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Law-StackExchange

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[ { "answer_id": 91422, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>If that property was transferred to the state when the highway was\nlast expanded wouldn't my property description have to be updated? Is\nthis a title insurance situation?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>You aren't far from the mark, but keep in mind that in the U.S. title to real property is not represented by a certificate for a particular geographic area as it is in most of the U.K. and Australia, for example (the modern U.K. land title system was actually invented in Australia). So, unlike those jurisdictions, the full legal description of what you own may not be consolidated into a single, up to date document.</p>\n<p>Instead, in the U.S., people file various documents with the real property records (usually maintained on a county level) of the county where the property is located. These records are indexed by grantee and grantor, not by geographic location.</p>\n<p>So, in this case, someone would file a plat for the subdivision you live in and that is a matter of public record. Later on the state transportation department would bring an eminent domain proceeding to seize property for public use in exchange for fair compensation, or would negotiate a non-court ordered sale of the land. The decree transferring the property in an eminent domain proceeding and/or the deed transferring the land to the state, would have been recorded in the real property records. But, if there was a discrepancy between how the owner of the property was described in the deed giving that owner title to the property and the name of the owner in the eminent domain matter, this decree or deed or a replat of the land might not get properly indexed.</p>\n<p>If the land was taken while you owned it, you should have received notice of the eminent domain lawsuit, although if you ignored it or failed to realize its significance, a default judgment could have been entered against you in that case with no further notice to you.</p>\n<p>If you purchased the land after the land was taken in a commercial real estate transaction, a title company should have identified the recorded documents that took that land away from you and that limitation should be listed in the deed by which you took title</p>\n<p>Sometimes the deed will simply reference &quot;all easements of record&quot; since the state highway interest will often be a very restrictive easement rather than outright ownership, since this costs the state less to acquire than outright ownership.</p>\n<p>If there is not some reference in the title commitment and the deed conveying the land to you, that references the land that the state took for the highway, then you have a title insurance claim against the title insurance company if this limitation was omitted from the title commitment, and you would have a claim for breach of warranty of title to every prior seller conveying by a warranty deed (which is the norm in arms length sales of real estate for fair market value) that omitted the land taken from the highway after the state took that land.</p>\n<p>The designation of the land taken, if it is actually an easement, wouldn't change the legal description of the property although the existing of the easement would have to be mentioned, at least in a general sense (&quot;<em>subject to all easements of record</em>&quot;) in the deed, and in a specific sense with a copy of instrument creating the easement in the title commitment. The draft title commitment would normally be disclosed pursuant to a real estate contract prior to closing, with an out from the contract available if the title work revealed had an unacceptable problem.</p>\n<p>Even if the land was taken outright, the change in the legal description could be subtle, such as &quot;Lot 1, Block 23 of the <em>Amended and Restated</em> Hillshire Subdivision Plat recorded at Book 456, page 128.&quot; And might not note that the original legal description was &quot;Lot 1, Block 23 of the Hillshire Subdivision Plat recorded at Book 34, Page 456.&quot;</p>\n<p>The change could also be stated as a reservation or limitations on the original property description, such as &quot;Lot 1, Block 23 of the Hillshire Subdivision Plat recorded at Book 34, Page 456, <em>subject to</em> the decree of the Hill Valley County District Court recorded at Book 455, Page 100.&quot;</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Apart from the missing land. The reason this matters now is that they\nare improving the highway again and taking another 17' and do not want\nto compensate my for the mature trees that I have screening the house\nfrom the highway, because they are already in the right of way or on\ntheir land depending on which survey is used.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The state is required to pay you an appraised fair market value for the land it takes which you can dispute in court (you pretty much always have to surrender the land and the only real issue is the price). If you think that the money offered is too small for the fair market value of the property you should consider hiring a lawyer and your own appraiser to context the valuation.</p>\n<p>But, as you note, if the trees in question are &quot;are already in the right of way or on their land depending on which survey is used&quot; then you don't own them and aren't entitled to compensation from the state for taking the trees. Again, this should have been mentioned five years ago in a title commitment and if it wasn't you may have a warranty of title and/or title insurance claim to compensate you for land you thought you were buying but didn't actually own.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "united-states", "real-estate", "minnesota" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91424, "body": "<p>You are quoting standards that are applicable during an appeal. So in this case, the defendant was brought to trial, was found guilty by a jury, and is now appealing that conviction. During that initial trial, the evidence was supposed to have been weighed neutrally.</p>\n<p>In an appeal, the appellate court is not attempting to re-litigate the entirety of the case. That would be costly and slow in addition to burdensome on witnesses that might have to be called again to testify. Instead, it defers to the trial court for things like the determination of facts. The standards you quote show that an appellate court is only going to overturn a lower court's verdict as insufficient if the lower court's ruling is manifestly unjust.</p>\n<p>The prosecution and the defense presented evidence on a particular element of the crime at trial. The jury determined that the prosecution met its burden, and proved the element beyond a reasonable doubt. The appeals court is not going to substitute its judgement for that of the jury particularly when the jury had the opportunity to assess the credibility of different witnesses that may not be possible from a simple text-based transcript. If the trial court convicted and the appeals court determines that the conviction was reasonable if the evidence was viewed from the standpoint most favorable to the prosecution, then the sufficiency standard would be met and the appeal would be denied. The appeals court would only overturn the verdict as insufficient if no reasonable juror could possibly have concluded that the state met its burden of proof given the evidence presented.</p>\n", "score": 9 }, { "answer_id": 91425, "body": "<p>This standard comes up when a defendant appeals a conviction, arguing that the evidence was <em>insufficient</em> to support a conviction. To show that the evidence <em>could not</em> support a conviction, it must be shown that even in its most favorable light for the prosecution, no rational trier of fact (properly instructed) could have convicted. See <em>Jackson v. Virginia</em>, 433 U.S. 307.</p>\n<p>Consider the alternative, where the evidence is construed in the light most favorable to the defendant. Then every defendant would win their appeal. The evidence against them would be viewed as wholly unbelievable, and then it would necessarily follow that no jury could have convicted.</p>\n<p>To be clear: the trier of fact is <em>not</em> instructed to view the evidence in a light favorable to the prosecution. Rather, it is a hypothetical framing adopted by the reviewing judges during an appeal.</p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "criminal-law", "evidence", "due-process" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91405, "body": "<p>Wikipedia is the <strong>Licensor</strong> who are granting you the license, thus in the text you quoted:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author <strong>or licensor</strong></p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>the manner specified by Wikipedia in the link you gave is the way you must attribute the work.</p>\n<p>When a person contributes content to a Wikimedia project, they agree to license it under the CC-BY-SA-3.0 license, but they <em>also</em> agree to be attributed &quot;in any of the following fashions... i. [through] hyperlink (where possible) or URL to the article to which you contributed (since each article has a history page that lists all authors and editors)&quot; (see Wikimedia Foundation, &quot;<a href=\"https://foundation.wikimedia.org/wiki/Policy:Terms_of_Use/en#7._Licensing_of_Content\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Policy:Terms of Use — 7. Licensing of Content</a>&quot;).</p>\n<hr />\n<p>See section 1(f) of <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Text_of_the_Creative_Commons_Attribution-ShareAlike_3.0_Unported_License\" rel=\"noreferrer\">the License used</a> for the definition of the Licensor</p>\n", "score": 38 }, { "answer_id": 91413, "body": "<p>Your question asks what you <em>must</em> do. To get to the &quot;must&quot; part, you look at the terms of use, and consult non-binding normative recommendations only when they are incorporated into the license agreement. The license is <a href=\"https://foundation.wikimedia.org/wiki/Policy:Terms_of_Use#7._Licensing_of_Content\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">here</a>. The first step is to understand the author's license to Wiki, that</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>When you submit text to which you hold the copyright, you agree to\nlicense it under:\n<a href=\"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License</a> (“CC BY-SA”), and\n<a href=\"https://www.gnu.org/licenses/fdl-1.3.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">GNU Free Documentation License</a> (“GFDL”) (unversioned, with no invariant sections, front-cover texts, or back-cover texts).\n(Re-users may comply with either license or both.)</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Under the terms of CC, that means that nobody in the chain of licensees can change the license, and &quot;You must give appropriate credit&quot;. This also means that Wiki does not get to impose additional licensing restrictions on contributor content. They are, however, free to make recommendations as indicated by their use of the word &quot;should&quot;, not &quot;must&quot; or &quot;shall&quot;.</p>\n<p>Wiki does not claim to have a special licensing relation with the author. Often, content is uploaded to a provider who is granted a license to redistribute, and that provider then sub-licenses the content to the world. Wiki does not do this: the author's license simply says &quot;you agree to license it&quot;, not limiting the scope of the license. Therefore, any contribution that you make on Wiki is directly licensed to any and all users – Wiki does not purport to add or subtract anything from those two licenses, and you do not sub-license from Wiki.</p>\n<p>Wiki can, however, ban you if you don't comply, in case there is a putative contradiction in licensing requirement and they think you have violated their rules.</p>\n", "score": 4 } ]

[ "creative-commons" ]

[ { "answer_id": 90599, "body": "<p><strong>Copyright law</strong></p>\n<p>Copyright law <a href=\"https://milleripl.com/blogs/patents/is-software-protected-by-copyrights-or-patents\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">operates</a> to protect proprietory software developers' rights to limit use of their software. The protection granted to them as creators of the work under the law is based in United States, for example, on the <a href=\"https://openstax.org/books/introduction-intellectual-property/pages/3-8-changes-in-copyright-law\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">United States law governing computer programs</a>, much of which is codified in the <em>Copyright Act of 1976</em></p>\n<p>This law operates by protecting software companies, mostly growing out of the United States jurisdiction, who effectively license users to use the software in accordance with copyright law, with no ownership of the software itself granted. Further, to implement Digital Restrictions Management, their licenses restrict the usage of their software.</p>\n<p><strong>Digital Restrictions Management</strong> (better known as Digital Rights Management) is a technique that is applied by companies for some file formats, i.e to prohibit users from opening &quot;proprietary file formats&quot; in other software.</p>\n<p>It is also accompanied by contractual or license restrictions that limit users from accessing the content in such files and from sharing it &quot;illegally&quot;.</p>\n<p>This technique was traditionally made for content which is used in <em>distribution channels</em> for example, Adobe Digital Editions prevents file owners from accessing .acsm files and it is used for implementing DRM in publishers' contracts with libraries with restrictions imposed on their patrons on copying or distributing copies.</p>\n<p><strong>Interoperability</strong></p>\n<p>A natural consequence of restricting users from accessing published content is to also disallow interoperability which can remove the lock on the digital content itself. While Adobe uses DRM in its distribution channel, <a href=\"https://www.gnu.org/proprietary/proprietary-drm.html#content\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">many others utilise it to limit the interoperability</a> of their software products and works made using those products.</p>\n<p><strong>Legal treatment of DRM and interoperability</strong></p>\n<p>The Digital Millenium Copyright Act &quot;<a href=\"https://www.khanacademy.org/computing/computers-and-internet/xcae6f4a7ff015e7d:digital-information/xcae6f4a7ff015e7d:digital-copyright-and-licenses/a/copyright-drm-and-the-dmca\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">criminalizes the production and distribution of technology that tries to circumvent DRM.</a>&quot;. However, as regards interoperability, the Act itself provides an exception under which computer programmers are allowed to reverse engineer a DRM product to provide for interoperability.</p>\n<p>What this means for you is, regardless of the software licensing terms, you are still entitled to break the DRM lock for the purposes of achieving interoperability as holding otherwise would defeat public policy in the United States, considering that,</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>In Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd, Louisiana Software License Enforcement Act clause <a href=\"https://lexinsight.wordpress.com/2020/06/08/achieving-interoperability-through-reverse-engineering-a-defense-to-copyright-infringement/#_edn12\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">permitting the Copyright owner to restrict or prohibit software decompilation or disassembly</a> was barred by the Copyright Act and therefore was held unenforceable by the US Courts.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p><strong>SaaS and Users' rights</strong></p>\n<p>A &quot;computer program&quot; is not the only thing that is shipped with a software product, there could also be a service or service(s), which can include many other features bundled on with the product which are more in the domain of services. It could include the provision of a collaboration feature on the cloud, in which case, the company has you bound by a Terms of Use on their website.</p>\n<p>For example, this is the case with <a href=\"https://www.apple.com/legal/internet-services/itunes/us/terms.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Apple Media's Services Terms and Conditions'</a> &quot;Usage Terms&quot; which states the following (this sub-clause is incorporated in its non-media services also, including the text-editor known as &quot;Pages&quot;):</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>You may access our Services only using Apple’s software, and may not modify or use modified versions of such software.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>In such a case, restriction operates on the basis of contract law governing contracts of service, whereby the service provider and you have agreed to provision of this service on certain restrictive terms and conditions.</p>\n<p>All of this is not to say that users don't have rights over their own works and content. Your rights to use your own works is also a protected by copyright, since the written work receives international protection as a &quot;literary work&quot; due to it falling within the scope of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. You also have the right to reverse-engineer software for the basis of interoperability. However, you cannot extend this to requesting a service to be provided outside its intended scope of provision as per the terms of use, since, <a href=\"https://bnblegal.com/article/everything-you-need-to-look-out-for-in-a-saas-agreement/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">in the case of SaaS, copyright laws are not invoked.</a></p>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 91412, "body": "<p>I think that the restrictions in the license would not actually be binding on the licensee, because a license isn't quite the same thing as a contract.</p>\n<p>If you violate a contract, a court can compel performance. If you violate a license, you no longer have (or possibly never had?) a license to the relevant intellectual property, and so any use of it would be unlicensed and possibly infringing.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "united-states", "copyright", "contract-law", "eula" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91353, "body": "<p>As you have stated, Alice was born two hours prior to Bob. In a will, &quot;eldest&quot; or &quot;oldest&quot; typically is equated with &quot;first-born&quot; (see Daniel N. Mattarlin, &quot;<a href=\"https://www.canlii.org/en/commentary/doc/1967CanLIIDocs112\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">A Simple Legacy: 'To My Children'</a>&quot; (1967) 12:3 McGill L.J. 240; Frederick Read, &quot;<a href=\"https://www.canlii.org/en/commentary/doc/1931CanLIIDocs20\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">The Legal Position of the Child of Unmarried Parents</a>&quot; (1931) 9:9 Can. Bar Rev. 609; <em>An Act Relating to Wills, Legacies and Executors, and for the Distribution of the Estates of Intestates</em>, S.N.S. 1758, c. 11, s. XII). It often is a reflection of an intention to borrow from the ancient law of primogeniture (which is all about literal order of birth), rather than to refer to a person's legal age as defined by statutes and anniversaries. Between Alice and Bob, Alice is the first-born and therefore the oldest under that understanding.</p>\n<p>But the question of <em>who inherits</em> depends on much more than the interpretation of this one word. For example, most (or all) provincial succession statutes give courts the power to rectify a will if the court determines that the will fails to carry out the will-maker's intentions. Evidence could be presented <strong>about how the birthdays of the two were celebrated in relation to each other, who the will-maker understood to be the oldest (if they both existed when the will was made), etc</strong>.</p>\n", "score": 22 }, { "answer_id": 91379, "body": "<p>Each party will do <em>discovery</em> to obtain evidence and testimony, share that material with the opposing side, and one of two things will happen:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>The evidence/testimony points to one set of facts being the truth, and both sides will agree; end of dispute.</li>\n<li>Both sides will litigate in court their interpretation of the evidence and testimony, and the judge will decide; or jury if they're going that way.</li>\n</ul>\n<p>In this case, Alice will argue &quot;time zones&quot;, and that would be a complete slam-dunk in court - to the point where if Bob raises the issue, it's likely to be deemed a waste of the court's time. As such, if Bob raises it, <em>the argument better be pretty good</em>. Like I don't know, Halifax was in the Eastern time zone then while Vancouver did daylight savings? I don't know, but it'd be a popcorn moment - you'd either &quot;learn something new today&quot; or watch the lawyer get taken behind the wood-shed.</p>\n<p>Far more likely, Bob's attorney would concede the point, and raise other theories as to why the &quot;eldest&quot; clause is invalid.</p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "canada", "wills", "inheritance" ]

[ { "answer_id": 90355, "body": "<p>In addition to judgments, you should have looked at &quot;<a href=\"https://main.sci.gov.in/daily-order\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Daily Orders</a>&quot;. The decision is uploaded here, amongst other situations, particularly if the case is devoid of merits and the SCI has not given a judgment. The decision on the BBC ban case was also uploaded here.</p>\n<p>Also, since your question was general, I additionally refer you to <a href=\"https://districts.ecourts.gov.in/e-scr\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">e-SCR</a>, which allows for keyword search of reportable judgments and orders.</p>\n<p>All of this is in addition to the free databases 'IndianKanoon' and 'LII of India' which upload judgments from various courts and tribunals in India.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "india", "court-records" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91326, "body": "<p>Yes - patents are not for results but for devices and processes that can achieve the result.</p>\n<p>An airplane and a helicopter can have similar results; more than one medication helps to reduce blood sugar levels.</p>\n", "score": 37 }, { "answer_id": 91325, "body": "<p>Yes, certainly.</p>\n<p>For example, <a href=\"https://americanhistory.si.edu/collections/search/object/nmah_322313\" rel=\"noreferrer\">according to the Smithsonian Institution</a>, over four thousand patents have been granted for mousetraps, and another 40 or so are successfully patented every year.</p>\n", "score": 31 }, { "answer_id": 91327, "body": "<p>If both inventions work in different ways, but achieve the same thing, they can both be patented. Take a petrol engine, diesel engine, and a Wankel engine.</p>\n<p>If your inventions work in the same way, one gets the patent, one gets nothing. Tough luck.</p>\n", "score": 8 }, { "answer_id": 91366, "body": "<p>I don't know anything about other fields, but drugs can do <em>extremely</em> similar things by <em>extremely</em> similar means and still all get patented.</p>\n<p>For example, there were a lot of patented angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitors (drugs with generic names ending in -pril). There were so many that doctors made jokes about 'another-pril'.</p>\n<p>These drugs all</p>\n<ul>\n<li>prevent heart disease and stroke</li>\n<li>by lowering blood pressure</li>\n<li>by reducing the formation of angiotensin</li>\n<li>by inhibiting angiotensin converting enzyme</li>\n<li>by blocking its active site</li>\n<li>at least for the first few (and maybe more), by mimicking the shape of the blood-pressure lowering component of <em>Bothrops jararaca</em> venom</li>\n</ul>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "united-states", "intellectual-property", "patents" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91398, "body": "<h2>Use at your own risk</h2>\n<p>I'm letting you use this (presumably computer code or database, not a novel), but I'm not promising that it will work, and you can't sue me if it doesn't work. Admittedly, if the laws of your country will hold me liable for damage done by my crummy code, I have no choice other than to pay for those damages. But otherwise, I make no promises, I don't even promise that this work isn't copyright infringement. I don't even promise that I know of no errors or other defects. So you can't sue me. Unless, by law wherever you can sue me, I am not allowed to prevent myself from being sued by making this disclaimer.</p>\n<p>That's the gist of the disclaimer.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "contract-law", "liability" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91386, "body": "<p>It could be. You would have to check the <a href=\"https://map.toronto.ca/maps/map.jsp?app=ZBL_CONSULT\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">specific address here</a>, although not all properties are covered by By-Law 569-2013. This will give you the allowed uses. Picking a random residential-looking location, you might be stopped by §15.20.20.100 of the zoning bylaw, which restricts service shops to being located in non-residential buildings. There are also specific laws about <a href=\"https://www.toronto.ca/zoning/bylaw_amendments/ZBL_NewProvision_Chapter150_94.htm\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">vehicle service shops</a>, which may included a required 3 meter soft landscape perimeter and fence, depending on what is adjacent to the lot.</p>\n", "score": 4 }, { "answer_id": 91392, "body": "<h2>Check zoning law</h2>\n<p>What is and is not permitted on a given parcel of land will be spelled out there.</p>\n<p>Most “industrial” uses are prohibited in residential zones but restoring a single car as a hobby may be allowed.</p>\n<h2>Check environmental law</h2>\n<p>Spray painting is often regulated - usually it must be done in a proper booth. The disposal of hydrocarbons (fuel, oil, grease) is also controlled.</p>\n<p>There will almost certainly be noise restrictions in these laws as well as zoning law.</p>\n<h2>Check work health and safety law</h2>\n<p>These are often broader than people expect and can cover hobbyists, not just businesses.</p>\n", "score": 4 } ]

[ "ontario", "car" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91345, "body": "<p>There is one context where this does happen.</p>\n<p>Common law judges have direct contempt power.</p>\n<p>This means that while a judge is in the courtroom presiding over a case, the judge can summarily punish someone with incarceration and/or a fine without a trial for &quot;contempt of court&quot; because the judge has personally observed what has happened. Contempt of court encompasses types of disorderly conduct that wouldn't otherwise be criminal conduct.</p>\n<p>In other contexts, the judge is just one more witness and would not be assigned to handle the case.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>so you can only get &quot;non-witness judges&quot; from out-of-state or another\nregion. The lawsuit hasn't begun yet, and all of the possible, local\njudges saw it happen.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>As a practical matter, this is basically impossible. But there are procedures in cases where large numbers of judges a conflicted out of a case, for example, to get a judge from the next county over or another part of the same state.</p>\n", "score": 10 }, { "answer_id": 91312, "body": "<h2>A material witness would not be assigned</h2>\n<p>The case would go to another judge.</p>\n", "score": 5 } ]

[ "witnesses", "judge" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91237, "body": "<h2>Contract law is the basis for private schools operations</h2>\n<p>Private schools are not operated by the state.</p>\n<p>To attend, the school and the parents sign a contract stipulating payment for schooling. These contracts also generally contain a passus that makes the staying of the student contingent on the student obeying the school rules. The contracts also usually cover who has to pay for additional equipment such as laboratory equipment or computers.</p>\n<p>Depending on the type of private school, there are two different types of clauses for school hours:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>In a &quot;study-hall&quot; or &quot;cram school&quot;, the number of hours you buy is contractually fixed. Such schools are usually in addition to a different school the student attends and are outside normal schooling hours. In effect, such institutions do group tutoring.</li>\n<li>A private school that replaces public school usually just dictates that the student has to attend according to the curriculum and then provides the curriculum.</li>\n</ul>\n<p>In either case, the qualification of the teachers is generally not part of the contract with the parents but only matter for the contracts of the school with the teachers.</p>\n<p>Private schools are generally regulated, but the <a href=\"https://www2.ed.gov/admins/comm/choice/regprivschl/index.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">regulations vary extremely widely in the USA.</a></p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "school-law" ]

[ { "answer_id": 70303, "body": "<p>The customers are able to leave, so there's no reason it could be a crime. Even if they weren't able to operate the lock themselves, they are presumably able to leave by asking a staff member. There is no way this could be remotely considered false imprisonment.</p>\n<p>Depending on the layout and size of the store and presence/lack of other fire exits, this might violate fire safety regulations.</p>\n", "score": 5 } ]

[ "canada", "labor-law", "british-columbia" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91378, "body": "<p>These flimsy bags are not given out for free. They're included at no additional charge with qualified purchases (specifically fresh produce to be weighed).</p>\n<p>It's like a &quot;buy two X, get a third one free&quot;. You can't just take one X and claim it's still free. Bob needs to first buy something in order to get something for free.</p>\n<p>If you buy two kiwis, get a bag for them, and proceed to eat the kiwis, you'll own an empty bag. It doesn't matter exactly when you eat these kiwis, this could even be directly after paying for them. And what you do with your bag is up to you.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "england-and-wales", "any-jurisdiction" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91377, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>Future income constitutes a “possession” only if the income has been earned or where an enforceable claim to it exists (Ian Edgar (Liverpool) Ltd v. the United Kingdom; Wendenburg and Others v. Germany; Levänen and Others v. Finland; Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal; Denisov v. Ukraine).</p>\n</blockquote>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Conversely, the volume of business enjoyed by a liberal profession – with no fixed income and no guaranteed turnover – which is subject to the hazards of economic life does not constitute a “possession” (Greek Federation of Customs Officers, Gialouris and Others v. Greece, Commission decision).</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>(quoted from <em>Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention\non Human Rights</em>, last updated 2022-08-31)</p>\n<p>Rent is a form of future income, assuming that there is an enforcable claim (i.e. an actual rental contract). You obviously aren't entitled to rent if you can't find a renter, or if your existing renter terminates the contract.</p>\n<p>Having said that, I think you utterly misunderstand the ECHR. &quot;For example, it may be that the ECHR doesn’t protect the right to be a residential landlord absolutely and unconditionally&quot;. Well obviously it doesn't. The very same article says\nin the second paragraph that governments are entitled to control the\nuse of property in accordance with the general interest.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "property", "landlord", "human-rights" ]

[ { "answer_id": 86946, "body": "<p>The <em>mere presence</em> of a conditional isn't a <em>determining</em> factor, but the <em>context</em> of the conditional <em>can</em> be a <em>contributing</em> factor in determining whether the threat is true or not. See a <a href=\"https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/20/20-1459/198236/20211029150021046_20-1459%20United%20States%20v%20Justin%20Eugene%20Taylor%20Amicus%20Brief.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">more recent publication from 2003</a> for a better understanding of those factors. I definitely wouldn't rely on anything from the 1600s as a reliable source.</p>\n<p>Back in the old days a threat was essentially the same as an assault, but nowadays we often view threats and assaults more distinctly and have crafted more specific laws to address them. Just as an &quot;arrest&quot; was once used to describe a seizure of any kind regardless of the duration, more modern case laws have established distinctions between arrests (full-custody seizures) and detentions (temporary, short-duration seizures).</p>\n<p>Since most jurisdictions in the US now have a separate statute for addressing threats in order to distinguish them from assaults, we have to read the exact verbiage of each state to determine whether it covers the particulars of the threat. Here are a few examples. Note the similarities and differences in each:</p>\n<p>Arizona: <a href=\"https://www.azleg.gov/ars/13/01202.htm\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Threatening or Intimidating</a></p>\n<p>Texas: <a href=\"https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/PE/htm/PE.22.htm\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Terroristic Threat</a></p>\n<p>New York: <a href=\"https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/PEN/120.15\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Menacing</a></p>\n<p>As you yourself pointed out, simply making a threat isn't necessarily mala en se, and there are times where the law explicitly allows for people to issue threats, particularly when it comes to defending themselves, another person, or their property. For example, in Arizona, <a href=\"https://www.azleg.gov/ars/13/00407.htm\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">ARS 13-407</a> allows a person to issue a <em><strong>threat</strong></em> of deadly force to defend their property against trespassers, but does not allow them to actually <em><strong>use</strong></em> deadly force to do so. This means that Arizonans who find themselves in a situation where they feel it necessary to issue a conditional threat to an intruder (&quot;leave my property right now <em><strong>or</strong></em> I'll shoot you&quot;), must understand that the threat is empty unless the intruder shifts his focus from mere trespassing to harming a person. (The bad guy doesn't need to know this though, and all the better if he doesn't.) Even though the threat is empty according to the issuer's knowledge, it is still a threat, albeit one that the issuer is legally entitled to make. In this situation, the threat to use deadly force is decriminalized, not because it contained a conditional, but rather because it was explicitly authorized by law.</p>\n<p>In practice, many jurisdictions, especially ones with high crime rates, have arbitrarily decided to triage threats cases based on whether they include a conditional statement or not. After all, if you have 1,000 cases a month and a team of only 30 prosecutors, you have to prioritize the cases that are easiest to prove. With that in mind, many prosecutors offices have provided direction to their law enforcement partners to only submit cases that include unconditional threats. Those agencies in turn train their officers to ignore any threats cases involving conditional threats, perpetuating the misunderstanding that a conditional automatically negates a threat as being a true threat.</p>\n<p>There are literally thousands of cases where offenders have had their convictions upheld for crimes involving conditional threats. Just think of robbery/carjacking: A man walks up to a victim in a parking lot and says &quot;give me your car <em><strong>or</strong></em> I'll kill you. Despite containing a conditional threat, there isn't a prosecutor or jury in the country that wouldn't instantly recognize this as a true threat and an element of robbery/carjacking.</p>\n<p><a href=\"https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7056&amp;context=jclc\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Conditional Intent to Kill is Enough for Federal Carjacking Conviction</a>.</p>\n", "score": 5 }, { "answer_id": 49824, "body": "<p>No.</p>\n\nTuberville v Savage ([1669] EWHC KB J25)\n\n<blockquote>\n <p>\"If it were not assize-time, I would not take such language from you.\"\n (said while grabbing the handle of sword)</p>\n</blockquote>\n\n<p><a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tuberville_v_Savage\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">According to this article</a>, conditional threats are not considered a true threat.</p>\n\n<blockquote>\n <p>The court held that a conditional threatening statement, without an imminent threat of harm, does not constitute an assault.</p>\n</blockquote>\n\n<p>Here is a similar Law.SE question and answers. <a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/q/2116/794\">Did Zoey Tur assault Ben Shapiro?</a></p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "criminal-law", "threats" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91371, "body": "<p>I presume you mean &quot;in a government school&quot;, in private schools the matter is completely different. Also, any administrator is free to express their wishes, the salient question is what command can be enforced.</p>\n<p>If the state enacts a policy rule for education, that rule is therefore enforceable against an employee. If the state does not enact such a rule, the district still has the option to set its own policy, as long as it doesn't contradict existing law and constitutional rights. The same reasoning carries through to the relationship between district policy and the policy of a specific school. Your boss can tell you what you do, even if the bosses boss didn't make such an order.</p>\n<p>The guiding principle here is that your superiors are allowed to state what the curriculum is, and to the extent that they haven't said anything on a topic, you can express yourself freely. When they tell you that you cannot exclusively teach the MAGA theory of modern American politics, then you run a risk of sanction. There are political and legal means of challenging those sanctions, the latter of which would rely on the First Amendment, that is, the government cannot prevent you from expressing your political opinion. On the other hand, the government is also not obligated to provide a paid platform with a captive audience for you to express your opinions. This is why you cannot preach a religion at your students, or require them to (at least superficially) accept a particular political ideology – that violates the rights of students.</p>\n<p>If there is a state law requiring the teaching of some particular matter, then you must teach it, because the state commands the district, and the district commands the principal who commands the department head. If the state is silent, but the district has a policy, that gives you a different starting point but a nearly same result for the individual teacher. When rules are added at the lowest end of the chain, there is a significant chance that the immediate superior actually does <em>not</em> have the authority to make such a rule, and does <em>not</em> have enforcement authority. The district almost certainly has authority to set policy, but it's not so obvious with principals and department heads (look at your contract).</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "united-states", "education", "school-law" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91370, "body": "<p>Anybody who walks out on a lease obligation can be sued for the money that they owe. The only thing that leaving the country adds is complication over the landlord collecting. In principle, A can sue B regardless of the countries that they live in. The landlord would sue you in state court, then would seek enforcement in your country. If your country is North Korea, the North Korean courts may not recognize the US state court claim, but UK courts would because there is a treaty whereby we recognize the judgments of each other courts, at least in areas where our laws agree (i.e. if you walk out on a lease, you still owe the money).</p>\n", "score": 4 } ]

[ "breaking-the-lease", "students" ]

[ { "answer_id": 90126, "body": "<p>Obviously, there are plenty of kitchen knives over 12 cm in length.</p>\n<p>A knife that is legal for home use be carried outside the home in an enclosed compartment (<em>verschlossenes Behältnis</em>) which prevents immediate access. So it is forbidden to carry the knife thrust through a belt, or in a jacket pocket, but it can carried in a <a href=\"https://www.berlin.de/polizei/service/waffenbehoerde/waffenrecht-uebersicht/#f%C3%BChrungsverbot\" rel=\"noreferrer\">locked tool box</a> or the like. A shrink-wrapped package also qualifies.</p>\n<p>To carry it &quot;unwrapped&quot; is forbidden, but there are exceptions to that ban which come down to &quot;reasonable use.&quot; A bread knife would be reasonable if it comes with a loaf of bread and all the other implements for a picnic. It is not reasonable in a nightclub.</p>\n<p>A number of knife styles or cutting implements are generally <a href=\"https://www.berlin.de/polizei/service/waffenbehoerde/waffenrecht-uebersicht/artikel.1044011.php\" rel=\"noreferrer\">forbidden</a>, no matter how they are carried or stored.</p>\n", "score": 46 }, { "answer_id": 90131, "body": "<p>According to <a href=\"https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/waffg_2002/__42a.html\" rel=\"noreferrer\">section 42a</a> Weapons Act (WaffG), Paragraph 1forbids:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<ul>\n<li>\n<ol start=\"3\">\n<li>Knives with a blade that can be locked with one hand (one-hand knife) or fixed knives with a blade length of more than 12 cm respectively.</li>\n</ol>\n</li>\n</ul>\n</blockquote>\n<p>But, at Paragraph 2, there are two potentially relevant statutory defences to carrying such a knife home from the shop:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>(2) Paragraph 1 does not apply:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>\n<ol start=\"2\">\n<li>for transport in a closed container,</li>\n</ol>\n</li>\n<li>\n<ol start=\"3\">\n<li>for carrying the objects according to paragraph 1 nos. 2 and 3, provided that there is <strong>a legitimate interest</strong>.</li>\n</ol>\n</li>\n</ul>\n</blockquote>\n<p>And Paragraph 3 defines <em>legitimate interest</em> to mean:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>(3) A legitimate interest pursuant to paragraph 2(3) exists in particular if the items are carried in connection with the exercise of a profession, the maintenance of customs, sport or <strong>a generally recognized purpose</strong>.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>If, as user @o.m. pointed out in their comment, the knife remains in its original packaging - i.e. within a &quot;<em>closed container</em>&quot; - then Paragraph 2(2) would presumably apply.</p>\n<p>If not, I strongly suspect that taking it home directly after buying it would be &quot;<em>a generally recognized purpose</em>&quot; so not prohibited under this Act.</p>\n<p>_{(The above quotations are via Google Translate, and I've altered them slightly to make sense in English)}</p>\n", "score": 15 } ]

[ "germany", "weapons" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91362, "body": "<p>Rule 3 of <a href=\"https://morth.nic.in/sites/default/files/CMVR-chapter2.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">The Central Motor Vehicle Rules, 1988</a> prescribe the conditions as per which an individual holding a license (as per Section 3 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988) can drive the vehicle.</p>\n<p>The relevant portion of the Rules pertaining to your query reads as follows:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>&quot;3. General. - The provisions of sub-section *(1) of section 3 shall\nnot apply to a person while receiving instructions or gaining\nexperience in driving with the object of presenting himself for a test\nof competence to drive, <strong>so long as</strong>— (a) such person is the holder of\nan effective learner's licence issued to him in Form 3 to drive the\nvehicle; (b) <strong>such person is accompanied by an instructor holding an\neffective driving License to drive the vehicle and such instructor is\nsitting in such a position to control or stop the vehicle</strong>; and</p>\n<p>...</p>\n<p>Provided that a person, while receiving instructions or gaining\nexperience in driving a motor cycle (with or without a side-car\nattached), shall not carry any other person on the motor cycle\nexcept for the purpose and in the manner referred to in clause (b)&quot;</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Hence, <strong>as a person with a learning license, you can only ride a motor cycle if you take a person as a pillion</strong>, and such person must be an instructor with a driving license for a motor cycle sitting in a position to control or stop the vehicle.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "india", "traffic", "driving" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91299, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>Could DA Bragg have only charged Trump with 34 misdemeanor counts,\nwithout elevating the charges to felonies?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Yes.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>if Trump's defense team argues that the law that elevates the\nmisdemeanor charges to felony charges does not apply in this case,\nbecause the elevation option does not include federal laws, then since\nthis is a matter of law and not a matter of fact, Judge Mercan (rather\nthan the jury) will decide whether or not to dismiss the felony\ncharges?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Yes.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Does Judge Mercan have the option of dismissing the felony enhancement\nbut allowing the misdemeanor charges to proceed, or would Mercan have\nto dismiss all charges against Trump?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Judge Mercan could probably choose either option if he found that the original charges were not supported by the law. There is law regarding how this decision is made but I personally don't know that area of law well.</p>\n<p>One of the reason that I am unfamiliar with it is that it is exceedingly rare for a judge to conclude that the prosecutor's charges are not supported by the law.</p>\n<p>I would be very surprised if that judge reached that conclusion in this case, in particular, because both federal election law violations and state and federal tax law violations are implicated by the indictment. The DA no doubt legally researched this issue exhaustively before presenting the charges to the grand jury and has made out a prima facie case for a felony under the applicable New York State law.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>If Trump is brought to trial, then would it be possible for a jury to\nreturn a verdict that Trump was guilty of the misdemeanor offenses of\nfalsifying business records but innocent of doing so with an intent to\ncommit another crime? If so, then could Trump still be found guilty of\nthe misdemeanors, or would he be fully acquitted, since the jury ruled\nthat he was not guilty of the exact charges that DA Bragg filed?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Whether a jury is presented with a lesser included offense charge at the request of the defense, is partially a matter of the prosecution's election to make that option available or not, and partially a matter of the judge's decision on how to handle it. The body of law involved in how this decision is handled on a case by case basis is quite involved.</p>\n<p>Most of the case law involves homicide cases, assault cases, and property crime cases where there are charges with are identical except for aggravating factors for the most serious charges. But, lesser charges generally aren't presented if based upon the evidence presented at trial, either the more serious charge is established or no charge is proven.</p>\n<p>For example, if the defendant presents an alibi defense, and a witness whose credibility is disputed places the defendant at the scene intentionally committing a crime, a lesser included offense charge would not be appropriate.</p>\n<p>But, if the defendant admits hitting a pedestrian and causing the pedestrian's death, but claims that the pedestrian was at fault in the accident for jay walking, while the prosecution alleges that the pedestrian was intentionally struck as part of a mafia hit, multiple lesser included offenses would probably be charged involving different levels of intent of premeditated intent/aggravated circumstances killing (first degree murder), to a knowing killing (second degree murder), to a reckless killing (manslaughter), to a criminally negligent homicide or vehicular homicide charge.</p>\n<p>Typically, the decision on this point would not be made until all evidence was received and the judge in a hearing away from the jury but in the presence of the prosecutors and defense counsel crafted jury instructions based upon the evidence presented at trial and the arguments raised by counsel at trial.</p>\n", "score": 18 }, { "answer_id": 91334, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>Could DA Bragg have only charged Trump with 34 misdemeanor counts, without elevating the charges to felonies?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>No. The statute of limitations for misdemeanors is only 2 years in New York so this would have had to have happened in 2018, maybe 2019 at the latest, at which point 1) DA Bragg hadn't become DA yet, and 2) Trump was still a sitting president. There are some ways to extend the statute of limitations in NY, but none that seem to apply here.</p>\n", "score": 7 } ]

