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How to accomplish a court hearing after arrest without being stuck in prison cell for more than 4 years like Assange?

TLDR / UPDATE / SUMMARY: Police: I'm arresting you. Me: You are breaking the law, what I do is minor. Police: No, I'm arresting you, what you do is more than minor. Arrested. Now the question is: how quickly can I land in court to dispute the arrest? Me discussing with the police: it is on the level "he said" / "she said" but they have monopoly on using force and it is only them who can arrest me (I cannot arrest them). I have never been arrested, I do not know how long it takes to land in court after the arrest. I would like to know how to professionally challenge authority and their interpretation of "anything more than minor" Since "anything more than minor" is not strictly defined, due to Climate Emergency, the threshold has been moved, therefore burden of proof is now on law enforcement. How long before we can cross-examine each other in the court of law? Sitting in a cell while waiting for a trial - MEH . Going to a court to have a debate with law enforcement - HELL YEAH . The reason why I can be inclined to do it: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (protest illegal) Public Order Act 2023 (intention of protest illegal) Secondary legislation through a back door ("anything more than minor") Judge Silas Reid putting people to jail for telling the truth More people arrested for sitting on a pavement and holding a sign Please allow me to quote: https://www.churchtimes.co.uk/articles/2023/9-june/news/uk/retired-priest-among-protesters-referred-to-attorney-general “When you take the stand, you take an oath to speak the ‘whole truth’. Our motivation is a crucial part of why we are there. I’m not a hoodlum sitting in the road for the fun of it. By not being allowed to speak about our motivation for taking action, we are being asked to break that oath by the judge.” Some reading on "more than minor": Policing Insight: https://policinginsight.com/features/opinion/the-end-of-protest-service-values-and-public-trust-are-more-important-than-assessing-more-than-minor-hinderance/ openDemocracy: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/police-powers-ban-protest-laws-suella-braverman/ EDIT / UPDATE: More resources, just search this phrase, use the quotes for more precise results: "more than minor" protest That's why was repeating "more than minor" Legal challenge by Liberty: https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/issue/liberty-launches-legal-action-against-home-secretary-for-overriding-parliament-on-protest-powers/ The Justice Gap: https://www.thejusticegap.com/liberty-launches-legal-action-against-home-secretary-for-breaching-constitutional-principles/ The Home Secretary has now altered the law, constituting anything causing “minor disruption” to being “serious disruption” and worthy of police action. According to a cross party parliamentary committee, this is the first time the government has turned to secondary legislation to make changes to a law already rejected in primary legislation by parliament. Amnesty International: https://www.amnesty.org.uk/files/2023-06/Amnesty%20International%20UK%20-%20%20Briefing%20on%20Revised%20Protest%20Regulations.pdf You can definitely dig deeper into protesting / intention of protest, but in the meantime please advise how to quickly and efficiently land in court after a potential arrest?

united-kingdom The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed in Article 6 of the Human Rights Act (bolding mine). In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. That said, I can't find any indication that there is a legal time requirement, so it will depend on the case, and you more or less need to make a legal appeal on your case to get things sped up if you feel the government is dragging their feet. Average times : According to government statistics, it took an average of 357 days for a case to get all the way to the Crown Court, and an average of 178 days in court to get to an outcome. The data can be further broken down by charging stage: Time between the offence being committed and being charged: 323 days Time between being charged and the first hearing: 34 days Time between the first hearing and completion at the magistrates’: 9 days Time between the sending of the case to Crown Court to the start of trial: 119 days Time between the start of the trial and the completion of the trial: 50 days Remember, however, that these figures are only averages. The more serious and complex the offence, the longer it takes for each stage to be completed.

How to accomplish a court hearing after arrest without being stuck in prison cell for more than 4 years like Assange?

TLDR / UPDATE / SUMMARY: Police: I'm arresting you. Me: You are breaking the law, what I do is minor. Police: No, I'm arresting you, what you do is more than minor. Arrested. Now the question is: how quickly can I land in court to dispute the arrest? Me discussing with the police: it is on the level "he said" / "she said" but they have monopoly on using force and it is only them who can arrest me (I cannot arrest them). I have never been arrested, I do not know how long it takes to land in court after the arrest. I would like to know how to professionally challenge authority and their interpretation of "anything more than minor" Since "anything more than minor" is not strictly defined, due to Climate Emergency, the threshold has been moved, therefore burden of proof is now on law enforcement. How long before we can cross-examine each other in the court of law? Sitting in a cell while waiting for a trial - MEH . Going to a court to have a debate with law enforcement - HELL YEAH . The reason why I can be inclined to do it: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (protest illegal) Public Order Act 2023 (intention of protest illegal) Secondary legislation through a back door ("anything more than minor") Judge Silas Reid putting people to jail for telling the truth More people arrested for sitting on a pavement and holding a sign Please allow me to quote: https://www.churchtimes.co.uk/articles/2023/9-june/news/uk/retired-priest-among-protesters-referred-to-attorney-general “When you take the stand, you take an oath to speak the ‘whole truth’. Our motivation is a crucial part of why we are there. I’m not a hoodlum sitting in the road for the fun of it. By not being allowed to speak about our motivation for taking action, we are being asked to break that oath by the judge.” Some reading on "more than minor": Policing Insight: https://policinginsight.com/features/opinion/the-end-of-protest-service-values-and-public-trust-are-more-important-than-assessing-more-than-minor-hinderance/ openDemocracy: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/police-powers-ban-protest-laws-suella-braverman/ EDIT / UPDATE: More resources, just search this phrase, use the quotes for more precise results: "more than minor" protest That's why was repeating "more than minor" Legal challenge by Liberty: https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/issue/liberty-launches-legal-action-against-home-secretary-for-overriding-parliament-on-protest-powers/ The Justice Gap: https://www.thejusticegap.com/liberty-launches-legal-action-against-home-secretary-for-breaching-constitutional-principles/ The Home Secretary has now altered the law, constituting anything causing “minor disruption” to being “serious disruption” and worthy of police action. According to a cross party parliamentary committee, this is the first time the government has turned to secondary legislation to make changes to a law already rejected in primary legislation by parliament. Amnesty International: https://www.amnesty.org.uk/files/2023-06/Amnesty%20International%20UK%20-%20%20Briefing%20on%20Revised%20Protest%20Regulations.pdf You can definitely dig deeper into protesting / intention of protest, but in the meantime please advise how to quickly and efficiently land in court after a potential arrest?

Don’t flee to the Ecuadorian embassy Mr Assange is in gaol because his bail was revoked because he decided to become a fugitive. If he had waited for his extra hearing, he could have lived in the community while this happened. Under section 4 Bail Act 1976, on each occasion that a person is brought before a court accused of an offence, or remanded after conviction for enquiries or a report, he must be granted bail without condition, if none of the exceptions to bail apply. Conditions of bail may only be imposed where necessary to ensure that the exceptions to bail are addressed. Only where conditions are not sufficient to address the exceptions to bail should a remand in custody be sought. As someone with no previous conviction charged with illegal protesting, you should be able to wait for your day in court from the comfort of your own home.

How to accomplish a court hearing after arrest without being stuck in prison cell for more than 4 years like Assange?

TLDR / UPDATE / SUMMARY: Police: I'm arresting you. Me: You are breaking the law, what I do is minor. Police: No, I'm arresting you, what you do is more than minor. Arrested. Now the question is: how quickly can I land in court to dispute the arrest? Me discussing with the police: it is on the level "he said" / "she said" but they have monopoly on using force and it is only them who can arrest me (I cannot arrest them). I have never been arrested, I do not know how long it takes to land in court after the arrest. I would like to know how to professionally challenge authority and their interpretation of "anything more than minor" Since "anything more than minor" is not strictly defined, due to Climate Emergency, the threshold has been moved, therefore burden of proof is now on law enforcement. How long before we can cross-examine each other in the court of law? Sitting in a cell while waiting for a trial - MEH . Going to a court to have a debate with law enforcement - HELL YEAH . The reason why I can be inclined to do it: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (protest illegal) Public Order Act 2023 (intention of protest illegal) Secondary legislation through a back door ("anything more than minor") Judge Silas Reid putting people to jail for telling the truth More people arrested for sitting on a pavement and holding a sign Please allow me to quote: https://www.churchtimes.co.uk/articles/2023/9-june/news/uk/retired-priest-among-protesters-referred-to-attorney-general “When you take the stand, you take an oath to speak the ‘whole truth’. Our motivation is a crucial part of why we are there. I’m not a hoodlum sitting in the road for the fun of it. By not being allowed to speak about our motivation for taking action, we are being asked to break that oath by the judge.” Some reading on "more than minor": Policing Insight: https://policinginsight.com/features/opinion/the-end-of-protest-service-values-and-public-trust-are-more-important-than-assessing-more-than-minor-hinderance/ openDemocracy: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/police-powers-ban-protest-laws-suella-braverman/ EDIT / UPDATE: More resources, just search this phrase, use the quotes for more precise results: "more than minor" protest That's why was repeating "more than minor" Legal challenge by Liberty: https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/issue/liberty-launches-legal-action-against-home-secretary-for-overriding-parliament-on-protest-powers/ The Justice Gap: https://www.thejusticegap.com/liberty-launches-legal-action-against-home-secretary-for-breaching-constitutional-principles/ The Home Secretary has now altered the law, constituting anything causing “minor disruption” to being “serious disruption” and worthy of police action. According to a cross party parliamentary committee, this is the first time the government has turned to secondary legislation to make changes to a law already rejected in primary legislation by parliament. Amnesty International: https://www.amnesty.org.uk/files/2023-06/Amnesty%20International%20UK%20-%20%20Briefing%20on%20Revised%20Protest%20Regulations.pdf You can definitely dig deeper into protesting / intention of protest, but in the meantime please advise how to quickly and efficiently land in court after a potential arrest?

Going to a court to have a debate with law enforcement - HELL YEAH. That's not how court works. Your premise seems to be incorrect and it seems there is a very large knowledge gap on how courtrooms work. There is not a thing where you get to gleefully cross-examine anyone in the fashion you hope. Cross-examination doesn't even mean that. Unfortunately, television doesn't give you much of an education. The sad fact is, actual court proceedings are deadly dull - too dull to make drama out of. That crowning moment of verbal glory is unlikely to ever happen, and even if it does, blink and you'll miss it. And if you think you're going to represent yourself as an amateur barrister, you will only be frustrated, and your moment of glory will never come. If you're doing some sort of organized protest that is organized by someone other than asshats, there'll be a legal team that will have every angle worked out, and will be doing the arguing to maximum effect. If you want to be one of those persons, then get onto a pre-law track in school and become a lawyer yourself.

Can renters take advantage of adverse possession under certain situations?

It's my understanding, depending on the state, a renter could take steps to procure the property through being clever* and living there a long time, while taking additional steps to gain a legal claim. Either they have to pay certain bills, improve the property, or get involved in the home owners association. Are there any situations where they can claim the property outside of convincing the landlord to let them pay the property taxes? What about states that allow withholding of rent until the landlord repairs the unity? I'm specifically looking for edge cases where a dispute could arise between a landlord and tenant that gets dragged out for years. It would be clearly be much easier to just find property no one owns as a result of something like the 2008 financial crisis, where the home owner goes bankrupt and the mortgage company. *such as, the landlord violating some clause in the lease, and him starting legal proceedings over that.

No The criteria for adverse possession is that you have to be in possession without permission . A tenant, even one that pays no rent (or stops paying rent), has permission.

Can renters take advantage of adverse possession under certain situations?

It's my understanding, depending on the state, a renter could take steps to procure the property through being clever* and living there a long time, while taking additional steps to gain a legal claim. Either they have to pay certain bills, improve the property, or get involved in the home owners association. Are there any situations where they can claim the property outside of convincing the landlord to let them pay the property taxes? What about states that allow withholding of rent until the landlord repairs the unity? I'm specifically looking for edge cases where a dispute could arise between a landlord and tenant that gets dragged out for years. It would be clearly be much easier to just find property no one owns as a result of something like the 2008 financial crisis, where the home owner goes bankrupt and the mortgage company. *such as, the landlord violating some clause in the lease, and him starting legal proceedings over that.

canada Several provinces have abolished adverse possession law (see e.g. British Columbia's Limitations Act , s. 28; Alberta's Property Rights Statutes Amendment Act, 2022 ; and New Brunswick's Land Title Act , s. 17). In provinces where adverse possession is still a viable claim, its requirements depend on the English law that was imported into the province and any statutory or common law developments since (see Nelson (City) v. Nelson , 2017 SCC 8, para. 17). A similar concept, acquisitive prescription , applies in Québec under the Civil Code (see arts. 992, 2910; Ostiguy v. Allie , 2017 SCC 22). Generally, the elements of adverse possession (which, when present, start the clock on the limitation period against the true owner) are that the possession must be: open; notorious; adverse ; exclusive; peaceful (not by force); actual; and continuous. Some provinces also have the requirement that the use be "inconsistent" with the true owner's intended use (e.g. Ontario, Nova Scotia). In any case, the possession must be adverse . This means that there is no claim to adverse possession where the claimant has the consent or permission of the true owner ( Re Koziey Estate , 2019 ABCA 43, para. 44).

Is attempted manslaughter a real crime?

Is there such thing as being charged with attempted manslaughter? During a scene of a movie where they're reading out another character's rap sheet they mention 'attempted manslaughter'. As I understand it manslaughter is the unlawful but unintentional killing of another person through some sort of criminal negligence. Calling it attempted manslaughter, in my eyes, implies some sort of intent thus attempted and manslaughter seem to contradict each other. I'm just wondering is this some sort of technical mistake in the movie or is there such a crime as attempted manslaughter?

Yes For example, s270AB of the south-australia Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 says: (1) Where— (a) a person attempts to kill another or is a party to an attempt to kill another; and (b) he would, if the attempt had been successfully carried to completion, have been guilty of manslaughter rather than murder, he shall be guilty of attempted manslaughter. Relevantly in SA, voluntary manslaughter occurs when a victim dies as the result of an offence that would otherwise amount to murder, but the defendant’s liability is reduced because of the presence of mitigating circumstances, such as provocation. So, in circumstances of provocation (say) where the accused shoots at the victim but misses, attempted manslaughter is a possible charge. Most likely this would be charged as attempted murder but downgraded where the defence of provocation was made out.

Is attempted manslaughter a real crime?

Is there such thing as being charged with attempted manslaughter? During a scene of a movie where they're reading out another character's rap sheet they mention 'attempted manslaughter'. As I understand it manslaughter is the unlawful but unintentional killing of another person through some sort of criminal negligence. Calling it attempted manslaughter, in my eyes, implies some sort of intent thus attempted and manslaughter seem to contradict each other. I'm just wondering is this some sort of technical mistake in the movie or is there such a crime as attempted manslaughter?

canada Case law is limited, but has taken the view that attempted manslaughter is not possible This has not been decided by the Supreme Court of Canada, but a court of appeal has said it is not possible. See R. v. Menard (1960), 130 C.C.C. 242 (Q.C.C.A.) , leave to appeal to Supreme Court of Canada refused: I find it impossible to conceive of attempted manslaughter; the French translation expresses my idea even better: how can one suppose that a person can mean to commit involuntary homicide? While the Criminal Code allows for a provocation defence to reduce an offence of murder to one of manslaughter, one court has said it does not operate to reduce a charge of attempted murder to one of attempted manslaughter ( R. v. Campbell (1977), 38 C.C.C. (2d) 6 (Ont. C.A.) ). new-york The Court of Appeals of the State of New York has also accepted that: An attempt to commit manslaughter is apparently a contradiction because the specific crime of manslaughter involves no intent and accordingly, an intention to commit a crime whose distinguishing element is lack of intent is logically repugnant. People v. Foster , 19 N.Y.2d 150 (N.Y. 1967) , quoting from People v. Brown , 21 A.D.2d 738 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964) However, in Foster , the Court allowed a plea to attempted manslaughter to stand, in the circumstance where the charge was for attempted murder. While there may be question whether a plea to attempted manslaughter is technically and logically consistent, such a plea should be sustained on the ground that it was sought by defendant and freely taken as part of a bargain which was struck for the defendant's benefit. The logic In these jurisdictions, an attempt requires intention to complete the entire actus reus of the offence. One of the elements of manslaughter's actus reus is the death of the victim. An attempted manslaughter therefore would require an intent to cause the death of the victim. But of course this intention to cause the death makes the crime no longer manslaughter in these jurisdictions, so therein lies the logical contradiction.

Is attempted manslaughter a real crime?

Is there such thing as being charged with attempted manslaughter? During a scene of a movie where they're reading out another character's rap sheet they mention 'attempted manslaughter'. As I understand it manslaughter is the unlawful but unintentional killing of another person through some sort of criminal negligence. Calling it attempted manslaughter, in my eyes, implies some sort of intent thus attempted and manslaughter seem to contradict each other. I'm just wondering is this some sort of technical mistake in the movie or is there such a crime as attempted manslaughter?

germany Mord (murder) is a homicide with any one enumerated aggravating circumstance. Totschlag (manslaughter) is a homicide without any of those enumerated circumstances. In both of these, the perpetrator wanted a death to happen. Fahrlässige Tötung (negligent killing) is a homicide with culpable negligence or recklessness, but no intent. Vorsätzliche Körperverletzung mit Todesfolge (intentional battery with lethal results) is an intentional, unlawful injury which causes unintentional death. So attempted Totschlag is possible (and actually a significant proportion of homicide-type cases), but the definion you gave sounds more like vorsätzliche Körperverletzung mit Todesfolge , where an attempt would be an attempted vorsätzliche Körperverletzung without the lethal results.

Is attempted manslaughter a real crime?

Is there such thing as being charged with attempted manslaughter? During a scene of a movie where they're reading out another character's rap sheet they mention 'attempted manslaughter'. As I understand it manslaughter is the unlawful but unintentional killing of another person through some sort of criminal negligence. Calling it attempted manslaughter, in my eyes, implies some sort of intent thus attempted and manslaughter seem to contradict each other. I'm just wondering is this some sort of technical mistake in the movie or is there such a crime as attempted manslaughter?

germany Yes , but attempted manslaughter/murder (Versuchte Totschlag) is not defined in the German Criminal Code (StGB). Since Totschlag or a less serious case of murder is a Serious criminal offence (Verbrechen), the attempt always entails a criminal liability and therefore does not need to be expressly stated, because StGB §23 (1) applies. For Less serious criminal offences (Vergehen), the attempt must be expressly stated to entail criminal liability. Sources : §12 - Serious (Verbrechen) and less serious (Vergehen) criminal offences (1) Serious criminal offences (Verbrechen) are unlawful acts which are punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment of one year . (2) Less serious criminal offences (Vergehen) are unlawful acts which are punishable by a lesser minimum term of imprisonment or by a fine. §23 - Criminal liability for attempt (1) An attempt to commit a serious criminal offence (Verbrechen) always entails criminal liability, an attempt to commit a less serious criminal offence (Vergehen) only if expressly so provided by law. §212 - Murder (Totschlag) §213 - Less serious case of murder ... the penalty is imprisonment for a term of between one year and 10 years.

Is attempted manslaughter a real crime?

Is there such thing as being charged with attempted manslaughter? During a scene of a movie where they're reading out another character's rap sheet they mention 'attempted manslaughter'. As I understand it manslaughter is the unlawful but unintentional killing of another person through some sort of criminal negligence. Calling it attempted manslaughter, in my eyes, implies some sort of intent thus attempted and manslaughter seem to contradict each other. I'm just wondering is this some sort of technical mistake in the movie or is there such a crime as attempted manslaughter?

finland As the other answers have pointed out, many jurisdictions have a crime in the books for actively killing a person, and an aggravated version translated as "murder". I'll just add the Finnish law's view on the matter. Finnish criminal law has a crime called "tappo", literally "killing" but translated as manslaughter. The definition of the crime is simply "Whoever kills another person." Murder is defined by premeditation or the presence of aggravating factors. As with other severe crimes, the sections end with "An attempt is punishable". (Rikoslaki chapter 21, §1 and §2) For an example, the Supreme Court's resolution 1999:20 was on a case where a person claimed that they simply meant to cut the victim without an intent to kill, and should be sentenced for aggravated assault. The court held that the cut only nearly missed major arteries and therefore was an attempted manslaughter. There is a fourth crime, "kuolemantuottamus" or "causing death by negligence", which governs situations where neither intent nor a direct harmful act was present. This covers everything from a boss neglecting workplace safety to accidentally running over a pedestrian with your car.

Is attempted manslaughter a real crime?

Is there such thing as being charged with attempted manslaughter? During a scene of a movie where they're reading out another character's rap sheet they mention 'attempted manslaughter'. As I understand it manslaughter is the unlawful but unintentional killing of another person through some sort of criminal negligence. Calling it attempted manslaughter, in my eyes, implies some sort of intent thus attempted and manslaughter seem to contradict each other. I'm just wondering is this some sort of technical mistake in the movie or is there such a crime as attempted manslaughter?

united-states minnesota It looks like there's a path to this in Minnesota. MN 609.17 : "Attempts" says that: Whoever, with intent to commit a crime, does an act which is a substantial step toward, and more than preparation for, the commission of the crime is guilty of an attempt to commit that crime MN 609.20 : Manslaughter in the first degree, P3 provides that someone is guilty of manslaughter who intentionally causes the death of another person because the actor is coerced by threats made by someone other than the actor's coconspirator and which cause the actor reasonably to believe that the act performed by the actor is the only means of preventing imminent death to the actor or another So, there's at least an argument to be made that someone who is being "coerced by threats" into killing someone else an "does an act which is a substantial step toward" that goal could be guilty of attempted manslaughter. That is, to my reading: if Alice puts a gun to my head and says "shoot Bob dead or I shoot you" and I pick up the gun on the table, that action could plausibly be charged as attempted manslaughter. There's probably a parallel argument to 609.20P1: intentionally causes the death of another person in the heat of passion provoked by such words or acts of another as would provoke a person of ordinary self-control under like circumstances, provided that the crying of a child does not constitute provocation ... but I strongly suspect that it'd be harder to prove the facts in that case.

