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Is there such a thing as a completely private language (#94)? Does learning
a language require learning a rule (#95)? Does learning a rule require
learning a language (#96)? When there is translation, is there also interpretation
(#97, #98)? If there are true statements that contain abstract objects,
does that mean those abstract objects exist (#99)? Is mathematical Platonism
the best way to explain mathematical knowledge (#100)?
How to Use This Book
Block quotations are provided to show how the argument is presented in
the text.
P1. Premises are marked β€œ P. ”
P2. A premise is a statement that is either true or false and is given as evidence
or a reason for accepting the conclusion; a conclusion is the statement
that is argued for and supported by the premises.
C1. Conclusions, of which there may be many, are marked with β€œ C ”
and are indented. Conclusion indicators – for example, β€œ therefore ”
and β€œ hence ” – have been omitted. The rule of inference or replacement
is listed after deductive conclusions.
In the boxed area that precedes the arguments, you will fi nd a reference
list of original and secondary sources.
Part I
Philosophy of Religion
1
Aquinas ’ Five Ways
Timothy J. Pawl
St. Thomas Aquinas (1224/5 – 74) offered his Five Ways, or fi ve proofs for
the existence of God, near the beginning of his magnum opus , the Summa
theologiae (Part 1, Question 2, Article 3, the response). The Summa (ST),
as it is often called, was written as a textbook for men in their priestly
formation. It is well over 2,500 pages in a standard English translation from
the Latin, but the Five Ways take up only slightly more than one page.
All quotations from Aquinas are taken from Alfred Freddoso ’ s translation of
the Summa theologiae , available online at www.nd.edu/ ∼ afreddos/summa -
translation/TOC - part1.htm
Baisnee , Jules . β€œ St. Thomas Aquinas ’ s Proofs of the Existence of God
Presented in Their Chronological Order , ” in Philosophical Studies in
Honor of the Very Reverend Ignatius Smith, O.P. , edited by John K.
Ryan , 29 – 64 . Westminster : The Newman Press , 1952 .
Bochenski , Joseph M. β€œ The Five Ways , ” in The Rationality of Theism , edited
by Adolfo Garc Γ­ a de la Sienra , 61 – 92 . Atlanta, GA : Rodopi , 2000 .
Kenny , Anthony . The Five Ways: Saint Thomas Aquinas ’ Proofs of God ’ s
Existence . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1969 .
Pawl , Timothy . β€œ The Five Ways , ” in The Oxford Handbook of Thomas
Aquinas , edited by Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump . Oxford : Oxford
University Press , 2011 .
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
Β© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
10 Timothy J. Pawl
Nevertheless, they are almost assuredly the most commented on section of
the Summa and some of the most well - known arguments for the existence
of God.
One should note that while each Way concludes with some variation of
β€œ and this we call God, ” Aquinas did not intend the Five Ways to be demonstrations
of a uniquely Christian God. In fact, he warns against attempts
to prove, for instance, that God is triune (three persons but one being, as
Christians affi rm), since such arguments, he explains, will fall short and
lead unbelievers to scoff (see his Summa contra gentiles , Book 1, Chapter
9, paragraph 2). Furthermore, Aquinas did not take the Five Ways to show
that this thing we call β€œ God ” is perfect, good, immutable, eternal, powerful,
knowledgeable, or even that there is just one such thing. As a consequence,
some common criticisms of the Ways – for instance, that they do not demonstrate
an omnipotent being – clearly miss the mark. Aquinas goes on later
to devote many pages to whether the thing we call β€œ God ” in the Five Ways
is omnipotent. And the same is true for the other abovementioned attributes.
Rather, Aquinas ’ intent in the Five Ways is to show that there is something -
or - other that, for instance, causes things but is itself uncaused, or something
that is necessary and does not have that necessary existence from another.
In fact, he does not argue that the Five Ways conclude to the same thing
– rather than fi ve different things – until later in the Summa (Part 1,
Question 11, Article 3, the response).
Finally, it is important to note that while the Five Ways are Aquinas ’
most often cited arguments for the existence of God, they are not his most
detailed or nuanced. The Summa , as said above, is a textbook of sorts, and
written for an audience of common men in formation for the priesthood
– not academics, scholars, atheists, or agnostics. To judge Aquinas ’ best and
most powerful arguments for the existence of God, one would do better to
look at the parallel passages from his other works rather than at his Summa
(see Baisnee for a helpful list of these passages). That said, it is the arguments
in the Summa that have received the most attention and have become,
by any reasonable standard, some of the most important arguments in the
Western intellectual tradition.
The First Way – The Argument from Motion
The First Way focuses on motion. By β€œ motion, ” Aquinas means the three
sorts of accidental change that Aristotle differentiates: change of location
(e.g., moving across the room), change in quality (e.g., heating up), and
change in quantity (e.g., getting fatter). The general thrust of the argument
is that anything changed in one of these ways is changed by something else.
That something else, in changing the fi rst thing, either is itself changed or
Aquinas’ Five Ways 11
remains changeless. A series of changing changers cannot proceed infi nitely.
So there must be some fi rst, unchanging being. That being we call β€œ God. ”
The argument below uses β€˜ F ’ as a variable governing end states of being
correlated with the three sorts of motion mentioned above. For instance,
one could substitute β€œ across the room, ” β€œ hot, ” or β€œ fat ” for F. Aquinas
provides three detailed defenses of C3 in the Summa contra gentiles , Part
1, Chapter 13. He considers the common objection that a thing can move
itself (e.g., the runner moves himself when sprinting from the starting line)
by saying that such cases are instances of a part moving a whole and not
a thing moving itself. In P3, Aquinas says that the mover must be in a
state of actuality relevant to F in order to make something F. The argument