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This private data includes stored passwords, login credential information from Web browsers, and a variety of cryptocurrency wallets | ['T1003'] |
Alerts for credential theft tools and privileged account lockouts should be investigated | ['T1003'] |
(Source: Dell SecureWorks) TG-3390 actors have also used the following publicly available tools: Windows Credential Editor (WCE) — obtains passwords from memory gsecdump — obtains passwords from memory winrar — compresses data for exfiltration nbtscan — scans NetBIOS name servers Tactics, techniques, and procedures Incident response engagements have given CTU researchers insight into the tactics TG-3390 employs during intrusions | ['T1003'] |
15 Database dump Decoded, it reveals a detailed log of each affected machine | ['T1003'] |
Mimikatz to obtain credentials. | ['T1003'] |
It was heavily modified, with almost all original code stripped out aside from its sekurlsa::logonpasswords credential stealing feature | ['T1003'] |
Domains The RoyalCli backdoor was attempting to communicate to the following domains: News.memozilla[.]org video.memozilla[.]org The BS2005 backdoor utilised the following domains for C2: Run.linodepower[.]com Singa.linodepower[.]com log.autocount[.]org RoyalDNS backdoor was seen communicating to the domain: andspurs[.]com Possible linked APT15 domains include: Micakiz.wikaba[.]org cavanic9[.]net ridingduck[.]com zipcodeterm[.]com dnsapp[.]info Published date: 10 March 2018 Written by: Rob Smallridge | ['T1008'] |
In order to extend the lifespan of the domains in case one or more are blacklisted, there are twelve different C2 domains that xparis() can be set to | ['T1008'] |
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) C&C servers Ssl[.]arkouthrie[.]com s3[.]hiahornber[.]com widget[.]shoreoa[.]com SHA256 Delivery document (W2KM_OCEANLOTUS.A): 2bb855dc5d845eb5f2466d7186f150c172da737bfd9c7f6bc1804e0b8d20f22a Dropper (OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D): 4da8365241c6b028a13b82d852c4f0155eb3d902782c6a538ac007a44a7d61b4 Backdoor (OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D): 673ee7a57ba3c5a2384aeb17a66058e59f0a4d0cddc4f01fe32f369f6a845c8f The post New MacOS Backdoor Linked to OceanLotus Found appeared first on | ['T1008'] |
Additionally malware reports itself to its hardcoded command and control servers and established a backdoor connection, so the attacker may have a permanent remote connection | ['T1008'] |
Business and government personnel who are traveling, especially in a foreign country, often rely on systems to conduct business other than those at their home office, and may be unfamiliar with threats posed while abroad | ['T1083'] |
These files are downloaded to a directory (C:\Users\Public\Libraries\tempsys) on the infected machine by Bxaki() and xparis() | ['T1083'] |
In this particular case in 2013, the config file included an unknown plugin set, aside from the usual ‘ddos’ plugin listing | ['T1083'] |
The malware then appends a script extension (php, bml, or cgi) with a random number of random parameters or a file extension from the following list with no parameters: gif, jpg, png, htm, html, php | ['T1083'] |
The body of the POST request may contain files contained in the cabinet format | ['T1083'] |
Figure 3 – A list of file extensions targeted for destruction by new variant of KillDisk component As well as being able to delete system files to make the system unbootable – functionality typical for such destructive trojans – the KillDisk variant detected in the electricity distribution companies also appears to contain some additional functionality specifically intended to sabotage industrial systems | ['T1083'] |
This is the only instance we observed where a hardcoded Google Drive URL was included in RogueRobin, which may suggest that the author may have overlooked this during testing | ['T1083'] |
HD Creates a file in the Temp path and names it “hd” + PCID then invokes another program module named hd.test1 to identify logical drives | ['T1083'] |
Implant directory contained in the malicious Flash file | ['T1083'] |
Otherwise, it runs a search for the “/bin/rsyncd” string within the files found in the /etc/ folder | ['T1083'] |
watch/? search/? find/? results/? open/? search/? close/? The “ai” value stands for the payload title | ['T1083'] |
The file names may vary from one version of the malware to another | ['T1083'] |
In one version of the malware, the code checks if the “ProgramData” folder has folders or files with the keywords “Kasper“, “Panda“, or “ESET“ | ['T1083'] |
It mimics the icon Finder usually applies to JPEG or text files to increase the likelihood the recipient will double-click the file | ['T1083'] |
The file appears to have been compiled using a bat2exe tool, which will take batch files (.bat) and convert them to PE (.exe) files | ['T1083'] |
Unlike a previously reported variant, this version of BADNEWS no longer looks at USB drives for interesting files | ['T1083'] |
4 Upload edg499.dat, which includes the list of interesting files | ['T1083'] |
Since it is a very long term group, some victims may be impossible to identify now | ['T1083'] |
