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Historically, the first use of the term Latin America has been traced only as far back as the 1850s. It did not originate within the region, but again from outside, as part of a movement called “pan-Latinism” that emerged in French intellectual circles, and more particularly in the writings of Michel Chevalier (1806-79). A contemporary of Alexis de Tocqueville who traveled in Mexico and the United States during the late 1830s, Chevalier contrasted the “Latin” peoples of the Americas with the “Anglo-Saxon” peoples (Phelan 1968; Ardao 1980, 1993). From those beginnings, by the time of Napoleon III’s rise to power in 1852 pan-Latinism had developed as a cultural project extending to those nations whose culture supposedly derived from neo-Latin language communities (commonly called Romance languages in English). Starting as a term for historically derived “Latin” culture groups, L’Amerique Latine then became a place on the map. Napoleon III was particularly interested in using the concept to help justify his intrusion into Mexican politics that led to the imposition of Archduke Maximilian as Emperor of Mexico, 1864-67. While France had largely lost out in the global imperial rivalries of the previous two centuries, it still retained considerable prestige in the world of culture, language, and ideas (McGuinness 2003). Being included in the pan-Latin cultural sphere was attractive to some intellectuals of Spanish America, and use of the label Latin America began to spread haltingly around the region, where it competed as a term with Spanish America (where Spanish is the dominant language), Ibero-America (including Brazil but presumably not French-speaking areas), and other sub-regional terms such as Andean America (which stretches geographically from Venezuela to Chile, but which more usually is thought of as including Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia), or the Southern Cone (Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay) (Rojas Mix 1991).

Holloway ‘08 (Thomas H.- author of “A Companion to Latin American History”; “Latin America: What’s in a Name?”; January 2008; http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-1405131616.html>)

, the first use of the term Latin America has been traced only as far back as the 1850s as part of a movement called “pan-Latinism” that emerged in French intellectual circles, in the writings of Chevalier who traveled in Mexico and the United States From those beginnings pan-Latinism had developed as a cultural project extending to those nations whose culture supposedly derived from neo-Latin language communities Starting as a term for historically derived “Latin” culture groups, L’Amerique Latine then became a place on the map France retained considerable prestige in the world of culture, language, and ideas

The term “Latin America” originated in French intellectual circles in order to map the region---it’s historically accurate

Critical Neglect Negative Supplement - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5

Northwestern (NHSI)

Case Negatives

2013

It is commonly known that the more general term “America” derives from the name of Amerigo Vespucci (1451?-1512), another navigator of Italian origin who made several voyages to the Caribbean region and along the coast of northern Brazil from 1497 to 1502. Unlike Columbus, Vespucci concluded that Europeans did not previously know about the lands he visited in the west, and he thus referred to them as the New World. In a 1507 map by German cartographer Martin Waldseemuller, America appears for the first time with that name. While the protocol of European exploration usually gives primacy to the first “discoverer,” there would seem to be some justification for naming the newly known land mass after the navigator who recognized it as separate from Asia (Amerigo Vespucci) rather than for the first European to report its existence, but who subsequently insisted that he had confirmed a new way to reach Asia (Christopher Columbus) (Arciniegas 1990).

Holloway ‘08 (Thomas H.- author of “A Companion to Latin American History”; “Latin America: What’s in a Name?”; January 2008; http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-1405131616.html>)

It is commonly known that “America” derives from the name of Amerigo Vespucci who made several voyages to the Caribbean region and along the coast of northern Brazil from 1497 to 1502. Vespucci concluded that Europeans did not previously know about the lands he visited in the west, and he thus referred to them as the New World. In a 1507 map by German cartographer Martin Waldseemuller, America appears for the first time with that name While the protocol of European exploration usually gives primacy to the first “discoverer,” there would seem to be some justification for naming the newly known land mass after the navigator who recognized it as separate from Asia

Their logic means the term “America” is offensive, make them propose an alternative

Critical Neglect Negative Supplement - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5

Northwestern (NHSI)

Case Negatives

2013

Not until the middle of the 20th century did the label Latin America achieve widespread and largely unquestioned currency in public as well as academic and intellectual discourse, both in the region (Marras 1992) and outside of it. With the establishment of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA, later adding Caribbean to become ECLAC) under United Nations auspices in 1948, the term became consolidated in policy circles, with political overtones challenging U.S. hegemony but largely devoid of the rivalries of culture, language, and “race” of earlier times (Reid 1978). The 1960s saw the continent-wide Latin American literary “boom” and the near-universal adoption of “Latin American Studies” by English-language universities in the U.S., Great Britain, and Canada. This trend began with the establishment of the Conference on Latin American History in 1927 and was consolidated with the organization of the interdisciplinary Latin American Studies Association in 1967. Despite the widespread and largely unproblematic use of the term in the main languages of the western hemisphere since that era, regional variations remain: In Brazil América Latina is commonly assumed to refer to what in the United States is called Spanish America, i.e., “Latin America” minus Brazil. While discussing the spontaneous creation of such collective labels, we need to recognize that the terms “Latino” or “Latina/o” now widespread in the United States have no basis in any specific nation or sub-region in Latin America. Like the latter term, from which it is derived linguistically, Latina/o is an invented term of convenience—a neologism built on a neologism (Oboler 1995; Gracia 1999; Oboler & González 2005; Dzidzienyo & Oboler, 2005). Whatever their origins, Latino or Latina/o have largely replaced the older “Hispanic” or Hispanic American” within the United States, although that English-derived term, problematic on several counts, lingers in library subject classifications.

Holloway ‘08 (Thomas H.- author of “A Companion to Latin American History”; “Latin America: What’s in a Name?”; January 2008; http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-1405131616.html>)

Not until the middle of the 20th century did Latin America achieve widespread currency in academic and intellectual discourse both in the region and outside of it. the term became consolidated in policy circles devoid of the rivalries of culture, language, and “race” of earlier times The 1960s saw the near-universal adoption of “Latin American Studies” Despite the widespread and largely unproblematic use of the term regional variations remain Brazil América Latina is assumed to refer to “Latin America” minus Brazil. we need to recognize that the terms now widespread in the United States have no basis in any specific nation

The term is politically correct and unproblematic---there’s no alternative or a root cause

Critical Neglect Negative Supplement - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5

Northwestern (NHSI)

Case Negatives

2013

Cuba is a Third World country that aspires to First World medicine and health. Its health-care system is not only a national public good but also a vital export commodity. Under the Castro brothers' rule, Cubans' average life expectancy has increased from 58 years (in 1950) to 77 years (in 2009), giving Cuba the world's 55th-highest life expectancy ranking, only six places behind the United States. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), Cuba has the second-lowest child mortality rate in the Americas (the United States places third) and the lowest per capita HIV/AIDS prevalence. Fifty years ago, the major causes of disease and death in Cuba were tropical and mosquito-borne microbes. Today, Cuba's major health challenges mirror those of the United States: cancer, cardiovascular disease, obesity, diabetes, and other chronic ailments related to aging, tobacco use, and excessive fat consumption.

Garrett Senior Fellow for Global Health at the Council on Foreign Relations 2010 Laurie “Castrocare in Crisis Will Lifting the Embargo Make Things Worse?” Foreign Affairs July/August http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~kmcm/Articles/Castrocare%20in%20Crisis.pdf

Under the Castro brothers' rule, Cubans' average life expectancy has increased from 58 years to 77 years Cuba has the second-lowest child mortality rate in the Americas and the lowest per capita HIV/AIDS prevalence.

Unq link – Cuban health care is rapidly improving - easing the embargo hurts Cuban health care industry – brain drain and medical tourism

Cuba Embargo Negative - Starter Pack - Berkeley 2013.html5

Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

Furious though it may be, the current debate over health care in the US is largely irrelevant to charting a path for poor countries of Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Pacific Islands. That is because the US squanders perhaps 10 to 20 times what is needed for a good, affordable medical system. The waste is far more than 30% overhead by private insurance companies. It includes an enormous amount of over-treatment, creation of illnesses, exposure to contagion through over-hospitalization, disease-focused instead of prevention-focused research, and making the poor sicker by refusing them treatment.1

Monthly Review 7/12/2012 “Why Is Cuba's Health Care System the Best Model for Poor Countries?” http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2012/fitz071212.html

health care in the US is irrelevant to charting a path for poor countries

Cuba is a key model for global health care – key to disease prevention

Cuba Embargo Negative - Starter Pack - Berkeley 2013.html5

Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

The two keys to Cuba's medical and public health achievements are training provided by the state and a community-based approach that requires physicians to live in the neighborhoods they serve and be on call 24 hours a day. In the wake of the 1959 Cuban Revolution, more than one-third of Cuba's doctors fled, mostly to the United States, leaving the country with just 6,300 physicians and a doctor-patient ratio of 9.2 per 10,000, according to the Cuban Ministry of Public Health. In response, Fidel Castro declared public health and doctor training to be paramount tasks for the new socialist state.

Garrett Senior Fellow for Global Health at the Council on Foreign Relations 2010 Laurie “Castrocare in Crisis Will Lifting the Embargo Make Things Worse?” Foreign Affairs July/August http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~kmcm/Articles/Castrocare%20in%20Crisis.pdf

The two keys to Cuba's medical and public health achievements are training provided by the state and a community-based approach that requires physicians to live in the neighborhoods they serve and be on call 24 hours a day.

Cuban health care industry good – improving and good doctor patient ratios

Cuba Embargo Negative - Starter Pack - Berkeley 2013.html5

Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

However, impacts of sanctions on Cuba's financial systems, medical supplies, and aggregate health measures appear to be attenuated by their successes in other aspects of health care. Despite the embargo, Cuba has produced better health outcomes than most Latin American countries, and they are comparable to those of most developed countries. Cuba has the highest average life expectancy (78.6 years) and density of physicians per capita (59 physicians per 10,000 people), and the lowest infant (5.0/1000 live births) and child (7.0/1000 live births) mortality rates among 33 Latin American and Caribbean countries (11, 26).

Drain School of Medicine, Stanford University & Barry Member of the Social Sciences Research Council Cuban Working Group of the American Council of Learned Societies 2010 Paul & Michele “Fifty Years of U.S. Embargo: Cuba's Health Outcomes and Lessons” Science Magazine April http://www.sciencemag.org/content/328/5978/572.full

Despite the embargo, Cuba has produced better health outcomes than most Latin American countries, and they are comparable to those of most developed countries Cuba has the highest average life expectancy and density of physicians per capita and the lowest infant and child mortality rates among 33 Latin American and Caribbean countries

Cuban health care good now – trends and focus on preventative care

Cuba Embargo Negative - Starter Pack - Berkeley 2013.html5

Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

Internet access is virtually nonexistent. And the Cuban health care system also seems unreal. There are too many doctors. Everybody has a family physician. Everything is free, totally free — and not after prior approval or some copay. The whole system seems turned upside down. It is tightly organized, and the first priority is prevention. Although Cuba has limited economic resources, its health care system has solved some problems that ours has not yet managed to address.1,2

Campion M.D. & Morrissey Ph.D. 2013 Edward & Stephen “A Different Model — Medical Care in Cuba” New England Journal of Medicine http://www.sld.cu/galerias/pdf/sitios/santiagodecuba/nejmp1215226_1.pdf

the Cuban health care system seems unreal. There are too many doctors. Everybody has a family physician. Everything is free, It is tightly organized, and the first priority is prevention. Although Cuba has limited economic resources, its health care system has solved some problems that ours has not yet managed to address.

Cuban health care doing good – lots of doctors and focus on prevention

Cuba Embargo Negative - Starter Pack - Berkeley 2013.html5

Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

This highly structured, prevention-oriented system has produced positive results. Vaccination rates in Cuba are among the highest in the world. The life expectancy of 78 years from birth is virtually identical to that in the United States. The infant mortality rate in Cuba has fallen from more than 80 per 1000 live births in the 1950s to less than 5 per 1000 — lower than the U.S. rate, although the maternal mortality rate remains well above those in developed countries and is in the middle of the range for Caribbean countries.3,4 Without doubt, the improved health outcomes are largely the result of improvements in nutrition and education, which address the social determinants of health. Cuba’s literacy rate is 99%, and health education is part of the mandatory school curriculum. A recent national program to promote acceptance of men who have sex with men was designed in part to reduce rates of sexually transmitted disease and improve acceptance of and adherence to treatment. Cigarettes can no longer be obtained with monthly ration cards, and smoking rates have decreased, though local health teams say it remains difficult to get smokers to quit. Contraception is free and strongly encouraged. Abortion is legal but is seen as a failure of prevention.

Campion M.D. & Morrissey Ph.D. 2013 Edward & Stephen “A Different Model — Medical Care in Cuba” New England Journal of Medicine http://www.sld.cu/galerias/pdf/sitios/santiagodecuba/nejmp1215226_1.pdf

This highly structured, prevention-oriented system has produced positive results. Vaccination rates in Cuba are among the highest in the world. The life expectancy is virtually identical to that in the U S The infant mortality rate in Cuba has fallen lower than the U.S. rate, Cuba’s literacy rate is 99%, and health education is part of the mandatory school curriculum.

Cuban health care strong – lots of positive trends

Cuba Embargo Negative - Starter Pack - Berkeley 2013.html5

Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

But a lot may change if the United States alters its policies toward Cuba. In 2009, a group of 30 physicians from Florida toured Cira García and concluded that once the U.S. embargo is lifted, the facility will be overwhelmed by its foreign patients. It takes little imagination to envision chains of private clinics, located near five-star hotels and beach resorts, catering to the elective needs of North Americans and Europeans. Such a trend might bode well for Canadians seeking to avoid queues in Ottawa for hip replacements or for U.S. health insurance companies looking to cut costs on cataract surgery and pacemakers. But providing health care to wealthy foreigners would drain physicians, technicians, and nurses from Cuba's public system.

Garrett Senior Fellow for Global Health at the Council on Foreign Relations 2010 Laurie “Castrocare in Crisis Will Lifting the Embargo Make Things Worse?” Foreign Affairs July/August http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~kmcm/Articles/Castrocare%20in%20Crisis.pdf

once the U.S. embargo is lifted, the facility will be overwhelmed by foreign patients. It takes little imagination to envision chains of private clinics, located near five-star hotels and beach resorts, catering to the elective needs of North Americans and Europeans. providing health care to wealthy foreigners would drain physicians, technicians, and nurses from Cuba's public system.

Internal and external brain drain

Cuba Embargo Negative - Starter Pack - Berkeley 2013.html5

Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

According to Steven Ullmann of the University of Miami's Cuba Transition Project, if Washington lifts its embargo, Cuba can expect a mass exodus of health-care workers and then the creation of a domestic health system with two tiers, one private and one public. The system's lower, public tier would be at risk of complete collapse. Ullmann therefore suggests "fostering this [public] system through partnerships and enhanced compensation of personnel." He also argues that officials in both governments should "limit out-migration of scientific brainpower from the country." Properly handled, the transition could leave Cuba with a mixed health-care economy -- part public, part locally owned and private, and part outsourced and private -- that could compensate Cuban physicians, nurses, and other health-care workers enough to keep them in the country and working at least part time in the public sector.

Garrett Senior Fellow for Global Health at the Council on Foreign Relations 2010 Laurie “Castrocare in Crisis Will Lifting the Embargo Make Things Worse?” Foreign Affairs July/August http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~kmcm/Articles/Castrocare%20in%20Crisis.pdf

if Washington lifts its embargo, Cuba can expect a mass exodus of health-care workers and then the creation of a domestic health system with two tiers, one private and one public. The system's public tier would be at risk of complete collapse.

Easing the embargo Brain drain which collapses Cuba’s public health care system

Cuba Embargo Negative - Starter Pack - Berkeley 2013.html5

Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

Given the range of issues dividing the two countries, experts say there is a long process that would precede resumption of diplomatic relations. Daniel P. Erikson of the InterAmerican Dialogue says that though "you could have the resumption of bilateral talks on issues related to counternarcotics or immigration, or a period of détente, you are probably not going to see the full restoration of diplomatic relations" in the near term.

Hanson associate director and coordinating editor at CFR.org 2009 Stephanie “US Cuba Relations” Council on Foreign Relations 4/14 http://gees.org/documentos/Documen-03412.pdf

there is a long process that would precede resumption of diplomatic relations. you are not going to see the full restoration of diplomatic relations" in the near term.

Ending sanctions doesn’t solve relations

Cuba Embargo Negative - Starter Pack - Berkeley 2013.html5

Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

Joe Nye is correct. Soft power contributes importantly to the nation's ability to achieve its goals in the world. But I don't think Professor Nye would disagree that soft power also has its limitations. U.S. attractiveness to others will never be shaped fundamentally by the government, nor can it be tapped for use in particular situations. Nor will soft power be a dominant consideration in situations in which there are real differences of interest and perspective. In these cases, harder forms of national strength will continue to dominate policy choices.

Barry M Blechman, founder and president of DFI International Inc., a research and consulting company in Washington, DC (frequent consultant to the US Government),Winter 2004/2005 “Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 119, Iss 4; pg. 680-681, proquest, accessed 07/10/07

oe Nye is correct. Soft power contributes importantly to the nation's ability to achieve its goals in the world. But soft power also has its limitations. U.S. attractiveness to others will never be shaped fundamentally by the government, nor can it be tapped for use in particular situations. Nor will soft power be a dominant consideration in situations in which there are real differences of interest and perspective. In these cases, harder forms of national strength will continue to dominate policy choices.

Policies can’t increase soft power, and impacts are limited by security concerns.

Cuba Embargo Negative - Starter Pack - Berkeley 2013.html5

Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

"The United States Exerts Influence Through Soft Power" Not really. Harvard political scientist Joseph S. Nye Jr. coined the concept of "soft power"-the notion that nontraditional forces such as cultural and commercial goods can exert influence in world affairs. And since so many of the world's largest multinationals are of U.S. origin, some argue that the products they sell make American culture attractive and are the key to the real power the United States wields. But the trouble with soft power is that it's, well, soft. All over the Islamic world kids enjoy (or would like to enjoy) bottles of Coke, Big Macs, CDs by Britney Spears and DVDS starring Tom Cruise. Do any of these things make them love the United States more? Strangely not. Well, perhaps it is not so strange. In the 19th century, Great Britain pioneered the use of soft power, though it projected its culture through the sermons of missionaries and the commentaries in Anglophone newspapers. Yet it was precisely from the most Anglicized parts of the indigenous populations of the British Empire that nationalist movements sprang. The archetype was the Bengali babu-better able to quote William Shakespeare than the average expatriate Brit-who worked for the British by day but plotted their overthrow by night. Antiglobalization protesters smashing McDonald's windows while clad in Gap khakis and Nike trainers are today's version of the same Janus-- faced phenomenon.

Niall Ferguson, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University, Jan/Feb 2003, “Power,” Foreign Policy, Iss. 134; pg. 18, 6 pgs, proquest, accessed 07/09/07

Nye coined the concept of "soft power But the trouble with soft power is that it's, well, soft All over the Islamic world kids enjoy bottles of Coke, Do any of these things make them love the United States more? Strangely In the 19th century, Great Britain pioneered the use of soft power . Yet it was precisely from the most Anglicized parts of the indigenous populations of the British Empire that nationalist movements sprang . Antiglobalization protesters smashing McDonald's windows while clad in Gap khakis and Nike trainers are today's version of the same Janus-- faced phenomenon.

Soft power can’t shape international attitudes.

Cuba Embargo Negative - Starter Pack - Berkeley 2013.html5

Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

At present Cuba possesses an estimated 4.6 million barrels of oil and 9.3 TFC (total final consumption) of natural gas in North Cuba Basin.4 This is approximately half of the estimated 10.4 billion barrels of recoverable crude oil in the Alaska Natural Wildlife Reserve. If viewed in strictly instrumental terms—namely, increasing the pool of potential imports to the U.S. market by accessing Cuban oil and ethanol holdings—Cuba’s oil represents little in the way of absolute material gain to the U.S. energy supply. But the possibility of energy cooperation between the United States and Cuba offers significant relative gains connected to the potential for developing production-sharing agreements, promoting the transfer of state-of-the art technology and foreign direct investment, and increasing opportunities for the development of joint-venture partnerships, and scientific-technical exchanges.

Benjamin-Alvadaro 10 (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation”)

Cuba possesses an estimated 4.6 million barrels of oil This is approximately half of the estimated 10.4 billion barrels of recoverable crude oil in the Alaska Natural Wildlife Reserve. If viewed in strictly instrumental terms namely, increasing the pool of potential imports to the U.S. market by accessing Cuban oil and ethanol holdings Cuba’s oil represents little in the way of absolute material gain to the U.S. energy supply. But the possibility of energy cooperation between the United States and Cuba offers significant relative gains connected to developing production-sharing agreements, promoting technology and foreign direct investment, and increasing opportunities for joint-venture partnerships, and scientific-technical exchanges.

Plan doesn’t affect US oil markets significantly

Cuba Embargo Negative - Starter Pack - Berkeley 2013.html5

Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

The shaded blocks in Figure 1 indicate the 16 blocks under contract with various oil companies. Six blocks are under contract to Repsol-YSP from Spain,12 4 blocks with Sherritt from Canada, 6 blocks are presently under negotiation, and the remaining 43 are presently open. According to Cuban energy officials, the objectives for 2006 are to increase the drilling of wells by over 50 percent, to carry out a seismic campaign to collect more data for the available tracts, to increase the domestic production of oil and gas (presently 85,000 barrels/day), and to put more drilling rigs into operation. But how does this compare to other significant oil finds? The 2005 report by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) estimated that the oil reserves off the northwest coast of Cuba contained a mean (a middle range estimate) of 4.6 billion barrels of oil (bbo) and a mean of 9.8 trillion feet of associated dissolved gas and 1.2 trillion cubic feet of non-associated gas. 13 By comparison, the 1998 USGS study of the vaunted Alaska National Wildlife Reserve (ANWR) contains resource volumes of 5.7 to 16 billion billion barrels of crude oil, with a mean estimate of 10.4 billion bbo. Clearly, this places the Cuban oil find at almost half the size of the reserves at ANWR (4.6bbo as compared to 10.4bbo) leaving little doubt that it is a discovery of significant size.

Benjamin-Alvadaro 06 (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, “The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special,” http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/oil-cuba-alvarado.pdf)

The shaded blocks indicate the 16 blocks under contract with various oil companies. The 2005 report estimated that the oil reserves off the northwest coast of Cuba contained a mean of 4.6 billion barrels of oil By comparison, the 1998 USGS study of ANWR contains resource volumes of 5.7 to 16 billion billion barrels of crude oil, with a mean estimate of 10.4 billion bbo. Clearly, this places the Cuban oil find at almost half the size of the reserves at ANWR

The plan doesn’t trigger that much new oil---Cuba’s reserves are half the size of ANWR

Cuba Embargo Negative - Starter Pack - Berkeley 2013.html5

Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

3. When deciding whether to approve seismic testing or exploration and production off the east coast, your department needs to balance the safety of those special areas against the potential for damage from oil drilling. The only way to adequately assess the balance would be for your department (with the participation of NOAA and possibly the National Academy of Science) to do a comprehensive census of those special places and analyze possible impacts on them from drilling.¶ 1. The Ocean: More Like A Diverse Forest Than A Desert¶ Many people look at the ocean and see it as a pretty, shiny surface. They may imagine a few fish swimming below the surface and a plain featureless bottom. This is not an accurate picture of the ocean in most places. Unless the bottom is sandy and continually disturbed by wind, wave or current the bottom of the ocean is filled with communities of diverse creatures. Depending on depth, penetration of light, type of bottom (i.e., muddy, sandy, pebbles, boulders) and other factors, the ocean’s floor is teaming with diverse communities of plants, invertebrates, shellfish, crustaceans and fish. Numerous kinds of fish live on the bottom. Other fish swim above the bottom in the water column at different levels. Thousands of types of phytoplankton, zooplankton and larvae at the base of most food chains ‘float’ around. Marine mammals, sea turtles and sea birds spend most of their time at or near the surface of the ocean. ¶ All of these creatures are sensitive to the impacts of oil and pollution from oil and gas drilling; some are more sensitive than others. But none are immune to the short or long term effects of oil. ¶ With this as background, it is important to recognize the special places in the ocean that are unique, especially sensitive to pollution or those that are especially productive. These include: submarine canyons cutting across the continental shelf; deep water coral gardens; plateaus where the floor of the ocean rises and becomes unusually productive because deeper nutrient rich waters come closer to the warmer temperatures and light of the surface; migratory pathways for marine mammals and sea turtles; and areas where fish aggregate to spawn or where larval stages of animals are concentrated. Finally, the margins of the ocean: beaches, bays and marshes are often unusually sensitive to oil pollution.¶ 2. Special Places in the Atlantic Ocean Deserving of Protection ¶ Based on the Environmental Sensitivity Index (ESI) and a crude measure of marine productivity that your own department uses, the New England, Mid Atlantic and South Atlantic planning areas are all very environmentally sensitive and highly productive. The South Atlantic planning area and Mid Atlantic have the first and third most environmentally sensitive coastlines, respectively, of all 22 MMS planning areas. New England comes in at #11. The South Atlantic and Mid Atlantic are ranked first and second respectively in terms of primary productivity among all the planning areas with North Atlantic being #12. ¶ There are 14 submarine canyons between Massachusetts and Virginia that slice through the continental shelf (See attached list). Submarine canyons, some with a mouth as wide as eight to ten miles and 30-40 miles long, are important because they shelter unusual species, provide hard bottoms and sidewalls for creatures to attach to or burrow in, provide nursery areas for many commercially important fish and bring nutrients from the deep ocean up to more shallow waters. Sea life in these canyons is unusually diverse which is why drilling in or near submarine canyons with their risk from spills and chronic pollution from production would be a very bad idea.¶ There are a number of important underwater plateaus and reefs off the eastern seaboard which serve as fish baskets, places of unusual marine productivity where very high populations of fish reproduce and grow. Often these are called ‘banks’ or ‘reefs’ with names like Georges Bank, Stellwagen Bank, Gray’s Reef or Occulina Bank. Some of these areas of the ocean are shallow enough to allow sunlight to penetrate to the seafloor and nutrients from the deeper ocean feed a richer abundance of life. These banks and reefs sometimes offer the only hard substrate for creatures to attach in a wide area. . Drilling in biological hot spots like these and jeopardizing productive commercial and recreational fisheries would make no sense.¶ Like on land, certain areas of the ocean support migration corridors for fish, marine mammals, sea turtles and sea birds. For much of the Mid Atlantic there is a coastal corridor extending out 20 miles from shore in which endangered marine mammals like the northern right whale, various sea turtles and migratory fish travel. For example, the last 350 northern right whales on earth travel each year from the Georgia-Florida border where they give birth and nurse their calves to an area off Cape Cod where they spend the summer feeding. Loggerheads, leatherback and Kemp’s ridley turtles all use this corridor at various times of the year.¶ Another corridor, farther offshore at the edge of the continental shelf break and slope provides food for various endangered sea turtles and other kinds of whales and dolphins. Whales and dolphins are typically migratory and each is only seasonally present but taken together the area is important year round to these marine mammals. ¶ There are four more hotspots of marine diversity and unusual productivity off the Mid Atlantic caused by ocean currents, type of bottom, [and] submarine canyons and other special characteristics. These include: the coastal waters off North Carolina near and south of Cape Hatteras, the mouth of the Chesapeake and Delaware Bays and off New York harbor. Coastal waters and sandy bottoms off New Jersey support a large and economically important clam and scallop industry.

Gravitz 9—Oceans Advocate for Environment America [Michael Gravitz, Statement at the Department of Interior Hearing On Offshore Ocean Energy Development in Atlantic City, New Jersey, April 6, 2009, pg. http://tinyurl.com/cxkzanz]

When deciding whether to approve production off the east coast, your department needs to balance the safety of those special areas against the potential for damage from drilling The only way to adequately assess the balance would be to do a comprehensive census of those special places and analyze possible impacts the ocean’s floor is teaming with diverse communities of plants, invertebrates, shellfish, crustaceans and fish. Numerous kinds of fish live on the bottom Thousands of phytoplankton, zooplankton and larvae at the base of most food chains ‘float’ around. All of these creatures are sensitive to the impacts of oil and gas drilling none are immune to the short or long term effects Based on the ESI the Atlantic planning areas are all very environmentally sensitive and highly productive submarine canyons shelter unusual species provide nursery areas and bring nutrients from the deep ocean up to hallow waters. Sea life in these canyons is unusually diverse which is why drilling in or near submarine canyons with their risk from spills and chronic pollution from production would be a very bad idea.¶ There are a number of important underwater plateaus and reefs off the eastern seaboard which serve as fish baskets These banks and reefs offer the only hard substrate for creatures to attach in a wide area. . Drilling in biological hot spots like these and jeopardizing productive fisheries would make no sense. There are hotspots of marine diversity and unusual productivity off the Mid Atlantic caused by ocean currents and submarine canyons

Every new offshore drilling operation threatens critical species in the ocean environment

Cuba Embargo Negative - Starter Pack - Berkeley 2013.html5

Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

The hotspots are the world’s most biologically rich areas hence recognized as important ecosystems not important¶ only for the rich biodiversity but equally important for the human survival as these are the homes for more than¶ 20% of the world’s population. India got recognition of one of the mega-diversity countries of world as the country¶ is home of the two important biodiversity hotspots: the Himalaya in north and the Western Ghats in the southern¶ peninsula. Policy makers and decision takers have recognized the importance of biodiversity (flora and fauna) and¶ this has resulted to segregate (in the form of protected areas) the rich and diverse landscape for biodiversity¶ conservation. An approach which leads towards conservation of biological diversity is good efforts but such¶ approaches should deal with humans equally who are residing in biodiversity hotspots since time immemorial. In¶ this endeavor, a study was conducted in Nagarahole National Park of Nilgiri Biosphere Reserve, in Karnataka. Our¶ empirical studies reveal that banning all the human activities in this ecosystem including agriculture, animal¶ husbandry has produced the results opposite to the approach ‘multiple values’ of national park. To monitor the¶ impact, existing policies have been tested from an economic and ecological view-point. Unfortunately, the local¶ livelihoods (most of them belongs to indigenous tribes) in the area have received setbacks due to the¶ implementation of the policies, though unintentionally. However, the ecological perspective is also not showing¶ support for the approach and framework of the current policies in the hotspots. Satellite data showed that the¶ temporal pattern of ecosystem processes has been changing. An integrated approach for ecosystem conservation and¶ strengthening local institutions for sustainable ecosystem management in such areas is therefore supported by this¶ study.

Nautiyal & Nidamanuri 10—Centre for Ecological Economics and Natural Resources @ Institute for Social and Economic Change & Department of Earth and Space Sciences @ Indian Institute of Space Science and Technology [SUNIL NAUTIYAL1 & RAMA RAO NIDAMANURI “Conserving Biodiversity in Protected Area of Biodiversity Hotspot in India: A Case Study,” International Journal of Ecology and Environmental Sciences 36 (2-3): 195-200, 2010

The hotspots are the world’s most biologically rich areas hence recognized as important ecosystems not important only for the rich biodiversity but equally important for the human survival Policy makers and decision takers have recognized the importance of biodiversity An approach which leads towards conservation of biological diversity is good efforts but such approaches should deal with biodiversity hotspots

These environmental hotspots are vital for human survival

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Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

The 2003 Iraq War provides an interesting example of the inter- play of the two forms of power. Some of the motives for war were based on the deterrent effect of hard power. Donald Rumsfeld is re- ported to have entered office believing that the United States "was seen around the world as a paper tiger, a weak giant that couldn't take a punch" and determined to reverse that reputation.40 America's military victory in the first Gulf War had helped to produce the Oslo process on Middle East peace, and its zoo3 victory in Iraq might eventually have a similar effect. Moreover, states like Syria and Iran might be deterred in their future support of terrorists. These were all hard power reasons to go to war. But another set of motives related to soft power. The neoconservatives believed that American power could be used to export democracy to Iraq and transform the politics of the Middle East. If successful, the war would become self-legitimizing. As William Kristol and Lawrence Kaplan put it, "What is wrong with dominance in the service of sound principles and high ideals?"41 Part of the contest about going to war in Iraq became a struggle over the legitimacy of the war. Even when a military balance of power is impossible (as at present, with America the only super- power), other countries can still band together to deprive the U.S. policy of legitimacy and thus weaken American soft power. France, Russia, and China chafed at American military unipolarity and urged a more multipolar world. In Charles Krauthammer's view, Iraq "provided France an opportunity to create the first coherent challenge to that dominance.'"+* Even without directly countering the superpower's military power, the weaker states hoped to deter the U.S. by making it more costly for us to use our hard power.43 They were not able to prevent the United States from going to war, but by depriving the United States of the legitimacy of a second Se- curity Council resolution, they certainly made it more expensive. Soft balancing was not limited to the UN arena. Outside the UN, diplomacy and peace movements helped transform the global debate from the sins of Saddam to the threat of American empire. That made it difficult for allied countries to provide bases and sup- port and thus cut into American hard power. As noted earlier, the Turkish parliament's refusal to allow transport of ground troops and Saudi Arabia's reluctance to allow American use of air bases that had been available in 1991 are cases in point. Since the global projection of American military force in the fu- ture will require access and overflight rights from other countries, such soft balancing can have real effects on hard power. When sup- port for America becomes a serious vote loser, even friendly leaders are less likely to accede to our requests. In addition, bypassing the UN raised the economic costs to the United States after the war, leading the columnist Fareed Zakaria to observe, "The imperial style of foreign policy is backfiring. At the end of the Iraq war the administration spurned any kind of genuine partnership with the world. It pounded away at the United Nations.""

Nye 04 (Joseph Professor of International Relations at Harvard, Soft Power, pg. 26-27)

The 03 Iraq War provides an interesting example of the inter- play of the two forms of power. Some of the motives for war were based on the deterrent effect of hard power. Even when a military balance of power is impossible other countries can still band together to deprive the U.S. policy of legitimacy and thus weaken American soft power. France, Russia, and China chafed at American military unipolarity and urged a more multipolar world. Soft balancing was not limited to the UN arena That made it difficult for allied countries to provide bases and sup- port and thus cut into American hard power. Since the global projection of American military force in the fu- ture will require access and overflight rights from other countries, such soft balancing can have real effects on hard power. When sup- port for America becomes a serious vote loser, even friendly leaders are less likely to accede to our requests.

US soft power is key to US power projection globally.

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Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

One year later, Charles Krauthammer emphasized in "The Unipolar Moment" that the United States had emerged from the Cold War as by far the most powerful country on the planet.2 He urged American leaders not to be reticent about using that power "to lead a unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being prepared to enforce them." Krauthammer's advice fit neatly with Fukuyama's vision of the future: the United States should take the lead in bringing democracy to less developed countries the world over. After all, that shouldn't be an especially difficult task given that America had awesome power and the cunning of history on its side. U.S. grand strategy has followed this basic prescription for the past twenty years, mainly because most policy makers inside the Beltway have agreed with the thrust of Fukuyama's and Krauthammer's early analyses. The results, however, have been disastrous. The United States has been at war for a startling two out of every three years since 1989, and there is no end in sight. As anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of world events knows, countries that continuously fight wars invariably build powerful national-security bureaucracies that undermine civil liberties and make it difficult to hold leaders accountable for their behavior; and they invariably end up adopting ruthless policies normally associated with brutal dictators. The Founding Fathers understood this problem, as is clear from James Madison's observation that "no nation can preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare." Washington's pursuit of policies like assassination, rendition and torture over the past decade, not to mention the weakening of the rule of law at home, shows that their fears were justified. To make matters worse, the United States is now engaged in protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that have so far cost well over a trillion dollars and resulted in around forty-seven thousand American casualties. The pain and suffering inflicted on Iraq has been enormous. Since the war began in March 2003, more than one hundred thousand Iraqi civilians have been killed, roughly 2 million Iraqis have left the country and 1.7 million more have been internally displaced. Moreover, the American military is not going to win either one of these conflicts, despite all the phony talk about how the "surge" has worked in Iraq and how a similar strategy can produce another miracle in Afghanistan. We may well be stuck in both quagmires for years to come, in fruitless pursuit of victory. The United States has also been unable to solve three other major foreign-policy problems. Washington has worked overtime-with no success-to shut down Iran's uranium-enrichment capability for fear that it might lead to Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons. And the United States, unable to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place, now seems incapable of compelling Pyongyang to give them up. Finally, every post-Cold War administration has tried and failed to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; all indicators are that this problem will deteriorate further as the West Bank and Gaza are incorporated into a Greater Israel. The unpleasant truth is that the United States is in a world of trouble today on the foreign-policy front, and this state of affairs is only likely to get worse in the next few years, as Afghanistan and Iraq unravel and the blame game escalates to poisonous levels. Thus, it is hardly surprising that a recent Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey found that "looking forward 50 years, only 33 percent of Americans think the United States will continue to be the world's leading power." Clearly, the heady days of the early 1990s have given way to a pronounced pessimism.

Mearsheimer 2011 (John J., R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, The National Interest, Imperial by Design, lexis)

Krauthammer emphasized in "The Unipolar Moment the United States is now engaged in protracted wars the American military is not going to win either one of these conflicts The United States has also been unable to solve foreign-policy problems Washington has worked overtime-with no success-to shut down Iran's uranium-enrichment the United States, unable to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place, now seems incapable of compelling Pyongyang to give them up every administration has tried and failed to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; all indicators are that this problem will deteriorate further the United States is in a world of trouble today on the foreign-policy front the heady days of the early 1990s have given way to a pronounced pessimism

Hegemony doesn’t solve global conflicts

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Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

As, the United States moves to reshape the geopolitical terrain of the world, 'Nith hundreds of military bases in 130 countries added to hundreds of installations stretched across its own territorial confines, the vast majority of Americans refuse to admit their nation possesses anything resembling an Empire. Yet U.S. global expansion is far more ambitious than anything pursued or even imagined by previous imperial powers. It might be argued that the "new militarism" is rooted in a "new imperialism" that aspires to nothing short of world domination, a project earlier outlined by its exuberant proponents and given new life by the Bush II presidency, which has set out to remove all vestiges of ideological and material impediments to worldwide corporate power-by every means at its disposal. It is hard to resist the conclusion that the United States, its strong fusion of national exceptionalism, patriotic chauvinism, and neoliberal fundamentalism fully in place, has evolved into something of an outlaw, rogue state--the kind of fearsome entity conjured up by its own incessant propaganda. Celebrations of power, violence, and conquest long associated with warfare inevitably take its architects and practitioners into the dark side of human experience, into a zone marked by unbridled fanaticism and destructive ventures requiring a culture of lies, duplicity, and double standards. Militarism as a tool of global power ultimately leads to a jettisoning of fixed and universal values, the corruption of human purpose, the degradation of those who embrace it, and finally social disintegration. As Chris Hedges writes in liVtzr Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning: "War never creates the society or harmony we desire, especially the harmony we briefly attain during wartime."1 Here the critical observer is entitled to ask whether the staggering costs and consequences of U.S. imperial domination can possibly be worth any of the goals or ideals invoked as their political justification. We seem to have reached a point where U.S. leaders see themselves as uniquely entitled to carry out warfare and imperial agendas simply owing to the country's status as the world's lone superpower and its preponderance of military force. In the wake of 9/11 and the onset of Bush's war against terrorism, the trajectory of U.S. militarism encounters fewer limits in time and space as it becomes amorphous and endless, galvanized by the threat of far-flung enemies.As at the height of the cold war, the power structure embellishes an image of the globe where two apocalyptic forces-good versus evil, civilized versus primitiv~e locked in a batde to the death. U.S. expansionism is thereby justified through its quest, its apparent need, for an increase in both domestic and global power-a quest destined to bring the superpower to work against even its own interestsc Empires across history have disintegrated on the shoals of their boundless elite hubris, accelerated by global overreach, internal decay, and collapse oflegirimacy, and there is little reason to think that Pax Americana will be able to avoid the same fate. While a feverish nationalism might sustain elite domestic legitimacy temporarily, it cannot secure the same kind of popular support internationally, any more than could a United States-managed world economy that sows its own dysfunctions in the form of mounting chaos, poverty. and inequality. To the extent the United States is determined to set itself above the rest of the world, brandishing technologically awesome military power and threatening planetary survival in the process, it winds up subverting its own requirements for international stability and hegemony. In a perpetual struggle to legitimate their actions, American leaders invoke the familiar and trusted, but increasingly hollow, pretext of exporting democracy and human rights. With the eclipse of the Communist threat, U.S. foreign policy followed the path of "humanitarian intervention," cynically employing seductive motifs like multiculturalism, human rights, and democratic pluralism-all naturally designed for public consumption. Few knowledgeable observers outside the United States take such rhetoric seriously, so its propagandistic merit is confined mainly to the domestic sphere, although even here its credibility is waning. "Democracy" becomes another self-serving facade for naked U.S. geopolitical interests, even as its popular credibility has become nearly exhausted, all the more with the fraudulent claims invoked to justify the war on Iraq. Strikingly, the concept of democracy (global or domestic) receives litde critical scrutiny within American political discourse, the mass media, or even academia; the de~ocratic ~umanitarian motives of U.S. foreign policy have become an arncle of fa.tth, and not just among neoconservatives. Yet even the most cursory inventory of the postwar historical record demonstrates a pervasive legacy of U.S. support for authoritarian regimes across the globe and a rathe_r flagr~t contempt for democracy where it hinders (imputed) nanonal mterests. Throughout the Middle East and Central Asia the United States has established close ties with a variety of dictators and monarchs willing to collaborate with American geopolitical and neoliberal agendas. The recent armed interventions in the Balkans, Mghanistan, and Iraq have left behind poor, chaotic, violence-ridden societies far removed from even the most generous definition of pluralist democracy. The case of Iraq is particularly instructive. Framing "preemptive" war as a strike against Saddarn Hussein's tyranny and for "liberation;' the Bush administration-its assertions regarding terrorist links, weapons of mass destruction, and inuninent Iraqi military threats shown to be liesscandalously trumpets the old myths while corporate boondoggles become more transparent by the day. The recent experience of U.S. involvement in Iraq reveals everything but democratic intent: support for Hussein throu~hout the 1980s, including his catastrophic wa.t against Iran; two devastanng military invasions; more than a decade of United States-led economic sanctions costing hundreds of thousands of lives; surveillance and bombings spanning more than a decade; repeated coup and assassination plots~ cynic~ use of the UN inspections process for intelligence and covert operatlons; atd to terrorist insurgents; an illegal, costly, and dictatorial military occupation. As elsewhere, U.S. ambitions in Iraq were never about democracy but were and are a function of resource wars, geopolitical strategy, and domestic pressures exerted by a powerful war machine. The Iraqi disaster, occurring fully within the general trajectory of American global power, illuminates perhaps even more the fragility and vulnerability of U.S. hegemony than its potency or invincibility, more the weaknesses than the strengths. A resurgent militarism is both cause and effect of the deepening crisis of

Boggs 2005 (Carl, Professor of Social Science at National University, Imperial Delusions p. x-xiii)

vast majority of Americans refuse to admit their nation possesses anything resembling an Empire the "new militarism" is rooted in a "new imperialism" that aspires to nothing short of world domination set out to remove all vestiges of ideological and material impediments to worldwide power-by every means at its disposal United States, its strong fusion of national exceptionalism, patriotic chauvinism, and neoliberal fundamentalism fully in place, has evolved into something of an outlaw, rogue state--the kind of fearsome entity conjured up by its own incessant propaganda. Celebrations of power, violence, and conquest long associated with warfare inevitably take its architects and practitioners into the dark side of human experience, into a zone marked by unbridled fanaticism and destructive ventures requiring a culture of lies, duplicity, and double standards. Militarism as a tool of global power ultimately leads to a jettisoning of fixed and universal values, the corruption of human purpose, the degradation of those who embrace it, and finally social disintegration the critical observer is entitled to ask whether the staggering costs and consequences of U.S. imperial domination can possibly be worth any of the goals or ideals invoked as their political justification. We seem to have reached a point where U.S. leaders see themselves as uniquely entitled to carry out warfare and imperial agendas the trajectory of U.S. militarism encounters fewer limits in time and space as it becomes amorphous and endless, galvanized by the threat of far-flung enemies U.S. expansionism is thereby justified through its quest, its apparent need, for an increase in both domestic and global power Empires across history have disintegrated on the shoals of their boundless elite hubris, accelerated by global overreach, internal decay, and collapse oflegirimacy, and there is little reason to think that Pax Americana will be able to avoid the same fate While a feverish nationalism might sustain elite domestic legitimacy temporarily, it cannot secure the same kind of popular support internationally a United States-managed world economy that sows its own dysfunctions in the form of mounting chaos, poverty. and inequality To the extent the United States is determined to set itself above the rest of the world it winds up subverting its own requirements for international stability and hegemony its propagandistic merit is confined mainly to the domestic sphere, although even here its credibility is waning The recent armed interventions in the Balkans, Mghanistan, and Iraq have left behind poor, chaotic, violence-ridden societies far removed from even the most generous definition of pluralist democracy . The Iraqi disaster, occurring fully within the general trajectory of American global power, illuminates perhaps even more the fragility and vulnerability of U.S. hegemony than its potency or invincibility, more the weaknesses than the strengths. A resurgent militarism is both cause and effect of the deepening crisis of

US leadership is unsustainable and mass suffering, militarism and conflict

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Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

At present, U.S. imperialism appears particularly blatant because it is linked directly with war in this way, and points to an endless series of wars in the future to achieve essentially the same ends. However, if we wish to understand the underlying forces at work, we should not let this heightened militarism and aggression distract us from the inner logic of imperialism, most evident in the rising gap in income and wealth between rich and poor countries, and in the net transfers of economic surplus from periphery to center that make this possible. The growing polarization of wealth and poverty between nations (a polarization that exists within nations as well) is the system’s crowning achievement on the world stage. It is also what is ultimately at issue in the struggle against modern imperialism. As Magdoff argues in Imperialism without Colonies, there is an essential oneness to economic, political, and military domination under capitalism. Those seeking to oppose the manifestations of imperialism must recognize that it is impossible to challenge any one of these effectively without calling into question all the others—and hence the entire system.

