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Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Yes, Ion, and you are right also. And as I have selected from the Iliad and Odyssee for you passages which describe the office of the prophet and the physician and the fisherman, do you, who know Homer so much better than I do, Ion, select for me passages which relate to the rhapsode and the rhapsode's art, and which the rhapsode ought to examine and judge of better than other men. ION: All passages, I should say, Socrates. SOCRATES: Not all, Ion, surely. Have you already forgotten what you were saying? A rhapsode ought to have a better memory. ION: Why, what am I forgetting? SOCRATES: Do you not remember that you declared the art of the rhapsode to be different from the art of the charioteer? | Come now, suppose that you were to say to me: 'Since you, Socrates, are able to assign different passages in Homer to their corresponding arts, I wish that you would tell me what are the passages of which the excellence ought to be judged by the prophet and prophetic art'; and you will see how readily and truly I shall answer you. For there are many such passages, particularly in the Odyssee; as, for example, the passage in which Theoclymenus the prophet of the house of Melampus says to the suitors:-- 'Wretched men! what is happening to you? Your heads and your faces and your limbs underneath are shrouded in night; and the voice of lamentation bursts forth, and your cheeks are wet with tears. And the vestibule is full, and the court is full, of ghosts descending into the darkness of Erebus, and the sun has perished out of heaven, and an evil mist is spread abroad (Od.).' And there are many such passages in the Iliad also; as for example in the description of the battle near the rampart, where he says:-- 'As they were eager to pass the ditch, there came to them an omen: a soaring eagle, holding back the people on the left, bore a huge bloody dragon in his talons, still living and panting; nor had he yet resigned the strife, for he bent back and smote the bird which carried him on the breast by the neck, and he in pain let him fall from him to the ground into the midst of the multitude. And the eagle, with a cry, was borne afar on the wings of the wind (Il.).' These are the sort of things which I should say that the prophet ought to consider and determine. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Not all, Ion, surely. Have you already forgotten what you were saying? A rhapsode ought to have a better memory. ION: Why, what am I forgetting? SOCRATES: Do you not remember that you declared the art of the rhapsode to be different from the art of the charioteer? ION: Yes, I remember. SOCRATES: And you admitted that being different they would have different subjects of knowledge? | Yes, Ion, and you are right also. And as I have selected from the Iliad and Odyssee for you passages which describe the office of the prophet and the physician and the fisherman, do you, who know Homer so much better than I do, Ion, select for me passages which relate to the rhapsode and the rhapsode's art, and which the rhapsode ought to examine and judge of better than other men. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Do you not remember that you declared the art of the rhapsode to be different from the art of the charioteer? ION: Yes, I remember. SOCRATES: And you admitted that being different they would have different subjects of knowledge? ION: Yes. SOCRATES: Then upon your own showing the rhapsode, and the art of the rhapsode, will not know everything? | Not all, Ion, surely. Have you already forgotten what you were saying? A rhapsode ought to have a better memory. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: And you admitted that being different they would have different subjects of knowledge? ION: Yes. SOCRATES: Then upon your own showing the rhapsode, and the art of the rhapsode, will not know everything? ION: I should exclude certain things, Socrates. SOCRATES: You mean to say that you would exclude pretty much the subjects of the other arts. As he does not know all of them, which of them will he know? | Do you not remember that you declared the art of the rhapsode to be different from the art of the charioteer? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Then upon your own showing the rhapsode, and the art of the rhapsode, will not know everything? ION: I should exclude certain things, Socrates. SOCRATES: You mean to say that you would exclude pretty much the subjects of the other arts. As he does not know all of them, which of them will he know? ION: He will know what a man and what a woman ought to say, and what a freeman and what a slave ought to say, and what a ruler and what a subject. SOCRATES: Do you mean that a rhapsode will know better than the pilot what the ruler of a sea-tossed vessel ought to say? | And you admitted that being different they would have different subjects of knowledge? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: You mean to say that you would exclude pretty much the subjects of the other arts. As he does not know all of them, which of them will he know? ION: He will know what a man and what a woman ought to say, and what a freeman and what a slave ought to say, and what a ruler and what a subject. SOCRATES: Do you mean that a rhapsode will know better than the pilot what the ruler of a sea-tossed vessel ought to say? ION: No; the pilot will know best. SOCRATES: Or will the rhapsode know better than the physician what the ruler of a sick man ought to say? | Then upon your own showing the rhapsode, and the art of the rhapsode, will not know everything? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Do you mean that a rhapsode will know better than the pilot what the ruler of a sea-tossed vessel ought to say? ION: No; the pilot will know best. SOCRATES: Or will the rhapsode know better than the physician what the ruler of a sick man ought to say? ION: He will not. SOCRATES: But he will know what a slave ought to say? | You mean to say that you would exclude pretty much the subjects of the other arts. As he does not know all of them, which of them will he know? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Or will the rhapsode know better than the physician what the ruler of a sick man ought to say? ION: He will not. SOCRATES: But he will know what a slave ought to say? ION: Yes. SOCRATES: Suppose the slave to be a cowherd; the rhapsode will know better than the cowherd what he ought to say in order to soothe the infuriated cows? | Do you mean that a rhapsode will know better than the pilot what the ruler of a sea-tossed vessel ought to say? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: But he will know what a slave ought to say? ION: Yes. SOCRATES: Suppose the slave to be a cowherd; the rhapsode will know better than the cowherd what he ought to say in order to soothe the infuriated cows? ION: No, he will not. SOCRATES: But he will know what a spinning-woman ought to say about the working of wool? | Or will the rhapsode know better than the physician what the ruler of a sick man ought to say? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Suppose the slave to be a cowherd; the rhapsode will know better than the cowherd what he ought to say in order to soothe the infuriated cows? ION: No, he will not. SOCRATES: But he will know what a spinning-woman ought to say about the working of wool? ION: No. SOCRATES: At any rate he will know what a general ought to say when exhorting his soldiers? | But he will know what a slave ought to say? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: But he will know what a spinning-woman ought to say about the working of wool? ION: No. SOCRATES: At any rate he will know what a general ought to say when exhorting his soldiers? ION: Yes, that is the sort of thing which the rhapsode will be sure to know. SOCRATES: Well, but is the art of the rhapsode the art of the general? | Suppose the slave to be a cowherd; the rhapsode will know better than the cowherd what he ought to say in order to soothe the infuriated cows? