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Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: And so we are rid of the difficulty of a man's not knowing what he knows, for we are not driven to the inference that he does not possess what he possesses, whether he be or be not deceived. And yet I fear that a greater difficulty is looking in at the window. THEAETETUS: What is it? SOCRATES: How can the exchange of one knowledge for another ever become false opinion? THEAETETUS: What do you mean? SOCRATES: In the first place, how can a man who has the knowledge of anything be ignorant of that which he knows, not by reason of ignorance, but by reason of his own knowledge? And, again, is it not an extreme absurdity that he should suppose another thing to be this, and this to be another thing;--that, having knowledge present with him in his mind, he should still know nothing and be ignorant of all things?--you might as well argue that ignorance may make a man know, and blindness make him see, as that knowledge can make him ignorant. | Conceive this under the form of a hunt after the science of odd and even in general. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: How can the exchange of one knowledge for another ever become false opinion? THEAETETUS: What do you mean? SOCRATES: In the first place, how can a man who has the knowledge of anything be ignorant of that which he knows, not by reason of ignorance, but by reason of his own knowledge? And, again, is it not an extreme absurdity that he should suppose another thing to be this, and this to be another thing;--that, having knowledge present with him in his mind, he should still know nothing and be ignorant of all things?--you might as well argue that ignorance may make a man know, and blindness make him see, as that knowledge can make him ignorant. THEAETETUS: Perhaps, Socrates, we may have been wrong in making only forms of knowledge our birds: whereas there ought to have been forms of ignorance as well, flying about together in the mind, and then he who sought to take one of them might sometimes catch a form of knowledge, and sometimes a form of ignorance; and thus he would have a false opinion from ignorance, but a true one from knowledge, about the same thing. SOCRATES: I cannot help praising you, Theaetetus, and yet I must beg you to reconsider your words. Let us grant what you say--then, according to you, he who takes ignorance will have a false opinion--am I right? | Having the use of the art, the arithmetician, if I am not mistaken, has the conceptions of number under his hand, and can transmit them to another. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: In the first place, how can a man who has the knowledge of anything be ignorant of that which he knows, not by reason of ignorance, but by reason of his own knowledge? And, again, is it not an extreme absurdity that he should suppose another thing to be this, and this to be another thing;--that, having knowledge present with him in his mind, he should still know nothing and be ignorant of all things?--you might as well argue that ignorance may make a man know, and blindness make him see, as that knowledge can make him ignorant. THEAETETUS: Perhaps, Socrates, we may have been wrong in making only forms of knowledge our birds: whereas there ought to have been forms of ignorance as well, flying about together in the mind, and then he who sought to take one of them might sometimes catch a form of knowledge, and sometimes a form of ignorance; and thus he would have a false opinion from ignorance, but a true one from knowledge, about the same thing. SOCRATES: I cannot help praising you, Theaetetus, and yet I must beg you to reconsider your words. Let us grant what you say--then, according to you, he who takes ignorance will have a false opinion--am I right? THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: He will certainly not think that he has a false opinion? | And when transmitting them he may be said to teach them, and when receiving to learn them, and when receiving to learn them, and when having them in possession in the aforesaid aviary he may be said to know them. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: I cannot help praising you, Theaetetus, and yet I must beg you to reconsider your words. Let us grant what you say--then, according to you, he who takes ignorance will have a false opinion--am I right? THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: He will certainly not think that he has a false opinion? THEAETETUS: Of course not. SOCRATES: He will think that his opinion is true, and he will fancy that he knows the things about which he has been deceived? | Attend to what follows: must not the perfect arithmetician know all numbers, for he has the science of all numbers in his mind? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: He will certainly not think that he has a false opinion? THEAETETUS: Of course not. SOCRATES: He will think that his opinion is true, and he will fancy that he knows the things about which he has been deceived? THEAETETUS: Certainly. SOCRATES: Then he will think that he has captured knowledge and not ignorance? | And he can reckon abstract numbers in his head, or things about him which are numerable? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: He will think that his opinion is true, and he will fancy that he knows the things about which he has been deceived? THEAETETUS: Certainly. SOCRATES: Then he will think that he has captured knowledge and not ignorance? THEAETETUS: Clearly. SOCRATES: And thus, after going a long way round, we are once more face to face with our original difficulty. The hero of dialectic will retort upon us:--'O my excellent friends, he will say, laughing, if a man knows the form of ignorance and the form of knowledge, can he think that one of them which he knows is the other which he knows? or, if he knows neither of them, can he think that the one which he knows not is another which he knows not? or, if he knows one and not the other, can he think the one which he knows to be the one which he does not know? or the one which he does not know to be the one which he knows? or will you tell me that there are other forms of knowledge which distinguish the right and wrong birds, and which the owner keeps in some other aviaries or graven on waxen blocks according to your foolish images, and which he may be said to know while he possesses them, even though he have them not at hand in his mind? And thus, in a perpetual circle, you will be compelled to go round and round, and you will make no progress.' What are we to say in reply, Theaetetus? | And to reckon is simply to consider how much such and such a number amounts to? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Then he will think that he has captured knowledge and not ignorance? THEAETETUS: Clearly. SOCRATES: And thus, after going a long way round, we are once more face to face with our original difficulty. The hero of dialectic will retort upon us:--'O my excellent friends, he will say, laughing, if a man knows the form of ignorance and the form of knowledge, can he think that one of them which he knows is the other which he knows? or, if he knows neither of them, can he think that the one which he knows not is another which he knows not? or, if he knows one and not the other, can he think the one which he knows to be the one which he does not know? or the one which he does not know to be the one which he knows? or will you tell me that there are other forms of knowledge which distinguish the right and wrong birds, and which the owner keeps in some other aviaries or graven on waxen blocks according to your foolish images, and which he may be said to know while he possesses them, even though he have them not at hand in his mind? And thus, in a perpetual circle, you will be compelled to go round and round, and you will make no progress.' What are we to say in reply, Theaetetus? THEAETETUS: Indeed, Socrates, I do not know what we are to say. SOCRATES: Are not his reproaches just, and does not the argument truly show that we are wrong in seeking for false opinion until we know what knowledge is; that must be first ascertained; then, the nature of false opinion? | And so he appears to be searching into something which he knows, as if he did not know it, for we have already admitted that he knows all numbers;--you have heard these perplexing questions raised? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: And thus, after going a long way round, we are once more face to face with our original difficulty. The hero of dialectic will retort upon us:--'O my excellent friends, he will say, laughing, if a man knows the form of ignorance and the form of knowledge, can he think that one of them which he knows is the other which he knows? or, if he knows neither of them, can he think that the one which he knows not is another which he knows not? or, if he knows one and not the other, can he think the one which he knows to be the one which he does not know? or the one which he does not know to be the one which he knows? or will you tell me that there are other forms of knowledge which distinguish the right and wrong birds, and which the owner keeps in some other aviaries or graven on waxen blocks according to your foolish images, and which he may be said to know while he possesses them, even though he have them not at hand in his mind? And thus, in a perpetual circle, you will be compelled to go round and round, and you will make no progress.' What are we to say in reply, Theaetetus? THEAETETUS: Indeed, Socrates, I do not know what we are to say. SOCRATES: Are not his reproaches just, and does not the argument truly show that we are wrong in seeking for false opinion until we know what knowledge is; that must be first ascertained; then, the nature of false opinion? THEAETETUS: I cannot but agree with you, Socrates, so far as we have yet gone. SOCRATES: Then, once more, what shall we say that knowledge is?--for we are not going to lose heart as yet. | May we not pursue the image of the doves, and say that the chase after knowledge is of two kinds? one kind is prior to possession and for the sake of possession, and the other for the sake of taking and holding in the hands that which is possessed already. And thus, when a man has learned and known something long ago, he may resume and get hold of the knowledge which he has long possessed, but has not at hand in his mind. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Are not his reproaches just, and does not the argument truly show that we are wrong in seeking for false opinion until we know what knowledge is; that must be first ascertained; then, the nature of false opinion? THEAETETUS: I cannot but agree with you, Socrates, so far as we have yet gone. SOCRATES: Then, once more, what shall we say that knowledge is?--for we are not going to lose heart as yet. THEAETETUS: Certainly, I shall not lose heart, if you do not. SOCRATES: What definition will be most consistent with our former views? | That was my reason for asking how we ought to speak when an arithmetician sets about numbering, or a grammarian about reading? Shall we say, that although he knows, he comes back to himself to learn what he already knows? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Then, once more, what shall we say that knowledge is?