Foster research at the North South Institute 2003 John Imperial America and War, Monthly Review, May 28 http://www.monthlyreview.org/0503jbf.htm

, U.S. imperialism appears particularly blatant because it is linked directly with war and points to an endless series of wars in the future to achieve essentially the same ends. we should not let this heightened militarism and aggression distract us from the inner logic of imperialism, most evident in the rising gap in income and wealth between rich and poor countries, and in the net transfers of economic surplus from periphery to center that make this possible. The growing polarization of wealth and poverty between nations is the system’s crowning achievement on the world stage there is an essential oneness to economic, political, and military domination under capitalism. Those seeking to oppose the manifestations of imperialism must recognize that it is impossible to challenge any one of these effectively without calling into question all the others—and hence the entire system.

Imperialism necessitates endless systems of war and global inequality

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Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

A second contention advanced by proponents of American hegemony is that the United States cannot withdraw from Eurasia because a great power war there could shape the post conflict international system in ways harmful to U.S. interests. Hence, the United States "could suffer few economic losses during a war, or even benefit somewhat, and still find the postwar environment quite costly to its own trade and investment."sa This really is not an economic argument but rather an argument about the consequences of Eurasia's political and ideological, as well as economic, closure. Proponents of hegemony fear that if great power wars in Eurasia occur, they could bring to power militaristic or totalitarian regimes. Mere, several points need to be made. First, proponents of American hegemony overestimate the amount of influence that the United States has on the international system. There are numerous possible geopolitical rivalries in Eurasia. Most of these will not culminate in war, but it's a good bet that some will. But regardless of whether Eurasian great powers remain at peace, the outcomes are going to be caused more by those states' calculations of their interests than by the presence of U.S. forces in Eurasia. The United States has only limited power to affect the amount of war and peace in the international system, and whatever influence it does have is being eroded by the creeping multipolarization under way in Eurasia. Second, the possible benefits of "environment shaping" have to be weighed against the possible costs of U.S. involvement in a big Eurasian war. Finally, distilled to its essence, this argument is a restatement of the fear that U.S. security and interests inevitably will be jeopardized by a Eurasian hegemon. This threat is easily exaggerated, and manipulated, to disguise ulterior motives for U.S. military intervention in Eurasia.

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 176-7

proponents of American hegemony overestimate the amount of influence that the United States has on the international system. There are numerous possible geopolitical rivalries in Eurasia The United States has only limited power to affect the amount of war and peace in the international system, and whatever influence it does have is being eroded by the creeping multipolarization under way in Eurasia the possible benefits of "environment shaping" have to be weighed against the possible costs of U.S. involvement in a big Eurasian war distilled to its essence, this argument is a restatement of the fear that U.S. security and interests inevitably will be jeopardized by a Eurasian hegemon. This threat is easily exaggerated, and manipulated, to disguise ulterior motives for U.S. military intervention in Eurasia

HEGEMONY DOESN’T SOLVE CONFLICT – extend Mearsheimer – Iran, North Korea and Middle East conflict all prove the US is declining as a global problem solver

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Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

3. Strategic Recovery by the US. The US will not, in 2012 or 2013, show signs of any recovery of its global strategic credibility or real strength. Its manufacturing and science and technology sectors will continue to suffer from low (even declining) productivity and difficulty in capital formation (for political reasons, primarily). A significant US recovery is not feasible in the timeframe given the present political and economic policies and impasse evident. US allies will increasingly look to their own needs while attempting to sustain their alliance relationship with the US to the extent feasible. Those outside the US alliance network, or peripheral to it, will increasingly disregard US political/diplomatic pressures, and will seek to accommodate the PRC or regional actors. The continued economic malaise of the US during 2012, even if disguised by modest nominal GDP growth, will make economic (and therefore strategic) recovery more difficult and ensure that it will take longer.¶ In any event, the fact that the US national debt exceeds the GDP hollows the dollar and thus makes meaningful recovery impossible in the short-term. The attractiveness of a low dollar value in comparison to other currencies in making US manufacturing investment more feasible than in recent years is offset by declining US workforce productivity and political constraints which penalize investment in manufacturing, or even in achieving appealing conditions for capital formation. Banks are as afraid of such investment as are manufacturing investors themselves.

Copley June 2012 (Gregory R., editor of Defense & Foreign Affairs’ Strategic Policy, Strategic Policy in an Age of Global Realignment, lexis)

The US will not, in 2012 or 2013, show signs of any recovery of its global strategic credibility or real strength. manufacturing and science and technology continue to suffer from declining) productivity significant US recovery is not feasible given political and economic policies and impasse US allies will increasingly look to their own needs Those outside the US alliance network increasingly disregard US political/diplomatic pressures and will seek to accommodate the PRC or regional actors the fact that the US national debt exceeds the GDP hollows the dollar and thus makes meaningful recovery impossible in the short-term

HEG IS UNSUSTAINABLE – extend Boggs – US hegemony is facing a crisis in legitimacy both internationally and domestically – guarantees a transition away from military based leadership

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Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

Whatever the objective merits of the United States as a world actor or global policeman, if other major actors lack confidence in America's ability to maintain open markets, if they believe that the global economic system is rigged against them, if they perceive other actors such as China or Germany to be taking advantage of the system, and if they lose confidence in the dollar as the ultimate vehicle for international payments, then they may begin to withdraw their support from an American-centred world order.

Allin Senior Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies & Jones is professor of European studies at Johns Hopkins's SAIS Bologna Centre 2012 Dana & Erik Special Issue: Weary policeman: American power in an age of austerity - Chapter Five: Power, influence and leadership Adelphi series 52(430-431) Taylor & Francis

Whatever the objective merits of the U S as a world actor or global policeman, if other major actors lack confidence in America's ability to maintain open markets, if they believe that the global economic system is rigged against them, if they perceive other actors such as China or Germany to be taking advantage of the system, and if they lose confidence in the dollar then they begin to withdraw their support from an American-centred world order

Global perception declining support

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Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

Sometimes perceptions create their own realities. Even if we choose to ignore the material constraints on the exercise of US foreign policy, the simple fact that there is such intense debate about the declining influence of the United States could have important implications for the stability of the global system – a system designed by American political leaders to sustain and reinforce America's global role. Other countries will only buy into an American-centred global order if they believe that the US government is willing and able to underwrite that system, if they can have an equitable chance to pursue their own self-interest, if they believe that other powerful actors will not violate the rules of the game and so take advantage of them.10

Allin Senior Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies & Jones is professor of European studies at Johns Hopkins's SAIS Bologna Centre 2012 Dana & Erik Special Issue: Weary policeman: American power in an age of austerity - Chapter Five: Power, influence and leadership Adelphi series 52(430-431) Taylor & Francis

perceptions create their own realities Even if we choose to ignore the material constraints on the exercise of US foreign policy, the simple fact that there is such intense debate about the declining influence of the U S could have important implications for the global system Other countries will only buy into an American-centred global order if they believe that the US is willing and able to underwrite that system,

Winning that there is a perception of US decline is sufficient to win the sustainability debate

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Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

Much of the current speculation about the future is that power will follow the growth in relative wealth and population.12 The gist of the argument is that current trends will not lead to a total eclipse of the United States, but they will result in its relative decline. And the preliminary evidence in terms of trade, investment and short-term capital flows suggests that the argument has merit, at least in broad terms. The rise of Germany within Europe and Europe within the Atlantic Alliance has altered the incentives for Europeans to accept American hegemony. The rise of China and India outside the Western system – and of Turkey and Brazil as middle-ranking powers – has altered the incentives to accept the rules, norms and conventions of a Western-dominated world (see Appendix: Figure 4 ‘Real historical gross domestic product for selected countries’, page 203).

Allin Senior Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies & Jones is professor of European studies at Johns Hopkins's SAIS Bologna Centre 2012 Dana & Erik Special Issue: Weary policeman: American power in an age of austerity - Chapter Five: Power, influence and leadership Adelphi series 52(430-431) Taylor & Francis

power will follow the growth in relative wealth and population current trends will result in relative decline. And the preliminary evidence in terms of trade, investment and short-term capital flows suggests that the argument has merit The rise of Germany has altered the incentives for Europeans to accept American hegemony. The rise of China and India Turkey and Brazil has altered the incentives to accept the rules, norms and conventions of a Western-dominated world

Rising economic powers decline

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Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

It is not obvious, in other words, how America will escape its current political paralysis. Leadership on climate change looks unlikely – yet failure to lead could be catastrophic. Economic revival will be difficult – yet that revival is a prerequisite to most other goals, foreign and domestic. Balance, of savings and investment as well as government revenue and government expenditure, will be hard to achieve – yet balance is what is needed for America to sustain a decent domestic society and a responsible world role. If Barack Obama is re-elected, he will continue to face a fiercely rejectionist Republican opposition, and will probably have to settle for incremental progress toward the goals that were boldly proclaimed in 2008. If Romney defeats the incumbent president, he will be driven by an emboldened, very conservative Republican Party to confront resentful Democrats with long memories. He would do well, if political circumstance allows, to rediscover the centrist, progressive persona of his Massachusetts governorship.

Allin Senior Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies & Jones is professor of European studies at Johns Hopkins's SAIS Bologna Centre 2012 Dana & Erik Special Issue: Weary policeman: American power in an age of austerity - Conclusion: Realist Dilemmas Adelphi series 52(430-431) Taylor & Francis

It is not obvious how America will escape its current political paralysis. Leadership on climate change looks unlikely – yet failure to lead could be catastrophic Economic revival will be difficult – yet that revival is a prerequisite to most other goals, foreign and domestic. Balance, of savings and investment as well as government revenue and government expenditure, will be hard to achieve – yet balance is what is needed for America to sustain a responsible world role Obama will continue to face a fiercely rejectionist Republican opposition, and will probably have to settle for incremental progress

Decline inevitable – domestic politics

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Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

The ideological mindset that legitimizes Western interference and intervention in the affairs of non-European countries assumes that the values of the West are and should be accepted as universal. This became a mantra since the meltdown of the Soviet empire and the adoption of liberal capitalism by the former socialist East European countries. The American political scientist Francis Fukuyama popularized the old liberal concept of “the end of history,” meaning that humanity was arriving at the end station of its societal development. However, what we have been experiencing since the defeat of state socialism is perhaps the most turbulent period of human history with the prospect of open-ended outcomes. Not many futurologists dare offer a rosy picture of things to come!

Brun researcher on development issues and international relations & Hersh professor emeritus of Aalborg University, 2012 Ellen & Jacques Faux Internationalism and Really Existing Imperialism Monthly Review 63.11 April http://monthlyreview.org/2012/04/01/faux-internationalism-and-really-existing-imperialism

The ideological mindset that legitimizes Western interference and intervention in the affairs of non-European countries assumes that the values of the West are and should be accepted as universal. Fukuyama popularized the old liberal concept of “the end of history,” meaning that humanity was arriving at the end station of its societal development. However we have been experiencing the most turbulent period of human history with the prospect of open-ended outcomes. Not many futurologists dare offer a rosy picture of things to come!

US HEGEMONY IMPERIALISM – extend Boggs – justifications for US predominance are based in a Fukyaman notion of the end of history – this ideology posits the US as the city on the hill and the rest of the world open for colonial exploitation

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Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

Classic power functioned as a threat that operated precisely by never actualizing itself, by always remaining a threatening gesture. Such functioning reached its climax in the Cold War, when the threat of mutual nuclear destruction had to remain a threat. With the "war on terror", the invisible threat causes the incessant actualization, not of the threat itself, but, of the measures against the threat. The nuclear strike had to remain the threat of a strike, while the threat of the terrorist strike triggers the endless series of preemptive strikes against potential terrorists. We are thus passing from the logic of MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) to a logic in which ONE SOLE MADMAN runs the entire show and is allowed to enact its paranoia. The power that presents itself as always being under threat, living in mortal danger, and thus merely defending itself, is the most dangerous kind of power-the very model of the Nietzschean ressentiment and moralistic hypocrisy. And indeed, it was Nietzsche himself who, more than a century ago, in Daybreak, provided the best analysis of the false moral premises of today's "war on terror":

Zizek in 2005 (Slavoj, In These Times, August 11, http://www.lacan.com/zizekiranian.htm)

the invisible threat causes the incessant actualization, not of the threat itself, but, of the measures against the threat. the threat triggers the endless series of preemptive strikes We are passing from the logic of MAD to a logic in which ONE SOLE MADMAN runs the entire show The power that presents itself as always being under threat, living in mortal danger, and thus merely defending itself, is the most dangerous kind of power-the very model of ressentiment

Security via military predominance violence and ressentiment

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Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

The history of capitalist imperialism shows, of course, that the subjugation of people and nations has not been driven by humanitarian considerations. It is in this context that leftist support for humanitarian interventionism ought to be discussed. Can it be anything other than an ideological construct legitimizing actually existing imperialism?

Brun researcher on development issues and international relations & Hersh professor emeritus of Aalborg University, 2012 Ellen & Jacques Faux Internationalism and Really Existing Imperialism Monthly Review 63.11 April http://monthlyreview.org/2012/04/01/faux-internationalism-and-really-existing-imperialism

The history of capitalist imperialism shows, that the subjugation of people and nations has not been driven by humanitarian considerations.

MILITARISM – extend Boggs – US leadership necessitates global militarism - any increase in predominance only greases the wheels of militarism and decreases popular resistance to war

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Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

Journalist Ron Suskind has noted that neocons always offer “a statement of enveloping peril and no hypothesis for any real solution.” They have no hope of finding a real solution because they have no reason to look for one. Their story allows for success only as a fantasy. In reality, they expect to find nothing but an endless battle against an enemy that can never be defeated. At least two prominent neocons have said it quite bluntly. Kenneth Adelman: “We should not try to convince people that things are getting better.” Michael Ledeen: “The struggle against evil is going to go on forever.”40 This vision of endless conflict is not a conclusion drawn from observing reality. It is both the premise and the goal of the neocons’ fantasy. Ultimately, it seems, endless resistance is what they really want. Their call for a unipolar world ensures a permanent state of conflict, so that the U.S. can go on forever proving its military supremacy and promoting the “manly virtues” of militarism. They have to admit that the U.S., with its vastly incomparable power, already has unprecedented security against any foreign army. So they must sound the alarm about a shadowy new kind of enemy, one that can attack in novel, unexpected ways. They must make distant changes appear as huge imminent threats to America, make the implausible seem plausible, and thus find new monsters to destroy.

Chernus 6 (Ira, Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Colorado-Boulder, Monsters to Destroy: The Neoconservative War on Terror and Sin 2006)

“The struggle against evil is going to go on forever.”40 This vision of endless conflict is not a conclusion drawn from observing reality. It is both the premise and the goal of the neocons’ fantasy. Ultimately, it seems, endless resistance is what they really want. Their call for a unipolar world ensures a permanent state of conflict, so that the U.S. can go on forever proving its military supremacy and promoting militarism . They must make distant changes appear as huge imminent threats to America, make the implausible seem plausible, and thus find new monsters to destroy.

Furthermore – the fantasy of hegemony militarism

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Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

In Scorched Earth: The Military's Assault on the Environment, William Thomas, a U.S. Navy veteran, illustrates the extent to which the peacetime practices of military institutions damage natural environments and communities. Thomas argues that even "peace" entails a dramatic and widespread war on nature, or as Joni Seager puts it, "The environmental costs of militarized peace bear suspicious resemblance to the costs of war" (Thomas 1995, xi).

Cuomo, Professor of Philosophy, 1996 Chris, Hypatia 11.4, proquest

even "peace" entails a dramatic and widespread war on nature, "The environmental costs of militarized peace bear suspicious resemblance to the costs of war"

B) MILITARISM – Extend Sanders ev – continued reliance on militaristic foreign policies guarantees extinction via destruction of the environment – this outweighs any alternative cause to environmental destruction – even if they win they deter conflict the build up to war accesses our impact

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Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

There is no longer any question: wealth and power are moving from the North and the West to the East and the South, and the old order dominated by the United States and Europe is giving way to one increasingly shared with non-Western rising states. But if the great wheel of power is turning, what kind of global political order will emerge in the aftermath? Some anxious observers argue that the world will not just look less American -- it will also look less liberal. Not only is the United States' preeminence passing away, they say, but so, too, is the open and rule-based international order that the country has championed since the 1940s. In this view, newly powerful states are beginning to advance their own ideas and agendas for global order, and a weakened United States will find it harder to defend the old system. The hallmarks of liberal internationalism -- openness and rule-based relations enshrined in institutions such as the United Nations and norms such as multilateralism -- could give way to a more contested and fragmented system of blocs, spheres of influence, mercantilist networks, and regional rivalries. The fact that today's rising states are mostly large non-Western developing countries gives force to this narrative. The old liberal international order was designed and built in the West. Brazil, China, India, and other fast-emerging states have a different set of cultural, political, and economic experiences, and they see the world through their anti-imperial and anticolonial pasts. Still grappling with basic problems of development, they do not share the concerns of the advanced capitalist societies. The recent global economic slowdown has also bolstered this narrative of liberal international decline. Beginning in the United States, the crisis has tarnished the American model of liberal capitalism and raised new doubts about the ability of the United States to act as the global economic leader. For all these reasons, many observers have concluded that world politics is experiencing not just a changing of the guard but also a transition in the ideas and principles that underlie the global order. The journalist Gideon Rachman, for example, says that a cluster of liberal internationalist ideas -- such as faith in democratization, confidence in free markets, and the acceptability of U.S. military power -- are all being called into question. According to this worldview, the future of international order will be shaped above all by China, which will use its growing power and wealth to push world politics in an illiberal direction. Pointing out that China and other non-Western states have weathered the recent financial crisis better than their Western counterparts, pessimists argue that an authoritarian capitalist alternative to Western neoliberal ideas has already emerged. According to the scholar Stefan Halper, emerging-market states "are learning to combine market economics with traditional autocratic or semiautocratic politics in a process that signals an intellectual rejection of the Western economic model." But this panicked narrative misses a deeper reality: although the United States' position in the global system is changing, the liberal international order is alive and well. The struggle over international order today is not about fundamental principles. China and other emerging great powers do not want to contest the basic rules and principles of the liberal international order; they wish to gain more authority and leadership within it. Indeed, today's power transition represents not the defeat of the liberal order but its ultimate ascendance. Brazil, China, and India have all become more prosperous and capable by operating inside the existing international order -- benefiting from its rules, practices, and institutions, including the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the newly organized G-20. Their economic success and growing influence are tied to the liberal internationalist organization of world politics, and they have deep interests in preserving that system. In the meantime, alternatives to an open and rule-based order have yet to crystallize. Even though the last decade has brought remarkable upheavals in the global system -- the emergence of new powers, bitter disputes among Western allies over the United States' unipolar ambitions, and a global financial crisis and recession -- the liberal international order has no competitors. On the contrary, the rise of non-Western powers and the growth of economic and security interdependence are creating new constituencies for it. To be sure, as wealth and power become less concentrated in the United States' hands, the country will be less able to shape world politics. But the underlying foundations of the liberal international order will survive and thrive. Indeed, now may be the best time for the United States and its democratic partners to update the liberal order for a new era, ensuring that it continues to provide the benefits of security and prosperity that it has provided since the middle of the twentieth century.

Ikenberry 2011 (G. John, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, The Future of the Liberal World Order Subtitle: Internationalism After America, Foreign Affairs, May/June, lexis)

the old order dominated by the United States is giving way what kind of global political order will emerge in the aftermath? Some argue Not only is the United States' preeminence passing away but so is rule-based international order this narrative misses a deeper reality: although the United States' position in the global system is changing, the liberal international order is alive and well The struggle over international order today is not about fundamental principles. China and other emerging great powers do not want to contest the basic rules they wish to gain more authority and leadership within it. Brazil, China, and India have all become more prosperous and capable by operating inside the existing international order -- benefiting from its rules, practices, and institutions, including the WTO and G-20 Their economic success and growing influence are tied to the liberal internationalist organization of world politics, and they have deep interests in preserving that system alternatives to an open and rule-based order have yet to crystallize Even though the last decade has brought new powers disputes over United States' unipolar ambitions the liberal international order has no competitors the rise of non-Western powers and the growth of economic and security interdependence are creating new constituencies for it.

THREAT CONSTRUCTION – the fear of transition violence is what the totality of our argument is criticizing – their focus is an attempt to justify continued imperialist violence – the totality of the link and impact debate are responsive to this argument

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Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

REASON FOR REASSURANCE Rising powers will discover another reason to embrace the existing global rules and institutions: doing so will reassure their neighbors as they grow more powerful. A stronger China will make neighboring states potentially less secure, especially if it acts aggressively and exhibits revisionist ambitions. Since this will trigger a balancing backlash, Beijing has incentives to signal restraint. It will find ways to do so by participating in various regional and global institutions. If China hopes to convince its neighbors that it has embarked on a "peaceful rise," it will need to become more integrated into the international order. China has already experienced a taste of such a backlash. Last year, its military made a series of provocative moves -- including naval exercises -- in the South China Sea, actions taken to support the government's claims to sovereign rights over contested islands and waters. Many of the countries disputing China's claims joined with the United States at the Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in July to reject Chinese bullying and reaffirm open access to Asia's waters and respect for international law. In September, a Chinese fishing trawler operating near islands administered by Japan in the East China Sea rammed into two Japanese coast guard ships. After Japanese authorities detained the trawler's crew, China responded with what one Japanese journalist described as a "diplomatic 'shock and awe' campaign," suspending ministerial-level contacts, demanding an apology, detaining several Japanese workers in China, and instituting a de facto ban on exports of rare-earth minerals to Japan. These actions -- seen as manifestations of a more bellicose and aggressive foreign policy -- pushed ASEAN, Japan, and South Korea perceptibly closer to the United States. As China's economic and military power grow, its neighbors will only become more worried about Chinese aggressiveness, and so Beijing will have reason to allay their fears. Of course, it might be that some elites in China are not interested in practicing restraint. But to the extent that China is interested in doing so, it will find itself needing to signal peaceful intentions -- redoubling its participation in existing institutions, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit, or working with the other great powers in the region to build new ones. This is, of course, precisely what the United States did in the decades after World War II. The country operated within layers of regional and global economic, political, and security institutions and constructed new ones -- thereby making itself more predictable and approachable and reducing the incentives for other states to undermine it by building countervailing coalitions. More generally, given the emerging problems of the twenty-first century, there will be growing incentives among all the great powers to embrace an open, rule-based international system. In a world of rising economic and security interdependence, the costs of not following multilateral rules and not forging cooperative ties go up. As the global economic system becomes more interdependent, all states -- even large, powerful ones -- will find it harder to ensure prosperity on their own. Growing interdependence in the realm of security is also creating a demand for multilateral rules and institutions. Both the established and the rising great powers are threatened less by mass armies marching across borders than by transnational dangers, such as terrorism, climate change, and pandemic disease. What goes on in one country -- radicalism, carbon emissions, or public health failures -- can increasingly harm another country. Intensifying economic and security interdependence are giving the United States and other powerful countries reason to seek new and more extensive forms of multilateral cooperation. Even now, as the United States engages China and other rising states, the agenda includes expanded cooperation in areas such as clean energy, environmental protection, nonproliferation, and global economic governance. The old and rising powers may disagree on how exactly this cooperation should proceed, but they all have reasons to avoid a breakdown in the multilateral order itself. So they will increasingly experiment with new and more extensive forms of liberal internationalism.

Ikenberry 2011 (G. John, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, The Future of the Liberal World Order Subtitle: Internationalism After America, Foreign Affairs, May/June, lexis)

Rising powers will discover another reason to embrace the existing global rules and institutions: doing so will reassure their neighbors as they grow more powerful A stronger China will make neighboring states potentially less secure if it acts aggressively Beijing has incentives to signal restraint As China's economic and military power grow, its neighbors will only become more worried about Chinese aggressiveness, and so Beijing will have reason to allay their fears it will find itself needing to signal peaceful intentions More generally, given the emerging problems of the twenty-first century, there will be growing incentives among all the great powers to embrace an open, rule-based international system. In a world of rising economic and security interdependence, the costs of not following multilateral rules and not forging cooperative ties go up Growing interdependence in the realm of security is also creating a demand for multilateral rules and institutions Intensifying economic and security interdependence are giving the United States and other powerful countries reason to seek new and more extensive forms of multilateral cooperation The old and rising powers may disagree on how exactly this cooperation should proceed, but they all have reasons to avoid a breakdown in the multilateral order itself

No transition wars- rising states will integrate into international institutions- no incentives for aggression

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Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

In this article, we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments. First, we challenge the retrenchment pessimists' claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. In fact, when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers, peaceful retrenchment is the most common response, even over short time spans. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61-83 percent. When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies or adversaries, draw down their military obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations. Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so. 12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but necessity is the mother of invention, and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. Knowing only a state's rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined. Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that great powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes. Faced with diminishing resources, great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics, retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through compromise, rather than conflict. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from being a hazardous policy, retrenchment can be successful. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position.

MacDonald and Parent 2011 (Paul K. and Joseph M., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, International Security, Graceful Decline?; The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment, Spring, lexis)

To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers we challenge the retrenchment pessimists' claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. In fact, when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers, peaceful retrenchment is the most common response, even over short time spans great powers retrenched in a range of 61-83 percent When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies or adversaries, draw down their military obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so Retrenchment is by no means easy, but necessity is the mother of invention, and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner great powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes Faced with diminishing resources, great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation

NOT UNIQUE – all of our evidence proves that lash-out is inevitable now – Iraq, Afghanistan etc prove US is aggressively intervening now

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Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

Implications for Sino-U.S. Relations Our findings are directly relevant to what appears to be an impending great power transition between China and the United States. Estimates of economic performance vary, but most observers expect Chinese GDP to surpass U.S. GDP sometime in the next decade or two. 91 This prospect has generated considerable concern. Many scholars foresee major conflict during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition. Echoing Gilpin and Copeland, John Mearsheimer sees the crux of the issue as irreconcilable goals: China wants to be America's superior and the United States wants no peer competitors. In his words, "[N]o amount of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia." 92 Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one's reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers. Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations.

MacDonald and Parent 2011 (Paul K. and Joseph M., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, International Security, Graceful Decline?; The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment, Spring, lexis)

Our findings are directly relevant to what appears to be an impending great power transition between China and the United States Many scholars foresee major conflict our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one's reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations

These studies specifically apply to the US

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Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

Let us be absolutely clear: retrenchment is risky, but not retrenching is riskier. Living beyond one's means is possible temporarily, but prolonged insolvency invites a terrible reckoning. Grasping great powers present a brittle, overextended defensive perimeter with strategic inflexibility and shallow reserves—a blatantly ripe target for opportunistic states. This is likely why so few declining states in our study chose not to retrench, and those that failed to fared poorly. It is understandable that declining powers retrench reluctantly; it is all the more telling that they tend to do so quickly.

MacDonald Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College & Parent Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami 2012 Paul & Joseph Correspondence: Decline and Retrenchment—Peril or Promise? International Security 36(4) project muse

retrenchment is risky, but not retrenching is riskier. Living beyond one's means is possible temporarily, but prolonged insolvency invites a terrible reckoning. Grasping great powers present a brittle, overextended defensive perimeter with strategic inflexibility and shallow reserves—a blatantly ripe target for opportunistic states This is so few declining states in our study chose not to retrench, and those that failed to fared poorly.

Attempting to hold on to hegemony is more dangerous than any consequence of transition

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Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

By no means did we intend for our conclusions to be taken as definitive, and the future does not always resemble the past. Yet Thompson's modesty goes too far. History and the tools of social science are not irrelevant to political prediction—they are the best available guides for policymakers to prepare for the future. Our critics propose a number of refinements to our model, but they do not replace it or impair our methods and evidence. As decisionmakers revamp the U.S. force posture, propose personnel cuts, and draw down foreign entanglements, they need to know which causal factors are primary and which are secondary to predict the likely effects of potential actions. Our arguments [End Page 202] and data have laid a foundation to do this, and we welcome subsequent improvements. Regardless, we agree with Thompson that Chinese dominance is not foreordained; retrenchment alone is no panacea; and domestic reforms are an indispensable part of great power recovery. These points are so consequential that we discuss them at length elsewhere.8

MacDonald Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College & Parent Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami 2012 Paul & Joseph Correspondence: Decline and Retrenchment—Peril or Promise? International Security 36(4) project muse

History and social science are the best available guides for policymakers to prepare for the future. As decisionmakers revamp the U.S. force posture, they need to know which causal factors are primary and which are secondary to predict the likely effects of potential actions. Our arguments and data have laid a foundation to do this

Prefer history and social science

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Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

Second, possession of nuclear weapons has signally failed to prevent war on a significant number of occasions since the end of World War II. US weapons did not deter China from attacking US forces in the Korean War, nor North Vietnam from attacking South Vietnam and US forces in the 1960s and 1970s. Israeli nuclear weapons did not dissuade Egypt from attacking Israel in 1973, and the Soviet nuclear arsenal did not deter the mujahedeen from waging war against the Soviet army in Afghanistan in the 1980s—nor did it prevent a Soviet defeat.

Human Security Report Project 2011 Human Security Report Project is an independent research centre affiliated with Simon Fraser University (SFU) in Vancouver, Canada, Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War http://hsrgroup.org/docs/Publications/HSR20092010/20092010HumanSecurityReport-Overview.pdf

US weapons did not deter China from attacking US forces in the Korean War, nor North Vietnam from attacking South Vietnam and US forces in the 1960s and 1970s. Israeli nuclear weapons did not dissuade Egypt from attacking Israel in 1973, and the Soviet nuclear arsenal did not deter the mujahedeen from waging war against the Soviet army in Afghanistan in the 1980s—nor did it prevent a Soviet defeat

Deterrence empirically fails – any contrary data is inconclusive

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Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

When Copernicus first claimed that the Sun, rather than the Earth, was the center of the solar system, he did not suddenly lose sight of our planet. Policymaking circles in the U.S. could use a Copernican shift of their own when analyzing the travel ban debate. Given the Cuban government's totalitarianism, its legitimacy and credibility should be questioned at all times, but simply preventing Americans from visiting the island does not chip away at Cuba's totalitarian pillars. We should reframe the issue by searching for other ways to delegitimize the regime. One possible solution is to facilitate the flow of visitors to and from the island, which would give the Cuban people access to the outside world, and provide them with the very unpropagandized information that the Cuban government would otherwise deny them. This Copernican shift - that is, placing travel within the orbit of change - would not lose sight of our end goal (an open Cuba), but would simply shift the emphasis away from breaking the Cuban regime with isolation. It instead would use travel to do an end-run around Cuba's self-imposed information blockade. Once travel to Cuba is properly seen as a way to pierce the Cuban government's totalitarian veil, and is no longer seen as a hindrance to reform on the island, a more pragmatic travel policy can then be crafted.

Perez JD Yale Law School 2010 David “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department” Harvard Latino Law Review lexis

Policymaking circles in the U.S. could use a shift when analyzing the travel ban debate. simply preventing Americans from visiting the island does not chip away at Cuba's totalitarian pillars. We should reframe the issue by searching for other ways to delegitimize the regime. One possible solution is to facilitate the flow of visitors to and from the island, which would give the Cuban people access to the outside world, and provide them with the very unpropagandized information that the Cuban government would otherwise deny them. This shift placing travel within the orbit of change - would not lose sight of our end goal (an open Cuba), but would simply shift the emphasis away from breaking the Cuban regime with isolation. It instead would use travel to do an end-run around Cuba's self-imposed information blockade

The United States federal government should lift the travel ban on Cuba

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Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

The embargo and the travel ban have sometimes been grouped together as the same policy, but should instead be dealt with separately. Although most Cuban-Americans endorse the embargo, almost all are opposed to the restrictions on family travel. n50 Separating the travel ban from the embargo would give the U.S. more flexibility as it considers the long-term viability of our current Cuba policy. By adopting this Copernican shift, policymakers could then envision a policy that promotes human rights by loosening the travel restrictions, but maintaining significant elements of the embargo.

Perez JD Yale Law School 2010 David “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department” Harvard Latino Law Review lexis

The embargo and the travel ban have sometimes been grouped together as the same policy, but should instead be dealt with separately. Although most Cuban-Americans endorse the embargo, almost all are opposed to the restrictions on family travel. Separating the travel ban from the embargo would give the U.S. more flexibility as it considers the long-term viability of our current Cuba policy. By adopting this shift, policymakers could then envision a policy that promotes human rights by loosening the travel restrictions, but maintaining significant elements of the embargo

Counterplan avoids the link to politics and the permutation doesn’t remedy

Cuba Embargo Negative - Starter Pack - Berkeley 2013.html5

Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

A steady flow of information would help highlight the cracks in Cuba's system of government. For example, public outrage over Cuba's economic decline has been muted because the public has a limited perception of their relative poverty since global interaction is so restricted. Highlighting relative economic disparities increases the potential for popular discontent. n151

Perez JD Yale Law School 2010 David “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department” Harvard Latino Law Review lexis

A steady flow of information would help highlight the cracks in Cuba's system of government public outrage over Cuba's economic decline has been muted because the public has a limited perception of their relative poverty since global interaction is so restricted. Highlighting relative economic disparities increases the potential for popular discontent.

Lifting travel restrictions solves the case

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Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

Camouflaged by ubiquitous anti-Castro rhetoric, the Cuban-American entrepreneurs have manufactured a lucrative business with the island, regulated by the very government they pretend to hate. The rightwing congressional representatives pretend to fight for every law to punish the "Castro regime" while in practice turn a dead eye to the growing trade that helps Florida's and Cuba's economy. Preserve the embargo, but make an exception for Cuban Americans.

Huffington Post 1/27/2013 “U.S.-Cuba Policy: A Boon for Cuban-American Entrepreneurs” lexis

rightwing congressional representatives fight for every law to Preserve the embargo,

Right wing will fight any attempt to loosen the embargo

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Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

Any move to ease the five-decade-old embargo would probably encounter anti-Castro resistance in Florida, one of the biggest prizes in recent presidential elections, and opposition from key lawmakers including Senator Robert Menendez, the Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Bloomberg 2/20/2013 “Obama Can Bend Cuba Embargo to Help Open Economy, Groups Say” http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-20/obama-should-bend-cuba-embargo-to-buoy-free-markets-reports-say.html

Any move to ease the embargo would encounter anti-Castro resistance in Florida, one of the biggest prizes in recent presidential elections, and opposition from key lawmakers

Easing embargo popular and political opposition

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Berkeley (CNDI)

Case Negatives

2013

On January 14, 2011, President Obama announced measures to significantly loosen the U.S. sanctions against Cuba, including broad new authorizations for travel and non-family remittances to support private economic activity in Cuba. These changes were made without prior Congressional approval and are only the latest in a string of modifications to the Cuba sanctions that have been implemented solely under the President’s executive authority. Along with the political and policy debates over the President’s actions, there will undoubtedly be some who question whether the President had sufficient legal authority to make these changes. This paper reviews the sources of the President’s authority to modify the Cuba sanctions and concludes that executive authority is broad enough to support not only the changes announced to date, but also a range of additional measures to ease restrictions. 1 I. Overview Through a complex series of federal statutes, Congress has codified the comprehensive U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba and restricted the President’s authority to suspend or terminate those sanctions until a “transition government” is in power in Cuba. Notwithstanding these statutory requirements, the President maintains broad authority and discretion to significantly ease specific provisions of the Cuba sanctions regime in support of particular U.S. foreign policy objectives recognized by Congress, including the provision of humanitarian support for the Cuban people and the promotion of democratic reforms. In fact, since Congress codified of the Cuba sanctions in 1996, Presidents Clinton, Bush and Obama have each exercised this authority to ease the scope of restrictions applicable to Cuba, without action or approval by Congress. This executive authority to modify the Cuba sanctions is grounded in Constitutional, statutory and regulatory provisions that empower the President and the responsible executive branch agencies to grant exceptions to the sanctions through executive actions, regulations and licenses. The authority is particularly broad in certain areas, such as telecommunications-related transactions and humanitarian donations, where Congress has explicitly granted discretion to the President under existing statutes. Consistent with the relevant statutory authorities and restrictions, as well as statutory statements of U.S. policy objectives, the President arguably has sufficient legal authority to make the following types of additional changes to the current U.S. sanctions against Cuba:

Propst 11 (Stephen F. Propst is a Partner in the International Trade Group at the law firm of Hogan Lovells US LLP, “Presidential Authority To Modify Economic Sanctions Against Cuba,” A legal analysis prepared at the request of the Cuba Study Group and released in connection with a forum on U.S.-Cuba Relations at The Brookings Institution, 15 February 2011)

President Obama announced measures to significantly loosen the U.S. sanctions against Cuba, including broad new authorizations for travel and non-family remittances to support private economic activity in Cuba These changes were made without prior Congressional approval and are only the latest in a string of modifications to the Cuba sanctions that have been implemented solely under the President’s executive authority This paper reviews the sources of the President’s authority to modify the Cuba sanctions and concludes that executive authority is broad enough to support not only the changes announced to date, but also a range of additional measures to ease restrictions Notwithstanding these statutory requirements, the President maintains broad authority and discretion to significantly ease specific provisions of the Cuba sanctions regime in support of particular U.S. foreign policy objectives recognized by Congress Presidents Clinton, Bush and Obama have each exercised this authority to ease the scope of restrictions applicable to Cuba, without action or approval by Congress. This executive authority to modify the Cuba sanctions is grounded in Constitutional, statutory and regulatory provisions that empower the President and the responsible executive branch agencies to grant exceptions to the sanctions through executive actions, regulations and licenses. where Congress has explicitly granted discretion to the President under existing statutes. the President arguably has sufficient legal authority to make the following types of additional changes to the current U.S. sanctions against Cuba

The United States Executive Branch should eliminate enforcement of statutes supporting the economic embargo of Cuba, and ease other restrictions on economic engagement with Cuba currently under Executive Branch purview.

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The President has the authority to ease restrictions on travel to Cuba. For example, the President could choose to authorize travel to Cuba under a general license for all eligible categories of travel. Lifting all the restrictions on travel, however, would require legislative action. This is because of the codification of the embargo in Section 102(h) of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114); that act conditions the lifting of the embargo, including the travel restrictions, on the fulfillment of certain democratic conditions in Cuba. Although the Administration retains flexibility through licensing authority to ease travel restrictions, the President may not lift all restrictions on travel as set forth in the CACR. Moreover, a provision in the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (§910(b) of P.L. 106-387, Title IX) prevents the Administration from licensing travel for tourist activities, and defines such activities as any activity not expressly authorized in the 12 broad categories of travel set forth in the CACR regulations. This legislative provision essentially circumscribes the authority of the executive branch to issue travel licenses for activities beyond the broad categories of travel allowed, and would have to be amended, superseded by new legislation, or repealed in order to expand categories of travel to Cuba or lift travel restrictions altogether.

