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23 Furthermore, in order to achieve the Directive's objectives, there must be cooperation between the authorities of the exporting State and those of the importing Member State, as the latter have to bring to the attention of the former any difficulties encountered regarding the phytosanitary certificates issued by them concerning, for example, contaminated products or certificates that are incorrect or have been interfered with (see Anastasiou I, paragraph 63).

61 It should be noted that the common system of protection against the introduction of harmful organisms in products imported from non-member countries, laid down in Directive 77/93, is based essentially on a system of checks carried out by experts lawfully empowered for that purpose by the Government of the exporting State and guaranteed by the issue of the appropriate phytosanitary certificate. The conditions governing acceptance of those certificates as a uniform means of proof must consequently be absolutely identical in all the Member States.

45 Indeed, it follows from the Court's case-law that, where a transaction consists of several elements, there is a single supply, particularly where one element is to be regarded as constituting the principal service, whilst another is to be regarded as an ancillary service sharing the tax treatment of the principal service; and a service is to be regarded as ancillary to a principal service if it does not constitute for customers an aim in itself, but a means of better enjoying the principal service supplied (see, in this sense, Case C-349/96 Card Protection Plan [1999] ECR I-973, paragraph 30).

43 The damage done to the reputation of a trade mark may, in principle, be a legitimate reason, within the meaning of Article 7(2) of the Directive, allowing the proprietor to oppose further commercialization of goods which have been put on the market in the Community by him or with his consent. According to the case-law of the Court concerning the repackaging of trade-marked goods, the owner of a trade mark has a legitimate interest, related to the specific subject-matter of the trade mark right, in being able to oppose the commercialization of those goods if the presentation of the repackaged goods is liable to damage the reputation of the trade mark (Bristol-Myers Squibb, cited above, paragraph 75).

75 Even if the person who carried out the repackaging is indicated on the packaging of the product, there remains the possibility that the reputation of the trade mark, and thus of its owner, may nevertheless suffer from an inappropriate presentation of the repackaged product. In such a case, the trade mark owner has a legitimate interest, related to the specific subject-matter of the trade mark right, in being able to oppose the marketing of the product. In assessing whether the presentation of the repackaged product is liable to damage the reputation of the trade mark, account must be taken of the nature of the product and the market for which it is intended.

30. However, the power referred to in paragraph 27 above does not mean that the Treaty rules on freedom of establishment do not apply to national legislation on the incorporation and winding up of companies (see Cartesio , paragraph 112).

16. First, it is clear from that case-law that, with regard to this type of contract, the place of performance of the obligation upon which the claim is based, as referred to in Article 5(1) of the Convention, must be determined by reference to uniform criteria which it is for the Court to lay down on the basis of the scheme and objectives of the Convention (see, inter alia , Case C-125/92 Mulox IBC [1993] ECR I-4075, paragraphs 10, 11 and 16; Case C-383/95 Rutten [1997] ECR I-57, paragraphs 12 and 13; and Case C-37/00 Weber [2002] ECR I-2013, paragraph 38). The Court has stressed that such an autonomous interpretation alone is capable of ensuring uniform application of the Convention, the objectives of which include unification of the rules on jurisdiction of the Contracting States, so as to avoid as far as possible the multiplication of the bases of jurisdiction in relation to one and the same legal relationship and to reinforce the legal protection available to persons established in the Community by, at the same time, allowing the plaintiff easily to identify the court before which he may bring an action and the defendant reasonably to foresee the court before which he may be sued ( Mulox IBC , cited above, paragraph 11; Rutten , cited above, paragraph 13).

16 It follows that, in the case of a contract of employment, it is appropriate to determine the place of performance of the relevant obligation, for the purposes of applying Article 5(1) of the Convention, by reference not to the applicable national law in accordance with the conflict rules of the court seised but, rather, to uniform criteria which it is for the Court to lay down on the basis of the scheme and the objectives of the Convention.

11. Selon une jurisprudence constante, l’existence d’un manquement doit être appréciée en fonction de la situation de l’État membre telle qu’elle se présentait au terme du délai fixé dans l’avis motivé et les changements intervenus par la suite ne sauraient être pris en compte par la Cour (voir, notamment, arrêt du 5 février 2009, Commission/Finlande, C‑293/08, point 7 et jurisprudence citée).

35. It is, admittedly, appropriate to interpret Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice as meaning that limitation cannot constitute a valid defence to a claim by a person who has suffered damage in the case where that person only belatedly became aware of the event giving rise to it and thus could not have had a reasonable time in which to submit his application before the expiry of the limitation period (Case 145/83 Adams v Commission [1985] ECR 3539, paragraph 50).

50 SELON L ' ARTICLE 43 DU STATUT DE LA COUR , ' LES ACTIONS CONTRE LA COMMUNAUTE EN MATIERE DE RESPONSABILITE NON CONTRACTUELLE SE PRESCRIVENT PAR CINQ ANS A COMPTER DE LA SURVENANCE DU FAIT QUI Y DONNE LIEU ' . IL CONVIENT D ' INTERPRETER CETTE DISPOSITION EN CE SENS QUE LA PRESCRIPTION NE SAURAIT ETRE OPPOSEE A LA VICTIME D ' UN DOMMAGE QUI N ' AURAIT PU PRENDRE CONNAISSANCE DU FAIT GENERATEUR DE CE DOMMAGE QU ' A UNE DATE TARDIVE , ET N ' AURAIT PU DISPOSER AINSI D ' UN DELAI RAISONNABLE POUR PRESENTER SA REQUETE OU SA DEMANDE AVANT L ' EXPIRATION DU DELAI DE PRESCRIPTION .

71. In that regard, it should be recalled that it is clear from Article 256 TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union that the General Court has exclusive jurisdiction, first, to find the facts, except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it and, second, to assess those facts. When the General Court has found or assessed the facts, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction under Article 256 TFEU to review the legal characterisation of those facts by the General Court and the legal conclusions it has drawn from them (Case C‑551/03 P General Motors v Commission [2006] ECR I‑3173, paragraph 51; Case C‑352/09 P ThyssenKrupp Nirosta v Commission [2011] ECR I‑2359 paragraph 179; and judgment of 28 July 2011 in Joined Cases C‑471/09 P to C‑473/09 P Diputación Foral de Vizcaya and Others v Commission , paragraphs 54 and 55).

53. Third, the argument regarding the constraints relating to time-limits likewise raised by the United Kingdom must also be rejected. As the Community has only conferred powers, the article of the Treaty which confers those powers on it must be determined before it acts. Furthermore, stating the legal basis subsequently, in an act intended to implement amendments to CITES at Community level, is not sufficient, contrary to the Council’s submissions, to comply with the duty to state reasons, since the statement of reasons for a measure must appear in that measure (see Case C-291/98 P Sarrió v Commission [2000] ECR I‑9991, paragraphs 73 and 75, and Case C-378/00 Commission v Parliament and Council [2003] ECR I‑937, paragraph 66).

73 In those circumstances, in the light of the case-law referred to in paragraphs 341 and 342 of the contested judgment, the essential procedural requirement to state reasons is satisfied where the Commission indicates in its decision the factors which enabled it to determine the gravity of the infringement and its duration. If those factors are not stated, the decision is vitiated by failure to state adequate reasons.

20. The Court also held, in paragraphs 16 to 20 of the judgment in Peacock , that network cards are designed solely for automatic information processing machines, that they are directly connected to those machines and that their function is to supply and accept data in a form which those machines can use. From this it inferred that network cards are comparable to any other medium whereby an automatic data processing machine accepts or delivers data in the sense that they have no function which they would be capable of performing without the assistance of such a machine. Accordingly, the final subparagraph of Note 5(B) to Chapter 84 of the CN, in the version in force prior to 1 January 1996, could not preclude them from being classified under heading No 8471, given that they do not perform any specific function. Furthermore, network cards satisfy the conditions relating to ‘units’ set out in that note, since they can be connected to the central unit and are specifically designed as parts of an automatic data-processing system.

24. However, the Court has also repeatedly ruled that, although it is not its task, in proceedings brought under Article 234 EC, to rule upon the compatibility of provisions of domestic law with Community law or to interpret domestic legislation or regulations, it may nevertheless provide the national court with an interpretation of Community law on all such points as may enable that court to determine the issue of compatibility for the purposes of the case before it (see, inter alia, Case C-292/92 Hünermund and Others [1993] ECR I-6787, paragraph 8; Case C-28/99 Verdonck and Others [2001] ECR I-3399, paragraph 28; Case C‑399/98 Ordine degli Architetti and Others [2001] ECR I‑5409, paragraph 48; and Joined Cases C-285/99 a nd C-286/99 Lombardini and Mantovani [2001] ECR I-9233, paragraph 27).

8 Although it is not for the Court, in proceedings under Article 177 of the Treaty, to rule on the compatibility of rules of domestic law with Community law, it is none the less competent to give the national court full guidance on the interpretation of Community law in order to enable it to determine whether those rules are so compatible.

26. En effet, cette directive vise, dans une large mesure, des projets d’envergure certaine, dont la réalisation s’étale très souvent sur une longue période. Ainsi, il ne serait pas opportun que des procédures, déjà complexes au niveau national, soient alourdies et retardées du fait des exigences spécifiques imposées par ladite directive, et que des situations déjà formées en soient affectées (arrêts précités Gedeputeerde Staten van Noord-Holland, point 24, ainsi que Križan e.a., point 95).

43. The freedom to provide services may, however, be restricted by national regulations justified on the grounds set out in Article 46(1) EC in conjunction with Article 55 EC or by overriding reasons in the public interest (see, to that effect, Case C‑262/02 Commission v France , paragraph 23), to the extent that there are no Community harmonising measures providing for measures necessary to ensure those interests are protected (see, to that effect, in the context of the free movement of goods, Case C-323/93 Centre d’insémination de la Crespelle [1994] ECR I-5077, paragraph 31 and case-law cited).

23. The freedom to provide services may, however, in the absence of Community harmonisation measures, be limited by national rules justified by the reasons mentioned in Article 56(1) of the EC Treaty, read together with Article 66, or for overriding requirements of the general interest (see, to that effect, Case C-243/01 Gambelli and Others [2003] ECR I-0000).

35. It should be noted that jurisdiction to hear an action in tort, delict or quasi-delict may be established in favour of the court seised of a claim for a finding of a breach of copyright, where the Member State in which that court is situated protects the rights of copyright relied on by the applicant and the alleged damage may occur within the jurisdiction of the court seised (see Pinckney EU:C:2013:635, paragraph 43).

46. It should be added that, in the absence of fraud or abuse, and subject to any adjustments which may be made in accordance with the conditions laid down by the VAT Directive, the right of deduction, once it has arisen, is retained (see, to that effect, Case C‑400/98 Breitsohl [2000] ECR I‑4321, paragraph 41, and Case C‑255/02 Halifax and Others [2006] ECR I‑1609, paragraph 84).

41 In the absence of fraud or abuse, and subject to adjustments which may be made in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 20 of the Sixth Directive, the principle of VAT neutrality requires, as indicated in paragraph 36 of this judgment, that the right to deduct, once it has arisen, be retained even where the tax authority is aware, from the time the first tax assessment is made, that the economic activity envisaged, which was to give rise to taxable transactions, will not be taken up.

27. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, as is in particular apparent from the third recital in its preamble, Directive 90/435 aims, by introducing a common system of taxation, to eliminate any disadvantage to cooperation between companies of different Member States as compared with cooperation between companies of the same Member State and thereby to facilitate the grouping together of companies at Community level ( Denkavit and Others , paragraph 22; Epson Europe , paragraph 20; Case C‑294/99 Athinaïki Zythopaiia [2001] ECR I‑6797, paragraph 25; Case C‑58/01 Océ van der Grinten [2003] ECR I‑9809, paragraph 45; and Banque Fédérative du Crédit Mutel , paragraph 23). Directive 90/435 thus seeks to ensure the neutrality, from the tax point of view, of the distribution of profits by a subsidiary established in one Member State to its parent company established in another Member State ( Banque Fédérative du Crédit Mutel , paragraph 24).

31. In that regard, it should be recalled that an applicant’s interest in bringing proceedings must, in the light of the purpose of the action, exist at the stage of lodging the action, failing which the action will be inadmissible (see, by analogy and as regards an action for annulment, judgments in Wunenburger v Commission , C‑362/05 P, EU:C:2007:322, paragraph 42, and Cañas v Commission , C‑269/12 P, EU:C:2013:415, paragraph 15).

15. À cet égard, il convient de rappeler que l’intérêt à agir d’un requérant doit, au vu de l’objet du recours, exister au stade de l’introduction de celui-ci, sous peine d’irrecevabilité, et perdurer jusqu’au prononcé de la décision juridictionnelle, sous peine de non-lieu à statuer, ce qui suppose que le recours soit susceptible, par son résultat, de procurer un bénéfice à la partie qui l’a intenté (voir arrêt du 7 juin 2007, Wunenburger/Commission, C‑362/05 P, Rec. p. I-4333, point 42, ainsi que du 28 mai 2013, Abdulrahim/Conseil et Commission, C‑239/12 P, non encore publié au Recueil, point 61).

30. Consequently, if the refund of the VAT becomes impossible or excessively difficult as a result of the conditions under which applications for tax refunds may be made, the principle of neutrality and the principle of effectiveness may require that the Member States provide for the instruments and the detailed procedural rules necessary to enable the taxable person to recover the improperly invoiced tax (see Stadeco , paragraph 40, and the case-law cited).

56 An undertaking which has participated in a single and complex infringement of that kind by its own conduct, which fell within the definition of an agreement or concerted practice having an anticompetitive object within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU and was intended to help bring about the infringement as a whole, may thus be responsible also in respect of the conduct of other undertakings in the context of the same infringement throughout the period of its participation in the infringement. That is the position where it is shown that the undertaking intended, through its own conduct, to contribute to the common objectives pursued by all the participants and that it was aware of the offending conduct planned or put into effect by other undertakings in pursuit of the same objectives or that it could reasonably have foreseen it and was prepared to take the risk (see judgment of 24 June 2015, Fresh Del Monte Produce v Commission and Commission v Fresh Del Monte Produce, C‑293/13 P and C‑294/13 P, EU:C:2015:416, paragraph 157 and the case-law cited).

157. An undertaking which has participated in such a single and complex infringement, by its own conduct, which meets the definition of an agreement or concerted practice having an anti-competitive object within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC and was intended to help bring about the infringement as a whole, may also be responsible for the conduct of other undertakings in the context of the same infringement throughout the period of its participation in the infringement. That is the position where it is shown that the undertaking intended, through its own conduct, to contribute to the common objectives pursued by all the participants and that it was aware of the offending conduct planned or put into effect by other undertakings in pursuit of the same objectives or that it could reasonably have foreseen it and was prepared to take the risk (judgment in Commission v Verhuizingen Coppens , C‑441/11 P, EU:C:2012:778, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

50 As regards national provisions on proof, covered by the first question, it must nevertheless be emphasised that the national courts called on to apply them must take account of both the principles referred to in paragraphs 37 and 38 of this judgment and of the principle of legal certainty, the corollary of which is the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, which requires, in particular, that the application of rules of law must be foreseeable by those subject to them (judgment of 2 December 2009, Aventis Pasteur, C‑358/08, EU:C:2009:744, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).

42 It is settled case-law that a provision of an agreement entered into by the Community with non-member countries must be regarded as being directly applicable when, regard being had to the wording, purpose and nature of the agreement, it may be concluded that the provision contains a clear, precise and unconditional obligation which is not subject, in its implementation or effects, to the adoption of any subsequent measure (see, in that regard, Case 12/86 Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd [1987] ECR 3719, paragraph 14, and Case C-162/96 Racke v Hauptzollamt Mainz [1998] ECR I-3655, paragraph 31).

14 A PROVISION IN AN AGREEMENT CONCLUDED BY THE COMMUNITY WITH NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES MUST BE REGARDED AS BEING DIRECTLY APPLICABLE WHEN, REGARD BEING HAD TO ITS WORDING AND THE PURPOSE AND NATURE OF THE AGREEMENT ITSELF, THE PROVISION CONTAINS A CLEAR AND PRECISE OBLIGATION WHICH IS NOT SUBJECT, IN ITS IMPLEMENTATION OR EFFECTS, TO THE ADOPTION OF ANY SUBSEQUENT MEASURE .

81 The first point to be borne in mind here is the need to ensure legal certainty, which means that rules must enable those concerned to know precisely the extent of the obligations which they impose on them (see, to that effect, Case 348/85 Denmark v Commission [1987] ECR 5225, paragraph 19). The Commission thus cannot choose, at the time of the clearance of EAGGF accounts, an interpretation which departs from and is not dictated by the normal meaning of the words used (see, to that effect, Case 349/85 Denmark v Commission [1988] ECR 169, paragraphs 15 and 16).

14 In so far as those three conditions must be satisfied cumulatively, the fact that one of them has not been satisfied is a sufficient basis on which to dismiss an action for damages.

19 AS THE COURT HAS HELD IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 2 OCTOBER 1979 IN CASE 152/77 MISS B V COMMISSION ( 1979 ) ECR 2819 , PSYCHOLOGICAL AND NON-PHYSICAL CONSEQUENCES MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT WHEN DETERMINING THE RATE OF INVALIDITY UNDER THE INSURANCE SCHEME PROVIDED FOR BY THE STAFF REGULATIONS . A BREAKDOWN OF THE RATE OF INVALIDITY ( 75% ) SHOWS THAT THIS WAS INDEED DONE IN THIS CASE . BESIDES THE PERCENTAGES ADOPTED FOR THE IMPAIRMENT OF MR LEUSSINK ' S HEARING , SENSE OF SMELL AND SENSE OF TASTE , A RATE OF 10% WAS FIXED FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL AND NON-PHYSICAL INJURY . THAT RATE CORRESPONDS TO COMPENSATION OF ALMOST BFR 1 000 000 .