[ "united-states", "criminal-law", "new-york-state" ]

[ { "answer_id": 90246, "body": "<h2>“People who make DMCA requests” is not a protected class under anti-discrimination law</h2>\n<p>Business do not have to deal with any particular customers if they don't want to unless the reason they aren't is due to them being a member of a protected class. SO, if they choose not to deal with you because you make DMCA requests then, subject to the contract, this is legal</p>\n<h2>What does the <a href=\"https://twitter.com/en/tos\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">contract</a> say?</h2>\n<blockquote>\n<p>We may suspend or terminate your account or cease providing you with all or part of the Services at any time <strong>for any or no reason</strong>, including, but not limited to, …</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Is this an “any or no reason”? Yes, it is. So, the contract can be terminated on this reason.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "dmca" ]

[ { "answer_id": 18059, "body": "<p>There is ultimately no meaningful regulation of name choice in the United States, but failing to follow convention can be a pain.</p>\n<p>Many countries have far more rigorous regulation of names and often require that a name be on a pre-approved list or at least that it receive advanced governmental approval.</p>\n<p>For example, I changed my surname when I married from &quot;Willeke&quot; to &quot;Oh-Willeke&quot; but many private and governmental computer systems do not accept hyphens in names. Non-standard characters and different kinds of punctuation pose similar issues. For example, most databases cannot handle Greek/Cyrillic alphabet characters such as &quot;π&quot; so they would have to spelled out &quot;Pi&quot; for inclusion in many databases.</p>\n<p>For example, I am not certain that the databases of most government agencies, even in Colorado which has a large Hispanic population, are capable of distinguishing between ñ and n. Similarly, I am sure that &quot;Æ&quot; (the AE grapheme) would be recorded as &quot;ae&quot; in most computerized databases and on most identification documents. Likewise, few identification document systems or computer databases can process Korean <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hangul\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Hangul characters</a>, so my children's middle names are in a particular romanization of the true and correct Hangul spelling of those names.</p>\n<p>Various agencies such as vital statistics departments and driver's license bureaus have practical limitations on their ability to input information into computer systems, but that doesn't really limit a true name, which at common law could be changed without resort to the court system or any bureaucracy, something which remains the law in Colorado.</p>\n<p>The bottom line is that even if your name in its true form has a representation in symbols that a database can't process and that really and truly is recognized in the law as your legal name, as a matter of practical reality, many entities that deal with names will be limited to a romanization of those names.</p>\n<p>Consider the following excerpt from a court of appeals case in Colorado that explains the underlying law:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Walter Knight, an inmate of the State Prison, petitioned the district\ncourt to change his name to Sundiata Simba. His reasons were 'to\nacknowledge the heritage of (his) past, and to Fortify (his)\nacceptance of (his) religious beliefs as required by (his) faith.'\nNine months later, the request was denied. We reverse.</p>\n<p>The statute under which the petition was filed, § 13--15--101,\nC.R.S.1973, provides that the court must approve the change of name if\nit is 'satisfied that the desired change would be proper, and not\ndetrimental to the interests of any other person.' Here, the court\nheld that the change would not be 'proper' because Knight has a\nlengthy criminal record, is incarcerated, and an F.B.I. 'rap' sheet is\nextant which lists him under his present name. However, there was no\nevidence Before the court as to how the name change would be\nprejudicial to prison or police authorities. Therefore, we do not\nconsider any of these reasons, without additional proof, as sufficient\nbasis for the court to conclude that the change of name would be\nimproper. In this day when a Lew Alcindor elects to be known as Kareem\nAbdul-Jabbar, and Cassius Clay opts for Muhammad Ali, the desire of\nWalter Knight to reflect his African heritage by adopting the [36\nColo.App. 189] name Sundiata Simba should not be dismissed lightly.\n<em>Cf. Petition of Rusconi</em>, 341 Mass. 167, 167 N.E.2d 847.</p>\n<p><strong>At common law, a person could adopt another name at will. Statutes\nsetting forth procedures to be followed in changing a name merely\nprovide an additional method for making the change.</strong> <em>See</em> 57 Am.Jur.2d\nName §§ 10 and 11. It is more advantageous to the state to have the\nstatutory method of changing names followed, <em>Application of McGehee</em>,\n147 Cal.App.2d 25, 304 P.2d 167, and for that reason applications\nunder the statute should be encouraged, <em>Petition of Buyarsky</em>, 322\nMass. 335, 77 N.E.2d 216, and <strong>generally should be granted unless made\nfor a wrongful or fraudulent purpose.</strong> <em>Application of Ferris</em>, 178 Misc.\n534, 34 N.Y.S.2d 909. <em>See generally</em> Annot., 110 A.L.R. 219.</p>\n<p>While a court has wide discretion in matters of this type, <strong>it should\nnot deny the application for a change of name as being improper unless\nspecial circumstances or facts are found to exist. Included in these\nwould be 'unworthy motive, the possibility of fraud on the public, or\nthe choice of a name that is bizarre, unduly lengthy, ridiculous or\noffensive to common decency and good taste.'</strong> <em>In re M.</em>, 91 N.J.Super.\n296, 219 A.2d 906; <em>See Petition of Rusconi, supra.</em> Likewise, <strong>there is\nauthority to deny the change if the interests of a wife or child of\nthe applicant would be adversely affected thereby.</strong> <em>See</em> Annot., 53\nA.L.R.2d 914.</p>\n<p>We do not suggest that a court must grant every petition for change of\nname; rather, we hold that some substantial reason must exist for\ndenying such petition, and that none appears in the record Before us.\n<em>See In Re Ross</em>, 8 Cal.2d 608, 67 P.2d 94. Before a court denies a\nrequest for a change of name under the statute, it should conduct an\nevidentiary hearing to determine if good and sufficient cause exists\nto deny the application. <em>Cf. Henderson v. Industrial Commission</em>,\nColo.App., 529 P.2d 651.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p><em>In re Knight</em>, 36 Colo.App. 187, 188-189, 537 P.2d 1085, 1086 (1975). <em>See also In re Cruchelow</em>, 926 P.2d 833, 834 (Utah 1996) (at common law an individual had a right to change his or her name at will); <em>In re Porter</em>, 31 P.3d 519 (Utah 2001) (it was an abuse of discretion to deny someone's request to change his name to Santa Claus); <em>In re Mokiligon</em>, 106 P.3d 584 (N.M.App. 2004) (summarily reversing a trial court's refusal to allow a name change from &quot;Snaphappy Fishsuit Mokiligon&quot; to &quot;Variable&quot;).</p>\n<p>In 2008, when the Colorado DMV prohibited newlywed women from changing their middle names to their maiden name and then adopting the surname of their spouses, this regulation caused such an outcry that <a href=\"http://washparkprophet.blogspot.com/2008/12/colorados-maiden-name-flub-and-more.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">it was promptly dropped</a> at the insistence of the Governor, but the state DMV still requires court recognition for more significant name changes.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The offending rule is found in the Colorado Code of Regulations at 1\nCCR 204-13 Part 2.3.5, and relies on Colorado Revised Statutes §\n42-2-107(2) and § 42-2-302(2), C.R.S., for authority. But, neither\nstatute actually purports to limit the means by which someone may\nchange their name in Colorado. They simply require that your state ID\nor driver's license have your name on it.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The replacement rule, which is still far more rigid than the case law which recognized a common law right to change your name at any time with or without a court application to do so stated:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>2.3.5 A certified certificate of marriage, decree of dissolution of marriage or legal separation issued by any Native American Tribal\ncourt or an authorized government agency or court of the United\nStates, any territory, or state of the United States, or any of their\npolitical subdivisions, or any court-ordered name change entered by\nany state or federal court may be used to modify the full legal name\nof the applicant.</p>\n<p>2.3.5.1 Name change as a result of marriage shall be subject to the following conventions:</p>\n<p>(1) the existing last name is replaced with the spouse’s last name;</p>\n<p>(2) the existing last name is added as a second middle name and the\nspouse’s last name becomes the applicant’s last name;</p>\n<p>(3) the existing last name replaces the existing middle name and the\nspouse’s last name becomes the applicant’s last name;</p>\n<p>(4) the spouse’s last name replaces the existing middle name and the\nexisting last name remains the applicant’s last name;</p>\n<p>(5) the spouse’s last name is added before or after the existing last\nname via a hyphen or space and becomes the applicant’s last name.</p>\n<p>2.3.5.2 All non-court-ordered name changes will require completion, and submission to the department, of the Affidavit of Name Change\nfor a Colorado driver’s license or identification card, form DR-2203.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 8 } ]

[ "name" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91357, "body": "<h2>It's trademarked.</h2>\n<p>Yu-Gi-Oh has active trademarks in at least the following categories:</p>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https://tsdr.uspto.gov/#caseNumber=76977902&amp;caseType=SERIAL_NO&amp;searchType=statusSearch\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">IC 041 - US 100, 101, 107</a> Providing games played through communication by computer terminals; providing computer game software programs that are downloaded through computer networks, providing a computer game that may be accessed network-wide by network users</li>\n<li><a href=\"https://tsdr.uspto.gov/#caseNumber=76977468&amp;caseSearchType=US_APPLICATION&amp;caseType=SERIAL_NO&amp;searchType=statusSearch\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">IC 041 - US 100, 101, 107</a> Providing games played through communication by computer terminals; providing computer game software programs that are downloaded through computer networks, providing a computer game that may be accessed network-wide by network users</li>\n</ul>\n<p>So <strong>any</strong> downloadable or internet-streamed game is covered.</p>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https://tsdr.uspto.gov/#caseNumber=76071879&amp;caseType=SERIAL_NO&amp;searchType=statusSearch\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">IC 009 - US 021, 023, 026, 036, 038</a> Computer products, namely, computer game programs; [ video game cartridges; video game CD-ROMs; video output game units; computer game CD-ROMS;] video game programs; video game programs for use with television sets [; video game machines for use with television sets; game-playing equipment, namely, joysticks and game controllers ]</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Any data-carriers sold are covered here. CDs, Cartridges, SD-cards. Together with the 041 trademark: <strong>Any and all computer game is covered.</strong></p>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https://tsdr.uspto.gov/#caseNumber=76071881&amp;caseType=SERIAL_NO&amp;searchType=statusSearch\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">IC 016 - US 002, 005, 022, 023, 029, 037, 038, 050</a> Playing cards; trading cards [ ; calendars; posters; game instruction manuals; computer game instruction manuals; game instructions sheets; scoring sheets; books, namely, strategy guides; stationery ].</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Almost all print products are covered here.</p>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https://tsdr.uspto.gov/#caseNumber=87501573&amp;caseType=SERIAL_NO&amp;searchType=statusSearch\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">IC 041 - US 100, 101, 107</a>: Entertainment services, namely, an ongoing series featuring animated cartoons provided through webcasts.</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Animation series are covered here.</p>\n<h2>They covered all their bases</h2>\n<p>The most extensive trademark under the Yu-Gi-Oh sub-items covers all of this, including pretty much any merchandize you could think of and that is not food:</p>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https://tsdr.uspto.gov/#caseNumber=88925847&amp;caseType=SERIAL_NO&amp;searchType=statusSearch\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">IC 009, 016, 018, 025, 028, 041 - US 001, 002, 003, 005, 021, 022, 023, 026, 029, 036, 037, 038, 039, 041, 050, 100, 101, 107</a> - Straps for mobile phones; accessories for mobile phones, namely, earphones, phone cases; mouse pads; integrated circuit cards and smart cards, namely, pre-recorded DVDs and CDs featuring computer programs for playing video and computer games; downloadable computer programs for video and computer games via communication networks; downloadable computer game programs; downloadable computer game programs for games adapted for use with an external display screen or monitor; downloadable video game programs via communication networks for computer games adapted for use with an external display screen or monitor; downloadable audio recordings featuring music via communication networks; exposed cinematographic films; exposed slide films; slide film mounts; recorded video discs, video tapes, DVDs, and CD-ROMs featuring animated cartoons and animation, and featuring movies in the field of adventure and children's entertainment; downloadable image files via the internet featuring animated cartoons and animation; downloadable electronic publications in the nature of books and magazines in the field of comics, cartoons, games, music, movies and toys; computer game programs for arcade games adapted for use with an external display screen or monitor; spectacles; sunglasses; downloadable electronic publications in the nature of comic books and magazines in the field of comics and cartoons, Notebooks for writing; paper; stationery; postcards; rubber erasers; seals for stationery; stickers for stationery; writing instruments; bookmarkers; writing pads; pen and pencil cases; posters; collectible trading cards; books and comic books featuring cartoons and children's stories; calendars; diaries; printed matter, namely, posters, brochures, and newsletters in the field of comics; electric pencil sharpeners; luncheon mats of paper; towels of paper; handkerchiefs of paper; pastes and adhesives for stationery or household use; comic books featuring cartoons and children's stories, All-purpose carrying bags; tote bags; handbags; waist bags; shoulder bags; backpacks; Boston bags; carry-on bags; school bags; travelling bags; wallets; key cases; commutation-ticket holders, namely, ticket pouches; business card cases; leather pouches; pouches for holding keys; drawstring pouches; pouches of textile; pouches for holding makeup, keys and other personal items; umbrellas; parasols; walking sticks; canes; clothing for domestic pets; envelopes of leather for packaging, Clothing, namely, jeans; jackets; pants; coats; sweaters; sport shirts; polo shirts; shirts; blouses; shirts for suits; sweatsuits; pajamas; nightwear; underwear; swimwear; swimming caps; T-shirts; sleep masks; aprons; socks and stockings; shawls; scarves; gloves; mittens; neckties; neckerchiefs; bandanas; under garments; mufflers as neck scarves; ear muffs; hoods; nightcaps; headwear; footwear, not for sports; shoes; boots; masquerade costumes; garters; suspenders; waistbands; belts for clothing; clothes for sports, namely, jerseys; footwear for sports, namely, athletic footwear, Computer game consoles for use with an external display screen or monitor; hand-held games with liquid crystal displays; toys, namely, action figures, dolls, puzzle games, and dominoes; playing cards; trading card games; cards for trading card games; coin-operated amusement machines and apparatus for use in amusement parks other than arcade video game machines; playing card game accessories, namely, playing card cases, playing card holders, mats for use in connection with playing card games, playing card shuffling devices and dice; jigsaw puzzles, Educational and instructional services, namely, providing classes, panel discussions, and seminars in the field of arts, crafts, sports, comics, and entertainment; arranging, conducting, and organizing game events, namely, card game competitions; providing non-downloadable electronic books and electronic comics in the field of cartoons, games, movies, and toys via communication networks; on-line reference library services, namely, providing electronic library services which feature electronic books, comics, pictures, and images via an on-line computer network; reference libraries of literature and documentary records; entertainment services, namely, provision of online non-downloadable comic books and graphic novels; movie showing, movie film production, and movie film distribution; entertainment services, namely, providing non-downloadable sound recordings featuring music via internet or mobile phone communications; providing non-downloadable games via communications by computer terminals or mobile phone communications; providing amusement facilities; entertainment services, namely, an ongoing series featuring animated cartoons provided through webcasts</li>\n</ul>\n<h2>Not enough?</h2>\n<p>Oh, and as a kicker: Yu-Gi-Oh <em>might</em> be considered a <a href=\"https://www.inta.org/topics/famous-well-known-marks/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">famous mark</a>, similar to Apple computers, Nintendo or Microsoft: hearing the word immediately gives people the idea of a very specific Anime card game with larger than life series attached to it.</p>\n<p>Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation's Foodservices, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 218 U.S.P.Q. 390 (Fed. Cir. 2004) held that the mark GIANT FOOD was famous because:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>45 years of use</li>\n<li>extensive media exposure</li>\n<li>sales in excess of 1 billion USD per year</li>\n<li>prominent display on the facade of supermarkets</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Yu-Gi-Oh can claim:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>24 years of use</li>\n<li>Extensive media exposure (dozens of Anime series, cinema movies...)</li>\n<li>Konami's '22 revenue of 2.8 Billion USD (~300 billion Yen) was largely due to Yu-Gi-Oh and in the 22 years some reporter claimed that <em>1 trillion Yen</em> would have been earned by Yu-Gi-Oh</li>\n<li>prominent ads for any of the merchandize and series, such as partnerships with McDonalds.</li>\n</ul>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "copyright", "intellectual-property", "trademark", "patents" ]

[ { "answer_id": 27779, "body": "<p>There is no loophole because a work released in object code form only — without the Corresponding Source — is not released under GPLv3, even if you say it is.</p>\n\n<blockquote>\n <p>GPLv3 only requires them to also provide whatever source came with it</p>\n</blockquote>\n\n<p>False. Providing the Corresponding Source is compulsory (§6 as pointed by @cHao). If they do not have access to it, it means the work has not been released under GPLv3.</p>\n", "score": 5 }, { "answer_id": 27775, "body": "<p>The GPL doesn't just require the distribution of \"whatever source came with it\". \nSee §1:</p>\n\n<blockquote>\n <p>The “Corresponding Source” for a work in object code form means all the source code needed to generate, install, and (for an executable work) run the object code and to modify the work, including scripts to control those activities. </p>\n</blockquote>\n\n<p><em>That</em> is what is required in order for others to comply with the license. An empty <code>src</code> folder simply won't cut it. A recipient of your software must be able to give others access to enough code to rebuild it, or they can't comply with the license, and thus are not authorized to distribute the software.</p>\n\n<p>As the sole creator of a not-already-covered work, you are not bound by that restriction. But assuming you're not just playing boneheaded legal games, you release such a work under the GPL precisely because <em>you want others to have the source code</em>. If you don't, then you picked the wrong license. The GPL doesn't prohibit linking to non-GPL code, so there's no requirement to work around. (Some companies do indeed release binary-only software...but they don't release it under the GPL.)</p>\n\n<p>Now, if your intent is to release software under the GPL in order to satisfy the requirements for derivative works, then tough luck. See §6:</p>\n\n<blockquote>\n <p>You may convey a covered work in object code form under the terms of sections 4 and 5, <strong>provided that you also convey the machine-readable Corresponding Source under the terms of this License</strong>...</p>\n</blockquote>\n\n<p>A \"covered work\" is the program, or <em>a work based on the program</em> (ie: your derivative work), so your agreement with the prior author requires you provide enough source code to rebuild your software.</p>\n", "score": 3 }, { "answer_id": 27800, "body": "<p>\"The (GPL) license does not apply to me because I'm the one offering the license, not accepting it.\"</p>\n\n<p>Sorry, but you're mistaken right there, and it's the core of the argument. You are not forced to offer the GPL license to sublicensees, as you are the original author. And you have the right to an any moment stop offering it. But when you do offer such a license, and anyone accepts the license, then the offer and its acceptance create a mutually binding contract. That is basic contract law.</p>\n\n<p>Since the GPL license grants the receiver of binary code the right to source code, since you offered a GPL license and someone accepted your offer, you are therefore bound by your offer of source code.</p>\n\n<p>The remainder of your question appears to build on this false premise, and is therefore unanswerable.</p>\n", "score": 1 }, { "answer_id": 65492, "body": "<p>When you created a program (from scratch), you are the author of that program, aka the <em>copyright owner</em>. Such ownership comes with certain rights, granted to you by the Copyright Law of your country. If any other person or organization wants to use your program, they must obtain a permit from you, which you usually give in the form of a <em>license</em>.</p>\n<p>Now, the text of the license is addressed to a user of your program, not to you the author. As such, the word &quot;You&quot; within the license means &quot;the user&quot;. Section 0 of GPLv3 even states this explicitly:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Each licensee is addressed as “you”</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>So, this is the first source of confusion that some have expressed: the GPL license puts the obligation to provide the source code on the <em>user</em>, not on the <em>author</em>. In fact, I do not see any kind of obligation that the license imposes on the author. So even if you live in a jurisdiction where a license can be considered a contract, this particular contract does not bind you in any way.</p>\n<p>In short: <strong>no</strong>, you, the author, do not have to provide your source code if you don't want to.</p>\n<p>One of the commenters mentioned that based on the preamble's statement that <code>Our GPLs are designed to make sure that ... you receive source code or can get it if you want it</code>, a judge may issue a ruling that this creates an obligation on the author to furnish the source code. However, I consider this to be very unlikely, as introductions typically have little legal weight. In fact, the introduction itself says as much at the end: <code>The precise terms and conditions for copying, distribution and modification follow.</code></p>\n<p>Another point of interest is, as mentioned by @cHao, whether the users of your program will be able to create derivative versions based on your Program. Section 6 of GPL requires that the derivative (&quot;covered work&quot;) be conveyed in &quot;Corresponding Source&quot; form, which includes source code for both their and your code. Obviously, they wouldn't be able to satisfy this requirement. However, there's also Section 5, which allows the user to</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>... convey a work based on the Program, or the modifications to produce it from the Program, in the form of source code under the terms of section 4,</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>whereas Section 4 does not require <em>Corresponding Source</em> but only</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>You may convey verbatim copies of the Program's source code <strong>as you receive it</strong>.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Thus, the users of your program will be able to create derivative works, but will be forced to distribute them in source form only.</p>\n<p>Lastly, it is always useful to think who has the standing to sue in case the terms of the license are violated. For example, if the user of your program goes on and distributes his modified version under the terms of Section 6, then you (the author) will be the only party with the standing to sue, accusing your user of violating the terms of the license by not providing the source code of <em>your program</em> (which they never had). I have a feeling, however, that the judge will not find such a case persuasive.</p>\n", "score": 0 }, { "answer_id": 91267, "body": "<p>The consequence of violating the GPL license is that the copyright holder can successfully sue you for copyright infringement.</p>\n<p>If you, Mr. A, write some software and are the sole copyright holder, you can absolutely release it under the GPL license and not provide source code, because you yourself are the only one who can sue you for doing it, and you are not going to do that. Of course that is a rather pointless thing to do and doesn't serve any good purpose. (I can't distribute your software further under the GPL license because I have no way to give anyone the source code, I can only point them to your website. And I can't create any derived work, because I don't have the source code. So the GPL license doesn't make any difference. )</p>\n<p>Now if you combine your software with my GPL licensed software, the result has two copyright holders: You and me. If you distributed the combined software without providing source code, or even just without the source code for your part, you are violating the GPL license and <em>I</em> can sue you for copyright infringement. So the answer to &quot;Dumb question 2&quot; is: Absolutely not.</p>\n", "score": 0 }, { "answer_id": 91277, "body": "<p>you include an AGPL licensed library, which means that ALL your code, as well as ALL code linking to it, now MUST be released under AGPL. Which is impossible as you include libraries that are not AGPL licensed, so you're already violating the AGPL. Whether you also violate GPL3 is irrelevant by now.</p>\n<p>And this doesn't just relate to using AGPL code in your application, even if you were to compile the AGPL dependent part into a web service and call that remotely (over a network connection) from the rest of your system that entire system now becomes infected by the AGPL. Even worse, if you call a service created by someone else that is AGPL licensed (even if they fail to disclose so! possibly because they don't realise it) your code is now infected by the AGPL as well.</p>\n<p>Such is the toxic nature of the AGPL, and which is why any sane person would never allow it anywhere near their computers, and why you should always be extremely wary of calling any 3rd party web service or other resource from your software.</p>\n<p>Note though that you don't have to actually make your source code publicly available for download. You just have to provide a means for people to receive it that is available for any interested party. So an email address where the code can be requested suffices, a physical mailing address where a CD-ROM can be requested MIGHT suffice as long as there are no shipping restrictions that prevent shipping those CDs to parts of the world.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "gpl" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91356, "body": "<p>Summarized, GDPR is about documented permissions and processes, and balances of interests.</p>\n<ul>\n<li>If Alice pays Bob to develop a website, but not to operate or troubleshoot it, then Alice should never, ever give Bob access to productive customer data. It is up to Alice to change any default passwords configured by Bob, and it is up to Bob to explain how in the documentation.<br />\nAlice is required to keep her (changed) credentials in a professional manner, which would probably not be done by putting them into the source code. (Technical and organizational measures.)</li>\n<li>If Alice pays Bob to develop <strong>and run</strong> a website, then Bob will need credentials to access the data. It is up to Bob to keep his credentials in a professional manner, and it is up to Alice to revoke those credentials when Bob stops working for Alice. In the role of a developer, Bob should explain to Alice how to do that. (Best as part of the written operations manual for the software.)<br />\nBob should only actually use those credentials to run/support the website, not for idle curiosity. Support cases involving actual customers should be documented.</li>\n<li>Of course Bob must not install any &quot;hardwired backdoors&quot; into the code. Credentials in the source code would probably be considered unprofessional security and a gross security risk, but not as a deliberate backdoor. (Backdoors tend to be more stealthy.)</li>\n</ul>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "united-kingdom", "criminal-law", "gdpr" ]

[ { "answer_id": 21443, "body": "<p>You agreed to pay these fees when you applied for the apartment, so unless they explicitly say that one or both of these fees is waived in case you don't take the apartment (virtually no chance that they said such a thing), you owe that money. Your obligation is not contingent on them convincing you that the fee is just, so it doesn't matter that they won't explain the difference. However, if they said you can pay electronically, then you can pay electronically, since that too is part of the agreement.</p>\n", "score": 3 }, { "answer_id": 91355, "body": "<p>Most apartment complexes have you to pay those fees upfront before your application can be processed, due in the form of a money order. The question is why they would run your application without payment if that is their policy? Nothing binds you to this if their policy states that payment is due before application can be processed. As well as online, the system shouldn't allow you to submit your application without payment of any fees associated with the application process. However, payment may not be refundable if you choose to not sign the lease.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "united-states", "residential-lease", "texas" ]

[ { "answer_id": 77791, "body": "<p>This has yet to be specifically decided in the federal courts. The Post Office can set &quot;rules of conduct&quot; for its facilities. Prohibiting photographing is plainly a restriction on one's First Amendment rights, and it is established beyond question that a government cannot issue / enforce a blanket prohibition of public photographing. Someone would have to take a case to court to determine whether this limitation on First Amendment rights passes the relevant level of judicial scrutiny. The rationale (as set forth by the USPS) is that <a href=\"https://about.usps.com/postal-bulletin/2008/html/pb22228/html/info_005.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">such photographing may be &quot;disruptive&quot;</a>.</p>\n<p>One can perhaps analogize <a href=\"https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1550/filming-the-police\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">the right to film police</a> with a new-found right to film post office, following from a right to <a href=\"https://deliverypdf.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=107064121121026006084086001004097002098014089077064041076070094098122000091114127094058057003006039016043114009119118091109098106078031069085002092097098064127096047093042123014121087089098079013017109071082110116088011003003124113023127126103116111&amp;EXT=pdf&amp;INDEX=TRUE\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">public oversight over the government</a>. DHS gives <a href=\"https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Operational%20Readiness%20Order%20HQ-ORO-002-2018%20Photography%20and%20Videotaping%20....pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">general guidance</a> of its own (with a pile of redacted stuff), directing you to <a href=\"https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/41/102-74.420\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">41 CFR 102-74.420</a>. Permission is thus required, until the courts find that to be an unconstitutional restriction (I would not expect there to be such a finding). But it is not unthinkable that the courts could at some point so rule.</p>\n<p>The YouTube aspect of the question is irrelevant: if you have the right, you have the right, and it doesn't derive from nor is it blocked by an intent to distribute on YouTube.</p>\n", "score": 4 }, { "answer_id": 79413, "body": "<p>Short answer: Poster 7 is essentially a reiteration of &quot;the regulations&quot; and thus &quot;the law&quot;. As for photography, &quot;it depends&quot;.</p>\n<ol>\n<li><p>Poster 7 is nearly word-for-word identical to the regulations in 39 CFR § 232.1, enacted in 1972, by the powers delegated to the Postal Service by Congress in 39 USC § 401. &quot;Nearly&quot;.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>The regulation refers to &quot;news purposes&quot;, not &quot;commercial use&quot;. When is photographing a person in a post office lobby actually a qualified &quot;news purpose&quot;? If the photographer tells people it's for his or her &quot;personal use&quot;, does that defeat the claim that it is a &quot;news purpose&quot;? Clearly it is illegal (like any activity inside postal property) once the &quot;authorized personnel&quot; tell you to stop, risking up to a $10,000 fine and 30 days in federal prison, in addition to the immediate state trespassing charge and penalties.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>The list of authorized &quot;news purposes&quot; photography locations ends with &quot;auditoriums when used for public meetings&quot;. If they meant to include only &quot;lobbies ... when used for public meetings&quot;, they should have put a comma in front of &quot;when&quot;. Otherwise the succeeding limitation grammatically and logically only applies to &quot;auditoriums&quot;. A court may apply the rules of statutory interpretations, such as <em>noscitur a sociis</em>, differently.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>Unlike Poster 7, the regulation 39 CFR § 232/1(i) and the original regulation at 37 FR 24347, Nov 16, 1972, have the limitations listed in &quot;Except as prohibited by official signs [etc]...&quot; BEFORE the term &quot;photographs for news purposes may be taken [in authorized public areas]...&quot;, rather than after. This would seem to more clearly state that photographs for &quot;news purposes&quot; are permitted unless specifically prohibited (by signs, orders, instructions), subject to &quot;permission&quot; for &quot;other photographs&quot;.</p>\n</li>\n</ol>\n<p>As for relevant &quot;court&quot; interpretation, I found a federal opinion that comes very close to answering this question, at least as related to an alleged violation of a &quot;First Amendment right&quot; to PLAY a recorded message in the post office lobby, after someone did so, in violation of 39 CFR § 232, refused to leave when told, and was arrested for trespassing. It's not even binding precedent in New York, but at least it shows that court's thinking.</p>\n<p>Held: Claims <strong>dismissed</strong> against US Post Office in lawsuit for damages and injunction arising from alleged illegal trespassing arrest. (among other things).</p>\n<p>In short:\n&quot;A First Amendment claim that the government is impermissibly restricting a speaker's access to government property is controlled by the now-familiar tripartite forum analysis.... The extent to which the Government can control access depends on the nature of the relevant forum. ... Generally speaking, when the state reserves property for its `specific official uses,' it remains nonpublic in character. ... There is little question that the Postal Service is essentially a commercial enterprise.... [I]t is also well settled that the government need not permit all forms of speech on property that it owns and controls. ... The court further finds that the interior of the Jordan, NY Post Office is a non-public forum with respect to which reasonable restrictions on speech may be imposed... In nonpublic fora, the government has wide latitude in regulation of speech, it may even be content-based as long as it is &quot;reasonable&quot; and &quot;not an effort to suppress the speaker's activity due to disagreement with the speaker's view.&quot; [internal Supreme Court and 2d Cir. case citations omitted]</p>\n<p>See, e.g., Moore v US Postal Service, in the NDNY federal district court, 01-CV-1609 Jan 13, 2005, where Mr Moore was &quot;trespassed&quot; from the post office and arrested by local police, after violations of several subsections in 39 CFR 232 inside the post office lobby, although not specifically 232.1(i) regarding &quot;photography&quot;.</p>\n<p>This information is only my personal view of this case excerpt and is not in any way intended as &quot;legal advice&quot;, let alone a complete analysis of the actual issue of post office photography. If someone finds a contradictory case in another federal court, let alone the US Supreme Court, let us know! FWIW, USPS or DHS policy statements about whether or not to enforce rules like this are not &quot;law&quot; and thus irrelevant to the underlying question.</p>\n", "score": 4 } ]

[ "civil-rights", "postal-service" ]

[ { "answer_id": 82067, "body": "<p>I hope someone can expound whether the Sale of Goods Act 1979 and/or Consumer Rights Act 2015 can assist OP. But nobody has answered OP.</p>\n<h1>OP, here is what I would do.</h1>\n<p>Escalate over this manager, if you can. Cite case law at the highest ranking employee of this retailer, as follows.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The basic rule, stated in <em>Hadley v Baxendale</em> (1854), is that a contracting party is liable for losses\neither:</p>\n<p>(a) arising naturally, i.e. according to the usual course of things; or<br />\n(b) such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties,\nat the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.</p>\n<p>This was transmuted to the composite test of ‘reasonably foreseeable as liable to result’ in <em>Victoria\nLaundry (Windsor) Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd</em> (1949) which itself has two subdivisions corresponding\nto the two limbs of the rule in <em>Hadley v Baxendale</em>: one dealing with losses that anyone,\n‘as a reasonable person’, could foresee and the second dealing with losses that are foreseeable\ngiven the special knowledge of the defendant.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>I quoted this from Damian Taylor, <em>Contract Law Directions</em> (8 edn, 2021, OUP), p 301. This introductory book is written for students, so you can try to read it.</p>\n<h3>Now apply the law to your facts. How?</h3>\n<p>First, apply Limb #1 of <em>Hadley v Baxendale</em>. Your &quot;additional accessories (ancillary cables and such)&quot; arise naturally. It is completely natural and usual to buy accessories for an amplifier, because an amplifier shall not work without accessories!</p>\n<p>Then apply Limb #2 of <em>Hadley v Baxendale</em>. Stress that you made known <strong>(to whom though???)</strong> that you bought &quot;additional accessories (ancillary cables and such)&quot; &quot;specifically for the amplifier at the time of purchase.&quot; Therefore, both parties contemplated these accessories at the time that you bought the amplifier. Therefore, your losses for these accessories resulted from the store's breach of contract of the amplifier.</p>\n<p>Let us know if this argument works!</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "united-kingdom", "consumer-protection" ]

