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A Chinese satellite swooped behind the moon and snapped a shot of two worlds: the heavily-cratered moon, and in the distance, the cloud-covered planet Earth.
The image, captured on February 3, shows the far side of the moon that us Earthlings never see. The moon is locked in orbit to Earth, meaning that the same side of the moon is always facing us. But as the image shows, the moon's far side is often illuminated by the sun, exposing the impact-blasted, grey lunar desert.
Meanwhile, some 239,000 miles away, clouds swirl over Earth's lands and oceans, and life goes on.
The moon and Earth Image: MINGCHUAN WEI/HARBIN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
The satellite responsible, DSLWP, is a 20-inch tall "microsatellite" built by Chinese astronomers. This moon-orbiting technology is not associated with any government space agency, so it falls into the category of an "amateur" satellite — though it's certainly capable of sophisticated science and maneuvering through space.
A student-built camera took the shot, which was then beamed via radio antennae to the 82-foot wide Dwingeloo Radio Telescope in the northeastern Netherlands.
Craters on the far side of the moon Image: Tammo Jan/Dwingeloo Radio Telescope
The heavily-cratered far side of the moon leaves evidence of the chaotic early solar system wherein rocky bodies pummeled the moon and planets. Things have certainly calmed down since then, allowing life to thrive on the blue ocean-world that is Earth. |
Q:
maintain value of variable outside function in javascript?
I try to manipulate a variable inside a function. But it seems to forget the values once I exit the function, eventhough the variable is declared outside the function.
The essential code:
var posts = {};
// Perform a data request
// skjutsgruppens-page
$.oajax({
url: "https://graph.facebook.com/197214710347172/feed?limit=500",
*SNIP*
success: function(data) {
$.extend(posts, data);
}
});
// Gruppen
$.oajax({
url: "https://graph.facebook.com/2388163605/feed?limit=500",
*snip*
success: function(data) {
$.extend(posts, data);
}
});
The oajax retrievies data from facebook. I want to make a variable that contains the data from both oajax methods.
The actual code: http://eco.nolgren.se/demo/resihop/#
A:
The issue is likely that the success function executes at an arbitrary time in the future--unless you specifically access posts after you know the success function has executed, you will receive undefined results, completely dependent on function and access timing.
The best approach is to handle this correctly by doing necessary work inside in the success function, or use something like jQuery's .when function.
|
The Liverpool defender will be allowed to return to the national team for future World Cup qualifiers should he apologise for his comments after the recent Hungary friendly
EXCLUSIVE
Dejan Lovren will play no part in Croatia's Euro 2016 campaign this summer following for his recent outburst,understands.The Liverpool centre-back reacted badly to being asked to warm-up, ending his exercises early before returning to his place on the bench in his country's 1-1 friendly draw with Hungary on March 26 in Budapest, angrily telling Sportske novosti: "I will either be in the starting XI or I will not go to the Euros!"Head coach Ante Cacic has revealed he held positive talks with Lovren on Sunday in a bid to calm the situation, and voiced the necessity for respect in a statement released on the Croatia Football Association website.It read: "We had an open conversation about everything, we want to keep that between us... I've said the national team is above every individual and I will not step away from that belief. There are no ultimatums in Croatian team and there has to be respect to Croatian jersey, team mates and coach."Dejan has his best years ahead of him, he plays good in Liverpool and I wish him to continue that way, I hope he will accept this decision in a mature way and realise that even the best players on Earth put themselves in service of the team rather than looking at themselves."That is the only acceptable way for Croatia national team player and only by thinking that way, Lovren could be a Croatia national team player in the future."However, nowhere in the statement does Cacic state Lovren's international status following his reprimand.Goal now understands Lovren will not travel to the European Championship in France, but Cacic has kept the door open for future World Cup qualifiers, in case Lovren accepts his mistake and apologises.Lovren though, has found support from club manager Jurgen Klopp regarding the national team issue. The 26-year-old has reportedly been told by the Liverpool boss that he would prefer the defender not travel to France for the competition if he is not going to play. |
Q:
Split Folders and sub folder to Data Frame in R
I have list of FolderPaths (as a Data.Frame Column) that I need to split and add 1,2 level folder names to my Data.Frame. I can split the path using
F1<-strsplit(DF$FolderPath,"\\\\")
This gives me a list of lists with uneven number of elements.(Folder tree has different depths) so using matrix(unlist(F1)) wouldn't work as indicated in other answers to similar questions. I need to select each element 1 and 2 in lists and add it to my data.frame, something like:
DF$FolderLevel1<-magicfunction using F1
DF$FolderLevel2<-magicfunction using F2
Please note I am not looking for writing a custom function. Just couldnt figure out the syntax.
A:
You can set the length of each list element to the maximum and than do rbind.
F1 <- strsplit(c("a", "a\\b", "a\\b\\c"),"\\\\")
do.call(rbind, lapply(F1, "[", 1:max(lengths(F1))))
# [,1] [,2] [,3]
#[1,] "a" NA NA
#[2,] "a" "b" NA
#[3,] "a" "b" "c"
|
A comparison of nonlinear methods for predicting earnings surprises and returns.
We compare four nonlinear methods on their ability to learn models from data. The problem requires predicting whether a company will deliver an earnings surprise a specific number of days prior to announcement. This problem has been well studied in the literature using linear models. A basic question is whether machine learning-based nonlinear models such as tree induction algorithms, neural networks, naive Bayesian learning, and genetic algorithms perform better in terms of predictive accuracy and in uncovering interesting relationships among problem variables. Equally importantly, if these alternative approaches perform better, why? And how do they stack up relative to each other? The answers to these questions are significant for predictive modeling in the financial arena, and in general for problem domains characterized by significant nonlinearities. In this paper, we compare the four above-mentioned nonlinear methods along a number of criteria. The genetic algorithm turns out to have some advantages in finding multiple "small disjunct" patterns that can be accurate and collectively capable of making predictions more often than its competitors. We use some of the nonlinearities we discovered about the problem domain to explain these results. |
S-transform time-frequency analysis of P300 reveals deficits in individuals diagnosed with alcoholism.
Decomposition of event-related potential (ERP) waveforms using time-frequency representations (TFR's) is becoming increasingly common in electrophysiology. The P300 potential is an important component of the ERP waveform and has been used to study cognition as well as psychiatric disorders such as alcoholism. In this work, we aim to further understand the nature of the event-related oscillation (ERO) components which form the P300 wave and how these components may be used to differentiate alcoholic individuals from controls. The S-transform decomposition method is used to derive TFR's from single trial and trial-averaged ERP data acquired during a visual oddball task. These TFR's are averaged within time and frequency windows to provide ERO measures for further investigation. ERO measures are compared with conventional ERP amplitude measures using correlation analyses. Statistical analyses was performed with MANOVA and stepwise logistic regressions to contrast an age-matched sample of control (N=100) and alcoholic male subjects (N=100). The results indicate that the P300 waveform, elicited using infrequent salient stimuli, is composed of frontal theta and posterior delta activations. The frontal theta activation does not closely correspond to any of the conventional ERP components and is therefore best analyzed using spectral methods. Between group comparisons and group predictions indicate that the delta and theta band ERO's, which underlie the P300, show deficits in the alcoholic group. Additionally, each band contributes unique information to discriminate between the groups. ERO measures which underlie and compose the P300 wave provide additional information to that offered by conventional ERP amplitude measures, and serve as useful genetic markers in the study of alcoholism. Studying the ERP waveform using time-frequency analysis methods opens new avenues of research in electrophysiology which may lead to a better understanding of cognitive processes, lead to improved clinical diagnoses, and provide phenotypes/endophenotypes for genetic analyses. |
The present invention relates to a monitor and alarm system for a central refrigeration installation for refrigerated display cases.
In commercial refrigeration installations for supermarkets where a number of refrigerated display cases are employed, typically a plurality of refrigerant compressors are utilized to supply high pressure liquid refrigerant to the evaporators contained in the display cases. Typically, a bank of such compressors will be coupled in parallel between a common input refrigerant manifold and an output manifold which, in turn, is coupled to a receiver containing a mechanical refrigerant liquid level sensor. The evaporators of each refrigerated display case are then commonly coupled to the refrigerant receiver and the outputs of the evaporators return to input manifold completing the refrigerant flow path. Certain refrigeration installations also incorporate a heat reclaiming system, which is used for ancillary heating functions such as room temperature control or heating water. Typically these heat reclaiming systems include a heat exchanger coupled in series to the refrigerant flow path, so that the warmed refrigerant can be selectively diverted or shunted by a valve or valves through the heat reclaiming system as required.
In the past, a mechanical dial-type refrigerant level float was mounted to the receiver to provide a local visual indication of the liquid level. Also, a separate fixed alarm switch, set for approximately 20% of liquid level, was provided to provide an alarm output signal at the fixed level for activating a suitable alarm to the system operator. Systems also typically include oil failure sensing switches at each compressor for detecting the oil level or oil pressure PM in each compressor and a remote panel indicating oil level or pressure PM failures as well as monitoring other functions such as suction and discharge pressures at the input and output manifolds, respectively, and a voltage sensor to detect the loss of any one of the three phase input power employed for powering the compressors.
Thus, although some form of monitoring was provided for some conditions in such a system, the known prior art does not provide an integrated monitoring and alarm system whereby a central panel is provided to display all of the monitored fault functions as well as provide, in addition to the alarm indications, a display of the actual refrigerant level.
Another problem is associated with refrigeration installations incorporating heat reclaiming systems. When the heat reclaim is in operation and refrigerant is diverted therethrough, the level of refrigerant within the remainder of the refrigeration system drops significantly. Thus, the engagement of the heat reclaim system at times when the refrigerant level is already low exacerbates the already undesirable low refrigerant level condition. |
# Cable Video2000
# Canton of Neuchatel, Switzerland
# freq sr fec mod
[CHANNEL]
DELIVERY_SYSTEM = DVBC/ANNEX_A
FREQUENCY = 306000000
SYMBOL_RATE = 6900000
INNER_FEC = NONE
MODULATION = QAM/64
INVERSION = AUTO
|
[Functional and supraomohyoid neck dissection in stage cN0/N1 oral squamous cell carcinoma].
Objective: To evaluate the clinical effects of functional neck dissection (FND) and supraomohyoid neck dissection (SOND) in patients with cN0/N1 oral squamous cell carcinoma (OSCC). Methods: A total of 210 patients with stage cN0/N1 OSCC underwent FND and SOND between January 2012 and May 2015 were retrospectively reviewed, among which, 147 patients were male and 63 were female, with an age range of 23-82 years and mean age of (62.2±10.2) years. There were 112 and 98 patients in FND and SOND groups, respectively. The follow-up data included cervical lymph node metastasis, movement of shoulder joint, great auricular nerve function, recurrence rate of cervical lymph nodes. Results: There was no significant difference in gender, age, tumor location, T stage, N stage, histological grades between the two groups (all P>0.05). Compared to patients in FND group, the activities of shoulder joint and earlobe numbness improved significantly in SOND group. Of the 210 patients, 17 patients (8.1%) had cervical recurrence, with 9 patients (8.0%) in FND group and 8 patients (8.2%) in SOND group. No significant difference was observed for neck recurrence between the two groups (P=0.973). Conclusion: SOND can be safely performed in cN0 or cN1 OSCC patients, which avoids major complications of FND, and improves postoperative quality of life in those patients. |
Newsroom
Related Topics
A federal judge has asked Argentina’s senate to allow the arrest and trial of former president Cristina Fernandez on a charge of treason for allegedly covering up the role of Iranians in a 1994 bomb attack on a Jewish centre.
Judge Claudio Bonadio asked politicians to remove Ms Fernandez’s immunity from prosecution, which she gained when she was sworn in as a senator last week.
She was president from 2007 to 2015.
The judge also ordered the arrest of several aides and allies of Ms Fernandez, including former presidency secretary Carlos Zannini and activist Luis D’Elia on the same charges.
Former foreign minister Hector Timerman was ordered held under house arrest due to health issues.
Cristina Fernandez
Prosecutor Eduardo Taiano said the charge of treason carries a potential prison sentence of 10 to 15 years while aggravated cover-up has a six-year penalty.
A vote of two thirds of the senate would be required to remove Ms Fernandez’s immunity from prosecution.
Ms Fernandez and the other defendants have repeatedly denied wrongdoing or involvement in any cover-up involving Argentina’s worst terror attack, the 1994 bombing of the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association centre in Buenos Aires, which killed 85 people and wounded hundreds.
Investigators have linked former Iranian officials to the attack, but Iran has denied any connection with the attack and declined to turn over suspects. |
I don't think it makes sense to have qemu-fe do dynamic labelling.
You certainly could avoid the fd passing by having qemu-fe do the
open though and just let qemu-fe run without the restricted security
context.
qemu-fe would also not be entirely simple,
Indeed.
because it will need to act
as a proxy for the monitor, in order to make hotplug work. ie the mgmt
app would be sending 'drive_add file:/foo/bar' to qemu-fe, which would
then have to open the file and send 'drive_add fd:NN' onto the real QEMU,
and then pass the results on back.
In addition qemu-fe would still have to be under some kind of restricted
security context for it to be acceptable. This is going to want to be as
locked down as possible.
I think there's got to be some give and take here.
It should at least be as locked down as libvirtd. From a security
point of view, we should be able to agree that we want libvirtd to
be as locked down as possible.
But there shouldn't be a hard requirement to lock down qemu-fe more
than libvirtd. Instead, the requirement should be for qemu-fe to be
as/more vigilant in not trusting qemu-system-x86_64 as libvirtd is.
The fundamental problem here, is that there is some logic in
libvirtd that rightly belongs in QEMU. In order to preserve the
security model, that means that we're going to have to take a
subsection of QEMU and trust it more.
Well we have a process that makes security decisions, and a process
which applies those security decisions and a process which is confined
by those decisions. Currently libvirtd makes& applies the decisions,
and qemu is confined. A qemu-fe model would mean that libvirt is making
the decisions, but is then relying on qemu-fe to apply them. IMHO that
split is undesirable, but that's besides the point, since this is not
a decision that needs to be made now.
'qemu-fe' needs to have a way to communicate with the confined process
('qemu-system-XXX') to supply it the resources (file FDs) it needs to
access. The requirements of such a comms channel for qemu-fe are going
to be the same as those needed by libvirtd talking to QEMU today, or
indeed by any process that is applying security decisions to QEMU.
But the fundamental difference is that libvirtd uses what's ostensible a
public, supported interface. That means when we add things like this,
we're stuck supporting it for general use cases.
It's much more palatable to do these things using a private interface
such that we can change these things down the road without worrying
about compatibility with third-party tools. |
Boesenbergia maxwellii
Boesenbergia maxwellii is a plant species in the family Zingiberaceae and tribe Zingibereae; its native range is in Indo-China from Myanmar to Laos.
Description
B. maxwellii is a herb, growing up to tall. The rhizome is small and approximately spherical, in diameter, with numerous cylindrical tuberous roots. Its leaves are simple and alternate: dimension 300-500 x 150-250 mm. Its flower spikes arise directly from the rhizome; individual flowers are horn-shaped, up to long. The flowers are white with a light labellum and dark pink- purple, sometimes with an orange base. Flowering (in Thailand) is in June–August.
References
External links
POWO
IPNI
Category:Zingiberaceae
Category:Flora of Indo-China |
Continuous microwave enhances the healing process of septic and aseptic wounds in rabbits.
Evidence indicates that local application of continuous microwave (CM) has positive effects, for instance, on skin grafts and white blood cells. To investigate the role of CM on local wound healing under different conditions (septic and aseptic), a study was performed in an animal model. Seventy-two rabbits were randomly assigned to four groups of 18 each: group 1 and group 2 consisted of animals with aseptic wounds, and group 3 and group 4 consisted of animals with infected wounds. In the medial third of the dorsolateral body of each animal a wound was prepared under local anesthesia. Animals of groups 1 and 3 received CM treatment, and those of groups 2 and 4 served as controls. The treatment consisted of an irradiation with CM (fixed frequency 37 GHz, power flow density 1 mW/cm2) for 30 min once per day for 5 (group 1) or 7 days (group 3). No other conservative or surgical methods were applied. Aseptic wounds were covered with a sterile dressing. Infected wounds of controls (group 4) were irrigated with 10% NaCl once a day. Measurements were visual analysis, planimetric, bacterial, and immunological tests. The wound surface of treated animals with aseptic wounds became dry and plicated faster, the daily decrease of the wound surface area being more than twice as large as that in the control group (group 2, P < 0.05). Complete epithelization and adhesion of wounds appeared around Day 19 (95% Cl, 18.3 to 20.1) in group 3 and around Day 31 (95% Cl, 29.5 to 32.7) in group 4.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS) |
Mortality within the first 24 hours after stroke frequently results from cerebral edema for which no effective treatment is available. Injury to endothelium by oxygen radicals in a well- recognized cause of edema formation in the lung and other organs but its role in cerebral ischemia is poorly defined. We show that enzymatic oxygen radical scavengers can reduce infarct volume in a rat focal stroke model and hypothesize that xanthine oxidase (XO) is an important source of these oxygen radicals. Evidence is presented to show that cerebral ischemia induces the conversion of a normally benign enzyme, xanthine dehydrogenase (XDH), to a free radical-producing oxidase which reduces molecular oxygen to the toxic intermediates, superoxide and H2O2. Most of the brain XDH and XO is localized within the endothelium, putting the blood-brain barrier at risk of oxygen radical injury. In this proposal, the role of cytotoxic oxygen free radicals will be investigated in early post-ischemic changes in cerebral blood flow, edema formation, neutrophil influx and infarction in a focal stroke model in the rat. The stroke is induced by occluding the right middle cerebral artery (MCA) and transiently clamping both carotid arteries for up to 90 minutes, which yields a reproducible, quantifiable infarct restricted to the right cortex and ideal for examining pharmacological efficacy. The effects of treatment with specific enzymatic radical scavengers on the development of cytotoxic and vasogenic edema, changes in cerebral blood flow and histologic injury after the MCA-carotid occlusion will be evaluated. To optimize delivery to sites of free radical production, the oxygen radical scavenging enzymes, superoxide dismutase and catalase, will be either conjugated to polyethylene glycol or entrapped in liposomes, which increases their circulatory half-life and cell entry. The contribution of ischemia-induced XDH conversion of XO to injury will be examined by depleting XDH/XO activity in rats by three independent methods and measuring the effects on infarct volume, edema formation, cerebral blood flow and histologic injury after the MCA-carotid procedure. Rates of oxygen radical production in vivo will be measured after treatment with free radical scavengers and xanthine oxidase inhibitors. These studies will help define the role of oxygen radicals in cerebral ischemia and may lead to new therapeutic approaches in the treatment of stroke. |
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Any legal decision on whether the largest U.S. life insurer MetLife Inc MET.N should be labeled "too big to fail" will probably come after the Trump administration defines its stance on the designation.
A MetLife Inc building is shown in Irvine, California, U.S., January 24, 2017. REUTERS/Mike Blake
A U.S. appeals court said on Wednesday that a U.S. government appeal of a ruling last year that the label was wrongly applied to MetLife would remain in abeyance until further court order. The label indicates companies that are not banks are still so large and interconnected they could damage the financial system if they fail.
Both parties are to file motions on the case’s future by Nov. 17 or within 30 days of Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin issuing a report on how the government determines non-bank financial institutions are “systemically important.”
The designation, which triggers heightened oversight, is decided by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), made up of the country’s top regulators.
“This decision provides the current administration time to determine whether any of FSOC’s positions in this case should be reconsidered and whether it is appropriate for the government to continue pressing this appeal,” said MetLife spokesman Christopher Stern.
Both MetLife and the Justice Department, representing FSOC, had requested an abeyance.
Last year, U.S. District Judge Rosemary Collyer rescinded the label of MetLife. The administration of former President Barack Obama, a Democrat, then appealed. That left only two companies, American International Group AIG.N and Prudential Inc PRU.N designated as systemically important.
After taking office, President Donald Trump, a Republican, ordered Mnuchin to review the designations. Many expect Trump will use his findings as reasons to withdraw the appeal.
There is no clear legal path for him to follow because FSOC and the designations are relatively new, both established in 2010.
Since FSOC labeled MetLife with a vote, some posit it should vote on withdrawing the appeal. That could be difficult. Trump appointees such as Securities and Exchange Commission Chair Jay Clayton sit on the council alongside Obama appointees, including Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen.
Others contend Trump or Mnuchin can order the Justice Department to withdraw it.
The appeals court also denied a request from advocacy group Better Markets Inc to appoint outside attorneys to represent FSOC.
Justice is “simultaneously representing the president, the treasury secretary, the treasury department and the FSOC in connection with FSOC’s designation authority,” said Better Markets President Dennis Kelleher, adding that the White House and Treasury “appear to have one view of that authority and FSOC clearly has an opposing view.” |
Posts tagged how to make him fall in love with you
Stop listening to dating tips from your girlfriends who are not qualified to deal with your situation. They’re well intended advice may be the very reason why your relationship is not working. Advice on how to captivate a man should come from someone who is qualified to give you this valuable information. You Agree? It’s […]
You’re In! You may not know it, but you’re sbout to discover classified information. Something never released to the public! You’re responsibly for this discovery is only that you don’t abuse it, as it renders men helpless. Get ready because you’re about to become irresistible to men! This Simple Secret Will Captivate Any Man. But […] |
Author of the Queen City Boys books
Where does the time go?
I had such high hopes for this year. I had a plan, a schedule, things to do. How is it nearly half way over already? The best laid schemes o’ mice an’ men and all that. Nothing to do but gather my (few) accomplishments and push on, gentle, but not into that good night.
Obviously I’ve been reading too much poetry (is there such a thing?) but what else have I been doing? Not finishing books, that’s for sure! All right, that’s not true. I have finished a novella and it’s coming soon to an Amazon screen near you (other venues to follow eventually).
Star Quality, is a smutty little story of falling for your hot friend and his husband. In Canada! With bonus TV show production back drop. Yeah I definitely realize this isn’t everyone’s cuppa, but hey, some of you, somewhere, have been looking for really explicit m/m/m married menage, gfy/ofy fic with made up TV stars, right? If so, watch this space for details forthcoming, just as soon as there’s a cover!).
That’s an accomplishment I’m pretty proud of, but life has mostly just gotten in my way this year. Some family stuff. Some personal stuff. Then I started a new job, which is a great job, but has upheaved my life just enough to cut down writing time. I travelled to Seattle, to New York city, to San Francisco. But I’m home and I’m ready, I’m steady, I’m gonna get back to it. I have the next Queen City Boys novel, Bad Reputation about halfway done (what does that even mean?) and a good start on an as yet untitled sci-fi book. And two short stories in the making. Things are coming!
And hey, new website is happening soon too. And there’s a mailing list to go sign up for fiction updates and extras. |
Geographically localised bursts of ribosomal DNA mobility in the grasshopper Podisma pedestris.
We report extraordinary variation in the number and the chromosomal location of ribosomal DNA (rDNA) arrays within populations of the alpine grasshopper Podisma pedestris; even greater differences were found between populations. The sites were detected by in situ hybridisation of labelled rDNA to chromosomal preparations. The total number of rDNA sites in an individual varied from three to thirteen. In the most extreme case, individuals from populations only 10 km apart had no rDNA loci in common. A survey of the geographical distribution of this variation identified clusters of populations with relatively similar chromosomal distribution of rDNA loci. These clusters correspond to those identified earlier by analysis of rDNA sequences. To explain this geographical clustering, we reconstructed the post-glacial colonisation of the region by assuming that the species' distribution has ascended to its current altitudinal range as the climate warmed. The reconstruction suggests that each cluster is descended from a colonisation route up a different alpine valley. That history would imply rapid establishment of rDNA differences, conceivably during the last 10,000 years since the last glaciation. The proposal for rapid change is consistent with the extensive within-population variation, which indicates that the processes responsible for the change in rDNA's chromosomal location continue to occur at a higher rate. We discuss whether our reconstruction of colonisation routes implies movement of the hybrid zone, which would indicate that a neo-XY sex chromosome system has spread through extant populations. |
I had to pay $515 back on my tax return Because I made so much money last year
265 shares |
Q:
Python check two dates inside date range
I need to check that two dates, not in any date range on the list.
I want to find out can user check-in in dates (check_range_true - can, check_range_false - can't) or this dates already booked (in date_ranges)
I have range looks like:
date_ranges = [
['2020-1-12', '2020-1-13'],
['2020-1-14', '2020-1-15'],
['2020-1-15', '2020-1-16'],
['2020-1-16', '2020-1-18'],
['2020-1-18', '2020-1-19'],
['2020-1-21', '2020-1-23'],
['2020-1-23', '2020-1-27'],
['2020-1-30', '2020-2-1'],
['2020-2-5', '2020-2-7'],
['2020-2-7', '2020-2-9'],
['2020-2-9', '2020-2-11'],
['2020-2-14', '2020-2-18'],
['2020-2-20', '2020-2-26'],
['2020-3-26', '2020-3-30'],
['2020-5-29', '2020-5-30'],
['2020-10-10', '2021-1-15']
]
And two dates (for example)
check_range_true = ['2020-02-02', '2020-02-04']
check_range_false = ['2020-02-02', '2020-02-05']
I know how check one date in range but not understand how to solve it with two dates.
What to the best way to check these dates in a range and got results, True for the first variable (because of 2020-02-02, 2020-02-04 not "touch" range) and False for the second variable (because of 2020-02-05 is in range of ['2020-2-5', '2020-2-7'])?
A:
What you what to do is to check the dates with (start < first_date < end) and (start < end_date < end) logic
date_ranges = [
['2020-1-12', '2020-1-13'],
['2020-1-14', '2020-1-15'],
['2020-1-15', '2020-1-16'],
['2020-1-16', '2020-1-18'],
['2020-1-18', '2020-1-19'],
['2020-1-21', '2020-1-23'],
['2020-1-23', '2020-1-27'],
['2020-1-30', '2020-2-1'],
['2020-2-5', '2020-2-7'],
['2020-2-7', '2020-2-9'],
['2020-2-9', '2020-2-11'],
['2020-2-14', '2020-2-18'],
['2020-2-20', '2020-2-26'],
['2020-3-26', '2020-3-30'],
['2020-5-29', '2020-5-30'],
['2020-10-10', '2021-1-15']
]
#convert to a flat list
date_ranges = [k for i in date_ranges for k in i]
#truncate the start and the end value
date_ranges = date_ranges[1:-1]
#convert values to datetime
import datetime
date_ranges = [datetime.datetime.strptime(i, '%Y-%m-%d') for i in date_ranges]
#create available time slots
date_ranges = [[date_ranges[i],date_ranges[i+1]] for i in range(0,len(date_ranges),2)]
#convert the check date to date time
check_range = ['2020-02-02', '2020-02-04']
check_range = [datetime.datetime.strptime(i, '%Y-%m-%d') for i in check_range]
# apply the logic of start < date < end twice
any([(i[0] < check_range[0] < i[1]) and (i[0] < check_range[1] < i[1]) for i in date_ranges])
True
check_range = ['2020-02-02', '2020-02-05']
check_range = [datetime.datetime.strptime(i, '%Y-%m-%d') for i in check_range]
any([(i[0] < check_range[0] < i[1]) and (i[0] < check_range[1] < i[1]) for i in date_ranges])
False
|
Our Cosmic Space Topic!
This term we have been reading the book ‘Cosmic’. This is a story about a boy called Liam, who is so tall that his mother has to get a chair to reach up to his head and top measure it. He’s so tall, he even got mistaken for an adult and ended up going up into space!
We used the book as an inspiration in Literacy to write a short story scene about a character going to space. In addition to that, we have been making space buggies out of wood in DT that can actually move on their own! Whilst we were doing this, we learnt how they worked and why they did not have a roof – there is no weather on the moon, and it would be a waste of material!
Additionally, in French, we have been learning about the solar system using French words to describe the planets. The planets in the solar system in French are Mercure (Mecury), Vénus (Venus), La Terre (the Earth), Mars(Mars), Jupiter (Jupiter), Saturne (Saturn), Uranus (Uranus) and Neptune (Neptune).
Written by SK and NY |
[Infection in lupus nephritis: risk factors and significance of immune cell functional assay].
To explore the risk factors for infection in lupus nephritis (LN) and identify the correlation of ImmuKnow adenosine triphosphate (ATP) value with the development of infections. We respectively followed up 96 patients from January 2006 to December 2012 and all infectious episodes were recorded. The amount of ATP produced by CD4(+)T cells was measured by ImmuKnow assay and compared with the results of 27 healthy controls. Multivariate Logistic regression analysis was used to evaluate possible risk factors associated with infection in LN patients. Among them, the incidence of infection was 22.68%. The mean CD4(+)T cell ATP level was significantly lower in LN patients with infection (258 ± 112) mg/L compared to both healthy controls (521 ± 257) mg/L (P < 0.01) and LN patients without infection (437 ± 193) mg/L (P < 0.05). A cutoff CD4(+)T cell ATP value of 300 mg/L predicted infection in LN patients with a specificity of 77% and a sensitivity of 77%. Multivariate Logistic analysis revealed that lower CD4(+)T cell ATP level (<300 mg/L), higher prednisone dosage ( ≥ 20 mg/d) and hyperglycemia (>10 mmol/L) were the independent predictors of infection. And the corresponding OR values were 3.47(P < 0.01), 1.17(P = 0.03) and 1.33 (P = 0.02) respectively. ImmuKnow assay may be effective in identifying the elevated risk of infection in LN patients. And larger studies are required to establish the clinical advantages of this assay in LN treatment. |
I first played Homeworld in 1999. Sixteen years on, I remember my hours with the space strategy sim about as well as I recall the topics of my first college classes that year, which is to say barely at all. And so it's with a mix of fear and nostalgia that I enter Gearbox's little preview room for Homeworld: Remastered at PAX South—fear of looking like an idiot, and nostalgia for a part of my past that's been rejuvinated in a way I'll never be.
I needn't have worried. The two younger writers with me have never even heard of Homeworld before, and the Gearbox team itself, which acquired the rights during the big THQ selloff in 2013, seems more occupied with showing me how pretty the remastered version is than showing me gameplay. But boy, is it pretty. Gearbox has two tables set up in the small curtained room, each with two screens. On the left screen, there's the remastered version; on the right, there's the old version, and the team makes sure both start in unison. They're undoubtedly proud of their product: they'd probably shown this stuff 10 times before I showed up, and even so, I swear I hear one of them make a little clap as the cutscenes buzz to life.
The coordinated dance is a smart movie. Had I not seen the two side by side, I'm not sure I would have noticed how much had changed. Memory and imagination have a way of filling in the little details unattainable by the technology of 16 years ago, and the remastered version thus looked like the Homeworld I remembered, while the right screen looked like a rough draft.
Same vision, new sights
It's a testament to how literally the team has taken the "remastered" concept. About four minutes in, the two versions are still in a rough unison (although, fascinatingly enough, the original version seems to take slightly longer to load), and yet I see differences in every detail. The first mothership the camera zooms in on looks fine enough in its 1999 form, but on the remastered screen, the light of the stars bounces off its hull and it's pocked with the scars of past battles or passing debris. Tendrils of nebulae akin to the Pillars of Creation worm their way through the orange backgrounds; in 1999, they looked more like they could be smears on the screen.
If I'm disappointed in the slightest, it's because the earlier opening cutscene had a hand-drawn look filled with bold black strokes, sort of like it was drawn by Kevin Eastman and Peter Laird back when they were imagining amphibious mutant ninjas. The images are the same right down to their duration on the screen, but the new version seems a little too neat, too computer generated.
But on to the next table—after all, the cutscenes are such a tiny part of the experience. Homeworld is a game about space combat on an armada scale, and few games have done it better in the intervening decade and a half. To younger eyes, I imagine it looks a bit like EVE Online after the makeover, but Relic's game was created on the eve of CCP's sandbox, and its focus on coordination means it delivers a much different form of strategy.
Far too much strategy, it seems, for us to bother with in the 30 minutes I have with Gearbox. They've already set up an impressive battle on one of the other computers, forgoing the need to spend hours to build a fleet of my own. My interaction with the remastered version is actually limited to watching one of the guys with me select a bunch of ships with his mouse (including his mothership), and attacking the ships array on the other side of the void. The battle goes downhill almost as soon as it begins, and we laugh as his ship erupts into a spectacular explosion that looks like a small supernova. I can tell by fiddling with the original version next to me, though, that little has changed in the way of gameplay, although one of the team members tells me they've simplified some commands for the new version.
And boom, that's it. They shoo me out, and it's time for the next group to come in. It's hardly the most involved demonstration I've ever seen, but it's enough to establish that it's exactly what Gearbox said it is: a remaster. Fortunately, it looks like a good one, particularly since they've "merely" modernized the old games (a massive undertaking in itself).
You can pick up both the remastered and original versions of Homeworld 1 and 2 for $35/£27 on Steam on February 25, and doing so will also get you into the Homeworld Remastered Steam Multiplayer Beta. That's a good deal if you've never played them before, and from what I've seen of the remastered versions so far, I suspect they'll be worth it. |
package containerfs
import (
"archive/tar"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/archive"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/idtools"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/system"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
)
// TarFunc provides a function definition for a custom Tar function
type TarFunc func(string, *archive.TarOptions) (io.ReadCloser, error)
// UntarFunc provides a function definition for a custom Untar function
type UntarFunc func(io.Reader, string, *archive.TarOptions) error
// Archiver provides a similar implementation of the archive.Archiver package with the rootfs abstraction
type Archiver struct {
SrcDriver Driver
DstDriver Driver
Tar TarFunc
Untar UntarFunc
IDMappingsVar *idtools.IDMappings
}
// TarUntar is a convenience function which calls Tar and Untar, with the output of one piped into the other.
// If either Tar or Untar fails, TarUntar aborts and returns the error.
func (archiver *Archiver) TarUntar(src, dst string) error {
logrus.Debugf("TarUntar(%s %s)", src, dst)
tarArchive, err := archiver.Tar(src, &archive.TarOptions{Compression: archive.Uncompressed})
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer tarArchive.Close()
options := &archive.TarOptions{
UIDMaps: archiver.IDMappingsVar.UIDs(),
GIDMaps: archiver.IDMappingsVar.GIDs(),
}
return archiver.Untar(tarArchive, dst, options)
}
// UntarPath untar a file from path to a destination, src is the source tar file path.
func (archiver *Archiver) UntarPath(src, dst string) error {
tarArchive, err := archiver.SrcDriver.Open(src)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer tarArchive.Close()
options := &archive.TarOptions{
UIDMaps: archiver.IDMappingsVar.UIDs(),
GIDMaps: archiver.IDMappingsVar.GIDs(),
}
return archiver.Untar(tarArchive, dst, options)
}
// CopyWithTar creates a tar archive of filesystem path `src`, and
// unpacks it at filesystem path `dst`.
// The archive is streamed directly with fixed buffering and no
// intermediary disk IO.
func (archiver *Archiver) CopyWithTar(src, dst string) error {
srcSt, err := archiver.SrcDriver.Stat(src)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if !srcSt.IsDir() {
return archiver.CopyFileWithTar(src, dst)
}
// if this archiver is set up with ID mapping we need to create
// the new destination directory with the remapped root UID/GID pair
// as owner
rootIDs := archiver.IDMappingsVar.RootPair()
// Create dst, copy src's content into it
if err := idtools.MkdirAllAndChownNew(dst, 0755, rootIDs); err != nil {
return err
}
logrus.Debugf("Calling TarUntar(%s, %s)", src, dst)
return archiver.TarUntar(src, dst)
}
// CopyFileWithTar emulates the behavior of the 'cp' command-line
// for a single file. It copies a regular file from path `src` to
// path `dst`, and preserves all its metadata.
func (archiver *Archiver) CopyFileWithTar(src, dst string) (err error) {
logrus.Debugf("CopyFileWithTar(%s, %s)", src, dst)
srcDriver := archiver.SrcDriver
dstDriver := archiver.DstDriver
srcSt, err := srcDriver.Stat(src)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if srcSt.IsDir() {
return fmt.Errorf("Can't copy a directory")
}
// Clean up the trailing slash. This must be done in an operating
// system specific manner.
if dst[len(dst)-1] == dstDriver.Separator() {
dst = dstDriver.Join(dst, srcDriver.Base(src))
}
// The original call was system.MkdirAll, which is just
// os.MkdirAll on not-Windows and changed for Windows.
if dstDriver.OS() == "windows" {
// Now we are WCOW
if err := system.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(dst), 0700, ""); err != nil {
return err
}
} else {
// We can just use the driver.MkdirAll function
if err := dstDriver.MkdirAll(dstDriver.Dir(dst), 0700); err != nil {
return err
}
}
r, w := io.Pipe()
errC := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
defer close(errC)
errC <- func() error {
defer w.Close()
srcF, err := srcDriver.Open(src)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer srcF.Close()
hdr, err := tar.FileInfoHeader(srcSt, "")
if err != nil {
return err
}
hdr.Name = dstDriver.Base(dst)
if dstDriver.OS() == "windows" {
hdr.Mode = int64(chmodTarEntry(os.FileMode(hdr.Mode)))
} else {
hdr.Mode = int64(os.FileMode(hdr.Mode))
}
if err := remapIDs(archiver.IDMappingsVar, hdr); err != nil {
return err
}
tw := tar.NewWriter(w)
defer tw.Close()
if err := tw.WriteHeader(hdr); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := io.Copy(tw, srcF); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}()
}()
defer func() {
if er := <-errC; err == nil && er != nil {
err = er
}
}()
err = archiver.Untar(r, dstDriver.Dir(dst), nil)
if err != nil {
r.CloseWithError(err)
}
return err
}
// IDMappings returns the IDMappings of the archiver.
func (archiver *Archiver) IDMappings() *idtools.IDMappings {
return archiver.IDMappingsVar
}
func remapIDs(idMappings *idtools.IDMappings, hdr *tar.Header) error {
ids, err := idMappings.ToHost(idtools.IDPair{UID: hdr.Uid, GID: hdr.Gid})
hdr.Uid, hdr.Gid = ids.UID, ids.GID
return err
}
// chmodTarEntry is used to adjust the file permissions used in tar header based
// on the platform the archival is done.
func chmodTarEntry(perm os.FileMode) os.FileMode {
//perm &= 0755 // this 0-ed out tar flags (like link, regular file, directory marker etc.)
permPart := perm & os.ModePerm
noPermPart := perm &^ os.ModePerm
// Add the x bit: make everything +x from windows
permPart |= 0111
permPart &= 0755
return noPermPart | permPart
}
|
49 Cal.4th 846 (2010)
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ANDRE STEPHEN ALEXANDER, Defendant and Appellant.
No. S053228.
Supreme Court of California.
July 15, 2010.
*855 Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Susan Ten Kwan and Joseph Chabot, Deputy State Public Defenders; and Thomas Kallay, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson and Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Sharlene A. Honnaka, Richard T. Breen, Keith H. Borjon, John R. Gorey and Stacy S. Schwartz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
CHIN, J.โ
On June 4, 1980, Julie Cross, an agent of the United States Secret Service, was murdered in the line of duty. Over a decade later, defendant Andre Stephen Alexander was charged with Cross's murder. In 1996, a jury convicted him of first degree murder (Pen. Code, ง 187),[1] and found true allegations that he personally used a firearm and that a principal was armed with a firearm (งง 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022, subd. (a)). The jury also found true special circumstance allegations that defendant previously had been convicted of murder (ง 190.2, subd. (a)(2)) and that the murder of Cross had been committed in the course of a robbery (ง 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). At the penalty phase of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. The trial court denied a motion for a new trial and the automatic motion to modify the penalty verdict (ง 190.4, subd. (e)), and it imposed the death sentence. Appeal to this court is automatic. (ง 1239, subd. (b).) We affirm the judgment.
*856 I. FACTS
A. Guilt Phase
1. Prosecution Evidence
a. Commission of the Murder
On the evening of Wednesday, June 4, 1980, Secret Service Agents Julie Cross and Lloyd Bulman were part of a team of agents planning to serve a search warrant on a suspected counterfeiter's residence. The two were partners whose role was to prevent the suspect's escape should he try to flee when the warrant was served. They were seated in an unmarked car near the corner of Belford Avenue and Interceptor Street near the Los Angeles International Airport; Bulman was in the driver's seat, and Cross was in the front passenger's seat. Both were dressed in civilian clothes.
The agents' vehicle contained a police radio and a 12-gauge shotgun with the standard Secret Service modifications of a shortened barrel, a pistol grip, and a folding stock. A guard attached to the barrel inhibited a person from placing a hand in front of the muzzle when firing the gun. This guard was unique to shotguns the Secret Service used because it was permanently, as opposed to temporarily, attached. On the night of the murder, the shotgun was loaded with four rounds: the first and third were slugs; the second and fourth were buckshot.
Bulman testified that, at some point before it became dark, a large, brown, two-door car with a lighter colored roof and rust spots on the body slowly drove past the agents. The two African-American men in the car looked at the agents as they drove by. The driver was neatly groomed and had a mustache. The passenger wore a stocking cap and also had a mustache. Several minutes later, the same car with the same occupants again slowly drove by, this time parking a short distance away. The two men left the car and walked out of sight between an apartment building and a garage. Two to three minutes later, they returned to the car and drove away.
A short time later, after it was dark outside, Cross told Bulman she saw someone coming up behind the agents' car. The agents drew their sidearms from their holsters, and Cross got out of the car. As Bulman turned to open his door, he saw someone approach the rear of the car on the driver's side. Before Bulman could exit the car, the person opened the door and pointed a revolver at Bulman's head. Bulman recognized the man, who was wearing a *857 black leather jacket, as the driver of the brown car. The driver[2] told Bulman to raise his hands. After putting his pistol on the seat, Bulman raised his hands and identified himself as a police officer. The driver said he also was a police officer, but refused Bulman's request to allow Bulman to show his badge. He ordered Bulman to tell Cross to drop her weapon; instead, Bulman told Cross not to do so. While the driver had the revolver pressed against Bulman's temple, forcing his head toward the seat, Bulman heard Cross say, "What are you doing? Get your hands back up on the car." Bulman could not see what was happening on the other side of the car.
Several seconds later, another man appeared at the driver's door. Bulman could not see clearly who he was. While bent over, Bulman tried to use the police radio, but it did not work because the car's ignition was not turned on. Bulman again identified himself as an officer and mentioned the police radio as proof. Saying, "He's got a radio," the second man reached into the car, removed the keys from the ignition, and knocked the radio's microphone from Bulman's hand. That man then noticed the shotgun on the floor in the front of the car, said something like, "What do we have here," and took the shotgun.
Bulman testified that, almost immediately after the man with the shotgun left the driver's door and went behind the car, Cross jumped into the car through the front passenger's door. She went over the seat into the back, a panicked look on her face. A shotgun blast then came through the open passenger's door, the shot traveling across Bulman's lap and out through the driver's door.
Bulman grabbed the revolver pressed to his head and wrestled his way out of the car. As he did so, the driver fired the gun, but the bullet did not hit Bulman. While Bulman and the driver struggled on the street, Bulman heard two more shotgun blasts coming from the agents' car. The driver fired several more shots from the handgun during the struggle, but again Bulman was not hit. The struggle continued for three or four car lengths in front of the agents' car in the middle of Interceptor Street until the driver said, "Shoot the son of a bitch." After Bulman heard another person say, "I can't. You're in the way," Bulman saw the passenger aiming the agents' shotgun at him. The passenger was wearing a dark stocking cap and a dark-colored jacket.
Bulman and the driver next wrestled in the opposite direction, behind and past the agents' car, each trying to put the other's body towards the shotgun as the passenger tried to get a clear shot at Bulman. Near the corner of *858 Interceptor and Belford, Bulman lost his balance and fell. As Bulman tried to get up, the passenger ran over and put the shotgun muzzle about six inches from Bulman's head. The passenger fired the weapon, but the shot missed Bulman and hit the pavement. The assailants then ran off.
When he realized he had not been shot, Bulman went to the car to get his pistol and check on Cross. She was lying on the backseat and had no pulse. Bulman ran to a Secret Service surveillance van parked nearby. He and Agent Terry Torrey, who was stationed in the van, then drove back to the car. Bulman did not see the shotgun, the keys to the agents' car, or Cross's pistol again.
Bulman was interviewed by agents that night and on numerous occasions in the following days, months, and years. He worked with a police sketch artist on June 6, 1980, and completed composite drawings of the suspects that were introduced into evidence at trial. Several of the interview sessions involved attempts to hypnotize Bulman in the hope of helping him to remember other details of the crime.
At a live lineup conducted on June 27, 1980, Bulman identified one subject, Terry Brock, as looking similar to the driver, the man with whom Bulman had struggled, except the person in the lineup had a beard. Bulman was unable to identify defendant Alexander as the passenger who fired the shotgun during a live lineup conducted on April 19, 1990, at the preliminary hearing, or at the trial. However, at trial, Bulman testified a picture of defendant Alexander taken around 1980 looked "closest" to the person with the shotgun, who was depicted on the left side of the composite sketch trial exhibit.
Agent Torrey testified that, minutes before Bulman ran to the surveillance van, he had seen a medium- to dark-colored car speeding on Belford Avenue with its lights off.
Wayne Dhaler was driving his car at the intersection of Belford and Interceptor at 9:00 p.m. the night of the murder. He testified he saw two men, one wearing a tan or brown jacket, leaning into the driver's side door of a car parked on the street.
Alvin Borges drove by the same area about the same time. He testified he saw two African-American men fighting with a White man who was on the ground. Borges saw one of the men shoot the man on the ground at almost pointblank range with a shotgun. The shooter, who used his right hand to pull the trigger and his left to hold the barrel, was wearing a brown, waist-length jacket. Borges testified the jacket later seized from defendant's parents' home "could be consistent" with the one the shooter had worn.
*859 Harry Zisko testified he heard shots that evening while in his Belford Avenue apartment. He saw two men running down the street, one carrying a two-inch-diameter cylinder that was between one and one and a half feet long. Zisko heard metal hitting metal as they ran. Ten to 20 seconds later, a car waiting near the curb with its lights on pulled into the street, briefly went out of control, and then sped away with its lights off.
Frank Kerr, who lived on Belford Avenue, testified that, at approximately 9:00 p.m., he heard shouting, gunfire, and two people running on his street. Kerr then saw Bulman at the Secret Service car. When Bulman left, Kerr checked on Cross, saw she had been shot in the chest, and unsuccessfully tried to find any sign of life. Kerr stated that a person could go through a breezeway between apartment buildings on Interceptor and wind up at an ivy-covered chain-link fence that was "next to where the Secret Service car was on the night of June 4th." Kerr added that a person could "come around" the fence onto the street where the Secret Service car had been parked.
b. Crime Scene Evidence
Analysis of the crime scene, the agents' car, and Cross's body indicated the first round fired from the shotgun, a slug, entered the front passenger door and exited through the driver's door. Cross was then shot with a round of buckshot likely fired from outside the front passenger's door. She next was shot in the chest at close range with the third round, another slug, which exited her back and traveled through the seat and floorboard. This shot probably was fired while the shooter leaned over the front seat and shot almost straight down. Each shotgun wound Cross suffered would have been fatal.
Los Angeles Police Detective Marvin Engquist testified there was a fine mist of blood splattered on the back of the front seat that was not captured on the crime scene photographs of the dark upholstery. Rod Englert, a crime scene reconstruction and bloodstain expert, testified the shotgun and the person who shot Cross would have been splattered with a fine mist of blood caused by the close-range shot into her chest.
Eyeglass frames, a broken eyeglass lens, and an eyeglass case were found in the street 57 feet in front of the agents' car and 13 feet from the curb. Agent Torrey interviewed people living in buildings nearby, but was unable to find anyone who owned the recovered eyeglasses.
The parties stipulated that on June 20, 1980, a Secret Service agent using a metal detector found a .38-caliber bullet buried in the ground between the sidewalk and chain-link fence on Interceptor, some distance in front of where *860 the agents' car had been parked. They also stipulated that the custodian of records at the Los Angeles County Coroner's Office determined there was no other reported homicide near the Los Angeles International Airport on June 4, 1980.
c. Search of Defendant's Parents' House
On November 12, 1990, Los Angeles Police Detective Richard Henry served a search warrant at the home of defendant's parents. He found a brown leather jacket (the jacket) and a knit cap in a closet that defendant's mother said contained defendant's belongings. Henry also found a 1987 postcard addressed to defendant that reminded him to pick up his eyeglasses from an optometrist. Bulman testified the cap found in the closet was similar to the one worn by the passenger; "presumptive tests," providing a preliminary indication whether or not blood might be present on the hat, were negative.
Los Angeles Police Department Crime Laboratory technicians also conducted two presumptive tests, a phenolphthalein and a luminol test, for the presence of blood on the jacket. The tests resulted in positive reactions on a stain on the left sleeve and small pinpoint spots in the chest area. The parties stipulated the jacket was sent to another laboratory for further tests to confirm the presence of blood, that one "vigorous" swabbing of the sleeve's stain again resulted in a positive result in a presumptive test, but that other tests to confirm the presence of human blood on the jacket were negative. The parties stipulated the negative results in the confirmation tests could mean the jacket had (1) nonhuman blood on it, (2) only a trace amount of blood insufficient to yield a confirmatory result, or (3) no human blood on it. The parties also stipulated that a Federal Bureau of Investigation analyst determined there was insufficient DNA on the jacket for testing. The owner of the company that manufactured the jacket testified it was made no later than 1976, and would have been sold soon afterwards.
Harold Ross, the optometrist who prepared defendant's eyeglasses in 1987 and sent the reminder postcard, testified defendant's prescription was to correct nearsightedness. Another optometrist, Richard Hopping, examined the glasses found at the scene and determined the lens prescription corrected nearsightedness and would be especially helpful for driving at night. Both optometrists testified a change in a person's lens prescription like the difference between the lens found at the scene and defendant's prescription seven years later would be possible.
d. Defendant's Refusal to Stand in a Lineup
On April 3, 1990, defendant was directed to stand in a live lineup related to the Cross murder investigation. A deputy at the jail testified that defendant, *861 who refused to stand in the lineup and became "boisterous" and "belligerent," signed a refusal form notifying him that the lineup was for the purpose of either eliminating or identifying him as a suspect involved in a crime and that his refusal to participate could be used in court to indicate "guilty knowledge." The form provided a space for defendant to explain his refusal. Defendant told the deputy he was refusing on "the advice of his attorney." Bernard Rosen, defendant's attorney in another matter, testified he had advised defendant to refuse to stand in the lineup but had added that defendant would have to participate if a judge so ordered. On April 19, 1990, pursuant to a court order, defendant did participate in a lineup at which Bulman failed to identify him.
e. Terry Brock
Defendant's sister, Darcel Taylor, testified defendant and Terry Brock, the person whom Bulman identified as looking like the driver suspect in the murder, knew each other around the time of the Cross murder.[3] The Brock and Alexander families had been neighbors when Taylor was young, and defendant and Terry became "associates" after defendant and Jessica Brock had a child together. Taylor did not know whether defendant and Terry were "close associates" in 1980; she saw Terry "very seldom[ly]" in 1980 and 1981.
In February 1991, Taylor wrote to Terry asking whether he had been talking to the police about defendant. She did so because defendant had told her he was concerned that Terry was talking to the police about him, and he wanted Taylor to try to contact Terry to learn if that was true.[4]
April Watson, who had been Terry's girlfriend for several years, told Detective Henry that defendant contacted her in August and October of 1990, concerned that Terry might be talking to police. Defendant wanted Watson to find out where Terry was and to tell him to "stay strong." Henry confirmed that he and other officers had transported Terry from the Los Angeles County jail on several occasions in August and September of 1990.
Yvette Curtis, Terry's girlfriend from approximately 1977 to 1982, testified she met defendant through Terry around 1978 and had a brief affair with *862 defendant in 1978 or 1979. During the affair, Curtis took a trip with defendant in which he drove a large truck north of Los Angeles to a place where the truck was unloaded. Defendant had worn glasses when driving at night. The frames of those glasses and their case were similar to the frames and case found at the crime scene. About a month after the trip, Terry confronted defendant about the affair and repeatedly hit defendant in the head with the butt of a gun. Despite that altercation, Curtis continued to see Terry and defendant together on occasion, and she knew they were associates at the time Cross was murdered.
Curtis testified that, just before 11:00 p.m. on June 4, 1980, Terry came to her apartment, looking nervous or excited. He said he needed "to watch the news" about the female Secret Service agent who was murdered "by the airport." Curtis added that she had seen Terry with a .38-caliber revolver two weeks before the murder.
Defendant's address book, recovered by law enforcement in May 1991, contained a telephone number for Terry Brock and April Watson.
f. Defendant's Employment at Swift Foods
Both Arthur Jackson and defendant drove trucks for Swift Foods in Los Angeles in 1980. Jackson testified defendant drove a particular tractor-trailer truck for deliveries to San Francisco and that the truck would be gone on Monday and Thursday mornings when Jackson came to work. On a few occasions, Jackson was at work when defendant returned from San Francisco on Tuesday and Friday evenings. Jackson had seen defendant driving a medium-sized faded brown car with a lighter colored top.
Richard Lamirande, warehouse manager at Swift Foods from 1977 to 1979, testified that, during those years, defendant usually left Sunday night to make a delivery to San Francisco and returned Tuesday afternoon, left Thursday morning to make another delivery and returned Friday afternoon. Lamirande said the seized jacket looked like one defendant wore while they worked at Swift Foods.
g. Jessica Brock
Jessica Brock, Terry's sister, had a child by defendant in May 1978. Her testimony varied between direct and cross-examination and was inconsistent with her various prior out-of-court statements to police and the defense. The version most helpful to the prosecution was based primarily on a statement she gave police in 1990. In that version, Jessica said defendant came to her apartment after midnight the night of the Cross murder with "blood spatters, *863 little specks of blood" on his chest and left arm and was carrying a bag containing what looked like a dark "crowbar" and a wooden object that could have been the butt of a handgun. He washed blood off of the crowbar-like object, was very concerned about whether police were outside the apartment, and told Jessica he had had to "take somebody out" near the airport, that "it was either him or them." When police later showed Jessica the barrel of a Secret Service shotgun with its unique handguard, she said it was "exactly" the same item she had seen defendant carry and clean that night. She said around 1980 defendant often wore knit caps similar to the one seized from his parents' house. Jessica testified her relationship with defendant ended because he had an affair with Eileen Smith.
Jessica felt pressured by defendant's family and her own family not to testify. She testified defendant's mother told her she was the prosecution's star witness and there was no case against defendant without her testimony.
2. Defense Evidence
Beverly Perry and Luis Jimenez, both employees of Swift Foods, testified they did not see defendant wearing eyeglasses around 1980. Carlos Jimenez also worked at Swift Foods; he testified he did not recall seeing defendant wear glasses around 1980.
In 1980, Nina Miller was the girlfriend of Charles Brock, brother of Terry and Jessica. Miller testified, and earlier had given a statement to police to the same effect, that in the early morning hours of June 5, 1980, she, Charles, and others picked up a friend at the Venice Police Station and returned to the friend's apartment. Terry was waiting at the apartment building, lying in his car. Once inside, Terry participated in sawing off the barrel of a shotgun and demonstrated shooting that gun, saying "This is how I shot it." Miller said that, at a later date, she heard Charles say "the Secret Service agent must have played dead" because the agent had not picked Charles out of a lineup. She added that Charles once described to her a shotgun with a folding stock like the Secret Service shotgun.
Eileen Smith had a romantic relationship with defendant and lived with him in 1980. She testified she never saw defendant wear prescription glasses before 1981, when she helped him buy a pair. She said in 1980 defendant drove a black Buick Park Avenue and that he sometimes had made deliveries for Swift Foods in the middle of the week and was gone on Wednesdays. She said there were other jackets in the closet Detective Henry searched, and that some clothes in it belonged to her, her son, and defendant's brother. Smith testified that defendant did not "hang out" with Terry after Terry hit defendant in the head with a gun.
*864 Defendant's father testified Jessica Brock told him she had lied in her statements to police after they had threatened her but that she would tell the truth at trial. He denied ever having contacted witnesses to pressure them not to testify or to change their testimony, although the prosecutor cross-examined him regarding his contacts with various witnesses in the case. He also denied previously trying to "pay off" a witness in a case against defendant involving a person named Dorothy Tyre.
Former Los Angeles Police Detective Michael Thies testified that, in Bulman's statements to police after the murder, Bulman did not say the struggle with the driver initially occurred in front of the agents' car. Bulman's description of the suspect with the shotgun contained in Thies's report and the all points bulletin Thies issued did not include that that suspect had a mustache, although the final composite of that individual did. Thies said he believed Bulman told him during their initial interview that the suspect with the shotgun had a mustache, but he agreed that he normally would have included such an important detail in his notes and the bulletin if Bulman had so stated. Secret Service Agent Frank Renzi testified his notes of Bulman's description of the suspect with the shotgun similarly did not include mention of a mustache, but he added that he might not have heard that part of Bulman's description of that suspect. Renzi's notes indicated that Bulman did describe the other suspect as having a neatly trimmed moustache.
3. Prosecution Rebuttal Evidence
Kevin McHugh worked at Swift Foods between 1977 and 1980. He testified he twice saw defendant wearing eyeglasses while reading.
Detective Henry testified that, in a call intercepted pursuant to a court-authorized wiretap, defendant's mother told Eileen Smith that, at defendant's request, she was listing things she wanted Smith to remember for her testimony that might help defeat a pending motion in the case. Henry also testified that the closet he searched appeared to contain only defendant's clothes. Henry added that, shown the barrel of a Secret Service shotgun, Jessica Brock told him it was the object she had seen defendant "washing the blood off of." Henry also testified Jessica described a square wooden bottom of the "gun butt" of a revolver as the object she saw protruding from the bag defendant brought to her apartment on June 5, 1980.
Dorothy Tyre testified defendant took coins, checks, a purse, and a wallet from her on December 17, 1972. Tyre said she pressed charges against defendant despite his parents' attempts to persuade her not to do so.
*865 4. The Special Circumstances Allegations
During a bifurcated portion of the guilt trial, the prosecution, in support of the prior-murder special-circumstance allegation, presented defendant's certified prison records and fingerprint records, which established that on July 19, 1990, he was convicted of three counts of first degree murder.[5] Detective Henry, the investigating officer in that case, testified he was in court when the jury convicted defendant of those murders. During this part of the trial, the prosecution did not present any new evidence related to the robbery-murder special circumstance, and no defense evidence was presented.
B. Penalty Phase
1. Prosecution Evidence
The prosecution presented evidence concerning six prior incidents of defendant's criminal behavior. On April 8, 1970, defendant was stopped for driving an unsafe car that was too low to the ground. Defendant was verbally abusive to the police officers. He was arrested after he tried to run away when they issued him a ticket. On December 17, 1972, defendant and another person, both armed with revolvers, entered Dorothy Tyre's home and robbed her of several items. This incident led to defendant's conviction on July 17, 1973, for first degree robbery and first degree burglary, with an enhancement for being armed with a firearm. On May 30, 1977, defendant was part of a crowd of bystanders who interfered with police officers in the process of arresting two men. Defendant had to be handcuffed and placed in a patrol car so that the officers could complete the arrest safely. On July 25, 1984, defendant shot James Williams in the arm for no apparent reason. The two men lived in the same apartment complex. On April 9, 1988, while incarcerated in a Los Angeles County jail, defendant struck a sheriff's deputy and held him in a chokehold. Other deputies had to physically subdue defendant. The prosecution also presented several photographs of the crime scene and the victims in the triple murder of which defendant was convicted in 1990. Two of the victims had been shot in the head.
