P.3d 57, 59 (App. 2006). We may only consider evidence presented at the suppression hearing and view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the court's ruling. State v. Butler , 232 Ariz. 84, 87, ¶ 8, 302 P.3d 609, 612 (2013). I. Purpose of the Exclusionary Rule ¶16 To resolve the choice-of-law issue, we first look to the history of the exclusionary rule. Known as a judicially-created "deterrent remedy," the exclusionary rule was imposed as a consequence for illegal searches and seizures. Wolf v. Colorado , 338 U.S. 25, 31-32, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949). In Weeks v. United States , 232 U.S. 383, 393, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914), the United States Supreme Court explained that "the protection of the 4th Amendment ... is of no value" if evidence obtained in an illegal search and seizure can be used in a federal prosecution. To provide no remedy "would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect, if not an open defiance, of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the people against such unauthorized action." Id . at 394, 34 S.Ct. 341. Thus, the Court in Weeks created the federal exclusionary rule, barring the use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id . at 391-99, 34 S.Ct. 341 ; see also Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States , 251 U.S. 385, 392, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920). ¶17 Later, in Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), the United States Supreme Court extended the exclusionary rule to violations of the Fourth Amendment by state actors through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court noted, "without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as a freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Id . (internal quotations omitted). The Court made clear that, at its core, the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to encourage compliance with the United States Constitution and prevent convictions based on illegally obtained evidence. Id . at 657, 81 S.Ct. 1684 ; see also Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229, 236-37, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) ("The rule's sole purpose, we have repeatedly held, is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations."). ¶18 Although the primary aim of the exclusionary rule is clearly deterrence, our courts have indicated that exclusion is also a "recognition that the judiciary ought not be involved in exploiting violations of the basic law." State v. Coats , 165 Ariz. 154, 157-58, 797 P.2d 693, 696-97 (App. 1990). The exclusionary rule also serves to promote "judicial integrity." Elkins v. United States , 364 U.S. 206, 222-24, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960). Although "judicial integrity" alone would not merit exclusion of evidence, it still plays a role in determining whether exclusion is proper in a given case. United States v. Janis , 428 U.S. 433, 458 n.35, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976). ¶19 In concluding Arizona's exclusionary rule "is no broader than the federal rule" in State v. Bolt , 142 Ariz. 260, 269, 689 P.2d 519, 528 (1984), the Arizona Supreme Court held that the rule in Arizona must mirror the federal rule. Noting that the exclusionary rule may allow guilty individuals to avoid prosecution, the Arizona Supreme Court conceded that it would be "poor judicial policy for rules governing the suppression of evidence to differ depending upon whether the defendant is arrested by federal or state officers." Id . at 267-69, 689 P.2d at 526-28. In adopting an exclusionary rule uniform with the scope and purpose of the federal rule, our courts have consistently held that the primary aim of the rule is to deter officer misconduct. E.g., Valenzuela , 239 Ariz. at 308-09, ¶ 31, 371 P.3d at 636-37 ("the exclusionary rule ... is a prudential doctrine invoked to deter future violations."); Mitchell , 234 Ariz. at 419, ¶ 31, 323 P.3d at 78 ("the exclusionary rule ... incentivizes law enforcement to err on the side of constitutional behavior."); Booker , 212 Ariz. at 504, ¶ 11, 135 P.3d at 59 ("when there is no cognitive nexus between the police misconduct and the crime for which the defendant is ultimately tried, the exclusionary rule's primary deterrent purpose is not served."). II. Choice-of-Law and the Exclusionary Rule Analysis ¶20 Based on the history of the exclusionary rule, we turn to the issue of which state's law applies. Although choice-of-law inquiries in the criminal context are rare and no prior Arizona case has directly addressed the issue, other jurisdictions have adopted methods for determining whether the forum law (location of prosecution) or the situs law (location of officer conduct) applies. See John Bernard Corr, Criminal Procedure and the Conflict of Laws , 73 Geo. L.J. 1217, 1220-26 (1985). ¶21 Some states have chosen to employ a civil choice-of-law approach, typically called the interest analysis, which focuses on the forum state's ties to the case in deciding which law to apply; this approach tends to favor application of forum law. See State v. Grissom , 251 Kan. 851, 840 P.2d 1142, 1185-86 (1992) ; People v. Benson , 88 A.D.2d 229, 454 N.Y.S.2d 155, 156-57 (1982) ; People v. Saiken , 49 Ill.2d 504, 275 N.E.2d 381, 385 (1971) ; Burge v. State , 443 S.W.2d 720, 723 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). ¶22 Other states have elected to use another approach, typically called the exclusionary rule analysis, which focuses on the underlying principles of the exclusionary rule in deciding which law to apply; this approach tends to favor application of situs law. See State v. Boyd , 295 Conn. 707, 992 A.2d 1071, 1084-88 (2010) ; State v. Harvin , 345 S.C. 190, 547 S.E.2d 497, 499-500 (2001) ; Pooley v. State , 705 P.2d 1293, 1302-03 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) ; State v. Lucas , 372 N.W.2d 731, 736-38 (Minn. 1985) ; People v. Blair , 25 Cal.3d 640, 159 Cal.Rptr. 818, 602 P.2d 738, 746-49 (1979). ¶23 While the exclusionary rule's focus on deterrence is meant to promote officers' "knowledge of controlling law," any forum-based analysis would require officers to learn the law of any "other potentially interested state[ ]." Corr, supra , at 1228-29. Moreover, any approach that favors application of forum law, even in cases where officers acted lawfully in the situs state, ignores the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule. See Pooley , 705 P.2d at 1302-03. Conversely, the exclusionary rule analysis focuses solely on the practical implications of exclusion in a given case. See Harvin , 547 S.E.2d at 499. Given the fact-driven nature of the exclusionary rule analysis and the problems that arise under the interest analysis, "the trend appears to be toward using the exclusionary rule analysis." Tom Quigley, Do Silver Platters Have a Place in State-Federal Relations? Using Illegally Obtained Evidence in Criminal Prosecutions , 20 Ariz. St. L.J. 285, 322 (1988). ¶24 In Boyd , Pooley , and Blair , the courts in Connecticut, Alaska, and California reasoned that, although the officers' conduct would have violated their state law, excluding evidence obtained lawfully in other states would not serve to deter future police misconduct. Boyd , 992 A.2d at 1084-86 ; Pooley , 705 P.2d at 1303 ; Blair , 159 Cal.Rptr. 818, 602 P.2d at 747-48. ¶25 In the absence of contrary authority in this state, we believe the exclusionary rule analysis is better suited to resolving choice-of-law issues in criminal cases. Using this approach, we must identify the underlying principles of Arizona's exclusionary rule and determine whether those principles will be served in the application of forum or situs law. See Richard Tullis & Linda Ludlow, Admissibility of Evidence Seized in Another Jurisdiction: Choice of Law and the Exclusionary Rule , 10 U.S.F.L. Rev. 67, 91 (1975). Mirroring federal law, Arizona courts have consistently held that the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future police misconduct. See State v. Weakland , 246 Ariz. 67, 69, ¶ 6, 434 P.3d 578, 580 (2019). ¶26 In this case, the blood draw occurred in Nevada and Officer Reinmuth used NHP protocol in collecting the sample. Officer Perea merely sent a request through DPS dispatch to Nevada dispatch, providing no direction about the procedure the Nevada officer should employ to collect Havatone's blood sample. Nothing in the record shows that Officer Reinmuth acted as an agent of Arizona law enforcement or that Officer Perea intended to bypass a more protective state law. See Boyd , 992 A.2d at 1084-86 (finding no agency relationship where officers were merely present during an out-of-state search and record did not show they intended to skirt their state's law); State v. Brown , 132 Wash.2d 529, 940 P.2d 546, 589-90 (1997) (finding no agency relationship where officers "merely telephoned" another jurisdiction and asked them to question a suspect). Moreover, Officer Reinmuth's conduct was authorized by Nevada law at the time of the blood draw. Infra ¶¶ 30-32. ¶27 For these reasons, we adopt the reasoning in Boyd , Pooley , and Blair . Although the blood draw would have violated Arizona law, it was lawful under Nevada law and exclusion would not serve the purpose of our exclusionary rule. ¶28 Using the exclusionary rule analysis, we hold that the superior court did not err in applying Nevada law to the blood draw. III. Application of the Good-Faith Exception ¶29 Next, we turn to whether the good-faith exception would apply to the blood sample obtained under Nevada law. As with other exceptions to the exclusionary rule, the good-faith exception arose out of the belief that suppression is "a massive remedy," unwarranted where it would yield no significant "deterrence benefits." Hudson v. Michigan , 547 U.S. 586, 596, 599, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006). In establishing the exception, the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 922, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), held that "the marginal or nonexistent benefits" of excluding evidence "obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion." Thus, in considering whether the good-faith exception applies, courts must consider whether exclusion has the potential to "meaningfully deter ... deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence." Herring v. United States , 555 U.S. 135, 144, 129 S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009). ¶30 At the time of the collision in this case, the Nevada "implied consent" statute permitted officers to obtain nonconsensual blood draws from unconscious DUI suspects. N.R.S. § 484C.160(1), (2). In Galvan v. State , 98 Nev. 550, 655 P.2d 155 (1982), decided before McNeely , the Nevada Supreme Court considered this portion of Nevada's "implied consent" statute. In Galvan , the defendant caused a collision, appeared nonresponsive at the scene, and was transported to the hospital. Id . at 155. Suspecting him of DUI, officers obtained a warrantless blood draw while the defendant was unconscious. Id . at 155-56. Looking to the United States Supreme Court decision in Schmerber v. California , 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), the Nevada Supreme Court recognized that blood draws trigger Fourth Amendment protections. Galvan, 655 P.2d at 157. The Nevada Supreme Court, however, noted that nothing in the Schmerber decision required that officers obtain consent, make an arrest, or secure a warrant in every case. Id . The Schmerber decision merely required that a "properly performed" blood draw be "justified by the circumstances." Id . Based on those requirements, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that the "inevitable and rapid" dissipation of alcohol in the defendant's blood was a sufficient exigent circumstance to justify a warrantless blood draw. Id . ¶31 Guided by McNeely , the Nevada Supreme Court ruled in 2014 that because dissipation of marijuana in the blood alone did not create a per se exigency, the portion of Nevada's "implied consent" law that allowed officers to use reasonable force in obtaining a warrantless blood draw was unconstitutional. Byars v. State , 130 Nev. 848, 336 P.3d 939, 944-46 (2014). In that case, however, the court held that the officer reasonably relied on federal appellate precedent and Nevada law at the time of the blood draw and exclusion "would not act as a deterrent to unconstitutional police conduct." Id . at 946-47 (citing Davis , 564 U.S. at 244-46, 131 S.Ct. 2419 ). ¶32 Contrary to Havatone's argument regarding Officer Reinmuth's knowledge of his state's case law, we need only look to the objective circumstances of the seizure. See Leon , 468 U.S. at 922-23, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (holding the good-faith inquiry is an objective standard). Based on Nevada's "implied consent" law and its precedent at the time of the blood draw, Officer Reinmuth reasonably relied on his department's policy for obtaining a blood sample when procuring Havatone's blood. Moreover, exclusion of the evidence would not serve to deter officer misconduct where none can be found. As noted by the superior court, the officer not only followed Nevada precedent at the time of the seizure, but his department has since changed its policies regarding warrant requirements for blood draws. Officer Reinmuth's department policy has evolved to comply with post- McNeely standards, the record shows no "recurring or systemic negligence" on the part of NHP, and exclusion would carry no deterrence benefits. See Herring , 555 U.S. at 144, 129 S.Ct. 695. Under Nevada law, the good-faith exception would apply to the blood draw and suppression would not be warranted. CONCLUSION ¶33 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Havatone's convictions and sentences. We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdicts. State v. Payne , 233 Ariz. 484, 509, ¶ 93, 314 P.3d 1239, 1264 (2013). Havatone added that, although he believed Arizona law controlled, the good-faith exception would not apply even under Nevada law. Although the parties cite to Arizona case law involving out-of-state officer conduct, our courts have declined to adopt a specific choice-of-law analysis. See State v. Davolt , 207 Ariz. 191, 201-05, ¶¶ 21-34, 84 P.3d 456, 466-67 (2004) (applying Arizona and federal law to a search conducted in California); State v. Anderson , 197 Ariz. 314, 326, ¶ 34, 4 P.3d 369, 381 (2000) (declining to apply Arizona initial appearance rule to time spent in custody in Illinois).

STARING, Presiding Judge: ¶1 In this appeal from Pablo Isaac Hernandez's conviction for unlawful flight from a law enforcement vehicle, we conclude the trial court erred by not giving an adverse-inference jury instruction based on State v. Willits , 96 Ariz. 184, 191, 393 P.2d 274 (1964). We thus reverse Hernandez's conviction and remand for a new trial. Factual and Procedural History ¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court's rulings and affirming Hernandez's conviction. See State v. Gay , 214 Ariz. 214, ¶¶ 2, 4, 150 P.3d 787 (App. 2007). On March 31, 2016, Pima County Sheriff's Deputy Michael Turner was driving a marked unit when a car ran a stop sign, entered his lane, and caused him to swerve to avoid a collision. While trying to avoid a collision, Turner "locked eyes" with the driver of the car for "a second to two seconds." He later testified the driver's face was "a face that [he] would never forget." ¶3 Turner attempted a traffic stop. The car did not stop, however, resulting in a pursuit that eventually ended in a parking lot, where the driver and two other occupants of the car fled on foot. Turner saw the driver's profile as he fled. ¶4 Within three minutes, federal marshals investigating another matter arrived at the parking lot and showed Turner a photograph bearing Hernandez's name. Turner identified him as the driver. Using the computer in his patrol unit, Turner then pulled up another photograph of Hernandez, and again identified him as the driver. ¶5 Before trial, Hernandez filed a motion to suppress evidence of Turner's pretrial identification, arguing the identification procedure was unduly suggestive under State v. Dessureault , 104 Ariz. 380, 453 P.2d 951 (1969), and the identification, if admitted, would be more prejudicial than probative under Rule 403, Ariz. R. Evid. He also moved to preclude Turner from making an identification during trial. The trial court denied the motions, finding the pretrial identification reliable. At trial, Turner again identified Hernandez as the driver. ¶6 Also before trial, Hernandez requested a Willits instruction based on the state's failure to collect DNA and fingerprint evidence from the car before releasing it to the registered owner. The trial court denied the motion, finding no loss or destruction of evidence, and also finding that, even had such evidence been discovered and preserved, it would have been "neutral" in terms of its capacity to exculpate or inculpate Hernandez. ¶7 Hernandez was convicted and sentenced to three years' imprisonment and this appeal followed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A). Discussion Pretrial Identification ¶8 Hernandez argues the trial court erred when it failed to preclude Turner's pretrial and in-court identifications. We review the court's "rulings on pretrial identifications for abuse of discretion." State v. Moore , 222 Ariz. 1, ¶ 17, 213 P.3d 150 (2009) ; see also State v. Leyvas , 221 Ariz. 181, ¶ 9, 211 P.3d 1165 (App. 2009) (fairness and reliability of challenged identification reviewed for clear abuse of discretion). "We defer to a ... court's factual findings that are supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous." Moore , 222 Ariz. 1, ¶ 17, 213 P.3d 150. "The ultimate question of the constitutionality of a pretrial identification is, however, a mixed question of law and fact" we review de novo. Id . And, "[a] trial court ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed based solely on the evidence presented at the suppression hearing." Id. ¶9 At the suppression hearing, Turner testified he was "[v]ery certain" of his identification of Hernandez as the driver when the marshals showed him the photograph moments after the pursuit ended. In challenging the reliability of Turner's identification and asserting the pretrial identification procedure was unduly suggestive, Hernandez points to Turner's other statement that, without that photograph, he "probably would not have been able to identify him later on down that road." The trial court, however, questioned Turner about that admission: The Court: And you mentioned if you hadn't had those pictures sitting here today, if it's the first time you saw him again, you don't know if you would be able to recognize him from the small view that you had when he went by you? [Turner]: From the incident, yeah, I could recognize him today, but from the point when-before I made contact with [Hernandez] that afternoon I would not have been able to identify [him] as Pablo Hernandez, but the face of the driver I would be able to identify . (Emphasis added.) ¶10 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "has been interpreted to require 'that any pretrial identification procedures [be] conducted in a manner that is fundamentally fair and secures the suspect's right to a fair trial.' " State v. Rojo-Valenzuela , 237 Ariz. 448, ¶ 6, 352 P.3d 917 (2015) (alteration in Rojo-Valenzuela ) (quoting State v. Lehr , 201 Ariz. 509, ¶ 46, 38 P.3d 1172 (2002) ). "Whether an identification procedure is so suggestive that it violates a defendant's due process rights depends on the totality of the circumstances." Id. A two-part test exists "for determining the admissibility of identification testimony," examining first "whether the method or procedure used was unduly suggestive," and then, "if unduly suggestive, whether it led to a substantial likelihood of misidentification, i.e., whether it was reliable." State v. Goudeau , 239 Ariz. 421, ¶ 132, 372 P.3d 945 (2016) (quoting Lehr , 201 Ariz. 509, ¶ 46, 38 P.3d 1172 ). ¶11 In Rojo-Valenzuela , our supreme court held "[a]n inherently suggestive one-person show-up identification procedure implicates due process, but such an identification is nevertheless admissible at trial if it is sufficiently reliable." 237 Ariz. 448, ¶ 1, 352 P.3d 917. Here, assuming without deciding that federal marshals showing Turner a single photograph was equivalent to a one-person show-up procedure and thus inherently suggestive, we must determine whether the resulting identification was nonetheless reliable. Id. In doing so, we consider the totality of circumstances including the following factors: "(1) the witness's opportunity to view or hear the perpetrator at the time of the offense; (2) the witness's degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness's prior description; (4) the level of certainty; and (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation." Goudeau , 239 Ariz. 421, ¶ 132, 372 P.3d 945. This list of factors is not exclusive and "a court may rely on other indicia of reliability as well." Rojo-Valenzuela , 237 Ariz. 448, ¶ 8, 352 P.3d 917. ¶12 Turner had the opportunity to view Hernandez's face, "lock[ing] eyes" with him, as he swerved to avoid a collision. Although he viewed Hernandez briefly, Turner's full attention was on Hernandez's face during the near collision. He also saw Hernandez's profile as he fled on foot from the car. Within three minutes of Hernandez fleeing, Turner saw the marshals' photograph and recognized him. Further, Turner testified he was "[v]ery certain" in his identification of Hernandez and that he would have been able to identify him in court without having first viewed the photograph. Applying the Goudeau factors, this record adequately supports the trial court's finding that Turner's identification was sufficiently reliable to be presented to the jury. See, e.g. , State v. Rojo-Valenzuela , 235 Ariz. 617, ¶ 15, 334 P.3d 1276 (App. 2014), aff'd , 237 Ariz. 448, 352 P.3d 917 (2015) (witness's identification reliable when "short duration of [witness's] observation was more than offset by his degree of attention"). Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the identification. Willits Instruction ¶13 Hernandez argues the trial court erred when it denied his request for a Willits instruction based on the state's failure to collect fingerprint and DNA evidence from the car before releasing it. "We review rulings regarding a Willits instruction for abuse of discretion." State v. Glissendorf (Glissendorf II) , 235 Ariz. 147, ¶ 7, 329 P.3d 1049 (2014). "An error of law constitutes an abuse of discretion." State v. Cheatham , 240 Ariz. 1, ¶ 6, 375 P.3d 66 (2016). ¶14 In a Willits instruction, the jury is told that if it finds "that the state ... allowed material evidence to be destroyed," or, in some circumstances failed to preserve evidence, it may "infer that the evidence would be against the interests of the state." State v. Hunter , 136 Ariz. 45, 50, 664 P.2d 195, 200 (1983) (instruction required after destruction of evidence) (citing Willits ); see also State v. Perez , 141 Ariz. 459, 464, 687 P.2d 1214, 1219 (1984) (instruction required where state fails to preserve "obviously material, and reasonably accessible" evidence and prejudice shown). In Willits , the state charged the defendant with attempting to ignite an explosion, and his defense was that the explosion was an accident. 96 Ariz. at 186-87, 393 P.2d 274. The state destroyed the package of explosives that was recovered at the scene, and Willits argued it might have aided him in showing the explosion was accidental. Id. at 187-88, 393 P.2d 274. The trial court denied his request for a jury instruction that read: "If you find that the plaintiff, the State of Arizona, has destroyed, caused to be destroyed, or allowed to be destroyed any evidence whose contents or quality are in issue, you may infer that the true fact is against their interest." Id. at 187, 393 P.2d 274. Our supreme court, however, concluded the requested instruction should have been given because "an inference unfavorable to the prosecution could have been drawn" and "[t]his in itself could create a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt." Id. at 191, 393 P.2d 274 (emphasis omitted). ¶15 Here, Hernandez's defense at trial was that he was not the driver of the car, and the state's evidence consisted solely of Turner identifying Hernandez as the driver. Before trial, Hernandez requested a Willits instruction "based upon the State's failure to preserve material evidence" because "[i]dentification is a major issue in this case and forensic evidence from inside the [car], including fingerprint and DNA evidence from the steering wheel could have shown that [Hernandez] was not driving the car." The state opposed the motion, arguing "the [car] had little probative value" and that "the identity of the driver is not an issue" because Turner identified Hernandez as the driver. The trial court ruled: [T]his is not evidence because we don't know what is there and it's not a loss of evidence and it's not a destruction of evidence. And whether you are talking about whether it's exculpatory, it just as easily could be inculpatory. It's a non-there is no indicator of which way the evidence goes. And what I believe, it's not appropriate to present an inference to the jury that something exculpatory was there because I don't think it rises to that level. It's a nullity in my mind. It's a neutral-the evidence could be against him and could be for him. That being the case obviously, because you had the opportunity if it's going to be an identification case-because you have the opportunity to discuss regarding what they could have done to further identify him and that's already in the record, I'm going to deny the motion because I don't think a Willits instruction is necessary under those circumstances. ¶16 Concerning the standard a defendant must satisfy to obtain a Willits instruction, our supreme court recently held: "To be entitled to a Willits instruction, a defendant must prove that (1) the state failed to preserve material and reasonably accessible evidence that could have had a tendency to exonerate the accused, and (2) there was resulting prejudice." Glissendorf II , 235 Ariz. 147, ¶ 8, 329 P.3d 1049 (quoting State v. Smith , 158 Ariz. 222, 227, 762 P.2d 509, 514 (1988) ); see also State v. Speer , 221 Ariz. 449, ¶ 40, 212 P.3d 787 (2009) ; State v. Broughton , 156 Ariz. 394, 399, 752 P.2d 483, 488 (1988). Although Glissendorf II acknowledges that a defendant "must do more than simply speculate about how the evidence might have been helpful," 235 Ariz. 147, ¶ 9, 329 P.3d 1049, the phrase "tendency to exonerate," "does not mean the evidence must have had the potential to completely absolve the defendant," id. ¶ 10. Indeed, "tendency to exonerate" has been used interchangeably with "potentially helpful." Id. ; see also State v. Murray , 184 Ariz. 9, 33, 906 P.2d 542, 566 (1995) ; State v. Davis , 205 Ariz. 174, ¶ 35, 68 P.3d 127 (App. 2002). Thus, "a defendant 'is entitled to an instruction if he can demonstrate that the lost evidence would have been material and potentially useful to a defense theory supported by the evidence.' " Glissendorf II , 235 Ariz. 147, ¶ 10, 329 P.3d 1049 (quoting State v. Glissendorf (Glissendorf I) , 233 Ariz. 222, ¶ 17, 311 P.3d 244 (App. 2013), vacated , 235 Ariz. 147, 329 P.3d 1049 ). ¶17 Hernandez maintains he was entitled to a Willits instruction because the state failed to preserve the car or collect fingerprint and DNA evidence from it, and that such evidence would have tended to exonerate him. Specifically, he argues the "absence of DNA and fingerprints could have substantiated his defense that he was not the driver." The state counters that Hernandez was not entitled to a Willits instruction because he "failed to show that fingerprinting and DNA testing of the car would have a tendency to exonerate him." The state also contends "whether the surfaces of the car would have produced fingerprint and DNA evidence is entirely speculative" and the absence of such evidence "would not support his defense theory of misidentification because people often do not leave behind fingerprints or DNA after touching an item." On the record before us, we agree with Hernandez. ¶18 First, the state failed to preserve any fingerprints and DNA that may have been present in the car before returning it to its owner. And, because the sole issue was the identification of the driver, and the validity of that identification was disputed, physical evidence from the interior of the car, particularly the driver's side, was material. This evidence was also reasonably accessible, as the car had been abandoned by the occupants and the sheriff's department had possession of it. Deputies had the opportunity to examine the car for fingerprints and DNA before releasing it. ¶19 Second, fingerprint and DNA evidence collected from the car could have had the potential to exonerate Hernandez. We disagree with the state's argument that whether the surfaces of the car could have produced such evidence is "entirely speculative." At trial, Hernandez admitted a photograph showing several visible fingerprints both on the window and driver's door frame. Hernandez neither could nor needed to show more about these fingerprints (i.e., whether they were on the inside or outside of the car or whether they were forensically useable) because, due to the actions of the state, he did not at any point have access to the car. Moreover, both the state and our dissenting colleague disregard the fact that, although not necessarily dispositive, the absence of Hernandez's fingerprints and DNA in the vehicle-particularly on the steering wheel, gear shift and door handle-would have been exculpatory. ¶20 Mindful of the inherently uncertain tilt of evidence which has been lost or destroyed, a Willits instruction merely erects a rebuttable presumption. It does not require the jury to infer the missing evidence would have been adverse to the state; the jury is free to reject that notion. Nor does a Willits instruction preclude the state from presenting evidence about why the absence of particular evidence is neither dispositive nor even exculpatory. The instruction allows the jury to weigh all of the evidence, the absence of evidence, and any explanation the state may have for why it was destroyed or otherwise not preserved. ¶21 We conclude that Hernandez has met his burden of showing that the evidence, if preserved, would have been potentially helpful to him. He was entitled to a Willits instruction as to the state's failure to preserve any fingerprint and DNA evidence in the car. The trial court erred by denying the instruction. Disposition ¶22 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse Hernandez's conviction and remand for a new trial. Such an instruction is commonly known as a "Willits instruction." An "unduly suggestive" identification procedure described in Dessureault , triggering "the need for a reliability analysis," is the same as an "inherently suggestive" identification procedure described in other case law. See Rojo-Valenzuela , 237 Ariz. 448, n.1, 352 P.3d 917. In view of our resolution of this issue, we need not reach the state's argument that the identification procedure was not unduly suggestive because the identification was made as a matter of law enforcement necessity. See State v. Wood , 180 Ariz. 53, 72, 881 P.2d 1158, 1177 (1994) ("Our disposition of the other issues on appeal, however, makes it unnecessary to reach this issue."). Ordinarily, a Willits instruction is not warranted merely because the state fails to test evidence, but rather when the state causes or allows the evidence to be unavailable to the defendant. See Broughton , 156 Ariz. at 399, 752 P.2d at 488 (instruction inappropriate where state delayed testing evidence but did not destroy or lose it); State v. Watkins , 126 Ariz. 293, 301, 614 P.2d 835, 843 (1980) (failure to identify blood type on weapon not destruction of evidence); State v. Todd , 244 Ariz. 374, ¶ 24, 418 P.3d 1147 (App. 2018) (decision not to develop DNA or fingerprint evidence from weapon not destruction or loss of evidence). Here, the deputies neither preserved the car nor examined it for fingerprints or DNA. Instead, they released it to the owner a few weeks after the incident, which was approximately three months before Hernandez's arrest. This prevented the defense from conducting any fingerprint or DNA testing of its own. Likewise, the presence of fingerprints or DNA belonging neither to Hernandez nor anyone else with legitimate access to the car could have been exculpatory. As the trial court correctly noted, the presence of Hernandez's fingerprints or DNA in the car would have inculpated him. But, as made clear in Glissendorf II , and implicit in Willits itself, a defendant need only show that the lost evidence would have had the potential to be exculpatory: he need not show it would necessarily have been so. The state has not argued that error in failing to give a Willits instruction would be harmless. Hernandez argues the trial court also erred by precluding expert testimony from a Tucson Police Department detective, who would describe proper non-suggestive identification procedures. See Wood , 180 Ariz. at 72, 881 P.2d at 1177. Hernandez maintains such testimony was relevant to explain to a jury how the photo identification here, which deviated substantially from those procedures, was suggestive. Because we reverse for the reasons stated above, we do not reach this issue.

JUSTICE LOPEZ, opinion of the Court: ¶ 1 We explain today the reasons for our prior decision order disqualifying the "Stop Political Dirty Money Amendment" from the November 2018 general election ballot. We honor the constitutional origins of our citizens' right to amend the Arizona Constitution and to enact legislation through the initiative process, and we are reluctant to impede such civic efforts. However, we must also enforce valid statutory requirements that permissibly regulate the initiative process. We hold that A.R.S. § 19-118(C) is constitutional, both facially and as applied here, because its requirement that registered petition circulators subpoenaed in an election challenge appear for trial "does not unreasonably hinder or restrict" the initiative process and it "reasonably supplements the constitutional purpose" by fostering the integrity of the process. Direct Sellers Ass'n v. McBrayer , 109 Ariz. 3, 5, 503 P.2d 951, 953 (1972). I. ¶ 2 The right to initiate constitutional amendments and propose statutes was retained by the people when delegating legislative authority to the Arizona legislature. Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1 (1)-(2). To exercise this right, a sufficient number of qualified electors must sign verified petitions in support of the proposed measure and submit them as prescribed by law. See A.R.S. tit. 19 ch. 1 (setting forth the specific process by which such petitions are to be submitted and processed). Constitutional initiatives require signatures from 15% of all qualified electors. Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1 (2). For a statewide initiative, the Arizona Secretary of State (the "Secretary") is required to review the submitted petitions, remove petition sheets and individual signatures on petition sheets that fail to comply with statutory requirements, and count the remaining signatures on the petition sheets. A.R.S. § 19-121.01(A). If, after satisfying other Title 19 requirements not contested here, the Secretary determines that the initiative is supported by the requisite number of valid signatures, the measure is placed on the ballot. A.R.S. §§ 19-121.04(B), -125. ¶ 3 On July 5, 2018, the Outlaw Dirty Money political committee (the "Committee") filed signature petitions with the Secretary to qualify initiative C-03-2018, otherwise known as the "Stop Political Dirty Money Amendment" (the "Initiative"), for the November 2018 ballot. The Initiative's purpose is to amend the Arizona Constitution to ensure public knowledge of the original source of campaign contributions. The Committee was required to gather 225,963 valid signatures to qualify the Initiative for the ballot. The Committee's signature count exceeded the minimum required. ¶ 4 On July 19, the tenth business day after the Committee filed its petitions, the Stanwitz Petitioners ("Petitioners") filed a complaint pursuant to § 19-118(D) challenging the validity of certain petitions based on various objections to petition circulators, including that their registrations were defective, they were ineligible to circulate petitions, and they were improperly paid based upon the number of signatures gathered. ¶ 5 On August 2, the Secretary completed her preliminary review of the petitions pursuant to § 19-121.01, and determined that 263,000 signatures remained to be verified pursuant to additional statutory procedures. On August 7, the Committee filed a complaint pursuant to A.R.S. § 19-122(A) claiming the Secretary erroneously removed certain petition sheets and signatures during her review. The trial court consolidated the actions. ¶ 6 On August 9, prior to trial, Petitioners notified the Committee's counsel and the trial court that they intended to subpoena approximately twenty of the Committee's petition circulators to testify concerning their statutory qualifications to gather signatures. Counsel for the Committee requested additional time to prepare for the evidentiary hearing in light of the subpoenaed witnesses, which the court granted. The next day, Petitioners issued subpoenas to fifteen circulators, approximately 0.6% of the Committee's circulators, requiring their appearance at the August 20 evidentiary hearing. ¶ 7 On August 10 and 13, Petitioners served the Committee's circulators. Petitioners provided counsel for the Committee with copies of the subpoenas on August 10 and informed counsel that they had served, or were in the process of serving, the circulators. Fourteen of the circulators listed as their statutory address, for purposes of service of process pursuant to § 19-118(B)(2), the same location-a ninth-floor suite in a multi-tenant Phoenix commercial office building rented by the petition circulation company hired by the Committee. Because there was a guard stationed at the first-floor entrance to the building, Petitioners served the subpoenas on the guard, who signed the service of process form and wrote that he was "authorized to receive and accept service of process." ¶ 8 None of the fifteen subpoenaed circulators appeared at the August 20 evidentiary hearing or otherwise responded to Petitioners' subpoenas. Petitioners moved the trial court to disqualify the non-appearing circulators' petitions containing 8824 signatures. In response, the Committee challenged the constitutionality of three statutes: A.R.S. § 19-102.01(A), which requires strict construction of, and compliance with, constitutional and statutory requirements for statewide initiative measures; § 19-122(A), which governs the Secretary's duties to accept and file a petition for an initiative or referendum; and § 19-118(C), which invalidates any petition signatures obtained by a registered circulator properly served with a subpoena who fails to appear for trial. ¶ 9 On August 22, the day before the trial court filed its ruling, the Secretary issued the results of her final review, which included county recorders' verifications of random signature samples pursuant to A.R.S. § 19-121.02(A)-(B). The Secretary determined, pursuant to A.R.S. § 19-121.04(A), that "the estimated total number of valid signatures is 223,892, which is less than the 225,963 minimum signatures required to qualify for the ballot under the Arizona Constitution." The Secretary concluded that, pending the outcome of legal challenges in the trial court, "[the Initiative] has not submitted a sufficient number of signatures for placement on the November 6, 2018 ballot." ¶ 10 On August 23, the trial court filed its ruling, in relevant part, upholding the constitutionality of § 19-102.01(A) (the strict compliance provision), finding that the statute "reasonably supplements" and does "not unreasonably hinder or restrict" the Constitution; upholding the constitutionality of § 19-118(C) (the circulator subpoena provision), "both on its face and as applied to the facts of this case," because it "reasonably supplements and does not unreasonably hinder[ ] the Committee's constitutional right of initiative"; and voiding the petition sheets containing 8824 signatures produced by the fifteen circulators who failed to appear pursuant to Petitioners' subpoenas. The trial court's ruling rendered the Initiative ineligible for the November 2018 ballot. ¶ 11 The Committee and Petitioners filed expedited appeals in this Court pursuant to A.R.S. § 19-122(A). The Committee challenges the constitutionality of §§ 19-102.01(A) and 19-118(C), and the trial court's decision to disqualify the non-appearing subpoenaed circulators' petition signatures. Because the parties agree that the validity of the signatures gathered by the non-appearing circulators is dispositive as to whether the Initiative qualified for inclusion on the November 2018 ballot, we do not consider Petitioners' appeal. II. ¶ 12 As our decision does not turn on whether the Committee strictly complied with § 19-118(C), we need not determine the constitutionality of the strict compliance requirement of § 19-102.01(A). See, e.g. , Hayes v. Cont'l Ins. Co. , 178 Ariz. 264, 273, 872 P.2d 668, 677 (1994) (noting that, if possible, "we construe statutes to avoid unnecessary resolution of constitutional issues"). Consequently, the only issues we must decide are the constitutionality of § 19-118(C) and the propriety of the trial court's exclusion of the non-appearing subpoenaed circulators' petition signatures. We have jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to article 6, § 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and § 19-122(C). III. ¶ 13 We will not disturb a trial court's findings of fact unless they are "clearly erroneous as not either supported by reasonable evidence or based on a reasonable conflict of evidence." Moreno v. Jones , 213 Ariz. 94, 98 ¶ 20, 139 P.3d 612, 616 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review de novo as a question of law whether an initiative violates a constitutional or statutory requirement. League of Ariz. Cities & Towns v. Brewer , 213 Ariz. 557, 559 ¶ 7, 146 P.3d 58, 60 (2006). We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo, "construing it, if possible, to uphold its constitutionality." State v. Hulsey , 243 Ariz. 367, 385 ¶ 67, 408 P.3d 408, 426 (2018) ; see Pedersen v. Bennett , 230 Ariz. 556, 558 ¶ 6, 288 P.3d 760, 762 (2012). ¶ 14 As noted above, the Arizona Constitution authorizes the state's qualified electors to propose and enact laws by initiative. Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1 (1)-(2). This authority, however, is subject to reasonable regulation. Id. § 1 (14) (the initiative power "shall not be construed to deprive the legislature of the right to enact any measure except that the legislature shall not have the power to adopt any measure that supersedes" an enacted initiative). "Further, article 7, section 12 directs the legislature to enact 'registration and other laws to secure the purity of elections and guard against abuses of the elective franchise.' " Molera v. Invest In Ed. Comm. , 245 Ariz. 291, ----, 428 P.3d 490, 493 ¶ 10 (2018) (quoting Ariz. Const. art. 7, § 12 ). A statute regulating a provision of our constitution is permissible if it "does not unreasonably hinder or restrict the constitutional provision and if the [statute] reasonably supplements the constitutional purpose" of the provision. Direct Sellers , 109 Ariz. at 5, 503 P.2d at 953. ¶ 15 Section 19-118(A) provides that "[a]ll circulators who are not residents of this state and, for statewide ballot measures only, all paid circulators must register as circulators with the secretary of state before circulating petitions pursuant to this title." Section 19-118(B)(1) requires that the circulator consent to the jurisdiction of Arizona courts "in resolving any disputes concerning the circulation of petitions by that circulator," and § 19-118(B)(2) mandates that the circulator designate an Arizona address "at which the circulator will accept service of process related to disputes concerning circulation of that circulator's petitions." "Service of process is effected under this section by delivering a copy of the subpoena to that person individually or by leaving a copy of the subpoena at the address designated by the circulator with a person of suitable age." § 19-118(B)(2). Thus, § 19-118, which requires certain circulators to register before gathering signatures for ballot measures and creates a cause of action to challenge the eligibility of petition circulators, is an exercise of legislative authority to regulate the ballot measure process. Cf. W. Devcor, Inc. v. City of Scottsdale , 168 Ariz. 426, 429-31, 814 P.2d 767, 770-72 (1991) (holding referendum petitions invalid because they did not comply with constitutional and statutory requirements for circulators' statements); Direct Sellers , 109 Ariz. at 5, 503 P.2d at 953 (holding that "the requirement that circulators of referendum petitions be qualified electors is a valid exercise of legislative power"). IV. ¶ 16 Section 19-118(C), the statutory provision the Committee challenges here, sets forth registered petition circulators' obligations to respond to a subpoena and the penalty for non-compliance: If a registered circulator is properly served with a subpoena to provide evidence in an action regarding circulation of petitions and fails to appear or produce documents as provided for in the subpoena, all signatures collected by that circulator are deemed invalid. A. ¶ 17 The Committee argues that § 19-118(C) is facially unconstitutional as it fails to pass muster under Direct Sellers because it unduly hinders and restricts the legislative authority of the people through the initiative process and fails to reasonably supplement the purpose of the initiative process. Specifically, the Committee contends that the statute impedes the initiative process because it improperly disqualifies otherwise valid signatures merely because a circulator fails to appear when subpoenaed to testify as to a petition challenge. We disagree. ¶ 18 To provide context for the Committee's constitutional challenge, we note that the Arizona Constitution specifically envisions a signature verification requirement, Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1 (9), and this Court has observed that "[t]he circulator is the only person in the process who is required to make a sworn statement and is, therefore, the person under the greatest compulsion to lend credibility to the process." W. Devcor , 168 Ariz. at 432, 814 P.2d at 773. Consequently, because the integrity of the signature collection process is singularly dependent on the probity of circulators, "statutory circulation procedures" are critical "to reduce the number of erroneous signatures, guard against misrepresentations, and confirm that signatures were obtained according to law." Brousseau v. Fitzgerald , 138 Ariz. 453, 456, 675 P.2d 713, 716 (1984) (discussing candidate nominating petitions); cf. Arrett v. Bower , 237 Ariz. 74, 79 ¶ 17, 345 P.3d 129, 134 (App. 2015) (concluding that a petition serial number requirement was "critical" to ensuring the integrity of the referendum process). ¶ 19 "To succeed on a facial challenge, ... 'the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid. The fact that the [statute] might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid.' " State v. Wein , 244 Ariz. 22, 31 ¶ 34, 417 P.3d 787, 796 (2018) (quoting United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) ), petition for cert. docketed , No. 18-391 (U.S. Sept. 27, 2018). "[T]he State need not narrowly tailor the means it chooses to promote ballot integrity," including deterrence of fraud. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party , 520 U.S. 351, 365, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997). As noted, supra ¶ 14, a statute regulating a provision of the Arizona Constitution is permissible if it "does not unreasonably hinder or restrict the constitutional provision and if the [statute] reasonably supplements the constitutional purpose" of the provision. Direct Sellers , 109 Ariz. at 5, 503 P.2d at 953. ¶ 20 The Committee's facial challenge fails for two reasons. First, the Committee does not contend that § 19-118(C)'s disqualification remedy is invalid in all circumstances. On the contrary, the Committee observes that "requiring the circulators to register and provide information to facilitate calling them as witnesses in any proceeding involving their petitions could arguably protect the integrity of the initiative process" when there is a "valid objection" or a "need for the circulator's testimony." The Committee's implicit concession refutes its facial constitutional challenge because it expressly contemplates a constitutional application of the statute. Second, contrary to the Committee's argument, the challenged provision reasonably supplements the initiative process by deterring fraud. ¶ 21 We agree with the trial court that the statute "represents a reasonable means of fostering transparency, facilitating the judicial fact-finding process, inducing compliance with valid compulsory process, and mitigating the threat of fraud or other wrongdoing infecting the petition process." Thus, § 19-118(C) is constitutionally valid on its face because it furthers the constitutional purpose of the initiative process by ensuring the integrity of signature gathering by reasonable means, and the Committee fails to demonstrate that there is "no set of circumstances" under which the statute's application would be valid. B. ¶ 22 The Committee's principal argument, then, is that § 19-118(C) is unconstitutional as applied in this case because the circulators' testimony was not factually or legally necessary to determine the validity of their petition signatures and Petitioners' issuance of subpoenas was unduly burdensome. More pointedly, the Committee contends that Petitioners "had no intention of actually relying on testimony by [the subpoenaed circulators]" because their testimony was unnecessary or irrelevant to Petitioners' challenges to the circulators' statutory qualifications. We are unpersuaded. ¶ 23 Petitioners raised serious allegations concerning the circulators' statutory qualifications to collect signatures. Despite the Committee's assertion that the circulators' testimony was unnecessary for the trial court to evaluate Petitioners' challenges, the court, in its discretion, reached the opposite conclusion. In fact, the trial court found that the [s]ubpoenaed circulators' failure to appear, or to otherwise respond to the subpoenas, materially prejudiced the fact-finding process, particularly with respect to questions relating to (1) the manner in which circulators were compensated, to include whether or to what extent signature quotas or other productivity factors affected circulators' compensation or employment status; (2) the existence and nature of felony convictions; and (3) alleged defects in the circulators' registration forms and petition affidavits. On this record, we find no basis to disturb the trial court's findings concerning the merits of Petitioners' asserted need for testimony to support their challenges to the subpoenaed circulators' qualifications. See Moreno , 213 Ariz. at 98 ¶ 20, 139 P.3d at 616. ¶ 24 Further, the Committee's suggestion that it was unduly burdened by Petitioners' subpoenas to circulators is unpersuasive. Petitioners subpoenaed only fifteen circulators to testify-fewer than one percent (0.6%) of the Committee's petition circulators-and the Committee received notice of the subpoenas eleven days before the evidentiary hearing. Section 19-118(C)'s application here demonstrates, rather than refutes, the constitutional application of the statute's disqualification remedy. C. ¶ 25 The Committee next argues that, even if § 19-118(C) is constitutional, the trial court erred in refusing to quash the subpoenas because Petitioners failed to comply with the statute's valid service requirement and Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 45's service and timeliness provisions. We disagree. ¶ 26 "Service of process is effected under [ § 19-118 ] by delivering a copy of the subpoena to that person individually or by leaving a copy of the subpoena at the address designated by the circulator with a person of suitable age." § 19-118(B)(2) ; see also Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.1(d)(1)-(3) (service is proper if an individual is served personally, if a copy of the served document is left at their dwelling or usual place of abode with a person of suitable age, or if service is performed on an authorized agent). For purposes of service of process, an authorized agent is a person who has actual authority to accept service or who has apparent authority to do so based on the principal's actions. Kline v. Kline , 221 Ariz. 564, 570 ¶ 20, 212 P.3d 902, 908 (App. 2009). ¶ 27 The Committee contends that Petitioners' service was defective under § 19-118(B)(2) because they served fourteen subpoenas on a guard stationed on the first floor of the multi-story office building rather than at the circulators' listed ninth-floor suite at the same address. This contention is unconvincing. The Committee, through its contracted petition-circulation company, chose this location as the circulators' statutory service address. Petitioners effected service at this facility as they were permitted-with the guard on the first floor of the circulators' building who signed the service of process form and avowed in writing that he was "authorized to receive and accept service of process" for the building's tenants. Petitioners reasonably served the building's guard as the circulators' authorized agent for service purposes. We see no reason to disturb the trial court's finding of proper service. See Moreno , 213 Ariz. at 98 ¶ 20, 139 P.3d at 616. Further, accepting the Committee's argument that Petitioners failed to satisfy the statute's service requirement on these facts would incentivize evasion of service because it would encourage a circulator to register a statutory service address beyond the reach of a process server, thus undermining the enforceability and fraud deterrence purpose of § 19-118(C). ¶ 28 The Committee's argument that Petitioners failed to comply with the Rule 45 requirements to provide proof of service of the subpoenas, Ariz. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3), and to do so within a "reasonable time to comply," Ariz. R. Civ. P. 45(e)(2)(A)(i), is also unavailing. On August 10, 2018, Petitioners provided written notice to the Committee of the fifteen subpoenas, including the circulators' names and service-of-process addresses, and that the circulators were being served. At the August 20 evidentiary hearing, after Petitioners moved to disqualify the non-appearing circulators, the Committee suggested for the first time that Petitioners' service was defective. But the Committee knew of the subpoenas at the initial hearing in the case, the subpoenas were issued and served ten days before the evidentiary hearing, and the Committee was promptly served with copies of the affidavits of service. Because the record belies the Committee's claim of inadequate notice and unfair delay, we affirm the trial court's ruling that the Committee failed to articulate any prejudice arising from the alleged Rule 45 violations. V. ¶ 29 The Committee recounts its extraordinary efforts in circulating petitions and gathering signatures over seven months to propose a constitutional amendment to enhance transparency concerning the source of campaign contributions. We do not discount the civic activism or the resources devoted to this campaign. But the right of the people to exercise the legislative prerogative is, and must be, subject to reasonable regulation of the initiative process. Because § 19-118 fosters the integrity of the initiative process and does so by reasonable means, we hold that § 19-118(C)'s disqualification provision is constitutional on its face and as applied here. ¶ 30 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment disqualifying the Initiative from the November 2018 ballot. One circulator provided a different address with no suite or room number and the Committee does not challenge the validity of service at that address under § 19-118(B)(2). The Committee, citing San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court , 193 Ariz. 195, 195-96 ¶¶ 37-40, 972 P.2d 179, 211-12 (1999), asserts in a footnote that "[t]o the extent that A.R.S. § 19-118(C) also precludes the court from making factual findings regarding the eligibility or lawful registration of circulators based on evidence before it, it raises separation of powers concerns." We decline to consider the Committee's passing reference to "separation of powers concerns." See, e.g. , AMERCO v. Shoen , 184 Ariz. 150, 154 n.4, 907 P.2d 536, 540 n. 4 (App. 1995) (declining to consider a "cursory parenthetical assertion" as sufficient to frame an issue for review).

CATTANI, Judge: ¶ 1 In this case, we consider whether a claim based on a divorce settlement agreement executed years before the decedent's death, but not enforceable until after death, should be deemed to have arisen before the decedent's death for purposes of Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") § 14-3803. This issue is significant in determining when the statute of limitations commences on a creditor's claim against the decedent's estate for breach of such a settlement agreement. We hold that when a person enters into a contract obligating him to act while living to ensure a payment to the claimant at or after his death, a claim for breach arises before the decedent's death. Accordingly, and for reasons that follow, we affirm the superior court's ruling barring Judith Evitt-Thorne's claim against her ex-husband's estate as time-barred under A.R.S. § 14-3803. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶ 2 Evitt-Thorne and Charles Evitt divorced in 1987. Their settlement agreement included the following provision: 10. Death Benefits to the Wife. If wife shall survive Husband, Husband agrees to provide wife ... the sum of $150,000.00 upon Husband's death. This provision shall be deemed satisfied if Husband provides insurance proceeds from any existing policy of life insurance or any new policy which Husband may from time to time obtain, including policies in which the Wife is now or in the future may be named as the owner and/or beneficiary. ¶ 3 Evitt remarried and moved to Wyoming, where he died in September 2013. Probate proceedings were initiated in Wyoming, and Evitt's surviving spouse and their two daughters were appointed as personal representatives of the estate. ¶ 4 The personal representatives were unaware of the settlement agreement Evitt made with Evitt-Thorne 26 years before he died. Preparing to settle the estate, the personal representatives reviewed Evitt's available business records and asked Evitt's accountant to identify any known creditors, debts, or regular payments being made on his behalf. The personal representatives provided notice to known creditors pursuant to Wyoming Statutes Annotated ("W.S.A.") § 2-7-205(a)(ii), and provided notice to the estate's unknown creditors by publication pursuant to W.S.A. § 2-7-201. The Wyoming probate court settled the estate in May 2014 and entered a stipulation for final distribution of the estate in August 2014. ¶ 5 A year after the estate was settled, Evitt-Thorne sent a letter to Evitt's daughters asserting that she intended to file a claim against the estate for the amount stated in the settlement agreement and would initiate probate proceedings in Arizona if the estate did not respond. The personal representatives told Evitt-Thorne they were not aware of an outstanding obligation and believed she had already been paid all monies owed to her. ¶ 6 Evitt-Thorne initiated probate proceedings in Arizona and petitioned for allowance of her claim. The personal representatives intervened and moved for summary judgment disallowing the claim, arguing it was barred by Wyoming's nonclaim statute and thus also was barred under A.R.S. § 14-3803(B), which bars claims against a decedent's estate that arose before the death of the decedent and are barred by the nonclaim statute of the decedent's domicile. The superior court granted the motion and awarded the estate attorney's fees of $46,926.27. Evitt-Thorne timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(9). DISCUSSION ¶ 7 Evitt-Thorne argues that the superior court erred by granting summary judgment because: (1) her claim was not barred because it arose "at or after the death of the decedent," see A.R.S. § 14-3803(C) ; (2) there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was a "reasonably ascertainable" creditor under Wyoming law; and (3) in any event, under W.S.A. § 2-7-703(c)(i), she was entitled to equitable relief due to "peculiar circumstances." We review de novo the grant of summary judgment. In re Estate of Wyttenbach , 219 Ariz. 120, 122, ¶ 8, 193 P.3d 814, 816 (App. 2008). We also review de novo issues of statutory interpretation. Scottsdale Healthcare, Inc. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys. Admin. , 206 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 10, 75 P.3d 91, 94 (2003). ¶ 8 Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; Orme Sch. v. Reeves , 166 Ariz. 301, 309, 802 P.2d 1000, 1008 (1990). We view the facts in the light most favorable to, and draw reasonable inferences for, the party against whom summary judgment was entered. Ader v. Estate of Felger , 240 Ariz. 32, 35, ¶ 2, 375 P.3d 97, 100 (App. 2016). I. A.R.S. § 14-3803. ¶ 9 Evitt-Thorne argues that her claim was not barred because it arose after the decedent's death, and that she thus had two years to file a claim pursuant to A.R.S. § 14-3803(C). A claim that "arose before the death of the decedent" is barred in Arizona if it is barred by the nonclaim statute of the decedent's domicile. A.R.S. § 14-3803(A)-(B). But if a claim "arise[s] at or after the death of the decedent," the claimant has until two years after decedent's death plus any time remaining on the notice of probate. A.R.S. § 14-3803(C)(2). Thus, whether § 14-3803(B) operates to bar Evitt-Thorne's claim (because it was not filed within the time required under Wyoming law) depends on whether the claim arose "before" or "at or after" the decedent's death. See A.R.S. § 14-3803(A)-(C). ¶ 10 Evitt-Thorne argues that her claim did not arise until Evitt's death because it could not be enforced until then. But the ordinary meaning of "arise" is "to come into being; originate." Ader , 240 Ariz. at 38, ¶ 16, 375 P.3d at 103 (citing The American Heritage Dictionary 95 (5th ed. 2011); see also Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) ("To originate; to stem (from)"). Thus, a claim "arises ... when a decedent commits the act that is the basis of the claim." Ader , 240 Ariz. at 38, ¶ 16, 375 P.3d at 103. ¶ 11 Although Evitt-Thorne's claim was not enforceable until decedent's death, the claim itself was based on the settlement agreement, which originated 26 years before the decedent's death. That the claim was not enforceable, because it was not yet due and contingent, is inapposite. Both § 14-3803(A) and (C) apply to claims "whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent." Thus, Evitt-Thorne's claim was a contingent claim that arose before Evitt's death under § 14-3803. ¶ 12 We note that the same rule would apply if there were an agreement to pay a sum certain several years after the decedent's death. See A.R.S. § 14-3803(A) (applying to claims "whether due or to become due " (emphasis added). If, for example, a payment was not due until three years after a decedent's death, the claimant would nevertheless be required to comply with § 14-3803(A) and timely notify the decedent's personal representative of the claim even though payment was not yet due; to hold otherwise would require that a decedent's estate remain open indefinitely and would frustrate Arizona's policy of promoting the "speedy and efficient" settling of the estate. See A.R.S. § 14-1102(B)(3) ; see also In re Estateof Winn , 214 Ariz. 149, 153, ¶ 20, 150 P.3d 236, 240 (2007) ; Barnett v. Hitching Post Lodge, Inc. , 101 Ariz. 488, 491, 421 P.2d 507, 510 (1966). ¶ 13 Finally, our interpretation is consistent with rulings in other Uniform Probate Code jurisdictions that have interpreted statutes similar to A.R.S. § 14-3803. See In re Estate of Hadaway , 668 N.W.2d 920 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a claim based on a dissolution judgment arose before the decedent's death even though payment was due upon the decedent's death); see also Spohr v. Berryman , 589 So.2d 225, 227-28 (Fla. 1991) (holding that a claim against the decedent's estate based on a divorce agreement "arose before the death of the decedent" because the claim "was based upon an agreement which was made many years before [the decedent's] death"). ¶ 14 Because Evitt-Thorne's claim falls under § 14-3803(A), her claim was barred in Arizona if it was not timely asserted in Wyoming. See A.R.S. § 14-3803(B). Under Wyoming's nonclaim statute, claims are barred unless they are filed within three months of the first date of the publication of notice. W.S.A. §§ 2-7-703, -201. Here, notice was first published on December 5, 2013; thus, any claim against the estate had to be filed by March 5, 2014. Evitt-Thorne did not take any action until she initiated Arizona probate proceedings in July 2015. Accordingly, Evitt-Thorne's claim was barred by Wyoming's nonclaim statute and thus is also barred under A.R.S. § 14-3803(B). II. Reasonably Ascertainable Creditor. ¶ 15 Evitt-Thorne also argues that a genuine issue of fact as to whether she was a reasonably ascertainable creditor precluded summary judgment. Under Wyoming law, a decedent's estate must provide notice to creditors by publication, W.S.A. § 2-7-201, or by mail, W.S.A. § 2-7-205(a). A creditor "whose identity is reasonably ascertainable" within three months is entitled to notice by mail. W.S.A. § 2-7-205(a)(ii), -201. A creditor must file any claims within three months of the date notice was first published (or within 30 days after notice is mailed) or the claim is barred; the claim is not barred, however, if the creditor was "reasonably ascertainable by the personal representative" and did not receive notice by mail. W.S.A. § 2-7-201, -703(a), (c)(ii). ¶ 16 Evitt-Thorne does not dispute whether the estate published notice in compliance with W.S.A. § 2-7-201. Instead, Evitt-Thorne argues that she was entitled to notice by mail because she was a reasonably ascertainable creditor. A creditor is "reasonably ascertainable" if the creditor is discoverable through "due diligence to identify the decedent's potential creditors from all available sources at hand." In re Estate of Novakovich , 101 P.3d 931, 938, ¶ 27 (Wyo. 2004) (citation omitted). ¶ 17 Evitt-Thorne argues that, because Evitt had conversations with his daughter (who was one of the personal representatives of his estate) years before his death about his obligations to Evitt-Thorne, there was an issue of fact as to whether Evitt-Thorne was a reasonably ascertainable creditor. But the only statements attributed to Evitt in the record were to the effect that he "no longer owed [Evitt-Thorne] anything and that any obligation he had ... had long ago been paid in full." Without more, those statements made years before Evitt's death and that only referenced an agreement that had already been satisfied, did not make Evitt-Thorne a reasonably ascertainable creditor. Accordingly, the superior court properly rejected Evitt-Thorne's claim on that basis. III. Equitable Relief. ¶ 18 Evitt-Thorne further argues that she is entitled to relief from the procedural bar of the nonclaim statutes under the unusual circumstances of this case. Under W.S.A. § 2-7-703(c)(i), the presence of "peculiar circumstances" may entitle a creditor to prosecute a claim that is otherwise barred. Under the statute, the failure to file a timely claim is excused if it "was caused by circumstances that are out-of-the ordinary, and it is fair to excuse the failure." Scott v. Scott , 918 P.2d 198, 201 (Wyo. 1996). We review the denial of equitable relief for an abuse of discretion. McCloud v. State , 217 Ariz. 82, 87, ¶ 10, 170 P.3d 691, 696 (App. 2007) ; see also In re Estate of Graves , 267 P.3d 1070, 1072, ¶ 11 (Wyo. 2011). ¶ 19 Evitt-Thorne asserts that because the probate occurred in Wyoming and was initiated shortly after Evitt's death, she is entitled to equitable relief. But Evitt had been domiciled in Wyoming for many years before he died, a fact known to Evitt-Thorne, so it was not peculiar that Evitt's probate would occur in Wyoming. ¶ 20 Evitt-Thorne also argues that she is entitled to equitable relief because the personal representatives did not mention the Wyoming probate proceeding when they responded to Evitt-Thorne's demand letter in May 2015. But Evitt-Thorne's claim was "barred forever" under W.S.A. § 2-7-703(a) as of March 5, 2014, and Evitt's estate had been settled in the Wyoming probate court well before Evitt-Thorne's May 2015 demand letter. ¶ 21 Finally, Evitt-Thorne claims that the manner in which the Arizona probate proceedings were carried out warrants equitable relief. She cites in particular her initiation of the Arizona proceedings and the superior court's initial finding that the claim should be addressed in Arizona and not in Wyoming, the court's delay in appointing personal representatives, the court's order that the estate place $175,000 from the estate in a restricted account to ensure that there would be assets available were Evitt-Thorne to prevail on her claim, and the court's conclusion that Evitt-Thorne needed to make her claim even before she was aware of Evitt's death. But none of these circumstances explain why Evitt-Thorne did not file a claim before March 5, 2014. Although it might have required extra diligence on Evitt-Thorne's part to learn of Evitt's death (or to ascertain whether he was maintaining a life insurance policy in her name) in time to assert a claim against his estate, it was her lack of diligence, rather than any of the circumstances she now cites, that resulted in her claim being barred under Wyoming law. Accordingly, the superior court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Evitt-Thorne was not entitled to equitable relief under W.S.A. § 2-7-703(c)(i). IV. Attorney's Fees. ¶ 22 Evitt-Thorne finally argues that if we reverse the superior court's grant of summary judgment, we should also reverse the superior court's award of attorney's fees and costs to the estate. Because we affirm the superior court's grant of summary judgment, we also affirm its award of attorney's fees and costs to the estate. ¶ 23 The personal representatives request fees on appeal under A.R.S. § 12-341.01. In an exercise of our discretion, we deny their request. CONCLUSION ¶ 24 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. As the prevailing party, the personal representatives are entitled to an award of costs upon compliance with ARCAP 21.

THUMMA, Chief Judge: ¶ 1 In 2017, the Arizona Superior Court in Maricopa County entered dependency, termination of parental rights and adoption orders for S.B., a young child. In 2018, the Arizona Superior Court learned that, in 2016, an Alabama state court had issued a valid child custody order for S.B. that remained in place. After learning Alabama retained exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over S.B., the Arizona Superior Court vacated the dependency, termination and adoption orders for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners, S.B.'s paternal grandparents Monique and Donald B., seek special action relief from the ruling vacating those orders. For the following reasons, this court accepts jurisdiction but denies relief. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 2 S.B. was born in Alabama in March 2013 to Cathy L. (Mother) and Jacob B. (Father). In 2014, Mother filed a custody petition in Alabama state court. Also in 2014, Father and S.B. moved to Arizona to live with Petitioners. In August 2016, the Alabama court awarded Father sole custody of S.B. ¶ 3 In January 2017, Father died in a traffic accident. That same month, the Department of Child Safety (DCS) filed a dependency petition in Arizona Superior Court, alleging abandonment by Mother. S.B. was placed with Petitioners, where she has remained ever since. ¶ 4 Attempts to locate Mother were unsuccessful. DCS reported that "in March 2017, she relocated to ... Tennessee" but could not be found. Also in March 2017, S.B.'s Guardian Ad Litem filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights alleging abandonment. After service by publication, S.B. was found dependent as to Mother in April 2017 and Mother's parental rights to S.B. were terminated in June 2017. Petitioners then filed a petition to adopt S.B. In November 2017, the Arizona Superior Court granted the adoption petition and dismissed the dependency. ¶ 5 Meanwhile, in November 2017, Mother filed a petition with the Alabama court seeking to modify that court's August 2016 custody order, noting she "recently learned that the Father is deceased." In December 2017, the Alabama court awarded Mother sole custody of S.B. At about this same time, Mother also contacted the Arizona Superior Court. ¶ 6 In January 2018, the Arizona Superior Court made a factual finding that Mother "is a resident of Tennessee," but was not asked to address and did not address the Alabama court's exclusive, continuing jurisdiction based on the August 2016 custody order. Later in January 2018, Mother asked the Arizona Superior Court to set aside the order granting the adoption and the order terminating her parental rights, asserting that the Alabama court "retained jurisdiction over this matter." Numerous filings and hearings followed. ¶ 7 Mother asked the Arizona Superior Court to confer with the Alabama court regarding jurisdiction. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (A.R.S.) §§ 25-1010, -1036(B) (2018); accord Ala. Code §§ 30-3B-110, -206(B) (2018). During the resulting conference in early May 2018, the Alabama court expressly retained its exclusive, continuing jurisdiction based on the August 2016 custody order. See A.R.S. § 25-1032 ; accord Ala. Code § 30-3B-202. As a result, and concluding it lacked jurisdiction to enter the adoption, termination and dependency orders issued in 2017 (the 2017 Orders), the Arizona Superior Court vacated the 2017 Orders and directed that S.B. be returned to Mother. Petitioners then promptly filed this special action in mid-May 2018. ¶ 8 This court granted Petitioners' motion for stay pending resolution of this special action. In late May 2018, after further consideration, the Alabama court relinquished exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, having determined that Alabama is an inconvenient forum and that Arizona is a more appropriate forum. See Ala. Code § 30-3B-207 ; accord A.R.S. § 25-1037. This court allowed supplemental briefing regarding that Alabama order and then held oral argument. DISCUSSION I. Special Action Jurisdiction. ¶ 9 Special action jurisdiction is appropriate where petitioner has no "equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal." Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a) ; Arpaio v. Figueroa , 229 Ariz. 444, 446 ¶ 5, 276 P.3d 513, 515 (App. 2012) (citation omitted). Special action jurisdiction also is appropriate when a statute requires "immediate interpretation;" when a petition "presents a purely legal issue of first impression that is of statewide importance" and when the issue "is likely to recur." See Gutierrez v. Fox , 242 Ariz. 259, 264 ¶ 13, 394 P.3d 1096, 1101 (App. 2017) ; Welch-Doden v. Roberts , 202 Ariz. 201, 204 ¶ 10, 42 P.3d 1166, 1169 (App. 2002). "Although 'highly discretionary,' accepting special action jurisdiction is particularly appropriate where the welfare of children is involved and the harm complained of can only be prevented by resolution before an appeal." Dep't of Child Safety v. Beene , 235 Ariz. 300, 303 ¶ 6, 332 P.3d 47, 50 (App. 2014) (citations omitted). ¶ 10 The special action petition here raises an issue regarding the application of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) not previously addressed by any published decision. Because the petition presents a legal issue of first impression in applying the UCCJEA, is likely to recur and involves the welfare of a child, in its discretion, this court accepts special action jurisdiction. II. Application Of The UCCJEA. ¶ 11 "Promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission in 1997, the UCCJEA is a uniform act adopted in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Key purposes of the UCCJEA include 'to create consistency in interstate child custody jurisdiction and enforcement proceedings.' " Angel B. v. Vanessa J. , 234 Ariz. 69, 71-72 ¶ 7, 316 P.3d 1257, 1259-60 (App. 2014) (citations omitted); see also A.R.S. § 25-1001 to -1067 (UCCJEA in Arizona); Ala. Code §§ 30-3B-101 to - 405 (UCCJEA in Alabama). Once a court with original jurisdiction issues an initial child custody order, the UCCJEA gives that court exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over all future custody determinations, subject to statutory exceptions. Unless a statutory exception applies, courts in other states are prohibited from modifying an initial child custody order entered by a court with exclusive, continuing jurisdiction. Angel B. , 234 Ariz. at 72 ¶ 11, 316 P.3d at 1260 (citations omitted). Unless a statutory exception applies, this exclusive, continuing jurisdiction of the court issuing the initial child custody order precludes any subsequent "child custody proceeding" in another state, including "termination of parental rights" and related proceedings. Id. , at 73 ¶ 12, 316 P.3d at 1261 (citations omitted). ¶ 12 Under the UCCJEA, the Alabama court's August 2016 custody order means that court "ha[d] exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination," A.R.S. § 25-1032(A) ; accord Ala. Code § 30-3B-202(a)(2), and that custody order "[wa]s binding on other states unless and until certain changes or specified events occur[red]," Angel B. , 234 Ariz. at 72 ¶ 8, 316 P.3d at 1260 (citations omitted). More specifically, the August 2016 custody order meant Alabama retained exclusive, continuing jurisdiction "unless" either: (1) the Alabama court "determine[d] that it no longer ha[d] exclusive, continuing jurisdiction ... or that a court of this state would be a more convenient forum" or (2) the Alabama court or "[a] court of this state ... determine[d] that the child, the child's parents and any person acting as a parent d[id] not presently reside in" Alabama. A.R.S. § 25-1033 ; accord Ala. Code § 30-3B-203. ¶ 13 Petitioners argue the Arizona Superior Court had jurisdiction to issue the 2017 Orders based on (1) the Alabama court's late May 2018 order relinquishing exclusive, continuing jurisdiction to Arizona and (2) the Arizona Superior Court's January 2018 order finding that Mother lived in Tennessee (and because Father had died and S.B. and Petitioners had lived in Arizona for years). For the Arizona Superior Court to have jurisdiction to issue the 2017 Orders, the January or late May 2018 order would have to apply retroactively. Both factually and legally, however, those 2018 orders apply prospectively only. ¶ 14 Factually, as DCS and Mother note, neither the Alabama court's late May 2018 order, nor the Arizona Superior Court's January 2018 order, state that they apply retroactively. Moreover, in context, those orders did not apply retroactively. The late May 2018 Alabama court order was issued just weeks after that same court declined to relinquish exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, negating any suggestion that the order was to apply retroactively. Similarly, at about this same time, the Arizona Superior Court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to issue the 2017 Orders, negating any suggestion that it viewed the January 2018 order as applying retroactively. Factually, on this record, the January and late May 2018 orders did not apply retroactively. ¶ 15 Legally, Petitioners have cited, and this court has found, no case holding that an order relinquishing or recognizing the loss of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under the UCCJEA properly could apply retroactively. "[T]he best and most reliable index of a statute's meaning is its language and, when the language is clear and unequivocal, it is determinative of the statute's construction." State ex rel. Montgomery v. Harris , 234 Ariz. 343, 345 ¶ 8, 322 P.3d 160, 162 (2014) (quoting State v. Hansen , 215 Ariz. 287, 289 ¶ 7, 160 P.3d 166, 168 (2007) ). If the plain language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, then it is given effect without resort to secondary statutory construction principles. See, e.g., Martinez v. Industrial Comm'n , 175 Ariz. 319, 321, 856 P.2d 1197, 1199 (1993). ¶ 16 A key aspect of the UCCJEA is that one (and only one) state court has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction at any single point in time. See Angel B. , 234 Ariz. at 72 ¶ 8, 316 P.3d at 1260 ("Unless a statutory exception applies, courts in other states are prohibited from modifying an initial child custody order entered by a court with exclusive, continuing jurisdiction.") (citations omitted); Melgar v. Campo , 215 Ariz. 605, 607 ¶ 11, 161 P.3d 1269, 1271 (App. 2007) ("With certain exceptions, the decision to discontinue exclusive, continuing jurisdiction belongs to the court exercising it, and no other."); see also A.R.S. § 25-1036 (generally prohibiting simultaneous child custody proceedings in courts of two different states); accord Ala. Code § 30-3B-206. Allowing the original state's custody order to be modified by another state's court issuing a custody order that also applied retroactively would seriously undercut the exclusivity, and resulting certainty, that the UCCJEA seeks to advance. See Welch-Doden , 202 Ariz. at 208 ¶ 32, 42 P.3d at 1173 (noting a primary purpose of the UCCJEA is to "avoid[ ] the jurisdictional competition and conflict that flows from hearings in competing states"). ¶ 17 The text of the UCCJEA provides that the original state issuing "a child custody determination" retains "exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until " a subsequent event divests that original state court of jurisdiction. A.R.S. § 25-1032(A) (emphasis added); accord Ala. Code § 30-3B-202(A). As stated in a somewhat different context, the original state's custody order "is binding on other states unless and until certain changes or specified events occur." Angel B. , 234 Ariz. at 72 ¶ 8, 316 P.3d at 1260 (emphasis added). Given this forward-looking approach, and the purposes of the UCCJEA, upon the determination that the original state no longer retains exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, the second state may issue prospective child custody orders, but lacks authority to do so retroactively. ¶ 18 That child custody orders under the UCCJEA are prospective only also is consistent with the focus of the act. Under the UCCJEA, "exclusive continuing jurisdiction" is invoked by the first state to issue a "child custody determination," defined as "legal custody, physical custody or visitation with respect to a child." A.R.S. § 25-1002(3) ; accord Ala. Code § 30-3B-102(3). "Child custody determination" expressly "[d]oes not include an order relating to child support or other monetary obligation of an individual." A.R.S. § 25-1002(3) ; accord Ala. Code § 30-3B-102(3). Custody and visitation orders are, by definition, prospective. Indeed, Petitioners have not shown how custody or visitation orders (as opposed to orders regarding monetary obligations) could apply retroactively. This further demonstrates that the UCCJEA does not contemplate retroactivity. ¶ 19 Finally, cases from other jurisdictions recognize this prospective nature of the UCCJEA. Even after the parties move away from the original state, a determination by the original state that it no longer is exercising exclusive, continuing jurisdiction applies prospectively and does so only after an express judicial determination. See In re Marriage of Nurie , 176 Cal.App.4th 478, 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 200, 220 (2009) ("It is not the parties' departure itself that terminates the decree state's exclusive, continuing jurisdiction. Rather, it is when a 'court ... determines' that all parties have ceased residing there that jurisdiction is lost.") (citation omitted); New Mexico ex rel. Children, Youth, & Families Dep't v. Donna J. , 139 N.M. 131, 129 P.3d 167, 171 (App. 2006) ("An automatic loss of jurisdiction, without any factual determination, would add uncertainty, diminish the oversight ability of the courts, and increase conflicts between states. These results are contrary to the purposes of the UCCJEA."); In re Lewin , 149 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. App. 2004) ("A court's exclusive continuing jurisdiction does not vanish immediately once all the parties leave the state."). Although addressing a somewhat different issue, these cases further show the prospective nature of the UCCJEA. ¶ 20 Because the January and late May 2018 orders did not apply retroactively, the Alabama court retained exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over S.B. throughout 2017. See A.R.S. § 25-1032(A) ; accord Ala. Code § 30-3B-202(A). As a result, the Arizona Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to issue the 2017 Orders. Accordingly, the Arizona Superior Court properly vacated the dependency, termination and adoption orders it entered in 2017. CONCLUSION ¶ 21 For these reasons, this court accepts special action jurisdiction but denies relief. Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated. There is no claim that the 2017 Orders were based on, or could be justified under, the UCCJEA's temporary emergency jurisdiction authorization. See A.R.S. § 25-1034. Given this conclusion, this opinion does not address the other arguments advanced by the participants in this special action. At oral argument, DCS stated it would file a renewed dependency petition if this court concluded the Arizona Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to enter the 2017 Orders. Other than noting that the Arizona Superior Court now has jurisdiction to consider a renewed dependency petition, this court does not address the merits of such a petition.