PHOTO: a DLL backdoor also reported publicly as “Derusbi”, capable of obtaining directory, file, and drive listing; creating a reverse shell; performing screen captures; recording video and audio; listing, terminating, and creating processes; enumerating, starting, and deleting registry keys and values; logging keystrokes, returning usernames and passwords from protected storage; and renaming, deleting, copying, moving, reading, and writing to files | ['T1083'] |
This allows the shell to upload and download files, execute applications with web server account permissions, list directory contents, access Active Directory, access databases, and any other action allowed by the .NET runtime | ['T1083'] |
With the exception of the ‘Speed’ method previously mentioned, the names of the methods called in this chain appear to be fairly random, as seen in the following list: ETransaksi.Speed ETransaksi.diomadnfagaghagh ETransaksi.fjcsERIfjfiojsGHIsdifjksi ETransaksi.gsgjIDJIGJIGJIGJIFDOSpl ETransaksi.FJaioefgkaoeK The last two methods in the chain carry out a majority of the first payload’s functionality | ['T1083'] |
Hashes For a list of all hashes of malware encountered during this campaign, please refer to the following file | ['T1083'] |
17-3 Function names To target specific victims, Astaroth is locale aware; any attempts to run the malware without locale spoofing will result in failed downloads and the inability to run the .dll files | ['T1083'] |
119 readFiles Obtains file information on a file or a folder, and supports a “*” wildcard and recursive file list | ['T1083'] |
Get Directory Information The malware gets information for the provided directory address using the following WINAPI calls: | ['T1083'] |
dir c:\ | ['T1083'] |
2, 2018, we published a blog detailing the use of an Adobe Flash zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2018-4878) by a suspected North Korean cyber espionage group that we now track as APT37 (Reaper) | ['T1203'] |
Observed vulnerabilities include: CVE-2012-0158 CVE-2017-0199 CVE-2017-8759 CVE-2017-11882 Figure 2: APT40 attack lifecycle Establish Foothold APT40 uses a variety of malware and tools to establish a foothold, many of which are either publicly available or used by other threat groups | ['T1203'] |
On October 10, 2017, Kaspersky Lab’s advanced exploit prevention systems identified a new Adobe Flash zero day exploit used in the wild against our customers | ['T1203'] |
We are also highly confident that BlackOasis was also responsible for another zero day exploit (CVE-2017-8759) discovered by FireEye in September 2017. The FinSpy payload used in the current attacks (CVE-2017-11292) shares the same command and control (C2) server as the payload used with CVE-2017-8759 uncovered by FireEye | ['T1203'] |
What does it mean for everyone and how to defend against such attacks, including zero-day exploits? For CVE-2017-11292 and other similar vulnerabilities, one can use the killbit for Flash within their organizations to disable it in any applications that respect it. Unfortunately, doing this system-wide is not easily done, as Flash objects can be loaded in applications that potentially do not follow the killbit | ['T1203'] |
This document exploited a newer vulnerability, CVE-2017-0199 | ['T1203'] |
This change is because Group 123 did not target South Korea during this campaign and Microsoft Office is standard in the rest of the world.Infection VectorsThe attackers exploited CVE-2017-0199 in order to download and execute a malicious HTA document inside of Microsoft Office | ['T1203'] |
Even when we observed LuckyMouse using weaponized documents with CVE-2017-11882 (Microsoft Office Equation Editor, widely used by Chinese-speaking actors since December 2017), we can´t prove they were related to this particular attack | ['T1203'] |
This time, weaponized lure documents claiming to contain seminar information on environmental protection were observed exploiting known Microsoft Office vulnerabilities CVE-2017-0199 and CVE-2017-11882 to drop and execute the backdoor binary on the victim’s machine | ['T1203'] |
In this campaign, we observed threat actors exploiting CVE-2017-0199 and CVE-2017-11882 to distribute malware | ['T1203'] |
Conclusion CVE-2017-0199 and CVE-2017-11882 are two of the more commonly exploited vulnerabilities that we are currently seeing | ['T1203'] |
Figure 3: Embedded URL in OLE object CVE-2017-11882 Similarly, we have also observed actors leveraging another recently discovered vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) in Microsoft Office | ['T1203'] |
In many cases, additional stealers, RATs, and other malware were observed being hosted on the same web servers.Analysis of HawkEye Reborn The campaign starts with sending the aforementioned Excel sheets that exploit the well-known CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability, an arbitrary code execution bug in Microsoft Office | ['T1203'] |
Less than a week after Microsoft issued a patch for CVE-2017-11882 on Nov | ['T1203'] |
14, 2017, FireEye observed an attacker using an exploit for the Microsoft Office vulnerability to target a government organization in the Middle East | ['T1203'] |
