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Magnetometers detect anomalies in magnetic fields, such as those caused by a massive piece of metal. Militaries have been using conventional magnetometers to detect magnetic signatures of submarines for decades. Despite continuous efforts towards miniaturization and costeffectiveness,32 however, these remain heavy, expensive and effective only at a relatively short range of less than 10 kilometres. As such, militaries usually pair them with other sensors, like sonars, which “offer longer detection ranges”.33 Magnetic anomaly detection also requires environmental mapping of the Earth’s magnetic field, especially where “variations in seabed magnetism and the presence of sunken ships generate many false alarms.”34 A quantum magnetometer promises an increase in sensitivity over traditional devices by several orders of magnitude.35 Sensitivity defines the detection range. The higher the sensitivity of the quantum magnetometer, the further it can reach into the ocean or the larger its search area can be.36 Among the many quantum magnetometers,37 the so called superconducting quantum interference device (SQUID) is most advanced and matured, and promises groundbreaking ultra-sensitivity.

Katarzyna Kubiak 20, a Senior Policy Fellow on nuclear and arms control policy. Previously, she was a Transatlantic Post-Doc Fellow for International Relations and Security at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS), an associate at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), a research assistant at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH), a field researcher for the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) and a fellow in the German Bundestag. December 2020, “Quantum Technology and Submarine Near-Invulnerability,” European Leadership Network.

Magnetometers detect anomalies in magnetic fields such as those caused by a massive piece of metal conventional magnetometers remain heavy, expensive and effective only at a relatively short range of less than 10 kilometres A quantum magnetometer promises an increase in sensitivity over traditional devices by several orders of magnitude Sensitivity defines the detection range. The higher the sensitivity of the quantum magnetometer, the further it can reach into the ocean or the larger its search area can be.36 Among the many quantum magnetometers,37 the so called superconducting quantum interference device (SQUID) is most advanced and matured, and promises groundbreaking ultra-sensitivity.

New Quantum technology ensures detection.

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Michigan (7-week)

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Chinese military leaders have contended they are so far behind the United States that their current nuclear posture isn’t an effective deterrent to being attacked. Maj. Gen. Yao Yunzhu, China’s director of the Center of America-China Defense Relations for the Academy of Military Science, explained that position in a letter last year to the Pacific Forum of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank. “The Ballistic Missile Defense systems that the United States and its allies have deployed, or are planning to deploy, are capable of intercepting residue Chinese nuclear weapons launched for retaliation after it has already been attacked, thus potentially negating the deterrence effect of the Chinese nuclear arsenal,” Yun wrote. Furthermore, U.S. conventional missile strike systems in development could strike China’s nuclear arsenal, “which, if adopted as an official doctrine, would discredit China’s No First Use policy,” Yun wrote. China’s nuclear arsenal is thought to total about 250 warheads, compared with 2,104 operational U.S. warheads and thousands in reserve, according to Federation of American Scientists figures. If Chinese leaders think their stockpile is in danger of being wiped out by U.S. aircraft, missiles and other conventional means during a hypothetical war, it leaves them with two broad options to protect their nuclear capability: strengthen their potential attack, or abandon the no first-use policy in favor of something more threatening. For now, they appear to have chosen the former option. China has built three Jin-class nuclear submarines capable of carrying the JL-2 missile, which has an estimated range of 4,600 miles. “This will give the China its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent, probably before the end of 2014,” Pacific Command chief Adm. Samuel Locklear said during congressional testimony in March. Although the deterrent is considered credible, its survivability is debatable. Jin-class subs are noisy — noisier than the Russian Delta II-class submarines built 30 years ago, according to an Office of Naval Intelligence report published in 2009. Noise is a submarine killer, and the U.S. has several ways of listening for them. Although China could develop a noise solution, multiple U.S. analysts think that design flaws in the missile compartments and hatches have left the Jin-class fundamentally flawed. China also has no experience with commanding and controlling nuclear-equipped submarines. However, it does have extensive experience with land-based missiles, which are also the only option capable of striking the continental United States after being launched from somewhere near China. “So from that perspective, modernizing the land-based missiles makes some sense,” said Vipin Narang, an associate professor at MIT and author of a recently published book on nuclear strategy. Besides any conventional strikes, a Chinese nuclear response in a hypothetical war would have to overcome three major U.S. defenses: the Aegis ballistic missile defense, significant parts of which are maintained on ships based in Japan and patrolling the Western Pacific; the ground-based midcourse defense; and a high-altitude area defense. The U.S. missile defense has destroyed 65 of 81 targets in tests conducted since 2001, according to the U.S. Missile Defense Agency.

Erik Slavin 14; Reporting on Japan, Asia-Pacific, US Navy for Stars and Stripes. “On Land and Sea, China’s Nuclear Capability Growing” 8-26-2014, http://www.stripes.com/news/on-land-and-sea-china-s-nuclear-capability-growing-1.299381

Chinese military leaders have contended they are so far behind the United States that their current nuclear posture isn’t an effective deterrent to being attacked The Ballistic Missile Defense systems that the United States and its allies have deployed, or are planning to deploy, are capable of intercepting residue Chinese nuclear weapons launched for retaliation after it has already been attacked, thus negating the deterrence effect of the Chinese nuclear arsenal U.S. missile strike systems could strike China’s nuclear arsenal Chinese leaders think their stockpile is in danger of being wiped out by U.S. aircraft, missiles and other conventional means during a hypothetical war China has built Jin-class nuclear submarines a Chinese nuclear response in a hypothetical war would have to overcome major U.S. defenses the Aegis ballistic missile defense the ground-based midcourse defense and a high-altitude area defense The U.S. missile defense has destroyed 65 of 81 targets in tests conducted since 2001

Even if some nukes survive BMD systems mop up the excess

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Michigan (7-week)

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2022

The Russian constitution gives the president control over nuclear weapons, but the transmission of any order to use them, and the authentification of that order, also involve the defence minister and the armed forces' chief-of-staff.

F24 22, France 24 News, an independent news agency, “Russia's nuclear force, the world's biggest,” https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220228-russia-s-nuclear-force-the-world-s-biggest, cy

Russian constitution gives the president control but the transmission of any order to use them, and the authentification of that order, also involve the defence minister and the armed forces' chief-of-staff.

Even if Putin wants to rumble, the military won’t comply.

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Michigan (7-week)

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There have recently been new simulations of a limited nuclear exchange in the India-Pakistan region using modern climate models (e.g., Mills et al., 2014; Stenke et al., 2013) that suggest devastating impacts on climate over a decadal time scale, although somewhat less extreme consequences have also been suggested (Pausata et al., 2016). Our team has taken a careful look at some of the assumptions that were used in those studies, using an end-to-end modeling sequence. Our series of simulations started with a nuclear weapon explosion followed by a simulation of the fireball and cloud rise. The key improvement in this study is our simulation of fire spread and soot transport in the environment that results from fires initiated by the fireball.

Jon Reisner et al 18, scientist at Los Alamos National Laboratory, with Gennaro D'Angelo, Eunmo Koo, Wesley Even, Matthew Hecht, Elizabeth Hunke, Darin Comeau, Randall Bos, James Cooley, February 13, 2018, “Climate Impact of a Regional Nuclear Weapons Exchange: An Improved Assessment Based On Detailed Source Calculations,” JGR Atmospheres Volume 123, Issue 5, https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/2017JD027331

Our series of simulations started with a nuclear weapon explosion followed by a simulation of the fireball and cloud rise The key improvement in this study is our simulation of fire spread and soot transport in the environment that results from fires initiated by the fireball.

Best scientific models concluded even worst-case scenarios do not produce anything close to a nuclear winter.

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Michigan (7-week)

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Radiation won't kill everyone because there aren't enough weapons, and radiation from them would be concentrated in some areas and wholly absent from other areas. Even in the worst affected areas, lethal radiation from fallout would drop to survivable levels within weeks. Here it's worth noting that there is an inherent tradeoff between length of halflife and energy released by radionuclides. The shorter the half life the more energy will be released, and the longer the half life the less energy. The fallout products from modern nuclear weapons are very lethal, but only for days to several weeks. Let's try the same calculation we used with kinetic damage, and see if an attack aimed at optimizing fallout for killing everyone could succeed. Using Nukemap again, I'll go with the fallout contour for 100 rads per hour. 400 rads is thought too be enough to kill 50% of people, so 100 rads per hour is likely to kill most all people not in some kind of shelter. We need to switch to using a groundburst detonation rather than an airburst detonation, because groundbursts create far more fallout. A 1mt ground burst would create an area of about 8,000 km² of >100 rads per hour. Okay, multiple that by 14,000 warheads, and we get 112 million km². That's a lot! It's still less than the 510.1 million km² of earth's land mass, but it's a lot more than the ~10.2 million km² of urban space. Presumably this is enough to cover every human habitation, so in principle, it might be possible to kill everyone with radiation from existing nuclear weapons. n practice, it would be almost impossible to kill every human via radiation with the existing nuclear arsenals, even if they were targeted explicitly for this purpose. The first reason is that fallout patterns are very uneven. After a ground burst, fallout is carried by the wind. Some areas will be hit bad and some areas will be hardly affected by fallout. Even if most human population centers were covered, a few areas would almost certainly escape. Two other things make extinction by radiation unlikely. Many countries, especially in the southern hemisphere, are unlikely to be affected by fallout much at all. Since most of these countries are likely to be neutral in a conflict, and not near combatant countries, they should be relatively safe from fallout. While fallout might travel hundreds of kms, it still won't reach places separated by greater distances. Fallout that reaches the upper atmosphere will eventually fall back down, but usually after the period of lethal radioactivity. The other mitigating factor is that in typical nuclear war plans, ground bursts are usually restricted to hardened targets, and air bursts are favored for population and industry centers. This is because air bursts maximize the size of the destructive pressure wave. Air burst detonations result in little lethal fallout reaching the ground, so populations not downwind of military targets would likely be safe from the worst of the radiological effects in a war scenario.

Ladish, 20 – (Jeffrey Ladish- Cybersecurity and biosecurity consultant assisting Dr. Megan Palmer's group in research on the management of dual use technologies "Nuclear war is unlikely to cause human extinction", 11-7-2020, Leswrong, https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/sT6NxFxso6Z9xjS7o/nuclear-war-is-unlikely-to-cause-human-extinction)//mishelle

Radiation won't kill everyone because there aren't enough weapons, and radiation from them would be concentrated in some areas and wholly absent from other areas Even in the worst affected areas, lethal radiation from fallout would drop to survivable levels within weeks. The fallout products from modern nuclear weapons are very lethal, but only for days to several weeks. We need to switch to using a groundburst detonation rather than an airburst detonation, because groundbursts create far more fallout it would be almost impossible to kill every human via radiation with the existing nuclear arsenals, even if they were targeted explicitly for this purpose. fallout patterns are very uneven. After a ground burst, fallout is carried by the wind. Some areas will be hit bad and some areas will be hardly affected by fallout. Even if most human population centers were covered, a few areas would almost certainly escape. Many countries, especially in the southern hemisphere, are unlikely to be affected by fallout much at all. Since most of these countries are likely to be neutral in a conflict, and not near combatant countries, they should be relatively safe from fallout. , it still won't reach places separated by greater distances. Fallout that reaches the upper atmosphere will eventually fall back down, but usually after the period of lethal radioactivity. ground bursts are usually restricted to hardened targets, and air bursts are favored for population and industry centers

Radiation not existential- fallout patterns are uneven, and fallout dissipates

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Michigan (7-week)

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2022

The US aerospace and defense market is projected to grow from USD 416.63 billion in 2020 to USD 550.78 billion, registering a CAGR of around 2.37% during the forecast period (2021-2030). The US aerospace and defense sector is undergoing an unprecedented disruption due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Although the sector is projected to recover in 2021, the recovery is expected to be uneven across the two constituent sectors. For instance, the commercial aerospace sector has been significantly affected by the pandemic, resulting in a drastic reduction in passenger traffic, which, in turn, has negatively affected aircraft demand. As a result, the commercial aerospace sector is expected to recover slowly, as travel demand is projected to normalize to pre-COVID levels by 2023. However, the defense sector is expected to remain stable and even grow as the United States has not reduced its defense budget and remains committed to sustaining its military capabilities. Nevertheless, due to the widespread disruption in the supply chain, some defense programs may face minor cost escalations and delays in the short term. The US aerospace and defense sector is one of the largest, globally, in terms of infrastructure and manufacturing activities. In 2019, the total industry sales revenue left a significant footprint on the American economy, contributing to a combined economic value of USD 396 billion, representing 1.8% of the nation’s GDP. The market is primarily driven by investments in the A&D sector and is supported by the rising demand for the products of the A&D sector by both commercial and military end-users. The market is also bolstered by the presence of leading industry incumbents in the US, whose manufacturing and R&D capabilities support the growth of the industry. Scope of the Report The study provides an in-depth analysis of the aerospace and defense industry in the United States. The scope of the study encompasses the commercial and military applications of all aerial assets. Besides, the study also accounts for the developments in the industry pertaining to critical systems and components of aircraft, UAVs, and satellites. For each segment, the market sizing and forecasts have been done based on value (USD billion). Key Market Trends Enhanced Defense Spending Promoting R&D and Manufacturing The United States is ranked as the world’s leading defense manufacturer and exporter. According to SIPRI, the US defense expenditure grew by 5.3% to amount to USD 732 billion in 2019, which is around 38% of the global defense expenditure. The US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) increased by USD 15 billion to reach USD 83.5 billion during FY2020. Besides, the US is one of the world’s largest FDI investors and the leading beneficiary of FDIs. In 2018, FDIs in the US aerospace industry totaled nearly USD 22 billion. This resulted in a significant upgrade of the manufacturing capabilities of key industry incumbents in the US. For instance, in January 2019, Airbus initiated the construction of its A220 Manufacturing Facility in Alabama. Similarly, in September 2018, Planet Labs Inc. invested around USD 183 million to open a 27,000-square-foot new satellite manufacturing and testing facility in San Francisco. In 2020, Lockheed Martin completed the construction of its USD 350 million satellite manufacturing facility, located at the company's Waterton Canyon campus near Denver. As the US envisions to retain its technological superiority over rival forces in terms of deployed platforms and weaponry in the aerial domain, a significant inflow of monetary resources is anticipated to occur during the upcoming period, thereby driving the US aerospace and defense market.

Mordor Intelligence, 2022 Mordor Intelligence is a fully revenue-funded organization, since our founding in 2014. To date, we have partnered with 4000+ enterprises across 20+ industries, to deliver precise data and actionable insights in over 6000 projects. Our domain-specific teams of research experts continuously track markets, providing our clients the competitive edge through high-quality market intelligence.(not that Mordor from LOTR)“US Aerospace and Defense Market - Growth, Trends, COVID-19 Impact, and Forecasts (2022 - 2027).” Mordorintelligence.com, 2022, www.mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/us-aerospace-and-defense-market.

The US aerospace and defense market is projected to grow to USD 550.78 billion, registering a CAGR of around 2.37% during (2021-2030). the defense sector is expected to remain stable and even grow as the United States has not reduced its defense budget and remains committed to sustaining its military capabilities due to the widespread disruption in the supply chain, some defense programs may face minor cost escalations and delays in the short term. Key Market Trends The United States is ranked as the world’s leading defense manufacturer and exporter US defense expenditure grew by 5.3% USD 732 billion around 38% of the global defense expenditure This resulted in a significant upgrade of the manufacturing capabilities of key industry incumbents in the US As the US envisions to retain its tech superiority over rival forces in terms of weaponry a significant inflow of monetary resources is anticipated to occur during the upcoming period, thereby driving the US defense market

The defense industry is growing and stable now – future purchases enable increased innovation of the defense market

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The impacts of an eroding domestic manufacturing base on national security largely stem from the military’s growing reliance on commercial cutting-edge technology since the 1980s. There are reasonable doubts that military technology still lags commercial technologies in all areas, as it generally did during the 1980s and 1990s. Starting in those years, and continuing into the present, defense procurement policy has put an emphasis on promoting greater civilian-military integration, and encouraging agencies and their contractors to purchase commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) and “dual-use” technology products. The rationale is that drawing on the often more innovative civilian sector not only would yield more up-to-date products but also big cost savings. Many, if not most, “dual-use” contractors and suppliers try to separate their defense and commercial businesses, in large part to avoid the bureaucratic drag of defense procurement requirements on their commercial work. Nevertheless, the ability of a firm to design, innovate, and improve on defense-critical technologies or devices that it produces for defense markets, increasingly depends on its ability to preserve and draw upon the technological edge it has obtained in its commercial business. As military products become more reliant on commercial advanced technologies, technology transfer from commercial technologies into defense-critical products requires a close relationship between the Pentagon or defense contractor customer and the suppliers of these technologies. However, as the commercial base upon which the defense sector relies for most of its components and subsystems globalizes, integrating commercial technology into defense systems becomes more difficult to achieve. That is, the loss of production facilities can lead to the loss of innovation capabilities, which would dangerously undermine the nation’s ability to maintain a strong defense base.

Joel S. Yudken 2010 [ is Principal and Founder of High Road Strategies, LLC.  He is a nationally known expert on policy issues that relate to manufacturing, energy, technology, workforce and economic development.  In a career spanning four decades, Dr. Yudken has held a wide range of professional positions in labor, government, academia, industry, and public interest organizations.  His broad background and training in engineering, political, and socio-economic systems enables him to apply a range of qualitative and quantitative research and analytical tools to his work], “AMERICA’S MANUFACTURING CRISIS AND THE EROSION OF THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE,” https://ecommons.cornell.edu/bitstream/handle/1813/88136/afl_cio_Manufacturing_Insecurity_report.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Cut By: m.jam

The impacts of an eroding domestic manufacturing base on national security largely stem from the military’s growing reliance on commercial cutting-edge technology since the 1980s. Nevertheless, the ability of a firm to design, innovate, and improve on defense-critical technologies or devices that it produces for defense markets, increasingly depends on its ability to preserve and draw upon the technological edge it has obtained in its commercial business. That is, the loss of production facilities can lead to the loss of innovation capabilities, which would dangerously undermine the nation’s ability to maintain a strong defense base.

DIB innovation prevents offshore manufacturing and enables US global leadership

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Missouri State (MSDI)

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2022

DoD tracks competition by obligations and contract actions based on data from the Federal Procurement Data System—Next Generation (FPDS-NG). The FPDS-NG competition report measures competition and fair opportunity at the contract and order level. The competition rate is calculated as either the dollars obligated for competitive contracts (i.e., two or more offerors) divided by the total dollars obligated, or the number of contract actions for competitive contracts divided by the total number of contract actions. The competition rate varies depending upon the mission and type of product or service being procured. Competition rates also differ greatly depending on whether the calculation uses obligations or contract actions. The DoD competition rate based on dollars obligated is typically in the 50-60% range; if based on the number of contract actions, the competition rate would be consistently in the 90% range. The competitive environment for the DIB remained relatively stable over the past several years. Over the past ten years, DoD has seen total dollars obligated vary from a high of $420 billion in Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 to a low of $273 billion in FY 2015. During that time, the competition rates ranged from a high of 58.3% in FY 2014 to 50.1% in FY 2020, and projected at 52% for FY 2021, for a ten-year average of 54.2%. Figure 1 displays the ten-year trend for competitive and non-competitive dollars obligated, with the peak of $420B total dollars obligated in FY 2020 due to increased obligations for COVID-19 related actions. To help improve its tracking of competition within the DIB, DoD developed a Procurement Business Intelligence Service Competition Analysis Scorecard to report competition rates at the 3 Obligations refers to the funds reserved in the accounting system upon contract award. Those dollars are obligated under the contract for expenditure. 57.1% 56.7% 58.3% 55.4% 52.8% 52.0% 53.9% 53.9% 50.1% 52.0% 40% 45% 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% $- $50 $100 $150 $200 $250 $300 $350 $400 $450 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Billions Total Competed ($B) Total Not Competed ($B) Competition Rate (%) Fiscal Year 4 product service code and broader portfolio group levels.4 The competition scorecard provides dashboard-like presentations to help components track and analyze competition trends in portfolio groups for major weapon system platforms (e.g., aircraft, ships, and land vehicles), electronic and communications equipment, and their associated sustainment phases. Historically, these portfolio groups report competition rates in the 15–40% range for dollars obligated, which has a significant impact on DoD’s overall competition rate since these weapon systems and major equipment account for a sizeable portion of the total dollars obligated. The competition scorecards provide management-level reports and tools to enable informed business decisions that support procurement policies with the goal of improving competition in the DoD supply chain and industrial base. Similarly, securing competition varies widely based upon the mission and type of product or service being procured. Generally, those contracting organizations supporting installation-level mission support and logistical requirements (e.g., food service, facility maintenance, grounds maintenance, transportation services) and/or depot-level maintenance services requirements (e.g., contractor logistics support for spare parts) have multiple potential suppliers resulting in very high competition rates. This is also true for contracting organizations heavily involved in services, commercial products, and construction. The competitive percentages are lower in organizations that procure major systems (e.g., weapons, automated information systems), specialized equipment, spares (especially on aging weapon systems), and upgrades that may need to be purchased from the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) or supplier. These programs can require sole-source extensions of contracts that were originally competed because the programs have moved past the stage in their lifecycle where competition is economically viable. These sole-source transactions are made in accordance with statutory requirements that authorize dealing with only one source.

US Department of Defense. 2022. DEPARTMENT of DEFENSE REPORT State of Competition within the Defense Industrial Base. media.defense.gov/2022/Feb/15/2002939087/-1/-1/1/STATE-OF-COMPETITION-WITHIN-THE-DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL-BASE.PDF.

The competitive environment for the DIB remained relatively stable over the past several years. Over the past ten years, DoD has seen total dollars obligated vary from a high of $420 billion the competition rates ranged from a high of 58.3% to 50.1%

The Defense Industrial Base is stable and doing well now

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Missouri State (MSDI)

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PARIS — Ukraine has a message it wants to convey to the U.S. defense industrial base and the government. The war-torn nation desperately needs artillery and artillery rounds, but what can truly give it the upper hand over its Russian invaders are long-range precision weapons such as armed Predator drones, loitering munitions and the multiple launch rocket system. Denys Sharapov, Ukraine’s deputy minister of the defense in charge of procurement, support for weapons and equipment, and Brig. Gen. Volodymyr Karpenko, land forces command logistics commander, spoke with National Defense Editor in Chief Stew Magnuson and other reporters through an interpreter in the Ukraine Ministry of Defense’s booth at the Eurosatory conference in Paris on June 15. Back in Washington, politicians and pundits debated this week as to whether it was practical to send Ukraine armed Predator drones as part of a $40 billion aid package. Sharapov and Karpenko said such technology may give Ukraine what it needs to gain an advantage in the war. The interview has been edited for brevity and clarity. Our readers are about 1,800 corporate members of the defense industrial base in the United States. What message do you have for them? And what do you need from them urgently? Sharapov: The [Ministry of Defense] is concentrating currently on fulfilling all the needs of the armed forces. You asked a question about needs. First, you have to understand that the frontline is 2,500 kilometers long. The frontline where there is active combat in more than 1,000 kilometers long. That’s like from Kyiv to Berlin. … As of today, all the people in all of our armed forces and within the defense and security sector is up to one million people. And we have to support them all. We have to supply them with small arms, with personal protection gear and with the means of communication. And of course, to carry out a war in this day and age, we need heavy weapons — that’s primarily artillery systems. As of today, our need for heavy artillery systems is measured by hundreds. That’s why we also need a huge number of rounds for these artillery systems.

Stew Magnuson Nationaldefensemagazine.org, 6/15/2022, www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/6/15/ukraine-to-us-defense-industry-we-need-long-range-precision-weapons.