Sullivan 12 (Mark P. Sullivan Specialist in Latin American Affairs, “Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances,” 11-9-12, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31139.pdf

The President has the authority to ease restrictions on travel to Cuba Lifting all the restrictions on travel, however, would require legislative action This is because of the codification of the embargo in Section 102(h) of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 conditions the lifting of the embargo, including the travel restrictions, on the fulfillment of certain democratic conditions in Cuba the President may not lift all restrictions on travel as set forth in the CACR a provision in the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 prevents the Administration from licensing travel for tourist activities This legislative provision essentially circumscribes the authority of the executive branch to issue travel licenses for activities beyond the broad categories of travel allowed, and would have to be amended, superseded by new legislation, or repealed in order to expand categories of travel to Cuba or lift travel restrictions altogether

2. Doesn’t Solve –

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Wyoming

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2013

The other difference in the early and late delivery situations arises because modification, waiver, and estoppel differ in their permanence. A modification is as permanent as any other contract. An estoppel may be too, if a court applies the doctrine, but that question is less certain. A waiver, on the other hand, could conceivably be retracted. In this sense, a waiver could be ephemeral. The next Section discusses this aspect of waiver, for it affects how one thinks about changing contracts, and the possibility of changing them back. B. Changing Changes What happens if one or both parties take some step to change the contract but then think better of it? n100 The issue this Section addresses is not so much whether the contract can accommodate further change, but whether a change, once accomplished, can be undone. The issue is most familiar in the context of waiver. In particular, can a waiver be retracted? 1. retraction and the problem of election Authorities have differed over whether a waiver may be retracted, and if so, under what circumstances. A fair amount of older case law held that a waiver, once made, was permanent. n101 Law students today are still likely to learn about waiver from Clark v. West, which states bluntly that a waiver "can never be revoked." n102 Under this older rule, the effect of a waiver differs little from the effect of a modification. In some ways, this is not surprising, as the term "waiver" has at times included what is today called a "modification." Using the definitions proposed here, however, a waiver would be a unilateral act, not a bilateral one; there could be no agreement, and no consideration. [*630] Under these circumstances, a waiver ought to be retractable. The modern rules state as much, both in the U.C.C. and in the Second Restatement, insofar as the waiver applies to an executory part of the contract. n103 An exception is provided in the case of reliance, however. If "the retraction would be unjust in view of a material change of position in reliance on the waiver," n104 then the court is charged simply to settle the matter justly. With considerably more verbiage, the Second Restatement states the same exception. n105 Notably, however, the lack of retractability is based on reliance, and thus estoppel as opposed to waiver, under the definitions above.

Snyder 99 (David – Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University, “THE LAW OF CONTRACT AND THE CONCEPT OF CHANGE: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE MODIFICATION, WAIVER, AND ESTOPPEL”, 1999, 1999 Wis. L. Rev. 607, lexis)

The other difference arises because modification, waiver, and estoppel differ in their permanence. A modification is permanent A waiver, on the other hand, could conceivably be retracted. a waiver could be ephemeral The issue is most familiar in the context of waiver a waiver would be a unilateral act there could be no agreement, and no consideration Under these circumstances, a waiver ought to be retractable The modern rules state as much

B. Waivers are uncertain – they can be retracted

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Wyoming

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2013

Q. When I refer to the government of the United States in text, should it be U.S. Federal Government or U.S. federal government? A. The government of the United States is not a single official entity. Nor is it when it is referred to as the federal government or the U.S. government or the U.S. federal government. It’s just a government, which, like those in all countries, has some official bodies that act and operate in the name of government: the Congress, the Senate, the Department of State, etc.

Chicago 7 (University of Chicago Manual of Style, “Capitalization, Titles”, http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/CMS_FAQ/CapitalizationTitles/CapitalizationTitles30.html)

The government of the U S is not a single official entity Nor is it when it is referred to as the U.S. federal government It’s just a government has some official bodies that act and operate in the name of government Congress Senate Department of State, etc

Federal Government” doesn’t mean “all three branches” – any one body acts as it

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Wyoming

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2013

Mexico’s President-elect Enrique Pena Nieto will be able to bring together members of his party and the opposition to pass laws opening up the oil industry to private investment, his top economic adviser said.Pena Nieto has “the conviction for the reforms, the political experience and the leadership of his party,” to push through the changes, Luis Videgaray, co-head of the incoming president’s transition team, said in an Oct. 26 interview. “It implies building a political consensus. It’s what we’ll do with energy.” The toughest resistance may come from within Pena Nieto’s Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI, a traditional ally of unions that have opposed past energy overhauls, said Lisa Schineller of Standard & Poor’s. Already, labor legislation presented by outgoing President Felipe Calderon and initially backed by Pena Nieto to ease the hiring and firing of workers is facing delays in Congress as PRI lawmakers refuse to approve some clauses to boost union transparency.

Cattan 12’ (Nacha Cattan is a reporter for Bloomberg News in Mexico City “Pena Nieto Has Ability to Open Mexico Oil Sector, Aide Says” October 30,2012 http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-10-30/pena-nieto-has-strength-to-open-mexico-s-oil-industry-aide-says)

Mexico’s President-elect Enrique Pena Nieto will be able to bring together members of his party and the opposition to pass laws opening up the oil industry to private investment, The toughest resistance may come from within Pena Nieto’s Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI, a traditional ally of unions that have opposed past energy overhauls

Pena working on opening up oil sector now but opposing party is key

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MEXICO CITY -- New President Enrique Pena Nieto has been fast out of the blocks in attacking some of Mexico's toughest issues in a country often stymied by monopolies and corruption.

WEISSENSTEIN 3/13’ (Michael Weissenstein correspondent at the Associated Press “Enrique Pena Nieto Reforms: Mexico's President Pushes Sweeping Changes To Telecom, Oil Industry” 03/19/13 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/19/enrique-pena-nieto-reforms-mexico-president_n_2906967.html”

President Enrique Pena Nieto has been fast out of the blocks in attacking some of Mexico's toughest issues in a country often stymied by monopolies and corruption.

Piena has momentum now to push oil reform

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MEXICO CITY — In their joint fight against drug traffickers, the United States and Mexico have forged an unusually close relationship in recent years, with the Americans regularly conducting polygraph tests on elite Mexican security officials to root out anyone who had been corrupted. But shortly after Mexico’s new president, Enrique Peña Nieto, took office in December, American agents got a clear message that the dynamics, with Washington holding the clear upper hand, were about to change.

Archibold, et al. 4/30 (Randal C., Damien Cave, and Ginger Thompson; “Mexico’s Curbs on U.S. Role in Drug Fight Spark Friction”, The New York Times, 30 April 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/world/americas/friction-between-us-and-mexico-threatens-efforts-on-drugs.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0) ~ew

e United States and Mexico have forged an unusually close relationship in recent years But shortly after Nieto, took office American agents got a clear message that the dynamics, with Washington holding the clear upper hand, were about to change.

Mexico actively excluding US from security coop – PC required for reversal

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Mexico’s current president, Enrique Pena Nieto, has opposed legalization. But he recently said that he would consider world opinion on the matter, particularly in light of recent voter-approved initiatives to legalize marijuana in Washington state and Colorado for recreational use.

Pierre 7/10 (Allen St. is the NORML Executive Director; National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, “NORML Meets With Former Mexican President”, NORML Website, 10 July 2013, http://blog.norml.org/2013/07/09/norml-meets-with-former-mexican-president/?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=NORML+Meets+With+Former+Mexican+President)

Nieto, has opposed legalization. But he recently said that he would consider world opinion on the matter, particularly in light of recent voter-approved initiatives to legalize marijuana in Washington state and Colorado for recreational use.

Legalization is an Uphill fight - unpopular

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2013

Investors seeking opportunities in renewable energy outside the United States should consider our next-door neighbor to the south. Mexico has an abundance of renewable power resources and a keen awareness of the environmental and social benefits of alternative energy development. Mexico’s consumption of energy is growing much more rapidly than in more-developed countries, and there is a shortage of conventional energy resources for power generation. The majority of the energy consumed in Mexico is used for industrial production (38 percent) or transportation (27 percent), and losses related to electricity generation and distribution account for a significant portion of consumption, at 22 percent (Figure 1). Within the electricity sector in particular, renewable energy sources will need to play a significantly expanded role if there is any hope of covering the gap between demand growth and generation capacity growth, even with the continued substantial expansion of efficient natural gas-fired, combined-cycle turbine generators as the dominant part of the overall generation mix (Figure 2). In 2006 the Mexican government’s secretariat of energy (SENER) conservatively predicted important increases in installed capacity for hydropower (2,254 MW), wind energy (592 MW) and geothermal energy (125 MW) for the period from 2005 to 2014 (Figure 3). By 2005 the government had approved more than 50 renewable energy projects. When they were completed by the end of 2007, they already accounted for 1,400 MW of new capacity. Given Mexico’s available renewable energy resources, domestic and international incentives and other environmental and economic factors, the market for renewable energy projects in Mexico could well be considerably larger. A significant proportion of the new gas-fired power plants in Mexico will replace older, inefficient steam generators powered by fuel oil, rather than creating incremental new capacity. Indeed, the rapid and large increase in demand for natural gas to meet electricity generation needs in Mexico, as in the United States, has constrained available supplies and raised real wholesale gas prices. This has created new opportunities for companies using renewable energy to compete, and it has prompted the Mexican government to look favorably on foreign investment in renewable energy projects. Investment Climate Any discussion of investment opportunities and incentives in Mexico must first broadly consider political stability, the rule of law and macroeconomic factors. The current attractiveness of Mexico as a source for serious, long-term private investment in energy and infrastructure results from many dramatic shifts over the past several years. Mexico has become a considerably more stable country in which to invest since the 1994 passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Democratization and a commitment to market discipline, especially in the financial sector (through privatization of banks, pension reforms, new insolvency laws, growing capital markets, recent tax reform, greater regulatory transparency and other measures), have strengthened the nation’s economy, banking system, government institutions, the rule of law and monetary policy. The results include steady growth in gross domestic product (GDP) and GDP per capita, deeper capital markets and electoral stability – all despite serious internal political challenges and increasing foreign economic competition from Asia. Income inequality remains a major social and political problem, but the percentage of the population in extreme poverty has declined markedly in the past decade. GDP has grown about 4 percent per year for about 10 years. Aggregate external debt has dropped both in absolute terms and as a share of GDP, and the government budget deficit has been reduced. Inflation in the late 1990s was in the double digits and has declined dramatically to under 5 percent on average for most of this decade (Figure 4). It is no surprise, then, that the value of the Mexican peso has nearly doubled against the U.S. dollar in the past 12 or so years, and that Mexico (along with Chile) has the highest sovereign debt credit rating in Latin America. Additionally, Mexico’s relative political stability and investor-friendliness (compared to such other countries in the region as Argentina, Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia) and, conversely, the longer-term trend of economic liberalization and political stability in Latin America’s major economies (Mexico, Brazil and Chile) have combined for steady growth in inbound foreign investment. High global oil prices, liquid domestic financial markets and a more transparent tax system also contribute to currency stability and positive trends in Mexico’s current account deficit. So while much remains to be done in these areas, the trends are positive. Consequently, Mexico appears to attract a much lower risk premium from foreign investors than in the past. Historically, most foreign investment in Mexico comes from the United States or international companies building manufacturing facilities for the export of goods to the United States. After NAFTA, this trend has accelerated. Most of the rest of the foreign direct investment in Mexico comes from European countries. In the near future, capital flows from Asia (especially China, Japan and Korea) will become increasingly important. Capital flows within Latin America (such as Brazilian investment in Mexico) also are on the rise, with promising implications for regional stability. Regardless of the source, investment in high technology and export-oriented industries is particularly welcome. Although reforms are under active debate, investments in energy remain tightly restricted. In recent years, though, both electricity generation and natural gas distribution have been opened to foreign investment. Indeed, due to the opening of the electric sector, renewable energy projects (like wind, solar and geothermal power plants) can offer more liberal investment opportunities and incentives than do other energy sectors (like upstream oil and gas facilities and petrochemicals), which remain largely off-limits to direct foreign investment. Incentives for Foreign Investors The attraction for foreign investors in renewable energy projects in Mexico is further enhanced by the existence of strong domestic and international incentives. Mexican law encourages such investments in several ways. The federal tax laws allow for 100 percent depreciation in the first year for all renewable energy capital investments. There is a fiscal credit of 30 percent for research and development. And the law covering the use of renewable energy sources, passed in December 2005, sets a goal of having renewables constitute 8 percent of the power generation mix by 2012, not including large hydro projects, and creates a trust to support renewable energy projects, rural electrification, biofuels and technological research and development. The fiscal reforms enacted in September 2007 fall short of reforming Mexico’s energy sector. It is possible that the potential energy legislation planned for the coming year may create further incentives to stimulate more private investment, including by foreign investors, in Mexico’s energy sector and specifically in renewable energy projects. The other source of incentives is the Kyoto Protocol, which became effective in 2005 and seeks to reduce carbon emissions and address the problem of global warming. Under the Kyoto Protocol, Mexico is designated an Annex II country, which makes it eligible for Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects. The objective of the CDM is to displace future carbon emissions by rewarding investors who build power generation or other facilities using cleaner technology, rather than hydrocarbons, coal or other fuels that produce harmful carbon emissions. As of January 2008, Mexico accounts for 100 of the nearly 900 CDM projects registered worldwide, over 11 percent of the world total (Figure 5). Of these, 767 projects globally are related to energy production and efficiency. Overall, Mexican CDM projects have been awarded 2,333,150 carbon emission reduction credits, which represent about 2.8 percent of the world total (Figure 6). By this measure, Mexico is second only to Brazil in Latin America in the creation of carbon credits. In Mexico, while most CDM projects are for methane recovery and energy production in conjunction with other agricultural or industrial activities, renewable energy projects for either hydropower or wind energy generation account for the largest number of credits awarded. About a third of Mexico’s CDM projects are in the energy sector. If the Mexican government certifies a proposed undertaking as a CDM project and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change approves it under the Kyoto Protocol, the owner of the new project will earn carbon emission reduction credits based on the number of carbon emissions that the facility is avoiding by not using carbon-based fuel. Carbon emission reduction credits have economic value that can be monetized in advance of the construction of a renewable energy power plant in Mexico. Already these credits are being traded in European carbon futures markets, though the forward price curve remains difficult to predict for a variety of economic and political reasons. To finance a wind farm in Mexico, for example, the investors could raise some of the money to build it by selling the credits expected to be earned. Credits for an approved CDM project constitute an additional source of capital to fund capital costs. As oil and gas prices rise, the expected revenues for power sales – even power generated by renewable sources – can be expected to rise. As such, renewable power projects today are benefiting from a happy confluence of factors: new government subsidies and incentives; improving technology, which is boosting both efficiency and reliability; higher costs for traditional energy sources, which makes renewable energy significantly more competitive even without subsidies; and popular support for all things “green.” Available Renewable Energy Sources in Mexico Mexico is better suited for some types of renewable energy than others. Here is a rundown of the various types of renewable energy sources available in Mexico and the issues involved in developing those sources. Wind. Mexico has relatively few installed wind power projects today. The country has a potential wind energy generation capacity of over 40,000 MW, according to SENER. The key to a successful wind energy project is identifying areas where the wind is consistently strong. Wind resources in Mexico are becoming much better known. The most promising areas for wind generation facilities in Mexico are in the states of Oaxaca and Baja California. The Yucatan Peninsula and other areas also may be suitable. By metering the intensity of the air flow in targeted areas, developers can determine appropriate places to construct wind farms, matching turbine technology to the specific characteristics of each site. Any wind farm that is constructed in Mexico will almost certainly be far from most load centers, the population concentrations or factories where the demand for power is greatest. Delivering power to these load centers must be done via Mexico’s power grid, and the nearest access point may be a considerable distance away. Thus, interconnection arrangements often can present the biggest challenges in developing a wind power generation project. Then there is the issue of who will pay for and own the necessary transmission line upgrades, substations and other interconnection facilities. It may turn out that the planned wind farm does not generate enough revenue to finance the upgrade and pay other expenses, absent subsidies. There also will be practical and commercial issues involved in the delivery of wind farms’ power to customers. The national public utility in Mexico, la Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE), is essentially a monopoly. There are some areas in which CFE is not the power provider – Mexico City, for instance – but CFE handles power transmission in most parts of the country where wind farms are operating or planned. Consequently, working out interconnection and transmission arrangements with CFE may be necessary even if CFE is not the ultimate purchaser of the power. For commercial reasons it may be preferable to sell a wind farm’s power to industrial hosts, such as “big box” retailers, factories or other large users of power. In such cases, careful project planning will address both dispatch procedures (by which power deliveries are scheduled and supplies balanced) and the reliability of transmission services (Figure 7). Another issue that must be confronted is backup power. Wind farms can generate electricity only when the wind is blowing, and potential customers will want to schedule power deliveries at any time they need it. The only source of backup power generally is CFE, so the wind developer’s arrangements with CFE must cover the provision of backup power on commercially reasonable terms. Fortunately, the Mexican government and CFE have taken steps to harmonize the wholesale tariffs for backup power and to address the dispatch priority more equitably, so that CFE does not abuse its monopoly position. Solar. Mexico has vast areas in which the sun shines year-round. The International Energy Agency estimates that the installed photovoltaic capacity in the country is just 14 MW, and most of that is not connected to Mexico’s power grid. So finding an appropriate site for harnessing solar energy is much less an issue than transmitting that energy to its users. Here, the transmission issues for large solar power arrays match those already discussed with respect to wind power plants. A large-scale solar power development will, of course, require a lot of land. Acquiring such sites, securing the necessary rights-of-way and perfecting title can be time-consuming. For these reasons, some of the most promising solar projects involve smaller arrays that are located at a host facility (such as an industrial plant, a hotel or a “big box” retailer) that is also the purchaser of the power. In such cases transmission issues are avoided. Likewise, solar projects that produce process heat (like steam) for industrial uses, rather than power, also show promise. Another issue with solar power is its high cost. The materials for a solar facility – glass, silica and copper – are expensive. Eventually new photovoltaic technology will bring those costs down, but currently making new solar power plants economically viable without subsidies or tax credits is a challenge. Geothermal. Mexico is the world’s third-largest producer of geothermal electricity, behind only the United States and the Philippines. In 2003, the latest year for which solid figures are available, Mexico had 955 MW of installed geothermal capacity. That is a small portion of the potential for this energy source; the U.S. Department of Energy estimates that installed geothermal capacity could increase to 8,000 MW. These projects hold enormous potential. Hydroelectric. Just under one-quarter of Mexico’s electricity supply is generated by hydroelectric power. The 2,300-MW Manuel Moreno Torres hydroelectric plant in the southern state of Chiapas is the largest in Mexico and, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, is the world’s fourth most productive hydroelectric plant. However, much of Mexico’s hydropower comes from small, outdated plants, many of which were built in remote areas as far back as 1920. Large new hydro plants are coming on line, such as the 750-MW El Cajon dam in the state of Nayarit, funded with foreign capital on the strength of an offtake contract with CFE. Hydropower, although not as directly subsidized as other renewable sources, will continue to play a substantial role in helping Mexico to meet its energy needs. Biomass. Biomass energy is produced from various sources: solid wastes and sludge gases; industrial waste incineration or processing, which costs little and displaces landfill use; and agricultural waste. The last of these sources displaces open field burning, and even with minimum control over emissions, air quality can be significantly improved. Consequently, many CDM projects in Mexico will be in the agricultural sector. But air emissions from biomass production can still create permitting and environmental issues. The waste management authority in metropolitan Monterrey is the only municipal waste utility generating electricity from biomass. This project was financed with World Bank funds. Other municipalities – among them Mexico City, Tlalnepantla, Cancún, Naucalpan, Puebla, Querétaro, Aguascalientes, Guadalajara and Tijuana – are currently studying the feasibility of a biomass production facility like that of Monterrey. Conclusion Mexico offers many opportunities for investment in renewable energy. Incentives and resources are real. Careful planning through regulatory, transmission and market issues may yet boost investment in green energy in Mexico. The government capacity to cover the costs of new energy facilities through CFE or otherwise is limited. The shortfall in public funds will likely become more dire in the coming years as Mexico faces the politically sensitive conundrum of energy and fiscal reform. The vast majority of Mexico’s federal budget is funded by Pemex, the national oil company. As Pemex requires the ability to reinvest more of its revenues to maintain otherwise declining oil and gas production, the government will face a serious budget deficit. The passage of major new tax legislation in 2007 helps, so far as it goes. How and whether the government can cover the gap through tax reform or other measures will determine to some extent how flexible the government can be to stimulate private investment in energy infrastructure. Conversely, it will also enhance the attractiveness to the government of private investment, both domestic and foreign, as an alternative source of development capital and expertise, particularly for renewable energy.

Marks, 8 -- UC Berkeley law professor, Universidad Panamericana in Mexico City visiting professor [Allan, partner in Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, an international law firm, "Mexico Offers Diverse Opportunities for Investment in Renewable Energy," World Energy, 10.4, www.worldenergysource.com/articles/text/marks_WE_v10n4.cfm]

Mexico has an abundance of renewable power resources the market for renewable energy projects in Mexico could well be considerably larger. This has created new opportunities for companies using renewable energy to compete, Mexico has a potential wind energy generation capacity of over 40,000 MW Mexico has vast areas in which the sun shines year-round Mexico is the world’s third-largest producer of geothermal That is a small portion of the potential for this energy source; capacity could increase to 8,000 MW. These projects hold enormous potential Mexico offers many opportunities for investment in renewable energy The shortfall in public funds will likely become more dire as Mexico faces the politically sensitive conundrum of energy reform whether the government can cover the gap through reform will determine how flexible the government can be to stimulate private investment in energy infrastructure. it will enhance the attractiveness to the government of private investment, both domestic and foreign, as an alternative source of development capital and expertise, particularly for renewable energy

Pemex reform key to Mexican renewables- massive potential

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Mr Calderón's officials say his enthusiasm is motivated by pure utilitarian maths: Mexico is both one of the countries most vulnerable to global warming and one rich in renewable energy resources. It has been hit by extreme weather several times during his term: in 2007, a devastating flood put 80% of the southern state of Tabasco under water and caused some $5 billion in damage, while farming in the north has been hurt by a lengthy drought. Mexico lies in the path of hurricanes both from the Atlantic and Pacific which many scientists believe are becoming stronger as a result of rising sea temperatures. Rising sea levels from melting polar ice caps threaten nearly half of the country's eastern seaboard. Since Mexico produces just 1.5% of the world's emissions, it will be affected by climate change regardless of what it does at home. But greens argue that it must practice what it preaches—especially if it wants to influence the debate on the issue in the United States. Moreover, officials see potential economic and diplomatic gains.

Economist, 9 ["What's hot, green and Mexican?" 4-16-9, www.economist.com/node/13496067]

Mexico is rich in renewable energy resources But it must practice what it preaches— if it wants to influence the debate on the issue in the U St officials see diplomatic gains.

Mexican renewables leads to US modeling

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Mexico’s solar resources are among the best in the world, far superior to those of Germany and Spain, the countries currently recognized as the world leaders in installed photovoltaic systems. Experts rank the quality of Mexico's photovoltaic (PV) and solar thermal resources among the world's best. In terms of photovoltaic resources, the country has significant advantages: Average Global Horizontal Irradiation (GHI) is approximately 5 kWh/m2/day, the energy equivalent of 50 times Mexico's annual national electricity generation 70% of the territory has GHI values greater than 4.5kWh/m2 Just 0.06% of the Mexican national territory would be sufficient to generate the overall electricity consumption of Mexico in 2005 according the GTZ report "Nichos de mercado para sistemas fotovoltáicos en conexión a la red eléctrica de México" (June 2009). Global Horizontal Solar Radiation Mexico's average solar resources for PV (5 kWh/m2/day) are more than 60% higher than the best solar in Germany (5.4 GW of installed PV). Spain and Germany are the global PV leaders, with a total of 8.7 GW, 67% of the world's PV installed capacity, according to the IEA Photovoltaic Power Systems Program 2008 Annual Report. Comparative Solar Resources, PV Performance, Energy Pay-Back and Energy Return (GHI kWh/m2)

Oseguera, 10 – journalist [Oso, "Sunny Mexico: An Energy Opportunity," GreenTechSolar, 7-7-10, www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/sunny-mexico-an-energy-opportunity, accessed 7-10-13]

Mexico’s solar resources are among the best in the world, far superior to Germany and Spain, the recognized world leaders Experts rank the quality of Mexico's PV) and solar thermal resources among the world's best. the country has significant advantages: GHI) is 50 times Mexico's annual national electricity generation 70% of the territory has GHI values greater than 4.5kWh/m2 Just 0.06% of the Mexican national territory would be sufficient to generate the overall electricity consumption of Mexico Mexico's average solar resources for PV are more than 60% higher than the global PV leaders

Mexican solar would be 60-times more efficient than current leaders

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According to a report made by the global policy network REN21, the global demand for renewable energy was steadily on the rise the past two years but slow to start this 2013.

Polintan 6/13’ ( L.J Polintan is a correspondent at Ecoseed “Global demand for renewable energy on the rise – REN21 2013 report” 13 Jun 2013 http://www.ecoseed.org/renewables/16584-global-demand-for-renewable-energy-on-the-rise-ren21-2013-report)

the global demand for renewable energy was steadily on the rise the past two years but slow to start this 2013.

Global demand for renewables decreasing

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For decades, Mexico's energy policy has largely boiled down to exporting oil for cash to fund state spending. Now the new government is negotiating with rival political parties to curb that practice and instead use state monopoly Petróleos Mexicanos to a different end: cheaper energy, said Pemex CEO Emilio Lozoya. In an interview with The Wall Street Journal, the 38-year-old chief said the administration of President Enrique Peña Nieto was striving to overhaul tax and energy laws this year that Mr. Lozoya said would result in cheaper energy for consumers and companies that could drive a more competitive economy. Now, the Mexican government relies on Pemex, one of the world's biggest oil firms, for 35% of government spending, leaving the company with little left over to invest in areas like natural gas. Private companies, meanwhile, are largely barred from investing thanks to Mexico's nationalistic energy laws. The result is an energy-rich country where companies often pay higher prices for energy than elsewhere. Mexico has large reserves of natural gas, for instance. But since Pemex doesn't invest enough in gas, the country imports gas from the U.S.—raising costs to Mexican firms as they try to compete with global players like China. "Energy ought to be looked at on a competitive basis and not as a foreign-exchange generator," Mr. Lozoya said, pointing to a prospective investment boost in industries ranging from gas to petrochemicals to fertilizers. Complicating matters, Mexico's oil output has slipped to 2.55 million barrels a day from a peak of 3.4 million in 2004, as easy oil in the Gulf is replaced by more difficult reserves of deep-water oil and heavy oil onshore. To boost production, the company will need more money, technology and know-how. Changing Mexico's energy laws is widely seen as an important test for a country that captured the imagination of investors for linking its economy in a free-trade deal with the U.S. in the mid-1990s, but which saw its star dim to other emerging markets like China and Brazil in recent years. For Mexico, beset by drug violence the past few years, such a move would send a powerful signal to investors, likely driving billions in foreign investment, economists say. "This is all about regaining the reform momentum, and you don't see that that often in emerging markets today. Taking on those taboos, and those changes, it would re-establish the Mexican narrative as a reformer and be very positive," said Gray Newman, chief economist for Latin America at Morgan Stanley . Change won't be easy. The oil nationalization in 1938, by Mr. Peña Nieto's own Institutional Revolutionary Party, is seen as a key event in Mexican identity. Some leftist lawmakers, Mexican contractors and even some foreign oil-service firms that work with Pemex on a fee basis might see change as a threat, analysts say. The freshly appointed Mr. Lozoya, the youngest ever Pemex chief and who is seen as close to the president, was careful not to discuss specifics about proposed changes to energy laws in the Tuesday interview, saying it was up to Mexico's political parties. But he did point out that political parties here from left to right had already come together in recent months on topics like education and labor reform. "Obviously, our challenge is we need to deliver on the pending reforms and governing responsibly over the next years, but I do see this as a very good opportunity for Mexico to retake a path of higher productivity and higher economic growth," he said. Mexico's conservative opposition, the National Action Party, largely favors a broader opening of the energy business to private investment, while the leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution has proposed a more limited opening for areas like refining. Mr. Newman believes Mr. Peña Nieto may well deliver a broad-ranging reform. "I don't think the prospects for reform have been this strong in Mexico in over 20 years," Mr. Newman said. The son of a former energy minister, Mr. Lozoya has had a tough start as head of Mexico's largest company, which had 2011 sales of $111 billion. An explosion at a Pemex office building at the company's Mexico City headquarters last month killed 37 workers. The company said the blast was caused by a buildup of methane in the building's cellar, but doesn't yet know what caused the gas to accumulate. The investigation, led by the country's attorney general's office, will take a few more weeks, Mr. Lozoya said. "We are in mourning, but we're standing and looking forward, and working on our modernization plans," said the executive, who is the grandson of a revolutionary general and politician. He pointed to the shale-gas revolution in the U.S., along with deep-water and heavy oil, as examples of how Mexico can benefit from new technologies that boost energy output, lower prices and create jobs. Mexico may hold the world's fourth-biggest reserves of shale gas, according to the U.S. government. But Pemex has drilled only a few wells and not produced any gas. "Mexico ought to be producing more of its own gas, and eventually exporting it," Mr. Lozoya, a lawyer and economist who got his master's degree in public policy at Harvard said. "Clearly the geology that you have in some parts of the U.S. extends into Mexican territory. So it's a matter of just investing and getting it done." Mr. Lozoya also envisions Pemex acting as a lever of development for the economy, spurring the development of a stronger oil service sector and promote new industries like ethanol. "It is important we support medium-size companies, together with programs from national development banks, so they can access credit and be suppliers to Pemex, and make sure over the next few years that we develop a strong oil-servicing industry in Mexico that can grow and be regionally competitive," he said, speaking in English. The government is considering slowly replacing additives like MTBE in gasoline with ethanol, he said. Pemex would act as the buyer and gatekeeper to the industry, Mr. Lozoya said. Last year, Pemex had to abandon its second tender for ethanol to be used as a gasoline additive because the offers made were above the price the oil company was prepared to pay. Mr. Lozoya said Pemex would be prepared to pay "above average prices" to firms. "Pemex may end up paying a little bit more, but it would have a positive impact on the environment and on jobs domestically, so it would be worth it," he said. "I foresee and I hope that in a couple of years we'll have a much stronger energy sector with many more medium-size companies present in it; and that Pemex becomes a much stronger development lever of the country."

Luhnow & Iliff, 13 (David, the Latin America Bureau Chief for the Wall Street Journal, and Laurence, reporter for Wall Street Journal Latin America Bureau, “Mexico Moves on Energy in Economic Reset”, Wall Street Journal, 2/13/13, AD: 7/9/13, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324162304578302343638712694.html | Sina)

Nieto was striving to overhaul energy laws this year that said would result in cheaper energy for consumers and companies that could drive a more competitive economy. , the Mexican government relies on Pemex for 35% of government spending, leaving the company with little to invest in areas like natural gas Private companies are barred from investing Mexico has large reserves of natural gas But since Pemex doesn't invest enough in gas, the country imports gas from the U.S.—raising costs to Mexican firms as they try to compete with global players like China Energy ought to be looked at on a competitive basis and not as a foreign-exchange generator Mexico's oil output has slipped to 2.55 million barrels a day from a peak of 3.4 million in 2004 To boost production, the company will need more money, technology and know-how For Mexico such a move would send a powerful signal to investors, likely driving billions in foreign investment Lozoya pointed to the shale-gas revolution in the U.S., along with deep-water and heavy oil, as examples of how Mexico can benefit from new technologies that boost energy output, lower prices and create jobs. Mexico may hold the world's fourth-biggest reserves of shale gas But Pemex has drilled only a few wells and not produced any gas Lozoya also envisions Pemex acting as a lever of development for the economy, spurring the development of a stronger oil service sector and promote new industries like ethanol.

Energy reform key to Mexican competitiveness – cheap energy, foreign investment, job creation

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Mexico's government, which is expected to announce energy reforms in August, will need to take bold steps if it expects to meaningfully participate in North America's oil and gas renaissance, experts said at a Woodrow Wilson Center for International Studies forum. "North America's oil and gas revolution is of enormous importance to Mexico," said Ernesto Marcos Giacoman, founding partner of Marcos y Associados, a consulting firm specializing in Mexico's energy industry. "If we don't do more serious reforms, more Mexican companies will start to build plans in the US because natural gas prices are lower, and Mexico will lose its competitive advantage." "A good part of Mexico's private sector is withholding investment in [national oil company Petroleos Mexicanos] because it wants to see what happens with the reforms," added Juan Pardinas Carpizo, general director of the Mexican Institute for Competitiveness. "The sooner this is resolved, the better." Duncan Wood, who directs the Wilson Center's Mexico Institute and led the June 21 discussion, said Enrique Pena Nieto became president in December after campaigning to reform the government overall. Other political reforms agreed to move legislation ahead, and fiscal and energy reform proposals are pending, he indicated. "This time around, everyone recognizes that changes need to be made," Wood said. "There's not agreement yet on what those changes will be." It's generally assumed that Pemex will continue to own Mexico's hydrocarbon resources, but production-sharing contracts and labor reform have been mentioned, according to Marcos. Downstream private investment also might be allowed, and the national hydrocarbons commission could have more regulatory power, he said. "The last time I checked, there were no chemical molecules on Mexico's flag, but everyone treats it that way," said Pardinas. "The challenge the next few months will be to draw a line from oil and other chemical molecules through a national company with a confused corporate identity." The US could help reform efforts by releasing more information about dramatic changes under way in North American energy so Mexico would understand what it's missing, he added. Pemex is the only one in the world that operates from the wellhead to the retailer, Pardinas said. "Even Cuba is more competitive," he observed. The country also badly needs to connect US gas transmission systems with Mexico's industries, he said. "In parts of Mexico, we're paying prices similar to China," Pardinas said. "It's essential to build infrastructure to bring US gas to Mexican industry, not only for energy security but also for economic growth." Marcos said Pemex would like to explore shale gas plays near the US border that are believed to be extensions of the Eagle Ford field. "My personal opinion is that it should not get involved in shale because it doesn't have the technological capacity," he said. "It's hiring Schlumberger, Halliburton, and other service companies to operate field laboratories instead."

Snow, 13 (Nick, Washington editor for the Oil & Gas Journal, “Mexico's energy reforms will need to be bold, experts suggest”, Oil & Gas Journal, 7/8/13, AD: 7/9/13, http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-111/issue-7a/general-interest/mexico-s-energy-reforms-will-need.html | Sina)

Mexico's government will need to take bold steps if it expects to meaningfully participate in North America's oil and gas renaissance If we don't do more serious reforms, more Mexican companies will start to build plans in the US because natural gas prices are lower, and Mexico will lose its competitive advantage Mexico's private sector is withholding investment because it wants to see what happens with the reforms The sooner this is resolved, the better." . Pemex is the only one in the world that operates from the wellhead to the retailer Even Cuba is more competitive The country also badly needs to connect US gas transmission systems with Mexico's industries In parts of Mexico, we're paying prices similar to China It's essential to build infrastructure to bring US gas to Mexican industry for energy security but also for economic growth."

Reform key to competitiveness – private sector investment and access to US gas

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MEXICO CITY (Reuters) - Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto's economic agenda looked to be on surer footing after local elections on Sunday yielded results that favor a cross-party pact he forged to push reforms through Congress. In the most closely watched race, the conservative National Action Party (PAN) won a tight contest for governor in its stronghold of Baja California, an outcome that should help defuse tensions between the opposition and Pena Nieto's Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI. Baja California was the only governor's office up for grabs as nearly half of Mexico's 31 states voted for a mix of local parliaments and city halls, producing results that allowed both the PRI and the PAN to claim success at the ballot box.

Graham and Gutierrez 7/8 (Mr. David B. Graham and Gutierrez are correspondents at Reuters “Mexico opposition wins key state vote, boosting reform outlook” Updated 7/8/2013 3:10:52 PM ET http://www.nbcnews.com/id/52423073/ns/world_news-americas/#.Udwem0LRlUR)

Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto's economic agenda looked to be on surer footing after local elections on Sunday yielded results that favor a cross-party pact he forged to push reforms through Congress

Economic reform will pass

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Accompanied by members of the Governing Council of "Pacto por Mexico" presented a project to reform different laws regulating the financial sector that seeks to promote the low level of credit in the second Latin American economy. The reform, which includes dozens of rules changes, including strengthening parastatal development banks in order to promote lending to small businesses and make it easier to run assurances for non-payment of loans, an old claim of Mexican banks. Mexico, an oil power and industrial growing below its potential, analysts say. The reform seeks to increase the role of the banking sector, involving some of the largest international players.The project, to be sent to the House of Deputies, was introduced in the framework of the so-called Pact of Mexico, an agreement with opposition parties to achieve key reforms and was relaunched on Tuesday after disputes over electoral issues.

Adrian 5/13’ (Jazmín Adrián correspondent at Demotix news “President Enrique Peña presents Financial Reform Initiative in Mexico” May 8th, 2013 http://www.demotix.com/news/2034262/president-enrique-pe-presents-financial-reform-initiative-mexico#media-2034276)

Accompanied by members of the Governing Council of "Pacto por Mexico" presented a project to reform different laws regulating the financial sector that seeks to promote the low level of credit in the second Latin American economy. The reform, which includes dozens of rules changes, including strengthening parastatal development banks in order to promote lending to small businesses and make it easier to run assurances for non-payment of loans, an old claim of Mexican banks. The reform seeks to increase the role of the banking sector, involving some of the largest international players.

Economic reform happening now

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In London last week, Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto said he will push for a “transformational” reform of Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex), Mexico’s state-owned monopoly in oil and gas exploration and production. “There are different options on what the reform should be, but I am confident …  It will be transformational,” Peña Nieto told the Financial Times, adding that the reform would include “the constitutional changes needed to give private investors certainty.”

Estevez, June 26 2013, native of Mexico who lives and works in Washington D.C. as a Foreign Correspondent. From 1989 to 2005 was bureau chief for El Financiero, Mexico’s leading financial newspaper and covered the NAFTA negotiations, Dolia, Most Mexicans Oppose President Peña Nieto's Plans To Open Up Pemex To Private Investment, http://www.forbes.com/sites/doliaestevez/2013/06/26/most-mexicans-oppose-president-pena-nietos-plans-to-open-up-pemex-to-private-investment/ Dolia Estevez 13’

a Nieto said he will push for a “transformational” reform of (Pemex the reform would include “the constitutional changes needed to give private investors certainty.”

Big opposition in Mexico to PEMEX reform

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Peña Nieto has vacillated from enforcement postures against drug traffickers and drug kingpins, to pursuing violent criminals with more of a focus on so-called "traditional crime." His stated desires, to move priorities away from drug arrests and seizures and simply towards violence reduction, have created concern among US political leaders.

Brewer 7/8 (Jerry, “Mexico's Law Enforcement and Police Policies Questioned”, Mexidata.info, 8 July 2013, http://www.mexidata.info/id3656.html) ~ew

Nieto has vacillated from enforcement postures against drug traffickers and drug kingpins, to pursuing violent criminals with more of a focus on so-called "traditional crime." His stated desires to move priorities away from drug arrests and seizures and simply towards violence reduction, have created concern among US political leaders.

Obama plans to aid Nieto in drug policy

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(Reuters) - The fanfare accompanying Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto's first months in office is increasingly being drowned out by discord in Congress that could undo his plans to raise more tax revenue and open up state oil giant Pemex to outside investment.

Graham 5/13’ (Dave Graham correspondent at Reuters “Cracks in Mexican political pact threaten president's reforms” Wed May 1, 2013 2:08pm http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/01/us-mexico-reforms-penanieto-idUSBRE9400NR20130501)

Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto's first months in office is increasingly being drowned out by discord in Congress that could undo his plans to raise more tax revenue

Tax reform wont pass too much opposition between opposing parties

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Defusing tensions between the PRI and its rivals is a big enough challenge for Pena Nieto. But he must do so at a time when there are major splits inside the opposition parties - in particular the PAN - his natural allies on economic reform. Without support from at least the PAN, Pena Nieto's ruling coalition of PRI and the Green Party is unlikely to muster the two-thirds majority in Congress needed to enact a constitutional change he wants to make Pemex more attractive to investors. The PRD is opposed to changing the constitution to open up the oil industry and is highly skeptical about imposing a value-added tax on food and medicine, a measure the PRI is considering to improve Mexico's weak tax revenues. Meanwhile, both the PAN and the PRD are pressuring Pena Nieto's Social Development Minister Rosario Robles to step down over the Veracruz revelations. To date, they have not made her departure a condition of their support for the pact.

Graham 5/13’ (Dave Graham correspondent at Reuters “Cracks in Mexican political pact threaten president's reforms” Wed May 1, 2013 2:08pm http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/01/us-mexico-reforms-penanieto-idUSBRE9400NR20130501)

tensions between the PRI and its rivals is a big enough challenge for Pena Nieto Pena Nieto's ruling coalition of PRI and the Green Party is unlikely to muster the two-thirds majority in Congress needed to enact a constitutional change he wants to make . The PRD is opposed to changing the constitution and is highly skeptical about imposing a value-added tax on food and medicine, a measure the PRI is considering to improve Mexico's weak tax revenues

Nieto won’t get the 2/3 vote in Congress

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With the largest oil reserves in the Western Hemisphere, Venezuela might appear like a natural candidate to attract major Direct Foreign Investment funds. But, as a direct result of Mr. Chávez’s policy of marginalizing private sector capital, Foreign Direct Investment flows actually slammed into reverse in 2009 – the latest for which ECLAC figures are available. United Nations 2009 Report ECLAC). Venezuela continues to experience a net outflow of foreign direct investment to the tune of $3.1 billion a year (page 53 of the report). Investors thinking of doing business in Venezuela should be aware that they are likely to lose money in the process.

Toro 11 [Francisco, lead co-writer of the Caracas Chronicles, an online news source of opposition literature, “Foreign Investment in Venezuela: Mission Almost Impossible” March 28 2011 https://www.whatsnextvenezuela.com/expropriation/foreign-investment-in-venezuela-mission-almost-impossible/]

Venezuela might appear like a natural candidate to attract major Direct Foreign Investment funds. But, as a direct result of Mr. Chávez’s policy of marginalizing private sector capital Venezuela continues to experience a net outflow of foreign direct investment to the tune of $3.1 billion a year Investors thinking of doing business in Venezuela should be aware that they are likely to lose money in the process.

