text1
stringlengths 7
2.5k
| labels
stringlengths 9
100
|
|---|---|
hxxp://www.sanjosemaristas[.]com/app/index.php?{A01BA0AD-9BB3-4F38-B76B-A00AD11CBAAA}, providing the current network adapter’s service name GUID | ['T1016'] |
In Figure 9, below, red indicates targeted IP addresses, malware, registrant information, and domains associated with the targeted attack campaign while blue indicates criminal attack IP addresses, malware used, registrant information, and domains: Figure 9 | ['T1016'] |
(Source: Dell SecureWorks) As shown in Figure 10, the unpacked JavaScript code reveals an iframe pointing to an IP address that is hosting the exploit | ['T1016'] |
It is a preferred platform within data centers and the cloud for businesses, as well as an ongoing favorite when it comes to a majority of Internet-facing web and application servers | ['T1505.003'] |
Furthermore, this group has routinely identified and exploited vulnerable web servers of targeted organizations to install web shells, such as ANTAK and ASPXSPY, and used stolen legitimate credentials to compromise externally facing Outlook Web Access (OWA) resources | ['T1505.003'] |
Attack Lifecycle Initial Compromise APT40 has been observed leveraging a variety of techniques for initial compromise, including web server exploitation, phishing campaigns delivering publicly available and custom backdoors, and strategic web compromises | ['T1505.003'] |
Web shells are heavily relied on for nearly all stages of the attack lifecycle | ['T1505.003'] |
Internal web servers are often not configured with the same security controls as public-facing counterparts, making them more vulnerable to exploitation by APT40 and similarly sophisticated groups | ['T1505.003'] |
Maintain Presence APT40 primarily uses backdoors, including web shells, to maintain presence within a victim environment | ['T1505.003'] |
APT40 strongly favors web shells for maintaining presence, especially publicly available tools | ['T1505.003'] |
OwaAuth — This web shell and credential stealer deployed to Microsoft Exchange servers is installed as an ISAPI filter | ['T1505.003'] |
(Source: SecureWorks) China Chopper web shell — This web-based executable script communicates with a full-featured user interface to allow threat actors to transfer and create files, open a command terminal, and interact with database servers | ['T1505.003'] |
(Source: SecureWorks) In multiple instances, CTU researchers observed artifacts from unsuccessful attempts to create a web shell on web-accessible JBOSS-based service desk software, followed by use of a functional shell to gain access to the environment | ['T1505.003'] |
(Source: SecureWorks) Reentry attempt After BRONZE UNION was evicted from a compromised environment, which involved blocking the group's known infrastructure, CTU researchers observed the group attempting to reconnect to its OWA web shells and a backup web shell it had deployed during the intrusion | ['T1505.003'] |
To report an intrusion and request resources for incident response or technical assistance, you are encouraged to contact DHS NCCIC (NCCICCustomerService@hq.dhs.gov or 888-282-0870), the FBI through a local field office, or the FBI’s Cyber Division (CyWatch@fbi.gov or 855-292-3937).Protect Against SQL Injection and Other Attacks on Web ServicesTo protect against code injections and other attacks, system operators should routinely evaluate known and published vulnerabilities, periodically perform software updates and technology refreshes, and audit external-facing systems for known web application vulnerabilities | ['T1505.003'] |
They should also take the following steps to harden both web applications and the servers hosting them to reduce the risk of network intrusion via this vector.Use and configure available firewalls to block attacks.Take steps to secure Windows systems, such as installing and configuring Microsoft’s Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) and Microsoft AppLocker.Monitor and remove any unauthorized code present in any www directories.Disable, discontinue, or disallow the use of Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) and Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) as much as possible.Remove unnecessary HTTP verbs from web servers | ['T1505.003'] |
