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53. On this point, it should be recalled that the Court has indeed held that the need to preserve the coherence of a tax system may justify a restriction on the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty. However, for such a justification to be accepted, a direct link has to be established between the granting of the tax advantage concerned and the offsetting of that advantage by a particular tax charge (see Manninen , paragraph 42, and Case C‑182/08 Glaxo Wellcome [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 77 and 78). | 77. With regard, first, to the argument concerning the need to preserve the coherence of the German tax system, it should be recalled that the Court has already accepted that the need to preserve the coherence of a tax system may justify a restriction on the exercise of the freedoms of movement guaranteed by the Treaty (Case C-204/90 Bachmann [1992] ECR I-249, paragraph 28; Manninen , paragraph 42; and Case C-418/07 Papillon [2008] ECR I-0000, paragraph 43). | 66. S’agissant des conséquences à tirer du constat d’une irrégularité résultant d’une telle pratique abusive, l’article 4, paragraphe 3, du règlement n o 2988/95, dont la portée est générale, énonce que «[l]es actes pour lesquels il est établi qu’ils ont pour but d’obtenir un avantage contraire aux objectifs du droit communautaire applicable en l’espèce, en créant artificiellement les conditions requises pour l’obtention de cet avantage, ont pour conséquence, selon le cas, soit la non-obtention de l’avantage, soit son retrait» (arrêt du 4 juin 2009, Pometon, C‑158/08, Rec. p. I‑4695, point 27). |
54. As regards whether, in the circumstances of the main action, the petroleum undertaking supplying the service station can be considered to be the producer or holder of waste within the meaning of Article 1(b) and (c) of the Directive, under the division of functions provided for by Article 234 EC it is for the national court to apply to the individual case before it the rules of Community law as interpreted by the Court (Case C-320/88 Shipping and Forwarding Enterprise Safe [1990] ECR I‑285, paragraph 11). | 11 By referring in the second question to the four elements thus defined, the national court is in reality asking the Court to apply Article 5(1 ) of the Sixth Directive to the contract at issue in the main proceedings . Under the division of functions provided for by Article 177 of the Treaty, however, it is for the national court to apply the rules of Community law, as interpreted by the Court, to an individual case . No such application is possible without a comprehensive appraisal of the facts of the case . | 31
Once the presumption of actual exercise of decisive influence is established, it is solely for the parent company holding all or almost all of the capital of its subsidiary to rebut it. |
34. On the other hand, the term ‘employee’ for the purpose of EU law must itself be defined according to objective criteria that characterise the employment relationship, taking into consideration the rights and responsibilities of the persons concerned. In that connection, it is settled case-law that the essential feature of that relationship is that for a certain period of time one person performs services for and under the direction of another person in return for which he receives remuneration (see judgments in N ., C‑46/12, EU:C:2013:97, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited, and Haralambidis , C‑270/13, EU:C:2014:2185, paragraph 28). | 40. Moreover, that concept must be defined in accordance with objective criteria which distinguish the employment relationship by reference to the rights and duties of the persons concerned. The essential feature of an employment relationship is that, for a certain period of time, a person performs services for and under the direction of another person, in return for which he receives remuneration (see Lawrie-Blum , paragraph 17; Ninni-Orasche , paragraph 24; and also Vatsouras and Kouptantze , paragraph 26). | 53 On that point, it cannot be demanded that it be demonstrated, on the basis of a precise inquiry, that in the particular case the public authorities specifically incited the public undertaking to take the aid measures in question. In the first place, having regard to the fact that relations between the State and public undertakings are close, there is a real risk that State aid may be granted through the intermediary of those undertakings in a non-transparent way and in breach of the rules on State aid laid down by the Treaty. |
16 As regards the latter condition, it is the way in which the activities are carried out that determines the scope of the treatment of public bodies as non-taxable persons (Joined Cases 231/87 and 129/88 Ufficio Distrettuale delle Imposte Dirette di Fiorenzuola d'Arda and Others v Comune di Carpaneto Piacentino and Others [1989] ECR 3233, paragraph 15, and Case C-4/89 Comune di Carpaneto Piacentino and Others v Ufficio Provinciale Imposta sul Valore Aggiunto di Piacenza [1990] ECR I-1869, paragraph 10). | 10 According to the judgment of 17 October 1989 in Joined Cases 231/87 and 129/88, cited above, paragraph 15, it is the manner in which the activities are carried out that determines the scope of the treatment of public bodies as non-taxable persons . In so far as that provision makes such treatment of bodies governed by public law conditional upon their acting "as public authorities", it excludes therefrom activities engaged in by them as bodies governed not by public law but by private law . Consequently, the only criterion making it possible to distinguish with certainty between those two categories of activity is the legal regime applicable under national law . | 13
By a decision of 20 December 2013, notified to the consortium, the latter was excluded from the tendering procedure because the original of the proof of a bank guarantee had not been submitted in good time. |
34 As regards the first requirement, it is apparent from paragraph 40 of the Konle judgment, cited above, that restrictions on the establishment of secondary residences in a specific geographical area, which a Member State imposes in order to maintain, for regional planning purposes, a permanent population and an economic activity independent of the tourist sector, may be regarded as contributing to an objective in the public interest. That finding can only be strengthened by the other concerns which may underly those same measures, such as protection of the environment. Moreover, it is apparent from the provisions of the SGVG that they do not discriminate between Austrian acquirers of title and persons resident in other Member States who exercise the freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty. | 40 In that regard, to the extent that a Member State can justify its requirement of prior authorisation by relying on a town and country planning objective such as maintaining, in the general interest, a permanent population and an economic activity independent of the tourist sector in certain regions, the restrictive measure inherent in such a requirement can be accepted only if it is not applied in a discriminatory manner and if the same result cannot be achieved by other less restrictive procedures. | 18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts. |
30 It is true that, according to the case-law of the Court, Member States may, for the purpose of ensuring fair trading and the protection of consumers, require the persons concerned to alter the description of a foodstuff where a product offered for sale under a particular name is so different, in terms of its composition or production, from the products generally understood as falling within that description within the Community that it cannot be regarded as falling within the same category (Case C-366/98 Geffroy [2000] ECR I-6579, paragraph 22). | 22 The Court has, however, not excluded the possibility that Member States might require producers or vendors to alter the description of a foodstuff where a product offered for sale under a particular name is so different, in terms of its composition or production, from the products generally understood as falling within that description within the Community that it cannot be regarded as falling within the same category (Case 286/86 Ministère Public v Deserbais [1988] ECR 4907, paragraph 13; Commission v France, cited above, paragraph 23). | 72. It is true, as Nuova Agricast claims, that the original application and the amended application both sought to obtain funding in respect of the same project and that the reformulation could not relate to the essential elements of the project but only to the elements taken into account by the indicators, which served to establish the ranking of the application in the list drawn up under the invitation to apply under which it was lodged. |
61. Therefore, for the purposes of this judgment, the Court must, first, refer to paragraphs 46 to 69 and paragraph 71 of the judgment in Schulin. Second, as to Article 4(3) of Regulation No 1768/95, which STV relies on in support of its interpretation of Article 8(2) of that regulation, it is sufficient to note that Article 4(3) does not impose any additional obligations on farmers but quite simply lays down rules for the purpose of determining who is required to comply with the farmer’s obligations deriving from Article 14 of Regulation No 2100/94. | 71. In any event, a farmer who does not pay equitable remuneration to the holder when he uses the product of the harvest obtained by planting propagating material from a protected variety, cannot rely on Article 14(1) of Regulation No 2100/94 and, therefore, must be considered to have undertaken, without being authorised, one of the acts referred to in Article 13(2) of that regulation. Accordingly, it is clear from Article 94 of that regulation that such a farmer can have an action brought against him by the holder for an injunction in respect of the infringement or for payment of equitable remuneration or both. If the infringement is intentional or negligent, the farmer is also obliged to pay damages to make good the loss suffered by the holder. | 65. To this end, clause 5 imposes on Member States the obligation to introduce into domestic law one or more of the measures listed in clause 5(1)(a) to (c) where equivalent legal provisions intended to prevent effectively the misuse of successive fixed-term employment contracts do not already exist in the Member State concerned. |