Investing in Venezuelan oil drains money - Castro’s nationalization and recent trends

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For its own good, Ecuador might want to reconsider rolling out the red carpet for NSA leaker Edward Snowden as he crisscrosses his way through anti-American countries while seeking asylum, some say. If Ecuador's President Rafael Correa does give Snowden the green light to call the Latin American country home -- in defiance of the U.S. -- analysts warn that Correa would be biting the hand that helps feed his country. The U.S. government has been sending Ecuador money for the past seven decades. National security analyst Aaron Cohen told Fox News the U.S. should consider cutting off that aid if Ecuador approves Snowden's asylum request. "The fact is is that we're giving millions of millions of dollars to this country right now who may potentially be harboring somebody who could have been responsible for one of the most massive intelligence leaks in the history of both private contracting and our espionage world," he said. "We've had trouble with these guys for a long time." During the past 50 years, USAID, the main American foreign aid agency, has given millions of dollars for education and economic growth. In the past five years alone, Ecuador has received $144.4 million.

Fox News, 13 ["US aid to Ecuador questioned amid Snowden asylum bid," 6-26-13, www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/06/26/us-could-pull-millions-in-aid-to-ecuador-if-country-gives-snowden-asylum/]

During the past 50 years, USAID, the main American foreign aid agency, has given millions for economic growth

AND- USAID is the main agency for economic policy

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This is the most likely means by which the coming famine will affect all citizens of Earth, both through the direct consequences of refugee floods for receiving countries and through the effect on global food prices and the cost to public revenues of redressing the problem. Coupled with this is the risk of wars breaking out over local disputes about food, land, and water and the dangers that the major military powers may be sucked into these vortices, that smaller nations newly nuclear-armed may become embroiled, and that shock waves propagated by these conflicts will jar the global economy and disrupt trade, sending food prices into a fresh spiral. Indeed, an increasingly credible scenario for World War III is not so much a confrontation of superpowers and their allies as a festering, self-perpetuating chain of resource conflicts driven by the widening gap between food and energy supplies and peoples' need to secure them.

Cribb ‘10 (Julian, Julian Cribb is a science communicator, journalist and editor of several newspapers and books. His published work includes over 7,000 newspaper articles, 1,000 broadcasts, and three books and has received 32 awards for science, medical, agricultural and business journalism. He was Director, National Awareness, for Australia's science agency, CSIRO, foundation president of the Australian Science Communicators, and originated the CGIAR's Future Harvest strategy. He has worked as a newspaper editor, science editor for "The Australian "and head of public affairs for CSIRO. He runs his own science communication consultancy, “The coming famine: the global food crisis and what we can do to avoid it,” p. 26)

the coming famine will affect all citizens of Earth through the effect on global food prices and the cost to public revenues Coupled with this is the risk of wars breaking out over local disputes about food and major military powers may be sucked into these vortices nations newly nuclear-armed may become embroiled, and that shock waves propagated by these conflicts will jar the global economy and disrupt trade, sending food prices into a fresh spiral an increasingly credible scenario for World War III is a festering chain of resource conflicts driven by the widening gap between food supplies and peoples' need to secure them

Food supply decline leads to nuclear World War 3

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The biggest threat to global stability is the potential for food crises in poor countries to cause government collapse. Those crises are brought on by ever worsening environmental degradation One of the toughest things for people to do is to anticipate sudden change. Typically we project the future by extrapolating from trends in the past. Much of the time this approach works well. But sometimes it fails spectacularly, and people are simply blindsided by events such as today's economic crisis. For most of us, the idea that civilization itself could disintegrate probably seems preposterous. Who would not find it hard to think seriously about such a complete departure from what we expect of ordinary life? What evidence could make us heed a warning so dire--and how would we go about responding to it? We are so inured to a long list of highly unlikely catastrophes that we are virtually programmed to dismiss them all with a wave of the hand: Sure, our civilization might devolve into chaos--and Earth might collide with an asteroid, too! For many years I have studied global agricultural, population, environmental and economic trends and their interactions. The combined effects of those trends and the political tensions they generate point to the breakdown of governments and societies. Yet I, too, have resisted the idea that food shortages could bring down not only individual governments but also our global civilization. I can no longer ignore that risk. Our continuing failure to deal with the environmental declines that are undermining the world food economy--most important, falling water tables, eroding soils and rising temperatures--forces me to conclude that such a collapse is possible. The Problem of Failed States Even a cursory look at the vital signs of our current world order lends unwelcome support to my conclusion. And those of us in the environmental field are well into our third decade of charting trends of environmental decline without seeing any significant effort to reverse a single one. In six of the past nine years world grain production has fallen short of consumption, forcing a steady drawdown in stocks. When the 2008 harvest began, world carryover stocks of grain (the amount in the bin when the new harvest begins) were at 62 days of consumption, a near record low. In response, world grain prices in the spring and summer of last year climbed to the highest level ever. As demand for food rises faster than supplies are growing, the resulting food-price inflation puts severe stress on the governments of countries already teetering on the edge of chaos. Unable to buy grain or grow their own, hungry people take to the streets. Indeed, even before the steep climb in grain prices in 2008, the number of failing states was expanding [see sidebar at left]. Many of their problem's stem from a failure to slow the growth of their populations. But if the food situation continues to deteriorate, entire nations will break down at an ever increasing rate. We have entered a new era in geopolitics. In the 20th century the main threat to international security was superpower conflict; today it is failing states. It is not the concentration of power but its absence that puts us at risk. States fail when national governments can no longer provide personal security, food security and basic social services such as education and health care. They often lose control of part or all of their territory. When governments lose their monopoly on power, law and order begin to disintegrate. After a point, countries can become so dangerous that food relief workers are no longer safe and their programs are halted; in Somalia and Afghanistan, deteriorating conditions have already put such programs in jeopardy. Failing states are of international concern because they are a source of terrorists, drugs, weapons and refugees, threatening political stability everywhere. Somalia, number one on the 2008 list of failing states, has become a base for piracy. Iraq, number five, is a hotbed for terrorist training. Afghanistan, number seven, is the world's leading supplier of heroin. Following the massive genocide of 1994 in Rwanda, refugees from that troubled state, thousands of armed soldiers among them, helped to destabilize neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (number six). Our global civilization depends on a functioning network of politically healthy nation-states to control the spread of infectious disease, to manage the international monetary system, to control international terrorism and to reach scores of other common goals. If the system for controlling infectious diseases--such as polio, SARS or avian flu--breaks down, humanity will be in trouble. Once states fail, no one assumes responsibility for their debt to outside lenders. If enough states disintegrate, their fall will threaten the stability of global civilization itself.

Brown, 9 (Lester R, - founder of the Worldwatch Institute and the Earth Policy Institute “Can Food Shortages Bring Down Civilization?” Scientific American, May)

The biggest threat to global stability is the potential for food crises to cause government collapse. Those crises are brought on by ever worsening environmental degradation the idea that civilization could disintegrate seems preposterous. The combined effects of those trends and the political tensions they generate point to the breakdown of governments and societies. Our continuing failure to deal with the environmental declines that are undermining the world food economy--most important, falling water tables, eroding soils and rising temperatures-- such a collapse is possible. As demand for food rises faster than supplies are growing, the resulting food-price inflation puts severe stress on the governments of countries already teetering on the edge of chaos. if the food situation continues to deteriorate, entire nations will break down at an ever increasing rate. In the 20th century the main threat to international security was superpower conflict; today it is failing states. Failing states are of international concern because they are a source of terrorists, drugs, weapons and refugees, threatening political stability everywhere. Our global civilization depends on a functioning network of politically healthy nation-states to control the spread of infectious disease, to manage the international monetary system, to control international terrorism and to reach scores of other common goals. If the system for controlling infectious diseases such as polio, SARS or avian flu--breaks down, humanity will be in trouble. Once states fail their fall will threaten the stability of global civilization itself.

Food insecurity causes failed states- that causes extinction

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The concept of the border of the state has enabled a dominant conception of juridical–political order that is central to the modern geopolitical imaginary: a view of that order as being divided between domestic and international realms and, notwithstanding aberrations from time to time, largely settled and stable. In this way the concept of the border of the state helps to domesticate the contingency of the juridical–political order by acting as a familiar reference point on the basis of which the repetition of diverse practices cumulates to create a sense of normality and permanence. Yet, as Agnew, Ó Tuathail and other critical geopolitics scholars have pointed out, the role of the concept of the border of the state in maintaining this semblance of stability and immutability contributes to a form of knowledge privileged by the modern geopolitical imaginary that is inherently linked to questions of power and authority. In other words, the work that the concept of the border of the state does in upholding the juridical–political order is not a natural nor neutral practice, but one that serves to benefit those whose interests are bound up in maintaining the status quo. Consequently, accounts of global politics that rely upon an unreflective usage of the concept of the border of the state are complicit in practices of forgetting the contingency of the juridical–political order and therefore also the reification of it. By contrast, thinking in terms of the generalised biopolitical border reveals the contingency and performative self (re)production of juridical–political order. Agamben's account of the logic and operation of sovereign power demonstrates that this order, born of the exception, is predicated upon the performative act of suspending the law to produce a zone of indistinction in which bare life can be produced. Seen in this light, sovereign power does not pre-exist bare life and neither does bare life pre-exist sovereign power. Instead, sovereign power and bare life must be thought of as co-constitutive of each other. Sovereign power comes to exist only through the constant (re)production of bare life in zones of indistinction that are amenable to its sway: The essence of political power in the West […] is the power to suspend (not apply) law and thus to produce a sphere of beings (p.133) without quantities, homines sacri, whom every being, insofar as he or she is alive, may be.4 On this basis, it is through the production of homo sacer that the politically qualified life of the polis, necessary for juridical–political order, is ultimately defined and sustained. As Andrew Norris puts it: ‘politics must again and again enact its internal distinction from bare life […] it must repeatedly define itself through the negation of bare life – a negation that can always take the form of death’.5 In other words, the politically qualified life of the polis and the form of juridical–political order this subjectivity enables are contingent upon a sovereign decision about the status of some ‘human’ life as not worthy of being lived as such. As Judith Butler has explored in her discussion of Agamben against the backdrop of indefinite detention in Guantánamo, this decision relies upon nothing other than the ‘deeming’ of certain forms of life to be ineligible for certain basic, if not universal, human rights: ‘the decision to detain, to continue to detain someone indefinitely, is a unilateral judgement made by government officials who simply deem that a given individual, or indeed a group, poses a danger to the state’.6 Moreover, as Butler highlights, it is a decision that is increasingly taken by government officials (such as those who sanctioned and shot Jean Charles de Menezes) rather than by democratically elected politicians, thereby constituting an extension of sovereign power by stealth.7 Often, the decision leading to the production of bare life is underwritten by so-called national security imperatives defined by a state of emergency: in this way the invocation of the discourse of exceptionalism attempts to legitimise the suspension of national and international law. Therefore, echoing Derrida's discussion of authority in Chapter 3, the legitimacy of sovereign power is legitimised by nothing other than its own legitimisation. One way of characterising how the generalised biopolitical border reconceptualises the (re)production of the juridical–political order is in terms of performance. Whereas the modern geopolitical imaginary supported by the concept of the border of the state implies a static, immutable juridical– political structure that is somehow given, Agamben's thesis reveals this as a performed fiction. The sovereign decision that creates bare life is not necessarily a singular act but a reiterative performance: one that leads to the perpetuation of bare life detained indefinitely in camps or left to die in cargo containers at sea. (p.134) Moreover, as Agamben's analysis implies, this border performance is also a body performance. Bodies do not simply encounter pre-existing borders as if they were timeless territorial artifacts. Rather, borders are continually (re)inscribed through mobile bodies that can be risk assessed, categorised, and then treated as either trusted citizen travellers or bare life. In this way border/body performances depend upon movement and are played out at sites across everyday life. A perspective that identifies the performative character of the juridical– political order reconfigures the way in which the relation between borders and subjectivity might be analysed. According to the modern geopolitical imaginary, the ‘proper’ political subject is the citizen: ‘bordered’ and autonomous before the law in the same way as the sovereign state of which it is a subject. Such a formulation attempts to domesticate the radical contingencies of subjects' socio-ontological status and fix their identities to territory in order to secure the presence of sovereign political community. Thinking in terms of the generalised biopolitical border prompts an alternative line of analysis that redirects emphasis away from the modern bordered citizen. For Agamben, the ‘real sovereign subject’ is not the citizen but rather homo sacer: the ‘mute carrier of sovereignty’ defined not by contract or rights but by exposure to the sovereign decision on whether it is deemed life worthy of living.8 The insistence on the significance of the marginal figure of homo sacer highlights the need for further analysis of the multifarious methods, contexts and locations in which bare life is produced in global politics. One example, which has already received some attention in the academic literature inspired by Agamben, is a critical engagement with the politics of humanitarianism.9 Conventional accounts of the relationship between human rights and sovereign power suggest that the former has a capacity to act as a check on the worst excesses of the latter. Agamben, however, shows a more insidious dimension to this relationship which, ultimately, challenges the basis for an optimistic reading of the potential of international human rights. According to an Agambenian perspective, human rights and sovereign power are not diametrically opposed because ultimately they both rely upon the same referent object: bare life. The subjects produced by the ideology of humanitarian intervention closely resemble the subjects of sovereign power: mute; undifferentiated; and depoliticised. In the same way that sovereign (p.135) power produces the bare life it needs to sustain itself, humanitarianism renders people into needy victims, lives to be saved taken outside of the workings of normal juridical–political order, in such a way that justifies flouting norms of territorial integrity and ‘intervening’ in the affairs of another sovereign state. In other words, the concept of humanity cannot be relied upon to check sovereign power: rather, as Anne Caldwell puts it, ‘humanity instead appears as the ground and object of sovereignty; it has become a political group, represented by a new political power’.10 Therefore, despite the stated aims of humanitarian organisations and ventures, there is a danger that they can end up in solidarity with the very powers they ostensibly seek to overcome or at least mitigate: the discourse of human rights fails to call into question the distinction between politically qualified life and bare life upon which the conception of rights rests. Thus, as Slavoj Žižek has provocatively argued, concentration camps and refugee camps can be seen as two sides of the same sociological matrix: ‘perhaps the ultimate image of the treatment of the “local population” as homo sacer is that of the American war plane flying above Afghanistan – one is never sure what it will drop, bombs or food parcels’.11 Thinking in terms of the generalised biopolitical border also has potentially challenging implications for the way in which analyses of global security relations might be framed. To a large extent the concept of the border of the state offers a stable and comfortingly coherent means of mapping who, where and what ‘the enemy’ is: it enables the juxtaposition of an immutable realm of warfare and barbarism outside the state on the one hand and the impression of safety, stability and possibility of progress inside the state on the other.12 Such a picture permits a double designation of ‘the enemy’ so that it is taken to be both (a) outside the state but (b) itself another state which, in turn, leads to the possibility of a resolution of conflict through classical forms of warfare between sovereign states. The concept of the generalised biopolitical border, however, scrambles this conventional logic and the assumed alignment between inside/amity and outside/enmity. Rather than essentialising the enemy as the other outside the state, an Agambenian approach is more attentive to the ways in which different threats are produced as ‘foreign’ or ‘exteriorised’, as, for example, Dan Bulley has shown in the case of the London bombings on 7 July 2005.13 Furthermore, Agamben argues that under biopolitical conditions in which security becomes the normal technique of government, classical (p.136) interstate warfare is eclipsed. Rather, as security becomes the ‘basic principle of state activity’ politics is reduced to policing, and lines of amity and enmity are fundamentally blurred. Conflict is no longer between states but potentially between the terroristic state and its citizens who are ‘all virtually homines sacri’.14

Vaughn-Williams 9 [Nick, IR MA @ university of Warwick IR PhD @ Aberystwyth, “Border Politics: The Limits of Sovereign Power” pg 132-36]

The concept of the border of the state has enabled a dominant conception of juridical–political order that is central to the modern geopolitical imaginary divided between domestic and international realms other critical geopolitics scholars have pointed out, the role of the concept of the border of the state in maintaining this semblance of stability and immutability contributes to a form of knowledge privileged by the modern geopolitical imaginary that is inherently linked to questions of power and authority upholding the juridical–political order is not a natural nor neutral practice, but one that serves to benefit those whose interests are bound up in maintaining the status quo predicated upon the performative act of suspending the law to produce a zone of indistinction in which bare life can be produced. Seen in this light, sovereign power does not pre-exist bare life and neither does bare life pre-exist sovereign power. Instead, sovereign power and bare life must be thought of as co-constitutive of each other. Sovereign power comes to exist only through the constant (re)production of bare life in zones of indistinction that are amenable to its sway: The essence of political power in the West […] is the power to suspend (not apply) law and thus to produce a sphere of beings without quantities, homines sacri, whom every being, insofar as he or she is alive, may be On this basis, it is through the production of homo sacer that the politically qualified life of the polis, necessary for juridical–political order, is ultimately defined and sustained politics must again and again enact its internal distinction from bare life […] it must repeatedly define itself through the negation of bare life – a negation that can always take the form of death this decision relies upon nothing other than the ‘deeming’ of certain forms of life to be ineligible for certain basic the decision to detain, to continue to detain someone indefinitely, is a unilateral judgement made by government officials who simply deem that a given individual, or indeed a group, poses a danger to the state’ Often, the decision leading to the production of bare life is underwritten by so-called national security imperatives defined by a state of emergency: in this way the invocation of the discourse of exceptionalism attempts to legitimise the suspension of national and international law the legitimacy of sovereign power is legitimised by nothing other than its own legitimisation the generalised biopolitical border reconceptualises the (re)production of the juridical–political order is in terms of performance. The sovereign decision that creates bare life is not necessarily a singular act but a reiterative performance: one that leads to the perpetuation of bare life detained indefinitely in camps or left to die in cargo containers at sea borders are continually (re)inscribed through mobile bodies that can be risk assessed, categorised, and then treated as either trusted citizen travellers or bare life. According to the modern geopolitical imaginary, the ‘proper’ political subject is the citizen: ‘bordered’ and autonomous before the law in the same way as the sovereign state of which it is a subject. Thinking in terms of the generalised biopolitical border prompts an alternative line of analysis that redirects emphasis away from the modern bordered citizen the ‘real sovereign subject’ is not the citizen but rather homo sacer: the ‘mute carrier of sovereignty’ defined not by contract or rights but by exposure to the sovereign decision on whether it is deemed life worthy of living. has provocatively argued, concentration camps and refugee camps can be seen as two sides of the same sociological matrix: ‘perhaps the ultimate image of the treatment of the “local population” as homo sacer is that of the American war plane flying above Afghanistan – one is never sure what it will drop, bombs or food parcels’ To a large extent the concept of the border of the state offers a stable and comfortingly coherent means of mapping who, where and what ‘the enemy’ is: it enables the juxtaposition of an immutable realm of warfare and barbarism outside the state on the one hand and the impression of safety, stability and possibility of progress inside the state on the other. Such a picture permits a double designation of ‘the enemy’ so that it is taken to be both outside the state but itself another state which, in , leads to the possibility of a resolution of conflict through classical forms of warfare between sovereign states. concept of the generalised biopolitical border, however, scrambles this conventional logic and the assumed alignment between inside/amity and outside/enmity. Rather than essentialising the enemy as the other outside the state, an Agambenian approach is more attentive to the ways in which different threats are produced as ‘foreign’ or ‘exteriorised’ Rather, as security becomes the ‘basic principle of state activity’ politics is reduced to policing, and lines of amity and enmity are fundamentally blurred. Conflict is no longer between states but potentially between the terroristic state and its citizens who are ‘all virtually homines sacri’.14

The affirmative’s geopolitical imaginary is characterized by a wholly enclosed land space of bounded nation-states. This only serves the interests of status quo power hierarchies through the construction of an inside to be secured against a dangerous outside, excepted from the law Such an order can only be maintained thought he constant policing of the inside and warfare externally.

Borders Kritik - UTNIF 2013.html5

Texas (UTNIF)

Kritiks

2013

The diverse, complex and contradictory ways in which Mexico, its culture, and its peoples have been imagined, portrayed, glorified or vilified by the people of the U.S. have a long history. They began with the conflicts between the two colonizing powers, Spain and England. And they continued as the young United States expanded into territories occupied by the Indians and possessed first by Spain and later Mexico. In the process, a cultural and physical space known as the Border emerged in the nineteenth century. Ultimately, it resulted in both a physical and a psychological distancing during and because of the U.S. nineteenth-century expansion and its conquest of what is now the U.S. Southwest. For political, cultural and psychological purposes this movement of displacement rendered the region's former owners, the Mexican as 'other,'that is, the construction of a different identity seen as dissonant to monolithic Western discourses of power.1 The dynamics of "othering" finally becomes self-serving for it affirms an on going process of, in this case, Anglo identity. Constituted as cultural contestants, the Mexican became everything the Anglo was not. In their studies of Anglo attitudes towards Mexicans Carey McWilliams and Arnoldo de Leon2 present the U.S. expansionist project as an acquisition of territory justified by the mission Anglos assumed as civilizers of the hinterlands with a need to control all that was barbaric-sexuality, vice, nature, and people of color. The initial constructions were racist: that 1see Edward Said, Orienta/ism (New York: Vintage Random House, 1978)Tzetan Todorov, The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other (New York: Harper & Row,1982); ; Michel de Certeau, Heterologies: Discourse on the Other (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986); Michael Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses (New York: Routledge, 1993). 2 Carey McWilliams, North from Mexico (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott,1949). Arnoldo de Leon, They called them greasers is, essential characteristics of personality, intelligence and morals were attributed to physical appearances. Mexicans were perceived in light of their differences from Anglos. Americans carried to the Southwest values constructed by the founding fathers, of English descent, male, white and Protestant-self-reliance, a puritanical morality, the erasure of the past, and a work ethic. They saw Mexicans as racially impure, descended of the Spaniards, who were contaminated by Moorish blood, and the "blood thirsty" Aztecs. " 'They are of mongrel blood, the Aztec predominating,' asserted Gilbert D. Kingsbury, writing about the Mexicans of Brownsville in the early 1860s".3 Positioned in relation to their differences to Anglos, Mexicans appeared to be dependent, resigned, complacent, not committed to improvement or progress, but rather to fun and frolic. For these expansionists "to have accepted other than 'white supremacy and civilization" , says de Leon, "was to submit to Mexican domination and to admit that Americans were willing to become like Mexicans. The prospect of being dominated by such untamed, uncivil, and disorderly creatures made a contest for racial hegemony almost inevitable." 4 Descriptions of Mexicans through the nineteenth century, some inoffensive, most virulent, are all grounded on the trope of difference, a rhetorical construct founded on paradigms of dissimilarity. The border was the line established both to delineate and inscribe that difference. Where the line is de-limited, the 'other' begins. The boundary was sacred, not to be transgressed. Yet, paradoxically, bridges and crossing passages were created as legitimate spaces where separation is established, precisely because the frontier, as de Certeau says, is created by contacts where "the points of differentiation between two bodies are also their common points.''5 In the case of the United States-Mexico border, the "contact zone" has become a "combat zone" where crossings and/or transgressions are the rule, rather than the 3 de Leon, 15. 4 de Leon, 13. 5 Michel de Certeau, "Spatial Stories" The Practice of Everyday Life exception.6 Constructions, concrete and imaginary, are established distancing the 'other' at least symbolically, and in this case, south of that de-limitation. The inhabitants of the United States continue to wrestle with that "alien territory." "South of the Borderism" is what I have called borrowing from Edward Said, the way that the United States and its peoples have come to terms with Mexico as they continuously invent an 'other' image, and defend and define their own. In their writings, and in contrast with the way Anglos constructed or invented themselves (stereotypically as morally superior, hard working, thrifty), the Mexican could in the best of cases be mysterious, romantic, fun-loving, laid back, colorfully primitive or alternatively conniving, highly sexualized, disorderly, lazy,violent, and uncivilized. 7 Hollywood appropriated all of the images, from 'the greaser' and the violent bandits, to the Latin lover and the Mexican spitfire. 8 As soon as a boundary is established, the other side becomes desirable, the threshold to cross into the unknown, the yet unexplored landscape where 'the self' is discovered and the 'other' is invented. The trope of difference becomes the figure most utilized by travellers and novelists writing about their adventures "south of the border" This trope, established from the initial moment of encounter and still prevalent today, opposes U.S. 'civilization' to Mexican 'barbarism'. It seems, however, an encounter of images where language, as a code of communication, is never or seldom mentioned, stressing and acknowledging that writers cannot (or choose not to) cross one of the main borders: the spoken code. Anthropologically we could say that such literature remains etic, and not emic, that is, the perspective is established as outside and above the culture. Paradoxically, and because of that positioning, the attraction to a regenerative vitality conceived as present within 'Barbarism' continues to seduce the traveller to the point of demarcation, both physically and psychologically, where the 'other' is found. The adventure can be positive or negative. Many times it becomes a place appropriated as material to feed the imagination back home, perceived as devoid of adventure. For Paul Theroux, the crossing resembled a descent into hell. Looking south, across the river, I realize that I was looking toward another continent, another country, another world, ...T he frontier was actual: people did things differently there ... No people, but cars and trucks were evidence of them. Beyond that, past the Mexican city of Nuevo Laredo, was a black slope-the featureless, night-haunted republics of Latin America .... Laredo required the viciousness of its sister city to keep its own churches full. Laredo had the airport and the churches; Nuevo Laredo, the brothels and basket factories. Each nationality had seemed to gravitate to its own level of competence. The frontier was more than an example of cozy hypocrisy; it demonstrated all one needed to know about the morality of the Americas, the relationship between the puritanical efficiency north of the border and the bumbling and passionate disorder-the anarchy of sex and hunger-south of it. 1 0 He doesn't stop there;Theroux's racism is rampant: Mexicans are naturally corrupt, lawless, unhygienic, a brutal and beaten people who "cruelly beat their animals." Laredo becomes a microcosm of all the United States; Nuevo Laredo not just of Mexico, but of Latin America. Mary Pratt sees Theroux's writing as exemplifying "a discourse of negation, domination, devaluation and fear that remain in the late 20th century, a powerful ideological constituent of the West's consciousness of the people and places it strives to hold in subjugation:•11 In both writings, Greene's and Theroux's, a distancing occurs, either by idealization or denigration.

Klahn 8, professor at the University of California Chicano/Latino Research Center, 2008 [Norma, “The Border: Imagined, Invented or from the Geopolitics of Literature to Nothingness”, Working Paper No.5 Chicano/Latino Research Center, clrc.soe.ucsc.edu/sites/clrcweb/files/sites/default/files/.../05_Klahn.pdf]

The ways in which Mexico, its culture, and its peoples have been vilified by the people of the U.S. have a long history. They began with , Spain and England. And they continued as the young United States expanded into territories occupied by the Indians and possessed first by Spain and later Mexico. In the process, a cultural and physical space known as the Border emerged in the nineteenth century. Ultimately, it resulted in both a physical and a psychological distancing during and because of the U.S. nineteenth-century expansion and its conquest of what is now the U.S. Southwest. For political, cultural and psychological purposes this movement of displacement rendered the Mexican as 'other , the construction of a different identity seen as dissonant to monolithic Western discourses of power. The dynamics of "othering" finally becomes self-serving for it affirms an on going process of , Anglo identity the Mexican became everything the Anglo was not. the U.S. expansionist project as an acquisition of territory justified by the mission Anglos assumed as civilizers of the hinterlands with a need to control all The initial constructions were racist essential characteristics of personality, intelligence and morals were attributed to physical appearances. Mexicans were perceived in light of their differences from Anglos. They saw Mexicans as racially impure, , and "blood thirsty" mongrel "to have accepted other than 'white supremacy and civilization" was to submit to Mexican domination and to admit that Americans were willing to become like Mexicans. The prospect of being dominated by such untamed, uncivil, and disorderly creatures made a contest for racial hegemony inevitable." Descriptions of Mexicans are all grounded on a rhetorical construct founded on paradigms of dissimilarity The border was the line established both to delineate and inscribe that difference. Where the line is de-limited, the 'other' begins. The boundary was sacred, not to be transgressed. Yet, paradoxically, bridges and crossing passages were created as legitimate spaces where separation is established, precisely because the frontier , is created by contacts where "the points of differentiation between two bodies are also their common points In the case of the United States-Mexico border, the "contact zone" has become a "combat zone" where crossings and/or transgressions are the rule, rather than the exception Constructions, concrete and imaginary, are established distancing the 'other' at least symbolically, and in this case, south of that de-limitation. South of the Borderism" is , the way that the United States and its peoples have come to terms with Mexico as they continuously invent an 'other' image, and defend and define their own As soon as a boundary is established, the other side becomes desirable, the threshold to cross into the unknown, the yet unexplored landscape where 'the self' is discovered and the 'other' is invented difference , established the initial moment of encounter and today, opposes U.S. 'civilization' to Mexican 'barbarism'. . Anthropologically we could say that the perspective is established as outside and above the culture. Paradoxically, , the attraction to a regenerative vitality conceived as present within 'Barbarism' continues to seduce the traveller to the point of demarcation, both physically and psychologically, where the 'other' is found. The adventure can be positive or negative For Paul Theroux, the crossing resembled a descent into hell. Looking south, across the river, I realize that I was looking toward another continent, another country, another world, ... Beyond that, past the Mexican city of Nuevo Laredo, was a black slope-the featureless, night-haunted republics of Latin America .... Laredo required the viciousness of its sister city to keep its own churches full. Laredo had the airport and the churches; Nuevo Laredo, the brothels and basket factories. Each nationality had seemed to gravitate to its own level of competence. The frontier was more than an example of cozy hypocrisy; it demonstrated all one needed to know about the morality of the Americas, the relationship between the puritanical efficiency north of the border and the bumbling and passionate disorder-the anarchy of sex and hunger-south of it. 1 0 racism is rampant: Mexicans are naturally corrupt, lawless, unhygienic, a brutal and beaten people who "cruelly beat their animals." Laredo becomes a microcosm of all the United States; Nuevo Laredo not just of Mexico, but of Latin America. a powerful ideological constituent of the West's consciousness of the people and places it strives to hold in subjugation

And, the construction of the US-Mexico border stabilizes American identity around the racist projection of lawlessness and barbarity onto the Mexican other in need of domination.

Borders Kritik - UTNIF 2013.html5

Texas (UTNIF)

Kritiks

2013

The interweavings of geopolitical power, knowledge and subordinating¶ representations of the other have a long history. For example, the identity¶ and authority of Western modernity took shape on the terrain of colonial¶ and imperial power, and the production of knowledge that characterized¶ the development of Western scientific disciplines went together with the¶ establishment of modern imperialism. In a similar vein, the history of¶ comparative literature, cultural analysis, and anthropology can be seen¶ as affiliated with imperial power, and as contributing to its methods for¶ ensuring Western ascendancy over non-Western peoples. Together with¶ this intertwining of power and knowledge one can locate varying forms¶ of subordinating representation which are equally geopolitical and¶ cultural. The assumption of Western supremacy goes together with a¶ silencing of the non-Western other. There is incorporation, inclusion,¶ coercion but only infrequently an acknowledgement that the ideas of¶ colonized people should be known.¶ This silencing of the non-Western other is customarily combined with¶ representations that legitimize the power to penetrate and to re-order.¶ The posited superiorities of Western ‘progress’, ‘modernization’,¶ ‘democracy’, ‘development’ and ‘civilization’ are deployed to justify a¶ project of enduring invasiveness. The non-Western society is shorn of the¶ legitimate symbols of independent identity and authority, and its representation¶ tends to be frozen around the negative attributes of lack,¶ backwardness, inertia and violence. It becomes a space ready to be¶ penetrated, worked over, restructured and transformed. This is a process¶ that is seen as being beneficial to the re-ordered society, so that resistance,¶ especially in its militant form, is envisaged as being deviant and¶ irrational. So while power and knowledge are combined together, they¶ cannot be adequately grasped if abstracted from the gravity of imperial¶ encounters and the geopolitical history of West/non-West relations.¶ One of the recurrent themes of this study has been the intersection¶ between intervention and representation. Geopolitical interventions as¶ examined in the nineteenth, twentieth and now twenty-first centuries¶ entail different forms of representation. Nevertheless, it can be argued¶ that they all presuppose a combination of desire, will, capacity and¶ justification. The desire to intervene, to possess, to take hold of another¶ society, even if only temporarily, flows from that deeply rooted sense of¶ superiority and mission. The nineteenth-century notions of ‘Manifest¶ Destiny’ or ‘benevolent assimilation’ were predicated on a belief in the¶ ostensible superiority of the Western and more specifically American way¶ of life. It was not just that the United States had a ruling vision of itself¶ that was associated with a destiny that needed to be fulfilled; it was a¶ vision that was also embedded in a hierarchical perspective on peoples,¶ races and cultures, whereby the white/black binary division was seen as a¶ crucial marker of value and significance. As was suggested in chapter 2,¶ in the history of US expansion, race went together with notions of destiny¶ and mission, as exemplified in the US–Mexico War, the colonization of¶ the Philippines and the creation of semi-protectorates such as Cuba at the¶ beginning of the twentieth century. In that era, the desire to intervene was¶ also linked to protecting the Americas from the insecurity of political¶ disorder, and the tenets of civilization were closely associated with the¶ stipulated need to preserve socio-economic order and stability throughout¶ the American hemisphere.¶ The desire to intervene can also be traced through the histories of¶ modernization theory and neo-liberalism. In the aftermath of the Second¶ World War, modernization ideas were formulated with a view to diffuse¶ Western capital, technology, and social and political values to societies¶ that were judged to be traditional and in need of modern transformation.¶ However, as I suggested in chapter 3, the desire to project modernization¶ was also tied to a fear of the perceived vulnerability of Third World¶ societies to the ‘contagion of communism’. Therefore, intervention had a¶ double motive, and while the perceived threat from communism came to¶ a close in 1989, the desire to modernize and re-order the other has¶ continued into the post-Cold War period.¶ Whereas, as was argued in chapter 4, the neo-liberal doctrine of development¶ can be distinguished from modernization theory in its greater¶ prioritization of the private sector and of the commodification of social¶ and economic life, it shares with modernization a privileging of a certain¶ view of the Western experience in matters not only economic, but also¶ governmental, social and more indirectly psychological. Its desire to¶ intervene was initially anchored in a perception of an economic malaise,¶ of a debt crisis in the Third World that called for the cure of structural¶ adjustment, deregulation and privatization. The ‘money doctors’ of the¶ international financial institutions have written a series of prescriptions¶ that amount to much more than a case of economic intervention, and their¶ will and capacity, as well as underlying desire, have been systematically¶ extended to cover a broad social, economic and political terrain, stretching¶ from structural adjustment through good governance to social capital.¶ Desire, as I am using it here, denotes a feeling of unsatisfied longing, a¶ feeling that satisfaction would be derived from obtaining or possessing¶ a given object. Intervention is an action that would facilitate such a¶ satisfaction, but such an action requires both the will and the capacity¶ to realize the desire. If desire is longing for a certain possession or¶ attainment, will represents a kind of concentration of desire. The will¶ to intervene is a focusing of the desire and is reflected in individual,¶ collective and governmental action. Moreover, as with desire, the will¶ to intervene, as reflected, for example, in governmental action, can be¶ envisaged as a condensation of multiple determinants – for instance,¶ cultural, economic, military, political. In both desire and will there is¶ multiplicity, but with will its focusing requires a greater degree of discursive¶ order. Governments, or more broadly states, as well as international¶ institutions such as the IMF or the World Bank, provide focal points for¶ the will to intervene; and equally, as we have seen in the case of the¶ United States, such a will has been allied to a multiple capacity to¶ intervene. The state provides the will and also coordinates the capacity¶ to intervene; and the desire, will and capacity all have a history and a¶ geopolitics (see chapters 2, 3 and 7 above).¶ Desire, will and capacity, to be effective as an ensemble of meaning¶ and practice, need a language of legitimization. The will to intervene as a¶ crystallization of desire can only be deployed with effect when the¶ capacities – military, economic, political – to intervene are in place.¶ Will and capacity together provide a force, but their power is secured¶ as hegemonic power through the deployment of a discourse of justification.¶ A will that focuses desire, and allies itself to capacity, seeks a¶ hegemonic role through the power of inducing consent while retaining¶ the ability to coerce.¶ In the context of the imperiality of US geopolitics, the will to power has¶ utilized a connected array of ideas and concepts to ground its projection.¶ The Roosevelt Corollary of 1904 invoked an international police power,¶ thus underlining the ability when necessary to intervene coercively, but it¶ also incorporated notions of ‘civilization’ and ‘order’ that the societies of¶ the Latin South were encouraged to embrace. The ‘Good Neighbor¶ Policy’ of the 1930s and the Alliance for Progress of 1961 were also¶ concerned with promoting order, but in a context of partnership, cooperation¶ and progress. These were codifications of a will to power that¶ varied according to the geopolitical conjuncture, including the responses¶ to American power from the societies of Latin America. Developing Latin¶ American nationalism in the 1920s and 1930s provided a key backdrop¶ to Washington’s framing of a good neighbour policy, and the Cuban¶ Revolution provided a crucial context for Kennedy’s announcement of¶ the Alliance for Progress, as well as for the unsuccessful US-sponsored¶ invasion of Cuba a month later at the Bay of Pigs.¶ The plurality of responses to the ‘colossus of the North’ reminds us of¶ what can be seen as absent from the suggested combination of desire,¶ will, capacity and legitimization. These are notions that have been used¶ to emphasize a certain projection of power, but such a projection can be¶ interpreted as implicitly denoting an array of passive recipients. From the¶ vantage point of the periphery, and especially the Latin South, there¶ would only seem to be an active, ubiquitous ‘outside’ which as an¶ analytical perspective can occlude the complexities and heterogeneities¶ of the ‘inside’. In this context of the interface between a mutating external¶ power and the dynamic specificities of internal social, economic¶ and political processes it is possible to highlight a number of different¶ tendencies.

Slater, Professor of Social and Political Geography at Loughborough University, in ‘4 [David, Geopolitics and the Post-colonial Rethinking North–South Relations]

geopolitical power subordinating representations of the other have the identity and authority of Western modernity took shape on the terrain of colonial and imperial power, and the production of knowledge that characterized the development of Western scientific disciplines went together with the establishment of modern imperialism There is incorporation, inclusion, coercion but only infrequently an acknowledgement that the ideas of colonized people should be known. This silencing of the non-Western other is customarily combined with representations that legitimize the power to penetrate and to re-order. The posited superiorities of Western ‘progress’, ‘modernization’, ‘democracy’, ‘development’ and ‘civilization’ are deployed to justify a project of enduring invasiveness. The non-Western society is shorn of the legitimate symbols of independent identity and authority, and its representation tends to be frozen around the negative attributes of lack, backwardness, inertia and violence It becomes a space ready to be penetrated, worked over, restructured and transformed. This is a process that is seen as being beneficial to the re-ordered society, so that resistance, especially in its militant form, is envisaged as being deviant and irrational. while power and knowledge are combined together, they cannot be adequately grasped if abstracted from the gravity of imperial encounters and the geopolitical history of West/non-West relations The desire to intervene, to possess, to take hold of another society, even if only temporarily, flows from that deeply rooted sense of superiority and mission. ‘Manifest Destiny’ or ‘benevolent assimilation’ were predicated on a belief in the ostensible superiority of the Western and more specifically American way of life. it was a vision that was also embedded in a hierarchical perspective on peoples, races and cultures, whereby the white/black binary division was seen as a crucial marker of value and significance race went together with notions of destiny and mission, as exemplified in the US–Mexico War, the colonization of the Philippines and the creation of semi-protectorates such as Cuba at the beginning of the twentieth century the desire to intervene was also linked to protecting the Americas from the insecurity of political disorder, and the tenets of civilization were closely associated with the stipulated need to preserve socio-economic order and stability throughout the American hemisphere. The desire to intervene can also be traced modernization ideas were formulated with a view to diffuse Western capital, technology, and social and political values to societies that were judged to be traditional and in need of modern transformation. the desire to project modernization was also tied to a fear of the perceived vulnerability of Third World societies to the ‘contagion of communism’ intervention had a double motive, and while the perceived threat from communism came to a close in 1989, the desire to modernize and re-order the other has continued into the post-Cold War period. the neo-liberal doctrine of development can be distinguished from modernization theory in its greater prioritization of the private sector and of the commodification of social and economic life, it shares with modernization a privileging of a certain view of the Western experience in matters not only economic Its desire to intervene was initially anchored in a perception of an economic malaise, of a debt crisis in the Third World that called for the cure of structural adjustment, deregulation and privatization The ‘money doctors’ of the international financial institutions have written a series of prescriptions that amount to much more than a case of economic intervention, and their will and capacity, as well as underlying desire, have been systematically extended to cover a broad social, economic and political terrain, stretching from structural adjustment through good governance to social capital with will its focusing requires a greater degree of discursive order states provide focal points for the will to intervene as we have seen in the case of the United States, such a will has been allied to a multiple capacity to intervene. The state provides the will and also coordinates the capacity to intervene The will to intervene as a crystallization of desire can only be deployed with effect when the capacities to intervene are in place. Will and capacity together provide a force, but their power is secured as hegemonic power through the deployment of a discourse of justification In the context of the imperiality of US geopolitics, the will to power has utilized a connected array of ideas and concepts to ground its projection it also incorporated notions of ‘civilization’ and ‘order’ that the societies of the Latin South were encouraged to embrace. These were codifications of a will to power that varied according to the geopolitical conjuncture, including the responses to American power from the societies of Latin America From the vantage point of the Latin South, there would only seem to be an active, ubiquitous ‘outside’ which as an analytical perspective can occlude the complexities and heterogeneities of the ‘inside’

This construction of civilization around state borders is a colonial artifact. It undergirds the justification for the affirmative’s intervention into Mexico to stabilize, develop and extract resources from the barbaric other.