Typical web servers and applications only require GET, POST, and HEAD.Where possible, minimize server fingerprinting by configuring web servers to avoid responding with banners identifying the server software and version number.Secure both the operating system and the application.Update and patch production servers regularly.Disable potentially harmful SQL-stored procedure calls.Sanitize and validate input to ensure that it is properly typed and does not contain escaped code.Consider using type-safe stored procedures and prepared statements.Audit transaction logs regularly for suspicious activity.Perform penetration testing on web services.Ensure error messages are generic and do not expose too much information.Permissions, Privileges, and Access ControlsSystem operators should take the following steps to limit permissions, privileges, and access controls.Reduce privileges to only those needed for a user’s duties.Restrict users’ ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications, and apply the principle of “Least Privilege” to all systems and services | ['T1505.003'] |
Additionally, on that same url, http://mdzz2019.noip[.]cn:3654/ is used to distribute more versions of this Gh0stRAT sample, along with a .zip file containing ASPXSpy, a web shell | ['T1505.003'] |
Audit ISAPI filters and search for web shells on Microsoft Exchange servers | ['T1505.003'] |
(Source: Dell SecureWorks) Passwords, like "admin-na-google123!@#" shown in Figure 4, are required to interact with the web shell | ['T1505.003'] |
TG-3390 has used additional web shells containing similarly formatted passwords | ['T1505.003'] |
However, the OwaAuth web shell password contains the victim organization's name | ['T1505.003'] |
More information about the OwaAuth web shell is available in Appendix C | ['T1505.003'] |
ASPXTool — A modified version of the ASPXSpy web shell (see Figure 6) | ['T1505.003'] |
The OwaAuth web shell is likely created with a builder, given that the PE compile time of the binary does not change between instances and the configuration fields are padded to a specific size | ['T1505.003'] |
The adversaries modify publicly available tools such as ASPXSpy to remove identifying characteristics that network defenders use to identify web shells | ['T1505.003'] |
TG-3390 actors have deployed the OwaAuth web shell to Exchange servers, disguising it as an ISAPI filter | ['T1505.003'] |
They then identify the Exchange server and attempt to install the OwaAuth web shell | ['T1505.003'] |
If the OwaAuth web shell is ineffective because the victim uses two-factor authentication for webmail, the adversaries identify other externally accessible servers and deploy ChinaChopper web shells | ['T1505.003'] |
(Source: Dell SecureWorks) To facilitate lateral movement, the adversaries deploy ASPXTool web shells to internally accessible systems running IIS | ['T1505.003'] |
Mapping of TG-3390's interactions with web shells during an intrusion responded to by CTU researchers | ['T1505.003'] |
OwaAuth web shell PDB string | ['T1505.003'] |
Each web shell instance is configured to contain SP, Key, and Log variables | ['T1505.003'] |
OwaAuth web shell command set | ['T1505.003'] |
The stylecs.aspx webshell provides fairly significant functionality, as its developer wrote this webshell in JScript that ultimately runs any supplied JScript code provided to it within the HTTP request.. | ['T1505.003'] |
The MPK Trojan also monitors specifically for windows that are likely to contain login forms for popular web-based email clients, such as titles that contain: “Gmail -” “Yahoo – login” “Sign In -” “Outlook.com -“ MPK will attempt to parse these window titles to identify the associated email address and record these to the log file using the following format: ///////////// Mail Find <email address> /////////// If the Trojan does not find the window titles associated with Gmail, Yahoo or Outlook, it saves the title to the “Save.tmp” file in the following format: +++++++++++++ Window= <window title> +++++++++++++ The major difference between the IRC variant and non-IRC variant of MPK is the C2 protocol used | ['T1010'] |
Offset Description 0x0 Victim GUID (8C8CEED9-4326-448B-919E-249EEC0238A3) 0x25 Victim IP Address (192.168.180.154) 0x45 Command (0x66660001) 0x49 Length of payload (0x2f – 47) 0x4d Field 1 – Windows major version (0x6 – Windows Vista+) 0x51 Field 2 – Windows minor version (0x1 – Windows 7) 0x55 Field 3 – Unknown (0x20) 0x59 Payload (default flag:4/2/2018 1:01:33 AM) Table 5 – Beacon structure for PLAINTEE | ['T1010'] |
Linux malware detection and prevention is not prevalent at this time, but Palo Alto Networks customers are protected through our next-generation security platform: IPS signature 14917 deployed to identify and prevent command and control activity The C2 domains and files mentioned in this report are blocked in our Threat Prevention product | ['T1070.004'] |