Ukraine has a message it wants to convey to the U.S. defense industrial base The war-torn nation desperately needs artillery and artillery rounds long-range precision weapons loitering munitions and the multiple launch rocket system politicians debated this week as to whether it was practical to send Ukraine drones as part of a $40 billion aid package

Ukrainian business and American military aid is promoting the DIB now

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Missouri State (MSDI)

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The prevalence of artificial intelligence (AI) systems, the growing centrality of information warfare, and threats to traditional command and control are redefining combat in the age of strategic competition. Amidst debates on the use of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) and pressure to modernize U.S. defense capabilities, what steps must the United States take to maintain its military advantage? CNAS experts are sharpening the conversation about the deployment of autonomous weapons and other defense technologies to enhance U.S. military readiness. Continue reading this edition of Sharper to explore their ideas and recommendations. Gaining an advantage in managing information and exercising command is a precondition of victory in warfare. This necessity has become even more acute as military organizations have integrated information technology into their forces and operations. The Pentagon’s belated response to these strategies appears overly technological and unrealistically fixated on regaining the kind of information dominance that the U.S. armed forces enjoyed in the aftermath of the Cold War. A new CNAS report by Chris Dougherty examines how the Department of Defense (DoD) can embrace, rather than fight against, the changes in the character of warfare and learn to thrive within its chaos in ways that China and Russia may be unable to match. In recent years, the machine learning revolution has sparked a wave of interest in AI applications across a range of industries. Nations are also mobilizing to use AI for national security and military purposes, write Paul Scharre and Michael Horowitz. It is therefore vital to assess how the militarization of AI could affect international stability and how to encourage militaries to adopt AI in a responsible manner. Doing so requires understanding the features of AI, the ways it could shape warfare, and the risks to international stability resulting from the militarization of artificial intelligence. America’s future leadership in the world and on the battlefield will be dependent on its ingenuity. Yet, while America remains the world’s leader in technology, its relative advantage wanes, argues Mikhail Grinberg in a CNAS policy brief. Future military operating environments will require technology from more diverse sources and business models that enable faster innovation cycles. Grinberg concludes that the superiority of next-generation weapon systems will be derived from progress in science, and the next National Defense Strategy needs to help the nation prioritize basic research as a source of competitive advantage. An international debate over lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) has been under way for nearly a decade. A new CNAS report by author Robert O. Work offers seven new principles that concentrate on the responsible use of autonomous functionalities in armed conflict in ways that preserve human judgment and responsibility over the use of force, and help minimize the probability of loss of control of the system or unintended engagements. Michèle Flournoy and Gabrielle Chefitz argue in a CNAS policy brief that the United States is losing its military technological advantage vis-à-vis great-power competitors such as China, and reversing this trend must be DoD leadership’s top priority. Doing so will require focused and empowered leadership, increased investment in the development of new concepts and capabilities, new pathways and incentives for promising prototypes to bridge the “valley of death” into production, a willingness to make hard program and budget choices, the development of a more tech-savvy workforce, and greater partnership with Congress to pursue these goals together.

Jennie Matuschak, Ainikki Riikonen and Anna Pederson 06-02-2021 [Jennie Matuschak is a former research assistant for the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS); Ainikki Riikonen is a former Research Associate for the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Her research focuses on emerging technologies, particularly artificial intelligence and information systems in the context of international competition; Pederson comes from Washington, where she received her undergraduate degree in English literature from Seattle University] “Sharper: Defense Tech,” https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/sharper-defense-tech Cut By: m.jam

The prevalence of artificial intelligence (AI) systems, the growing centrality of information warfare, and threats to traditional command and control are redefining combat in the age of strategic competition. Amidst debates on the use of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) and pressure to modernize U.S. defense capabilities, what steps must the United States take to maintain its military advantage? CNAS experts are sharpening the conversation about the deployment of autonomous weapons and other defense technologies to enhance U.S. military readiness. Gaining an advantage in managing information and exercising command is a precondition of victory in warfare. This necessity has become even more acute as military organizations have integrated information technology into their forces and operations. Chris Dougherty examines how the Department of Defense (DoD) can embrace, rather than fight against, the changes in the character of warfare and learn to thrive within its chaos in ways that China and Russia may be unable to match. America’s future leadership in the world and on the battlefield will be dependent on its ingenuity. An international debate over lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) has been under way for nearly a decade. A new CNAS report by author Robert O. Work offers seven new principles that concentrate on the responsible use of autonomous functionalities in armed conflict in ways that preserve human judgment and responsibility over the use of force, and help minimize the probability of loss of control of the system or unintended engagements. the United States is losing its military technological advantage vis-à-vis great-power competitors such as China, and reversing this trend must be DoD leadership’s top priority. Doing so will require focused and empowered leadership, increased investment in the development of new concepts and capabilities, new pathways and incentives for promising prototypes to bridge the “valley of death” into production, a willingness to make hard program and budget choices, the development of a more tech-savvy workforce, and greater partnership with Congress to pursue these goals together.

A LAW ban hurts the DIB and Dod ability to make and use better weapons

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Missouri State (MSDI)

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Military commanders often have very little time to make decisions – sometimes just seconds. And with threats like hypersonic missiles accelerating the pace of modern warfare, that window of time is shrinking. Complicating things is the sheer volume of data flow. There are petabytes of intelligence information coming from sensors on land, at sea, in the air and in space, many using different formats. The solution, according to experts at Raytheon Intelligence & Space, a Raytheon Technologies business, is clear: Artificial intelligence – specifically, teaming military commanders with intelligent systems to cull through data in seconds. This will be key to bringing the vision for the U.S. Department of Defense’s Joint All Domain Command and Control network, often called JADC2, to reality. That network will link military capabilities around the world and in every domain. With artificial intelligence and machine learning, those systems can define, combine and provide the right information to the right people at the right time – giving them the best possible chance to make the best possible decision. “Manually processing all that data would require armies of analysts, but with AI/ML, we can task systems to cull through the data and produce higher level information useful to operators,” said Jim Wright, RI&S technical director for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Systems. Experts from Raytheon Intelligence & Space discussed the concept further during a webinar on July 15, 2021 that is now available on-demand. Here’s a preview of what they discussed. 1. AI/ML makes sense of the complex There’s a confluence of factors that are driving the need for autonomy and automation in data analysis – a proliferation of information and a shortage of analysts to start. AI and ML can help by doing the legwork – searching, processing and fusing larger amounts of data across the domains – and helping the humans save their brainpower for decision-making. “A customer once told me that the military collects 22 football seasons worth of video every day,” Wright said. “There’s a colossal amount of information circling in today’s battlespace. We’re developing smart software, called Cognitive Aids to Sensor Processing, Exploitation and Response, to lighten the operator’s workload and use automation to help make decisions faster. The cognitive aids will do the groundwork and data analysis to provide recommended courses of action, leaving the operators to focus on making the best decision.” The Department of Defense is also mobilizing combatant commands to use AI/ML for the future battlefield in a new effort called the Artificial Intelligence and Data Acceleration Initiative. “Its goal is to rapidly advance data and AI-dependent concepts like Joint All-Domain Command Control,” Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks said during the department’s AI Symposium on June 22. 2. AI/ML counters threats more quickly and intelligently Another factor is the speed of modern weapons. “Think about hypersonic glide vehicles and similar types of weapons,” Wright said. “From the time you see them to the time when you must counter them is very short, and there isn’t time for operators to search multi-sensor data to optimize targeting solutions. Instead, AI/ML can automatically search across many sensor sources to accurately detect and classify threats, and then quickly evaluate multiple engagement alternatives to find the optimum weapons target pairing.” AI and ML could even give combatant commanders insights into adversaries’ decision-making processes – information they can use to anticipate enemy actions and proactively outmaneuver them. “At that point, the adversary won’t be able to respond in time because our commander is already way ahead of them,” said Chris Worley, director for Civil and Digital Solutions at RI&S.

Raytheon Intelligence & Space 06-30-2021 [One of the four business segments of U.S. defense and aerospace conglomerate Raytheon Technologies. Headquartered in Arlington, Virginia, RIS has a total employment of 39,000 and 2019 sales of US$15 billion. Roy Azevedo is the segment's president.], “How AI can alter multi-domain warfare,” https://www.raytheonintelligenceandspace.com/news/2021/06/30/how-ai-can-alter-multi-domain-warfare Cut By: m.jam

Military commanders often have very little time to make decisions – sometimes just seconds. And with threats like hypersonic missiles accelerating the pace of modern warfare, that window of time is shrinking. The solution, according to experts at Raytheon Intelligence & Space, a Raytheon Technologies business, is clear: Artificial intelligence A customer once told me that the military collects 22 football seasons worth of video every day,” Wright said. “There’s a colossal amount of information circling in today’s battlespace. We’re developing smart software “Its goal is to rapidly advance data and AI-dependent concepts like Joint All-Domain Command Control,” Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks said during the department’s AI Symposium on June 22.

Raytheon, a DIB company, is working on improving AI for military strength – the ban hurts their ability to develop AI

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Missouri State (MSDI)

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The American military is still the most powerful in the world. Its leading defense industry companies are still global leaders in weapons innovation and production. Likewise, the Department of Defense is still the colossus of the federal system, i.e., the single biggest buyer of goods in the US government. But unless the industrial and manufacturing base that develops and builds those goods modernizes and adjusts to the world’s new geopolitical and economic realities, America will face a growing and likely permanent national security deficit. America’s defense industrial base was once the wonder of the free world, constituting a so-called “military-industrial complex” that, regardless of criticism, was the model for, and envy of, every other country—and the mainstay of peace and freedom for two generations after World War II. Today, however, that base faces problems that necessitate continued and accelerated national focus over the coming decade, and that cannot be solved by assuming that advanced technologies like autonomous systems, artificial intelligence (AI), 5G, and quantum will wave those challenges away, and magically preserve American leadership. On the contrary, those advanced technologies themselves rely on a manufacturing complex whose capability and capacity will have to be trusted and secure to protect the Pentagon’s most vital supply chains. These include microelectronics, space, cyber, nuclear, and hypersonics, as well as the more conventional technologies that make up our legacy defense equipment. What will be required is a defense industrial strategy based on a four-part program to:

Lord and Nader 21. (Ellen Lord, Senior Fellow, Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory. Jeffrey Nadaner, Executive Director, Commanding Heights of Global Transportation Initiative. “A 21st Century Defense Industrial Strategy for America.” Hudson Institute, June 14, 2021. https://www.hudson.org/research/17011-a-21st-century-defense-industrial-strategy-for-america. shARK.)

American defense industry companies are still global leaders in weapons innovation and production. America’s defense industrial base was once the wonder of the free world, and that cannot be solved by assuming that advanced technologies like autonomous systems, artificial intelligence (AI), 5G, and quantum will wave those challenges away, and magically preserve American leadership. On the contrary, those advanced technologies themselves rely on a manufacturing complex whose capability and capacity will have to be trusted and secure to protect the Pentagon’s most vital supply chains.

U.S. DIB K2 Military Competitivness

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As William Wohlforth has noted, American primacy and activism acted as a powerful deterrent to great-power conflict by creating enormous disincentives for Russia, China, or other actors to incur the “focused enmity” of the United States. 11 The persistence and even extension of the U.S. security blanket smothered potential instability in unsettled regions such as Eastern Europe, while removing any possibility of German or Japanese revanchism—a prospect much feared in the early 1990s—by keeping those countries tightly lashed to Washington. American intervention helped extinguish bloody conflicts in the Balkans before they could spread to neighboring countries; U.S. diplomatic and military pressure kept aggressive tyrannies such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea bottled up and helped slow the spread of nuclear weapons. U.S. support helped democratic forces triumph in countries from Haiti to Poland, as the number of democracies rose from 76 in 1990 to 120 in 2000; America crucially assisted the advance of globalization and the broad prosperity that came with it by promoting pro-market policies and providing the necessary climate of reassurance and stability. 12

Hal Brands and Charles Edel, 2019, Hal Brands is the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs in the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Charles Edel is a senior fellow at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and previously served on the U.S. Secretary of State's policy planning staff. “The Lessons of Tragedy Statecraft and World Order” Ch. 5 Yale University Press. Accessed 7-14-2019 [MoStateLibraries]/mnw

American primacy and activism acted as a powerful deterrent to great-power conflict by creating enormous disincentives for Russia, China, or other actors to incur the “focused enmity” of the United States. U.S. security blanket smothered potential instability in unsettled regions while removing any possibility of German or Japanese revanchism by keeping those countries tightly lashed to Washington. American intervention helped extinguish bloody conflicts in the Balkans before they could spread to neighboring countries; U.S. diplomatic and military pressure kept aggressive tyrannies such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea bottled up and helped slow the spread of nuclear weapons. U.S. support helped democratic forces triumph in countries America crucially assisted the advance of globalization and the broad prosperity that came with it by promoting pro-market policies and providing the necessary climate of reassurance and stability. 12

Primacy solves great power conflict, growth and prolif

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Missouri State (MSDI)

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The United States has good reason to push back more forcefully against China’s grab for power in the South China Sea, as Defense Secretary Ashton Carter did on a trip to Asia this week. Beijing has repeatedly ignored earlier warnings to moderate the aggressive behavior that is unsettling its regional neighbors and further undermining its relations with the United States. On Friday, American officials disclosed that China had installed two mobile artillery vehicles on an artificial island it is building in the sea, which is rich in natural resources like oil and gas and where China clearly hopes to establish some form of hegemony. The weapons are not considered a threat to American naval forces. Still, they reinforce fears that China intends to militarize the Spratly Islands, a collection of reefs and rocks also claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Taiwan, and use them to control the waterway’s shipping lanes and dominate its smaller neighbors. China’s ambitions have become increasingly clear since 2012 when it publicly asserted a claim to 80 percent of the South China Sea. In recent months, photographic evidence from commercial satellites and American spy planes has left little doubt that China is moving with alarming speed to turn the Spratlys into more substantial land masses, complete with runways and harbors. Some American officials now believe China regards its claims in the South China Sea as nonnegotiable. If so, that’s terrible news for the region but also ultimately for China, which claims it prizes stability but will find it impossible to realize its economic goals if Asia is in constant tension. China’s bullying on the South China Sea has already caused many Asian countries to forge closer defense ties with the United States. Now, the Obama administration has decided to more firmly underscore America’s intention to remain a Pacific power and to ensure that the region and its waters remain accessible to all nations. That is a role the United States has played constructively for decades, promoting a stability that has allowed Japan, South Korea and other countries, including China, to develop. “There should be no mistake: the United States will fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows, as forces do around the world,” Mr. Carter said in his speech. He also called for “an immediate and lasting halt to land reclamation by all claimants.” Although the administration would obviously prefer a peaceful resolution of all South China Sea disputes, it cannot allow China’s claims to go unchallenged. It sent a surveillance plane close to one of China’s artificial islands, is considering air and sea patrols that could go closer to disputed reefs and shoals, and is expanding military exercises with regional partners. President Obama and President Xi Jinping of China plan to meet later this year. In the meantime, American officials and their Chinese counterparts must avoid any miscalculation that could lead to a direct confrontation.

Nicholas Kristof, 15, 5-29-2015, (American journalist and political commentator. A winner of two Pulitzer Prizes) "EDITORIAL: Pushback in the South China Sea", https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/30/opinion/pushback-in-the-south-china-sea.html, AVD

The United States has good reason to push back more forcefully against China’s grab for power in the South China Sea Beijing has repeatedly ignored earlier warnings to moderate the aggressive behavior that is unsettling its regional neighbors and further undermining its relations with the United States China’s ambitions have become increasingly clear since 2012 when it publicly asserted a claim to 80 percent of the South China Sea. Some American officials now believe China regards its claims in the South China Sea as nonnegotiable. China’s bullying on the South China Sea has already caused many Asian countries to forge closer defense ties with the United States That is a role the United States has played constructively for decades, promoting a stability that has allowed Japan, South Korea and other countries, including China, to develop. There should be no mistake: the United States will fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows, as forces do around the world,” He also called for “an immediate and lasting halt to land reclamation by all claimants.” Although the administration would obviously prefer a peaceful resolution of all South China Sea disputes, it cannot allow China’s claims to go unchallenged

American primacy de-escalates South China Sea tensions

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Missouri State (MSDI)

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In 2015 the USA elevated the issue of autonomy to the highest strategic level with the publication of its new ‘Defense Innovation Initiative’, which is also referred to as the ‘Third Offset Strategy’.11 Like the first two offset strategies that were introduced during the cold war, the Third Offset Strategy is based on the idea that the USA should seek to leverage emerging and disruptive technologies in innovative ways to offset the advantages of potential adversaries and maintain its strategic superiority.12 Each of the previous offset strategies had a specific ‘technological sauce’ as Robert Work, US Deputy Secretary of Defense, puts it.13 For the First Offset Strategy, it was the miniaturization of nuclear components, which enabled the adoption of tactical nuclear weapons for conventional deterrence. For the Second Offset Strategy, it was the development of digital microprocessors, information technologies, new sensors and stealth, which enabled the USA to develop precision-guided weapons and achieve dominance in conventional warfare. For the Third Offset Strategy, a key component is going to be AI (particularly machine learning) and autonomy.14 The reasons for this are manifold (and will be presented in the next subsection), but the main rationale is that AI and autonomy could leverage many operational benefits that could allow the US military to improve the strength and cost-effectiveness of its forces. In this way, it would continue to outmatch Russia, China, Iran or North Korea, even if those countries were to catch up with the USA in the development of high-end weapon technologies, such as precision-guided munitions, robotic technology, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities and A2/AD denial technologies.1

Vincent Boulanin and Maaike Verbruggen 2017 “MAPPING THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS” November 2017 Stockholm International peace research institute https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2017-11/siprireport_mapping_the_development_of_autonomy_in_weapon_systems_1117_1.pdf

the USA elevated the issue of autonomy to the highest strategic level with the publication of its new ‘Defense Innovation Initiative’ referred to as the ‘Third Offset Strategy’ the Strategy is based the idea that the USA should seek to leverage emerging technologies in innovative ways to offset the advantages of potential adversaries a specific ‘technological sauce’ For the First it was nuclear For the Second it was the development of digital and stealth the Third Offset Strategy is going to be AI and autonomy AI and autonomy could leverage many operational benefits that could allow the US military to improve the strength and cost-effectiveness of its forces it would continue to outmatch Russia, China, Iran or North Korea even if those countries were to catch up with the USA in the development of high-end weapon technologies, such as precision-guided munitions, robotic technology, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities and A2/AD denial technologies.1

LAW’s are the new frontier of innovation – also check every enemies aggression

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Missouri State (MSDI)

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The U.S. military and China’s [PLA] People’s Liberation Army are both pursuing[AI] artificial intelligence capabilities which could give them a leg up in future conflicts. PLA investment in AI is now on par with the Pentagon’s, experts say. The United States [US] views China as its top military and economic competitor. “Supported by a burgeoning AI defense industry, the Chinese military has made extraordinary progress in procuring AI systems for combat and support functions,” according to a recent report from the Georgetown University Center for Security and Emerging Technology. The People’s Liberation Army is most focused on procuring AI for intelligence analysis, predictive maintenance, information warfare, and navigation and target recognition in autonomous vehicles, said the study, “Harnessed Lightning: How the Chinese Military is Adopting Artificial Intelligence,” by analysts Ryan Fedasiuk, Jennifer Melot and Ben Murphy. Additionally, laboratories affiliated with the Chinese military are actively pursuing AI-based target recognition and fire-control research, which may be used in lethal autonomous weapon systems, according to the authors. “If public contracts reflect how the PLA prioritizes different emerging technologies, then it is likely the PLA spends more than $1.6 billion each year on AI-enabled systems,” the study said. “However, because it is still an emerging technology, the PLA’s true spending on AI likely exceeds this number, as more funding is captured in research and development rather than off-the-shelf technology procurement. Moreover, the most resource-intensive AI projects are likely classified,” it added. The analysts estimate that annual Chinese military spending on AI is in “the low billions” of U.S. dollars, a level of funding that is “on par” with Pentagon’s investments. “Various analyses of DoD budgets for procurement and research indicate that it spent between $800 million and $1.3 billion on AI in 2020, with an additional $1.7 billion to $3.5 billion for unmanned and autonomous systems,” the report said. For fiscal year 2022, the Defense Department requested $874 million for artificial intelligence projects, reflecting the “rapidly growing importance of AI in every facet of the department’s operations,” according to budget documents. That money would help fund more than 600 AI-related efforts. “It remains to be seen how exactly AI might alter the balance of military power in the Indo-Pacific,” the CSET report said. Additional Pentagon research into “counter-autonomy” capabilities, as well as U.S. and allied efforts to regulate access to semiconductor devices, may hinder the utility and availability of artificial intelligence systems for the PLA, the authors noted.