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Thus in the modern state system the overlapping frontier is as anathema as the idea of multiple sovereign bodies within a territory. The edict of Pope Alexander VI in 1492 which gave impetus to the idea of a spatially divided earth by drawing lines delineating certain parts of the globe and specifying which part ‘belonged’ to which European power was extended and formalized in the 17th century with the Peace of Westphalia (1648), strengthened in the 18th century with the emphasis on territorial (‘national’) unity in the French and American revolutions, and consolidated in the 20th century with an international state system – a system which became so entrenched that the territorial state became the political form to be adopted by all nations. The ‘modernization’ of politics was thus as much a process of territorialization as it was a process of seculariz- ation and rationalization. The form of sovereign power that developed in Europe from the 16th century onward conceived space as bounded. ‘Sovereignty’, like ‘state’, implies ‘space’, and control of a territory becomes the foundation of sover- eignty (Lefebvre, 1974: 280; Foucault, 1980: 68–9; 1991: 87). This division of territorial sovereignty between states is most explicit at the point where the fields of power interface: there must be no overlap and no uncertainty about the borders of the territory. As Michael Hardt and Toni Negri (2000: 167) put it, ‘modern sovereignty resides precisely on the limit’. This requires a new kind of political geography in which neither overlapping margin nor multiple sovereignty is permitted. (It is precisely because of this exclusive territoriality that Embassies exist. Having created mutually exclusive territories, states found that there was little space left for the conduct of diplomacy. The outcome was little islands of alien sovereignty within the state’s territory: the Embassy [see Mattingly, 1955].) At the same time, it requires the permanent policing of territorial boundaries. States become and remain ‘sovereign’ not just in the sense that they are all- powerful within their territories, but also because they police the borders of a particular space and claim to ‘represent’ the citizens within those borders. The consequence of this mutually constitutive relation between territory and state power is that the earth’s surface has been inscribed in a particular way – according to the territorial ambitions of the modern state – and space has come to assume absolute priority in the statist political imaginary. Without this essential conjunction of space and politics, sovereignty would lose its meaning. As such, we might say that the modern political imaginary is a territorial imaginary. That this is so is illustrated by the policy of ‘containment’ in which a political counter to the Soviet Union was thought to be necessary for territorial reasons, and the broader 20th-century terminological distinction between East and West as friend and foe, with Cuba somehow belonging to the East and Japan co-opted for the West (Buck-Morss, 2000: 22–5). But there is more to territory than just space. The notion of ‘territory’ is derived from a complex of terms: from terra (of earth, and thus a domain) and territo-rium, referring to a place from which people are warned off, but is also has links with terre-re, meaning to frighten. And the notion of region derives from the Latin regere (to rule) with its connotations of military power. Territory is land occupied and maintained through terror; a region is space ruled through force. The secret of territoriality is thus violence: the force necessary for the production of space and the terror crucial to the creation of boundaries. It is not just that sovereignty implies space, then, but that ‘it implies a space against which violence, whether latent or overt, is directed – a space established and constituted by violence’ (Lefebvre, 1974: 280). As macrosociologists have pointed out time and again, it is the use of physical force in controlling a territory that is the key to the state, for without it any claim to the territory would mean nothing. Put more simply: ‘borders are drawn with blood’ (General Mladić, cited in Campbell, 1998: 45). A founding violence, and continuous creation by violent means, are the hallmarks of the state. Part of the construction of the state’s territory took the form of defining the legitimate use of violence – this is the key to Weber’s famous definition of the state as involving a monopoly over the means of violence. To do this, the distinc- tion between the ‘legitimate’ use of force by the state and ‘illegitimate’ use of force by non-state actors had to be made coherent and acceptable to the members of states. During its early history, the state exercised violence alongside and often in conjunction with a range of ‘non-state’ or ‘semi-state’ organizations. (These terms are misleading because ‘state’ itself had not been fully developed, but for the sake of the argument we will leave that issue aside.) Piracy and banditry, for example, were once entirely legitimate practices within the state system, bringing, as they did, revenue to both the sovereign and private investors and weakening enemies by attacking their ships. Piracy on the seas was conducted with the full co- operation and support of cities and states, while banditry, as a form of terrestrial piracy, was conducted with the continual aid of lords. International agreements now have it that piracy, as an act of violence divorced from the authority of any state, is a crime. To reach this state of affairs required a campaign against piracy which relied on a change in the state’s attitude from one in which non-state violence was an exploitable resource to one in which it was a practice to be elim- inated. The catalyst appears to have been a clash of British interests in the 18th century, when the British East India Company began demanding British Royal Navy protection against British pirates who were operating in collusion with British colonists to plunder British commerce in the East. When the Navy was sent to patrol the Eastern waters, the pirates moved to the Bahamas. Suppressing it in American waters in turn pushed the pirates back to Madagascar. Since other states and companies connected with other states found themselves in the same situation, a broader and lasting solution to the problem was sought, and an agree- ment was reached among the European powers that each state was responsible for controlling piracy in its own waters. But this required that states distance themselves from piratical acts.¶ No clear norm could develop, much less be universalized, until the state system¶ produced a clear definition of what constituted piracy. And this was impossible so long¶ as states continued to regard individual violence as an exploitable resource. Simply put,¶ piracy could not be expunged until it was defined, and it could not be defined until¶ it was distinguished from state-sponsored or -sanctioned individual violence.¶ (Thomson, 1994: 117–18)¶ Distinguishing it from state-sponsored or state-sanctioned violence required that¶ states be defined as the sole legitimate organization in the exercise of violence, a¶ process that only occurred towards the end of the 18th century. By challenging¶ the state’s claim to a monopoly of the means of violence within a particular territory,¶ piracy and banditry threatened the state system as a whole. Crucially, the¶ delegitimization of piracy relied on pirates being defined as stateless persons –¶ persons, that is, for whose actions no state could be held responsible.¶ Similarly, the word ‘bandit’ derives from the Italian bandire, meaning ‘to exile¶ or banish’, and thus contains the notion of frontier or border within its very¶ meaning. A bandit is by definition one who exists on the physical borders of the¶ state as well as at the edge of law. In struggling against banditry, states were thus¶ involved in a struggle over the frontiers of territory as well as the exercise of violence.¶ Bandits contributed to the demarcation of territorial states and were partly responsible¶ for the consolidation of state power [through] the ‘border effect’. Boundaries took¶ on concrete form in space through the interactions between border guards and bandits¶ who seized upon the jurisdictional ambiguity of these liminal zones as cover for their¶ depredations. (Gallant, 1999: 40)¶ It is because the bandit throws down a challenge to law, state violence and the¶ territorial imaginary that the state sees in the bandit not just a criminal but a¶ political opponent and, conversely, why many bandits become ‘primitive rebels’¶ (Hobsbawm, 1969; 1971). The bandit, like the pirate, was slowly but surely¶ ‘banned’ from the kind of political order emerging under the state. The ‘ban’ is¶ symptomatic of the connection between sovereignty and territory being drawn¶ here. The ban designates exclusion from a territory, but also refers to the¶ command and insignia of the sovereign power. The banned are not merely set¶ outside the law but rather are abandoned by it, an abandonment that has the full¶ force of state violence to implement it (physical exclusion) and which identifies¶ a territory within which the ban holds: one who has been banned is outside the¶ juridical order of this or that particular state (Agamben, 1998: 29, 109; Nancy,¶ 1993: 44).¶ In a contemporaneous development, mercenarism was also gradually eradicated.¶ It is often claimed that the absolutist states of the 16th and 17th centuries pioneered the professional army. But such armies were far from being the kind¶ of national conscription force which are now the norm. Rather, they were a mixed¶ mass constructed from the ‘foreign’ and ‘professional’ soldiers then available to¶ any state. The condottieri hired by the 15th-century Italian city-states were essentially¶ contractors – a condotta was a contract to make war for a particular¶ sovereign. The German Unternehmer conveys the same commercial tone, while¶ etymologically ‘soldier’ means ‘one who serves in an army for pay’ not ‘one who¶ serves his country’. The extent of mercenarism and its significance to the state is¶ illustrated by the fact that in the 18th century, all the major European armies¶ relied heavily on foreign mercenaries for troops, as Janice Thomson (1994: 10,¶ 88) has shown:¶ Half the Prussian army was comprised of mercenaries. Foreigners constituted onethird¶ of the French army. Britain used 18,000 mercenaries in the American war for¶ Independence and 33,000 mercenaries in its 1793 war with France . . . The last¶ instance in which a state raised an army of foreigners was in 1854, when Britain hired¶ 16,500 German, Italian, and Swiss mercenaries for the Crimean war.¶ For several reasons, however, states gradually stopped hiring their soldiers and¶ sailors from anywhere, and began substituting them with standing armies based¶ on conscription. Following the example of the French Revolution and Napoleon,¶ in which huge effective armies were raised from within France, the practice of¶ mercenarism gradually died out through the 19th century. One factor was sheer¶ cost: states began to realize that fighting forces could be constructed more cheaply¶ from its ‘own’ citizens. But a further factor was reliability: states realized that an¶ armed force whose relation to the state was purely contractual often dragged its¶ feet and was always ready to rebel; its ‘own’ citizens, however, were more reliable.¶ To form mass national armies states therefore had to lay claim to a monopoly¶ on the acts of military violence carried out by its own citizens. The US Neutrality¶ Act of 1794, for example, prevented citizens of the United States from enlisting¶ in the service of a foreign state, and prohibited all persons in the US from¶ ‘setting on foot’ military expeditions against states with which the US was at¶ peace. Such practices of neutrality soon became the standard for other states. In¶ other words, to prevent the enlistment of those individuals increasingly seen as¶ being the state’s ‘own’ citizens, states prevented their citizens from either joining¶ the armies of foreign states or of forming their own armies.1 On the one side,¶ then, states began to develop an international code on mercenarism. Only at this¶ point does mercenarism become mercenarism – just as ‘contraband usually¶ becomes contraband when rulers decide to monopolize the distribution of the¶ commodity in question’ (Tilly, 1992: 54), so mercenarism only becomes mercenarism¶ when states decide to use and monopolize the exercise of violence by¶ its own citizens. This was crucial to the states’ claim to a monopoly over the¶ means of legitimate violence within its own borders. (It is also one reason, though¶ by no means the only reason, why states felt threatened by the International¶ Brigade in Spain in the 1930s.) On the other side, however, to legitimize this¶ monopoly, each state had to foster a national consciousness among its citizens, in order that they would more easily imagine that allegiance to the state of which¶ one is a member is stronger than any allegiance formed through contract. Perry¶ Anderson (1975: 30) suggests that the most obvious reason for the mercenary¶ phenomenon was the natural refusal of the noble class to arm its own peasantry;¶ the nobility understood that it was impossible to train its subjects in the art of¶ war and to simultaneously keep them obedient. But by the late 18th century, the¶ semi-disciplined peasantry had been more or less converted into a working class¶ jointly disciplined through a combination of the new rules of wage-labour and¶ the rationalization of the legal process. Ideologically, the newly emergent citizens¶ were expected to imagine themselves as part of a community held together by¶ and through the state. It is this imagination which has meant that many people¶ are now more repulsed by the mercenary, and especially the citizen who fights¶ against his own state, than by the genuinely foreign enemy. This ‘nationalization¶ of the masses’ was both material and ideological. It was a component of both the¶ politically centralizing tendencies of the bourgeois class and the ideological¶ tendency to imagine political formations in national rather than international¶ terms. This can be understood as the ideological generation of ‘one national class¶ interest’ (in Marxist terms) or ‘national identity’ (in sociological parlance). Either¶ way, what is at stake is the generation of a subjectivity rooted in a political imaginary¶ centred on the state and its national institutions. It is partly for this reason¶ that writers on nationalism stress the importance of the late 18th century for the¶ forming of the nation state. The ‘imagined community’ of the nation that¶ emerges at this time was a product of the imagined community embodied in the¶ state’s territory.¶ Little is heard these days of the bandit, pirate and mercenary, but thinking¶ about them allows a greater sense of the historic importance over the struggle to¶ delegitimize their practices. This struggle was central to the struggle over the¶ means of violence and thus to the consolidation of the notion of territory. They¶ were the unwitting instruments of history, as Carlo Levi comments on the bandit¶ (1947: 137), in that their existence acted as a major catalyst in the shaping of the¶ state, a process in which they themselves were (almost) swept from history. One effect of this ideological isolation of non-state violence from other modal- ities of violence has been to endow state violence with a special sanctity. Since the Peace of Westphalia, the state system has seen non-intervention in a state’s domestic affairs as the corollary of the ideological commitment to the protection of state sovereignty. As Cynthia Weber has shown, in modern global political discourse, ‘intervention’ generally implies a violation of state sovereignty. ‘Inter- vention discourse begins by positing a sovereign state with boundaries that might be violated and then regards transgressions of these boundaries as a problem’ (1995: 4, 27).2 In violating sovereignty, intervention violates the norms of the international state system and the sanctity of the state. As a consequence, intervention comes to function as an alibi for the actions carried out in the name of the sovereign state, to such an extent that states use their claim to territorial sover- eignty to legitimize genocidal practices against peoples under its rule. The United Nations (UN) has generated for itself a humanitarian air, refusing a seat on the General Assembly to such states, but in accepting the state’s claim to sovereign territorial control the UN has effectively condoned the sacrifice of human beings to the demands of the territorial state and thus accepted genocide as regular tool of sovereign power (Kuper, 1981: 161–85). Conversely, while state violence has been endowed with a special sanctity, non- state violence is either ignored entirely or is invested with a unique danger. Identifying 120 wars in 1987, Bernard Nietschmann found that only 3 per cent involved conflict between two sovereign territorial states; the vast bulk of the wars were struggles between states and insurgent groups or nations. Yet these struggles receive very little media or academic attention. One reason for this is that the statist imaginary is so deeply entrenched in our political and intellectual culture that the predominant tendency is to consider struggles against the state to be illegitimate or invisible. They are hidden from view because the struggles are against peoples, movements, formations and countries that are often not even on the map. In this war, as Nietschmann (1987) puts it, only one-half of the geography is shown and only one side of the fighting has a name. This last point is only half the story, however, since the ‘other’ side of the fighting, when it is mentioned, often does go under a generic name intended to capture the unique danger of non-state violence: ‘terrorism’. ‘Terrorism’ retains part of the original double meaning of territory, in that it refers not only to violence, but to space too. Things are usually labelled terrorist when the acts of violence in question are not sanctioned by the state. Where they have been sanctioned by a state, then they always take place outside of that particular state’s territories (and usually result in the state in question being labelled a ‘rogue state’). What this means, in effect, is that ‘terrorism’ is in fact generated by the international state system; it is the ‘other’ generated by the system of states. As William Connolly notes (1991: 207), terrorism ‘allows the state and the interstate system to protect the logic of sovereignty in the international sphere while veiling their inability to modify systemic conditions that generate violence by non-state agents’. Thus while terrorism appears to threaten the state, any such threat is ultimately superficial, since the production of ‘terrorism’ by the state in fact protects the identity of particular states and the state system as a whole. The statist political imaginary uses terrorism to effect a political rationalization of violence under the firm control of the state. The declaration of a- ism by the US state and its allies in 2001 proves nothing other than the state’s own misunderstanding of the world it has created. (And note that such a declar- ation was immediately expanded to include designated states which it could then properly confront.) The standard Left-liberal critique of the category ‘terrorism’ is to point to the lack of any internationally agreed definition of the term (the UN, NATO and the EU have all struggled to come up with an acceptable definition); or to point to the contradiction involved in the once-denigrated ‘terrorist’ being feted as ‘world statesman’ (Mandela), or to the once-celebrated ‘freedom fighter’ being castigated as terrorist (Bin Laden); or, finally, to object to the hypocrisy of western liberal democracies training and funding armed rebellions in some parts of the globe while objecting to armed rebellions elsewhere. While pertinent, these points miss the central point, which is that terrorism is defined according to the raison d’état of hegemonic powers. States define terrorism according to their own interests, and the predominant interests are necessarily those of the hegemonic forces. In other words the terrorist, like the mercenary and pirate, is treated as part of a particular (rogue) state’s violence. Alternately, they are simply ‘off the map’.

Neocleous 3 [Mark Neocleous is Senior Lecturer in Politics at Brunel University, “Off the Map: On Violence and Cartography”, European Journal of Social Theory 2003 6: 409]

modern sovereignty resides precisely on the limit’ neither overlapping margin nor multiple sovereignty is permitted it requires the permanent policing of territorial boundaries. States remain ‘sovereign’ because they police the borders of a particular space and claim to ‘represent’ the citizens within those borders The consequence of this mutually constitutive relation between territory and state power is that the earth’s surface has been inscribed in a particular way – according to the territorial ambitions of the modern state – and space has come to assume absolute priority in the statist political imaginary Without this essential conjunction of space and politics, sovereignty would lose its meaning this is so is illustrated by the policy of ‘containment’ in which a political counter to the Soviet Union was thought to be necessary for territorial reasons, and the broader terminological distinction between East and West as friend and foe, with Cuba somehow belonging to the East there is more to territory than just space And the notion of region derives from the Latin with its connotations of military power. Territory is land occupied and maintained through terror; a region is space ruled through force The secret of territoriality is thus violence: the force necessary for the production of space and the terror crucial to the creation of boundaries sovereignty implies a space against which violence, whether latent or overt, is directed – a space established and constituted by violence it is the use of physical force in controlling a territory that is the key to the state, for without it any claim to the territory would mean nothing borders are drawn with blood A founding violence, and continuous creation by violent means, are the hallmarks of the state. Part of the construction of the state’s territory took the form of defining the legitimate use of violence the distinc- tion between the ‘legitimate’ use of force by the state and ‘illegitimate’ use of force by non-state actors had to be made coherent and acceptable to the members of states The banned are not merely set outside the law but rather are abandoned by it, an abandonment that has the full force of state violence to implement it and which identifies a territory within which the ban holds: one who has been banned is outside the juridical order of this or that particular state One effect of this ideological isolation of non-state violence from other modal- ities of violence has been to endow state violence with a special sanctity Inter- vention discourse begins by positing a sovereign state with boundaries that might be violated and then regards transgressions of these boundaries as a problem’ As a consequence, intervention comes to function as an alibi for the actions carried out in the name of the sovereign state, to such an extent that states use their claim to territorial sover- eignty to legitimize genocidal practices against peoples under its rule accepting the state’s claim to sovereign territorial control has effectively condoned the sacrifice of human beings to the demands of the territorial state and thus accepted genocide as regular tool of sovereign power while state violence has been endowed with a special sanctity, non- state violence is either ignored entirely or is invested with a unique danger Identifying 120 wars in 1987 Nietschmann found that only 3 per cent involved conflict between two sovereign territorial states; the vast bulk of the wars were struggles between states and insurgent groups or nations. these struggles receive very little media or academic attention the predominant tendency is to consider struggles against the state to be illegitimate or invisible. They are hidden from view because the struggles are against peoples, movements, formations and countries that are often not even on the map only one-half of the geography is shown and only one side of the fighting has a name the ‘other’ side of the fighting, when it is mentioned, often does go under a generic name intended to capture the unique danger of non-state violence: ‘terrorism’. Terrorism refers not only to violence, but to space too. Things are usually labelled terrorist when the acts of violence in question are not sanctioned by the state. Where they have been sanctioned by a state, then they always take place outside of that particular state’s territories (and usually result in the state in question being labelled a ‘rogue state’ that ‘terrorism’ is in fact generated by the international state system; it is the ‘other’ generated by the system of states. terrorism ‘allows the state and the interstate system to protect the logic of sovereignty in the international sphere while veiling their inability to modify systemic conditions that generate violence by non-state agents’ while terrorism appears to threaten the state, any such threat is ultimately superficial, since the production of ‘terrorism’ by the state in fact protects the identity of particular states and the state system as a whole. The statist political imaginary uses terrorism to effect a political rationalization of violence under the firm control of the state The declaration of a- ism by the US state and its allies in 2001 proves nothing other than the state’s own misunderstanding of the world it has created. terrorism is defined according to the raison d’état of hegemonic powers. States define terrorism according to their own interests, and the predominant interests are necessarily those of the hegemonic forces the terrorist is treated as part of a particular (rogue) state’s violence. Alternately, they are simply ‘off the map

Next, bounding nation-states through the enclosure of borders is the control of territory through violence. This production of the space of the state obfuscates always on-going non-state violence and legitimates wars and genocides in the name of state-making.

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The question of whether there is an “exteriority” to the modern/colonial world system Is somewhat peculiar to this group, and easily misunderstood. It was originally proposed and carefully elaborated by Dussel in his classic work on liberation philosophy (1976) and reworked in recent years. In no way should this exteriority be thought about as a pure outside, untouched by the modern. The notion of exteriority does not entail an ontological outside; it refers to an outside that is precisely constituted as difference by a hegemonic discourse. This notion of exteriority arises chiefly by thinking about the Other from the ethical and epistemological perspective of a liberation philosophy framework: the Other as oppressed, as woman, as racially marked, as excluded, as poor, as nature. By appealing from the exteriority in which s/he is located, the Other becomes the original source of an ethical discourse vis à vis a hegemonic totality. This interpellation of the Other comes from outside or beyond the system’s institutional and normative frame, as an ethical challenge. This challenge might only be “quasi-intelligible” at first (Dussel 1996: 25), given the difficulties in establishing meaningful interpellation that exploited peoples have with respect to a hegemonic system (contra Habermas’ notion of a communication free of domination). There are degrees of exteriority; in the last instance, the greater challenge comes from the interpellation which the majority of the population of the planet, located in the South, raises, demanding their right to live, their right to develop their own culture, economy, politics, etc. ... There is no liberation without rationality; but there is no critical rationality without accepting the interpellation of the excluded, or this would inadvertently be only the rationality of domination. ... From this negated Other departs the praxis of liberation as “affirmation” of the Exteriority and as origin of the movement of negation of the negation” (Dussel 1996: 31, 36, 54). 6 This is precisely what most European and Euro-American theorists seem unwilling to consider: that it is impossible to think about transcending or overcoming modernity without approaching it from the perspective of the colonial difference. Both Mignolo and Dusselsee here a strict limit to deconstruction and to the various eurocentered critiques of eurocentrism –in short, these continue to be thought about from within eurocentric categories(of,say, liberalism, Marxism, poststructuralism), not from the border thinking enabled by the colonial difference .....Critiques of modernity, in short, are blind to the (epistemic and cultural) colonial difference that becomes the focus of modernity/coloniality. Dussel’s notion of transmodernity signals the possibility of a non-eurocentric and critical dialogue with alterity, one that fully enables “the negation of the negation” to which the subaltern others have been subjected, and one that does not see critical discourse as intrinsically European. Integral to this effort is the rescuing of non-hegemonic and silenced counter-discourses, of the alterity that is constitutive of modernity itself. This is the ethical principle of liberation of the negated Other, for which Dussel coins the term, “transmodernity,” defined as a project for overcoming modernity not simply by negating it but by thinking about it from its underside, from the perspective of the excluded other. Trans- modernity is a future-oriented project that seeks the liberation of all humanity (1996: 14, Ch. 7), “a worldwide ethical liberation project in which alterity, which was part and parcel of modernity, would be able to fulfill itself” (2000: 473), “in which both modernity and its negated alterity (the victims) co-realize themselves in a process of mutual fertilization” (1993: 76). In short, trans-modernity cannot be brought about from within modernity, but requires of the action –and the incorporative solidarity– of the subalternized groups, the objects of modernity’s constitutive violence embedded in, among otherfeatures, the developmentalist fallacy. Rather than the rational project of a discursive ethics, transmodernity becomes the expression of an ethics of liberation. Mignolo’s notions of border thinking, border epistemology, and pluritopic hermeneutics are important in this regard. They point at the need “for a kind of thinking that moves along the diversity of historical processes” (Mignolo 2001: 9). There are, to be sure, no original thinking traditions to which one can go back. Rather than reproducing Western abstract universals, however, the alternative is a kind of border thinking that “engages the colonialism of Western epistemology (from the left and from the right) from the perspective of epistemic forces that have been turned into subaltern (traditional, folkloric, religious, emotional, etc.) forms of knowledge” (2001: 11). Resituating Anzaldúa’s metaphor of the border into the domain of coloniality, Mignolo adumbrates the possibility of “`thinking otherwise’, from the interior exteriority of the border. That is, to engage in border thinking is to move beyond the categories created an imposed by Western epistemology” (p. 11). This is not just a question of changing the contents but the very terms of the conversation. It is not a question of replacing existing epistemologies either; these will certainly continue to exist and as such will remain viable as spaces of, and for, critique. Instead, what he claims “is the space for an epistemology that comes from the border and aims toward political and ethical transformations” (p. 11). Finally, while Mignolo acknowledges the continued importance of the monotopic critique of modernity by Western critical discourse (critique from a single, unified space), he suggests that this has to be put into dialogue with the critique(s) arising from the colonial difference, which constitutes border thinking. The result is a “pluritopic hermeneutics” (a term he seemingly adaptsfrom Pannikar’s “diatopic hermeneutics”), a possibility of thinking from different spaces which finally breaks away from eurocentrism as sole epistemological perspective. This is the double critique of modernity from the perspective of coloniality, from the exterior ofthe modern/colonial world system. Let it be clear, however, that border thinking entails both “displacement and departure” (2000: 308), double critique and positive affirmation of an alternative ordering of the real. To sum up, Border thinking points towards a different kind of hegemony, a multiple one. As a universal project, diversity allows us to imagine alternatives to universalism (we could say that the alternative to universalism in this view is not particularism but multiplicity). “The `West and the rest’ in Huntington’s phrase provides the model to overcome, as the `rest’ becomes the sites where border thinking emerges in its diversity, where `mundialización’ creates new local histories remaking and readapting Western global designs ….and transforming local(European) historiesfrom where such designs emerged…. `Interdependence’ may be the word that summarizes the break away from the idea of totality and brings about the idea of networks whose articulation will require epistemological principles I called in this book `border thinking’ and `border gnosis,’ as a rearticulation of the colonial difference:`diversality as a universal project,’ which means that people and communities have the right to be different precisely because `we’ are all equals” (2000: 310, 311). “There is no question,” writes Mignolo (2000: 59), “that Quijano, Dussel and I are reacting not only to the force of a historical imaginary but also to the actuality ofthis imaginary today.” The corollary isthe need to build narrativesfrom the perspective of modernity/coloniality “geared towardsthe search for a different logic” (22). This project has to do with the rearticulation of global designs by and from local histories; with the articulation between subaltern and hegemonic knowledge from the perspective of the subaltern; and with the remapping of colonial difference towards a worldly culture –such as in the Zapatista project, that remaps Marxism, thirdworldism, and indigenism, without being either of them, in an excellent example of borderthinking. While “there is nothing outside of totality ... totality is always projected from a given local history,” it becomes possible to think of “other local histories producing either alternative totalities or an alternative to totality” (329). These alternatives would not play on the “globalization/civilization” couplet inherent to modernity/coloniality; they would rather build on a “mundialización/culture” relation centered on the local histories in which colonial global designs are necessarily transformed, thus transforming also the local histories that created them. Unlike globalization, mundialización brings to the fore the manifold local histories that, in questioning global designs(e.g., neo-liberal globalization), aim at forms of globality that arise out of “cultures of transience” that go against the cultural homogeneity fostered by such designs. The diversity of mundialización is contrasted here with the homogeneity of globalization, aiming at multiple and diverse social orders.

Escobar 2 [Arturo, department of anthropology at university of north Carolina chapel hill, ““Worlds and Knowledges Otherwise”: The Latin American modernity/coloniality Research Program”, http://apse.or.cr/webapse/pedago/enint/escobar03.pdf]

The notion of exteriority does not entail an ontological outside it refers to an outside that is precisely constituted as difference by a hegemonic discourse This notion of exteriority arises chiefly by thinking about the Other as oppressed, as woman, as racially marked, as excluded, as poor, as nature. By appealing from the exteriority in which s/he is located, the Other becomes the original source of an ethical discourse vis à vis a hegemonic totality This interpellation of the Other comes from outside or beyond the system’s institutional and normative frame, as an ethical challenge This challenge might only be “quasi-intelligible” at first given the difficulties in establishing meaningful interpellation that exploited peoples have with respect to a hegemonic system the greater challenge comes from the interpellation which the majority of the population of the planet, located in the South, raises, demanding their right to live, their right to develop their own culture, economy, politics, etc From this negated Other departs the praxis of liberation as “affirmation” of the Exteriority and as origin of the movement of negation of the negation” This is precisely what most European and Euro-American theorists seem unwilling to consider: that it is impossible to think about transcending or overcoming modernity without approaching it from the perspective of the colonial difference eurocentered critiques of eurocentrism continue to be thought about from within eurocentric categories(of liberalism Marxism poststructuralism not from the border thinking enabled by the colonial difference Critiques of modernity are blind to the (epistemic and cultural) colonial difference that becomes the focus of modernity/coloniality Dussel’s notion of transmodernity signals the possibility of a non-eurocentric and critical dialogue with alterity, one that fully enables “the negation of the negation” to which the subaltern others have been subjected, and one that does not see critical discourse as intrinsically European Integral to this effort is the rescuing of non-hegemonic and silenced counter-discourses This is the ethical principle of liberation of the negated Other which Dussel coins the term, “transmodernity,” defined as a project for overcoming modernity not simply by negating it but by thinking about it from its underside, from the perspective of the excluded other. Trans- modernity is a future-oriented project that seeks the liberation of all humanity a worldwide ethical liberation project in which alterity, which was part and parcel of modernity, would be able to fulfill itself in which both modernity and its negated alterity (the victims) co-realize themselves in a process of mutual fertilization trans-modernity cannot be brought about from within modernity, but requires of the action –and the incorporative solidarity– of the subalternized groups the objects of modernity’s constitutive violence embedded in the developmentalist fallacy Rather than the rational project of a discursive ethics, transmodernity becomes the expression of an ethics of liberation border thinking border epistemology, and pluritopic hermeneutics are important in this regard Rather than reproducing Western abstract universals the alternative is a kind of border thinking that “engages the colonialism of Western epistemology from the perspective of epistemic forces that have been turned into subaltern forms of knowledge Mignolo adumbrates the possibility of “`thinking otherwise’, from the interior exteriority of the border to engage in border thinking is to move beyond the categories created an imposed by Western epistemology This is not just a question of changing the contents but the very terms of the conversation It is not a question of replacing existing epistemologies either; these will certainly continue to exist and as such will remain viable as spaces of, and for, critique Instead, what he claims “is the space for an epistemology that comes from the border and aims toward political and ethical transformations Western critical discourse has to be put into dialogue with the critique(s) arising from the colonial difference, which constitutes border thinking The result is a possibility of thinking from different spaces which finally breaks away from eurocentrism as sole epistemological perspective border thinking entails both “displacement and departure double critique and positive affirmation of an alternative ordering of the real diversity allows us to imagine alternatives to universalism (we could say that the alternative to universalism in this view is not particularism but multiplicity `West and the rest’ in Huntington’s phrase provides the model to overcome, as the `rest’ becomes the sites where border thinking emerges in its diversity networks will require epistemological principles diversality as a universal project,’ which means that people and communities have the right to be different precisely because `we’ are all equals This project has to do with the rearticulation of global designs by and from local histories; with the articulation between subaltern and hegemonic knowledge from the perspective of the subaltern and with the remapping of colonial difference towards a worldly culture –such as in the Zapatista project, that remaps Marxism thirdworldism, and indigenism without being either of them, in an excellent example of borderthinking there is nothing outside of totality ... totality is always projected from a given local history,” it becomes possible to think of “other local histories producing either alternative totalities or an alternative to totality” Unlike globalization, mundialización brings to the fore the manifold local histories that, in questioning global designs(e.g., neo-liberal globalization), aim at forms of globality that arise out of “cultures of transience” that go against the cultural homogeneity fostered by such designs The diversity of mundialización is contrasted here with the homogeneity of globalization, aiming at multiple and diverse social orders.

The alternative is to begin from the epistemology of the subaltern.

Borders Kritik - UTNIF 2013.html5

Texas (UTNIF)

Kritiks

2013

The modern foundation of knowledge is territorial and imperial. By modern we¶ mean the socio-historical organization and classification of the world founded¶ on a macro-narrative and on a specific concept and principles of knowledge. The¶ point of reference of modernity is the European Renaissance founded, as an idea¶ and interpretation of a historical present, on two complementary moves: the¶ colonization of time and the invention of the Middle Ages, and the colonization¶ of space and the invention of America that became integrated into a Christian tripartite geo-political order: Asia, Africa and Europe. It was from and in Europe¶ that the classification of the world emerged and not in and from Asia, Africa or¶ America – borders were created therein but of different kinds. The Middle Ages¶ were integrated into the history of Europe, while the histories in Asia, Africa and¶ America were denied as history. The world map drawn by Gerardus Mercator¶ and Johannes Ortelius worked together with theology to create a zero point of¶ observation and of knowledge: a perspective that denied all other perspectives¶ (Castro-Gómez, 2002). Epistemological frontiers were set in place in that double¶ move: frontiers that expelled to the outside the epistemic colonial differences¶ (Arabic, Aymara, Hindi, Bengali, etc.). Epistemic frontiers were re-articulated in¶ the eighteenth century with the displacement of theology and the theo-politics¶ of knowledge by secular ego-logy and the ego-politics of knowledge. Epistemic¶ frontiers were traced also by the creation of the imperial difference (with the¶ Ottoman, the Chinese and the Russian empires) and the colonial difference¶ (with Indians and Blacks in America). Both epistemic differences, colonial and¶ imperial, were based on a racial classification of the population of the planet, a¶ classificatory order in which those who made the classification put themselves at¶ the top of Humanity. The Renaissance idea of Man was conceptualized based on¶ the paradigmatic examples of Western Christianity, Europe, and white and male¶ subjectivity (Kant, 1798; Las Casas, 1552). Thus, from the Renaissance all the¶ way down, the rhetoric of modernity could not have been sustained without its¶ darker and constitutive side: the logic of coloniality.¶ Border thinking or theorizing emerged from and as a response to the violence¶ (frontiers) of imperial/territorial epistemology and the rhetoric of modernity¶ (and globalization) of salvation that continues to be implemented on the assumption¶ of the inferiority or devilish intentions of the Other and, therefore,¶ continues to justify oppression and exploitation as well as eradication of the¶ difference. Border thinking is the epistemology of the exteriority; that is, of the¶ outside created from the inside; and as such, it is always a decolonial project.¶ Recent immigration to the imperial sites of Europe and the USA – crossing the¶ imperial and colonial differences – contributes to maintaining the conditions for¶ border thinking that emerged from the very inception of modern imperial expansion.¶ In this regard, critical border thinking displaces and subsumes Max¶ Horkheimer’s ‘critical theory’ which was and still is grounded in the experience¶ of European internal history (Horkheimer, 1937). ‘Critical border thinking’¶ instead is grounded in the experiences of the colonies and subaltern empires.¶ Consequently, it provides the epistemology that was denied by imperial expansion.¶ ‘Critical border thinking’ also denies the epistemic privilege of the humanities¶ and the social sciences – the privilege of an observer that makes the rest of¶ the world an object of observation (from Orientalism to Area Studies). It also¶ moves away from the post-colonial toward the de-colonial, shifting to the geo and¶ body-politics of knowledge. Why do we need border thinking? Where is it taking us? To the de-colonial¶ shift as a fracture of the epistemology of the zero point. Border thinking brings to¶ the foreground different kinds of theoretical actors and principles of knowledge¶ that displace European modernity (which articulated the very concept of theory¶ in the social sciences and the humanities) and empower those who have been¶ epistemically disempowered by the theo- and ego-politics of knowledge. The decolonial¶ epistemic shift is no longer grounded in Greek and Latin categories of¶ thought that informed modern epistemology (since the Renaissance) in the six¶ European imperial languages (Italian, Spanish and Portuguese for the Renaissance;¶ French, English and German for the Enlightenment), but in the epistemic¶ borders between European imperial categories and languages and categories that¶ modern epistemology ruled out as epistemically non-sustainable (e.g. Mandarin,¶ Japanese, Russian, Hindi, Urdu, Aymara, Nahuatl, Wolof, Arabic, etc.). The¶ epistemology of the zero point is ‘managerial’ and it is today common to¶ business, natural sciences, professional schools, and the social sciences. Border¶ thinking is the epistemology of the future, without which another world will be¶ impossible.¶ Epistemology is woven into language and, above all, into alphabetically¶ written languages. And languages are not something human beings have but they¶ are part of what human beings are. As such, languages are embedded in the body¶ and in the memories (geo-historically located) of each person. A person formed¶ in Aymara, Hindi or Russian who has to learn the rules and principles of knowledge¶ mainly inscribed in the three imperial languages of the second modernity¶ (French, English and German), would of necessity have to deal with a ‘gap’; while¶ a person formed in German or English who learns the rules and principles of¶ knowledge inscribed in German or English is not subject to such a gap. But there¶ is more, since the situation is not one that can be accounted for in terms of the¶ universal history of human beings and society. Knowledge and subjectivities have¶ been and continue to be shaped by the colonial and imperial differences that¶ structured the modern/colonial world.¶ Consider, on the one hand, knowledge in the modern and imperial European¶ languages and – on the other hand – Russian, Arabic and Mandarin. The difference¶ here is imperial. However, they are not just different. In the modern/¶ colonial unconscious, they belong to different epistemic ranks. ‘Modern’ science,¶ philosophy, and the social sciences are not grounded in Russian, Chinese and¶ Arabic languages. That of course does not mean that there is no thinking going¶ on or knowledge produced in Russian, Chinese and Arabic. It means, on the¶ contrary, that in the global distribution of intellectual and scientific labor, knowledge¶ produced in English, French or German does not need to take into account¶ knowledge in Russian, Chinese and Arabic. Furthermore, increasingly since the¶ sixteenth century, knowledge in Russian, Chinese and Arabic cannot avoid intellectual¶ production in English, French and German. Strictly speaking, societies¶ in which Russian, Chinese and Arabic are spoken were not colonized in the way¶ the Americas and South Asia were. Thus, any languages beyond the six imperial¶ European ones, and their grounding in Greek and Latin, have been disqualified¶ as languages with world-wide epistemic import. And of course, this impinges on¶ subject formation: people who are not trusted in their thinking, are doubted in¶ their rationality and wounded in their dignity. Border thinking then emerges¶ from the colonial and the imperial wound. If we consider, instead, Hindi or¶ Aymara, the epistemic difference with modern European languages and epistemology¶ will be colonial. In both cases, the coloniality of knowledge and of being¶ goes hand in hand with modernity’s rhetoric of salvation. The rhetoric of¶ modernity and the logic of coloniality are mutually constituted and are the two¶ sides of the same coin. Today the shaping of subjectivity, the coloniality of¶ being/knowledge is often described within the so-called globalization of culture,¶ a phrase, which in the rhetoric of modernity reproduces the logic of coloniality¶ of knowledge and of being.

Mignolo & Tlostanova 2006 [Walter D. & Madina V., Duke University & People’s Friendship Univ, Moscow, “Theorizing from the Borders Shifting to Geo- and Body-Politics of Knowledge”, European Journal of Social Theory 9(2): 205–221]

The modern foundation of knowledge is territorial and imperial. The point of reference of modernity is as an idea and interpretation of a historical present, the colonization of space It was from and in Europe that the classification of the world emerged and not in and from Asia, Africa or America borders were created therein but of different kinds The Middle Ages were integrated into the history of Europe, while the histories in Asia, Africa and America were denied as history The world map drawn by Mercator worked together with theology to create a zero point of observation and of knowledge: a perspective that denied all other perspectives Epistemological frontiers were set in place in that double move: frontiers that expelled to the outside the epistemic colonial differences Epistemic frontiers were re-articulated in the eighteenth century with the displacement of theology and the theo-politics of knowledge by secular ego-logy and the ego-politics of knowledge Epistemic frontiers were traced also by the creation of the imperial difference and the colonial difference Both epistemic differences, colonial and imperial, were based on a racial classification of the population of the planet, a classificatory order in which those who made the classification put themselves at the top of Humanity Border thinking or theorizing emerged from and as a response to the violence of imperial/territorial epistemology and the rhetoric of globalization of salvation that continues to be implemented on the assumption of the inferiority or devilish intentions of the Other and continues to justify oppression and exploitation as well as eradication of the difference Border thinking is the epistemology of the exteriority of the outside created from the inside; and as such Recent immigration to the imperial sites of Europe and the USA contributes to maintaining the conditions for border thinking that emerged from the very inception of modern imperial expansion Critical border thinking’ privilege of an observer that makes the rest of the world an object of observation Border thinking brings to the foreground different kinds of theoretical actors and principles of knowledge that displace European modernity and empower those who have been epistemically disempowered by the theo- and ego-politics of knowledge. in the epistemic borders between European imperial categories and languages and categories that modern epistemology ruled out as epistemically non-sustainable Border thinking is the epistemology of the future, without which another world will be impossible Epistemology is woven into language And languages are not something human beings have but they are part of what human beings are. languages are embedded in the body and in the memories (geo-historically located) of each person . Knowledge and subjectivities have been and continue to be shaped by the colonial and imperial differences that structured the modern/colonial world In the modern/ colonial unconscious, they belong to different epistemic ranks Border thinking then emerges from the colonial and the imperial wound the shaping of subjectivity, the coloniality of being/knowledge is often described within the so-called globalization of culture, a phrase, which in the rhetoric of modernity reproduces the logic of coloniality of knowledge and of being

Taking Cuba of the terror list only consolidates a world order founded on the colonization of space instantiated in the world map of bounded nation-states, reproducing colonial knowledge through the language of the 1AC. This short-circuits the border thinking that allows a break from the colonial structure of modernity.