[ { "answer_id": 5868, "body": "<h2>Legalese is not required</h2>\n\n<p>You can and should write a will in plain English. However, you need to ensure that your <em>simple</em> wishes can:</p>\n\n<ol>\n<li>Actually be understood,</li>\n<li>Actually be implemented,</li>\n<li>Don't have unintended consequences,</li>\n<li>Cover all bases.</li>\n</ol>\n\n<h2>Use a lawyer</h2>\n\n<p>I suggest that you write your simple wishes out as you have done and take them to a lawyer. A good lawyer will be able to:</p>\n\n<ol>\n<li>Draft a will and have it executed so that it complies with the law,</li>\n<li>Keep a copy of the will so that your executor can find the damn thing without having to tear your house apart,</li>\n<li>Consider the contingencies that you haven't.</li>\n</ol>\n\n<p>My lawyer charged me and my wife $150 each - 20 years latter the estate has twice as many children and would be worth several million dollars; I consider it one of the cheapest pieces of insurance I have ever bought.</p>\n\n<h2>Contingencies</h2>\n\n<ol>\n<li>Who is the executor of the will? This is the person who administers the estate until it is finalised. As written, you haven't named one: in most jurisdictions this makes the government's Public Trustee the executor.</li>\n<li>How and how much will the executor get paid? Executor's are entitled to be paid for their services.</li>\n<li>What happens if you and your wife are separated or divorced at the time of your death? Wills are not automatically terminated by these events.</li>\n<li>What if Bob is dead before you die? Or has emigrated? Or is insane?</li>\n<li>What if Bob dies in the same car crash that kills you and your wife?</li>\n<li>What if Bob dies after he becomes the trustee of the trust?</li>\n<li>Who will be your child's guardian? As written, Bob is responsible for the finances but he is not the guardian. The child would be reliant on kinship guardianship or become a ward of the state.</li>\n<li>For what purposes can Bob use the trust money? Education of the child? Vacations for the child? His own gambling problem?</li>\n<li>Can the trust borrow money?</li>\n<li>What types of investments can the trust make? Bolivian palm tree futures anyone?</li>\n<li>Does Bob need to get professional financial advice about this?</li>\n<li>Who will audit the trust to ensure Bob is behaving appropriately?</li>\n<li>Your wife falls pregnant tomorrow. Do you want to write a new will or have one that works no matter how many children you have?</li>\n<li>What if all 3 of you die in the same car crash? Who gets the estate then?</li>\n</ol>\n\n<p><strong>Only people with no assets or dependants have a <em>simple</em> estate</strong></p>\n", "score": 9 }, { "answer_id": 5866, "body": "<blockquote>\n <p>Can anyone point towards specific cases where someone with a similar\n will has run into major problems because they wrote a simple will\n instead of the complex legalese one?</p>\n</blockquote>\n\n<p>Like every case in every Trusts and Estates textbook. </p>\n\n<p>You wife? Everything goes to her? So when you divorce and remarry does your stuff go to wife A or to wife B?</p>\n\n<p>Your child? What about your other child? The one who is not born yet?</p>\n\n<p>Bob dies before your son. Or better yet, Bob is with you and your wife when you all die. </p>\n\n<p>EDIT TO ADD:<br>\nThere are two legal fictions that are used in imagining the possibilities, the fertile octogenarian and the promiscuous toddler. </p>\n", "score": 6 }, { "answer_id": 5867, "body": "<p>@jqning pointed out some practical considerations of going the DIY route. So I'll approach it differently...</p>\n\n<p>I suggest you conduct the following thought experiment:</p>\n\n<p>I assume, like most people, you have worked at least one job before? Maybe you have had a career in a profession? Maybe not. It doesn't matter for the purpose of this thought experiment.</p>\n\n<p>Fix your mind on your experience in one of those jobs. Imagine all the little details, nuances, tricks and knowledge you gained by experience over time to help you do that job well. Now imagine somebody walking in off the street and on the first day trying to do that job with no training or experience. How well do you think they will perform the first time? Now, if they stick with it and get training and experience they will improve and might do well. But not the first time.</p>\n\n<p>Now let's say they are given an example of what to do. Written by professionals in the job they are trying to do for the first time and the professionals say, \"Do it this way.\"</p>\n\n<p>But the new person knows better and says, \"No, I don't need to do it that way. That way is too complicated. All I need is to do it this much simpler way (that I'll just make up off-the-cuff) and it'll be much better.\"</p>\n\n<p>How do you think that will work out?</p>\n\n<p>Friend, if you insist on DIY lawyering, the least you can do is follow exactly what the professionals have laid out for you. Otherwise, I am certain you will wish you had. Or in this case, your heirs will.</p>\n", "score": 4 }, { "answer_id": 32667, "body": "<p>There are a number of available will generation programs, which you can install on your computer and use. Generally these ask you a series of questions, and based on your answers will generate a will using tested language that will stand up in court, and will get the results you wish. The language is tailored to any specific rules in your state or jurisdiction.</p>\n<p>The output also includes specific instructions on how to sign the will (or other document) so that it is binding, what needs to be notarized, etc.</p>\n<p>Such programs will also advise you if the kind of will you want is more complex than can be handled with the program, so that a lawyer is advisable. I have used such a program myself. I would urge someone with wishes of about the level of complexity suggested by the original question here to use such a program. I also assisted both my parents to generate documents including POAs using such a program.</p>\n<p>The program I used (now out of date) and others I have seen will also create both financial and health care powers of attorney, living wills, trusts for children or other dependents, and various similar and related documents. Basic identity information is reused from document to document, so it need not be retyped.</p>\n<p>Such a program is, in my view, a good value for money.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "wills" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91342, "body": "<h1>A Commerce Clause challenge would fail</h1>\n<p>A Commerce Clause challenge seems like a sure loser. Under the Commerce Clause, Congress “has authority to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce,” <a href=\"https://casetext.com/case/gonzales-v-raich\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>Gonzales v. Raich</em>, 545 U.S. 1, 16 (2005)</a>.</p>\n<p>Because “the Internet is an instrumentality and channel of interstate commerce” <a href=\"https://casetext.com/case/us-v-macewan#p245\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>United States v. MacEwan</em>, 445 F.3d 237, 245 (3d Cir. 2006)</a>, Congress has virtually boundless authority to regulate its use. <a href=\"https://casetext.com/case/gibbons-v-ogden-5#p194\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>Gibbons v. Ogden</em>, 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824)</a> (“This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution.”)</p>\n<h1>A First Amendment challenge would probably fail</h1>\n<p>But as you note, that authority is not boundless, as congressional enactments must still comport with the First Amendment. I would not be surprised by a First Amendment challenge to such a law, but I think it would fail.</p>\n<p>Commercial speech enjoys less protection than speech by individuals. For instance, although the government may not limit speech merely because it concerns unlawful activity (<a href=\"https://casetext.com/case/brandenburg-v-ohio\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>Brandenburg v. Ohio</em>, 395 U.S. 444, (1969)</a>) or because it is false (<a href=\"https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-alvarez\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>United States v. Alvarez</em>, 132 S. Ct. 2537, (2012)</a>).</p>\n<p>But commercial speech is essentially unprotected by the First Amendment unless it concerns lawful activity and is not misleading. <a href=\"https://casetext.com/case/central-hudson-gas-electric-corporation-v-public-service-commission-of-new-york#p564\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>Central Hudson Gas Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n</em>, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)</a>. And even then, the government has wide latitude to compel commercial speech, as opposed to restricting it:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Because the extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the information such speech provides ... appellant's constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual information in his advertising is minimal. Thus, in virtually all our commercial speech decisions to date, we have emphasized that because disclosure requirements trench much more narrowly on an advertiser's interests than do flat prohibitions on speech, warnings or disclaimers might be appropriately required in order to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or deception.&quot;</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"https://casetext.com/case/zauderer-v-office-of-disciplinary-counsel\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel</em>, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)</a>.</p>\n<p>There are, of course, still limits on the government's authority to compel speech, and the Supreme Court has struck down compelled commercial disclosures that did not deal with &quot;purely factual and uncontroversial information&quot; and did not relate &quot;to the services that [speakers] provide.&quot; <a href=\"https://casetext.com/case/natl-inst-advocates-life-advocates-v-becerra\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>Nat'l Inst. of Family &amp; Life Advocates v. Becerra</em>, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018)</a></p>\n<p>It's unclear whether a disclosure law must satisfy both parts of that test or only one. If it's only one, an e-mail chain of custody seems sufficiently factual and uncontroversial to survive a First Amendment challenge. If the law has to pass both tests, it would likely come down to the question of whether that chain of custody bears a significant enough relationship to the speaker's services. I can imagine arguments both ways.</p>\n<h1>The states may not impose new limits on spam e-mails.</h1>\n<p>Although the federal government could enforce this law, a state government could not.</p>\n<p>The <a href=\"https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-15-commerce-and-trade/chapter-103-controlling-the-assault-of-non-solicited-pornography-and-marketing\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">CAN-SPAM Act of 2003</a> sets baseline rules for unsolicited commercial e-mail and permits the Federal Trade Commission to further regulate those messages. Although many people think those laws don't go far enough, the states are generally not permitted to enact any further regulations, because they are expressly pre-empted by <a href=\"https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-15-commerce-and-trade/chapter-103-controlling-the-assault-of-non-solicited-pornography-and-marketing/section-7707-effect-on-other-laws\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">15 U.S.C. § 7707</a> (“This chapter supersedes any statute, regulation, or rule of a State or political subdivision of a State that expressly regulates the use of electronic mail to send commercial messages”).</p>\n<p>There are two exceptions to this pre-emption. One permits additional state regulations addressing deceptive communications, and another permits additional state regulations that only incidentally effect e-mail messages. The first option seems weak, but perhaps a state could enact a law requiring <em>any</em> commercial solicitation -- regardless of medium -- to require such a chain of custody. I'd imagine, though, that the most common alternate means of sending such messages (fax, USPS, text message) are also regulated by federal laws that likewise pre-empt state regulation, so I think this could be difficult to pull off as well.</p>\n<p>tl;dr: The federal government would likely be permitted to impose this law, but a state could not.</p>\n", "score": 4 }, { "answer_id": 91340, "body": "<p>Commercial emails are highly regulated especially under the <a href=\"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-108publ187/pdf/PLAW-108publ187.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">CAN-SPAM Act</a>, so the federal government could pass amendments to the existing law to implement your suggestion. Depending on the exact law constructed, there could be a legal challenge based on the unreasonable burden that the new law would impose on businesses, insofar as the added burden is unlikely to materially advance the proffered government interest from the current state.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "first-amendment", "email", "spam", "marketing", "commerce-clause" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91341, "body": "<p>Ideas can't be copyrighted.</p>\n<p>Implementations of ideas can be patented, but that involves a significant process far beyond a Youtube comment.</p>\n<p>It sounds like you're not after their exact-word endorsement per se... you just think they have a good idea and want to use it. That's fine, just don't use their words exactly if you don't want to credit them.</p>\n<p>That's the best way to do it regardless: ”many people online say &lt;your originally written restatement of the idea here&gt;.&quot; Note the restatement does not go in quotes. So it is</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Joe Blow says &quot;poutine is the best&quot;.</li>\n<li>Many commenters say poutine is wonderful.</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Here's the thing. If many people are saying the same idea, who has standing to sue you for that idea? No one of them more than any other. Can you imagine 500 people who all agree on something, filing a <em>class action</em> against yet another person who also agrees with that? It would be absurd and would be promptly dismissed as frivolous.</p>\n", "score": 1 }, { "answer_id": 91336, "body": "<p>One always turns to the <a href=\"https://www.youtube.com/static?template=terms\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">terms of service</a>, where Youtube (or some other provider) sets out the rules. Stackexchange requires a certain kind of <a href=\"https://stackoverflow.com/legal/terms-of-service#licensing\">permission to copy</a> to be granted to others, so that I can quote user content from here as long as I abide by CC BY-SA 4.0 license. Youtube has a slightly different sub-licensing condition:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>You also grant each other user of the Service a worldwide,\nnon-exclusive, royalty-free license to access your Content through the\nService, and to use that Content, including to reproduce, distribute,\nprepare derivative works, display, and perform it, <strong>only as enabled by\na feature of the Service (such as video playback or embeds)</strong>. For\nclarity, this license does not grant any rights or permissions for a\nuser to make use of your Content independent of the Service.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>That means that you cannot legally copy comments using ordinary cut-and-paste, but you can make comments available via embedding (unlikely to be how you intended to redistribute comments).</p>\n<p>You might have available a &quot;fair use&quot; defense when you get sued, in fact if you don't actually quote text (or quasi-quote, where you copy but change a few words), there is no issue. You could say for example &quot;7 users were upset with this, and 12 were pleased&quot;, since that isn't copying their content. Fair use does not start out on your side, you have to prove that your use is &quot;fair&quot; under US law (which is where you would be sued). You basically need to hire a lawyer that specializes in finding that line, though a basic guideline is that you getting money or them losing money from your copying is not in your favor, and large-scale copying does not work in your favor.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "fair-use", "youtube" ]

[ { "answer_id": 31027, "body": "<blockquote>\n <p>is there anything i can do to prevent my ex from costing us our home\n and my husbands job by making false reports, thus sending more police\n to our home for no reason at all??</p>\n</blockquote>\n\n<p>Many laws are similar across states. Thus, in your jurisdiction there might be a statute akin to Michigan's <a href=\"http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(S(l4pvsnls01fjqbx15grn2p2f))/mileg.aspx?page=getobject&amp;objectname=mcl-722-633\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">MCL 722.633(5)</a>, sanctioning \"<em>[a] person who intentionally makes a false report of child abuse or neglect under this act knowing that the report is false</em>\".</p>\n\n<p>Since the sheriff got involved, there must be a police report reflecting that. You might want to approach the general attorney or police so as to proceed in accordance with the remedies provided by statutory law.</p>\n\n<blockquote>\n <p>The day after the visit my husbands employer told him this type of\n thing could not happen again. It looks bad on the company and if it\n happens again my husband will loose his job and our home as well.</p>\n</blockquote>\n\n<p>Although the incident from the false report evidently harmed your husband's reputation with respect to his employer, suing the false accuser at this point in time unfortunately seems a long shot. That is because the court would conclude that you have not suffered <em>special damages</em>. Likewise, applying the current case law, a finding of <em>defamation per se</em> would be hard to establish under the circumstances.</p>\n\n<p>(Note: I am not knowledgeable of child custody laws, so I am not aware of whether the false report bears any relevance in family court)</p>\n\n<p>However, if you or your husband suffer any losses as a result of unjustified actions directly or indirectly caused by the false accuser, he (the false accuser) would be liable for defamation and/or <em>tortious interference with employment relation</em>. The concept of losses not only includes termination of employment, but also other detrimental effects such as demotions and any new costs derived from having to move out of company property.</p>\n\n<p>If the false accuser is aware of the link between your home and your husband's employment, a claim of <em>tortious interference</em> will be more evident because that awareness is one of the <em>prima facie</em> elements of that claim. (For more info on the prima facie elements of a claim, see <a href=\"http://leagle.com/leaglesearch\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">leagle.com</a>)</p>\n\n<p>Immunity does not protect a person who makes reports that are knowingly and intentionally false. By law, the court can always order the agency to disclose the identity of the person(s) who made false reports that the agency determined were unfounded. See Michigan's <a href=\"http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(S(l4pvsnls01fjqbx15grn2p2f))/mileg.aspx?page=getobject&amp;objectname=mcl-722-625\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">MCL 722.625</a>.</p>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 31024, "body": "<p>Talk to the attorney you have for your custody situation. If you don't have an attorney, find one. Google for free or low cost legal aid in your city or state. If you don't qualify due to income, they can make referrals.</p>\n\n<p>You need an attorney to deal with the X (and their attorney), to carefully appraise your husband's company about the situation, and to interface with DHS and the state legal department, if needed.</p>\n\n<p>The idea is not to threaten your X with legal action, or your husband's company if he is fired, or to push back against DHS; the idea is to be sure you (and your husband) don't do any of those things yourself, while making sure all parties know you are prepared to defend your position with legal representation, if needed.</p>\n\n<p>I'm not going to try and predict or advise what might happen if DHS visits again, or your husband is fired, or your custody fight gets worse; that could be legal advice, which is off-topic here (and illegal). You need to deal with your own attorney.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "children", "investigation" ]

[ { "answer_id": 90515, "body": "<p>This is unlikely to give rise to criminal charges in the U.S., if the bare bone facts of the question are all that is involved.</p>\n<p>It does not count as child pornography. But possible offenses might include contributing to the delinquency of a minor (a minor misdemeanor), or perhaps enticing a minor to travel in interstate commerce for sex, neither of which are likely to come up in a case where no travel occurs until both parties are adults. The potential offenses, unlike child pornography offenses themselves, would generally include defense for good faith mistakes regarding age.</p>\n<p>The <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LGBT_rights_in_Turkey\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">situation in Turkey</a> could be more serious. While I can't identify a particular offense, if the participants were of the same sex, even though homosexuality is not outright banned in Turkey, as it is in many predominantly Islamic countries, this could be characterized as an &quot;offense against public morality&quot; in Turkey.</p>\n<p>In either a same sex or opposite sex circumstance, it might be characterized in Turkey as some form of illegal seduction, or perhaps as some implicit form of blasphemy.</p>\n<p>Even if it didn't give rise to criminal charges, it might also be used as a basis for severe parental discipline, or as a basis for finding that someone lacked &quot;good character&quot; in a civil context, in either country.</p>\n<p>Of course, unless the interaction is known, identified with real people, and brought to the attention of law enforcement, nothing would happen.</p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "united-states", "criminal-law", "international", "minor", "turkey" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91314, "body": "<p>Untouchability refers to social practices with respect to those who are <em>avarna</em>, referring to the ancient 4 occupational classes identified by the <em>varna</em> system as exemplified by the Mānavadharmaśāstras. Anyone who is not kṣatriya, brahmin, vaiśya or śudra is avarna (&quot;outcaste; dalit; untouchable&quot;). <a href=\"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1987997/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Article 17</a> simply asserts that &quot;Untouchability&quot; is forbidden, leaving it to ordinary interpretation to figure out what that really means.</p>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.cvmc.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/PoA-Act-English.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989</a>. &quot;Scheduled Caste&quot; is invoked in <a href=\"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/68762/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Art. 341</a> of the constitution, which simply says</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>(1) The President may with respect to any State or Union territory,\nand where it is a State after consultation with the Governor thereof,\nby public notification, specify the castes, races or tribes or parts\nof or groups within castes, races or tribes which shall for the\npurposes of this Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Castes in\nrelation to that State or Union territory, as the case may be</p>\n<p>(2) Parliament may by law include in or exclude from the list of\nScheduled Castes specified in a notification issued under clause ( 1 )\nany caste, race or tribe or part of or group within any caste, race or\ntribe, but save as aforesaid a notification issued under the said\nclause shall not be varied by any subsequent notification</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Leaving aside the further definition of those in a Scheduled Caste, the act lists numerous specific actions which are prohibited, the Offenses of Atrocities in Ch II, for example</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>(a) puts any inedible or obnoxious substance into the mouth of a\nmember of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or forces such member\nto drink or eat such inedible or obnoxious substance</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>You can summarize this as &quot;you cannot commit crimes against a member of a Scheduled Caste&quot;.</p>\n<p>The membership question is reduced to lists, for example\n<a href=\"https://socialjustice.gov.in/writereaddata/UploadFile/CONSTITUTION%20(SC)%20ORDER%201950%20dated%2010081950.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">The Constitution, (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950</a>. There are about 7 such orders for caste, and as many for tribes. Note that only Hindus can be in Scheduled Castes, and Sikhs are dealt with by listing relevant caste members as Hindus irrespective of their religious profession. It is unclear what the law says about the indigenous Christians e.g. Malankara Nasrani, who seem to be likewise treated as Hindu.</p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "legal-terms", "india", "indian-constitutional-law" ]

[ { "answer_id": 83251, "body": "<p>To answer the question in the headline, yes, it is legal to install a non-original battery in an iPhone. In a <a href=\"https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/impression-products-inc-v-lexmark-international-inc/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">2016 Supreme Court case</a> regarding another consumer electronics product (in that case, printers), the Court found that once a company has sold a product they cannot dictate how it is used. Since the phone is your property you are free to repair as you see fit.</p>\n<p>Re your edit: The tech making the repair would not get in trouble either, unless they separately had a contract with Apple that forbade them from doing the repair; that's not something you as a customer can account for.</p>\n<p>You do not say if your phone is under warranty. If it is not, Apple is generally free to decline to service it for any reason. For information about your rights under warranty, see <a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/users/14149/bta\">bta</a>'s excellent <a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/a/83263/11062\">answer</a> on this same question. There is also good information in the comments on this answer.</p>\n", "score": 20 }, { "answer_id": 83263, "body": "<p>What Apple did is an unfortunately common practice that in most cases is indeed illegal. In recent years, with the rise in support for &quot;right to repair&quot; movements, the FTC has been more aggressive about <a href=\"https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2018/04/ftc-staff-warns-companies-it-illegal-condition-warranty-coverage-use-specified-parts-or-services\" rel=\"noreferrer\">sending official warnings</a> to companies that try to deny warranty repairs to people who use third-party parts or repair services. According to the FTC, these limitations are prohibited by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, and could potentially be seen as &quot;deceptive statements&quot; under the FTC Act.</p>\n<p>There are limitations to this, though. The manufacturer <em>can</em> legally require you to use &quot;official&quot; replacement parts if they provide those parts/services for free, as is often the case for safety recalls. They can also apply for a waiver from the FTC, but those are not common or easy to get.</p>\n<p>All that being said, companies will still act like they can do this, though &quot;warranty void if removed&quot; stickers and with clauses in warranty contracts. Even if those things are not enforceable, they're convincing enough that a large portion of the user base won't take a chance on using third-party parts or services. Customer support personnel are even instructed to deny warranty claims on hardware with third-party parts, even though the company knows they can't legally do that. If this happens to you, your recourse is to take the company to small claims court. Between the hassles of filing a suit and the restrictions in the &quot;Terms of Service&quot; agreement (mandatory arbitration, use of a specific venue, waiver of right to class action, etc.), the company knows that exceedingly few people are going to bother suing them. They know they're in the wrong, but enforcing your rights is too expensive compared to what you get in return. That's why it's good to see the FTC working on this from the top, where the problem can be solved more efficiently. They released a <a href=\"https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/nixing-fix-ftc-report-congress-repair-restrictions/nixing_the_fix_report_final_5521_630pm-508_002.pdf\" rel=\"noreferrer\">report</a> in May of 2021 that explains the overall problems to Congress. <a href=\"https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Executive_Order_on_Promoting_Competition_in_the_American_Economy\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Executive Order 14036</a> instructs the FTC to pursue solutions more aggressively, and shortly afterwards the <a href=\"https://www.theverge.com/2021/7/21/22587331/right-to-repair-apple-iphone-ftc-lina-khan-open-meeting\" rel=\"noreferrer\">FTC unanimously voted</a> to investigate and address these sorts of illegal warranty restrictions &quot;with vigor&quot;.</p>\n<p>If you don't want to go through small claims court or if this isn't a warranty repair, you have a couple of options. You can put the original battery back in, get the screen repaired (at a different location), and then swap back to the larger battery. Alternatively, you can have a third-party service provider install a new screen. Many can obtain OEM hardware by salvaging parts from secondhand devices.</p>\n", "score": 12 }, { "answer_id": 83312, "body": "<h2>Your issue has a name: <em><a href=\"https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;ved=2ahUKEwisk7SnnNL5AhVgs4QIHSPDAlwQFnoECBAQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2020%2F10%2F23%2Fclimate%2Fright-to-repair.html&amp;usg=AOvVaw1yH9-hYHWRwmitwMxEKGC1\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Right to Repair</a></em></h2>\n<p>Obviously companies would like very much to block your right to fix your own products, or force you to take service only from their authorized dealers. Fortunately, thanks to the auto industry, this is a well-trod area of law, although as &quot;products&quot; and &quot;services&quot; keep getting closer and closer together, manufacturers just keep trying. Automakers too - just look at <a href=\"https://www.youtube.com/c/RichRebuilds/videos\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Rich Rebuilds on Youtube</a>, and <a href=\"https://www.vice.com/en/article/dy8y5m/rich-rebuilds-is-fighting-for-the-right-to-repair\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">his struggle</a> with Right to Repair on Tesla cars.</p>\n<p>Again fortunately, the political sense in Washington <em>right now</em>, and in California <em>generally</em>, is to strongly protect Right to Repair.</p>\n<ul>\n<li>It will be very difficult for manufacturers to make it illegal for you to fix it.</li>\n<li>Third party repairmen cannot get in legal trouble. (though, manufacturers can hassle them in petty ways; again see Rich Rebuilds.)</li>\n</ul>\n<h2>However, this doesn't help a lot with your case.</h2>\n<p>Let's look at your list of recourses.</p>\n<p>Warranties do not apply to user-caused damage. For instance if you crash your car, Ford does not cover that under warranty. <strong>That is insurance</strong>. Similarly, you broke your screen, which is not a factory defect, so it's a matter of insurance not warranty. As such it's not subject to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.</p>\n<p>This gets confusing because it's often bundled.</p>\n<p>Apple had every right to refuse a <strong>warranty</strong> repair as it was not a factory defect.</p>\n<p>Apple has the right to set any condition on their <strong>insurance contract</strong> which is not unreasonable, and you can read the contract and see. <em>And in particular things which increase their likelihood of a claim</em>. For instance, that battery may have been thicker than a stock battery, possibly contributing to the screen breakage. <em>Your recourse is to decline that insurance coverage, and get it from someone else.</em></p>\n<p>As far as taking cash for an off-insurance repair, where Apple is playing the role of any random repairman... like any business Apple has the right to refuse service to anyone. *</p>\n<p>So yes, Apple can just do that.</p>\n<p>* barring certain prohibited categories, like race, religion, national origin and the like.</p>\n<h2>The financier also gets a say.</h2>\n<p>Note that if you're not paying $1000-ish upfront for a nice iPhone), there's some sort of financing going on behind the scenes, with the phone as security. Your rights to modify it are limited because you don't own it free and clear. This is often shrouded in smoke and mirrors, like the &quot;free phone&quot; you get in exchange for a contract commitment. Not free, and not yours (yet)... read the contract.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "united-states", "california", "property", "hardware", "right-to-repair" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91275, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>Can an attorney plead the 5th if attorney-client privilege is pierced?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Yes. But if the prosecutor offers the attorney &quot;use immunity&quot; for the testimony (i.e. a binding promise that the attorney's own testimony won't be used against that attorney), then the 5th Amendment privilege can be overcome as well.</p>\n<p>In other words, the prosecutor can unilaterally force an attorney to waive his or her fifth amendment rights by granting the attorney immunity from having that testimony used against the attorney, even if the attorney doesn't want to do that.</p>\n<p>This is established, for example, as noted in the comments by bdb484, by the case of <em>Kastigar v. United States</em>, 406 U.S. 441, (1972) (“The United States can compel testimony from an unwilling witness who invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination by conferring immunity”).</p>\n", "score": 24 } ]

[ "united-states", "fifth-amendment", "attorney-client-privilege" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91003, "body": "<h2><a href=\"/questions/tagged/united-states\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-united-states-tooltip-container\">united-states</a> - <a href=\"/questions/tagged/cfaa\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;cfaa&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;cfaa&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-cfaa-tooltip-container\">cfaa</a></h2>\n<p>The last person to have control of the AI executed the code in a knowing manner about the risk that the self-replicating program could get itself unauthorised access to computers and disk space that this person has no authorisation to use. Because of how it spread, it is more likely classified as malware.</p>\n<p>&quot;Creating a botnet&quot; is typically violating the authorisation to use the computers that are part of the botnet. As the last user is responsible for letting his <em>malware</em> free, his act breached these provisions:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>(a) Whoever— (5) (B) intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, recklessly causes damage; or\n(C) intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, causes damage and loss.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>He intentionally let his program free knowing very well that it will spread to computers that are classified as protected. As a result, he will be treated just the same as if he had written and released... <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ILOVEYOU\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">ILOVEYOU</a> - however in contrast to that case, the gap of non-applicable laws has been closed more than 20 years ago.</p>\n<p>Private PCs are off limits for the AI because of that stipulation, but even Webspace can't be gained to save itself to:</p>\n<p>The problem lies in the fact that authorization to space can only be gained in some sort of agreement between legal entities (companies and humans) - which is a contract. An AI however <strong>isn't</strong> a legal entity, it is classified as a <em>widget</em>. Widgets are not able to sign contracts on their own, and to gain access to webspace, one usually has to agree to a contract.</p>\n<p>The contracts the AI tries to sign would thus be void <em>ab initio</em> and have no force. As a result, because the contract for the webspace is void, the access to the webspace is by definition without the required authorization - the contract granting it never existed, so the access is unauthorized. The AI now fills disk space and uses resources in an unauthorized manner, which is damage.</p>\n<p>As a result, the one who knowingly set the AI free is fully responsible and criminally liable for his AI, should it spread.</p>\n<h2>How far can it legally spread?</h2>\n<p>If the AI is programmed to only act in ways inside the law, it won't leave the owner's system and won't proliferate, as it can't gain access to new space in a legal manner.</p>\n", "score": 12 }, { "answer_id": 91002, "body": "<p>In practice, an AI that has the ability to replicate would typically be a computer virus. In most cases, the act of replication itself would violate TOS. That alone is not a crime, but using third party resources without permission is.</p>\n<p>Assuming you targeted only services that permit such software, and allow automated account creation. Then the person that has knowingly executed the program, or the one that has caused another to unknowingly execute it, will be liable for whatever the consequences are.</p>\n<p>Whether it is a self-replicating program or a single action has no influence - programs are currently considered tools of their creator/operator, not legal entities.</p>\n<p>If no laws were broken at any time, the parties whose resources were used might be able to bring a tort against you. Then it will be down to the court to hear and evaluate whatever arguments can be brought.</p>\n<p>The AI is not a legal entity and is not responsible for anything on its own. The person or the company that launched it, is.</p>\n", "score": 8 }, { "answer_id": 91001, "body": "<p>As you have stipulated (in an edit, and further in comments that are now in chat) that there is no illegality, no damages, no violation of rights or obligations: it follows that there is no liability.</p>\n<p>I don't know what I can cite for the proposition that no remedy lies without a wrong.</p>\n<p>A commenter suggests that &quot;At a minimum the code would be 'trespassing' on privately owned PCs and servers, right?&quot; No: according to the question author, for anything that would be considered trespassing, the AI is <em>not</em> doing that. E.g. if it would be illegal to access a computer system, then this AI is not accessing that computer system. Perhaps this means the AI does not roam very far at all, possibly nowhere.</p>\n", "score": 4 }, { "answer_id": 91037, "body": "<p>One of <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer_worm\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Computer Worms</a> core 'feature' is the ability to replicate itself though I wouldn't consider their method to break through networks and increase their ability to infect hosts as smart as an AI-assisted virus/worm may tackle such task nowadays.</p>\n<p>There has been a conviction in case of <a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/archive/criminal/cybercrime/press-releases/2002/melissaSent.htm\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Melissa</a> so I guess one could be held liable for any damage done by such an AI-assited worm/virus.</p>\n<p>Another case was the <a href=\"https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/morris-worm-30-years-since-first-major-attack-on-internet-110218\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Morris-worm</a> which was originally published by a 23-year-old Cornell University graduate student named Robert Tappan Morris from a computer on the premises of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).</p>\n<p>Morris was found guilty via the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act passed by the Congress in 1986. Morris, however, was spared jail time, instead receiving a fine, probation, and an order to complete 400 hours of community service.</p>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 91035, "body": "<p>The question is ill-formed, how can you be liable of not doing anything (making a bot that uses free online services according to their ToS)? This is not a hypothetical scenario, bots perform scales of magnitude more communications with cloud computing servers than manual communications. Every online hosting service has a provision about bots, either disallowing them completely, limiting what they can be used for or explicitly allowing them to operate. If your hypothetical AI can read and understand ToS, then it will exist only on those servers that allow (or rather not explicitly ban) self-replicating bots. If the AI is not welcomed on a server, but the owner of the service didn't predict this problem, then update in ToS would force it to commit suicide, following it's own programming.</p>\n<p>I don't see anything that the creator of an AI could be liable for in this specific scenario, unless the legality of the AI itself was put into question. If some part of AI programming broke copyright law (as far as I know there is no such legislation at the moment but it's a current hot topic in media), then the creator would be liable for making it public, which they did by connecting the AI to the internet. But that is true regardless if the AI can replicate itself or not. A concept of a copyrighted work being unlawfully released to the public and replicated in a way that cannot be stopped by original leaker is also not novel, this is exactly how p2p torrents work.</p>\n<p>Any server hosting an illegal AI is not legally liable under the DMCA act but they need to remove it from their platform on the request of copyright holder, for example by updating their ToS.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "liability", "artificial-intelligence" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91320, "body": "<p>Yes. The introduction to the license says &quot;You may adapt — ... build upon the material for any purpose, <strong>even commercially</strong>&quot;. (My emphasis).</p>\n<p>Note that there is an attribution requirement so you need to find a way to attribute each image to its individual author.</p>\n<p>For the fine details, you certainly need to read the actual license (rather than the introduction) and you probably need to consult your own, paid-for, IP lawyer - but if you are just scoping the project out at the moment, you should be fine.</p>\n<p>For contrast, <a href=\"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/legalcode\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">here</a> is a Creative Commons licence that <em>does</em> prohibit commercial use.</p>\n", "score": 4 } ]

[ "copyright", "software", "licensing", "ownership", "digital-content" ]

[ { "answer_id": 90247, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>Can you be trespassing on public property for no reason at all?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p><strong>Yes.</strong></p>\n<p>When the government owns property, it can direct you to leave for any reason (even a legally invalid reason), and you are trespassing if you don't leave.</p>\n<p>When you are present on land you don't own with permission, but without a lease, you have a &quot;license&quot; to be there which is a contract-like right and is not a property right.</p>\n<p>A license doesn't give you the right to stay on the property over the objections of the owner or an agent of the owner.</p>\n<p>You might be able to receive money damages for an improper termination of your license to be present at the property (e.g. if you are told for no reason to leave a movie after paying for a ticket), but you don't have the right to simply stay there. If you stay there over the objections of the owner or the owner's agent, you are trespassing.</p>\n<p>The law applicable to government property owners and private property owners is basically the same in this regard.</p>\n<p>Realistically, on government property, furthermore, the standard by which the government employee may legally terminate your license to be there and exclude you from the property is low.</p>\n<p>Basically, it must merely not violate any constitutional right you may have, and you do not have a constitutional right to be present on government owned property, except in a quite narrow subset of cases (e.g. the &quot;town square&quot;).</p>\n<p>More exactly, you do not have a right to be on government property <em>per se</em>, but you can't be excluded from it for a constitutionally impermissible reason. The government gets to decide what parts of property it owns are available to the general public and for what content-neutral purposes.</p>\n<p>Thus, the right to be present on government owned &quot;public&quot; property (which doesn't include private areas of government owned property) can be subjected to reasonable and content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions.</p>\n<p>For example, a town could legally decide that the town square is closed from midnight to eight a.m. every day.</p>\n<p>The quoted material from the case <em>Chicago v. Morales</em>, 527 U.S. 41, 53-54 (1999) cited in the <a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/a/90245\">answer by bdb484</a> is narrower than a plain reading out of context would suggest. In that quotation, the term &quot;public place&quot; is being used in a sense much more restrictive than in the broader sense of property that is merely government owned. It is referring to places where the government has expressly or implicitly allowed members of the general public to be present on land that it owns (as opposed, for example, to a government office area of a building, or a maintenance facility in a government owned park, or a conservation area in a government owned park). This narrow sense of the word resolves what would otherwise seem to be a contradiction in the law.</p>\n<p>But, the government has the authority to make something that once was a public place into a non-public place going forward.</p>\n<p>For example, historically, the Civic Center park in front of the capitol in Denver, Colorado has been a public place. But, the government can and did close it off to the public for many months for maintenance and out of public health concerns when heavy use of it by homeless people and drug dealers caused the premises to be seriously damaged and created a public health risk from it being used to dispose of dirty, used, injection-drug syringes, and for people to defecate.</p>\n<p><strong>A Hypothetical</strong></p>\n<p>Suppose that Chris is the sole librarian in one of the towns of <a href=\"http://www.lyndonirwin.com/ccorner.htm\" rel=\"noreferrer\">College Corner</a>, which is on the Ohio-Indiana border, which are in different time zones. In that capacity, Chris has the authority to set library policies including the hours of the library and the rules for its use without the approval of anyone else.</p>\n<p>Chris has a hot date at 5:30 p.m. But, at lunch time, Chris learned that the hot date was at 5:30 p.m. in Ohio and not an hour later at 5:30 p.m. in Indiana, but the library's official closing time is 5 p.m. in Indiana, because Ohio was observing daylight savings time, but Indian was not, at the time when this happened.</p>\n<p>Chris, as the sole government official in charge of the library, decides to close the library before its posted closing time at 4:00 p.m. Indiana time (5 p.m. Ohio time) in order to be able to make it to the hot date.</p>\n<p>Chris quietly asks everyone left in the library to leave at 4 p.m. Indiana time, and everyone but you does. But you, who are homeless, really want to stay the extra hour before getting out in the cold and finding a bridge to sleep under, so you refuse to leave saying that the library is still open until 5 p.m. Indiana time, as stated in its posted hours.</p>\n<p>Chris orders you to leave and warns you that he is calling the police to remove you if you don't do so voluntarily. The police arrive and restate the complaint of Chris. The police arrest you for trespassing and you are charged with this crime in the appropriate court by the appropriate prosecuting attorney.</p>\n<p>You had done nothing wrong whatsoever prior to being asked to leave and refusing to do so. But, Chris has not violated your constitutional rights by ordering you removed for some unconstitutional reason. Chris then goes on the hot date; it is love at first sight, and Chris gets married the next week. As an apology for putting you out for the sole convenience of Chris, Chris invites you to the wedding.</p>\n<p>Do you have a valid defense to the criminal trespassing charge on the grounds that the librarian's actions were unconstitutional? No. You might have a &quot;good faith claim of right&quot; defense, however, to the criminal charges.</p>\n<p>Do you have a valid claim for money damages for a violation of your constitutional rights? No.</p>\n<p>Indeed, ordering you removed for &quot;no reason&quot; that has anything to do with your conduct, as in this case, is probably more likely to be legal and constitutional, than having you removed for &quot;some reason&quot; other than just &quot;because I the librarian say so&quot; that doesn't involve wrongdoing on your part.</p>\n<p><em>A Variation In The Hypothetical</em></p>\n<p>If instead, your were being ordered to leave the library because you were wearing an National Rifle Association cap (and the library didn't prohibit wearing caps), this affirmative reason, which is contrary to the First Amendment freedom of expression, would be a violation of your constitutional rights, which would definitely be a basis for a civil lawsuit against the librarian and police involved in you being arrested.</p>\n<p>I don't know the details of constitutional defenses in criminal law well enough to know if the violation of your constitutional rights would be a valid defense to the criminal trespassing charge (or a failure to obey a police officer's order to leave charge) resulting from you failing to leave in that circumstance, and I can see legitimate arguments both ways. This is also a situation where the non-constitutional claim of right defense to a trespassing charge would be a strong one.</p>\n", "score": 32 }, { "answer_id": 90249, "body": "<p>The mistake here is that the library is publicly owned/funded but is a place of government business and as such, is allowed to implement property rights similar to that of a private business and maybe allowed to press trespass charges if a customer is asked to leave and refuses to do so. Even certain public locations (i.e. a public park) may have hours where the public is not permitted on the property (lots of parks are &quot;dawn to dusk&quot; hours and while not enforced, it can be considered trespass if you are on park property after operational hours.).</p>\n<p>This is especially true if the behavior of the person being asked to leave is such that there is a disruption to the conduct of the government property's business or service and the delivery of that service to the public. Libraries, public and privately owned, are famous for employees that like to remind you to &quot;shush&quot; and suspending borrowing services if you have overdue books still checked out OR outstanding fines for those late returns or lost material. Similarly they may also direct a citizen to leave if they engaged in behavior that is a risk to the safety of patrons on a whole (almost every library I lived by had signs notifying people that skateboarding was not allowed on the outdoor property at any time. And I imagine that asking a patron to leave if they are acting in a manner that is harassing to an employee.).</p>\n<p>Just because a place is owned and operated by government and is opened to the public for the purposes of conducting business, it does not negate the right of the government to remove those who would be disruptive to the intended business of the property.</p>\n<p>That said, typically protest is allowed to the effect that it does not unduly hinder access to the facility during normal business hours. One may hold signs on a sidewalk or public easement in front of a library, DMV, or post office, so long as that protest respects the business being conducted inside of said facility. The last thing anyone wants to do is go to the DMV let alone fight through a crowd of protesters shouting &quot;Down with Speed Cameras&quot; who won't let you in to take care of their change of address.</p>\n", "score": 10 }, { "answer_id": 91317, "body": "<p>&quot;Disruption&quot; in itself is not a criminal act. I prefer the question framed without attachment(s). Can a public official (postal employee, school superintendent, Social Security office guard) ask, demand a person to leave a publicly accessible (non restricted access - lobby, foyer, corridor)? Sure, they can ask, demand you hop on one foot and remove your hat too. But, is that a lawful notice of trespass? Well, now the police are called and the reporting party says whatever they choose in attempt to convince the police to remove the offending party from public property. Is simple notice by the reporting party of (I don't want them here), sufficient for a police officer to generate a criminal trespass warning? What does the law say about revoking an implied license? Must it have elements of the minimal standard usually invoked by police &quot;reasonable suspicion&quot;? Or, is it more comprehensive to be in honor of the 4th amendment and include articulable facts and evidence that support &quot;probable cause&quot;.</p>\n<p>What if the reporting party drafts a document, (You are permanently banned from gaining access to this public building, if you return you will be arrested for defiant trespass because you caused a disturbance!!!). This document is sent via certified mail and the offending party signed that they received the document.</p>\n<p>Now, this document didn't identify the &quot;crime&quot; related to a disturbance, was not limited in duration, provided no path to appeal, and was a clear threat of violence (arrest is a physical act against ones free will). This smells of a 14th amendment violation.</p>\n<p>But, the reporting party doesn't have the lawful power of arrest, they must defer that to law enforcement. Now the offending party receives this document, knows that the letter is not an official &quot;criminal trespass warning&quot; supported by an affidavit or sworn statement of probable cause. The offending party returns to the property. The reporting party calls the police (Hey, I sent a trespass notice and this guy has returned, you need to arrest them for defiant trespass after warning, come quick we are afraid.)</p>\n<p>The police respond, are presented this document, shackle the offender, transport (kidnap) the offender, book and charge with defiant trespass after warning. But here is the kicker, the police have no record of generating a criminal trespass warning to the offender and are at risk of dereliction of duty in conducting a reasonable investigation and an unlawful arrest under 42 USC 1983.</p>\n<p>Now, instead of adding elements to this scenario, state the law that authorizes an officer or public servant the &quot;lawful&quot; authority to remove any private citizen with an implied license to gain access to public property and public services. (Please avoid feelings or reference to policy)</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "united-states", "trespass" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91315, "body": "<p>Only the owner of real estate can sign the paperwork transferring title from A to B. The titular owner is now dead, so there is a process whereby some other person is authorized to dispose of the decedents property – the personal representative could do this. There is a prior procedure procedure whereby that individual is appointed to be the decedent's personal representative. Since Florida does not have Transfer on Death deeds, the property cannot pass immediately to the son.</p>\n<p>In is not inconceivable that the PR can be appointed within a month, but the 90 day creditor claims deadline is a hard legal fact. This might not matter if the house has the Florida homestead exemption, and might not matter if it doesn't, but ask your lawyer.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "real-estate", "florida", "homeownership" ]