103 Thus, an importation of goods constitutes an unlawful introduction if it does not comply with the following stages laid down by the Customs Code. First, under Article 38(1) of that code, goods brought into the customs territory of the European Union must be conveyed without delay to the designated customs office or to a free zone. Secondly, under Article 40, when the goods arrive at the customs office they must be presented to customs. Presentation of goods to customs is defined in Article 4(19) of that code as the notification to the customs authorities, in the manner laid down, of the arrival of goods at that customs office or at any other place designated or approved (judgment of 3 March 2005, Papsimedov and Others, C‑195/03, EU:C:2005:131, paragraph 26).

28 As regards the Explanatory Notes to the HS, it must be added that, although they do not have legally binding force, they are an important means of ensuring the uniform application of the Common Customs Tariff and, as such, may be regarded as useful aids to its interpretation (see, to that effect, judgments in Kloosterboer Services, C‑173/08, EU:C:2009:382, paragraph 25, and in Agroferm, C‑568/11, EU:C:2013:407, paragraph 28). However, they cannot alter the content of the CN notes (see, to that effect, judgment in Duval, C‑44/15, EU:C:2015:783, paragraph 24).

24. The Court has also held that the explanatory notes to the CN and those to the HS are an important aid for interpreting the scope of the various tariff headings but do not have legally binding force. The wording of those notes must therefore be consistent with the provisions of the CN and cannot alter their scope. Where it is apparent that they are contrary to the wording of the headings of the CN and the section or chapter notes, the explanatory notes to the CN must be disregarded (see, inter alia, judgment in JVC France , C‑312/07, EU:C:2008:324, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

75. Accordingly, it is for the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, to fix the lump sum in an amount appropriate to the circumstances and proportionate to the infringement (judgment in Commission v Greece , EU:C:2009:428, paragraph 146).

24. Il convient de relever que, selon une jurisprudence constante, l’existence d’un manquement doit être appréciée en fonction de la situation de l’État membre telle qu’elle se présentait au terme du délai fixé dans l’avis motivé. Les changements intervenus par la suite ne sauraient être pris en compte par la Cour (voir, notamment, arrêts du 30 mai 2002, Commission/Italie, C‑323/01, Rec. p. I‑4711, point 8, et du 12 juillet 2007, Commission/Autriche, C‑507/04, Rec. p. I‑5939, point 79).

8 It is settled case-law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation obtaining in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, in particular, Case C-103/00 Commission v Greece [2002] ECR I-1147, paragraph 23).

29. In that respect, as is apparent from settled case-law, when the Court replies to a question submitted for a preliminary ruling by a Court of a Member State in accordance with Article 267 TFEU, it does not have jurisdiction to interpret the national law of that Member State (see, inter alia, Case C-37/92 Vanacker and Lesage [1993] ECR I-4947, paragraph 7; Case C-511/03 Ten Kate Holding Musselkanaal and Others [2005] ECR I-8979, paragraph 25, and Case C-506/04 Wilson [2006] ECR I-8613, paragraph 34).

23 The exclusion of persons in minor employment from social insurance, which is laid down by the SGB, is intended to meet a social demand for minor employment which the German Government considered it should respond to in the context of its social and employment policy (see Case C-317/93 Nolte v Landesversicherungsanstalt Hannover [1995] ECR I-4625, paragraph 31; and Case C-444/93 Megner and Scheffel v Innungskrankenkasse Rheinhessen-Pfalz [1995] ECR I-4741, paragraph 27).

31 The German Government further explains that there is a social demand for minor employment, that it considers that it should respond to that demand in the context of its social policy by fostering the existence and supply of such employment and that the only means of doing this within the structural framework of the German social security scheme is to exclude minor employment from compulsory insurance.

22 Article 7 of Directive 90/314 requires Member States to provide for security for the refund of money paid over, or for the repatriation of consumers, in the event of the insolvency of the operator from whom they bought the travel. That provision must be interpreted as prescribing a result whereby package travellers enjoy rights guaranteeing their repatriation and the refund of money that they have paid over, the aim being that of consumer protection (see Joined Cases C-178/94, C-179/94 and C-188/94 to C-190/94 Dillenkofer and Others v Federal Republic of Germany [1996] ECR I-4845, paragraphs 35 and 42).

14 With regard to those characteristics, the first point to bear in mind is that, as the Court has repeatedly held (see, in particular, the judgments in Case 252/86 Bergandi v Directeur-Général des Impôts [1988] ECR 1343, paragraph 15, Joined Cases 93 and 94/88 Wisselink and Others v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [1989] ECR 2671, paragraph 18, Case C-109/90 Giant v Gemeente Overijse [1991] ECR I-1385, paragraphs 11 and 12, Case C-200/90 Dansk Denkavit and Poulsen v Skatteministeriet [1992] ECR I-2217, paragraph 11, and Case C-347/90 Bozzi [1992] ECR I-2947, paragraph 12), VAT applies generally to transactions relating to goods or services, it is proportional to the price of those goods or services, it is charged at each stage of the production and distribution process and finally it is imposed on the added value of goods and services, since the tax payable on a transaction is calculated after deduction of the tax paid on the previous transaction.

12 As the Court has repeatedly held (see, in particular, the judgments in Case 252/86 Bergandi v Directeur-Général des Impôts [1988] ECR 1343, paragraph 15, Joined Cases 93/88 and 94/88 Wisselink and Others v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [1989] ECR 2671, paragraph 18, Case C-109/90 Giant [1991] ECR I-1385, paragraphs 11 and 12 and in the aforementioned Dansk Denkavit case, paragraph 11), the essential features of VAT are as follows: VAT applies generally to transactions relating to goods or services; it is proportional to the price of those goods or services; it is charged at each stage of the production and distribution process; and finally it is imposed on the added value of goods and services, since the tax payable on a transaction is calculated after deduction of the tax paid on the previous transaction.

13 In that regard, it suffices to refer to paragraph 38 of the judgment in Job Centre II, where the Court held that public placement offices are subject to the prohibition contained in Article 86 of the Treaty, so long as application of that provision does not obstruct the performance of the particular task assigned to them. A Member State which prohibits any activity as an intermediary between supply and demand on the employment market, unless carried on by those offices, is in breach of Article 90(1) of the Treaty where it creates a situation in which those offices cannot avoid infringing Article 86 of the Treaty. That is the case, in particular, in the following circumstances: - the public placement offices are manifestly unable to satisfy demand on the market for all types of activity; and - the actual placement of employees by private companies is rendered impossible by the maintenance in force of statutory provisions under which such activities are prohibited and non-observance of that prohibition gives rise to penal and administrative sanctions; and - the placement activities in question could extend to the nationals or to the territory of other Member States.

51 However, such a restriction may be justified in so far as it pursues a legitimate objective in the public interest, and to the extent that it complies with the principle of proportionality in that it is suitable for securing the attainment of that objective and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (see, to that effect, judgments of 27 October 2005, Contse and Others, C‑234/03, EU:C:2005:644, paragraph 25, and of 23 December 2009, Serrantoni and Consorzio stabile edili, C‑376/08, EU:C:2009:808, paragraph 44).

25. It must be recalled, as all the parties which lodged observations before the Court have done, that, disregarding Article 46 EC, the national measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty must, according to settled case-law, fulfil four conditions in order to comply with Article 43 EC and Article 49 EC: they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner, they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest, they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue, and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (see Case C-19/92 Kraus [1993] ECR I-1663, paragraph 32; Case C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR I-4165, paragraph 37; and Case C-243/01 Gambelli and Others [2003] ECR I-13031, paragraphs 64 and 65).

25. In that regard, it is apparent from settled case-law that national legislation which places certain nationals at a disadvantage simply because they have exercised their freedom to move and to reside in another Member State constitutes a restriction on the freedoms conferred by Article 21(1) TFEU on every citizen of the Union (judgments in Morgan and Bucher , EU:C:2007:626, paragraph 25, and Prinz and Seeberger , EU:C:2013:524, paragraph 27).

40 In particular, by entering into an agreement conferring jurisdiction in accordance with Article 23(1) of the Brussels I Regulation, the parties may derogate not only from the general jurisdiction under Article 2 thereof but also from the special jurisdiction laid down in Articles 5 and 6. Thus, the court seised of a matter can, in principle, be bound by a jurisdiction clause derogating from the rules of jurisdiction laid down in Articles 5 and 6 which was concluded by the parties under Article 23(1) (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 May 2015, CDC Hydrogen Peroxide, C‑352/13, EU:C:2015:335, paragraphs 59 and 61).

61. It must therefore be concluded that the court seised of a matter can, in principle, be bound by a jurisdiction clause derogating from the rules of jurisdiction laid down in Articles 5 and 6 of Regulation No 44/2001 which was concluded by the parties under Article 23(1) of that regulation.

25. Consequently, although Directive 2003/88 does not preclude national legislation or practices which allow a worker on sick leave to take paid annual leave during that sick leave ( Schultz-Hoff and Others , paragraph 31), it follows from paragraph 22 of the present judgment that, where that worker does not wish to take annual leave during a period of sick leave, annual leave must be granted to him for a different period.

116 Without there being any need to rule on the Commission’s argument that Tilly-Sabco lacks standing to rely on an infringement of Article 3(3) of Regulation No 182/2011, it suffices to observe that, where it finds such an infringement the Court of the European Union must examine that infringement of its own motion (judgment of 24 June 2015, Spain v Commission, C‑263/13 P, EU:C:2015:415, paragraph 56).

56. Moreover, it follows from the Court’s case-law, first, that failure to comply with the procedural rules relating to the adoption of an act adversely affecting an individual, such as a failure by the Commission to take the contested decision within the time-limit defined by the EU legislature, constitutes an infringement of essential procedural requirements (see judgments in United Kingdom v Council , 68/86, EU:C:1988:85, paragraphs 48 and 49; Spain v Commission , C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraph 103; and Spain v Commission , C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraph 103), and, secondly, that if the Court of the European Union finds, on examining the act at issue, that it was not regularly adopted, it must draw the necessary conclusions from the infringement of an essential procedural requirement and, consequently, annul the act vitiated by that defect (see judgments in Commission v ICI , C‑286/95 P, EU:C:2000:188, paragraph 51; Commission v Solvay , C‑287/95 P and C‑288/95 P, EU:C:2000:189, paragraph 55; Spain v Commission , C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraph 103; and Spain v Commission , C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraph 103).

41 In the judgment in Case 35/85 Tissier [1986] ECR 1207, paragraph 22, the Court held that, subject to Article 30 et seq. of the Treaty concerning products imported from other Member States, Community law does not affect the right of Member States to subject substances not meeting the Community definition of medicinal product to controls or to require prior authorization in accordance with their own national law on medicinal products.

22 It follows from the Treaty context in which Article 155 must be placed and also from practical requirements that the concept of implementation must be given a wide interpretation. Since only the Commission is in a position to keep track of agricultural market trends and to act quickly where necessary, the Council may find it necessary to confer on it wide powers in that sphere. Consequently, the limits of those powers must be determined by reference among other things to the essential general aims of the market organization (Case C-478/93 Netherlands v Commission [1995] ECR I-3081, paragraph 30).

30 The Court has consistently held that it follows from the Treaty context in which Article 155 must be placed and also from practical requirements that the concept of implementation must be given a wide interpretation. Since only the Commission is in a position to keep track of agricultural market trends and to act quickly when necessary, the Council may confer on it wide powers in that sphere. Consequently, the limits of those powers must be determined by reference amongst other things to the essential general aims of the market organization (see Case 22/88 Vreugdenhil and Another v Minister van Landbouw en Visserij [1989] ECR 2049, paragraph 16 and the cases cited therein).

26. Le signe «ecoDoor» pouvant ainsi servir à désigner le caractère écologique des produits concernés, il y a lieu, au vu de l’intérêt général poursuivi par l’article 7, paragraphe 1, sous c), du règlement nº 207/2009, tel que rappelé au point 19 du présent arrêt, de garantir qu’il puisse être utilisé par tous les opérateurs et qu’il ne soit pas réservé à un seul opérateur (voir, en ce sens, arrêt Deutsche SiSi-Werke/OHMI, C‑173/04 P, EU:C:2006:20, point 62). Par ailleurs, il n’est pas contesté, dans le cas d’espèce, que les produits concernés par la demande d’enregistrement comportent des portes ou peuvent en être équipés.

43. Article 27 of Regulation No 1408/71 deals with the situation of a pensioner who is entitled to draw pensions under the legislation of several Member States, including that of the Member State in whose territory he resides, and who is also entitled to benefits in that Member State. Article 28 of the regulation, as has been determined in paragraphs 31 and 32 above, deals with the situation of a pensioner who is entitled to draw pensions under the legislation of one or more Member States, other than the Member State in whose territory he resides, and who is not entitled to benefits in that latter Member State. Article 28a of the regulation governs a situation similar to that covered by Article 28, the difference being that there is an entitlement to benefits in kind in the Member State of residence ( Rundgren , paragraph 43).

43 Article 27 of Regulation No 1408/71 deals with the situation of a pensioner who is entitled to draw pensions under the legislation of two or more Member States, including that of the Member State in whose territory he resides, and is also entitled to benefits in that Member State. Article 28 of the Regulation deals with the situation of a pensioner who is entitled to draw a pension or pensions under the legislation of one or more Member States, other than the Member State in whose territory he resides, and who is not entitled to benefits in that Member State. Article 28a of the Regulation governs a situation similar to that covered by Article 28, the difference being that there is an entitlement to benefits in kind in the Member State of residence.

43. Instead, the contribution forms part of a general system of taxation which, in principle, is applied uniformly, in particular in respect of the rate and chargeable event thereof, to Greek agricultural products alone, whether they are intended for the domestic market or for export, and which is used to fund a public body responsible for the prevention of, and compensation for, damage caused to Greek agricultural holdings by natural risks (see, to that effect, Nygård , cited above, paragraph 24).

9 The rules on equal treatment, both in the Treaty and in Article 7 of Regulation No 1612/68, forbid not only overt discrimination by reason of nationality but also all covert forms of discrimination which, by the application of other criteria of differentiation, lead in fact to the same result (see Case 152/73 Sotgiu v Deutsche Bundespost [1974] ECR 153, paragraph 11).

11 THE RULES REGARDING EQUALITY OF TREATMENT, BOTH IN THE TREATY AND IN ARTICLE 7 OF REGULATION NO 1612/68, FORBID NOT ONLY OVERT DISCRIMINATION BY REASON OF NATIONALITY BUT ALSO ALL COVERT FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION WHICH, BY THE APPLICATION OF OTHER CRITERIA OF DIFFERENTIATION, LEAD IN FACT TO THE SAME RESULT . THIS INTERPRETATION, WHICH IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE EFFECTIVE WORKING OF ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE COMMUNITY, IS EXPLICITLY RECOGNIZED BY THE FIFTH RECITAL OF THE PREAMBLE TO REGULATION NO 1612/68 WHICH REQUIRES THAT EQUALITY OF TREATMENT OF WORKERS SHALL BE ENSURED 'IN FACT AND IN LAW '. IT MAY THEREFORE BE THAT CRITERIA SUCH AS PLACE OF ORIGIN OR RESIDENCE OF A WORKER MAY, ACCORDING TO CIRCUMSTANCES, BE TANTAMOUNT, AS REGARDS THEIR PRACTICAL EFFECT, TO DISCRIMINATION ON THE GROUNDS OF NATIONALITY, SUCH AS IS PROHIBITED BY THE TREATY AND THE REGULATION .

19 With regard to that submission the Court observes that, in Case C-191/95 Commission v Germany [1998] ECR I-5449, at paragraphs 48 to 50, the Court considered an identical plea presented by the German Government concerning the circumstances in which the Commission adopts reasoned opinions. There the Court held first of all that the principle of collegiality which governs the functioning of the Commission is based on the equal participation of the Commissioners in the adoption of decisions and implies that decisions should be the subject of collective deliberation and that all the members of the college of Commissioners should bear collective responsibility at the political level. It then explained that the formal requirements for effective compliance with the principle of collegiality varied according to the nature and legal effects of the acts adopted. A reasoned opinion merely conferred upon the Commission the right, but not a duty, to commence proceedings before the Court. The decision to commence proceedings before the Court did not per se alter the legal position in question.

41 Therefore, even if that case-law on the exercise of an intellectual property right were applicable to the exercise of any property right whatever, it would still be necessary, for the Magill judgment to be effectively relied upon in order to plead the existence of an abuse within the meaning of Article 86 of the Treaty in a situation such as that which forms the subject-matter of the first question, not only that the refusal of the service comprised in home delivery be likely to eliminate all competition in the daily newspaper market on the part of the person requesting the service and that such refusal be incapable of being objectively justified, but also that the service in itself be indispensable to carrying on that person's business, inasmuch as there is no actual or potential substitute in existence for that home-delivery scheme.

54 The appellants' refusal to provide basic information by relying on national copyright provisions thus prevented the appearance of a new product, a comprehensive weekly guide to television programmes, which the appellants did not offer and for which there was a potential consumer demand. Such refusal constitutes an abuse under heading (b) of the second paragraph of Article 86 of the Treaty.

58. It is settled case‑law that, in interpreting a provision of Community law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording, but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (Case C‑34/05 Schouten [2007] ECR I‑1687, paragraph 25, and Case C‑45/05 Maatschap Schonewille‑Prins [2007] ECR I‑3997, paragraph 30).

53. In that connection, it is clear from settled case-law that the need for an application, and hence a uniform interpretation, of the provisions of Community law makes it impossible, in cases of doubt, for the text of a provision to be considered in isolation in one of its versions, but requires, on the contrary, that it should be interpreted and applied in the light of the versions existing in the other official languages (Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] ECR 419, paragraph 3; Case C‑296/95 EMU Tabac and Others [1998] ECR I-1605, paragraph 36; and Case C‑174/05 Zuid-Hollandse Milieufederatie and Natuur en Milieu [2006] ECR I‑2443, paragraph 20).