Cheryl Meyers, a San Diego Police Department captain who had worked with Julie Cross before she joined the Secret Service, Cross's older brother, and Agent Bulman testified about Agent Cross and the impact her death had on them. Bulman then testified about how he personally was affected by the events of June 4, 1980.
*866 2. Defense Evidence
Deputy Sheriff Dave Sher testified defendant caused no problems and served as spokesman for inmates on his row while confined in the county jail during the trial proceedings. Lazaro Simone, a jail inmate, testified defendant was helpful and generous toward other inmates and was respectful toward jail staff.
Defendant's parents, two siblings, four children, current and former girlfriends Debra Edwards and Eileen Smith, and a family friend testified consistently with each other concerning defendant's history. They described him as a loving and supportive son, brother, and father who fell into trouble due to drug use and associating with the wrong people. Defendant voluntarily entered a drug treatment program in approximately 1984. These witnesses, and an officer of the Swift Foods corporation while defendant worked there, described defendant as a hard and conscientious worker. Defendant's family members testified that, in their view, defendant did not deserve the death penalty.
Defendant recounted his personal history and tried to explain or minimize his culpability in the criminal incidents the prosecution presented in aggravation. He denied committing the triple murder and the murder of Agent Cross.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Pretrial Claims
1. Denial of Motion to Appoint Madelynn Kopple As Trial Counsel
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request to continue Madelynn Kopple's appointment as his attorney and thereby violated his state and federal right to the assistance of counsel.[6] In *867 response to the People's claim that review of this decision is barred by the "law of the case" doctrine, he claims the doctrine does not apply because "exceptional circumstances" justify review, namely that the Court of Appeal's decision is "manifestly unjust." (See England v. Hospital of Good Samaritan (1939) 14 Cal.2d 791, 795 [97 P.2d 813].)
a. Background
On October 1, 1992, defendant was remanded into custody for the Cross murder. He asserted his rights under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S.Ct. 2525], and was granted leave to proceed in propria persona. Attorney Madelynn Kopple was appointed as advisory counsel. On March 10, 1993, she submitted an attorney substitution form, seeking to have herself appointed as attorney of record. She withdrew her request once told she could not be appointed and receive payment for her services without following local requirements for capital appointments, including that the public defender and alternate defense counsel first decline appointment and that the appointment must be filled by an attorney on the Central District's death penalty "bar panel."
The preliminary hearing was set for July 13, 1993. Kopple filed four motions prior to that date: a motion to continue the hearing; a 45-page motion to strike the prior-murder special-circumstance allegation; an 11-page motion to suppress testimony of witnesses who were hypnotized during the police investigation; and a 10-page motion to dismiss the case for prejudicial prearrest delay. Kopple signed these motions as defendant's "advisory counsel." Defendant did not sign them.
The motion to continue was based on the fact that Kopple was scheduled to be in trial on an unrelated case. At the May 24, 1993 hearing on that motion, Kopple said she was appearing "on behalf of" defendant, and she referred to this motion and the motion to strike as motions that "I filed." Other than agreeing to the continuance, defendant said nothing at that hearing.
At a hearing on July 7, 1993, Kopple appeared without defendant and said he would be making a motion to substitute her as attorney of record. She presented declarations from the public defender and alternate defense counsel stating they would not represent defendant because of conflicts of interest. Despite acknowledging what the court described as a "hullabaloo" regarding *868 her qualifications, Kopple represented that she was on the "bar panel" and qualified to receive a special circumstances appointment, and that she understood it was "mandatory" that the court appoint her because she had been advisory counsel for over six months. She added, "I'm thoroughly familiar with the case," defendant "wants me as lead counsel," and, if she were not appointed as counsel of record, defendant would not be ready to proceed with the preliminary hearing scheduled to start the following week.
On July 12, 1993, defendant filed a motion to substitute Kopple as counsel of record; the next day, the court indicated it had told the court clerk that Kopple "would qualify to serve as counsel," granted the motion, and terminated defendant's in propria persona status. Kopple represented defendant during the preliminary hearing, after which the court denied the motion to strike the prior-murder special-circumstance allegation and denied, without prejudice, the motion to dismiss for delay. The court excluded no testimony based on a witness's having been hypnotized.
Defendant was bound over to superior court and, on August 2, 1993, he was arraigned before Judge Ito. Kopple appeared with defendant but did not mention that she had been appointed as counsel in municipal court. Judge Ito assigned the matter to Judge Horan for trial. Later that morning, when Judge Horan questioned her status as appointed counsel, Kopple said she had been appointed in municipal court and assumed her appointment would continue. Judge Horan returned the matter to Judge Ito to clarify Kopple's status because she was "not on the list," presumably a reference to "the Superior Court's approved list of death penalty case attorneys." That afternoon, Judge Ito commented that he had assumed Kopple "was privately retained since she had announced ready to proceed with the arraignment and did not request to be appointed to represent [defendant]." Kopple reiterated that she had not mentioned her status as appointed counsel because she assumed the appointment automatically would continue. Judge Ito relieved her because, he said, given the charge, "this is something I have to refer to our contract," presumably another reference to the arrangements for appointments in special circumstances cases. Kopple then produced written opposition to her removal as defendant's attorney. When Judge Ito took the opposition under submission and set a hearing for the next day, Kopple noted that she had filed a motion for the appointment of Attorney Barry Levin as cocounsel and asked the court to consider that motion as well. Judge Ito conducted an in camera hearing on August 3, 1993, after which he appointed Attorney Penelope Watson as defendant's counsel, subject to her evaluation of whether she could accept the appointment and to Judge Ito's continued consideration of defendant's opposition to Kopple's removal.
Judge Ito issued a written order declining to appoint Kopple as defendant's attorney, noting that she had applied for, but was denied, admission to "the *869 Superior Court's approved list of death penalty case attorneys." The order expressed concern that Kopple had acted inappropriately as de facto counsel of record in municipal court, by improperly "billing for services not necessary or authorized," including filing the motion to strike a special circumstance allegation, and generally preparing for trial, when she had been appointed only as advisory counsel for the preliminary hearing. The order noted that Kopple submitted bills totaling over $50,000 for work as advisory counsel for the period up to one month before the preliminary hearing, an amount Judge Ito found to be "excessive." Judge Ito found that Kopple's actions "operated as a subterfuge to allow [defendant] to retain the in custody privileges" afforded a self-represented defendant while having counsel "present [his] case." The order noted that defendant based his preference for Kopple's appointment on no "specific or unique reason" other than his trust and confidence in her. Finding no indication that "Kopple alone possesses a quality or talent necessary to represent [defendant]," and that the credibility and substance of the "claim of preference" was "undermine[]d" by his agreeing to the motion to appoint Cocounsel Levin, who had "no prior contact with either the case or [defendant]," Judge Ito continued Watson's appointment and referred the case to the trial court.
On August 17, 1993, defendant challenged Judge Ito's refusal to continue Kopple's appointment by filing a petition for writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal. That court denied the writ because the supplied record was insufficient for adequate review, and because, based on the record provided, defendant failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion. We granted the petition for review and transferred the matter to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its order denying mandate and to issue an alternative writ to be heard before that court. After briefing and oral argument, the Court of Appeal denied the petition, concluding the trial court had not abused its discretion. (Alexander v. Superior Court (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 901 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 732].) The Court of Appeal denied defendant's petition for rehearing, and, on May 19, 1994, we denied defendant's petition for review and request for depublication of the decision.
While the mandate petition was under review, defendant filed two motions in the trial court pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 [84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44] (Marsden), to have Watson removed from serving as his attorney. After those motions were denied, defendant filed a new motion to proceed in propria persona, which was granted on March 30, 1994. On April 13, 1994, Attorney Robert Gerstein was appointed for the limited purpose of filing a motion for reconsideration of the order removing Kopple, and Attorney Rowan Klein was appointed as advisory counsel for defendant in the trial proceedings.
*870 The motion for reconsideration was supported by new declarations by Kopple, defendant, his father and sister, Attorneys Richard Millard, Howard Gillingham, Barry Levin, and Gigi Gordon, and a report by Dr. Samuel Miles, a psychiatrist who "explore[d] [defendant's] motivation" for wanting Kopple to represent him. After a hearing on the motion, in a written order filed June 13, 1994, Judge Ito denied the motion because the "purported cost savings, while usually an important factor, does not override the court's previously expressed concerns for the integrity of the [appointment] process in this particular case under these unique circumstances." The court considered that, at the time of its original ruling removing Kopple, she made "unprofessional" comments about the trial court and Court of Appeal, and that she unsuccessfully had applied for admission to the Orange County Superior Court's capital case attorney panel. Judge Ito also found that the new report and Dr. Miles's comments amounted to "an embellishment of comments already made" and failed to demonstrate special circumstances that "require[d]" him to appoint Kopple.
On July 26, 1994, at defendant's request, Klein was appointed as counsel of record. Klein represented defendant through the completion of the trial.
b. Discussion
(1) "The law of the case doctrine states that when, in deciding an appeal, an appellate court `states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, that principle or rule becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the lower court and upon subsequent appeal . . ., and this although in its subsequent consideration this court may be clearly of the opinion that the former decision is erroneous in that particular.' [Citations.]" (Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 892-893 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 728, 838 P.2d 250].) The doctrine "can apply to pretrial writ proceedings. When the appellate court issues an alternative writ, the matter is fully briefed, there is an opportunity for oral argument, and the cause is decided by a written opinion. The resultant holding establishes law of the case upon a later appeal from the final judgment." (Id. at p. 894.)
Here, defendant sought review of the initial order removing Kopple from the case by filing a pretrial petition for writ of mandate. An alternative writ issued, the Court of Appeal decided the matter in a published opinion, and we denied review. The Court of Appeal's conclusion that the trial court's initial order was not an abuse of discretion is law of the case. The claim that we should nonetheless revisit this order based on "exceptional circumstances" fails because defendant, in essence, simply asks us to reweigh the evidence presented below. (See People v. Martinez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 673, 683-688 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 648, 74 P.3d 748] [law of the case doctrine applies unless *871 existing principles have been manifestly misapplied, resulting in substantial injustice, or intervening decisions have clarified the law].)
However, the law of the case doctrine does not bar review of the trial court's denial of the motion for reconsideration, which addressed new evidence and arguments and was not the subject of review. (Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 442 ["the law-of-the-case doctrine governs only the principles of law laid down by an appellate court, . . . and it controls the outcome [in subsequent proceedings] only to the extent the evidence is substantially the same"].) We therefore review the denial of the motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion. (Drumgo v. Superior Court (1973) 8 Cal.3d 930, 934-935 [106 Cal.Rptr. 631, 506 P.2d 1007] ["appointment of counsel to represent an indigent rests . . . in the sound discretion of the trial court . . ."]; see also Harris v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 786, 799 [140 Cal.Rptr. 318, 567 P.2d 750] (Harris) [trial court abused its discretion when considerations in support of appointment "heavily outweighed" contrary factors, such that "only one conclusion [was] possible"]; People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1187 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811] [trial court does not abuse its discretion when nothing in the record demonstrates "the relationship between defendant and [requested counsel] ever approached the depth of the relationship between the petitioners and their requested counsel in Harris"].) Although, under the law of the case, we do not directly review the initial decision to remove Kopple, our review of the denial of the motion for reconsideration requires that we evaluate the reasons underlying the initial order to the extent the court weighed defendant's new evidence and arguments against its "previously expressed concerns for the integrity of the process."
(2) As we recently stated, the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution guarantees the right to the assistance of counsel for a defense, but this guarantee "is subject to an important limitation, however: `[T]he right to counsel of choice does not extend to defendants who require counsel to be appointed for them.' [Citation.]" (People v. Noriega (2010) 48 Cal.4th 517, 522 [108 Cal.Rptr.3d 74, 229 P.3d 1].) Similarly, the "`state Constitution does not give an indigent defendant the right to select a court-appointed attorney,' but a trial court may abuse its discretion in refusing to appoint an attorney `with whom the defendant has a long-standing relationship.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 523.) In deciding whether a particular attorney should be appointed to represent an indigent defendant, a trial court considers subjective factors such as a defendant's preference for, and trust and confidence in, that attorney, as well as objective factors such as the attorney's special familiarity with the case and any efficiencies of time and expense the attorney's appointment would create. (People v. Chavez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 334, 346 [161 Cal.Rptr. 762, 605 P.2d 401].) Defendant was not asking to retain counsel of his own choosing. (3) However, even in cases involving the defendant's *872 constitutional right to retain an attorney of his choosing, that right can be forced to yield if the court determines the appointment at issue will result "in a disruption of the orderly processes of justice unreasonable under the circumstances of the particular case." (People v. Crovedi (1966) 65 Cal.2d 199, 208 [53 Cal.Rptr. 284, 417 P.2d 868]; see People v. Jones (2004) 33 Cal.4th 234, 244-245 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 579, 91 P.3d 939] [removal, against a defendant's wishes, of defense counsel because of potential conflict of interest does not violate our state Const.].) A trial court has "wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel of choice against the needs of fairness [citation] and against the demands of its calendar [citation]. The court has, moreover, an `independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them.' [Citation.]" (United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez (2006) 548 U.S. 140, 152 [165 L.Ed.2d 409, 126 S.Ct. 2557].)
Here, it was apparent to Judge Ito that, although Kopple had planned to become counsel of record since at least March 10, 1993, she did not pursue appointment at that time and chose to continue as "advisory counsel" because payment for her services as lead counsel was not guaranteed. The court reasonably found that Kopple nonetheless prepared the case as though she would represent defendant as lead counsel at the preliminary hearing and beyond, billing an inordinate number of hours for her advisory role in proceedings prior to that hearing. A week before the scheduled hearing, Kopple renewed her request for appointment as lead counsel, having taken steps to ensure she would be paid, while notifying the municipal court that defendant, who on the record was his own attorney, would be unprepared to proceed if she were not appointed. Judge Ito reasonably was concerned that Kopple had acted as de facto counsel of record without seeking permission, and perhaps had done so to allow defendant to maintain his in propria persona status in jail while being represented. In addition, Judge Ito reasonably considered Kopple's conduct at defendant's arraignment and subsequent hearings the same morning that called into question her ethics and honesty as an officer of the court.[7] Judge Ito also reasonably questioned Kopple's fitness for the appointment based on events that occurred after her removal from the case. Although the record does not contain the "unprofessional" comments Kopple made after denial of defendant's mandate petition, defendant's counsel for the motion to reconsider described them as "very unfortunate" and regrettable. The court similarly reasonably recognized that the denial of *873 Kopple's application for admission to Orange County Superior Court's capital case appointment panel weakened her claim of fitness for appointment, as did the fact that she previously had been denied admission to the capital case panel in the Los Angeles County Superior Court.
The court reasonably found the evidence assertedly showing that defendant personally preferred Kopple as his attorney, and that her appointment would create time and monetary savings, did not outweigh concerns about the integrity of the judicial process in this case. That finding revealed no "`arbitrary determination, capricious disposition or whimsical thinking.'" (Harris, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 796.) The court correctly noted that, unlike the circumstances in Harris, Kopple's claim of special familiarity with the charges against defendant did not extend beyond this very case; it also pointed out that to give weight to the fact Kopple was familiar with the evidence and allegedly could proceed to trial more quickly and at less cost than newly appointed counsel could reward her for improperly acting as de facto lead counsel while appointed only as advisory counsel. Furthermore, the court properly found nothing in the record to indicate defendant's trust and confidence in Kopple or her role in preparing his defense was so unique that his right to effective assistance would be affected negatively if Kopple did not represent him.[8] In addition, as the court noted, the fact that defendant acquiesced in Kopple's request for the appointment of Cocounsel Levin, an attorney with whom defendant had no apparent prior relationship, weakened his claim that he could trust only Kopple to handle his defense. In that regard, we note that defendant's supposed difficulty in trusting and cooperating with any attorney other than Kopple appears to have evaporated once the issue of her representation was not being pursued and Attorney Klein was appointed as lead counsel at defendant's request.
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to reconsider its order removing Kopple. Because we conclude there was no abuse of discretion, we do not consider whether defendant was prejudiced by Kopple's absence from the case or whether any error in removing her would have been reversible without showing prejudice.
*874 2. Denial of Motion to Dismiss Based on Delay in Bringing Charges
Agent Cross was murdered on June 4, 1980, but defendant was not charged with this crime until October 1, 1992. He contends the trial court violated his state and federal rights to due process and a fair trial by denying his motion to dismiss the charges because of this delay.
(4) "Delay in prosecution that occurs before the accused is arrested or the complaint is filed may constitute a denial of the right to a fair trial and to due process of law under the state and federal Constitutions. A defendant seeking to dismiss a charge on this ground must demonstrate prejudice arising from the delay. The prosecution may offer justification for the delay, and the court considering a motion to dismiss balances the harm to the defendant against the justification for the delay. [Citations.]" (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 107 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357].) "`In the balancing process, the defendant has the initial burden of showing some prejudice before the prosecution is required to offer any reason for the delay [citations]. The showing of prejudice requires some evidence and cannot be presumed. [Citations.]'" (People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 37 [249 Cal.Rptr. 119, 756 P.2d 843].)
On appeal defendant challenges the trial court's finding that the loss of three types of evidence due to the delay in filing the charges did not prejudice him. The lost evidence included audio recordings of interview sessions at which investigators tried to hypnotize Agent Bulman and other witnesses; medical records from an unknown optometrist who may have prescribed defendant glasses in 1981; and swabs used in the presumptive phenolphthalein blood test on the seized jacket. The challenged finding of no prejudice was made after a hearing on the motion to dismiss at which defendant and other witnesses testified. With regard to the items addressed on appeal, we conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that defendant failed to prove prejudice, and the trial court therefore properly denied the motion as to those items. (See People v. Hill (1984) 37 Cal.3d 491, 499 [209 Cal.Rptr. 323, 691 P.2d 989] [prejudice, a factual question for the trial court, is reviewed for substantial evidence].)[9]
*875 a. Audiotapes of Hypnosis Sessions
Various witnesses involved in this case, including Agent Bulman, attended interview sessions conducted by the Los Angeles Police Department during which an interviewer attempted to hypnotize them. The parties disputed whether any such attempt at hypnosis was successful, particularly focusing on whether Bulman ever was hypnotized. (See, post, pt. II.A.4.) Audio recordings of the sessions were made. Police Captain Michael Nielsen testified at the pretrial motions hearing that he was in charge of periodically reviewing the department's inventory of recordings of hypnosis sessions and deciding whether to retain or erase the tapes. In 1984, Nielsen decided the tapes of hypnosis sessions from this case should be erased because the reports indicated that no information not already known from prior interviews had resulted from the sessions, and, in Nielsen's view, the tapes were of no evidentiary value because investigators present at the sessions would have taken notes and prepared reports of what transpired.[10] Nielsen did not listen to the tapes before ordering their destruction.
Defendant contends the destruction of the tapes prejudiced him because they contained statements about what witnesses saw or heard about the murder, and the tapes of Bulman's sessions may have helped show that Bulman had been hypnotized, which would have aided defendant's motion to preclude Bulman from testifying at trial. Neither contention is persuasive. To the extent defendant argues the tapes may have included statements not contained in, or that contradicted, the investigators' reports or witnesses' testimony at the preliminary hearing or trial, his claim is based on speculation, not proof of actual prejudice. To the extent the tapes contained the same statements contained in the reports and testimony of the witnesses, they would have been cumulative. To the extent the reports and witness testimony conflicted, defendant was able to point out the inconsistencies to the jury without the tapes. Although, as even Nielsen testified, it might have been preferable to save the tapes, defendant has not demonstrated that he actually was prejudiced by their destruction.
b. Record of 1981 Eyeglass Prescription
Defendant testified at the hearing that he did not wear prescription eyeglasses before 1981 or 1982, when he went to an eye doctor on Van Nuys Boulevard. Defense investigators testified they were unable to locate any records regarding defendant's 1981 or 1982 prescription for eyeglasses from *876 any optometrist who practiced in that area during that time period. Defendant argues he was prejudiced because the optometrist's records may have indicated the glasses he received in 1981 or 1982 were his first prescription eyeglasses, from which he could argue that those found at the murder scene could not have been his.
Defendant's claim that the missing records might establish his first eyeglass prescription was in 1981 or 1982 is based on speculation. It is questionable whether defendant sufficiently established that these records ever existed, whether or not they confirmed when he first wore prescription eyeglasses. The only evidence supporting a claim that he bought prescription eyeglasses in 1981 or 1982 was his own testimony, and the triple-hearsay testimony of a defense investigator that defendant's girlfriend, Eileen Smith, told him she talked with a doctor who was in the area during that period and who told her she accurately had described his office interior. Although Smith also testified at trial that defendant bought prescription eyeglasses in 1981, defendant never presented corroboration of his or her testimony through receipts or other records.
In any event, if there were optometrist records from those years stating that defendant previously had not worn prescription eyeglasses, such information, as defense counsel acknowledged at the hearing, would be based on defendant's statements to the doctor, not the doctor's personal knowledge. Even if records of defendant's treatment generally would have been admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule (Evid. Code, ง 1271), any statement by defendant in the missing records that this was his first eyeglass prescription would have been inadmissible in light of its double-hearsay nature. Defendant has not explained how the records otherwise could have led to admissible evidence on the issue. (People v. Hamilton (1963) 60 Cal.2d 105, 131 [32 Cal.Rptr. 4, 383 P.2d 412] [the business records exception, under then effective ง 1953f of the Code Civ. Proc., did "`not make the record admissible when oral testimony of the same facts would be inadmissible'"]; see also People v. Williams (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 355, 365 [9 Cal.Rptr. 722] [a medical history given to a physician is not admissible "as substantive proof of the facts so stated" by the patient]; cf. Evid. Code, งง 1251 [statement of declarant's previously existing physical state only admissible if declarant is unavailable and the physical state is itself an issue in the action and is not offered to prove any other fact], 1252 [statements for purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment are admissible only when made by a minor describing an act of child abuse].) We also note that at trial defendant presented testimony of several witnesses who said he did not wear prescription glasses at the time of the murder. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that defendant's inability to locate the alleged optometrist's records did not actually prejudice his defense.
*877 c. Swabs from the Presumptive Blood Test on Defendant's Jacket
Gregory Matheson, a Los Angeles Police Department laboratory forensic chemist, performed the phenolphthalein test on the stain on the seized jacket. Matheson testified at the motion hearing that, if there is blood on a swab taken from a stain on an item, there will be an immediate change in color when chemical reagents used in the test are added. Matheson explained that all swabs subjected to the test turn the same color within five minutes even if there is no blood, and that the reagents destroy the substance on the swab being tested. Thus, Matheson discarded the swabs once he had observed the immediate color change that presumptively indicated the presence of blood.
This testimony established that swabs generated in the phenolphthalein test were not lost through delay in bringing the charges; rather, they were discarded soon after the test was complete because their evidentiary value dissipated within minutes of the test. Even if defendant had been charged or brought to trial on the day the tests were performed and the swabs still were available, they would have been of no apparent evidentiary value. Similarly, to the extent defendant contends Matheson's failure to photograph the reaction constitutes prejudicial loss of evidence, even assuming such photographs could have served any evidentiary purpose, no connection exists between the absence of photographs and the delay in bringing the charges. We also observe that defendant has provided no evidence to indicate that preserving the test results would have been helpful to him, other than speculation that perhaps the results were inconsistent with Matheson's testimony. The likelihood that defendant's speculation is accurate is lessened by the fact that the second lab also reported a positive phenolphthalein test result on the same jacket stain. For these reasons, the trial court's finding that defendant failed to show prejudice from prearrest delay regarding the "loss" of the swabs was supported by substantial evidence.
3. Denial of Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Preserve Evidence
In the trial court defendant also filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479 [81 L.Ed.2d 413, 104 S.Ct. 2528] (Trombetta) and Arizona v. Youngblood (1988) 488 U.S. 51 [102 L.Ed.2d 281, 109 S.Ct. 333], for violation of his due process rights based on the police department's failure to preserve exculpatory evidence. The motion encompassed the June 6, 1980 tape recording of the attempted hypnosis session with Agent Bulman, the original composite drawings Bulman and the police sketch artist created, and the blood test swabs. The trial court denied the motion, finding defendant had not shown that the missing evidence had any exculpatory value. Defendant challenges this ruling.
*878 The police sketch artist who prepared the composite drawings testified at the preliminary hearing that they were completed before Bulman's hypnosis session on June 6, 1980. Following the artist's normal procedures, those drawings were photocopied, and then minimal modifications may have been made to them after the hypnosis session. The original drawings could not be found at the time of the preliminary hearing, but photographs of the original drawings were admitted at trial. Defendant presented the two photocopies of the original composites, and he contended the possible lack of a mustache in the prehypnosis session drawing supported his claim that Bulman was hypnotized during the later interview session and had recalled the mustache while hypnotized. However, as the trial court noted, the defense's proffered prehypnosis composite of the suspect who fired the shotgun had no chin or section under the nose, besides not having a mustache, which supported the prosecutor's explanation that what defendant proffered was merely a bad photocopy. On appeal, defendant contends the procedure of altering the original drawings after the hypnosis session, rather than preserving them for comparison with any posthypnosis session versions, inhibited his ability to establish Bulman was, in fact, hypnotized during the session and recalled the mustache while under hypnosis.
(5) Due process requires the state preserve evidence in its possession where it is reasonable to expect the evidence would play a significant role in the defense. (People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, 976 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 891 P.2d 153].) The evidence must "possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means." (Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 489.)
As we discussed regarding defendant's motion to dismiss because of precharging delay, his claim that the erased audiotape had exculpatory value is based on speculation that something on it would have contradicted the evidence and testimony tending to show that Agent Bulman was not hypnotized. Similarly, any supposed exculpatory value lost by the failure to preserve the original composite drawings is based on speculation that the mustache was added later, despite the fact that the evidence before the trial court, including testimony of the percipient witnesses, contradicted that claim. Bulman at all times described the shotgun-wielding suspect as having a mustache and attributed the differences in the copies defense counsel showed him to poor photocopying. Bulman's testimony is consistent with the sketch artist's explanation of his procedures and the fact that, if any changes had been made to the original composite sketch on June 6, 1980, they were so minor as to have been joked about after the session. Finally, as the trial court noted, the only evidence in the record was that the presumptive blood tests were inculpatory. Defendant speculates that the swabs and photographs of the results might have contradicted what the analyst reported, but he has *879 not shown failure to preserve the test results, to the extent possible, resulted in destruction of exculpatory evidence. We agree with the trial court that defendant failed to sustain his burden of proving the threshold requirement that the unavailable evidence had any exculpatory value, and therefore the exculpatory value of these items could not have been apparent before they were "destroyed." As the trial court noted, it appears the failure to preserve these items more likely could have tended to harm the prosecution's case. Because defendant failed to prove the destruction of the items made his trial fundamentally unfair, the failure to preserve them became an issue for the jury to weigh in its decision.
4. Denial of Motion to Preclude Agent Bulman's Testimony Because of the Use of Hypnosis
(6) Agent Bulman participated in five interviews during which an interviewer tried to hypnotize him in an attempt to obtain new information about the murder. Three sessions occurred in June and July of 1980; two were in May of 1987. In 1982, we concluded in People v. Shirley (1982) 31 Cal.3d 18, 23 [181 Cal.Rptr. 243, 723 P.2d 1354] (Shirley), that the use of hypnosis for the purpose of "refreshing" a witness's memory generally was not accepted as a reliable practice in the scientific community. We held that, because of the strong likelihood that hypnosis would lead to false memories and an inability effectively to explore the veracity of the witness's recollections upon examination at trial, "the testimony of a witness who has undergone hypnosis for the purpose of restoring his memory of the events in issue is inadmissible as to all matters relating to those events, from the time of the hypnotic session forward." (Id. at pp. 66-67.)[11] In 1984, however, the Legislature enacted section 795 of the Evidence Code,[12] which allows the admission of testimony of a witness who has been hypnotized if certain conditions are satisfied. Thereafter, we decided in People v. Hayes (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1260 [265 Cal.Rptr. 132, 783 P.2d 719] that a witness who had been hypnotized before January 1, 1985, when section 795 became effective, would be permitted to testify about prehypnotic memories that are found to have been recalled and related to others before the witness was hypnotized, and that the additional requirements section 795 imposed would not be applied retroactively when the witness was hypnotized before its effective date. (Hayes, at pp. 1273-1274.)
Pursuant to Shirley and Hayes, defendant made a motion to preclude Bulman from testifying at trial. In response, the prosecution argued Bulman *880 had not been hypnotized at the sessions, but that, if he had, his testimony was admissible nonetheless. The trial court[13] heard testimony from Bulman, those who attempted to hypnotize him, and prosecution and defense hypnosis experts; it also watched the video recording of the 1987 sessions. In general, Bulman, the officers who tried to hypnotize him in 1980, and the prosecution's expert testified that Bulman was not hypnotized to any meaningful extent during any of the sessions. Dr. Harley Stock, the hypnotist who conducted the 1987 sessions, testified Bulman was in and out of a hypnotic state at various points in the sessions, but Dr. Stock did not believe Bulman's memory of the events could have been affected. Defendant's expert testified Bulman had been hypnotized when he recounted the murder in 1987, and that his memory may have been affected by the hypnosis.
The trial court resolved the conflicting evidence in favor of the prosecution. Finding "there was no hypnosis" of Bulman as that state is "described in Shirley," the court suggested that what had happened was "the mere attempt to hypnotize a witness." Noting that experts could not "agree as to what took place" and that it carefully had watched the available tapes and listened to extensive testimony on the issue, the court found "nothing to convince [it] . . . that Agent Bulman was placed . . . in that mental status that Shirley is concerned about." With regard to each session, it concluded there "is absolutely no evidence" of "any success in putting Agent Bulman in that state known as hypnosis under Shirley."
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court's decision was wrong as a factual matter, the court violated section 795 because it based its decision on an improper legal interpretation of the provision, and its application of the holding of Hayes, that section 795 did not apply retroactively to the 1980 hypnosis sessions, violated his right to equal protection of the law under the federal and state Constitutions.[14]
Subdivision (a) of section 795 provides, in part, that "[t]he testimony of a witness is not inadmissible in a criminal proceeding by reason of the fact that the witness has previously undergone hypnosis for the purpose of recalling events that are the subject of the witness's testimony, if all of the following conditions are met . . . ." Subdivision (a)(1) through (4) sets forth conditions on the type of testimony permitted and procedures that must be followed *881 during the hypnosis session in order for the testimony to be admissible.[15] Subdivision (b) of section 795 provides that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to limit the ability of a party to attack the credibility of a witness who has undergone hypnosis, or to limit other legal grounds to admit or exclude the testimony of that witness." There is no question that, were it not for the trial court's finding that Bulman had not been hypnotized, Bulman's testimony would be subject to Shirley and Hayes because, as the trial court noted, a law enforcement officer was present during the sessions, contrary to section 795, subdivision (a)(3)(D).
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously interpreted the term "undergone hypnosis" in section 795, subdivision (a), as requiring that the attempt to hypnotize the witness be successful. This contention is without merit.
(7) Section 795 does not, by itself, exclude any evidence. Its plain language makes evidence meeting its requirements "not inadmissible," i.e., it allows the use of evidence that otherwise would be excluded. The use of the double negative is significant. Our decision in Shirley prohibited the admission of all future testimony by a witness who had been hypnotized. Section 795's enactment two years later tempered Shirley's effect by allowing some witnesses who had been hypnotized to testify under certain conditions. (People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 430, fn. 1 (conc. opn. of Kaus, J.) [ง 795 "modifies Shirley by authorizing a witness who has previously undergone hypnosis to testify to matters which the witness recalled and related prior to the hypnosis, so long as a number of specified safeguards are followed"].) It is the holding of Shirley, not section 795, that is the basis for excluding a previously hypnotized witness's testimony, a situation somewhat akin to the operation of the hearsay rule and the statutory exceptions to that rule. (See People v. Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 773, fn. 10 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d *882 432, 842 P.2d 1192] [ง 795 sets forth conditions "which, if met, permit a trial court to determine that the testimony of a previously hypnotized witness is not rendered inadmissible by `the fact that the witness has previously undergone hypnosis for the purpose of recalling events which are the subject of the witness'[s] testimony'"]; Evid. Code, งง 1200, subd. (b) [hearsay evidence is inadmissible, except as provided by law], 1220 [an admission of a party "is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule"].) Defendant's claim on appeal that the trial court misinterpreted section 795 has no relevance here because, having never found that Bulman's testimony was subject to exclusion under Shirley, the trial court did not decide whether section 795 nonetheless would permit Bulman to testify. The issue we must decide is whether the trial court's decision conflicts with Shirley.
(8) Our holding in Shirley, that use of hypnosis to "refresh" a witness's memory was not accepted generally as a reliable practice in the scientific community and that a witness who had undergone hypnosis therefore should not be permitted to testify regarding the subject of the hypnosis, rested on the rule for the introduction of scientific evidence set forth in Frye v. U.S. (D.C. Cir. 1923) 54 U.S. App.D.C. 46 [293 F. 1013]. (Shirley, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 66.) The touchstone of the Frye test, and our holding in Shirley, is the "reliability" of the proffered scientific evidence. (People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, 40 [130 Cal.Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240].) When a witness actually has not been hypnotized in any meaningful way, despite attempts to do so, the concerns expressed in Shirley regarding reliability of the witness's testimony, namely, introduction of false memories and the tendency for the witness to develop unjustified confidence in recollections, are not at issue. The reliability of such a witness is that of any other witness, and the ensuing testimony similarly would be subject to a credibility attack based on circumstances surrounding the witness's recollections.[16]
The trial court noted that determining whether a witness actually has been hypnotized can be difficult, but it then properly addressed the foundational question whether Bulman had been hypnotized as that state is "described in Shirley." It found Bulman never had been hypnotized for purposes of Shirley, i.e., he never had been placed in a state of "heightened suggestibility," and therefore he was never questioned about the murder in a state in which false confidence in his recollections or false memories were likely to occur. Defendant disputes the trial court's resolution of the conflicting documentary evidence, lay witness testimony, and expert opinions, but, as with other types *883 of factual findings, "`[o]n appeal all presumptions favor proper exercise...'" of the trial court's power to "`judge credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh evidence and draw factual inferences' "and its "`findingsโwhether express or impliedโmust be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.'" (People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 107 [137 Cal.Rptr. 447, 561 P.2d 1135] (James).)
Here, each witness involved in the 1980 sessions testified Bulman never was hypnotized during them; the only contrary evidence consists of somewhat ambiguous statements in written reports of the sessions. Although, as the trial court noted, the destruction of the recordings of those sessions could be viewed as suspicious, we agree with the trial court that any implication arising from this circumstance is insufficient to overcome the evidence that Bulman never was hypnotized as we envisioned that state in Shirley.
Evidence concerning the 1987 sessions was closer. Bulman gave conflicting statements about whether he thought he had been hypnotized. He said he did not believe he was hypnotized in a way that affected his memory of the murder, but he thought he may have been hypnotized when, while he concentrated on raising his arm in response to Dr. Stock's suggestions, his arm did rise, and when he had a particularly strong "flashback" of the shotgun being fired at his head. The experts more or less agreed that Bulman was hypnotized to some degree at some point or points during the sessions, especially during the arm raising, but they disagreed about whether Bulman was in an altered mental state when questioned about the murder, such that false memories or false confidence in existing memories might have occurred. Dr. Stock testified first that he did not believe Bulman's memory had been affected, but later stated that Bulman's "state of consciousness" "fluctuated" during questioning about the murder. In Dr. Spiegel's opinion, Bulman was in a very light hypnotic state during the preliminary "induction" stage of the sessions, but was not hypnotized at all when questioned about the murder. Dr. Karlin was of the opinion that Bulman was in a hypnotic state of varying degrees throughout the questioning about the murder. The experts disputed, based on Bulman's extremely low scores on two tests that measure "hypnosis susceptibility," whether, as Dr. Spiegel believed, Bulman psychologically was unable to be hypnotized to any significant degree, or, as Dr. Karlin believed, simply was unwilling to be hypnotized when the tests were conducted.
On appeal defendant essentially claims the evidence supports a finding that Bulman was hypnotized at the 1987 sessions when questioned about the murder, implicating the dangers detailed in Shirley. Our role, however, is not to reweigh the evidence, but to determine whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's choices between conflicting evidence and reasonable inferences arising from such evidence. Here, Bulman's testimony, the testimony of those who witnessed the 1980 sessions, and Dr. Spiegel's expert *884 testimony amply support the trial court's determination that Bulman was not hypnotized within the meaning of Shirley. Finding substantial evidence supports the trial court's decision, we uphold it on appeal. (James, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 107.) Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err by permitting Agent Bulman to testify.
5. Denial of Motion to Dismiss Due to Prosecution's Interception of Conversation Involving Defendant, Defendant's Mother, and a Defense Investigator
Defendant contends the monitoring and recording of a telephone call involving himself, his mother, and a defense investigator violated his state statutory rights and his state and federal constitutional rights. We perceive defendant as raising five distinct possible grounds for claims of error: (1) a statutory violation of Evidence Code section 954, the attorney-client privilege; (2) a violation of his federal Sixth Amendment right to counsel; (3) a violation of his fedal Fifth Amendment due process right to a fair trial; (4) a violation of his federal Fifth Amendment right to substantive due process; and (5) a violation of his state constitutional right to counsel. After setting forth the factual background, we address each ground in turn.
Before jury selection began, the prosecution obtained a warrant authorizing law enforcement agents to monitor and record conversations from several telephones, including the one at the home of defendant's parents. The warrant's justifications were to attempt to prevent intimidation or dissuasion of witnesses in defendant's case and, to the extent any conversations concerning attempts to influence witnesses might be intercepted, to bolster the prosecution's case against defendant by demonstrating his consciousness of guilt. (See CALJIC No. 2.06; CALCRIM No. 371.) During jury selection, after the wiretap operation had ended and the prosecution had provided the defense transcripts of the intercepted calls, defendant moved to dismiss the charges based on the prosecution's having intercepted and recorded a call involving himself, his mother, and a defense investigator. During that call, several subjects concerning the trial were discussed, including potential defense witnesses and how the defense might respond to the prosecution's evidence.[17]
*885 The prosecution argued the call was not privileged due to the participation of defendant's mother, but that, in any event, the charges should not be dismissed because the prosecution gained no advantage from the intercepted call, as shown by declarations of the prosecutors and law clerks working on the case stating that they never read the transcript of the call. The trial court sealed that transcript and continued the hearing on the motion until after trial;[18] after the penalty phase verdict, it unsealed the transcript over defendant's objection.
On the date of sentencing, the trial court heard testimony regarding the motion from defendant, Detective Henry, and Gene Salvino, the district attorney's investigator who recorded the call. Henry testified he supervised the wiretap operation and was present when the call was intercepted. During the call, he sought advice from the district attorney's office concerning whether it should be monitored and recorded, and, for the first time during the wiretap operation, attorneys from that office told Henry he should be "careful" about intercepting any call in which trial strategy was discussed.[19] The next day, Henry sought similar advice from the judge who issued the warrant, who told Henry he "should probably be concerned" with intercepting calls involving defense investigators.[20] Henry then decided to "minimize" all calls involving defense investigators, meaning the recording apparatus was turned off once the person monitoring the call determined a defense investigator was participating. Henry made this decision because he doubted he *886 adequately could explain to those involved in the wiretap operation, most of whom did not know the particulars of defendant's case, how to determine whether a particular call involved trial strategy. All such calls were minimized for the remainder of the operation.
Henry testified he heard parts of the intercepted conversation while seeking legal advice, and he most likely later read the investigator's log summarizing it. He could not recall whether he listened to the tape of the call near the time it was recorded; he did listen to it after the trial to prepare for the hearing on the motion to dismiss. Both Henry and investigator Salvino testified they never communicated the call's contents to anyone on the prosecution team. The trial court asked Henry, "And in terms of the information contained in Exhibit A, did you make any attempt to exploit or profit from that information and investigate the people mentioned in [it]?" Henry responded, "I had interviewed most of the people that I heard on these conversations prior to this conversation, but nothing related to this conversation." Henry added that he did not use anything he heard to investigate people mentioned in the call.
Stating it was giving defendant the benefit of the doubt, the trial court found defendant had made a "prima facie showing" that the call was a privileged communication under Evidence Code section 952. The court reasoned that, because defendant's mother participated in the call to further his interests, her presence did not destroy the confidentiality of the conversation.[21] The court, however, then denied the motion to dismiss because the evidence demonstrated that the interception of the call did not prejudice defendant or benefit the prosecution. The court observed that Detective Henry was confronted with an "unusual situation" when he had to decide whether to monitor and record the call and, to the extent his choice to record it interfered with defendant's attorney-client privilege, this was not "egregious conduct" on the part of the prosecution. The court credited the prosecution team's statements, including those of Henry, that the prosecution made no use of any information disclosed in the call. The court also observed that, immediately after that call, defendant's mother in subsequent, clearly nonprivileged calls to people not part of the defense team repeated "almost verbatim" the *887 information conveyed in the call at issue. The court gave "zero weight" to defense counsel's unsupported statement in his declaration that the interception of the call prevented counsel from proceeding with the planned defense. Accordingly, the trial court concluded interception of the call was "at best," a "technical violation of the attorney/client relationship, not exploited, not undertaken in bad faith, ... and [it] could not have had any bearing on the outcome of this trial."
Assuming arguendo the three-way call was a confidential communication as defined in section 952 of the Evidence Code (see People v. Meredith (1981) 29 Cal.3d 682, 690, fn. 3 [175 Cal.Rptr. 612, 631 P.2d 46]), we conclude the record does not support a claim that defendant's statutory rights under the attorney-client privilege were violated. Defendant has made no showing that any witness disclosed any information from the call during the proceedings in violation of Evidence Code section 954.[22] Indeed, substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings that the call's contents were not disclosed to the prosecutors. Although we acknowledge, as defendant points out, that Henry's testimony was not as clear as it might have been in resolving whether he utilized any information he learned from the call in any manner, when we view the testimony in context, and in light of the absence of any contrary evidence, we conclude that substantial evidence also supports the trial court's findings that "there is no testimony or no suggestion that anybody profited from any of the information contained in" the call, and that "[i]t does not appear to me that there was any attempt by the officer ... to profit from that situation or to exploit it." Defendant's speculation that Henry's trial testimony might in some way have been affected by what he might have learned from the call, with no specific allegation of how the record supports such a claim, does not demonstrate that Henry's testimony improperly disclosed privileged information learned from the call.
(9) As to the possibility that defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated, defendant contends interception of the call "deprived [him] of his right to privileged communication with his attorney as well as his constitutional right to counsel." To some degree, this argument is based on the unsupported premise that there is a federal constitutional privilege that protects confidential communications between a defendant and his attorney. No federal constitutional provision, however, establishes an attorney-client communication privilege. Rather, the Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to "assistance of counsel for his defense." (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.) Confidential communication between a defendant and his lawyer is *888 itself not a separate "right" that the federal Constitution guarantees, but rather an aspect of ensuring fulfillment of the right to assistance of counsel.
(10) As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the right to the assistance of counsel is violated either by (1) the complete denial of counsel or its equivalent, or (2) the denial of the effective assistance of counsel. (United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 659 [80 L.Ed.2d 657, 104 S.Ct. 2039] (Cronic); Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 104 S.Ct. 2052]; McMann v. Richardson (1970) 397 U.S. 759, 771, fn. 14 [25 L.Ed.2d 763, 90 S.Ct. 1441].) As the high court noted in Strickland, typically, a defendant claiming a violation of the federal constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel must satisfy a two-pronged showing: that counsel's performance was deficient, and that the defendant was prejudiced, that is, there is a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different were it not for the deficient performance. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 687.) In contrast, a defendant is spared "the need of showing probable effect upon the outcome ... where assistance of counsel has been denied entirely or during a critical stage of the proceeding ... the likelihood that the verdict is unreliable is so high that a case-by-case inquiry is unnecessary. [Citations.] But only in `circumstances of that magnitude' do we forgo individual inquiry into whether counsel's inadequate performance undermined the reliability of the verdict." (Mickens v. Taylor (2002) 535 U.S. 162, 166 [152 L.Ed.2d 291, 122 S.Ct. 1237]; see also Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 659 & fn. 25 [no showing of prejudice is required when counsel is "totally absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding," or "fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing"].)
(11) To the extent defendant contends interception of the conversation between him and an agent of his attorney constitutes a "circumstance of [the] magnitude" of the complete denial of counsel that alone is sufficient to establish a denial of his federal right to counsel, he is mistaken. In Weatherford v. Bursey (1977) 429 U.S. 545, 549 [51 L.Ed.2d 30, 97 S.Ct. 837] (Weatherford) the Supreme Court rejected a per se rule that "`whenever the prosecution knowingly arranges or permits intrusion into the attorney-client relationship the right to counsel is sufficiently endangered to require reversal and a new trial.'" Although the high court did not establish a definitive standard for determining when surreptitious state participation in communications between a defendant and his or her attorney or, as here, the attorney's agent, does violate the Sixth Amendment, it stated that unless the record supports "at least a realistic possibility of injury to [the defendant] or benefit to the State, there can be no Sixth Amendment violation." (Id. at p. 558; see also Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 658 ["Absent some effect of challenged conduct on the reliability of the trial process, the Sixth Amendment guarantee is generally not implicated."].) In other words, a court properly rejects a Sixth *889 Amendment claim based on surreptitious state participation in communications between a defendant and his or her attorney or the attorney's agent when the record demonstrates there was no realistic possibility of injury to the defendant or benefit to the prosecution.[23]
Here, the trial court essentially found there was no realistic possibility of injury to defendant or benefit to the state and therefore there was no violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. We conclude that ruling was correct. Although the factual contexts of this case and Weatherford are different (this case involved a secret wiretap, that case an undercover officer), the critical facts are comparable in all important respects. In both cases a law enforcement officer who was assisting in the investigation of the defendant's offenses, and who testified at the defendant's trial, became privy to trial strategy discussions between the defendant and the defense attorney or the attorney's agent. In both, the record supported the findings that the information the officer learned was not conveyed to the prosecutors and that the officer's investigation or testimony at trial was not affected by information learned during the discussions. (Weatherford, supra, 429 U.S. at pp. 547-549, 555.) At no point during the trial, the hearing on the motion to dismiss, or this appeal has defendant identified any specific evidence that the prosecution offered that he suspects was developed as a result of the intercepted call. As in Weatherford, we find no grounds to believe "federal or state prosecutors will be so prone to lie or the difficulties of proof will be so great that we must always assume not only that an informant communicates what he learns from an encounter with the defendant and his counsel but also that what he communicates has the potential for detriment to the defendant or benefit to the prosecutor's case." (Id. at pp. 556-557.)
That defendant's mother repeated to others much of what was discussed during the three-way call, and that Detective Henry, and even the prosecutors, *890 therefore would have learned much of its contents even if it had been minimized, further decreases any possibility that interception of the call hindered the defense or benefited the prosecution. Even to the extent defendant is correct that the trial court's finding that the mother repeated the contents of the call "almost verbatim" in later nonprivileged calls overstates the extent to which she disclosed the substance of the conversation at issue, defendant identifies no specific items that were not repeated that were, or even could have been, particularly helpful to the prosecution, and we discern none from our reading of the record.
Defendant not only failed to point to any evidence of a benefit to the prosecution from the intercepted call; he has made no attempt to refute the trial court's finding that defense counsel's conclusory statement in his declaration that the interception affected the choice of the defense presented at trial was entitled to "zero weight." We also observe that, by the time the defense learned of the wiretaps and interception of the three-way call, the warrant had expired, and the defense would have been aware that even when the warrant was in effect, all calls involving defendant and his attorneys and investigators (other than the one at issue) had been minimized. Defendant, who testified at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, did not claim his ability to communicate with his attorneys or investigators was negatively affected after he learned of the wiretap operation. (See Ervine, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 769 ["a defendant's inability to consult with counsel or to assist in his defense must appear in the record"].)
We also conclude that, as in Weatherford, the present case "is not a situation where the State's purpose was to learn what it could about the defendant's defense plans." (Weatherford, supra, 429 U.S. at p. 557.) The monitoring and recording of the three-way call was pursuant to a warrant authorizing interception of calls emanating from defendant's parents' telephone for the purpose of gathering evidence concerning attempts to intimidate and dissuade witnesses who might testify against defendant. Defendant does not challenge on appeal the validity of that warrant. (Cf. Weatherford, supra, 429 U.S. at pp. 551-554 [distinguishing the high court's earlier cases involving law enforcement's surreptitious participation in attorney-client communications that also constituted violations of the defendants' 4th Amend. rights].) There is no evidence the purpose of the wiretap in this case was to attempt to learn defense strategy, and the record contradicts such an assertion. Detective Henry testified that directions to minimize all calls involving a defense attorney, as well as all calls involving only defendant and an investigator, were in effect for the entire wiretap operation, and that immediately after the call at issue, all calls involving a defense investigator, including those in which a third person participated, were minimized. Henry's decision to continue recording the call at issue (the first of its kind during the operation) while seeking to confirm his understanding that doing so would *891 not violate defendant's attorney-client privilege does not show that the purpose of recording that call had changed to an attempt to gain knowledge of the defense plans, as opposed to obtaining potential evidence of intimidation or dissuasion of witnesses. Contrary to defendant's arguments, the fact that Henry at some point read the log summary of the call, as he did with every call, and may have listened to the recording, does not show that his purpose in doing so was to learn defense trial strategy rather than to determine whether the call, parts of which involved only defendant and his mother and therefore were not privileged, had evidentiary value.[24]
For these reasons, the record demonstrates no realistic possibility that defendant was injured by, or the prosecution benefited from, the monitoring and recording of the three-way call. Accordingly, defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel could not have been violated.[25]
(12) To the extent defendant contends the monitoring and recording of the call violated his due process right to a fair trial under the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution, we are not convinced. For much the same reasons as we concluded his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated, we conclude the interception of the call did not make defendant's trial fundamentally unfair. Assuming a due process violation could, in an appropriate case, be grounded on the prosecution's secretly learning defense evidence and strategy beyond that which the discovery statutes may compel the defense to disclose, interception of the call at issue in this case could not have upset the "balance of forces between the accused and his accuser" to a degree that denied defendant any constitutional right to reciprocity of discovery. (Wardius v. Oregon (1973) 412 U.S. 470, 474, 476 [37 L.Ed.2d 82, 93 S.Ct. 2208] ["It is fundamentally unfair to require a defendant to divulge the details of his own case while at the same time subjecting him to the hazard of surprise concerning refutation of the very pieces of evidence which he disclosed to the State."]; Weatherford, supra, 429 U.S. at p. 562 (dis. opn. of Marshall, J.) ["the fairness of trials is undermined when the prosecution surreptitiously acquires information concerning the defense strategy and evidence (or lack of it), the defendant, or the defense counsel"].) As discussed above, there has been no showing that (1) the purpose of intercepting the call *892 was to discover defense strategy, (2) information in it was communicated to the prosecutors, or (3) law enforcement agents utilized, or even could have utilized, information conveyed in the call. In addition, defendant's mother disclosed most of the same information to others in properly intercepted calls, and, as the trial court noted, defendant made no showing that the witnesses discussed in the call "were ever found, what the witnesses would have said had they been found and how in the world that impacted upon the defense in this case." Interception of the three-way call did not force defendant to divulge details of his own case while subjecting him to the hazard of surprise refutation of that evidence, did not compel him to be a witness against himself, and did not otherwise make the trial fundamentally unfair.
(13) Defendant complains of what he characterizes as the "egregious" nature of the authorities' actions in intercepting the apparently privileged call. To the extent he claims the allegedly egregious actions violated his right to substantive due process under Rochin v. California (1952) 342 U.S. 165 [96 L.Ed. 183, 72 S.Ct. 205] and its progeny, his contention is without merit. Arbitrary official action can violate a defendant's substantive due process rights, but "only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be `arbitrary in the constitutional sense ....'" (County of Sacramento v. Lewis (1998) 523 U.S. 833, 846 [140 L.Ed.2d 1043, 118 S.Ct. 1708] (Lewis).) The high court described the required level of egregiousness as "that which shocks the conscience," but it has recognized that courts cannot apply a "calibrated yard stick" in assessing whether challenged official action shocks the conscience. (Id. at pp. 846-847.) We easily conclude the challenged actions here were not so egregious as to shock the conscience such that the conduct was arbitrary in the constitutional sense. The call at issue was intercepted pursuant to a judicially approved warrant authorizing the monitoring and recording of calls on that phone line. Before the wiretap operation began, Detective Henry, anticipating that three-way calls involving defendant, members of the defense team, and third parties might occur, asked for legal advice concerning whether such calls should be treated as privileged. Even if that initial advice was incorrect or too general, there is no reason to believe Henry knew the advice was deficient, or that the attorney purposefully gave him bad advice. While the three-way call was occurring, Henry sought to confirm what he had been told concerning whether it was permissible to monitor and record the call. Once he received the new advice, Henry took an arguably overly cautious approach, rather than risk an invasion of defendant's privilege. Further, no evidence establishes that Henry tried to exploit any information conveyed in the call either by sharing it with the prosecutors or utilizing it in his own investigation or testimony.
*893 The record demonstrates that the interception of the call at issue, if improper at all in a constitutional sense,[26] was the result of negligence in interpreting the privilege statute in the heat of the moment. As the high court has stated, however, "liability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process." (Lewis, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 849.) It is only "behavior at the other end of the culpability spectrum that would most probably support a substantive due process claim; conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest is the sort of official action most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level." (Ibid.) Because there is no evidence of an unjustifiable intent to harm defendant by invading his attorney-client privilege, we conclude his substantive due process rights were not violated.
Finally, we address any claim defendant may have raised that his right to counsel under article I, section 15 of our state Constitution was violated. Defendant cites our decision in Barber v. Municipal Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 742 [157 Cal.Rptr. 658, 598 P.2d 818] (Barber), in which we considered, as a matter of California constitutional law, "what is the proper remedy for an accused when his constitutional right to counsel has been denied by the actions of an undercover police officer who poses as a codefendant and attends the confidential attorney-client conferences of the accused." (Id. at p. 745.) Addressing that issue, we stated, "The right to counsel, which embodies the right to private consultation with counsel, is violated when a state agent is present at confidential attorney-client conferences." (Id. at p. 752; see also In re Johnson (1979) 24 Cal.3d 769, 771 [157 Cal.Rptr. 674, 598 P.2d 834] [Barber held "the surreptitious invasion of confidential attorney-client meetings by an agent of the state denied an accused his right to counsel"].) Having concluded in Barber that the defendants' right to counsel had been violated in this manner, we also rejected an exclusionary remedy that would have simply sought to eliminate any benefit the prosecution gained from the violation, and concluded the only appropriate remedy was dismissal of the charges. (Barber, supra, 24 Cal.3d at pp. 756-759.) To the extent defendant contends Barber warrants the reversal of the judgment and dismissal of the charges in his case, we disagree. Barber is distinguishable. (See, e.g., Ervine, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 769-770 [discussing and distinguishing Barber].)
*894 The prosecution in Barber arose from a "sit-in" protest at a nuclear power station, during which many protesters were arrested and charged with trespassing. Unbeknownst to the protesters, two of their group were undercover police officers who had participated on behalf of the local law enforcement authorities in planning and executing the protest. When the defendants ultimately learned that an officer who continued his undercover activities after the arrests had actively participated in a number of defense strategy meetings, they moved to dismiss the charges. The trial court denied the motion, and defendants sought a pretrial writ of prohibition. The testimony at the hearing on the motion to dismiss was as follows.
After the arrests, the protesters chose group representation by two attorneys. One undercover officer dropped out of the group, but the other remained in his undercover capacity. The prosecutor was aware a police officer was in the group, but did not inform defense counsel. The officer attended meetings between the defendants and their attorneys at which defense strategy was discussed. He also prepared a map of the protest site for the defense attorneys, but it omitted an opened gate in the area that may have been crucial in defending against the trespassing charges. The officer testified he did not intentionally omit the gate from the map. He contended that, although the meetings with the attorneys discussed the case and defense strategies in detail, he participated only in general discussions about the case. (Barber, supra, 24 Cal.3d at pp. 745-748.) While involved in these activities, the officer was reporting to his superiors. His reports were almost all oral; he filed only one written report during the two months at issue. The superiors testified the officer provided no information about defense strategy, but the officer testified that at one point he told his superiors "the defense was to become more `political.'" (Id. at p. 749.)
Eventually, the trial court informed defense counsel that one of the defendants was an undercover police officer. The defense attorney testified that when the remaining defendants learned of this fact, they became excessively suspicious and, in contrast to their earlier behavior, reluctant to discuss the case with counsel and distrustful of each other and the defense team. (Barber, supra, 24 Cal.3d at pp. 749-750.)
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss based on its finding that the officer shared nothing that he learned at the meetings with the prosecutors. The court ordered that the prosecution could use no evidence obtained by the officer, and could present no evidence without proving beyond a reasonable doubt that it was not derived from the officer's activities. (Barber, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 750.) We granted relief, however, concluding that the defendants' right to counsel had been violated, and that the trial court's exclusionary remedy was insufficient. (Id. at pp. 752-759.)
*895 The circumstances of Barber are quite different from those in the present case. As noted above, the officer in Barber participated in many meetings during which defense strategy was thoroughly discussed, he conveyed, to some degree, the nature of the anticipated defense with his superiors, and he inserted himself directly into the defense preparations by volunteering to draw the map of the area, which, suspiciously, omitted a key feature likely to have been helpful to the defense. All of this occurred because the officer, with the knowledge of the prosecution, deceived the defendants and their attorneys concerning his true status. (See Barber, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 754, fn. 12 [effect of an officer participating in the defense is not the same as a codefendant cooperating with authorities because "it is one thing for an individual to be `betrayed' by an acquaintance or a private person with whom he has associated[;] [i]t is another for the government deliberately to send out agents to do to its citizens by trickery what it may not do to them directly"].) In addition, there was evidence that the defendants "[had] been prejudiced in their ability to prepare their defense" after they learned an undercover officer had been in their midst. (Id. at p. 756.)
Here, detectives intercepted one telephone call between defendant and a defense investigator that covered only limited topics related to certain witnesses, and the interception occurred pursuant to a judicially approved warrant, not "trickery" by the authorities. There was no evidence anyone other than the officers monitoring the call learned of its contents, and much of what was discussed in that call was repeated in subsequent calls that were not privileged. One might question whether the circumstances in the present case warrant a conclusion that defendant's state constitutional right to counsel was violated, notwithstanding broad language used in the much more egregious circumstances of Barber that suggests it is invariably the case that "[t]he right to counsel, which embodies the right to private consultation with counsel, is violated when a state agent is present at confidential attorney-client conferences." (Barber, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 752.)[27] We need not decide in this case whether Barber's statement of the rule should be interpreted more narrowly in light of its facts, however, because, even assuming defendant's state constitutional right to counsel was violated, we conclude reversal of the judgment is not warranted.