[ { "answer_id": 74821, "body": "<p>Pre-1991, Wisconsin criminal law ONLY prevented handguns (as well as various other things such as nunchuks and tasers) from being possessed by minors (being people under age 18), in section 948.60. <a href=\"https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/1987/related/acts/332\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/1987/related/acts/332</a></p>\n<p>The Hunting code is a <strong>civil</strong> code, and it places restrictions on the use of firearms by people aged under 16, at 29.304 <a href=\"https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/statutes/29.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/statutes/29.pdf</a></p>\n<p>This meant that prior to 1991, the possession of an AR-15 by a 15-year-old would not face any criminal penalties, only the civil penalty provided under 29.971 ($1000 fine).</p>\n<p>In 1991 the Wisconsin Senate passed a law which updated 948.60 <a href=\"https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/1991/related/acts/18\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/1991/related/acts/18</a></p>\n<p>Because 948.60 is a criminal law cross-referencing a civil one, the wording ends up confusing, but the effect of the revised 948.60 was that:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>a minor who went hunting with any firearm without a hunting accomplishment certificate (29.593 of the civil hunting code)</li>\n<li>a child under 16 who possessed a firearm of any kind except in accordance with 29.304</li>\n</ul>\n<p>would for the first time be guilty of a crime, after the 1991 law passed.</p>\n<p>In addition, because 948.60 does double purpose as the <strong>supply</strong> of a weapon to a minor section, an adult supplying a child with an illegal short-barreled weapon (as defined in 941.28) is also guilty of 948.60, along with the minor themself.</p>\n<p>Therefore, 948.60 gives criminal effect to breaches of 29.304.</p>\n<p>Hence, children aged under 16 ONLY (29.304 does not apply to 16 or 17 year olds), and the person supplying them must comply with 29.304, or commit a misdemeanor under 948.60 as the minor (subject to age of criminal responsibility of 10), or a felony as the supplying person.</p>\n<p>Thus:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Age 0-11 - can only carry a firearm during a hunter education class under supervision by an instructor, or carrying it, unloaded, to or from said class, by their parent, or an adult designated by their parent</li>\n<li>Age 12-13 - ditto, but can also carry a firearm while accompanied by their parent or adult designated by their parent</li>\n<li>Age 14-15 - ditto, but can now possess a firearm if they have a hunter education program certificate, including from other states or countries, if evidence is provided to the department</li>\n</ul>\n<p>So we can see that:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>under Wisconsin code 29.592, no person may hunt without an accomplishment certificate, and that for a 16 or 17 year old ONLY, such hunting with a firearm becomes a criminal offence under 948.60</li>\n<li>the person supplying a gun to an 0-11 commits a crime, as does the child if they are 10-11</li>\n<li>it would appear to be legal for a parent to accompany their 12 or 13 year old to a riot armed with an AR-15, or for the parent to designate a person to do this</li>\n<li>a 14 or 15 year old who has a hunter competency certificate can attend a riot armed with an AR-15 unaccompanied</li>\n<li>a 16 or 17 year old can attend a riot with an AR-15. However, unlike 18+ year olds they cannot attend with a handgun, since 948.60 is only intended to ban minors from handguns, while giving teeth to other restrictions on the use of rifles and shotguns by minors.</li>\n</ul>\n", "score": 4 }, { "answer_id": 74808, "body": "<h3>A child under 10 cannot be guilty of a crime in Wisconsin</h3>\n<p>As <a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/74799/what-would-be-different-if-kyle-rittenhouse-were-9-instead-of-17#comment158018_74799\">Mark points out in the comments</a>, the relevant statutes restrict the application of criminal law to children 10 years and older. For the rest of this answer, I'm going to assume</p>\n<h3>A child under 12 having such a weapon would be a Class A misdeamanor</h3>\n<p>Per <a href=\"https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/document/statutes/948.60(2)(a)\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Wisconsin Statutes 948.60(2)(a)</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Any person under 18 years of age who possesses or goes armed with a dangerous weapon is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>However, there's also the aforementioned exception for long-barreled rifles and shotguns in <a href=\"https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/document/statutes/948.60(3)(c)\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">948.60(3)(c)</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>This section applies only to a person under 18 years of age who possesses or is armed with a rifle or a shotgun if the person is in violation of s. 941.28 or is not in compliance with ss. 29.304 and 29.593. This section applies only to an adult who transfers a firearm to a person under 18 years of age if the person under 18 years of age is not in compliance with ss. 29.304 and 29.593 or to an adult who is in violation of s. 941.28.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Section 941.28 refers to &quot;Possession of short-barreled shotgun or short-barreled rifle,&quot; and is not violated, so this section wouldn't apply for that reason (this is why the underage possession charge was dropped against Rittenhouse). Section 29.593 simply describes the &quot;Requirement for certificate of accomplishment to obtain hunting approval.&quot;</p>\n<p>Section 29.304 covers &quot;Restrictions on hunting and use of firearms by persons under 16 years of age,&quot; and is the most relevant section. Specifically, <a href=\"https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/document/statutes/29.304(1)(b)\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">29.304(1)(b)</a> states that:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>No person under 12 years of age may have in his or her possession or control any firearm unless he or she is enrolled in the course of instruction under the hunter education program and he or she is carrying the firearm in a case and unloaded to or from that class under the supervision of his or her parent or guardian, or by a person at least 18 years of age who is designated by the parent or guardian, or is handling or operating the firearm during that class under the supervision of an instructor.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>So if the hypothetical armed child were 10 instead of 9, they could be charged (at least in juvenile court; I'm unclear on the rules for whether it could be charged in adult court) with that.</p>\n<h3>An adult who gave a weapon to a child (either 9 or 10 years old) in this manner would be guilty of a felony</h3>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Does this mean I could just buy a rifle and then give it to a random 9 year old? And if said 9 year old then went and hurt someone with it, there would be no consequences for me?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Per <a href=\"https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/document/statutes/948.60(2)(b)\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Wisconsin Statutes 948.60(2)(b)</a> and (c),</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>(b) Except as provided in par. (c), any person who intentionally sells, loans or gives a dangerous weapon to a person under 18 years of age is guilty of a Class I felony.<br>\n(c) Whoever violates par. (b) is guilty of a Class H felony if the person under 18 years of age under par. (b) discharges the firearm and the discharge causes death to himself, herself or another.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>So the adult could be charged with a felony, the class of which would be determined by whether anyone was killed due to the firearm being discharged. The same possible 948.60(3)(c) exception analysis applies to this as well, but because the person under 18 years of age in this scenario is <em>not</em> in compliance, the adult is also guilty.</p>\n", "score": 3 }, { "answer_id": 91287, "body": "<p>To thelawnet's outstanding answer I would add one very fine detail: While it seems fair to say the purpose of 29.593 is to prevent hunting without safety training, it achieves the goal indirectly, via a restriction on obtaining a hunting <em>approval</em> [permit or license]. What it says precisely is that no one born after 1972 may obtain any hunting approval [permit or license] without having earned a hunter safety certificate or approved equivalent.</p>\n<p>Therefore, to violate 29.593, one must do what it prohibits: (A) be born after 1972; (B) obtain a hunting approval; and (C) NOT have earned a hunter safety certificate. As such, 29.593 might best be thought of as a ban on improperly obtained hunting licenses (with respect to the safety training prerequisite). The list of fines available on the WI DNR web site gives some confirmation for this: it lists the fine for 29.593 with the brief description &quot;Obtain hunting license without completing hunter education when required&quot;</p>\n<p>This has the somewhat odd consequence that any minor who has improperly obtained a hunting license in this way is in violation of 948.60 as soon as they lay hands on a firearm, whether hunting or not. Conversely, a 16 or 17 year old who goes gun hunting with no license or safety certificate is in arguably better shape: while liable for a civil fine for hunting without a license, they have committed no criminal misdemeanor violation of 948.60 because they have not violated 29.593. This might be felt to be counter to the spirit of 29.593, but the rule of lenity could support reading it strictly in this way.</p>\n<p>Another consequence is that on this interpretation, it would remain an open factual question through the trial whether evidence might be presented that Rittenhouse did improperly obtain a hunting license: one could not dismiss this possibility simply because he was not hunting.</p>\n<p>Again, this is a very fine detail. But the precise meaning of &quot;compliance with 29.593&quot; is one of the puzzle points in interpreting the long gun exception. I have not come across a single legal commentator who has been literal-minded enough to read it this way, but it seems to me the correct one.</p>\n<p>(The trial judge himself wound up accepting a reading of the logic according to which they did not have to consider the issue of compliance with 29.593 for 17 year olds. I believe this got the right result, but for the wrong reason.)</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "united-states", "firearms", "federalism" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91309, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/new-south-wales\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;new-south-wales&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;new-south-wales&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-new-south-wales-tooltip-container\">new-south-wales</a></p>\n<h2>No it's not <a href=\"https://www.alrc.gov.au/publication/serious-invasions-of-privacy-in-the-digital-era-alrc-report-123/15-harassment/criminal-offences-for-harassment/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">harassment</a></h2>\n<blockquote>\n<p>State and territory laws criminalise stalking. These offences often target behaviour amounting to harassment</p>\n<p>There are also state and territory offences that capture harassment at work, in family or domestic contexts, and in schools and other educational institutions.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>&quot;Harassment&quot; requires a pattern of behaviour which is missing from your example.</p>\n<h2>It's probably the tort of <a href=\"https://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/benchbks/civil/intentional_torts.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">battery</a></h2>\n<blockquote>\n<p>A battery is a voluntary and positive act, done with the intention of causing contact with another, that directly causes that contact: Barker et al at p 36. See <em>Carter v Walker</em> (2010) 32 VR 1 at [215] for a summary of the definition of “battery”.</p>\n<p>The requisite intention for battery is simply this: the defendant must have intended the consequence of the contact with the plaintiff. The defendant need not know the contact is unlawful. He or she need not intend to cause harm or damage as a result of the contact.</p>\n<p>The modern position, however, is that hostile intent or angry state of mind are not necessary to establish battery: <em>Rixon v Star City Pty Ltd</em>, above, at [52]. It is for that reason that a medical procedure carried out without the patient’s consent may be a battery.</p>\n<p>On the other hand, it is not every contact that will be taken to be a battery. People come into physical contact on a daily basis. For example it is impossible to avoid contact with other persons in a crowded train or at a popular sporting or concert event. The inevitable “jostling” that occurs in these incidents in every day life is simply not actionable as a battery: Rixon at [53]–[54]; <em>Colins v Wilcock</em> [1984] 3 All ER 374 per Robert Goff LJ.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 4 } ]

[ "harassment" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91106, "body": "<p>In most jurisdictions, the only exception to the confidentiality rules is imminent harm. For example, if the patient announces that they intend to commit a violent crime, reporting this would be allowed.</p>\n<hr />\n<p>In <a href=\"/questions/tagged/canada\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-canada-tooltip-container\">canada</a> specifically, there are both rules from the various professional organizations (for physicians, for psychologists etc.) and laws, which may depend on the province.</p>\n<p>As an example, the <a href=\"https://www.cap.ab.ca/Portals/0/pdfs/Practice%20Guideline%20-%20Disclosure.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">guideline of the College of Alberta Psychologists</a> says:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Psychologists may disclose personal or confidential information\nwithout a client’s consent when there is likelihood of imminent and\ngrave harm to the client and/or a third-party, or when required to do\nso by law.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>So, unless there is a law which explicitly requires it, past activity need not (and may not) be passed on.</p>\n<hr />\n<p>For another jurisdiction, in <a href=\"/questions/tagged/germany\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-germany-tooltip-container\">germany</a>, confidentiality is mandated (among other things) by <a href=\"https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/__203.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">StGB §203</a>, which punishes breach of confidentiality with up to one year in prison. It basically applies to everyone who works in a regulated profession (as medical professional, psychologist or social worker), or who works in an officially recognized counseling service (such as family counseling).</p>\n<p>As in Canada, disclosure of personal information without consent of the client is only allowed in emergency situations involving imminent danger of harm (&quot;necessity as justification&quot;, <a href=\"https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/__34.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">StGB §34</a>), or when explicitly required by law (for example, there is a general duty to report the planning of certain serious crimes, <a href=\"https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/__138.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">StGB §138</a>).</p>\n<p>In addition to that, the various professional organizations also have confidentialty rules which sometimes go beyond the legal rules. For example, <a href=\"https://www.dgps.de/die-dgps/aufgaben-und-ziele/berufsethische-richtlinien/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">the rules of the society of psychologists</a> require psychologists to explicitly inform clients of the limits of confidentiality, which is not required by law.</p>\n", "score": 1 }, { "answer_id": 91118, "body": "<h2>What is a “counsellor therapist”?</h2>\n<p>I know what a medical practitioner is. I know what a psychologist is. I know what a physiotherapist is. I know what a legal counsel is. I know what a massage therapist is.</p>\n<p>I don’t know what a “counsellor therapist” is.</p>\n<p>The point I am belabouring here is that you have identified a profession that the law may not recognise. Is this a regulated profession or can anyone hang up a slate saying “counsellor therapist” and start charging fees?</p>\n<p>Notwithstanding, let’s assume that this person is working in a profession recognised by law and subject to mandatory ethical standards.</p>\n<h2>Reporting</h2>\n<p>There are basically four situations regarding reporting of what is revealed:</p>\n<ol>\n<li>Privilege - the information cannot be shared but <em>even if it is</em> it cannot be used against the person who owns the privilege.</li>\n<li>Mandatory reporting - where the person is obliged by law or contract to revel the information.</li>\n<li>A duty of confidentiality - where the person is obliged by law, ethical standards, or contract to keep the information confidential.</li>\n<li>None of the above - where reporting or not reporting is at the discretion of the person.</li>\n</ol>\n<h2>Privilege</h2>\n<p>In Canadian common law, there are three types of privilege: lawyer-client, litigation, and situations that meets the <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R_v_Gruenke\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Wigmore</a> criteria. None seem applicable to your situation.</p>\n<p>The Wigmore criteria may apply to the relationship described but it is a cas by case test, not a blanket rule.</p>\n<h2>Mandatory Reporting</h2>\n<p>All Canadian provinces have <a href=\"https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12889-018-5864-0\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">mandatory reporting</a> for, among others, health professionals for child physical and sexual abuse and 8 of 10 have laws for reporting exposure to intimate partner violence. There is a national law that requires mandatory reporting of child pornography.</p>\n<p>Some jurisdictions, although I don’t believe any in Canada do, require reporting of serious offences <em>by anyone</em> who becomes aware of them.</p>\n<p>Contractural reporting obligations generally arise when the therapist is not <em>your</em> therapist. For example, where the therapist is employed by the court, the prison service, your employer etc. In these circumstances, not only do they not have a duty of confidence, they may have a positive duty to report and analyse what you say and do.</p>\n<h2>Confidentiality</h2>\n<p>A common law duty of <a href=\"https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d54d14e3-9abb-40ed-aebe-ef3440050688\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">confidentiality</a> arises whenever confidential information is imparted in circumstances of confidentiality. A normal therapist-patient relationship would normally qualify.</p>\n<p>In addition, if the therapist operates under a mandatory code of ethics, that will normally address confidentiality and the circumstances in which it can be broken. In addition to “when required by law”, these often include disclosure to further your treatment or to prevent harm to yourself or others.</p>\n<p>In addition, you may have a contract with the therapist that deals with confidentiality.</p>\n<h2>None of the above</h2>\n<p>In this case, its a matter for the therapist’s conscience.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "canada", "medical", "confidentiality", "mental-health" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91302, "body": "<p>I believe a frame challenge is necessary, as the underlying assumption of the question, and in particular the material quoted from another answer, is, I understand, incorrect.</p>\n<p>This assertion, in short, is that if an invocation of the 5th is challenged, or perhaps just &quot;hard to understand (the validity of)&quot;, then the judge may privately question the one asserting the right for more specific details. And from there they may then make the determination of the whether the invocation is valid. I've heard this logic many times myself, and have had it enter my head as fact at some point or another. It seems one of those persistent folk tales about the legal world.</p>\n<p>My best guess is this stems from how the limits of the 5th amendment protection on self incrimination are typically phrased within major decisions, or popular summations thereof (including but not necessarily limited to, or specifically implicating, wikipedia pages). The phrasing I am most familiar with is &quot;an invocation of the 5th is valid if the person has a reasonable fear that the answer may be used against them in a prosecution&quot;; perhaps modified, more accurately reflecting the jurisprudence, to add &quot;or as a link which could lead them to evidence that could be used in a prosecution against them&quot;.</p>\n<p>The mistake then arises in applying an everyday understanding of this phrasing: how else are you to decide if a person is being reasonable unless you question them? Maybe they've got a good reason, maybe they have a psychotic delusion, maybe they're just trying to mess with the court for their own amusement, etc. etc. Surely you have to investigate to find out.</p>\n<p>But within American courts, the term &quot;reasonable&quot; in such a standard almost never invokes the everyday understanding like this. Instead, it refers to some abstract and generic entity. A &quot;reasonable jury&quot; is not a judgment made about the particulars of a given jury, but rather an artificial construct created within the mind(s) of the judge(s) composed of purely hypothetical and generically &quot;reasonable&quot; everyday people. And the legal standard to uphold that the &quot;reasonable&quot; standard has been met is not whether the particular person/jury/whatever at hand was acting reasonably in the usually understood fashion. But rather if such an imagined being/group/whatever could possibly act in such fashions.</p>\n<p>As such, if a Judge is considering overruling an invocation of the 5th, they must invoke such an abstracted entity, within the context at hand, and see if they can construe one who reasonably invokes the protection. The judge may be able to use certain facts about the particular entity at hand, depending. If you are invoking the 5th and the record already shows you have an extensive criminal record, the court may consider that this reasonable abstraction also has an extensive criminal record; at which point it may become clear that such a person may wish to invoke the 5th so as not to incriminate themselves in other crimes. Even moreso if the context is a far-ranging federal grand jury investigation into organized crime, and the questions you invoked the 5th on regard your connections to events of established interest to this investigation. And this is done without actually further questioning the person, beyond what is already in the record. All the court has to do is imagine some reasonable person with a reasonable fear within the context at hand; if it can, the invocation of the 5th is generally to be sustained. No actual determination of the particular person's &quot;reasonableness&quot; is required, or really even permitted.</p>\n<p>All of the latter hypothetical was essentially the fact of the matter in the case <a href=\"https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/341/479/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Hoffman v. United States</a>. It is a very interesting and informative read, and I think fairly accessibly written (as long as one isn't too easily thrown off the rails by the citation formatting). It covers a great deal of how any potential challenges to the 5th are to be handled. And the short is as I have indicated above: an abstract &quot;reasonable&quot; person is constructed, with such construction informed by the circumstances and knowledge at hand, and judgement of reasonableness made from there. It specifically points out that courts should be mindful of the fact that some people earn a living by violating and evading the law, and they are protected by the 5th as thoroughly and strongly as anyone else is, so the courts should consider the question of whether it would be reasonable for such a person to have invoked the 5th when deciding if it should be upheld.</p>\n", "score": 1 }, { "answer_id": 91206, "body": "<p>I'm hesitant to say that the judge would pull a witness into chambers to make a determination of if the witness can plead the 5th. Normally this debate is held between the lawyers for the party (A judge talking to the witness is an Ex Parte communication, as the witness is favorable to one side of the case.). That said, if you are called as a witness and has a valid concern that you might be asked to testify to something that would incriminate you, you should get your own lawyer to argue on your behalf, as you are likely not a client of either attorney and thus they are not obligated to look out for your own legal interests and keep you from having to testify to anything 5th amendment. The only time I've seen the judge question witnesses taking the 5th are in cases where the witness communicates ahead of testimony that they will be pleading the 5th to all questions, at which upon swearing in, the judge will confirm this in open court with a question to the effect of &quot;It is my understanding that you will be exercising your 5th amendment right in the entirety of your testimony today, is that correct?&quot; to which the witness confirms their intentions to do so, makes sure the records reflect this, and dismiss them. The judge is not questioning them as to the nature of their exercising of their rights, but as to the intention to exercise it.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "united-states", "constitutional-law", "us-constitution", "fifth-amendment", "attorney-client-privilege" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91284, "body": "<p>New York State's sentencing laws do not have sentencing guidelines in the sense that the federal courts do.</p>\n<p>Donald Trump is an individual with no prior felony convictions who is charged with Class E felonies. The statutory sentencing range for these offenses under New York Penal Law Section 70.02(1)(d) is a determinate sentence of 1.5 to 4 years. Under some circumstances, alternative sentencing (like probation) might be authorized.</p>\n<p>Essentially the whole ballgame is the discretion of the sentencing judge and the question of whether the sentences of conviction would be served concurrently or consecutively.</p>\n<p>The sentencing hearing would happen only after a jury enters its verdict on guilt or innocence, and only in the event that there was a conviction on at least one count of the indictment. It would be an evidentiary hearing at which evidence regarding an appropriate sentence would be presented by the prosecution and the defense.</p>\n<p>I am not familiar enough with the facts of the complaint and the applicable New York State Penal Law provisions to know how the issue of consecutive v. concurrent sentences would be resolved.</p>\n", "score": 14 } ]

[ "new-york-state", "sentencing" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91296, "body": "<h2>It doesn’t matter who the winnings go to, they’re legitimate business expenses and therefore tax deductible</h2>\n<p>The prize money for these shows is a tax deductible business expense just like the salaries of the cast and crew, the hire of the studio, or the marketing and advertising expenses. As such they are part of the expenses that are deducted from the revenues to determine the taxable profit.</p>\n<p>Whether the winnings are taxable in the hands of the winners depends on local tax law. Some countries treat prizes as taxable income, some treat it as a non taxable windfall, and some make a distinction between professional “gamblers” and amateurs.</p>\n<p>For those celebrity episodes, the celebrities are paid a fee for their performance (because it’s their job) and the prize goes straight from the producer to the charity.</p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "tax-law", "france", "corporate-tax-laws" ]

[ { "answer_id": 90924, "body": "<p>Per a decision of the US Copyright Office <a href=\"https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2023/02/us-copyright-office-withdraws-copyright-for-ai-generated-comic-artwork/\" rel=\"noreferrer\">last month</a>, AI generated <em>images</em> are not subject to copyright. That means you can use the generated images for any purpose you want^<em>1</em>, but <strong>so can anyone else</strong>. However, the specific usage of a given image might be protected - so if you put a caption on the image and arrange it in the form of a comic (as the artist in that example did), that specific text and arrangement can be protected, but the underlying image can't be.</p>\n<p>Laws may differ elsewhere in the world, but that's the current stance in the US.</p>\n<hr />\n<p>^<em>1</em> <em>Subject to any appropriate laws, including any copyright laws which the new image itself may violate. Just because the image isn't protected itself doesn't mean that it can't infringe on someone else's copyrights. See <a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/a/90926/582\">the other answer</a> for more details.</em></p>\n", "score": 34 }, { "answer_id": 90926, "body": "<p>The new work would not be protected by copyright law in the US. A different concern would be whether a created image might leave you liable in a copyright-infringement lawsuit. Although the output might be unique in that it algorithmically mashes two protected images into a new image, you might get sued for copying those underlying works. The input might just be text, not an image file, but that text is used by the program to search for relevant images, then copies the files (without permission). A person who unleashes a content-copying program on the internet is not immunized from an infringement lawsuit because &quot;it wasn't me, it was my program&quot;. This is an issue that is being addressed in the courts right now (see <a href=\"https://stablediffusionlitigation.com/pdf/00201/1-1-stable-diffusion-complaint.pdf\" rel=\"noreferrer\">this complaint</a>).</p>\n<p>On the other hand, if an image is created in a different manner, analogous to how you might verbally describe a desired image to a human artist, then there is literally no copying, and probably no legal infringement. I say &quot;probably no infringement&quot; because the output could end up resembling a protected work, so even if there was no actual copying, there could be legal infringement when the result is &quot;strikingly similar&quot; to a protected work.</p>\n", "score": 10 } ]

[ "copyright", "product-liability", "artificial-intelligence" ]

[ { "answer_id": 89327, "body": "<p><a href=\"https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/commentary-on-the-international-covenant-on-civil-and-political-rights/article-15-retroactive-criminal-law/D8E5723F3C92C7B12ACE66C7ED606DF4\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Article 15</a> of the <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Covenant_on_Civil_and_Political_Rights\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>prohibits the retroactive application of criminal law, both in\nrelation to criminal conviction (Article 15(1), first sentence) and\ngreater severity of any sentence (second sentence). <strong>It also requires\na more lenient penalty to be applied if one is introduced after the\noffence was committed</strong> (third sentence). Article 15(2) preserves the\nlegitimacy of the trial and punishment of crimes ‘according to the\ngeneral principles of law recognized by the community of nations’,\nprompted by concerns that the post-Second World War prosecution of war\ncrimes may otherwise be called into question.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>But, as Wikipedia in the link above explains, this only &quot;requires the imposition of the lesser penalty where criminal sentences have changed between the offence and conviction.&quot;</p>\n<p>Many countries have adopted it, but some have adopted it only with reservations. The United States, for example, has specifically reserved and not assented to those provisions of Article 15:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The United States has made reservations that none of the articles\nshould restrict the right of free speech and association; that the US\ngovernment may impose capital punishment on any person other than a\npregnant woman, including persons below the age of 18; that &quot;cruel,\ninhuman and degrading treatment or punishment&quot; refers to those\ntreatments or punishments prohibited by one or more of the fifth,\neighth, and fourteenth amendments to the US Constitution; <strong>that the\nthird clause of Paragraph 1, Article 15 will not apply</strong>; and that,\nnotwithstanding paragraphs 2(b) and 3 of Article 10 and paragraph 4 of\nArticle 14, the US government may treat juveniles as adults, and\naccept volunteers to the military prior to the age of 18. The United\nStates also submitted five &quot;understandings&quot;, and four &quot;declarations&quot;.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 89321, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/canada\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"canada-container\">canada</a></p>\n<p>Canada has <em>An Act to provide no-cost, expedited record suspensions for simple possession of cannabis</em> (<a href=\"https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/trnsprnc/brfng-mtrls/prlmntry-bndrs/20201201/001/index-en.aspx\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">described here</a>).</p>\n<p>It also has the <em>Expungement of Historically Unjust Convictions Act</em> (<a href=\"https://www.canada.ca/en/parole-board/services/expungements/expungement.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">described here</a>).</p>\n<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/united-states\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"united-states-container\">united-states</a></p>\n<p>Statutes can retroactively reduce sentences and allow for those in custody to seek resentencing. See e.g. <em><a href=\"https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/20-5904_i4dk.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Terry v. United States</a></em> (2021) (relating to the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 and the First Step Act of 2018).</p>\n", "score": 1 }, { "answer_id": 89324, "body": "<h2><a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amnesty_Act\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">The Amnesty Act of 1872</a></h2>\n<p>The USA was embroiled in a civil war with separatists. The very act of fighting against the USA was illegal, people were convicted and ineligible for office due to being part of the confederate army. But in 1872, all people who fought and had been made ineglible were forgiven.</p>\n", "score": 0 }, { "answer_id": 91285, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/france\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;france&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;france&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-france-tooltip-container\">france</a></p>\n<p>Article 34 of the <a href=\"https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/sites/default/files/as/root/bank_mm/anglais/constiution_anglais_oct2009.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Constitution of France as currently in force</a> (<a href=\"https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/le-bloc-de-constitutionnalite/texte-integral-de-la-constitution-du-4-octobre-1958-en-vigueur\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">French text</a>) expressly provides:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Statutes shall determine the rules concerning:\n...</p>\n<ul>\n<li>the determination of serious crimes and other major offences and the penalties they carry; criminal procedure; <strong>amnesty</strong>; ...</li>\n</ul>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The provision has been used at least 10 times (<a href=\"https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amnistie_en_France#Cinqui%C3%A8me_R%C3%A9publique\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">partial list on the French version of Wikipedia</a>) since the Constitution was enacted in 1958.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "criminal-law" ]

[ { "answer_id": 719, "body": "<p>In broad terms, in a three pillar democracy, the job of the legislature is to make the law, the job of the executive is to enforce the law and the job of the courts is to interpret the law.</p>\n\n<p>The courts may find that a piece of legislation is invalid, either in whole or in part for any number of reasons. The legislature can respond by:</p>\n\n<ol>\n<li>Repealing the legislation</li>\n<li>Changing the legislation to remove the invalidity</li>\n<li>Doing nothing.</li>\n</ol>\n\n<p>Your first question is why would they go for option 3?</p>\n\n<p>I can, off the cuff, think of several reasons:</p>\n\n<ol>\n<li>Time pressures, a legislature can only deal with so many pieces of legislation per year - it may not be a worthwhile investment of time to \"tidy up\" the statute books.</li>\n<li>Possibility of appeal, the precedent may be open to appeal or having an alternative ruling in a higher court.</li>\n<li>Precedent, unless and until the decision reaches the Supreme Court or equivalent then the decision is only binding on lower courts.</li>\n<li>Possibility of change to superordinate legislation, in the particular circumstance you cite, the local authority may leave the law on the books in the hope or expectation that the state law may be repealed or overturned - the local law would then be valid.</li>\n</ol>\n\n<p>For your second question, the judge is supposed to know. That said, judges make mistakes so a wise plaintiff/defendant will draw the judge's attention to the current state of the law. It would certainly look bad for them on appeal if it emerged that they <em>did</em> know and allowed the judge to make a mistake. Firstly, they are officers of the court and secondly, justice is blind but justice<strong>s</strong> may remember you made them look like a fool!</p>\n\n<p>For your third question ... maybe. However, such a claim would be limited to what you actually lost through your lawyer's malpractice. It can't be the case because you couldn't win it anyway - the law was against you! You may be able to argue that the lawyer should be responsible for some of the costs or losses that arose from you failing to settle earlier. Good luck with that.</p>\n", "score": 4 } ]

[ "united-states", "lawyer", "preemption" ]

[ { "answer_id": 37706, "body": "<p>Women can get pregnant, so men can be held to stricter rules:</p>\n\n<p>From <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ages_of_consent_in_the_United_States\" rel=\"noreferrer\">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ages_of_consent_in_the_United_States</a></p>\n\n<blockquote>\n <p>Although legislation tends to reflect general societal attitudes\n regarding male versus female ages of consent, Richard Posner notes in\n his Guide to America's Sex Laws:</p>\n \n <p>The U.S. Supreme Court has held that stricter rules for males do not\n violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution, on the theory\n that men lack the disincentives (associated with pregnancy) that women\n have, to engage in sexual activity, and the law may thus provide men\n with those disincentives in the form of criminal sanctions.</p>\n \n <p>Posner, Richard (1996). A Guide to America's Sex Laws. The University\n of Chicago Press. p. 45. ISBN 0-226-67564-5. The case cited is Michael\n M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).</p>\n</blockquote>\n\n<hr>\n\n<p>However, to modern sensibilities, this doesn't justify the states that have age of consent <em>lower</em> for women. [The pregnancy argument would mean states could punish an adult male for sex with a minor female, to protect the woman. Whereas a minor male of that same age doesn't necessarily need the same protection, at least for that concern.]</p>\n\n<p>Law in those states seems to be an attempt to mirror the historical tendency for men to be slightly older than women when marry - but re goal of discouraging sexual predation, those states have it backwards.</p>\n\n<p>I'd have to agree with the answers that speculate this is a patriarchal holdover that eventually will change or be overturned. [But US Supreme Court - having ruled it <strong>isn't inherently an Equal Protection violation</strong> - seems inclined to leave these laws alone regardless of which age is slightly lower; leaving it to the states to decide the non-symmetric circumstances of the sexes.]</p>\n\n<hr>\n\n<p>More detail from the case itself:</p>\n\n<blockquote>\n <p>(a) Gender-based classifications are not \"inherently suspect\" so as to\n be subject to so-called \"strict scrutiny,\" but will be upheld if they\n bear a \"fair and substantial relationship\" to legitimate state ends.\n Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71. Because the Equal Protection Clause does\n not \"demand that a statute necessarily apply equally to all persons\"\n or require \"things which are different in fact . . . to be treated in\n law as though they were the same,\" Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U. S. 305,\n 384 U. S. 309, a statute will be upheld where the gender\n classification is not invidious, but rather realistically reflects the\n fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in certain\n circumstances. Pp. 450 U. S. 468-469.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 5 }, { "answer_id": 3532, "body": "<p>This is more a question about society and politics than about the law; that is, you know what the law is you want to know why.</p>\n\n<p>Without any research and no idea of the particulars I can say that the reason is historical and derives from the fact that our society has been (and still is) a patriarchy and has deeply ingrained sexism (along with a lot of other -isms). These laws were laid down when it was considered not only acceptable but prudent and reasonable to treat men and women differently and nobody has got around to changing them.</p>\n\n<p>That said, they are quite likely unconstitutional as discrimination on the basis of sex is unlawful. For why they are still there see <a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/717/why-do-municipalities-keep-laws-on-the-books-that-are-invalid/719#719\">Why do municipalities keep laws on the books that are invalid?</a> - it is equally applicable to states; I would suggest my idea No 1.</p>\n", "score": 4 }, { "answer_id": 3715, "body": "<p>The Equal Protection clause of the 14th amendment provides for equal protection under the laws.</p>\n\n<p>The Supreme Court has held this prohibits sex based discrimination, unless the government proves this law satisfies the intermediate scrutiny test.</p>\n\n<p>In brief, this test means: the law furthers an important government interest in a way that is substantially related to that interest.</p>\n\n<p>This standard was applied in Craig v. Boren (1976). In this case: \"Oklahoma passed a statute prohibiting the sale of 'nonintoxicating' 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 but allowed females over the age of 18 to purchase it. The statute was challenged as Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection violation by Curtis Craig, a male who was over 18 but under 21, and by an Oklahoma vendor of alcohol.\"\nIn this case the Supreme Court \"held that the gender classifications made by the Oklahoma statute were unconstitutional because the statistics relied on by the state were insufficient to show a substantial relationship between the statute and the benefits intended to stem from it.\"</p>\n\n<p>For more see: <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Craig_v._Boren\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Craig_v._Boren</a></p>\n\n<p>In this day and age, it is unlikely that different age of consent laws would be upheld. The only problem is that you must have standing to challenge such laws. As minors cannot file lawsuits, without their parents, the most likely case providing standing would be where someone knowingly violates the law and is arrested for violating it. Then the person would have legal standing to challenge the age of consent laws. But that requires a lot of effort, could result in you spending some time in jail while the case is appealed and so forth.</p>\n\n<p>Even more likely, the differences in age of consent will not be enforced by the government, leading a situation, where the law is on the books, and has not been ruled invalid, yet is most likely unconstitutional.</p>\n\n<p>TL;DR: So in the end, the ages are practically not different, and just historically exist on the books as different.</p>\n\n<p>Edit: as pointed out by ToolmakerSteve, (Thanks!) there actually is caselaw on this issue: Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981). It was a plurality opinion and it seems to be quite a persuasive authority on this issue. In the current composition of the Supreme Court staggered age of consent laws by gender would probably continue to be upheld; when I first wrote this answer Justice Kennedy was still a Supreme Court justice and his expansive view of the equal protection clause seemed to swing such a case the other way.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "united-states", "criminal-law", "discrimination", "age" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91273, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>For example, would a name in the form first initial last name be considered personal data, considering this could apply to many people?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Yes, it is. Your IP address could be used by a whole campus, there could be dozens of people living in your appartment block, many, many people could be called John R. Doe, it does not change the fact that it is personal data.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>What about if we added in a hobby, perhaps that they watch football or like GTA. Would this make this personal data or would it still be generic enough to not be?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>That is still personal data. You could argue that it does not fall under the GDPR, since it is &quot;personal or family&quot; use. You are not a company, these are your 12 buddies. Whether that is true or not, is something only you can decide.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>For example, a document with a list of 25 names was held for the purposes of a roster with no further information, or was titled by 'Man City fans' or 'GTA players' with no further information.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Yes, this is personal data. But whether the GDPR applies to it depends heavily on what you do with it and who those people are. Are you a company that holds them in a computer system for their online fantasy football game? The GDPR applies. Are you a guy on his couch who scribbled their friends names on a piece of paper for your personal fantasy football league? The GDPR does not apply. Somewhere in between? Maybe you need a real lawyer to figure out the exact borders you should not cross.</p>\n", "score": 1 }, { "answer_id": 91278, "body": "<p>The GDPR defines personal data in Art 4(1) to mean</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’)</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>There are two criteria here:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>the information must <strong>relate</strong> to the data subject</li>\n<li>the data subject must be <strong>identifiable</strong></li>\n</ul>\n<p>Notably, it does not require that the data subject is identifiable <em>through</em> that information. What counts as identifiable is explained in the remainder of that paragraph, and in GDPR Recital 26. In particular, the data subject is still identifiable if you can only do so if you combine the information with additional data, or if you can only do so with assistance from third parties. Identification can also be indirect, for example by “one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity” which could include hobbies or video game preferences.</p>\n<p>What counts is whether you have the reasonable means to likely identify the data subject, if you tried.</p>\n<p>Thus, the GDPR concept of personal data includes information that can be linked to a person, even if the information itself is not identifying.</p>\n<p>Whether your examples of information qualify as personal data will depend a lot on the context. While you might not be able to identify the data subjects yourself, you might know someone who can do that. A list of names is likely to be directly identifying though, and would then inherently be personal data (unless you knew e.g. that the names only referred to deceased or fictional persons).</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "gdpr" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91248, "body": "<p>In a normal case, it is not merely the contents of the indictment that are secret, but also the very fact that an indictment exists.</p>\n<p>This level of secrecy surrounding grand jury proceedings is a practice so old that it may be impossible to say with any certainty why it began, but it is currently justified on various grounds. For instance:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>It reduces the danger of reputational harm to suspects who the grand jury believes have not committed any crime.</li>\n<li>It reduces the danger of witness tampering.</li>\n<li>It reduces the danger of defendants taking additional steps to avoid detection.</li>\n<li>It reduces the danger of defendants fleeing upon learning that they've been indicted.</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Naturally, the importance of any of these considerations will vary from case to case.</p>\n<p>So, had the process gone normally, the public would not be curious about the Trump indictment because it wouldn't even know the Trump indictment existed. But media leaks put the court in an awkward position, as the court was still legally obligated to pretend it didn't even know whether an indictment existed, even though the defendant had been blabbing about it for days on social media.</p>\n", "score": 15 }, { "answer_id": 91246, "body": "<p>Without getting into the nitty-gritty chapter and verse, here is a sketch of the logic. Incidentally, since the indictment of Donald Trump today was in a New York State court, that indictment is governed by the New York State rules of criminal procedures which do not closely track the federal rules of criminal procedure. New York State is one of about half of U.S. states, mostly in the eastern U.S., which, in addition to the federal system, are required to initiate most serious criminal cases with a grand jury indictment, rather than merely a filing by the prosecutor without a grand jury.</p>\n<p>Grand jury proceedings are secret. This is so that prosecutors can use grand juries to gather evidence in order to charge suspects with criminal charges in secrecy so that suspects in criminal investigations do not use knowledge that they could obtain from a grand jury investigation in order to thwart the investigation by fleeing or hiding from arrest, destroying evidence, tampering with witnesses, and/or coaching grand jury witnesses to give testimony that supports or contradicts the testimony given by previous witnesses.</p>\n<p>In states like New York, a grand jury investigation is the primary way that prosecutors can compel people to provide testimony in a criminal investigation prior to charging someone with a crime. In states without a strong grand jury system, the prosecutor normally has subpoena power to compel witnesses to give testimony or information to a prosecutor without the involvement of a grand jury.</p>\n<p>Frequently, and as a default, once a grand jury decides which charges the prosecutor is allowed to bring in an indictment by casting a majority vote in favor of each of the charges in the indictment (this is called a &quot;true bill&quot;), the prosecutor still wants to keep the facts related to who has been indicted for what secret.</p>\n<p>The prosecutor wants to keep the indictment a secret in order to facilitate the arrest of the suspect or suspects, until a warrant for the arrest of the person can be carried out without the suspect knowing that it is coming, or until an arraignment, in the alternative, when the court formally asserts its jurisdiction over the defendant, takes a plea, and is in a position to set bail.</p>\n<p>This way, a defendant won't flee because there are any charges against them (usually grand juries indictments are reserved for felonies or serious misdemeanors), or because the charges are more serious that the suspect believed that they would be.</p>\n<p>Once the court has adequate assurances that the suspect won't flee, by having the suspect in court, submitted to its jurisdiction, either by virtue of an arrest or a voluntary appearance with pre-trial release conditions established, the court no longer has to worry about the suspect fleeing, and the indictment can be unsealed.</p>\n<p>In a case like the one today, where Donald Trump is appearing voluntarily at an arraignment in a court appearance carefully coordinated with his secret service detail, the flight risk concern is smaller, but the procedures are set based upon the average case and not the exceptional one. Due to the highly newsworthy nature of this case, the existence of an indictment was announced in advance and there was leaks that have been largely disregarded as &quot;harmless&quot; about the contents of the indictment.</p>\n<p>But, in the usual case, secrecy prior to an arrest or voluntary appearance at an arraignment is paramount as a matter of the operational effectiveness of arresting law enforcement officers, and the public doesn't even know that there is an indictment or even sometimes that there is a pending grand jury investigation, until the indictment is unsealed at an arraignment.</p>\n", "score": 11 } ]