Jon Harper 1/6/2022 https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/1/6/china-matching-pentagon-spending-on-ai (Jon Harper is

The U.S. military and China’s [PLA] People’s Liberation Army are both pursuing[AI] artificial intelligence capabilities which could give them a leg up in future conflicts. PLA investment in AI is now on par with the Pentagon’s, experts say. The United States [US] views China as its top military and economic competitor it is likely the PLA spends more than $1.6 billion each year on AI-enabled systems the PLA’s true spending on AI likely exceeds this number Chinese military spending on AI is on par” with Pentagon’s investments it spent between $800 million and $1.3 billion on AI in 2020, with an additional $1.7 billion to $3.5 billion for autonomous systems That money would fund more than 600 AI-related efforts

China is matching US spending on AI – at worst proves that the aff can’t spillover

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The global autonomous weapons market was valued at $11,565.2 million in 2020, and is projected to reach $30,168.1 million in 2030, registering a CAGR [Compounded annual growth rate] of 10.4%.The rapid spread of COVID-19 had a significant impact on the global autonomous weapons market in 2020, owing to the implementation of strict lockdown measures across the world. COVID-19 pandemic led to several challenges for the autonomous weapons industry such as disruption in the supply chain of essential raw materials, logistics challenges, reduction in defense spending across various countries, and others. On the other hand, the defense systems manufacturers and service providers had to reduce expansion and R&D investments to withstand the decline in revenue and operating performance of the defense industry. The delay in purchase orders and slow production rate were some of the challenges observed in the autonomous weapons market throughout the year, and are expected to continue for a few years. Without the need for human involvement, autonomous weapons choose and engage targets. They usually include armed quadcopters that can hunt for and eliminate persons who fulfil specific pre-defined criteria, however, they do not include remotely piloted drones or cruise missiles where humans are in charge of all targeting decisions. Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology has advanced to the point that deployment of such systems may be accomplished in a few years, and the stakes are quite high. After gunpowder and nuclear weapons, autonomous weapons have been dubbed as the third revolution in warfare. Rise in technological advancements in autonomy of weapons are being observed throughout the world. Autonomy is being added to different parts of existing weapons systems, from target planning to mission execution. Global military spending on autonomous weapons and AI is anticipated to grow significantly over the years. This factor is expected to account for rapid development of the autonomous weapons market during the forecast period. The market segmentation is based on product, platform, type, and region. The product segment is further divided into missiles, munitions, guided rockets, guided projectiles, hypersonic weapon, and others. By platform, the market is segmented into land, airborne, and naval. By type, it is segmented into semi-autonomous and autonomous. Region wise, the market is analyzed across North America, Europe, Asia-Pacific, and LAMEA. Key players operating in the global autonomous weapons market include BAE Systems plc, Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd., Kongsberg Gruppen ASA, Lockheed Martin Corporation, MBDA, Northrop Grumman Corporation, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd., Raytheon Technologies Corporation, Rheinmetall AG, and Thales Group. Increase in number of autonomous defense vehicles, drones, and robots Autonomous defense systems including weapons, smart vehicles, armed drones, and robots play a vital role in the defense operations. These are fully autonomous tools that employ telecommunication technology such as 5G network, at the disposal of defense agencies to provide services in real time at dangerous, inconvenient, and impossible areas of operation such as remote surveillance for enemy infantry. Various countries across the globe have focused on development of autonomous systems to be utilized in public and national safety applications. In recent times, multiple governments from developed and emerging nations such as the U.S., Russia, China, and India have invested billions of dollars for autonomous defense projects. For instance, Europe launched a defense research and development program of $9.32 billion in January 2021 toward financing defense R&D projects. Adoption of autonomous technologies helps in reduction of operational costs and increases efficiency significantly. For instance, during the operation of a naval destroyer for a single day $700,000 are spent by the U.S. navy whereas in the case of an autonomous ship's operation costs would come down to $15,000 to $20,000 per day. Moreover, for increased efficiency; several nations around the world are deploying the use of 5G in the operation of autonomous defense vehicles, robots, and drones. For instance, U.S. ignite launched a technology pilot program in January 2021 for 5G Living Lab at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Miramar situated in San Diego. Moreover, several pilot projects aimed at utilization of 5G in autonomous defense vehicles, drones, and robots are underway globally. Rise in adoption of autonomous technology to improve defense capabilities of nation globally is anticipated to propel growth of the global autonomous weapons market during the forecast period. Increase in investments to develop autonomous weapons Although autonomous weapons technology is still in its early stages, several militaries and private companies are developing and testing weapons that could one day be deployed to fight on their own. For instance, Russia is performing tests on autonomous tanks on Syrian battlefields, the U.S. has successfully tested swarms of drones, the UK wants to induct drone squadrons in combat roles as soon as possible, and China is developing unmanned submarines capable of carrying out kamikaze attacks (Japanese suicide bombing tactic) on enemy vessels. Armed forces across the world have been working on autonomous weapons for several decades now. Presently, at least 30 countries use them, mainly to defend airbases, ground vehicles, or ships against missile attacks. Various countries are competing with each other intensely to manufacture or procure leading-edge autonomous weapons. For instance, China and Russia aim to pursue development of autonomous weapons and are heavily investing in R&D activities. In addition, UK’s new defense strategy is aimed at propelling defense capabilities leveraging AI, as does Israel. According to the Brookings Institution (a Washington, DC-based non-profit public policy organization), the Chinese military and defense sector have been investing heavily in robots, swarming, and other artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning applications (ML). So far, advancements in autonomous weapons have drawn on existing research and development expertise. Moreover, Russia is developing an array of autonomous weapon platforms utilizing artificial intelligence as part of an ambitious push supported by high-tech cooperation with China. Such developments provide rise in demand for autonomous weapons, which is anticipated to propel growth of the global autonomous weapons market during the forecast period. Serious issues with fully autonomous weapons Fully autonomous weapons are those that can choose and fire on targets without the need for human interaction. Fully autonomous weapons are capable of assessing tactical context on a battlefield and deciding on appropriate assault based on processed data. Several countries fund and assist operations aimed at developing and researching completely autonomous weaponry. China, Germany, India, Israel, Republic of Korea, Russia, and the UK. UK, U.S., Israel, and South Korea have already deployed robotic systems with varying degrees of autonomy and lethality. Although abovementioned nations project great prospects for fully autonomous weapons, experts across the globe have pointed out issues related to accountability, protection of lives of citizens, and falling of such technology with non-authorized persons. No single human may be held responsible for his or her acts in an armed battle if the weapon system is autonomous. Instead, accountability is shared among a larger, possibly unidentifiable group of people, which could include robot's programmer or maker. Removal of humans from the selection and execution of attacks on targets, as the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions noted in their report to the Human Rights Council, represents a critical moment in the new technology that is considered a revolution in modern warfare. It was advised to nations to carefully consider consequences of such weapon systems, adding that such technology raises danger of states engaged in armed conflicts, owing to a lower risk of military casualties. Fully autonomous weapons could lower conflict threshold, particularly in cases where other side lacks comparable systems to deploy in response. These factors, as experts have pointed out, could lead to serious conflicts and uncalled war like situations caused due to unsupervised attacks made by fully autonomous weapons, and hinder growth of the global autonomous weapons market during the forecast timeframe. Rise in use of autonomous weapons globally Use of weapons that make their own judgments or autonomous weapons, have increased in recent years as a result of technological improvements and rise in complicated conflicts such as the Syrian and Libyan civil wars. Libya is not the only place where destructive autonomous weapons have been utilized in recent years. For instance, autonomous quadcopters were employed by Turkey to monitor its border with Syria. In September 2020, when Azerbaijan attacked Armenian-occupied territory, it used loitering munitions (drones that can autonomously fly over an area and divebomb enemy radar signals) made by both Turkish and Israeli companies. These weapons appear to be miniature versions of remote-controlled drones that the U.S. military has deployed extensively in battles with Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries. Loitering munitions, on the other hand have a built-in explosive and destroy themselves on impact with their target, rather than releasing missiles via remote control. These factors prove lethality and efficiency of autonomous weapons and rise in use of autonomous weapons is expected to propel growth of the global autonomous weapons market during the forecast period.

Himanshu Joshi , Sonia Mutreja August 2021 “Autonomous Weapons Market by Product (Missiles, Munitions, Guided Rockets, Guided Projectiles, Hypersonic Weapons, and Others), Platform (Land, Airborne, and Naval), and Type (Semi-Autonomous and Autonomous): Global Opportunity Analysis and Industry Forecast, 2021–2030” https://www.alliedmarketresearch.com/autonomous-weapons-market-A13132#:~:text=The%20global%20autonomous%20weapons%20market,registering%20a%20CAGR%20of%2010.4%25.

The autonomous weapons market was valued at $11,565.2 million projected to reach $30,168.1 million registering a CAGR [Compounded annual growth rate] of 10.4%. AI has advanced to the point that deployment of such systems may be in a few years, and the stakes are high autonomous weapons have been dubbed as the third revolution in warfare. Rise in technological advancements in autonomy of weapons are being observed throughout the world. Autonomy is being added to different parts of existing weapons systems, from target planning to mission execution. Global spending is anticipated to grow significantly Autonomous systems play a vital role in defense operations Various countries across the globe have focused on development of autonomous systems multiple governments from developed and emerging nations such as the U.S., Russia, China, and India have invested billions of dollars for autonomous projects Europe launched a research program of $9.32 billion in January 2021 during the operation of a naval destroyer for a single day $700,000 are spent by the U.S. navy whereas an autonomous ship's operation costs would come down to $15,000 to $20,000 per day Armed forces across the world have been working on autonomous weapons for several decades now Various countries are competing with each other intensely to manufacture leading-edge autonomous weapons Russia is developing autonomous as part of an ambitious push supported by high-tech cooperation with China. Such developments provide rise in demand for autonomous weapons, which is anticipated to propel growth of the global weapons the new technology is considered a revolution in modern warfare

The LAW market is a massive global R&D program that is at the frontier of the market and research

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Missouri State (MSDI)

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2022

The DOD recently announced that it is planning to update DODD 3000.09 this year. Michael Horowitz, director of the DOD’s Emerging Capabilities Policy Office and the Pentagon official with responsibility for shepherding the policy, praised DODD 3000.09 in a recent interview, stating that “the fundamental approach in the directive remains sound, that the directive laid out a very responsible approach to the incorporation of autonomy and weapons systems.” While not making any firm predictions, Horowitz suggested that major revisions to DODD 3000.09 were unlikely. In general, this is good news. The DOD’s existing policy recognizes that some categories of autonomous weapons, such as cyber weapons and missile defense systems, are already in widespread and broadly accepted use by dozens of militaries worldwide. It also allows for the possibility that future technological progress and changes in the global security landscape, such as Russia’s potential deployment of artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled lethal autonomous weapons in Ukraine, might make new types of autonomous weapons desirable. This requires proposals for such weapons to clear a high procedural and technical bar. In addition to demonstrating compliance with U.S. obligations under domestic and international law, DOD system safety standards, and DOD AI-ethics principles, proposed autonomous weapons systems must clear an additional senior review process where the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under secretary of defense for policy; and the under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics certify that the proposed system meets 11 additional requirements, each of which require presenting considerable evidence.

Gregory C. Allen, 22, (Gregory C. Allen, Gregory C. Allen is the director of the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Governance Project and a senior fellow in the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., 6-6-2022, CISA, DOD Is Updating Its Decade-Old Autonomous Weapons Policy, but Confusion Remains Widespread, https://www.csis.org/analysis/dod-updating-its-decade-old-autonomous-weapons-policy-confusion-remains-widespread, 7-3-2022) SCade

The DOD recently announced that it is planning to update DODD 3000.09 this year the fundamental approach in the directive remains sound, that the directive laid out a very responsible approach to the incorporation of autonomy and weapons systems this is good news The DOD’s existing policy recognizes that some categories of autonomous weapons such as cyber weapons and missile defense systems It allows for the possibility that future tech progress and changes in the global security landscape make new types of autonomous weapons desirable This requires proposals for such weapons to clear a high procedural and technical bar In addition to demonstrating compliance with U.S. obligations under domestic and international law, DOD system safety standards, and DOD AI-ethics principles proposed autonomous weapons systems must clear an additional senior review process where the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The DOD is rewriting internal policy to allow for broader acquisition of LAWS

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Resolved: 5. To express, as an opinion or determination, by resolution and vote; to declare or decide by a formal vote; -- followed by a clause; as, the house resolved (or, it was resolved by the house) that no money should be apropriated (or, to appropriate no money).

Webster’s 98 (Revised Unabridged, Dictionary.com)

To express, as an opinion or determination, by resolution and vote

Determination reached by voting

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Gonzaga (GDI)

Topicality

2022

INTRANSITIVE VERB:1. To reach a decision or make a determination: resolve on a course of action. 2. To become separated or reduced to constituents. 3. Music To undergo resolution.

AHD 6 (American Heritage Dictionary, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolved)

To reach a decision or make a determination: resolve on a course of action

Specific course of action

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Gonzaga (GDI)

Topicality

2022

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go on… If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, begin the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

Webster’s 00 (Guide to Grammar and Writing, http://ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/marks/colon.htm)

If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence,

Colon is meaningless --- everything after it is what’s important

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Gonzaga (GDI)

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co·lon (plural co·lons) noun Definition: 1. punctuation mark: the punctuation mark (:) used to divide distinct but related sentence components such as clauses in which the second elaborates on the first, or to introduce a list, quotation, or speech. A colon is sometimes used in U.S. business letters after the salutation. Colons are also used between numbers in statements of proportion or time and Biblical or literary references.

Encarta 7 (World Dictionary, “colon”, http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?refid=1861 598666)

used to divide distinct but related sentence components such as clauses in which the second elaborates on the first,

The colon just elaborates on what the community was resolved to debate

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4 -- used as a function word before a noun or a substantivized adjective to indicate reference to a group as a whole <the elite>

Webster’s 5 (Merriam Webster’s Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary)

used as a function word before a noun to indicate reference to a group as a whole

“The” indicates reference to a noun as a whole

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2. indicating generic class: used to refer to a person or thing considered generically or universally Exercise is good for the heart. She played the violin. The dog is a loyal pet.

Encarta 9 (World English Dictionary, “The”, http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?refid=1861719495)

indicating generic class: used to refer to a thing considered generically or universally Exercise is good for the heart

“The” means all parts

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3 a—used as a function word before a singular noun to indicate that the noun is to be understood generically <the dog is a domestic animal> b—used as a function word before a singular substantivized adjective to indicate an abstract idea <an essay on the sublime>

Webster’s 9 (Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, “The”, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/the)

used as a function word before a singular noun to indicate that the noun is to be understood generically <the dog is a domestic animal the

Means the noun must be interpreted generically

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the1     P    (th before a vowel; th before a consonant) def.art. Used before singular or plural nouns and noun phrases that denote particular, specified persons or things: the baby; the dress I wore. Used before a noun, and generally stressed, to emphasize one of a group or type as the most outstanding or prominent: considered Lake Shore Drive to be the neighborhood to live in these days. Used to indicate uniqueness: the Prince of Wales; the moon. Used before nouns that designate natural phenomena or points of the compass: the weather; a wind from the south. Used as the equivalent of a possessive adjective before names of some parts of the body: grab him by the neck; an infection of the hand. Used before a noun specifying a field of endeavor: the law; the film industry; the stage. Used before a proper name, as of a monument or ship: the Alamo; the Titanic. Used before the plural form of a numeral denoting a specific decade of a century or of a life span: rural life in the Thirties.

American Heritage, 00 (Fourth Edition, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/the)

the Used before singular or plural nouns that denote particular, specified persons or things Used to indicate uniqueness

“The” is used to denote a specific entity

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used as a function word to indicate that a following noun or noun equivalent is a unique or a particular member of its class <the President> <the Lord>

Merriam-Websters 8 Online Collegiate Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary

used as a function word to indicate that a following noun is a unique or a particular member of its class <the President>

‘The’ denotes uniqueness – distinguishes the federal government from other governments

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U·nit·ed States [ y ntəd stáyts ] country in central North America, consisting of 50 states. Languages: English. Currency: dollar. Capital: Washington, D.C.. Population: 290,342,550 (2001). Area: 9,629,047 sq km (3,717,796 sq mi.)  Official name  United States of America

Encarta 7 (Dictionary Online, “United States”, http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?refid=1861708119)

U·nit·ed States country in central North America, consisting of 50 states Official name  United States of America

“United States” is the USA

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Q. Should I capitalize “the states” when used alone (referring to the United States)? I’m copyediting a novel in which the author capitalizes “the States” when used alone. I think it would be lowercased.

Chicago Manual of Style 10 – Chicago Manual of Style Online, “Capitalization, Titles”, http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/qanda/data/faq/topics/CapitalizationTitles.html

Should I capitalize “the states” when used alone (referring to the United States)?

“United States” is capitalized---referring to the collective, not individual states

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We're coming up on the Fourth of July, when the United States is full of barbecues, fireworks, parades, and competitive hot dog eating. But why do we say "the United States is full of..." instead of "the United States are"? On Independence Day, there's no better time to reflect on how the rise of America's national unity was mirrored by its grammatical unity, as "the United States" turned into a singular noun. The late historian Shelby Foote repeated an oft-told tale for the popular documentary series The Civil War (first broadcast on PBS in 1990): Before the war, it was said "the United States are." Grammatically, it was spoken that way and thought of as a collection of independent states. And after the war, it was always "the United States is," as we say today without being self-conscious at all. And that sums up what the war accomplished. It made us an "is." Foote's tidy narrative is just a little too tidy, reiterating conventional wisdom that has been floating around since a couple of decades after the end of the Civil War. In 1887, a Washington Post writer declared that the Civil War "settled forever the question of grammar... The surrender of Mr. Davis and Gen. Lee meant a transition from the plural to the singular." Four years later, clergyman G. H. Emerson wrote that "the change from the plural to the singular was vital, though it has taken a War of Rebellion to make the difference unmistakable." And in 1909, classics scholar and former Confederate soldier Basil Lanneau Gildersleeve stated, in a widely quoted lecture, "It was a point of grammatical concord which was at the bottom of the Civil War — 'United States are,' said one, 'United States is,' said another." Rather than just accepting such sweeping claims, one writer sought to track the actual shift in usage from "the United States are" to "the United States is." In 1901, former secretary of state John W. Foster contributed an article to the New York Times finding that the transformation from plural to singular was a slow and messy one. In the Constitution, for instance, "the United States" is treated as plural, but so is "the House of Representatives," "the Senate," and "Congress." Over time, usage changed in American English, so that these collective nouns became construed as singular. (In British English, collective nouns can still take plural verb forms.) "The United States" also went the singular route, but its path was complicated by the plural ending -s at the end of "States." Foster shoots down the popular notion that the Civil War was wholly responsible for the change in thinking. Before the war, there were writers and statesmen who preferred the singular, and afterwards there were still many who held on to the old plural usage. You can see the persistence of the traditional plural treatment of "the United States" in the 13th Amendment, ratified at war's end in 1865: Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. In fact, the "United States is/are" debate raged for decades and was hardly settled by the surrender of the Confederacy. An 1895 column in the Indianapolis Journal defended the usage of Secretary of State Richard Olney, who preferred "the United States are." The writer insisted that this was correct usage on grammatical grounds: "Thoroughly as one may believe in the idea of nationality, one cannot ignore the structural principles of the English language." As late as 1909, Ambrose Bierce was clinging to this grammatical defense of "the United States" as plural. In his peevish compendium Write it Right, Bierce griped, "Grammar has not a speaking acquaintance with politics, and patriotic pride is not schoolmaster to syntax." But Bierce was on the losing side of that argument. Already, as a result of Secretary Foster's careful historical research on the subject, the House of Representative's Committee on Revision of the Laws had ruled in 1902 that "the United States" should be treated as singular, not plural. The tide had finally turned — four decades after the Civil War.

Zimmer 9 – Ben Zimmer, Executive Producer of the Visual Thesaurus and Vocabulary.com and Language Columnist for The Wall Street Journal and Former Language Columnist for The Boston Globe and The New York Times Magazine, “The United States Is... Or Are?”, Visual Thesaurus, 7-3, http://www.visualthesaurus.com/cm/wordroutes/the-united-states-is-or-are/

why do we say "the United States is full of..." instead of "the United States are"? the rise of America's national unity was mirrored by its grammatical unity, as "the United States" turned into a singular noun Already, as a result of Secretary Foster's careful historical research on the subject, the House of Representative's Committee on Revision of the Laws had ruled in 1902 that "the United States" should be treated as singular, not plural

It’s a singular noun

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(f) Definition of United States. As used in this section, the term "United States" means each of the several States of the United States, the District of Columbia, and territories and possessions of the United States.

US Code 7 (2 USCS § 1966, lexis)

the term "United States" means each of the States District of Columbia, and territories and possessions

United States includes territories and possessions

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(6) United states. The term "United States" means the 50 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and any other territory or possession of the United States.

US Code 7 (6 USCS § 1111, lexis)

The term "United States" means 50 States District of Columbia, Puerto Rico Northern Mariana Islands Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and any other territory or possession

United States includes territories and possessions

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FIa.App. 3 Dist. 19,76. Term "United States," as used in statute providing for exclusion of income and losses derived from sources outside of United States, means only the 50 states and the District of Columbia. West's F.S.A. § 220.13(1)(b)2b. Heft- ler Const. Co. and Subsidiaries v. Department of Revenue, 334 So.2d 129, certiorari denied 341 So.2d 1082.-Tax 1001.1, 1074.1.

Words & Phrases 3 – WORDS & PHRASES, Vol. 43, 2003, p. 469

Term "United States," means only the 50 states and D C

“United States” means the 50 states and D.C.

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federal [‘federal] adjective (a) referring to a system of government in which a group of states are linked together in a federation; a federal constitution = constitution (such as that in Germany) which provides for a series of semi-autonomous states joined together in a national federation (b) referring especially to the federal government of the United States; federal court or federal laws = court or laws of the USA, as opposed to state courts or state laws.

Dictionary of Government and Politics ’98 (Ed. P.H. Collin, p. 116)

federal referring especially to the federal government of the U S as opposed to state courts or state laws

Federal refers to the national government. It’s distinct from state law.

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Federal government. Of or relating to the central government of a nation, having the character of a federation as distinguished from the governments of the constituent unites (as states or provinces).

WEBSTER'S 76 NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED, p. 833.

Federal government. Of or relating to the central government of a nation as distinguished from the governments of the constituent unites (as states

Federal government is central government

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Federal government. 1. A national government that exercises some degree of control over smaller political units that have surrendered some degree of power in exchange for the right to participate in national politics matters – Also termed (in federal states) central government. 2. the U.S. government – Also termed national government. [Cases: United States -1 C.J.S. United States - - 2-3]

Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, June 1, 2004, pg.716.

Federal government. 1. A national government that exercises some degree of control over smaller political units that have surrendered some degree of power in exchange for the right to participate in national politics matters – Also termed (in federal states) central government. 2. the U.S. government

Federal government is the national government that expresses power

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United States of America (USA) [ju:’naitid ‘steits av e’merike] noun independent country, a federation of states (originally thirteen, now fifty in North America; the United States Code = book containing all the permanent laws of the USA, arranged in sections according to subject and revised from time to time COMMENT: the federal government (based in Washington D.C.) is formed of a legislature (the Congress) with two chambers (the Senate and House of Representatives), an executive (the President) and a judiciary (the Supreme Court). Each of the fifty states making up the USA has its own legislature and executive (the Governor) as well as its own legal system and constitution

Dictionary of Government and Politics ’98 (Ed. P.H. Collin, p. 292)

United States of America independent country federal government (based in Washington D.C.) is formed of a legislature an executive and a judiciary

USFG is the federal government of the USA, based in DC

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“[Government] In the United States, government consists of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches in addition to administrative agencies. In a broader sense, includes the federal government and all its agencies and bureaus, state and county governments, and city and township governments.”

Black’s Law 90 (Dictionary, p. 695)

In the U S government consists of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches

“Government” is all three branches

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shall 'shall' describes something that is mandatory. If a requirement uses 'shall', then that requirement _will_ be satisfied without fail. Noncompliance is not allowed. Failure to comply with one single 'shall' is sufficient reason to reject the entire product. Indeed, it must be rejected under these circumstances. Examples: # "Requirements shall make use of the word 'shall' only where compliance is mandatory." This is a good example. # "C++ code shall have comments every 5th line." This is a bad example. Using 'shall' here is too strong. should 'should' is weaker. It describes something that might not be satisfied in the final product, but that is desirable enough that any noncompliance shall be explicitly justified. Any use of 'should' should be examined carefully, as it probably means that something is not being stated clearly. If a 'should' can be replaced by a 'shall', or can be discarded entirely, so much the better. Examples: # "C++ code should be ANSI compliant." A good example. It may not be possible to be ANSI compliant on all platforms, but we should try. # "Code should be tested thoroughly." Bad example. This 'should' shall be replaced with 'shall' if this requirement is to be stated anywhere (to say nothing of defining what 'thoroughly' means).

AC 99 (Atlas Collaboration, “Use of Shall, Should, May Can,” http://rd13doc.cern.ch/Atlas/DaqSoft/sde/inspect/shall.html)

'shall' describes something that is mandatory 'should' is weaker. It describes something that might not be satisfied in the final product, but that is desirable enough

“Should” means desirable --- this does not have to be a mandate

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D.S.C. 1966. The word “substantial” within Civil Rights Act providing that a place is a public accommodation if a “substantial” portion of food which is served has moved in commerce must be construed in light of its usual and customary meaning, that is, something of real worth and importance; of considerable value; valuable, something worthwhile as distinguished from something without value or merely nominal

Words and Phrases 2 (Volume 40A, p. 458)

The word “substantial” within Civil Rights Act providing that a place is a public accommodation if a “substantial” portion of food has moved in commerce must be construed in light of its usual and customary meaning, that is, something of real worth and importance; of considerable value

"Substantial" means of real worth or considerable value --- this is the USUAL and CUSTOMARY meaning of the term

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Plaintiffs should argue that the term "substantially prevail" is not a term of art because if considered a term of art, resort to Black's 7th produces a definition of "prevail" that could be interpreted adversely to plaintiffs. 99 It is commonly accepted that words that are not legal terms of art should be accorded their ordinary, not their legal, meaning, 100 and ordinary-usage dictionaries provide FOIA fee claimants with helpful arguments. The Supreme Court has already found favorable, temporally relevant definitions of the word "substantially" in ordinary dictionaries: "Substantially" suggests "considerable" or "specified to a large degree." See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2280 (1976) (defining "substantially" as "in a substantial manner" and "substantial" as "considerable in amount, value, or worth" and "being that specified to a large degree or in the main"); see also 17 Oxford English Dictionary 66-67 (2d ed. 1989) ("substantial": "relating to or proceeding from the essence of a thing; essential"; "of ample or considerable amount, quantity or dimensions"). 101

Arkush 2 (David, JD Candidate – Harvard University, “Preserving "Catalyst" Attorneys' Fees Under the Freedom of Information Act in the Wake of Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources”, Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, Winter, 37 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 131)

words that are not legal terms of art should be accorded their ordinary, not their legal, meaning The Supreme Court has already found favorable definitions of the word "substantially" in ordinary dictionaries: "Substantially" suggests "considerable" or specified to a large degree

“Substantial” means considerable or to a large degree --- this common meaning is preferable because the word is not a term of art

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The URAA and the SAA neither amend nor refine the language of § 1677(4)(C).  In fact, they merely suggest, without disqualifying other alternatives, a “clearly higher/substantial proportion” approach.  Indeed, the SAA specifically mentions that no “precise mathematical formula” or “‘benchmark’ proportion” is to be used for a dumping concentration analysis.  SAA at 860 (citations omitted); see also Venez. Cement, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1329-30.  Furthermore, as the Court of International Trade noted, the SAA emphasizes that the Commission retains the discretion to determine concentration of imports on a “case-by-case basis.”  SAA at 860.  Finally, the definition of the word “substantial” undercuts the CFTVC’s argument.  The word “substantial” generally means “considerable in amount, value or worth.”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2280 (1993).  It does not imply a specific number or cut-off.  What may be substantial in one situation may not be in another situation.  The very breadth of the term “substantial” undercuts the CFTVC’s argument that Congress spoke clearly in establishing a standard for the Commission’s regional antidumping and countervailing duty analyses.  It therefore supports the conclusion that the Commission is owed deference in its interpretation of “substantial proportion.”  The Commission clearly embarked on its analysis having been given considerable leeway to interpret a particularly broad term.