*896 We first point out that Barber involved an application for a pretrial writ of prohibition, while the present case is an appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence. As such, this case is subject to article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution, which provides: "No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to any matter of pleading, or for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice." This provision mandates that, typically, a defendant having proved error must further establish there exists a reasonable probability he or she would have obtained a more favorable outcome in the trial of guilt or innocence were it not for the error. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243] (Watson) ["a `miscarriage of justice' should be declared only when the court, `after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,' is of the `opinion' that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error"].) In Barber, because we were not considering the reversal of a judgment, we had no occasion to consider whether a violation of the state right to counsel resulting from an invasion of the attorney-client relationship can be considered a "miscarriage of justice" without a showing of prejudice to the outcome of the trial. Although we have acknowledged that some errors may rise to the level of a miscarriage of justice without regard to the strength of the evidence presented at trial (People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 501 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 853 P.2d 1037] (Cahill)), the facts in this case do not involve such an error.[28]
"[T]he kinds of errors that, regardless of the evidence, may result in a `miscarriage of justice' because they operate to deny a criminal defendant the constitutionally required `orderly legal procedure' (or, in other words, a fair trial)โfor example, the denial of the defendant's right to a jury trial or to an impartial trial judge [citation]โall involve fundamental `structural defects' in the judicial proceedings, analogous to those to which the United States Supreme Court referred in its [Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279 [113 L.Ed.2d 302, 111 S.Ct. 1246]] decision ...." (Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 501-502.) The assumed violation of the right to counsel at issue here is not such a "structural defect." Defendant had counsel, and his attorney vigorously pursued his interests throughout the trial. (See Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 8 [144 L.Ed.2d 35, 119 S.Ct. 1827] ["`[M]ost constitutional errors can be harmless.' [Citation.] `[I]f the defendant had *897 counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any other [constitutional] errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless-error analysis.'"].) As the trial court found, there is no evidence that the interception of the call benefited the prosecution or negatively affected the presentation of the defense. We therefore cannot conclude that counsel's performance was affected to such a degree that it was as though defendant was denied counsel. (Cf. ibid. [the complete denial of counsel in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335 [9 L.Ed.2d 799, 83 S.Ct. 792] is structural error].) Nor can we say that, because of the interception of the call defendant's trial could not "reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence." (Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 577-578 [92 L.Ed.2d 460, 106 S.Ct. 3101].) Accordingly, we conclude the assumed violation of the right to counsel in this case is not an error that by itself constitutes a miscarriage of justice, without consideration of the error's impact on the outcome of the case. (Cf. United States v. Morrison (1981) 449 U.S. 361, 365 [66 L.Ed.2d 564, 101 S.Ct. 665] ["[A]bsent demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof, dismissal of the indictment [under the Sixth Amendment] is plainly inappropriate, even though the violation [(an invasion of the attorney-client relationship)] may have been deliberate." (Fn. omitted.)].)
To the extent defendant draws on our discussion of the adequacy of an exclusionary remedy for the violation in Barber in lieu of outright dismissal of the charges as support for an assertion that the violation in the present case was itself a miscarriage of justice, his argument is not persuasive. No concern that led to our conclusion that dismissal was required in Barber is present in this case.
In Barber, the evidence established that the violation of the right to counsel negatively affected the defense, in that the defendants came to mistrust their attorneys and refused to cooperate with them as a result of the officer's infiltration into their group. As a result, the attorneys were unable to prepare adequately for trial. (Barber, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 750.) Here, there is no evidence the defense was impaired, other than counsel's unsupported, conclusory statement in his declaration, which the trial court reasonably accorded "zero weight."
In addition, given the circumstances of the violation in Barber, it would have been particularly difficult for the defendants to prove prejudice, because there was essentially no written record of what the officer learned as a participant in the defense meetings, what information he conveyed to his superiors, and what information he or his superiors could have conveyed to the prosecutors, if their testimony that they had not passed on information was untruthful. All but one of the officer's reports were oral, there was a *898 possibility he actively had tried to sabotage the defense by creating an erroneous map, and even among the prosecution's witnesses there was uncertainty regarding what aspects of the defense strategy, if any, the officer actually conveyed to his superiors. Here, there was a record of everything Detective Henry could have learned from the interception of the three-way call, and there was no inconsistency concerning whether anyone other than Henry and the other monitoring officer gained any information from that call.
Furthermore, because the content of that intercepted call was transcribed, we need not rely solely on the officers' and prosecutors' assurances that the information was not used at trial. In contrast, in Barber, the undercover officer was privy to all of the defense planning, and thus there were myriad ways in which the officer or prosecutor could have used the information that the officer learned. Here, with the much more narrow universe of information at issue, defendant reasonably could be expected to point out specific instances in the trial record where he at least suspects that the prosecution or a witness utilized information gained from the three-way call, and to explain how the use of any such information might have affected the outcome of the trial. (Cf. People v. Towler (1982) 31 Cal.3d 105, 122-123 [181 Cal.Rptr. 391, 641 P.2d 1253] (Towler) [noting the record was inadequate to determine whether dismissal of the charges would be an appropriate remedy for a violation of the right to counsel arising from the seizure of a legal document from the defendant's jail cell because "unlike the situation in Barber, here it might have been readily apparent from an examination of the document whether or not the prosecution was actually aided by the information and whether some remedy short of dismissal would be adequate to protect defendant's rights"].)
Similarly, the "Catch-22" we acknowledged in Barberโthat a remedy of merely excluding affected evidence would be illusory in that particular case because requiring a determination whether the prosecution's evidence was untainted would require the defendants to disclose the confidential information, which in turn would give the prosecutor access to the very information the defendants sought to keep confidentialโis not at issue in the present case. (Barber, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 758.) We are not considering whether a defendant's confidences adequately can be protected during trial by a particular remedy, but rather whether defendant has established that the judgment against him should be overturned. In this context, we discern no impropriety in requiring that defendant disclose the intercepted call's contents in order to prove its interception harmed him or benefited the prosecution, in much the same manner that a defendant who contends his conviction or sentence should be reversed because his attorney provided ineffective assistance often must disclose confidential aspects of the preparation of the defense in order to prove the claim. We also observe that the trial court delayed resolving defendant's motion to dismiss until after trial, at which point the disclosure to *899 the prosecution of the transcripts of the call could not have aided in its presentation of the case to the jury. (Cf. Towler, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 122 [distinguishing Barber because the defendant in Towler "would not have had to provide any information that the prosecutor did not already know because the confidential information was contained in a written document that the prosecutor had seized"].)
(14) Accordingly, we conclude that, assuming defendant's state constitutional right to counsel was violated, he is not entitled to reversal of the judgment unless he can demonstrate a reasonable probability that, absent the violation, the trial's outcome would have been more favorable to him. Defendant has failed to do so for the same reasons he has failed to prove his other constitutional claims. No evidence establishes the prosecution gained anything from intercepting the call or that the defense was affected negatively in a way that could have changed the trial's outcome. Because defendant has not established a reasonable probability that, without the assumed violation of his right to counsel, the result of the trial would have been more favorable to him, we will not reverse the judgment.[29]
6. Reference to Murder of Peace Officer Special Circumstance During Jury Selection
When voir dire of the prospective jury commenced, the information alleged the special circumstance of murder of a peace officer under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(7). Defendant unsuccessfully had challenged this allegation in a section 995 motion on the ground that no evidence was presented at the preliminary hearing indicating the assailant knew or reasonably should have known Agent Cross was a peace officer. After the jury returned a verdict on the murder charge and firearm allegations, and before the special circumstance portion of the trial, the trial court granted the prosecutor leave to amend the information to allege the special circumstance of murder of a federal law enforcement agent (ง 190.2, subd. (a)(8)), as Cross was not a "peace officer" as defined in section 190.2, subdivision (a)(7) and as charged in the information. (See ง 830.1 et seq.) Defendant then moved for a directed verdict of not true on the new allegation because no evidence established he knew or reasonably should have known Cross was a federal law enforcement agent. The trial court granted the motion, noting there was evidence defendant knew Cross was some type of law enforcement officer, but no evidence he knew or should have known Cross worked for the federal authorities. As a *900 result, the only special circumstance allegations submitted to the jury were the robbery-murder and prior-murder-conviction circumstances, both of which the jury found to be true.
On appeal defendant claims he was denied a fair trial because certain questions in the juror questionnaire and questions orally posed by the trial court during voir dire addressed whether the prospective jurors' impartiality would be affected by the peace-officer-murder special-circumstance allegation. He contends these references "implanted" this invalid special circumstance in the prospective jurors' minds, improperly emphasized that this case involved the murder of a peace officer, and improperly suggested the peace officer aspect of the case "was a special circumstance that warranted the death penalty." Defendant did not raise such a claim in the trial court; in fact, he requested one of the questions in the questionnaire on this subject, and he did not object to other related questions in the questionnaire or to those the trial court asked the prospective jurors. Assuming, without deciding, that defendant has not waived or forfeited this claim because he later successfully moved for a directed verdict on the allegation, we conclude the claim is without merit.
The trial court could not have known when voir dire commenced, before the presentation of any evidence, that the prosecution would fail to prove the elements of the special circumstance of murder of a federal law enforcement agent, especially because defendant had not argued that the prosecution had charged the incorrect special circumstance, or that the evidence was insufficient to prove the correct allegation. Despite defendant's claim to the contrary, it does not become retroactively improper for the trial court to have inquired of the prospective jurors concerning the potential for bias resulting from a charged allegation, even though it ultimately was not submitted to the jury due to a shortcoming in the evidence presented at trial. Although the jury was not called upon to render a verdict on the peace-officer-murder special circumstance, the juror questionnaire and the trial court properly explored that issue during voir dire.
In any event, defendant has not established prejudice resulting from the alleged error. One purpose of the questionnaire and voir dire was to weed out prospective jurors who would be improperly influenced by the fact that a law enforcement officer had been murdered. Defendant provided no evidence that any juror in his trial actually was biased. His conclusory claims that the questions "infected" the jurors are insufficient to show that the purpose of conducting voir dire was nullified. Even if no special circumstance related to the murder of a law enforcement officer had been alleged, the trial court and the parties likely would have explored the potential for bias that might arise from the fact that the victim was a law enforcement agent, a fact that would *901 have come to light at trial regardless whether a special circumstance involving a peace officer or federal agent was alleged. Thus, questioning the prospective jurors about their views concerning the murder of a peace officer in the specific context of a special circumstance allegation, even if erroneous, could not have prejudiced defendant.
B. Guilt Phase Claims
1. Admission of Agent Bulman's Photographic Identification of Defendant
On the night before the trial began, the prosecutors met with Agent Bulman and showed him five photographs they intended to introduce at trial: a photograph of Terry Brock; a 1980 booking photograph of Terry Brock; a 1984 booking photograph of defendant; a 1983 driver's license photograph of defendant, which may have been taken in 1978; and a 1980 booking photograph of Charles Brock. Bulman identified the photographs of Terry Brock as looking "closest to" the person with whom Bulman struggled in the street, and the photographs of defendant as looking "closest to" the person who had the shotgun. Bulman did not recognize Charles Brock from his photograph. When the prosecutor began to question Bulman about the photographs at trial the next day, defendant objected to the manner of the previous night's identification, and the fact that the prosecution had not told the defense that Bulman would identify defendant's photographs as depicting the person with the shotgun. The trial court overruled the objection, finding nothing improper in showing a witness photographs to be introduced at trial, but stated that it would consider a request for a continuance if defense counsel needed more time to prepare for cross-examination. Bulman then testified about his identification of the photographs, and was cross-examined on the subject the next day. As noted earlier, Bulman did not identify defendant in court as the person who had the shotgun. On appeal, defendant contends showing the photographs to Bulman before trial was an impermissibly suggestive identification procedure resulting in a unreliable identification that was admitted at trial in violation of defendant's federal and state due process rights. (See Neil v. Biggers (1972) 409 U.S. 188 [34 L.Ed.2d 401, 93 S.Ct. 375]; People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 411-412 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442] (Ochoa).)
(15) "In order to determine whether the admission of identification evidence violates a defendant's right to due process of law, we consider (1) whether the identification procedure was unduly suggestive and unnecessary, and, if so, (2) whether the identification itself was nevertheless reliable under the totality of the circumstances, taking into account such factors as the opportunity of the witness to view the suspect at the time of the offense, the *902 witness's degree of attention at the time of the offense, the accuracy of his or her prior description of the suspect, the level of certainty demonstrated at the time of the identification, and the lapse of time between the offense and the identification." (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 989 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519].) "We review deferentially the trial court's findings of historical fact, especially those that turn on credibility determinations, but we independently review the trial court's ruling regarding whether, under those facts, a pretrial identification procedure was unduly suggestive." (People v. Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 932, 943 [44 Cal.Rptr.3d 237, 135 P.3d 649].) "Only if the challenged identification procedure is unnecessarily suggestive is it necessary to determine the reliability of the resulting identification." (People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 125 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166] (Yeoman).)
Here, we assume for the sake of argument that the procedure was suggestive to some degree because Agent Bulman repeatedly had identified Terry Brock, previously had failed to identify Charles Brock, and the only remaining pictures were of defendant. Nonetheless, showing the photographs to Bulman in this manner was not unduly suggestive and unnecessary. The prosecutors intended to introduce several photographs at trial that were significant, in and of themselves, separate from Bulman's identification of them. For example, any differences in defendant's physical appearance in the photographs and at trial could explain Bulman's current inability to identify defendant; the jury could compare the photographs to the composite drawing of the suspects made at Bulman's direction; and the jury could compare the photograph of Charles and the composite drawings of the two suspects to consider whether the photograph eliminated Charles as a participant in the crime. As part of their trial preparation, the prosecutors asked if Bulman recognized anyone depicted in the photos. This is quite different from an officer showing a possible witness a photographic lineup during the investigatory stages of a case, when one reasonably would expect that, absent any exigent circumstances, police would take time to ensure that any suggestiveness is minimized. In the specific circumstances here, we would not necessarily expect lawyers trying to learn what a witness's testimony about trial exhibits will be to take time to hide the photographs at issue among others irrelevant to the case in order to create a less suggestive procedure.
Moreover, because Bulman did not identify defendant in court as the person with the shotgun, showing him the photographs could not have tainted a later identification. (Cf. Simmons v. United States (1968) 390 U.S. 377, 384 [19 L.Ed.2d 1247, 88 S.Ct. 967].) In fact, it is significant that the prosecutors already knew Bulman had not identified defendant at the preliminary hearing or at a prior live lineup. It is therefore highly unlikely they showed him the photographs in the hope of inducing him to identify defendant in court the next day. To the contrary, Bulman's history as a witness showed he was not *903 susceptible to making a false identification even in the more suggestive situation of viewing defendant in court. The prosecutors reasonably could have expected Bulman's continued frankness when viewing photographs in preparation for his testimony, despite the potentially suggestive way in which the photographs were presented.
(16) We are unaware of any authority that suggests that, had the prosecution waited until Bulman was on the witness stand to show him the photographs, and had Bulman made the same identifications, such a procedure would be subject to a constitutional challenge. Rather, in such circumstances, defendant would have explored the reliability of the identifications on cross-examination. Here, the prosecutors showed Bulman the exhibits the night before trial to learn what he would say about them before asking him in front of the jury. This was not an unduly suggestive and unnecessary procedure under the facts of this case, and we therefore need not evaluate the reliability of the identification. (Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 125.) That Bulman was allowed to testify he had identified defendant's photographs as closely resembling the person who had the shotgun did not render defendant's trial unfair. The circumstances of the identification were disclosed to the defense, they were the subject of thorough cross-examination, and the jury was able to evaluate the reliability of Bulman's identification by comparing the photographs to the composite drawing and to defendant's current appearance at trial. As the high court stated in Manson v. Brathwaite (1977) 432 U.S. 98, 116 [53 L.Ed.2d 140, 97 S.Ct. 2243], "[E]vidence with some element of untrustworthiness is customary grist for the jury mill. Juries are not so susceptible that they cannot measure intelligently the weight of identification testimony that has some questionable feature."
2. Admission of Blood Tests Conducted on the Jacket
Defendant contends the testimony regarding the presumptive blood tests conducted on the seized jacket should not have been admitted because the evidence was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial under sections 350 and 352 of the Evidence Code, respectively, and because its admission violated his federal constitutional right to a reliable determination of guilt.
Relevant evidence is evidence "having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action." (Evid. Code, ง 210.) On appeal we consider "(1) whether the challenged evidence satisfied the `relevancy' requirement set forth in Evidence Code section 210, and (2) if the evidence was relevant, whether the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 in finding that the probative value of the [evidence] was not substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission would create a substantial danger of undue *904 prejudice." (People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 13 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 939 P.2d 748].) "The trial court is vested with wide discretion in determining the relevance of evidence," although a court "has no discretion to admit irrelevant evidence." (People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 681 [248 Cal.Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253].)
(17) Defendant relies on People v. Slone (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 611, 631 [143 Cal.Rptr. 61], and decisions from two other states, State v. Fukusaku (1997) 85 Haw. 462 [946 P.2d 32], and Young v. State (1994) 316 Ark. 225 [871 S.W.2d 373], to argue that the presumptive blood tests performed are irrelevant in the absence of positive confirmatory test results indicating the stains were human blood. We rejected the reasoning in Slone as unpersuasive in People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 527 [224 Cal.Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251]. Furthermore, over two decades ago, we noted that California courts had long allowed the admission of the results of presumptive tests for blood. (People v. Coleman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 749, 775 [251 Cal.Rptr. 83, 759 P.2d 1260].)[30] We see no reason to reconsider that conclusion.
The circumstance that presumptive tests for blood on a jacket that might have been defendant's indicated the jacket might have had bloodstains in a pattern consistent with the murder in issue tends "in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action." (Evid. Code, ง 210.) The factors raised in defendant's challenge to this evidenceโthat the presumptive tests could not confirm the substance tested was human blood, that confirmatory tests failed to confirm the presence of blood, and that it is unknown when the jacket might have been exposed to the substance that created the positive resultsโdo not mean the test results have no tendency in reason to establish that defendant shot Agent Cross. Those issues affect the probative weight of the evidence, not whether the test results meet the threshold requirement of relevancy. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding this evidence was relevant.
(18) Similarly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the danger of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury *905 did not substantially outweigh the evidence's probative value. "`The "prejudice" referred to in Evidence Code section 352 applies to evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual and which has very little effect on the issues. In applying section 352, "prejudicial" is not synonymous with "damaging."'" (People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638 [250 Cal.Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189].) Evidence need not be excluded under this provision unless it "poses an intolerable `"risk to the fairness of the proceedings or the reliability of the outcome."' "(People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1114 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 118, 129 P.3d 321].) The testimony regarding the presumptive blood tests had no particularly emotional component, nor did it consume an unjustified amount of time. Further, because the defense fully explored the limitations of the presumptive tests through cross-examination, there is no likelihood this evidence confused or misled the jury. The trial court did not err, and defendant's constitutional rights were not violated.
3. Admission of Defendant's Refusal to Stand in the Lineup
Defendant contends evidence regarding his refusal to participate in the lineup planned for April 3, 1990, should have been excluded under section 352 of the Evidence Code. Defendant's objection at trial, however, was based only on the relevance of this evidence, not whether it was unduly prejudicial.[31] Defendant therefore has forfeited his claim that the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 by admitting this evidence. (Evid. Code, ง 353, subd. (a); People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 433-434 [35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765] (Partida).)
Defendant unpersuasively argues that the evidence he refused to participate in the lineup was irrelevant. The evidence was relevant for the purpose of establishing his consciousness of guilt. (See People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1223, fn. 9 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1].) Defendant disputes the inferences to be drawn from this evidence, arguing a reason other than consciousness of guilt explains his decision, namely, that he had followed his attorney's advice. However, as the trial court noted, the jury also could reasonably interpret the evidence to find defendant used the advice as an excuse to avoid standing in the lineup in an attempt to prevent a witness from identifying him. The jury reasonably might question why, if he were not involved in the shooting, defendant would not want to appear in the lineup to clear his name despite his attorney's advice. That the jury also could draw reasonable inferences from the evidence that might not support a finding of *906 guilt does not make the evidence irrelevant. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing its admission.
Even if he had not forfeited his alternative claim, defendant has not shown that the evidence's probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury. As with the blood test evidence, the lineup refusal evidence was not especially emotional, the possible reasons why defendant chose not to participate were fully developed, and the issue was not especially time consuming, or so confusing or misleading that it was beyond the jury's ability to resolve based on the presented evidence.
4. Admission of Testimony Regarding Telephone Calls Between Defendant and April Watson
In September 1990, Detective Henry interviewed April Watson concerning several telephone calls she received from defendant in August 1990. Watson said that in the calls, defendant expressed concern that Terry Brock might be cooperating with the police. Defendant told Watson to find out if that was true, and to tell Terry to "stay strong." In November 1990, Watson told Henry that defendant had called her again in late October concerning his suspicions regarding Terry.
Before Watson was called to testify, defendant moved on relevance grounds to exclude testimony about these calls because it was not definitively known whether they pertained to the Cross murder case or the triple murder case. Observing that defendant already had been convicted of the triple murder when the calls were made, the trial court denied the motion. It noted that defendant could present to the jury his theory of the possible subject of the calls, while acknowledging that defendant probably would not want to do so given his effort to keep references to the triple murder case out of this trial.
When Watson testified about the August calls, she professed to remember only being interviewed by Detective Henry, and said she had no specific memory of telling him about calls from defendant or of the details of the calls. When asked leading questions concerning the specific contents of her statements at the September interview, Watson testified it was "possible" she made those statements and that she "believe[d]" she had been truthful during that interview.
*907 The prosecution later called Detective Henry to testify about Watson's statements about the calls.[32] After addressing Watson's statements from the September interview, the prosecutor asked if Henry later received a call from Watson (the Nov. call). Defendant objected based on lack of foundation. The trial court overruled the objection. The trial court later overruled the same objection after the prosecutor asked Henry what Watson said in the November call. Henry then testified that Watson told him defendant again had asked if she knew where Terry was housed, and that she told defendant she did not know.
On appeal, defendant renews his relevance objection to admission of the contents of Watson's statements to Detective Henry about what defendant told her in the telephone calls.[33] He also argues that Henry's testimony about those statements was inadmissible hearsay under section 1200, subdivision (b) of the Evidence Code, and that the erroneous admission of the statements' contents violated his federal due process rights.
Defendant contends evidence concerning his calls to Watson was irrelevant because another inference besides consciousness of guilt regarding the Cross murder might be drawn from them, namely, that when he called Watson he was concerned Terry was cooperating in the triple murder case. We agree with the trial court that this scenario is highly unlikely because defendant already had been convicted of the three murders and knew he was a suspect in the Cross murder, having been asked to stand in the lineups in this case. His statements to Watson have some "tendency in reason" to support an inference that he did not want Terry, who was implicated as having been defendant's partner in the Cross murder, to tell police that defendant was the one who killed Agent Cross. Given that defendant would have been the only possible source of direct evidence of what he had meant in making the statements, the prosecution was obliged to rely on inferences arising from the statements to establish defendant's state of mind. Contrary to his assertion, had defendant chosen to argue that the calls might have concerned a different *908 case, requiring the jury to choose between the reasonable, possible interpretations of the statements' significance would not invite the type of speculation that supports exclusion of the evidence.
As to the hearsay nature of Detective Henry's testimony regarding the statements Watson gave at the September interview concerning defendant's calls, our review of the record reveals that defendant failed to object to this testimony at trial. Defense counsel objected only to Henry's testimony regarding statements that were not brought up during Watson's testimony, namely, calls to Watson from Eileen Smith, and Watson's November call to Henry. Defendant has forfeited his claim on appeal that Henry's testimony about defendant's August calls was inadmissible hearsay. (Evid. Code, ง 353, subd. (a); Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 433-434.) In any event, the claim is meritless.
Although defendant claims Henry's testimony was "double-hearsay" (see Evid. Code, ง 1201), the majority of the testimony was "single hearsay" because, for example, defendant's requests for information about Terry and for Watson to tell Terry to "stay strong" were not offered for their truth, but rather for the fact that defendant made the statements. (Evid. Code, ง 1200, subd. (a); People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 117 [41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319, 131 P.3d 400].) To the extent defendant's statements that he had heard "some things that wasn't [sic] right" and that Terry had been seen with the police were offered to prove defendant had in fact heard these things, Henry's testimony was multiple-level hearsay, but the first level (from defendant to Watson) was an admission of a party, and therefore admissible under Evidence Code section 1220. (People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 898 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 305, 102 P.3d 228].)
The crux of the issue is whether Henry's testimony regarding what Watson told him about defendant's August calls was admissible under a hearsay exception. Had defendant objected to the testimony on this ground, the trial court would have acted within its discretion to overrule the objection under the prior inconsistent statement exception of Evidence Code section 1235. (See People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 106, 120 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d 687, 990 P.2d 563] [trial court's finding regarding applicability of a hearsay exception is reviewed for abuse of discretion].) This hearsay exception provides that "[e]vidence of a statement made by a witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing and is offered in compliance with Section 770." (Evid. Code, ง 1235.) That the requirements of Evidence Code section 770 were met here is undisputed, given that Watson was asked directly about the contents of her September statements to Henry during her testimony. (Evid. Code, ง 770, subd. (a) ["Unless the interests of justice otherwise require, *909 extrinsic evidence of a statement made by a witness that is inconsistent with any part of his testimony at the hearing shall be excluded unless: [ถ] (a) The witness was so examined while testifying as to give him an opportunity to explain or deny the statement ...."].)
Defendant contends Watson's testimony was not inconsistent for purposes of this hearsay exception because she did not contradict her earlier statements to Henry, but merely professed being unable to recall the details of what she had said. However, when a witness's claim of a lack of present memory of prior statements is based on deliberate evasion, inconsistency is implied. (People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 84-85 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506].) The record supports a finding of such an inference here. Watson's testimony was not even internally consistent: in successive answers to the prosecutor's questions, she claimed she did not recall "anything happening in 1990, August and September," but she then recalled receiving a call from defendant, but stated she did not recall the nature of the call. While she specifically remembered being interviewed at the police station, when confronted with the contents of her statements there, Watson repeatedly said only it was "possible" she said those things. On this record,[34] there is a reasonable basis for finding Watson's claimed lack of memory was based on her unwillingness to cooperate. Accordingly, had defendant objected to Henry's testimony regarding Watson's statements about the August calls, the trial court would not have abused its discretion in admitting that testimony.
Defendant did, however, object to Henry's testimony about what Watson said regarding defendant's October call, which she reported to Henry in her November call. Assuming defendant's objections to a lack of foundation were adequate to alert the trial court to the fact that the prosecutor had not asked Watson about this later statement during her testimony, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the testimony.[35] Because Watson never was asked about her November call to Henry, the record does not support the application of the exception for either a prior inconsistent statement or a past recollection recorded. (Evid. Code, ง 1237.) As to the first exception, Watson was excused at the end of her testimony and was therefore not provided an opportunity to explain or deny that statement. (Evid. Code, ง 770, subds. (a), (b).) As to the latter exception, it was not established that Watson had *910 "insufficient present recollection to enable [her] to testify fully and accurately" about that statement. (Evid. Code, ง 1237, subd. (a).)
We conclude this error was harmless under both the Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, standard for assessing the prejudicial effect of state error (requiring the defendant establish a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome absent the error), and the Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824], standard for evaluating the prejudicial effect of federal constitutional error (requiring the prosecution establish the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). The substance of this testimony was that defendant called Watson and "still wanted to know where Terry was housed," and Watson said she did not know. Because Henry's testimony regarding Watson's statements at the September interview, which were more explicit and thus much stronger evidence of defendant's state of mind (consciousness of guilt), had been admitted properly, the fact that the jury improperly learned defendant called again to ask the same question about where Terry was housed could not have affected its verdict.
5. Admission of Testimony Regarding Defendant's Prior Commission of a "Serious Criminal Offense"
Defendant contends admission of testimony regarding his prior commission of a "serious criminal offense" violated sections 1101 and 352 of the Evidence Code and his federal due process rights. We disagree.
As the trial court recognized, Jessica Brock was the crucial witness in this case. The following critical inconsistency emerged in her testimony. She previously had told police that on the night Agent Cross was murdered, defendant came to her apartment with blood on his shirt, washed blood off what appeared to be the barrel of the Secret Service shotgun, told her he had to "take someone out" near the airport because it was "either him or them," and was worried about the police finding him. However, she testified on cross-examination and told the defense attorney in an interview that this incident happened two years earlier at a different apartment, and that both defendant and her brother Terry were there.[36] On further cross-examination and redirect, Jessica testified there were two separate visits, one by defendant and Terry, and a later one by defendant alone. The trial court aptly observed that Jessica's first statement that defendant came to her apartment on the night of Cross's murder "would point the finger straight at the defendant and I would not be surprised if the jury would convict if they credited that earlier *911 statement," but, if they credited her statement to defense counsel that there was only one visit two years before Cross was murdered, "then that evidence is absolutely 100 percent diffused and the jury is left with very little evidence as to the defendant's guilt."
The prosecutor pointed out to the trial court that the earlier visit appeared to coincide with the triple murder, and argued that Jessica had confused the two visits during her interview with the defense. To bolster Jessica's testimony that there were two separate visits, the prosecutor sought permission to ask her whether the two visits were distinct in her mind because she associated the first with the triple murder. At a hearing held without the jury present, Jessica testified about her memories of the visits and ultimately said she did associate the earlier visit with the triple murder. Defendant objected under section 352 of the Evidence Code to Jessica's mentioning the triple murder case in her testimony. The trial court gave a detailed analysis of the relative probative value of the evidence that Jessica distinctly remembered the earlier visit because of the triple murder, as opposed to the danger of undue prejudice to defendant. It then decided the proffered testimony was very important, and that the danger of undue prejudice, which the court acknowledged was potentially high, could be sufficiently reduced by limiting the scope of the testimony and providing an admonition regarding the limited purpose for which it would be admitted.
Accordingly, the trial court determined the prosecution would be permitted to elicit from Jessica that in October 1978, or soon thereafter, she learned that defendant and Terry allegedly had committed a "serious offense" that eventually resulted in a trial; she associated that offense in her mind with the visit by defendant and Terry; and she now was sure defendant made two separate visits. The court did not allow the prosecutor to elicit that the "serious offense" was a triple murder, that Jessica knew one of the victims, or that defendant and Terry were convicted of those charges. Jessica then testified before the jury that there were two separate visits and that she connected the earlier one with an allegation that defendant and Terry had committed a different offense that had made a strong impression on her.[37] As promised, the court instructed the jury that this evidence was admitted only as it related to Jessica's credibility, that it could be used in determining whether there was one visit or two, and that the jury must not speculate about the nature of the offense or use the testimony for any other purpose.[38]
*912 Because defendant did not object to this evidence at trial as improper character evidence under Evidence Code section 1101, he has forfeited such a claim. (Evid. Code, ง 353; Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 433-434.) In any event, defendant's argument that admission of this evidence violated this provision, and his reliance on cases discussing it, are unavailing.
With exceptions not relevant here, "evidence of a person's character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion." (Evid. Code, ง 1101, subd. (a), italics added.) Subdivision (b) of the same section, referred to as the "other crimes" provision, provides that "[n]othing in this section prohibits the admission of evidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident ... other than his or her disposition to commit such an act." (Evid. Code, ง 1101, subd. (b).) An example of the application of subdivision (b) would be a case in which the charged crime has distinct features similar to a prior crime that the defendant committed, and the prosecution seeks to present evidence of the prior crime to prove that the defendant committed both crimes. (See, e.g., People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 202-203 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 451, 118 P.3d 496].)
Although defendant characterizes Jessica's testimony about the "serious offense" as "other crimes evidence" falling under this provision, the evidence was not offered to prove defendant's conduct. Instead, it was offered to explain Jessica's state of mind regarding why she recalled two separate visits. In fact, the jury was instructed this evidence was not received, and should not be considered, as proof that defendant had committed the prior offense to which Jessica referred.
We next consider the trial court's ruling under Evidence Code section 352. After reviewing for abuse of discretion the trial court's weighing of the probative value of the challenged evidence against the danger of undue prejudice and confusion of the jury, we cannot say its decision was outside *913 the bounds of reason. (See People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 666 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640].) If the jury found them credible, Jessica's initial statements to the police regarding defendant's visit hours after Agent Cross was murdered were the strongest evidence tying defendant to that murder. On the other hand, if the jury believed her statements to defense counsel that this visit occurred two years before Cross was murdered, defendant's behavior and statements during that visit could have had no connection to this case.
While defendant is correct that other aspects of Jessica's testimony besides her association of his prior visit with the "serious offense," such as the age of her child at relevant times, bolster her testimony that there were two separate visits, it is also true that defense counsel created this ambiguity by suggesting to Jessica during the interview she might have "switched the dates," and then by eliciting this inconsistent statement on cross-examination. It was within the bounds of reason for the trial court to find that Jessica's association in her mind of the first visit with a different serious offense defendant and Terry allegedly committed carried much more weight than the fact that she could also date the visits based on her child's age. The trial court also reasonably found this evidence to be significantly probative on the issue of Jessica's overall credibility as a witness, given that she had expressed no confusion about whether defendant's relevant visit happened in 1980 or 1978 when the police interviewed her, but that she later changed her story when defense counsel interviewed her, and then went back and forth during her trial testimony. That the defense was unhappy with the consequences of its having confronted Jessica with her inconsistency regarding the date of defendant's visit with the crowbar-like object does not mean the trial court was obliged to exclude the prosecution's evidence rebutting the contradiction that defendant had exploited.
The trial court recognized that admitting testimony that defendant and Terry together had been involved in a serious offense two years before the Cross murder created a significant risk of undue prejudice for the defense. However, the court took reasonable steps to minimize this danger by limiting the scope of the testimony and by giving an instruction that set forth the narrow manner in which the jury was permitted to consider this evidence.[39] For these reasons, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting this testimony.
*914 6. Denial of Motion for Mistrial
The trial court's efforts to sanitize the testimony regarding the "serious offense" from any mention of the nature of that charge were frustrated when, in response to the prosecutor's question whether she connected the earlier visit by defendant and her brother Terry "with an offense that had been committed by both [of them] in 1978," Jessica asked, "What are you referring to? The triple murder?" The jury was excused, and defendant moved for a mistrial. After stating that it believed Jessica "for reasons of her own decided to blurt that answer out," the trial court denied the motion. When the jury returned, the court announced it was striking the last question and answer, and it directed the jury to disregard them. Over defendant's objection, the court later individually asked the jurors and alternates whether they had heard the question and answer. The court's questions were phrased in general terms and did not reveal what Jessica had said. Only two jurors said they had heard the triple murder statement, and they said they could disregard it in their deliberations. The court then admonished the jurors to disregard any statement they might have heard and not to discuss with other jurors what they individually had discussed with the court.
The trial court revisited the mistrial motion the next day. Defense counsel questioned the credibility of the jurors who said they had not heard the triple murder remark, but the court found no basis to doubt their answers. Although it believed the jurors who heard the statement but said they could disregard it, the court offered to consider removing them at defendant's request. Defendant, while explicitly stating he was not waiving the motion for a mistrial, said he would not ask the court to remove the two jurors. The trial court left them on the jury subject to its further consideration of whether they should be removed to eliminate the possibility of defendant's raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a later proceeding, i.e., that no competent attorney would have allowed the two jurors to remain on the jury. The trial court later conducted an in camera ex parte proceeding with defendant and his attorney in which they presented their tactical reasons for not asking the court to remove the jurors. The court ultimately did not dismiss the two jurors. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court should have granted his mistrial motion, and that its failure to do so violated section 1101 of the Evidence Code, defendant's federal due process rights, and his federal right to a reliable determination of guilt under Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625 [65 L.Ed.2d 392, 100 S.Ct. 2382].
(19) Because defendant did not mention Evidence Code section 1101 in conjunction with the mistrial motion, he has forfeited any claim that the trial court should have granted it on that ground. Regardless, that provision does not apply because the triple murder statement was not admitted to prove *915 defendant's conduct; in fact, it was stricken and the jury was admonished not to consider it for any purpose. As to the other grounds raised, "[a] mistrial should be granted if the court is apprised of prejudice that it judges incurable by admonition or instruction. [Citation.] Whether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions." (People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 854 [180 Cal.Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776].)
We find no reason to disturb the trial court's determination that the jurors truthfully answered whether or not they had heard the triple murder remark. Accordingly, as to jurors who did not hear Jessica's statement, defendant has made no showing of prejudice. Regarding the two jurors who did hear the remark, defendant makes no showing of prejudice beyond his mere assertion that because of the nature of the statement, no juror would be able to follow the admonition to disregard it, but "[i]t must be presumed that the jurors acted in accordance with the instruction and disregarded the question and answer." (People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 961 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 70 P.3d 277].) We do not agree with respondent's claim that defendant invited error by not requesting the dismissal of these jurors. The error defendant challenges on appeal is the trial court's denial of his motion for a mistrial, which, if granted, would have had the practical effect of dismissing all of the jurors. It does not follow that, because for tactical reasons defendant did not agree to the offer of a lesser remedy, he gave up his right to challenge the denial of the full remedy he sought. Nonetheless, the fact that defendant did not avail himself of the option of removing the two jurors undercuts the claim that the trial court erred in finding that any potential prejudice could be cured by admonishing them to disregard the statement and not to mention it to other jurors. In fact, defendant personally stated during the in camera hearing that he believed the two jurors "were honest in their answers and ... honest when they said they could put it to the side." The defense attorney said that, "in terms of evaluating them as fair and impartial jurors compared to the alternates that exist, we much prefer those two jurors," a "lesser of two evils" statement that still indicated counsel did not believe these jurors would be so prejudiced that they could not be fair at all. The trial court acted within its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial.
7. Exclusion of Testimony of Jacqueline Sherow
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of Jacqueline Sherow (see People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 153 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614, 38 P.3d 461]), and thereby violated his federal due process rights.
It appears that, in a report of his 1992 interview with Sherow, Detective Henry stated that she told him she had a conversation with Charles Brock *916 some time after the Cross murder in which Charles said, "I had something to do with the killing of Julie Cross," or "I am involved in the murder of Julie Cross," and "I have to get away from here." In response to defendant's notice that he intended to call Sherow as a witness to testify concerning Charles's supposed statements, the prosecution objected, arguing the statements were hearsay and did not qualify as declarations against penal interest under section 1230 of the Evidence Code. In a hearing outside the presence of the jury, Sherow testified Charles told her "he knew about" the murder, and she had interpreted his statement to mean he was involved in it or knew who was involved. Sherow also testified that she did not ask Charles the nature of his involvement in the murder, and he provided her with no details on his own. The trial court excluded Sherow's testimony, finding that defendant had not satisfied the foundational requirements of the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest.
(20) We conclude the trial court's decision to exclude Sherow's proffered testimony was not an abuse of discretion because defendant failed to establish that Charles's actual statement "so far subjected him to the risk of ... criminal liability ... that a reasonable man in his position would not have made [it] unless he believed it to be true." (Evid. Code, ง 1230.) Sherow repeatedly testified at the hearing that Charles said only he "knew about" the murder. Merely knowing about a murder is not a crime, and it follows that admitting to someone that one knows about a murder is not a statement against one's penal interest, or any other interest listed in section 1230 of the Evidence Code.
Defendant's reliance on Detective Henry's report as supporting application of the hearsay exception is misplaced. The report is not part of the record but the prosecutor appears to have summarized it at the hearing. We observe that statements apparently set forth in quotation marks in that report may not be a verbatim record of what Sherow said Charles told her, as neither of them was likely to have referred to the victim as "Julie Cross." In addition, the report apparently states that what Charles told Sherow about his involvement was either he "had something to do with" or he was "involved in" the murder. Such uncertainty further lessens the likelihood the report was an exact record of what was said. Henry did not testify concerning whether he understood the statements in his report to be Charles's actual statements as Sherow recounted them, her interpretation of what Charles said, as Sherow testified at the hearing, or Henry's interpretation of what Sherow said Charles said. The only definitive evidence regarding what Charles actually may have said was Sherow's testimony at the hearing, testimony that did not establish that his statement was against his penal interest.
Even if the trial court erred by excluding Sherow's testimony, the error would be harmless under any standard. Charles's statements as testified to by *917 Sherow at the hearing, namely, that he only knew about the murder, were not inculpatory to any significant degree. Had Sherow testified at trial in the same manner, and had she subsequently been confronted with the statements apparently contained in Detective Henry's reportโfor example pursuant to the hearsay exception for prior inconsistent statements under section 1235 of the Evidence Codeโwe discern no possibility that the jury would have reached a different verdict. The jury also would have learned that the statements in the report were Sherow's interpretation of the meaning of what Charles said, that he did not further elaborate concerning his "involvement" in the murder, and that he appeared to be under the influence of drugs during the conversation. In addition, the prosecutor might have reasonably argued that Charles was referring to his being involved in the murder in the sense that he had been arrested as a suspect, not that he actually played a role in committing the crime. The prosecutor also might have pointed out that Sherow's recollection and interpretation of the conversation could have been faulty because she had been drinking alcoholic beverages earlier that day. The less than compelling evidence that Charles might have said he was "involved in" or "had something to do with" the murder would not have affected the resolution of the key issue in the trial, namely, whether Jessica Brock's statements strongly incriminating defendant were credible. For these reasons, the exclusion of Sherow's testimony could not have affected the outcome of the trial.
8. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish that he was guilty of the Cross murder or to support the special circumstance finding that the murder was committed in the course of a robbery. We conclude substantial evidence supports the challenged verdict.
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, "we `examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidenceโevidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid valueโsuch that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' [Citations.] We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.] [ถ] The same standard of review applies to cases in which the prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial evidence and to special circumstance allegations. [Citation.] `[I]f the circumstances reasonably justify the jury's findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.' [Citation.] We do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a witness's credibility. [Citation.]" (People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1129.)
*918 Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support the guilty verdict because the trial court should have excluded certain testimony and evidence, and because Jessica Brock's testimony was not credible. As discussed ante, we have concluded the challenged evidence, specifically the composite drawings of the suspects completed with Agent Bulman, Bulman's identification of defendant's photographs, and the presumptive blood tests on the seized jacket, was properly admitted. Therefore, that aspect of defendant's claim is without merit. As to Jessica's testimony, defendant is correct that Jessica's version of events changed numerous times between her pretrial statements to the police and the defense attorney, and during her trial testimony. However, we are convinced that a rational trier of fact reasonably could have believed the first version that Jessica gave to the police, the version that strongly incriminated defendant, and reasonably could have found that her story changed only because defendant, his family, Jessica's family, and even Jessica's own internal conflicted loyalties, pressured Jessica to lie and undermine the case against defendant.
The possible shortcomings defendant points to in Jessica's testimony, Agent Bulman's identification of defendant's photographs, the presumptive blood tests on the jacket, and the evidence of the eyeglasses found at the scene were brought out through the examination of the relevant witnesses and counsel's arguments to the jury. On appeal we do not reevaluate the weight or credibility of this evidence, nor do we examine each piece of evidence in isolation. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence and the reasonable deductions arising from it adequately support the jury's finding that defendant was guilty of Agent Cross's murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Even were we to conclude the evidence reasonably might be reconciled with a contrary finding, this would not warrant a reversal of the judgment.
Defendant challenges the robbery-murder special-circumstance finding on the grounds (1) that there was insufficient evidence that defendant intended to rob Agents Bulman and Cross; and (2) that the taking of the shotgun and keys constituted a robbery in the course of committing the murder, which would not support the special circumstance finding. (See People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 41 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262] (Marshall).)
(21) The special circumstance applies if defendant was engaged in the commission of, or the attempted commission of, a robbery. (ง 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A).) The jury reasonably could have found from the evidence that the assailants identified the agents, who appeared to be civilians parked on a poorly lit street, as potential victims to rob, "cased" the victims by slowly driving by twice and by watching the agents from behind the vegetation-covered fence next to their car, and waited until it was dark to *919 commit their crime. The jury reasonably could have found that when defendant and the other assailant approached the agents' car from behind, one on each side and with at least one of them being armed with a firearm, they intended to take the agents' personal property from their presence by force or fear with the intent of permanently depriving them of that property and had taken a substantial step towards completing the robbery, and that they therefore were engaged in the attempted commission of a robbery. (Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 34 [defining robbery]; People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 604 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 909 P.2d 994] ["To constitute an attempt, there must be (i) proof of specific intent to commit the target crime and (ii) a direct, ineffectual act done towards its commission."].) The jury also reasonably could have found that once the would-be robbers discovered their victims were armed law enforcement officers who might apprehend them on the spot, defendant decided to murder the agents in order to facilitate his and his partner's escape from the botched robbery. (See People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1025-1026 [248 Cal.Rptr. 568, 755 P.2d 1017] [robbery-felony-murder special circumstance includes murder committed during period the perpetrator is in flight from the crime until he reaches a place of temporary safety].)
That the incident never progressed to the point where the assailants could say to the agents, "This is a robbery, give us your property," is immaterial because the reasonable inferences the jury could draw from the evidence amply support the finding that committing a robbery was their unspoken intent. Similarly, given that the jury reasonably could have found that defendant was engaged in an attempt to commit a robbery by the time he and his partner first contacted the agents, and that defendant subsequently murdered Agent Cross during his flight from this unsuccessful attempt, we need not consider whether, as defendant contends, the taking of the shotgun and the keys was an incidental "robbery in the course of a murder" such that reliance on that evidence to prove the special circumstance would violate the rule we stated in Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at page 41, that "[t]he robbery-murder special circumstance applies to a murder in the commission of a robbery, not to a robbery committed in the course of a murder."
In sum, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict and its finding that the robbery-murder special circumstance was true.
9. Challenged Guilt Phase Jury Instructions
a. Aiding and Abetting
The trial court gave CALJIC No. 8.27, regarding first degree felony-murder liability for an aider and abettor to a robbery or attempted robbery, and *920 CALJIC Nos. 8.80 and 8.81.17, during the special circumstance phase regarding the requirement that an aider and abettor in the commission of a murder in the first degree also have the intent to kill.[40] Defendant objected to these instructions on the ground that aiding and abetting was not "applicable" because the prosecution's theory was that defendant was the person who shot Agent Cross, and defendant's theory was that he did not participate in the crime at all. The trial court overruled the objection because, in the court's view, it was possible the jury might find that defendant participated in the robbery and murder, but was not the person who actually shot Cross, because the defense had strongly challenged the evidence regarding blood on his jacket, and had presented evidence that Terry or Charles Brock might have been the shooter, that Agent Bulman had not positively identified defendant as the shooter, and that Jessica Brock's statement did not establish that defendant actually admitted to being the shooter. Defendant claims the trial court erred by giving these instructions because no evidence supported his aiding and abetting liability, making the instructions unnecessary and confusing, and that this error also violated his federal due process rights.
(22) "The trial court has the duty to instruct on general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence [citations] and has the correlative duty `to refrain from instructing on principles of law which not only are irrelevant to the issues raised by the evidence but also have the effect of confusing the jury or relieving it from making findings on relevant issues.' [Citation.] `It is an elementary principle of law that before a jury can be instructed that it may draw a particular inference, evidence must appear in the *921 record which, if believed by the jury, will support the suggested inference [citation].' [Citation.]" (People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 681 [156 Cal.Rptr. 871, 597 P.2d 130].)
The instructions given were proper statements of the law on aider and abettor liability; defendant does not contend otherwise. Instead, he contends the fact the prosecution only argued to the jury that he was the actual killer means no evidence supported a finding that he was the other participant. We disagree. Although the prosecution pursued what it viewed as the strongest case against defendant, the trial court correctly articulated how, based on evidence presented at trial, the jury might possibly find defendant guilty as an aider and abettor despite both the prosecution and defense theories of the case. In addition, the jury was not required to agree unanimously whether defendant was the shooter or the other participant in the crime. (People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 408 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 684, 956 P.2d 1137].) Because the evidence could support aiding and abetting liability, the trial court properly gave the aiding and abetting instructions.
Finally, we are not persuaded by defendant's contention that the aiding and abetting instructions confused the jurors and allowed some to vote to convict despite their not being convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt. The assertion is based on pure speculation and is contradicted by the absence of anything in the record showing the jury was confused, as well as by the fact that the instructions properly stated the law. (See People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 34 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224] [the jury is presumed to follow the instructions as given].)
b. Consciousness of Guilt
Defendant contends the trial court erred by instructing, pursuant to CALJIC Nos. 2.04 and 2.05, that the jury could infer defendant harbored a consciousness of guilt if it found he attempted to or did persuade a witness to testify falsely, or authorized someone else to attempt to procure false evidence. Together the instructions clarified that such conduct by defendant or his authorization of such conduct "is not sufficient by itself to prove guilt, and its weight and significance, if any, are matters for [the jury's] consideration." Defendant objected to these two instructions in the trial court.
(23) Defendant first argues there was insufficient evidence to support giving these two instructions, but "to the extent [he] contends that facts giving rise to an inference of consciousness of guilt must be conclusively established before [the instructions] may be given, [he] is incorrect; there need only be some evidence in the record that, if believed by the jury, would sufficiently support the suggested inference. [Citations.]" (People v. Coffman *922 and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 102 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30].) Here, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to raise an inference that defendant, and others acting on his behalf and with his authorization, tried to persuade a witness to testify falsely. As the trial court noted, defendant contacted Jessica Brock shortly before defense counsel interviewed her, and she then recanted her statement to the police and said, instead, that defendant's visit happened two years before Cross was murdered. There was evidence that defendant's parents were in regular contact with defendant and also talked to Jessica before trial, after which her testimony was inconsistent in nearly every relevant aspect with her initial statements to the police. The jury reasonably could find that her changed statement and testimony were false and the result of pressure from defendant and his parents on his behalf. The jury also reasonably could infer, despite conflicting evidence to which defendant points, that defendant's sister Darcel Taylor sent a letter to Terry Brock at defendant's request for the purpose of convincing Terry to tell the police defendant had not participated in the Cross murder, and that defendant had asked April Watson to contact Terry for the same purpose.
For the first time in his reply brief, defendant also contends these instructions were improperly argumentative in that they "pinpointed" the prosecution's argument regarding how the jury should view certain evidence. He forfeited this claim by not raising it at trial or in his opening brief. In any event, we consistently have rejected such challenges to the standard consciousness of guilt instructions, and defendant presents no compelling reason for us to reconsider that conclusion. (See Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 152-154.)
c. First Degree Murder
Defendant contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury on first degree murder because the information alleged only that the murder of Agent Cross was committed with malice aforethought in violation of section 187. To the extent we may review this claim under section 1259 despite defendant's failure to raise it at trial because he alleges his substantial rights were affected, we previously have rejected this contention and discern no reason to revisit the issue. (See People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593, 616-617 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 753, 170 P.3d 129].)
Defendant also contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct that the jurors must unanimously agree on whether defendant was guilty of premeditated and deliberate first degree murder or felony first degree murder. Again, to the extent that we may review his claim under section 1259, it is without merit. (People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 313 [79 Cal.Rptr.3d 648, 187 P.3d 363].)
*923 10. Asserted Improper Interference by the Trial Court with the Jury's Deliberations During the Guilt Phase
Defendant contends the trial court violated his state and federal constitutional rights by invading the jury's deliberations in its questioning of the foreman and by improperly coercing a verdict in its instruction to the jury. He contends these errors deprived him of his right to trial by jury, a unanimous and reliable verdict, and due process of law. We disagree.
On the second day of the guilt phase deliberations, the jury requested a readback of Jessica Brock's testimony concerning defendant's visit to her apartment and of Agent Bulman's testimony concerning the composite drawings of the assailants and whether he had identified defendant from them. The next morning, the jury foreman gave the bailiff a note that asked for "help on a jury room problem." The note stated there was "one juror that will not listen to reason regarding circumstantial evidence & has stated from the start of deliberations that since we have no ID of the killer & their [sic] is no proof the glasses are defendants [sic], he is not guilty. I feel very strong about our obligation & responsibility, but feel our efforts are in vain. The other eleven jurors are willing to openly discuss the case & try to reach a unanimous decision. How can we convince the juror that this case depends on circumstantial evidence. I will formally poll the jury this morning & am prepared to stay with it as long as the discussions are productive."
The parties disputed how the trial court should respond. The prosecutor argued the note demonstrated the juror at issue was refusing to deliberate, and therefore should be removed. Defense counsel argued the note showed only that the juror was not convinced defendant's guilt had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and it appeared to counsel the juror was not doing anything improper. Defense counsel suggested that, before deciding whether to remove the juror, the court ought to question the jurors individually, reinstruct them on circumstantial evidence and the process of deliberating, and ask "if that is something that they can all do." The court decided to question only the foreman about the note. It also clarified that the jury had deliberated only one afternoon and part of the next morning before requesting the readback, which had been completed minutes before the court took up the matter of the foreman's note.
In response to the court's questions, the foreman said he had prepared the note at home the previous evening. He explained that, within the first 30 minutes of deliberations, the juror at issue was "basically non-cooperative. You try to talk in regards to circumstantial evidence or the fact that there are no positive i.d.'s on anybody, it is just that that means that it cannot be settled. And no room for real discussion." The foreman said the juror would *924 not discuss "certain topics," even when other jurors asked him questions, but he would discuss other topics. The juror refused to participate in attempts to "bypass an issue and go on to other issues building a chain of events." The foreman described the juror as "not receptive to the normal conversation that is going on in the jury room." He added that the jurors had discussed the instructions concerning circumstantial evidence, but the juror at issue "does not respond to that particular instruction . . . . He does not agree. That is cut out. The impression is that it is black and white and this case is not black and white." The foreman reported that the juror "is totally hung up on positive i.d.," and that the juror had said, "`If we could positively identify him, I would fry his ass just like the rest of you. But without a positive i.d., I cannot see' or I don't know his exact words but to the extent that `I cannot vote for guilty.'" The foreman believed the juror's decision that there could be no conviction without positive identification was made before deliberations began. The foreman mentioned that some jurors had suggested they take a vote regarding the verdicts, but that was not done "for a number of reasons because we felt we should talk about it certainly a lot more longer than a half hour or so." The court directed the foreman to return to the jury room and resume deliberating, and not to mention to the other jurors the discussion they had had.
The parties again disputed whether the juror was refusing to deliberate or follow the law and should be removed, or whether he simply had a particular view of the weight of the evidence and was not acting improperly. Defense counsel again suggested the court only reread the instructions concerning circumstantial evidence and the deliberation process. Counsel also objected when the prosecutor suggested the court should instruct the jury that eyewitness identification is not required for a conviction. The trial court recognized the possibility that this was "an eleven to one situation," and that it must be "very careful that anything we do . . . is not taken by the jurors as being an order or coercion toward resolving this case at all costs." The court acknowledged the jury might be in disagreement over the weight of the evidence, but noted "the other possibility is that there is a misunderstanding that a juror believes that you have to have a particular form of testimony . . . . [ถ] The juror may believe that you need that type of direct evidence [(eyewitness testimony)] in order to convict when in fact the issue is given all the evidence, whether it be direct or circumstantial or any combination thereof, is there proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the truth of the charge. [ถ] That is in the charge I gave the jury and that is the law." The court also observed that "there were quite a few witnesses and exhibits, [but] almost immediately upon the deliberation process we had a fairly firm position taken." Defense counsel requested that if the court gave an instruction concerning the absence of a legal requirement for eyewitness positive identification evidence, it also *925 mention other types of evidence, such as fingerprints and confessions, so the instruction would not focus only on eyewitness evidence. The court agreed to do so.
The trial court subsequently reread to the entire jury the circumstantial evidence instructions. (CALJIC Nos. 2.00, 2.01.) It also gave an instruction concerning the factors the jury might consider in evaluating identification evidence (CALJIC No. 2.92), and read instructions concerning how the jury should deliberate (CALJIC Nos. 17.40, 17.41).
The court then gave additional instructions concerning the jury's consideration of the evidence. It first reminded the jurors "there is no preference for direct evidence or no preference for circumstantial evidence, there is a special rule, 2.01, that applies when the case is based on circumstantial evidence." After suggesting the jurors reread and discuss that instruction, the court added that, "in terms of the forms or sorts of evidence that you might see in the homicide case or in other case[s], you might see fingerprints. You might see confessions. You might see eyewitness identification in court. [ถ] There is no requirement under the law that there is anyโthat there be fingerprints or a confession or be someone who comes into court and identifies a defendant as the perpetrator of the crime." The court explained that the issue is that, "[g]iven the evidence presented by the People and their witnesses and their items of evidence, and given the evidence presented by the defense and their witnesses and items of evidence, you take that mound, that group of facts as you determine from the evidence, and you ask yourself are the proven facts sufficient to convince me beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty or not? [ถ] If the evidence, whatever form it comes in, is sufficient to convince you beyond a reasonable doubt under these instructions that the defendant is guilty, the law says vote guilty. [ถ] If the sum total of that evidence is not of the type and nature that convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, you vote not guilty."
As agreed, the court told the jury "[t]here is no legal requirement, as I have set forth, for a particular sort of thing, fingerprint evidence or eyewitness evidence, confession evidence or anything like that. [ถ] If there was, I would tell you that. [ถ] The issue is given all the evidence does that equal proof beyond a reasonable doubt in this case or not. You look at the totality of everything that was introduced by the prosecution and by the defense and you then answer that question."
The court's instructions continued as follows: "You are not prosecutors or defense attorneys. You are judges of the facts of this case. You must do your very best conscientiously and under the law or arrive at a verdict based on these instructions and the evidence. [ถ] There is a requirement, and I stress it *926 again, that the defendant in this case or any criminal case be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, the prosecution has the burden here of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Alexander was involved in those events and is guilty under the law before a jury could return a verdict of guilt. [ถ] However, that requirement need not be met by any particular type of evidence. [ถ] The question is, again, I stress to you, given the totality of the evidence in the case, whatever it is, whether it is 100 eyewitnesses or no eyewitnesses, you look at all the evidence and you ask yourself does that evidence equal proof beyond a reasonable doubt under the instructions given by the court as a whole."
The court also stressed several times that the instructions applied to the jury as a whole, not any particular juror or group of jurors, and that the court was not encouraging any position on "whether the matter should be resolved and if so in what way." The jury deliberated for an additional three days before reaching its verdicts. The jury was polled after the verdict was announced, and each juror affirmed the verdict.
(24) Section 1089 provides that a trial court may dismiss a juror and replace him or her with an alternate if it finds the juror is unable to perform his or her duty. The court properly may dismiss a juror based on the juror's "unwillingness to engage in the deliberative process." (People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466, 485 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 313, 21 P.3d 1225] (Cleveland).) A juror who expresses a fixed conclusion at the start of deliberations and rebuffs attempts to engage him or her in the discussion of other points of view raised by other jurors has refused to deliberate, and properly may be discharged. On the other hand, "[t]he circumstance that a juror does not deliberate well or relies upon faulty logic or analysis does not constitute a refusal to deliberate and is not a ground for discharge. Similarly, the circumstance that a juror disagrees with the majority of the jury as to what the evidence shows, or how the law should be applied to the facts, or the manner in which deliberations should be conducted does not constitute a refusal to deliberate and is not a ground for discharge." (Ibid.) A deliberating juror's refusal to follow the law set forth in the instructions also constitutes a failure to perform the juror's duties, and is grounds for discharge. (People v. Engelman (2002) 28 Cal.4th 436, 444 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 862, 49 P.3d 209] (Engelman).)