[ "united-states", "privacy", "new-york-state", "criminal-procedure", "grand-jury" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91207, "body": "<p>It is conceivable that A's employer would claim that the intellectual property was actually created by A in the course of their employment rather than B. That would be a question of fact for the lawsuit to determine.</p>\n<p>Realistically, assuming A and B both testify that B created the intellectual property with no input from A and A's employer had only the IP address as evidence, it is pretty unlikely that the fact finder would find that A created the intellectual property. A's employer would almost certainly need to provide some additional evidence that would show that the balance of probabilities favored the employer's position (i.e. A works at FedEx writing software for package logistics, B is a 12 year old kid with no formal computer science training, and the intellectual property in question involves the implementation of sophisticated graph traversal algorithms that would be common in package logistics applications).</p>\n", "score": 25 }, { "answer_id": 91253, "body": "<p>I would not be too worried about Company A making a claim over company B's intellectual property because your wife sent something over the shared home network. I would more concerned if your Company A and your wife's company B were competitors or in the same line of business. If that is so, you could open yourself up to trade secret or confidentiality legal actions.</p>\n<p>I have been a lawyer in Silicon Valley for over 25 years. There are certain companies that rigorously defend their trade secrets and will sue former employees in the flimsiest of cases. After you have spent thousands of dollars defending yourself they settle with you for an apology having taught you &quot;a lesson&quot;.</p>\n<p>If your employer believes you may have leaked trade secrets I could see them filing a law suit connected to the shared home network. You are a computer expert. So you know the solution to this better than I do. Interesting question. Thank you.</p>\n", "score": 4 }, { "answer_id": 91229, "body": "<p>I am not a lawyer but from the technical aspect, it does not make much sense.</p>\n<p>A company that allows you to work remotely ensures that your work environment is secure. This can roughly be done though</p>\n<ul>\n<li>providing you with a complete network connected to the company (this is typical for small branch offices, but also doable at home)</li>\n<li>or making sure that your device (typically a laptop) is secure when on a generic network</li>\n</ul>\n<p>In the first case, you are alone on the network built by the company that connects to the company so it is an extension of what they have. This network &quot;lays&quot; on top of the home network, and then the Internet. The home network and Internet are just transport - so if a company states that this contributes to the IP they should sue the Internet, the providers of the tunnels the cables run through, and the vendors of the fiber.</p>\n<p>In the second case, the laptop is expected to be secure and appropriately isolated so you are back to the &quot;transport layers&quot; above.</p>\n<p>In other words - where you do not matter because the way the IP flows in is independent of the network it ultimately is. The company provides the appropriate security padding so that it does not matter.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "united-states", "intellectual-property", "workplace" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91272, "body": "<p>According to the Wikipedia article I cited in the original answer, the reasoning for these countries is that Saudi Arabia has a high population of immigrants from those nations and prefers not to allow further immigrants entry through marriage.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "marriage", "saudi-arabia" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91266, "body": "<p>They existed in many other places. A quick read of Wikipedia identifies several countries in contemporaneous eras with the U.S. Laws where anti-miscegenation laws were enacted, including Australia (anti-aboriginal, repealed c. 1930s), South Africa (Repealed in 1985), India (under British Colonial Government, following the rebellion of 1857), Germany (Under Nazi Laws), and Italy (under Fascist laws).</p>\n<p>There are also countries that still have these laws at time of writing, including Egypt (Men can lose their citizenship if they marry an Israeli woman), Saudi Arabia (Women are forbidden to marry non-Muslim men. Saudi Men must get a government permit to marry a foreign woman and may only do so as second wives if their first wife is unable to give birth. They are also forbidden from marrying anyone from Bangladesh, Myanmar, Chad, or Pakistan.), North Korea (Specifically targets Eastern Europeans following a bad diplomatic situation with the Soviet Union and Marriages to Chinese citizens), and debatably Israel (Israeli citizens can marry Palestinians, however, said spouses are not automatically granted citizenship or residency status in Israel.).</p>\n<p>Historically, China had laws enacted and repealed many times over its long history, with the only date offered being in the 9th century AD, France had some laws enacted in the 1723 and repealed in 1833, however it's hard to track if and when the laws were enacted and enforced. Finally, pre-Islamic Iberia (Modern day Spain, Portugal, and possibly Andora) had some laws preventing Visigoths from marrying Hispano-Roman peoples in the 5th Century AD but they were largely abandoned by the 6th Century AD.</p>\n<p>With respect to the United States, only three Anti-Miscegenation Laws pertained to bans on marriages in which neither spouse was white - OK banned people of African descent from marrying people of non-African descent. Louisiana banned marriages between people of Native Americans and African decent, and Maryland banned marriage between people of African and Filipinos descent. All other laws can be summed up as generally banning the marriage of Europeans and African, Native American, or Asian descent (note: This does not mean every state banned all three, but rather that all laws would ban a combination of all three.). A total of 9 states never enacted any Anti-Miscegenation laws at any point in history.</p>\n<p>An interesting aspect was Hispanic Americans were not considered &quot;not white&quot; and this consideration is relatively recement (to the point that &quot;I Love Lucy&quot; can be considered the first mixed race marriage on TV... but at the time it originally aired, Ricky Ricardo was considered &quot;white&quot;). That said, in State v. Pass (1942), Frank Pass was convicted of murder based on compelled testimony from his wife, Ruby Conteras Pass, who was a Mexican immigrant. Pass tried to appeal on the grounds that a spouse cannot testify against her husband, but he appelant courts ruled that Pass' marriage was illegal because Conteras Pass was partially Native American heritage. The court did note that the ruling was only due to the wording of the law meant people of mixed race couldn't legally marry anyone at all in the State of Arizona (Arizona repealed all of its Anti-Miscegenation laws prior to the 1967 Loving v. Virgina decision which ruled such laws unconstitutional.).</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "legal-history", "any-jurisdiction" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91111, "body": "<p>There are multiple potential issues involved with an eviction. The primary interest here seems to be landlord repossession of the premise; there is also potentially collection of rents owed, and official termination of the tenancy. This identifies three landlord interests, the latter two of which are not addressed by tenant leaving. Tenant may have <a href=\"https://www.state.nj.us/dca/divisions/codes/publications/pdf_lti/lease.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">unlawfully broken the lease</a>. Landlords have <a href=\"https://www.nj.gov/dca/divisions/codes/publications/pdf_lti/grnds_for_evicti_bulltin.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">limited rights</a> over their property, and cannot &quot;evict or fail to renew a lease, whether it is a written or an\noral lease without good cause&quot; (a matter that the court decides). The landlord's suit can result in &quot;A Judgment for\nPossession [which] ends the tenancy and allows the landlord to have the tenant evicted from the rental\npremises&quot; – the suit thus accomplishes two things. If a tenant (later) pays the owed rent, the tenancy still exists and tenant can move back in. This is the interpretation that is most favorable to the landlord.</p>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.njcourts.gov/sites/default/files/court-opinions/2022/a0785-21.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">80 West Century LLC v. Drossos Lorenzo</a>\nrecites in §II numerous prior rulings regarding mootness, that\n&quot;Mootness is a threshold justiciability determination rooted in the notion\nthat judicial power is to be exercised only when a party is immediately\nthreatened with harm&quot;, that &quot;Courts 'normally will not entertain\ncases when a controversy no longer exists and the disputed issues have become\nmoot'&quot;, and that\n&quot;An issue is 'moot when [the]\ndecision sought in a matter, when rendered, can have no practical effect on the\nexisting controversy'&quot;.</p>\n<p>Furthermore,\n&quot;In a summary dispossess action, 'the court's jurisdiction is limited to\ndetermining the issue of the landlord's right to possession of the premises'&quot;, citing <a href=\"https://casetext.com/case/daoud-v-mohammad\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Daoud v. Mohammad</a>. Specifically,</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The landlord's repossession of the premises, either by execution of a\nwarrant for removal or a voluntary vacation of the premises, renders\nmoot an appeal from the JOP. Accordingly, we ordinarily dismiss as\nmoot an appeal challenging an eviction when the tenant was removed\nfrom or otherwise vacated the premises.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>In Daoud, the court states that</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Because the court's jurisdiction is limited to determining the issue\nof the landlord's right to possession of the premises, and, as\npreviously noted, the tenant vacated the premises and the premises\nhave been re-rented, the issue can no longer be determined.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>In 80 West Century, citing Daoud, the court notes that</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>An evicted tenant may seek in the Law Division damages arising from a\nwrongful eviction</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>which identifies what controls mootness: court jurisdiction. <a href=\"https://www.njcourts.gov/self-help/special-civil-court\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Special Civil Court</a> is a more-efficient limited jurisdiction court. As stated in Daoud,</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>such actions [in the Special Civil Part] are statutory proceedings\ndesigned to accord landlords an expeditious and inexpensive means of\nregaining possession of leased premises as authorized by statute.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>If the <em>only</em> issue is repossession and plaintiff selects Special Civil Court, then the motion is moot.</p>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 91270, "body": "<p>I write this very tentatively, given my unfamiliarity with the application of this doctrine in practice and invite edits to improve this answer.</p>\n<p>The voluntary-cessation doctrine is an exception to mootness. A defendant cannot render a case moot simply by ceasing their illegal conduct. See <em>United States v. W.T. Grant Co.</em>, 345 U.S. 629 (1953) (citations removed):</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>... voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case, i. e., does not make the case moot. A controversy may remain to be settled in such circumstances, e.g., a dispute over the legality of the challenged practices. The defendant is free to return to his old ways. This, together with a public interest in having the legality of the practices settled, militates against a mootness conclusion. For to say that the case has become moot means that the defendant is entitled to a dismissal as a matter of right. The courts have rightly refused to grant defendants such a powerful weapon against public law enforcement.</p>\n<p>...</p>\n<p>Along with its power to hear the case, the court's power to grant injunctive relief survives discontinuance of the illegal conduct.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "united-states", "landlord", "tenant", "civil-procedure", "new-jersey" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91204, "body": "<p>An accused would be arrested for the purposes of <a href=\"https://nycourts.gov/courthelp/criminal/arraignments.shtml\" rel=\"noreferrer\"><em><strong>arraignment</strong></em></a> (&quot;even a scheduled arrest is still an arrest&quot;). That does not entail that the accused would be held in custody pending or during trial. Many commenters are of the view that Mr. Trump would be released under his own recognizance without bail.</p>\n<p>Reference: <a href=\"https://apnews.com/article/trump-arrest-process-what-to-know-02a2ce34e03e25ab2fdd0e81dbcc62c7\" rel=\"noreferrer\">AP News</a>.</p>\n", "score": 35 }, { "answer_id": 91209, "body": "<p>New York Criminal Procedure Law, <a href=\"https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/CPL/210.10\" rel=\"noreferrer\">section 210.10</a>, <em>Requirement of and methods of securing defendant's appearance for arraignment upon indictment,</em> subsection 3 (emphasis added):</p>\n<blockquote>\n<ol start=\"3\">\n<li>If the defendant has not previously been held by a local criminal\ncourt for the action of the grand jury and the filing of the indictment\nconstituted the commencement of the criminal action, <strong>the superior court</strong>\nmust order the indictment to be filed as a sealed instrument until the\ndefendant is produced or appears for arraignment, and <strong>must issue a\nsuperior court warrant of arrest. Upon the request of the district\nattorney, in lieu of a superior court warrant of arrest, the court may\nissue a summons if it is satisfied that the defendant will respond\nthereto. Upon the request of the district attorney, in lieu of a warrant\nof arrest or summons, the court may instead authorize the district\nattorney to direct the defendant to appear for arraignment on a\ndesignated date if it is satisfied that the defendant will so appear.</strong> A\nsuperior court warrant of arrest is executable anywhere in the state.\nSuch warrant may be addressed to any police officer whose geographical\narea of employment embraces either the place where the offense charged\nwas allegedly committed or the locality of the court by which the\nwarrant is issued. It must be executed in the same manner as an\nordinary warrant of arrest, as provided in section 120.80, and following\nthe arrest the executing police officer must without unnecessary delay\nperform all recording, fingerprinting, photographing and other\npreliminary police duties required in the particular case, and bring the\ndefendant before the superior court. If such superior court is not\navailable, the executing police officer may bring the defendant to the\nlocal correctional facility of the county in which such superior court\nsits, to be detained there until not later than the commencement of the\nnext session of such court occurring on the next business day.</li>\n</ol>\n</blockquote>\n<p>So, the district attorney can ask the court not to issue a warrant, but the court isn't obliged to comply. In fact the court is obliged not to comply if it concludes that the defendant may not appear voluntarily or in response to a summons.</p>\n<p>My guess is that the district attorney did not make the necessary request. However, as noted in the AP article linked in Jen's answer, &quot;Manhattan District Attorney Alvin Bragg’s office said it had contacted Trump’s lawyer to coordinate his surrender and arraignment,&quot; so it's entirely possible that the third option <em>is</em> in play, in which case Trump won't necessarily be arrested.</p>\n", "score": 19 } ]

[ "criminal-law", "new-york-state", "arrest", "indictment" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91265, "body": "<p>First review the existing contract for anything that specifies what happens at the end of the term. I have seen ones that switch to month to month, others automatically extend by a whole year.</p>\n<p>In the United states the rental law is done at the state level or even more local than that. So I took a look at the UK policies. I focused on England.</p>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/how-to-rent/how-to-rent-the-checklist-for-renting-in-england\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Guidance How to rent: the checklist for renting in England Updated 24 March 2023</a></p>\n<blockquote>\n<ol start=\"5\">\n<li>At the end of the fixed period If you want to stay</li>\n</ol>\n<p>If you want to extend your tenancy after any initial fixed period,\nthere are a number of important issues to consider. Check Shelter’s\nwebsite for advice. Do you want to sign up to a new fixed term?</p>\n<p>If not, you will be on a ‘rolling periodic tenancy’. This means you\ncarry on as before but with no fixed term. Your tenancy agreement\nshould say how much notice you must give the landlord if you want to\nleave the property – one month’s notice is typical. Shelter publishes\nadvice on how you can end your tenancy.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>I then went to the shelter website <a href=\"https://england.shelter.org.uk/housing_advice/private_renting/ending_a_periodic_tenancy/how_much_notice\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">How to end a periodic tenancy</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>How much notice</p>\n<p>You can give your landlord a legal notice called a 'notice to quit' to\nend a rolling tenancy.</p>\n<p>This is a more formal option. Your tenancy will end legally if you\nfollow the rules on how much notice and where to send it.</p>\n<p>A legal notice must:</p>\n<ul>\n<li><p>be in writing</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>give the right amount of notice</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>end on the correct day</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Here is an example of a notice to quit.</p>\n<p>A legal notice ends your tenancy and your right to live in your home.</p>\n<p>Joint tenancies will end for all tenants even if only one of you gives\nnotice.</p>\n<p>You cannot withdraw a valid notice if you change your mind.</p>\n<p>Your landlord may agree to let you or other joint tenants stay on\nafter a notice ends. Minimum notice periods</p>\n<p>You need to give at least:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>1 month if your rent is due monthly</li>\n<li>4 weeks if your rent is due weekly</li>\n</ul>\n<p>You can usually give the minimum notice to end your tenancy if your\nmost recent agreement does not mention a longer notice period or if\nyou've never had a written agreement.</p>\n<p>You may still need to give more than the minimum notice to make sure\nit ends on the right day. If your agreement says you must give more\nnotice</p>\n<p>Your agreement might have a 'notice clause'.</p>\n<p>For example, if it says you have to give 2 months' notice.</p>\n<p>A notice clause might not apply after your fixed term has ended but\nsometimes it will. When will the longer notice apply?</p>\n<p>The longer notice period will only apply if either:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>you never had a fixed term agreement</li>\n<li>your agreement says it continues as a contractual periodic tenancy after the fixed term</li>\n</ul>\n<p>You can ignore a notice clause in your most recent agreement if both:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>your fixed term has ended</li>\n<li>your agreement does not say that it continues as a contractual periodic tenancy</li>\n</ul>\n</blockquote>\n<p>It looks like the notice period is a month, unless the contract says that the notice period is longer during the periodic tenancy.</p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "united-kingdom", "rental-property", "landlord" ]

[ { "answer_id": 89765, "body": "<h2>It seems to be violating IPC §375</h2>\n<p>Having sex is only the first half of the check. The other is the enumerated list 1-7 that describes pretty much circumstances of no consent. Among them are</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>(1) Against her will.<br>\n(2) Without her consent.<br>\n(3) With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>There are two prongs here: You can argue that the consent wasn't properly given because it was given out of fear of coming injury (IPC §90), or it was given but for a fear of hurt coming from the eviction.</p>\n<p>In either case, the description demanded can be fulfilled:</p>\n<h3>no-consent theory</h3>\n<p>Being homeless directly leads to physical harm of the body, destruction or loss of property and reputation, and as such is an injury as defined in the IPC. As such, the threat of eviction is a threat of injury. Consent isn't present if the reason for a person to comply with a demand is fear of such an injury. As such, there is no consent as required by IPC §375 (2), and so it is rape.</p>\n<p>In the alternative, it is forced against the will, and thus violates IPC §375 (1).</p>\n<h3>harm theory</h3>\n<p>Being made homeless is directly harming any person in body and mind. Having obtained consent from a threat of harm to the person or close person, it is violating IPC §375 (3), and as a result is rape.</p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "india", "indian-penal-code", "rape" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91249, "body": "<p>It is not a violation. <a href=\"https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-45/subtitle-A/subchapter-C/part-164/subpart-E\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">The privacy rule</a> requires that your personal medical information be kept &quot;private&quot;, but your consent is not required for another health care provider to process PMI. For example, your consent is not required to send samples to a particular lab for analysis, your consent is not required for the doctor to consult with a specialist. The primary health care provider can disclose information to a business associate, who is bound by the same privacy rule, the result being that your PMI cannot be &quot;generally published&quot; because disclosures are only allowed to those who are bound by the privacy rule (or, to whom disclosure has been authorized by the patient, e.g. to a relative).</p>\n", "score": 11 } ]

[ "hipaa" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91260, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>Is there a law requiring a landlord to respond to rental agencies\nrequest for information in regards to previous tenants?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>No. There is no such law.</p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "united-states", "rental-property", "landlord", "tennessee" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91258, "body": "<p>It means that they have to provide reasons so an appellate court can review the decision. If they don't, the appellate court will remand the case for a statement or reasons before reconsidering the sentence on appeal.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "india" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91257, "body": "<p>First, the camera can't be in a restroom, shower, or gym locker room. Second, they can't be placed in an employee private place, such as a break room. They can be in an employees-only work area, which is not a &quot;public area&quot;. They are mandatory in a cannabis dispensary. They are forbidden in a room where employees are undertaking union-organizing activities. You cannot trespass to install the recording device.</p>\n<p>California is an all-party state w.r.t. <a href=\"https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayText.xhtml?chapter=1.5.&amp;part=1.&amp;lawCode=PEN&amp;title=15.\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">recording communications</a>, which means that you need the consent of everybody that is a party to a communication, in order to record it. Specifically:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Any person who, by means of any machine, instrument, or contrivance,\nor in any other manner, intentionally taps, or makes any unauthorized\nconnection, whether physically, electrically, acoustically,\ninductively, or otherwise, with any telegraph or telephone wire, line,\ncable, or instrument, including the wire, line, cable, or instrument\nof any internal telephonic communication system, or who willfully and\nwithout the consent of all parties to the communication, or in any\nunauthorized manner, reads, or attempts to read, or to learn the\ncontents or meaning of any message, report, or communication while the\nsame is in transit or passing over any wire, line, or cable, or is\nbeing sent from, or received at any place within this state; or who\nuses, or attempts to use, in any manner, or for any purpose, or to\ncommunicate in any way, any information so obtained, or who aids,\nagrees with, employs, or conspires with any person or persons to\nunlawfully do, or permit, or cause to be done any of the acts or\nthings mentioned above in this section, is punishable by a fine not\nexceeding two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500), or by\nimprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or by\nimprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170, or by both a\nfine and imprisonment in the county jail or pursuant to subdivision\n(h) of Section 1170. If the person has previously been convicted of a\nviolation of this section or Section 632, 632.5, 632.6, 632.7, or 636,\nthe offense is punishable by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars\n($10,000), or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one\nyear, or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170,\nor by both that fine and imprisonment.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Recording a person walking down a hall is not recording a communication. Video recording two people walking down the hall signing at each other <em>is</em> recording a conversation, and is illegal (the law is not stated in terms of &quot;spoken language&quot;, it is in terms of any kind of communication). The escape route for a would-be recorder is to clearly announce that video is being recorded and therefore a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy (insofar as confidential communication &quot;means any communication carried on in circumstances as may reasonably indicate that any party to the communication desires it to be confined to the parties thereto, but excludes a communication made... in any other circumstance in which the parties to the communication may reasonably expect that the communication may be overheard or recorded&quot;).</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "california", "surveillance" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91251, "body": "<p>There is not a civil disobedience defense in a court of law.</p>\n<p>When you engage in civil disobedience, you accept the fact that you may face criminal sanctions and do so anyway out of your commitment to the cause.</p>\n<p>A judge could take your civil disobedience motive as an aggravating factor, a mitigating factor, or could ignore it, in the sentencing phase following a conviction for a crime motivated by civil disobedience. An executive branch official might also consider this motive when evaluating whether to pardon or commute the sentence of someone convicted of a crime intended as civil disobedience.</p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "political" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91250, "body": "<p>Federal laws prohibit false, deceptive, unfair etc. advertising, and there simply exists no federal law prohibiting advertising marijuana. Because of the First Amendment, there is no law prohibiting the advocacy of an illegal act. Because of the Commerce Clause, Congress could pass laws restricting commercial speech, as long as it passes strict scrutiny, see <a href=\"https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/447/557/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Central Hudson Gas &amp; Electric v Public Service Commission of New York</a>. However, &quot;For commercial speech to come within the First Amendment, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading&quot;. So Congress <em>could</em> pass a federal advertising ban. A state where marijuana is illegal can do likewise, but as you noted Twitter does not cross that line. <a href=\"https://apps.leg.wa.gov/wac/default.aspx?cite=314-55-155\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Washington allows</a> marijuana sales and advertising, however &quot;A cannabis licensee may not engage in advertising or marketing that specifically targets persons residing out of the state of Washington&quot; (not even Oregon where the herb is also legal). Still, the state attempted to limit advertising which resulted in <a href=\"https://www.gleamlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/FINALORDER.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Plausible Products, LLC d/b/a Hashtag Cannabis v Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board</a>. The ruling observes that</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The State argues that, “[f]or purposes of the first Central Hudson\ntest, marijuana activity cannot be considered to be ‘lawful activity”\nwhere its use, possession, manufacture, and distribution remains\nillegal under federal criminal law.”</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>§2(B) analyses this rationale, quoting from New England\nAccessories Trade Ass’n v. City of Nashua, 679 F.2d 1, where the New England\nAccessories court also considers that\n“If New York, or some\nother state, decided to legalize the sale and use of marijuana, New Hampshire would have\ngreater difficulty . . . prohibiting an advertisement suggesting that the Big Apple was the\nplace to get high on marijuana.” The Plausible Products court then concluded</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>It follows that, where one state could not avoid Central Hudson\nscrutiny for banning advertisement of Washington recreational\nmarijuana, neither can the State here avoid Central Hudson scrutiny on\nthe basis that recreational marijuana is still illegal under federal\nlaw</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>There are other relevant tests applicable to restrictions on commercial speech –<br />\nis the government's interest substantial, does the regulation directly advance that interest, and is it narrowly tailored. Presumably, the state interest would be in preventing underage consumption (accepted by the court). Another possible interest, rejected by the court, was &quot;not tipping off the feds&quot;, with reference to the &quot;federal government’s expectation of a strong and effective marijuana regulatory system&quot;. But as the court noted, the Cole Memorandum was rescinded, and states cannot rely on it, thus the &quot;asserted interest in avoiding federal\nintervention is too elusive to amount to a substantial interest under Central Hudson&quot;.</p>\n<p>The Twitter restrictions on cannabis ads are very similar to the Washington state regulations on such advertising. Allowed ads seem to be reined in to meet the general state interest (in restricting underage consumption), so I conclude that there are no legal consequences of their business decision.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "united-states" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91139, "body": "<h2>Yes</h2>\n<p>Being disabled is a protected class under the Equality Act. being a cyclist isn’t. The landlord <em>has</em> to make reasonable accomodations for her, he doesn’t have to for you.</p>\n", "score": 17 } ]

[ "united-states", "england-and-wales", "hypothetical", "equal-protection", "equality-act-2010" ]

