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Gather Victim Identity Information | It has gathered detailed information of target employees to enhance their social engineering lures. |
Gather Victim Identity Information | It has acquired mobile phone numbers of potential targets, possibly for mobile malware or additional phishing operations. |
Gather Victim Identity Information | For Operation Dream Job, It conducted extensive reconnaissance research on potential targets. |
Gather Victim Identity Information | During Operation Wocao, threat actors targeted people based on their organizational roles and privileges. |
Gather Victim Identity Information:Credentials | It has harvested user's login credentials. |
Gather Victim Identity Information:Credentials | During C0027, It sent phishing messages via SMS to steal credentials. |
Gather Victim Identity Information:Credentials | It has collected credentials for the target organization from previous breaches for use in brute force attacks. |
Gather Victim Identity Information:Credentials | It has gathered user identities and credentials to gain initial access to a victim's organization; the group has also called an organization's help desk to reset a target's credentials. |
Gather Victim Identity Information:Credentials | It has collected compromised credentials to use for targeting efforts. |
Gather Victim Identity Information:Credentials | It gathered credentials from two victims that they then attempted to validate across 75 different websites. It has also collected credentials from over 900 Fortinet VPN servers in the US, Europe, and Israel. |
Gather Victim Identity Information:Credentials | For the SolarWinds Compromise, It conducted credential theft operations to obtain credentials to be used for access to victim environments. |
Gather Victim Identity Information:Email Addresses | AADInternals can check for the existence of user email addresses using public Microsoft APIs. |
Gather Victim Identity Information:Email Addresses | It has collected e-mail addresses for activists and bloggers in order to target them with spyware. |
Gather Victim Identity Information:Email Addresses | It has gathered targeted individuals' e-mail addresses through open source research and website contact forms. |
Gather Victim Identity Information:Email Addresses | It has collected e-mail addresses for users they intended to target. |
Gather Victim Identity Information:Email Addresses | It has targeted executives, human resources staff, and IT personnel for spearphishing. |
Gather Victim Identity Information:Email Addresses | It has collected valid email addresses that were subsequently used in spearphishing campaigns. |
Gather Victim Identity Information:Email Addresses | It has gathered employee email addresses, including personal accounts, for social engineering and initial access efforts. |
Gather Victim Identity Information:Email Addresses | It collected email addresses belonging to various departments of a targeted organization which were used in follow-on phishing campaigns. |
Gather Victim Identity Information:Email Addresses | It has identified high-value email accounts in academia, journalism, NGO's, foreign policy, and national security for targeting. |
Gather Victim Identity Information:Email Addresses | It has specifically targeted government agency employees with spearphishing e-mails. |
Gather Victim Identity Information:Email Addresses | It has obtained valid emails addresses while conducting research against target organizations that were subsequently used in spearphishing campaigns. |
Gather Victim Identity Information:Email Addresses | It has collected e-mail addresses from targeted organizations from open Internet searches. |
Gather Victim Identity Information:Email Addresses | It has used spoofed company emails that were acquired from email clients on previously infected hosts to target other individuals. |
Gather Victim Identity Information:Employee Names | It has collected victim employee name information. |
Gather Victim Identity Information:Employee Names | It's research of potential victim organizations included the identification and collection of employee information. |
Gather Victim Identity Information:Employee Names | It has collected lists of names for individuals from targeted organizations. |
Gather Victim Network Information | It gathered the fully qualified domain names (FQDNs) for targeted Exchange servers in the victim's environment. |
Gather Victim Network Information:Domain Properties | AADInternals can gather information about a tenant’s domains using public Microsoft APIs. |
Gather Victim Network Information:Domain Properties | It conducted technical reconnaissance of the Parliament of Georgia's official internet domain prior to its 2019 attack. |
Gather Victim Network Information:Network Topology | It has searched for infrastructure that can provide remote access to an environment for targeting efforts. |
Gather Victim Network Information:IP Addresses | It has limited its watering hole attacks to specific IP address ranges. |
Gather Victim Network Information:IP Addresses | It has obtained IP addresses for publicly-accessible Exchange servers. |
Gather Victim Network Information:IP Addresses | It has captured the IP addresses of visitors to their phishing sites. |
Gather Victim Org Information | It has collected victim organization information including but not limited to organization hierarchy, functions, press releases, and others. |
Gather Victim Org Information | It has studied publicly available information about a targeted organization to tailor spearphishing efforts against specific departments and/or individuals. |
Gather Victim Org Information | For Operation Dream Job, It gathered victim organization information to identify specific targets. |
Gather Victim Org Information:Determine Physical Locations | It has collected location information from visitors to their phishing sites. |
Gather Victim Org Information:Business Relationships | It has collected open source information to identify relationships between organizations for targeting purposes. |
Gather Victim Org Information:Business Relationships | It has gathered detailed knowledge of an organization's supply chain relationships. |
Gather Victim Org Information:Business Relationships | In preparation for its attack against the 2018 Winter Olympics, It conducted online research of partner organizations listed on an official PyeongChang Olympics partnership site. |
Gather Victim Org Information:Identify Roles | It has identified executives, HR, and IT staff at victim organizations for further targeting. |
Gather Victim Org Information:Identify Roles | It has gathered detailed knowledge of team structures within a target organization. |
Gather Victim Org Information:Identify Roles | During Operation Dream Job, It targeted specific individuals within an organization with tailored job vacancy announcements. |
Phishing for Information | It has used spearphishing to compromise credentials. |
Phishing for Information | It has used a combination of credential phishing and social engineering to capture one-time-password (OTP) codes. |
Phishing for Information | ItM targeted presidential campaign staffers with credential phishing e-mails. |
Phishing for Information:Spearphishing Service | During C0027, It sent Telegram messages impersonating IT personnel to harvest credentials. |
Phishing for Information:Spearphishing Attachment | It has used spearphishing with Microsoft Office attachments to enable harvesting of user credentials. |