JUSTICE TIMMER, opinion of the Court: ¶1 Maricopa County imposes a surcharge on car rental agencies to fund a stadium and other sports and tourism-related ventures. The issue here is whether this surcharge violates the dormant Commerce Clause implied by Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution or the anti-diversion provision, article 9, section 14 of the Arizona Constitution. We hold that it does not violate either provision. BACKGROUND ¶2 The legislature created the Arizona Tourism and Sports Authority (the "AzSTA") in 2000 to build and operate a sports stadium, build Major League Baseball spring training facilities, build youth and amateur sports and recreation facilities, and promote tourism. See A.R.S. §§ 5-801(4), -802(A), -807 to -809, -815. AzSTA's authority is restricted to counties with populations greater than two million people, meaning it has only ever operated in Maricopa County. See § 5-802(A). AzSTA's construction projects are funded solely by taxes and surcharges approved by Maricopa County voters. See § 5-802(C). One such voter-approved surcharge is at issue here. ¶3 Soon after the creation of AzSTA, Maricopa County voters passed an initiative that levied a surcharge on car rental companies based on their income derived from leasing vehicles for less than one year. See A.R.S. § 5-839(A)-(C) (authorizing voters to levy the surcharge and providing its terms). (The initiative also imposed a tax on hotels. The hotel tax is not at issue here.) The surcharge is the greater of $2.50 per rental or 3.25% of the company's gross proceeds or gross income. § 5-839(B)(1). If the rental is a "temporary replacement" for a damaged or lost vehicle, however, the surcharge is a flat $2.50. § 5-839(B)(2). The state treasurer distributes $2.50 per rental transaction to the Maricopa County Stadium District, which has collected a surcharge in this amount since 1991. See § 5-839(G)(1) ; Act of June 25, 1991, ch. 285, § 10, 1991 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1444, 1451-53 (1st Reg. Sess.) (codified at A.R.S. § 48-4234 ). The remaining amount, the difference between $2.50 per rental transaction and 3.25% of the company's gross income or proceeds, is distributed to AzSTA. § 5-839(G)(2). Although the surcharge is imposed on car rental companies, they can and do pass its cost on to their customers. ¶4 Plaintiff Saban Rent-a-Car ("Saban") rents vehicles in Maricopa County and has paid the car rental surcharge. Its customers are primarily local residents. In 2009, after unsuccessfully seeking a refund from the Arizona Department of Revenue ("ADOR"), Saban sued ADOR in the tax court and sought refunds and injunctive relief for all similarly situated car rental companies. The tax court certified a class of all individuals or entities that paid the surcharge from September 2005 through March 2008 and allowed AzSTA to intervene as a defendant. ¶5 As it does here, Saban argued to the tax court that the surcharge violates both the dormant Commerce Clause and the anti-diversion provision. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court agreed with ADOR and AzSTA that the surcharge does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. It agreed with Saban, however, that the surcharge violates the anti-diversion provision. Consequently, the court granted summary judgment for Saban and ordered ADOR to refund the surcharge payments to class members. The court also authorized ADOR to recoup the refund amounts from AzSTA pursuant to A.R.S. § 42-5029(G). ¶6 Like the tax court, the court of appeals ruled that the surcharge does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. Saban Rent-A-Car LLC v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue , 244 Ariz. 293, 296 ¶ 2, 418 P.3d 1066, 1069 (App. 2018). But unlike the tax court, the court of appeals concluded that the surcharge also does not violate the anti-diversion provision. Id. It therefore reversed the tax court's ruling and remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of ADOR and AzSTA. See id. at 308 ¶ 49, 418 P.3d at 1081. ¶7 We granted review to address these legal issues of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution. DISCUSSION I. The Dormant Commerce Clause ¶8 We review the constitutionality of the car rental surcharge de novo, as a question of law. See Gallardo v. State , 236 Ariz. 84, 87 ¶ 8, 336 P.3d 717, 720 (2014). Likewise, "[w]e review questions of statutory construction and grants of summary judgment de novo." BSI Holdings, LLC v. Ariz. Dep't of Transp. , 244 Ariz. 17, 19 ¶ 9, 417 P.3d 782, 784 (2018). We presume that a statute not involving fundamental constitutional rights or suspect-classification distinctions is constitutional "and will uphold it unless it clearly is not." Cave Creek Unified Sch. Dist. v. Ducey , 233 Ariz. 1, 5 ¶ 11, 308 P.3d 1152, 1156 (2013). ¶9 The Commerce Clause empowers Congress "[t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several States." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. By negative implication, states cannot unjustifiably discriminate against or erect barriers to interstate commerce. See Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality of Or. , 511 U.S. 93, 98, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994). This implied restraint is known as the "dormant Commerce Clause" and serves to prevent "economic protectionism[,] that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors." Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis , 553 U.S. 328, 337-38, 128 S.Ct. 1801, 170 L.Ed.2d 685 (2008) ; see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy , 519 U.S. 278, 299, 117 S.Ct. 811, 136 L.Ed.2d 761 (1997) (describing the dormant Commerce Clause's fundamental objective as "preserving a national market for competition undisturbed by preferential advantages conferred by a State upon its residents or resident competitors"). The principles developed under the dormant Commerce Clause to counter economic Balkanization, however, have respected a degree of local autonomy, as favored by the Framers. See Davis , 553 U.S. at 338, 128 S.Ct. 1801 ; see also Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n , 432 U.S. 333, 350, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977) (recognizing that "in the absence of conflicting legislation by Congress, there is a residuum of power in the state to make laws governing matters of local concern which nevertheless in some measure affect interstate commerce or even, to some extent, regulate it" (internal quotation marks omitted)). ¶10 To determine if a law violates the dormant Commerce Clause, courts initially ask whether the law "regulates evenhandedly with only incidental effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates against interstate commerce." Or. Waste Sys. , 511 U.S. at 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345 (internal quotation marks omitted). If a law is discriminatory, it will survive only if its proponents "show that it advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives." Id. at 100-01, 114 S.Ct. 1345 (internal interlineations and quotation marks omitted). Courts have sometimes noted that such scrutiny renders a law "virtually per se invalid." See id. at 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345. If the challenged law is non-discriminatory but incidentally affects interstate commerce, a balancing test is used, and the law will be upheld unless "the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. , 397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S.Ct. 844, 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970). ¶11 Saban argues the car rental surcharge is discriminatory and thus subject to strict scrutiny review. A "discriminatory" tax is one that is "facially discriminatory, has a discriminatory intent, or has the effect of unduly burdening interstate commerce." Amerada Hess Corp. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, N.J. Dep't of the Treasury , 490 U.S. 66, 75, 109 S.Ct. 1617, 104 L.Ed.2d 58 (1989). Saban abandons prior assertions that the surcharge is facially discriminatory and unduly burdens interstate commerce, see Saban , 244 Ariz. at 303 ¶ 30, 304 ¶ 32, 418 P.3d at 1076-77, and solely argues the surcharge is "invalid because it was motivated by discriminatory intent, that is, forcing out-of-state visitors [to] pay a special tax that residents are shielded from." ADOR and AzSTA counter that the surcharge was not enacted with a discriminatory intent but, even if it was, intent alone is an insufficient reason to invalidate the surcharge. ¶12 The car rental surcharge was not enacted with a discriminatory intent, as that term is used in Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Discrimination "means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter." Or. Waste Sys. , 511 U.S. at 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345. Nothing in the language of the surcharge or in the publicity pamphlet for the initiative enacting the surcharge suggests an intent to treat in-state and out-of-state interests differently or engage in the type of "economic protectionism" at odds with the Commerce Clause. Indeed, the surcharge applies equally to resident and non-resident car rental agencies operating in Maricopa County and is calculated and imposed without regard to their customers' residencies. ¶13 Saban nevertheless argues that discriminatory intent exists because statements in the initiative's publicity pamphlet suggest voters targeted non-resident visitors, who purportedly rent most vehicles offered by car rental agencies, to pay the lion's share of the surcharges. But even if true, this does not evidence an intent that out-of-state visitors be treated any differently from residents, as required to be discriminatory. See id. The fact that visitors as a group pay most of the surcharges collected by car rental agencies is not "discriminatory." ¶14 The Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana , 453 U.S. 609, 101 S.Ct. 2946, 69 L.Ed.2d 884 (1981), is illuminative. There, the Court concluded that Montana's tax on the sale of coal did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause even though most of the tax burden was borne by out-of-state consumers. Id. at 618, 636, 101 S.Ct. 2946. The Court expressed misgivings about judging the validity of a state tax on "its 'exportation' of the tax burden out of State," as the challengers there urged. Id. at 618, 101 S.Ct. 2946. It noted that for purposes of promoting free trade under the Commerce Clause, state borders are "essentially irrelevant" and reasoned that "invalidat[ing] the Montana tax solely because most of Montana's coal is shipped across the very state borders that ordinarily are to be considered irrelevant would require a significant and, in our view, unwarranted departure from the rationale of our prior discrimination cases." Id. at 618-19, 101 S.Ct. 2946. The Court also disagreed with the challengers' argument that out-of-state consumers should be protected from discriminatory tax treatment, pointing out "there is no real discrimination in this case; the tax burden is borne according to the amount of coal consumed and not according to any distinction between in-state and out-of-state consumers." Id. at 619, 101 S.Ct. 2946. ¶15 Although Commonwealth Edison addressed the purported discriminatory effect of Montana's coal tax, the Court's reasoning also reveals the meaning of "discriminatory intent" under the dormant Commerce Clause. Just as a tax that does not differentiate between interstate and intrastate commerce does not have a "discriminatory effect" when the tax burden is borne primarily by out-of-state consumers, those who enacted the tax intending that consequence did not do so with a "discriminatory intent." Cf. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias , 468 U.S. 263, 270-71, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 (1984) (stating that the Hawaii legislature acted with discriminatory intent by exempting only certain Hawaiian-made alcohol from alcohol tax to encourage and promote Hawaiian industry). Concluding otherwise would mean the validity of a tax would turn on serendipity: one state's tax that happens to be disproportionately paid by non-residents would be valid, see Commonwealth Edison , 453 U.S. at 618-19, 101 S.Ct. 2946, while the same tax in another state would be invalid only because its enactors intended that result. Because the surcharge here, like the Montana coal tax, is imposed even-handedly and does not distinguish between in-state and out-of-state car rental agencies or consumers, any intent by voters that out-of-state visitors ultimately pay most of the surcharge was not "discriminatory." ¶16 Saban argues that the car rental surcharge is like the Maine tax scheme that the Supreme Court invalidated under the dormant Commerce Clause in Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison , 520 U.S. 564, 117 S.Ct. 1590, 137 L.Ed.2d 852 (1997). Maine provided a complete property and personal tax exemption for charitable organizations incorporated in the state but only if they did not operate principally for the benefit of non-residents. Id. at 568, 117 S.Ct. 1590. As a result, a church camp catering mostly to out-of-state campers was required to pay taxes while organizations operating camps attracting mostly Maine residents were exempt. Id. at 568-69, 117 S.Ct. 1590. The Court found the Maine tax scheme facially discriminatory because it expressly "singl[ed] out camps that serve mostly in-staters for beneficial tax treatment, and penaliz[ed] those camps that do a principally interstate business." Id. at 575-76, 117 S.Ct. 1590. It also analogized the discriminatory exemption to prohibited special fee assessments charged nonresidents for use of local services, noting "Maine's facially discriminatory tax scheme falls by design in a predictably disproportionate way" on non-residents and has the same "pernicious effect on interstate commerce." Id. at 578-80, 117 S.Ct. 1590 ; see also id. at 579 n.13, 117 S.Ct. 1590 (stating "the [Maine] tax scheme functions by design and on its face to burden out-of-state users disproportionately"). ¶17 We disagree with Saban that the car rental surcharge is tantamount to Maine's scheme to disproportionately burden non-residents who used services provided by in-state charitable organizations. The disproportionate burden in Camps Newfound/Owatonna referred to the costs placed only on non-residents for using in-state services. See id. at 578-79, 117 S.Ct. 1590 (explaining that the discriminatory exemption is effectively no different from imposing a penalty on activity). It did not refer to the disparate impact on non-residents that stems solely from the fact that they consume more of the uniformly taxed good or service than in-state consumers. See id. at 580 n.13, 117 S.Ct. 1590 (distinguishing Commonwealth Edison because although non-residents bore most of the Montana coal tax burden by virtue of buying most of the coal, the tax was based on consumption and made no distinctions between resident and non-resident consumers). Like the tax in Commonwealth Edison , and unlike the exemption in Camps Newfound/Owatonna , the car rental surcharge is imposed uniformly on all car rental agencies, and ultimately on their customers, regardless of the agencies' or customers' residency status. ¶18 Saban also argues that voters acted with discriminatory intent by "exempting" temporary replacement vehicles "as a proxy for an overt exemption for the 'ordinary Arizona citizen.' " See § 5-839(B)(2). We disagree. First, temporary replacement vehicles are not exempted from the surcharge. Rather, the surcharge is calculated at $2.50 per vehicle rather than the greater of $2.50 per rental or 3.25% of the company's gross proceeds or gross income, as the surcharge is calculated for other rentals. See § 5-839(B)(1)-(2). Second, nothing suggests car rental agencies pass through more than $2.50 per rental to ordinary renters, thereby suggesting that those renting temporary replacement vehicles are treated more favorably. Indeed, according to its owner, Saban, like other car rental agencies, charges the same surcharge rate to all its customers. Third, the temporary replacement vehicle calculation applies whether the renter is a resident or a non-resident. And because numerous non-residents temporarily relocate to Arizona during the year, it is likely that many nonresidents rent temporary replacement vehicles. ¶19 In sum, the voters did not enact the car rental surcharge with a discriminatory intent because they did not intend to treat in-state and out-of-state economic interests differently. As a result, the surcharge does not trigger strict scrutiny review. Because Saban does not assert that the tax court or court of appeals misapplied the Pike balancing test, we do not address that issue. And considering our decision, we do not resolve the extent to which discriminatory intent alone can invalidate a tax under the dormant Commerce Clause. We note, however, that as Saban acknowledged at oral argument, a tax must burden interstate commerce in some way to be invalidated under that clause. Cf. Or. Waste Sys. , 511 U.S. at 98, 114 S.Ct. 1345 (describing dormant Commerce Clause as addressing discrimination against or erection of barriers to interstate commerce). II. The Anti-Diversion Provision ¶20 The anti-diversion provision, article 9, section 14 of the Arizona Constitution, provides in relevant part as follows: No moneys derived from fees, excises, or license taxes relating to registration, operation, or use of vehicles on the public highways or streets or to fuels or any other energy source used for the propulsion of vehicles on the public highways or streets, shall be expended for other than highway and street purposes. The parties agree the car rental surcharge is an excise and is unrelated to vehicle registration. The only issue, therefore, is whether the surcharge "relat[es] to [the] ... operation[ ] or use of vehicles," which determines whether surcharge revenues must be used for road-related purposes. Resolution of this issue turns on the meaning of "relating to." ¶21 Our primary goal in interpreting the anti-diversion provision is to effectuate the electorate's intent in adopting it. See Jett v. City of Tucson , 180 Ariz. 115, 119, 882 P.2d 426, 430 (1994). If we can discern the provision's meaning from its language alone, we will apply it without further analysis. See id. In doing so, however, we do not apply "[f]ine semantic or grammatical distinctions, legalistic doctrine [or] pars[e] ... sentences," as doing so "may lead us to results quite different from the objectives which the framers intended to accomplish." United States v. Superior Court , 144 Ariz. 265, 275-76, 697 P.2d 658, 668-69 (1985). "Constitutions, meant to endure, must be interpreted with an eye to syntax, history, initial principle, and extension of fundamental purpose." Id. ; cf. Heath v. Kiger , 217 Ariz. 492, 495 ¶ 12, 176 P.3d 690, 693 (2008) ("[C]ourts should avoid hypertechnical constructions that frustrate legislative intent." (quoting State v. Estrada , 201 Ariz. 247, 251 ¶ 19, 34 P.3d 356, 360 (2001) ). ¶22 Saban argues that a fee, excise, or tax "relating to" the use or operation of vehicles plainly means one that is "connected to" driving vehicles on Arizona roads. And because the surcharge is passed through to car rental customers and "[c]ustomers rent cars to use them" on Arizona roads, Saban contends the surcharge falls within the anti-diversion provision. But Saban, somewhat anomalously, concedes that " 'related to' could have an almost unlimited reach if construed too broadly" and thus must be limited. We accept this concession. As the court of appeals explained, interpreting "relating to" as having any connection to the use or operation of vehicles on the pubic highways would encompass revenues that voters clearly did not intend to be covered, including those from "retail sales or business privilege taxes on car sales, tire sales, car leases and car repairs." See Saban , 244 Ariz. at 298 ¶ 10, 301 ¶ 23, 418 P.3d at 1071, 1073. Because we cannot discern the meaning of "relating to" from the language of the anti-diversion provision alone, we consider its text in conjunction with the history and purpose of the provision. ¶23 The anti-diversion provision's origins are rooted in the early proliferation of automobiles in the United States, which sparked a need for a more extensive road network. See Chad D. Emerson, All Sprawled Out: How the Federal Regulatory System Has Driven Unsustainable Growth , 75 Tenn. L. Rev. 411, 437-38 (2008). Although state and local governments had traditionally borne the costs of building, improving, and maintaining roads, Congress passed the Federal Aid Road Act in 1916 to provide funding assistance. See id. at 432-33, 438. Even so, states, including Arizona, soon looked to new revenue sources, like gasoline taxes, to pay increasing costs rather than raising existing taxes. See id. at 438 (stating, for example, that by the end of the 1920s, every state had adopted a gasoline tax); Texas Co. v. State , 31 Ariz. 485, 487, 254 P. 1060 (1927) (addressing Arizona's gasoline tax passed in 1921). ¶24 Congress passed the Hayden-Cartwright Amendment in 1934, which, in part, amended the Federal Aid Road Act by reducing federal aid to states that had imposed taxes on motor-vehicle transportation to fund roads before 1935 but thereafter diverted those tax revenues to non-road-related purposes. See Hayden-Cartwright Amendment of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-393, § 12, 48 Stat. 993, 995 (1934). Specifically, the Amendment provided: Since it is unfair and unjust to tax motor-vehicle transportation unless the proceeds of such taxation are applied to the construction, improvement, or maintenance of highways, after June 30, 1935, Federal aid for highway construction shall be extended only to those States that use at least the amounts now provided by law for such purposes in each State from State motor vehicle registration fees, licenses, gasoline taxes, and other special taxes on motor-vehicle owners and operators of all kinds for the construction, improvement, and maintenance of highways and administrative expenses in connection therewith.... Id. Rather than risk reduced federal funding by failing to devote road-user tax revenues to road uses at less than 1934 levels, "all states have, by custom, statute or constitution, pledged highway user taxes to highway construction." Jerry L. Mashaw, The Legal Structure of Frustration: Alternative Strategies for Public Choice Concerning Federally Aided Highway Construction , 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1973). ¶25 Arizona reacted to the Hayden-Cartwright Amendment and ensured stable roadway funding by passing the "Better Roads Amendment" referendum in 1952, which added the anti-diversion provision to the state constitution. The publicity pamphlet mailed to all voters contained a "pro" argument from the Arizona Better Roads Committee's chair, who described the provision's purpose as "insur[ing] the expenditure of all revenues derived from road users to road uses only." See Ariz. Sec'y of State, 1952 Publicity Pamphlet 3 (1952), http://azmemory.azlibrary.gov/digital/collection/statepubs/id/10641 (hereinafter "Pamphlet"); Ariz. Early Childhood Dev. & Health Bd. v. Brewer , 221 Ariz. 467, 471 ¶ 14, 212 P.3d 805, 809 (2009) (stating publicity pamphlets can be examined to ascertain electorate's intent in passing a measure). He quoted the Hayden-Cartwright Amendment's rationale that diverting such tax revenues would be "unfair and unjust," see supra ¶ 24, and noted the importance of not "jeopardiz[ing] federal aid by allowing any diversion of road user taxes to other than road purposes." Pamphlet, supra , at 4-5. (The Pamphlet did not contain other arguments.) ¶26 Saban argues that the text, purpose, and history of the anti-diversion provision demonstrate it applies to tax revenues "connected to" use or operation of vehicles on roads, as limited by an historically grounded "benefits theory of taxation." Specifically, the provision applies only to taxes and fees specially imposed on "those who impose wear and tear or otherwise benefit from using the roads." ¶27 ADOR and AzSTA argue that Saban's "benefits theory" limitation is illusory as it would give "relating to" an unlimited application that voters did not intend. They urge the court of appeals' narrower view that "relating to ... the ... use[ ] or operation of vehicles" refers to "a tax or fee that is a prerequisite to, or triggered by, the legal operation or use of a vehicle on a public thoroughfare." See Saban , 244 Ariz. at 302 ¶ 25, 418 P.3d at 1075. We agree with the court of appeals' interpretation. ¶28 First, the provision's text supports a narrower interpretation of the disputed phrase than one meaning "connected to" or benefitting from road usage. The provision applies to two categories of taxes: (a) those "relating to" the "registration, operation, or use of vehicles," and (b) those imposed on fuels and other energy sources used to propel vehicles. See Ariz. Const. art. 9, § 14. Registration fees and fuel taxes are "connected to" the use or operation of vehicles. Owners register vehicles to use the roads. And fuel sellers indisputably benefit from their customers' use and operation of vehicles. The explicit mention of registration fees and fuel taxes therefore suggests that tax revenues "relating to ... the ... operation, or use of vehicles" encompass a more finite tax class than revenues derived from those with a "connection to" road usage or who benefit from it. Otherwise, as the court of appeals noted, the references to registration fees and fuel taxes would be superfluous. See Saban , 244 Ariz. at 298 ¶ 13, 418 P.3d at 1071 ; see also Fields v. Elected Officials' Ret. Plan , 234 Ariz. 214, 218 ¶ 16, 320 P.3d 1160, 1164 (2014) (rejecting proposed interpretation of constitution that would render language meaningless). Interpreting "relating to" as the court of appeals did gives meaning to all terms. ¶29 We are unpersuaded by Saban's assertion that the legislature explicitly mentioned registration fees and fuel taxes in the Better Roads Amendment referendum simply to remove any doubt they were covered. We presume the legislature avoids redundancy in favor of concision and see no reason to conclude otherwise here. See City of Phx. v. Glenayre Elecs., Inc. , 242 Ariz. 139, 147 ¶ 32, 393 P.3d 919, 927 (2017). We also disagree with Saban that the legislature demonstrated a penchant for redundancy by referring to revenues from both the "operation" and "use" of vehicles. They are different. The former refers to fees imposed on drivers while the latter refers to taxes and fees assessed on vehicles . See, e.g. , A.R.S. §§ 28-3002(A) (setting fees for driver licenses), -5471(A) (setting vehicle registration fees). ¶30 Second, the anti-diversion provision's history supports the court of appeals' interpretation. The Pamphlet identified non-fuel-related revenues dedicated to roads as "registration fees, unladen weight fees on common and contract motor carriers, and motor carrier taxes based on gross receipts" that are all "derived from road users." See Pamphlet, supra , at 3. All these taxes and fees are prerequisites for or triggered by the legal use of vehicles on our roads. None are imposed on businesses, like car rental agencies, that merely benefit from the existence of roads. ¶31 Notably, the Pamphlet also stated that adopting the referendum would maintain the status quo as Arizona was then using all road-user taxes for road uses. Pamphlet, supra , at 5 ("Arizona is in a particularly favorable position to adopt [the anti-diversion provision] this year, because it is not now diverting its road user taxes ... [and passage] will entail no change in the source or expenditure of highway revenues."). Yet Arizona had imposed transaction privilege taxes on car rental agencies since 1935 and used those revenues for general purposes. See Saban , 244 Ariz. at 299 ¶ 15, 418 P.3d at 1072 (relating history of transaction privilege tax on car rental agencies). This history suggests that neither the referendum drafter (the legislature) nor voters considered existing taxes on car rental agencies to be "road user taxes" or intended to include such taxes within the provision's ambit. ¶32 Saban agrees that 1952 voters did not intend that the anti-diversion provision apply to transaction privilege taxes on car rental agencies. It nevertheless argues that the car rental surcharge is distinguishable, likening it to the license tax Arizona imposed on common and contract motor carriers of property and passengers in 1952, which the Pamphlet described as a road-user tax that would be subject to the provision. See Act of Mar. 18, 1933, ch. 100, §§ 2, 17, 1933 Sess. Laws 472, 473-74, 481-82 (codified at Ariz. Ann. Code §§ 66-502, -518 (1939)); Pamphlet, supra , at 3, 5. Specifically, Saban asserts that, like the motor carrier license tax, the surcharge is a "special tax" not imposed generally on all businesses but aimed at "motor vehicle owners and operators of all kinds" who benefit from using Arizona roads. According to Saban, and echoing the Hayden-Cartwright Amendment's vernacular, it would be "unfair and unjust" to impose the surcharge on car rental drivers but divert those revenues from road-related purposes. ¶33 We disagree that the car rental surcharge is more like the motor carrier license tax imposed in 1952 than the 1935 transaction privilege tax imposed on car rental agencies. Payment of the motor carrier license tax was required to legally use vehicles on our roads. See §§ 2, 17, 1933 Sess. Laws at 473-74, 481-82. In contrast, the surcharge, like the transaction privilege tax, is imposed on the business of renting vehicles and is not required to be paid before a rental vehicle can be legally operated on roads. Instead, car rental agencies pay licensing fees, like everyone else, to authorize a vehicle's road usage whether the operator is an employee or a customer. See A.R.S. §§ 28-2153(A), -2157 (requiring vehicle registration and payment of registration fees). And car rental drivers pay licensing fees to their home states/countries as a condition for driving on Arizona roads. See A.R.S. §§ 28-3151, -3158(B) (requiring driver's license and payment of fee). Additionally, the surcharge is no more aimed at car rental customers than was the 1935 transaction privilege tax. Like the surcharge, the transaction privilege tax could be passed on to car rental customers, yet the tax was not considered a road-user tax and did not fall within the provision. ¶34 That the surcharge is a "special tax" not levied generally on all businesses also fails to distinguish it from the 1935 transaction privilege tax. When enacted, that tax applied to a limited number of businesses. See White v. Moore , 46 Ariz. 48, 54-55, 46 P.2d 1077 (1935) (describing 1935 transaction privilege tax and noting "the Legislature thought best not to impose it on ... all lines of endeavor but only on ... certain occupations and businesses"), superseded by statute as stated in Peterson v. Smith , 92 Ariz. 340, 342, 376 P.2d 865 (1962). Car rental agencies fell within a class of public entertainment and tourist-related businesses, which were taxed at the highest rate. See id. at 55-56, 46 P.2d 1077. Regardless of this "special" treatment, the legislature and voters in 1952 did not consider the tax a road-user tax. Similarly, the anti-diversion provision does not apply to the surcharge, which is part of a taxing plan that imposes a special tax on hotels, simply because it applies only to car rental agencies. ¶35 The court of appeals' interpretation also aligns with the Hayden-Cartwright Amendment, which at least partially drove the Better Roads Amendment. The Hayden-Cartwright Amendment conditioned full federal aid on a state continuing to direct revenues from road-user taxes and fees to road uses. See supra ¶ 24. As explained, revenues from the 1935 transaction privilege tax on car rental agencies were never dedicated solely for road purposes. Likewise, directing surcharge revenues, which also derive from taxes imposed on the business of renting vehicles, to non-road purposes does not offend the Hayden-Cartwright Amendment. ¶36 Finally, we agree with ADOR and AzSTA that Saban's "benefits theory" provides no limitation to the term "relating to." If the anti-diversion provision applies to the surcharge, no principled reason exists not to apply it to fees and taxes levied against car sale dealers, automotive repair shops, and the like. ¶37 Justice Bolick's partial dissent accuses us of embarking on a "circuitous journey" that "rewrite[s] constitutional text" to "create[ ] a loophole" for publicly financed sports stadiums. See infra ¶¶ 41-42, 59. Strong words. But they are not backed by rejoinders to our analysis rejecting Saban's "special tax" argument, see supra ¶¶ 31-35, despite the fact the dissent adopts Saban's view. See infra ¶¶ 49-51 (stating that "a tax is 'relating to' if it is specially directed at the operation or use of vehicles on public highways," and concluding that a surcharge imposed on car rental agencies is such a tax). ¶38 The dissent's effort to ascertain the voters' intent in enacting the anti-diversion provision by parsing language from the Hayden-Cartwright Amendment is unpersuasive. See infra ¶¶ 45-49. Neither the provision nor the Pamphlet recited (or even mentioned) the language seized on by the dissent, meaning that language almost certainly had no bearing on voters' intent. Also, the provision was not enacted to comply with the Hayden-Cartwright Amendment and obtain federal funding. See infra ¶ 49 ("Arizona voters implemented the Hayden-Cartwright Amendment through the anti-diversion clause."). Arizona had already been receiving federal funding for roads at the time the provision was adopted in 1952. See Pamphlet, supra , at 5. Necessarily, therefore, the state had already complied with the Hayden-Cartwright Amendment by devoting road-user taxes-which did not include the "special" transaction privilege tax placed on car rental agencies-to road uses. Proponents of the provision were driven by the desire to ensure that Arizona continued to devote these tax revenues to road uses. See Pamphlet, supra , at 5 ("Public policy in Arizona has consistently opposed diversion [of road user taxes to non-road purposes], although there have been constant threats to highway funds in bills introduced from time to time in the legislature."). ¶39 In sum, "fees, excises, or license taxes relating to ... the ... operation, or use of vehicles" are ones imposed as a prerequisite to, or triggered by, the legal operation or use of a vehicle on a public road. The surcharge falls outside this definition and therefore does not violate the anti-diversion provision. CONCLUSION ¶40 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the court of appeals' opinion. We reverse the tax court's judgment in favor of Saban and remand with directions to enter judgment in favor of ADOR and AzSTA and for any further required proceedings consistent with our opinion. Finally, we vacate the tax court's refund order.

CHIEF JUSTICE BALES, opinion of the Court: ¶1 Issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, precludes relitigating an issue of fact in a later case when, in a previous case, the same issue was "actually litigated, a final judgment was entered, and the party against whom the doctrine is to be invoked had a full and fair opportunity to litigate." Chaney Bldg. Co. v. City of Tucson , 148 Ariz. 571, 573, 716 P.2d 28, 30 (1986). We hold that issue preclusion may apply in a criminal proceeding when an issue of fact was previously adjudicated in a dependency proceeding and the other elements of preclusion are met. We find that those elements are met in this case. I. ¶2 On July 5, 2016, Nikolas Crosby-Garbotz ("Crosby") stayed home with his five-month-old baby (here referred to as "C.C.") while Lacy Crosby ("Mother") went to work. C.C. became fussy and later had a seizure and appeared dazed and went limp. Crosby called 911. C.C. was taken to the hospital, where she was diagnosed with subdural hematoma, bilateral retinal hemorrhaging, and retinoschisis. She did not have a skull fracture or trauma to her neck or upper body. ¶3 Days later, the State, through the Department of Child Safety ("DCS"), took temporary custody of C.C., and on July 13, 2016, DCS filed a dependency petition alleging that C.C. was dependent as to Crosby because he abusively shook her to the point of causing bleeding in her brain and eyes. DCS also alleged C.C. was dependent as to Mother because she was unable to protect C.C. from Crosby. ¶4 On November 10, 2016, the dependency trial began and lasted for eleven nonconsecutive days, with the juvenile court taking the matter under advisement on February 16, 2017. While the dependency hearing was ongoing, a grand jury on December 15, 2016, returned an indictment against Crosby alleging child abuse under A.R.S. §§ 13-3623(A) and 13-3601. Specifically, the State charged Crosby with one count of child abuse alleging that: on or about the 5th day of July, 2016, NIKOLAS CROSBY-GARBOTZ committed child abuse by intentionally or knowingly causing physical injury to C.C., a child less than fifteen years of age, under circumstances likely to produce death or serious physical injury, to wit: BY CAUSING BRAIN DAMAGE AND RETINAL BLEEDING AND RETINOSCHISIS, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-3623(A)(1), 13-3601. ¶5 From July 2016 through March 2017, C.C. was not in Crosby's or Mother's care due to the pending dependency petition. On March 8, 2017, the juvenile court issued its ruling, dismissed the dependency petition as to both parents, and returned C.C. to Mother and Crosby's care. The judge ruled that DCS had not met its burden of proof in establishing a dependency, expressly finding that "the Department has not met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Crosby inflicted physical injury, impairment of bodily function, or disfigurement to [C.C.]" and "the Court has found that it is more likely than not that [Crosby] did not injure [C.C.]." The State did not appeal the dependency judgment. ¶6 In May 2017, Crosby moved to remand for a redetermination of probable cause in the criminal proceeding, which the trial court denied. Crosby then moved to dismiss, arguing that issue preclusion prevented the State from relitigating whether he had abused C.C. on July 5, 2016. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge denied the motion. Crosby sought special action relief from the court of appeals, which accepted jurisdiction but denied relief. Crosby-Garbotz v. Fell , 244 Ariz. 339, 340 ¶ 1, 342 ¶ 8, 418 P.3d 1112, 1113, 1115 (App. 2017). ¶7 Although the court of appeals noted that most elements of issue preclusion appeared to have been met, id. at 344 ¶¶ 15-17, 418 P.3d at 1117, it declined to apply preclusion, id. at 345 ¶ 18, 418 P.3d at 1118. Relying on cases from other jurisdictions, the court held in blanket fashion that preclusion should not apply in these circumstances because the state might forego dependency proceedings if it were precluded from relitigating issues in a later criminal proceeding, or it might instead present its criminal case in the dependency proceeding which "could unnecessarily complicate and delay the adjudication, placing an undue burden on the juvenile court system." Id. at 347 ¶ 28, 418 P.3d at 1120. The court also believed that "the distinction between juvenile and criminal proceedings would be impermissibly blurred." Id. Finally, the court refused to adopt a case-by-case approach to applying issue preclusion in this context. Id. ¶ 29. ¶8 We granted review because this case presents recurring issues of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution. II. ¶9 "Application of issue preclusion is an issue of law, which we review de novo." Picaso v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist. , 217 Ariz. 178, 180 ¶ 6, 171 P.3d 1219, 1221 (2007). ¶10 Issue preclusion serves to "protect[ ] litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue" and to "promot[e] judicial economy by preventing needless litigation." Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore , 439 U.S. 322, 326, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979). As our courts have noted, the doctrine seeks to avoid the basic unfairness associated with duplicative, harassing litigation. See Circle K Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n , 179 Ariz. 422, 426, 880 P.2d 642, 646 (App. 1993). ¶11 Arizona has long recognized that "when the second case is upon a different cause of action, the prior judgment or decree operates as an estoppel only as to matters actually in issue, or points controverted, upon the determination of which the judgment or decree was rendered." MacRae v. Betts , 40 Ariz. 454, 458, 14 P.2d 253 (1932) (citing Balt. S.S. Co. v. Phillips , 274 U.S. 316, 319, 47 S.Ct. 600, 71 L.Ed. 1069 (1927) ). This common law doctrine, now termed issue preclusion, applies when a fact "was actually litigated in a previous suit, a final judgment was entered, and the party against whom the doctrine is to be invoked had a full opportunity to litigate the matter and actually did litigate it" and the fact "was essential to the prior judgment." Chaney Bldg. Co. , 148 Ariz. at 573, 716 P.2d at 30 ; see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (Am. Law Inst. 1982). In criminal cases, we also continue to require mutuality of parties or their privities as an additional element of issue preclusion, see State v. Edwards , 136 Ariz. 177, 188, 665 P.2d 59, 70 (1983), which is consistent with the Restatement's more general issue preclusion rule which applies in a "subsequent action between the parties," see Restatement § 27. When one of these elements is not met, preclusion does not apply. See Kopp v. Physician Grp. of Ariz., Inc. , 244 Ariz. 439, 442 ¶¶ 14-15, 421 P.3d 149, 152 (2018) (affirming Chaney and refusing to give preclusive effect to stipulated dismissals with prejudice because no issues were "actually litigated"). ¶12 No previous decision by this Court, however, has considered whether a finding in a dependency adjudication may have preclusive effect in a criminal prosecution. On this issue, the State and Crosby disagree on the application of two issue preclusion cases. In Ferris v. Hawkins , the court of appeals declined to apply issue preclusion from one administrative proceeding to a later, different administrative proceeding, finding the two proceedings involved distinct legal rights and remedies. 135 Ariz. 329, 332, 660 P.2d 1256, 1259 (App. 1983). Fitzgerald v. Superior Court In and For County of Maricopa involved a civil forfeiture proceeding in which the trial court found that the defendant had not possessed or used the items in question for any criminal activity, and the court of appeals held that issue preclusion barred the state's relitigating those issues in a later prosecution. 173 Ariz. 539, 548, 845 P.2d 465, 474 (App. 1992). ¶13 Neither case is dispositive here. Fitzgerald involved a "quasi-criminal" forfeiture proceeding and a later criminal proceeding. 173 Ariz. at 545-46, 845 P.2d at 471-72. Ferris addressed successive administrative proceedings in which the state may not have had adequate opportunity and incentive to fully litigate the issue in question in the first proceeding. 135 Ariz. at 332 n.3, 660 P.2d at 1259 n.3. Neither case determined whether a finding in a non-criminal dependency adjudication could ever have preclusive effect in a criminal case; nor did either case adopt a categorical rule applying or rejecting preclusion in the circumstances presented here. ¶14 In contrast to Fitzgerald and Ferris , here the court of appeals relied on public policy to adopt a categorical rule barring issue preclusion. The court recognized that the California Court of Appeals reached a different conclusion in Lockwood v. Superior Court , 160 Cal.App.3d 667, 206 Cal.Rptr. 785 (1984), but noted that another California appellate panel had refused to follow Lockwood as inconsistent with intervening California Supreme Court precedent. Crosby-Garbotz , 244 Ariz. at 345 ¶¶ 19-21, 28, 418 P.3d at 1118. The court also pointed to opinions from other jurisdictions that either rejected Lockwood or reached a different result. Id. at 345-47 ¶¶ 22-27, 418 P.3d at 1118-20. ¶15 As the court of appeals observed, Lockwood "is not meaningfully distinguishable from the case before us." Id. at 345 ¶ 19, 418 P.3d at 1118. There, the state brought a dependency petition against both parents alleging abuse, and later filed criminal charges. Lockwood , 206 Cal.Rptr. at 786. After the juvenile court found no abuse and dismissed the dependency petition, the parents unsuccessfully sought to invoke issue preclusion to dismiss the criminal charges. Id. Reversing the trial court's ruling, the California Court of Appeal noted that although the dependency and criminal proceedings involved different purposes, such differences were "perhaps relevant to res judicata in the broad sense" but "not necessarily dispositive of the collateral estoppel question." Id. at 787. Noting that the issue-whether the parents had abused their child on a specific occasion-was the same in both proceedings, and the juvenile court had "expressly found no such abuse," the court of appeal found all elements of issue preclusion established and directed the trial court to dismiss the criminal charges. Id. at 787-88. That same year, Maryland's highest court also applied issue preclusion in similar circumstances, concluding that the state should not be given a second chance to prove alleged wrongful conduct and cause the defendant "to 'run the gantlet' a second time." Bowling v. State , 298 Md. 396, 470 A.2d 797, 801 (1984) (quoting Ashe v. Swenson , 397 U.S. 436, 446, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970) ). ¶16 Other jurisdictions, however, have refused to apply issue preclusion in the dependency-to-criminal context. In so holding, courts have noted various policy reasons, including a concern that the state, in dependency proceedings, does not perform the "extensive preparation typically required for felony trials," State v. Cleveland , 58 Wash.App. 634, 794 P.2d 546, 551 (1990), and the fact that the dependency and criminal proceedings serve "disparate" purposes, People v. Gates , 434 Mich. 146, 452 N.W.2d 627, 633 (1990), as the juvenile proceeding is meant to protect children whereas the criminal proceeding's "ultimate litigated issue" is the accused's guilt, People v. Moreno , 319 Ill.App.3d 445, 253 Ill.Dec. 173, 744 N.E.2d 906, 912 (2001). ¶17 We are not persuaded that these policy concerns justify an absolute bar on applying issue preclusion. Although criminal charges put at stake an accused's liberty, dependency proceedings affect liberty interests as well-the fundamental right of parents regarding their children's upbringing, see A.R.S. § 1-601(A) ; Kent K. v. Bobby M. , 210 Ariz. 279, 284 ¶ 24, 110 P.3d 1013, 1018 (2005) (citing Santosky v. Kramer , 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) ), and a child's best interest, including "an interest in a 'normal family home,' " see Kent K. , 210 Ariz. at 286 ¶ 34, 110 P.3d at 1020 (quoting Santosky , 455 U.S. at 759, 102 S.Ct. 1388 ). Thus, we reject the suggestion that the state does not take dependency proceedings as seriously as criminal prosecutions, and we likewise reject the notion that the state will forego dependency proceedings if issue preclusion may apply. See Crosby-Garbotz , 244 Ariz. at 347 ¶ 28, 418 P.3d at 1120 ; Cleveland , 794 P.2d at 551. Furthermore, the concern that the state "might be compelled to present its entire criminal case in the dependency proceeding," Crosby-Garbotz , 244 Ariz. at 347 ¶ 28, 418 P.3d at 1120, is unavailing. If the state alleges that a child is dependent, it must present sufficient evidence to establish the necessary facts by a preponderance of the evidence. See A.R.S. § 8-844(C). If the state has such a case, it bears the burden of proving it. If the state cannot prove a dispositive fact under the preponderance standard, it is unlikely to be able to do so, absent new or additional evidence, in a subsequent criminal proceeding under the more-demanding standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶18 Finally, the State argues that public policy counsels against applying issue preclusion because "[t]he public has a strong interest in the enforcement of our criminal laws." But the public also has a strong interest in the enforcement of the laws regarding the protection of dependent children. So too do parents have a strong interest in the care and upbringing of their children, and defendants have a strong interest in fundamental fairness. ¶19 The purposes of dependency and criminal proceedings are admittedly different. But issue preclusion and claim preclusion are also different, and sometimes mistakenly conflated. See Circle K Corp. , 179 Ariz. at 425-26, 880 P.2d at 645-46 ; cf. Hawkins v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 183 Ariz. 100, 103, 900 P.2d 1236, 1239 (App. 1995) (noting that although issue and claim preclusion "have similar purposes, they are nevertheless different"). That two types of cases have different purposes does not affect the application of issue preclusion, but rather informs the application of claim preclusion. See Lockwood , 206 Cal.Rptr. at 787. Under claim preclusion, a final judgment may preclude later litigation of other causes of action based on the transaction or series of transactions out of which an action arises, considering "whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation." Restatement § 24. However, issue preclusion is narrower, and applies only to determinations that were essential to the judgment. See id. § 27. Furthermore, unlike claim preclusion, issue preclusion requires that the issue be "actually litigated" in the previous judgment. 4501 Northpoint LP v. Maricopa Cty. , 212 Ariz. 98, 102-03 ¶¶ 25-26, 128 P.3d 215, 219-20 (2006). ¶20 Applying preclusion from dependency to criminal proceedings is consistent with preclusion principles. See Allan D. Vestal, Issue Preclusion and Criminal Prosecutions , 65 Iowa L. Rev. 281, 340 (1980) (stating that if burden of proof in prior civil action was lower than required in criminal case and state cannot meet lower burden, preclusion should bar attempt by state in criminal case to assert issue found against it in civil litigation). First, this Court has noted that "[c]ollateral estoppel in criminal cases is not favored and is applied sparingly." State v. Goudeau , 239 Ariz. 421, 455 ¶ 134 n.8, 372 P.3d 945, 979 n.8 (2016) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Rodriguez , 198 Ariz. 139, 141 ¶ 6, 7 P.3d 148, 150 (App. 2000) ). This language, which admittedly described federal rather than state law, suggests that preclusion is available in criminal cases as well as civil ones. Second, absolutely barring preclusion in criminal cases is neither supported by our precedent, see, e.g. , State v. Little , 87 Ariz. 295, 304-07, 350 P.2d 756 (1960) (adopting issue preclusion in criminal cases), nor finds favor in the Restatement, see Restatement § 28, cmt. g (noting that relief from preclusion "must be the rare exception" permitted "only when the need for a redetermination of the issue is a compelling one"). ¶21 The elements of issue preclusion serve to alleviate many of the concerns raised by the court of appeals and the State. If the State did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue, then preclusion will not apply. See Chaney Bldg. Co. , 148 Ariz. at 573, 716 P.2d at 30. Issue preclusion may not apply, for instance, if a subsequent prosecution is based upon additional, material evidence of abuse that was not considered in the dependency proceeding, or if the State were unable to secure an expert witness in the dependency proceeding. Additionally, preclusion does not apply where circumstances are different, based on new evidence or events giving rise to subsequent prosecution. Cf. Bennigno R. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 233 Ariz. 345, 349 ¶ 17, 312 P.3d 861, 865 (App. 2013) (no issue preclusion of best-interest inquiry in second proceeding where new evidence was presented nearly a year after judge found severance would not be in child's best interest). The party seeking to invoke preclusion must establish all its elements, and relitigation will be barred in only exceptional criminal cases. ¶22 The dissent's observation that dependency and criminal proceedings are distinct and serve different purposes, ¶¶ 28, 34, does not support a blanket rejection of issue preclusion (though, as noted above, ¶ 19, it is relevant to claim preclusion). Moreover, the Restatement illustration cited by the dissent, ¶ 31, is inapposite, as it reflects the rule that one court's determination of an issue will not bar relitigation before another court having "special competency" to decide the issue. See Restatement § 28, cmt. d. The juvenile and criminal divisions of the superior court are each competent to determine if a child was abused. Applying preclusion also does not contradict the legislature's intent; indeed the dissent does not identify any statement of legislative intent but instead imputes intent based on its belief that preclusion should not apply. Nor do we obstruct the executive's authority to initiate prosecutions. Our opinion does not prevent the state from pursuing parallel or successive proceedings; it only prevents the state from relitigating a factual issue that it had a full and fair opportunity to litigate, which it could not prove by a preponderance of evidence, and where the related judgment has become final, i.e. any appeals have been exhausted. This no more infringes on executive prerogatives than does a judge dismissing a criminal case when the prosecution fails to present sufficient evidence on an element of a crime. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20. III. ¶23 Having determined that issue preclusion may apply from dependency to subsequent criminal proceedings, we turn to its application here. At oral argument, the State conceded that there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue at hand before the juvenile court, the issue was essential to that court's judgment, the issue was actually litigated, and the judgment was final and valid. These concessions are supported by the record. ¶24 The State argues that because DCS and the County Attorney are not the same party, there is no mutuality of parties, and issue preclusion cannot apply. The court of appeals did not address this argument. See Crosby-Garbotz , 244 Ariz. at 345 ¶ 18, 418 P.3d at 1118. We conclude that there was mutuality of parties. The State, acting through DCS and the County Attorney, has brought its power to bear on Crosby through both the dependency and criminal proceedings. That different legal offices handle different cases does not mean that the State is not a party in both actions. The Attorney General's Office, which represented DCS in the dependency proceedings, not only has supervisory authority over county attorneys, see, e.g. , A.R.S. § 41-193(A)(4), (5), but is also responsible for handling appeals of criminal cases originally tried by county attorneys, who must furnish that office with a statement of facts and legal authority for appellate purposes, see A.R.S. § 11-532(B). Cf. Cleveland , 794 P.2d at 549 (holding that the attorney general and county attorney constituted the same party for preclusion purposes, noting that "[t]he party against whom ... collateral estoppel is asserted is the State of Washington in both cases"); Gates , 452 N.W.2d at 630 (holding that the Department of Social Services and county prosecutor are the same party for preclusion purposes based on a "functional analysis"); People v. Sims , 32 Cal.3d 468, 186 Cal.Rptr. 77, 651 P.2d 321, 332-33 (1982) (holding that the district attorney's office and a county are the same party for preclusion purposes because they both act on behalf of the state). ¶25 The State also argues that the issues are not the same because the two proceedings "are governed by different substantive law and different procedures." This argument misses the mark. The precise issue here is whether Crosby abused C.C. on July 5, 2016, by shaking her, causing bleeding in C.C.'s brain and eyes. This factual issue was adjudicated in the dependency proceeding against the State. The same factual issue is the basis for the criminal charge. The State has not pointed to any additional evidence it was foreclosed from presenting in the dependency proceeding that would apply in the criminal case, nor has it indicated any changed circumstances that would make relitigation appropriate. ¶26 Crosby is using issue preclusion defensively as a shield, not as a sword. This is not an instance of a defendant attempting to use an accomplice's favorable factual determination against the government as offensive issue preclusion-a situation that would present different considerations. See State v. Jimenez , 130 Ariz. 138, 139-41, 634 P.2d 950, 951-53 (1981) (refusing to abandon the mutuality requirement for collateral estoppel in criminal cases). Here, the State failed to prove in the superior court, at a lower burden of proof, that Crosby abused C.C. and thereby caused specific injuries on July 5, 2016. This issue was essential to the dependency allegations and was fully and fairly adjudicated during an eleven-day trial with testimony from several expert witnesses (including two experts the State called). The State then chose not to appeal, making the juvenile court's judgment final for purposes of preclusion. In these circumstances, the State cannot force Crosby to again litigate the same issue. IV. ¶27 We vacate the court of appeals' opinion and remand this case to the superior court to dismiss the criminal charge. TIMMER, J., joined by GOULD, J. and LOPEZ, J., dissenting. ¶28 Arizona law empowers the state to address alleged parental child abuse in concurrent ways. The Department of Child Services ("DCS") may initiate dependency or termination-of-parental-rights proceedings in juvenile court, see A.R.S. §§ 8-533 and 8-841 to 8-847, and a prosecutorial agency may criminally prosecute the parent in superior court, see A.R.S. 13-3623. The proceedings serve different interests, and the legislature intended they proceed separately. Applying issue preclusion in the pending criminal case against Crosby for the common factual issue adjudicated in the dependency proceeding concerning C.C. interferes with this legislative structure and the executive's authority to simultaneously protect children through dependency proceedings and vindicate society's insistence that everyone obey our laws. The application also undermines the public's interest and role in criminal justice. I respectfully dissent. ¶29 The doctrine of issue preclusion has several exceptions. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 (Am. Law Inst. 1982). Two exceptions apply here: A new determination of the issue is warranted by differences in the quality or extensiveness of the procedures followed in the two courts or by factors relating to the allocation of jurisdiction between them.... .... There is a clear and convincing need for a new determination of the issue ... because of the potential adverse impact of the determination on the public interest or the interests of persons not themselves parties in the initial action.... Restatement § 28(3),(5); see Hullett v. Cousin , 204 Ariz. 292, 298 ¶¶ 28-29, 63 P.3d 1029, 1035 (2003) (applying Restatement § 28 ). ¶30 First, a statutory limitation on the juvenile court's authority in dependency proceedings compels a conclusion that issue preclusion does not apply here. See Restatement § 28(3). Although the juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction over dependency proceedings, see A.R.S. 8-202(B), it has no authority to adjudicate pending criminal charges concerning events underlying the dependency allegations, see § 8-202(C)(1) ("[T]he juvenile court shall not consolidate ... [a] criminal proceeding that is filed in another division of superior court and that involves a child who is subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court."). Only the superior court adjudicating the criminal charges has that authority. Thus, the juvenile court here had no authority to adjudicate Crosby's criminal liability, and its determination that DCS failed to prove Crosby abused C.C. should not serve to effectively adjudicate the pending criminal charge. See Restatement § 28 cmt. d (stating a compelling reason not to apply issue preclusion exists if "the legislative allocation of jurisdiction among the courts of the state may have been designed to insure that when an action is brought to determine a particular issue directly, it may only be maintained in a court having special competence to deal with it" and thus "after a court has incidently [sic] determined an issue that it lacks jurisdiction to determine directly, the determination should not be binding when a second action is brought in a court having such jurisdiction"). ¶31 Issue preclusion should not apply here even though the juvenile court's determination was necessary to the dependency adjudication. An illustration in Restatement § 28 supports this conclusion: H brings an action for forcible entry and detainer against W before a justice of the peace. W defends on the ground that the parties are legally married and that under the law of the State such an action cannot be maintained between spouses. The justice of the peace rejects the defense, ruling that the parties are not legally married. A subsequent action for divorce is brought between W and H in the domestic relations court, which has exclusive jurisdiction over divorce actions. The determination in the prior action that the parties are not legally married is not conclusive. Restatement § 28, cmt. d, illus. 9. Like the child abuse issue here, whether H and W were legally married was properly decided by both courts. And just as the domestic relations court had exclusive authority over divorce actions and thus could not be bound by the justice court's determination of a common issue, the superior court here has exclusive jurisdiction in the pending criminal proceedings and cannot be bound by the juvenile court's determination that DCS failed to prove that Crosby abused C.C. Although the juvenile court is part of the superior court and not a different court, as in the illustration, the illustration is apt. The majority disagrees, asserting "[t]he juvenile and criminal divisions of the superior court are each competent to determine if a child was abused." See supra ¶ 22. I do not quibble the point, but the legislature has decreed otherwise. By precluding the juvenile court from adjudicating a related, pending criminal case, the superior court is required to resolve the charges against Crosby through the criminal trial process. See Restatement § 28, cmt. d. ¶32 Second, a clear and convincing need exists to permit a new determination in the pending criminal proceedings because otherwise the public interest would be adversely affected. See Restatement § 28(5). Section 8-202(C)(1) reflects a public policy that the superior court is the exclusive forum to adjudicate criminal charges when the state concurrently files a related dependency action. Cf. Quiroz v. ALCOA Inc. , 243 Ariz. 560, 566-67 ¶ 19, 416 P.3d 824, 830-31 (2018) (recognizing that the legislature has the primary responsibility to declare public policy). Applying issue preclusion here frustrates that public policy by allowing the juvenile court to effectively adjudicate a criminal charge and displace the criminal case. Cf. People v. Gates , 434 Mich. 146, 452 N.W.2d 627, 632-33 (1990) ("[T]he purposes of a child-protective proceeding and a criminal proceeding are so fundamentally different that application in this instance of collateral estoppel would be contrary to sound public policy."); People v. Percifull , 9 Cal.App.4th 1457, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 331, 335 (1992) (refusing to apply issue preclusion in similar circumstances reasoning, in part, that the dependency proceeding "did not and could not reach the need, paramount in any criminal proceeding, to vindicate society's insistence that every citizen obey the penal laws"). ¶33 Apart from the legislative declaration of public policy reflected in § 8-202(C)(1), the public has a significant interest and role in the criminal proceedings that is nullified by the application of issue preclusion here. A grand jury indicted Crosby under § 13-3623(A)(1) while the dependency proceedings were pending. The State, representing the public's interest, has a right for a jury selected from the public to determine whether Crosby committed child abuse. See A.R.S. § 13-3983 (requiring both parties' consent to waive a jury trial); Phx. City Prosecutor's Office v. Ybarra , 218 Ariz. 232, 235 ¶ 14, 182 P.3d 1166, 1169 (2008) ("[ Section] 13-3983 requires that in all criminal cases the right to a bench trial is conditioned on the prosecution's consent."). That right does not exist in dependency proceedings. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 6 ("Proceedings as set forth in these rules ... shall proceed in a manner similar to the trial of a civil action before the court sitting without a jury...."). The public also has a right to observe the criminal proceedings against Crosby and examine the record, which was not the case in the dependency proceedings. See A.R.S. §§ 8-208(F) (providing that, with exception, dependency proceeding records "shall not be open to public inspection"), -525(B) (authorizing the juvenile court to close proceedings to the public); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 9.3(b) (requiring that all criminal proceedings be open to the public unless "an open proceeding presents a clear and present danger to the defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury"). ¶34 The public's interests in criminal proceedings cannot be vindicated in a dependency proceeding. Likely for this reason, issue preclusion is rarely applied in a criminal case for a factual issue adjudicated in a civil proceeding. Cf. State v. Edwards , 136 Ariz. 177, 188, 665 P.2d 59, 70 (1983) (explaining that Arizona courts apply preclusion in criminal cases only rarely because, "[w]hile the concerns of judicial economy may be a significant factor in applying the doctrine of [issue preclusion] in civil cases, the 'public interest in the accuracy and justice of criminal results is greater' " (quoting Standefer v. United States , 447 U.S. 10, 25, 100 S.Ct. 1999, 64 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980) ) ); Gates , 452 N.W.2d at 630 (recognizing rarity of "cross-over estoppel," between civil and criminal cases); Gregory v. Commonwealth , 610 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Ky. 1980) (noting that issue preclusion applied "civil to criminal" is "least common"). Indeed, although the Supreme Court has acknowledged that issue preclusion can apply in the civil-to-criminal combination, see Yates v. United States , 354 U.S. 298, 335-36, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356 (1957), overruled on other grounds by Burks v. United States , 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), the Court has yet to do so. And the only Arizona case to do so was a civil forfeiture proceeding, which is "quasi-criminal." See Fitzgerald v. Superior Court In and For County of Maricopa , 173 Ariz. 539, 546-48, 845 P.2d 465, 472-74 (App. 1992). ¶35 This is not a case in which the State pursued criminal charges to get a "second bite at the apple" after failing to prove its case in dependency proceedings-a scenario that may result in the "rare circumstance" when issue preclusion should apply. See Lucido v. Super. Ct., 51 Cal.3d 335, 272 Cal.Rptr. 767, 795 P.2d 1223, 1227 (1990) (stating that "the public policies underlying collateral estoppel," including "protection of litigants from harassment by vexatious litigation ... strongly influence whether its application in a particular circumstance would be fair to the parties and constitutes sound judicial policy"). The State indicted Crosby while the dependency proceedings were pending, and the superior court had exclusive authority in that circumstance to adjudicate the criminal charge against him through the criminal trial process. See § 8-202(C)(1). By applying issue preclusion here, the majority eradicates that authority and bypasses the prosecution and public's interest and roles in the pending criminal proceedings. ¶36 To be clear, although issue preclusion rarely applies in the civil-to-criminal context, I do not advocate a "blanket rule" precluding application of issue preclusion in all criminal cases or even in those sharing issues in common with dependency proceedings, as the majority suggests. See supra ¶ 22. But to accommodate public policy, and particularly policies underlying § 8-202(C)(1), the court in a criminal case should always refuse to apply issue preclusion to factual disputes resolved in concurrently pursued dependency proceedings. I would permit the criminal case against Crosby to continue. I therefore respectfully dissent.

WEINZWEIG, Judge: ¶1 This case involves an airport taxicab driver who sought workers' compensation benefits for injuries he sustained while driving a taxi he leased from a cab company. The Industrial Commission of Arizona ("ICA") found the injury was non-compensable because the driver was an independent contractor of the cab company rather than an employee for workers' compensation purposes. We affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶2 AAA Cab Services ("AAA") is a transportation business and one of three taxicab companies licensed to operate at Sky Harbor International Airport (the "Airport") by the City of Phoenix. AAA leases taxicabs to its airport drivers under a standard one-year lease agreement that automatically renews unless terminated. ¶3 Before leasing a taxicab, AAA requires all drivers to complete a written application, provide their driver's license, undergo a background check and attend an eight-hour defensive driving course. The lease agreement permits AAA drivers to work for other taxicab companies; designates them as independent contractors who are responsible for paying their own taxes; cautions that AAA provides no workers' compensation insurance to drivers; and authorizes drivers to terminate the relationship without cause upon 45 days of notice. AAA can terminate the agreement only for cause. ¶4 AAA imposes no minimum hour requirement on airport drivers and conducts no performance reviews of them. Airport drivers set their own work schedule, arrange for replacement drivers when unavailable and purchase their own gasoline. Airport drivers receive no salary or wages from AAA. The drivers instead retain all passenger fares as compensation, while AAA receives fixed, regular lease payments from the drivers for their taxis. Cash transactions are not reported to AAA, but AAA processes all vouchers and credit card payments to airport drivers and deducts a bank service charge. AAA annually issues IRS 1099 forms to airport drivers to report their income. AAA registers, licenses, insures and performs all necessary maintenance and upkeep on the leased taxicabs. AAA maintains its own company rules to ensure safety and facilitate a positive customer experience; for instance, AAA requires drivers to wear seatbelts, observe all traffic laws and clean the vehicles. ¶5 Most significant here, the Airport wields extensive control and oversight over the general and minute-to-minute operations of all airport taxicab drivers. The Airport requires a separate application, an independent test, a Department of Transportation physical and a federal background check. ¶6 The Airport sets passenger fares. It also imposes and enforces its own detailed set of rules for drivers. For instance, it requires the drivers to use E85 fuel, dress professionally, clean their cabs, be courteous to passengers and refrain from eating, drinking, or smoking in the vehicle. The Airport also leads when disciplinary action is required, not the cab companies. The Airport imposes 95 percent of all disciplinary actions against airport drivers. ¶7 The Airport restricts the movement and customers of airport drivers. Airport drivers wait in a designated airport parking lot until an airport dispatcher instructs them to retrieve passengers at a particular terminal. The drivers then retrieve the passengers and transport them to their destination before returning to the designated airport lot and waiting for the airport dispatcher's next call. The Airport provides a breakroom for drivers. ¶8 Kardakh Danial drives a AAA taxicab and operates exclusively from the Airport. He signed AAA's standard lease agreement in 2002, which has since been annually renewed. He was injured in May 2016 while driving airport passengers in a AAA leased taxicab and requested workers' compensation benefits from AAA's insurer, which were denied. He filed a timely protest with the ICA. ¶9 An administrative law judge ("ALJ") conducted a two-day hearing. She heard testimony from Danial and his brother, who also leases a AAA cab, along with AAA's present and former fleet managers. The ALJ entered an award for a non-compensable claim. Though characterizing it as a "close call," the ALJ found that Danial was an independent contractor because the AAA "exercised very little direction or control over the details of [Danial's] work." Danial requested administrative review, but the ALJ summarily affirmed the award. ¶10 Danial timely challenged the ruling. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(2) and § 23-951(A), as well as Arizona Rule of Procedure for Special Actions 10. DISCUSSION ¶11 The sole issue is whether Danial is an independent contractor or AAA employee under A.R.S. § 23-902. Danial maintains he is an employee. The ALJ found he was an independent contractor. Whether Danial is an independent contractor or employee is a question of law that we review de novo . Vance Int'l v. Indus. Comm'n, 191 Ariz. 98, 100, ¶ 6, 952 P.2d 336 (App. 1998). We defer to the ALJ's factual findings unless no reasonable evidence supports them and view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the award. Micucci v. Indus. Comm'n , 108 Ariz. 194, 195, 494 P.2d 1324 (1972). ¶12 An employee who is injured in the course of employment is generally entitled to compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury. A.R.S. § 23-1021. A factual predicate for recovery, however, is the existence of an employer-employee relationship. An independent contractor is not an employee for purposes of workers' compensation law. See Munoz v. Indus. Comm'n , 234 Ariz. 145, 149, ¶ 12, 318 P.3d 439 (App. 2014). The legislature has drawn the line between employees and independent contractors in this context as follows: When an employer procures work to be done for the employer by a contractor over whose work the employer retains supervision or control, and the work is a part or process in the trade or business of the employer, then the contractors and the contractor's employees, and any subcontractor and the subcontractor's employees, are, within the meaning of this section, employees of the original employer. For the purposes of this subsection, "part or process in the trade or business of the employer" means a particular work activity that in the context of an ongoing and integral business process is regular, ordinary or routine in the operation of the business or is routinely done through the business' own employees. A person engaged in work for a business, and who while so engaged is independent of that business in the execution of the work and not subject to the rule or control of the business for which the work is done, but is engaged only in the performance of a definite job or piece of work, and is subordinate to that business only in effecting a result in accordance with that business design, is an independent contractor . A.R.S. § 23-902(B)-(C) (emphases added). ¶13 Arizona courts have adopted the control test to distinguish between employees and independent contractors in workers' compensation cases. The distinction turns on a prospective employer's right "to control the details of the work." Cent. Mgmt. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n , 162 Ariz. 187, 189, 781 P.2d 1374 (App. 1989) (quoting 1C A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 44.10 (1986) ); see also Home Ins. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n , 123 Ariz. 348, 350, 599 P.2d 801 (1979) ("The right to control or supervise the method of reaching a specific result determines whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor."). The court examines the "objective nature of the relationship" when determining the character of an employment arrangement based upon "the totality of the facts and circumstances of each case." Anton v. Indus. Comm'n , 141 Ariz. 566, 568-69, 688 P.2d 192 (1984). ¶14 Arizona courts have recognized several nonexclusive indicia of control, including "the duration of the employment; the method of payment; who furnishes necessary equipment; the right to hire and fire; who bears responsibility for workmen's compensation insurance; the extent to which the employer may exercise control over the details of the work, and whether the work was performed in the usual and regular course of the employer's business." Home Ins. Co. , 123 Ariz. at 350, 599 P.2d 801. ¶15 The record supports the ALJ's finding that Danial was an independent contractor, not AAA's employee. AAA does not possess or exercise the degree or quality of control over its airport drivers to recognize an employee-employer relationship for workers' compensation purposes. Danial receives his general and minute-to-minute direction from the Airport and its dispatchers, not AAA. The Airport fixes his compensation in the form of passenger rates and fares. AAA earns no income from his passenger fares, only from his lease payments. The Airport also imposes fuel and additional hiring requirements on drivers. And while AAA has company rules, the Airport imposes almost all disciplinary action against AAA's airport drivers. ¶16 Second, Danial retains significant flexibility under the AAA lease agreement. He can simultaneously work for AAA and its competitors and terminate the lease without cause upon 45 days' notice, while AAA needs cause to terminate. He controls his own hours and driving schedule, keeps his fares and tips, and pays his own taxes. He is not subjected to regular AAA performance reviews and does not have personalized AAA business cards. If unable or unwilling to work, he can secure a AAA-approved relief driver to operate his cab. ¶17 We note the stark contrast in this regard with AAA's medical transport drivers, who drive patients to medical providers in non-emergency settings. AAA hires the medical drivers as AAA employees. The medical drivers receive biweekly AAA payroll checks with tax withholding. AAA fixes their work hours and pays for their gasoline. ¶18 Third, Danial's lease agreement expressly identifies him as an independent contractor and specifies that AAA will not procure workers' compensation insurance. It further directs that Danial is responsible for his federal and state income taxes. Danial also "agree[d] to accept full responsibility for any and all injuries" and "to make no claim for workmen's compensation or unemployment." Though not controlling, the terms of Danial's signed lease agreement only reinforce the ALJ's finding. Anton , 141 Ariz. at 568, 688 P.2d 192 ("We agree that neither the absence nor the presence of a written contract controls the resolution of the question of whether petitioner was an employee or an independent contractor."). ¶19 Danial argues that Central Management Company v. Industrial Commission , 162 Ariz. 187, 781 P.2d 1374 (App. 1989), controls and compels a different result. Central Management raised the same issue here. An ALJ found the claimant taxicab driver was an employee of the cab company under A.R.S. § 23-902, not an independent contractor, and this court affirmed. Id . But the facts and circumstances here and there are meaningfully different on the dispositive issue of control. The cab company in Central Management withheld and exerted far greater control over its drivers than does AAA over its airport drivers. State Comp. Fund v. Yellow Cab Co. of Phoenix , 197 Ariz. 120, 123, ¶¶ 9-10, 3 P.3d 1040 (App. 1999) (distinguishing Central Management where cab company exercised less control). The drivers here (unlike in Central Management ) receive their orders and service routes from the Airport and its dispatcher, not the cab company's dispatcher; the drivers here (unlike there) are disciplined almost exclusively by Airport authorities, not the cab company; the passenger fares here (unlike there) are set by the Airport, not the cab company; the drivers here (unlike there) can simultaneously work for any other cab company; the lease agreement here (unlike there) expressly specifies that drivers are independent contractors and disclaims workers' compensation insurance; the drivers here (unlike there) are not subject to continuous performance reviews; and the drivers here (unlike there) control their own work hours. Central Management , 162 Ariz. at 191, 781 P.2d 1374. ¶20 In sum, the record includes ample evidence to support the ALJ's finding that Danial was an independent contractor rather than AAA's employee. CONCLUSION ¶21 We affirm. Danial insists that Santiago v. Phoenix Newspapers adopted several more factors from the Restatement (Second) of Agency and IRS guidelines "to determine a worker's employment status." 164 Ariz. 505, 794 P.2d 138 (1990). But Santiago considered the distinction between employees and independent contractors in the context of vicarious liability, not workers' compensation benefits. Id . at 512 n.6, 794 P.2d 138 ("We recognize that the law of workers' compensation carries with it unique historical and statutory provisions which may not be completely applicable to the theory of vicarious liability."). We note that state and local laws require AAA to exercise various indicia of control over its drivers, but government-required control is not normally ascribed to an employer under the control test in workers' compensation cases. See, e.g. , La Grande v. B & L Servs., Inc. , 432 So.2d 1364, 1367 (Fla. App. 1983) ("[I]t became evident that what little dress code there was (shoes, long pants and collared shirt) was required by local ordinance. Here again, we would note that governmental regulation of workers should not be visited upon the putative employer in determining whether the latter has such control over the worker as would establish an employment relationship."). While Danial testified he could not read English and did not understand the lease when he signed it, the record indicates that AAA reviews the lease agreement with new drivers "paragraph by paragraph" to ensure their understanding and orally explains to them that drivers are independent contractors, must provide their own insurance, and pay their own taxes.

McMURDIE, Judge: ¶ 1 Salvador Vera ("Father") seeks special action review of two conflicting orders issued by different judicial officers of the superior court. The first is a temporary order related to Father's petition for legal decision-making, parenting time, and child support, which granted Father temporary parenting time of his two children. The second order affirmed an active order of protection barring Father from any contact with the children's mother, Araceli Chaidez ("Mother"), and the children. We accept special action jurisdiction and hold that although the superior court may act to harmonize parenting-time and protective orders, its authority to do so is limited once a coordinate member of that same court affirms the protective order following an evidentiary hearing. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶ 2 Father and Mother are the biological parents of two minor children. In April 2018, Mother obtained an ex parte order of protection in the Phoenix Municipal Court prohibiting Father from having any contact with Mother. The children were also designated as protected persons under the order of protection. Mother, without informing Father, then moved out of Arizona with the children, allegedly to escape the domestic violence that gave rise to the need for the order of protection. ¶ 3 Before Father realized Mother and the children had left the state, Father petitioned to establish legal decision-making authority, parenting time, and child support in the superior court ("the family case"). After learning Mother and the children had left Arizona, Father petitioned the court to issue a series of emergency ex parte temporary orders awarding Father sole legal decision-making authority over the children and requiring Mother to immediately return them to Arizona. The court denied Father's request to issue the orders ex parte but scheduled a temporary-orders hearing. ¶ 4 Between the time of the filing of Father's petition for temporary orders and the temporary-orders hearing, Father was served with the order of protection. On Father's motion, the municipal court, pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 12-3602(P), ordered the order-of-protection case to be transferred to the superior court "for consolidation under Case No. FC2018-091238 for all further proceedings." Once the transfer was effectuated, however, the superior court, pursuant to its obligations under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 123 and the Federal Violence Against Women Act, assigned the order of protection case a new cause number-FC2018-092621. ¶ 5 In the family case, the superior court held the temporary orders hearing as scheduled. Before the hearing, Father filed a pretrial statement notifying the court that the order of protection had been transferred to the superior court. At the hearing, the court heard testimony and took evidence concerning Father and Mother's relationship, their relationship with the children, the allegations of domestic violence by Father, and the order of protection. The court took the matter under advisement and subsequently issued temporary orders. The court awarded Mother sole legal decision-making authority regarding the children, but ordered that Father have regular access to the children, including daily remote communication and in-person parenting time on school holidays and breaks. But the court made no mention of the still-active order of protection prohibiting Father from any contact with Mother or the children. ¶ 6 Both Mother and Father immediately challenged the temporary orders as conflicting with the order of protection. Mother requested the court reconsider the parenting time aspects of its order given the order of protection, and Father requested the court amend the order of protection to implement the temporary order concerning parenting time. The court denied both requests by minute entry, mistakenly noting the order of protection had not been transferred to the superior court under a new cause number. The court concluded that "[o]nce an Order of Protection is properly transferred to the Superior Court, a hearing may be properly requested and will take place accordingly." ¶ 7 Father then requested a hearing on the order of protection. At the order-of-protection hearing before a different judicial officer, Mother, Father, and the court discussed the conflict between the order of protection and the temporary orders issued by the court in the family case. The judge handling the order of protection interpreted the minute entry in the family case denying reconsideration of the temporary orders as placing priority on the active order of protection. The court determined that the parenting-time order would become effective only if the court modified the order of protection or removed the children from that order. Based on this interpretation, the court found that it could go forward with the hearing. Father did not object to proceeding in the manner outlined by the court. ¶ 8 After hearing testimony and taking evidence on the domestic abuse allegations raised by Mother against Father, the court affirmed the order of protection in its entirety. The court found Mother had met her burden of proving the domestic abuse allegations by a preponderance of the evidence, and that the involvement of the children in the incidents justified their inclusion on the order of protection. Father then filed this special action seeking an order directing the court in the family case to amend the order of protection to effectuate its temporary parenting-time order. SPECIAL ACTION JURISDICTION ¶ 9 "Special action jurisdiction is discretionary, but appropriate, when there is no equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal." Courtney v. Foster ex rel. County of Maricopa , 235 Ariz. 613, 615, ¶ 4, 334 P.3d 1272 (App. 2014) (citing Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a) ). Because temporary orders issued pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-404 are not appealable, they are well-suited for special action review. Gutierrez v. Fox , 242 Ariz. 259, 264, ¶ 12, 394 P.3d 1096 (App. 2017). Moreover, special action jurisdiction is appropriate when "a petition 'presents a purely legal issue of first impression that is of statewide importance.' " Id. at 264, ¶ 13, 394 P.3d 1096 (quoting Escalanti v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa , 165 Ariz. 385, 386, 799 P.2d 5 (App. 1990) ). ¶ 10 The petition for special action in this case raises an issue of first impression concerning the interplay between the procedural rules and statutes governing protective orders and family law proceedings. Thus, in the exercise of our discretion, we accept special action jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Rule of Procedure for Special Actions 1(a). DISCUSSION A. The Superior Court Has the Authority to Hold a Joint Hearing Regarding Temporary Parenting-Time and Protective Orders. ¶ 11 We begin by clarifying how the statutes and procedural rules address the interrelationship between temporary parenting-time orders and active orders of protection. We review the interpretation of statutes and court rules de novo . Premier Physicians Grp., PLLC v. Navarro , 240 Ariz. 193, 194, ¶ 6, 377 P.3d 988 (2016) (statutes); State v. Fitzgerald , 232 Ariz. 208, 210, ¶ 10, 303 P.3d 519 (2013) (court rules). "We interpret statutes and rules in accordance with the intent of the drafters, and we look to the plain language of the statute or rule as the best indicator of that intent." Fragoso v. Fell , 210 Ariz. 427, 430, ¶ 7, 111 P.3d 1027 (App. 2005). "If the language is clear and unambiguous, it is the best and most reliable index of the meaning of the rule or statute." Courtney , 235 Ariz. at 615, ¶ 6, 334 P.3d 1272. "However, we must construe related statutes and rules in conjunction with each other and harmonize them whenever possible." Fitzgerald v. Myers , 243 Ariz. 84, 96, ¶ 39, 402 P.3d 442 (2017). ¶ 12 A parent may petition to determine legal decision-making and parenting time "in any proceeding for marital dissolution, legal separation, annulment, paternity or maternity, or modification of an earlier decree or judgment." A.R.S. § 25-402(B)(1). Once a legal decision-making or parenting time proceeding is initiated, the court may, on motion by a party, issue temporary orders awarding parenting time. A.R.S. § 25-404(A) ; Ariz. R. Fam. Law. P. ("Family Rule") 47. When issuing a temporary parenting-time order, the court must consider "all factors that are relevant to the child's physical and emotional well-being," including whether conditions should be placed on parenting time if a parent has committed an act of domestic violence. A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(8) ; see also A.R.S. § 25-403.03(F) (listing examples of conditions the superior court may place on parenting time). ¶ 13 The superior court has exclusive jurisdiction to issue orders of protection when a family law action is pending. A.R.S. § 13-3602(P) ; see also Ariz. R. Protect. Ord. P. 34(a). A.R.S. § 13-3602(P) provides that an order of protection issued in a municipal or justice court must be promptly transferred to the superior court when a family law action is pending between the parties. See also Ariz. R. Protect. Ord. P. 34(c). Upon transfer, the court is authorized to "proceed as though the petition for an order of protection had been originally brought in the superior court." A.R.S. § 13-3602(P). ¶ 14 When a parent's request for temporary parenting time conflicts with an active order of protection transferred to the superior court, the Family Rules recognize the court's concurrent authority over both actions by permitting it to consider them together in a joint hearing. Family Rule 5(A) provides: When actions within the scope of these rules involving a common child, common parties, or a common question of law or fact, are pending before the court, the court may order a joint hearing ... of any or all the matters in issue in the actions ... and the court may make such orders concerning proceedings therein to avoid unnecessary costs or delay or to serve in the best interest of a minor child. (Emphasis added. ) A joint hearing to consider both actions is especially appropriate in a case such as this. Requests for temporary parenting time and orders of protection that bar contact with a parent's child necessarily involve a common child and will typically concern common questions of law or fact. By resolving the issues raised by both actions in a joint hearing, the court may ensure that conflicts do not arise between the order of protection and the parenting-time order and avoid forcing the alleged victim of domestic abuse to testify multiple times. ¶ 15 Thus, if at the end of a joint hearing a court finds both that (1) the requesting parent is entitled to immediate, temporary parenting time and (2) the protective order should not remain in effect as originally issued, it may harmonize the temporary parenting-time order and the order of protection. Ariz. R. Fam. Law. P. 5(A) ("[T]he court may make such orders ... to serve in the best interest of a minor child."). In doing so, a court may fashion an appropriate solution from the range of statutory and procedural options available to it, including amending the order of protection to remove any child listed as a protected person. See, e.g. , A.R.S. § 25-403.03(F) (listing conditions that may be placed on parenting time when the court finds a parent has committed an act of domestic violence); A.R.S. § 13-3062(G) (listing conditions that may be imposed by an order of protection); Ariz. R. Protect. Ord. P. 35 (modification of an order of protection to permit one parent to contact the other parent to implement legal decision-making and parenting-time orders). But given the priority placed upon protective orders-and the criminal penalties associated with them-the court must ensure that any decision affecting the order of protection will not hinder the "understanding and compliance by the parties and ease of enforcement by law enforcement officers." Ariz. R. Protect. Ord. P. 35(d); see also Ariz. R. Protect. Ord. P. 21(c) (protective orders control over conflicting legal decision-making orders); A.R.S. § 13-2810 (criminal penalties for violations of protective orders). ¶ 16 We note two important caveats to the superior court's authority to amend an order of protection. First, while the superior court has the discretion to hold a joint hearing to harmonize parenting-time orders and an order of protection, it is not obligated to do so. See Ariz. R. Fam. Law. P. 5(A). Second, the court's authority to modify an order of protection only exists pursuant to the statutes and rules controlling protective orders. See, e.g. , Ariz. R. Protect. Ord. P. 2 ("To the extent not inconsistent with these rules, the Arizona Rules of Family Law Procedure apply to protective order matters heard in conjunction with pending family law cases." (emphasis added) ). With this background in mind, we now turn to the issues Father raises. B. The Statutes and Rules Governing Orders of Protection Do Not Authorize the Relief Father Seeks in this Case. ¶ 17 Father argues the superior court in the family case erred by failing to amend the order of protection to effectuate its parenting-time orders. Father's argument hinges on his contention that "this Court has already reviewed this issue" in Courtney , and the straightforward application of our holding in that case authorizes us to order the superior court to amend the order of protection. We disagree. ¶ 18 In Courtney , the superior court denied a mother's request for temporary parenting time with her minor child because the court found it could not amend an active order of protection that included the child as a protected person. We accepted special action jurisdiction to determine whether the superior court had the authority to amend an order of protection that had been issued, contested, and affirmed in the municipal court before its transfer to superior court. Courtney , 235 Ariz. at 615, ¶¶ 2-3, 5-6, 334 P.3d 1272. After examining the applicable rules and statutes governing protective orders and temporary parenting-time orders, we concluded the superior court had the authority "to modify the protective order if the court is satisfied that parenting time would not endanger the child or significantly impair the child's emotional development." Id. at 616, ¶ 11, 334 P.3d 1272 ; accord Michael M. v. Arizona Dept. of Economic Sec. , 217 Ariz. 230, 233, ¶ 14, 172 P.3d 418 (App. 2007) ("[J]uvenile court has authority under § 8-202(F) to issue orders that take precedence over a pre-existing municipal court order of protection and therefore supersede it."). ¶ 19 Here-and critically distinct from the circumstances at issue in Courtney -a superior court judicial officer, at Father's request, held a hearing on the order of protection and affirmed it in its entirety before Father filed the instant special action. Father's claim for relief thus requires us to determine whether the statutory and procedural scheme described above authorizes the superior court to amend an order of protection that has been affirmed by a coordinate member of the same court. We conclude it does not. ¶ 20 The superior court's authority to amend an active order of protection after a contested hearing in the superior court exists only to the extent such action would not conflict with the statutes and procedural rules governing protective orders. See Ariz. R. Protect. Ord. P. 2. Pursuant to both A.R.S. § 13-3602(H) and Arizona Rule of Protective Order Procedure ("ARPOP") 38, a party restrained by an order of protection is only entitled to one hearing to contest the order. Michael M. , 217 Ariz. at 233, ¶ 12, 172 P.3d 418 ("[ A.R.S. §] 13-3602 sets forth the proper procedure to contest an order of protection, entitling a party to one hearing and an appeal...."). Once that hearing has been held, an affirmed order of protection may be amended or dismissed only in two ways: (1) by a request of the party protected by the order, Ariz. R. Protect. Ord. P. 40(a), 41(a); or (2) by appeal, Ariz. R. Protect. Ord. P. 42(a)(2), (b). Mother has not requested that the order be amended, and Father did not appeal from the court's final judgment. Therefore, neither remedy is now available to Father. ¶ 21 We note that ARPOP 40(a) specifically limits modification requests to the "plaintiff" for an important reason-to avoid potential harassment from a defendant who might repeatedly seek reconsideration or modification of a protective order. In this case, Father had two options after the court denied his motion to reconsider the inconsistent orders: (1) file a special action petition challenging the court's denial of his motion to reconsider based on the court's erroneous factual premise that it could not harmonize the two orders because the order-of-protection case had not been transferred to the superior court; or (2) ask for a hearing on the order of protection. Father chose the latter option, did not prevail at the hearing, and then sought relief from this court to circumvent the order-of-protection ruling. Under the rules governing protective orders, Father is bound by the strategy he chose. See State v. West, 176 Ariz. 432, 447, 862 P.2d 192 (1993) (defendant is bound by his counsel's tactical or strategic decisions to waive even constitutional rights), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rodriguez, 192 Ariz. 58, 961 P.2d 1006 (1998) ; Bobrow v. Bobrow , 241 Ariz. 592, 598, ¶ 29, 391 P.3d 646 (App. 2017) (a party may not sit by and allow error to be committed and, upon receiving an unfavorable judgment, ask for a new trial on that ground). ¶ 22 Furthermore, a superior court judicial officer is not to engage in horizontal appellate review of another judicial officer's decision to affirm an order of protection. "[A] superior court judge has no jurisdiction to review or change the judgment of another superior court judge when the judgment has become 'final.' " Davis v. Davis , 195 Ariz. 158, 161, ¶ 11, 985 P.2d 643 (App. 1999) ; see also Bogard v. Cannon & Wendt Elec. Co. , 221 Ariz. 325, 333, ¶ 26, 212 P.3d 17 (App. 2009). "An Order of Protection ... that is ... affirmed ... after a hearing at which both parties had an opportunity to appear" is a final, appealable order. Ariz. R. Protect. Ord. P. 42(a)(2); see also Mahar v. Acuna , 230 Ariz. 530, 533, ¶ 11, 287 P.3d 824 (App. 2012) (signed order of protection issued after a hearing is a final, appealable order under the Rules of Protective Order Procedure, A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1), and A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(5)(b) ). Once the superior court judicial officer presiding over the order-of-protection hearing affirmed the order of protection, Father's sole remedy was to appeal that ruling to this court, which he did not do. ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ¶ 23 Father and Mother each request an award of attorney's fees and costs. Because neither cites authority to support the request, neither is entitled to an award of attorney's fees. ARCAP 21(a)(2) ; see also Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 4(g) (Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure apply to the extent not inconsistent with these rules); Roubos v. Miller , 214 Ariz. 416, 420, ¶ 21, 153 P.3d 1045 (2007). However, as the prevailing party, Mother is entitled to her costs upon compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21. CONCLUSION ¶ 24 For the foregoing reasons, we accept special action jurisdiction, but deny relief. At the time the new cause number was assigned to the order-of-protection case, a case note was added to the digital files for both cases which stated that the order of protection had been transferred to a new cause number and that the new case was connected to the family case. We have taken judicial notice of this case note, located in the records of the superior court. See State v. Valenzuela , 109 Ariz. 109, 110, 506 P.2d 240 (1973) (court may take judicial notice of related superior court records). The Arizona Supreme Court has recently adopted new rules abrogating and replacing the Rules of Family Law Procedure almost in their entirety, effective January 1, 2019. See Order Amending the Arizona Rules of Family Law Procedure and Rule 9, Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, Arizona Court Order 0023 (adopted August 30, 2018). We refer to these new rules as the "2019 Rules of Family Law Procedure," and will note any changes that substantially modify the current rules discussed in this opinion. To the extent they do not conflict, the Arizona Rules of Protective Order Procedure explicitly incorporate the Arizona Rules of Family Law Procedure. Ariz. R. Protect. Ord. P. 2. To eliminate any confusion regarding whether a court may hold a joint hearing on an order of protection and parenting time, the 2019 Family Rules explicitly recognize the court's authority to hold such a hearing. 2019 Rule of Family Law Procedure 5(a)(4) ("The court may not consolidate a case involving an order of protection with a family case but may conduct a joint hearing."). The judicial officer hearing the order-of-protection case is a full-time court commissioner but presided over the action as a judge pro tempore . As a pro tempore judge, she had the same authority as a full-time regularly seated superior court judge. See Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 31 (B); State v. White, 160 Ariz. 24, 32, 770 P.2d 328 (1989). ARPOP 40 provides: (a) A plaintiff may ask for modification of a protective order at any time during the term of the order. * * * (c) If a contested hearing has not yet been requested or held, the judicial officer must personally interview the plaintiff and make sufficient inquiry of the plaintiff to determine that the plaintiff is not making the request under duress or coercion. (d) If a contested hearing has been requested or has occurred, the motion to modify must be set for hearing with notice to the defendant.