[ { "answer_id": 31714, "body": "<p>The only meaningful discussion from the Supreme Court of what constitutes a \"true threat\" comes from <a href=\"https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/537/465.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>Virginia v. Black</em>, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003)</a>: </p>\n\n<blockquote>\n <p>“True threats” encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals. ... The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats “protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence” and “from the disruption that fear engenders,” in addition to protecting people “from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.” Ibid. \n Intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.</p>\n</blockquote>\n\n<p>A few other courts have elaborated further:</p>\n\n<blockquote>\n <p>A true threat is a communication that, when taken in context, “would have a reasonable tendency to create apprehension that its originator will act according to its tenor.” </p>\n</blockquote>\n\n<p><a href=\"https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-11th-circuit/1651051.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>United States v. Martinez</em>, 736 F.3d 981, 986 (11th Cir. 2013)</a>.</p>\n\n<blockquote>\n <p>A “true threat” is defined as a “statement that a reasonable recipient would have interpreted as a serious expression of an intent to harm or cause injury to another.”</p>\n</blockquote>\n\n<p><a href=\"https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-8th-circuit/1587154.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>United States v. Mabie</em>, 663 F.3d 322, 330 (8th Cir. 2011)</a>.</p>\n\n<p>As far as I know, the Ninth Circuit is the only circuit to conclude that a speaker must intend his communication to be threatening. Most courts find it sufficient to show only that the speaker intended to make the communication, and that a reasonable person would feel threatened by it.</p>\n\n<p>If your hypothetical were in court, the debate would be about the two questions above. Since it doesn't sound like there's any question that you meant to make the statement, most of the debate would focus on whether a reasonable person would feel threatened by your statement. </p>\n\n<p>The prosecution would ask the victim about the background of your relationship, what you said, what your demeanor was, and what the victim understood the statement to mean, and then the prosecutor would argue that in the context in which the statement was made, any reasonable person would fear being harmed. </p>\n\n<p>Your defense attorney would try to minimize the seriousness of the statement, demonstrate that you never followed through (though this may not be relevant), suggest that the statement wasn't serious and wasn't intended to be serious, and that no one could believe you honestly intended to hurt the victim.</p>\n\n<p>From there, would be up to the jury to decide who it believes.</p>\n", "score": 3 }, { "answer_id": 31710, "body": "<p>In the United States, all speech is considered to be protected until proven otherwise. In a criminal case, the defense has no burden of proof that the statement was made as a form of a threat. Thus, the Prosecution must show that the speech was unacceptable. As the case of Watts v. The United States decided, a True Threat only if the messenger intended it to be interpreted as a threat and the audience reacted as such. In the case of Watts, who was opposed to the Vietnam war and the draft and said at a public protest that if the nation ever made him carry a rifle, he would endeavor to make sure President Lyndon Johnson was the first person in his sights, and then mimed shooting a gun. He was arrested by the Secret Service for making a threat against the President.</p>\n<p>While the supreme court, on appeal, found that the law against threatening the life of the President was constitutional, but it did not make Watts statements illegal. Watts maintained that he was merely joking, and admitted it was probably not the best joke to make, thus showing his intent was not malicious, and the fact that the audience was largely laughing and applauding and cheering, meant that it was not seen as a threat by the reasonable person.</p>\n<p>This is not an either or situation. A true threat must be both intended by the speaker to threaten someone or something AND must be understood by the recipient(s) as a threat in order for it to be a true threat.</p>\n<p>Take for the situation a fake bomb scare called into emergency services. The speaker would know that any threat made in a 911 call will be understood as a threat, and thus, cannot joke with an on duty 911 operator. There is no reasonable way to interpret a call of a bomb threat to 911 as a joke, and thus the intent is to make a threat, even though no lives are ever in danger.</p>\n<p>However, if we look at the Kathy Griffon picture of her holding President Trump's severed head, we do understand the likely intended message was not a threat to kill the president, even though the audience largely was not amused. She did get investigated by the Secrete Service, but they found no evidence to say that the joke was nothing more than a very bad joke that was not intended to actually threaten, but just mock (Most Americans do not appreciate jokes about killing the President, even if they do not like the current president. Its one of the very few things Americans do agree on.).</p>\n<p>The Prosecution will have to prove that your intention was either to threaten or make the listener believe the false threat AND the listener must understand it to be a threat.</p>\n<p>Because all restrictions must be context neutral, no specific statements or practices are outright labeled as a threat. You can in fact shout Fire in a Crowded theater without being arrested for making a threat. After all, scene in the play called for the actor to announce the fire. And when in doubt, the speech should be protected.</p>\n<p>Edit:</p>\n<p>To answer why the intent of the speaker, I'd like to use my go favorite lawyer movie, &quot;My Cousin Vinny&quot; to show how context when related to speech is very critical.</p>\n<p>The cousin of Vinny (Bill) is from Brooklyn and is charged with a murder of a shop clerk he did not commit in rural Alabama (The viewer knows this). The cousin believes that he was arrested for an honest mistake petty theft of a can of tuna from the same store (he was probably the last person to see the clerk alive). When he tries to confess to taking the tuna, the sheriff believes he was confessing to the murder of the clerk, and when the sheriff gets impatient, we get to this exchange:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Sheriff: When did you shoot him?</p>\n<p>Bill: what?</p>\n<p>Sheriff: At what point did you shoot the clerk?</p>\n<p>Bill (confused): I shot the clerk?</p>\n<p>Sheriff: Yes, when did you shoot him?</p>\n<p>Bill (still processing the question): I shot the clerk?!</p>\n<p>Officer: Dean, we need you out here!</p>\n<p>Sheriff: I'm right in the middle of a damn confession here! (Sheriff\nand Deputy leave room. Bill realizes...)</p>\n<p>Bill: WHOA!!! Wait a minute!!</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>It's important to state that there is no malicious on this part. My Cousin Vinny was praised for it's ability to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were not corrupt country hicks that sleep with their sisters, as the movie puts it in more crass language. The sheriff does actually help Vinny win the case at a point where he makes it clear that it is not part of his job and once new evidence comes to light the prosecution does admit it got it wrong (he's even given a sympathetic story to show he's not a bad guy). In the above scene, Bill is clearly trying to work through what the sheriff asked him and is quite floored by the accusation that is made. The sheriff believes he's confessing to the murder, not petty theft and thinks Bill is stalling, and both are unfamiliar with each others accents. Furthering the problem an officer pulls the sheriff away as Bill comes to the realization of the gravity of the situation he's in but the Sheriff is distracted by other matters and doesn't catch these changes in attitude going on. And later in this movie, the fruits of this scene come to bear when the sheriff is testifying in court</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Sheriff: (dryly without any hint of emotion) I asked him if he did it, and he said 'I shot the clerk.' I asked him again, and again he said 'I shot the clerk.'</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The sheriff, in complete earnest, has turned Bill's questions made in a state of utter confusion to be statements of fact. An emotionless quotation of an utterance is quite plausible in court. Even if the sheriff was personally out to get Bill, he's been in court enough times to testify to all manner of crimes that he has developed a dry read of statements because he's relying on the facts and facts alone.</p>\n<p>This scene is usually used to show what they mean by &quot;Anything you say can and will be used against you&quot; during Miranda reads. In fact, because of rules on Hearsay, an arresting officer can only testify to statements you made that are injurious to you... if you say over and over that You are Innocent, he cannot attest to those statements during trial.</p>\n<p>But we can also use it to show why context and intent of speech is important. In this case, the difference in punctuation of the spoken words &quot;I shot the clerk?!&quot; and &quot;I shot the Clerk.&quot; are so vast that in the court of law, it's the difference between innocence and guilt. And because punctuation is not heard in an English statement, things such as tone are used to convey the question. You probably even read the two quoted statements in completely different tones, even though they were side by side.</p>\n<p>Again, it's important to know that the sheriff did not deliberately misrepresent Bill's statement. He gave an accurate report of the statement as he recalled it. The analysis of the error was not really explored because the charge was for murder, not a true threat, so free speech issues weren't discussed much in that issue. However, had this been a free speech error, the misread is a critical mistake that could have flipped the case against Bill despite the fact that Bill never would have confessed had he known ahead of time that he was under arrest for murder. Here, it only put him up for the death penalty.</p>\n<p>And as a final note, I did leave something out on Watts: He did in fact commit a crime that night. Watts was found in possession of marijuana during a search related to his arrest for making a threat against the President. He was found guilty of the crime well before his case was decided by the Supreme Court. When the court ruled in his favor, this case was overturned by lower courts because the cause for the search (the arrest for threatening the president) was no longer a valid arrest, and thus the probable cause for the search and the evidence was only found on that justification. Just to stress how absolutely critical a speaker's intended meaning is to a case of True Threat.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "united-states", "constitutional-law", "freedom-of-speech", "first-amendment", "threats" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91247, "body": "<p>The easiest way for you is to distribute source code and compiled code <em>together</em>. That way you have fulfilled all your GPL obligations and you have no requirement to do anything for anyone in the future.</p>\n<p>The alternative is to distribute the compiled code, together with an offer valid for three years to supply the source code on request to <em>anyone</em> ever asking for it. So distributing without supplying the source code <em>right now</em> is legal, but you <em>must</em> supply it later when requested.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "software", "open-source-software", "gpl" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91241, "body": "<p>The organization of the Postal Service is set forth in <a href=\"https://uscode.house.gov/browse/prelim@title39/part1/chapter2&amp;edition=prelim\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Title 39 of the United States Code</a> and the U.S. Postmaster General's role in the U.S. Postal Service is set forth at 39 U.S.C. § 203, although references to the U.S. Postmaster General are found throughout Title 39. Section 203 states:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>§203. Postmaster General; Deputy Postmaster General</p>\n<p>The chief executive officer of the Postal Service is the Postmaster\nGeneral appointed under section 202(c) of this title. The alternate\nchief executive officer of the Postal Service is the Deputy Postmaster\nGeneral appointed under section 202(d) of this title.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The powers of the Postmaster General vis-a-vis the Board of Governors of the U.S. Postal Service are further clarified at 39 U.S.C. 402 which states:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>§402. Delegation of authority</p>\n<p>Except for those powers, duties, or obligations specifically vested in\nthe Governors, as distinguished from the Board of Governors, the Board\nmay delegate the authority vested in it to the Postmaster General\nunder such terms, conditions, and limitations, including the power of\nredelegation, as it deems desirable. The Board may establish such\ncommittees of the Board, and delegate such powers to any committee, as\nthe Board determines appropriate to carry out its functions and\nduties. Delegations to the Postmaster General or committees shall be\nconsistent with other provisions of this title, shall not relieve the\nBoard of full responsibility for the carrying out of its duties and\nfunctions, and shall be revocable by the Governors in their exclusive\njudgment.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>As a practical matter, the Board of Governors delegates responsibility for almost everything related to the operations of the U.S. Postal Service to the Postmaster General.</p>\n<p>Also, to be clear, the U.S. Postmaster General isn't the only person with the title &quot;Postmaster&quot; in the U.S. Postal Service and it isn't entirely clear which person with that title is being discussed in this question. The title &quot;Postmaster&quot; without elaboration or further detail refers to the U.S. Postal Service official who is the top manager in charge of a particular post office, which could have just one or two employees in an rural area, or might have hundreds of employees in a particular post office in someplace like New York City.</p>\n<p>It would be helpful to know why the person asking the question wants to know, in order to determine which position is really relevant and to make a more focused inquiry into that person's relevant duties, responsibilities, and authority.</p>\n<p>In U.S. law it is frequently the case that issues that come up frequently are well defined, but that other issues which come up only infrequently if ever, have answers that are ill-defined, vague, or indeterminate. A &quot;top down&quot; approach of trying to find governing documents that provide a general answer to all possible questions is rarely a fruitful one.</p>\n<p>Based upon a previous closed question, it looks like the main reason question is <a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/91211/nys-what-documents-give-authority-to-postmasters-to-decide-which-houses-get-mai\">who has the authority to decide which houses get mail delivery</a> and how decisions regarding this matter can be disputed.</p>\n<p>I don't know the answer to that question without research, but I suspect that the answer is a mix of regulations suggested by the Postmaster General and approved by the Board of Governors, in the Code of Federal Regulations, that are implemented by a local post office level postmaster for the region including that house or their regional supervisor, but I don't know that for a fact.</p>\n<p>In that question you stated:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>I assume that on the funding path, contacting our local NYS State\nAssembly member would be the first stop, but this is all new territory\nfor me and I would appreciate any and all pointers as to how to go\nabout finding available funding to support the new mail routes. But my\nreal question here is: assuming the funding was even there, how do we\n(as a Village) put pressure on the US Postal Service (local and\nRegional) to deliver mail to our streets?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Your assumption was wrong, but close. Since the U.S. Postal Service is part of the federal government, rather than part of the state government, your New York State Assemblyman has absolutely no input or clout on this issue at all. The people you would need to contact would be your local member of the House of Representatives, and secondarily the two U.S. Senators for New York State.</p>\n<p>Each elected official in the U.S. House and the U.S. Senate has staff members who are devoted to what is called &quot;constituent service&quot; which basically means helping ordinary people navigate the federal bureaucracy to meet their needs. If you were to contact one of these offices, you would be put in the touch with a constituent services staff member of that elected official who would help you figure out a solution to your problem, or would tell you that either as a matter of practical reality, or as a matter of that elected official's position on that particular issue, that the office won't be able to help you.</p>\n<p>Constituent services staff members contact the right person in the federal bureaucracy (in this case the right person in the U.S. Postal Service) to inquire, in what is known by employees within those federal government agencies as &quot;a Congressional&quot; which receives very high priority in the agency relative to ordinary citizen complaints and communications.</p>\n<p>Agencies that disregard Congressional inquiries routinely find their funding interrupted, appointments to their agency frozen, riders to legislation related to their agency specifically addressing the issue, and related follow up communications from the President at the request of a member of Congress when the President needs support from that member of Congress, none of which is something that the top officials in the agency want to deal with if it can be avoided in any way.</p>\n<p>Contacting your local U.S. House member's office should probably be your first step.</p>\n", "score": 3 }, { "answer_id": 91236, "body": "<p>You are looking for the Postal Operations Manual, a searchable PDF file available <a href=\"https://www.nalc.org/workplace-issues/resources/body/Postal-Operations-Manual-POM-Issue-9-July-2002-Updated-With-Revisions-Through-January-31-2021.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">here</a>. As a federal operation, there aren't state-specific variants in the rules.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "united-states", "new-york-state", "mail", "postal-service" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91228, "body": "<p>The <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First-sale_doctrine\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">first-sale doctrine</a> says that someone who legally bought a trademarked product is permitted to use the trademark when later reselling that product to a 3rd party.</p>\n<p>However, altering the product before reselling it is something different. When a product is altered in a way that there is a &quot;material difference&quot; to the original product, then the first-sale doctrine might no longer apply.</p>\n<p>Why is that? Because those alterations might violate warranty. Or poor or inappropriate alterations might impair the quality of a product in a way that it is not clear for the consumers if the problem is with the original product or with the alteration. Which is why, for example, <a href=\"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-ksd-2_07-cv-02440/pdf/USCOURTS-ksd-2_07-cv-02440-1.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">a court in Kansas</a> once ruled that simply removing the serial number of a product is very likely an alteration that breaches the first sale doctrine (I said &quot;very likely&quot; because this is just a preliminary injunction, not an actual ruling).</p>\n<p>In case of clothing, the original trademark owner might have a legal argument of inappropriate alterations harming their brand identity. For example, when a modification adds a political or obscene message that doesn't fit with the brand image of the original manufacturer. People seeing someone wear that article of clothing in public with both the slogan and the brand logo might not realize that it is a modification by an intermediate trader and erroneously attribute that statement to the original manufacturer. Will they win in court? Well, a company like VF Corporations can probably afford much better lawyers than the guy with an embroidery machine in their basement who sells on eBay.</p>\n<p>For that reason it's usually safer to sell altered products without using the name and logo of the original supplier.</p>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 91243, "body": "<p>Corporations zealously protect their brands, but North Face (NF) does allow co-branding:</p>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.thenorthface.com/en-us/approach/response-co-branding\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Our Position on Co-Branding</a></p>\n<p>I think the important part of that message is:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Letting another company put its logo on our products and essentially affiliating our brand with theirs isn’t a choice we take lightly, which is why these inquiries are thoughtfully considered with our brand DNA and long-standing outdoor values in mind.</p>\n<p><strong>We manage co-branding requests on a case-by-case basis</strong>.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>(emphasis my own)</p>\n<p>For instance, I found this one company that co-brands (new) NF apparel:</p>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.logosoftwear.com/custom-made/the-north-face/category.php\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Logo</a>.</p>\n<p>At that site, they state what is not approved:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The North Face prohibits decorations featuring vulgar designs, violence or illegal activity, firearms, tobacco, and pornography. Designs which are political in nature or featuring oil and gas industries are subject to review.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Reselling used clothing that has already been co-branded happens everyday.</p>\n<p>Seems tricky though. If I took my NF jacket and personally put a prohibited logo on it, I'm confident there is nothing they can or will do. I bought it, it's my personal item to deface as I wish. If I were to sell that item - especially online - I would think twice.</p>\n<p>But what if I bought the item like that - prohibited logo - with the intent to sell it?</p>\n<p>In 2014, my then 12 yo daughter made and sold polymer clay charms on Etsy, one of which was an &quot;M&amp;M Cookie Charm - Mirror On Back&quot;. Mars Corporation sent Etsy a cease and desist mail which they promptly complied with.</p>\n<p>As stated previously, Corporations such as NF (VF Corporation) have vast resources and employ large law firms.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "copyright", "california", "trademark" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91240, "body": "<p>The bigger problem than the enforceability of the legal documents you receive, on their face, is the authority of the person you are dealing with to take action on behalf of the property owner.</p>\n<p>A common scam these days is for someone pretending to be the property owner who actually has no connection to the property owner or the property at all, to obtain security deposits and initial rent payments and lease application fees from online prospective tenants who are doing business sight unseen.</p>\n<p>If you do business with the property owner and the property owner wants to back out, you have a legality of the lease problem. But the main problem someone in your situation faces is an bald faced lie about how you are dealing with problem. The legality of the documents will be irrelevant because there is no doubt that the person you dealt with committed a fraud (probably under an untraceable fake name) and ran off with your money.</p>\n<p>Your best prospect for avoiding that kind of fraud is to check the county real estate records (which are usually searchable online in urban areas) to determine who owns the property and to independently initiate a contact to that person with contact information you have found, to determine if the person claiming to be the owner really is the owner.</p>\n<p>Another option is to not lease a place until you have been granted entry to it by the person purporting to lease it and inspected it, and to obtain temporary housing in the meantime, when you first arrive at the city where you intend to lease a property.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "contract-law", "consumer-protection", "fraud", "landlord", "deposit" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91218, "body": "<blockquote>\n<ol start=\"2\">\n<li>What authority oversees this process?</li>\n</ol>\n</blockquote>\n<blockquote>\n<ol start=\"6\">\n<li>What entity enforces compliance and hears consumer complaints?</li>\n</ol>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The state tax agency. They go by different names, such as the California Franchise Tax Board, Texas Comptroller, New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, and Florida Department of Revenue.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<ol start=\"5\">\n<li>What are the legal consequences of charging the wrong tax rate (collecting the wrong tax)?</li>\n</ol>\n</blockquote>\n<p>This would depend on State law. If you merely fail to file or under-remit, you would likely have to pay a percentage penalty, which may go up depending on time, plus interest.</p>\n<p>If you intentionally misrepresent taxes due, that would be tax evasion or tax fraud, which could result in a higher percentage penalty, seizure of assets, a misdemeanor or felony conviction, depending on the magnitude, and potential jail.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<ol start=\"4\">\n<li>How can it be explained when non-exempt sales from different online sellers being shipped to a single address are all assessed different tax rates?</li>\n</ol>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Some states use an origin-based sales tax system. For in-state remote sales, the seller collects tax based on the rate in the seller's location. This would be similar as if you had collected the purchase yourself at their premises.</p>\n<p>The opposite would be a destination-based sales tax system where the tax rate collected is based on the address the goods were shipped to. Out-of-state sales tax collection is almost always destination-based.</p>\n<p>States with generally origin-based tax rates are Arizona, Illinois, Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia. California is origin-based for city, county, and state taxes, but destination-based for district.</p>\n<p>This is all broadly speaking, there are complicated state-dependent rules. For example New Mexico is origin-based on some types of services.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>i.e., you purchase a $10.00 item (non-exempt) with $10.00 shipping from each of 5 online retailers</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Another factor is the <a href=\"https://www.avalara.com/blog/en/north-america/2022/02/how-to-handle-sales-tax-on-shipping-a-state-by-state-guide.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">taxability of shipping fees is complicated</a>. In some states, &quot;shipping and handling&quot; becomes taxable when the fee charged is different from the fee charged by the carrier, e.g. the store is charging for boxes and labor. In other states, it may depend on the taxability of the items being shipped.</p>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 91219, "body": "<p>You can determine the sales tax that you should be subject to by determining the applicable sales taxes of each taxing jurisdiction that you live in. There is a fair chance that the state's &quot;Department of Revenue&quot; or similar has that information consolidated. In Washington, you start <a href=\"https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=82\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">here</a> and note that Ch. 82.08 and 82.14 are the sales tax chapters. Fortunately for residents in Washington, there is <a href=\"https://webgis.dor.wa.gov/taxratelookup/SalesTax.aspx\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">a program</a> that computes tax based on address, which is actually accurate (AFAICT) unlike some unofficial websites.</p>\n<p>A vendor is only allowed to charge the correct tax. This imposes an unreasonable burden on online vendors, who have to accurately determine the tax facts of the individual customer. The burden is primarily shifted to the customer, who has to <a href=\"https://dor.wa.gov/file-pay-taxes/apply-tax-refund/apply-consumer-sales-tax-refund\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">apply for a tax refund</a>. For the most part, the vendor will give a refund when the appropriate paperwork is submitted, but if e.g. the vendor disappears or has no money, you instead apply to the Dept. of Revenue. There are penalties for willfully overcharging sales tax.</p>\n<p>Because vendors use different online resources for guessing what a customer's tax is, different taxes may be charged. One service may have better geo-location services: these are &quot;business&quot; details, not legal features.</p>\n", "score": 1 }, { "answer_id": 91217, "body": "<p>Responding to 3 and 4</p>\n<p>3.How to determine the tax rate from address</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>10 second google turned up <a href=\"https://www.taxjar.com/sales-tax-calculator\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">https://www.taxjar.com/sales-tax-calculator</a> which seemed to work well</p>\n</blockquote>\n<ol start=\"4\">\n<li>How can it be explained . . .</li>\n</ol>\n<blockquote>\n<p>People are used to paying different amounts when sales tax is involved.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "united-states", "tax-law" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91233, "body": "<p>The Crown Prosecution Service can always take over a private prosecution, regardless of whether consent was needed at an earlier stage. So they could always force it to proceed, or to stop (subject to whatever judicial control is in play for the stage of the proceedings). There are different ways of halting it depending on how far it has progressed and in which court, but the main point is that once the CPS has taken over, the original prosecutor is out of the picture.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Where criminal proceedings are instituted in circumstances in which the Director is not under a duty to take over their conduct, he may nevertheless do so at any stage.</p>\n<p>(<a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1985/23/section/6\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, s.6(2)</a>; &quot;the Director&quot; is the Director of Public Prosecutions, who heads the CPS)</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>But by <a href=\"https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/private-prosecutions\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">current policy</a>, the act of seeking the DPP's consent will mean that the CPS will either take over the prosecution and run with it, or else refuse consent so that it doesn't go forward anyway:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>If an offence requires the DPP's consent to prosecute, the private prosecutor must seek that consent. If the proposed prosecution passes the Full Code Test, the CPS will take over the prosecution. Conversely, if the proposed prosecution fails the Test, the DPP's consent to prosecute will not be given.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The &quot;Full Code Test&quot; is an assessment of whether there is enough evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction, and of whether prosecution would be in the public interest. This appears to be functionally the same policy for offences that need the DPP's consent (which can be delegated to other officials) or his personal consent (which can't).</p>\n<p>Some offences can only be prosecuted with the Attorney General's consent. The AG also has power to halt <em>any</em> prosecution, by entering a declaration of <em>nolle prosequi</em>, so could certainly terminate a prosecution to which she had previously consented. Additionally, I would expect that if someone sought the AG's consent for a private prosecution, she'd also refer it to the CPS to take over. If she didn't, but then wanted it to proceed after the original prosecutor had changed his mind, she could contact the CPS at that stage.</p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "united-kingdom", "criminal-law" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91201, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/canada\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-canada-tooltip-container\">canada</a></p>\n<p>The constitutional minimum <em>mens rea</em> for murder in Canada (no matter which avenue is pursued; there are three) requires the <strong>subjective foresight that death was likely to result</strong>. See <em><a href=\"https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/646/index.do\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">R. v. Martineau</a></em>, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633.</p>\n<p>This is factored in by constraining the permissible definitions that Parliament can give to &quot;murder.&quot; It also then factors in as a required element that the Crown must prove at trial. Without proving this element, there can be no conviction. It therefore also factors in at the charge-assessment stage, where charges will not be laid unless there is a reasonable prospect or substantial likelihood of conviction.</p>\n", "score": 1 }, { "answer_id": 91202, "body": "<p>There are different ways intent can be relevant to murder and related crimes. Different jurisdictions define them differently, but in general there are different degrees of culpability for</p>\n<ul>\n<li>an act intended to cause someone's death</li>\n<li>an act intended to harm someone that unintentionally causes death</li>\n<li>a criminal act intended to harm nobody (for example a burglary) that causes someone's death</li>\n<li>an act that wouldn't necessarily harm anyone but could reasonably be expected to create a risk of harm</li>\n<li>an act that is entirely unintentional that causes death</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Which of these applies to any given fact pattern will depend on the specific facts. Of the two examples in the question, it should be easy to see that the first is far more likely to result in greater culpability, but the second would nonetheless expose the friend to the possibility of a good deal of prison time.</p>\n<p>Related New York statutes are found in <a href=\"https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/PEN/P3THA125\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Article 125 of the New York Penal Law, Homicide and Related Offenses</a>.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "murder", "homicide" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91073, "body": "<h2>Japan's justice system is sometimes called <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hostage_justice\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">hostage justice</a></h2>\n<p>In general, the Japanese justice system has a more than 99% conviction rate! In part, this is because the number of state attorneys is super low - on about half the population of the US, there were only 2000 State attorneys out of 35000 lawyers in Japan, whereas the USA has a five-to-six digit number of state/district/... attorneys and 1.5 million lawyers in total. Or in other words: each state-employed attorney is responsible for more than 10 times the people and the caseload they create, and lawyers are prohibitively expensive.</p>\n<p>This leads to a <a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/a/82077/10334\">two-pronged result</a>: on the one hand, only the best cases should be followed up on and brought to court. Depending on the statistics, <strong>about every other case (~50%) that the police investigators hand to the prosecution is not followed up on by the prosecution</strong>. The other result is, that <strong>the Japanese justice system relies heavily on confessions</strong> obtained from the defendants.</p>\n<p>As I elaborated when comparing the <a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/a/84030/10334\">detention time without charges</a>, the Japanese justice system is unlike almost any other modern justice system in the world in some regards, even though it is a civil law system and most of the same principles can be found. The Japanese prosecution can detain people for up to 23 days without bringing the case, you can't have your lawyer present when talking to the police, and by clever tactic, the prosecution can hold a person nigh-indefinitely without even filing a case. As a result, the prosecution can often get confessions, and with a confession, the actual court case can become super fast: charges are brought, the confession is read, a little extra evidence is presented, and to <em>spare the victim a lengthy trial</em> with the confession in the room, the judge comes down with a guilty verdict.</p>\n<p>This is compounded by how the rules of evidence are laid out: investigation and the court case are allowed to happen at the same time! As a result, the case of the prosecutor tends to become <em>better</em> the longer the case drags on, resulting in the defendant either settling or giving a (partial) confession to some of the charges just to get it over because lawyers are crazy expensive. By giving a confession, they <em>throw themselves at the mercy of the court</em> for a mild verdict.</p>\n<h3>And it's very much stacked</h3>\n<p>As shown above, the Japanese justice system is already stacked against the defendant. But it is even more stacked than what is shown up there.\nAs <a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/users/9517/ohwilleke\">ohwilke</a> noted in excellent comments, I want to preserve them here:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Also the vast majority of Japanese criminal cases are tried without lay judges,</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>This is by the way a result of the Japanese legal system that was set up in the Meiji era being based on the Prussian branch of the <a href=\"/questions/tagged/german\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;german&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;german&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-german-tooltip-container\">german</a> Civil Law school. That was one of the dominant systems of the Meiji era next to the French and Spanish schools of Civil Legal Systems - and after WW2 they did not swap to a Common Law system but stayed with their own take on this Prusso-German branch of the Civil Legal System. This means there are no juries like in the common law system, and since 2009 <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lay_judges_in_Japan\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">lay judges in japan</a> are increasingly used, but not in every case. Those lay judges are very much akin to the Schöffen in Germany, being allowed to question the evidence and such - the German school is based on an inquisitorial system after all - but it is not used in every case. And the whole system is lived <em>extremely</em> differently from the inspiring Prussian system, such as this part of the comment shows:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>and from my experiences talking with several Japanese judges at length about the issue (back in the early 1990s, maybe it is different now), the institutional mindset is for judges to believe that all of the prosecution evidence is true and all of the defense evidence is lies unless the evidence to the contrary is overwhelming and unshakable. The level of judicial bias towards the prosecution is greater than in any other common law or civil law legal system, that is not in an authoritarian regime, in the world.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>This for example shows in the 23 days without charge. Technically, 23 days is not the initial time, but the police has 72 hours. But they can extend this time by 10 days with a judge's order, and then again by another 10 days on the same charge offered on the paperwork. According to a statistic, 99.8% of these requests are granted, meaning they are almost rubberstamped. Legally, people that are detained are not yet defendants, they are <em>suspects</em> and kept in <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daiy%C5%8D_kangoku\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>Substitute Prisons</em></a> which are located in police districts - which further helps to get confessions.</p>\n<p>And this plays directly into another factor that differentiates the Japanese system from other countries: There's a huge cultural factor, which is what makes the Japanese system so different from others.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Additional factors are that police officers in Japan have much more authority to handle minor cases outside the court system and routinely do so, that a certain level of criminal conduct from organized crime and by authority figures is tolerated, that there is much less crime per capita in Japan than most places, and that Confucian values re deference to hierarchy and the Japanese specific high cultural obligation to apologize influences how Japanese people interact with the criminal justice system as defendants and as implementers of that system.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>This has its problems too: Because the prosecution is notoriously overworked, citizens with problems are often more reluctant to bring cases to their attention. Further, the shame culture works against not just the perpetrators, but also the victims and the people that report certain crimes - for example, <a href=\"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dajKNczCPRs\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">a female police officer was groped on a train, and when she reported it, <strong>she</strong> became the target of shunning.</a></p>\n<h3>Further reading &amp; Research papers</h3>\n<ul>\n<li>US Department of Justice: <a href=\"https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/toward-balancing-approach-use-apology-japanese-society\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Toward a Balancing Approach: The Use of Apology in Japanese Society</a>.</li>\n<li>US Department of Justice: <a href=\"https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/confession-apology-repentance-and-settlement-out-court-japanese\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Confession, Apology, Repentance and Settlement Out-of-Court in the Japanese Criminal Justice System -- is Japan a Model of Restortative Justice? (From Restorative Justice in Context: International Practice and Directions, P 173-196, 2003, Elmar G. M. Weitekamp and Hans-Jurgen Kerner, eds. -- See NCJ</a>.</li>\n<li>Hiroshi Wagatsuma, Arthur Rosett: <a href=\"https://www.jstor.org/stable/3053463\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in Japan and the United States</a>, Law &amp; Society Review, Vol. 20, No. 4 (1986), pp. 461-498 (38 pages).</li>\n<li>John O. Haley: <a href=\"https://www.jstor.org/stable/3053464\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Comment: The Implications of Apology</a>, Law &amp; Society Review, Vol. 20, No. 4 (1986), pp. 499-508 (9 pages).</li>\n<li>DAVID ALLEN CHIYOMI SUMIDA: <a href=\"https://www.stripes.com/news/japanese-tradition-of-apology-western-worry-about-admitting-guilt-can-clash-1.309\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Japanese tradition of apology, Western worry about admitting guilt can clash</a>, (2002).</li>\n<li>HOSOI, YOKO AND HARUO NISHIMURA: <a href=\"https://restorativejustice.org/rj-archive/the-role-of-apology-in-the-japanese-criminal-justice-system/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">The Role of Apology in the Japanese Criminal Justice System</a> (1999).</li>\n<li>Ernils Larsson: <a href=\"http://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1646984/FULLTEXT01.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Confucianism as\na Religion in Japan’s Courts of Law</a> (2022).</li>\n<li>Joseph I. Lieberman: <a href=\"https://www.nytimes.com/1984/07/09/opinion/confucius-s-lesson-to-litigants.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">CONFUCIUS'S LESSON TO LITIGANTS</a> New York Times (1984).</li>\n<li>Lynn Berat: <a href=\"https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&amp;httpsredir=1&amp;article=1508&amp;context=auilr\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">The Role of Conciliation in the Japanese Legal\nSystem</a> American University International Law Review (1992).</li>\n<li>Nicholas Lassi: <a href=\"https://commons.und.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3264&amp;context=theses\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">A Confucian Theory Of Crime</a>, Dissertation, University of North Dakota (2018).</li>\n<li>Graham Mayeda: [Appreciate the Difference: The Role of\nDifferent Domestic Norms in Law\nand Development Reform;\nLessons from China and Japan] (2006).</li>\n<li>Katrina Tran: <a href=\"https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1051&amp;context=themis\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">How Japan How Japan’s Cultur s Cultural Norms Aff al Norms Affect Policing: A Side-By-Side olicing: A Side-By-Side\nComparison with the United States</a> Themis: Research Journal of Justice Studies and Forensic (2017).</li>\n<li>David Brooks: <a href=\"https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/15/opinion/the-shame-culture.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">The Shame Culture</a> New York Times (2016).</li>\n</ul>\n<h4>podcast</h4>\n<ul>\n<li>Dan Carlin: <a href=\"https://www.dancarlin.com/product/hardcore-history-62-supernova-in-the-east-i/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Hardcore History 62 – Supernova in the East I</a> (2018).</li>\n</ul>\n", "score": 33 }, { "answer_id": 91082, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/united-states\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-united-states-tooltip-container\">united-states</a></p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>What causes the conviction rate in North America . . . to be so high?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Relative to what? What would you expect the conviction rate to be?</p>\n<p>The conviction rate in the U.S. is not particularly high across the board, and is quite low in some U.S. states (59% in Florida), even though it is high in the federal courts (93%). As the cited link notes:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>In the United States federal court system, the conviction rate rose\nfrom approximately 75 percent to approximately 85% between 1972 and\n1992. For 2012, the US Department of Justice reported a 93% conviction rate. In 2000, the conviction rate was also high in\nU.S. state courts. Coughlan, writing in 2000, stated, &quot;In recent\nyears, the conviction rate has averaged approximately 84% in Texas,\n82% in California, 72% in New York, 67% in North Carolina, and 59% in\nFlorida.&quot;</p>\n<p>In 2018, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that among\ndefendants charged with a felony, 68% were convicted (59% of a felony\nand the remainder of a misdemeanor) with felony conviction rates\nhighest for defendants originally charged with motor vehicle theft\n(74%), driving-related offenses (73%), murder (70%), burglary (69%),\nand drug trafficking (67%); and lowest for defendants originally\ncharged with assault (45%).</p>\n<p>There are frequent &quot;guilty acceptance&quot; plea deals in the United\nStates. That said, the ostensible &quot;conviction rate&quot; may not be\naccurate because the charges are dropped.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Federal courts handle <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_court_(United_States)\" rel=\"noreferrer\">only a small share of U.S. criminal cases</a> and the kind of cases it handles are highly atypical:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>As of 2019, about 1,255,689 people currently behind bars in the United\nStates—or 87.7% out of a total of 1,430,805 prisoners—had been\nconvicted in state court for violating state criminal laws, rather\nthan in federal court for violating federal criminal laws.</p>\n<p>The proportion of criminal cases brought in state court rather than\nfederal court is higher than 87.7% because misdemeanor and petty\noffense prosecutions are disproportionately brought in state courts\nand most criminal prosecutions involve misdemeanors and petty\noffenses. The number of trials conducted in each system is another way\nto illustrate the relative size of the two criminal justice systems.\nIn Colorado, in 2002, there were approximately 40 criminal trials in\nfederal court, and there were 1,898 criminal trials (excluding\nhundreds of quasi-criminal trials in juvenile cases, municipal cases\nand infraction cases) in state courts, so only about 2% of criminal\ntrials took place in federal court. Most jury trials in the United\nStates (roughly five out of six jury trials conducted in any U.S.\nCourt) take place in criminal cases in state courts.</p>\n<p>State courts do not have jurisdiction over criminal cases arising on\nIndian reservations even if those reservations are located in their\nstate. Less serious crimes on Indian reservations are prosecuted in\ntribal courts. A large share of violent crimes that are prosecuted in\nfederal court arise on Indian reservations or federal property, where\nstate courts lack jurisdiction, since tribal court jurisdiction is\nusually limited to less serious offenses. Federal crimes on federal\nproperty in a state are often defined with reference to state criminal\nlaw.</p>\n<p>Federal courts disproportionately handle white-collar crimes,\nimmigration-related crimes and drug offenses (these crimes make up\nabout 70% of the federal docket, but just 19% of the state court\ncriminal docket). Federal courts have the power to bring death penalty\ncharges under federal law, even if they arise in states where there is\nno death penalty under state law, but the federal government rarely\nutilizes this right.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Conviction rates are high in federal court because due to the overlap of the state and federal court system, federal prosecutors can choose to prosecute predominantly open and shut cases. Also, high mandatory minimum penalties for many federal crimes make the benefit of a lower sentence outweigh the modest probability of acquittal in all but the closest cases.</p>\n<p>Conviction rates are frequently lower in state courts because they have to handle pretty much all criminal cases presented to them, the sentencing penalty for going to trial is often weaker causing fewer cases to be resolved by plea bargains, and the levels of resources and professionalism is lower in some (but not all) state courts relative to federal courts.</p>\n<p>In a world with no procedural biases and near perfect information, most cases would result in plea bargains at modest discounts from the sentence that would be imposed at trial reflecting the cost of the trial process to the prosecutors, and cases that go to trial would have close to a 50% conviction rate among cases that go to trial, but a very high guilty plea rate, because the cases that go to trial would be only those cases where the outcome is hardest to predict.</p>\n<p>We don't live in such a world, however. Indigent defendants are entitled to government paid public defenders at trial and on a direct appeal (and most criminal defendants are indigent). And, most criminal offense by number of cases (which is how conviction rates are calculated) have fairly modest maximum penalties, so the sentencing penalty for going to trial can be modest in a lot of low to medium level offense criminal prosecutions. And, as a practical matter, juries reach incorrect verdicts in cases close enough to go to trial at least about 10% of the time under normal state criminal court conditions, which is a nearly irreducible uncertainty involved in going to trial. So, even criminal defendants with a very high risk of being convicted will &quot;roll the dice&quot; and result in a more than 50% rate of conviction at trial (but a lower plea bargaining rate).</p>\n<p>Ultimately, conviction rates for plea bargains and trials combined are a function of how well prosecutors and law enforcement prepare and screen their cases. The higher their standards, the higher the conviction rate will be, because close cases won't be prosecuted at all. The lower their standards, the lower the conviction rate will be, because even very weak cases will go to trial and result in acquittals. Ultimately, how strict those standards are ends up being a matter of institutional culture and the quirks of how minor differences in resources and formal rules between different criminal justice systems play out in practice.</p>\n<p>In addition to institutional culture, the behavior of jurors in different places varies greatly.</p>\n<p>For example, African American jurors are, on average, according to well designed studies including <a href=\"https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1673994\" rel=\"noreferrer\">one from Florida</a>, more skeptical of prosecutors and law enforcement, and hence, more likely to acquit criminal defendants at trial than other jurors (on average). So, jurisdictions in which African Americans make up a larger share of the jury pool tend to have higher acquittal rates at trial than jurisdictions with low percentages of African American jurors.</p>\n<p>This is often a significant enough effect to significantly influence the overall conviction rate and jurisdictions with high percentages of African American jurors also often have fewer resources for prosecutors and law enforcement per crime prosecuted, which can reduce the quality of presentations that are made to juries in trials and the quality of criminal investigations, of all kinds, in those jurisdictions.</p>\n", "score": 16 }, { "answer_id": 91072, "body": "<p>In the case of the United States, Plea Bargaining is an accepted practice and is not stigmatized against, such that prosecutors are likely to cut deals with defendant and charge them for lesser charges than what they would have taken them to court for. This means less work (and less expense) to the prosecutor's office and a lesser sentence for the convicted (It's a high chance that most of the people convicted of simple drug possession in the U.S. were going to be charged with Possession with intent to Sell but had it reduced in exchange for avoiding going to trial. Simple Possession is a slap on the wrist compared to &quot;Possession with intent to Sell&quot; and is easier to convict (Do you have drugs on your person?) where as intent is much more difficult).</p>\n<p>In Japan, the high conviction rate seems to be due to the fact that unless the police witness the defendant committing a crime, they must get judicial approval to make an arrest, meaning, they have to be pretty close to indicting the person already.</p>\n", "score": 12 }, { "answer_id": 91071, "body": "<p>In <a href=\"/questions/tagged/british-columbia\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;british-columbia&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;british-columbia&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-british-columbia-tooltip-container\">british-columbia</a> prosecutors are directed to not bring a charge unless there is a <strong>substantial likelihood</strong> of conviction (or, in exceptional cases, a mere <strong>reasonable prospect</strong> of conviction), considering the anticipated evidence, its reliability, and viability of any defences or constitutional impediments. See <a href=\"https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/law-crime-and-justice/criminal-justice/prosecution-service/crown-counsel-policy-manual/cha-1.pdf\" rel=\"noreferrer\">the Crown Counsel Policy Manual's Charge Assessment Guideline</a>.</p>\n<p>This standard applies throughout the proceeding. If evidence comes to light that changes the assessment, such that there is no longer a substantial likelihood of conviction, the Crown should request a stay of proceedings.</p>\n", "score": 6 } ]

[ "united-states", "criminal-law", "japan" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91212, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/united-states\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-united-states-tooltip-container\">united-states</a></p>\n<p>This is a form of libel. Libel is not protected by the first amendment. The exact laws vary by state. Quoting <a href=\"https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/defamation\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/defamation</a> , libel law is typically as follows:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>To prove prima facie defamation, a plaintiff must show four things:</p>\n<ol>\n<li>a false statement purporting to be fact;</li>\n<li>publication or communication of that statement to a third person;</li>\n<li>fault amounting to at least negligence;</li>\n<li>damages, or some harm caused to the reputation of the person or entity who is the subject of the statement.</li>\n</ol>\n</blockquote>\n<p>#1 would be covered by the statement itself, assuming the publication lacked proper disclaimers.<br />\n#2 is trivially satisfied.<br />\n#3 is debatable; providing sufficient hinting that the article is parody would perhaps be enough to argue against negligence, depending on context.<br />\n#4 would require showing harm (e.g., increased support tickets, fewer Amazon orders, etc.).</p>\n<p>Unsurprisingly, the answer would depend heavily on context.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "tort", "damages", "media" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91208, "body": "<p>As a terminological matter, I assume that by &quot;public school&quot; you mean state-operated K-12 systems. As a part of the government, public schools cannot be sued unless the state has allowed a suit on such grounds. Issues such as negligence and violation of rights are not litigated under contract-law theories.</p>\n<p>Because the public school is required to accept and teach students, parents are required to send their children to school, and parents are not obligated to pay anything, the opportunities for a contract to exist are highly limited. I set aside popular fake contracts between student and teacher which simply recites the teacher's pedagogical vows and expectations, since these are not enforceable contracts with new obligations and consideration. IEP (<a href=\"https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/20/1414#d\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Individualized Education Program</a>) &quot;contracts&quot; may be advertised as being agreements, but they are mandated (of the school) by law.\nThe contract would be between the parent and the school because the student as a minor lacks capacity to form contracts. The parent cannot be &quot;forced&quot; into an enforceable contract since state law already mandates that the school must provide an education, and the parent never faces the &quot;sign or no schooling&quot; choice. Public schools can, of course, contract with a business, for example a pest-control service, or employment in general. The person whom they contract with can naturally be a parent of a child in the district, but the business contract is incidental to the person's being a parent.</p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "school-law" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91188, "body": "<p>The General Assembly can pass a resolution, and unlike Security Council resolutions, no nation has veto power. However, except in procedural matters where the resolution can bind the General Assembly, such resolutions are not binding on member states. They are considered to be &quot;recommendations&quot;. <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chapter_VII_of_the_United_Nations_Charter\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Chapter VII resolutions</a> i.e. Security Council resolutions are binding. Enforcement requires assent by the Security Council.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "international", "treaty" ]