Borders Kritik - UTNIF 2013.html5

Texas (UTNIF)

Kritiks

2013

The process of U.S. hegemony in North American economies is not unique or¶ unrelated to the larger workings of international order and world economy. The changing¶ tenor of Canadian, U.S., and Mexican geopolitical rhetoric, couched in free trade¶ and securitization, is related to the bigger project of condoning and supporting U.S.¶ hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. It is also closely related to the larger project of¶ globalization in which the U.S. has been a driving force during the 20th and 21st centuries¶ (Agnew 2005). Over the past decade, the U.S. has focused closely on defining¶ regional parameters for U.S. hegemonic influence or extraterritorial control within North¶ America, meaning that the shape of geo-economic and geopolitical regionalization in¶ North America and its “neighbors” (the Caribbean and Central America for example)¶ is directly related to U.S. responses to globalization issues. Indeed, there is a large¶ literature suggesting that hegemony is central to U.S. imperialist claims to intervention¶ at global, hemispheric, and continental levels (Slater 2004; Agnew 2003, 2005).¶ While originally the desire for such hegemony was couched in Cold War terms¶ regarding the right of the U.S. to intervene in Western Hemisphere affairs in general,¶ and the need for its neighbors to support the benevolent superpower in its bid for hemispheric¶ security as communism was “contained,” today such grand strategies are less¶ obviously stated. Rather than the nakedly aggressive military and economic agendas¶ that characterized Cold War or later “Reaganomics” rhetoric, U.S. hegemony is now¶ promoted as a civilizing mission in support of democracy, human rights, and continental¶ (as well as global) free trade. In this sense it is not unlike the EU mission in Eastern¶ Europe and beyond, although the EU and U.S. differ in terms of the methods they¶ employ. In both North America and the Caribbean, Cuba has figured prominently as a¶ marker for changing bilateral and multilateral relations with the U.S., as well as for¶ new geopolitical discourses concerning the changing role of the U.S. in New World¶ and global orders. For example, there has been policy convergence in the sense that¶ increasingly hegemonic and U.S.-based attitudes towards Cuba are currently being¶ adopted by Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Friendly¶ relations have been disrupted if diplomatic ties are not. But there has also been policy¶ divergence in others, as holding out against Helms-Burton and other U.S. prescriptions¶ for regime change in Cuba have also become normative for America’s neighboring¶ countries. The underlying coherence, or consistent rationale for this apparent contradiction¶ is given by the fact that in all cases the resulting convergence and divergence in¶ policies and diplomatic relations, or compliance and resistance to U.S. insistence of¶ economic embargo and political shunning, are consciously framed to in reference to a¶ U.S. geopolitical rhetoric. Cuba as a field of contest, or a contested arena for U.S.¶ intervention, and therefore contested legitimacy of U.S. hegemonic claims. Thus the¶ real theme is the contours of resistance or support to U.S. policy in North America and¶ the success or failure in the universalization of U.S. Cuban policy (Agnew 2005; Slater¶ 2004; Nicol 2002b) rather than actual events in Cuba.¶ Even as the U.S. position on Cuba (made concrete in the Helms Burton Act) continues¶ to reinforce the strong and impermeable physical and political border the U.S. shares with Cuba, this border is not a “hold-over” from the Cold War. It is a dynamic¶ and ongoing construction, embargo, political, and societal “shunning” on several¶ fronts—requiring policies which construct new kinds of “walls” with neighboring countries¶ as well as with Cuba itself. In this sense, NAFTA is critical to this process, although¶ as Agnew (2003) suggests, more generally, the criterion for this ideological¶ borderline are structural and historical, going back to the very nature of the state system¶ itself. This means that in even terms of its relationship to Cuba, the apparent continuity¶ in Cuban-American relations since the turn of the 20st century to the Post Cold¶ War period is actually quite deceptive. Significant shifts have taken place, particularly¶ with respect to how Cuba policy has become a political marker for compliance with¶ U.S. strategic and economic interests among North American states, and how Cuba has¶ itself adapted to the neoliberalization of U.S. foreign policy in terms of its own regional¶ relationship within the Caribbean. Both of these are significant outcomes.¶ In the case of subordinating Cuba, however, the U.S. has tackled a complex problem¶ in that conformity to geopolitical rhetoric is now required at a continental level.¶ This complex relationship—U.S. hegemony and North American complicity or resistance—¶ has served to define the edges or borders of American hegemony in North¶ America during the 21st century. Bearing this in mind, if we look at foreign policies as¶ important functional foundations for the construction of boundaries for a 21st century¶ U.S. political space, then it is impossible to support the idea that economic integration¶ can proceed without significant structural change in the foreign policies of North America¶ countries at all levels of engagement. The situation in North America suggests that¶ clear convergences have occurred in the area of foreign policy, and that these shifts are¶ situated in geopolitical events that have postdated the imposition of the NAFTA. Indeed, Canada, Mexico, the U.S., Caribbean countries, and Cuba have been engaged¶ in a complex and often reactive foreign policy-making process for a number of¶ years. While U.S.-Cuba relations remain conspicuous in much Western Hemisphere¶ discussion and foreign policy-making analysis, Canadians, Mexicans, and Caribbean¶ nations outside of Cuba have understood the relationship to Cuba in very different¶ ways than their American neighbors. This has meant that Canada-Cuba relations have¶ become part of a broader discussion about Canada-U.S.-Cuba relations, or even Western¶ Hemisphere relations towards Cuba and the Caribbean, which continue to challenge¶ the hegemonic perspectives of U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba. The virulent¶ rhetoric concerning Cuba which defines much of the U.S. political position is not about¶ Cuba per se, but about the logics of the leadership role which the U.S. has defined for¶ itself in the Western Hemisphere, since World War II, particularly in North America¶ and the countries immediately touching its geographical borders.

Nicol, 2011 [Heather Nicol, Associate Professor in the Department of¶ Geography, Trent University, Peterborough, Ontario,¶ Canada, “U.S. Hegemony in the 21st¶ century: Cuba's Place in the¶ regionalizing geopolitics of¶ North America and Caribbean¶ Countries” Journal of Borderlands Studies, 23:1, 31-52, DOI: 10.1080/08865655.2008.9695687]

The process of U.S. hegemony in North American economies is not unique or unrelated to the larger workings of international order and world economy. The changing tenor of geopolitical rhetoric, couched in free trade and securitization, is related to the bigger project of condoning and supporting U.S. hegemony It is also closely related to the larger project of globalization in which the U.S. has been a driving force the U.S. has focused closely on defining regional parameters for U.S. hegemonic influence or extraterritorial control within North America, meaning that the shape of geo-economic and geopolitical regionalization in North America and its “neighbors” is directly related to U.S. responses to globalization issues. hegemony is central to U.S. imperialist claims to intervention at global, hemispheric, and continental levels today such grand strategies are less obviously stated. Rather than the nakedly aggressive military and economic agendas U.S. hegemony is now promoted as a civilizing mission in support of democracy, human rights, and continental (as well as global) free trade. Cuba has figured prominently as a marker for changing bilateral and multilateral relations with the U.S., as well as for new geopolitical discourses concerning the changing role of the U.S. in New World Friendly relations have been disrupted if diplomatic ties are not. But there has also been policy divergence in others in all cases the resulting convergence and divergence in policies and diplomatic relations, or compliance and resistance to U.S. insistence of economic embargo and political shunning, are consciously framed to in reference to a U.S. geopolitical rhetoric. Cuba as a field of contest, or a contested arena for U.S. intervention, and therefore contested legitimacy of U.S. hegemonic claims. Thus the real theme is the contours of resistance or support to U.S. policy in North America and the success or failure in the universalization of U.S. Cuban policy rather than actual events in Cuba. this border is not a “hold-over” from the Cold War. It is a dynamic and ongoing construction, embargo, political, and societal “shunning” on several fronts requiring policies which construct new kinds of “walls” the criterion for this ideological borderline are structural and historical, going back to the very nature of the state system itself. the apparent continuity in Cuban-American relations since the turn of the 20st century to the Post Cold War period is actually quite deceptive. Significant shifts have taken place with respect to how Cuba policy has become a political marker for compliance with U.S. strategic and economic interests conformity to geopolitical rhetoric is now required at a continental level. This complex relationship—U.S. hegemony and North American complicity has served to define the edges or borders of American hegemony in North America during the 21st century. it is impossible to support the idea that economic integration can proceed without significant structural change in the foreign policies at all levels of engagement. clear convergences have occurred in the area of foreign policy While U.S.-Cuba relations remain conspicuous nations outside of Cuba have understood the relationship to Cuba in very different ways than their American neighbors. Canada-Cuba relations have become part of a broader discussion about Canada-U.S.-Cuba relations which continue to challenge the hegemonic perspectives of U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba. The virulent rhetoric concerning Cuba which defines much of the U.S. political position is not about Cuba per se, but about the logics of the leadership role which the U.S. has defined for itself , particularly in North America and the countries immediately touching its geographical borders.

Also, you should be skeptical of their engagement with Cuba – expanding American geopolitical influence in the region only serves to further the goals of US regional domination and the securitization of borders.

Borders Kritik - UTNIF 2013.html5

Texas (UTNIF)

Kritiks

2013

Nominally a group of islands, more properly a sea studded with islands, and originally ‘the ¶ chief sea’ that more commonly is known as the Aegean, the archipelago is a geographical form ¶ that invites significant productive thinking about island relations. I have been pondering why ¶ such labours to rethink island relations anew might matter, doing so most concertedly by ¶ working alongside colleagues Elizabeth McMahon, Godfrey Baldacchino, Steve Royle, and ¶ Carol Farbotko. Together, we have put the case that creative, innovative, and timely research ¶ on islands and island futures is urgently needed. In the face of challenging changes at various ¶ scales of impact, we suggest that island peoples and places are not served well by prevalent ¶ ideas of them as remote and dependent on oft-distant mainlands. Indeed, these tropes hamper ¶ more complete and nuanced understandings of the island condition and island prospects. ¶ Alternatively, we surmise, the idea of the archipelago suggests relations built on connection,¶ assemblage, mobility, and multiplicity. For centuries, island worlds have been positioned as geographical entities mostly ¶ isolated and unmappable—‘other spaces’ that need to be occupied, conquered, and colonized. ¶ Yet, archipelagos were connected by nautical trade routes long before European interventions. ¶ Indeed, for Elizabeth DeLoughrey (2007), geography is an appropriate starting point to explore ¶ land/sea relationships that favoured complex patterns of migration and settlement, and that ¶ exemplify the idea that islands are the open subjects of ‘transoceanic imaginaries’. So, too, is ¶ geography an appropriate starting point to explore mainland/island and island/island relations, ¶ and the archipelago may be a useful material and theoretical tool in such labours. As Elizabeth ¶ McMahon has suggested to me in conversation, thinking with the archipelago may reveal ¶ multiple emancipatory narratives that enunciate exceptions to colonizing grammars of empire ¶ that rendered islands remote, isolated and backward. Thinking with the archipelago thus may ¶ also enable island scholars and others to radically recentre positive, mobile, nomadic ¶ geopolitical and cultural orderings between and among island(er)s. This special set of papers focuses upon just such matters. Its genesis might also be read ¶ archipelagically for, in 2010, I found myself in conversation with colleague Dr Joseph Palis ¶ (North Carolina State University) on the island of Bornholm, Denmark, at a conference of the ¶ International Small Island Studies Association. There, Joseph and I talked about our mutual ¶ interest in positioning island geographies more visibly at annual meetings of the Association of ¶ American Geographers. Thus it was that at, on the archipelagic shores of Seattle at the AAG in ¶ 2011, with Arnd Holdschlag from the University of Hamburg, we brought together several ¶ presenters to focus on the theme Reframing islandness I: critical and discursive cartographies ¶ in island worlds. This inaugural day-long session engaged thirteen scholars, notably doctoral ¶ candidates and early career researchers, who are working on diverse geographies of the ¶ Galápagos Islands, the Solomons, the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, New Zealand, and ¶ on island languages, island mobilities, island censuses, statistics, and place names, tropes of ¶ tropicality, and the cartographic impulse to map island places. Delighted at the response, we ¶ determined to organize a second session at the AAG Conference on the island of Manhattan in ¶ February 2012, entitled Reframing islandness II: thinking with the archipelago. The day's ¶ sessions attracted 24 speakers and a significant audience, attesting, we think, to the growing ¶ interest in island studies. It included two panel discussions: one on islands, arts and the ¶ geographical imagination; and another on Island enclaves, Baldacchino’s (2010a) monograph ¶ on offshoring strategies, creative governance, and subnational island jurisdictions. Let me now ¶ turn to the papers from the conference that comprise this special issue. In considering island movements as a means to think archipelagically, Jonathan Pugh ¶ starts from the premise that islands are deeply implicated in the contemplation of human nature ¶ and our place in the world. He then builds a compelling argument to show that inattention to ¶ the archipelago is problematic “because we live (increasingly) in a world of island-island ¶ movements and not static forms” both obvious and less apparent, among them, “wind turbine ¶ arrays, industrial oil and military constellations”. Graciously (but not uncritically) building on ¶ Stratford et al. (2011), and setting the scene for the papers that follow in ways that will set ¶ agenda for new scholarship, Pugh asks “what does it mean to think with the archipelago?” His ¶ twin argument is that this labour will denaturalize how we think of space and place, and that it ¶ enables a focus on ‘metamorphosis’: “the adaptation and transformation of material, cultural ¶ and political practices through island movements”. Building in new ways on work on the ¶ spatial turn (Pugh, 2009) and Caribbean islands (most recently, Pugh, 2012), he then applies ¶ his own critical reflections to post-colonial island movements, asking “how do Caribbean ¶ people struggle with and against the language that they have inherited, and is this language up ¶ to the task of effectively naming and renaming the New World that they inhabit?” For Pugh, ¶ the archipelago provides a framework of transfiguration rather than repetition, and “gives us ¶ another reason why we should not only think about, but with, islands”. In a study demonstrating the ongoing value of the archive and of meticulous historical ¶ analysis of geographical dynamics, Anyaa Anim-Addo is concerned with the Caribbean and ¶ island-to-island movements and mappings that implicate the operations of the Royal Mail ¶ Steam Packet Company. I have already alluded to the importance of the idea of networks in ¶ archipelagic thinking, and for Anim-Addo a networked approach offers “a useful lens through ¶ which to analyse nineteenth-century steamship services”; it also provides “a theoretical ¶ intersection between networked approaches to empire and island studies”. Indeed, and in ways ¶ that should influence the reconceptualization or refinement of such approaches, Anim-Addo ¶ suggests that thinking archipelagically enables a sharpening of analytical focus, such that ¶ certain “colonial priorities, imperatives and hierarchies that can appear flattened out through a ¶ networked approach” are brought to the fore. In Anim-Addo’s work, such thinking has ¶ foregrounded “the relationship between the maritime service and mobilities in the Caribbean” ¶ (see also Anim-Addo, 2012). It has also demonstrated empirically how those charged with ¶ negotiating a transportation network within the Caribbean archipelago were forced to respond ¶ to various forms of connection and entanglement between and among islands, thus adding ¶ weight to earlier speculations advanced by Stratford et al. (2011). Anim-Addo is able to posit ¶ that “if the steamship network was a network in process … part of this process was one of ¶ resolution between maritime links and archipelagic relations” and invites others to “develop a ¶ nuanced understanding of the significance of mobilities in colonial and postcolonial contexts”.

Stratford 13 [Elaine, Ph.D. in Philosophy from the Center for Environmental Studies at the University of Adelaide, Associate Professor of Geography and Environmental Studies and Head of School at UTasmania, “The Idea of the Archipelago: Contemplating Island Relations,” Island Studies Journal 8(1)]

Nominally a group of islands, more properly a sea studded with islands, the archipelago is a geographical form that invites significant productive thinking about island relation island peoples and places are not served well by prevalent ideas of them as remote and dependent on oft-distant mainlands these tropes hamper more complete and nuanced understandings of the island condition and island prospects Alternatively the idea of the archipelago suggests relations built on connection, assemblage, mobility, and multiplicity. For centuries, island worlds have been positioned as geographical entities mostly isolated and unmappable—‘other spaces’ that need to be occupied, conquered, and colonized. Yet, archipelagos were connected by nautical trade routes long before European interventions. islands are the open subjects of ‘transoceanic imaginaries’. the archipelago may reveal multiple emancipatory narratives that enunciate exceptions to colonizing grammars of empire that rendered islands remote, isolated and backward. Thinking with the archipelago thus may also enable island scholars and others to radically recentre positive, mobile, nomadic geopolitical and cultural orderings between and among island(er)s. inattention to the archipelago is problematic “because we live (increasingly) in a world of island-island movements and not static forms” asks “what does it mean to think with the archipelago?” this labour will denaturalize how we think of space and place, and that it enables a focus on ‘metamorphosis’: “the adaptation and transformation of material, cultural and political practices through island movements”. asking “how do Caribbean people struggle with and against the language that they have inherited, and is this language up to the task of effectively naming and renaming the New World that they inhabit?” the archipelago provides a framework of transfiguration rather than repetition, and “gives us another reason why we should not only think about, but with, islands”. . I have already alluded to the importance of the idea of networks in archipelagic thinking, a networked approach offers “a useful lens through which to analyse a theoretical intersection between networked approaches to empire and island studies”. thinking archipelagically enables a sharpening of analytical focus, such that certain “colonial priorities, imperatives and hierarchies that can appear flattened out through a networked approach” are brought to the fore. It has also demonstrated empirically how those charged with negotiating a transportation network within the Caribbean archipelago were forced to respond to various forms of connection and entanglement between and among islands

And, we must break from the idea of separate islands, but use an Archipelagic perspective of islands to expose imperialism – viewing islands as isolated is the link

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The consequence, however, can also be read in relation to all those historical struggles in which states have effectively minimized the sovereignty of the¶ 9 people in the name of their own supremacy, whether for the long-term good¶ 10 of the people, or for the short-term demands of some state of emergency. The¶ danger of the modern state, we know all too well, is the potential for “totalitarianism,” “authoritarianism,” “fascism,” or what has often, and disturbingly, been in danger of amounting to much the same thing, the monopolistic claim to a state sovereignty sundered from, but articulated in, the name of a popular sovereignty, and capable of effacing all claims to diversity in the name of its own collective unity. It is in this context that we can again¶ 17 understand much of the contemporary impetus behind claims about demo-¶ 18 cratization, or even claims about the potentialities of a market rationality; but¶ 19 also the sense that the claims of sovereign states to be able to provide the¶ 20 conditions under which democratization might be possible are fundamentally¶ 21 at odds with the administrative and disciplinary apparatus, and in the final, or¶ 22 not so final, instance, the physical force and resort to war, they deem neces-¶ 23 sary for the constitution of a properly democratic politics.¶ 24 Perhaps the most important constitutive gamble of modern politics, in fact, has been that the sovereign state would nurture rather than devour its citizens.¶ 26 Contemporary references to the “security dilemma” now tend to be dominated by analogies between the structurally driven competition among states coexisting in a system of states and Hobbes’ account of a world of free and¶ 29 equal (modern, liberal) individuals in an abstract “state of nature,” but¶ 30 Hobbes’ major contribution in this respect may well be his commentary on¶ 31 the ways in which the sovereignty he insists must be constituted so as to pro-¶ 32 tect free and equal individuals is not exactly guaranteed to live up to its pro-¶ 33 mise. States are a source of insecurity precisely because of the way they promise to provide security. The subject of security, as I have put it elsewhere, is precisely the modern subject that must be secured. States encourage claims about freedoms within their territory because to be within a territory is to be under law, under necessity and always subject to the exception that enables the rule. Again, many are sufficiently privileged to take a gamble of trusting in the freedoms and securities promised by the modern state, but it is also a gamble that very many people have lost, and lost very badly.¶ 41 There have been suspicions, third, about the capacity of the modern state to fulfill its promise to provide a home for modern politics, even when struggles¶ 43 to sustain powerful institutions and practices of popular sovereignty have¶ 44 been relatively effective. These suspicions can also be traced back a long way. They are expressed in a broad range of claims about the increasingly problematic status of conceptions of the political within the modern state,¶ 2 given various suspicions about the plausibility of any sharp distinction¶ 3 between the internal spaces of the modern state and the spaces of the inter-¶ 4 national, of the modern system of states, beyond. Difficulties arise here not in¶ 5 relation to the ambivalences and tensions between politics and something else,¶ 6 or to the capacity of states to impose their understanding of collective neces-¶ 7 sities on everyone and everything, but to the capacity of states to demarcate a¶ 8 clear limit to their capacities and jurisdictions, especially in relation to the¶ 9 claims of the system of sovereign states, and the claims of that system to¶ 10 express rights and needs that might be attributed to humanity in general.¶ 11 It is this third group of suspicions that has come to be of most pressing¶ 12 concern in contemporary political life, though they implicate and complicate¶ 13 the other two sorts of suspicion in various ways.23 They also explain much of¶ 14 the contemporary impetus both to reimagine where and what we take politics¶ 15 to be, as well as to wish that politics would somehow go away, or to suspect¶ 16 that politics is indeed already in the process of coming to an end. If we are to¶ 17 make any sense of what is at stake in contemporary calls to reimagine the¶ 18 political imagination, it is now necessary to pay a lot more attention to what happens on the line that effects an apparently sharp distinction between two distinct spaces: the domestic spaces of the territorial state, and the foreign spaces of the modern system of states, each with their own accounts of temporal and political possibility – a line that also assumes a capacity to draw further lines between the modern subject and other subjects/sovereigns and between the modern system of states and the wider world beyond. The dou-¶ 25 bles and triples of modern political life are easily multiplied.24¶ 26 To take this line for granted is precisely not to affirm a set of realities that simply exist in the world, and which, fortunately or tragically, resist any attempt to imagine something different. It is to affirm an ensemble of historical and abstractly formulated but massively embodied accounts of what it must mean to divide the world, to discriminate between that which is included and that which is excluded, that which is friend and that which is enemy, that which is society and that which is anarchy, that which is normal and that which is exceptional: accounts that must be affirmed – authorized, legitimized – as the only condition under which worldly realities and political possibilities can properly be engaged. What counts for reality and necessity in modern political life, and thus what works to both enable and constrain the modern political imagination, has to be understood in the first instance as an enactment of an historically specific imagination of political possibility, an imagination that knows how to draw the line: that knows both how to discriminate and how to authorize the discriminations that are enacted by sovereign acts of discrimination. This enactment literally and figuratively centres on the practices of the modern state and its subjects; on all their potentialities and all their dangers.¶ 44 It especially centres on the discriminations and authorizations enacted andexpressed in the practices and institutions of modern state sovereignty practices which simultaneously draw the line in territorial space and differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate practices within the space they delimit. It is in relation to the sovereign practices of the modern state that we are supposed to understand what it means to draw the line: to distinguish between what is legal and illegal, possible and impossible, realistic and utopian, the properly political and the merely economic, civil or private internally and the also merely international, or perhaps theological, externally. The most important decisions about modern political life – about which and what kinds of people get to be counted among the included, about what has to be done to secure the inclusion, about what ought to be done once these inclusions are secured and normalized, about who gets to decide when previously accepted decisions are to be redecided or suspended, about who gets to decide who gets to make, and make binding, judgements about these and all other decisions – are made in relation to this line, this border that is so much more than a physical demarcation on earthly topography. It is the sense that this line has become a little problematic in some contexts and radically uncertain in others that has undermined so many convictions not only about what it now means to engage in political life, but also of what it would mean to struggle for something better, for something more democratic, for something recognizably political in an age in which suspicions about what now counts for politics have become quite intense.¶ 22 To draw attention to contemporary suspicions about the distinction¶ 23 between the state and the system of states, the properly political and the¶ 24 merely international, however, is to run into extensive analytical difficulties.¶ 25 Not least, the modern disciplines of knowledge that seek to engage with¶ 26 modern politics and its imaginative possibilities are already carefully situated¶ 27 on either side of the line that distinguishes the political from the international.¶ 28 Moreover, they are themselves largely constituted through the assumption that this line must be drawn. They tend to observe both its discriminations and its authorizations as a natural condition rather than as an historical achievement, an ongoing practice, and an ongoing problem. In effect, they¶ 32 assume what they are now increasingly asked to examine. Many contemporary attempts to reimagine the political imaginations likewise seek to do so from either side of this line and, unsurprisingly, tend to both reproduce and reauthorize the line they seek to evade, transcend or simply ignore. Although the line between the political and the international is widely judged to be increasingly problematic, and although questions about political life supposedly settled in relation to it are now asked with renewed urgency, itis a line that cannot be evaded, transcended or ignored. As a constitutive limit of modern politics in territorial space, it is also a constitutive limit of both modern political practice and the modern political imagination. As a¶ 42 demarcation, however, it is also the site of a mutual production, and much of¶ 43 what is interesting about it concerns the very active and diverse practices of¶ 44 mutual production that are enabled once the demarcation has been made.¶ 45 Many of these practices hinge on the ways in which the demarcation of an¶ 1 outside that affirms an inside produces a powerful sense of what it must mean¶ 2 to escape the inside: of what it means to escape from the modern achievement¶ 3 of a spatially delimited political community always seeking to go beyond¶ 4 what has already been achieved in time. Consequently, if modern political life is in need of reimagination, attempts to do so on terms uncritically assuming a stance on either side of the line that sets the limits of the modern political imagination will necessarily run into irresolvable difficulties.¶

Walker 2009 [R.B.J., Walker is a professor in the department of Political Science at the University of Victoria and is the chief editor of the Journal of International Political Sociology, “After the Globe, Before the world”, pg. 77 – 80]

The¶ danger of the modern state is the monopolistic claim to a sovereignty capable of effacing all claims to diversity in the name of its own collective unity. Perhaps the most important constitutive gamble of modern politics, in fact, has been that the sovereign state would nurture rather than devour its citizens.¶ States are a source of insecurity precisely because of the way they promise to provide security. . States encourage claims about freedoms within their territory because to be within a territory is to be under law, under necessity and always subject to the exception that enables the rule. .¶ There have been suspicions, , about the capacity of the modern state to fulfill its promise to provide a home for modern politics, , it is now necessary to pay a lot more attention to what happens on the line that effects an apparently sharp distinction between two distinct spaces: the domestic spaces of the territorial state, and the foreign spaces of the modern system of states, each with their own accounts of temporal and political possibility – a line that also assumes a capacity to draw further lines between the modern subject and other subjects/sovereigns and between the modern system of states and the wider world beyond. To take this line for granted is precisely not to affirm a set of realities that simply exist in the world, and which, fortunately or tragically, resist any attempt to imagine something different. It is to affirm an ensemble of historical and abstractly formulated but massively embodied accounts of what it must mean to divide the world, What counts for reality and necessity in modern political life, and thus what works to both enable and constrain the modern political imagination, has to be understood in the first instance as an enactment of an historically specific imagination of political possibility, an imagination that knows how to draw the line: . It is in relation to the sovereign practices of the modern state that we are supposed to understand what it means to draw the line: to distinguish between what is legal and illegal, possible and impossible, realistic and utopian, the properly political and the merely economic, civil or private internally and the also merely international, or perhaps theological, externally The most important decisions about modern political life – about which and what kinds of people get to be counted among the included, about what has to be done to secure the inclusion, about what ought to be done once these inclusions are secured and normalized, about who gets to decide when previously accepted decisions are to be redecided or suspended Consequently, if modern political life is in need of reimagination, attempts to do so on terms uncritically assuming a stance on either side of the line that sets the limits of the modern political imagination will necessarily run into irresolvable difficulties.¶

{Insert cards from coloniality file}

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So far, the history of the modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world−system has privileged the culture, knowledge, and epistemology produced by the West (Spivak 1988 ; Mignolo 2000). No culture in the world remained untouched by European modernity. There is no absolute outside to this system. The monologism and monotopic global design of the West relates to other cultures and peoples from a position of superiority and is deaf toward the cosmologies and epistemologies of the non−Western world. The imposition of Christianity in order to convert the so−called savages and barbarians in the 16th century, followed by the imposition of "the white man’s burden" and "civilizing mission" in the 18th and 19th century, the imposition of the "developmentalist project" in the 20th century and, more recently, the imperial project of military interventions under the rhetoric of "democracy" and "human rights" in the 21st century, have all been imposed by militarism and violence under the rhetoric of modernity of saving the other from its own barbarianisms. Two responses to the Eurocentric colonial imposition are Third World nationalisms and fundamentalisms. Nationalism provides Eurocentric solutions to an Eurocentric global problem. It reproduces an internal coloniality of power within each nation−state and reifies the nation−state as the privileged location of social change (Grosfoguel 1996). Struggles above and below the nation−state are not considered in nationalist political strategies. Moreover, nationalist responses to global capitalism reinforce the nation−state as the political institutional form per excellence of the modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world−system. In this sense, nationalism is complicit with Eurocentric thinking and political structures. On the other hand, Third World fundamentalisms of different kinds respond with the rhetoric of an essentialist "pure outside space" or "absolute exteriority" to modernity. They are "anti− modern modern" forces that reproduce the binary oppositions of Eurocentric thinking. If Eurocentric thinking claims "democracy" to be a western natural attribute, Third World fundamentalisms accept this Eurocentric premise and claim that democracy has nothing to do with the non−West. Thus, it is an inherent European attribute imposed by the West. Both deny the fact that many of the elements that we consider to be part of modernity, such as democracy, were formed in a global relation between the West and the non−West. Europeans took a lot of its utopian thinking from the non−Western historical systems they encounter in the colonies and appropriated them as part of Eurocentred modernity. Third World fundamentalisms respond to the imposition of Eurocentred modernity as a global/imperial design with an anti−modern modernity that is as Eurocentric, hierarchical, authoritarian and anti−democratic as the former. One of many plausible solutions to the Eurocentric versus fundamentalist dilemma is what Walter Mignolo, following Chicano(a) thinkers such as Gloria Anzaldua (1987) and Jose David Saldivar (1997), calls "critical border thinking" (Mignolo 2000). Critical border thinking is the epistemic response of the subaltern to the Eurocentric project of modernity. Instead of rejecting modernity to retreat into a fundamentalist absolutism, border epistemologies subsume/redefine the emancipatory rhetoric of modernity from the cosmologies and epistemologies of the subaltern, located in the oppressed and exploited side of the colonial difference, towards a decolonial liberation struggle for a world beyond eurocentered modernity. What border thinking produces is a redefinition/subsumption of citizenship, democracy, human rights, humanity, economic relations beyond the narrow definitions imposed by European modernity. Border thinking is not an anti−modern fundamentalism. It is the decolonial transmodern response of the subaltern to Eurocentric modernity.

Grosfoguel, Associate Professor at the University of California at Berkeley, Ethnic Studies Department, in ‘11[Ramon, “Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of Political-Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality, TRANSMODERNITY: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World, 1(1)]

the history of the modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world−system has privileged the culture, knowledge, and epistemology produced by the West No culture in the world remained untouched by European modernity. There is no absolute outside to this system The monologism and monotopic global design of the West relates to other cultures and peoples from a position of superiority and is deaf toward the cosmologies and epistemologies of the non−Western world. The imposition of Christianity in order to convert the so−called savages and barbarians in the 16th century, followed by the imposition of "the white man’s burden" and "civilizing mission" in the 18th and 19th century, the imposition of the "developmentalist project" in the 20th century and, more recently, the imperial project of military interventions under the rhetoric of "democracy" and "human rights" in the 21st century, imposed by militarism and violence under the rhetoric of modernity of saving the other from its own barbarianisms Nationalism provides Eurocentric solutions to an Eurocentric global problem. It reproduces an internal coloniality of power within each nation−state and reifies the nation−state as the privileged location of social change nationalist responses to global capitalism reinforce the nation−state as the political institutional form per excellence of the modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world−system nationalism is complicit with Eurocentric thinking and political structures Third World fundamentalisms of different kinds respond with the rhetoric of an essentialist "pure outside space" or "absolute exteriority" to modernity. They are "anti− modern modern" forces that reproduce the binary oppositions of Eurocentric thinking Critical border thinking is the epistemic response of the subaltern to the Eurocentric project of modernity. Instead of rejecting modernity to retreat into a fundamentalist absolutism, border epistemologies subsume/redefine the emancipatory rhetoric of modernity from the cosmologies and epistemologies of the subaltern, located in the oppressed and exploited side of the colonial difference, towards a decolonial liberation struggle for a world beyond eurocentered modernity.

First development is just a replacement for the white man’s burden because it reinforces the colinal relationship through the state and neoliberlaims.

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Many of today’s pervasive and intractable security and nation-building dilemmas issue from the dissonance between the prescribed model of territorially bounded nation-states and the imprisonment of postcolonial polities in territorial straitjackets bequeathed by colonial cartographies. With a focus on the Durand Line, the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan and the epicenter of the prolonged war in the region, this article explores the enduring ramifications of the mutually constitutive role of colonialism and modern law. The global reach of colonial rule reordered subjects and reconfigured space. Fixed territorial demarcations of colonial possessions played a pivotal role in this process. Nineteenth century constructs of international law, geography, geopolitics, and the frontier, fashioned in the age of empire, were interwoven in the enabling frame that made the drawing of colonial borders like the Durand Line possible. Imperatives of colonial rule and compulsions of imperial rivalries positioned these demarcations that often cut across age-old cultural and historical social units. Postcolonial states inherited these demarcations and, with them, a host of endemic political and security afflictions. Modern international law, which in its incipient stage lent license to colonial rule, today legitimates colonial cartographies, thereby accentuating postcolonial dilemmas of nation-building and territorial integrity. By freeze-framing inherited colonial borders, international law forces disparate people to circumscribe their political aspirations within predetermined territorial bounds, precluding political and territorial arrangements in tune with their aspirations. To silence the questions that rise from colonial territorial demarcations, international law raises the specter of disorder. It seeks to preserve order, even an unjust and dysfunctional one. In the process, international law betrays a deeper affliction that plagues it - its refusal to squarely face its complicity in colonial domination accentuates its inability to resolve today’s international disputes procreated by colonial cartographies.

Mahmud 2010 [Tayyab, Professor of Law and Director, Center for Global Justice, Seattle University School of Law, “COLONIAL CARTOGRAPHIES AND POSTCOLONIAL BORDERS: THE UNENDING WAR IN AND AROUND AFGHANISTAN,” pg.1]

Many of today’s pervasive and intractable security and nation-building dilemmas issue from the dissonance between the prescribed model of territorially bounded nation-states and the imprisonment of postcolonial polities in territorial straitjackets bequeathed by colonial cartographies. the enduring ramifications of the mutually constitutive role of colonialism and modern law. colonial rule reordered subjects and reconfigured space. Fixed territorial demarcations of colonial possessions played a pivotal role nternational law, geography, geopolitics were interwoven in the enabling frame that made the drawing of borders Postcolonial states inherited these demarcations and, a host of endemic political and security afflictions. Modern international law, which in its incipient stage lent license to colonial rule, today legitimates colonial cartographies, thereby accentuating postcolonial dilemmas of nation-building and territorial integrity. , international law forces disparate people to circumscribe their political aspirations within predetermined territorial bounds , international law raises the specter of disorder. It seeks to preserve order, even an unjust and dysfunctional one. international law betrays a deeper affliction that plagues it - its refusal to squarely face its complicity in colonial domination accentuates its inability to resolve today’s international disputes procreated by colonial cartographies

Next, International law legitimizes colonial cartographies and historical borders which perpetuate the logic of colonial domination

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As I have suggested,52 ontological monopolisations constitute vio- lence through two reciprocally conditioning mechanisms. First, through the oblivion of the mechanism of ‘appropriation’ (Ereignis), which works by intrinsically concealing the openness of being and its reservoir of ungrounded possibilities; and second, through the violence intrinsic in par- ticular historical modes of revealing, for instance, the ontological ordering of entities in neoliberal enframing. The first mechanism of violence appar- ently refers to the fundamental (im)possibility for the different forms of life to emerge. It is a question concerning particular appropriations of being, which take place by monopolising their own mode of revealing, thus refusing their intrinsic condition of possibility, the abyssal richness of open being. The sec- ond mechanism of violence, in turn, is related to the designated positions, such as the neoliberal enframing, which violently enframe human existence and the revealing of the real to particular modalities of ontology. At the level of the first mechanism, neoliberal fabrication of particular mode of existence takes advantage of what I have discussed, by following Heidegger, the ontological ambiguity of being, its happening as a concealing- revealing.53 Accordingly, while disclosing a peculiar mode of existence, Downloaded by [University of Chicago Library] at 18:46 27 July 2013 366 Mikko Joronen the appropriation of being always conceals the open possibility for the other modes of revealing to come about. Such concealment is an intrin- sic necessity for all revealing to take place: all modes of revealing conceal their originary source, the inexhaustible plenitude of open being. Neoliberal governmentality, however, follows the logic of violent mono-politics and complete grounding of the revealing of things to the point of abandoning the possibility for ontological change. It remains solely withdrawn to the optimised arrangement of ontic realities: it concentrates on the calculative ordering of things (beings), and as a result, hides the ontological ques- tion concerning its own mode of revealing (being). Neoliberalisation thus covers not only the ontological mechanism of concealing-revealing, but its own ontological finitude. By monopolising its own modality of revealing, neoliberal enframing veils its own finitude, its nature as a finite ‘Event of appropriation’ (das Ereignis), thus passing the originary openness of being into oblivion. The latter mechanism of ontological violence, in turn, refers to the inner logic of neoliberal enframing. Neoliberalisation operates, first, by reducing political capabilities of individuals to the internalised rule of the maximum economy, but also by moulding all things into reserves of profits. First of all, neoliberalisation violently enframes human existence into bare reserves of human capital, which are increasingly used by states in their tactics to succeed in global competition. The neoliberal state, governing its popu- lation by the means of encouraging economically calculating subjectivity, is not established out of the violent act of territorial inclusion and order, but above all, out of the violent fact of reducing human existence into usable capital. Second, as a drive to reveal things as profitable reserves, neoliberalisation violently divests natural entities from their abrupt happen- ing and phenomenological richness of revealing. Altogether, such reductions constitute the post-political situation of neoliberal governmentality: they cre- ate a world of technical solutions and politics-free zones abrogating the politics of ontological revealing. The depoliticising conduct of the neoliberal state is an ultimate political act, which paradoxically establishes an anti- political abrogation of all political acts through the concealment of the politics of ontological possibility. Such ‘ontological mono-politics’ thus inter- twines with the first mechanism of ontological violence: by fabricating the real, including human existence, for the use of economic calculations and profits, neoliberal governmentality monopolises a particular mode of reveal- ing, and thus, fades the ontological openness of being and its finite Event (Ereignis) to the background. What remains excluded in the process of neoliberal enframing, what remains “outside” of its framework, is evidently no-thing ontic, but the ontological openness of being. As the critical explorations of neoliberalism in recent geographical literature have emphasised, mainly by leaning on Marx, Harvey and a set of interpretations of Foucault, neoliberalism should Downloaded by [University of Chicago Library] at 18:46 27 July 2013 Conceptualising New Modes of State Governmentality 367 be conceptualised as an open and unpredictable process of ‘enclosure’, as “a complex set of logics of inclusion and exclusion operating through a variety of spatial territories and networks”.54 Instead of a fixed set of doctrines and practices, neoliberalisation is conceptualised as a contingent process that works by enclosing a variety of subjects, practices, technolo- gies and materialities through different, even conflicting, rationalities and spatialities. Nevertheless, even as delegate contributions as these seem to fall short on scrutinising the ontological characteristics involved in the pro- cess of neoliberalisation, not to mention the evident absence of Heidegger’s work, which also Foucault, though with cryptic and non-explicated man- ner, admitted as being a central influence on his own thinking.55 Although neoliberalism is conceptualised as a flexible and contingent process emerg- ing through the unlimited number of unpredictable enclosures, from the Heideggerian perspective, neoliberalism is not so much a dialectical pro- cess of inclusion and exclusion,56 but a process of ontological mono-politics enframing the real as such in terms of available, usable, orderable, and make- able reserve. Instead of exclusion, neoliberal enframing works through total inclusion, where every-thing is revealed as having the potential to become utilised. Things escaping the measures of neoliberal enframing are revealed, not as excluded, but as not-yet-enframed-and-utilised reserves. Neoliberal enframing is hence a process of ontological inclusion – an ontological drive towards the complete economic usability of things, where this drive in itself is never under suspect.

Joronen 2013, (Mikko, Department of Geography and Geology, Geography Section, University of Turku, Finland, “Conceptualising New Modes of State Governmentality: Power, Violence and the Ontological Mono-politics of Neoliberalism”, 3/21/13, 7/28/13|Ashwin)

ontological monopolisations constitute vio- lence through two reciprocally conditioning mechanisms through the oblivion of the mechanism of ‘appropriation’ concealing the openness of bein and second, through the violence intrinsic in par- ticular historical modes of revealing , the ontological ordering of entities in neoliberal enframing neoliberal enframing violently enframe human existence and the revealing of the real to particular modalities of ontology Neoliberal governmentality grounding the revealing of things to the point of abandoning the possibility for ontological change Neoliberalisation operates by reducing political capabilities of individuals to the internalised rule of the maximum economy, but also by moulding all things into reserves of profits violently enframes human existence into bare reserves of human capital The neoliberal state , is established out of the violent fact of reducing human existence into usable capital they cre- ate a world of technical solutions and politics-free zones abrogating the politics of ontological revealing is an ultimate political act, which paradoxically acts through the concealment of the politics of ontological possibility by fabricating the real neoliberal governmentality monopolises a particular mode of reveal- ing, and thus, fades the ontological openness of being neoliberalism should be conceptualised as an unpredictable process of ‘enclosure’ of logics of inclusion and exclusion operating through a variety of spatial territories and networks a contingent process that works by enclosing a variety of subjects, practices, technolo- gies and materialities through different, even conflicting, rationalities and spatialities neoliberalism is but a process of ontological mono-politics enframing the real as such in terms of available, usable, orderable, and make- able reserve neoliberal enframing works through total inclusion, where every-thing is revealed as having the potential to become utilised this drive in itself is never under suspect.