(25) The trial court's authority to discharge a juror includes the authority to conduct an appropriate investigation concerning whether there is good cause to do so, and the authority to take "less drastic steps [than discharge] where appropriate to deter any misconduct or misunderstanding it has reason to suspect." (People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 533 [250 Cal.Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081] (Keenan).) As we have stated, "a trial court's inquiry into *927 possible grounds for discharge of a deliberating juror should be as limited in scope as possible, to avoid intruding unnecessarily upon the sanctity of the jury's deliberations. The inquiry should focus upon the conduct of the jurors, rather than upon the content of the deliberations. Additionally, the inquiry should cease once the court is satisfied that the juror at issue is participating in deliberations and has not expressed an intention to disregard the court's instructions or otherwise committed misconduct, and that no other proper ground for discharge exists." (Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 485.) Nonetheless, the need to protect sanctity of the deliberations does not mean that any inquiry into the deliberation process violates the defendant's constitutional or statutory rights: "secrecy may give way to reasonable inquiry by the court when it receives an allegation that a deliberating juror has committed misconduct." (Engelman, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 443, citing Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 476.) On appeal, we review for abuse of discretion the trial court's decisions concerning whether and how to investigate the possibility that a juror should be discharged for failure to perform his or her duties, and whether, ultimately, to discharge the juror or to take some other action. (Engelman, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 442.)
(26) In the present case, the trial court reasonably viewed the foreman's note as indicating that one juror was refusing to deliberate, was refusing to follow the court's instructions on the law, or was doing some combination of both. Its choice to question the foreman about the circumstances did not needlessly invade the secrecy of the jury's deliberations. The court reasonably asked more detailed questions about what was occurring than simply whether the juror at issue was deliberating because it was concerned the juror may have been refusing to follow its instructions concerning circumstantial evidence. In light of the foreman's responses to its inquiry, the trial court was well within the bounds of reason in (1) suspecting the juror was failing to follow the court's instructions, and (2) determining that further instructions emphasizing direct evidence is not legally required might help disabuse the juror of such a notion and obviate the need to discharge him. The court was mindful of its obligation not to do anything that might sway the juror, or any juror, from an honest view of the weight of the evidence, rather than settling a misunderstanding of the law. The court properly recognized that it was "imperative if the jury is going to hang, they will hang for the right reason which is an honest, good faith disagreement over whether the evidence rises to the level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and not due to anything else." The trial court accordingly stressed to the jurors in its instructions that it was not directing the instructions at any one juror, and was not implying that any particular outcome, even reaching a verdict, was favorable or required.
(27) Defendant unsuccessfully tries to portray the trial court's actions and instructions as a so-called Allen charge, in which jury instructions encourage a seemingly deadlocked jury to continue deliberations in order to try to reach *928 a verdict. (See Allen v. United States (1896) 164 U.S. 492 [41 L.Ed. 528, 17 S.Ct. 154]; People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 852 [139 Cal.Rptr. 861, 566 P.2d 997] [holding, as a matter of judicially declared criminal procedure, that in response to a jury's indication that it is deadlocked, "it is error for a trial court to give an instruction which either (1) encourages jurors to consider the numerical division or preponderance of opinion of the jury in forming or reexamining their views on the issues before them; or (2) states or implies that if the jury fails to agree the case will necessarily be retried"].) Despite speculation that the jury might have been leaning 11 to one against the juror at issue, the foreman specifically stated that the jury had not yet voted on the charges. Moreover, according to the foreman, the whole jury still was discussing the evidence; indeed, at that time, it had been deliberating only for a few hours. The issue was not that the jury had discussed the evidence thoroughly and could not unanimously agree on a verdict, but rather it appeared that, from the outset of deliberations, the discussion and evaluation of the evidence was being short circuited by one juror's apparent misunderstanding of, or refusal to follow, the law. The trial court's attempt to ensure the jurors understood the law cannot be viewed as an improper attempt to overcome a deadlock in the jury's deliberations. The court recognized there might ultimately be a hung jury, and, in fact, told the jury it had no position on "whether the matter should be resolved and if so in what way." Its instructions merely were an attempt to persuade the jurors to follow the law, which is not improper. (Keenan, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 536.) The fact that the jury was polled after the guilt phase verdict was announced and each juror individually affirmed the verdict also supports our conclusion that the trial court's actions did not improperly interfere with the jury's deliberations.
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate any of defendant's statutory or constitutional rights in making its inquiry in response to the foreman's note or in deciding to give the supplemental instructions in an attempt to clarify the law for the jury.
C. Challenged Penalty Phase Jury Instructions
Defendant contends the trial court erred by declining to instruct the jury at the penalty phase with a modified version of CALJIC No. 8.85 that would have informed the jury that mitigating factors need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and that evidence of only one mitigating factor may be sufficient to support a decision that the appropriate punishment is life without the possibility of parole. We previously have rejected these contentions, and defendant presents no compelling reason for us to reconsider those decisions. (People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1150; see also People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 729-731 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 871, 3 P.3d 248] [CALJIC *929 No. 8.85 correctly describes the jury's role in evaluating penalty phase evidence, and the trial court is not obliged to give an instruction purporting to clarify that role].)
D. Alleged Interference with Jury Deliberations During Penalty Phase
Defendant contends the trial court's response to a penalty phase note from the jury improperly invaded the jury's deliberations and coerced a verdict in violation of his statutory and constitutional rights. This claim is without merit.
On the afternoon of the second day of penalty phase deliberations, the jury sent the trial court a note asking "to take the balance of the day off to allow feelings to cool down" because it felt "this time off will be well spent. Tomorrow should be a much better day." The court excused the jury for the rest of the day. After lunch recess the next day, the jury sent the court another note that read, "We have a split eleven to one + the holdout will not listen to any reason. Please let us know how to continue. The holdout is based on the children." During a discussion of the second note with the parties, the court and the prosecutor expressed concern that the juror might be improperly considering sympathy for defendant's children as a mitigating factor, and/or might be basing a decision on sympathy evidence in isolation, rather than weighing it in conjunction with all the other evidence. (See Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 456 [a capital jury cannot consider sympathy for a defendant's family in mitigation, but "family members may offer testimony of the impact of an execution on them if by so doing they illuminate some positive quality of the defendant's background or character"].) Over a defense objection, the trial court decided, without questioning the jurors, to give an instruction explaining the proper role of sympathy in the jury's deliberations. After incorporating two changes proposed by defense counsel, it gave the supplemental instruction set forth below in order to explain to the jury that, with regard to consideration of "sympathy," the focus of its inquiry at the penalty phase must be on defendant's character and background, "not the effect [its] verdict will or may have on any third party or parties."[41] As it had done in its *930 response to the jury's guilt phase note, discussed ante, in part II.B.10., the trial court emphasized that it was not suggesting any particular result would be proper, and that the supplemental instruction was directed at all of the jurors, not those favoring one verdict or the other.
After receiving the supplemental instruction, the jury deliberated for approximately 25 minutes before adjourning for the weekend. Approximately 10 minutes after returning to deliberations on Monday, it announced that it had reached a verdict. As was the case in the guilt phase, the jury was polled after the verdict was announced, and each juror affirmed the verdict.
*931 We conclude the trial court reasonably viewed the penalty phase note as indicating that a juror might not be following the law, and it took reasonable steps to remedy that potential problem. The court recognized the possibility that the juror at issue might have been improperly considering the effects that a sentence of death could have on defendant's children, and might have been basing a decision on the assessment of a single factor in isolation, rather than weighing the significance of that evidence against all other evidence. Pursuant to its authority to take steps less drastic than simply removing the juror for not following the law, the court properly first sought to clarify the applicable law to ensure that if the juror at issue, or any juror, decided a sentence of life without the possibility of parole sentence was appropriate, that decision would be legally proper. In response to defense counsel's objection that the proposed supplemental instruction was directed at the single juror, the court emphasized that the instruction was "not aimed at anybody. [ถ] What it is aimed at is trying to determine [that if] a verdict is reached, . . . everybody [is] playing by the same rules." The court then reiterated that position in the instruction by explicitly advising the jurors that the court was not suggesting a particular outcome, but was directing the instruction to the entire jury in an attempt to clarify the law for its deliberations.
Notwithstanding defendant's parsing of the language of the supplemental instruction in an attempt to create ambiguity in its meaning, the trial court's supplemental admonition was a correct statement of law. The instruction considered in its totality properly stated the role of sympathy in the deliberations (see People v. Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 577, 601 [88 Cal.Rptr.3d 131, 199 P.3d 535]), and it also properly stated the requirement that the jury weigh all the evidence in reaching the verdict, assigning whatever weight it deemed appropriate to each factor. Once again, the court also properly stressed that it was not indicating a position on how the case should be decided or how any piece of aggravating or mitigating evidence should be weighed in relation to the other evidence.
(28) It is not improper for a trial court to attempt to ensure that jurors follow the law in order to avoid the need to remove a juror for failing to do so, and an instruction merely clarifying the law is not the equivalent of an Allen charge. The supplemental instruction here was such a proper attempt to clarify the law. The jurors could not reasonably have viewed it as encouraging any juror simply to give up a decision that was based on a proper application of the law to the facts of the case because other jurors had reached a different decision. In addition, in the context of the present case, the jurors could not have interpreted the legally correct admonition that they had a duty to notify the court if any juror was not following the law as an improper invitation for the majority of the jurors to "browbeat" a single juror into giving up what the court had just explained could be a legally proper *932 assessment of sympathy evidence and the balance of the mitigating and aggravating factors. (Cf. Engelman, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 445-447 [an instruction at the beginning of deliberations that jurors should notify the court if a juror is refusing to follow the court's instructions carries needless potential danger of inducing the jurors to expose the contents of their deliberations in the event of a later disagreement].) Significantly, the supplemental instruction at the same time stated that the court would continue to attempt to clarify the law if a juror still was having difficulty understanding it. Contrary to defendant's arguments, the fact that the jury reached a unanimous verdict fairly soon (in terms of court time) after receiving the court's supplemental instruction does not necessarily reflect that the court's instructions had some improper influence on the verdict. Instead, the unanimous verdict, which was confirmed by polling the jury, could have resulted from the holdout juror's realizing that he or she had, in fact, been improperly considering sympathy solely for defendant's children, rather than how the children's testimony reflected on defendant's character, or basing his or her decision on the improper consideration of sympathy in isolation, rather than weighing the mitigating force of that evidence in the context of all of the aggravating and mitigating evidence. In other words, the change in the juror's position very well could have been the result of enlightenment, not coercion.
Defendant appears simultaneously to fault the trial court for considering "mental process information" contained in the note, and for assuming the meaning of the note without inquiring of the jurors. At oral argument, defendant primarily asserted that the trial court should not have addressed its instruction to the issue mentioned in the note because doing so invaded the secrecy of the jury's deliberations. The court, however, could not ignore what was contained in the note (see Engelman, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 443 [a claim of juror misconduct may require judicial action "even though [the claim] may implicate the content of deliberations"]), and the court's decision to interpret its meaning and address what it saw as a likely potential problem expressed therein was reasonable. Nor was it an abuse of discretion for the court to do so without asking the jurors any questions: the deliberations obviously were at a crucial point and had become so contentious that the jury felt compelled to cut deliberations short on the previous day. The trial court reasonably could have believed that inquiring of the jury regarding the note could have led to statements that might further exacerbate the conflict or give an inaccurate impression of what was occurring. Defendant does not suggest how the court could have explored the issue with the jurors in a way that would have illuminated the difficulty without making matters worse. In fact, defense counsel objected to any inquiry when he stated, "my general feeling is that if the court has given a correct instruction, we're not supposed to invade why a juror is making a decision based upon evidence that the court allowed to be heard in the penalty phase of the trial." The court's cautious *933 approach in this sensitive situation was not beyond the bounds of reason. (Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 480.)
In sum, the trial court's supplemental instruction was a reasonable response to a reasonable determination of the implications of the jury's note, and therefore did not constitute an abuse of discretion or a violation of defendant's rights.
E. Denial of New Trial Motion
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a continuance to file a new trial motion, and it thereby denied him his federal rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel. Defendant also contends the court erred by "deeming" that he had made a new trial motion, and proceeding to deny that motion. We are not persuaded.
The jury reached its penalty verdict on March 18, 1996.[42] Defendant's attorney suggested the hearing on a motion for a new trial and other pending defense motions be held on April 15, 16, or 17. Because Detective Henry was unavailable on the dates suggested by defense counsel, the trial court set the hearing for April 23 at the prosecutor's request. On March 22, four days after the verdict, defendant filed a motion for release of the jurors' identifying information, asserting his counsel wished to interview the jurors to determine whether any juror misconduct occurred that could be raised in the new trial motion. On April 11, the trial court denied the motion, finding that defendant had not shown good cause for disclosure.
The next day, defendant moved for a continuance of the hearing on the new trial motion because defense counsel would not be prepared to file the motion due to counsel's health and time spent working on another matter, and because counsel would need more time to conduct juror interviews if the court reconsidered and granted the motion to release juror information. The court held a hearing on the continuance motion on April 16, during which defense counsel said he would not be prepared because he was cocounsel in a habeas corpus case that had an evidentiary hearing scheduled for April 22, and he had been working exclusively and extensively on that case since March 29. The court expressed concern that defendant's case, which at that point had been pending for several years, should proceed without further unwarranted delay. It also noted that the date for the new trial motion had been set later than defendant had requested, and that several months before, defense counsel had indicated that the habeas corpus case would not interfere with his ability to prepare for defendant's case. In denying the motion for the *934 continuance, the court found that five weeks was sufficient time to prepare the motion for a new trial and that counsel's calendaring conflicts were not sufficient cause for a continuance.[43]
At the April 23 hearing, defense counsel again raised the issue of his inability to prepare the motion for a new trial, claiming his failure to file the motion may have resulted in defendant receiving "incompetent assistance." The trial court reiterated its reasons for denying the continuance, and described counsel's claim of incompetence as an attempt to "blackmail" it into granting the continuance. The trial court later noted that defense counsel had not filed a motion for a new trial, and stated that the court would "deem" the defense to have made such a motion based on all of defendant's trial objections, the court's exclusion of defense evidence, the motion for mistrial, the objections to the jury instructions, the court's decision to allow impeachment of defendant with the triple murder conviction if he testified, the use of the triple murder in the special circumstance phase despite defendant's claim that his attorney in that case had been constitutionally deficient, and the court's denial of defendant's motions to dismiss the case based on improper wiretap procedures and the removal of Attorney Kopple from the case. The trial court then stated it was denying "your motion," but it invited the defense to add any other grounds. When defendant raised a claim that defense counsel was ineffective for having failed to pursue a writ of mandate concerning the denial of defendant's motion to recuse the trial judge, the trial court denied the new trial motion on that ground as well.
(29) Under section 1050, subdivision (e), "[a] `trial court has broad discretion to determine whether good cause exists to grant a continuance of the trial. [Citation.] A showing of good cause requires a demonstration that counsel and the defendant have prepared for trial with due diligence.' [Citation.] Such discretion `may not be exercised so as to deprive the defendant or his attorney of a reasonable opportunity to prepare.' [Citation.] `To effectuate the constitutional rights to counsel and to due process of law, an accused must . . . have a reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense and respond to the charges.' [Citation.]" (People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 670 [27 Cal.Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289].) "[B]road discretion must be granted trial courts on matters of continuances; only an unreasoning and arbitrary `insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay' violates the right to the assistance of counsel." (Morris v. Slappy (1983) *935 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 [75 L.Ed.2d 610, 103 S.Ct. 1610] (Slappy); see also People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1039-1040 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044] (Jenkins).)
The trial court did not abuse its broad discretion by denying the continuance in this case. Defendant was provided with a reasonable period of time in which to file the new trial motion, longer than he originally had requested. This case is distinguishable from People v. Sarazzawski (1945) 27 Cal.2d 7 [161 P.2d 934], on which defendant relies. In that case, despite the trial court's having required that the motion for new trial be filed only three days after the verdict, defense counsel did file the motion. We concluded, however, that the trial court had denied the defendant his right to a fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard by misleading defense counsel in stating that argument on the motion would take place 10 days after the motion was filed, but then requiring counsel to argue the motion at the initial hearing, and denying her request for a continuance. (Sarazzawski, supra, 27 Cal.2d at pp. 16-18.) Here, the trial court did not mislead defendant about the date the motion would be heard, and it provided a much longer period of time to prepare. In addition, defense counsel's purported focus on the unrelated habeas corpus proceeding did not begin until more than 10 days after the verdict in defendant's case. Although counsel knew one week before the April 23 hearing that the court had refused a continuance, he filed no motion. Nor did the filing and ultimate denial of the motion for disclosure of the juror information prevent counsel from completing other aspects of the new trial motion, as defendant seems to argue on appeal. Even if defendant had asked the court to reconsider the denial of this motion, which he did not, counsel could have filed a new trial motion addressing other potential claims before the deadline to ensure consideration of at least those claims. The trial court's decision to deny the continuance under these circumstances did not deny defendant a "fair and reasonable opportunity" to be heard. The decision was within the bounds of reason given the defense's apparent lack of diligence as weighed against the length of time the case had been pending and the court's concern that it not continue to drag on.
Having concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a continuance, we reject defendant's claims that the ruling violated his federal constitutional rights. Assuming without deciding that his counsel's comment that denial of the motion may have resulted in defendant's receiving "incompetent representation" preserved defendant's claims, they fail because the trial *936 court acted reasonably and within its broad discretion in denying the continuance. (Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1039-1040; Slappy, supra, 461 U.S. at pp. 11-12.)[44]
We turn to defendant's separate challenge to the trial court's decision to "deem" that a new trial motion had been made and to deny such motion. Even assuming the court's decision was equivalent to its acting ultra vires by making its own new trial motion, contrary to the statute (see ง 1181; People v. Rothrock (1936) 8 Cal.2d 21, 24 [63 P.2d 807]), and that defendant did not forfeit or waive this contention by failing to object below and by adding his own ground for granting the motion, the trial court's actions could not have prejudiced defendant. Defense counsel did not file a motion for a new trial on defendant's behalf, and, as discussed above, the trial court's decision not to grant the continuance counsel requested for that purpose was not an abuse of discretion and did not violate defendant's rights. The trial court did not "replace" defendant's motion for a new trial with one of its own, as defendant asserts. The trial court's purporting to deny a motion that may not have been properly before it did not adversely affect the fairness of defendant's trial; at most, the trial court's action could be viewed as a legal nullity.
F. Alleged Error During Section 190.4, Subdivision (e) Hearing
At the hearing at which it imposed sentence, the trial court considered the automatic application for modification of the verdict. (ง 190.4, subd. (e).) Defendant contends the court erred by reviewing his probation report prior to hearing argument and ruling on the application because the report contained potentially aggravating information not presented to the jury, some of which was erroneous.[45]
(30) "In ruling on an application for modification of the verdict, the trial court may only rely on evidence that was before the jury. [Citation.] Therefore, the better procedure is to rule on the application for modification before reading the probation report. [Citation.]" (People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 526 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 89, 66 P.3d 1182] (Navarette).) We will not find error, however, when the trial court reads the probation report in preparation for sentencing that is to occur on the same day as the ruling on the motion if nothing in the record suggests the court considered or relied on the probation report when ruling on the motion. (Ibid.)
*937 Although the trial court's early statements at the hearing might give the impression that it had read and considered the probation report in evaluating the motion for modification of the verdictโperhaps because counsel on both sides repeatedly interrupted the court before it could explain what it meantโ the court later, in both its oral statement of reasons and its written order that had been prepared before the hearing, clarified exactly what material it had considered. Nothing in the court's oral or written statements of reasons indicated that it considered any information in the probation report, which notably is absent from the actual list of items and evidence the court stated it did consider. The general references to "the record" and "the entire record" in the court's statements regarding its search for any mitigating circumstances that had not been argued to the jury do not suggest the court had considered the probation report, much less that it considered the potentially aggravating parts of the report of which defendant complains. In its discussion of how the particular aspects of the case fit within the mitigating and aggravating factors set forth in section 190.3, the trial court did not mention any fact contained in the probation report that was not in the evidence presented at trial. In fact, the trial court recognized that the parties "may be qui[te] correct that the matters set forth in the probation report should not be considered vis-เ-vis a modification of the sentence."
We are not persuaded by defendant's claim that because the trial court later in the proceeding struck erroneous information from the probation report, it must have considered erroneous aggravating information in the report when ruling on the application for modification. Instead, we find that this shows the trial court properly compartmentalized the various aspects of the proceedings by ruling on the application to modify the verdict based on the evidence that had been presented at trial and then addressing the accuracy of the probation report and imposing the sentence. Finding no suggestion in the record that the trial court actually considered the probation report when it ruled on the application to modify the verdict, we conclude it did not err. (Navarette, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 526.)
Defendant also contends the trial court abused its discretion because it denied his request for a continuance to file the new trial motion, in which he also asked for continuances of the section 190.4 and sentencing hearings. We already have concluded ante, in part II.E., that the trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding the continuance for the new trial motion. The claim is even less compelling here, given that defense counsel never indicated he was unable to prepare for the automatic motion for modification of the verdict or sentencing.
*938 G. Constitutionality of California's Death Penalty Law
Defendant reiterates various constitutional challenges to California's death penalty law, including challenges to the standard penalty phase jury instructions that we have rejected repeatedly. As we concluded in Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pages 198-199, and cases cited therein, we reiterate that the death penalty statutes adequately narrow the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty, are not impermissibly vague or overbroad, and do not result in an "arbitrary and capricious" or "wanton and freakish" penalty determination. Those cases also have held that the statutes do not require that the prosecution carry the burden of proof or persuasion at the penalty phase, that the jury make written findings or reach unanimous decisions regarding aggravating factors, or that the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the aggravating factors have been proved, (2) the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, or (3) death is the appropriate sentence. Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435, 120 S.Ct. 2348] and Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 [153 L.Ed.2d 556, 122 S.Ct. 2428] do not render the statutes invalid; neither does Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [166 L.Ed.2d 856, 127 S.Ct. 856]. (People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 429 [79 Cal.Rptr.3d 334, 187 P.3d 56].) There is no violation of the equal protection of the laws as a result of the statutes' asserted failure to provide for capital defendants some procedural guarantees afforded to noncapital defendants.
The use in the statutes, and in the standard jury instructions, of terms such as "extreme," "substantial," "reasonably believed," and "at the time of the offense" in setting forth the mitigating factors does not impermissibly limit the mitigation evidence or otherwise result in an arbitrary or capricious penalty determination. The statutes, as translated into those standard jury instructions, adequately and properly describe the process by which the jury is to reach its penalty determination. There is no need to instruct the jury at the penalty phase (1) regarding a burden of proof, except as to section 190.3, factors (b) and (c), or the absence of a burden of proof, (2) regarding the meaning of the term "mitigation," (3) that mitigating factors can be considered only in mitigation, (4) that if the mitigating evidence outweighs the aggravating evidence, the jury must impose a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, or (5) that the jury is not required to impose the death penalty even if it finds the aggravating evidence outweighs the mitigating evidence. The trial court need not omit from the instructions any mitigating factors that appear not to apply to the defendant's case.
There is no requirement that the trial court or this court engage in intercase proportionality review when examining a death verdict. A sentence of death *939 that comports with state and federal statutory and constitutional law does not violate international law or norms, or the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
H. Cumulative Error
Defendant contends the cumulative effect of the claimed guilt and penalty phase errors requires reversal of his conviction and death sentence even if no error is prejudicial individually. The only error we have found is the admission of Detective Henry's testimony about the November 1, 1992 telephone call he received from April Watson, see ante, part II.B.4. That error was harmless. Similarly, in those circumstances in which we have assumed error, we have concluded defendant could not have been prejudiced. We are not persuaded that, even if considered cumulatively, such errors could have denied defendant a fair trial.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment.
George, C. J., Kennard, J., Baxter, J., Werdegar, J., Moreno, J., and Corrigan, J., concurred.
NOTES
[1] All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
[2] We refer to the men who confronted the agents as "driver" and "passenger," based on their positions in the car that had driven by the agents.
[3] Terry Brock's brother and sister, Charles and Jessica, will be mentioned throughout this opinion. To simplify our discussion of the facts and law, we occasionally refer to the Brock siblings by first name.
[4] Taylor's testimony was contradictory regarding whether defendant actually instructed her to contact Terry, although she noted that he had instructed her to contact witnesses before, and that, this time, he had expressed concern that Terry "was trying to implicate [defendant]." Taylor stated, "We discussed it and I found him."
[5] The triple murder was committed in 1978. The Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions on June 10, 1993, in an unpublished decision, and we denied review on September 1, 1993.
[6] In this claim and most others on appeal, defendant contends the asserted error or misconduct he raises infringed various of his state and federal constitutional rights to a fair and reliable trial. What we stated in People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 441, footnote 17 [42 Cal.Rptr.3d 677, 133 P.3d 581] (Boyer), applies in the present case: "In most instances, insofar as defendant raised the issue at all in the trial court, he failed explicitly to make some or all of the constitutional arguments he now advances. In each instance, unless otherwise indicated, it appears that either (1) the appellate claim is of a kind (e.g., failure to instruct sua sponte; erroneous instruction affecting defendant's substantial rights) that required no trial court action by the defendant to preserve it, or (2) the new arguments do not invoke facts or legal standards different from those the trial court itself was asked to apply, but merely assert that the trial court's act or omission, insofar as wrong for the reasons actually presented to that court, had the additional legal consequence of violating the Constitution. To that extent, defendant's new constitutional arguments are not forfeited on appeal. [Citations.] [ถ] In the latter instance, of course, rejection, on the merits, of a claim that the trial court erred on the issue actually before that court necessarily leads to rejection of the newly applied constitutional `gloss' as well. No separate constitutional discussion is required in such cases, and we therefore provide none."
[7] That day Kopple told two judges she "assumed" her municipal court appointment would continue in superior court, but the trial court was aware that her immediate presentation of an already prepared opposition to her removal once she was disabused of that supposed assumption suggested her failure to mention her status as previously appointed counsel had not been an oversight.
[8] Defendant's asserted difficulties with Attorney Watson are irrelevant in evaluating whether it was necessary that Kopple represent him. The proper course for addressing alleged deficiencies in Watson's representation was to file a motion to substitute counsel pursuant to Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, which defendant twice did. The trial court denied both motions, and defendant has not challenged those rulings on appeal. Whether Watson adequately represented defendant is a separate question from whether the trial court abused its discretion by declining to reconsider its order appointing some attorney other than Kopple to represent defendant.
[9] In the trial court defendant unsuccessfully argued that he was prejudiced by the delay due to loss of his June 1980 employment records from Swift Foods and the loss of witnesses who may have been able to support a claim of third party culpability for the murder, but who became unavailable or claimed loss of memory at the time of trial. He has waived any claims regarding those aspects of the trial court's decision by not raising those claims on appeal. (People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 121 [74 Cal.Rptr.3d 454, 180 P.3d 224] (Rundle); see Cal. Rules of Court, former rule 14(a)(1)(B), now rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).)
[10] The parties disputed whether certain tapes were erased on Nielsen's order, or whether they were blank due to malfunctioning equipment, but it does not appear the trial court resolved this issue. Even assuming all the tapes were erased purposefully, our analysis and conclusion are not affected.
[11] In People v. Guerra (1984) 37 Cal.3d 385, 390 [208 Cal.Rptr. 162, 690 P.2d 635], we made the holding of Shirley retroactive to all cases not yet final on the date Shirley was decided.
[12] Hereinafter in this part of our opinion, we refer to this provision as section 795.
[13] This and subsequent references to the trial court refer to Judge Horan unless otherwise specified.
[14] Defendant did not raise his equal protection claim in the trial court; instead, his own motion to preclude the testimony cited Hayes as the controlling authority. The claim therefore is forfeited. In any event, we need not resolve the merits of that claim, or those of his claim that the trial court misinterpreted section 795, because we are convinced that section 795 does not apply in this case.
[15] Section 795, subdivision (a)(1) through (4) reads in full: "(1) The testimony is limited to those matters that the witness recalled and related prior to the hypnosis. [ถ] (2) The substance of the prehypnotic memory was preserved in a writing, audio recording, or video recording prior to the hypnosis. [ถ] (3) The hypnosis was conducted in accordance with all of the following procedures: [ถ] (A) A written record was made prior to hypnosis documenting the subject's description of the event, and information that was provided to the hypnotist concerning the subject matter of the hypnosis. [ถ] (B) The subject gave informed consent to the hypnosis. [ถ] (C) The hypnosis session, including the pre- and post-hypnosis interviews, was video recorded for subsequent review. [ถ] (D) The hypnosis was performed by a licensed medical doctor, psychologist, licensed clinical social worker, or a licensed marriage and family therapist experienced in the use of hypnosis and independent of and not in the presence of law enforcement, the prosecution, or the defense. [ถ] (4) Prior to admission of the testimony, the court holds a hearing pursuant to Section 402 at which the proponent of the evidence proves by clear and convincing evidence that the hypnosis did not so affect the witness as to render the witness's prehypnosis recollection unreliable or to substantially impair the ability to cross-examine the witness concerning the witness's prehypnosis recollection. At the hearing, each side shall have the right to present expert testimony and to cross-examine witnesses."
[16] Similarly, section 795, subdivision (b) provides that although the testimony of a witness who has been hypnotized in accordance with the requirements of the statute is not inadmissible, the statute does not limit other grounds for challenging the admissibility or credibility of the witness's testimony.
[17] The call was between defendant and his mother until defendant asked her to initiate a three-way call by calling the defense investigator. During the subsequent conversation, they mentioned the following subjects: (1) locating a potential witness, Tim Crayton, who was incarcerated under a different name, which they were unsure of, and obtaining his rap sheet; (2) plans to subpoena school records to confirm whether defendant and Detective Henry attended the same high school at the same time; (3) a desire to locate a witness named Donna Hall, who had an alias and who might be able to help find another witness, Barbara Maroney; (4) plans for an investigator to talk to a "Chuckie," and that defendant suspected the prosecution had taken witness "Patricia Ann" off the witness list to save for rebuttal because someone would be talking to "Chuckie," who might know about a conspiracy between "Patricia Ann," "Tiny," and Detective Henry; (5) the fact that "Chuckie" and others claimed defendant was "running" with Terry Brock, but they actually had not seen them together, and the existence of police reports stating that defendant was "on the outs with him at that time"; (6) the importance of "Cheryl's" testimony from the triple murder case, that she did not see Terry "after Howard's incident," because "they need to try to hook me to Terry Brock"; (7) getting defendant a copy of a court order concerning his in propria persona status; and (8) their belief that "Cleotis" was lying "about we was doing all this stuff together" because Tim Crayton was in prison, and defendant "never did nothing with Cleotis in the first place." The conversation was mainly between defendant and the investigator, but defendant's mother participated at several points. The discussion of these subjects was for the most part brief and superficial; the most in-depth part of the call concerned various possible spellings of Crayton's assumed name.
[18] The trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss the charges based on the interception of two other calls involving only the defense investigator and defendant's mother on the basis that those conversations were not privileged. Defendant does not challenge that determination on appeal.
[19] Detective Henry also testified that, in a training session before the wiretaps were in effect, he specifically asked the attorney from the district attorney's office who was at the session whether a three-way conversation between defendant, a defense investigator, and a third party would be privileged. The attorney told Henry such a call would not be privileged.
[20] Contrary to defendant's assertion on appeal, there is no evidence in the record that the judge "confirmed" that interception of the call at issue was, in fact, improper because it was privileged.
[21] At the time of defendant's trial, Evidence Code former section 952 provided: "As used in this article [concerning the attorney-client privilege], `confidential communication between client and lawyer' means information transmitted between a client and his or her lawyer in the course of that relationship and in confidence by a means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third persons other than those who are present to further the interest of the client in the consultation or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the lawyer is consulted, and includes a legal opinion formed and the advice given by the lawyer in the course of that relationship. A communication between a client and his or her lawyer is not deemed lacking in confidentiality solely because the communication is transmitted by facsimile, cellular telephone, or other electronic means between the client and his or her lawyer." (Evid. Code, former ง 952, as amended by Stats. 1994, ch. 587, ง 9, p. 2915.)
[22] Section 954 of the Evidence Code provides, in part, that "[s]ubject to Section 912 [(addressing waiver of a privilege)] and except as otherwise provided in this article, the client, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between client and lawyer ...."
[23] We are aware of no decision by the high court in the intervening years that has answered the questions left unresolved in Weatherfordโwhat showing of injury to the defendant or benefit to the state is, in the affirmative, required to prove a Sixth Amendment violation, and who bears the burden of persuasion. (See Cutillo v. Cinelli (1988) 485 U.S. 1037 [99 L.Ed.2d 915, 108 S.Ct. 1600] (dis. of White, J., from denial of petn. for cert.) [noting a three-way split of authority in the federal courts of appeals]; People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 766-767 [102 Cal.Rptr.3d 786, 220 P.3d 820] (Ervine).) Defendant cites our decision in People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704] as having adopted the view that once a defendant has made a preliminary showing of state interference with the attorney-client relationship, the burden then falls on the prosecution to prove the absence of prejudice. (See also Morrow v. Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1258 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 210], quoting Zapien, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 967.) As we explained in Ervine, however, in Zapien we "had no occasion to consider ... who would bear the burden of proving or disproving prejudice and how that burden might be satisfied where a defendant claimed a violation of the right to counsel due to an invasion of the attorney-client relationship." (Ervine, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 769, fn. 11.)
[24] We also observe that, as previously noted, the record contains no evidence that Detective Henry ever received a definitive legal opinion that the three-way call was privileged and therefore should not have been reviewed.
[25] Because we conclude there has been no showing of a realistic possibility of harm to defendant or benefit to the prosecution and that defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated, we do not decide, when the record of a particular case establishes a realistic possibility of harm or benefit, what evidence would establish a Sixth Amendment violation, whether the prosecution may attempt to disprove a violation by demonstrating that no harm or benefit actually occurred, or what remedy, e.g., retrial or dismissal of the charges with or without prejudice, is appropriate if a violation of this type is established.
[26] It is unclear how, as a federal constitutional matter, the question of the propriety of intercepting the three-way call would be resolved. It appears the interception would have been contrary to the statutory attorney-client privilege if any gained information had been used at the trial. On the other hand, the call was intercepted pursuant to a judicially approved warrant, the validity of which defendant does not challenge. In addition, as we have explained ante, defendant has not established that interception of the call violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. One might question whether only a potential violation of state law, by itself, could amount to egregious misconduct for federal constitutional purposes.
[27] In Barber, we refuted the state's reliance on Weatherford in arguing that no violation of the right to counsel occurred by distinguishing that case on its facts (in addition to stating that, as Weatherford dealt with the federal right to counsel, it was inapposite). (Barber, supra, 24 Cal.3d at pp. 754-755.) However, as we discuss, ante, in analyzing whether defendant's federal right to counsel was violated, the important factual circumstances here are essentially indistinguishable from those of Weatherford. (See also In re Martin (1987) 44 Cal.3d 1, 55 [241 Cal.Rptr. 263, 744 P.2d 374] [concluding, under the facts of that case, Barber "is inapposite: in [Barber], a governmental agent's intrusion by trickery into confidential attorney-client conferences justified dismissal; in this case, no suchโor even similarโintrusion appears"].)
[28] We need not, and do not, decide whether in some other case a violation of the right to counsel resulting from government interference with the attorney-client relationship could be considered a miscarriage of justice without requiring the defendant to establish a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome.
[29] As with defendant's Sixth Amendment claim, because we conclude the judgment should not be overturned, we need not decide what would be the appropriate remedyโfor example, retrial or dismissal of the charges with or without prejudiceโin a case in which a defendant establishes a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial was affected by a violation of the right to counsel resulting from the state's invasion of the attorney-client relationship.
[30] Other states have rejected the contention that presumptive blood tests, and specifically the luminol and phenolphthalein tests performed here, are inadmissible on relevancy grounds. (See State v. Canaan (1998) 265 Kan. 835 [964 P.2d 681, 694] [luminol test results admissible because the test's presumptive nature goes to weight of the evidence, not its admissibility]; State v. Stenson (1997) 132 Wn.2d 668 [940 P.2d 1239, 1262-1263] [same, as to phenolphthalein test results]; see also State v. Carriger (1979) 123 Ariz. 335 [599 P.2d 788, 792]; Mackerley v. State (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2005) 900 So.2d 662, 663-664; Commonwealth v. Duguay (1999) 430 Mass. 397 [720 N.E.2d 458, 462-463]; Jackson v. State (Miss.Ct.App. 2005) 924 So.2d 531, 546; State v. Moseley (1994) 336 N.C. 710 [445 S.E.2d 906, 912]; State v. Carillo (1979) 122 R.I. 392 [407 A.2d 491, 494-495]; Arrick v. State (Tex.Crim.App. 2003) 107 S.W.3d 710, 720-721; State v. Wyant (1985) 174 W.Va. 567 [328 S.E.2d 174, 179-180].)
[31] Defendant made an Evidence Code section 352 objection only to admission of a part of his signed refusal form that referred to his pending triple murder case, a case unrelated to the purpose of the lineup; that portion of the form was redacted.
[32] When Henry began to testify that Watson told him she also had received calls from Eileen Smith, defendant objected to testimony about those calls on hearsay grounds. The trial court erroneously stated that Watson had been asked about Smith's calls despite defense counsel correctly insisting to the contrary. Defense counsel then stated, "All right. I assume that the People are going to bring out information relating to the telephone calls that [Watson] talked about." The prosecution agreed with counsel's assumption. The trial court then overruled the objection pursuant to the hearsay exception for prior inconsistent statements. The prosecution, however, did not elicit any more testimony from Henry about any calls Watson received from Smith.
[33] At trial, Watson never confirmed what defendant said to her during the October and November calls. Although defendant primarily frames this argument as a challenge to the relevance of Watson's trial testimony, we construe it, as it was raised in the trial court, as encompassing the admission of Watson's statements as a whole, i.e., to include Henry's recounting of those statements.
[34] Defendant did not object to this part of the testimony. Therefore, our analysis cannot account for other factors that might have been developed on the record had the trial court been asked to rule on an objection.
[35] As noted earlier, defendant already had unsuccessfully argued that Detective Henry had exceeded the scope of what was brought out in Watson's testimony with regard to Eileen Smith's calls, and counsel had stated his assumption that the prosecutor would ask only about calls to which Watson had testified, an assumption with which the prosecutor agreed. Also, the trial court overruled the later objections to the November statement without inviting further explanation from counsel.
[36] Jessica's trial testimony was inconsistent with essentially every relevant detail she originally told the police about defendant's visit. The trial court commented that it appeared "[s]he [was] trying to serve so many masters here, her brother, her family, [defendant], his family, that she has told stories all over the place."
[37] Despite the court's admonition to Jessica before her testimony that she not mention the "serious offense" was the triple murder, Jessica referred to the triple murder in response to a question from the prosecutor. This was the subject of defendant's motion for a mistrial, the denial of which defendant challenges on appeal, discussed post, in part II.B.6.
[38] The court instructed that evidence received that indicated the defendant may have been involved in offenses other than the one for which he was on trial "was not received, and may not be considered by you, as proof that such offenses were in fact committed by the defendant ... [or] to prove that the defendant is a person of bad character, or that he has a disposition to commit crimes. [ถ] Such evidence was received, and may be considered by you, only for the limited purpose of assisting you in your assessment of the credibility and testimony of ... Jessica Brock. [ถ] As to Jessica Brock, such evidence may also be used in resolving any conflict regarding whether the defendant visited the residence of Ms. Brock, and if he did, how many such visits occurred, and the timing, location, and the circumstances involved in such visit or visits. [ถ] For the limited purpose for which you may consider such evidence, you must weigh it in the same manner as you do all other evidence in the case. You are not permitted to consider such evidence for any other purpose."
[39] We do not consider as part of this analysis Jessica's failure to follow the court's directions not to mention the triple murder during her testimony because, in ruling on the admissibility of the limited evidence it was allowing, the trial court reasonably could assume the witness would comply with the limitations.
[40] The relevant parts of these instructions, as modified and given by the trial court, were as follows:
CALJIC No. 8.27: "If a human being is killed by any one of several persons engaged in the commission or attempted commission of the crime of robbery, all persons, who either directly and actively commit the act constituting such crime, or who with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator of the crime and with the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, aid, promote, encourage, or instigate by act or advice its commission, are guilty of murder of the first degree whether the killing is intentional, unintentional, or accidental."
CALJIC No. 8.80: "If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was either the actual killer or an aider or abettor, but you are unable to decide which, then you must also find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant with intent to kill aided and abetted an actor in commission of the murder in the first degree, in order to find the robbery murder special circumstance to be true. On the other hand, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the actual killer, you need not find that the defendant intended to kill a human being in order to find the robbery murder special circumstance to be true."
CALJIC No. 8.81.17: "As stated earlier, if the defendant is the actual killer, no intent to kill need be shown under this special circumstance. However, if the defendant is not the actual killer, but rather an aider and abett[or] to robbery or attempted robbery, or if you are unable to decide whether the defendant was the actual killer as opposed to an aider and abett[or], then you must also find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the intent to kill in order to find this special circumstance true."
[41] The trial court instructed as follows: "By these instructions the court is not suggesting what result would be proper, or that I have or am expressing any opinion on the eventual penalty phase determination. [ถ] The following provisions are, however, the law: [ถ] It would be inappropriate for any juror, whether one favoring a sentence of death or one favoring a sentence of life without parole, to single out one piece of evidence or one instruction and ignore the others. This case must be decidedโthe case must be decided based on a totality of all the evidence and law that applies. [ถ] It would be improper for any juror, whether favoring a sentence of death or a sentence of life without parole, to single out one aggravating or mitigating factor, and refuse or fail to weigh it against all of the other aggravating and mitigating factors shown by the evidence. [ถ] The facts and the law are there to guide you to a decision. The facts and the law are not there to justify any preformed or preexisting determination to stand for a certain verdict, whether it be for the death penalty or for a sentence of life without parole. [ถ] In terms of the evidence relating to the defendant's family, such evidence was received as it may bear upon that portion of factor (k) relating to `any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant's character or record.' Bear in mind that this `sympathy' relates to sympathy for the defendant, not solely for any other person or persons. And bear in mind that the `character' in issue is a character of the defendant. Insofar as this evidence evinces sympathy for the defendant or is seen as being evidence relating to the character or record of the defendant, the jury may consider it under factor (k), assign it whatever weight you believe is appropriate, and then weigh it along with all other aggravating and mitigating evidence and factors. Insofar as this evidence raises sympathy only for third parties, it is not appropriate factor (k) evidence. The focus, in other words, is on the defendant's personal moral culpability, and it is the defendant's character and background that is the focus of the inquiry, not the effect that your verdict will or may have on any third party or parties.
"Do not hesitate to change your position if you are convinced that it is wrong. Do not change your position simply because a majority of the jurors, or any of them, favor such a change. [ถ] It is important that all jurors both understand as well as follow the law. If a juror or jurors do not understand the law, the court will continue to attempt to clarify it. If a juror or jurors refuses or fails to follow the law, the court should be notified of that fact. If any juror, whether they are in the majority or minority, cannot, in good conscience, follow the law, it is the duty of that juror or jurors to notify the court of that fact. [ถ] Each juror should recognize a penalty phase determination is not an unguided arbitrary exercise in raw emotion whether the juror favors one penalty or the other. This decision must be based on a calm, rational assessment of the evidence and a weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in the law, and shown by the evidence. This requires that each juror render an honest, unbiased assessment of these factors without bias, without fear and without a desire to favor one side over the other. Jurors are not advocates for either side, but must be impartial judges of penalty.
"All of these additional instructions are directed at all twelve trial jurors, not those favoring one verdict or the other. Further, please keep in mind as I instructed you at the outset of these instructions, these latest instructions, that these instructions are not to be interpreted by the jury as suggesting an outcome, or as suggesting that the court is expressing an opinion as to the propriety of one outcome or the other. [ถ] That's the instruction. [ถ] Let me add to it the following: [ถ] The court in no way, shape or form is suggesting to you the weight any juror or combination of jurors should place on any aggravating factor, any mitigating factor or any combination thereof. [ถ] That is a jury determination, not a determination for the court. [ถ] It is simply a hope that the instruction I read to you will assist you in following the law in this case and as I have outlined it in earlier instructions."
[42] All calendar dates in part II.E. of this opinion refer to 1996.
[43] At the hearing, the trial court also denied defendant's personal request for a 30-day continuance for him to file in propria persona a new trial motion. On April 23, defendant did file his own new trial motion, raising several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court entertained and denied that motion. We shall assume the filing of defendant's "pro per" motion for a new trial did not render moot the issue whether the trial court improperly denied defendant a reasonable opportunity to have his attorney file such a motion on his behalf.
[44] The question whether or not defendant's attorney provided constitutionally deficient assistance by failing to file the motion in a timely manner is not before us.
[45] We assume, without deciding, that defense counsel's statements regarding the trial court's consideration of the probation report, made before the court actually stated what it considered when ruling on the motion, are sufficient to preserve this issue for review although counsel did not object after the court listed what it actually had considered and explained the reasons for its decision.
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Probabilistic acute risk assessment of cumulative exposure to organophosphorus and carbamate pesticides from dietary vegetables and fruits in Shanghai populations.
Organophosphorus pesticides (OPs) and carbamate pesticides (CPs) are among the most widely used pesticides in China, playing a major role in protecting agricultural commodities. In this study, we determined the cumulative acute exposure to OPs and CPs of Shanghai residents from vegetables and fruits (VFs). The food consumption data were obtained from the Shanghai Food Consumption Survey (SHFCS) of 2012-14 including a total of 1973 participants aged 2-90 years. The pesticide residue data were obtained from the Shanghai monitoring programme during 2008-11 with 34 organophosphates and 11 carbamates analysed in a total of 5335 samples of VFs. A probabilistic approach was performed as recommended by the EFSA, using the optimistic model with non-detects set as zero and with processing factors (PFs) being used and the pessimistic model with non-detects replaced by limit of detection (LOD) and without PFs. We used the relative potency factor (RPF) method to normalise the various pesticides to the index compound (IC) of methamidophos and chlorpyrifos separately. Only in the pessimistic model using methamidophos as the IC was there was small risk of exposure exceeding the ARfD (3 µg kg-1 bw day-1) in the populations of preschool children (0.029%), school-age children (0.022%) and adults (0.002%). There were no risk of exposure exceeding the ARfD of methamidophos in the optimistic model and of chlorpyrifos (100 µg kg-1 bw day-1) in both optimistic and pessimistic models in all three populations. Considering the Chinese habits of overwhelmingly eating processed food (vegetables being cooked, and fruits being washed or peeled), we conclude that little acute risk was found for the exposure to VF-sourced OPs and CPs in Shanghai. |
Todd Klein on lettering, literature and more
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And Then I Read: ASTRO CITY 9
The main character of this storyline, the top super-heroine of the series, Winged Victory, can obviously be compared to DC’s Wonder Woman. But the Amazon warrior has one important support that Winged Victory does not: a home base, a family of other Amazons, a refuge and retreat on Paradise Island that she can always turn to. Winged Victory has built up her own support system year by year, woman by woman; taking them in, training them, having them administer her strongholds around the world, but now that’s all crumbling. In this issue we meet one of the women who have given Winged Victory her power, and it’s a great moment, but only a pause in the battle she faces. Meanwhile, unknown forces continue to attack Winged Victory and knock down what she’s built.
Great work by Kurt Busiek and Brent Anderson, and of course Alex Ross on cover. Recommended. |
In this custom video, Lora and Ryan are in the office dressed in business attire with tight pencil skirts and tan pantyhose. The two girls start to kiss which eventually leads to more – with Ryan bringing Lora to orgasm by rubbing her pussy through her pantyhose with her hands and a dildo.
Eventually Ryan sits on Lora’s face while Lora licks Ryan’s pussy through her pantyhose.
Running time: 11:43 |
Dublin Locksmith Services
Dublin Locksmith in CA offer fast, and efficient 24 hour emergency locksmith services in the Dublin area at very good rates. At Locksmith in Dublin we make sure that our work speaks for itself, done to our client’s satisfaction. Our fully equipped mobile shop is available for you 24/7 with all kinds of different high-end hardware to offer our customers the services that they need. We service all kinds of major as well as minor lock brands and all other associated door hardware which includes common and reputed names such as Primus, Ilco, Fichet, Sentry, Insta-key, Kaba, Master to name a few.
At Dublin Locksmith, each client has our personal promise that the varied kinds of jobs done by our locksmiths, will be completed at affordable rates. We also do all kinds of services for various properties, whether business or residential, and tailor make every security solution for them. In the rare case that we are unable to do something for our client, we will try referring them to locksmiths best suited in resolving the issue because we believe that a happy client is a return client.
Call us at (925) 905-1061
Dublin Automotive Locksmith
Any car ignition and lock repair, or any kind of re-keying service that needs a skilled hand, can depend on us to get the issue resolved. Our Dublin auto locksmiths, CA have all the latest tools, technologies and we use gentle techniques to do any kind of work, including opening car locks, or even repairing the ignition. If you find yourself in need of a professional auto locksmith in Dublin, California, just give us a call and we will do the best we can.
Dublin Locksmiths undertake repairs as per your vehicle needs. We can work on any security system and for any security requirement, and also handle any kind of locksmith issues, however complex they may be.
The other automotive services that we provide include:
Car Key Duplication
Emergency locksmith services for key replacement
Lock Rekeying
Car Door Unlocking
Lock Picking
Emergency opening of Doors
Transponder Key Programming
Replace ignition locks
Call us at (925) 905-1061
Dublin Emergency Locksmith
Emergencies are just as they sound, extremely panic inducing and very stressful. But we at Dublin Locksmiths have you taken care of, since we boast of a 15-minute or less, response time and our 24-hour emergency service. We also do answer our telephones and this is done by well-trained staff, who can dispatch one of our mobile locksmith vehicles, no matter where in Dublin, CA you may be.
Dublin locksmiths provide quality service to the Dublin area of CA, which includes:
Emergency vehicle locksmith service
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Emergency residential locksmith service
Residential Lock Picking
Keys made super-fast
Emergency car opening
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Door lock repairs
Call us at (925) 905-1061
Dublin Residential Locksmith
Although most of us believe that our residences are very secure, yet statistics have shown that they are most prone to breaches and attacks. That’s why having a fool proof system is the key and for this, you need to call us at Dublin Locksmiths.
Locksmith services for residential purposes include:
Instalment of home safes
All services on master systems and high-security locks
Total Home Security solutions
Installation of new lock sets for doorways and other furniture
Re-keying and/or new keys made for existing locks and deadbolts
Call us at (925) 905-1061
Dublin Commercial Locksmith
We at Dublin Locksmiths understand your business needs and requirements and to take care of them, provide a range of services for all your needs in the Dublin area of California. All you have to do is call us regarding any security solutions, and we will know what has to be done. |
Q:
Annotating a quote to remove text?
In writing up an answer, I wrote:
Furthermore we are cautioned that using shame punishment from a "retributive standpoint because the public can see punishment at work, it is nonproductive."
Now, I know I'm missing a comma after "furthermore", but my question is how would I remove ", it" from this quote? Using an ellipses seems like overkill, but I could be wrong.
Here is the original text:
In every case possible, judges should combine shame punishment with some utilitarian aspect. While requiring an individual to parade around a courthouse satisfies society from a retributive standpoint because the public can see punishment at work, it is nonproductive.
A:
The original text is:
In every case possible, judges should combine shame punishment with
some utilitarian aspect. While requiring an individual to parade
around a courthouse satisfies society from a retributive standpoint
because the public can see punishment at work, it is nonproductive.
You suggest the following:
Furthermore we are cautioned that using shame punishment from a "retributive standpoint because the public can see punishment at work, it is nonproductive."
However that's not what the original says (and that is why it isn't grammatical).
Here's one possibility:
Furthermore we are cautioned that "requiring an individual to parade around a courthouse ... is nonproductive."
If that is not the part you want to highlight then you have to choose a different set of words. The point is that "it is nonproductive" does not belong with "retributive standpoint because the public can see punishment at work".
If you simply want to remove the comma and 'it' then you have no alternative but to use ellipsis, thus:
Furthermore we are cautioned that using shame punishment from a "retributive standpoint because the public can see punishment at work ... is nonproductive."
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Paddling
Kayaking the great fresh water ocean we call Great Bear Lake can be enjoyed either guided or unguided in tandem or single sea kayaks with seven day trips either basing from Arctic Circle or from Branson’s outpost or by travelling from either Arctic Circle to Branson’s or vice versa over the course of the week and camping in the field along the way. We provide the boats, paddles, tents, stoves, and cooking kits. You need to bring your paddling PFD’s, sleeping pads and bags with you. This is an incredible opportunity to paddle a body of water that is so rarely seen with plenty of wildlife to see and artifacts to discover. As you paddle the Carribean blue water amongst the islands and channels that make up the rugged shield spanning the back of the McTavish Arm you will pass by history of mankind in the site of Port Radium where silver, gold and radium were discovered in 1930 and where the nuclear material for the Manhattan project was mined. We recommend some pleasure reading including some historical tales of the explorers of the area be read before your trip and one or two books brought with you as they are sure to conjure goose bumps around the fire in the evenings.
Prices: Your seven day Kayaking adventure includes everything you will need as well as meals and accommodations at the start and end points and camping along the way. You must bring your own sleeping bag and pad. Air charter to and from Yellowknife is included. Prices exclude fishing license, liquor, gratuities and tax (5%).
Saturday to Saturday starting June 30 - Aug 18, 2018
Rafting the rivers of the Arctic including the Coppermine is a serene and spectacular way to see the Arctic and to fish for char, hike the tundra and explore. There are too many options to list but the adventures that you can embark on include anything from a few days floating a river during a one week stay at Great Bear Lake to a couple of weeks covering 200 kms of river and everything in between. We can even provide some of the equipment for camping riverside other than sleeping pads and bags. We also encourage you to bring your own properly fitted PFD but we can provide them for you as well. We fly two rafts into the field per trip. Each raft holds up to three people.
Pricing for rafting trips vary depending on so many options that we recommend you contact us to discuss by telephone or email.
Canoe Tripping the Arctic
Like kayaking and rafting, we can outfit canoe trips from our lodges. We have 16, 17, and 18 foot prospector ABS boats and can drop you where you want to begin and pick you up where you want to finish. So the first part of the fun is opening your map of the north, putting it on the dart board and start the planning! The limitless options are really up to your sense of adventure. Call or email us to arrange these trips. |
Hand him the ...
Sam Richmond | NCAA.com | December 8, 2015
Heisman Watch: Full breakdown of the 2015 finalists
After a wildly unpredictable race, the Heisman Trophy finalists were named on Monday: Derrick Henry, Christian McCaffrey and Deshaun Watson.
No Ezekiel Elliott or Trevone Boykin, who entered the season perceived by many to be the top two favorites. No Leonard Fournette, who appeared to be running away with the award in the middle of the season. And no Baker Mayfield or Dalvin Cook, who were especially dominant toward the end of the season and finished with some of the best statistics for their respective positions.
Nope, only three players will head to New York next Saturday with the chance to claim college football’s greatest individual honor.
A small field, yes, but it’s hard to argue the voters made a mistake with their top three.
Henry, McCaffrey and Watson were the three best players this season and deserve this recognition.
Henry is the driving force behind perhaps the most dangerous team in the country right now. The junior was the Crimson Tide’s workhorse, toting the ball a whopping 339 times for 1,986 yards and 23 touchdowns this season. He set Alabama records for touchdowns rushing and yards rushing in a season and he also toppled Georgia legend Herschel Walker’s SEC record of yards rushing in a season.
Henry scored a touchdown in every game this season and had seven games in which he recorded multiple touchdowns. He also rushed for at least 200 yards in four games (another Alabama record).
Henry came up especially big when the Crimson Tide needed him most. The Florida native carried the ball 46 times in the Iron Bowl with an SEC Championship berth on the line and then hammered Florida’s defense to the tune of 44 carries the next week in Atlanta with a College Football Playoff berth at stake. Henry recorded an absurd 460 yards rushing and two touchdowns combined in the must-win games.
Christian McCaffrey, Stanford, RB
What didn’t Christian McCaffrey do this season? The Stanford running back put together one of the most impressive statistical seasons in college football history, embodying the word “versatile” on a weekly basis. McCaffrey was an all-purpose yardage machine, racking up an FBS record 3,496 yards. He saved his best performance for last, posting 207 yards on the ground and 461 total yards (a school record) in Stanford’s Pac-12 title game win over USC on Saturday.
McCaffrey finished the season with 1,847 yards rushing (second most in the FBS), 1,109 yards returning, 540 yards receiving and 14 total touchdowns (eight rushing, four receiving and two passing).
McCaffrey’s record-breaking season is made even more special when considering that he started slow. After two weeks of the season, Stanford was 1-1 and McCaffrey had racked up just 124 total yards rushing. But McCaffrey was nearly unstoppable from that point forward, rushing for at least 100 yards in 10 of his final 11 games, and helping turn Stanford into the type of elite team that will play in the Rose Bowl on New Year’s Day.
Deshaun Watson, Clemson, QB
Deshaun Watson led Clemson to unprecedented success in 2015, as the Tigers went 13-0 and earned the No. 1 spot in the College Football Playoff. Along the way, the dual-threat quarterback made life a nightmare for opposing defenses. He finished with 3,512 yards passing (69.5 completion percentage, third best in the country), 30 touchdowns passing, 887 yards rushing and 11 touchdowns rushing.
Similar to Henry and McCaffrey, Watson stepped up as the lights got brighter. The sophomore had one of, if not the, best games of his season against North Carolina in the ACC title game, throwing for 289 yards and three touchdowns while also rushing for 131 yards and two scores. He finished the season by throwing for at least 275 yards in his last six games (three 300-yard games) and rushed for at least 100 yards in four of his final five games.
Who’s the favorite?
The best part about this Heisman race is that, unlike years past, there’s no runaway favorite. All three of the finalists have a legitimate chance to win this award, and each of their candidacies is different.
If we’re taking the player with simply the best numbers, McCaffrey’s the guy. The Stanford running back toppling Barry Sanders’ FBS record of all-purpose yards was nothing short of amazing. But the Cardinal aren't headed to the playoff, which is why heading into championship week this writer viewed McCaffrey more as a player that would make the ceremony and less as a guy that could realistically win the award. But 461 yards against USC changed things, and, in a real testament to simply how good he was this season, McCaffrey is right in the mix to win the award despite his team finishing outside of the top four. This isn’t to say Stanford’s No. 6 ranking doesn’t hurt McCaffrey – it absolutely does – just that the running back has done all he can to minimize its impact.
If we’re taking the player who has the most winning on his side, then Watson’s obviously the guy. Watson is the leader of an undefeated team that made the College Football Playoff, and that’s huge when it comes to the Heisman. Five of the last seven winners of the award have played for the national title.
History is also on Watson’s side for another reason: he’s a quarterback. Thirteen of the past 14 Heisman winners have been quarterbacks. As the lone QB among the finalists, Watson’s position certainly gives him a boost. With the winning, the position and the great, albeit not eye-popping, numbers on his side, Watson has a heck of a case to win the award.