How to decode a citation to a case reporter

Citations to cases are often in the form Style of cause (year, if not reflected in the citation), [citation] . The [citation] element generally will include an abbreviated form of the reporter (e.g., S.C.R., All E.R., Sask. R., P.), or a neutral citation of the Court (e.g. SCC, UKSC, ABPC, etc.) How can one determine what these abbreviations mean?

commonwealth united-states The most comprehensive source of reporter abbreviation in the commonwealth and United States is found in the Index to Legal Citations and Abbreviations , which should be available at any law library. For the United States, the Bluebook might be more comprehensive. Most law schools or libraries also publish their own abbreviation indices for common reporters. See e.g. The University of Aberdeen's . Here is another from the University of McGill . They all show, for example, that "All E.R." is an abbreviation for "All England Law Reports." Some databases create their own citation formats that look like neutral citations: see e.g. https://www.bailii.org/bailii/citation.html

How to decode a citation to a case reporter

Citations to cases are often in the form Style of cause (year, if not reflected in the citation), [citation] . The [citation] element generally will include an abbreviated form of the reporter (e.g., S.C.R., All E.R., Sask. R., P.), or a neutral citation of the Court (e.g. SCC, UKSC, ABPC, etc.) How can one determine what these abbreviations mean?

For those not familiar with it, a "reporter" is a periodical publication that prints of full text of published decisions of the courts covered by the reporter (historically, a task mostly done by commercial publishing firms such as the firm branded as "West" which hasn't been anything more than a brand since it was acquired by another firm, for a long time). This would be done in encyclopedia sized bound volumes, often numbering in the hundreds, and the citation was to volume X on page Y of the reporter. So, if something were in volume 348 of the Pacific Reporter on starting on page 24, the case number would be 348 P. 24. In this system if you want to refer to a specific quotation or point within a case, you add a "pinpoint citation" to the page upon which what you are referring to is located, so for example, a full citation with pinpoint citation might read: The court of appeals found that the issue of estoppel was not preserved in the trial court. Jones v. Doe , 348 P. 24, 33 (Colo. App. 1984). This full citation contains the surnames of first parties in the case as Plaintiff and Defendant (preferably underlined or in italics), followed by the case citation, followed by the pinpoint citation followed by a parenthetical with the abbreviation of the court and the year decided). The point referenced is on page 33 of volume 348 of the Pacific reporter as part of a case which starts at page 24 of the same volume. The courts in recent years became concerned about becoming too reliant upon commercial case reporters run by private businesses for official governmental court business, so they created a "neutral" a.k.a. "public domain" citation system. This also reflected the concern that dead tree book reporters might cease to exist entirely so that the citation system should not be wedded to them. In this system the format is YEAR abbreviation for the court SEQUENTIAL NUMBER OF CASE IN COURT IN THAT YEAR. So, for example, 2020 CO 57 is the 57th published cases decided by the Colorado Supreme Court in the year 2020. In this system if you want to refer to a specific quotation or point within a case, you add a "pinpoint citation" to the paragraph number in which what you are referring to is located, so for example, a full citation with pinpoint citation might read: The court of appeals found that the issue of estoppel was not preserved in the trial court. Martin v. Nelson , 2020 CO 57, ¶ 22. This form of full citation starts with the surnames of first parties listed as plaintiff and defendant in the case, followed by the case citation, followed by the pinpoint citation. The parenthetical found in a reporter based citation is omitted as redundant. For many years now, however, almost no one has used the physical dead tree bound volumes to research law (a transition that has occurred during my career with the transition taking place around 2005 +/- a few years for the most part), although the volumes and page numbers in physical volumes are still used as one method to identify published decisions in court cases. Neutral citation forms are somewhat more recent than that for the most part. A quite complete list of abbreviations used in legal citations can be found here . The sidebar at the link further decodes citation practices.

Why do court opinions list multiple layers of citations?

It is common in for courts to cite case law. But why do they cite or note what their citations cite? Here's an example I just came across: National Business Services, Inc. v. Wright , 2 F. Supp. 2d 701 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (citing Albert E. Price, Inc. v. Metzner , 574 F. Supp. 281, 289 (E.D. Pa.1983)) The first citation is to a specific page in a 1998 order from a U.S. District Court. Why parenthetically note how that in turn cites an earlier 1983 order from the same court ? It's not like it lends more authority to the primary citation. (Or if it does, then why stop at the second layer of citation? If the 1983 order cited something earlier should it be listed as well?)

This practice varies depending on the court and/or judge's own style preferences and is often a judgment call based on what the author is trying to communicate with a citation. I'll give a few reasons why a judgment might provide multiple layers of citations: because the "deeper" source is a well-used precedent for a particular point, so it is meaningful for readers to know that the shallower source cited the well-accepted leading case on an issue to show that a particular proposition has been long-accepted in a jurisdiction (your example might show that whatever proposition that is being cited has been used in this district over a 25-year period) to show that a decision from a lower-level court is consistent with historical jurisprudence or with higher-level jurisprudence One example : [12] It is common ground between the parties that reasonableness is the applicable standard of review for the Independent Chairperson’s decision. I agree ( Perron v Canada (Attorney General) , 2020 FC 741 (" Perron ") at para 45, citing Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov , 2019 SCC 65 (" Vavilov ") at para 23; see also Schmit v Canada (Attorney General) , 2016 FC 1293 at paras 19-20, and the cases cited therein). Here, the author is trying to say this point is well settled. What is the standard of review for decisions of the Independent Chairperson? It is "reasonableness." This was stated in Perron , which itself cited Vavilov , Canada's leading case (since 2019) on how to select the standard of review. It is important to know that Perron relied on Vavilov rather than an obsolete framework for selecting the standard of review. In your particular example, it seems that Albert E. Price, Inc. v. Metzner is or was a leading case in the 3rd Circuit on what constitues irreparable harm when seeking a preliminary injunction in copyright infringment cases (based on my very brief skim of how other judgments tend to use it). By noting that a judgment cited Metzner , this is a form of shorthand that is quite meaningful to practitioners in this area of law.

Why do court opinions list multiple layers of citations?

It is common in for courts to cite case law. But why do they cite or note what their citations cite? Here's an example I just came across: National Business Services, Inc. v. Wright , 2 F. Supp. 2d 701 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (citing Albert E. Price, Inc. v. Metzner , 574 F. Supp. 281, 289 (E.D. Pa.1983)) The first citation is to a specific page in a 1998 order from a U.S. District Court. Why parenthetically note how that in turn cites an earlier 1983 order from the same court ? It's not like it lends more authority to the primary citation. (Or if it does, then why stop at the second layer of citation? If the 1983 order cited something earlier should it be listed as well?)

There can be several reasons for this practice. Often it is because the words quoted, or the key section of the quote, came originally from the other case, so the opinion gives credit there, but also acknowledge that this court got it from the newer case. So it may be a matter of credit. It is often to show that a doctrine or test has remained steady across series of cases over time, which may well grant more authority than any one case does. It can be to show the different contexts in which the same wording has been used, to show the breadth of the rule. It allows one to trace a relevant line of cases, which can be more important than any one case.

Why do court opinions list multiple layers of citations?

It is common in for courts to cite case law. But why do they cite or note what their citations cite? Here's an example I just came across: National Business Services, Inc. v. Wright , 2 F. Supp. 2d 701 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (citing Albert E. Price, Inc. v. Metzner , 574 F. Supp. 281, 289 (E.D. Pa.1983)) The first citation is to a specific page in a 1998 order from a U.S. District Court. Why parenthetically note how that in turn cites an earlier 1983 order from the same court ? It's not like it lends more authority to the primary citation. (Or if it does, then why stop at the second layer of citation? If the 1983 order cited something earlier should it be listed as well?)

The primary citation from 1998 states in the language cited: Harm is irreparable when it cannot be adequately compensated in damages, either because of the nature of the right that is injured, or because there exists no certain pecuniary standards for the measurement of damages. Albert E. Price, Inc. v. Metzner, 574 F. Supp. 281, 289 (E.D.Pa.1983). The secondary citation from 1983 states in the language cited by the primary court. As heretofore noted, the party seeking a preliminary injunction bears the burden of showing that it will be irreparably harmed pendente lite if an injunction is *289 not issued. See Continental Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chemical Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir.1980); Oburn v. Shapp, 521 F.2d 142, 151 (3d Cir.1975). The general rule in equity is that harm is "irreparable" when it cannot be adequately compensated in damages because of the nature of the injury itself or because of the nature of the right or property that is injured or because there exists no certain pecuniary standard for measurement of damages. See Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. Norton, 21 F. Supp. 707 (E.D.Pa.1937). Courts have also described irreparable injury as "substantial injury to a material degree coupled with the inadequacy of money damages." Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834, 850 (D.N.J.1972), accord Judice's Sunshine Pontiac, Inc. v. General Motors, 418 F. Supp. 1212 (D.N.J.1976). Future injury of uncertain date and incalculable magnitude is "irreparable harm" and protection from such an injury is a legitimate end of injunctive relief. See Phillips v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 602 F.2d 616 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074, 100 S. Ct. 1021, 62 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1979). Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, this Court has determined that Price has shown that it will be irreparably harmed if an injunction is not entered. This irreparable harm would result from the serious, long-lasting, and incalculable harm to Price's competitive position vis-a-vis the defendants if the defendants were allowed to continue marketing their infringing duck card boxes. The secondary citation is to provide the source with the best overall legal analysis summarizing the case law in this area. The primary citation is to show that the older trial court opinion is still good law.

Why do court opinions list multiple layers of citations?

It is common in for courts to cite case law. But why do they cite or note what their citations cite? Here's an example I just came across: National Business Services, Inc. v. Wright , 2 F. Supp. 2d 701 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (citing Albert E. Price, Inc. v. Metzner , 574 F. Supp. 281, 289 (E.D. Pa.1983)) The first citation is to a specific page in a 1998 order from a U.S. District Court. Why parenthetically note how that in turn cites an earlier 1983 order from the same court ? It's not like it lends more authority to the primary citation. (Or if it does, then why stop at the second layer of citation? If the 1983 order cited something earlier should it be listed as well?)

I've also seen this style of multiple-citation (though don't have an example handy) when a case has been going on for many years, possibly with one or more trips to an appeals court then back to the lower court in order to show that a particular bit of information was injected into the case during the first round through the lower court but that it has remained stable since. The current opinion (of the lower court) cites the appeals panel which cited the original lower court opinion. Or even a second round through the appeals panel citing the lower court citing the appeals panel citing the lower court.

Why do court opinions list multiple layers of citations?

It is common in for courts to cite case law. But why do they cite or note what their citations cite? Here's an example I just came across: National Business Services, Inc. v. Wright , 2 F. Supp. 2d 701 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (citing Albert E. Price, Inc. v. Metzner , 574 F. Supp. 281, 289 (E.D. Pa.1983)) The first citation is to a specific page in a 1998 order from a U.S. District Court. Why parenthetically note how that in turn cites an earlier 1983 order from the same court ? It's not like it lends more authority to the primary citation. (Or if it does, then why stop at the second layer of citation? If the 1983 order cited something earlier should it be listed as well?)

One possible reason is for convenience, but that isn't the most compelling reason by itself because one can always look up the cited argument to see what it cites. When used as a tool for argumentation, it is evidently because precedent by itself is insufficient as a basis to make an argument authoritative. This fact can be highlighted for example when contrasting or dissenting opinions can be shown to exist--therefore even when considered in terms of precedent alone, it becomes necessary to show why one opinion might be regarded as "more authoritative" than another. If an opinion cites another opinion, then at least there is some evidence of consensus of opinions, which adds to the appearance of weight beyond citing an opinion that does not cite another opinion (never mind that the judgment being actively rendered is creating more of the same, by passing an opinion upon an opinion). Why stop at just two opinions deep rather than citing a third opinion on which the second is based? It may be assumed that a secondary opinion is sufficient to justify the strength of the argument and so further opinions are regarded as more redundant , or it may be that an earlier opinion is deliberately omitted because it might distract from or weaken the point that the current opinion is trying to make. It should be noted that there may be different cases cited in the primary opinion even as it pertains to the specific topic and so there may be even further discretion in choosing which opinion(s) to include in a nested citation.

Does USA have Neutral Citations like those of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and UK?

CANZUK 's Neutral Citations all utilize the same formula — does USA have anything alike? I cannot remember who, but some professor wrote that American citations are more baffling than CANZUK's Neutral Citations. Gonzales v. Oregon , 546 U.S. 243 (2006) doesn't abbreviate the court — SCOTUS in this case. Castle Rock v. Gonzales , 125 S.Ct. 2796 (2005) doesn't number the judgment . But CANZUK Neutral Citations bear the Judgment Year + Court Identifier + Judgment Number . United Kingdom ACG Acquisition XX LLC v Olympic Airlines SA (in liquidation) [2013] EWCA Civ 369 [. . .] ACG Acquisition XX LLC v Olympic Airlines SA (in liquidation) [2012] EWHC 1070 (Comm) [. . .] Actionstrength Ltd v International Glass Engineering SpA [2003] UKHL 17 Severine Saintier, Poole's Textbook on Contract Law (2021 15th edn), page xv. Australia Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Karam [2005] NSWCA 344 Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallen Investments Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 55 Neil Andrews, Contract Law in Practice (2021), page lvii. Canada 0856464 BC Ltd v Timber West Forest Corp (2014) BCSC 2433 Westpoint Management Ltd v Chocolate Factory Apartments Ltd [2007] NSWCA 253 Whiten v Pilot Insurance Co [2002] SCC 18 New Zealand Bahramitash v Kumar [2005] NZSC 39 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Fletcher Challenge Ltd [2001] NZCA 289 Ibid , page lviii.

Your examples are not neutral citations Gonzales v. Oregon , 546 U.S. 243 (2006) and Castle Rock v. Gonzales , 125 S.Ct. 2796 (2005) are not neutral citations because elements depend on the particular reporter series, rather than being neutral as to who has published. These are citations to: The case found at page 243 of volume 546 of the U.S. Reports (the Court's official reporter), decided in 2006 The case found at page 2796 of Volume 125 of West Publishing's Supreme Court Reporter , decided in 2005 (and this decision is also reported in the U.S. Reports at 545 U.S. 748 ) The court name is not separately mentioned because it is readily inferred from the reporters. Some courts have enabled / prescribed some form of neutral citation Federal and state courts in the U.S. do not uniformly provide their decisions with vendor-neutral citations, but many do provide and/or prescribe some method of citation that does not rely on proprietary reporters. The Illinois state court system has directed parties to cite Illinois state court decisions by reference to the year, court level, and docket number . Several other states have adopted a more typical neutral citation system, using the year, court, and sequence number. This conforms with the approach recommended by the American Association of Law Libraries and is consistent with Canadian, N.Z., and U.K. practice. E.g. Oklahoma and North Dakota : 1995 OK 11 1997 ND 15

Does USA have Neutral Citations like those of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and UK?

CANZUK 's Neutral Citations all utilize the same formula — does USA have anything alike? I cannot remember who, but some professor wrote that American citations are more baffling than CANZUK's Neutral Citations. Gonzales v. Oregon , 546 U.S. 243 (2006) doesn't abbreviate the court — SCOTUS in this case. Castle Rock v. Gonzales , 125 S.Ct. 2796 (2005) doesn't number the judgment . But CANZUK Neutral Citations bear the Judgment Year + Court Identifier + Judgment Number . United Kingdom ACG Acquisition XX LLC v Olympic Airlines SA (in liquidation) [2013] EWCA Civ 369 [. . .] ACG Acquisition XX LLC v Olympic Airlines SA (in liquidation) [2012] EWHC 1070 (Comm) [. . .] Actionstrength Ltd v International Glass Engineering SpA [2003] UKHL 17 Severine Saintier, Poole's Textbook on Contract Law (2021 15th edn), page xv. Australia Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Karam [2005] NSWCA 344 Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallen Investments Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 55 Neil Andrews, Contract Law in Practice (2021), page lvii. Canada 0856464 BC Ltd v Timber West Forest Corp (2014) BCSC 2433 Westpoint Management Ltd v Chocolate Factory Apartments Ltd [2007] NSWCA 253 Whiten v Pilot Insurance Co [2002] SCC 18 New Zealand Bahramitash v Kumar [2005] NZSC 39 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Fletcher Challenge Ltd [2001] NZCA 289 Ibid , page lviii.

American courts do not have any officially prescribed standard for citing cases. The citations we use don't usually include a judgment number, but I'd say they're still pretty straightforward in most cases. Generally, most citations will be laid out to include the following information: The name of the case (usually as Plaintiff v. Defendant ), A reference to the volume and page of the reporter publishing the decision, The court issuing the decision (if necessary), The year of the decision. Looking at Gonzales v. Oregon , 546 U.S. 243 (2006) , for instance, the citation doesn't say that it's a SCOTUS decision, but it also doesn't need to because it's a citation to Volume 546, Page 243 of the U.S. Reports, which publishes decisions exclusively from the U.S. Supreme Court. But decisions from the circuit courts of appeals don't have their own individual reporters, so you would need to identify which court issued the decision when citing the case that Gonzales affirmed, e.g., Oregon v. Ashcroft , 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004) The most widely accepted standard for citations -- whether to court decisions or previous court filings or external sources -- is the Bluebook , and "baffling" would be a generally accepted description of that standard. I imagine you've heard of the criticisms from Judge Posner , who has written repeatedly on this topic.

Does a real estate buyer have recourse to recover fees related to an offer due to seller not disclosing probate period?

I live in the state of Massachusetts and recently put in an offer for a home. The seller is actually 4 owners for which one passed recently (last year). During title search, it was found that there was a probate period with unknown period of time to clear. In fact, my attorney brought it up to the Seller team and apparently they had not even submitted a "S petition" to amend the title yet. This probate period was not disclosed to us in writing and in fact, we agreed to a closing date within the normal ~1.5 months from initial offer. From the buyer perspective, I would have not put in an offer had I known this could potentially drag on. I already accrued fees for attorney, appraisal and inspection. If I walk away from the deal, those are lost. For now, we are looking to salvage the situation by giving them 6 months to clear probate. Clearly, this ties my deposit and I cannot put an offer for other potential houses. But should the worst situation arise (where I have to pull out of the deal), my direct question is whether I have enough standing to pursue them for the expense I incurred due to their error and actually win?

There is no general duty to disclose in real estate sales, except as statutorily mandated. The burden is on the buyer to ask the relevant questions, and not over-interpret what was said. In Massachusetts, there is actually a law stating that non-disclosure is legally irrelevant in certain cases (e.g. "was the site of a felony or suicide"). There are statutes requiring a person to disclose known lead paint and septic systems, otherwise there is no duty on the seller to disclose, instead the law follows the doctrine caveat emptor . Therefore, you must first ask, and not assume anything about the property or the title.

GDPR: Can a city request deletion of all personal data that uses a certain domain for logins?

A city in Finland asked me to delete all data for everyone whose login uses a certain domain. The domain contains "edu" in it and "oppilas" (which translates to "student"), and my website doesn't have data that anyone is going to mind losing, so I have already deleted that data, however, I have some concerns about what to do in the future if the decision is less easy: I'm a little worried that I shouldn't allow certain domains to be used as logins in the first place, especially ones that might be school related I'd like to have some idea for future reference if there's any case where the GDPR would require me to comply with such a request I want to figure out the right way to reply to emails like this one Is deleting the data actually more of a legal liability than not deleting it in some cases? (People shouldn't be able to delete other people's accounts.) I searched quite a bit but couldn't find anyone discussing the possibility of any of these things: an organization asking for the deletion of personal data requests to delete data for more than one person the GDPR saying anything about school-related domain names What makes this request seem wrong is probably pretty obvious, judging from the very straightforward wording of the GDPR: an individual can ask for deletion of their own data, and a guardian acting on a specific child's behalf can ask for data deletion, but there is no mention of any other situation you can (should?) ask for a reasonable amount of identification for the individuals, but in a case like this, it would require the city to identify all logins and prove that they are acting on behalf of all these people, which would, itself seem like a breach of privacy (unless they have a specific list for the ones visiting my website) This seems like a pretty blatant misuse of the GDPR even if it is well-intentioned, and I'm wondering if I should notify some authority about it. I wouldn't bother if it were a teacher or some other small group, but it's the government of a city with a population of tens of thousands of people, and it seems like they're just blasting this request out to every website that has been visited by their users, without even providing a way for anyone to verify that they are, in fact, government officials. I should note that I'm a US citizen living in the US and I'm the sole proprietor of the website, and the website doesn't pertain to the EU specifically in any way, which, as far as I understand it, means the GDPR doesn't require me to do anything about deleting private data, even by their own standards. However, I'd still prefer to comply with it even if I don't really have to.

Can a city request deletion of all personal data that uses a certain domain for logins? Well, they can , but they have no legal backing to make it happen. Their chances of succeeding are about as good as me requesting a Ferrari, a Yacht and a Mansion. I can make that request. People will laugh. I will not get it. I'm a little worried that I shouldn't allow certain domains to be used as logins in the first place, especially ones that might be school related You have no way to know who owns what email address. And it's none of your business. Your only interest should be in whether the address is owned by the person that is creating the account. You probably already do that by sending a confirmation link to the email address when people sign up. I'd like to have some idea for future reference if there's any case where the GDPR would require me to comply with such a request The only way you have to comply with such a request is if the owner can prove their identity. As far as I understood, the "Finnish city" was three degrees away from that. They could not provide any proof they are who they said they are, they could not provide a finite list of accounts they claimed to own and they could not even provide proof they own those accounts. They literally just wrote an email with zero legal meaning. I want to figure out the right way to reply to emails like this one The correct way to handle this is have a feature on your website where the account owner can delete their own account. GDPR compliant. Then you make a text template explaining how to use that feature and reply with that template to every request, no matter how stupid (like this case) they are. If they cannot identify themselves to you by proving they have access to their "own" email, they have no business wasting your time. Legally, they could provide you with a different method of identification. In case of a Finnish school, that would probably need to be power of attorney from all children's legal guardians and a specific way to identify the accounts that is consistent with the data given (for example if they entered their full name and address on your website). You would probably in your rights to demand a certified translation if it's all in Finnish. Apart from the fact that you as a private US citizen have no real means to check the validity of all that paperwork, personally, if I saw hundreds of pages of certified translated paperwork, I would probably just comply. Not sure it it were actually enough, but it certainly gets an A+ for effort to delete data from a private website. But a real lawyer might give better advice with a real case on their hands. Is deleting the data actually more of a legal liability than not deleting it in some cases? (People shouldn't be able to delete other people's accounts.) Indeed. You should not delete people's data because a random punk on the internet sent you an email. You need to identify who the request is from and if they are allowed to make such a request. Whether you have a legal duty to actually keep data, is up to you or your lawyer to find out. It depends on your data and laws. It is perfectly legal to make a website with a textfield that deletes any data you enter after a second. Destruction of data you own is only a problem if you break other laws with it. For example the IRS might not be amused if you destroyed invoices and other proof of taxable income. "Some dude claimed I must in an email" is not going to fly with them. That said, again, please, identify who you deal with, find out if their claim is valid . Don't do stuff because random internet punks write you an email. Because the next mail you get, will be from a Nigerian Prince. Please wisen up before opening that one. People on the internet, through stupidity or malice, might not have your best interests at heart. Don't believe random emails.