The process of state driven neoliberal practice uses inclusionary ontological enframing to reducing human existence to particular modalities of potential contribution to the market—this idea constitutes ontological violence and the reduction of the infinite possibility of being- ontologically positioned to serve the interests of profit-making

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First, all cross-border concepts refer to the importance of cross-border¶ or even ‘deterritorialised’ politics, economics and culture. Yet, diaspora¶ and transnational approaches emphasise intense connections to national or local territories, especially in the case of migrants. For example, the lobbying that Kurdish migrant organisations do may take place¶ at the European Parliament in Brussels, but its focus is on ‘local’ issues,¶ such as Kurdish autonomy in Turkey or the right to organise in¶ European Union member states. In this way, cross-border social phenomena have a clear territorial reference and are thus also local or national in their focus and goals (see Lyons 2006).¶ Second, there is also no claim that a global or world consciousness is¶ evolving in a linear way. The broad definition of transnational spaces, fields and formations as sets of dense and continuous social and symbolic ties encompasses all kinds of social phenomena. These definitions¶ apply across the board, from the cross-border activities of nongovernmental organisations and social protest movements, through the¶ migration flows that link specific sending and receiving countries, to¶ the ongoing ties migrants retain with their countries of origin.¶ However, in diaspora and transnational approaches, the intensified¶ cross-border transactions are not necessarily connected to a global consciousness, a global horizon of world society, global justice and cosmopolitanism (Beck 2006) or the growing importance of universal norms¶ in the world polity approach (Meyer, Boli, Thomas & Ramirez 1997). In¶ particular, migration is a case where there is no neat coincidence of¶ ‘globalisation from below’ (Portes 1996), no growing awareness of ‘oneworldness’, on the one hand, and universal ideas, on the other.¶ Moreover, diaspora and transnationalism – as concepts and observable¶ phenomena – are not necessarily coterminous with what is called global¶ or transnational civil society in the form of ‘transnational advocacy networks’ (Keck & Sikkink 1998). Transnational advocacy networks are often portrayed as promoting universal values, such as human rights, democracy and gender equity. Similarly, transnational social movements¶ are studied as an instance of globalisation and the universalisation of¶ practices and rights from below (Della Porta, Andretta, Mosca & Reiter¶ 2006). By contrast, diaspora and transnational concepts often relate to¶ the observation that, when it comes to understandings of the political,¶ human mobility may reinforce and recreate all kinds of beliefs and –¶ isms, including nationalism, patriarchism, sexism, sectarianism and¶ ethno-nationalism. Third, terms such as ‘diaspora’ and ‘transnationalism’ or ‘transnationalisation’ do not suggest a (linear) progression of the universalisation¶ of rights, as world approaches do. For example, post-national approaches posit that migrants’ ‘right to have rights’ (Arendt 1973 [1959])¶ has led to the evolution of post-national membership, which – in liberal¶ democracies – guards essential social and civil rights of migrants,¶ though falls short of full political rights and citizenship (Soysal 1994).¶ According to this view, the ultimate source of this tendency is to be¶ found in a diffusion of Western norms of human rights into the regulations and constitutions of national states. While considerations attached¶ to terms such as ‘diaspora’ and ‘transnationalism’ do not provide comprehensive theories on rights and citizenship, there are no clear-cut assumptions about the global spread of norms. Instead, the focus is¶ usually on contentious struggles around issues such as rights in both¶ national and transnational arenas (Faist 2010). Diaspora and transnational concepts, in contrast to global and world theory concepts, often¶ start from the observation that, while there is less of a requirement of physical or geographical proximity for social life, there is still no clear¶ tendency towards universalisation. Instead, the emphasis is placed on¶ the co-presence of universalising and particularising processes. Thus,¶ universal norms – such as collective self-determination, democracy and¶ human rights – may enable local or national claims. For example, demands for political autonomy or multicultural rights of cultural groups¶ often refer to global norms such as the right to collective self-determination. In this way, the concepts of diaspora and transnationalism are closely related to ‘glocalisation’, which combines the notions of globalisation and localisation (Robertson 1995).

Faist 2010 [Thomas, Professor, Transnational, Development & Migration Studies, “Diaspora and ¶ Diaspora and Transnationalism¶ Transnationalism,” pg. 14-16]

transnational approaches emphasise intense connections to national territories border social phenomena have a clear territorial reference and are thus also local or national in their focus and goals in transnational approaches, the intensified¶ cross-border transactions are not necessarily connected to a global consciousness, a global horizon of world society, global justice and cosmopolitanism or the growing importance of universal norms¶ in the world polity approach there is no neat coincidence of¶ ‘globalisation from below’ no growing awareness of ‘oneworldness’, on the one hand, and universal ideas, on the other transnationalism – are not coterminous with what is called global¶ or transnational civil society in the form of ‘transnational advocacy networks’ Transnational advocacy networks are often portrayed as promoting universal values, such as human rights, democracy and gender equity. transnational concepts reinforce and recreate all kinds of beliefs and –¶ isms, including nationalism, patriarchism, sexism, sectarianism and¶ ethno-nationalism ‘transnationalism’ do not suggest a (linear) progression of the universalisation¶ of rights transnational concepts start from the observation that , there is still no clear¶ tendency towards universalisation collective self-determination, democracy and¶ human rights – may enable local or national claims

Their transnationalism results in increased nationalism and reifies borders

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We cannot think of decolonization in terms of conquering power over the juridical−political boundaries of a state, that is, by achieving control over a single nation− state (Grosfoguel 1996). The old national liberation and socialist strategies of taking power at the level of a nation−state are not sufficient because global coloniality is not reducible to the presence or absence of a colonial administration (Grosfoguel 2002) or to the political/economic structures of power. One of the most powerful myths of the 20th century was the notion that the elimination of colonial administrations amounted to the decolonization of the world. This led to the myth of a "postcolonial" world. The heterogeneous and multiple global structures put in place over a period of 450 years did not evaporate with the juridical−political decolonization of the periphery over the past 50 years. We continue to live under the same "colonial power matrix". With juridical− political decolonization we moved from a period of "global colonialism" to the current period of "global coloniality".¶ Although "colonial administrations" have been almost entirely eradicated and the majority of the periphery is politically organized into independent states, non−European people are still living under crude European/Euro− American exploitation and domination. The old colonial hierarchies of European versus non−European remain in place and are entangled with the "international division of labour" and accumulation of capital at a world−scale (Quijano 2000 ; Grosfoguel 2002). Herein lies the relevance of the distinction between "colonialism" and "coloniality". Coloniality allows us to understand the continuity of colonial forms of domination after the end of colonial administrations, produced by colonial cultures and structures in the modern/colonial capitalist world−system. "Coloniality of power" refers to a crucial structuring process in the modern/colonial world−system that articulates peripheral locations in the international division of labour with the global racial/ethnic hierarchy and Third World migrants’ inscription in the racial/ethnic hierarchy of metropolitan global cities. Peripheral nation−states and non−European people live today under the regime of "global coloniality" imposed by the United States through the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), the Pentagon and NATO. Peripheral zones remain in a colonial situation even though are no longer under colonial administration. "Colonial" does not refer only to "classical colonialism" or "internal colonialism", nor can it be reduced to the presence of a "colonial administration". Quijano distinguishes between colonialism and coloniality. I use the word "colonialism" to refer to "colonial situations" enforced by the presence of a colonial administration such as the period of classical colonialism, and, following Quijano (1991 ; 1993 ; 1998), I use "coloniality" to address "colonial situations" in the present period in which colonial administrations have almost been eradicated from the capitalist world−system. By "colonial situations" I mean the cultural, political, sexual and economic oppression/exploitation of subordinate racialized/ethnic groups by dominant racial/ethnic groups with or without the existence of colonial administrations. Five hundred years of European colonial expansion and domination formed an international division of labour between Europeans and non−Europeans that is reproduced in the present so−called "post− colonial" phase of the capitalist world−system (Wallerstein, 1979 ; 1995). Today the core zones of the capitalist world−economy overlap with predominantly white/European/Euro− American societies such as western Europe, Canada, Australia and the United States, while peripheral zones overlap with previously colonized non−European people. Japan is the only exception that confirms the rule. Japan was never colonized nor dominated by Europeans and, similar to the West, played an active role in building its own colonial empire. China, although never fully colonized, was peripheralized through the use of colonial entrepots such as Hong Kong and Macao, and through direct military interventions.¶ The mythology of the "decolonization of the world" obscures the continuities between the colonial past and current global colonial/racial hierarchies and contributes to the invisibility of "coloniality" today. For the last fifty years, peripheral states that are today formally independent, following the dominant Eurocentric liberal discourses (Wallerstein, 1991a ; 1995), constructed ideologies of "national identity", "national development", and "national sovereignty" that produced an illusion of "independence," "development," and "progress". Yet their economic and political systems were shaped by their subordinate position in a capitalist world−system organized around a hierarchical international division of labour (Wallerstein, 1979 ; 1984 ; 1995).¶ The multiple and heterogeneous processes of the world−system, together with the predominance of Eurocentric cultures (Said, 1979 ; Wallerstein, 1991b ; 1995 ; Lander 1998 ; Quijano 1998 ; Mignolo 2000), constitute a "global coloniality" between European/Euro−American peoples and non−European peoples. Thus, "coloniality" is entangled with, but is not reducible to, the international division of labour. The global racial/ethnic hierarchy of Europeans and non−Europeans is an integral part of the development of the capitalist world system’s international division of labour (Wallerstein, 1983 ; Quijano, 1993 ; Mignolo, 1995). In these "post−independence" times, the "colonial" axis between Europeans/Euro−Americans and non−Europeans is inscribed not only in relations of exploitation (between capital and labour) and relations of domination (between metropolitan and peripheral states), but in the production of subjectivities and knowledge. In sum, part of the Eurocentric myth is that we live in a so−called "post"−colonial era and that the world, and in particular metropolitan centres, are in no need of decolonization. In this conventional definition, coloniality is reduced to the presence of colonial administrations. However, as the work of Peruvian sociologist Anibal Quijano (1993, 1998, 2000) has shown with his "coloniality of power" perspective, we still live in a colonial world and we need to break from the narrow ways of thinking about colonial relations, in order to accomplish the unfinished and incomplete 20th century dream of decolonization. This forces us to examine new decolonial utopian alternatives beyond Eurocentric and "Third Worldist" fundamentalisms.¶

Grosfoguel, Associate Professor at the University of California at Berkeley, Ethnic Studies Department, in ‘8 [Ramon, “DECOLONIZING POLITICAL ECONOMY AND POSTCOLONIAL STUDIES: Transmodernity, border thinking, and global coloniality, http://www.humandee.org/spip.php?page=imprimer&id_article=111]

We cannot think of decolonization in terms of conquering power over the juridical−political boundaries of a state by achieving control over a single nation− state The old national liberation and socialist strategies of taking power at the level of a nation−state are not sufficient because global coloniality is not reducible to the presence or absence of a colonial administration or to the political/economic structures of power One of the most powerful myths of the 20th century was the notion that the elimination of colonial administrations amounted to the decolonization of the world. This led to the myth of a "postcolonial" world. The heterogeneous and multiple global structures put in place over a period of 450 years did not evaporate with the juridical−political decolonization of the periphery over the past 50 years. We continue to live under the same "colonial power matrix". With juridical− political decolonization we moved from a period of "global colonialism" to the current period of "global coloniality". Although "colonial administrations" have been almost entirely eradicated and the majority of the periphery is politically organized into independent states, non−European people are still living under crude European/Euro− American exploitation and domination The old colonial hierarchies of European versus non−European remain in place and are entangled with the "international division of labour" and accumulation of capital at a world−scale Coloniality allows us to understand the continuity of colonial forms of domination after the end of colonial administrations, produced by colonial cultures and structures in the modern/colonial capitalist world−system Coloniality of power" refers to a crucial structuring process in the modern/colonial world−system that articulates peripheral locations in the international division of labour with the global racial/ethnic hierarchy and Third World migrants’ inscription in the racial/ethnic hierarchy of metropolitan global cities. Peripheral zones remain in a colonial situation even though are no longer under colonial administration. "Colonial" does not refer only to "classical colonialism" or "internal colonialism", nor can it be reduced to the presence of a "colonial administration". By "colonial situations" I mean the cultural, political, sexual and economic oppression/exploitation of subordinate racialized/ethnic groups by dominant racial/ethnic groups with or without the existence of colonial administrations Five hundred years of European colonial expansion and domination formed an international division of labour between Europeans and non−Europeans that is reproduced in the present so−called "post− colonial" phase of the capitalist world−system Today the core zones of the capitalist world−economy overlap with predominantly white/European/Euro− American societies while peripheral zones overlap with previously colonized non−European people. The mythology of the "decolonization of the world" obscures the continuities between the colonial past and current global colonial/racial hierarchies and contributes to the invisibility of "coloniality" today peripheral states that are today formally independent, following the dominant Eurocentric liberal discourses constructed ideologies of "national identity", "national development", and "national sovereignty" that produced an illusion of "independence," "development," and "progress". Yet their economic and political systems were shaped by their subordinate position in a capitalist world−system organized around a hierarchical international division of labour The multiple and heterogeneous processes of the world−system constitute a "global coloniality" between European/Euro−American peoples and non−European peoples. part of the Eurocentric myth is that we live in a so−called "post"−colonial era and that the world, and in particular metropolitan centres, are in no need of decolonization we still live in a colonial world and we need to break from the narrow ways of thinking about colonial relations

And, this reinforcement of the nation-state and soverignetny perpetuate the colonial relationship between the west and Latin America. No amount of internal reform can change the oppression of Mexican labor by global markets.

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Brian Massumi likens this form of decisioning to a ‘lightning strike’ or ‘flash of sovereign power’.132 Moreover, he argues that this approach is the temporal equivalent of a tautology: ‘the time form of the decision that strikes like lightning is the foregone conclusion. When it arrives, it always seems to have preceded itself. Where there is a sign of it, it has always already hit.’133 The lightning-strike decision is a foregone conclusion because it sidesteps or effaces the blurriness of the present in favour of a perceived need to act on the future without delay.134 Illustrating his argument Massumi suggests that this approach characterises the Presidency of George W. Bush for whom there is no time for uncertainty: ‘I have made judgements in the past. I have made judgements in the future.’135 Citing Bush's admission that it took just twelve minutes for him to ‘discuss’ the invasion of Iraq with cabinet colleagues, Massumi points to the way the United States administration tends to skip decision-making that takes time because: Deliberation […] in the current lexicon […] is perceived as a sign less of wisdom than of weakness. […] To admit to discussing, studying, consulting, analysing is to admit to having been in a state of indecision preceding the making of the decision. It is to admit to passages of doubt and unclarity in a blurry present.136 (p.122) For Massumi, the ‘lightning strike’ approach in general is one that seeks to act on the future or, in other words, one that responds to the threat of ‘an indefinite future: what may yet come’.137 Whereas traditionally, however, threats were responded to through ‘prevention’, Massumi argues that we are witnessing the birth of a new form of response in the context of the global ‘war on terror’: the politics of ‘pre-emption’.138 This change is marked by a shift in temporal registers from the indefinite future tense to the future perfect tense: the ‘always-will-have-been-alread’.139 In other words, the politics of preemption does not respond to events by simply trying to ‘prevent’ them but actually effects or induces the event: Rather than acting in the present to avoid an occurrence in the future, pre-emption brings the future into the present. It makes present the future consequences of an eventuality that may or may not occur, indifferent to its actual occurrence. The event's consequences precede it, as if it had already occurred.140 Massumi illustrates his point using the analogy of a fire. A politics of preemption does not simply predict but actually causes fires: ‘it is like watching footage of a fire in reverse: there will have been fire, in effect, because there is now smoke’.141

Vaughn-Williams 9 ( Nick, IR MA @ university of Warwick IR PhD @ Aberystwyth, “Border Politics: The Limits of Sovereign Power” pg 122-23)

Brian Massumi likens this form of decisioning to a ‘lightning strike’ or ‘flash of sovereign power’ temporal equivalent of a tautology: the time form of the decision that strikes like lightning is the foregone conclusion Where there is a sign of it, it has always already hit. The lightning-strike decision is a foregone conclusion because it sidesteps or effaces the blurriness of the present in favour of a perceived need to act on the future without delay Bush's admission that it took just twelve minutes for him to ‘discuss’ the invasion of Iraq with cabinet colleagues Massumi points to the way the United States administration tends to skip decision-making that takes time because: Deliberation in the current lexicon is perceived as a sign less of wisdom than of weakness lightning strike’ approach in general is one that seeks to act on the future or, in other words, one that responds to the threat of ‘an indefinite future what may yet come’ Massumi argues that we are witnessing the birth of a new form of response in the context of the global ‘war on terror’: the politics of ‘pre-emption’ the politics of preemption does not respond to events by simply trying to ‘prevent’ them but actually effects or induces the event: Rather than acting in the present to avoid an occurrence in the future, pre-emption brings the future into the present. It makes present the future consequences of an eventuality that may or may not occur, indifferent to its actual occurrence. The event's consequences precede it, as if it had already occurred.1

The aff’s immediate call to action is a lightning approach across borders that acts in the future trying to pre-empt their impacts- which is the same decision making as the invasion of Iraq- without more deliberation the aff causes their impacts

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In his essay Critique of Violence (1927), Walter Benjamin considers the relationship between law and violence. More specifically, Benjamin analyzes the foundations of justifications for the use of certain forms of violence and the designation of such violence as legitimate. Indeed, it is precisely the assumed distinction between what counts as legitimate and illegitimate violence that he seeks to interrogate overall. His hypothesis is that the interest of law in having a monopoly of violence over a population within a given territory is not simply to preserve legal ends but rather to preserve the very foundational structure of the juridical– political order of the state itself. Thus, in an extended passage, Benjamin argues: For if violence, violence crowned by fate, is the origin of the law, then it may be readily supposed that where the highest violence, that over life and death, occurs in the legal system, the origins of the law jut manifestly and fearsomely into existence.… For in the exercise of violence over life and death, more than in any other legal act, the law reaffirms itself. But in this very violence something rotten in the law is revealed, above all to a finer sensibility, because the latter knows itself to be infinitely remote from conditions in which fate might imperiously have shown itself in such a sentence. (Benjamin 2004:242 emphasis added) As this passage indicates, Benjamin’s analysis refers to a separation between law-making violence on the one hand (the origin of the law is violent) and lawpreserving violence on the other (the law reaffirms itself through the exercise of violence). However, according to Benjamin these two types of violence merge in a ‘‘spectral mixture’’ in the authority of the police: police violence is both lawmaking because ‘‘its characteristic function is not the promulgation of laws but the assertion of legal claims for any decree’’ and law-preserving ‘‘because it is at the disposal of these ends’’’(Benjamin 2004:243). The police, he argues, often intervene where there is no clear legal situation and as such their power can be thought of as ‘‘formless,…[a] nowhere-tangible, all pervasive, ghostly presence in the life of civilized states’’ (Benjamin 2004:243). Nevertheless, the key point Benjamin seeks to emphasize is that these inter-related forms of violence are inextricably implicated through the problematic of law. According to Connolly, this argument has provided an important point of departure for a number of critical twentieth century thinkers who have sought to theorize the ways in which violence is bound up in the juridical–political order of the modern sovereign territorial state and state-system (Connolly 2004:24). One of these engagements, which, as I will go on to suggest is instructive for any attempt to interrogate the borders, territory, law triad, is that given by Jacques Derrida.

Vaughan-Williams 8 (Nick Vaughan-Williams, ph.d Assistant Professor of International Security , 2008, Borders, Territory, Law, University of Exeter, International Political Sociology (2008) 2, 322–338, Accessed: 7/27/13,)

the relationship between law and violence the foundations of justifications for the use of certain forms of violence and the designation of such violence as legitimate law having a monopoly of violence over a population within a given territory is not simply to preserve legal ends but rather to preserve the very foundational structure of the juridical political order of the state itself For if violence, violence crowned by fate, is the origin of the law, then it may be readily supposed that where the highest violence, that over life and death, occurs in the legal system, the origins of the law jut manifestly and fearsomely into existence.… For in the exercise of violence over life and death, more than in any other legal act, the law reaffirms itself. But in this very violence something rotten in the law is revealed, above all to a finer sensibility the origin of the law is violent lawpreserving violence on the other (the law reaffirms itself through the exercise of violence these two types of violence merge in a ‘‘spectral mixture’’ in the authority of the police: police violence is both lawmaking because ‘‘its characteristic function is not the promulgation of laws but the assertion of legal claims for any decree’ and law-preserving ‘‘because it is at the disposal of these ends’’’ The police often intervene where there is no clear legal situation and as such their power can be thought of as ‘‘formless,…[ nowhere-tangible Nevertheles these inter-related forms of violence are inextricably implicated through the problematic of law a number of critical twentieth century thinkers who have sought to theorize the ways in which violence is bound up in the juridical–political order of the modern sovereign territorial state and state-system One of these engagements is instructive for any attempt to interrogate the borders, territory, law triad

The root of the creation of law that governs a nature is violence therefore law itself is violence in order to prevent violence

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In Force of Law: The Mystical Foundations of Authority (Derrida 1992), Derrida engages with Benjamin’s text in order to offer a deconstructive critique of the inter-relationships between the law and justice, authority and violence, and authorizations of authority and mystery. At first, Derrida invokes and elucidates the Benjaminian distinction between law-making and law-preserving violence in order to claim that the law rests on non-law through these two types of violence. Derrida explains the former type of violence (law-making or ‘‘originary’’ violence) in terms of the attempt of the authority behind the law to establish itself by a ‘‘pure performative act that does not have to answer to or before anyone’’ (Derrida 1992:36). The latter type of violence (law-making or ‘‘secondary’’ violence) works to secure originary violence in order to conserve, maintain, and ensure the ‘‘permanence and enforceability of law’’ (Derrida 1992:31). Since the origin of the authority behind the law cannot rest upon anything but itself it is understood by Derrida to be a violence without a ground: a state of suspense beyond the conventional opposition between ‘‘legal’’ and ‘‘illegal.’’ Derrida calls the moments when the authority of a new law tries to establish itself the e´pokhe`: a Greek word, meaning pause (Derrida 1992:36). These moments, supposing that they may be isolated, are said to be ‘‘terrifying moments’’ because of the ‘‘sufferings, the crimes, the tortures that rarely fail to accompany them’’ (Derrida 1992:36). On this basis, Derrida argues that, no matter how distant it may feel, ‘‘the foundation of all states occurs in a situation that we can call revolutionary’’ (Derrida 1992:36). For each revolution to be successful in the founding of a new authority behind law it is necessary for that authority to create ‘‘apre`s coup what it was destined in advance to produce, namely, proper interpretive models to give sense [and] legitimacy to the violence it has produced’’ (Derrida 1992:36). Elsewhere, Derrida claims: ‘‘successful unifications or foundations only ever succeed in making one forget that there never was a natural unity or a prior foundation’’ (Derrida 2002:115). These interpretive models and imperatives to forget are all bound-up in what Derrida calls a ‘‘discourse of self-legitimation’’ (Derrida 1992:36). The justification for the violent origins of the foundation of authority behind the juridical–political order of every state can only ever be justified belatedly (Derrida 2002:115). According to Derrida, one only has to look at revolutionary situations with their accompanying discourses throughout the twentieth century in order to get a sense for the way in which the recourse to violence is always justified ‘‘by alleging the founding, in progress or to come, of a new law’’ (Derrida 1992:35). However, while Derrida takes his lead from Benjamin, the argument presented in Force of Law is that the oppositions set up in the Critique of Violence between law-making and law-preserving violence do not hold in the final analysis. Derrida claims that this conclusion is reached implicitly within Benjamin’s own text in his discussion of the police referred to earlier: it is precisely because the police are everywhere that the separation between law-making and law-preserving The very violence of the foundation or positing of the law must envelop the violence of the preservation of the law and cannot break with it. It belongs to the structure of fundamental violence in that it calls for the repetition itself and founds what ought to be preserved, preservable, promised to heritage and to tradition, to partaking. A foundation is a promise.… Consequently, there is no more pure foundation or pure position of law, and so a pure founding violence, than there is a purely preserving violence. Positing is already an iterability, a call for self-serving repetition. Preservation in turn refounds, so that it can preserve what it claims to found. Thus there can be no rigorous opposition between positing and preserving, only what I call a differential contamination between the two, with all the paradoxes this may lead to. (Derrida 1992:35 emphasis added)

Vaughan-Williams 8 (Nick Vaughan-Williams, ph.d Assistant Professor of International Security , 2008, Borders, Territory, Law, University of Exeter, International Political Sociology (2008) 2, 322–338, Accessed: 7/27/13,)

the inter-relationships between the law and justice, authority and violence, and authorizations of authority and mystery distinction between law-making and law-preserving violence in order to claim that the law rests on non-law through these two types of violence type of violence (law-making or ‘‘originary’’ violence) in terms of the attempt of the authority behind the law to establish itself by a ‘‘pure performative act that does not have to answer to or before anyone’’ The latter type of violence (law-making or ‘‘secondary’’ violence) works to secure originary violence in order to conserve, maintain, and ensure the ‘‘permanence and enforceability of law’’ ). Since the origin of the authority behind the law cannot rest upon anything but itself it is understood violence without a ground: a state of suspense beyond the conventional opposition between ‘‘legal’’ and ‘‘illegal. These moments, supposing that they may be isolated, are said to be ‘‘terrifying moments’’ because of the ‘‘sufferings, the crimes, the tortures that rarely fail to accompany them’’ the foundation of all states occurs in a situation that we can call revolutionary’’ each revolution to be successful in the founding of a new authority behind law it is necessary for that authority to create ‘‘apre`s coup what it was destined in advance to produce, namely, proper interpretive models to give sense [and] legitimacy to the violence it has produced’’ successful unifications or foundations only ever succeed in making one forget that there never was a natural unity or a prior foundation These interpretive models and imperatives to forget are all bound-up in ‘‘discourse of self-legitimation’’ The justification for the violent origins of the foundation of authority behind the juridical–political order of every state can only ever be justified belatedly one only has to look at revolutionary situations with their accompanying discourses throughout the twentieth century in order to get a sense for the way in which the recourse to violence is always justified ‘‘by alleging the founding, in progress or to come, of a new law’’ Critique of Violence between law-making and law-preserving violence do not hold in the final analysi it is precisely because the police are everywhere that the separation between law-making and law-preserving The very violence of the foundation or positing of the law must envelop the violence of the preservation of the law and cannot break with it.

The revolutions that create new states gives way to an authority that legitimizes law and justifies the violence of the law

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This conceptualization has enormous implications that I can only briefly mention here : 1) The old Eurocentric idea that societies develop at the level of the nation−state in terms of a linear evolution of modes of production from pre−capitalist to capitalist is overcome. We are all encompassed within a capitalist world−system that articulates different forms of labour according to the racial classification of the world’s population (Quijano 2000 ; Grosfoguel 2002). 2) The old Marxist paradigm of infrastructure and superstructure is replaced by a historical−heterogeneous structure (Quijano 2000) or a "heterarchy" (Kontopoulos 1993), that is, an entangled articulation of multiple hierarchies, in which subjectivity and the social imaginary is not derivative but constitutive of the structures of the world−system (Grosfoguel 2002). In this conceptualization, race and racism are not superstructural or instrumental to an overarching logic of capitalist accumulation, but are constitutive of capitalist accumulation at a world−scale. The "colonial power matrix" is an organizing principle involving exploitation and domination exercised in multiple dimensions of social life, from economic, sexual, or gender relations, to political organizations, structures of knowledge, state institutions, and households (Quijano 2000). 3) The old division between culture and political−economy as expressed in postcolonial studies and political−economy approaches is overcome (Grosfoguel 2002). Postcolonial studies conceptualize the capitalist world−system as being constituted primarily by culture, while political−economy place the primary determination on economic relations. In the "coloniality of power" approach, what comes first, "culture or the economy", is a chicken−egg dilemma that obscure the complexity of the capitalist world−system (Grosfoguel 2002). 4) Coloniality is not equivalent to colonialism. It is not derivative from, or antecedent to, modernity. Coloniality and modernity constitute two sides of a single coin. The same way as the European industrial revolution was achieved on the shoulders of the coerced forms of labour in the periphery, the new identities, rights, laws, and institutions of modernity such as nation−states, citizenship and democracy were formed in a process of colonial interaction with, and domination/exploitation of, non− Western people. 5) To call the present world−system "capitalist" is misleading, to say the least. Given the hegemonic Eurocentric "common sense", the moment we use the word "capitalism" people immediately think that we are talking about the "economy". However, "capitalism" is only one of the multiple entangled constellations of colonial power matrix of the "European modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world−system". It is an important one, but not the sole one. Given its entanglement with other power relations, destroying the capitalist aspects of the world−system would not be enough to destroy the present world−system. To transform this world−system, it is crucial to destroy the historical−structural heterogenous totality called the "colonial power matrix" of the "world−system". 6) Anti−capitalist decolonization and liberation cannot be reduced to only one dimension of social life. It requires a broader transformation of the sexual, gender, spiritual, epistemic, economic, political, linguistic and racial hierarchies of the modern/colonial world−system. The "coloniality of power" perspective challenges us to think about social change and social transformation in a non−reductionist way.

Grosfoguel, Associate Professor at the University of California at Berkeley, Ethnic Studies Department, in ‘8[Ramon, “DECOLONIZING POLITICAL ECONOMY AND POSTCOLONIAL STUDIES: Transmodernity, border thinking, and global coloniality, http://www.humandee.org/spip.php?page=imprimer&id_article=111]

The old Eurocentric idea that societies develop at the level of the nation−state in terms of a linear evolution of modes of production from pre−capitalist to capitalist is overcome Coloniality and modernity constitute two sides of a single coin. The same way as the European industrial revolution was achieved on the shoulders of the coerced forms of labour in the periphery, the new identities, rights, laws, and institutions of modernity such as nation−states, citizenship and democracy were formed in a process of colonial interaction with, and domination/exploitation of, non− Western people. capitalism" is only one of the multiple entangled constellations of colonial power matrix of the "European modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world−system" destroying the capitalist aspects of the world−system would not be enough to destroy the present world−system Anti−capitalist decolonization and liberation cannot be reduced to only one dimension of social life. It requires a broader transformation of the sexual, gender, spiritual, epistemic, economic, political, linguistic and racial hierarchies of the modern/colonial world−system

The nation-state and democracy are the product of colonial interaction of Latin America with the west.

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Borders of our minds secure violence to satiate elite desires for hegemonic politics. Sovereignty and borders may correlate with objective, geographical markers but their significance operates primarily in the mind (cf. Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson, and Duvall, 1999). Peoples and societies did not express legalistic notions of borders or sovereignty until the spread of the Westphalian state-system in the 17th century. Indeed, European colonization proceeded precisely on this lack. Osama bin Laden revitalizes this colonial past to rationalize his hegemonic politics: that is, a religious sovereignty against the ‘‘West.’’ George W. Bush seeks not just national retribution for heinous crimes committed against America but a return to old-fashioned colonialism: that is, (Western, Christian) civilizational discipline against all ‘‘terror.’’ (The Bush administration’s semantic shift from ‘‘terrorism’’ to ‘‘terror’’ offers one small indication of this change from a political to cultural agenda.) Both leaders transgress national, physical boundaries to reinforce their borders of the mind: that is, an ‘‘international coalition’’ against terrorism for Bush; ‘‘global jihad,’’ for bin Laden; and, 3. National desires for security based on neoliberal globalization transnationalizes violence and insecurity. By neoliberal globalization, we refer to the developmental maxims of international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, U.S. Treasury, Citigroup, as well as the central banks of the world’s richest economies. These maxims come in familiar sound bites: for example, ‘‘free trade benefits everyone,’’ ‘‘economies need direct foreign investment to develop,’’ ‘‘liberalization and privatization deliver a level playing field,’’ ‘‘governments should not intervene in the economy,’’ and ‘‘markets know best.’’ Most Arabs/Muslims agree with Osama bin Laden’s allegations of Western cultural annihilation due to neoliberal globalization’s legacy in the Middle East (Waldman, 2001). But neither George W. Bush nor other globalizers could recognize this grievance due to their vested interest in existing infrastructures of power and wealth. At the same time, bin Laden funds his quest for ‘‘pure Islam’’ with riches made from his family’s business contracts with the West, economic enterprises in the Middle East and Northern Africa, as well as the international opium trade (Robinson, 2002). Indeed, he utilizes neoliberal, corporate strategies to design his terrorism campaign. Each camp blurs national security with neoliberal wealth such that one comes to mean the other, regardless of the outcome.

Agathangelou 4-Associate Professor of Political Science and Women’s Studies @ York University [Anna, International Studies Quarterly, “Power, Borders, Security, Wealth: Lessons of Violence and Desire from September 11,” pg. 520, 2004, WileyOnlineLibrary, DKP]

Borders of our minds secure violence to satiate elite desires for hegemonic politics. Sovereignty and borders may correlate with objective, geographical markers but their significance operates primarily in the mind Peoples and societies did not express legalistic notions of borders or sovereignty until the spread of the Westphalian state-system European colonization proceeded precisely on this lack. bin Laden revitalizes this colonial past Bush seeks a return to old-fashioned colonialism that is civilizational discipline against all ‘‘terror.’’ Both leaders transgress national, physical boundaries to reinforce their borders of the mind National desires for security based on neoliberal globalization transnationalizes violence and insecurity. By neoliberal globalization, we refer to the developmental maxims of international financial institutions as well as the the world’s richest economies. These maxims come in familiar sound bites: for example, ‘‘free trade benefits everyone,’’ ‘‘economies need direct foreign investment to develop,’’ ‘‘liberalization and privatization deliver a level playing field,’’ Each camp blurs national security with neoliberal wealth such that one comes to mean the other, regardless of the outcome.

{**In CUBA Teror 1NC**} The development discourse of the aff are a prime example of the borders created in our minds that propagate hegemonic politics and are the root cause of transnational neoliberal globalization

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The interweavings of geopolitical power, knowledge and subordinating representations of the other have a long history. For example, the identity and authority of Western modernity took shape on the terrain of colonial and imperial power, and the production of knowledge that characterized the development of modern imperialism. In a similar vein, the history of comparative literature, cultural analysis, and anthropology can be seen as affiliated with imperial power, and as contributing to its methods for ensuring Western ascendency over non-Western peoples. Together with this intertwining of power and knowledge one can locate varying forms of subordinating representation which are equally geopolitical and cultural. The assumption of Western supremacy goes together with a silencing of the non-Western other. There is incorporation, inclusion, coercion but only infrequently an acknowledgement that the ideas of colonized people should be known. This silencing of the non-Western other is customarily combined with representations that legitimize the power to penetrate and to re-order. The posited superiorities of Western ‘progress’, ‘modernization’, ‘democracy’, ‘development’, and ‘civilization’ are deployed to justify project of enduring invasiveness. The non-Western society is shorn of the legitimate symbols of independent identity and authority, and its representation tends to be frozen around the negative attributes of lack, backwardness, inertia and violence. It becomes a space ready to be penetrated, worked over, restructured and transformed. This is a process that is seen as being beneficial to the re-ordered society, so that resistance, especially in its militant form, is envisaged as being deviant and irrational. So while power and knowledge are combined together, they cannot be adequately grasped if abstracted from the gravity of imperial encounters and the geopolitical history of West/non-West relations.

Slater, Professor of Social and Political Geography at Loughborough University, 2004 [David, Modernizing the other and the Three Worlds of Development, Geopolitics and the Post-Colonial pg. 223-224]

The interweavings of geopolitical power, knowledge and subordinating representations of the other have a long history. the identity and authority of Western modernity took shape on the terrain of colonial and imperial power, and the production of knowledge that characterized the development of modern imperialism , the history of comparative literature, cultural analysis, and anthropology can be seen as affiliated with imperial power, and as contributing to its methods for ensuring Western ascendency over non-Western peoples with this intertwining of power and knowledge one can locate varying forms of subordinating representation which are equally geopolitical and cultural. The assumption of Western supremacy goes together with a silencing of the non-Western other only infrequently an acknowledgement that the ideas of colonized people should be known This silencing of the non-Western other is customarily combined with representations that legitimize the power to penetrate and to re-order. The posited superiorities of Western ‘progress’, ‘modernization’, ‘democracy’, ‘development’, and ‘civilization’ are deployed to justify project of enduring invasiveness. The non-Western society is shorn of the legitimate symbols of independent identity and authority, and its representation tends to be frozen around the negative attributes of lack, backwardness, inertia and violence. It becomes a space ready to be penetrated, worked over, restructured and transformed resistance, especially in its militant form, is envisaged as being deviant and irrational. So while power and knowledge are combined together, they cannot be adequately grasped if abstracted from the gravity of imperial encounters and the geopolitical history of West/non-West relations.

{In Mexico OIL 1NC**}The West masks insidious imperialism as attempts at developing the non-west

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While important theoretical inroads have been made in the state space literature it is clear that efforts to overcome the naturalisation of the territorial state as a unit of analysis extend well beyond this line of work. For example in studying international policy transfer Mark Evans has sought to capture the ways in which ‘competition states’ actively produce and reshape the international force fields that condition their policy making. This makes the competition state itself a major agent of globalisation.5 Following this line of thought Peter Cerny and Mark Evans have analysed the dynamic through which actors and institutions in neoliberal competition states have come to promote new forms of complex globalisation while attempting to ‘adapt state action to cope more effectively with what they see as global “realities”’.6 Emphasising the longue durée history of the modern state system Saskia Sassen also points out that the analysis of globalisation too often assumes a dichotomy between the national and the global. To avoid state-centred anal- ysis of globalisation it is necessary to step out of what she calls ‘endogeneity trap’. The study of globalisation should not focus on the characteristics of world-scale processes and institutions but, instead, seek inroads into how globalisation is constituted ‘inside’ the nation-state system. Sassen accepts that the nation-state is historically the most successful institutional form but nevertheless seeks to unravel the aspects in nation-states’ functions that are conducive to the yet emergent ‘global assemblages’.7 Significant conceptual inroads into the complex relationships between national and international politics have also been made in some critical strands of International Relations scholarship.8 Especially scholars inspired by the “practice turn” in social theory have systematically sought to interrogate the assumptions that underlie world politics, and to show that conceptions of the world ordered as a system of nation-states can not be directly mapped onto the very practices through which this order is upheld and governed.9 Hence, “the traditional distinction between foreign and domestic politics . . . is a false dichotomy . . . [that calls for] a more sophisticated reading of the interrelationship between the internal and external contexts in which policy is made”. To this end it is useful to pay specific attention to “‘human practice’ and thus on the interaction of ideas, beliefs and identities with the structural environment in which action takes place to produce practices”.10 Moreover, it is necessary to view the topologies of world political practices “as in a Möbius ribbon, a situation where one never knows whether one is inside or outside”.11 In short, the critical interrogation of states’ functions and strategies under contemporary globalisation stresses that ‘the national’ and ‘the global’ are interdependent and have historically constituted each other. In this paper I wish to explore the potential of field theory in understanding how this complex dynamic unfolds. My intention is to develop further the concept of transnational field as a tool for a nuanced understanding of the articulation between the state and the global realm.12 As a starting point, I posit that the transnational action horizon is still dominated by an inside/outside dichotomy, portraying the nation-state as a space and sphere clearly distinct from the rest of the world.13 This distinction also acts as a key mechanism that sustains the cognitive distance between the inten- tional activities of nation-state actors and globalisation as their (unintended) consequence. The paper proceeds as follows. I first chart the conceptual starting points for this approach by discussing the idea of state in the context of field theory. I then seek ways of overcoming the national/global dichotomy by means of the concept of field. Because this is a theory-driven study, I offer an outline of theoretical propositions and working hypotheses to lay ground for further theoretical and empirical work. I conclude by discussing the possibilities and challenges involved in applying field theory in the study of state space.

Häkli 2013 [Jouni, Space and Political Agency Research Group (SPARG), School of Management, University of Tampere, Finland, “State Space – Outlining a Field Theoretical Approach”, Geopolitics 18:343–355,]

the analysis of globalisation too often assumes a dichotomy between the national and the global. To avoid state-centred anal- ysis of globalisation it is necessary to step out of endogeneity trap’ The study of globalisation should not focus on the characteristics of world-scale processes and institutions but, instead, seek inroads into how globalisation is constituted ‘inside’ the nation-state system. Especially scholars inspired by the “practice turn” in social theory have systematically sought to interrogate the assumptions that underlie world politics, and to show that conceptions of the world ordered as a system of nation-states can not be directly mapped onto the very practices through which this order is upheld and governed “the traditional distinction between foreign and domestic politics . . . is a false dichotomy . . . [that calls for] a more sophisticated reading of the interrelationship between the internal and external contexts in which policy is made”. To this end it is useful to pay specific attention to “‘human practice’ and thus on the interaction of ideas, beliefs and identities with the structural environment in which action takes place to produce practices it is necessary to view the topologies of world political practices “as a situation where one never knows whether one is inside or outside”. ‘the national’ and ‘the global’ are interdependent and have historically constituted each other. the transnational action horizon is still dominated by an inside/outside dichotomy, portraying the nation-state as a space and sphere clearly distinct from the rest of the world. This distinction also acts as a key mechanism that sustains the cognitive distance between the inten- tional activities of nation-state actors and globalisation as their (unintended) consequence.

Separating the foreign and the domestic forms an inside/outside dichotomy that obscures the process of globalization

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The connection between geopolitics and mobility is significant, in that it foregrounds asymmetries of access to mobility. Privilege and disbarment are repeated across various categories of mobility, significantly in relation to migration.18 There are those individuals for whom globalisation implies an un-tethering of spatial impediment, and those who are denied access to the networked configurations of global mobilities. A concept that continues to provide a useful sounding board for these debates is that of deterritorialisation; although the image of globalisation as a deterritorialised space of unfettered flows has, of course, been decisively critiqued by a range of geographers.19 Popular perceptions of globalisation do still persist however, accentuating for example the dissolution of barriers to the free movement of trade.20 These processes of deterritorialisation are claimed by advocates of economic globalisation to underscore the transformative poten- tial of new spatio-temporal configurations, (such as digital communication networks and global transport), produced by the growing interconnectivity of socio-technological networks.21 These processes of deterritorialisation are likewise claimed to lead to the disembedding and detachment of social relations away from specific, localised contexts towards the projection of social relations onto a global level.22 Deterritorialisation may at first be defined in relation to such practices of de-linking from the confines of a territory. However, the unequal distribution of access to these processes (including mobility) brings with it the need to stress the very notion of deterritorialisation, by implication reterritorialisation, but perhaps most significantly that of territoriality. As Deleuze and Guattari make clear, the processes of decoding, destabilisation and destratification that are often emphasised as part of deterritorialisation are continually channelled through recoding, restabilisation and restratification.23 So, whilst the reach of the nation-state may indeed have been reconfigured, with sovereign power located both within and beyond the containment of the geographical border, there is, as Elden has recently suggested, a significant fault line in such assertions. In particular, the notion of deterritorialisation as a straightforward de-linking from the confines of territorial configuration neglects to recognise the reassertion of and – as I argue – reconfiguration of territoriality.24 As a result the question of territory and spatial control becomes ever more fraught: Deterritorialization in its most useful sense therefore forces us to think anew on the notion of territory, and to recognize how its logic is both played out and challenged in a period of globalization.25 It is clear that the deterritorialising strategies of globalisation cannot be separated from reterritorialisation: they are mutually dependent.26 I sug- gest that the decisive factor in this relationship is that of interconnection: on the one hand the control of interconnection for mobilising specific groups, information and trade, but simultaneously these interconnections are secured in terms of access to them. Put simply, deterritorialisation has to be produced and secured through reterritorialisation, thus necessitating a consideration of territoriality itself as a form of interconnectivity. The notion of interconnectivity (of the global networks of mobility) presents a significant problematic in relation to the governance and securitisation of such networks. The crux of the issue: increasing interconnectivity results in the growing complexity of connections. For advocates of global trade circulation the need to protect and securitise “good circulation from bad circulation” cannot be over-determined so that the flows are curtailed.27 Reterritorialisation as an attempt to stabilise interconnection holds within it the potential to stymie connection. As a result the over-securitisation of flows in the form of immovable barriers to the movement of trade, for example, are simultaneously contested. Thus I suggest that territorial- ity must be figured around the curtailment of movement for unsanctioned flows and whilst also facilitating the movement of sanctioned flows. These entwined logics of interconnection are determined by a precarious balance between the apparent openness of mobility flows and the potential stasis of securitisation. This highlights the continued importance of territoriality, not solely as a notion of bounded territory but rather as the production and securitisation of interconnectivity. This makes the case for attending to the shifting configurations of territoriality.28 What is at stake here, then, is the role of interconnection. This abstract conception of interconnectivity is concretised through the operation of various mobility networks, however my emphasis lies with the spatio-temporal practices of commercial logistics. In particular I argue that commercial logistics is an increasingly important exemplar of the strate- gic control of global mobilities, most clearly in terms of commodities, but by implication with corporeal movement. As Cowen rightly suggests, such practices of spatio-temporal calculation enforce “market logics on social and political problems”.29 The root of this market-driven control resides in my reading of geopower as the means to structure, manage and con- trol the technologies and practices of interconnection in order to promote specific mobilities: those of sanctioned commodities, peoples, knowledge, etc. This conception of geopower refers to the relationship between gov- ernmentality and geography, supplementing this with the ability to control interconnection.30 Here then the inherent relationship between geopower and logistics is crucial, for I argue that logistics represents the strategic implementation of geopower.

