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The critique of power addresses AI as an apparatus of domination and traces the technology through the production of data – data collected by corporations thriving in so-called ‘platform capitalism’ as well as by the state and its repressive agencies. Power emerges in multiple forms, from the historicity of data, its extraction by corporations and the state, its valorisation and the effects of surveillance and oppression it creates. What statisticians and computer scientists refer to as bias is created by training data reflecting historical or social inequities. When gathering training data, specific groups – such as people of colour, minorities or women – are often underrepresented. They might have been overlooked in the process of data sampling or during the testing of the AI technology. This ‘prototypical whiteness’ that renders racialised subjects invisible is entwined with surveillance technologies that render them hypervisible, as Simone Browne has shown.15 For example, a dataset called‘Faces in the Wild’, which had long been considered as a benchmark for testing facial recognition software, now comes with the warning that its data is not representative – 70% of the faces are male and 80% white, as digital activist Joy Buolamwini found out.16 And even if values representing race, gender, sexual orientation or class are removed, AI models, always looking for patterns, turn to proxy discrimination using statistical correlations of postcodes, education or particular expressions to discriminate. As Wendy Chun pointed out in her study Discriminating Data: ‘These “errors” often come from “ignoring” race – that is, wrongly assuming that race-free equals racism-free’.17

Aradau and Bunz 2022 (Claudia Aradau, Professor of International Politics at King’s College London and a member of the editorial collective of Radical Philosophy. Mercedes Bunz, Reader in Digital Culture and Society at the Department of Digital Humanities, King’s College London, and an editor of the Open Access meson press. Her work explores the digital transformation of knowledge, and its effect on power. Radical Philosophy Issue 212, “Dismantling the apparatus of domination? Left critiques of AI”)

The critique of power addresses AI as an apparatus of domination and traces the technology through the production of data . Power emerges in multiple forms, from the historicity of data, its extraction by corporations and the state, its valorisation and the effects of surveillance and oppression it creates bias is created by training data reflecting historical or social inequities. When gathering training data, specific groups – such as people of colour, minorities or women – are often underrepresented. They might have been overlooked in the process of data sampling or during the testing of the AI technology. This ‘prototypical whiteness’ that renders racialised subjects invisible is entwined with surveillance technologies that render them hypervisible data is not representative – 70% of the faces are male and 80% white And even if values representing race, gender, sexual orientation or class are removed, AI models, always looking for patterns, turn to proxy discrimination using statistical correlations of postcodes, education or particular expressions to discriminate.

AI is used as an apparatus of domination due to data that will always construct power relations via rendering women and minorities invisible because its data is not representative of the entire population

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Jean Elshtain (1987) notes that the narrative of men as “Just Warriors” and women as “Beautiful Souls” does not “denote what men and women really are in time of war, but function[s] instead to re-create and secure women’s location as noncombatants and men’s [location] as warriors” (4). Identifying this “trope” is one way to see the power of gender hierarchies and to question and break down that power relation. The masculine male as ideal solider, the feminine female as ideal noncombatant (innocent, victim, powerless) is something we should, and have more recently started to, question in practice.1 Indeed, with the United States repealing its exclusion of women for direct combat roles (United States Department of Defense 2013), one might hope that breaking down the gender hierarchies is on the horizon. However, as one hand gives, another takes away. While women are now de jure permitted to engage in combat roles, and thus all roles in warfighting, there is another movement afoot which threatens this process of gender balancing and mainstreaming: the creation of humanoid robotics. While some might view the creation of autonomous robotic warfighters as emancipatory, potentially freeing the military of gendered practices, I argue that this viewpoint is incorrect. Rather, the creation of humanoid robot fighters further entrenches a hegemonic masculinity that subordinates all humans. The humanoid robot fighter is the ideal of masculinity in western culture, for it represents an “independent, risk-taking, aggressive, heterosexual and rational ”being free from any weakness, particularly irrationality, frailty, emotion or desires (Barrett 2001, 79). The article traces three potential avenues for the construction of gender in a “warbot,” or humanoid robot warfighter. First, I look to hardware, or the physical constructions of humanoid robots. I utilize the United States Defense Advanced Research Project Agency’s (DARPA) Robotics Challenge as current evidence of these physical design choices (and potential trajectory for future designs).2 Second, I look to the naming of these systems, as well as their intended roles. I argue that the way research teams currently name and task these systems perpetuates and reifies gendered roles and power hierarchies. I caution that without a critical examination on the part of researchers and engineers, the current practice may lead to an accretion of gendered practices that threatens inclusion and mainstreaming. Third and finally, I look to the software of a potential humanoid robotic warfighter. Using feminist critiques of the philosophy of science, epistemology, technology and artificial intelligence (AI), I argue that the AIs created will not only emulate and/or co-opt the biases of their creators, but that the creators will actually distill gender into hegemonic masculinities and femininities for these machines. Taken together, these three gender vectors will produce an artificially intelligent, artificially gendered, lethal autonomous humanoid robot. Instead of using technology to free us from gendered practices and hierarchies, a` la Haraway’s (1990) conception of the post-human cyborg, this machine will perpetuate domination and subordination.

Roff 16 (Heather, Gendering a Warbot, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 18:1, 1-18, DOI: 10.1080/14616742.2015.1094246)

the narrative of men as “Just Warriors” and women as “Beautiful Souls” does not “denote what men and women really are in time of war, but function[s] instead to re-create and secure women’s location as noncombatants and men’s [location] as warriors” (4). Identifying this “trope” is one way to see the power of gender hierarchies and to question and break down that power relation. The masculine male as ideal solider, the feminine female as ideal noncombatant (innocent, victim, powerless) is something we should question in practice. there is another movement afoot which threatens this process of gender balancing and mainstreaming: the creation of humanoid robotics. , the creation of humanoid robot fighters further entrenches a hegemonic masculinity that subordinates all humans The humanoid robot fighter is the ideal of masculinity in western culture, for it represents an “independent, risk-taking, aggressive, heterosexual and rational ”being free from any weakness, particularly irrationality, frailty, emotion or desires the way research teams currently name and task these systems perpetuates and reifies gendered roles and power hierarchies. without a critical examination on the part of researchers and engineers, the current practice may lead to an accretion of gendered practices that threatens inclusion and mainstreaming the AIs created will not only emulate and/or co-opt the biases of their creators, but that the creators will actually distill gender into hegemonic masculinities and femininities for these machines. , these will produce an artificially intelligent, artificially gendered, lethal autonomous humanoid robot. Instead of using technology to free us from gendered practices and hierarchies, a` la Haraway’s (1990) conception of the post-human cyborg, this machine will perpetuate domination and subordination.

An Artificial intelligence weapon is the gold standard for hegemonic masculinity—free of vulnerability

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Finally, and the most likely reason for intended gendering of AI, the purpose of gender is to reconstitute the gendered practices of the sending state’s military. As militarized masculinity is well known, the construction of a masculinized robot would act as an archetype for other human soldiers. The warbot would embody all of the “warrior virtues” and would surpass all of its human compatriots because it would never fatigue, require food, sleep or suffer from the trauma of war.23 As Goldstein (2001) points out, suppressing emotions, shaming and refusing to acknowledge wartime trauma are consistent practices across cultures to socialize men to war. A gendered warbot would act asa norm generator, and militaries, instead of trying to mold human soldiers to suppress their human tendencies by denying their physical limits through training, shaming and abuse, can instead create machines that embody all of these qualities. The humanoid robot fighter does not sleep, is “rational” in its calculations, is aggressive and can fight in the most dangerous of situations. It is Barrett’s (2001) vision of hegemonic masculinity in military culture. The result is that all humans become subordinated as weak, incapable and emotional; that is, feminized. One may object here and claim that all I have shown is that the creation of gendered humanoid robots perpetuates militarized masculinity. In a way, this is certainly true. Recall that Harding (2011) observes the mutually dependent relationship between the military and science/technology/engineering is coconstituted. If the producers and consumers of the technology co-constitute one another, then they will perpetuate already existing gendered practices. Humans gender because they are gendered. However, if I am correct, and the first-generation robots in the DRC portend a future of gendered autonomous warbots, then those machines will be hypermasculinized AIs in oversexed bodies. Technology is not going to free us from gendered practices and hierarchies, as Haraway (1990) suggests, but will instead reify those very practices and power relationships. I have suggested here that no human warfighter will be capable of living up to the standard set by these machines. To be sure, many of the “warrior virtues” are idealized, and human warriors often fall short of those standards. Humans will always be subject to the realities of fatigue, limitations of physical strength, hunger and emotion. Yet creating gendered autonomous machines entails that those machines will always live up to the ideal, and humans can never (and have never) met those standards. “Virtues” will not be “excellences” any longer; rather they will be the standard behavior for warbots. In turn, this will solidify a version of hegemonic masculinity, and further factionalize and subordinate all other masculinities and femininities. Thus I agree with Manjikan (2013) when she worries that “autonomous technologies might actually prove harmful to both genders” (12).

Roff 16 (Heather, Gendering a Warbot, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 18:1, 1-18, DOI: 10.1080/14616742.2015.1094246)

the most likely reason for intended gendering of AI, the purpose of gender is to reconstitute the gendered practices of the sending state’s military. As militarized masculinity is well known, the construction of a masculinized robot would act as an archetype for other human soldiers. The warbot would embody all of the “warrior virtues” and would surpass all of its human compatriots because it would never fatigue, require food, sleep or suffer from the trauma of war. suppressing emotions, shaming and refusing to acknowledge wartime trauma are consistent practices across cultures to socialize men to war. A gendered warbot would act asa norm generator, and militaries, instead of trying to mold human soldiers to suppress their human tendencies by denying their physical limits through training, shaming and abuse, can instead create machines that embody all of these qualities. The humanoid robot fighter does not sleep, is “rational” in its calculations, is aggressive and can fight in the most dangerous of situations. It is hegemonic masculinity in military culture. all humans become subordinated as weak, incapable and emotional; that is, feminized. the creation of gendered humanoid robots perpetuates militarized masculinity the mutually dependent relationship between the military and science/technology/engineering is coconstituted. If the producers and consumers of the technology co-constitute one another, then they will perpetuate already existing gendered practices. Humans gender because they are gendered. the first-generation robots portend a future of gendered autonomous warbots, then those machines will be hypermasculinized AIs in oversexed bodies. Technology is not going to free us from gendered practices and hierarchies, but will instead reify those very practices and power relationships. no human warfighter will be capable of living up to the standard set by these machines. human warriors often fall short of those standards. Humans will always be subject to the realities of fatigue, limitations of physical strength, hunger and emotion. Yet creating gendered autonomous machines entails that those machines will always live up to the ideal, and humans can never (and have never) met those standards , this will solidify a version of hegemonic masculinity, and further factionalize and subordinate all other masculinities and femininities

AI weapons are gendered to become an archetype for “warrior virtues” and embody hegemonic masculinity as it paints humanity as vulnerable, and thus feminine

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NATO’s approach to gender mainstreaming is just as superficial as that of the UN. In the early 1960s, senior female service officers from NATO countries began meeting to discuss how women could be more effectively integrated and utilized in NATO forces. Their efforts eventually led the Military Committee (MC), NATO’s highest military authority, to establish a consultative committee in 1976 with the purpose of facilitating information sharing between NATO members on the representation of female military personnel and issues affecting women’s ability to perform effectively in the armed forces (Garcia 1999). The Committee on Women in NATO Forces (CWINF) met formally only once a year, for a maximum of five working days (NATO 2007b: 8). Nonetheless, for twenty years it was the only body in the organization directly addressing women’s roles and status. In 1997, the MC agreed to create the Office on Women in NATO Forces (OWINF), run by two staff members, in order to allow for greater continuity in NATO’s support for the integration of women (Garcia 1999). The establishment of these bodies was the result of many years of hard work by women serving in NATO’s armed forces. The CWINF and the OWINF, however, focused not on gender mainstreaming, but rather on the integration of women in NATO forces through increasing the representation of female military personnel, ensuring female military personnel enjoy the same personal and professional opportunities as their male colleagues, and improving the quality of life of female personnel.34 In May 2009, the MC made the decision to replace the CWINF with the NATO Committee on Gender Perspective, while the OWINF was renamed the NATO Office on Gender Perspective. According to the MC, these changes were made to support the organization’s objective of integrating ‘the gender perspective into all aspects of NATO operations,’ in line with Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 (NATO 2009). The responsibilities of these bodies now include facilitating information sharing on gender mainstreaming within NATO, among NATO members, and between NATO and other relevant international organizations and agencies; providing advice and support on gender mainstreaming to the MC; and gathering information on the progress of member states in implementing Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 (NATO 2009). The changes made, however, appear to have greater symbolic than practical significance. Like the bodies they replaced, the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives meets once annually for a maximum of five working days, while the NATO Office on Gender Perspectives is run by only two staff members, one of whom is an administrative assistant rather than a gender specialist. As with its anti-trafficking policy, the limited dedicated support the NATO leadership has directed to these gender mainstreaming bodies inevitably constrains their ability to have a substantive impact on NATO policies, planning priorities, and operations. From a feminist constructivist perspective, there is nothing surprising about the failure of the UN and NATO to go beyond a surface approach to gender mainstreaming in the security arena, even when these institutions (particularly the UN) position themselves as women’s rights standard-setters. Although International Relations scholars have made clear that states are not ‘black boxes’ that are uniform across time and place, common markers nonetheless distinguish states from other political entities, including their ability to harness the resources to wage war and preserve peace (Tilly 1990: 12). Prior to the mid-20th century, sovereign statehood was guaranteed only for those states that possessed the capacity to defend their sovereignty. Following World War II, however, sovereign statehood was granted to states through international recognition, whether or not they were fully capable in the modern sense (Jackson 1990). Since the period of decolonization, rapid militarization has occurred throughout the global South, attributable less to the practical urgency of state survival and more to global environmental processes and pressures that have come to define the symbols of legitimate statehood. Militaries, as described by Eyre and Suchman, ‘no longer build modern nations, but rather, the world political and social system builds modern nation-states, which in turn build modern militaries and procure modern weaponry’ (1996: 82). Military systems have not remained static. They have adapted to changing domestic and international environmental pressures and circumstances, including the shifting nature of security threats and technological developments that have altered strategic calculations and recruitment needs. But what largely remains unchanged is that military systems continue to function as ‘muscular,’ virile, masculine symbols of state power, irrespective of women’s gradual integration into armed forces (Peterson 1992: 48 and 2010: 23-24). Thus, for organizations such as the UN and NATO that rely on member states for their military capacity, to take 135 gender and gender mainstreaming into account is to threaten the military institutions that have been constructed as emblematic of sovereign statehood and substantive membership in the international society of states – a move inevitably resisted by their constituent states. Even with the rise of robust Chapter VII missions, peacekeeping continues to be characterized as a softer form of military power, with contemporary operations mainly requiring soldiers to perform a peace support rather than combat role. Although peacekeeping forces may serve a function distinct from national military systems, peacekeeping is ultimately inseparable from traditional militaries. Given the human and financial constraints facing most military systems, creating and training peacekeeping forces detached from military contingents serving national security interests is not a feasible option (Dandeker and Gow 2004: 12). Even in countries where the threat of inter-state war is remote, the priority is placed on preparing soldiers for the potential of combat situations and then ‘training down’ in order to ‘cater to the needs of missions in which a more restrained use of force is appropriate’ (Sorenson and Wood 2005: 11). Nonetheless, concerns persist among military leaders that the ‘peacekeeping ethos’ will filter into national military systems and erode combat capabilities (Boëne et al. 2004: 416). The failure of political and military leaders to take gender seriously in the security arena is thus neither the result of accidental oversight or lack of appreciation of the complexity of gender construction. Rather, attempts to penetrate military systems and culture in order to deepen the gender justice norm and prevent gendered exploitation continue to be frustrated by the fear of feminization – the fear at the heart of concerns that the peacekeeping ethos will taint national military systems. To expose the gender norms that inform (and are informed by) militarism is to exacerbate the perceived threat participation in peacekeeping missions poses to national military strength and preparedness. The norm of gender justice has sufficiently penetrated the security arena such that it can’t be ignored or overtly rejected, thus the recognition by the UN and NATO that their reputations and operational effectiveness are damaged by allegations of sexual misconduct. It can, however, be co-opted through the adoption of policies that invoke the appropriate language and give the impression of substantive change but which instead blunt its transformative potential. As long as the fundamental association between security threats, military capacity, and the masculine soldier ideal persists, we can expect that gender mainstreaming will continue to take the form of integrating women into already-defined masculine structures and efforts to address peacekeeper sexual misconduct will remain palliative rather than preventive.

Hebert 11, (Laura Hebert, Analyzing UN and NATO responses to Sexual Misconduct in Peacekeeping Operations, published in Making Gender, Making war. Laura Hebert is an associate professor of Diplomacy and World Affairs at the Occidental College.) GP

NATO’s approach to gender mainstreaming superficial Office on Women in NATO Forces (OWINF), run by two staff members The changes made, have greater symbolic than practical significance there is nothing surprising about the failure of the UN and NATO to go beyond a surface approach to gender mainstreaming in the security arena Militaries, as described by Eyre and Suchman, ‘no longer build modern nations, but rather, the world political and social system builds modern nation-states, which in turn build modern militaries and procure modern weaponry’ ). Military systems have not remained static. They have adapted to changing domestic and international environmental pressures and circumstances, including the shifting nature of security threats and technological developments that have altered strategic calculations and recruitment needs. But what largely remains unchanged is that military systems continue to function as ‘muscular,’ virile, masculine symbols of state power, irrespective of women’s gradual integration into armed forces , for organizations such as the UN and NATO that rely on member states for their military capacity, to take 135 gender and gender mainstreaming into account is to threaten the military institutions that have been constructed as emblematic of sovereign statehood and substantive membership in the international society of states Although peacekeeping forces may serve a function distinct from national military systems, peacekeeping is ultimately inseparable from traditional militaries ). The failure of political and military leaders to take gender seriously in the security arena is thus neither the result of accidental oversight or lack of appreciation of the complexity of gender construction. attempts to penetrate military systems and culture in order to deepen the gender justice norm and prevent gendered exploitation continue to be frustrated by the fear of feminization – . As long as the fundamental association between security threats, military capacity, and the masculine soldier ideal persists, we can expect that gender mainstreaming will continue to take the form of integrating women into already-defined masculine structures and efforts to address peacekeeper sexual misconduct will remain palliative rather than preventive.

Fear of feminization structures NATO with masculine ideals.

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Cohn reports that because of the constant need to prove one's manhood, a sexualized discourse, veritable verbal "pissing contests," served to obscure any personal vulnerability or concern about lives lost; to do so risked being ostracized and demeaned as "soft," a "pussy," or for "acting like a wimp," which is, in their eyes, femalelike. Concern that Russians were essentially "harder" permeated strategic discussions, while, at the same time, new entrants to the nuclear club were said to have lost their virginity. It is thus hardly surprising to learn that when Edward Teller communicated news of the first successfully detonated hydrogen bomb, his telegram exclaimed, "It's a boy." Extant customary weapons still reflect a time-honored masculine iconography. Like arrows and guns, conventional and nuclear bombs evoke clearly discernible phallic imagery; the power and immediacy of their impact connote a masculine orgasmic event

Cecire 09, (Ruth Cecire, Feminist Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring 2009), pp. 41-65, Feminist Studies, Inc., http://www.jstor.org/stable/40607923) GP

the constant need to prove one's manhood, a sexualized discourse served to obscure any personal vulnerability or concern about lives lost; to do so risked being ostracized and demeaned as "soft," which is, femalelike. Concern that Russians were essentially "harder" permeated strategic discussions, while, at the same time, new entrants to the nuclear club were said to have lost their virginity It is thus hardly surprising to learn that when Edward Teller communicated news of the first successfully detonated hydrogen bomb, his telegram exclaimed, "It's a boy." Like arrows and guns, conventional and nuclear bombs evoke clearly discernible phallic imagery;

Nuclear discourse is rooted in masculine language- the nuclear debate reinforces masculinity as an arms race becomes the masculinized concept of a “pissing contest”

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Nuclear weapons are, beyond the shadow of a doubt, the most dangerous invention of mankind, and a fierce resistance to their proliferation remains at the very crux of the international security architecture. Nuclear weapons have also given rise to waves of anti-nuclear activism since their very invention, particularly during the Cold War years. One of the most significant debates surrounding anti-nuclear activism and the disarmament movement contends itself with gender. Nuclear weapons are seen to symbolise strength and the power of a particular state. Nuclear weapons are, thus, embedded in notions of masculinity and this perceived connection between masculinity and weapons of mass destruction serves as a hurdle to their abolishment. For instance, the naming of the atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki as ‘Little boy’ and ‘Fat man’ respectively opened the door for masculine characteristics to be associated with nuclear proliferation. Furthermore, after India tested its nuclear weapons in 1998, a prominent Indian politician remarked that the tests were necessary to prove ‘we are not eunuchs’ (Perlik, 2018). This statement aptly captures the high societal value and status awarded to nuclear weapons and brings to light how disarmament is seen as an affront to masculine norms and is hence feminine and weak. 

Agarwalla 20 [Yashna Agarwalla, “The Gendered Dimensions of Anti-Nuclear Weapons Policy,” https://www.e-ir.info/2020/09/28/the-gendered-dimensions-of-anti-nuclear-weapons-policy/, 2020 WE DO NOT ENDORSED GENDERED LANGUAGE IN THIS CARD] Mr.Mr.

Nuclear weapons are, beyond the shadow of a doubt, the most dangerous invention of mankind, and a fierce resistance to their proliferation remains at the very crux of the international security architecture. One of the most significant debates surrounding anti-nuclear activism and the disarmament movement contends itself with gender Nuclear weapons are seen to symbolise strength and the power of a particular state. Nuclear weapons are, thus, embedded in notions of masculinity and this perceived connection between masculinity and weapons of mass destruction serves as a hurdle to their abolishment Furthermore, after India tested its nuclear weapons in 1998, a prominent Indian politician remarked that the tests were necessary to prove ‘we are not eunuchs’ This statement aptly captures the high societal value and status awarded to nuclear weapons and brings to light how disarmament is seen as an affront to masculine norms and is hence feminine and weak.

The possession of nuclear weapons goes back to the drive to exert dominance.

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( 1) Transnational and multi-national corporations, which typically have a strong gender division of labour, and a strongly masculinized management culture (Wajcman 1 999) . (2) The international state, including the institutions of diplomacy and UN agencies. These too are gendered, mainly run by men, though with more cultural complexity than multi-national corporations (Gierycz 1999) . (3) International media, which have a strong gender division of labour and powerfully circulate gender meanings through entertainment, advertising and news. New media participate in the commodification of women in an international trade in v.ives and sexual partners (Cunneen and Stubbs 2000 ) . (4) Global markets - in capital, commodities, services and labour - have an increasing reach into local economies. They are often strongly gender-structured (e.g. Chang and Ling 2000) , and are now very weakly regulated, apart from border controls on migration.

Connell 05, (RW Connell and James W. Messerschmidt, Hegemonic Masculinities, RW Connell was formerly a professor at the University of Sydney and an Australian sociologist)GP

Transnational corporations, which typically have a strong gender division of labour, and a strongly masculinized management culture The international state, including the institutions of diplomacy and UN agencies. These too are gendered, mainly run by men ) International media, which have a strong gender division of labour and powerfully circulate gender meanings through entertainment, advertising and news ) Global markets - in capital, commodities, services and labour - have an increasing reach into local economies. They are often strongly gender-structured

Transnational organizations uniquely create a form of Hegemonic Masculinity

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Media Coverage of NATO Bombings Throughout the 1990s, the American news media represented the Balkans as a violent region rocked by ethnic cleansing following the collapse of communist regimes at the end of the Cold War. Reports on concentration camps, torture, mass murder, and expulsion of thousands from their homes reinforced a narrative about the failure of democracies rather than the failure of market economies to emerge. Moreover, by mid-decade, reporters began to discuss the extraordinarily high levels of sexual violence by Serbian and Yugoslav forces in this region, especially in Bosnia. Feminist analyses foreground the associations between Serbian national- ism, rape warfare, and ethnic cleansing in order to understand rape as a military and political tool (Milic 1993; B. Allen 1996; Rejali 1998). Lynda Boose, for instance, argues that the sexual sadism of Serbian brutality was crucial to this "orgy of nationalism" (2002, 74). Statistics vary widely but conservative estimates of women raped in Bosnia range from twenty thousand to fifty thousand. (Boose 2002) U.S. media attention turned to Kosovo/a in the late 1990s as violence escalated against Albanian Muslim populations. The moment of most intense interest in the region came during the NATO bombings when the United States was directly involved in the conflict through its military presence. NATO operations never achieved the popular support of the Gulf War, coming as they did shortly after the impeachment hearings of President Clinton. Instead, the bomb- ings provoked intense debates about appropriate methods of humanitarian intervention as well as exposed the problematic nature of NATO's very existence after 1991.

(Kozol 04, Wendy. , Wendy Kozol is a professor in the American Studies department at Oberlin College , “Domesticating NATO’s War in Kosovo/a: (In) Visible Bodies and the Dilemma of Photojournalism.” Meridians, vol. 4, no. 2, 2004, pp. 1–38. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40338878. Accessed 22 Jun. 2022.) // RB

Media Coverage of NATO Bombings Throughout the 1990s, the American news media represented the Balkans as a violent region rocked by ethnic cleansing following the collapse of communist regimes at the end of the Cold War. Reports on concentration camps, torture, mass murder, and expulsion of thousands from their homes reinforced a narrative about the failure of democracies rather than the failure of market economies to emerg reporters began to discuss the extraordinarily high levels of sexual violence by Serbian and Yugoslav forces in this region, especially in Bosnia Feminist analyses foreground the associations between Serbian national- ism, rape warfare, and ethnic cleansing in order to understand rape as a military and political tool U.S. media attention turned to Kosovo/a in the late 1990s as violence escalated against Albanian Muslim populations. The moment of most intense interest in the region came during the NATO bombings when the United States was directly involved in the conflict through its military presence. NATO operations never achieved the popular support of the Gulf War, coming as they did shortly after the impeachment hearings of President Clinton.

Aff the engages in media framing that sees NATO as the savoir of Women as a alibi to western intervention, as seen in NATO bombing response in the Kosovo conflict

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On the other hand, the military complex understands that ‘climate change is likely to cause an increase in demand for military forces in both disaster response and humanitarian assistance operations’ (Bigger et al, 2021; Brzoska, 2015; Burnett & Mach, 2021; Hayden, 2018; McGrady et al., 2010, p. 5; see also Smith, 2007). Indeed, in 2007 a group of eleven high-ranking, retired U.S. admirals and generals released a report arguing that climate change will act as a ‘threat multiplier’ that makes existing concerns, such as water scarcity and food insecurity, more complex and intractable and presents a tangible threat to U.S. national security interests (Brown, Hammill, and McLeman 2007, 1142). Much of this, however, remains hidden in plain sight. As Patricia Hynes (2014, p. 1) writes, ‘a well-glued solidarity between the military, national security advisors, civilian defense contractors, and government elites has cloaked this debt of pollution, destruction of land, and exploitation of finite resources under the paternalistic mantle of national security.

Inwood and Tyner 22, [Joshua FJ Inwood and James A Tyner; Inwood works at the Department of Geography, Rock Ethics Institute, The Pennsylvania State University, State College, PA; Tyner works at the Department of Geography, Kent State University, Kent, OH, USA; “Militarism and the mutually assured destruction of climate change,” https://doi.org/10.1080/13562576.2022.2052720, p.3-4, March 2022] Mr.Mr.

On the other hand, the military complex understands that ‘climate change is likely to cause an increase in demand for military forces in both disaster response and humanitarian assistance operations’

The aff justifies environmental exploitation under the patriarchal guise of national security.

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What matters in bringing attention to such linked harms is that real harms to bodies—biological bodies, psyches, social bodies/species, pseudo-bodies (eco-regions), and Earthly bodies (bodies of water or air)—are multiplied, exacerbated, and intensified through the collaborative synergies of multiple systems of oppression. Identifying linked harms points to the need for ethics and politics that can address those interwoven systems, and integrate considerations of social justice and environmental ethics at all levels. Regarding sex and gender, which are always interwoven with other factors, the “second class” yet simultaneously exhalted nature of feminity and what is associated with female biological reproductivity is a fundamental feature shaping ideas and relationships in sexist and nature-harming cultures, as is the identification of masculinity and superiority with domination and the absence of vulnerability. A second theme in work focused on matters of sex and gender in environmental ethics is the investigation of the conceptual presuppositions and frameworks, and hence the subtle values, that inform and enable systems of oppression. Philosophers and critical historicans have argued that environmentally destructive and dismissive value systems reflect meanings and symbolic systems built on identities and conceptions of nature and nonhuman animals that create and maintain a general logics of domination (Merchant, 1982; Warren, 1990; Allen, 1992). A guiding theory has been that nature and subordinated groups are symbolically associated on the debased side of western culture’s foundational hierarchies. Rather than being essentialist in an Aristotelian sense, this analysis emphasizes the historical material and symbolic associations between women and nature, and tracks evident patterns in who bears the brunt of the violence. To say that women and nature have been powerfully linked in western culture, and that those association have enabled sexist, racist, colonizing intersecting oppressions and social dominations, is not to imply that all femaleness is identified with only one cultural stereotype of what or how nature is, or that all women suffer the same or similar domination. Different women are symbolically identified with different aspects or fantasies of nature and anti-nature, and those associations have distinct repercussions in exploitative social systems, such as being revered as a natural beauty or being treated as a beast of burden. And naturalness is a pliable designation, for masculinities can be associated with certain ideas about nature and naturalness (physical strength, wildness), and femininity is also often characterized as a domesticating cultural force, or an enemy of nature. What matters for politics and ethics is not merely that nature and femininity are reductively associated with each other, but also that the effects of the association are debilitating and distorting for both. Pernicious cultural and symbolic connections between women and nature as reproductive, submissive, and decorative create and maintain divisions of labor that put women in closer proximity to the material world and symbolically associate femininity with subjectable naturalness, which can or even ought to be molded to man’s needs or whims. Projected associations between “women and nature” and the like propagate subordination and the potential for victimization, for example by compulsively relegating females to the work of caring for others. Hierarchical characterizations of male/female, nature/culture, primitive/civilized are interwoven systems of exploitation that shape and inform environmental relationships at every scale. Understanding sex and gender critically in relation to environmental ethics, and deconstructing the roles certain conceptions of nature play in propagating social oppression, complicates one-dimensional ideas about the nature of environmental problems, and points toward fruitful areas for ethical development and exploration.

Cuomo 16 (Chris, “Sexual Politics in Environmental Ethics: Impacts, Causes, Alternatives,” The Oxford Handbook of Environmental Ethics. Edited by Stephen M Gardiner and Allen Thompson)

What matters in bringing attention to such linked harms is that real harms to bodies—biological bodies, psyches, social bodies/species, pseudo-bodies (eco-regions), and Earthly bodies (bodies of water or air)—are multiplied, exacerbated, and intensified through the collaborative synergies of multiple systems of oppression. Regarding sex and gender, which are always interwoven with other factors, the “second class” yet simultaneously exhalted nature of feminity is a fundamental feature shaping ideas and relationships in sexist and nature-harming cultures, as is the identification of masculinity and superiority with domination and the absence of vulnerability. sex and gender in environmental ethics is the investigation of the conceptual presuppositions and frameworks, and hence the subtle values, that inform and enable systems of oppression. environmentally destructive and dismissive value systems reflect meanings and symbolic systems built on identities and conceptions of nature and nonhuman animals that create and maintain a general logics of domination nature and subordinated groups are symbolically associated on the debased side of western culture’s foundational hierarchies this analysis emphasizes the historical material and symbolic associations between women and nature, and tracks evident patterns in who bears the brunt of the violence. To say that women and nature have been powerfully linked in western culture, and that those association have enabled sexist, racist, colonizing intersecting oppressions and social dominations, is not to imply that all femaleness is identified with only one cultural stereotype of what or how nature is, or that all women suffer the same or similar domination. What matters for politics and ethics is not merely that nature and femininity are reductively associated with each other, but also that the effects of the association are debilitating and distorting for both. Pernicious cultural and symbolic connections between women and nature as reproductive, submissive, and decorative create and maintain divisions of labor that put women in closer proximity to the material world and symbolically associate femininity with subjectable naturalness, which can or even ought to be molded to man’s needs or whims. associations between “women and nature” and the like propagate subordination and the potential for victimization, for example by compulsively relegating females to the work of caring for others. Hierarchical characterizations of male/female, nature/culture, primitive/civilized are interwoven systems of exploitation that shape and inform environmental relationships at every scale.

The environment, like femininity, is coded vulnerable and exploitable by the dominant man, which is the root cause of environmental destruction

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Kritiks

2022

Within the framework of its welfare-state paradigm of protection, liberal governmentality was based on multiple forms of precarity as inequality through othering: on the one hand, on the unpaid labour of women in the reproduction area of the private sphere; on the other hand, on the precarity of all those excluded from the nation-state compromise between capital and labour - whether as abnormal, foreign or poor - as well as those living under extreme conditions of exploitation in the colonies.31 All those who did not meet the norm and normalization of the free, sovereign-bourgeois, white subject, along with his concomitant property relations, and all those who threatened this norm, were precarized. Western modernity, along with its conceptions of sovereignty and biopolitics, is unthinkable without a ‘political culturc of danger’,34 without the permanent endangerment of the normal, without imaginary invasions of constant, everyday threats such as illness, filth, sexuality, criminality or the fear of ‘racial’ impurity, which must be immunized against in various ways.35 The presumed paradox of biopolitical governmentality is evident here in a further aspect: this mode of governing makes it possible, as Cornelia Ott has aptly phrased it, ‘for human beings to learn to consider themselves as unique “subjects”, while uniting them at the same time as an amorphous, standardized “population mass” . .. The reverse side of the “right to life” here is always the exclusion or destruction of life.’36

Lorey et al 15(Lorey, Isabell, et al. , Lorey is a Queer Studies Professor at the Academy of Media Arts in Cologne, works for transversal texts, the publication platform of the European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies. , “Biopolitical Governmentality .” State of Insecurity: Government of the Precarious, Verso, London, 2015, pp. 36–39.) //RB

Within the framework of its welfare-state paradigm of protection, liberal governmentality was based on multiple forms of precarity as inequality through othering: on the one hand, on the unpaid labour of women in the reproduction area of the private sphere; on the other hand, on the precarity of all those excluded from the nation-state compromise between capital and labour - whether as abnormal, foreign or poor - as well as those living under extreme conditions of exploitation in the colonies. All those who did not meet the norm and normalization of the free, sovereign-bourgeois, white subject, along with his concomitant property relations, and all those who threatened this norm, were precarized Western modernity, along with its conceptions of sovereignty and biopolitics, is unthinkable without a ‘political culturc of danger’,34 without the permanent endangerment of the normal, without imaginary invasions of constant, everyday threats such as illness, filth, sexuality, criminality or the fear of ‘racial’ impurity, which must be immunized against in various ways.