32
That principle is not a rule of primary law which can condition the validity of a reduced rate, but a principle of interpretation, to be applied concurrently with the principle of strict interpretation of reduced rates (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 July 2012, Deutsche Bank, C‑44/11, EU:C:2012:484, paragraph 45). | 45. Lastly, it must be stated that that conclusion is not called into question by the principle of fiscal neutrality. As the Advocate General stated at point 60 of her Opinion, that principle cannot extend the scope of an exemption in the absence of clear wording to that effect. That principle is not a rule of primary law which can condition the validity of an exemption, but a principle of interpretation, to be applied concurrently with the principle of strict interpretation of exemptions. | 30. Thus, in the case of successive sales, the prices relating to sales made after export, but before release into free circulation in the Community, may be taken into account for the purpose of determining the ‘transaction value’ within the meaning of Article 29(1) of the Community Customs Code (see, by analogy, Unifert , paragraph 13). |
40
In this regard, it is necessary to establish, in accordance with the case-law of the Court, the obligation which characterises the contract (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 July 2016, Granarolo, C‑196/15, EU:C:2016:559, paragraph 33). | 33
The Court has also held that, for the purposes of identifying the court with jurisdiction in relation to contracts for the sale of goods or for the provision of services, Article 5(1) of the Brussels I Regulation adopts as a connecting factor the obligation which characterises the contract in question (judgment of 25 February 2010 in Car Trim, C‑381/08, EU:C:2010:90, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited). | 59. Dès lors que l’article 91, paragraphe 12, du règlement n° 1623/2000 ne reflète pas un changement d’appréciation du législateur de l’Union quant au caractère adéquat du régime de sanction qui avait été spécifiquement défini à l’article 5 du règlement n° 360/95 en lien avec la vente de deux lots déterminés d’alcool, le principe d’application rétroactive de la sanction la moins sévère, tel qu’énoncé à l’article 2, paragraphe 2, du règlement n° 2988/95, ne saurait être utilement invoqué (voir, en ce sens, arrêt Jager, précité, point 70). |
35. By providing that certain interest paid by a resident company to a company established in a non-member country, with which it has special relations, is not to be deductible for the purposes of determining the taxable profit of that resident company, rules such as those at issue in the main proceedings are capable of preventing practices the sole purpose of which is to avoid the tax that would normally be payable on profits generated by activities undertaken in the national territory. It follows that such rules are an appropriate means of attaining the objective of combatting tax evasion and avoidance (see, by analogy, Case C‑524/04 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation , paragraph 77). | 77. By providing that that interest is to be treated as a distribution, such legislation is able to prevent practices the sole purpose of which is to avoid the tax that would normally be payable on profits generated by activities undertaken in the national territory. It follows that such legislation is an appropriate means of attaining the objective underlying its adoption. | La Cour a précisé qu’une dégradation de l’environnement est inhérente à la présence de déchets dans une décharge, quelle que soit la nature des déchets en cause (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 10 juin 2010, Commission/Portugal, C‑37/09, non publié, EU:C:2010:331, point 37 et jurisprudence citée). |
51
That said, according to case-law, when new elements change the perception of a risk or show that that risk can be contained by less restrictive measures than the existing measures, it is for the institutions and in particular the Commission, which has the power of legislative initiative, to bring about an amendment to the rules in the light of the new information (judgment of 12 January 2006, Agrarproduktion Staebelow, C‑504/04, EU:C:2006:30, paragraph 40). Accordingly, in the present case, it is for the Commission, under Article 16(3) of Directive 2000/29, to assess periodically, as has already been stated in paragraph 44 above, whether the measures taken in order to address the particular risk to plant health must be amended or repealed. | 40. On the other hand, when new elements change the perception of a risk or show that that risk can be contained by less restrictive measures than the existing measures, it is for the institutions and in particular the Commission, which has the power of legislative initiative, to bring about an amendment to the rules in the light of the new information. | 32. It must be added that, in the procedure referred to in Article 234 EC, which is based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts and the Court of Justice, any assessment of the facts in the case is a matter for the national court. However, in order to give the national court a useful answer, the Court may, in a spirit of cooperation with national courts, provide it with all the guidance that it deems necessary (Case C‑49/07 MOTOE [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited therein). |
24
Admittedly, as claimed by the EBU, and as is apparent from the file before the Court, duplicate bridge involves, inter alia, logic, memory, planning and/or lateral thinking, and constitutes an activity beneficial to the mental and physical health of regular participants. However, even if they do prove beneficial to physical and mental health, activities of pure rest or relaxation are not covered by that provision (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 February 2013, Žamberk, C‑18/12, EU:C:2013:95, paragraph 22, and of 25 February 2016, Commission v Netherlands, C‑22/15, not published, EU:C:2016:118, paragraphs 23 to 25). In those circumstances, the fact that an activity promotes physical and mental health is not, of itself, a sufficient element for it to be concluded that that activity is covered by the concept of ‘sport’ within the meaning of that same provision. | Il y a donc lieu de constater que la législation nationale en cause exonère de la TVA la location de postes d’amarrage et
d’emplacements pour l’entreposage destinée à des bateaux qui, en raison de leurs caractéristiques objectives, telles que leur
forme, leur vitesse, leur manœuvrabilité, leur poids et leurs dimensions, ne se prêtent pas à la pratique du sport ou de l’éducation
physique et que au nombre de ces bateaux figurent les bateaux résidentiels ou de promenade. | 51. Where, as in the present case, an application for a Community trade mark to be declared invalid is based on an earlier right protected by a rule of national law, the competent OHIM bodies must first assess the authority and scope of the particulars submitted by the applicant in order to establish the content of that rule. |
33. By contrast, contrary to the view which the national court appears to take, there is no need in that regard for the person providing the service to be seeking to make a profit (see, inter alia, C-157/99 Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-5473, paragraphs 50 and 52). | 52 None of those arguments can be upheld. | 54 In particular, it is contrary to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty to levy a tax on imported used vehicles based on a value which is higher than the real value of the vehicle with the result that imported used vehicles are taxed more heavily than similar used vehicles which are on sale on the domestic market (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark, paragraph 22). In taxing used vehicles, their actual depreciation must therefore be taken into account. |
41
The Court also considers that it is compatible with EU law to lay down reasonable time limits for bringing proceedings in the interests of legal certainty, which protects both the individual and the administrative authority concerned. In particular, it finds that such time limits are not liable to make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by EU law (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 April 2010, Barth, C‑542/08, EU:C:2010:193, paragraph 28, and of 16 January 2014, Pohl, C‑429/12, EU:C:2014:12, paragraph 29). | 29. As regards the principle of effectiveness, the Court has stated that it is compatible with European Union law to lay down reasonable time-limits for bringing proceedings in the interests of legal certainty to the extent that such time-limits are not liable to make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by European Union law (see, to that effect, Barth , paragraph 28 and the case-law cited). | 33. Although the concept of ‘direct investment’ is not defined by the Treaty, it has nevertheless been defined in the nomenclature of the capital movements set out in Annex I to Council Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty [article repealed by the Treaty of Amsterdam] (OJ 1988 L 178, p. 5) ( Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation , paragraphs 177 and 178). |
16 In the same judgment, the Court also rejected the argument that a maker of a film who has offered the video-cassette of that film for sale in a Member State whose legislation confers on him no exclusive right of hiring it out must accept the consequences of his choice and the exhaustion of his right to restrain the hiring-out of that video-cassette in any other Member State. Where national legislation confers on authors a specific right to hire out video-cassettes, that right would be rendered worthless if its owner were not in a position to authorise the operations for doing so (paragraphs 17 and 18). | 17 However, the defendant in the main proceedings, relying on the judgments of 22 January 1981 in Case 58/80 Dansk Supermarked v Imerco (( 1981 )) ECR 181 and of 20 January 1981 Musik Vertrieb Membran v GEMA, cited above, contends that the author is at liberty to choose the Member State in which he will market his work . The defendant in the main proceedings emphasizes that the author makes his choice according to his own interests and must, in particular, take into consideration the fact that the legislation of certain Member States, unlike that of certain others, confers on him an exclusive right enabling him to restrain the hiring-out of the recording of the work even when that work has been offered for sale with his consent . That being so, a maker of a film who has offered the video-cassette of that film for sale in a Member State whose legislation confers on him no exclusive right of hiring it out ( as in the main proceedings ) must accept the consequences of his choice and the exhaustion of his right to restrain the hiring-out of that video-cassette in any other Member State . | 65. Thus, provisions which, in order to be adopted, require political choices falling within the responsibilities of the European Union legislature cannot be delegated. |