20. In this respect, firstly, according to settled case-law, where a provision of Community law is open to several interpretations, preference must be given to that interpretation which ensures that the provision retains its effectiveness (see Case 187/87 Saarland and Others [1988] ECR 5013, paragraph 19, and Case C-403/99 Italy v Commission [2001] ECR I-6883, paragraph 28) and which does not detract from its validity (see Italy v Commission , paragraph 37). Secondly, the need for a uniform interpretation of Community law makes it impossible for the text of a provision to be considered, in case of doubt, in isolation; on the contrary, it requires that it be interpreted in the light of the versions existing in the other official languages (see Case 9/79 Koschniske [1979] ECR 2717, paragraph 6, and Case C-296/95 EMU Tabac and Others [1998] ECR I-1605, paragraph 36).

As regards, in the second place, the appellants’ line of argument alleging a breach of the principle of equal treatment, it must be borne in mind that that principle requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (see, inter alia, judgment of 16 December 2008, Arcelor Atlantique and Lorraine and Others, C‑127/07, EU:C:2008:728, paragraph 23).

41. On the other hand, the position is different if the services are in fact supplied in that other Member State. Such a situation is contrary to the objective of the provisions of the VAT Directive determining the place where supplies of services are taxed, which is to avoid, first, conflicts of jurisdiction which may result in double taxation and, secondly, non-taxation (see, to this effect, judgment in Welmory , C‑605/12, EU:C:2014:2298, paragraph 42). Furthermore, such a situation, in that it results in VAT due in a Member State being avoided, is contrary both to the obligation of the Member States, which stems from Article 4(3) TEU, Article 325 TFEU and Articles 2, 250(1) and 273 of the VAT Directive, to take all legislative and administrative measures appropriate for ensuring collection of all the VAT due on their territory and for preventing evasion and to the principle of fiscal neutrality inherent in the common system of VAT, according to which economic operators carrying out the same transactions must not be treated differently in relation to the levying of VAT (see, to this effect, judgments in Commission v Italy , C‑132/06, EU:C:2008:412, paragraphs 37, 39 and 46; Belvedere Costruzioni , C‑500/10, EU:C:2012:186, paragraphs 20 to 22; and Åkerberg Fransson , C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraphs 25 and 26).

21. Under the common system of VAT, the Member States are required to ensure compliance with the obligations to which taxable persons are subject, and they enjoy in that respect a certain measure of latitude, inter alia, as to how they use the means at their disposal ( Commission v Italy , paragraph 38).

35 According to established case-law, the derogation for which it provides must be restricted to activities which in themselves are directly and specifically connected with the exercise of official authority (Case 2/74 Reyners [1974] ECR 631, paragraph 45, and Case C-42/92 Thijssen [1993] ECR I-4047, paragraph 8).

7. It is settled case-law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation obtaining in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see, inter alia, Case C‑348/99 Commission v Luxembourg [2000] ECR I‑2917, paragraph 8, and Case C‑272/01 Commission v Portugal [2004] ECR I‑6767, paragraph 29).

8 In that connection, it must be borne in mind that, in proceedings under Article 226 EC, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in that Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-315/98 Commission v Italy [1999] ECR I-0000, paragraph 11).

27 Thus, the purpose of a ship’s journey within European Union waters is irrelevant for the application of that exemption when that navigation involves the provision of a service for consideration (see, by analogy, judgments of 1 March 2007, Jan De Nul, C‑391/05, EU:C:2007:126, paragraph 37, and of 10 November 2011, Sea Fighter, C‑505/10, EU:C:2011:725, paragraph 17).

105. To recognise an attenuating circumstance in situations where an undertaking is party to a manifestly unlawful agreement which it knew or could not be unaware constituted an infringement could encourage undertakings to continue a secret agreement as long as possible, in the hope that their conduct would never be discovered, while knowing that if their conduct were discovered they could expect, by then curtailing the infringement, their fine to be reduced. Such a recognition would deprive the fine imposed of any deterrent effect and would undermine the effectiveness of Article 81(1) EC (see Case C‑510/06 P Archer Daniels Midland v Commission [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 149).

149. To recognise an attenuating circumstance in situations where an undertaking is party to a manifestly unlawful agreement which it knew or could not be unaware constituted an infringement could encourage undertakings to continue a secret agreement as long as possible, in the hope that their conduct would never be discovered, while knowing that if their conduct were discovered they could expect, by then curtailing the infringement, their fine to be reduced. Such a recognition would deprive the fine imposed of any deterrent effect and would undermine the effectiveness of Article 81(1) EC.

34. Since, in addressing the question referred for a preliminary ruling in the case which gave rise to the judgment in Stratmann and Fleischversorgung Neuss , the Court did not answer the question whether a fee charged pursuant to point 4(b) of Chapter I of Annex A to Directive 85/73 must take the form of a standard-rated payment, it is impossible to infer any conclusion as to the answer to that question from that judgment.

104 It follows from the case-law of the Court of Justice, however, that the taking into account of differences between the undertakings that have participated in a single cartel (in particular with regard to the geographic scope of their respective involvement) for the purpose of assessing the gravity of an infringement need not necessarily occur when the multipliers for the ‘gravity of the infringement’ and for the ‘additional amount’ are set but may occur at another stage in the setting of the fine, such as when the basic amount of the fine is adjusted in the light of mitigating and aggravating circumstances under points 28 and 29 of the 2006 Guidelines (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 July 2013, Team Relocations and Others v Commission, C‑444/11 P, not published, EU:C:2013:464, paragraphs 104 and 105, and of 11 July 2013, Gosselin Group v Commission, C‑429/11 P, not published, EU:C:2013:463, paragraphs 96 to 100).

100. En effet, premièrement, conformément à la jurisprudence rappelée au point 90 du présent arrêt, le Tribunal a bien analysé la gravité de l’infraction telle qu’elle avait été commise par Gosselin ainsi que la pertinence, aux fins de l’octroi éventuel du bénéfice de circonstances atténuantes, du comportement individuellement adopté par celle-ci dans l’entente. Il convient, en particulier, de relever à cet égard que, tout en constatant, au point 182 de l’arrêt attaqué, que le point 29 des lignes directrices pour le calcul des amendes ne prévoyait pas expressément que le comportement dont cette société se prévalait puisse constituer une circonstance atténuante, le Tribunal a cependant apprécié si les circonstances particulières de l’espèce n’appelaient pas néanmoins une réduction de l’amende infligée à cette dernière, se conformant ainsi pleinement à la jurisprudence susmentionnée.

23. The general principle of equal treatment, as a general principle of Community law, requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (see, inter alia, Case 106/83 Sermide [1984] ECR 4209, paragraph 28; Joined Cases C‑133/93, C‑300/93 and C‑362/93 Crispoltoni and Others [1994] ECR I‑4863, paragraphs 50 and 51; and Case C‑313/04 Franz Egenberger [2006] ECR I‑6331, paragraph 33).

64 In that respect, DEI and the Commission state that, if, according to the settled case-law of the Court, an omission attributed to a Member State may result in the emergence of State aid (judgment of 19 mars 2013, Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom v Commission and Others and Commission v France and Others, C‑399/10 P and C‑401/10 P, EU:C:2013:175, paragraphs 100 to 103), such would, a fortiori, be the case of a measure taken by an organ of the State, even when it is not a legislative measure.

101. In particular, measures which, in various forms, mitigate the burdens normally included in the budget of an undertaking, and which therefore, without being subsidies in the strict meaning of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect, are considered to be aid (see, to that effect, Banco Exterior de España , paragraph 13; Case C-75/97 Belgium v Commission [1999] ECR I-3671, paragraph 23; and Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission [2000] ECR I-6857, paragraph 25).

61. Afin qu’une mesure nationale restreignant une liberté de circulation garantie par le traité puisse être justifiée par des motifs de lutte contre la fraude et l’évasion fiscales, le but spécifique d’une telle restriction doit être de faire obstacle à des comportements consistant à créer des montages purement artificiels, dépourvus de réalité économique, dans le but d’éluder l’impôt normalement dû sur les bénéfices générés par des activités réalisées sur le territoire national (voir, en ce sens, arrêts précités Cadbury Schweppes et Cadbury Schweppes Overseas, point 55; Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation, point 74, ainsi que SIAT, point 40).

51. According to settled case-law, the need for a uniform interpretation of European Union directives makes it impossible for the text of a provision to be considered, in case of doubt, in isolation; on the contrary, it requires that it be interpreted and applied in the light of the versions existing in the other official languages (see, to that effect, Case C‑296/95 EMU Tabac and Others [1998] ECR I‑1605, paragraph 36; Case C‑321/96 Mecklenburg [1998] ECR I-3809, paragraph 29; Case C‑375/07 Heuschen & Schrouff Oriental Foods Trading [2008] ECR I‑8691, paragraph 46; and Case C‑199/08 Eschig [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 54). In addition, where there is divergence between the various language versions of a European Union text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (see Case C‑437/97 EKW and Wein & Co. [2000] ECR I‑1157, paragraph 42; Case C‑457/05 Schutzverband der Spirituosen-Industrie [2007] ECR I‑8075, paragraph 18; and Case C‑239/07 Sabatauskas and Others [2008] ECR I‑7523, paragraph 39).

46. However, according to settled case-law, the need for a uniform interpretation of Community regulations makes it impossible for the text of a provision to be considered in isolation but requires, on the cont rary, that it should be interpreted and applied in the light of the versions existing in the other official languages (Case C-48/98 Söhl & Söhlke [1999] ECR I-7877, paragraph 46).

45. Thus, the Member States must, when exercising their powers in the sphere of nationality, have due regard to European Union law ( Micheletti and Others , paragraph 10; Mesbah , paragraph 29; Case C‑192/99 Kaur [2001] ECR I‑1237, paragraph 19; and Zhu and Chen , paragraph 37).

25 It is clear from settled case-law that, for the use of a brand name to be capable of being regarded as likely to cause confusion or mislead the persons to whom it is addressed, it must be established, having regard to the opinions or habits of the consumers concerned, that there is a real risk of their economic behaviour being affected (see, inter alia, Case C-303/97 Sektkellerei Kessler [1999] ECR I-513, paragraph 33).

33 Finally, in its judgment in Case C-456/93 Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs v Langguth [1995] ECR I-1737, concerning Article 40 of Regulation No 2392/89, the wording of which is almost identical with that of Article 13 of Regulation No 2333/92, the Court held in paragraph 28 that the fact that a brand name is presented in a conspicuous manner does not mean that it is likely to cause confusion or mislead the persons to whom it is addressed, even if it contains a word that has been designated by the rules in question as information which may be used in the appellation of a quality wine psr. The Court added in paragraph 29 that the wording of Article 40 of Regulation No 2392/89 shows that it is aimed primarily at prohibiting the untruthful use of brand names. It follows from that judgment that, for the use of a brand name to be capable of being regarded as likely to cause confusion or mislead the persons to whom it is addressed, it must be established, having regard to the opinions or habits of the consumers concerned, that there is a real risk of their economic behaviour being affected.

48. In that regard, it must be noted that, first, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court (see, inter alia, Bosman , paragraph 59).

149. It follows from this that the implementation of the Framework Agreement cannot have the effect of reducing the protection previously applicable, under the domestic legal order, to fixed-term workers to a level below that set by the minimum protective provisions laid down by the Framework Agreement in order to prevent the status of employees from being insecure (see Adeneler and Others , paragraph 63, and Impact , paragraph 88; see also, by analogy, with regard to clause 4 of the Framework Agreement, Del Cerro Alonso , paragraph 27).

88. From this angle, the framework agreement seeks to place limits on successive recourse to the latter category of employment relationship, a category regarded as a potential source of abuse to the disadvantage of workers, by laying down as a minimum a number of protective provisions designed to prevent the status of employees from being insecure (see Adeneler and Others , paragraph 63).

12 However, the Hellenic Republic maintains that a distinction must be drawn between the charge at issue in the main proceedings and that involved in the Legros case. In the latter case, the dock dues were imposed solely on imported goods and their purpose was to limit imports in order to encourage local production. In the present cases, on the other hand, the communal tax is imposed not only on imports but also on exports from the Dodecanese, including exports of local products. That difference shows that the aim of the communal tax was solely to provide the local administrative authorities with financial resources. Consequently, the tax does not constitute a charge having an effect equivalent to a customs duty on imports or exports.

37. Finally, as regards the third objective which the national measure at issue pursues, this is, according to the Commission, economic in nature and cannot, in accordance with settled case‑law, serve as justification for obstacles to fundamental freedoms (see, inter alia, Case C‑367/98 Commission v Portugal [2002] ECR I‑4731, paragraph 52).

52 As regards the need to safeguard the financial interest of the Portuguese Republic, it must be recalled that, save in so far as they may fall within the ambit of the reasons set out in Article 73d(1) of the Treaty, which relate in particular to tax law, the general financial interests of a Member State cannot constitute adequate justification. It is settled case-law that economic grounds can never serve as justification for obstacles prohibited by the Treaty (see, as regards the free movement of goods, Case C-265/95 Commission v France [1997] ECR I-6959, paragraph 62, and, in relation to freedom to provide services, Case C-398/95 SETTG [1997] ECR I-3091, paragraph 23). That reasoning is equally applicable to the economic policy objectives reflected in Article 3 of Law No 11/90 and the objectives mentioned by the Portuguese Government in the present proceedings, namely choosing a strategic partner, strengthening the competitive structure of the market concerned or modernising and increasing the efficiency of means of production. Such interests cannot constitute a valid justification for restrictions on the fundamental freedom concerned.

34. According to consistent case-law, taxes do not fall within the scope of the EC Treaty’s provisions concerning State aid unless they constitute the method of financing an aid measure, so that they form an integral part of that measure (Case C-174/02 Streekgewest [2005] ECR I-85, paragraph 25).

53 In that respect it follows from the judgments in Case 174/83 Amman v Council [1986] ECR 2647, paras 19 and 20, in Case 175/83 Culmsee v ESC [1986] ECR 2667, paras 19 and 20, in Case 176/83 Allo v Commission [1986] ECR 2687, paras 19 and 20, in Case 233/83 Agostini v Commission [1986] ECR 2709, paras 19 and 20, in Case 247/83 Ambrosetti v Commission [1986] ECR 2729, paras 12 and 20 and in Case 264/83 Delhez v Commission [1986] ECR 2749, paras 20 and 21 that an obligation to pay default interest can arise only where the amount of the principal sum owed is certain or can at least be ascertained on the basis of established objective factors. The same judgments stated that the powers conferred on the Council by Article 65 of the Staff Regulations for adjusting the remuneration and pensions of officials and other servants and for fixing the weightings applicable to such remuneration and pensions involve the exercise of a discretion. No certainty exists as to the amount by which the remuneration and pensions will be adjusted or the manner in which the weightings will be fixed until the Council has exercised those powers and adopted the regulation.

21 THE POWERS CONFERRED ON THE COUNCIL BY ARTICLE 65 OF THE STAFF REGULATIONS FOR ADJUSTING THE REMUNERATION AND PENSIONS OF OFFICIALS AND OTHER SERVANTS AND FOR FIXING THE WEIGHTINGS APPLICABLE TO SUCH REMUNERATION AND PENSIONS INVOLVE THE EXERCISE OF A DISCRETION . NO CERTAINTY EXISTS AS TO THE AMOUNT BY WHICH THE REMUNERATION AND PENSIONS WILL BE ADJUSTED OR THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WEIGHTINGS WILL BE FIXED UNTIL THE COUNCIL HAS EXERCISED THOSE POWERS AND ADOPTED THE REGULATION ON THE MATTER . ALTHOUGH IN ITS AFORESAID JUDGMENT OF 6 OCTOBER 1982 IN CASE 59/81 THE COURT HELD THAT THE COUNCIL MUST , IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS DISCRETION , TAKE CERTAIN FACTORS INTO CONSIDERATION , IT DID NOT , CONTRARY TO THE APPLICANTS ' ASSERTION , EITHER DETERMINE THE AMOUNTS WHICH WERE ACTUALLY PAYABLE TO OFFICIALS AND OTHER SERVANTS PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 65 OF THE STAFF REGULATIONS OR ESTABLISH THE OBJECTIVE CRITERIA ENABLING THOSE AMOUNTS TO BE DETERMINED SUFFICIENTLY PRECISELY .

50. As for Decision No 3/80, Article 3(1) thereof constitutes the implementation and the concrete expression, in the particular field of social security, of the general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality laid down in Article 9 of the Association Agreement (judgment in Akdas and Others , EU:C:2011:346, paragraph 98).

96 Nevertheless, as the Commission has stated, in the absence of provisions of EU law, disputes concerning the recovery of amounts wrongly paid under EU law must be decided by national courts in application of their own domestic law, subject to the limits imposed by EU law, on the basis that the rules and procedures laid down by domestic law must not have the effect of making it practically impossible or excessively difficult to recover aid not due and that the national legislation must be applied in a manner which is not discriminatory as compared to procedures for deciding similar national disputes (judgments of 16 July 1998, Oelmühle and Schmidt Söhne, C‑298/96, EU:C:1998:372, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited, and of 15 January 2009, Bayerische Hypotheken- und Vereinsbank, C‑281/07, EU:C:2009:6, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).

24. In the absence of provisions of Community law, disputes concerning the recovery of amounts wrongly paid under Community law must be decided by national courts in application of their own domestic law, subject, however, to the limits imposed by Community law, on the basis that the rules and procedures laid down by domestic law must not have the effect of making it practically impossible or excessively difficult to recover the aid not due and that the national legislation must be applied in a manner which is not discriminatory as compared to procedures for deciding similar national disputes (see Case C-336/00 Huber [2002] ECR I-7699, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).