However, if we’re taking the player with the best balance between numbers and winning, Derrick Henry is the guy. The only knock on Henry’s candidacy is that he’s not a quarterback, but the other components of his resume are strong enough to overcome that. Henry’s Tide lost a game early in the season to Ole Miss, but will head to the playoff and that’s really the most important thing in regards to team success. Combine that with his record-breaking numbers, and Henry’s resume is the most complete, which figures to make him the slight favorite to come away with the hardware.
Yet, the unknown is what makes the anticipation for Saturday so great. All three of these guys could hear their name called and no one should be surprised. We very well could see one of the closest votes in Heisman Trophy history, and it sure is going to be fun to see how it all plays out. |
Along with haute cuisine and chic fashion, there’s another long-standing tradition in Paris that’s decidedly less pleasing. Since before the days of Napoleon, the city of love has battled the odorous scourge of les pipis sauvages, or wild peeing. The widespread practice of public urination is technically illegal. But that hasn’t seemed to stanch the…
The resulting fertilizer will be used in city parks and gardens. Unlike the “splash-back” tactics employed at frequently micturated-upon walls in San Francisco, officials in Paris have opted to take a gentler, less demoralizing and ultimately less messy approach in dissuading public urination. While certainly not encouraging full-bladdered Parisian men to take to the streets…
If you can’t beat ’em, enjoin ’em: France is tackling public urination by whipping out greenery-topped, compost-generating “Uritrottoir” urinals. Doing a wee-wee in public is a no-no just about everywhere, and for a host of obvious reasons. Unfortunately, drinkers gonna drink and when public restrooms are unavailable, well… what goes in must come out, anywhere…
Design agency Faltazi created the Uritrottoir as an attempt to fight the foul smell of public bathrooms People tend to stay away from conversations about defecation and urine (for obvious reasons). Discussions around sanitation are avoided even though an estimated 2.5 billion people lack access to improved sanitation, which amounts to more than 35 percent…
Will these flower-topped receptacles prove effective in the city’s fight against public urination? Paris has a pee problem. As any visitor with a nose knows, the City of Light is also a city of unpleasant, urinous odors. Every day, Parisian sanitation workers wash some 1,800 square miles of sidewalk in an attempt to combat the…
Why it matters to you We all want our big cities to smell less like urine, so why not provide an attractive and green place to pee? Paris is a beautiful place full of great food, great people, and great scenery. However, anyone who has actually visited Paris knows that underneath all that glamor lies…
Nocturnal urinators don’t just leave the unpleasant stench of pee in our streets. They also damage public infrastructure and leave behind a mess that’s surprisingly costly and labor intensive to clean up. Cities are working hard to find a fix: Amsterdam has retractable toilets that rise from the ground. San Francisco deployed paint that splashes…
Designed to look like flower planters, Paris’s new Uritrottoir urinals store pee on beds of straw or sawdust, which is eventually turned into fertilizer for local parks. Outside the Gare de Lyon train station in Paris, two red boxes topped with flowers look like overdesigned planters, or, from the side, mailboxes. They’re actually public urinals…
Parisians met with Uritrottoir, new generation urinals introducing a sustainable way to solve the public urination problem. Even if it is a dream city, Paris has a serious “wild pissing” issue, or as they call it in French, “les pipis sauvages”. To keep their city clean in a sustainable way, French company Faltazi designed eco-friendly… |
Q:
IMO 2015 warm up problem
I get this problem from IMO 2015 facebook page. Let $x_i$ be positive integers for $i=1,2,...,11$. If $x_i+x_{i+1}\geq 100$, $|x_i-x_{i+1}|\geq 20$ for $i=1,2,...,10$. And $x_{11}+x_{1}\geq 100$, $|x_{11}-x_1|\geq 20$. What is the minimum possible value of $\sum_{i=1}^{11}x_i$ ?
Thanks for solutions.
A:
The minimum sum is 580. Imagine that $x_1, x_2, ..., x_{11}$ are placed around a circle. By summing consecutive pairs starting at $x_{j+1}$ we notice that $\sum x_i \geq 500 + x_j$. So letting $x^* = \max_i\{x_i\}$ we have
$$ \sum x_i \geq 500 + x^* $$
First we note that $x^* \geq 60$ because if not, its neighbors cannot possibly satisfy the constraints. Next we prove that $x^* \geq 80$. Suppose NOT and WLOG let $x_1 = x^*$. By the constraints and the bounds on $x^*$, we find
$$x_1 \in [60,80) \implies x_2 \in (20,60) \implies \\ x_3 \in [60,80) \implies \;\;\;\;\;\;\;\; ... \;\;\;\;\;\;\;\implies \\ x_{11} \in [60,80) \implies x_1 \in (20,60) \;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;$$
a contradiction (the two $\implies$ are fairly obvious so I leave the gritty details to you). So we've shown that $\sum x_i \geq 580$. The assignment 80, 60, 40, 60, 40, 60, 40, 60, 40, 60, 40 proves that the bound is tight.
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679 F.2d 223
W. E. VIEHMAN, et al., Plaintiff-Appellant,v.Richard SCHWEIKER, Secretary of Health and Human Services,Defendant-Appellee.
No. 81-5574.
United States Court of Appeals,Eleventh Circuit.
June 25, 1982.
Louis K. Rosenbloum, Stephen H. Echsner, Pensacola, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant.
Loretta B. Anderson, Tampa, Fla., for defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
Before FAY, VANCE and ARNOLD*, Circuit Judges.
FAY, Circuit Judge:
In this appeal, we are called upon to review an order of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, dismissing the plaintiff's complaint which sought review of an adverse determination by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. The plaintiff, William E. Viehman, on behalf of his daughter, Katherine E. Viehman, requested waiver of an overpayment of social security disability benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 404(b) (1976). The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled that Mr. Viehman had not proved he was "without fault" in the acceptance of the overpayment and was therefore not entitled to the waiver. The District Court adopted the findings of the magistrate, which recommended affirmance of the decision of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. As we are unable to discern whether the ALJ based his ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence presented or relied on a credibility determination of Mr. Viehman's testimony, we remand this case to the Secretary for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and Remanded.
The Scenario
1
Mr. Viehman applied for insurance disability benefits for his daughter Katherine on April 26, 1974; the application was approved. At that time, Katherine resided at Sunland Training Center in Fort Myers, Florida, and worked in the surrounding community under the supervision of the Center.1 On June 24, 1974, she married Ronald Arsenio Rodriguez, who also worked under the supervision of Sunland Training Center. During his stay at Sunland, Mr. Rodriguez also received social security benefits. Mr. Rodriguez was discharged from Sunland on January 15, 1974. Apparently his benefits had been terminated in July, 1973, but he continued to receive checks through June, 1974. On January 13, 1976, a final dissolution of marriage was entered.2
2
According to testimony received during the administrative hearing, Mr. Viehman called the social security office to advise the Administration of his daughter's marriage. He asked to speak to Mrs. Lou Weaver, who had previously handled his daughter's application. As she was not available, he proceeded to explain his daughter's marriage to the social security representative who had answered the phone. He told her that his daughter was retarded and that she was marrying a retarded boy. He inquired as to whether he needed to comply with any further regulation with respect to continued receipt of the benefits.
3
The representative advised Mr. Viehman that nothing more need be done in view of the fact that his daughter was marrying another retarded person. No attempt was made to solicit additional information from Mr. Viehman concerning his daughter's social security number or Mr. Rodriguez's status as a benefits recipient. Thus, Mr. Viehman continued to receive payments on behalf of his daughter, which he deposited into her savings account and disbursed to her according to her needs.
4
More than four years later, by a letter dated October 16, 1978, the Social Security Administration advised Mr. Viehman of a problem in the continued receipt of payments for Katherine due to her marriage and requested that he come in to discuss the matter. Record, vol. II, at 71. On October 19, 1978, within three days of the date of the letter, Mr. Viehman visited the Social Security Office.
5
At that time, he openly discussed his previous conversation with the social security representative concerning Katherine's marriage. He told Ms. Riley, the Social Security Administration representative, that "he didn't know how he could repay the money. just (sic) hoped Ronald was due SSA back then." Social Security Administration's Report of Contact, Record, vol. II, at 77. As Ms. Riley noted in her report, Mr. Viehman "didn't try to talk his way out of the situation-was friendly thru whole interview." Id.3
6
Notwithstanding his explanation of the events which had taken place, Mr. Viehman received a second letter from the Administration, dated November 27, 1978, informing him of an overpayment in excess of $7,000 and that his benefits would be terminated to make up for the amount of the overpayment. Mr. Viehman retained counsel who requested a "preadjustment review and/or waiver pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 404(b)." Record, vol. II, at 50.
7
By letter, dated July 18, 1979, the Social Security Administration advised Mr. Viehman of its denial of his request for a waiver. The "Special Determination" report which accompanied the letter stated:
8
Waiver is not applicable because without fault has not been established. William says he notified the social security office when his daughter was married and was told that the marriage did not affect his daughter's benefits since his daughter was retarded and since she married a retarded boy. Our records show when William applied for disability benefits for Katherine, he agreed to report any event which would affect payment of her benefits and to return any check to which she was not entitled. Upon thorough investigation of William's statement that he did report Katherine's marriage, and was told her marriage would not affect her benefits he could not submit sufficient proof to substantiate his allegation. Under the circumstances, waiver of recovery of the overpayment is not applicable.
9
Record, vol. II, at 55 (emphasis supplied).
10
Mr. Viehman requested reconsideration. The Administration found the original decision to be "correct and in accordance with the law and regulations." In its Reconsideration Determination, the Administration stated that "(w)aiver was denied because without fault could not be established.... Sufficient proof has not been submitted to substantiate his allegation. Also, Mr. Viehman did not follow through and determine if the boy his daughter was marrying was receiving benefits." Record, vol. II, at 58-59.
11
Subsequently, Mr. Viehman requested a hearing. The evidence consisted of several documents pertaining to his daughter's marriage and divorce, statements obtained by the Administration, and testimony from Mr. Viehman. He testified that he was 70 years old, had a tenth grade education, and that he had worked in the construction industry most of his life. He then proceeded to explain the facts surrounding his daughter's marriage and his telephone report of it to the Social Security Administration.
12
Based on the record, the ALJ found that "Mr. Viehman failed to timely report his daughter's marriage to the Social Security Administration." Record, vol. II, at 11. The Appeals Council refused to review the case and adopted the ALJ's ruling as final. In considering Mr. Viehman's petition for review of the administrative decision, the federal magistrate deciphered the ALJ's ruling to mean that insufficient proof had been offered to support Mr. Viehman's claim that he did, in fact, report his daughter's marriage and he had therefore failed to prove he was "without fault." The magistrate found that the ALJ had determined the testimony was "not credible proof of the required notification." He concluded the record contained substantial evidence to support the Secretary's final decision.4 The District Court adopted the magistrate's report and recommendation.
With or Without Fault-That is the Question
13
Substantial evidence sets the parameters for our review of the Secretary's adverse final determination in this case.5 Watkins v. Schweiker, 667 F.2d 954 (11th Cir. 1982). Satisfaction of this test requires "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 216, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938). While the limited scope of our review prohibits substitution of our own evaluation of the evidence for that of the Secretary's, we are not restricted from scrutinizing the record to determine if substantial evidence exists to support the Secretary's findings. Millet v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 1199, 1201 (5th Cir. 1981). In the absence of an affirmative determination in this regard, it is our duty to reverse and remand. Rini v. Harris, 615 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1980).
14
There is no dispute as to the underlying problem that an overpayment has occurred.6 Nor do the parties disagree on the relevant statutes and regulations. The conflict arises from the ALJ's ruling that Mr. Viehman was not "without fault," and thus not entitled to a waiver of the overpayment.
15
Section 204(b) of the Social Security Act provides for a waiver of an overpayment of benefits for "any person who is without fault if such adjustment or recovery would defeat the purpose of this title or be against equity and good conscience." 42 U.S.C. § 404(b) (1976) (emphasis supplied). The burden is upon the claimant to establish the negative prerequisite ("without fault"), before the Secretary considers the second tier of the waiver statute. Kendrick v. Califano, 460 F.Supp. 561 (E.D.Va.1978). In this case, an adverse finding of the "without fault" requirement terminated the ALJ's consideration before reaching the second tier of the waiver statute. The government argues that Mr. Viehman failed to furnish the Administration with information he knew or should have known was material to continued receipt of his daughter's benefits since Mr. Viehman was unable to provide documentary evidence to substantiate his story of reporting his daughter's marriage to the Administration.7
16
We have reviewed the record. We have read the preliminary determinations of the Administration, the findings and conclusions of the ALJ, and the magistrate's recommendation. In each instance we have been unable to discern whether the trier of fact based his findings and conclusion on the quantitative scope of Mr. Viehman's evidence, limited to his own testimony, or chose to disbelieve Mr. Viehman.
17
Credibility determinations lie solely within the province of the trier of fact. Id. at 574. This long-standing evidentiary rule retains its validity because of the unique position occupied by the fact finder and his ability to view first-hand the demeanor of the witness. If, in fact, the ALJ chose not to believe Mr. Viehman, the record would be devoid of sufficient evidence to prove he was "without fault" as required by the statute. On the other hand, if the ALJ chose to believe his testimony, it alone is sufficient to meet the burden of proof imposed upon him.
18
(A)n examiner's findings should be as comprehensive and analytical as feasible and, where appropriate, should include a statement of subordinate factual foundations on which ultimate factual conclusions are based, so that a reviewing court may know the basis for the decision.
19
Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309, 312 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 931, 95 S.Ct. 1133, 43 L.Ed.2d 403 (1975). The circuit courts have expanded this rule to encompass credibility determinations "whenever the claimant's credibility is a critical factor in the Secretary's decision." Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1981).
20
"Critical" aptly describes Mr. Viehman's testimony. It was critical because it explained away any suspicion of wrongdoing or "fault," thereby entitling him to a waiver. It became even more critical by the absence of any other supporting evidence with which he could establish his claim.
21
In view of these circumstances, it is necessary to our review that the fact finder articulate "any reasons for questioning (Mr. Viehman's) credibility...." Id. The findings at each level in this case are ambiguous at best. The Administration's Special Determination stated that Mr. Viehman "could not submit sufficient proof to substantiate his allegation." Record, vol. II, at 55. But, there is no indication if this is based on disbelief of his story or that the Administration wanted more proof.
22
In its reconsideration, the Administration reiterated its original statement and then added that Mr. Viehman had not followed through to determine if his son-in-law was receiving payments. This tends to indicate that it was not disbelief in his story, but rather that the Administration required more. The ALJ found that Mr. Viehman failed to timely report his daughter's marriage. Once again, the conclusion left open the question of credibility.
23
We are cognizant of the burdensome work load which confronts the Social Security Administration. And so we do not lightly impose upon the fact finder a more stringent requirement to articulate with greater detail its reasons for disbelieving a claimant. "However, if the claimant could have prevailed if all of the claimant's evidence had been believed, the trier of fact has a duty to pass on the issue of the truth and reliability of (his claim)...." Scharlow v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 1981).8
24
Since we are unable to decipher whether the ALJ based his ruling on a credibility determination, and because that determination is critical to Mr. Viehman's claim9 and our review for substantial evidence, we find it necessary to remand this case. We leave to the sound discretion of the Secretary the question of whether the evidence can be supplemented without an additional hearing or whether the remand necessitates a new hearing on this matter. REVERSED and REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.10
*
Honorable Richard S. Arnold, U. S. Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation
1
Katherine E. Viehman had been adjudicated incompetent. Doctors had diagnosed her condition as "encephalopathy associated with prematurity and depressive neurosis." Appellee's Brief at 5
2
Although the overpayment is not disputed, we are concerned that the period of overpayment encompasses a period from May, 1974, through October, 1978. If the marriage stands as the determining factor in Katherine's eligibility for disability benefits, the subsequent divorce in January, 1976, should have eliminated the ineligibility factor
3
During his visit he made a statement espousing the same factual details of his conversation with the Social Security Administration as he testified to during the hearing
4
If, in fact, the ALJ based his decision on insufficient evidence, it seems incongruous that the requisite standard of review would require us to find substantial evidence to support a finding of insufficient evidence to establish a negative-"without fault."
5
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive...."
6
(b) The last month for which a child is entitled to a child's insurance benefit is the month before the month in which any one of the following events first occurs:
....
(2) The child marries (except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section):
....
(d) The marriage of a child, age 18 or over and entitled to child's insurance benefits based on disability, will not terminate such entitlement (however, see paragraph (c) of this section for termination because of a subsequent event) if the marriage is to:
(1) A person age 18 or older entitled to child's insurance benefits based on a disability....
20
C.F.R. § 404.321, quoted in Brief for Appellee, at 7-8
7
"Fault" has been defined as:
(a) An incorrect statement made by the individual which he knew or should have known to be incorrect; or
(b) Failure to furnish information which he knew or should have known to be material; or
(c) With respect to the overpaid individual only, acceptance of a payment which he either knew or could have been expected to know was incorrect.
20
C.F.R. 404.507
8
The Code of Federal Regulations lists circumstances under which a recipient is considered "without fault" in accepting benefits. These circumstances include:
(b) Reliance upon erroneous information from an official source within the Social Security Administration ... with respect to the interpretation of a pertinent provision of the Social Security Act or regulations pertaining thereto....
....
(g) The continued issuance of benefit checks to him after he sent notice to the Administration of the event which caused or should have caused the deductions provided that such continued issuance of checks led him to believe in good faith that he was entitled to checks subsequently received.
20
C.F.R. § 404.510. In addition, 20 C.F.R. § 404.510a provides:
Where an individual or other person on behalf of an individual accepts such overpayment because of reliance on erroneous information from an official source within the Social Security Administration ... with respect to the interpretation of a pertinent provision of the Social Security Act or regulations pertaining thereto ... such individual, in accepting such overpayment, will be deemed to be "without fault."
The appellant contends Mr. Viehman clearly fits within the circumstances outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.510a. The record, as it stands before us, could certainly support the application of this section to Mr. Viehman's case. However, the limited scope of review afforded us precludes substitution of our judgment for that of the fact finder's, "even if the reviewing court finds the evidence preponderates toward a wholly different finding." Oldham v. Schweiker, 660 F.2d 1078, 1083 (5th Cir. 1981).
9
If the ALJ believes Mr. Viehman called the Social Security office and had the conversation he testified about, the conclusions that "Mr. Viehman failed to timely report his daughter's marriage" and did "not submit sufficient proof to substantiate his allegation" are clearly erroneous as a matter of law
10
If on remand the ALJ finds Mr. Viehman "without fault," it will then be necessary to apply the second tier of the waiver provision. Under this second tier, the ALJ is called upon to determine whether repayment would "defeat the purpose" of the Social Security Act or would be "against equity and good conscience." 42 U.S.C. § 404(b) (1976). The regulations state that the purpose of the Act would be defeated if overpayment places the individual in financial need in order to meet his current living expenses. Mr. Viehman's age, occupation, and sources of income provide relevant factors for consideration of his needs to retain "substantially all of his current income (including social security monthly benefits) to meet current ordinary and necessary living expenses." 20 C.F.R. § 404.508(b); Cucuzzella v. Weinberger, 395 F.Supp. 1288 (D.Del.1975). As noted earlier, his payments appear to have been terminated in order to initiate repayment of the benefits
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GD-ROM (Comic)
Even further… I admire how Paypal is unable to show you a list of your current active payment subscriptions, and how to even see your subscription history, you have to navigate through layers and layers of submenus. The designer has clearly been on vacation for a while. |
Back in the summer of 2006, Ukraine's pro-Western government planned to host NATO exercises in Crimea as part of the alliance's Partnership for Peace program.
But when the NATO troops arrived, they were greeted with noisy, and often violent, demonstrations organized by pro-Moscow groups on the peninsula. When U.S. Marine Corps reservists tried to reach their training facility, demonstrators surrounded their bus, rocked it, and attempted to break its windows.
After days of similar harassment, the exercises were canceled.
The anti-NATO rebellion in Crimea nine years ago was just one example of how the Kremlin used pro-Moscow groups to advance its interests in Ukraine.
By using its proxies in Russophone regions to stir up trouble and infiltrate public institutions, Russia was able to create the impression that Ukraine was divided and dysfunctional -- and prevent Kyiv from making any decisive moves toward integrating with the West.
The Kremlin lost a measure of this capacity last year when it annexed Crimea, by far Ukraine's most pro-Moscow region. It would lose still more if it annexes the separatist-held regions of the Donbas -- or even freezes the conflict there. And had Moscow's ill-fated Novorossia pipe dream ever gotten off the ground, it would have lost all of it.
Every bit of territory Vladimir Putin takes away from Ukraine costs Moscow more and more of the fifth column it has spent decades developing inside the country.
This is all worth bearing in mind as Russia again masses troops on the border amid widespread speculation that a new offensive in eastern Ukraine is coming this summer.
Whether or not an offensive is, indeed, coming depends largely on what Putin wants. And what Putin wants is not exactly clear.
The Guns Of Summer
According to an eyewitness report by Reuters last week, Russia " is massing troops and hundreds of pieces of weaponry including mobile rocket launchers, tanks, and artillery at a makeshift base near the border with Ukraine."
The widely circulated story also noted that troops at the Kuzminsky firing range, located approximately 50 kilometers from the border, had removed their insignia. Vehicles there had also removed their number plates and other identifying markers.
The Reuters report added to fresh fears that the warmer weather will be accompanied by a summer offensive by Russia and its proxies to seize more territory in eastern Ukraine.
General Philip Breedlove, the NATO commander, said the separatists were using the relative quiet of the current cease-fire to regroup and rearm. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko told his National Security and Defense Council on May 6 that Russia had amassed 50,000 troops on the border and the separatists had 40,000 fighters inside Ukraine.
In a recent article in The Daily Beast, Michael Weiss and James Miller examined recent separatist attacks and the flow of heavy and sophisticated weaponry into rebel-held territory, concluding that "a summer offensive is inevitable."
This could well be the case. Or Russia's menacing stance could be a classic example of gunboat diplomacy.
The Stalemate In Putin's Head
Despite multiple documented cease-fire violations and fresh separatist attacks, the conflict in eastern Ukraine is deadlocked.
It's deadlocked militarily. It's deadlocked diplomatically. It's deadlocked politically.
And it even appears deadlocked inside Putin's head.
And this is because from the start of the crisis, Putin has appeared to be pursuing contradictory -- and, indeed, mutually exclusive -- objectives in Ukraine.
At times, he's seemed bent on seizing large chunks of Ukraine's Russophone east, from Kharkiv in the north to Mariupol and Odesa in the south. This would not only give Russia some key strategic ports, it would also provide a coveted land bridge to Crimea.
But achieving this objective has always been a tall order. It would be difficult -- if not impossible -- to accomplish with just hybrid-war tactics. It would probably require a full-on invasion.
"The cost of restarting the war would be high," The Economist wrote in a recent editorial. "Russia would probably be hit with a fresh round of sanctions, which could bring down its banks. It would also have to send large numbers of regular troops to Ukraine, which most Russians do not support."
Not only would a full-on invasion be costly in terms of blood and treasure, there would also be no guarantee of success. It would be a militarily difficult operation and Russophone populations in Kharkiv, Odesa, and Mariupol have proven much more loyal to Kyiv than the Kremlin expected.
And even in the event of success, achieving this objective would mean giving up on Moscow's other goal: keeping its fifth column inside Ukraine in order to paralyze the country and prevent it from moving West.
Put simply, if Putin wants one of his goals in Ukraine, he has to give up the other.
And which one he wants will set the tone for whether this conflict winds down, or whether it escalates.
Known Unknowns
So which of these objectives is Putin really after?
First, the obligatory caveat. When trying to get inside this man's head, a measure of epistemological modesty is probably a good idea. Because, in reality, we simply don't know.
We don't know what Putin is thinking. We don't know whom he is listening to. And we don't know what he is planning. We can only surmise based on his words and actions -- and those of his surrogates.
That said, my sense at this point is that the Kremlin leader is engaging in some high-stakes gunboat diplomacy.
The suspension of the Novorossia project, the assassination of rebel leader Aleksei Mozgovoi, and the Kremlin's recent rhetoric seems to suggest that a fresh offensive isn't Plan A.
Putin "wants the separatist Donbas to remain inside Ukraine, but as an open sore which Russia can prod when needed to control the country," The Economist wrote.
"Only once he has this 'political settlement' will he discuss closing the border with Ukraine. The West wants Russia to secure the border and withdraw its forces from Ukraine, so that local elections in Donbas can pave the way for its reintegration. That would defy the purpose of Mr. Putin’s exercise."
Russia's menacing posture looks like an effort to remind Kyiv and the West that if he doesn't get the Bosnia-style "federalization" he wants for Ukraine, then he might be prepared to go for broke and re-escalate the conflict.
Which doesn't mean it is harmless. The thing about blackmail is that for it to work, you need to be ready to follow through on the threat. An invasion may not be Plan A -- but it could very well be Plan B.
-- Brian Whitmore |
Q:
Msi & exe singing Microsoft Authenticode requirments
I am trying to sign my small application, following this tutorial:
In the tutorial they did not ask me to purchase Microsoft Authenticode Certificates
I need to Removes "Unknown Publisher" security warnings; after I signmy msi and exe files I still have "Unknown Publisher"
Can I sign my msi or exe without purchasing Microsoft Authenticode Certificates?
I know that I can sign Java, Authenticode, and AIR apps free: https://www.globalsign.com/en/code-signing/code-signing-tool/
A:
No you can't remove "Unknown Publisher" security warnings without purchasing a code signing certificate.
The tutorial link describes how to create a test certificate. Quoting the first paragraph "If you use a test (self-created) certificate, the installation dialogs will display an "Unknown publisher" message."
When you purchase a code signing certificate, the certifying authority takes certain steps to verify your identity. If those steps are passed, the certifying authority issues you a certificate signed by their private key. The private key is kept secret. When you install code signed software, the operating system extracts the code signature from the software and validates it against the public key provided by the certifying authority. This is a simplification, the actual check involves a chain of certificates. But the key point is: if you use a self signed test certificate, the operating system has no knowledge of the public key of the self signed test certificate so cannot validate against it.
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rs picked without replacement from {l: 1, j: 4, h: 9, d: 2}. What is prob of sequence dj?
1/30
Two letters picked without replacement from {v: 7, c: 7}. What is prob of sequence cc?
3/13
Calculate prob of sequence uutt when four letters picked without replacement from ttutut.
1/15
What is prob of sequence hvv when three letters picked without replacement from vjkhjjjjkjqv?
1/660
Calculate prob of sequence qg when two letters picked without replacement from quguuugquuuuqq.
4/91
Calculate prob of sequence larr when four letters picked without replacement from iihylliayryrihy.
1/8190
Calculate prob of sequence sj when two letters picked without replacement from jbjjjjjjjvjs.
3/44
Four letters picked without replacement from {k: 1, t: 1, v: 2, g: 2, x: 2}. Give prob of sequence vxxv.
1/420
What is prob of sequence ot when two letters picked without replacement from vot?
1/6
What is prob of sequence mivm when four letters picked without replacement from vmvvvmi?
1/105
Calculate prob of sequence ej when two letters picked without replacement from wiejefiwjejeljwwwjjj.
7/95
Two letters picked without replacement from mmmmm. What is prob of sequence mm?
1
Three letters picked without replacement from {w: 10, m: 6, l: 2, i: 2}. Give prob of sequence ilm.
1/285
Four letters picked without replacement from drnrdrddda. Give prob of sequence rrdn.
1/168
Two letters picked without replacement from xzmxxmfxfmmmz. What is prob of sequence mf?
5/78
Calculate prob of sequence dqo when three letters picked without replacement from {j: 1, d: 1, t: 4, z: 2, q: 4, o: 3}.
2/455
What is prob of sequence vj when two letters picked without replacement from {v: 3, j: 11}?
33/182
Two letters picked without replacement from {m: 4, a: 3, b: 2, q: 1, j: 6}. What is prob of sequence jb?
1/20
Three letters picked without replacement from wvssvvmvmssvw. Give prob of sequence vvs.
20/429
Three letters picked without replacement from {x: 1, b: 11}. Give prob of sequence bbx.
1/12
What is prob of sequence kk when two letters picked without replacement from {h: 2, k: 4}?
2/5
Three letters picked without replacement from {w: 2, e: 1, m: 1, x: 2, d: 1}. Give prob of sequence mxe.
1/105
Calculate prob of sequence gu when two letters picked without replacement from uuugsrsuu.
5/72
What is prob of sequence ll when two letters picked without replacement from {t: 7, l: 2}?
1/36
Three letters picked without replacement from xxlxxkggjgkl. Give prob of sequence llk.
1/330
Four letters picked without replacement from prpprrpppprrppprrrr. What is prob of sequence prpp?
45/646
Three letters picked without replacement from {o: 6, m: 2}. Give prob of sequence ooo.
5/14
Calculate prob of sequence xaaa when four letters picked without replacement from eaexeeeeaaeaxaxe.
3/728
What is prob of sequence ss when two letters picked without replacement from ssssuuusss?
7/15
Calculate prob of sequence ovt when three letters picked without replacement from oootototoooottvtoot.
77/5814
Two letters picked without replacement from {d: 4, f: 2, u: 2, r: 3, m: 1}. What is prob of sequence rf?
1/22
Three letters picked without replacement from pppp. What is prob of sequence ppp?
1
Four letters picked without replacement from podpbpdpppppkppp. What is prob of sequence bdpo?
11/21840
Calculate prob of sequence ffs when three letters picked without replacement from {x: 3, s: 5, f: 8}.
1/12
Calculate prob of sequence tq when two letters picked without replacement from tquttmqutfuutqfuqq.
25/306
Three letters picked without replacement from gigggnn. What is prob of sequence ing?
4/105
Two letters picked without replacement from xtjxyttajdaytytyy. Give prob of sequence yj.
5/136
Three letters picked without replacement from llrrrrlfrfll. What is prob of sequence lfr?
5/132
Two letters picked without replacement from cvlfj. Give prob of sequence fl.
1/20
Two letters picked without replacement from cspsscspssscssssss. What is prob of sequence pp?
1/153
What is prob of sequence gu when two letters picked without replacement from urqfuurugrf?
2/55
Calculate prob of sequence neh when three letters picked without replacement from nhneneeeceeecnhceee.
40/2907
Three letters picked without replacement from uxcgkcc. What is prob of sequence kgx?
1/210
Calculate prob of sequence er when two letters picked without replacement from erqirup.
1/21
Two letters picked without replacement from pbb. What is prob of sequence bb?
1/3
Three letters picked without replacement from xoxceeooyx. Give prob of sequence xoe.
1/40
Three letters picked without replacement from qqmmnnqmqqnsgsc. What is prob of sequence mgn?
3/910
What is prob of sequence tu when two letters picked without replacement from nunuunnnntnuunt?
1/21
Two letters picked without replacement from usdsduqqqdq. What is prob of sequence ud?
3/55
Three letters picked without replacement from {n: 2, t: 7, l: 3}. Give prob of sequence ttl.
21/220
Calculate prob of sequence mfku when four letters picked without replacement from {h: 2, u: 2, s: 2, f: 5, m: 2, k: 1}.
5/6006
Three letters picked without replacement from eyeyiyhleyy. Give prob of sequence lye.
1/66
What is prob of sequence ewtw when four letters picked without replacement from teuelwuw?
1/420
What is prob of sequence uh when two letters picked without replacement from ueurheraqrqerue?
1/70
Calculate prob of sequence ax when two letters picked without replacement from {t: 1, x: 1, o: 1, z: 1, a: 2, g: 1}.
1/21
Four letters picked without replacement from fhfhjjjfffjf. What is prob of sequence hfhj?
2/495
What is prob of sequence zzz when three letters picked without replacement from zzmzzzzzmzzmzzzz?
143/280
Three letters picked without replacement from {w: 5, u: 3, r: 1}. Give prob of sequence uuw.
5/84
What is prob of sequence tww when three letters picked without replacement from {p: 1, t: 9, w: 2, y: 8}?
1/380
Four letters picked without replacement from {b: 7, j: 7, k: 2}. What is prob of sequence bbbk?
1/104
Calculate prob of sequence gg when two letters picked without replacement from {n: 1, s: 2, d: 3, u: 2, g: 1, z: 3}.
0
Calculate prob of sequence yyg when three letters picked without replacement from {y: 8, g: 5, p: 5}.
35/612
Calculate prob of sequence okck when four letters picked without replacement from cckohkkkohh.
1/165
Four letters picked without replacement from {j: 3, y: 1, t: 4}. Give prob of sequence jjtt.
3/70
Two letters picked without replacement from cncmm. Give prob of sequence mc.
1/5
Two letters picked without replacement from {f: 4, x: 2, h: 4, v: 2}. Give prob of sequence hf.
4/33
Two letters picked without replacement from {l: 2, h: 7, i: 1, t: 2}. Give prob of sequence ih.
7/132
What is prob of sequence qqq when three letters picked without replacement from {q: 3}?
1
Two letters picked without replacement from llyyllylllyllllllll. What is prob of sequence ll?
35/57
Three letters picked without replacement from {h: 9, b: 3}. Give prob of sequence hbh.
9/55
What is prob of sequence mr when two letters picked without replacement from {q: 1, z: 2, m: 4, r: 1, b: 2}?
2/45
Calculate prob of sequence nvd when three letters picked without replacement from xdznvznpx.
1/252
Three letters picked without replacement from zqdszxdxzbds. What is prob of sequence zqb?
1/440
What is prob of sequence fiqe when four letters picked without replacement from ieqqqeeefife?
1/198
What is prob of sequence zz when two letters picked without replacement from zzzzwzzz?
3/4
Two letters picked without replacement from {c: 7}. Give prob of sequence cc.
1
Three letters picked without replacement from {s: 3, y: 1, x: 2, j: 3, w: 2, e: 1}. What is prob of sequence ewx?
1/330
Calculate prob of sequence jjo when three letters picked without replacement from rrrrrjrsorsrjrrosssj.
1/570
Four letters picked without replacement from uuuxuuxxuuu. What is prob of sequence uxux?
7/165
Calculate prob of sequence kv when two letters picked without replacement from vkvkvzkz.
9/56
Calculate prob of sequence ag when two letters picked without replacement from {g: 8, a: 1, n: 10}.
4/171
Calculate prob of sequence khkj when four letters picked without replacement from {h: 3, r: 1, j: 3, n: 3, k: 3, b: 2}.
3/1820
What is prob of sequ |
Q:
Scala: getting the name of the class the trait is mixed in
Given an instance of a class, we can obviously return its name:
trait MixedInClassDiscovery {
val className = this.getClass.getName
}
class AClass extends MixedInClassDiscovery {
...
this.className // returns "AClass"
...
}
But this way uses reflection, once for every instance of AClass. Can the same be done once for every class, instead?
One solution which comes to mind is to mix it into companion objects instead of classes themselves.
A:
I can't think of any way to do it with no extra overhead. You could do it with companion objects, however, and a couple of extra pieces of work:
object Example {
trait Discovery {
def companion: Discovered
def className: String = companion.className
}
trait Discovered extends Discovery {
override lazy val className = {
println("Getting class name!") // To see how many times we're called
this.getClass.getSuperclass.getName
}
}
class Test extends Discovery {
def companion = Test
}
object Test extends Test with Discovered {}
}
And here we see that this works:
scala> val a = new Example.Test
a: Example.Test = Example$Test@17e4c97
scala> val b = a.className
Getting class name!
b: String = Example$Test
scala> val c = a.className
c: String = Example$Test
but it comes at rather a price: you need to not only decorate the class with Discovery but also implement the companion method and write the companion object (which need not have the same name, incidentally) for every class.
|
This project will investigate whether HMO patients who transfer into an academic hospital-based practice from a community-based practice are more severely ill and/or use significantly more health care resources. The stud will determine whether a previously unidentified form of adverse selection -- within an HMO exists, and will assess its impact on hospital finances, case management and continuity of care. Enrollment and utilization data fro HealthPASS, a mandatory medicaid IPA-model HMO in Philadelphia, will be collected and analyzed in order to address the following questions: 1) do HealthPASS patients who transfer into an academic hospital-based practice from a community-based practice use more care and have more serious or resource-intensive health problems than do patients who maintain enrollment with a community-based practitioner or who initially chose that hospital-based practice?; 2) are diagnostically-defined patient subgroups (e.g. AIDS or obstetrics patients) more likely to transfer into a hospital-based practice, and do they experience resource-intensive episodes of care shortly thereafter?; and, 3) are patients who disenroll from hospital-based practices less frequent utilizers of care, perhaps following an initial resource-intensive episode of care? The HealthPASS patient panel of two large academic hospital-based primary care practices will be examine in depth. Detailed data on enrollment and service utilization will be obtained from the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, an supplemente by data collected from the participating practices. The analysis will exami e differences between transfers and ongoing hospital and community-based grou s with regard to demographic and diagnostic characteristics, utilization of specific primary care, specialty consultation, and inpatient services, tota charges for car time to first hospitalization, and severity of illness, as measured by computerized disease staging and case-mix index. While many studies have examined selection between competing forms of insurance and HM plans, none have looked at patient selection differences among alternative practice forms participating in one IPA-model HMO. The possibility that patients transfer into teaching hospital-based practices in anticipation of resource-intensive episodes of care, or, are encouraged to do so by community-based practitioners, needs to be explored. |
SNC Going Public with Forest Conservation Working Group – Membership Call
NATION VALLEY — South Nation Conservation’s (SNC) Board of Directors has approved new membership to broaden the stakeholder engagement on its Forest Conservation Working Group. The SNC Board represents 16-member Municipalities in Eastern Ontario.This enhanced Committee of 14 new members are scheduled to meet approximately 6 times between March and June to provide recommendations to SNC’s Board and Municipalities on measures to increase and/or protect forest cover. The new group’s membership will include First Nations, municipal representatives, land developers, woodlot organizations and community members working with 3 farm producers appointed by the previous forest cover agricultural working group.“The goal is to get people to collaborate on ways to work together to maintain forest cover throughout the region,” explained John Mesman, SNC’s Communications Team Lead. “The group will be brought up to speed on past and current studies and will review feedback provided from the agricultural community.”Work on the topic of declining forest cover began when SNC struck it’s Agricultural Forest Cover Working Group in 2017 to produce a report on preliminary recommendations from an agricultural perspective. This group consisted of 22 members, of which nearly all were local farmers, appointed by their local federations of agriculture, farmers union and Christian farmers’ federation.SNC is actively recruiting membership-at-large to provide feedback from a community-based perspective. A call for applications is out, closing on Friday, March 9.“We’re hoping to find people eager to come to the table and work together,” said Mesman, adding: “we need community-driven solutions and enhanced program ideas.”Persons interested can visit nation.on.ca/forest-cover to access information on the Forest Conservation Initiative or to download an application form. The SNC-produced 2016 Forest Cover and Trends Analysis Report can also be found online.“The initiative aims to bring people from different industries together to discuss ways to conserve forest cover,” added Mesman. “It’s our local environment, we’re in it together.”For more information: John Mesman, Team Lead, Communications and Outreach, 1-877-984-2948 ext. 302, jmesman@nation.on.ca.
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ABBY'S
ABBY'S
This bar is a dark caramel that is just right for pulling, not to soft or stick to the teeth hard. It's finished in a custom blend darker milk chocolate and topped with sea salt.
Quantity:
Add To Cart
Abby is my younger sister whose name is actually Lorra Lee. For reasons known to close circles in the family, she ended up with Abby or even Ab as a nickname. Caramel in milk chocolate with sea salt was what she told me I needed to make as soon as she heard of my new venture so it only seemed right to name the bar after her.
This bar is a dark caramel that is just right for pulling, not tot soft or stick to the teeth hard. It’s finished in a custom blend darker milk chocolate and topped with sea salt. |
Shooting Hitler the first time may have changed history in that second version of the universe, but then they overshoot their desired time again and have to go forward to a third (and unchanged) version of the universe. In that version, the Professor misses Hitler and hits Eleanor Roosevelt. Notice, from the episode transcript, that he didn't say he killed her:
Farnsworth: Just slow it down, I'll shoot Hitler out the window. [He takes out his weapon again and aims out the window and shoots.] Darn! I shot Eleanor Roosevelt by mistake.
He just says he shot her. It's possible he just accidentally winged her, since he was shooting while they were still moving. In addition, as other answers mention, with over 1000 years of intervening history filled with drastic and apocalyptic occurrences, the injury (or possible death) of Eleanor Roosevelt may not affect the state of things all that much by the year 3000.
So, why might the Professor be so quick to monkey around with history? It's possible that, with all of his prior experiences with changing history ("Roswell that Ends Well") and time paradoxes (Bender's Big Score), he realizes that time seems to right itself just fine, so why not have fun and live out everyone's time-travel-tyrant-murder fantasy. In the Professor's own words: |
[Tobacco smoking and clinical periodontal status with clinical parameters].
Increasing evidence points to smoking as a major risk factor for periodontitis and, affecting the prevalence, extentent and severity of the disease. The aim of our study was to asses due to clinical and statistical methods oral health status among a group of 61 patients of Conservative Dentistry and Perodontology Department Poznań University of Medical Sciences according to DMF and CPITN indices, PPD and CAL level. In statistical analysis the Friedmann and Kruskal Wallis test were used. |
Disclaimer: The simulator made me force the gender binary on some of these characters. Please ignore that.
Events under the cut.
An odd mixture of people being charitable, but ok.
A bunch of them run away.
UM????
Ok.
That’s pretty in character for her seeing as she’s blind. She probably meant to run away.
More running away like sensible people.
Maybe so Undyne can’t use it against him?
More running.
HERMANN! YIKES WOMAN! …Kind of badass but YIKES!
Maybe they’re planning on using it for some sort of poetic revenge on Asgore?
Ya know I’ve always found it weird. This happens in-game where after you spare him it says Flowey runs away. …and in my head all I see is him pulling up his roots and running like a lil bellsprout or something.
FIRST BLOOD GOES TO PAPYRUS OH MY GOD
Still not over Papyrus murdering Toriel in cold blood holy cow dude.
Very in character.
Chara you’ve come so far, I’m so proud of you.
Very effective since he IS a plant.
I can only imagine Monster Kid holds the sword in their mouth, and that’s awesome.
Oh boo hoo! PEOPLE ARE DEAD METTATON.
Sneaky boy.
PAPYRUS?? I don’t like what this game has done to you… ;n;
YES GOOD. HIDE. HIDE FROM PAPYRUS. HE’S APPARENTLY GONE OFF THE DEEP END.
She’s telling Frisk that sais are dangerous.
Pfff… He probably deserves that one, seeing as he DID kind of capture and torture Hanah with weird determination experiments.
Such a smart bean.
Probably looking for Purrgatorio.
I don’t blame Blake. She’s a scary lady when she wants to be.
WHO WILL DIE NEXT??
WHO WHO WILL WIN???
I HAVE NO IDEA!!!
|
Background
==========
Thoracic aorta false aneurysms are a rare and life-threatening complication of aortic surgery, infection, genetic disorders and trauma. After trauma approximately 2% to 5% of patients with aortic disruption develop a false aneurysm either after non operative treatment or lack of diagnosis \[[@B1]\]. Little is known about the natural history of this complication. However, a perfused false aneurysm may partially clot and organize with a fibrous wall potentially evolving into a saccular or fusiform aneurysm; late enlargement and even rupture may occur. Ninety percent of the false aneurysms involve the aortic isthmus; this probably reflects a sort of protection by the mediastinal periadventitial tissues at this level \[[@B2],[@B3]\]. Patients developing chronic pseudoaneurysms show a low rate of associated injuries at the time of trauma \[[@B2],[@B3]\]; in fact, 35% present no other injuries, and 50% only one.
Case report
===========
A 33 year-old male motocross rider came to our attention complaining of back chest pain and cough. He referred a history of chest trauma 4 years ago during a motorbike race. The trauma resulted in an exstensive left shoulder and head injury associated to multiple rib fractures. He spent one month in hospital; he subsequently improved and was discharged in stable conditions. However, he continued to complain of a progressively increasing chest pain. At chest x-ray a left upper mediastinal mass was detected. A 64 multislice CT scan showed the presence of an aortic aneurysm (4 cm × 4.5 cm) arising from the descending thoracic aorta (Fig [1](#F1){ref-type="fig"}, [2](#F2){ref-type="fig"}, [3](#F3){ref-type="fig"}); the neck was located immediately after the origin of the left subclavian artery. on the convex aspect of the vessel. CT also showed the presence of a bovine configuration of the aorta. The diagnosis was \"post-traumatic false aneurysm\" involving the distal arch, as in most of the cases. The patient underwent endograft placement and fully recovered.
{#F1}
{#F2}
{#F3}
|
Tinnye
Tinnye is a village in Pest county, Hungary.
References
Category:Populated places in Pest County |
Semi-Rad: The Point of the Whole Thing
This story originally appeared in the December 2015 issue of our print edition.
Photo: Courtesy Brendan Leonard
After returning from a trip to learn big wall climbing in Zion last year, my heart didn’t seem to be in it anymore. I had what you might call a lull in stoke.
While my friend Ethan led a block of pitches on Lunar Ecstasy (5.10 C2) on Moonlight Buttress, I worried about my last leads, the final two pitches, and felt a cloud of dread creeping up underneath me, seeming to fill the 600 feet of air between me and the ground.
For a few months after that, I wasn’t climbing because I wanted to, but because I felt like I should. The voice in my head said: “You’ll get out of shape! You should be climbing harder. You’ve been doing this for years now. You’re a climber. What else are you? Come on.” And then another voice said something that made sense: “Maybe it’s time for a break from all this.”
My few weeks off turned into months. I didn’t swing an ice tool once last winter. I took multi-day trips on my mountain bike and went down to the bottom of the Grand Canyon, once, twice, three times. My friend Sagar texted me, “Rock climbing? Let’s go rock climbing.” I told him, “Thanks, but I’m waiting for the stoke to come back on its own.”
The stoke didn’t come. I wondered what happened to the guy I’d been the past eight years, frantically digging through Mountain Project for the next thing, leafing through guidebooks, the guy who never wanted to climb indoors but started going to the climbing gym anyway. A lot.
Sagar kept at me, until finally one day in June, I said OK, let’s do something. You lead. Tow me up something. We did Star Wars in Eldorado Canyon, two pitches, 5.8. Following Sagar, I jammed my way up the V-slot with zero anxiety. From the belay ledge halfway up the Lower Peanuts Wall, we couldn’t see any other climbers—most people stay off the walls during hot weekday afternoons in June. I sat and fed out rope while Sagar finished the second pitch, remembering what a strange place Eldo is. It really doesn’t look like much if you see photographs of the whole thing, just some blocky red walls sweeping up to the sky, not even that big or majestic, really. If you pointed out a route you climbed to a non-climber, they might not even understand it, or see the line. But when you’re there, sitting in the middle of it, in places only climbers go? It’s magical. Complicated, unpredictable, intimidating sometimes. I loved it, I dreaded it, I never did most of the classic climbs. I didn’t think I wanted to, but yeah, I did want to. It scared the shit out of me at times, and other times it pushed me to do things I thought I couldn’t do. I never once approached a climb there thinking, “This will be a fun, straightforward, easy day.” I suppose it was kind of like my entire life in climbing. To paraphrase the “Mayor of Long Beach,” Jason “Woody” Wood: I don’t like it, but I love it.
Never once, from the start of my life as a climber, did I approach climbing like it was what it should be: play. I never toproped anything I thought I should be able to lead, never took a lap on something before tying into the sharp end, never let a stronger friend just take me up a climb without feeling like I should lead half the pitches.
A college kid slammed into a ledge right next to me on Castleton Tower a couple years ago, and it was the first time I’d seen anyone deck and what happened when they did, and it pulled everything into sharp focus for me: If you’re not careful, you can get really fucked up doing this. I thought of the hundred times I pulled desperate moves above gear, hoping it went well, and how it usually did, and how I never really got strong, and how climbing would have been way more fun and less scary if I did. I never just went to the crag for a day with the attitude of maybe leading a few climbs, maybe toproping everything, or maybe taking photos and eating potato chips all day if I “wasn’t feeling it.” But maybe I should have.
So this year, I asked myself something deep: What’s the point of the whole thing? I always thought climbing was teaching me to deal with fear. Sometimes it did, sometimes it just showed me that I could get past the crippling paralysis caused by fear, and do what needed to be done to get up and over something so we could make it home again. And of course, since most of us only climb a couple days a week at the most, you take those lessons and apply them to your life, which is a good thing. But the more I think about it, for me, the point is to explore the mountains, to really get into them, not just look up at them from a trail at the bottom of a valley.
Later in the summer, I had a conversation with an outdoor industry client about “ers” vs. “ings”—the idea that most people may not see themselves as “climbers” or “skiers” or whatever it is they do in the outdoors—they just go climbing or skiing. I thought about that, and for a long time, I believed it was really important for me to be an “er,” or more specifically, a “climber.” And maybe climbers have periods of their lives where they climb a little less. Maybe not.
If not, that’s OK—I can just go climbing. But I might need a friend to lead the hard pitches. |
If there were ever any doubt about where the overwhelming majority of Democratic 2020 presidential candidates stand on the issue of slavery reparations, this week’s National Action Network (NAN) conference cleared it up.
Virtually every presidential contender who spoke at Al Sharpton’s event was asked by the civil rights activist if they support slavery reparations. To a person, their answer was a resounding yes.
Specifically, Sharpton wanted to know if they support H.R. 40, a bill originally introduced by former Democratic Michigan Rep. John Conyers in 1989 and reintroduced by Democratic Texas Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee this year that would create a “Commission to Study and Develop Reparation Proposals for African-Americans to examine slavery and discrimination in the colonies and the United States from 1619 to the present and recommend appropriate remedies.” (RELATED: 2020 Democrats Support Slavery Reparations: What Does This Mean?)
Contenders who answered Sharpton’s question in the affirmative included former Texas Rep. Beto O’Rourke, Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders, Minnesota Sen. Amy Klobuchar, New York Sens. Kirsten Gillibrand and Elizabeth Warren, California Sen. Kamala Harris, Colorado Gov. John Hickenlooper, former Maryland Rep. John Delaney, and South Bend Mayor Pete Buttigieg. Others also expressed their support of the concept either during their speeches at the event or previously.
Here’s a summary of where each candidate stands on slavery reparations thus far:
Beto O’Rourke
“I had a chance to speak with and just listen to and learn from Brian Stevenson in Montgomery, Alabama and learn from his work on working with the community to build a memorial to justice and to peace and he said ‘foundational to reparations is the word ‘repair.’ Foundational to repair is the truth,'” O’Rourke told Sharpton on Wednesday.
Bernie Sanders
While the Vermont senator had previously seemed reluctant about simply “writing a check” to black Americans, he told Sharpton on Friday that if a reparations bill is passed by the House and Senate, “of course I will sign it.”
“There needs to be a study,” said Sanders. “Let me also say this. I think what we need to do is to pay real attention to the most distressed communities in America. We have got to use 10% of all federal funds to make sure that kids who need it get the education, get the jobs, get the environmental protection that they need. And that would be a major focus of my efforts.”
Kamala Harris
The California senator said in February she supported some form of reparations. “We have got to recognize, back to that earlier point, people aren’t starting out on the same base in terms of their ability to succeed,” she told “The Breakfast Club” radio show. “So we have got to recognize that and give people a lift up.”
“When I am elected president, I will sign that bill,” she said Friday, referring to H.R. 40.
Elizabeth Warren
“We have to be honest that people in this country do not start from the same place or have access to the same opportunities,” Warren told The New York Times in February. “I’m serious about taking an approach that would change policies and structures and make real investments in black communities.”
“So I believe it’s time to start the national full-blown conversation about reparations in this country,” she said this week at NAN. “And that means I support the bill in the House to appoint a congressional panel of experts, people that are studying this and talk about different ways we may be able to do it and make a report back to Congress, so that we can as a nation do what’s right and begin to heal.”
Kirsten Gillibrand
“I firmly support Congresswoman Jackson Lee’s bill to create a commission to study reparations,” Gillibrand told NAN attendees during her speech. “As president, I would advocate Congress to pass that bill and I would sign that bill into law. This is the first step that 100 years of slavery and institutional racism have caused mass inequity and harm to black people and has held black communities back for generations from achieving their full potential.”
Amy Klobuchar
The Minnesota senator wasn’t directly asked the question by Sharpton at the NAC conference, but she told NBC’s Chuck Todd last month that while it’s a debate worth having, reparations do not necessarily “have to be a direct pay” for every individual.
“I believe we have to invest in those communities that have been so hurt by racism. It doesn’t have to be a direct pay for each person,” she said.
John Hickenlooper
The former Colorado governor told NAN attendees that slavery is “the nagging unrelenting shame of America, that continues to deny the true promise of this country to too many of its citizens. We must own our past, and acknowledge the shame, the sin, the injustice, and the ongoing consequences of enslaving an entire race of people. And we must apologize and that apology should come from the Oval Office.”
Julian Castro
“I’ve said that if under our Constitution that we compensate if we take their property, why wouldn’t we compensate people who were considered property and sanctioned by the state?” Castro, an early proponent of the idea, told NAN attendees. “I believe that for the black community, for the white community, for every other American — that it is important to address that original sin, and until we do we may feel like we’re moving forward as one nation, but I don’t think that we ever will.”
Cory Booker
“Do I support legislation that is race-conscious about balancing the economic scales? Not only do I support it, but I have legislation that actually does it,” the New Jersey senator, an on-record supporter of H.R. 40, told CNN anchor Jake Tapper last month.
Andrew Yang
Yang called the idea of reparations a “logical step,” but told NAN attendees he would “go again further.”
“I would put $1,000 a month in the hands of every adult starting at age 18 and then I would say this is not reparations,” Yang said. “We need to study reparations independently of the fact that we can make this economy work for you all, minimum, minimum.”
Pete Buttigieg
“The country as a whole is effectively segregated by race and the resources are different,” the South Bend, Indiana mayor said Thursday at NAN. “There is a direct connection between exclusion in the past and exclusion in the present.”
Tulsi Gabbard
The Hawaii congresswoman is a cosponsor of H.R. 40.
John Delaney and Tim Ryan
Both candidates expressed their support of the concept at this week’s NAN conference.
Howard Schultz
The former Starbucks CEO and potential independent candidate reportedly wasn’t asked the question at the NAN conference, but said in an interview last month that he would “rather look forward than look back.”
“And in looking forward, I think there are ways to address this issue. I would have a different view, and mine would be looking forward, not backwards, in how to invest significant support, dollars and programs within the African American community,” he said.
Follow Scott on Twitter |
> In lieu of any other policy changes, are you, as a RIPE member and
> participant in the LIR, EIX, and IPv6 WGs, in favor of the interim policy
> proposal for IPv6 address assignment policy for internet exchange points?
yes |
Chromosomal aberrations in peripheral blood lymphocytes of breast cancer patients prior to any therapy.
In a study comprised of 53 breast cancer patients, chosen for determining the cytogenetic damage to peripheral blood lymphocytes (PBL) due to cancer therapy, eleven patients revealed chromosomal abnormalities in 3.18% of cells prior to any such therapy. Age matched controls showed 0.18% abnormal cells. Statistical analysis of the abnormal cells in patients prior to therapy and normal controls revealed significant values at 1% level (p < 0.01). The factors causing "chromosome instability" causing chromosome breakage or whether any clastogenic metabolites produced by the tumor itself is triggering neoplastic transformation are discussed. |
A sleeveless tank top with a rich floral print of small purple flowers. Hints of green leave fall amongst the purple flowers. Sleeveless, this tank top is perfect for layering or simply pairing with your favorite jeans on a casual day. |
Xpress Boats H17 - Bass Boat
2014 Xpress Boats H17 Description
Speed. Grace. Style.
The Xpress Hyper-Lift Bass boat series is the culmination of nearly 50 years of boat building artistry. With sports car performance, you know the fun begins long before you arrive at your destination, and at a price you can afford.Spacious casting decks. Superior performance. Exciting options. Everything is at your fingertips to make each trip a memorable event. |
Characterization of mutants expressing thermostable D1 and D2 polypeptides of photosystem II in the cyanobacterium Synechococcus elongatus PCC 7942.
Photosystem II complex embedded in thylakoid membrane performs oxygenic photosynthesis where the reaction center D1/D2 heterodimer accommodates all components of the electron transport chain. To express thermostable D1/D2 heterodimer in a cyanobacterium Synechococcus elongatus PCC 7942, we constructed a series of mutant strains whose psbA1 and psbD1 genes encoding, respectively, the most highly expressed D1 and D2 polypeptides were replaced with those of a thermophilic strain, Thermosynechococcus vulcanus. Because the C-terminal 16 amino acid sequences of D1 polypeptides should be processed prior to maturation but diverge from each other, we also constructed the psbA1ΔC-replaced strain expressing a thermostable D1 polypeptide devoid of the C-terminal extension. The psbA1/psbD1-replaced strain showed decreased growth rate and oxygen evolution rate, suggesting inefficient photosystem II. Immunoblot analyses for thermostable D1, D2 polypeptides revealed that the heterologous D1 protein was absent in thylakoid membrane from any mutant strains with psbA1, psbA1ΔC, and psbA1/psbD1-replacements, whereas the heterologous D2 protein was present in thylakoid membrane as well as purified photosystem II complex from the psbA1/psbD1-replaced strain. In the latter strain, the compensatory expression of psbA3 and psbD2 genes was elevated. These data suggest that heterologous D2 polypeptide could be combined with the host D1 polypeptide to form chimeric D1/D2 heterodimer, whereas heterologous D1 polypeptide even without the C-terminal extension was unable to make complex with the host D2 polypeptide. Since the heterologous D1 could not be detected even in the whole cells of psbA1/psbD1-replaced strain, the rapid degradation of unprocessed or unassembled heterologous D1 was implicated. |
Sofia's Little Blog Themed towards busy moms.
Like breakfast during intercourse or a 1st class-ticket, a clean house may be the ultimate luxury. While a bit is required by it more effort than other indulgences, it's more often than not worth the problems- and because of cleaning services, it's progressively easier to accomplish.Every house requires a great dirt brush: Search for one made with an all natural fiber-over time it'll build-up an electrostatic cost that collects dirt easily. The hairs ought to be dense, versatile, and soft, and when you clear it with baby hair shampoo it'll last forever.A garbage can be an element in your inside too: Think about the style along with the functionality. Choose a weighty garbage can that may deal with trash without tipping over. It's good to possess a lid to help keep things safe from kids and pets.With regards to cleaning solutions, the one-size-fits-all solution is really a myth: Know very well what you're cleaning to check out something that works for that surface area. Then consider: Might it be gentle at first glance you're cleaning, gentle you, and gentle on earth? If the solution to all or any three yes is, you've found your item.An excellent valet steamer is really a brilliant multi-tasking cleaning tool: Needless to say, it's ideal for steaming away facial lines on clothing or refreshing your closet after seasonal storage, but it makes easy function of refreshing curtains and upholstery also.In your closet, choose hangers over folding: Place as much pieces on hangers as you possibly can so you can see everything you have and you also won't spend your time ironing. Search for flocked hangers-their narrow user profile saves space plus they assist in preventing garments from slipping to the ground.When organizing your cleaning tools, proximity is essential: In an ideal world, supplies would usually live near where they're being used-it just helps make things easier. But in the event that's extremely hard, assign a closet to function as cleaning closet. And do not be afraid to utilize high shelves to help keep things organized-store excrement in the closet, as well, in order that things are at your fingertips always.
