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Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | It has registered fraudulent domains such as "mail-newyorker.com" and "news12.com.recover-session-service.site" to target specific victims with phishing attacks. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | It has registered malicious domains for use in intrusion campaigns. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | It have acquired C2 domains prior to operations. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | During Operation Dream Job, It registered a domain name identical to that of a compromised company as part of their BEC effort. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | For Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors established domains as part of their operational infrastructure. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | For Operation Ghost, It registered domains for use in C2 including some crafted to appear as existing legitimate domains. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | During Operation Honeybee, threat actors registered domains for C2. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | For Operation Spalax, the threat actors registered hundreds of domains using Duck DNS and DNS Exit. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | It has registered domain names and created URLs that are often designed to mimic or spoof legitimate websites, such as email login pages, online file sharing and storage websites, and password reset pages. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | It has acquired domains to establish credential harvesting pages, often spoofing the target organization and using free top level domains .TK, .ML, .GA, .CF, and .GQ. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | For the SolarWinds Compromise, It acquired C2 domains, sometimes through resellers. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | It has registered domains often containing the keywords "kimjoy," "h0pe," and "grace," using domain registrars including Netdorm and No-IP DDNS, and hosting providers including xTom GmbH and Danilenko, Artyom. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | It has registered domains to impersonate services such as Dropbox to distribute malware. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | It has obtained domains to host their payloads. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | It has registered domains for C2. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | It has registered domains to mimic file sharing, government, defense, and research websites for use in targeted campaigns. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | It has registered domains for C2 that mimicked sites of their intended targets. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | ItM has purchased domains for use in targeted campaigns. |
Acquire Infrastructure:DNS Server | It has acquired dynamic DNS services for use in the targeting of intended victims. |
Acquire Infrastructure:DNS Server | It has set up custom DNS servers to send commands to compromised hosts via TXT records. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Virtual Private Server | It has used VPS hosting providers in targeting of intended victims. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Virtual Private Server | It has acquired VPS infrastructure for use in malicious campaigns. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Virtual Private Server | It has operated from leased virtual private servers (VPS) in the United States. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Virtual Private Server | It has used VPS hosting providers for infrastructure. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Virtual Private Server | It has used Virtual Private Server (VPS) infrastructure. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Server | It has acquired multiple servers for some of their operations, using each server for a different role. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Server | It has used Taiwan-based servers that appear to be exclusive to It. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Server | It has purchased hosting servers with virtual currency and prepaid cards. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Server | During Night Dragon, threat actors purchased hosted services to use for C2. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Server | During Operation Dream Job, It acquired servers to host their malicious tools. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Server | For Operation Honeybee, at least one identified persona was used to register for a free account for a control server. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Server | For Operation Wocao, the threat actors purchased servers with Bitcoin to use during the operation. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Server | It has leased servers from resellers instead of leasing infrastructure directly from hosting companies to enable its operations. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Web Services | It has created profile pages in Microsoft TechNet that were used as C2 infrastructure. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Web Services | It has used newly-created Blogspot pages for credential harvesting operations. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Web Services | It has registered algorithmically generated Twitter handles that are used for C2 by malware, such as HAMMERTOSS. It has also used legitimate web services such as Dropbox and Constant Contact in their operations. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Web Services | It has set up Dropbox, Amazon S3, and Google Drive to host malicious downloads. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Web Services | It has obtained cloud storage service accounts to host stolen data. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Web Services | It has established GitHub accounts to host their malware. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Web Services | It has set up Amazon S3 buckets to host trojanized digital products. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Web Services | It has acquired web services for use in C2 and exfiltration. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Web Services | It created Dropbox accounts for their operations. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Web Services | It has hosted content used for targeting efforts via web services such as Blogspot. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Web Services | It has hosted malicious downloads on Github. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Web Services | It has established GitHub accounts to host its toolsets. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Web Services | It has acquired Amazon S3 buckets to use in C2. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Web Services | It has used file sharing services including OneHub to distribute tools. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Web Services | During Operation Dream Job, It used file hosting services like DropBox and OneDrive. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Web Services | For Operation Sharpshooter, the threat actors used Dropbox to host lure documents and their first-stage downloader. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Web Services | It has created and used legitimate Microsoft OneDrive accounts for their operations. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Web Services | It has hosted malicious files on various platforms including Google Drive, OneDrive, Discord, PasteText, ShareText, and GitHub. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Web Services | It has created web accounts including Dropbox and GitHub for C2 and document exfiltration. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Web Services | ItM has used GitHub to host malware linked in spearphishing e-mails. |
Compromise Accounts:Social Media Accounts | It has compromised social media accounts to conduct social engineering attacks. |
Compromise Accounts:Email Accounts | It has used compromised email accounts to send credential phishing emails. |
Compromise Accounts:Email Accounts | It has compromised email accounts to further enable phishing campaigns and taken control of dormant accounts. |
Compromise Accounts:Email Accounts | It has used compromised accounts to send spearphishing emails. |
Compromise Accounts:Email Accounts | It has compromised legitimate email accounts to use in their spearphishing operations. |
Compromise Accounts:Email Accounts | It has compromised email accounts to send spearphishing e-mails. |
Compromise Accounts:Email Accounts | It has payed employees, suppliers, and business partners of target organizations for credentials. |
Compromise Accounts:Email Accounts | It has compromised email accounts to conduct social engineering attacks. |
Compromise Accounts:Email Accounts | It has compromised personal email accounts through the use of legitimate credentials and gathered additional victim information. |
Compromise Accounts:Cloud Accounts | It has used residential proxies, including Azure Virtual Machines, to obfuscate their access to victim environments. |
Compromise Infrastructure:Domains | It hijacked FQDNs associated with legitimate websites hosted by hop points. |
Compromise Infrastructure:Domains | During C0010, UNC3890 actors likely compromised the domain of a legitimate Israeli shipping company. |
Compromise Infrastructure:Domains | For C0021, the threat actors used legitimate but compromised domains to host malicious payloads. |
Compromise Infrastructure:Domains | It has compromised legitimate sites and used them to distribute malware. |
Compromise Infrastructure:Domains | It has used compromised domains to host links targeted to specific phishing victims. |
Compromise Infrastructure:Domains | For Operation Dream Job, It compromised domains in Italy and other countries for their C2 infrastructure. |
Compromise Infrastructure:Domains | It has compromised domains for some of their infrastructure, including for C2 and staging malware. |
Compromise Infrastructure:Domains | For the SolarWinds Compromise, It compromised domains to use for C2. |
Compromise Infrastructure:Domains | It has compromised domains for use in targeted malicious campaigns. |
Compromise Infrastructure:DNS Server | It has reconfigured a victim's DNS records to actor-controlled domains and websites. |
Compromise Infrastructure:Virtual Private Server | It has used the VPS infrastructure of compromised Iranian threat actors. |
Compromise Infrastructure:Server | It has compromised otherwise legitimate sites as staging servers for second-stage payloads. |
Compromise Infrastructure:Server | It has compromised legitimate websites to host C2 and malware modules. |
Compromise Infrastructure:Server | It has used compromised web servers as part of their operational infrastructure. |
Compromise Infrastructure:Server | It has served fake updates via legitimate websites that have been compromised. |
Compromise Infrastructure:Server | It has compromised servers to stage malicious tools. |
Compromise Infrastructure:Server | During Night Dragon, threat actors compromised web servers to use for C2. |
Compromise Infrastructure:Server | For Operation Dream Job, It compromised servers to host their malicious tools. |
Compromise Infrastructure:Server | For Operation Sharpshooter, the threat actors compromised a server they used as part of the campaign's infrastructure. |
Compromise Infrastructure:Server | It has used compromised servers as infrastructure. |
Compromise Infrastructure:Server | It has used compromised PRTG servers from other organizations for C2. |
Compromise Infrastructure:Botnet | It has used large groups of compromised machines for use as proxy nodes. |
Compromise Infrastructure:Botnet | It has used a large-scale botnet to target Small Office/Home Office (SOHO) network devices. |
Compromise Infrastructure:Botnet | It has routed traffic through compromised small office and home office (SOHO) network equipment, many of which were located in the same geographic area as the victim. |
Compromise Infrastructure:Web Services | It has compromised Google Drive repositories. |
Compromise Infrastructure:Web Services | It has frequently used compromised WordPress sites for C2 infrastructure. |
Develop Capabilities | It created and used a mailing toolkit to use in spearphishing attacks. |
Develop Capabilities:Malware | It has used custom malware, including Mongall and Heyoka Backdoor, in their operations. |
Develop Capabilities:Malware | It has used unique malware in many of their operations. |
Develop Capabilities:Malware | For C0010, UNC3890 actors used unique malware, including SUGARUSH and SUGARDUMP. |
Develop Capabilities:Malware | It has created customized tools and payloads for functions including ARP poisoning, encryption, credential dumping, ASP.NET shells, web backdoors, process enumeration, WMI querying, HTTP and SMB communications, network interface sniffing, and keystroke logging. |
Develop Capabilities:Malware | For CostaRicto, the threat actors used custom malware, including PS1, CostaBricks, and SombRAT. |
Develop Capabilities:Malware | It has utilized custom malware to maintain persistence in a compromised environment. |
Develop Capabilities:Malware | It has developed malware for use in operations, including the creation of infected removable media. |
Develop Capabilities:Malware | It has developed malware for their operations, including ransomware such as BitPaymer and WastedLocker. |
Develop Capabilities:Malware | It has developed custom malware that allowed them to maintain persistence on victim networks. |
Develop Capabilities:Malware | It has developed its own unique malware such as MailFetch.py for use in operations. |