Phishing for Information:Spearphishing Attachment | It has crafted generic lures for spam campaigns to collect emails and credentials for targeting efforts. |
Phishing for Information:Spearphishing Attachment | It has sent e-mails with malicious attachments that lead victims to credential harvesting websites. |
Phishing for Information:Spearphishing Link | AADInternals can send phishing emails containing malicious links designed to collect users’ credentials. |
Phishing for Information:Spearphishing Link | It has conducted credential phishing campaigns with embedded links to attacker-controlled domains. |
Phishing for Information:Spearphishing Link | It has used malicious links to direct users to web pages designed to harvest credentials. |
Phishing for Information:Spearphishing Link | It has used spearphishing with PDF attachments containing malicious links that redirected to credential harvesting websites. |
Phishing for Information:Spearphishing Link | It has used links in e-mail to steal account information. |
Phishing for Information:Spearphishing Link | It has used SMS and email messages with links designed to steal credentials or track victims. |
Phishing for Information:Spearphishing Link | It has delivered web bugs to profile their intended targets. |
Phishing for Information:Spearphishing Link | It has used embedded image tags (known as web bugs) with unique, per-recipient tracking links in their emails for the purpose of identifying which recipients opened messages. |
Phishing for Information:Spearphishing Link | It has crafted spearphishing emails with hyperlinks designed to trick unwitting recipients into revealing their account credentials. |
Phishing for Information:Spearphishing Link | It has sent e-mails with malicious links to credential harvesting websites. |
Phishing for Information:Spearphishing Link | It has used links in e-mails to direct victims to credential harvesting websites designed to appear like the targeted organization's login page. |
Phishing for Information:Spearphishing Link | SMOKEDHAM has been delivered via malicious links in phishing emails. |
Phishing for Information:Spearphishing Link | ItM has used web beacons in e-mails to track hits to attacker-controlled URL's. |
Phishing for Information:Spearphishing Voice | During C0027, It used phone calls to instruct victims to navigate to credential-harvesting websites. |
Phishing for Information:Spearphishing Voice | It has called victims' help desk to convince the support personnel to reset a privileged account’s credentials. |
Search Closed Sources | It has searched for information on targeted individuals on business databases including IttReach and CrunchBase. |
Search Closed Sources:Purchase Technical Data | It has purchased credentials and session tokens from criminal underground forums. |
Search Open Websites | It researched Ukraine's unique legal entity identifier (called an "EDRPOU" number), including running queries on the EDRPOU website, in preparation for the NotPetya attack. It has also researched third-party websites to help it craft credible spearphishing emails. |
Search Open Websites | It has copied data from social media sites to impersonate targeted individuals. |
Search Open Websites | It has used Twitter to monitor potential victims and to prepare targeted phishing e-mails. |
Search Open Websites | For Operation Dream Job, It used LinkedIn to identify and target employees within a chosen organization. |
Search Open Websites | It has searched for vulnerabilities, tools, and geopolitical trends on Google to target victims. |
Search Open Websites | It has searched public code repositories for exposed credentials. |
Search Victim-Owned Websites | It has used contact forms on victim websites to generate phishing e-mails. |
Search Victim-Owned Websites | It has searched for information on the target company's website. |
Search Victim-Owned Websites | It has conducted research against potential victim websites as part of its operational planning. |
Search Victim-Owned Websites | It has searched victim's websites to identify the interests and academic areas of targeted individuals and to scrape source code, branding, and organizational contact information for phishing pages. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | It has registered hundreds of domains for use in operations. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | It registered domains imitating NATO, OSCE security websites, Caucasus information resources, and other organizations. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | It has set up and operated websites to gather information and deliver malware. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | It has registered a variety of domains to host malicious payloads and for C2. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | For C0010, UNC3890 actors established domains that appeared to be legitimate services and entities, such as LinkedIn, Facebook, Office 365, and Pfizer. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | For C0011, It registered domains likely designed to appear relevant to student targets in India. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | For C0021, the threat actors registered domains for use in C2. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | For C0026, the threat actors re-registered expired C2 domains previously used for ANDROMEDA malware. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | For CostaRicto, the threat actors established domains, some of which appeared to spoof legitimate domains. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | It has registered domains for targeting intended victims. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | It has registered domains, intended to look like legitimate target domains, that have been used in watering hole attacks. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | It has registered domains to spoof targeted organizations by changing the top-level domain (TLD) to ".us", ".co" or ".biz". |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | It has acquired domains imitating legitimate sites. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | It has registered look-alike domains for use in phishing campaigns. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | For FunnyDream, the threat actors registered a variety of domains. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | It has registered multiple domains to facilitate payload staging and C2. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | It has registered and operated domains for campaigns, often using a security or web technology theme or impersonating the targeted organization. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | It has established domains, some of which were designed to look like official government domains, for their operations. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | It has registered domains to spoof targeted organizations and trusted third parties. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | It has acquired domains related to their campaigns to act as distribution points and C2 channels. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | It has used dynamic DNS providers to create legitimate-looking subdomains for C2. |
Acquire Infrastructure:Domains | It has established domains that impersonate legitimate entities to use for targeting efforts. |