GDPR: Can a city request deletion of all personal data that uses a certain domain for logins?

A city in Finland asked me to delete all data for everyone whose login uses a certain domain. The domain contains "edu" in it and "oppilas" (which translates to "student"), and my website doesn't have data that anyone is going to mind losing, so I have already deleted that data, however, I have some concerns about what to do in the future if the decision is less easy: I'm a little worried that I shouldn't allow certain domains to be used as logins in the first place, especially ones that might be school related I'd like to have some idea for future reference if there's any case where the GDPR would require me to comply with such a request I want to figure out the right way to reply to emails like this one Is deleting the data actually more of a legal liability than not deleting it in some cases? (People shouldn't be able to delete other people's accounts.) I searched quite a bit but couldn't find anyone discussing the possibility of any of these things: an organization asking for the deletion of personal data requests to delete data for more than one person the GDPR saying anything about school-related domain names What makes this request seem wrong is probably pretty obvious, judging from the very straightforward wording of the GDPR: an individual can ask for deletion of their own data, and a guardian acting on a specific child's behalf can ask for data deletion, but there is no mention of any other situation you can (should?) ask for a reasonable amount of identification for the individuals, but in a case like this, it would require the city to identify all logins and prove that they are acting on behalf of all these people, which would, itself seem like a breach of privacy (unless they have a specific list for the ones visiting my website) This seems like a pretty blatant misuse of the GDPR even if it is well-intentioned, and I'm wondering if I should notify some authority about it. I wouldn't bother if it were a teacher or some other small group, but it's the government of a city with a population of tens of thousands of people, and it seems like they're just blasting this request out to every website that has been visited by their users, without even providing a way for anyone to verify that they are, in fact, government officials. I should note that I'm a US citizen living in the US and I'm the sole proprietor of the website, and the website doesn't pertain to the EU specifically in any way, which, as far as I understand it, means the GDPR doesn't require me to do anything about deleting private data, even by their own standards. However, I'd still prefer to comply with it even if I don't really have to.

A school may be a legal guardian At common law (so not necessarily Finnish law), a school stands in loco parentis - “in the place of the parent”. That gives them the legal authority, in some circumstances, to act as a legal guardian of their students. Probably including declining with what is done with a school issued email. I don’t know of any case law on this point. However, this just moves the goalposts because it is likely that staff emails are indistinguishable from student emails and the school’s authority to act as guardian only extends to the students, not the staff. As others have said, the GDPR only requires you to honour data deletion requests in certain circumstances, including that you have identified that the person requesting the deletion is who they say they are and has the authority to make the request. While you have identified an issue with this specific request, it appears that you have not addressed this for any request - you need to fix that. When you can delete data without such a request will depend on the terms of service you have with your customers. The GDPR requires that you only keep data as long as necessary so you should have a data retention policy and procedures to purge no longer needed data anyway. The GDPR almost surely applies to you. It only doesn’t if you are conducting a hobby (which doesn’t seem to be the case), or your operations do not include Europe. “[T]he website doesn't pertain to the EU specifically in any way” is not enough - it needs to be specifically targeted at somewhere not in the EU. A worldwide operation is covered by the GDPR if part of it is available in the EU. For example, Amazon has an EU based subsidiary, partly for tax reasons but also so Amazon US is not operating the EU; Amazon Europe has to comply with the GDPR, Amazon US does not keep PII of people in Europe nor sell into Europe so it doesn’t have to comply.

GDPR: Can a city request deletion of all personal data that uses a certain domain for logins?

A city in Finland asked me to delete all data for everyone whose login uses a certain domain. The domain contains "edu" in it and "oppilas" (which translates to "student"), and my website doesn't have data that anyone is going to mind losing, so I have already deleted that data, however, I have some concerns about what to do in the future if the decision is less easy: I'm a little worried that I shouldn't allow certain domains to be used as logins in the first place, especially ones that might be school related I'd like to have some idea for future reference if there's any case where the GDPR would require me to comply with such a request I want to figure out the right way to reply to emails like this one Is deleting the data actually more of a legal liability than not deleting it in some cases? (People shouldn't be able to delete other people's accounts.) I searched quite a bit but couldn't find anyone discussing the possibility of any of these things: an organization asking for the deletion of personal data requests to delete data for more than one person the GDPR saying anything about school-related domain names What makes this request seem wrong is probably pretty obvious, judging from the very straightforward wording of the GDPR: an individual can ask for deletion of their own data, and a guardian acting on a specific child's behalf can ask for data deletion, but there is no mention of any other situation you can (should?) ask for a reasonable amount of identification for the individuals, but in a case like this, it would require the city to identify all logins and prove that they are acting on behalf of all these people, which would, itself seem like a breach of privacy (unless they have a specific list for the ones visiting my website) This seems like a pretty blatant misuse of the GDPR even if it is well-intentioned, and I'm wondering if I should notify some authority about it. I wouldn't bother if it were a teacher or some other small group, but it's the government of a city with a population of tens of thousands of people, and it seems like they're just blasting this request out to every website that has been visited by their users, without even providing a way for anyone to verify that they are, in fact, government officials. I should note that I'm a US citizen living in the US and I'm the sole proprietor of the website, and the website doesn't pertain to the EU specifically in any way, which, as far as I understand it, means the GDPR doesn't require me to do anything about deleting private data, even by their own standards. However, I'd still prefer to comply with it even if I don't really have to.

Probably a complicated situation, which may also depend on where in Europe that school is. First assumption, all the email accounts in question are actually administered by the school and belong to students. Assuming the city "owns" the domain, that's probably the case. When a school or a teacher instruct a student to go to your site, they should probably have a data processing agreement with you before they do, which would spell out that the school does own the data (and that the school admin can order the deletion). Since you were surprised, I'll assume that no such agreement exists. So now you are holding PII which is associated with a number of data subjects (the students) who used their school accounts to log in, but who may or may not have been using them for educational purposes only. If the data subjects are minors, you would have to deal with their legal representatives, which could (for these purposes) either be the parents or the school officials. So you probably need a specialist lawyer to find out. (I also agree with nvoigt that you need to authenticate who asks what, but I'm less dismissive of the possibility that you do have to do as they ask. After you ascertain that the mail accounts are administered by the school, and what Finland has to say about students' rights to their own data.)

GDPR: Can a city request deletion of all personal data that uses a certain domain for logins?

A city in Finland asked me to delete all data for everyone whose login uses a certain domain. The domain contains "edu" in it and "oppilas" (which translates to "student"), and my website doesn't have data that anyone is going to mind losing, so I have already deleted that data, however, I have some concerns about what to do in the future if the decision is less easy: I'm a little worried that I shouldn't allow certain domains to be used as logins in the first place, especially ones that might be school related I'd like to have some idea for future reference if there's any case where the GDPR would require me to comply with such a request I want to figure out the right way to reply to emails like this one Is deleting the data actually more of a legal liability than not deleting it in some cases? (People shouldn't be able to delete other people's accounts.) I searched quite a bit but couldn't find anyone discussing the possibility of any of these things: an organization asking for the deletion of personal data requests to delete data for more than one person the GDPR saying anything about school-related domain names What makes this request seem wrong is probably pretty obvious, judging from the very straightforward wording of the GDPR: an individual can ask for deletion of their own data, and a guardian acting on a specific child's behalf can ask for data deletion, but there is no mention of any other situation you can (should?) ask for a reasonable amount of identification for the individuals, but in a case like this, it would require the city to identify all logins and prove that they are acting on behalf of all these people, which would, itself seem like a breach of privacy (unless they have a specific list for the ones visiting my website) This seems like a pretty blatant misuse of the GDPR even if it is well-intentioned, and I'm wondering if I should notify some authority about it. I wouldn't bother if it were a teacher or some other small group, but it's the government of a city with a population of tens of thousands of people, and it seems like they're just blasting this request out to every website that has been visited by their users, without even providing a way for anyone to verify that they are, in fact, government officials. I should note that I'm a US citizen living in the US and I'm the sole proprietor of the website, and the website doesn't pertain to the EU specifically in any way, which, as far as I understand it, means the GDPR doesn't require me to do anything about deleting private data, even by their own standards. However, I'd still prefer to comply with it even if I don't really have to.

That could be a false flag - the writer may not even be from that city, and may have gotten everyone's data deleted as a prank. So this could be a social hack by malicious actors. I would give the email writer the following instructions: Lock the account holder out of their email address. When that is done, let me know and I will send a message to each email address with an authorization code. (just basically rand().) Open those emails with your administrative powers, and send me back the authorization codes I emailed to those addresses. If they quarrel with it, say "Sorry, due to GPDR I can't help you." That would prove they own the email address. It's hardly a perfect solution - really, you should provide a "GPDR Delete" function for the end user... and make the city log into each student email, take control of the account using "Forgot Password" and then do the delete.

What are the consequences of evicting a licensee without giving them “reasonable notice”?

Bob is a licensee (ie non-tenant occupier). Because he isn’t a tenant, a possession order is not legally required to evict him. Instead, he may be peaceably evicted upon “reasonable notice.” Reasonable notice depends on the circumstances of each case, but often equates to a single rental period. Suppose he is evicted without any notice, for example comes home one day to find someone else living in his place, without any notice or explanation. If he was a tenant, he would have a host of civil remedies available to him in this situation, but does the situation differ since he is not? And, if so, how?

As this is a residential licence, Bob is protected by section 1 Protection from Eviction Act 1977: (2) If any person unlawfully deprives the residential occupier of any premises of his occupation of the premises or any part thereof, or attempts to do so, he shall be guilty of an offence unless he proves that he believed, and had reasonable cause to believe, that the residential occupier had ceased to reside in the premises. For clarity: A license agreement provides a person to use or occupy property without acquiring the rights of a tenant. Because of this, granting a license rather than a tenancy may seem appealing to landlords, however, simply labelling an agreement as a license does not make it a license. ... A license agreement can be terminated by the serving of a notice to quit which in most cases must provide no less than 28 days notice 1 . However, where there is a breach of the agreement by the licensee, the agreement may provide for less than 28 days notice to be given. 1 section 5(1A) Source

How can sound assets be "license and royalty free" but also "non-commercial use only"?

MAGIX likes to sell sound packages that they proclaim as "license-free and royalty free content for non-commercial use only" (e.g https://www.cloudswave.com/creative-tools/s/magix-soundpool-dvd-collection-20/compare/magix-video-slideshow-sound-archive-8/ ). Sometimes they offer products that they advertise as "completely license and royalty free" but if you inquire they still tell you they are for non-commercial use only. I would have thought that prohibiting commercial use inherently requires a license, and that "license-free" inherently meant that the content could be used commercially. Is my assumption incorrect?

They can't. It seems that what is going on here is that someone doesn't actually understand what "license" means.

How can sound assets be "license and royalty free" but also "non-commercial use only"?

MAGIX likes to sell sound packages that they proclaim as "license-free and royalty free content for non-commercial use only" (e.g https://www.cloudswave.com/creative-tools/s/magix-soundpool-dvd-collection-20/compare/magix-video-slideshow-sound-archive-8/ ). Sometimes they offer products that they advertise as "completely license and royalty free" but if you inquire they still tell you they are for non-commercial use only. I would have thought that prohibiting commercial use inherently requires a license, and that "license-free" inherently meant that the content could be used commercially. Is my assumption incorrect?

If it's license free, that means you can do exactly what copyright law allows, and nothing else. Which in practice means not much. If you want to use these sounds on your non-commercial website for example, then you need a license that allows you use your non-commercial website. Now their website might contain a promise that they will never, ever sue you for copyright infringement for non-commercial use, and that they will never ask you for royalties for such use, and that might be enough in court to stop them from getting any damages for copyright infringement. And prohibiting commercial use doesn't require a license. Allowing non-commercial use requires a license.

May my business notify Christians that we won't serve them?

Hypothetically, suppose that I own and operate a small business in Colorado which expresses artwork for clients and that I do not want to express Christian concepts because I am a Satanist. Might it be lawful to make a public notice that I will not offer business to folks who want me to express Christian concepts? Is it any better/worse if I note that I will accept Christian clients as long as they don't ask for anything Christian to be expressed in the product? For context, I'm attempting to understand the conjunction of Masterpiece and 303 Creative .

Probably not. The impediment is the claim that you have a genuinely held religious belief. Changing the context a tiny bit, your employer is statutorily required to make an accommodation for the requirements of your religion, therefore they cannot fire you for refusing to work on the Sabbath, unless it would impose an unreasonable burden on them. If they fire you, you complain to the EOC and the EOC sanctions them. The employer's defense would be that you did not request a reasonable religion-based accommodation (you failed to explain that this was about Sabbath). The employer does not scrutinize the validity of your claim (does not demand proof of what your religion requires). In your planned announcement, you are not requesting a statutory accommodation from the government, analogous to requesting an accommodation from an employer, you are offering a defense in the case the government takes action against you for violating the law. There is a statutory exception to the prohibition against employment discrimination based on religion, that (roughly speaking) a church is not required to hire a rabbi instead of a mullah to deliver sermons. There is no statutory exception w.r.t. public accommodations and religious discrimination. Therefore, to implement your plan, you would have to have the law or the EOC's interpretation of it overturned as unconstitutional. To succeed in your argument, you would have to show that the law unconstitutionally restricts your free exercise of your religion. One part would be a demonstration that your religion prohibits... The least likely scenario is that your religion prohibits doing business with a person outside of your religion. I don't of any religion that maintains a requirement of absolute religious segregation, but that is hypothetically a path to argue – that you will burn in hell forever if you do business with a Christian, or a Muslim. I am maximally skeptical that the courts would ever take such a claim seriously. A more likely possibility would involve "compelled speech" as well, where you are forced under the law to express a viewpoint that contradicts your fundamental religious beliefs. You cannot be compelled by law to express a viewpoint. What is less clear is what constitutes expressing a viewpoint, see this . For example, there is a federal law withholding federal funds from schools which discriminate against military recruiters. Some law schools argued in Rumsfield v Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights that allowing military recruiters amounts to forcing the schools to express a viewpoint, but the court held that "the Solomon Amendment regulates conduct, not speech". The upshot of 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis is that "The First Amendment prohibits Colorado from forcing a website designer to create expressive designs speaking messages with which the designer disagrees". A proposal to refuse to service Christians plainly does not fall within the penumbra of that ruling. Nor does a refusal to print books containing religious material (which you already created). You have to cater to Christians, but you do not have to create Christian messages. You could draw a line between a simple ISP who you pay to make available your religious website (you create it), versus hiring a company to design the website, which clearly involves "expression". The issue is simplified if you don't make a claim based on a specific belief system, instead rely on simple "compelled speech" doctrine. General beliefs do not enjoy the same "Free Exercise" protections that religions enjoy. What matters is what you are "expressing", not what you are doing (like, printing).

Does PHI need to contain health information PLUS one of the 18 identifiers?

I've worked for various healthcare companies and found there's a wide range of interpretation to what protected HIPAA data is. It should be more cut and dry, but in actual practice it seems to be a little confusing. My questions: Can one of the 18 identifiers be PHI by itself, without having any medical information attached to it? For example an first and last name from an EHR system. I have always thought you need some sort of medical information attached with the 18 identifiers to make it PHI, otherwise without the health information, it's PII. So a first and last name with the diagnosis of diabetes is PHI, but my first and last name is not PHI, only PII. Does it matter where the information originated from? For example if a person inputs their health information into a healthcare website, say weight and medical condition, is that different from a doctor inputting that same data into their EHR? The definition states that it's protected if the covered entity receives the information - but what if the patient gives health information (let's say weight and medical conditions) to a downstream business associate (with a signed BAA)? I thought HITECH extended liability to downstream associates as if they were the covered entity. It's worth posting the definition of protected health information for reference. Under HIPAA, protected health information is considered to be individually identifiable information relating to the past, present, or future health status of an individual that is created, collected, or transmitted, or maintained by a HIPAA-covered entity in relation to the provision of healthcare, payment for healthcare services, or use in healthcare operations (PHI healthcare business uses). Health information such as diagnoses, treatment information, medical test results, and prescription information are considered protected health information under HIPAA, as are national identification numbers and demographic information such as birth dates, gender, ethnicity, and contact and emergency contact information. PHI relates to physical records, while ePHI is any PHI that is created, stored, transmitted, or received electronically. PHI only relates to information on patients or health plan members. It does not include information contained in educational and employment records, that includes health information maintained by a HIPAA covered entity in its capacity as an employer. PHI is only considered PHI when an individual could be identified from the information. If all identifiers are stripped from health data, it ceases to be protected health information and the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s restrictions on uses and disclosures no longer apply.

Response to point 1: Yes, it’s true that for information to be classified as PHI, PII must be attached to the health information. If there is no health-related information that could be past, present or, future with the PII, it is only Personally Identifiable Information. E.g. if there is a web page with details like First Name, Last Name, Mobile No and health report attached, then the system is considered and PHI/ePHI. Secondly, all the health records have PII for traceability purposes. Secondly, First and Last Name also does not qualify to be PII, as it’s generic information. I can’t identify an individual basis First Name and Last Name; a 3rd attribute will be required. Response to point 2:- 1. Not at all. 2. PHI is classified based on the kind of information irrespective of who is entering the data, whether its Data Subject, Covered Entity or Data Processor/Business Associate. Response to Point 3:- 1. Even if the PHI is being collected by the Business Associate or downstream actors, it will still be classified as PHI. It is Covered Entities' responsibility to sign a Business Associate Agreement (BAA) with the Business Associate. The agreement should have the definition of the PHI for the understanding of all the affected parties.

Can I ask a cop, "What happened?"

Around 10pm, I see red and blue lights through my window. I look outside, and I see 7 cop cars (and a bike) in front of my house. There are 8 cops standing around in a circle, laughing -- I'm concerned because I bought this (my first) home only months ago. I go out and from a distance have the following dialogue: me: "Is everything okay?" cop1: "It's okay, was just a shark attack." me: "What?" cop2: "We caught the bad guy." And they turned back around to their group, barring me from further conversation. Did I just have a run-in with an arrogant group of officers, or am I in the wrong here? Can I legally pursue the question of "Hey, what's happening here?" Are they not required to inform me if I ask? Edit: I live in west Florida, if that's relevant. I could see it possibly being based on local laws?

You are allowed to ask the police whatever questions you like. There is an upper limit that you can't refuse to obey a lawful order on the premise that you want to ask a bunch of questions, but they don't seem to have ordered you to do anything, so you can ask away. They have no obligation to tell you anything or to be truthful, except for certain questions like "am I free to go" when you want to leave and are testing whether you are under arrest. Even then they don't have to answer your questions right away. The police can therefore ignore you, especially if you are asking curiosity questions. It might be that they are restricted from giving information in certain circumstances (pertaining to the privacy of others). If there is an issue of legitimate concern (e.g. Little Billy has been beating up on cats again) and you feel that you need to know this, then you can request the police record on the matter. Certain information will probably be redacted under state law, but you could get a report that states that some [redacted] juvenile was beating up on animals. The Florida records law is one of the first in he nation, dating back to 1909. You can read this , to see if you think the circumstances match one of the exemptions, though all you have to do is make the request and be told that the record is exempt, then you will have some idea what was going on.

Is it legal to bill a company that made contact for a business proposal, then withdrew based on their policies that existed when they made contact?

Based on a Twitter thread from a mid sized YouTube personality: I have been emailed MORE THAN 10 TIMES by a service I'd like to be sponsored with that I will not name Every time they email me, I say I'd love to work with them, then the middle men come back to me and say they don't work with gaming channels THEN WHY DID YOU EMAIL ME Would it be legal for this creator, or another creator, to stipulate on their contact information page that contacting them for a sponsorship deal when the contacting entity has policies that would make a sponsorship arrangement not possible, and then withdrawing that sponsorship offer when the creator replies with interest, incurs an automatic administrative fees invoice for wasting the creator's time? And would the company be legally obligated to pay that invoice?? I think I've heard a couple of stories about people who put a clause like that on their contact page, sent the invoice and had the company pay the invoice. I'm interested in Canadian, USA and Belgian/EU laws on the subject.

If you have an agreement with a company that specifies "you agree to give me something of value, in case I give you something of value", you have a contract. In order for there to be a contract, there has to be actual acceptance of the offer. You can put out on a web page some contract stating those terms, and if you get positive acceptance of the contract (hence the standard click-through technology), then as long as you have done the thing promised, you can bill them for doing the thing promised. It's not clear what thing of value you are offering on the web page, since it's not "doing actual work". Them sending you an email isn't you doing something. One thing you could do is block all incoming emails, and for money you agree to unblock emails from registered subscribers. Just announcing that you will bill anyone for emailing you does not create a contract, because the emailer need not have even seen your announcement. This is why e-contracts need a click-through button. It's legal to request money, but there is no legal obligation for them to comply. That will be $10, please.

Is it legal to bill a company that made contact for a business proposal, then withdrew based on their policies that existed when they made contact?

Based on a Twitter thread from a mid sized YouTube personality: I have been emailed MORE THAN 10 TIMES by a service I'd like to be sponsored with that I will not name Every time they email me, I say I'd love to work with them, then the middle men come back to me and say they don't work with gaming channels THEN WHY DID YOU EMAIL ME Would it be legal for this creator, or another creator, to stipulate on their contact information page that contacting them for a sponsorship deal when the contacting entity has policies that would make a sponsorship arrangement not possible, and then withdrawing that sponsorship offer when the creator replies with interest, incurs an automatic administrative fees invoice for wasting the creator's time? And would the company be legally obligated to pay that invoice?? I think I've heard a couple of stories about people who put a clause like that on their contact page, sent the invoice and had the company pay the invoice. I'm interested in Canadian, USA and Belgian/EU laws on the subject.

In theory it is possible to actually bill them. Whether you can get paid is the other matter, and whether you want to go to court is again something very different. Most people consider legally binding "contract" to be a lenghty text on paper, signed and stamped by representatives of parties involved. This is not entirely true. Most of the daily activities that involve exchanging money are also contracts, although in different form. For example, the combination of the offer and acceptance of the said offer constitutes a legally binding contract. So for example, when you see a person with a hot dog cart with the advertisement "hot dogs, $10", that's an offer. When you approach the person manning the cart and say "I will have one", that is your acceptance of the contract. If you find stone in the said hot dog and break your tooth, that is breach of the contract, because the offer "hot dogs $10" clearly stipulates edible hot dogs, and the seller did not deliver promised goods. If you get your hot dog and run without paying, that is breach of the contract. All of these can be legally enforced through courts. Back to your case. If you carefully document their persistent offers and make sure they are not pranks, that they are clearly made by people with authority to offer you something, and you accept it each time, then perhaps you could build a legal case that would have some chance of succeeding to enforce their payment (of course you NEED to supply the services as well).