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: At any rate he will know what a general ought to say when exhorting his soldiers? ION: Yes, that is the sort of thing which the rhapsode will be sure to know. SOCRATES: Well, but is the art of the rhapsode the art of the general? ION: I am sure that I should know what a general ought to say. SOCRATES: Why, yes, Ion, because you may possibly have a knowledge of the art of the general as well as of the rhapsode; and you may also have a knowledge of horsemanship as well as of the lyre: and then you would know when horses were well or ill managed. But suppose I were to ask you: By the help of which art, Ion, do you know whether horses are well managed, by your skill as a horseman or as a performer on the lyre--what would you answer? | But he will know what a spinning-woman ought to say about the working of wool? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Well, but is the art of the rhapsode the art of the general? ION: I am sure that I should know what a general ought to say. SOCRATES: Why, yes, Ion, because you may possibly have a knowledge of the art of the general as well as of the rhapsode; and you may also have a knowledge of horsemanship as well as of the lyre: and then you would know when horses were well or ill managed. But suppose I were to ask you: By the help of which art, Ion, do you know whether horses are well managed, by your skill as a horseman or as a performer on the lyre--what would you answer? ION: I should reply, by my skill as a horseman. SOCRATES: And if you judged of performers on the lyre, you would admit that you judged of them as a performer on the lyre, and not as a horseman? | At any rate he will know what a general ought to say when exhorting his soldiers? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Why, yes, Ion, because you may possibly have a knowledge of the art of the general as well as of the rhapsode; and you may also have a knowledge of horsemanship as well as of the lyre: and then you would know when horses were well or ill managed. But suppose I were to ask you: By the help of which art, Ion, do you know whether horses are well managed, by your skill as a horseman or as a performer on the lyre--what would you answer? ION: I should reply, by my skill as a horseman. SOCRATES: And if you judged of performers on the lyre, you would admit that you judged of them as a performer on the lyre, and not as a horseman? ION: Yes. SOCRATES: And in judging of the general's art, do you judge of it as a general or a rhapsode? | Well, but is the art of the rhapsode the art of the general? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: And if you judged of performers on the lyre, you would admit that you judged of them as a performer on the lyre, and not as a horseman? ION: Yes. SOCRATES: And in judging of the general's art, do you judge of it as a general or a rhapsode? ION: To me there appears to be no difference between them. SOCRATES: What do you mean? Do you mean to say that the art of the rhapsode and of the general is the same? | Why, yes, Ion, because you may possibly have a knowledge of the art of the general as well as of the rhapsode; and you may also have a knowledge of horsemanship as well as of the lyre: and then you would know when horses were well or ill managed. But suppose I were to ask you: By the help of which art, Ion, do you know whether horses are well managed, by your skill as a horseman or as a performer on the lyre--what would you answer? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: And in judging of the general's art, do you judge of it as a general or a rhapsode? ION: To me there appears to be no difference between them. SOCRATES: What do you mean? Do you mean to say that the art of the rhapsode and of the general is the same? ION: Yes, one and the same. SOCRATES: Then he who is a good rhapsode is also a good general? | And if you judged of performers on the lyre, you would admit that you judged of them as a performer on the lyre, and not as a horseman? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: What do you mean? Do you mean to say that the art of the rhapsode and of the general is the same? ION: Yes, one and the same. SOCRATES: Then he who is a good rhapsode is also a good general? ION: Certainly, Socrates. SOCRATES: And he who is a good general is also a good rhapsode? | And in judging of the general's art, do you judge of it as a general or a rhapsode? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Then he who is a good rhapsode is also a good general? ION: Certainly, Socrates. SOCRATES: And he who is a good general is also a good rhapsode? ION: No; I do not say that. SOCRATES: But you do say that he who is a good rhapsode is also a good general. | What do you mean? Do you mean to say that the art of the rhapsode and of the general is the same? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: And he who is a good general is also a good rhapsode? ION: No; I do not say that. SOCRATES: But you do say that he who is a good rhapsode is also a good general. ION: Certainly. SOCRATES: And you are the best of Hellenic rhapsodes? | Then he who is a good rhapsode is also a good general? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: But you do say that he who is a good rhapsode is also a good general. ION: Certainly. SOCRATES: And you are the best of Hellenic rhapsodes? ION: Far the best, Socrates. SOCRATES: And are you the best general, Ion? | And he who is a good general is also a good rhapsode? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: And you are the best of Hellenic rhapsodes? ION: Far the best, Socrates. SOCRATES: And are you the best general, Ion? ION: To be sure, Socrates; and Homer was my master. SOCRATES: But then, Ion, what in the name of goodness can be the reason why you, who are the best of generals as well as the best of rhapsodes in all Hellas, go about as a rhapsode when you might be a general? Do you think that the Hellenes want a rhapsode with his golden crown, and do not want a general? | But you do say that he who is a good rhapsode is also a good general. |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: And are you the best general, Ion? ION: To be sure, Socrates; and Homer was my master. SOCRATES: But then, Ion, what in the name of goodness can be the reason why you, who are the best of generals as well as the best of rhapsodes in all Hellas, go about as a rhapsode when you might be a general? Do you think that the Hellenes want a rhapsode with his golden crown, and do not want a general? ION: Why, Socrates, the reason is, that my countrymen, the Ephesians, are the servants and soldiers of Athens, and do not need a general; and you and Sparta are not likely to have me, for you think that you have enough generals of your own. SOCRATES: My good Ion, did you never hear of Apollodorus of Cyzicus? | And you are the best of Hellenic rhapsodes? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: But then, Ion, what in the name of goodness can be the reason why you, who are the best of generals as well as the best of rhapsodes in all Hellas, go about as a rhapsode when you might be a general? Do you think that the Hellenes want a rhapsode with his golden crown, and do not want a general? ION: Why, Socrates, the reason is, that my countrymen, the Ephesians, are the servants and soldiers of Athens, and do not need a general; and you and Sparta are not likely to have me, for you think that you have enough generals of your own. SOCRATES: My good Ion, did you never hear of Apollodorus of Cyzicus? ION: Who may he be? SOCRATES: One who, though a foreigner, has often been chosen their general by the Athenians: and there is Phanosthenes of Andros, and Heraclides of Clazomenae, whom they have also appointed to the command of their armies and to other offices, although aliens, after they had shown their merit. And will they not choose Ion the Ephesian to be their general, and honour him, if he prove himself worthy? Were not the Ephesians originally Athenians, and Ephesus is no mean city? But, indeed, Ion, if you are correct in saying that by art and knowledge you are able to praise Homer, you do not deal fairly with me, and after all your professions of knowing many glorious things about Homer, and promises that you would exhibit them, you are only a deceiver, and so far from exhibiting the art of which you are a master, will not, even after my repeated entreaties, explain to me the nature of it. You have literally as many forms as Proteus; and now you go all manner of ways, twisting and turning, and, like Proteus, become all manner of people at once, and at last slip away from me in the disguise of a general, in order that you may escape exhibiting your Homeric lore. And if you have art, then, as I was saying, in falsifying your promise that you would exhibit Homer, you are not dealing fairly with me. But if, as I believe, you have no art, but speak all these beautiful words about Homer unconsciously under his inspiring influence, then I acquit you of dishonesty, and shall only say that you are inspired. Which do you prefer to be thought, dishonest or inspired? | And are you the best general, Ion? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: My good Ion, did you never hear of Apollodorus of Cyzicus? ION: Who may he be? SOCRATES: One who, though a foreigner, has often been chosen their general by the Athenians: and there is Phanosthenes of Andros, and Heraclides of Clazomenae, whom they have also appointed to the command of their armies and to other offices, although aliens, after they had shown their merit. And will they not choose Ion the Ephesian to be their general, and honour him, if he prove himself worthy? Were not the Ephesians originally Athenians, and Ephesus is no mean city? But, indeed, Ion, if you are correct in saying that by art and knowledge you are able to praise Homer, you do not deal fairly with me, and after all your professions of knowing many glorious things about Homer, and promises that you would exhibit them, you are only a deceiver, and so far from exhibiting the art of which you are a master, will not, even after my repeated entreaties, explain to me the nature of it. You have literally as many forms as Proteus; and now you go all manner of ways, twisting and turning, and, like Proteus, become all manner of people at once, and at last slip away from me in the disguise of a general, in order that you may escape exhibiting your Homeric lore. And if you have art, then, as I was saying, in falsifying your promise that you would exhibit Homer, you are not dealing fairly with me. But if, as I believe, you have no art, but speak all these beautiful words about Homer unconsciously under his inspiring influence, then I acquit you of dishonesty, and shall only say that you are inspired. Which do you prefer to be thought, dishonest or inspired? ION: There is a great difference, Socrates, between the two alternatives; and inspiration is by far the nobler. SOCRATES: Then, Ion, I shall assume the nobler alternative; and attribute to you in your praises of Homer inspiration, and not art. *** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ION *** Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will be renamed. Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project Gutenberg™ electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG™ concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you charge for an eBook, except by following the terms of the trademark license, including paying royalties for use of the Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and research. Project Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and printed and given away—you may do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks not protected by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark license, especially commercial redistribution. | But then, Ion, what in the name of goodness can be the reason why you, who are the best of generals as well as the best of rhapsodes in all Hellas, go about as a rhapsode when you might be a general? Do you think that the Hellenes want a rhapsode with his golden crown, and do not want a general? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: One who, though a foreigner, has often been chosen their general by the Athenians: and there is Phanosthenes of Andros, and Heraclides of Clazomenae, whom they have also appointed to the command of their armies and to other offices, although aliens, after they had shown their merit. And will they not choose Ion the Ephesian to be their general, and honour him, if he prove himself worthy? Were not the Ephesians originally Athenians, and Ephesus is no mean city? But, indeed, Ion, if you are correct in saying that by art and knowledge you are able to praise Homer, you do not deal fairly with me, and after all your professions of knowing many glorious things about Homer, and promises that you would exhibit them, you are only a deceiver, and so far from exhibiting the art of which you are a master, will not, even after my repeated entreaties, explain to me the nature of it. You have literally as many forms as Proteus; and now you go all manner of ways, twisting and turning, and, like Proteus, become all manner of people at once, and at last slip away from me in the disguise of a general, in order that you may escape exhibiting your Homeric lore. And if you have art, then, as I was saying, in falsifying your promise that you would exhibit Homer, you are not dealing fairly with me. But if, as I believe, you have no art, but speak all these beautiful words about Homer unconsciously under his inspiring influence, then I acquit you of dishonesty, and shall only say that you are inspired. Which do you prefer to be thought, dishonest or inspired? ION: There is a great difference, Socrates, between the two alternatives; and inspiration is by far the nobler. SOCRATES: Then, Ion, I shall assume the nobler alternative; and attribute to you in your praises of Homer inspiration, and not art. *** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ION *** Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will be renamed. Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project Gutenberg™ electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG™ concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you charge for an eBook, except by following the terms of the trademark license, including paying royalties for use of the Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and research. Project Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and printed and given away—you may do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks not protected by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark license, especially commercial redistribution. | My good Ion, did you never hear of Apollodorus of Cyzicus? |
Respond as Socrates | SOCRATES: Then, Ion, I shall assume the nobler alternative; and attribute to you in your praises of Homer inspiration, and not art. *** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ION *** Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will be renamed. Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project Gutenberg™ electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG™ concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you charge for an eBook, except by following the terms of the trademark license, including paying royalties for use of the Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and research. Project Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and printed and given away—you may do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks not protected by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark license, especially commercial redistribution. | One who, though a foreigner, has often been chosen their general by the Athenians: and there is Phanosthenes of Andros, and Heraclides of Clazomenae, whom they have also appointed to the command of their armies and to other offices, although aliens, after they had shown their merit. And will they not choose Ion the Ephesian to be their general, and honour him, if he prove himself worthy? Were not the Ephesians originally Athenians, and Ephesus is no mean city? But, indeed, Ion, if you are correct in saying that by art and knowledge you are able to praise Homer, you do not deal fairly with me, and after all your professions of knowing many glorious things about Homer, and promises that you would exhibit them, you are only a deceiver, and so far from exhibiting the art of which you are a master, will not, even after my repeated entreaties, explain to me the nature of it. You have literally as many forms as Proteus; and now you go all manner of ways, twisting and turning, and, like Proteus, become all manner of people at once, and at last slip away from me in the disguise of a general, in order that you may escape exhibiting your Homeric lore. And if you have art, then, as I was saying, in falsifying your promise that you would exhibit Homer, you are not dealing fairly with me. But if, as I believe, you have no art, but speak all these beautiful words about Homer unconsciously under his inspiring influence, then I acquit you of dishonesty, and shall only say that you are inspired. Which do you prefer to be thought, dishonest or inspired? |