Prost 4 (Judge – United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, “Committee For Fairly Traded Venezuelan Cement v. United States”, 6-18, http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/04opinions/04-1016.html)

the definition of the word “substantial” undercuts the argument.  The word “substantial” generally means “considerable in amount, It does not imply a specific number or cut-off.  What may be substantial in one situation may not be in another situation.

Substantial means “of considerable amount” – not some contrived percentage

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Ala. 1909. “Substantial” means “belonging to substance; actually existing; real; *** not seeming or imaginary; not elusive; real; solid; true; veritable

Words and Phrases 2 (Volume 40A) p. 460

Substantial” means “belonging to substance; actually existing; real; *** not seeming or imaginary

"Substantial" means actually existing, real, or belonging to substance

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Instruction No. 10 was not given in isolation, however. The district court's instructions also contained a definition of "substantial." Instruction No. 11 defined "substantial" as meaning "true, real or likely to materialize" and as not meaning "imaginary or unlikely to materialize." This instruction properly limited the potential bases for the jury's decision, which is the essential function of jury instructions. When combined with the contract and the verdict-directing instructions, [*1432] which tracked the operative language of the contract, Instruction No. 11 required the jury to find that KCPL had determined a real risk, not some imaginary hypothetical risk premised solely on a reduction in the DRD. Because the contract provided only one means of creating a risk of making an indemnity payment--a demand notice from an Investor--the jury's discretion was properly channelled into deciding whether KCPL had sufficiently studied and honestly considered the likelihood of receiving such a demand notice. That determination is all that the contract required.

Wollman ’93 (Circuit Judge, US Court of Appeals – 8th Circuit, Kansas City Power & Light Company, a Missouri corporation, Appellee, v. Ford Motor Credit Company, a Delaware corporation; McDonnell Douglas Finance Corporation, a Delaware corporation; HEI Investment Corp., a Hawaii corporation, Appellants, 995 F.2d 1422; 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 13755, L/N)

The district court' defined "substantial" as meaning "true, real or likely to materialize" and as not meaning "imaginary or unlikely to materialize.

Substantial means real, not imaginary

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Ala. 1909. “Substantial” means “belonging to substance; actually existing; real; * * * not seeming or imaginatary; not illusive; real; solid; true; veritable.” – Elder v. State, 50 So. 370, 162 Ala. 41.

Words and Phrases, 2 (Words and Phrases Permanent Edition, “Substantial,” Volume 40A, p. 448-486 October 2002, Thomson West)

Substantial” means “belonging to substance; actually existing; real; * * * not seeming or imaginatary; not illusive; real; solid; true; veritable

Substantial has to be material

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The words “outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive,” in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain; absolute; real at present time, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive.

Words & Phrases 64 (40 W&P 759)

The words substantial mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment

“Substantially” means not covert

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Ordinary Meaning. First, words in a patent are to be given their ordinary meaning unless otherwise defined. 30 However, what if a particular word has multiple meanings? For example, consider the word "substantial." The Webster dictionary gives eleven different definitions of the word substantial. 31 Additionally, there are another two definitions specifically provided for the adverb "substantially." 32 Thus, the "ordinary meaning" is not clear. The first definition of the word "substantial" given by the Webster's Dictionary is "of ample or considerable amount, quantity, size, etc." 33 Supposing that this is the precise definition that the drafter had in mind when drafting the patent, the meaning of "ample or considerable amount" appears amorphous. This could have one of at least the following interpretations: (1) almost all, (2) more than half, or (3) barely enough to do the job. Therefore, the use of a term, such as "substantial," which usually has a very ambiguous meaning, makes the scope of protection particularly hard to determine.

Stark 97 (Stephen J., “Key Words And Tricky Phrases: An Analysis Of Patent Drafter's Attempts To Circumvent The Language Of 35 U.S.C.”, Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Fall, 5 J. Intell. Prop. L. 365, Lexis)

consider the word "substantial." the meaning of "ample or considerable amount" appears amorphous. This could have one of at least the following interpretations: (1) almost all, (2) more than half, or (3) barely enough to do the job. Therefore, the use of a term, such as "substantial," which usually has a very ambiguous meaning, makes the scope of protection particularly hard to determine

The qualitative definitions of substantial are amorphous and unlimiting

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For reasons explained at length in the decision, none of the companies meets the conditions for obtaining immunity from fines, a "very substantial" reduction of the fine (i.e. at least 75%) or even a "substantial" reduction (i.e. between 50% and 75%).

Glosbe No Date, “substantial reduction in English”, https://glosbe.com/en/en/substantial%20reduction

a "very substantial" reduction of the fine (i.e. at least 75%) or even a "substantial" reduction (i.e. between 50% and 75%).

A substantial reduction is 50-75%

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'Substantial" means "of real worth and importance; of considerable value; valuable." Bequest to charitable institution, making 1/48 of expenditures in state, held exempt from taxation; such expenditures constituting "substantial" part of its activities. Tax Commission of Ohio v. American Humane Education Soc., 181 N.E. 557, 42 Ohio App. 4.

Words & Phrases 60

'Substantial" means "of real importance Bequest to charitable institution, making 1/48 of expenditures such expenditures constituting "substantial" activities

“Substantial” must be at least 2%

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Substantial v. insubstantial: Modern courts consider competition with commercial firms as “strong evidence of a substantial nonexempt purpose.” Living Faith, Inc. v. Comm’r, 60 T.C.M. 710, 713 (1990). Although the tax court has held that the definition of insubstantial is fact specific, it has found that less than ten percent of a charity’s total efforts is “insubstantial”, World Family Corp. v. Comm’r, 78 T.C. 921 (1982), where as unrelated business activity generating one-third of an organizations revenue does not qualify for tax-exempt status. Orange County Agric. Soc’y, Inc. v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. 1602, 1604 (1988), aff’d 893 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1990). However, this may be changing after an increasing emphasis on commensurate test.

Mickels 8 (Alissa, JD Candidate – Hastings College of Law, “Summary of Existing US Law Affecting Fourth Sector Organizations”, 7-17, http://www.fourthsector.net/attachments/7/original/Summary_of_US_Law_Affecting_ FS.pdf?1229493187)

Substantial v. insubstantial: the definition of insubstantial is fact specific, it has found that less than ten percent of efforts is “insubstantial”

Less than 10% is insubstantial

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In the opinion below, the Tenth Circuit suggested that a percentage figure would be a way to avoid vagueness issues. (Pet. App., at 13-14) Indeed, one of the Amici supporting the City in this case, the American Planning Association, produced a publication that actually makes a recommendation of a percentage figure that should be adopted by municipalities in establishing zoning  [*37]  regulations for adult businesses. n8 The APA's well researched report recommended that the terms "substantial" and "significant" be quantified at 40 percent for floor space or inventory of a business in the definition of adult business. n9 (Resp. Br. App., at 15-16)

Schwartz 4 (Arthur, Lawyer – Schwartz + Goldberg, 2002 U.S. Briefs 1609, Lexis)

the Tenth Circuit suggested that a percentage figure would be a way to avoid vagueness issues the American Planning Association, produced a publication that actually makes a recommendation of a percentage figure n8 The APA's well researched report recommended that the terms "substantial" and "significant" be quantified at 40 percent

“Substantially” means 40% --- strict quantification avoids vagueness

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n241 I am assuming here that "foreseeable" means "probable," as in "more probable than not." This appears to be a safe assumption given the proliferance of cases granting immunity to officials who offend the Constitution. If this definition is correct, deterrence only works and liability should only attach if one's conduct, viewed ex ante, is more likely illegal than legal: the risk of illegality must be more than fifty percent. In other words, one cannot face deterrence, and liability will not attach, if the risk of illegality is less than fifty percent. (When viewed in this fashion, one might perceive a risk of illegality but still not be deterrable because the risk is not substantial, i.e., not greater than fifty percent.). Lawful conduct, of course, need not be probably lawful. That is what risk is about. Situations might arise where the objective risk is that conduct is unlawful, but ex post it is lawful. Lest judicial reasoning be completely askew, a fairly strong correlation exists, however, between action that is ex ante probably lawful and that which is lawful ex post in the courts. If this is not true, then courts are reaching objectively improbable conclusions, and the whole idea of reliance is illusory.

Brown 94 (Mark R., Professor of Law – Stetson University College of Law, “The Demise of Constitutional Prospectivity: New Life for Owen?”, Iowa Law Review, January, 79 Iowa L. Rev. 273, Lexis)

. (When viewed in this fashion, one might perceive a risk is not substantial, i.e., not greater than fifty percent.).

Less than 50% is insubstantial

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Change in selected pressures on natural ecosystems 2002-32. For the ecosystem quality component, see the explanation of the Natural Capital Index. Values for the cumulative pressures were derived as described under Natural Capital Index. The maps show the relative increase or decrease in pressure between 2002 and 2032. 'No change' means less than 10 per cent change in pressure over the scenario period; small increase or decrease means between 10 and 50 per cent change; substantial increase or decrease means 50 to 100 per cent change; strong increase means more than doubling of pressure. Areas which switch between natural and domesticated land uses are recorded separately.

UNEP 2 ( United nations environmental program, www.unep.org/geo/geo3/english/584.htm, October 1 2002, DA6/21/11, OST)

small increase or decrease means between 10 and 50 per cent change; substantial increase or decrease means 50 to 100 per cent change;

Substantial increase or decrease is 50 to 100 percent

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“Substantial” is a relative word, which, while it must be used with care and discrimination, must nevertheless be given effect, and in a claim of patent allowed considerable latitude of meaning where it is applied to such subject as thickness, as by requiring two parts of a device to be substantially the same thickness, and cannot be held to require them to be of exactly the same thickness. Todd. V. Sears Roebuck & Co., D.C.N.C., 199 F.Supp. 38, 41.

Words and Phrases 60 (Vol. 40, State – Subway, p. 762)

“Substantial” is a relative word, which, while it must be used with care and discrimination, must nevertheless be given effect

“Substantial” must be given meaning

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Cal. 1956. “Substantial” is a relative term, its measure to be gauged by all the circumstances surrounding the matter in reference to which the expression has been used

Words and Phrases 2 (Volume 40A, p. 464)

Substantial” is a relative term, its measure to be gauged by all the circumstances surrounding the matter in reference to which the expression has been used

"Substantial" must be gauged in context

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The word “substantial” is susceptible to different meanings according to the circumstances, and is variously defined as actual, essential, material, fundamental, although no rule of thumb can be laid down fixing its exact meaning

Words and Phrases 2 (Volume 40A, p. 483)

substantial” is susceptible to different meanings according to the circumstances, and is variously defined no rule of thumb can be laid down fixing its exact meaning

Context is key --- "substantial" has no exact meaning

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Might price reductions of less than twenty percent qualify as substantial? In some markets they should, and it would be reasonable to decide substantiality on a case-by-case basis. One advantage of a bright-line rule is that it would let incumbents know where they stand. Monopolies that price only slightly above their average cost would be insulated from the entry of higher-cost entrants if they could credibly convey a willingness to price below the entrants' cost after entry, as illustrated in Part III. However, these monopolies do consumers little harm and may enhance market efficiency.

Edlin 2 (Aaron, Professor of Economics and Law – University of California Berkeley School of Law, January, 111 Yale L.J. 941)

Might price reductions of less than twenty percent qualify as substantial? In some markets they should, and it would be reasonable to decide substantiality on a case-by-case basis

"Substantiality" should be defined on a case-by-case basis

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n138. I.R.C. 877(e). Neither the statute nor the legislative history indicates how much of a reduction in taxes is necessary in order to constitute a "substantial" reduction. The meaning of "substantial" varies from one Code section to the other. Compare, e.g., I.R.C. 368(a)(1)(C) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996) (acquisition of "substantially all" of acquired company's assets for ruling purposes is 70% of gross assets and 90% of net assets (Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568)) with I.R.C. 1092 (West 1988 & Supp. 1996) ("substantial diminution" of risk of loss).

Jeffrey M. Colon, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law, Winter 1997, San Diego Law Review, 34 San Diego L. Rev. 1, Lexis Academic

Neither the statute nor the legislative history indicates how much of a reduction in taxes is necessary in order to constitute a "substantial" reduction. The meaning of "substantial" varies from one Code section to the other

Their definition of substantial is arbitrary – there’s no consistency in US Code.

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Substantial and substantially exhibit the same problem as aggressively, which I ranted about in this October 2010 AdamsDrafting blog post. How big does something have to be before it is substantial or can be said to do something substantially? More than 50% of its maximum potential magnitude? More than 70%? 85.42%? I have no idea. So the subjectivity inherent in vagueness is compounded by imprecision. Maybe substantial and substantially refer to a magnitude that’s close enough to the maximum that a reasonable person in the position of whoever has the benefit would be satisfied. That may be the case, but I’m not aware that that meaning is sufficiently accepted that you can take it for granted.

Ken Adams 18, Author at Adam’s drafting, “Substantial” and “Substantially”, http://www.adamsdrafting.com/substantial-and-substantially/, January 25

How big does something have to be before it is substantial or can be said to do something substantially? More than 50% of its maximum potential magnitude? More than 70%? the subjectivity inherent in vagueness is compounded by imprecision Maybe substantial and substantially refer to a reasonable person in the position of whoever has the benefit would be satisfied

Substantial(ly) cannot be measured—its too vague

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First, the court said that the ordinary meaning of the word “increase” is “to make something greater,” which it believed should not “be limited to cases in which a company raises the rate that an individual has previously been charged.” 435 F.3d at 1091. Yet the definition offered by the Ninth Circuit compels the opposite conclusion. Because “increase” means “to make something greater,” there must necessarily have been an existing premium, to which Edo’s actual premium may be compared, to determine whether an “increase” occurred. Congress could have provided that “ad-verse action” in the insurance context means charging an amount greater than the optimal premium, but instead chose to define adverse action in terms of an “increase.” That definitional choice must be respected, not ignored. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392-93 n.10 (1979) (“[a] defin-ition which declares what a term ‘means’ . . . excludes any meaning that is not stated”). Next, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that because the Insurance Prong includes the words “existing or applied for,” Congress intended that an “increase in any charge” for insurance must “apply to all insurance transactions – from an initial policy of insurance to a renewal of a long-held policy.” 435 F.3d at 1091. This interpretation reads the words “exist-ing or applied for” in isolation. Other types of adverse action described in the Insurance Prong apply only to situations where a consumer had an existing policy of insurance, such as a “cancellation,” “reduction,” or “change” in insurance. Each of these forms of adverse action presupposes an already-existing policy, and under usual canons of statutory construction the term “increase” also should be construed to apply to increases of an already-existing policy. See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (“a phrase gathers meaning from the words around it”) (citation omitted).

Buckley 6 Jeremiah, Attorney, Amicus Curiae Brief, Safeco Ins. Co. of America et al v. Charles Burr et al, http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/06-84/06-84.mer.ami.mica.pdf

the ordinary meaning of the word “increase” is “to make something greater which it believed should not “be limited to cases in which a company raises the rate that an individual has previously been charged Yet the definition compels the opposite conclusion Because “increase” means “to make something greater,” there must necessarily have been an existing premium to determine whether an “increase” occurred Congress chose to define adverse action in terms of an “increase.” That definitional choice must be respected, not ignored. under usual canons of statutory construction the term “increase” should be construed to apply to increases of an already-existing policy

Increase must be of something that already exists

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Specifically, we must decide whether charging a higher price for initial insurance than the insured would otherwise have been charged because of information in a consumer credit report constitutes an "increase in any charge" within the meaning of FCRA. First, we examine the definitions of "increase" and "charge." Hartford Fire contends that, limited to their ordinary definitions, these words apply only when a consumer has previously been charged for insurance and that charge has thereafter been increased by the insurer. The phrase, "has previously been charged," as used by Hartford, refers not only to a rate that the consumer has previously paid for insurance but also to a rate that the consumer has previously been quoted, even if that rate was increased [**23] before the consumer made any payment. Reynolds disagrees, asserting that, under [*1091] the ordinary definition of the term, an increase in a charge also occurs whenever an insurer charges a higher rate than it would otherwise have charged because of any factor--such as adverse credit information, age, or driving record 8 --regardless of whether the customer was previously charged some other rate. According to Reynolds, he was charged an increased rate because of his credit rating when he was compelled to pay a rate higher than the premium rate because he failed to obtain a high insurance score. Thus, he argues, the definitions of "increase" and "charge" encompass the insurance companies' practice. Reynolds is correct.

Reinhardt 5 U.S. Judge for the UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT (Stephen, JASON RAY REYNOLDS; MATTHEW RAUSCH, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.; HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants-Appellees., lexis

, under the ordinary definition of the term, an increase in a charge also occurs whenever an insurer charges a higher rate than it would otherwise have charged because of any factor- --regardless of whether the customer was previously charged some other rate.

“Increase” doesn’t require prior existence

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[**48]  Statutory Interpretation. HN16While the CAA defines a "modification" as any physical or operational change that "increases" emissions, it is silent on how to calculate such "increases" in emissions. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4). According to government petitioners, the lack of a statutory definition does not render the term "increases" ambiguous, but merely compels the court to give the term its "ordinary meaning." See Engine Mfrs.Ass'nv.S.Coast AirQualityMgmt.Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 124 S. Ct. 1756, 1761, 158 L. Ed. 2d 529(2004); Bluewater Network, 370 F.3d at 13; Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Glickman, 342 U.S. App. D.C. 7, 215 F.3d 7, 10 [*23]  (D.C. Cir. 2000). Relying on two "real world" analogies, government petitioners contend that the ordinary meaning of "increases" requires the baseline to be calculated from a period immediately preceding the change. They maintain, for example, that in determining whether a high-pressure weather system "increases" the local temperature, the relevant baseline is the temperature immediately preceding the arrival of the weather system, not the temperature five or ten years ago. Similarly,  [**49]  in determining whether a new engine "increases" the value of a car, the relevant baseline is the value of the car immediately preceding the replacement of the engine, not the value of the car five or ten years ago when the engine was in perfect condition.

Rogers 5 Judge – New York, et al., Petitioners v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent, NSR Manufacturers Roundtable, et al., Intervenors, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 12378, **; 60 ERC (BNA) 1791, 6/24, Lexis

Relying on real world" analogies, the ordinary meaning of "increases" requires the baseline to be calculated from a period immediately preceding the change.

Must be a net increase

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Main Entry: its Pronunciation: \ˈits, əts\ Function: adjective Date: circa 1507 : of or relating to it or itself especially as possessor, agent, or object of an action <going to its kennel> <a child proud of its first drawings> <its final enactment into law>

Webster’s 10 (Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, “its”, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/its)

its of or relating to it or itself especially as possessor, agent, or object of an action

Of or relating to

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It is important to state the context in which the term ‘maritime security cooperation’ has been used in this paper because it potentially encompasses relations which range from alliances bound by treaties to informal collaborations. In this paper, the term ‘maritime security cooperation’ refers to ‘collaboration’71 which may include explicit or implicit informal arrangements between states under the ambit of defence cooperation and may manifest as navy-to-navy staff talks, multinational exercises, ship visits and exchanges of visits by senior officials. The drivers for maritime security cooperation are: Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), training, capacity building, benchmarking of operational standards, building interoperability, coalition building etc.

Sawan 20 (Ranendra Singh Sawan; naval commander from the Indian Navy, “Problems and prospects of maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region: a case study of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)” [] Accessed 7/11/22, TR)

security cooperation’ refers to collaboration which include Confidence Building Measures training capacity building, benchmarking of operational standards, building interoperability, coalition building etc.

Security coop includes capacity building

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C1.1.2. Distinguishing Between Security Cooperation and Security Assistance Programs. As the definition of SC above reveals, there are many types of SC activities. For the purposes of this Manual, it is important to be able to distinguish between SC Programs and SA Programs. Programs of both types are the means by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense services to our partner nations in support of U.S. National Security objectives, including Building Partner Capacity (BPC). They are distinguished by the statutes by which they are authorized and funded.

Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 12 (Department of Defense, Security Assistance Management Manual, Chapter 1, Accessed 7/2/22, https://samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-1 )

, it is important to distinguish between SC Programs and SA Programs They are distinguished by the statutes by which they are authorized and funded.

Security cooperation is funded and authorized by the DoD under the NDAA. Programs involving the State department are security assistance.

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The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy oversees the Department’s security cooperation enterprise, aligning security cooperation programs, activities, and resources with defense strategy and priorities. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017 set forth significant reforms including the consolidation of authorities under Title 10 U.S. Code, Chapter 16, and the requirement for the Department to maintain a program of assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) in support of security cooperation programs and activities. This site serves as a source for policy and reports implementing the Department’s security cooperation strategy and FY17 NDAA reforms. Additionally, summaries of completed independent strategic evaluations will be published to this site as part of the AM&E program pursuant to Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 383. Sponsored by the Department, these independent strategic evaluations produce findings, conclusions, and recommendations by measuring the efficiency and effectiveness of security cooperation programs and activities in achieving desired outcomes.

DOD No date (“Security Cooperation,” https://open.defense.gov/Transparency/Security-Cooperation/.)-JV

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy oversees the Department’s security cooperation enterprise, aligning security cooperation programs, activities, and resources with defense strategy and priorities.

DOD oversees all U.S. security cooperation.

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The term “security cooperation programs and activities of the Department of Defense” means any program, activity (including an exercise), or interaction of the Department of Defense with the security establishment of a foreign country to achieve a purpose as follows: (A) To build and develop allied and friendly security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations. (B) To provide the armed forces with access to the foreign country during peacetime or a contingency operation. (C) To build relationships that promote specific United States security interests.

US Code, Accessed 7/14/22, (Title 10, Subtitle A- General Military Law, Part I- Organization and General Military Powers, Chapter 16 - SECURITY COOPERATION, § 301 – Definitions, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/301)

The term “security cooperation means any program, activity (including an exercise), or interaction of the Department of Defense with the security establishment of a foreign country to build and develop allied and friendly security capabilities To provide the armed forces with access to the foreign country To build relationships that promote specific United States security interests.

“Security Cooperation” is between the Department of defense and the security establishment of a foreign country.

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Although the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, security assistance and security cooperation are not the same thing. Typically, security cooperation refers to all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments (such as the Afghanistan Ministry of Defense) aimed at building relationships to promote U.S. interests, develop partner capacity, and increase U.S. ties to its allies.5 Generally speaking, DOD considers all activities listed under Title 10 of the U.S. Code to be security cooperation. The Congressional Research Service estimates that DOD has more than 80 authorities to engage in security cooperation.6

Young 18 (Angelic Young; served as a frontline civilian for over a decade, beginning with the Department of State in 2001, “On Women, Peace, and Security” [https://www.wiisglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/10th-US-CSWG-April-25-2018.pdf] Accessed 7/4/22, TR)

Typically, security cooperation refers to all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments (such as the Afghanistan Ministry of Defense) aimed at building relationships to promote U.S. interests, develop partner capacity, and increase U.S. ties to its allies. all activities listed under Title 10 of the U.S. Code to be security cooperation.