Can a previously binding precedent be overturned based on its rationale being outdated?

Al loses a case at first instance and appeals to some very high court if not all the way to last resort. The ultimate decision is made based on some rationale that appeals to common sense or general social conditions like an observation of what is socially typical. Or alternatively perhaps it is literally a ruling based on a determination what a “reasonable person” in a given scenario might do. Anyway, this becomes the prevalent legal regime for a certain type of case for 50 years, during which time society and culture progress and develop. 60 years later Bob loses a case on the basis of this precedent from a superior court 50 years ago. Is it generally possible to argue to the court in which Bob finds himself that the rationale for the prevailing regime, laid down 60 years ago, is now outdated and thus inapplicable?

An "outdated rationale" is one factor to be considered when overruling precedent. Yes. Precedent relies on respect for the principle of stare decisis , the idea that courts should stand by what they have already decided, and thus enforce similar outcomes for similarly situated individuals. In the United States, the U.S. Supreme Court has established a test for when to ignore stare decisis and overturn precedent: the quality of the precedent's reasoning the workability of the rule it established the precedent's consistency with other related decisions developments since the decision was handed down; and reliance on the decision Janus v. AFSCME , 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478-79 (2018) . Your question seems to most squarely implicate factor 4, i.e., when the Court decided United States v. Al , the state of the universe required Rule X , but the universe has now changed such that Rule Y makes more sense in United States v. Bob . Establishing that fact alone may not be enough to justify overruling a precedent, but that fact will often also support the other factors, as well. Perhaps the quality of the precedent's reasoning is low because it failed to account for the possibility of the changes Bob is relying on. Perhaps those changes are so prevalant that they have rendered the precedent's rule unworkable. Perhaps the precedent is inconsistent with related decisions that have relied on those changes to establish their rules. An outdated rationale was key to the decision to overrule Quill Many precedents have been overruled based -- at least in part -- on that scenario. Probably the best recent example is South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. , 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) , which overruled Quill Corp. v. North Dakota , 504 U.S. 298 (1992) and Nat. Bellas Hess v. Dept. of Revenue , 386 U.S. 753, 87 S. Ct. 1389 (1967) , which held that states may not impose sales-tax collection obligations on a business based on its sales into the state, unless the business had a "physical presence," such as an office, warehouse, or sales agents, in the state. Bellas Hess reached that decision based in large part on the administrative burdens businesses would encounter in trying to discern the sales tax rates applicable to every sale across the country. Doing so would require the seller to (1) know not only what state all their buyers live in, but also whether they were also subject to sales tax based on the county, city, school district, water district, etc., in which each one lived; and if so (2) determine whether their product was within the definition of a taxable good or service in each of those jurisdictions; and if so (3) calculate tax based on the current rates of each of those jurisdictions; and then (4) comply with each jurisdiction's reporting and recordkeeping requirements. In 1967, there was no practical way for remote sellers to carry on their business without incurring massive compliance costs. But when the Court heard Wayfair 50 years later, the same was no longer true. Although other factors also counseled in favor of setting aside stare decisis , Wayfair focused most of its attention on the technological changes that demanded a new rule, noting that everything had changed since Quill was decided. On one hand, the importance and impact of remote sales had grown wildly: Internet access had grown from 2 percent of America to 89 percent. Remote sales had grown from $180 billion annually to more than half a trillion dollars annually, with Amazon and other e-commerce platforms supplanting Wal-Mart stores and other brick-and-mortar sellers. The loss of tax revenue from remote sales had grown from $3 billion to $33 billion. But while the ease and impact of making remote sales had been increasing, the states had seriously ameliorated the burden of collecting taxes on those sales. Many states had spent the last 15 years on the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement , collaborating to bring uniformity to their sales tax definitions, administration, and collection. And technological developments from companies like Avalara -- subsidized by the states -- had greatly reduced the burden of calculating the tax due on purchases anywhere in the country. Therefore, given "the present realities of the interstate marketplace," the Court concluded that it must overrule its holdings from Quill and Bellas Hess : The real world implementation of Commerce Clause doctrines now makes it manifest that the physical presence rule as defined by Quill must give way to the far-reaching systemic and structural changes in the economy and many other societal dimensions caused by the Cyber Age. Though Quill was wrong on its own terms when it was decided in 1992, since then the Internet revolution has made its earlier error all the more egregious and harmful. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. , 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2097 (2018) . Other cases Of course, this was not the first or only case to find that the rationale for a precedent was outdated. Others include: “The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have seemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with the central meaning of the fundamental right to marry is now manifest.” Obergefell v. Hodges , 576 U.S. 644, 670-71 (2015) , overruling Baker v. Nelson , 409 U.S. 810 (1972) "The deficiencies in Bowers became even more apparent in the years following its announcement. [Bowers relied on the prevalance of similar laws in other states as a basis for upholding Georgia's anti-sodomy law, but] the 25 States with laws prohibiting the relevant conduct referenced in the Bowers decision are reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against homosexual conduct. Lawrence v. Texas , 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) , overruling Bowers v. Hardwick , 478 U.S. 186, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) "Experience in applying the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson , had revealed its defects, political and social; and the benefits expected to flow from the rule did not accrue." Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins , 304 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1938) , overruling Swift v. Tyson , 41 U.S. 1 (1842) . "It is untenable to suggest these days that it would be a special hardship for each and every woman to perform jury service or that society cannot spare any women from their present duties." Taylor v. Louisiana , 419 U.S. 522, 533-35 (1975) , overruling Hoyt v. Florida , 368 U.S. 57 (1961) . " Austin is undermined by experience since its announcement. ... Rapid changes in technology—and the creative dynamic inherent in the concept of free expression—counsel against upholding a law that restricts political speech in certain media or by certain speakers. Today, 30–second television ads may be the most effective way to convey a political message. Soon, however, it may be that Internet sources, such as blogs and social networking Web sites, will provide citizens with significant information about political candidates and issues." Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n , 558 U.S. 310, 364-65 (2010) , overruling Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce , 494 U.S. 652, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990) .

Can a previously binding precedent be overturned based on its rationale being outdated?

Al loses a case at first instance and appeals to some very high court if not all the way to last resort. The ultimate decision is made based on some rationale that appeals to common sense or general social conditions like an observation of what is socially typical. Or alternatively perhaps it is literally a ruling based on a determination what a “reasonable person” in a given scenario might do. Anyway, this becomes the prevalent legal regime for a certain type of case for 50 years, during which time society and culture progress and develop. 60 years later Bob loses a case on the basis of this precedent from a superior court 50 years ago. Is it generally possible to argue to the court in which Bob finds himself that the rationale for the prevailing regime, laid down 60 years ago, is now outdated and thus inapplicable?

canada Vertical stare decisis Trial courts are generally bound by existing precedent from higher in the appellate hierarchy. This is the principle of vertical stare decisis . However, a trial judge can consider and decide arguments based on Charter provisions that were not raised in the earlier case; this constitutes a new legal issue. Similarly, the matter may be revisited if new legal issues are raised as a consequence of significant developments in the law, or if there is a change in the circumstances or evidence that fundamentally shifts the parameters of the debate Canada v. Bedford , 2013 SCC 72, para. 44. Horizontal stare decisis As for when an apex or appellate court can deviate from its own previous holdings, this has not been squarely addressed by a majority of the Supreme Court, but see the dissent in R. v. Kirkpatrick , 2022 SCC 33. It observes that it is proper for the Court to overturn its own precedent when: The previous decision failed to regard binding authority or a relevant statute; The decision has proven unworkable; or The decision's rationale has been eroded by significant societal or legal change.

Can a previously binding precedent be overturned based on its rationale being outdated?

Al loses a case at first instance and appeals to some very high court if not all the way to last resort. The ultimate decision is made based on some rationale that appeals to common sense or general social conditions like an observation of what is socially typical. Or alternatively perhaps it is literally a ruling based on a determination what a “reasonable person” in a given scenario might do. Anyway, this becomes the prevalent legal regime for a certain type of case for 50 years, during which time society and culture progress and develop. 60 years later Bob loses a case on the basis of this precedent from a superior court 50 years ago. Is it generally possible to argue to the court in which Bob finds himself that the rationale for the prevailing regime, laid down 60 years ago, is now outdated and thus inapplicable?

Yes. In the U.S., for example, while the Supreme Court precedent is binding on all lower courts, it is not necessarily binding on SCOTUS itself. Perhaps famously, SCOTUS overruled its previous decision of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) and the "separate but equal" doctrine in Brown v. Board of Ed, which abolished the decision. In First Amendment Law, the Supreme Court thrice changed precedent with respect to what qualifies as unprotected speech and when the state may restrict speech and under what conditions. Further, Constitutional Amendments or Amendments to Laws in question can overrule the Supreme Court as precedent is interpretation of statutory laws. If the law changes and the change is valid, then the decision may no longer hold as it is no longer applicable.

Final Income tax Return due to death

If a person dies in 2023 and he has significant income in 2023 he has to file an income tax return. Would that income tax return cover the entire year or would it just cover Jan 1 to the date of death? Could it be done either way?

united-states Income Taxation At Death Final Income Tax Returns Of Decedents The return covers income from the start of the tax year (usually, but not always the calendar year, other elections are possible) until the date of death for the decedent who is unmarried at the time of death or does not file a joint tax return in the final return at death. It is usually reported on IRS Form 1040 for the decedent and prepared by their executor or personal representative. When the final return is a joint income tax return filed, usually on IRS Form 1040, by a surviving widow or widower, it includes the decedent's income from the start of the tax year to the date of death, and the widow or widowers income for the entire year (assuming that the survivor lives through the end of the tax year, if not, it is filed by the surviving spouse's executor or personal representative and includes the income through date of death for each spouse). Note that sometimes in addition to a final income tax return, income tax returns for years during which a decedent was alive the whole year have also not been filed on the date of death. In those cases, income tax returns for those years have to be filed as well as the income tax return for the year of death. For example, suppose that someone died on September 2023 after having received an extension of time until October to file their 2022 income tax return, and this person earned substantial income in 2022 and 2023. Then, the executor or personal representative or surviving spouse needs to file a final tax return for all of 2022 and another final tax return for the partial year of 2023. Income Taxes On Estates Income earned after the date of death from a decedent's assets or contract rights is reported on the estate tax return (IRS Form 1041). These returns must be filed until the decedent ceases to earn income in the decedent's name or the name of the decedent's estate, possibly for decades in the case of estates where there is a large continuing royalty income that is not assigned to someone else, for example. Income In Respect Of A Decedent Income earned before the date of death but received after the date of death is called income in respect of a decedent and is reported on the income tax return of the first person to receive that income after the date of death. Examples of income in respect of a decedent (IRD) include tax deferred retirement account income, and income from a job where the work is done before death and the payment arrives after death for some reason. Capital Gains Taxation At Death But, keep in mind that unrealized capital gains in property at death are not taxed even if the property is later sold at a price in excess of its pre-death basis for capital gains tax purposes (i.e. for more than its purchase price, less depreciation, plus capital improvements, plus certain other adjustments especially in pass though entity ownership interests). Property sold after death is taxed at the sales prices less fair market value as of date of death plus or minus post-death adjustments to capital gains tax basis (with certain losses which would have been gains but for the death disallowed). State and Local Income Taxes Note that all of the above pertains to federal income taxes (often there would be final state and local income taxes as well). Footnote On Transfer Taxation There is a separate tax called the "federal estate tax" that is due on some high net worth people when they die based upon their net worth at death with various exemptions and adjustments that is filed on IRS Form 706 within nine months of the date of death unless an extension of time is obtained. For an individual who has made no gift taxable gifts prior to death, the first $12 million or so of net worth is exempt from estate taxation on Form 706. Federal estate taxation on Form 706 is completely different from Federal income taxation of estate on Form 1041, which is an income tax, just like Form 1040, but for dead people. The Federal Estate Tax is part of a group of "transfer taxes" that also includes the Federal Gift Tax (on certain large gifts made during life) and the Federal Generation Skipping Transfer Tax (which imposes additional taxes in lieu of gift and estate taxes on transfers made to grandchildren or more remote descendants in an effort to reduce gift and estate taxes). Sometimes the death of a person will trigger a generation skipping transfer tax liability for a trust of which the decedent was a beneficiary prior to death under complicated rules beyond the scope of this answer. State inheritance taxes used to be common in addition to the federal estate tax, but all or all but a handful of state have now abolished them.

Asset protection trusts and death of the beneficiary

It is my understanding that an asset protection trust cannot allow the beneficiary to specify where the money goes after the beneficiary dies. That is, it cannot give the beneficiary a general power of appointment after the beneficiary dies. That is the trust must irrevocable specify where the money goes after the beneficiary dies. Am I right about this?

You are wrong about this. An irrevocable asset protection trust can (and often does) contain a "special power of appointment" that a beneficiary can exercise. A special power of appointment is a right to say who gets trust assets that forbids the person using it to distribute to themselves, their creditors, their estate, or the creditors of their estate. In the real world, there must also be a showing that the special power of appointment can't be used (or at least, will not be used) in a way that circumvents these limitations as part of a larger plan (e.g. by making a distribution to a spouse who tacitly agrees to use the money to pay the power of appointment holder's creditors, or if two parallel beneficiaries use their powers of appointment to make parallel distributions to each other). Some special powers of appointment are open ended, others have limitations. For example, a power of appointment allowing someone to decide which charity trust assets go to at their death would be common. Powers of appointment allowing the holder to decide who among the grantor/settlor's descendants gets the trust assets, in what amounts, on what terms, would also be common.

Buying a house from a trust that you own

Suppose that person X is the beneficiary and the sole trustee of an irrevocable asset protection trust. He is not the grantor of the trust. The trust has stocks, bonds and an house in it. Person X has the right to take assets from the trust. That is, if he wanted to he could just transfer the house to himself. Can person X buy the house from the trust at fair market value?

The primary question is why the trustee is disposing of the asset at all. The trustee has a particular fiduciary duty (we haven't seen the document so we have no idea what that duty is). It could be justified because, for example, the grantor needs cash for a brain operation. Self-dealing (acting in one's own interest, which is a conflict of interest), is prohibited for a trustee. With real estate, "fair market value" is a fluid concept, but within limits one can determine that a sale (to self) at $900,000 undervalued the house and that a sale to another would have garnered $1,100,000, therefore this would be an illegal self-dealing. However, the simple act of a trustees purchasing an asset from a trust that he is the trustee of is not categorially prohibited.

If a court witness self-implicates are they automatically charged?

If a witness under oath in court gives evidence that reveals they have committed a previously unknown crime or offence, are they automatically charged or is there another process that may or may not be followed before they are charged? They don't have an explicit immunity agreement, they have just revealed evidence that implicates them. The crime or offence doesn't have to be the one before the court. An example from TV: A man is asked how he was in a position to witness the assault. He says, "I was in my garden at the time ritually slaughtering a goat." He comes from a country where ritually slaughtering goats is done by civilised people and he genuinely doesn't realise that it's illegal in this country. Nobody could anticipate that he would say that in advance and warn him not to. Would he be automatically charged or would it be discretionary? I am particularly interested in Australian courts.

In the US, they would not be automatically prosecuted. The prosecutor would have to find out about the testimony, decide to prosecute, and go through all the normal processes they otherwise would, but they have an additional piece of evidence. Per the 5th Amendment to the US Constitution, a witness cannot be forced to answer a question that would incriminate them. If the question was objected to on this ground and the objection overruled, the witness' answer would not be admissible against that witness at trial, and the prosecutor would have to prove the case using other evidence.

If a court witness self-implicates are they automatically charged?

If a witness under oath in court gives evidence that reveals they have committed a previously unknown crime or offence, are they automatically charged or is there another process that may or may not be followed before they are charged? They don't have an explicit immunity agreement, they have just revealed evidence that implicates them. The crime or offence doesn't have to be the one before the court. An example from TV: A man is asked how he was in a position to witness the assault. He says, "I was in my garden at the time ritually slaughtering a goat." He comes from a country where ritually slaughtering goats is done by civilised people and he genuinely doesn't realise that it's illegal in this country. Nobody could anticipate that he would say that in advance and warn him not to. Would he be automatically charged or would it be discretionary? I am particularly interested in Australian courts.

It's complicated . In NSW, Part 3.10 Div 2 of the Evidence Act 1995 grants a privilege against self-incrimination on the ground that the evidence may tend to prove that the witness has committed an offence against, or arising under, an Australian law or a law of a foreign country, or is liable to a civil penalty. Note that the privilege does not apply to protect you against civil claims by a third-party: you can't claim the privilege to protect yourself from being sued; it only serves to protect you from criminal charges or civil penalties by the state. Where it appears to the court that a question may lead to self-incrimination the judge should recuse the jury and advise you of your rights. If they don't do this then the testimony is inadmissible, however, if the court couldn't foresee the incrimination the testimony is admissible e.g. Q: "Where were you on August 12, 2014?" A: "I was murdering my wife." So, now that you know your rights you can: Choose to answer without objection Object, in which case the judge will decide if you have reasonable grounds If the judge decides you don't not have reasonable grounds, you have to answer the question; the testimony can be used against you. Obviously, if you can't show reasonable grounds then it can't be too incriminating, can it? If the judge decides you do have reasonable grounds, and the offence is under NSW, ACT or Commonwealth law (only): you can choose to answer it willingly and you will get a certificate which protects you from that testimony or any evidence directly or indirectly arising from it. if the judge believes it is in the interests of justice that you answer, you can be forced to and you get the same certificate but if your evidence is false they will throw the book at you. If the judge decides you do have reasonable grounds, and the offence is under a jurisdiction other than NSW, ACT or Commonwealth law: you may choose to answer and, if you do, the testimony can be used against you

If a court witness self-implicates are they automatically charged?

If a witness under oath in court gives evidence that reveals they have committed a previously unknown crime or offence, are they automatically charged or is there another process that may or may not be followed before they are charged? They don't have an explicit immunity agreement, they have just revealed evidence that implicates them. The crime or offence doesn't have to be the one before the court. An example from TV: A man is asked how he was in a position to witness the assault. He says, "I was in my garden at the time ritually slaughtering a goat." He comes from a country where ritually slaughtering goats is done by civilised people and he genuinely doesn't realise that it's illegal in this country. Nobody could anticipate that he would say that in advance and warn him not to. Would he be automatically charged or would it be discretionary? I am particularly interested in Australian courts.

No. In the common law world, conviction of a criminal offence can only occur after a judicial process which starts with a charge laid by the prosecution. The decision to lay a charge is never automatic and involves the exercise of prosecutorial discretion . The other answers have explained the privilege against self-incrimination . While this is an important privilege, it is not uncommon for witnesses to waive it and give incriminating evidence. For example, an accomplice may give evidence against a co-accused in the hope of receiving a lighter sentence, even if that evidence is not important enough for the authorities to induce it with an immunity from prosecution . Or a defendant facing serious charges might explain apparently inculpatory evidence by admitting responsibility for a less serious offence which has not been charged and is not available as an alternative verdict . As suggested in the question, the admission might also be incidental and not understood by the witness to be incriminating. If the authorities choose to prosecute the witness, what the witness said in the previous court proceedings is an admission against interest . It is admissible in the same way as a voluntary confession outside the courtroom. Although the fact that it was made on oath may mean that it carries more weight, it is not conclusive. The witness might choose to give different evidence in their defence – “I was lying then, but I’m telling the truth now.” The exercise of prosecutorial discretion depends on the overall strength of the case against the witness, including the evidence of their previous admission. It would also depend on the seriousness of the admitted offence and any applicable statute of limitations. A less serious or historical offence is unlikely to be of interest to the parties in court and may never come to the attention of the prosecuting authorities. More serious offences are likely to be referred to the police for further investigation and prosecution.

If a court witness self-implicates are they automatically charged?

If a witness under oath in court gives evidence that reveals they have committed a previously unknown crime or offence, are they automatically charged or is there another process that may or may not be followed before they are charged? They don't have an explicit immunity agreement, they have just revealed evidence that implicates them. The crime or offence doesn't have to be the one before the court. An example from TV: A man is asked how he was in a position to witness the assault. He says, "I was in my garden at the time ritually slaughtering a goat." He comes from a country where ritually slaughtering goats is done by civilised people and he genuinely doesn't realise that it's illegal in this country. Nobody could anticipate that he would say that in advance and warn him not to. Would he be automatically charged or would it be discretionary? I am particularly interested in Australian courts.

Not sure about Australia, but protection against this is a constitutional right under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . Most notably, §13: Self-crimination A witness who testifies in any proceedings has the right not to have any incriminating evidence so given used to incriminate that witness in any other proceedings, except in a prosecution for perjury or for the giving of contradictory evidence. Unless you are charged with perjury, which can be summed up by intentionally lying to a court of law, the Crown can not charge you for a crime that you may give rise to, provided that the testimony is yours. It might raise an eyebrow among police services, but that testimony that you provide in someone else's trial cannot be used against you.

Are there any non-conventional sources of law?

The usual sources of law are specific laws created through a legislature and the executive, but are there any sources of law that aren't dependent on an organization or polity? For example, something like customary law, but broader.

There is no one answer, but here are some examples. India is famous for deriving general principles of more important constitutional law concepts that can be used to find constitutional amendments to be unconstitutional. The U.S. has not gone to that extreme but does derive constitutional protections for the overall scheme of the constitution and from the legal context of the nation when constitutional provisions were enacted that don't obvious flow from the text of the legislation (e.g. the 11th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution) has been interpreted to establish state sovereign immunity that the text of that amendment does not expressly provide for). Another somewhat weird source of law in the U.S. (constitutional at the federal level and usually common law at the state level) is that the 21st century right to a jury trial in a civil case depends upon whether the claim would have been litigated in England in 1789 in the courts of law or the courts of chancery in England. Customary international law is a thing. It also often arises from international practices or diplomatic norms, rather than tribunal adjudications. In the jurisprudence of the legislative process and some aspects of federalism, historical practices that have not been litigated are frequently resorted to as a source of law. For example, the question of whether a legislature is in recess has been resolved based upon historical practice. Prior to the French Revolution, customary practice was an important source of law in France. Customary practice was an important source of the English common law. In many British colonies and former British colonies (e.g. South Africa and Kenya and Sudan), lower tribal or village courts were often expressly permitted to apply local custom in their decision making. In the U.S., a collection of secondary authority texts compiled by the American Law Institute, an affiliate of the American Bar Association, called the Restatements, which summarize in codified form, various subjects in common law, are often used by courts as a source of law where there is no case law on point in a jurisdiction. In civil law countries, the leading legal treatises of law professors are an important source of interpretive authority of the civil code and other major codification of the law. Most Islamic countries provide in their constitutions that Islamic law is the highest authority and supersedes any secular law including other provisions of the constitution to the contrary. In many parts of the United States, mostly in the west, but also in Florida and Louisiana, property rights arising under Spanish/Mexican law, or under Native American law continue in force even though they derived from legal systems other than U.S. statutes and common law. See, for example: Tribe: We have "aboriginal title" to these lands in New Mexico because we had exclusive occupation of them from around 1300 to 1650, and then still used them a lot since then. Further, the "sovereign" (the U.S.) has never properly taken them away, so they're still ours. District court: No. Tribe on motion to reconsider: How about just these bits of the lands? District court: Still no. Tenth Circuit : There's still a claim for one of the bits. Concurrence 1: No bits for you. Concurrence 2: Two bits. ( Source )

Are there any non-conventional sources of law?