The organization managed to discover what scripts were hosted on the server before BE/SandWorm gang deleted them, and unfortunately couldn’t restore them after they were deleted | ['T1070.004'] |
For example, at the end of 2016 CTU researchers observed the threat actors using native system functionality to disable logging processes and delete logs within a network | ['T1070.004'] |
After running within the %TEMP% path, Comnie will delete the original file | ['T1070.004'] |
KEYS Deletes the file named by tempPath + “ky” file so as not to upload anything | ['T1070.004'] |
HDS Deletes the file created by the HD command to reverse the effect | ['T1070.004'] |
DEL-TEMP Deletes all files in the “AppData/Local/Temp” path | ['T1070.004'] |
Overwrite a file with all zeros and mark it for deletion on reboot Wiping files with zeros and marking it for deletion on reboot. Delete files using the DeleteFile() API Load an arbitrary library into its process space | ['T1070.004'] |
The SHAPESHIFT malware is capable of wiping disks, erasing volumes and deleting files, depending on its configuration | ['T1070.004'] |
Appendix Malware Family Descriptions Malware Family Description Availability DROPSHOT Dropper that has been observed dropping and launching the TURNEDUP backdoor, as well as the SHAPESHIFT wiper malware Non-Public NANOCORE Publicly available remote access Trojan (RAT) available for purchase | ['T1070.004'] |
The message sent to the C2 will be “file is deleted.” if successful or “file is not deleted.” if unsuccessful | ['T1070.004'] |
The dropped executable (MD5: 78734CD268E5C9AB4184E1BBE21A6EB9) contains the compressed FELIXROOT dropper component in the Portable Executable (PE) binary overlay section | ['T1070.004'] |
The dropper will delete itself at the end of the process | ['T1070.004'] |
After this file is copied, the original ‘Update.~tmp’ file is deleted | ['T1070.004'] |
boom! Deletes GID.bin, ShwDoc.VBS and ShwDoc.srv files, as well as the scheduled task whose name a GUID stored in the GID.bin file | ['T1070.004'] |
Also, the x command will delete the generated registry key and the Office365DCOMCheck/SystemDiskClean scheduled task | ['T1070.004'] |
This system configuration file (in.sys) will drop a backdoor installer (UserInstall.exe) then delete itself | ['T1070.004'] |
and then deletes the original launcher | ['T1070.004'] |
This version of the campaign made malicious use of unins000.exe, a process that belongs to the Brazilian information security company GAS Tecnologia, to gather personal information undetected | ['T1082'] |
The autonomous system name of the IP shows that the allocation is controlled by Serverius Holding B.V., which is an autonomous system name we have previously seen associated with the OilRig group | ['T1082'] |
This backdoor collects system information, including the operating system version and hostname, and includes functionality to check, upload, and register plugins that can further enhance its capabilities | ['T1082'] |
The data above contains the hostname (‘HOSTNAME-PC’) of the victim machine, as well as an instruction | ['T1082'] |
To obtain a job, the Trojan builds a subdomain that has the following structure and issues a DNS query to the C2 server: c<unique identifier><job identifier padded with ‘0’ to make three digits><sequence number>c The generated subdomain is then subjected to a number-to-character substitution function that is the inverse of the Table 4, which effectively converts all the digits in the subdomain into characters | ['T1082'] |
Once the second DLL is executed, it gathers information about the victim system’s setup, such as operating system version, and driver and processor information | ['T1082'] |
One computer that was infected with both Cadelspy and Remexi was a system that ran a SIM card editing application | ['T1082'] |
Other functionalities provided by this section of the PowerShell Script are as follows: Retrieves the following data from the system by leveraging Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) queries and environment variables: IP Address from Network Adapter Configuration OS Name OS Architecture Computer Name Computer Domain Name Username All of this data is concatenated and formatted as shown in Figure 13: Figure 13: Concatenated and formatted data retrieved by PowerShell script Register the victim’s machine to the C2 server by sending the REGISTER command to the server | ['T1082'] |
Freenki is used to gather information about the infected system and to download a subsequent stage payload | ['T1082'] |