Respond as Socrates | Then, Ion, I shall assume the nobler alternative; and attribute to you in your praises of Homer inspiration, and not art. *** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ION *** Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will be renamed. Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project Gutenberg™ electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG™ concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you charge for an eBook, except by following the terms of the trademark license, including paying royalties for use of the Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and research. Project Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and printed and given away—you may do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks not protected by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark license, especially commercial redistribution. |
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Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: That is my notion. SOCRATES: Whether the giver of the name be an individual or a city? HERMOGENES: Yes. SOCRATES: Well, now, let me take an instance;—suppose that I call a man a horse or a horse a man, you mean to say that a man will be rightly called a horse by me individually, and rightly called a man by the rest of the world; and a horse again would be rightly called a man by me and a horse by the world:—that is your meaning? HERMOGENES: He would, according to my view. | Son of Hipponicus, there is an ancient saying, that “hard is the knowledge of the good.” And the knowledge of names is a great part of knowledge. If I had not been poor, I might have heard the fifty-drachma course of the great Prodicus, which is a complete education in grammar and language—these are his own words—and then I should have been at once able to answer your question about the correctness of names. But, indeed, I have only heard the single-drachma course, and therefore, I do not know the truth about such matters; I will, however, gladly assist you and Cratylus in the investigation of them. When he declares that your name is not really Hermogenes, I suspect that he is only making fun of you;—he means to say that you are no true son of Hermes, because you are always looking after a fortune and never in luck. But, as I was saying, there is a good deal of difficulty in this sort of knowledge, and therefore we had better leave the question open until we have heard both sides. |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Yes. SOCRATES: Well, now, let me take an instance;—suppose that I call a man a horse or a horse a man, you mean to say that a man will be rightly called a horse by me individually, and rightly called a man by the rest of the world; and a horse again would be rightly called a man by me and a horse by the world:—that is your meaning? HERMOGENES: He would, according to my view. SOCRATES: But how about truth, then? you would acknowledge that there is in words a true and a false? HERMOGENES: Certainly. | I dare say that you may be right, Hermogenes: let us see;—Your meaning is, that the name of each thing is only that which anybody agrees to call it? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: He would, according to my view. SOCRATES: But how about truth, then? you would acknowledge that there is in words a true and a false? HERMOGENES: Certainly. SOCRATES: And there are true and false propositions? HERMOGENES: To be sure. | Whether the giver of the name be an individual or a city? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Certainly. SOCRATES: And there are true and false propositions? HERMOGENES: To be sure. SOCRATES: And a true proposition says that which is, and a false proposition says that which is not? HERMOGENES: Yes; what other answer is possible? | Well, now, let me take an instance;—suppose that I call a man a horse or a horse a man, you mean to say that a man will be rightly called a horse by me individually, and rightly called a man by the rest of the world; and a horse again would be rightly called a man by me and a horse by the world:—that is your meaning? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: To be sure. SOCRATES: And a true proposition says that which is, and a false proposition says that which is not? HERMOGENES: Yes; what other answer is possible? SOCRATES: Then in a proposition there is a true and false? HERMOGENES: Certainly. | But how about truth, then? you would acknowledge that there is in words a true and a false? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Yes; what other answer is possible? SOCRATES: Then in a proposition there is a true and false? HERMOGENES: Certainly. SOCRATES: But is a proposition true as a whole only, and are the parts untrue? HERMOGENES: No; the parts are true as well as the whole. | And there are true and false propositions? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Certainly. SOCRATES: But is a proposition true as a whole only, and are the parts untrue? HERMOGENES: No; the parts are true as well as the whole. SOCRATES: Would you say the large parts and not the smaller ones, or every part? HERMOGENES: I should say that every part is true. | And a true proposition says that which is, and a false proposition says that which is not? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: No; the parts are true as well as the whole. SOCRATES: Would you say the large parts and not the smaller ones, or every part? HERMOGENES: I should say that every part is true. SOCRATES: Is a proposition resolvable into any part smaller than a name? HERMOGENES: No; that is the smallest. | Then in a proposition there is a true and false? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: I should say that every part is true. SOCRATES: Is a proposition resolvable into any part smaller than a name? HERMOGENES: No; that is the smallest. SOCRATES: Then the name is a part of the true proposition? HERMOGENES: Yes. | But is a proposition true as a whole only, and are the parts untrue? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: No; that is the smallest. SOCRATES: Then the name is a part of the true proposition? HERMOGENES: Yes. SOCRATES: Yes, and a true part, as you say. HERMOGENES: Yes. | Would you say the large parts and not the smaller ones, or every part? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Yes. SOCRATES: Yes, and a true part, as you say. HERMOGENES: Yes. SOCRATES: And is not the part of a falsehood also a falsehood? HERMOGENES: Yes. | Is a proposition resolvable into any part smaller than a name? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Yes. SOCRATES: And is not the part of a falsehood also a falsehood? HERMOGENES: Yes. SOCRATES: Then, if propositions may be true and false, names may be true and false? HERMOGENES: So we must infer. | Then the name is a part of the true proposition? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Yes. SOCRATES: Then, if propositions may be true and false, names may be true and false? HERMOGENES: So we must infer. SOCRATES: And the name of anything is that which any one affirms to be the name? HERMOGENES: Yes. | Yes, and a true part, as you say. |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: So we must infer. SOCRATES: And the name of anything is that which any one affirms to be the name? HERMOGENES: Yes. SOCRATES: And will there be so many names of each thing as everybody says that there are? and will they be true names at the time of uttering them? HERMOGENES: Yes, Socrates, I can conceive no correctness of names other than this; you give one name, and I another; and in different cities and countries there are different names for the same things; Hellenes differ from barbarians in their use of names, and the several Hellenic tribes from one another. | And is not the part of a falsehood also a falsehood? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Yes. SOCRATES: And will there be so many names of each thing as everybody says that there are? and will they be true names at the time of uttering them? HERMOGENES: Yes, Socrates, I can conceive no correctness of names other than this; you give one name, and I another; and in different cities and countries there are different names for the same things; Hellenes differ from barbarians in their use of names, and the several Hellenic tribes from one another. SOCRATES: But would you say, Hermogenes, that the things differ as the names differ? and are they relative to individuals, as Protagoras tells us? For he says that man is the measure of all things, and that things are to me as they appear to me, and that they are to you as they appear to you. Do you agree with him, or would you say that things have a permanent essence of their own? HERMOGENES: There have been times, Socrates, when I have been driven in my perplexity to take refuge with Protagoras; not that I agree with him at all. | Then, if propositions may be true and false, names may be true and false? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Yes, Socrates, I can conceive no correctness of names other than this; you give one name, and I another; and in different cities and countries there are different names for the same things; Hellenes differ from barbarians in their use of names, and the several Hellenic tribes from one another. SOCRATES: But would you say, Hermogenes, that the things differ as the names differ? and are they relative to individuals, as Protagoras tells us? For he says that man is the measure of all things, and that things are to me as they appear to me, and that they are to you as they appear to you. Do you agree with him, or would you say that things have a permanent essence of their own? HERMOGENES: There have been times, Socrates, when I have been driven in my perplexity to take refuge with Protagoras; not that I agree with him at all. SOCRATES: What! have you ever been driven to admit that there was no such thing as a bad man? HERMOGENES: No, indeed; but I have often had reason to think that there are very bad men, and a good many of them. | And the name of anything is that which any one affirms to be the name? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: There have been times, Socrates, when I have been driven in my perplexity to take refuge with Protagoras; not that I agree with him at all. SOCRATES: What! have you ever been driven to admit that there was no such thing as a bad man? HERMOGENES: No, indeed; but I have often had reason to think that there are very bad men, and a good many of them. SOCRATES: Well, and have you ever found any very good ones? HERMOGENES: Not many. | And will there be so many names of each thing as everybody says that there are? and will they be true names at the time of uttering them? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: No, indeed; but I have often had reason to think that there are very bad men, and a good many of them. SOCRATES: Well, and have you ever found any very good ones? HERMOGENES: Not many. SOCRATES: Still you have found them? HERMOGENES: Yes. | But would you say, Hermogenes, that the things differ as the names differ? and are they relative to individuals, as Protagoras tells us? For he says that man is the measure of all things, and that things are to me as they appear to me, and that they are to you as they appear to you. Do you agree with him, or would you say that things have a permanent essence of their own? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Not many. SOCRATES: Still you have found them? HERMOGENES: Yes. SOCRATES: And would you hold that the very good were the very wise, and the very evil very foolish? Would that be your view? HERMOGENES: It would. | What! have you ever been driven to admit that there was no such thing as a bad man? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Yes. SOCRATES: And would you hold that the very good were the very wise, and the very evil very foolish? Would that be your view? HERMOGENES: It would. SOCRATES: But if Protagoras is right, and the truth is that things are as they appear to any one, how can some of us be wise and some of us foolish? HERMOGENES: Impossible. | Well, and have you ever found any very good ones? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: It would. SOCRATES: But if Protagoras is right, and the truth is that things are as they appear to any one, how can some of us be wise and some of us foolish? HERMOGENES: Impossible. SOCRATES: And if, on the other hand, wisdom and folly are really distinguishable, you will allow, I think, that the assertion of Protagoras can hardly be correct. For if what appears to each man is true to him, one man cannot in reality be wiser than another. HERMOGENES: He cannot. | Still you have found them? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Impossible. SOCRATES: And if, on the other hand, wisdom and folly are really distinguishable, you will allow, I think, that the assertion of Protagoras can hardly be correct. For if what appears to each man is true to him, one man cannot in reality be wiser than another. HERMOGENES: He cannot. SOCRATES: Nor will you be disposed to say with Euthydemus, that all things equally belong to all men at the same moment and always; for neither on his view can there be some good and others bad, if virtue and vice are always equally to be attributed to all. HERMOGENES: There cannot. | And would you hold that the very good were the very wise, and the very evil very foolish? Would that be your view? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: He cannot. SOCRATES: Nor will you be disposed to say with Euthydemus, that all things equally belong to all men at the same moment and always; for neither on his view can there be some good and others bad, if virtue and vice are always equally to be attributed to all. HERMOGENES: There cannot. SOCRATES: But if neither is right, and things are not relative to individuals, and all things do not equally belong to all at the same moment and always, they must be supposed to have their own proper and permanent essence: they are not in relation to us, or influenced by us, fluctuating according to our fancy, but they are independent, and maintain to their own essence the relation prescribed by nature. HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you have said the truth. | But if Protagoras is right, and the truth is that things are as they appear to any one, how can some of us be wise and some of us foolish? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: There cannot. SOCRATES: But if neither is right, and things are not relative to individuals, and all things do not equally belong to all at the same moment and always, they must be supposed to have their own proper and permanent essence: they are not in relation to us, or influenced by us, fluctuating according to our fancy, but they are independent, and maintain to their own essence the relation prescribed by nature. HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you have said the truth. SOCRATES: Does what I am saying apply only to the things themselves, or equally to the actions which proceed from them? Are not actions also a class of being? HERMOGENES: Yes, the actions are real as well as the things. | And if, on the other hand, wisdom and folly are really distinguishable, you will allow, I think, that the assertion of Protagoras can hardly be correct. For if what appears to each man is true to him, one man cannot in reality be wiser than another. |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you have said the truth. SOCRATES: Does what I am saying apply only to the things themselves, or equally to the actions which proceed from them? Are not actions also a class of being? HERMOGENES: Yes, the actions are real as well as the things. SOCRATES: Then the actions also are done according to their proper nature, and not according to our opinion of them? In cutting, for example, we do not cut as we please, and with any chance instrument; but we cut with the proper instrument only, and according to the natural process of cutting; and the natural process is right and will