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The 1056 weather observation at BED included calm wind, an overcast ceiling at 400 ft above ground level, 2 statute miles (sm) visibility with mist, temperature 20°C, dew point 18°C, and an altimeter setting of 30.22 inches of mercury.
A pilot who landed at BED about 1045 reported the tops of the clouds at 1,800 ft msl and cloud bases at 400 ft msl.
He also reported visibility under the cloud bases at 2 sm and no turbulence during his approach to runway 29.
The airplane collided with trees and terrain on a heading of 070° in a wooded area behind a residence about 4.2 miles east-southeast of BED.
The wreckage path was about 300 ft in length.
A large tree, about 3 ft in diameter, was brought down by the wreckage.
The airframe was highly fragmented.
There was a postaccident fire that consumed about 20% of the wreckage.
The engine separated from the firewall and the propeller separated from the engine during the impact sequence.
All primary structural components and flight control surfaces were accounted for within the debris field.
The aileron and elevator control tubes were found connected to the left and right control sticks.
The aileron control rod was intact from the side stick to the aileron torque tube bell crank.
The elevator push/pull tube was attached to the elevator interconnect assembly.
The aileron control tubes and the elevator control tubes separated from their mounts and were found along the wreckage path.
All fractures exhibited overload signatures.
The rudder cables were attached to the rudder torque tubes.
The cables separated in tension overload near the center of the fuselage.
The rudder separated from the empennage.
The elevator trim tab cable exhibited tensile overload signatures.
The cabin seats detached from their mounting points during impact.
The seat bases were fractured into multiple pieces and dispersed from the final impact point in several directions.
The engine sustained substantial impact damage to the No.
2 cylinder head, which allowed only partial rotation of the crankshaft.
The crankshaft was fractured aft of the propeller flange where it exited the nose seal of the crankcase.
The fracture surface displayed 45-degree shear lips.
The crankshaft was manually rotated by inserting an adapter into the right accessory drive gear.
Internal crankshaft continuity was confirmed through manual rotation of the accessory drive gears.
Partial compression and valve train continuity were established; impact damage prevented compression confirmation on all cylinders.
The camshaft was not observed; however, camshaft continuity was confirmed during partial rotation of the crankshaft.
The left magneto was separated from its mounting pad and the housing sustained impact damage that deformed the housing in the capacitor area.
The magneto drive was manually rotated and a spark was observed in firing order during the audible snap of the impulse coupling.
The right magneto remained attached to the mounting pad.
The magneto was removed and the drive was manually rotated.
The impulse coupling produced an audible snap, but no spark was observed from any of the leads.
All of the spark plugs displayed normal wear and light combustion deposits with no signs of lead or carbon fouling when compared to a Champion Check-a-Plug chart.
The fuel system was examined.
There were no indications of preaccident anomalies or malfunctions of the engine-driven fuel pump, throttle body, fuel metering unit, intake plenum, fuel manifold, or fuel injector nozzles.
Fuel was recovered from the line between the engine-driven fuel pump and the fuel metering unit.
Fuel was also recovered from the engine-driven fuel pump.
Residual fuel was observed in the line between the fuel metering unit and the fuel manifold valve, though the inlet fitting of the fuel manifold valve was fractured.
The three-bladed propeller hub remained intact and all three blades remained attached to the hub.
All of the blades rotated independently within the hub, indicative of pitch change link fractures.
The blades were arbitrarily labeled A, B, and C for descriptive purposes.
Blade A displayed chord-wise paint burnishing, significant blade twisting toward low pitch, and s-bending on the trailing edge.
Blade B was bent in in half with impact-related damage on the trailing edge.
Blade C was bent aft and twisted toward low pitch, with slight s-bending on the trailing edge.
Two tree branches were observed at the accident site that displayed angular cuts with gray paint transfers, consistent with propeller contact.
According to FAA Advisory Circular 60-4A, Pilot's Spatial Disorientation: The attitude of an aircraft is generally determined by reference to the natural horizon or other visual reference with the surface.
If neither horizon nor surface references exist, the attitude of an aircraft must be determined by artificial means from the flight instruments.
Sight, supported by other senses, allows the pilot to maintain orientation.
However, during periods of low visibility, the supporting senses sometimes conflict with what is seen.
When this happens, a pilot is particularly vulnerable to disorientation.
The degree of orientation may vary considerably with individual pilots.