79. Finally, it may be seen from the contested decision that, despite the contacts between the German Government and the appellants on the one side and the Commission on the other revealing persistent differences of opinion as to whether that provision was applicable, no specific argument was put forward during the administrative procedure (see Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission , paragraphs 104 to 108).

42 Thus the Court has held that, with regard to decisions adopted for the purpose of ensuring observance of the competition rules, in which the Commission finds that there has been an infringement of those rules, issues directions to undertakings and imposes pecuniary penalties upon them, that the undertakings or associations of undertakings addressed by such decisions must be assured that the operative part and the statement of reasons were actually adopted by the college of Commissioners (see, to that effect, Commission v BASF and Others, cited above, paragraphs 65 to 67).

66 Such decisions must state the reasons on which they are based, in accordance with Article 190 of the EEC Treaty. It is settled law that this requires the Commission to set out the reasons which prompted it to adopt a decision, so that the Court can exercise its power of review and Member States and nationals concerned know the basis on which the Treaty has been applied.

34. It should be pointed out that when adopting provisions granting relief from customs duties, the Council of the European Union must take account, amongst other things, of the difficulties confronting national customs administrations (see, by analogy, Case C-247/97 Schoonbroodt [1998] ECR I-8095, paragraph 23).

35 As far as companies or firms are concerned, their corporate seat, in the sense expressed above, serves to determine, like nationality for natural persons, their connection to a Member State's legal order (see ICI, cited above, paragraph 20, and the case-law cited there).

13 IT MUST BE STATED FIRSTLY THAT ARTICLE 52 OF THE EEC TREATY EMBODIES ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE COMMUNITY AND HAS BEEN DIRECTLY APPLICABLE IN THE MEMBER STATES SINCE THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD . BY VIRTUE OF THAT PROVISION , FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT FOR NATIONALS OF ONE MEMBER STATE ON THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER INCLUDES THE RIGHT TO TAKE UP AND PURSUE ACTIVITIES AS SELF-EMPLOYED PERSONS AND TO SET UP AND MANAGE UNDERTAKINGS UNDER THE CONDITIONS LAID DOWN FOR ITS OWN NATIONALS BY THE LAW OF THE COUNTRY WHERE SUCH ESTABLISHMENT IS EFFECTED . THE ABOLITION OF RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT ALSO APPLIES TO RESTRICTIONS ON THE SETTING UP OF AGENCIES , BRANCHES OR SUBSIDIARIES BY NATIONALS OF ANY MEMBER STATE ESTABLISHED IN THE TERRITORY OF ANY MEMBER STATE .

47 A restrictive interpretation of the scope of the remedy provided for in Article 27(1) of the Dublin III Regulation might thwart the attainment of that objective (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 June 2016, Ghezelbash, C‑63/15, EU:C:2016:409, paragraph 53).

40 Second, such a finding requires a subjective element, namely that it must be apparent from a number of objective factors that the essential aim of the transactions concerned is to obtain an undue advantage. The prohibition of abuse is not relevant where the economic activity carried out may have some explanation other than the mere attainment of an advantage (see judgments of 21 February 2006 in Halifax and Others, C‑255/02, EU:C:2006:121, paragraph 75; of 22 December 2010 in Weald Leasing, C‑103/09, EU:C:2010:804, paragraph 30; and of 13 March 2014 in SICES and Others, C‑155/13, EU:C:2014:145, paragraph 33).

33. Such a finding requires also a subjective element to the effect that it must be apparent from a number of objective factors that the essential aim of the transactions concerned is to obtain an undue advantage. The prohibition of abuse is not relevant where the economic activity carried out may have some explanation other than the mere attainment of an advantage ( Halifax and Others , paragraph 75). The existence of such an element relating to the intention of operators may be established, in particular, by proof of the purely artificial nature of the transactions (see, to that effect, Emsland-Stärke , paragraph 53, and Case C‑425/06 Part Service [2008] ECR I‑897, paragraph 62).

68 Nevertheless, far from putting the proportionality of Article 6(2)(a) of Implementing Decision 2015/789 into question, the fact that the Commission limited the obligation to remove host plants at a radius of 100 metres, although the vectors are capable of spreading the bacterium beyond that distance, shows, on the contrary, that that obligation was limited to what is necessary for attaining the objective sought (see, by analogy, judgment of 12 July 2001, Jippes and Others, C‑189/01, EU:C:2001:420, paragraph 120).

54. The possibility thus given to the national court by the second paragraph of Article 267 TFEU of asking the Court for a preliminary ruling before disapplying the national provision that is contrary to European Union law cannot, however, be transformed into an obligation because national law does not allow that court to disapply a provision it considers to be contrary to the constitution unless the provision has first been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. By reason of the principle of the primacy of European Union law, which extends also to the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age, contrary national legislation which falls within the scope of European Union law must be disapplied (see, to that effect, Mangold , paragraph 77).

77. In those circumstances it is the responsibility of the national court, hearing a dispute involving the principle of non-discrimination in respect of age, to provide, in a case within its jurisdiction, the legal protection which individuals derive from the rules of Community law and to ensure that those rules are fully effective, setting aside any provision of national law which may conflict with that law (see, to that effect, Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, paragraph 21, and Case C-347/96 Solred [1998] ECR I-937, paragraph 30).

67. Thus, the Court has already held that, while certain objective and subjective factors connected with the concept of fault under a national legal system may be relevant, in the light of the case-law referred to in paragraph 51 of the present judgment, for the purpose of determining whether or not a given breach of EU law is sufficiently serious, the fact remains that the obligation to make reparation for loss or damage caused to individuals cannot depend upon a condition based on any concept of fault going beyond that of a sufficiently serious breach of EU law. Imposition of such a supplementary condition would be tantamount to calling in question the right to reparation founded on the EU legal order (see Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame , paragraphs 78 to 80, and Haim , paragraph 39).

37. It should be noted, first of all, that the deduction scheme is meant to relieve the trader entirely of the burden of the VAT payable or paid in the course of all his economic activities. The common system of VAT consequently ensures neutrality of taxation of all economic activities, whatever their purpose or results, provided that they are themselves subject in principle to VAT (see Rompelman , paragraph 19; Case C‑37/95 Ghent Coal Terminal [1998] ECR I-1, paragraph 15; Gabalfrisa , cited above, paragraph 44; Case C‑98/98 Midland Bank [2000] ECR I‑4177, paragraph 19; and Abbey National , paragraph 24). Given the general nature of that right, derogations are permitted only in the cases expressly provided for in the Directive (see, to that effect, Ghent Coal Terminal , cited above, paragraph 16).

16 In the absence of any provision empowering the Member States to limit the right of deduction granted to taxable persons, that right must be exercised immediately in respect of all the taxes charged on transactions relating to inputs. Such limitations on the right of deduction must be applied in a similar manner in all the Member States and therefore derogations are permitted only in the cases expressly provided for in the Directive (see, in particular, Commission v France, cited above, paragraphs 16 and 17, Case C-97/90 Lennartz v Finanzamt München III [1991] ECR I-3795, paragraph 27, and Case C-62/93 BP Supergas v Greek State [1995] ECR I-1883, paragraph 18).

34 In view of those considerations, it must be concluded therefore that the Regulation and the Directive are to be interpreted as meaning that the principles of self-sufficiency and proximity do not apply to waste for recovery. The interpretation of Article 130t of the Treaty

37. It should be recalled in this respect that it is clear from the case‑law that the concept of a ‘dominant position’ under Article 82 EC concerns a position of economic strength held by an undertaking, which enables it to prevent effective competition from being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers and, ultimately, consumers ( United Brands and United Brands Continentaal v Commission , cited above, paragraph 65; Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission [1979] ECR 461, paragraph 38; and Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie-Michelin v Commission , cited above, paragraph 30).

65THE DOMINANT POSITION REFERRED TO IN THIS ARTICLE RELATES TO A POSITION OF ECONOMIC STRENGTH ENJOYED BY AN UNDERTAKING WHICH ENABLES IT TO PREVENT EFFECTIVE COMPETITION BEING MAINTAINED ON THE RELEVANT MARKET BY GIVING IT THE POWER TO BEHAVE TO AN APPRECIABLE EXTENT INDEPENDENTLY OF ITS COMPETITORS , CUSTOMERS AND ULTIMATELY OF ITS CONSUMERS .

32. In that regard, it should be noted that it is one of the essential characteristics of VAT that it is imposed on the added value of the goods or services concerned, since the tax payable on a transaction is calculated after the tax paid on the preceding transaction has been deducted (see, inter alia, Case C‑208/91 Beaulande [1992] ECR I‑6709, paragraph 14; Case C‑347/95 UCAL [1997] ECR I‑4911, paragraph 34; and Case C‑308/01 GIL Insurance and Others [2004] ECR I‑4777, paragraph 33). Consequently, the option of treating certain applications as supplies made for consideration, as interpreted above, cannot be used in order to charge VAT on the value of goods which the taxable person concerned has made available to the third party who completed or improved them, to the extent that the taxable person has already, in the context of an earlier tax period, paid VAT on that value. As the Commission stated, such repeated taxation would be incompatible both with the essential characteristic of VAT, referred to above, and with the aim of the above option, which is intended to enable Member States to make subject to VAT the application of goods for the purposes of activities exempt from VAT, but in no way authorises Member States to levy VAT several times on the same element of the value of those goods.

51. In that regard, it must be recalled that although the desire to avoid disturbances on the labour market is undoubtedly an overriding reason in the public interest, workers who are employed by an undertaking established in a Member State and posted to another Member State for the purposes of providing services there do not purport to gain access to the labour market of that second State, as they return to their country of origin or residence after the completion of their work (see judgments in Rush Portuguesa , C‑113/89, EU:C:1990:142, paragraph 15; Commission v Luxembourg , EU:C:2004:655, paragraph 38; and Commission v Austria , EU:C:2006:595, paragraph 55).

55. It should be borne in mind in this regard that workers employed by an undertaking established in a Member State and who are posted to another Member State for the purpose of providing services there do not purport to gain access to the labour market of that second State, as they return to their country of origin or residence after the completion of their work (see Commission v Luxembourg , paragraph 38).

38 Thus, according to the case-law of the Court, a method based on a comparison of prices applied in the Member State concerned with those applied in other Member States must be considered valid. It is apparent from that case-law that, when an undertaking holding a dominant position imposes scales of fees for its services which are appreciably higher than those charged in other Member States, and where a comparison of the fee levels has been made on a consistent basis, that difference must be regarded as indicative of an abuse of a dominant position (judgments of 13 July 1989, Tournier, 395/87, EU:C:1989:319, paragraph 38, and of 13 July 1989, Lucazeau and Others, 110/88, 241/88 and 242/88, EU:C:1989:326, paragraph 25).

43. The Court notes that Directive 91/414 is aimed not only at improving plant production and removing barriers to intra-Community trade in plant products, but also at protecting human and animal health and the environment (see, to that effect, Case C‑174/05 Zuid‑Hollandse Milieufederatie and Natuur en Milieu [2006] ECR I-2443, paragraph 30).

30. In the present case, it is apparent from the reasons underlying Directive 91/414 that it has the objective, firstly, of removing barriers to intra-Community trade in plant products and of improving plant production and, secondly, of protecting human and animal health and the environment.

33. In the application of Article 110 TFEU, and in particular in the comparison of the taxes applicable to imported second-hand cars with those applicable to second-hand cars which are already on national territory, it is necessary to have regard not only to the rate of tax but also to the basis of assessment and the detailed rules for levying the tax in question (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission v Denmark , C‑47/88, EU:C:1990:449, paragraph 18; Nunes Tadeu , C‑345/93, EU:C:1995:66, paragraph 12; and Commission v Greece , C‑74/06, EU:C:2007:534, paragraph 27).

47 Even assuming that a tax exemption for certain undertakings constitutes an aid measure within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, the possible unlawfulness of the aid is not such as to affect the legality of the charge in respect of which those undertakings are exempt. In that regard, the Court has held that businesses liable to pay a tax cannot rely on the argument that the exemption enjoyed by other businesses constitutes State aid in order to avoid payment of that tax (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 October 2005, Distribution Casino France and Others, C‑266/04 to C‑270/04, C‑276/04 and C‑321/04 to C‑325/04, EU:C:2005:657, paragraphs 42 and 43 and the case-law cited).

43. Accordingly, even if the tax exemption for small retail outlets constitutes an aid measure within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC, the possible illegality of that aid is not such as to affect the legality of the TACA.

28. Although, in the light of the 10th recital of the Directive, the protection conferred under Article 5(1)(a) is an absolute right when the use affects or is liable to affect one of the functions of the mark (see Case C-206/01 Arsenal Football Club [2002] ECR I-10273, paragraphs 50 and 51), the application of Article 5(1)(b) depends on there being a likelihood of confusion (see Case C-425/98 Marca Mode [2000] ECR I-4861, paragraph 34). The Court points out that in SABEL , cited above (paragraphs 20 and 21), it has already excluded a broad interpretation of Article 4(1)(b) of the Directive, which is, in substance, identical to Article 5(1)(b), an interpretation which had been suggested to it on the ground, inter alia , that Article 5(2) of the Directive, on its wording, applies only where a sign is used for non-similar goods or services.

15. Under Article 13 of the Protocol, officials and other servants of the European Union are liable to a tax for the benefit of the Union on the salaries, wages and emoluments paid to them by the Union, and those payments are exempt from national taxes (see Kristoffersen , paragraph 10).

10 Pursuant to Article 13 of the Protocol, officials and other servants of the Communities are liable to a tax for the benefit of the Communities on salaries, wages and emoluments paid to them by the Communities and are exempt from national taxes on such salaries, wages and emoluments.

34 Thus, the services provided by an IGP come within the exemption provided for in Article 132(1)(f) of Directive 2006/112 where the provision of those services contributes directly to the exercise of activities in the public interest referred to in Article 132 of that directive (see, by analogy, judgment of 5 October 2016, TMD, C‑412/15, EU:C:2016:738, paragraphs 31 to 33).

26. In the case of gifts, it follows from that case-law that the measures prohibited by Article 56(1) EC as being restrictions on the movement of capital include those whose effect is to reduce the value of a gift by a resident of a Member State other than that in which the property concerned is located and which taxes the gift of that property (see, by analogy, van Hilten-van der Heijden , paragraph 44; Jäger , paragraph 31; Eckelkamp and Others , paragraph 44; Arens-Sikken , paragraph 37; and Block , paragraph 24).

31. Furthermore, as regards inheritances, the case‑law has confirmed that the measures prohibited by Article 73b(1) of the Treaty as being restrictions on the movement of capital include those the effect of which is to reduce the value of the inheritance of a resident of a State other than the Member State in which the assets concerned are situated and which taxes the inheritance of those assets ( van Hilten-van der Heijden , cited above, paragraph 44).

34 According to settled case-law, the purpose of the pre-litigation procedure is to give the Member State concerned an opportunity, on the one hand, to comply with its obligations under Community law and, on the other, to avail itself of its right to defend itself against the complaints made by the Commission. The subject-matter of an action brought under Article 169 of the Treaty is therefore delimited by the pre-litigation procedure provided for by that article. Consequently, the action cannot be founded on any complaints other than those formulated in the reasoned opinion (Case C-206/96 Commission v Luxembourg [1998] ECR I-3401, paragraph 13).

26. In that regard, it is settled case-law that the nature of a tax, duty or charge must be determined by the Court, under Community law, according to the objective characteristics by which it is levied, irrespective of its classification under national law (Joined Cases C-197/94 and C-252/94 Bautiaa and Société française maritime [1996] ECR I-505, paragraph 39).

39 As regards the duty to which those transactions are subject, it is settled case-law that the nature of a tax, duty or charge must be determined by the Court, under Community law, according to the objective characteristics by which it is levied, irrespective of its classification under national law (see the judgments in Case 295/84 Rousseau Wilmot v Organic [1985] ECR 3759 and Case C-200/90 Dansk Denkavit and Poulsen Trading v Skatteministeriet [1992] ECR I-2217).

171. On the other hand, according to Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003, the fines which the Commission may impose on undertakings which infringe Article 81 EC are not to infringe, for each undertaking participating in the infringement, 10% of its total turnover in the business year preceding the adoption of the decision imposing the fine (Case C‑291/98 P Sarrió v Commission [2000] ECR I‑9991, paragraph 85).

53. Accordingly, the fact that the condition of eligibility for the right in question, in this case residence with the Turkish worker for a certain period, ceases to obtain after the family member of the worker has acquired the relevant right cannot affect the enjoyment of that right (see Aydinli , paragraph 26). A different interpretation of the first paragraph of Article 7 of Decision No 1/80 would not be consistent with the aim and broad logic of Decision No 1/80, which is intended to promote the gradual integration in the host Member State of Turkish nationals who satisfy the conditions laid down in one of the provisions of that decision and thus enjoy the rights conferred on them by the decision (see, in particular, Case C‑171/01 Wählergruppe Gemeinsam [2003] ECR I-4301, paragraph 79).

79. Moreover, as the Commission rightly pointed out, the above interpretation is the only one consistent with the aim and broad logic of Decision No 1/80, which is intended to secure progressively freedom of movement for workers and to promote the integration in the host Member State of Turkish workers who satisfy the conditions laid down in that decision and thus enjoy the rights conferred on them by it (see Kurz , paragraphs 40 and 45). Granting Turkish workers legally employed in the territory of a Member State entitlement to the same conditions of work as those enjoyed by workers who are nationals of the Member States is an important step towards creating an appropriate framework for the gradual integration of migrant Turkish workers.

18 According to the Court’s settled case-law, the principle of State liability for loss or damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of EU law for which the State can be held responsible is inherent in the system of the treaties on which the European Union is based (see judgments of 19 November 1991 in Francovich and Others, C‑6/90 and C‑9/90, EU:C:1991:428, paragraph 35; of 5 March 1996 in Brasserie du pêcheur and Factortame, C‑46/93 and C‑48/93, EU:C:1996:79, paragraph 31, and of 14 March 2013 in Leth, C‑420/11, EU:C:2013:166, paragraph 40).