The usual sources of law are specific laws created through a legislature and the executive, but are there any sources of law that aren't dependent on an organization or polity? For example, something like customary law, but broader.

There is the concept of natural law . The idea of natural law is that certain law can be derived solely from ethics and innate human intuition of "right" and "wrong". US law still has allusions for natural law. For example, the declaration of independence begins with "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights". The declaration doesn't give people unalienable rights, it merely affirms that people already have those rights due to natural law. A practical legal concept based on natural law is that of jury nullificaton where a jury can decide to just ignore the written law when they believe it to be blatantly unjust in this particular case. Natural law was also used as legitimization for the Nuremberg Trials . Although the Nazi leaders did not commit any crimes according to the written law of Germany (written by them), and international law like the universal declaration of human rights did not exist yet, they were still tried for committing "crimes against humanity". Deeds so heinous that their injustice was self-evident and no legal code written by any legislative authority was required to punish them.

Are there any non-conventional sources of law?

The usual sources of law are specific laws created through a legislature and the executive, but are there any sources of law that aren't dependent on an organization or polity? For example, something like customary law, but broader.

In South Africa we also have Indigenous Laws I suspect that by all definitions of 'non-conventional' this would apply. The sources of South African law in descending order of authority are as follows... The Constitution - the supreme law of the country (s 2 of the Constitution) legislation (acts of the national and provincial legislatures, and governmental regulations) Common Law Judicial Precedent Customary / Indigenous Law These being defined as follows.Indigenous law has been defined by the Constitutional Court of South Africa in as having three different forms: law practised in the community; law in statutes, case law or textbooks on official customary law; and academic law that is used for teaching purposes (Bhe v Magistrate Khayelitsha [2005] 1 SA 580 (CC) at [152]). Religious Personal Laws International Law The writings of authoritative publicists of the law. SOURCE

Are there any non-conventional sources of law?

The usual sources of law are specific laws created through a legislature and the executive, but are there any sources of law that aren't dependent on an organization or polity? For example, something like customary law, but broader.

In New Zealand we have https://www.data.govt.nz/toolkit/data-ethics/nga-tikanga-paihere/what-are-tikanga/ --"appropriate customary practices or ‘layers of the culture’ developed by Māori communities and individuals and informed by common cultural values and concepts". Last year our Supreme court allowed an appeal to proceed, despite the death of the appellant, on the grounds that Under tikanga, Ellis would have a right to clear his name or re-establish his mana, even if dead. In Māoridom, mana and reputation carries on in whakapapa[lineage], rather than an individual's life. AFAIK the appellant was not a Maori, so there is a precedent that tikanga applies to everone in NZ.

Are there any non-conventional sources of law?

The usual sources of law are specific laws created through a legislature and the executive, but are there any sources of law that aren't dependent on an organization or polity? For example, something like customary law, but broader.

canada I will list various sources of law recognized in Canada. Whether you consider these sources "unconventional" depends on your perspective. To many people, these are very conventional and obvious sources of law, but I take it from your question you are asking for non-statutory sources. common law (including equity ), including private obligations such as contract the law of England, as it existed at a specified time near a colony's entrance into the Confederation, unless altered or otherwise inapplicable due to local circumstances (for example, see British Columbia's Law and Equity Act , s. 2 ) doctrine (especially in the civil law tradition in Québec) the Constitution, including unwritten constitutional principles and constitutional conventions Indigenous law customary international law treaties

Are there any non-conventional sources of law?

The usual sources of law are specific laws created through a legislature and the executive, but are there any sources of law that aren't dependent on an organization or polity? For example, something like customary law, but broader.

england In England there is a recognised notion of "Common Law", whereby certain rules/laws have been established via precedents set by judges. A very simple example is use of force in self-defence, which is effectively formulated as Self-defence applies where the defendant uses necessary, reasonable and proportionate force to defend themselves or another from imminent attack The basic principles of self-defence are set out in Palmer v R, [1971] AC 814 ; approved in R v McInnes, 55 Cr App R 551 : "It is both good law and good sense that a man who is attacked may defend himself. It is both good law and good sense that he may do, but only do, what is reasonably necessary." Reference: https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/self-defence-and-prevention-crime

Are there any non-conventional sources of law?

The usual sources of law are specific laws created through a legislature and the executive, but are there any sources of law that aren't dependent on an organization or polity? For example, something like customary law, but broader.

germany While the typical role of the jurisdiction is to interpret the written law, court decisions can factually be an equivalent of legislation. In common law jurisdictions, this process is an important and integral part of the development of the law: This is called case law , as Aleks mentioned in his answer. In addition and beyond, and indeed instead of written laws, in common law jurisdictions like England court decisions are one important power developing the law by establishing precedence. But even in civil law jurisdictions which depend much more on written law, for example continental Europe, court decisions can develop the law to an extent which is normally the prerogative of the legislature. A rather prominent example is a ruling of the German constitutional court which established a human right not mentioned at all in the constitution: The right to informational self-determination . The ruling derived a protection against unreasonable data acquisition from the inviolable human dignity stated in the first sentence of the constitution and the right to "free development of one's personality" ( Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG ). Both would be compromised by unmitigated data collection through the authorities or other actors. For all intents and purposes, this human right now has the same status as the explicitly mentioned ones, like freedom of speech and religion, the inviolability of one's home etc. Interestingly a majority to explicitly codify this right in the constitution could not yet be found; one could argue that the court shaped the law in a way which would not find the necessary majority in the elected legislature. On the other hand the court decision made the need for an explicit constitutional law less pressing and the effort to do so less adamant.

Are there any non-conventional sources of law?

The usual sources of law are specific laws created through a legislature and the executive, but are there any sources of law that aren't dependent on an organization or polity? For example, something like customary law, but broader.

germany In addition to the examples given by other answers, there is the interesting intersection of secular law and church law. The two major churches, Catholic and Lutheran, are major employers and they are allowed to apply some non-secular rules e.g. for employment matters. The origin of this is the gradual pushback against religious authority without a total break. Churches claim the right to offer 'asylum' on sacred grounds. This is no longer applied to criminal matters, but it is offered to some foreigners who are due to be deported . Secular authorities are simply hestiant to send cops into churches to deport people. Churches claim the right to demand an 'ethical lifestyle' from their employees, even if those employees are working in places like a hospital or a daycare center. Churches claim the right to investigate allegiations of sexual abuse by their priests , and to handle them e.g. by punitive reassignments. As with asylum, this is facilitated when the secular government fails to investigate properly.

In order to get a refund, I lied about not getting pickles on my burger. Did I commit a crime?

I patronized the Krusty Krab once and ordered something very complex. My burger was supposed to contain pickles, which it did. However, I said there were no pickles and asked for (and received) a refund on that basis. Is that a crime?

If you were in washington state, perhaps. It is not criminal fraud , which is limited to impersonation, forgery and various acts related to "instruments". It could be theft , which (RCW 9A.56.020(1)(b)) is By color or aid of deception to obtain control over the property or services of another or the value thereof, with intent to deprive him or her of such property or services There has been a lawful transfer of property, then later you gain control over some of their property by aid of deception, and intend to keep the money. What remains to be determined is whether you gained control over their property by "aid of deception", as defined in RCW 9A.56.010. This "means that the deception operated to bring about the obtaining of the property or services; it is not necessary that deception be the sole means of obtaining the property or services" (that much appears to be true), and "Deception" occurs when an actor knowingly : (a) Creates or confirms another's false impression which the actor knows to be false; or (b) Fails to correct another's impression which the actor previously has created or confirmed The prosecution would have to prove beyond reasonable doubt that when you made the statement, you did in fact know that the burger contained pickles.

In order to get a refund, I lied about not getting pickles on my burger. Did I commit a crime?

I patronized the Krusty Krab once and ordered something very complex. My burger was supposed to contain pickles, which it did. However, I said there were no pickles and asked for (and received) a refund on that basis. Is that a crime?

A straightforward fraud (1) A person who, by any deception, dishonestly— (a) obtains property belonging to another, or (b) obtains any financial advantage or causes any financial disadvantage, is guilty of the offence of fraud. Maximum penalty—Imprisonment for 10 years.

What is the rationale for alimony or 50/50 asset splits?

Pearl Davis opined, “okay we got a big super chat, ‘why is she awarded alimony and child support if she went to college and got ran through the whole premise of going to college is what if he leaves’— oh that’s a good point —-‘then why did you go to college if you’re just asking for his assets in a divorce. Just go get a job after the divorce” Is there any legal merit in this argument? The consideration seems to be that the rationale for alimony and child support is no longer applicable and true because women have no more legal and social barriers to entering the workforce and are often thought to be rather advantaged over men in the workplace and treated favourably. Presumably when the divorce regime of blanket 50/50 asset splits and even child support and alimony payments were laid down by the law it was rationalised by the fact that women made greater domestic contributions which should be accounted for against the men’s almost invariably greater financial contributions. Where did this regime come from, and what if these social conditions seem no longer to be present, can the regime be argued to be obsolete?

It seems self-evident the spouse who gave up their career to keep the home and raise the children will not post-divorce be in an equivalent position employment-wise (A) as if they had not given up their career or (B) to the spouse who continued their career. england-and-wales The law doesn't mandate a 50-50 split although there is a widespread perception it does. The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (as amended) is current law. It says of a court making property orders, financial provision orders etc: s25 (1) It shall be the duty of the court in deciding whether to exercise its powers under section 23, 24 [F124, 24A [F125, 24B or 24E]] above and, if so, in what manner, to have regard to all the circumstances of the case, first consideration being given to the welfare while a minor of any child of the family who has not attained the age of eighteen. (2) As regards the exercise of the powers of the court under section 23(1)( a ), ( b ) or ( c ), 24 [F126 , 24A [F127, 24B or 24E]] above in relation to a party to the marriage, the court shall in particular have regard to the following matters— (a)the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future, including in the case of earning capacity any increase in that capacity which it would in the opinion of the court be reasonable to expect a party to the marriage to take steps to acquire; (b)the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future; (c)the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the marriage; (d)the age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage; (e)any physical or mental disability of either of the parties to the marriage; (f)the contributions which each of the parties has made or is likely in the foreseeable future to make to the welfare of the family, including any contribution by looking after the home or caring for the family; (g)the conduct of each of the parties, if that conduct is such that it would in the opinion of the court be inequitable to disregard it; (h) in the case of proceedings for divorce or nullity of marriage, the value to each of the parties to the marriage of any benefit F128 . . . which, by reason of the dissolution or annulment of the marriage, that party will lose the chance of acquiring. (3) As regards the exercise of the powers of the court under section 23(1)( d ), ( e ) or ( f ), (2) or (4), 24 or 24A above in relation to a child of the family, the court shall in particular have regard to the following matters— (a)the financial needs of the child; (b)the income, earning capacity (if any), property and other financial resources of the child; (c)any physical or mental disability of the child; (d)the manner in which he was being and in which the parties to the marriage expected him to be educated or trained; (e) the considerations mentioned in relation to the parties to the marriage in paragraphs ( a ), ( b ), ( c ) and ( e ) of subsection (2) above. (4) As regards the exercise of the powers of the court under section 23(1)( d ), ( e ) or ( f ), (2) or (4), 24 or 24A above against a party to a marriage in favour of a child of the family who is not the child of that party, the court shall also have regard— (a)to whether that party assumed any responsibility for the child’s maintenance, and, if so, to the extent to which, and the basis upon which, that party assumed such responsibility and to the length of time for which that party discharged such responsibility; (b)to whether in assuming and discharging such responsibility that party did so knowing that the child was not his or her own; (c)to the liability of any other person to maintain the child.] In short the division of the matrimonial assets must depend on the circumstances of the case. The Lords in the House of Lords judgments White v White and Miller v Miller: McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24 supply some history, their observations of how divorce has changed over time, and of course their own rationales for their judgments. In White Lord Nicholls said there should be recognition of the non-financial contribution of the homemaker/child-raiser. In Miller : ... to greater or lesser extent every relationship of marriage gives rise to a relationship of interdependence. The parties share the roles of money-earner, home-maker and child-carer. Mutual dependence begets mutual obligations of support. When the marriage ends fairness requires that the assets of the parties should be divided primarily so as to make provision for the parties' housing and financial needs, taking into account a wide range of matters such as the parties' ages, their future earning capacity, the family's standard of living, and any disability of either party. The contemporary aim is fairness which is not necessarily the same as an equal share. There is a 'yardstick of equality' (from White ) but it must be applied as an aid, not a rule. Miller v Miller makes the point that people will have different views about fairness and that views may change over time: Fairness is an elusive concept. It is an instinctive response to a given set of facts. Ultimately it is grounded in social and moral values. These values, or attitudes, can be stated. But they cannot be justified, or refuted, by any objective process of logical reasoning. Moreover, they change from one generation to the next. It is not surprising therefore that in the present context there can be different views on the requirements of fairness in any particular case.

In the USA, is it legal for parents to take children to strip clubs?

I understand there are often different laws in different states, if this is the case with this question I would appreciate answers mentioning what differences are there between states.

Findlaw has an article headlined Strip Club Laws and the Regulation of Sexually Oriented Business . Among othe things, it says Below are some of the more common types of adult entertainment and strip club laws affecting the "manner" in which sexually-oriented establishments may operate (in addition to alcohol, which is discussed above): Age Requirements - Most ordinances require patrons and employees to be 18 and older; 21 if alcohol is served ... I'm not going to look for the exceptions implied by the word "most," but I doubt any of them allow patrons under the age of 18. Regardless, if the child has reached the prescribed minimum age then it is permissible under the laws regulating sexually oriented businesses for a parent to take the child to such a business. If the child is still a minor, child protection laws may also have something to say on the matter.

In the USA, is it legal for parents to take children to strip clubs?

I understand there are often different laws in different states, if this is the case with this question I would appreciate answers mentioning what differences are there between states.

germany Since Germany was mentioned in the comments: Jugendlichen darf der Aufenthalt in Nachtklubs und Nachtbars zu keiner Zeit und auch nicht in Begleitung eines Erwachsenen gestattet werden. Zu den Nachtklubs und Nachtbars zählen auch Angebote wie Stripteasebars, Animierbetriebe, Swingerklubs oder Betriebe der Prostitution. Meaning, "adolescents must at no time be allowed to spend time in night clubs, even when accompanied by adults. Nightclubs includes amongst others venues such as strip clubs and places of prostitution" (or just put the paragaph above through Google translate). Previous sections of the cited brochure make clear that adolescents in context also includes children. It is however correct that teenagers 14 years or older may drink beer or wine if their parents are present and give permission. (German Source: Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth )

In the USA, is it legal for parents to take children to strip clubs?

I understand there are often different laws in different states, if this is the case with this question I would appreciate answers mentioning what differences are there between states.

new-south-wales It is not legal for minors to be on the premises of a declared sex club under s21D of the Summary Offences Act 1988. The offence is committed by the operator, not by any non-operator adult who may be accompanying the minor. However, a parent who did this may well find themselves under investigation as to whether they are a fit and proper parent under Commonwealth family law.

Does RIPA 3000 require service providers to retain the contents rather than merely metadata of SMS communications?

The question is not deeper than what is articulated in its title

If you mean the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (aka RIPA), it doesn't provide for mandatory retention of communications data. Broadly speaking, RIPA is about interception as opposed to mass surveillance or retention just in case. The Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009 obliged "public communications providers" to retain what is commonly known as 'metadata', i.e. information about the communication - the originating phone number, the receiving phone number, the date, time and duration (if relevant), the type of call or message - not the content of the communication. See Schedule 1 . In April 2014, in the case known as Digital Rights Ireland the Court of Justice of the European Union declared the EC Directive invalid. In response, the UK made the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA) - sunsetted on 31 December 2016. This provided for the Secretary of State to issue a data retention notice to a communications services provider (CSP), requiring it to retain the data types set out in the Schedule to the 2009 Regulations. DRIPA's Explanatory Notes support my claims above with a summary of the history. This was replaced by the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA), Part 4 of which deals with the retention of communications data . Here too the retention is of the metadata not the content (see s11(87) and the Explanatory Notes ).

Damaged library books by accident

Bob borrowed a book from the library and months later, accidentally dropped his bag (with the book in it) in a river. He retrieves the bag, but the book is ruined, being all sandy and wet. What is the consequence of this accident legally speaking?

If this is a public library in England or Wales, then they are allowed to charge for lost or damaged items, at their discretion, even though there is a general duty for libraries to make their normal lending services available free of charge. The Library Charges (England and Wales) Regulations 1991 , a statutory instrument made under section 8 of the Public Libraries and Museums Act 1964 of says this in regulation 3(2)(e): A relevant authority may make a charge [...] in respect of library apparatus, library material and any other equipment or thing used in providing the library service which is lost, damaged or destroyed by, or whilst on loan to, the person paying the charge. Similarly, they can charge for late return of items, and for various special services. "Library material" includes "words, figures, images, sounds or data recorded in or on any medium", which certainly covers books - even picture books. The library has broad discretion as to the amount and terms of any charge, but the replacement cost of the lost item is a typical starting point. Whether it was Bob's fault that he dropped the book in the river is irrelevant. He is on the hook for the charge. Potentially, he could claim against somebody else if they had damaged the book and thus caused him to suffer a financial loss, but that does not affect the fact that Bob has to pay the library. While other libraries could make this part of their contractual terms for using the service, this specific regulatory provision is necessary because the default position for public libraries is that they cannot charge any fees to local residents for borrowing books; this aspect of their operations is a matter of public law, as opposed to a contract between the library and any given local resident.

Damaged library books by accident

Bob borrowed a book from the library and months later, accidentally dropped his bag (with the book in it) in a river. He retrieves the bag, but the book is ruined, being all sandy and wet. What is the consequence of this accident legally speaking?

As a condition of use of the library Bob will have agreed (A) to pay a fine for late returns and (B) to pay for replacing damaged books (either a flat rate or the specific cost, depending on the library).

SARing received text messages from a lost phone

Al loses his phone and it runs out of battery. He then is sent 10 SMS from various people. He then recovers his phone and switched it on and the messages are all received. Bob loses his phone but never recovers it yet would like to see any messages he may have been sent. As evidenced above and under RIPA 2000, we know that his service provider has been storing all of his received messages even if he never gets back that particular SIM card. Is Bob entitled to access the SMS that were sent to him?

The service provider has no obligation (unless by contract) to keep the content of SMS messages. The service provider may keep content for a few hours or days, for circumstances such as unpowered phones. It will retain the metadata e.g. sender, recipient, date and time, and message type, for a longer period. Bob should be able to obtain the metadata for his outgoing communications via SAR. But before resorting to a SAR, Bob should find out if his provider makes that information available via the customer support or customer account section of its website. Bob will need a court order to obtain the metadata for his incoming communications. The above is true for, at least, Vodafone , O2 , Three and EE , each of which has published material specifically about this topic.

Calling a judge as a witness in a case that the judge is presiding over?

I want to pose a question on the limits of a defendant's right to call people to testify at trial. Let's assume that a judge is conducting a trial (the sort of trial is irrelevant - it could be criminal, civil, family or traffic court even), and the defendant calls the judge to the stand to testify - as a "hostile" witness if need be. Does this action result in an automatic mistrial regardless of whether the judge accepted or refused to take the stand? Further, does a defendant have the right to subpoena and call anyone he wants to the stand, as a witness - even the president or the pope or a member of the jury? If the ridiculous witnesses he calls don't take the stand, is this also grounds for a mistrial since the witnesses he wanted were not heard in court?

Parties may only call witnesses for the purpose of adducing * admissible evidence. Evidence is only admissible if it is relevant . If a witness cannot give any relevant evidence, then a party has no right to call them or invoke the court's power to compel them to give evidence. In practice, if there were any doubt about the witness's ability to give relevant evidence, it is likely that the court would allow the defendant to call the witness, if only for the purpose of a preliminary hearing where the parties can argue about whether the proposed evidence is actually admissible. If a judge or juror is able to give relevant evidence about a case, they should recuse themselves. If a judge does not recuse, or does not permit the defendant to call some other witness having decided that the witness could not give relevant evidence, these decisions can be reviewed on appeal. The standard required to overturn the judge's decision varies depending on the jurisdiction, but generally the defendant would have to show that the evidence they were not permitted to adduce was also material . This might prevent a mistrial from occurring in cases where, for example, the defendant was not permitted to call the President to give evidence about something that occurred at a public event the President attended. The President's knowledge of the event might be technically admissible, but plainly not likely to advance either side of the case, given the other evidence available. Of course, if the President can give relevant, admissible and material evidence about a fact in issue then the defendant would be entitled to call them. * Adduce: cite as evidence.

Calling a judge as a witness in a case that the judge is presiding over?

I want to pose a question on the limits of a defendant's right to call people to testify at trial. Let's assume that a judge is conducting a trial (the sort of trial is irrelevant - it could be criminal, civil, family or traffic court even), and the defendant calls the judge to the stand to testify - as a "hostile" witness if need be. Does this action result in an automatic mistrial regardless of whether the judge accepted or refused to take the stand? Further, does a defendant have the right to subpoena and call anyone he wants to the stand, as a witness - even the president or the pope or a member of the jury? If the ridiculous witnesses he calls don't take the stand, is this also grounds for a mistrial since the witnesses he wanted were not heard in court?