All DoD activities listed under Title 10 of the US code are considered security cooperation

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The Secretary of Defense identifies security cooperation goals, assesses the overall effectiveness of security cooperation activities, and revises goals when required to ensure continued support for US interests abroad.54 Security cooperation is the means by which DoD encourages and enables countries and organizations to work with the US to achieve strategic objectives. The myth that only DoD participates in security cooperation activities could not be farther from the truth. A good working definition of security cooperation is provided by Colonel Albert Zaccor:55 Security cooperation refers to all USG assistance provided to foreign law enforcement, security, and defense establishments in support of national defense, security, and foreign policy objectives.

Henneke 7 (Jason Henneke; US Army author and financial professional, “In What Ways Has US Security Cooperation Programs Been Effective in Helping Kenya to Build Partnership Capacity to Counter Transnational Terrorism” [https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA470674.pdf] Accessed 7/4/22, TR)

The myth that only DoD participates in security cooperation activities could not be farther from the truth Security cooperation refers to all USG assistance provided to foreign law enforcement, security, and defense establishments in support of national defense, security, and foreign policy objectives.

Security coop isn’t contained to just the DoD

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We define SC as “activities undertaken by the U.S. government to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve security sector objectives.” This is a modification of a definition set down in DoD doctrine in 2008, with the differences being that we use the term “U.S. government” rather than “Department of Defense” and replace “strategic” with “security sector.”5 SC thus covers a broad range of DoD, Department of State (DoS), and other activities from individual interactions, to unit exercises, to large train and equip programs.

McNerney et all ’14 (McNerney, Michael J., Angela O'Mahony, Thomas S. Szayna, Derek Eaton, Caroline Baxter, Colin P. Clarke, Emma Cutrufello, Michael McGee, Heather Peterson, Leslie Adrienne Payne, and Calin Trenkov-Wermuth, “Assessing Security Cooperation as a Preventive Tool”, RAND Corporation, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR350.html. Accessed 07-06-22)

We define SC as “activities undertaken by the U.S. government to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve security sector objectives.” SC thus covers a broad range of DoD, Department of State (DoS), and other activities from individual interactions, to unit exercises, to large train and equip programs.

Security Cooperation is done by multiple agencies within the USFG

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It is an oft-repeated mantra that in order to defeat transnational terrorism, and by extension other related non-state threats, the United States must apply all the elements of national power, including diplomatic, informational, military, and economic.34 The OSD SCG directs that DOD Security Cooperation “will be integrated with other elements of national power…in order to achieve national security, defense, and foreign policy objectives.”35 This formulation, while helpful, obscures two key facts. First, Security Cooperation includes activities that by their very nature involve the simultaneous application of more than one element of national power. Security Cooperation at a minimum requires the combination of diplomatic relations, military assistance, military-to-military contacts, and public diplomacy. In other words, Security Cooperation is itself an application of at least three of the classic elements of national power.36 Second, DOD is not the only entity in the USG that interacts with foreign governments to achieve the stated objectives: relationships, capabilities, information and intelligence, and access. The Department of State, the Intelligence Community, and to a lesser extent, other departments and agencies, conduct activities aimed at the accomplishment of these objectives, broadly understood. There is, however, no common USG, or interagency, definition or concept of Security Cooperation.37 We will return to this issue in the final section of this paper. For the purposes of the present discussion, this paper offers the following working definition of Security Cooperation: Security Cooperation refers to all USG assistance provided to foreign law enforcement, security, and defense establishments in support of national defense, security, and foreign policy objectives.38 This expanded definition of Security Cooperation will help us to see how the USG may leverage its programs and activities to fight terrorism and related non-state threats.

Zaccor 05 (Colonel Albert Zaccor, Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, Security Cooperation and Non-State Threats: A Call for an Integrated Strategy, 2005, pg 7, The Atlantic Council of the United States, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/46290/2005_08_Security_Cooperation_and_Non-State_Threats.pdf, Date Accessed 7-11-22) -JVK

the United States must apply all the elements of national power, including diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. DOD is not the only entity in the USG that interacts with foreign governments to achieve the stated objectives: relationships, capabilities, information and intelligence, and access. The Department of State, the Intelligence Community, and to a lesser extent, other departments and agencies, conduct activities aimed at the accomplishment of these objectives, broadly understood Security Cooperation refers to all USG assistance provided to foreign law enforcement, security, and defense establishments in support of national defense, security, and foreign policy objectives

Security cooperation refers to all US assistance to foreign law enforcement, security, and defense establishments

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The Security Assistance Team is organized into three regional teams and develops military assistance policy and manages security assistance funding through three programs: Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). The Security Assistance Team, in close cooperation with the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources (F), regional and functional bureaus, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and U.S. regional Combatant Commanders, determines military grant assistance policy, develops and manages the programs’ budgets, provides notifications to Congress, supports determinations made to waive legislative constraints on security assistance funding, distributes funds, and provides program oversight.

Office of security Assistance, 21 “Key Topics – Office of Security Assistance - United States Department of State.” United States Department of State, 14 Oct. 2021, www.state.gov/about-us-office-of-security-assistance/. Accessed 2 July 2022, , FLC

The Security Assistance Team is organized into three regional teams and develops military assistance policy and manages security assistance funding through three programs: Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). The Security Assistance Team, in close cooperation with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and U.S. regional Combatant Commanders, determines military grant assistance policy, develops and manages the programs’ budgets, provides notifications to Congress, supports determinations made to waive legislative constraints on security assistance funding, distributes funds, and provides program oversight.

Security cooperation is undertaken by a different agency than Security Assistance, they are not the same

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The discussion of U.S. assistance to foreign military and other security forces is complicated by the lack of a standard and adequate terminology. “Military assistance,” “security assistance,” “security cooperation,” “security sector assistance,” “security force assistance,” and “defense articles and services” are all terms used in connection with the supply of weapons, equipment, supplies, and training to such forces and, in some cases, engagement with them. Some of these terms are defined by policy documents or in law (see Appendix A). Some authorities are labeled with two more informal terms—“build partner capacity” or “train and equip”—which are used in the discussion of specific authorities below.7 Terminology The two terms most commonly used today for assistance to foreign military and security forces are “security assistance” and “security cooperation.” Security assistance is the term most frequently used, regardless of the agency providing that assistance. There is no State Department definition for security assistance. The annual State Department congressional budget justification (CBJ), however, lists six budget accounts under the heading “International Security Assistance.” These accounts, with their underlying Title 22 authorities (the 1961 FAA and the AECA), are commonly regarded as the State Department’s security assistance portfolio.

Serafino 16 (Nina A. Serafino; Specialist in International Security Affairs at Congressional Research Service in Washington, D.C, “Security Assistance and Cooperation: Shared Responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense” [https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R44444.pdf] Published 5/26/16, Accessed 7/11/22, TR)

The discussion of U.S. assistance to foreign military and other security forces is complicated by the lack of a standard and adequate terminology security assistance,” “security cooperation all terms used in connection with the supply of weapons, equipment, supplies, and training to such forces and, in some cases, engagement with them The two terms most commonly used today for assistance to foreign military and security forces are “security assistance” and “security cooperation. Security assistance is the term most frequently used regardless of the agency providing that assistance no State Department definition for security assistance

No distinction between “security assistance” and “security cooperation” – used interchangably

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For most of the past half-century, Congress has authorized U.S. security assistance programs through Title 22 of the U.S. Code (Foreign Relations) and appropriated the bulk of security assistance funds through State Department accounts. DOD administers programs funded through several of these accounts under the Secretary of State’s direction and oversight. Beginning in the 1980s, however, and increasingly after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 (9/11), some policymakers have come to view the State Department authorities, or the funding allocated to them, as insufficient and too inflexible to respond to evolving and emerging security threats. As a result, Congress has increasingly provided DOD with the means to offer security assistance under authorities in either Title 10 of the U.S. Code (Armed Services) or the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), both funded as part of the DOD budget. (These are collectively known as “Title 10” authorities and referred to by DOD as “security cooperation.”)

Serafino 16 (Nina A. Serafino; Specialist in International Security Affairs at Congressional Research Service in Washington, D.C, “Security Assistance and Cooperation: Shared Responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense” [https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R44444.pdf] Published 5/26/16, Accessed 7/11/22, TR)

For most of the past half-century, Congress has authorized U.S. security assistance programs through Title 22 of the U.S. Code (Foreign Relations) and appropriated the bulk of security assistance funds through State Department accounts Beginning in the 1980s, however, and increasingly after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 (9/11), some policymakers have come to view the State Department authorities, or the funding allocated to them, as insufficient and too inflexible to respond to evolving and emerging security threats. Congress has increasingly provided DOD with the means to offer security assistance under authorities in either Title 10 of the U.S. Code (Armed Services) or the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), both funded as part of the DOD budget. (These are collectively known as “Title 10” authorities and referred to by DOD as “security cooperation

Security Assistance and Security Cooperation are the same thing – Security Cooperation was created out of the same processes as Security Assistance .

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Scan these two lists, and you come to an inescapable conclusion: Security and resilience are not synonyms or even second cousins. In fact, security and resilience have remarkably little to do with one another. The measures under the “security” list are about locking up. Those under “resilience” are about standing up. Security is about hunkering down. Resilience is about doing business.

Rothrock, 17 (Ray Rothrock, 5-5-2017, accessed on 7-2-2022, TechBeacon, "Security vs. resilience: Know the difference", https://techbeacon.com/security/security-vs-resilience-know-difference)-JLI

Security and resilience are not synonyms or even second cousins security and resilience have remarkably little to do with one another The measures under the “security” list are about locking up. Those under “resilience” are about standing up. Security is about hunkering down. Resilience is about doing business

Security and resilience are distinct- security is about locking up, resilience is about standing back up.

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Gonzaga (GDI)

Topicality

2022

The contours of artificial intelligence and machine learning are not well defined, but generally, "artificial intelligence" refers to machines designed to act intelligently and mimic human decision making and "machine learning" refers to the ability of software to learn and self-improve.

Marcogliese et al. 19 ( Pamela L. Marcogliese; a partner at Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, ranked among four leading lawyers in the United States for Corporate Governance by Legal 500 US 2021, Colin D. Lloyd; a partner in the Firm’s Commodities, Futures and Derivatives and Capital Markets Groups, Sandra M. Rocks; active in Cleary’s FinTech practice as one of the principal advisors on commercial law implications of the use of digital assets, Lauren Gilbert; Professor of Law at the St. Thomas University School of Law, “Treasury Report Embraces Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence in Financial Services” [https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?men_tab=srchresults&handle=hein.journals/rail2&id=30&size=2&collection=usjournals&terms=refers%20to|artificial%20intelligence&termtype=phrase&set_as_cursor=1] Accessed 7/3/22, TR)

artificial intelligence" refers to machines designed to act intelligently and mimic human decision making

AI technology has to mimic human decision calculus

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Gonzaga (GDI)

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2022

The third wave of artificial intelligence, perception artificial intelligence, refers to deep machine learning and neural networks. With perception artificial intelligence, algorithms are able to interpret and identify shapes and images in the way a human would. Lee explains that "[algorithms can now group the pixels from a photo or video into meaningful clusters and recognize objects much in the same way our brain does . . .. The same goes for audio data."8 The book offers several examples, such as Amazon's Echo and Alibaba's Citybrain, which rely upon deep-learning algorithms to analyze data and provide users with real-time assessments of the environment, whether at home or waiting in traffic on the highway

Smith 19 (Jessica “Zhanna” Malekos Smith; Reuben Everett Cyber Scholar at Duke University Law School and served as a Captain in the U.S. Air Force Judge Advocate General's Corps, “Finding Humanity in the Great Power Competition for Artificial Intelligence” [https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?men_tab=srchresults&handle=hein.journals/judica103&id=255&size=2&collection=usjournals&terms=refers%20to|artificial%20intelligence&termtype=phrase&set_as_cursor=2] Accessed 7/3/22, TR)

artificial intelligence refers to deep machine learning and neural networks algorithms are able to interpret and identify shapes and images in the way a human would analyze data and provide users with real-time assessments of the environment

AI includes machine learning programs

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Gonzaga (GDI)

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2022

This definition of big data comes from VIKTOR MAYER-SCH)NBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUJTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM How WE LIvE, WORK, AND THINK 4-5 (2013). There is also a tendency to treat two related concepts-artificial intelligence and machine learning-as synonyms in popular writing. While the two concepts are related, they are distinct. Artificial intelligence refers to the branch of computer science interested in building machines capable of intelligent behavior. Machine learning, a subset of artificial intelligence, refers to the use of algorithms capable of learning from experience. Developments in machine learning have made everyday applications like Facebook tagging, Siri, sophisticated web searching, and movie recommendations possible. See, e.g., Lee Bell, Machine Learning Versus AL What's the Difference?, WIRED UK (Dec. 1, 2016), http:// www.wired.co.uk/article/machine-leaming-ai-explained [https://perma.cc/QVQ4-QVRG] (noting that machine learning and AL, while related, are distinct concepts). Moreover, "[a]n algorithm is a procedure or set of instructions often used by a computer to solve a problem." Julia Angwin, Making Algorithms Accountable, PROPUBLICA(Aug. 1, 2016, 3:21 AM), https:// www.propublica.org/article/making-algorithms-accountable [https://perma.cc/RZY6-XM38]. But see Steve Lohr, How Big Data Became So Big, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2012), http:// www.nytimes.com/2012/08/12/business/how-big-data-became-so-big-unboxed.html ("Big Data is a shorthand label that typically means applying the tools of artificial intelligence, like machine learning, to vast new troves of data beyond that captured in standard databases.").

Joh 17 (Elizabeth E. Joh; Martin Luther King, Jr. Professor of Law at the University of California, Davis School of Law, “Feeding the Machine: Policing, Crime Data, & Algorithms” [https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?men_tab=srchresults&handle=hein.journals/wmbrts26&id=307&size=2&collection=usjournals&terms=Artificial%20intelligence%20refers%20to|refers%20to|artificial%20intelligence&termtype=phrase&set_as_cursor=3] Accessed 7/3/22, TR)

Artificial intelligence refers to the branch of computer science interested in building machines capable of intelligent behavior. Machine learning, a subset of artificial intelligence, refers to the use of algorithms capable of learning from experience.

AI refers to machinery capable of intelligent behavior, and includes machine learning

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Gonzaga (GDI)

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2022

Artificial Intelligence represents our next frontier, as space exploration in the 60's and 70's and decoding the human genome in the 90's and 00's, a new land of promises and dangers ready to be conquered. As happened with the previous technological developments, the concept has the ability to embody our wildest dream as pictured in Sci-Fi culture. Therefore, it is important to begin by offering a clear definition. Artificial intelligence "refers to systems that display intelligent behaviour by analysing their environment and taking actions - with some degree of autonomy - to achieve specific goals. AIbased systems can be purely software-based, acting in the virtual world (e.g. voice assistants, image analysis software, search engines, speech and face recognition systems) or Al can be embedded in hardware devices (e.g. advanced robots, autonomous cars, drones or Internet of Things applications). We are using Al on a daily basis, e.g., to translate languages, generate subtitles in videos or to block email spam. Many Al technologies require data to improve their performance. Once they perform well, they can help improve and automate decision making in the same domain. For example, an Al system will be trained and then used to spot cyber attacks on the basis of data from the concerned network or system. 34 On the other hand, Minsky simplified the concept by defining artificial intelligence as "the science of producing machines that can carry out tasks that require intelligence (if developed by humans)

Álvarez 18 (Joaquin Rodriguez Alvarez; Researcher and Professor at the School of Prevention and Integral Safety and Security at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, “Social Challenges of Artificial Intelligence: The Case of Lethal Autonomous Systems” [https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/tsujrnl2018&id=249&men_tab=srchresults] Accessed 7/3/22, TR)

Artificial intelligence "refers to systems that display intelligent behaviour by analysing their environment and taking actions - with some degree of autonomy - to achieve specific goals Many Al technologies require data to improve their performance

AI constitutes acting autonomously from any controller

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Gonzaga (GDI)

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2022

Abstract. Biotechnology can be defined as any technology that involves living organisms or their derivatives. In applying this definition to rotifers, we focus on their contribution in culturing of early larval stages of marine fish. After almost four decades of marine fish culture in captivity, the success of this worldwide industry is still quite dependent on mass culture of the species Brachionus plicatilis and B. rotundiformis. In mass culture, the rotifers are continuously driven to reproduce at high rates, in relatively extreme environmental conditions of high population density and high loads of organic matter. Therefore, the success of mass cultures and future improvements in these systems relies on a close interaction between basic and applied studies of rotifers. In the present review, we will attempt to analyze why rotifers are suitable for early life stages of fish and to describe, in general, methodologies that have been devised for reliable supply of rotifers in large quantities. Problems associated with rotifer production, nutritional quality and effect on fish health and nutrition, will be discussed. Research on B. plicatilis and B. rotundiformis has increased enormously during the past three decades and these two species are the best-studied rotifers so far. While much of the research on these species is directed or devoted to the needs of aquaculture industry, they are also used as models for addressing basic biological questions, due to the relative ease of culture and their availability. Studies on feeding, pheromones, speciation in rotifers, the occurrence and putative hormones involved in sexual and asexual reproduction and production of resting eggs, are few examples of such studies. Rotifers will probably maintain their role as food organism for fish larvae, in spite of attempts to replace them with more accessible formulated food. Development of new culture methods that will improve the nutritional quality and production efficiency of rotifers may result in more diversified and flexible tasks for these organisms in aquaculture.

Lubzens 01 {“Biotechnology and aquaculture of rotifers.” Esther Lubzens (National Institute of Oceanography, Haifa, Israel), Odi Zmora (National Center for Mariculture, Eilat, Israel), and Yoav Barr (National Center for Mariculture, Eilat, Israel). Israel Oceanographic and Limnological Research, Rotifera IX pp 337–353. Part of the Developments in Hydrobiology book series (DIHY, volume 153). Published 2001, Accessed July 2, 2022. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-010-0756-6_44} – TW

Biotechnology can be defined as any tech that involves living organisms or their derivatives

Biotechnology must involve living organisms

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Gonzaga (GDI)

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2022

1.2 BIOTECHNOLOGY. Biotechnology in its broadest sense is the socio-economic exploitation of biology. However that definition is more usually defined in the context of the modern tools resulting from our expanding knowledge of genetics. Today biotechnology is considered to encompass the use of tools such as genetic engineering, protein engineering, advanced cellular engineering (hybridomas etc) and the instruments which permit ever more rapid developments. Such instruments include DNA sequencers and synthesisers, protein sequencers and synthesisers, polysaccharide sequencers and synthesisers etc. The development of diagnostic devices of many kinds (including DNA chips) has been one of the benefits of modern biotechnology. Recently the advent of biotechnological tools has greatly strengthened the potential of microbiology and has given rise to the "biotechnology company" which I believe is a fairly ephemeral beast destined to become just a new tool in the established disciplines of microbiology, medicine, agriculture etc.

Simpson 02 {“Industrial Aspects Of Technical Microbiology And Biotechnology,” Karl Simpson,. 20 peer-reviewed scientific publications and hundreds of articles written as Editor of journals and newsletters. Current activities involve: vaccine start-up Enesi Pharma, with a focus on the ImplaVax solid-dose immunisation technology , Maximizing the Security and Development Benefits from the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention pp 309–317. Part of the NATO Science Series book series (ASDT, volume 36) Published 2002, Accessed July 6, 2022. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-010-0472-5_27} – KV/TW

Biotechnology in its broadest sense is the socio-economic exploitation of biology However that definition is more usually defined in the context of the modern tools resulting from our expanding knowledge of genetics. Today biotechnology is considered to encompass the use of tools such as genetic engineering protein engineering advanced cellular engineering ) and the instruments which permit ever more rapid developments DNA protein polysaccharide sequencers and synthesisers etc The development of diagnostic devices DNA chips

Biotech means socio-economic exploitation of biology- includes genetic, protein, and cellular engineering, as well as instruments like DNA and protein sequencers.

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Gonzaga (GDI)

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2022

Cybersecurity refers to the body of technologies, processes, and practices designed to protect networks, devices, programs and data from attack, damage or unauthorized access. Cybersecurity may also be referred to as information technology security. Studies have shown that the highest vulnerabilities lie in small and mid-sized businesses. These businesses may be more informal in nature, with few staff members and a lack of checks and balances. However, large companies are not invulnerable.

Borges 20 (Wanda Borges; experience law attorney, and member at Borges & Associates, LLC, “Business Related Fraud and Cyber Security Awareness” [https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?men_tab=srchresults&handle=hein.journals/colaworl34&id=18&size=2&collection=usjournals&terms=Cybersecurity%20refers%20to&termtype=phrase&set_as_cursor=0], Accessed 7/3/22, TR)

Cybersecurity refers to the body of technologies, processes, and practices designed to protect networks, devices, programs and data from attack, damage or unauthorized access. Cybersecurity may also be referred to as information technology security.

Cybersecurity refers to the protection of information networks

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Gonzaga (GDI)

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2022

Cybersecurity refers to the defense against attacks on the information technology infrastructure of an organization or, in this case, of the federal government and agencies. Cybersecurity is intertwined with the physical security of assets-from computers, networks, and their infrastructure to the environment surrounding these systems. While both parts of security are necessary to achieve overall security, this report focuses on protecting software and data from attacks that are electronic in nature and that typically arrive over a data communication link. Cybersecurity is a major concern of both the federal government and the private sector.

GAO 10 (GAO; the U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Cybersecurity: Key Challenges Need To Be Addressed To Improve Research And Development” [https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=gao&handle=hein.gao/gaobaceko0001&id=5&men_tab=srchresults] Accessed 7/3/22, TR)

Cybersecurity refers to the defense against attacks on the information technology infrastructure of an organization or, in this case, of the federal government and agencies. intertwined with the physical security of assets-from computers, networks, and their infrastructure to the environment surrounding these systems focuses on protecting software and data from attacks that are electronic in nature

Cybersecurity refers to the defense against attacks on information infrastructure.

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Gonzaga (GDI)

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2022

The technical definition of cybersecurity refers to the Internet security as a branch of computer security specifically related to Internet. Its objective is to establish rules and measures to use against attacks over Internet. The advantages of cybersecurity will defend us from critical attacks and help us to browse the safe websites. Internet security processes all the incoming and outgoing data on our computer. The term "cybersecurity" commonly refers to the safeguards and actions that can be used to protect the cyber domain, both in the civilian and military fields, from those threats that are associated with or that may harm its interdependent networks and information infrastructure. Cybersecurity strives to preserve the availability and integrity of the networks and infrastructure and the confidentiality of the information contained therein. See the 2013 European Union Strategy. 'The term "cybersecurity regime" will be used in this article referring to the definition of Oran Young as a "complex regime" because cybersecurity is not yet a consolidated regime but it is in the process to become one and in that sense, this article helps to establish the existence of a regime when referring to cybersecurity. A "regime complex" is a collection of governance arrangements that are linked together in the sense that they address matters related to a common issue area or spatially defined region but that are not hierarchically related in the sense that they all fit within some well-defined institutional architecture. The originators and theorists of this way of thinking about governance have focused on cases like the regime complex for plant genetic resource and the regime complex of climate change. Regime complexes vary dramatically along a spectrum ranging from severe fragmentation to close-knit integration. For "regime complex" see Oran, 2012. Building and International Regime Complex for the Arctic: Current Status and Next Steps, The Polar Journal, No. 2, pp. 391-407.

Cassotta & Petterson 19 (Dr. Sandra Cassotta; Associate Professor in International Environmental Law at the Department of Law of Aalborg University, Maria Petterson; Finnish journalist from the University of Helsinki and the Aalto University School of Business, “Climate Change, Environmental Threats and Cyber-Threats to Critical Infrastructures in Multi-Regulatory Sustainable Global Approach with Sweden as an Example” [https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?men_tab=srchresults&handle=hein.journals/beijlar10&id=553&size=2&collection=journals&terms=cybersecurity%20refers%20to&termtype=phrase&set_as_cursor=11] Accessed 7/3/22, TR)

The technical definition of cybersecurity refers to the Internet security as a branch of computer security specifically related to Internet. Its objective is to establish rules and measures to use against attacks over Internet.