Spatial disorientation to a pilot means simply the inability to tell which way is 'up.'…Surface references and the natural horizon may at times become obscured, although visibility may be above flight rule minimums.
Lack of natural horizon or such reference is common on over water flights, at night, and especially at night in extremely sparsely populated areas, or in low visibility conditions….
The disoriented pilot may place the aircraft in a dangerous attitude… therefore, the use of flight instruments is essential to maintain proper attitude when encountering any of the elements which may result in spatial disorientation.
The Office of the Chief Medical Examiner of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts performed the autopsy of the pilot.
The cause of death was blunt force injuries.
The FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory performed toxicology testing on specimens from the pilot.
Testing was not performed for carbon monoxide and cyanide.
FAA testing detected the previously reported medication losartan.
Also present was atorvastatin, a prescription medication used to reduce high cholesterol and triglyceride levels.
Neither of these are considered impairing.
Ethanol was found at 13 mg/dl in muscle tissue consistent with postaccident production.
No ethanol was found in brain tissue.
According to the pilot, the airplane departed the runway and climbed to 3000 feet above ground level.
She reported that while maneuvering, the airplane lost engine power.
After several attempts to restart the engine, the pilot made a forced landing on a highway bridge.
She reported that during the landing roll, the airplane's right wing struck a sign that was affixed to the bridge.
According to the pilot, at the time of the accident, there were twenty gallons of fuel on board the airplane.
She reported that the airframe and power plant mechanic removed approximately two cups of water from the fuel tanks after the accident in preparation for the airplane's recovery.
The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right wing spar and aileron.
Fuel contamination resulting in the loss of engine power, a forced landing on a highway, and subsequent right wing impact with highway signage.
During a night flight, the pilot reported that after he landed on the runway, he slowed the airplane to taxi speed, and continued to the taxiway turnoff.
The pilot misidentified the taxiway turn and turned off the runway into a grass area between the runway and taxiway.
The pilot reported that the grass area had a downslope that led to level ground and he felt a bump from the tail as the airplane transitioned from the downslope to level ground.
The airplane sustained substantial damage to the rudder.
The pilot reported no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:The pilot's failure to identify the taxiway, which resulted in a runway excursion and impact with terrain while turning off the runway at night.
The pilot practiced several maneuvers and then entered a straight-in practice autorotation.
He pointed the helicopter into the wind at 800 feet above ground level near midfield and above the runway.
He reduced the throttle to flight idle and lowered the collective while gently flaring the nose of the helicopter to set up the appropriate main rotor rpm and airspeed.
He reported that he monitored those parameters carefully during the descent and noted that they remained well within the normal range.
At the bottom of the descent, the pilot flared a little high to allow a margin of safety for tail boom clearance as he was planning a power recovery from the autorotation.
The pilot stated that he did not add power at that point and that there was inadequate rotor inertia to dampen the landing, even though he applied full collective deflection.
The helicopter hit hard and sustained substantial damage.
The aft portion of the tail boom and tail rotor separated due to a main rotor blade contact and the skids were damaged.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:The pilot’s inadequate use of throttle during the practice autorotation that resulted in a hard landing.
The 79-year-old private pilot was making a local personal flight in his airplane when he reported over the aircraft emergency frequency that he was losing vision in one of his eyes.
About the same time, a radar target using the emergency transponder squawk code was acquired traveling northbound along the coastline.
The airplane wreckage was subsequently located on a beach close to the last radar target.
The damage to the airplane was consistent with a high-speed, left wing-low impact due to a loss of control.
According to the pilot's son, the pilot had been diagnosed with multiple chemical sensitivity and had a history of sudden vision loss, sometimes in just one eye but at other times in both eyes, which had been attributed to his chemical sensitivity.
He had not reported the episodes of vision loss or the chemical sensitivity on any of his Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) medical applications.
His most recent FAA medical certificate had expired 5 years before the accident, and it had been 5 years since he had accomplished a flight review.
The pilot continued to fly, and his flight instructor, who had given the pilot his last flight review and flew with him 1 year before the accident, reported a significant degradation in the pilot's flying skills.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:The pilot's loss of vision during cruise flight, which resulted in a loss of aircraft control.
Contributing to the accident was the pilot's decision to fly with a known medical condition.
On January 13, 2017, about 1125 Pacific standard time, a Piper PA28-236 airplane, N81839, impacted a beach near Port Orford, Oregon.