In this latest campaign, APT34 leveraged the recent Microsoft Office vulnerability CVE-2017-11882 to deploy POWRUNER and BONDUPDATER | ['T1203'] |
CVE-2017-11882: Microsoft Office Stack Memory Corruption Vulnerability CVE-2017-11882 affects several versions of Microsoft Office and, when exploited, allows a remote user to run arbitrary code in the context of the current user as a result of improperly handling objects in memory | ['T1203'] |
Figure 3: CVE-2017-11882 and POWRUNER attack sequence The malicious .rtf file exploits CVE-2017-11882 | ['T1203'] |
An RTF, an MSI file, a .NET Wrapper and two stages of Shellcode walk into a bar… Our journey begins with an RTF file named “New Salary Structure 2017.doc”, which exploits CVE-2017-0199 | ['T1203'] |
Older documents used by Patchwork focused on the CVE-2017-0261 vulnerability, however in late January 2018 when, paradoxically, newer documents abandoned this vulnerability to attack the older CVE-2015-2545 vulnerability | ['T1203'] |
Try to exploit the following Remote Code Execution vulnerabilities in the targeted servers: a) CVE-2012-0874: JBoss Enterprise Application Platform Multiple Security Bypass Vulnerabilities b) CVE-2010-1871: JBoss Seam Framework remote code execution c) JBoss AS 3/4/5/6: Remote Command Execution (exploit) d) CVE-2017-10271: Oracle WebLogic wls-wsat Component Deserialization RCE e) CVE-2018-2894: Vulnerability in the Oracle WebLogic Server component of Oracle Fusion Middleware | ['T1203'] |
We believe the adversary exploited a recently vulnerability in Microsoft SharePoint tracked by , which is a remote code execution vulnerability used to compromise the server and eventually install a webshell | ['T1203'] |
Exploited Vulnerabilities: Frequent exploitation of vulnerabilities in Hangul Word Processor (HWP), as well as Adobe Flash | ['T1068'] |
APT40 leverages exploits in their phishing operations, often weaponizing vulnerabilities within days of their disclosure | ['T1068'] |
Exploitation of this vulnerability allows an attacker to escalate privileges on the affected system | ['T1068'] |
All zero-day exploits known, or suspected, to have been used by this group are for vulnerabilities in Internet Explorer and Flash | ['T1068'] |
APT32 regularly used stealthy techniques to blend in with legitimate user activity: During one investigation, APT32 was observed using a privilege escalation exploit (CVE-2016-7255) masquerading as a Windows hotfix | ['T1068'] |
Documents with the Flash exploit managed to evade static defenses and remain undetected as an exploit on VirusTotal | ['T1068'] |
McAfee detects these threats as: RDN/Generic Exploit RDN/Generic.dx Generic PWS.y Generic.hbg Exploit-CVE2018-4878 McAfee customers are also covered by McAfee Global Threat Intelligence Web Reputation classification, which rate these URLs as High Risk | ['T1068'] |
The database is located in the “/usr/lib/cva-ssys/My_BD” folder (“~/.local/cva-ssys/My_BD”—if the Trojan does not have root privileges) | ['T1068'] |
CVE-2014-4113 is a privilege escalation vulnerability that was disclosed publicly on 2014-10-14 | ['T1068'] |
The first dropped file, doc.exe, contains the CVE-2014-4113 exploit and then attempts to execute test.exe with the elevated privileges | ['T1068'] |
Are the attackers using any zero-day vulnerabilities? No zero-day vulnerabilities have been found in the analysis of the samples obtained regarding this campaign | ['T1068'] |
OfficeScan’s Vulnerability Protection shields endpoints from identified and unknown vulnerability exploits even before patches are even deployed. Trend Micro™ Deep Discovery™ provides detection, in-depth analysis, and proactive response to attacks using exploits and other similar threats through specialized engines, custom sandboxing, and seamless correlation across the entire attack lifecycle, allowing it to detect these attacks even without any engine or pattern update | ['T1068'] |
Dubbed ‘SpeakUp’, the new Trojan exploits known vulnerabilities in six different Linux distributions | ['T1068'] |
Among them, we found variations on the EternalDarkness SMBv3 exploit (CVE-2020-0796) , a , the privilege escalation exploit published on the Google Security Github account, and the privilege escalation exploit. | ['T1068'] |
A 2016 Novetta report detailed the work of security vendors attempting to unveil tools and infrastructure related to the 2014 destructive attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment | ['T1518.001'] |
The analysis of the tools and techniques used in the Astaroth campaign show how truly effective LOLbins are at evading antivirus products | ['T1518.001'] |
Tools CTU researchers observed BRONZE UNION using the following tools in intrusions since the 2015 analysis, but clients should assume that the threat group still has access to the previously reported tools | ['T1518.001'] |
In doing so, it will attempt to detect the following Anti-Virus products via various techniques: Trend Micro Kaspersky Symantec Avira AVG ALYac Ahnlab Ahnlab and ALYac are the most widely used Anti-Virus solutions in South Korea, and Trend Micro and the rest are also known to be most widely used in Taiwan | ['T1518.001'] |
When combined with email tracking software, APT32 was able to closely track phishing delivery, success rate, and conduct further analysis about victim organizations while monitoring the interest of security firms | ['T1518.001'] |