43 It is true that Directive 2005/29 applies, in accordance with Article 3(1) of that directive, to unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices, as defined in Article 5 of the directive, before, during and after a commercial transaction in relation to a product. Article 2(d) of the directive defines commercial practices as being ‘any act, omission, course of conduct or representation, commercial communication including advertising and marketing, by a trader, directly connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a product to consumers’ (see judgment of 16 July 2015 in Abcur, C‑544/13 and C‑545/13, EU:C:2015:481, paragraph 73).

73. It is clear from Article 3(1) of Directive 2005/29 that that directive applies to unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices, as laid down in Article 5, before, during and after a commercial transaction in relation to a product. Article 2(d) of that directive defines such practices as ‘any act, omission, course of conduct or representation, commercial communication including advertising and marketing, by a trader, directly connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a product to consumers’.

56. Although national law is applicable to a situation arising from the overpayment of a pension supplement by reason of the authorised maximum income's having been exceeded, it must however be stated that, with regard to a situation concerning a worker who has exercised his right to freedom of movement under the Treaty, it is a requirement of Community law that the detailed procedural rules governing that situation should observe the principles of equivalence and effectiveness (see, to that effect, Case C-261/95 Palmisani [1997] ECR I-4025, paragraph 27 and Case C-231/96 Edis [1998] ECR I-4951, paragraph 34).

32 In paragraph 34 of its judgment of 10 September 1996 in Case C-11/95 Commission v Belgium [1996] ECR I-4155 the Court held that under the system established by the Directive for allocating obligations between the Member States from which broadcasts emanate and those which receive them, it is solely for the Member State from which television broadcasts emanate to monitor the application of the law of the originating Member State applying to such broadcasts and to ensure compliance with the Directive and that the receiving Member State is not authorized to exercise its own control in that regard.

34 It follows, first, that it is solely for the Member State from which television broadcasts emanate to monitor the application of the law of the originating Member State applying to such broadcasts and to ensure compliance with Directive 89/552, and, second, that the receiving Member State is not authorized to exercise its own control in that regard.

30. Thus, there is no provision of EU law which prevents the Member States, or, as the case may be, management and labour from exceeding the minimum protection of workers guaranteed by EU legislation and providing for the maintenance of all the components of the total remuneration to which such workers are entitled during their period of work (see, to that effect, Parviainen , paragraph 63).

80. Article 43 EC is thus intended to ensure that all nationals of all Member States who establish themselves in another Member State for the purpose of pursuing activities there as self-employed persons receive the same treatment as nationals of that State, and it prohibits, as a restriction on freedom of establishment, any discrimination on grounds of nationality resulting from national legislation ( Commission v France , paragraph 14).

14 ARTICLE 52 IS THUS INTENDED TO ENSURE THAT ALL NATIONALS OF MEMBER STATES WHO ESTABLISH THEMSELVES IN ANOTHER MEMBER STATE , EVEN IF THAT ESTABLISHMENT IS ONLY SECONDARY , FOR THE PURPOSE OF PURSUING ACTIVITIES THERE AS A SELF-EMPLOYED PERSONS RECEIVE THE SAME TREATMENT AS NATIONALS OF THAT STATE AND IT PROHIBITS , AS A RESTRICTION ON FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT , ANY DISCRIMINATION ON GROUNDS OF NATIONALITY RESULTING FROM THE LEGISLATION OF THE MEMBER STATE .

26 It is accordingly clear from the scheme of Directive 95/46 and from the wording of Article 7 thereof that Article 7(f) of Directive 95/46 does not, in itself, set out an obligation, but expresses the possibility of processing data such as the communication to a third party of data necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by that third party. As the Advocate General stated in points 43 to 46 of his Opinion, such an interpretation may also be deduced from other EU instruments touching upon personal data (see, to that effect, as regards the processing of personal data in the electronic communications sector, judgment of 29 January 2008, Promusicae, C‑275/06, EU:C:2008:54, paragraphs 54 and 55).

41. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, in determining the scope of a provision of European Union law, its wording, objective and context must all be taken into account (see, to that effect, Case C‑280/04 Jyske Finans [2005] ECR I‑10683, paragraph 34, and Case C‑116/10 Feltgen and Bacino Charter Company [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 12).

12. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to the Court’s settled case‑law, in interpreting a provision of European Union law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, inter alia, Case 292/82 Merck [1983] ECR 3781, paragraph 12; Case C-34/05 Schouten [2007] ECR I‑1687, paragraph 25; and Case C‑433/08 Yaesu Europe [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 24).

25. In that regard, it must be recalled that, in accordance with settled case‑law, the procedure provided for by Article 234 EC is an instrument of cooperation between the Court of Justice and national courts, by means of which the Court provides the national courts with the points of interpretation of Community law which they need in order to decide the disputes before them (see, in particular, Case C‑83/91 Meilicke [1992] ECR I‑4871, paragraph 22, and Case C‑380/01 Schneider [2004] ECR I-1389, paragraph 20).

18 The right of deduction provided for in Article 17 et seq. of the Sixth Directive is an integral part of the VAT scheme and in principle may not be limited. The Court has consistently held (see, in particular, Case 50/87 Commission v France [1988] ECR 4797, paragraphs 15 to 17 and Case C-97/90 Lennartz v Finanzamt Muenchen III [1991] ECR I-3795, paragraph 27) that the right of deduction must be exercised immediately in respect of all the taxes charged on transactions relating to inputs. Any limitation on the right of deduction affects the level of the tax burden and must be applied in a similar manner in all the Member States. Consequently, derogations are permitted only in the cases expressly provided for in the directive.

15 From the features of VAT described above it may be inferred, as the Court pointed out in its judgment of 14 February 1985 in Case 268/83 Rompelman (( 1985 )) ECR 655, that the deduction system is meant to relieve the trader entirely of the burden of VAT payable or paid in the course of all his economic activities . The common system of VAT consequently ensures that all economic activities, whatever their purpose or results, provided that they are themselves subject to VAT, are taxed in a wholly neutral way .

46. It must be noted at the outset that that provision does not distinguish between the causes or the objectives of State aid, but defines them in relation to their effects (Case C-56/93 Belgium v Commission , paragraph 79, Case C-241/94 France v Commission , paragraph 20, and Case C-75/97 Belgium v Commission , paragraph 25).

29. Under point (a) of the first paragraph of Article 78 of the VAT Directive, taxes, excluding the VAT itself, are to be included in the taxable amount. The Court has held previously that, in order for taxes to be included in the taxable amount for VAT, even though they do not represent any added value and do not constitute the financial consideration for the supply of goods or services, they must have a direct link with that supply and the question whether the chargeable event for the tax coincides with that for VAT is a decisive factor for the purposes of establishing the existence of such a direct link (see, to that effect, judgments in De Danske Bilimportører , C‑98/05, EU:C:2006:363, paragraph 17; Commission v Poland , C‑228/09, EU:C:2010:295, paragraph 30; Commission v Austria , C‑433/09, EU:C:2010:817, paragraph 34; and TVI , C‑618/11, C‑637/11 and C‑659/11, EU:C:2013:789, paragraphs 37 and 39).

39. Quant à la question de savoir si la taxe sur la diffusion représente un lien direct avec la prestation de services de diffusion de publicité commerciale, il ressort d’une jurisprudence constante que la question de savoir si le fait générateur de ladite taxe litigieuse coïncide avec celui de la TVA est un élément déterminant pour établir l’existence d’un tel lien direct (voir, en ce sens, arrêts précités De Danske Bilimportører, points 17 et 18, ainsi que Commission/Pologne, points 30 à 32).

31. The first part of the first ground of appeal is admissible to the extent that the Court is requested by the appellant to rule on the existence of an error of law committed by the General Court in the characterisation of harm alleged as actual and certain in the context of the European Union’s non-contractual liability (see, to that effect, judgments in Archer Daniels Midland v Commission , C‑510/06 P, EU:C:2009:166, paragraph 105, and in Commission v Schneider Electric , C‑440/07 P, EU:C:2009:459, paragraph 191).

53. According to the case-law of the Court, although the Member States enjoy institutional autonomy as regards the organisation and the structuring of their NRAs within the meaning of Article 2(g) of the Framework Directive, that autonomy may be exercised only in full compliance with the objectives and obligations laid down in that directive (see judgments in Comisión del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones , C‑82/07, EU:C:2008:143, paragraph 24, and in Base and Others , C‑389/08, EU:C:2010:584, paragraph 26).

24. Although the Member States enjoy institutional autonomy as regards the organisation and the structuring of their regulatory authorities within the meaning of Article 2(g) of the Framework Directive, that autonomy may be exercised only in accordance with the objectives and obligations laid down in that directive.

18. The prohibition on measures having an effect equivalent to restrictions set out in Article 28 EC covers all commercial rules enacted by the Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade (see, in particular, Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5; Case 178/84 Commission v Germany [1987) ECR 1227 ( " Beer purity law " ), paragraph 27; and Case C-12/00 Commission v Spain [2003] ECR I-459, paragraph 71).

25. According to the scheme and structure of Directive 69/335, capital duty is to be levied on the capital company receiving the contribution in question. The recipient is normally the company to which the resources or services in question are physically given. It is only exceptionally that that is not the case and that it is necessary to seek to identify the ‘real recipient’ of the resources or services in question (see, in particular, in relation to a financial contribution paid to the subsidiaries of a company which increased its capital, Case C-339/99 ESTAG [2002] ECR I-8837, paragraphs 44 to 47).

44 The latter position is adopted with good reason. In order to determine whether a transaction comes within the scope of Directive 69/335, it is appropriate not only to check that the transaction is one of those listed in Article 4 thereof, but also to take into account the context in which it is carried out, as is clear from paragraphs 37 and 38 of this judgment.

34 That interpretation is borne out by the third, fourth, fifth and sixth recitals in the preamble to Regulation No 1247/92, from which it is clear that the intention of the legislature was to provide a specific system of coordination taking account of the special characteristics of certain benefits falling simultaneously within the categories of both social assistance and social security and treated, according to the Court's case-law, as social security benefits as regards workers already covered by the social security scheme of the State whose legislation is relied on (see, in particular, Newton and Snares). As the Advocate General has stated at point 24 of his Opinion, a benefit such as AA is indeed a benefit of that kind.

20 With regard, firstly, to the comparability of actions, it is solely for the national court, which has direct knowledge of the detailed procedural rules applicable, to ascertain whether the actions concerned are similar as regards their purpose, cause of action and essential characteristics (judgment of 27 June 2013, Agrokonsulting-04, C‑93/12, EU:C:2013:432, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).

39. So far as concerns, first of all, the principle of equivalence, it is apparent from the Court’s case-law that observance of that principle requires that the national rule at issue be applied without distinction, whether the action is based on rights which individuals derive from European Union law or whether it is based on an infringement of national law, where the purpose and cause of action are similar. It is for the national court, which has direct knowledge of the detailed procedural rules applicable, to ascertain whether the actions concerned are similar as regards their purpose, cause of action and essential characteristics (see, to that effect, Pontin , paragraph 45 and the case-law cited, and Case C-591/10 Littlewoods Retail and Others [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 31).

22 That technical argument cannot be accepted . The Commission' s complaint does not relate to compliance with technical requirements but to the refusal of the Irish authorities to verify whether those requirements are satisfied where the manufacturer of the materials has not been certified by the IIRS to IS 188 . By incorporating in the notice in question the words "or equivalent" after the reference to the Irish standard, as provided for by Directive 71/305 where it is applicable, the Irish authorities could have verified compliance with the technical conditions without from the outset restricting the contract only to tenderers proposing to utilize Irish materials .

42 It must be stated at the outset that, although the Spanish Government alleges that the contested regulation adversely affects the legitimate expectations of the Member States as well, in all essential respects its arguments refer to breach of the legitimate expectations of the traders concerned. Nevertheless, despite the doubts expressed by the Council, there is nothing to prevent a Member State from claiming in an action for annulment that an act of the institutions frustrates the legitimate expectations of particular individuals (see, in this respect, Case 278/84 Germany v Commission [1987] ECR 1, paragraphs 34 to 36; Case 203/86 Spain v Council [1988] ECR 4563, paragraphs 17 to 20, and Case C-169/95 Spain v Council [1997] ECR I-135, paragraphs 49 to 54).

53 The fact that the Commission initially decided not to raise any objections to the aid in issue cannot be regarded as capable of having caused the recipient undertaking to entertain any legitimate expectation since that decision was challenged in due time before the Court, which annulled it. However regrettable it may be, the Commission's error cannot erase the consequences of the unlawful conduct of the Kingdom of Spain.

40. The Court has also ruled that the provisions of European Union law on the free movement of workers apply in judging all legal relationships in so far as those relationships, by reason either of the place where they are entered into or of the place where they take effect, can be located within the European Union (see, to that effect, Prodest , cited above, paragraph 6).

70. The Court has, nevertheless, ruled that if the Member States remain, in essential respects, free to fix, in keeping with their domestic needs, the requirements of public policy and public security, as grounds for derogating from a fundamental freedom, those requirements must be interpreted strictly, so that their scope cannot be determined unilaterally without any control by the institutions of the European Community. So, public policy and public security may not be invoked unless there is a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society (see, inter alia, Case C‑355/98 Commission v Belgium [2000] ECR I‑1221, paragraph 28; Case C‑54/99 Eglise de scientologie [2000] ECR I‑1335, paragraph 17; and Commission v Spain , paragraph 47).

28 As regards the reasons of public policy and public security relied upon in order to justify that requirement, it should be noted, first, that the concept of public policy assumes a genuine and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society. Like all derogations from a fundamental principle of the Treaty, the public policy exception must be interpreted restrictively (see Case C-348/96 Calfa [1999] ECR I-11, paragraphs 21 and 23).

25. It follows that, if the Community and the African States and Madagascar associated with the Community had intended to address the problem of the internal taxation of unlike products which are in competition with each other, instead of adopting a provision which was similar only to the first paragraph of Article 90 EC, they would have adopted a provision which was also modelled on the second paragraph of Article 90 EC (see, by analogy, Case C‑469/93 Chiquita Italia [1995] ECR I‑4533, paragraph 43).

59. Secondly, attention should be drawn to the importance, both in the European Union legal order and in the national legal orders, of the principle of res judicata . In order to ensure stability of the law and legal relations, as well as the sound administration of justice, it is important that judicial decisions which have become definitive after all rights of appeal have been exhausted or after expiry of the time‑limits provided to exercise those rights can no longer be called into question (Case C‑224/01 Köbler [2003] ECR I‑10239, paragraph 38; Case C‑234/04 Kapferer [2006] ECR I‑2585, paragraph 20; and Case C‑2/08 Fallimento Olimpiclub [2009] ECR I‑7501, paragraph 22).

22. In that connection, attention should be drawn to the importance, both for the Community legal order and for the national legal systems, of the principle of res judicata . In order to ensure stability of the law and legal relations, as well as the sound administration of justice, it is important that judicial decisions which have become definitive after all rights of appeal have been exhausted or after expiry of the time-limits provided for in that regard can no longer be called into question (Case C‑224/01 Köbler [2003] ECR I-10239, paragraph 38, and Case C‑234/04 Kapferer [2006] ECR I-2585, paragraph 20).

31. It should also be pointed out that the Court has held, in Mostaza Claro , paragraph 38, that the nature and importance of the public interest underlying the protection which the Directive confers on consumers justify the national court being required to assess of its own motion whether a contractual term is unfair, compensating in this way for the imbalance which exists between the consumer and the seller or supplier.

38. The Court subsequently found provisions concerning inter alia the place and times of sale of certain products and advertising of those products as well as certain marketing methods to be provisions governing selling arrangements within the meaning of Keck and Mithouard , cited above (see inter alia Case C-292/92 Hünermund and Others [1993] ECR I-6787, paragraphs 21 and 22; Joined Cases C-401/92 and C-402/92 Tankstation ‘t Heukske and Boermans [1994] I-2199, paragraphs 12 to 14; and TK‑Heimdienst , cited above, paragraph 24).

12 However, the application to products from other Member States of national provisions restricting or prohibiting certain selling arrangements is not such as to hinder, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, trade between Member States within the meaning of the Dassonville judgment, cited above, provided that those provisions apply to all relevant traders operating within the national territory and provided that they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of those from other Member States. Where those conditions are fulfilled, the application of such rules to the sale of products from another Member State meeting the requirements laid down by that State is not by nature such as to prevent their access to the market or to impede access any more than it impedes the access of domestic products. Such rules therefore fall outside the scope of Article 30 of the Treaty (see the judgment in Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097, paragraphs 16 and 17).

65. Au rang des facteurs pertinents à cet égard figurent notamment des éléments tels que la gravité du manquement, la durée de persistance de celui-ci depuis l’arrêt l’ayant constaté, les conséquences du manquement sur les intérêts publics et privés concernés ainsi que l’attitude de l’État membre défendeur (voir arrêt Commission/France, C‑121/07, EU:C:2008:695, point 64 et jurisprudence citée).