The perm is just the affs attempting to normalize the precarious that the liberal state has pushed to the margins, just like neoliberalism

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2022

Feminisation as Devalorisation ir scholarship, amongst other scholarship, has always valued masculine traits above feminine ones: rationality of capability over weakness (as well as the rationality of attitude over one informed by emotion); sovereignty over cooperation/dependency.86 Therefore, the discourse of progress and good governance is not only Western-centric but inherently masculinist as well. To demonstrate this I will unpack the feminist understanding of ‘feminisation’. It is not enough to think that simply by ‘including’ women in policies, solutions, or measurements means that progress is being made. This is the assumption that Chakrabarty pointed out as a hypocritical fallacy. Instead, a deeper grasp of what gender is and how it operates as a structure must be understood. The declinist literature is not manipulating women’s positions but it is replicating gender dynamics when it fails to pay attention to certain violence, like structural violence, sexual and gender-based violence, and violence against sexual minorities. Ann Tickner begins her seminal text on gender and international relations by working through a critique of how Morgenthau transposes the rational man onto the state. This has given mainstream ir scholars the presumption that states are (or ought to aspire to being) rational, sovereign actors.87 Yet, as Tickner points out, rationality and sovereignty are masculine attributes.88 In a logocentrism, such as the one that exists in the masculinity-femininity binary, one side is always valued over another. Particular masculinities are valorised— rational, wealthy, white, heteronormative ones;89 most if not all femininities are devalorised.

Gentry 16, C. E. (2016). (Caron Gentry is Senior Lecturer in the School of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews and Chair of the Feminist Theory and Gender Studies Section of the International Studies Association, The ‘Duel’ Meaning of Feminisation in International Relations: The Rise of Women and the Interior Logics of Declinist Literature, Global Responsibility to Protect, 9(1), 101-124. doi: https://doi-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/10.1163/1875984X-00901007)

Feminisation as Devalorisation ir scholarship, amongst other scholarship, has always valued masculine traits above feminine ones: rationality of capability over weakness (as well as the rationality of attitude over one informed by emotion); sovereignty over cooperation/dependency the discourse of progress and good governance is not only Western-centric but inherently masculinist as well. To demonstrate this I will unpack the feminist understanding of ‘feminisation’. It is not enough to think that simply by ‘including’ women in policies, solutions, or measurements means that progress is being made This is the assumption that Chakrabarty pointed out as a hypocritical fallacy. Instead, a deeper grasp of what gender is and how it operates as a structure must be understood. The declinist literature is not manipulating women’s positions but it is replicating gender dynamics when it fails to pay attention to certain violence, like structural violence, sexual and gender-based violence, and violence against sexual minorities This has given mainstream ir scholars the presumption that states are (or ought to aspire to being) rational, sovereign actors Yet, as Tickner points out, rationality and sovereignty are masculine attributes. logocentrism, such as the one that exists in the masculinity-femininity binary, one side is always valued over another Particular masculinities are valorised— rational, wealthy, white, heteronormative ones;89 most if not all femininities are devalorised.

Women in IR can’t solve because it doesn’t challenge the hierarchy embedded in nation states, institutions and policy – a complete overhaul is necessary

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Kritiks

2022

The Precarias’ derive inscribes itself in the tradition of ‘militant research’, generating ‘minor knowledge forms’ for the purpose of self-organization. This practice refers back to the idea of co-research associated with the Italian workers’ movement of the 1970s, as well as to practices of consciousness-raising deriving from second-wave feminism.4 Starting from their own precarized existences, in their encounters and affections with other precarious they seek to break through the isolation and individualization of post-Fordist living and working conditions.5 They traverse not only places of work, residence, shopping and meeting, places of sexuality and of transport, but also the different modes of subjectivation involved. The Precarias a la deriva start, first of all, from their own different experiences of precarity and precarization, in order to enable a common orientation with others in the derives. This orientation is not directed to a goal, but emerges in practice. In the derive they pass through social spaces and explore the conditions of precarized everyday life, in order to find out, first of all, what a common struggle against precarity and precarization might mean.6 As they start from the presupposition that the precarious goes far beyond the realm of work and covers the whole of existence, there is no search for a common identity that would conjoin everyone into a unity. Instead, the Precarias are interested in inventing ‘common notions’ in Spinoza’s sense.7 Such notions are formed by way of the affective connections of bodies, through what they have in common in their mutual affections. Common notions arise through actualizing that ‘which is common to and a property of the human body and such other bodies as are wont to affect the human body\s Developed in encounters with others, in exchanges with them, both the multiplicity and the singularities of existence manifest themselves in common notions.

Lorey et al 15(Lorey, Isabell, et al. , Lorey is a Queer Studies Professor at the Academy of Media Arts in Cologne, works for transversal texts, the publication platform of the European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies. , “Care Crisis and Care Strike .” State of Insecurity: Government of the Precarious, Verso, London, 2015, pp. 92–94.) //RB

The Precarias’ derive inscribes itself in the tradition of ‘militant research’ generating ‘minor knowledge forms’ for the purpose of self-organization. This practice refers back to the idea of co-research associated with the Italian workers’ movement of the 1970s, as well as to practices of consciousness-raising deriving from second-wave feminism Starting from their own precarized existences, in their encounters and affections with other precarious they seek to break through the isolation and individualization of post-Fordist living and working conditions They traverse not only places of work, residence, shopping and meeting, places of sexuality and of transport, but also the different modes of subjectivation involved The Precarias a la deriva start, from their own different experiences of precarity and precarization, in order to enable a common orientation with others in the derives This orientation is not directed to a goal, but emerges in practice In the derive they pass through social spaces and explore the conditions of precarized everyday life, in order to find out, first of all, what a common struggle against precarity and precarization might mean As they start from the presupposition that the precarious goes far beyond the realm of work and covers the whole of existence, there is no search for a common identity that would conjoin everyone into a unity. Instead, the Precarias are interested in inventing ‘common notions’ in Spinoza’s sense notions are formed by way of the affective connections of bodies through what they have in common in their mutual affections. Common notions arise through actualizing that ‘which is common to and a property of the human body and such other bodies as are wont to affect the human body\s Developed in encounters with others, in exchanges with them, both the multiplicity and the singularities of existence manifest themselves in common notions.

Precarity needs to explored in the debate space to search for common notions and go against the logic of security

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Scholars’ geographical locations matter for a number of reasons to do with the politics of knowledge (some of which are discussed above), and they also matter because they can shape the types of research that is possible. While in some locations (e.g. in Hungary) it may be impossible to conduct feminist research in an academic institution at all, practical issues in other locations—such as the priorities and methodological biases of funding bodies, the relative permissiveness of risk assessment regimes, and the possibility of getting research access into military institutions—all shape what types of feminist research are possible. This likely plays out in different ways across Europe, but I offer a couple of examples from the UK here because, given that most scholars are located in the UK, this likely has the most significant impact on the field as a whole. The most immediate point here is that the concentration of scholars in the UK leads to an disproportionate focus in the literature on the UK military, but there are also more subtle factors at play. Many UK institutions have cautious travel risk assessment policies that somewhat simplistically (and influenced by a colonial mindset) divide the world into ‘low risk’ and ‘high risk,’ or even ‘hostile’ locations. Anecdotally, this may result in researchers being denied permission to carry out fieldwork in certain locations in a way that would not happen, for example, in Sweden, where universities do not seem to follow restrictive travel risk assessment regimes. Similarly, the quantity of scholarship that does exist on the British military perhaps masks the often difficult processes required to gain approval to conduct research with members of the institution itself, which particularly constrain research that is interpretive, critical, and/or feminist. The power and biases of military gatekeepers in the British context have doubtless prevented and/or reshaped feminist research that would otherwise have been conducted (Basham and Catignani 2021). It is not possible, of course, to conduct a review of literature not published and research 2 DISPARITIES AND DIVERSIFICATION … 25 not carried out. However, the point I want to make here is that it is not only intellectual interest that drives how feminist scholars in Europe select the focus of their research, it is also political economic realities and the constraints of requiring various forms of institutional permission. These realities shape the body of feminist literature on war and militarism that is produced across Europe in powerful, if usually unseen, ways.

Stern and Towns 22, [Maria Stern, Ann E. Towns, “Feminist IR in Europe: Knowledge Production in Academic Institutions,” https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-91999-3, 2022] Mr.Mr.

Scholars’ geographical locations matter for a number of reasons to do with the politics of knowledge (some of which are discussed above), and they also matter because they can shape the types of research that is possible While in some locations (e.g. in Hungary) it may be impossible to conduct feminist research in an academic institution at all, practical issues in other locations—such as the priorities and methodological biases of funding bodies, the relative permissiveness of risk assessment regimes, and the possibility of getting research access into military institutions—all shape what types of feminist research are possible The power and biases of military gatekeepers in the British context have doubtless prevented and/or reshaped feminist research that would otherwise have been conducted However, the point I want to make here is that it is not only intellectual interest that drives how feminist scholars in Europe select the focus of their research, it is also political economic realities and the constraints of requiring various forms of institutional permission. These realities shape the body of feminist literature on war and militarism that is produced across Europe in powerful, if usually unseen, ways.

The oxymoronic act of reading their K in the debate space dooms the alt.

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The feminine/masculine divide is a (or perhaps "the") critical hermeneutic through which each society constructs experience, assigns meaning, and asserts its basic values. Bridging the essentialist/constructionist rift, I would argue that this divide is informed by a conflation of biological difference and cultural representation. It is my contention that bioweapons have been disdained and ostensibly banned, at least in part, because they are largely gendered female and, hence, do not serve the fantasies and ends of the patriarchal war system; their semi-androgynous amalgam of science and disease fuels and substantiates extant culture and gender wars. As instruments of terror for the aforementioned "disenfranchised" nations and groups, they connote the mythical "furies" of "disempowered" female rage. That is not to say that bioweapons will never be employed by First World powers but, rather, that gendered perceptions shape their geopolitical status and deter potential use.

Cecire 9, [Ruth Cecire, “Bioweapons: Postmodern Ruminations on a Premodern Modality,” https://sci-hub.se/10.2307/40607923, Feminist Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring 2009), pp. 41-65] Mr.Mr.

The feminine/masculine divide is a (or perhaps "the") critical hermeneutic through which each society constructs experience, assigns meaning, and asserts its basic values. It is my contention that bioweapons have been disdained and ostensibly banned, at least in part, because they are largely gendered female and, hence, do not serve the fantasies and ends of the patriarchal war system; their semi-androgynous amalgam of science and disease fuels and substantiates extant culture and gender wars. As instruments of terror for the aforementioned "disenfranchised" nations and groups, they connote the mythical "furies" of "disempowered" female rage. That is not to say that bioweapons will never be employed by First World powers but, rather, that gendered perceptions shape their geopolitical status and deter potential use.

Gender politics deter use of bioweapons – patriarchal militaries don’t want to use “feminine” weapons.

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I am sympathetic to Sjoberg’s agenda. Like her, I believe that there is no credible way for feminist IR to develop knowledge on war without engaging nonfeminist literatures on the topic. We may want to disavow the mainstream, but it does not allow itself to be ignored and invariably pops up in our topics, framings, and contestations. Because there is no pure feminist location outside previously existing knowledge, the long-standing debate among IR feminists over whether one should engage with the mainstream or not is beside the point. The question should be instead: What are the terms of engagement and who gets the home field advantage? And on this point I become uneasy with Sjoberg’s method; her dialogical approach does not sufficiently recognize the power relations that underlie her engagement with war studies. The author gives the home field advantage to the other team: She seeks an engagement on a playing field mapped by levels of analysis and structuralism, in a game following the rules of positivism and rationalism. But she is ambivalent about this. In the course of her dialogue, she sometimes plays by the rules but more often than not seeks to change them—a dialogue with feminism cannot be con- fined to positivism and rationalism. Not an easy way to win! Her decision to proceed from mainstream rather than feminist literature compounds the problem. Both the mainstream (“studies of war”) and the margin (“feminisms”) are introduced as diverse. Yet whereas the former is invited to play with well-coordinated teams and mature theories (structural realism, decision-making theories, dyadic theories, domestic politics approaches), the latter is presented as an assortment of seemingly disjointed ideas that are deployed on individual missions to rattle the mainstream. Feminisms do not seem to be amenable to team formation; feminisms apparently are good only for critique. Sjoberg is in good company with this approach: Poststructuralist feminists in IR are similarly wary of categorizing thought. But the approach systematically prevents a serious engagement between existing bodies of feminist war theorizing, hiding the complexity of feminist contributions to an understanding of war. For example, Betty Reardon, Valerie Hudson and her co-authors, Cynthia Cockburn, Dubravka Zarkov, and many others have put forward significantly different theories on war and gender that could be discussed against one another. Sjoberg cites them all, but does not start from this literature. She forgoes an opportunity to valorize it by weighing its merits and developing it, including with tools eclectically drawn from war studies. Instead, she recreates the role of the feminist underdog barking bits of critique at the mainstream and admonishing it that it should be doing better. Alternatively, it seems to me, there are spaces between the mainstream and the margins that could have been more hospitable points of departure. They pop up in the book in the persons of women who do not fit: Lene Hansen, presumably a member of the Copenhagen School but also its feminist critic; Mary Caprioli, identified as a liberal peace theorist but also its feminist critic. By playing on more than one team, do these scholars, and their work, not offer an engagement on a more equal playing field? And could not have critical security studies, constructivism, and poststructuralism provided a setting for dialogue in which rules of engagement are more welcoming to feminist ideas? Indeed, feminists have contributed to these approaches. The book unfortunately dispenses with them in a few short pages. One of the dangers of unmooring feminism from itself and from other critical approaches is that its insights become molded so as to be all things to all approaches. In the process, its core propositions get flattened so they can adjust to other theoretical axioms. This is the case here with regard to gender, arguably feminism’s core analytical concept. Sjoberg develops a “realist feminism,” proposing that gender hierarchy is a structural feature of the international system and a permissive cause of war, in addition to or substituting for anarchy (p. 98). In this approach, gender becomes “genders” (pp. 76 ff), that is, the categories women and men, and gender hierarchy an organizational attribute of states. What is lost is gender as a relational concept and as an analytical category, the usages preferred by many feminists. Casting aside feminist debates about the sense and nonsense of structuralist theories of patriarchy, Sjoberg resurrects them under the mantle of gendering neorealism. In her dialogue between unequals, gender yields to the theoretical axioms of the mainstream. Another casualty of this dialogue between unequals is the explanatory status of masculinity, which has become somewhat contested in feminist IR. In Sjoberg’s hands, hegemonic masculinity freezes into a predictive variable. She hypothesizes that “the more competitive a state’s hegemonic masculinity, the more likely that state is to make war. . . . States with elements of hypermasculinity in the nationalist discourse would be expected to be more aggressive” (p. 100). We are left to guess why masculinities always seem to be (more or less) competitive, what hypermasculinity consists of, and how its characteristics can be known in advance. Despite the feminist truism that gender (and thus masculinity) is a social construct, pro- fessed also by Sjoberg, she seems to imply that too much masculinity somehow brings about war. That is, masculinities always seem to be already tainted with militarism and aggression, suggesting some masculine core that no amount of social construction can overcome. Perhaps it is overdrawn to assign responsibility for this confusion to a dialogue between unequals in which gender is reformu- lated to fit positivist epistemologies; however, a targeted engagement with feminist literatures on militarist masculinities might have prevented this mistake.

Prugl 14 [Elisabeth Prügl is Professor of International Relations/ Political Science at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Perspectives on Politics , Volume 12 , Issue 1 , March 2014 , pp. 176 - 177 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592713003460] Mr.Mr.

Like her, I believe that there is no credible way for feminist IR to develop knowledge on war without engaging nonfeminist literatures on the topic. We may want to disavow the mainstream, but it does not allow itself to be ignored and invariably pops up in our topics, I become uneasy with Sjoberg’s method; her dialogical approach does not sufficiently recognize the power relations that underlie her engagement with war studies. The author gives the home field advantage to the other team: She seeks an engagement on a playing field mapped by levels of analysis and structuralism, in a game following the rules of positivism and rationalism Her decision to proceed from mainstream rather than feminist literature compounds the problem Yet whereas the former is invited to play with well-coordinated teams and mature theories (structural realism, decision-making theories, dyadic theories, domestic politics approaches), the latter is presented as an assortment of seemingly disjointed ideas that are deployed on individual missions to rattle the mainstream. Feminisms do not seem to be amenable to team formation; feminisms apparently are good only for critique But the approach systematically prevents a serious engagement between existing bodies of feminist war theorizing, hiding the complexity of feminist contributions to an understanding of war. its core propositions get flattened so they can adjust to other theoretical axioms. This is the case here with regard to gender, Sjoberg develops a “realist feminism,” proposing that gender hierarchy is a structural feature of the international system What is lost is gender as a relational concept and as an analytical category, the usages preferred by many feminists Sjoberg resurrects them under the mantle of gendering neorealism. Another casualty of this dialogue between unequals is the explanatory status of masculinity, which has become somewhat contested in feminist IR. In Sjoberg’s hands, hegemonic masculinity freezes into a predictive variable She hypothesizes that “the more competitive a state’s hegemonic masculinity, the more likely that state is to make war. We are left to guess why masculinities always seem to be (more or less) competitive, what hypermasculinity consists of, and how its characteristics can be known in advance she seems to imply that too much masculinity somehow brings about war. That is, masculinities always seem to be already tainted with militarism and aggression, suggesting some masculine core that no amount of social construction can overcome a targeted engagement with feminist literatures on militarist masculinities might have prevented this mistake.

The hypermasculine war-making thesis lacks predictive and explanatory power. Sjoberg also engages with the “mainstream” in her analysis, which proves that traditional IR is both unavoidable and necessary in feminist theorizing – the perm! Plus, she excludes non-binary people from the discussion of gender IR theory.

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The derision with which many conventional feminists view feminist quantitative studies persists to the detriment of both feminist and other types of IR scholarship. As Jan Jindy Pettman (2002) has argued, however, no single feminist position exists in international relations. One of the most common feminist critiques of feminist quantitative research is that scholars cannot simply "add gender and stir" (Peterson 2002;Steans2003), for gender is not just one of many variables. Yet, gender is one of many variables when we are discussing international issues, from human rights to war. As Fred Halliday (1988) has observed, gender is not the core of international relations or the key to understanding it. Such a position would grossly overstate the feminist case. Gender may be an important explanatory and predictive component but it certainly is not the only one.260 Such a critique only serves to undermine the feminist argument against a scientific methodology for the social sciences by questioning the scholarship of those who employ quantitative methodologies. One does not pull variables "out of the air" to put into a model, thereby "adding and stirring." Variables are added to models if a theoretical justification for doing so exists. Peterson (2002:158) postulates that "as long as IR understands gender only as an empirical category (for example, how do women in the military affect the conduct of war?), feminisms appear largely irrelevant to the discipline's primary questions and inquiry." Yet, little evidence actually supports this contention—unless one is arguing that gender is the only important category of analysis. If researchers cannot add gender to an analysis, then they must necessarily use a purely female-centered analysis, even though the utility of using a purely female- centered analysis seems equally biased. Such research would merely be gender-centric based on women rather than men, and it would thereby provide an equally biased account of international relations as those that are male-centric. Although one might speculate that having research done from the two opposing worldviews might more fully explain international relations, surely an integrated approach would offer a more comprehensive analysis of world affairs. Beyond a female-centric analysis, some scholars (for example, Carver 2002) argue that feminist research must offer a critique of gender as a set of power relations. Gender categories, however, do exist and have very real implications for individuals, social relations, and international affairs. Critiquing the social construction of gender is important, but it fails to provide new theories of international relations or to address the implications of gender for what happens in the world. Sylvester (2002a) has wondered aloud whether feminist research should be focused primarily on critique, warning that feminists should avoid an exclusive focus on highlighting anomalies, for such a focus does not add to feminist IR theories.

Caprioli 04 [Mary, Professor of Political Science – University of Tennessee, “Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Methodology: A Critical Analysis”, International Studies Review, 42(1), March, http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/0020-8833.00076] Mr.Mr.

gender is one of many variables when we are discussing international issues gender is not the core of international relations or the key to understanding it Such a position would grossly overstate the feminist case. Gender may be an important explanatory and predictive component but it certainly is not the only one One does not pull variables "out of the air" to put into a model adding and stirring If researchers cannot add gender to an analysis, then they must necessarily use a purely female-centered analysis, even though the utility of using a purely female- centered analysis seems equally biased. Such research would merely be gender-centric based on women rather than men, and it would thereby provide an equally biased account as those that are male-centric. Critiquing the social construction of gender is important, but it fails to provide new theories of international relations or to address the implications of gender for what happens in the world feminists should avoid an exclusive focus on highlighting anomalies for such a focus does not add to feminist IR theories.

Perm do both - IR is not over-determined by gender – their scholarship creates new biases without disrupting masculinity – we’ll win even under their framework

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Kritiks

2022

We acknowledge the important role played by some IR feminists in critiquing/expanding security studies to be more inclusive of women's needs. But it is also true that deploying gender as a variable and a category of analysis has contributed important insights to security studies, which must be taken seriously by security studies scholars not only for feminist reasons, but because security scholars – and policy makers – miss much of what is going on by ignoring gender. We reject the claim that IR feminist approaches require non-quantitative methods or a critical theoretical epistemology, a claim which has in the past been reified both by IR feminists (Tickner 2005) and by those writing within the IR mainstream (e.g., Carpenter 2003). As Mary Caprioli has argued, much quantitative work is also relevant to feminist questions (Caprioli 2004). We agree with Robert Keohane (1989) that gender as a category of analysis can contribute something to IR as conventionally defined, and it is this contribution which we explore in this essay. In our view, seeking to integrate gender more fully into the discipline of security studies serves to validate the empirical insights yielded by many feminist IR scholars by taking them seriously within the mainstream. While methodologies and specification of explanans and explanandum may differ from the work cited above, such analysis can indeed be consistent with “rethinking security on feminist grounds.” By drawing on empirical insights from gender theory, while speaking to the major concerns of international security studies as a discipline, the literature on gender and security can speak to both IR feminists and security studies scholars. In this essay, we will concentrate on what this literature can say to mainstream security studies, whose primary concerns are, following Walt: “the conditions that make the use of force more likely, the ways that the use of force affects individuals, states and societies, and the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war (1991:212). Taking a gender perspective need not entail a rejection of conventional concepts, methodologies, or questions that define the discipline. Unlike the critical feminist scholarship, which is skeptical of conventional methodologies, this literature review includes a range of empirical scholarship on gender, whether qualitative or quantitative, positivist or constructivist, that make a meaningful contribution to security studies.

Hudson et al 10 [Valerie M. Hudson, Prof of Poli Sci at Texas A&M University, PhD in Poli Sci from Ohio State R. Charli Carpenter, Associate Prof of Poli Sci at the University of Massachussetts-Amherst, PhD in Poli Sci from the University of Oregon; Mary Caprioli, Associate Prof of Poli Sci and Director of the International Studies program at the University of Minnesota-Duluth, PhD from the University of Connecticut; “Gender and Global Security,” from The International Studies Encyclopedia, ed. Robert A. Denemark]

We reject the claim that IR feminist approaches require non-quantitative methods or a critical theoretical epistemology, a claim which has in the past been reified both by IR feminists As Mary Caprioli has argued, much quantitative work is also relevant to feminist questions seeking to integrate gender more fully into the discipline of security studies serves to validate the empirical insights yielded by many feminist IR scholars by taking them seriously within the mainstream such analysis can indeed be consistent with “rethinking security on feminist grounds.” By drawing on empirical insights from gender theory, while speaking to the major concerns of international security studies literature on gender and security can speak to both IR feminists and security studies scholars Taking a gender perspective need not entail a rejection of conventional concepts, methodologies, or questions that define the discipline. empirical scholarship on gender, make a meaningful contribution to security studies

Our methods are compatible

K - Fem IR 2 - Michigan 7 2022 K LAB.html5

Michigan (7-week)

Kritiks

2022

There is nothing wrong with identifying one’s victimization. The act is critical. There is a lot wrong with moding it into an identity. Naomi Wolf, Fire with Fire. Feminist debate about victimology is not new, but its appearance in the feminist popular press is. That discourse about feminist victimology has attracted substantial contributions from popular press feminists is an indication of this discourse’s significance to feminism’s appeal as a social movement, indeed to feminism’s “marketability” as a cultural formation. For these contributions aim precisely to revitalize feminism’s appeal, to rewire its “marketing strategy,” in order to overcome the “alienation” of “ordinary” women from feminism that, they argue, victimology has brought into effect. Although Denfeld, Wolf, and Roiphe have been vocal about their disagreements with one another, their accounts of “the victim problem in current feminism” have more substantive similarities than differences, with Wolf having produced the most generous and systematic account. The manner in which they deal with victim feminism follows the same line, and both Denfeld and Wolf exhibit the same desire to cure feminism of victimology and charge inexorably toward an alternative. What, then, is feminist victimology, or victim feminism? It can be understood in general terms as an attitude fueled by the belief that women are victims of power, where power is understood exclusively as man’s capacity to dominate – a capacity given a fixed and central place in a social order (patriarchy) that fosters its systematic and repeated expression. In short, and to exemplify, relations between the sexes are understood as “a system of sexism in which men as a group have access to power and privilege that women do not have.” This understanding of the sexed distribution of power is posited as an exhaustive account of the power and, as such, breathes life into an elaborate feminist morality. Feminist victimology is, on all accounts, a morally righteous kind of feminism. The experience of powerlessness (women’s experience, whether they “realize” it or not), as the inverse and opposite of power, is the raw material from which the injurious effects of domination can be tabled. As Wolf writes, victim feminism proffers definitive judgment on good and evil with reference to sexual difference and thereby “casts women themselves as good and men themselves as wrong.” A mantle of virtue is bestowed on women and their distinctive ways of doing things, on account of their radical subjection to power, while men “as a group” take on the suits of evil as they are cast as the source of harm. Under the auspice of victim feminism, resistance to domination begins with the process of articulating and tabling its effects to produce an undistorted view of how domination really works, where the responsibility for it really lies, and who stands outside of it – who can, at the end of the day, be evacuated to a position that is, morally speaking, “above” domination and outside of power. Wolf’s criticism of situating feminism’s constituency outside of power is that it “urges women to identify with powerlessness even at the expense of taking responsibility for the power they do possess.” It follows from this that adherents to a victimological line of thinking would avoid registering the figure of the consciously and deliberately powerful woman – who is not, and does not desire to be, above or outside of power – much less the workings of power within its own auspice. The possibility that women and feminists might themselves practice and participate in domination, that not all men have or use the capacity to dominate, that power expresses itself in forms other than domination, is rendered unthinkable if power is conflated with male domination. This much is noted by Denfeld, who argues that victimology makes some women’s conscious participation in “racism, sexism, and violence” at most invisible and at least excusable. For Denfeld, under the auspice of victim feminism women are cast not only as victims but also as dupes. This casting serves a dual purpose. First, some women’s participation in regimes of domination can be excused as “manipulated by negative male ideas.” Second, anointing patriarchy with great powers of deception is an effective means of defending feminism against negative criticism. Denfeld writes, If you don’t agree with current feminists about the enemy, that’s only another sign that he exists.” Victimology, on Denfeld’s account, embraces a hopeful purity of position and registers anything less as contaminated compromise. We can add to Denfeld’s complaint that a victimological perspective will evade the idea that not all experiences of powerlessness are the same and should not, therefore, be collapsed under a single moral claim and that the experience of powerlessness offers no less distorted a view than does the “power-infused” view with which it competes politically. Wolf argues that victimology is especially impoverished in the respect that it inhibits the registration and representation of women’s capacities to assume positive relationships to power. It dwells exclusively on powerlessness, “molding it into an identity,” ratifying and regenerating, rather than transforming, socially derived stereotypes of female weakness and vulnerability. Moreover, having granted victimhood the status of a grand category into which women as a group can be hereded, feminists effectively eschew the conceptual strategies at their disposal for overcoming victim identity. As Sandra Harding has commented, “Victimology… often hide[s] the ways in which women have struggled against misogyny and exploitation.” Harding’s comment indicates that even as a victimological perspective can have a dramatic reversal of the social order in mind – for men must be made to repent for the injuries they have caused by relinquishing the values, ideals, and sociocultural configurations that secure their power – the very logic through which relations of power are conceived from this perspective works against registration of struggle (successful and otherwise) with these values, ideals, and sociocultural configurations.

Stringer 2k, [Rebecca, “’A Nietzschean Breed’: Feminism, Victimology, Ressentiment,” Why Nietzsche Still? Reflections on Drama, Culture, Politics. Pg. 249-251] Mr.Mr.

There is nothing wrong with identifying one’s victimization. There is a lot wrong with moding it into an identity. feminist victimology can be understood as the belief that women are victims of power, where power is understood as man’s capacity to dominate given a fixed and central place in a social order that fosters its systematic and repeated expression relations between the sexes are understood as “a system of sexism in which men as a group have access to power and privilege that women do not have.” This understanding of the sexed distribution of power is posited as an exhaustive account of the power The experience of powerlessness (women’s experience, whether they “realize” it or not) is the raw material from which the injurious effects of domination can be tabled victim feminism proffers casts women themselves as good and men themselves as wrong.” situating feminism’s constituency outside of power “urges women to identify with powerlessness adherents would avoid registering the powerful woman – who is not, and does not desire to be, above or outside of power – much less the workings of power within its own auspice. victimology makes women’s conscious participation in “racism, sexism, and violence excusable women are cast not only as victims but also as dupes women’s participation in regimes of domination can be excused as “manipulated by negative male ideas.” Second, anointing patriarchy with great powers of deception is an effective means of defending feminism If you don’t agree with current feminists about the enemy, that’s only another sign that he exists.” not all experiences of powerlessness are the same and should not, therefore, be collapsed under a single moral claim victimology inhibits women’s capacities to assume positive relationships to power. It dwells exclusively on powerlessness, “molding it into an identity,” ratifying and regenerating, rather than transforming, socially derived stereotypes of female weakness feminists effectively eschew the conceptual strategies for overcoming victim identity. Victimology hide[s] the ways women have struggled against misogyny and exploitation even as a victimological perspective can have a dramatic reversal of the social order in mind the very logic through which relations of power are conceived works against registration of struggle with these values

The kritik’s framing of women as victims steals female power – turns the K.

K - Fem IR 2 - Michigan 7 2022 K LAB.html5

Michigan (7-week)

Kritiks

2022

The U.S. defense secretary emphasized partnership as the main priority for the American security strategy in the Indo-Pacific during a keynote speech in Singapore on Saturday, but stressed that the U.S. was not seeking to create “an Asian NATO.” The United States remains “deeply invested” and committed to a free and open Indo-Pacific, Lloyd Austin said in a 30-minute speech during the first plenary session of the Shangri-La Dialogue security forum here. “We do not seek confrontation and conflict and we do not seek a new Cold War, an Asian NATO or a region split into hostile blocs,” the U.S. defense chief said, referring to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Russian President Vladimir Putin had cited Ukraine’s interest in joining the regional inter-governmental alliance as a reason for launching an invasion of the smaller country next-door in late February. The United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific have recently expressed concern over China’s increasingly assertive military posture in the region, and that the war in Ukraine might encourage Beijing even more. Beijing, for its part, has been complaining about what it sees as attempts by the U.S. and its partners to form a defense alliance in the region. When leaders from the U.S., Japan, India and Australia met last month for a summit of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, China cried foul. Foreign Minister Wang Yi said Washington was “keen to gang up with ‘small circles’ and change China’s neighborhood environment,” making Asia-Pacific countries serve as “pawns” of the U.S. hegemony. “I think Secretary Austin made it very clear that there’s no appetite for an Asian NATO,” said Blake Herzinger, a Singapore-based defense analyst. “The U.S. values collective partnerships with shared visions and priorities, without the need to form a defense alliance,” he told BenarNews. ‘A region free from coercion and bullying’ The U.S will “continue to stand by our friends as they uphold their rights,” said Austin, adding that the commitment is “especially important as the People’s Republic of China adopts a more coercive and aggressive approach to its territorial claims.” He spoke of the Chinese air force’s almost daily incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and an “alarming” increase in the number of unsafe and unprofessional encounters between Chinese planes and vessels with those of other countries. Most recently, U.S. ally Australia accused China of conducting a “dangerous intercept,” of one of its surveillance aircraft near the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. On Friday, Austin met with his Chinese counterpart, Wei Fenghe, on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue. During the meeting that lasted nearly an hour, the two sides discussed how to better manage their relationship and prevent accidents from happening but did not reach any concrete resolution. Austin used his speech on Saturday to remind Beijing that “big powers carry big responsibilities,” saying “we’ll do our part to manage these tensions responsibly – to prevent conflict, and to pursue peace and prosperity.” The Indo-Pacific is the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DOD) “priority theater,” he noted, adding that his department’s fiscal year 2023 budget request calls for one of the largest investments in history to preserve the region's security. This includes the U.S. $6.1 billion for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative to strengthen multilateral information-sharing and support training and experimentation with partners. The budget also seeks to encourage innovation across all domains, including space and cyberspace, “to develop new capabilities that will allow us to deter aggression even more surely,” he said. The U.S. military is expanding exercises and training programs with regional partners, the defense secretary said. Later in June, the Pentagon will host the 28th Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercise with forces from 26 countries, 38 ships and nearly 25,000 personnel. Next year, a Coast Guard cutter will be deployed to Southeast Asia and Oceania, he said, “the first major U.S. Coast Guard cutter permanently stationed in the region.” Protecting Taiwan “Secretary Austin offered a compelling vision, grounded in American resolve to uphold freedom from coercion and oppose the dangerously outmoded concept of aggressively-carved spheres of influence,” said Andrew Erickson, research director of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College, speaking in a personal capacity. “The key will be for Washington to match Austin’s rhetoric with requisite resolve and resources long after today’s Dialogue is over,” Erickson said. “It is that follow-through that will determine much in what President Biden rightly calls the ‘Decisive Decade’,” he added. Last month in Tokyo, Biden announced a new Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) that Austin said would provide better access to space-based, maritime domain awareness to countries across the region. The U.S. defense secretary spoke at length about his government’s policy towards Taiwan, saying “we’re determined to uphold the status quo that has served this region so well for so long.” While remaining committed to the longstanding one-China policy, the U.S. categorically opposes “any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side.” “We do not support Taiwan independence. And we stand firmly behind the principle that cross-strait differences must be resolved by peaceful means,” Austin said. The U.S. continues assisting Taiwan in maintaining self-defense capability and this week approved the sale of U.S. $120 million in spare parts and technical assistance for the Taiwanese navy.