CRUZ, Judge: ¶ 1 Dana Nicole Prouty ("Mother") appeals final orders relating to child custody, legal decision-making authority, child support, and attorney fees. We address in this opinion whether the superior court had jurisdiction to modify a foreign child custody order concerning her daughter. Because our resolution of only this issue merits publication, we have addressed Mother's other arguments in a memorandum decision filed concurrently with this opinion. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(h). For the following reasons, we affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 2 Mother and Adam Timothy Kafka ("Kafka") are the parents of M.P. ("Daughter"), born in Illinois in 2008. When Daughter was two years old, Mother and Kafka entered into a custody agreement in Illinois which awarded Mother sole legal decision-making authority and primary physical custody, and provided Kafka with unspecified parenting time. Soon thereafter, Mother and Daughter moved to Arizona after Mother became romantically involved with Bradley Hughes ("Hughes"). ¶ 3 In December 2012, Kafka, a Nebraska resident, filed the Illinois custody order in Arizona with a petition to modify that order, along with a motion for temporary orders without notice seeking custody of Daughter. Pursuant to the agreement of Prouty, Hughes and Kafka, under Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure 69, the superior court granted temporary physical custody of Daughter to Hughes, with Mother having supervised parenting time and Kafka having parenting time with Daughter in Arizona once a month. ¶ 4 In May 2013, Kafka filed a petition to modify the temporary orders. At the modification hearing, the superior court raised possible jurisdictional concerns regarding the Illinois order and requested Kafka to register the foreign order in Arizona pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 25-1055. Kafka filed his affidavit registering the order in August 2013 and the court subsequently issued notice of the registration to the parties. Mother took the children to Illinois without notice the same month. ¶ 5 The superior court entered several additional temporary orders regarding custody of Daughter and legal decision-making authority. Specifically, in November 2013 the court entered orders for joint legal decision-making authority, but only temporarily, for Daughter to reside exclusively with Kafka. The court also issued a warrant to take physical custody of Daughter. ¶ 6 When Kafka first attempted to enforce the warrant in Illinois, Mother obtained an emergency restraining order from the Illinois court against Kafka. In support of her petition for a restraining order, Mother alleged that Arizona did not have proper jurisdiction to make orders regarding Daughter because Mother and Daughter only "sporadically and temporarily" resided in Arizona, as their primary residence was Illinois, and the Illinois order was not properly registered in Arizona because Mother had not been personally served. ¶ 7 Kafka filed an emergency motion for enforcement of the child custody warrant in Arizona and in December 2013 the superior court made findings of fact and conclusions of law affirming the warrant and all prior orders. Of relevance, the court found Mother and Daughter resided in Arizona beginning October 2012 and Mother had made admissions conceding Arizona was Mother's and Daughter's home state. Shortly after, the parties appeared in Illinois. The Illinois court also found that Arizona was the proper forum and ordered that the Arizona custody warrant was immediately enforceable. ¶ 8 Mother urged the superior court to reconsider its December 2013 orders arguing she did not receive notice of the registration because it was not sent to her Illinois address, and, therefore, the Illinois custody order was not properly registered. The superior court found the Illinois order was properly registered pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-1055 and Mother's failure to update her address with the court did not invalidate its registration or enforceability. ¶ 9 Four months later, Mother filed a motion to dismiss the Arizona proceedings for lack of jurisdiction. The superior court denied the motion and affirmed its December 2013 findings and orders. In May 2014, Kafka petitioned the superior court to find Mother in contempt for her failure to comply with the court's November 2013 custody warrant, and later filed a supplement documenting attempts by Mother, in Illinois, to serve Kafka with an order of protection, listing Daughter as a protected person. On its own motion, the superior court set a Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA") conference with the Illinois court to further address jurisdictional issues. The Illinois court found, for the purposes of the UCCJEA, that Arizona was the proper forum and that Mother was utilizing Illinois courts merely because she "[did] not agree with the orders of the court in Arizona." The Illinois court vacated its order of protection proceedings. ¶ 10 Following a two and a half-day trial in January 2016, the Arizona court granted Kafka's petition to modify legal decision-making authority and parenting time. ¶ 11 We have jurisdiction over Mother's timely appeal from these orders pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1). DISCUSSION ¶ 12 This court reviews the superior court's jurisdiction to modify a custody order from another state de novo . Danielson v. Evans, 201 Ariz. 401, 411, ¶ 36, 36 P.3d 749 (App. 2001). When Kafka filed his petition to modify the Illinois custody order, he did not register the order in accordance with A.R.S. § 25-1055. Mother contends the superior court, therefore, lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the Illinois custody order and, as a result, all subsequent orders by the superior court are void. In support of her argument, Mother relies on this court's opinion in Glover v. Glover, 231 Ariz. 1, 289 P.3d 12 (App. 2012). We find Glover distinguishable. ¶ 13 In Glover, a Massachusetts court ordered the father to pay child support. The parties relocated to Arizona and subsequently entered into an agreement to reduce the father's child support obligation. Id. at 2-3, ¶¶ 2-5, 289 P.3d 12. On appeal, this court held the superior court lacked jurisdiction to modify the foreign support order because it was never registered in Arizona as required by the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act ("UIFSA"), A.R.S. § 25-1201 to -1342. Id . at 7, ¶¶ 21-22, 289 P.3d 12. ¶ 14 The UIFSA applies to child support orders. The UIFSA statutes governing modification of foreign child support orders require such orders to be registered. See A.R.S. § 25-1309 (party seeking to modify foreign support order shall register that order); § 25-1310 (Arizona courts may enforce a registered foreign support order, but may modify a registered support order only if certain requirements are met); see also Glover, 231 Ariz. at 7, ¶ 21, 289 P.3d 12 ("Unless the foreign child support order is registered, the issuing state retains exclusive jurisdiction, which means another state lacks jurisdiction to modify the order unless it is registered and other prerequisites are satisfied."). ¶ 15 By contrast, the jurisdictional provision at issue here is the UCCJEA, A.R.S. § 25-1033, not the UIFSA. Unlike the UIFSA, the UCCJEA does not require that a foreign custody order be registered before it may be modified. See also A.R.S. §§ 25-1055, -1056. While A.R.S. § 25-1055(A) provides that "[a] child custody determination issued by a court of another state may be registered in this state," it does not require registration. (Emphasis added). Under the UCCJEA, the jurisdictional requirement for modification of a child custody determination is that this state have jurisdiction to make an initial determination and that either of the following be true: 1. The court of the other state determines it no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under § 25-1032 or that a court of this state would be a more convenient forum under § 25-1037. 2. A court of this state or a court of the other state determines that the child, the child's parents and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in the other state. A.R.S. § 25-1033. See Ex parte Davis, 82 So.3d 695, 701 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) (holding that under the plain language of a similar Alabama UCCJEA provision, registration is not required to modify foreign custody order, only to enforce such order), overruled on other grounds by Ex parte Reynolds, 209 So.3d 1122, 1126 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016) ; see also Lopez v. Olson, 314 Ga.App. 533, 724 S.E.2d 837, 841 (2012) (holding Georgia's identical version of UCCJEA did not require registration of foreign custody order prior to modification); Butler v. Butler, M2011-01341-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 4762105, at *4-5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2012) (holding that to modify foreign custody order, Tennessee's similar UCCJEA provisions do not require registration of order). ¶ 16 The reasons for a registration requirement in the UIFSA but not in the UCCJEA are explained in the UIFSA commentary: UIFSA and UCCJEA seek a world in which there is but one order at a time for child support and custody and visitation. Both have similar restrictions on the ability of a tribunal to modify the existing order. The major difference between the two acts is that the basic jurisdictional nexus of each is founded on different considerations. UIFSA has its focus on the personal jurisdiction necessary to bind the obligor to payment of a child-support order. UCCJEA places its focus on the factual circumstances of the child, primarily the "home state" of the child; personal jurisdiction to bind a party to the custody decree is not required. § 611 (Unif. Law Comm'n 2008). Registration of the Illinois custody order was not required; therefore, the failure to timely register the order did not deprive the Arizona court of jurisdiction. ¶ 17 Mother also argues other UCCJEA requirements were not met because Arizona did not have jurisdiction under § 25-1033. As previously stated, see supra ¶ 14, § 25-1033 requires jurisdiction to make an initial determination under § 25-1031(A)(1) or (2), and that one of two additional requirements be met. Here, all of the § 25-1033 jurisdictional requirements were satisfied. The superior court found that in December 2012, Arizona was Mother's and Daughter's home state and that neither Daughter nor either of the parties resided in Illinois. The record supports these findings. Therefore, the court did not err in finding it had jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 25-1033 and properly exercised jurisdiction over Father's petition to modify. CONCLUSION ¶ 18 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

ESPINOSA, Judge: ¶ 1 Jane Sherring appeals the determination of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") that she was not an employee at the time of her injury and therefore was not entitled to workers' compensation. We affirm the ALJ's award. Factual and Procedural Background ¶ 2 "We view the evidence in the light most favorable to affirming the Industrial Commission's findings and award." City of Tucson v. Indus. Comm'n , 236 Ariz. 52, ¶ 2, 335 P.3d 1131 (App. 2014). On January 4, 2017, Sherring accepted the City of Tucson's conditional offer of employment to be a Parking Service Agent. The City's offer stated that it was contingent upon "successful completion of all paperwork, background investigation, reference checks, pre-employment testing, and approval from the Equal Opportunity Programs Division & Human Resources." ¶ 3 By January 13, the date on which Sherring went to a medical center for a pre-employment physical exam, she had completed most, if not all, of the other requirements. As part of the exam, a medical assistant instructed Sherring to lift a box containing "50-pound free weights" and place it on a shelf. According to Sherring, the box was "so large that [it] hit [her] knee, twisted [her] left knee" while she was lifting it, but she nevertheless was able to lift it and place it on the shelf "[t]hree or four" times. The lift test was the last part of the physical, and while Sherring was checking out, the doctor told her she had "passed" the exam. ¶ 4 Following the physical examination, Sherring notified the City she had completed it and was informed where to report on her first day of work. However, she never actually began work for the City. According to Sherring, "when [she] left [the] appointment [her] knee was hurting pretty bad and [she] had some large bruises on the inside of [her] thigh." Although she initially believed "it would kind of go away because some things just take some time to heal," it "got worse" and, on February 2, she informed the City of the injury and asked if she could "go back and see the doctor [from the pre-employment physical] to have it checked" before starting work the following Monday. Her start date was pushed back a couple of times, but ultimately the City denied her request for a reasonable accommodation and rescinded its employment offer based on her inability "to perform the essential functions of a Parking Service Agent." ¶ 5 On February 3, 2017, Sherring saw an emergency room doctor regarding her knee, and on February 10, filed a "worker's report of injury" with the Industrial Commission of Arizona ("ICA"). The City denied the claim on the basis that Sherring was "not an Employee of City of Tucson," and she requested a hearing before an ALJ. After the hearing, the ALJ dismissed the claim upon finding Sherring "did not sustain a compensable injury on January 13, 2017 as she was not an employee of the [City] on that date." The ALJ affirmed the award upon review, and Sherring brought this statutory special action. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(2) and 23-951. Discussion ¶ 6 "In reviewing ICA findings and awards, we defer to the ALJ's factual findings but review questions of law de novo." Landon v. Indus. Comm'n , 240 Ariz. 21, ¶ 9, 375 P.3d 86 (App. 2016). Sherring raises two arguments on appeal: First, she disputes the ALJ's conclusion that she was not an employee of the City at the time the injury occurred. Second, she urges us to find entitlement to workers' compensation as a matter of public policy when a person is injured in a pre-employment physical that is a condition of employment. We address each argument in turn. Employment Status ¶ 7 Sherring contends the ALJ erred in dismissing her claim because under contract principles she "was an employee of the City for purposes of workers' compensation benefits." In support she cites Tabler v. Industrial Commission , 202 Ariz. 518, ¶ 8, 47 P.3d 1156 (App. 2002), which recognized that "[f]or an enforceable contract to exist, there must be an offer, acceptance, and consideration." According to Sherring, in her case, "[t]here was a contingent offer, there was acceptance, and once the contingencies were met by Sherring, the contract of employment was complete." ¶ 8 Sherring's injury, however, did not occur after she had met all the contingencies of the offer. Rather, the injury occurred during the pre-employment physical, and as the ALJ found below, Sherring "was not yet an employee on the date of her exam." Sherring relies on Pauley v. Industrial Commission , 109 Ariz. 298, 300, 508 P.2d 1160 (1973), Knack v. Industrial Commission , 108 Ariz. 545, 546, 503 P.2d 373 (1972), and City Products Corp. v. Industrial Commission , 19 Ariz. App. 286, 287-88, 506 P.2d 1071 (1973), which all addressed when the claimants were hired in the context of whether they were hired in Arizona, but which also all involved injuries that clearly occurred after the claimants began work. None of these cases is applicable here because none involved a contingent offer of employment. Moreover, Sherring herself admits "a bilateral contract was formed after [she] attended and passed the physical," apparently ignoring that her claimed injury occurred during the physical, not after she passed it. ¶ 9 Additionally, we agree with the City and the ALJ that this case is more like Ryan v. Industrial Commission , 127 Ariz. 607, 623 P.2d 37 (App. 1981), than the cases Sherring cites. In Ryan , this court determined the claimant was hired in Oklahoma because, although he had contacted the employer and received an application in Arizona, he had traveled to Oklahoma to deliver his application and "take a written test required by the Department of Transportation, a physical examination, and a driving test." 127 Ariz. at 608-09, 623 P.2d 37. While Sherring had a contingent job offer and Ryan did not, both needed to complete a number of requirements before they were in fact hired. And Ryan cited the Restatement (First) of Contracts § 74 (1932), which provides, "A contract is made at the time when the last act necessary for its formation is done." See 127 Ariz. at 609, 623 P.2d 37. All parties here agree the injury occurred before the physical was completed. ¶ 10 In her reply brief, Sherring cites A.R.S. § 23-1061 to argue that because her injury "did not manifest itself until sometime after the physical," "she did not have a viable compensation claim" until after "she had completed the contingencies of the City's offer and the contract of hire was complete." Section 23-1061(A) establishes the workers' compensation statute of limitations, allowing a claimant to file up to one year after "the injury becomes manifest" or the claimant knows or should know she "has sustained a compensable injury." That the statute of limitations may not start to run on the date of the injury, however, and the injury may not be immediately "compensable," does not alter when the injury occurred or give the claimant more time to become an employee after sustaining a pre-employment injury. Cf. A.R.S. § 23-1021 (workers' compensation available for employee "who is injured ... by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment"). Pre-Employment Physical ¶ 11 Sherring next argues that, even if an employment contract was not completed at the time of her injury, she should nevertheless be considered an employee because of "Arizona's policies on workers' compensation." She relies, however, on an out-of-state case, Laeng v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board , 6 Cal.3d 771, 100 Cal.Rptr. 377, 494 P.2d 1 (1972). There, California's supreme court considered whether the claimant was entitled to workers' compensation when he had been injured "[w]hile participating in the 'obstacle course' phase of a physical agility test conducted by the City of Covina as part of a 'tryout' competition for the position of 'refuse crew worker.' " Id. , 100 Cal.Rptr. 377, 494 P.2d at 2. The court determined that Laeng was so entitled, concluding the agility test was a "tryout" "designed to correlate with the skills, and, therefore, the risks, that would be involved in the ultimate employment position," sufficiently similar to "on-the-job trial performance[s]" found compensable in other jurisdictions. Id., 100 Cal.Rptr. 377, 494 P.2d at 7-9. ¶ 12 In response, the City cites Gebhard v. Dixie Carbonic , 261 Neb. 715, 625 N.W.2d 207, 210 (2001), in which Nebraska's supreme court declined "to adopt a rule that would make injuries [that] occur during a prehiring physical examination compensable under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, even when passing the physical is a precondition to employment." The facts of that case are very similar to those at hand. Gebhard was offered employment on the condition she "pass a drug test, pass a lower back physical examination, and complete a job orientation." Id. at 209. During the physical, Gebhard injured her back while "lift[ing] a box weighing 60 pounds" and was subsequently told she had failed the exam. Id. The court found Gebhard's injury non-compensable based on the "basic principle underlying the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act ... that only employees are entitled to workers' compensation benefits." Id. at 210, 213. ¶ 13 Sherring attempts to distinguish Gebhard , noting "the applicant there did not complete the required contingencies to finalize the employment contract" whereas "Sherring did pass the physical and therefore completed all of the contingencies." But we have already rejected Sherring's argument that she was an employee during the physical because she subsequently passed the exam. Moreover, from a public policy perspective, it would be incongruous to allow workers' compensation for pre-employment exam injuries that are not so severe as to prevent the applicant from passing but to disallow compensation for injuries that result in a failing score. ¶ 14 More importantly, the public policy underscoring the Nebraska court's refusal to extend workers' compensation to pre-employment physical exams finds more in common with Arizona's statutes than the California court's extension of workers' compensation rights. Arizona's definition of "[e]mployee" for workers' compensation purposes, someone "in the service of" the employer "whether by election, appointment or contract of hire," A.R.S. § 23-901(6)(a), is nearly identical to that considered in Gebhard , see 625 N.W.2d at 210-11. The relevant definition in Laeng , however, carried a presumption of employee status for any person who rendered service to another. See 100 Cal.Rptr. 377, 494 P.2d at 4. In contrast, the Gebhard court was "guided ... by the language of [the statute], which requires that a person be under a contract of hire in order to be considered an employee." 625 N.W.2d at 212. Our statute and the principle that public policy is determined by the legislature, not the courts, compel the same result here. See Quiroz v. ALCOA Inc. , 243 Ariz. 560, ¶ 19, 416 P.3d 824 (2018) (matters of public policy generally within purview of legislature, not judiciary). ¶ 15 Even considering the "service" aspect of the employee definition, Laeng does not support a broader interpretation of Arizona law. In discussing Laeng and the tryout cases cited there, Sherring asserts that "[t]he critical points in determining service are that the workers are performing a service for the employer[,] the risk of injury is inherent in the work," and "the services provided by the worker are the very services provided by the employer." The court in Laeng noted, however, that "the value of any specialized 'tryout' test generally lies in its ability to reproduce, or highlight, actual working conditions." 100 Cal.Rptr. 377, 494 P.2d at 8-9. A pre-employment medical lifting test does not have the same level of correlation with the actual work that Sherring was to perform, and cannot be said to have "occurred in the service of the employer" to the same extent as the Laeng agility test, which not only was likened to an "on-the-job trial performance," but as the ALJ noted in her decision upon hearing, was conducted on the employer's premises and supervised by city employees. Laeng , 100 Cal.Rptr. 377, 494 P.2d at 3, 8-9 ; see also Rahla v. Med. Ctr. at Bowling Green , 483 S.W.3d 360, 362-63 (Ky. 2016) (concluding claimants are not in employer's "service" during pre-employment medical screenings even though Kentucky has otherwise "endorsed the try-out period approach"). Disposition ¶ 16 For the foregoing reasons, the ALJ's award is affirmed. The City disputes that Sherring had completed the other requirements, asserting there were additional contingencies involving first-day "on-boarding" paperwork and administrative tasks. Sherring testified she received a start date on January 13, before completing the pre-employment physical, but the record contains a January 19 email from the City congratulating her on successfully completing the prerequisites and asking her to contact the City "to discuss a start date." Ultimately, this issue is not dispositive and, in any event, February 6, 2017, was selected as Sherring's start date. The ALJ also concluded that "although Ms. Sherring had an expectation of being employed when she showed up for work at the City, no contract of employment was made until she arrived at work on her first day." Because the injury occurred before completion of the pre-employment physical, however, we need not decide whether Sherring became an employee for workers' compensation purposes immediately after passing the exam or would only have become an employee once she started work.

ECKERSTROM, Chief Judge: ¶1 In this statutory special action, Arcadia Tapia petitions this court to set aside the Industrial Commission's award denying her complaint for unfair claim processing practices against Banner University Medical Center Tucson and Banner Health Workers Compensation (collectively, "Banner"). For the reasons that follow, we set the award aside. Factual and Procedural History ¶2 "We consider the evidence in a light most favorable to upholding the administrative law judge's award." Aguayo v. Indus. Comm'n , 235 Ariz. 413, ¶ 2, 333 P.3d 31, 32 (App. 2014). On July 31, 2015, while Tapia was working as a housekeeper for Banner's environmental services department, she bent down to clean the floor and felt a tearing sensation in her right knee. Tapia's supervisor helped her fill out an incident form and walked her to the emergency room. Banner's medical staff examined her and, pursuant to doctor's orders, Tapia did not return to work for four days. ¶3 Tapia filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits with the Industrial Commission and, on August 25, Banner, a self-insured employer, received notification thereof. On September 11, Banner issued a notice of claim status denying Tapia's claim on the ground the incident had not been reported to the organization. Tapia sought review from the Industrial Commission and obtained an award in her favor. ¶4 Tapia then filed a "complaint of bad faith and/or unfair claim processing practice" alleging that when Banner initially denied her claim, it had done so without a "reasonable basis and [had] failed to conduct an adequate investigation," among other allegations. After a hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Banner had acted reasonably when it initially denied Tapia's claim. Tapia requested review, and the ALJ affirmed its award. Tapia petitioned this court for special action; we have jurisdiction. A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(2), 23-951(A). Bad Faith and Unfair Claim Processing ¶5 Tapia argues the ALJ erroneously considered the twenty-one-day deadline specified in § 23-1061(M), A.R.S., in a manner that lessened Banner's obligation to properly investigate her claim. Our review is limited to "determining whether or not the commission acted without or in excess of its power" and whether the findings of fact support the award. A.R.S. § 23-483(B) ; see Special Events Serv. Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n , 228 Ariz. 332, ¶ 6, 266 P.3d 358, 360 (App. 2011). Whether Banner reasonably denied Tapia's claim is a mixed question of fact and law; accordingly, we defer to the ALJ's determination of disputed facts but review questions of law de novo. See Miller v. Indus. Comm'n , 240 Ariz. 257, ¶ 9, 378 P.3d 434, 436 (App. 2016). ¶6 Section 23-930(B), A.R.S., states that if an ALJ "finds that unfair claim processing ... has occurred in the handling of a particular claim, it shall award the claimant ... a benefit penalty." A self-insured employer commits unfair claim processing when it "[u]nreasonably issues a notice of claim status without adequate supporting information in its possession or available to it." Ariz. Admin. Code R20-5-163(B)(1) ; see Hayes v. Cont'l Ins. Co. , 178 Ariz. 264, 268, 872 P.2d 668, 672 (1994) ( § 23-930(E) directs Industrial Commission to adopt definition of unfair claim processing). Although this language suggests self-insured employers generally should not issue a notice of claim status "without adequate supporting information," see Ariz. Admin. Code R20-5-163(B)(1), a self-insured employer may reasonably deny a claim when a lack of adequate supporting information results from no fault of the employer. Cf. Epstein v. Indus. Comm'n , 154 Ariz. 189, 194, 741 P.2d 322, 327 (App. 1987) (untimely hearing request accepted when claimant did not receive actual notice through no fault of his own). ¶7 Here, Banner denied Tapia's claim on the ground that the incident had not been reported to the organization. The ALJ determined this denial "was reasonable given the available information and the short period to deal with accepting or denying the claim." Further, the ALJ also determined the denial had been reasonable in light of the evidence produced at the compensability hearings. We separately address the "short period" during which Banner was required to issue its initial notice of claim status, the information then available, and the evidence produced at the compensability hearings. Short Period to Issue a Notice of Claim Status ¶8 Tapia asserts, and Banner does not contest, that the "short period" the ALJ referred to in his decision pertains to the twenty-one-day timeframe within which a self-insured employer must deny a claim, lest it be required to immediately compensate an employee "as if the claim were accepted." § 23-1061(M). We note that § 23-1061(M) applies only in cases where the injured employee misses more than seven days of work. Here, Tapia only missed four days; accordingly, § 23-1061(M) did not apply. Nevertheless, § 23-1061(F) requires self-insured employers to "promptly report ... any denial of a claim." Accordingly, the parties agree it is an "over-arching rule" in the industry that insurers accept or deny a claim within twenty-one days. Because the parties agree it was proper for the ALJ to account for this industry standard in evaluating the reasonableness of Banner's denial of the claim, we consider whether the claims adjuster denied Tapia's claim upon adequate supporting information and whether such denial was reasonable in light of Banner's investigation and the information then available. See Ariz. Admin. Code R20-5-163(B)(1). Information Available to Banner ¶9 Tapia argues Banner unreasonably denied her claim because the claims adjuster failed to conduct even a minimally sufficient investigation. As already noted, a self-insured employer engages in unfair claim processing when it "unreasonably issues a notice of claim status without adequate supporting information in its possession or available to it." Ariz. Admin. Code R20-5-163(B)(1). As Banner correctly argues, the regulation does not create a per se rule that a self-insured employer commits unfair claim processing whenever it denies a claim without adequate supporting information. Indeed, such employer might reasonably deny a claim when a diligent investigation fails to uncover adequate information; for example, when the injured party has not been forthcoming. Here, Tapia argues Banner acted unreasonably by failing to conduct the industry-standard, three-point investigation, in which an adjuster contacts the injured party, her supervisor, and the treating physician, and by failing to request Tapia's claim form from the Industrial Commission. ¶10 Banner argues its denial was justified because the lack of a claim form accompanying the notice of claim was "inconsistent with the existence of an actual claim." In support, the claims adjuster testified that when Banner receives a notice of claim without certain forms, as here, the notice was commonly the result of an administrative error; for example, when an employee of another company or an independent contractor filed the claim or when there had been a "mixup with the physician's office." ¶11 But we cannot agree that the adjuster acted reasonably; although adequate information was readily available, she did not pursue it. See Ariz. Admin. Code R20-5-163(B)(1). First, the adjuster apparently confirmed that Tapia was, in fact, a Banner employee in the environmental services department. Further, although the adjuster testified it was standard industry practice to conduct a three-point investigation upon receipt of a claim, she only attempted, unsuccessfully, to contact the environmental services department. The adjustor did not await an answer from that department before denying the claim and made no attempt to contact Tapia herself. Furthermore, as Banner acknowledges, even though the adjuster easily could have obtained the claim form from the Industrial Commission, in which Tapia had articulated the nature and circumstances of her injury, see Ariz. Admin. Code R20-5-108(A), (B), the adjuster did not attempt to do so. ¶12 Relying on Rawlings v. Apodaca , Banner characterizes the initial denial as "reflect[ing] a confluence of communication and reporting failures, outside [its] control or responsibility" and an innocent or negligent system failure that does not rise to the level of bad faith. 151 Ariz. 149, 157, 726 P.2d 565, 573 (1986) (insurer "should not be held liable because of a good faith mistake in performance or judgment"). But, consistent with R20-5-163(B)(1), Rawlings makes clear that an insurer should secure "adequate information" before denying a claim. Id. Banner, however, relies on A.R.S. § 23-908(E) to argue certain other parties failed their reporting requirements. Although § 23-908(E) mandates reporting by the employee to the employer and by any treating physician to the employer, insurer, and commission, Banner overlooks that as a self-insured employer whose own emergency room treated Tapia, it bore institutional responsibility for these reporting requirements at every turn. See A.R.S. § 23-961(A), (B) (requiring self-insured employers to comply with workers' compensation scheme); § 23-908(E), (G) (requiring physician and employer to inform insurer after receiving notice of accident). Without supporting authority, Banner suggests the standard for unfair claim processing should be evaluated from the perspective of an individual claims adjuster and not by looking at the information available to the self-insured employer as a whole. We do not agree that the failures of communication between the environmental services department and the workers' compensation department were outside Banner's control or responsibility. Instead, as a self-insured employer that internally processes its own claims, Banner itself is responsible for the instant failures of communication. See § 23-908(G). The right hand cannot excuse itself for the failures of the left. ¶13 Moreover, responsibility for the unsupported denial of the claim would not rest with the environmental services department's failure to respond to the adjuster's inquiries, but in the latter's decision to deny benefits without adequate supporting information that, with reasonable efforts, was available. See Ariz. Admin. Code R20-5-163(B)(1). It was, after all, the claims adjuster's task and duty to investigate claims before denying them. ¶14 In sum, Banner denied Tapia's claim without adequate supporting information. That decision was unreasonable because the adjuster failed to conduct even a basic investigation. As previously noted, had the adjuster simply contacted the Industrial Commission, she could have quickly obtained information supporting Tapia's claim. Thus, we conclude the ALJ erred to the extent it determined that Banner reasonably denied Tapia's claim upon adequate supporting information. Other Supporting Evidence ¶15 Finally, the award stated, "Reasonableness of denial was then borne out by the evidence at the compensability hearings." It is not apparent, however, what evidence from those hearings the ALJ considered or how that evidence supported Banner's initial denial. Instead, the compensability award credits Tapia's version of events regarding when and how she documented the injury. It finds that on the night of the injury she "clearly ... obtained an accident form that she filled out and signed ... consistent with the timeline that she presented in her testimony." Although we generally defer to the ALJ's determinations of fact, the record discloses no evidence presented during those hearings that indicates Banner possessed, or had available to it, adequate supporting information to warrant denial of Tapia's claim. See Eagle Indem. Co. v. Hadley , 70 Ariz. 179, 190, 218 P.2d 488 (1950) (determination by Industrial Commission will not be disturbed unless clearly without support in evidence); see also Ariz. Admin. Code R20-5-163(B)(1). Severability of Awards ¶16 Finally, Tapia asks this court to set aside only the finding that Banner did not commit unfair claim processing with respect to its initial denial, but affirm the ALJ's determination that Banner acted in bad faith by unreasonably terminating her benefits as a "distinct and severable issue." Citing Professional Furniture Service v. Industrial Commission , she argues this issue is "completely severable" from the rest of the award and, therefore, may be excepted from the rule in A.R.S. § 23-951(D) that awards be set aside in their entirety. 133 Ariz. 206, 209, 650 P.2d 508, 511 (App. 1982). But as Banner observes, the court in Professional Furniture Service severed two distinct claims against two insurance carriers that the award separately addressed and resolved. Id. By contrast, in Kwietkauski v. Industrial Commission , the court determined an award resolving suspension of benefits, termination of benefits, and complaint for bad faith and unfair claims processing was not completely severable. 231 Ariz. 168, ¶¶ 2, 17, 291 P.3d 365, 366, 368 (App. 2012). Like Kwietkauski , the award here is not completely severable: Tapia filed her claims in a single petition against a single defendant, and the award addressed and resolved all claims together. Disposition ¶17 For all the above reasons we set the award aside. The ALJ additionally determined, however, that Banner had acted in bad faith with respect to other allegations by Tapia and awarded a penalty in her favor. We do not reach the question of whether or how the deadline in § 23-1061(M) should inform the reasonableness of a self-employed insurer's decision to deny a claim. The parties dispute whether the adjuster should have contacted Tapia's physician and whether the physician could have provided information without running afoul of medical privacy laws. See A.R.S. § 12-2235 (privileging patient's communication with doctor and results of doctor's personal examination in civil actions). We need not resolve these issues, however, because wholly apart from contacting the physician, the adjuster could have obtained adequate supporting information simply by obtaining a copy of Tapia's claim from the Industrial Commission. See Ariz. Admin. Code R20-5-108(A), (B). Banner argues that testimony supported a finding that Tapia had not submitted to Banner certain forms that typically initiate a claim. We need not address this argument, however, because the claim form Tapia filed with the Industrial Commission was available upon Banner's request and would have provided the adjuster with the necessary information either to properly evaluate her claim or at least direct her to sources enabling her to do so. At oral argument, Tapia acknowledged the entire award must be set aside under current law but maintained that severability furthered the interests of judicial efficiency.

CAMPBELL, Judge: ¶1 The question addressed in this special action is whether Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 29-785(A) mandates that an action for the involuntary judicial dissolution of a limited liability company be brought in the county in which the LLC's known place of business is located. We accept special-action jurisdiction and grant relief, holding that the statute does not limit venue to the county which contains an LLC's known place of business. BACKGROUND ¶2 This case arises from a conflict over various business and financial matters among a group of siblings and their families involving jointly owned and managed companies and properties. Pishit Patel ("Petitioner") filed suit against members of his family, including Nilay Patel and Mayank Patel ("Respondents"), and various other entities in the Maricopa County Superior Court. In his second amended complaint, Petitioner alleged, in relevant part, that Respondents misused operating funds from Sammy's Island, LLC-a business he formed to operate a mobile home and RV park. Petitioner's complaint asked the court to determine the ownership interests of Sammy's Island and to appoint a receiver, and included claims for an accounting, breach of contract, fraudulent nondisclosure, breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, conversion, civil racketeering, and unjust enrichment. ¶3 Respondents denied all of Petitioner's claims and filed counterclaims. They alleged that, together, they owned 50 percent of the membership interests in Sammy's Island, while Petitioner effectively owned the other 50 percent. Respondents' counterclaims included breach of contract, conversion, defamation, false light, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. ¶4 The same day Respondents filed their answer and counterclaims in Maricopa County, they also filed a complaint against Petitioner in the Mohave County Superior Court. Their complaint included claims for breach of contract, accounting, conversion and aiding and abetting, injunctive and declaratory relief, and for the judicial dissolution of Sammy's Island under A.R.S. § 29-785, again alleging that Respondents together had a 50 percent ownership interest in Sammy's Island and that Petitioner's actions had made it impossible to continue operating the company. ¶5 Petitioner filed a motion for abatement in Mohave County, arguing that substantially identical claims were already pending in Maricopa County. In their response, Respondents argued that pursuant to A.R.S. § 29-785, Mohave County was the "exclusive" forum with "subject matter jurisdiction" to resolve the judicial dissolution and related claims. The Mohave County Superior Court denied Petitioner's motion for abatement, ruling that the statute does not allow for "concurrent jurisdiction [between counties] in the dissolution claim." Petitioner then filed a petition for special action with this court. ¶6 After the petition for special action, response, and reply were filed, Respondents filed a notice to supplement the record to inform this court they were voluntarily dismissing their counterclaims relating to Sammy's Island in the Maricopa County action. They argued this voluntary dismissal of certain claims meant there were "no longer any claims related to Sammy's Island ... remaining in the Maricopa County [a]ction," rendering moot the issue before us. DISCUSSION ¶7 Petitioner argues the Mohave County Superior Court erred by ruling that A.R.S. § 29-785(A) does not allow for "concurrent jurisdiction in the judicial dissolution claim." The Mohave County Superior Court ruled that regardless of whether the Mohave claims were sufficiently identical to the Maricopa claims to warrant abatement, the statute does not permit the judicial dissolution claim to be raised anywhere else but Mohave County. We agree with Petitioner that the superior court erred. ¶8 Because the question raised by this special action-whether the statute mandates the exclusive forum in which an action for the involuntary judicial dissolution of an LLC may be raised-is a purely legal question and a matter of first impression, we accept special action jurisdiction. See Glenn H. v. Hoskins , 244 Ariz. 404, 407, ¶ 7, 419 P.3d 567, 570 (App. 2018) ("This Court has discretion to accept special action jurisdiction and appropriately exercises that discretion in cases 'involving a matter of first impression, statewide significance, or pure questions of law.' " (quoting State ex rel. Pennartz v. Olcavage , 200 Ariz. 582, 585, ¶ 8, 30 P.3d 649, 652 (App. 2001) ) ). We defer to findings of fact made by the superior court, W. Valley View, Inc. v. Maricopa Cty. Sheriff's Office , 216 Ariz. 225, 227, ¶ 7, 165 P.3d 203, 205 (App. 2007), but review pure questions of law-including statutory interpretation-de novo, Robson Ranch Mountains, LLC v. Pinal County , 203 Ariz. 120, 125, ¶ 13, 51 P.3d 342, 347 (App. 2002). We also review de novo mixed questions of fact and law. Id. ¶9 First, we address Respondents' contention that their notice to supplement the record before us renders this issue moot. See, e.g. , Lord v. City of Tucson , 10 Ariz. App. 54, 55, 455 P.2d 1004 (1969) ("A question is moot when any action the court may take will have no effect on the parties to the action."). The dismissal of Respondents' counterclaims concerning Sammy's Island in Maricopa County did nothing to alter the LLC's status as a party and as the subject of many of Petitioner's claims in the Maricopa County action. Therefore, whether Petitioner's Maricopa County claims and Respondents' Mohave County judicial-dissolution claims are substantially identical remains squarely at issue. ¶10 Next, we turn to the interpretation of A.R.S. § 29-785(A), which states: "On application by or for a member, the superior court in the county in which the known place of business of the limited liability company is located may decree dissolution of a limited liability company" if the court makes certain findings. The Mohave County Superior Court erred in ruling that this statute does not allow for "concurrent jurisdiction in the judicial dissolution claim." Instead, the statute merely provides a preferred venue for such claims. ¶11 Pursuant to Article 6, Section 13 of the Arizona Constitution, "the superior courts constitute a single court composed of all the judges in every county." Sil-Flo Corp. v. Bowen , 98 Ariz. 77, 82, 402 P.2d 22 (1965). The superior courts are a unified trial court of general jurisdiction, Marvin Johnson, P.C. v. Myers , 184 Ariz. 98, 102, 907 P.2d 67, 71 (1995), with jurisdiction conferred by the state constitution and statutes, Schoenberger v. Bd. of Adjustment of City of Phx. , 124 Ariz. 528, 530, 606 P.2d 18, 20 (1980) ; see also A.R.S. § 12-123(A) ("The superior court shall have original and concurrent jurisdiction as conferred by the constitution...."). "Jurisdiction is the power to decide a case on its merits whereas venue relates to the place where the suit may be heard." Sil-Flo Corp ., 98 Ariz. at 83, 402 P.2d 22. Venue, however, "is a privilege which permits one in whose favor it runs to have a case tried at a convenient place[;] it is personal and unless asserted may be waived." Id. "If an action is not brought in the proper county, the court shall nevertheless have jurisdiction and may hear and determine the action unless the defendant" requests a transfer to the proper county. A.R.S. § 12-404(A). ¶12 "To determine a statute's meaning, we look first to its text." State v. Burbey, 243 Ariz. 145, 147, ¶ 7, 403 P.3d 145, 147 (2017). "When the text is clear and unambiguous, we apply the plain meaning and our inquiry ends." Id. Conspicuously absent from A.R.S. § 29-785(A) is any language mandating that "only" or "exclusively" the superior court in the county in which the known place of business of the LLC is located may decree dissolution because that county alone has subject-matter jurisdiction. Rather, the statute prescribes the proper venue for the judicial dissolution of the LLC but does not foreclose raising such a claim elsewhere. See Mohave County v. James R. Brathovde Family Tr. , 187 Ariz. 318, 324, 928 P.2d 1247, 1253 (App. 1996) (holding that a statute providing for tax lien foreclosure actions to be brought in the county where real property is located merely reiterated proper venue and did not specify mandatory initial venue). ¶13 "Although convenience to the defendant is ... the first consideration in establishing venue, venue may be changed when necessary" to secure to parties fair and impartial trials of causes, to promote the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice, or for other good and sufficient cause, to be determined by the court. Yarbrough v. Montoya-Paez , 214 Ariz. 1, 3, ¶ 4, 147 P.3d 755, 757 (App. 2006) ; A.R.S. § 12-406(B)(1)-(3). The Mohave County Superior Court therefore erred in ruling that it alone had the power to decide Respondents' action for the judicial dissolution of Sammy's Island, and in ruling that this was a reason to deny Petitioner's motion for abatement. Abatement is appropriate when "the pendency of a prior action between the same parties for the same cause in a state court of competent jurisdiction gives grounds for the abatement of a subsequent action either in the same court or in another court of the state having like jurisdiction." Allen v. Super. Ct. of Maricopa Cty. , 86 Ariz. 205, 209, 344 P.2d 163 (1959). "[T]he true test for determining whether parties and causes of action are the same for purposes of abatement, by reason of pendency of a prior action, ordinarily is, whether the two actions present a substantial identity as to parties, subject matter, issues involved, and relief demanded." Id. ¶14 In explaining its ruling on the Petitioner's motion for abatement, the Mohave County Superior Court found that "the parties are the same" in the Mohave and Maricopa County actions, but the record is unclear on whether the court found the remainder of the Allen test satisfied. Because we conclude that A.R.S. § 29-785(A) is a venue statute and does not create any bar to abatement, we remand for such a determination. CONCLUSION ¶15 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the Mohave County Superior Court's denial of Petitioner's motion for abatement and remand for a ruling in accordance with this opinion.

JOHNSEN, Judge: ¶1 A Yuma County justice court convicted Jason Wayne Lay of two misdemeanors. After the superior court affirmed his convictions, Lay petitioned for special action relief, arguing the State had not offered evidence to prove the justice court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the charges. We accept jurisdiction of his petition but deny relief. We agree with Lay that Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") § 22-301 (2019) establishes the subject-matter jurisdiction of an Arizona justice court but conclude the evidence at his trial was sufficient to satisfy that statute. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶2 Lay was charged with harassment under A.R.S. § 13-2921(A)(1) (2019) and threatening or intimidating under A.R.S. § 13-1202(A)(1) (2019). The harassment charge was based on text messages Lay sent a woman with whom he had been in a relationship; the threatening or intimidating charge was based on evidence that Lay threatened to kill the woman's current significant other. ¶3 At the close of the State's case, Lay moved for judgment of acquittal under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 20, arguing the State had failed to offer evidence that he committed the crimes within the precinct as required by A.R.S. § 22-301. The justice court denied the motion. It then convicted Lay and sentenced him to 60 days in jail. ¶4 Lay appealed to the superior court, which affirmed his convictions. After the superior court denied Lay's motion to reconsider, he filed this petition for special action. JURISDICTION ¶5 We exercise our discretion to accept jurisdiction of this special action under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(4) (2019) and Arizona Rule of Procedure for Special Actions 1(a). Lay has no remedy by appeal, see A.R.S. § 22-375 (2019), and this case presents a question of statutory interpretation, a question of law, which is of statewide importance, see Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a) ; State ex rel. Montgomery v. Brain , 244 Ariz. 525, 527, ¶¶ 6-7, 422 P.3d 1065, 1067 (App. 2018). DISCUSSION A. A.R.S. § 22-301 Establishes the Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of a Justice Court. ¶6 Section 22-301, titled "Jurisdiction of criminal actions," states in relevant part: A. The justice courts shall have jurisdiction of the following offenses committed within their respective precincts: 1. Misdemeanors and.... 2. Felonies, but only for the purpose of commencing action and conducting proceedings through preliminary examinations.... * * * C. For the purposes of subsection A ... of this section, an offense is committed within the precinct of a justice court if conduct constituting any element of the offense or a result of such conduct occurs either: 1. Within the precinct. 2. Within [certain county parks]. ¶7 Lay was convicted in the justice court for Precinct One in Yuma. He argues that court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction absent evidence that the offenses were committed "within the precinct" under § 22-301(C). ¶8 We determine subject-matter jurisdiction de novo . See State v. Flores , 218 Ariz. 407, 410, ¶ 6, 188 P.3d 706, 708-09 (App. 2008). In interpreting a statute, we first look to the measure's words, giving them their ordinary meaning unless the legislature has provided a definition. See State v. Pledger , 236 Ariz. 469, 471, ¶ 8, 341 P.3d 511, 513 (App. 2015). Additionally, when possible, "[w]e ... construe statutes to give effect to an entire statutory scheme." Backus v. State , 220 Ariz. 101, 104, ¶ 10, 203 P.3d 499, 502 (2009). ¶9 Without question, § 22-301 establishes the subject-matter jurisdiction of a justice court: "The justice courts shall have jurisdiction of the following offenses committed within their respective precincts." A.R.S. § 22-301(A). In subparts (A)(1) and (2), the statute sets out the matters (misdemeanors and felony preliminary proceedings) over which a justice court "shall have jurisdiction" when an offense is "committed within [the] respective precinct[ ]" of the court. And subpart (C) defines what it means to be "committed within" a precinct. As relevant here, "an offense is committed within the precinct of a justice court if conduct constituting any element of the offense or a result of such conduct occurs ... within the precinct." ¶10 By mandating that a justice court "shall have jurisdiction" of specific offenses when those offenses are "committed within" the precinct, the statute circumscribes the power of a justice court to exercise its jurisdiction in criminal matters. See Bruce v. State , 126 Ariz. 271, 272, 614 P.2d 813, 814 (1980) (in dictum , characterizing § 22-301 as establishing the jurisdiction of justice court); State v. Shearer , 27 Ariz. 311, 314-15, 232 P. 893 (1925) (provision in 1913 territorial code referring to "offenses ... within their respective precincts" determined justice-court jurisdiction); City Court of City of Phoenix v. State ex rel. Baumert , 115 Ariz. 351, 354, 565 P.2d 531, 534 (App. 1977) ( § 22-301"is a special statute, referring specifically to the jurisdiction of justice courts"). ¶11 Although case authority interpreting § 22-301 is scant, the legislature used similar language in A.R.S. § 13-108 (2019) to describe the jurisdiction of the Arizona court system to try criminal offenses. That statute provides: A. This state has jurisdiction over an offense that a person commits by his own conduct or the conduct of another for which such person is legally accountable if: 1. Conduct constituting any element of the offense or a result of such conduct occurs within this state. ¶12 The cases uniformly hold that § 13-108(A)(1) defines the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Arizona judicial system to try a criminal offense. See, e.g. , State v. Willoughby , 181 Ariz. 530, 536-40, 892 P.2d 1319, 1325-29 (1995) (premeditation in Arizona of homicide committed in Mexico established subject-matter jurisdiction in Arizona because premeditation is element of first-degree murder); State v. Yegan , 223 Ariz. 213, 215-16, ¶¶ 6-10, 221 P.3d 1027, 1029-30 (App. 2009) ( § 13-108 establishes subject-matter jurisdiction of superior court over a criminal offense); Flores , 218 Ariz. at 410, ¶ 9, 188 P.3d at 709-10 (same); State v. Jackson , 208 Ariz. 56, 62, ¶ 21, 90 P.3d 793, 799 (App. 2004) ("territorial jurisdiction issue addressed in Willoughby " implicated subject-matter jurisdiction of the court). Consistent with our interpretation of § 22-301, these cases hold that, as relevant here, the Arizona court system has subject-matter jurisdiction to try criminal cases only when "[c]onduct constituting any element of the offense or a result of such conduct occurs within this state." A.R.S. § 13-108(A)(1). We have no reason to conclude that the language describing the "jurisdiction" of the justice court in § 22-301 does not likewise define that court's subject-matter jurisdiction. See Bruce , 126 Ariz. at 272, 614 P.2d at 814 ; Shearer , 27 Ariz. at 314-15, 232 P. 893. ¶13 In an amicus brief submitted at this court's invitation, the Arizona Attorney General asserts that § 22-301(A) establishes the subject-matter jurisdiction of a justice court only insofar as the statute identifies categories of matters (misdemeanor prosecutions and felony preliminary proceedings) that a justice court may hear. The Attorney General argues that subpart (C) of the statute, defining when "an offense is committed within the precinct of a justice court," does not concern subject-matter jurisdiction but instead establishes the "territorial jurisdiction" of a justice court. ¶14 The Attorney General argues § 22-301 does two distinct things: (1) It establishes what offenses fall within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the justice court, and (2) separately, it establishes in which precincts those offenses may be tried. But the statute is not written that way. Subpart (A), which the Attorney General concedes defines the court's subject-matter jurisdiction, states that "justice courts shall have jurisdiction of the following offenses committed within their respective precincts ." (Emphasis added). Subpart (C), which states what it means to be "committed within the precinct," therefore is not distinct from subpart (A)'s grant of subject-matter jurisdiction but instead is a critical component of that grant. Read together, as relevant here, the statute provides that a justice court has jurisdiction over misdemeanors and felony preliminary proceedings only when the "offense[ ] [is] committed within [its] respective precinct[ ]," meaning when "conduct constituting any element of the offense or a result of such conduct occurs ... [w]ithin the precinct." A.R.S. § 22-301(A), (C)(1). ¶15 The Attorney General relies on Womack v. State , 7 Ariz. App. 455, 440 P.2d 336 (1968), in which the defendant was charged by complaint filed in justice court, then bound over to the superior court. Id . There, the State filed an information, which it later amended when the defendant agreed to plead guilty to burglary. Id. at 456, 440 P.2d 336. On appeal, the defendant argued for the first time that the justice court in which the complaint had been filed lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under § 22-301 because the offense was committed outside the precinct. 7 Ariz. App. at 455-56, 440 P.2d 336. In a two-page opinion, this court affirmed the conviction, holding without explanation that the defendant "waived defects in the preliminary proceedings" when he pled guilty. Id. at 456, 440 P.2d 336. See generally State v. White , 102 Ariz. 18, 20, 423 P.2d 716, 718 (1967) (Plea in superior court waived any error in preliminary matters: "Jurisdiction to try all felonies is conferred on the Superior Court.... If the proper preliminary proceedings, i.e., filing of a complaint with a magistrate ... were not carried out then the defendant should have moved to quash the information."). ¶16 The Attorney General argues that Womack , which did not mention jurisdiction, would not have applied waiver if the defendant's assertion of a defect in the justice court had implicated subject-matter jurisdiction. We do not draw that conclusion from the court's scant discussion of waiver in that case. The Attorney General's argument fails to acknowledge that a felony prosecution need not begin in justice court but may be undertaken by the filing of a complaint directly in superior court, where a defendant may enforce his right to a preliminary hearing. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 2.2(b) (complaint may be filed in superior court); 2.4, 3.1(a)(3). There is no suggestion in Womack that the superior court in which the information was filed (and which accepted the defendant's guilty plea) lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the offense. ¶17 Finally, the Attorney General argues that § 22-301 does not limit the subject-matter jurisdiction of the justice court because A.R.S. §§ 22-302 (2019) and -303 (2019) allow transfer of criminal offenses from one justice court precinct to another for trial. It is true that, under certain circumstances, § 22-302 allows a case to be commenced in another precinct: If the justice of the peace of the precinct in which the crime is alleged to have been committed is absent therefrom, or for any reason is unable to act, the prosecution may be commenced in any precinct within the county designated by the justice of the peace or in the absence of the justice of the peace in any precinct designated by the presiding judge of the superior court. A.R.S. § 22-302. And under § 22-303, once a case is properly filed in a justice court, "venue may be changed as provided by law" upon a showing of prejudice "in the precinct where the action is pending," for the convenience of the witnesses or for "other good and sufficient cause." ¶18 The Attorney General argues that these provisions must mean that the subject-matter jurisdiction of a justice court is not limited under § 22-301 to offenses committed within the precinct. To be sure, because subject-matter jurisdiction "refers to a court's statutory or constitutional power to hear and determine a particular type of case," it can neither be created by consent nor waived. State v. Maldonado , 223 Ariz. 309, 311, ¶ 14, 223 P.3d 653, 655 (2010) ; see Jasper v. Batt , 76 Ariz. 328, 332, 264 P.2d 409 (1953) ("[P]arties cannot by stipulation or otherwise create jurisdiction and thereby confer upon the court a power not given by law."). Nevertheless, §§ 22-302 and -303 do not undermine the significance of the language of § 22-301(A) that limits the subject-matter jurisdiction of a justice court to "offenses committed within [its] respective precinct." ¶19 The validity and construction of the two venue provisions are not before us. We note, however, that § 22-302 could be read as a separate grant of subject-matter jurisdiction when a justice of the peace who is empowered to hear a matter under § 22-301 is "absent" or "unable to act." See Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 32 (B)-(C) (jurisdiction of justice courts "shall be as provided by law"). In State v. Melvin , 140 Ariz. 402, 682 P.2d 407 (1984), for example, our supreme court held that, notwithstanding § 22-301, the legislature had the power under the Arizona Constitution to allow justice courts to decide motions to controvert search warrants in felony investigations. 140 Ariz. at 404-05, 682 P.2d at 409-10 ; see A.R.S. § 13-3922 (2019) ("magistrate" may rule on motions to controvert warrant). Further, § 22-303 might be construed to allow transfer of a criminal offense from one precinct with subject-matter jurisdiction under § 22-301 to another precinct with subject-matter jurisdiction under § 22-301. Nothing in the two statutes, however, requires or allows us to disregard the plain language in § 22-301(A) that limits justice courts' jurisdiction in criminal matters to "offenses committed within their respective precincts." See Bruce , 126 Ariz. at 272, 614 P.2d at 814 ; Shearer , 27 Ariz. at 314-15, 232 P. 893 ; see also Willoughby , 181 Ariz. at 536-40, 892 P.2d at 1325-29 ; Yegan , 223 Ariz. at 215-16, ¶¶ 6-10, 221 P.3d at 1029-30 ; Flores , 218 Ariz. at 410, ¶ 9, 188 P.3d at 709-10. B. A "Result" of the Offenses Occurred in the Justice Court's Precinct. ¶20 To determine whether the justice court had subject-matter jurisdiction to try Lay on the two misdemeanor charges, we turn to whether "conduct constituting any element of the offense[s] or a result of such conduct occur[ed]" within Precinct One of Yuma County. See A.R.S. § 22-301(C). Here, as in all criminal prosecutions, the State had the burden of proving jurisdictional facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See Willoughby , 181 Ariz. at 538, 892 P.2d at 1327. ¶21 The State charged Lay with harassment under § 13-2921(A)(1), which provides that: A person commits harassment if, with intent to harass or with knowledge that the person is harassing another person, the person: 1. Anonymously or otherwise contacts, communicates or causes a communication with another person by verbal, electronic, mechanical, telegraphic, telephonic or written means in a manner that harasses. ¶22 The female victim testified that after she asked Lay to stop contacting her, someone she believed to be Lay sent her dozens of text messages that upset her. Lay argues, and we agree, that, notwithstanding the victim's testimony, there was no evidence that "conduct causing any element of the offense" occurred within Precinct One. Although the female victim did not work within the precinct, the court heard evidence that she lived with the male victim within the precinct. That being said, the State offered no evidence of the location from which Lay sent the harassing text messages, nor did the court hear evidence of the location of the female victim when she received them. ¶23 The same was true of the evidence offered to prove Lay threatened or intimidated the male victim. Under § 13-1202(A)(1), "[a] person commits threatening or intimidating if the person threatens or intimidates by word or conduct ... [t]o cause physical injury to another person or serious damage to the property of another." The female victim testified Lay called her on her cell phone while she was at work and told her he would kill the male victim. The male victim testified he was present and overheard the threat when it was made. As noted, the victims were not within Precinct One when they heard Lay's telephone threat, and the State offered no evidence of where Lay was when he made the call. ¶24 Without evidence that "conduct constituting any element" of either offense occurred in the precinct, jurisdiction turned on whether "a result of such conduct" occurred in the precinct. See A.R.S. § 22-301(C). In interpreting the same language in § 13-108, we have held that the "result" of criminal conduct occurs within a jurisdiction when the crime has and is intended to have a "substantial" or "direct" effect within the jurisdiction. See Flores , 218 Ariz. at 414, ¶¶ 17, 20, 188 P.3d at 713 ; State v. Miller , 157 Ariz. 129, 130-34, 755 P.2d 434, 435-39 (1988). ¶25 In Flores , we held Arizona had subject-matter jurisdiction over the prosecution of a man charged with solicitation to commit human smuggling because the purpose and the result of the crime (which was committed in Mexico) was the defendant's own transport into Arizona. 218 Ariz. at 416, ¶ 25, 188 P.3d at 715. We cautioned in that case, however, that jurisdiction is not created wherever a "result" or "detrimental effect" occurs; instead, "the adverse consequence must be part of the design of the actor." 218 Ariz. at 415, ¶ 20, 188 P.3d at 713-14. In Miller , the defendant became acquainted with a man and a woman in Colorado who had stolen 11 diamond rings from a Flagstaff store. 157 Ariz. at 130, 755 P.2d at 435. The defendant agreed to help the pair dispose of the rings and they gave him two of them in return. Id . After the defendant was arrested, extradited to Arizona and charged with theft, he moved to dismiss the charge for lack of jurisdiction. Id. We affirmed the superior court's order granting the motion. Id. Construing § 13-108, we reasoned that the defendant's acts "had, at most, only an insubstantial and indirect effect in Arizona" because the harm to the victim-the deprivation of the rings-"had already occurred before" the defendant became involved. Id. at 133, 755 P.2d at 438. ¶26 Most recently, we addressed criminal subject-matter jurisdiction in Yegan , where the defendant was a California man who was convicted of luring a minor for sexual exploitation after he developed an online relationship with someone he thought was a 14-year-old Phoenix girl. 223 Ariz. at 214-15, ¶¶ 1-4, 221 P.3d at 1028-29. We held the Arizona court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the prosecution; even though the defendant's crimes "were technically completed while he was still in California, the intended results and consequences of his Internet communications were to participate in prohibited sexual activities in Arizona with a minor." Id. at 217, ¶ 13, 221 P.3d at 1031. ¶27 Applying those principles here, we conclude the justice court had subject-matter jurisdiction under § 22-301 to try both charges because the results of the two crimes occurred at the victims' residence within the precinct. ¶28 Under § 13-2921(E), harassment occurs when the defendant's "conduct ... seriously alarms, annoys or harasses the person." In multiple texts to the female victim, Lay told her he would kill her current partner and threatened to circulate nude photos of her and to go to her work or home and destroy her belongings. The State offered evidence Lay not only knew where the female victim was living, but that the purpose of his texts was, at least in part, to coerce her to move out of the home she shared with her partner and return to Lay. This evidence plainly showed Lay intended to and did alarm or annoy the victim at her home, which was located within the precinct. See Yegan , 223 Ariz. at 217, ¶ 13, 221 P.3d at 1031 ("intended results and consequences" of criminal acts were to cause harm within the jurisdiction). ¶29 As for Lay's other conviction, after they heard the threat, the victims called police, who told them to go home and call again from there. The crime of threatening or intimidating does not require proof of the mental state of the intended victim. See In re Ryan A. , 202 Ariz. 19, 23, ¶¶ 13-14, 39 P.3d 543, 547 (App. 2002). Nevertheless, a threat made in violation of § 13-1202 naturally may cause the victim fear or apprehension of physical harm or damage to property to be inflicted at some future time. The male victim heard Lay's threat, took it seriously, and immediately drove home at the direction of law enforcement. The justice court reasonably could have inferred his apprehension did not disappear before he reached home, where he met with police to describe the alarming incident in greater detail. ¶30 Lay and amicus Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice argue the court's subject-matter jurisdiction over the two offenses should not extend to any precinct into which a victim might travel while he or she feels annoyed or alarmed by a harassing text or a threatening call. Notwithstanding their contention that a victim cannot create jurisdiction by moving from one precinct to another, here, the two victims' retreat to their home was an entirely logical and expected result of Lay's crimes. Given that the victims naturally returned to their home in Precinct One after receiving the texts and hearing the threat, we need not determine the outer boundaries of a justice court's jurisdiction under § 22-301. ¶31 Accordingly, we conclude Lay's criminal offenses caused intended results and "substantial effects" within the justice court's precinct. Just as in Yegan and Flores , where the defendants committed crimes intending to cause effects in Arizona, Lay's criminal acts were designed to cause fear, anxiety and other emotional upset in the victims. Given the nature of the harassing texts and the death threat, the victims felt those harms most particularly in their home, which was located within the precinct in which the charges were tried. CONCLUSION ¶32 For the above reasons, we accept jurisdiction of the petition for special action but deny relief because the justice court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the charged offenses. Absent material revision after the date of an alleged offense, we cite the current version of a statute or rule. Under Article 6, section 14(4) of the Arizona Constitution, "the superior court" has original jurisdiction of "[c]riminal cases amounting to felony, and cases of misdemeanor not otherwise provided for by law." Although A.R.S. § 22-301 defines the subject-matter jurisdiction of a particular justice court precinct, the law of subject-matter jurisdiction treats all of Arizona's superior courts as a single entity. That is because "[t]he superior courts ... shall constitute a single court, composed of all the duly elected or appointed judges in each of the counties of the state." Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 13 ; see State v. Flemming , 184 Ariz. 110, 114, 907 P.2d 496, 500 (1995) (in general, "there is only one superior court in the state of Arizona"); Marvin Johnson, P.C. v. Myers , 184 Ariz. 98, 100, 907 P.2d 67, 69 (1995) ("The single trial court of general jurisdiction is the superior court."). Once Arizona has acquired subject-matter jurisdiction over a felony offense pursuant to § 13-108, venue provisions determine where the offense will be tried. See A.R.S. § 13-109 (2019); Massengill v. Superior Court , 3 Ariz. App. 588, 591, 416 P.2d 1009 (1966). Section 13-108 has other provisions that apply, inter alia , to attempt, solicitation or conspiracy offenses, or when "[t]he offense is a violation of a statute of this state that prohibits conduct outside the state." A.R.S. § 13-108(A).

STARING, Presiding Judge: ¶1 Michael and Sandi Smith appeal the trial court's judgment that they violated Arizona's Prompt Pay Act ("APPA"), A.R.S. §§ 32-1129 to 32-1129.07, by failing to pay or object in writing to a payment application submitted to them for construction of their new home. The Smiths also argue the court erroneously concluded no issues remained in their lawsuit against the concrete subcontractor after granting the subcontractor summary judgment. Finally, they challenge the attorney fees awarded to both the general contractor and concrete subcontractor as unreasonable. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. Factual and Procedural Background ¶2 In September 2010, the Smiths entered into an agreement with SK Builders, Inc., a licensed general contractor, for the construction of a home. The original contract price was $1,632,804. The house was approved for occupancy, subject to final inspection and corrections, on March 22, 2012. ¶3 On May 1, 2012, SK submitted a third amended version of Payment Application No. 19 ("PA 19") to the Smiths, claiming they owed $180,289.61. Pursuant to the contract, SK had previously submitted and the Smiths had paid numerous monthly payment applications throughout the period of construction. In total, they made progress payments to SK in the amount of $1,506,314.76. ¶4 Before SK submitted the third amended version of PA 19, Ronald Robinette, architect and contract administrator, sent SK a letter advising that no further payments would be made until outstanding issues were resolved. According to Robinette, SK actually owed the Smiths money. ¶5 The outstanding issues to which Robinette referred concerned an interior concrete crack and the absence of wire mesh in the concrete that formed the back patio. SK had made repairs by injecting epoxy into the interior concrete crack. SK had also retained engineers to test the back patio, and they had concluded that, although the concrete deviated from the plans, it was in fact stronger than as specified in the plans. Based on the engineering findings, the concrete subcontractor, DC Concrete, refused to completely replace the back patio. PA 19 did not contain any request for payment related to the concrete work; the Smiths had already paid the full amount for the concrete work in previous payment applications, without objection. ¶6 The Smiths terminated the contract with SK effective May 5, 2012. Neither the Smiths, nor Robinette acting on their behalf, ever paid SK the amount requested in PA 19. Nor did the Smiths or Robinette object in writing to any of the items contained in PA 19. The Smiths continue to occupy the house and have not replaced the back patio. ¶7 SK sued the Smiths, claiming a violation of the APPA, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. In the lawsuit, SK sought payment of the $180,289.61 claimed in PA 19, an additional $10,234.15, interest, and attorney fees. The Smiths counterclaimed against SK, also bringing a third-party complaint against SK's owner and some of SK's subcontractors, including DC, alleging breach of contract/defective workmanship, professional negligence, and fraudulent misrepresentation. Additionally, after several amendments to the third-party complaint, the Smiths included claims against Robinette and various project engineers. All claims except SK's claims against the Smiths were settled or otherwise resolved before trial. ¶8 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of DC on the Smiths' breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation claims, finding no contractual privity between DC and the Smiths. Further, notwithstanding the Smiths' assertion that there were unresolved claims, the court ruled that no legal issues remained with respect to DC and, therefore, it was entitled to judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ariz. R. Civ. P. The court awarded DC $259,092.70 in attorney fees, $5,299.34 in costs, and $30,564 in sanctions pursuant to Rule 68(g), Ariz. R. Civ. P. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 68(g) (sanctions for party who rejects offer of judgment, but does not obtain more favorable judgment). ¶9 After a bench trial, the trial court found the Smiths had violated the APPA by failing to object in writing to any of the items in PA 19 within fourteen days of its submission. The court, however, found in favor of the Smiths on SK's breach of contract claim and dismissed SK's unjust enrichment claim. It entered judgment for SK for $180,289.61, and awarded SK $60,000 in attorney fees. The court later reduced the attorney fees awarded to SK to $50,000. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21 and 12-2101(A)(1). Discussion Payment Application No. 19 ¶10 The Smiths first argue PA 19 did not comply with the requirements for a progress payment under the APPA because most of the work in PA 19 was completed outside the preceding thirty-day billing cycle. They also argue that PA 19 was at most a "final billing" that did not impose the same obligations and time limits on them as a progress payment application. ¶11 We review issues of statutory interpretation and application de novo. Obregon v. Indus. Comm'n , 217 Ariz. 612, ¶ 9, 177 P.3d 873 (App. 2008). When interpreting a statute, our primary goal is to "discern and give effect to legislative intent." People's Choice TV Corp. v. City of Tucson , 202 Ariz. 401, ¶ 7, 46 P.3d 412 (2002). Ordinarily, we give words in statutes their commonly accepted meaning. Obregon , 217 Ariz. 612, ¶ 11, 177 P.3d 873. "If a statute's language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it without resorting to other methods of statutory interpretation." Hayes v. Cont'l Ins. Co. , 178 Ariz. 264, 268, 872 P.2d 668, 672 (1994). And, we construe a statute in context with other related provisions and its place in the statutory scheme. Goulder v. Ariz. Dep't of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div. , 177 Ariz. 414, 416, 868 P.2d 997, 999 (App. 1993). ¶12 The APPA requires an owner to make progress payments to a contractor "on the basis of a duly certified and approved billing or estimate of the work performed and the materials supplied during the preceding thirty day billing cycle." 2000 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 233, § 4. Payment must be made within seven days after the billing or estimate is certified and approved. Id. The "billing or estimate shall be deemed approved and certified fourteen days after the owner receives [it] unless before that time the owner or the owner's agent prepares and issues a written statement detailing those items in the billing or estimate that are not approved and certified." Id. An owner may object to "a billing or estimate or portion of a billing or estimate for unsatisfactory job progress, defective construction work or materials not remedied, disputed work or materials, [or] failure to comply with other material provisions of the construction contract...." Id. "Payment shall not be required pursuant to [the APPA] unless the contractor provides the owner with a billing or estimate for the work performed or the material supplied in accordance with the terms of the construction contract between the parties." Id. Finally, "[a] construction contract shall not alter the rights of any contractor, subcontractor or material supplier to receive prompt and timely progress payments [under the APPA]." Id. ¶13 The Smiths received the final amended PA 19 from SK on May 1, 2012. As noted, they neither objected to the billing within the statutory fourteen-day period, nor paid it within the statutory seven-day period that followed. Although the APPA requires owners and contractors to comply with time limitations, see generally 2000 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 233, § 4, the Smiths argue their compliance was unnecessary in this instance because PA 19 contained work completed outside the thirty-day billing cycle and, therefore, was not a progress payment application under the APPA, but rather a final billing. But that is not the case. After SK submitted PA 19, the Smiths asked for a "final statement" of the remaining amount owed to SK. Further, Robinette issued "The Final Adjusted Contract Sum" more than one month after SK submitted PA 19. PA 19 was, therefore, a progress payment application. However, even though we reach this conclusion, our interpretation of the APPA leads us to further conclude SK was not entitled to relief for any items not falling within the preceding thirty-day billing cycle. ¶14 The APPA unambiguously provides that a contractor must base a progress payment "billing or estimate" on "the work performed and the materials supplied during the preceding thirty day billing cycle." 2000 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 233, § 4. Thus, the plain language necessarily means that the APPA does not allow relief for work performed or materials supplied outside the preceding thirty-day billing cycle. See Farris v. Advantage Capital Corp. , 217 Ariz. 1, ¶ 5, 170 P.3d 250 (2007) ("A statute's plain language is the best indicator of legislative intent."); see also State v. Lychwick , 222 Ariz. 604, ¶ 9, 218 P.3d 1061 (App. 2009) (court ordinarily applies plain language without resorting to other interpretation methods). ¶15 Further, and contrary to SK's assertion, applying the APPA's plain language with regard to the thirty-day billing cycle does not create an absurd result. See Lowing v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 176 Ariz. 101, 103, 859 P.2d 724, 726 (1993) (a statute's language, "where clear and unequivocal, controls [a] statute's meaning unless it leads to absurd or impossible results"); see also Lychwick , 222 Ariz. 604, ¶ 9, 218 P.3d 1061 (recognizing absurdity and impossibility exceptions). Here, in support of its absurdity argument, SK gives the example of an appliance being purchased one month, stored the next month, installed the next month, and then tested as operational the next month. SK, however, ignores the fact that the APPA expressly allows progress payments to include either a "billing or estimate" of "work performed" and "materials supplied." 2000 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 233, § 4. Thus, applying the APPA to SK's example, a contractor would comply with the APPA by submitting estimates of the amount of work performed and materials supplied concerning the appliance within each thirty-day billing cycle. ¶16 Moreover, SK overlooks the demanding standard for finding absurdity. "A result is 'absurd if it is so irrational, unnatural, or inconvenient that it cannot be supposed to have been within the intention of persons with ordinary intelligence and discretion.' " State v. Estrada , 201 Ariz. 247, ¶ 17, 34 P.3d 356 (2001) (quoting Perini Land & Dev. Co. v. Pima County, 170 Ariz. 380, 383, 825 P.2d 1, 4 (1992) ). Thus, finding absurdity contemplates extraordinary circumstances; a court may not disregard a statute's plain language and find absurdity merely because it believes the statute is unwisely enacted, results in awkward procedures, or leads to a harsh result. See Ariz. Const. art. III (Arizona's separation of powers); cf. City of Phoenix v. Butler , 110 Ariz. 160, 162, 515 P.2d 1180, 1182 (1973) (citation omitted) ("[I]t is not the function of the courts to rewrite statutes. The choice of the appropriate wording rests with the Legislature, and the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Legislature."). Here, considering the plain language of the statute, including the legislature's decision to permit estimates of the work performed and the materials supplied in the preceding thirty-day billing cycle, requiring compliance with the plain language of the APPA's thirty-day billing provision does not lead to an absurd result. ¶17 SK also contends strict interpretation of the thirty-day billing cycle requirement is inconsistent with contractor-subcontractor relations. The APPA does link the owner's progress payments to work done by subcontractors billed in the contractor's payment application. Stonecreek Bldg. Co. v. Shure , 216 Ariz. 36, ¶ 16, 162 P.3d 675 (App. 2007). And, a subcontractor is not obligated to provide the contractor with payment applications limited to the preceding thirty-day billing cycle. 2000 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 233, § 5. Therefore, as provided for by the plain language of the statute, the burden is on the contractor either to estimate the work performed and materials supplied by subcontractors during each thirty-day cycle, or to contractually obligate their subcontractors to submit their respective billings and estimates on time. ¶18 The "primary purpose of [the APPA] is to require an owner to identify and disapprove those items that need to be corrected early in the process so that contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers receive prompt payment for their work." Stonecreek , 216 Ariz. 36, ¶ 20, 162 P.3d 675. As discussed, for contractors to benefit from the APPA, they must comply with the thirty-day billing cycle requirement. SK admitted that PA 19 was submitted "[f]or work that had been completed to the date of that application," and could have been completed in the year and one-half leading up to that date. None of the items in PA 19 list the dates when the work was performed or the materials supplied, so it is unclear which items, if any, were within the applicable billing cycle. The Smiths identified and SK agreed that $13,744.61 of plumbing work and $17,777 of flooring work included in PA 19 were completed at least before the certificate of occupancy was issued on March 22, 2012, and that PA 19 billed $27,596.80 for appliances that were purchased in 2011. Further, Robinette testified that none of the items billed in PA 19 occurred within the previous thirty-day cycle. ¶19 Neither the APPA, nor Arizona cases discussing it, expressly assign the burden of proof concerning the thirty-day billing cycle requirement. We conclude that the burden of proving compliance with the APPA's thirty-day billing cycle requirement falls on the contractor submitting a payment application. Cf. Yeazell v. Copins , 98 Ariz. 109, 116, 402 P.2d 541 (1965) ("The party who asserts a fact has the burden to establish the fact."). This is consistent with the obligation of the contractor to establish a violation of the APPA. Here, in finding in favor of SK, the trial court found SK "ha[d] proved all the elements required under the statute and the case law to establish a violation of the [APPA]." However, the court did not address the Smiths' thirty-day billing cycle argument. Thus, seeking relief under the APPA, SK met its burden of proving that PA 19 was submitted to the Smiths and not objected to or paid, but failed to prove compliance with the thirty-day billing cycle requirement. And, as noted, PA 19 included many items that were undisputedly outside the thirty-day cycle. Further, SK has failed to present any evidence refuting Robinette's testimony that none of the items billed in PA 19 occurred within the previous thirty-day cycle, only suggesting that maybe "touch-up" and "minor stuff" was done, without mention of its cost. ¶20 Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment in favor of SK on its APPA claim. Rule 54(b) Judgment ¶21 The Smiths next argue the trial court erroneously granted DC judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ariz. R. Civ. P., arguing that there remained unresolved claims against DC. ¶22 Rule 54(b) provides that if an action involves multiple claims or parties, then "the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines there is no just reason for delay and recites that the judgment is entered under Rule 54(b)." In the context of Rule 54(b), a final judgment is "an ultimate disposition of an individual claim." Davis v. Cessna Aircraft Corp. , 168 Ariz. 301, 304, 812 P.2d 1119, 1122 (App. 1991) (final disposition of individual claim required). Further, a court's Rule 54(b) certification does not give this court jurisdiction on appeal if the judgment is not in fact final. Id. We review de novo a trial court's decision to apply Rule 54(b). Id. ¶23 On three occasions, the Smiths amended their third-party complaint against DC, with the last amendment dated almost three years before trial. The original third-party complaint alleged breach of contract/defective workmanship as count one, professional negligence as count two, and fraudulent misrepresentation as count three. The Smiths only included DC in counts one and three. In subsequent amendments, the Smiths added additional parties and additional claims, but the only counts against DC remained breach of contract/defective workmanship and fraudulent misrepresentation. Ultimately, the Smiths included several additional "claims" against DC in their response to DC's motion for summary judgment regarding fraudulent misrepresentation. These new allegations were conspiracy, concealment, and aiding and abetting. The trial court declined to consider them or any other new allegation, reasoning that the Smiths "had three and one-half years to amend their complaint to add counts ... [and] [t]o permit [the Smiths] to maintain entirely new causes of action against [DC] without proper notice and an informed chance to defend themselves would be grossly unfair." The court then granted DC summary judgment on both counts, and entered judgment in favor of DC pursuant to Rule 54(b). ¶24 At issue is whether any claims against DC other than breach of contract/defective workmanship and fraudulent misrepresentation remained. The Smiths argue additional claims were present in the case since at least the third amended third-party complaint, which they assert contained, at a minimum, claims for negligence, respondeat superior, and negligent misrepresentation. Although language about conspiracy and concealment was contained within the breach of contract/defective workmanship and fraudulent misrepresentation counts, the trial court entered judgment in favor of DC on the entirety of those two counts, which were the only counts directed towards DC. The decision not to consider any additional allegations was within the trial court's discretion. See Walls v. Ariz. Dep't of Pub. Safety , 170 Ariz. 591, 597, 826 P.2d 1217, 1223 (App. 1991). We thus conclude the court did not err in granting Rule 54(b) judgment in favor of DC. Attorney Fees at Trial ¶25 Finally, the Smiths argue the awards of attorney fees to both SK and DC were unreasonable. They assert SK's award was unreasonable given the fact they prevailed on two of SK's three claims; and, therefore, they claim entitlement to an award of attorney fees. The Smiths argue DC's award was unreasonable because the trial court erroneously concluded the breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation claims were irreconcilably intertwined. SK's Attorney Fees ¶26 We review an award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Orfaly v. Tucson Symphony Soc'y , 209 Ariz. 260, ¶ 18, 99 P.3d 1030 (App. 2004). The successful party to an APPA claim is entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees. 2000 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 233, § 4. Further, the successful party to a contract action may be awarded reasonable attorney fees on that basis. A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A). ¶27 The trial court found in favor of the Smiths on SK's breach of contract claim, dismissed SK's unjust enrichment claim, and we have reversed the court's judgment in favor of SK on its APPA claim. Therefore, we reverse the award of attorney fees to SK, and remand to the trial court to award the Smiths their reasonable attorney fees. DC's Attorney Fees ¶28 We review a trial court's decision on the amount of attorney fees awarded pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01 for an abuse of discretion. Rudinsky v. Harris , 231 Ariz. 95, ¶ 27, 290 P.3d 1218 (App. 2012). Section 12-341.01 allows attorney fees for the successful party "[i]n any contested action arising out of a contract" in order to "mitigate the burden of the expense of litigation to establish a just claim or a just defense." The phrase "arising out of a contract" in § 12-341.01 must be read broadly, and "an action is considered to have arisen out of contract when the plaintiff asserted a contract and the defendant successfully proved that no contract existed." ML Servicing Co. v. Coles , 235 Ariz. 562, ¶ 30, 334 P.3d 745 (App. 2014). An action also arises out of contract when the claim would not exist absent the contract. Id. ¶ 31. Even a tort claim will arise out of a contract "when the tort could not exist 'but for' the breach or avoidance of contract." Ramsey Air Meds, L.L.C. v. Cutter Aviation, Inc. , 198 Ariz. 10, ¶ 27, 6 P.3d 315 (App. 2000). ¶29 The Smiths alleged breach of contract against DC, which brought the matter within § 12-341.01. DC successfully proved no contract existed with the Smiths and successfully defended their fraudulent misrepresentation claim. The trial court awarded DC attorney fees, noting that the defense of one claim could not be separated from the defense of the other. The Smiths argue the court mistakenly concluded that the breach of contract claim was irreconcilably intertwined with the fraudulent misrepresentation claim and, therefore, DC's fee award should have been limited to the breach of contract defense. They further assert the facts necessary to grant summary judgment on the breach of contract claim were undisputed and available to all parties when the case started three and one-half years earlier. Thus, the Smiths essentially argue, DC should have brought its summary judgment motion sooner. ¶30 Here, we must determine whether the fraudulent misrepresentation claim could not exist but for the alleged contract. See ML Servicing , 235 Ariz. 562, ¶ 31, 334 P.3d 745. The Smiths alleged that DC breached a contractual agreement with them by failing to pour the concrete according to plans and specifications, and by knowingly performing and concealing defective work. Their fraudulent misrepresentation claim was based on the allegation that DC knew it performed defective work under the contract and did not intend to cure the defects in the concrete according to the contractually required plans and specifications. Thus, both the breach of contract claim and the fraudulent misrepresentation claim were intertwined in the counts against DC. The Smiths' fraudulent misrepresentation claim could not exist but for the alleged contract. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding DC attorney fees. Attorney Fees on Appeal ¶31 All parties request attorney fees on appeal. The Smiths and DC request attorney fees and costs pursuant to Rule 21(a), Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., and A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and 12-341.01. We award the Smiths their reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal with respect to SK's claims against the Smiths. DC prevailed against the Smiths in this appeal; therefore, we award DC reasonable attorney fees against the Smiths. The Smiths may recover taxable costs against SK, and DC may recover taxable costs against the Smiths, each pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341, upon compliance with Rule 21(b), Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. We deny SK's request for attorney fees. Disposition ¶32 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's Rule 54(b) judgment in favor of DC and award of attorney fees to DC, reverse the court's judgment that the Smiths violated the APPA and the court's award of attorney fees to SK, and remand to determine the Smiths' reasonable attorney fees at trial. Among other things, PA 19 requested payment for wrought iron railings, electrical work, area drains, a garden gate, fireplace facing, doors and door frames, tile surrounds, flooring, appliances, final cleaning, and jobsite cleanup. The legislature has amended the APPA since its original enactment, but the parties assert, and we agree, that in this instance the initial version is applicable because the project was designed before January 1, 2011, and the construction contract was entered before January 1, 2012. See 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 337, § 6. Accordingly, the statutory references in this opinion refer to provisions within the initial version of the APPA. The amendments do not affect our interpretation of the thirty-day billing cycle requirement discussed below. Failure to comply with the statutory requirements of the APPA does not necessarily deprive the contractor of all remedy. A non-compliant contractor may be entitled at law by its contract or perhaps even in equity to payment for work performed and materials supplied. The Smiths also argue PA 19 was insufficient because SK sent it to Robinette rather than the Smiths as purportedly directed. The Smiths have waived this argument on appeal because they raised it for the first time in their reply brief. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(c) ; see also Dawson v. Withycombe , 216 Ariz. 84, ¶ 91, 163 P.3d 1034 (App. 2007). The APPA began as Senate Bill 1549, and the fact sheet prepared by senate staff describes its purpose as a bill that "[e]stablishes time frames and procedures for the periodic payment of contractors, alters the time frame for the periodic payment of subcontractors and permits work stoppage for failure of a contractor or subcontractor to receive timely payment." S. Rev. Fact Sheet for S.B. 1549, 44th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. Feb. 16, 2000). PA 19 was originally submitted on March 28, 2012, resubmitted on April 30, 2012, and then submitted for the last time May 1, 2012. SK withdrew the original at Robinette's request to negotiate some changes and discounts. The Smiths later asserted that each of these counts contained additional allegations of negligence, respondeat superior, and negligent misrepresentation. A claim for relief requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Ariz. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of Rule 8 is to "give the opponent fair notice of the nature and basis of the claim and indicate generally the type of litigation involved." Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. , 218 Ariz. 417, ¶ 6, 189 P.3d 344 (2008) (quoting Mackey v. Spangler , 81 Ariz. 113, 115, 301 P.2d 1026 (1956) ). The Smiths explicitly pled negligence against other parties by distinctly making it a separate count, but did not do so against DC. And, although the Smiths asserted conspiracy, concealment, and aiding and abetting claims against DC in the Smiths' response to DC's motion for summary judgment regarding fraudulent misrepresentation, the response was not a pleading. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 7. The Smiths challenged the applicability of § 12-341.01 for the first time in a reply brief. Accordingly, we decline to consider this issue. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(c) ("[R]eply brief ... must be strictly confined to rebuttal of points made in the appellee's answering brief."); Phelps v. Firebird Raceway, Inc. , 210 Ariz. 403, n.1, 111 P.3d 1003 (2005).