15 S'agissant plus spécifiquement de la politique agricole commune et de la politique communautaire de l'environnement, la jurisprudence ne fournit aucun élément de droit permettant de faire en principe prévaloir l'une sur l'autre. Elle précise qu'une mesure communautaire ne saurait relever de l'action de la Communauté en matière d'environnement en raison du seul fait qu'elle tient compte des exigences de protection visées à l'article 130 R, paragraphe 2, du traité CE (arrêt du 29 mars 1990, Grèce/Conseil, C-62/88, Rec. p. I-1527, point 20). Les articles 130 R et 130 S laissent entières les compétences que la Communauté détient en vertu d'autres dispositions du traité et ne fournissent une base juridique que pour des actions spécifiques en matière d'environnement (voir, pour l'utilisation des filets maillants dérivants réglementée dans le cadre de la politique agricole commune, arrêt du 24 novembre 1993, Mondiet, C-405/92, Rec. p. I-6133, points 25 à 27). Doivent, en revanche, être fondées sur l'article 130 S du traité les dispositions qui relèvent spécifiquement de la politique de l'environnement (voir, pour des directives portant sur l'élimination des déchets, arrêt du 17 mars 1993, Commission/Conseil, précité), même si elles ont des incidences sur le fonctionnement du marché intérieur (voir, pour un règlement sur le transfert des déchets, arrêt du 28 juin 1994, Parlement/Conseil, C-187/93, Rec. p. I-2857, points 24 à 26) ou si elles poursuivent un objectif d'amélioration de la production agricole (voir, pour une directive concernant des produits phytopharmaceutiques, arrêt du 18 juin 1996, Parlement/Conseil, C-303/94, Rec. p. I-2943).

25 As the Court has consistently held (see in particular Case C-155/91 Commission v Council, cited above, paragraph 19), the mere fact that the establishment or functioning of the internal market is involved is not enough to render Article 100a of the Treaty applicable and recourse to that article is not justified where the act to be adopted has only the ancillary effect of harmonizing market conditions within the Community.

60. It is true that the concepts used in Directives 2001/29 and 2009/24 must in principle have the same meaning (see Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier League and Others [2011] ECR I-9083, paragraphs 187 and 188). However, even supposing that Article 4(2) of Directive 2001/29, interpreted in the light of recitals 28 and 29 in its preamble and in the light of the Copyright Treaty, which Directive 2001/29 aims to implement (judgment of 9 February 2012 in Case C-277/10 Luksan , paragraph 59), indicated that, for the works covered by that directive, the exhaustion of the distribution right concerned only tangible objects, that would not be capable of affecting the interpretation of Article 4(2) of Directive 2009/24, having regard to the different intention expressed by the European Union legislature in the specific context of that directive.

125. According to settled case-law, the status of citizen of the Union is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those among such nationals who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for in that regard (see, in particular, Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193, paragraph 31; Case C-224/98 D’Hoop [2002] ECR I-6191, paragraph 28; Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] ECR I-11613, paragraphs 22 and 23; and Case C-224/02 Pusa [2004] ECR I-5763, paragraph 16).

28 Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy within the scope ratione materiae of the Treaty the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for (Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193, paragraph 31).

10 It is settled case-law (see, inter alia, Case 50/87 Commission v France [1988] ECR 4797, paragraph 15) that the deduction system is meant to relieve the trader entirely of the burden of VAT payable or paid in the course of all his economic activities. The common system of VAT consequently ensures that all economic activities, whatever their purpose or results, provided they are themselves subject to VAT, are taxed in a wholly neutral way.

26 It is settled case-law that the Treaty rules governing freedom of movement for persons and measures adopted to implement them cannot be applied to activities which have no factor linking them with any of the situations governed by Community law and which are confined in all respects within a single Member State (Case C-332/90 Steen v Deutsche Bundespost [1992] ECR I-341, paragraph 9; Case C-134/95 USSL No 47 di Biella v INAIL [1997] ECR I-195, paragraph 19; Joined Cases C-64/96 and C-65/96 Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Uecker and Jacquet v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1997] ECR I-3171, paragraph 16; and Joined Cases C-225/95, C-226/95 and C-227/95 Kapasakalis and Others v Greek State [1998] ECR I-4239, paragraph 22).

22 Finally, it has consistently been held that the Treaty rules governing freedom of movement and acts adopted to implement them cannot be applied to activities which have no factor linking them with any of the situations governed by Community law and which are confined in all respects within a single Member State (Joined Cases C-64/96 and C-65/96 Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Uecker and Jacquet v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1997] ECR I-3171, paragraph 16; Case C-134/95 USSL No 47 di Biella v INAIL [1997] ECR I-195, paragraph 19, and Case C-332/90 Steen v Deutsche Bundespost [1992] ECR I-341, paragraph 9).

47 Consequently, in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings which is confined in all respects within a single Member State, it is for the referring court to indicate to the Court, in accordance with the requirements of Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, in what way the dispute pending before it, despite its purely domestic character, has a connecting factor with the provisions of EU law on the fundamental freedoms that makes the preliminary ruling on interpretation necessary for it to give judgment in that dispute (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2016, Ullens de Schooten, C‑268/15, EU:C:2016:874, paragraph 55).

55. Consequently, on the basis of the Court’s settled case-law according to which a request for a preliminary ruling brought by a national court must be rejected where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main proceedings or its purpose (see, inter alia, judgments in Cipolla and Others C‑94/04 and C‑202/04 EU:C:2006:758, paragraph 25, and Jakubowska C‑225/09 EU:C:2010:729, paragraph 28), the third question must be declared to be inadmissible. Costs

28. In the light of the various pleas of inadmissibility, it should be recalled that questions concerning European Union law enjoy a presumption of relevance. Thus, the Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of European Union law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-94/04 and C-202/04 Cipolla and Others [2006] ECR I‑11421, paragraph 25, and to Joined Cases C-570/07 and C‑571/07 Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraph 36).

79. En effet, il est de jurisprudence constante que les conséquences financières qui pourraient découler pour un État membre d’un arrêt de la Cour ne justifient pas, par elles-mêmes, la limitation des effets dans le temps de cet arrêt (voir, en ce sens, arrêts du 24 septembre 1998, Commission/France, C‑35/97, Rec. p. I‑5325, point 52, ainsi que Buchner e.a., précité, point 41).

53. Further, in paragraphs 51 to 56 of the judgment in Mercredi (EU:C:2010:829), the Court held that the duration of a stay can serve only as an indicator, as part of the assessment of all the circumstances of fact specific to each individual case, and set out the factors which are particularly to be taken into account when the child is young.

55. That is even more true where the child concerned is an infant. An infant necessarily shares the social and family environment of the circle of people on whom he or she is dependent. Consequently, where, as in the main proceedings, the infant is in fact looked after by her mother, it is necessary to assess the mother’s integration in her social and family environment. In that regard, the tests stated in the Court’s case‑law, such as the reasons for the move by the child’s mother to another Member State, the languages known to the mother or again her geographic and family origins may become relevant.

51 It is immaterial, in that regard, that the national provisions at issue were not interpreted in a manner consonant with Article 119 of the Treaty until after the date of the judgment in Defrenne II, since that interpretation is capable of being applied, if necessary, to situations which arose and became established before that date. It is not for the Court to pronounce as to the application in time of rules of national law.

44 As the Court has already held, such an economic link exists where, inter alia, the goods in question have been put into circulation by a licensee, by a parent company, by a subsidiary of the same group, or by an exclusive distributor. In all those situations, the proprietor or the entity of which that proprietor is part can control the quality of the goods to which the mark is affixed (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 June 1994, IHT Internationale Heiztechnik and Danziger, C‑9/93, EU:C:1994:261, paragraphs 34 and 37).

37 In the situations described above (paragraph 34) the function of the trade mark is in no way called in question by freedom to import. As was held in HAG II: "For the trade mark to be able to fulfil [its] role, it must offer a guarantee that all goods bearing it have been produced under the control of a single undertaking which is accountable for their quality" (paragraph 13). In all the cases mentioned, control was in the hands of a single body: the group of companies in the case of products put into circulation by a subsidiary; the manufacturer in the case of products marketed by the distributor; the licensor in the case of products marketed by a licensee. In the case of a licence, the licensor can control the quality of the licensee' s products by including in the contract clauses requiring the licensee to comply with his instructions and giving him the possibility of verifying such compliance. The origin which the trade mark is intended to guarantee is the same: it is not defined by reference to the manufacturer but by reference to the point of control of manufacture (see the statement of grounds for the Benelux Convention and the Uniform Law, Bulletin Benelux, 1962-2, p. 36).

38. An amendment to a service concession contract during its currency may be regarded as substantial if it introduces conditions which, if they had been part of the original award procedure, would have allowed for the admission of tenderers other than those originally admitted or would have allowed for the acceptance of an offer other than that originally accepted (see, by analogy, pressetext Nachrichtenagentur , paragraph 35).

78. The Spanish Government maintains that, since the Union is not a contracting party to the ESM Treaty, the Court has no jurisdiction to interpret, in the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling, the provisions of that treaty (see Case C‑132/09 Commission v Belgium [2010] ECR I‑8695, paragraph 43 and case‑law cited).

43. In relation to international conventions in general, it should be noted that, according to the case-law of the Court, if the Community is not a Contracting Party to a convention, in principle the Court is not competent to interpret the provisions of that convention in the context of preliminary proceedings (Case 130/73 Vandeweghe and Others [1973] ECR 1329, paragraph 2; Order C‑162/98 Hartmann [1998] ECR I-7083, paragraph 9; Case C-301/08 Bogiatzi [2009] ECR I-10185, paragraph 24; and Case C-533/08 TNT Express Nederland [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraph 61).

27. Since the FEU Treaty abolished the reasoned opinion stage in infringement proceedings under Article 260(2) TFEU, the reference date for assessing whether there has been such an infringement is the deadline set in the letter of formal notice issued under that provision (judgment in Commission v Spain , EU:C:2012:781, paragraph 67).

96. It is clear from the Guidelines on environmental aid that it is essential that aid be classified as either aid for investment or operating aid. Different legal rules apply to each of those classifications (Spain v Commission , paragraphs 77 to 80).

78 Paragraph 3.2 of the Guidelines, which relates to aid for investment, states first of all at paragraph 3.2.1 that such aid, including aid for equipment intended to reduce pollution or nuisances, may be authorised within the limits laid down in the Guidelines. The Guidelines state that eligible costs must be strictly confined to the extra investment costs necessary to meet environmental objectives and that costs not attributable to environmental protection must be excluded. Thus, in the case of replacement plant, the cost of the basic investment involved merely to replace production capacity without improving environmental performance is not eligible. In any case, aid ostensibly intended for environmental protection measures but which is in fact for general investment is not covered by the Guidelines.

67. In that regard, it must be remembered that in the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling the need to provide an interpretation of Community law which will be of use to the national court makes it necessary for the referring court to define the factual and legislative context of the questions it is asking or, at the very least, explain the factual circumstances on which those questions are based (Joined Cases C-320/90 to C-322/90 Telemarsicabruzzo and Others [1993] ECR I-393, paragraph 6, and Joined Cases C-421/00, C-426/00 and C-16/01 Sterbenz and Haug [2003] ECR I-1065, paragraph 20). The information supplied in the decision making the reference thus serves to enable the Court to give useful answers (see, in particular, the order of 28 June 2000 in Case C-116/00 Laguillaumie [2000] ECR I-4979, paragraph 14).

37. The Commission’s argument that it follows from the case-law concerning exemptions that activities carried out upstream from those provided by the ultimate service provider are not exempt (Case 107/84 Commission v Germany [1985] ECR 2655, paragraph 20; Case C‑240/99 Skandia [2001] ECR I‑1951, paragraphs 40 and 41; Case C‑235/00 CSC Financial Services [2001] ECR I‑10237, paragraphs 39 and 40; and Case C‑472/03 Arthur Andersen [2005] ECR I‑1719, paragraph 39), so that only medical tests carried out by laboratories on behalf of patients in the context of a direct contractual relationship with those patients comes within the scope of Article 13A(1)(b) of the Sixth Directive, must also be rejected, as that case-law relates to the interpretation of other exemptions, the wording and objectives of which are different from those pursued by that provision (see, to that effect, Case 107/84 Commission v Germany , paragraph 13).

41 According to the definition of insurance transactions set out in paragraph 17 of the judgment in CPP and cited in paragraph 37 of this judgment, it appears that the identity of the person supplied with the service is relevant for the purposes of the definition of the type of services covered by Article 13B(a) of the Sixth Directive and that an insurance transaction necessarily implies the existence of a contractual relationship between the provider of the insurance service and the person whose risks are covered by the insurance, namely the insured.

39 Lastly, it must be recalled that, since the Commission enjoys a wide measure of discretion, particularly as to the nature and extent of the measures which it adopts, the Community judicature must, when reviewing such measures, restrict itself to examining whether the exercise of such discretion is vitiated by a manifest error or a misuse of powers or whether the Commission did not clearly exceed the bounds of its discretion (Case 98/78 Racke v Hauptzollamt Mainz [1979] ECR 69, paragraph 5).

41. In this connection, it must be observed that Article 14(2) of that directive, like Article 2(2) of Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions (OJ 1976 L 39, p. 40), which it replaced, is a derogation from an individual right laid down by Directive 2006/54 since it authorises Member States to provide that a difference of treatment which is based on a characteristic related to sex does not, under certain specified conditions, constitute discrimination within the meaning of that directive. Consequently, it must be interpreted strictly (see, to that effect, Case 222/84 Johnston [1986] ECR 1651, paragraph 36, and Case C-273/97 Sirdar [1999] ECR I-7403, paragraph 23).

36 S ' AGISSANT DE SAVOIR SI UNE TELLE MOTIVATION EST SUSCEPTIBLE D ' ETRE COUVERTE PAR L ' ARTICLE 2 , PARAGRAPHE 2 , DE LA DIRECTIVE , IL CONVIENT D ' OBSERVER D ' ABORD QUE , EN TANT QUE DEROGATION A UN DROIT INDIVIDUEL CONSACRE PAR LA DIRECTIVE , CETTE DISPOSITION EST D ' INTERPRETATION STRICTE . IL Y A LIEU , TOUTEFOIS , D ' ADMETTRE QUE LES CONDITIONS DE L ' EXERCICE DE L ' ACTIVITE PROFESSIONNELLE DES MEMBRES D ' UNE POLICE ARMEE SONT DETER MINEES PAR L ' ENVIRONNEMENT DANS LEQUEL CES ACTIVITES SONT EXERCEES . A CET EGARD , ON NE SAURAIT EXCLURE LA POSSIBILITE QUE , DANS UNE SITUATION DE TROUBLES INTERIEURS GRAVES , LE PORT D ' ARMES A FEU PAR DES FEMMES POLICIERS PUISSE CREER DES RISQUES SUPPLEMENTAIRES D ' ATTENTATS SUR ELLES ET PUISSE DES LORS ETRE CONTRAIRE AUX EXIGENCES DE LA SECURITE PUBLIQUE .

54. It should be noted in this context that the public authorities which grant betting and gaming licences have a duty to comply with the fundamental rules of the Treaties and, in particular, with Articles 43 EC and 49 EC, the principles of equal treatment and of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality and the consequent obligation of transparency (see, to that effect, Case C‑203/08 Sporting Exchange [2010] ECR I‑4695, paragraph 39, and Case C‑64/08 Engelmann [2010] ECR I‑8219, paragraph 49 and the case‑law cited).

38 In that regard, a directive must be transposed into national law by provisions capable of creating a situation which is sufficiently precise, clear and transparent to enable individuals to ascertain their rights and obligations (see in particular to that effect Case C-221/94 Commission v Luxembourg [1996] ECR I-5669, paragraph 22).

22 As regards the arguments which the Luxembourg Government draws from its liberal policy on terminal equipment, it is sufficient to point out here that, according to the case-law of the Court, the fact that a practice is in conformity with the requirements of a directive in the matter of protection may not constitute a reason for not transposing that directive into national law by provisions capable of creating a situation which is sufficiently precise, clear and transparent to enable individuals to ascertain their rights and obligations (see, in particular, to this effect the judgment in Case C-361/88 Commission v Germany [1991] ECR I-2567, paragraph 24). Nor is a draft regulation capable of the transposing of Directive 91/263.

40 If it were apparent from an examination of the decision that its `industrial' component is identifiable as the main or predominant component, whereas the `cultural' component is merely incidental, it would follow that the only appropriate legal basis for it was Article 130 of the Treaty.

25 In the third place, it must be recalled that the right of information provided for in Article 8(1) of Directive 2004/48 is a specific expression of the fundamental right to an effective remedy guaranteed in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and thereby ensures the effective exercise of the fundamental right to property, which includes the intellectual property right protected in Article 17(2) of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2015, Coty Germany, C‑580/13, EU:C:2015:485, paragraph 29). That right of information thus enables the holder of an intellectual property right to identify who is infringing that right and take the necessary steps, such as making an application for the provisional measures set out in Article 9(1) and (2) or for damages as provided for in Article 13 of Directive 2004/48, in order to protect that right. Without full knowledge of the extent of the infringement of his intellectual property right, the rightholder would not be in a position to determine or calculate precisely the damages he was entitled to by reason of the infringement.

29. The right to information which is intended to benefit the applicant in the context of proceedings concerning an infringement of his right to property thus seeks, in the field concerned, to apply and implement the fundamental right to an effective remedy guaranteed in Article 47 of the Charter, and thereby to ensure the effective exercise of the fundamental right to property, which includes the intellectual property right protected in Article 17(2) of the Charter. As noted by the Advocate General in point 31 of his Opinion, the first of those fundamental rights is a necessary instrument for the purpose of protecting the second.

37. That provision equally benefits both migrant workers resident in a host Member State and frontier workers employed in that Member State while residing in another Member State (Case C-213/05 Geven [2007] ECR I-6347, paragraph 15, and Case C-542/09 Commission v Netherlands [2012] ECR I-0000, paragraph 33).

76. In the present case, the prohibition on the use of the sales name "chocolate" under which cocoa and chocolate products containing vegetable fats other than cocoa butter are lawfully manufactured in the Member State of production may compel the traders concerned to adjust the presentation of their products according to the place where they are to be marketed and consequently to incur additional packaging costs. It is therefore liable to obstruct intra-Community trade (see, to that effect, Mars , paragraph 13, and Ruwet , paragraph 48, both cited above).