The information this malware collected included the following:The computer nameThe usernameThe execution path of the sampleThe BIOS modelA randomly-generated ID to uniquely identify the systemGroup123 utilized this method to ensure their victim was (a) someone they wanted to target further and (b) someone they could infect further based on the information obtained from the reconnaissance phase | ['T1082'] |
After connecting to the IRC server, the MPK bot sends custom ping messages and provides an introduction via a “!Hello” message that contains the current logged in user of the infected host, if the user has administrator privileges, the hostname, the UUID of the system, and operating system version | ['T1082'] |
The malware queries the Windows API to get the computer name, user name, volume serial number, Windows version, processor architecture and two additional values, which are “1.3” and “KdfrJKN” | ['T1082'] |
As we can see, the following information is present within this configuration: Remote Command and Control (C2) server Remote port Sleep timer Reaver continues to collect various information from the victim machine, including the following: CPU speed Computer name Username IP Address Microsoft Windows version Physical and virtual memory information The malware proceeds to communicate with the remote server via HTTP GET and POST requests | ['T1082'] |
Reaver continues to collect various information from the victim machine, including the following: Computer name Volume serial number Microsoft Windows version CPU speed ANSI code page OEM code page identifier for the operating system Physical and virtual memory information Reaver encrypts this data using an incremental XOR key and uploads it to the configured remote server on the port specified | ['T1082'] |
Here is an example of the result of ps ax on an infected system: $ ps ax[...] 566 ?? Ss 0:00.01 /usr/libexec/icloudsyncd -launchd netlogon.bundle[...] Figure 8: Result of ps ax on an infected system Keychain stealing The OSX/Keydnap backdoor is equipped with a mechanism to gather and exfiltrate passwords and keys stored in OS X’s keychain | ['T1082'] |
This phase will often leverage a specialized tool that automatically collects a wide array of information including credentials, group management policies, and even system logs to better hone further attacks and assure execution of their malware | ['T1082'] |
A noteworthy addition to the Poseidon toolkit is the IGT supertool (Information Gathering toolkit), a bulking 15 megabyte executable that orchestrates a series of different information collections steps, exfiltration, and the cleanup of components | ['T1082'] |
A multilayered approach is a must to securing the organization’s perimeter, especially for information security professionals and system/IT administrators | ['T1082'] |
This variation of the Zebrocy downloader begins by gathering the serial number for the storage volume with the label “C:\” and the computer name | ['T1082'] |
Download & execute Startup (with persistence) Collection of system information (OS, version, installed location, etc.) Self-update Uninstall This project was created by a user called zettabithf which is linked to a user with the same name in Hack Forums | ['T1082'] |
Low confidence generally means that the information's credibility and/or plausibility is questionable, or that the information is too fragmented or poorly corroborated to make solid analytic inferences, or that [there are] significant concerns or problems with the sources | ['T1082'] |
The verb get can be used in a myriad of ways to retrieve information for a machine, however in this case os get /format: is being abused to download payloads from non-local resources with .xsl extensions | ['T1082'] |
Revenge RAT is a simple and freely available Remote Access Trojan that automatically gathers system information before allowing threat actors to remotely access system components such as webcams, microphones, and various other utilities | ['T1082'] |
itwm= ags= oe= aq= btnG= oprnd= itwm= utm= channel= The XAgent OSX Trojan generates a system specific value that it refers to as an “agent_id”, which is a unique identifier for each compromised host | ['T1082'] |
The value is derived using the IOService to access the IOPlatformUUID property, which is equivalent to the “Hardware UUID” listed in the system information application, as seen in the Figure 3 screenshot of our analysis system | ['T1082'] |
The Trojan uses the first four bytes of this hardware ID as a unique identifier for the system, which in our case was “0000” | ['T1082'] |