BROWN, Judge: ¶1 The State challenges the denial of its request that Carlos Espinoza-Sañudo ("Defendant") be held without bond because his presence was secured through issuance of a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum ("Writ"), which granted the State temporary physical custody of Defendant to allow prosecution of his pending criminal charges. For the following reasons, we hold that the respondent commissioner erred in allowing Defendant to post a bond because releasing him from custody conflicted with the express terms of the Writ. BACKGROUND ¶2 The State arrested Defendant and charged him with three counts of sale or transportation of narcotic drugs and one count of possession of narcotic drugs for sale, all class 2 felonies, after he sold drugs to an undercover detective. Defendant was released after posting a $2,500 bond, but the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") took him into custody and detained him for removal proceedings. ¶3 When Defendant failed to appear at a status conference for his pending criminal charges, the superior court issued a bench warrant. The State then petitioned for the Writ, requesting permission from ICE to transfer physical custody of the Defendant to the county sheriff until final adjudication of the pending criminal charges. The superior court's criminal presiding judge issued the Writ, which directed the Eloy Detention Center Warden or the Maricopa County Sheriff to bring Defendant to the superior court, "keep [him] in custody and available for all court proceedings until final judicial disposition is completed," and then "return [him] to the prison from which custody was obtained ... within a reasonable time." ¶4 ICE honored the Writ and the State took physical custody of Defendant. Despite the terms of the Writ, the commissioner set release conditions, including an $1,800 bond. The State filed a motion requesting Defendant be held without bond because he would be immediately deported by ICE if released, depriving the State of its opportunity to prosecute him. The State also contended Defendant was merely "on loan" from the federal government and thus "not eligible for bail or any release conditions." The commissioner denied the motion, and the State challenged the decision by filing its petition for special action in this court. In response, Defendant argued in part that the issue was moot because he had accepted a plea offer and was sentenced to a prison term. ¶5 Acknowledging mootness, we determined exercising special action jurisdiction was appropriate because the petition raises an important issue, affects the public interest, and is capable of repetition yet evading review. See State v. Valenzuela , 144 Ariz. 43, 44, 695 P.2d 732, 733 (1985) (noting the discretion of appellate courts to decide issues that have become moot but pose significant issues that are likely to recur); see also Velazquez v. Myers , 1 CA-SA 17-0298, 2018 WL 326515, at *2, ¶ 8 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2018) (mem. decision) (addressing whether the superior court was permitted to release a defendant on his own recognizance when he remained in federal custody and "on loan" to the State pursuant to a writ). We issued an order accepting jurisdiction and granting relief, indicating a written decision would follow. We now explain our reasoning for the order. DISCUSSION ¶6 The State argues the commissioner acted in excess of his legal authority by denying its request to hold Defendant without bond, contending he was required to be held in custody until adjudication was complete because his presence was obtained from ICE pursuant to the Writ. See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 3(b) (listing the questions that may be raised in a special action, including "[w]hether the defendant has proceeded or is threatening to proceed without or in excess of jurisdiction or legal authority"). Defendant counters that the commissioner acted properly because the State failed to establish proof supporting either of the two methods by which a court may properly deny bail under Arizona law. See Simpson v. Miller , 241 Ariz. 341, 348, ¶¶ 23-26, 387 P.3d 1270, 1277-78 (2017) (explaining a superior court may deny bail (1) based on an individualized determination of a defendant's dangerousness, or (2) where the proof is evident or presumption great that defendant committed a crime presenting an "inherent risk of future dangerousness"). ¶7 The constitutional framework of the United States allocates sovereignty between federal and state governments. See, e.g. , Murphy v. NCAA , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1461, 1475-77, 200 L.Ed.2d 854 (2018). Defendant correctly notes the limited circumstances in which the superior court may deny bail, but this case turns on the legal significance of the Writ, which stems from a longstanding practice permitting both sovereigns "to enforce and vindicate" their respective charges against a defendant. Lunsford v. Hudspeth , 126 F.2d 653, 655 (10th Cir. 1942). ¶8 Each sovereign has "its own system of courts to declare and enforce its laws," and it is imperative that each system remains "effective and unhindered in its vindication of its laws." Ponzi v. Fessenden , 258 U.S. 254, 259, 42 S.Ct. 309, 66 L.Ed. 607 (1922). For this reason, it is well-established that "the first sovereign to arrest a defendant has priority of jurisdiction for trial, sentencing, and incarceration," Thomas v. Brewer , 923 F.2d 1361, 1365 (9th Cir. 1991), and "must be permitted to exhaust its remedy ... before the other [sovereign] shall attempt to take [the defendant] for its purpose," Ponzi , 258 U.S. at 260, 42 S.Ct. 309. ¶9 The first sovereign will lose its priority if (1) it dismisses the charges, (2) it grants bail or parole, or (3) the defendant's sentence expires. See Johnson v. Gill , 883 F.3d 756, 765 (9th Cir. 2018). Priority is not relinquished, however, through consent to a defendant's temporary transfer via a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum , see Ponzi , 258 U.S. at 261, 42 S.Ct. 309, which is a "common law writ ... issue[d] when it is necessary to remove a prisoner in order to prosecute in the proper jurisdiction where the crime was committed," State v. Heisler , 95 Ariz. 353, 354, 390 P.2d 846 (1964). Essentially, the Writ is "the equivalent of a request for temporary [physical] custody." State v. Seay , 232 Ariz. 146, 148, ¶ 7, 302 P.3d 671, 673 (App. 2013) (quoting State v. Loera , 165 Ariz. 543, 545-46, 799 P.2d 884, 886-87 (App. 1990) ); see also 28 C.F.R. § 527.30 ("The Bureau of Prisons will consider a request ... that an inmate be transferred to the physical custody of state ... agents pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum...."). ¶10 Here, the State obtained priority jurisdiction over Defendant when it arrested him for selling drugs. See Brewer , 923 F.2d at 1365. However, the State relinquished its priority by, consistent with Arizona law governing the right to bail, permitting Defendant to post a bond for his release. See Gill , 883 F.3d at 765. ICE then took Defendant into custody, and it acquired priority jurisdiction. In order to continue its prosecution against Defendant, the State petitioned for the Writ, which the superior court granted. ¶11 The terms of the Writ presented to ICE were clear-Defendant would remain in State custody until a final adjudication of his pending charges in superior court and then be returned to the Eloy Detention Center. Stated differently, ICE did not relinquish its priority jurisdiction; it merely agreed to loan physical custody of Defendant to the State. See Brewer , 923 F.2d at 1367 (noting that an accused "transferred pursuant to a writ ad prosequendum " is considered to be "on loan" to the federal authorities such that "jurisdiction over the accused continues uninterruptedly." (quoting Crawford v. Jackson , 589 F.2d 693, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ); e.g. , Thomas v. Whalen , 962 F.2d 358, 361 n.3 (4th Cir. 1992) (same); Causey v. Civiletti , 621 F.2d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 1980) (same). ¶12 Implicit in this arrangement was ICE's understanding that the State would adhere to the Writ's conditions as a "practice [of] comity which the harmonious and effective operation of both systems of courts requires." Ponzi , 258 U.S. at 263, 42 S.Ct. 309 ; see also Fremont Indem. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n , 144 Ariz. 339, 345, 697 P.2d 1089, 1095 (1985) ("Comity is ... giv[ing] effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another ... jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation, but out of deference and mutual respect." (internal quotation and citation omitted) ). We also presume that ICE's decision to honor the Writ was made pursuant to, or at least consistent with, federal regulations governing state-issued writs ad prosequendum . Those provisions give a federal institution's warden the authority to allow, pursuant to such a writ, the transfer of a "state [or] federal inmate serving sentences in federal institutions" only if there are no substantial concerns regarding whether "the inmate's appearance is necessary, ... state and local arrangements are satisfactory, ... and ... federal interests, which include those of the public, will not be interfered with, or harmed." 28 C.F.R. § 527.31(a) - (b). If the writ raises substantial concerns regarding these matters, the warden may decline authorization of the transfer. Id. ¶13 Granted, this regulatory scheme appears to cover only those cases where a defendant is already serving a prison sentence. But we see nothing in that scheme precluding a federal warden from relying on the criteria outlined in 28 C.F.R. § 527.31(a) - (b) to determine whether to transport a pretrial detainee under a writ ad prosequendum . Moreover, the regulations are consistent with the common law notion that writs are a function of comity. Adherence to a writ's terms, regardless of whether the defendant has been convicted and sentenced, promotes comity between the two sovereigns; the practice of sharing custody of defendants would be substantially undermined if a court without priority could issue a ruling that conflicts with the writ. Such non-compliance would, among other things, likely create a "substantial concern" regarding federal interests and may deter future writs from being honored, which could ultimately deprive the State of its opportunity to prosecute individuals in federal custody. ¶14 Given the State's interest in vindicating and enforcing the laws of Arizona, comity mandates a finding that once the Writ was issued and transfer of Defendant was authorized, the commissioner had no discretion to release him from custody. Cf. Taylor v. Reno , 164 F.3d 440, 445 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Because the state retained primary jurisdiction, the district court did not have the authority to place [Defendant] into federal custody for the purpose of commencing his federal sentence."). We therefore reject Defendant's implicit assertion that the commissioner was obligated to apply Simpson in determining whether Defendant could be held without bond. Simpson , 241 Ariz. at 348, ¶¶ 23-26, 387 P.3d at 1278. The parameters of Defendant's State-custody arrangement were defined by the specific terms of the Writ and the release conditions, if any, imposed as part of his removal proceedings. Cf. Roche v. Sizer , 675 F.2d 507, 510 (2d Cir. 1982) (explaining that although the sovereign with priority jurisdiction relinquished it by allowing the defendant to post bond, he was not eligible for release because priority jurisdiction passed to the state, which had not granted him bail or release terms). CONCLUSION ¶15 The commissioner acted in excess of his legal authority in denying the State's motion to hold Defendant without bond. We therefore accept jurisdiction and grant relief.

JUSTICE PELANDER, opinion of the Court: ¶1 Under Arizona's implied consent statute, a law enforcement officer may obtain a blood or breath sample from a person arrested for driving under the influence ("DUI") only if the arrestee expressly agrees to the test. We today hold that, apart from any constitutional considerations, the statute itself does not require that the arrestee's agreement be voluntary. I. ¶2 On April 2, 2016, Alexis Diaz was arrested and later charged with DUI. After the arrest, the investigating officer read her the following "admin per se" admonition: Arizona law states that a person who operates a motor vehicle at any time in this state gives consent to a test or tests of blood, breath, urine or other bodily substances for the purpose of determining alcohol concentration or drug content. The law enforcement officer is authorized to request more than one test and may choose the types of tests. If the test results are not available, or indicate an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or above ... then your Arizona driving privilege will be suspended for not less than 90 consecutive days. If you refuse, or do not expressly agree to submit to, or do not successfully complete the tests, your Arizona driving privilege will be suspended. The suspension will be requested for 12 months, or for two years if you've had a prior implied-consent refusal within the last 84 months. Will you submit to the tests? Diaz agreed and submitted to a breath test that revealed an alcohol concentration above the legal limit. ¶3 In municipal court, Diaz moved to suppress the breath test result, arguing her consent was not voluntary under either the Fourth Amendment or A.R.S. § 28-1321, Arizona's implied consent statute. The court deemed the admonition coercive, ruled that Diaz's consent to testing was involuntary, found the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule inapplicable, and granted her motion to suppress. On appeal, the superior court affirmed the municipal court's involuntariness finding but found the good-faith exception applicable and therefore reversed the suppression order. ¶4 The court of appeals accepted jurisdiction of Diaz's ensuing special action petition but denied relief for reasons different from the superior court's. Diaz v. Bernini , 244 Ariz. 417, 418 ¶ 1, 419 ¶ 5, 419 P.3d 950, 951, 952 (App. 2018). Finding any federal or state constitutional challenge to the warrantless breath test foreclosed by prior case law, the court of appeals addressed whether Arizona's implied consent statute required suppression. Id. at 419-20 ¶¶ 6-9, 419 P.3d at 952-53 (citing Birchfield v. North Dakota , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 2184, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016), and State v. Navarro , 241 Ariz. 19, 21 ¶ 4, 382 P.3d 1234, 1236 (App. 2016) ). The court held that a DUI arrestee's "agreement to testing under § 28-1321 must be voluntary" and "[i]f it is not, the officer has not secured a statutorily required pre-condition to conduct testing" and "has taken the sample unlawfully." Id. at 421 ¶ 14, 419 P.3d at 954. But concluding that the officer "accurately advise[d] Diaz of state law," and finding no facts suggesting that Diaz was coerced or misled to submit to testing, the court held that "her agreement was voluntary." Id. at 422 ¶¶ 18-19, 419 P.3d at 955. Accordingly, the breath test "results were obtained in compliance with the statute and were admissible at trial." Id. ¶ 20. ¶5 In her petition for review, Diaz challenges the court of appeals' determination that the State met its burden of proving voluntary consent and argues that, contrary to the superior court's ruling, the municipal court correctly found the good-faith exception inapplicable (an issue the court of appeals did not reach). In its cross-petition for review, the State argues the court of appeals erred in holding that § 28-1321 requires "voluntary" agreement to submit to breath tests and that if that requirement is not met, evidence of breath test results is inadmissible in a criminal DUI prosecution under A.R.S. § 28-1381. We granted review of the petition and cross-petition because the issues raised are of statewide importance and recurring. This Court has jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24. II. ¶6 Preliminarily, we agree with the court of appeals that this case does not implicate any constitutional issues. "[T]he administration of a breath test is a search" subject to Fourth Amendment constraints. Birchfield , 136 S.Ct. at 2173. A warrantless search is deemed reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, however, if "one of a few well-established exceptions [to the warrant requirement] applies." State v. Valenzuela (Valenzuela II ), 239 Ariz. 299, 302 ¶ 10, 371 P.3d 627, 630 (2016) (citing Arizona v. Gant , 556 U.S. 332, 338, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009) ). Under the search-incident-to-arrest exception, the United States and Arizona Constitutions permit law enforcement officers to administer warrantless breath tests to lawfully arrested DUI suspects. Birchfield , 136 S.Ct. at 2184 (holding that "the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests incident to arrests for drunk driving"); Navarro , 241 Ariz. at 21 ¶ 4, 382 P.3d at 1236 (concluding that for purposes of article 2, section 8 of the Arizona Constitution"a search incident to a lawful arrest does not require any warrant" and "non-invasive breath tests for DUI arrestees fall within this exception"). ¶7 A warrantless search is also reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes if the subject voluntarily consents. Birchfield , 136 S.Ct. at 2185. But Birchfield makes clear that because a warrantless breath test is "a permissible search incident to [a suspect's] arrest for drunk driving," the government need not establish under the totality of circumstances that the suspect voluntarily consented to the test. Id. at 2186. ¶8 Based on Birchfield and Navarro , the court of appeals correctly rejected Diaz's argument that her voluntary consent to the breath test was constitutionally required. Diaz , 244 Ariz. at 419-20 ¶¶ 6-8, 419 P.3d at 952. Therefore, like the court of appeals, we limit our analysis to § 28-1321. III. ¶9 Commonly referred to as Arizona's implied consent law, § 28-1321 provides in part: A. A person who operates a motor vehicle in this state gives consent ... to a test or tests of the person's blood, breath, urine or other bodily substance for the purpose of determining alcohol concentration or drug content if the person is arrested for any offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed in violation of this chapter or § 4-244, paragraph 34 while the person was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs. The test or tests chosen by the law enforcement agency shall be administered at the direction of a law enforcement officer having reasonable grounds to believe that the person was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this state ... [w]hile under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs. ... B. After an arrest a violator shall be requested to submit to and successfully complete any test or tests prescribed ... and if the violator refuses the violator shall be informed that the violator's license or permit to drive will be suspended ... unless the violator expressly agrees to submit to and successfully completes the test or tests. A failure to expressly agree to the test or successfully complete the test is deemed a refusal. The statute further provides that "[i]f a person under arrest refuses to submit" to the designated test, it may not be given except pursuant to a search warrant or as provided by the medical-purpose exception in A.R.S. § 28-1388(E), and the violator's license must be surrendered. § 28-1321(D)(1), (2)(c). The purpose of § 28-1321 is to "remove from Arizona highways those drivers who may be a menace to themselves and others because of intoxication." Carrillo v. Houser , 224 Ariz. 463, 465 ¶ 13, 232 P.3d 1245, 1247 (2010) (quoting Sherrill v. Dep't of Transp. , 165 Ariz. 495, 498, 799 P.2d 836, 839 (1990) ). ¶10 The parties dispute whether § 28-1321 provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment by requiring DUI arrestees to voluntarily agree to breath testing. The issue is whether the statute requires that an arrestee "voluntarily consent" (as that phrase is understood for Fourth Amendment purposes) to a breath test even though the Fourth Amendment itself does not require such consent. Whether § 28-1321 imposes a voluntariness requirement, as Diaz contends and the court of appeals held, is a question of statutory construction which we review de novo. Stambaugh v. Killian , 242 Ariz. 508, 509 ¶ 7, 398 P.3d 574, 575 (2017). If, as here, the statute is subject to only one reasonable interpretation based on its words and context, we apply it without further analysis. Id. ¶11 Citing Carrillo , Diaz argues that § 28-1321"unquestionably imposes a consent requirement." And relying on State v. Butler , 232 Ariz. 84, 302 P.3d 609 (2013), she contends that requirement "is governed not just by the statute, but also by traditional Fourth Amendment analysis" requiring that the consent be voluntary. Neither those cases nor the statute itself supports this argument. ¶12 In Carrillo , based on the statute's requirement "that an arrestee 'expressly agree' to warrantless testing," 224 Ariz. at 466 ¶ 19, 232 P.3d at 1248 (quoting § 28-1321(B) ), this Court held that § 28-1321"generally does not authorize law enforcement officers to administer the test without a warrant unless the arrestee expressly agrees to the test," id. at 463 ¶ 1, 232 P.3d at 1245. "[T]o satisfy the statutory requirement," we said, "the arrestee must unequivocally manifest assent to the testing by words or conduct." Id. at 467 ¶ 19, 232 P.3d 1245. We resolved the case solely "as a matter of statutory interpretation" and did "not address any constitutional issues," clearly implying that the statute and constitution involve distinct inquiries and impose different requirements. Id. ¶ 21 ; see also Butler , 232 Ariz. at 88 ¶ 16, 302 P.3d 609 (noting that Carrillo turned solely "on statutory grounds and did not address any constitutional issues"). Neither § 28-1321 nor Carrillo mentions the term "voluntary," and they do not suggest that the statutory requirement of express agreement equates to or necessarily implies a voluntary consent requirement. ¶13 Nor does Butler support any such statutory requirement. There we held that "independent of § 28-1321, the Fourth Amendment requires an arrestee's consent to be voluntary to justify a warrantless blood draw." Butler , 232 Ariz. at 88 ¶ 18, 302 P.3d 609. This holding implies that "voluntary consent" for Fourth Amendment purposes is distinct from the statutory requirement of an arrestee's express agreement. Unlike this case, Butler and Carrillo involved blood tests. And unlike Carrillo , Butler dealt solely with constitutional issues in that context and did not suggest, let alone hold, that as a statutory matter lawful, warrantless testing under § 28-1321 requires an arrestee's voluntary consent. Likewise, Valenzuela II involved only a constitutional, not statutory, issue and held that under the Fourth Amendment, "a trial court should examine the totality of the circumstances to decide whether consent was voluntary, even when given after a law enforcement officer's assertion of lawful authority to search." 239 Ariz. at 301 ¶ 2, 305-06 ¶ 21, 371 P.3d at 629, 633-34. Although Valenzuela II involved both blood and breath tests, that case focused only on constitutional principles and, like Butler and Carrillo , preceded Birchfield . ¶14 In support of its holding that "the required agreement to testing under § 28-1321 must be voluntary," the court of appeals cited State v. Superior Court (Hays I ), 155 Ariz. 403, 747 P.2d 564 (App. 1986), aff'd , (Hays II ), 155 Ariz. 408, 747 P.2d 569 (1987). Diaz , 244 Ariz. at 421 ¶¶ 13-14, 419 P.3d at 954. Diaz neither cites nor relies on that case, which at any rate is inapposite. Hays I involved a prior version of the implied consent law which provided that "[t]he issue of refusal shall be an issue of fact and will be determined by the trier of fact in all cases." Hays I , 155 Ariz. at 406, 747 P.2d at 567 (quoting A.R.S. § 28-692(K) (1986)). The court of appeals stated that "implicit" in that statute was "a voluntary, i.e., intelligent or knowing, refusal"; held that "a preliminary hearing on refusal is permissible"; but determined that the trial court was "not permitted to delve into the voluntariness of the [DUI defendant's] refusal." Id. at 407-08, 747 P.2d at 568-69. On review, this Court merely agreed that the defendant "was not entitled to a voluntariness hearing," and stated that any evidence bearing on her refusal went to the weight, not admissibility, of the evidence in a criminal DUI prosecution. Hays II , 155 Ariz. at 412, 747 P.2d at 573. ¶15 The next year, the legislature changed the definition of "refusal" from a specific question of fact to a capacious term encompassing anything short of an express agreement. See Carrillo , 224 Ariz. at 466 ¶ 16, 232 P.3d at 1248 (tracing § 28-1321 's evolution). Hays I 's statement about what the former statute implied does not correlate to current law on refusal-an arrestee is legally deemed to refuse if she fails to expressly agree to or successfully complete the test(s). See § 28-1321(B). No voluntariness inquiry regarding an arrestee's refusal is needed or required under the current statute, and Hays I has no bearing on whether that statute requires a showing of voluntary consent to testing. ¶16 The court of appeals' resort to dictionary definitions of "agree" and "consent" to support its holding is also unpersuasive. Diaz , 244 Ariz. at 421 ¶ 13, 419 P.3d at 954 (finding "little semantic difference" between those terms and concluding that both "must logically be voluntary to fulfill their meaning"). Section 28-1321 permits arrestees to either "expressly agree" or "refuse" testing-it does not require that arrestees "consent" to testing. This distinction is meaningful because, as relevant here, the word "consent" is found only in subsection (A), under which a DUI arrestee "gives consent" to testing by operating a motor vehicle in this state. At most, then, the definition of "consent" is relevant only to determine if an arrestee's initial act implying consent-driving-requires voluntariness. Cf. State v. Wulff , 157 Idaho 416, 337 P.3d 575, 582 (2014) (reviewing a constitutional challenge to test results from a DUI blood draw and finding that the initial decision to drive must be made voluntarily). The court of appeals erred by converting the word "agree" in subsection (B) to "consent" and then implying for the latter a voluntariness requirement not found in the statute. See Comm. for Pres. of Established Neighborhoods v. Riffel , 213 Ariz. 247, 249-50 ¶ 8, 141 P.3d 422, 424-25 (App. 2006) ("[W]e assume that when the legislature uses different language within a statutory scheme, it does so with the intent of ascribing different meanings and consequences to that language."); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 170 (2012) ("A word or phrase is presumed to bear the same meaning throughout a text; a material variation in terms suggests a variation in meaning."). ¶17 In short, dictionary definitions are neither helpful nor necessary here. Section 28-1321 's text does not contain the term "voluntary" and requires in subsection (B) only that the arrestee "expressly agree[ ]" to testing, a phrase that we have already defined as "unequivocally manifest[ing] assent to the testing by words or conduct." Carrillo , 224 Ariz. at 467 ¶ 19, 232 P.3d at 1249. We therefore hold that the statutory requirement of express agreement to testing does not equate to or necessarily imply a voluntary consent requirement. ¶18 Diaz argues that requiring voluntary consent for a warrantless blood test but not for a warrantless breath test creates an illogical and unworkable "two-tiered analysis" that is unsupported by the statute. But that dichotomy is based not on § 28-1321, which treats both tests alike, but rather on separate constitutional considerations and requirements. The Fourth Amendment, not the statute, requires voluntary consent or exigent circumstances for a warrantless blood test because it is "significantly more intrusive than blowing into a tube." Birchfield , 136 S.Ct. at 2178 ; see also Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. 141, 148, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) ; Butler , 232 Ariz. at 87 ¶ 10, 302 P.3d 609. Breath tests, in contrast, involve "negligible" physical intrusion and "do not 'implicat[e] significant privacy concerns.' " Birchfield , 136 S.Ct. at 2176 (alteration in original) (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n , 489 U.S. 602, 626, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) ); cf. Campbell v. Superior Court , 106 Ariz. 542, 547, 479 P.2d 685, 690 (1971) (noting the minimal inconvenience of breath testing). ¶19 Diaz acknowledges that she "does not assert a right to refuse, and she did not refuse" the officer's request to submit to a breath test. See Carrillo , 224 Ariz. at 465 ¶ 11, 232 P.3d at 1247 ("The implied consent noted in [ § 28-1321(A) ] statutorily disclaims any asserted 'right' by an arrestee to refuse testing."). And she concedes that if the statute contains no voluntariness requirement, as we conclude, she "expressly agree[d] to the test" by her words and conduct. Id. at 463 ¶ 1, 232 P.3d at 1245. For purposes of § 28-1321, the State was not required to also show that Diaz voluntarily consented to the test. ¶20 Accordingly, we do not address Diaz's argument that the court of appeals erroneously concluded that "her agreement was voluntary," Diaz , 244 Ariz. at 422 ¶ 19, 419 P.3d at 955, or Diaz's challenges to the admonition the officer recited in obtaining her consent to the breath test and to the superior court's application of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, see State v. De Anda , No. CR-18-0286-PR, 246 Ariz. 104, 105, 434 P.3d 1183, 1184 ¶ 1, 2019 WL 962440 (Ariz. Feb. 28, 2019) (holding that officer's recitation of admin per se form identical to that used here "did not in itself render [DUI arrestee's] consent [to blood draw] involuntary"). Nor do we address the State's assertion that any violation of § 28-1321 would affect only administrative license-suspension proceedings and not a criminal DUI prosecution under § 28-1381. ¶21 Finally, we express no opinion on any hypothetical scenarios in which allegedly involuntary breath tests might raise statutory-compliance issues or implicate due process or other constitutional concerns. Cf. State v. Berg , 76 Ariz. 96, 97-98, 259 P.2d 261, 262-63 (1953) (finding, in an advisory opinion based on an "incomplete and unsatisfactory" record and issued before the Fourth Amendment was applied to the states through due-process incorporation and before enactment of Arizona's implied consent law, evidence of breath test results constitutionally admissible even though sample was "forcibly taken" from the defendant over his objection). In rejecting a "voluntary consent" requirement for purposes of § 28-1321, however, we do not suggest that arrestees can, consistent with the statute, be compelled to submit to a breath test or even that mere acquiescence (arguably the circumstances in Carrillo ) would satisfy the "expressly agrees" requirement in § 28-1321(B). IV. ¶22 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the superior court's ruling that reversed the municipal court's suppression order, vacate the court of appeals' opinion, and remand the case to the municipal court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JUSTICE GOULD, opinion of the Court: ¶ 1 In this case, we address the crime exception to the anti-marital fact privilege. A.R.S. § 13-4062(1). We hold that when a defendant commits a crime against his or her spouse and is charged for that crime, the crime exception to the anti-marital fact privilege allows the witness-spouse to testify regarding not only that charge, but also any charges arising from the same unitary event. I. ¶ 2 The City of Phoenix ("the City") alleges that H.C., the husband of Real Party in Interest Claudette Craig, called the police to report that Craig had been drinking and was attempting to leave their residence. H.C. tried to prevent Craig from driving by parking one of their cars behind her mini-van. Craig backed into the parked car, damaging both vehicles, which were jointly-owned by H.C. and Craig. Craig was charged with one count of criminal damage, a domestic violence offense under A.R.S. §§ 13-1602 and -3601(A), and three counts of driving under the influence ("DUI") under A.R.S. §§ 28-1381(A)(1) ("impaired to the slightest degree"), -1381(A)(2) (blood "alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more"), and -1382(A)(1) ("extreme influence of intoxicating liquor"). ¶ 3 Before trial, Craig moved to preclude H.C. from testifying about the DUI charges and to sever those charges from the criminal damage charge. Both motions were based on Craig's invocation of the anti-marital fact privilege. The municipal court granted Craig's motions. ¶ 4 The City petitioned the superior court for special action relief, arguing that H.C. could testify about the DUI charges based on the crime exception to the anti-marital fact privilege. See § 13-4062(1). The superior court accepted review but denied relief. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that severance was proper because the anti-marital fact privilege precluded H.C. from testifying about the DUI charges. Phx. City Prosecutor v. Lowery , 244 Ariz. 308, 310 ¶ 1, 418 P.3d 1081 (App. 2018). ¶ 5 We granted review because the scope of the anti-marital fact privilege and the crime exception are recurring issues of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24. II. ¶ 6 We review the municipal court's ruling on the applicability of the anti-marital fact privilege for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Whitaker , 112 Ariz. 537, 542, 544 P.2d 219 (1975) ; see also State v. Cooperman , 232 Ariz. 347, 349 ¶ 7, 306 P.3d 4 (2013). "An error of law constitutes an abuse of discretion." State v. Cheatham , 240 Ariz. 1, 2 ¶ 6, 375 P.3d 66 (2016). We interpret statutes de novo. State v. Boyston , 231 Ariz. 539, 543 ¶ 14, 298 P.3d 887 (2013). A. ¶ 7 In Arizona, "[a] person shall not be examined as a witness" in the case of "[a] husband for or against his wife without her consent, nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent, as to events occurring during the marriage." § 13-4062(1). This testimonial privilege, known as the anti-marital fact privilege, enables a defendant-spouse in a criminal proceeding "to prevent the other spouse from testifying." Blazek v. Superior Court , 177 Ariz. 535, 538, 869 P.2d 509 (App. 1994). ¶ 8 The anti-marital fact privilege, though rooted in common law, has existed in Arizona in some statutory form since before statehood. State v. Crow , 104 Ariz. 579, 583, 457 P.2d 256 (1969), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Burchett , 107 Ariz. 185, 484 P.2d 181 (1971) ; see also Rev. Stat. Ariz. Territory, Penal Code § 1111 (1901); Trammel v. United States , 445 U.S. 40, 43-45, 100 S.Ct. 906, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980) (noting the "ancient roots" of the anti-marital fact privilege in the early common law). The privilege is grounded on the policy that precluding spouses from testifying against each other promotes marital peace and harmony. Crow , 104 Ariz. at 585, 457 P.2d 256 ; see also Trammel , 445 U.S. at 44, 100 S.Ct. 906. ¶ 9 In practice, however, the privilege excludes relevant evidence and presents an obstacle to the truth-seeking goal of the justice system. See Whitaker , 112 Ariz. at 541-42, 544 P.2d 219 (explaining that allowing a spouse's testimony better promotes truth-seeking). Thus, as with other privileges, courts have narrowly construed the privilege. Cf. Trammel , 445 U.S. at 50, 100 S.Ct. 906 ("Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental principle that the public ... has a right to every man's evidence. As such, they must be strictly construed." (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) ); State v. Drury , 110 Ariz. 447, 454, 520 P.2d 495 (1974) (stating that the marital communications privilege poses "an obstacle to the pursuit of truth" and "it should be limited rather than expanded"); Indus. Comm'n v. Superior Court , 122 Ariz. 374, 375, 595 P.2d 166 (1979) (holding that "statutes creating evidentiary privileges are strictly construed"). B. ¶ 10 There are several exceptions to the anti-marital fact privilege. See, e.g. , § 13-4062(1) (stating that "[e]ither spouse" may "request[ ] to testify" as to "bigamy or adultery, committed by either spouse, or for sexual assault committed by the husband" or any of the serious offenses listed in A.R.S. § 13-706(F)(1) ). Here, the City claims the "crime exception" applies to H.C.'s testimony. 1. ¶ 11 The crime exception provides that a spouse may testify "in a criminal action or proceeding for a crime committed by the husband against the wife, or by the wife against the husband." § 13-4062(1). This exception, like the privilege itself, is a "longstanding one at common law." Trammel , 445 U.S. at 46 n.7, 100 S.Ct. 906. ¶ 12 The crime exception, by its terms, applies to any "crime" committed by one spouse against the other spouse. See Bilke v. State , 206 Ariz. 462, 464 ¶ 11, 80 P.3d 269 (2003) (stating that in construing a statute, we look to the plain language of the statute, giving effect to every word and phrase, and assigning to each word its plain and common meaning). It is not limited to crimes where one spouse physically injures or threatens the other spouse. See Crow , 104 Ariz. at 583-84, 457 P.2d 256 (holding that the crime exception could be applied to crimes against a spouse's family, and was not limited to crimes in which a defendant physically injured the other spouse); see also Trammel , 445 U.S. at 46 n.7, 100 S.Ct. 906 (noting that the crime exception "has been expanded ... to include crimes against the spouse's property ... and in recent years crimes against children of either spouse" (citing Herman v. United States , 220 F.2d 219, 226 (4th Cir. 1955) (property crimes), and United States v. Allery , 526 F.2d 1362 (8th Cir. 1975) (crimes against children) ) ). 2. ¶ 13 We have also applied the crime exception to charges arising out of the same unitary event as the crime committed against the spouse. For example, in Crow , the defendant's estranged wife arrived at his home with her family to gather her belongings. 104 Ariz. at 580-81, 457 P.2d 256. An argument ensued inside the home between the defendant and his wife's father and brother; the defendant shot and killed them, then ran outside and physically assaulted his wife. Id. at 581, 457 P.2d 256. The defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree murder and one count of assault-with-intent-to-murder against his wife. Id. at 580, 582, 457 P.2d 256. The defendant's wife testified at trial, and he was convicted on all three counts. Id. ¶ 14 On appeal, the defendant argued that allowing his wife to testify regarding the murders violated the anti-marital fact privilege. Id. at 582, 457 P.2d 256. We disagreed, concluding that the crime exception encompassed not only the assault charge, but also permitted the wife to testify about the murder charges. Id. at 586, 457 P.2d 256. In reaching this conclusion we explained that the crime exception applies when "the crime committed [s]o closely touches or affects the other spouse as to render the reason for the rule-promotion of marital peace and apprehension of marital dissension-inapplicable." Id. at 585, 457 P.2d 256 ; see also State v. Salazar , 146 Ariz. 547, 548, 550, 707 P.2d 951 (App. 1985) (holding that the crime exception permitted a wife to testify in her husband's trial for vehicular manslaughter and DUI when the husband was also charged with endangering his wife, and all the charges arose from the same course of events). ¶ 15 We again addressed the crime exception in Whitaker . There, the defendant broke his estranged wife's apartment window and fired four shots into the building while the wife, her boyfriend, and her daughter were home. Whitaker , 112 Ariz. at 538-39, 544 P.2d 219. A jury convicted the defendant of assault with a deadly weapon. Id. at 538, 544 P.2d 219. On appeal, the defendant argued that allowing his wife to testify at trial violated the anti-marital fact privilege. Id. at 539, 544 P.2d 219. Rejecting that argument, we held the wife's testimony was permitted under the crime exception. Id. at 540-42, 544 P.2d 219. ¶ 16 In applying the crime exception in Whitaker , we used a different test than the one used in Crow . Specifically, we relied on a New Jersey case, State v. Briley , 53 N.J. 498, 251 A.2d 442 (1969), which involved a defendant's "atrocious assault and battery" of his wife and murder of her acquaintance, with "both charges growing out of a single incident." Whitaker , 112 Ariz. at 541, 544 P.2d 219. We quoted the following principles from Briley : If there is a single criminal event in which she and others are targets or victims of the husband's criminal conduct in the totality of the integrated incident and formal charges are made against the husband for some or all the offenses committed (one of which charges is for an offense against the spouse ), the wife should be a competent and compellable witness against her husband at the trial of all the cases regardless of whether they are tried separately or in one proceeding. And, in this connection, it should be immaterial that the offense against the wife does not reach the same dimensions of criminality as it does against the third-party victim. And: ... [I]n view of subsection (b) of the rule, the requirement for a spouse's consent mentioned in subsection (a) must be regarded as applicable only to a criminal proceeding in which the wife's role is strictly that of a witness , as distinguished from that in which she is a victim or an intended victim, or one victim in a unitary event in which her husband is a criminal actor . Id. at 541-42, 544 P.2d 219 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Briley , 251 A.2d at 446, 448 ). Applying this rationale, we concluded that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the defendant's wife to testify, noting that "Mrs. Whitaker and her child were potential victims of defendant's assault" and "[t]he evidence is sufficient from which the trial court could find that Mrs. Whitaker and her daughter were endangered by the gunfire." Id. at 542, 544 P.2d 219. ¶ 17 In sum, Whitaker holds that when a defendant commits a crime "against" his or her spouse and is charged for that crime, the crime exception allows the witness-spouse to testify not only regarding that charge, but also as to any charges arising out of that same unitary event. Id . at 539, 541-42, 544 P.2d 219. 3. ¶ 18 We recognize some differences between the tests used in Crow and Whitaker . Although Whitaker relied on Crow , it also further developed and refined the test applied in Crow . We therefore conclude that Whitaker sets forth the proper test that courts should follow in applying the crime exception. ¶ 19 Our conclusion is supported by decisions from other jurisdictions having an identical or nearly identical crime exception as Arizona's. In several of these jurisdictions, courts have applied a "unitary event" approach similar to the test used in Whitaker . See, e.g. , People v. Ford , 60 Cal.2d 772, 36 Cal.Rptr. 620, 388 P.2d 892, 901 (1964) (concluding that crime exception applied to wife's testimony where defendant kidnapped wife and shot police officer because "the crime of kidnaping was still being committed when the shooting occurred"), overruled in part on other grounds by People v. Satchell , 6 Cal.3d 28, 98 Cal.Rptr. 33, 489 P.2d 1361 (1971) ; People v. Vieau , 136 Mich.App. 670, 357 N.W.2d 736, 738 (1984) (relying on Briley and concluding that the crime exception applied where defendant shot his wife and her acquaintance because the shootings happened "at the same time" and were "part of the same transaction," even if the crimes were tried separately); Miller v. State , 78 Neb. 645, 111 N.W. 637, 638-39 (1907) (concluding that crime exception applied where defendant shot his wife and her parents because "the shots fired by the defendant ... were so closely connected in point of time as to be a part of the res gestæ"); State v. Mowery , 1 Ohio St.3d 192, 438 N.E.2d 897, 900-01 (1982) (relying on Briley and holding that the crime exception applied where defendant broke into home and shot estranged wife and her companion because the crimes were "one continuous transaction or happening culminating in offenses against two individuals" and "[t]he three offenses were not well-defined and separate, but rather, were overlapping and intertwined"); Brown v. Commonwealth , 223 Va. 601, 292 S.E.2d 319, 323 (1982) (relying on Briley in construing crime exception and holding that "where one spouse is indicted for an offense against the other and an offense against a third party, and both offenses arose from a common criminal enterprise, the witness-spouse can testify against the defendant-spouse in the prosecution of both charges"); State v. Thompson , 88 Wash.2d 518, 564 P.2d 315, 317-18 (1977) (following Briley and concluding that crime exception applied in "this carefully defined situation" where during one night, defendant beat his wife and killed her romantic partner, because there was a "logical relationship of the crimes"), overruled on other grounds by State v. Thornton , 119 Wash.2d 578, 835 P.2d 216 (1992). C. ¶ 20 As Craig concedes, H.C. may testify about the criminal damage charge. If we assume the City's allegations are true, Craig clearly committed a crime "against" H.C. when she became intoxicated and damaged their vehicles. See § 13-4062(1) ; see also § 13-1602(A)(1) ("A person commits criminal damage by ... [r]ecklessly defacing or damaging property of another person ." (emphasis added) ). ¶ 21 The crime exception also applies to the DUI charges. The conduct forming the basis for both the criminal damage charge and the DUI charges-Craig's alleged intoxication and subsequent reckless behavior in trying to drive the mini-van-is based on one unitary event. III. ¶ 22 Finally, we address whether the municipal court erred in severing Craig's DUI charges from the criminal damage charge. We review a trial court's ruling on severance for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Murray , 184 Ariz. 9, 25, 906 P.2d 542 (1995) ; Whitaker , 112 Ariz. at 542, 544 P.2d 219. "An error of law committed in reaching a discretionary conclusion may, however, constitute an abuse of discretion." Busso-Estopellan v. Mroz , 238 Ariz. 553, 554 ¶ 5, 364 P.3d 472 (2015) (quoting State v. Wall , 212 Ariz. 1, 3 ¶ 12, 126 P.3d 148 (2006) ). ¶ 23 Craig conceded at oral argument that if the crime exception applies to H.C.'s testimony regarding the DUI charges, there is no basis for severance. We agree. Because H.C. may testify about Craig's DUI charges, severance is no longer "necessary to promote a fair determination of [the] defendant's guilt or innocence of any offense." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 13.4(a). CONCLUSION ¶ 24 We reverse the municipal court's ruling on the anti-marital fact privilege and remand the case to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Additionally, we vacate the decisions of the superior court and the court of appeals and lift the stay we previously granted. Section 13-4062(1) also contains a second privilege, referred to as the marital communications privilege, that "protects confidential communications made between spouses while they are married." Blazek , 177 Ariz. at 538, 869 P.2d 509. Because Craig has not invoked the marital communications privilege, we do not address it here.

WINTHROP, Judge: ¶ 1 In this garnishment proceeding, the judgment debtor requested a jury trial on the validity of an assignment to funds that the judgment creditor claimed was a fraudulent transfer. We hold that, under these circumstances, there is no right to a jury trial in garnishment proceedings with respect to whether an assignment would constitute a fraudulent transfer. Judgment debtor Gary Soucy and intervenor XYZED, LLC appeal from the denial of Soucy's objection to the application for writ of garnishment, the denial of their motion for new trial, and the garnishment judgment in favor of judgment creditor Dan Carey. For the following reasons, we affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 2 In February 2016, Gary Soucy stipulated to judgment against him and in favor of Dan Carey for $175,000 (the "Judgment"). Carey recorded the Judgment two days after it was signed and filed. ¶ 3 In September 2016, Soucy, in a separate matter and represented by attorney James Mack, entered a settlement agreement with an estate ("Garnishee"), requiring the estate to pay Soucy $50,000 on or before October 7, 2016, and another $50,000 on or before January 7, 2017 (the "Settlement"). ¶ 4 On October 7, 2016, Mack received the first Settlement payment in his firm's trust account. Mack and Soucy met at Mack's bank later that day; from the $50,000, Mack paid his firm $25,320.07, representing unpaid attorneys' fees due and owing from Soucy, and wrote Soucy a check for the remaining $24,679.93. Soucy cashed the check before leaving the bank. ¶ 5 On October 18, 2016, Carey served a writ of garnishment on Mack in an attempt to collect the Judgment. Mack answered that he was not indebted to or otherwise in possession of monies belonging to Soucy. ¶ 6 At some point in October 2016, Soucy, Mack, and XYZED, whose sole member is Mack, executed an agreement in which Soucy assigned the second $50,000 Settlement payment to XYZED (the "Assignment") and XYZED loaned Soucy $40,000. The purported purpose of the Assignment was for Soucy to use the $40,000 to take advantage of a time-sensitive business opportunity to purchase goods for resale. In addition to assigning the second Settlement payment, Soucy also agreed to remit $3,800 to XYZED upon the resale of the purchased goods. The $40,000 loan was made up of two separate wire transfers: (1) $15,000 wire transferred from the Mack law firm operating account to Lighthouse Ventures, LLC on September 21, 2016 (prior to the Assignment) and (2) $25,000 wire transferred from the Mack law firm operating account to Lighthouse Ventures, LLC on October 18, 2016. Mack later provided counsel for Garnishee with a copy of the Assignment. ¶ 7 On December 23, 2016, Carey served a writ of garnishment on Garnishee. Garnishee answered that it was in possession of $50,000 due and owing to Soucy (the second Settlement payment) and noted that Mack had provided an agreement purporting to assign the $50,000 debt to XYZED. Soucy objected and requested a hearing, alleging Garnishee's answer was incorrect. Soucy included a jury trial demand in his request for hearing. ¶ 8 Mack initially represented Soucy in the garnishment proceeding, but the superior court found that Mack's representation of Soucy was a conflict of interest, and ordered Soucy to retain new counsel or proceed pro per . XYZED, also represented by Mack, moved to intervene in the garnishment proceeding. Soucy and XYZED then obtained the same counsel, and the court set a hearing. The court was provided with conflict waivers and, after denying the request for a jury trial, proceeded with the hearing. ¶ 9 In the garnishment proceeding, the superior court determined: (1) the Assignment of the $50,000 from Soucy to XYZED was a fraudulent transfer; (2) XYZED did not take the transfer in good faith; and (3) the transfer was not for reasonably equivalent value. The court denied Soucy's and XYZED's objections to the writ of garnishment and entered judgment for $50,000 in favor of judgment creditor Carey against Garnishee. ¶ 10 Soucy and XYZED moved for a new trial, contending they were erroneously denied their timely request and right to a jury trial, and the superior court's finding of a fraudulent transfer was contrary to law. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). The court denied the motion, finding that it was authorized by statute to determine and set aside a fraudulent transfer in a garnishment hearing without a jury, and sufficient evidence supported the finding that the transfer between Soucy and XYZED was a fraudulent conveyance. ¶ 11 Soucy and XYZED timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 12-2101(A)(1) and (A)(5). DISCUSSION I. There Is No Right to a Jury Trial in a Garnishment Proceeding ¶ 12 Soucy and XYZED contend they have a right to a jury trial on the fraudulent transfer issue. Whether a party is entitled to a jury trial is a question of law we review de novo . In re Estate of Newman , 219 Ariz. 260, 271, ¶ 42, 196 P.3d 863, 874 (App. 2008) (citing Stoudamire v. Simon , 213 Ariz. 296, 297, ¶ 3, 141 P.3d 776, 777 (App. 2006) ). ¶ 13 Soucy and XYZED argue the superior court wrongly denied them a jury trial under Article 2, Sections 23 and 24 of the Arizona Constitution, which preserves the right to a jury in those actions that existed at common law at the time the Constitution was adopted in 1910. Life Investors Ins. Co. of Am. v. Horizon Res. Bethany, Ltd. , 182 Ariz. 529, 532, 898 P.2d 478, 481 (App. 1995) ; see also Newman , 219 Ariz. at 272, ¶ 45, 196 P.3d at 875. They argue the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFTA") as adopted in Arizona is a declaration of common law, see Hay v. Duskin , 9 Ariz. App. 599, 604, 455 P.2d 281 (1969) ; see also Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg , 492 U.S. 33, 43, 109 S.Ct. 2782, 106 L.Ed.2d 26 (1989) ; therefore, they are entitled to a jury trial. ¶ 14 Soucy and XYZED misapprehend the nature of garnishment. It is not a cause of action-it is a remedy. The constitutional provisions Soucy and XYZED rely upon simply do not apply in this setting. In a garnishment proceeding, the superior court, "sitting without a jury, shall decide all issues of fact and law." A.R.S. § 12-1584(E). Additionally, UFTA specifically provides for garnishment as a remedy and states that the garnishment remedy be "in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law in obtaining such remedy." A.R.S. § 44-1007(A)(1). It is well settled that the legislature is presumed to know existing law when it enacts a statute. Wareing v. Falk , 182 Ariz. 495, 500, 897 P.2d 1381, 1386 (App. 1995) (citing State v. Garza Rodriguez , 164 Ariz. 107, 111, 791 P.2d 633, 637 (1990) ; Daou v. Harris , 139 Ariz. 353, 357, 678 P.2d 934, 938 (1984) ). ¶ 15 Soucy and XYZED failed to cite, and our independent research did not discover, a case where in the absence of a state statute authorizing it, a court has ordered a jury trial on a fraudulent transfer within a garnishment proceeding. This is not surprising. Garnishment was not a cause of action that existed under the common law. As stated in Andrew Brown Co. v. Painters Warehouse, Inc. , 11 Ariz. App. 571, 572, 466 P.2d 790 (1970) : [G]arnishment was unknown to the common law; it has come into being as a statutory remedy. State v. Allred , 102 Ariz. 102, 425 P.2d 572 (1967) ; 3 J. G. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction Sec. 7005 (3d ed. 1943); 38 C.J.S. Garnishment [§] 1 (1943). Since garnishment is a creature of statute, garnishment proceedings are necessarily governed by the terms of those statutes. Davis v. Chilson , 48 Ariz. 366, 62 P.2d 127 (1936) ; Moody v. Lloyd's of London , 61 Ariz. 534, 152 P.2d 951 (1944) ; State v. Allred, Supra . Thus, courts may not allow garnishment proceedings to follow any course other than that charted by the legislature. See Undercofler v. Brosnan , 113 Ga. App. 475, 148 S.E.2d 470 (1966) ; Siegel, Cooper & Co. v. Schueck , 167 Ill. 522, 47 N.E. 855 (1897) ; 38 C.J.S. Garnishment [§] 3 b (1943). ¶ 16 It is also significant to note that judgment creditor Carey did not initiate a civil case alleging fraudulent transfer against Soucy, Mack, and XYZED; rather, Carey utilized the garnishment framework established by statute to ascertain whether Garnishee was holding funds that belonged to Soucy. Soucy objected to Garnishee's answer and requested a hearing in the garnishment proceeding, thus availing himself of and subjecting himself to the parameters of the garnishment statutes. Had Garnishee already transferred the second Settlement payment to Soucy, Carey's recourse would have been to file an affirmative civil claim for fraudulent conveyance in superior court, seeking the return of the funds. While we need not reach the issue, a request for a jury trial might present a different question in that procedural context. ¶ 17 Here, because Carey was not seeking return of property already transferred, we see no reason to disrupt the statutory framework and the long line of cases permitting fraudulent conveyance matters to be resolved in garnishment proceedings without a jury. See Sackin v. Kersting , 105 Ariz. 464, 465, 466 P.2d 758, 759 (1970) ("Garnishment is an appropriate remedy to be utilized in cases of fraudulent conveyances." (citation omitted) ), opinion supplemented on reh'g , 105 Ariz. 566, 468 P.2d 925 (1970) ; Premier Fin. Servs. v. Citibank (Ariz.) , 185 Ariz. 80, 86, 912 P.2d 1309, 1315 (App. 1995) (affirming superior court's conclusion at a garnishment proceeding that parents fraudulently transferred a certificate of deposit to their daughter); Retzke v. Larson , 166 Ariz. 446, 448, 803 P.2d 439, 441 (App. 1990) ("Legal action to prove a fraudulent conveyance need not be separate from the garnishment proceeding."); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Trout , 145 Ariz. 355, 359, 701 P.2d 851, 855 (App. 1985) (determining that "[g]arnishment is an appropriate remedy for recovering the proceeds of a fraudulent conveyance"). II. Ample Evidence Supports the Fraudulent Transfer Ruling ¶ 18 Soucy and XYZED contend that the superior court erred in finding that the Assignment was a fraudulent transfer and that XYZED took the Assignment in bad faith without giving a reasonably equivalent value. ¶ 19 We review the superior court's garnishment judgment for an abuse of discretion. See Cota v. S. Ariz. Bank & Trust Co. , 17 Ariz. App. 326, 327, 497 P.2d 833 (1972). A court abuses its discretion where the record fails to provide substantial support for its decision or the court commits an error of law in reaching the decision. Grant v. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. , 133 Ariz. 434, 456, 652 P.2d 507, 529 (1982) ; see also Torres v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc. , 135 Ariz. 35, 40, 658 P.2d 835, 840 (App. 1982) (discretion abused if "manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons"). We view the evidence in a light most favorable to sustaining the superior court's ruling. Gutierrez v. Gutierrez , 193 Ariz. 343, 346, ¶ 5, 972 P.2d 676, 679 (App. 1998). It is the role of the trial court to weigh the evidence, id. at 347, ¶ 13, 972 P.2d at 680-81, and "[w]e must give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses," Double AA Builders, Ltd. v. Grand State Const. L.L.C. , 210 Ariz. 503, 511, ¶ 41, 114 P.3d 835, 843 (App. 2005). Accordingly, we will not disturb the judgment if there is evidence to support it. Yano v. Yano , 144 Ariz. 382, 384, 697 P.2d 1132, 1134 (App. 1985). ¶ 20 Our review of the superior court's findings of fact is limited to determining whether they are clearly erroneous. Triple E Produce Corp. v. Valencia , 170 Ariz. 375, 379, 824 P.2d 771, 775 (App. 1991) (citation omitted). In this case, the record contains substantial evidence related to statutory factors and other "badges of fraud" sufficient to support the court's findings. A. A.R.S. § 44-1004(B) Factors ¶ 21 A transfer is fraudulent as to a creditor "if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation ... [w]ith actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of the debtor." A.R.S. § 44-1004(A)(1). The UFTA identifies eleven specific factors that may be considered (among other factors) in determining "actual intent." A.R.S. § 44-1004(B)(1)-(11). ¶ 22 Here, considering the enumerated factors identified in § 44-1004(B), the evidence, taken in a light most favorable to sustaining the superior court's ruling, supports the finding of a fraudulent transfer. See Gutierrez , 193 Ariz. at 346, ¶ 5, 972 P.2d at 679. In the Assignment, Soucy assigned the funds to XYZED, of which Mack-Soucy's attorney-is the sole member. A.R.S. § 44-1004(B)(1). Additionally, but for the garnishment proceeding, there is no evidence that the Assignment would have been disclosed to either the Garnishee or Carey. A.R.S. § 44-1004(B)(3). Before the Assignment, Carey had sued for and obtained the Judgment against Soucy. A.R.S. § 44-1004(B)(4). Further, Carey had to resort to garnishment proceedings to collect on the Judgment-Soucy testified that before he received the proceeds of the Settlement, he "didn't have any money" to pay his attorney. A.R.S. § 44-1004(B)(5). The record also suggests Soucy removed or concealed assets when he instructed Mack to wire the two payments to a bank account for Lighthouse Ventures, an administratively-dissolved Wyoming LLC, rather than to Soucy himself. A.R.S. § 44-1004(B)(7). The Assignment occurred within nine months of the Judgment. A.R.S. § 44-1004(B)(10). ¶ 23 Taken together, the statutory factors have "a tendency to show the existence of fraud" and often only "a single one of them may establish and stamp a transaction as fraudulent." Gerow v. Covill , 192 Ariz. 9, 17, ¶ 34, 960 P.2d 55, 63 (App. 1998) (discussing the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, the predecessor to the UFTA) (quoting Torosian v. Paulos , 82 Ariz. 304, 312, 313 P.2d 382 (1957) ). When, as here, several statutory factors are present, "strong, clear evidence will be required to repel the conclusion of fraudulent intent." Id. Based on our review of the record, Carey presented sufficient evidence to support the court's finding of a fraudulent conveyance. B. Other Badges of Fraud ¶ 24 In addition to the A.R.S. § 44-1004(B) factors, the common law recognizes additional "badges of fraud" that may also support the superior court's findings. "Badges of fraud" are facts which throw suspicion on a transaction, and which call for an explanation.... [T]hey are the signs or marks of fraud. They do not of themselves or per se constitute fraud, but they are facts having a [tendency] to show the existence of fraud, although their value as evidence is relative and not absolute.... When, however, several are found in the same transaction, strong, clear evidence will be required to repel the conclusion of fraudulent intent. Torosian , 82 Ariz. at 312, 313 P.2d 382 (quotations and citation omitted). ¶ 25 Here, it was not clearly erroneous for the superior court to consider the chronology of events as a badge of fraud. See Triple E Produce Corp. , 170 Ariz. at 379, 824 P.2d at 775. Soucy and Mack entered an attorney-client relationship regarding the Garnishee before Carey obtained the Judgment against Soucy. Although the Assignment is dated October 7, 2016, it was purportedly not executed until later that month. The Assignment states that XYZED "will lend" $40,000 in exchange for the second $50,000 payment, plus an additional $3,800. However, at the time of the Assignment, Mack/XYZED had already wired Lighthouse Ventures (Soucy's administratively-dissolved LLC) the first $15,000 of funds the previous month, even though Soucy then owed over $23,000 in unpaid attorneys' fees. The next month, Mack/XYZED wired the remaining amount of $25,000 from the Mack firm operating account to Lighthouse Ventures. Although Mack testified he "investigated" Lighthouse Ventures, he did not do so before the transfer of funds. ¶ 26 Additionally, Soucy paid Mack his initial retainer and subsequent payments in cash. Upon receiving the first $50,000 Settlement payment from Garnishee, Mack and Soucy met at Mack's bank, where Mack wrote Soucy a check for over $24,000 (the amount left after unpaid attorneys' fees), which Soucy immediately cashed before leaving the bank. Soucy and XYZED contend that utilizing cash in this manner is, in and of itself, not illegal. They cite In re $315,900.00 , a case involving the state's burden to establish probable cause for forfeiture. 183 Ariz. 208, 902 P.2d 351 (App. 1995). While using cash exclusively, without other considerations, is not illegal, we see no error in the trial court finding Soucy's practice of using cash exclusively under these circumstances as an additional badge of fraud. ¶ 27 Considering the A.R.S. § 44-1004(B) factors, the other badges of fraud, and judging the credibility of the witnesses, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the Assignment was a fraudulent transfer. C. Good Faith ¶ 28 Likewise, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in determining that XYZED did not take the Assignment in good faith, which would constitute a defense to voiding the Assignment. A.R.S. § 44-1008(A). ¶ 29 In determining good faith, the question is whether XYZED knew, or should have known, that Soucy "was not trading normally, but that on the contrary, the purpose of the trade, so far as the debtor was concerned, was the defrauding of his creditors." See Hay , 9 Ariz. App. at 605, 455 P.2d 281. Additionally, "[n]otice of facts and circumstances which would put a man of ordinary prudence and intelligence on inquiry is ... equivalent to knowledge of all of the facts a reasonably diligent inquiry would disclose." Hall v. World Sav. & Loan Ass'n , 189 Ariz. 495, 500-01, 943 P.2d 855, 860-61 (App. 1997) (quotations and citation omitted). ¶ 30 There were many facts that should have put XYZED on notice that Soucy intended to defraud his creditors. Hay , 9 Ariz. App. at 605, 455 P.2d 281. Mack was Soucy's attorney in the Settlement matter at the time Soucy stipulated to the Judgment in favor of Carey. Mack, XYZED's sole member, loaned $40,000 to Soucy, his client, who was already indebted to him for almost $24,000 in past-due attorneys' fees. Additionally, Soucy and/or Mack directed that XYZED transfer the money from the Mack firm operating account to Lighthouse Ventures, not to Soucy. After the two transfers, Mack investigated Lighthouse Ventures and learned it had been administratively dissolved. Additionally, as noted above, all of Soucy's payments to Mack were in cash and Soucy cashed a check for $24,679.93 rather than depositing the funds. These facts provided ample evidence to support the superior court's finding that the Assignment was not taken in good faith. D. Attorneys' Fees and Costs ¶ 31 Soucy and XYZED request their attorneys' fees and costs under A.R.S. § 12-1580(E), which permits the court to award attorneys' fees and costs to the prevailing party in a garnishment action. Carey requests his attorneys' fees and costs under A.R.S. § 12-1580(E). Carey also requests his attorneys' fees as a sanction under ARCAP 25, contending that Soucy's and XYZED's appeal was frivolous. ¶ 32 Because they were not the prevailing parties, Soucy's and XYZED's request for attorneys' fees is denied. In our discretion, we award reasonable attorneys' fees and costs to Carey under only A.R.S. § 12-1580(E) in an amount to be determined upon compliance with ARCAP 21. CONCLUSION ¶ 33 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. We award reasonable attorneys' fees and costs to Carey upon compliance with ARCAP 21. The Assignment is dated October 7, 2016; however, Mack later testified Soucy did not see it until "mid to late October." At the time, Lighthouse Ventures, LLC was an administratively-dissolved Wyoming limited liability company. Soucy's and XYZED's briefing to this court substantially fails to provide citations to the record in support of its factual assertions, in violation of Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure ("ARCAP") 13(a)(5) and (7). As such, we do not rely on their recitation of those facts and instead rely on the record available to this court. XYZED did not open a bank account until more than a month after the second wire transfer to Lighthouse Ventures. We need not reach whether the Assignment was made for reasonably equivalent value; for XYZED to avail itself of the defense under A.R.S. § 44-1008, it must have taken the Assignment "in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value." A.R.S. § 44-1008(A) (emphasis added). Because the superior court did not abuse its discretion in determining XYZED did not act in good faith, we need not analyze whether the Assignment was taken for a reasonably equivalent value.

THOMPSON, Judge: ¶1 This is an administrative law case. The appellant-claimants (hereafter, employees) timely appeal from the decisions of respondent Arizona Department of Economic Security (Department) Appeals Board's (Board) denial of their claims for unemployment benefits. Employees raise one issue: whether the Board erred as a matter of law by denying them benefits for the 2016 summer recess between school terms. We find the Board did err and employees are entitled to unemployment benefits. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶2 This court has jurisdiction to review unemployment benefit decisions pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 41-1993(B) (2018). We defer to the ALJ's factual findings unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Munguia v. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 159 Ariz. 157, 158-59, 765 P.2d 559. 560-61 (App. 1988). However, this court draws its own legal conclusions and determines whether the Board properly interpreted the law and applied it to the facts. Avila v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 160 Ariz. 246, 248, 772 P.2d 600, 602 (App. 1989). PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY ¶3 Employees work for the respondent employer, Chicanos Por La Causa (the non-profit), an Arizona non-profit corporation, at its childcare centers. The non-profit operates licensed childcare facilities for infants, toddlers and preschool children up to the age of five-years-old. The non-profit's childcare facilities administer federally funded Early Head Start and Migrant and Seasonal Head Start programs as part of its Early Childhood Development program. ¶4 Employee Maria Rosas worked as an infant and toddler teacher and employee Maria Castillo worked as a cook at the childcare center, in Somerton, Arizona. Employee Alicia Solorzano worked as a cook's assistant at the childcare center in Yuma, Arizona. Employee Xochitl Correa worked as an infant and toddler teacher at the childcare center in San Luis, Arizona. ¶5 Before each childcare center closed for the summer break, the employees all received a reasonable assurance of reemployment in the fall. Employees applied for, and were granted, unemployment benefits for the summer break. The non-profit appealed the deputy's determinations, and the department's Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal) held evidentiary hearings. ¶6 Relying on A.R.S. § 23-750(E)(5) (2018), the Tribunal reversed and found employees were not entitled to unemployment benefits. The Tribunal reasoned that the non-profit "provides services to or on behalf of an educational institution," namely the Gadsden, Somerton, and Yuma school districts (collectively, school districts), and that each employee "had reasonable assurance of reemployment for the following school year." For these reasons, it concluded that the employees were subject to the" between and within terms" exclusion to payment of unemployment benefits. Employees appealed to the Board, which adopted the Tribunal's reasoning and affirmed the denial of benefits. ¶7 Employees timely filed applications for appeal to this court. We granted leave to appeal and consolidated these cases for decision. DISCUSSION ¶8 Employees argue the Board erred in concluding they were not eligible to receive unemployment benefits based on the "between and within terms" exclusion in A.R.S. § 23-750(E)(5). We agree. ¶9 Section 23-750(E) provides in pertinent part: 1. Benefits based on service in an instructional, research, or principal administrative capacity for an educational institution shall not be paid to an individual for any week of unemployment which begins during the period between two successive academic years ... if the individual performs such services in the first of such academic years or terms and if there is a contract or a reasonable assurance that such individual will perform services in any such capacity for any educational institution in the second of such academic years or terms. 2. Benefits based on service in any other capacity for an educational institution shall not be paid to an individual for any week of unemployment which begins during a period between two successive academic years or terms if the individual performs services in the first of such academic years or terms and if there is reasonable assurance that such individual will perform such services in the second of such academic years or terms ... * * * * 5. With respect to services described in paragraph 1, 2 or 3 of this subsection, benefits are not payable on the basis of services specified in paragraph 1, 2 or 3 of this subsection to any individual who performed these services while in the employ of an entity that provides these services to or on behalf of an educational institution . [Emphasis added.] ¶10 Employees assert that they, as individuals employed by the non-profit, did not provide any of the statutorily-excluded services to or on behalf of an educational institution which would make them subject to the "between and within terms" exclusion. ¶11 By virtue of memorandums of understanding (MOUs) between the non-profit and the school districts, the services provided by the non-profit were limited to the screening of three to five-year-old preschool children in their Head Start programs for disabilities. ¶12 Each of the employees worked at a non-profit Head Start program that collaborated with one of the school districts, pursuant to a written MOU. Each MOU contained the following language: II. PROGRAM MANDATES A. RESPONSIBILITY OF ... [SCHOOL DISTRICT] * * * * 2. Ensure that Special Education Services to preschool children with disabilities are provided in accordance with the Individuals with Disabilities Act of 2004 (IDEA) as specified 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. and assure that services provided to children with disabilities by other agencies meet appropriate standards. To maintain federal funding, the non-profit's Head Start programs must make at least ten percent of their enrollment available to children with disabilities who are eligible for special education services under IDEA. 42 U.S.C. 9835(d)(1). ¶13 The MOUs the non-profit entered into with the school districts allowed the school districts to meet their duty under IDEA to identify three to five-year-old preschool children with disabilities and help these children obtain special education in compliance with state and federal law. Based on this expressly stated purpose, the non-profit provided services to or on behalf of an educational institution. ¶14 Paragraphs (1) and (2) of A.R.S. § 23-750(E) prohibit payment of unemployment benefits based on "service in an instructional, research, or principal administrative capacity" or "service in any other capacity" for educational institutions if the employee has "reasonable assurance" of performing these services during the next academic term or year. Paragraph (5) extends the "between and within terms" exclusion to persons not employed by an educational institution, but who perform services covered by paragraphs (1) and (2) "to or on behalf of an educational institution" while employed by a nonprofit organization. Id. ¶15 It is undisputed that employees worked for a nonprofit organization which provided Head Start services to or on behalf of educational institutions. It is undisputed that employees were given reasonable assurance of returning to work the next academic term. However, the remaining element of A.R.S. § 23-750(E)(5) -whether employees individually performed any of the MOU services, i.e., screening three to five-year-old preschool students for disabilities subject to IDEA was not addressed by the Tribunal or the Board. Our determination hinges on that factor. ¶16 Employees Rosas and Correa worked as Head Start infant and toddler teachers. Federal law limits Early Head Start programs to children from birth to three-years-old. It is unlikely that these employees would have been in a position to interact with the students that required screening. In the event of any overlap of three-year-old children between the Early Head Start and other Head Start enrollees, only a maximum of ten percent of the enrolled students would have disabilities. For that reason, both teachers would also serve nondisabled children. ¶17 Regarding employee Castillo, a cook, and employee Solorzano, a cook's assistant, the evidence established that they worked at childcare centers open from 8 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., Monday-Friday. Their job titles indicate that they would serve meals to all the enrolled students, including the ten percent enrollment reserved for students with disabilities. There is no evidence in the record that either employee participated in the IDEA screening of the three to five-year-old students. ¶18 Without additional factual findings regarding each of the employees' duties at the childcare centers, we cannot say that they individually provided any of the services which would preclude them from using their educational wage credits towards their eligibility for unemployment benefits. We reverse the Board's decisions and remand to Department for further proceedings in accordance with this decision. CONCLUSION ¶19 For the above stated reasons, we reverse the ruling of the Department. The above listed employees are entitled to the benefits for which they applied. Employees' reasonable attorneys' fees, in an amount to be determined upon compliance with ARCAP 21, are awarded. We cite to the current version of any statute unless the statute was amended after the pertinent events and such amendments would affect the result of this appeal. The Yuma center provided care for "121 children," in "8 classes: 5 preschool classes, 2 toddler classes and 1 infant class," from "8-3:30 p.m. Monday-Friday for the preschool classrooms." The San Luis center provided care for "8 classes of preschoolers," at three separate locations, between the "hours of 8-3:30 p.m. Monday-Friday." IDEA is federal legislation which provides federal funds to states to meet the educational needs of children with disabilities. To receive funding, a state must provide a free appropriate public education to all children with disabilities residing in the state between the ages of three and twenty-one. 20 U.S.C. 1412(a)(1)(A). Paragraphs (3) and (4) are not germane to this case. Unemployment benefits are only available to persons who have sufficient wages ("wage credits") during the relevant base period. Generally, as discussed above, educational wage credits will not count towards that that amount.