[ { "answer_id": 59685, "body": "<p>The terminology is different, but there are analogous concepts that aren't about shares in publicly traded companies. Jurisdictions generally have laws designed to resolve / prevent &quot;conflict of interest&quot;. There is a <a href=\"https://apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=42.52&amp;full=true\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">big section of Washington law</a> that regulates ethics in public service. Therefore, the Chief of the Washington State Patrol cannot award a contract for new vehicles to himself, because &quot;No state officer or state employee may have an interest, financial or otherwise, direct or indirect, or engage in a business or transaction or professional activity, or incur an obligation of any nature, that is in conflict with the proper discharge of the state officer's or state employee's official duties&quot;. The Attorney General could not unload his real estate holdings in area X, knowing that his office was initiating a legal proceeding that would make such land worthless (using confidential knowledge), but once fact is made public, he can act on that knowledge.</p>\n<p>Your specific hypotheticals do not involve SEC regulations or public officials. You may sell all of your diamonds if you think the bottom will fall out on the diamond market, indeed people do this all the time (and are often wrong about the future). People often buy land because they have a reason to believe that it will become valuable (e.g. they heard a rumor about a business expanding into the area); many people invested in micro-computer companies because they got the idea (even from people who has specific technical knowledge) that microcomputers would become very popular. The closest you will get to an &quot;insider trading&quot; concept for stuff (not shares) is the local conflict of interest laws, which are about government officials acting on their knowledge and power as government officials.</p>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 59691, "body": "<p>&quot;Insider trading&quot; laws are far less stringent for land and property assets than for stocks, because the former are traded infrequently. The intent of those laws is to prevent people from &quot;day trading,&quot; based on rumors, because stocks are, in fact, traded every day.</p>\n<p>Even in securities law, the issue is one of &quot;fiduciary duty.&quot; The issue is not that &quot;insiders&quot; aren't allowed to trade. Instead, they are prevented from profiting from &quot;day to day&quot; (rather than long term) fluctuations in the price of the stock. For instance, company executives usually aren't allowed to trade shortly before before a company earnings announcement, but they are allowed to trade after the announcement, when the playing field is considered &quot;level.&quot; This duty extends not only to the executives themselves, but their spouses, children and friends, and business counterparties (even a printer), basically anyone they hope to see again.</p>\n<p>On the other hand, if you were sitting on a plane, train, bus, and you overheard &quot;random&quot; company executives talk about a takeover, and traded on that information at your own risk, you have no fiduciary duty to refrain. (I'm assuming that you don't know the executives and have no hopes to see them again.)</p>\n<p>If you are representing a train company building in Nowheresville, the COMPANY can buy all the land that it wants to, develop it, and profit from it, even selling off some of it for subdivisions. The fiduciary issues come it at the point where you are buying for yourself personally, as opposed to for the company. In that case, you might be hurting the interests of the company. Then you should formally obtain permission of the company, represented by its Board of Directors, before buying land for your own account. The company lawyer might put out a notification, or even formally ask permission from the other shareholders for you to buy land for yourself in this way.</p>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 91193, "body": "<p>The offense commonly called &quot;insider trading&quot; in the United States arises under federal securities laws. Real estate is not generally a security.</p>\n<p>The only time real estate would have something akin to the situation of insider trading, whether there would be a duty of disclosure that wouldn't implicate a simple first party fraudulent concealment or fraud law, would be when property is owned by a REIT, but even then would apply to REIT shares rather than the real estate itself, or in a sale of ownership interests in a single asset entity that owns only the real estate.</p>\n<p>Many states require a variety of disclosures about real estate when it is sold, however.</p>\n<p>For example, in Colorado, there is a duty to disclose a variety of defects on a standard real estate commission form, in addition to the common law requirement in a sale of a &quot;used&quot; piece of real estate (as opposed to a newly constructed residence) to disclose any latent defects not detectable by a reasonable physical inspection of the property that are known to the seller. In the sale of a newly constructed residence, there is a warranty implied in law that the property is free of defects which may not be disclaimed by mutual agreement.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "business", "property", "insider-trading", "investment" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91179, "body": "<h2>Yes, you can appeal</h2>\n<p>Deciding that an issue is moot is a matter of law. Issues of law are apealable.</p>\n<p>So, from your example, if the evidence showed that the tenant was still at the premises and, for whatever reason, the court misinterpreted or misunderstood that evidence, then there would clearly have been an appealable error of law in deciding that the issue was moot.</p>\n<p>However, if the evidence showed the tenant had left the premises and the court decided on that basis the case was moot they would have clearly been right and an appeal would fail.</p>\n", "score": 9 }, { "answer_id": 91187, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/canada\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-canada-tooltip-container\">canada</a></p>\n<p>Mootness is not a jurisdictional issue for superior courts in Canada. Instead, mootness is a discretionary doctrine reflecting a desire to preserve an adversarial context and a concern for judicial economy. Even if an matter is moot in that it fails to present a &quot;live controversy,&quot; a court may nonetheless decide the issue if the circumstances warrant. See generally <em>Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General)</em>, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342.</p>\n<p>Therefore, that a lower court addressed a moot issue is not a ground for appeal. In fact, if the issue was actually moot, it will continue to be moot on appeal, and that may be a reason for the court of appeal to decline to entertain any questions on the merits.</p>\n", "score": 6 }, { "answer_id": 91191, "body": "<p>Assuming that the determination that the judgment was moot is correct, you cannot appeal it. Under the circumstances explained, it would indeed be moot.</p>\n<p>The fact that the judgment became moot before appeals were exhausted, however, may prevent the judgment from having &quot;collateral estoppel&quot; effect, which is to say that the factual and legal determinations necessary to make that ruling may not be binding in any related case.</p>\n", "score": 5 } ]

[ "united-states", "civil-law", "new-jersey", "court-order" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91168, "body": "<p>Under your description, the embryo donor might have <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_nationality_law\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">French nationality</a>, since at least one of her parent was presumptively a French citizen, but since she was born in the US, it was also required that the birth was recorded in the French civil register, so one might have to litigate to get the donor's French citizenship recognized. There is a time limit under the French Civil code Art 30-3 (probably not applicable)</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>When a person habitually resides or has resided in a foreign country,\nin which the ancestors from whom he holds the nationality by parentage\nhave settled for more than half a century, that person may not prove\nthat he has the French nationality by parentage if he himself or his\nfather or mother who could have transmitted it to him has not enjoyed\nthe possession of being a French national. In that event, the court\nmust record the loss of the French nationality under Article 23-6</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>A complication is that <a href=\"https://reader.elsevier.com/reader/sd/pii/S2405661818300443?token=B0D954335E3AF062E3486F405FB6533C4E67F02B28E67D0B77B533F6580541676ABDC64B29F5C21874F8663D0889D08B&amp;originRegion=us-east-1&amp;originCreation=20230402154426\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">surrogacy is illegal</a> in France, and requests for the appropriate certification from the French government may be denied, as stated in the article &quot;In the majority\nof cases, children born abroad by surrogacy are denied\nFrench civil status, and there are delays in the issuing of\ncertificates of French nationality&quot;. This being a political matter, it could change. A further complication is that in the US there is significant variation between states in whether the donor is on the birth certificate at all.</p>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 91192, "body": "<p>No.</p>\n<p>In a legally recognized IVF arrangement, the donors of the genetic material do not have a parent-child relationship to the child born.</p>\n<p>Citizenship by means other than place of birth or naturalization requires a parent-child relationship to have been formed.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "immigration", "passport" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91176, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/colorado\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;colorado&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;colorado&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-colorado-tooltip-container\">colorado</a></p>\n<p>You have committed <a href=\"https://law.justia.com/codes/colorado/2022/title-18/article-4/part-4/section-18-4-409/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">aggravated motor vehicle theft in the second degree</a> in violation of CRS 18-4-409(4):</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>A person commits aggravated motor vehicle theft in the second degree if he or she knowingly obtains or exercises control over the motor vehicle of another without authorization or by threat or deception and if none of the aggravating factors in subsection (2) of this section are present.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>If the value of the vehicle was less than $2000, then this is a Class 1 misdemeanor and is <a href=\"https://leg.colorado.gov/publications/overview-colorados-sentencing-scheme\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">punishable</a> by 6 to 18 months imprisonment and/or a fine of $500 to $5000.</p>\n<p>Colorado's <a href=\"https://law.justia.com/codes/colorado/2022/title-18/article-4/part-4/section-18-4-401/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">general theft statute (CRS 18-4-401)</a> requires an additional element, that you intend to permanently deprive the rightful owner of the benefit of the property. So your slide example is not theft. However, they specifically excluded such a requirement from the motor vehicle theft statute.</p>\n<p>If you drove it on a public road, then you may have committed a few traffic violations as well:</p>\n<ul>\n<li><p>The vehicle's registration is presumably expired, so you violated <a href=\"https://law.justia.com/codes/colorado/2022/title-42/article-3/part-1/section-42-3-121/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">CRS 42-3-121(1)(a)</a>.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>If any of its required safety equipment is not working (all lights and signals, brakes, mirrors, horn, seat belts, etc, as well as a muffler) then you are in violation of <a href=\"https://law.justia.com/codes/colorado/2022/title-42/article-4/part-2/section-42-4-202/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">CRS 42-4-202(1)</a>.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>The vehicle is presumably not insured, so you violated <a href=\"https://law.justia.com/codes/colorado/2022/title-42/article-4/part-14/section-42-4-1409/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">42-4-1409(2)</a>. You might think your own auto insurance policy covers you when you drive another vehicle, but if it's like my policy, this clause only applies when you drive it &quot;with the express or implied permission of the owner, and within the scope of that permission&quot;.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>If the dump truck has a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) over 26,000 pounds, then it is a commercial motor vehicle under <a href=\"https://law.justia.com/codes/colorado/2022/title-42/article-2/part-4/section-42-2-402/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">CRS 42-2-402(4)(a)(I)</a>, and under <a href=\"https://law.justia.com/codes/colorado/2022/title-42/article-2/part-4/section-42-2-402/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">42-2-404(1)</a> you need a commercial driver's license to operate it, which you presumably don't have. (Note that GVWR is the maximum weight, <em>including load</em>, at which it is rated, whether or not it is currently loaded.)</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n", "score": 6 }, { "answer_id": 91178, "body": "<h2><a href=\"https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/html/inforce/current/act-1900-040#sec.117\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Larceny</a>, <a href=\"https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/html/inforce/current/act-1900-040#sec.154F\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Stealing motor vehicle, vessel, or trailer</a>, and/or <a href=\"https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/html/inforce/current/act-1900-040#sec.154A\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Taking a conveyance without the consent of the owner</a></h2>\n<p>The last is a specific subset of larceny, which removes the element of intent to permanently deprive the owner of it. The 2nd offence is an aggravated form of the first offence and carries twice the maximum penalty - 10 years instead of 5.</p>\n<p>Assuming the facts stated are known to the prosecutor, they would probably opt for the last offence as it's the easiest to prove. The elements are you:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>don't have the consent of the owner (check),</li>\n<li>took it (check),</li>\n<li>drove it (check).</li>\n</ul>\n", "score": 4 }, { "answer_id": 91180, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/canada\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-canada-tooltip-container\">canada</a></p>\n<p>Assuming the owner did not consent, the acts you describe would make out the offence of <em>theft</em> (<em>Criminal Code</em>, <a href=\"https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-46/page-46.html#h-121703\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">s. 322</a>) or <em>taking motor vehicle without consent</em> (joyriding) (<em>Criminal Code</em>, <a href=\"https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-46/page-47.html#h-121811\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">s. 335</a>), depending on the intent of the accused.</p>\n<h3>Theft</h3>\n<p>Theft has several forms, but the scenario you describe would be caught by the phrasing, &quot;Every one commits theft who fraudulently¹ and without colour of right... converts to his use... anything... with intent to deprive, temporarily or absolutely, the owner of it.&quot; The theft occurs when the taker moves the thing or causes it to move or be moved, or begins to cause it to become movable.</p>\n<h3>Taking motor vehicle (&quot;joyriding&quot;)</h3>\n<p>The <em>taking motor vehicle without consent</em> offence (colloquially, &quot;joyriding&quot;) is even broader, capturing conduct that was not necessarily done with the intent to <em>deprive</em>, because sometimes this aspect of theft is difficult to prove. For joyriding, it is enough that the accused had the intent to <em>drive</em> the vehicle, knowing (or being wilfully blind) that it was taken without the consent of the owner.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>... every one who, without the consent of the owner, takes a motor vehicle or vessel with intent to drive, use, navigate or operate it or cause it to be driven, used, navigated or operated, or is an occupant of a motor vehicle or vessel knowing that it was taken without the consent of the owner, is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<h3>The distinction</h3>\n<p>To clarify the distinction, the Supreme Court of Canada has said (<em>Lafrance v. R.</em> [1975] 2 S.C.R. 201):</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>the distinction between the two offences lies in the difference that characterizes the intent of the taker which, in the case of theft, is to convert, permanently or temporarily, the property of another in a motor vehicle—or in any other thing—to the use of the taker and which, in the case of the offence under s. 281 [now s. 335], is merely to drive a motor vehicle or cause it to be driven.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<h3>Using a slide isn't theft or joyriding</h3>\n<p>Using a slide would not be captured by the above offences.</p>\n<hr />\n<p>^{1. &quot;Fraudulently&quot; in this context means with knowledge that the thing taken is the property of another person or being wilfully blind to that fact.}</p>\n", "score": 3 }, { "answer_id": 91182, "body": "<p>As you omitted a jurisdiction some generic possibilities :</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><em>What crime would I be charged with?</em></p>\n</blockquote>\n<ul>\n<li><p>Theft - regardless of whether the vehicle is secured or not. E.g. If I don't lock my car that doesn't translate into giving other people permission to take it.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>Possibly driving an untaxed vehicle</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>Likely driving uninsured because I can't imagine an insurance policy that could cover you as they typically have all sorts of clauses that void this kind of thing. You typically need the owner's explicit consent to drive a vehicle as a minimum and someone had better have insurance covering someone other that the owner driving.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>Possibly driving unlicensed.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>Possibly driving an unsafe vehicle (do you know it's safe to drive when you drive it away ?).</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>Abandoning a vehicle. You parked it last.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>Possibly failing to report a crime (e.g. the vehicle could have been stolen in the first place).</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>Maybe illegal parking.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>Potentially interfering with evidence, as the vehicle could have been the location of a crime or a getaway vehicle. If it was previously stolen you've likely messed up evidence of the criminals (like finger prints).</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>Potentially going equipped to steal (screwdriver and whatever else you used to hot wire or gain entry).</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<p>There's practically no end to the list of potential offenses your generic scenario <em>might</em> be breaking. All you need to do is annoy a police officer or a prosecutor and they'll get very busy looking for things you've done wrong.</p>\n<p>You also, incidentally, opened yourself up to claims by the true owner that you took their vehicle without permission (civil claim) or damaged it (civil claim) or, again, any range of claims. Insurance companies could sue you.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>what is the difference to lets say someone installing a slide on public property and me using it?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Firstly the person installing had better have had permission to do that or they're potentially in trouble. A slide is problematic as it's a device that attracts children to use and, yes, there are typically a slew of regulations about what constitutes a safe slide for public use.</p>\n<p>As for you using the slide, I know of at least two public parks in my area where the slides are posted for use by children only. However breaking these rules would be breaking <em>by-laws</em> normally and not unlikely to become a felony issue unless you did something really daft like use it while under a court order not to.</p>\n<p>The difference between this and the dumper is that :</p>\n<ul>\n<li>You did not take possession of the slide, you did take possession of the dumper. Using the slide is not taking possession.</li>\n<li>There would be no licenses or tax required to use the slide, whereas the dumper will have multiple requirements.</li>\n<li>You do not need to have valid insurance to use a slide, but a vehicle does require valid insurance, usually tied into to ownership, permission and license.</li>\n<li>You did not use any tool to activate the device - a slide, whereas you used tools to start the vehicle. And again there's that &quot;going equipped to steal&quot; thing which does not apply to the slide because you did not take it and used no tools to access it.</li>\n</ul>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 91183, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/germany\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-germany-tooltip-container\">germany</a> and <a href=\"/questions/tagged/washington\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;washington&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;washington&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-washington-tooltip-container\">washington</a></p>\n<p>Since you just use the vehicle for a while, this is not theft in Germany, or Washington as a representative of US law. In Germany, this is <a href=\"https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#p2361\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">unlawful taking of a motor-vehicle or bicycle</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>(1) Whosoever uses a motor-vehicle or a bicycle against the will of\nthe person authorised to use it shall be liable to imprisonment not\nexceeding three years or a fine unless the act is subject to a more\nsevere penalty under other provisions.</p>\n<p>(2) The attempt shall be punishable</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>However if you permanently take it away, that is <a href=\"https://www.lewik.org/term/15761/theft-section-242-german-criminal-code/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">theft</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Whosoever takes chattels belonging to another away from another with\nthe intention of unlawfully appropriating them for himself or a third\nperson shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding five years or a\nfine.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>In <a href=\"https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=9A.56.075\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Washington</a></p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>A person is guilty of taking a motor vehicle without permission in the\nsecond degree if he or she, without the permission of the owner or\nperson entitled to possession, intentionally takes or drives away any\nautomobile or motor vehicle, whether propelled by steam, electricity,\nor internal combustion engine, that is the property of another, or he\nor she voluntarily rides in or upon the automobile or motor vehicle\nwith knowledge of the fact that the automobile or motor vehicle was\nunlawfully taken</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>which is a class C felony, but if you <a href=\"https://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=9A.56.065\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">actually steal it</a>, it is a more serious class B felony. (There is also &quot;joyriding with apparent intent to sell it, which for some reason is not subsumed under standard vehicle theft).\nIn Washington (and many US states), vehicle theft is distinct from ordinary theft. In the case of non-vehicles, there are three degrees of theft distinguished in terms of value of the object, the most severe penalty being class B felony for theft of stuff worth over $5,000. It is not a crime to use my shovel without my permission, unless you are in <a href=\"https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/harrison/latest/harrison_oh/0-0-0-11472\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Harrison OH</a>.</p>\n<p>The <a href=\"https://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=9A.56.020\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">definition of theft</a> is</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>(a) To wrongfully obtain or exert unauthorized control over the\nproperty or services of another or the value thereof, with intent to\ndeprive him or her of such property or services; or (b) By color or\naid of deception to obtain control over the property or services of\nanother or the value thereof, with intent to deprive him or her of\nsuch property or services; or (c) To appropriate lost or misdelivered\nproperty or services of another, or the value thereof, with intent to\ndeprive him or her of such property or services.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Your described use show no intent to deprive the owner of their property, not even fuel – it is just use.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "common-law", "trespassing" ]

[ { "answer_id": 17888, "body": "<p>The right to trial by jury in criminal cases by a unanimous jury of twelve under the 6th Amendment to the United States Constitution and some related rights are only <em>partially</em> incorporated to apply against states via the 14th Amendment due process clause. (The right to a jury trial in a civil case under the 7th Amendment to the United States Constitution does not apply to the states.)</p>\n<ul>\n<li><p>As noted, the federal right to a jury trial in a criminal case applies only when more than six months of imprisonment are a possible sentence pursuant to <em>Baldwin v. New York</em>. (Proceeding to trial without a jury on a more serious charge is allowed so long as the actual sentence does not exceed six months.) In practice, many states establish a right to a jury trial in many criminal cases where the U.S. Constitution does not require them.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>Juries are not required in juvenile delinquency proceedings. The 6th Amendment right to a criminal jury trial does not apply to military justice either, although there are constitutional limitations that do apply to military justice. There are no jury trials in the territorial courts of American Samoa which is beyond the scope of 6th Amendment protection.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>A unanimous jury of six or more jurors is allowed (at least in non-death penalty cases).</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>A state jury does not have to be unanimous (at least in non-death penalty cases). Ten of twelve is constitutionally sufficient for a twelve person jury; nine of twelve is not sufficient constitutionally. In practice, only one or two states permit non-unanimous jury verdicts. [Since this post was originally written, the precent implicitly referenced here was overturned and all criminal case juries must be unanimous. New York State, however, never allowed non-unanimous jury trials anyway.]</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>There is not a federal constitutional right to waive a jury trial, although this exists in some states by state constitution or other forms of state law.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>The right to have felony charges screened by a grand jury also does not apply to the states. About half of U.S. states require grand juries to screen felony charges, mostly in the eastern U.S.</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<p>I have the precedents in a criminal procedure text book and will update is I get a chance. See also the footnotes <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juries_in_the_United_States\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">here</a>.</p>\n<p>To some extent, the constitutional provision in NY State is designed to make clear that bench trials are allowed when a jury has been waived. It also authorizes bench trials where the U.S. Constitution and state law permits them.</p>\n", "score": 5 }, { "answer_id": 17887, "body": "<p>It appears that the Supreme Court has determined that the right to jury trial does not apply to \"petty offenses\", those punishable by less than six months' imprisonment. See <a href=\"http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/399/66.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>Baldwin v. New York</em></a> and citations therein.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "criminal-law", "constitutional-law", "new-york-state", "jury", "sixth-amendment" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91189, "body": "<h2>Oversize transports are known beforehand and have special permits.</h2>\n<p>The <a href=\"https://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/freight/sw/permit_report/index.htm\" rel=\"noreferrer\">department of transportation/Federal Highway Administration</a> provides information for oversize and overweight transports.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Permits</p>\n<p>The Federal government does not issue permits for oversize or overweight vehicles. This is a State option.</p>\n<p>Nondivisible Loads:</p>\n<p>Permits may be issued by the States without regard to the axle, gross, or Federal bridge formula requirements for nondivisible vehicles or loads. Nondivisible is defined as any load or vehicle exceeding applicable length or weight limits which, if separated into smaller loads or vehicles, would:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Compromise the intended use of the vehicle, i.e., make it unable to perform the function for which it was intended;</li>\n<li>Destroy the value of the load or vehicle, i.e., make it unusable for its intended purpose; or</li>\n<li>Require more than 8 work hours to dismantle using appropriate equipment. The applicant for a nondivisible load permit has the burden of proof as to the number of workhours required to dismantle the load.</li>\n</ul>\n</blockquote>\n<p>In this case, a super-long girder has its value from being a single item, so the state is allowed to make a special permit to exceed the normal regulations on weight and size. The regulations what is needed for a permit and what the permit allows is state specific.</p>\n<p>Typically, the permit is single-use and bound to a specific day and route. It's also not atypical for the crossings to be closed by police before the truck convoy arrives. Even without a police escort, the special permit allows them to block the road in specific circumstances, such as taking a tight turn.</p>\n", "score": 49 } ]

[ "united-states", "traffic" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91177, "body": "<h2>There are a number of preliminary steps in the <a href=\"https://www.legisquebec.gouv.qc.ca/en/document/cs/a-4.1\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">law</a> but ultimately the government will sell the land for whatever they can get</h2>\n<p>All the details are in Division V Penalties but the end of the line is s28. You will be given 6 months to sell, after that, the court will sell the land using what they deem the best method (auction, tender etc) for a commercially reasonable price (as detailed in Title III of the <a href=\"https://www.legisquebec.gouv.qc.ca/en/document/cs/C-25.01?&amp;target=\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Code of Civil Procedure</a>, deduct the costs and the fines for you breaking the law and give you whatever is left.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "canada", "quebec" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91150, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/canada\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-canada-tooltip-container\">canada</a></p>\n<p>In Canada, the Codes of Professional Conduct, established by the regulating bodies in each province, have a rule similar to:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>A lawyer must be courteous and civil and act in good faith with all persons with whom the lawyer has dealings in the course of his or her practice. (British Columbia)</p>\n</blockquote>\n<blockquote>\n<p>A lawyer shall be courteous, civil, and act in good faith with all persons with whom the lawyer has dealings in the course of their practice. (Ontario)</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The regulating bodies explain further (this wording from Ontario):</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>A lawyer <strong>shall agree</strong> to reasonable requests concerning trial dates, <strong>adjournments</strong>, the waiver of procedural formalities, and similar matters that do not prejudice the rights of the client.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Courts have held that it is not a breach of the standard of care to consent to an adjournment without seeking the consent of the client. Further, it will often be <em>against</em> the client's interests to oppose an adjournment sought by opposing counsel, especially given the costs of a hearing on an adjourment motion that could have been consented to. See e.g. <em>Chen v. Melville and Scott</em>, 2014 BCPC 380:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>I do not find that consenting to an adjournment without the consent of the client to be a breach of the standard care, given Mr. Melville's obligation under Rule 7 of the Code of Professional Conduct, and his explanation to Mr. Chen by e-mail dated December 3rd, 2013, that Mr. Chen had not told him of any facts as a basis to assert prejudice, which would be the principled reason to oppose a reasonable request for an adjournment.</p>\n<p>Leaving aside the commentary to Rule 7, and Mr. Melville's professional obligation to lawyers and others, Mr. Melville had been hired for his professional advice to Mr. Chen and to act in the best interests of Mr. Chen. Part of that duty would involve informing Mr. Chen about the risks of taking positions unlikely to be successful in court, such as opposing a request for an adjournment that Mr. Melville assessed as reasonable and likely to succeed. Opposing such a request and necessitating a court application would involve court time, court costs, costs to the client, and the result, in Mr. Melville's opinion, would be the same as if the request had been accommodated, but with extra time and money, including Mr. Chen's money, being spent.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 1 }, { "answer_id": 91151, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>does he need to consult with his client</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>By default, no.</p>\n<p>Lawyers are vested with reasonable latitude in figuring out on their own what is in the best interest of their clients.</p>\n<p>Not consenting (i.e. opposing) an adjournment comes at a cost, and the lawyer evaluates 1) whether the adjournment hurts the interests of his client in the first place; 2) if it does, whether any effort to fight it would be justified. If the answer to either of those questions is a definite &quot;no&quot;, the lawyer would consent without talking to his client. If in doubt, he will talk.</p>\n<p>However, a client is free to define their own terms of engagement with their would-be lawyer (yes, it goes both ways). So, a term could say &quot;you shall check with me prior to making any decisions re adjournments&quot;. If the lawyer accepts this term, then yes he will need to follow it.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "united-states", "new-york-state", "professional-ethics", "malpractice", "attorney-client-relationship" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91161, "body": "<p>Law enforcement does not need to secure signed testimony for their bases of action.</p>\n<p>Even anonymous tips can give an law enforcement officer “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” <em>Navarette v. California</em>, <a href=\"https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/572/393/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">572 U.S. 393</a> (2014).</p>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 91169, "body": "<h2>Q1</h2>\n<p>No. There was <strong>reasonable suspicion</strong> because the police do not need to verify the claim of a crime <strong>before</strong> they act on it. They got the report, thought the witness was at least credible, and thus secured a warrant to search the person. As such, the search of the person would have been following <a href=\"https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/392/1/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>Terry v Ohio</em></a>, and even Stop-Search would be allowed.</p>\n<p>During the search, new evidence came up that rose reasonable suspicion for a <em>different</em> crime, which warranted arrest. As a result, <a href=\"https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/572/393/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>Navarette v. California</em></a> can be applied besides <em>Terry</em>, as there was a reasonable interest in searching him and they found evidence of a different possible crime.</p>\n<p>Only during the following investigation, it turned out that there was malicious act by <strong>someone that is not the police</strong> that rose the suspicion for the stop. But that does not invalidate that <strong>the witness did appear credible in the first moment</strong> thus the stop was conducted properly, and the evidence found is admissable.</p>\n<h2>Q2</h2>\n<p>No. It doesn't take a signed witness statement for the police to act. They assess credibility based on the story told. As an example, calling Police and telling them &quot;My neighbor is butchering a green martian in his cellar&quot; would get you laughed at. But the following story is much more believable:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>&quot;My neighbor Caine invited Abel last night. An hour later I heard a fight and then saw him strike down his brother in the backyard, after which he dragged him down the flight of stairs to the cellar. Today I saw Caine dig up a large hole in the backyard. I believe he has killed him and is trying to bury the evidence under the roses.&quot;</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Only <strong>after</strong> investigating the story the whole thing comes up as obviously made-up stuff. The problem with your argument is, that you take the <strong>result</strong> and plug it into the beginning of the equitation to verify the result. However, that is not how it works.</p>\n<p>Police only needs a reasonable suspicion based on anything that is known <strong>before</strong> the search, then anything found during the search is admissable. If that results in the police realizing they were mistaken, the search still was reasonable <strong>in the moment it was conducted</strong>.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "constitutional-law", "evidence", "rules-of-evidence", "utah", "admissibility" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91167, "body": "<h2>Illegal is violating the law</h2>\n<p>Because there is a law against something, it is illegal. For example, Murder is illegal because a law prohibits killing someone for any reason but self-defense.</p>\n<h2>Unconstitutional is a law that contradicts the constitution</h2>\n<p>This is more easily shown with an example:</p>\n<p>Let's assume that the constitution of Borovia contains a provision that enshrines equality of humans:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Article 1: Every human is to be treated the same way by any law. Gender, Sex, the color of skin, hair, eyes, and choice of faith shall not be allowed to treat any group differently from another.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Also, Our country's criminal code contains a right to a lawyer:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Criminal Code Sect. 1234: All Humans have the right to an attorney when accused. Its costs are to be paid by the state.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Now, the lawmaker invents the following addition to that law:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Criminal Code Sect. 1234-A: Humans with blue skin, yellow, and black hair are excluded from CC §1234.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>This law clearly contradicts with Article 1 of Borovia's constitution, as it excludes one group of human, even if this group does not seem to exist naturally. This law is thus unconstitutional.</p>\n<h2>All unconstitutional laws are illegal laws</h2>\n<p>Because an unconstitutional law violates a <em>higher</em> law than itself (the constitution <strong>is</strong> a law after all), it is also illegal.</p>\n<h2>Not all illegal laws are unconstitutional</h2>\n<p>As laws come in different <em>ranks</em>, a law can be illegal and not violate the constitution at the same time. This happens especially with very low ranked laws such as a city ordinance.</p>\n<p>Let's assume Borovia's code of roads and street traffic contains this:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>§12 On all streets a double-yellow line shall mark areas of non-parking. No other areas shall be deemed off-limit for parking, and no other signage is allowed.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>And the town of Boron enacts this city ordinance:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Ord. 123456: On Main Sreet, no car shall be parked. Signs shall be placed on the side of the road to preserve the historic cobblestone.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The street and traffic code forbids alternate markings, but the city ordinance demands a different marking. That makes it an illegal law, but it does not violate the constitution, so the ordinance is not unconstitutional.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "legal-terms" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91164, "body": "<h2>No, it isn’t true</h2>\n<p>To avoid the confusion that comes from whether traffic drives on the left or the right, I will refer to the outside lane (nearest the kerb) and the inside lane (nearest the middle).</p>\n<p>Across the world there are 2 ways of ending a passing lane - either one lane ends and is crossed by a broken line, or the dividing line simply ends. The illustration shows the former.</p>\n<p>When one land ends, it is <em>invariably</em> the outside lane for two very practical reasons:</p>\n<ol>\n<li>The outside lane is the slow lane and it makes sense that the slower moving traffic is the one to give way.</li>\n<li>If something goes wrong, if the outside lane ends, the traffic in that lane will end up on the verge - on a highway, this is usually wide enough that it won’t result in a collision. If the inside lane ends, the traffic in that lane will end up in the oncoming traffic.</li>\n</ol>\n<p>In jurisdictions where the line simply ends, the rule is that the vehicle behind gives way to the vehicle in front.</p>\n<p>In all jurisdictions, these rules are always subordinate to the primary rule of the road: don’t collide with anything.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "canada", "traffic", "alberta" ]

[ { "answer_id": 88369, "body": "<h2>Because it's a <a href=\"https://youtu.be/jl0hMfqNQ-g\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">guideline, not a rule</a></h2>\n<p>It falls within the scope of prosecutorial (and judicial) discretion rather than being a law with force of its own. For shoplifting, a police officer is far more likely to issue a warning than make an arrest - that's de minimis at work.</p>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 88427, "body": "<h1>The punishment should also fit the crime.</h1>\n<p>It costs real money to prosecute. It also cost more money to prosecute than to defend. Also, depending on the location DA offices (or the UK equivalent) may be understaffed and overworked.</p>\n<p>The unsavory reality is not every case can be prosecuted or should be. No justice system is perfect.</p>\n", "score": 1 }, { "answer_id": 91162, "body": "<p>An assessment of <em>de minimis</em> is likely to account not just for a particular instance of a crime, but for that kind of crime in general.</p>\n<p>In other words, small crimes which are nevertheless extremely frequent, characterised by repeat offences or widespread flouting, may not be considered <em>de minimis</em>.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "criminal-law", "england-and-wales", "any-jurisdiction" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91157, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>Can people A and B sign a contract</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>It occurs to me that you are actually asking whether the signed contract will be <strong>enforceable</strong>. As for <em>signing</em>, people can sign whatever — a wall, a piece of toilet paper, an ass etc.</p>\n<p>It will surely be enforceable in countries M and N. Where it was signed — in O, in outer space or on Mars — does not matter.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>not allowed to sign according to the local laws of the country O</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>It will then not be enforceable in O. Moreover, depending on those local laws and what the contract is, A and B might go to jail by revealing they have signed such a contract. The New York Convention won't help then.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "contract-law" ]

[ { "answer_id": 54952, "body": "<p><strong>Yes, states could allow aliens to vote for President.</strong> As ohwilleke says, <em>the Constitution gives the states control over who can vote.</em> In fact, <strong>for much of our history, many states allowed aliens to vote.</strong> To the extent that <a href=\"https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/611\" rel=\"noreferrer\">18 U.S.C. § 611</a>, which forbids aliens from voting for President, contradicts that power, it is unconstitutional.</p>\n<p>If 18 U.S.C. § 611 is so obviously unconstitutional, why is it still on the books? Mostly because <strong>18 U.S.C. § 611 is purely symbolic.</strong> <em>It literally has had no effect on who can vote in the US.</em> As noted above, throughout the 19th and early 20th century, <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right_of_foreigners_to_vote_in_the_United_States#Historical_data\" rel=\"noreferrer\">many states</a> allowed aliens to vote. But with the turn against immigration in the early 20th century, states that had allowed aliens to vote explicitly revoked that privilege. The last state to prohibit aliens from voting was Arkansas, in 1926. Thus, for almost a century, every state has prohibited aliens from voting in state elections, so no voter was affected by the passage of 18 U.S.C. § 611. (For a survey of the history of alien suffrage, see <a href=\"https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3652&amp;context=penn_law_review#page=7\" rel=\"noreferrer\">here</a>.)</p>\n<p><strong>Voting is a state matter:</strong></p>\n<p>It is widely agreed that the <a href=\"https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articlei#section2\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Qualifications Clause</a>, Art I, § 2.1 of the Constitution gives states control over who votes in federal elections, (subject, of course, to other constitutional requirements, such the 15th, 19th and 26th Amendments). The clause says</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>In other words, anyone who is qualified to vote for the largest branch of the state legislature is qualified to vote for President. (The original text only talked about elections to the House because Senators were chosen by state legislatures, not voters. When this was changed by 17th Amendment, that Amendment repeated this qualification for voters.)(For more extended, but reader friendly, discussion of these issues see <a href=\"https://law.loyno.edu/sites/law.loyno.edu/files/file_attach/Mortellaro-PEs-2.14.18.pdf#page-25\" rel=\"noreferrer\">here</a>.</p>\n<p>People sometimes point to the &quot;Elections Clause,&quot; <a href=\"https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articlei\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Art. I, § 4.1</a>, as giving Congress power over voter qualifications. That clause gives Congress the power to regulate the &quot;Times, Places and Manners of holding elections.&quot; They read, &quot;Manners of holding elections” to include the qualifications for voting.</p>\n<p><strong>This reading of the Elections Clause is inconsistent with several of the sources of constitutional authority Americans typically consult,</strong> including the text, the intent of the Founder and precedent. All of these support the “Qualifications Clause” reading of the Constitution.</p>\n<p><strong>1) Constitutional Text</strong>: Reading the Elections Clause as giving Congress control over voter qualifications, renders the Qualifications Clause almost completely meaningless. Yet everyone agrees the Constitution should be read so that all its parts mean something – no part should be rendered superfluous.</p>\n<p><strong>2) Intent of the Founders</strong>: When the Founders debated voting qualifications, they were clearly worried that politicians would manipulate the electoral rules to favor them. The Founders believed the Qualifications Clause kept both national and state politicians from stacking the electoral deck. First, by giving the power of deciding who could vote to the states, the Clause prevented national politicians from choosing their own electorate. Secondly, by requiring the states to use the same qualifications for voters in state and national elections, the Clause prevented state politicians from manipulating the rules in national elections.</p>\n<p>As for the Electoral Clause, in <a href=\"https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed60.asp\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Federalist 60</a>, Hamilton was clear who controlled voter qualifications: “The qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen…are unalterable by the [federal] legislature…”</p>\n<p><strong>3) Precedent and practice</strong>: For most of our history, people acted consistently with Hamilton’s statement. They tolerated a wide variation in who was allowed to vote across states. As noted above, many of those states specifically allowed aliens to vote. (And, starting in 1787 with the passage of the Northwest Ordinance, Congress passed a series of laws allowing aliens to vote in territories.) When Americans did make nationwide changes to voting qualifications, they did so by amending the Constitution, as when they prohibited discrimination in voting by race, sex or age.</p>\n<p>There are only a handful of Supreme Court decisions involving federal control over voting qualifications. In 1970, in <em><a href=\"https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/400/112\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Oregon v. Mitchell,</a></em> the Supreme Court upheld a federal law changing the voting age to 18. The opinion of the Court, written by Justice Black, relied on the Elections Clause to say that Congress had the power to change voting requirements. None of the other Justices shared Black's views on the Elections Clause. Instead, they agreed with Justice Harlan, who said, “nothing” in the Constitution, “lends itself to the view that voting qualifications in federal elections are to be set by Congress.” (These Justices used the Equal Protection Clause as the basis for federal control over voter qualifications.)</p>\n<p>Since then, no Justice has followed Justice Black. Instead, they have followed Justice Harlan. For example, in 2013, in <a href=\"https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/12-71_7l48.pdf\" rel=\"noreferrer\"><em>Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council</em></a> Justice Scalia, (in an opinion joined by Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, Kennedy, Roberts, and Sotomayor) said,</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>“the Elections Clause empowers Congress to regulate how federal elections are held, but not <em>who</em> may vote in them.”</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>From this evidence, I’d say you were right to be puzzled about the constitutional authority for the IIRIRA. A federal law preventing aliens from voting in federal elections undermines the text of the constitution by rendering the Qualifications Clause superfluous, goes against the clear intent of the Founders, and is inconsistent with 200+ years of history and precedent. It only survives because it has no practical effect on voting in the US. Since this situation seems unlikely to change soon, it seems likely the statute will remain on the books to confuse Americans for the foreseeable future.</p>\n<p><strong>Edited to add:</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Could states count alien votes under the IIRIRA?</strong></p>\n<p>No: Under the IIRIRA, <em>there can't be any alien votes to count!</em> <a href=\"https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/611\" rel=\"noreferrer\">§ 611(a)(3)</a> of the IIRIRA says aliens can only vote in an election if they do <em>not</em> have &quot;an opportunity to vote for a candidate for any one or more of such Federal offices.&quot;</p>\n<p>You ask whether &quot;non-vote&quot; methods of measuring alien's opinions, such as surveys, are legal under the IIRIRA. These clearly violate the <em>purpose</em> of the IIRIRA, which is to prevent aliens' opinions from influencing the outcome of federal elections. But it's not clear they violate the IIRIRA <em>as written.</em> They only violate the IIRIRA if you are willing to apply the &quot;<a href=\"https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/143/457\" rel=\"noreferrer\">familiar rule</a>&quot; that</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>But in real life, these questions are irrelevant. As a practical matter, they would never come up. If a state really wanted to allow aliens to vote, it would challenge the constitutionality of the IIRIRA. That no state has done this means no state politicians want to be seen advocating for alien voting. The IIRIRA is like the proverbial law &quot;requiring you to breathe:&quot; You follow it, not b/c it's the law, but because that's what you were going to do anyway.</p>\n", "score": 37 }, { "answer_id": 54948, "body": "<p>Maybe.</p>\n<p>The right to vote in a federal election is a matter of state law, subject to constitutional restrictions on who cannot be denied the right to vote, and federal statutes.</p>\n<p>No provision of the U.S. Constitution prohibits a U.S. state from allowing a non-citizen to vote.</p>\n<p>I think that the &quot;Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996&quot; provision that you cite could be legitimately interpreted either way by a court. Federal immigration laws have broad pre-emptive power with respect to state law related to immigration, although it isn't total. The interpretation you propose is plausible, but so is the interpretation that the implied intent of the law was to prohibit non-citizens from voting and that a state law to the contrary is pre-empted by this clear statement of federal law immigration policy on the subject.</p>\n<p>The <a href=\"https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/19-465_i425.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">recent SCOTUS ruling on the ability of states to criminally sanction electors for being unfaithful</a>, favors, by analogy, the conclusions that a criminal vote by a non-citizen could not be validly counted.</p>\n<p>I would also disagree with the Vox interpretation of a statement in <em>Bush v. Gore</em> regarding state appointment of electors, which was not before the Court and, as a result, is dicta and not a binding precedent. I think that a state legislature would be prohibited from doing so under other federal laws and federal constitutional provisions governing the franchise, if that issue were actually litigated.</p>\n", "score": 10 } ]