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Summer break is nearly over (gasp!) for most kids in the Triangle. The National Summer Learning Association and Learning Heroes recently shared this list of 10 things parents can do to help their child start the school year strong.
Aggregate Theatre Company, a Raleigh-based theater group, is in the middle of its very first month-long series of children's shows and will offer free previews of the remaining two shows in the next couple of weeks. |
apiVersion: apiextensions.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: CustomResourceDefinition
metadata:
name: clusterversions.config.openshift.io
annotations:
include.release.openshift.io/self-managed-high-availability: "true"
spec:
group: config.openshift.io
versions:
- name: v1
served: true
storage: true
scope: Cluster
subresources:
status: {}
names:
plural: clusterversions
singular: clusterversion
kind: ClusterVersion
preserveUnknownFields: false
additionalPrinterColumns:
- name: Version
type: string
JSONPath: .status.history[?(@.state=="Completed")].version
- name: Available
type: string
JSONPath: .status.conditions[?(@.type=="Available")].status
- name: Progressing
type: string
JSONPath: .status.conditions[?(@.type=="Progressing")].status
- name: Since
type: date
JSONPath: .status.conditions[?(@.type=="Progressing")].lastTransitionTime
- name: Status
type: string
JSONPath: .status.conditions[?(@.type=="Progressing")].message
validation:
openAPIV3Schema:
description: ClusterVersion is the configuration for the ClusterVersionOperator.
This is where parameters related to automatic updates can be set.
type: object
required:
- spec
properties:
apiVersion:
description: 'APIVersion defines the versioned schema of this representation
of an object. Servers should convert recognized schemas to the latest
internal value, and may reject unrecognized values. More info: https://git.k8s.io/community/contributors/devel/sig-architecture/api-conventions.md#resources'
type: string
kind:
description: 'Kind is a string value representing the REST resource this
object represents. Servers may infer this from the endpoint the client
submits requests to. Cannot be updated. In CamelCase. More info: https://git.k8s.io/community/contributors/devel/sig-architecture/api-conventions.md#types-kinds'
type: string
metadata:
type: object
spec:
description: spec is the desired state of the cluster version - the operator
will work to ensure that the desired version is applied to the cluster.
type: object
required:
- clusterID
properties:
channel:
description: channel is an identifier for explicitly requesting that
a non-default set of updates be applied to this cluster. The default
channel will be contain stable updates that are appropriate for production
clusters.
type: string
clusterID:
description: clusterID uniquely identifies this cluster. This is expected
to be an RFC4122 UUID value (xxxxxxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx
in hexadecimal values). This is a required field.
type: string
desiredUpdate:
description: "desiredUpdate is an optional field that indicates the
desired value of the cluster version. Setting this value will trigger
an upgrade (if the current version does not match the desired version).
The set of recommended update values is listed as part of available
updates in status, and setting values outside that range may cause
the upgrade to fail. You may specify the version field without setting
image if an update exists with that version in the availableUpdates
or history. \n If an upgrade fails the operator will halt and report
status about the failing component. Setting the desired update value
back to the previous version will cause a rollback to be attempted.
Not all rollbacks will succeed."
type: object
properties:
force:
description: "force allows an administrator to update to an image
that has failed verification, does not appear in the availableUpdates
list, or otherwise would be blocked by normal protections on update.
This option should only be used when the authenticity of the provided
image has been verified out of band because the provided image
will run with full administrative access to the cluster. Do not
use this flag with images that comes from unknown or potentially
malicious sources. \n This flag does not override other forms
of consistency checking that are required before a new update
is deployed."
type: boolean
image:
description: image is a container image location that contains the
update. When this field is part of spec, image is optional if
version is specified and the availableUpdates field contains a
matching version.
type: string
version:
description: version is a semantic versioning identifying the update
version. When this field is part of spec, version is optional
if image is specified.
type: string
overrides:
description: overrides is list of overides for components that are managed
by cluster version operator. Marking a component unmanaged will prevent
the operator from creating or updating the object.
type: array
items:
description: ComponentOverride allows overriding cluster version operator's
behavior for a component.
type: object
required:
- group
- kind
- name
- namespace
- unmanaged
properties:
group:
description: group identifies the API group that the kind is in.
type: string
kind:
description: kind indentifies which object to override.
type: string
name:
description: name is the component's name.
type: string
namespace:
description: namespace is the component's namespace. If the resource
is cluster scoped, the namespace should be empty.
type: string
unmanaged:
description: 'unmanaged controls if cluster version operator should
stop managing the resources in this cluster. Default: false'
type: boolean
upstream:
description: upstream may be used to specify the preferred update server.
By default it will use the appropriate update server for the cluster
and region.
type: string
status:
description: status contains information about the available updates and
any in-progress updates.
type: object
required:
- availableUpdates
- desired
- observedGeneration
- versionHash
properties:
availableUpdates:
description: availableUpdates contains the list of updates that are
appropriate for this cluster. This list may be empty if no updates
are recommended, if the update service is unavailable, or if an invalid
channel has been specified.
type: array
items:
description: Release represents an OpenShift release image and associated
metadata.
type: object
properties:
channels:
description: channels is the set of Cincinnati channels to which
the release currently belongs.
type: array
items:
type: string
image:
description: image is a container image location that contains
the update. When this field is part of spec, image is optional
if version is specified and the availableUpdates field contains
a matching version.
type: string
url:
description: url contains information about this release. This
URL is set by the 'url' metadata property on a release or the
metadata returned by the update API and should be displayed
as a link in user interfaces. The URL field may not be set for
test or nightly releases.
type: string
version:
description: version is a semantic versioning identifying the
update version. When this field is part of spec, version is
optional if image is specified.
type: string
nullable: true
conditions:
description: conditions provides information about the cluster version.
The condition "Available" is set to true if the desiredUpdate has
been reached. The condition "Progressing" is set to true if an update
is being applied. The condition "Degraded" is set to true if an update
is currently blocked by a temporary or permanent error. Conditions
are only valid for the current desiredUpdate when metadata.generation
is equal to status.generation.
type: array
items:
description: ClusterOperatorStatusCondition represents the state of
the operator's managed and monitored components.
type: object
required:
- lastTransitionTime
- status
- type
properties:
lastTransitionTime:
description: lastTransitionTime is the time of the last update
to the current status property.
type: string
format: date-time
message:
description: message provides additional information about the
current condition. This is only to be consumed by humans.
type: string
reason:
description: reason is the CamelCase reason for the condition's
current status.
type: string
status:
description: status of the condition, one of True, False, Unknown.
type: string
type:
description: type specifies the aspect reported by this condition.
type: string
desired:
description: desired is the version that the cluster is reconciling
towards. If the cluster is not yet fully initialized desired will
be set with the information available, which may be an image or a
tag.
type: object
properties:
channels:
description: channels is the set of Cincinnati channels to which
the release currently belongs.
type: array
items:
type: string
image:
description: image is a container image location that contains the
update. When this field is part of spec, image is optional if
version is specified and the availableUpdates field contains a
matching version.
type: string
url:
description: url contains information about this release. This URL
is set by the 'url' metadata property on a release or the metadata
returned by the update API and should be displayed as a link in
user interfaces. The URL field may not be set for test or nightly
releases.
type: string
version:
description: version is a semantic versioning identifying the update
version. When this field is part of spec, version is optional
if image is specified.
type: string
history:
description: history contains a list of the most recent versions applied
to the cluster. This value may be empty during cluster startup, and
then will be updated when a new update is being applied. The newest
update is first in the list and it is ordered by recency. Updates
in the history have state Completed if the rollout completed - if
an update was failing or halfway applied the state will be Partial.
Only a limited amount of update history is preserved.
type: array
items:
description: UpdateHistory is a single attempted update to the cluster.
type: object
required:
- completionTime
- image
- startedTime
- state
- verified
properties:
completionTime:
description: completionTime, if set, is when the update was fully
applied. The update that is currently being applied will have
a null completion time. Completion time will always be set for
entries that are not the current update (usually to the started
time of the next update).
type: string
format: date-time
nullable: true
image:
description: image is a container image location that contains
the update. This value is always populated.
type: string
startedTime:
description: startedTime is the time at which the update was started.
type: string
format: date-time
state:
description: state reflects whether the update was fully applied.
The Partial state indicates the update is not fully applied,
while the Completed state indicates the update was successfully
rolled out at least once (all parts of the update successfully
applied).
type: string
verified:
description: verified indicates whether the provided update was
properly verified before it was installed. If this is false
the cluster may not be trusted.
type: boolean
version:
description: version is a semantic versioning identifying the
update version. If the requested image does not define a version,
or if a failure occurs retrieving the image, this value may
be empty.
type: string
observedGeneration:
description: observedGeneration reports which version of the spec is
being synced. If this value is not equal to metadata.generation, then
the desired and conditions fields may represent a previous version.
type: integer
format: int64
versionHash:
description: versionHash is a fingerprint of the content that the cluster
will be updated with. It is used by the operator to avoid unnecessary
work and is for internal use only.
type: string
versions:
- name: v1
served: true
storage: true
|
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FOOTBALL: Manager Claudio Ranieri has put the heat on Leicester City ahead of its Champions League clash with FC Copenhagen early tomorrow morning (AEST).
The defending English Premier League champions have struggled in the early part of this season after their dream run to the domestic title as 5000-1 outsiders last season.
They sit 13th after losing four of their eight EPL matches and drawing another two.
They have fared better in the Champions League, however, where they top Group G with two wins in two games.
Ranieri said: "At this moment this (the Champions League) is the priority.”
Ranieri denied his team, coming off a 3-0 loss to Chelsea, lacked fight, and it was more a case of the fact "everybody knows us” now.
"They are human, not machines,” Ranieri said. "We will have to give the best performance of the season, it is very important for us to get three points. We have to be strong, playing with passion, with heart, with the support of our fans. It will be a hard match until the end.” |
“How I long for sweet old songsThat
were sung in each abode,Or the pipers tune by the ligh of the moonAs they marched down the old bye road,Or to
pitch and toss at old CloggyWhen the sun is sinking low,Ah! Life was gay in those olden daysAround lovely sweet
Drumcrow”Bernard Donohue
Here Come the Drumcrows - Clear the Way
You never know what’s going to come around the corner,
especially, if you are just three years old as I was on that sunny day in May, 1937 as I sat on the edge of the pavement outside
Barney Reilly’s shop in Gowna. I was completely absorbed in examining discarded coloured sweet wrappings trapped on
the grating at the edge of the pavement. The picture of the small dog on an empty Kerry Blue cigarette packet particularly
fascinated me. My mind was so engrossed that I was unaware of people walking past and disappearing round Ned Brady’s
corner,- opposite the signposts for Arva, and Ballinagh, and congregating along the street where Ellen Cleary’s sweet
shop and Whites’ provision and drapery shops were situated. Suddenly, I was startled by three loud bangs from that direction.
Alarmed,
I looked around; was it thunder? The street was deserted; I was a diminutive solitary figure in an empty street; the silence
was eerie. I stood up ready to bolt for home when suddenly a big drum beat and loud music filled the air, the volume increasing;
at that precise moment around Ned Brady’s corner marched a Pipers Band followed by the whole village. I bolted for home
across the street, in the door and up the stairs to hide somewhere; my mother was at the bedroom window peeping through the
lace curtains; I asked, “Who are they; why are they all dressed up like that?” “They’re the Drumcrows;”
she replied and added, “They’re the Drumcrow Warpipers Band.”
We watched them march past; a whole
parish of them, walking tall, proud and erect, like a phalanx of ancient Celts, clad in immaculate green tunics, tartan kilts
and swinging blue shawls shoulder fastened by colourful Tara broaches, their silver buckled marching feet synchronised to
the beat of Sean O’ Neill’s March banged out by their big drummer; our whole world was filled with the fighting
swagger of marching war pipe music as the Drumcrow Warpipers Band paraded past.
Drumcrow TownlandDrumcrow is just a small townland in the
parish of Kilmore on the outer perimeter area of Cornafean and convenient to the town of Ballinagh, also in the parish of
Kilmore. Several parishes border each other here -the “bottom” of the town is in the parish of Ballintemple and
out the Cavan road a short distance is Crosserlough parish.Archives:a) The Collar of Gold, found by Tom Sheridan,
Drumcrow, Corlismore, Cavan.
The following note dated 21st October, 1935, written by National
School pupil, Jimmy Scott, Clinloskin, Cornafean, is filed in the Folklore Commission Library.“There was a collar
of gold found in Newtown bog about the year 1870. It was found by Tom Sheridan of Dromcrow who gave it to James Christy as
it was in his bog he found it. It is now in the Museum in Dublin. I saw it last year. It is narrow piece of gold and a clip
to fasten it at the back. Newtown bog is a half a mile from Crossdoney and two miles from Ballinagh. There are about two acres
in it.”
b) Feis Breffni Winners – Sunday, 4th June, 1939.Anglo
Celt reported as follows-“The Drumcrow Warpipers Band was awarded 86% and recommended for first prize. Mr. McGinley
said he noticed a marked improvement in the playing, with nice balance between pipers and drummers; good tuning and beautiful
round note, much fuller and more pleasing than last year; Great life and freedom in the rhythm of the dance tunes and chanter
work splendid. He added that the Band deserved congratulations on their performance (Applause). In solo playing William Cassidy,
Drumcrow was placed first with 85marks and H. Maguire, Corlismore second with 84marks.”
d) Old Roads: Cavan Folklore commission Library- The following
comment was written on 27th June, 1938 by National School pupil, Eliza Collins-
“Drumcrow road is known as the
old road. It is leading to Drumcarbin House; it also leads to Drumcarbin N. S. It is said to be over eighty years old. The
roads are still used.”Former member of the band, Sean Masterson, Annagh, Cornafean, still hale and hearty, recently
told me that the roads are still there- narrow and tarred; the school was sold, it’s a dwelling house now and the old
road went to Drumcarbin and the crossroads at the end where the Band practiced was in the parish of Ballintemple.
Sean
continuing in anecdotal language, outlined the history of the Band- “That must have been the Band’s original colours
you saw in 1937; at that time the uniform comprised a green tunic, deep brown/saffron kilt and blue shawl pinned on by Tara
broaches, green boat shaped cap with blue streamers. Subsequently, we had black tunics trimmed with white, blue shawls and
Glengarryton caps.
The shoe buckles in latter years, were made and chromed by a Johnny Sweetman from Sligo, in the
Motor factory in Birmingham -Johnny was a member of the Birmingham Irish Band. The cap badge was a circular plate with a harp-
an Irish penny chromed on it. The Band was originally founded in the 1920’s; it was revised in the 1930’s by the
schoolmaster; his name was Connaghton.
The band was called Drumcrow maybe because five McGuire brothers from Drumcrow
were leading men in it; their names were – Eddie, Tom, Jimmy, Harry and Bill; Bill died in his late teens. We had a
hard task master, but a brilliant music teacher in Ballinagh man, Charlie Fitzpatrick, an army man as you can guess, and not
very polite at times. He took it over in the 1930’s. When parading, he was the Sergeant Major; he’d walk in front,
dressed to kill, good suit and studded walking stick. He set the music; he also set the music for The Birmingham Irish Band;
the McGuires started it when they went over. When we were practicing, if some fellow was playing the practice chanter wrong
he’d say “you are blowing f**king bubbles.” My first day playing was in Cavan, at the Diocesan Boy Scouts
rally parading the Scouts to the Cathedral; Harry McGuire had gone to England; Charlie Fitzpatrick missed him in Ballinagh
and said, “what about this Masterson guy—form a circle and lets play a selection- give him a chance. When we were
finished, with a good crowd standing around, he said, “Good! You had very good playing but stand up to attention with
your heals together; you had a spraddle on you like an auld woman.” I never or won’t ever forget it.”
In
regard to our repertoire of tunes, we always led off with Sean O’Neill’s march, followed by Irish Man’s
Toast; other favourites were Men of the West, Paddy O’Flaherty, Mc Clouds Reel, the Three Little Drummers, the Highlanders
March, The 79’s Farewell, and The Baron Rocks of Aden.
Fund Raising: In regard to funds, there was always
a Concert in Ballinagh Hall on the first Sunday night in lent. Ballintemple troupe always did a new play on the occasion.
We went round on bikes selling tickets at one shilling and two shillings and many houses wouldn’t have it till later.
The Band kept people together. There was great comradeship, great local support. But as time went on and the economy began
to slide, fellows emigrated and it became difficult to keep going; there was lack of recruits and of course we were getting
older.—Our last day out was at opening of the Cornafean G.A.A. Park.”
The O’Rahilly Warpipers Killann BandI was passing
Tom Gray’s Shop on Shercock’s main street in the summer of 1947 when I spotted the blue and red hand written poster
prominently displayed in the window. It informed the public that the O’ Rahilly Warpipers Killann Band, founded in 1917
was reforming and would march into Shercock on the following Sunday at 3pm. The band would play in the town, after which collections
would be made for funds to outfit the band; all contributions would be very much appreciated. Highlights of the Band’s
past achievements were noted. I questioned my father about the band; “Daddy! I didn’t know that at one time
there was a pipers’ band in Killann; when was that?” He was pensive for a while before he replied. “The
band was there for a good while up to ten years ago, I’d say - up to 1938; they were very good; John Keenan was the
mainstay- he plays now and again on the radio, and Hugh O’ Reilly was the Big Drummer, he was a champion drummer- you
know Hugh; he brings the Creamery cans on the big shifter to Bailieboro Creamery every day; you’d see him leading the
horse and shifter full of creamery cans turning down the Bailieboro road at Hoeys’ corner.“You mean the man
who comes up the Maudabawn road and walks alongside the big cart through Shercock and around Hoeys’ corner every day-
the man with the cap and wellingtons with the tops turned down?”“Yes” he replied, “the very man”.“And
he was a champion drummer?” I asked in astonishment.“Yes he was and no doubt still is—with a bit of
practice,” he added.On the following Sunday, I sat on the window sill of Hoeys’ shop waiting for the band
to arrive. Young lads were congregating there. I was expecting a marvellous spectacle; still vivid in my mind were pictures
of the Drumcrow pipers clad in colourful uniforms turning Ned Brady’s corner and marching down Gowna main street nine
years previously.
Someone shouted, “Here they come.” I heard three bangs on the big drum followed by the
swinging lilting swirl of the warpipes. I jumped off the window sill and pushed forward for a better view. Up the main street
they came, followers left and right of them. I peered hard trying to distinguish members of the band from their followers.
As they passed I became aware of the cause of my problem—only one member, big John Keenan was fully dressed in kilts,
tunic and shawl; the rest wore their ordinary clothes, some shabby looking. Champion drummer, Hugh O’ Reilly, flanked
by two pikemen marched proudly in the centre banging out the beat on his big drum. They marched tall, with Banners flowing
free, playing their old proud music with great rhythm and verve; they had pride in the sanctuaries of their hearts and souls,
and were completely oblivious to their mob appearance as were their supporters and onlookers. Years later, recalling the
scene, I decided that pride , spirit and proud music was all they had; Cavan were doing well on the Football field; it helped
to keep everyone going in hard times. Christ! At that time, we, the people of rural Ireland, had hit rock bottom.
Killann
Townland: Killann is a large parish in the dioceses of Kilmore and incorporates the towns of Bailieboro and Shercock; the
townland of Killann is situated midway between both towns and always had a vibrant and independently minded community with
its own band and dramatic society and A.O.H community hall, (accidentally burned down in recent years) which was a great landmark
for travellers.
Archives:a). Former Band member Michael O’Reilly,
Annahern, Shercock, kettle drummer in the reformed band, recently recalled some of the Band’s historical highlights.
Michael’s brother, Hugh, was the big Drummer and won several prizes in drumming competitions. Michael has in his possession
a framed photograph of the Band taken in 1930 in Breffni Park when the Band led the parade of teams prior to the match between
Cavan and Sligo. “The photograph was picked up in New York and given to me seven years ago” said Michael before
continuing--
“The O’ Rahilly Warpipers Killann Band was founded in 1917 and dedicated to the O’ Rahilly.
The uniform comprised saffron kilt, green tunic and green sash. On parade they carried two shields portraying, St. Patrick
and St. Bridget. The main flag had a depiction of Myles O’Reilly (Myles the Slasher) defending the bridge of Finea on
one side and Penal Days emblazoned on the other side. Also, pikes were carried by two young men, one each side of the big
drummer. The Sergeant Major was Peter Reilly who walked in front and carried the staff with the big flag. Renowned piper,
Big Michael Keenan, trained the band. Members were scattered over a wide area.
I often heard the older members of the
Band tell of the old R.I.C visiting houses where they suspected the instruments were stored. The Band always paraded with
the original banners.The Band carried the original name until 1943 when we bought a new banner depicting Oliver Plunkett
and changed the name of the Band. We continued until 1948 or 1949 but due to emigration and lack of funds, the Band ceased
to function, despite repeated attempts to get it off the ground. We worked hard at fund raising- collections, torch light
processions and ceilis.b). A 1946 advertisement in The Anglo Celt reads as follows---
c) Memorable Engagements:1. June 1918, the band played in Ballyduff,
near Virginia, at the famous General Election speech by Fr. Flanagan (Roscommon priest) for Sinn Fein Candidate, Sean Young,
East Cavan; the speech was suppressed as he was critical of everything British.2. 29th May, 1920 at the funeral of Michael
Shorten who was shot by the Black and Tans and to whom a monument is erected at Crossdoney.3. July, 1929 in Phoenix Park
at the Centenary Celebrations of Catholic Emancipation.4 .1949-Eoghan Roe O’ Neill Memorial Celebrations in Cavan’s
old Franciscan Abbey; a hugh crowd attended, the biggest seen in Cavan up to then. 5. Torchlight Procession, 1945. The
following report is from The Anglo Celt, November10, 1945.-
“ On Wednesday night of last week the torchlight
procession organised by Killann Oliver Plunket Pipers Band, in memory of the Manchester Martyrs and all who died for Ireland,
took place from Cornalara Cross, the Band striking up “The Dawning of the Day,” as the large procession, composed
of various shades of political thought , started off to the church. As befitted the occasion, the National Flag replaced the
Standard usually carried by the band, and the Guard of Honour was two pikemen, changed at intervals along the route. A large
crowd awaited the arrival of the procession at the church, where prayers were said for the repose of the souls for those who
had made the supreme sacrifice and for the deceased friends and relatives of all present. The band then gave selections, after
which “Faith of our Fathers” and the National Anthem were played on the pipes by Michael O’ Cianain. A word
of praise is due to Mr. John Dermott, Chief Marshal of the parade and an untiring worker of the band. The procession was most
successful and very picturesque.
The Band—at a meeting of the band the next night the people of the district
were complemented on turning out for the procession in such large numbers. Thanks were noted to Mr. P.Smith, T.D., and Senator
D. McCabe for their generous subscriptions of £1 each. House to house collectors had their task made easy by the enthusiasm
of subscribers. The Shercock collection is still proceeding and is as good as anywhere else, there being only two refusals.
Messrs. D. McCullough, Dublin was thanked for his promptness, which made the procession possible. Band practices two nights
weekly- Sec.”
“Great to recall the past” said Michael O’ Reilly.But recollections must
have a present and future perspective; hopefully, Michael’s and Sean Masterson’s recollections will encourage
the youth of Drumcrow and Killann to Fall in and Strike up the Band. |
Quantification of receptor-ligand binding with [¹⁸F]fluciclatide in metastatic breast cancer patients.
The purpose of the study was to estimate the receptor-ligand binding of an arginine-glycine-aspartic acid (RGD) peptide in somatic tumours. To this aim, we employed dynamic positron emission tomography (PET) data obtained from breast cancer patients with metastases, studied with the α(v)β(3/5) integrin receptor radioligand [(18)F]fluciclatide. First, compartmental modelling and spectral analysis with arterial input function were performed at the region of interest (ROI) level in healthy lung and liver, and in lung and liver metastases; compartmental modelling was also carried out at the pixel level. The selection of the most appropriate indexes for tumour/healthy tissue differentiation and for estimation of specific binding was then assessed. The two-tissue reversible model emerged as the best according to the Akaike Information Criterion. Spectral analysis confirmed the reversibility of tracer kinetics. Values of kinetic parameters, estimated as mean from parametric maps, correlated well with those computed from ROI analysis. The volume of distribution V(T) was on average higher in lung metastases than in the healthy lung, but lower in liver metastases than in the healthy liver. In agreement with the expected higher α(v)β(3/5) expression in pathology, k(3) and k(3)/k(4) were both remarkably higher in metastases, which makes them more suitable than V(T) for tumour/healthy tissue differentiation. The ratio k(3)/k(4), in particular, appeared a reasonable measure of specific binding. Besides establishing the best quantitative approaches for the analysis of [(18)F]fluciclatide data, this study indicated that the k(3)/k(4) ratio is a reasonable measure of specific binding, suggesting that this index can be used to estimate α(v)β(3/5) receptor expression in oncology, although further studies are necessary to validate this hypothesis. |
5 F.3d 542NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Paul KLOEPPEL, Defendant-Appellant.UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Alan Andre LA POLICE, Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 92-10427, 92-10416.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted July 16, 1993.Decided Aug. 18, 1993.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona; No. CR-91-00136-EHC, Earl H. Carroll, District Judge, Presiding.
D.Ariz.
AFFIRMED.
Before: WALLACE, Chief Judge, and D.W. NELSON and O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM
1
Kloeppel and LaPolice appeal from their convictions of conspiracy and wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. Secs. 371, 1342, 1343. The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3231. We have jurisdiction over this timely appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. We affirm.
2
Kloeppel and LaPolice each argue that the court abused its discretion by denying their motions for mistrial because of extrajudicial contact between a government witness and members of the jury. We review this question for abuse of discretion. United States v. Crisco, 725 F.2d 1228, 1233 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 977 (1984).
3
Kloeppel and LaPolice rely on Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954), for their argument that the government has failed to rebut a presumption of prejudice arising from the extrajudicial contact. However, Remmer stands only for the unremarkable premise that contact or communication with a juror "about the matter pending before the jury is ... deemed presumptively prejudicial." Id. But if, as in this case, the contact or communication does not relate to a "matter pending before the jury," Kloeppel and LaPolice must bear the burden of proving actual prejudice. United States v. Madrid, 842 F.2d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 912 (1988). The district court's finding of no actual prejudice is entitled to a presumption of correctness. Id. As that presumption has not been rebutted, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for a mistrial.
4
LaPolice further contends that the extrajudicial contact was prosecutorial misconduct that required a mistrial. This presents a mixed question of fact and law that we review de novo. United States v. Spillone, 879 F.2d 514, 520 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 864, and cert. denied, 498 U.S. 878 (1990). Assuming arguendo that witness misconduct can be attributed to the prosecution, an assertion for which we find no support, reversal is required only if it is more probable than not that the misconduct materially affected the fairness of the trial. United States v. Polizzi, 801 F.2d 1543, 1558 (9th Cir.1986). Because we have already determined that no actual prejudice occurred, this argument must fail.
5
Kloeppel argues that the district court should have declared a mistrial in his case to avoid any spill over effect from the impeachment of LaPolice's witness. We review this question for abuse of discretion. United States v. Joetzki, 952 F.2d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir.1991). Kloeppel bears the burden of demonstrating that he was denied a fair trial; he must show that "clear, manifest, or undue prejudice resulted from [the] joint trial" and that the limiting instructions given by the district court were insufficient. Id. This burden has not been met; therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion.
6
LaPolice argues that he was denied a fair trial because the government was allowed to present tape recordings containing evidence of "other crimes" in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). We review de novo the question of whether the tape recordings were "other crimes" evidence for purposes of Rule 404(b). United States v. Soliman, 813 F.2d 277, 278 (9th Cir.1987). We conclude that tape recordings contained evidence that was "inextricably intertwined" with evidence of the charged crimes; therefore, it should not be treated as "other crimes" evidence and does not offend Rule 404(b). Id. at 279. No reason for reversal has been demonstrated.
7
Next, LaPolice argues that his right of confrontation was violated when the district court admitted two appraisal reports without producing the expert who prepared them. We review this evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion. United States v. Lee, 846 F.2d 531, 536 (9th Cir.1988). We conclude that LaPolice opened the door for the admission of these records by creating a false impression about the value of the property appraised in the reports. Once the door was opened, the government was entitled to introduce the reports to correct the false impression. United States v. Segal, 833 F.2d 144, 148 (9th Cir.1987). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the reports into evidence.
8
Finally, LaPolice argues that the cumulative effect of the alleged errors deprived him of a fair trial. Because we have found no error, this argument is not addressed.
9
AFFIRMED.
|
Q:
Why is my SQL foreign keys not working?
I'm supposed to find out the foreign key for these SQL codes but there's error:
Msg 1767, Level 16, State 0, Line 18 Foreign key
'FK__payments__custom__44FF419A' references invalid table 'Customer'.
Msg 1750, Level 16, State 0, Line 18 Could not create constraint. See
previous errors.
This is my code:
Drop table Payments
CREATE TABLE payments (
customerNumber Int NOT NULL,
checkNumber Varchar(50) NOT NULL,
paymentDate Datetime NOT NULL,
amount Float NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (customerNumber, checkNumber));
Drop table Customers
CREATE TABLE Customers (
customerNumber Int NOT NULL,
customerName Varchar(50) NOT NULL,
contactLastName Varchar(50) NOT NULL,
contactFirstName Varchar(50) NOT NULL,
phone Varchar (50) NOT NULL,
addressLine1 Varchar (50) NOT NULL,
addressLine2 Varchar (50) NOT NULL,
city Varchar (50) NOT NULL,
state Varchar (50) NULL,
postalCode Varchar (15) NOT NULL,
country Varchar(50) NOT NULL,
salesRepEmployeeNumber Int NOT NULL,
creditLimit Float NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (customerNumber));
ALTER TABLE Payments ADD FOREIGN KEY(customerNumber) REFERENCES Customer(customerNumber);
Drop table Offices
CREATE TABLE Offices (
officeCode Varchar(10) NOT NULL,
city Varchar(50) NOT NULL,
phone Varchar(50) NOT NULL,
addressLine1 Varchar(50) NOT NULL,
addressLine2 Varchar(50) NOT NULL,
state Varchar(50) NULL,
country Varchar(50) NOT NULL,
postalCode Varchar(15) NOT NULL,
territory Varchar(10) NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (officeCode));
Drop table OrderDetails
CREATE TABLE OrderDetails (
orderNumber Int NOT NULL,
productCode Varchar(15) NOT NULL,
quantityOrdered Int NOT NULL,
priceEach Float NOT NULL,
orderLineNumber SMALLINT NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (orderNumber, productCode));
Drop table ProductLines
CREATE TABLE ProductLines (
productLine Varchar (50) NOT NULL,
textDescription TEXT NOT NULL,
htmlDescription TEXT NOT NULL,
image Float NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (productLine));
Drop table Orders
CREATE TABLE Orders (
orderNumber Int NOT NULL,
orderDate DateTime NOT NULL,
requiredDate DateTime NOT NULL,
shippedDate DateTime NOT NULL,
status Varchar(15) Not null,
comments TEXT NOT NULL,
customerNumber INT NOT NULL,
Primary key(orderNumber));
ALTER TABLE OrdersDetails ADD FOREIGN KEY(orderNumber) REFERENCES Orders(orderNumber);
Drop table Employees
CREATE TABLE Employees (
employeeNumber Int Not null,
lastName Varchar(50) Not null,
firstName Varchar(50) Not null,
extension Varchar(10) NOt null,
email Varchar(100) Not null,
officeCode Varchar(10) Not Null,
reportsTo Int Not null,
jobTitle Varchar(50) Not null,
Primary key(employeeNumber));
Drop table Products
CREATE TABLE Products (
productCode Varchar(15) Not Null,
productName Varchar(70) Not Null,
productLine Varchar(50) Not null,
productScale Varchar(10) Not null,
productVendor Varchar(50) Not null,
productDescription TEXT Not null,
quantityinStock Int Not null,
BuyPrice Float Not null,
MSRP Float Not null,
Primary key (productCode))
ALTER TABLE OrderDetails ADD FOREIGN KEY(productCode) REFERENCES Product(productCode);
A:
There indeed is no such table Customer. Your table is called Customers, in plural:
ALTER TABLE Payments
ADD FOREIGN KEY (customerNumber)
REFERENCES Customers (customerNumber);
-- Here! ----------^
A:
Multiple typos with s in table names Customer vs Customers and OrdersDetails vs OrderDetails:
CREATE TABLE payments (
customerNumber Int NOT NULL,
checkNumber Varchar(50) NOT NULL,
paymentDate Datetime NOT NULL,
amount Float NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (customerNumber, checkNumber));
CREATE TABLE Customers (
customerNumber Int NOT NULL,
customerName Varchar(50) NOT NULL,
contactLastName Varchar(50) NOT NULL,
contactFirstName Varchar(50) NOT NULL,
phone Varchar (50) NOT NULL,
addressLine1 Varchar (50) NOT NULL,
addressLine2 Varchar (50) NOT NULL,
city Varchar (50) NOT NULL,
state Varchar (50) NULL,
postalCode Varchar (15) NOT NULL,
country Varchar(50) NOT NULL,
salesRepEmployeeNumber Int NOT NULL,
creditLimit Float NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (customerNumber));
ALTER TABLE Payments ADD FOREIGN KEY(customerNumber) REFERENCES Customers(customerNumber); -- here
CREATE TABLE Offices (
officeCode Varchar(10) NOT NULL,
city Varchar(50) NOT NULL,
phone Varchar(50) NOT NULL,
addressLine1 Varchar(50) NOT NULL,
addressLine2 Varchar(50) NOT NULL,
state Varchar(50) NULL,
country Varchar(50) NOT NULL,
postalCode Varchar(15) NOT NULL,
territory Varchar(10) NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (officeCode));
CREATE TABLE OrderDetails (
orderNumber Int NOT NULL,
productCode Varchar(15) NOT NULL,
quantityOrdered Int NOT NULL,
priceEach Float NOT NULL,
orderLineNumber SMALLINT NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (orderNumber, productCode));
CREATE TABLE ProductLines (
productLine Varchar (50) NOT NULL,
textDescription TEXT NOT NULL,
htmlDescription TEXT NOT NULL,
image Float NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (productLine));
CREATE TABLE Orders (
orderNumber Int NOT NULL,
orderDate DateTime NOT NULL,
requiredDate DateTime NOT NULL,
shippedDate DateTime NOT NULL,
status Varchar(15) Not null,
comments TEXT NOT NULL,
customerNumber INT NOT NULL,
Primary key(orderNumber));
ALTER TABLE OrderDetails ADD FOREIGN KEY(orderNumber) REFERENCES Orders(orderNumber); -- here
CREATE TABLE Employees (
employeeNumber Int Not null,
lastName Varchar(50) Not null,
firstName Varchar(50) Not null,
extension Varchar(10) NOt null,
email Varchar(100) Not null,
officeCode Varchar(10) Not Null,
reportsTo Int Not null,
jobTitle Varchar(50) Not null,
Primary key(employeeNumber));
CREATE TABLE Products (
productCode Varchar(15) Not Null,
productName Varchar(70) Not Null,
productLine Varchar(50) Not null,
productScale Varchar(10) Not null,
productVendor Varchar(50) Not null,
productDescription TEXT Not null,
quantityinStock Int Not null,
BuyPrice Float Not null,
MSRP Float Not null,
Primary key (productCode))
ALTER TABLE OrderDetails ADD FOREIGN KEY(productCode) REFERENCES Products(productCode);
SqlFiddleDemo
I strongly recommend to use exact datatype DECIMAL for prices instead of approximate datatype FLOAT.
And change TEXT which is deprecated to NVARCHAR(MAX).
|
Mega @ Woodlands
Located at Woodlands Close, Mega @ Woodlands is an eight-storey multiple-user clean, light and general industrial factory development with a total of 512 factory units, commercial spaces (clinic and minimart), two canteens, 120 heavy vehicle parking lots and other ancillary facilities.
Mega @ Woodlands is Wee Hur’s third industrial development. As such, they have gathered experiences and feedback from end users for their past two developments. Their feedback played an important role in the formation of the design brief.
The floor-to-floor height is high, at 5.95 metres for levels one to seven. A wide ramp is provided for access to the ramp-up units. There is a 40-footer access at the first level. The loading and unloading bay can also cater for a 40-footer at the first storey. Wide driveways were incorporated and the number of car parks and lorry parks were maximised where possible. Twenty-footer access is also provided for levels one to six.
In order to cater to different needs of end users, different unit layouts were designed.
Portrait orientated units have more depth. For most units, an additional back door to the driveway was included to provide more flexibility. On the other hand, landscape orientated units have wider frontage. In some units, two roller shutters were incorporated to facilitate the movement of goods.
SUSTAINABILITY AND WELL-BEINGEnvironmental sustainability and end users’ well-being were taken into consideration in the design. This development has achieved Green Mark Gold Certification. Energy- and water-efficient features—such as carbon monoxide sensors for car park ventilation and sanitary fittings with a good water-efficient rating—were adopted. Good thermal performance of the building envelope has also been achieved.
There are three sky gardens in the development. The biggest sky garden is at the eighth level, which has a jogging trail, outdoor fitness stations, barbeque pits, water feature, greenery and Sky Lounge. The lounge is equipped with a gym, meetings rooms and conference room for the facilitation of meetings. A clinic and a minimart also provide convenience to the end users. |
// RUN: not clang-query -c foo -c bar %s -- | FileCheck %s
// RUN: not clang-query -f %S/Inputs/foo.script %s -- | FileCheck %s
// RUN: not clang-query -f %S/Inputs/nonexistent.script %s -- 2>&1 | FileCheck --check-prefix=CHECK-NONEXISTENT %s
// RUN: not clang-query -c foo -f foo %s -- 2>&1 | FileCheck --check-prefix=CHECK-BOTH %s
// CHECK: unknown command: foo
// CHECK-NOT: unknown command: bar
// CHECK-NONEXISTENT: cannot open {{.*}}nonexistent.script
// CHECK-BOTH: cannot specify both -c and -f
|
Save
Save money and time by completing an order from the service with the best deal from the restaurant you selected! |
Q:
URL Page Name Without Php ID
I have any Url with php extension eg:
http://localhost/test/admin/users.php
http://localhost/test/admin/list.php
http://localhost/test/admin/dates.php
Now For print menu ( navigation ) I Have This :
$pagename = basename($_SERVER['PHP_SELF'], '.php') . '';
if ($pagename = "users") {echo "true";} else {}
My Methods Not Work! How To Get PHP page name ?
Thanks
A:
You have to use == (or ===), not = in your if statement.
You are currently assigning the string "users" to the variable $pagename, so that always evaluates to true.
|
Chelsea F.C.–Leeds United F.C. rivalry
The rivalry between Chelsea and Leeds United is a football rivalry between London-based club Chelsea and Yorkshire-based Leeds United. The rivalry first emerged in the 1960s after a series of fiercely contested and controversial matches, when the two clubs were frequently involved in the pursuit of domestic and European honours culminating in the 1970 FA Cup Final, which is regarded as one of the most physical matches in English football history.
The perceived contrast between the clubs also fuelled the rivalry, summed up as "Yorkshire grit versus flash Cockney." The rivalry between the clubs often spilled out onto the terraces: at the height of British football hooliganism in the 1970s and 1980s, Chelsea's Headhunters and Leeds' Service Crew were among the most notorious football firms and had numerous violent encounters with each other. Hooliganism has been effectively curtailed since the 1990s and the rivalry has since declined.
In the Official Chelsea Biography, Leeds were cited as one of Chelsea's major rivalries. However, Leeds' relegation from the Premier League in 2004 has effectively ended the rivalry; the clubs have only met once in the fourteen years since. In the 2003 Football Fans Census, while Leeds fans named Chelsea as their second-biggest rivals, behind Manchester United, Chelsea fans consider Arsenal to be their main rivals, followed by Tottenham Hotspur and Manchester United.
History
Early years
Chelsea were founded in 1905, Leeds United in 1919. Both teams flitted between the First and Second Divisions in their early years, and neither won a major trophy prior to World War II. The clubs first met in a competitive match in the Second Division on 10 December 1927; Leeds won 5–0. Leeds also won 3–2 in the return fixture at Stamford Bridge that season to clinch promotion back to Division One. In 1952, they contested a gruelling fifth round FA Cup tie which took three matches to produce a winner, Chelsea eventually prevailed 5–1 in a second replay at Villa Park. An aggregate crowd of almost 150,000 watched the three matches and such was the fearsome tackling on display, Chelsea had to make seven changes to their line-up for a subsequent match.
1960s
It was in the 1960s that a significant rivalry first emerged between the clubs. Under the management of Don Revie, Leeds became a force in English football for the first time, capped by winning the league title in 1969. Chelsea, too, had enjoyed a renaissance under Tommy Docherty and also challenged for honours in the 1960s. Over the next decade, they would meet in numerous important, and fiercely contested, matches. Chelsea goalkeeper Peter Bonetti opined that the rivalry between the teams emerged because "Leeds had a name, a reputation as being dirty... [and] We matched them in the physical side of things because we had our own players who were physical... We weren't unalike in the way we played." Tommy Baldwin said, "There were a lot of scores being settled from previous games whenever we played them. It always just seemed to go mad, with everyone kicking each other." Norman Hunter said that he and Chelsea striker Peter Osgood shared a "tremendous rivalry." It was often rumoured that Osgood was top of the list in Jack Charlton's infamous "black book" of players he intended to exact revenge on, although Charlton himself stated that it was actually another, unnamed, Chelsea player. Johnny Giles recalled the "special sort of animosity" between the teams and his "previous" with Eddie McCreadie.
The rivalry was also fuelled by the traditional North-South divide in England, and by the clubs having markedly different images and philosophies. Chelsea were associated with the fashionable King's Road and celebrities like Raquel Welch and Steve McQueen. Leeds were perceived as a cynical, albeit talented, side with a style which some observers regarded as "dirty." Damien Blake of When Saturday Comes wrote that "Chelsea were The Beatles (attractive, clean-cut, fashionable) to Leeds' Stones (surly, violent, sexy, going out with Marianne Faithfull)" According to John King, "Leeds were... portrayed as dour Yorkshiremen with a reputation for playing dirty... Chelsea, on the other hand, were the wide boys of London, dedicated followers of fashion. While Leeds were drinking tea and playing cards, Chelsea were out boozing and chasing girls [but] when it came to games between the two, however, war was declared."
In 1964–65, Chelsea and Leeds had a three way tussle for the league title with Manchester United and met in a league match at Stamford Bridge in September 1964. The Yorkshire Evening Post's reporter observed that "'Never mind the ball' seemed to be the order of the day as scything, irresponsible tackles ruffled tempers." Bobby Collins "viciously" retaliated against Ron Harris and a McCreadie tackle on Giles saw Giles leave the field on a stretcher, reducing Leeds to ten men for the remainder of the match. In 1966, the teams met in an FA Cup fourth round tie, where a crowd of 57,000 saw Chelsea win 1–0 with a goal from Bobby Tambling, a game in which "the young Chelsea team withstood an almost continuous battering from Leeds."
The rivalry intensified when they met in the FA Cup again a year later, this time a semi-final at Villa Park, which Chelsea won 1–0. In a game with "frighteningly ruthless" tackling, Leeds goalkeeper Gary Sprake kicked Chelsea midfielder John Boyle in the face as they challenged for a high ball, a grudge which still remained when the teams met in the FA Cup final three years later. Further controversy came when Leeds had two late goals disallowed; a Terry Cooper strike was ruled out for offside, and a long range Peter Lorimer goal was disallowed because a free kick had been taken too quickly. Opinions on the offside decision were mixed, although Docherty conceded he would not have complained had the second goal been allowed to stand. Six months later, Leeds gained revenge by beating managerless Chelsea (Docherty had resigned the previous day) 7–0 at Elland Road, their biggest ever win in the fixture.
1970s
The clubs would meet six times during the 1969–70 season. Leeds won both league games, 2–0 at Elland Road and 5–2 at Stamford Bridge. The match at Elland Road on 20 September 1969 continued in the same vein as previous encounters. A Yorkshire Post journalist lamented the many "late and early tackles" and condemned the teams for playing "venomously". During the match Allan Clarke, Jack Charlton, David Webb, Peter Houseman, Ron Harris and Alan Birchenall all suffered injuries which ruled them out of subsequent matches. Chelsea gained a measure of revenge by knocking Leeds out of the League Cup after a replay. The teams also met in the 1970 FA Cup Final, the game which cemented the rivalry.
Chelsea and Leeds contested the FA Cup final at Wembley on 11 April 1970. Leeds were generally regarded as the better team on the day and led twice but a late Chelsea equaliser from Ian Hutchinson took the game to a replay, the first in an FA Cup final since 1912. The replay at Old Trafford attracted a UK television audience of 28 million, making it the sixth most-watched television broadcast in British history. It is regarded as one of the dirtiest football matches ever. Harris was detailed to mark Wembley Man of the Match Eddie Gray; a series of Harris fouls during the first half effectively immobilised the Scot. Elsewhere, Charlton kneed and headbutted Osgood, Hunter and Hutchinson traded punches, and Eddie McCreadie flattened Billy Bremner with a "kung fu" challenge. Bonetti was injured after being bundled into the net by Jones and limped through the rest of the match with a heavily bandaged knee.
Modern day referee David Elleray reviewed the match years later and concluded that he would have issued six red cards and twenty yellow cards. However, referee Eric Jennings only booked one player – Hutchinson – over the two games. Hugh McIlvanney wrote that "at times it appeared that Mr Jennings would give a free kick only on production of a death certificate". Mick Jones put Leeds ahead again, but Osgood equalised with 12 minutes remaining. Chelsea eventually prevailed 2–1 after extra time. Charlton was so angry at the loss that he left the pitch without collecting his runners-up medal. Charlton later said: "It wasn't the losing of the game, it was the losing of the game to Chelsea, because there were never two more competitive sides when we played each other over a period of four or five years." The match has been cited as one of the greatest FA Cup finals.
The mutual animosity continued into the 1970s. Geoffrey Green of The Times reported that a hard-fought 0–0 draw at Stamford Bridge in December 1971 at times "more resembled some Mafia vendetta than football". A crowd of 51,000 (with a further 9,000 locked out) watched a 4–0 Chelsea win over Leeds in the opening match of the 1972–73 season. The match was "marred by a string of infringements"; Trevor Cherry, Chris Garland and Terry Yorath were all booked, and Leeds lost David Harvey and Mick Jones to injury. Crowd trouble and pitch invasions led Chelsea to erect wire fences around the terraces.
1980–present
By the end of the 1970s both clubs were in decline and would spend many of the ensuing years in the Second Division. Chelsea were relegated in 1975 and again in 1979. Leeds were relegated in 1982, and would not regain their First Division status for the next eight years. No longer challenging for trophies (but frequently competing for promotion), the rivalry often continued off the pitch in the form of hooliganism. When the teams met in the Second Division in the 1982–83 season, their first match for four seasons, 153 Leeds and Chelsea hooligans were arrested after fighting broke out at Piccadilly Circus tube station on the London Underground, and another 60 were arrested at the match itself. In April 1984, when Chelsea beat Leeds 5–0 to clinch promotion to the First Division, Chelsea fans invaded the pitch several times, and Leeds fans smashed up the Stamford Bridge scoreboard. Clashes between rival fans resulted in 41 arrests. More recently, before a Chelsea-Leeds match in 2002 then-Leeds manager David O'Leary urged fans to behave after recent crowd trouble at other matches although stricter policing and the introduction of CCTV in grounds and all-seater stadia in the 1990s means that crowd trouble at matches is now generally rare.
Both clubs enjoyed another revival in the 1990s, which coincided with a series of "ill-tempered and highly-charged" clashes as "the mutual loathing that characterized these sides three decades ago... resurfaced." In an "X-rated" 0–0 draw in December 1997, eight players were booked and Leeds had two players – Gary Kelly and Alf-Inge Håland – sent off. Martin Lipton called the match "a throwback to the worst excesses of the Revie era when the likes of Chopper Harris kicked lumps out of Johnny Giles and Co." Another 0–0 draw in October 1998 resulted in 12 yellow cards and a red card for Chelsea's Frank Leboeuf. In a 2–0 Leeds win at Stamford Bridge in December 1999, Leeds' Lee Bowyer was booked a minute into the game and Leboeuf was again sent off. A bad tempered League Cup fourth round match in November 2001 – their first cup clash since 1970 – saw Chelsea win 2–0, with Eiður Guðjohnsen scoring a goal while Stephen McPhail was on the ground injured. Graeme Le Saux was later stretchered off after being hit in the face by Alan Smith.
The clubs have not met in the league since Leeds' relegation from the Premier League in the 2003–04 season. Their last meeting took place on 15 May 2004, with Chelsea winning 1–0. The animosity between the clubs has still been expressed in the hostility of Leeds fans to the club being taken over by former Chelsea owner and chairman Ken Bates, and to the appointment of former Chelsea captain Dennis Wise as manager in 2006, resulting in chants like "Get the Chelsea out of Leeds." Gus Poyet, another former Chelsea player who served as Wise's assistant at Leeds, later commented that "The fans didn't want us there because of the rivalry with Chelsea."
The two were drawn to play each other in the League Cup in December 2012 at Elland Road, which was the first competitive meeting between them in eight years. After a goal by Leeds striker Luciano Becchio which put the West Yorkshire side ahead in the first half, Chelsea responded by scoring five in the second half, with the final score being 5–1 to Chelsea. Due to police concerns over potential crowd trouble, Chelsea were only allocated 3000 tickets rather than the usual 5000. The match drew a gate of 33,816, Leeds' highest attendance for two years.
Notable matches
Leeds United 7–0 Chelsea (7 October 1967)
Six months after the heated FA Cup semi-final at Villa Park, Leeds notched their biggest ever win over Chelsea. Chelsea entered the match in turmoil, their manager Tommy Docherty having resigned the day before. Albert Johanneson opened the scoring after five minutes and Leeds were 3–0 up within 14 minutes thanks to further goals from Jimmy Greenhoff and Jack Charlton. Peter Lorimer put Leeds 4–0 ahead by half-time. After the break, Eddie Gray beat Bonetti from outside the area, Marvin Hinton scored an own goal and Leeds captain Billy Bremner capped his man of the match performance by scoring the seventh himself.
Chelsea 5–0 Leeds United (28 April 1984)
In the Second Division, John Neal's high-flying Chelsea met mid-table Leeds, managed by Eddie Gray and fielding two survivors from the 1970 FA Cup Final, David Harvey and Peter Lorimer, knowing a win would secure promotion to the First Division for the first time since 1979. In Chelsea's first win over Leeds since 1972, winger Mickey Thomas put Chelsea ahead, Kerry Dixon scored a "perfect" hat-trick and Paul Canoville completed the win with a goal in stoppage time. At the end of the match Chelsea fans invaded the pitch, while Leeds fans trashed the scoreboard.
Leeds United 1–5 Chelsea (19 December 2012)
Chelsea and Leeds' first game against each other in eight years was in League Cup quarter finals in the 2012–13 season. Chelsea were in the Premier League at this time and Leeds were in the Championship. Chelsea ran out winners after going behind to a Luciano Becchio goal eight minutes before half time, however Juan Mata's goal one minute after half time set Chelsea on their way to the last four. Branislav Ivanović, Victor Moses, Eden Hazard and Fernando Torres wrapped up victory for the Blues.
Statistics
Head to head summary
Scorelines
Biggest win:
Chelsea 7–1 Leeds United (Saturday 16 March 1935)
Leeds United 7–0 Chelsea (Saturday 7 October 1967)
Head-to-head fixtures
Honours
These are the major football honours won by Chelsea and Leeds United.
Player transfers
There have been few direct player transfers between Chelsea and Leeds United. The first came in 1991, when left-back Tony Dorigo moved from Chelsea to Leeds for £1.3 million. Chelsea have never bought a senior player from Leeds, although they did controversially sign Leeds youth players Tom Taiwo and Michael Woods in 2006. Duncan McKenzie, Mickey Thomas, Vinnie Jones, Mikael Forssell, Terry Phelan, David Hopkin, David Rocastle, Jimmy Floyd Hasselbaink and Tore André Flo have also played for both clubs. Additionally, three former Chelsea players have managed Leeds; George Graham, Terry Venables and Dennis Wise.
From Chelsea to Leeds United
Footnotes and references
Leeds United
Chelsea
Category:England football derbies |
1. Field of the Invention
The present invention relates to an improvement in a lens barrel including a plurality of lenses and a lens driving apparatus or zoom lens driving apparatus configured to drive the lenses from a collapsed position to a photographic or extended position, and a camera including the lens barrel, more specifically to a lens barrel including a lens driving apparatus or zoom lens driving apparatus capable of performing stable operation without backlash.
2. Description of Related Art
In recent years, each of a large number of lens barrels used to photograph is mainly applied for a zoom lens configured to vary a focal distance continuously by changing positions of a plurality of lens groups in photographing. On the other hand, in case of non-photograph, the lens barrel is mainly used as a miniaturized collapsable-type-zoom lens barrel in which the lens groups are accommodated in a fixed cylinder of the lens barrel by moving relatively the lens groups so that small intervals are set among the lens groups.
Such a lens barrel includes a lens moving structure in which a rotational cylinder is attached to the fixed cylinder and lens frames are moved in a direction of an optical axis through a cam or helicoidal engagement structure when the rotational cylinder is rotated relative to the fixed cylinder.
The lens moving structure has a typical mechanism in which a rotational cylinder is engaged with a fixed cylinder through a cam structure so that the rotational cylinder rotates and forwardly and backwardly moves through the cam structure. The lens moving structure includes a linearly moving guide cylinder which is disposed in the rotational cylinder, rotatable relative to the rotational cylinder and moves together with the rotational cylinder in a direction of an optical axis and lens frames which are disposed in the linearly moving guide cylinder and configured to hold a plurality of lenses, respectively. Each of the lens frames has a cam follower which passes through a linearly moving groove of the linearly moving guide cylinder extending in the optical axial direction and engages with a cam groove provided in an inner surface of the rotational cylinder.
When the rotational cylinder is rotated, the lenses can be moved to any position within a movable range without being rotated. For example, a rotational key provided on the linearly moving guide cylinder to radially project is engaged in a peripherally extending rotational groove provided in the inner surface of the rotational cylinder, thereby the linearly moving guide cylinder can be rotated about an optical axis relative to the rotational cylinder, but can be moved together with the rotational cylinder in the optical axial direction.
A lens barrel needs to align an optical axis of each lens group in order to maintain image-focusing property. However, as the number of driving parts to move lenses increases, it is difficult to align the optical axis of each lens. As the lend barrel is downsized, it is required to enhance accuracy for alignment of the optical axis of each lens.
As a method for aligning the optical axis of each lens, it is proposed to hold two lens group frames with an inner diameter of one lens group frame (for reference, see Japanese Patent Application Publication No. 2003-270509). According to a technology as disclosed in Japanese Patent Application Publication No. 2003-270509, coaxial performance of a first lens group and a second lens group is maintained with relatively high accuracy. However, because one lens frame is supported by a rotational cylinder and a linearly moving guide cylinder, fall over of the lenses due to a backlash generated in these parts occurs.
Consequently, it is not possible to align the optical axis of each lens. Also, there is known a technology configured to compensate lens frames to a correct position from a deviated position by use of springs biasing each of the lenses (for reference, see Japanese Patent Application Publication No. 2006-071844). However, there is a problem that when each lens is in a collapsed potion, a biasing force is applied to structural parts, a large energy is required to move the lens frames and so on between the collapsed position and a photographic position. |
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Thursday, April 15, 2010
There He Goes Again: Mann Claims His Hockey Stick was Given "Clean Bill of Health"
Spinmeister Michael Mann is quoted in this article from the Telegraph yesterday as follows:
Prof Hand (Head of the UK Royal Statistical Society) praised the blogger Steve McIntyre of Climate Audit for uncovering the fact that inappropriate methods were used which could produce misleading results. "The Mann 1998 hockey stick paper used a particular technique that exaggerated the hockey stick effect," he said.
Prof Mann, who is Professor of Earth System Science at the Pennsylvania State University, said the statistics used in his graph were correct. "I would note that our '98 article was reviewed by the US National Academy of Sciences, the highest scientific authority in the United States, and given a clean bill of health," he said. "In fact, the statistician on the panel, Peter Bloomfield, a member of the Royal Statistical Society, came to the opposite conclusion of Prof Hand."
Mann has been repeating this arrogant duplicitous spin continuously since Climategate and refuses to acknowledge any problems whatsoever with his infamous doomsday hockey stick graph. Mann always refers to the subtly worded US National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report as his ally because he knows McIntyre & McKitrick, the Wegman Report, Hans von Storch, et al, and now the Head of the Royal Statistical Society have minced no words debunking his hockey stick. But what did the NAS report and the authors actually say about the Mann hockey stick? In fact, the NAS report validated all of the significant criticisms of McIntyre & McKitrick (M&M):1. The NAS indicated that the hockey stick method systematically underestimated the uncertainties in the data (p. 107).
2. In subtle wording, the NAS agreed with the M&M assertion that the hockey stick had no statistical significance, and was no more informative about the distant past than a table of random numbers. The NAS found that Mann's methods had no validation (CE) skill significantly different from zero. In the past, however, it has always been claimed that the method has a significant nonzero validation skill. Methods without a validation skill are usually considered useless. Mann’s data set does not have enough information to verify its ‘skill’ at resolving the past, and has such wide uncertainty bounds as to be no better than the simple mean of the data (p. 91). M&M said that the appearance of significance was created by ignoring all but one type of test score, thereby failing to quantify all the relevant uncertainties. The NAS agreed (p. 110), but, again, did so in subtle wording.
3. M&M argued that the hockey stick relied for its shape on the inclusion of a small set of invalid proxy data (called bristlecone, or “strip-bark” records). If they are removed, the conclusion that the 20th century is unusually warm compared to the pre-1450 interval is reversed. Hence the conclusion of unique late 20th century warmth is not robust—in other word it does not hold up under minor variations in data or methods. The NAS panel agreed, saying Mann’s results are “strongly dependent” on the strip-bark data (pp. 106-107), and they went further, warning that strip-bark data should not be used in this type of research (p. 50).
4. The NAS said " Mann et al. used a type of principal component analysis that tends to bias the shape of the reconstructions", i.e. produce hockey sticks from baseball statistics, telephone book numbers, and monte carlo random numbers.
5. The NAS said Mann downplayed the "uncertainties of the published reconstructions...Even less confidence can be placed in the original conclusions by Mann et al. (1999) that ‘the 1990s are likely the warmest decade, and 1998 the warmest year, in at least a millennium.’
Mann never mentions that a subsequent House Energy and Commerce Committee report chaired by Edward Wegman totally destroyed the credibility of the ‘hockey stick’ and devastatingly ripped apart Mann’s methodology as ‘bad mathematics’. Furthermore, when Gerald North, the chairman of the NAS panel -- which Mann claims ‘vindicated him’ – and panel member Peter Bloomfield who Mann says above came to the opposite conclusions as Prof Hand, were asked at the House Committee hearings whether or not they agreed with Wegman’s harsh criticisms, they said they did:
CHAIRMAN BARTON. Dr. North, do you dispute the conclusions or the methodology of Dr. Wegman’s report?