succeed, but any other will fail and be of no use at all. HERMOGENES: I should say that the natural way is the right way. | Nor will you be disposed to say with Euthydemus, that all things equally belong to all men at the same moment and always; for neither on his view can there be some good and others bad, if virtue and vice are always equally to be attributed to all. |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Yes, the actions are real as well as the things. SOCRATES: Then the actions also are done according to their proper nature, and not according to our opinion of them? In cutting, for example, we do not cut as we please, and with any chance instrument; but we cut with the proper instrument only, and according to the natural process of cutting; and the natural process is right and will succeed, but any other will fail and be of no use at all. HERMOGENES: I should say that the natural way is the right way. SOCRATES: Again, in burning, not every way is the right way; but the right way is the natural way, and the right instrument the natural instrument. HERMOGENES: True. | But if neither is right, and things are not relative to individuals, and all things do not equally belong to all at the same moment and always, they must be supposed to have their own proper and permanent essence: they are not in relation to us, or influenced by us, fluctuating according to our fancy, but they are independent, and maintain to their own essence the relation prescribed by nature. |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: I should say that the natural way is the right way. SOCRATES: Again, in burning, not every way is the right way; but the right way is the natural way, and the right instrument the natural instrument. HERMOGENES: True. SOCRATES: And this holds good of all actions? HERMOGENES: Yes. | Does what I am saying apply only to the things themselves, or equally to the actions which proceed from them? Are not actions also a class of being? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: True. SOCRATES: And this holds good of all actions? HERMOGENES: Yes. SOCRATES: And speech is a kind of action? HERMOGENES: True. | Then the actions also are done according to their proper nature, and not according to our opinion of them? In cutting, for example, we do not cut as we please, and with any chance instrument; but we cut with the proper instrument only, and according to the natural process of cutting; and the natural process is right and will succeed, but any other will fail and be of no use at all. |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Yes. SOCRATES: And speech is a kind of action? HERMOGENES: True. SOCRATES: And will a man speak correctly who speaks as he pleases? Will not the successful speaker rather be he who speaks in the natural way of speaking, and as things ought to be spoken, and with the natural instrument? Any other mode of speaking will result in error and failure. HERMOGENES: I quite agree with you. | Again, in burning, not every way is the right way; but the right way is the natural way, and the right instrument the natural instrument. |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: True. SOCRATES: And will a man speak correctly who speaks as he pleases? Will not the successful speaker rather be he who speaks in the natural way of speaking, and as things ought to be spoken, and with the natural instrument? Any other mode of speaking will result in error and failure. HERMOGENES: I quite agree with you. SOCRATES: And is not naming a part of speaking? for in giving names men speak. HERMOGENES: That is true. | And this holds good of all actions? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: I quite agree with you. SOCRATES: And is not naming a part of speaking? for in giving names men speak. HERMOGENES: That is true. SOCRATES: And if speaking is a sort of action and has a relation to acts, is not naming also a sort of action? HERMOGENES: True. | And speech is a kind of action? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: That is true. SOCRATES: And if speaking is a sort of action and has a relation to acts, is not naming also a sort of action? HERMOGENES: True. SOCRATES: And we saw that actions were not relative to ourselves, but had a special nature of their own? HERMOGENES: Precisely. | And will a man speak correctly who speaks as he pleases? Will not the successful speaker rather be he who speaks in the natural way of speaking, and as things ought to be spoken, and with the natural instrument? Any other mode of speaking will result in error and failure. |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: True. SOCRATES: And we saw that actions were not relative to ourselves, but had a special nature of their own? HERMOGENES: Precisely. SOCRATES: Then the argument would lead us to infer that names ought to be given according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument, and not at our pleasure: in this and no other way shall we name with success. HERMOGENES: I agree. | And is not naming a part of speaking? for in giving names men speak. |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Precisely. SOCRATES: Then the argument would lead us to infer that names ought to be given according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument, and not at our pleasure: in this and no other way shall we name with success. HERMOGENES: I agree. SOCRATES: But again, that which has to be cut has to be cut with something? HERMOGENES: Yes. | And if speaking is a sort of action and has a relation to acts, is not naming also a sort of action? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: I agree. SOCRATES: But again, that which has to be cut has to be cut with something? HERMOGENES: Yes. SOCRATES: And that which has to be woven or pierced has to be woven or pierced with something? HERMOGENES: Certainly. | And we saw that actions were not relative to ourselves, but had a special nature of their own? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Yes. SOCRATES: And that which has to be woven or pierced has to be woven or pierced with something? HERMOGENES: Certainly. SOCRATES: And that which has to be named has to be named with something? HERMOGENES: True. | Then the argument would lead us to infer that names ought to be given according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument, and not at our pleasure: in this and no other way shall we name with success. |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Certainly. SOCRATES: And that which has to be named has to be named with something? HERMOGENES: True. SOCRATES: What is that with which we pierce? HERMOGENES: An awl. | But again, that which has to be cut has to be cut with something? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: True. SOCRATES: What is that with which we pierce? HERMOGENES: An awl. SOCRATES: And with which we weave? HERMOGENES: A shuttle. | And that which has to be woven or pierced has to be woven or pierced with something? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: An awl. SOCRATES: And with which we weave? HERMOGENES: A shuttle. SOCRATES: And with which we name? HERMOGENES: A name. | And that which has to be named has to be named with something? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: A shuttle. SOCRATES: And with which we name? HERMOGENES: A name. SOCRATES: Very good: then a name is an instrument? HERMOGENES: Certainly. | What is that with which we pierce? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: A name. SOCRATES: Very good: then a name is an instrument? HERMOGENES: Certainly. SOCRATES: Suppose that I ask, “What sort of instrument is a shuttle?” And you answer, “A weaving instrument.” HERMOGENES: Well. | And with which we weave? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Certainly. SOCRATES: Suppose that I ask, “What sort of instrument is a shuttle?” And you answer, “A weaving instrument.” HERMOGENES: Well. SOCRATES: And I ask again, “What do we do when we weave?”—The answer is, that we separate or disengage the warp from the woof. HERMOGENES: Very true. | And with which we name? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Well. SOCRATES: And I ask again, “What do we do when we weave?”