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reasons against killing; the effects on relatives of the intellectually |
disabled human will sometimes - but not always - constitute |
additional indirect reasons against killing the human. For |
further discussion of this issue, see Chapter 7.) |
In the present state of our knowledge, this strong case against |
killing can be invoked most categorically against the slaughter |
of chimpanzees, gorillas, and orangutans. On the basis of what |
we now know about these near-relatives of ours, we should |
immediately extend to them the same full protection against |
being killed that we extend now to all human beings. A case |
can also be made, though with varying degrees of confidence, |
on behalf of whales, dolphins, monkeys, dogs, cats, pigs, seals, |
bears, cattle, sheep and so on, perhaps even to the point at |
which it may include all mammals - much depends on how |
far we are prepared to go in extending the benefit of the doubt, |
where a doubt exists. Even if we stopped at the species I have |
named, however - excluding the remainder of the mammals - |
our discussion has raised a very large question mark over the |
justifiability of a great deal of killing of animals carried out by |
humans, even when this killing takes place painlessly and without |
causing suffering to other members of the animal community. |
(Most of this killing, of course, does not take place |
under such ideal conditions.) |
When we come to animals who, as far as we can tell, are not |
rational and self-conscious beings, the case against killing is |
weaker. When we are not dealing with beings aware of themselves |
as distinct entities, the wrongness of painless killing derives |
from the loss of pleasure it involves. Where the life taken |
would not, on balance, have been pleasant, no direct wrong is |
done. Even when the animal killed would have lived pleasantly, |
it is at least arguable that no wrong is done if the animal killed |
will, as a result of the killing, be replaced by another animal |
132 |
Taking Life: Animals |
living an equally pleasant life. Taking this view involves holding |
that a wrong done to an existing being can be made up for by |
a benefit conferred on an as yet non-existent being. Thus it is |
possible to regard non-self-conscious animals as interchangeable |
with each other in a way that self-conscious beings are not. |
This means that in some circumstances - when animals lead |
pleasant lives, are killed painlessly, their deaths do not cause |
suffering to other animals, and the killing of one animal makes |
possible its replacement by another who would not otherwise |
have lived - the killing of non-self -conscious animals may |
not be wrong. |
/ Is it possible, along these lines, to justify raising chickens for |
their meat, not in factory farm conditions but roaming freely |
around a farmyard? Let us make the questionable assumption |
that chickens are not self-conscious. Assume also that the birds |
can be killed painlessly, and the survivors do not appear to be |
affected by the death of one of their numbers. Assume, finally, |
that for economic reasons we could not rear the birds if we did |
not eat them. Then the replaceability argument appears to justify |
killing the birds, because depriving them of the pleasures of |
their existence can be offset against the pleasures of chickens |
who do not yet exist, and will exist only if existing chickens are |
killed. |
As a piece of critical moral reasoning, this argument may be |
sound. Even at that level, it is important to realise how limited |
it is in its application. It cannot justify factory farming, where |
animals do not have pleasant lives. Nor does it normally justify |
the killing of wild animals. A duck shot by a hunter (making |
the shaky assumption that ducks are not self-conscious, and the |
almost certainly false assumption that the shooter can be relied |
upon to kill the duck instantly) has probably had a pleasant |
life, but the shooting of a duck does not lead to its replacement |
by another. Unless the duck population is at the maximum that |
can be sustained by the available food supply, the killing of a |
duck ends a pleasant life without starting another, and is for |
133 |
Practical Ethics |
that reason wrong on straightforward utilitarian grounds. So |
although there are situations in which it is not wrong to kill |
animals, these situations are special ones, and do not cover very |
many of the billions of premature deaths humans inflict, year |
after year, on animals. |
In any case, at the level of practical moral principles, it would |
be better to reject altogether the killing of animals for food, |
unless one must do so to survive. Killing animals for food makes |
us think of them as objects that we can use as we please. Their |
lives then count for little when weighed against our mere wants. |
As long as we continue to use animals in this way, to change |
our attitudes to animals in the way that they should be changed |
will be an impossible task. How can we encourage people to |
respect animals, and have equal concern for their interests, if |
they continue to eat them for their mere enjoyment? To foster |
the right attitudes of consideration for animals, including nonself- |
conscious ones, it may be best to make it a simple principle |
to avoid killing them for food. |
134 |
I |
I |
! |
6 |
TAKING LIFE: THE EMBRYO |
AND THE FETUS |
THE PROBLEM |
FEW ethicaUssues are as bitterly fought over today as abortion, |
and, while the pendulum has swung back and forth, |
neither side has had much success in altering the opinions of |
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