DR. NORTH. No, we don’t. We don’t disagree with their criticism. In fact, pretty much the same thing is said in our report.
DR. BLOOMFIELD. Our committee reviewed the methodology used by Dr. Mann and his co-workers and we felt that some of the choices they made were inappropriate. We had much the same misgivings about his work that was documented at much greater length by Dr. Wegman.
WALLACE: ‘the two reports were complementary, and to the extent that they overlapped, the conclusions were quite consistent.’ (Am Stat Assoc.)
3 comments:
Isn't it time that the work of Gerlich & Tscheuschner is given the credit it’s due- The greenhouse gas effect has no scientific bases-it violates fundamental laws of physics. Michal Mann's "forcing' is a fairy tale ,his MANNipulation of temperature data, should be exposed and criminal charges brought against him and the University for not bringing out the truth.List of references:The paper "Falsification of the Atmospheric CO2 greenhouse effect within the frame of physics" by Gerhard Gerlich and Ralf D. Tscheuschner is an in-depth examination of the subject. Electronic version of an article published as International Journal of Modern PhysicsB, Vol. 23, No. 3 (2009) 275{364 , DOI No: 10.1142/S021797920904984X, c WorldScientifc Publishing Company, http://www.worldscinet.com/ijmpb.
Report of Alan Carlin of US-EPA March, 2009 that shows that CO2 does not cause global warming.
Greenhouse Gas Hypothesis Violates Fundamentals of Physics” by Dipl-Ing Heinz Thieme This work has about 10 or 12 linkthat support the truth that the greenhouse gas effect is a hoax.
R.W.Wood .Greenhouse Theory Disproved a Century AgoTown Hall ^ | 02/03/09 | reasonmclucus Posted on Tuesday, February 03, 2009 7:15:22 PM by kathsua The claim that carbon dioxide (CO2) can increase air temperatures by "trapping" infrared radiation (IR) ignores the fact that in 1909 physicist R.W. Wood disproved the popular 19th Century thesis that greenhouses stayed warm by trapping IR. Unfortunately, many people who claim to be scientists are unaware of Wood's experiment which was originally published in the Philosophical magazine , 1909, vol 17, p319-320.
www. Strata-Sphere.com » There Is No Atmospheric Green House Effect.mhtThe bottom line is that the facts show that the greenhouse gas effect is a fairy-tale and that Man-made global warming is the World larges Scam!!! The IPCC and Al Gore should be charged under the US Anti-racketeering act and when convicted - they should spend the rest of their lives in jail for the Crimes they have committed against Humanity.
Actually, greenhouse acting as a gas was first proposed by Fourier in mid 19th century and carbon dioxide was fingered by Svante Arrenas in 1896. He was quickly proven wrong by his nemiss, Kunt Angstrom, but given the delay in peer review it took a while for the truth to be verified. The US Monthly Weather Review of June 1901 has article "Knut Angstrom on Atmospheric Absorption" but Svantee, then head of the new Nobel Committee refused to admit his error until 1905.
More on this history in my article "Strange Tale of the Green House Gas Gang" and for a good laugh at the hockey stick maker read "Hockey Stickery Doc"....all posted at a website near you ! |
Classificação e Jogos Copa do Mundo
Nem só de sucesso vive a relação entre o Canarinho e a torcida brasileira. Antes de virar fenômeno nas redes sociais e ganhar o apelido Pistola, por conta da cara "enfezada", termo que a CBF prefere usar, a mascote da entidade era uma ave "fofa". O visual infantil, criado quatro anos atrás, foi um fiasco como produto e caiu no ostracismo depois do vexame da seleção na Copa do Mundo de 2014.
- Simule os classificados e o mata-mata do Mundial
- Neymar S/A: a engrenagem por trás do maior jogador de futebol do Brasil
- De ídolo a homem de negócios, Ronaldo tem tudo a ver com a seleção atual
Criado para comemorar os cem anos de fundação da Confederação Brasileira de Futebol, a primeira versão do Canarinho foi lançada em 23 de junho de 2014, mesmo dia em que o Brasil venceu Camarões por 4 a 1, em Brasília, pelo Mundial. Uma divulgação protocolar, sem alarde nem pompas, resumida em três curtos parágrafos de uma nota publicada no site da entidade. A pelúcia da mascote estava disponível apenas na loja que fica na sede da CBF, na Barra da Tijuca, Zona Oeste do Rio de Janeiro. O texto informava que o boneco poderia ser encontrado "também em outros locais", mas sem especificar quais.
Relegado até por seus criadores, também porque não poderia ser comercializado nos locais de jogos da Copa por restrições impostas pela Fifa, o Canarinho "feliz" encalhou, situação que só piorou após a derrota da seleção por 7 a 1 para a Alemanha, na semifinal. A própria CBF comprou lotes da Dartel Toys, parceira da entidade na produção da pelúcia, e distribuiu bonecos como souvenires a aliados e patrocinadores. Outras unidades foram entregues à doação, segundo apurou o UOL Esporte.
Mais uma vítima do maior vexame da história do futebol brasileiro, o Canarinho desapareceu da mesma forma que surgiu: sem ser notado.
A primeira versão do Canarinho da CBF, lançada em 2014 Imagem: Divulgação/CBF
Símbolo de uma nova identidade
Em campo, resgatar a autoestima do futebol brasileiro virou missão de Tite. Fora dele, era necessário reaproximar-se do torcedor, uma missão inglória estando a CBF inundada em acusações criminosas que envolviam os seus últimos três presidentes. Nesse cenário, no fim de 2016, ressurge o Canarinho, com visual repaginado: irreverente, marrento, habilidoso com a bola, patriota e com cara de mau, mas sem perder a ternura. A influência mais visível vem de mascotes das ligas esportivas dos Estados Unidos, especialmente a NBA.
"No Brasil, se jogar uma pelada, a final da Copa do Mundo ou qualquer coisa, futebol com a sua família, você já fica com uma cara mais enfezada querendo ganhar, a gente não aceita perder. Precisa ter identificação com o torcedor. Então, não adianta perder e ele estar com cara de feliz da vida. Não tem sentido", explicou Gilberto Ratto, diretor de Marketing da CBF, que prefere não relacionar a remodelação da mascote com a crise na entidade. "Se tivesse ou não problemas como esse, a gente criaria o produto de qualquer jeito. Não tem nada a ver com a parte política", afirmou ao UOL Esporte.
"O briefing da CBF pedia um semblante mais confiante, sagaz, de força, de vitalidade. Por isso, ele tem um peitoral mais forte. A ideia era fazer uma mascote que ao mesmo tempo fosse simpática, transmitisse essas características de força e respeito, misturado com a simpatia", complementou Thiago Mendes, sócio-proprietário e diretor de criação da Dartel Toys, empresa de Goiânia que confeccionou a nova versão do Canarinho.
A primeira aparição da mascote recauchutada ocorreu em outubro de 2016, na Arena das Dunas, em Natal, palco da partida entre Brasil e Bolívia, pelas Eliminatórias da Copa de 2018. A empatia com o torcedor foi imediata, a ponto de os perfis da CBF nas redes sociais serem metralhados por críticas de seguidores quando, em 2017, a versão feliz da mascote renasceu das cinzas no evento Somos Futebol, obrigando a confederação a se explicar.
O ambiente virtual tem papel primordial no sucesso do Canarinho, que recebeu a alcunha Pistola, gíria usada nas redes sociais quando alguém perde as estribeiras. A CBF torce o nariz para o apelido, tanto que orientou a Rede Globo a não disseminá-lo nas transmissões da Copa do Mundo da Rússia.
"Popularizou. A gente, particularmente, não usa. Porque tem quem possa achar que não é bacana, que é ofensivo, então a gente respeita a todos. Até porque o nome dele é Canarinho. Ele é um canário, o nome é Canarinho, não tem mais nada", disse Ratto.
Goste ou não do "sobrenome", o Canarinho Pistola caiu no gosto popular e passou a receber atenção diferenciada da CBF. Para capitalizar com o clima de Copa sem infringir as regras da Fifa, a mascote viajou para amistosos no exterior e também para Sochi, base da seleção na Rússia, e fez aparições em pontos turísticos de cidades como Paris, Londres, Liverpool, Viena e Moscou. As visitas foram registradas em foto e vídeo, abastecendo as plataformas digitais da entidade.
- Não há birra com a CBF que resista ao Canarinho Pistola, a mascote mais querida do Brasil
O público-alvo do marketing da CBF, ao criar um conceito diferente de mascote, é o público jovem, explica Gilberto Ratto. "A gente fez um estudo também com a molecada. Na nossa época, você vai tirar foto com criança e a mãe até dava um tapa na cabeça para sorrir para a foto. Hoje, o moleque de 10 anos está sorrindo, mas vai tirar foto e faz cara de mau. Sem risadinha. É uma outra geração, a gente tem de entender essa geração, não é igual a nossa. A gente começou a entender isso, entender como funciona as mascotes, começa a aproximar com o torcedor e aí vai surgindo o nosso Canarinho."
Você pode ter o seu próprio Canarinho Pistola
Canarinho "dá selinho" em torcedora nas ruas de Rostov-on-Don Imagem: CBF/oficial
No fim de maio, novamente com um comunicado no site oficial, porém com divulgação mais incisiva, a CBF lançou a pelúcia do Canarinho "enfezado", com direito a criação de uma loja virtual, chamada Meu Canarinho, para comercialização online. Há menos de um mês no ar, o endereço chegou a receber 20 mil visitantes/dia. Uma estimativa de vendas será feita após a Copa, já que o torneio na Rússia, e consequentemente o sucesso da seleção em campo, deverão potencializar as vendas.
Na loja da sede da CBF, dias após o anúncio do produto, 500 unidades do Canarinho foram vendidas em um único dia, a maioria adquirida por adultos. "Isso surpreendeu", destacou Ratto. "Claro, [o adulto] vai comprar para o filho, mas se bobear o filho não pediu. Ele achou legal para caramba e vai dar para o filho. Tem isso muito. Muito adulto comprando. Muita gente quer, patrocinadores ligam", valorizou o diretor da CBF. |
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Q:
How to "move" Eigen::VectorXd s
A commenter in a recent post of mine told me I need to utilize c++11 move-semantics better to deal with a bottleneck in my code. Below is a simplified version of what needs to be fixed.
#include <iostream>
#include <Eigen/Dense>
#include <vector>
void makeCopy(std::vector<Eigen::VectorXd> &oldV){
int n = oldV.size();
std::vector<Eigen::VectorXd> mandatoryCopy;
mandatoryCopy.resize(n);
for(int i = 0; i < n; i++){
mandatoryCopy[i] = oldV[i];
}
// swap the two
oldV = mandatoryCopy;
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
// starting vector
int len(1000);
Eigen::VectorXd placeHolder(50);
std::vector<Eigen::VectorXd> v(len, placeHolder);
// copy it a bunch of times
for(int iter = 0; iter < 1000; ++iter){
std::cout << "iter: " << iter << "\n";
makeCopy(v);
}
return 0;
}
Question: inside the for loop of makeCopy, oldV[i]is an lvalue, so how could I do something like mandatoryCopy[i]&& = oldV[i]? This is the primary bottleneck, right? I'm thinking something like mandatoryCopy[i]&& = std::move(oldV[i]), but this obviously won't compile.
Edit
As per @vsoftco's suggestion, I have tried
std::vector<Eigen::VectorXd> makeCopy2(std::vector<Eigen::VectorXd> oldV){
int n = oldV.size();
std::vector<Eigen::VectorXd> mandatoryCopy;
mandatoryCopy.resize(n);
for(int i = 0; i < n; i++){
mandatoryCopy[i] = oldV[i];
}
return mandatoryCopy;
}
but I find that it is slower. Both @vsoftco and @ggael have mentioned that it would be faster to return a modified copied argument, instead of copying again, and I agree, but I doubt that this is possible for my actual code. I could ask about this later, but it would be a separate question/thread.
A:
You are not looking at the right line. If one copy is mandatory, then you cannot get rid of it. Nonetheless, better avoid the for loop and right:
std::vector<Eigen::VectorXd> mandatoryCopy = oldV;
On the other hand, you can omit the second copy by replacing oldV=mandatoryCopy with:
std::swap(oldV,mandatoryCopy);
that will perform a cheap pointer exchange. You get:
void makeCopy(std::vector<Eigen::VectorXd> &oldV){
std::vector<Eigen::VectorXd> V = oldV;
// do something with V
std::swap(oldV,V);
}
For the functional style, in your second example, you must directly play with the argument which is already a copy:
std::vector<Eigen::VectorXd> makeCopy2(std::vector<Eigen::VectorXd> V){
// do something with V
return V;
}
and call it with v = makeCopy2(v);.
Do not forget to compile with -std=c++11 to get move semantic copies.
Finally, it might be better to pack your vector<VectorXd> within a MatrixXd. This will dramatically reduce the number of memory allocations:
void makeCopy3(MatrixXd &oldV){
int n = oldV.cols();
MatrixXd V = oldV;
for(int i = 0; i < n; i++){
V.col(i) *= 0.99;
}
oldV.swap(V); // or oldV = std::move(V); with c++11 enabled
}
|
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275.00
My shooting style is very forgiving. If you're nervous about this type of session because "I don't like my ______", don't worry, I've got you covered, literally. I will make you look your best, and feel your sexiest. Do this for yourself, do this for your husband/boyfriend, do this for your little baby bump, whatever you do, just do it. You will be so happy and confident with these photos, I promise.
I have the light up Marquee lettering to write "BABY" "BRIDE" and "LOVE" and I guess whatever words you can come up with using those same letters lol
So are you ready to have some fun? Message me for my availability, and book your time today. Please plan for 2-3 hours or more depending on how many out fits or looks that you have. Session comes with 2 dozen roses in the color of your choice.
Please add $75 if you would like to include a Milk Bath at the end of your boudoir session. |
It's been years of waiting here for you (you) and I'm not waiting anymore here for you (you), here they burn for murder.So now I want to see the world burn in flames (flames), and I'll light the match, till you respect me... Till you respect me... Until you respect me.Burn... For...
It's been years of waiting here for you (you) and I'm not waiting anymore here for you (you), 'cause here they burn for murder.So now I want to see the world burn in flames (flames), and I'll light the match, till you respect me... Till you respect me... Till you respect me... Till you respect me.'Cause I will not speak until you respect me.'Cause I will not speak until you respect me... Till you respect me.Yeah... Yeah...
Fiction is me and I'm my own apathy.I have done nothing with my pistols.They say it just takes a second to die, but I was set up to be knocked down.Well, it's all over now.
Somewhere a violin plays as I watch this ship capsize.But I am a long mean streak of independence, and between you and I, there's no difference... No difference... No difference... There's no difference. |
Srbiji su danas potrebni racionalni, dobri i normalni odnosi s Hrvatskom, ali se Srbija istovremeno neće sramiti zato što poštuje vlastite žrtve, poručio je u srijedu srbijanski premijer Aleksandar Vučić, pišu srbijanski mediji.
"Ne razumijem ljude koji slave progon stanovništva. Potrebno je šest dana i šest noći samo da se pročita popis ljudi koji su otišli iz Hrvatske", rekao je on, navodeći da ne shvaća ni odnos prema Srbima koji postoji danas u Hrvatskoj.
Sada, međutim, dodao je, Srbija treba učiniti sve što može da sve suze, muke i nedaće našeg naroda pretoči u borbu i energiju za bolju srpsku ekonomiju.
"Mi smo naučili i sebe i naše sugrađane da poštuju tuđe žrtve, ali ono što se promijenilo i ono što se mijenja jest da se nećemo sramiti zbog toga što poštujemo vlastite žrtve, naprotiv poštovat ćemo ih nimalo manje nego što poštujemo tuđe", kazao je premijer, primijetivši da to govori o novoj snazi Srbije i o tome da ranije Srbija sebi nije mogla dopustiti takve stvari zbog svoje "malene moći, ali i volje političkih elita".
Vučić je to poručio povodom Dana sjećanja na stradanje srpskog naroda u akciji Oluja, te Dana žalosti u Srbiji.
Socijalistička partija Srbije poručila je istom prigodom da je proslava vojno-redarstvene akcije "Oluja" u Hrvatskoj "koketiranje sa zločinom".
Socijalisti ističu da je 5. kolovoza najtužniji datum u novijoj povijesti Srbije, jer je na taj dan izvršeno najveće etničko čišćenje poslije Drugog svjetskog rata.
SPS u priopćenju navodi da se nada da će Hrvatska, kao i svi ostali narodi bivše Jugoslavije, što je Srbija već učinila, smoći snage i hrabrosti da se suoči sa svojim zločinima radi mira, budućnosti i napretka koji su svi narodi Balkana zaslužili.
U Beogradu je misu za Srbe stradale u Hrvatskoj i BiH održao patrijarh Srpske pravoslavne crkve Irinej.
Srbija je točno u podne minutom šutnje, crkvenim zvonima i sirenama obilježila Dan sjećanja i odala počast stradalim i prognanim Srbima.
Sirene i crkvena zvona oglasili su se i u Republici Srpskoj, gdje je također kao i u Srbiji proglašen Dan žalosti.
H |
Mammoth Studios
Mammoth Studios is the generic name used for fictional movie studios in movies, television, books and comic books. Mammoth Pictures Studios has appeared in movies such as Bombshell (1933), Abbott and Costello in Hollywood (1945), and Merton of the Movies (1947), as well as the television series The Beverly Hillbillies (from 1964-1971). Four episodes of The Monkees ("I've Got a Little Song Here", "Monkees at the Movies", "The Picture Frame" and "Mijacogeo") from 1966-1968 mention "Mammoth Studio", but not "Mammoth Pictures Studios". Mammoth Pictures Studios has appeared in books such as The Woman Chaser (1960) by Charles Willeford, and comic books, such as "Blueribbon Comics" (in the 1930s and 1940s) and Marvel's Tower of Shadows in 1970 and the 70’s TV series “Emergency!” Episode 3, ‘Botulism’. But it is never the same studio; the signs and sets are different. In the episodes of The Monkees, Mammoth Studio (not Mammoth Pictures Studios) goes from being active in 1966 (owned by "MD") to being bankrupt and abandoned in 1967 and finally being turned into KXIW, a television station, in 1968. During this same time, Mammoth Pictures Studios was a thriving studio owned by Jed Clampett on episodes of The Beverly Hillbillies, where it was operated by Lawrence Chapman (Milton Frome), proving it to be a different studio. It was last seen February, 2018 in the TV series "Endeavour", series 5 episode 2, "Cartouche".
Real Mammoth Studios exist in various countries, such as America, Canada, and Great Britain. Real Mammoth Pictures exists and is a motion picture production company in America.
References
Category:Fictional companies |
Financial advisers deal with clients’ scandal anxiety
When Wall Street misbehaves, it’s often a financial adviser who ends up on the hot seat, left to answer the public’s questions.
A scathing New York Times op-ed about Goldman Sachs by a departing executive last week marks the latest black eye for the industry. The latest embarrassment comes after toxic investment products, insider trading and Ponzi schemes already had shaken clients’ trust in the people who handle their money.
The headlines have hit close to home for advisers. Merrill Lynch advisers have had to field questions about woes at their parent company, Bank of America Corp, several times over the last few months. Last September, UBS Wealth Management Americas parent UBS AG had a $2 billion rogue trader scandal, which made even faraway U.S. clients nervous.
[dmc-related-post-wp numitems="3" title="Also read"]
And it did not reflect well on Morgan Stanley Smith Barney advisers recently when a banker was arrested for allegedly stabbing a cab driver and another was allegedly linked to a prostitution venture.
The best way to navigate the bad press? Don’t call clients each time a new scandal breaks. Being prepared, however, can help turn a scandal into an opportunity. Advisers who arm themselves with talking points before skittish clients call can help turn that anxiety into a new level of comfort and loyalty.
The conversations can remind clients that they need an adviser to serve as a liaison to the complicated world of financial services.
“It’s a perfect opportunity to emphasize why they’re with you,” said Mike Kostoff, managing partner with the wealth management consulting firm The Kostoff Group. “Client anxiety is a good thing if you can help them manage it.”
KEEPING PERSPECTIVE
Advisers who get in front of negative news by reaching out to clients may just end up informing them of something they did not care about or even know about.
For those in the insular world of New York or the financial services industry, it may seem like Greg Smith – the author of the now-famous public resignation – became ubiquitous last week after he said that Goldman had a toxic culture and a pattern of mistreating and cheating clients.
But the op-ed, in which Smith wrote that some colleagues referred to their clients as “muppets” – a British slang term for a stupid person, not Jim Henson’s beloved puppets – has not come up in conversations, said a half-dozen advisers interviewed by Reuters. One Merrill Lynch Wealth Management adviser based in the South said she had not even heard about the op-ed.
If you work at a firm that has been repeatedly hit with negative news, don’t make the mistake of thinking your clients are paying close attention. Don’t contact them unless the news is bad enough to make the average person worry about your firm’s financial health.
“It always seems worse from our perspective because we know more,” said Ed Friedman, a senior partner at the New York-based Friedman Consulting Group. “We live it every day.”
TALKING POINTS
When anxious clients do call, don’t just wing it. Have talking points ready. If it’s your firm in the news, get the public relations department to help you figure out what to say.
As a first step, listen, and don’t be defensive. Start the conversation by letting your clients vent, which may be all they really want to do. Then address their concerns in simple language and avoid financial jargon, which will only make them more apprehensive.
Andy Tasnady, founder of the consulting firm Tasnady & Associates, said that clients mostly want to be assured of two things during the conversation: “Is my money safe?” and, “Can I trust the people and products from this firm?”
Address the first question by reiterating your firm’s risk controls and how client money is safeguarded.
How you address the second concern will depend on your business model. If you have a record of giving clients a balanced view of your firm’s proprietary products, remind them of that. And let clients know where your loyalties lie: You are a representative of your firm, but in the end you work for them. |
# depd
[![NPM Version][npm-version-image]][npm-url]
[![NPM Downloads][npm-downloads-image]][npm-url]
[![Node.js Version][node-image]][node-url]
[![Linux Build][travis-image]][travis-url]
[![Windows Build][appveyor-image]][appveyor-url]
[![Coverage Status][coveralls-image]][coveralls-url]
[![Gratipay][gratipay-image]][gratipay-url]
Deprecate all the things
> With great modules comes great responsibility; mark things deprecated!
## Install
This module is installed directly using `npm`:
```sh
$ npm install depd
```
This module can also be bundled with systems like
[Browserify](http://browserify.org/) or [webpack](https://webpack.github.io/),
though by default this module will alter it's API to no longer display or
track deprecations.
## API
```js
var deprecate = require('depd')('my-module')
```
This library allows you to display deprecation messages to your users.
This library goes above and beyond with deprecation warnings by
introspection of the call stack (but only the bits that it is interested
in).
Instead of just warning on the first invocation of a deprecated
function and never again, this module will warn on the first invocation
of a deprecated function per unique call site, making it ideal to alert
users of all deprecated uses across the code base, rather than just
whatever happens to execute first.
The deprecation warnings from this module also include the file and line
information for the call into the module that the deprecated function was
in.
**NOTE** this library has a similar interface to the `debug` module, and
this module uses the calling file to get the boundary for the call stacks,
so you should always create a new `deprecate` object in each file and not
within some central file.
### depd(namespace)
Create a new deprecate function that uses the given namespace name in the
messages and will display the call site prior to the stack entering the
file this function was called from. It is highly suggested you use the
name of your module as the namespace.
### deprecate(message)
Call this function from deprecated code to display a deprecation message.
This message will appear once per unique caller site. Caller site is the
first call site in the stack in a different file from the caller of this
function.
If the message is omitted, a message is generated for you based on the site
of the `deprecate()` call and will display the name of the function called,
similar to the name displayed in a stack trace.
### deprecate.function(fn, message)
Call this function to wrap a given function in a deprecation message on any
call to the function. An optional message can be supplied to provide a custom
message.
### deprecate.property(obj, prop, message)
Call this function to wrap a given property on object in a deprecation message
on any accessing or setting of the property. An optional message can be supplied
to provide a custom message.
The method must be called on the object where the property belongs (not
inherited from the prototype).
If the property is a data descriptor, it will be converted to an accessor
descriptor in order to display the deprecation message.
### process.on('deprecation', fn)
This module will allow easy capturing of deprecation errors by emitting the
errors as the type "deprecation" on the global `process`. If there are no
listeners for this type, the errors are written to STDERR as normal, but if
there are any listeners, nothing will be written to STDERR and instead only
emitted. From there, you can write the errors in a different format or to a
logging source.
The error represents the deprecation and is emitted only once with the same
rules as writing to STDERR. The error has the following properties:
- `message` - This is the message given by the library
- `name` - This is always `'DeprecationError'`
- `namespace` - This is the namespace the deprecation came from
- `stack` - This is the stack of the call to the deprecated thing
Example `error.stack` output:
```
DeprecationError: my-cool-module deprecated oldfunction
at Object.<anonymous> ([eval]-wrapper:6:22)
at Module._compile (module.js:456:26)
at evalScript (node.js:532:25)
at startup (node.js:80:7)
at node.js:902:3
```
### process.env.NO_DEPRECATION
As a user of modules that are deprecated, the environment variable `NO_DEPRECATION`
is provided as a quick solution to silencing deprecation warnings from being
output. The format of this is similar to that of `DEBUG`:
```sh
$ NO_DEPRECATION=my-module,othermod node app.js
```
This will suppress deprecations from being output for "my-module" and "othermod".
The value is a list of comma-separated namespaces. To suppress every warning
across all namespaces, use the value `*` for a namespace.
Providing the argument `--no-deprecation` to the `node` executable will suppress
all deprecations (only available in Node.js 0.8 or higher).
**NOTE** This will not suppress the deperecations given to any "deprecation"
event listeners, just the output to STDERR.
### process.env.TRACE_DEPRECATION
As a user of modules that are deprecated, the environment variable `TRACE_DEPRECATION`
is provided as a solution to getting more detailed location information in deprecation
warnings by including the entire stack trace. The format of this is the same as
`NO_DEPRECATION`:
```sh
$ TRACE_DEPRECATION=my-module,othermod node app.js
```
This will include stack traces for deprecations being output for "my-module" and
"othermod". The value is a list of comma-separated namespaces. To trace every
warning across all namespaces, use the value `*` for a namespace.
Providing the argument `--trace-deprecation` to the `node` executable will trace
all deprecations (only available in Node.js 0.8 or higher).
**NOTE** This will not trace the deperecations silenced by `NO_DEPRECATION`.
## Display
When a user calls a function in your library that you mark deprecated, they
will see the following written to STDERR (in the given colors, similar colors
and layout to the `debug` module):
```
bright cyan bright yellow
| | reset cyan
| | | |
▼ ▼ ▼ ▼
my-cool-module deprecated oldfunction [eval]-wrapper:6:22
▲ ▲ ▲ ▲
| | | |
namespace | | location of mycoolmod.oldfunction() call
| deprecation message
the word "deprecated"
```
If the user redirects their STDERR to a file or somewhere that does not support
colors, they see (similar layout to the `debug` module):
```
Sun, 15 Jun 2014 05:21:37 GMT my-cool-module deprecated oldfunction at [eval]-wrapper:6:22
▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲
| | | | |
timestamp of message namespace | | location of mycoolmod.oldfunction() call
| deprecation message
the word "deprecated"
```
## Examples
### Deprecating all calls to a function
This will display a deprecated message about "oldfunction" being deprecated
from "my-module" on STDERR.
```js
var deprecate = require('depd')('my-cool-module')
// message automatically derived from function name
// Object.oldfunction
exports.oldfunction = deprecate.function(function oldfunction() {
// all calls to function are deprecated
})
// specific message
exports.oldfunction = deprecate.function(function () {
// all calls to function are deprecated
}, 'oldfunction')
```
### Conditionally deprecating a function call
This will display a deprecated message about "weirdfunction" being deprecated
from "my-module" on STDERR when called with less than 2 arguments.
```js
var deprecate = require('depd')('my-cool-module')
exports.weirdfunction = function () {
if (arguments.length < 2) {
// calls with 0 or 1 args are deprecated
deprecate('weirdfunction args < 2')
}
}
```
When calling `deprecate` as a function, the warning is counted per call site
within your own module, so you can display different deprecations depending
on different situations and the users will still get all the warnings:
```js
var deprecate = require('depd')('my-cool-module')
exports.weirdfunction = function () {
if (arguments.length < 2) {
// calls with 0 or 1 args are deprecated
deprecate('weirdfunction args < 2')
} else if (typeof arguments[0] !== 'string') {
// calls with non-string first argument are deprecated
deprecate('weirdfunction non-string first arg')
}
}
```
### Deprecating property access
This will display a deprecated message about "oldprop" being deprecated
from "my-module" on STDERR when accessed. A deprecation will be displayed
when setting the value and when getting the value.
```js
var deprecate = require('depd')('my-cool-module')
exports.oldprop = 'something'
// message automatically derives from property name
deprecate.property(exports, 'oldprop')
// explicit message
deprecate.property(exports, 'oldprop', 'oldprop >= 0.10')
```
## License
[MIT](LICENSE)
[npm-version-image]: https://img.shields.io/npm/v/depd.svg
[npm-downloads-image]: https://img.shields.io/npm/dm/depd.svg
[npm-url]: https://npmjs.org/package/depd
[travis-image]: https://img.shields.io/travis/dougwilson/nodejs-depd/master.svg?label=linux
[travis-url]: https://travis-ci.org/dougwilson/nodejs-depd
[appveyor-image]: https://img.shields.io/appveyor/ci/dougwilson/nodejs-depd/master.svg?label=windows
[appveyor-url]: https://ci.appveyor.com/project/dougwilson/nodejs-depd
[coveralls-image]: https://img.shields.io/coveralls/dougwilson/nodejs-depd/master.svg
[coveralls-url]: https://coveralls.io/r/dougwilson/nodejs-depd?branch=master
[node-image]: https://img.shields.io/node/v/depd.svg
[node-url]: http://nodejs.org/download/
[gratipay-image]: https://img.shields.io/gratipay/dougwilson.svg
[gratipay-url]: https://www.gratipay.com/dougwilson/
|
Kay Rankel’s Dog-Walking Fishing Kayak, Wisconsin
We live on a small lake in northern Wisconsin. My brother, Gary Rankel, just gave me a Wavewalk for my birthday and I’m really enjoying it so far. I still haven’t figured anything out that’s any better than this setup…my pup sits a bit high, but luckily she’s stayed calm while we’re out there (I haven’t been capsized yet!). So far she’s been great, despite distractions like other boats/waverunners/dogs… It’s not pretty, but it works for now!
9 Comments
There seem to be a lot of w yakers who take their dogs with them on board
Rox07/22/2010 at --
That’s awesome, what a great Birthday present. 🙂 You have a wonderful Brother.
As far as your dog goes, maybe a board that sits on the saddle, with leg supports that reach the pontoon floor. Hummmmmmm, my dog would love to go with me, but at 95lbs…………………. 🙂 But maybe I’ll try it to, never thought about it till now.
Tight lines and Paddle Safe
Jeff McGovern07/23/2010 at --
Finally back on line. Wow, nice shot and one happy looking dog for sure. Darn shame you don’t have a rod over the side trying to get a few smallmouth, pike or muskie. Those northern waters are wonderful.
Claudia Hermes07/24/2010 at --
You know when you put them higher than you, who is in command. Josey is probably a great navigator. Looks like fun.
Claudia
Kay Rankel07/25/2010 at --
My husband built a new chair for Josey yesterday that I think will work great…made of lightweight cedar, adirondack back, slats underneath that fit in the grooves of the WW. I plan to test it out with her today and will report back on our trek!
Pete07/26/2010 at --
Sounds like a solid design!
Pete
Kay Rankel04/18/2011 at --
4-18-11…I just got back in from my maiden voyage this year out with the WW. Our dog Josey did great in the new chair that my husband built for her…it fits right into the grooves of the WW and I use a bungee to secure it to the boat. Hard to believe there was ice out there just a week ago! |
After a car accident, Pierre must spend four weeks in forced convalescence in the hospital. With friends and family coming over to see him, other patients from the hospital paying him unsolicitedvisits and staff dropping in in his room at any hour, Pierre gets more attention than he would ask for. Stuck in his bed with time to think over his mistakes he realizes that his convalescence mightbe offering him a second chance... |
[COMPARATIVE CYTOGENETIC ANALYSIS OF MONOLAYER AND SUSPENSION CHINESE HAMSTER OVARY CELL LINES CHO(dhfr-)].
The karyotypes of CHO(dhfr-) and CHO(dhfr-)/susp Chinese hamster ovary cell lines were investigated with the use of GTG-staining. Modal chromosome set consists of 20 and 18 chromosomes respectively. The karyotypes of both cell lines were stable with constant ratio of normal chromosomes and chromosomes with structural rearrangements. Monosomy for chromosomes 1, 2, 4, 5, 8 was observed in both cell lines and for chromosome 9 in CHO(dhfr-)/susp cell line. The differences between CHO(dhfr-) cell lines studied by us consists of inclusion of part of chromosome 7 in der(6)t(1;6), rearrangement of del(5) and monosomy of chromosome 9. It was shown that in karyotypes of all CHO cell lines studied up today there are 5 common structurally chromosome rearrangements: del(2), inv(3), add(6), del(9) and mar1. In both CHO(dhfr-) cell lines investigated by us three unique chromosome rearrangements: del(1), der(6)t(1,6) and mar3 were revealed. Necessity of simultaneous GTG and FISH analysis of chromosomes rearrangements in the CHO cell lines under study is discussed. |
Comparison of susceptibility of pest Euschistus servus and predator Podisus maculiventris (Heteroptera: Pentatomidae) to selected insecticides.
Susceptibility of the brown stink bug, Euschistus serous (Say), and the spined soldier bug, Podisus maculiventris (Say), to acetamiprid, cyfluthrin, dicrotophos, indoxacarb, oxamyl, and thiamethoxam, was compared in residual and oral toxicity tests. Generally, susceptibility of P. maculiventris to insecticides was significantly greater than or not significantly different from that of E. servus. Cyfluthrin and oxamyl were more toxic to the predator than to E. servus in residual and feeding tests, respectively. Dicrotophos is the only compound that exhibited both good residual and oral activity against E. servus, but even this toxicant was more toxic to the predator than to the pest in oral toxicity tests. Feeding on indoxacarb-treated food caused high mortality for both nymphs and adults of P. maculiventris. In contrast, E. servus was unaffected by feeding on food treated with this compound. Insecticide selectivity to P. maculiventris was detected only with acetamiprid for adults in residual toxicity tests and for nymphs in oral toxicity tests. Because insecticide selectivity to P. maculiventris was limited, it is extremely important to conserve P. maculiventris in cotton fields by applying these insecticides for control of brown stink bugs only when the pest reaches economic threshold. |
The Urban Development Institute, which lobbies to curb renters’ rights and cut taxes for the rich, is calling on members to oppose pro-rep
British Columbia’s most powerful real estate lobby group is desperately trying to stop the province from adopting a new voting system.
As British Columbians cast votes in a referendum on whether the province should stick with its Victorian-era first-past-the-post system or change to a modern proportional voting system, the head of BC’s biggest real estate lobby group is appealing to real estate developers to stick with the status quo.
In a recent e-mail, Urban Development Institute CEO Anne McMullin urged the group’s members to “VOTE NO,” arguing that a more proportional voting system will make life harder for wealthy developers.
Despite studies showing countries that use proportional voting systems have greater political stability and stronger economies, McMullin claimed without evidence that electoral reform will lead to “government instability and economic instability, impacting housing investments.”
“UDI is deeply concerned,” the real estate lobbyist noted.
The UDI describes itself as the “voice of BC’s real estate industry” and regularly lobbies the BC government on behalf major real estate firms.
Last summer, the group begged the BC government to let landlords hike rents for the province’s struggling renters and spoke against any future increases in protections for renters’ rights under the province’s Residential Tenancy Act.
The UDI also opposes BC’s popular speculation tax and wants the provincial government to cut taxes for people who own real estate worth over $3 million in the province’s wealthiest neighbourhoods. The powerful lobby group also criticized the Land Owners’ Transparency Act, a piece of legislation designed to clamp down on tax fraud and money laundering in BC’s real estate sector.
Leading UDI directors include Jon Stovell, whose company is currently trying to evict tenants from a 15-storey apartment building in Vancouver, recently claimed proportional representation has turned Sweden into a “train wreck” and predicted “intolerant parties” could end up “calling the shots” if BC adopts pro-rep (outside of BC’s three big parties, the vote share of all other parties combined during the last provincial election amounted to less than 2%).
PR Train Wreck in Sweeden. NDP/Green peeps do do you really want to have Intolerance parties sitting across from you in the legislature and maybe even calling the shots. Careful what you wish for: https://t.co/PC2lL7qApL — Jon Stovell (@JonStovell) November 9, 2018
Earlier this year, a group of four UDI-affiliated companies announced plans to replace nearly 400 residential units with expensive high-rise condos in Burnaby. The plan is expected to displace thousands of renters.
Other real estate corporations represented on the UDI board include Hollyburn Properties, a company that evicted dozens of tenants from a Vancouver apartment building in 2010, as well as Rize Alliance, a firm known for trying to replace affordable housing units with luxury condos in Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside.
Also on the UDI board is Beedie Developments Vice President Houtan Rafii, whose company unsuccessfully tried to get permission to construct a luxury apartment complex in the heart of Vancouver’s historic China Town. The company’s founder Ryan Beedie is a major BC Liberal donor as well as a top-tier donor to the official campaign against election reform in BC.
Several other real estate giants have also publicly called for votes against electoral reform. Developer and Vancouver Canucks owner Francesco Aquilini said he is “opposed” to proportional representation and claimed that modernizing BC’s dysfunctional electoral system is a “terrible idea.”
Proportional Representation in B.C. would create more problems than it is supposedly meant to solve. I agree with this @BIVNews editorial about why changing our current electoral system is a terrible idea.https://t.co/073DP27mj4 — Francesco Aquilini (@fr_aquilini) October 23, 2018
In 2014, Aquilini’s property company kicked out residents from a historic apartment building in order to construct a plush 11-storey tower primed for wealthier clients.
Under BC’s current first-past-the-post electoral system, corporate interest groups like the UDI can maximize their influence on government policy by only having to lobby one political party at a time. That’s because under first-past-the-post, one political party can wield 100% of the power despite receiving less than half the popular vote.
#ProportionalRepresentation means a louder voice for regular people, & less influence from lobbyists & donors. And groups who have grown accustomed to power in govt are getting worried their easy street is about to become a dead end.”#pr4bc #ProRep #bcpoli #millenials4pr https://t.co/o1efogrVXo — Fair Vote Canada BC (@fairvotebc) November 4, 2018
While in government, the BC Liberals received around $12 million in donations from real estate firms, many of them linked to the UDI. Conveniently, real estate lobbyists were able to exercise powerful influence over the BC Liberal government’s housing policy. Christy Clark’s government was known for implementing developer-friendly policies and taking slow action on rising numbers of “renoviction” projects in Vancouver.
The BC Liberal administration was also accused of turning a blind eye to money laundering and tax-fraud schemes connected to the real estate industry.
In 2016, lawyer and researcher Richard Kirkland told the Vancouver Sun:
“When you look at the real estate industry and our domestic political party system, there are links. And so a reduction in the number of clients would logically be against the interests of the real estate industry. Connect the dots.”
Several top-donors donors listed on the official anti-reform campaign’s financial disclosure reports are major developers with interests in relaxing regulations in the real estate sector. |
Graviola Shown to kill malignant cells in 12 different types of cancer,
Graviola tree, also known as soursop, is found in the Amazon jungle and some of the Caribbean islands. The Annona muricata tree produces a delicious fruit which is widely consumed by indigenous peoples. (There seems to be some confusion regarding calling the graviola fruit Brazilian pawpaw or papaw since fruits from other plant species may also be called pawpaw, such as the tropical fruit papaya
In the early 1990s A billion-dollar drug company in the United States tried, in secret for nearly seven years, to synthesize two of the tree's most powerful anti cancerous chemicals. In the early 1990s, behind lock and key, this well-known drug giant began searching for a cure for cancer--while preciously guarding their opportunity to patent it and, therefore, profit from it. Not with standing that many thousands of Cancer sufferers may have benefited from the discovery of Graviola. Breast cancer sufferers may want to look at Graviola if the drug " Herceptin " is beyond their budget Although not yet tested in human trials, the Graviola tree has been studied in
more than 20 laboratory tests since the 1970s, where it's been shown to:
Albert Schweitzer MD Each patient carries his own Doctor in side of him
FACT :Your Doctor will not Cure You
FACT : Only you (as your own doctor within you) can cure yourself
Approx 2,000,000 new cancer cases this year will be diagnosed.
Patients who are subject to Chemotherapy will have a greater chance of developing
Leukemia
Bone Cancer
soft Tissue Cancer
Practices like chemotherapy used in the war as Mustard Gas are Barbaric
Radiation therapy is barbaric would you stand in front of a Nuclear Bomb to cure yourself yet doctors recommend this
Modern-day chemotherapy has its origins on the battlefields of the First World War. Military Doctors noticed that soldiers exposed to mustard gas, a chemical warfare agent, died because their bone marrow was destroyed (a condition called 'bone marrow aplasia').
Yet YOUR Doctor and cancer society recommends Chemo and Radiation and Surgery because it makes them money and plenty of it.
Unfortunately, a mammogram uses ionizing radiation at a relatively high dose, which in and of itself can contribute to the development of breast cancer. Mammograms expose your body to radiation that can be 1,000 times greater than that from a chest x-ray, which we know poses a cancer risk. Mammography also compresses your breasts tightly, which could lead to a dangerous spread of cancerous cells, should they exist.
And, should you end up getting a breast biopsy, then that too can have detrimental consequences.
If I was a woman, I wouldn’t get one as there are much safer options available.
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Specifications TableSubjectPsychology (General); Social PsychologySpecific subject areaPsychology of Religion; Religion in the Workplace; I--O psychology; Ethical Behavior; Organizational Behavior; Society, Culture, and ReligionType of dataTableHow data were acquiredData was acquired through a cross-sectional survey. Printed questionnaires were distributed to targeted population.Data formatRaw\
AnalyzedParameters for data collectionSamples consisted of Malay Muslim teachers in Brunei. They were sampled from two different types of school systems: non-religious schools and religious schools.Description of data collectionSchool authorities were contacted and liaise with to distribute questionnaires, which were then collected after one month.Data source locationDistrict: Belait, Tutong, and Brunei-Muara\
Country: BruneiData accessibilityData is included with this article, and on Mendeley Data Repository: Mendeley Data <https://data.mendeley.com/datasets/j22dcftx7y/draft?a=b90c5bf3-72c1-4060-93a9-592e339324d5>Related research articleArticle 1:\
Aminnuddin, N. A. (2019). Predicting Islamic ethical work behavior using the theory of planned behavior and religiosity in Brunei. The Journal of Behavioral Science, 14(1), 1--13. Retrieved from <https://www.tci-thaijo.org/index.php/IJBS/article/view/147140>\
Article 2:\
Aminnuddin, N. A. (2019). Demographic factors and religious dimensions as predictors of Islamic ethical work behavior in Brunei. Psychological Thought. 12(2), 185--201. <https://doi.org/10.5964/psyct.v12i2.386>**Value of the Data**•The data exhibits the interplay of religion and theory of planned behavior that can help to understand intention and actualization of Islamic ethical work behavior.•These data can be useful for researchers in social psychology, psychology of religion, and behavioral sciences, as well as others who are interested to have a clearer picture of religion and ethical behavior, including those in human resource management.•Considering limited availability of studies that examined determinants of Islamic ethical work behavior \[[@bib1]\] and predicting it \[[@bib2]\], the data paper can provide a starting point in further replicating and extending literature, especially in other countries.•Researchers can examine group differences based on demographic variables, including gender and school system.•Social desirability and attitude in the data provide a snapshot of how the behavior in question is viewed at this specific time period, which can be used as reference point.•The data represents valuable information concerning the notion that religion is integral in the Bruneian society where it permeates every aspects of life, even though religiosity level may differ depending on the dimensions, of which this information can be useful for researchers and policymakers.
1. Data description {#sec1}
===================
The data comprised of survey data that examined Islamic ethical work behavior (see "Dataset" file under [supplementary material](#appsec1){ref-type="sec"}). Data included were demographics, and measures on religiosity and theory of planned behavior. All items had been properly labeled with values assigned, including ratings. Sampled population consisted of a convenience sample of Malay Muslim teachers in Brunei (370 teachers). Some demographics information were missing. The sample was drawn from non-religious schools (218 teachers) and religious schools (152 teachers). The participants were made up of 79 males and 289 females. Majority of them had a bachelor\'s degree (69.89%), followed by master\'s degree (25.14%) and diploma (4.97%). The participants also reported that religion influenced their life: perception of personal religiosity (88.83%), upbringing (85.01%), and work environment (83.88%). Demographics are presented (see [Table 1](#tbl1){ref-type="table"}).Table 1Demographics of participants (N = 370).Table 1VariablesCategory*NMSD*%School SystemNon-religious schools21858.92%Religious schools15241.08%Total3701.590.49Age Group21--25102.72%26--305916.08%31--359826.70%36--408523.16%41--509626.16%50 and above195.18%Total3673.691.24GenderMale7921.47%Female28978.53%Total3681.790.41Marital statusSingle9024.52%Married27775.48%Total3671.750.43Education levelDiploma184.97%Bachelor\'s degree25369.89%Master\'s degree9125.14%Total3622.200.51Employment statusFulltime3661.000.00100.00%Work experience5 years or less7921.41%6--10 years9425.47%11--20 years14940.38%21 years or more4712.74%Total3692.440.97Do you consider yourself as religious?No20.54%Neutral3910.63%Yes32688.83%Total3672.880.34Do you consider yourself growing up in an environment influenced by religion?No61.63%Neutral4913.35%Yes31285.01%Total3672.830.41Do you consider your current work environment influenced by religion?No102.73%Neutral4913.39%Yes30783.88%Total3662.810.46
2. Experimental design, materials, and methods {#sec2}
==============================================
This data article aimed at documenting data to examine Islamic ethical work behavior, grounded on religiosity and theory of planned behavior. The data had been used for several papers \[[@bib1],[@bib2]\] and still has research values. The parameter of sample population was for the person to be a teacher of Malay ethnicity, religion being Islam, and of Bruneian nationality. Out of Brunei\'s four districts, Brunei-Muara has the highest population density, followed by Belait, and then Tutong, with Temburong having the lowest. Statistics for the year 2016 of schools and teachers were taken from Brunei Darussalam Statistical Yearbook 2016 \[[@bib3]\]. There was a total of 175 public schools with 8470 teachers in Brunei Darussalam: 103 schools with 6280 teachers in Brunei-Muara, 24 schools with 945 teachers in Belait, 36 schools with 1013 teachers in Tutong, and 12 schools with 232 teachers in Temburong.
The numbers of schools and teachers were concentrated mostly in Brunei-Muara. The numbers were roughly similar in Belait and Tutong, while the numbers were extremely and negligibly small in Temburong. Hence, Temburong is excluded from this study due to a very low population, and the target sample population from the other three districts was deemed as adequate.
Two types of school systems were selected: non-religious schools and religious schools. For non-religious schools, the following were selected: Sekolah Menengah Sayyidina Ali in Belait; Pusat Tingkatan Enam Tutong in Tutong; and Sekolah Menengah Sultan Muhammad Jamalul Alam, Sekolah Menengah Sayyidina Hasan, and Pusat Tingkatan Enam Meragang in Brunei-Muara. For religious schools, in Belait and Tutong, there was only one in each district. In Brunei-Muara, there were only four of these schools. Therefore, for religious schools, the following five schools were selected: Sekolah Arab Belait in Belait; Ma\'had Islam Brunei in Tutong; and Sekolah Persediaan Arab Sungai Akar, Sekolah Ugama Arab Menengah Perempuan Raja Isteri Pengiran Anak Damit, and Sekolah Menengah Arab Lelaki Hassanal Bolkiah in Brunei-Muara.
Relevant authorities were contacted to get approval. Following approval, copies of questionnaires were sent to liaison officers at schools to be distributed to participants. Liaison officers were strictly instructed to only distribute it among local Malay Bruneians. Questionnaires were to be completed anonymously. Participants were also informed they have the choice not to return the questionnaires or to submit an uncompleted copy.
In the dataset, for theory of planned behavior, the measures were attitude toward behavior (ATB), subjective norm (SN), perceived behavioral control (PBC), and behavioral intention (BI). Islamic ethical work behavior in the dataset was labeled as IEWB and measured only with a single item. ATB has two sub-measures: instrumental (ATBI) and experiential (ATBE). SN has injunctive (SNI) and descriptive (SND). PBC has capacity (PBCC) and autonomy (PBCA). Each sub-measure had three items. Items were labeled with numbers (e.g., ATBI1 and SND3). The process of developing the measures were done adhering to several guidelines \[[@bib4],[@bib5]\]. Items, including labels and ratings, will further be explained later on, with more comprehensive detail as [supplementary material](#appsec1){ref-type="sec"} (see "Annotated Questionnaire" file under [supplementary material](#appsec1){ref-type="sec"}). This is because each item has different ratings and choices.
In order to measure religiosity, seven scales from Psychological Measures of Islamic Religiosity were used \[[@bib6]\]. The scales were Islamic beliefs scale (IBS) with 5 items, Islamic ethical principles scale (IEPS) with 10 items, Islamic universality scale (IUS) with 4 items, Islamic duty scale (IDS) with 5 items, Islamic obligation scale (IOS) with 5 items, Islamic exclusivism scale (IES) with 4 items, and global religiousness scale (GRS) with 2 items. Similar to measures of theory of planned behavior, religiosity items were also assigned with numbers (e.g., IBS1 and IEPS5). Items, including labels and ratings, will further be explained later on, with more comprehensive detail as [supplementary material](#appsec1){ref-type="sec"} (see "Annotated Questionnaire" file under [supplementary material](#appsec1){ref-type="sec"}). This is because in some scales, items have varying ratings and choices.
In the dataset itself, all items for both measures of theory of planned behavior and religiosity were properly labeled. Ratings were also provided in the dataset. Furthermore, items were computed to conceive their respective measure\'s mean values, and then labeled as their composite counterpart (e.g., all items under ATB were averaged resulting to ATBMean in the dataset).
However, due to the dataset containing multiple measures and their items having varying ratings (even within measures), an annotated questionnaire is attached for a clearer picture of the data (see "Annotated Questionnaire" file under [supplementary material](#appsec1){ref-type="sec"}). The annotated questionnaire provides list of items in the questionnaires that were distributed to participants, and composite variables that had been computed, with annotations, including labels and ratings as assigned in the dataset.
Reliabilities of instruments (see [Table 2](#tbl2){ref-type="table"}) and correlations between variables (see [Table 3](#tbl3){ref-type="table"}) were also reported. Measures concerning theory of planned behavior had no items deleted. However, for religiosity, one item was removed from IES to improve reliability. For IBS, respondents had a consensus of agreeing to a single rating, which led to inability to evaluate its reliability. All showed adequate evidence for reliability, while correlation pairings were mostly significant, with the exception of pairings with IOS.Table 2Reliability of measures.Table 2ScaleItemsReliabilityItem deletedFinal ReliabilityATBATBI1 to ATBI3, and ATBE1 to ATBE3.93--.93SNSNI1 to SNI3, and SND1 to SND3.89--.89PBCPBCC1 to PBCC3, and PBCA1 to PBCA3.71--.71BIBI1 to BI6.91--.91IBSIBS1 to IBS5------IEPSIEPS1 to IEPS10.91--.91IUSIUS1 to IUS4.81--.81IDSIDS1 to IDS5.67--.67IOSIOS1 to IOS5.79--.79IESIES1 to IES4.35IES3.77GRSGRS1 and GRS2.89--.89Table 3Correlation of measures.Table 3ATBSNPBCBIRBIEPSIUSIDSIOSIESGRSATB1.63\*\*.68\*\*.88\*\*.65\*\*.59\*\*.54\*\*.45\*\*.06.33\*\*.35\*\*SN1.63\*\*.63\*\*.70\*\*.41\*\*.41\*\*.27\*\*.05.24\*\*.38\*\*PBC1.69\*\*.69\*\*.45\*\*.39\*\*.30\*\*.03.27\*\*.31\*\*BI1.65\*\*.53\*\*.45\*\*.40\*\*.06.26\*\*.33\*\*RB1.51\*\*.48\*\*.38\*\*.13.22\*\*.39\*\*IEPS1.71\*\*.36\*\*.33\*\*.23\*\*.39\*\*IUS1.39\*\*.23\*\*.26\*\*.37\*\*IDS1.10.23\*\*.36\*\*IOS1.09.09IES1.19\*\*GRS1[^1]
Conflict of Interest {#appsec1}
====================
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.
Appendix A. Annotated Questionnaire {#appsec2}
===================================
The following is the Supplementary data to this article:Multimedia component 1Multimedia component 1
The author gratefully acknowledges the contribution of all participants, the authorities who granted approvals, and faculty members at Universiti Brunei Darussalam. The author expresses his sincerest gratitude specifically toward Stephen C. Druce (Academy of Brunei Studies, Universiti Brunei Darussalam) for supervising the research, and to Harris Shah Bin Abd Hamid (Department of Educational Psychology and Counselling, Faculty of Education, Universiti Malaya) for his supervision during Master\'s program that inspired this research at the doctorate level.
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dib.2020.105157>.
[^1]: \*\* ≤ 0.01.
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INTRODUCTION
============
Iatrogenic demineralization of enamel during orthodontic treatment is a concern for orthodontists \[[@B1]\]. Several attempts have been made to address this problem such as diet changes, lowering carbohydrate intake, efficient oral hygiene measures and rinsing fluoride mouthwashes \[[@B2]\]. Application of sealants \[[@B3]\], fluoride releasing bonding agents \[[@B4]\], elastic modules impregnated with fluoride \[[@B5]\] and fluoride varnishes are the most commonly used preventative methods by orthodontists. Despite all these efforts, we still witness white spot lesions following bracket removal. If a void exists between the adhesive and enamel surface at the margin of brackets, this could lead to microleakage and accumulation of cariogenic bacteria in inaccessible areas \[[@B6],[@B7]\]. Such voids are responsible for some cases of white spot lesions. These lesions occur in about 45% of orthodontic patients \[[@B4]\] and according to a previous study, they have a higher incidence in males \[[@B8]\]. They are unsightly and appear as enamel opacity, involving at least one-third of the labial surface \[[@B9]\]. Occasionally, they may result in discontinuation of treatment without achieving the treatment goals. Another concern is the gap between metal brackets and adhesives. Empty pockets at the margins of this interface should be prevented. Corrosion and craters in the stainless steel bracket base initiate at the gap developed between the brackets and adhesives.
Arhun et al. investigated the amount of microleakage following the application of different adhesive systems for bonding ceramic and metal brackets. In their study, the amount of microleakage was reported to be higher beneath the metal brackets at both interfaces regardless of the adhesive system used \[[@B6]\].
Uysal et al, also reported higher amount of microleakage at the gingival in comparison to the occlusal margin (light curing was done at the occlusal margin for both adhesive systems) \[[@B7]\]. Although use of light activated composites has become popular in orthodontics, prevention of light penetration by metal brackets, the most commonly used attachments in fixed orthodontics, is a major concern \[[@B10]\]. Also, the stress due to the polymerization shrinkage is among the most important problems associated with light-activated composites \[[@B11]\].
If the contracting forces of curing resins overcome the bond of adhesive, marginal failure and microleakage may result \[[@B12]\]. To overcome this side effect, various curing procedures have been proposed.
The suggested three-sided light curing technique was based on the assumption that contraction of photo-activated composite resin is directed toward the light source \[[@B13]\]. In our study, the transillumination technique was used to assess its efficacy for bonding of metal brackets. This method was initially suggested for cementation of acid-etched fixed partial dentures. In this technique, the light is illuminated from the back of the teeth with attachments \[[@B14]\]. Some previous studies have investigated the bond strength of visible light-cured composites using transillumination as a curing technique \[[@B15]--[@B18]\].
In 2013, Kumar et al. showed that 90% of light intensity was lost when using transillumination technique for bonding brackets. They demonstrated that this reduction was related to the buccolingual dimension of teeth. However, they found that both the conventional method and transillumination technique yielded similar results in terms of bond strength of metal brackets \[[@B17]\].
Also, in 2013 Heravi et al. concluded that to achieve an acceptable bracket bond strength for the posterior teeth, doubling the curing time from 40 to 80 seconds and increasing the light intensity to 800 mW/cm^2^ during transillumination technique were required \[[@B18]\]. From the previous studies it can be concluded that transillumination is an applicable technique for improving the bond strength; however, marginal seal is also an important factor to prevent marginal corrosion and bacterial attacks, and inappropriate marginal seal can lead to white spot lesions or bracket bond failure during the course of treatment. To the best of our knowledge, no study has evaluated the effect of transillumination as a curing technique on the microleakage beneath metal orthodontic brackets. The aim of this study was to evaluate the effect of transillumination as a light curing technique on the amount of microleakage, in comparison to the conventional technique of curing, using two methods of enamel conditioning.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
=====================
According to a study by Arhun et al, 120 freshly extracted bovine deciduous mandibular incisors were collected for this study \[[@B6]\]. The teeth were examined to be free of surface developmental defects and cracks under direct light. The soft tissue remnants and the debris were removed and the specimens were polished with pumice paste and rubber cups for 10 seconds each, and were then stored in distilled water for one month. Before the onset of the bonding process, all the specimens were disinfected by immersion in 1% thymol solution for one week.
The middle-third of the enamel surface of each tooth was prepared using two enamel preparation methods. The first method included the use of 37% phosphoric acid gel (Unitek, Monrovia, CA) for enamel conditioning and Transbond XT primer (3M, Unitek, Monrovia, CA) as a sealant. In the second method, Transbond Plus (3M, Unitek, Monrovia, CA) was applied as self-etching primer. The stainless steel twin maxillary central incisor brackets (.022-in-Daynalock series, 3M, Monrovia, CA) were bonded on the middle third of the buccal surface in all samples with Transbond XT (3M, Unitek, Monrovia, CA), a light-cured orthodontic resin, using a light curing unit (Coltolux 75, Coltene/Whaledent GmbH, Langenau, Germany) with a light intensity of 530 mW/mm^2^.
In order to maintain a fixed distance and angle of light curing, a holder was designed and used to set the position of the samples at 5 mm distance from the tip of the light-curing unit. The device held the samples vertically in such a way that the tip of the light-curing unit was perpendicular to the long axis of the samples on both sides depending on the group of samples ([Fig. 1](#F1){ref-type="fig"}). The samples were randomly divided into four groups of 30 teeth and were prepared as follows: Group I: The teeth were etched with 37% phosphoric acid for 30 seconds, and then rinsed and dried for 20 seconds with oil-free air spray. The brackets were bonded using Transbond XT primer as the sealant and Transbond XT as the adhesive. Finally, the mesial and distal margins of the brackets were light cured for 10 seconds each.Group II: The same methods of enamel preparation and bracket bonding were applied as in group I; but transillumination (applying the light source to the middle third of the lingual surface) was used for 50 seconds as the technique of resin polymerization.Group III: Transbond Plus self-etching primer was applied for 3--5 seconds with mild pressure of the brush according to the manufacturer's instructions, followed by a gentle burst of air for 1--2 seconds. Then, the brackets were bonded using Transbond XT and 10 seconds of light curing was performed at the mesial and distal margins.Group IV: The same method of enamel preparation as in group III was applied; but transillumination for 50 seconds from the lingual side was used as the method of curing. Thermal cycling in deionized water was performed at 5 ± 2° C -- 55 ± 2° C for 500 cycles with a dwell time of 30 seconds and transfer time of 5 seconds. Then, the samples were stored in distilled water at room temperature and a dark environment for three months for the aging process.