APT12 closely monitors online media related to its tools and operations and reacts when its tools are publicly disclosed | ['T1518.001'] |
Types of attacks possibly averted include Structured Query Language (SQL) injection, cross-site scripting, and command injection.Use stringent file reputation settings – Tune the file reputation systems of your anti-virus software to the most aggressive setting possible | ['T1518.001'] |
We would like to thank White-Hat, Tom Lancaster of Palo Alto Networks, Michael Yip of Stroz Friedberg, security researcher Marcus, and other security researchers and organizations who shared information and provided feedback | ['T1518.001'] |
In addition to obfuscation techniques, it also has the ability to detect security tools on the analysis machine, and can also shut down the system if it detects the presence of such tools | ['T1518.001'] |
Figure 14: System shut down upon discovery of security tools Ability to receive PowerShell script from the C2 server and execute on the machine | ['T1518.001'] |
Additionally it checks to determine if common analysis tools are currently running on the infected system | ['T1518.001'] |
Given the regional file format used there is a chance that some security software suites may not handle them well, and this may have provided an evasion case for the attacker.The documents sent to the targets were titled "Analysis of "Northern New Year in 2017" and used the official logo of the Korean Ministry of Unification | ['T1518.001'] |
Smart, optimized, and connected, XGen security powers Trend Micro’s suite of security solutions: Hybrid Cloud Security, User Protection, and Network Defense | ['T1518.001'] |
Link analysis of infrastructure and tools also revealed a potential relationship between Magic Hound and the adversary group called “Rocket Kitten” (AKA Operation Saffron Rose, Ajax Security Team, Operation Woolen-Goldfish) as well as an older attack campaign called Newscasters | ['T1518.001'] |
As seen below, the relational analysis proved to be quite fruitful: Figure 1 Overview of relationships We rapidly discovered a different set of tools communicating to the exact same C2 servers as those two Word documents, in addition to other tools communicating to other subdomain variations of chrome-up[.]date as seen in the following graphic: Figure 2 Command and control overlaps From there, we were able to map out a large infrastructure separating out into four categories of tools: downloaders, droppers, loaders, and payloads | ['T1518.001'] |
The toolset used by the Magic Hound campaign was an assortment of custom tools, as well as open sourced tools available to the general public | ['T1518.001'] |
They are known for “living off the land,” meaning they use already available tools and software installed on the computer to operate, and once inside a target network, they will tailor their malware specifically to the target | ['T1518.001'] |
Traditional antivirus software and other systems that rely on low-level indicators do not effectively detect and block common and pervasive malware | ['T1518.001'] |
End users can benefit from security solutions such as Trend Micro Home Security for Mac, which provides comprehensive security and multi-device protection against cyberthreats | ['T1518.001'] |
As we discover new tools used by this group, we have consistently discovered overlapping artifacts with previously used tools and infrastructure | ['T1518.001'] |
Mitigation Security and system/IT administrators must practice due diligence in protecting their websites and web-based applications from threats that can undermine their security, and hijack them to do the bad guys’ bidding—delivering malware to their victims | ['T1518.001'] |
Network Security appliances such as NGFW, NGIPS, and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat | ['T1518.001'] |
AMP Threat Grid helps identify malicious binaries and build protection into all Cisco Security products | ['T1518.001'] |
Mitigation As this sample installs itself through the use of EternalBlue, the targeted protocol is SMB. Because of this, in order to best mitigate and avoid possible installations, you need your system updated to the latest security patches. Specifically, you’d want to make sure that you have MS17-010 installed, as this is the security patch that patches the EternalBlue vulnerability | ['T1518.001'] |
The malware queries the value for the flag BeingDebugged from PEB to check whether the process is being debugged. | ['T1518.001'] |
The RIPTIDE exploit document drops its executable file into the C:\Documents and Settings\{user}\Application Data\Location folder while the HIGHTIDE exploit document drops its executable file into the C:\DOCUMENTS and SETTINGS\{user}\LOCAL SETTINGS\Temp\ folder | ['T1005'] |
In many payment card data breaches, a point-of-sale (POS) system is infected with malware that searches for specific processes in memory known to store card data in plain text | ['T1005'] |
Additionally, VALUEVAULT will call Windows PowerShell to extract browser history in order to match browser passwords with visited sites. | ['T1005'] |