The judge on the stand? Properly Done: A witness must be listed or motioned for, and witnesses can be denied Any party in a lawsuit needs to list all witnesses well in advance of the trial. Presenting the witness list is part of normal motion practice. The law is such that there should be no surprise witnesses because both parties need to be able to prepare for the witnesses. If a new witness or evidence surfaces during the trial, there's a motion to present them. That motion can be oral, during the trial. But without such a motion, they can't be heard. As such, the judge will review the request days to months in advance and deny the motion. The lawyer could try to appeal that, but unless he has extremely good reasons to get the judge into the witness stand, then the motion will be denied, because the judge is extremely rarely a relevant witness. When the lawyer actually had such good reasons, then the judge would have needed to recuse themselves in the first place, and can't preside over the case. In the heat of the moment If the lawyer has the glorious idea to request the judge to take the stand during the trial, the Judge can do a lot of things, starting with denying the motion. If the lawyer does not stop, then the judge can order the lawyer to shut up, then fine them for contempt of court, and finally lock them up for contempt of court. The proper way to deal with the ad-hoc motion being denied is to appeal the decision, which does not lead to a mistrial and if the denial was proper, nothing at all. Who's a witness? Only relevant people may be called as witnesses. Relevant means, that their testimony will lead to helping the case to progress. Unless the sweet old lady that has to tell lots of good things about the accused actually has something case relevant to say, she is not a witness that can be called for anything but a character witness. The President and pope would almost never be relevant witnesses, and so is the judge. The judge can smack down any nonrelevant witness, and deny that they can be heard at all. It is up to the person calling the witness to establish that and how they are relevant, when they provide their list of witnesses to the court.

Calling a judge as a witness in a case that the judge is presiding over?

I want to pose a question on the limits of a defendant's right to call people to testify at trial. Let's assume that a judge is conducting a trial (the sort of trial is irrelevant - it could be criminal, civil, family or traffic court even), and the defendant calls the judge to the stand to testify - as a "hostile" witness if need be. Does this action result in an automatic mistrial regardless of whether the judge accepted or refused to take the stand? Further, does a defendant have the right to subpoena and call anyone he wants to the stand, as a witness - even the president or the pope or a member of the jury? If the ridiculous witnesses he calls don't take the stand, is this also grounds for a mistrial since the witnesses he wanted were not heard in court?

If you had any issue with the judge being a neutral and uninvolved party, you needed to raise it pre-trial. You are to share your witness list pre-trial (so opposing counsel can depose them). Having the judge on that list is a prima-facie claim that the judge is involved. Opposing counsel will jump all over that, and force you to raise the issue pre-trial. Part of their job is to prevent anything which would give you a basis for an appeal. The likely result is that the judge will be recused and you'll get another judge assigned. To add the judge as a witness mid-trial, you'd need to show a legitimate reason to have failed to mention it pre-trial. why you are not simply arguing for a mistrial due to judge disqualification (which ends the trial and moots the point). Be very careful here: you are implicitly claiming the judge remains qualified, and as such, forfeiting your right to claim otherwise later . and lastly, why it's relevant.

Lease signed before I’m fully approved, do I have a case to get out of the lease?

I signed a lease a few months ago and someone from the apartment signed it as well. The move in day is in august. Now, they are saying that my lease is not “fully approved” and I can’t move in until I send in my proof of income. By saying I can’t move in, I feel as if they aren’t fulfilling their obligations of the signed lease. I would like to get out of the lease and I am wondering if it will be easier to do since at this point I am not fully approved.

A lease is a contract. A contract becomes binding once there is an offer and acceptance. Sometimes something smells like an offer, but it is really an "invitation to treat", a sign that they are willing to negotiate. The clear sign that they did not make an offer (as required for there to be a contract) is that they do not consider themselves bound the minute you accept. The language of the document would include some provision like "subject to approval of the application". It is possible that you have "made an offer", which they can accept thereby completing the offer-and-accept cycle, but until you do, you can revoke your offer, if you really want out. You do have to clearly and quickly communicate the revocation.

What did former Justice Dyson Heydon mean by "put that respectfully"?

I'm having difficulty understanding this exchange between Robert Newlinds SC , the barrister representing the Australian Council of Trade Unions , and Dyson Heydon KC , the Commissioner of the Royal Commission into Trade Union Governance and Corruption , on 17 August 2015 ( transcript , video ): THE COMMISSIONER: From whom do you get your instructions, Mr Newlinds, if you don't mind telling me that? MR NEWLINDS: Mr Gordon. THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, but from whom do the lay instructions come? MR NEWLINDS: They pass through a Mr Oliver but I understand they come from the constituent entity. THE COMMISSIONER: Where is Mr Oliver? MR NEWLINDS: He's here somewhere. THE COMMISSIONER: Is he in the hearing room? MR NEWLINDS: I believe so. THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. That seems to remove one obstacle to getting instructions. MR NEWLINDS: No, it doesn't. THE COMMISSIONER: You put that, of course, respectfully. MR NEWLINDS: I do. Is Heydon accusing Newlinds of being disrespectful? THE COMMISSIONER: I don't quite understand that point. If, for example, Mr Oliver had just gone into hospital and was under a general anaesthetic, then of course your position would be impeccable. MR NEWLINDS: May I explain the point? THE COMMISSIONER: Can I just conclude by saying this: that if Mr Oliver is here, it is possible to get instructions from him. If he has difficulties in getting instructions from others, this is just a possible point of view I am putting to you, he should have come armed with them this morning to pass on to you. MR NEWLINDS: You say that. THE COMMISSIONER: I do say that. That is a possible view, is it not? MR NEWLINDS: I don't accept that's a reasonable view. I looked up the legal meaning of "instructions," which is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as: 5. In plural . Law . Information or directions regarding a case, as given by a client to a solicitor or a solicitor to a barrister. Also: authorization of a solicitor or barrister to conduct a case on a person's behalf. However, I also don't understand the point. What is Newlinds saying?

“You put that, of course, respectfully?” You bet your ass Heydon is telling Newlands off. Knock down drag out fights in a courtroom are more subtle than in a barroom and the judge always wins. First we have the trivial issue that the barrister interrupted the commissioner while he was speaking ! This is extreemly disrespectful and Heydon was pointing that out by calmly but sarcastically suggesting that the interruption should have started with “With respect ..,”. The clear implication that the interruption should not have happened at all . It doesn’t matter if you disagree with what the court is saying, you don’t interrupt , you wait for your opportunity to respond. You will be given it. That’s respect. More germanely, the barrister is in a tricky position. I don’t know what came before the video starts but it was clearly one Newlands did not expect but that Heydon thought was foreseeable. Newlands is trying to hide behind “I haven’t been instructed on that” but is having trouble because the client (or at least, the client’s representative) is in the room and can instruct him right now . Not being prepared in court is also disrespectful. At a rough guess, just the people you see in the video are costing somebody north of $10,000 per hour. You don’t show up for the big game, tell the coach you can’t play because you forgot your boots but that it’s not your fault. Particularly when the person standing behind you is holding your boots .

Serving as a trustee of a trust

A person serves as a trustee of an asset protection trust without compensation. Suppose there is a problem and some of the money is missing from the trust. Could the trustee be sued and have to pay money? Would it be a valid defense that since the trustee was not paid there was no contract and therefore the trustee is not liable?

Could the trustee be sued and have to pay money? Yes. Would it be a valid defense that since the trustee was not paid there was no contract and therefore the trustee is not liable? No. There are no gray areas on either of these points. This is clear "black letter law."

Serving as a trustee of a trust

A person serves as a trustee of an asset protection trust without compensation. Suppose there is a problem and some of the money is missing from the trust. Could the trustee be sued and have to pay money? Would it be a valid defense that since the trustee was not paid there was no contract and therefore the trustee is not liable?

Depends on how the money went missing A trustee owes a fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries irrespective of if they are being remunerated or not. They are personally liable for any breach of that duty. However, they are not liable if the acted honestly, justly, and reasonably in discharging their duties under the trust. So, if money is lost as a result of reasonable businesses or investment decisions made by and honest and just trustee, they are not liable. This may extend if the money went “missing” due to malfeasance by an employee or agent of the trust whom the trustee reasonably engaged (assuming the trust deed allows them to do this - most do), providing the trustee took reasonable precautions such as inquiring into their honesty or considering if they should insure against this risk. However, if money is just “missing” and no one knows why, the trustee has clearly failed in their duty and would be personally liable.

Serving as a trustee of a trust

A person serves as a trustee of an asset protection trust without compensation. Suppose there is a problem and some of the money is missing from the trust. Could the trustee be sued and have to pay money? Would it be a valid defense that since the trustee was not paid there was no contract and therefore the trustee is not liable?

It is normal for unpaid trustees (who are not beneficiaries) to have a clause in the trust document, holding them not liable. This would not normally apply to misconduct by the trustee. We have such a clause in our last three trust documents for our accountant, who is the third trustee and unpaid and independent.

Is there a term for set/prescribed measures of damages?

A recent answer answers the question with another question, that of what damage the plaintiff has actually suffered . Yet certain statutory/case regimes have guidelines for compensation that are blind to actual damage suffered. For example, where one can make out that a breach of the equality act has taken place, the Vento scale applies, even if it didn’t actually result in £900 worth of suffering. Likewise, if a breach of either s213(3/6) HA2004 can be demonstrated, then the value of claims under S214 is prescribed by a set formula, regardless of actual impact to the applicant. Can anyone think of any further examples of this, and Is there a name for this kind of prescribed, impact-blind regime for damages measures?

Statutory Damages … the amount awarded is stipulated within the statute rather than being calculated based on the degree of harm to the plaintiff. Liquidated Damages Parties to a contract are free to agree on the amount of damages that will be payable for a class or classes of breach. For example, it is very common in construction and engineering contracts for a per diem to be set for late completion. Such damages must be a genuine pre-estimate of the damage that might be suffered by the breach. If they are excessive, they will be set aside as an unlawful penalty clause. Nominal Damages Some corners of the law allow a suit to be brought in the absence of actual damage in which a successful plaintiff is awarded $1 or similar nominal sum. Such a victory can still be important in jurisdictions where costs follow the event i.e. the loser pays the winner’s costs. Many such regimes are statutory in nature and involve areas where damage can be hard to quantify, particularly in advance - IP law, anti-competitive behaviour, consumer protection, unlawful discrimination etc. in essence, this is still statutory damages. One area of non statutory (i.e. common) law where this applies is defamation. Notably, it does not apply in the largest area of tort litigation - negligence.

Are there causes of action for which an award can be made without proof of damage?

Are there causes of action for which an award can be made without the plaintiff demonstrating loss/damage?

Yes. Therefore, when assessing a claim, it would be incorrect or premature to conclude simply from lack of actual harm/damage that a wronged party would have no available remedy. In order to make this conclusion, one would have to examine the statutory scheme or the nature of the tort to determine whether the claim is actionable without proof of damage. Many statutory causes of action are actionable without having to prove loss or harm. Canada's Copyright Act , s. 38.1 allows a plaintiff to opt for statutory damages Texas's SB-8 creates a cause of action that allows the claimant to recover statutory damages absent any proof of harm to the claimant The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 , 47 USC § 227 provides for statutory damages in the amount of $500 In British Columbia, "it is a tort, actionable without proof of damage, for a person to use the name or portrait of another for the purpose of advertising or promoting the sale of, or other trading in, property or services, unless that other, or a person entitled to consent on his or her behalf, consents to the use for that purpose" ( Privacy Act , RSBC 1996, c 373 ) The common law and equity also recognize various wrongs and remedies without proof of damage The tort of trepass is actionable without proof of damage ( Peter Ballantyne Cree Nation v Canada (Attorney General) , 2016 SKCA 124, at para 130 ). The tort of battery is actionable without proof of damage ( Norberg v. Wynrib , [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226 ). The equitable remedy of disgorgement may also be available without proof of damage (for example, after a breach of fiduciary duty) ( Atlantic Lottery Corp. Inc. v. Babstock , 2020 SCC 19, at para 32 ).

How are "deep fakes" defined in the Online Safety Bill?

It is in the news that sharing deepfake intimate images to be criminalised in England and Wales in the Online Safety Bill : Sharing deepfake intimate images is to be criminalised in England and Wales. Amendments to the online safety bill will make it illegal to share explicit images or videos that have been digitally manipulated to look like someone else without their consent. To try to find the definition I have searched the bill for the relevant words in that paragraph (deep, manipulated, "someone else", "explicit images") and they do not occur. "consent" occurs 9 times but not in this context. I am interested in how the distinction is made between a deep fake created specifically to look like someone and one that looks like someone because they are in the training dataset. Generative AI porn is a thing , and this is all created from video and images available online, pornographic and not. It seems plausible that one could create and share an explicit work using an AI without the knowledge that it looked like a real person. Could that be criminalised under this law?

Section 170 of the Online Safety Bill proposes a new section 66A in the Sexual Offences Act: 66A Sending etc photograph or film of genitals (1) A person (A) who intentionally sends or gives a photograph or film of any person’s genitals to another person (B) commits an offence if— (a) A intends that B will see the genitals and be caused alarm, distress or humiliation, or (b) A sends or gives such a photograph or film for the purpose of obtaining sexual gratification and is reckless as to whether B will be caused alarm, distress or humiliation … (5) References to a photograph or film also include— (a) an image, whether made by computer graphics or in any other way, which appears to be a photograph or film … So the law doesn’t define or prohibit the sharing of “deepfakes” as such. What makes the sharing illegal is the sender’s state of mind and the recipient’s potential “alarm, distress or humiliation.” Subsection (5)(a) then makes it clear that the law applies even if the shared image is computer-generated and therefore not really “a photograph or film of any person’s genitals.”

Salaried workers and sick pay - UK

Someone I work with (in the UK) is salaried by definition of their contract. They used to get a flat rate at the end of each month, lets say £2000 or thereabouts. A new owner has come in and said that sick days will be taken off their pay unless they make those up elsewhere. So the worker has three choices if they are off a day due to illness, they can either have their pay reduced, they can do an extra day at some other point in the month or they can use some of their holiday to cover the illness so they get paid their usual amount. If they work beyond what is expected of them, they get no overtime as they are salaried. The contract they have signed doesn't say they get sick pay, just SSP, but to me this seems to be wrong given they are meant to be salaried. To me this seems like a lose-lose situation for the worker and I'm wondering if it is at all legal? Thanks Rabidbean

This is legal Employees are not legally entitled to receive their salary whilst off sick. However, if the employee is ill for 4 or more days (including weekends), they would be entitled to Statutory Sick Pay. However … It’s possible their contract has been varied by tacit agreement with the previous owner if they were routinely paid for sick time. If so, the varied contract would bind the new owner. However, waivers and variations by conduct of contracts are a tricky area of law and difficult to prove particularly if they flat-out contradict a written contract.

Can personal data compelled by police able to be disclosed to a private business?

Bob is ejected from a private business as the police are called because the security guard felt his dietary proclivities were socially unacceptable in public. The police arrived and Bob was already out of the store but they claimed even after hearing his side of the story that he must give his personal address and details under s50 police reform act due to their having been allegations of anti social behaviour committed. If he didn’t comply with their demand, they said, then he would be arrested. Several problems with this: at first they requested Bob’s details for the purpose of rendering a trespass/barring notice to him. When he declined on the basis that no offences had been committed, they replied by changing their request to a demand on threat of arrest, for which the ground was the then-invoked s50 police reform act, and the fact that there had been at least allegations of anti social behaviour. First, it was evident that they had not been planning to treat the situation as one of dealing with a case of ASB. They simply wanted to relay the private business’s desire to ban Bob from future visits to their premises, which was evidently the motive for their request for bob’s personal details, and in Itself I think I grounds for a compulsory demand for the same. The second issue is that they then turned around and disclosed Bob’s details including name and DoB to the private business who in itself has no right to compel such disclosure of personal data. In my experience, an uncharged criminal suspect’s details have never been disclosed to me by police even when they are aware of them, when I have been a complainant/victim. Why does a business’s private security become entitled to a private individual’s personal details disclosed under compulsion and force of law? The officers explained to Bob that it is permissible to disclose for the purpose of prevention and detection of crime. (Which trespassing in itself is not). Was this officer talking nonsense?

The relevant part of the act is: If a constable in uniform has reason to believe that a person has engaged, or is engaging, in anti-social behaviour, he may require that person to give his name and address to the constable. It certainly seems reasonable for an officer in this situation to assume this is the case. Sharing the information in this scenario seems a little more sketchy. The officer was correct that the police can disclose this info for prevention and detection of crime. However, there appears to be no reason that this is the case here. Bob's information is not necessary to bar him. This can be done without any details besides a physical description for security staff (which the business already has from witnessing and CCTV). Name and address are pointless here. If the business doesn't take that information on entry then it is useless to know; if they do then they know anyway.

Can personal data compelled by police able to be disclosed to a private business?

Bob is ejected from a private business as the police are called because the security guard felt his dietary proclivities were socially unacceptable in public. The police arrived and Bob was already out of the store but they claimed even after hearing his side of the story that he must give his personal address and details under s50 police reform act due to their having been allegations of anti social behaviour committed. If he didn’t comply with their demand, they said, then he would be arrested. Several problems with this: at first they requested Bob’s details for the purpose of rendering a trespass/barring notice to him. When he declined on the basis that no offences had been committed, they replied by changing their request to a demand on threat of arrest, for which the ground was the then-invoked s50 police reform act, and the fact that there had been at least allegations of anti social behaviour. First, it was evident that they had not been planning to treat the situation as one of dealing with a case of ASB. They simply wanted to relay the private business’s desire to ban Bob from future visits to their premises, which was evidently the motive for their request for bob’s personal details, and in Itself I think I grounds for a compulsory demand for the same. The second issue is that they then turned around and disclosed Bob’s details including name and DoB to the private business who in itself has no right to compel such disclosure of personal data. In my experience, an uncharged criminal suspect’s details have never been disclosed to me by police even when they are aware of them, when I have been a complainant/victim. Why does a business’s private security become entitled to a private individual’s personal details disclosed under compulsion and force of law? The officers explained to Bob that it is permissible to disclose for the purpose of prevention and detection of crime. (Which trespassing in itself is not). Was this officer talking nonsense?

Complain to the ico Police are subject to the GDPR just like everybody else. While the collection of the personal information seems legal, the disclosure to a third party is questionable.

Closed source code theft prevention via license

Let's say I have an app stored as a closed source code (e.g on github) for which I have a software license in place (Apache 2.0), is this enough to prevent/prosecute an employee or just a random outsider who somehow managed to get the code, copy it and thereby "proclaiming" it as his own, and in what specific circumstances is it possible (him publishing the app, giving it to a third party etc.)?

You can’t prevent “theft” of your source code, but you can ensure that you can sue the “thief” for copyright infringement and receive damages, or force them to delete all copies of your source code. Now a license doesn’t do what you seem to think it does. Copyright law, without any license, allows people to do very little: It allows them to have and use one copy of the code that you gave them and nothing else. A license allows people to do things that would be illegal without the license. So you need to check the apache license to see what exactly it allows others to do. For example, the GPL license allows people who received the software legally from you with the license to give it to others under some conditions. But I don’t think there is any license that allows people to just take your copy from you. If you think someone took your software without your permission, you can ask a lawyer for help. You can as a first step send them a letter that you believe they have your software without permission, ask them to destroy all copies, and notify you that they have done this. Penalty for copying your software in the USA is either between 30,000 and 150,000 if you can’t proof the amount of damages, or the amount of damages you can prove. Of course this requires that you win a lawsuit which isn’t cheap, and that they have money to pay you.

In United Kingdom what are consumer rights about online subscription

A few months ago I subscribed to an online service that monthly delivers goods (beers) to my home. I now want to cancel but they ask to call to do so. I tried for a few days and of course, no one is ever available... What are my rights? Can I just call my bank to stop the payment?

Assuming the question relates to a consumer as defined in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 . I quote from Janet O'Sullivan, O'Sullivan & Hilliard's Law of Contract (2020 9 ed), p 207. The 2022 10 ed shall be published in July 2022. 8.27 According to s 61 of the CRA, a ‘consumer contract’ is defined in s 61(1) as a ‘contract between a trader and a consumer’. In turn, ‘trader’ and ‘consumer’ are defined in s 2 of the CRA as follows: (2) ‘Trader’ means a person acting for purposes relating to that person’s trade, business, craft or profession, whether acting personally or through another person acting in the trader’s name or on the trader’s behalf. (3) ‘Consumer’ means an individual acting for purposes that are wholly or mainly outside that individual’s trade, business, craft or profession. (4) A trader claiming that an individual was not acting for purposes wholly or mainly outside the individual’s trade, business, craft or profession must prove it. If it does relate to a consumer, then I suggest the starting point is the CRA 2015, which protects Consumers way more than the Sale of Goods Act 1979.

In United Kingdom what are consumer rights about online subscription

A few months ago I subscribed to an online service that monthly delivers goods (beers) to my home. I now want to cancel but they ask to call to do so. I tried for a few days and of course, no one is ever available... What are my rights? Can I just call my bank to stop the payment?

You might contact the Citizens Advice in UK who help in cases of such issues. You might look at Cancelling a service you’ve arranged : Contact the Citizens Advice consumer helpline on 0808 223 1133 if you need more help - a trained adviser can give you advice over the phone. You can also use an online form. If you’re in Northern Ireland, contact Consumerline. An adviser at your nearest Citizens Advice will also be able to help you argue your case or argue for you. Generally, you have a contract with this business, and if you just stop paying they might keep delivering their goods and send a debt collector. Usually a letter with a written cancellation is always strongly recommended. Here they argue (for UK) that e.g. a letter of cancellation might be sufficient, see below. On the above referenced Citizens Advice webpage they have some templates for cancellation letters. There is no specific requirement as to how notification to cancel a contract should be given but in the event of a dispute the burden falls upon the consumer to prove that he did cancel within the cancellation period. So, for example, if he rings you but calls the wrong number, he will have failed to cancel. As a trader, you have an obligation to provide information about how to cancel as well as the means to do so (a form in a prescribed format that your customer can use to give you notice). But whilst you must provide the model cancellation form in your system or process, the consumer is not obliged to use it. He can notify you in any way he likes, and in hard or soft copy. That includes, by letter or written note, by e-mail, or even by an SMS text message. If you offer an online cancellation form on your website then your customer may use that, but if he does, then you must acknowledge receipt of that notice without delay through what the Regulations call a durable medium - e-mail message, written letter, or text message. Of course, the cancellation is effective only if the communication is sent to you before the end of the cancellation period. To emphasise, the key time is when the communication was sent, not when you received it.

If a minor enters a contract without the other party knowing about the age, and then the minor breaks a term, is it fraud?