{#F1}
Microleakage evaluation:
------------------------
For evaluation of microleakage in all margins, each group was randomly divided into two subgroups of 15 samples in order to perform tooth sectioning in two different directions. In subgroup one, the teeth were sectioned from the middle of the brackets in incisogingival direction while in subgroup two, the teeth were sectioned in mesiodistal direction to evaluate the margins that were directly light cured as instructed by the manufacturer. The apices of all teeth were sealed with sticky wax and then all surfaces were coated with two layers of nail varnish except for 1 mm around the bracket margins. In the next step, the samples were immersed in 0.5% basic fuchsine solution for 24 hours at room temperature.
After removal from the solution, the teeth were rinsed with distilled water, the superficial dye was removed with a brush and the teeth were left to dry.
The samples were embedded in epoxy resin blocks according to the direction of sections using an index in the heavy putty impression ([Fig. 2](#F2){ref-type="fig"}).
{#F2}
Sectioning was carried out using a low-speed diamond saw (Accutom-50, Struers, Denmark).
All samples were numbered before sectioning according to their group allocation and were examined randomly under a stereomicroscope (Motic, Xiamen, China) at ×40 magnification. The microleakage scores were directly recorded using an electronic digital caliper (GuangLu Measuring Instrument Co. Ltd, Shanghai, China) by a single blinded observer (SH.A).
Half of the samples were randomly examined blindly for the second time under the same stereomicroscope by the same observer (SH.A) after a week to assess the intra-observer error of measurements. The incisogingival and mesiodistal dimensions of each section were examined at enamel-adhesive and adhesive-bracket interfaces (in each side) and scored based on the amount of microleakage ([Fig. 3](#F3){ref-type="fig"}).
{#F3}
Statistical analysis:
---------------------
For data analysis, the mean and standard deviation values of all groups were obtained using SPSS version 15.0 (Microsoft, IL, USA).
To compare the sides and interfaces within each group (dependent samples), the non-parametric Wilcoxon Singed Rank test was used. The Kruskal-Wallis (independent non-parametric test) and the Mann-Whitney U tests with Bonferroni correction were used to compare the groups. Intra-examiner error was evaluated by the kappa statistic. The level of statistical significance was set at α=0.05.
RESULTS
=======
The overall intra-observer agreement for each group was high (kappa value of 0.792).
In case of disagreements, the mean of measurements was reported. All groups showed microleakage at the incisal and gingival margins; but in comparison between conventional and transillumination groups, significant differences were observed only between incisal and gingival margins in the transillumination group (P\<0.001).
Comparison of mesial and distal margins revealed no statistically significant differences in any group (P\>0.05). When direct illumination and transillumination were compared as the two methods of curing, the amount of microleakage was significantly higher at the gingival margins compared to the incisal margins in both interfaces in the transillumination group irrespective of the method of enamel preparation (P\<0.05).
At the mesial and distal margins, there were no differences among the groups ([Tables 1](#T1){ref-type="table"} and [2](#T2){ref-type="table"}). Comparison of groups based on the method of enamel conditioning revealed no significant differences at the incisal and gingival margins in any of the interfaces; but at the mesial and distal margins, only group seven (self-etching primer + direct illumination) showed significantly lower microleakage score in comparison with group five (acid-etching + direct illumination) (P=0.001).
######
Comparison of microleakage scores (mm) between enamel-adhesive and adhesive-bracket interfaces in buccolingual sections[^a^](#TFN1){ref-type="table-fn"}
**Margin** **N** **Group[^b^](#TFN2){ref-type="table-fn"}** **Enamel-adhesive** **Adhesive-bracket** **P value**
-------------- ------- -------------------------------------------- --------------------- ---------------------- ------------- ------ ------ ----
**Incisal** 15 1 0.18 0.10 0.13 0.19 .066 NS
15 2 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.12 .475 NS
15 3 0.18 0.10 0.14 0.12 .125 NS
15 4 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.13 .553 NS
**Gingival** 15 1 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.22 .476 NS
15 2 0.40 0.16 0.35 0.14 .142 NS
15 3 0.21 0.09 0.21 0.13 .556 NS
15 4 0.34 0.14 0.26 0.09 .056 NS
N indicates sample size; SD, standard deviation; S, significant; NS, not significant
Group 1: Acid etching + direct illumination; Group 2: Acid etching + transillumination; Group 3: Self etching primer + direct illumination; Group 4: Self etching primer + transillumination.
######
Comparison of microleakage scores (mm) between enamel-adhesive and adhesive-bracket interfaces in mesiodistal sections[^a^](#TFN3){ref-type="table-fn"}
**Margin** **N** **Group[^b^](#TFN4){ref-type="table-fn"}** **Enamel-adhesive** **Adhesive-bracket** **P value**
------------ ------- -------------------------------------------- --------------------- ---------------------- ------------- ------ ------ ----
**Mesial** 15 5 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.15 .783 NS
15 6 0.14 0.13 0.17 0.15 261 NS
15 7 0.03 0.04 0.16 0.16 .018 S
15 8 0.07 0.10 0.17 0.14 .054 NS
**Distal** 15 5 0.22 0.21 0.26 0.22 .414 NS
15 6 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.16 .767 NS
15 7 0.02 0.04 0.17 0.15 .008 S
15 8 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.10 .332 NS
N indicates sample size; SD, standard deviation; S, significant; NS, not significant
Group 5: Acid etching + direct illumination; Group 6: Acid etching + transillumination; Group 7: Self etching primer + direct illumination; Group 8: Self etching primer + transillumination
Multiple comparisons among all groups are shown in [Tables 3](#T3){ref-type="table"} and [4](#T4){ref-type="table"} with Bonferroni correction.
######
Multiple comparisons of microleakage scores among groups at incisal and gingival margins in enamel-adhesive and adhesive-bracket interfaces[^a^](#TFN5){ref-type="table-fn"}
**Interface** **Margin** **N** **Group[^b^](#TFN6){ref-type="table-fn"}** **One-way ANOVA P value** **Multiple Comparisons**
-------------------------------- ------------ --------- -------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------ -------------------------- ---- --
**Enamel-adhesive interface** Incisal 15 Group 1 .492 NS NS
15 Group 2 NS
15 Group 3 NS
15 Group 4
Gingival 15 Group 1 .003 [\*\*](#TFN7){ref-type="table-fn"} NS
15 Group 2 NS
15 Group 3 [\*](#TFN6){ref-type="table-fn"}
15 Group 4
**Adhesive-bracket interface** Incisal 15 Group 1 .932 NS NS
15 Group 2 NS
15 Group 3 NS
15 Group 4
Gingival 15 Group 1 .006 [\*](#TFN6){ref-type="table-fn"} NS
15 Group 2 NS
15 Group 3 [\*](#TFN6){ref-type="table-fn"}
15 Group 4
N indicates sample size; SD, standard deviation; S, significant; NS, not significant;
P\< 0.05;
P\<0.01
Group 1: Acid etching + direct illumination; Group 2: Acid etching + transillumination; Group 3: Self etching primer + direct illumination; Group 4: Self etching primer + transillumination.
######
Multiple comparisons of microleakage scores among groups at the mesial and distal margins in enamel-adhesive and adhesive-bracket interfaces[^a^](#TFN9){ref-type="table-fn"}
**Interface** **Margin** **N** **Group[^b^](#TFN10){ref-type="table-fn"}** **P value** **Multiple comparisons**
-------------------------------- ------------ --------- --------------------------------------------- ------------- ------------------------------------- ------------------------------------- --
**Enamel-adhesive interface** Mesial 15 Group 5 .012 NS [\*\*](#TFN11){ref-type="table-fn"}
15 Group 6 NS
15 Group 7 NS
15 Group 8
Distal 15 Group 5 .008 NS [\*\*](#TFN11){ref-type="table-fn"}
15 Group 6 NS
15 Group 7 NS
15 Group 8
**Adhesive-bracket interface** Mesial 15 Group 5 .955 NS NS
15 Group 6 NS
15 Group 7 NS
15 Group 8
Distal 15 Group 5 .271 NS NS
15 Group 6 NS
15 Group 7 NS
15 Group 8
N indicates sample size; SD, standard deviation; S, significant; NS, not significant;
P\< 0.05;
P\<0.01
Group 5: Acid etching + direct illumination; Group 6: Acid etching + transillumination; Group 7: Self etching primer + direct illumination; Group 8: Self etching primer +transillumination.
DISCUSSION
==========
Enamel decalcification during fixed orthodontic treatment is a major concern for clinicians. This process occurs rapidly and mineral loss has been reported even within a few months of treatment initiation \[[@B1],[@B19]\]. The aim of the current study was to compare the amount of microleakage of an orthodontic adhesive following the use of two different methods of enamel conditioning and light curing.
In this study, we used bovine incisors as available substitutes for human incisors. Bovine deciduous lower incisors have nearly the size of permanent human maxillary central incisors, which are the most ideal for testing bonding properties since they provide flat bonding surfaces. These two types of teeth have been compared in a number of previous studies \[[@B15],[@B20], [@B21]\]. The assumption that the contraction of photo-activated composite resins is directed toward the light source \[[@B13]\], and also the problem of not being able to directly cure the composite resin under metal brackets led to the idea of evaluating transillumination as a method of curing in this study. Behrents et al, also supported the use of this technique for bonding of lingual attachments due to its practical application in the oral environment \[[@B22]\]. In the current study, the group conditioned with self-etching primer showed less microleakage. One reason for less microleakage following the use of self-etching adhesive systems at margins cured directly could be the simultaneous penetration of etchant and monomer and the identical length of primer tags in the etched enamel.
In contrast to the conventional method of enamel conditioning, self-etching primers produce a uniform and more conservative etched pattern providing uniform adhesive penetration and less aggressive enamel demineralization \[[@B23]\]. In a study conducted by Vicente et al, on the effect of thermocycling on the microleakage beneath brackets bonded to bovine incisors, they found that microleakage increased significantly at the enamel-adhesive interface when using Transbond XT as the bonding agent \[[@B20]\]. In the current study, thermocycling was performed for all samples. This may explain the greater amount of microleakage at all margins in comparison with some other studies on this topic \[[@B7], [@B24]\]. In 2013, Sabzevari et al. demonstrated that thermocycling did not significantly increase the microleakage when a self-etching primer was used as a conditioner. However, comparison of different methods of bonding after thermocycling showed no significant differences between self-etching primers and the conventional method of conditioning \[[@B25]\].
Surface conditioning causes leakage of fluid and bacteria beneath the orthodontic brackets; thus, a deeper etching pattern with acid etchant cannot guarantee an interface free of microleakage \[[@B26]\]. This is also supported by an in vivo study by Feigal and Quelhas \[[@B27]\].
On the other hand, less penetrated resin tags in these systems may not resist the contracting forces of resin shrinkage \[[@B28]\]. However, this is acceptable in restorative dentistry when a bulk of composite is placed in a prepared cavity \[[@B29]\]. Orthodontic adhesive layers are very thin and the free, floating brackets are pulled closer to the enamel surface by the shrinkage \[[@B30]\]. The amount of microleakage reported in our study was lower than that in some previous studies \[[@B6],[@B7]\]; this finding is in agreement with less microleakage reported for Transbond XT in an in vitro study by Sener et al \[[@B31]\].
Less microleakage at the margins of specimens in self-etching primer groups cured directly is similar to the results of a study by Uysal et al, which showed significantly higher scores at the gingival compared to the occlusal margins (where the tip of the light curing unit was positioned) \[[@B7]\].
Another factor that should be taken into account regarding the microleakage scores is a phenomenon called percolation. The linear coefficient of thermal expansion for enamel, metal brackets and the adhesive is not the same (α=12 for enamel, α=16 for stainless steel brackets and α=20--55 ppm/c for composite resin) \[[@B6]\]. These materials expand and contract at different rates when hot and cold foods are consumed; thus, the fluids are sucked in and pushed out at the margins of the brackets bonded to the teeth in both tooth-adhesive and adhesive-bracket interfaces. This can lead to microbial leakage at both interfaces \[[@B6]\].
The greater the light energy received by the composite, the greater the polymerization; therefore, transillumination must provide greater light energy than direct curing \[[@B32],[@B33]\]. Since pulpal temperature should not exceed 5°--6° C, extending the exposure time should be done with caution. With 1 mm of dentine between the composite and the pulp, the temperature increases to 6°C with 40 seconds of continuous exposure \[[@B34]\]. In orthodontics, the enamel and dentine are thicker and provide greater pulpal insulation. Oesterle and Shellhart reported comparable bond strength in the group using transillumination for 50 seconds with the group cured for 40 seconds at the margins \[[@B16]\]. However, Heravi et al. concluded that 80 seconds of curing with high power mode of Blue Phase C8LED light curing unit with transillumination technique resulted in a clinically acceptable shear bond strength of brackets to posterior teeth with no risk of pulpal damage \[[@B18]\].
As reported by Yazici et al, and Haiduc et al, LED units cause significantly lower rise of pulp temperature in comparison with halogen light curing units \[[@B35],[@B36]\]. In the current study, the amount of microleakage in the transillumination groups was comparable to that in the conventional curing groups at most of the margins of brackets except for the gingival margin. This may be due to the reflection of light from the bracket base as was pointed out by Oesterle and Shellhart \[[@B16]\].
Also, in 2013 Kumar et al. showed that even though the amount of light intensity lost in transillumination technique was significant, there were no differences in the shear bond strength of brackets bonded by transillumination technique or conventional method of curing at the mesial and distal margins \[[@B17]\].
In our study, only at the gingival margin of the samples, irrespective of the method of enamel conditioning, a significant amount of microleakage was observed. This may be explained by the gradual increase of buccolingual width from the incisal toward the gingival side. Consequently, although some studies reported adequate bond strength by transillumination, microleakage should be a concern especially in teeth with greater thickness.
As concluded by Heravi et al, to achieve an acceptable bracket bond strength to the posterior teeth, doubling the curing time from 40 to 80 seconds and increasing the light intensity to 800 mW/cm^2^ during the transillumination technique should be done \[[@B18]\].
In studies by Ramuglu et al, and Uysal et al, light was irradiated from the occlusal surface and a significant amount of microleakage was reported at the gingival margin. They reasoned that this result might be due to the degradation of light intensity and insufficient polymerization of composite \[[@B24],[@B7]\]. Other studies in which the samples were cured according to the manufacturer's instructions did not score the microleakage at the directly cured margins (mesial and distal margins) \[[@B32],[@B33]\].
In our study, the manufacturers' instructions were followed in all groups and evaluation of all margins showed that the amount of microleakage at the mesial and distal margins was lower than that at the incisal and gingival margins and these differences were statistically significant in groups which received self-etching primer for enamel conditioning. Polymerization starts in areas of resin closest to the light source. Even for metal brackets the best result will be gained if light is irradiated from all four sides of brackets. However, a well-designed study on this technique of curing may better elucidate this topic. It is impossible to extrapolate the results of an in vitro study to the actual oral environment; thus, future studies are necessary for further assessment of results.
CONCLUSION
==========
Within the limitations of this study, use of self-etching primer and conventional light curing method caused less microleakage compared to the transillumination technique. Microleakage will be minimized if all margins of brackets are cured directly. The transillumination technique, irrespective of the method of enamel preparation, caused greater microleakage in both interfaces at the gingival margin and thus should not be used as the method of curing in orthodontic treatment.
|
The present invention relates to wireless communications in general and more particularly to communication using multiple frequency channels, spectra or bands.
IEEE 802.11 and other contention-based Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN) provide low-cost communication systems that help coordinate radio spectrum access for wireless communication systems according to standardized protocols. The 802.11 protocol supports data communication with moderate quality of service requirements using shared radio frequency channels. It was designed to be simple to use, and robust when operating in interference prone environments typical of unlicensed spectra. Such spectra are unlicensed in the sense that compliant devices are free to transmit without previously arranged spectrum or frequency channel assignments.
Accordingly, contention-based protocols are useful in uncoordinated environments, where distributed and independent decision-makers share resources. In wireless communications, one important resource to share by base stations and mobile stations is the available or designated radio spectrum, which is a limited resource. When accessing the available or designated radio spectrum in a distributed way, stations access resources repeatedly for a limited duration, before releasing them again for use by other stations. Transmitting data from a base station to a mobile station is referred to as downlink, whereas communication in the opposite direction is referred to as uplink. Downlink and uplink data transmission in traditional contention-based wireless communication and networking environments typically occur on the same radio spectrum, i.e., the same radio frequencies or frequency channels. Frequency channels sometimes include a block of frequencies in some continuous area of the radio frequency spectrum.
With contention-based protocols, a station waits for a contention period of random duration and, if no other stations begin sending data by the end of that the random wait time, the station will start sending data over the shared frequency channel. However, if another station starts to send data on the shared frequency channel before the end of the contention or wait period, then the station pauses its timer and waits until the spectrum resources are available again, before resuming the contention period count down. Systems that operate in this manner are often referred to as a listen-before-talk or listen-before-send type systems or protocols. Since stations in listen-before-talk systems select random waiting times independently, multiple stations may initiate data exchange at the same time, which is referred to as collision and results in lost data and the undesirable need for re-transmissions. Collision probabilities can be reduced with increasing the contention window at the potential cost of spectrum efficiency. The addition of frequency channels to the available spectrum can alleviate the congestion on heavily trafficked WLANs.
Recently, previously licensed frequency channels have been opened up and made available to unlicensed device and protocols due to changes in certain regulations. For example, TV white space (“TVWS”) refers to spectra that were previously licensed to analog television broadcasters, but is now unlicensed following the transition of licensed television broadcasts from analog form to digital form in different frequency ranges. While the use of TVWS will be unlicensed, there are certain requirements for transmitters and receivers in the allocated wireless frequency ranges that are designed to avoid widespread interference in those frequency ranges.
To operate in the newly released TVWS, a TVWS device (TVWD) should be able to detect unused radio frequency channels in which to operate. Channel availability may change dynamically depending on the environment and the original spectrum usage by the primary system. Some rules of using TVWS prohibit emitting radio signals in certain channels, to avoid unwanted interference to primary radio systems such as terrestrial TV receivers that may be located in close proximity. However, the rules regarding listening in a TVWD (i.e., listen, measure signals, or receive data) are more relaxed relative to the rules regarding transmitting, because listening does not normally create interference.
In the United States, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) regulates wireless transmissions and other countries have radio regulators as well. As for TVWS, FIG. 1 illustrates the FCC's TVWS regulation. Solid lines indicate permissions for secondary usage of TV channels for fixed or portable TV white space devices (TVWDs). Dotted lines indicate channels that are excluded from TVWS. After the digital transition, channels 52-69 will be used for next generation cellular and for public safety applications. The FCC, in its “Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broadcast Bands” report, describes the regulatory framework for the TVWS. The FCC defines two classes of TVWDs: (1) fixed TVWDs and (2) personal/portable TVWDs. The personal/portable TVWDs operate either under control of a fixed TVWD or autonomously. Different regulatory rules are defined for the two different device classes.
Fixed TVWDs are permitted to operate in the VHF channels except channels 3-4, and on the UHF channels, except channels 36-38. The reason for the exclusion of channels 3-4 is to prevent interference with external devices (e.g., DVD players) that are often connected with shielded cables to a TV utilizing these channels. The exclusion for channel 36-38 is to prevent interference with radio astronomy measurements at channel 37. In FIG. 1, exclusions are indicated by dotted instead of solid lines for fixed and portable services.
The operation of portable TVWDs is even more restricted, because of their potentially nomadic mobility pattern. Portable TVWDs are only permitted to operate in the UHF channels starting from channel 21, and with the exception of channel 37. Portable devices are not permitted on channels 14-20, since some metropolitan areas of the U.S. use some of those channels for public safety applications.
For the different VHF and UHF channels, the proposed regulation defines maximum power levels for the fixed and for the portable TVWDs. Fixed TVWDs are permitted to transmit with up to 30 dBm (1000 mW) and additionally with up to 6 dBi antenna gain, resulting in maximum 4000 mW EIRP. Portable TVWDs are permitted to transmit with up to 20 dBm (100 mW) with no antenna gain. A contour protection requires portable TVWDs to further reduce the transmission power when operating on channels adjacent to active TV broadcast channels. The capability to dynamically reduce the transmission power when possible is required for all TVWDs. In general, the requirements of fixed TVWD devices are more relaxed relative to portable TVWDs. All TVWDs must be able to sense spectrum and identify analogue and digital TV signals (ATSC and NTSC TV signals), plus auxiliary primary signals such as wireless microphones, all at a level of −114 dBm (averaged over a predefined bandwidth).
A central geo-location database controls mechanism of TVWS operations. Permission to access channels is given in a location grid of 50 meter accuracy. All fixed TVWDs must provide accurate geo-location at 50 meter accuracy and database access, as well as for all autonomous portable TVWDs that are not operating under control of a fixed TV WD. In the database, an entire venue such as an entertainment venue or an event can be registered and protected against any secondary TVWS activity. Instead of relying on geo-location with GPS or similar means, for fixed TVWDs, a certified installer can configure the device location during setup. Further, fixed TVWDs must transmit their identities and location information to facilitate their detection in interference scenarios.
FIG. 1 illustrates allocation of regulated channels for 802.11 frequency division multiplexing. This is particularly useful where regulations or technical considerations have distinct rules for fixed and portable channels. In such cases, if the more constraining rules apply to one set of frequencies, such as allowing only transmissions from fixed devices, a downlink from a fixed device might be on that one set of frequencies, whereas the uplink is on a more relaxed set of frequencies.
FIG. 2 illustrates the application of TVWS regulations for three example locations in the U.S. In densely populated areas, such as Market Street in San Francisco (top line) or Wall Street in New York City (bottom line), the number of available TVWS channels are zero or close to zero. In Orlando, Fla., a few free channels are available in UHF and in VHF, but because of the restrictive regulation, none of them would be available for fixed and portable secondary spectrum usage with TVWDs. FIG. 2 also illustrates allocation of channels for frequency division multiplexing using portable devices. In some cases, FDM helps with TVWS operations. In the example shown in FIG. 2, TV channel 9 is used for fixed/downlink traffic and TV channel 28 is used for portable/uplink traffic.
Television broadcast signals are protected with a contour, inside which TV white space devices are not allowed to transmit. Within the protected area defined by the contour, there are special rules for operation on a TV channel adjacent to an active TV broadcast channel. Fixed TV white space devices are not permitted to operate on channels adjacent to TV broadcast channels that are allocated to TV broadcast services. Portable devices are permitted to operate on an adjacent TV channel with the maximum allowed transmission power of 16 dBm (4 dB lower than on non-adjacent channels, i.e., 40 mW).
The release of TVWS is one of the biggest allocations of spectrum for unlicensed use that has been created in recent history. Embodiments of the present invention take advantage of the newly available spectrum to increase the efficiency with which bandwidth in WLANs can be utilized. |
Middletown Indiana Dentist Wants to See Your Grin!
Your Middletown Indiana dentists know that even though you like to visit our office every once and a while- we are probably not the #1 people you upkeep your smile for. You smile big for the ones you love, your family, your friends, your fans for a number of reasons. We work daily to enhance the smiles of all of our patients and keep them healthy for just this reason- we know how a smile can change someone’s life.
Have you ever taken a time out to think about why you really smile, though? If not, maybe some of the following reasons will make you want to smile even more than ever before!
All the Looks / All the Feels
There is no doubt in anyone’s mind that you look your best while you smile. Genuine smiling works muscles in the face that help ward off wrinkles and crow’s feet, making you look an average of 5 years younger! Not to mention, smiling also releases all sorts of “feel good” hormones and endorphins that help in battling sickness, sadness and pain. Look your best while feeling your best for all of the selfies you and your circle will take by simply smiling!
Speak Without Saying
Smiling can also be a big way to say things without saying them and is great in several social contexts. Who hasn’t blushed and smiled while they were embarrassed or nervous? What about smiling big to get the attention of someone across the room before sparking up a conversation for the first time? And we all know nothing works better on a new boss than a healthy smile and firm handshake at a job interview. Say all the things you can’t (or might not want to) say with a genuine smile!
Going Viral
While we know you probably saw it last as a poster on the wall of your kindergarten classroom- smiling truly is contagious! Studies show that for every person you smile at, 50% will smile back or go on to smile at someone else soon. You can smile even more in knowing that you have spread all of the above benefits onto someone else by just…well…simply smiling! |
960 A.2d 837 (2008)
COM.
v.
JAMES[5].
No. 150 WAL (2008).
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
September 23, 2008.
Disposition of petition for allowance of appeal. Denied.
NOTES
[5] Justice McCAFFERY did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.
|
Today, we're going to work as a waiter or waitress in a restaurant full of hamsters. Hamsters are tiny animals, but they have a huge appetite! Choose a place for them in your restaurant, and bring them the food or drinks they ordered. If you serve them quickly and if the food's all right, your restaurant will be a big success. In that case, you can even expand in the next levels. Make your restaurant the most successful of the whole hamster country! |
[Several risk indicators in industrial accidents].
Since the 1986, the National Institute for Occupational Accident Insurance (INAIL) provides each single Region with the occupational accident data on magnetic support. This strengthens the need to critically evaluate the most commonly used risk indicators. In this paper we discuss advantages and limits of the usual frequency and severity measures; the formulae for the standard errors are also given. A method proposed by I. Bross (1958), the RIDIT Analysis, is considered and exemplified. The appealing properties of this method ask for a more extensive application in this field. |
Q:
How do I...Store Image from imageview To sd card.on a button click
I was Developing an application which will have image on image view .
My need:
What i need is When i click the button then it should store the image that exist in the image view to the sd card(emulator).
Here is how i used:(but no expected results)
Button btnWriteSDFile = (Button) findViewById(R.id.btnWriteSDFile);
btnWriteSDFile.setOnClickListener(new OnClickListener() {
public void onClick(View v) {
ImageView myImage = (ImageView) findViewById(R.id.imageView1);
BitmapDrawable drawable = (BitmapDrawable) myImage.getDrawable();
Bitmap bitmap = drawable.getBitmap();
File sdCardDirectory = Environment.getExternalStorageDirectory();
File image = new File(sdCardDirectory, "image.png");
boolean success = false;
// Encode the file as a PNG image.
FileOutputStream outStream;
try {
outStream = new FileOutputStream(image);
bitmap.compress(Bitmap.CompressFormat.PNG, 100, outStream);
outStream.flush();
outStream.close();
success = true;
} catch (FileNotFoundException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
} catch (IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
if (success) {
Toast.makeText(getApplicationContext(), "Image saved with success",
Toast.LENGTH_LONG).show();
} else {
Toast.makeText(getApplicationContext(),
"Error during image saving", Toast.LENGTH_LONG).show();
}
}
});
In my above code i didnt get any error
It simply Shows that "save file in mnt/sd/image.png" but no images found.
It would be appreciable if some one helps me to get me out from this rid.
**
"Found out where the exact issues": My program was running perfectly
@ 1st time if i click button and check in gallery means there is no
image but once i close and open the emulator then there is a image.But
i need to see the image as soon as updated how to do this any ideas?
**
A:
Your code looks good, but in order to write something to external storage, you should have the following permission declared in the manifest:
android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
|
Friday, February 6, 2009
Bollywood Busts Out
Indian films have long been dismissed by the West as formulaic Hindi fare. Signs are that might be changing.
Runaway hit: Dev Patel and Anil Kapoor in 'Slumdog Millionaire'.The year's hot film, Slumdog Millionaire, tells a classic Bollywood tale of love and revenge through the postmodern storytelling frame of a TV game show. The film is fresh because it fuses Eastern and Western filmmaking techniques. But this crossover of Eastern and Western celluloid skills had been taking place in Bollywood and Hollywood boardrooms well before it ever showed up in an editing room.
Last September, for example, Steven Spielberg officially dropped his longstanding ties with Paramount for a $1.5 billion deal with Indian billionaire Anil Ambani. Disney (nyse: DIS - news - people ), meanwhile, has for the last year been systematically buying into India's UTV. Disney's recent Hindi feature film, Roadside Romeo, was about a pampered pooch released into the mean streets of Mumbai and reportedly cost $7 million to make. Low production costs are certainly one reason Hollywood is attracted to India, but tapping the nation's growing middle classes, and their voracious movie appetite, is equally part of the heady mix.
Warner Bros. wants a piece, too. It just released Chandni Chowk to China, a Hindi feature film about a roadside chef from Delhi mistakenly believed to be the reincarnation of an ancient Chinese warrior. Reviews are dire, but box office sales are curry hot. The film was the fourth-highest-grossing film ever to open in India. Warner quickly followed up with a three-film deal with an Indian production company, People Tree Films.
Budgets for Bollywood extravaganzas usually peak, according to one report, around $5 million; most cost around $150,000 to make. In contrast, it costs $107 million on average for a major Hollywood studio to make and market a film, according to the Motion Picture Association of America.
Back-alley Bollywood is further believed to make around 1,000 films a year, sell 3 billion low-cost tickets and generate an estimated $2 billion in revenue. PricewaterhouseCoopers estimates that India's film industry will grow at a 15% rate a year until 2012, when it will be a $4 billion industry.
Hollywood makes only a few hundred films a year but sells, in the U.S. domestic market alone, close to $10 billion worth of tickets. So Bollywood is still far from Hollywood, even though the latter has been struggling recently with overproduction and fallout from the credit crisis. But in this fertile environment India's famously parochial film industry, with scripts chock-full of weeping, singing and dancing, is slowly opening up to outside influences.
UTV World Cinema, NDTV and Palador Pictures recently began, for example, showing the best films of the West to India's middle-class audiences. One of the surprise hits of last year, according to India's Financial Express: Palador's Ingmar Bergman festival, which drew crowds in six cities across the country and, by popular demand, repeat shows in Mumbai.
Comment On This StoryDo Knot Disturb is a Bollywood film not yet released but filmed last October at the Filmistan Studios in Mumbai. During shooting, paparazzi clamored by the studio gate, hoping to get a shot of starlet Lara Dutta. The studios, some of the oldest in India, are crumbling warehouse edifices on a rutted lane. Young men and women with earpieces, elderly men carrying trays of tea and carpenters constructing sets for the next shot all scurry through the narrow passageways in a dusty haze of feverish activity.
Inside, director David Dhawan was shooting a dance scene with 110 Bollywood hunks and starlets. At the assistant director's order the set suddenly erupted in a blur of azure, crimson, gold, pink, yellow, mauve and mustard costumes as the 110 hotties burst into their frenetic dance moves. "Now boys and girls, listen. No circle. Just follow the actors," barked Dhawan's deputy.
If India's industry continues to absorb some of the best ideas of Western cinema traditions--song-and-dance routines that move the plot forward, for example, a technique established by American musicals in the early 20th century--it's hard to predict what will happen to this lively local industry.
In the late 1950s a small group of French directors and actors drew inspiration from Hollywood B films. Adapting film techniques established by Hollywood directors, they unleashed a flowering in French films eventually known as La Nouvelle Vague (New Wave). Perhaps a similar movement is in the making in India: films that are both innovative and popular with global audiences.
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INDIAN FLAG
INDEX BELOW
Indian Heroes
Patriotism
Upright Beauracrats
Community information
REAL ESTATE IN INDIA
INDIAN HEROES
These are the men and women from among Hindus, Dalits, Adivasis, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Jains, Buddhists, Zoroastrians, Jews, and other traditions that are deeply committed to the idea of One India and one people acknowledging the uniqueness of each one of the Indians.
Their work brings people together, their effort is to restore harmony among Indians unlike some lost souls who are hell bent on pitting one Indian against the other.
Lord Krishna had said, whenever the negative forces become stronger in dividing families and disrupt peace and harmony, he will emerge among them to restore sanity, the same idea is reflected in Quran, that God does not deprive his goodness to anyone and sends a peacemaker to every community and nation. After the founding fathers of the nation, these are our real heroes restoring dharma – the righteousness. Dharma is when people get along, mind their own business, live their lives and let others live theirs. God has created all of us and respects each one of us is the highest form of worship.
I salute them for their work and they come from all walks of life. They see you as an Indian and nothing but an Indian. They believe every human should be free to eat, drink, wear or believe whatever he or she wants in the pursuit of their happiness.
Please share stories of such Indians who have made efforts to build a cohesive India, an India where no Indian lives in apprehension, tension or fear of the other.
INDIAN HEROES - NEW FROM 12/20/17
PATRIOTISM
Two of India’s dangerous trends: Misplaced Patriotism and intolerance towards different points of view.
The real heroes of India are those who relentlessly “criticize” the government because they do not want their government to falter and make decisions that will mess up the social structure of the nation. They keep the government rascals on their toes. After all, they are elected to serve us not the other way around. The real heroes rise the nation for the common good of all.
What do the Chamchas on the other hand do? They wear a false badge of patriotism and to them patriotism is oppression of those who differ, and war mongering. They cannot handle criticism of government, they are yes sir, yes sir I lick your chappals. They bring down the nation by keeping their man at helm in a bubble giving him or her false assurance that everything is alright.
I hope the Prime Minister wises up and invites and honors those who criticize him, they are the real supporters of him by reminding him from falling into the pit. He should welcome all those who criticize. He needs to defend the rights of such heroes. The Indian Citizens on the other hand need to make a conscious effort to support those who criticize the government, BJP or Congress or any one.
The test of a successful civilized nation is when every man and woman of India can breathe, eat, drink, wear and believe whatever the hell she or he wants to believe.
UPRIGHT BUREAUCRATS
These are the public service heroes; officers who go against their political bosses to do the right thing for India, i.e, every Indian. We will be developing the list as we go forward. You can send in your entries to MikeGhouseforIndia@gmail.com
UPRIGHT BUREAUCRATS
ABOUT MIKE GHOUSE
Mike Ghouse is committed to his life mission of building cohesive work places, communities and nations. His work is for the Indians and Americans where each one of the 322 million Americans should feel secure without apprehension or fear of the other.
He is one of the 5 people in the world who is actively pursuing research, activism and teaching the subject of Pluralism. Just Google and find a tremendous amount of work on pluralism in religion, politics, society and culture. Mike defines Pluralism as an attitude of “respecting the otherness of other” and accepting the God-given uniqueness of each one of us.
He is a pluralist, thinker, writer, activist and a speaker on Pluralism, Interfaith, politics, Islam, human rights and foreign policy including India and Israel-Palestine. He is a news maker, interfaith wedding officiant and a community consultant and offers pluralistic solutions on issues of the day.
Dr. Ghouse has appeared in over 300 National TV shows and is a frequent guest with Hannity and Varney shows at Fox News along with others. He has over 1000 hours of Radio Shows of which 700 were dedicated to interfaith and pluralism. Over 3500 articles have been published of which a 1000 were on politics, foreign policy, sports and movies, a 1500 for interfaith and pluralism matters and a 1000 plus on Islam. In addition Mike has conducted workshops on Atheist to Zoroastrian and every one in between.
Mike is committed to building cohesive societies and offers pluralistic solutions on issues of the day. His work is at www.Centerforpluralism.com and www.WorldMuslimCongress.org
Welcome
We are proud of our heritage - a multi-faith, multi-cultural, multi-regional and multi-linguistic society, where we have come to accept and respect every which way people have lived their lives. For over 5000 years, India has been a beacon of pluralism - it has embraced Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Baha’i and Zoroastrianism to include in the array of the indigenous religions; Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism and Sikhism. India led the way to the freedom movement, since 1947 every country has been liberated from colonialism. Indian democracy is a shining example to the world, where the people have peacefully transferred the powers. Indians are inherently secular and economically capitalistic. They believe in "live-and-let-live" life style, which is the essence of capitalism.Through the years we have expressed the highest degree of maturity on handling extreme situations; the more divergent opinions we hear, the larger our heart grows, the bigger our embrace would be and we can cushion more differences. Let’s continue to honor the concept that there is always another side to the story, as finding the truth is our own responsibility.I am proud of my heritage and am proud to be an Indian-American. Please join me in the discovery of India on a daily basis, as time permits and share the wealth of knowledge you have on this forum.
DallasIndians@yahoogroups.com is the information exchange center for the Indian community living in the Dallas/ Fort Worth Metroplex. You can join by sending an email to: DallasIndians-Subscribe@yahoogroups.com |
It was like a scene straight from an epic western: 94 wild Yellowstone bison, their instincts in full throttle despite five years behind government fences, thundering through an open gate and onto a vast plain.... |
994 F.2d 1262
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Marc L. POLLAND, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 92-1702.
United States Court of Appeals,Seventh Circuit.
Argued Dec. 3, 1992.Decided May 28, 1993.Rehearing and Rehearing In Banc DeniedJuly 29, 1993.
Rodney Cubbie (argued) Office of U.S. Atty., Milwaukee, WI, for plaintiff-appellee.
Ann Auberry, Milwaukee, WI, Thomas G. Halloran, Fox & Fox, Madison, WI, Michael R. Barth, Burlington, WI, for defendant-appellant.
Before FLAUM and ROVNER, Circuit Judges, and LAY, Senior Circuit Judge.*
FLAUM, Circuit Judge.
1
Khalil Muhammad was arrested at his apartment at 3885 North Sherman Boulevard in Milwaukee, Wisconsin on June 22, 1989. Marc Polland, an attorney and a personal friend of Muhammad's, heard of his arrest and went to see him at the U.S. Marshall's Office at the federal courthouse. During that meeting, Muhammad told Polland that approximately two kilograms of cocaine were concealed in a milk chute in the downstairs hallway of the apartment building. Muhammad asked Polland to retrieve the cocaine and turn it over to Michael Johnson, who had started selling cocaine for Muhammad in the spring of 1988. Polland responded that Johnson was not someone who could be trusted, and before the two parted, Polland indicated that he would not turn any of the cocaine over to Johnson.
2
That same day, Muhammad's landlord Richard Hackbarth received a phone call from an acquaintance who wanted to come by and get into the milk chute. After this phone call, Hackbarth, who had been introduced to Polland several months prior to Muhammad's arrest and had noticed Polland visiting Muhammad on a number of occasions afterward, called Polland and reported that he had "a real problem." Polland went to the building after visiting Muhammad at the federal courthouse and planned with Hackbarth for the removal of the cocaine from the milk chute. According to Hackbarth, there were three plastic bags of cocaine inside. Polland arranged to have James "Sonny" Harrison retrieve the cocaine that evening.
3
Polland later told Muhammad that he had possession of the two kilograms of cocaine. Apparently believing that he would be released, Muhammad decided to allow Polland to keep the cocaine. In fact, Harrison kept actual possession of the cocaine at first. Periodically, Harrison received instructions from Polland to deliver a "document"--a half-ounce or an ounce of cocaine. Harrison himself also sold approximately eight ounces of the cocaine for his own personal gain. Eventually, Polland demanded and received the remaining cocaine, which amounted to a little over a kilogram. Polland contends that he consumed a "tennis ball" size portion of cocaine and destroyed the remainder.
4
In November, 1989, Muhammad was convicted. After his conviction, Muhammad instructed Johnson to get the cocaine from Polland and sell it to raise money. Between November of 1989 and January of 1990, Polland dealt a total of six ounces of cocaine to Johnson in five deliveries. Eventually, Polland and Johnson had a falling out over the price of the cocaine. Polland also told Johnson not to tell Muhammad anything about their drug transactions because Muhammad talked too much.
5
Muhammad did talk, and among those he fingered was Polland. Prior to this, Muhammad, while away from Polland, had handed the Assistant United States Attorney a folded piece of paper after a final pretrial conference for Muhammad and had requested that it be passed along to the Deputy United States Attorney. The paper contained a diagram of a "hypothetical operation." Determining that the paper was not in and of itself significant, the government did not disclose it to Polland. After Muhammad's conviction, the government obtained a grant of immunity for him and had him testify before the grand jury. In his testimony, Muhammad implicated Polland in cocaine distribution. After a jury trial, Polland was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and possession with intent to distribute. With enhancements for obstruction of justice and abuse of trust, Polland's sentence totaled 121 months. He appeals.
I.
A.
6
Polland has raised a number of issues on appeal, only some of which merit discussion. He alleges first that the government engaged in widespread misconduct throughout the investigation and trial of this case. In particular, Polland challenges the prosecutor's acceptance of the diagram of the hypothetical operation from Muhammad without any disclosure to Polland, who was acting as Muhammad's attorney. According to Polland, the government's conduct violated Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(A) as well as the duty to notify the court and Polland himself of the conflict. The principal flaw in this argument is that any right violated belongs to Muhammad, not Polland. He has no standing to assert Muhammad's rights. In addition, Polland cannot identify any prejudice to him on account of the nondisclosure. Certainly, the government is under no obligation to inform suspects that they may be under investigation.
B.
7
Polland also argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the indictment should have been dismissed for prosecutorial misconduct or vindictive prosecution. A prosecution is vindictive and a violation of due process if undertaken "[t]o punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do." United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 2488, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982). The filing of an indictment may in some instances be the basis for such a claim. See United States v. Napue, 834 F.2d 1311, 1329 (7th Cir.1987). Whether to hold an evidentiary hearing is a matter within the court's discretion. United States v. Valona, 834 F.2d 1334, 1340 (7th Cir.1987). A trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct unless a substantial right of the defendant has been put in jeopardy. See United States v. Wilson, 715 F.2d 1164, 1169 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986, 104 S.Ct. 434, 78 L.Ed.2d 366 (1983). The court should grant an evidentiary hearing on the issue of vindictive prosecution only when a defendant has offered sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt about the propriety of the government's conduct. See United States v. Heidecke, 900 F.2d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir.1990).
8
Polland contends that an evidentiary hearing was warranted for a couple of reasons. First, Polland thinks that his prosecution stems in part from a letter he submitted to the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Wisconsin complaining about the conduct of the Drug Enforcement Administration. Second, he believes that a hearing would clear up whether Muhammad had been put up to implicating Polland in the cocaine distribution scheme. Polland offered no other facts to the trial court to support his motion for a hearing.
9
Neither of these reasons offered by Polland amounts to a showing of actual vindictiveness. In his capacity as an attorney, Polland complained of alleged D.E.A. improprieties against his clients. However, he has not shown a nexus between these incidents and his own subsequent indictment. In addition, Polland has not established any factual basis for his allegation of government intervention or misconduct in the production of the hypothetical operation diagram. The district court's decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing was not in error.
C.
10
A third claim advanced by Polland is that the government's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Withholding evidence constitutes a Brady violation only if it is both favorable to the accused and material. United States v. Douglas, 874 F.2d 1145, 1163-64 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 841, 110 S.Ct. 126, 107 L.Ed.2d 87 (1989). Evidence is material "only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." United States v. Dweck, 913 F.2d 365, 371 (7th Cir.1990) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)).
11
During pretrial, Polland had requested the disclosure of evidence of his non-involvement in drug distribution. It was only in the course of the cross-examination of F.B.I. Agent Plambeck that the defense learned that the D.E.A. may have attempted to make a controlled buy from Polland several years earlier. This evidence is not favorable to Polland. If anything, it reflects the fact that the D.E.A. harbored suspicions about Polland's conduct, which is more inculpatory than exculpatory. The evidence is also not material. No reasonable probability exists that this evidence would have been sufficient to rebut the direct evidence of Polland's conduct in the present case.
12
Polland similarly argues that the government failed to disclose a preindictment interview with one of its witnesses. At the outset of a conversation with Agent Plambeck, Michael Johnson, a witness, appeared to be withholding information. The prosecutor and Plambeck allowed him to talk with Muhammad by phone. After the unmonitored phone call, Johnson was more cooperative. Polland contends that this episode constituted Brady material, and the government's failure to disclose it represented bad faith, if not animus. However, it is not clear that this information was favorable to Polland. See Douglas, 874 F.2d at 1163. Although the defense may have relied on it to impeach Johnson, it had ample opportunity to explore the relationship between Muhammad and Johnson, including their phone conversations, and impeach Johnson during his cross-examination. (Tr. 279-83, 301-02). Moreover, Agent Plambeck did not say or suggest that Johnson was lying or being untruthful; rather, Plambeck thought that Johnson was withholding information. And even if this evidence could be construed as favorable, it is not material. The defense's cross was directed primarily at discrediting Johnson for bias. There is no reasonable probability that this additional shred would have altered the outcome of the trial. It follows that the absence of any Brady violation answers the question of government bad faith or animus in not disclosing the phone call.
D.
13
Polland also alleges that the prosecutor made numerous prejudicial errors during closing and rebuttal argument. Among the errors cited by Polland, the prosecutor told the jury to do its job by returning a guilty verdict, improperly shifted the burden of proof by arguing that Polland could have called Muhammad as a witness, overreacted to the defense's characterization of Muhammad and Johnson as "boys," and alluded to his special insight into the crime world. In fact, it appears that Polland has engaged in a fishing expedition through the trial transcript, casting about for any remotely colorable violations by the government. Because Polland failed to object to any of these remarks during closing argument, we review them under the plain error standard. United States v. Martinez, 937 F.2d 299, 308 (7th Cir.1991).
14
First, Polland has construed some of the government's statements as urging the jury to "do its job" by returning a guilty verdict. Yes, the government urged the jury to do its job. And yes, the government urged the jury to find Polland guilty. However, nothing in its rebuttal argument linked the two ideas:
15
The system works if everybody does their job, and you treat everybody the same. You do your job and you treat him just like you would treat the idiots and the boys as they were referred to and you'll find him guilty. (Tr. 816).
16
Here the government was suggesting that the jury would be doing its job by treating Polland the same as other criminal defendants. (Tr. 816). There is no reasonable inference that the government told the jury that its job was to convict Polland.
17
With respect to the second improper remark, Polland's counsel initiated the exchange by repeatedly suggesting that the government was somehow delinquent in not putting Muhammad on the stand. (Tr. 721-22). The government's reply that the defense could have called Muhammad as a witness was an invited response. See United States v. Swiatek, 819 F.2d 721, 730 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 903, 108 S.Ct. 245, 98 L.Ed.2d 203 (1987). Moreover, nothing in the government's response constituted new evidence, but was either established during the trial or could be inferred from the evidence. See United States v. Jewel, 947 F.2d 224, 230 (7th Cir.1991). In fact, the court gave a cautionary instruction that counsels' remarks at closing are not evidence.
18
Polland also asserts that the government "overresponded" to the defense's characterization of Muhammad and Johnson, who are black, as "boys." The prosecutor regarded this label, in contrast to the repeated references to "attorney Polland," as an attempt to solicit special consideration for Polland because of his status as a lawyer. By way of response, the prosecutor urged the jury to treat everyone fairly. (Tr. 816). There is nothing improper in the government's rebuttal. Polland also contends that the prosecutor claimed to have insight into the world of drug dealers and criminals superior to that of the jurors which led him to conclude that Polland was guilty. While the prosecutor may have implied some special knowledge, he in no way suggested that his insights as a public prosecutor should lead the jury to find Polland guilty. (Tr. 719-20). Consequently, this statement was not harmful or erroneous.
E.
19
The only comment in the prosecutor's rebuttal argument that Polland objected to was the government's assertion that the attorney-client relationship between Polland and Muhammad was established on June 23, 1989, the day after Muhammad asked Polland to rectify the problem in the milk chute. We review such challenges to prosecutorial statements under the test elaborated in Swiatek, 819 F.2d at 730: "First, we determine whether, considered in isolation, the challenged remark was improper. If so, we reexamine the improper remark in light of the entire record to determine whether the remark deprived the defendant of a fair trial."
20
Polland contends that the prosecutor deliberately misstated the law on attorney-client privilege. Polland had presented testimony of his service as Muhammad's attorney prior to his appointment by the magistrate on June 23, 1989. The government, on the other hand, contends that the appointment by the magistrate is the relevant date in evaluating Polland's conduct here. Although exceedingly technical, the prosecutor's argument is not clearly improper. And even if we assume that the comment was improper, Polland was not deprived of a fair trial. Overruling the objection, the district court commented: "Counsel, this is the final argument. The jury again will use their collective recollections to recall the accuracy of the statements." (Tr. 805). In other words, the district court was reiterating that counsel were presenting argument, not evidence. During the presentation of evidence, both sides had ample opportunity to lay out their respective theories and contest the opposing one. As against the entire trial record, nothing in this brief exchange during closing argument leads us to conclude that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial.
II.
A.
21
Polland is also challenging the district court's enhancement of his sentence by two levels for obstruction of justice. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. He argues that, if anything, he interfered with the investigation of another offense, the one resulting in the conviction of Muhammad. The district court explained that section 3C1.1 "does set forth as an example of enhancement the concealing or procuring another person to conceal evidence that is material to an official investigation or a judicial proceeding. The court feels that on the basis of that it could not find otherwise then that the defendant did obstruct justice insofar as the ongoing investigation was concerned." (Sent. Tr. 33-34). On appeal, we will uphold the district court's sentence so long as it results from a correct application of the guidelines to factual findings that are not clearly erroneous. United States v. Hubbard, 929 F.2d 307, 310 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 206, 116 L.Ed.2d 165 (1991).
22
Section 3C1.1 indicates that the obstruction of justice enhancement does not apply to any and all obstructive conduct that a defendant may have attempted or committed, but instead applies only to willful attempts "to obstruct or impede the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense." U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. In other words, section 3C1.1 does not contemplate enhancements for obstruction of justice if the relevant conduct impedes the investigation or prosecution of a separate crime. Therefore, while the guidelines themselves do not define the term "instant offense," it refers solely to the offense of conviction. This term does nevertheless pose a problem of construction in that it states that the enhancement applies only if the obstruction occurred during the investigation (for our purposes) of the instant offense. One could arguably construe this language as requiring that the obstruction have occurred after the authorities have begun investigating the offense of conviction.
23
The commentary to section 3C1.1, however, points to a more plausible interpretation. For example, the commentary indicates that enhancement is appropriate for conduct that includes "destroying or concealing or directing or procuring another person to destroy or conceal evidence that is material to an official investigation or judicial proceeding." U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, comment 3(d). This application note then goes on to distinguish apparently obstructive conduct that is contemporaneous with an arrest, for which an enhancement is warranted only if that conduct materially hindered the investigation. In other words, the commentary clarifies that the significant factor is not merely the timing of the obstruction but rather whether the obstruction or attempt involves evidence that is material to the investigation or prosecution of the offense of conviction.
24
The case law also supports this common-sense interpretation. Other circuits have affirmed enhancements awarded under section 3C1.1 when the defendant attempted to conceal evidence of the offense of conviction from authorities even though at the time of the obstructive conduct, the authorities were actually investigating an offense other than the offense of conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Dortch, 923 F.2d 629, 631-32 (8th Cir.1991) (section 3C1.1 enhancement proper after guilty plea to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute even though no ongoing investigation of that offense when defendant stopped for a traffic violation tossed package of cocaine out the window); United States v. Roberson, 872 F.2d 597, 609 (5th Cir.) (section 3C1.1 enhancement proper for credit card fraud for defendant who attempted to conceal stolen credit card after arrest for public intoxication), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 861, 110 S.Ct. 175, 107 L.Ed.2d 131 (1989). Thus, the enhancement under section 3C1.1 applies to a defendant who obstructed or attempted to obstruct justice even if the obstruction occurred before the police or prosecutors began investigating or prosecuting the specific acts of the defendant.
25
Admittedly, Polland's situation is different as far as timing is concerned: His initial obstructive act was neither motivated by some other official investigation of him nor did it immediately precipitate such an investigation. However, as we have already indicated, our focus is not on timing but on materiality. His decision to arrange for the disposition of Muhammad's cocaine in the milk chute and subsequently to sell a portion of that cocaine implicated him in Muhammad's conspiracy. The jury concluded as much in finding Polland guilty of the count for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute. Accordingly, that no investigation of Polland was under way or even contemplated at the time of his obstructive conduct does not alter the fact that the enhancement was for the instant offense.1
26
Another aspect of this enhancement does give us pause. Under the present facts, Polland's decision to take possession of the cocaine and sell it amounts to a decision to join the conspiracy. That conduct alone would not be sufficient to warrant an enhancement for obstruction of justice because it is nothing more than participation in the conspiracy. But Polland also testified that he destroyed any cocaine that he did not personally use. (Tr. 618). According to the guidelines, destruction of material evidence to the instant offense is an obstruction of justice. However, the government never pressed the destruction of the cocaine as the relevant obstructive conduct. More importantly, the district court accepted the government's reasoning that concealment alone warranted this enhancement.2 Since participation is distinguishable from obstruction, we do not believe that concealment of contraband, standing alone, by someone who joins a conspiracy during its investigation, prosecution, or sentencing is sufficient to merit an enhancement for obstruction of justice.
B.
27
Polland's final contention is that the district court erred in enhancing his base offense level for abuse of trust. Section 3B1.3 provides that a court may increase a defendant's offense level by two "if the defendant abused a position of public or private trust ... in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense." U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. Furthermore, the commentary elaborates that "[t]he position of trust must have contributed in some substantial way to facilitating the crime and not merely have provided an opportunity that could easily have been afforded to other persons." Id., comment n. 1.
28
Polland maintains that the district court's error lies in not acknowledging that he merely took advantage of an opportunity to gain access to the cocaine in the milk chute by virtue of his friendship with Muhammad and Hackbarth. Muhammad had shared this information with several other people, including non-attorneys, who also had the opportunity to take the cocaine from the milk chute. Therefore, his capacity as an attorney was not relevant to the disposition of the cocaine. The government, in opposing this argument, appears to be taking an inconsistent position. It contends that the abuse of trust occurred, or at least began, on June 22, 1989 while simultaneously maintaining that Polland was not appointed as Muhammad's attorney until June 23, 1989.
29
The district court, nevertheless, viewed skeptically the government's argument concerning the establishment of an attorney-client relationship on June 23. In fact, the court explained at sentencing that "it's obvious to the court that Mr. Polland would not have received the information regarding the two kilograms-plus of cocaine from Mr. Muhammad had it not been for the attorney/client relationship that existed there." (Sent. Tr. 55). In other words, the district court declined to embrace fully the government's reasoning but instead weighed Polland's abuse of the public trust. Clearly, as a criminal defense lawyer well-versed in the details of drug cases, Polland was in a unique position to oversee the concealment and distribution of his client's cocaine. Polland himself argued that his respect for the attorney-client relationship motivated him to conceal the existence of the cocaine, effectively acknowledging that his role as an attorney governed his conduct. And after Muhammad's conviction, Polland elected both to pursue Muhammad's appeal and to sell his cocaine. Thus, continued contact with Muhammad as his attorney afforded Polland initial access to the cocaine and the expedient to dispose of it. Consequently, the district court's decision to grant the two-level increase for abuse of trust, in light of the particular facts of this case, was not clear error.
30
For the foregoing reasons, the conviction is AFFIRMED, the sentence is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for resentencing on the issue of obstruction of justice.
*
The Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation
1
At trial Polland maintained that he was ethically bound not to disclose the existence of the cocaine; therefore, his actions cannot be construed as obstructing justice. However, assuming that an attorney-client relationship between Polland and Muhammad in fact existed on June 22, 1989, the scope of the privilege obviously does not include disposing of or otherwise dealing drugs for a client. Polland himself acknowledged that he could have alerted law enforcement to the existence of the problem in the milk chute without violating the attorney-client privilege. (Tr. 642). Instead, he elected to join the conspiracy by retrieving and selling Muhammad's cocaine while representing Muhammad
2
In basing the enhancement on Polland's concealment of the cocaine, the district court did analogize this conduct to the shredding of documents whose existence the government was unaware of. (Sent. Tr. 34). We are unable to conclude from this single example that the district court relied on the destruction of the cocaine in imposing the two-level enhancement
|
Pontomedullary transection attenuates central respiratory modulation of sympathetic discharge, heart rate and the baroreceptor reflex in the in situ rat preparation.
Previous studies have indicated a major role for the pons in the genesis of the respiratory pattern. The respiratory rhythm is coupled to the cardiovascular system to ensure optimal matching of minute ventilation and cardiac output. Since much of this coupling results from cross-talk between brainstem circuits, we have assessed the role of the pons in both the co-ordination of respiratory and cardiovascular efferent activities and the baroreceptor reflex efficacy. Using the arterially perfused in situ rat preparation, we recorded neural activities from the left phrenic nerve, central end of the vagus nerve, thoracic sympathetic chain (T8-T10) and heart rate. Respiratory sinus arrhythmia, respiratory modulation of sympathetic nerve activity (and Traube-Hering waves in arterial pressure) and postinspiratory discharges recorded from vagal efferents were eliminated after pontine transection. We also found that although the sympathetic arterial baroreflex remained intact, respiratory gating of the baroreceptor reflex (i.e. both bradycardia and sympathoinhibition) was abolished after pontine removal. We propose that neural activity of the pons is essential for physiological coupling of centrally generated respiratory and cardiovascular efferent activities. |
Growth hormone response to arginine test distinguishes multiple system atrophy from Parkinson's disease and idiopathic late-onset cerebellar ataxia.
Multiple system atrophy (MSA) is difficult to distinguish from idiopathic Parkinson's disease (PD) and idiopathic late-onset cerebellar ataxia (ILOCA). This study aimed to evaluate GH response to three different GH stimulation tests in order to establish a reliable test to differentiate these degenerative disorders. Twelve patients with MSA, 10 with PD, eight with ILOCA and 30 healthy controls entered the study. They were submitted to clonidine, arginine, and GH-releasing-hormone (GHRH) + arginine tests in a random manner on three different nonconsecutive days. The peak serum GH response was used as a primary variable for analysis of stimulation tests. By ROC analysis, the optimum cut-off level was considered as the cut-off with the maximal sum of sensitivity and specificity. After clonidine administration, GH peak was significantly lower in patients with MSA than in those with ILOCA (P < 0.05) and in the controls (P < 0.001). At the optimum cut-off level of 5 mU/l, the clonidine test distinguished patients with MSA from those with PD with a sensitivity and specificity of 78%. Moreover, this test distinguished patients with MSA from those with ILOCA with a sensitivity of 100% and a specificity of 75% at a cut-off level of 5 mU/l, and with a sensitivity of 75% and a specificity of 100% at the cut-off level of 7.6 mU/l. After arginine administration, the GH peak was significantly lower in patients with MSA than in those with ILOCA (P = 0.001) and in controls (P < 0.001). At the optimum cut-off level of 5 mU/l, the arginine test distinguished patients with MSA from those with PD with a sensitivity and a specificity of 100%. At a GH peak cut-off value of 3.6 mU/l the arginine test distinguished patients with MSA from those with ILOCA with a sensitivity and specificity of 100%. After GHRH + arginine administration, a significant GH increase was found in all groups of patients and controls. The GH response to arginine administration is impaired in MSA. Therefore, the arginine test showed the highest diagnostic accuracy to distinguish MSA from both PD and ILOCA, and could be used in the clinical practice of these neurodegenerative diseases. |