49 As regards the effect on the amount of the tax credit of the fact that the taxpayer's personal and family circumstances are taken into account in the State of residence but not in the State of employment, it must be pointed out that the disparity derives from the fact that, in relation to direct taxes, the situations of residents and of non-residents are not, as a rule, comparable, since income received in the territory of a State by a non-resident is in most cases only a part of his total income, which is concentrated at his place of residence (Case C-279/93 Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v Schumacker [1995] ECR I-225, paragraphs 31 and 32). | 32 Income received in the territory of a Member State by a non-resident is in most cases only a part of his total income, which is concentrated at his place of residence. Moreover, a non-resident' s personal ability to pay tax, determined by reference to his aggregate income and his personal and family circumstances, is more easy to assess at the place where his personal and financial interests are centred. In general, that is the place where he has his usual abode. Accordingly, international tax law, and in particular the Model Double Taxation Treaty of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), recognizes that in principle the overall taxation of taxpayers, taking account of their personal and family circumstances, is a matter for the State of residence. | 33. Moreover, it should also be remembered that the conditions for applying Article 13(1)(d), second indent, of Regulation No 561/2006 are to be interpreted strictly, given that that provision constitutes a derogation from Articles 5 to 9 of that regulation. |
20 As the Court pointed out in Case C-111/92 Lange v Finanzamt Fürstenfeldbruck [1993] ECR I-4677, at paragraph 12, that principle relates only to products which, because of their special characteristics, may not be marketed or incorporated into economic channels. | 12 In those judgments, the Court added that illegal imports or supplies of such goods, whose release into the economic and commercial channels of the Community was by definition absolutely precluded and which could give rise only to penalties under the criminal law, were wholly alien to the provisions of the Sixth Directive (see the judgments in Case 294/82, cited above, at paragraphs 19 and 20, in Cases 269/86 and 289/86, cited above, at paragraphs 15 and 17 in each case, and in Case C-343/89, cited above, at paragraph 19). Those judgments therefore concern products which, because of their special characteristics, may not be marketed or incorporated into economic channels. | 18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts. |
47 Moreover, in its judgment in Pistre, cited above, paragraphs 39 and 40, the Court has held that Regulation No 2081/92 does not preclude application of domestic rules protecting designations containing specific geographical references, which, if there were links between the characteristics of the products which those designations evoke and the geographical area to which they refer, could be registered under that regulation. | 40 It must therefore be held that Regulation No 2081/92 does not preclude application of domestic rules, such as those laid down by Article 34 of Law No 85-30 and Decree No 88-194, which lay down the conditions governing the use of the description `mountain' in relation to agricultural products or foodstuffs.
Articles 30 and 36 of the Treaty | 19 It is clear that a provision such as that in issue before the national court is liable, even though it applies without regard to the nationality of the workers concerned, to place migrant workers in a worse position as regards social security than those who have worked in only one Member State. |
63. Notwithstanding the foregoing considerations, it should be recalled that the Court has consistently held that, in the application of Article 234 EC, it may extract from the wording of the questions formulated by the national court, and having regard to the facts stated by the latter, those elements which concern the interpretation of Community law, for the purpose of enabling that court to resolve the legal problems before it (see Joined Cases C-330/90 and C-331/90 López Brea and Hidalgo Palacios [1992] ECR I-323, paragraph 5; Case C-224/01 Köbler [2003] ECR I-10239, paragraph 60; and Case C-346/05 Chateignier [2006] ECR I‑10951, paragraph 18). | 60. At the outset it must be recalled that the Court has consistently held that, in the context of the application of Article 234 EC, it has no jurisdiction to decide whether a national provision is compatible with Community law. The Court may, however, extract from the wording of the questions formulated by the national court, and having regard to the facts stated by the latter, those elements which concern the interpretation of Community law, for the purpose of enabling that court to resolve the legal problems before it (see, inter alia, the judgment in Joined Cases C-332/92, C-333/92 and C-335/92 Eurico Italia and Others [1994] ECR I-711, paragraph 19). | 32 In the particular circumstances of this case, all the effects of the annulled directive should be preserved provisionally until the Council has adopted a new directive. |
70. However, that right is none the less subject to certain limitations based on grounds of public or private interest ( Sison v Council , paragraph 62, and Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau , paragraph 53). | 53. It is true that, in order to justify refusal of access to a document the disclosure of which has been requested, it is not sufficient, in principle, for that document to fall within an activity mentioned in Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001. The institution concerned must also supply explanations as to how access to that document could specifically and effectively undermine the interest protected by an exception laid down in that article (Joined Cases C‑39/05 P and C‑52/05 P Sweden and Turco v Council [2008] ECR I‑4723, paragraph 49). | 18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts. |
35. In that regard, it must be observed that, in proceedings under Article 267 TFEU, which is based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts and the Court of Justice, any assessment of the facts in the case is a matter for the national court. However, in order to give the national court a useful answer, the Court may, in a spirit of cooperation with national courts, provide it with all the guidance that it deems necessary (see, to that effect, Mickelsson and Roos , paragraph 41). | 41. In that regard, it must be observed that, in proceedings under Article 234 EC, which is based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts and the Court of Justice, any assessment of the facts in the case is a matter for the national court (Case C-450/06 Varec [2008] ECR I-581, paragraph 23). However, in order to give the national court a useful answer, the Court may, in a spirit of cooperation with national courts, provide it with all the guidance that it deems necessary (see, inter alia, Case C-49/07 MOTOE [2008] ECR I-0000, paragraph 30). | 70. In view of the preponderant position which the right to deduct has in the common system of VAT, such a penalty appears disproportionate where no evasion or detriment to the budget of the State is ascertained. |
66. Accordingly, the Court has already acknowledged the existence of such presumptions in four particular cases, namely with regard to the documents in the administrative file relating to a procedure for reviewing State aid (see Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau , paragraph 61), the documents exchanged between the Commission and notifying parties or third parties in the course of merger control proceedings (see Commission v Éditions Odile Jacob , paragraph 123, and Commission v Agrofert Holding , paragraph 64), the pleading lodged by one of the institutions in court proceedings (see Sweden and Others v API and Commission , paragraph 94) and the documents concerning an infringement procedure during its pre-litigation stage (see LPN and Finland v Commission , paragraph 65). | 64. Consequently, for the purpose of the interpretation of the exceptions under the first and third indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001, the General Court ought to have acknowledged the existence of a general presumption that the disclosure of the documents concerned undermines, in principle, the protection of the commercial interests of the undertakings involved in the merger and also the protection of the purpose of investigations relating to the control proceedings (see, to that effect, Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau , paragraph 61). | 25 They are however to be regarded as "services" within the meaning of the Treaty. |