—The answer is, that we separate or disengage the warp from the woof. HERMOGENES: Very true. SOCRATES: And may not a similar description be given of an awl, and of instruments in general? HERMOGENES: To be sure. | Very good: then a name is an instrument? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Very true. SOCRATES: And may not a similar description be given of an awl, and of instruments in general? HERMOGENES: To be sure. SOCRATES: And now suppose that I ask a similar question about names: will you answer me? Regarding the name as an instrument, what do we do when we name? HERMOGENES: I cannot say. | Suppose that I ask, “What sort of instrument is a shuttle?” And you answer, “A weaving instrument.” |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: To be sure. SOCRATES: And now suppose that I ask a similar question about names: will you answer me? Regarding the name as an instrument, what do we do when we name? HERMOGENES: I cannot say. SOCRATES: Do we not give information to one another, and distinguish things according to their natures? HERMOGENES: Certainly we do. | And I ask again, “What do we do when we weave?”—The answer is, that we separate or disengage the warp from the woof. |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: I cannot say. SOCRATES: Do we not give information to one another, and distinguish things according to their natures? HERMOGENES: Certainly we do. SOCRATES: Then a name is an instrument of teaching and of distinguishing natures, as the shuttle is of distinguishing the threads of the web. HERMOGENES: Yes. | And may not a similar description be given of an awl, and of instruments in general? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Certainly we do. SOCRATES: Then a name is an instrument of teaching and of distinguishing natures, as the shuttle is of distinguishing the threads of the web. HERMOGENES: Yes. SOCRATES: And the shuttle is the instrument of the weaver? HERMOGENES: Assuredly. | And now suppose that I ask a similar question about names: will you answer me? Regarding the name as an instrument, what do we do when we name? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Yes. SOCRATES: And the shuttle is the instrument of the weaver? HERMOGENES: Assuredly. SOCRATES: Then the weaver will use the shuttle well—and well means like a weaver? and the teacher will use the name well—and well means like a teacher? HERMOGENES: Yes. | Do we not give information to one another, and distinguish things according to their natures? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Assuredly. SOCRATES: Then the weaver will use the shuttle well—and well means like a weaver? and the teacher will use the name well—and well means like a teacher? HERMOGENES: Yes. SOCRATES: And when the weaver uses the shuttle, whose work will he be using well? HERMOGENES: That of the carpenter. | Then a name is an instrument of teaching and of distinguishing natures, as the shuttle is of distinguishing the threads of the web. |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Yes. SOCRATES: And when the weaver uses the shuttle, whose work will he be using well? HERMOGENES: That of the carpenter. SOCRATES: And is every man a carpenter, or the skilled only? HERMOGENES: Only the skilled. | And the shuttle is the instrument of the weaver? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: That of the carpenter. SOCRATES: And is every man a carpenter, or the skilled only? HERMOGENES: Only the skilled. SOCRATES: And when the piercer uses the awl, whose work will he be using well? HERMOGENES: That of the smith. | Then the weaver will use the shuttle well—and well means like a weaver? and the teacher will use the name well—and well means like a teacher? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Only the skilled. SOCRATES: And when the piercer uses the awl, whose work will he be using well? HERMOGENES: That of the smith. SOCRATES: And is every man a smith, or only the skilled? HERMOGENES: The skilled only. | And when the weaver uses the shuttle, whose work will he be using well? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: That of the smith. SOCRATES: And is every man a smith, or only the skilled? HERMOGENES: The skilled only. SOCRATES: And when the teacher uses the name, whose work will he be using? HERMOGENES: There again I am puzzled. | And is every man a carpenter, or the skilled only? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: The skilled only. SOCRATES: And when the teacher uses the name, whose work will he be using? HERMOGENES: There again I am puzzled. SOCRATES: Cannot you at least say who gives us the names which we use? HERMOGENES: Indeed I cannot. | And when the piercer uses the awl, whose work will he be using well? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: There again I am puzzled. SOCRATES: Cannot you at least say who gives us the names which we use? HERMOGENES: Indeed I cannot. SOCRATES: Does not the law seem to you to give us them? HERMOGENES: Yes, I suppose so. | And is every man a smith, or only the skilled? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Indeed I cannot. SOCRATES: Does not the law seem to you to give us them? HERMOGENES: Yes, I suppose so. SOCRATES: Then the teacher, when he gives us a name, uses the work of the legislator? HERMOGENES: I agree. | And when the teacher uses the name, whose work will he be using? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Yes, I suppose so. SOCRATES: Then the teacher, when he gives us a name, uses the work of the legislator? HERMOGENES: I agree. SOCRATES: And is every man a legislator, or the skilled only? HERMOGENES: The skilled only. | Cannot you at least say who gives us the names which we use? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: I agree. SOCRATES: And is every man a legislator, or the skilled only? HERMOGENES: The skilled only. SOCRATES: Then, Hermogenes, not every man is able to give a name, but only a maker of names; and this is the legislator, who of all skilled artisans in the world is the rarest. HERMOGENES: True. | Does not the law seem to you to give us them? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: The skilled only. SOCRATES: Then, Hermogenes, not every man is able to give a name, but only a maker of names; and this is the legislator, who of all skilled artisans in the world is the rarest. HERMOGENES: True. SOCRATES: And how does the legislator make names? and to what does he look? Consider this in the light of the previous instances: to what does the carpenter look in making the shuttle? Does he not look to that which is naturally fitted to act as a shuttle? HERMOGENES: Certainly. | Then the teacher, when he gives us a name, uses the work of the legislator? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: True. SOCRATES: And how does the legislator make names? and to what does he look? Consider this in the light of the previous instances: to what does the carpenter look in making the shuttle? Does he not look to that which is naturally fitted to act as a shuttle? HERMOGENES: Certainly. SOCRATES: And suppose the shuttle to be broken in making, will he make another, looking to the broken one? or will he look to the form according to which he made the other? HERMOGENES: To the latter, I should imagine. | And is every man a legislator, or the skilled only? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Certainly. SOCRATES: And suppose the shuttle to be broken in making, will he make another, looking to the broken one? or will he look to the form according to which he made the other? HERMOGENES: To the latter, I should imagine. SOCRATES: Might not that be justly called the true or ideal shuttle? HERMOGENES: I think so. | Then, Hermogenes, not every man is able to give a name, but only a maker of names; and this is the legislator, who of all skilled artisans in the world is the rarest. |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: To the latter, I should imagine. SOCRATES: Might not that be justly called the true or ideal shuttle? HERMOGENES: I think so. SOCRATES: And whatever shuttles are wanted, for the manufacture of garments, thin or thick, of flaxen, woollen, or other material, ought all of them to have the true form of the shuttle; and whatever is the shuttle best adapted to each kind of work, that ought to be the form which the maker produces in each case. HERMOGENES: Yes. | And how does the legislator make names? and to what does he look? Consider this in the light of the previous instances: to what does the carpenter look in making the shuttle? Does he not look to that which is naturally fitted to act as a shuttle? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: I think so. SOCRATES: And whatever shuttles are wanted, for the manufacture of garments, thin or thick, of flaxen, woollen, or other material, ought all of them to have the true form of the shuttle; and whatever is the shuttle best adapted to each kind of work, that ought to be the form which the maker produces in each case. HERMOGENES: Yes. SOCRATES: And the same holds of other instruments: when a man has discovered the instrument which is naturally adapted to each work, he must express this natural form, and not others which he fancies, in the material, whatever it may be, which he employs; for example, he ought to know how to put into iron the forms of awls adapted by nature to their several uses? HERMOGENES: Certainly. | And suppose the shuttle to be broken in making, will he make another, looking to the broken one? or will he look to the form according to which he made the other? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Yes. SOCRATES: And the same holds of other instruments: when a man has discovered the instrument which is naturally adapted to each work, he must express this natural form, and not others which he fancies, in the material, whatever it may be, which he employs; for example, he ought to know how to put into iron the forms of awls adapted by nature to their several uses? HERMOGENES: Certainly. SOCRATES: And how to put into wood forms of shuttles adapted by nature to their uses? HERMOGENES: True. | Might not that be justly called the true or ideal shuttle? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Certainly. SOCRATES: And how to put into wood forms of shuttles adapted by nature to their uses? HERMOGENES: True. SOCRATES: For the several forms of shuttles naturally answer to the several kinds of webs; and this is true of instruments in general. HERMOGENES: Yes. | And whatever shuttles are wanted, for the manufacture of garments, thin or thick, of flaxen, woollen, or other material, ought all of them to have the true form of the shuttle; and whatever is the shuttle best adapted to each kind of work, that ought to be the form which the maker produces in each case. |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: True. SOCRATES: For the several forms of shuttles naturally answer to the several kinds of webs; and this is true of instruments in general. HERMOGENES: Yes. SOCRATES: Then, as to names: ought not our legislator also to know how to put the true natural name of each thing into sounds and syllables, and to make and give all names with a view to the ideal name, if he is to be a namer in any true sense? And we must remember that different legislators will not use the same syllables. For neither does every smith, although he may be making the same instrument for the same purpose, make them all of the same iron. The form must be the same, but the material may vary, and still the instrument may be equally good of whatever iron made, whether in Hellas or in a foreign country;—there is no difference. HERMOGENES: Very true. | And the same holds of other instruments: when a man has discovered the instrument which is naturally adapted to each work, he must express this natural form, and not others which he fancies, in the material, whatever it may be, which he employs; for example, he ought to know how to put into iron the forms of awls adapted by nature to their several uses? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Yes. SOCRATES: Then, as to names: ought not our legislator also to know how to put the true natural name of each thing into sounds and syllables, and to make and give all names with a view to the ideal name, if he is to be a namer in any true sense? And we must remember that different legislators will not use the same syllables. For neither does every smith, although he may be making the same instrument for the same purpose, make them all of the same iron. The form must be the same, but the material may vary, and still the instrument may be equally good of whatever iron made, whether in Hellas or in a foreign country;—there is no difference. HERMOGENES: Very true. SOCRATES: And the legislator, whether he be Hellene or barbarian, is not therefore to be deemed by you a worse legislator, provided he gives the true and proper form of the name in whatever syllables; this or that country makes no matter. HERMOGENES: Quite true. | And how to put into wood forms of shuttles adapted by nature to their uses? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Very true. SOCRATES: And the legislator, whether he be Hellene or barbarian, is not therefore to be deemed by you a worse legislator, provided he gives the true and proper form of the name in whatever syllables; this or that country makes no matter. HERMOGENES: Quite true. SOCRATES: But who then is to determine whether the proper form is given to the shuttle, whatever sort of wood may be used? the carpenter who makes, or the weaver who is to use them? HERMOGENES: I should say, he who is to use them, Socrates. | For the several forms of shuttles naturally answer to the several kinds of webs; and this is true of instruments in general. |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Quite true. SOCRATES: But who then is to determine whether the proper form is given to the shuttle, whatever sort of wood may be used? the carpenter who makes, or the weaver who is to use them? HERMOGENES: I should say, he who is to use them, Socrates. SOCRATES: And who uses the work of the lyre-maker? Will not he be the man who knows how to direct what is being done, and who will know also whether the work is being well done or not? HERMOGENES: Certainly. | Then, as to names: ought not our legislator also to know how to put the true natural name of each thing into sounds and syllables, and to make and give all names with a view to the ideal name, if he is to be a namer in any true sense? And we must remember that different legislators will not use the same syllables. For neither does every smith, although he may be making the same instrument for the same purpose, make them all of the same iron. The form must be the same, but the material may vary, and still the instrument may be equally good of whatever iron made, whether in Hellas or in a foreign country;—there is no difference. |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: I should say, he who is to use them, Socrates. SOCRATES: And who uses the work of the lyre-maker? Will not he be the man who knows how to direct what is being done, and who will know also whether the work is being well done or not? HERMOGENES: Certainly. SOCRATES: And who is he? HERMOGENES: The player of the lyre. | And the legislator, whether he be Hellene or barbarian, is not therefore to be deemed by you a worse legislator, provided he gives the true and proper form of the name in whatever syllables; this or that country makes no matter. |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: Certainly. SOCRATES: And who is he? HERMOGENES: The player of the lyre. SOCRATES: And who will direct the shipwright? HERMOGENES: The pilot. | But who then is to determine whether the proper form is given to the shuttle, whatever sort of wood may be used? the carpenter who makes, or the weaver who is to use them? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: The player of the lyre. SOCRATES: And who will direct the shipwright? HERMOGENES: The pilot. SOCRATES: And who will be best able to direct the legislator in his work, and will know whether the work is well done, in this or any other country? Will not the user be the man? HERMOGENES: Yes. | And who uses the work of the lyre-maker? Will not he be the man who knows how to direct what is being done, and who will know also whether the work is being well done or not? |
Respond as Socrates | HERMOGENES: The pilot. SOCRATES: And who will be best able to direct the legislator in his work, and will know whether the work is well done, in this or any other country? Will not the user be the man? HERMOGENES: Yes. SOCRATES: And this is he who knows how to ask questions? HERMOGENES: Yes. | And who is he? |