BROWN, Judge: ¶ 1 Gilbert Aguirre Jr. seeks review of an Industrial Commission of Arizona ("ICA") award concluding he failed to prove he sustained a work-related injury. He argues the administrative law judge ("ALJ") failed to comply with Post v. Industrial Commission , 160 Ariz. 4, 770 P.2d 308 (1989), which requires an ALJ to make findings that are specific enough to enable proper judicial review of the award. Because we cannot properly review the award on this record, we set aside the award. BACKGROUND ¶ 2 Aguirre, a firefighter for the City of Goodyear ("Goodyear"), received a blood test for his annual employment physical in May 2015. His test results were abnormal and soon thereafter he was diagnosed with chronic myeloid leukemia ("CML"). Aguirre filed a workers' compensation claim, which was denied by the respondent carrier, CopperPoint American Insurance Company ("CopperPoint"). Aguirre timely requested an ICA hearing, and the ALJ held hearings where Aguirre and two physicians testified. ¶ 3 Aguirre testified that in August 2000 he started working as a firefighter in Sierra Vista, and as part of his job duties he responded to both structural and wildland fires. In August 2007, Goodyear hired Aguirre as a firefighter. ¶ 4 Following his CML diagnosis, Aguirre obtained his Goodyear firefighting records to help him recall the types of fires he responded to and his likely chemical exposures. Of the fires identified, Aguirre was most concerned about a large fire in a cabinet factory that contained "paints, thinners, lacquers, [and] everything that they used to make cabinets," an airport hangar with burning jet fuel, a potato chip factory, a house with chlorine stored in the attic, and a number of meth labs. For some fires, Aguirre wore a self-contained breathing apparatus ("SCBA"), but for others it was not standard practice, and afterwards-when he would not wear a SCBA-he would have soot on his hands and face, and up his nose. When the firefighters returned to the station after a fire, they would use a garden hose and a brush to "try to get as much off of us that we could." Then they cleaned up the equipment and showered. ¶ 5 Marc Wilkenfeld, M.D., board certified in occupational medicine, authored a report based on Aguirre's occupational history as a firefighter, and testified at the hearing. When attempting to relate a disease to an exposure, the doctor explained that several elements were important: (1) the correct disease diagnosis, (2) workplace exposures and latency periods-the time between "exposures and the development of the disease," and (3) biologic responsibility, i.e., what the medical literature says about exposures in terms of carcinogenicity. The doctor addressed these points in his report and testimony. ¶ 6 As background for his report, Wilkenfeld interviewed Aguirre and reviewed his work-related exposures to carcinogenic material and medical treatment records. Wilkenfeld stated that Aguirre responded to four or five fires per month and had annual physical examinations clearing him for work as a firefighter. As a firefighter, Aguirre "had repeated exposure to the carcinogens present at the fires, often without proper protective equipment." Wilkenfeld concluded that based on his review of medical literature, exposure records, and Aguirre's medical history, Aguirre developed CML as a result of such exposures. ¶ 7 Wilkenfeld testified about Aguirre's exposure to chemicals and toxins that could lead to a diagnosis of CML, including benzene, asbestos, heavy metals, dioxins, and volatile organic compounds, to which he was exposed only during his work as a firefighter. Wilkenfeld explained that the fires Aguirre identified as being of particular concern were dangerous in terms of exposure to carcinogens because they involved oils and solvents. He also noted that even if Aguirre used protective gear, he still would have been exposed to toxins while cleaning his equipment at the fire station after firefighting in toxic environments. ¶ 8 Wilkenfeld has experience working with the World Trade Center program that has treated firefighters, responders, and survivors of the September 11, 2001 attacks ("9/11") since 2001. He stated that CML is on the list of cancers compiled by the federal government that are believed to have resulted from 9/11 exposures. He further testified that for firefighters present at Ground Zero who developed CML, the federal government has accepted latency periods as short as two years. Wilkenfeld relied on peer-reviewed studies that have shown increased rates of leukemia in firefighters. For these reasons, Wilkenfeld opined that "to a reasonable degree of medical certainty," Aguirre developed CML "as a result of exposure that he experienced during his work as a firefighter." ¶ 9 Jason Salganick, M.D., board certified in medical oncology, produced a report and testified on behalf of CopperPoint. He reviewed Aguirre's testimony, medical treatment records, and the Goodyear call records, as well as Wilkenfeld's report and testimony. Salganick also performed a literature search on PubMed and reviewed monographs by the International Association for Research on Cancer ("IARC") and what he termed documents "involving 9/11 research and government directive protocols for compensation of firefighters." ¶ 10 In his report, Salganick noted that the toxins to which firefighters are generally exposed include "benzenes, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, aromatic amines, [and] chlorinated dioxins." He acknowledged that benzene is a potential carcinogen and is included in IARC's list of chemicals to which firefighters are presumed to be exposed. Salganick testified that firefighters are generally exposed to potential carcinogens, including benzene, but he could not determine if Aguirre was exposed to a known carcinogen as defined by the IARC because the records did not indicate what specific toxins were present at particular fires, what protective gear Aguirre wore, or the length of time he spent at each fire. ¶ 11 Salganick also explained he was not aware of a reasonable relationship between any carcinogen to which Aguirre may have been exposed and CML, yet he acknowledged that Aguirre "would have been exposed" to various "well-documented substances," including benzene. Salganick stated he was unable to find that Aguirre's cancer was "causally related to his work as a firefighter." Salganick also explained why his opinion differed from Wilkenfeld's opinion when they had both relied on the same studies. Salganick stated that based on his review of the medical literature, it was necessary to show a standard mortality ratio ("SMR") of greater than 200, or a two-fold increase in the risk of developing cancer, before a study could be considered statistically significant and the cancer reasonably related for purposes of establishing a compensable claim. According to Salganick, there is a paucity of medical literature meeting that standard. As a result, the literature only supported a possible connection between Aguirre's work as a firefighter and CML. Regarding the federal government's 9/11 Ground Zero list of potentially-related cancers, the only two on the list that have been recognized as being causally related are thyroid and prostate cancer. ¶ 12 Following the hearings, the parties filed simultaneous post-hearing memoranda. In his ruling, after briefly summarizing the testimony, the ALJ stated he was more persuaded by CopperPoint's memorandum and concluded that Aguirre "failed to carry his burden of proving by a reasonable preponderance of the evidence that he sustained a work related injury on May 14, 2015." Following Aguirre's request for review, the ALJ summarily affirmed the award and Aguirre sought review in this court. DISCUSSION ¶ 13 To establish a compensable injury under the Arizona Workers' Compensation Act, a claimant must prove an accidental injury that arose out of, and in the course of, employment. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. ("A.R.S.") section 23-1021 ; Malinski v. Indus. Comm'n , 103 Ariz. 213, 216, 439 P.2d 485, 488 (1968) (stating that claimant has the burden to affirmatively establish entitlement to compensation). An injury includes an occupational disease, A.R.S. § 23-901(13)(c), which is compensable only if the claimant meets six requirements, including proof of a "direct causal connection between the conditions under which the work is performed and the occupational disease," A.R.S. § 23-901.01(A). The compensability of certain occupational diseases contracted by firefighters or peace officers, however, involves a lower burden of proof, as reflected in A.R.S. § 23-901.01(B) : [A]ny disease, infirmity, or impairment of a firefighter's or peace officer's health that is caused by ... leukemia... and that results in disability or death is presumed to be an occupational disease as defined in § 23-901, paragraph 13, subdivision (c) and is deemed to arise out of employment. The presumption is granted if all of the following apply: 1. The firefighter or peace officer passed a physical examination before employment and the examination did not indicate evidence of cancer. 2. The firefighter or peace officer was assigned to hazardous duty for at least five years. 3. The firefighter or peace officer was exposed to a known carcinogen as defined by the international agency for research on cancer and informed the department of this exposure, and the carcinogen is reasonably related to the cancer. (Emphasis added.) On appeal, CopperPoint does not dispute that subsections B(1) and B(2) have been satisfied; instead, it focuses primarily on subsection B(3)'s third prong-the requirement that the carcinogen to which Aguirre was allegedly exposed is "reasonably related" to his CML. To meet that condition, Aguirre had to "demonstrate that at least one carcinogen he was exposed to during hazardous duty is reasonably related" to his CML. Hahn v. Indus. Comm'n , 227 Ariz. 72, 75, ¶ 12, 252 P.3d 1036, 1039 (App. 2011) (emphasis added). ¶ 14 Aguirre argues the ALJ's award lacks legally sufficient findings for this court to be able to review whether the award was compensable, citing Post . In Post , our supreme court granted review to "examine the need for and degree of specificity in findings and awards required in workers' compensation cases." 160 Ariz. at 5, 770 P.2d at 309. The Post court first noted the lack of specificity in the award at issue there-the ALJ "made no factual findings of consequence, resolved no conflicts in the evidence, and set forth no conclusions applying law to fact. Instead, ... he simply set forth the ultimate legal conclusion." Id. Concluding that "judicial review" was not possible "on this record," the court re-affirmed the longstanding principle that an award must specify the basis for the ultimate disposition and the evidence supporting that basis. Id. at 7-8, 770 P.2d at 311-12 ; see also Douglas Auto & Equip. v. Indus. Comm'n , 202 Ariz. 345, 347, ¶ 9, 45 P.3d 342, 344 (2002) (stating that an ALJ "must make factual findings that are sufficiently comprehensive and explicit for a reviewing court to glean the basis for the [ALJ's] conclusions"); Wammack v. Indus. Comm'n , 83 Ariz. 321, 325, 320 P.2d 950, 954 (1958) (stating that "the findings of administrative agencies must be explicit to enable the reviewing court to review the decision intelligently and to ascertain whether the facts as found afford a reasonable basis for the decision or be sufficiently definite and certain to permit of judicial interpretation"). A. Waiver ¶ 15 CopperPoint contends that Aguirre is precluded from seeking appellate review of the sufficiency of the ALJ's findings because he failed to raise the issue in his request for review of the award by the ALJ. We are not persuaded by this contention for several reasons. First, nothing in Post suggests a party is required to challenge the sufficiency of findings in a request for review as a condition of asserting that argument on appeal. See 160 Ariz. at 7, 770 P.2d at 311 (requiring ALJs to include sufficient findings to ensure that judicial review is possible). ¶ 16 Second, although a party seeking to challenge an ICA award in the appellate courts must first file a request for review, A.R.S. § 23-943(A), that same provision makes it clear that a party has no obligation to include any specific arguments in the request to preserve them for appellate review, id. (stating that a request for review "need only state that the party requests a review of the award " and that the request "may be accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities") (emphasis added). See generally Backus v. State , 220 Ariz. 101, 104, ¶ 11, 203 P.3d 499, 502 (2009) ("When statutory language admits of only one interpretation, we go no further."). ¶ 17 Third, CopperPoint's reliance on Stephens v. Industrial Commission , 114 Ariz. 92, 559 P.2d 212 (App. 1977), is misplaced. Stephens did not address the question presented here-whether the failure to raise a challenge to the sufficiency of findings must be raised in a request for review. Instead, the issue in Stephens centered on the claimant's argument that the hearing officer erred by addressing whether a permanent disability had been proven. Id. at 94, 95, 559 P.2d at 214. Explaining that the claimant had previously challenged the carrier's notice terminating benefits with no permanent disability, we rejected his argument on three grounds: (1) the claimant clearly placed the matter at issue in his request for hearing; (2) given the lack of evidence presented regarding a permanent disability, the claimant necessarily failed to meet his burden; and (3) he failed to raise the issue at any point in the ICA proceedings. Id. at 96, 559 P.2d at 216. Addressing the third ground, we explained that consistent with principles of exhaustion of administrative remedies, our review would "be limited to the same matters which the hearing officer could consider in its review of its own decision." Id. at 95, 559 P.2d at 215. ¶ 18 Here, Aguirre had no obligation to challenge the sufficiency of the findings in the ICA proceedings to preserve it for appeal because the only action he was required to take under § 23-943 was to file a request for review; he was not required to raise any specific argument. Thus, unlike the issue in Stephens , the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine does not apply here because § 23-943 is permissive as to whether a party may challenge the sufficiency of the ALJ's findings in a request for review. See Sw. Paint & Varnish Co. v. Ariz. Dep't of Envtl. Quality , 194 Ariz. 22, 24, ¶ 14, 976 P.2d 872, 874 (1999) (recognizing that "the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine does not apply in many circumstances, including those where the remedy is permissive"). ¶ 19 Because Stephens does not apply to the issue before us, neither does the sole reported decision that relied on Stephens in summarily concluding that failure to challenge the sufficiency of the ALJ's findings in a request for review waives that argument on appeal. See Spielman v. Indus. Comm'n , 163 Ariz. 493, 496, 788 P.2d 1244, 1247 (App. 1989). Spielman was decided 11 months after Post , but did not address it. And the only reported decision citing Spielman is Teller v. Industrial Commission , 179 Ariz. 367, 371, 879 P.2d 375, 379 (App. 1994), which relied solely on Spielman to conclude that failure to raise lack of findings in a request for review precludes that party from raising the issue on appeal. Teller has never been cited in a reported decision for the principle that a party in an ICA proceeding is precluded from challenging the sufficiency of the ALJ's findings if it failed to raise that argument in a request for review. Because the genesis of these two cases was Stephens , a case that did not address the question presented here, we decline to follow Spielman and Teller insofar as they would preclude us from deciding whether the award in this instance includes sufficient findings. ¶ 20 Accordingly, we hold that Post 's requirement that an ALJ make findings sufficient to permit meaningful judicial review, 160 Ariz. at 8, 770 P.2d at 312, applies even if a party fails to raise that specific issue in a request for review. We are not suggesting a party should ignore an obvious issue of insufficient findings; the better practice would be to bring the matter to the ALJ's attention. But failure to do so does not preclude judicial review. B. Sufficiency of Findings ¶ 21 Alternatively, CopperPoint argues the ALJ's award "contains ample findings and conclusions" to permit meaningful appellate review. Relying on Pearce Development v. Industrial Commission , 147 Ariz. 582, 712 P.2d 429 (1985), CopperPoint notes that a court will uphold an award where the ALJ "at least draws conclusions on the legal issues" and thereby allows the court to "determine from the record" whether the evidence supports the ALJ's conclusions. In Post , our supreme court distinguished Pearce , because the ALJ in Pearce "had at least drawn conclusions on the legal issues so that we could determine from the record whether the evidence supported his conclusions." 160 Ariz. at 8, 770 P.2d at 312. The Post court acknowledged that normally, an appellate court reviews the record in search of support for the award. Id. However, in Post, the court was "unable to perform the type of judicial review that workers' compensation cases require." Id. ¶ 22 Here, the lack of specificity in this award mandates the same conclusion. The ALJ summarized the facts and the testimony of both doctors and came to the bare conclusion that Aguirre "failed to carry his burden of proving by a reasonable preponderance of the evidence that he sustained a work related injury." The ALJ did not resolve conflicting evidence, make ultimate factual findings, provide legal analysis of § 23-901.01(B)(3), or discuss Hahn , which is the only reported decision to date interpreting that statute. See Post , 160 Ariz. at 8, 770 P.2d at 312 ("If we were to approve the award here, however, with no stated resolution of conflicting testimony, no findings of ultimate fact, and no conclusions on the legal issues, there would be no purpose in requiring [ALJs] to make findings."). ¶ 23 Finally, with no citation to authority, CopperPoint also argues the ALJ's reliance on its post-hearing memorandum makes the findings sufficient. Our research reveals one reported decision where this court found, under unique circumstances, that an ALJ's reliance on a party's legal memorandum was sufficient to comply with Post . See Hester v. Indus. Comm'n , 178 Ariz. 587, 589-90, 875 P.2d 820, 822-23 (App. 1993) (noting the ALJ's findings "incorporated" one party's memorandum and the court "could determine whether the factual assumptions and legal arguments in this memorandum support the no loss award"). Post recognized that an ALJ's findings do not have to be in "any particular form" but the supreme court reiterated that "we must know how the [ALJ] reached his or her conclusion." 160 Ariz. at 8-9, 770 P.2d at 312-13. Stated differently, regardless of the format in which the findings are presented, if the award requires us to speculate about how the ALJ resolved material disputes in the case, then the findings are insufficient. See id. at 7-9, 770 P.2d at 311-13 ("Although lack of findings on a particular issue does not invalidate an award per se," if we must "speculate" about the basis for the award or "assume a factfinder role," then the award must be set aside.). ¶ 24 Here, the ALJ's decision finding that CopperPoint's memorandum was more persuasive does not satisfy Post . We need not address every point in the eight-page memorandum to reach this determination, as a few examples will suffice. CopperPoint asserted that Aguirre failed to meet the statutory presumption, but even if he did, the ALJ "should conclude that Dr. Salganick's opinions are more probably correct that there is insufficient scientific evidence to support a causal connection between [Aguirre's] CML and his work as a firefighter." But CopperPoint cited no authority addressing under what circumstances an employer may rebut the presumption under the statute, as worded in 2015. See Hahn , 227 Ariz. at 77, ¶ 18 n.3, 252 P.3d at 1041, n.3 (declining to address the "nature and effect" of the presumption "when it does apply"). ¶ 25 CopperPoint argued Aguirre failed to establish, under the first prong of § 23-901.01(B)(3), he was exposed to a known carcinogen as defined by the IARC, relying on Salganick's testimony. Wilkenfeld stated in his report that Aguirre "had repeated exposures to the carcinogens present at the fires," including "Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons (PAHs) and dioxins." Wilkenfeld testified that as a firefighter Aguirre would have been exposed to "things like benzene." Salganick testified that nothing in the records showed that Aguirre was exposed to a known carcinogen, but on cross-examination he agreed Aguirre "would have been exposed" to substances such as "benzenes, [etc.]" because "they are generally accepted as the kinds of chemicals to which firefighters are exposed." And Salganick did not dispute that benzene is listed by the IARC. CopperPoint's memorandum, however, did not include any discussion of benzene or the other potential carcinogens the doctors discussed in their reports and testimony. ¶ 26 CopperPoint's memorandum also seemed to suggest that Aguirre failed to report his exposure to his employer as required by the second prong of § 23-901.01(B)(3). The statute does not address when, or in what format, such a report must be given. See § 23-901.01(B)(3). Regardless, other than the award's bare reference to the memorandum, nothing else in the record indicates the ALJ relied on either of these prongs to conclude that Aguirre failed to meet his burden. ¶ 27 CopperPoint argued further that Aguirre "presented absolutely no evidence that he was exposed at a particular time to a particular carcinogen." Aguirre challenged this point in his request for review, asserting that CopperPoint was seeking to impose "an impossible burden" by contending that he was required to connect exposure to a specific potential carcinogen to a specific firefighting event. Without citation to authority, CopperPoint faulted Wilkenfeld for failing to identify details such as the year of the exposure, the length of time Aguirre was on the scene, whether Aguirre went into the fire or manned a hose or what type of protective equipment he used during the alleged exposure. Nothing in the statute or Hahn requires this level of detail. As we explained in Hahn , application of the statute means Aguirre "need only show a general causal link between a carcinogen to which he was exposed and one of the enumerated cancers to qualify for the presumption, not that the exposure caused his particular cancer ." 227 Ariz. at 76, ¶ 16, 252 P.3d at 1040 (second emphasis added). ¶ 28 Finally, as to the credibility of witnesses, the memorandum fails to satisfy Post 's directive that an ALJ "must resolve all conflicts in the evidence, especially when the conflicts involve expert medical testimony." 160 Ariz. at 8, 770 P.2d at 312. Although CopperPoint analyzed portions of the testimony, the memorandum lacks any meaningful attempt to resolve the various conflicts between the opinions offered by Wilkenfeld and Salganick. For example, the experts offered conflicting testimony as to what the SMR, or increase of risk in developing cancer, must be to show a reasonable relation between exposure of a carcinogen and the cancer. According to Salganick, anything less than a two-fold increase in the risk means that a connection between a carcinogen and the cancer is only possible, not probable, but Wilkenfeld disputed that a two-fold increase is required to establish a probable association. They also offered differing opinions as to what types of carcinogens Aguirre was exposed to, if any, and disagreed as to whether Salganick was qualified to offer an expert opinion on causation. ¶ 29 Nothing in the ALJ's award or the memorandum indicate that the ALJ resolved these issues. It is not our role to speculate as to which arguments made by CopperPoint the ALJ found more persuasive to ultimately conclude that Aguirre failed to meet his burden. Thus, referencing the memorandum does not remedy the ALJ's inadequate findings. In our view, an ALJ will generally be better served to issue his or her own findings instead of relying on a party's memorandum. Doing so will help avoid ambiguities and conflicts that may arise on appeal. Thus, at a minimum, an ALJ choosing to rely on a memorandum should carefully delineate which portions of the memorandum he or she is relying on and how those portions support the award. ¶ 30 On this record, we must set aside the award because the lack of findings leaves us unable to meaningfully review the ALJ's decision. See id. at 7, 770 P.2d at 311 ("[W]e have no way of evaluating the basis of the judge's award and consequently cannot determine the factual support for, or the legal propriety of, his conclusion."). Aguirre needed to show a general causal link between his exposure to at least one particular carcinogen and his CML, but we are unable to determine whether the ALJ erred by ruling he failed to meet that burden-we cannot tell what evidence the ALJ relied on and why, or what elements of § 23-901.01(B), if any, were not satisfied. CONCLUSION ¶ 31 Given the absence of legally-sufficient findings, we set aside the ICA award. Unless otherwise noted, we refer to Goodyear and CopperPoint collectively as "CopperPoint." The legislature's 2017 amendment to § 23-901.01(B) included a provision addressing the standard of proof required to rebut the presumption. See A.R.S. § 23-901.01(F) ("The presumptions provided in subsection B of this section may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a specific cause of the cancer other than an occupational exposure to a carcinogen as defined by the international agency for research on cancer."). Because we only address whether the award includes sufficient findings, the 2017 amendment does not affect the substance of our analysis.

CHIEF JUSTICE BALES, opinion of the Court: ¶1 We here explain our March 20, 2019 order affirming the trial court's decision enjoining a recall election of Phoenix City Councilman Michael Nowakowski. Urban Phoenix Project PAC (the "Committee") failed to collect sufficient valid signatures to trigger a recall because its signature sheets were not attached to a time-and-date-marked copy of its recall application, as required by statute. I. ¶2 Nowakowski represents District 7 of the City of Phoenix. Displeased with his conduct as a councilman, some electors from District 7 sought to initiate a recall election. To that end, the Committee filed an application for a recall petition on August 29, 2018. After gathering signatures over the next several months, the Committee in December submitted a recall petition with 2,361 signatures to the Phoenix City Clerk for verification. The next month, the City Clerk certified that the petition had sufficient signatures to be on the ballot for the March 2019 city election. ¶3 Rosa Maria Morales, an elector of District 7, then filed this action challenging the recall petition in superior court. She raised three objections: (1) the Committee failed to attach the "official text of the recall, which consists of the date-and-time stamped copy of the petition serial number application," to petition sheets in violation of A.R.S. §§ 19-202.01(D) and -203(D); (2) "a copy of the petition form" was not attached to the Committee's petition application, in violation of § 19-202.01(B)-(C) ; and (3) the petition sheets did not include language required by A.R.S. § 19-204(A). ¶4 The Committee moved to dismiss, arguing that Morales lacked a statutory cause of action, as the sole statute authorizing an elector's challenge to recall petitions is A.R.S. § 19-208.04, which only allows challenges to "the number of signatures certified by the county recorder under the provisions of § 19-208.02." (Pursuant to Phoenix City Charter Chapter XVII, § 3, the Phoenix City Clerk takes the place of the county recorder in the signature verification process.) On the merits, the Committee argued that it should be required only to substantially comply with the statutory requirements for recalls; that § 19-201.01's requirement of strict compliance with statutory requirements is unconstitutional; and that it had substantially complied. ¶5 The trial court ruled that § 19-208.04 is the only statute authorizing a private right of action in the recall context. Under that section, a private party may challenge the validity of signatures. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that Morales was statutorily authorized to raise her first objection. Because Morales's other two objections were not based on signature verification, the court held they were not cognizable and dismissed them. ¶6 On the merits of Morales's surviving objection, the trial court determined that the Committee had failed to comply with the statutory requirements. The court found that the Committee failed to attach a "time-and-date-marked copy of the [petition] application" to its petition sheets, and thus the City Clerk should not have included any of the sheets in certifying the number of signatures. § 19-203(D). Accordingly, the court ruled the recall was not eligible to be placed on the ballot. ¶7 Although ultimately unnecessary to its decision, the trial court also rejected the Committee's challenge to the constitutionality of § 19-201.01, and, in the event the court's jurisdictional rulings were not upheld on appeal, ruled alternatively for Morales on her second objection and for the Committee on the third. ¶8 Morales and the Committee appealed to the court of appeals, and we granted the Committee's unopposed motion to transfer. In this Court, Morales argues that the trial court erred by holding that no broad right of action exists to challenge recall petitions and by rejecting Morales's third objection related to the petition language. The Committee argues that the trial court erred in upholding § 19-201.01, in ruling that the petitions did not comply with §§ 19-202.01(D) and -203(D), and in its alternative ruling on Morales's second objection. II. ¶9 Before reaching the merits, we consider whether Morales is statutorily authorized to raise any of her objections to the recall. Morales contends that § 19-208.04 broadly authorizes recall challenges; the Committee argues that no statute allows her claims. A. ¶10 Section 19-208.04 allows any elector to challenge the number of signatures certified on a recall petition. Morales argues that this authorization creates a broad private right of action "irrespective of the legal theory undergirding the challenge." She states that it is "well-established in the initiative and referendum context" that petitions can be challenged for reasons beyond the certification of signatures. ¶11 Morales neglects two key points. First, her claim that the "plain language" of § 19-208.04 creates a broad private right of action is undermined by the statute's own terms. Section 19-208.04(B) authorizes a challenge to "the number of signatures certified by the county recorder." In this respect, recalls (title 2 of chapter 19) are like initiatives and referenda (title 1 of chapter 19), for which the same sort of challenge is authorized by A.R.S. § 19-121.03(B). But the provisions for initiatives and referenda are notably different from those for recalls because they also include A.R.S. § 19-122(C), which authorizes any person to "contest the validity of an initiative or referendum" for failure to comply with any statutory requirement. See Kromko v. Superior Court , 168 Ariz. 51, 55-56, 811 P.2d 12, 16-17 (1991) (stating that § 19-122(C)"permits any citizen to explore beyond the county recorder's certification" of signatures). The cases Morales cites in support of her broad right of action, all in the initiative and referendum context, were brought under § 19-122, for which there is no counterpart in the recall context. ¶12 The second flaw in Morales's argument is that it conflates the process for recalls with those for initiatives and referenda. See Ross v. Bennett , 228 Ariz. 174, 178 ¶¶ 19-21, 265 P.3d 356, 360 (2011). We have previously declined to extend the same requirements we place on referendum petitions to recall petitions. See id. We decline to do so here as well. ¶13 The legislature has statutorily created a broad private right of action in the context of initiatives and referenda but has declined to do so for recalls. With that background, we will not construe § 19-208.04(B) as implicitly incorporating § 19-122. See City of Flagstaff v. Mangum , 164 Ariz. 395, 398, 793 P.2d 548, 551 (1990) (stating "[w]here the legislature uses a term within one statute and excludes it from another, the term usually will not be read into the provision from which it was excluded"). B. ¶14 By its terms, § 19-208.04 authorizes a challenge to "the number of signatures certified by the county recorder under the provisions of § 19-208.02." Section 19-208.02(A), in turn, requires "the county recorder [to] determine the number of signatures or affidavits of individuals whose names were transmitted that must be disqualified for any of the reasons set forth in § 19-121.02, subsection A." Under § 19-121.02(A), the county recorder must disqualify signatures for statutorily prescribed reasons, including "the same reasons any signatures or entire petition sheets could have been removed by the secretary of state pursuant to § 19-121.01, subsection A, paragraph 1 or 3. § 19-121.02(A)(11)." As the final link in the chain, § 19-121.01(A)(1) and (3) specify requirements for petition sheets and signatures. ¶15 Although Morales is not entitled broadly to challenge the validity of the recall, § 19-208.04 authorizes her to challenge the number of signatures certified. The grounds for such a challenge rest in the statutes, including § 19-121.01(A)(1) or (3), that specify how the number of certified signatures is determined. Thus, the trial court correctly ruled that it had jurisdiction to consider Morales's first objection, which contended that the signature sheets should not have been counted because they had not been attached to "the complete title and text of the measure." § 19-121.01(A)(1)(a). ¶16 Morales's other objections - a failure to attach a petition sheet when initially filing the petition application and to include on petition sheets the precise language prescribed by § 19-204(A) - do not relate to the validity of signatures. Although these procedural steps should be followed by those undertaking a recall petition, § 19-208.04 does not contemplate a private right of action challenging a failure to comply with these requirements. Thus, the trial court correctly ruled that it was not authorized to consider Morales's second and third objections. III. ¶17 We now consider whether the Committee complied with § 19-121.01(A)(1)(a), which requires that petition sheets be attached to the "complete title and text" of the recall in order for the signatures to be verified. ¶18 The "complete title and text" of a recall measure is defined in § 19-202.01(D), which states "the time-and-date-marked application ... constitutes the official copy of the text of the recall and shall be used in all instances as the text of the recall." Similarly, § 19-203(D) states the "time-and-date-marked copy of the application ... constitutes the full and correct copy of the recall text and is the only valid copy for circulation of signatures. Signatures that are collected with any copy of the recall text that is not a facsimile of the time-and-date-marked copy ... are invalid." ¶19 The Committee argues that neither § 19-202.01(D) nor § 19-203(D) states that a time-and-date-marked copy of the application must be attached to the petition sheets. True, neither statute uses the word "attach." But § 19-203(D) expressly recognizes that signatures, to be valid, must be collected with such a copy, which § 19-202.01(D) specifies "shall be used in all instances as the text of the recall." ¶20 Moreover, the definition of the text of the recall does not operate in isolation. Morales's entire challenge is premised on § 19-208.04 which, at the end of a line of references, incorporates § 19-121.01(A)(1)(a). That statute requires the removal of petition sheets "not attached to a copy of the complete title and text of the measure." Thus, to the extent that § 19-203(D) only implicitly requires the attachment of the time-and-date-marked application, § 19-121.01(A)(1)(a) makes the requirement express. ¶21 Taken together, the statutes require that any petition signature sheet not attached to a copy of the time-and-date-marked application be removed from the verification process. It is not enough, as the Committee argues, for the petition sheets to reproduce the application's statement of why a recall is being sought. The time-and-date-marked copy of the application - unlike the petition sheets - both identifies the applicant (including any organization, certain officers, and contact information) and reflects that the application has in fact been filed. Requiring the attachment of a such a copy also helps ensure that signatures are not obtained before the application is filed, consistent with §§ 19-202.01(A) (requiring the submission of an application before circulating a petition) and -203(D) (providing that signatures are invalid if not collected with a copy of the time-and-date-marked copy of the application). ¶22 Here, none of the Committee's sheets were attached to the complete time-and-date-marked application. Moreover, because the Committee failed to attach a copy of the application to the petition sheets, and it did not otherwise collect the signatures with a "facsimile of the time-and-date-marked copy," § 19-203(D), it completely failed to comply with the statutory requirements. Finally, because the Committee did not substantially comply, we need not determine the constitutionality of § 19-201.01. See Stanwitz v. Reagan , 245 Ariz. 344, 348 ¶ 12, 429 P.3d 1138, 1142 (2018). Nor do we address any of the other issues raised by the parties. IV. ¶23 Our state constitution guarantees voters the right to recall elected officers for whatever reasons they choose. Ross , 228 Ariz. at 176 ¶ 7, 180 ¶ 33, 265 P.3d at 358, at 362. That right, however, must be exercised pursuant to constitutional and statutory provisions. While we recognize that the Committee and its volunteers undertook substantial efforts to gather signatures, those signatures could not be certified because the petition sheets were not attached to a time-and-date-marked copy of the recall application. We therefore affirm the trial court's decision enjoining the recall election.

CAMPBELL, Judge: ¶1 This is a special action review of an Industrial Commission of Arizona ("ICA") award and decision upon review of Benjamin Pitts' workers' compensation claim. The sole issue presented on appeal is whether Pitts' claim for workers' compensation benefits, based on post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"), was untimely under Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 23-1061(A). Because insufficient evidence supported the ALJ's finding of untimeliness, we set aside the award. BACKGROUND ¶2 Pitts worked for the City of Chandler as a police officer between July 2002 and April 2017. In May 2013, Pitts was on duty in his patrol vehicle with his fiancée, who was participating in a ride-along. That evening, Pitts received a service call. Dispatch explained there was a man acting in a disorderly manner and possibly brandishing a gun outside Chandler Regional Hospital. The dispatcher told Pitts the man was walking up the road with hospital security guards following at a distance. Upon arriving in his patrol car, Pitts directed his spotlight at a man fitting the suspect's description. The man then stopped, leveled his gun, and fired. The first bullet shattered the windshield, spraying glass toward Pitts' face and eyes. As multiple bullets continued to pelt the car, Pitts got out and returned fire. Pitts shot the man in the shoulder, ending the gunfight. Neither Pitts nor his fiancée were injured by the spray of bullets. ¶3 Pitts took three weeks off work after the incident. A week or two into his leave, his superiors required him to see the police department psychologist, who advised Pitts to "get back on that horse." Although Pitts told the department psychologist he felt unready to work, he resumed his duties a week later. The department psychologist did not provide a diagnosis at that time, and Pitts did not seek or receive any additional treatment related to the shooting incident. ¶4 Almost a year later, the man went on trial for shooting at Pitts. Pitts attended the three-week trial daily and testified about the events of that evening. The shooter was convicted and sentenced to over 50 years in prison. ¶5 Between the shooting incident and the trial, Pitts experienced emotional problems, including difficulty sleeping and nightmares, anxiety, and social withdrawal. Pitts also became hypervigilant-constantly assessing potential threats to his safety and that of his family. A year after the trial, the shooter's sentence was reduced. Pitts testified at the hearing that the sentence reduction was a "gut punch." In his opinion, the reduction in sentence was based solely on a legal technicality. Over the next six months, Pitts' depression worsened: he lost interest in his children and home life, began having panic and anxiety attacks at work, and experienced tunnel vision, insomnia, dissociative episodes where he lost track of time, and a hollow echoing sound in his ears. ¶6 On December 28, 2015, Pitts visited his primary care doctor to obtain sleep medication. The doctor's note from that visit states, "[p]robable PTSD," and opined that Pitts needed to see a psychologist for evaluation. In the ICA proceeding that eventually followed, Pitts testified he did not recall the doctor mentioning the need for psychological treatment. ¶7 At the recommendation of fellow officers, Pitts saw a trauma psychologist in January 2016. This was the first time a medical professional diagnosed him with dissociative complex PTSD related to the shooting incident. Based on this medical assessment, he was taken off patrol duty. The trauma psychologist's treatment summary shows that his initial visit occurred on January 21, 2016, with a diagnosis that day or soon thereafter. ¶8 Shortly before seeing the trauma psychologist, Pitts made an injury report to Corvel Enterprise Corp., Inc. (the "Carrier"). It was not until the Carrier refused to pay his medical bills that Pitts decided to pursue a workers' compensation claim. On October 27, 2016, he filed a worker's report of injury for PTSD stemming from the shooting incident. The Carrier again denied his claim for benefits, and he timely requested an ICA hearing. The ALJ held a hearing, limited to the issue of timeliness, and heard testimony from Pitts and his fiancée. ¶9 Pitts' fiancée testified that she had lived with Pitts since the incident and witnessed the May 2013 shooting. She explained that sometime in July 2015, Pitts began to disassociate, hide in his room, and stop communicating, doing chores, or getting dressed for the day. He appeared depressed and quit interacting with his children. His fiancée testified that Pitts became hypervigilant about his family's safety. ¶10 Following the hearing, the ALJ determined Pitts' claim was untimely and that the ICA thus lacked jurisdiction. Pitts timely requested administrative review, and the ALJ supplemented and affirmed the decision. Pitts next brought this special action. DISCUSSION ¶11 Pitts asserts that the ALJ erred in finding his claim untimely, arguing that he did not know of his condition until early 2016 when he was diagnosed with PTSD and began treatment. The City and the Carrier respond that the ALJ correctly concluded that Pitts knew both the nature and seriousness of his injury within one year of the incident. Because neither the City nor the Carrier presented adequate evidence to support a finding that the claim was untimely, we set aside the award. ¶12 A workers' compensation claim must be filed "within one year after the injury occurred or the right thereto accrued." A.R.S. § 23-1061(A). A compensable injury becomes manifest-and the one-year period begins to run-when the injured employee recognizes the nature of his injury, the seriousness of the injury, and the probable causal relationship between the injury and the employment. Pac. Fruit Express v. Indus. Comm'n , 153 Ariz. 210, 214, 735 P.2d 820, 824 (1987). The ALJ considers these factors together to determine "when the claimant knew or should have known that he sustained a compensable injury." Id. ; see A.R.S. § 23-1061(A). This rule allows compensation for an injury that manifests and becomes compensable sometime after the triggering event. See Henry v. Indus. Comm'n , 157 Ariz. 67, 70, 754 P.2d 1342, 1345 (1988) (holding that a claim filed by a police officer 24 years after a traumatic incident was timely when "the condition [of PTSD] was not diagnosable at the time [the claimant] first sought treatment"). ¶13 The party opposing the claim based on timeliness of filing under A.R.S. § 23-1061(A) must raise the issue as an affirmative defense. Allen v. Indus. Comm'n , 152 Ariz. 405, 412, 733 P.2d 290, 297 (1987) ("The one-year filing requirement is in the nature of an affirmative defense and will be deemed waived unless timely asserted."); see Ariz. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1)(P). That party then bears the burden of production of evidence to support the affirmative defense. Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Thruston , 218 Ariz. 112, 119, ¶ 26, 180 P.3d 977, 984 (App. 2008) ; see Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Indus. Comm'n , 125 Ariz. 1, 4, 606 P.2d 819, 822 (App. 1979) ("While the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to Industrial Commission proceedings, the rationale [therein].... [is] equally applicable to both proceedings...."). In this instance, the City and the Carrier were responsible for producing sufficient evidence to support a determination of when the injury manifest to the degree that it became a compensable injury, which would trigger the running of the one-year statute of limitations. ¶14 As the trier of fact, the ALJ reviews the evidence presented to determine when a compensable injury manifests and the statute of limitations begins to run. Pac. Fruit Express , 153 Ariz. at 214, 735 P.2d at 824. On appeal, this court limits its review to whether the record supports the ALJ's finding. Id. We will affirm so long as reasonable evidence supports the award, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the ALJ's decision. Delgado v. Indus. Comm'n , 183 Ariz. 129, 131, 901 P.2d 1159, 1161 (App. 1994). Here, the ALJ found that Pitts' claim was untimely based solely on testimony from Pitts and his fiancée. The ALJ's conclusion, in relevant part, read as follows: Here ... the applicant knew, in the year following the shooting incident that he was missing more time from work than previously, for reasons related to the shooting. He had constant difficulty sleeping, nightmares, emotional instability and social withdrawal throughout the first year following the incident. Those symptoms only increased over the next eighteen months, which finally led the applicant to see his primary care doctor in December 2015 to get sleep medication. While he may not have known what was happening to him ... he did not seek medical or psychological help with his symptoms between June, 2013, and December, 2015, though there is no evidence that he was prevented from doing so.... Based on all the foregoing, it is found that the applicant's claim was untimely filed.... ¶15 In contrast to many physical injuries where a diagnosis is immediate and obvious, the emergence of a mental health injury is difficult to pinpoint. See City of Glendale v. Indus. Comm'n , 1 CA-IC 17-0049, 2018 WL 2676431, at *3, ¶ 17 (Ariz. App. June 5, 2018) (mem. decision) ("[A testifying doctor] stated that she reached a 'tentative' diagnosis of PTSD at her first appointment with the claimant ... [but likely did not immediately] share[ ] her diagnosis with the claimant ... because she needed to gather and verify his symptoms."). The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ("DSM-5 "), included in the hearing file and cited in Pitts' psychological reports, sets forth a complex diagnosis scheme for PTSD, noting that "[t]he essential feature of [PTSD] is the development of characteristic symptoms following exposure to one or more traumatic events." Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 274 (5th ed. 2013). ¶16 Characteristic symptoms of PTSD after exposure to a traumatic event are defined in the DSM-5 and include the presence of the following: "intrusion symptoms" such as recurrent distressing dreams or memories or prolonged psychological distress after exposure to stimuli related to the traumatic event; persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the event, such as internal or external reminders; negative alterations in cognition and mood, such as memory loss of the event, lowered self-esteem, or detachment from others; marked alterations in personality; clinically significant impairment in important areas of functioning; and that any of these characteristic disturbances exceed one month and are not attributable to any other cause. Id. at 271-72. ¶17 While PTSD is a specific diagnosis with characteristic symptoms, the DSM-5 instructs that the presentation of symptoms varies widely: In some individuals, fear-based re-experiencing, emotional, and behavioral symptoms may predominate. In others, anhedonic or dysphoric mood states and negative conditions may be most distressing. In some other individuals, arousal and reactive-externalizing symptoms are prominent, while in others, dissociative symptoms predominate. Finally, some individuals exhibit combinations of these symptom patterns. Id. at 274. ¶18 To complicate the issue further, the concept of "delayed expression" recognizes that while some symptoms immediately appear, there may be a delay-spanning months or even years-in meeting full criteria for a PTSD diagnosis. Id. at 276; Howe v. Indus. Comm'n , 1 CA-IC 17-0002, 2018 WL 1004292, at *3, ¶ 15 (Ariz. App. Feb. 22, 2018) (mem. decision) ("DSM-5 includes a diagnosis for delayed PTSD in which symptoms do not manifest for at least six months after the traumatic event."). See Underwood v. Zurich Ins. Co. , 854 S.W.2d 94, 96, 99 (Tenn. 1993) (discussing a workers' compensation suit where a psychiatrist reported that the claimant's PTSD symptoms were "subtle in onset"). With these considerations in mind, fact-intensive medical determinations are especially important when ruling on the timeliness of a workers' compensation claim involving PTSD. See Brunell v. Wildwood Crest Police Dep't , 176 N.J. 225, 822 A.2d 576, 599-600 (2003). ¶19 In this case, the record shows that Pitts experienced a traumatic incident. He then developed symptoms that increased in nature and severity over a period of years. Pitts was not diagnosed with PTSD, however, until January 2016, and the Carrier did not present evidence to show that his symptoms had become acute enough to allow a diagnosis of PTSD before that time. ¶20 Despite the complex nature of a PTSD diagnosis, neither the City nor the Carrier offered the necessary evidence to allow the ALJ to resolve when the injury became compensable or when Pitts knew or should have known that his injury had become acute enough to constitute a compensable claim. While the ALJ found that Pitts understood he missed work "for reasons related to the shooting" immediately following the incident, no evidence of record supports a finding that he knew or should have known of his condition at the time of the shooting or at any specific time thereafter when he began to avoid work. Pitts concedes he did not seek medical or psychological help with his symptoms in the years immediately following the shooting. However, neither the City nor the Carrier-who bear the burden of production in their affirmative defense-presented evidence to identify at what point in time Pitts' condition required him to do so. Cf. Pac. Fruit Express , 153 Ariz. at 212-13, 735 P.2d at 822-23 (affirming a finding of timeliness when the ALJ identified the precise medical test after which the claimant knew or should have known his hearing loss was a compensable injury). ¶21 Furthermore, the record does not indicate a point (other than the date Pitts was diagnosed as having PTSD) at which Pitts' symptoms had progressed to the point that a diagnosis would have been possible. Due to the complex nature of a PTSD diagnosis, expert testimony is generally required to assess when such a diagnosis could have been made. See Tronsen v. Indus. Comm'n , 18 Ariz. App. 149, 150, 500 P.2d 1137, 1138 (1972) (noting that when the answer to a question of fact is within the purview of medical experts, an ALJ must generally rely on testimony from such experts); Cash v. Indus. Comm'n , 27 Ariz. App. 526, 532, 556 P.2d 827, 833 (1976). Here, the sole witnesses at the administrative hearing were Pitts and his fiancée. No expert testimony was presented to support the conclusion that Pitts could have been diagnosed earlier than January 2016 or whether someone with PTSD would be more or less likely to understand the severity of the symptoms and seek treatment for the condition. ¶22 The City and the Carrier failed to meet their burden of proving the claim untimely. They submitted no competent evidence to allow the ALJ to ascertain when Pitts' claim became compensable and when he knew or should have known it had become compensable, as required to identify the date on which the clock on the one-year limitation began to run. On this record, the ALJ's finding of untimeliness was not supported by the record and Pitts was entitled to a hearing on the merits. CONCLUSION ¶23 For the foregoing reasons, we set aside the ALJ's award.

Progressive Logistics Services, LLP, St. Louis, MO, Appellee JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, Dallas, TX, Appellee Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, Denver, CO, Appellee Wal-Mart Associates, Inc., Denver, CO, Appellee Manuel Gallarzo, Phoenix, Appellant Phyllis Chase, Phoenix, Appellant Pedro Martinez, Phoenix, Appellant Kimberlee Sullins, Show Low, Appellant Gabriela Ramos, Lynwood, CA, Appellant Nicole Grow, Phoenix, Appellant Judge Peter B. Swann delivered the opinion of the court, in which Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop joined. SWANN, Judge: ¶ 1 This consolidated matter arises from the Arizona Department of Economic Security's sustained failure, over a period of years, to perform its obligation under A.R.S. § 41-1993(B) to transmit to this court applications for appeal in disputes regarding claimants' entitlement to government benefits. The Department's unexcused breach of its statutory duty resulted in the delayed resolution of hundreds of applications, including applications concerning substantial benefit overpayments and interest thereon. The parties whose applications were delayed were unjustifiably denied the procedural due process right to timely adjudication of their disputes. In the exercise of our inherent authority, we order that the Department must waive all non-fraud overpayment interest caused by its delay in the consolidated cases. Further, as set forth below, we issue several orders designed to prevent future delays, ensure a complete remedy, and protect the rights of applicants whose colorable claims were delayed. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 2 The Department administers various benefit programs under state and federal law, including state unemployment and federal nutritional assistance programs. See A.R.S. §§ 41-1953(E), -1954(A). Disputes arising from claims for benefits under those programs are resolved in multi-stage administrative proceedings, after which an aggrieved party may seek this court's review by filing an application for appeal with the Department. See A.R.S. §§ 41-1991 to -1993. A.R.S. § 41-1993(B) requires the Department to notify this court of the pendency of an application for appeal by transmitting the application and the record. See also A.R.S. § 23-674(A) (obligating Department to transcribe hearing upon party's application for appeal). ¶ 3 Beginning in 2013 the Department failed, for approximately three years and in hundreds of cases, to fulfill its statutory obligation to transmit applications for appeal. In re Arizona Department of Economic Security's Compliance with Administrative Order 2017-01 , 2017 WL 4784584 ¶ 13 (App. 2017). According to the Department, the problem was the result of misconduct by the employee whose job it was to prepare case files and transmit them to this court. Rather than send the files to the court, the employee, who no longer works for the Department, hid them in her workspace at the Department, employing various devices to conceal her malfeasance. ¶ 4 The Department reportedly did not discover and therefore did not begin to remedy the consequences of the employee's misconduct until late 2016, and its initial efforts did not resolve the issue. Accordingly, in February 2017, this court issued an administrative order, A.O. 2017-01, that required the Department to transmit all outstanding applications for appeal within 20 days. The Department's failure to comply with that order led to our decision in In re Arizona Department of Economic Security's Compliance with Administrative Order 2017-01 , wherein we held the Department in contempt and entered orders designed to prevent future delayed transmissions. 1 CA-UB 17-0128, 2017 WL 4784584, at *1, 10-11, ¶¶ 1, 51-53 (Ariz. App. Oct. 24, 2017) (mem. decision). Under those orders, which we repeated in A.O. 2017-03, the Department must transmit all applications for appeal within 30 days, transmit all associated transcripts within 40 days, and file monthly audit and inventory reports. Id. at *10-11, ¶¶ 51-54. Non-compliance carries the risk of additional consequences, including monetary sanctions. Id. at *11, ¶ 53. ¶ 5 All delayed applications-totaling approximately 350-were provided to this court by mid-April 2017. By that time, roughly 200 of the appeal applications had been delayed for at least one year. And of that 200, approximately one-third had been delayed for between two and three years, and one-third for between three and four years. ¶ 6 Delays in resolution of benefit claims can have significant consequences for the applicants. A claimant whose application for benefits is wrongfully denied is deprived of a legal entitlement while the appeal is pending. And in some cases, a claimant is initially granted benefits, for a period of time, but the claim is eventually ruled invalid in the course of administrative review. When that happens, the claimant is required to repay the resulting overpayments, which, depending on the length of the process, may amount to thousands of dollars. Of the 200 appeals applications delayed for two years or more, more than half implicate benefit overpayments, with a quarter of that subset delayed between two and three years and a quarter between three and four years. All delayed overpayment applications (without regard to length of delay) placed roughly $450,000 in principal and more than $62,000 in interest at issue, with only a small fraction of the applications involving suspected or actual fraud by the claimant. ¶ 7 We examine here, in six consolidated cases-all of which involve unemployment benefits and some of which implicate overpayments (none of which were procured by fraud)-whether the Department's failure to timely transmit applications violated the applicants' right to procedural due process. We appointed pro bono counsel to assist our inquiry. DISCUSSION ¶ 8 "Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of 'liberty' or 'property' interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment." Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 332, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). ¶ 9 We must first decide whether those who apply for an appeal under A.R.S. § 41-1993(B) have an interest that implicates due process. We have no difficulty concluding that they do. All applicants, regardless of the merits of their claims, have a property interest in their right to use the statutorily established adjudicatory procedures. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. , 455 U.S. 422, 428-31, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982) (holding that party's right to use adjudicatory procedures of state employment practices act was a property interest for purposes of due-process analysis). Additionally, all applicants, however situated, have an often-acute financial interest in a benefit-eligibility determination. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth , 408 U.S. 564, 576, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) (holding that person receiving social-welfare benefits under a statutory scheme has a property interest in continued receipt of the benefits); Kapps v. Wing , 404 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that, though "the Supreme Court has repeatedly reserved decision on the question of whether applicants for benefits (in contradistinction to current recipients of benefits) possess a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause[, e]very circuit to address the question ... has concluded that applicants for benefits, no less than current benefits recipients, may possess a property interest in the receipt of public welfare entitlements"). ¶ 10 We must next decide whether there was a deprivation of due process. The process due in a particular case depends on three factors: "[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Mathews , 424 U.S. at 334-35, 96 S.Ct. 893. ¶ 11 The Department and pro bono counsel do not dispute that the third Mathews factor weighs in favor of finding a due-process violation and the second Mathews factor does not. We agree. The Department's failure to timely transmit the applications served no legitimate government interest, but neither did it create a risk of substantively erroneous judicial resolutions. ¶ 12 With respect to the first Mathews factor, we conclude that it weighs in favor of finding a deprivation of due process. As an initial matter, we acknowledge that we have, by separate orders of even date, denied on the merits all applications in the consolidated cases. Accordingly, the applicants in the consolidated cases have suffered less prejudice than applicants whose meritorious applications were delayed. See Goldberg v. Kelly , 397 U.S. 254, 264, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) ("[T]ermination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits. Since he lacks independent resources, his situation becomes immediately desperate."). We also acknowledge that though each of the consolidated cases were significantly delayed, the delay lengths were not identical, and "the possible length of wrongful deprivation of benefits" is "an important factor in assessing the impact of official action on the private interests." Mathews , 424 U.S. at 341, 96 S.Ct. 893 (citing Fusari v. Steinberg , 419 U.S. 379, 389, 95 S.Ct. 533, 42 L.Ed.2d 521 (1975) ). ¶ 13 But each of the cases shares a common and compelling factor that tips the balance in favor of finding a deprivation of due process: the complete lack of justification for the Department employee's bad-faith conduct and the Department's failure to timely discover the malfeasance and ensure efficient adjudication of claims involving a vulnerable population. See Kraebel v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Hous. Pres. & Dev. , 959 F.2d 395, 405 (2d Cir. 1992) (observing that "no bright-line rule exists for determining when a delay is so burdensome as to become unconstitutional," and examining "whether these delays were egregious and without any rational justification"); see also Littlefield v. Heckler , 824 F.2d 242, 247 (3d Cir. 1987) (in finding no violation of due process based on nine-month delay, noting "there is no allegation of bad faith, a dilatory attitude, or a lack of evenhandedness"). ¶ 14 Weighing the totality of the circumstances, we hold that the delayed transmission of the applications for appeal uniformly deprived the applicants of procedural due process they were entitled to receive. ¶ 15 We must exercise our inherent authority to vindicate the constitutional deprivation. See Arpaio v. Baca , 217 Ariz. 570, 576, 579, ¶¶ 19, 28, 177 P.3d 312, 318, 321 (App. 2008) (holding that presiding criminal judge had inherent authority to schedule consolidated hearing to resolve urgent common ancillary issue of defendants' deprivation of constitutional right to communicate with counsel, and that courts are not only inherently authorized but obligated to provide relief for such deprivations). In so doing, we are mindful of the limitations on our authority. See id. at 577-78, ¶ 23, 177 P.3d at 319-20 (holding that inherent authority extended to consolidated cases only, and not to cases involving similarly affected parties not made part of the consolidating proceeding); Acker v. CSO Chevira , 188 Ariz. 252, 254-55, 934 P.2d 816, 818-19 (App. 1997) (defining inherent authority as "such powers as are necessary to the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction," and holding that exercise of the unwritten powers must be justified with particularity (citation omitted) ). CONCLUSION ¶ 16 We order that in those of the consolidated cases involving overpayments-UB 17-0004, UB 17-0012, and UB 17-0013-the Department must exercise its discretion under A.R.S. § 23-787(G) to waive all overpayment interest attributable to Department delay. We note with approval that this is a measure that the Department avers it has already taken in all delayed cases with overpayments not involving fraud, and will take in all future such delayed cases. ¶ 17 We further adopt the preventative orders set forth in In re Arizona Department of Economic Security , 2017 WL 4784584, at *10-11, ¶¶ 51-53, and A.O. 2017-03. We also order that the Department must, within 30 days of the date of this opinion, file with this court: (1) an updated report regarding the status of all investigations, whether internal or external, into the malfeasance and negligence that precipitated this opinion; and (2) updated copies of all training plans it has implemented to remediate those circumstances and prevent their recurrence, including copies of all training plans provided to customer service representatives. We further order that the Department has a continuing obligation to notify this court of any changes in the training plans or investigations (or of the institution of any new investigation). We also order that the Department must immediately cease any practice of purging record items relevant to applications for appeal, until such time as the Department may establish that its storage policies create no risk of prejudice to applicants. ¶ 18 Finally, we recognize that additional remedial measures-such as the waiver of overpayment principal under A.R.S. § 23-787(C) -may be appropriate in delayed cases when (unlike in these consolidated cases) the claimants prevail on appeal. To ensure that such claimants' rights are fully remediated, and to aid the court, we order that pro bono counsel shall be appointed in all pending and future cases in which we accept a Department-delayed application for appeal. This order applies to all pending cases in which we have accepted the application as of the date of this opinion, except that it does not apply to resolved cases and it does not apply if the court determines that the benefit of the appointment is outweighed by the delay that the appointment would cause in the resolution of a particular case. ¶ 19 The court today issues an administrative order that sets forth the obligations imposed in paragraphs 16 to 18 above. The Department has never satisfactorily explained how ordinary supervisory audit and reporting controls failed to more timely reveal the employee's stunning dereliction. According to the Department, it has and will exercise its discretion under A.R.S. § 23-787(G) to waive 25% of the interest accrued because of Department-caused delay in cases involving fraud.

CATTANI, Judge: ¶1 E.H. seeks special action review of the Coconino County Superior Court's ruling denying her request to be treated as a victim in criminal proceedings involving Jason Conlee, who is accused of killing E.H.'s six-year-old sibling, J.H. Under Arizona's Victims' Bill of Rights, if a criminal offense is committed against someone who is killed or incapacitated, victims' rights are to be accorded to "the person's spouse, parent, child, grandparent or sibling, any other person related to the person by consanguinity or affinity to the second degree or any other lawful representative of the person." Ariz. Rev. Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 13-4401(19) ; see also Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1 (C). The superior court declined to treat E.H. as a victim, reasoning that § 13-4401(19) contemplates that only one person may be designated as a representative of the deceased, and in this case, such a representative (a victim advocate from Coconino County Victim Witness Services) had already been appointed. We hold to the contrary that, when the person against whom the crime was committed is deceased or incapacitated, § 13-4401 grants victim status to each person who fits within any of the defined categories of victims under the statute. Accordingly, and for reasons that follow, we accept jurisdiction and grant relief. DISCUSSION ¶2 Under Arizona's Victims' Bill of Rights, crime victims have a right "[t]o be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity, and to be free from intimidation, harassment, or abuse, throughout the criminal justice process." Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1 (A)(1). Other rights include the right "[t]o be heard at any proceeding involving a post-arrest release decision, a negotiated plea, and sentencing" and the right "[t]o confer with the prosecution, after the crime against the victim has been charged, before trial or before any disposition of the case and to be informed of the disposition." See id. § 2.1 (A)(4), (6). ¶3 For these purposes, the Arizona Constitution defines "victim" as "a person against whom the criminal offense has been committed or, if the person is killed or incapacitated, the person's spouse, parent, child or other lawful representative, except if the person is in custody for an offense or is the accused." Id. § 2.1 (C). The Legislature has broadened the class of victims by statute to also include the deceased or incapacitated person's "grandparent or sibling, any other person related to the person by consanguinity or affinity to the second degree or any other lawful representative of the person." A.R.S. § 13-4401(19). ¶4 Focusing on the use of the word "or" in the constitutional and statutory provisions, the superior court interpreted those provisions as creating an exclusive disjunctive, meaning a choice of one among several options. But "or" can also be an inclusive disjunctive, meaning one or the other or both. And in the context of the Victims' Bill of Rights and as explained below, the most logical construction is that "or" is used inclusively, and that victim status in cases in which there is a deceased or incapacitated victim should be accorded to anyone who is either a spouse, or a parent, or a child, or a grandparent, etc. of the deceased person. ¶5 Interpreting "or" as an inclusive disjunctive is necessary to give meaning to the constitutional mandate that victims be treated with respect, and it avoids a process that would require the superior court to select the most "appropriate" victim from among the categories of individuals listed in the statute. If, for example, the two surviving parents of a deceased victim were to differ in their view of whether a plea should be extended, or whether a certain sentence should be imposed, see Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1 (A)(4), (6), the superior court would have no principled basis from which to choose just one parent to provide input to the prosecutor and to the court. Neither the constitutional nor the statutory provision prioritizes one family member (within the designated relationships) over another, and it would be demeaning to all such relations to pit them against each other in competition to be the person who best represents the interests of the deceased. ¶6 Our interpretation of the statutory language is further supported by the fact that the Legislature added to the categories of potential victims under § 13-4401(19) without any suggestion that the additions are only relevant if no one else fits within the previously defined categories of victims. Moreover, the prior version of the statute included several categories of victims-parents, spouses, and children-while specifically excluding anyone in custody for an offense or who is the accused. The Legislature added grandparents, siblings, and other relatives to the list of designated victims without specifying or implying that anyone other than a person in custody or who is the accused may not be entitled to victim status. Thus, the statutory change is more logically read as creating additional categories of victims, all of whom are entitled to the rights guaranteed under the Victims' Bill of Rights. ¶7 The Coconino County Attorney notes that the Victims' Bill of Rights contemplates that only one person-the person against whom the crime was committed-can exercise victims' rights if the crime victim is living, even though other individuals (including the crime victim's parents and siblings) may have suffered serious harm as a result of the crime. See Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1 (C); A.R.S. § 13-4401(19). The County Attorney thus argues that, in the case of a deceased or incapacitated victim, the list of relations-spouse, parent, child, grandparent, sibling, etc.-should be read as creating a class of potential representatives of the deceased victim, i.e., a class of persons from which one member is to be selected to take the place of or speak for the victim. ¶8 Although there may be some benefit to having a single voice represent the interests of the deceased victim, the language of the statute contemplates the possible appointment of a "lawful representative" (distinct from the deceased victim's relations) to act in the victim's best interests with no suggestion that the appointment of such a representative removes victim status from other designated victims. See A.R.S. §§ 13-4401(19), -4403(B). Moreover, as noted above, it would be illogical to compel a procedure that would require the superior court to arbitrarily select the most "appropriate" survivor to represent the interests of the deceased victim. ¶9 Finally, recognizing multiple victims under the statute (both parents in the example noted above, or even a broader group of relations as designated in the statute) is not unworkable. The State and the court can hear and consider multiple-even conflicting-views from multiple family members of a deceased victim without unduly burdening the criminal justice system. And, contrary to Real Party in Interest Jason Conlee's assertion, a request to be accorded victim status is not an improper attempt to "control the direction of the prosecution." A victim's rights under the Arizona Constitution and the implementing legislation do not include the right to "control" the prosecution, but rather the right to be treated fairly and with respect, and an opportunity to express views that the prosecution and the court must consider but that are not binding on the prosecutor or the court. See State v. Lamberton , 183 Ariz. 47, 49, 899 P.2d 939 (1995) ; Lindsay R. v. Cohen , 236 Ariz. 565, 567, ¶ 8, 343 P.3d 435 (App. 2015) ; see also, e.g. , A.R.S. §§ 13-4419(C), -4423, -4426. CONCLUSION ¶10 Based on the foregoing, we accept jurisdiction and grant relief, holding that in cases in which there is a deceased or incapacitated victim, anyone who fits within the enumerated categories of familial relations specified in A.R.S. § 13-4401(19) is a victim and thus entitled to the rights guaranteed under Arizona's Victims' Bill of Rights. Accordingly, E.H. must be permitted to exercise such rights in any prospective proceedings involving the crime committed against J.H. ¶11 We note that the superior court has already entered Jason Conlee's plea in this matter. The superior court must determine (absent an agreement among the parties) whether E.H. was on notice of prior proceedings and timely asserted her rights as a victim, entitling her to a reexamination of prior proceedings, see A.R.S. § 13-4436, and/or whether such reexamination would implicate principles of double jeopardy. The Victims' Bill of Rights vests the Legislature with the power to "enact substantive and procedural laws to define, implement, preserve and protect the rights guaranteed to victims." Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1 (D).

CAMPBELL, Judge: ¶ 1 Attorneys Leonard Karp and Annette Everlove ("Petitioners") appeal from the superior court's ruling awarding them fees in quantum meruit. They argue the court erred by failing to order the Estate of their late client Susan Chalker-with her son David Chalker acting as Personal Representative ("Respondent")-to pay statutorily-mandated interest on that award. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand. BACKGROUND I. The Initial 1994 Divorce Proceeding and the Subsequent State and Federal Litigation ¶ 2 Petitioners represented Susan Chalker in her divorce proceeding from Robert Catz, filed in November 1994. At the time the divorce was filed, Robert Catz held investment accounts at various financial institutions, but the following month, he re-titled three accounts with Fidelity Investments (the "Fidelity Accounts") in the names of his two sons, Shawn and Jason Catz. ¶ 3 The superior court entered a default decree of dissolution of marriage in March 1995. The decree awarded Chalker all right, title, and interest in the Fidelity Accounts. Subsequently, Robert, Shawn, and Jason Catz proceeded to file three separate lawsuits in the federal courts in Ohio and Tennessee against Petitioners, Chalker, Fidelity, and others attacking the validity of the Arizona decree. That litigation, and multiple iterations thereof, would oscillate through federal and state courts for almost two decades. Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the Catzes' claims against Petitioners in 2009 and against Chalker and Fidelity in 2013. On November 14, 2013, the Arizona district court dismissed the last vestiges of these cases with prejudice. II. Petitioners' Agreements with Chalker Throughout the Litigation ¶ 4 Petitioners began jointly representing Chalker in the divorce action in 1994. Petitioners contend that, by mid-1999, Chalker owed them approximately $273,000 in fees and costs. In February 1999, at Chalker's suggestion, the parties entered into a new fee agreement calling for 50 percent of the Fidelity Accounts to be paid to Petitioners once the Accounts were recovered. ¶ 5 Petitioner Karp and Chalker signed the new fee arrangement ("Retainer/Fee Agreement"), which provided in part: 4. Client agrees to pay to [Petitioners] FIFTY PERCENT (50%) of all sums and/or assets recovered by, or upon [Chalker]'s behalf, arising out of the determination of ownership interest in and to the following accounts: Fidelity Latin American Fund, Fidelity Southeast Asia Fund, Fidelity U.S. Government Reserves; and/or any other accounts held by Fidelity Trust and/or any of its related entities. ... 10. Client further acknowledges and agrees that in the event no recovery is obtained in this matter, the Attorneys fees incurred on behalf of Client in all matters other than that referenced in ¶ 4 above shall remain due and owing in full. III. Chalker's Death and Petitioners' Claim on her Estate ¶ 6 Susan Chalker died in July 2005. In August 2005, an informal probate was opened in an Arizona superior court. A notice to creditors was mailed to Petitioners on August 4, 2005, stating: "All persons having claims against the estate are required to present their claims within four months after the date of the first publication of this Notice or the claims will be forever barred." ¶ 7 Petitioners timely filed their claim against the Estate ("Claim"), asserting the Estate was indebted to them in "an amount equal to 50% of all sums and/or assets recovered by the Estate of Susan Ruth Chalker, or upon the Estate's behalf arising out of the determination of ownership interest in and to any of the Fidelity accounts," "an amount equal to 50% of any attorney's fees awarded to and recovered by the Estate" in the related actions, costs of $46,406.94, and any additional costs they had incurred on Chalker's behalf since May 1999, as yet undetermined. ¶ 8 David Sobel, the attorney for the Estate, informed Petitioners that the Estate was prepared to file an objection to their Claim, but instead proposed entering an agreement tolling the time for filing their objection pending the outcome of Robert Catz's federal litigation. The Petitioners signed, and the superior court approved, a Tolling Agreement in January 2006, stating, in pertinent part: 3. The time for original presentation of claims expires on December 4, 2005. 4. The personal representative has sixty (60) days from December 4, 2005 to file a notice of allowance or disallowance of claims. 5. The parties agree to extend the personal representative's deadline to file a notice of allowance or disallowance of the Everlove and Karp claim until the following case has been resolved in the United States Federal District Court for the District of Arizona, Case No. CV-03-91-TUC-FRZ. ¶ 9 After the Arizona district court finally dismissed the Catzes' case on November 14, 2013, the Estate filed its notice of disallowance of Petitioners' Claim on November 27, 2013. Petitioners filed their petition for allowance of their Claim on January 15, 2014. ¶ 10 In March 2014, the Estate filed a petition to finally recover the Fidelity Accounts. In July 2014, the superior court issued an order determining that the Fidelity Accounts "are the sole and separate property of The Chalker Estate and that Shawn Catz and Jason Catz have no ownership interest in the Fidelity Accounts." In August 2014, the Fidelity Accounts were transferred to the Estate and liquidated, yielding a total value of over $1.2 million. ¶ 11 The superior court held a bench trial in January 2016. The court determined that Petitioners were not entitled to 50 percent of the Fidelity Accounts under the terms of the 1999 fee agreement. Rather, the court held the Petitioners were each entitled to an award in quantum meruit for services rendered, but that they were not entitled to receive interest on those awards. The superior court ultimately awarded $94,463.00 in attorney fees to Karp, $101,608.00 in attorney fees to Everlove, and $42,438.59 in total costs. DISCUSSION ¶ 12 Petitioners argue the superior court erred by failing to add interest to their award in quantum meruit, claiming the probate code mandates interest on all allowed creditor claims. We review the trial court's conclusions of law de novo, Sholes v. Fernando , 228 Ariz. 455, 458, ¶ 6, 268 P.3d 1112 (App. 2011), while reviewing its factual findings for clear error, State v. Herrera , 183 Ariz. 642, 648, 905 P.2d 1377 (App. 1995). Whether a party is entitled to an award of prejudgment interest, as well as questions of statutory interpretation, are questions of law that we review de novo. Alta Vista Plaza, Ltd. v. Insulation Specialists Co., Inc. , 186 Ariz. 81, 82, 919 P.2d 176 (App. 1995) ; Hobson v. Mid-Century Ins. Co. , 199 Ariz. 525, 528, ¶ 6, 19 P.3d 1241 (App. 2001). In interpreting a statute, our goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent, and we first consider the statute's language as the most reliable index of its meaning. Indus. Comm'n v. Old Republic Ins. Co. , 223 Ariz. 75, 77, ¶ 6, 219 P.3d 285 (App. 2009) (citations omitted). ¶ 13 Pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 14-3803(A), all claims against a decedent's estate that arose before the decedent's death must be presented within the given statutory timeframe, "whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort or other legal basis." If the personal representative timely disallows any such claim, the claim is barred "unless the claimant files a petition for allowance in the court or commences a proceeding against the personal representative not later than sixty days after the mailing of the notice of disallowance." A.R.S. § 14-3806(A). Once a claimant has timely filed a petition for allowance, the probate court may then allow the claim in whole or in part. A.R.S. § 14-3806(C). Generally, "allowed claims bear interest at the legal rate for the period commencing sixty days after the time for original presentation of the claim has expired ," unless the claim is based on a contract that makes a provision for interest. A.R.S. § 14-3806(E) (emphasis added). ¶ 14 Section 14-3810(A) further provides that, "[i]f a ... contingent or unliquidated claim becomes due or certain before the distribution of the estate, and if the claim has been allowed or established by a proceeding , it is paid in the same manner as presently due and absolute claims of the same class." (emphasis added). ¶ 15 Petitioners argue that, according to the above statutory framework, they timely presented their unliquidated Claim for attorney fees; Respondent disallowed that Claim; and Petitioners timely commenced a proceeding to allow their Claim in probate court. Because the court ultimately awarded Petitioners fees in quantum meruit-i.e., establishing their Claim for attorney fees through that proceeding-they argue their Claim must be "paid in the same manner as presently due and absolute claims of the same class," A.R.S. § 14-3810(A), by "bear[ing] interest at the legal rate" beginning sixty days after the deadline for the original presentation of claims, A.R.S. § 14-3806(E). We agree. ¶ 16 The language of A.R.S. § 14-3806(E) states plainly that "allowed claims bear interest at the legal rate"; it does not differentiate between liquidated or unliquidated claims or make any other qualification applicable here. Section 14-3810(A) further highlights the lack of differentiation between liquidated and unliquidated claims, stating that even unliquidated claims that become due or certain before the distribution of the estate and have been allowed or established by the court are to be paid "in the same manner" as presently due and absolute claims. See State v. Hansen , 215 Ariz. 287, 289, ¶ 7, 160 P.3d 166 (2007) (Wherever possible, rules and statutes should be harmonized and read in conjunction with one another.). ¶ 17 In its ruling, the superior court held: "The Petitioners ... claim interest on the [quantum meruit] amounts. The Personal Representative argues that interest is not allowable under the theory of quantum meruit. In support, they cite Schwartz v. Schwerin , 85 Ariz. 242, 336 P.2d 144 (1959). The case supports the Estate's position." The superior court therefore ordered that Petitioners were not entitled to an award of interest on the quantum meruit awards, but did rule that "Petitioners are entitled to interest at the statutory rate on the costs advanced." ¶ 18 In Schwartz -in which an attorney brought an action against his clients to recover attorney fees in quantum meruit-the Arizona Supreme Court held that, if a "claim is unliquidated and is in dispute," interest is only allowed from the date of judgment "upon the theory that the person liable does not know the sum he owes and therefore can be in no default for not paying." 85 Ariz. at 250, 336 P.2d 144 (citing Am. Eagle Fire Ins. Co. v. Van Denburgh , 76 Ariz. 1, 257 P.2d 856 (1953) ). The supreme court, however, also noted that at the time, unlike some states, "we have no statute governing the allowance of interest in such a situation." Schwartz , 85 Ariz. at 249, 336 P.2d 144. Since the supreme court's decision in Schwartz , Arizona has enacted provisions of the Uniform Probate Code rather than following the common-law principle in matters of probate. While we acknowledge that awarding prejudgment interest on unliquidated claims is inconsistent with Arizona's general rule, see Metzler v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. , 235 Ariz. 141, 144, 329 P.3d 1043 (2014) (under common law, "prejudgment interest is generally not awardable on unliquidated claims"), we must apply the given statutory language. ¶ 19 Furthermore, to hold that unliquidated claims in probate never bear interest because they are unliquidated-as the superior court effectively did here by applying Schwartz rather than the express mandate of the probate code-would essentially mean that all unliquidated claims which have been timely presented to a decedent's estate would not accrue interest under the statute until the claim is litigated, allowed, and reduced to a sum certain by the probate court. Such a holding would be inconsistent with the purposes of our probate code, which should be construed liberally to "promote a speedy and efficient system for liquidating the estate of the decedent and making distribution to his successors." A.R.S. § 14-1102(A), (B)(3). ¶ 20 Here, the Estate notified Petitioners of the opening for the presentation of claims on August 4, 2005, and stated in the notice that the date of expiration for the presentation of claims was December 4, 2005-a date the parties agreed on, as evidenced by their Tolling Agreement, supra ¶8. Because interest on all allowed claims begins to accrue sixty (60) days after the time for the original presentation of the claim expires, A.R.S. § 14-3806(E), Petitioners' claim for attorney fees began bearing interest as of February 2, 2006. We therefore reverse the decision of the superior court on this issue and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. CONCLUSION ¶ 21 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand the decision of the superior court on the limited issue of interest on Petitioners' awards in quantum meruit. Both parties request an award of attorney fees on appeal and cross-appeal under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 ; as the prevailing party, we award Petitioners their costs on appeal and cross-appeal upon compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21, but, in our discretion, decline to award either party attorney fees. In a separate memorandum decision, Karp, et al. v. Chalker, et al. , 1 CA-CV 17-0109 (Ariz. App. September 20, 2018), filed simultaneously with this opinion, see Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(h), we provide additional factual and procedural background as well as reject both Petitioners' remaining arguments and the arguments presented in Respondent's cross-appeal. See Catz v. Chalker , No. 06-17183 (9th Cir. May 13, 2009) (mem. decision). See Catz v. Chalker , No. 11-16285 (9th Cir. Mar. 20, 2013) (mem. decision). Absent material revision since the events in question, we cite to the current version of a statute. Because we agree with Petitioners that the probate code mandates an award of interest on their quantum meruit claim, we need not address their alternative argument that the superior court erred by not granting an equitable award of interest.