Benar News ’22 (Staff written, “US not seeking to create ‘Asian NATO,’ defense secretary says,” 2022.06.11, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/thai/singapore-summit-day-1-06112022015249.html)-mikee

The United States remains “deeply invested” and committed to a free and open Indo-Pacific The United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific have recently expressed concern over China’s increasingly assertive military posture in the region The U.S will “continue to stand by our friends as they uphold their rights,” The Indo-Pacific is the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DOD) “priority theater,” adding that his department’s fiscal year 2023 budget request calls for one of the largest investments in history to preserve the region's security. This includes the U.S. $6.1 billion for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative to strengthen multilateral information-sharing and support training and experimentation with partners. The budget also seeks to encourage innovation across all domains, including space and cyberspace, “to develop new capabilities that will allow us to deter aggression even more surely The U.S. military is expanding exercises and training programs with regional partners, the the Pentagon will host the RIMPAC) naval exercise Protecting Taiwan “The key will be for Washington to match Austin’s rhetoric with requisite resolve and resources long after today’s Dialogue is over The U.S. defense secretary spoke at length about his government’s policy towards Taiwan, saying “we’re determined to uphold the status quo that has served this region so well for so long.” The U.S. continues assisting Taiwan in maintaining self-defense capability

a. Uniqueness: US military is prioritizing China – current budgets and diplomatic efforts are key to maintain deterrence, specially over Taiwan.

DA - China Tradeoff - CNDI 2022.html5

Berkeley (CNDI)

Disadvantages

2022

As China's power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington's fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil. A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a military confrontation-resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan-no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think. Members of China's strategic community tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as "somewhere between nil and zero." This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon's preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States' signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent's key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power. China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China's conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to. As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place. A NEW KIND OF THREAT There are some reasons for optimism. For one, China has long stood out for its nonaggressive nuclear doctrine. After its first nuclear test, in 1964, China largely avoided the Cold War arms race, building a much smaller and simpler nuclear arsenal than its resources would have allowed. Chinese leaders have consistently characterized nuclear weapons as useful only for deterring nuclear aggression and coercion. Historically, this narrow purpose required only a handful of nuclear weapons that could ensure Chinese retaliation in the event of an attack. To this day, China maintains a "no first use" pledge, promising that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The prospect of a nuclear conflict can also seem like a relic of the Cold War. Back then, the United States and its allies lived in fear of a Warsaw Pact offensive rapidly overrunning Europe. Nato stood ready to use nuclear weapons first to stalemate such an attack. Both Washington and Moscow also consistently worried that their nuclear forces could be taken out in a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear strike by the other side. This mutual fear increased the risk that one superpower might rush to launch in the erroneous belief that it was already under attack. Initially, the danger of unauthorized strikes also loomed large. In the 1950s, lax safety procedures for U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on nato soil, as well as minimal civilian oversight of U.S. military commanders, raised a serious risk that nuclear escalation could have occurred without explicit orders from the U.S. president. The good news is that these Cold War worries have little bearing on U.S.-Chinese relations today. Neither country could rapidly overrun the other's territory in a conventional war. Neither seems worried about a nuclear bolt from the blue. And civilian political control of nuclear weapons is relatively strong in both countries. What remains, in theory, is the comforting logic of mutual deterrence: in a war between two nuclear powers, neither side will launch a nuclear strike for fear that its enemy will respond in kind. The bad news is that one other trigger remains: a conventional war that threatens China's nuclear arsenal. Conventional forces can threaten nuclear forces in ways that generate pressures to escalate- especially when ever more capable U.S. conventional forces face adversaries with relatively small and fragile nuclear arsenals, such as China. If U.S. operations endangered or damaged China's nuclear forces, Chinese leaders might come to think that Washington had aims beyond winning the conventional war- that it might be seeking to disable or destroy China's nuclear arsenal outright, perhaps as a prelude to regime change. In the fog of war, Beijing might reluctantly conclude that limited nuclear escalation- an initial strike small enough that it could avoid full-scale U.S. retaliation- was a viable option to defend itself. STRAIT SHOOTERS The most worrisome flash point for a U.S.-Chinese war is Taiwan. Beijing's long-term objective of reunifying the island with mainland China is clearly in conflict with Washington's longstanding desire to maintain the status quo in the strait. It is not difficult to imagine how this might lead to war. For example, China could decide that the political or military window for regaining control over the island was closing and launch an attack, using air and naval forces to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bombard the island. Although U.S. law does not require Washington to intervene in such a scenario, the Taiwan Relations Act states that the United States will "consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States." Were Washington to intervene on Taipei's behalf, the world's sole superpower and its rising competitor would find themselves in the first great-power war of the twenty-first century. In the course of such a war, U.S. conventional military operations would likely threaten, disable, or outright eliminate some Chinese nuclear capabilities- whether doing so was Washington's stated objective or not. In fact, if the United States engaged in the style of warfare it has practiced over the last 30 years, this outcome would be all but guaranteed. Consider submarine warfare. China could use its conventionally armed attack submarines to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bomb the island, or to attack U.S. and allied forces in the region. If that happened, the U.S. Navy would almost certainly undertake an antisubmarine campaign, which would likely threaten China's "boomers," the four nuclear armed ballistic missile submarines that form its naval nuclear deterrent. China's conventionally armed and nuclear-armed submarines share the same shore-based communications system; a U.S. attack on these transmitters would thus not only disrupt the activities of China's attack submarine force but also cut off its boomers from contact with Beijing, leaving Chinese leaders unsure of the fate of their naval nuclear force. In addition, nuclear ballistic missile submarines depend on attack submarines for protection, just as lumbering bomber aircraft rely on nimble fighter jets. If the United States started sinking Chinese attack submarines, it would be sinking the very force that protects China's ballistic missile submarines, leaving the latter dramatically more vulnerable. Even more dangerous, U.S. forces hunting Chinese attack submarines could inadvertently sink a Chinese boomer instead. After all, at least some Chinese attack submarines might be escorting ballistic missile submarines, especially in wartime, when China might flush its boomers from their ports and try to send them within range of the continental United States. Since correctly identifying targets remains one of the trickiest challenges of undersea warfare, a U.S. submarine crew might come within shooting range of a Chinese submarine without being sure of its type, especially in a crowded, noisy environment like the Taiwan Strait. Platitudes about caution are easy in peacetime. In wartime, when Chinese attack submarines might already have launched deadly strikes, the U.S. crew might decide to shoot first and ask questions later. Adding to China's sense of vulnerability, the small size of its nuclear armed submarine force means that just two such incidents would eliminate half of its sea-based deterrent. Meanwhile, any Chinese boomers that escaped this fate would likely be cut off from communication with onshore commanders, left without an escort force, and unable to return to destroyed ports. If that happened, China would essentially have no naval nuclear deterrent. The situation is similar onshore, where any U.S. military campaign would have to contend with China's growing land based conventional ballistic missile force. Much of this force is within range of Taiwan, ready to launch ballistic missiles against the island or at any allies coming to its aid. Once again, U.S. victory would hinge on the ability to degrade this conventional ballistic missile force. And once again, it would be virtually impossible to do so while leaving China's nuclear ballistic missile force unscathed. Chinese conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles are often attached to the same base headquarters, meaning that they likely share transportation and supply networks, patrol routes, and other supporting infrastructure. It is also possible that they share some command-and-control networks, or that the United States would be unable to distinguish between the conventional and nuclear networks even if they were physically separate. To add to the challenge, some of China's ballistic missiles can carry either a conventional or a nuclear warhead, and the two versions are virtually indistinguishable to U.S. aerial surveillance. In a war, targeting the conventional variants would likely mean destroying some nuclear ones in the process. Furthermore, sending manned aircraft to attack Chinese missile launch sites and bases would require at least partial control of the airspace over China, which in turn would require weakening Chinese air defenses. But degrading China's coastal air defense network in order to fight a conventional war would also leave much of its nuclear force without protection. Once China was under attack, its leaders might come to fear that even intercontinental ballistic missiles located deep in the country's interior were vulnerable. For years, observers have pointed to the U.S. military's failed attempts to locate and destroy Iraqi Scud missiles during the 1990-91 Gulf War as evidence that mobile missiles are virtually impervious to attack. Therefore, the thinking goes, China could retain a nuclear deterrent no matter what harm U.S. forces inflicted on its coastal areas. Yet recent research suggests otherwise. Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles are larger and less mobile than the Iraqi Scuds were, and they are harder to move without detection. The United States is also likely to have been tracking them much more closely in peacetime. As a result, China is unlikely to view a failed Scud hunt in Iraq nearly 30 years ago as reassurance that its residual nuclear force is safe today, especially during an ongoing, highintensity conventional war. China's vehement criticism of a U.S. regional missile defense system designed to guard against a potential North Korean attack already reflects these latent fears. Beijing's worry is that this system could help Washington block the handful of missiles China might launch in the aftermath of a U.S. attack on its arsenal. That sort of campaign might seem much more plausible in Beijing's eyes if a conventional war had already begun to seriously undermine other parts of China's nuclear deterrent. It does not help that China's real-time awareness of the state of its forces would probably be limited, since blinding the adversary is a standard part of the U.S. military playbook. Put simply, the favored U.S. strategy to ensure a conventional victory would likely endanger much of China's nuclear arsenal in the process, at sea and on land. Whether the United States actually intended to target all of China's nuclear weapons would be incidental. All that would matter is that Chinese leaders would consider them threatened. LESSONS FROM THE PAST At that point, the question becomes, How will China react? Will it practice restraint and uphold the "no first use" pledge once its nuclear forces appear to be under attack? Or will it use those weapons while it still can, gambling that limited escalation will either halt the U.S. campaign or intimidate Washington into backing down? Chinese writings and statements remain deliberately ambiguous on this point. It is unclear which exact set of capabilities China considers part of its core nuclear deterrent and which it considers less crucial. For example, if China already recognizes that its sea based nuclear deterrent is relatively small and weak, then losing some of its ballistic missile submarines in a war might not prompt any radical discontinuity in its calculus. The danger lies in wartime developments that could shift China's assumptions about U.S. intentions. If Beijing interprets the erosion of its sea- and land-based nuclear forces as a deliberate effort to destroy its nuclear deterrent, or perhaps even as a prelude to a nuclear attack, it might see limited nuclear escalation as a way to force an end to the conflict. For example, China could use nuclear weapons to instantaneously destroy the U.S. air bases that posed the biggest threat to its arsenal. It could also launch a nuclear strike with no direct military purpose-on an unpopulated area or at sea-as a way to signal that the United States had crossed a redline.

Talmadge ‘18 (Caitlin; associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University; 11/18; "Beijing’s Nuclear Option"; Foreign Affairs; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option; SM)

As China's power has grown so has the risk of war with the U S Under Xi China increased political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations reefs in the S C S fueling Washington's fears Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence U.S. destroyers transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers wondered whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. the prospect of a military confrontation-resulting from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan-no longer seems implausible the odds of a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers think. If deployed against China, the Pentagon's style of conventional warfare would be a recipe for nuclear escalation the U S signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory to rapidly knock out opponent's key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power. China not only has nuclear weapons; it has intermingled them with conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. a major U.S. campaign targeting China's conventional forces would threaten its nuclear arsenal. Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while still able to. a conventional war could skid into nuclear confrontation As long as the U S and China pursue their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. The bad news is one trigger remains: a conventional war that threatens China's nuclear arsenal. Conventional forces can threaten nuclear forces in ways that generate pressures to escalate- especially when more capable U.S. conventional forces face adversaries with small nuclear arsenals, such as China. If U.S. operations endangered China's nuclear forces, Chinese leaders might think Washington had aims beyond winning the conventional war seeking to destroy China's nuclear arsenal as a prelude to regime change. In the fog of war, Beijing might conclude limited nuclear escalation was a viable option to defend itself. The most worrisome flash point for a U.S.-Chinese war is Taiwan. Beijing's objective of reunifying the island with China is in conflict with Washington's desire to maintain the status quo this might lead to war. China could decide the political or military window for regaining control over the island was closing and launch an attack, using air and naval forces to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bombard the island. Were Washington to intervene on Taipei's behalf, the world's superpower and its competitor would find themselves in the first great-power war of the twenty-first century. In the course of a war, U.S. conventional military operations would threaten, disable, or outright eliminate Chinese nuclear capabilities- whether doing so was Washington's objective if the U S engaged in the style of warfare it practiced over last 30 years, this outcome would be guaranteed. China could use conventionally armed submarines to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bomb the island, or attack U.S. and allied forces If that happened, the U.S. Navy would undertake an antisubmarine campaign, which would threaten China's "boomers," nuclear armed ballistic missile submarines China's conventionally armed and nuclear-armed submarines share the same communications system; a U.S. attack on these transmitters would cut off boomers from contact with Beijing, leaving Chinese leaders unsure of fate of naval nuclear force. nuclear ballistic missile submarines depend on attack submarines for protection If the U S started sinking Chinese attack submarines, it would be sinking the force that protects China's ballistic missile submarines, leaving the latter more vulnerable. more dangerous, U.S. forces hunting Chinese attack submarines could inadvertently sink a Chinese boomer Since correctly identifying targets remains one of the trickiest challenges of undersea warfare, a U.S. submarine crew might come within shooting range of a Chinese submarine in a crowded, noisy environment like the Taiwan Strait. In wartime, when Chinese attack submarines might already have launched strikes, the U.S. crew might decide to shoot first and ask questions later. Adding to China's vulnerability, the small size of its nuclear armed submarine force two incidents would eliminate half of its sea-based deterrent. any Chinese boomers that escaped this fate would be cut off from communication with onshore commanders, left without an escort and unable to return to destroyed ports. China would have no naval nuclear deterrent. onshore any U.S. military campaign would have to contend with China's growing land based conventional ballistic missile force. this force is within range of Taiwan, ready to launch ballistic missiles against the island or any allies coming to its aid. U.S. victory would hinge on ability to degrade conventional ballistic missile force. it would be impossible to do so while leaving China's nuclear ballistic missile force unscathed. Chinese conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles are attached to the same base headquarters, meaning they share transportation and supply networks, patrol routes, and other infrastructure. It is possible that they share command-and-control networks, or that the U S would be unable to distinguish between conventional and nuclear networks if separate. To add to the challenge China's ballistic missiles can carry either a conventional or nuclear warhead, and the two versions are indistinguishable to U.S. surveillance. In a war, targeting conventional variants would mean destroying nuclear ones in the process. degrading China's coastal air defense network to fight a conventional war would leave its nuclear force without protection. the favored U.S. strategy to ensure conventional victory would endanger China's nuclear arsenal in the process Whether the U S actually intended to target China's nuclear weapons would be incidental. All that matter is that Chinese leaders would consider them threatened. danger lies in wartime developments that could shift China's assumptions about U.S. intentions. If Beijing interprets erosion of sea- and land-based nuclear forces as a deliberate effort to destroy nuclear deterrent, or as a prelude to nuclear attack, it might see limited nuclear escalation as a way to force an end to the conflict. China could use nuclear weapons to instantaneously destroy U.S. air bases that posed the biggest threat to its arsenal.

2. That war goes nuclear – conventional and nuclear forces are intermingled.

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With the administration’s attention having shifted to Ukraine, President Biden plans to emphasize that the United States can counter aggression in both Europe and Asia. President Biden departing for South Korea on Thursday. Mr. Biden’s first trip to Asia will pose diplomatic challenges on several fronts. SEOUL — President Biden embarked Thursday on his first diplomatic mission to Asia since taking office, hoping to demonstrate that the United States remained focused on countering China, even as his administration stage-managed a war against Russia in Europe. With his original strategy of pivoting foreign policy attention to Asia effectively blown up by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Mr. Biden has now shifted to the argument that there can be no trade-off between Europe and Asia and that only the United States can bring together the democracies of the East and West to stand up to autocracy and aggression in both spheres. For Mr. Biden, finding his balance between the twin imperatives will require geopolitical maneuvering that would challenge any president. The competing demands on his time and attention were on display on Thursday as he squeezed in a last-minute meeting at the White House with the leaders of Sweden and Finland to welcome their decisions to join NATO before heading to Joint Base Andrews to board Air Force One for the long flight to South Korea. And days before that, Mr. Biden hosted Southeast Asian nations at the White House to detail new investments in clean energy and maritime assets, part of an effort to prevent China from dominating the Indo-Pacific.

Baker and Kanno-Youngs ’22 (Peter Baker is the chief White House correspondent and has covered the last five presidents for The Times and The Washington Post. Zolan Kanno-Youngs is a White House correspondent covering a range of domestic and international issues in the Biden White House. “Biden Begins Trip to Asia Meant to Reassure Allies of Focus on China,” NY Times, May 19, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/19/us/politics/biden-trip-asia.html)-mikee

Biden plans to emphasize that the United States can counter aggression in both Europe and Asia. Biden’s first trip to Asia will pose diplomatic challenges on several fronts. Biden embarked Thursday on his first diplomatic mission to Asia hoping to demonstrate that the United States remained focused on countering China even as his administration stage-managed a war against Russia in Europe Biden has now shifted to the argument that there can be no trade-off finding his balance between the twin imperatives will require geopolitical maneuvering that would challenge any president The competing demands on his time and attention were on display as he squeezed in a meeting with NATO before the long flight to South Korea

The status quo is goldilocks – Biden is balancing both regions now, but new demands trade-off and complicate existing strategies.

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It is worth remembering that in the year before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, President Biden sought a “stable” relationship with Russia and its leader, Vladimir Putin. The reason he wanted stability in that relationship was so the United States could shift its attention toward China and the Indo-Pacific region. Indeed, in the week before Biden’s June 2021 summit with Putin, the Group of Seven and NATO communiques focused more on building a coordinated response to China. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan was also keyed on a reorientation toward China. Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine obviously pushed “countering Russia” to the top of the policy queue. Putin’s continual ratcheting down of war aims from “regime decapitation and occupation of Kyiv” to “let’s take the entire Donbas region” to “let’s take Luhansk oblast” suggests that U.S. support of Ukraine has been a foreign-policy success. The war in Ukraine raises the awkward question of whether the United States can still reorient toward the Indo-Pacific region, however. Biden administration officials sure think so. Many of them told Bloomberg News’s Peter Martin earlier this month that they “see the conflict’s toll and the slew of sanctions placed on Moscow as leaving Russia hobbled for years to come. Combined with bolstered European defense spending, that means the U.S. may have a freer hand to accelerate its long-term shift toward China, viewed as America’s biggest future challenge.” Such a supposition holds up in theory. Russia’s actions in Ukraine have caused a sea change in European perceptions of Russia. This explains Germany’s increased military spending, Sweden’s and Finland’s applications for NATO membership, and even Switzerland’s flirtation with more cooperation with NATO. A better-armed Europe and a depleted Russia should free up U.S. time and resources to focus on the Indo-Pacific. And China experts such as Andrew Nathan argue that the Biden administration has the necessary strategic acumen to counter China.

Drezner ’22 (Daniel W. Drezner is a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, “Can the United States focus on China while countering Russia?,” May 18, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/05/18/can-united-states-focus-china-while-countering-russia/)-mikee

President wanted stability so the United States could shift its attention toward China The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan was also keyed on a reorientation toward China Biden officials see Russia hobbled for years to come Combined with bolstered European defense spending, that means the U.S. may have a freer hand to accelerate its long-term shift toward China, viewed as America’s biggest future challenge This explains Germany’s increased military spendin A better-armed Europe and a depleted Russia should free up U.S. time and resources to focus on the Indo-Pacific. experts argue that the Biden administration has the necessary strategic acumen to counter China.

Long-term efforts still point to China – time and resources are zero-sum.

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WASHINGTON — President Biden on Thursday began hosting the leaders of Southeast Asian nations at the White House for a two-day visit, delivering a message of solidarity — and aiming to provide a bulwark against Chinese influence in the region — even as much of his administration remains focused on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The summit, which concludes on Friday, is intended to cover an array of topics, including trade, human rights and climate change. But it is also part of an effort by Mr. Biden’s foreign policy team to highlight one of the president’s primary goals: assembling a united front against China as it increasingly demonstrates its economic and military might around the world. As a candidate, Mr. Biden promised to make China a central focus of his foreign policy. Instead, a senior administration official acknowledged to reporters this week that the war in Europe had created daily demands that had consumed the time and energy of the president and his team. But the official, who requested anonymity to discuss preparations for the summit, said Mr. Biden remained concerned about, and focused on, the need to prevent China from dominating the Indo-Pacific. The gathering of Mr. Biden and the other world leaders in Washington is an opportunity to demonstrate that commitment, the official said. On Thursday evening, the White House announced new investments of about $150 million in the region as part of a series of agreements between the United States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN. The investments by the United States include $40 million for clean energy projects in Southeast Asia. A senior White House official said the administration estimated that the money would be used to help raise or finance as much as $2 billion for the construction of the projects. The United States also pledged to invest $60 million to deploy additional maritime assets — led by the Coast Guard — to the region, and to perform training and other activities in coordination with other countries aimed at enforcing maritime laws. And the administration said it would spend $15 million to expand health surveillance programs in Southeast Asia and better detect Covid-19 and other airborne diseases in the region. The president is also traveling to Japan and South Korea from May 20 to May 24, a trip that will focus in large part on China. White House officials have not provided details about the trip, but the president is expected to meet with fellow leaders of the other so-called Quad countries: Australia, India and Japan. On Thursday, the leaders from the ASEAN countries met with Speaker Nancy Pelosi and other lawmakers before gathering at a Washington hotel to discuss business opportunities with Gina Raimondo, the commerce secretary, and executives from American industries. Mr. Biden welcomed the leaders to the White House on Thursday evening in a brief ceremony on the South Lawn. The group posed for a picture before walking into the White House for dinner. On Friday, the Asian leaders will meet with Vice President Kamala Harris and Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken in the morning, and then with Mr. Biden at the White House later in the day. According to the administration official, the group will discuss trading opportunities; transit through disputed waterways, including the South China Sea; and other topics. One of those topics is likely to be Myanmar, an ASEAN member, where Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was ousted as the country’s civilian leader last year when the military staged a coup. The administration official said the United States and countries in the region were focused on the situation and frustrated by it. An American national security official said the United States and the other nations agreed to leave a chair empty during the summit for Myanmar as a way of registering their disapproval of the actions by its military. The official also said the United States supported the decision by ASEAN to prevent a military representative from Myanmar from attending the summit. The gathering is also intended to be an opportunity for Ms. Harris to demonstrate her focus on the region. She led an American delegation to Asia last summer, using a speech in Singapore to denounce China’s “unlawful claims” over the South China Sea, which she said “undermine the rules-based order and threaten the sovereignty of nations.” The administration official said Ms. Harris planned to use Friday’s meeting with the Asian leaders to focus on climate action, clean energy and sustainable infrastructure.

Shear ’22 (Michael D. Shear is a veteran White House correspondent and two-time Pulitzer Prize winner, “Biden Hosts Southeast Asian Leaders as He Tries to Return Focus to China,” May 12, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/12/us/politics/biden-asian-nations-china.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article)-mikee

Biden began hosting the leaders of Southeast Asian nations delivering a message of solidarity — and aiming to provide a bulwark against Chinese influence in the region the president’s primary goals: assembling a united front against China Biden promised to make China a central focus of his foreign policy The gathering of Mr. Biden and the other world leaders in Washington is an opportunity to demonstrate that commitment, The president is also traveling to Japan and South Korea a trip that will focus in large part on China. The gathering is also intended to be an opportunity for Ms. Harris to demonstrate her focus on the region.

Biden prioritizing China now – diplomatic meetings and resources.

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Standing firm to support Europe does not equal diminishment of focus on Asia. In the past several weeks alone, President Biden has hosted leaders from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Washington for the first time. He traveled to Seoul and Tokyo, where he met with leaders from the Quadrilateral Grouping (Australia, India, Japan, the United States), in addition to strengthening bilateral and trilateral relations in Northeast Asia. He launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. Importantly for Taiwan, the Biden administration also committed to the Initiative on 21st Century Trade, a new effort to break the logjam and invigorate U.S.-Taiwan economic ties. President Biden also signed legislation to push for Taiwan’s observer status at the World Health Assembly and Secretary of State Antony Blinken rallied other countries to lend support for Taiwan’s participation. In other words, the Biden administration is deepening its investments in Asia and upping its focus on Taiwan. The more pressure Beijing has placed on Taiwan, the more visible America’s support for Taiwan has grown. President Biden’s statement that the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense should be understood as an insight into his state of mind, rather than a signal of a significant policy shift. Biden clearly feels strongly about defending Taiwan and deterring Beijing’s aggression. He is not an activist who is seeking to radically alter the cross-Strait status quo, though. His administration remains committed to deterring unilateral changes to the status quo. This longstanding American position reflects America’s guiding focus on upholding peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Secretary Blinken’s May 26 speech provided a clear, well-coordinated articulation of America’s interests relating to China and Taiwan. The State Department’s decision to update its website on Taiwan policy following ​Blinken’s remarks reflects the authoritative nature of the speech. Beijing’s growing military capabilities clearly are focusing minds in Washington, Taipei, and elsewhere on taking steps to strengthen deterrence. At the same time, I do not detect enthusiasm in Washington or elsewhere for dramatic shifts in government policies on Taiwan, barring an aggressive move by Beijing that compels countries to respond. Given these dynamics, Taiwan’s best path for gaining greater international support for its political autonomy, economic dynamism, and dignity on the world stage is by continuing to demonstrate its steady, principled, and practical in its approach to cross-Strait tensions. The more Taiwan does so, the more it stands to benefit by contrast from Beijing’s pressure. Taiwan also would be well-served to seize the opportunity the Initiative on 21st Century Trade presents. A strong coalition of countries already has made clear the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait to global security and prosperity. American, European, Japanese, and other countries’ interests will dictate their further involvement in cross-Strait issues if Beijing ratchets up tensions further.

Hass ’22 (Ryan, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for East Asia Policy Studies and Nonresident Fellow at Yale Law School, “For Taiwan, reading the moment is essential,” June 13, 2022, Order From Chaos report from Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/06/13/for-taiwan-reading-the-moment-is-essential/)-mikee

Standing firm to support Europe does not equal diminishment of focus on Asia Biden has hosted leaders from ) He traveled to Seoul and Tokyo, where he met with leaders from the Quadrilateral Groupin He launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. Importantly for Taiwan, the Biden administration also committed to the Initiative on 21st Century Trade, Secretary Blinken rallied other countries to lend support for Taiwan’s participation. the Biden administration is deepening its investments in Asia and upping its focus on Taiwan. The more pressure Beijing has placed on Taiwan, the more visible America’s support for Taiwan has grown. Biden’s statement that the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense should be understood as an insight into his state of mind Biden clearly feels strongly about defending Taiwan and deterring Beijing’s aggression. Beijing’s growing military capabilities clearly are focusing minds in Washington on taking steps to strengthen deterrence American interests will dictate their further involvement in cross-Strait issues if Beijing ratchets up tensions further.

US increasing its involvement with Taiwan now.

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The United States has a nasty habit of firing resources at a military problem first and asking questions about effective implementation later — as recently demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan — but that does not have to be the case with Taiwan. U.S. officials are starting to get more serious about supporting Taiwan’s ability to defend itself. They debate competing policy stances on defending Taiwan (ambiguity versus clarity) but largely agree that “bolstering Taiwan’s self-defenses is an urgent task and an essential feature of deterrence,” as recently stated by the Pentagon’s top official for Asia. Experienced U.S. officials are raising the alarm that China may attempt forceful unification with Taiwan later this decade if deterrence continues to erode. In the 1970s, the United States used triangular diplomacy to gain leverage over the Soviet Union by opening relations with China and eventually switching diplomatic recognition from Taipei, which Washington had previously recognized as the seat of the legitimate Chinese state and government, to Beijing. Prior to this switch in 1979, the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group-Taiwan was the central hub for planning, coordinating, and executing defense cooperation initiatives. It served as the eyes, ears, and voice of the U.S. military to the Taiwanese armed forces. It possessed the requisite staff and planning horsepower to facilitate the large-scale military arms transfers, training, and advising that contributed to decades of Taiwanese military superiority over China, which has since evaporated. BECOME A MEMBER U.S.-Taiwanese defense initiatives are ramping up — to levels unseen since 1979 — due to legitimate concerns about Chinese designs on the island. However, the thick military organizational connective tissue that existed prior to 1979 is no longer in place to facilitate this cooperation. Without a military organization focused on the island, the U.S. personnel, funding, and materiel poured into supporting Taiwan may be inefficiently applied and generate limited return on investment — defined in terms of deterrence and lethality in conflict. To help to deter Chinese aggression, the United States should establish a 21st century version of this often forgotten advisory group to provide the staff capacity, synchronization, and interagency integration required to facilitate increasingly robust U.S.-Taiwanese military collaboration, bolster Taiwan’s defenses, and strengthen its will to fight. Despite inevitable Chinese government counterpressure, reestablishing this organization would probably not trigger military conflict and would be consistent with the U.S. commitment to the One China policy, guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. The Original Organization The original U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group-Formosa (this last word was later changed to “Taiwan”) operated from 1951 to 1979 and was instrumental in professionalizing and modernizing Taiwan’s military. During the Cold War, the United States established military assistance advisory groups in South Korea, Japan, South Vietnam, Europe, and the Middle East to strengthen allies threatened by communism. The group in Taiwan was a reincarnation of the similarly named organization that operated in China from 1947 to 1949, until the Republic of China was defeated by the Communists and withdrew to Taiwan. From 1951 to 1955, this group was responsible for all U.S.-Taiwanese defense matters. In 1955, upon ratification of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty, the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command was established and absorbed many personnel, resources, and responsibilities that had previously been aligned to the advisory group. The original advisory group was established in 1951 to facilitate large-scale arms transfers and provide military training and assistance to deter Chinese aggression. The impetus for establishing the organization was a U.S. military aid package worth $300 million — equivalent to over $3 billion today — that would have overwhelmed the small U.S. military staff in Taiwan at the time. In 1950, after North Korea invaded South Korea, the United States shifted its policy to support Taiwan and sent a small team to the island to prepare a comprehensive report on Taiwan’s military that was the basis for the aid package. Once established, the advisory group was led by a major general and initially manned with 116 U.S. servicemembers, but later grew to over 2,000 personnel. The group established a comprehensive American-type military school system for Taiwan’s officer corps, helped the country to implement conscription, trained and advised the military, and oversaw military aid. The U.S. advisory group deeply understood the Taiwan military, shaped its defense concepts, and built complementary U.S. war plans. Lessons from previous U.S. security cooperation efforts — including recent failures in Iraq and Afghanistan — suggest that Washington’s willingness to influence higher-order issues of mission, organizational structure, and leadership is critical. The original advisory group had offices in the same building as the Taiwan Ministry of National Defense and U.S. staff sections were directly attached to their Taiwanese counterparts. It embedded advisers in all major Taiwanese training units and at the regimental level and above. All of the group’s initiatives were informed by the in-depth understanding of Taiwan’s military that was gained through this integration. The group also influenced Taiwan’s defense concepts. It translated hundreds of U.S. military training manuals into Chinese, which shaped Taiwan’s warfighting approach. In the early 1950s, U.S. advisors helped Taiwan to adjust its defense concept from static to mobile defense. The United States later helped Taiwan to shift from a defensive approach to an offensive posture, to hasten an end to the Korean War by implicitly threatening a second front in China’s southeastern underbelly. Prior to the establishment of the Taiwan Defense Command, the advisory group developed U.S. war plans that complemented Taiwan’s own. It also planned U.S. support to the island’s wartime logistical requirements. As part of the U.S. strategy to leverage Taiwan to help to end the Korean War, the organization planned to help to deploy 25,000 Taiwanese military personnel to the Korean front by the end of 1954. A reestablished advisory group could similarly improve Taiwan’s defenses today while creating regional security benefits for the United States and its interests. The Requirement: Control the Increasing Flow of U.S. Military Resources to Taiwan A new advisory group would ensure that increased U.S. defense support provided to Taiwan is synchronized and woven into a holistic plan that enables a credible defense of the island and helps to reverse the erosion of cross-strait deterrence. China has rapidly modernized its fleet and increased its inventory of major naval combatants since 2005, while the U.S. fleet has aged and shed major combat vessels. The U.S. Navy still leads — 213 major combatants to China’s 145 — but China is expected to reach rough parity in major combatants and surpass the U.S. Navy in total submarines by 2030. Further, China’s navy is deployed almost entirely in the Indo-Pacific while America’s is dispersed around the globe. There is ample opportunity to bolster Taiwan’s deterrence to help offset declines on the U.S. side of the equation. This organization would help to fulfill the legal mandate in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. The law requires the United States to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capacity.” The group would ensure that the growing volume and complexity of “defense articles” and “services” being provided to Taiwan arrive in a timely manner and are “sufficient” to deter Chinese aggression. Bilateral military initiatives are reportedly expanding, in accordance with the growing threat posed by China. Washington is reportedly considering using special operators to help Taipei to conduct irregular warfare, including establishing resistance networks and countering an amphibious landing. This could support Taiwan’s grassroots efforts to mount a whole-of-society defense of the island, integrating civilian militias with active-duty and reserve military personnel. Earlier this year, the United States and Taiwan signed a coast guard cooperation agreement. Taiwan is fielding coast guard vessels capable of carrying anti-ship missiles and envisions its coast guard as a second navy during wartime. Taiwan is also revamping its military reserve system. These are complex undertakings that would benefit from substantial U.S. advice and assistance — especially if they are to be realized this decade. Congress is also pushing for more tangible U.S. support to Taiwan’s defensive preparedness, beyond routine U.S. arms sales. The recently introduced Taiwan Deterrence Act and Arm Taiwan Act would authorize $2 billion and $3 billion a year respectively in foreign military financing for Taiwan. This could help Taipei to purchase relevant defense articles like survivable communications systems, coastal defense cruise missiles (including in shipping containers), small missile boats, sea mines, loitering munition swarms, and mobile air defenses. The Taiwan Partnership Act would establish a partnership between the U.S. National Guard and Taiwan’s military. Taiwan’s plan to spend an extra $9 billion on domestically manufactured missiles and other capabilities may also generate demand for increased U.S. military assistance. Unless it reestablishes a dedicated Taiwan-focused organization, U.S. military staff planning capacity — rather than U.S. policy — may soon become the limiting factor that slows the momentum of expanding U.S.-Taiwanese defense initiatives. U.S. Forces Korea and U.S. Forces Japan headquarters are staffed with hundreds of personnel dedicated to bilateral military cooperation and supporting the defense of their host-nation allies. The U.S. military lacks an equivalent organizational headquarters focused on military cooperation with Taiwan. The United States needs an integrated organization that is dedicated to military deterrence and tightly networked with other elements of national power. It should be flush with U.S. interagency personnel and allies — especially from Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan. To have credibility with Taiwan’s senior officers, it should be led by a U.S. general or flag officer who is empowered to speak authoritatively on military matters on behalf of the U.S. government. It should start with 100 to 200 personnel and grow as additional initiatives come online or scale-up. It should also maintain well-staffed satellite offices in U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and Washington. The advisory group would facilitate training for Taiwanese personnel beyond the borders of Taiwan, in the United States and throughout the Indo-Pacific region. This new security cooperation and assistance organization should be headquartered in Taiwan to enable integration with Taiwanese counterparts. Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, it should be affiliated with the American Institute in Taiwan — the non-profit organization responsible for U.S. relations with Taiwan. This new organization would not be a military “command” — like the old U.S. Taiwan Defense Command — and placing it in Taiwan would not constitute “basing” troops on the island. Most of its personnel should be contractors and retired military personnel, with a smaller contingent of active-duty liaisons and interagency personnel to fill key leadership and staff positions. These personnel would serve in an unofficial capacity, consistent with how the institute is currently staffed in order to maintain Washington’s adherence to the One China policy. If placing this new organization on the island is deemed politically infeasible, it could be headquartered elsewhere — perhaps Palau, Guam, Japan, or Australia — with forward elements in Taiwan.