114. À cet égard, il importe de rappeler qu’il résulte des articles 225 CE et 58, premier alinéa, du statut de la Cour de justice que le Tribunal est seul compétent, d’une part, pour constater les faits, sauf dans le cas où l’inexactitude matérielle de ses constatations résulterait des pièces du dossier qui lui ont été soumises, et, d’autre part, pour apprécier ces faits. Lorsque le Tribunal a constaté ou apprécié les faits, la Cour est compétente pour exercer, en vertu de l’article 225 CE, un contrôle sur la qualification juridique de ces faits et les conséquences de droit qui en ont été tirées par le Tribunal (arrêts du 6 avril 2006, General Motors/Commission, C‑551/03 P, Rec. p. I‑3173, point 51, et du 29 mars 2011, ThyssenKrupp Nirosta/Commission, C‑352/09 P, non encore publié au Recueil, point 179). | 51. In that regard, it is clear from Article 225 EC and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice that the Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction, first to find the facts except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it and, second, to assess those facts. When the Court of First Instance has found or assessed the facts, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction under Article 225 EC to review the legal characterisation of those facts by the Court of First Instance and the legal conclusions it has drawn from them (see, in particular, Case C-185/95 P Baustahlgewebe v Commission [1998] ECR I-8417, paragraph 23). | 17. Il convient de rappeler, à cet égard, que, si les États membres sont libres de choisir les voies et moyens destinés à assurer la mise en œuvre d’une directive, cette liberté laisse cependant entière l’obligation, pour chacun des États destinataires, de prendre, dans le cadre de son ordre juridique national, toutes les mesures nécessaires en vue d’assurer le plein effet de la directive (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 10 avril 1984, von Colson et Kamann, 14/83, Rec. p. 1891, point 15). |
24 In that respect, it should be borne in mind that the Commission may adopt guidelines on the exercise of its powers of assessment, particularly in State aid matters. In so far as those guidelines do not contradict Treaty rules, the policy rules which they contain are to be followed by that institution (see Case 310/85 Deufil v Commission [1987] ECR 901, paragraph 22; Case C-313/90 CIRFS and Others v Commission [1993] ECR I-1125, paragraphs 34 and 36, and Case C-311/94 IJssel-Vliet [1996] ECR I-5023, paragraph 42). | 22 HOWEVER, THAT IS NOT THE CASE . THE AID CODE CONSTITUTES GUIDELINES SETTING OUT THE COURSE OF CONDUCT WHICH THE COMMISSION INTENDS TO FOLLOW AND WITH WHICH IT ASKS THE MEMBER STATES TO COMPLY IN REGARD TO AID TO THE SYNTHETIC YARNS AND FIBRES SECTOR . IT DOES NOT DEROGATE FROM THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLES 92 AND 93 OF THE TREATY, NOR COULD IT DO SO . | 15. An advertiser cannot be regarded as taking unfair advantage of the reputation of the distinguishing marks of his competitor if effective competition on the relevant market is conditional upon a reference to those marks (see Toshiba Europe , cited above, paragraph 54). |
91
In particular, it is incumbent upon the EU institutions to comply with both components of the requirement of impartiality, which are, first, subjective impartiality, by virtue of which no member of the institution concerned may show bias or personal prejudice, and second, objective impartiality, under which there must be sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt as to possible bias on the part of the institution concerned (judgment of 11 July 2013, Ziegler v Commission, C‑439/11 P, EU:C:2013:513, paragraphs 154 and 155 and the case-law cited). | 155. Article 41 of the Charter provides that every person has the right, inter alia, to have his or her affairs handled impartially by the institutions of the European Union. That requirement of impartiality encompasses, on the one hand, subjective impartiality, in so far as no member of the institution concerned who is responsible for the matter may show bias or personal prejudice, and, on the other hand, objective impartiality, in so far as there must be sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt as to bias on the part of the institution concerned (see, by analogy, Joined Cases C 341/06 P and C‑342/06 P Chronopost and La Poste v UFEX and Others [2008] ECR I‑4777, paragraph 54, and Case C‑308/07 P Gorostiaga Atxalandabaso v Parliament [2009] ECR I‑1059, paragraph 46). | 10 INDEED , THE UNDERTAKING WAS COMPELLED TO AGREE TO A DELAY IN PAYMENT , NOT PROVIDED FOR IN THE CONTRACT , ON THE PART OF THE RECIPIENT OF ITS SERVICES . THE INTEREST WHICH CONSTITUTES THE CONSIDERATION FOR THAT DELAY WAS FIXED BY A COURT IN APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF BOTH THE BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH ( GERMAN CIVIL CODE ) AND THE HANDELSGESETZBUCH ( GERMAN COMMERCIAL CODE ). IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES , THE GRANT OF CREDIT IS ONLY REMOTELY CONNECTED TO THE MAIN SERVICES PROVIDED . THE INTEREST PAYABLE IN RESPECT OF SUCH CREDIT CANNOT THEREFORE BE DESCRIBED AS SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENT .
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58. As regards the question whether the right to equal treatment enjoyed by nationals of a Member State seeking employment in another Member State also encompasses benefits of a financial nature such as the benefit at issue in the main proceedings, the Court has held that Member State nationals who move in search of employment qualify for equal treatment only as regards access to employment in accordance with Article 48 of the Treaty and Articles 2 and 5 of Regulation No 1612/68, but not with regard to social and tax advantages within the meaning of Article 7(2) of that regulation ( Lebon , paragraph 26, and Case C-278/94 Commission v Belgium , cited above, paragraphs 39 and 40). | 39 It follows that the special programmes in question, which, in view of their special features, are linked to unemployment, fall outside the field of access to employment in the strict sense, as provided for in Title I of Regulation No 1612/68, in particular Article 3(1) on which the Commission relies. | 13 It is also settled case-law that the taxable amount for the supply of goods or services is represented by the consideration actually received for them. That consideration is thus the subjective value, that is to say, the value actually received, and not a value estimated according to objective criteria (see judgments in Case 154/80 Coöperatieve Aardappelenbewaarplaats [1981] ECR 445, paragraph 13; Case 230/87 Naturally Yours Cosmetics [1988] ECR 6365, paragraph 16; Case C-126/88 Boots Company [1990] ECR I-1235, paragraph 19; Case C-38/93 Glawe [1994] ECR I-1679, paragraph 8; Case C-33/93 Empire Stores [1994] ECR I-2329, paragraph 18, and Case C-288/94 Argos Distributors [1996] ECR I-5311, paragraph 16). |
73. However, it is established that requirements of public security must, in particular as a derogation from the fundamental principle of the free movement of capital, be interpreted strictly, so that their scope cannot be determined unilaterally by each Member State without any control by the institutions of the European Union. Thus, public security may be relied on only if there is a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society (see, inter alia, Case C‑54/99 Église de scientologie [2000] ECR I‑1335, paragraph 17). | 17 It should be observed, first, that while Member States are still, in principle, free to determine the requirements of public policy and public security in the light of their national needs, those grounds must, in the Community context and, in particular, as derogations from the fundamental principle of free movement of capital, be interpreted strictly, so that their scope cannot be determined unilaterally by each Member State without any control by the Community institutions (see, to this effect, Case 36/75 Rutili v Minister for the Interior [1975] ECR 1219, paragraphs 26 and 27). Thus, public policy and public security may be relied on only if there is a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society (see, to this effect, Rutili, cited above, paragraph 28, and Case C-348/96 Calfa [1999] ECR I-11, paragraph 21). Moreover, those derogations must not be misapplied so as, in fact, to serve purely economic ends (to this effect, see Rutili, paragraph 30). Further, any person affected by a restrictive measure based on such a derogation must have access to legal redress (see, to this effect, Case 222/86 Unectef v Heylens and Others [1987] ECR 4097, paragraphs 14 and 15). | 35. As regards eider, the Court notes that it is apparent from the ornithological study carried out by the Riista ja kalatalouden tutkimuslaitos (Institute for the Study of Game and Fishing), referred to by the parties (‘the study’), that a not inconsiderable number of specimens of that species is present in the spring hunting territories from early autumn onwards. As to the Finnish Government’s assertion that the individuals of that species present in the autumn in those territories are females or chicks born that year, that assertion is not supported by any evidence, as the Finnish Government moreover acknowledges. Lastly, although it is true that hunters perform a useful function in environmental management, by hunting small predators in the spring so that the eider’s rearing can produce better results, it is not apparent that that function can be fulfilled only if the eider hunting season is open in the spring. |
22 It is also clear from the Court's case-law (see, to that effect, in particular, Joined Cases 87/77, 130/77, 22/83, 9/84 and 10/84 Salerno and Others v Commission and Council [1985] ECR 2523, paragraph 56; Case 294/83 Les Verts v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, paragraph 28; Case 242/87 Commission v Council [1989] ECR 1425, paragraph 18; and Case 16/88 Commission v Council [1989] ECR 3457, paragraphs 15 to 19) that, in the system of the Treaty, any implementation of expenditure by the Commission in principle presupposes, in addition to the entry of the relevant appropriation in the budget, an act of secondary legislation (commonly called the `basic act') from which the expenditure derives. | 28 THE ARGUMENT THAT THE COURT OF AUDITORS ' POWER OF REVIEW UNDER ARTICLE 206A OF THE TREATY PRECLUDES ANY REVIEW BY THE COURT OF JUSTICE MUST BE REJECTED . THE COURT OF AUDITORS ONLY HAS POWER TO EXAMINE THE LEGALITY OF EXPENDITURE WITH REFERENCE TO THE BUDGET AND THE SECONDARY PROVISION ON WHICH THE EXPENDITURE IS BASED ( COMMONLY CALLED ' THE BASIC MEASURE ' ). ITS REVIEW IS THUS IN ANY EVENT DISTINCT FROM THAT EXERCISED BY THE COURT OF JUSTICE , WHICH CONCERNS THE LEGALITY OF THE BASIC MEASURE . THE MEASURES CONTESTED IN THIS CASE ARE IN REALITY THE EQUIVALENT OF A BASIC MEASURE , INASMUCH AS THEY PROVIDE IN PRINCIPLE FOR THE EXPENDITURE AND LAY DOWN THE DETAILED RULES ACCORDING TO WHICH THE EXPENDITURE IS TO BE EFFECTED .