JUSTICE PELANDER, opinion of the Court: ¶ 1 Under Arizona's third-party-visitation statute, the superior court may grant visitation rights to a person other than a child's legal parent upon a finding that "visitation is in the child's best interests." A.R.S. § 25-409(C). In making that discretionary determination, the court "shall give special weight to the legal parents' opinion of what serves their child's best interests." § 25-409(E). We hold that when two legal parents disagree about whether visitation is in their child's best interests, both parents' opinions are entitled to special weight under § 25-409(E). We further hold that under those circumstances, neither parent is entitled to a presumption in his or her favor and the parents' conflicting opinions must give way to the court's finding on whether visitation is in the child's best interests. I. ¶ 2 We view the record in the light most favorable to supporting the family court's visitation order. See Johnson v. Johnson , 131 Ariz. 38, 44, 638 P.2d 705, 711 (1981). Lisa Friedman ("Mother") and David Roels, Jr. ("Father") married in 2001, had two children together (M., born in 2003, and R., born in 2005), informally separated in 2010, and divorced in 2011. Under the dissolution decree, Mother obtained sole custody of, and legal decision-making for, the children, but Father was entitled to supervised parenting time for two four-hour periods every week. The supervision requirement was partly based on Father's hospitalization for psychiatric issues and his abusive behavior toward the children, which included kicking M. at least once. After Mother and Father separated, the children began seeing various therapists for post-traumatic stress disorder and other anxiety-related issues. Father attended some of the children's therapy sessions. ¶ 3 Before Mother and Father's divorce, Father's parents, David Roels, Sr. and Claudia Roels ("Grandparents"), were involved in the children's lives, attended their sports practices and other special events, and provided child care. After Mother and Father separated, however, Grandparents had almost no contact with the children for nearly four years, largely because Mother obstructed Grandparents' attempted interaction by, for example, withholding gifts and cards they sent the children, refusing to accept Grandparents' certified mail, and not responding to their emails. ¶ 4 In April 2014, Grandparents sought to re-establish their relationship with the children by filing a petition for visitation pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-409(C). In December, the family court entered a temporary order allowing Grandparents to participate in Father's supervised visits for one hour per month. Pursuant to that order, Grandparents saw the children monthly for eight one-hour sessions between January and August 2015. Supervisory staff who documented those visits described Grandparents as being "well received" by the children and their interaction as warm and affectionate, and noted Grandparents' remarkable preparation for their visits. The children were more engaged in the visits when Grandparents were present, which also seemed to improve the children's interactions with Father. ¶ 5 The trial on Grandparents' visitation petition occurred over two days in August 2015. On the morning of the trial's first day, Mother and Father stipulated to a parenting plan (the "Parenting Plan") that gave each parent joint legal decision-making authority, with Mother having "final legal decision making" authority if they disagreed. When Mother and Father presented the Parenting Plan to the family court for approval, Father stated, without objection by Mother, that the Parenting Plan did not contain "an agreement on ... whether or not his parents can be present at his parenting time." ¶ 6 At trial, Mother, Father, and Grandparents testified and presented testimony from other witnesses. Two therapists whom Mother called-Beth Winters and Karen Morse-testified that visitation with Grandparents exacerbated the children's PTSD and anxiety. Both therapists acknowledged, however, that their opinions were partly based on "selected" visitation reports Mother provided, and they had difficulty explaining why visitation would harm the children. Mother also testified that she believed visitation would be harmful to her children's mental health and would compromise their relationship with Father. But Mother later conceded that the children struggled with anxiety before Grandparents' visitation began. ¶ 7 Father and Grandparents presented testimony from staff who supervised Grandparents' visitation with the children. Those witnesses described the visits as positive and warm. Father testified about having been diagnosed with severe depression and explained his treatment for that condition. Father also expressed his belief that visitation would benefit the children and that "it's important [for them] to have their own relationship" with Grandparents. Grandparents testified about their efforts to resume their relationship with the children, characterized the court's preliminary visitation order as "a miracle," and explained that their primary focus was "just to keep spending time with the children" because they "love them very much." As for any impact visitation would have on the children's relationship with Father, Grandparents explained that they would be willing to "work that out with him" because "his time with [the] children is most important." ¶ 8 The family court granted Grandparents' visitation petition. In its ruling, the court made extensive findings of fact, explained its reasoning in detail, and specified the nature and amount of Grandparents' visitation. After stating that it gave "deference to Mother's position" and "accept[ed] and ... applie[d] the [rebuttable] presumption that Mother has and shall continue to make decisions that are in the children's best interests," the court found that "it is in the children's best interests that grandparents have visitation with the children." The court also found that Mother was "motivated by a desire to exclude the grandparents in part because of her relationship with them" and that Mother's witnesses based their opinions on limited information and did not clearly explain how they arrived at certain conclusions. Finally, the court found that Grandparents had a warm, bonding relationship with the children and were motivated to seek visitation "by a desire to influence the children in a positive way [and to] love, nurture and care for the children." ¶ 9 In a split decision, the court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that Father's opinion on visitation, not only Mother's, was entitled to "special weight" under Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (plurality), and A.R.S. § 25-409(E) because he "was not found to be an unfit parent." In re Marriage of Friedman & Roels , 242 Ariz. 463, 466-67 ¶ 12, 468 ¶ 18, 397 P.3d 1063, 1066-67, 68 (App. 2017). The court concluded that the family court "applied the proper standards in awarding visitation to Grandparents." Id. at 468 ¶ 19, 397 P.3d at 1068. Addressing Mother's and the dissent's assertion that Goodman v. Forsen , 239 Ariz. 110, 366 P.3d 587 (App. 2016), retroactively applied and contravened the family court's ruling, the court of appeals found that case "significantly distinguishable" and declined to "extend its holding to the very different situation presented here." Friedman , 242 Ariz. at 468-69 ¶¶ 20-21, 397 P.3d at 1068-69. Ultimately, the court ruled that the family court did not abuse its discretion in granting "limited visitation" to Grandparents because they "demonstrated that [Mother]'s decision to bar them from visitation was not in the children's best interests." Id. at 469 ¶ 22, 397 P.3d at 1069. ¶ 10 We granted review because this case presents recurring issues of statewide importance-the intersection of parents' constitutional rights regarding their children and Arizona's statutory scheme relating to grandparents' claimed visitation rights. We have jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24. II. ¶ 11 We review the interpretation of statutes and constitutional issues de novo. Brenda D. v. Dep't of Child Safety , 243 Ariz. 437, 442 ¶ 15, 410 P.3d 419, 424 (2018). "If a statute's language is subject to only one reasonable meaning, we apply that meaning." Bell v. Indus. Comm'n of Ariz. , 236 Ariz. 478, 480 ¶ 7, 341 P.3d 1149, 1151 (2015). And when "statutes relate to the same subject," we construe them "together ... as though they constitute[ ] one law" in order to "give effect to all the statutes involved." Pima Cty. ex rel. Tucson v. Maya Const. Co. , 158 Ariz. 151, 155, 761 P.2d 1055, 1059 (1988). ¶ 12 A.R.S. §§ 25-401 through -416 establish the framework Arizona courts use to resolve legal decision-making and parenting time issues relating to children in statutorily defined circumstances. See A.R.S. § 25-402(B). Relevant here is § 25-409, which addresses, among other things, third-party visitation rights. That statute allows "a person other than a legal parent" to "petition the superior court for visitation with a child," and generally authorizes the court to "grant visitation rights during the child's minority on a finding that the visitation is in the child's best interests." § 25-409(C). As amended in 2013, the statute also provides that "[i]n deciding whether to grant visitation to a third party, the court shall give special weight to the legal parents' opinion of what serves their child's best interests" and prescribes a non-exhaustive list of "relevant factors" the court shall consider. § 25-409(E). For § 25-409 purposes, " '[l]egal parent' means a biological or adoptive parent whose parental rights have not been terminated." § 25-401(4). Mother and Father both meet that definition. ¶ 13 Because § 25-409(C) is framed in permissive terms, it generally does not require the court to grant third-party visitation upon a finding that it would be in the child's best interests; subsection (C) merely vests the court with discretionary authority to do so. But that is not the case with certain grandparents. Subsection (F), which Mother does not address, provides that "[i]f logistically possible and appropriate, the court shall order visitation by a grandparent or great-grandparent if the child is residing or spending time with the parent through whom the grandparent or great-grandparent claims a right of access to the child." § 25-409(F) (emphasis added). ¶ 14 Although § 25-409 does not define "special weight," the legislature's use of that phrase is significant because of identical wording in Troxel . 530 U.S. at 69-70, 120 S.Ct. 2054. In that case, the mother, a presumptively "fit custodial parent" of two children whose father had died, sought to limit (but not preclude) the paternal grandparents' visitation with her children. Id. at 60-61, 69, 120 S.Ct. 2054. Addressing a "breathtakingly broad" nonparental-visitation statute and a trial court visitation order that "gave no special weight at all" to the mother's determination of her children's best interests, id. at 67, 69, 120 S.Ct. 2054, a United States Supreme Court plurality held that the statute as applied "violated [the mother's] due process right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of her daughters." Id. at 75, 120 S.Ct. 2054. The Court coined the phrase "special weight" to describe the deference courts must afford a parent's visitation opinion, which prevents state "interference with [parents'] fundamental right to make decisions concerning the rearing" of their children. Id. at 68, 120 S.Ct. 2054. This deference, the Court reasoned, is consistent with "the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of his or her child." Id. at 69, 120 S.Ct. 2054. Troxel , however, did not articulate "the precise scope of the parental due process right in the visitation context." Id. at 73, 120 S.Ct. 2054. ¶ 15 Although the meaning of "special weight" under Troxel is a matter of first impression before this Court, several post- Troxel court of appeals cases have addressed that issue. Before the legislature added the "special weight" provision to § 25-409(E), the court of appeals held that the statute "satisfies the due process concerns identified in Troxel " by "requir[ing] Arizona courts to give weight to the parent's visitation decisions." Jackson v. Tangreen , 199 Ariz. 306, 310 ¶¶ 12, 15, 18 P.3d 100, 104 (App. 2000) ; see also Graville v. Dodge , 195 Ariz. 119, 125-26 ¶¶ 26-27, 985 P.2d 604, 610-11 (App. 1999) (holding pre- Troxel that former § 25-409, permitting grandparent visitation only after finding that it is in child's best interests, was constitutional); cf. Downs v. Scheffler , 206 Ariz. 496, 502 ¶ 25, 80 P.3d 775, 781 (App. 2003) (recognizing that "in custody disputes between a fit legal parent and a third person, a parent's wishes concerning custody are entitled, at a minimum, to special weight as a measure of protection for the parent's constitutional right to rear the child"). ¶ 16 In McGovern v. McGovern , our court of appeals distilled from Troxel two "constitutionally based principles" that must guide a family court's visitation analysis. 201 Ariz. 172, 177 ¶ 17, 33 P.3d 506, 511 (App. 2001). First, "the court should recognize and apply a [rebuttable] presumption that a fit parent acts in his or her child's best interest in ... [making] decisions concerning grandparent visitation." Id. Second, courts must afford " 'some special weight' to a fit parent's determination of whether visitation is in the child's best interest" and " 'significant weight' to a parent's voluntary agreement to some visitation, albeit not as much visitation as the grandparent desires." Id. at 177-78 ¶ 18, 33 P.3d at 511-12 (quoting Troxel , 530 U.S. at 70-72, 120 S.Ct. 2054 ). McGovern stated that those constitutional principles "affect but do not necessarily control a trial court's determinations of 'best interests of the child' and 'reasonable [grandparent] visitation rights' under [former § 25-409(A) ]." Id. at 178 ¶ 19, 33 P.3d at 512. As for the "amount of weight a trial court should place on these factors," the McGovern court concluded that Troxel "left that issue for development on a case-by-case basis." Id. ¶ 18 (quoting Harrington v. Daum , 172 Or.App. 188, 18 P.3d 456, 460 (2001) ). ¶ 17 Fifteen years later, after the legislature amended § 25-409(E), the court of appeals in Goodman revisited what "special weight" means and requires. 239 Ariz. at 112-14 ¶¶ 9-14, 366 P.3d at 589-91. In reversing a family court order granting visitation under § 25-409"in favor of the former girlfriend of a fit mother," id. at 111 ¶ 2, 366 P.3d at 588, and despite recognizing that neither Troxel nor the Arizona Legislature defined "special weight," id. at 113 ¶ 11, 366 P.3d at 590, Goodman interpreted that language to require "robust deference to fit parents' opinions concerning their children's best interests," id. at 113 ¶ 13, 366 P.3d at 590 ; accord Chapman v. Hopkins , 243 Ariz. 236, 244 ¶ 28, 404 P.3d 638, 646 (App. 2017). Thus, according to Goodman , "special weight" under § 25-409(E)"mean[s] that the parents' determination is controlling unless" the nonparent seeking visitation proves "a parental decision clearly and substantially impairs a child's best interests." 239 Ariz. at 113 ¶ 13, 366 P.3d at 590. III. ¶ 18 Mother contends that the court of appeals erred by failing to afford her the constitutional protection to which only she is entitled under Goodman ' s"robust deference" standard. Echoing the dissent below, Mother argues the family court lacked authority to award visitation to Grandparents absent a showing that her visitation opinion would cause substantial harm to the children's best interests. See Friedman , 242 Ariz. at 471-72 ¶¶ 31-33, 36, 397 P.3d at 1071-72 (Staring, P.J., dissenting); Goodman , 239 Ariz. at 113 ¶ 13, 366 P.3d at 590. ¶ 19 We disagree. Neither Troxel nor Arizona's statutory visitation scheme supports Goodman 's broad pronouncements that any "nonparent who seeks visitation carries a substantial burden to prove that the parent's decision [to bar visitation] is harmful," and that "[t]he nonparent must prove that the child's best interests will be substantially harmed absent judicial intervention." 239 Ariz. at 114 ¶ 14, 366 P.3d at 591. Indeed, Troxel and McGovern expressly declined to require a showing of harm to rebut a parent's visitation opinion that is entitled to "special weight." In addition, although Arizona law requires a showing of "significant[ ] detriment[ ] to the child" when a nonparent seeks legal decision-making authority or child placement, § 25-409(A)(2), it contains no such requirement in the visitation context, see § 25-409(C), (E), (F). We therefore reject Goodman 's broader interpretation of "special weight" and disavow that case insofar as it purports to subject a nonparent to a heightened burden of proof beyond that required under Troxel and McGovern . ¶ 20 We have no reason to believe that the legislature intended "special weight" for § 25-409 purposes to be any different than in Troxel or McGovern . Indeed, the legislature presumably added that phrase to § 25-409(E) with Troxel and its progeny in mind and quite clearly intended to incorporate Troxel 's"special weight" component into the visitation analysis. Nor do we read Troxel as imposing a higher constitutional standard for "special weight" than does § 25-409. In short, we interpret Arizona's statutory phrase in line with Troxel . ¶ 21 Mother does not challenge the constitutionality of § 25-409 on its face or as applied. Thus, absent any constitutional impediments, that statute is controlling here. It expressly provides that "[i]n deciding whether to grant visitation to a third party, the court shall give special weight to the legal parents' opinion of what serves their child's best interests." § 25-409(E). That provision does not contain any varying gradations of "special weight," nor is it qualified by any requirement other than "legal parent" status. Furthermore, the legislature's use in § 25-409(E) of "legal parents" in the plural possessive form is significant because it contemplates scenarios in which two legal parents' visitation opinions are entitled to "special weight." Notably, the legislature did not qualify that directive by adding, for example, "to the extent the legal parents agree" (or similar language). A. ¶ 22 Attempting to follow § 25-409 and McGovern , the family court here gave "deference to Mother's position" and applied "the presumption that Mother has and shall continue to make decisions that are in the children's best interests." (Because no court had found him to be "an unfit parent," however, Father was also entitled to "a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children." Troxel , 530 U.S. at 68, 120 S.Ct. 2054.) But the parental presumption was not required here. Troxel and McGovern 's interpretation and application of "special weight" was made in the context of what those cases addressed: a lone parent's visitation opinion pitted against a court's contrary order based on the court's determination of the children's best interests. Troxel , 530 U.S. at 72, 120 S.Ct. 2054 ; McGovern , 201 Ariz. at 173-74 ¶¶ 2-3, 33 P.3d at 507-08. In contrast, in this case both Father and Mother are legal parents, § 25-401(4), and therefore each of their opinions on visitation is entitled to "special weight," § 25-409(E). Thus, assuming "special weight" under the statute implicates Troxel and McGovern 's presumption, when two legal parents have competing visitation views, as is the case here, the respective presumptions effectively and necessarily cancel each other out. Cf. McDermott v. Dougherty , 385 Md. 320, 869 A.2d 751, 770 (2005) (observing that in custody dispute, "the parents commence as presumptive equals" and "each fit parent's constitutional right neutralizes the other parent's constitutional right, leaving, generally, the best interests of the child as the sole standard to apply"). ¶ 23 Arizona's visitation statute provides the solution to the resulting stalemate: "The superior court may grant visitation rights ... on a finding that the visitation is in the child's best interests." § 25-409(C). Given Mother and Father's conflicting visitation opinions, the family court, after considering "all relevant factors," § 25-409(E), was statutorily permitted to grant visitation rights "on a finding that the visitation is in the [children's] best interests." § 25-409(C). Accordingly, the family court should not have required Grandparents to rebut a presumption in Mother's favor because imposing that burden deprived Father of the "special weight" to which his visitation opinion is entitled under § 25-409(E). Even so, we will affirm the court's judgment if it "reached the right result for the wrong reason." City of Phoenix v. Geyler , 144 Ariz. 323, 330, 697 P.2d 1073, 1080 (1985). ¶ 24 Mother argues on several grounds that the family court erred by giving Father's opinion any weight or not affording her opinion against any grandparent visitation "extra" special weight. We turn next to those arguments, none of which is persuasive. B. ¶ 25 We first address Mother's reliance on the Parenting Plan to refute the family court's visitation order. Mother argues that the rights afforded a "legal parent" under § 25-409(E)"are distinct from the rights associated with a grant of legal decision-making" and that only her opinion on visitation is entitled to special weight because the Parenting Plan affords her "final decision-making authority" when she and Father disagree. Relying on Goodman and Nicaise v. Sundaram , which held that an award of "final decision-making authority on certain issues must be interpreted as awarding sole legal decision-making on those issues," 1 CA-CV 17-0069 FC, ---Ariz. ----, ----, 418 P.3d 1045, 1048, 2018 WL 1101654, at *1 ¶ 1 (Ariz. App. Mar. 1, 2018), Mother contends that because she had "final say" on "all [disputed] issues," her decision on third-party visitation governs absent proof "that the child's best interests will be substantially harmed [without] judicial intervention." Mother further asserts that, as the parent with sole legal decision-making power "in the event of an impasse," she had exclusive statutory authority to "determine the child's upbringing, including the child's education, care, health care and religious training." A.R.S. § 25-410(A). ¶ 26 We are not persuaded. Nicaise is inapposite as it did not address visitation issues. And the statutes relating to legal decision-making and parenting plans do not override § 25-409, which specifically addresses third-party rights and grandparent visitation. Furthermore, Mother's argument is based on the mistaken premise that a parenting plan that is silent on visitation matters nonetheless controls the outcome of a visitation dispute. But whether a parent's opinion is entitled to "special weight" under § 25-409 turns on whether he or she is a "legal parent" as defined in § 25-401(4), not whether that parent has legal decision-making authority under a parenting plan. See § 25-409(E) ; cf. A.R.S. §§ 25-401(3) (defining "[l]egal decision-making"), -403.02 (addressing parenting plans). ¶ 27 Other provisions of § 25-409 support this interpretation. For example, subsection (D) of that statute differentiates between a child's "legal parents," "[a] third party who possesses legal decision-making authority over the child or visitation rights," and "[a] person or agency that ... claims legal decision-making authority or visitation rights concerning the child." § 25-409(D)(1), (2), (4). By making those distinctions and separately defining "[l]egal decision-making" and "[l]egal parent," § 25-401(3), (4), the legislature indicated that a legal parent may not necessarily have legal decision-making authority and nonetheless required courts to "give special weight to the legal parents' opinion of what serves their child's best interests," § 25-409(E). This plainly demonstrates that "special weight" for visitation purposes is independent from a grant of legal decision-making authority under a preexisting parenting plan. In short, Mother's decision-making authority under the Parenting Plan does not control here. ¶ 28 Even assuming a parenting plan could control visitation disputes, the record does not support Mother's position. When Mother and Father presented the Parenting Plan to the family court for approval, Father, without objection from Mother, stated that the parties had "not made an agreement on ... whether or not his parents can be present at his parenting time." This brings the Parenting Plan, insofar as it relates to Grandparents' visitation rights, squarely within the bounds of § 25-403.02(D), which directs the court to determine "any element to be included in a parenting plan" about which "the parents are unable to agree." Thus, because Mother and Father were unable to agree on Grandparents' visitation rights, the Parenting Plan does not control and the family court did not err by basing its determination on § 25-409. C. ¶ 29 Mother next argues that the court of appeals erroneously concluded that Father is entitled to the same "special weight" under § 25-409(E) as Mother. See Friedman , 242 Ariz. at 468 ¶ 18, 397 P.3d at 1068. She contends that the family court was constitutionally required under Troxel to give more weight to her opinion than Father's because she is "the only 'fit' and legal parent" with custody, and Father is a noncustodial parent who has only supervised visitation time. According to Mother, the court of appeals "ignored the distinction between the fit custodial parent and a noncustodial parent by affording the same 'special weight' to both." Giving equal weight to both parents' opinions here, she argues, "vitiates the protections provided in Troxel and the best interests of the children." ¶ 30 We disagree. Mother's argument rests on the incorrect premise that Troxel 's"special weight" is afforded to only a "fit custodial parent." Although Troxel referred to the mother in that case as a "fit custodial parent," 530 U.S. at 69, 72, 120 S.Ct. 2054, that was a descriptive, not a normative, term. In other words, Troxel did not as a constitutional matter confine its "special weight" entitlement to custodial parents. As Mother concedes, " Troxel is silent on the special weight to be given a parent who is noncustodial or who may not be found 'fit.' " In addition, "special weight" under § 25-409(E) does not hinge on whether one has custody, but only on "legal parent" status. ¶ 31 We also reject Mother's suggestion that only parents who are fit and have custody of their children are entitled to Troxel 's"special weight." To the contrary, it is well-established that a parent's rights "do [ ] not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child.... Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life." Santosky v. Kramer , 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) ; accord In re D.I.S. , 249 P.3d 775, 780-82 (Colo. 2011). Thus, even though Father's parenting time is subject to significant restrictions, that fact does not strip him of, or even limit, his fundamental right to "direct the upbringing ... of [his] children." A.R.S. § 1-601(A) ; cf. Downs , 206 Ariz. at 502 ¶ 25 n.5, 80 P.3d at 781 n.5 (noting that " Troxel was decided in the context of a grandparent's demand for visitation[,] not custody, and thus presumably involved a less intrusive demand upon a fit parent's constitutional right than would a grandparent's demand for custody"). ¶ 32 We also reject Mother's argument that Father's visitation opinion is not entitled to "special weight" because the family court did not expressly find him to be a "fit" parent and because "Father's strictly supervised contact with the children" establishes that "he is not 'fit.' " Because § 25-409(E) affords "special weight" to "legal parents," whether Father is entitled to "special weight" does not turn on whether he is declared to be a "fit" parent, but on whether his parental rights have been terminated. § 25-401(4). And because they have not, Father is a "legal parent" whose visitation opinion is entitled to "special weight" under § 25-409(E). ¶ 33 Even if parental fitness were relevant here, we reject Mother's assertion that, although Father has not been adjudicated "unfit," he is presumptively unfit because the family court did not expressly find him to be a fit parent. A parent is either fit or unfit-there is no middle ground-and when "[t]here has been no adjudication of the issue of ... fitness," a person "is presumed to be a fit [parent]." Ward v. Ward , 88 Ariz. 130, 139, 353 P.2d 895 (1960) ; cf. Santosky , 455 U.S. at 760, 102 S.Ct. 1388 ("[U]ntil the State proves parental unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship."). We therefore reaffirm what we have long held: a parent is presumed to be "fit" until he or she has been adjudicated unfit. D. ¶ 34 We hold that when, as here, two legal parents' visitation opinions conflict, neither parent is entitled to a presumption in his or her favor and, although both parents' visitation opinions are entitled to special weight, the family court's factually supported determination of whether visitation is in the child's best interests controls. ¶ 35 To the extent Mother argues that applying the best-interests standard here will impermissibly diminish her fundamental right to direct the upbringing of her children, we disagree. That assertion would apply equally to Father, whose parental rights concerning his children are no less fundamental than Mother's. See A.R.S. § 1-602(D) ("Unless otherwise required by law, the rights of parents of minor children shall not be limited or denied."). And Mother's argument is inconsistent with her concession that the governing statute, including its "best interests" standard, is constitutional. § 25-409(C). IV. ¶ 36 Because the decision to award visitation rests within the family court's discretion upon finding that visitation is in the child's best interests, we will not disturb the court's decision absent an abuse of discretion in making the best-interests finding. See Andro v. Andro , 97 Ariz. 302, 305, 400 P.2d 105 (1965) (noting that because trial court is in best position to determine best interests of child, its ruling will not be disturbed absent abuse of discretion). "An abuse of discretion exists when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's decision, is 'devoid of competent evidence to support' the decision." Little v. Little , 193 Ariz. 518, 520 ¶ 5, 975 P.2d 108, 110 (1999) (quoting Fought v. Fought , 94 Ariz. 187, 188, 382 P.2d 667 (1963) ). ¶ 37 Section § 25-409 provides that in determining whether visitation is in a child's best interests, and in addition to the "special weight" requirement discussed above, the trial court must "consider all relevant factors including:" 1. The historical relationship, if any, between the child and the person seeking visitation. 2. The motivation of the requesting party seeking visitation. 3. The motivation of the person objecting to visitation. 4. The quantity of visitation time requested and the potential adverse impact that visitation will have on the child's customary activities. 5. If one or both of the child's parents are deceased, the benefit in maintaining an extended family relationship. § 25-409(E). ¶ 38 Although the family court expressly "consider[ed]" and made findings on "all relevant factors," including those outlined in § 25-409(E), Mother contends the court abused its discretion in granting Grandparents visitation because there is "significant evidence" that visitation caused the children emotional harm. Mother further argues that the record does not support the court's finding that Grandparents "had [a] significant relationship [that] was very positive with the children until the time of [Mother and Father's] separation." According to Mother, the record does not support the court's best-interests finding because there is "significant evidence of harm to the children emotionally" and "no evidence that the children received anything but a fleeting benefit" from visiting with Grandparents. ¶ 39 Mother's arguments seriously mischaracterize the record. The family court implicitly, but understandably, questioned Mother's evidence that visitation with Grandparents negatively impacted the children's mental wellbeing. One of the therapists Mother called acknowledged that her testimony was based on "selected" visitation reports that Mother provided and that she had never met Grandparents or evaluated the children's reaction to them. The other therapist could not clearly explain the basis for her conclusions and inexplicably said that she would oppose visitation even if the visitation reports were "extremely positive." ¶ 40 The family court similarly had reason to question Mother's own testimony. Although Mother viewed Grandparents' visitation as harmful because M. "stopped being able to go to school" and R. "started having panic attacks" after visitation began, she later conceded that M. "had a lot of difficulty attending school ... when the grandparents were not involved," and that R. had trouble with anxiety before visitation began. Mother's anti-visitation opinion was also contradicted by her acknowledging in closing argument that her opposition to visitation was based upon "a false knowledge" of Grandparents and that "these are not the grandparents [to whom] you would deny visits." ¶ 41 Viewed in the light most favorable to supporting the family court's ruling, the record suggests that the children suffered little, if any, harm from visitation with Grandparents. Staff who supervised the visitation sessions described the children as "enjoying themselves and engaged" and observed "a lot of laughing and joking around, kidding, [and] having fun" during visits. Some evidence showed that the children were (at least initially) uncomfortable and anxious about visitation with Grandparents, but the record also reflects that the children ultimately deemed these fears unfounded. Most telling on this point is M.'s statement to R. after the first visit with Grandparents that he was "[p]retty nervous about nothing." Equally notable is R.'s response: "You would be fine if they came again. Are you with me? I like them coming." ¶ 42 The record also contradicts Mother's suggestion that the children received only fleeting benefit from visitation with Grandparents. To the contrary, the record establishes that Grandparents fostered a loving, structured environment in which the children were better able to interact with Father-a relationship Mother concedes is important to the children's wellbeing. If anything, the evidence suggests that Grandparents facilitated the children's relationship with Father, which is undeniably more than a "fleeting" benefit. ¶ 43 Also meritless is Mother's assertion that the record does not support the family court's finding that the children have a significant and positive historical relationship with Grandparents. Indeed, despite the distance between Mother and Father's marital residence in Tucson and Grandparents' home in Avondale, Grandparents were present during or shortly after the children's births and attended the children's martial arts and ballet lessons, baseball games, birthdays, and other special occasions. Grandparents' visits were frequent enough that they shared a special saying with the children-"go up and make a hook"-describing the route Grandparents' vehicle took to enter the Tucson-area hotel where Grandparents stayed during their visits. The fact that both M. and R. recalled this saying during their visitation with Grandparents further buttresses the family court's finding that before Mother and Father's separation and divorce, the children had a significant, positive relationship with Grandparents. ¶ 44 In sum, far from being devoid of credible evidence to support the family court's best-interests finding as Mother asserts, the record plainly supports the court's finding that visitation is in the children's best interests. Accordingly, the family court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Grandparents visitation. V. ¶ 45 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the family court's visitation order and vacate the court of appeals' opinion. In our discretion, we deny both sides' requests for an award of attorney fees under A.R.S. § 25-324. Mother's characterization of Father as a "noncustodial parent" is obsolete; the legislature abolished the principle of "child custody" in 2012 and replaced it with "parenting time" and "legal decision making." 2012 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 309, § 4 (codified as amended at A.R.S. § 25-401 ).

SWANN, Judge: ¶ 1 The plaintiffs in this legal malpractice action allege that transaction counsel's negligence caused them to incur the cost of defending an action brought against the plaintiffs based on the transaction. The superior court concluded that the plaintiffs' claims created waiver of the protections of the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine with respect to their communications with their litigation defense counsel. Applying the test for implied waiver set forth in Hearn v. Rhay , 68 F.R.D. 574 (E.D. Wash. 1975), and adopted by our supreme court in State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Lee , 199 Ariz. 52, 13 P.3d 1169 (2000), we hold that the court erred. The plaintiffs cannot be said to have knowingly and voluntarily waived privilege-the purported waiver resulted not from plaintiffs' own act, but from the defendants' independent decision to defend on a contributory negligence theory. The protected communications have no inherent relevance to the malpractice claims. Further, preservation of the privilege does not deny the defendants access to information vital to their defense. We therefore accept jurisdiction and grant relief. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 2 Robert W. Baird & Co. and Hilltop Securities Inc. (collectively, "Underwriters") were principal underwriters of a municipal bond offering that financed the construction of an event center in the Town of Prescott Valley. Stinson Leonard Street L.L.P. ("Stinson") served as Underwriters' counsel in connection with the offering, and Kutak Rock L.L.P. and its partner Patrick Ray (collectively, "Kutak") served as bond counsel. Kutak and Stinson are hereinafter referred to collectively as "Bond Counsel." ¶ 3 The bonds were sold in late 2005 pursuant to official statements and related bond documents, which Bond Counsel helped prepare. In 2009, the bondholders brought an action ("the Bond Litigation") against Underwriters, Bond Counsel, and others. The bondholders alleged that the official statements misrepresented debt-service funding projections and debt-service security, and that the bond documents were defective with respect to the security interest. Underwriters retained counsel ("Bond Litigation Counsel") to defend them in the Bond Litigation. Underwriters expended millions of dollars in defense costs in the Bond Litigation before eventually settling. ¶ 4 In 2014, Underwriters brought a malpractice action ("the Malpractice Litigation") against Bond Counsel. Underwriters assert professional negligence claims arising from Bond Counsel's preparation of the official statements and bond documents, and they assert a negligent misrepresentation claim arising from an opinion letter that Kutak provided in connection with the bond offering. On the professional negligence claims, Underwriters seek as damages their cost of defending the Bond Litigation. Bond Counsel assert, as an affirmative defense, that Underwriters' defense costs were not reasonable. Bond Counsel also asserts that Underwriters' damages were caused wholly or partially by Underwriters or others, and Bond Counsel have filed notices of non-parties at fault. ¶ 5 Underwriters produced Bond Litigation Counsel's billing records to Bond Counsel. Underwriters moved for a protective order, however, with respect to Bond Counsel's discovery requests for information protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine. The superior court denied Underwriters' motion, reasoning: [Underwriters'] affirmative assertion that malpractice by [Bond Counsel] caused them to incur all of their attorney's fees in the bond litigation is an affirmative claim which squarely puts in dispute what their attorneys in the [B]ond [L]itigation were doing and why they were doing it. What those attorneys were doing and why they were doing it is vital information to [Bond Counsel] in mounting a defense to such a claim. Applying the privilege to requests for this information would be allowing [Underwriters] to use [Bond Litigation Counsel]'s work as both a sword (as a basis for their damages) and a shield (in prohibiting [Bond Counsel] from inquiry about what [Bond Litigation Counsel] w[as] doing and why.... ¶ 6 The court then stayed the matter to permit this special action by Underwriters. DISCUSSION ¶ 7 We accept special-action jurisdiction because Underwriters have no equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal. Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Burke , 204 Ariz. 251, 252, ¶ 3, 63 P.3d 282, 283 (2003). We review the superior court's ruling de novo. Id. at 254, ¶ 10, 63 P.3d at 285. ¶ 8 With some exceptions that do not apply here, "[i]n a civil action an attorney shall not, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment." A.R.S. § 12-2234(A) ; see also Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 42, ER 1.6(a). The privilege exists "to encourage free exchange of information between the attorney and the client and to promote the administration of justice." State v. Holsinger , 124 Ariz. 18, 22, 601 P.2d 1054, 1058 (1979). "As a matter of common law and legislative policy, the privilege serves as a narrow impediment to the search for the truth...." Accomazzo v. Kemp , 234 Ariz. 169, 172, ¶ 9, 319 P.3d 231, 234 (App. 2014). ¶ 9 The question here is whether Underwriters impliedly waived the privilege with respect to their communications with Bond Litigation Counsel and Bond Litigation Counsel's advice. " 'Waiver' is a vague term used for a great variety of purposes, good and bad, in the law. In any normal sense, however, it connotes some kind of voluntary knowing relinquishment of a right." Green v. United States , 355 U.S. 184, 191, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957). To determine whether a litigant has impliedly waived the attorney-client privilege when the litigant's mental state is at issue, we apply the three-part Hearn test. Empire W. Title Agency, L.L.C. v. Talamante , 234 Ariz. 497, 499, ¶ 9, 323 P.3d 1148, 1150 (2014). Under the Hearn test, waiver exists when: (1) [The] assertion of the privilege was the result of some affirmative act, such as filing suit [or raising an affirmative defense], by the asserting party; (2) through this affirmative act, the asserting party put the protected information at issue by making it relevant to the case; and (3) application of the privilege would have denied the opposing party access to information vital to his defense. Empire W. Title Agency , 234 Ariz. at 499, ¶ 9, 323 P.3d at 1150 (quoting Lee , 199 Ariz. at 56, ¶ 10, 13 P.3d at 1173 ). Each element of the Hearn test must be satisfied before waiver may be found. On the record before us, none of the elements are met. I. UNDERWRITERS' ASSERTION OF THE PRIVILEGE WAS NOT THE RESULT OF THEIR FILING OF THE MALPRACTICE LITIGATION. ¶ 10 First, we reject Bond Counsel's contention that Underwriters' malpractice complaint caused their assertion of privilege. ¶ 11 By commencing the Malpractice Litigation against Bond Counsel (and only Bond Counsel), Underwriters put at issue whether Bond Counsel caused Underwriters to incur the cost of defending the Bond Litigation. See Glaze v. Larsen , 207 Ariz. 26, 29, ¶ 12, 83 P.3d 26, 29 (2004) (holding that elements of malpractice include proximate causation, actual causation, and damages). But the complaint did not place at issue the question that resulted in Underwriters' assertion of privilege: whether persons other than Bond Counsel were responsible for some or all of those claimed damages. See Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of Am., Inc. , 163 Ariz. 539, 546, 789 P.2d 1040, 1047 (1990) ( "The [negligent] defendant's act or omission need not be a 'large' or 'abundant' cause of the injury; even if defendant's conduct contributes 'only a little' to plaintiff's damages, liability exists if the damages would not have occurred but for that conduct." (citation omitted)). Contributory negligence is an affirmative defense that the defendant may plead and must prove. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1)(D) ; Hall v. A.N.R. Freight Sys., Inc. , 149 Ariz. 130, 140, 717 P.2d 434, 444 (1986), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized by State Comp. Fund of Ariz. v. Fink , 224 Ariz. 611, 614, ¶ 14, 233 P.3d 1190, 1193 (App. 2010) ; see also Piner v. Superior Court (Jones) , 192 Ariz. 182, 189, ¶¶ 28, 30, 962 P.2d 909, 916 (1998) (adopting Restatement rule that "the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the conduct of each defendant was a cause of the injury, but when a defendant 'seeks to limit his liability on the ground that the harm is capable of apportionment ... the burden of proof as to the apportionment is upon each such actor.' " (citation omitted)). Bond Counsel, not Underwriters, placed fault- and damage-apportionment at issue by asserting contributory negligence as an affirmative defense and filing notices of non-parties at fault. ¶ 12 Bond Counsel nonetheless contend that Underwriters were responsible for placing apportionment at issue because the complaint was the "catalyst" for Bond Counsel's defenses. This argument would, of course, mean that every plaintiff is responsible for every defendant's actions in every case, because claims are always the catalysts for defenses. In support of such a rule, Bond Counsel cites Elia v. Pifer , 194 Ariz. 74, 977 P.2d 796 (App. 1998), a case that predates our supreme court's adoption of the Hearn test. Elia did not, however, as Bond Counsel contends, hold that "the act of filing suit puts contributory negligence at issue." The malpractice defendant in Elia asserted contributory negligence as a defense. Id. at 78, ¶ 12, 977 P.2d at 800. But the court found waiver of the attorney-client privilege based on the plaintiff' s specific theory of the case. Id. at 81, ¶ 35, 977 P.2d at 803 ("Elia's theory of the case was that he had not agreed to settle his dissolution matter and that he had not been advised of appeal rights. He was not, therefore, entitled to preclude evidence relevant to these matters by asserting the attorney-client privilege."). ¶ 13 Bond Counsel also cites several cases from other jurisdictions. Those cases are distinguishable. None of them involved a fact pattern in which a malpractice defendant represented the plaintiff in an initial transaction, and later sought to discover, based on its defenses, privileged information related to the plaintiff's representation by separate counsel in litigation arising from the transaction. By contrast, Parler & Wobber v. Miles & Stockbridge, P.C. , 359 Md. 671, 756 A.2d 526, 542 (2000), and Lyon Financial Services, Inc. v. Vogler Law Firm, P.C. , 2011 WL 3880948, at *3 (S.D. Ill. 2011) (unpublished), recognized "catalyst" waiver when the malpractice defendant sought to shift blame to others who had represented the plaintiff in the same underlying litigation. And Simmons Foods, Inc. v. Willis , 191 F.R.D. 625, 636-37 (D. Kan. 2000), recognized such waiver when the malpractice defendant sought to shift blame to others who had been involved in the same underlying bankruptcy action. Here, the alleged malpractice preceded the separate litigation in which the damages were incurred-the damages stemming from the Bond Litigation are simply the cost (not the content) of Underwriters' defense in that action. ¶ 14 More persuasive is the extra-jurisdictional authority cited by Underwriters. For example, Fischel & Kahn, Ltd. v. van Straaten Gallery, Inc. , 189 Ill.2d 579, 244 Ill.Dec. 941, 727 N.E.2d 240 (2000), involved an analogous fact pattern: the defendant drafted consignment contracts for the plaintiff, the plaintiff retained litigation counsel to defend against claims based on the contracts, the plaintiff sued the defendant for malpractice, and the defendant raised affirmative defenses. Id. 244 Ill.Dec. 941, 727 N.E.2d at 241-42. The defendant sought to discover the plaintiff's privileged communications with the litigation counsel based on the theory that it would otherwise "be impossible to determine whether and to what extent [the plaintiff]'s alleged loss resulted from [the defendant]'s alleged malpractice." Id. at 243, 727 N.E.2d at 241-42. The Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that "[t]o allow [the defendant] to invade the attorney-client privilege with respect to [the plaintiff's litigation counsel] simply by filing the affirmative defenses it did would render the privilege illusory with respect to the communications between [the plaintiff] and [its litigation counsel]." Id. at 244, 727 N.E.2d at 241-42. The court further explained: "That [the plaintiff]'s damages are subject to dispute by the parties does not mean that [the plaintiff] has waived its attorney-client privilege regarding communications between it and [its litigation counsel] that might touch on that question. If raising the issue of damages in a legal malpractice action automatically resulted in the waiver of the attorney-client privilege with respect to subsequently retained counsel, then the privilege would be unjustifiably curtailed." Id. at 244-45, 727 N.E.2d at 241-42. ¶ 15 Underwriters' assertion of the attorney-client privilege was the result of Bond Counsel's defense strategy. Bond Counsel's choice of defense cannot be attributed to Underwriters for purposes of the first prong of the Hearn test. II. UNDERWRITERS DID NOT PUT PROTECTED INFORMATION AT ISSUE. ¶ 16 We further hold that Underwriters' complaint did not put protected information at issue for purposes of the second prong of the Hearn test. Nor, in fact, did Bond Counsel's defense. ¶ 17 Waiver is not effected by the mere filing of an action. Empire W. Title Agency , 234 Ariz. at 499, ¶ 10, 323 P.3d at 1150. Nor is it effected by the mere fact that the privileged information would be relevant or of pragmatic importance to the issues before the court-otherwise, the privilege would have little meaning. Twin City , 204 Ariz. at 256, ¶ 22, 63 P.3d at 287 ; Accomazzo , 234 Ariz. at 172, ¶ 9, 319 P.3d at 234. Waiver occurs only when the party seeks to use protected information as both sword and shield. Throop v. F.E. Young & Co. , 94 Ariz. 146, 158, 382 P.2d 560, 572 (1963). Waiver requires that "the party claiming the privilege [ ] affirmatively 'interject[ ] the issue of advice of counsel into the litigation.' " Empire W. Title Agency , 234 Ariz. at 499, ¶ 10, 323 P.3d at 1150 (quoting Lee , 199 Ariz. at 62, ¶ 28, 13 P.3d at 1179 ). The touchstone for implied waiver is whether the protected information is inherently relevant to the privilege-holder's theory of the case. See Burch & Cracchiolo, P.A. v. Myers , 237 Ariz. 369, 375, ¶ 20, 351 P.3d 376, 382 (App. 2015) ("Implied waiver can occur where a party advances a claim or affirmative defense premised upon otherwise privileged information, such as the reasonableness of its evaluation of the law, which directly relates to the heart of the litigation."); Everest Indem. Ins. Co. v. Rea , 236 Ariz. 503, 505, ¶ 7, 342 P.3d 417, 419 (App. 2015) ("[T]he attorney-client privilege is impliedly waived only when the litigant asserts a claim or defense that is dependent upon the advice or consultation of counsel."). ¶ 18 Underwriters' basic claim is simple: Bond Counsel committed malpractice that later required Underwriters to spend money to defend themselves. The substance of Underwriters' communications with defense counsel are not necessary to decide whether Bond Counsel committed malpractice before the bondholders ever sued Underwriters. Further, even if Bond Counsel is correct that tortious conduct by parties other than Bond Counsel led to the Bond Litigation, Underwriters' privileged communications with Bond Litigation Counsel are not inherently relevant to that defense theory. That is not to say that Underwriters' decision to assert the privilege is without risk to Underwriters. Indeed, the decision may well impair Underwriters' claims-to the extent that the disclosed billing records are insufficient to permit an informed assessment of how much of Bond Litigation Counsel's work related to Bond Counsel's alleged negligence, Underwriters ultimately may be unable to recover all or a portion of their damages. Underwriters' privilege, however, remains intact. ¶ 19 Bond Counsel contend that Underwriters put Bond Litigation Counsel's advice at issue "by claiming that they could not have settled any of the claims asserted [in the Bond Litigation] until after they incurred [the] fees." But Underwriters' bare claim for litigation expenses cannot be equated with assertion of a settlement-timing theory dependent on the advice of counsel. Again, the assertion of the privilege to bar discovery of relevant evidence on that theory could profoundly diminish any potential recovery. But that is not the same as waiver. ¶ 20 Even if Underwriters' claim for damages had raised the settlement issue, that alone would not provide grounds for waiver. "[T]o waive the attorney-client privilege, a party must make an affirmative claim that its conduct was based on its understanding of the advice of counsel-it is not sufficient that the party consult with counsel and receive advice." Everest Indem. , 236 Ariz. at 505, ¶ 9, 342 P.3d at 419 (finding no waiver related to a settlement decision). III. UNDERWRITERS' ASSERTION OF PRIVILEGE DOES NOT DENY BOND COUNSEL ACCESS TO VITAL DEFENSE INFORMATION. ¶ 21 We finally hold that preservation of Underwriters' privilege does not deprive Bond Counsel access to information vital to their defense, as required by the third prong of the Hearn test. ¶ 22 Bond Counsel overreach when they claim entitlement to Bond Litigation Counsel's "status reports, litigation budgets, and analyses of liability exposure and the likelihood of settlement," and information regarding "how the underwriters themselves viewed the claims" and "why [Bond Litigation Counsel] were doing [what they did]." The fact that such information might reveal information useful to Bond Counsel (such as Underwriters' and Bond Litigation Counsel's assessment of Bond Counsel's relative culpability) is insufficient to cause waiver. Privileged communications almost always present the spectre of usefulness and relevance, but their allure does not defeat the privilege. The privileged information's potential utility to Bond Counsel does not provide grounds for waiver; it instead illustrates the importance of preserving the privilege when the malpractice plaintiff seeks to use it as a shield only. CONCLUSION ¶ 23 Underwriters did not waive the attorney-client privilege with respect to their communications with Bond Litigation Counsel. They did not assert the privilege in response to their own act, they did not put protected information at issue, and application of the privilege does not deny Bond Counsel access to information vital to their defense. The superior court erred by denying Underwriters' motion for a protective order. We accept jurisdiction and grant relief.

JOHNSEN, Judge: ¶ 1 Syed Bashir Ahmed Shah appeals the superior court's order quashing garnishment of funds Shah alleges a debtor fraudulently transferred into a retirement plan. Because Shah's claim does not fall within the limited exceptions to the federal law barring recovery from a qualified retirement plan, we affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶ 2 Shah sued Abdul J. Baloch for breach of contract and fraud and obtained a judgment in 2009 for $411,505. Attempting to collect on the judgment, Shah served a writ of garnishment on Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as the trustee of Baloch's 401(k) account. According to the record, Baloch's 401(k) account balance is nearly $50,000; Shah alleged Baloch fraudulently transferred several thousand dollars into the account after entry of Shah's judgment against him. Wells Fargo objected to the garnishment and the superior court quashed the writ, finding the funds in Baloch's 401(k) account exempt from garnishment under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"). ¶ 3 Shah timely appealed the superior court's order. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 12-2101(A)(4) and (5)(c) (2017) and 12-120.21(A) (2017). DISCUSSION ¶ 4 Under Arizona's version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, a creditor may garnish a transfer made with "actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud" the creditor. A.R.S. §§ 44-1004(A) (2017), -1007(A)(1) (2017); see Sackin v. Kersting , 105 Ariz. 464, 465, 466 P.2d 758, 759 (1970). Baloch, however, argues state law prohibits a judgment creditor from executing on or attaching a judgment debtor's retirement account. See A.R.S. § 33-1126(B) (2017) (exempting from attachment "money or other assets payable to a participant in or beneficiary of, or any interest of any participant or beneficiary in, a retirement plan [qualified under federal law]"). But with few exceptions, none of which apply here, ERISA preempts state laws that "relate to any employee benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2017). Thus, ERISA preempts A.R.S. § 33-1126(B) as applied to a qualified pension plan. In re Hirsch , 98 B.R. 1, 2 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1988) (" A.R.S. § 33-1126(B) would undoubtedly be pre-empted in a state court proceeding wherein creditors seek to enforce their claims against an ERISA pension plan."), aff'd sub nom In re Siegel , 105 B.R. 556 (D. Ariz. 1989) ; see Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc. , 486 U.S. 825, 829-30, 108 S.Ct. 2182, 100 L.Ed.2d 836 (1988) (state garnishment provision pertaining to employee pension plan preempted by ERISA). ¶ 5 ERISA grants comprehensive protections to qualified pension plan participants and beneficiaries. At issue in this case is a rule that, to qualify, a pension plan must "provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated." 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2017). The corresponding Treasury Regulation defines "assignment" and "alienation" to include "[a]ny direct or indirect arrangement ... whereby a party acquires from a participant or beneficiary a right or interest enforceable against the plan in, or to, all or any part of a plan benefit payment which is, or may become, payable to the participant or beneficiary." Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(c)(1)(ii) (2017); see Hoult v. Hoult , 373 F.3d 47, 54-55 (1st Cir. 2004) (anti-alienation regulation entitled to deference under Chevron,U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) ). Baloch's retirement plan undisputedly is a qualified plan under 26 U.S.C. § 401(k) (2017) and contains the required anti-alienation provision. ¶ 6 ERISA's anti-alienation bar generally prohibits a creditor from garnishing a qualified plan to collect on a judgment against a plan participant. In Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund , 493 U.S. 365, 367, 110 S.Ct. 680, 107 L.Ed.2d 782 (1990), a labor union sought a constructive trust on the pension benefits of an official who had embezzled from the union. The Supreme Court likened a constructive trust to a garnishment, and noted that the anti-alienation provision "erects a general bar to the garnishment of pension benefits from plans covered by" ERISA. Id. at 371, 110 S.Ct. 680. As Wells Fargo argues, under this principle, funds Baloch deposited into his 401(k) plan are not subject to garnishment because they are or may become payable to him as a benefit. ¶ 7 Shah argues funds that a participant fraudulently conveys into a 401(k) account may be garnished because such a transfer is void as a matter of law. See also Sackin , 105 Ariz. at 465, 466 P.2d at 759. But under Guidry , even a fraudulent transfer of funds by a participant into his or her qualified plan may not be recovered unless a statutory exception applies. A bankruptcy court applied this principle in Matter of Loomer , 198 B.R. 755 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996), ruling that even if a fraudulent transfer could be proved, the ERISA restraint on alienation precluded enforcement of a judgment against the retirement plan. Id. at 759-60 ; see Majteles v. AVL Corp. , 182 Misc.2d 140, 696 N.Y.S.2d 748, 749, 751-52 (1999) (judgment creditor barred from recovering funds insolvent company fraudulently conveyed to company's pension plan). ¶ 8 The cases Shah cites do not apply under the circumstances here. Wagner v. Galbreth , 500 B.R. 42 (D.N.M. 2013), and In re Vaughan Co., Realtors , 493 B.R. 597 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2013), both concerned pension plans that had invested in what turned out to be a Ponzi scheme. See Wagner , 500 B.R. at 45-46 ; Vaughan , 493 B.R. at 601-03. In unwinding the scheme, a bankruptcy trustee sought to recover transfers the perpetrator had made to the pension plans as returns on their investments before the fraud was discovered. See Wagner , 500 B.R. at 45 ; Vaughan , 493 B.R. at 601-03. In both cases, the court held the ERISA anti-alienation provision did not bar recovery from the pension plans. See Wagner , 500 B.R. at 49 ; Vaughan , 493 B.R. at 607-08. But in approving the trustee's recovery of the transfers, the courts did not hold the ERISA anti-alienation rule generally excepts fraudulent conveyances. Instead, they reasoned based on Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(c)(1)(ii) that the anti-alienation bar did not apply because the transfers to be unwound there were between the perpetrator and the respective trustees of the pension plans, not between the perpetrator and a plan participant. See Vaughan , 493 B.R. at 606 (plan trustee contracted with fraudulent investment company as trustee; "no evidence that [he] acted in his capacity as a beneficiary or participant"); Wagner , 500 B.R. at 48. ¶ 9 As noted, the regulation defines "assignment" and "alienation" to include "[a]ny direct or indirect arrangement ... whereby a party acquires from a participant ... a right or interest enforceable against the plan in, or to, all or any part of a plan benefit payment which is, or may become, payable to the participant." Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(c)(1)(ii). Under this provision, whether funds fraudulently transferred to a pension plan may be recovered depends on the circumstances of the transfer giving rise to the claim. The anti-alienation rule did not bar recovery in Vaughan and Wagner because the claims there arose out of investment transactions between the trustees of the two plans and the perpetrator, who was otherwise a stranger to the plans. By contrast, Shah has a judgment against Baloch, a plan participant, and seeks to enforce that judgment against Baloch's transfers into the plan. ¶ 10 Shah further cites Batiza v. Superfon , 175 Ariz. 431, 436, 857 P.2d 1285, 1290 (App. 1992), in which the court held the ERISA anti-alienation rule did not bar a claim alleging that a pension plan had fraudulently transferred assets. As in Wagner and Vaughan , however, the underlying claim in that case was against the plan itself (for breach of contract), not a claim against a beneficiary or participant. Id. at 432-33, 435, 857 P.2d at 1286-87, 1289. ¶ 11 Shah argues public policy requires us to except fraudulent transfers by plan participants from the anti-alienation rule. But Guidry rejected-in no uncertain terms-the suggestion that courts may create equitable exceptions to the anti-alienation rule. See Guidry, 493 U.S. at 376, 110 S.Ct. 680 ("The identification of any exception" to ERISA's prohibition of the assignment or alienation of pension benefits "should be left to Congress."); see also Loomer , 198 B.R. at 760 ("Courts are forbidden from carving out exceptions to the ERISA alienation restriction."). Guidry held that because Congress has enumerated specific exceptions to anti-alienation, courts may not create other exceptions, even for criminal conduct, and even when the result is that funds are rendered immune from otherwise valid collection efforts: Nor do we think it appropriate to approve any generalized equitable exception-either for employee malfeasance or for criminal misconduct-to ERISA's prohibition on the assignment or alienation of pension benefits. [ 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) ] reflects a considered congressional policy choice, a decision to safeguard a stream of income for pensioners (and their dependents, who may be, and perhaps usually are, blameless), even if that decision prevents others from securing relief for the wrongs done them. If exceptions to this policy are to be made, it is for Congress to undertake that task. As a general matter, courts should be loath to announce equitable exceptions to legislative requirements or prohibitions that are unqualified by the statutory text. The creation of such exceptions, in our view, would be especially problematic in the context of an antigarnishment provision. Such a provision acts, by definition, to hinder the collection of a lawful debt. A restriction on garnishment therefore can be defended only on the view that the effectuation of certain broad social policies sometimes takes precedence over the desire to do equity between particular parties. It makes little sense to adopt such a policy and then to refuse enforcement whenever enforcement appears inequitable. ... Understandably, there may be a natural distaste for the result we reach here. The statute, however, is clear. 493 U.S. at 376-77, 110 S.Ct. 680 ; see Patterson v. Shumate , 504 U.S. 753, 760, 112 S.Ct. 2242, 119 L.Ed.2d 519 (1992) ("Indeed, this Court itself vigorously has enforced ERISA's prohibition on the assignment or alienation of pension benefits, declining to recognize any implied exceptions to the broad statutory bar."); see also Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis , 444 U.S. 11, 19-20, 100 S.Ct. 242, 62 L.Ed.2d 146 (1979) ("[I]t is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it."). ¶ 12 As in the cases cited above, the result here is distasteful. Guidry , 493 U.S. at 377, 110 S.Ct. 680 ; Loomer , 198 B.R. at 763. The superior court order that we are affirming leaves Shah unable to satisfy his judgment from funds Baloch allegedly fraudulently transferred to his pension plan to avoid the judgment. But the case authorities interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) do not permit exceptions that Congress has not authorized. CONCLUSION ¶ 13 For the reasons stated, we affirm the superior court's order quashing the writ of garnishment. Wells Fargo and Baloch each seek attorney's fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-1580(E), under which a prevailing party in a garnishment "may be awarded costs and attorney fees in a reasonable amount determined by the court." We deny both requests for attorney's fees, but award them their costs on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-342(A) (2017). We take judicial notice that Baloch filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 2011. The bankruptcy court ruled Shah's claim was nondischargeable, and that court's judgment was affirmed on appeal. Absent material revision after the relevant date, we cite a statute's current version. We review de novo the superior court's determination that federal law exempts funds in an ERISA-qualified account from a writ of garnishment. See Nat'l Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-2 v. Rand , 241 Ariz. 169, 171, ¶ 7, 384 P.3d 1249, 1251 (App. 2016). There are two statutory exceptions to the anti-alienation rule, neither of which is at issue here. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2) ( "voluntary and revocable assignment of not to exceed 10 percent of any benefit payment") and (d)(3)(A) (qualified domestic relations order). Shah argues that Vaughan relied on other cases "that have permitted recovery of fraudulent transfers from ERISA plans." We have reviewed each of the cases Vaughan cites as support for its statement that "[a]lthough only a handful of courts have examined this issue, the majority permitted bankruptcy trustees to use the avoiding power of [bankruptcy law] to recover from ERISA plans." See 493 B.R. at 607 (citing In re Goldschein , 241 B.R. 370, 379 (Bankr. D. Md. 1999), In re CF&I Fabricators of Utah Inc. , 163 B.R. 858, 878 (Bankr. D. Utah 1994), Velis v. Kardanis , 949 F.2d 78, 82 (3d Cir. 1991), and In re Key Commc'ns, Inc. , No. 93-2899, 1994 WL 242643, at *1 (5th Cir. May 17, 1994) ). Although some of the cited cases expressed in dictum the view that a fraudulent transfer might be recovered from a plan, none of the cases actually permitted a creditor of a participant in a qualified plan to recover an alleged fraudulent transfer by the participant to the plan.

BEENE, Judge: ¶ 1 Ron Wulf, trustee for the Wulf Family Support Trust, Wulf Family Trust, and Wulf Irrevocable Trust (collectively, the "Trusts"), appeals the superior court's finding that probable cause supports beneficiaries' Arizona Adult Protective Services Act ("APSA") claim, and thus, did not trigger the in terrorem clauses in the Trusts. Wulf contends that each factual allegation giving rise to a claim challenging an in terrorem clause must be supported by probable cause. Because A.R.S. § 14-2517 requires only that the beneficiaries' claim-and not each of the underlying factual allegations-be supported by probable cause, we affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 2 Each of the Trusts contain an in terrorem clause. In October 2013, beneficiaries of the Trusts, Debora Barrow and Kathi Wulf ("Beneficiaries"), petitioned to remove Wulf as trustee. Beneficiaries amended the petition in April 2014 to add an alleged violation of APSA. Ariz. Rev. Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 46-456 (2017). Beneficiaries asserted seven factual allegations of financial exploitation in support of their APSA claim: (1) $200,000 withdrawn from a bank account, which is unaccounted for; (2) proceeds from the sale of real property owned by the Trusts amounting to $120,790.64 are unaccounted for; (3) $20,000 withdrawn from a bank account, which is unaccounted for; (4) A $11,351.52 purchase and installation of solar panels; (5) Wulf opened a bank account and added the vulnerable adult to the account; (6) A $10,990.14 check was issued from the Trusts to Wulf Urethane, Inc.; (7) A $7,000 check issued to a law firm. ¶ 3 Wulf counterclaimed seeking to enforce the in terrorem clauses of the Trusts. Beneficiaries then filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking to invalidate the in terrorem clause, but the superior court denied the motion, ruling that the Beneficiaries' complaint "trigger[ed] the in terrorem provisions of the three trusts." The superior court also ruled that there were disputed issues of material fact regarding whether Beneficiaries had probable cause, as required by A.R.S. § 14-2517, for their APSA claim. ¶ 4 The superior court ordered a bifurcated trial to determine whether there was probable cause for the Beneficiaries' APSA claim. Before the bifurcated trial, this court issued its opinion in In re Shaheen Trust , 236 Ariz. 498, 341 P.3d 1169 (App. 2015). In a motion in limine , Wulf contended that under Shaheen , all of Beneficiaries' allegations must be supported by probable cause. ¶ 5 After oral argument, the superior court determined that "the parties and the Court have always treated the Beneficiaries' claim that triggers the in terrorem clause as one claim[.]" Therefore, the court ruled that the Beneficiaries "need only establish 'probable cause' for [the APSA claim as a whole] and not for each and every allegation that may support that claim." Alternatively, and in the event Shaheen would bar Beneficiaries' claim, the superior court determined that Shaheen did not retroactively apply. ¶ 6 After an evidentiary hearing, the court ruled that "most of the contested allegations ... do not give rise to 'probable cause,' " but found that Beneficiaries, "by the thinnest of margins," had shown probable cause for their APSA claim. At Wulf's request, the court entered partial final judgment on that decision pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). ¶ 7 Wulf timely appealed the superior court's ruling. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(1) (2017). DISCUSSION ¶ 8 Wulf argues that the superior court erred in its application of Shaheen and finding that it does not apply retroactively. Whether the superior court erred in its interpretation of Shaheen is a question of law, which we review de novo . Enter. Leasing Co. of Phx. v. Ehmke , 197 Ariz. 144, 148, ¶ 11, 3 P.3d 1064, 1068 (App. 1999). ¶ 9 In Shaheen , beneficiaries of a trust containing an in terrorem clause "filed a petition alleging multiple claims of breach of trust." 236 Ariz. at 499, ¶ 2, 341 P.3d 1169. The beneficiaries' petition "contained a multitude of allegations, which the trial court distilled into nine separate claims of breach of trust." Id . at 501 n.3, ¶ 13, 341 P.3d 1169 (internal quotations omitted). The beneficiaries, however, did not appeal the characterization of their allegations as claims. Id . In response, the trustee filed a counter-petition requesting the beneficiaries' interest in the trust be forfeited pursuant to the in terrorem clause. Id . at 499-500, ¶ 2, 341 P.3d 1169. The superior court denied the trustee's counter-petition, holding that the in terrorem clause was unenforceable. Id . This court reversed, holding that the in terrorem clause was enforceable, and "there must have been probable cause for each of the [beneficiaries'] nine claims." Id . at 500, ¶ 7, 341 P.3d 1169. Citing public policy, including the cost of litigation and the donative intent of the transferor, this court reasoned: When a party brings nine claims against a trustee, as the [beneficiaries] have done here, that party litigates nine different challenges, and, accordingly, contests nine separate claims. If these nine claims had been presented in nine separate petitions, there would be no question that probable cause would have to support each claim to avoid forfeiture. We see no reason for a different result merely because the claims were asserted in a single petition. Id . at 501, ¶ 9, 341 P.3d 1169. ¶ 10 Wulf incorrectly construes Shaheen to require that all allegations of financial exploitation be supported by probable cause. On the contrary, Shaheen held that all claims must be supported by probable cause, but did not apply that same standard to their underlying allegations. ¶ 11 Interpreting Shaheen as requiring parties to support each factual allegation with probable cause is contrary to A.R.S. § 14-2517. This statute provides that an in terrorem clause is unenforceable "if probable cause exists for that action ." A.R.S. § 14-2517 (emphasis added). Ordinarily, an action is "any matter or proceeding in a court, civil or criminal." A.R.S. § 1-215(1) (2017); see also Semple v. Tri-City Drywall, Inc. , 172 Ariz. 608, 611, 838 P.2d 1369, 1372 (App. 1992) ("The common definition of action is a proceeding in a court of justice by which one demands or enforces one's right.") (internal citation and quotations omitted). If the Legislature intended to require probable cause exist for each allegation, rather than the entire suit, it would have explicitly said so. See Orca Commc'ns Unlimited, LLC v. Noder , 236 Ariz. 180, 182, ¶ 10, 337 P.3d 545, 547 (2014). Instead, the Legislature used "action." Under § 14-2517, Beneficiaries are not required to demonstrate probable cause for each factual allegation. ¶ 12 Wulf contends that each allegation of financial exploitation is a separate claim by Beneficiaries. However, a plain language interpretation of the word "claim" further evidences the fact that Wulf misconstrues Shaheen . ¶ 13 Neither APSA nor Title 46, chapter 4 of the Arizona Revised Statutes defines "claim." Therefore, we turn to the ordinary meaning of the word and look to the dictionary for guidance. See DBT Yuma, L.L.C. v. Yuma Cty. Airport Auth. , 238 Ariz. 394, 396, ¶ 9, 361 P.3d 379, 381 (2015). A "claim" ordinarily means a "cause of action." Resolution Trust Corp. v. W. Tech., Inc. , 179 Ariz. 195, 201, 877 P.2d 294, 300 (App. 1994). On the other hand, an allegation can mean something quite different, such as a "declaration that something is true; esp., a statement, not yet proved, that someone has done something wrong or illegal." Black's Law Dictionary 81 (8th ed. 2004). ¶ 14 Here, Beneficiaries asserted as a claim a violation of APSA, and sought financial and equitable remedies. The APSA violation was the claim because it provided the statutory grounds for the relief sought by Beneficiaries. The violation of APSA was based on allegations that Wulf misused or appropriated over $370,000 worth of the Trusts' property. The allegations of financial exploitation were just that-allegations. They were declarations of Wulf's wrongdoing, giving rise to Beneficiaries' APSA claim. And as the superior court noted, the court and the parties "always treated the Beneficiaries' claim that triggers the in terrorem clause as one claim-an [APSA] claim." CONCLUSION ¶ 15 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court's decision. Two of the in terrorem clauses are identical, and the third has the same effect as the other clauses. An in terrorem clause, or no-contest clause, is a provision that threatens to dispossess any beneficiary who challenges the terms of a trust or will. Black's Law Dictionary 1073 (8th ed. 2004). An in terrorem clause is invalid as a matter of law if probable cause supports the beneficiaries' claim challenging the trust or will. A.R.S. § 14-2517 (2017). Absent material revisions after the relevant date, we cite a statute's current version. Because Shaheen does not require Beneficiaries to have all factual allegations underlying a claim be supported by probable cause, we need not address the superior court's retroactivity analysis.