Cybersecurity refers to internet security

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Gonzaga (GDI)

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2022

Individuals and organizations have the right to report conducts endangering cybersecurity to relevant departments.150 Cybersecurity refers to the "capacity for network data to be complete, confidential and usable as well as protecting them from attack."151 The relevant competent departments may order the organisations to make corrections, and can, according to the circumstances, confiscate any illegal income made and impose a fine of not less than one time and not more than ten times the illegal gains. If there are no illegal gains, a fine up to 1,000,000 yuan shall be imposed, and the person in charge and other persons directly responsible shall be fined not less than 10,000 yuan but not more than 100,000 yuan. If the circumstances are serious, the relevant departments can suspend the organisations' relevant business and revoke their business licenses.

Huang et al. 21 (Robin Hui Huang; Professor of Law in the Faculty of Law Chinese University of Hong Kong, Qiang Han; PhD candidate at Columbia University, Xiuwen Zhu; senior research scientist experienced scientist in medicinal chemistry and drug discovery, “Protecting Data Privacy for Mobile Payments under the Chinese Law: Comparative Perspectives and Reform Suggestions” [https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?men_tab=srchresults&handle=hein.journals/jointpro20&id=346&size=2&collection=usjournals&terms=Cybersecurity%20refers%20to&termtype=phrase&set_as_cursor=13] Accessed 7/3/22, TR)

Cybersecurity refers to the "capacity for network data to be complete, confidential and usable as well as protecting them from attack

Cybersecurity concerns the capacity of the existing system

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Gonzaga (GDI)

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2022

For instance, even on the question of how to define cybersecurity. For the Chinese authorities and media, cybersecurity means technological safety and political stability. In other words, the Chinese side emphasizes information content and safety, and they state that cyberspace should not develop into a realm for political struggle. For the United States, however, cybersecurity refers to technological resilience, intellectual property protection and privacy. In short, the United States side stresses the freedom of cyberspace and data protection.

Dong 14 (Qingling Dong; applied scientist with a PhD in deep machine learning, “Confidence Building for Cybersecurity between China and the United States” [https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?men_tab=srchresults&handle=hein.journals/chintersd47&id=61&size=2&collection=journals&terms=cybersecurity%20refers%20to&termtype=phrase&set_as_cursor=1] Accessed 7/3/22, TR)

For the Chinese authorities and media, cybersecurity means technological safety and political stability For the United States, however, cybersecurity refers to technological resilience, intellectual property protection and privacy

Cybersecurity refers to tech resilience and protection

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Gonzaga (GDI)

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2022

Cybersecurity refers to a broad set of concepts for which there is no standard definition-it often varies by the entity employing it. DHS, for example, has defined cybersecurity as "the activity or process, ability or capability, or state whereby information and communications systems and the information contained therein are protected from and/or defended against damage, unauthorized use or modification, or exploitation."' The Committee on National Security Systems has defined a "cyber attack" as An attack, via cyberspace, targeting an enterprise's use of cyberspace for the purpose of disrupting, disabling, destroying, or maliciously controlling a computing environment/infrastructure; or destroying the integrity of the data or stealing controlled information.

Francis and Ginsberg 16 (Kathryn A. Francis; analyst in Government Organization and Management, Wendy Ginsberg; analyst in American National Government, “Federal Cybersecurity Workforce: Background and Congressional Oversight Issues for the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security” [https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?men_tab=srchresults&handle=hein.crs/crsmthabexv0001&id=5&size=2&collection=milandgov&terms=Cybersecurity%20refers%20to&termtype=phrase&set_as_cursor=10] Accessed 7/3/22, TR)

Cybersecurity refers to a broad set of concepts for which there is no standard definition-it often varies by the entity employing it DHS, for example, has defined cybersecurity as "the activity or process, ability or capability The Committee on National Security Systems has defined a "cyber attack" as An attack, via cyberspace, targeting an enterprise's use of cyberspace

“Cybersecurity” is inherently imprecise- no standard definition

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Gonzaga (GDI)

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2022

As proven in multiple high-profile cases in Federal and State Parliament this year, sexual violence and sexism are rife in politics. This is not limited to right-wing political organisations, as was shown in the Greens case in 2018. Nor is it limited to political parties. We need not look further than our very own campus to recognise that under the progressive veneer of left-wing activist organisations are structural issues of sexism, misogyny, gendered labour and abuse. There is not one such organisation on USyd’s campus that is free of this. Imperialist, sexist, racist and classist structures are replicated in spaces where we organise against them, and reconstitute themselves endlessly in individual interactions by default.

Dibben 21 (Dibben, Kimmy. “Sexism in the Campus Left.” Honi Soit, Honisoit, 17 Aug. 2021, http://honisoit.com/2021/08/sexism-in-the-campus-left/.)

. We need not look further than our very own campus to recognise that under the progressive veneer of left-wing activist organisations are structural issues of sexism, misogyny, gendered labour and abuse Imperialist, sexist, racist and classist structures are replicated in spaces where we organise against them, and reconstitute themselves endlessly in individual interactions by default.

The cooption of femnism under anti cap movements renforce the sexism in these spaces just pushes women out of the space, the left doesn’t care about femnism no matter how much they say they do

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Michigan (7-week)

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2022

The base knowledge provided and the process by which it is accessed is key. What “facts” or pieces of information go into the database will affect the actions of the machine. If a data point or “piece” is not present, there is no opportunity for it to get there. An AI might be able to rearrange existing bits of information to combine them into new insights, but it will never generate something outside of its existing set of information structures. There is a gatekeeping function present in the construction of all symbolic representations. As Adam (1998) notes, “A formal system, in other words a computer system, is a political choice to maintain existing power structures” (108).16 To bring this back to gendered warbots, if programmers decide that “child” as an object or representation can never be paired with “combatant,” then the machine will not be capable of identifying child soldiers. Moreover, what constitutes “child” will have to be represented in some way. The process by which such “knowledge” is represented is thus crucial. As Adam (1998) explains, the problem about deciding “what sort of objects there are in the world” becomes another problem about knowledge about “facts,” and how a knowledge base about “facts” is recreated within a system of purely propositional knowledge” (39).17 The purely propositional knowledge approach is open to all of the feminist critiques from feminist epistemology, in particular, that there is some sort of Truth about which the facts must correspond and that knowledge derived from skills (such as a “knowing how”) is not real knowledge (Adam 1998, 114). Warfighting is as much an art as it is a science, and so prohibiting this kind of embodied or practical knowledge would appear to undermine the ability of a warbot to fight effectively. The most pressing problem for symbolic systems, however, comes from the direction of analogical reasoning. Faced with the certainty that warbots will encounter complex situations, which they cannot have prior knowledge of, they will require some mechanism to abstract the situation to one about which they do have some higher order representation. This is done by way of analogy. A program will have to break down the situation into smaller objects that it can represent, and then it will search its database for something that is analogous where the concepts are equivalent or appropriate. To find such an abstract analogy, the AI uses stereotypes (Adam 1998, 39).18 Programmers may not readily admit to this, claiming that “the important thing is to break the overall experience reflected in the memory into composable regularities” (Storrs Hall 2007, 221). “Composable regularities” might be that all hills are convex physical structures, but they might also be that “all women speak with a high voice” or “all combatants are men between 18 and 35.” Reasoning by analogy is a heuristic that humans employ when they are being cognitive misers and is not appropriate for complex situations requiring critical thought.19 This brings us full circle to the problem of which objects and concepts get represented in the dataset. If the programmers, who are predominantly white, male, upper-middle class and academic, equip an AI with these perspectives, then it is not difficult to see how gendered constructions will reproduce themselves (AAUW 2015). A particular masculinity might be reproduced, or a particular view of femininity may not be modeled at all (Adam 1998, 23). In either case, the AI is clearly not “gender neutral.”

Roff 16 (Heather, Gendering a Warbot, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 18:1, 1-18, DOI: 10.1080/14616742.2015.1094246)

An AI might be able to rearrange existing bits of information to combine them into new insights, but it will never generate something outside of its existing set of information structures. “A formal system, in other words a computer system, is a political choice to maintain existing power structures” . The process by which such “knowledge” is represented is thus crucial. the problem about deciding “what sort of objects there are in the world” becomes another problem about knowledge about “facts,” and how a knowledge base about “facts” is recreated within a system of purely propositional knowledge” The purely propositional knowledge approach is open to all of the feminist critiques from feminist epistemology, in particular, that there is some sort of Truth about which the facts must correspond and that knowledge derived from skills (such as a “knowing how”) is not real knowledge Faced with the certainty that warbots will encounter complex situations, which they cannot have prior knowledge of, they will require some mechanism to abstract the situation to one about which they do have some higher order representation. This is done by way of analogy. A program will have to break down the situation into smaller objects that it can represent, and then it will search its database for something that is analogous where the concepts are equivalent or appropriate. To find such an abstract analogy, the AI uses stereotypes they might also be that “all women speak with a high voice” or “all combatants are men between 18 and 35.” Reasoning by analogy is a heuristic that humans employ when they are being cognitive misers and is not appropriate for complex situations requiring critical thought If the programmers, who are predominantly white, male, upper-middle class and academic, equip an AI with these perspectives, then it is not difficult to see how gendered constructions will reproduce themselves A particular masculinity might be reproduced, or a particular view of femininity may not be modeled at all In either case, the AI is clearly not “gender neutral.”

The idea that AI is gender neutral is complete BS—as long as the programmers are biased, so too is their creation

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But the appeal to science plunges us into circularity. For it has been shown, in convincing historical detail, that natural science itself has a gendered character. Western science and technology are culturally masculinized. This is not a question of personnel, though it is a fact that the great majority of scientists and technologists are men. The guiding metaphors. of scientific research, the impersonality of its discourse, the structures of power and communication in science, the reproduction of its internal culture, all stem from the social position of dominant men in a gendered world. The dominance of science in discussions of masculinity thus reflects the position of masculinity (or specific masculinities) in the social relations of gender.7 In that case, what can be expected from a science of masculinity, being a form of knowledge created by the very power it claims to study? Any such knowledge will be as ethically compromised as a science of race created by imperialists, or a science of capitalism produced by capitalists. There are, indeed, forms of scientific talk about masculinity that have capitulated to the dominant interests in much the same way as scientific racism and neoconservative economics.

Connell 05, (RW Connell and James W. Messerschmidt, Hegemonic Masculinities, RW Connell was formerly a professor at the University of Sydney and an Australian sociologist)GP

science itself has a gendered character Western science and technology are culturally masculinized . The guiding metaphors. of scientific research, the impersonality of its discourse, the structures of power and communication in science, the reproduction of its internal culture, all stem from the social position of dominant men in a gendered world The dominance of science in discussions of masculinity thus reflects the position of masculinity ) in the social relations of gender. . There are, indeed, forms of scientific talk about masculinity that have capitulated to the dominant interests in much the same way as scientific racism and neoconservative economics.

The language of bio science is entrenched in masculine ideals and norms- absent the alternative the aff just recreates harmful masculinity.

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2022

 Indigenous seeds, called landraces, were considered valueless, like indigenous peoples before them. Value was added to seeds only after an investment of time and money. The economic impact of this artificial value assigned to a gift of nature will be seen in Third World countries as plant breeders demand "rights" under new utility patents. The plant breeders, who are attempting to substitute local plant diversity with patented seeds throughout the world, go so far as to want laws to prevent farmers from using seeds gleaned from patented plants they have cultivated. Biotechnology is now treating human reproduction in the same proprietary way. Childbirth has been mechanized, and knowledge and skills are considered to be lodged with physicians, not with mothers. By transforming pregnancy into a medical disease, professional management, once confined to abnormal cases, is now considered necessary in every case. In cases of "abnormal" infertility, physicians believe they "create" babies, using the woman's body as so much raw material. The absurdity of this notion of man as creator can be seen by the patent application for the gene sequence coding for the hormone relaxin, which is produced in female ovaries but is being treated as an "invention" which can be owned. This attempt on the part of man to totally engineer the world, including the basic regenerative functions of the seed and women's bodies, is brought into question by the current crisis in health and ecology.

Shiva 92, (V Shiva, 1992, Women, Ecology, and Health: Rebuilding Connections: Introduction, published in the National Library of Medicine, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/12286886/)GP

 Indigenous seeds, called landraces, were considered valueless, like indigenous peoples before them The economic impact of this artificial value assigned to a gift of nature will be seen in Third World countries as plant breeders demand "rights" under new utility patents Biotechnology is now treating human reproduction in the same proprietary way. Childbirth has been mechanized, By transforming pregnancy into a medical disease, professional management, once confined to abnormal cases, is now considered necessary in every case. In cases of "abnormal" infertility, physicians believe they "create" babies, using the woman's body as so much raw material. This attempt on the part of man to totally engineer the world, including the basic regenerative functions of the seed and women's bodies, is brought into question by the current crisis in health and ecology

Biotechnology reinforces imperial patriarchy across the globe

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Michigan (7-week)

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2022

Gender, in addition to the practical concerns already discussed, appears to offer auseful prism through which to contemplate these issues. The feminine/masculine divide is a (or perhaps "the") critical hermeneutic through which each society constructs experience, assigns meaning, and asserts its basic values. Bridging the essentialist/constructionist rift, I would argue that this divide is informed by a conflation of biological difference and cultural representation. It is my contention that bioweapons have been disdained and ostensibly banned, at least in part, because they are largely gendered female and, hence, do not serve the fantasies and ends of the patriarchal war system; their semi-androgynous amalgam of science and disease fuels and substantiates extant culture and gender wars. As instruments of terror for the aforementioned "disenfranchised" nations and groups, they connote the mythical "furies" of "disempowered" female rage. That is not to say that bioweapons will never be employed by First World powers but, rather, that gendered perceptions shape their geopolitical status and deter potential use. Evidencing what Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie Russell Hochschild refer to as the "metaphorically gendered relationship between rich and poor countries,"36 First World males are intent on safeguarding their advantage by denying their Third World (disempowered) counterparts access to weaponry that would equalize the destructive playing field. Lastly, inasmuch as each weapon system conveys a certain status, banning a class of weapons, declaring them outlaw armaments, functions to further demean potential users.

Cecire 09, (Ruth Cecire, Feminist Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring 2009), pp. 41-65, Feminist Studies, Inc., http://www.jstor.org/stable/40607923) GP

The feminine/masculine divide is a ") critical hermeneutic through which each society constructs experience, assigns meaning, and asserts its basic values bioweapons have been disdained and ostensibly banned, at least in part, because they are largely gendered female and, hence, do not serve the fantasies and ends of the patriarchal war system their semi-androgynous amalgam of science and disease fuels and substantiates extant culture and gender wars they connote the mythical "furies" of "disempowered" female rage First World males are intent on safeguarding their advantage by denying their Third World counterparts access to weaponry that would equalize the destructive playing field.

Discourse and fear of bioweaponry is gendered feminine- MDC’s utilize discourse and banning of biological warfare to justify feminizing and repressing LDCs

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Michigan (7-week)

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2022

One reason is that in functionally differentiated and rapidly internationalising societies, the existing political institutions lack the structural ability to formulate and implement coordinated and effective policy approaches. Yet there is more to it than this. In order to see the arguably most powerful obstacle to major ecological progress, we need to focus on the values and paradigms governing national as well as international environmental policy-making. ¶ Since the mid-1980s, environmental politics has incrementally come to be dominated by a policy paradigm that is inherently incapable of organising the category of change that the IPCC targets necessitate. This is the paradigm of sustainability, ecological modernisation and, in its most recent appearances, "ecological industrial politics" and the "Green New Deal".[1] For all the good they have done in terms of turning environmentalism into a "new ideological masterframe" and a "non-controversial collective concern",[2] the concept of sustainability as well as the strategy of ecological modernisation have proved unable to deliver the "break with traditional models of economic development"[3] which are now widely recognised as indispensable for the effective mitigation of climate change. This is even more applicable to the latest addition to the lexicon of green-speak, the Green New Deal. ¶ Sustainability is interpreted by national governments as well as transnational bodies such as the EU first and foremost as sustained economic growth and competitiveness securing the continuation of established lifestyles and patterns of societal development. Its fundamental weakness is that as a purely formal concept (do not use up more resources than can be reproduced) it does not contain any inherent specification of what is to be counted as a resource (do polar bears count or not?), at which level an equilibrium between use and reproduction is to be achieved (before or after the destruction of Indonesian rain forests?) and which political values or principles are to be implemented in the envisaged society (authoritarian or democratic; decentralised or centralised; egalitarian or polarised).[4] ¶ Ecological modernisation (EM), in turn, is a market and technology-oriented policy strategy fraught with inherent limitations. For key environmental problems (e.g. habitat destruction, soil erosion, bio-diversity loss), marketable technological fixes are simply not available; environmental efficiency gains are persistently over-compensated by rebound effects and ongoing processes of growth; and all ecological modernisation depends on targets that are circumscribed by the ability to generate political legitimation and public support. Perhaps most importantly, though, EM ultimately just renews and extends the logic of growth and consumption which political ecologists as well as the much more moderate UN Brundtland Report[5] once identified as the underlying cause of industrial society's unsustainability. ¶ More explicitly even than EM approaches, the new ecological industrial politics and the Green New Deal aim first and foremost to spur technological innovation, increase consumer demand, create new jobs, open up new export markets, enhance the international competitiveness of national economies and so forth. In other words, they reframe global warming and the environmental crisis as an opportunity, a tool, for a new round of innovation and growth. They are supposed to provide a double, or even triple, dividend (economic, environmental, social), yet they entirely reverse the relation between means and ends that had once been envisaged by those proposing the use of economic or market based instruments for the achievement of ecological goals. In practice they are primarily an attempt to prolong the life expectancy of what is known to be unsustainable. Even Europe's leading Green Party, the once fairly radical German Greens, have fully embraced this rhetoric.

Bluhdom 09, [Ingolfur Blühdorn¶ is Associate Professor in Politics / Political Sociology at the Department of European Studies at the University of Bath Locked into the politics of unsustainability http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2009-10-30-bluhdorn-en.html, 2009] Mr.Mr.

Ecological modernisation is a market and technology-oriented policy strategy fraught with inherent limitations. For key environmental problems (e.g. habitat destruction, soil erosion, bio-diversity loss), marketable technological fixes are simply not available EM ultimately just renews and extends the logic of growth and consumption which political ecologists identified as the underlying cause of industrial society's unsustainability. the new ecological industrial politics aim to spur technological innovation create new jobs enhance international competitiveness and so forth. they reframe the environmental crisis as a tool, for a new round of innovation

The K turns the aff – domination and technocracy embed the cycle of environmental destruction into politics

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Michigan (7-week)

Kritiks

2022

It is already all too apparent around the world that COVID-19 is dangerous. In the modern history of natural disasters, this virus will have few rivals. States continue to wrestle with how best to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, but its securitisation is already universal.1 The mechanisms of securitisation are socially and culturally specific. Simply put, all states securitise COVID-19 but each state does so in a unique way. By identifying the pandemic as an existential security threat, national decision-makers respond to it from both operational and normative perspectives. In doing so, they actualise and perform some national identities, while excluding or silencing others. We scrutinise this process by drawing on the cases of the United States and Russia. Experiences of these two states matter because they both play an active role in the evolving global discursive politics of the COVID-19 pandemic and consistently appear among the top ten most affected countries. Moreover, there is a divergence between the resurgence of the Cold War-style geopolitical confrontation between the West and Russia and the diplomatic ‘bromance’ between the US President Donald Trump and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin.2 These two politicians present themselves as alpha males promising to make their nations ‘great again’. As Sarah Ashwin and Jennifer Utrata point out, both of them attract immense international attention, and hence ‘these hypermasculine performances are not merely national in scope, but shape other places in our globalized world’. 3 Building our analysis on feminist methodologies,4 we examine how Trump and Putin instrumentalise hierarchical gendered identities to enforce the securitisation of COVID-19. Our analysis shows that both Trump and Putin draw heavily on projections of gendered power to maximise the effect of their securitisation moves and mobilise diverse gendered narratives, imageries, and practices to construct the meaning of the threat. These performances of securitisation set standards of appropriateness and legitimise certain kinds of foreign policy responses to the pandemic while silencing others or presenting them as ineffective. In this sense, we contribute to the discussion of COVID-19 politics by exploring gendered discursive practices that enable the move from ‘normal’ politics to the domain of emergency and exception or, as Andreas Kalyvas puts it, to the ‘politics of the extraordinary’. 5 This areticle is organised into three sections. The first section outlines our approach to securitisation and the methodology of our study. The following two sections examine the dynamics of securitising COVID-19 in the United States and Russia, indicating differences and similarities in their discursive strategies. The conclusions raise and bring to the fore questions not only regarding political responses to the COVID-19 pandemic but also concerning the nature and outcomes of the securitisation process.

Kuteleva and Clifford 2021 (Anna Kuteleva is a postdoctoral research fellow at the School of International Regional Studies at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (Russia). Anna holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Alberta (Canada). Sarah J. Clifford is an MSc student in Political Science at the University of Copenhagen (Denmark). Her Master’s project explores the intersections of American militarised masculinities, identity politics, and education policies. Clifford studied Political Science and worked as a Research Assistant for the China Institute and the Faculty of Education at the University of Alberta. “Gendered securitisation: Trump’s and Putin’s discursive politics of the COVID-19 pandemic,” European Journal of International Security (2021), 6, 301–317 doi:10.1017/eis.2021.5)

. States continue to wrestle with how best to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, but its securitisation is already universal The mechanisms of securitisation are socially and culturally specific. By identifying the pandemic as an existential security threat, national decision-makers respond to it from both operational and normative perspectives. In doing so, they actualise and perform some national identities, while excluding or silencing others. there is a divergence between the resurgence of the Cold War-style geopolitical confrontation between the West and Russia and the diplomatic ‘bromance’ between the US President Donald Trump and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin.2 These two politicians present themselves as alpha males promising to make their nations ‘great again’. , both of them attract immense international attention, and hence ‘these hypermasculine performances are not merely national in scope, but shape other places in our globalized world’. Trump and Putin instrumentalise hierarchical gendered identities to enforce the securitisation of COVID-19. Trump and Putin draw heavily on projections of gendered power to maximise the effect of their securitisation moves and mobilise diverse gendered narratives, imageries, and practices to construct the meaning of the threat. These performances of securitisation set standards of appropriateness and legitimise certain kinds of foreign policy responses to the pandemic while silencing others or presenting them as ineffective. gendered discursive practices enable the move from ‘normal’ politics to the domain of emergency and exception or the ‘politics of the extraordinary’

Identifying COVID 19 as a security threat reinforce and recreate hierarchal gendered identities in order to enforce its securitization

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2022

Securitisation is ‘a set of interrelated practices and the processes of their production, diffusion, and reception/translation that bring threats into being’. 6 The concept of securitisation opens up a way to denaturalise the framing of certain events, issues, things, or people as posing existential threats to states and societies.7 Many scholars also use it to call into question the givenness of the differential categories of ‘security’ and ‘insecurity’. 8 Scholars who examine the politics of diseases, however, often deal with threats that are not talked into being. For example, using the case of HIV/AIDS, Colin McInnes and Simon Rushton argue9 that to question the ‘reality’ of the threat posed by a disease is ‘both morally indefensible and empirically absurd’. Similarly, the danger that COVID-19 presents is all too real. More than two million people are known to have died from COVID-19 as of January 2021. A year has passed since the virus was discovered, yet hospitals are still buckling under a torrent of COVID-19 patients and the routines of daily life remain interrupted for billions worldwide. Importantly, COVID-19 is an endemic that will stay with us for some time. In this context, the concept of securitisation is used not to question the threat that COVID-19 poses for the survival and wellbeing of people around the world but to elucidate how political actors reconstruct understandings of COVID-19 via securitising moves and what different pathways of response become appropriate as a result of these moves. Consequently, we treat securitisation as ‘a sustained strategic practice aimed at convincing a target audience to accept, based on what it knows about the world, the claim that a specific development … is threatening enough to deserve an immediate policy to alleviate it’. 10 Adopting Thierry Balzacq’s approach,11 we do not problematise the fact of securitisation but critically examine how and with what effect discursive politics of securitisation works. Specifically, we are interested in how state actors that dominate discursive politics of (in)security performatively build upon established and context-specific gendered identities in the process of securitisation. The very notion of national security is gendered inasmuch as it is grounded in the gendered nature of the state and state practices.12 This entails that power operates via the (discursive) construction and reconstruction of hierarchical hybrid gendered identities with the intent to enforce certain security interests on domestic and international levels. As Charlotte Hooper emphasises, ‘it is a commonplace observation that international relations reflect a world of men in that they influence international affairs through their physical capacities, through (masculinist) practices at the institutional level, and through the symbolic links between masculinity and power’. 13 Consequently, Hooper argues that masculinity is hegemonic, meaning that specific forms of masculinity dominate over all other gendered identities, including other masculinities. These relatively stable hegemonic configurations of gender practices exemplify ‘the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women’. 14 Following this logic, hegemonic masculinity is instrumental in constructing threat and danger as well as performing security. Hegemonic masculinity takes on many forms depending on different social, political, and economic settings. In this sense, it is dynamic and context-specific. Each state’s potential to claim the status of the masculine hegemon in the international arena depends on its performance among other states and its ability to repel threats both domestically and internationally. National leaders actualise and perform hegemonic masculinities to convince audiences at home and abroad that they are able to combat a threat. Masculinised imageries allow national leaders to present security as a result of their rule, making that rule legitimate. In effect, performing a state’s hegemonic masculinity ties directly to its leader’s ability to securitise a threat. Importantly, the process of securitising not only represents but also is reproductive of hegemonic masculinity of the state. National leaders rearticulate it through the narratives and imageries evoked in their securitising moves. Drawing on this theoretical framework, we examine how national leaders in the United States and Russia reconstitute hegemonic masculinities within the ‘threat-defence’ logic of responses to the COVID-19 outbreak. Our sample includes statements on COVID-19 made by Trump and Putin from the early onset of the current global public health crisis to 30 April 2020. This time frame covers an important period in the discursive formation of the COVID-19 outbreak in both the United States and Russia as a matter of national security. It allows us to examine securitisation in the making rather than focus on the audience’s acceptance of securitising moves. In other words, the chosen time frame restricts our analysis to the very first performative attempts at securitising the pandemic.