Yeager and Gerichten ’22 (Maj. Jake Yeager is an intelligence officer in the U.S. Marine Corps. William Gerichten works for the U.S. Defense Attaché Service as a civilian attaché and serves in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserves as an intelligence officer. “REESTABLISH THE U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP-TAIWAN,” JANUARY 7, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/01/reestablish-the-u-s-military-assistance-advisory-group-taiwan/)

U.S. officials are starting to get more serious about supporting Taiwan’s ability to defend itself. They debate competing policy stances on defending Taiwan (ambiguity versus clarity) but largely agree that “bolstering Taiwan’s self-defenses is an urgent task and an essential feature of deterrence,” U.S.-Taiwanese defense initiatives are ramping up due to legitimate concerns about Chinese designs on the island. Without a military organization focused on the island, the U.S. personnel, funding, and materiel poured into supporting Taiwan may be inefficiently applied and generate limited return on investment A new advisory group would ensure that increased U.S. defense support provided to Taiwan is synchronized and woven into a holistic plan that enables a credible defense of the island and helps to reverse the erosion of cross-strait deterrence There is ample opportunity to bolster Taiwan’s deterrence to help offset declines on the U.S. side of the equation Bilateral military initiatives are reportedly expanding Washington is considering using special operators to help Taipei to conduct irregular warfar Earlier this year, the United States and Taiwan signed a coast guard cooperation agreement. These are complex undertakings that would benefit from substantial U.S. advice and assistance Congress is also pushing for more tangible U.S. support to Taiwan’s defensive preparedness Unless it reestablishes a dedicated Taiwan-focused organization, U.S. military staff planning capacity may soon become the limiting factor that slows the momentum of expanding U.S.-Taiwanese defense initiatives. The United States needs an integrated organization that is dedicated to military deterrence and tightly networked with other elements of national power new security cooperation and assistance organization should be headquartered in Taiwan

US-Taiwan security cooperation is increasing, and there are plans to expand it further, but only with sufficient resources and dedicated effort.

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To his credit, Biden dialed back his administration’s goals in a measured op-ed for the New York Times on May 31. “We do not seek a war between NATO and Russia. … [T]he United States will not try to bring about [Putin’s] ouster in Moscow. So long as the United States or our allies are not attacked, we will not be directly engaged in this conflict. We are not encouraging or enabling Ukraine to strike beyond its borders. We do not want to prolong the war just to inflict pain on Russia.” But the reality is that the administration has become the arsenal of Ukraine’s democracy, not the broker of a peace that it is leaving to Ukraine to define. Three of Europe’s most important leaders — French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi — are distinctly uneasy about this. They would much prefer to see an imminent ceasefire and the start of peace negotiations. But to speak of compromise in the current febrile atmosphere of Ukrainophilia is to invite charges of appeasement. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy reacted angrily to Kissinger’s argument for a peace based on the status quo ante. “I get the sense that instead of the year 2022,” Zelenskiy snapped, “Mr. Kissinger has 1938 on his calendar.” Yet Zelenskiy himself has said repeatedly — most recently in an interview on May 21 — that he would regard as “victory” a return to the territorial position on Feb. 23, which was what Kissinger plainly meant by the status quo ante. That would mean Ukraine taking back Kherson and the ravaged city of Mariupol. It would mean pushing Russia out of its “land bridge” from Crimea to Russia. And it would mean completely reversing all the gains the Russians have made in the eastern Donbas region. Zelenskiy knows, and so should we, what a daunting task that represents. In a speech last week, he acknowledged that Russia has seized around a fifth of Ukraine’s territory. In an interview with Newsmax, he admitted that Ukraine was losing “60 to 100 soldiers per day as killed in action and something around 500 people as wounded in action.” Even with an open-ended commitment from the US to supply them with weapons, do the Ukrainians have the trained manpower to drive Russia out of all the territory it has occupied since Feb. 24? And if this brutal war continues through the summer, and is still being fought as the year wanes and the temperatures begin to fall in Europe, what then? Vladimir Putin is surely counting on the usual divisions within the Western alliance and within American politics to resurface sooner or later. The most remarkable thing about the foreign policy of the Biden administration is that helping Ukraine defeat Russia is not even its top priority. “Even as President Putin’s war continues,” declared Secretary of State Antony Blinken in a speech at George Washington University on May 26, “we will remain focused on the most serious long-term challenge to the international order — and that’s posed by the People’s Republic of China.” Blinken’s speech repays close study. About one-tenth of it was conciliatory. “We are not looking for conflict or a new Cold War,” he declared. “We do not seek to transform China’s political system. … We will engage constructively with China wherever we can.” But the rest was as hawkish a speech on China as the one delivered by then Vice President Mike Pence in October 2018, which for me was the moment Cold War II got going in earnest. In Blinken’s words: Under President Xi, the ruling Chinese Communist Party has become more repressive at home and more aggressive abroad. We see that in how Beijing has perfected mass surveillance within China and exported that technology to more than 80 countries; how its advancing unlawful maritime claims in the South China Sea, undermining peace and security, freedom of navigation, and commerce; how it’s circumventing or breaking trade rules … and how it purports to champion sovereignty and territorial integrity while standing with governments that brazenly violate them. Blinken spelled out how the US intends to “shape the strategic environment around Beijing,” citing the new Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, announced by Biden on his recent Asia tour, and the Quad of the US, Australia, India and Japan, with its new Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, not forgetting AUKUS, the US deal on nuclear submarines with Australia and the UK. But the most startling lines in Blinken’s speech were the ones on “the genocide and crimes against humanity happening in the Xinjiang region”; on US support for “Tibet, where the authorities continue to wage a brutal campaign against Tibetans and their culture, language, and religious traditions”; on Hong Kong, “where the Chinese Communist Party has imposed harsh anti-democratic measures under the guise of national security”; on “Beijing’s aggressive and unlawful activities in the South and East China Seas”; and — the coup de grace from a Chinese vantage point — on “Beijing’s growing coercion” and “increasingly provocative rhetoric and activity” toward Taiwan. The response of the Chinese Foreign Ministry to this confrontational speech was, I thought, surprisingly restrained. Taiwan is, of course, the key issue. As if to confirm Xi Jinping’s darkest suspicions, Biden went off script again at a press conference in Tokyo with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on May 23. A reporter asked if the United States would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. “Yes,” the president answered. “That’s the commitment we made. We agree with a one-China policy. We've signed on to it and all the intended agreements made from there. But the idea that, that it (Taiwan) can be taken by force, just taken by force, is just not, is just not appropriate.” Almost immediately, US officials, led by Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, walked this latest gaffe back. But when is a gaffe not a gaffe? When the president of the United States says it three times. By my count, that is the number of occasions Biden has pledged to come to Taiwan’s defense since August last year. What are the practical implications of ditching the half-century-old policy of “strategic ambiguity” on Taiwan, which dates to Kissinger’s compromise with Zhou Enlai in 1972? In his book “The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict,” Elbridge Colby argues that the US can and must prioritize the defense of Taiwan. Colby was deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and force development under Donald Trump. His book has been a hit with China hawks precisely because it gets specific about how the US could cope with a Chinese attempt to seize Taiwan. “Defending forces operating from a distributed, resilient force posture and across all the war-fighting domains,” Colby writes, “might use a variety of methods to blunt the Chinese invasion in the air and seas surrounding Taiwan.” The US and its allies might “seek to disable or destroy Chinese transport ships and aircraft before they left Chinese ports or airstrips. The defenders might also try to obstruct key ports; neutralize key elements of Chinese command and control … And once Chinese forces entered the Strait, US and defending forces could use a variety of methods to disable or destroy Chinese transport ships and aircraft.” “There’s a very real chance of a major war with China in the coming years,” Colby tweeted last month. “Everyone with influence should be asking themselves: Did I do *everything* I could to deter it? And make it less costly for Americans if it does happen? … China has the will, the way, and increasingly a sense of urgency to take us on over stakes that are genuinely decisive for us (and the world, for that matter).”

Ferguson ’22 (Niall Ferguson is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. The Milbank Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, “Dust Off That Dirty Word Detente and Engage With China,” June 5, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-06-05/niall-ferguson-on-china-biden-should-dust-off-the-word-detente)-mikee

Biden dialed back his goals we will not be directly engaged in this conflict. We do not want to prolong the war just to inflict pain on Russia. Three of Europe’s most important leaders are uneasy They would much prefer to see an imminent ceasefire and the start of peace negotiations The most remarkable thing about the foreign policy of the Biden administration is that helping Ukraine defeat Russia is not even its top priority we will remain focused on the most serious long-term challenge to the international order — and that’s posed by the People’s Republic of China.” Blinken’s speech repays close study. About one-tenth of it was conciliatory But the rest was hawkish on China the US intends to “shape the strategic environment around Beijing Taiwan is, the key issue. “There’s a very real chance of a major war with China in the coming years,” Colby tweeted last month “Everyone with influence should be asking themselves: Did I do *everything* I could to deter it?

Biden is reducing involvement in Ukraine– China is the top-priority now

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The past couple of months marked a rallying moment for the geopolitical West. The Russian invasion of Ukraine triggered a sweeping, united response from Europe and its allies across the Atlantic. It led to far-reaching, coordinated sanctions on Moscow. It provoked a new, steely approach from many Europeans to diplomatically and militarily confront Russia. And it spurred the imminent expansion of NATO, an alliance cast by critics not long ago as an obsolete relic of the Cold War. The United States and its E.U. partners are flooding Ukraine with weaponry and aid. By some accounts, the Biden administration alone has mustered more funding for Ukraine in recent weeks than it is committing in the next fiscal year for fighting the planetary peril of climate change. Yet in Washington, there remains a large elephant in the room: China. New battles with the Kremlin have energized the doyens of the city’s foreign policy establishment, many of whom cut their teeth during the Cold War. But the Biden administration is trying to show that it hasn’t lost sight of its key 21st century “strategic competitor.” And it recognizes that its contest with China requires closer partnerships well outside Europe. A new push started this week. On Thursday evening, the White House hosted a dinner with eight leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a part of a major U.S.-led summit with the regional bloc. On Friday, the Southeast Asian delegations are slated to continue discussions at the State Department before a plenary session with President Biden. Next week, Biden will embark on a five-day trip to South Korea and Japan, culminating in another meeting of the “Quad” grouping with Australia, Japan and India. U.S. officials recognize that a decade of talk about a strategic “pivot” to Asia has yet to yield concrete results. “Several administrations in succession in the United States have tried … to launch more fundamental efforts, policies, frameworks in Asia, East Asia, Indo-Pacific, and found themselves stymied or misdirected or directed toward other pursuits,” said Kurt Campbell, the White House’s lead official on Indo-Pacific policy, in a speech this week at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “And that has been something that I think all of us are deeply aware of in the formulation and execution of policy.” The Biden administration aims to show that its heavy involvement in the Ukraine war is not a distraction from its priorities to the East. But it is climbing an uphill road with ASEAN countries, where many officials lament a lack of American engagement, especially during the years of the Trump administration.

Tharoor ‘22 (Isanan, analyst @ WaPo, “Biden pivots to Asia as Ukraine war rages on,” Washington Post, 5-13-2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/13/asean-southeast-asia-china-biden/)

The Russian invasion of Ukraine triggered a sweeping, united response from Europe and its allies across the Atlantic It provoked a new, steely approach from many Europeans to diplomatically and militarily confront Russia. And it spurred the imminent expansion of NATO The United States and its E.U. partners are flooding Ukraine with weaponry and aid Yet there remains a large elephant in the room: China. Biden hasn’t lost sight of its key 21st century “strategic competitor.” A new push started this week Biden will embark on a five-day trip to South Korea and Japan, culminating in another meeting of the “Quad” grouping with Australia, Japan and India Biden involvement in Ukraine is not a distraction from its priorities to the East

Biden is shifting from Ukraine to focus resources on China now

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In the long run, the United States can’t contain both Russia and China. Europe’s resolute opposition to Putin’s war provides an opening for a strategic shift. When a great power takes a gamble, the world shakes. By ordering an attack on Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has unleashed a chain of reactions whose endpoint no one can yet foresee. Already apparent, however, is one consequence for the United States. Overstretched to begin with, America has just seen its strategic burden increase. Just as suddenly, however, a new solution is coming into view: Europe is ready to take on greater military duties. Before the war, many Americans, including some political leaders, had determined to be more realistic about their country’s strategic ambitions in an increasingly competitive world. Sensibly, President Biden had sought to stabilize relations with Russia and reduce U.S. war-making in the greater Middle East while turning attention and resources toward managing a rising China. But Putin’s Russia has refused to be sidelined. By invading Ukraine, it has caused NATO’s eastern flank, with four countries bordering Russian territory, to demand reinforcements — and the United States has risen to the task. Biden has sent 14,000 American troops to Europe since the crisis began, bringing the total to 100,000. Providing temporary reinforcements is the right decision today in the face of Russia’s bald aggression. But the United States should resist the inclination to revive its role as the military protector of Europe, especially since Europe is awakening to its responsibilities. Britain is sending troops to the Baltic states and Poland. France is pushing “strategic autonomy” for the European Union. And days after halting the Nord Stream 2 pipeline supplying natural gas from Russia, Germany reversed a long-standing ban on providing military assistance and sent weapons to Ukraine. Germany also vowed to spend more than 2 percent of its economy on defense, finally committing to meet NATO’s target. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz declared his country, and Europe, to have reached a “historic turning point.” Both Americans and Europeans would benefit if Scholz’s words prove true. In the coming years, European states should move to take the lead in their collective defense, and the United States should do everything possible to encourage them. To stake the defense of Europe on the United States, over the next decade and beyond, would be to answer Putin’s rash gamble with a slow-moving gamble of our own. It might seem as though the United States will remain able and willing to protect all of NATO’s 28 European countries far into the future. After all, America has orchestrated Europe’s defense for the past eight decades. Yet it did so under two markedly different conditions. During World War II and the Cold War, the United States sought to stop totalitarian powers from conquering the region. An Axis or Soviet takeover of Europe would have closed off the entire continent to liberal, American-style interaction and influence, and put the Western Hemisphere on the defensive. After the Cold War, however, as the Soviet threat collapsed, the United States recommitted to Europe not because the stakes were high but arguably because they were low. Threats were so negligible that it seemed U.S. leadership could keep things that way through modest exertion — and spread democracy to boot. Expanding NATO eastward, American officials convinced themselves that what had been a military alliance was more comparable to a political club, one that need not become an adversary of Russia. Russia’s assault on Ukraine ends that chapter and begins a new one. The prospect of further Russian aggression in Eastern Europe cannot be dismissed as negligible, as it was in the 1990s or 2000s. At the same time, Russia poses far less a threat to overrun Europe and threaten American security or prosperity than the Soviet Union did. After all, the Russian economy is roughly one-fifth the size of that of the European Union, and that was before the severe sanctions of the past week. Although Russia has built a formidable military, one that enables it to launch wars like that in Ukraine, NATO’s European members collectively outspend Russia on defense. During the Cold War, by contrast, the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact boasted land forces superior in number to those of NATO (including the U.S. share), and the gap between its economic output and that of Western Europe was several times smaller than Russia’s shortfall today. In the security environment now emerging, with Russia menacing Eastern Europe, the United States is set to face major costs and the ultimate risk: great-power war between nuclear peers. Yet the threat Russia poses remains one that Europeans could handle themselves, with America acting as a supporter rather than the leader. The United States remains a superpower. Why shouldn’t it be the main counterweight in Europe to Moscow? There are two reasons both the United States and Europe would be better off if it declined this role. One lies in Beijing, and the other in Washington. The United States has already identified China as its primary rival, embarking on “strategic competition” with the world’s number-two power. Taking on China and Russia at once would be unwise and likely impossible. True, the Pentagon has previously planned to fight two wars at once, but those wars were envisioned as “regional” conflicts against small states like Iran, Iraq or North Korea. In practice, the United States had difficulty prosecuting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously. China and Russia represent challenges of a far greater magnitude, which explains why the Pentagon abandoned its two-war standard in 2018, even as its budget has grown. If the United States doubles down on European security while leading the charge in Asia, it may either fall short in both places or default on its commitments in Europe just when they come due. America’s domestic divisions must also be taken seriously. The Republican front-runner for 2024, former president Donald Trump, initially called Putin’s invasion of Ukraine a “genius” move. How reliable, then, is America’s commitment to Europe? Even in better times, it would remain uncertain whether a U.S. president would place the American people in peril for the sake of repelling a Russian attack in Eastern Europe — for example, potentially trading a nuclear attack on Boston to protect the Estonian capital of Tallinn. Under present circumstances, it would be folly for Europe to trust its fate to doubtful promises, and wise for the Biden administration to Trump-proof American alliances. Today, even smaller European countries like Belgium, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are ferrying arms to Ukraine, while perpetually neutral Switzerland is freezing Russian assets. Yet proclamations of a “new Europe” are premature. If the United States does not galvanize and incentivize its allies to step up, they are unlikely to make the profound changes needed to build a European security architecture that can last. In the coming months, the administration could formulate a multiyear but time-limited plan to transition to a European defense led by Europe. Such a plan would build on the work of the British-Baltics-Polish coalition that reinforced Eastern Europe before the war, but it must also involve the major Continental powers of Germany and France, whose participation is key to forging a durable order. By publicizing the plan, and doing so while passions remain high, the United States and its allies could create a credible commitment on both sides of the Atlantic. Europe would have to act quickly to redress its strategic deficits relative to Russia, which are real but too often exaggerated. The European members of NATO already possess around two dozen armored and mechanized brigades, enough to make a Russian offensive difficult in the early stages and allow Europe to prevail through its overwhelming economic and demographic advantages. The most urgent task is to improve the readiness and sustainability of European forces. German determination and funding will go a long way toward that end. In particular, Europe must develop certain critical capabilities, such as surface-to-air missile batteries, combat-support assets, and air-refueling systems — all essential for high-end operations, and at present possessed mostly by the United States. During the transitional period, U.S. military would continue to provide command-and-control functions and logistics support so as not leave an opportunity for Moscow to exploit. The Biden administration would, however, begin to shift command of NATO to European leadership, and deepen its support for E.U. defense efforts, which previous administrations sought to suppress. As European forces steps up, the United States could bring most of its personnel home, with some air and naval forces remaining. Europe would also need to grow its defense-industrial base, both to develop cutting-edge technologies and to create enduring political support for higher spending. Since 2017, the E.U. has implemented promising new measures to increase and coordinate investments in defense. If the E.U. could borrow 750 billion euros to fund pandemic recovery, it could borrow billions more to finance new defense capabilities. Here, as elsewhere, the United States would have to take concerned action just to keep from getting in its allies’ way. To allow European industry to grow, the White House and Congress ought to be less aggressive in facilitating sales of U.S.-made military equipment. The profits of domestic contractors should yield to the vital defense needs of the United States and Europe. In another era, the prospect of letting Europeans lead Europe’s defense would have caused an outcry in some quarters of Washington. Even today, it will cause controversy. But political reality suggests it is necessary. Biden has a once-in-a-generation chance to realign America’s strategic priorities while demonstrably strengthening Europe’s defenses. By doing so, he could inspire bipartisan unity. He could forge a path that his successors could follow, regardless of party or personality, by building a Europe-led, U.S.-supported order to preserve the next decades of peace and prosperity across the Atlantic.

Wertheim ’22 (Stephen, senior fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Europe is showing that it could lead its own defense,” March 3, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/03/europe-defense-nato-ukraine-war/)-mikee

the United States can’t contain both Russia and China Providing temporary reinforcements is the right decision today But the United States should resist the inclination to revive its role as the military protector of Europe since Europe is awakening to its responsibilities In the coming years, European states should move to take the lead in their collective defense, and the United States should do everything possible to encourage them. the threat Russia poses remains one that Europeans could handle themselves, with America acting as a supporter rather than the leader There are reasons both the United States and Europe would be better off if it declined this role Beijing The United States has already identified China as its primary rival, Taking on China and Russia at once would be unwise and likely impossible China and Russia represent challenges of a far greater magnitude If the United States doubles down on European security while leading the charge in Asia, it may either fall short in both places or default on its commitments in Europe just when they come due Today, even smaller European countries like Belgium, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are ferrying arms to Ukraine If the United States does not galvanize and incentivize its allies to step up, they are unlikely to make the profound changes needed to build a European security architecture that can last. strategic deficits relative to Russia, which are real but too often exaggerated. Europe would also need to grow its defense-industrial base, both to develop cutting-edge technologies and to create enduring political support for higher spending. Here, as elsewhere, the United States would have to take concerned action just to keep from getting in its allies’ way To allow European industry to grow, the White House ought to be less aggressive in facilitating sales of U.S.-made military equipment Biden has a once-in-a-generation chance to realign America’s strategic priorities while demonstrably strengthening Europe’s defenses

Increasing security cooperation locks in dependence and makes challenging China impossible – status quo is temporary, the aff makes in permanent.

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There has been a lot of global media frenzy about Taiwan’s security in recent weeks. Experts have debated what lessons China might be drawing from Russia’s military setbacks in Ukraine. Pundits grew excited when President Joe Biden declared in Tokyo that the United States would intervene militarily if Taiwan was attacked. Yet, below this exuberant froth, policy discussions in the United States, Asia, and Europe have remained relatively steady. I have had an opportunity to interact with senior officials and diplomats from all three of these regions in recent weeks, as well as a range of business executives. They all have unanimously said they are paying heightened attention to developments in the Taiwan Strait and thinking methodically through how best to adjust to shifting circumstances. Contrary to what daily newspaper headlines would suggest, though, they are not considering radical shifts in approach. They are responding to evolving circumstances by doing the equivalent of adjusting a light dimmer rather than flipping a light switch​. Some American experts fear that Ukraine will distract the U.S. from preparing for the principal arena of potential conflict — Asia. They argued early in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that the United States should not allow itself to get bogged down in a European conflict that did not implicate America’s vital interests. They suggested instead that the United States should accelerate its transition in focus and military resources to the Indo-Pacific and strengthen America’s deterrent posture against China.

Hass ’22 (Ryan, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for East Asia Policy Studies and Nonresident Fellow at Yale Law School, “For Taiwan, reading the moment is essential,” June 13, 2022, Order From Chaos report from Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/06/13/for-taiwan-reading-the-moment-is-essential/)-mikee

There has been a lot of global media frenzy about Taiwan’s security in recent weeks senior officials and diplomats from all three of these regions have unanimously said they are paying heightened attention to developments in the Taiwan Strait . They are responding Some American experts fear that Ukraine will distract the U.S. from preparing for the principal arena of potential conflict — Asia. the United States should not allow itself to get bogged down in a European conflict that did not implicate America’s vital interests. the United States should accelerate its transition in focus and military resources to the Indo-Pacific and strengthen America’s deterrent posture against China

The plan distracts US from deterring China.

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Effective cyber threat information sharing requires planning, long-term investment, and sustained commitment. For example, technical cyber threat information sharing is not merely a matter of adopting a technical standard and installing software. It takes engineering and analytic time on an ongoing basis as well as maintenance of the technology and processes. Similarly, consuming cyber security best practices is not a one-time endeavour; organisations must incorporate regular review and implementation into their business processes. Absent a long-term commitment from organizational leadership, sharing usually withers after an initial burst of enthusiasm. Cyber security should take on the same status as other business enablers, such as accounting, legal affairs, and communications; like these areas, cyber security should be a function that all organisations budget for and sustain over the long-term. Cyber threat information sharing has bedevilled the cyber security community for at least two decades. Faulty assumptions have prevented this fundamentally sound concept from achieving its potential. But while information sharing is a tough problem, it is not an insoluble one. If the cyber security community adopts different underlying assumptions for information sharing then the volume, quality, and utility of the exchanged information can increase. In turn, more effective, relevant information sharing will enable defenders to better understand and anticipate adversaries, develop mechanisms to disrupt adversary activities more strategically, and raise the level of cyber security across the digital ecosystem. Under these circumstances, cyber threat information sharing can finally live up to its promise to enable better cyber security for everyone. For NATO, updating programmes to reflect these revised information sharing assumptions would require significant changes to current operations. First, overcoming the technical, economic, legal, and cultural barriers to sharing relevant, actionable information across member countries and economic sectors will require sustained attention, prioritisation, and funding from NATO’s senior leadership. Absent such attention, the barriers will likely prove insurmountable. Second, NATO should build on its existing MISP [Malware Information Sharing Platform] use to create a more comprehensive system of information sharing that broadens the types of information shared and widens the number of recipients. Third, NATO should consider how to better leverage industry for technical information, while enriching that information with government-derived information about context, attribution, and intent. If NATO shifted its approach to information sharing as suggested, the Alliance would have the opportunity to assume a leadership position in this area. If not, NATO will continue to struggle to make information sharing live up to its promise.

Daniel & Kenway ’20 (Michael Daniel currently serves as President and CEO of the non-profit Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA). Joshua Kenway is a Cybersecurity Associate at the Cyber Threat Alliance and a Research Fellow with the Algorithmic Justice League. “Repairing the Foundation: How Cyber Threat Information Sharing Can Live Up to its Promise and Implications for NATO,” in Cyber Threats and NATO 2030: Horizon Scanning and Analysis, December 2020, https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2020/12/Cyber-Threats-and-NATO-2030_Horizon-Scanning-and-Analysis.pdf)-mikee

cyber threat information sharing requires planning, long-term investment, and sustained commitment It takes engineering and analytic time on an ongoing basis as well as maintenance of the technology and processes consuming cyber security best practices is not a one-time endeavour; organisations must incorporate regular review and implementation into their business processes Absent a long-term commitment from organizational leadership cyber security should be a function that all organisations budget for and sustain over the long-term For NATO, updating programmes to reflect these revised information sharing assumptions would require significant changes to current operation First, overcoming the technical, economic, legal, and cultural barriers to sharing relevant, actionable information across member countries and economic sectors will require sustained attention, prioritisation, and funding from NATO’s senior leadership

The plan would demand significant resources and attention – guarantees a trade-off.

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NATO has achieved some strategic ambiguity with its current cyber policy, which may help to deter high-stakes Russian assaults during the present crisis. However, rather than an all-out Russian cyberattack, a far more plausible scenario is a lower-level attack carried out by the Russian government or a proxy group against one or more allies. In this case, the alliance’s interests — not to mention transatlantic security — would be better served by adopting nationally-tailored responses rather than pulling the Article 5 lever. Additionally, to prevent further escalation and reinforce the implicit firebreak that currently exists between cyber and conventional military operations, NATO allies should also agree to restrict any retaliatory response against Moscow to the cyber realm or non-military instruments of power. With little chance of improved NATO-Russian relations any time soon, time is of the essence to get this right. The allies should begin the hard political legwork now to ensure members get on the same page before NATO’s June summit, if not sooner. Achieving consensus on significant cyber issues has previously taken time. NATO’s attribution of the Microsoft Exchange hack last summer to China was an important step for the alliance and sent a strong signal to our adversaries. But it took months to reach agreement on the statement; the hack was uncovered in March 2021 and the NATO statement was not made public until July. In the current crisis, the alliance will not have the luxury of waiting four (or more) months to agree on a response. To avoid incurring damaging costs to NATO’s credibility and its deterrent powers, the allies should refine their cyber policy, now.

Lonergan and Moller ‘22 (Erica D. Lonergan is an assistant professor in the Army Cyber Institute and a research scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. Sara B. Moller is a former Eisenhower Fellow at the NATO Defense College and will be joining the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University later this year. “NATO’s Credibility Is on the Line with its Cyber Defense Pledge. That’s a Bad Idea.,” Politico, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/04/27/nato-credibility-cyber-defense-pledge-russia-ukraine-00027829)

NATO has achieved some strategic ambiguity with its current cyber policy, NATO allies should also agree to restrict any retaliatory response against Moscow to the cyber realm or non-military instruments of power The allies should begin the hard political legwork now to ensure members get on the same page Achieving consensus on significant cyber issues has previously taken time NATO’s attribution of the Microsoft Exchange hack last summer to China was an important step But it took months to reach agreement on the statement; the hack was uncovered in March 2021 and the NATO statement was not made public until July

The plan is resource intensive. It would require long and drawn-out negotiations

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Until recently, a wide bipartisan consensus held that China, not Russia, represented America’s greatest national security challenge and that Asia, not Europe, was the region in which this century’s fortunes would be determined. The long-delayed “Pivot to Asia” would recognize these realities, as the U.S. devoted greater attention and resources to the Indo-Pacific. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has upended this approach. Now Washington must deal with revisionist great powers in two regions, while the Middle East also continues to demand attention. The U.S. should continue a long-term shift to Asia, but in a way that better balances resources and engagements across the three strategic theaters. Paradoxically, Putin’s aggression demonstrates how this should be done. First, policy makers should absorb the enduring strategic logic behind a pivot to Asia. China combines the greatest capability and will to upend the international order. The Indo-Pacific represents the primary, but not the only, regional theater in which U.S.-China competition takes place. But a sustainable pivot to Asia is possible only in the absence of serious national security crises in Europe and the Middle East. No U.S. president will ignore a Russian-induced emergency in Europe, a major terrorist threat, or a nuclear and/or hegemonic Iran. America remains a global and not a regional power. The central challenge is allocating national security resources across all three regions, without either weakening vital U.S. national interests in one or imagining that America can do everything, everywhere. That problem is most acute in the military sphere. An increase in defense spending will be required, but how that money is spent is equally important. In the Middle East, for example, regular troops should relieve the burden placed on elite special operations forces in security cooperation missions. Washington should move expensive military equipment — like F-35 and F-22 aircraft — to the two arenas of great-power competition, employing less-capable aircraft, including unmanned systems, for counterterrorism missions. A combination of regional diplomacy and continued deterrence could limit Iran's regional ambitions, freeing up some of the forces that have deployed to the Middle East in recent years to deter a potential Iran threat. In Europe, the U.S. should build on its allies’ newfound willingness to enhance their military capabilities and deter further Russian aggression. This should involve moving American troops currently stationed in Europe further east, to countries such as Poland, Romania and the Baltics. Washington should also capitalize on the recent increase in intelligence sharing – including to NATO non-members – by eliminating barriers to sharing defense technology with allies newly willing to invest. For the Indo-Pacific, Washington should reserve the lion's share of military resources that matter most, including smaller naval surface ships, long-range missiles and next-generation fighter aircraft. Building on efforts like the Aukus security arrangement with Australia and the U.K. would give regional allies more leverage to strengthen their own defense, helping them better deter China and serve as the frontline in daily competition with it. Diplomatic resources are less zero-sum than military power, and economic engagement less still. Intense diplomatic work in Europe and the Middle East could bolster the coalitions in each that are willing and able to deal with threats there, and potentially reduce some of the threats themselves. Washington should couple this with an affirmative economic agenda, beginning with re-entry to or renegotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement. Over the next several years, the U.S. must adopt a slower, less-intense pivot to Asia than it intended before Putin's war. That is, however, preferable to no pivot at all, or to pretending that the crisis in European security does not alter American plans. The long game will be all-important.

Blackwill and Fontaine ‘22, (Robert is senior fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations, Richard is Chief Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security, “Ukraine War Should Slow But Not Stop the U.S. Pivot to Asia,” Bloomberg, March 8, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-03-09/russia-s-ukraine-invasion-should-slow-not-stop-u-s-pivot-to-china)-mikee

The U.S. should continue a long-term shift to Asia policy makers should absorb the enduring strategic logic behind a pivot to Asia. China combines the greatest capability and will to upend the international order. The Indo-Pacific represents the primary theater in which U.S.-China competition takes place The central challenge is allocating national security resources across regions, without either weakening vital U.S. national interests in one or imagining that America can do everything, everywhere That problem is most acute in the military sphere. An increase in defense spending will be required, but how that money is spent is equally important For the Indo-Pacific, Washington should reserve the lion's share of military resources that matter most, Diplomatic resources are less zero-sum than military power Intense diplomatic work in Europe East could bolster the coalitions in each that are willing and able to deal with threats there, and potentially reduce some of the threats themselves The long game will be all-important

Resources are zero-sum, the plan forces a trade-off.

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Nikolas Gvosdev: Which is the bigger challenge, China or Russia? Or are they equivalent? Elbridge Elbridge Colby: China is by a very considerable margin the more significant challenge to U.S. interests. The fundamental U.S. interest abroad is in denying another state the ability to dominate a key region like Asia or Europe. This could allow such a state to prejudice or deny our trade, access to markets, and so forth. China is a much greater threat on both of these scores: it is a far larger economy and thus can mount a much more plausible challenge to establish hegemony over its region than Russia can over Europe, and Asia is the world’s largest economy. So, the top priority must be to deny China hegemony over Asia. That said, Russia remains a challenge in Europe, and, in particular, is a concrete military threat in Eastern NATO; ensuring Russia does not see a plausible “theory of victory” in this area needs to be the priority focus for the Atlantic Alliance.