A minor who signs a contract can void it at any time, which might cause damage to the other party. Let's consider this scenario: A minor signs a contract with an adult online with neither party knowing each other's age. So the adult assumes that the contract is legally binding for both. The minor knows that the contract can be voided at any time, but doesn't tell the adult. In the contract, there is a confidentiality agreement which the minor breaks, such as giving out trade secrets to others. The adult decides to file a lawsuit but only then realizes that the contract was never truly valid. In that case, will the minor face any charges? What can be done?

canada united-kingdom equity A court exercising its equitable jurisdiction may disallow a minor from impeaching the validity of a contract on the grounds of minority if the minor acted fraudulently: Wilbur v. Jones (1881), 21 N.B.R. 4 (C.A.). See also Stocks v. Wilson (1913), 2 K.B. 235 : What the Court of Equity has done in cases of this kind is to prevent the infant from retaining the benefit of what he has obtained by reason of his fraud. It has done no more than this, and this is a very different thing from making him liable to pay damages or compensation for the loss of the other party’s bargain. If the infant has obtained property by fraud he can be compelled to restore it; if he has obtained money he can be compelled to refund it. If he has not obtained either, but has only purported to bind himself by an obligation to transfer property or to pay money, neither in a Court of law nor a Court of Equity can he be compelled to make good his promise or to make satisfaction for its breach. Fraud in this context is not limited to literal misrepresentations at the time of contract formation : "support may be found for the view that the mere fact that the minor wishes to retain the property which he has obtained while at the same time pleading infancy as a defence to a claim for its value, is fradulent conduct in the requisite sense... 'for an infant to attempt to obtain something for nothing is, in effect, fraud in the eye of equity'": John D. McCamus, " Restitution of Benefits Conferred Under Minors' Contract " (1979) 28 U.N.B. Law Journal 89. In the circumstances you describe, if all is believed by the court, the court may exercise its equitable jurisdiction to require the infant to return any benefit they obtained from the transaction. I cannot find an example case, but it also seems open for the court to enjoin the minor to stop disclosing the secrets. Common law and equity user6726's answer focuses on the limited nature of remedies for this wrong at common law. user6726 is correct that fraudulent misrepresentation has a fairly narrow conception in common law, and it is a good answer for pointing this out. My answer is complementary in that it focuses on potential equitable remedies. This is yet another example where the distinction between common law and equity is significant : common law produces a somewhat harsh result for the wronged party, but equity may step in to return some fairness to the situation. The common law rule is that a minor is not liable to restore benefits conferred on him under a contract which is unenforceable against him, even if the contract results from his fraudulent misrepresentation of majority. Chitty on Contracts , §11-056.

If a minor enters a contract without the other party knowing about the age, and then the minor breaks a term, is it fraud?

A minor who signs a contract can void it at any time, which might cause damage to the other party. Let's consider this scenario: A minor signs a contract with an adult online with neither party knowing each other's age. So the adult assumes that the contract is legally binding for both. The minor knows that the contract can be voided at any time, but doesn't tell the adult. In the contract, there is a confidentiality agreement which the minor breaks, such as giving out trade secrets to others. The adult decides to file a lawsuit but only then realizes that the contract was never truly valid. In that case, will the minor face any charges? What can be done?

united-states Contract fraud requires that a representation was made, it was false, the defendant knew at the time that the representation was false, and intended that the plaintiff rely on it, in addition plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation and suffered harm as a result. In your scenario, the child does not make a representation, so failure to ask is the responsibility of the plaintiff. In general, there is no duty to speak, except in limited circumstances such as involves a serious defect or serious risk of injury. The plaintiff therefore cannot sue for damages, though if the minor disaffirms the contract in a timely manner, most states will require returning the goods / consideration in their possession. Also, certain contracts can't be disaffirmed by a minor. Criminal prosecution for fraud is highly unlikely. In the US, most criminal fraud statutes are limited to specific kinds of fraud such as real estate fraud, vehicle fraud, check or credit card fraud, identity fraud, forgery.

Could any British statutes have remained in force as U.S. federal law after the American Revolution?

The question Are any British or English Acts of Parliament still in force in the United States? asked Are there any Acts of the British (or English Parliament) in force before American independence that remain in force either at a federal, state (or other) level in the United States? The existing answers to that question address state law, but not federal law, so I want to re-ask the question about federal law only. Clearly, British laws against e.g. murder, theft, fraud, and most other crimes were received into state law because those matters are under the jurisdiction of the states. But there were also some British laws related to the enumerated powers of Congress, so perhaps they continued in force as US federal law, at least for a brief period of time until Congress repealed them? For example, before Congress enacted the Naturalization Act of 1790 , would a person born outside the US to a US citizen father have been a US citizen by dint of the US "inheriting" the British Nationality Act 1772 mutatis mutandis ? And before Congress enacted the Crimes Act of 1790 , would an American who levied war against the US, gave aid and comfort to its enemies, or counterfeited US currency have been convicted and sentenced under the Treason Act 1351 ?

Clearly, British laws against e.g. murder, theft, fraud, and most other crimes were received into state law because those matters are under the jurisdiction of the states. States (and also to some extent federal criminal statutes) received British common law definitions of various crimes and defenses, but not British penal statutes (which often didn't define those crimes in the late 18th century). The statutory law of Britain did not apply as U.S. law at either the state or federal level upon the U.S. Declaration of Independence, except in isolated cases where a state, or the federal government expressly adopted it by reference in their own statute. The existence of British law, both statutory and through case law, informs how the U.S. common law was understood (something that was predominantly a matter of state law) and how concept in the U.S. Constitution, U.S. federal statutes, and state constitutions and statutes were understood (especially when terms from British statutes are used in a similar matter in U.S. state and federal statutes and constitutions). But, British statutes did not have direct force and effect in the U.S. after independence. As much as anything else, this simply reflect how the nature of statutes v. common law was understood in the late 18th and early 19th century. Nobody expected that British statutes would be directly applicable, so they weren't. There may have been instances where common law rules actually had their roots in British statutes that were mostly forgotten in long layers of British common law case law, and many statutes expressly adopting British case law also expressly incorporate selected relevant British statutes of generally applicability. But, no British statutes were applicable "automatically" in the U.S. For example, before Congress enacted the Naturalization Act of 1790, would a person born outside the US to a US citizen father have been a US citizen by dint of the US "inheriting" the British Nationality Act 1772 mutatis mutandis? No. Basic ways of thinking about what nationality or citizenship even was or meant would have been received, but not by receiving the British Nationality Act 1772 as U.S. law. And before Congress enacted the Crimes Act of 1790, would an American who levied war against the US, gave aid and comfort to its enemies, or counterfeited US currency have been convicted and sentenced under the Treason Act 1351? Not really. From the adoption of the Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776 until the adoption of the Articles of Confederation on June 11, 1777, as a practical matter, the revolutionary forced had very little actual control of the courts in an enforceable way, there was an insurgency against the British underway, and it was an ad hoc effort from day to day and month to month that was muddled through without a formal structure or guidance at a colony by colony level, or even more granularly within a colony. In the period from June 11, 1777 until the new U.S. Constitution was implemented in 1789-1790, under the Articles of Confederation , the situation was fluid and irregular. State governments made most statutory and common law, adopting their colonial era colonial statutes but not necessarily British statutes that their local legislature didn't adopt. Central government laws usually acted on the states, not directly on individuals, much like treaties today. There was little or no directly applicable central government legislation. Many topics, like citizenship, were simply ignored in this era. The U.S. Constitution adopted in 1789, and the initial acts of the First Congress to implement it, were a response to the realization that after the war and its immediate aftermath had settled down, that the newly formed country needed to regularize, institutionalize, and deal with a lot of governance issues and legal questions that nobody had had the time or resources or authority to deal with while a war had been going on. For much of this time period the Revolutionary War was in progress and it wasn't always obvious who even controlled the courts or had practice authority to enforce court judgments. The Revolutionary War was not concluded until 1783. It was an improvisation at first, and not necessarily a uniform one, since the Articles of Confederation conceived of the U.S. as many countries in an alliance with each other rather than an actual single nation that had to address legal issues uniformly. Prior to the establishment of the federal court system under the U.S. Constitution of 1789 that remains in force, the only institution of the central government was Congress and its committees, which functioned as a legislative body, a body selecting people with executive authority, and as a court of last resort from state court judgments. Everything was carried out at the state level except for courts-martial. Structurally, the Articles of Confederation were a fused system, akin to the U.K. Parliament which had its highest court of appeals and its prime ministership fused with the legislative authority of parliament, layered on top of 13 separate sovereign state governments.

Could any British statutes have remained in force as U.S. federal law after the American Revolution?

The question Are any British or English Acts of Parliament still in force in the United States? asked Are there any Acts of the British (or English Parliament) in force before American independence that remain in force either at a federal, state (or other) level in the United States? The existing answers to that question address state law, but not federal law, so I want to re-ask the question about federal law only. Clearly, British laws against e.g. murder, theft, fraud, and most other crimes were received into state law because those matters are under the jurisdiction of the states. But there were also some British laws related to the enumerated powers of Congress, so perhaps they continued in force as US federal law, at least for a brief period of time until Congress repealed them? For example, before Congress enacted the Naturalization Act of 1790 , would a person born outside the US to a US citizen father have been a US citizen by dint of the US "inheriting" the British Nationality Act 1772 mutatis mutandis ? And before Congress enacted the Crimes Act of 1790 , would an American who levied war against the US, gave aid and comfort to its enemies, or counterfeited US currency have been convicted and sentenced under the Treason Act 1351 ?

In 1664 King Charles II decided the eastern boundary of the northern part of the Province of New York would be the west bank of the Connecticut River, and that was reaffirmed a century later by King George III. Then in 1777 the State of Vermont was created within the geographic region considered by those two orders-in-council to be part of New York, and in 1791 admitted to the Union as the 14th state. That would mean the boundary between Vermont and New Hampshire is the west bank of the river rather than running down the middle of the river, as is more typical. If you look a Google Maps, you'll see it clearly marked that way. Only New Hampshire has jurisdiction on the river itself. In 1915, the state of Vermont asked the U.S. Supreme Court to rule that the thread of the channel, i.e. the deepest part of the river, is the boundary. New Hampshire maintained that it is the top of the west bank, not just the edge of the water. (That would enable New Hampshire to collect taxes on an industrial plant on the river bank but below the top of the bank.) Finally in 1933 the Court ruled that it is the western edge of the water rather than the top of the bank or the thread of the channel. The Court cited the orders-in-council of those two kings in support of its decision.

What if someone published program on invalid license and then fixed it?

I saw repository on GitHub where someone had LICENSE file as below: Copyright year name Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations under the License. I have read that Apache2.0 license must be copied into LICENSE file, and then the NOTICE file will contain exactly that what I showed above. If the license was invalid at first time, then can someone say "your code at some moment wasn't licensed, so I created repo with your code and added copyright on my name"? And if license was fixed, then does still someone could do it, because "law is not retroactive"? If yes, what this poor man should do to have copyrights?

It doesn't work like that! If the code is not properly licensed, you can not acquire a license for it. If you don't have a license, you can not use it. Usage without a license is copyright infringement and not allowed: the copyright is with the author, and only the author may make derivates or copies or allow them to be made by licensing it. You do not gain copyright by fixing a licensing error - in fact, you commit copyright infringement if you do not have a license, and providing wrong copyright management information is illegal under 17 USC 1202

Can a bank force you to use their app in order to use their services under the PSD2?

An online bank I am using (Qonto) contacted my recently by email to tell me that I will not be able to use my account from 5th July unless I install their app in my phone. They say it is mandatory for PSD2 compliance. While I understand PSD2 may enforce security mechanisms, it surprises me that under the EU, an open standard is not promoted/enforced for banks (like One-Time-Password/OTP mechanisms). Enforcing to use their app could be discriminatory since it assumes you can install it in your device (you may not have a compatible phone). Also, being a proprietary app, it could be used to track information about you that you do not want to share with your bank. Can a European bank do this? Wouldn't PSD2 protect users from this somehow?

The PSD2 article 4(30) defines multifactor authentication : ‘strong customer authentication’ means an authentication based on the use of two or more elements categorised as knowledge (something only the user knows), possession (something only the user possesses) and inherence (something the user is) that are independent, in that the breach of one does not compromise the reliability of the others, and is designed in such a way as to protect the confidentiality of the authentication data; The EBA published an opinion about the means of 2FA that are compliant with the Strong Customer Authentication of the PDS2 it surprises me that under the EU, an open standard is not promoted/enforced for banks (like One-Time-Password/OTP mechanisms). OTP/TOTP is not a compliant way to conduct SCA because of : The EBA is also of the view that an OTP that contributes to providing evidence of possession would not constitute a knowledge element for approaches currently observed in the market. Indeed, knowledge, by contrast with possession, is an element that should exist prior to the initiation of the payment or the online access. TOTP would be compliant if it used a non-transferrable token that is only useable on that device alone (which a normal SOTP isn't) : As stated in the EBA Opinion on the implementation of the RTS (paragraph 35), a device could be used as evidence of possession, provided that there is a ‘reliable means to confirm possession through the generation or receipt of a dynamic validation element on the device’. Evidence could, in this context, be provided through the generation of a one-time password (OTP), whether generated by a piece of software or by hardware, such as a token, text message (SMS) or push notification. In the case of an SMS, and as highlighted in Q&A 4039, the possession element ‘would not be the SMS itself, but rather, typically, the SIM-card associated with the respective mobile number’. Can a European bank do this? App-based auth is compliant because : The EBA is of the view that approaches relying on mobile apps, web browsers or the exchange of (public and private) keys may also be evidence of possession, provided that they include a device-binding process that ensures a unique connection between the PSU’s app, browser or key and the device. This may, for instance, be through hardware crypto-security, web browser and mobile-device registration or keys stored in the secure element of a device Also, being a proprietary app, it could be used to track information about you that you do not want to share with your bank. You need to read the Privacy Policy of the app/service and exert your country/EU consent modification/retraction right Can a European bank do this? Why wouldn't they be allowed? There are many services that you can only access on a proprietary app. Wouldn't PSD2 protect users from this somehow? PSD2 gives security requirements, not anything else

In what sense is the City of London a "corporation"?

According to its recently quoted annual report, legislation treats it "as a corporation". In what sense is this true and in which is it not true?

Although the word typically refers to a specific type of business entity, "corporation" simply means a group (or "body") of people or other entities that are collectively endowed with a status that treats them as though they were a single legal person that can exist indefinitely. In common-law jurisdictions like the U.K., this includes municipal corporations, which generally consist of the people living within the corporation's territorial boundaries, exercising their collective will through their elected representatives, and assigned certain rights and obligations as a result of their collective status. Although the same word is used, it would generally not be the case that a municipal corporation would be governed by the same laws as business corporations or trade guilds, which are also sometimes referred to as corporations. Barclay's and the City of London are both corporations, and therefore are treated as entities capable of making their own decisions, with rules allowing for their decision-making bodies to keep them "alive" in perpetuity. But there are also many obvious differences. The City of London does not have shareholders in the same sense that Barclays would, nor is it obligated to register its existence or undertake most of the other responsibilities facing a corporate entity. Wikipedia has more detail broken down by jurisdiction.

In what sense is the City of London a "corporation"?

According to its recently quoted annual report, legislation treats it "as a corporation". In what sense is this true and in which is it not true?

A corporation is one type of judicial person All corporations are creatures of statute; that is, they exist because there is a statute that creates them or allows them to be created. Most corporations in the UK are companies created under the Companies Act 2006; the City of London (formally the Mayor and Commonality and Citizens of the City of London) isn't one of those. The statute that first created the City does not survive, and the city is regarded as being incorporated by prescription, meaning the law presumes it to have always existed (which is, obviously, not true - it's another legal fiction). The first recorded Royal Charter dates from 1067 when William the Conqueror granted the citizens of London a charter confirming the rights and privileges that they had enjoyed since the time of Edward the Confessor. Over the centuries, various charters and acts of Parliament have modified how the corporation operates.

Why was the video evidence heavily debated in the Kyle Rittenhouse case?

During the Kyle Rittenhouse Trail, on days 6 and 8, questions were raised about the program used to enhance the video evidence. The program, Amped FIVE, was used for the drone footage. To do this, Amped FIVE employs interpolation algorithms. Because of this, a dispute broke out between the prosecution and defense. These debates ranged from what is an interpolation, to whether the program added colors. James Armstrong, the senior forensic imaging specialist responsible for producing these enhanced videos, was brought in the courtroom to explain the process. What followed was truly interesting. My main concern was with how the defense went about justifying why the drone footage should not have been used. I admit I do not understand court procedures and several things had me scratching my head. I would like to preface this by saying I understand it is the job of the defense to protect Kyle Rittenhouse. However, I felt did not make the best case. When questioned about the algorithm, on multiple occasions the defense would ask Mr. Armstrong how the interpolation worked. However, every time he was asked, he could only provide them with what kind of interpolation was used. He admitted that he did not understand how it was programmed. And why would he? Interpolation is an incredibly complex process that requires advanced mathematics and computer science. Not only that but, companies purposely do not disclose this information to prevent people from reverse-engineering their products. These questions could only be answered by a computer scientist or mathematician who worked on the program. So why wasn't one brought in? Also, because of his ignorance, wasn't a majority of the questioning a waste of time? Another problem arose when the defense was trying to explain interpolation, they used an example that oversimplified the concept so much that it seemed to no longer make sense. The red, purple, and blue pixel example was very flawed in how it was presented. I believe the example wouldn't even work for the nearest neighbor because it would not have turned the pixels in the middle purple. Although this was a poor example, the judge used this as a basis for his understanding of interpolation which worked in the favor of the defense. Also, the defense kept trying to make Mr. Armstrong admit things he did not feel comfortable with because of his lack of knowledge. They asked the same question about adding colors repeatedly and he could never answer. And the language they use like "add" and "manipulate" implies that the enhanced footage was deceptively altered to give the prosecution an advantage. Because of this, they tried to argue that the video was unreliable. Ironically, the defense submitted evidence that was altered similarly. Lastly, why was a peer-reviewed process using an industry-standard program not allowed to be used? I am aware that the judge said the burden of proof is on the prosecution but didn't they already prove that the footage was perfectly suitable for use in the trial? The prosecution asked Mr. Armstrong whether the procedures were acceptable for forensic imaging. I guess to sum everything up, why wasn't this handled better by both the defense and prosecution. I felt like the discussion went nowhere and all parties were incredibly ignorant.

The defense has an opportunity to question the witness the prosecution had called to provide foundation for the evidence, and in this case the defense's perspective is that the prosecution was trying to introduce evidence that they had improperly digitally manipulated. Part of their questioning was trying to figure out how the witness had manipulated the image prior to offering it as evidence. It's the prosecution's burden to prove that the evidence they are offering is accurate, the defense's purpose in asking the witness questions he could not answer is to try to prove to the judge that the prosecution has not laid proper foundation for the evidence because it has been manipulated from its original form in a way the prosecution cannot explain or justify as remaining fair and accurate to the events captured by the original footage. This case in particular had a lot of video evidence, and most of these issues were handled in motions in limine before the trial started. However, the drone evidence in question was dropped at the prosecutor's office after the trial started, so the prosecution did not really have time to hire and voir dire an expert witness on Amped 5 (keeping in mind that the defense similarly had little time to review and account for the new evidence in the middle of trial). Since the defense in this case were cross-examining the witness, they have some leeway to present an argument with their questioning like they chose to do with the red/blue pixel drawings. As I recall the judge allowed the evidence as-is, so it does not appear that the defense's arguments were persuasive to the judge.

Why was the video evidence heavily debated in the Kyle Rittenhouse case?

During the Kyle Rittenhouse Trail, on days 6 and 8, questions were raised about the program used to enhance the video evidence. The program, Amped FIVE, was used for the drone footage. To do this, Amped FIVE employs interpolation algorithms. Because of this, a dispute broke out between the prosecution and defense. These debates ranged from what is an interpolation, to whether the program added colors. James Armstrong, the senior forensic imaging specialist responsible for producing these enhanced videos, was brought in the courtroom to explain the process. What followed was truly interesting. My main concern was with how the defense went about justifying why the drone footage should not have been used. I admit I do not understand court procedures and several things had me scratching my head. I would like to preface this by saying I understand it is the job of the defense to protect Kyle Rittenhouse. However, I felt did not make the best case. When questioned about the algorithm, on multiple occasions the defense would ask Mr. Armstrong how the interpolation worked. However, every time he was asked, he could only provide them with what kind of interpolation was used. He admitted that he did not understand how it was programmed. And why would he? Interpolation is an incredibly complex process that requires advanced mathematics and computer science. Not only that but, companies purposely do not disclose this information to prevent people from reverse-engineering their products. These questions could only be answered by a computer scientist or mathematician who worked on the program. So why wasn't one brought in? Also, because of his ignorance, wasn't a majority of the questioning a waste of time? Another problem arose when the defense was trying to explain interpolation, they used an example that oversimplified the concept so much that it seemed to no longer make sense. The red, purple, and blue pixel example was very flawed in how it was presented. I believe the example wouldn't even work for the nearest neighbor because it would not have turned the pixels in the middle purple. Although this was a poor example, the judge used this as a basis for his understanding of interpolation which worked in the favor of the defense. Also, the defense kept trying to make Mr. Armstrong admit things he did not feel comfortable with because of his lack of knowledge. They asked the same question about adding colors repeatedly and he could never answer. And the language they use like "add" and "manipulate" implies that the enhanced footage was deceptively altered to give the prosecution an advantage. Because of this, they tried to argue that the video was unreliable. Ironically, the defense submitted evidence that was altered similarly. Lastly, why was a peer-reviewed process using an industry-standard program not allowed to be used? I am aware that the judge said the burden of proof is on the prosecution but didn't they already prove that the footage was perfectly suitable for use in the trial? The prosecution asked Mr. Armstrong whether the procedures were acceptable for forensic imaging. I guess to sum everything up, why wasn't this handled better by both the defense and prosecution. I felt like the discussion went nowhere and all parties were incredibly ignorant.

I'm not overly familiar with this case, so will answer in general terms: If the defence are not satisfied by a prosecution witness’s testimony then they are free to call their own witnesses in rebuttal, or to submit their own version of events and/or evidence to the jury. As a side note; poor legal representation or case management by the defence team may be grounds for appeal (I don't know about the USA, but this is only available in extreme circumstances in England and Wales).

Does running your own limited liability company constitute employment?

What exactly is "employment"? Does running my own limited liability company (GmbH or similar) constitute "employment"? I am asking this because my (Swiss) employment contract (which I am about to sign) forbids "any other remunerated employment". Is it then OK to (at the same time) form a company and serve another client(s), provided that all the other clauses and ethical rules are met, e.g. I am not entering into direct competition, trading business secrets etc.? Thank you UPDATE (1): OK thank you for your answers and hints so far. If we just remove this clause from the contract, would it then be OK to run a company and serve (for pay) other client(s) (provided that all the other clauses and ethical rules are met)? Or is this prohibited by default (where?), and hence must be explicitly allowed? UPDATE (2): the employment contract in question is part-time.