48 Although applicable to national and imported ciders without distinction, a national measure such as that in issue in the main proceedings is liable to hinder intra-Community trade inasmuch as it applies to prepackages having a nominal volume of 0.33 l, lawfully manufactured and marketed in other Member States. It may compel the traders concerned to adjust the presentation of their products according to the place where they are to be marketed and consequently to incur additional packaging costs. Such a prohibition therefore falls within the scope of Article 30 of the Treaty (see, to this effect, the judgment in Mars, cited above, paragraphs 13 and 14).

19 By these questions the national court asks whether the limitation of the effects in time of the Barber judgment also applies to the right to join an occupational pension scheme such as that in question in the main proceedings and whether in any event a limitation of the same kind should be laid down in the present case.

53 Furthermore, an implementing regulation must, if possible, be given an interpretation consistent with the basic regulation (Case C-90/92 Dr Tretter v Hauptzollamt Stuttgart-Ost [1993] ECR I-3569, paragraph 11; Case C-61/94 Commission v Germany [1996] ECR I-3989, paragraph 52). In this case, an analysis of Regulation No 1312/96 in the light of the provisions of Regulation No 2377/90, which constitutes its legal basis, confirms that those references must be regarded as merely declaratory, and not having, in themselves, the character of legislation.

52 When the wording of secondary Community legislation is open to more than one interpretation, preference should be given as far as possible to the interpretation which renders the provision consistent with the Treaty. Likewise, an implementing regulation must, if possible, be given an interpretation consistent with the basic regulation (see Case C-90/92 Dr Tretter v Hauptzollamt Stuttgart-Ost [1993] ECR I-3569, paragraph 11). Similarly, the primacy of international agreements concluded by the Community over provisions of secondary Community legislation means that such provisions must, so far as is possible, be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with those agreements.

41 It must be noted that the fourth subparagraph of Article 4(5) of the Sixth Directive, besides activities of bodies governed by public law which are not taxable by virtue of the first subparagraph of that provision, gives Member States the option of excluding bodies governed by public law from treatment as taxable persons in respect of activities exempt from VAT inter alia under Article 13 of that directive (see Case C-247/95 Finanzamt Augsburg-Stadt v Marktgemeinde Welden [1997] ECR I-779, paragraph 19).

35 Protocol No 2 which, by virtue of Article 239 of the Treaty, is an integral part of the Treaty is worded as follows: "For the purposes of Article 119 of this Treaty, benefits under occupational social security schemes shall not be considered as remuneration if and in so far as they are attributable to periods of employment prior to 17 May 1990, except in the case of workers or those claiming under them who have before that date initiated legal proceedings or introduced an equivalent claim under the applicable national law."

43 In the light of those provisions, the Member States and the parties concerned were reasonably entitled to consider that Article 119 did not apply to pensions paid under contracted-out schemes and that derogations from the principle of equality between men and women were still permitted in that sphere .

27. It must be added, however, that when exercising the powers thus vested in them, the Member States must comply with EU law and its general principles and, consequently, the principle of proportionality (see judgment in Rēdlihs , C‑263/11, EU:C:2012:497, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).

37. It follows from the wording of that note that the ‘specific function’ performed by a machine working with an automatic data-processing machine must be a function ‘other than data processing’ (see Olicom , paragraph 30).

30. Secondly, it follows from the wording of Note 5(E) to Chapter 84 of the CN that the ‘specific function’ performed by a machine working with an automatic data-processing machine must be a function ‘other than data-processing’. Since the combined cards are designed to transfer data between a number of computers and, in order to do so, render incoming external signals comprehensible to the computer and transform outgoing signals processed by it into signals usable externally, regardless of whether the signal received or emitted is analogue or digital, the function which they perform consists of data-processing. It follows that such cards do not perform a ‘specific function’ within the meaning of that note.

41. Whilst, as Article 6(3) TEU confirms, fundamental rights recognised by the ECHR constitute general principles of EU law and whilst Article 52(3) of the Charter requires rights contained in the Charter which correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR to be given the same meaning and scope as those laid down by the ECHR, the latter does not constitute, as long as the European Union has not acceded to it, a legal instrument which has been formally incorporated into EU law (see Schindler Holding and Others v Commission EU:C:2013:522, paragraph 32).

131. It is settled case-law that, in the context of proceedings under Article 226 EC, the existence of a failure to fulfil obligations must be assessed in the light of the European Union legislation in force at the close of the period prescribed by the Commission for the Member State concerned to comply with its reasoned opinion (see, inter alia, Case C‑365/97 Commission v Italy [1999] ECR I‑7773, paragraph 32; Case C‑275/04 Commission v Belgium [2006] ECR I‑9883, paragraph 34; and Case C‑270/07 Commission v Germany [2009] ECR I‑1983, paragraph 49).

49. It is the Court’s settled case-law in that regard that, in the context of proceedings under Article 226 EC, the existence of a failure to fulfil obligations must be assessed in the light of the Community legislation in force at the close of the period prescribed by the Commission for the Member State concerned to comply with its reasoned opinion (see, inter alia, Case C‑365/97 Commission v Italy [1999] ECR I-7773, paragraph 32, and Case C‑275/04 Commission v Belgium [2006] ECR I-9883, paragraph 34).

24 First of all, as stated in paragraph 20 of this judgment, the provisions of the Treaty relating to the free movement of goods may be applicable to slot machines, which constitute goods capable of being imported or exported. It is true that such machines are intended to be made available to the public for use in return for payment. However, as the Advocate General has stated in point 19 of his Opinion, the fact that an imported item is intended for the supply of a service does not in itself mean that it falls outside the rules regarding freedom of movement (see, to that effect, Case C-158/94 Commission v Italy [1997] ECR I-5789, paragraphs 15 to 20).

19. It must be recalled at the outset that the Sixth Directive confers a very wide scope of application on VAT, covering all economic activities of producers, traders and persons supplying services. However, Article 13 of that directive exempts from VAT certain activities of public interest (Article 13(A)) and other activities (Article 13(B)) (see Case C-253/07 Canterbury Hockey Club and Canterbury Ladies Hockey Club [2008] ECR I‑7821, paragraph 15, and Case C-473/08 Eulitz [2010] ECR I‑0000, point 24).

24. Next, it must be recalled that the Sixth Directive confers a very wide scope of application on VAT, covering all economic activities of producers, traders and persons supplying services. However, Article 13 of that directive exempts certain activities from VAT (see Case C-253/07 Canterbury Hockey Club and Others [2008] ECR I‑7821, paragraph 15).

9 Under the first paragraph of Article 10 EC, the Member States are to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the EC Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. Such action includes directives which, pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 249 EC, are binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which they are addressed. That obligation involves, for each Member State to which a directive is addressed, the adoption, within the framework of its national legal system, of all the measures necessary to ensure that the directive is fully effective, in accordance with the objective which it pursues (Case C-119/00 Commission v Luxembourg [2001] ECR I-4795, paragraph 12).

36. It follows from the case-law cited in paragraph 25 of this judgment that it is for the Court of Justice to ascertain whether the General Court, in its assessment of the facts and evidence, made an error of law by infringing general principles of law, such as the presumption of innocence and the applicable rules of evidence, such as those relating to the burden of proof and the taking of evidence (see, to that effect, Case C‑7/95 P Deere v Commission [1998] ECR I‑3111, paragraph 22; Case C‑8/95 P New Holland Ford v Commission [1998] ECR I‑3175, paragraph 26; Case C‑185/95 P Baustahlgewebe v Commission [1998] ERC I‑8417, paragraph 24; and Case C‑199/92 P Hüls v Commission [1999] ECR I‑4287, paragraph 65).

26 The Court of Justice thus has no jurisdiction to establish the facts or, in principle, to examine the evidence which the Court of First Instance accepted in support of those facts. Provided that the evidence has been properly obtained and the general principles of law and the rules of procedure in relation to the burden of proof and the taking of evidence have been observed, it is for the Court of First Instance alone to assess the value which should be attached to the evidence produced to it (see, in particular, the order in San Marco v Commission, cited above, paragraph 40). The appraisal by the Court of First Instance of the evidence put before it does not constitute, save where that evidence has been fundamentally distorted, a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice (judgment in Case C-53/92 P Hilti v Commission [1994] ECR I-667, paragraph 42).

68. As regards the controls provided for in Article 78‑2, fourth paragraph, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it must be observed that they are carried out not ‘at borders’ but within the national territory and they do not depend on movement across the border by the person checked. In particular, they are not carried out at the time when the border is crossed. Thus, those controls constitute not border checks prohibited under Article 20 of Regulation No 562/2006, but checks within the territory of a Member State, covered by Article 21 of that regulation.

10 That 60% rule was also held to be invalid by the Court on the ground of breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, since the application to producers covered by Article 3a of Regulation No 857/84 as amended of a reduction of 40% which, far from being representative of the rates applicable to the producers covered by Article 2, was more than double the highest total of such rates was to be regarded as a restriction which specifically affected the first-mentioned category of producers by very reason of their undertaking as to non-marketing or conversion (Case C-189/89 Spagl v Hauptzollamt Rosenheim [1990] ECR I-4539, paragraphs 24 and 29, and Case C-217/89 Pastaetter v Hauptzollamt Bad Reichenhall [1990] ECR I-4585, paragraphs 15 and 20).

20 It follows that the contested 60% rule detracts from the legitimate expectations which the producers concerned were entitled to entertain as to the limited nature of their undertakings . The contested provision must therefore be declared void for breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, and it is unnecessary therefore to consider the other arguments concerning its validity put forward in the course of the proceedings .

43. However, Article 13(2)(f), which was introduced into Regulation No 1408/71 following the judgment in Ten Holder , implies that a cessation of all occupational activity, regardless of whether it is temporary or definitive, places the person in question outside the scope of application of Article 13(2)(a). Article 13(2)(f) thus applies inter alia to a person who has ceased carrying on occupational activity in one Member State and has transferred his residence to another Member State (see Kuusijärvi , paragraphs 39 to 42 and 50).

26 Second, it should be borne in mind that the Court has consistently held that the rights which the three indents of Article 6(1) confer on Turkish workers in regard to employment necessarily imply the existence of a right of residence for the person concerned, since otherwise the right of access to the labour market and the right to work as an employed person would be deprived of all effect (Sevince, paragraph 29, Kus, paragraphs 29 and 30, and Bozkurt, paragraph 28).

28 Where those conditions are satisfied, Article 6(1) of Decision No 1/80, which grants Turkish workers the right, after specified periods of legal employment, to continue working for the same employer or in the same occupation for an employer of his choice, or to enjoy free access to any paid employment of his choice, necessarily implies the existence of a right of residence for the person concerned, since otherwise the right of access to the labour force and the right to work as an employed person would be deprived of all effect (see, to that effect, the judgments in Sevince, cited above, paragraph 29, and Case C-237/91 Kus v Landeshauptstadt Wiesbaden [1992] ECR I-6781, paragraphs 29 and 30).

44. Next, it should be noted that, where a national authority adopts measures which fall within the scope of EU law, those measures must comply with the general principles of that law such as, inter alia, the principle of proportionality which requires that those measures be appropriate for attaining the objective pursued and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it (see, inter alia, to that effect, judgment in ABNA and Others , C‑453/03, C‑11/04, C‑12/04 and C‑194/04, EU:C:2005:741, paragraph 68).

34 As to the second ground of inadmissibility, it need merely be recalled that, even when there is case-law of the Court resolving the point of law at issue, national courts remain entirely at liberty to bring a matter before the Court if they consider it appropriate to do so, and the fact that the provisions whose interpretation is sought have already been interpreted by the Court does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction to give a further ruling (judgment of 17 July 2014, Torresi, C‑58/13 and C‑59/13, EU:C:2014:2088, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).

32. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, even when there is case-law of the Court resolving the point of law at issue, national courts and tribunals remain entirely at liberty to bring a matter before the Court if they consider it appropriate to do so (see the judgment in Cilfit and Others , 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraphs 13 to 15), and the fact that the provisions whose interpretation is sought have already been interpreted by the Court does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction to give a further ruling (see, to that effect, the judgment in Boxus and Others , C‑128/09 to C‑131/09, C‑134/09 and C‑135/09, EU:C:2011:667, paragraph 32).

31 As appears from paragraphs 41, 42 and 43 of Francovich and Others, cited above, subject to the right to reparation which flows directly from Community law where the three conditions referred to above are satisfied, the State must make reparation in accordance with its domestic law on liability for the consequences of the loss and damage caused. However, the conditions for reparation of loss and damage laid down by domestic law must not be less favourable than those relating to similar domestic claims and must not be such as in practice to make it impossible or excessively difficult to obtain reparation (see also the judgment in Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, cited above, paragraph 67).

17 In the absence of Community rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from the direct effect of Community law. However, such rules must not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions nor render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (see, in particular, the judgments in Case 33/76 Rewe v Landwirtschaftskammer fuer das Saarland [1976] ECR 1989, paragraph 5, Case 45/76 Comet v Produktschap voor Siergewassen [1976] ECR 2043, paragraphs 12 to 16, Case 68/79 Hans Just v Danish Ministry for Fiscal Affairs [1980] ECR 501, paragraph 25, Case 199/82 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v San Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595, paragraph 14, Joined Cases 331/85, 376/85 and 378/85 Bianco and Girard v Directeur Général des Douanes des Droits Indirects [1988] ECR 1099, paragraph 12, Case 104/86 Commission v Italy [1988] ECR 1799, paragraph 7, Joined Cases 123/87 and 330/87 Jeunehomme and EGI v Belgian State [1988] ECR 4517, paragraph 17, Case C-96/91 Commission v Spain [1992] ECR I-3789, paragraph 12, and Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Others v Italian Republic [1991] ECR I-5357, paragraph 43).

14 ON THE OTHER HAND , ANY REQUIREMENT OF PROOF WHICH HAS THE EFFECT OF MAKING IT VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE OR EXCESSIVELY DIFFICULT TO SECURE THE REPAYMENT OF CHARGES LEVIED CONTRARY TO COMMUNITY LAW WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH COMMUNITY LAW . THAT IS SO PARTICULARLY IN THE CASE OF PRESUMPTIONS OR RULES OF EVIDENCE INTENDED TO PLACE UPON THE TAXPAYER THE BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING THAT THE CHARGES UNDULY PAID HAVE NOT BEEN PASSED ON TO OTHER PERSONS OR OF SPECIAL LIMITATIONS CONCERNING THE FORM OF THE EVIDENCE TO BE ADDUCED , SUCH AS THE EXCLUSION OF ANY KIND OF EVIDENCE OTHER THAN DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE . ONCE IT IS ESTABLISHED THAT THE LEVYING OF THE CHARGE IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH COMMUNITY LAW , THE COURT MUST BE FREE TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT THE BURDEN OF THE CHARGE HAS BEEN PASSED ON , WHOLLY OR IN PART , TO OTHER PERSONS .

54 It is also settled case-law that the special nature of certain services does not remove them from the ambit of the fundamental principle of freedom of movement (Case 279/80 Webb [1981] ECR 3305, paragraph 10, and Kohll, paragraph 20), so that the fact that the national rules at issue in the main proceedings are social security rules cannot exclude application of Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty (Kohll, paragraph 21).

12 As the Court held in Case 43/75 Defrenne II [1976] ECR 455, paragraph 12, that principle, which is a particular expression of the general principle of equality which prohibits comparable situations from being treated differently unless the difference is objectively justified, forms part of the foundations of the Community (see Case C-381/99 Brunnhofer [2001] ECR I-4961, paragraph 28).

12 THIS DOUBLE AIM , WHICH IS AT ONCE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL , SHOWS THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL PAY FORMS PART OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMUNITY .

63. Such considerations are also valid as regards the application of a 20-year limitation period laid down in a provision of the Civil Code with a view to bringing proceedings in respect of an irregularity, within the meaning of Article 1 of Regulation No 2988/95. In any event, if a four-year limitation period were to appear, from the national authorities’ point of view, too short to enable them to bring proceedings in respect of irregularities displaying a certain complexity, it would always be open to the national legislature, within the framework of the possibility provided for in Article 3(3), to adopt a longer limitation rule such as Article 40 of Decree-Law No 155/92 (see, to that effect, judgment in Ze Fu Fleischhandel and Vion Trading , EU:C:2011:282, paragraph 46).

22. As the Court has already held, it follows that, pursuant to the first sentence of Article 93(3) of the Treaty, plans to grant or alter aid must be notified to the Commission before they are implemented (see, inter alia, Case C-367/95 P Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France [1998] ECR I‑1719, paragraph 35; Case C-295/97 Piaggio [1999] ECR I‑3735, paragraph 44; and Case C-278/00 Greece v Commission [2004] ECR I-3997, paragraph 30).

30. In that regard, it should be pointed out that, under the first sentence of Article 88(3) EC, plans to introduce or alter aid measures must be notified to the Commission before they are implemented. The Commission then conducts an initial review of the planned aid. If at the end of that review it considers a plan to be incompatible with the common market, it must without delay initiate the consultative examination procedure under Article 88(2) EC.

49 In addition, since the General Court correctly held, as is apparent from paragraphs 40 to 44 above, that the Implementing Measures were not applicable in the present case, the Court must also find that, in so far as the third and fourth parts of the appellant’s first ground of appeal allege misinterpretation of the relationship between Articles 68 and 72 of the Implementing Measures, as well as distortion of the sense of the letter of 27 June 2013, which, according to the appellant, should have been considered to be a complaint within the meaning of Article 72, those parts of the first ground of appeal are directed against reasons included in the judgment under appeal purely for the sake of completeness and cannot, according to the settled case-law of the Court, lead to that judgment being set aside (see judgments of 21 December 2011 in France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, C‑27/09 P, EU:C:2011:853, paragraph 79, and 13 February 2014 in Hungary v Commission, C‑31/13 P, EU:C:2014:70, paragraph 82).

17 In this respect, it should be pointed out that, as the Court stated in its judgment in Case 252/85 Commission v France [1988] ECR 2243, paragraph 15, the importance of complete and effective protection of wild birds throughout the Community, irrespective of the areas they stay in or pass through, causes any national legislation which delimits the protection of wild birds by reference to the concept of national heritage to be incompatible with the Directive.