Colby ’20 (Eldridge, co-founder and principal of The Marathon Initiative, a policy initiative focused on developing strategies to prepare the United States for an era of sustained great power competition. “How NATO Manages the “Bear” and the “Dragon”,” Elbridge A. Colby and Ian Brzezinski in Conversation with Nikolas Gvosdev, Orbis, https://www.themarathoninitiative.org/2020/12/how-nato-manages-the-bear-and-the-dragon/)

Which is the bigger challenge, China or Russia? China is by a very considerable margin the more significant challenge to U.S. interests. The fundamental U.S. interest abroad is in denying another state the ability to dominate a key region like Asia or Europe. This could allow such a state to prejudice or deny our trade, access to markets, and so forth. China is a much greater threat on both of these scores: it is a far larger economy and thus can mount a much more plausible challenge to establish hegemony over its region than Russia can over Europe, and Asia is the world’s largest economy So, the top priority must be to deny China hegemony over Asia

China poses a larger and more probable risk than Russia

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Island of uncertainties Under China’s President Xi Jinping, who has consolidated power within the communist apparatus to an unusual degree, Beijing has been increasingly clear that it wants to bring Taiwan under control of the mainland by 2050, and that any threat to that goal could lead it to use force. “Taiwan is clearly one of their ambitions. ... And I think the threat is manifest during this decade, in fact, in the next six years,” Adm. Philip Davidson, then-commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, told Congress last year. Beijing’s statements suggest that China could move on Taiwan at any moment, if it believes the conditions are right. “It’s dangerous to say that 2027 or 2030 or 2035 is some heightened date,” the former Defense Department official said. “You are actually ignoring the risk that tomorrow something could happen.” An invasion of Taiwan would likely begin with an air assault and amphibious landing, analysts and former officials say, but what happens next is a mystery. How long can China continue launching missiles and aircraft, for example? What capacity does Beijing have to maintain and repair equipment in a fight? How will China’s military fare if the conflict turns into urban warfare? How will Beijing grapple with mass casualties or displaced civilians? Unlike with Russia, which has been fighting in Ukraine and Syria over the past decade, there is less recent history to draw from for China. Beijing has not fought a war since 1979, and its air force has not participated in a major conflict since 1958, Garafola noted. “The harder thing to measure, of course, is how they would perform in combat in a complex environment where things don’t go entirely as planned,” said Randy Schriver, a top Asia policy official in the Pentagon during the Trump administration. “It’s questionable that, even as they’ve improved their training, whether or not they are training at complex enough levels to be able to handle unintended or unknown developments.” The United States also has limited insight into how the different arms of the Chinese military apparatus would work together in a high-end campaign, analysts said. The U.S. military long ago began emphasizing “jointness” in its training exercises and operations, meaning integrating its air, sea, space, maritime and cyber capabilities. It’s unclear Beijing can do the same in a real-world operation. “There’s a lot of talk about cyber — we know how they use cyber for theft of information and intelligence, but we know less about how they might use cyber integrated into a war plan,” Schriver said. One area which the current reviews of foreign military assessments are paying close attention to is China’s supply lines if it attacks Taiwan, the Biden administration official said. Taiwan is an island, making resupplying invading forces a tougher task than what Russia faces in its overland routes to Ukraine. China’s economic and diplomatic initiatives across the Pacific also offer puzzles for American officials wondering if the efforts have a military angle. Chinese military officers and diplomats recently gathered alongside their Cambodian counterparts for a groundbreaking ceremony at Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of Thailand. China has pledged to upgrade the base, which sits near the South China Sea, in exchange for the Chinese military having access to part of it, a Chinese official confirmed to The Washington Post. Chinese Ambassador to Cambodia Wang Wentian said at the ceremony that the work was “not targeted at any third party, and will be conducive to even closer practical cooperation between the two militaries.” The deal recalls Beijing’s 2017 establishment of a logistics port in Djibouti in eastern Africa, a facility leased close to an American base in the tiny country at the mouth of the Red Sea. China has about 2,000 troops manning the base, which is a logistics hub for wider Chinese interests on the continent. Satellite image from shows a Cambodian naval base. This satellite image from Planet Labs PBC shows a Cambodian naval base in Ream, Cambodia, April 25, 2022. Cambodian and Chinese officials will break ground this week on the expansion of a port facility that the U.S. and others have worried will be used by Beijing a naval outpost on the Gulf of Thailand. | Planet Labs PBC via AP Photo Wrong now, right later? The U.S. intelligence community’s misjudgments of Russian and Ukrainian troops’ performance stood in stark contrast to what appeared to be far more accurate forecasts about Vladimir Putin’s plans to invade and some of the disinformation tactics he intended to use. The United States appears to have better intelligence about top-level Russian decision-making than it has for China. President Joe Biden and his aides also chose to publicize some of the intelligence in a bid to thwart Putin’s plans. FBI Director Christopher Wray testifies during a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing about worldwide threats. When asked about why one aspect of the intelligence — Putin’s intentions — was right, while the other — his military’s battlefield performance — was off-base, some U.S. and foreign officials said it’s likely because it’s a safer bet for an analyst to forecast that a military will do well and be wrong than to say it will do poorly and be wrong. And until that military is actually fighting, it’s impossible to know with absolute certainty how it will do. “You err on the side of caution when it comes to defense intelligence,” James Cleverly, a top British official, said when POLITICO asked about the issue earlier this year. Putin appeared to believe he could quickly take out Ukraine’s government, while his troops would be greeted as liberators as they stormed the whole country. His entire battle plan appeared premised on such notions. But in the face of Western-backed Ukrainian resistance, he’s had to recalibrate, focusing on Ukraine’s east and south for now. Some Russia-focused analysts, while acknowledging that early expectations that Moscow would defeat Ukraine quickly were wrong, say that, as the war drags on, Russia could get its act together and ultimately prove correct some of their predictions about its capabilities. “We overestimated the Russian military, but the jury is still out on the lessons from this war,” said Michael Kofman, a Russia analyst with CNA. If anything, the United States should avoid the trap of underestimating Chinese abilities after overestimating that of the Russians, some foreign affairs hands say. During the hearing earlier this year, senators asked Haines and Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier, the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, what lessons China was taking away from Russia’s war in Ukraine. “We’re not really sure what lessons Xi Jinping is taking away from this conflict right now. We would hope they would be the right ones,” Berrier said, adding later that one lesson could be “just how difficult a cross-strait invasion might be and how dangerous and high risk that might be.” Sen. Josh Hawley, however, wondered if that was optimistic. After all, efforts to deter the Russian invasion didn’t work. “We pretty dramatically overestimated the strength of the Russian military,” the Missouri Republican acknowledged. He added, however, “Don’t you think we’re dealing with a significantly more formidable adversary in China?” To which Berrier replied: “I think China is a formidable adversary.”

Toosi & Seligman ’22 (Nahal and Lara are Politico reporters, “The U.S. overestimated Russia’s military might. Is it underestimating China’s?” 06/15/2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/15/china-military-00039786)-mikee

eijing has been increasingly clear that it wants to bring Taiwan under control of the mainland by 2050, and that any threat to that goal could lead it to use force. Taiwan is clearly one of their ambitions. ... And I think the threat is manifest during this decade, in fact, in the next six years,” China could move on Taiwan at any moment if it believes the conditions are right. It’s dangerous to say that 2027 or 2030 You are actually ignoring the risk that tomorrow something could happen.” there is less recent history to draw from for China “The harder thing to measure, of course, is how they would perform in combat in a complex environment where things don’t go entirely as planned One area which the current reviews of foreign military assessments are paying close attention to is China’s supply lines if it attacks Taiwan the United States should avoid the trap of underestimating Chinese abilities after overestimating that of the Russians, China is a formidable adversary

Threat of Taiwan invasion is high now – uncertainty and force capabilities means the US needs to be extra committed.

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A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able tosuccessfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

Hunkovic ‘9 [Lee J, 2009, American Military University, 09 “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America”, http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf]

A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war many countries could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the U S and China are the most dominant If China were to annex Taiwan the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat if China and the U S in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be affected

Taiwan draws-in everyone – extinction

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2019 has not been a good year for China. General Secretary Xi Jinping’s ambitions and the Communist Chinese Party’s imperious means to achieve them have become transparent. The current situation in the Asia-Pacific is illustrative. Two Chinese actions defined this past year's regional news cycle. First, China's reaction to Hong Kong's peaceful pro-democratic protests escalated to a full-scale military crackdown. The Beijing Government deployed 12,000 People's Armed Police – a 1.5-million strong army dedicated to internal security – to the island, beating protestors and besieging the democracy movement's university strongholds. Most remarkable has been the resilience of average Hong Kongers. The opposition lacks a designated leader and organizational structure, a clear demonstration of widespread rage at China's dishonoring the Basic Law that protects Hong Kong's freedoms and to which the CCP agreed before Hong Kong's sovereignty passed from the U.K. to China in 1997. Second, China has escalated its campaign against Uighur Muslims in the country's West. Internal party documents have confirmed that Premier Xi and his confidants have no qualms about executing the largest instance of ethnically-targeted mass internment since the Holocaust. Beijing has constructed a Stasi-style police state in Xinjiang and deported 1.5 million Uighurs to "reeducation" camps. The more horrific accusations – that China harvests organs from Uighur men, and that Chinese soldiers are raping the wives of interned Uighur men in the form of extermination-by-forced-breeding – are unconfirmed. However, the situation merits a serious independent examination of these accusations. Only with the context of these events, combined with China’s escalating aggression towards the United States and its Pacific allies, can the importance of Beijing’s pressure against Taiwan be grasped. Global dominance is China’s ultimate ambition. A toxic combination of paranoia and imperial longing propels China’s rulers – reclaiming the Middle Kingdom’s place at the center of the world requires destroying America’s international position, while—as China’s rulers apparently believe—its security entails monopolizing the Western Pacific, eliminating any ethnically or politically distinct entities within China, and ensuring Chinese access to resources and markets abroad. Chinese pressure on Taiwan, therefore, stems from the same desires that prompt repression in Hong Kong and savagery in Xinjiang. Moreover, Taiwan poses a unique problem for Beijing. Its links with the United States make it a potential forward operating base for China’s adversaries, frustrating Beijing’s ambitions to control the Western Pacific. Taiwan’s democratization after decades of military rule proves that it can govern itself without Beijing’s imperial management. Bringing Taiwan to heel, therefore, is the inexorable result of China’s ambitions. Its actions this past year demonstrate Beijing’s multi-spectrum approach to achieving this end.

Seth Cropsey 1-9-2020 – Cropsey is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute and director of Hudson’s Center for American Seapower. He served as a naval officer and as deputy Undersecretary of the Navy in the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations. ["Strengthening the U.S.–Taiwan Alliance", Accessible Online at: https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2020/01/09/strengthening_the_ustaiwan_alliance_114970.html] @ AG

Xi Jinping’s ambitions and the Communist Chinese Party’s imperious means to achieve them have become transparent. The current situation in the Asia-Pacific is illustrative. Two Chinese actions defined this past year's regional news cycle. First, China's reaction to Hong Kong's peaceful pro-democratic protests escalated to a full-scale military crackdown. The Beijing Government deployed 12,000 People's Armed Police – a 1.5-million strong army dedicated to internal security – to the island, beating protestors and besieging the democracy movement's university strongholds The opposition lacks a designated leader and organizational structure, a clear demonstration of widespread rage at China's dishonoring the Basic Law that protects Hong Kong's freedoms and to which the CCP agreed before Hong Kong's sovereignty passed from the U.K. to China Second, China has escalated its campaign against Uighur Muslims in the country's West Internal party documents have confirmed that Premier Xi and his confidants have no qualms about executing the largest instance of ethnically-targeted mass internment since the Holocaust. Beijing has constructed a Stasi-style police state and deported 1.5 million Uighurs to "reeducation" camps. Only with the context of these events can the importance of Beijing’s pressure against Taiwan be grasped. Global dominance is China’s ultimate ambition. A toxic combination of paranoia and imperial longing propels China’s rulers – reclaiming the Middle Kingdom’s place at the center of the world requires destroying America’s international position, while—as China’s rulers apparently believe—its security entails monopolizing the Western Pacific, eliminating any ethnically or politically distinct entities within China, and ensuring Chinese access to resources and markets abroad. Chinese pressure on Taiwan, therefore, stems from the same desires that prompt repression in Hong Kong and savagery in Xinjiang. Taiwan poses a unique problem for Beijing Taiwan’s democratization after decades of military rule proves that it can govern itself without Beijing’s imperial management. Bringing Taiwan to heel, therefore, is the inexorable result of China’s ambitions.

Chinese goals require violently securing global domination – domestic policy and government documents prove – evaluate internal Chinese affairs before the aff’s empirics because it’s impossible to explain why China acts without understanding their mindset.

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"Sino-centrism" that is related to this historical reality has long governed the mentality of Chinese people. According to this hierarchical world view, China, as the most advanced civilization, is at the center of East Asia and the world, and all China's neighbors are vassal states (Kang 2010). This mentality was openly revealed by the Chinese foreign minister's recent public statement that I quoted previously: "China is a big country . . . and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact" (Economist 2012). This view is related to Chinese people's ancient superiority complex that developed from the long history and rich cultural heritage of Chinese civilization (Jacques 2012). In a sense, China has always been a superpower regardless of its economic standing at least in most Chinese people's mind-set. The strong national or civilizational pride of Chinese people, however, was severely damaged by "the Century of Humiliation," a period between the first Opium War (1839) and the end of the Chinese Civil War (1949). During this period, China was encroached on by the West and invaded by Japan, experienced prolonged civil conflicts, and finally became a semicolony of Great Britain while its northern territory was occupied by Japan. China's economic modernization is viewed as a national project to lay an economic foundation to overcome this bitter experience of subjugation and shame and recover its traditional position and old glory (Choi 2015). Viewed from this perspective, economic modernization or the accumulation of wealth is not an ultimate objective of China. Rather, its final goal is to return to its traditional status by expanding its global political and military as well as economic influence. What it ultimately desires is recognition (Anerkennung), respect (Respekt), and status (Stellung). These are important concepts for constructivists who see ideational motives as the main driving forces behind interstate conflicts (Lebow 2008). This reveals that constructivist elements can be combined with long cycle and power transition theories in explaining the rise and fall of great powers, although further systematic studies on it are needed.¶ Considering all this, China has always been a territorial power rather than a trading state. China does not seem to be satisfied only with the global expansion of international trade and the conquest of foreign markets. It also wants to broaden its (particularly maritime) territories and spheres of influence to recover its traditional political status as the Middle Kingdom. As emphasized previously, the type or nature and goals or ideologies of a rising power matter. Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan (territorial powers) experienced rapid economic expansion and sought to expand their territories and influence in the first half of the twentieth century. For example, during this period Japan's goal was to create the Japanese empire in East Asia under the motto of the East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. On the other hand, democratized Germany and Japan (trading powers) that enjoyed a second economic expansion did not pursue the expansion of their territories and spheres of influence in the post-World War II era. Twentiethcentury history suggests that political regimes predicated upon nondemocratic or nonliberal values and cultures (for instance, Nazism in Germany and militarism in Japan before the mid-twentieth century, and communism in the Soviet Union during the Cold War) can pose significant challenges to democratic and liberal regimes. The empirical studies of Lemke and Reed (1996) show that the democratic peace thesis can be used as a subset of power transition theory. According to their studies, states organized similarly to the dominant powers politically and economically (liberal democracy) are generally satisfied with the existing international rules and order and they tend to be status quo states. Another historical lesson is that economic interdependence alone cannot prevent a war for hegemony. Germany was one of the main trade partners of Great Britain before World War I (Friedberg 2011), and Japan was the number three importer of American products before its attack on Pearl Harbor (Keylor 2011).

Choi 18—Ji Young Choi, associate professor in the Department of Politics and Government and affiliated professor in the International Studies Program and East Asian Studies Program at Ohio Wesleyan University (“Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on the Rise of China: Long Cycles, Power Transitions, and China's Ascent,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 42, Issue 1, January-March 2018, pages 61-84, Available through ProQuest)

Sino-centrism has long governed the mentality of Chinese people. According to this world view, China, as the most advanced civilization, is at the center of East Asia and the world and all China's neighbors are vassal states China's economic modernization is viewed as a national project to lay an economic foundation to overcome this bitter experience of subjugation its final goal is to return to its traditional status by expanding its global political and military as well as economic influence China has always been a territorial power rather than a trading state China does not seem to be satisfied only with the global expansion of international trade and the conquest of foreign markets It wants to broaden its territories and spheres of influence to recover its traditional political status as the Middle Kingdom political regimes predicated upon nondemocratic or nonliberal values pose significant challenges to democratic and liberal regimes economic interdependence alone cannot prevent a war for hegemony Germany was one of the main trade partners of Great Britain before World War I and Japan was the number three importer of American products before its attack on Pearl Harbor

A historical legacy of dominance and the way the Chinese view their role in the world confirms revisionism.

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The United States often claims to be a beacon of freedom and democratic government. 263 Much of its moral legitimacy in foreign affairs is based upon its efforts to ensure freedom and democracy around the world. When its allies are found to commit human rights violations - with the acquiescence or encouragement of U.S. officials - it undermines this moral legitimacy. And, where the human rights violations are enabled even in part by U.S. funding and training, the United States limits its own access to the moral high ground.

Nathanael Tenorio Miller 12, J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 2013. "Note: The Leahy Law: Congressional Failure, Executive Overreach, and the Consequences." Cornell International Law Journal, 45, 667, pp. 694-696, Fall, 2012, Lexis, nihara

U S claims to be a beacon of freedom and democratic government Much of its moral legitimacy in foreign affairs is based upon its efforts to ensure freedom and democracy around the world. When its allies are found to commit human rights violations - with the acquiescence or encouragement of U.S. officials - it undermines this moral legitimacy where the human rights violations are enabled even in part by U.S. funding and training, the U S limits its own access to the moral high ground.

The CP solves US HR credibility – checks foreign democratic backsliding – increasing Congressional application AND Court enforcement is key to compliance AND deterrence

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Michigan (7-week)

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2022

Perhaps more important than their effect on congressional-presidential debates over the direction of foreign policy, the congressional human rights mandates have entrenched the norms and institutions of international human rights law and governance within the executive branch. International human rights governance is a series of decentralized processes of norm creation, elaboration, and enforcement. It is made up of interconnected political and legal institutions, treaty bodies, courts, and commissions, which interact with states, NGOs, corporations, and individuals in polycentric processes. 20The polycentric nature of human rights governance allows multiple entry points for official U.S. federal government participation - through the executive branch, the courts, and Congress - in the full range of international human rights governance. The process of compliance with CHRMs has fundamentally altered the methods through which the executive branch carries out diplomacy, expanding the work of diplomats to include coordination and cooperation with human rights NGOs and other members of civil society, and with courts and other consumers of human rights reporting. The CHRM process has, therefore, created a dynamic policy feedback cycle among the State Department, Congress, and civil society, which has informed the continual expansion of the breadth and depth of human rights reporting requirements. 21This process serves as an alternative mechanism to treaty membership. 22Through the CHRM process, the U.S. influences, and is influenced by, the development of international human rights law in regional and international human rights systems.

Margaret E. McGuinness 21, Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Center for International and Comparative Law, St. John's University School of Law. "Article: Human Rights Reporting as Human Rights Governance." Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 59, 364, pp. 370-374, 2021, Lexis, nihara

c h r m s entrenched norms and institutions of international human rights law and governance within the executive branch The polycentric nature of human rights governance allows multiple entry points for official U.S. federal government participation - through the executive branch, the courts, and Congress - in the full range of international human rights governance. compliance with CHRMs has fundamentally altered the methods through which the executive branch carries out diplomacy, expanding the work of diplomats to include coordination and cooperation with human rights NGOs and other members of civil society, and with courts and other consumers of human rights reporting CHRM process has, therefore, created a dynamic policy feedback cycle among the State Department, Congress, and civil society, which has informed the continual expansion of the breadth and depth of human rights reporting requirements the U.S. influences, and is influenced by, the development of international human rights law in regional and international human rights systems

Enhanced compliance with Congressional reporting requirements develops cyclical coordination with NGOs – CPs unilateral policy expands the scope of international HR law AND shapes governance via opinio juris – BUT, retreating from commitment to human rights only decks credibility

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Michigan (7-week)

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2022

U.S. aid to Colombia has declined considerably since 2008. Counternarcotics and counterinsurgency activities, in which Washington has been heavily involved since Plan Colombia’s inception in 2000, have been steadily “Colombianized.” Now, Colombia is stepping up efforts to export its “know-how” to countries in Central America, the Caribbean, and beyond the Western Hemisphere affected by drug-related crime and violence, largely via South-South cooperation and triangulated efforts with U.S. support. This report explores what seems to be an emerging international security cooperation model in which both Colombia and the United States play key roles. [2]

Arlene B. Tickner 14, Professor of International Relations, Political Science Department, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá., 18 March 2014, Washington Office on Latin America Advocacy for Human Rights in the Americas, https://www.wola.org/analysis/colombia-the-united-states-and-security-cooperation-by-proxy/#1, nihara

Colombia is stepping up efforts to export its “know-how” to countries in Central America, the Caribbean, and beyond the Western Hemisphere affected by drug-related crime and violence, largely via South-South cooperation and triangulated efforts with U.S. support emerging international security cooperation model in which both Colombia and the United States play key roles

Colombia is increasing global cooperation through proxy with U.S. support AND funding – that’s key to Colombian power projection AND Latin American stability – exporting counternarcotics, anti-corruption, international law, countering organized crime AND governance failures – HR credibility through vetting is key

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Michigan (7-week)

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2022

Non-State Acquisition of Nuclear Material and WMD Before the developmental stage of radiological dispersal devices (RDD), also known as ‘dirty bombs,’ or other WMD, acquisition of the necessary nuclear material proves the most daunting part for any non-state entity, such as Hezbollah. Overall, RDDs perform exactly as the name suggests. They combine conventional high explosives with some kind of radioactive material to contaminate an area and induce chaos.12 WMDs, to include biological, chemical, and nuclear means, follow the same principle but on a larger scale. A simple threat analysis suggests that global and regional black markets offer the best chance at acquiring restricted nuclear material. Hezbollah’s monetary and international standing as a recognized terrorist organization would provide ample assurance to reserve restricted resources. While highly impractical, a nuclear-enabled nation-state could theoretically supply a non-state actor with material from its own facilities. The most logical combination would be Iran and Hezbollah. According to the US State Department, Iran holds the dubious label as a state sponsor of terrorism, as it supplies Hezbollah with money and arms against its archrival Israel. Iran also maintains a problematic nuclear program. Moreover, both actors have publicly made known their contempt for the United States. However, this phenomenon is highly unlikely for several reasons: stockpiles are heavily monitored, non-state actors are not trustworthy and could use the material on a whim without fear of its powers, and nation-states ultimately fear retribution from other nation-states for the transfer in the first place. Simply put, the inherent risk is too big for any nation-state to assume. As a result of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of 2015 (JCPOA), commonly referred to as the Iran nuclear deal, the Islamic Republic of Iran is not looking to tarnish its image and open itself to retribution from Western powers. The avenues of acquisition do not end with Iran. Black markets provide another way to obtain restricted nuclear and WMD material. In the modern age, the international community has taken steps to ensure the accountability of nuclear materials through numerous treaties and bodies. Chief among these steps include the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and IAEA. The responsibility that comes with state-ownership of nuclear material by itself is enormous. For those that maintain weapons-grade nuclear material, thermo-nuclear weapons, and other WMD, the responsibility is that much greater. However, even with all these safeguards in place, material and equipment fall into the wrong hands. Currently, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina possess LatinAmerica’s largest and only nuclear energy programs for means of power production. 13 While these facilities are closely monitored, the threat of material being stolen still exists. Infiltration by means of disguise or force stands as a legitimate obstacle to safety and security. Incidents range from the temporary misplacement of a gauge to a stolen piece of nuclear material or equipment. Latin America specifically has a worrisome history involving these incidents. The CNS database details that between 2013 and 2018 approximately thirty-five (35) incidents have been reported.14 While this number may seem minute in comparison to that of the United States with over 600 incidents, the descriptions of said events raise concerns. The United States also has stricter reporting procedures than all IAEA ITDB-abiding (Incident and Trafficking Database) nations in Latin America and houses significantly more material in its borders, resulting in a higher margin of reports.15 Most the thirty-six Latin American cases involve lost, stolen and unauthorized possession of nuclear material and equipment, with many still unaccounted for to this day. The majority of incidents are not connected to nefarious intent. Take for example a truck carrying radioactive sources in Mexico in 2004. A group of men stole the truck, but shortly abandoned it a distance away, most likely after noticing its contents. They had no intent of actually stealing the restricted material. Although small in number, incidents of nefarious intent have been recorded. A quick glance at these past events informs future threats and worries. In 2015, a 58 year-old male was arrested in Engativa, Colombia for illegally stockpiling and selling nuclear material, such asIridium-192 and depleted uranium.16 More recently on March 19, 2019, armed men attacked a Brazilian nuclear plant uranium convoy in Rio de Janeiro.17 No material was compromised. In the instance of a convoy being attacked, nefarious and deliberate intent becomes likely. These are only two instances of dangerous activity involving nuclear material in Latin America. There very well could be other serious cases that have not been documented. While the aforementioned cases could very well be anomalies, they still occur. After a couple or few of these seemingly isolated incidents, terrorists and other non-state actors have the capacity to begin constructing a RDD or WMD. Additional requirements, such as subject matter experts, expert scientists, and instructions, are relatively easy to acquire. Hezbollah and its regional partners could very well solicit help or threaten malice against private or public subject matter experts in order to obtain talent. Even then, countless resources are available online and on the dark web to aid its efforts. One phenomenon that has yet to be explored is the involvement of regional cartels and paramilitary groups in such operations. It is highly unlikely that Latin American cartels or paramilitary factions would ever use RDDs or WMDs against their targets. The very premise behind a cartel is stealth and to remain out of the public limelight and away from law enforcement. The nature of trafficking weapons, drugs, and persons demands isolation and secrecy. Cartels will only strike if they feel threatened or attacked in the first place. If prompted to lash out against an interrupting force, cartels almost always use conventional weapons, such as small arms. It makes perfect sense that an organization with such modus operandi would shy away from using RDDs or WMDs. Likewise, paramilitary groups, such as the ELN and PCC, also strive to operate in relative secrecy and with surprise. However, different from cartels, their objective to strike out against government targets unprompted. Take for example the actions of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in Colombia. Being a paramilitary group, it operated out of remote, crude bases in the uninhabitable portions of the country, while assassinating and kidnapping government officials. While the FARC utilized guerilla tactics, paramilitary factions primarily espouse the use of conventional weapons and explosives to achieve their desired objectives. While it is unlikely that cartels and paramilitary organizations would use RDDs or WMDs, the United States and its regional partners should recognize the potential role of these parties in trafficking nuclear and WMD material and equipment for financial gain. With their given skill in moving illicit cargoes, Latin American non-state actors are ideal outlets for terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah, to acquire and move high-profile restricted material across borders. Since they are not bound to follow international laws, these regional partnerships would provide lucrative deals for both sides. The hefty payout of trafficking dangerous materials could certainly attract attention from cartels and other organizations looking to make a quick profit. Delivery of Radiological Material and WMD Provided that Hezbollah or other non-state organizations have the necessary material, the most feared stage of the RDD and WMD process is the system’s implementation. The international community would be correct not to expect a thermo-nuclear weapon on-par with that of the United States or nuclear weapons states of the IAEA. Dynamic and mobile terrorist cells do not have the resources, time or capacity to manufacture and store a legitimate nuclear weapon. However, this likelihood does not guarantee full security in light of ‘dirty bombs’ or biological and chemical systems. While the size, mechanics, range and lethality of radiological and WMD devices vary across a large spectrum depending upon the target, the main problem is they still pose a threat. With the right isotope, RDDs can temporarily contaminate large areas for long amounts of time. Even with the advent of more stringent security measures at the US-Mexican border, there are concurrent loopholes in air, land, sea, and cyberspace that leave the US vulnerable. At more porous borders been Latin American countries, the possibility is quadrupled. While the prospect of trafficking nuclear and radiological material across sovereign borders looms, perhaps the most readily available and effective means of attack for an organization like Hezbollah is biological. WMDs provide an effective avenue of attack for an organization such as Hezbollah. The examples of the Ghaddafi and Assad regimes in Libya and Syria respectively and their abilities to develop covert biological and chemical weapons still loom in the Western psyche. With the right tools, Hezbollah could do the same, if they are not closely surveilled. The failed state of Venezuela provides Hezbollah with a sanctuary to operate out of in Latin America. In fact, regular flights connect Caracas and Teheran, making it easy for operatives to transit to and from South America. Separately, over the past year, the Bolivarian republic has seen millions of its citizens move to neighboring countries in one of our time’s greatest humanitarian crises. The US intelligence community designated Venezuela a displacement hotspot in 2019, citing the strong probability of infectious disease outbreaks.18 Many of these displaced persons settle in Colombia, Brazil, Chile, and Peru. From there they disperse around the Western Hemisphere. An infected operative could very well blend in as a refugee and spread a deadly, infectious disease around a densely-populated area of a neighboring country. By the time authorities notice the epidemic, it is already too late to contain in light of the rudimentary medical facilities available. Like human-borne suicide bombings, this form of biological attack is relatively inexpensive in Hezbollah’s view, amounting to a follower’s life, little money, and biological agent capable of being harnessed. History teaches us that most terrorist organizations prefer a variety of delivery methods, from person-based suicide to car-based to pressure-cooker to improvised explosive device (IED) bombings and so on. In other words, they are very hard to track and prevent. Historically, Hezbollah has utilized suicide (body-based), rocket-based and vehicle-based bombing tactics, as evident in Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and Argentina. As detection technology has advanced over the years to expose more threats, so has the adversary’s ability to disguise their explosives and products. The simplest explosive device fueled by fertilizer or nitrogenous compounds might not be detectable except by the human eye. Today, gel-based explosives and more minute IEDs stand as the foremost obstacle to detection and explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) teams. Counterterrorism measures to prevent these catastrophes from occurring include: cutting-edge airport and border monitoring technology able to detect gel-like and composite explosives, new, discrete systems for detecting radiation, special municipal and federal law enforcement units dedicated to inspecting vehicles (within the shell and under the carriage), and collaboration between national agencies and departments. If Hezbollah or another terrorist organization were to strike in Latin America, the next logical question to ask would be ‘Where?’ There are hundreds of eligible targets in the Americas, such as embassies, consulates, shared operating bases for the US military, foreign nuclear plants, foreign military bases, the Panama Canal, and urban and cultural centers. Looking at past Hezbollah activity in the Middle East, it is reasonable to surmise the organization would first target the Brazilian or Argentinian Jewish community, Israel, and the United States. Seeing as how Hezbollah has already targeted the heart of the Jewish community in Buenos Aires, the next closest and largest communities would be the ones in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (±500 and 700 miles away from the TBA respectively). The closest Israeli consulates are in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. American consulates are located nearby in the same two Brazilian cities, in addition to the US Embassy in Asunción, Paraguay. The group also boasts an affinity for military targets. Any arrival of US forces into South America could also prompt an attack.

Lawrence James King 19, Service Academy Research Associate Program, USAFA, 7-9-19, “The Radiological and WMD Threat Posed to National Security By Hezbollah in Latin America,” https://permalink.lanl.gov/object/tr?what=info:lanl-repo/lareport/LA-UR-19-26442

RDD), also known as ‘dirty bombs perform exactly as the name suggests. They combine conventional explosives with radioactive material to contaminate an area and induce chaos WMDs include biological, chemical, and nuclear means, follow the same principle on a larger scale black markets offer the best chance at restricted nuclear material a nuclear nation-state could supply a non-state actor with material The most logical would be Iran and Hezbollah Iran supplies Hezbollah with money and arms Iran also maintains a problematic nuclear program both made known their contempt for the United States markets provide another way to obtain restricted nuclear and WMD material Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina possess LatinAmerica’s largest and only nuclear energy programs the threat of material being stolen still exists. Infiltration by disguise or force stands as a legitimate obstacle Latin America specifically has a worrisome history between 2013 and 2018 thirty-five incidents have been reported While this number may seem minute descriptions raise concerns. The United States also has stricter reporting procedures than IAEA ITDB-abiding nations in Latin America and houses significantly more material resulting in a higher margin of reports Most Latin American cases involve lost, stolen and unauthorized possession with many still unaccounted for A quick glance at these past events informs future threats While cases could be anomalies, they still occur. After a couple seemingly isolated incidents, terrorists and other non-state actors have the capacity to begin constructing a RDD or WMD. Additional requirements, such as subject matter experts, expert scientists, and instructions, are easy to acquire. Hezbollah and regional partners could solicit help or threaten malice against private or public subject matter experts Even then, countless resources are available online and on the dark web While it is unlikely that cartels and paramilitary organizations would use RDDs or WMDs, the United States and regional partners should recognize the role of these parties in trafficking material for financial gain Latin American non-state actors are ideal outlets for terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah, to acquire and move high-profile material Since they are not bound to international laws regional partnerships provide lucrative deals Provided that Hezbollah have the necessary material, the most feared stage is implementation dirty bombs’ or biological systems RDDs can contaminate large areas for long amounts of time. Even with stringent security measures there are loopholes in air, land, sea, and cyberspace At more porous borders the possibility is quadrupled the most readily available and effective means of attack is biological. WMDs provide an effective avenue of attack for Hezbollah. The Ghaddafi and Assad regimes in Libya and Syria and their abilities to develop covert biological and chemical weapons loom in the Western psyche Hezbollah could do the same The failed state of Venezuela provides Hezbollah with a sanctuary regular flights connect Caracas and Teheran, making it easy for operatives to transit The intelligence community designated Venezuela a displacement hotspot citing the strong probability of infectious disease outbreaks they disperse around the Western Hemisphere. An infected operative could blend in as a refugee and spread a deadly, infectious disease around a densely-populated area By the time authorities notice the epidemic, it is too late to contain this is inexpensive in Hezbollah’s view they are very hard to track and prevent As detection technology advanced so has the adversary’s ability to disguise explosives and products There are hundreds of eligible targets in the Americas, such as embassies, consulates, shared operating bases foreign nuclear plants, foreign military bases, the Panama Canal, and urban centers Hezbollah the organization would target the Brazilian or Argentinian Jewish community, Israel, and the United States

Latin American instability causes existential CBRN deployment

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Over the past decades, Colombia and the United States have consolidated a mutually beneficial partnership that has successfully safeguarded both nations’ security interests. Under Plan Colombia, the country became an increasingly peaceful and prosperous democracy and, together, the United States and Colombia effectively reduced transnational organized crime, violence, coca cultivation, and drug trafficking. Now, with Colombia’s improved security situation, strengthened economy, and increased leadership in the region, the bilateral relationship calls for a renewed partnership.