Kuteleva and Clifford 2021 (Anna Kuteleva is a postdoctoral research fellow at the School of International Regional Studies at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (Russia). Anna holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Alberta (Canada). Sarah J. Clifford is an MSc student in Political Science at the University of Copenhagen (Denmark). Her Master’s project explores the intersections of American militarised masculinities, identity politics, and education policies. Clifford studied Political Science and worked as a Research Assistant for the China Institute and the Faculty of Education at the University of Alberta. “Gendered securitisation: Trump’s and Putin’s discursive politics of the COVID-19 pandemic,” European Journal of International Security (2021), 6, 301–317 doi:10.1017/eis.2021.5)

Securitisation is ‘a set of interrelated practices and the processes of their production, diffusion, and reception/translation that bring threats into being’ The concept of securitisation opens up a way to denaturalise the framing of certain events, issues, things, or people as posing existential threats to states and societies Scholars who examine the politics of diseases, however, often deal with threats that are not talked into being. For example, using the case of HIV/AIDS to question the ‘reality’ of the threat posed by a disease is ‘both morally indefensible and empirically absurd’ , the concept of securitisation is used not to question the threat that COVID-19 poses for the survival and wellbeing of people around the world but to elucidate how political actors reconstruct understandings of COVID-19 via securitising moves and what different pathways of response become appropriate as a result of these moves , we treat securitisation as ‘a sustained strategic practice aimed at convincing a target audience to accept, based on what it knows about the world, the claim that a specific development … is threatening enough to deserve an immediate policy to alleviate it state actors that dominate discursive politics of (in)security performatively build upon established and context-specific gendered identities in the process of securitisation. The very notion of national security is gendered inasmuch as it is grounded in the gendered nature of the state and state practices. This entails that power operates via the (discursive) construction and reconstruction of hierarchical hybrid gendered identities with the intent to enforce certain security interests on domestic and international levels. ‘it is a commonplace observation that international relations reflect a world of men in that they influence international affairs through their physical capacities, through (masculinist) practices at the institutional level, and through the symbolic links between masculinity and power’. masculinity is hegemonic, meaning that specific forms of masculinity dominate over all other gendered identities, including other masculinities. These hegemonic configurations of gender practices exemplify ‘the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees the dominant position of men and the subordination of women’ hegemonic masculinity is instrumental in constructing threat and danger as well as performing security Hegemonic masculinity takes on many forms depending on different social, political, and economic settings. Each state’s potential to claim the status of the masculine hegemon in the international arena depends on its performance among other states and its ability to repel threats both domestically and internationally. National leaders actualise and perform hegemonic masculinities to convince audiences at home and abroad that they are able to combat a threat. Masculinised imageries allow national leaders to present security as a result of their rule, making that rule legitimate a state’s hegemonic masculinity ties directly to its leader’s ability to securitise a threat the process of securitising not only represents but also is reproductive of hegemonic masculinity of the state. national leaders in the United States and Russia reconstitute hegemonic masculinities within the ‘threat-defence’ logic of responses to the COVID-19 outbreak

The Securitization of COVID-19 is emblematic of National Leaders’ desires to secure their nation’s place as the masculine hegemon and their place as its ruler, reconstructing narratives of toxic masculine power and weak feminine subordinates

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2022

In a paralleled vein to feminist discussions of 9/11, COVID-19 produces what Bonnie Mann calls the ‘unmanning’ of America.18 Mann details how sovereignty is a ‘style of national masculinity’ with any violation of a nation’s borders resulting in its figurative demasculinisation.19 Accordingly, the pandemic challenges the American doctrines of absolute sovereignty, invulnerability, and global hegemony. To counter this threat, Trump reframes it not as a public health dilemma but as a threat to the nation’s security and hegemonic masculinity. In this setting, COVID-19 presents a direct threat to the national body that is innately gendered. On 4 February Trump securitises COVID-19.20 However, in January and February, Trump struggles with fully committing to the securitising move and vacillates between securitising and desecuritising the spread of COVID-19. At first, Trump frames the virus only as a ‘potential threat’ contained in China.21 Simultaneously, he assures his audience that ‘[o]ur country is prepared for any circumstances’ and that ‘there’s no reason to panic at all’ as the possibility of exposure and mortality to the American nation ‘remain[s] low’. 22 It is not until 13 March that Trump constructs COVID-19 as an existential crisis and ‘national emergency’, one that not only threatens the nation’s health but also has the power to obstruct its sovereignty and security.23 As specified by Trump, one of the existential challenges of the pandemic is that the United States will face the ‘public health consequences of a mass uncontrolled cross-border movement’. 24 Starting from the presidential campaign in 2015, Trump persistently pushes migration out of the domain of ‘normal politics’. As the pandemic unfolds, he builds upon the image of the othered and villainised migrant to redefine COVID-19 not only as a health hazard but also as a security threat that can compromise the nation’s sovereignty. Trump personifies these fears in undocumented migrants who potentially carry COVID-19. This extra discursive layer highlights how the perceived threat to America’s sovereignty elevates the virus from a public health dilemma to a national security crisis through the processes of Othering. For example, he emphasises that they threaten to create a perfect storm that would spread the infection to our border agents, migrants, and to the public at large. Left unchecked, this would cripple our immigration system, overwhelm our healthcare system, and severely damage our national security.25 As a response, Trump affirmatively declares that ‘we’re not going to let that happen’. 26 Sara Ahmed explains such a discursive reconstruction as an attempt to monopolise and ‘eliminate the source of fear’ – a move by the state to control the uncontrollable through asserting selfdetermination and containment.27 In other words, Trump portrays the United States as no longer fearful but as a nation that is mobilised to repel the dangerous Other. This construction also frames Trump and his administration as the protectors of the nation (‘we’) from the existential threat (‘they’) by concurrently securitising and desecuritising COVID-19. Trump’s narrative does not alleviate the threat of the pandemic but, counterintuitively, dispels notions of fear and security to discursively embolden his masculine command over the nation. COVID-19 is not only embodied by the undocumented migrant but is also personified through a multiplicity of Others. To shift the blame for the harms of the COVID-19 outbreak, Trump fixates on China and racialises the pandemic as a ‘Chinese’ threat. Since 21 January, Trump obsessively emphasises that COVID-19 ‘comes from China’ and should be regarded as the ‘Chinese virus’ or ‘Wuhan virus’. 28 Restricting international travel from China to the United States, Trump labels his executive order the ‘China ban’, stating that ‘China, you can’t come in. I’m sorry.’ 29 While the United States evades an attack from the virus by shutting its borders and taking strong actions, China is presented as weak and incapable. According to Trump, the COVID-19 outbreak ‘could have been stopped in China, before it started, and it wasn’t’ and now ‘the whole world is suffering because of it’. 30 China is portrayed as a soft nation because of its permeable borders, passivity, and ineffective leadership. The feminine softness makes it not only vulnerable but also dangerous. By differentiating and separating the nation from the pandemicstricken Others, Trump does not allow the insecurity of COVID-19 to feminise the United States and, in turn, (re)secures America’s masculinity. By framing COVID-19 as a destabilising force to the United States’ masculinity, Trump mobilises the nation around three gendered narratives to perform and actualise American hegemony: the gendered construction of the national ‘we’, militarisation, and displays of the United States’ economic omnipotence. These three discursive formations function as applicators to deconstruct how the nation is mobilised to repel the threat. Building on this logic, Trump’s performances of certain hegemonic traits demonstrate how gender practices become a securitising tool utilised by national leaders in times of crisis. The performative values that the American state believes its citizens personify are embedded in these gender practices. In Trump’s words, Americans are those who ‘do not despair’. 31 He argues that ‘we do not give in to fear’ and ‘we pull together, we persevere, and we overcome, and we win’. 32 Americans ‘sacrifice together’, 33 but, as Ahmed puts it, the nation is presented as winning by ‘refusing to transform its vulnerability and wounds … into an affective response of fear’. 34 A response that is premised on exemplifying the masculine characteristics of ‘valour’, aggression, and determination in times of combat. These characteristics frame the nation as being militarised and in a perpetual state of conflict that will not dissipate until the threat has been vanquished: As our citizens persevere through this present challenge, we’re renewing American unity and we’re replenishing American will and we are witnessing new American valor each and every day. We see it every day. The daring and determination of our people in this crisis reminds us that no matter how hard it gets, no matter what obstacles we must overcome, Americans will keep on fighting to victory and we will secure the glorious future that our citizens so richly deserve, especially after going through this nightmare, this evil beast.35 Here, Trump constructs the notion of an ‘internal strength’ that the American populace epitomises – one that transforms the emotions of fear and insecurity into the imagery of mobilisation and collective triumph.36 In this framework, the nation escapes potential feminisation by acting as a wilful subject and taking command of the pandemic. To further denote a sense of control and agency, Trump uses active verbs to place the United States not as a passive, feminised observer but as an active, masculine participant. By positioning the United States as one that is ‘renewing’, ‘replenishing’, and ‘witnessing’, Trump construes the nation as actively mobilising and hence, enacting its masculinity against COVID-19. To perform the state’s hegemonic masculinity, Trump also militarises the society. Drawing upon established gendered identities, the Trump administration evokes a series of securitising moves to militarise COVID-19.37 As early as 15 March, Trump argues that the United States ‘deployed over a thousand officers in support of the coronavirus missions’, reframing the pandemic not as an emergency managed by health professionals but one controlled by the military that will ‘defend our homeland during this crisis’. 38 In this framework, the nation’s military capabilities are constructed as a source of security, a physical reassertion of its masculinised control and dominance. Here, Trump touts the desirability of the military, stating that [o]ur great military is operating at 100 per cent during this crisis and thousands of troops are deployed alongside of civilians in the COVID hotspots, as you know. You see them all over. I spoke – when I spoke with Governor Cuomo, and when I spoke to Gavin Newsom, and many of the other governors, they wanted to know if we could have some military help with the medical, and we – we gave it to them.39 This quote presents the military as the masculinist protector of the nation with Governors jockeying for its aid while simultaneously framing it as a pervasive and saturating force who is ‘all over’. The military’s spreading encroachment across all vectors of society assures Trump’s audience of the United States’ ever-growing control over the virus, and in turn, paints the military as the reason for the nation’s success. As a result, Trump hails his response to the pandemic as ‘a tremendous victory’, ‘thanks to our all-out military operation and the extraordinary devotion of our people’ as ‘we believe we will experience far fewer deaths than even the optimistic projection’. 40 In tandem with the physical deployment of the military, Trump’s rhetoric is imbued with militarised references. Trump constructs the pandemic as a figurative battlefield, one that parallels ‘a World War, or a World War One or Two or something’ as it is ‘a war all unto itself’. 41 To align with this imagery, military hospitals are deployed to New York and Los Angeles, ‘frontline workers’ are reconceptualised as heroic, selfless soldiers falling in the line of duty, and even ordinary citizens are viewed as making their patriotic contribution to the nation by ‘fighting this battle from home’. 42 Not only does Trump construct the pandemic as an ‘all-out war’ but he places himself at the centre of society’s militarisation: ‘I’m a wartime president. This is a war. This is a war. A different kind of war that we’ve ever had.’ 43 Here, Trump figuratively takes control of all militarised activities intended to protect the population by using the personal pronoun ‘I’. As an extension of this militarised paternalism, Trump’s reluctance to count the casualties of this ‘war’ creates ambiguity and disillusionment that alters what Christine Sylvester calls the ‘perceptions of American war capabilities’. 44 Following this logic, Trump often refuses to broadcast the statistics of American mortality and case rates. However, when discussing these statistics discreetly, multiple members of Trump’s team utilise dehumanising tactics by referring to those who passed away from COVID-19 as having ‘expired’ – a term that more frequently refers to food past its due date rather than the loss of a citizen.45 Trump also deploys these discursive tactics to create a façade of militarised success that is further bolstered by notions of paternalistic protection as well as hegemonic and charismatic leadership. For instance, when prompted by reporters in multiple press briefings to discuss the number of cases, Trump belligerently dismisses their questions as ‘nasty’, ‘really bad reporting’, and ‘sensationalism’. 46 These discursive tactics expose Trump’s lack of transparency as an effort to give the American people a renewed sense of ‘hope’ and safeguard them from the brutal truth of ‘war’. 47 Once again, such militarised responses to the pandemic place Trump not only within the centrefold of controlling America’s military activities but also in the role of hegemonic protector. While Trump’s role as the nation’s protector rests upon his position as the Commander in Chief, his legitimation strategy also relies heavily on the United States’ economic capacity. Unlike his two predecessors, Trump’s reign has conjured a blatant reframing of previously exemplified American masculine norms. From George W. Bush’s indelible hyper-sexualised bravado48 to Barack Obama’s familial paternalism,49 Trump’s form of physical masculinity leaves much to be desired. As a result, the construction of Trump’s masculinity and, in the consortium, his legitimacy revolves not around his prominent physical characteristics but instead around his success as an entrepreneur.50 On multiple occasions, Trump draws on his economic success over the three years as president to demonstrate his capacity to rule. He states that ‘nobody has ever done anything like what we were able to do’ 51 and forcefully appropriates this achievement: I think you’re going to have a recovery. Look, I built – they were just telling me inside, and it’s fact – I built the greatest economy – with the help of 325 million people, I built the greatest economy in the history of the world. And one day, because of something that should have never been allowed to happen, we had to close our country, we had to close our economy.52 Such assertions portray Trump not only as a legitimate and successful leader of the United States but, more importantly, as the one responsible for maintaining its position as the economic powerhouse and global hegemon. As the latter quote exemplifies, Trump excessively utilises the first personal pronoun (‘I’), which allows him to embody the success of the nation. As the American economy slipped into one of the worst downturns since the Great Depression, Trump claims that ‘I had to turn it off in order to get to a point where we are today.’ 53 While claiming responsibility for the economic safety of the nation, Trump also assures his audience that Americans will ‘help countries around the world as well’ because ‘the whole world is watching’ them.54 The narrative of Trump’s leadership par excellence produces an image of the United States as the supreme leader in the fight against COVID-19, whereas other countries ‘aren’t highly sophisticated’ and represent failures.55 For example, Trump contrasts the United States’ rate of COVID-19 testing with that of other countries: We are way ahead on testing. We are the best in the world on testing. We’ve tested much more than anybody else, times two – or every country combined. We’ve tested more than every country combined. … The quality of our tests is the best and the number is the best.56 These multiple superlatives and assertions that the United States is ‘first’ on one or another measure enable Trump to reinforce a masculine fiction of conquest and triumph. In this framework, the pandemic becomes a platform for the United States to demonstrate and maintain its innovative capacity and supremacy. Similarly, other top-level members of Trump’s administration extend the narrative of American omnipotence. As a case in point, Mike Pompeo reminds the media that ‘a lot of countries are asking us for assistance and a lot of countries have received assistance’, assuring that the United States has ‘of course, done the right thing’. 57 However, he instantly highlights that the United States will be ‘an enormous force for good’ in other countries and regions only after it provides for itself: We’ve made sure we had the resources for our own people, but as the American greatness – as American power and American commercial prosperity continues to grow, we’re building out – we’re getting not only ventilators but all of the equipment that the world will need.58 While Trump and Pompeo make it clear that the United States will take care of itself first, they continue to represent the nation as the world’s saviour and protector of the weak. This notion is explicitly rhetorical. Although both figures elevate COVID-19 to a ‘global threat’, 59 it is clear that the United States is isolated. Rather than binding together as a universal front and leading the world to victory, Trump and his most prominent team members continually denounce the work of both other nations and international organisations, portraying the United States as individually successful in comparison. In turn, the fight against COVID-19 is framed not as a fight for global immunity and humankind but as a competition over who is going to defeat the threat first.

Kuteleva and Clifford 2021 (Anna Kuteleva is a postdoctoral research fellow at the School of International Regional Studies at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (Russia). Anna holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Alberta (Canada). Sarah J. Clifford is an MSc student in Political Science at the University of Copenhagen (Denmark). Her Master’s project explores the intersections of American militarised masculinities, identity politics, and education policies. Clifford studied Political Science and worked as a Research Assistant for the China Institute and the Faculty of Education at the University of Alberta. “Gendered securitisation: Trump’s and Putin’s discursive politics of the COVID-19 pandemic,” European Journal of International Security (2021), 6, 301–317 doi:10.1017/eis.2021.5)

the pandemic challenges the American doctrines of absolute sovereignty, invulnerability, and global hegemony , Trump reframes it not as a public health dilemma but as a threat to the nation’s security and hegemonic masculinity COVID-19 presents a direct threat to the national body that is innately gendered. , Trump portrays the United States as no longer fearful but as a nation that is mobilised to repel the dangerous Other. This construction also frames Trump and his administration as the protectors of the nation (‘we’) from the existential threat (‘they’) by concurrently securitising and desecuritising COVID-19 Trump’s narrative does not alleviate the threat of the pandemic but, counterintuitively, dispels notions of fear and security to discursively embolden his masculine command over the nation. . To shift the blame for the harms of the COVID-19 outbreak, Trump fixates on China and racialises the pandemic as a ‘Chinese’ threat. While the United States evades an attack from the virus by shutting its borders and taking strong actions, China is presented as weak and incapable. According to Trump, the COVID-19 outbreak ‘could have been stopped in China, before it started, and it wasn’t’ and now ‘the whole world is suffering because of it’. China is portrayed as a soft nation because of its permeable borders, passivity, and ineffective leadership. The feminine softness makes it not only vulnerable but also dangerous. By differentiating and separating the nation from the pandemicstricken Others, Trump does not allow the insecurity of COVID-19 to feminise the United States and, in turn, (re)secures America’s masculinity. By framing COVID-19 as a destabilising force to the United States’ masculinity, Trump mobilises the nation around three gendered narratives to perform and actualise American hegemony: the gendered construction of the national ‘we’, militarisation, and displays of the United States’ economic omnipotence. Trump’s performances of certain hegemonic traits demonstrate how gender practices become a securitising tool utilised by national leaders in times of crisis. The performative values that the American state believes its citizens personify are embedded in these gender practices the nation is presented as winning by ‘refusing to transform its vulnerability and wounds … into an affective response of fear’. A response that is premised on exemplifying the masculine characteristics of ‘valour’, aggression, and determination in times of combat. These characteristics frame the nation as being militarised and in a perpetual state of conflict that will not dissipate until the threat has been vanquished: As our citizens persevere through this present challenge, we’re renewing American unity and we’re replenishing American will and we are witnessing new American valor each and every day. The daring and determination of our people in this crisis reminds us that no matter how hard it gets, no matter what obstacles we must overcome, Americans will keep on fighting to victory and we will secure the glorious future that our citizens so richly deserve, especially after going through this nightmare, this evil beast. In this framework, the nation escapes potential feminisation by acting as a wilful subject and taking command of the pandemic. , Trump uses active verbs to place the United States not as a passive, feminised observer but as an active, masculine participant. To perform the state’s hegemonic masculinity, Trump also militarises the society. Drawing upon established gendered identities, the Trump administration evokes a series of securitising moves to militarise COVID-19 Trump argues that the United States ‘deployed over a thousand officers in support of the coronavirus missions’, reframing the pandemic not as an emergency managed by health professionals but one controlled by the military that will ‘defend our homeland during this crisis’. The military’s spreading encroachment across all vectors of society assures Trump’s audience of the United States’ ever-growing control over the virus, and in turn, paints the military as the reason for the nation’s success. Trump’s rhetoric is imbued with militarised references. Trump constructs the pandemic as a figurative battlefield, ‘frontline workers’ are reconceptualised as heroic, selfless soldiers falling in the line of duty, and even ordinary citizens are viewed as making their patriotic contribution to the nation by ‘fighting this battle from home’ Trump figuratively takes control of all militarised activities intended to protect the population by using the personal pronoun ‘I’. As an extension of this militarised paternalism, Trump’s reluctance to count the casualties of this ‘war’ creates ambiguity and disillusionment that alters the ‘perceptions of American war capabilities’ Trump also deploys these discursive tactics to create a façade of militarised success that is further bolstered by notions of paternalistic protection as well as hegemonic and charismatic leadership. Once again, such militarised responses to the pandemic place Trump not only within the centrefold of controlling America’s military activities but also in the role of hegemonic protector. , Trump’s reign has conjured a blatant reframing of previously exemplified American masculine norms. While Trump and Pompeo make it clear that the United States will take care of itself first, they continue to represent the nation as the world’s saviour and protector of the weak. . Rather than binding together as a universal front and leading the world to victory, Trump and his most prominent team members continually denounce the work of both other nations and international organisations, portraying the United States as individually successful in comparison. In turn, the fight against COVID-19 is framed not as a fight for global immunity and humankind but as a competition over who is going to defeat the threat first.