The payload sends system information about the infected computer to the C&C server and downloads additional tools. | ['T1082'] |
If it is successful then it will send out basic host information and await further commands. | ['T1082'] |
After decoding their C2 server IP addresses, from obfuscated strings, both trojans will attempt to collect host information and send it to the C2 server. | ['T1082'] |
Operating system's name (i.e., the name of the machine) Operating system's OS architecture Operating system's caption Computer system's domain Computer system's username Computer's public IP address | ['T1082'] |
Once successfully installed in a system, Trickbot will gather system information such as OS, CPU, and memory information, user accounts, lists of installed programs and services. | ['T1082'] |
(To bypass UAC) configurable setting for the process to abuse Other than these, new coding algorithm has been introduced | ['T1548.002'] |
This request is followed by a call to “GetisrunasAbById” to determine if the Trojan should use “runas” to execute the downloaded executable with elevated privileges, which would display the UAC dialog for the user to click | ['T1548.002'] |
The CAB file contains the following files and functions: dll: A malicious DLL used to launch batch files (used with cliconfg.exe for UAC bypass) | ['T1548.002'] |
The macro then extracts the CAB file into %systemroo%\system32, using either wusa.exe or expand.exe (depending on the OS) to again bypass UAC prompts Once the files have been extracted, the Visual Basic macro deletes the CAB file and runs the malicious NTWDBLIB.dll via cliconfg.exe (to gain privileges and bypass UAC protections) Command lines used by the Visual Basic macro: cmd /c wusa %TEMP%\setup.cab /quiet /extract:%SystemRoot%\System32 && del /f /q %TEMP%\setup.cab && cliconfg.exe cmd /c expand %TEMP%\setup.cab -F:* %SystemRoot%\System32 && del /f /q %TEMP%\setup.cab && cliconfg.exe A combination of NTWDBLIB.dll and cliconfg.exe are used to bypass UAC protections; this is a familiar attack on Windows | ['T1548.002'] |
The key differences in this variant: Two CAB files are encoded into the Word document in text boxes instead of being appended in the DOC file There is one CAB file for an x86 system and another for an x64 system This malware sample uses uacme.exe with dummy.dll to implement the UAC bypass exe is the program vulnerable to the UAC bypass attack dll runs install.bat to set up the service (same as NTWDBLIB.dll) exe and dummy.dll may be either 64-bit or 32-bit binaries based on the OS | ['T1548.002'] |
Its encoding method has been modified from time to time, aligned with major upgrade of PlugX itself | ['T1124'] |
Campaign Code and Compile Time Correlation In some cases, there is a close proximity of the compile time of a CARBANAK sample to the month specified in a particular campaign code | ['T1124'] |
These four were then all modified on the same date and time on October 13, 2018 08:21 | ['T1124'] |
A possible explanation for this is that the document was copied to another system with an incorrectly set system time, then saved with the incorrect time | ['T1124'] |
When the backdoor establishes a connection to the command and control server, it sets the request period time equal to the specified dwell time for the standby mode | ['T1124'] |
If the dwell time value for the active mode has been set, but the package has not been received, the dwell time value is incremented by the dwell time value for the active period | ['T1124'] |
This action is repeated until the dwell time value is bigger or equal to the dwell time value for the standby mode | ['T1124'] |
Timezone Check The Trojan check to see if the system is configured (“DaylightName”) with one of the following time zones: Arabic Daylight Time (UTC+3) Arab Daylight Time (UTC+3) Arabian Daylight Time (UTC+4) Middle East Daylight Time (UTC+2) Iran Daylight Time (UTC+3.5) Human Interaction Check Before executing its functional code, the Trojan presents a dialog box with the following line of code: Interaction.MsgBox(encodedStringClass.return_user32_bogus_errorcode_(3), MsgBoxStyle.Critical, null); This dialog box displays An error occurred while processing user32.dll!, which the user must click the ok button for the Trojan to run its functional code | ['T1124'] |
Figure 3 Countries in which OopsIE will run in based on the time zone Notable Differences The OopsIE Trojan delivered in this attack had functional code that was very similar to the OopsIE variant discussed in our previous blog | ['T1124'] |