Senator Roy Blunt & Cardin 19 (R-MO) Task Force Co-Chair Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD) Task Force Co-Chair, 9-26-2019, "The Untapped Potential of the US-Colombia Partnership," Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/untapped-potential-us-colombia-partnership/#blueprint, nihara

Colombia and the U S consolidated a mutually beneficial partnership that has successfully safeguarded both nations’ security interests the U S and Colombia effectively reduced transnational organized crime, violence, coca cultivation, and drug trafficking. with Colombia’s improved security situation, strengthened economy, and increased leadership in the region, the bilateral relationship calls for a renewed partnership.

Exporting the Colombian-US security cooperation model solves transnational organized crime, AND drug trafficking

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WASHINGTON — Citing human rights concerns, the United States will not give Egypt $130 million in annual security assistance, officials said on Friday, even as the Biden administration continues to approve billions of dollars in military sales to the Middle Eastern ally.

Lara Jakes 1/28 and Mona El-Naggar, Lara Jakes is a diplomatic correspondent based in the Washington bureau of The New York Times. Over the past two decades, Ms. Jakes has reported and edited from more than 40 countries and covered war and sectarian fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel, the West Bank and Northern Ireland. Mona El-Naggar is an international correspondent, based in Cairo. She writes and produces stories that cover politics, culture, religion, social issues and gender across the Middle East. 1-28-2022, "U.S. Blocks $130 Million in Aid for Egypt Over Rights Abuses," New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/28/us/politics/egypt-us-human-rights.html, nihara

Citing human rights concerns, the U S will not give Egypt $130 million in annual security assistance

We just cut aid to Egypt over human rights – AND have consistently suspended aid due to HR concerns – it’s indistinguishable – thumps AND empirically denies their impact – BUT, does NOT solve

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Following the January 30 deadline, the Biden administration decided that it will reprogram $130 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) originally intended for the brutal government of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. The United States had withheld this military aid since mid-September of last year pending the Egyptian government’s fulfillment of two modest human rights conditions: ending the unjust detentions of or dropping the charges against 16 Egyptians politically targeted by al-Sisi’s government and completely closing the decade-old Case 173 targeting independent civil society.

Human Rights Watch 22, 2-1-2022, "Joint Statement – Biden Administration’s Decision to Reprogram Military Aid to Egypt Is Necessary but Insufficient," https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/02/01/joint-statement-biden-administrations-decision-reprogram-military-aid-egypt, *[signatories list condensed], nihara

Biden decided it will reprogram $130 million in Fiscal Year 2020 FMF intended for the brutal government of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. pending the Egyptian government’s fulfillment of two modest human rights conditions

Reprogramming of FMF thumps the turn – BUT, doesn’t solve the net benefit – credible enforcement of Leahy is key

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Last week, the container ship "Ever Given" became lodged in the Suez Canal, the 120-mile long man-made waterway that runs through Egypt and connects the Red Sea with the Mediterranean Sea. The waterway allows commercial vessels to travel more quickly between the Far East and Europe. The route is also used by military ships, including those of the United States Navy. The blockage is not a show stopper for the U.S. military, however.

Todd C. Lopez 21, 3-29-2021, "Military Using Alternatives to Suez Canal In Middle East," U.S. Department of Defense, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2553768/military-using-alternatives-to-suez-canal-in-middle-east/, nihara

Suez Canal blockage is not a show stopper for the U.S. military

No Suez Canal impact

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To be sure, the new Biden team will not be a carbon copy of the Obama team and even those that return will do so with new perspective and their own lessons learned in the interval. However, they would be wise to recognize that a rapid shift in leadership styles now may create a sort of civil-military whiplash. The Biden team almost certainly will want to reestablish processes that provide greater civilian direction for war plans, budgeting, and global priorities. After four years of relative autonomy for the Joint Staff and combatant commands, combined with reduced daily civilian oversight due to under-filled political positions in the Pentagon, a micromanagement narrative could almost write itself. Biden and his team will need to be attuned to these dynamics and look for early opportunities to establish trust and clarify their expectations about the civil-military relationship while also providing senior military officers a real voice in the policy process that makes them feel respected and heard.

Golby and Feaver, 21—senior fellow at the Clements Center for National Security at the University of Texas at Austin AND professor of political science and public policy and director of the American Grand Strategy Program at Duke University (Jim and Peter, “BIDEN INHERITS A CHALLENGING CIVIL-MILITARY LEGACY,” https://warontherocks.com/2021/01/biden-inherits-a-challenging-civil-military-legacy/, dml)

Biden would be wise to recognize that a rapid shift in leadership styles now may create a sort of civil-military whiplash Biden will want to provide greater civilian direction for war plans, budgeting, and global priorities. After four years of relative autonomy for the Joint Staff a micromanagement narrative could almost write itself Biden and his team will need to be attuned to these dynamics and look for early opportunities to establish trust and clarify their expectations about the civil-military relationship while also providing senior military officers a real voice in the policy process that makes them feel respected and heard

Genuine consultation avoids politics and is key to CMR—solves global threats.

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In the twenty-first century, the United States faces an increasingly complex and dynamic strategic environment. Contested international borders, emerging powers, economic inequality, political instability, societal upheaval, sectarian conflict, ecological changes, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will all affect U.S. national security. In contrast to the Cold War era, most of these challenges can not be addressed through economic and security alliances, with the military providing nuclear and conventional deterrence. As the 2015 National Security Strategy notes, “The challenges we face require … the pursuit of a comprehensive agenda that draws on all elements of our national strength.”1 While the need is clear, efforts to implement a “whole-of government” approach to national security have been episodic and ultimately unsuccessful. Although there has been much discussion, frustration, and angst about the lack of cooperation and coordination between and among U.S. government agencies and departments, there has been very little progress in establishing mechanisms to coordinate disparate and diverse organizations, each with their own leadership, culture, and authorities. The result is a disjointed and often ineffective foreign policy. While it will take national leadership to change this at the strategic level, there are measures that can be taken to mitigate challenges at the operational and tactical levels. Although a whole-of-government approach may seem a daunting task, one of the most effective ways to encourage coordination and collaboration is to bring representatives from interagency entities together for realistic training with their military counterparts before they are forced to work together in a crisis. Recognizing the importance of “training as you fight,” the Army’s Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany, integrates interagency personnel into its exercises. They include mission rehearsal exercises, noncombatant evacuation operations, and brigade readiness exercises with NATO allies and multinational partners. This experience provides soldiers and other interagency participants the opportunity to work with, and learn from, the other entities they may encounter during a deployment. Integrated training also helps build the relationships and develop the trust required to effectively implement national security policy. The Need for Development of Interagency Lines of Effort In 2002, the first post-9/11 National Security Strategy dramatically changed the focus of how national security policy was implemented.2 For the first time, international development was included as an essential component. Since then, every national security strategy has noted the importance of a “Three D” (defense, diplomacy, and development), whole-of-government approach to national security. The Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (DOS), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are tasked to work together to foster peace and long-term stability. While there are numerous challenges that have limited the implementation of this guidance, two stand out: the lack of stability and civil-military operations education and integrated, interagency training. As part of its effort to fulfill this new national security emphasis, USAID established a small cadre of foreign service officers specialized in crisis, stabilization, and governance in 2003. Known as Backstop 76ers, these officers are charged with planning and implementing humanitarian, transitional, and governance activities in unstable or politically volatile areas. However, they have had limited impact where interagency coordination and joint planning and implementation are crucial for success. This is the result of a number of factors including little or no interagency education, very low-risk tolerance, the predilection of promotion boards to favor traditionally developed officers over those with experience in conflict zones, and a siloed approach to programming in unstable areas. In 2004, the DOS established a similar capability when it created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.3 It managed to recruit over 130 direct-hire deployable specialists under the Crisis Response Corps. However, this initiative ended in 2011 when funding cuts caused the Crisis Response Corps to disband. It is worth noting that neither entity included stability or civil-military operations education as a regular requirement in their programs. The growth of violent extremism, increased frequency of humanitarian disasters, global health crises (e.g., Ebola), and increased migration mean that U.S. government officials will continue to operate in unstable environments across the globe. While the DOD has the capability and capacity to respond to crises anywhere, it often lacks the subject-matter expertise to identify and mitigate nonmilitary challenges that directly affect political end states. In contrast, joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational entities have the subject-matter experts but often lack the capability and capacity to quickly deploy them. Therefore, it is imperative that these entities understand and leverage each other’s capabilities and capacities. Mission success requires military and civilian personnel to work seamlessly with each other as well as with allies and partners, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); each with overlapping mandates and often divergent objectives. Even though the DOD, DOS, USAID, and other agencies are colocated in our embassies, they are not adequately trained in crisis response, often causing unnecessary delays and potential mission failure as interagency personnel have to learn “on the job” about one another’s roles, resources, and expertise. To foster effective collaboration and deconfliction of activities, these entities must be educated in stability and civil-military operations and train together before a crisis. These are significant challenges, as there is no interagency stability or civil-military operations education or training, nor is there policy guidance mandating it.

James W. Derleth 18, PhD, senior interagency training advisor at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany, subject-matter expert in civil-military operations, international conflict, and stability operations. 2-28-2018. "Fostering a Whole-of-Government Approach to National Security from the Bottom Up Interagency Training at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center." Army University Press. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2018-OLE/Feb/Fostering-Security/

In the twenty-first century, the U S faces an increasingly complex and dynamic strategic environment. Contested international borders, emerging powers inequality, political instability, societal upheaval, sectarian conflict, ecological changes, and the proliferation of w m d will all affect U.S. national security most of these challenges can not be addressed through security alliances, with the military The challenges we face require … the pursuit of a comprehensive agenda that draws on all elements of our national strength While the need is clear, efforts to implement a “whole-of government” approach While the DOD has the capability and capacity to respond to crises anywhere, it often lacks the subject-matter expertise to identify and mitigate nonmilitary challenges that directly affect political end states. In contrast, joint entities have the subject-matter experts but often lack the capability and capacity to quickly deploy Therefore, it is imperative that these entities understand and leverage each other’s capabilities and capacities. Mission success requires military and civilian personnel to work seamlessly To foster effective collaboration and deconfliction of activities, these entities must be educated in civil-military operations

Turns and controls every other impact

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The operating environment is changing fast. By 2015 the large scale civil-military experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq already felt like distant memories. Military and civilian leaders talk of volatility that is out of control, the “worst they’ve seen it in forty years” (Odierno in Sterman 2015; Guterres 2013). Pushed by rapidly evolving communication and other technologies the line between war and “not war” continues to blur (Rosa Brooks in Sterman 2015) underscoring Mary Kaldor’s earlier warnings about the “new” wars with their perpetually chaotic environments and no clear winners, losers, or negotiated settlements. No longer fought within national boundaries wars would evolve into regions of chronic insecurity where cyclical violence and recurring civil wars would facilitate the formation of new militias, gangs, and financial networks linking transnational criminal activities with terrorist networks in mutually beneficial arrangements. Fast moving conflicts would become the new normal and with the advent of sophisticated social media and communication technology users capable of launching disruptions and violence at any time in any place throughout the world (Kaldor 2012; see Chapter 4). The recent humanitarian crisis caused by the violent mass displacement of Syrian civilians is just the tip of the iceberg. As personal dangers for civilians increase UNHCR’s High Commissioner Antonio Guterres has warned about unparalleled humanitarian crises erupting on a global scale in a world where international power relationships are unpredictable and the international community is unable to stop conflicts (World Development Report 2011; Guterres 2013).

Marcia Hartwell 16, 2016, Embedded civilian advisor with the U.S. Army In Iraq, Scholar at the Center for the Study of Civil-Military Operations at the United States Military Academy at West Point, Ph.D. from the University of Oxford; Negotiating Civil-Military Space: Redefining Roles in an Unpredictable World, “The ‘New War’ Challenge,” Ch. 6

The operating environment is changing fast Military and civilian leaders talk of volatility that is out of control Pushed by rapidly evolving communication and other technologies the line between war and “not war” continues to blur underscoring warnings about “new” wars with perpetually chaotic environments and no clear winners No longer fought within national boundaries wars would evolve into regions of chronic insecurity where cyclical violence and recurring civil wars would facilitate the formation of transnational terrorist networks The recent humanitarian crisis caused by the violent mass displacement of Syrian civilians is just the tip of the iceberg. As personal dangers for civilians increase unparalleled humanitarian crises erupt on a global scale where international power relationships are unpredictable and the international community is unable to stop conflicts

Civil-military coordination prevents global system collapse – aggravates every existential risk

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Second, each challenge has both domestic and international constituencies seeking to raise the profile of the threat—from climate change and human trafficking to regional conflicts and nuclear war. And in each case, policymakers seek to enlist the extraordinary capabilities of the American military to combat the threat.

Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski 18, January 15, 2018, Professor in the Division of Global Affairs at Rutgers University; Professor of Strategy in the Strategic and Operational Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College, Cornell University Press, “The End of Grand Strategy: US Maritime Operations in the Twenty-First Century,” vol. 95

from climate change and human trafficking to regional conflicts and nuclear war

CMR averts environmental systems risks – extinction

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While Huntington’s theory of objective control still provides an important foundation for thinking about civil-military relations, it does not adequately deal with modern situations where military officers have to take on roles beyond managing violence. For example, in Iraq and Afghanistan the U.S. military had to perform roles related to nation building and development traditionally left to the State Department or USAID. The inability of the and military to successfully manage interagency cooperation, or to perform roles outside of the management of violence, contributed to the deteriorating situation in both countries, and was one of the most important lessons of the early years in both conflicts.[3] This is not a new problem, but was analyzed in depth by R.W. Komer in his RAND study of the Vietnam conflict, “Bureaucracy Does its Thing.” In Komer’s analysis, he explains how large organizations, the military included, tend to be slow to depart from established beliefs and ways of doing things, and to reward conformity rather than creative thinking. In the Vietnam War, the U.S. military relied on a traditional war mindset that resulted in an overly conventional and militaristic response when a more political counterinsurgency response was needed. Komer recognized that the civilian bureaucracies were just as stuck in their traditional mindsets in the Vietnam War as the U.S. military. In particular, Komer points out that the State Department deferred to traditional thinking on civil-military relations and focused on diplomatic relations with the South Vietnam government rather than becoming involved with ground operations, despite the political nature of counterinsurgency missions. In insurgencies, the military simply has more logistical capacity and manpower to carry out nation building and development projects than civilian agencies, and in many theaters it is too dangerous for civilians to carry out this work. However, even as traditional war becomes less and less common, there is still a lag as agencies are unable and unwilling to change how they think of themselves that results in inefficiencies that learning organizations like insurgencies can exploit, despite their smaller traditional capacity. This is an especially salient point considering that the U.S. military and foreign policy bureaucracies have proven to have a short organizational memory when it comes to non-traditional operations that fall out of the scope of what these organizations consider to be their traditional roles. In order to understand modern civil-military relations, it is important to consider the role of the national security bureaucrats who increasingly control national security policy more than elected political leaders. According to Michael Glennon, this has resulted in a double government where the “dignified,” institutions like the Congress and the Presidency are a façade for the real decision making power wielded by career national security professionals. This double government did not emerge from conscious effort, but emerged overtime because of systemic and legal incentives baked in the national security structures of the United States. Glennon dubs this class of national security officials and influencers an “efficient” class due to the relative quickness they are able to work compared to the elected officials publically thought to be in charge of national security policy. This efficiency is especially important now that national security covers a wide range of non-traditional threats like terrorism, piracy, and cyber attack that require quick action and a wide range of expertise that elected officials cannot match. Glennon points out that despite running on a platform dedicated to changing the national security policies of the Bush Administration, President Obama has continued most of the same policies. The United States is a democracy, and as the head of the executive branch, the American public expects the President to set the national security agenda, so this double government has subverted U.S. civil-military relations, even if the façade of Presidential leadership remains. Another way that this situation has effected civil-military relations is that some members of this efficient class are even taking over the traditional military role of organizing violence. The best case in point is the use of UAV strikes in counter-terror operations carried out by the CIA. Under President Obama, the CIA has increased the number of UAV strikes and covert operations, carrying out what should be military operations.[4] As the security environment has evolved and become more complex, theories about civil-military relations are vital to understand the complexity of these relationships. Many older theories still form a relevant core, such as Huntington’s ideas about military professionalism and objective civilian control, but are no longer adequate to cover the evolving roles of both the civilians and the military. As Komer has shown, large organizations like the military or the State Department are slow to change their conceptions of themselves, and have difficulty in adapting to the new roles that modern “grey area” warfare demand. Even though these large institutions have a hard time adapting to new challenges, there is a class of national security officials who operate efficiently, and as shown by Glennon, are increasingly monopolizing national security decision making, and in some cases the actual management of violence itself. Situations as complex as these require robust theories and frameworks to analyze successfully, and require looking both to traditional theorists as well as more modern ones, and even theorists who are not writing explicitly about civil-military relations itself.

Leon Whyte 14, Fletcher school of Law and Diplomacy. 12-15-2014. "Civil-Military Relations Theory for the Modern World." Small Crowded World. https://smallcrowdedworld.wordpress.com/2014/12/15/civil-military-relations-theory-for-the-modern-world/

c m r does not adequately deal with modern situations where military officers have to take on roles beyond managing violence. For example, in Iraq and Afghanistan the U.S. military had to perform roles related to nation building and development traditionally left to State or USAID. The inability of the military to successfully manage interagency cooperation contributed to the deteriorating situation in both countries, and was one of the most important lessons of the early years in both conflicts this has resulted in a double government where the “dignified,” institutions like the Congress and the Presidency are a façade for the real decision making power wielded by career national security professionals. As the security environment has evolved and become more complex, c m r are vital to understand the complexity of these relationships. large organizations like the military or the State Department are slow to change their conceptions of themselves, and have difficulty in adapting to the new roles that modern “grey area” warfare demand. Even though these large institutions have a hard time adapting there is a class of national security officials who operate efficiently Situations as complex as these require robust frameworks and require looking to modern c m r

CMR enables synergies that cap gray zone conflicts

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2022

If the case for a positive “Snowden effect” therefore is stronger than the one for Chelsea Manning and WikiLeaks, critics claim that it also created significant dangers in the fight against terror. The NSA and White House warned about the Snowden leaks immediately after they began. Senator Dianne Feinstein, a Democrat from the reliably liberal and tech-friendly state of California, even called Snowden’s actions treasonous.111 In a February 2015 news conference, NSA Director Admiral Mike Rodgers claimed that the leak “has had a material impact on our ability to generate insights as to what terrorist groups around the world are doing. . . . Anyone [who] thinks this has not had an impact . . . doesn’t know what they are talking about.”112 Stewart Baker, formerly a high-ranking Homeland Security official and General Counsel of the NSA, was one of Snowden’s most publicly vocal critics, alleging that Snowden might have been in the employ of a foreign intelligence service and that his disclosures significantly impaired the country’s ability to defend itself, especially given the specific details about the NSA’s programs that Snowden disclosed.113

Mark Fenster 17, Stephen C. O'Connell Chair at the Levin College of Law, “8 The Disappointment of Megaleaks,” The Transparency Fix: Secrets, Leaks, and Uncontrollable Government Information, Stanford Law Books, an imprint of Stanford University Press, 2017, pp. 174–192

Snowden critics claim created significant dangers in the fight against terror

Leaks don’t cause any intelligence failures

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Michigan (7-week)

Counterplans

2022

When it releases documents from which text has been “redacted” (that is, obscured with a black mark or erased) for security purposes, the executive branch simultaneously discloses information and quite explicitly and clearly keeps it secret. The public can see the document; it just cannot see every word—or perhaps any word at all, if the entire document or page has been redacted. An agency sometimes redacts a document that it is otherwise required to release under a legal mandate; alternatively, an agency may not have been obliged to release a redacted document but decided to declassify or make it available in an effort to meet public expectations or enhance public understanding of an issue. As a surgical removal of privileged information, redaction constitutes a compromise, a second-best alternative to complete secrecy that is better than no disclosure at all. But by making visible that which is kept secret, redaction reveals secrecy’s machinery in ways that the flat refusal to release a document does not. Paradoxically, redactions allow citizens to see precisely what the state has decided they cannot know.

Mark Fenster 17, Stephen C. O'Connell Chair at the Levin College of Law, “7 The Implausibility of Information Control,” The Transparency Fix: Secrets, Leaks, and Uncontrollable Government Information, Stanford Law Books, an imprint of Stanford University Press, 2017, pp. 153–173

When it releases documents from which text has been “redacted” the executive branch simultaneously discloses information and quite explicitly keeps it secret. The public can see the document; it just cannot see every word As a surgical removal of privileged information, redaction constitutes a compromise, a second-best alternative to complete secrecy But by making visible that which is kept secret, redaction reveals secrecy’s machinery redactions allow citizens to see precisely what the state has decided they cannot know.

Redaction failures routinely reveal secret information

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Michigan (7-week)

Counterplans

2022

More than anything, our ongoing preoccupation with civil-military crises may reflect our increasing uncertainty about the overall purpose of the military and our growing inability to define the role of the armed forces—or the distinction between the political and military realms—in any coherent way. Considering today’s complex, hybrid challenges such as terrorism, epidemic disease, climate change, cyber threats, Russian information warfare, and expanding Chinese global influence, it is impossible to draw neat distinctions between the role of the military and the role of diplomacy, development, and trade policy—or for that matter, between foreign and domestic issues and threats.29 But with the lines between war and not war, foreign and domestic, and military and civilian growing ever blurrier, it is less clear what we mean when we talk about crises in civil-military affairs.

Brooks, 3-2-21—Scott K. Ginsberg Professor of Law and Policy at Georgetown University Law Center (Rosa, “Are US Civil-Military Relations in Crisis?,” Parameters 51(1), Spring 2021, dml)

Considering today’s complex, hybrid challenges such as terrorism disease, climate change, cyber threats, Russian information warfare, and expanding Chinese global influence, it is impossible to draw neat distinctions between military and civilian

Civilian control is a relic that prevents effective response to existential threats.

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Michigan (7-week)

Counterplans

2022

This Article supports the view that the law can constrain the President's war powers and argues that some mechanisms of legal constraint work better than others in limiting these powers. In considering Bradley and Morrison's mechanisms of constraint in reconceptualizing the meaning of "hostilities," this Article argues that the second and third of these mechanisms--external sanctions and public legal dialogue--operate most effectively in limiting presidential discretion on war powers. By proposing a definition to provide clearer standards of what constitutes an introduction of U.S. forces into "hostilities," this Article posits that Congress can raise the political costs of the President's precarious legal arguments, as well as more clearly identify potential violations of the WPR to temper executive branch discretion.

By Erica H. Ma 21, J.D., 2020, New York University School of Law; B.A., 2015, University of Pennsylvania, "Article: The War Powers Resolution and the Concept of Hostilities," Northeastern University Law Review, 13, 519, pp. 542-546, May 2021, Lexis, nihara

the law can constrain the President's war powers reconceptualizing the meaning of "hostilities," operate most effectively in limiting presidential discretion on war powers proposing a definition to provide clearer standards of what constitutes an introduction of U.S. forces into "hostilities Congress can raise the political costs of the President's precarious legal arguments, as well as more clearly identify potential violations of the WPR to temper executive branch discretion

Reconceptualizing “hostilities” is key – raises political costs and sets clear threshold for violations of the WPR – executive “norm internalization” does NOT solve – NO textual guidance causes overreach

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Michigan (7-week)

Counterplans

2022

According to a congressional staff member involved in cyber oversight deliberations at the time, the armed services committees were initially concerned about preventing Cyber Command from exceeding its authorities and acting like a "bull in a china shop." 170However, these concerns turned out to be unwarranted. In the first few years of its existence, Cyber Command employed a highly cautious approach to cyber warfare. U.S. military cyber operations remained relatively limited to theaters of active combat, and fears that Cyber Command would assume an aggressive cyber posture without any legal or regulatory constraints did not materialize. 171For several years after Cyber Command's inception, oversight over cyber operations thus remained an "academic issue," the staff member recalled. 172The DOD's incomplete efforts at articulating a cyber strategy, limited proactive operations, and the rapid rise of cyber adversaries explain why Congress both empowered the DOD in cyberspace and simultaneously demanded more reporting.

Oona A. Hathaway et al. 21, Tobias Kuehne, Randi Michel & Nicole Ng, Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of Law, Yale Law School; J.D. (2021), Yale Law School & Ph.D. (2021), Yale University; J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School (2022); J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School (2022), respectively. "Article: Congressional Oversight of Modern Warfare: History, Pathology, and Proposals for Reform." William & Mary Law Review, 63, 137 October, 2021, pp. 174-184, Lexis, nihara

Congress empowered the DOD in cyberspace and simultaneously demanded more reporting

Congress will authorize future cybersecurity operations which solves – BUT, transparency AND oversight are key – otherwise, they’ll limit funding for future cyber operations – turns the case

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Michigan (7-week)

Counterplans

2022

After 18 years of illegal warfare, corruption, and untold numbers of innocent people killed or made into refugees, the U.S. combat mission in Iraq will be declared finished—for the third time. Sort of. This week, President Joe Biden said that the United States is “not going to be, by the end of the year, in a combat mission” in Iraq. The 2,500 U.S. soldiers officially staged there—almost certainly an undercount, as military leaders tend to fudge deployment numbers and reorganize troops under intelligence authorities or noncombat roles so as to disguise the scale of our overseas footprint—will be moving on.

Jacob Silverman 21, Jacob Silverman is a staff writer at The New Republic and the author of Terms of Service: Social Media and the Price of Constant Connection, July 28, 2021, “The Forever Wars Aren’t Ending. They’re Just Being Rebranded.” The New Republic, https://newrepublic.com/article/163088/forever-wars-arent-ending-theyre-just-rebranded, nihara

After 18 years of illegal warfare, corruption people killed or made into refugees, the U.S. combat mission in Iraq will be declared finished—for the third time. Sort of.

Biden does NOT solve – “withdrawals” are a legal evasion for “advise-and-assist” positions that continue involvement AND increase escalation risk through strategic ambiguity in the Middle East AND North Africa

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Michigan (7-week)

Counterplans

2022

As Vladimir Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine enters its second week, the Russian autocrat escalates his threats of nuclear war. Some policy commentators say this means we should look for easy “offramps” that Putin can exploit to save his failing régime. They are badly mistaken. There are no offramps for Putin now, and trying to build them for him will only invite far more dangerous aggression.

Thomas D. Grant 22, served as Senior Advisor for Strategic Planning in the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation at the U.S. Department of State, 2019-2021, “No Respite: Why Putin’s Nuclear Threats Must Not Deter the Defense of the Free World,” Real Clear Defense, 3/3/2022, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2022/03/03/no_respite_why_putins_nuclear_threats_must_not_deter_the_defense_of_the_free_world_819782.html

Some commentators say we should look for easy “offramps” that Putin can exploit They are badly mistaken. There are no offramps and trying to build them will only invite far more dangerous aggression

Russia’s aggressive---they won’t stop at Ukraine. Getting response policy in order in advance is key.

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Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

From its opening moments, the conflict in Ukraine has involved a nuclear dimension. On Feb. 24, Russian President Vladimir Putin ominously warned of “consequences you have never seen” if other countries tried to get involved in Ukraine — an implied nuclear threat. Several days later, Putin announced that Russia’s nuclear forces would be put on a “special combat readiness” status. More recently, Dmitry Medvedev, a senior Russian official, warned that if Finland and Sweden join NATO, “there can be no more talk of any nuclear-free status for the Baltic.”

Erica Longergan & Keren Yarhi-Milo 22, Lonergan is an assistant professor in the Army Cyber Institute at West Point and a research scholar at the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University; Yarhi-Milo is the Arnold A. Saltzman Professor of War and Peace Studies in the political science department and the School of International and Public Affairs, “Cyber Signaling and Nuclear Deterrence: Implications for the Ukraine Crisis,” War on the Rocks, 4/21/22, https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/cyber-signaling-and-nuclear-deterrence-implications-for-the-ukraine-crisis/

From its opening Ukraine involved a nuclear dimension Putin warned of “consequences you have never seen” if other countries tried to get involved an implied nuclear threat

A full-scale NATO response risks nuclear escalation

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Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

The problem is that, more often than not, cyber operations are ambiguous signals. There is evidence that states can use cyber operations under some (narrow) conditions to signal a desire to de-escalate international crises. But these findings do not extend well to nuclear crises where clarity, rather than uncertainty, is important for stability. The use of cyber operations to defuse crises have involved cyber signaling short of war, not during an ongoing conventional conflict involving nuclear powers. And they have not involved cyber operations targeting a state’s nuclear command and control where states, like Russia, have already staked out declaratory policies. Moreover, states are still at a nascent stage in developing shared indices to inform assessments of intent in cyberspace, especially when it comes to cyber operations in nuclear crises.

Erica Longergan & Keren Yarhi-Milo 22, Lonergan is an assistant professor in the Army Cyber Institute at West Point and a research scholar at the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University; Yarhi-Milo is the Arnold A. Saltzman Professor of War and Peace Studies in the political science department and the School of International and Public Affairs, “Cyber Signaling and Nuclear Deterrence: Implications for the Ukraine Crisis,” War on the Rocks, 4/21/22, https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/cyber-signaling-and-nuclear-deterrence-implications-for-the-ukraine-crisis/

more often than not, cyber operations are ambiguous There is evidence that states can use cyber operations under some (narrow) conditions to signal a desire to de-escalate international crises. But these findings do not extend well to nuclear crises where clarity is important for stability. The use of cyber operations to defuse crises have involved cyber signaling short of war, not during an ongoing conflict involving nuclear powers states are still at a nascent stage in developing shared indices to inform assessments of intent in cyberspace, especially when it comes to cyber operations in nuclear crises

It causes global posture shifts that make accidental nuclear use far more likely.

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Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

NATO has achieved some strategic ambiguity with its current cyber policy, which may help to deter high-stakes Russian assaults during the present crisis. However, rather than an all-out Russian cyberattack, a far more plausible scenario is a lower-level attack carried out by the Russian government or a proxy group against one or more allies. In this case, the alliance’s interests — not to mention transatlantic security — would be better served by adopting nationally-tailored responses rather than pulling the Article 5 lever. Additionally, to prevent further escalation and reinforce the implicit firebreak that currently exists between cyber and conventional military operations, NATO allies should also agree to restrict any retaliatory response against Moscow to the cyber realm or non-military instruments of power.

Erica D. Lonergan & Sara B. Moller 22, Lonergan is an assistant professor in the Army Cyber Institute and a research scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University; Moller is a former Eisenhower Fellow at the NATO Defense College and will be joining the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University later this year, “NATO’s Credibility Is on the Line with its Cyber Defense Pledge. That’s a Bad Idea.,” Politico, 4/27/22, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/04/27/nato-credibility-cyber-defense-pledge-russia-ukraine-00027829

NATO has achieved some strategic ambiguity However, rather than an all-out Russian cyberattack far more plausible is a lower-level attack carried out by the Russian government or a proxy group against allies. In this case, the alliance’s interests — not to mention transatlantic security — would be better served by adopting nationally-tailored responses to prevent further escalation and reinforce the implicit firebreak that currently exists between cyber and conventional military operations, NATO allies should also agree to restrict any retaliatory response against Moscow to the cyber realm or non-military instruments of power.

The plan solves by reinforcing the cyber-kinetic firebreak---stops cyberattacks from escalating.

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Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

The United States and Japan have identified the gray zone threat as a major challenge to the international rules-based order. Given the United States’ conventional military superiority and the severe risks associated with regional war, competitors such as Russia and China—who desire to challenge U.S. predominance but remain determined to avoid large-scale conflict if possible—are adopting tactics that undermine U.S. interests but that makes conventional military responses infeasible. By relying largely on non-military capabilities and operating in what has been called a “gray zone,” these competitors confront the United States and its allies with a series of policy and strategy challenges. Thus far, the United States and regional actors have arguably yet to form a coherent policy to address the challenges.

Lyle J. Morris 19, Senior Policy Analyst at RAND, M.A. in international affairs, Columbia University; B.A. in international business administration, Western Washington University, 1/7/19, “Gray Zone Challenges in the East and South China Sea”, http://www.maritimeissues.com/politics/gray-zone-tactics-and-their-challenge-to-maritime-security-in-the-east-and-south-china-sea.html

The U S and Japan identified the gray zone threat as a major challenge to the international rules-based order. Given the U S conventional military superiority and the severe risks associated with regional war, competitors such as Russia and China—who desire to challenge U.S. predominance but remain determined to avoid large-scale conflict if possible are adopting tactics that undermine U.S. interests but that makes conventional military responses infeasible.

Aggressive China causes miscalculated war

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Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

Russia and Turkey are headed towards a Cold War nightmare scenario after fighting between the two major powers in Syria left two Turkish soldiers dead.

Matthew Petti 20, national security reporter at the National Interest, “Will Turkey Drag America Into a ‘World War III Scenario’ With Russia?,” National Interest, 2/20/20, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/will-turkey-drag-america-%E2%80%98world-war-iii-scenario%E2%80%99-russia-125676

Russia and Turkey are headed towards a Cold War nightmare scenario

Escalating Turkey crisis causes WWIII

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Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

A wave of new cyberattacks and an increase in information warfare tactics are helping to create an existential threat to humanity, according to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, who said in their annual report that its Doomsday Clock “is two minutes to midnight.”

Justin Lynch 19, Associate Editor at Fifth Domain, has written for the New Yorker, the Associated Press, Foreign Policy, the Atlantic, 1/24/19, “Why cyberwar is contributing to a potential doomsday,” https://www.fifthdomain.com/thought-leadership/2019/01/25/why-cyberwar-is-contributing-to-a-potential-doomsday/

A wave of new cyberattacks and an increase in information warfare tactics are helping to create an existential threat to humanity, according to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists its Doomsday Clock “is two minutes to midnight

Failure to cooperatively apply international norms to cyber weapons allows proliferating information warfare

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Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

Two recent events have forced the alliance to tailor deterrence to specific actors. The first was Moscow’s aggression toward Ukraine from 2014 onward, along with its military exercises that rehearsed a war with NATO. The second was the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and North Africa: civil wars in Syria and Libya and the emergence of the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, which helped spawn the 2015 migration crisis. Since then, Russia has remained the focus of NATO’s deterrence, but a reflection is under way on how to best deter nonstate and state threats from the Middle East and North Africa.