McMURDIE, Judge ¶ 1 Robin M. and John M. Lunney appeal the superior court's judgment in favor of the State. We hold the attorney general's office's involvement in responding to the Lunneys' public records requests did not violate Arizona's Public Records Law because it did not unnecessarily delay the process of promptly providing the requested information. We also hold under Arizona's Public Records Law: (1) when responding to public records requests, state agencies are required to query and search their electronic databases and produce responsive public records; (2) a public employee's private cell phone records pertaining to the conduct of public business may become public records subject to disclosure if a public records requestor establishes the employee used the cell phone for a public purpose; (3) without justification for the delay, a 135-day response time to a request is not prompt; and (4) under these facts, the State's responses to the Lunneys' other requests were otherwise prompt and complete. Accordingly, we affirm in part and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶ 2 Following the death of their son in December 2012, the Lunneys made numerous requests under Arizona's Public Records Law to the Arizona Department of Public Safety ("DPS") and the Arizona Department of Transportation ("ADOT"). Initially, the agencies sent the responses directly to the Lunneys. However, in July 2014, Assistant Attorney General Fred Zeder asked the agencies to forward all requests and responses to the attorney general's office. The attorney general's office would then forward the responses to the Lunneys in "Supplemental Disclosures." ¶ 3 In 2015, the Lunneys filed a statutory special action under Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 39-121 against the State, ADOT, DPS, and Zeder in his official capacity. The complaint alleged the defendants violated Arizona's Public Records Law by failing to provide access to public records, and applied for an order to show cause why the Lunneys' requested relief should not be granted. Zeder moved to dismiss the claim against him, which the court granted. ¶ 4 Following a four-day hearing and additional briefing, the court found the State did not violate Arizona's Public Records Law by routing requests through the attorney general's office, and the State was not required to consult multiple databases to obtain information and create responsive documents. The superior court also made findings on each request at issue. The Lunneys had specifically claimed they were entitled to the private cell phone records of the officers at the scene of the accident, so the court ordered the parties to meet and prepare a joint report for the court on the cell phone issue. Following additional briefing, the superior court entered a final judgment finding for the State on all issues. The Lunneys timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1). DISCUSSION ¶ 5 The Lunneys raise four issues on appeal: (1) whether the agencies violated Arizona's Public Records Law by routing requests and responses through the attorney general's office instead of responding to the Lunneys directly; (2) when responding to requests, were the agencies required to query and search their electronic databases and produce records subject to disclosure from those databases; (3) does Arizona's Public Records Law require disclosure of police officers' private cell phone records, "where the officers use their private cellular phones in the ordinary course of their employment on agency business;" and (4) did the agencies violate Arizona's Public Records Law by failing to respond timely and completely to the Lunneys' requests. ¶ 6 Whether a document is a public record and whether a denial of access to public records was wrongful are issues of law we review de novo. Griffis v. Pinal County , 215 Ariz. 1, 3, ¶ 7, 156 P.3d 418, 420 (2007) ; Cox Arizona Publ'ns, Inc. v. Collins , 175 Ariz. 11, 14, 852 P.2d 1194, 1197 (1993). ¶ 7 "Public records and other matters in the custody of any officer shall be open to inspection by any person at all times during office hours." A.R.S. § 39-121. Arizona law defines "public records" broadly, and a presumption in favor of disclosure exists. Griffis , 215 Ariz. at 3-4, ¶ 8, 156 P.3d at 420-21; see Carlson v. Pima County , 141 Ariz. 487, 489, 687 P.2d 1242, 1244 (1984). Section 39-121.01(B) requires "[a]ll officers and public bodies" to maintain all records "reasonably necessary or appropriate to maintain an accurate knowledge of their official activities and of any of their activities which are supported by monies from this state or any political subdivision of this state." ¶ 8 Our supreme court has articulated three definitions of public records: (1) a record "made by a public officer in pursuance of a duty, the immediate purpose of which is to disseminate information to the public;" (2) a record "required by law to be kept, or necessary to be kept in the discharge of a duty imposed by law or directed by law to serve as a memorial and evidence of something written, said or done;" or (3) any "written record of transactions of a public officer in his office, which is a convenient and appropriate method of discharging his duties, and is kept by him as such, whether required by ... law or not." Mathews v. Pyle , 75 Ariz. 76, 78-79, 251 P.2d 893 (1952) (citations omitted). The "nature and purpose" of a document determines its status as a public record. Griffis , 215 Ariz. at 4, ¶ 10, 156 P.3d at 421. A document must have a "substantial nexus with a government agency's activities," and documents of a "purely private or personal nature" are not public records. Id. ; Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v. Rogers , 168 Ariz. 531, 541, 815 P.2d 900, 910 (1991). A. Agencies are Entitled to Seek Legal Advice from the Attorney General's Office, and the Involvement of the Attorney General Did Not Violate Arizona's Public Records Law. ¶ 9 The Lunneys argue the State violated Arizona's Public Records Law by routing requests and responses through the attorney general's office, rather than responding directly to the Lunneys. The Lunneys contend Arizona's Public Records Law does not "specify that the agency furnish those documents to another agency or department," and a fair reading of the law is that "production of responsive public records be made directly to the requestor, and certainly not some other arm of government." ¶ 10 As the chief legal officer of the State, the attorney general is required to be the legal advisor to state departments and to "render such legal services as the departments require." A.R.S. § 41-192(A)(1) ; Arizona State Land Dep't v. McFate , 87 Ariz. 139, 143, 348 P.2d 912 (1960). Determining whether a request is appropriate under the public records law can involve legal advice. See Fisher v. Maricopa County Stadium Dist. , 185 Ariz. 116, 124, 912 P.2d 1345, 1353 (App. 1995) ("legal advice" encompasses advice given to a public body "regarding the legal ramifications of the facts and information given" and "the legality" of the proposed action) (quoting City of Prescott v. Town of Chino Valley , 166 Ariz. 480, 485, 803 P.2d 891, 896 (1990) ). Accordingly, routing public record requests and responses through the attorney general's office to ensure legal compliance with Arizona's Public Records Law does not violate the law. ¶ 11 The Lunneys maintain, however, that Arizona's Public Records Law does not "envision" the restrictions placed upon the Lunneys by the assistant attorney general. Specifically, the Lunneys argue the law does not allow an assistant attorney general to direct an agency to ignore a requestor, to order a requestor to refrain from contacting the agency from which he has sought documents, or to threaten a requestor with arrest "should he exercise his right to obtain documents directly from the [a]gencies." ¶ 12 Generally, the attorney general's office "has no right to make rules or regulations in the other departments in connection with their operation." State ex rel. Morrison v. Thomas , 80 Ariz. 327, 332, 297 P.2d 624 (1956). Likewise, one party generally cannot object to the other party's legal representation. See Alexander v. Superior Court (State) , 141 Ariz. 157, 161, 685 P.2d 1309, 1313 (1984) ("Only in extreme circumstances should a party to a lawsuit be allowed to interfere with the attorney-client relationship of his opponent."). If the attorney general's office overstepped its authority with respect to an agency here, any objection is for the agency to raise, not the Lunneys. The Lunneys' complaint is limited to whether the State wrongfully denied them access to public records. See A.R.S. § 39-121.02(A) ("Any person who has requested ... public records ... and who has been denied access to ... such records, may appeal the denial...."). ¶ 13 DPS's safety and records manager Teresa Fuentes testified that after the attorney general's office became involved, DPS continued processing responses just as it would any other request. But instead of sending them directly to the Lunneys, DPS sent the responses to the attorney general's office to be forwarded to the Lunneys. Zeder's paralegal testified it typically took one to three days for the attorney general's office to send a response to the Lunneys. The superior court found the Lunneys did not establish that Arizona's Public Records Law "prohibits the procedure employed in this case" and that the "decision of the State ... to route [the Lunneys'] requests through counsel resulted in no significant delay, and there has been no showing that the procedure resulted in denial of production of any documents." The superior court also found nothing "in the public records statutory scheme specifically requires an agency to provide records directly to a requestor, nor are an agency [or its] employees restricted from seeking legal advice." ¶ 14 Arizona's Public Records Law does not delineate the procedure state agencies must follow when responding to requests, other than to require a records custodian to "promptly furnish" public records. See A.R.S. §§ 39-121 to -128. "Courts will not read into a statute something that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as gathered from the statute itself." Collins v. Stockwell , 137 Ariz. 416, 420, 671 P.2d 394, 398 (1983). The Lunneys do not allege that the Attorney General's involvement substantively affected the responses that the they received. See Carlson , 141 Ariz. at 491, 687 P.2d at 1246 ("[W]here the countervailing interests of confidentiality, privacy or the best interests of the state should be appropriately invoked to prevent inspection ... the officer or custodian may refuse inspection."). Because the agencies are entitled to receive legal assistance from the attorney general's office, and because the procedure employed by the State in this case did not violate Arizona's Public Records Law by unnecessarily delaying the responses, we affirm the superior court's decision on this issue. B. Agencies are Required to Query and Search their Electronic Databases to Produce Responsive Public Records Subject to Disclosure. ¶ 15 The Lunneys argue the State was required to query and search its electronic databases to produce records subject to disclosure. 1. The Lunneys' Request for Information about the Major Crimes District Commander. ¶ 16 On January 30, 2014, the Lunneys requested the "name[,] rank[,] badge number[,] [and] call sign for the Major Crimes District Commander" on December 8, 2012. On May 31, 2015, DPS sent the Lunneys a letter in response stating the request "is not a request for records." However, on August 31, 2014, the Lunneys made a similar request for the identities of personnel in the special investigations unit. DPS responded to the August 31 request with a document created by a DPS employee identifying officers as Major Crimes District Commanders for incidents dated January 1, 2011, to December 13, 2013. ¶ 17 On appeal, the Lunneys' arguments regarding this request are limited to: "DPS provided responsive documents to a request for the identity of members of a special investigation unit but responded to a nearly identical request for the identify of members of a major crimes unit was not a public records request," and "the State never did produce these public records stored in databases." The Lunneys have not directed us to any evidence in the record showing DPS's response to the August 31 request did not encompass the information sought in the January 30 request. We affirm the superior court's finding that the State did not violate Arizona's Public Records Law in responding to this request. See ARCAP 13(a)(7) ("An "argument" ... must contain: [a]ppellant's contentions concerning each issue presented for review, with supporting reasons for each contention, and with citations of legal authorities and appropriate references to the portions of the record on which the appellant relies."). 2. The Lunneys' Request for Information about On-Duty Officers. ¶ 18 The Lunneys requested "ALL: first and last names, badge numbers, call-signs and vehicle numbers, for those officers associated with East, West, Central and McDowell commands that were ON DUTY from December 7, 2012 between the hours of 7:00 PM and 8:00 AM of December 8, 2012." Six days later, the State, through the attorney general's office, responded to the Lunneys by letter saying, "DPS does not have any responsive documents [to this request].... This information may be available within various databases maintained within separate departments of DPS. If you ... require this information, please serve a formal interrogatory on our office and we will research and provide an appropriate response." ¶ 19 The superior court noted "an agency need not create a record in order to respond to a public records request." See Lake v. City of Phoenix , 222 Ariz. 547, 551, ¶ 15, 218 P.3d 1004, 1008 (2009). The superior court also ruled if the State created documents to respond to some of the Lunneys' requests, that does not mean it was obligated to do so for others; and the State's failure to create documents did not violate Arizona's Public Records Law. Specifically, the superior court concluded Arizona law did not require DPS to create a document compiling the information from the different databases as the Lunneys requested. ¶ 20 Arizona's Public Records Law requires a state agency to "query and search its database to identify, retrieve, and produce responsive records for inspection" if the agency maintains public records in an electronic database. American Civil Liberties Union v. Arizona Department of Child Safety (ACLU) , 240 Ariz. 142, 144, ¶ 1, 377 P.3d 339, 341 (App. 2016). Agencies are not required to "tally and compile previously untallied and un-compiled information or data available" in an electronic database. Id. ¶ 21 In ACLU , we held a state agency did not have to respond to requests seeking "information about information." 240 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 24, 377 P.3d at 347. To respond to the requests at issue in ACLU , the agency "would have had to write a computer program to extract the raw data" from a database, "determine or calculate" what information fell within the categories requested, and analyze the information it found. Id. at 151, ¶ 23, 377 P.3d at 348. Federal courts interpreting the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") have also recognized agencies are not required to respond to requests for "aggregate data," meaning a request that requires an agency to create a new record listing, indexing, or aggregating information about information in a database. Nat'l Sec. Counselors v. CIA , 898 F.Supp.2d 233, 270 (D.D.C. 2012) ; see, e.g., Serv. Women's Action Network v. Dep't of Def. , 888 F.Supp.2d 231, 242 (D. Conn. 2012) (an agency need not respond to requests for aggregate or statistical information, such as requests for the "number of" and outcomes of courts martial or benefit claims filed with agencies, or a breakdown of information by race or gender); Frank v. U.S. Dep't of Justice , 941 F.Supp. 4, 5 (D.D.C. 1996) ("FOIA provides access to existing records but does not establish a research service[;] FOIA entitles citizens to the disclosure of documents, but it does not oblige the government to answer their questions."); ACLU , 240 Ariz. at 149-50, ¶ 21, 377 P.3d at 346-47. ¶ 22 The Lunneys argue ACLU is distinguishable from this case because there the agency was asked to "tally or compile numerical or statistical information and percentages" and "create a new record that compiles analytical information about information." We agree. ¶ 23 A distinction exists between "searching an electronic database to produce existing records and data" and "searching an electronic database to compile information about the information it contains." ACLU , 240 Ariz. at 149, ¶ 18, 377 P.3d at 346. Here, the Lunneys did not request information about information, they simply wanted the names and related information about the officers on duty during a specified period. The State informed the Lunneys the information may be "available within various databases maintained within separate departments of DPS." DPS's records manager Fuentes testified, "if structured in a proper request for the same information, that is a public records' request, but as a request for that information relative to [officers]," DPS could "possibly" go to various sources and find the information. The State is not required to create a single comprehensive document responding to the Lunneys' request. But to the extent the information requested is a public record, the State is required to "query and search" its electronic databases and produce any responsive documents that result from those searches. This is true even if the search would require the agency to search various databases. Therefore, we reverse the superior court's findings on this issue, and remand for the court to order the production of the information. C. If a Public Records Requestor Establishes an Officer Used his or her Personal Cell Phone for Public Business, the Cell Phone Records May Become Public Records Subject to Disclosure. ¶ 24 The Lunneys made three requests seeking information regarding DPS officers' personal cell phone records. None of the requests specifically stated the Lunneys were seeking "cell phone" or "personal" records. Rather, the requests were for the "phone records" of two DPS officers. After the evidentiary hearing, the superior court found, "[a]s written, the [requests] did not put DPS on notice that Lunney sought [personal cell phone] records." The superior court then ordered the parties to meet and prepare a Joint Report that: (1) delineate[s] specifically which records Plaintiffs seek from the cell phones at issue; (2) an explanation from the State Defendants as to whether the records sought exist; and (3) if the records no longer exist, include an explanation of what investigation was conducted to determine the status of the documents. If the documents exist, counsel for the Defendants is directed to provide copies to the Court for in camera review.... ¶ 25 The parties did not submit a joint report to the court as ordered; instead, each party filed a Report on the Effort to Meet and Confer. The superior court ordered the Defendants to provide the personal cell phone numbers of the two DPS officers and their cell phone providers. The State reported to the superior court the officers informed counsel that "the cell phone records do not exist in the possession of either officer." The superior court then issued its final judgment, finding in favor of the State. ¶ 26 The Lunneys argue records of officers' cell phone use while on duty fit within one of Arizona's three definitions of public records. Further, even if cell phone records do not meet the definition of public records, the Lunneys contend "Arizonans have a right to access records that may not be required by law to be kept as public records, but which relate to the public's general welfare," and "it hardly could be doubted that records pertaining to the use of a device so fundamental to police business as a cellular telephone by an officer on duty ... qualify as public records because they have a substantial nexus to the police agency's activities." See Bradford v. Dir., Emp't Sec. Dep't , 83 Ark. App. 332, 128 S.W.3d 20, 28 (2003) ("[t]he creation of a record of communications about the public's business is no less subject to the public's access because it was transmitted over a private communications medium ..."); Bertoli v. City of Sebastopol , 233 Cal.App.4th 353, 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 308, 325 (2015), as modified (Jan. 30, 2015) ("an e-mail message which both relates to the conduct of the public's business and is written and retained by an agency employee on his/her personal computer or cell phone is arguably a [public record under California's Public Records Act]"). ¶ 27 The public is not entitled to a public employee's purely personal records. See Griffis , 215 Ariz. at 4, ¶ 10, 156 P.3d at 421. As recognized by the United States and Arizona Supreme Courts, an individual has a cognizable privacy interest in his or her personal cell phone. Riley v. California , --- U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2489-90, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014) ; State v. Peoples , 240 Ariz. 244, 249, ¶ 16, 378 P.3d 421, 426 (2016). However, the line between public and private records is not always clear, and when a "substantial question" exists as to whether information is subject to disclosure, courts must first determine if the information qualifies as a public record. Griffis , 215 Ariz. at 5, ¶ 13, 156 P.3d at 422. ¶ 28 The threshold to show whether a "substantial question" exists about a document's status is "relatively low." Griffis , 215 Ariz. at 6, ¶ 16, 156 P.3d at 423. In the case of a public employee's personal cell phone records, a requestor can raise a "substantial question" by showing the employee used his or her personal cell phone for a public purpose. See id. However, mere use of a private cell phone during working hours is insufficient to meet the threshold showing; rather, the requestor must present evidence the information on, or use of, a private cell phone created a public record. See id. at 4, ¶ 11, 156 P.3d at 421 (holding that a public officer or agency merely possessing a document makes the document a public record "would create an absurd result ... [u]nder that analysis, a grocery list written by a government employee while at work, a communication to schedule a family dinner, or a child's report card stored in a desk drawer in a government employee's office would be subject to disclosure"). If the threshold showing is met, the burden then shifts to the party claiming the record is private to so establish. Id. at 6, ¶ 16, 156 P.3d at 423. ¶ 29 If a document is a public record, Arizona's presumption in favor of disclosure applies, and "when necessary, the court can perform a balancing test to determine whether privacy, confidentiality, or the best interests of the state outweigh the policy in favor of disclosure." Griffis , 215 Ariz. at 5, ¶ 13, 156 P.3d at 422. In camera review is appropriate when competing interests may limit disclosure. Id. at 6, ¶ 16, 156 P.3d at 423 (in camera review is appropriate where a requestor has shown "a government agency or public official withheld documents generated or maintained on a government-owned computer on the grounds that those documents are personal or private"); Mathews , 75 Ariz. at 81, 251 P.2d 893 (case remanded for the documents in question "to be produced in court for the private examination of the trial judge in order that the court may determine whether [the] ... documents are confidential and privileged or whether their disclosure would be detrimental to the best interests of the state"); Little v. Gilkinson , 130 Ariz. 415, 417, 636 P.2d 663, 665 (App. 1981) (approving a trial court's in camera inspection to protect the confidentiality of police files). ¶ 30 Here, the superior court relied on a DPS officer's testimony, given in a deposition in the wrongful death case, that DPS officers will use their personal cell phones to conduct police business while working. Based on that evidence, the court ordered the parties to determine if the records existed, and, if they did, to produce them for in camera inspection. Fuentes testified DPS does not collect personal cell phone records for officers, and after the superior court's order, DPS contacted the officers and were told the records did not exist. The superior court then found in favor of the State on this issue. Because there is no evidence presented that the records are available, we need not decide if the threshold showing was made in this case that the officers' cell phone records were public, and we affirm the superior court's ruling that DPS did not violate Arizona's Public Records Law by failing to produce the officers' private cell phone records. D. Without Justification, a 135-Day Response Time to a Public Records Requests Is Not Prompt, but the State Otherwise Promptly and Completely Responded to the Lunneys' Requests. ¶ 31 The Lunneys argue certain records were not promptly produced. Under Arizona's Public Records Law, "when records are subject to disclosure the required response is the prompt and actual production of the documents." Phoenix New Times, L.L.C. v. Arpaio , 217 Ariz. 533, 538, ¶ 12, 177 P.3d 275, 280 (App. 2008) ; see also A.R.S. § 39-121.01(D)(1). Whether a response is prompt depends on the factual circumstances of the request. Phoenix New Times , 217 Ariz. at 538, ¶ 14, 177 P.3d at 280 ; W. Valley View, Inc. v. Maricopa County Sheriff's Office , 216 Ariz. 225, 230, ¶ 21, n.8, 165 P.3d 203,208 (App. 2007). The burden is on the agency to establish its responses to requests were prompt. See Phoenix New Times , 217 Ariz. at 538-39, ¶ 15, 177 P.3d at 280-81. ¶ 32 Below, the Lunneys argued the State did not timely respond to the following items: 1, 4, 28, 31-35. The Lunneys argued the State's responses to the following items were both untimely and incomplete: 1-3, 7-8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18-20, 22-25, 27, 30, 31, 36, and 38. We first address the items the Lunneys discussed in detail in their opening brief. 1. The Lunneys' Request for Information about a DPS Officer and Individuals Under his Supervision. ¶ 33 On November 17, 2014, the Lunneys requested information about "individuals under the supervision of [DPS's] Bart Graves on December 7, 8, 9 of 2012." DPS responded to the request on March 30, 2015, and the Lunneys received the response on April 1, 2015, as part of the State's 13th Supplemental Disclosure Statement. Fuentes testified that this response was not timely and that an "employee performance issue" caused the delay. ¶ 34 The superior court found DPS did not timely respond, but found "[H]uman error was to blame. There is no evidence of any bad faith by DPS or an attempt to prevent Lunney from learning the information requested." However, "evidence of inattentiveness on the part of the public body does not establish the promptness of a response." Phoenix New Times , 217 Ariz. at 541, ¶¶ 27-28, 177 P.3d at 283 ("By offering no legally sufficient reason why 141 days should be considered 'prompt' disclosure of documents that were clearly requested and immediately available, [the government agency] failed, as a matter of law, to meet its burden of establishing that it did not wrongfully deny the ... document request."). ¶ 35 Fuentes testified DPS did not begin working on the request until February 2015, but provided no reason why the employee did not begin working on the request until that date, or why DPS did not provide the response until March 30, 2015. While denial is not wrongful if a custodian made "reasonable efforts" and "acted in good faith," Phoenix New Times , 217 Ariz. at 541, ¶ 28, n.5, 177 P.3d at 283, there is no evidence here that the State made reasonable efforts to promptly respond to this request. Cf. McKee v. Peoria Unified Sch. Dist. , 236 Ariz. 254, 259, ¶ 21, 338 P.3d 994, 999 (App. 2014) (unintentional failure to include a set of notes with a 150-plus-page disclosure and quickly correcting the mistake is not bad faith and "does not undermine the overall reasonableness/promptness" of the response). ¶ 36 It took the State 135 days, meaning 95 working days, to respond to this request. Because the State did not provide a legally sufficient reason for the delay, we hold the State's response to this request was not prompt. We remand for the superior court to determine an appropriate sanction addressing the State's failure to timely respond to this request in accordance with A.R.S. § 39-121.02. 2. The Lunneys' March 13, 2015 Request. ¶ 37 Mr. Lunney testified he submitted a request on December 16, 2014, but resubmitted the request on March 13, 2015, after not having received a response. DPS responded to the request on March 27, 2015, and the Lunneys received the response on April 1, 2015, as part of the State's 13th Supplemental Disclosure Statement. There is no record of a request dated December 16, 2014, and Fuentes testified the date of the request was March 13, 2015, and the two-week response time was "reasonable." ¶ 38 The superior court found the evidence did not support the Lunneys' claim they first made the request on December 16, 2014, and found DPS timely responded to this request. We affirm the superior court's finding the State's response to this request was prompt. 3. The Lunneys' Request for Information about Vehicle Collisions in Maricopa County. ¶ 39 On December 25, 2014, the Lunneys submitted a request for Information about Vehicle Collisions in Maricopa County, and the State responded to the request on April 16, 2015, as part of the State's 15th Supplemental Disclosure Statement. The State's response was over 2000 pages. The superior court found, "Given the extent of the documentation that was responsive to this [request] ... the response was timely made." ¶ 40 In their opening brief, the Lunneys do not challenge the superior court's finding. Rather, the Lunneys argue the superior court "seemed not to take into account evidence that the response was non-responsive." However, below, the Lunneys stated the only issue with this request was the timeliness of the State's response. Issues not raised before the superior court are waived on appeal. See Romero v. SW. Ambulance , 211 Ariz. 200, 204, ¶ 7, 119 P.3d 467, 471 (App. 2005). Therefore, we decline to address the Lunneys' argument that the State's response to this request was not responsive. Because the Lunneys do not challenge the superior court's finding regarding the promptness of the response, we do not address the issue on appeal. Ritchie v. Krasner , 221 Ariz. 288, 305, ¶ 62, 211 P.3d 1272, 1289 (App. 2009) ("Opening briefs must present and address significant arguments, supported by authority that set forth the appellant's position on the issue in question."). 4. The Lunneys' Request for Information about Employees on Leave. ¶ 41 On November 6, 2014, the Lunneys requested information, including name, rank, badge numbers, and call signs, for all DPS employees on duty December 7 or 8, 2012, who took or were required to take leave or vacation between December 6, 2012, and January 31, 2013. On April 1, 2015, an attorney representing DPS and ADOT informed the Lunneys that responding to this request would take one employee, working full-time on this request alone, approximately six to eight weeks to respond. Due to the burdensome nature of the request, DPS did not respond to the request. ¶ 42 The superior court found this request was "unduly burdensome," that requiring DPS to respond would "substantially impair its ability to respond to public records requests in other cases," and that DPS was not required to respond. The Lunneys argue the superior court failed to weigh the burden imposed on the agency against the public's interest in disclosure, and the superior court "did not specify that the requested records would be difficult to identify." See Cong. Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 17 of Yavapai County v. Warren , 227 Ariz. 16, 19, ¶ 12, 251 P.3d 395, 398 (App. 2011) (involving public records requests requiring more than 417 hours to review nearly 9000 pages of documents). ¶ 43 Arizona courts have held the burden imposed on the government by responding to an unfettered disclosure request can outweigh the public interest in disclosure of public records. See, e.g., London v. Broderick , 206 Ariz. 490, 493, ¶ 9, 80 P.3d 769, 772 (2003) ; Hodai v. City of Tucson , 239 Ariz. 34, 43, ¶ 27, 365 P.3d 959, 968 (App. 2016) (a search of 1400 email accounts that would have to be reviewed and redacted, plus documents normally available in hard copy form only, required a "time-intensive and costly manual search of all paper records" and was "unreasonably burdensome," not requiring inspection by the agency); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. City of Phoenix , 228 Ariz. 393, 397, ¶ 17, 267 P.3d 1185, 1191 (App. 2011). The agency wishing to withhold public documents bears the burden of proving the burden of disclosure outweighs the public interest in inspecting the records. Id. To determine if producing documents "poses an unreasonable administrative burden," courts consider whether the general presumption in favor of disclosure is overcome by: "(1) the resources and time it will take to locate, compile, and redact the requested materials; (2) the volume of materials requested; and, (3) the extent to which compliance with the request will disrupt the agency's ability to perform its core functions." Hodai , 239 Ariz. at 43, ¶ 27, 365 P.3d at 968. ¶ 44 In the State's letter to the Lunneys in response to their request, the State explained there are approximately 1100 DPS employees, time sheets are not automated or kept in a centralized location, the information would need to be reviewed and redacted prior to disclosure, and it would take approximately six to eight weeks for one person to complete the response. Fuentes also testified DPS does not have an employee who can work on this type of request for six to eight weeks. The superior court did not err by finding DPS was not required to respond to this "unduly burdensome" request. 5. The Remaining Requests at Issue. ¶ 45 On appeal, the Lunneys also argue the record shows "the State refused to produce public records in relation to 24 of 35 'valid, concise, and reasonable [requests],' " and "the State refused to disclose documents requested in six further [Arizona's Public Records Law] requests." The Lunneys argue "the agencies produced nonresponsive or incomplete records" and describe several responses they take issue with. The Lunneys do not, however, reference the responses by Item or Exhibit number or support their arguments on appeal with references to caselaw or evidence in the record demonstrating how the responses were incomplete, as required. See ARCAP (13)(a). Therefore, we do not address each issue in detail here. Krasner , 221 Ariz. at 305, ¶ 62, 211 P.3d at 1289 (appellant's failure to cite "authorities, statutes, and parts of the record" can constitute [an] abandonment and waiver" of a claim). E. Because the Lunneys Have Not Substantially Prevailed on Appeal, their Request for Attorney's Fees is Denied. ¶ 46 The Lunneys requested attorney's fees pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21(a) and A.R.S. § 39-121.02. Under A.R.S. § 39-121.02(B), a court may award attorney's fees "if the person seeking public records has substantially prevailed." We deny the Lunneys' request for attorney's fees, finding the Lunneys have not "substantially prevailed" in this case. See ACLU , 240 Ariz. at 153-54, ¶¶ 37-38, 377 P.3d at 350-51. CONCLUSION ¶ 47 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and vacate and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In December 2013, the Lunneys also filed a wrongful death action against DPS and ADOT stemming from the death of their son. Lunney v. State , Maricopa County Superior Court case number CV2013-096220. In their reply brief, the Lunneys acknowledged they had waived any challenge to the court's order granting Zeder's motion to dismiss. Therefore, we summarily affirm. Van Loan v. Van Loan , 116 Ariz. 272, 274, 569 P.2d 214, 216 (1977) ("The failure to raise an issue ... in briefs on appeal constitutes a waiver of the issue."). In their briefs to this court, the parties disagree whether attachments to a pleading submitted to the superior court by the Lunneys are part of the record. However, the substantive references the Lunneys made in the pleading are found elsewhere in the record, and the superior court relied on the pleading in its ruling. Therefore, we need not resolve the issue of whether the pleading is part of the record on appeal. Assuming these arguments are based in fact, we find it disconcerting that, absent evidence of criminal conduct, an attorney representing a state agency would instruct a public records requestor to not contact the agency and threaten to contact law enforcement if he did. Despite these alleged actions by the lawyers for the State, the Lunneys continued to make requests and the agencies continued to respond to the Lunneys' requests. The attorney general's paralegal testified the process slowed down for a period after the assistant attorney general was named personally as a defendant in the special action and when the State was waiting on a response from the Lunneys. Below, the Lunneys argued three items (Items 16, 25/26, 30) were "database issues," although those items were not specifically referenced as such in the opening brief. We discuss Items 16 and 25/26 in this section, and discuss Item 30 as a "Promptness and Responsiveness" issue, as Item 30 does not involve an electronic database search and was not argued as a "database" issue in the Lunneys' opening brief. Arizona's Public Records Law is broader than FOIA, see 5 U.S.C.A. § 552, but "[w]hen interpreting Arizona's public records statutes, it is appropriate to look to FOIA for guidance." Phoenix New Times, L.L.C. v. Arpaio , 217 Ariz. 533, 539, ¶ 15, n.3, 177 P.3d 275, 281 (App. 2008). A federal agency's responsibility to search databases to respond to a FOIA request is analogous to a state agency's responsibility to search databases to respond to a request under Arizona's Public Records Law. In Congress Elementary , the government was seeking an injunction prohibiting defendants from filing additional public records requests without leave of the superior court, and this court denied the district's request for prospective relief. Id. at 17, 20, ¶¶ 4, 17, 251 P.3d at 396, 399.

JONES, Judge: ¶ 1 Compassionate Care Dispensary, Inc. (CCD) appeals entry of summary judgment in favor of the Arizona Department of Health Services (the Department) on CCD's complaint for declaratory judgment and mandamus relief. The Department cross-appeals the denial of its motion for sanctions. ¶ 2 CCD argues the evidence establishes that the Department acted arbitrarily and capriciously in interpreting the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act (AMMA) and corresponding regulations in a manner that permitted a competitor to participate in a lottery for a medical marijuana dispensary registration certificate without first obtaining a conditional use permit (CUP). The interpretation and application of these provisions present a question of first impression. We hold that neither the statutes and regulations, nor the applicable municipal code, require applicants to obtain a CUP before applying for a dispensary registration certificate, and the Department did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in its application of the law. We further hold that the "sworn statement" required to accompany a dispensary registration application need not take any particular form so long as it impresses upon the signatory the importance of telling the truth. ¶ 3 Because we find no error in the trial court's resolution of the issues presented on summary judgment and in the Department's motion for sanctions, we affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 4 In 2010, Arizona voters passed Proposition 203, now codified as the AMMA, Ariz. Rev. Stat. (A.R.S.) §§ 36-2801 to -2819, to allow for the medicinal use of marijuana within the state. See White Mountain Health Ctr., Inc. v. Maricopa Cty. , 241 Ariz. 230, 233, ¶ 3, 386 P.3d 416, 419 (App. 2016). The AMMA requires non-profit medical marijuana dispensaries to register with the Department-the agency tasked with implementing and administering the AMMA. See A.R.S. §§ 36-2803, -2804(A). A prospective dispensary's application for a registration certificate must contain, among other things, documentation that the proposed dispensary location complies with local zoning restrictions. See A.R.S. § 36-2804(B)(1)(d) ; Ariz. Admin. Code (A.A.C.) R9-17-304(C)(5)-(6). ¶ 5 Initially, the A.A.C. authorized the Department allocate only one dispensary registration certificate for each Community Healthcare Analysis Area (CHAA). See A.A.C. R9-17-302 (2011). If the Department received more than one application for a single CHAA, it would randomly select a qualifying applicant according to the priority set forth in A.A.C. R9-17-302(B). ¶ 6 In May 2012, CCD applied to operate a dispensary at 1600 East Second Street in the City of Winslow (the City), within the Winslow CHAA. CCD established its compliance with applicable zoning restrictions by providing: (1) a "Sworn Statement of Compliance with Local Zoning Restrictions," executed by an officer and board member of CCD; (2) a copy of a CUP for the Second Street location issued by the City; and (3) a Department form entitled "Documentation of Compliance with Local Jurisdiction Zoning" executed by the City's Principal Planner. ¶ 7 Two other entities, Green Cross Medical, Inc. (GCM) and The Medicine Room, L.L.C. (TMR), also submitted applications for the Winslow CHAA. Each application was accompanied by the same type of Department form, again executed by the City's Principal Planner, and a statement of compliance executed by the companies' principal officers. The Department determined all three applications were substantively complete in June 2012 and scheduled a lottery in August 2012 to determine which entity would be awarded the certificate for the Winslow CHAA. ¶ 8 In the meantime, CCD notified the Department it believed GCM's and TMR's applications had been errantly accepted because the proposed locations were not in compliance with City zoning ordinances. At the same time, the City Attorney notified the Department, GCM, and TMR that City ordinances require applicants to obtain a CUP before the City could certify a proposed dispensary location as compliant with zoning restrictions. The City Attorney explained the City's Principal Planner had issued letters of compliance for GCM and TMR by mistake, the Planner believing only that he was affirming the proposed dispensary locations were, generally, in the proper zone. The City Attorney confirmed the proposed locations were in fact "in the commercial zone, and would be ... appropriate location[s] for a medical marijuana dispensary." However, neither GCM nor TMR had yet applied for, let alone received, a CUP. ¶ 9 In July 2012, the Department notified GCM and TMR their applications were not substantively complete because they had not obtained a CUP from the City and therefore were not in compliance with local zoning ordinances. After further discussion with the City Attorney, the Department advised it did not require a CUP at the application stage. The Department explained: "DHS has formulated a two-step process for applicants and does permit them a period of time from when they are awarded a dispensary registration certificate to receive actual documentation (such as certificates of occupancy or conditional use permits) authorizing their occupancy as a dispensary." The Department assured the City that, after a certificate was issued, "DHS will require the applicant to be in full compliance [with the City's zoning and business requirements] before [a dispensary] is allowed to open." The City Attorney admitted he had been unaware of the two-step process but maintained his position that the City independently required "both commercial zoning and a conditional use permit be granted for a marijuana dispensary to be located in the city limits." ¶ 10 Based upon its "two-step process" analysis, the Department accepted the City's prior assurances that the proposed locations would be appropriate for a medical marijuana dispensary and re-designated GCM's and TMR's applications as substantively complete. However, GCM was unable to demonstrate it had the requisite financial backing and lost its preference for selection. See A.A.C. R9-17-302(B). The Department conducted the lottery as between TMR and CCD, and, as the randomly chosen applicant, TMR was awarded a dispensary registration certificate for the Winslow CHAA. ¶ 11 In December 2012, CCD filed a complaint alleging the Department acted arbitrarily and capriciously in permitting TMR to participate in the lottery and sought: (1) a declaration that the Department improperly accepted the application of TMR; (2) a writ of mandamus ordering the Department to void the lottery results and award a dispensary registration certificate to CCD; and (3) an award of damages, attorneys' fees, and costs. After discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment, and the Department sought sanctions against CCD for maintaining a frivolous claim. After briefing and oral argument, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the Department but denied its motion for sanctions. CCD timely appealed, and the Department timely cross-appealed. We have jurisdiction over both appeals pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1). DISCUSSION I. Summary Judgment A. The Department Did Not Violate Rule 56(c)(3). ¶ 12 CCD argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the Department because, it contends, the Department did not submit a separate statement of facts in the form prescribed by Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(3). That rule requires a party filing or opposing a motion for summary judgment to file "a statement separate from the supporting memorandum, [setting forth] the specific facts relied on in support of the motion." Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). We have reviewed the Department's statement of facts and find it contains concise, numbered paragraphs identifying specific relevant events, in chronological order, and referencing supporting portions of the record and exhibits, and therefore find no merit in CCD's contention. ¶ 13 CCD's suggestion that the format of the Department's separate statement of facts made it difficult for CCD to identify the factual issues in dispute is likewise unsupported by the record. CCD's objections to the Department's statement of facts total 593 pages and reflect it had adequate opportunity and ability to address the statements contained therein and to act to protect its interests. ¶ 14 Moreover, the trial court has broad discretion in granting judgment regardless of the form of a party's response. Although the court may enter summary judgment against a party who does not properly oppose a motion, see Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(e), so may the court "grant summary judgment for a nonmoving party; ... grant summary judgment on grounds not raised by a party; or ... consider summary judgment on its own after identifying for the parties material facts that may not be genuinely in dispute," Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(f). In determining the appropriate disposition, the court is required to consider the portions of the record brought to its attention by the parties, regardless of their technical compliance with Rule 56(c). See Hunt v. Richardson , 216 Ariz. 114, 122 n.7, ¶ 25, 163 P.3d 1064, 1072 n.7 (App. 2007) (citing State ex rel. Corbin v. Sabel , 138 Ariz. 253, 256, 674 P.2d 316, 319 (App. 1983) ). ¶ 15 CCD has not proved reversal is warranted upon this ground. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 61 ("At every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party's substantial rights."). B. CCD Abandoned Its Evidentiary Challenges. ¶ 16 CCD also argues the trial court abused its discretion in entering summary judgment without specifically ruling on CCD's objections to the Department's evidence. However, when the court entered final judgment in the Department's favor, the pending objections were deemed denied as a matter of law. See Dowling v. Stapley , 221 Ariz. 251, 264, ¶ 39, 211 P.3d 1235, 1248 (App. 2009). CCD waived appellate review of evidentiary rulings not specifically identified and argued within its opening brief. See Schabel v. Deer Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 97 , 186 Ariz. 161, 167, 920 P.2d 41, 47 (App. 1996) ("Issues not clearly raised and argued in a party's appellate brief are waived.") (citations omitted); see also MT Builders, L.L.C. v. Fisher Roofing, Inc. , 219 Ariz. 297, 304 n.7, ¶ 19, 197 P.3d 758, 765 n.7 (App. 2008) (deeming waived arguments raised "without any analysis"). The challenges CCD preserves for appeal are addressed herein. C. The Applicable Statutes, Regulations, and Ordinances Contemplate a Two-Step Process of Establishing Zoning Compliance. ¶ 17 CCD argues the trial court erred in concluding the AMMA creates a two-step process for establishing zoning compliance. The interpretation of statutes and regulations presents a question of law we review de novo . Yavapai-Apache Nation v. Fabritz-Whitney , 227 Ariz. 499, 503, ¶ 13, 260 P.3d 299, 303 (App. 2011) (quoting Libra Grp., Inc. v. State , 167 Ariz. 176, 179, 805 P.2d 409, 412 (App. 1991) ). The basic principles of statutory interpretation are well-established: If a statute is unambiguous, we apply its terms without resorting to other tools of statutory interpretation, unless doing so leads to impossible or absurd results. And when statutes relate to the same subject matter, we construe them together as though they constitute one law and attempt to reconcile them to give effect to all provisions involved. Berndt v. Ariz. Dep't of Corrs. , 238 Ariz. 524, 528, ¶ 11, 363 P.3d 141, 144 (App. 2015) (quoting Fleming v. Dep't of Pub. Safety , 237 Ariz. 414, 417, ¶ 12, 352 P.3d 446, 449 (2015) ). ¶ 18 The two-step process derives from both statute and regulations. As relevant here, a dispensary is eligible for a dispensary registration certificate if it submits "a sworn statement" certifying that it is in compliance with local zoning restrictions. See A.R.S. § 36-2804(B)(1)(d). The Department interpreted this requirement within a corresponding regulation, which elaborates: To apply for a dispensary registration certificate, an entity shall submit to the Department the following: ... 5. As required in A.R.S. § 36-2804(B)(1)(d), a sworn statement signed and dated by the [principal officers of the dispensary] certifying that the dispensary is in compliance with any local zoning restrictions; [and] 6. Documentation from the local jurisdiction where the dispensary's proposed physical address is located that: a. There are no local zoning restrictions for the dispensary's location, or b. The dispensary's location is in compliance with any local zoning restrictions. A.A.C. R9-17-304(C)(5)-(6). ¶ 19 Following the issuance of a dispensary registration certificate, the holder must apply for approval to operate. A.A.C. R9-17-305. Relevant to issues in the immediate case, an application for operational approval must include: 2. A copy of documentation issued by the local jurisdiction to the dispensary authorizing occupancy of the building as a dispensary ... such as a certificate of occupancy, a special use permit, or a conditional use permit; [and] 3. A sworn statement signed and dated by the [principal officers of the dispensary] certifying that the dispensary is in compliance with local zoning restrictions. A.A.C. R9-17-305(A)(2)-(3). ¶ 20 CCD argues these provisions require the same documentation be submitted twice-once when applying for a dispensary registration certificate and again when applying for approval to operate the dispensary. We disagree. ¶ 21 According to the plain language of the statutes and regulations, both the initial application for a dispensary registration certificate and the subsequent application for operational approval require a sworn statement of compliance signed and dated by the principal officers. A.A.C. R9-17-304(C)(5) and - 305(A)(3). The other requirements use different language and must be given independent meaning. See Williams v. Thude , 188 Ariz. 257, 259, 934 P.2d 1349, 1351 (1997) (directing statutes be construed so that "[e]ach word, phrase, clause, and sentence of a statute [is] given meaning so that no part will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial") (quoting City of Phx. v. Yates , 69 Ariz. 68, 72, 208 P.2d 1147 (1949) ) (emphasis omitted). Specifically, the application for a certificate-step one-requires documentation from the local jurisdiction that "[t]he dispensary's location is in compliance with any local zoning restrictions." A.A.C. R9-17-304(C)(6). The application to operate-step two-requires documentation from the local jurisdiction "authorizing occupancy of the building," such as a certificate of occupancy or CUP. A.A.C. R9-17-305(A)(2). ¶ 22 According to their plain language, the two regulations refer to two different types of documents. A document authorizing occupancy, such as a CUP, is not required until the dispensary seeks operational approval following its selection. The statutes and regulations do not require the Department to reject the initial application for a dispensary registration certificate because it lacks a CUP. See White Mountain , 241 Ariz. at 234, ¶ 6, 386 P.3d at 420 ("Only upon [the Department's] allocation and issuance of a registration certificate may a proposed [medical marijuana dispensary then] apply to operate.") (citing A.A.C. R9-17-305(A) ). ¶ 23 Moreover, obtaining a CUP from the City requires, at a minimum: (1) the applicant prepare and submit engineering reports and professional drawings of the facility and surrounding area that detail the topography and electric and water access, (2) the applicant prepare and submit a detailed security plan, (3) the applicant and City analyze and report on community impact, and (4) the City provide public notices and conduct public hearings on the proposed use. Requiring multiple applicants to undergo the arduous process of obtaining a CUP before selection of the recipient of a dispensary registration certificate, simply as a matter of course and knowing that only one applicant will ultimately be awarded the certificate, would result in a waste of both the unsuccessful applicants' and the municipalities' resources. We will not advance an interpretation that leads to such an absurd result. See AEA Fed. Credit Union v. Yuma Funding, Inc. , 237 Ariz. 105, 109, ¶ 13, 346 P.3d 991, 995 (App. 2015) (citing State v. Affordable Bail Bonds , 198 Ariz. 34, 37, ¶ 13, 6 P.3d 339, 342 (App. 2000) ). ¶ 24 Finally, while a municipality may choose to impose "something more" than required by the Department, the Winslow Municipal Code did not do so. The Code simply states that a non-profit medical marijuana dispensary is a permitted conditional use in a commercial zone "contingent on Arizona State licensure." See Winslow Municipal Code § 17.44.040(P), http://www.codepublishing.com/AZ/Winslow/. The Code further permits the City to take action against a CUP if the conditional use is not active. See Winslow Municipal Code § 17.68.020(E). The Code thus indicates that, under the City's municipal law, the need for a CUP is triggered only after the dispensary receives a dispensary registration certificate from the Department. The Winslow Municipal Code is therefore consistent with the two-step process outlined in the AMMA and adopted by the Department and imposes no additional requirements. D. CCD Did Not Establish Any Genuine Issue of Material Fact Regarding the Nature of the Department's Actions. ¶ 25 CCD argues the evidence establishes the Department acted arbitrarily and capriciously in accepting TMR's application when it did not contain a CUP, and therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Department. An agency acts arbitrarily and capriciously when it does not examine "the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a 'rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.' " Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. , 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States , 371 U.S. 156, 168, 83 S.Ct. 239, 9 L.Ed.2d 207 (1962) ). ¶ 26 Summary judgment is only appropriate if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Thruston , 218 Ariz. 112, 115, ¶ 14, 180 P.3d 977, 980 (App. 2008). "On appeal from a summary judgment, we must determine de novo whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the trial court erred in applying the law." Airfreight Express Ltd. v. Evergreen Air Ctr., Inc. , 215 Ariz. 103, 110, ¶ 19, 158 P.3d 232, 239 (App. 2007) (quoting Bothell v. Two Point Acres, Inc. , 192 Ariz. 313, 316, ¶ 8, 965 P.2d 47, 50 (App. 1998) ). Summary judgment should be granted "if the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense." Orme Sch. v. Reeves , 166 Ariz. 301, 309, 802 P.2d 1000, 1008 (1990). ¶ 27 CCD argues the Department acted arbitrarily and capriciously in adopting the two-step process and accepting TMR's application because: (1) the Department's website contained information contradicting its stated position, and (2) the City Attorney supported a different interpretation. Even assuming the circumstances alleged by CCD to be true, CCD does not establish a genuine issue of fact. ¶ 28 First, contrary to CCD's contentions otherwise, the Department's decision to accept TMR's application is consistent with the information contained in its website. At the time the motions were decided, the website provided: An applicant does not need to submit a special or conditional use permit from a city or town with an application for a dispensary registration certificate. The applicant is required to submit documentation from a city or town that the proposed dispensary location complies with any zoning restrictions. A city or town may however require a special or conditional use permit for the proposed dispensary location before issuing documentation of compliance with local zoning restrictions. This paragraph confirms the Department's position that a CUP need not be submitted with an application for a dispensary registration certificate. Although local ordinances may prescribe a different process, the Winslow Municipal Code does not. See supra ¶ 24. ¶ 29 Second, to the extent the City Attorney disagreed with the Department's interpretation, CCD has established only a difference of opinion between the various participants. "[W]here there is room for two opinions, the action is not arbitrary or capricious if exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even though it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion has been reached." Petras v. Ariz. State Liquor Bd. , 129 Ariz. 449, 452, 631 P.2d 1107, 1110 (App. 1981) (quoting Tucson Public Schs., Dist. No. 1 v. Green , 17 Ariz.App. 91, 94, 495 P.2d 861 (1972) ). Moreover, "the advice of a c [i]ty attorney is just that: advice. It is not a dictate that supersedes the law." White Mountain , 241 Ariz. at 247, ¶ 58, 386 P.3d at 433. The correspondence in the record reflects the Department received and considered feedback from the City Attorney and engaged in an appropriate and informative discussion regarding his concerns. The Department ultimately reached a decision that, although different than the position espoused by the City Attorney, is supported by the language of the applicable statutes and regulations, as well as the Winslow Municipal Code. See supra Part I(C). ¶ 30 In sum, the Department's interpretation of the applicable statutes, regulations, and ordinances as promulgating a two-step process is logical, comports with their plain language, and, at the application stage, requires only a statement that the location complies, generally, with local zoning restrictions. The undisputed evidence indicates the City Attorney and Principal Planner both confirmed the location proposed in TMR's application was "in the commercial zone, and would be an appropriate location for a medical marijuana dispensary." Based upon this information, the City submitted a fully executed form documenting the compliance necessary to complete TMR's application. Although the City Attorney later advised the Department that TMR had not obtained a CUP, the Winslow Municipal Code does not require a dispensary to obtain a CUP before applying for a dispensary registration certificate. Further, CCD did not submit any proof supporting the notion that the Department did not take a reasoned approach to its decision to accept TMR's application over the City Attorney's objection or that the Department applied the two-step process inconsistently among the applicants. Therefore, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in the Department's favor. E. TMR's Application was Otherwise Complete. ¶ 31 CCD alternatively argues the Department acted arbitrarily and capriciously in determining TMR's application was complete and including TMR in the lottery because TMR's application did not contain a sworn statement of zoning compliance. ¶ 32 As noted above, an application for a dispensary registration certificate must contain "a sworn statement signed and dated by the [principal officers of the dispensary] certifying that the dispensary is in compliance with any local zoning restrictions." A.A.C. R9-17-304(C)(5) ; see also A.R.S. § 36-2804(B)(1)(d). The relevant facts are undisputed; the parties agree TMR submitted with its application a signed, dated statement from its principal officers titled "Attestation in Lieu of a Sworn Statement" and reading: I, Hugo [O.] and Abraham [B.], attest to the best of our knowledge, that we have met all City and State, Rules and Regulations regarding Prop 203 as well as in compliance with local zoning restrictions. All information is true and correct. ¶ 33 CCD argues a sworn statement must be made under oath or affirmation. We agree. We disagree, however, with CCD's contention that the oath or affirmation must take a specific form. The most important aspect of the oath or affirmation, as made clear within our constitution, statutes, and rules, is that the person making the statement feel compelled to tell the truth. See Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 7 ("The mode of administering an oath, or affirmation, shall be such as shall be most consistent with and binding upon the conscience of the person to whom such oath, or affirmation, may be administered."); A.R.S. § 12-2221(A) ("An oath or affirmation shall be administered in a manner which will best awaken the conscience and impress the mind of the person taking the oath or affirmation, and it shall be taken upon the penalty of perjury."); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 80(c) (stating an unsworn statement may "have the same force and effect" as a sworn written statement if "signed by the person as true under penalty of perjury") (previously Rule 80(i) ); Ariz. R. Evid. 603 (stating "an oath or affirmation to testify truthfully ... must be in a form designed to impress that duty on the witness's conscience"). ¶ 34 As a matter of law, TMR's statement complies with that requirement. The document is titled an attestation and indicates the principal officers attest its contents are "true and correct." A person is subject to criminal prosecution for a false attestation, just as he would be for making a false statement under oath. See State v. Gear , 239 Ariz. 343, 344, ¶ 1, 372 P.3d 287, 288 (2016) (affirming the State's right to pursue prosecution of a physician "for falsely attesting that he reviewed a patient's medical records" in compliance with the AMMA). The language of TMR's sworn statement demonstrates the signatories' understanding that they are obligated to tell the truth. CCD has not presented any evidence suggesting otherwise. ¶ 35 CCD has not presented evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find the Department acted arbitrarily and capriciously in accepting the sworn statement of TMR's principal officers. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in the Department's favor on this ground. II. Sanctions ¶ 36 Within its cross-appeal, the Department argues the trial court erred in denying its motion for sanctions against CCD and its counsel, either pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 11 or A.R.S. § 12-349(A). "In general, an attorney violates Rule 11 by filing a document that he or she knows or should know asserts a position that 'is insubstantial, frivolous, groundless or otherwise unjustified.' " Cal X-Tra v. W.V.S.V. Holdings, L.L.C. , 229 Ariz. 377, 410, ¶ 113, 276 P.3d 11, 44 (App. 2012) (quoting James, Cooke & Hobson, Inc. v. Lake Havasu Plumbing & Fire Prot. , 177 Ariz. 316, 319, 868 P.2d 329, 332 (App. 1993) ). Sanctions may also be imposed against a party who brings or defends a claim without substantial justification or solely for the purpose of delay or harassment or engages in an abuse of discovery. A.R.S. § 12-349(A). We review an order denying Rule 11 sanctions for an abuse of discretion, Cal X-Tra , 229 Ariz. at 410, ¶ 113, 276 P.3d at 44 (citing James , 177 Ariz. at 320, 868 P.2d at 333 ), and the application of A.R.S. § 12-349de novo , City of Casa Grande v. Ariz. Water Co. , 199 Ariz. 547, 555, ¶ 27, 20 P.3d 590, 598 (App. 2001) (citations omitted). In doing so, we accept the court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous. Id. (citing Phx. Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep't of Corrs. , 188 Ariz. 237, 243, 934 P.2d 801, 807 (App. 1997) ). We are further mindful that "[c]ourts should not impose sanctions lightly." Estate of Craig v. Hansgen , 174 Ariz. 228, 239, 848 P.2d 313, 324 (App. 1992) (citing Johnson v. Brimlow , 164 Ariz. 218, 222, 791 P.2d 1101, 1105 (App. 1990) ). ¶ 37 After considering the arguments and evidence presented in the summary judgment proceedings, the trial court determined CCD's allegations were "unfounded and without any factual support." The Department argues this finding mandates an award of sanctions. We disagree. The mere fact that a party is ultimately unable to sustain its claims in defense of a motion for summary judgment does not automatically equate to a determination that the complaint itself was frivolous, unjustified, or put forth for an improper purpose. See Johnson v. Mohave Cty. , 206 Ariz. 330, 335, ¶ 19, 78 P.3d 1051, 1056 (App. 2003) (" Section 12-349 does not provide a basis for an award of attorneys' fees against a party whose unsuccessful claim was ... nonetheless fairly debatable.") (citing Casa Grande , 199 Ariz. at 556, ¶ 30, 20 P.3d at 599 ). ¶ 38 Indeed, here, the trial court specifically rejected the Department's motion for sanctions after it "d[id] not find that CCD and Counsel have violated Rule 11... or A.R.S. [§] 12-349," and "d[id] not find that [CCD's motion for summary judgment] was filed with the intent to harass the Department, increase the cost of litigation in this matter or with the intent of unreasonabl[y] expanding or delaying these proceedings." The Department argues these findings are erroneous, and sanctions were warranted, because the record reflects: (1) the City Attorney eventually accepted the Department's interpretation; (2) CCD filed its complaint knowing the Department did not require a CUP be submitted with the application for a dispensary registration certificate; (3) CCD maintained its claims against the Department even after learning GCM's application was not included in the lottery for reasons unrelated to zoning; and (4) CCD opposed the Department's efforts to obtain permission to release confidential information regarding GCM's, TMR's, and CCD's applications in an attempt to "keep CCD's lies and deception concealed." ¶ 39 In advancing this position as to the first three points, the Department misconstrues CCD's argument. CCD's claims, though perhaps inartfully presented, center around its understanding that a municipality may require something more from applicants than what is minimally required by state statutes and regulations before issuing a statement of zoning compliance. CCD asserted the City is a municipality that requires "something more" and supported that claim with a sworn statement of the City Attorney. Although its position that the Department acted arbitrarily in determining otherwise was ultimately unsuccessful, we cannot say the claim was entirely frivolous where resolution of the issue involved interpretation of a newly enacted and previously unchallenged law. Nor can we say CCD acted in a wholly unreasonable fashion in adopting the opinion of the City Attorney, a licensed professional tasked with representing the City's interests. ¶ 40 The Department's fourth point is likewise unsupported by the record. The Department indeed filed a motion for leave to disclose certain documents relating to GCM's, TMR's, and CCD's applications for a dispensary registration certificate, otherwise protected from disclosure pursuant to A.R.S. § 36-2810(A). But CCD did not make any "strenuous objections" to the disclosure; rather, CCD argued the trial court should order disclosure of all relevant and discoverable documents, rather than "cherry pick[ ] documents that they think will benefit their case." In doing so, CCD presented valid concerns regarding the fairness and utility of releasing the information and did not act unreasonably. ¶ 41 The trial court's factual findings are supported by the record and support the conclusion that sanctions were not warranted. On this record, we find no error in the order denying sanctions. CONCLUSION ¶ 42 The trial court's orders are affirmed. ¶ 43 Both parties request attorneys' fees and costs be awarded against the other as a sanction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-349 and ARCAP 25. Neither party has proved the other's filings were frivolous or filed for an improper purpose, and we deny both requests. ¶ 44 CCD also requests its attorneys' fees and costs incurred on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-348 (authorizing an award of fees and expenses to a party who prevails in certain actions against the state). Because we conclude neither party prevailed on appeal, CCD's request is denied, and we decline to award either party costs pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341. "On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we view all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered." City of Tempe v. State , 237 Ariz. 360, 362 n.3, ¶ 1, 351 P.3d 367, 369 n.3 (App. 2015) (quoting Bothell v. Two Point Acres, Inc. , 192 Ariz. 313, 315, ¶ 2, 965 P.2d 47, 49 (App. 1998) ). Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite the current version of statutes, regulations, and rules. After the Department allocated all initial dispensary registration certificates, this section was no longer necessary and was repealed effective December 2012. 18 Ariz. Admin. Reg. 3354 (Dec. 5, 2012), http://apps.azsos.gov/public_services/register/2012/52/final.pdf. The Department remains obligated to "review current valid dispensary registration certificates to determine if the Department may issue additional dispensary registration certificates pursuant to A.R.S. § 35-2804(C)." A.A.C. R9-17-303. In a prior appeal, this Court determined the allegations of CCD's complaint were sufficient to state a claim for relief and reversed a prior dismissal. See CCD v. Ariz. Dept. Health Servs. , 1 CA-CV 13-0133, 2015 WL 1395271, at *1, ¶ 1 (Ariz. App. Mar. 24, 2015) (mem. decision). CCD also suggests the Department acted unreasonably in response to a letter from TMR threatening legal action if TMR were not included in the lottery. However, CCD did not raise this argument to the trial court and also objects to our consideration of this letter, which it contends lacks foundation and contains inadmissible hearsay. Accordingly, the intimidation argument has not been preserved and we will not address arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Dawson v. Withycombe , 216 Ariz. 84, 106, ¶ 67, 163 P.3d 1034, 1056 (App. 2007) (citing McDowell Mountain Ranch Land Coal. v. Vizcaino , 190 Ariz. 1, 5, 945 P.2d 312, 316 (1997) ). Because we do not address the newly raised substantive argument, we need not resolve the evidentiary argument. The terms oath and affirmation are largely interchangeable. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 43(b) ("When these rules require an oath, a solemn affirmation suffices."). The term affirmation simply removes the religious connotation that might attach to the term "oath." State v. Albe , 10 Ariz.App. 545, 549-50, 460 P.2d 651 (1969). Because we conclude summary judgment was properly granted to the Department, we need not and do not address the Department's argument that CCD lacked standing to contest TMR's inclusion in the lottery, nor CCD's arguments that the Department's evidence to support that claim was inadmissible. CCD's counsel did not file an answering brief on its own behalf. When debatable issues exist and a party fails to file an answering brief, we may consider such failure a confession of reversible error. See United Bonding Ins. v. Thomas J. Grosso Inv., Inc. , 4 Ariz.App. 285, 285, 419 P.2d 546 (1966) (citations omitted). However, we are not required to do so, and, in our discretion, we address the merits of the Department's cross-appeal as to all interested parties. See Nydam v. Crawford , 181 Ariz. 101, 101, 887 P.2d 631, 631 (App. 1994) (expressing reluctance to reverse upon an "implied confession of error" where the trial court correctly applied the law). Contrary to the Department's contention otherwise, the City Attorney continued to disagree with the Department's interpretation long after the lottery was held and the litigation commenced.

JONES, Judge: ¶ 1 This special action addresses a single issue: whether the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction to grant a hospital's employees' oral requests, made via an emergency telephone line, to authorize medical procedures for a minor patient whose parents did not consent. Because the hospital did not create an action through the filing of a complaint, and the court's conduct was not otherwise statutorily authorized, we hold the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the requests. Accordingly, we accept jurisdiction and vacate the orders authorizing medical treatment for the non-consenting minor. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 2 In August 2017, Cody H., the fourteen-year-old son of Petitioners, Glenn and Sonia H., was diagnosed with bone cancer. Thereafter, Cody sought treatment, including chemotherapy, known to suppress the production of red blood cells, and surgery at Banner Cardon Children's Medical Center (the Hospital). Cody and his parents are practicing Jehovah's Witnesses, and objected to the use of blood transfusions upon religious grounds. The sincerity of Cody's and Petitioners' religious beliefs is undisputed. Cody's medical team developed a treatment plan using alternative therapies designed to avoid the need for blood transfusions. ¶ 3 On October 12, 13, and 16, and December 4, 2017, one or more Hospital employees called the superior court via an "emergency hotline." The employees sought orders authorizing blood transfusions over Cody's and Petitioners' objections. Although Petitioners were never given formal notice of the proceedings and learned of the employees' first request only when advised it had been denied, and the second by overhearing conversations in the Hospital's corridors, they were present and represented by counsel at all but the first proceeding. At each stage, Petitioners argued first that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the requests, and second that the Hospital had failed to prove Cody's medical condition constituted an emergency warranting a blood transfusion. Although various medical personnel presented evidence and argument to support the requests, the Hospital itself did not appear through counsel. ¶ 4 In the course of addressing the Hospital's requests, the court explained the emergency hotline was the "standard practice in the county" for these types of requests, and it did not expect the Hospital would be filing a complaint or dependency petition, "particularly when [Cody] does not meet the definition of a dependent child." As far as the record reveals, this emergency hotline is assigned to Maricopa County Superior Court judges on a rotating basis and available after business hours. The record does not reflect when the court established the emergency hotline, the type of relief generally sought by individuals using the hotline, or how the Hospital employees became aware of the hotline. It is also not clear from the record what the prescribed process is for accepting the calls, whether any restrictions exist on who is authorized to call, or what record is kept of the contents of the calls. Indeed, it is unclear whether the callers here were doctors, administrators, or staff, as the identification and credentials of the caller were apparently not part of the information required to be provided. However, it is undisputed that the Hospital never filed a complaint or petition to initiate the proceedings. ¶ 5 The superior court ultimately granted three of five requests for authorization to administer blood transfusions. Petitioners filed this special action in November but did not request a stay of the court's orders. Thereafter, the Hospital administered blood transfusions to Cody on December 1 and 5. ¶ 6 While the petition for special action was pending, the superior court appointed an attorney and a guardian ad litem for Cody. At this Court's urging, the Hospital entered an appearance and answered the petition. Additionally, the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. was granted leave to file an amicus brief in support of Petitioners. The Arizona Attorney General "decline[d] the invitation" to submit an amicus brief on behalf of the superior court. Shortly thereafter, the Hospital notified Petitioners that they needed to seek alternative care for Cody. As of January 2018, Cody was being treated at a facility in Portland, Oregon. DISCUSSION I. Special Action Jurisdiction ¶ 7 Special action jurisdiction is proper when a party has no "equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal." Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a). This Court has discretion to accept special action jurisdiction and appropriately exercises that discretion in cases "involving a matter of first impression, statewide significance, or pure questions of law." State ex rel. Pennartz v. Olcavage , 200 Ariz. 582, 585, ¶ 8, 30 P.3d 649, 652 (App. 2001) (citations omitted). Special action jurisdiction is also appropriate to prevent the superior court from acting without jurisdiction. See Caruso v. Superior Court , 100 Ariz. 167, 170, 412 P.2d 463 (1966) (citation omitted). ¶ 8 The Hospital argues the superior court's orders are moot because they have expired and Cody is no longer a Hospital patient. While the Hospital is correct, we may consider moot issues "if there is either an issue of great public importance or an issue capable of repetition yet evading review." Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. De Meo , 227 Ariz. 192, 194, ¶ 8, 254 P.3d 1138, 1140 (App. 2011) (quoting Phx. Newspapers, Inc. v. Molera , 200 Ariz. 457, 460, ¶ 12, 27 P.3d 814, 817 (App. 2001), and citing Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 2 v. Phx. Emp. Relations Bd. , 133 Ariz. 126, 127, 650 P.2d 428, 429 (1982) ); see also Coconino Cty. No. MH 1425 , 181 Ariz. 290, 292, 889 P.2d 1088, 1090 (1995) (considering an otherwise moot issue because a decision addressing a common practice would have "a significant impact on the mechanics of involuntary commitment hearings"). ¶ 9 Whether the superior court has jurisdiction to authorize medical treatment via the emergency hotline presents a matter of first impression, of significant statewide importance, and that may be resolved as a pure question of law. Moreover, because of the emergency nature of the hotline, the issue is likely to evade review in future cases. Accordingly, we accept special action jurisdiction. II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction ¶ 10 "On every writ of error or appeal the first and fundamental question is that of jurisdiction." Mansfield, C. & L. M. Ry. v. Swan , 111 U.S. 379, 382, 4 S.Ct. 510, 28 L.Ed. 462 (1884). Here, the superior court identified Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 8-245(A) as the source of its jurisdiction. That section states: When a child under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court appears to be in need of medical or surgical care, the juvenile court may order the parent, guardian or custodian to provide treatment for the child in a hospital or otherwise. This provision does not confer jurisdiction but instead permits the court to order medical treatment only when a child is already under the jurisdiction of the court. ¶ 11 Subject matter jurisdiction attaches to the superior court when a complaint or petition is filed. McCulloch v. W. Land & Cattle Co. , 27 Ariz. 154, 156, 231 P. 618 (1924) ; see also Bryant v. Bloch Cos. , 166 Ariz. 46, 48, 800 P.2d 33, 35 (App. 1990) ; Ariz. R. Civ. P. 3 ("A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court."). Moreover, complaints or petitions that fail to comply with rules of civil procedure or other statutory requirements do not confer jurisdiction on the court. See Pima Cty. Juv. Action Nos. B-8272 and J-65774 v. Fisher , 126 Ariz. 374, 375, 616 P.2d 49, 50 (1980) (citing Pima Cty. Juv. Action No. J-46735 , 25 Ariz. App. 424, 426, 544 P.2d 248, 250 (1976) ). No complaint or petition was filed in this case. ¶ 12 We are aware of only two exceptions to this general rule, whereby the legislature has authorized oral, ex parte requests for relief: telephonic search warrants and emergency orders of protection. See A.R.S. §§ 13-3914(C), -3915(A) (authorizing a court to issue a search warrant after an officer makes a recorded, sworn statement via telephone); 13-3624(A) (authorizing judges to issue emergency orders of protection by telephone). Both telephonic search warrants and emergency orders of protection, however, are regulated by statutes and rules of procedure that protect the due process rights of opposing parties and ensure the orderly administration of justice. See generally A.R.S. § 13-3911 to -3925 (regulating the procurement, execution, and return of search warrants); Ariz. R. Protective Order P. 24 (regulating the issuance, scope, and service of emergency protective orders). Our review of Arizona statutes and rules of procedure reveals no provision either authorizing the superior court to maintain an emergency hotline for the purpose of ordering medical treatment for a non-consenting minor, or guaranteeing the participation or protection of the persons likely to be affected by such an order. ¶ 13 However well-intended the emergency hotline may be, the superior court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain ex parte oral requests in the absence of specific statutory authorization. See Redewill v. Superior Court , 43 Ariz. 68, 81, 29 P.2d 475 (1934) ("A court cannot do something not authorized by law, because it may think it is 'just as good,' or even better than the thing which the law does sanction."); see also San Joaquin Cty. Human Servs. Agency v. Marcus W. , 185 Cal.App.4th 182, 110 Cal.Rptr.3d 232, 240 (2010) (reversing a court order compelling a minor to undergo periodic blood transfusions obtained through an analogous process, finding that "although well intended, the 'system' created in San Joaquin County does not comply with the statutory scheme and results in a juvenile court acting without subject matter jurisdiction"). Therefore, the court's orders authorizing treatment are void. CONCLUSION ¶ 14 The superior court lacked jurisdiction to grant ex parte oral requests, made via the emergency hotline, for authorization to perform medical procedures without the consent of a minor patient or his parents. No written complaint or petition supports the requests, and the procedure, while entertained by the court, is not specifically authorized by statute or rule. Accordingly, the court's orders are void. "A corporation cannot appear in superior court except through counsel. Until a corporation appears in court by counsel, its appearance is defective." State v. Eazy Bail Bonds , 224 Ariz. 227, 229, ¶ 12, 229 P.3d 239, 241 (App. 2010) (citing Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Lane & Bird Advert., Inc. , 102 Ariz. 127, 128, 426 P.2d 395, 396 (1967), and then Boydston v. Strole Dev. Co. , 193 Ariz. 47, 50, ¶ 12, 969 P.2d 653, 656 (1998) ). Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite a statute's current version. Notably, the superior court's orders do not order Petitioners to obtain, nor the Hospital to provide, treatment as contemplated within A.R.S. § 8-245(A). Instead, the orders provide a contingent authorization for the use of blood transfusions. For example, the November 14 order states: IT IS ORDERED that if [Cody's surgeon], or [an]other appropriate treating physician at [the Hospital], concludes during the Surgery that there exists a medical emergency necessitating the use of a blood transfusion to avoid serious injury or death, [Cody's surgeon] and the treatment team ... are authorized to provide such transfusions as appear medically necessary for Cody. This Order is not intended to authorize transfusion treatment solely to alleviate Cody's discomfort over Cody's objection. Similar language providing a contingent authorization appears in the October 13 and December 4 orders. Moreover, the efficacy of these orders is unclear given that A.R.S. § 36-2271 already permits a healthcare provider "to save the life of the [minor] patient," notwithstanding the parent's consent, when a physician determines that "an emergency exists and that it is necessary to perform such surgical procedures." Although not raised by Petitioners, we note that the ex parte nature of the emergency hotline may run afoul of the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct, which prohibits judges from permitting or considering an ex parte communication unless, among other narrow exceptions, "expressly authorized by law to do so." See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 81, Canon 2.9(A). Petitioners also argue the procedures associated with the emergency hotline violate their due process rights. Although the trajectory of this case raises substantial concerns, we need not address the due process arguments given the absence of subject matter jurisdiction. See infra ¶ 13.

JOHNSEN, Judge: ¶ 1 Gail Bussberg appeals the superior court's judgment invalidating her stepmother's will under the two-witness requirement of Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 14-2502(A)(3) (2018). We hold that a notary public who acknowledges the testator's signature may qualify as a witness under the statute, and reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶ 2 The material facts are undisputed. Barbara Bradley, then 76 years old and suffering from terminal cancer, signed a will that disposed of her property upon her death to her boyfriend, Billy Walker, and her stepdaughters, Bussberg and Sandra Estrada. Walker and Tamara Adamovich, who is a notary public, were present in Bradley's home when Bradley signed the will. Before Bradley signed the will, Adamovich asked Walker to leave the room so that she could speak privately to Bradley. After Adamovich concluded that Bradley was competent and under no duress, Walker returned, and both Adamovich and Walker watched Bradley sign the will. Walker then signed the will, followed by Adamovich, who executed an acknowledgement and stamped it with her notary seal. ¶ 3 The signatures appear on the will as follows: Barbara J. Bradley agrees to the conditions of the directives or wishes prior to her death. /s/ Billy R. Walker agrees to the directives or wishes of Barbara J. Bradley. /s/ Acknowledgment State of Arizona County of Mohave On this day March 23, 2016 before me the undersigned Notary Public, personally appeared Barbara J. Bradley and Billy R. Walker known to me to be the individuals who executed the foregoing instrument and acknowledged the same to be his, her, their free act and deed. My commission expires August 13, 2018 /s/ 3-23-16 Notary Public Tamara Adamovich ¶ 4 Bradley died two weeks later. When Bussberg petitioned to probate the will, Bradley's estranged son, Timothy Everson, objected, arguing neither Adamovich nor Walker was a valid witness under A.R.S. § 14-2502(A)(3). Everson claimed that he and Bradley's estranged daughter were Bradley's legal heirs. ¶ 5 At an evidentiary hearing, Everson conceded that Bradley had the necessary testamentary intent when she executed the will. Walker and Adamovich both testified they were present and watched Bradley sign the will before they signed it. Nevertheless, the superior court ruled the will invalid under § 14-2502(A)(3), reasoning it was not signed by two valid witnesses. According to the court, Adamovich was not a valid witness because she had signed "as a notary public," not as a witness; Walker did not qualify because he had signed to indicate he agreed to Bradley's directives, not "as a witness." ¶ 6 The superior court entered final judgment pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) invalidating the will, and Bussberg timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1), (9) (2018). DISCUSSION ¶ 7 "Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo." In re Estate of Jung , 210 Ariz. 202, 204, ¶ 11, 109 P.3d 97, 99 (App. 2005). In interpreting a statute, we look first to its language. Id. at 204, ¶ 12, 109 P.3d at 99. We "liberally construe[ ]" will statutes to promote various policies, including to "discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his property," "simplify and clarify the law concerning the affairs of decedents," "promote a speedy and efficient system for liquidating the estate of the decedent and making distribution to his successors," and "make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions." A.R.S. § 14-1102(A), (B)(1)-(3), (B)(5) (2018). "If the statutory language is unambiguous," however, "we must give effect to the language and do not use other rules of statutory construction." Jung , 210 Ariz. at 204, ¶ 12, 109 P.3d at 99. ¶ 8 As applicable here, § 14-2502(A)(3) requires that a will be "[s]igned by at least two people, each of whom signed within a reasonable time after that person witnessed either the signing of the will ... or the testator's acknowledgment of that signature or acknowledgment of the will." The plain language of this provision requires that (1) the will be signed by two people, other than the testator; (2) before signing, each of the two "witnessed" the testator signing the will or the testator's acknowledgment of his or her signature or the will; and (3) each of the two signed the will within a reasonable time after the testator signed or acknowledged his or her signature or the will. ¶ 9 Everson contends the statute also imposes a fourth requirement-that each of the witnesses must sign specifically "as a witness," rather than in some other role. Everson argues, and the superior court agreed, that although Adamovich signed the will, she cannot serve as a witness under § 14-2502(A)(3) because she signed as a notary public, not as a witness. ¶ 10 The text of § 14-2502(A)(3) requires only that one who signs the will first have "witnessed" the testator signing or acknowledging the signature or the will. Everson cites no authority that the verb "witnessed" in the statute means anything other than to have observed or perceived the testator's signing or acknowledgment. See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 1990 (5th ed. 2011) (defining verb "witness" as "[t]o see or know by personal experience"); Gonzalez v. Satrustegui , 178 Ariz. 92, 98, 870 P.2d 1188, 1194 (App. 1993) ("witnessed" in § 14-2502(A)(3) requires having "seen the testator sign or acknowledge the will" before signing), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Jung , 210 Ariz. at 206, ¶ 22, 109 P.3d at 101 ; see also In re Estate of McGurrin , 113 Idaho 341, 743 P.2d 994, 997 (Idaho App. 1987) (interpreting "witnessed" in similar statute to require only that person "observe[d] the testator sign"). ¶ 11 In support of his contention that a notary cannot qualify under § 14-2502(A)(3), Everson points to A.R.S. § 14-2505(A) (2018), which states that "[a] person who is generally competent to be a witness may act as a witness to a will." He argues the legislature's use of the term "act as a witness" in that provision means that, to qualify under § 14-2502(A)(3), a witness to a will must sign or be designated to sign as a witness (and by implication, not as a notary). We disagree and instead construe § 14-2505(A) only as a broad allowance that one need not have any particular qualifications (unrelated to powers of observation or perception) to "witness" a will. Cf. Ariz. R. Evid. 601 ("Every person is competent to be a witness unless these rules or an applicable statute provides otherwise."). ¶ 12 Everson also cites the official comment to § 2-502 of the Uniform Probate Code, upon which § 14-2502(A)(3) is based. See Jung , 210 Ariz. at 206, ¶ 20, 109 P.3d at 99. He argues that the comment, which states that "witnesses must sign as witnesses," shows that the drafters of the uniform act intended that witnesses must sign in the capacity of witnesses. See Unif. Probate Code § 2-502, cmt. a. We do not agree that the comment means that one who signs a will must be designated as a witness or the signature will be of no avail. The case the comment cites concerns a relative who printed her name in a line of the will identifying the executor-she did not sign the will in any capacity. See Mossler v. Johnson , 565 S.W.2d 952, 957 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). Moreover, because the relative printed her name before the testator signed, her mark did not in any way signify that she had witnessed the testator's signing. Id. at 956 ; see McGurrin , 743 P.2d at 999 ("The official comment to section 2-502... conveys, albeit rather awkwardly, the idea that witnessing is an active function, directed toward certain observable conduct of the testator"). ¶ 13 Contrary to Everson's argument, a notary who properly acknowledges a will necessarily qualifies as a witness under the terms of § 14-2502(A)(3). An "acknowledgment" is "a notarial act in which a notary certifies that a signer, whose identity is proven by satisfactory evidence, appeared before the notary and acknowledged that the signer signed the document." A.R.S. § 41-311(1) (2018); see A.R.S. § 33-503 (2018) (person "taking an acknowledgment" must ascertain identity of the person and "certify that ... [t]he person acknowledging appeared before him and acknowledged he executed the instrument"). Thus, as recited in the acknowledgment, when Adamovich signed the acknowledgment, she certified that Bradley (1) appeared before her and (2) acknowledged that she (Bradley) had signed the will. By acknowledging the document as a notary, Adamovich thereby satisfied the second of the alternative ways in which a witness may qualify under § 14-2502(A)(3) (will must be signed by two persons who "witnessed either the signing of the will ... or the testator's acknowledgement of that signature or acknowledgment of the will"). ¶ 14 Adamovich's executed acknowledgment of the will, by itself, was sufficient to qualify her as a witness under the statute. But at the hearing in the superior court, Adamovich also testified without contradiction that she saw Bradley sign the will before she herself signed the notarial acknowledgment. Adamovich thereby also qualified as a witness under § 14-2502(A)(3) by signing after having "witnessed ... the signing of the will" by the testator. ¶ 15 The additional acts not required by § 14-2502(A)(3) that Adamovich performed-stamping the document with an official seal and recording the notarial act in her log book-do not negate the fact that she satisfied the requirements of a witness under § 14-2502(A)(3). In State v. Solis , 236 Ariz. 242, 245-46, ¶¶ 8-10, 338 P.3d 982, 985-86 (App. 2014), we refused to invalidate a document because a notary had done more than the statute at issue required. The statute there required a notary's acknowledgement, but the notary had performed a jurat instead. Id. at 245-46, ¶¶ 8-9, 338 P.3d at 985-86 (citing A.R.S. § 41-311(1), (5) (defining "acknowledgment" and "jurat") ). The court noted that a jurat is a notarial act that, like an acknowledgment, required the notary to certify that the signature on the document was genuine, and concluded that rejecting the jurat simply because it additionally required the signer to take an oath "would be absurd." Id. at 245-46, ¶¶ 9-10, 338 P.3d at 985-86. Here, it is likewise irrelevant that in stamping the document with her seal, Adamovich took an additional step not required by § 14-2502(A)(3). ¶ 16 Everson nevertheless argues that In re Estate of Muder , 159 Ariz. 173, 765 P.2d 997 (1988), compels the conclusion that the will is invalid. The document at issue in Muder had been signed by a notary who signed an acknowledgment and by a second person who signed below an attestation clause. See id. at 177-78, 765 P.2d at 101-02, ex. A. Without mentioning the notary, the supreme court stated that "[i]t is apparent" that the document did not satisfy the two-witness requirement of § 14-2502(A)(3)"because only one witness signed." 159 Ariz. at 174-75, 765 P.2d at 998-99. The court then proceeded to analyze at some length whether the document qualified as a valid holographic will, eventually upholding it as such. Id. at 175-76, 765 P.2d at 999-100. ¶ 17 Given that the court upheld the will under another statute, Muder 's observation that the will was not signed by two valid witnesses under § 14-2502(A)(3) is non-binding dictum. See Town of Chino Valley v. City of Prescott, 131 Ariz. 78, 81, 638 P.2d 1324, 1327 (1981) ("[A] court's statement on a question not necessarily involved in the case and, hence, ... without force of adjudication ... is not controlling as precedent.") (citations omitted); cf . Gonzalez , 178 Ariz. at 99, n.1, 870 P.2d at 1195, n.1 (recognizing that Muder did not settle whether a notary's signature can qualify as a witness signature under § 14-2502(A)(3) ). Moreover, there is no suggestion that the Muder court considered whether a notary's signature could qualify as a witness signature. See Creach v. Angulo , 186 Ariz. 548, 552, 925 P.2d 689, 693 (App. 1996) ("Dictum is not binding precedent because, inter alia , it is without the force of adjudication and the court may not have been fully advised on the question."), aff'd , 189 Ariz. 212, 214, 941 P.2d 224, 226 (1997). The notary's signature, while apparent on the face of the will in Muder , is mentioned neither in the supreme court decision nor in the appellate decision it reversed. See In re Estate of Muder , 156 Ariz. 326, 327, 751 P.2d 986, 987 (App. 1987) ("There is no evidence in the record, and apparently none was offered, that the witnesses who signed the document witnessed either decedent's signature or his acknowledgment thereof."), vacated , 159 Ariz. 173, 765 P.2d 997. Because the supreme court did not consider the issue presented here, and because the statement on which Everson relies was not necessary to the court's resolution of the case, the supreme court's statement in Muder does not control our resolution of this matter. ¶ 18 Everson also argues that other Arizona cases suggest that a notary serving as a notary cannot be a witness. But, like Muder , none of the cases he cites addresses the issue. See Jung , 210 Ariz. at 203, ¶ 1, 109 P.3d at 98 (determining whether witness may sign after testator's death); Gonzalez , 178 Ariz. at 98, 870 P.2d at 1194 (witness ruled invalid because she "printed her name on the will substantially before she observed [testator] execute the will"). ¶ 19 Given Everson's concession that Bradley's will expresses her testamentary intent, our conclusion that § 14-2502(A)(3) allows a notary to serve as a witness promotes that intent. See A.R.S. § 14-1102(B)(2) (a purpose of will statutes is "[t]o discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his property"). Moreover, our decision also furthers the statutory goal of "mak[ing] uniform the law among the various jurisdictions." See A.R.S. § 14-1102(B)(5). Other jurisdictions are nearly unanimous that a notary who acknowledges a will may serve as one of the witnesses required to validate a will. See, e.g. , In re Estate of Alfaro , 301 Ill.App.3d 500, 234 Ill.Dec. 759, 703 N.E.2d 620, 626 (1998) ("[W]e see no reason why a notary cannot act [as a witness to a will] under the appropriate circumstances."); Smith v. Neikirk , 548 S.W.2d 156, 157, 158 (Ky. App. 1977) ("The fact that she signed as a notary is merely surplusage."); Osborn v. Sinnett , 503 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Mo. App. 1973) ("The case law and the secondary authorities are unanimous that a will 'witnessed' in the official character of his office does not of itself invalidate an officer's signature as a 'witness' to the will.") (citations omitted); In re Friedman , 116 Nev. 682, 6 P.3d 473, 474 (2000) ; In re Estate of Martinez , 99 N.M. 809, 664 P.2d 1007, 1013, ¶¶ 21-23 (N.M. App. 1983) ; In re Will of Priddy , 171 N.C.App. 395, 614 S.E.2d 454, 459 (2005) ; In re Estate of Teal , 135 S.W.3d 87, 91 (Tex. App. 2002) ; In re Estate of Valcarce , 301 P.3d 1031, 1038, ¶ 23 (Utah App. 2013) ; In re Estate of Price , 73 Wash.App. 745, 871 P.2d 1079, 1083 (1994) ; In re Estate of Zelikovitz , 923 P.2d 740, 744 (Wyo. 1996). But see In re Estate of Overt , 768 P.2d 378, 380 (Okla. Civ. App. 1989) (statute required "two attesting witnesses, each of whom must sign his name as a witness at the end of the will at the testator's request and in his presence"; notary was not asked to sign as "an attesting witness" (emphasis omitted) ). ¶ 20 In sum, the text of § 14-2502(A)(3) is unambiguous and controls here. Nothing in the statute prohibits a notary who otherwise qualifies from serving as one of the two required witnesses to a will. Adamovich testified she was present when Bradley signed the will and saw her sign it. As stated in the acknowledgment Adamovich performed, she also witnessed Bradley's acknowledgment of Bradley's own signature on the will. Under the statute, Adamovich therefore witnessed both "the signing of the will" and "the testator's acknowledgment of that signature." See A.R.S. § 14-2502(A)(3). CONCLUSION ¶ 21 Adamovich qualified as one of the two required witnesses to a will under A.R.S. § 14-2502(A)(3), and Everson no longer disputes that the other witness who signed the will also satisfied the statute. Accordingly, we reverse the superior court's judgment invalidating the will and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Absent material revision after the relevant date, we cite a statute's current version. Although Everson argued in the superior court that Walker did not qualify as one of the two required witnesses under the statute, at oral argument before this court, he conceded Walker qualified because he signed the will after watching Bradley sign it.