Trump used COVID to secure the US’s masculinity by portraying it as the strong, masculine hegemon ready to defend both its own weak, and destroy the weakness around it to prevent “contamination”

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The masculinity performed by Trump and Putin is toxic, inasmuch as it (re)produces and nourishes state-inspired nationalism and white supremacy. On the domestic level, their gendered securitisation discourses atomise American and Russian citizens, imposing on them subjugating features of a homogenous national ‘we’ and creating new exclusionary boundaries along the lines of race and ethnicity. As a case in point, Trump employs hegemonic discourses to reconceptualise the United States as a white, masculine entity. In stark terms, Trump’s gendering of the nation constructs fictionalised divisions between who belongs to the ‘we’ and who is framed as the excluded Other. These discourses not only formulate the pandemic as a health crisis but also elevate it to that of a racialised security threat, capable of compromising the purity of the United States. As for the Russian case, the brand of hegemonic masculinity reproduced by Putin normalises the racialisation of Russian nationalism and further anchors Russianness in its ethnic and religious terms. Moreover, Putin fosters paternalistic domination over women by rendering them as passive victims of the pandemic to be protected and guided. Both Trump and Putin elevate the COVID-19 outbreak to a global threat. However, while Trump turns his response to the pandemic into a competition that the United States is destined to win, Putin focuses on cooperation under collective responsibility. Trump wants the United States to get ahead of other countries. Putin claims that Russia will learn from other countries and analyse their experience carefully while setting an example of the proper ethical conduct for the rest of the world. As much as these two narratives are at odds with each other, they both create multiple dichotomies where Others are represented as subordinated to the national Self and thus are either feminine or hyper-masculine. In the case of feminisation, Others are presented as passive, weak, and poorly organised. Hyper-masculine Others are aggressive, irrational, egotistical, and competitive. Both are portrayed as dangerous and threatening to the international community at large. These tight hierarchical dichotomies normalise and fuel the great power confrontation and prevent the international community from engaging in a constructive dialogue and synergetic planning to respond to the pandemic. In both cases, political leaders enacted hierarchical gendered identities in the securitisation of COVID-19, sustaining their national manhoods and bolstering their legitimation strategy. A year down the road, it is evident that Trump’s and Putin’s illusionary projections of the ‘guardian of the nation’ did not translate into effective policy responses that alleviated the threat of COVID-19. Both the United States and Russia are among the top ten most affected countries by COVID-19 worldwide.96 For the United States, 2020 was the deadliest year in its history, with deaths associated with COVID-19 reaching 473,000.97 Russia officially recorded more than 358,000 excess deaths between April and December 2020,98 with almost 100 per cent of these deaths in some regions attributed to COVID-19.99 These numbers demonstrate that both Trump and Putin failed many of their citizens, letting the deadly virus run wild. However, bringing to the fore Trump’s and Putin’s convergent securitising discourses, we do not target the failure of their securitising moves. Rather, we problematise Trump and Putin’s deployment of masculinity as a tool in securitisation that led both leaders to dangerously exert hegemonic masculinity in times of uncertainty. In the United States, Trump dispelled contrasting emotions of fear and security to quell the pandemic’s threat to American sovereignty, invulnerability, and global dominance, while concurrently cementing his position as the nation’s protector. In Russia, Putin drew on the idealised heteronormative concept of the nuclear family to frame himself as the nation’s patriarch and legitimise his authoritarian regime. As such, the process of securitising is not uniform but instead socially and culturally specific. We do not argue that a resurgence of hegemonic masculinity is intrinsic to securitisation or that securitisation is simply a ploy used by all national leaders during a crisis to reassert their nation’s sovereignty. Yet, our findings show that both Trump and Putin – two very notable and influential politicians in the international arena, to say the least – virtually turn masculinity into the means of securitising COVID-19. Overall, studies as the one we present here demonstrate how implicit and explicit references to masculinity in the process of securitisation confirm it as the political norm and thus naturalise the systemic effects of toxic gendered practices that permeate both Trump’s and Putin’s quests for power.

Kuteleva and Clifford 2021 (Anna Kuteleva is a postdoctoral research fellow at the School of International Regional Studies at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (Russia). Anna holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Alberta (Canada). Sarah J. Clifford is an MSc student in Political Science at the University of Copenhagen (Denmark). Her Master’s project explores the intersections of American militarised masculinities, identity politics, and education policies. Clifford studied Political Science and worked as a Research Assistant for the China Institute and the Faculty of Education at the University of Alberta. “Gendered securitisation: Trump’s and Putin’s discursive politics of the COVID-19 pandemic,” European Journal of International Security (2021), 6, 301–317 doi:10.1017/eis.2021.5)

The masculinity performed by Trump and Putin is toxic it (re)produces and nourishes state-inspired nationalism and white supremacy. , their gendered securitisation discourses atomise American and Russian citizens, imposing on them subjugating features of a homogenous national ‘we’ and creating new exclusionary boundaries along the lines of race and ethnicity. Trump employs hegemonic discourses to reconceptualise the United States as a white, masculine entity Trump’s gendering of the nation constructs fictionalised divisions between who belongs to the ‘we’ and who is framed as the excluded Other These discourses not only formulate the pandemic as a health crisis but also elevate it to that of a racialised security threat, capable of compromising the purity of the United States. the brand of hegemonic masculinity reproduced by Putin normalises the racialisation of Russian nationalism and further anchors Russianness in its ethnic and religious terms. Moreover, Putin fosters paternalistic domination over women by rendering them as passive victims of the pandemic to be protected and guided. while Trump turns his response to the pandemic into a competition that the United States is destined to win, Putin focuses on cooperation under collective responsibility. As much as these two narratives are at odds with each other, they both create multiple dichotomies where Others are represented as subordinated to the national Self and thus are either feminine or hyper-masculine. In the case of feminisation, Others are presented as passive, weak, and poorly organised. Hyper-masculine Others are aggressive, irrational, egotistical, and competitive. Both are portrayed as dangerous and threatening to the international community at large. These tight hierarchical dichotomies normalise and fuel the great power confrontation and prevent the international community from engaging in a constructive dialogue and synergetic planning to respond to the pandemic. In both cases, political leaders enacted hierarchical gendered identities in the securitisation of COVID-19, sustaining their national manhoods and bolstering their legitimation strategy Trump’s and Putin’s illusionary projections of the ‘guardian of the nation’ did not translate into effective policy responses that alleviated the threat of COVID-19. Trump and Putin failed many of their citizens, letting the deadly virus run wild. problematise Trump and Putin’s deployment of masculinity as a tool in securitisation that led both leaders to dangerously exert hegemonic masculinity in times of uncertainty. In the United States, Trump dispelled contrasting emotions of fear and security to quell the pandemic’s threat to American sovereignty, invulnerability, and global dominance, while concurrently cementing his position as the nation’s protector. In Russia, Putin drew on the idealised heteronormative concept of the nuclear family to frame himself as the nation’s patriarch and legitimise his authoritarian regime. As such, the process of securitising is not uniform but instead socially and culturally specific. We do not argue that a resurgence of hegemonic masculinity is intrinsic to securitisation or that securitisation is simply a ploy used by all national leaders during a crisis to reassert their nation’s sovereignty. studies here demonstrate how implicit and explicit references to masculinity in the process of securitisation confirm it as the political norm and thus naturalise the systemic effects of toxic gendered practices

The dichotomy of gendered discourses used by Trump and Putin in their attempt to securitize COVID-19 normalize harmful gender stereotypes and roles, and normalize using toxic masculinity in response to a crisis

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The White House likes a bit of threat. In his State of the Union address, Barack Obama wanted to nudge Congress yet again into passing meaningful legislation. The president emphasized that America's enemies are "seeking the ability to sabotage our power grid, our financial institutions, and our air traffic control systems." After two failed attempts to pass a cybersecurity act in the past two years, he added swiftly: "We cannot look back years from now and wonder why we did nothing in the face of real threats to our security and our economy." Fair enough. A bit of threat to prompt needed action is one thing. Fear-mongering is something else: counterproductive. Yet too many a participant in the cybersecurity debate reckons that puffery pays off. The Pentagon, no doubt, is the master of razzmatazz. Leon Panetta set the tone by warning again and again of an impending "cyber Pearl Harbor." Just before he left the Pentagon, the Defense Science Board delivered a remarkable report, Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat. The paper seemed obsessed with making yet more drastic historical comparisons: "The cyber threat is serious," the task force wrote, "with potential consequences similar to the nuclear threat of the Cold War." The manifestations of an all-out nuclear war would be different from cyberattack, the Pentagon scientists helpfully acknowledged. But then they added, gravely, that "in the end, the existential impact on the United States is the same." A reminder is in order: The world has yet to witness a single casualty, let alone fatality, as a result of a computer attack. Such statements are a plain insult to survivors of Hiroshima. Some sections of the Pentagon document offer such eye-wateringly shoddy analysis that they would not have passed as an MA dissertation in a self-respecting political science department. But in the current debate it seemed to make sense. After all a bit of fear helps to claim -- or keep -- scarce resources when austerity and cutting seems out-of-control. The report recommended allocating the stout sum of $2.5 billion for its top two priorities alone, protecting nuclear weapons against cyberattacks and determining the mix of weapons necessary to punish all-out cyber-aggressors. Then there are private computer security companies. Such firms, naturally, are keen to pocket some of the government's money earmarked for cybersecurity. And hype is the means to that end. Mandiant's much-noted report linking a coordinated and coherent campaign of espionage attacks dubbed Advanced Persistent Threat 1, or "APT1," to a unit of the Chinese military is a case in point: The firm offered far more details on attributing attacks to the Chinese than the intelligence community has ever done, and the company should be commended for making the report public. But instead of using cocky and over-confident language, Mandiant's analysts should have used Words of Estimative Probability, as professional intelligence analysts would have done. An example is the report's conclusion, which describes APT1's work: "Although they control systems in dozens of countries, their attacks originate from four large networks in Shanghai -- two of which are allocated directly to the Pudong New Area," the report found. Unit 61398 of the People's Liberation Army is also in Pudong. Therefore, Mandiant's computer security specialists concluded, the two were identical: "Given the mission, resourcing, and location of PLA Unit 61398, we conclude that PLA Unit 61398 is APT1." But the report conspicuously does not mention that Pudong is not a small neighborhood ("right outside of Unit 61398's gates") but in fact a vast city landscape twice the size of Chicago. Mandiant's report was useful and many attacks indeed originate in China. But the company should have been more careful in its overall assessment of the available evidence, as the computer security expert Jeffrey Carr and others have pointed out. The firm made it too easy for Beijing to dismiss the report. My class in cybersecurity at King's College London started poking holes into the report after 15 minutes of red-teaming it -- the New York Times didn't. Which leads to the next point: The media want to sell copy through threat inflation. "In Cyberspace, New Cold War," the headline writers at the Times intoned in late February. "The U.S. is not ready for a cyberwar," shrieked the Washington Post earlier this week. Instead of calling out the above-mentioned Pentagon report, the paper actually published two supportive articles on it and pointed out that a major offensive cyber capability now seemed essential "in a world awash in cyber-espionage, theft and disruption." The Post should have reminded its readers that the only military-style cyberattack that has actually created physical damage -- Stuxnet -- was actually executed by the United States government. The Times, likewise, should have asked tough questions and pointed to some of the evidential problems in the Mandiant report; instead, it published what appeared like an elegant press release for the firm. On issues of cybersecurity, the nation's fiercest watchdogs too often look like hand-tame puppies eager to lap up stories from private firms as well as anonymous sources in the security establishment.

Rid 13, [Thomas, reader in war studies at King's College London, author of "Cyber War Will Not Take Place," "The Great Cyberscare," 3/13/13, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/13/the_great_cyberscare] Mr.Mr.

Obama wanted to nudge Congress into passing meaningful legislation threat to prompt needed action is one thing. Fear-mongering is something else: counterproductive Panetta set the tone by warning again and again of an impending "cyber Pearl Harbor the Defense Science Board seemed obsessed with making yet more drastic historical comparisons The world has yet to witness a single casualty, let alone fatality, as a result of a computer attack a bit of fear helps to claim -- or keep -- scarce resources when austerity and cutting seems out-of-control private computer security companies are keen to pocket some of the government's money earmarked for cybersecurity. And hype is the means to that end The firm offered far more details on attributing attacks to the Chinese than the intelligence community has ever done Mandiant's report was useful and many attacks indeed originate in China. But the company should have been more careful in its overall assessment of the available evidence The media want to sell copy through threat inflation Instead of calling out the above-mentioned Pentagon report, the paper actually published two supportive articles on it and pointed out that a major offensive cyber capability now seemed essential the only military-style cyberattack that has actually created physical damage was actually executed by the United States government the nation's fiercest watchdogs too often look like hand-tame puppies eager to lap up stories from private firms

Representations of cyberwar actively work to justify violent Otherizing lashouts via unnecessary fearmongering based on false data

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Narratives of crisis often invoke the specter of existential, physical threats to the body of the nation such as terrorist threats (Huysmans and Buonfino 2008); it is in this physical sense of security that Bigo (2002, p. 63) notes that human migration is ‘increasingly interpreted as a security problem’. Importantly, however, the production of unease also draws on everyday and (especially) economic challenges in a competitive global economy. Indeed, key aspects of contemporary economic life (tax and welfare regimes, productivity and innovation, and employment law, for instance) are increasingly interpreted as problems of national security. In the realm of immigration policy, for instance, national security no longer simply requires keeping out the dangerous, the poor and the sick. Rather, national security is also achieved by actively attracting and retaining desired, ‘talented’ migrants. Hence the contention of the Singaporean Prime Minister (cited in Ong 2006, p. 188) that the successful attraction of ‘foreign talent will be a matter of life and death’ for the nation, where he clearly had in mind not the physical security but the continued economic viability of the nation. As Ong (2006, p. 5) suggests, the state of exception occasioned by neoliberalism ‘can be deployed to include as well as to exclude’ (emphasis mine).¶ Economic viability within a global economy is thus increasingly constructed as a matter of national security problem. As Agamben (2005, p. 13) notes, while the idea of the state of emergency was normalized during World War I, after the war, ‘military emergency … ceded its place to economic emergency’. The key discursive move in constructing economic viability as an issue of national security is the application of the metaphor of war to economic challenges. Agamben (2005) cites Franklin D. Roosevelt’s response to the Great Depression (‘I shall ask the Congress … for broad Executive power to wage war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe’ (p. 22)) to ground his claim that ‘the metaphor of war [became] an integral part of the presidential political vocabulary’ (p. 21). The metaphor of war is deployed within a narrative of constant crisis in which national economies are engaged in an unending global contest for resources, trade access and investment. As we shall see, the challenges of neoliberal globalization are not constructed primarily as crises of environmental degradation or political sovereignty, but – overwhelmingly – as a pervasive crisis of economic competitiveness.¶ The state-at-war metaphor is one of the main ways in which an economically based ‘shared purpose’ is naturalized and used to suppress alternative conceptions (Skilling 2011, p. 78). It is during times of war that the state can most easily call for an almost endless degree of loyalty and sacrifice in the name of a clearly defined shared objective. It is during times of war that it becomes most acceptable to ask what citizens can do for their country, and to recognize and reward them on that basis. And, in a context of permanent crisis, the criteria of individual contribution to national viability can be used to justify massive inequalities of outcome.¶ Neoliberalism, then, can be understood as a mode of ‘governing through freedom’ that institutes the danger and uncertainty that lies at the far side of that freedom. And within a neoliberal global economy, the external environment is constructed as a fluid and potentially hostile realm of opportunity and challenge. The pursuit of global economic competitiveness, in turn, is justified as the urgently necessary response to that danger and uncertainty: as the salve for unease. It is thus essential to its legitimacy that the state is seen as offering a credible and coordinated response to that challenging environment. Far from eroding state power, neoliberalism provides the conditions that enhance the status and legitimacy of the state (and other actors) as the producer and implementer of strategy (see Thrift 2000, p. 95), even if that strategy stipulates a decreased scope of direct governmental action or control. As Kim McKee (2009, p. 469) notes, ‘less direct government in society does not necessarily entail less governing.’ In neoliberalism’s recasting of politics as a ‘problematizing activity’ and its ‘transforming [of] situations of uncertainty into calculative strategies’ (Ong 2006, p. 178), a dialectic emerges between problems and strategies. Problems call forth a ‘necessary’ strategic response; strategy produces correlative problems. The practice of strategy validates and empowers those experts able to formulate, implement and assess the technical solutions that the discourses of crisis, risk, unease and (in)security require.

Skilling 14 [3/1, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Management @ Auckland University of Technology, “Everyday Emergency: Crisis, Unease, and Strategy in Contemporary Political Discourse,” http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19460171.2013.862504#tabModule retrieved 5/19/14] Mr.Mr.

the production of unease also draws on everyday and (especially) economic challenges in a competitive global economy Indeed, key aspects of contemporary economic life (tax and welfare regimes, productivity and innovation, and employment law, for instance) are increasingly interpreted as problems of national security. military emergency … ceded its place to economic emergency’ war is deployed within a narrative of constant crisis in which national economies are engaged in an unending global contest for resources, trade access and investment in a context of permanent crisis, the criteria of individual contribution to national viability can be used to justify massive inequalities The pursuit of global economic competitiveness, in turn, is justified as the urgently necessary response to that danger and uncertainty: as the salve for unease The practice validates and empowers those experts able to formulate, implement and assess the technical solutions that the discourses of crisis, risk, unease and (in)security require.

Describing economic issues in existential frames militarizes the economy—results in structural inequalities and acts as a mental justification for war.

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Philipp Pattberg (2007) discusses the ideology of domination over nature that is still with us today, how it is “|d]eeply rooted in our every-day beliefs, actions, reflections and hopes, it lies at the center of any attempt to transform the world into a more loveable, friendlier, lighter and safer place” (p. 7). By discussing what he terms the enslavement of nature and the enslavement of humans by other humans, he concludes that this has led to a global state which is not sustainable. Exploring its historical trajectory, the ideology of domination over the natural environment took hold, according to Pattberg, “in the context of . . . the decline of Christianity as a total explanatory structure for human existence, the scientific turn of Cartesianism and the rise of capitalism to a self-replicating structure of rational choice” (p. 8). Lynn White (1974) suggests that the ecological crisis is due to the orthodox Christian legacy, especially its Western branch, stating, “Christian- ity, in absolute contrast to ancient paganism and Asia’s religions (except, perhaps Zorastrianism), not only established a dualism of man and nature but also insisted that it is Cod’s will that man exploit nature for his proper ends” (p. 4). Moreover, White proposes that “(o]ur science and technology have grown out of Christian attitudes towards man’s relation to nature which are almost universally held, not only by Christians and neo-Chris- tians but also by those who fondly regard themselves as post-Christians” (p. 5). Interestingly, White suggests a return to unorthodox Christianity spearheaded by St. Francis, an idea I will return to later in this book. Max Weber’s thesis, 7he Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism (1905/2001), is based on the assumption that there is a close relationship between Protestantism and capitalism, that capitalism’s basis is (what was interpreted as) the Christian work ethic, particularly in Calvinism. The idea is that domination over nature through hard work and frugality will be rewarded by God. There is therefore an important epistemological dimension to this crisis. As Kincheloe and Steinberg (2008) put it, “Some indigenous educators and philosophers put it succinctly: We want to use indigenous knowledge to counter Western’s science destruction of the Earth. Indigenous knowledge can facilitate the 21st century project because of its tendency to focus on relationships of human beings to both one another and to their eco-system” (pp. 136-137). The exclusion of alternative epistemologies and the privileging of rational science have meant the demise of ecological sustainability while the epitomization of scientific truth and rationality has excluded values that transcend the so-called rationality dogma of the West. This denial of epistemological diversity and the privileging of European epistemic mono-culture is still hegemonic and perceived as a sign of development and modernity. Ideological Pathology There is a naive belief among modernization theoreticians that since ecological problems are a result of the economic activities of modernization, further economic activities should cure these environmental problems. Due to the finiteness of the earth’s resources, the vicious circle of repair- ing the consequences of progress with further progress is not sustainable. Ronald Wright (2004) argues that the 20lh century was a period where unlimited growth in terms of population, consumption, and technology exploited the natural systems in an unsustainable way. Wright calls these activities of ecological unsustainability the very worst kind of “ideologi- cal pathology.” While colonialism and the capitalist world system have been beset with territorial, political, and economic conquest, Western science is based on the same idea of conquest, that is, not respecting the earth’s ecological limits. Moreover, in line with worid-systems analysis, there is an ecologi- cal unequal exchange here, as the core’s exploitation and utilization of the world’s resources is matched in the periphery with the burden of negative ecological costs imposed by the core. As has been discussed above, the issue of Western science and knowledge production is existentially important because the Eurocentric epistemology of knowing (mastering) and dominating the world is, despite its mer- its, dramatically problematic in a world where the majority of the world’s population not only suffers from hunger and malnutrition, illiteracy, and lack of work, but where the hegemonic epistemology upsets the relationship between [people] man and nature as it seeks to possess the earth in the same way as a master exploits his slave. The ecological challenges are closely intertwined with the current economic challenges in the West, and it is difficult to ignore that the aggressive ideology of exploitation and the maximizing of profits, which are so central to European hegemonic epistemology, is detrimental to the efforts to save the planet from ecological disaster. Vivas (2011) is right when contending that the difference between the present economic crisis and those of the 1970s and 1929 is “its ecological aspect. Indeed, we cannot analyze the global ecological crisis separately from the crisis in which we are immersed or the critique of the economic model that has led us into it.” Even if we do not agree that the crisis is due to capitalism’s inherent contradictions, the global economic crisis has long been there; the eco- nomic crises in Greece, Italy, and Spain are miniscule compared to the permanent crises in the South, where millions go hungry to bed every day and live on a dollar per day despite heavy interventions from the aid com- munities in the West/North. Even though economic hegemony is shifting to Asia (China and India) and Latin America (Brazil), there is no reason to believe that the hegemonic discourse of resource exploitation and profit maximization will change. On the contrary, China’s economic growth is based on the same Eurocentric discourse, and the ecological challenges in China are, as a consequence, enormous, not only for China, but for the world as a whole. Its emission of greenhouse gases is the highest (in volume) in the world. There is a shortage and pollution of water. Annual desertification of land amounts to an area of about 13000 sq km (the size of Connecticut), and economic growth and rapid development mean “increasing urbanization, consumerism, and pol- lution’' (Council on Foreign Relations, 2011). The failures of past climate summits in Copenhagen (December 2009), Cancun (December 2010), and Durban (December 2011) show the inertia of the governments in wealthy countries. Actually, there is no global leader- ship to fend off the ecological crisis, simply because the leaders of wealthy countries are entrenched in an economic system that prioritizes non-sus- tainable development. There seems to be no willingness or ability to find a solution that requires a comprehensive social and economic transforma- tion, such as the necessity to decrease consumption levels in the North (given that similar consumption levels across the globe would require sev- eral planets). Here there is no difference between Communist China (a capi- talist in economic matters) and the US. This is one important reason why “the critique of the epistemic foundations of Western academic discourse has triggered and nourished discussions on the possibilities of construction of an alternative to capitalism” (Santos et a!., 2008, p. xxxiv). It was the universalist claims of Europe’s hegemonic epistemology (as discussed earlier in the chapter) that was employed to justify Europe’s “civi- lizing mission,” which is still hegemonic globally. As Griffiths and Knezevic (2009) state: This scientific universalism, the most recent manifestation of European universal ism, asserts objectivity across all phenomena and time . . . Such claims of universalism, or assertions of universal truths, function as meta-narratives that encapsulate the ideology of those groups with power in the world-system . . . (pp. 67-68).

Breidlid 13 [Anders, Professor, Master programme in Multicultural and International Education, Oslo University College, “Education, Indigenous Knowledge, and Development in the Global South”, p. 23-25]Mr.Mr.

the ideology of domination over nature that is still with us today has led to a global state which is not sustainable The idea is that domination over nature through hard work and frugality will be rewarded by God. There is therefore an important epistemological dimension to this crisis This denial of epistemological diversity and the privileging of European epistemic mono-culture is still hegemonic and perceived as a sign of development and modernity. Due to the finiteness of the earth’s resources further progress is not sustainable As has been discussed above, the issue of Western science and knowledge production is existentially important because the Eurocentric epistemology of knowing (mastering) and dominating the world is dramatically problematic in a world where the majority of the world’s population not only suffers from hunger and malnutrition, illiteracy, and lack of work, but where the hegemonic epistemology upsets the relationship between [people] and nature as it seeks to possess the earth in the same way as a master exploits his slave. China’s economic growth is based on the same Eurocentric discourse, and the ecological challenges in China are enormous, not only for China, but for the world as a whole. Its emission of greenhouse gases is the highest There seems to be no willingness or ability to find a solution there is no difference between Communist China (a capi- talist in economic matters) and the US

Securitizing the environment via the aff’s Western scientific discourse ignores structural issues in the environment – masculine domination over nature is the root cause, which makes the kritik prerequisite.

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Kritiks

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