Łukasz Kulesa 19, Łukasz Kulesa is the deputy head of research at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), “The Future of Deterrence: Effectiveness and Limitations of Conventional and Nuclear Postures,” Carnegie Europe, 11/28/19, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2019/11/28/future-of-deterrence-effectiveness-and-limitations-of-conventional-and-nuclear-postures-pub-80440

recent events have forced the alliance to tailor deterrence The first was Moscow’s aggression toward Ukraine

Internal honesty exerts pressure on allies to fill capability gaps

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Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

What then might lead to cyber-attack causing Article 5 to be invoked? No one knows, as it is situationally dependent. The old way of thinking is that a ‘severe cyber-attack’ has to involve physical destruction – people have to die, and physical damage must be seen in the critical infrastructure. However, as we become ever more dependent on data and ‘non-kinetic assets’, could for example the manipulation of health records lead to Article 5 being invoked? Moreover, is there a difference between banking data and health-care data being manipulated, with one potentially leading to severe economic disruptions and the other in extremis to death.

Jarno Limnéll 16, Professor of Cybersecurity, Aalto University, Finland, Charly Salonius-Pasternak, Senior Research Fellow, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Challenge for NATO – Cyber Article 5, Briefing Paper, Published by the Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies, June 2016, Swedish Defence University, https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1119569/FULLTEXT01.pdf

What might lead to cyber-attack causing Article 5 it is situationally dependent. The old way of thinking is that a ‘severe cyber-attack’ has to involve physical destruction However, as we become ever more dependent on data could for example the manipulation of health records lead to Article 5 is there a difference between banking data and health-care data being manipulated

Establishing internal limits to the collective defense is key to a credible cyber policy for NATO

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Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

Nuclear annihilation still looms over us: the only consolation is that, thanks to arms control efforts between the superpowers, there are about five times fewer weapons than during the Cold War— Russia and the United States each have about seven thousand—and fewer are on ‘hair trigger’ alert. However, there are now nine nuclear powers, and a higher chance than ever before that smaller nuclear arsenals might be used regionally, or even by terrorists. Moreover, we can’t rule out, later in the century, a geopolitical realignment leading to a standoff between new superpowers. A new generation may face its own ‘Cuba’—and one that could be handled less well (or less luckily) than the 1962 crisis was. A near-existential nuclear threat is merely in abeyance.

Martin Rees 18, Astronomer Royal, founded the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, Fellow of Trinity College and Emeritus Professor of Cosmology and Astrophysics at the University of Cambridge, “1. Deep in the Anthropocene,” in On the Future: Prospects for Humanity, 10/16/2018, Princeton University Press, pp 11-60

Nuclear annihilation looms over us there are now nine nuclear powers, and a higher chance than ever before that smaller nuclear arsenals might be used regionally, or even by terrorists we can’t rule out, later in the century, a geopolitical realignment leading to a standoff between new superpowers. A new generation may face its own ‘Cuba’ A near-existential nuclear threat is merely in abeyance.

Causes existential nuclear risks

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Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

Cyberspace is full of adversaries with potential actors ranging from state-sponsored groups to criminal enterprises, to anyone with an Internet connection who wishes to do harm. Cyberattacks on the various elements of the U.S. critical infrastructure occur on a daily basis. For instance, the Industrial Control Systems- Computer Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) reports that U.S. industrial control systems were attacked at least 245 times over a 12-month period (OAS, 2015). "While China, the U.S. and Russia lead the world in cyberattacks, virtually every government engages in such attacks, and nearly every country has its share of computer hackers" (Wagner, 2017). The ability to launch a successful cyber-attack makes every nation- state, into a potential super power (Wagner, 2017). Perhaps the most egregious example comes from the Ukraine. In December 2015, a presumed Russian cyberattacker successfully seized control of the Prykarpattyaoblenergo Control Center (PCC) in the Ivano-Frankivsk region of Western Ukraine (Wagner, 2017). This attack marked the first time that a concerted cyber-attack was successfully launched against a nation's power grid (Wagner, 2017). However Stuxnet, in 2010, might be the first instance of a nation enforcing policy through other means (Howard & Parot, 1976). The perpetrators of the Ukrainian attack were observed conducting similar exploits against the U.S. energy sector (Brasso, 2016). Although there was never any actual disruption, many experts believe that those activities were a probe for future moves on the U.S. infrastructure (Brasso, 2016). One key question is, "Could a catastrophic cyberattack in the United States Infrastructure ever occur? The National Security Agency's former Director, Mike Rodgers, made his own evaluation of the possibility of a successful attack against critical infrastructure when he said; "It's a matter of, when, not if' (Smith, 2014). Power grids are the most frequently mentioned target (Wagner,2016; Brasso, 2016; Smith, 2014) due to the interconnectedness of power grids which opens them up to "cascading failures". As nearby grids take up the slack for a failed grid system, they overload and fail themselves, causing a chain reaction. Rogers says that such attacks are part of "coming trends" in which so-called zero-day vulnerabilities in U.S. cyber systems are exploited (Smith, 2014). The reason why the protection of our national infrastructure is so critically important is that a major exploit, like a successful cyberattack on the electrical grid could leave the U.S. cloaked in darkness, unable to communicate and without any form of twenty-first century transport. It would likely kill many thousands of citizens, perhaps millions either through civil unrest, failure of public systems, or mass starvation (Brasso, 2016; Maynor, 2006). Many experts believe that the cyberwar began in 2003 (Wagner, 2017) when the Northeast (U.S.) blackout occurred. That blackout caused 11 deaths and an estimated $6 billion in economic damages (Wagner, 2017). After the attack, SCADA attacks occurred in the UK, Italy and Malta, among others. According to Dell's 2015 Annual Security Report, cyber-attacks against infrastructure systems doubled in 2014 to more than 160,000. (Wagner, 2017) Infrastructure systems are diverse and coupled with the criticality of the sensors and controllers that comprise a typical infrastructure system, make them tempting targets for attack. Therefore, there have been long-standing concerns about the overall digital infrastructure being vulnerable to cyberwarfare and cyberterrorism attacks (Eisenhauer, 2006, Nat-Geo, 2017). Notwithstanding the disastrous nature of cyberattacks on digital targets, none of the industries in our current national infrastructure have developed coherent plans, or effective strategies, to protect themselves (Brasso, 2016). This has caused an increasing interest in a coherent model for defending the critical infrastructure against cyberattack (Symantec, 2014; E-Y, 2014).

William Arthur Conklin & Anne Kohnke 18. Conklin is at the College of Technology, Houston; Kohnke is at the College of Management, Lawrence Technological University. 03/09/2018. “Cyber Resilience: An Essential New Paradigm for Ensuring National Survival.” Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security: National Defense University Washington DC, USA.

Cyberspace is full of adversaries with potential actors ranging from state-sponsored groups to criminal enterprises, to anyone with an Internet connection Cyberattacks on the various elements of the U.S. critical infrastructure occur on a daily basis. For instance ICS-CERT reports that U.S. industrial control systems were attacked at least 245 times over a 12-month period "While China, the U.S. and Russia lead the world in cyberattacks, virtually every government engages in such attacks, and nearly every country has its share of computer hackers" The ability to launch a successful cyber-attack makes every nation- state, into a potential super power Perhaps the most egregious example comes from the Ukraine The perpetrators of the Ukrainian attack were observed conducting similar exploits against the U.S. energy sector Although there was never any actual disruption, many experts believe that those activities were a probe for future moves on the U.S. infrastructure One key question is, "Could a catastrophic cyberattack in the U S Infrastructure ever occur? It's a matter of, when, not if' Power grids are the most frequently mentioned target due to the interconnectedness of power grids which opens them up to "cascading failures". As nearby grids take up the slack for a failed grid system, they overload and fail themselves, causing a chain reaction such attacks are part of "coming trends" in which so-called zero-day vulnerabilities in U.S. cyber systems are exploited The reason why the protection of our national infrastructure is so critically important is that a major exploit, like a successful cyberattack on the electrical grid could leave the U.S. cloaked in darkness, unable to communicate and without any form of twenty-first century transport. It would kill many millions through civil unrest, failure of public systems, or mass starvation the cyberwar began in 2003 Notwithstanding the disastrous nature of cyberattacks on digital targets, none of the industries in our current national infrastructure have developed coherent plans, or effective strategies, to protect themselves

Especially from cyberattacks---best case kills millions because of failure cascades.

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Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

Jim Woolsey, a former director of central intelligence and noted Oklahoma City conspiracy theorist, and Peter Pry had an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal on Tuesday warning that North Korea might attack United States with a nuclear weapon. But instead of vaporizing Washington, Woolsey and Pry warn that North Korea would use just one bomb to create a massive electromagnetic pulse (EMP) that would fry our iPhones and end "modern civilization."

Jeffrey Lewis 13, Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program for the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, “The EMPire Strikes Back”, Foreign Policy, 5/24/2013, https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/24/the-empire-strikes-back/

Woolsey noted conspiracy theorist, and Pry had an op-ed warning that North Korea would create a massive (EMP) that would end "modern civilization."

No EMP alt cause

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Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

Security experts have argued for some time that the energy sector has become a potential target for cyber attack through the creation of Internet links—both physical and wireless—that interfere with the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems used by electrical and power distribution networks.16 SCADA systems manage the flow of electricity and natural gas, while also being used to control the industrial systems and facilities used by chemical processing plants, water purification and water delivery operations, wastewater management facilities, and a host of manufacturing firms.17 Studies have indicated that critical infrastructures that include SCADA systems may be vulnerable to a cyberterrorist attack because the infrastructure and the computer systems used are highly complex, making it effectively impossible to eliminate all potential weaknesses.18 It is believed by many security professionals that a terrorist’s ability to control, disrupt, or alter the command and monitoring functions performed by SCADA systems could threaten regional or national security.19 Cyberterrorism, when considered generally, may be conducted by either state or non-state actors, but the calculus and implications can be quite different for each category. Of note, the U.S. Department of State lists three designated state sponsors of terrorism in 2015: Iran, Sudan, and Syria.20 State sponsored cyberterrorism would most likely be conducted to achieve the goals as defined by the state’s political leadership and any actions would tend to support long-term national security goals. Even though the cyber domain offers a bit of anonymity, if a cyber attack is traced back to its network source or Internet address, then the physical location of those perpetrating the attack could be determined within the boundaries of the state authorizing the cyber attack. Because states have geographic boundaries and the initiating computer networks potentially have a physical location, there is increased likelihood, when compared to non-state actors, that those responsible for initiating a state-sponsored cyber attack would be identified. In contrast, non-state actors—to include many terrorist organizations—do not necessarily act uniformly or according to the same underlying beliefs, and many of the most aggressive organizations are motivated by an ideology that embraces martyrdom and an apocalyptic vision.21 This ideology may be based on religion or a desire to overthrow a government. Terrorists who are motivated by ideology and intend to conduct cyber attacks against the United States or its interests may not care about the repercussions following an act of cyberterrorism, whether military in scope or not. In such a scenario, some strategists think a terrorist organization’s leadership may prove undeterrable by traditional military means.22 Despite the disparate motivators of terrorists, many terrorist organizations, to include al-Qaida and the self-proclaimed Islamic State, are said by some security experts to function strategically and rationally.23 Because a terrorist organization’s leadership may be inclined to make rational decisions, deterrence may at times be a suitable method of influencing future actions. Consequently, deterrence should be considered a critical element in a successful national strategy to prevent cyberterrorism. The Advantages of Cyberterrorism There are several advantages to using the cyber domain to conduct acts of terrorism. First, cyberterrorism can be far less expensive than traditional terrorist methods.24 Potentially, all that is needed is a personal computer and an Internet connection, instead of needing to buy weapons, like guns or explosives, or acquire transportation.25 Second, cyberterrorism has the potential for being more anonymous than traditional, kinetic methods.26 It can be difficult for security and police agencies to track down the identity of terrorists when they use online “screen names” or are an unidentified “guest user.”27 Third, the number of potential targets is enormous when compared to the number of targets typically used in kinetic actions.The cyberterrorist could target the computer networks of governments, individuals, public utilities, private airlines, SCADA systems, and other critical networks. The sheer number of potential cyber targets is thought to increase the likelihood that an adversary can find a weakness or vulnerability in one of the different networks to exploit. Finally, cyberterrorism can be conducted remotely, a feature that may be especially appealing to some would-be attackers. Exaggerated Threat? Many critics have noted, however, that while the potential threat of cyberterrorism is alarming and despite all the dire predictions of impending attack, no single instance of real cyberterrorism has been recorded.28 To date, there has been no recorded instance of cyberterrorism on U.S. public facilities, transportation systems, nuclear power plants, power grids, or other key components of the national infrastructure. While cyber attacks on critical components of the national infrastructure are not uncommon, such attacks have not been conducted in a manner to cause the kind of damage or severity of effects that would qualify as cyberterrorism.29 The 2007 widespread denial of service cyber attack in Estonia, which brought down the banking system for three weeks, did not cause catastrophic damage, injury, or death.30 Even in the case of the Stuxnet malware, discovered in June 2010 and called “world’s first digital weapon” because of its capability of causing physical destruction to computers and other equipment, did not cause widespread, severe destructive effects.31 This begs the question: Just how real is the cyberterrorism threat? While cyberterrorism may be an attractive option for modern terrorists who value its remote access, anonymity, potential to inflict massive damage, and psychological impact, some critics say that cyber fears have been exaggerated.32 Furthermore, there is disagreement among some cyber experts about whether critical infrastructure computers, to include SCADA systems, offer an effective target for furthering terrorists’ goals.33 Many computer security experts do not believe that it is possible to use the Internet to inflict damage, injury, or death on a large scale.34 Some of these experts note that critical computer systems are resilient to attack through the investments of time, money, and expertise during the design and development of these critical systems. For example, the U.S. Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation are reported to protect their most critical systems by isolating —also called air-gapping—them from the Internet and other internal computer networks.35 Despite the ongoing debate about whether the cyberterrorism threat is exaggerated or if the potential destructive effects can be sufficiently achieved to warrant concern, both the news media and government reporting indicate that some terrorist organizations now use the Internet to communicate, recruit people, raise funds, and coordinate future attacks.36 Even though there is no publically available information that terrorist organizations have directly and successfully attacked Internet servers or major computer networks, reporting does suggest that many terrorist organizations would employ cyber means to achieve their goals if the opportunity presented itself.37 Because there appears to be a persistent desire by some terrorist organizations to use any and all means, including cyber attacks, to achieve their desired goals, it is paramount for policy makers and military planners to take preparatory actions to prevent such acts and mitigate any effects should such an attack occur. These preparatory actions include deterrence efforts.

John J. Klein 18. Senior Fellow at Falcon Research in Northern Virginia. Spring/2018. “Deterring and Dissuading Cyberterrorism.” Air & Space Power Journal: Afrique et Francophonie, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 21–34.

Security experts argued the energy sector has become a target for cyber attack through the creation of Internet links—both physical and wireless—that interfere with SCADA systems SCADA systems manage the flow of electricity and gas, while also being used to control industrial systems and facilities used by chemical processing plants, water purification and water delivery operations, wastewater management facilities, and a host of manufacturing firms Studies have indicated that critical infrastructures that include SCADA systems may be vulnerable to a cyberterrorist attack because the infrastructure and the computer systems used are highly complex, making it impossible to eliminate all weaknesses a terrorist’s ability to control, disrupt, or alter the command and monitoring functions performed by SCADA systems could threaten security cyberterrorism can be far less expensive than traditional methods all that is needed is a personal computer and an Internet connection, instead of needing to buy weapons, like guns or explosives, or acquire transportation. cyberterrorism has the potential for being more anonymous the number of potential targets is enormous The cyberterrorist could target the computer networks of governments, individuals, public utilities, private airlines, SCADA systems, and other critical networks. The sheer number is thought to increase the likelihood that an adversary can find a weakness or vulnerability in one of the different networks to exploit. Finally, cyberterrorism can be conducted remotely Many have noted that while the threat is alarming and despite dire predictions no single instance has been recorded To date This begs the question: Just how real is the cyberterrorism threat? some critics say that cyber fears have been exaggerated Despite the ongoing debate both news media and government reporting indicate that some terrorist organizations now use the Internet to communicate, recruit and coordinate attacks Even though there is no publically available information that terrorist organizations have directly and successfully attacked Internet servers reporting does suggest that many terrorist organizations employ cyber means Because there appears to be a persistent desire to use any and all means, including cyber attacks, to achieve their desired goals, it is paramount for policy makers and planners to take preparatory actions to prevent such acts and mitigate any effects should such an attack occur

Vulnerability AND motive are real---but even if not, threat magnitude justifies prevention.

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Northwestern (NHSI)

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2022

4. Real-world attacks Among others, the STUXNET worm infection [17] perfectly represents the frailty of the regulatory systems devoted to control critical infrastructures. First isolated in mid-June 2010, STUXNET was a computer virus specifically designed for attacking Windows based industrial computers and taking control of Programmable Logic Controller (PLCs), influencing the behaviour of remote actuators and leading to instability phenomena or even worse. The paradox is that critical infrastructures massively rely on newest interconnected (and vulnerable) Information and Communication Technology (ICT) technologies, while the control equipment is typically old, legacy software/hardware. Such a combination of factors may lead to very dangerous situations, exposing the systems to a wide variety of attacks. The lesson the CIIP (Critical Information Infrastructure Protection) community has learned from the spread of the STUXNET worm is that, in order to effectively react to a specific low level menace, there is the need to consider both the global and local perspectives. In fact, besides obtaining a wider perspective on the state of the System of Systems, there is the need to increase the intelligence of equipments and devices that are used to influence the behaviour of the system, such as RTUs, valves, etc. Moreover, as emphasised by several episodes [18], another effective way to paralyse a SCADA system via cyber attack is to saturate the bandwidth of the carrier used for the communication (this was, for example, the way in which the SLAMMER worm operated in 2003 to affect the SCADA of two United States (US) utilities and a nuclear power plant). Indeed, as emphasised also by the ANSI/ISA.99 (American National Standards Institute/International Society of Automation), availability is the most crucial attribute of information security. The lack of timely information to/from the field may cause dramatic consequences because the field is unable to receive the adequate command, hence even trivial episodes may provoke dramatic impact, as shown by the US black-out. In an evaluation of the Mariposa botnet infection in an ICS organisation, the US Department of Homeland Security [19] explained that they found that the infection occurred when an employee used a USB drive to download presentation materials to a corporate laptop. When the user connected the laptop to the corporate network upon returning to work, the virus spread to over 100 hosts. The security of SCADA communications is becoming more complicated because the decision has been taken to link the SCADA networks with IT networks to allow better and faster communications. But these new features have increased the threats and risks on SCADA communications. There are presently no convinced solutions to enforce the security of SCADA communications in that perspective. The idea to add intelligence to the field is not new; electro-valves for gas pipelines are available on the market that, in the case they receive a rapid sequence of open-close commands, do not perform them in order to avoid the consequence of the mechanical shock. A number of EU (European Union) projects such as the FP6 SAFEGUARD and FP7 CRUTIAL (CRitical UTility InfrastructurAL Resilience) have explored the technical feasibility to improve cyber security of SCADA system by improving the smartness of the field devices. 5. Discussion Further complication arises because it is known that a large percentage of attacks are induced by inside attackers. Thus perimeter defense alone cannot defend the system. In such cases, the question that one is confronted with is whether there is enough indication of an ongoing attack in the dynamics of the system itself [20]. Despite this range of activities, it has been proven that half of these have human error at their core [21]. Therefore, there should be increased empirical and theoretical research in to human aspects of cyber security based on the volumes of human error related incidents in order to establish ways in which mainstream cyber security practice can benefit. Security measures tend to neglect that persistent attackers will eventually gain access whatever that perimeter protection may be. One main objective from modern security solutions would be to develop novel methods that could detect and disturb the activities of the attackers once they have gained access inside the system. Special care should be given to the implementation of new strategies that can detect, prevent and mitigate data exfiltration attacks, since intrusion detection/prevention strategies are now deemed to be inadequate for data protection [22]. In order to strengthen the security of SCADA systems, one solution is to deliver defence in depth [23] by layering security controls so as to reduce the risk to the assets being protected. By applying multiple controls on top of the information asset (in this case the SCADA and ICS configuration and management data) the architect introduces further barriers, which a threat actor has to overcome. For the more competent threat actors this will slow them down. Within the time it takes to get through some of the controls, the protective monitoring service should have alerted someone to the attack, which will allow further action to be taken (such as dropping the threat actors connection). Defence in depth ensures there is no single point of failure from threats to assets by providing differing barriers (controls) in a layered approach. 6. Conclusions The synergy between the ICS and the IoT has emerged largely bringing new security challenges. We have identified key security issues for ICS and current solutions. Future work should primarily focus on the balance between holistic approaches that can deal with a wide variety of attacks, real time identification of intruders with high accuracy and solutions that impose low overhead to the communication and performance of SCADA/ICS systems.

Maglaras et al. 18. School of Computer Science and Informatics, De Montfort University. 03/01/2018. “Cyber Security of Critical Infrastructures.” ICT Express, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 42–45.

STUXNET perfectly represents the frailty of the regulatory systems devoted to control critical infrastructures rely on newest interconnected ICT technologies while the control equipment is typically old, legacy software/hardware Such a combination of factors may lead to very dangerous situations, exposing the systems to a wide variety of attacks. The lesson the CIIP community has learned from the spread of the STUXNET worm is that, in order to effectively react to a specific low level menace, there is the need to consider both the global and local perspectives another effective way to paralyse a SCADA system via cyber attack is to saturate the bandwidth of the carrier used for the communication (this was, for example, the way in which the SLAMMER worm operated in 2003 to affect the SCADA of two United States (US) utilities and a nuclear power plant). Indeed, as emphasised also by the ANSI/ISA availability is the most crucial attribute of information security. The lack of timely information may cause dramatic consequences because the field is unable to receive the adequate command, hence even trivial episodes may provoke dramatic impact, as shown by the US black-out. The security of SCADA is becoming more complicated because the decision has been taken to link the SCADA networks with IT networks to allow better and faster communications. But these new features have increased the threats and risks on SCADA communications Further complication arises because it is known that a large percentage of attacks are induced by inside attackers. Thus perimeter defense alone cannot defend the system The synergy between the ICS and the IoT has emerged largely bringing new security challenges

Multiple weak points now

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Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

Some industry analysts predict enormous growth of microgrids in the next five years, but technical, economic, and regulatory barriers remain. Technical barriers. Most distributed energy resources as currently installed are incapable of providing backup power during a grid outage, because they weren’t designed with resiliency in mind. For a distributed energy resource to provide electricity during a grid outage, it must be designed to function as a standalone system that can isolate itself from the grid and continue power production in island mode. For safety reasons, current operating standards require that grid-connected resources automatically disconnect from the grid during a power outage. Most of these systems are currently designed to cease power production once they disconnect from the grid, leaving customers in the dark.61 Thus, for example, the majority of New Jersey's distributed energy resource systems, including solar, combined heat and power, fuel cells, and other renewables, did not operate during or after Superstorm Sandy when the distribution grid went down.62 In order to provide resilience and security of supply benefits to consumers, these systems need to be designed – and in some cases reconfigured – so that they can operate in island mode when they are disconnected from the grid. Economic barriers. Microgrids are cost-prohibitive for many customers, particularly in the residential sector. Federally funded research63 and tax incentives64 have been essential in making distributed solar PV technology available to an increasing number of Americans. However, there is real concern that these federal programs may be reduced or even eliminated as part of President Trump's announced intention to cut spending on initiatives linked to climate change. In the current political environment, it may become increasingly important to focus the debate on alternative justifications for decentralized power resources, such as resilience and security of supply. Regulatory barriers. Regulatory barriers complicate and even prohibit the deployment of microgrids in some areas. Microgrids typically require the use of existing power distribution lines or the construction of new power lines within a defined zone, which may infringe on traditional utility franchise rights. Microgrid operation may involve the exchange of power between parties or the distribution of power across streets or public areas, which could make operators subject to comprehensive public utility regulation. The lack of clarity regarding interconnection rules and who pays for necessary equipment and network upgrades is another major barrier. New financing models are also needed to overcome the barrier of high upfront costs and make microgrids more accessible to a broader number of customers.65

Julia E. Sullivan & Dmitriy Kamensky 17. Sullivan is a U.S. attorney based in Annapolis, Maryland, who advises energy companies, investors, and public institutions in connection with market formation, risk management, mergers and acquisitions, and regulatory compliance, Visiting Professor at Berdyansk State Pedagogical University; Kamensky is a Professor of Law at Berdyansk State Pedagogical University. 04/2017. “How Cyber-Attacks in Ukraine Show the Vulnerability of the U.S. Power Grid.” The Electricity Journal, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 30–35.

industry analysts predict enormous growth of microgrids but technical, economic, and regulatory barriers remain. Most distributed energy resources as currently installed are incapable of providing backup power during outage because they weren’t designed with resiliency in mind. For a distributed energy resource to provide electricity during a grid outage, it must be designed to function as a standalone system For safety reasons, current operating standards require that grid-connected resources automatically disconnect Most are currently designed to cease production leaving customers in the dark Economic barriers Microgrids are cost-prohibitive for many customers, particularly in the residential sector. Federally funded incentives have been essential However these may be reduced or even eliminated as part of Trump's announced intention to cut spending on initiatives linked to climate change Regulatory barriers complicate and even prohibit the deployment of microgrids in some areas operation may involve the exchange of power between parties or the distribution of power across streets or public areas, which could make operators subject to comprehensive public utility regulation lack of clarity regarding interconnection rules and who pays is another major barrier.

Not coming AND don’t solve

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Northwestern (NHSI)

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2022

Reliable electricity supply requires a constant, second-by-second simultaneous balancing of power generation supply to meet demand on the utility grid. 3 The United States electric grid will collapse within approximately four seconds if sufficient generation of power is not constantly supplied to meet fluctuating consumer demand. 4 Either too [*55] much or too little power causes system instability, 5 and a loss of power would disrupt communication, transportation, heating and water supplies, hospitals, and emergency rooms. 6 According to Kirchoff's Law, 7 power moves almost at the speed of light on an energized grid. 8 If power supply does not constantly balance instantaneous demand, the grid can blackout large areas, 9 as happened to the Northeast United States population on August 14, 2003, 10 and subsequently with rolling blackouts in Texas. 11 The 2003 blackout affected fifty million people and caused a loss of six billion dollars. 12 During this blackout, production was lost at approximately half of the Chrysler plants, a Ford plant was lost for a week of repairs, oil refineries shut down, one chain of 237 drugstores in New York City was forced to close, major urban airports closed causing more than a thousand flights to be cancelled, and frozen and perishable foods were lost. 13

Steven Ferrey 14. Professor of Law at Suffolk University Law School and served as a Visiting Professor of Law at Harvard Law School in 2003. 2014. “Broken at Both Ends: The Need to Reconnect Energy and Environment.” 65 Syracuse L. Rev. 53. Lexis.

Reliable electricity supply requires a constant, second-by-second simultaneous balancing of power generation supply to meet demand The United States electric grid will collapse within approximately four seconds if sufficient generation of power is not constantly supplied to meet fluctuating consumer demand too much or too little power causes system instability 5 and would disrupt communication transportation heating and water supplies hospitals and emergency rooms According to Kirchoff's Law power moves almost at the speed of light on an energized grid. 8 If power supply does not constantly balance instantaneous demand, the grid can blackout large areas

Supply/demand mismatches collapse the grid in seconds.

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Northwestern (NHSI)

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2022

Now, with over 560 major multilateral instruments deposited with the United Nations alone, citizens around the world benefit every day from rules their governments have adopted conjointly with each other. These agreements, as the American Society of International Law has documented, enable worldwide telecommunications and postal networks; universal recognition of time standards; improved weather forecasting; stronger safety standards for automobiles, airplanes, and ships; sharing of information about the origin of our food and other products; protection of software, literary, and artistic works; and preservation of cultural heritage sites and endangered species, to name a few.[1] With the adoption of international human rights treaties after World War II, these rules expanded to protect people from torture and other forms of inhumane treatment; promote equal protection for women and children, including for adopted children and those caught in custody disputes; and facilitate pursuit of war criminals, terrorists, human smugglers, and drug traffickers. Agreements to protect the public and the environment from chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other harmful pollutants are among some of the more effective binding instruments of modern international law.¶ Despite these and many other obvious benefits from international law, the political culture of the United States has turned markedly sour when it comes to ratifying treaties that demonstrably serve its national interests. Two recent examples immediately come to mind: The U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which is modeled on the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and would protect disabled Americans when traveling overseas, was denied Senate ratification in 2012 based on spurious charges it would impinge on home schooling.[2] Similarly, the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, endorsed by senior U.S. military, defense, business, and environmental leaders as a key instrument for protecting U.S. interests in safe passage for its vessels and in its 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone, was blocked by 34 Republican senators in 2012 on grounds it would, inter alia, bind the United States to third party arbitration.[3] Meanwhile, China and others are shaping the rules and practices of the treaty body that regulates exploitation of seabed resources without Washington having a seat at the table. ¶ Such pro-sovereignty sentiments are now the dominant view in the White House and most of the Republican-controlled Congress. That is likely to spell further trouble for preserving U.S. leadership of an international order which has overwhelmingly served U.S. interests in a coherent system of rules and customs that has given us 70 years free of direct major power conflict and impressive economic prosperity.¶ The Justice Stephen Breyer Lecture series on international law, formally established in 2014 in partnership with the Netherlands Foreign Ministry, the mayor of The Hague, and The Hague Institute for Global Justice, was created to help policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic think about new challenges to international law and order. It would be fair to say that when our cooperation on this initiative began in 2013, we did not imagine that the pendulum swing against the underpinnings of the international order would advance as far and as fast as it has in the last year. Core beliefs and lessons learned from the 20th century are up for grabs around the world, including on both sides of the Atlantic, at least judging from current political discourse favoring nationalism over “globalism.” A trans-Atlantic approach, therefore, is particularly timely and relevant.¶ A trans-Atlantic perspective is also valuable as an intellectual endeavor because Europeans and Americans come from different historical perspectives, a point James Madison made in 1792: “The [U.S.] Constitution is a charter of power granted by liberty,” not, as in Europe, “a charter of liberty…granted by power.”[4] The Declaration of Independence’s reference to “a decent respect to the opinions of mankind” was an early indication, however, that America’s founding fathers felt an obligation to consider the views of others, even its former colonial masters, in matters of law and justice. Justice Breyer, “the great transnationalist judge of our age,” has taken up that charge in the modern era, following in the tradition of Chief Justices John Marshall and John Jay.[5]¶ Since then, trans-Atlantic jurisprudence has largely converged around some fundamental principles based on national constitutions, the United Nations Charter, and institutions founded after World War II—“shared public norms with similar meanings in every national system of the world,” as Professor Harold Koh puts it. But meaningful differences remain and often revolve around the limits to which citizens and their representatives are prepared to cede traditional sovereignty to an international body. The European Union, for example, is wrestling mightily with both the benefits and costs of “pooled sovereignty.” While the United States may be a laggard when it comes to adopting certain treaties, it is not immune from the judicial and legislative decisions of other countries, as Justice Breyer himself explained so well in his inaugural lecture at Brookings. In a quickly changing world, he said, “we better learn what is going on elsewhere because that affects directly what we do at the Supreme Court. In a word, understanding and referring to what is happening abroad is often the best way to preserve our American values,”[6] particularly our faith in the rule of law for ourselves and in our relations with others.¶ Justice Breyer’s analysis of five areas in which the development of law in other parts of the world has a direct effect on U.S. judicial decisionmaking includes matters highly relevant to public debates today, from protecting civil liberties from executive overreach to determining the application of World Trade Organization rules and decisions to U.S. domestic law. Under a Trump White House and Republican-controlled Congress clamoring to put America first, these issues are bound to be fiercely contested in the months ahead.

Ted Piccone 17, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Security and Strategy - Foreign Policy, 4/12/17, “Why international law serves U.S. national interests”, https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-international-law-serves-u-s-national-interests/

with over 560 major multilateral instruments deposited with the U N alone, citizens around the world benefit every day from rules their governments have adopted conjointly with each other agreements International Law enable worldwide telecommunications and postal networks; universal recognition of time standards improved weather forecasting stronger safety standards for automobiles, airplanes, and ships; sharing of information about the origin of our food and other products protection of software, literary, and artistic works; and preservation of cultural heritage sites and endangered species Agreements to protect the public and the environment from chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other harmful pollutants are among some of the more effective binding instruments of modern international law.¶

Adapting international law to new forms of warfare solves Bio-d and pollution

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Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

As the sixth mass extinction event accelerates around the world, engulfing thousands of animal and plant species, humans risk facing a similar fate unless drastic interventions are made, according to Cristiana Pașca Palmer, the United Nations biodiversity chief, who recently spoke with the Guardian.

Joe McCarthy 18, a Staff Writer at Global Citizen, Nov 8 2018, "Humans Could Face Extinction if We Don't Protect Biodiversity: UN", Global Citizen, https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/biodiversity-loss-human-extinction/

As the sixth mass extinction event accelerates around the world, engulfing thousands of animal and plant species, humans risk facing a similar fate unless drastic interventions are made

Biod loss causes human extinction

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Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

Ironically, there has been a lot of work done to help nations work through the law regarding cyber incidents. For example, the NATO-sponsored Tallinn 2.0 Manual provides superb guidance as to the current state of the law vis-à-vis cyber operatiions (albeit it is not an official NATO document.) Chapter XVI of the DoD Law of War Manual also provides – at least for DoD – some broad guidance as to the law applicable to cyber operations.

Charlie Dunlap 17, former deputy judge advocate general of the United States Air Force, joined the Duke Law faculty in July 2010 where he is a professor of the practice of law and Executive Director of the Center on Law, Ethics and National Security, “Are cyber norms as to what constitutes an “act of war” developing as we would want?,” Lawfire, 9/15/17, https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/2017/09/15/are-cyber-norms-as-to-what-constitutes-an-act-of-war-developing-as-we-would-want/

Ironically there has been a lot of work done to help nations work through the law regarding cyber incidents. For example, the NATO-sponsored Tallinn 2.0 Manual provides guidance as to the current state of the law vis-à-vis cyber operatiions

Squo doesn’t solve norms---AFF key

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Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

Russia and China have been working hard to end the unipolar order of the US, which has dominated global politics since the end of the Cold War and the implosion of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in 1991. It has to be acknowledged that a multi-polar world order, with China and Russia competing with the US for global influence and power, is the reality of today’s global world affairs. Australia has to recognise this reality in order to not fall into the trap of blindly following the US’s present attempts to counter and/or reverse the threats to its waning unipolar status as sole superpower without too much concern regarding its allies.