JUSTICE TIMMER, opinion of the Court: ¶ 1 With exceptions, all property in Arizona is "subject to taxation to be ascertained as provided by law." Ariz. Const. art. 9, § 2 (13); A.R.S. § 42-11002. Property is valued for tax purposes either "centrally" by the Arizona Department of Revenue ("ADOR") or "locally" by county assessors. See A.R.S. §§ 42-13002 to -13501; 42-14001 to -14503. Valuation is based on the "full cash value" of the property as directed by statute. Id . § 42-11001(6). Unless a statute prescribes otherwise, full cash value corresponds to market value, determined by applying standard appraisal methods and techniques set by ADOR. Id . §§ 42-11001(6), -11054(A)(1). ¶ 2 The issues here are whether ADOR or county assessors are authorized to value solar panels owned by SolarCity Corporation and Sunrun, Inc. (collectively, "Taxpayers") and leased to residential and commercial property owners; what valuation methodology applies; and, assuming a zero-value provision in § 42-11054(C)(2) applies, whether it violates the Arizona Constitution's Exemptions Clause or Uniformity Clause. See Ariz. Const. art. 9, §§ 1 - 2. We hold that ADOR is not authorized to value the leased solar panels. We remand to the tax court to decide the remaining issues. BACKGROUND ¶ 3 Taxpayers lease solar panels to homeowners and commercial property owners. The panels are installed on or around a building (e.g., on a rooftop) to capture solar energy, convert it to electricity in a self-contained "inverter," and use it to power the property. Although the panels operate "behind the ... meter"-meaning they operate independently of a utility company's power grid-they transfer any excess energy to the utility company through the grid for others' use. The utility company gives the lessee property owner credit for the retail value of the excess energy. See Ariz. Admin. Code R14-2-2306(D). ¶ 4 For years, Taxpayers' leased solar panels were neither valued nor taxed. That changed when ADOR issued a "notice of value" for tax year 2015, which notified Taxpayers that their panels had been assigned full cash values, and taxes would be assessed. Taxpayers responded by filing this lawsuit. They sought a declaratory judgment that (1) the panels are "considered to have no value" pursuant to § 42-11054(C)(2) and therefore are not subject to valuation or assessment for property tax purposes, and (2) the panels are not subject to valuation under §§ 42-14151 and -14155, which authorize ADOR to value "renewable energy equipment" used by taxpayers in the operation of an "electric generation facility." ADOR responded that it properly valued the panels under those statutes. It alternately asserted that applying § 42-11054(C)(2)'s "zero value" provision to the panels would violate the Exemptions Clause and the Uniformity Clause of the Arizona Constitution. See Ariz. Const. art. 9, §§ 1 - 2. ¶ 5 On cross-motions for summary judgment, the tax court agreed in part with each party. The court agreed with Taxpayers that §§ 42-14151 and -14155 do not authorize ADOR to value leased solar panels. Instead, the court ruled that the panels are "general property" that must be valued by county assessors pursuant to § 42-13051(A), which concerns real property valuation. On the other hand, the court agreed with ADOR that the zero-value provision of § 42-11054(C)(2) violates both the Exemptions Clause and the Uniformity Clause of the Arizona Constitution. The tax court therefore ruled that county assessors must value Taxpayers' leased solar panels and, in doing so, cannot assign a zero value. ¶ 6 The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. SolarCity Corp. v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue , 242 Ariz. 395, 399 ¶ 4, 396 P.3d 631, 635 (App. 2017). It agreed with the tax court that §§ 42-14151 and -14155 do not authorize ADOR to value Taxpayers' panels. Id . But it found that § 42-11054(A)'s directive that ADOR prescribe appraisal guidelines, together with § 42-11054(C)(2)'s zero-value provision, authorizes ADOR, not the counties, to value the solar panels. Id . at 408 ¶ 40, 396 P.3d at 644. Finally, the court concluded that § 42-11054(C)(2) violates neither the Exemptions Clause nor the Uniformity Clause. Id . at 405-07 ¶¶ 29-39, 396 P.3d at 641-43. The court of appeals thus decided that ADOR must value Taxpayers' solar panels but give them a zero value. ¶ 7 We granted review to determine whether ADOR is authorized to value Taxpayers' leased solar panels for taxation purposes, a recurring issue of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3), of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24. DISCUSSION I. ADOR's authority to value the solar panels ¶ 8 We review de novo the tax court's grant of summary judgment and its interpretation of Arizona's tax statutes. See Delgado v. Manor Care of Tucson AZ, LLC , 242 Ariz. 309, 312 ¶ 10, 395 P.3d 698, 701(2017). Our goal in statutory interpretation is to effectuate the legislature's intent. State ex rel. DES v. Pandola , 243 Ariz. 418, 419 ¶ 6, 408 P.3d 1254, 1255 (2018). The best indicator of that intent is the statute's plain language, which we read in context with other statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general purpose, and when that language is unambiguous, we apply it without resorting to secondary statutory interpretation principles. See id . A. A.R.S. §§ 42-14151, -14155 ¶ 9 Section 42-14151(A) broadly authorizes ADOR to value property owned or leased by gas, water, electric, sewer, and wastewater utilities, including "all property, owned or leased, and used by taxpayers in the following businesses ... (4) [o]peration of an electric generation facility." ADOR is required to annually determine the full cash values of these properties in each taxing district and transmit the valuations to the respective county assessor. A.R.S. § 42-14153. The legislature prescribed valuation methods for the utilities described in § 42-14151(A). See A.R.S. §§ 42-14154 to -14159. As relevant here, § 42-14155 provides the method for determining the "full cash value of taxable renewable energy equipment," which includes "electric generation facilities" used to generate, store, transmit, or distribute solar energy "not intended for self-consumption." Id . § 42-14155(A), (C)(3). ¶ 10 ADOR argues that Taxpayers use their solar panels to operate an "electric generation facility," and § 42-14151(A)(4) therefore authorizes ADOR to value the solar panels. And because Taxpayers do not use the solar energy generated from the panels for "self-consumption," the panels must be valued using the method prescribed by § 42-14155(A) for "renewable energy equipment." ¶ 11 ADOR's authority to value Taxpayers' solar panels depends on whether Taxpayers operate electric generation facilities under § 42-14151(A). A facility generates electricity if it "tak[es] a source of energy ... and convert[s] the energy into electricity to be delivered to customers through a transmission and distribution system." See A.R.S. § 42-14151(B) (defining "generation of electricity"); see also id . § 42-14156(B)(1) (defining "electric generation facility" for use in applying valuation methodologies as "all land, buildings and personal property ... used or useful for the generation of electric power"). ADOR argues that because Taxpayers' solar panels convert solar energy into electricity, and excess energy is transmitted on a utility's power grid for use by the utility's customers, § 42-14151(A)(4) applies. We disagree. ¶ 12 ADOR ignores that § 42-14151(A)(4) applies to businesses that operate an electric generation facility. Taxpayers are in the business of leasing solar panels. They themselves do not operate a facility to convert solar energy into electricity. See id . § 42-14151(B). Nor do they deliver electricity to their customers "through a transmission and distribution system." See id . Instead, they lease panels to customers to enable those customers to generate electricity for self-use. Although utilities take excess electricity to transmit it to their customers, Taxpayers have no part in these transmissions and receive no benefit from them. ¶ 13 Because Taxpayers do not operate electric generation facilities, ADOR lacks authority under § 42-14151(A) to value the solar panels. And because § 42-14151(A) does not apply, the valuation method set forth in § 42-14155(A) for renewable energy equipment is likewise inapplicable. Thus, we affirm the tax court's ruling that neither § 42-14151 nor § 42-14155 authorizes ADOR to centrally assess and tax Taxpayers' leased solar panels. B. A.R.S. § 42-11054 ¶ 14 The court of appeals concluded that § 42-11054 authorizes ADOR to value Taxpayers' leased solar panels because subsection (A) charges ADOR with prescribing guidelines for applying standard appraisal methods and techniques and subsection (C)(2) provides that "[i]n applying prescribed standard appraisal methods and techniques," solar energy devices and systems designed "primarily for on-site consumption" must be given a zero value. See SolarCity , 242 Ariz. at 400 ¶ 40, 396 P.3d at 636. "Thus, the statute provides a method for [ADOR], not the counties, to value the solar panels." Id . (ADOR does not press § 42-11054 as a basis of authority to value Taxpayers' solar panels.) ¶ 15 The court of appeals misconstrued § 42-11054. That provision does not authorize ADOR to value any property but instead addresses standard appraisal methods and techniques prescribed by ADOR. And while the statute gives ADOR sole authority to "prescribe guidelines for applying standard appraisal methods and techniques," it also provides that these methods "shall be used by [ADOR] and county assessors in determining the valuation of property." A.R.S. § 42-11054(A)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, § 42-11054(C)(2) does not apply exclusively to ADOR and does not authorize it to value Taxpayers' solar panels. II. County assessors' authority to value solar panels ¶ 16 The legislature established classes of property for the common tax treatment of real and personal property. See A.R.S. § 42-12010(A). Whether Taxpayers' leased solar panels constitute real or personal property impacts whether § 42-11054(C)(2)'s zero-value provision applies. A. Valuation as real property ¶ 17 The tax court ruled without explanation that Taxpayers' leased solar panels must be locally assessed pursuant to § 42-13051(A), which provides that "each year the county assessor shall identify by diligent inquiry and examination all real property in the county that is subject to taxation and that is not otherwise valued by [ADOR] as provided by law." Under this provision, the assessor then determines the full cash value of this property "using the manuals furnished and procedures prescribed by [ADOR]." Id . § 42-13051(B)(2). Thus, if the leased panels are "real property," the assessor would determine their value by applying ADOR's standard appraisal methods and techniques, which are constrained by § 42-11054(C)(2)'s zero-value provision. See id . §§ 42-11001(6), -11054(A). ¶ 18 But leased solar panels are not "real property," and neither ADOR nor Taxpayers assert otherwise. Although § 42-13051(A) uses the term "real property," the term is synonymous with "real estate" because, for tax purposes, property is either "real estate" or "personal property." "Real estate" is "the ownership of, claim to, possession of or right of possession to lands or patented mines," while "personal property" is every other kind of tangible and intangible property "not included in the term real estate." A.R.S. § 42-11001(10), (13) ; see also Sw. Airlines Co. v. Ariz. Dep't. of Revenue , 217 Ariz. 451, 455 ¶ 23, 175 P.3d 700, 704 (App. 2008) (noting that it is an "unassailable proposition" under Arizona law that personal property is anything other than what is included in the term "real estate"). Solar panels are neither land nor mines, and no one contends that the panels, which remain the Taxpayers' and not the homeowners' property, are fixtures, taxable as part of the real property. Thus, the panels must be "personal property." Section 42-13051(A) is inapplicable here, and we reverse the tax court's ruling concluding otherwise. B. Valuation as personal property ¶ 19 ADOR maintains that Taxpayers' leased solar panels fall within the tax code's business personal property classification. As such, ADOR asserts that county assessors are authorized to assess value pursuant to § 42-13054. Section 42-13054(A) provides that "[t]he taxable value of personal property that is valued by the county assessor is the result of acquisition cost less any appropriate depreciation as prescribed by tables adopted by [ADOR]. The taxable value shall not exceed the market value." Because § 42-13054(A) provides a valuation methodology, ADOR argues that county assessors would not use standard appraisal methods and techniques, and therefore § 42-11054(C)(2)'s zero-value provision would not apply. Taxpayers urge us to refrain from deciding the counties' authority to value the leased solar panels and attendant issues because the counties have not sought to tax the panels, the counties are not parties, and Taxpayers sought relief only against ADOR. ¶ 20 The solar panels are business personal property under § 42-12001(13). That provision includes within class one property "[p]ersonal property that is devoted to any other commercial or industrial use, other than property that is specifically included in another class described in this article, and that is valued at full cash value." By leasing the solar panels to its customers for a profit, Taxpayers use them for a commercial purpose. ¶ 21 The remaining issues before us concern whether § 42-13054 authorizes county assessors to value Taxpayers' solar panels and, if so, whether § 42-11054(C)(2) nevertheless applies to mandate a zero-value assessment. Also, if § 42-11054(C)(2) applies, we are asked to decide whether its application to the leased solar panels would violate the Arizona Constitution's Exemptions Clause or Uniformity Clause. ¶ 22 We agree with Taxpayers that we should refrain from deciding these issues and instead remand for the tax court to address them in the first instance. Neither the tax court nor the court of appeals decided the statutory issues as now framed. See supra ¶ 21. Although the tax court has decided the constitutional issues, if it determines that § 42-11054(C)(2) is inapplicable, those issues would be rendered moot. ¶ 23 We are also mindful that as this case has progressed, the arguments have become untethered from the questions originally presented to the tax court. Specifically, Taxpayers' complaint sought declaratory relief concerning ADOR's assessment authority, not the counties' authority. Because we have determined that ADOR is not authorized to centrally value and tax the leased solar panels, the counties, which are not parties to this lawsuit, have a substantial interest in arguing their authority to value the solar panels. Remanding to the tax court will permit the counties an opportunity to join the case. Cf. Bennett v. Brownlow , 211 Ariz. 193, 196 ¶ 16, 119 P.3d 460, 463 (2005) (noting in the context of standing the desirability that "issues be fully developed between true adversaries"). CONCLUSION ¶ 24 We affirm the tax court's judgment to the extent it concludes that ADOR lacks statutory authority to value Taxpayers' leased solar panels. We reverse the remainder of the judgment. We remand for the tax court to determine whether § 42-13054 authorizes county assessors to value the solar panels and, if so, whether § 42-11054(C)(2) nevertheless requires a zero valuation. If the court determines that § 42-11054(C)(2) applies, then it should determine whether that provision violates the Arizona Constitution's Exemptions Clause or Uniformity Clause as applied here. We vacate the court of appeals' opinion. Finally, we deny Taxpayers' request for an award of attorney fees pursuant to § 12-348(B), without prejudice to their reasserting the request if they prevail before the tax court. Although the legislature has amended some statutes cited in this opinion since this lawsuit began, we cite the current versions because the amendments do not affect the issues presented.

WINTHROP, Presiding Judge: ¶ 1 Phoenix Newspapers, et al. ("Petitioners") are a group of news agencies covering the prosecution of John Michael Allen, a high-profile murder case in which the State is seeking the death penalty. In this special action, Petitioners challenge the superior court's order temporarily precluding Petitioners from disseminating the name or likeness of the lead prosecutor. Petitioners argue the order is an impermissible prior restraint. For the following reasons, we agree and accept jurisdiction, granting the limited relief ultimately sought by Petitioners. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 2 The Allen murder trial began on October 9, 2017. During a recess in the trial on October 25, the prosecutor, Jeannette Gallagher, testified as an alleged victim of stalking in the separate and unrelated trial of Albert Karl Heitzmann. ¶ 3 On October 30, the first day evidence was to be taken in the Allen trial, the Arizona Republic submitted a request to use a still camera in court during the trial, but both the prosecutor and defense counsel again objected. The prosecutor, Gallagher, referenced the stalking trial, asking the court to ensure the media "not cover this until [the Heitzmann] trial is over because I certainly don't want to see it affect that jury and have me as a victim have to go through that trial again." The court denied the newspaper's request as untimely, noting that any request to use a camera in court must by rule be made seven calendar days before the trial date. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 122(c)(2)(A). The court, however, went on to rule that the newspaper could use a still camera in the courtroom beginning seven days from the date of the filing of the request, meaning November 6. In making its ruling, the court did not reference Gallagher's request. ¶ 4 On the morning of November 6-which turned out to be the last day evidence was presented in the guilt phase of the Allen trial-the court again addressed the newspaper's still camera request. After noting that both the prosecution and defense had objected to media coverage of the trial, the court ruled that it would allow the still camera in the courtroom. However, after further noting Gallagher was an alleged victim in the Heitzmann trial, which by then had proceeded to the jury deliberations stage, the court, perhaps in furtherance of Gallagher's previous request, temporarily barred the media from disseminating her name and likeness: [A]t least until further notice, I need the media and I'm ordering that the media not to be able to film Ms. Gallagher or indicate her name in the-any coverage, whether it be video and/or news coverage of this case just until further notice and that is because at this point in time there is a pending case in court where Ms. Gallagher is a victim. The court explained that the court in the Heitzmann trial had barred the jury in that case from hearing evidence about the types of cases Gallagher handled, including that she prosecuted capital murder cases. The court expressed its "need to stick to that [judge's] order," and stated that the restrictions it imposed were "something that can change once that trial has come to completion." The court further explained that it did so to protect the rights of the defendants (Allen and Heitzmann) and any victims, and so the "sanctity of those trials is protected." ¶ 5 Neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel commented regarding the ruling; however, Petitioners' counsel, who was present, objected. Petitioners' counsel argued the restriction on using the prosecutor's name was an unconstitutional prior restraint on the press and that the court should consider less restrictive measures. The court overruled the objection, reiterating that its order was temporary, the rights of the two defendants and the victim were "of the most concern to [the court] at this point," and the court wanted to ensure "that we don't affect two separate trials." The court concluded, "If there's a verdict today and [the Heitzmann trial] is concluded today, then as of tomorrow you will be able to write about [the prosecutor]." ¶ 6 The jury in the Heitzmann trial returned guilty verdicts on November 7, and the aggravation phase of that trial concluded the next day. The jury in the Allen trial returned guilty verdicts on November 8. ¶ 7 On November 9, Petitioners moved to vacate or clarify the November 6 order. The court's public information officer informed Petitioners via e-mail on Monday, November 13, that they were "free to use the prosecutor's name." The court, however, did not issue a formal order to that effect or rule on Petitioners' motion to vacate or clarify the November 6 order. ¶ 8 On November 15, 2017, Petitioners filed a petition for special action, asking this court to hold the superior court's order was an unconstitutional prior restraint on their coverage of the Allen trial. ANALYSIS I. Jurisdiction ¶ 9 We accept special action jurisdiction because Petitioners have no equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal, and they assert the superior court abused its discretion or proceeded in excess of its legal authority. See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a), 3(b)-(c). Further, this dispute involves a legal question of statewide importance. See City of Phoenix v. Superior Court (Laidlaw Waste Sys., Inc.) , 158 Ariz. 214, 216, 762 P.2d 128, 130 (App. 1988). ¶ 10 The State does not challenge Petitioners' standing to bring this request, and we conclude standing exists. See U.S. Const. amend. I ; Ariz. Const. art. 2, §§ 6, 11 ; Ariz. R. Crim. P. 9.3(b) ; KPNX Broad. Co. v. Superior Court , 139 Ariz. 246, 249, 678 P.2d 431, 434 (1984) ; see also Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court , 156 F.3d 940, 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that because media members lack standing to bring a direct appeal, they must rely on a petition for writ of mandamus to seek review of orders denying them access to judicial documents or proceedings); Oregonian Publ'g Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court , 920 F.2d 1462, 1464 (9th Cir. 1990) (same); cf. Citizen Publ'g Co. v. Miller , 210 Ariz. 513, 516, ¶ 8, 115 P.3d 107, 110 (2005) ("There is good reason to [accept special action jurisdiction] when a suit raises serious First Amendment concerns."). ¶ 11 Finally, even if, as the State argues, the superior court's November 6 order became moot once the Heitzmann stalking trial ended, "jurisdiction is not necessarily defeated simply because the order attacked has expired, if the underlying dispute between the parties is one 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.' " KPNX Broad. Co. , 139 Ariz. at 250, 678 P.2d at 435 (quoting Neb. Press Ass'n et al. v. Stuart , 427 U.S. 539, 546, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976) (quoting S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. I.C.C. , 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S.Ct. 279, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911) )). Because criminal trials are often of short duration, orders restricting media coverage of such trials often would evade review absent special action jurisdiction. Id. Accordingly, neither the conclusion of the Heitzmann trial nor the e-mail from the superior court's public information officer moots this special action. II. The Merits ¶ 12 As they did in the superior court, Petitioners argue the court's November 6 order was an impermissible prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment and the Arizona Constitution, and that the court failed to consider less restrictive options before issuing its order. We review de novo the lawfulness of the superior court's order. See Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Burke , 204 Ariz. 251, 253-54, ¶ 10, 63 P.3d 282, 284-85 (2003). ¶ 13 "[P]rior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights." Neb. Press Ass'n , 427 U.S. at 559, 96 S.Ct. 2791 ; accord Near v. Minn. ex rel. Olson , 283 U.S. 697, 713, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931) ("[I]t has been generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the [First Amendment] to prevent previous restraints upon publication."); see also Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court , 101 Ariz. 257, 259, 418 P.2d 594, 596 (1966) ("The words of [ Article 2, Section 6, of] the Arizona Constitution are too plain for equivocation. The right of every person to freely speak, write and publish may not be limited but such a person may be held accountable for an abuse of that right. There can be no censor appointed to whom the press must apply for prior permission to publish...."). ¶ 14 Moreover, the temporary nature of a restraint does not make it less objectionable or reduce the burden on the government to justify it. Neb. Press Ass'n , 427 U.S. at 559, 96 S.Ct. 2791. Thus, "any order prohibiting the publication or broadcast of certain information [is subject] to a 'heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.' " KPNX Broad. Co. , 139 Ariz. at 251, 678 P.2d at 436 (quoting Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe , 402 U.S. 415, 419, 91 S.Ct. 1575, 29 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) ). ¶ 15 In evaluating the propriety of a prior restraint, we consider three factors: (1) the nature and extent of the harm sought to be avoided; (2) whether measures short of a prior restraint would adequately protect against that harm; and (3) how effectively the restraint would operate to prevent the threatened harm. See Neb. Press Ass'n , 427 U.S. at 562, 96 S.Ct. 2791, adopted in KPNX Broad. Co. , 139 Ariz. at 251, 678 P.2d at 436. ¶ 16 First, what was the nature and extent of the harm sought to be avoided by the order? The State has an undeniable interest in protecting the rights of defendants to a fair trial, as well as in protecting a crime victim's right to a prompt and speedy resolution of his or her case. See, e.g. , U.S. Const. amend. VI, XIV ; Ariz. Const. art. 2, §§ 2.1 (A)(10), 24. The court recognized those interests when it noted the possibility that revealing the identity of the prosecutor in media coverage of the Allen trial could affect the jury's deliberations in the unrelated stalking trial, thus potentially negatively affecting the rights of both Heitzmann, the defendant in the stalking trial, and Gallagher, the alleged victim in that trial. In court on November 6, neither the court nor the parties identified any specific harm that might occur absent the order. The court, however, seemingly was concerned that jurors in the stalking trial would see coverage of the Allen murder trial, that they would recognize Gallagher as the victim in their case, and that they would allow that information to affect their decision making, notwithstanding the standard instruction the court gave them to base their verdicts solely on the evidence. Although we agree with the State that the nature and extent of the harm were potentially significant, and clearly the judge in the Heitzmann trial had decided the precluded information was significant enough to bar the jury from hearing it, we also agree with Petitioners that the potential harm was simply too speculative to satisfy the constitutional burden imposed on a prior restraint. See CBS, Inc. v. Davis , 510 U.S. 1315, 1318, 114 S.Ct. 912, 127 L.Ed.2d 358 (1994) (declining to rely on speculative predictions as grounds justifying a prior restraint); United States v. Noriega , 752 F.Supp. 1045, 1054 (S.D. Fla. 1990) ("If nothing else, Nebraska Press stands for the proposition that speculative harm falls well short of the showing necessary for the imposition of a prior restraint." (citing Neb. Press Ass'n , 427 U.S. at 569, 96 S.Ct. 2791 )). ¶ 17 Second, could measures short of a prior restraint have adequately protected against the risk of harm? It appears from the court's comments that the court was primarily concerned about jurors in the Heitzmann trial inadvertently learning that the alleged victim in that case was a capital prosecutor. On this record, we do not know what less restrictive measures the court in the Heitzmann trial had already taken to bar the jury from learning of such information, but if that court considered the information potentially harmful, we presume it would have already fashioned a means to preclude that jury from otherwise learning of it, such as admonishing the jurors to avoid all media coverage of any pending case until they had completed their service. Further, the Heitzmann court could have instructed its jurors that any knowledge of the specific types of cases handled by Gallagher was to have no impact on their deliberations. In other words, to the extent the court in the Heitzmann trial was concerned about that jury learning Gallagher was a capital-case prosecutor, it was up to that court, in the first instance, to fashion a means of preventing that jury from learning that information. ¶ 18 We understand the Allen court's concern that unlimited coverage of the murder trial might expose jurors in the Heitzmann trial to information that could damage Heitzmann's right to a fair trial and Gallagher's right as a crime victim to a prompt and speedy resolution of that other case. This concern arguably became heightened because the Heitzmann jurors possibly were more likely to see or hear media coverage of the Allen trial during the recess on the day of the court's order. Further, because the Heitzmann trial was in recess, it would have been impractical to try to reassemble the Heitzmann jurors and admonish them about exposure to information from the Allen trial. But if that were a realistic concern, the Heitzmann court presumably would have admonished them about that issue at the outset of their jury service. Nevertheless, the court here should have considered such a restrictive measure, and perhaps other measures, including simply contacting the judge in the Heitzmann trial to determine what restrictive measures were already in place and whether other measures were needed, before resorting to a prior restraint. ¶ 19 Third, how effectively would the prior restraint operate to prevent the threatened harm? We agree with Petitioners that, because of the widely disseminated previous reporting on the Allen case and readily available public records, the court's order likely had no real effect except to temporarily limit the media in reporting on the trial. The prosecutor's name had already been associated with the Allen case in numerous media accounts and public records, including the court's own publicly available minute entries. See Okla. Publ'g Co. v. Dist. Court ex rel. Okla. Cty. , 430 U.S. 308, 311, 97 S.Ct. 1045, 51 L.Ed.2d 355 (1977) (invalidating a court order prohibiting the dissemination of a juvenile defendant's name and photograph where that information was obtained during an open court proceeding); In re Charlotte Observer (A Div. of Knight Publ'g Co. & Herald Publ'g Co.) , 921 F.2d 47, 49 (4th Cir. 1990) (invalidating a restriction on the publication of an attorney's name where it was "revealed in open court"); Phoenix Newspapers , 156 F.3d at 949 ("Indeed, if a document becomes part of the public record, the public has access to it, and the press may report its contents." (citing The Florida Star v. B.J.F. , 491 U.S. 524, 538, 109 S.Ct. 2603, 105 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) )). Although the court's order may have operated to temporarily prevent any perceived harm related to the Heitzmann trial, it was likely unnecessary and ineffective, and it infringed the media's right to truthfully disseminate public judicial records that already identified the prosecutor. ¶ 20 Because the court's November 6 order does not pass the three-part test announced in Nebraska Press Ass'n and adopted in KPNX Broadcasting Co. , the order constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on the media's constitutional right to cover the Allen trial. See U.S. Const. amend. I ; see also Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 6. III. The Remedy ¶ 21 In their memoranda, Petitioners asked this court to enter an order requiring that if the superior court intends to impose any other restrictions on the media in this case, it must utilize the least-restrictive means available. By seeking prospective relief, Petitioners in effect asked us to issue an advisory opinion restraining a theoretical future ruling of the superior court. This we decline to do. ¶ 22 At oral argument, however, Petitioners appeared to modify their position by stating they were simply seeking a declaration that the superior court's ruling constituted an impermissible prior restraint on the media's right to cover the Allen trial. Because the issue presented here-a prior restraint imposed in the middle of a jury trial-is an issue capable of repetition but evading review, we accept jurisdiction and grant this portion of the relief Petitioners have requested. Before imposing a prior restraint on the media, a superior court should fully apply the three-part inquiry set forth in Nebraska Press Ass'n and memorialize its findings, including its weighing of the rights of the defendant(s), the press, and any victims, see U.S. Const. amend. I, VI, XIV ; Ariz. Const. art. 2, §§ 2.1 (A)(10), 6, 24, and its consideration of any less restrictive alternatives that might effectively prevent any threatened harm. CONCLUSION ¶ 23 Accordingly, we accept special action jurisdiction and grant in part the limited relief requested by Petitioners. Petitioners' special action petition challenges only the prohibition on the use of the prosecutor's name in media coverage of the trial, and does not challenge that part of the court's order limiting camera coverage of the prosecutor. That same day, the court received a request from 3TV/CBS 5 News to live stream or, alternatively, use a still camera to record the trial. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 122. Both the prosecutor and defense counsel objected, and the court set a hearing for October 12. When no media representative appeared at the hearing, the court denied the live streaming request and found the still camera request to be "abandoned as it relates to the entire trial," although the court indicated it would entertain a motion to reconsider. 3TV/CBS 5 News made no additional requests. Heitzmann's stalking trial began on October 24, 2017. The judge in that case imposed limitations on what the jury could be told about Gallagher's employment, only allowing testimony that she was employed by the Maricopa County Attorney's Office, and not allowing testimony that she prosecuted capital cases or that she was the Bureau Chief of her office's Capital Litigation Bureau. The jury began deliberating on October 31, but took a recess and did not resume until November 7. The State argues the court's order expired upon conclusion of the Heitzmann trial, and we agree; however, the court did not memorialize its order in the minute entry it issued at the close of trial proceedings on November 6, except to note that it had ruled on the request for media coverage "with specific conditions as stated on the record." Thus, the scope and particulars of the order can be gleaned only by carefully analyzing the court's statements over several pages of a transcript. To avoid ambiguity and create a clear record, the superior court should have plainly and concisely made findings, including findings concerning any less restrictive alternatives, and memorialized its ruling and those findings in a written minute entry. At the same time, Petitioners and/or the parties could have submitted a formal order for the court's review and signature concerning the court's findings, the conditions imposed, and the duration of any limitations, but they did not do so. On November 7, the jury found Heitzmann guilty of one count of stalking causing the victim reasonable fear of death, and one count of stalking causing the victim to fear physical injury. The next day, the jury found the presence of two aggravating circumstances as to each count. The jury found Allen guilty of first degree murder, conspiracy to commit child abuse, two counts of intentional or knowing child abuse, and reckless child abuse. The jury also found the victim was under the age of fifteen. On November 16, the jury found Allen should be sentenced to death. Certainly, if the court was concerned that jurors in the Allen trial might inadvertently reveal the name of the prosecutor in that matter to jurors in the Heitzmann trial they might encounter in the courthouse, the court could have admonished them to have no communications regarding the case, including discussions identifying any prosecution or defense counsel. The Allen court also could have admonished its jurors to avoid media coverage of the Heitzmann trial (or perhaps any superior court trials) during their service in the Allen trial to reduce the possibility they would find out that their prosecutor was a victim in the stalking trial and inadvertently mention that to the jurors in that trial. Of course, absent (and perhaps in spite of) such restrictions, jurors in the Heitzmann trial might have learned the victim in their case was a capital prosecutor before the Allen court's November 6 order. Whether any jurors already had that information, and if so, whether it affected their deliberations in any way, is on this record mere speculation.

JUSTICE BRUTINEL, opinion of the Court: ¶ 1 Winslow Memorial Hospital ("Hospital") filed this legal-malpractice action in the Superior Court of Navajo County against Butler Law Firm, PLC ("BLF"), a professional limited liability company ("PLLC") organized in Maricopa County, and against attorneys Everett S. Butler and Matthew D. Williams, both Maricopa County residents (collectively, "Defendants"). The trial court denied Defendants' motion for change of venue. We reverse and hold that venue does not properly lie in Navajo County as to any of the Defendants. I. BACKGROUND ¶ 2 In March 2013, BLF entered into a legal-services agreement (the "Representation Agreement" or "Agreement") with the Hospital to draft an employment contract for the Hospital's CEO. The Hospital is in Navajo County. The Representation Agreement stated that BLF would provide "legal services" to the Hospital and that Everett S. Butler, BLF's sole member, would have "primary responsibility" for representing the Hospital. In addition to an hourly fee, the Hospital agreed to reimburse BLF for costs incurred on its behalf, including "travel, parking, computerized legal research, long distance calls, photocopying, court costs and filing fees, court transcripts, messenger services, etc." The Representation Agreement was written on BLF's letterhead and displayed BLF's Phoenix address, but it was silent as to where BLF was to perform its services under the Agreement. ¶ 3 The relationship between the parties soured. In January 2016, the Hospital sued BLF, Butler, and Williams, a non-member attorney employed by BLF. The complaint alleged legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. ¶ 4 Defendants moved to transfer venue to Maricopa County pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-404(A). They argued that because all Defendants resided in Maricopa County, venue in Navajo County was improper unless a statutory exception applied under A.R.S. § 12-401. ¶ 5 The trial court denied the motion. Relying on Morgensen v. Superior Court , 127 Ariz. 55, 56, 617 P.2d 1171, 1172 (App. 1980), it found that venue in Navajo County was proper under § 12-401(5) because "the plaintiff exclusively contracted business in Navajo County." The court also found venue proper under § 12-401(18), reasoning that because the liability limitations of both limited liability companies ("LLCs") and corporations are susceptible to "veil-piercing," LLCs should be considered corporations for venue purposes. The court did not address any other exception. The court of appeals declined special-action review. ¶ 6 We granted review to consider (1) whether BLF "contracted in writing to perform an obligation" in Navajo County, and (2) whether an LLC is an "other corporation" contemplated by the venue statute. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3), of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24. II. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review ¶ 7 The interpretation of Arizona's venue statutes is a matter of law that we review de novo. Yarbrough v. Montoya-Paez , 214 Ariz. 1, 4 ¶ 11, 147 P.3d 755, 758 (App. 2006) ; see Samiuddin v. Nothwehr , 243 Ariz. 204, 207 ¶ 7, 404 P.3d 232, 235 (2017). "Our primary goal in interpreting statutes is to effectuate the legislature's intent." Rasor v. Nw. Hosp., LLC , 243 Ariz. 160, 164 ¶ 20, 403 P.3d 572, 576 (2017). To determine that intent, we look first to the statute's language. See State v. Burbey , 243 Ariz. 145, 147 ¶ 7, 403 P.3d 145, 147 (2017) ; Wilks v. Manobianco , 237 Ariz. 443, 446 ¶ 8, 352 P.3d 912, 915 (2015). "When the text is clear and unambiguous, we apply the plain meaning and our inquiry ends." Burbey , 243 Ariz. at 147 ¶ 7, 403 P.3d at 147. Statutes relating to the same subject or general purpose should be considered to guide construction and to give effect to all the provisions involved. Stambaugh v. Killian , 242 Ariz. 508, 509 ¶ 7, 398 P.3d 574, 574 (2017). But when a statute's language is ambiguous, we look to its "legislative history, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose." Rasor , 243 Ariz. at 164 ¶ 20, 403 P.3d at 576. ¶ 8 Section 12-401 provides generally that "[n]o person shall be sued out of the county in which such person resides" unless a statutory exception applies. The statutory exceptions to the general venue rule are narrowly construed, and "courts will not enlarge or add to an express exception." Wray v. Superior Court , 82 Ariz. 79, 84, 308 P.2d 701 (1957). To determine venue, courts consider the complaint and construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Pride v. Superior Court , 87 Ariz. 157, 160, 348 P.2d 924 (1960). The general venue rule is sufficiently important, however, that "an equal doubt between the exception and the rule is to be resolved in favor of the rule." Goodrich v. Superior Oil Co. , 150 Tex. 159,237 S.W.2d 969, 972 (1951). Our court of appeals has noted that "convenience to the defendant is ... the first consideration in establishing venue." Yarbrough , 214 Ariz. at 3 ¶ 4, 147 P.3d at 757. ¶ 9 The Hospital argues that three exceptions allow Defendants to be sued in Navajo County: A.R.S. § 12-401, subsections (5), (10), and (18). Because it is not clear that the trial court considered the applicability of subsection (10), although the Hospital urged it as a ground for suing Defendants in Navajo County, we confine our review to subsections (5) and (18). B. Written Contract to Perform an Obligation in One County ¶ 10 Section 12-401(5) states: "Persons who have contracted in writing to perform an obligation in one county may be sued in such county or where they reside." We interpreted this provision in Miller Cattle Co. v. Mattice : "[I]f the contract be in writing, and must necessarily be executed in a county different from that of the domicile of the party contracting, then, for breach of the contract, he may be sued in either of these counties." 38 Ariz. 180, 185, 298 P. 640 (1931) (quoting Seley v. Williams , 20 Tex.Civ.App. 405, 50 S.W. 399, 400 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899) ). The contract itself must "plainly specify" or necessarily imply the place of performance. Id. at 184-5, 298 P. 640 (citing Cecil v. Fox , 208 S.W. 954, 955-56 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) ); accord Blakely v. Superior Court , 6 Ariz. App. 1, 2, 429 P.2d 493 (1967). ¶ 11 The Hospital argues that the Representation Agreement was a written contract to perform legal services in Navajo County because the Agreement expressly referred to representation of the Hospital (located in Navajo County) with respect to the Hospital's Navajo County business affairs. Therefore, according to the Hospital, BLF's obligations under the Representation Agreement could not be performed without "acting within" Navajo County, "whether by traveling there physically or by causing effects within that county by use of the Internet and other communication methods." ¶ 12 But for venue to lie in Navajo County, the Representation Agreement must have required performance there, "either expressly or by necessary implication." Blakely , 6 Ariz. App. at 2, 429 P.2d 493. To determine whether the Representation Agreement so required, we consider not only its text but also the allegations in the complaint, construing them in the Hospital's favor. See Tribolet v. Fowler , 77 Ariz. 59, 61, 266 P.2d 1088 (1954). Here, the Representation Agreement did not specify any place of performance. Moreover, nowhere in its complaint does the Hospital allege that the Representation Agreement required BLF to perform legal services in Navajo County. Indeed, the complaint is silent as to where BLF was to perform its obligations. Likewise, nothing in the Representation Agreement implied that BLF must do any work in Navajo County. Thus, neither the Representation Agreement nor the complaint provides any support for finding that BLF was required, expressly or by necessary implication, to perform in Navajo County. ¶ 13 The trial court misconstrued Morgensen by finding that the Agreement implicitly required performance in Navajo County because the Hospital "exclusively contracted business" there. Although the Hospital is in Navajo County, "[t]he determining factor is not whether the contract requires the plaintiff to perform in the county of suit, but whether it requires the defendant to so perform." Morgensen , 127 Ariz. at 57, 617 P.2d at 1173 (emphasis added). And we will not expand the meaning of "place of performance" to include a place where performance merely causes an effect. See Wray , 82 Ariz. at 84, 308 P.2d 701. BLF's performance under the contract may have had an effect in Navajo County, but BLF was not explicitly or implicitly required to perform any services in Navajo County. C. Venue as to the Attorney Defendants ¶ 14 The Hospital also claims venue is proper as to Butler and Williams individually under subsection (5) because, under the PLLC statute, each member or employee of a PLLC remains "personally liable for any results of the negligent or wrongful acts, omissions or misconduct committed by him or by any person under his direct supervision and control while performing professional services on behalf of the limited liability company." A.R.S. § 29-846 (emphasis added). ¶ 15 This argument is unavailing. Subsection (5) applies only to "[p]ersons who have contracted in writing to perform an obligation." Here, neither attorney entered into the Representation Agreement; rather, BLF did. As the Hospital acknowledges, although Butler signed the Agreement, he did so as BLF's agent. See A.R.S. § 29-654 (describing when a member or manager is an agent of an LLC). But when an LLC binds itself to a contract through an agent, only the LLC, not the agent, is bound to the contract. See Queiroz v. Harvey , 220 Ariz. 273, 275 ¶ 8, 205 P.3d 1120, 1122 (2009) ; Restatement (Third) of Agency § 6.01. ¶ 16 Even if Butler were bound personally by the Representation Agreement, contract-based venue in Navajo County would remain improper for the reasons discussed above. See supra ¶¶ 10-13. And in no event would the Representation Agreement create venue as to Williams, who did not sign the Agreement and is not even a member of BLF. ¶ 17 Furthermore, even if the subsection (5) exception applied to BLF, venue would still not lie as to Butler and Williams. Section 12-401(7) provides: "When there are several defendants residing in different counties, action may be brought in the county in which any of the defendants reside." This permits defendants to be subject to venue outside their county of residence, but only if another defendant is a resident in the county of suit. BLF is not a resident of Navajo County, so § 12-401(7) would not make venue proper as to Butler and Williams under subsection (5) or any other exception. D. Actions Against "Other Corporations" ¶ 18 Section 12-401(18) states: Actions against railroad companies, insurance companies, telegraph or telephone companies, joint stock companies and other corporations may be brought in any county in which the cause of action, or a part thereof, arose, or in the county in which the defendant has an agent or representative, owns property or conducts any business. Subsection (18) does not refer to LLCs, so it does not on its face apply to BLF. But the Hospital argues, as it successfully did in the trial court, that a limited liability company is an "other corporation[ ]" under the statute. ¶ 19 Subsection (18) creates an exception for "other corporations." We interpret words in a statute in accordance with their statutory definition. See Fields v. Elected Officials' Ret. Plan , 234 Ariz. 214, 219 ¶ 19, 320 P.3d 1160, 1165 (2014). The venue statute itself does not define "corporation." Statutes in title 10, although limited to specific sections, define various types of "corporation[s]" by reference to their governing statutes. See, e.g. , A.R.S. § 10-140(14) (" 'Corporation' ... means a corporation for profit ... that is incorporated under or subject to chapters 1 through 17 of this title."). No statutory definition of "corporation," however, includes LLCs. ¶ 20 The Arizona Constitution states, "The term 'corporation,' as used in this article, shall be construed to include all associations and joint stock companies having any powers or privileges of corporations not possessed by individuals or co-partnerships...." Ariz. Const. art. 14, § 1. The "powers or privileges" of corporations are found in A.R.S. § 10-302. See Reilly v. Clyne , 27 Ariz. 432, 435-36, 234 P. 35 (1925). These powers are quite similar to those of a domestic LLC, which are addressed in A.R.S. § 29-610(A). Nevertheless, an LLC does not fall within the constitutional definition, which by its terms is limited to article 14. But more importantly, the LLC statute's placement in the overall statutory scheme, its history, and its structure reflect the legislature's intent to create a new form of unincorporated business entity. ¶ 21 Limited liability companies are statutorily created entities formed pursuant to the Arizona Limited Liability Company Act ("ALLCA"). A.R.S. §§ 29-601 to -858. The legislature placed ALLCA within title 29, which governs partnerships, whereas corporations are governed by title 10. The inclusion of ALLCA under a separate title from corporations bespeaks a legislative intent to create an entity distinct from corporations. And the legislature expressly recognized that an LLC organized outside Arizona is an "unincorporated entity." See § 29-601(13) (defining "foreign limited liability company"). ¶ 22 Legislative history is likewise bereft of any suggestion that LLCs fall within the subsection (18) exception. Partnerships have never been included in an exception in the venue statute and are therefore covered by the general venue rule under § 12-401. See Rev. Stat. Ariz. Terr., Civ. Code, § 17-85 (1901). And because ALLCA was enacted long after the general venue statute and the corporation exception, the legislature could not have intended to include LLCs in an exception to the venue statute when it was enacted. Nor has the legislature since manifested any intent to include them. Cf. Collins v. Stockwell , 137 Ariz. 416, 420, 671 P.2d 394, 398 (1983) ("Courts will not read into a statute something that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as gathered from the statute itself."). To the contrary, the inclusion of ALLCA in title 29 suggests that the legislature did not consider LLCs to be "other corporations" for venue purposes. ¶ 23 Furthermore, the LLC structure is sufficiently different from that of corporations that an LLC does not naturally fall within the scope of "other corporations" in subsection (18). An Arizona LLC is a distinct business entity that is neither a partnership nor a corporation. "Limited liability companies are statutorily-created entities, designed primarily to provide the personal liability protection found in a corporate structure, while allowing the LLC members the state and federal tax benefits generally provided in a partnership setting." TM2008 Invs., Inc. v. Procon Capital Corp. , 234 Ariz. 421, 424 ¶ 13, 323 P.3d 704, 707 (App. 2014). Although corporations and LLCs have overlapping statutory powers, an LLC can waive any of these powers in its articles of organization. § 29-610(B). And LLCs have features shared by neither corporations nor partnerships: for instance, unlike both corporations and partnerships, LLC members do not owe each other fiduciary duties unless they are expressly included in the LLC operating agreement. See TM2008 Invs. , 234 Ariz. at 424-25 ¶¶ 13-15, 323 P.3d at 707-78. Indeed, an LLC's organizational flexibility is one of its central characteristics: an LLC may be managed directly by its members, making it more like a partnership, or it may be managed by a manager or group of managers, making it more like a corporation. See A.R.S. § 29-632(A)(6), (B)-(C). Although some LLCs, because of their specific articles of organization, may more closely resemble a corporation, LLCs as a class are not sufficiently like corporations to be included in the "corporation" exception for venue. ¶ 24 The trial court erred when it applied the subsection (18) exception on the basis that LLCs, like corporations, are amenable to "veil-piercing," that is, subjecting their members to personal liability via the alter-ego doctrine. Venue and the alter-ego doctrine reflect different policy considerations. Venue is based on convenience in choosing the site for litigation, see, e.g. , Sil-Flo Corp. v. Bowen , 98 Ariz. 77, 83, 402 P.2d 22 (1965), whereas the alter-ego doctrine attempts to prevent "fraud," "misuse," and "injustice" arising from misuse of the corporate form of organization, see NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC Commc'ns, LLC , 537 F.3d 168, 176-77 (2d Cir. 2008). Moreover, imparting such an expansive meaning to "other corporations" would substantially increase the reach of the exception. Absent legislative action, we "will not enlarge or add to [this] express exception." Wray , 82 Ariz. at 84, 308 P.2d 701. III. CONCLUSION ¶ 25 We reverse the trial court's order denying the Defendants' motion for a change of venue, and we remand the case to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. "Because Arizona's venue statute was adopted from the Texas statute, that state's decisions are of particular interest." Cacho v. Superior Court , 170 Ariz. 30, 33, 821 P.2d 721, 724 (1991). Section 12-401(10) states, in relevant part: "When the foundation of the action is a crime, offense or trespass for which an action in damages may lie, the action may be brought in the county in which the crime, offense or trespass was committed or in the county in which the defendant or any of the several defendants reside or may be found...." We do not decide here whether subsection (10) applies, and that question may be raised on remand. But we have held that "a defendant must have been present in the county at the time of the commission of the 'trespass' before venue can be laid in that county." Smitherman v. Superior Court , 102 Ariz. 504, 508, 433 P.2d 634, 638 (1967). Professional limited liability companies, like BLF, are formed pursuant to article 11 of ALLCA. A.R.S. §§ 29-841 to -848. Only those licensed to perform the professional services described in a PLLC's articles of organization may be members of that PLLC. § 29-844(B)(1). PLLCs also have distinct rules relating to liability for professional negligence. See § 29-846. None of the unique features of PLLCs are pertinent to this case, and so we base our decision on "the laws applicable to other limited liability companies." See § 29-843. By contrast, some states expressly treat LLCs as partnerships. See, e.g. , Ex parte WMS, LLC , 170 So.3d 645, 650 (Ala. 2014) (applying to LLCs the venue statute for partnerships); Ex parte Miller, Hamilton, Snider & Odom, LLC , 942 So.2d 334, 336 (Ala. 2006) (citing statute declaring that the term "partnership" in any statute encompasses LLCs).

McMURDIE, Judge: ¶ 1 Petitioner John Doe seeks special action relief from a superior court order denying his motion to quash a subpoena served by Real Party in Interest U.S. American Resources, Inc. ("USAR") requiring Doe's identity to be disclosed because of alleged defamatory statements he made on an internet blog. We accept jurisdiction and grant relief, holding that under the controlling analysis set forth in Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe , 217 Ariz. 103, 170 P.3d 712 (App. 2007), and considering the First Amendment's protection of anonymous and pseudonymous speech, USAR's claims would not survive a motion for summary judgment based on the six statements reviewed in the superior court's order. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶ 2 USAR is a mining and exploration company founded by John Owen, who currently serves as its CEO. As part of its business, USAR seeks investors to develop various mining projects by promising them profits from those mining investments. From 2005 to 2007, USAR and its subsidiaries received cease and desist orders from Washington, California, and Maryland, based on its conduct in soliciting investments. ¶ 3 In September 2005, Washington's Department of Financial Institutions Securities Division issued a "Statement of Charges and Notice of Intent to Enter Order to Cease and Desist and to Impose Fines." The securities administrator that issued the statement found USAR "failed to provide material information regarding the investment, including ... the risks involved with gold mining." The statement further concluded that USAR "made misstatements of material fact or omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading." USAR was fined $5000 as part of a consent order related to the statement of charges issued by the State of Washington. ¶ 4 In June 2006, California's Department of Corporations issued a "Desist and Refrain Order," which found USAR was offering securities "by means of written or oral communications which included an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statement made ... not misleading...." As part of the stipulation with the California Department of Corporations, USAR acknowledged, without admitting or denying fault, that the California Corporations Commissioner found USAR made three material omissions when soliciting potential investors regarding a mine in Arizona (the "Chastain" mine). The omissions listed in the stipulation included failing to tell potential investors that (1) USAR was promising more gold on its properties than had been recovered from the entire state of Arizona since the late 1800s; (2) at that time no gold mines were currently active in Arizona; and (3) no Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") mining plan had been approved and USAR was therefore not yet authorized to mine, despite claims that it was mining tons of ore a day. ¶ 5 In September 2007, the Securities Commissioner of Maryland issued to International Energy and Resources, Inc. ("IER"), a wholly owned subsidiary of USAR, a "Final Order to Cease and Desist." In the order, the commissioner found IER had made "materially false and misleading statements regarding the value of [investment] interests and the promised investor profits," and had omitted material facts, "including full representation of the risk associated with an investment in IER." ¶ 6 From May to December 2016, Doe made a series of posts on a blog hosted on InvestorsHub.com, a website that organizes online debates for investors regarding various companies and prospective investments. Doe's posts concerned the viability of USAR mining investments in Arizona and accused USAR of fraud. Doe is a moderator of the blog on which he posted, which is entitled "Mining Company Research Board" and is described as "a place to bring concerns and questions about penny stock mining companies and their mining claims or to just discuss the merits of individual penny stock mining companies and share/build research on those companies." Doe commented on the blog under the username "gitreal." ¶ 7 In January 2017, USAR filed a defamation complaint against Doe for his posts on the blog. Afterwards, USAR served a subpoena on Cox Communications, Inc., seeking Doe's IP address. Doe filed a motion to quash the subpoena, and after oral argument, the superior court denied the motion and ordered Doe's identity revealed. In its order, the superior court did not evaluate all the statements challenged by USAR, but instead focused on just six of the defamatory statements alleged by USAR. The court found that at least one of the statements, if proven true, could render USAR's claim of defamation capable of surviving summary judgment under the test set forth in Mobilisa . Doe filed this petition for special action seeking review of the superior court's ruling. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶ 8 Special action jurisdiction is discretionary and appropriate when no "equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal" exists. Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a). An order denying a motion to quash is appropriate for special action review. Helge v. Druke , 136 Ariz. 434, 436, 666 P.2d 534, 536 (App. 1983). Furthermore, Doe does not have an adequate remedy by appeal because the challenged subpoena will reveal his identity unless this court grants relief. Thus, in the exercise of our discretion, we accept special action jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 12-120.21(A)(4) and Arizona Rule of Procedure for Special Action 1(a). ¶ 9 This court reviews rulings on discovery matters for abuse of discretion. Mobilisa , 217 Ariz. at 107, ¶ 9, 170 P.3d at 716. Whether the superior court applied the correct legal standard, including whether a cause of action could survive a motion for summary judgment, is a matter of law that we review de novo . See Ponce v. Parker Fire Dist. , 234 Ariz. 380, 382, ¶ 9, 322 P.3d 197, 199 (App. 2014). DISCUSSION ¶ 10 Doe argues the superior court abused its discretion by denying his motion to quash and by improperly analyzing the controlling authority set forth in Mobilisa . Because none of the six statements analyzed by the superior court supports a claim that could survive a motion for summary judgment, the superior court erred by denying Doe's motion to quash. ¶ 11 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the right to speak anonymously and to publish pseudonymously. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n , 514 U.S. 334, 341-51, 357, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 426 (1995) ; Mobilisa , 217 Ariz. at 108, ¶ 11, 170 P.3d at 717. Those rights include speech on the internet. Reno v. ACLU , 521 U.S. 844, 870, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997). Furthermore, the Arizona Constitution also provides that "[e]very person may freely speak, write, and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right." Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 6. The Arizona Constitution has been interpreted broadly, and in certain circumstances provides greater protection than the First Amendment. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n , 160 Ariz. 350, 354-55, 773 P.2d 455, 459-60 (1989) ; Sign Here Petitions LLC v. Chavez , 243 Ariz. 99, 104, ¶ 10, 402 P.3d 457, 462 (App. 2017). However, our courts have yet to expressly find a right to speak anonymously or pseudonymously under the Arizona Constitution. But cf. Mountain States , 160 Ariz. at 357, n.13, 773 P.2d at 462 (suggesting the right to privacy under Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 8 may protect right to anonymity and stating citizens have a right to "gain access to an information source" without risking a breach of anonymity). In recognizing that such a right exists under the federal constitution, this court noted that "[t]he right to speak anonymously, however, is not absolute." Mobilisa , 217 Ariz. at 108, ¶ 12, 170 P.3d 712. Therefore, courts must "balance the competing rights of anonymous internet speakers and parties seeking redress for wrongful communications." Id. ; see generally Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous Speech , 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1537, 1594-1602 (2007) ("If all it takes is an allegation of defamation to uncover a defendant's identity, the right to speak anonymously is very fragile indeed ... [o]n the other hand, anonymity should not immunize the defendant's tortious conduct."). ¶ 12 In balancing the competing interest of anonymity and potential tortious conduct, the parties agree that Mobilisa is the controlling authority on whether an anonymous party's identity is subject to disclosure in a defamation action. Under Mobilisa , the party requesting disclosure of the anonymous party's identity must show: (1) the speaker has been given adequate notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond to the discovery request, (2) the requesting party's cause of action could survive a motion for summary judgment on the elements of the claim not dependent on the identity of the anonymous speaker, and (3) a balance of the parties' competing interests favors disclosure. Mobilisa , 217 Ariz. at 114-15, ¶ 40, 170 P.3d at 723-24. Doe does not dispute he had adequate notice under the first prong. ¶ 13 The second prong of the Mobilisa test requires a claim based on at least one statement from Doe to be able to survive a motion for summary judgment on the elements not dependent on Doe's identity. Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Orme Sch. v. Reeves , 166 Ariz. 301, 309-10, 802 P.2d 1000, 1008-09 (1990). Both parties agreed at oral argument that an analysis under the private figure standard was appropriate. USAR's burden at trial would be to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the statements were false and negligently made. However, in reviewing a hypothetical summary judgment motion in a defamation case under Mobilisa , the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the anonymous speaker. Mobilisa , 217 Ariz. at 113, ¶ 34, 170 P.3d at 722. Accordingly, USAR "must present evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case with convincing clarity." See Sign Here , 243 Ariz. at 104, ¶ 14, 402 P.3d at 462. ¶ 14 "Under Arizona common law, a defamatory publication by a private figure on matters of private concern 'must be false and must bring the defamed person into disrepute, contempt, or ridicule, or must impeach that person's honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation.' " Sign Here , 243 Ariz. at 104, ¶ 15, 402 P.3d at 462 (quoting Turner v. Devlin , 174 Ariz. 201, 203-04, 848 P.2d 286, 288-89 (1993) ). The court first decides whether "under all the circumstances, [the] statement is capable of bearing a defamatory meaning." Yetman v. English , 168 Ariz. 71, 79, 811 P.2d 323, 331 (1991). If so, the jury may then decide "whether the defamatory meaning ... was in fact conveyed." Id. ¶ 15 Doe argues his statements were substantially true. In a defamation action, truth is an absolute defense. Read v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. , 169 Ariz. 353, 355, 819 P.2d 939, 941 (1991). A defamatory statement that damages a plaintiff's reputation is actionable only if the inaccuracy changes the "substantial sting" of an otherwise true statement. Fendler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. , 130 Ariz. 475, 480, 636 P.2d 1257, 1262 (App. 1981). The burden rests on the plaintiff to show triable issues, and therefore the falsity of the statements made, because to hold otherwise would have a chilling effect on free speech. See Read , 169 Ariz. at 356-57, 819 P.2d at 942-43 ; Sign Here , 243 Ariz. at 104, ¶ 14, 402 P.3d at 462. ¶ 16 The superior court found USAR could prove six of the statements were false. Because only one statement capable of surviving a motion for summary judgment is necessary to deny the motion to quash, the court did not review the remaining statements made by Doe. Doe challenges the superior court's findings on the statements reviewed. 1. USAR Claims that "the California Desist and Refrain Order states that the 'goal' was to raise $10 million, not ... $30 million," and "USAR has never raised $30 million," Resulting in Defamation. ¶ 17 In a post, Doe stated that "USAR 'bilked' investors out of $30 million." USAR argued that such a claim was defamatory because the goal in California was to raise $10 million, not $30 million, and USAR has never raised $30 million. Doe maintained that a discrepancy in the amounts of money USAR sought to raise, or did raise, did not establish the falsity of his statements because the amount of money to be raised is not the "substantial sting" of the statement, which was that USAR fraudulently raised funds. Because the original statement-that "USAR 'bilked' investors out of $30 million"-would be no less derogatory if it stated "$10 million," we agree. See Read , 169 Ariz. at 355, 819 P.2d at 941 (determination of substantial truth looks at whether the literal truth would have made a material difference). ¶ 18 USAR contends the difference in the amount of money is large enough to alter the defamatory sting. However, Doe was asserting that USAR fraudulently attempted to raise large sums from investors, and therefore the amount of money actually raised is much less significant than the fact of fraudulent conduct. See Sign Here , 243 Ariz. at 106-07, ¶ 25, 402 P.3d at 464-65 (the "general tenor" was not to report the exact number involved in the statement, but the action itself); Fendler , 130 Ariz. at 480, 636 P.2d at 1262. Accordingly, these statements do not establish the falsity of Doe's statement such that it would survive a motion for summary judgment. 2. USAR Claims that "the Maryland documents describe two Maryland investors in [International Energy Resources, Inc. ("IER") ], not USAR, who lost a total of $62,500, not $30 million," and "Maryland's Cease and Desist Order was against another entity, IER, and not against USAR." ¶ 19 Disputing Doe's "bilked" statement further, USAR maintained that the two Maryland investors lost only $62,500 and not $30 million, and therefore the statement was false. Doe's "bilked" statement was not wholly based on the two Maryland investors included in the Maryland cease and desist order. While some of Doe's statements referred to the Maryland order, he did not identify the Maryland order as the exclusive basis for the $30 million claim. As stated above, the "substantial sting" of Doe's statements was the fraudulent practices of USAR, not the specific amounts of money any one investor lost by investing. See Fendler , 130 Ariz. at 480, 636 P.2d at 1262 (damage to reputation of the plaintiff came from conviction of crime, not his presence in a prison). ¶ 20 USAR further contends that any reference to the Maryland cease and desist order was false because the order was against IER and not USAR, and specifically points to Doe's statement that, "Three different state securities commissions found the securities offered by USAR to be illegal." Doe claims IER and USAR are not distinct entities because IER is a wholly owned subsidiary of USAR, has the same business address, and has the same CEO and founder (Owen). Therefore, Doe asserts it is irrelevant that the Maryland Cease and Desist Order named IER and not USAR. Additionally, Doe maintains "[t]he sting of violating anti-fraud provisions of securities law in three states rather than two is inconsequential." We agree. That the Maryland cease and desist order did not specifically identify USAR does not render Doe's statement substantially false. ¶ 21 A reasonable person reading Doe's statement would not distinguish the actions of IER and USAR based on the corporate structure or their operation. As Doe identified in his petition, USAR and IER have the same CEO and founder, same address, and often the same ventures. USAR's response acknowledges its ownership and operation of the Chastain Mine. The management of the "Chastain Mine Joint Venture" was the subject of the Maryland cease and desist order identified by Doe, and as such, a person reading Doe's statements regarding the two companies could reasonably interpret the two corporations to be equally liable for the management of the Chastain Mine. See Yetman , 168 Ariz. at 76, 811 P.2d at 328 (when considering whether alleged defamatory statements are actionable assertions of fact, courts review whether a statement "stated or implied an assertion of objective fact 'from the point of view of the reasonable person' "). Furthermore, California and Washington found no reason to distinguish the actions of these two corporate entities, and mentioned both by name in their respective cease and desist orders. Finally, the "substantial sting" of Doe's statements is not altered in any significant way because only two states found USAR's conduct in violation of securities law, instead of three. See Read , 169 Ariz. at 355, 819 P.2d at 941 ("Slight inaccuracies will not prevent a statement from being true in substance, as long as the 'gist' or 'sting' of the publication is justified.") (quoting Heuisler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. , 168 Ariz. 278, 285, n.4, 812 P.2d 1096, 1103 (App. 1991) ); Sign Here , 243 Ariz. at 107-08, ¶ 30, 402 P.3d at 465-66 ; Fendler , 130 Ariz. at 480, 636 P.2d at 1262. Thus, these statements also do not establish the falsity of Doe's statements. 3. USAR Claims that Doe's Statements that USAR's Operation is a "Scam" is Refuted by an Affidavit that "Kevin Jones, an expert geologist, opines in his declaration that the Congress Mine Tailings Project is not worthless, and that USAR's mining projects held tremendous potential." ¶ 22 Doe referred to USAR's operation in several posts as a "scam," and stated "[Kevin Jones's company, Cardinal Resources, Inc.] did a series of technical reports in 2006 on the Congress Mine that Owen then used in the same fraudulent fashion up through the current time to promote the same bogus mining project." USAR presented an affidavit from geologist and president of Cardinal Resources, Inc., Kevin Jones, that stated "the Chastain Mine a/k/a the Rex Mine, hold [sic] substantial potential reserves in gold, silver, and other precious metals." Relying on the affidavit, the court found Doe's statements would survive a summary judgment motion. We disagree. ¶ 23 Most of the Jones affidavit concerned the "Congress Mine," which USAR admits in its response "is not owned or operated by USAR." The only statement in the affidavit relating to USAR's "Chastain Mine" is at the end of the affidavit, and states simply, "the Chastain Mine a/k/a the Rex Mine, hold [sic] substantial potential reserves in gold, silver, and other precious metals." This statement alone would not be sufficient to establish the falsity of Doe's statement under the summary judgment standard in a defamation case, which requires evidence "sufficient to establish a prima facie case with convincing clarity." See Read , 169 Ariz. at 356-57, 819 P.2d at 942-43 ; Sign Here , 243 Ariz. at 104, ¶ 14, 402 P.3d at 462 ; see also Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (opposing party must set forth "specific facts" to defeat a motion for summary judgment); Florez v. Sargeant , 185 Ariz. 521, 526, 917 P.2d 250, 255 (1996) ("[A]ffidavits that only set forth ultimate facts or conclusions of law can neither support nor defeat a motion for summary judgment."). The affidavit provides no facts supporting the legitimacy of the Chastain Mine. While the geologist describes extensive studies and testing done on the Congress Mine, and declares he has personally processed mine tailings at the Congress Mine, he makes no such claim regarding the Chastain Mine. USAR's response is equally conclusory when attempting to rebut Doe's argument. USAR simply quotes the geologist's statement from his affidavit and then asserts: "Thus, the [affidavit] created a genuine issue of material fact." The conclusory statements by the geologist are insufficient to establish the falsity of Doe's statements. 4. USAR Claims that Doe's Statement that USAR and Vast Mountain Development are the Same Entity is Demonstrably False. ¶ 24 Finally, the superior court cited a declaration stating that USAR and Vast Mountain Development are separate entities as evidence establishing the falsity of Doe's statement that "USAR is the same entity as Vast Mountain Development which is engaged in fraudulent conduct." Again, the "substantial sting" of Doe's alleged defamatory statement is that USAR engaged in fraudulent activities. While USAR and Vast Mountain Development may be separate entities, the defamatory thrust of Doe's statement is again the fraudulent actions of USAR, which are not proven substantially untrue by USAR's assertion that it is a separate entity than Vast Mountain Development. CONCLUSION ¶ 25 We accept special action jurisdiction and grant relief because the superior court erred by finding USAR's claims could survive a motion for summary judgment based on the six statements reviewed in the superior court's order. Because we find USAR's claims would not survive a motion for summary judgment under the second prong of Mobilisa , we need not reach the third prong, which balances the competing parties' interests. Mobilisa , 217 Ariz. at 114-15, ¶ 40, 170 P.3d at 723-24. Nor do we address the other arguments raised by Doe. See In re Eric L. , 189 Ariz. 482, 486, 943 P.2d 842, 846 (App. 1997) (the court need not review other arguments if one argument is dispositive). Accordingly, we remand to the superior court to review USAR's remaining claims under the Mobilisa analysis and determine if any of the other claims raised by USAR could survive a motion for summary judgment. Under the public figure standard, the plaintiff must make an additional showing of "actual malice" on the part of the speaker, "that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan , 376 U.S. 254, 280-83, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964) ; see Dombey v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. , 150 Ariz. 476, 480-81, 724 P.2d 562, 566-67 (1986). Doe provided evidence that, like USAR and IER, Vast Mountain Development is part of the same enterprise. All three companies share the same founder, CEO, and business address. While we need not make such a determination in this decision, the evidence presented suggests these entities are closely related. See Walker v. Sw. Mines Dev. Co. , 52 Ariz. 403, 414, 81 P.2d 90 (1938) ("[W]hile in general, a corporation is a separate legal entity, nevertheless when one corporation so dominates and controls another as to make that other a simple instrumentality or adjunct to it, the courts will look beyond the legal fiction of distinct corporate existence, as the interests of justice require...."); Keg Rests. Ariz., Inc. v. Jones , 240 Ariz. 64, 73, ¶ 31, 375 P.3d 1173, 1182 (App. 2016).

GEMMILL, Judge: ¶ 1 Watts Water Technologies, Inc. ("Watts") appeals the denial of its motions to dismiss and compel arbitration. The parties disagree about whether these product liability subrogation claims are subject to mandatory contractual arbitration. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. BACKGROUND ¶ 2 In April 2014, a Watts-made water supply line allegedly failed at the residence of Terry and Lisa McNemar, causing property damage. The McNemars' insurer, Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company ("Allstate"), paid $53,149.65 for the McNemars' loss and nearly two years later, in March 2016, filed a subrogation action against Watts. ¶ 3 In June 2014, Russell and Pam Vaughn suffered property damage following the alleged malfunction of a reverse osmosis water filter manufactured by Watts. The Vaughns were insured by State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, Inc. ("State Farm"). State Farm paid $15,675.00 for the Vaughns' loss and filed a subrogation action against Watts in April 2016. ¶ 4 At the time of the incidents causing property damage, Allstate, State Farm (collectively, "the Insurers"), and Watts were parties to a Property Subrogation Arbitration Agreement ("the Agreement") promulgated by Arbitration Forums, Inc. ("AF"), which required that signatory companies forego litigation and arbitrate property subrogation claims. Article First of the Agreement, signed by Allstate in 1996 and State Farm in 2003, provided in pertinent part: Signatory companies are bound to forego litigation and in place thereof submit to arbitration any questions or disputes which may arise from ... any fire subrogation or property damage claim not in excess of $100,000. The Agreement, signed by Watts in 2005, also provided, in Article Fifth, that "AF, representing the signatory companies, is authorized to ... (a) make appropriate Rules and Regulations for the presentation and determination of controversies under this Agreement." ¶ 5 In November 2014, AF advised its signatory members through an e-bulletin that, effective January 1, 2015, it was adding a "new exclusion" to the Agreement that would remove product liability claims arising from allegedly defective products from the claims subject to mandatory arbitration between signatory companies. The November e-bulletin further advised: While the use of the Property Program to resolve disputes involving product liability claims arising from an alleged defective product will no longer be compulsory as of January 1, 2015, cases filed prior to January 1, 2015 will remain in arbitration's jurisdiction and will be processed to hearing. ¶ 6 AF did not include the foregoing e-bulletin language regarding claims accrued or "cases filed prior to January 1, 2015" within the revised Agreement ("Amended Agreement") promulgated by AF in January 2015. Instead, only the following exclusion (i) was added to Article Second: Article Second Exclusions No company shall be required, without its written consent , to arbitrate any claim or suit if: ... (i) it is a product liability claim arising from an alleged defective product. (Emphasis in original). The Amended Agreement does not include any language specifying whether the new exclusion applied to claims accruing before 2015 but not filed until after January 1, 2015. Neither Watts nor the Insurers signed the Amended Agreement with the new exclusion removing product liability claims from compulsory arbitration. ¶ 7 In 2016, the Insurers filed product liability actions against Watts in superior court, based on the losses that occurred in 2014. Watts moved for dismissal of the lawsuits or alternatively for a stay and order compelling arbitration. Watts argued the claims accrued before January 2015 and were therefore subject to mandatory arbitration under the Agreement in effect in 2014. After briefing and oral argument, the superior court in State Farm's case denied Watts's motion, finding the Agreement "was modified and the matter before the Court is not subject to mandatory arbitration." The superior court in Allstate's case concluded that "as both Plaintiff and Defendant are signatories to the AF Agreement, they are bound by the provisions of the same, including the right of AF to delineate when its services will be provided," and, therefore, denied the motion. Watts timely appeals the superior court's orders denying the motions to dismiss and compel arbitration. We have consolidated these appeals. Appellate jurisdiction is based upon Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 12-120.21(A)(1) (2018) and -2101.01(A)(1) (2018). See also Brumett v. MGA Home Healthcare, L.L.C., 240 Ariz. 420, 430-31, ¶¶ 20-21, 380 P.3d 659, 669-70 (App. 2016). ANALYSIS ¶ 8 Watts argues the superior court erred in denying its motions to dismiss and compel arbitration because AF's change to the Agreement does not govern claims arising before the change. The Insurers maintain that AF was authorized by the Agreement to exclude product liability claims because of its power to make "appropriate Rules and Regulations for the presentation and determination of controversies under th[e] Agreement," and therefore the superior court correctly determined product liability claims filed after January 1, 2015 were "excluded" from compulsory arbitration. The parties ask us to determine which is applicable-the Agreement, based on date of loss, or the Amended Agreement, based on date of filing. ¶ 9 The validity and enforceability of an arbitration agreement are mixed questions of fact and law that we review de novo. Estate of DeCamacho ex rel. Guthrie v. La Solana Care & Rehab, Inc ., 234 Ariz. 18, 20-21, ¶ 9, 316 P.3d 607, 612 (App. 2014) (citing Schoneberger v. Oelze , 208 Ariz. 591, 594, ¶ 12, 96 P.3d 1078, 1081 (App. 2004) ). We also review de novo a trial court's decision whether to compel arbitration. Sun Valley Ranch 308 Ltd. P'ship ex rel. Englewood Props., Inc. v. Robson , 231 Ariz. 287, 291, ¶ 9, 294 P.3d 125, 129 (App. 2012) (citing Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Schwartz , 230 Ariz. 310, 311, ¶ 4, 283 P.3d 41, 42 (App. 2012) ). ¶ 10 A written arbitration agreement "is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." A.R.S. § 12-1501 (2018); accord A.R.S. § 12-3006(A) (2018); see also U.S. Insulation, Inc. v. Hilro Constr. Co ., 146 Ariz. 250, 256, 705 P.2d 490, 496 (App. 1985). When a party denies the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, the trial court "shall proceed summarily to the determination of the issue so raised." A.R.S. § 12-1502(A) (2018); see also A.R.S. § 12-3006(B) ("The court shall decide whether an agreement to arbitrate exists or a controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate."). "Although it is commonly said that the law favors arbitration, it is more accurate to say that the law favors arbitration of disputes that the parties have agreed to arbitrate." S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Peabody W. Coal Co. , 194 Ariz. 47, 51, ¶ 11, 977 P.2d 769, 773 (1999) (citing Clarke v. ASARCO Inc. , 123 Ariz. 587, 589, 601 P.2d 587, 589 (1979), and Pima Cty. v. Maya Constr. Co. , 158 Ariz. 151, 154, 761 P.2d 1055, 1058 (1988) ); see also Smith v. Pinnamaneni , 227 Ariz. 170, 176, ¶ 22, 254 P.3d 409, 415 (App. 2011) ("[A] party is bound to arbitrate only those disputes which it has contractually agreed to arbitrate."). ¶ 11 The parties do not contest the validity of the Agreement or the Amended Agreement. The parties acknowledge that each signed the Agreement to forego litigation and submit to arbitration all claims described therein. The parties also agree that the Amended Agreement was effective January 2015 and applies to all claims accruing thereafter. Watts, however, contends the Amended Agreement did not negate its right to arbitration of claims that arose before January 2015, but were filed after January 1, 2015. The Insurers argue in response that the Amended Agreement unambiguously applies to all claims filed after January 1, 2015, regardless of when the claim arose. ¶ 12 To resolve this conflict, we look to the plain language of the Agreement and Amended Agreement. See US W. Commc'ns, Inc. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n , 185 Ariz. 277, 280, 915 P.2d 1232, 1235 (App. 1996) (explaining the purpose of contract interpretation "is to determine and enforce the parties' intent" (citing Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. , 175 Ariz. 148, 152, 854 P.2d 1134, 1138 (1993) ) ). "[I]t is axiomatic that any agreement must be construed as a whole, and each part must be read in light of all the other parts." C & T Land & Dev. Co. v. Bushnell , 106 Ariz. 21, 22, 470 P.2d 102, 103 (1970) (citing Goodman v. Newzona Inv. Co. , 101 Ariz. 470, 473, 421 P.2d 318, 321 (1966) ). We apply a common-sense approach and consider the language used and the organizational structure of the contract. See Sw. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. SunAmp Sys., Inc. , 172 Ariz. 553, 560, 838 P.2d 1314, 1321 (App. 1992) (citing Burkons v. Ticor Title Ins , 168 Ariz. 345, 350-51, 813 P.2d 710, 715-16 (1991) ); see also Fishman v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank , 247 F.3d 300, 302-03 (1st Cir. 2001) ("Common sense is as much a part of contract interpretation as is the dictionary or the arsenal of canons."). ¶ 13 Based on the language of the Agreement in effect in 2014 when the property damage occurred, arbitration of product liability claims less than $100,000 was compulsory-the Insurers and Watts had agreed upon it. The Insurers contend, however, that the Agreement was amended and superseded in 2015 by the Amended Agreement and that AF had the power to promulgate new exclusions because Article Fifth of the Agreement authorized AF to "make appropriate Rules and Regulations for the presentation and determination of controversies under this Agreement." To evaluate this provision, we must examine the organizational structure and language of the Agreement. ¶ 14 Article First of the Agreement describes with specificity the disputes the signatory companies agreed to arbitrate, limited by the exclusions in Article Second. Articles First and Second therefore delineate the controversies the parties agreed to arbitrate. ¶ 15 Article Fifth separately empowers AF to make rules and regulations for the arbitration of "controversies under this Agreement"-that is, to promulgate procedures for the presentation of evidence and conduct of the arbitrations. AF's unilateral addition of a new exclusion of product liability claims from mandatory arbitration was not a mere procedural rule change. Rather, it was a significant, substantive change. Cf. Thurston v. Judges' Retirement Plan , 179 Ariz. 49, 51, 876 P.2d 545, 547 (1994) ("[I]t is generally agreed that a substantive law creates, defines and regulates rights while a procedural one prescribes the method of enforcing such rights or obtaining redress."). Nowhere does Article Fifth authorize AF to change, expand, or contract the disputes the signatories specifically agreed to arbitrate in Articles First and Second. The other portions of Article Fifth-addressing details such as fees, locations, means, and selection of arbitrators, see supra note 2-further confirm that Article Fifth does not authorize AF to amend Articles First or Second and thereby unilaterally expand or contract the controversies the parties have agreed to arbitrate. ¶ 16 Based on a plain reading of the Agreement, therefore, AF was not empowered to unilaterally amend the predetermined "controversies under this Agreement." The "controversies" subject to the Agreement were those described in Article First and not excluded by Article Second. We therefore conclude that these signatory parties-by agreeing AF would provide rules and regulations for arbitrations-did not empower AF to change which controversies were subject to compulsory arbitration. ¶ 17 Moreover, application of the Agreement to these claims is confirmed by A.R.S. § 12-1501 : A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable , save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. (Emphasis added); accord A.R.S. § 12-3006(A). The statute indicates that an "existing controversy" and "any controversy thereafter arising" become "enforceable and irrevocable" upon the arising of the controversy, unless the parties agree otherwise. There is no requirement for the formal filing of a demand for arbitration or an action in court. The controversies at issue here arose before 2015 and the Agreement became "enforceable and irrevocable" between the signatories prior to the Amended Agreement. Accordingly, the accrual of these property damage claims in 2014 triggered the application of the Agreement providing mandatory arbitration of these product liability claims. ¶ 18 Nevertheless, the Insurers rely upon the language of the November 2014 e-bulletin to argue the Amended Agreement specifies the operative date for the exclusion of product liability claims is the date the claim was filed, not the date the claim arose. But the e-bulletin language is not part of any agreement signed by the parties, nor is it part of the Amended Agreement. The Amended Agreement does not contain any new language beyond exclusion (i). The e-bulletin presumably represents the desire of AF, but this record reveals no contractual documents signed by Watts or the Insurers stating that the Amended Agreement would apply to all actions filed after January 1, 2015, even if the claims accrued prior to that date. ¶ 19 The Insurers also rely on an opinion of the Illinois Court of Appeals that addressed similar issues, State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Watts Regulator Co. (Montero ), 407 Ill.Dec. 380, 63 N.E.3d 304 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). The court in Montero , however, conflated the e-bulletin language with the language of the Amended Agreement. The Montero court twice quoted the Amended Agreement as saying, "cases filed prior to January 1, 2015, will remain in arbitration's jurisdiction and will be processed to hearing." Id. , 407 Ill.Dec. 380, 63 N.E.3d at 307-08, ¶¶ 4, 8. However, that language is found only in the e-bulletin; the Amended Agreement contains no such language. The Montero opinion is therefore unpersuasive. ¶ 20 The Insurers further rely on an Indiana Court of Appeals case, Watts Water Technologies, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (Lucka ) , 66 N.E.3d 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), which relied in part on the Montero case and the e-bulletin language. The Lucka court also decided that AF's authority to make rules and regulations included the authority to add the product liability exclusion at issue here. Id. at 989. We disagree with Lucka's analysis. ¶ 21 Finally, State Farm relies upon Article Sixth, Withdrawals, to support its interpretation of the Agreement. The provision states: Any signatory company may withdraw from this Agreement by notice in writing to AF. Such withdrawal will become effective sixty (60) days after receipt of such notice except as to cases then pending before arbitration panels. The effective date of withdrawal as to such pending cases shall be upon final compliance with the finding of the arbitration panel on those cases. This provision specifically addresses claims pending at the time of withdrawal. In contrast, the Amended Agreement does not address whether the new exclusion of product liability claims applies to pending claims or claims already accrued but not yet filed. The withdrawal provision does not provide the answer to the issue before us. CONCLUSION ¶ 22 The Agreement does not give AF the power to unilaterally impose the product liability exclusion, and Watts and the Insurers never agreed between themselves to apply the Amended Agreement to claims arising before 2015. Accordingly, the Agreement in effect in 2014 applies to these property damage claims and the Amended Agreement does not. We therefore vacate the superior court's orders denying Watts's motions to compel arbitration and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We award taxable costs to Watts upon compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21(b). Article Fifth further authorized AF to: "(b) determine the location, and the means by which, arbitration cases are heard; (c) determine qualification criteria and provide for the selection and appointment of arbitrators; (d) establish fees; (e) invite other insurance carriers, noninsurers , or self-insureds to participate in this arbitration program, and compel the withdrawal of any signatory for failure to conform to the Agreement or the Rules issued thereunder." (Emphasis in original.) The insured homeowners are not signatories to the AF Agreement. The parties have focused on the dates of the property losses and the dates the subrogation actions were filed in superior court. The parties have not addressed the dates the Insurers paid the claims. Generally, an insurer's right to subrogation does not arise until it has made payment for the property damage and thereby becomes subrogated to the claim. See Safeway Ins. v. Collins , 192 Ariz. 262, 266, ¶ 19, 963 P.2d 1085, 1089 (App. 1998) (citing Hamman-McFarland Lumber Co. v. Ariz. Equip. Rental Co. , 16 Ariz. App. 188, 190, 492 P.2d 437, 439 (1972), and St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. Glassing , 269 Mont. 76, 887 P.2d 218, 220 (1994) ). The record on appeal does not establish when the Insurers made payments and became subrogated to their insureds' claims. The parties have not argued or briefed whether the date of payment by the Insurers was significant, and we do not address that issue. Although Allstate contends it "did not have a direct contractual relationship" with Watts, it agrees that each party was "bound by the rules and services administered and offered by AF." State Farm at oral argument before this court contended that an unpublished, unappealed order in Watts Water Technologies v. Arbitration Forums, Inc ., 1:14-cv-14411-RGW (D. Mass. Feb. 24, 2015), constituted res judicata or collateral estoppel preventing Watts from arguing in this appeal that AF did not have the power to unilaterally impose the product liability exclusion. We disagree. In its February 2015 order, the Massachusetts federal district court granted a motion to dismiss Watts's complaint for failure to state a claim because, according to the court, AF was not a party to the Agreement. In dicta, the court expressed the view that the parties had "implicitly recognize[d] the authority of AF to define the scope of the arbitration services that it will offer." We are not bound by that court's ruling, nor its differing interpretation of the Agreement.