Your own limited company will at the very least have a company director (you) which is most likely employed.

Does running your own limited liability company constitute employment?

What exactly is "employment"? Does running my own limited liability company (GmbH or similar) constitute "employment"? I am asking this because my (Swiss) employment contract (which I am about to sign) forbids "any other remunerated employment". Is it then OK to (at the same time) form a company and serve another client(s), provided that all the other clauses and ethical rules are met, e.g. I am not entering into direct competition, trading business secrets etc.? Thank you UPDATE (1): OK thank you for your answers and hints so far. If we just remove this clause from the contract, would it then be OK to run a company and serve (for pay) other client(s) (provided that all the other clauses and ethical rules are met)? Or is this prohibited by default (where?), and hence must be explicitly allowed? UPDATE (2): the employment contract in question is part-time.

Answer to updated question. It is legal to have to jobs, or a job plus your own company, in Switzerland. This should be known to both employers to prevent them being in violation of labor laws. Thus, the most non-controversial course of action is to negotiate this clause out of the contract, disclose your private practice, and ask what if anything is needed to comply.

What allows the Connecticut legislature to exonerate previous witch convictions?

A number of news services have report on the Connecticut legislature voting to "exonerate" witch convictions from the 17th century. For example, this article from wtnh.com news: With distant family members looking on, Connecticut senators voted Thursday to absolve the 12 women and men convicted of witchcraft — 11 of whom were executed — more than 370 years ago and apologize for the “miscarriage of justice” that occurred over a dark 15-year-period of the state’s colonial history. The Senate voted 33-1 in favor of a resolution that officially proclaimed their innocence. ... Some of the descendants recently learned through genealogy testing that they were related to the accused witches and have since lobbied the state’s General Assembly to officially clear their names. I'm not familiar with the Connecticut constitution, but it seems that most states in the United States tend to follow the general format of the U.S. Consitution. What part of the Connecticut constitution allows the legislature to do this? That would seem to violate separation of powers for the legislature to void a court decision. I can understand a pardon from the governor, since that tends to be an enumerated power. But the legislature ? Article XVIII of the Connecticut constitution mentions the separation of powers: The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them confided to a separate magistracy.... And article FIVE section 1 says that "The powers and jurisdiction of these courts shall be defined by law." But from my lay person understanding, allowing the legislature to define the "powers and jurisdiction" of the courts wouldn't allow the legislature to grant the power to themselves . It looks like the Connecticut constitution doesn't enumerate legislative powers the way the U.S. Constitution does. And that sort of makes sense since "police powers" are granted to the states, and their legislatures can pretty much do anything that they want, as long as it isn't specifically prohibited by the state or U.S. Constitution. But since Article FIVE says specifically that "powers of government shall be divided ..." [emphasis added], it seems to my lay-person reasoning that the legislature couldn't intrude into court decision unless specifically authorized elsewhere in the Connecticut constitution. The news article linked above mentions "Because it’s a resolution, it does not require the governor’s signature." Does that mean it's all for show? That it doesn't truly exonerate the victims?

The resolution in Connecticut is a statement that has been agreed by the state's legislature, but is not a law. If it were, it would indeed need to be signed by the Governor, by virtue of Article 4, Section 15 of the state Constitution. It exonerates the victims insofar as it expresses the current legislature's disapproval of the witchcraft trials of the past, and apologizes to living relatives. All of the victims are long dead, whether they were executed by the state or not, so even if this were a legally-effective pardon, it would have no other practical consequences. That said, a state legislature could enact pardons for named individuals, or a class of people. It would be unlawful to criminalize a named person (that's a "bill of attainder") or to punish someone for an act that wasn't a crime at the time (an "ex post facto law"). But the opposite, which reduces or eliminates a punishment, is not covered by the federal or state constitutional bans on such laws. That was explained by Samuel Chase in Calder v Bull , 3 U.S. 386 , a Supreme Court decision of 1798 dealing with actions of the Connecticut legislature ordering a retrial in a probate case (with my emphasis): Every law that takes away or impairs rights vested agreeably to existing laws is retrospective, and is generally unjust and may be oppressive, and it is a good general rule that a law should have no retrospect; but there are cases in which laws may justly, and for the benefit of the community and also of individuals, relate to a time antecedent to their commencement, as statutes of oblivion or of pardon . They are certainly retrospective, and literally both concerning and after the facts committed. But I do not consider any law ex post facto within the prohibition that mollifies the rigor of the criminal law, but only those that create or aggravate the crime or increase the punishment or change the rules of evidence for the purpose of conviction. Every law that is to have an operation before the making thereof, as to commence at an antecedent time or to save time from the statute of limitations or to excuse acts which were unlawful, and before committed, and the like, is retrospective. But such laws may be proper or necessary, as the case may be. There is a great and apparent difference between making an unlawful act lawful and the making an innocent action criminal and punishing it as a crime. At the time, Connecticut's system for pardons made it so that an offender would always have to petition the legislature to pass a bill to that specific effect. That model predated the U.S. Constitution, and continued to operate after its ratification. The Governor only had the power to grant temporary reprieves, when the legislature was out of session - in fact, he still does (Article 4, Section 13 of the Constitution of Connecticut). Presently, the state has instituted a permanent system of a Board of Pardons and Paroles, but in principle they could enact some other model. The contemporaneous A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut by Zephaniah Smith (1795) says in Book 5, Chapter 26 : The power of granting pardon to criminals sentenced to death, or to any other punishment, is vested by law in the legislature. This carries forward a practice from the British legislatures, which also often passed acts to pardon or indemnify certain offenders. There was therefore quite a long history for Chase to allude to, even though he was writing not long after the revolution, in terms of this being part of the standard panoply of things a state legislature can generally do.

Testament valid / children disinherited GEORGIA

following scenario: A man lives and dies in Georgia. He served in the army and was located for a specific time in Germany. While he was there he was in a relationship with a woman. She became pregnant. The man signed the acknowledgement of paternity while the woman was still pregnant. He left Germany some weeks before his child would be born. A few days / weeks after his return he married in the states. He adopted the son of this fresh married wife and soon after the marriage she became pregnant with a girl. So far as a background. Now the man dies in the scenario. He created a testament will many years ago when his son in Germany was only a couple of years old. In this testament and will he mentioned that he is married and that he has 2 children (the adopted one and the girl). In a paragraph you can find this: "Except as otherwise provided in this my LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT, I have intentionally anitted to provide herein for any other relatives or for any other person, whether claiming to be an heir of mine or not." Questions: is the son from Germany disinherited by the sentence mentioned above? As it is his son (he is named as father in the birth certificate) and he didn´t name him in the testament and will: is this positive for the son to contest the will? if the family of the man wants the son from Germany to sign the acknowledgment of service and the son refuses: what will happen next? Thank you!

Under Georgia inheritance law, when a person writes a will then, unless the will is proven invalid, the provisions of the will are followed. If a person dies without a will, then the laws of intestate succession apply, whereby potentially all children receive a share of the estate. The courts will presumably interpret "anitted" in the will to mean "omitted". The son from Germany is not necessarily disinherited by the sentence. The outcome depends on the provisions stating who will receive what portion of the estate. Typically, a will would say e.g. "I bequeath my stuff to my son Billy Rae and my daughter Becky Sue", so the fact of omission of Karl Johan suffices to not entitle Karl Johan to a share. If the will specifies "my two children", then there is an opportunity for litigation, since "my children" might be interpreted to mean "my two natural issue", or "the two whom I treated as my children, one having been formally adopted" (who would be entitled to a share under Georgia law – adoption is as thick as blood under the law). On the third hand, if the will designates as beneficiaries "all of my children whether by lineal descent or by adoption", Karl does fall into that category, however, Karl's sister has been explicity excluded by that sentence, likewise his mother, aunt etc. Karl can contest the will, but whether it would benefit him to do so depends on what the will actually says. The consequences of refusing to sign an acknowledgment of service are hard to assess, but it will at the very least draw out the process. However, under Georgia law, it does mean that you agree to the terms of the will and do not contest it. So, if Becky Sue is the nominated executor and has signaled her intent to ignore Karl, in signing the acknowledgment of service, Karl has indicated that he'll abide by her decisions. Therefore, Karl should not sign and should lawyer up to contest the will or choice of executor (and Karl should hire a Georgia attorney to do this, since German inheritance law i different).

Testament valid / children disinherited GEORGIA

following scenario: A man lives and dies in Georgia. He served in the army and was located for a specific time in Germany. While he was there he was in a relationship with a woman. She became pregnant. The man signed the acknowledgement of paternity while the woman was still pregnant. He left Germany some weeks before his child would be born. A few days / weeks after his return he married in the states. He adopted the son of this fresh married wife and soon after the marriage she became pregnant with a girl. So far as a background. Now the man dies in the scenario. He created a testament will many years ago when his son in Germany was only a couple of years old. In this testament and will he mentioned that he is married and that he has 2 children (the adopted one and the girl). In a paragraph you can find this: "Except as otherwise provided in this my LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT, I have intentionally anitted to provide herein for any other relatives or for any other person, whether claiming to be an heir of mine or not." Questions: is the son from Germany disinherited by the sentence mentioned above? As it is his son (he is named as father in the birth certificate) and he didn´t name him in the testament and will: is this positive for the son to contest the will? if the family of the man wants the son from Germany to sign the acknowledgment of service and the son refuses: what will happen next? Thank you!

Every U.S. state allows you to disinherit your children. Many U.S. states provide (in what is probably the majority rule) that if a child not provided for in a Will has to be identified by name or other adequate description (which the language in this Will would not meet) is entitled to the same share as other children provided for in the Will. See, e.g. , a Law.SE analysis of New Hampshire law on point . Georgia does have a somewhat similar provision in the case of afterborn children, which can be deemed to be a partial revocation of a Will if the Will is not revised to reflect an intent to provide for that child. The relevant statute is Georgia Code § 53-4-48 . Subsection (a) of that section states: Except as otherwise provided in Code Section 53-4-49, the marriage of the testator, the birth of a child to the testator, including a posthumous child born within ten months of the testator's death, or the adoption of a child by the testator subsequent to the making of a will in which no provision is made in contemplation of such event shall result in a revocation of the will only to the extent provided in the remainder of this Code section. In this case, however, since the German child is not an afterborn child and was not unknown to the testator (i.e. to th person who wrote the Will), Georgia's law does not amend the Will to reflect this omission. is the son from Germany disinherited by the sentence mentioned above? As noted by user6726 , the failure to affirmatively provide for the German child is what disinherits that child, not the sentence quoted above. As it is his son (he is named as father in the birth certificate) and he didn´t name him in the testament and will: is this positive for the son to contest the will? Not really. There is not indication from the facts of the question that the omission of the German child from the will was due to the incapacity of the person writing the Will at the time that the Will was written. Given his formal acknowledgment of paternity, there is every reason to believe that he knew that he has a German child at the time and intentionally omitted that child, rather than doing so because due to dementia he didn't know who his children were. if the family of the man wants the son from Germany to sign the acknowledgment of service and the son refuses: what will happen next? There is no context in the question for this statement. Who is serving the German child with what?

Can you be charged with employee theft after being fired?

Suppose that a person, A, was hired by an employer, B, and then got fired a week later. Suppose that B mailed A a laptop while A was employed by B. Once A had been fired, B emailed A asking for the laptop back and sent a box for it to be returned. Suppose that A was fired on Tuesday, got the email Wednesday, and was charged with theft ( GS 14-74 ) on the following Monday. Suppose that B called the local police and made a complaint, and a warrant was issued for A's arrest on Tuesday. The laptop has already been mailed back by then. Is such an arrest lawful? What options does A have?

If you are facing felony charges, you need to hire a criminal defense lawyer, not ask for legal advice on the Internet. Do not talk to the police without your lawyer present. Do not attempt to represent yourself in any kind of hearing. Ignore any advice based on what seems fair or reasonable to someone on the Internet unless it is based on a real case in North Carolina or written by a real lawyer. That said, it appears to me that you have at least two strong defenses. First, if you you returned the laptop (It will help if you sent it by registered mail or otherwise kept a receipt, although, remember, they need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that you kept it), that shows you had no “intent to steal” or “purpose to steal” it, which is a necessary element of the crime. Second, according to the University of North Carolina criminal law blog, you appear to have been charged with the wrong offense (although I don’t think that will actually help you if the prosecutor decides to bring the charge that matches what your former employer alleges you to have done). It cites a relevant North Carolina Supreme Court ruling on the difference between larceny and embezzlement, State v. McDonald, 45 S.E. 582 (N.C. 1903). I would focus on getting yourself cleared of these charges first. You can ask your lawyer if there is any recourse you might have against your former employer. I’m skeptical that suing them would be worth it, but I don’t know the circumstances. If you have proof of what they said to you and about you, hang on to it.

Can you be charged with employee theft after being fired?

Suppose that a person, A, was hired by an employer, B, and then got fired a week later. Suppose that B mailed A a laptop while A was employed by B. Once A had been fired, B emailed A asking for the laptop back and sent a box for it to be returned. Suppose that A was fired on Tuesday, got the email Wednesday, and was charged with theft ( GS 14-74 ) on the following Monday. Suppose that B called the local police and made a complaint, and a warrant was issued for A's arrest on Tuesday. The laptop has already been mailed back by then. Is such an arrest lawful? What options does A have?

The laptop was in your possession legally. Being fired makes no difference, it is still in your possession legally. Of course they can demand that you return the laptop, but that has to happen in a reasonable time. Charging you with theft two working days after is not allowing a reasonable time. For example, if you told me I was fired today, it wouldn't be unreasonable for me to take off for a week or two to visit friends, and get the email and the box two weeks later. Still no theft. Assuming that you were contacted by the police, you can. go to them, explain the situation, and tell them that your ex-employer made a malicious false allegation. I believe you also have the right to ask the police about anything they hold against you to see exactly what is going on. (If we only look at the title of the question: If you are fired today, and next week your old employer figures out that you stole from them, of course you can be charged. The difference is that in your situation, you didn't steal anything, and they should have known that).

Can you be charged with employee theft after being fired?

Suppose that a person, A, was hired by an employer, B, and then got fired a week later. Suppose that B mailed A a laptop while A was employed by B. Once A had been fired, B emailed A asking for the laptop back and sent a box for it to be returned. Suppose that A was fired on Tuesday, got the email Wednesday, and was charged with theft ( GS 14-74 ) on the following Monday. Suppose that B called the local police and made a complaint, and a warrant was issued for A's arrest on Tuesday. The laptop has already been mailed back by then. Is such an arrest lawful? What options does A have?

In my jursdiction, the crime of shoplifting only requires that you take physical possession of goods for sale with the intent of permanently depriving their rightful owner of those goods. Pretty much every shopper at a grocery store satisfies every element of the crime of shoplifting except they don't have the right mental state. If you pick up a melon in a grocery store with the intent to steal it, you've committed a crime. If you pick up that melon with no intent to steal it, you're shopping. Now, of course, we can't directly prove what mental state a person has. But if you put a chicken down your pants in a grocery store, a jury could reasonably infer that you were stealig it. In this case, you have satisfied every element of the crime of larceny by employee except the intent element. Larceny by employee requires the employee to have the intent of permanently depriving the rightful owner of the property. To charge you, someone had to have a reasonable belief that you intended to permanently retain the laptop. Otherwise, what they're doing is no different from charging someone with shoplifting for picking up a melon. You need a lawyer. The lawyer needs to figure out what your employer told the police and what was the basis for the charge. From what you've said, it seems like someone screwed up because there is no conceivable way anyone could reasonably believe that you intended to retain the laptop.

Can you be charged with employee theft after being fired?

Suppose that a person, A, was hired by an employer, B, and then got fired a week later. Suppose that B mailed A a laptop while A was employed by B. Once A had been fired, B emailed A asking for the laptop back and sent a box for it to be returned. Suppose that A was fired on Tuesday, got the email Wednesday, and was charged with theft ( GS 14-74 ) on the following Monday. Suppose that B called the local police and made a complaint, and a warrant was issued for A's arrest on Tuesday. The laptop has already been mailed back by then. Is such an arrest lawful? What options does A have?

The real issue here is if charges have been filled. While unpleasant, an arrest carries very little legal weight. It simply means that the police thought that you could be guilty, but they were not sure and you were not allowed a chance to defend yourself. This means that innocent people get arrested every day, no big deal! Now, if you have shown to the police/DA (and convinced them) that you already had sent the laptop, it shows that you did not intend to keep it itself, and it is unlikely that the DA (the one who could press charges) will continue. If he wants to continue, you get representation by a lawyer that helps you through the trial. To address your questions: Is such an arrest lawful? Probably yes, at least from the part of the police. Even if from your POV is overkill, that does not mean that they did something illegal or that you can sue them. What options does A have? If we are talking about defending against charges of theft, there is one: hire a lawyer. If we are talking at getting a compensation to your troubles, next to none. Certainly none from the police. The only thing that I think could be helpful would be if your employer deceived the police about your intentions. E.g., if you told your employer "I am busy right now but if you come to my place I will hand you the laptop, otherwise I will mail it on Monday" and your employer reported to the police that what you say was "I am keeping my laptop and you will never see it again!", then probably you could sue your employer. But then you would need evidence of what was said. But if your employer told the police "he says he will return it but I do not believe him", then the employer was not lying to the police and he is quite safe.

Do I need a licence to fly a drone in public?

If I practice flying a drone in a public park not over gardens or using the camera for looking into windows do I need a licence?

Skykam has provided a summary of UK regulations for 2023: Drone operators must be at least 12 years old to fly independently Drones are not permitted to fly higher than 400 feet (120 meters) Operators must maintain a line of sight with their drone at all times Permission is required before flying in restricted airspace Do not fly your drone within a 5-kilometer radius of airports. A minimum distance of 50 meters must be maintained from uninvolved persons (Drones below 250 grams are permitted to fly closer and over people) Drones weighing 250 grams or more must be operated at least 150 meters away from parks, industrial areas, residential zones, and other built-up locations. If a drone is equipped with a camera, the operator must register for an Operator ID with the CAA. Insurance is mandatory for commercial drone use. Compliance with these regulations is required during both daytime and nighttime operations. So... If your drone has a camera, then Yes, you will need a flyer ID. This isn't a licence as such, and is free, but does involve a theory test. If your drone weighs 250g or more, then you can't use it in a park.

Whiteboards availability in High courts and Supreme courts of USA and UK

Are Whiteboards available separately for the two lawyers in High courts and Supreme courts of USA and UK to explain their cases? If No, Do you recommend to have Whiteboards in the courts?

US Supreme Court No Briefs According to the Supreme Court's rules, the petitioner has a certain amount of time to write a brief, not to exceed 50 pages, putting forth his/her legal case concerning the issue on which the Court granted review. After the petitioner's brief has been filed, the other party, known as the respondent, is given a certain amount of time to file a respondent's brief. This brief is also not to exceed 50 pages. After the initial petitions have been filed, the petitioner and respondent are permitted to file briefs of a shorter length that respond to the other party's respective position. If not directly involved in the case, the U.S. Government, represented by the Solicitor General, can file a brief on behalf of the government. With the permission of the Court, groups that do not have a direct stake in the outcome of the case, but are nevertheless interested in it, may file what is known as an amicus curiae (Latin for "friend of the court") brief providing their own arguments and recommendations for how the case should be decided. Oral arguments Each case is allotted an hour for arguments. During this time, lawyers for each party have a half hour to make their best legal case to the Justices. Most of this time, however, is spent answering the Justices' questions. The Justices tend to view oral arguments not as a forum for the lawyers to rehash the merits of the case as found in their briefs, but for answering any questions that the Justices may have developed while reading their briefs. No room for whiteboards. UK Supreme Court No Application An appellant needs to provide four copies of the application for permission to appeal; the order appealed against and the order refusing permission to appeal to the Supreme Court; the official transcript of the judgment of the court appealed from; the orders made by all other courts in the proceedings; the transcript of the final judgments of all other courts in the proceedings; and a document which sets out the history of the proceedings. Documents ... the documents which are needed for an appeal hearing. These are a statement of facts and issues - this document has to be agreed by all the parties to the appeal; the appendix - this includes the documents listed at paragraph 8 above together with other documents which are necessary for understanding the legal issues and the > arguments in the appeal; and the appellant's case and the respondent's case - these are the statements of the parties' arguments in the appeal: their 'skeleton argument'. At least two weeks before the hearing date, the appellant must file core volumes which include the notice of appeal or re-sealed application for permission to appeal; statement of facts and issues; the appellant's and respondent's cases; Part I of the appendix; and an index to the volumes of authorities. Hearing At the hearing, the appellant will have the opportunity to state his arguments first. The respondent to the appeal will then make his submissions and the appellant has a right of 'reply'. No room for whiteboards here either. General Even in a trial court, there will be no whiteboards. Cases are not made up spontaneously like a brainstorming session. For any significant criminal or civil litigation, both sides will have provided large numbers of highly detailed documents (which term includes non-written things like video, audio, and physical evidence), which will have been argued over and agreed upon long before any hearing. Should issues arise during a hearing, the parties will be given time to make further submissions. No one's using a whiteboard Summary offences and small-value civil claims dealt with in the lower courts are a bit of a sausage factory, with a magistrate dealing with 40 or more matters in a day. That's about 10-12 minutes each. No one's using whiteboards here either.

Can questions of private investigator without Miranda warning be used in trial?

I was watching the Hansen vs predator series. In there a random guy called Chris Hansen goes online and pretends to be a 13 years old girl. When people chat with him, he tries to steer the discussion on a sexual level ("I'm just coming out of the shower", etc.). Then he lures them into his house, where there is a real life decoy (a 19 years old girl). After some talking, the decoy goes away and Chris Hansen appears. He then starts to question them, and then he "let them go" out of the garage where the police arrests them. They are charged with "criminal attempt to commit risk of injury to a minor". My understanding is that Chris Hansen is a total random guy who does not work for the government. That is, he is not an undercover police agent. Question: Can Chris Hansen's interrogation, carried out without Miranda warnings, be used against the suspect in a criminal trial?

It's not an interrogation Nothing makes Mr. Hansen a police investigator. He is a private person talking with another private person. His testimony or the recording of the interview might or might not be admissible in trial, that's for the court to decide. But Miranda warnings are only needed when you are under arrest or when you are in a custodial interrogation. Hansen, agent of the police? There's arguments that Hansen might or might not have acted as an agent of the police, and in one case he was deputized. However, that does not change that for Miranda you need an arrest or custodial interrogation (e.g. where one is not free to leave). As far as I am aware, none of the people interviewed was in such a situation and technically free to go at any time - making Miranda not required.