[ "united-states", "us-constitution", "voting", "elections" ]

[ { "answer_id": 53762, "body": "<p>This is a valid question that comes up from time to time. The answer can be a bit fuzzy and the law on questions 1 and 2 is often not well spelled out. This answer refers only to U.S. legal history without much customization for Maryland in particular, so I may omit references to some relevant Maryland specific statutes or cases of which I am not aware.</p>\n<p>Often there is no statutory guidance or there is only inconclusive or vague statutory guidance. There is often also little appellate case law precedent to provide guidance.</p>\n<p>The issue comes up far more often than it is litigated, in part, because these issues tend to become moot before they can be resolved by a precedent creating appellate court, and because statutes addressing the issue tend to be recent and not yet litigated, or non-existent. These issues are often highly time sensitive and don't have an economic prize to spend money litigating over are often not litigate to the maximum extent. Court rulings when cases are presented to them often depend a lot on the procedural context of the way the issue comes up, how the issue is framed by the litigants, and upon the court's gut feelings and upon unwritten social norms.</p>\n<p>For example, one recent case involving the ability of a priest to visit a man who was sick with COVID-19 in a Maryland hospital notwithstanding hospital visitation policies was resolved in the context of <a href=\"https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/07/21/ocr-resolves-religious-discrimination-complaint-maryland-hospital-system-ensures-patients-receive-religious-visitations-during-covid-19.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">a complaint to the Maryland Office of Civil Rights</a> and would not be generally applicable to an intrafamily dispute as opposed to an allegation of religion based discrimination.</p>\n<p>The hospital's opinion is often given outsized weight, since it is a &quot;neutral&quot; party in a family dispute, has a vested interesting in having litigation resolved that is more economic than that of the family members, and is likely to have counsel that is most familiar with the issues presented. this is true even though often, a hospital has a religious affiliation or is for some other reason specific to the facts of a case is not truly a &quot;neutral&quot; party in a visitation dispute and takes a position for a non-medical reason.</p>\n<p>As a young lawyer at a law firm that represented a hospital, I handled cases like these for a hospital when they came up for a couple of years, because nobody more experienced wanted to deal with these emotionally draining and time consuming conflicts with few monetary rewards for the hospital, and because the stakes from the hospital's perspective were low, so junior associate attorneys could be trusted with this cases.</p>\n<p>Appellate courts also often frame these decisions as fact bound case by case questions decided under general considerations applicable to all forms of injunctive relief in civil cases, rather than questions presenting more general questions of law to which general policy rules apply.</p>\n<p>Furthermore, the conceptual foundation in which we think about the authority of different family members over an incapacitated person at common law has shifted materially since the 19th century when these issues started to arise, and mostly hasn't been formally discussed by the courts as applied to these particular situations in the meantime.</p>\n<p>So, even when there are old precedents governing these situations, there is doubt regarding whether they are still good law, because the old precedents are based upon assumptions about spousal and parental and family member rights that no longer hold in other areas of the law.</p>\n<p><em>See also</em> <a href=\"https://dredf.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Disability-Org-Guidance-on-COVID-19-Hospital-Visitation-Policies.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">an analysis of issues of visitation and medical decision making for disabled persons</a>, primarily under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act and related regulations, with footnotes particular to Maryland's state laws on the subject.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<ol>\n<li><p>Can E block B, C and D from visiting A in the hospital?</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>What legal authorization form(s) can person A fill out and provide to B, C and D to prevent that from happening if this is a serious\nconcern?</p>\n</li>\n</ol>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The right of a private individual to visit someone in a hospital is usually not codified into law and is usually a matter of hospital policy within reason, acting in the best interests of its patients from a medical perspective.</p>\n<p>Usually E could only block B, C and D from visiting A in the hospital (1) with the cooperation of the hospital based upon its own policies (since as a practical matter, the hospital is generally in control of the situation and has broad authority to restrict access to its patients for health reasons), or (2) with a restraining order or protective order obtained from a court, or (3) as a legal guardian appointed by a court of person A (who generally has the authority to decide who their ward can interact with).</p>\n<p>In old common law cases (usually mid-19th century or earlier, but sometime in the early 20th century), the spouse of a married person (sometimes only the husband of a wife, but not vice versa), or the parents of an unmarried minor or unmarried person more generally, had the rights of a legal guardian with respect to an incapacitated person, and a family member had authority to make decisions for an incapacitated person as next of kin, in the absence of a parent or spouse.</p>\n<p>But, for the most part, this is no longer legally enforceable law.</p>\n<p>The Married Women's Property Acts of the late 19th century and early 20th century generally eliminated the authority of a spouse to act as legal guardian of an incapacitated spouse without a court order, sometimes subject to cases of &quot;necessities&quot;, and control of personal family property like a marital residence, household goods, or vehicle titled in a spouse's name alone that the competent spouse used in the ordinary course prior to the incapacity.</p>\n<p>The authority of a parent or next of kin person to take action for an incapacitated person without a court order was largely abrogated by state probate codes establishing court procedures for guardianship and conservatorship appointments for incapacitated people giving spouses, parents and next of kin priority, but not authority in the absence of a court order, except in the case of minor, unmarried, unemancipated minor children. And, even then, it is rare for statutes for expressly grant parents that authority over the children by statute and the authority is merely assumed as background common law to other statutes limiting that authority in cases of child abuse or child neglect, and some kinds of decisions still need court approval even in the case of parents of unemancipated, unmarried minor children.</p>\n<p>Documents specifically authorizing visitation are rare (I've never seen one in real life outside a civil union of a same sex couple), although states with &quot;civil union&quot; laws enacted before same sex marriage was legalized, often expressly afford a civil union partner visitation rates with priority over other family in hospitals, despite the fact that the status quo law is often ill defined. Hospital policies that denied visitation to <em>de facto</em> civil union partners were an important driving force in causing civil union legislation to be adopted with the support of legislators who didn't have a strong feeling about gay rights as an overall matter and who were otherwise indifferent to the economic rights of civil union matters but adopted the rights of married couples because it was the mindless default way to adopt a body of pre-existing law with little serious thought or fact rich informed deliberation.</p>\n<p>This is, in part, because visitation is not a matter over which a patient at a hospital has unilateral decision making power. Hospitals generally have their own policies regarding visits to patients. <em>See, e.g.,</em>, discussing <a href=\"https://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2020/03/10/baltimore-hospitals-visitor-policy-changes-coronavirus/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">the University of Maryland's hospital visitation policy</a>.</p>\n<p>Usually, a hospital will honor a patient's reasonable request to not allow someone to visit them (out of general respect for patient autonomy). But, a hospital will often decline to allow a patient to have visitors out of concern for the best interests of the health of the patient even when a patient would like to have a visitor (e.g. a hospital would often refuse to allow someone with a recent positive COVID-19 test to enter an Intensive Care Unit (ICU) even if the patient would like to visit that person).</p>\n<p>Even here, however, the conceptual foundation behind traditional hospital practices related to visitation have shifted. The modern view is to more strongly respect the personal autonomy interests of a hospital patient than hospitals did in the past (the trend started to shift more strongly to a patient autonomy mindset in the late 1950s and gradually shifted toward greater patient autonomy in that time frame, particularly, following the deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill).</p>\n<p>Hospitals are loathe to create a situation where their express statutory, contractual, and/or common law authority to regulate visitation could be overridden by a patient, and laws related to hospital visitation are rarely adopted by a legislature over the objection of the hospital lobby.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<ol start=\"3\">\n<li>What legal authorization form(s) can person A fill out and provide to B and C so that they get precedence in medical decision-making\nauthority over E?</li>\n</ol>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Many hospitals would give E priority over B and C and D in making medical decisions for A, if A is incapacitated and there are no court orders or legal documents that provide otherwise, as a matter of policy. And, these policies are often traceable to the mindset associated with the old common law rules that no legal have binding legal effect.</p>\n<p>But some states have a scheme in which the hospital makes unilateral decisions in the best interests of the patient as they see it, unless B, C, D and E (and possibly other people designated by mutual agreement) jointly agree on who should make those decisions. <em>See, e.g.</em>, Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-18.5-103 (Proxy decision-makers for medical treatment authorized--definitions). On paper, Colorado is such a state, although in practice, a hospital would offer listen to a spouse over other family anyway.</p>\n<p>I don't know if Maryland is such a state. I could not easily locate any statute in Maryland governing medical decision-making authority for an incompetent patient in the absence of a health care power of attorney or the equivalent or a guardianship proceeding, although my search was not exhaustive.</p>\n<p>A document commonly known either as a medical power of attorney, or a health care power of attorney, or a health care proxy designation made by a competent person who does not have a legal guardian appointed for them at the time, can designate someone such as B and C to have priority over E in making medical decisions for them. This document would be controlling absent a court order to the contrary, and usually a court would give authority to the person named in that document (although a court is almost never required to do so without regard to the suitability of the person seeking court ordered decision making power).</p>\n", "score": 4 } ]

[ "maryland", "proxy", "medical" ]

[ { "answer_id": 16293, "body": "<p><strong>Assumptions</strong></p>\n<p>While more specifics would be helpful, I think that I understand what you are asking and can give you at least a partial reply.</p>\n<p>You have an LLC that is engaged in two lines of business. For clarity of exposition I will call those lines of business: Widget selling (the original line of business), and the &quot;new service&quot; that the LLC intends to get in the business of selling under a different trade name.</p>\n<p>It appears that since you call it &quot;my LLC&quot; that the LLC is currently a single member LLC owned by you which is disregarded for income tax purposes and treated as a sole proprietorship whose income from Widget selling you report on Schedule C or C-EZ to your personal form 1040.</p>\n<p>I assume that this is a limited liability company in the United States since this is the only jurisdiction that I am aware of where the name LLC is commonly used for a form of business entity.</p>\n<p><strong>General Legal Background Regarding LLCs</strong></p>\n<p>A limited liability company in the United States is governed for tax purposes by check the box regulations.</p>\n<p>The default rule for an LLC formed under U.S. law is that a single member LLC is disregarded for tax purposes (and is treated as a sole proprietorship reporting income on the owner's Schedule C or C-EZ to form 1040 when the owner is a natural person) and that multi-member LLCs are taxed under Subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code as partnerships (which file a form 1065 each issue and issue a form K-1 to each partner in connection with doing so which the partner reports on their form 1040 were indicated by the form K-1).</p>\n<p>An LLC can also elect by &quot;checking a box&quot; to be taxed instead as a C corporation, but if you are going to do that, outside rare instances where state law prohibits businesses from being organized as corporations (e.g. farms in certain Great Plains states) or there is already an established identity as an LLC and you just want to change the tax treatment without informing the public of that fact, it is usually easier to form a corporation rather than an LLC in the first place, rather than checking the box.</p>\n<p>In a limited liability company in the United States, equity owners are called &quot;members&quot; rather than partners or shareholders. Anyone who is an owner of the business or a part of the business, is a <strong>member of the LLC for state law purposes</strong>, by definition, and is a <strong>partner in the company for federal income tax purposes</strong>.</p>\n<p><strong>Special Allocations in LLCs</strong></p>\n<p>An LLC with multiple members, unlike an S corporation (which is required to divide all profits and losses pro-rata), is permitted under federal income tax laws to make what is called a &quot;special allocation&quot; of profits and losses from the entity. Some of the most common reasons this is done are:</p>\n<p>(1) to treat distributions returning originally invested capital differently than distributions once all invested capital has been returned to the original investors,</p>\n<p>(2) for the similar purpose of giving a member (often an active manager with little personal wealth) an interest in profits but not invested capital, or</p>\n<p>(3) to allow members to have different interests in different lines of business (as you appear to be proposing).</p>\n<p><strong>Special Allocations In This Case</strong></p>\n<p>In the case you present, you could draft an operating agreement for the LLC which contained a special allocation that allocated all profits and losses from the Widget selling line of business to you, and allocated all profits and losses from the new service line of business 60% to you and 40% to your new partner. You would have to figure out to handle situations when one line of business had a loss or was unable to pay its debts from assets associated with its line of business, and the other had a profit or was at least not insolvent.</p>\n<p>Your partner in the new service line of business would become a member of the LLC and the LLC would now have to file a form 1065 each year.</p>\n<p>You would also have to decide under the operating agreement what matters could be decided by you unilaterally and what matters would require the approval of both of you.</p>\n<p>For example, your new partner would probably need the assurance that his percentage interest in profits from the new service line of business would require mutual consent and could not be decided unilaterally by you, but day to day management decisions in the business might be decided by you unilaterally.</p>\n<p><strong>Why This Is A Horrible Idea</strong></p>\n<p>This said, while you could do that, the structure of the transaction you are contemplating is horribly ill advised.</p>\n<p><em>Higher Transaction Costs</em></p>\n<p>It is very expensive and very complex to draft an operating agreement that accomplishes what you are contemplating. But, it is very cheap and very easy, to form a new LLC for the new service line of business owned 60-40 by you and your partner, and to leave the existing LLC in the Widget line of business undisturbed.</p>\n<p>I would probably charge something like $6,000-$7,000 to draft the combined operating agreement, but would probably charge something more like $1,500-$2,000 to set up a new LLC plus the nominal filing fee for a new entity.</p>\n<p>The tax returns for the two separate businesses each year would also be profoundly less complicated if you had two separate businesses than if they were a single entity that had to report its income each year on a single form 1065. You might even be able to do your own tax returns if they were two separate entities, while there is no humanly possible way that a non-tax professional without specialized experience in partnership taxation could do the tax returns correctly for the combined entity.</p>\n<p>Usually, the only people who are concerned about setting up new LLCs are people in Delaware and California that have fairly significant minimum annual taxes for LLCs, with California's franchise tax board being particularly ruthless in this regard. (Most states charge no minimum fee or tax for merely having an LLC or only a nominal amount like $10-$50 to file an update of contact information report each year.) But, the dollar amount of the annual minimum taxes even in those two jurisdictions would be totally overwhelmed by the additional CPA charges you would need to incur to file returns for them each year and the additional legal fees you would incur over the lifetime of the entity.</p>\n<p><em>Liability and Governance In Combined v. Separate LLCs</em></p>\n<p>If you had two separate LLCs, the assets and income flow of the Widget line of business would not be subject to liability incurred in the new service line of business and vice versa.</p>\n<p>Also, your partner in the new service line of business would not have a right to information about your Widget line of business as your partner would if the two were combined in one LLC, and would not have any legal rights to allege that you were mismanaging the Widget line of business as your partner would if the two were combined in one LLC.</p>\n<p><em>Risk Of Forming An Unlimited Liability General Partnership</em></p>\n<p>If you didn't treat the new partner as a member of the existing LLC in the operating agreement and otherwise, you would also have made a grave error.</p>\n<p>This is because then you would have formed a general partnership without limited liability protection between your LLC and your new partner, and you would have to comply with special tax rules governing cases in which one partner has unlimited liability for partnership debts (the new partner) and the other (you via the LLC) has limited recourse for partnership debts. The tax laws that apply in this hybrid situation are insanely complicated.</p>\n<p>Also, you are needlessly exposing your partner to unnecessary liability for all debts of the company if the business fails in this situation (and your partner may sue you for failing to disclose this liability if you indeed do fail to disclose this risk).</p>\n<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>\n<p>Your desire to avoid forming a new LLC is penny wise and pound foolish. It makes far more sense to achieve your objectives by forming a new LLC for the new service line of business and to leave your existing LLC as it is.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "business", "ownership" ]

[ { "answer_id": 46207, "body": "<h2>Probably</h2>\n\n<p>There are two relevant legal principles here:</p>\n\n<p><strong><a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apparent_authority\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Apparent authority</a></strong></p>\n\n<p>The legal question to be answered is if a reasonable person standing in the position of the contractor reasonably believe that you had your wife's authority to sign on her behalf?</p>\n\n<p>If the answer is yes (and it probably is) then your wife is bound to the contract.</p>\n\n<p><strong><a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mistake_(contract_law)#Unilateral_mistakes\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Unilateral mistake: mistaken identity</a></strong></p>\n\n<p>If you can prove you were not acting as your wife's agent, then on whose behalf were you acting?</p>\n\n<p>I merely mention this because its a (difficult) option for the contractor to void the contract. If they can show that they only intended to contract with your wife rather than you (unlikely) and they took steps to verify that you were your wife (which they didn't) and that you knew that they only wanted to deal with your wife (which you didn't) then the contract would be void for mistaken identity if it was unconscionable on the contractor for it to proceed (which it isn't).</p>\n", "score": 1 }, { "answer_id": 46215, "body": "<p>The nature of the agreement matters as does the context and you'd have to know more facts to reliably answer. The default rule is &quot;no&quot; your signature wouldn't count to sign on behalf of your wife, but there are exceptions that might apply.</p>\n<p>There are also multiple ways that your action could be interpreted depending upon the context.</p>\n<p>One possibility is that a contract is formed between you and the other party, despite the fact that your wife was the original intended contract party. For example, if the contractor intended to enter into a contract with you and mistakenly wrote down the wrong name despite the fact that both of you intended that you be the signatory and the wrong name was merely a clerical error.</p>\n<p>One possibility is that your wife is bound but not you, on the theory that you had apparent oral authority to act on her behalf (or perhaps a power of attorney authorizing you to do so). A person is bound to a third-party when someone with apparent authority acts as their agent in a transaction, even if that person didn't have actual authority to take that action. But, if you sign in your own name, rather than in her name expressly purporting to sign on her behalf as her agent, it is not clear that this was suffice to show apparent authority.</p>\n<p>A third possibility is that only your wife is a permissible party to the contract and not you, and that you do not have actual or apparent authority to act on her behalf.</p>\n<p>If it is a business agreement with your wife or involves investments, you do not have any common law actual authority in Colorado to act on her behalf (that common law authority was expressly overridden by the Married Women's Property Act, Colo. Rev. Statutes §§ 14-2-201 to 14-2-210) without your wife's express permission to do so, and would generally not have apparent authority to act on her behalf <em>solely by virtue of being her husband</em> in the absence of a power of attorney to that effect or an express oral communication of your authority from her to the other party to the business contract. Of course, if you were also an officer or employee in her business that might be another thing entirely.</p>\n<p>The original version of part of that act has been on the books in Colorado since two years before it became a state in its territorial laws in 1874 currently read as follows (the language was made gender neutral and stripped of archaic terminology effective August 8, 2018):</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Colorado Revised Statutes § 14-2-208. Married person may contract</p>\n<p>A person, while married, may contract debts in his or her own name and\nupon his or her own credit, and may execute promissory notes, bonds,\nbills of exchange, and other instruments in writing, and may enter\ninto any contract the same as if he or she were unmarried. In all\ncases where any suit or other legal proceedings are instituted against\nthe married person and any judgment, decree, or order is rendered or\npronounced against the married person, the same may be enforced by\nexecution or other process against the married person as if he or she\nwere unmarried.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Likewise, you certainly couldn't legally sign a government contract that your wife was entitled to sign only in her official capacity as an officer or employee of a government agency. Government contracts are only valid when signed by someone who has actual authority to do so, even if everyone involved mutually believed that the person signing it had apparent authority to do so in Colorado, and there is some rather harsh case law to that effect.</p>\n<p>If the agreement is for &quot;necessities&quot; for the family, arguably a contract is actually formed between you and the other party, even though your wife was the originally intended signer, and that this is also binding on a non-signatory spouse because a wife is legally responsible in Colorado for purchases of necessities entered into on credit by her husband (and vice versa), because the other party to the contract is a third-party beneficiary of your spouse's legal duty to support you. <em>See</em> <a href=\"https://www.abi.org/feed-item/am-i-responsible-for-the-debts-of-my-spouse\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">here</a>. This was the historical common law rule and there is little recent case law to determine if this old rule remains good law. Arguably later legislation and constitutional developments have implicitly superseded that rule and debt collectors prefer not to rely upon it if they can avoid doing so.</p>\n<p>It is also fairly plausible that you did have apparent authority to bind her to a contract as her agent, even if you didn't actually have authority to do so, in a way that it wouldn't be plausible in the case of a government contract or business or investment contract, in a contract to purchase necessities on credit (or even &quot;luxuries&quot; for the family), since you are presumably an adult decision maker in the family.</p>\n<p>If you are the owner or co-owner of a building having work done on it, it is more likely that you would have authority, than it would be if the public records showed that it was only in her name.</p>\n<p>Ultimately, a trier of fact would have to sort through the context and facts, including the nature of the contract, to determine whether or not it would be binding upon her.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "contract-law", "colorado" ]

[ { "answer_id": 74249, "body": "<p>Most prosecuting attorney positions in a District Attorney, or State Attorney General's office are full time salaries positions that prohibit individuals holding those positions from having any other legal employment. They are also, often, conceptually a division of state government, even if the DA is locally elected. So, any criminal defense engagement in the same state court system would also be a conflict of interest, and the reality of joint task forces discussed below would also make almost any federal case criminal defense engagement in the same state a conflict of interest in most cases because state prosecutors would gain confidential information about pending federal criminal prosecutions (and vice versa).</p>\n<p>In theory, a criminal defense engagement in the next state over, for example, say, in Gary, Indiana for a prosecutor employed in Chicago, Illinois, would not be a conflict of interest, but it would still be prohibited in most cases because the prosecutor is a full time salaried employee whose full efforts are required to be devote to that position. (In practice, <em>de minimis</em> civil transactional work for the assistance of friends and family members, even for a small fee, or representation of such persons in small civil lawsuits would probably be tolerated, however, and maybe even a defense of a civil ordinance violation like a traffic ticket brought by a separate local government as discussed below, for a friend or family member for free, might be tolerated.)</p>\n<p>Local governments such as cities, towns, and counties, however, sometime have an office separate from the DA's office or State Attorney General's office often called a city attorney, town attorney, or county attorney, who works part-time on a contract basis for that government and has limited authority to prosecution violations of that local government's own ordinances in the name of that governmental entity, rather than on behalf of the People as part of the state government.</p>\n<p>In those cases, it is generally ethically permissible for the city attorney (for example) to serve as a criminal defense attorney in cases outside that city that do not otherwise pose a conflict of interest from having been adverse to various criminal defendants in the city attorney role. But there might be a conflict of interest, if, for example, there was a joint task force of the city attorney, the local DA, and the federal assistant U.S. attorney to prosecute people in a coordinated fashion on federal, state and local charges of various kinds, in connection with a rash of gun violence. And, if one of the city attorney's clients were arrested for an ordinance violation in the city, a non-conflicted counsel would have to be retained by the city for that case.</p>\n<p>Often, in those cases, however, even though it is not a prohibited conflict of interest, the lawyers involved would view a criminal defense representation as a &quot;business development conflict&quot; that would risk non-renewal of the city/town/county attorney position if undertaken.</p>\n<p>Incidentally, government attorneys, unlike almost all other government employees, are usually employees at will, as a matter of legal professional ethics, unlike almost all other fixed term contract or civil service employees, even if they have other contractual or civil service employee rights.</p>\n", "score": 7 } ]

[ "united-states", "criminal-law", "lawyer", "criminal-procedure", "prosecution" ]

[ { "answer_id": 18676, "body": "<p>When an author writes a book, it is frequently licensed to one company in the United States and another company in the U.K.</p>\n<p>If the publishing company Bathroom Books gets permission to print and sell the books pursuant to a license from the author in the U.S., that contract will usually include a non-compete clause that prohibits Bathroom Books from selling books it prints to retail customers in the U.K. or to wholesale customer that intend to sell the books at retail in the U.K., where the permission to print and sell the books pursuant to a license from the author has been granted to WC Books (and vice versa).</p>\n<p>The clauses are about enforcing the peace between distributors given different territories, because different publishers have better sales networks in different places.</p>\n<p>The first sale doctrine, clarified for purposes of U.S. copyright law in <em>Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley</em>, makes the &quot;not for sale in the U.S.&quot; language inapplicable under U.S. law to a consumer who purchases the book in the U.S. and then resells it used to someone in the U.S.</p>\n<p>Whether it bars someone who purchased the books on a wholesale basis in the U.K. from reselling the books in the U.S. depends to some extent on the nature of the contract between the wholesaler and the publisher. For example, if the wholesaler is selling the books on a consignment basis for the publisher and has a right to return the unsold books without payment to the publisher and doesn't have to pay for the books sold until they are sold at retail, the first sale doctrine likewise does not apply.</p>\n<p>It also isn't entirely obvious that the &quot;first sale doctrine&quot; makes it illegal to count U.S. sales towards the amount due to the U.S. publisher rather than the U.K. publisher, even if they are sold by WB Books instead of Bathroom Books. (Re the faux names of the publishers, one of the first books I every handled copyright and licensing for, a year out of law school, involved bathroom humor.)</p>\n<p>Also, if the case ends up in a U.K. court before it reaches a U.S. court, the first sale doctrine may or may not apply, but <em>Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley</em> will not be binding precedent, so the applicable rule of law might be different. And, it isn't hard to write a binding forum selection clause that insures that the case would be resolved in a U.K. court rather than a U.S. court if the law in the U.K. were more favorable.</p>\n", "score": 4 }, { "answer_id": 18653, "body": "<blockquote>\n <p>What was the historical basis for this notice?</p>\n</blockquote>\n\n<p>This is a hypothesis but a likely one: <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Price_discrimination\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">price discrimination</a>. The market in the US was willing to pay more for textbooks than the UK market is and the publisher makes greater profits as a result. This is more likely in the case you cite.</p>\n\n<p>For older publications it is usually because different publishers were licensed by the rights holder in different jurisdictions. The \"multi-national\" corporation is a largely late 20th century creation, particularly in book publishing. Also, prior to the 1990s the US was not a signatory to the Berne Convention on copyright: during the late 19th and early 20th century the US was regarded as something of an IP \"pirate\" nation.</p>\n\n<blockquote>\n <p>Is this notice indeed legally void in the United States under Kirtsaeng (assuming the book was lawfully acquired in the UK or its territories)? In other works, could I legally sell such a book in the US?</p>\n</blockquote>\n\n<p>It is legally void to the extent that it contravenes the <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First-sale_doctrine\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">first sale doctrine</a>, that is a copyright owner cannot enforce their rights on a physical copy once it is legally no longer their property. However, there is a growing trend to <em>licence</em> copies rather than <em>sell</em> them - in such a case the first sale doctrine is not relevant - the ownership of the physical copy <em>never</em> passes from the copyright owner. Such rights can also be waived in a contract, however, in such a case the cause of action is breach of contract not breach of copyright.</p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "united-states", "copyright", "united-kingdom" ]

[ { "answer_id": 27686, "body": "<h1>Short Answer</h1>\n<p>Any kind of check, and any wire transfer, provides effectively perfect, irrefutable proof in court that payment was made by you to the person who received it. One method is not meaningfully better than the other for that purpose.</p>\n<h1>Long Answer</h1>\n<h3>Security Measures Associated With Checks</h3>\n<p>Checks are never notarized in the United States. Sometimes, someone who is requested that someone write them a check will ask to have a notarized document requesting the funds, or, in the case of a request for a large life insurance payment or securities account pay on death benefit, a private analog to a notarization called a &quot;guaranteed signature&quot;.</p>\n<p>But, the person who writes the check never does either of these things. A check's validity is determined by whether it is honored when it is deposited. Cashier's checks and money orders do, however, often have security devices similar to those found in currency such as special colored thread, special paper with watermarks, and even holograms to prevent counterfeiting.</p>\n<h3>Wire Transfers v. Checks</h3>\n<p><em>They Are Equal For Purposes Of Legal Proof</em></p>\n<p>A wire transfer, and a check that is deposited by someone, each provide definitive and basically irrefutable proof that is easily to provide in any possible court case that prove that the payment was made by you.</p>\n<p>The bank will have an electronic copy of the deposited check in its records for at least seven years showing the image of the front of the check at the time it was deposited and physical stamps on the reverse of the check showing when it was deposited and into whose account.</p>\n<p>The bank will also have electronic records demonstrated when the wire transfer was made, in which amount, to which account and with which instructions. These are also kept for at least seven years.</p>\n<p>Also while I call this kind of proof &quot;perfect&quot; and &quot;irrefutable&quot; in my short answer, this is really only 99.9999% true. There are one in a million or one in a billion exceptions involving very elaborate frauds in both transactions involving checks and wire transfer transactions that range from hacked bank computer systems to elaborate forgeries to a criminal who impersonates the intended recipient or impersonates a bank officer. These kinds of professional fraudulent schemes are not materially more common in wire transfers than it check transactions, or vice versa. But, I can count on my fingers the number of times that I have seen either of these kinds of fraud in twenty years of practicing law - only once or twice each.</p>\n<p><em>Disadvantages Associated With Personal Checks v. Good Funds</em></p>\n<p>A personal check has the disadvantage to someone receiving it that it is not in &quot;good funds&quot; and can bounce in the person writing the check has insufficient funds in their account. Funds transferred by personal check, for this reason, also aren't immediately available to the person receiving the check unless the amount of money is very small (the main thresholds are <a href=\"https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/how-quickly-can-i-get-money-after-i-deposit-a-check-into-my-checking-account-what-is-a-deposit-hold-en-1023/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">$200 or less for same business day access, and $5000 or less for second business day access</a>).</p>\n<p>But, these disadvantages (which are disadvantages to the recipient only, not to the person writing the check) to personal checks can be overcome by using a certified check, a cashier's check, or for smaller sums of money, a money order. All of those special kinds of checks are &quot;good funds&quot; which cannot be refused for insufficient funds by the issuing bank or financial institution, and are immediately available to the person receiving it.</p>\n<p><em>When Are Checks v. Wire Transfers Used And Why</em></p>\n<p>As a matter of custom and practice, if you are going to attend the closing on the investment transaction in person or the person receiving the funds has an office physically close to you, it is more common to make the payment in the form of a certified check or cashier's check, which is a faster transaction if the check is hand delivered and can be deposited immediately.</p>\n<p>In contrast, a wire transfer must usually be requested in the morning at your bank to arrive at their bank by the afternoon of the same day and often has a slightly higher service fee than a certified check or cashier's check.</p>\n<p>If same day hand delivery of the check isn't convenient (or if there is any reason to fear that the person delivering the funds might be robbed or might lose the check en route to its destination), it is more common to wire transfer the funds, to avoid the expense and delay associated with having to deliver a physical check by FedEx or Express mail or some other courier service. The difference in service fees between a certificate check or cashier's check and a wire transfer is usually less than the cost of a FedEx, Express mail, or courier service delivery charge.</p>\n<p>Usually, the concern that the check would be stolen or lost en route is only considered so serious that only wire transfers are used, despite other factors that would usually favor a cashier's check or certified check, for transactions of more than about $50 million or more in a single transfer.</p>\n<h3>The Real Risk</h3>\n<p>Of course, in the transaction that you contemplate, the risk that the company you are funding will deny that they received your investment funds is negligible. To worry about that is like wondering if you should go to college because if you do, you might get a paper cut when turning in your essays.</p>\n<p>Almost all of the risk in a transaction such as this one involve (1) the company losing money despite the legitimate and good faith efforts of all involved, (2) the receiving entity siphoning away money from the entity for expenses like salaries and related party contract payments while claiming that it was merely losing money from bad business luck (since if the money is lost due to bad business luck, an equity investor has no right to sue) or, (3) losing money because the business fails due to an undisclosed serious risk factor (this is called securities fraud), or (4) even more blatantly, siphoning away money with no pretense of a legal basis for doing so and preventing you from discovering their embezzlement until the money is gone using fraudulent information sent to you such as forged bank statements (as was done in more than one fraud case that I have handled for clients).</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "united-states", "business", "banking" ]

[ { "answer_id": 22891, "body": "<p>Sweden and most of the other Scandinavian countries once had a civil code based upon the <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_Code_of_1734\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Civil Code of 1734</a>.</p>\n<p>Generally speaking, this code is in turn derived from the <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_Sweden\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">German Civil Code</a> (as opposed to the French Civil Code), which is written in a more carefully defined, lawyer oriented manner than the French Civil Code which sought to be written in common French for use by the ordinary French citizen.</p>\n<p>In general, Scandinavian law is originally quite similar to the German law upon which it was modeled, and the systems have continued to influence each other intellectually. For example, Scandinavians followed the lead of the Germans (or vice versa) in adopting &quot;day-fines&quot; as a major means of criminal punishment in the time period following World War II.</p>\n<p>Both the French and German civil codes, in turn, were derived from Roman law.</p>\n<p>But, at some point prior to the end of World War II, the Scandinavians departed from the German model substantially.</p>\n<p>All civil law jurisdictions resort to doctrine from legal treatises as a major source of authority and the Scandinavians are no exception. Leading law professors in civil law countries have an influence on how the law is interpreted comparable to that of leading appellate court justices in common law countries.</p>\n<p>But, unlike other civil law countries, Scandinavians rely upon case law more than Continental Europeans do as binding authority in the form of judge made law.</p>\n<p>It appears that the typical Continental European pattern that was in place at one point in Sweden's modern history has been supplanted by a system that does indeed <a href=\"https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=3&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=0ahUKEwiY9a2omcbWAhVlylQKHZEYD2cQFggyMAI&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.juridicum.su.se%2Fuser%2Fmasc%2Fintroduction%2520to%2520Swedish%2520law%2FTortLawInSweden.ppt&amp;usg=AFQjCNGnT8OI2iPpB_A4O9Ugz5ii4o43vw\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">give more weight to case law</a> and is more systematic. This <a href=\"http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/applicable_law/applicable_law_swe_en.htm\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">European Commission source</a> confirms this account in the private international law context, stating:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Private international law in Sweden is codified only in part, and\nconsists of a combination of statute and case law. The statute law is\nfor the most part aimed at giving effect to international conventions\nto which Sweden is a party.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.bloomsburyprofessional.com/uk/swedish-perspectives-on-private-law-europeanisation-9781509900954/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">This book</a>, however, notes that Sweden is in the process of drafting a more comprehensive and systematic civil code for itself and made significant progress towards that goal with a 2009 report, in furtherance of the goal of better harmonizing the private law of EU and EFTA members.</p>\n<p>The very thin Wikipedia article in English on the <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_Sweden\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Law of Sweden</a>, upon which I relied, appears to be inaccurate, or at least, misleading, on the key points. Based upon your comments and the information gathered while updating this answer, I have updated the Law of Sweden article to make it more accurate. It isn't clear from sources available to me, however, precisely when Sweden began to deviate from the German model other than to say that it was sometime well after 1734 CE and was not later than the end of World War II, which as a two century range admittedly isn't very specific.</p>\n<p>Skimming the material, a lot of the reforms apparently take place in the late 20th century. The scholar in the linked power point presentation suggests that Sweden's legal system is neither in the Civil Law tradition nor the Common Law tradition, contrary to my understanding until your comments brought more information to my attention. Not having my histories of Sweden or Finland easily at hand, it is hard to tell how or why this happened. But, I appreciate your comments and question which have brought this information to my attention and would strongly suggest that you prepare an answer of your own as you appear to be very knowledgable about the details of Swedish law and may be better equipped than I to get to the bottom of the question.</p>\n<p>This <a href=\"https://www.jstor.org/stable/839054?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">journal article discussing the Swedish tort statute adopted in 1972</a> suggests that following World War II there was a concerted international effort of the Scandinavian countries to engage in legal cooperation producing more or less uniform laws in the region related to private law with tort law high on the agenda for reform and homogenization although turning that into concrete legislation apparently took 27 years and many commissions and negotiations.</p>\n", "score": 4 } ]

[ "european-union", "legal-history", "comparative-law", "civil-legal-system" ]

[ { "answer_id": 17334, "body": "<ol>\n<li><p>Yes. You can build your business with that.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>Yes. Also, a trademark is not a trade name and vice versa. This is a common mistake. A trademark is a brand affixed to some kind of product. A trade name is the name of a business. They are not the same things. The fact that you have a business with a particular trade name does not mean that you necessarily have a trademark in that name. You do not necessarily need to have a trademark in your trade name and often you can't because it is not a branding of your product.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>Probably not. Certainly, you cannot get a principle register trademark for this. You could file a state trademark registration if you sell it in a U.S. second or perhaps a supplemental trademark registration, which don't necessarily give you legal rights, but do conclusively establish that you were using the mark in a particular place from a particular time which would discourage anyone else from trying to get a trademark of their own and oust you from using yours. Sometimes trademark examiners are lazy and let generic marks get registered even though they shouldn't.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>Hard to say. They shouldn't be able to get a trademark in the U.S. on that basis, but the quality of trademark examination varies from country to country, and from examiner to examiner. Every once in a while I see an approved registration for a mark that should totally be disqualified and I shrug my shoulders and ask myself why I always clear a clear &quot;no&quot; from the PTO when I try to submit a mark like that and somehow the bozo who submitted that mark got it approved when it should be clearly ineligible for registration - for example, &quot;Palisade Red&quot; for red wine made in Palisade, Colorado. A lesser level of trademark registration such as a state trademark or a supplemental register mark discourages an otherwise lenient examiner from approving an already dubious mark and strengthen your case if you ever need to seek to have their mark cancelled.</p>\n</li>\n</ol>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "trademark" ]