Martin 12 [Craig, Department of Geography, Royal Holloway College, University of London, “Desperate Mobilities: Logistics, Security and the Extra-Logistical Knowledge of ‘Appropriation’ ”, Geopolitics, 17:355–376]

The connection between geopolitics and mobility is significant, in that it foregrounds asymmetries of access to mobility. Privilege and disbarment are repeated across various categories of mobility, significantly in relation to migration There are those individuals for whom globalisation implies an un-tethering of spatial impediment, and those who are denied access to the networked configurations of global mobilities These processes of deterritorialisation are claimed by advocates of economic globalisation to underscore the transformative poten- tial of new spatio-temporal configurations, (such as digital communication networks and global transport), produced by the growing interconnectivity of socio-technological networks the unequal distribution of access to these processes (including mobility) brings with it the need to stress the very notion of deterritorialisation, by implication reterritorialisation, but perhaps most significantly that of territoriality. So, whilst the reach of the nation-state may indeed have been reconfigured, with sovereign power located both within and beyond the containment of the geographical border, there is a significant fault line in such assertions the question of territory and spatial control becomes ever more fraught: Deterritorialization in its most useful sense therefore forces us to think anew on the notion of territory, and to recognize how its logic is both played out and challenged in a period of globalization. The notion of interconnectivity (of the global networks of mobility) presents a significant problematic in relation to the governance and securitisation of such networks. The crux of the issue: increasing interconnectivity results in the growing complexity of connections. For advocates of global trade circulation the need to protect and securitise “good circulation from bad circulation” cannot be over-determined so that the flows are curtailed.27 Reterritorialisation as an attempt to stabilise interconnection holds within it the potential to stymie connection. As a result the over-securitisation of flows in the form of immovable barriers to the movement of trade, for example, are simultaneously contested. These entwined logics of interconnection are determined by a precarious balance between the apparent openness of mobility flows and the potential stasis of securitisation This abstract conception of interconnectivity is concretised through the operation of various mobility networks, however my emphasis lies with the spatio-temporal practices of commercial logistics. The root of this market-driven control resides in my reading of geopower as the means to structure, manage and con- trol the technologies and practices of interconnection in order to promote specific mobilities: those of sanctioned commodities, peoples, knowledge, etc. This conception of geopower refers to the relationship between gov- ernmentality and geography, supplementing this with the ability to control interconnection

Globalization ushers in an unequal access to wealth, resulting in notions of deterritorialization. Innerconnectivity brings problems with governance and securitization to the forefront.

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To further clarify the point, let me return to the ethnographic example from¶ my introduction. In the fall of 2000, MSF brought a traveling exhibit to several¶ sites in greater New York and Los Angeles as part of a special publicity campaign¶ on behalf of displaced people.¶ Entitled “A Refugee Camp in the Heart of the¶ City,” it brought together two of Agamben’s key elements—the camp and the¶ city—as a small circle of tents briefly appeared in the center of Central Park. MSF¶ volunteers and staff issued identity cards to visitors and then led them through¶ the exhibit in small groups to experience the key features of a miniature model¶ camp. The first section of the exhibit illustrated basic needs: shelter in the form of¶ simple tents adapted to different climates, water purification in the form of a giant¶ bladder dispensing five gallons per person per day, food in the form of compact¶ bars providing 2100 calories, and finally hygiene in the form of a latrine (the VIP¶ version) equipped with both a public education folk painting about hand washing¶ and an ingenious method of trapping flies. Here was a panorama of survival in all its¶ measured essence. To one side hung a small poster about mental health and trauma¶ and beyond lay the medical zone, featuring a model clinic, a weighing station, and¶ vaccination center, and finally a cholera exclusion area. The tour closed with a¶ depiction of landmines and a photographic testimonial to the plight of refugees.¶ In this model camp the spatial order is both exact and essential. It does not¶ represent a final solution or a politics involving fully realized subjects, however,¶ but an endlessly temporary defense of minimal existence. In this sense, it is the precise inverse of a concentration camp, if likewise revealing a border zone between¶ life and death. The camp arranges itself around an effective rationale of immediate concerns localized within biological necessity. There are bodies to cleanse, to¶ shelter and protect from hunger and disease. There are children to weigh, inoculate, and categorize by the circumference of their upper arms. In the model camp,¶ links between these different tasks are clear. Indeed, a number of volunteer guides¶ remarked how much clearer the system appeared to them in this context than it had¶ in the chaos of an actual emergency. Life itself is exposed beneath the language¶ of rights invoked to defend it and the protest against conditions that produced the¶ camp in the first place. In this setting, human zoology exceeds biography: those¶ whose dignity and citizenship is most in question find their crucial measurements¶ taken in calories rather than in their ability to voice individual opinions or perform acts of civic virtue. The species body, individually varied but fundamentally¶ interchangeable, grows visible and becomes the focus of attention.

Redfield 5 [Peter, Ph.D. Anthropology at UC Berkeley, professor of Anthropology at UNC Chapel Hill, “Doctors, Borders, and Life in Crisis,” Cultural Anthropology 20(3)] ***MSF = Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders)

of a miniature model camp illustrated basic needs: shelter in the form of simple tents adapted to different climates, water purification in the form of a giant bladder dispensing five gallons per person per day, food in the form of compact bars providing 2100 calories, and finally hygiene in the form of a latrine Here was a panorama of survival in all its measured essence. To one side hung a small poster about mental health and trauma and beyond lay the medical zone, featuring a model clinic, a weighing station, and vaccination center, and finally a cholera exclusion area It does not represent a final solution or a politics involving fully realized subjects, however, but an endlessly temporary defense of minimal existence. In this sense, it is the precise inverse of a concentration camp, if likewise revealing a border zone between life and death There are bodies to cleanse, to shelter and protect from hunger and disease. There are children to weigh, inoculate, and categorize by the circumference of their upper arms. In the model camp, links between these different tasks are clear. Life itself is exposed beneath the language of rights invoked to defend it , human zoology exceeds biography: those whose dignity and citizenship is most in question find their crucial measurements taken in calories rather than in their ability to voice individual opinions or perform acts of civic virtue. The species body, individually varied but fundamentally interchangeable, grows visible

Rights should not be the center point of the discussion – It cordones off and submits the body to a regime of politics incapable of solving

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The first dimension of the prism depicts a savage and evokes images of barbarism. The abominations of the savage are presented as so cruel and unimaginable as to represent their state as a negation of humanity. The human rights story presents the state as the classic savage, an ogre forever bent on the consumption of humans.7 Although savagery in human rights discourse connotes much more than the state, the state is depicted as the operational instrument of savagery. States become savage when they choke off and oust civil society.8 The "good" state controls its demonic proclivities by cleansing itself with, and internalizing, human rights. The "evil" state, on the other hand, expresses itself through an illiberal, anti-democratic, or other authoritarian culture. The redemption or salvation of the state is solely dependent on its submission to human rights norms. The state is the guarantor of human rights; it is also the target and raison d'etre of human rights law.9¶ But the reality is far more complex. While the metaphor may suggest otherwise, it is not the state per se that is barbaric but the cultural foundation of the state. The state only becomes a vampire when "bad" culture overcomes or disallows the development of "good" culture. The real savage, though, is not the state but a cultural deviation from human rights. That savagery inheres in the theory and practice of the one-party state, military junta, controlled or closed state, theocracy, or even cultural practices such as the one popularly known in the West as female genital mutilation (FGM),10not in the state per se. The state itself is a neutral, passive instrumentality— a receptacle or an empty vessel—that conveys savagery by implementing the project of the savage culture.¶ The second dimension of the prism depicts the face and the fact of a victim as well as the essence and the idea of victimhood. A human being whose "dignity and worth" have been violated by the savage is the victim. The victim figure is a powerless, helpless innocent whose naturalist attributes have been negated by the primitive and offensive actions of the state or the cultural foundation of the state. The entire human rights structure is both anti- catastrophic and reconstructive. It is anti-catastrophic because it is designed to prevent more calamities through the creation of more victims. It is reconstructive because it seeks to re-engineer the state and the society to reduce the number of victims, as it defines them,11 and prevent conditions that give rise to victims. The classic human rights document—the human rights report—embodies these two mutually reinforcing strategies. An INGO human rights report is usually a catalogue of horrible catastrophes visited on individuals. As a rule, each report also carries a diagnostic epilogue and recommended therapies and remedies.12¶ The third dimension of the prism is the savior or the redeemer, the good angel who protects, vindicates, civilizes, restrains, and safeguards. The savior is the victim's bulwark against tyranny. The simple, yet complex promise of the savior is freedom: freedom from the tyrannies of the state, tradition, and culture. But it is also the freedom to create a better society based on particular values. In the human rights story, the savior is the human rights corpus itself, with the United Nations, Western governments, INGOs, and Western charities as the actual rescuers, redeemers of a benighted world.13 In reality, however, these institutions are merely fronts. The savior is ultimately a set of culturally based norms and practices that inhere in liberal thought and philosophy.

Mutua 01’ Mutua, Makau. "Savages, victims, and saviors: the metaphor of human rights." Harvard International Law Journal 42.1 (2001): 201-245. Makau W. Mutua is the Dean of the University at Buffalo Law School, where he is also a SUNY Distinguished Professor and the Floyd H. & Hilda L. Hurst Faculty Scholar. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

the prism depicts a savage and evokes images of barbarism. The human rights story presents the state as the classic savage, an ogre forever bent on the consumption of humans savagery in human rights discourse connotes much more than the state, the state is depicted as the operational instrument of savagery. States become savage when they choke off and oust civil society. The "good" state controls its demonic proclivities by cleansing itself with, and internalizing, human rights. The "evil" state, expresses itself through an illiberal, anti-democratic, or other authoritarian culture The redemption or salvation of the state is solely dependent on its submission to human rights norms. The state is the guarantor of human rights; it is also the target and raison d'etre of human rights law. it is not the state per se that is barbaric but the cultural foundation of the state. The state only becomes a vampire when "bad" culture overcomes or disallows the development of "good" culture. The real savage, though, is not the state but a cultural deviation from human rights. That savagery inheres in the theory and practice of the one-party state, military junta, controlled or closed state, theocracy, or even cultural practices such as the one popularly known in the West as female genital mutilation (FGM),10not in the state per se. The state itself is a neutral, passive instrumentality— a receptacle or an empty vessel—that conveys savagery by implementing the project of the savage culture The second dimension of the prism depicts the face and the fact of a victim as well as the essence and the idea of victimhood. A human being whose "dignity and worth" have been violated by the savage is the victim. The victim figure is a powerless, helpless innocent whose naturalist attributes have been negated by the primitive and offensive actions of the state or the cultural foundation of the state. It is reconstructive because it seeks to re-engineer the state and the society to reduce the number of victims, as it defines them,11 and prevent conditions that give rise to victims In the human rights story, the savior is the human rights corpus itself, The savior is ultimately a set of culturally based norms and practices that inhere in liberal thought and philosophy.

The human rights story of of the state as a savage only when “bad” culture disallows “good” culture fails to understand that the state is a empty vessel and it is societal norms that fill it.

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Second, the SVS metaphor and narrative rejects the cross-contamination of cultures and instead promotes a Eurocentric ideal. The metaphor is premised on the transformation by Western cultures of non-Western cul¬tures into a Eurocentric prototype and not the fashioning of a multicultural mosaic. The SVS metaphor results in an "othering" process that imagines the creation of inferior clones, in effect dumb copies of the original. For ex¬ample, Western political democracy is in effect an organic element of human rights. "Savage" cultures and peoples are seen as lying outside the human rights orbit, and by implication, outside the regime of political democracy. It is this distance from human rights that allows certain cultures to create victims. Political democracy is then viewed as a panacea. Other textual ex¬amples anchored in the treatment of cultural phenomena, such as "tradi¬tional" practices that appear to negate the equal protection for women, also illustrate the gulf between human rights and non-liberal, non-European cultures.¶ Third, the language and rhetoric of the human rights corpus present significant theoretical problems. The arrogant and biased rhetoric of the human rights movement prevents the movement from gaining cross-cultural legitimacy. This curse of the SVS rhetoric has no bearing on the substance of the normative judgment being rendered. A particular leader, for example, could be labeled a war criminal, but such a label may carry no validity lo¬cally because of the curse of the SVS rhetoric. In other words, the SVS rhetoric may undermine the universalist warrant that it claims and thus en¬gender resistance to the apprehension and punishment of real violators.¶ The subtext of human rights is a grand narrative hidden in the seemingly neutral and universal language of the corpus. For example, the U.N. Charter describes its mandate to "reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small." This is certainly a noble ideal. But what exactly does that terminology mean here? This phraseology conceals more than it reveals. What, for example, are fundamental human rights, and how are they determined? Do such rights have cultural, religious, ethical, moral, political, or other biases? What exactly is meant by the "dignity and worth" of the human person? Is there an essentialized human being that the corpus imagines? Is the individual found in the streets of Nairobi, the slums of Boston, the deserts of Iraq, or the rainforests of Brazil? In addition to the Herculean task of defining the prototypical human being, the U.N. Charter puts forward another pretense—that all nations "large and small" enjoy some equality. Even as it ratified power imbalances between the Third World1 and the dominant American and European powers, the United Na­tions gave the latter the primary power to define and determine "world peace" and "stability."2 These fictions of neutrality and universality, like so much else in a lopsided world, undergird the human rights corpus and belie its true identity and purposes. This international rhetoric of goodwill re­veals, just beneath the surface, intentions and reality that stand in great ten­sion and contradiction with it.

Mutua 01’ Mutua, Makau. "Savages, victims, and saviors: the metaphor of human rights." Harvard International Law Journal 42.1 (2001): 201-245. Makau W. Mutua is the Dean of the University at Buffalo Law School, where he is also a SUNY Distinguished Professor and the Floyd H. & Hilda L. Hurst Faculty Scholar. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

the SVS metaphor and narrative rejects the cross-contamination of cultures and instead promotes a Eurocentric ideal. The metaphor is premised on the transformation by Western cultures of non-Western cul¬tures into a Eurocentric prototype and not the fashioning of a multicultural mosaic. The SVS metaphor results in an "othering" process that imagines the creation of inferior clones, in effect dumb copies of the original. For ex¬ample, Western political democracy is in effect an organic element of human rights. "Savage" cultures and peoples are seen as lying outside the human rights orbit, and by implication, outside the regime of political democracy. It is this distance from human rights that allows certain cultures to create victims. the language and rhetoric of the human rights corpus present significant theoretical problems. The arrogant and biased rhetoric of the human rights movement prevents the movement from gaining cross-cultural legitimacy. This curse of the SVS rhetoric has no bearing on the substance of the normative judgment being rendered. In other words, the SVS rhetoric may undermine the universalist warrant that it claims and thus en¬gender resistance to the apprehension and punishment of real violators. human rights is a grand narrative hidden in the seemingly neutral and universal language of the corpus What, for example, are fundamental human rights, and how are they determined? Do such rights have cultural, religious, ethical, moral, political, or other biases Is there an essentialized human being that the corpus imagines? Even as it ratified power imbalances between the Third World and the dominant American and European powers, the United Na­tions gave the latter the primary power to define and determine "world peace" and "stability." These fictions of neutrality and universality, like so much else in a lopsided world, undergird the human rights corpus and belie its true identity and purposes. This international rhetoric of goodwill re­veals, just beneath the surface, intentions and reality that stand in great ten­sion and contradiction with it.

The savage metaphor is built in colonial thought, it is distance from human rights that allows the creation of victims and justifies intervention while undermining resistance to the real violators.

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The fifth flaw concerns the role of race in the development of the human rights narrative. The SVS metaphor of human rights carries racial connota¬tions in which the international hierarchy of race and color is reintrenched and revitalized. The metaphor is in fact necessary for the continuation of the global racial hierarchy. In the human rights narrative, savages and victims are generally non-white and non-Western, while the saviors are white. This old truism has found new life in the metaphor of human rights. But there is also a sense in which human rights can be seen as a project for the redemp¬tion of the redeemers, in which whites who are privileged globally as a peo¬ple—who have historically visited untold suffering and savage atrocities against non-whites—redeem themselves by "defending" and "civilizing" "lower," "unfortunate," and "inferior" peoples. The metaphor is thus laced with the pathology of self-redemption.¶ As currently constituted and deployed, the human rights movement will ultimately fail because it is perceived as an alien ideology in non-Western societies. The movement does not deeply resonate in the cultural fabrics of non-Western states, except among hypocritical elites steeped in Western ideas. In order ultimately to prevail, the human rights movement must be moored in the cultures of all peoples. ¶ The project of reconsidering rights, with claims to their supremacy, is not new. The culture of rights in the present milieu stretches back at least to the rise of the modern state in Europe. It is that state's monopoly of violence and the instruments of coercion that gave rise to the culture of rights to coun-terbalance the abusive state. Robert Cover refers to this construction as the myth of the jurisprudence of rights that allows society to both legitimize and control the state. Human rights, however, renew the meaning and scope of rights in a radical way. Human rights bestow naturalness, transhis- toricity, and universality to rights. But this Article lodges a counterclaim against such a leap. This Article is certainly informed by the works of criti¬cal legal scholars, feminist critics of rights discourse, and critical race theorists. Still, the approach of this Article differs from all three because it seeks to address an international phenomenon and not a municipal, dis¬tinctly American question. The critique of human rights should be based not just on American or European legal traditions but also on other cultural milieus. The indigenous, non-European traditions of Asia, Africa, the Pacific, and the Americas must be central to this critique. The idea of hu¬man rights—the quest to craft a universal bundle of attributes with which all societies must endow all human beings—is a noble one. The problem with the current bundle of attributes lies in their inadequacy, incomplete¬ness, and wrong-headedness. There is little doubt that there is much to cele¬brate in the present human rights corpus just as there is much to quarrel with. In this exercise, a sober evaluation of the current human rights corpus and its language is not an option—it is required.

Mutua 01’ Mutua, Makau. "Savages, victims, and saviors: the metaphor of human rights." Harvard International Law Journal 42.1 (2001): 201-245. Makau W. Mutua is the Dean of the University at Buffalo Law School, where he is also a SUNY Distinguished Professor and the Floyd H. & Hilda L. Hurst Faculty Scholar. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

The SVS metaphor of human rights carries racial connota¬tions in which the international hierarchy of race and color is reintrenched and revitalized. The metaphor is in fact necessary for the continuation of the global racial hierarchy. In the human rights narrative, savages and victims are generally non-white and non-Western, while the saviors are white. there is also a sense in which human rights can be seen as a project for the redemp¬tion of the redeemers, in which whites who are privileged globally as a peo¬ple—who have historically visited untold suffering and savage atrocities against non-whites—redeem themselves by "defending" and "civilizing" "lower," "unfortunate," and "inferior" peoples. The metaphor is thus laced with the pathology of self-redemption the human rights movement will ultimately fail because it is perceived as an alien ideology in non-Western societies. The movement does not deeply resonate in the cultural fabrics of non-Western states, except among hypocritical elites steeped in Western ideas. In order ultimately to prevail, the human rights movement must be moored in the cultures of all peoples. The culture of rights in the present milieu stretches back at least to the rise of the modern state in Europe. It is that state's monopoly of violence and the instruments of coercion that gave rise to the culture of rights to coun-terbalance the abusive state. Human rights, however, renew the meaning and scope of rights in a radical way. Human rights bestow naturalness, transhis- toricity, and universality to rights. The idea of hu¬man rights—the quest to craft a universal bundle of attributes with which all societies must endow all human beings—is a noble one. The problem with the current bundle of attributes lies in their inadequacy, incomplete¬ness, and wrong-headedness.

Human rights reinforce racism due to the narrative of the redeemers redeeming themselves by protecting the inferior people. This view causes the movement to fail as the people who need help are alienated.

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Although the human rights movement is located within the historical continuum of Eurocentrism as a civilizing mission, and therefore as an at¬tack on non-European cultures, it is critical to note that it was European, and not non-European, atrocities that gave rise to it. While the movement has today constructed the savage and the victim as non-European, Adolf Hitler was the quintessential savage. The abominations and demise of his regime ignited the human rights movement. Hitler, a white European, was the personification of evil. The Nazi regime, a white European government, was the embodiment of barbarism. The combination of Hitler's gross devia¬tion from the evolving European constitutional law precepts and the en¬tombment of his imperial designs by the West and the Soviet Union started the avalanche of norms known as the human rights corpus.¶ Nuremberg, the German town where some twenty-two major Nazi war criminals were tried—resulting in nineteen convictions—stands as the birthplace of the human rights movement, with the London Agreement its birth certificate. Originally, the West did not create the human rights movement in order to save or civilize non-Europeans, although these hu-manist impulses drove the anti-slavery abolitionist efforts of the nineteenth century. Neither the enslavement of Africans, with its barbaric conse¬quences and genocidal dimensions, nor the classic colonization of Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans by Europeans, with its bone-chilling atroci¬ties, were sufficient to move the West to create the human rights movement. It took the genocidal extermination of Jews in Europe—a white people—to start the process of the codification and universalization of human rights norms. Thus, although the Nuremberg Tribunal has been argued by some to be in a sense hypocritical, it is its promise that is significant. For the first time, the major powers drew a line demarcating impermissible conduct by states towards their own people and created the concept of collective re¬sponsibility for human rights. But no one should miss the irony of brutal¬izing colonial powers pushing for the Nuremberg trials and the adoption of the UDHR.

Mutua 01’ Mutua, Makau. "Savages, victims, and saviors: the metaphor of human rights." Harvard International Law Journal 42.1 (2001): 201-245. Makau W. Mutua is the Dean of the University at Buffalo Law School, where he is also a SUNY Distinguished Professor and the Floyd H. & Hilda L. Hurst Faculty Scholar. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Although the human rights movement is located within the historical continuum of Eurocentrism as a civilizing mission, and therefore as an at¬tack on non-European cultures that it was European, and not non-European, atrocities that gave rise to it. While the movement has today constructed the savage and the victim as non-European, Adolf Hitler was the quintessential savage. The abominations and demise of his regime ignited the human rights movement. Hitler, a white European, was the personification of evil. Nuremberg stands as the birthplace of the human rights movement the West did not create the human rights movement in order to save or civilize non-Europeans, although these hu-manist impulses drove the anti-slavery abolitionist efforts of the nineteenth century. Neither the enslavement of Africans, with its barbaric conse¬quences and genocidal dimensions, nor the classic colonization of Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans by Europeans, with its bone-chilling atroci¬ties, were sufficient to move the West to create the human rights movement. It took the genocidal extermination of Jews in Europe—a white people—to start the process of the codification and universalization of human rights norms. no one should miss the irony of brutal¬izing colonial powers pushing for the Nuremberg trials

Human rights discourse is rooted in Euro-centric thought. Human rights was born out of the death of Europeans, but not the genocides in Africa, slavery, and the atrocities of colonialism.

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The human rights corpus, only put into effect following the atrocities of the Second World War, had its theoretical underpinnings in Western colonial attitudes. It is rooted in a deep-seated sense of European and Western global predestination.48 As put by David Slater, European "belief in the ne¬cessity of an imperial mission to civilize the other and to convert other socie¬ties into inferior versions of the same" took hold in the nineteenth century.49 This impulse to possess and transform that which was different found a ready mask and benign cover in messianic faiths. For example, Denys Shrop-shire, a European Christian missionary, described Africans as "primitive" natives in the "technically barbaric and pre-literary stage of sociological and cultural development."50 The purpose of the missionary was not "merely to civilize but to Christianize, not merely to convey the 'Gifts of Civilization.'" By the nineteenth century, the discourse of white over black superi¬ority had gained popularity and acceptance in Europe:¶ The advocates of this discourse—[German philosopher Georg} Hegel most typically, but duly followed by a host of 'justifiers'—declared that Africa had no history prior to direct contact with Europe. Therefore the Africans, having made no history of their own, had clearly made no de¬velopment of their own. Therefore they were not properly human, and could not be left to themselves, but must be "led" towards civilization by other peoples: that is, by the peoples of Europe, especially of West¬ern Europe, and most particularly of Britain and France. ¶ As if by intuition, the missionary fused religion with civilization, a proc¬ess that was meant to remove the native from the damnation of prehistory and to deliver him to the gates of history. In this idiom, human develop¬ment was defined as a linear and vertical progression of the dark or backward races from the savage to the civilized, the pre-modern to the modern, from the child to the adult, and the inferior to the superior. Slater has captured this worldview in a powerful passage:¶ [T}he geological power over other societies, legitimated and codified under the signs of manifest destiny and civilizing missions, has been a rather salient feature of earlier Western projects of constructing new world orders. These projects or domains of truth, as they emanated from Europe or the United States, attempted to impose their hegemony by defining normalcy with reference to a particular vision of their own cul¬tures, while designating that which was different as other than truth and in need of tutelage. ¶ The United States, whose history is simply a continuation of the Age of Europe, suffers from this worldview just like its European predecessors. American predestination, as embodied in the Monroe Doctrine, is almost as old as the country itself. President Theodore Roosevelt expressed this sense of predestination when he referred to peoples and countries south of the United States as the "weak and chaotic governments and people south of us" and declared that it was "our duty, when it becomes absolutely inevitable, to police these countries in the interest of order and civilization." The treat¬ment of the Portuguese and Spanish-speaking Latin America as being in the backyard of the United States was instrumental in consolidating the psyche of the United States as an empire.

Mutua 01’ Mutua, Makau. "Savages, victims, and saviors: the metaphor of human rights." Harvard International Law Journal 42.1 (2001): 201-245. Makau W. Mutua is the Dean of the University at Buffalo Law School, where he is also a SUNY Distinguished Professor and the Floyd H. & Hilda L. Hurst Faculty Scholar. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

The human rights corpus had its theoretical underpinnings in Western colonial attitudes. It is rooted in a deep-seated sense of European and Western global predestination European "belief in the ne¬cessity of an imperial mission to civilize the other and to convert other socie¬ties into inferior versions of the same" This impulse to possess and transform that which was different found a ready mask and benign cover in messianic faiths The advocates of this discourse duly followed he Africans, having made no history of their own, had clearly made no de¬velopment of their own. Therefore they were not properly human, and could not be left to themselves, but must be "led" towards civilization by other peoples human develop¬ment was defined as a linear and vertical progression of the dark or backward races from the savage to the civilized, the pre-modern to the modern, from the child to the adult, and the inferior to the superior. Slater has captured this worldview in a powerful passage: [T}he geological power over other societies, legitimated and codified under the signs of manifest destiny and civilizing missions, has been a rather salient feature of earlier Western projects of constructing new world orders as they emanated from the United States to impose their hegemony by defining normalcy with reference to a particular vision of their own cul¬tures, this sense of predestination peoples and countries south of the United States as the "weak and chaotic governments and people south of us" and declared that it was "our duty, when it becomes absolutely inevitable, to police these countries in the interest of order and civilization." The treat¬ment of the Portuguese and Spanish-speaking Latin America as being in the backyard of the United States was instrumental in consolidating the psyche of the United States as an empire

Human rights discourse is rooted in Western predistenation, assuming the necessity of an imperial mission to civilize the inferior, undeveloped.

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There is, actually, an ongoing effort at developing a Latin American political ecology framework that similarly purport sto develop a unique geopolitical perspective on the question of nature; the brief comments below are purposely written from this vantage point. 12 To begin with, political ecology underscores the civilizational character of the current environmental crisis; this crisis is, bluntly put, is a crisis of modernity, to the extent that modernity has failed to enable sustainable worlds. It is also a crisis of thought, to the extent that logocentric thought has fueled the ecologically destructive practices of modernity (Leff 2000, Boff 2002). (Assome feminists convincingly argue, the domination of women and nature are at the basis of the modern patriarchal project enacted by fallogocentric thought.) It is difficult for those not accustomed to thinking in ecological terms to realize that today’s environmental crisis is not only a generalized crisis but perhaps the central contradiction and limit to capital today. More readily accepted is the idea that modernity is structured around the split between nature and culture, even if it is rarely acknowledged that thissplit might be equally formative of modernity than the civilized/other (us/them) binary. Nature then appears at the other side of the colonial difference, with certain natures(colonial/third world natures, women’s bodies, dark bodies) located in the exteriority to the Totality of the male eurocentric world. The environmental crisis thus signals the limits of modern, instrumental rationality; it reflects modernity’s failure to articulate biology and history save through the capitalization of nature and labor. What ensued was a regime of capitalist nature that subalternized all other articulations of biology and history, of nature and society, particularly those that enact –through their local models and practices of the natural—a culturally established continuity (as opposed to a separation) between the natural, human, and supernatural worlds. These local models of the natural are at the basis of environmental struggles today. In this way, these struggle need to be seen as struggles for the defense of cultural, ecological, and economic dif erence (Leff 2000; Escobar 1999). Ethno-ecological social movements are very clear about this. Here lies another type of critical borderthinking that needsto be taken into account. In a more prospective way, the Latin American political ecology effort attemptsto construct an ethics and culture of sustainability; this entails the rethinking of production towards a new environmental rationality; and a dialogue among forms of knowledge towards the construction of novel environmental rationalities. This ecology’s ethical perspective on nature, life, and the planet entails a questioning of modernity and development, indeed an irrefutable indictment ofthe developmentalistfallacy. By privileging subaltern knowledges of the natural, this political ecology articulates in unique ways the questions of diversity, difference, and inter-culturality –with nature, of course, occupying a role as actor and agent. At stake here is a cultural politics of difference that goes beyond the deconstruction of anthropo-logocentrism; it aims at the cultural re-appropriation of nature through political strategies such as those of social movements. According to this group, there is an emergent Latin American environmental thought that builds on the struggles and knowledges of indigenous, peasants, ethnic and other subaltern groups to envision other ways of being with a multiplicity of living and non-living beings, human and not. Respecting the specificity of place-based cultures and peoples, it aims at thinking about the re/construction of local and regional worlds in more sustainable ways.

Escobar 2 [Arturo, department of anthropology at university of north Carolina chapel hill, ““Worlds and Knowledges Otherwise”: The Latin American modernity/coloniality Research Program”, http://apse.or.cr/webapse/pedago/enint/escobar03.pdf]

political ecology underscores the civilizational character of the current environmental crisis; this crisis is, bluntly put, is a crisis of modernity, to the extent that modernity has failed to enable sustainable world It is also a crisis of thought, to the extent that logocentric thought has fueled the ecologically destructive practices of modernity It is difficult for those not accustomed to thinking in ecological terms to realize that today’s environmental crisis is not only a generalized crisis but perhaps the central contradiction and limit to capital today modernity is structured around the split between nature and culture Nature then appears at the other side of the colonial difference with certain natures(colonial/third world natures, women’s bodies, dark bodies) located in the exteriority to the Totality of the male eurocentric world. The environmental crisis thus signals the limits of modern, instrumental rationality; it reflects modernity’s failure to articulate biology and history save through the capitalization of nature and labor What ensued was a regime of capitalist nature that subalternized all other articulations of biology and history, of nature and society particularly those that enact –through their local models and practices of the natural These local models of the natural are at the basis of environmental struggles today. these struggle need to be seen as struggles for the defense of cultural, ecological, and economic dif erence Here lies another type of critical borderthinking that needsto be taken into account. Latin American political ecology entails the rethinking of production towards a new environmental rationality; and a dialogue among forms of knowledge towards the construction of novel environmental rationalities This ecology’s ethical perspective on nature, life, and the planet entails a questioning of modernity and development By privileging subaltern knowledges this political ecology articulates in unique ways the questions of diversity, difference, and inter-culturality At stake here is a cultural politics of difference that goes beyond the deconstruction of anthropo-logocentrism; it aims at the cultural re-appropriation of nature through political strategies such as those of social movements there is an emergent Latin American environmental thought that builds on the struggles and knowledges of indigenous, peasants, ethnic and other subaltern groups to envision other ways of being with a multiplicity of living and non-living beings Respecting the specificity of place-based cultures and peoples, it aims at thinking about the re/construction of local and regional worlds in more sustainable ways

The root cause of the environmental crisis is a crisis of modernity’s division between man and nature – their approach makes ecological destruction inevitable

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The intellectual constellation of natural terror, non-political or unavoidable suffering and the raced category of the sublime inaugurated by the Lisbon earthquake/tsunami meshes with the mapping of colonial geographies as dangerous and inimical. Gregory Bankoff describes how in the production of disasters: ‘tropicality’, ‘development’ and ‘vulnerability’ form part of ‘the same essentialising and generalising cultural discourse: one that denigrates large regions of the world as dangerous – disease-ridden, poverty-stricken and disaster-prone; one that depicts the inhabitants of these regions as inferior – untutored, incapable, victims; and that . . . reposes in Western medicine, investment and preventive systems the expertise required to remedy these ills’ (2002, 29). Yet, Bankoff argues, the disproportionate incidence of disasters in the non-Western world is not simply a question of geography. It is also a matter of demographic difference, exacerbated in more recent centuries by the unequal terms of international trade, that renders the inhabitants of less developed countries more likely to die from hazard . . . No single term has yet emerged that defines the areas where disasters are more commonplace: the media often sensationalises a certain region as a ‘belt of pain’ or a ‘rim of fire’ or a ‘typhoon alley’, while scientific literature makes reference to zones of ‘seismic or volcanic activity’ . . . or to meteorological conditions such as the El Nin˜o . . . Whatever the term, however, there is an implicit understanding that the place in question is somewhere else . . . and denotes a land and climate that have been endowed with dangerous and life-threatening qualities. (24) This somewhere else – ‘belt of pain’, ‘typhoon alley’ – is discursively and representationally rendered as somewhere else by the very enframing technologies of theatre, screen and spectacle discussed above. Technologies of enframing, and of rendering trauma and disaster into a theatre of the sublime, symbolically mark the line between the ‘us’ and ‘them’ that Bankoff underscores. As the responses to Hurricane Katrina in the United States demonstrated, these references to a somewhere else map racialized geographies on to spatial demarcations of ‘East’ and ‘West’. Dangerous geographies are geographies of otherness and difference. The enframing technologies that produced geographies of danger simultaneously generate and sustain the illusion between a wild, undomesticated and disease-ridden nature, the locus of bare life, ‘out there’, in contradistinction to a civilized, scientifically superior and sanitary space that is the privileged home of the West. The sea itself figures among the most dangerous of these othered geographies because of elemental imaginaries of the ocean as a wild and ungovernable space distinct from land, one that is associated in Christian symbology with sin and error (as in the biblical flood). The bare life located in dangerous geographies, lacking the ability to ‘sublimate’ their environment, are condemned to an eternal victimhood from which only superior powers of reason, and all the scientific, medical and material power that entails, can attempt to rescue them. At work here, then, are all the familiar violently unequal power relations of colonial power that, on the one hand enable, sustain and reproduce the possibility for strategic providential interventions, rescue missions, and acts of benevolence, while on the other demarcating disposable lives situated within necropolitical domains; marked with the unredeemable imprimatur of bare life. These lives can be either killed with impunity or be abandoned to innumerable forms of letting die. The bare life that inhabit dangerous geographies, represented as incapable of mastering or overcoming their own environment (‘nature’), consequently lack both selfsovereignty and subjecthood. This is the conceptual product of Hegelian dialectics in which, as Mbembe explains in ‘Necropolitics’, questions of ‘becoming subject’, sovereignty and death all interlink: In transforming nature, the human being creates a world; but in the process, he or she also is exposed to his or her own negativity. Within the Hegelian paradigm, human death is essentially voluntary. It is the result of risks consciously assumed by the subject. According to Hegel, in these risks, the ‘animal’ that constitutes the human subject’s natural being is defeated. (2003, 14) In geographies of danger – the Third World, the global South, the arc of instability – ‘nature’ is precisely that which can be neither negated nor transformed (‘sublimated’) through work and struggle. The inhabitant of the global South, marked by this ‘failure’, is she or he who consequently cannot overcome their ‘animal’ status in order to become human/subject and be ‘cast into the incessant movement of history’ (Mbembe 2003, 14). Their deaths, as in the world of non-human animals, cannot be ‘essentially voluntary’; rather, they die the animal death of the creature caught in unmasterable relations of nature.

Perera 2010 (Suvendrini Perera, Department of Communication & Cultural Studies, Curtin University, Perth, Australia, Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies Vol. 24, No. 1 page 37-38)

The intellectual constellation of natural terror, non-political or unavoidable suffering meshes with the mapping of colonial geographies as dangerous and inimical in the production of disasters: ‘tropicality’, ‘development’ and ‘vulnerability’ form part of ‘the same essentialising and generalising cultural discourse: one that denigrates large regions of the world as dangerous – disease-ridden, poverty-stricken and disaster-prone; one that depicts the inhabitants of these regions as inferior – untutored, incapable, victims; the disproportionate incidence of disasters in the non-Western world is not simply a question of geography This somewhere else is discursively and representationally rendered as somewhere else by the very enframing technologies of theatre, screen and spectacle discussed above. Technologies of enframing, and of rendering trauma and disaster into a theatre of the sublime, symbolically mark the line between the ‘us’ and ‘them’ As the responses to Hurricane Katrina in the United States demonstrated, these references to a somewhere else map racialized geographies on to spatial demarcations of ‘East’ and ‘West’. Dangerous geographies are geographies of otherness and difference produced geographies of danger simultaneously generate and sustain the illusion between a wild, undomesticated and disease-ridden nature, the locus of bare life, ‘out there The bare life located in dangerous geographies, lacking the ability to ‘sublimate’ their environment, are condemned to an eternal victimhood from which only superior powers of reason, and all the scientific, medical and material power that entails, can attempt to rescue them. These lives can be either killed with impunity or be abandoned to innumerable forms of letting die. The bare life that inhabit dangerous geographies, represented as incapable of mastering or overcoming their own environment (‘nature’), consequently lack both selfsovereignty and subjecthood In geographies of danger – the Third World, the global South, the arc of instability – ‘nature’ is precisely that which can be neither negated nor transformed (‘sublimated’) through work and struggle. The inhabitant of the global South, marked by this ‘failure’, is she or he who consequently cannot overcome their ‘animal’ status in order to become human/subject and be ‘cast into the incessant movement of history’ (Mbembe 2003, 14). Their deaths, as in the world of non-human animals, cannot be ‘essentially voluntary’; rather, they die the animal death of the creature caught in unmasterable relations of nature.

The AFFIRMATIVE too easily deploys representations of dangerous geographies – the space of disaster is taken up as the space of nature, which, when taken to its logical limit, is the epicenter of modern violence

Borders Kritik - UTNIF 2013.html5

Texas (UTNIF)

Kritiks

2013

The invocation of strategies of spatial exclusion as key to security, or keeping the bad guys out, or at least threats at a distance, works in other counter-productive ways in contemporary consumer culture. Privatized commodities are frequently seen as the way of protecting ourselves from numerous threats. In Andrew Szasz’s (2007) terms, purchasing all manner of things allows us the illusion that we can “shop our way to safety”. In the process spatial strategies of what he terms “inverted quarantine” and suburbanization as distancing oneself from numerous dangers, have changed concerns from protecting the environment to protecting individuals from particular hazards. But the general concern with ecological wellbeing is abandoned in the process. The point about ecological thinking is precisely that such strategies of spatial separation are at best temporary measures that in the long run damage environments. At the larger scale this separation or “drawbridge” strategy, invoking national security in the face of global disruptions (Ripsman and Paul 2010), is also revealed to be counter productive in terms of nation states in the long run. The Anthropocene emphasizes how interconnected humanity is, and that now the collective fate of our planet requires that the illusion of separation be abandoned. The geopolitical cartography of separate and rival Westphalian boxes is completely inappropriate as a series of assumptions if sensible geopolitical decisions are to be taken in the next couple of decades. It is however a plausible strategy if the operant geopolitical specification of the world is one of competing separate spaces, and if the object of what is portrayed in sports metaphors as “winning” such a competition in terms of being most powerful, first, or at least primus inter pares.

Dalby 2012 (Simon, CIGI Chair in the Political Economy of Climate ChangeBalsillie School of International Affairs,Waterloo, Ontario, “ENVIRONMENTAL GEOPOLITICS IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY,” pg 10-11)

The invocation of strategies of spatial exclusion as key to security, or keeping the bad guys out works in other counter-productive ways in contemporary consumer culture. Privatized commodities are frequently seen as the way of protecting ourselves from numerous threats. distancing oneself from numerous dangers, have changed concerns from protecting the environment to protecting individuals from particular hazards. the general concern with ecological wellbeing is abandoned in the process. The point about ecological thinking is precisely that such strategies of spatial separation are at best temporary measures that in the long run damage environments. The Anthropocene emphasizes how interconnected humanity is, and that now the collective fate of our planet requires that the illusion of separation be abandoned. The geopolitical cartography of separate and rival Westphalian boxes is completely inappropriate as a series of assumptions if sensible geopolitical decisions are to be taken in the next couple of decades.

The politics of separation and spatial exclusion in the name of “safety” and protection from “hazards” causes ecological wellbeing to become a second thought. The interconnected nature of the world means we must deconstruct the image of borders as a tool for demarcation

Borders Kritik - UTNIF 2013.html5

Texas (UTNIF)

Kritiks

2013