15 A CET EGARD, IL CONVIENT DE RAPPELER, AINSI QUE LA COUR L' A SOULIGNE DANS SON ARRET DU 8 JUILLET 1987 ( COMMISSION/ITALIE, 262/85, REC . P . 3073 ), QUE, COMME L' INDIQUE LE TROISIEME CONSIDERANT DE LA DIRECTIVE, LA PROTECTION DES ESPECES MIGRATRICES REVET LE CARACTERE D' UN PROBLEME D' ENVIRONNEMENT TYPIQUEMENT TRANSFRONTALIER QUI IMPLIQUE DES RESPONSABILITES COMMUNES DES ETATS MEMBRES . EN EFFET, L' IMPORTANCE D' UNE PROTECTION COMPLETE ET EFFICACE DES OISEAUX SAUVAGES A L' INTERIEUR DE TOUTE LA COMMUNAUTE, QUEL QUE SOIT LEUR LIEU DE SEJOUR OU ESPACE DE PASSAGE, REND INCOMPATIBLE AVEC LA DIRECTIVE TOUTE LEGISLATION NATIONALE QUI DETERMINE LA PROTECTION DES OISEAUX SAUVAGES EN FONCTION DE LA NOTION DU PATRIMOINE NATIONAL .

45 In that regard, in so far as the requests for a preliminary ruling concern the compatibility of the requirements in question with the provisions of the TFEU on freedom to provide services, it should be observed that they are not applicable in a situation all the elements of which are confined within a single Member State (see, to that effect, order of 12 May 2016, Security Service and Others, C‑692/15 to C‑694/15, EU:C:2016:344, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited, and judgment of 15 November 2016, Ullens de Schooten, C‑268/15, EU:C:2016:874, paragraph 47).

19 However, although the Court has held, in Joined Cases C-358/93 and C-416/93 Bordessa and Others [1995] ECR I-361 and in Sanz de Lera and Others, which concerned the exportation of currency, that systems of prior authorisation were not, in the circumstances particular to those cases, necessary in order to enable the national authorities to carry out checks designed to prevent infringements of their laws and regulations and that such systems consequently constituted restrictions contrary to Article 73b of the Treaty, it has not held that a system of prior authorisation can never be justified, particularly where such authorisation is in fact necessary for the protection of public policy or public security (see judgment of 1 June 1999 in Case C-302/97 Konle v Austria [1999] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 45 and 46).

46 A procedure simply involving a declaration does not, therefore, in itself enable the aim pursued to be achieved in the context of a procedure for prior authorisation. In order to ensure that the land is used in accordance with its intended purpose, as it appears from the national legislation in force, Member States must also be able to take measures where a breach of the agreed declaration is duly established after the property has been acquired.

30 In order to determine whether a user is making a communication to the public within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29 it is necessary to take into account several complementary criteria, which are not autonomous and are interdependent. Consequently, those criteria must be applied both individually and in their interaction with one another, since they may, in different situations, be present to widely varying degrees (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 March 2012, SCF, C‑135/10, EU:C:2012:140, paragraphs 78 and 79; of 15 March 2012, Phonographic Performance (Ireland), C‑162/10, EU:C:2012:141, paragraph 30; and of 8 September 2016, GS Media, C‑160/15, EU:C:2016:644, paragraph 34).

53. Even if those benefits did fall within the field of social security, as the Greek Government submits, that is not sufficient to preclude application of Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty (see to that effect, inter alia , Case C-157/99 Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-5473, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited therein).

54 It is also settled case-law that the special nature of certain services does not remove them from the ambit of the fundamental principle of freedom of movement (Case 279/80 Webb [1981] ECR 3305, paragraph 10, and Kohll, paragraph 20), so that the fact that the national rules at issue in the main proceedings are social security rules cannot exclude application of Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty (Kohll, paragraph 21).

Or, il y a lieu de rappeler que, conformément à l’article 256, paragraphe 1, TFUE et à l’article 58, premier alinéa, du statut de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, le pourvoi est limité aux questions de droit. Le Tribunal est seul compétent pour constater et apprécier les faits pertinents ainsi que pour apprécier les éléments de preuve. L’appréciation de ces faits et éléments de preuve ne constitue donc pas, sous réserve du cas de leur dénaturation, une question de droit soumise, comme telle, au contrôle de la Cour dans le cadre d’un pourvoi (arrêt du 9 octobre 2014, ICF/Commission, C‑467/13 P, non publié, EU:C:2014:2274, point 26).

34. At paragraphs 39 to 51 of that judgment, the Court considered whether the old Federal Law on the remuneration of civil servants engendered discrimination within the meaning of Articles 2 and 6(1) of Directive 2000/78 and concluded that it did, on the ground that the allocation of a basic pay step to civil servants upon recruitment according to their age went beyond what was necessary to attain the legitimate aim pursued by that law.

80. In those circumstances, it must be held that the domestic legislature did not exceed the limits of its discretion by taking the view that it was neither realistic nor desirable to apply the new classification system retroactively to all established civil servants or to apply a transitional system guaranteeing an established civil servant and in a favoured position the same level of pay as he received previously until he has gained the experience required to qualify for higher pay under the new scheme.

108. Accordingly, it is not necessary to consider whether, as the Belgian Government contends, those provisions of Article 17 of the fertiliser decree correctly give effect to the obligations deriving from Annex III to the Directive. As the Court has held on numerous occasions, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion, and subsequent changes cannot be taken into account by the Court (see, in particular, Case C‑384/97 Commission v Greece [2000] ECR I-3823, paragraph 35).

33. However, according to settled case-law of the Court, where national legislation falling within an area which has not been harmonised at Community level is applicable without distinction to all persons and undertakings operating in the territory of the Member State concerned, it may, notwithstanding its restrictive effect on the freedom to provide services, be justified where it meets overriding requirements relating to the public interest in so far as that interest is not already safeguarded by the rules to which the service provider is subject in the Member State in which he is established and in so far as it is appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (see Säger , paragraph 15; Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-376/96 Arblade and Others [1999] ECR I-8453, paragraphs 34 and 35; Case C‑164/99 Portugaia Construções [2002] ECR I‑787, paragraph 19; Case C‑279/00 Commission v Italy , paragraph 33; Case C‑445/03 Commission v Luxembourg [2004] ECR I‑10191, paragraph 21; and Commission v Germany , paragraph 31).

31. However, where national legislation falling within an area which has not been harmonised at Community level is applicable without distinction to all persons and undertakings operating in the territory of the Member State concerned, it may, notwithstanding its restrictive effect on the freedom to provide services, be justified where it meets an overriding requirement relating to the public interest and that interest is not already safeguarded by the rules to which the service provider is subject in the Member State in which he is established and in so far as it is appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (see Joined Cases C‑369/96 and C‑376/96 Arblade and Others [1999] ECR I-8453, paragraphs 34 and 35, and Portugaia Construções , paragraph 19).

61 As has already been held with regard to Article 14 of that directive, which establishes a list of requirements that are ‘prohibited’ within the framework of the exercise of freedom of establishment, the Court considers that Articles 9 to 13 of Directive 2006/123 provide for exhaustive harmonisation concerning the services falling within their scope (see, by analogy, judgment of 16 June 2015 in Rina Services and Others, C‑593/13, EU:C:2015:399, paragraphs 37 and 38).

55. The as-efficient-competitor test has been specifically applied by the Court to low-pricing practices in the form of selective prices or predatory prices (see, in respect of selective prices, judgment in Post Danmark , C‑209/10, EU:C:2012:172, paragraphs 28 to 35, and in respect of predatory prices, judgments in AKZO v Commission , C‑62/86, EU:C:1991:286, paragraphs 70 to 73, and France Télécom v Commission , C‑202/07 P, EU:C:2009:214, paragraphs 107 and 108), and margin squeeze (judgment in TeliaSonera Sverige , C‑52/09, EU:C:2011:83, paragraphs 40 to 46).

35. When that estimation was completed, it was found, among other things, that the price offered to the Coop group did not enable Post Danmark to cover the average total costs attributed to the activity of unaddressed mail distribution taken as a whole, but did enable it to cover the average incremental costs pertaining to that activity, as estimated by the Danish competition authorities.

85 That said, it is necessary to answer the third question in so far as it is clear from the order for reference that, in the present case, Protect’s action was dismissed by the court of first instance precisely because it had lost the status of party to the procedure pursuant to the time-barring rule set out in Paragraph 42 of the AVG, from which it follows that the question is not manifestly hypothetical within the meaning of the settled case-law of the Court (see, inter alia, judgment of 12 October 2017, Kubicka, C‑218/16, EU:C:2017:755, paragraphs 30 and 31).

26 Whilst it is true that Article 86 concerns undertakings and may be applied within the limits laid down by Article 90(2) to public undertakings or undertakings vested with exclusive rights or specific rights, the fact nevertheless remains that the Treaty requires the Member States not to take or maintain in force measures which could destroy the effectiveness of that provision (see judgment in Case 13/77 Inno [1977] ECR 2115, paragraphs 31 and 32). Article 90(1) in fact provides that the Member States are not to enact or maintain in force, in the case of public undertakings and the undertakings to which they grant special or exclusive rights, any measure contrary to the rules contained in the Treaty, in particular those provided for in Articles 85 to 94.

56. In that connection, the Court has held that the fact that national legislation does not guarantee an insured person who has been authorised to receive hospital care in another Member State, in accordance with Article 22(1)(c) of Regulation No 1408/71, a level of insurance cover equivalent to that to which he would have been entitled had he received hospital treatment in the Member State of affiliation is a restriction of the freedom to provide services, for the purposes of Article 49 EC, in that it may deter, or even prevent, that person from applying to providers of services established in other Member States (see, to that effect, Vanbraekel and Others , paragraph 45). The Court stated, with regard to national legislation under which hospital care was to be free of charge if provided within the national health service, that such a level of cover corresponds to the cost, in the system of the Member State of affiliation, of care equivalent to that provided to the insured person in the Member State of stay (see, to that effect, Watts , paragraphs 131 and 133).

28 Thus, the Court has repeatedly classified measures which have the effect of causing workers, as a consequence of the exercise of their right to freedom of movement, to lose the social security advantages afforded them by the legislation of one Member State as obstacles, especially where those advantages represent the counterpart of contributions which they have paid (see judgments of 21 October 1975, Petroni, EU:C:1975:129, paragraph 13; of 1 April 2008, Government of the French Community and Walloon Government, C‑212/06, EU:C:2008:178, paragraph 46; and of 18 April 2013, Mulders, C‑548/11, EU:C:2013:249, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).

46. In the light of those principles, measures which have the effect of causing workers to lose, as a consequence of the exercise of their right to freedom of movement, social security advantages guaranteed them by the legislation of a Member State have in particular been classed as obstacles (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C‑45/92 and C‑46/92 Lepore and Scamuffa [1993] ECR I‑6497, paragraph 21; Case C‑165/91 van Munster [1994] ECR I‑4661, paragraph 27, and Hosse , paragraph 24).

103. The Court has held in that connection that restrictive practices are viewed differently by European Union law and national law. Whilst Articles 101 TFEU and 102 TFEU view them in the light of the obstacles which may result for trade between the Member States, each body of national legislation proceeds on the basis of considerations peculiar to it and considers restrictive practices solely in that context (see, to that effect, Case C-67/91 Asociación Española de Banca Privada and Others [1992] ECR I-4785, paragraph 11).

100 That provision lays down a precise obligation to produce a specific result, which may be relied on by an individual to apply to a national court to set aside the provisions at the origin of an obstacle to the free movement of capital or to apply, in its regard, the rules whose non-application is at the origin of that obstacle to the free movement of capital, without any further implementing measures being required for that purpose (see, by analogy, judgments of 27 September 2001, Kondova, C‑235/99, EU:C:2001:489, paragraph 34, and of 27 September 2001, Barkoci and Malik, C‑257/99, EU:C:2001:491, paragraph 34).

34 This rule of equal treatment lays down a precise obligation to produce a specific result and, by its nature, can be relied on by an individual before a national court to request it to set aside the discriminatory provisions of the legislation of a Member State making the establishment of a Czech national subject to a condition which is not imposed on that Member State's own nationals, without any further implementing measures being required for that purpose (see, to that effect, Sürül, cited above, paragraph 63).

53. Second, UNCLOS was signed by the Community and approved by Decision 98/392, thereby binding the Community, and the provisions of that Convention accordingly form an integral part of the Community legal order (see Case C‑459/03 Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR I‑4635, paragraph 82).

31 The residence obligation imposed on both managers and staff of security firms and internal security services, save for administrative and logistical staff, constitutes a restriction on both the freedom of establishment (see Commission v Spain, cited above, paragraph 44) and the free movement of workers (see Case C-350/96 Clean Car Autoservice v Landeshauptmann von Wien [1998] ECR I-2521, paragraphs 27 to 30).

44 The rule according to which directors and managers of all security undertakings must reside in Spain constitutes an obstacle to freedom of establishment (see, in this regard, Case C-221/89 Factortame [1991] ECR I-3905, paragraph 32) and to the freedom to provide services.

25. In the case of a contract for the supply of services, the fact that the supplier is not remunerated directly by the contracting authority, but is entitled to collect payment from third parties, meets the requirement of consideration laid down in Article 1(4) of Directive 2004/18 (see Eurawasser , paragraph 57).

33 The Court has, moreover, specified that the concept of ‘communication to the public’ requires an individual assessment (see judgment of 15 March 2012, Phonographic Performance (Ireland), C‑162/10, EU:C:2012:141, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited, relating to the concept of ‘communication to the public’, for the purposes of Article 8(2) of Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property (OJ 2006 L 376, p. 28), it having the same scope in that directive as in Directive 2001/29 (see, to that effect, judgment of 31 May 2016, Reha Training, C‑117/15, EU:C:2016:379, paragraph 33)).

29. As regards the concept of ‘communication to the public’ within the meaning of Article 8(2) of Directive 92/100, codified by Directive 2006/115, the Court held in Case C-135/10 SCF [2012] ECR I-0000, paragraph 76, that it requires an individual assessment. The same applies as regards the identity of the user and the question of the use of the phonogram at issue ( SCF , paragraph 78).

45. The onus is on the Commission, within the framework of its discretion to adopt the measures required for the implementation of the Community Customs Code, and in particular those relating to the origin of goods, to adopt provisions of a general nature which, with a view to ensuring legal certainty, take into account the overall situation of an industrial sector on a long-term basis and which, consequently, will not be called into question by the specific situation at a given time of one particular undertaking within that sector ( Thomson and Vestel , paragraph 36).

25. According to settled case-law, the purpose of Directive 89/105, according to Article 1 thereof, is to ensure that any national measure to control the prices of medicinal products for human use or to restrict the range of medicinal products covered by their national sickness insurance systems complies with the requirements of that directive (see, to that effect, Case C-424/99 Commission v Austria [2001] ECR I-9285, paragraph 30, and Commission v Finland , paragraph 37).

30 That interpretation is, moreover, corroborated by the purpose of the directive which, under Article 1 thereof, is to ensure that any national measure to control the prices of medicinal products for human use or to restrict the range of medicinal products covered by their national health insurance systems complies with the requirements of the directive.

52. Even supposing that this last argument put forward by OTE seeks to assert a legitimate aim falling within policy on economic development and job creation, it nevertheless constitutes a mere generalisation insufficient to show that the aim of the measures at issue is unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex (see, to this effect, Case C-167/97 Seymour-Smith and Perez [1999] ECR I-623, paragraph 76).

34. As the referring court points out, it is for it to assess the facts which are placed before it and to determine whether action constituting an abusive practice has taken place in the case before it. The Court, when giving a preliminary ruling, may however provide clarification designed to give the referring court guidance in its interpretation (see inter alia, to this effect, judgments in Halifax and Others , C‑255/02, EU:C:2006:121, paragraphs 76 and 77, and Part Service , C‑425/06, EU:C:2008:108, paragraphs 54 to 56).

77. However, the Court, when giving a preliminary ruling, may, where appropriate, provide clarification designed to give the national court guidance in its interpretation (see, in particular, Case C-79/01 Payroll and Others [2002] ECR I-8923, paragraph 29).

40 The Member States are, therefore, free to set the objectives of their policy on betting and gaming and, where appropriate, to define in detail the level of protection sought. However, the restrictive measures that the Member States impose must satisfy the conditions laid down in the case-law of the Court as regards, inter alia, their justification by overriding reasons in the general interest and their proportionality (judgment of 8 September 2016, Politanò, C‑225/15, EU:C:2016:645, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).

67. In this connection, in the context of an order for reference concerning the interpretation of a provision of Community law, the Court may, exceptionally, in application of the general principle of legal certainty inherent in the Community legal order, decide to restrict for any person concerned the right to rely upon a provision, which it has interpreted, with a view to calling in question legal relations established in good faith (see, in particular, Case 43/75 ‘ Defrenne II ’ [1976] ECR 455, paragraphs 72 to 75, and Case C-292/04 Meilicke and Others [2007] ECR I-1835, paragraph 35.

35. It is only exceptionally that, in application of a general principle of legal certainty which is inherent in the Community legal order, the Court may decide to restrict the right to rely upon a provision, which it has interpreted, with a view to calling in question legal relations established in good faith (see, in particular, Case C-104/98 Buchner and Others [2000] ECR I-3625, paragraph 39, and Linneweber and Akritidis , cited above, paragraph 42).

58. Furthermore, although the essential purpose of Directive 65/65 is to remove obstacles to trade in medicinal products within the Community and although for that purpose Article 1 gives a definition of medicinal products, it nevertheless constitutes merely a first stage in the harmonisation of national legislation on the production and distribution of pharmaceutical products (see, in particular, Commission v Germany , paragraph 15).