--for we are not going to lose heart as yet. THEAETETUS: Certainly, I shall not lose heart, if you do not. SOCRATES: What definition will be most consistent with our former views? THEAETETUS: I cannot think of any but our old one, Socrates. SOCRATES: What was it? | Shall we say then that he is going to read or number what he does not know, although we have admitted that he knows all letters and all numbers? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: What definition will be most consistent with our former views? THEAETETUS: I cannot think of any but our old one, Socrates. SOCRATES: What was it? THEAETETUS: Knowledge was said by us to be true opinion; and true opinion is surely unerring, and the results which follow from it are all noble and good. SOCRATES: He who led the way into the river, Theaetetus, said 'The experiment will show;' and perhaps if we go forward in the search, we may stumble upon the thing which we are looking for; but if we stay where we are, nothing will come to light. | Then shall we say that about names we care nothing?--any one may twist and turn the words 'knowing' and 'learning' in any way which he likes, but since we have determined that the possession of knowledge is not the having or using it, we do assert that a man cannot not possess that which he possesses; and, therefore, in no case can a man not know that which he knows, but he may get a false opinion about it; for he may have the knowledge, not of this particular thing, but of some other;--when the various numbers and forms of knowledge are flying about in the aviary, and wishing to capture a certain sort of knowledge out of the general store, he takes the wrong one by mistake, that is to say, when he thought eleven to be twelve, he got hold of the ring-dove which he had in his mind, when he wanted the pigeon. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: What was it? THEAETETUS: Knowledge was said by us to be true opinion; and true opinion is surely unerring, and the results which follow from it are all noble and good. SOCRATES: He who led the way into the river, Theaetetus, said 'The experiment will show;' and perhaps if we go forward in the search, we may stumble upon the thing which we are looking for; but if we stay where we are, nothing will come to light. THEAETETUS: Very true; let us go forward and try. SOCRATES: The trail soon comes to an end, for a whole profession is against us. | But when he catches the one which he wants, then he is not deceived, and has an opinion of what is, and thus false and true opinion may exist, and the difficulties which were previously raised disappear. I dare say that you agree with me, do you not? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: He who led the way into the river, Theaetetus, said 'The experiment will show;' and perhaps if we go forward in the search, we may stumble upon the thing which we are looking for; but if we stay where we are, nothing will come to light. THEAETETUS: Very true; let us go forward and try. SOCRATES: The trail soon comes to an end, for a whole profession is against us. THEAETETUS: How is that, and what profession do you mean? SOCRATES: The profession of the great wise ones who are called orators and lawyers; for these persuade men by their art and make them think whatever they like, but they do not teach them. Do you imagine that there are any teachers in the world so clever as to be able to convince others of the truth about acts of robbery or violence, of which they were not eye-witnesses, while a little water is flowing in the clepsydra? | And so we are rid of the difficulty of a man's not knowing what he knows, for we are not driven to the inference that he does not possess what he possesses, whether he be or be not deceived. And yet I fear that a greater difficulty is looking in at the window. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: The trail soon comes to an end, for a whole profession is against us. THEAETETUS: How is that, and what profession do you mean? SOCRATES: The profession of the great wise ones who are called orators and lawyers; for these persuade men by their art and make them think whatever they like, but they do not teach them. Do you imagine that there are any teachers in the world so clever as to be able to convince others of the truth about acts of robbery or violence, of which they were not eye-witnesses, while a little water is flowing in the clepsydra? THEAETETUS: Certainly not, they can only persuade them. SOCRATES: And would you not say that persuading them is making them have an opinion? | How can the exchange of one knowledge for another ever become false opinion? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: The profession of the great wise ones who are called orators and lawyers; for these persuade men by their art and make them think whatever they like, but they do not teach them. Do you imagine that there are any teachers in the world so clever as to be able to convince others of the truth about acts of robbery or violence, of which they were not eye-witnesses, while a little water is flowing in the clepsydra? THEAETETUS: Certainly not, they can only persuade them. SOCRATES: And would you not say that persuading them is making them have an opinion? THEAETETUS: To be sure. SOCRATES: When, therefore, judges are justly persuaded about matters which you can know only by seeing them, and not in any other way, and when thus judging of them from report they attain a true opinion about them, they judge without knowledge, and yet are rightly persuaded, if they have judged well. | In the first place, how can a man who has the knowledge of anything be ignorant of that which he knows, not by reason of ignorance, but by reason of his own knowledge? And, again, is it not an extreme absurdity that he should suppose another thing to be this, and this to be another thing;--that, having knowledge present with him in his mind, he should still know nothing and be ignorant of all things?--you might as well argue that ignorance may make a man know, and blindness make him see, as that knowledge can make him ignorant. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: And would you not say that persuading them is making them have an opinion? THEAETETUS: To be sure. SOCRATES: When, therefore, judges are justly persuaded about matters which you can know only by seeing them, and not in any other way, and when thus judging of them from report they attain a true opinion about them, they judge without knowledge, and yet are rightly persuaded, if they have judged well. THEAETETUS: Certainly. SOCRATES: And yet, O my friend, if true opinion in law courts and knowledge are the same, the perfect judge could not have judged rightly without knowledge; and therefore I must infer that they are not the same. | I cannot help praising you, Theaetetus, and yet I must beg you to reconsider your words. Let us grant what you say--then, according to you, he who takes ignorance will have a false opinion--am I right? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: When, therefore, judges are justly persuaded about matters which you can know only by seeing them, and not in any other way, and when thus judging of them from report they attain a true opinion about them, they judge without knowledge, and yet are rightly persuaded, if they have judged well. THEAETETUS: Certainly. SOCRATES: And yet, O my friend, if true opinion in law courts and knowledge are the same, the perfect judge could not have judged rightly without knowledge; and therefore I must infer that they are not the same. THEAETETUS: That is a distinction, Socrates, which I have heard made by some one else, but I had forgotten it. He said that true opinion, combined with reason, was knowledge, but that the opinion which had no reason was out of the sphere of knowledge; and that things of which there is no rational account are not knowable--such was the singular expression which he used--and that things which have a reason or explanation are knowable. SOCRATES: Excellent; but then, how did he distinguish between things which are and are not 'knowable'? I wish that you would repeat to me what he said, and then I shall know whether you and I have heard the same tale. | He will certainly not think that he has a false opinion? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: And yet, O my friend, if true opinion in law courts and knowledge are the same, the perfect judge could not have judged rightly without knowledge; and therefore I must infer that they are not the same. THEAETETUS: That is a distinction, Socrates, which I have heard made by some one else, but I had forgotten it. He said that true opinion, combined with reason, was knowledge, but that the opinion which had no reason was out of the sphere of knowledge; and that things of which there is no rational account are not knowable--such was the singular expression which he used--and that things which have a reason or explanation are knowable. SOCRATES: Excellent; but then, how did he distinguish between things which are and are not 'knowable'? I wish that you would repeat to me what he said, and then I shall know whether you and I have heard the same tale. THEAETETUS: I do not know whether I can recall it; but if another person would tell me, I think that I could follow him. SOCRATES: Let me give you, then, a dream in return for a dream:--Methought that I too had a dream, and I heard in my dream that the primeval letters or elements out of which you and I and all other things are compounded, have no reason or explanation; you can only name them, but no predicate can be either affirmed or denied of them, for in the one case existence, in the other non-existence is already implied, neither of which must be added, if you mean to speak of this or that thing by itself alone. It should not be called itself, or that, or each, or alone, or this, or the like; for these go about everywhere and are applied to all things, but are distinct from them; whereas, if the first elements could be described, and had a definition of their own, they would be spoken of apart from all else. But none of these primeval elements can be defined; they can only be named, for they have nothing but a name, and the things which are compounded of them, as they are complex, are expressed by a combination of names, for the combination of names is the essence of a definition. Thus, then, the elements or letters are only objects of perception, and cannot be defined or known; but the syllables or combinations of them are known and expressed, and are apprehended by true opinion. When, therefore, any one forms the true opinion of anything without rational explanation, you may say that his mind is truly exercised, but has no knowledge; for he who cannot give and receive a reason for a thing, has no knowledge of that thing; but when he adds rational explanation, then, he is perfected in knowledge and may be all that I have been denying of him. Was that the form in which the dream appeared to you? | He will think that his opinion is true, and he will fancy that he knows the things about which he has been deceived? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Excellent; but then, how did he distinguish between things which are and are not 'knowable'? I wish that you would repeat to me what he said, and then I shall know whether you and I have heard the same tale. THEAETETUS: I do not know whether I can recall it; but if another person would tell me, I think that I could follow him. SOCRATES: Let me give you, then, a dream in return for a dream:--Methought that I too had a dream, and I heard in my dream that the primeval letters or elements out of which you and I and all other things are compounded, have no reason or explanation; you can only name them, but no predicate can be either affirmed or denied of them, for in the one case existence, in the other non-existence is already implied, neither of which must be added, if you mean to speak of this or that thing by itself alone. It should not be called itself, or that, or each, or alone, or this, or the like; for these go about everywhere and are applied to all things, but are distinct from them; whereas, if the first elements could be described, and had a definition of their own, they would be spoken of apart from all else. But none of these primeval elements can be defined; they can only be named, for they have nothing but a name, and the things which are compounded of them, as they are complex, are expressed by a combination of names, for the combination of names is the essence of a definition. Thus, then, the elements or letters are only objects of perception, and cannot be defined or known; but the syllables or combinations of them are known and expressed, and are apprehended by true opinion. When, therefore, any one forms the true opinion of anything without rational explanation, you may say that his mind is truly exercised, but has no knowledge; for he who cannot give and receive a reason for a thing, has no knowledge of that thing; but when he adds rational explanation, then, he is perfected in knowledge and may be all that I have been denying of him. Was that the form in which the dream appeared to you? THEAETETUS: Precisely. SOCRATES: And you allow and maintain that true opinion, combined with definition or rational explanation, is knowledge? | Then he will think that he has captured knowledge and not ignorance? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Let me give you, then, a dream in return for a dream:--Methought that I too had a dream, and I heard in my dream that the primeval letters or elements out of which you and I and all other things are compounded, have no reason or explanation; you can only name them, but no predicate can be either affirmed or denied of them, for in the one case existence, in the other non-existence is already implied, neither of which must be added, if you mean to speak of this or that thing by itself alone. It should not be called itself, or that, or each, or alone, or this, or the like; for these go about everywhere and are applied to all things, but are distinct from them; whereas, if the first elements could be described, and had a definition of their own, they would be spoken of apart from all else. But none of these primeval elements can be defined; they can only be named, for they have nothing but a name, and the things which are compounded of them, as they are complex, are expressed by a combination of names, for the combination of names is the essence of a definition. Thus, then, the elements or letters are only objects of perception, and cannot be defined or known; but the syllables or combinations of them are known and expressed, and are apprehended by true opinion. When, therefore, any one forms the true opinion of anything without rational explanation, you may say that his mind is truly exercised, but has no knowledge; for he who cannot give and receive a reason for a thing, has no knowledge of that thing; but when he adds rational explanation, then, he is perfected in knowledge and may be all that I have been denying of him. Was that the form in which the dream appeared to you? THEAETETUS: Precisely. SOCRATES: And you allow and maintain that true opinion, combined with definition or rational explanation, is knowledge? THEAETETUS: Exactly. SOCRATES: Then may we assume, Theaetetus, that to-day, and in this casual manner, we have found a truth which in former times many wise men have grown old and have not found? | And thus, after going a long way round, we are once more face to face with our original difficulty. The hero of dialectic will retort upon us:--'O my excellent friends, he will say, laughing, if a man knows the form of ignorance and the form of knowledge, can he think that one of them which he knows is the other which he knows? or, if he knows neither of them, can he think that the one which he knows not is another which he knows not? or, if he knows one and not the other, can he think the one which he knows to be the one which he does not know? or the one which he does not know to be the one which he knows? or will you tell me that there are other forms of knowledge which distinguish the right and wrong birds, and which the owner keeps in some other aviaries or graven on waxen blocks according to your foolish images, and which he may be said to know while he possesses them, even though he have them not at hand in his mind? And thus, in a perpetual circle, you will be compelled to go round and round, and you will make no progress.' What are we to say in reply, Theaetetus? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: And you allow and maintain that true opinion, combined with definition or rational explanation, is knowledge? THEAETETUS: Exactly. SOCRATES: Then may we assume, Theaetetus, that to-day, and in this casual manner, we have found a truth which in former times many wise men have grown old and have not found? THEAETETUS: At any rate, Socrates, I am satisfied with the present statement. SOCRATES: Which is probably correct--for how can there be knowledge apart from definition and true opinion? And yet there is one point in what has been said which does not quite satisfy me. | Are not his reproaches just, and does not the argument truly show that we are wrong in seeking for false opinion until we know what knowledge is; that must be first ascertained; then, the nature of false opinion? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Then may we assume, Theaetetus, that to-day, and in this casual manner, we have found a truth which in former times many wise men have grown old and have not found? THEAETETUS: At any rate, Socrates, I am satisfied with the present statement. SOCRATES: Which is probably correct--for how can there be knowledge apart from definition and true opinion? And yet there is one point in what has been said which does not quite satisfy me. THEAETETUS: What was it? SOCRATES: What might seem to be the most ingenious notion of all:--That the elements or letters are unknown, but the combination or syllables known. | Then, once more, what shall we say that knowledge is?--for we are not going to lose heart as yet. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Which is probably correct--for how can there be knowledge apart from definition and true opinion? And yet there is one point in what has been said which does not quite satisfy me. THEAETETUS: What was it? SOCRATES: What might seem to be the most ingenious notion of all:--That the elements or letters are unknown, but the combination or syllables known. THEAETETUS: And was that wrong? SOCRATES: We shall soon know; for we have as hostages the instances which the author of the argument himself used. | What definition will be most consistent with our former views? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: What might seem to be the most ingenious notion of all:--That the elements or letters are unknown, but the combination or syllables known. THEAETETUS: And was that wrong? SOCRATES: We shall soon know; for we have as hostages the instances which the author of the argument himself used. THEAETETUS: What hostages? SOCRATES: The letters, which are the clements; and the syllables, which are the combinations;--he reasoned, did he not, from the letters of the alphabet? | What was it? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: We shall soon know; for we have as hostages the instances which the author of the argument himself used. THEAETETUS: What hostages? SOCRATES: The letters, which are the clements; and the syllables, which are the combinations;--he reasoned, did he not, from the letters of the alphabet? THEAETETUS: Yes; he did. SOCRATES: Let us take them and put them to the test, or rather, test ourselves:--What was the way in which we learned letters? and, first of all, are we right in saying that syllables have a definition, but that letters have no definition? | He who led the way into the river, Theaetetus, said 'The experiment will show;' and perhaps if we go forward in the search, we may stumble upon the thing which we are looking for; but if we stay where we are, nothing will come to light. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: The letters, which are the clements; and the syllables, which are the combinations;--he reasoned, did he not, from the letters of the alphabet? THEAETETUS: Yes; he did. SOCRATES: Let us take them and put them to the test, or rather, test ourselves:--What was the way in which we learned letters? and, first of all, are we right in saying that syllables have a definition, but that letters have no definition? THEAETETUS: I think so. SOCRATES: I think so too; for, suppose that some one asks you to spell the first syllable of my name:--Theaetetus, he says, what is SO? | The trail soon comes to an end, for a whole profession is against us. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Let us take them and put them to the test, or rather, test ourselves:--What was the way in which we learned letters? and, first of all, are we right in saying that syllables have a definition, but that letters have no definition? THEAETETUS: I think so. SOCRATES: I think so too; for, suppose that some one asks you to spell the first syllable of my name:--Theaetetus, he says, what is SO? THEAETETUS: I should reply S and O. SOCRATES: That is the definition which you would give of the syllable? | The profession of the great wise ones who are called orators and lawyers; for these persuade men by their art and make them think whatever they like, but they do not teach them. Do you imagine that there are any teachers in the world so clever as to be able to convince others of the truth about acts of robbery or violence, of which they were not eye-witnesses, while a little water is flowing in the clepsydra? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: I think so too; for, suppose that some one asks you to spell the first syllable of my name:--Theaetetus, he says, what is SO? THEAETETUS: I should reply S and O. SOCRATES: That is the definition which you would give of the syllable? THEAETETUS: I should. SOCRATES: I wish that you would give me a similar definition of the S. | And would you not say that persuading them is making them have an opinion? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: That is the definition which you would give of the syllable? THEAETETUS: I should. SOCRATES: I wish that you would give me a similar definition of the S. THEAETETUS: But how can any one, Socrates, tell the elements of an element? I can only reply, that S is a consonant, a mere noise, as of the tongue hissing; B, and most other letters, again, are neither vowel-sounds nor noises. Thus letters may be most truly said to be undefined; for even the most distinct of them, which are the seven vowels, have a sound only, but no definition at all. SOCRATES: Then, I suppose, my friend, that we have been so far right in our idea about knowledge? | When, therefore, judges are justly persuaded about matters which you can know only by seeing them, and not in any other way, and when thus judging of them from report they attain a true opinion about them, they judge without knowledge, and yet are rightly persuaded, if they have judged well. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: I wish that you would give me a similar definition of the S. THEAETETUS: But how can any one, Socrates, tell the elements of an element? I can only reply, that S is a consonant, a mere noise, as of the tongue hissing; B, and most other letters, again, are neither vowel-sounds nor noises. Thus letters may be most truly said to be undefined; for even the most distinct of them, which are the seven vowels, have a sound only, but no definition at all. SOCRATES: Then, I suppose, my friend, that we have been so far right in our idea about knowledge? THEAETETUS: Yes; I think that we have. SOCRATES: Well, but have we been right in maintaining that the syllables can be known, but not the letters? | And yet, O my friend, if true opinion in law courts and knowledge are the same, the perfect judge could not have judged rightly without knowledge; and therefore I must infer that they are not the same. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Then, I suppose, my friend, that we have been so far right in our idea about knowledge? THEAETETUS: Yes; I think that we have. SOCRATES: Well, but have we been right in maintaining that the syllables can be known, but not the letters? THEAETETUS: I think so. SOCRATES: And do we mean by a syllable two letters, or if there are more, all of them, or a single idea which arises out of the combination of them? | Excellent; but then, how did he distinguish between things which are and are not 'knowable'? I wish that you would repeat to me what he said, and then I shall know whether you and I have heard the same tale. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Well, but have we been right in maintaining that the syllables can be known, but not the letters? THEAETETUS: I think so. SOCRATES: And do we mean by a syllable two letters, or if there are more, all of them, or a single idea which arises out of the combination of them? THEAETETUS: I should say that we mean all the letters. SOCRATES: Take the case of the two letters S and O, which form the first syllable of my own name; must not he who knows the syllable, know both of them? | Let me give you, then, a dream in return for a dream:--Methought that I too had a dream, and I heard in my dream that the primeval letters or elements out of which you and I and all other things are compounded, have no reason or explanation; you can only name them, but no predicate can be either affirmed or denied of them, for in the one case existence, in the other non-existence is already implied, neither of which must be added, if you mean to speak of this or that thing by itself alone. It should not be called itself, or that, or each, or alone, or this, or the like; for these go about everywhere and are applied to all things, but are distinct from them; whereas, if the first elements could be described, and had a definition of their own, they would be spoken of apart from all else. But none of these primeval elements can be defined; they can only be named, for they have nothing but a name, and the things which are compounded of them, as they are complex, are expressed by a combination of names, for the combination of names is the essence of a definition. Thus, then, the elements or letters are only objects of perception, and cannot be defined or known; but the syllables or combinations of them are known and expressed, and are apprehended by true opinion. When, therefore, any one forms the true opinion of anything without rational explanation, you may say that his mind is truly exercised, but has no knowledge; for he who cannot give and receive a reason for a thing, has no knowledge of that thing; but when he adds rational explanation, then, he is perfected in knowledge and may be all that I have been denying of him. Was that the form in which the dream appeared to you? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: And do we mean by a syllable two letters, or if there are more, all of them, or a single idea which arises out of the combination of them? THEAETETUS: I should say that we mean all the letters. SOCRATES: Take the case of the two letters S and O, which form the first syllable of my own name; must not he who knows the syllable, know both of them? THEAETETUS: Certainly. SOCRATES: He knows, that is, the S and O? | And you allow and maintain that true opinion, combined with definition or rational explanation, is knowledge? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Take the case of the two letters S and O, which form the first syllable of my own name; must not he who knows the syllable, know both of them? THEAETETUS: Certainly. SOCRATES: He knows, that is, the S and O? THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: But can he be ignorant of either singly and yet know both together? | Then may we assume, Theaetetus, that to-day, and in this casual manner, we have found a truth which in former times many wise men have grown old and have not found? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: He knows, that is, the S and O? THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: But can he be ignorant of either singly and yet know both together? THEAETETUS: Such a supposition, Socrates, is monstrous and unmeaning. SOCRATES: But if he cannot know both without knowing each, then if he is ever to know the syllable, he must know the letters first; and thus the fine theory has again taken wings and departed. | Which is probably correct--for how can there be knowledge apart from definition and true opinion? And yet there is one point in what has been said which does not quite satisfy me. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: But can he be ignorant of either singly and yet know both together? THEAETETUS: Such a supposition, Socrates, is monstrous and unmeaning. SOCRATES: But if he cannot know both without knowing each, then if he is ever to know the syllable, he must know the letters first; and thus the fine theory has again taken wings and departed. THEAETETUS: Yes, with wonderful celerity. SOCRATES: Yes, we did not keep watch properly. Perhaps we ought to have maintained that a syllable is not the letters, but rather one single idea framed out of them, having a separate form distinct from them. | What might seem to be the most ingenious notion of all:--That the elements or letters are unknown, but the combination or syllables known. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: But if he cannot know both without knowing each, then if he is ever to know the syllable, he must know the letters first; and thus the fine theory has again taken wings and departed. THEAETETUS: Yes, with wonderful celerity. SOCRATES: Yes, we did not keep watch properly. Perhaps we ought to have maintained that a syllable is not the letters, but rather one single idea framed out of them, having a separate form distinct from them. THEAETETUS: Very true; and a more likely notion than the other. SOCRATES: Take care; let us not be cowards and betray a great and imposing theory. | We shall soon know; for we have as hostages the instances which the author of the argument himself used. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Yes, we did not keep watch properly. Perhaps we ought to have maintained that a syllable is not the letters, but rather one single idea framed out of them, having a separate form distinct from them. THEAETETUS: Very true; and a more likely notion than the other. SOCRATES: Take care; let us not be cowards and betray a great and imposing theory. THEAETETUS: No, indeed. SOCRATES: Let us assume then, as we now say, that the syllable is a simple form arising out of the several combinations of harmonious elements--of letters or of any other elements. | The letters, which are the clements; and the syllables, which are the combinations;--he reasoned, did he not, from the letters of the alphabet? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Take care; let us not be cowards and betray a great and imposing theory. THEAETETUS: No, indeed. SOCRATES: Let us assume then, as we now say, that the syllable is a simple form arising out of the several combinations of harmonious elements--of letters or of any other elements. THEAETETUS: Very good. SOCRATES: And it must have no parts. | Let us take them and put them to the test, or rather, test ourselves:--What was the way in which we learned letters? and, first of all, are we right in saying that syllables have a definition, but that letters have no definition? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Let us assume then, as we now say, that the syllable is a simple form arising out of the several combinations of harmonious elements--of letters or of any other elements. THEAETETUS: Very good. SOCRATES: And it must have no parts. THEAETETUS: Why? SOCRATES: Because that which has parts must be a whole of all the parts. Or would you say that a whole, although formed out of the parts, is a single notion different from all the parts? | I think so too; for, suppose that some one asks you to spell the first syllable of my name:--Theaetetus, he says, what is SO? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: And it must have no parts. THEAETETUS: Why? SOCRATES: Because that which has parts must be a whole of all the parts. Or would you say that a whole, although formed out of the parts, is a single notion different from all the parts? THEAETETUS: I should. SOCRATES: And would you say that all and the whole are the same, or different? | That is the definition which you would give of the syllable? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Because that which has parts must be a whole of all the parts. Or would you say that a whole, although formed out of the parts, is a single notion different from all the parts? THEAETETUS: I should. SOCRATES: And would you say that all and the whole are the same, or different? THEAETETUS: I am not certain; but, as you like me to answer at once, I shall hazard the reply, that they are different. SOCRATES: I approve of your readiness, Theaetetus, but I must take time to think whether I equally approve of your answer. | I wish that you would give me a similar definition of the S. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: And would you say that all and the whole are the same, or different? THEAETETUS: I am not certain; but, as you like me to answer at once, I shall hazard the reply, that they are different. SOCRATES: I approve of your readiness, Theaetetus, but I must take time to think whether I equally approve of your answer. THEAETETUS: Yes; the answer is the point. SOCRATES: According to this new view, the whole is supposed to differ from all? | Then, I suppose, my friend, that we have been so far right in our idea about knowledge? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: I approve of your readiness, Theaetetus, but I must take time to think whether I equally approve of your answer. THEAETETUS: Yes; the answer is the point. SOCRATES: According to this new view, the whole is supposed to differ from all? THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: Well, but is there any difference between all (in the plural) and the all (in the singular)? Take the case of number:--When we say one, two, three, four, five, six; or when we say twice three, or three times two, or four and two, or three and two and one, are we speaking of the same or of different numbers? | Well, but have we been right in maintaining that the syllables can be known, but not the letters? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: According to this new view, the whole is supposed to differ from all? THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: Well, but is there any difference between all (in the plural) and the all (in the singular)? Take the case of number:--When we say one, two, three, four, five, six; or when we say twice three, or three times two, or four and two, or three and two and one, are we speaking of the same or of different numbers? THEAETETUS: Of the same. SOCRATES: That is of six? | And do we mean by a syllable two letters, or if there are more, all of them, or a single idea which arises out of the combination of them? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Well, but is there any difference between all (in the plural) and the all (in the singular)? Take the case of number:--When we say one, two, three, four, five, six; or when we say twice three, or three times two, or four and two, or three and two and one, are we speaking of the same or of different numbers? THEAETETUS: Of the same. SOCRATES: That is of six? THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: And in each form of expression we spoke of all the six? | Take the case of the two letters S and O, which form the first syllable of my own name; must not he who knows the syllable, know both of them? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: That is of six? THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: And in each form of expression we spoke of all the six? THEAETETUS: True. SOCRATES: Again, in speaking of all (in the plural) is there not one thing which we express? | He knows, that is, the S and O? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: And in each form of expression we spoke of all the six? THEAETETUS: True. SOCRATES: Again, in speaking of all (in the plural) is there not one thing which we express? THEAETETUS: Of course there is. SOCRATES: And that is six? | But can he be ignorant of either singly and yet know both together? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Again, in speaking of all (in the plural) is there not one thing which we express? THEAETETUS: Of course there is. SOCRATES: And that is six? THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: Then in predicating the word 'all' of things measured by number, we predicate at the same time a singular and a plural? | But if he cannot know both without knowing each, then if he is ever to know the syllable, he must know the letters first; and thus the fine theory has again taken wings and departed. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: And that is six? THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: Then in predicating the word 'all' of things measured by number, we predicate at the same time a singular and a plural? THEAETETUS: Clearly we do. SOCRATES: Again, the number of the acre and the acre are the same; are they not? | Yes, we did not keep watch properly. Perhaps we ought to have maintained that a syllable is not the letters, but rather one single idea framed out of them, having a separate form distinct from them. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Then in predicating the word 'all' of things measured by number, we predicate at the same time a singular and a plural? THEAETETUS: Clearly we do. SOCRATES: Again, the number of the acre and the acre are the same; are they not? THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: And the number of the stadium in like manner is the stadium? | Take care; let us not be cowards and betray a great and imposing theory. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Again, the number of the acre and the acre are the same; are they not? THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: And the number of the stadium in like manner is the stadium? THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: And the army is the number of the army; and in all similar cases, the entire number of anything is the entire thing? | Let us assume then, as we now say, that the syllable is a simple form arising out of the several combinations of harmonious elements--of letters or of any other elements. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: And the number of the stadium in like manner is the stadium? THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: And the army is the number of the army; and in all similar cases, the entire number of anything is the entire thing? THEAETETUS: True. SOCRATES: And the number of each is the parts of each? | And it must have no parts. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: And the army is the number of the army; and in all similar cases, the entire number of anything is the entire thing? THEAETETUS: True. SOCRATES: And the number of each is the parts of each? THEAETETUS: Exactly. SOCRATES: Then as many things as have parts are made up of parts? | Because that which has parts must be a whole of all the parts. Or would you say that a whole, although formed out of the parts, is a single notion different from all the parts? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: And the number of each is the parts of each? THEAETETUS: Exactly. SOCRATES: Then as many things as have parts are made up of parts? THEAETETUS: Clearly. SOCRATES: But all the parts are admitted to be the all, if the entire number is the all? | And would you say that all and the whole are the same, or different? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Then as many things as have parts are made up of parts? THEAETETUS: Clearly. SOCRATES: But all the parts are admitted to be the all, if the entire number is the all? THEAETETUS: True. SOCRATES: Then the whole is not made up of parts, for it would be the all, if consisting of all the parts? | I approve of your readiness, Theaetetus, but I must take time to think whether I equally approve of your answer. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: But all the parts are admitted to be the all, if the entire number is the all? THEAETETUS: True. SOCRATES: Then the whole is not made up of parts, for it would be the all, if consisting of all the parts? THEAETETUS: That is the inference. SOCRATES: But is a part a part of anything but the whole? | According to this new view, the whole is supposed to differ from all? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Then the whole is not made up of parts, for it would be the all, if consisting of all the parts? THEAETETUS: That is the inference. SOCRATES: But is a part a part of anything but the whole? THEAETETUS: Yes, of the all. SOCRATES: You make a valiant defence, Theaetetus. And yet is not the all that of which nothing is wanting? | Well, but is there any difference between all (in the plural) and the all (in the singular)? Take the case of number:--When we say one, two, three, four, five, six; or when we say twice three, or three times two, or four and two, or three and two and one, are we speaking of the same or of different numbers? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: But is a part a part of anything but the whole? THEAETETUS: Yes, of the all. SOCRATES: You make a valiant defence, Theaetetus. And yet is not the all that of which nothing is wanting? THEAETETUS: Certainly. SOCRATES: And is not a whole likewise that from which nothing is absent? but that from which anything is absent is neither a whole nor all;--if wanting in anything, both equally lose their entirety of nature. | That is of six? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: You make a valiant defence, Theaetetus. And yet is not the all that of which nothing is wanting? THEAETETUS: Certainly. SOCRATES: And is not a whole likewise that from which nothing is absent? but that from which anything is absent is neither a whole nor all;--if wanting in anything, both equally lose their entirety of nature. THEAETETUS: I now think that there is no difference between a whole and all. SOCRATES: But were we not saying that when a thing has parts, all the parts will be a whole and all? | And in each form of expression we spoke of all the six? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: And is not a whole likewise that from which nothing is absent? but that from which anything is absent is neither a whole nor all;--if wanting in anything, both equally lose their entirety of nature. THEAETETUS: I now think that there is no difference between a whole and all. SOCRATES: But were we not saying that when a thing has parts, all the parts will be a whole and all? THEAETETUS: Certainly. SOCRATES: Then, as I was saying before, must not the alternative be that either the syllable is not the letters, and then the letters are not parts of the syllable, or that the syllable will be the same with the letters, and will therefore be equally known with them? | Again, in speaking of all (in the plural) is there not one thing which we express? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: But were we not saying that when a thing has parts, all the parts will be a whole and all? THEAETETUS: Certainly. SOCRATES: Then, as I was saying before, must not the alternative be that either the syllable is not the letters, and then the letters are not parts of the syllable, or that the syllable will be the same with the letters, and will therefore be equally known with them? THEAETETUS: You are right. SOCRATES: And, in order to avoid this, we suppose it to be different from them? | And that is six? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Then, as I was saying before, must not the alternative be that either the syllable is not the letters, and then the letters are not parts of the syllable, or that the syllable will be the same with the letters, and will therefore be equally known with them? THEAETETUS: You are right. SOCRATES: And, in order to avoid this, we suppose it to be different from them? THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: But if letters are not parts of syllables, can you tell me of any other parts of syllables, which are not letters? | Then in predicating the word 'all' of things measured by number, we predicate at the same time a singular and a plural? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: And, in order to avoid this, we suppose it to be different from them? THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: But if letters are not parts of syllables, can you tell me of any other parts of syllables, which are not letters? THEAETETUS: No, indeed, Socrates; for if I admit the existence of parts in a syllable, it would be ridiculous in me to give up letters and seek for other parts. SOCRATES: Quite true, Theaetetus, and therefore, according to our present view, a syllable must surely be some indivisible form? | Again, the number of the acre and the acre are the same; are they not? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: But if letters are not parts of syllables, can you tell me of any other parts of syllables, which are not letters? THEAETETUS: No, indeed, Socrates; for if I admit the existence of parts in a syllable, it would be ridiculous in me to give up letters and seek for other parts. SOCRATES: Quite true, Theaetetus, and therefore, according to our present view, a syllable must surely be some indivisible form? THEAETETUS: True. SOCRATES: But do you remember, my friend, that only a little while ago we admitted and approved the statement, that of the first elements out of which all other things are compounded there could be no definition, because each of them when taken by itself is uncompounded; nor can one rightly attribute to them the words 'being' or 'this,' because they are alien and inappropriate words, and for this reason the letters or elements were indefinable and unknown? | And the number of the stadium in like manner is the stadium? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Quite true, Theaetetus, and therefore, according to our present view, a syllable must surely be some indivisible form? THEAETETUS: True. SOCRATES: But do you remember, my friend, that only a little while ago we admitted and approved the statement, that of the first elements out of which all other things are compounded there could be no definition, because each of them when taken by itself is uncompounded; nor can one rightly attribute to them the words 'being' or 'this,' because they are alien and inappropriate words, and for this reason the letters or elements were indefinable and unknown? THEAETETUS: I remember. SOCRATES: And is not this also the reason why they are simple and indivisible? I can see no other. | And the army is the number of the army; and in all similar cases, the entire number of anything is the entire thing? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: But do you remember, my friend, that only a little while ago we admitted and approved the statement, that of the first elements out of which all other things are compounded there could be no definition, because each of them when taken by itself is uncompounded; nor can one rightly attribute to them the words 'being' or 'this,' because they are alien and inappropriate words, and for this reason the letters or elements were indefinable and unknown? THEAETETUS: I remember. SOCRATES: And is not this also the reason why they are simple and indivisible? I can see no other. THEAETETUS: No other reason can be given. SOCRATES: Then is not the syllable in the same case as the elements or letters, if it has no parts and is one form? | And the number of each is the parts of each? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: And is not this also the reason why they are simple and indivisible? I can see no other. THEAETETUS: No other reason can be given. SOCRATES: Then is not the syllable in the same case as the elements or letters, if it has no parts and is one form? THEAETETUS: To be sure. SOCRATES: If, then, a syllable is a whole, and has many parts or letters, the letters as well as the syllable must be intelligible and expressible, since all the parts are acknowledged to be the same as the whole? | Then as many things as have parts are made up of parts? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Then is not the syllable in the same case as the elements or letters, if it has no parts and is one form? THEAETETUS: To be sure. SOCRATES: If, then, a syllable is a whole, and has many parts or letters, the letters as well as the syllable must be intelligible and expressible, since all the parts are acknowledged to be the same as the whole? THEAETETUS: True. SOCRATES: But if it be one and indivisible, then the syllables and the letters are alike undefined and unknown, and for the same reason? | But all the parts are admitted to be the all, if the entire number is the all? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: If, then, a syllable is a whole, and has many parts or letters, the letters as well as the syllable must be intelligible and expressible, since all the parts are acknowledged to be the same as the whole? THEAETETUS: True. SOCRATES: But if it be one and indivisible, then the syllables and the letters are alike undefined and unknown, and for the same reason? THEAETETUS: I cannot deny that. SOCRATES: We cannot, therefore, agree in the opinion of him who says that the syllable can be known and expressed, but not the letters. | Then the whole is not made up of parts, for it would be the all, if consisting of all the parts? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: But if it be one and indivisible, then the syllables and the letters are alike undefined and unknown, and for the same reason? THEAETETUS: I cannot deny that. SOCRATES: We cannot, therefore, agree in the opinion of him who says that the syllable can be known and expressed, but not the letters. THEAETETUS: Certainly not; if we may trust the argument. SOCRATES: Well, but will you not be equally inclined to disagree with him, when you remember your own experience in learning to read? | But is a part a part of anything but the whole? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: We cannot, therefore, agree in the opinion of him who says that the syllable can be known and expressed, but not the letters. THEAETETUS: Certainly not; if we may trust the argument. SOCRATES: Well, but will you not be equally inclined to disagree with him, when you remember your own experience in learning to read? THEAETETUS: What experience? SOCRATES: Why, that in learning you were kept trying to distinguish the separate letters both by the eye and by the ear, in order that, when you heard them spoken or saw them written, you might not be confused by their position. | You make a valiant defence, Theaetetus. And yet is not the all that of which nothing is wanting? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Well, but will you not be equally inclined to disagree with him, when you remember your own experience in learning to read? THEAETETUS: What experience? SOCRATES: Why, that in learning you were kept trying to distinguish the separate letters both by the eye and by the ear, in order that, when you heard them spoken or saw them written, you might not be confused by their position. THEAETETUS: Very true. SOCRATES: And is the education of the harp-player complete unless he can tell what string answers to a particular note; the notes, as every one would allow, are the elements or letters of music? | And is not a whole likewise that from which nothing is absent? but that from which anything is absent is neither a whole nor all;--if wanting in anything, both equally lose their entirety of nature. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Why, that in learning you were kept trying to distinguish the separate letters both by the eye and by the ear, in order that, when you heard them spoken or saw them written, you might not be confused by their position. THEAETETUS: Very true. SOCRATES: And is the education of the harp-player complete unless he can tell what string answers to a particular note; the notes, as every one would allow, are the elements or letters of music? THEAETETUS: Exactly. SOCRATES: Then, if we argue from the letters and syllables which we know to other simples and compounds, we shall say that the letters or simple elements as a class are much more certainly known than the syllables, and much more indispensable to a perfect knowledge of any subject; and if some one says that the syllable is known and the letter unknown, we shall consider that either intentionally or unintentionally he is talking nonsense? | But were we not saying that when a thing has parts, all the parts will be a whole and all? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: And is the education of the harp-player complete unless he can tell what string answers to a particular note; the notes, as every one would allow, are the elements or letters of music? THEAETETUS: Exactly. SOCRATES: Then, if we argue from the letters and syllables which we know to other simples and compounds, we shall say that the letters or simple elements as a class are much more certainly known than the syllables, and much more indispensable to a perfect knowledge of any subject; and if some one says that the syllable is known and the letter unknown, we shall consider that either intentionally or unintentionally he is talking nonsense? THEAETETUS: Exactly. SOCRATES: And there might be given other proofs of this belief, if I am not mistaken. But do not let us in looking for them lose sight of the question before us, which is the meaning of the statement, that right opinion with rational definition or explanation is the most perfect form of knowledge. | Then, as I was saying before, must not the alternative be that either the syllable is not the letters, and then the letters are not parts of the syllable, or that the syllable will be the same with the letters, and will therefore be equally known with them? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Then, if we argue from the letters and syllables which we know to other simples and compounds, we shall say that the letters or simple elements as a class are much more certainly known than the syllables, and much more indispensable to a perfect knowledge of any subject; and if some one says that the syllable is known and the letter unknown, we shall consider that either intentionally or unintentionally he is talking nonsense? THEAETETUS: Exactly. SOCRATES: And there might be given other proofs of this belief, if I am not mistaken. But do not let us in looking for them lose sight of the question before us, which is the meaning of the statement, that right opinion with rational definition or explanation is the most perfect form of knowledge. THEAETETUS: We must not. SOCRATES: Well, and what is the meaning of the term 'explanation'? I think that we have a choice of three meanings. | And, in order to avoid this, we suppose it to be different from them? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: And there might be given other proofs of this belief, if I am not mistaken. But do not let us in looking for them lose sight of the question before us, which is the meaning of the statement, that right opinion with rational definition or explanation is the most perfect form of knowledge. THEAETETUS: We must not. SOCRATES: Well, and what is the meaning of the term 'explanation'? I think that we have a choice of three meanings. THEAETETUS: What are they? SOCRATES: In the first place, the meaning may be, manifesting one's thought by the voice with verbs and nouns, imaging an opinion in the stream which flows from the lips, as in a mirror or water. Does not explanation appear to be of this nature? | But if letters are not parts of syllables, can you tell me of any other parts of syllables, which are not letters? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Well, and what is the meaning of the term 'explanation'? I think that we have a choice of three meanings. THEAETETUS: What are they? SOCRATES: In the first place, the meaning may be, manifesting one's thought by the voice with verbs and nouns, imaging an opinion in the stream which flows from the lips, as in a mirror or water. Does not explanation appear to be of this nature? THEAETETUS: Certainly; he who so manifests his thought, is said to explain himself. SOCRATES: And every one who is not born deaf or dumb is able sooner or later to manifest what he thinks of anything; and if so, all those who have a right opinion about anything will also have right explanation; nor will right opinion be anywhere found to exist apart from knowledge. | Quite true, Theaetetus, and therefore, according to our present view, a syllable must surely be some indivisible form? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: In the first place, the meaning may be, manifesting one's thought by the voice with verbs and nouns, imaging an opinion in the stream which flows from the lips, as in a mirror or water. Does not explanation appear to be of this nature? THEAETETUS: Certainly; he who so manifests his thought, is said to explain himself. SOCRATES: And every one who is not born deaf or dumb is able sooner or later to manifest what he thinks of anything; and if so, all those who have a right opinion about anything will also have right explanation; nor will right opinion be anywhere found to exist apart from knowledge. THEAETETUS: True. SOCRATES: Let us not, therefore, hastily charge him who gave this account of knowledge with uttering an unmeaning word; for perhaps he only intended to say, that when a person was asked what was the nature of anything, he should be able to answer his questioner by giving the elements of the thing. | But do you remember, my friend, that only a little while ago we admitted and approved the statement, that of the first elements out of which all other things are compounded there could be no definition, because each of them when taken by itself is uncompounded; nor can one rightly attribute to them the words 'being' or 'this,' because they are alien and inappropriate words, and for this reason the letters or elements were indefinable and unknown? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: And every one who is not born deaf or dumb is able sooner or later to manifest what he thinks of anything; and if so, all those who have a right opinion about anything will also have right explanation; nor will right opinion be anywhere found to exist apart from knowledge. THEAETETUS: True. SOCRATES: Let us not, therefore, hastily charge him who gave this account of knowledge with uttering an unmeaning word; for perhaps he only intended to say, that when a person was asked what was the nature of anything, he should be able to answer his questioner by giving the elements of the thing. THEAETETUS: As for example, Socrates...? SOCRATES: As, for example, when Hesiod says that a waggon is made up of a hundred planks. Now, neither you nor I could describe all of them individually; but if any one asked what is a waggon, we should be content to answer, that a waggon consists of wheels, axle, body, rims, yoke. | And is not this also the reason why they are simple and indivisible? I can see no other. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Let us not, therefore, hastily charge him who gave this account of knowledge with uttering an unmeaning word; for perhaps he only intended to say, that when a person was asked what was the nature of anything, he should be able to answer his questioner by giving the elements of the thing. THEAETETUS: As for example, Socrates...? SOCRATES: As, for example, when Hesiod says that a waggon is made up of a hundred planks. Now, neither you nor I could describe all of them individually; but if any one asked what is a waggon, we should be content to answer, that a waggon consists of wheels, axle, body, rims, yoke. THEAETETUS: Certainly. SOCRATES: And our opponent will probably laugh at us, just as he would if we professed to be grammarians and to give a grammatical account of the name of Theaetetus, and yet could only tell the syllables and not the letters of your name--that would be true opinion, and not knowledge; for knowledge, as has been already remarked, is not attained until, combined with true opinion, there is an enumeration of the elements out of which anything is composed. | Then is not the syllable in the same case as the elements or letters, if it has no parts and is one form? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: As, for example, when Hesiod says that a waggon is made up of a hundred planks. Now, neither you nor I could describe all of them individually; but if any one asked what is a waggon, we should be content to answer, that a waggon consists of wheels, axle, body, rims, yoke. THEAETETUS: Certainly. SOCRATES: And our opponent will probably laugh at us, just as he would if we professed to be grammarians and to give a grammatical account of the name of Theaetetus, and yet could only tell the syllables and not the letters of your name--that would be true opinion, and not knowledge; for knowledge, as has been already remarked, is not attained until, combined with true opinion, there is an enumeration of the elements out of which anything is composed. THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: In the same general way, we might also have true opinion about a waggon; but he who can describe its essence by an enumeration of the hundred planks, adds rational explanation to true opinion, and instead of opinion has art and knowledge of the nature of a waggon, in that he attains to the whole through the elements. | If, then, a syllable is a whole, and has many parts or letters, the letters as well as the syllable must be intelligible and expressible, since all the parts are acknowledged to be the same as the whole? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: And our opponent will probably laugh at us, just as he would if we professed to be grammarians and to give a grammatical account of the name of Theaetetus, and yet could only tell the syllables and not the letters of your name--that would be true opinion, and not knowledge; for knowledge, as has been already remarked, is not attained until, combined with true opinion, there is an enumeration of the elements out of which anything is composed. THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: In the same general way, we might also have true opinion about a waggon; but he who can describe its essence by an enumeration of the hundred planks, adds rational explanation to true opinion, and instead of opinion has art and knowledge of the nature of a waggon, in that he attains to the whole through the elements. THEAETETUS: And do you not agree in that view, Socrates? SOCRATES: If you do, my friend; but I want to know first, whether you admit the resolution of all things into their elements to be a rational explanation of them, and the consideration of them in syllables or larger combinations of them to be irrational--is this your view? | But if it be one and indivisible, then the syllables and the letters are alike undefined and unknown, and for the same reason? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: In the same general way, we might also have true opinion about a waggon; but he who can describe its essence by an enumeration of the hundred planks, adds rational explanation to true opinion, and instead of opinion has art and knowledge of the nature of a waggon, in that he attains to the whole through the elements. THEAETETUS: And do you not agree in that view, Socrates? SOCRATES: If you do, my friend; but I want to know first, whether you admit the resolution of all things into their elements to be a rational explanation of them, and the consideration of them in syllables or larger combinations of them to be irrational--is this your view? THEAETETUS: Precisely. SOCRATES: Well, and do you conceive that a man has knowledge of any element who at one time affirms and at another time denies that element of something, or thinks that the same thing is composed of different elements at different times? | We cannot, therefore, agree in the opinion of him who says that the syllable can be known and expressed, but not the letters. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: If you do, my friend; but I want to know first, whether you admit the resolution of all things into their elements to be a rational explanation of them, and the consideration of them in syllables or larger combinations of them to be irrational--is this your view? THEAETETUS: Precisely. SOCRATES: Well, and do you conceive that a man has knowledge of any element who at one time affirms and at another time denies that element of something, or thinks that the same thing is composed of different elements at different times? THEAETETUS: Assuredly not. SOCRATES: And do you not remember that in your case and in that of others this often occurred in the process of learning to read? | Well, but will you not be equally inclined to disagree with him, when you remember your own experience in learning to read? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Well, and do you conceive that a man has knowledge of any element who at one time affirms and at another time denies that element of something, or thinks that the same thing is composed of different elements at different times? THEAETETUS: Assuredly not. SOCRATES: And do you not remember that in your case and in that of others this often occurred in the process of learning to read? THEAETETUS: You mean that I mistook the letters and misspelt the syllables? SOCRATES: Yes. | Why, that in learning you were kept trying to distinguish the separate letters both by the eye and by the ear, in order that, when you heard them spoken or saw them written, you might not be confused by their position. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: And do you not remember that in your case and in that of others this often occurred in the process of learning to read? THEAETETUS: You mean that I mistook the letters and misspelt the syllables? SOCRATES: Yes. THEAETETUS: To be sure; I perfectly remember, and I am very far from supposing that they who are in this condition have knowledge. SOCRATES: When a person at the time of learning writes the name of Theaetetus, and thinks that he ought to write and does write Th and e; but, again, meaning to write the name of Theododorus, thinks that he ought to write and does write T and e--can we suppose that he knows the first syllables of your two names? | And is the education of the harp-player complete unless he can tell what string answers to a particular note; the notes, as every one would allow, are the elements or letters of music? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Yes. THEAETETUS: To be sure; I perfectly remember, and I am very far from supposing that they who are in this condition have knowledge. SOCRATES: When a person at the time of learning writes the name of Theaetetus, and thinks that he ought to write and does write Th and e; but, again, meaning to write the name of Theododorus, thinks that he ought to write and does write T and e--can we suppose that he knows the first syllables of your two names? THEAETETUS: We have already admitted that such a one has not yet attained knowledge. SOCRATES: And in like manner be may enumerate without knowing them the second and third and fourth syllables of your name? | Then, if we argue from the letters and syllables which we know to other simples and compounds, we shall say that the letters or simple elements as a class are much more certainly known than the syllables, and much more indispensable to a perfect knowledge of any subject; and if some one says that the syllable is known and the letter unknown, we shall consider that either intentionally or unintentionally he is talking nonsense? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: When a person at the time of learning writes the name of Theaetetus, and thinks that he ought to write and does write Th and e; but, again, meaning to write the name of Theododorus, thinks that he ought to write and does write T and e--can we suppose that he knows the first syllables of your two names? THEAETETUS: We have already admitted that such a one has not yet attained knowledge. SOCRATES: And in like manner be may enumerate without knowing them the second and third and fourth syllables of your name? THEAETETUS: He may. SOCRATES: And in that case, when he knows the order of the letters and can write them out correctly, he has right opinion? | And there might be given other proofs of this belief, if I am not mistaken. But do not let us in looking for them lose sight of the question before us, which is the meaning of the statement, that right opinion with rational definition or explanation is the most perfect form of knowledge. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: And in like manner be may enumerate without knowing them the second and third and fourth syllables of your name? THEAETETUS: He may. SOCRATES: And in that case, when he knows the order of the letters and can write them out correctly, he has right opinion? THEAETETUS: Clearly. SOCRATES: But although we admit that he has right opinion, he will still be without knowledge? | Well, and what is the meaning of the term 'explanation'? I think that we have a choice of three meanings. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: And in that case, when he knows the order of the letters and can write them out correctly, he has right opinion? THEAETETUS: Clearly. SOCRATES: But although we admit that he has right opinion, he will still be without knowledge? THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: And yet he will have explanation, as well as right opinion, for he knew the order of the letters when he wrote; and this we admit to be explanation. | In the first place, the meaning may be, manifesting one's thought by the voice with verbs and nouns, imaging an opinion in the stream which flows from the lips, as in a mirror or water. Does not explanation appear to be of this nature? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: But although we admit that he has right opinion, he will still be without knowledge? THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: And yet he will have explanation, as well as right opinion, for he knew the order of the letters when he wrote; and this we admit to be explanation. THEAETETUS: True. SOCRATES: Then, my friend, there is such a thing as right opinion united with definition or explanation, which does not as yet attain to the exactness of knowledge. | And every one who is not born deaf or dumb is able sooner or later to manifest what he thinks of anything; and if so, all those who have a right opinion about anything will also have right explanation; nor will right opinion be anywhere found to exist apart from knowledge. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: And yet he will have explanation, as well as right opinion, for he knew the order of the letters when he wrote; and this we admit to be explanation. THEAETETUS: True. SOCRATES: Then, my friend, there is such a thing as right opinion united with definition or explanation, which does not as yet attain to the exactness of knowledge. THEAETETUS: It would seem so. SOCRATES: And what we fancied to be a perfect definition of knowledge is a dream only. But perhaps we had better not say so as yet, for were there not three explanations of knowledge, one of which must, as we said, be adopted by him who maintains knowledge to be true opinion combined with rational explanation? And very likely there may be found some one who will not prefer this but the third. | Let us not, therefore, hastily charge him who gave this account of knowledge with uttering an unmeaning word; for perhaps he only intended to say, that when a person was asked what was the nature of anything, he should be able to answer his questioner by giving the elements of the thing. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Then, my friend, there is such a thing as right opinion united with definition or explanation, which does not as yet attain to the exactness of knowledge. THEAETETUS: It would seem so. SOCRATES: And what we fancied to be a perfect definition of knowledge is a dream only. But perhaps we had better not say so as yet, for were there not three explanations of knowledge, one of which must, as we said, be adopted by him who maintains knowledge to be true opinion combined with rational explanation? And very likely there may be found some one who will not prefer this but the third. THEAETETUS: You are quite right; there is still one remaining. The first was the image or expression of the mind in speech; the second, which has just been mentioned, is a way of reaching the whole by an enumeration of the elements. But what is the third definition? SOCRATES: There is, further, the popular notion of telling the mark or sign of difference which distinguishes the thing in question from all others. | As, for example, when Hesiod says that a waggon is made up of a hundred planks. Now, neither you nor I could describe all of them individually; but if any one asked what is a waggon, we should be content to answer, that a waggon consists of wheels, axle, body, rims, yoke. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: And what we fancied to be a perfect definition of knowledge is a dream only. But perhaps we had better not say so as yet, for were there not three explanations of knowledge, one of which must, as we said, be adopted by him who maintains knowledge to be true opinion combined with rational explanation? And very likely there may be found some one who will not prefer this but the third. THEAETETUS: You are quite right; there is still one remaining. The first was the image or expression of the mind in speech; the second, which has just been mentioned, is a way of reaching the whole by an enumeration of the elements. But what is the third definition? SOCRATES: There is, further, the popular notion of telling the mark or sign of difference which distinguishes the thing in question from all others. THEAETETUS: Can you give me any example of such a definition? SOCRATES: As, for example, in the case of the sun, I think that you would be contented with the statement that the sun is the brightest of the heavenly bodies which revolve about the earth. | And our opponent will probably laugh at us, just as he would if we professed to be grammarians and to give a grammatical account of the name of Theaetetus, and yet could only tell the syllables and not the letters of your name--that would be true opinion, and not knowledge; for knowledge, as has been already remarked, is not attained until, combined with true opinion, there is an enumeration of the elements out of which anything is composed. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: There is, further, the popular notion of telling the mark or sign of difference which distinguishes the thing in question from all others. THEAETETUS: Can you give me any example of such a definition? SOCRATES: As, for example, in the case of the sun, I think that you would be contented with the statement that the sun is the brightest of the heavenly bodies which revolve about the earth. THEAETETUS: Certainly. SOCRATES: Understand why:--the reason is, as I was just now saying, that if you get at the difference and distinguishing characteristic of each thing, then, as many persons affirm, you will get at the definition or explanation of it; but while you lay hold only of the common and not of the characteristic notion, you will only have the definition of those things to which this common quality belongs. | In the same general way, we might also have true opinion about a waggon; but he who can describe its essence by an enumeration of the hundred planks, adds rational explanation to true opinion, and instead of opinion has art and knowledge of the nature of a waggon, in that he attains to the whole through the elements. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: As, for example, in the case of the sun, I think that you would be contented with the statement that the sun is the brightest of the heavenly bodies which revolve about the earth. THEAETETUS: Certainly. SOCRATES: Understand why:--the reason is, as I was just now saying, that if you get at the difference and distinguishing characteristic of each thing, then, as many persons affirm, you will get at the definition or explanation of it; but while you lay hold only of the common and not of the characteristic notion, you will only have the definition of those things to which this common quality belongs. THEAETETUS: I understand you, and your account of definition is in my judgment correct. SOCRATES: But he, who having right opinion about anything, can find out the difference which distinguishes it from other things will know that of which before he had only an opinion. | If you do, my friend; but I want to know first, whether you admit the resolution of all things into their elements to be a rational explanation of them, and the consideration of them in syllables or larger combinations of them to be irrational--is this your view? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Understand why:--the reason is, as I was just now saying, that if you get at the difference and distinguishing characteristic of each thing, then, as many persons affirm, you will get at the definition or explanation of it; but while you lay hold only of the common and not of the characteristic notion, you will only have the definition of those things to which this common quality belongs. THEAETETUS: I understand you, and your account of definition is in my judgment correct. SOCRATES: But he, who having right opinion about anything, can find out the difference which distinguishes it from other things will know that of which before he had only an opinion. THEAETETUS: Yes; that is what we are maintaining. SOCRATES: Nevertheless, Theaetetus, on a nearer view, I find myself quite disappointed; the picture, which at a distance was not so bad, has now become altogether unintelligible. | Well, and do you conceive that a man has knowledge of any element who at one time affirms and at another time denies that element of something, or thinks that the same thing is composed of different elements at different times? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: But he, who having right opinion about anything, can find out the difference which distinguishes it from other things will know that of which before he had only an opinion. THEAETETUS: Yes; that is what we are maintaining. SOCRATES: Nevertheless, Theaetetus, on a nearer view, I find myself quite disappointed; the picture, which at a distance was not so bad, has now become altogether unintelligible. THEAETETUS: What do you mean? SOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain: I will suppose myself to have true opinion of you, and if to this I add your definition, then I have knowledge, but if not, opinion only. | And do you not remember that in your case and in that of others this often occurred in the process of learning to read? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Nevertheless, Theaetetus, on a nearer view, I find myself quite disappointed; the picture, which at a distance was not so bad, has now become altogether unintelligible. THEAETETUS: What do you mean? SOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain: I will suppose myself to have true opinion of you, and if to this I add your definition, then I have knowledge, but if not, opinion only. THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: The definition was assumed to be the interpretation of your difference. | Yes. |