4 . THE QUESTION WHETHER THE CONTESTED MEASURES ARE OF DIRECT AND INDIVIDUAL CONCERN TO THE APPLICANT ASSOCIATION WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 173 OF THE TREATY | 77. En effet, dans la mesure où l’État membre où l’immeuble est situé ne prévoit pas de possibilité de prise en compte des pertes encourues lors de la vente de l’immeuble, une telle possibilité n’a jamais existé. |
47 Relying on paragraphs 28 and 37 of Beentjes, the French Government contends that an additional award criterion of that kind has been permitted by the Court of Justice. It states, furthermore, that the award criterion in question in this case does not constitute a primary criterion, such as those referred to in Article 29 of Directive 71/305, the purpose of which is to make it possible to determine which is the most advantageous tender, but a secondary criterion which is not decisive. | 28 As regards the exclusion of a tenderer on the ground that it is not in a position to employ long-term unemployed persons, it should be noted in the first place that such a condition has no relation to the checking of contractors' suitability on the basis of their economic and financial standing and their technical knowledge and ability or to the criteria for the award of contracts referred to in Article 29 of the directive . | 39. Accordingly, the measures at issue are intended to preserve the general interest, in particular public policy, public security and public health, grounds which, in accordance with the Treaty and settled case‑law, may justify restrictions on fundamental freedoms, as the Court has, inter alia, held in the context of the security of supply in the petroleum, telecommunications and energy sectors (see, inter alia, Case C‑326/07 Commission v Italy , paragraph 69 and the case‑law cited). |
39. First, regarding the nature of those elements, the Court has held inter alia that it is only in the light of the documents relating to animal health referred to in Article 5(2) of Regulation No 615/98, the reports on the checks referred to in Article 4 of that regulation and/or other elements at its disposal concerning compliance with Article 1 of the regulation and having a bearing on animal welfare that the competent authority may conclude that Directive 91/628 has not been complied with (see Viamex Agrar Handel and ZVK , paragraphs 39 to 41). | 41. That interpretation cannot be affected by the wording of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 615/98, according to which the competent authority may also conclude that Directive 91/628 has not been complied with in the light of all other elements at its disposal. In fact, that wording must also be interpreted as referring to elements which have some bearing on the welfare of the animals. | 19 That argument cannot be accepted. The right to property safeguarded by the Community legal order does not include the right to dispose, for profit, of an advantage, such as the reference quantities allocated in the context of the common organization of a market, which does not derive from the assets or occupational activity of the person concerned (judgment in Case C-44/89 Von Deetzen v Hauptzollamt Oldenburg (Von Deetzen II) [1991] ECR I-5119, paragraph 27). |
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On the other hand, it is important to bear in mind that Article 7 of Directive 2008/95 is worded in general terms and comprehensively regulates the question of the exhaustion of trade mark rights for goods traded in the European Union and that, where EU directives provide for the harmonisation of measures necessary to ensure the protection of the interests referred to in Article 36 TFEU, any national measure relating thereto must be assessed in relation to the provisions of that directive and not Articles 34 to 36 TFEU. Like any secondary EU legislation, however, that directive must be interpreted in the light of the TFEU rules on the free movement of goods and of Article 36 TFEU in particular (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 July 1996, Bristol-Myers Squibb and Others, C‑427/93, C‑429/93 and C‑436/93, EU:C:1996:282, paragraphs 25 to 27 and the case-law cited, and of 20 March 1997, Phytheron International, C‑352/95, EU:C:1997:170, paragraphs 17 and 18). | 17 It should be noted that, according to the Court's case-law, Article 7 of the Trade Mark Directive is worded in general terms and comprehensively regulates the question of the exhaustion of trade mark rights for products traded in the Community, and that where Community directives provide for the harmonization of measures necessary to ensure the protection of the interests referred to in Article 36 of the Treaty, any national measure relating thereto must be assessed in relation to the provisions of that directive and not Articles 30 and 36 of the Treaty (see Joined Cases C-427/93, C-429/93 and C-436/93 Bristol-Myers Squibb and Others [1996] ECR I-3457, paragraphs 25 and 26). | 46. In effect, to give companies the option to have their losses taken into account in the Member State in which they are established or in another Member State would significantly jeopardise a balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between Member States, as the taxable basis would be increased in the first State and reduced in the second to the extent of the losses transferred. |
26. Article 4(4)(a) of the Directive establishes, for the benefit of trade marks with a reputation, a wider form of protection than that provided for in Article 4(1). The specific condition of that protection consists of a use of the later mark without due cause which takes or would take unfair advantage of, or is or would be detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier mark (see, to that effect, in respect of Article 5(2) of the Directive, Marca Mode , paragraph 36; Adidas-Salomon and Adidas Benelux , paragraph 27, and Case C-102/07 adidas and adidas Benelux [2008] ECR I-0000, paragraph 40). | 27. In that regard, it must be noted at the outset that, unlike Article 5(1)(b) of the Directive, which is designed to apply only if there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, Article 5(2) of the Directive establishes, for the benefit of trade marks with a reputation, a form of protection whose implementation does not require the existence of such a likelihood. Article 5(2) applies to situations in which the specific condition of the protection consists of a use of the sign in question without due cause which takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark (see Case C-425/98 Marca Mode [2000] ECR I-4861, paragraphs 34 and 36). | 18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts. |
73 As regards the cumulative effect of projects, it is to be remembered that the criteria and/or thresholds mentioned in Article 4(2) are designed to facilitate the examination of the actual characteristics exhibited by a given project in order to determine whether it is subject to the requirement to carry out an assessment, and not to exempt in advance from that obligation certain whole classes of projects listed in Annex II which may be envisaged on the territory of a Member State (Commission v Belgium, cited above, paragraph 42, Kraaijeveld, cited above, paragraph 51, and Case C-301/95 Commission v Germany [1998] ECR I-6135, paragraph 45). | 52 In a situation such as the present, it must be accepted that the Member State concerned was entitled to fix criteria relating to the size of dykes in order to establish which dyke projects had to undergo an impact assessment. The question whether, in laying down such criteria, the Member State went beyond the limits of its discretion cannot be determined in relation to the characteristics of a single project. It depends on an overall assessment of the characteristics of projects of that nature which could be envisaged in the Member State. | 54 In particular, it is contrary to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty to levy a tax on imported used vehicles based on a value which is higher than the real value of the vehicle with the result that imported used vehicles are taxed more heavily than similar used vehicles which are on sale on the domestic market (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark, paragraph 22). In taxing used vehicles, their actual depreciation must therefore be taken into account. |
19. Concerning this form of investment, the Court has stated that national measures must be regarded as ‘restrictions’ within the meaning of Article 56(1) EC if they are liable to prevent or limit the acquisition of shares in the undertakings concerned or to deter investors of other Member States from investing in their capital (see Commission v Portugal , paragraph 45; Commission v France , paragraph 41; Commission v Spain , paragraph 61; Commission v United Kingdom , paragraph 47; Commission v Italy , paragraphs 30 and 31; and Commission v Netherlands , paragraph 20). | 47. In this instance, although the relevant restrictions on investment operations apply without distinction to both residents and non-residents, it must none the less be held that they affect the position of a person acquiring a shareholding as such and are thus liable to deter investors from other Member States from making such investments and, consequently, affect access to the market (see, also, the judgment of today's date in Case C-463/00 Commission v Spain [2003] ECR I-4579, paragraph 61). | 20 In view of this answer, there is no need to reply to the national court' s second and third questions. |
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The factors capable of affecting the assessment of the gravity of the infringements include the conduct of each of the undertakings, the role played by each of them in the establishment of the cartel, the profit which they were able to derive from it, their size, the value of the goods concerned and the threat that infringements of that type pose to the objectives of the European Union (judgments of 28 June 2005, Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission, C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C‑205/02 P to C‑208/02 P and C‑213/02 P, EU:C:2005:408, paragraph 242, and of 11 July 2013, Team Relocations and Others v Commission, C‑444/11 P, not published, EU:C:2013:464, paragraph 100). | 100. The factors capable of affecting the assessment of the gravity of the infringements include the conduct of each of the undertakings, the role played by each of them in the establishment of the cartel, the profit which they were able to derive from it, their size, the value of the goods concerned and the threat that infringements of that type pose to the objectives of the EU (see, to that effect, Musique Diffusion française and Others v Commission , paragraph 129, and Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission , paragraph 242). | 18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts. |
53. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with settled case‑law, Article 267 TFEU gives national courts the widest discretion in referring matters to the Court if they consider that a case pending before them raises questions involving the interpretation of provisions of European Union law, or consideration of their validity, which are necessary for the resolution of the case before them. National courts are, moreover, free to exercise that discretion at whatever stage of the proceedings they consider appropriate (see Case C‑173/09 Elchinov [2010] ECR I‑8889, paragraph 26 and the case‑law cited). | 26. It is settled case-law that Article 267 TFEU gives national courts the widest discretion in referring matters to the Court if they consider that a case pending before them raises questions involving interpretation of provisions of European Union law, or consideration of their validity, which are necessary for the resolution of the case (see, to that effect, Case 166/73 Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf [1974] ECR 33, paragraph 3; Case C‑348/89 Mecanarte [1991] ECR I‑3277, paragraph 44; Case C‑261/95 Palmisani [1997] ECR I‑4025, paragraph 20; Case C‑210/06 Cartesio [2008] ECR I‑9641, paragraph 88; and Joined Cases C‑188/10 Melki and Abdeli [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 41). National courts are, moreover, free to exercise that discretion at whatever stage of the proceedings they consider appropriate (see, to that effect, Melki and Abdeli , paragraphs 52 and 57). | 34. Since Directive 2002/14 defined the group of persons to be taken into account at the time of that calculation, Member States cannot exclude from that calculation a specific category of persons initially included in that group. Thus, although that directive does not prescribe the manner in which the Member States are to take account of employees falling within its scope when calculating the thresholds of workers employed, it does nevertheless require that they be taken into account. |
43. It should be recalled at the outset that the deduction system established by the VAT Directive is meant to relieve the operator entirely of the burden of the VAT paid or payable in the course of all his economic activities. The common system of VAT seeks to ensure complete neutrality of taxation of all economic activities, whatever their purpose or results, provided that they are themselves subject, in principle, to VAT (see, inter alia, Case 268/83 Rompelman [1985] ECR 655, paragraph 19, and Case C-153/11 Klub [2012] ECR, paragraph 35). | 35. It should be recalled at the outset that the deduction system established by the VAT Directive is meant to relieve the operator entirely of the burden of the VAT paid or payable in the course of all his economic activities. Thus, the common system of VAT seeks to ensure complete neutrality of taxation of all economic activities, whatever their purpose or results, provided that they are themselves subject, in principle, to VAT (see, inter alia, Case 268/83 Rompelman [1985] ECR 655, paragraph 19, and Case C‑118/11 Eon Aset Menidjmunt [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 43). | 31. En troisième lieu, pour vérifier si l’acte attaqué comporte des mesures d’exécution, il convient de se référer exclusivement à l’objet du recours et, dans le cas où un requérant ne demande que l’annulation partielle d’un acte, ce sont seulement les mesures d’exécution que cette partie de l’acte comporte éventuellement qui doivent le cas échéant être prises en considération. |
48. It is clear from the case-law of the Court that the latter is required to observe that principle since it constitutes a customary rule of international law which, as such, is binding upon the European Union institutions and forms part of its legal order (see, to that effect, Brita , paragraphs 42 to 44). | 43. Pursuant to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, a treaty is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. In that respect, account is to be taken, together with the context, of any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. | 32. Unlike those contributions, which had to be paid for each seconded worker for the purposes of his social security (see Arblade and Others , paragraphs 48, 49 and 80), VTL does not seem, as was indicated in paragraphs 22 and 24 of this judgment, to be paid by the undertakings liable to it for the purposes of granting a direct benefit to those undertakings, and even less so to their employees, but is paid into a State fund which offers grants to vocational training institutions in Hungary. VTL cannot therefore, subject to the verification by the referring court referred to in paragraph 24, be treated in the same way as the contributions which were at issue in Arblade and Others . |
79. Moreover, as the Commission rightly pointed out, the above interpretation is the only one consistent with the aim and broad logic of Decision No 1/80, which is intended to secure progressively freedom of movement for workers and to promote the integration in the host Member State of Turkish workers who satisfy the conditions laid down in that decision and thus enjoy the rights conferred on them by it (see Kurz , paragraphs 40 and 45). Granting Turkish workers legally employed in the territory of a Member State entitlement to the same conditions of work as those enjoyed by workers who are nationals of the Member States is an important step towards creating an appropriate framework for the gradual integration of migrant Turkish workers. | 45 Such an interpretation is inconsistent with the aim and broad logic of Decision No 1/80, which seek to promote the integration of Turkish workers in the host Member State (see paragraph 40 of the present judgment). An apprentice who, as in the main proceedings, has pursued a genuine and effective economic activity with an employer for more than four years, in return for which he has received remuneration corresponding to the work performed, is just as integrated in the host Member State as a worker who has carried out comparable work for an equivalent period. | 34. However, Article 13 of the Authorisation Directive does not concern all fees to which infrastructure permitting the provision of networks and electronic communication services are subject. |
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Moreover, it must be recalled that, as is apparent from recital 31 of Directive 2001/29, a fair balance must be safeguarded between the rightholders and the users of protected subject matter. According to the Court’s case-law, a fair compensation system must, therefore, contain mechanisms, in particular for reimbursement, which are designed to correct any situation where ‘overcompensation’ occurs to the detriment of particular categories of users, which would not be compatible with the requirement set out in that recital (see, by analogy, judgment of 12 November 2015, Hewlett-Packard Belgium, C‑572/13, EU:C:2015:750, paragraphs 85 and 86). | 86. Such ‘overcompensation’ would not be compatible with the requirement, set out in recital 31 in the preamble to Directive 2001/29, that a fair balance be safeguarded between the rightholders and the users of protected subject-matter. | 54 In particular, it is contrary to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty to levy a tax on imported used vehicles based on a value which is higher than the real value of the vehicle with the result that imported used vehicles are taxed more heavily than similar used vehicles which are on sale on the domestic market (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark, paragraph 22). In taxing used vehicles, their actual depreciation must therefore be taken into account. |
13. First, it is to be remembered that when a question on the validity of a measure adopted by the European Union institutions is raised before a national court, it is for that court to decide whether a decision on the matter is necessary to enable it to give judgment and consequently whether it should request the Court to rule on that question. Accordingly, where the national court’s questions relate to the validity of a provision of Community law, the Court is obliged in principle to give a ruling (Case C‑491/01 British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco [2002] ECR I‑11453, paragraph 34, and Case C‑308/06 Intertanko and Others [2008] ECR I‑4057, paragraph 31). | 34. In that regard, it is to be remembered that when a question on the validity of a measure adopted by the Community institutions is raised before a national court, it is for that court to decide whether a decision on the matter is necessary to enable it to give judgment and consequently whether it should request the Court to rule on that question. Accordingly, where the national court's questions relate to the validity of a provision of Community law, the Court is obliged in principle to give a ruling (Case C-408/95 Eurotunnel and Others [1997] ECR I-6315, paragraph 19). | 38. In those circumstances, it must be found that Article 1(2) of Regulation No 2252/2004 pursues an objective of general interest recognised by the Union. |
16. The cour du travail de Bruxelles observes, however, that the Court of Justice has found on various occasions that Belgian legislation on pensions did not sufficiently ensure the portability of the rights of a worker who was employed in the service of both a Belgian employer and a European institution. It cites in this regard the judgments in Commission v Belgium (137/80, EU:C:1981:237, paragraph 19) and My (EU:C:2004:821). It expresses doubts as to ONEM’s argument that the reasoning followed in the latter judgment is based on the existence of a specific provision concerning pensions and therefore cannot be transposed to the unemployment insurance regime, observing that the approach adopted by the Court in that judgment seems to relate to the principle of sincere cooperation. It adds that that approach has been applied in respect of not only pensions but also parental allowances and family allowances, as well as in relation to a tax advantage. | 8 IT FOLLOWS THAT THE STAFF REGULATIONS , IN ADDITION TO HAVING EFFECTS IN THE INTERNAL ORDER OF THE COMMUNITY ADMINISTRATION , ARE BINDING ON MEMBER STATES IN SO FAR AS THEIR COOPERATION IS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO GIVE EFFECT TO THOSE REGULATIONS .