Sascha Dominik (Dov) Bachmann et al 19, Professor, Canberra Law School, “Competition short of war – how Russia’s hybrid and grey-zone warfare are a blueprint for China’s global power ambitions ,” Australian Journal of Defence and Strategic Studies Vol. 1 No. 1, November 2019, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3483981

Russia and China have been working hard to end the unipolar order of the US, which has dominated global politics

NATO’s failure to respond to Russia’s hybrid warfare legitimizes China

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Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

The Erdoğan government has been taking Turkey from one crisis to another, opening up new military and diplomatic fronts. The government’s decision to send troops to support the Government of National Accord in Libya, and its prior acceptance that these forces can be engaged in actual conflicts, is the most risky military adventure the AKP has ever taken. It seems that both the government and the pro-AKP circles do not seem to be aware of the risks they have taken in such an overseas military engagement which would be conducted in a hostile environment, against a multitude of adversaries and two thousand km away from the mainland.

İlhan Uzgel 20, professor in the department of international relations at Ankara University, “The rise of Turkey’s gunboat diplomacy,” Duvar English, 1/6/20, https://www.duvarenglish.com/columns/2020/01/06/the-rise-of-turkeys-gunboat-diplomacy/

The Erdoğan government has been taking Turkey from one crisis to another opening up new military and diplomatic fronts The government’s decision to send troops to support the Government of National Accord in Libya and prior acceptance that these forces can be engaged in actual conflicts, is the most risky military adventure the AKP has ever taken. government and the pro-AKP circles do not seem to be aware of the risks they have taken

Turkey’s actions are symptomatic of a turn to gunboat diplomacy

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Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

The infrastructure for human civilization is undeniably tangible (that is, physical, chemical, and biological), but it is increasingly virtual as well, and the virtual aspects of that infrastructure – the information ecosystem (or, equivalently, environment) – in many ways has become central and often critical to the way people now live all over the world.

Herbert Lin 19, senior research scholar for cyber policy and security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University, “The Existential Threat from Cyber-Enabled Information Warfare,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 75, no. 4, Routledge, 07/04/2019, pp. 187–196

The infrastructure for human civilization is increasingly virtual and the information ecosystem has become central and critical to the way people live

The threats it causes are systemic and can’t be addressed without targeting the pollution of the information space

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Northwestern (NHSI)

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2022

HARRIS: So, if you think about the topics that we've covered, whether you've seen the social dilemma or you followed our interviews previously on topics like attention span shortening or addiction or information overwhelm and distraction, the fall of trust in society, more polarization, breakdown of truth, our inability to solve problems like climate change, well, this is really about an interconnected set of problems and the kind of core generator functions that are leading to all of these things to happen at once. So, I really encourage you to listen to this all the way through, and I think that we're going to get into some very deep and important knowledge that will hopefully be orienting for all of us.

Tristan Harris & Daniel Schmachtenberger 21, Harris is the president and co-founder of the Center for Humane Technology; Schmachtenberger is a founding member of the Consilience Project, studies catastrophic and existential risk, “A Problem Well-Stated Is Half-Solved,” Center for Humane Technology, Your Undivided Attention, 6/25/21, https://www.humanetech.com/podcast/36-unedited-a-problem-well-stated-is-half-solved

attention span shortening or addiction or information overwhelm and distraction, the fall of trust in society, more polarization, breakdown of truth, our inability to solve problems is really about an interconnected set of problems and the core generator functions leading to all of these things at once

Outweighs on magnitude. Polarization is a generator function for all existential risks. It’ll subvert any symptom-focused approach.

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Northwestern (NHSI)

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2022

It is important to appreciate that the bar for success in circumventing Article 5 NAT and Article 42(7) TEU is not necessarily high. The primary goal of a hybrid adversary is not to convince an expert audience that its activities do not amount to an armed attack or an act of armed aggression. Rather, its goal is to prevent the targeted state and its allies from making a compelling case that invoking Article 5 or Article 42(7) would be a lawful, legitimate, and prudent response to the threats they are facing. A plausible narrative that casts doubt on these points among domestic and international audiences might suffice to achieve that objective.278 States craft legal storylines to support their national security objectives on a regular basis.279 Although the idea that such verbal strategies are as important as military strategies may push the point too far,280 the significance of legal narratives and counter-narratives for opening up certain courses of action and for foreclosing others must not be underestimated. If anything, the progressive legalization of the conduct of foreign affairs and the vastly increased public interest in the legality of military action,281 amplified by social media,282 has boosted the impact of legal justifications. Assessing the potential vulnerabilities of the Transatlantic and European collective security arrangements from a narrow black letter perspective therefore risks misjudging their susceptibility to hostile strategic communication.

Aurel Sari 19, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Exeter; Director, Exeter Centre for International Law; Fellow, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe; Fellow, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, “The Mutual Assistance Clauses of the North Atlantic and EU Treaties: The Challenge of Hybrid Threats,” Harvard National Security Journal, Volume 10, https://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/2019/06/Mutual-Assistance-Clauses-of-the-North-Atlantic-and-EU-Treaties.pdf

It is important to appreciate that the bar for success in circumventing Article 5 NAT is not necessarily high The primary goal of a hybrid adversary is not to convince an expert audience that its activities do not amount to an armed attack Rather its goal is to prevent the targeted state and allies from making a compelling case that invoking Article 5 would be a lawful legitimate and prudent response to the threats they are facing. A plausible narrative that casts doubt on these points among domestic and international audiences might suffice to achieve that objective the significance of legal narratives and counter-narratives for opening up certain courses of action and for foreclosing others must not be underestimated Assessing the potential vulnerabilities of the Transatlantic and European collective security arrangements from a narrow black letter perspective therefore risks misjudging their susceptibility to hostile strategic communication

Article V gets circumvented now

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Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

This article was written with the intention of making ‘hybrid threats’ as a 21st -century security threat known to the wider audience despite NATO’s decision not to adopt a comprehensive approach. This failure does not reduce the dangers of this category of global risks. Ongoing debate and academic engagement with the topic and rationale of ‘hybrid threats’, such as the Swedish experiment in 2012, will hopefully lead to further awareness and eventually preparedness. This submission concludes with a sobering prediction: it is the opinion of the authors that the present legal concepts on the use of military force, the jus ad bellum, have become relatively anachronistic and even partially outdated, something that will not suffice when dealing with the security threats and challenges of the 21st century. The authors predict that the emergence of hybrid threats and their recognition as potential threats to peace and security as such, the proliferation of low-threshold regional conflicts (such as the 2011 Libyan conflict, Syria and now Iraq), as well as continuing asymmetric warfare scenarios (such as Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan) will have a significant influence on the prevailing culture and prism of traditional military activity, which is still influenced by concepts from the previous century. With such a change of military doctrines, a change of legal paradigms will be inevitable: new adaptive means and methods of ‘flexible responsiveness’ through escalating levels of confrontation and deterrence will question the existing legal concept of the prohibition of the use of force with its limited exceptions, as envisaged under Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter and Article 5 of the NATO Treaty.53 Future direct intervention in failed state scenarios will require flexibility in terms of choice of military assets and objectives. Future responses to multi-modal threats will always include the kinetic force option, directed against – most likely – NSAs. They will also affect our present concepts of the illegality of the use of force in international relations, as enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter with limited exceptions available under Article 51 of the UN Charter, namely individual and collective self-defence (cf. Article 5 of the NATO Treaty) as well as UN authorisation. Already today, the continuing use of UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones) for ‘targeted killing’ operations effectively emphasises the legal challenges ahead: the ongoing ‘kill’ operations in the so-called ‘tribal’ areas of Waziristan/Pakistan are kinetic military operations, which demonstrate how quickly the critical threshold of an armed conflict can be reached and even surpassed. These operations clearly fall within the scope of the definition of ‘armed conflict’ by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the appeal decision in The Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic54 and therefore giving rise to the applicability of the norms of the so-called ‘Law of Armed Conflict’, the body of international humanitarian law governing conduct in war. The ‘lawfulness’ of such operations does, however, require the existence of either a mandate in terms of Article 51 of the UN Charter (in the form of a United Nations Security Council [UNSC] Resolution authorising the use of force in an enforcement and peace enforcement operation context) or the existence of an illegal armed attack in order to exercise a right to national or state self-defence in terms of Article 51 of the UN Charter. Whether such military operations are within the scope of these categories remains open to discussion.

Sascha-Dominik Bachmann and Håkan Gunneriusson 15, Bachmann is Associate Professor in International Law at Bournemouth University, UK, Gunneriusson is Associate Professor in War Studies at Swedish Defence University, “HYBRID WARS: THE 21st-CENTURY’S NEW THREATS TO GLOBAL PEACE AND SECURITY,” Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 43, No. 1, 2015, pp. 77 – 98, https://ung.edu/institute-leadership-strategic-studies/_uploads/files/bachmann-gunneriusson-hybrid-wars-16-sep-2016-scientia-militaria.pdf?t=1569110400096

This article was written with the intention of making ‘hybrid threats’ known to the wider audience despite NATO’s decision not to adopt a comprehensive approach This failure does not reduce the dangers of this category of global risks Ongoing debate will hopefully lead to further awareness and eventually preparedness present legal concepts on the use of military force, the jus ad bellum, have become outdated something that will not suffice when dealing with the security threats and challenges of the 21st century. the emergence of hybrid threats and their recognition as potential threats to peace and security as such, the proliferation of low-threshold regional conflicts as well as continuing asymmetric warfare scenarios will have a significant influence on the prevailing culture and prism of traditional military activity, With such a change of military doctrines, a change of legal paradigms will be inevitable new adaptive means and methods of ‘flexible responsiveness’ through escalating levels of confrontation and deterrence will question the existing legal concept of the prohibition of the use of force with its limited exceptions, as envisaged under Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter and Article 5 of the NATO Treaty

Hybrid war forces inevitable changes to ilaw and norms---BUT ad-hoc modifications are worse than the AFF’s approach

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Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

NATO has been primarily concerned with building up cybersecurity in member states. The next step, led by the United States, is to go on the offensive and accurately identify the sources of these cyber aggressions. On several occasions, Russia has been able to hide behind the idea that the cyber-attackers are not state-affiliated and fiend responsibility of aggressions from within the Federation:

Dominick Namias & Jacob Chase 22, Helms School of Government, Liberty University, “U.S. Warfare Within the Fifth Domain: Deterring Russian Cyber Aggression,” https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1267&context=hsgconference

NATO has been primarily concerned with building up cybersecurity in member states Russia has been able to hide behind the idea that the cyber-attackers are not state-affiliated

Zero link---the AFF only reduces NATO’s treaty-mandated cyber responses---voluntary coordination avoids NATO’s institutional deficits and solves

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Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

The abovementioned incidents have led cyber-conflict scholars to point to several technical and practical difficulties in the operational integration of cyber effects.29 In the interviews and background conversations that contributed to this study, three of these difficulties were continuously reiterated when discussing successful integration of cyber effects into NATO operational planning: the temporal dimension of developing exploits; the assessment of battle damage; and the problem of confliction.

Jeppe T. Jacobsen 21, Ph.D. candidate at the Danish Institute for International Studies and the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark, worked as cyber coordinator at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark where he coordinated Denmark’s cyber diplomacy, “Cyber Offense in NATO: Challenges and Opportunities,” International Affairs, vol. 97, no. 3, 05/01/2021, pp. 703–720

incidents have led cyber scholars to point to technical and practical difficulties in operational integration of cyber effects In interviews and background conversations three difficulties were continuously reiterated the temporal dimension the assessment of damage; and the problem of confliction

OCOs fail as a deterrence tool---it is too hard and slow to develop tools with kinetic capability.

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Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

Deterrence aims to discourage an adversary from taking offensive action. Traditionally, its two pillars have been deterrence-by-denial and deterrence-by-punishment. The first refers to measures that reduce or eliminate the benefits of a certain aggressive move, while the second seeks to impose additional costs for performing it. NATO’s traditional mandate of defending its own systems fits comfortably into the deterrence-by-denial part of this framework. Deterrence-by-punishment, however, is far more controversial because of the problem of attribution—which refers to the difficulty of identifying the perpetrators of operations. Finally, both concepts also rely on intent, capability and credibility. As it stands, a palpable lack of trust among member states hinders collective action on both fronts. Progress in the denial category will be easier and more visible, but countermeasures should be considered as well.

Patrik Maldre 16, Adjunct Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), where he leads the CEPA Cyber Defense Initiative, “Moving Toward NATO Deterrence for the Cyber Domain,’ Center for European Policy Analysis, Cyber Intelligence Brief No. 1, May 2016, https://cepa.ecms.pl/files/?id_plik=2446

Deterrence aims to discourage an adversary from taking offensive action its two pillars have been deterrence-by-denial and deterrence-by-punishment Deterrence-by-punishment is controversial because of the problem of attribution both concepts rely on intent capability and credibility a palpable lack of trust among member states hinders collective action on both fronts.

Mistrust and uncertainty means deterrence fails now---AFF enables OCO effectiveness

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Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Article 5 does not provide the agility for forward deployed forces to effectively respond to challenges below the threshold of war. These challenges are also known as Grey Zone activities. This paper is a summation of a chapter the author wrote for publication at the NATO Staff College in Rome, regarding NATO in the Grey Zone, which was edited Dr Howard Coombes, Royal Military College of Canada.

Steve MacBeth 20, retired officer from the Canadian Forces and former Battle Group Commander of the NATO enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group in Latvia, 11/25/20, Targeting North Atlantic Treaty Organization Article 5: Assessing Enhanced Forward Presence as a Below War Threshold Response, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2020/11/25/targeting_north_atlantic_treaty_orga[…]d_presence_as_a_below_war_threshold_response_651003.html

NATO Article 5 does not provide the agility for forces to effectively respond to Grey Zone activities

NATO is unable to respond to Russian grey zone threats – decision making time is too slow

Aff - Cyber Article 5 - Northwestern 2022.html5

Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

Let us check the reality first. The cyber deterrence strategies currently used rely on defense and punishment. They are not very effective as they fail to scare adversaries away in cyber attacks. For example, Morgan (2017) estimates that global ransomware damage costs is up from $324 million in 2015 to $5 billion in 2017, "a 15X increase in two years, and expected to worsen". Larson (2017) lists the major cyber hacks of 2017 such as Equifax data breach with the loss of the personal data of 145 million people, leaked government tools, WannaCry that got spanned in more than 150 countries and took down many businesses, NotPetya virus that targeted Ukrainian businesses with compromised tax software, Bad Rabbit ransomware campaign that compromised news and media websites, almost 200 million voter records exposed, and hacks that targeted school districts. In addition to some of the hacks mentioned above, Mittal (2017) includes the following into the list: Cloudbleed security bug that leaked sensitive data of affected users such as passwords and authentication tokens, and HBO hack with 1.5 terabytes of information stolen including scripts and episodes of popular TV show Game o f Thrones. There are other reasons for the unsuccessful implementation of deterrence in the cyber domain. They cover various aspects such as legal, psychological, strategic, financial, and operational aspects. First, legally, attribution is slow as it needs time in acquiring, examining, and analyzing evidence in an investigative process. To make things even more complicated, attackers have developed various ways of hiding their identity by using botnets or hijacked hosts while launching attacks. The camouflage further slows down attribution. Second, psychologically, people's responses towards attacks in the virtual world are different from people's responses towards attacks in the physical world. As damages cannot be seen with eyes in most cases, attacks in the virtual world seem to be less severe than those in the physical world in many cases. In other words, not seeing is less believing. Besides, Wells (2017) discusses disinformation campaigns that "aim to undermine citizen confidence and core beliefs". Such a campaign may not be recognized at the time when it is launched. It may take days, weeks, months, or even years to recognize such a campaign. Should it be recognized, it is still difficult to quantitatively measure the true damage that it has caused. This renders quick and well-cooperated countermeasures impossible. Third, strategically, most cyber attacks are deliberately designed to be below the threshold of physical armed attacks. This makes it difficult for defenders to carry out retaliation traditionally used in the physical world. In many cases, intruders walk away without being punished. This sets bad examples for other intruders. Fourth, financially, the cost of retaliation is not cheap. Depending upon the measures used in varied domains, the cost may go higher. In addition, an economic sanction may affect multiple parties in a global economic environment even the intruder side gets the hard hit. Fifth, operationally, collaboration requires a great amount of time and efforts from all parties involved due to diverse interests and capabilities. Should an economic measure or a military operation be deemed necessary after a severe cyber attack from an adversary, a response must be well orchestrated from all the relevant domains to guarantee its effectiveness. All these factors make deterrence hard to be implemented in the cyber domain.

Jim Chen 18, National Defense University, Fort McNair. 03/09/2018. “Effectively Exercising Deterrence in the Cyber Domain.” Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security: National Defense University Washington DC, USA.

Let us check reality cyber deterrence strategies currently rely on defense and punishment They are not effective as they fail to scare adversaries away in cyber attacks. global ransomware damage costs is up from $324 million in 2015 to $5 billion in 2017, "a 15X increase in two years, and expected to worsen". Larson lists the major cyber hacks of 2017 such as Equifax data breach with the loss of the personal data of 145 million people, leaked government tools, WannaCry that got spanned in more than 150 countries and took down many businesses, NotPetya virus that targeted Ukrainian businesses with compromised tax software, Bad Rabbit ransomware campaign that compromised news and media websites, almost 200 million voter records exposed, and hacks that targeted school districts Cloudbleed security bug that leaked sensitive data of affected users such as passwords and authentication tokens, and HBO hack with 1.5 terabytes of information stolen including scripts and episodes of popular TV show Game o f Thrones There are other reasons for the unsuccessful implementation of deterrence in the cyber domain. They cover various aspects such as legal, psychological, strategic, financial, and operational aspects. First legally, attribution is slow as it needs time in acquiring, examining, and analyzing evidence in an investigative process. To make things even more complicated, attackers have developed various ways of hiding their identity by using botnets or hijacked hosts while launching attacks. The camouflage slows down attribution. Second, psychologically, people's responses towards attacks in the virtual world are different from people's responses towards attacks in the physical world. As damages cannot be seen with eyes in most cases, attacks in the virtual world seem less severe In other words, not seeing is less believing It may take days, weeks, months, or even years to recognize such a campaign. Should it be recognized, it is still difficult to quantitatively measure the damage This renders quick and well-cooperated countermeasures impossible Third, strategically, most cyber attacks are deliberately designed to be below the threshold of physical armed attacks. This makes it difficult for defenders to carry out retaliation traditionally used in the physical world. In many cases, intruders walk away without being punished. This sets bad examples Fourth, financially, the cost of retaliation is not cheap. Depending upon the measures used in varied domains, the cost may go higher Fifth, operationally, collaboration requires a great amount of time and efforts from all parties involved due to diverse interests and capabilities a response must be well orchestrated from all the relevant domains to guarantee its effectiveness. All these factors make deterrence hard to be implemented in cyber

Deterrence fails for Cyber

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Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

Against the backdrop of a fast-developing cyber threat landscape, NATO has struggled to enact a comprehensive strategy that sufficiently prepares allies to deter or defend themselves against cyberattacks. While important steps have been taken, the alliance is still nowhere near ready to face cyber threats at the ‘speed of relevance’. Individual members’ guarantees to use their cyber capabilities on behalf of the alliance – as the United States announced this year – can help fill that gap in strategy.

Sophie Arts 18, program coordinator supporting The German Marshall Fund of the United States’ (GMF) security and defense policy work in Washington DC., “Offense as the New Defense: New Life for NATO’s Cyber Policy,” GMF Policy Brief No. 039, 2018, https://www.gmfus.org/publications/offense-new-defense-new-life-natos-cyber-policy

Against the backdrop of a fast-developing cyber threat landscape NATO has struggled to enact a comprehensive strategy that sufficiently prepares allies to deter or defend themselves against cyberattacks Individual members’ cyber capabilities fill that gap in strategy.

BUT, tech investment without clarifying article 5 first causes offensive ops---those escalate and turn the DA

Aff - Cyber Article 5 - Northwestern 2022.html5

Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

Despite Silicon Valley and the millennial generation’s supposed penchant for innovative disruption, U.S. total factor productivity has been slowing since the 1970s. Productivity today is the lowest in more than a century. Innovation, historically a clear driver of U.S. productivity, means the creation of ideas and inventions that are translated into practical value and improve the quality of people’s lives directly or via their ability to grow the economy. Whether measured in terms of triadic patents (patents filed in the United States, Europe, and Japan), most available measures of productivity, or even startup company creation, the United States’ trademark innovative spirit has been gradually dampening for decades. And if not for China’s meteoric rise this century, the United States might still be sleepwalking—optimistically but without a serious plan—instead of waking up to the need for a coherent national strategy.

Alexander Kersten 21, Deputy Director and Fellow, Renewing American Innovation Project, “Why Renewing American Innovation? The “Endless Frontier Act” and Biden’s Bid for Maintaining U.S. Global Competitiveness,” CSIS, https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-renewing-american-innovation-endless-frontier-act-and-bidens-bid-maintaining-us-global

Despite Silicon Valley and the millennial generation’s supposed penchant for innovative disruption, U.S. total factor productivity has been slowing since the 1970s. Productivity today is the lowest in more than a century. the United States’ trademark innovative spirit has been gradually dampening for decades. And if not for China’s meteoric rise this century, the United States might still be sleepwalking

US total factor productivity has been abysmal since the 70s.

Aff - Cyber Article 5 - Northwestern 2022.html5

Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

Smart defense and more so in the field of cyber-security is NATOs main priority policy. It does however reflect as well on to the tools and mechanisms used to innovated in and for management operations, processes, and tactics. It allows for defense entrepreneurial thinking and application. Constant changes in strategy and policy do request efficient leadership and management skills to operate. And so, should NATO’s cyber-resilience strategic policy.

Marios Efthymiopoulos 19, PhD from the University of Crete in Security and Strategic Affairs on NATO issues and NATO-Russia relations, Chairman of the Board of Advisors of Strategy International, 6/24/19, "A cyber-security framework for development, defense and innovation at NATO", Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship, Volume 8, Article 12, https://innovation-entrepreneurship.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s13731-019-0105-z

Smart defense the field of cyber-security is NATOs main priority policy. Constant changes in strategy and policy request efficient leadership and management And so, should NATO’s cyber-resilience strategic policy

AFF key to resilience

Aff - Cyber Article 5 - Northwestern 2022.html5

Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

Few (if any) surveys of U.S. public opinion about NATO even hint about the extent of the risks Americans incur because of Washington’s obligations under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which commits the signatories to consider an attack on any member as an attack on all. A typical poll question will ask respondents whether the United States should defend country X, if Russia attacks that country. A more honest question would be whether the United States should defend country X from a Russian attack, even if doing so might result in a nuclear war with Russia that could kill millions of Americans.

Ted Galen Carpenter 19, senior fellow is security studies at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor to the National Interest, “NATO’s Dirty Little Secret Is Out,” CATO, 12/4/19, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/natos-dirty-little-secret-out

Few (if any) surveys of U.S. public opinion about NATO even hint about the extent of the risks Americans incur because of Washington’s obligations under Article 5 which commits the signatories to consider an attack on any member as an attack on all. A typical poll question will ask respondents whether the United States should defend country X, if Russia attacks that country A more honest question would be whether the United States should defend country X from a Russian attack, even if doing so might result in a nuclear war with Russia that could kill millions of Americans.

AFF popular OR no one cares

Aff - Cyber Article 5 - Northwestern 2022.html5

Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

But among Democratic primary voters, there's little interest. A recent NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll found just 11 percent of respondents said national security and terrorism should be the top priority of the federal government, down from 21 percent at a similar point in the last presidential election cycle. And those questions rarely get put to candidates by voters as they visit the early voting states around the country. "It's hard to get people to care about foreign policy, generally," said Tommy Vietor, a former Obama national security spokesperson who now hosts Pod Save the World, a foreign policy spinoff of the popular Pod Save America podcast. But he predicted candidates won't be able to avoid the issues forever and noted that foreign policy is the one place where presidents can implement their vision without worrying too much about Congress or the courts. "It's surprising to me how much time candidates spend debating policy that they may never end up getting through Congress when, on foreign policy, as president, you have full latitude to act on your own," he said. One reason is that few of the Democratic presidential candidates have much experience in international relations and may feel more comfortable sticking to familiar domestic turf, especially when voters aren't demanding it. It used to be accepted as fact that no one could win the White House without passing the "commander-in-chief test," which meant projecting strength, a steady hand and expertise on national security, but recent elections have scrambled the rules of American politics. Clinton twice tried and failed to exploit the test. First, in 2008 against Obama, her campaign produced an ad asking voters if they wanted Obama, an inexperienced freshman senator from Illinois, answering a 3 a.m. phone call about a global crisis. Then, Clinton and her allies tried in 2016 when they borrowed the mushroom cloud page from Lyndon Johnson's playbook to question Trump's temperament. In both cases, her successful opponents countered that they had better judgment on world affairs, even if she had more experience. Stephen Miles, the director of Win Without War, a progressive national security coalition, said Trump was effective in 2016 by painting Democrats as defenders of a creaky foreign policy establishment that had led to endless wars, controversial trade deals and pointless foreign aggression. In 2020, he said, candidates should offer an alternative not only to Trump, but also to the old way of doing things. "Trying to defend the failed status quo is not going to fly, so what is your take?” he said. But he pointed to some candidates who have started to take steps to do that, even if it's far from being the centerpieces of their campaigns. Sanders has given some speeches on foreign policy, hired a well-known adviser and pushed congressional resolutions against the Trump administration’s policy toward the Yemeni civil war. Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass., who joined the Senate Armed Services Committee a few years ago in part to bolster her limited foreign policy experience, recently has become more active on that panel and laid out her vision in a speech and article in Foreign Affairs. And while many Democrats may not agree with her worldview, longshot contender Rep. Tulsi Gabbard, D-Hawaii, a military veteran, has made foreign policy central to her presidential bid. But the candidate with by far the most experience in that realm is former Vice President Joe Biden. When speaking, he weaves in stories about world leaders and mockery of Trump's warmth to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. "I know all the world leaders," Biden said in an interview with a South Carolina NBC affiliate. "I'm the guy that told the Chinese that when they set up these air defense zones, we're going to fly right through them." Jesse Lehrich, a foreign policy spokesperson on Clinton's 2016 campaign, summed it up: "I get it — Democratic primary voters aren't clamoring for detailed plans on countering terrorism in the Sahel. But there's a real opportunity to put forward an affirmative vision of American leadership."

Alex Seitz-Wald 19, Political reporter for NBC News, "Trump's Facing Crises Around The World. So Why Aren't Democratic Candidates Talking About Foreign Policy?," NBC News, 5/19/2019, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/democratic-candidates-aren-t-talking-about-foreign-policy-why-cone-n1007131

among Democratic primary voters there's little interest just 11 percent said national security should be the top priority down from 21 at a similar point in the last presidential election cycle. those questions rarely get put to candidates by voters as they visit the early voting states around the country. "It's hard to get people to care about foreign policy few of the Democratic candidates have much experience in international relations and may feel more comfortable sticking to familiar domestic turf, especially when voters aren't demanding it. It used to be accepted as fact that no one could win the White House without passing the "commander-in-chief test," Clinton twice tried and failed to exploit the test primary voters aren't clamoring for detailed plans on countering terrorism in the Sahel

Small shifts don’t trigger political waves.

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Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

Moreover, understanding the points about which application and interpretation are subject to disparate views allows States to focus their efforts where clarification of the law is needed and in their national interest. Such clarification will help deter other States from exploiting these grey zones in the law of cyberspace. For instance, Russia has very adroitly operated within this grey zone, as in the case of its operations in the Ukraine and, more recently, in respect of interference in the U.S. elections by means of the DNC hacks and the subsequent release of emails via Wikileaks and other outlets. In the latter case, an active debate surrounds whether the Russian operations satisfy the “coercion” element that is necessary to establish an act of prohibited intervention under international law. Such grey zones allow for maneuver space in the sense that the cyber operations in question cannot be definitively styled as unlawful, thereby weakening any international blowback that might result.

Michael Schmitt 17, Professor of International Law at the University of Reading in the United Kingdom, “Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law of Cyber Operations: What It Is and Isn’t,” Just Security, 2/9/17, https://www.justsecurity.org/37559/tallinn-manual-2-0-international-law-cyber-operations/

understanding the points about which application and interpretation are subject to disparate views allows States to focus their efforts where clarification of the law is needed Such clarification will help deter other States from exploiting these grey zones in the law of cyberspace Russia has adroitly operated within this grey zone Such grey zones allow for maneuver space in the sense that the cyber operations in question cannot be definitively styled as unlawful thereby weakening any international blowback that might result.

Legal ambiguity causes escalating attacks---clarity deters hybrid attacks and reduces risk of miscalc

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Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

The United States and twenty-six other nations came together during last year’s United Nations General Assembly to issue a call-to-action on making cyberspace safer. This came after the United Nations rolled out two independent norm-building processes on advancing responsible behavior in cyberspace. Yet conflicting interests suggest that nations will not be able to reach consensus on new rules in either process anytime soon. The United States should instead engage like-minded partners to work towards making cyberspace safer for all nations.

Angelo Sanakli 20, writer at IAR, 4/30/20, "America Should Engage Like-Minded Partners for a Safer Cyberspace", International Affairs Review, https://iar-gwu.org/2020/04/30/america-should-engage-like-minded-partners-for-a-safer-cyberspace/

conflicting interests suggest that nations will not be able to reach consensus on new rules The United States should instead engage like-minded partners to work towards making cyberspace safer

US lead-initiatives in NATO key to norm building for cyber

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Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

Analysts at the Brookings Institution have called extending the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) a “no brainer.” In reality, the United States is better off letting New START expire.

Michaela Dodge 19, Research Scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy, “New START Sunk by Old Problem – Russian Cheating,” Heritage, 5/29/19, https://www.heritage.org/europe/commentary/new-start-sunk-old-problem-russian-cheating

Analysts at Brookings called extending the New START) a “no brainer In reality the United States is better off letting New START expire.

Extending New START fails and turns the DA

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Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

Following the US attack on a Syrian airbase overnight, Russian officials expressed outrage. Russia, which is allied with Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, denounced the missile strikes as a “violation of the norms of international law.” Russia also took an even more ominous step, announcing that it would be shutting down the “deconfliction” hotline it shares with the United States.

Hananh Levintova 17, reporter at Mother Jones, 4/7/17, "Russia Threatened to Shut Down the “Deconfliction” Hotline. Here’s Why That’s Terrifying.", Mother Jones, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/04/deconfliction-hotline-syria-trump-russia/

Following the US attack on a Syrian airbase Russian officials expressed outrage. Russia also took an even more ominous step, announcing that it would be shutting down the “deconfliction” hotline it shares with the United States.

Hotlines don’t solve conflict---Russia will suspend their use in conflict

Aff - Cyber Article 5 - Northwestern 2022.html5

Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

RUSSIA has claimed a secure hotline between the US and the Kremlin is “active” and being used by both nations to communicate their planned operations and military responses in Syria following the chemical attack in Douma.

Matthew Robinson 18, 4/13/18, "US-Russia hotline ‘ACTIVE’ to avoid escalating conflict over Syrian air strikes", Express, https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/945422/world-war-3-Russia-US-hotline-active-avoid-escalation-conflict-Syrian-air-strikes

RUSSIA has claimed a secure hotline between the US and the Kremlin is “active” and being used by both nations to communicate their planned operations and military responses in Syria

The CP is unnecessary because hotlines exist now---only question is whether they’ll be used

Aff - Cyber Article 5 - Northwestern 2022.html5

Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

Over the past decade, Allies have identified a steep increase in cyber activities targeting the critical infrastructure sectors that NATO military operations rely upon. Directly or indirectly, these malicious cyber activities can also disrupt the Alliance’s logistics and forward operations. NATO’s commitment to “operate and defend itself ”5 in the cyber domain as effectively as in the geographic domains came, thus, as a direct recognition of cyber as a hybrid threat to both the Allies and the Alliance.

Ion A. Iftimie 20, Eisenhower PhD Candidate Fellow, NATO Defense College, and Senior Advisor, European Union Research Center, George Washington University School of Business, “NATO’s needed offensive cyber capabilities”, NDC Policy Brief, No. 10, May 2020, http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1441

Allies have identified a steep increase in cyber activities targeting the critical infrastructure sectors that NATO military operations rely upon. these malicious cyber activities can also disrupt the Alliance’s logistics and forward operations. NATO’s commitment to defend itself ” in the cyber domain came as a direct recognition of cyber as a hybrid threat to both the Allies and the Alliance.

AFF GROUND---limiting the AFF to the DOD eliminates core affs like arms sales, training, and information sharing which require the guidance and resources of other agencies.

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Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

All future military confrontations are expected to be fought with cyber weapons. These offensive cyber capabilities in the hands of adversaries pose a significant threat to the military forces and critical infrastructure of NATO member states; and the Alliance recognizes that cyber-attacks (as hybrid threats) can be as damaging as conventional ones. This is because malicious cyber activities against computers that control physical processes can be as dangerous as threats that are purely physical in nature and could lead to explosions, nuclear meltdowns, blackouts, or financial crises. As put by NATO Secretary General, “in just minutes, a single cyberattack can inflict billions of dollars’ worth of damage to our economies, bring global companies to a standstill, paralyze our critical infrastructure, undermine our democracies and cripple our military capabilities”.4

Ion A. Iftimie 20, Eisenhower PhD Candidate Fellow, NATO Defense College, and Senior Advisor, European Union Research Center, George Washington University School of Business, “NATO’s needed offensive cyber capabilities”, NDC Policy Brief, No. 10, May 2020, http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1441

All future military confrontations are expected to be fought with cyber weapons. offensive cyber capabilities in the hands of adversaries pose a significant threat to the military forces and critical infrastructure of NATO member states the Alliance recognizes that cyber-attacks (as hybrid threats) can be as damaging as conventional ones because malicious cyber activities against computers that control physical processes can be as dangerous as threats that are purely physical could lead to explosions, nuclear meltdowns, blackouts, or financial crises “in just minutes, a single cyberattack can inflict billions of dollars’ worth of damage to our economies, bring global companies to a standstill

Effective OCOs contain all conflict---anything else escalates.

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Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022

NATO is building a cyber command that is scheduled to be fully operational in 2023 and will coordinate and conduct all offensive cyber operations. Until then, whatever NATO does offensively, it will rely heavily on the United States and the discretion of U.S. commanders, according to Sophie Arts, program coordinator for security and defense at the German Marshall Fund, who explains in this December report.

Patrick Tucker 19, Tech editor @ Defense One, 5/24/19, "NATO Getting More Aggressive on Offensive Cyber", Defense One, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2019/05/nato-getting-more-aggressive-offensive-cyber/157270/

NATO is building a cyber command that is scheduled to be fully operational in 2023 and will coordinate and conduct all offensive cyber operations. Until then, whatever NATO does offensively, it will rely heavily on the United States and the discretion of U.S. commanders

US limitation shapes strategy

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Northwestern (NHSI)

Affirmatives

2022