| 51. As the Court has repeatedly held, the deduction system is meant to relieve the trader entirely of the burden of the VAT payable or paid in the course of all his economic activities. The common system of VAT consequently ensures complete neutrality of taxation of all economic activities, whatever their purpose or results, provided that they are themselves subject to VAT (see, among others, Case 268/83 Rompelman [1985] ECR 655, paragraph 19; Case 50/87 Commission v France [1988] ECR 4797, paragraph 15; Case C-37/95 Ghent Coal Terminal [1998] ECR I-1, paragraph 15; and Case C-465/03 Kretztechnik [2005] ECR I‑4357, paragraph 34). |
31. The information provided in the order for reference must not only enable the Court to reply usefully but must also give the governments of the Member States and the other interested parties the opportunity to submit observations pursuant to Article 23 of the Statute of the Court of Justice. It is the Court’s duty to ensure that that opportunity is safeguarded, bearing in mind that under that provision only the orders for reference are notified to the interested parties (see, inter alia, Enirisorse , paragraph 18 and the case-law cited). | 18. Thus, the information provided in the order for reference must not only enable the Court to reply usefully but must also give the governments of the Member States and the other interested parties the opportunity to submit observations pursuant to Article 23 of the Statute of the Court of Justice. It is the Court’s duty to ensure that that opportunity is safeguarded, bearing in mind that under that provision only the orders for reference are notified to the interested parties (see, inter alia, order in Joined Cases C-128/97 and C-137/97 Testa and Modesti [1998] ECR I-2181, paragraph 6; order in Case C-325/98 Anssens [1999] I‑2969, paragraph 8; and Altair Chimica , paragraph 25). | 37. In those circumstances, it necessarily follows from the judgment in Alzetta and Others v Commission and from the dismissal of the appeal against it by the judgment delivered today in Italy v Commission that the present action has become devoid of purpose as regards the claim for the annulment of Articles 2 and 5 of the contested decision in so far as they concern aid to undertakings engaged in transport at a local, regional or national level. |
29. Thus, where engagement in the sporting activity must be assessed in the light of the Treaty provisions relating to freedom of movement for workers or freedom to provide services, it will be necessary to determine whether the rules which govern that activity satisfy the requirements of Articles 39 EC and 49 EC, that is to say do not constitute restrictions prohibited by those articles ( Deliège , paragraph 60). | 60 If it is assumed that Ms Deliège's activity can be classified as a provision of services, it is necessary to consider whether the selection rules at issue in the main proceedings constitute a restriction on the freedom to provide services within the meaning of Article 59 of the Treaty. | 129. Consequently, the claims in the Commission’s application seeking a declaration that the Federal Republic of Germany has failed to fulfil its obligations under Directive 2005/36 are in principle admissible, on condition that the obligations arising under that directive are analogous to those arising under Directive 89/48 (see, by analogy, Case C‑416/07 Commission v Greece , paragraph 29). |
16 However, it is also apparent from the case-law of the Court (Case C-106/89 Marleasing v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentación [1990] ECR I-4135, paragraph 8; Case C-334/92 Wagner Miret v Fondo de Garantía Salarial [1993] ECR I-6911, paragraph 20; Faccini Dori, paragraph 26; and Joined Cases C-240/98 to C-244/98 Océano Grupo Editorial v Salvat Editores [2000] ECR I-4941, paragraph 30) that, when applying national law, whether adopted before or after the directive, the national court that has to interpret that law must do so, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive so as to achieve the result it has in view and thereby comply with the third paragraph of Article 189 of the EC Treaty (now the third paragraph of Article 249 EC). | 20 Thirdly, it should be borne in mind that when it interprets and applies national law, every national court must presume that the State had the intention of fulfilling entirely the obligations arising from the directive concerned. As the Court held in its judgment in Case 106/89 Marleasing v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentación [1990] ECR I-4135, paragraph 8, in applying national law, whether the provisions in question were adopted before or after the directive, the national court called upon to interpret it is required to do so, so far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive in order to achieve the result pursued by the latter and thereby comply with the third paragraph of Article 189 of the Treaty. | 95. In that regard, it must, however, be observed, as the Commission has stated, that neither the 2008 Memorandum nor the 2010 Report contain any indication to that effect and that the Council and the intervening Member States have not provided any evidence in support of their claims. |
36. ‘Economic activities’ are defined in Article 4(2) of the Sixth Directive as including all activities of producers, traders and persons supplying services, inter alia the exploitation of tangible or intangible property for the purpose of obtaining income therefrom on a continuing basis (see, in particular, Case C‑465/03 Kretztechnik [2005] ECR I‑4357, paragraph 18; and Hutchison 3G and Others , paragraph 27). | 27. Under Article 4(1) of the Sixth Directive, ‘taxable person’ means any person who independently carries out in any place any economic activity specified in paragraph 2 thereof, whatever the purpose or results of that activity. ‘Economic activity’ is defined in Article 4(2) as including all activities of producers, traders and persons supplying services, inter alia the exploitation of tangible or intangible property for the purpose of obtaining income therefrom on a continuing basis. | 16 Where a sub-buyer of goods purchased from an intermediate seller brings an action against the manufacturer for damages on the ground that the goods are not in conformity, it must be observed that there is no contractual relationship between the sub-buyer and the manufacturer because the latter has not undertaken any contractual obligation towards the former. |
34
In addition, the right to paid annual leave, according to settled case-law, as laid down in Article 7 of Directive 2003/88, has the dual purpose of enabling the worker both to rest from carrying out the work he is required to do under his contract of employment and to enjoy a period of relaxation and leisure (judgments in Schultz-Hoff and Others, C‑350/06 and C‑520/06, EU:C:2009:18, paragraph 25, and 22 November 2011 in KHS, C‑214/10, EU:C:2011:761, paragraph 31). | 25. It is common ground that the purpose of the entitlement to paid annual leave is to enable the worker to rest and to enjoy a period of relaxation and leisure. The purpose of the entitlement to sick leave is different. It is given to the worker so that he can recover from being ill. | 54 In particular, it is contrary to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty to levy a tax on imported used vehicles based on a value which is higher than the real value of the vehicle with the result that imported used vehicles are taxed more heavily than similar used vehicles which are on sale on the domestic market (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark, paragraph 22). In taxing used vehicles, their actual depreciation must therefore be taken into account. |
39
In that context, it should be recalled that Article 9 of Annex I to the Agreement on the free movement of persons, entitled ‘Equal treatment’, ensures the application of the principle of non-discrimination laid down in Article 2 of the Agreement in connection with the free movement of workers (judgment of 19 November 2015, Bukovansky, C‑241/14, EU:C:2015:766, paragraph 47). | 47. With regard to the principle of non-discrimination laid down in Article 2 of that agreement, it should be noted that that article prohibits, as a general rule, any discrimination on grounds of nationality. As Article 9 of Annex I to the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons ensures the application of that principle in the area of the free movement of workers, there are also no grounds for concluding that there is discrimination contrary to Article 2 (see, by analogy, judgment in Werner , C‑112/91, EU:C:1993:27, paragraphs 19 and 20 and the case-law cited). | 35. Furthermore, the aim of the system of adjustment is analogous to that of the levying of VAT on the private use of immovable property. It is a matter, firstly, of avoiding giving an unjustified economic advantage to a taxable person by comparison with a final consumer, by obliging the taxable person to pay amounts equivalent to the deductions to which he was not entitled (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-487/01 and C-7/02 Gemeente Leusden and Holin Groep [2004] ECR I-5337, paragraph 90, and Uudenkaupungin kaupunki , paragraph 30). |
50 A Member State is therefore in a position to check whether contributions have actually been paid by one of its taxpayers to an institution coming under the authority of another Member State. In addition, there is nothing to prevent the tax authorities concerned from requiring the taxpayer to provide such proof as they may consider necessary in order to determine whether the conditions for deducting contributions provided for in the legislation at issue have been met and, consequently, whether to allow the deduction requested (see, to that effect, Bachmann, paragraphs 18 and 20 and Commission v Belgium, paragraphs 11 and 13). | 13 It should be noted in that regard that under Article 8(1) of the Directive there is no obligation on the tax authorities of Member States to collaborate where their laws or administrative practices prevent the competent authorities from carrying out enquiries or from collecting or using the information for those States' own purposes. However, the inability to request such collaboration cannot justify the non-deductibility of insurance contributions. There is nothing to prevent the Belgian tax authorities from requiring the person concerned to provide such proof as they may consider necessary and, where appropriate, from refusing to allow deduction where such proof is not forthcoming. | 70 Since it is in the trade mark owner' s interest that the consumer or end user should not be led to believe that the owner is responsible for the repackaging, an indication must be given on the packaging of who repackaged the product. |
68. It follows from paragraph 24 of the judgment in Bundesverband der Bilanzbuchhalter v Commission that individuals may, in certain circumstances, be entitled to bring an action for annulment against a decision which the Commission addresses to a Member State on the basis of Article 90(3) of the Treaty if the conditions laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the EC Treaty (now, following amendment, the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC) are satisfied. | 24 As is apparent from the judgment in Netherlands and Others v Commission, cited above, individuals may, in some circumstances, be entitled to bring an action for annulment, under the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty, against a decision of the Commission taken on the basis of Article 90(3) of the Treaty. | 20 THAT EXPRESS REFERENCE TO NATIONAL LAWS IS , HOWEVER , SUBJECT TO THE SAME LIMITS AS THOSE AFFECTING THE IMPLIED REFERENCE , THE NEED FOR WHICH HAS BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED IN THE ABSENCE OF COMMUNITY PROVISIONS , INASMUCH AS THE APPLICATION OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION MUST BE EFFECTED IN A NON-DISCRIMINATORY MANNER HAVING REGARD TO THE PROCEDURAL RULES RELATING TO DISPUTES OF THE SAME TYPE , BUT PURELY NATIONAL , AND IN SO FAR AS PROCEDURAL RULES CANNOT HAVE THE RESULT OF MAKING IMPOSSIBLE IN PRACTICE THE EXERCISE OF RIGHTS CONFERRED BY COMMUNITY LAW .
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28. However, although direct taxation falls within their competence, the Member States must exercise that competence consistently with Community law (see Case C-265/04 Bouanich [2006] ECR I-923, paragraph 28, and Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation , paragraph 36).
The existence of a restriction on the freedom of establishment | 28. The first point to be noted here is that, according to the settled case-law of the Court, while direct taxation falls within the competence of the Member States, they must none the less exercise that competence consistently with Community law (see, in particular, Case C-80/94 Wielockx [1995] ECR-I 2493, paragraph 16, and Case C-319/02 Manninen [2004] ECR I-7477, paragraph 19). | 20. Thus, the fundamental objective of that provision is to ensure that the repatriation of the consumer and the refund of money paid over are guaranteed in the event of insolvency or bankruptcy on the part of a travel organiser (see, to that effect, Dillenkofer and Others , paragraphs 35 and 36). |
34. In paragraph 25 of the judgment in Schriever , the Court emphasised that, in order to find that there has been a transfer of a business, or of an independent part of an undertaking, for the purposes of Article 5(8) of the Sixth Directive, all of the elements transferred must, together, be sufficient to allow an independent economic activity to be carried on. | 25. It follows that, in order to find that there has been a transfer of a business, or of an independent part of an undertaking, for the purposes of Article 5(8) of the Sixth Directive, all of the elements transferred must, together, be sufficient to allow an independent economic activity to be carried on. | 24. The fact that a levy is categorised as a tax under national legislation does not mean that, in respect of Regulation No 1408/71, that same levy cannot be regarded as falling within the scope of that regulation (judgments in Commission v France , EU:C:2000:84, paragraph 34, and Commission v France , EU:C:2000:85, paragraph 32). |
120. According to case-law, where a number of legal persons may be held personally liable for participation in an infringement of the European Union’s competition rules because they form part of a single undertaking responsible for the infringement, the Commission has the power, under Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003 to impose a fine for which those persons are jointly and severally liable (see, to that effect, Commission v Siemens Österreich and Others and Siemens Transmission & Distribution and Others v Commission , paragraphs 39 to 51). | 50. The Commission’s criticism of paragraph 150 of the judgment under appeal in its seventh ground of appeal must be rejected, since it does not follow from that paragraph, placed in context and in the light of the case-law cited there, that the Commission is in fact required to find all the persons who may be held personally responsible for participation in an infringement committed by one and the same undertaking jointly and severally liable for payment of a fine. | 100 As the national court states, it follows from the wording of Article 9(4) of the ZFW and Article 1 of the Rhbz that in principle that condition applies irrespective whether the request for authorisation relates to treatment in an establishment located in the Netherlands with which the sickness insurance fund has no contractual arrangements or in an establishment located in another Member State. |
53. It is settled case-law that the prohibition of quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect applies not only to national measures but also to measures adopted by the Community institutions (see, inter alia , Case C-114/96 Kieffer and Thill [1997] ECR I-3629, paragraph 27, and Case C-169/99 Schwarzkopf [2001] ECR I-5901, paragraph 37). | 37 In this regard, it should be remembered that it is settled case-law that the prohibition of quantitative restrictions and of all measures having equivalent effect applies not only to national measures but also to measures adopted by the Community institutions (see, in particular, to this effect, the judgment in Case C-51/93 Meyhui [1994] ECR I-3879, paragraph 11). | 27. Il ressort d’une jurisprudence constante que l’État membre destinataire d’une décision l’obligeant à récupérer des aides illégales est tenu, en vertu de l’article 288 TFUE, de prendre toutes les mesures propres à assurer l’exécution de cette décision. Il doit parvenir à une récupération effective des sommes dues (arrêts du 5 octobre 2006, Commission/France, C-232/05, Rec. p. I-10071, point 42; du 20 octobre 2011, Commission/France, C-549/09, non encore publié au Recueil, point 27, et du 1 er mars 2012, Commission/Grèce, C-354/10, non encore publié au Recueil, point 57). |
100
It is clear from the case-law of the Court of Justice that Article H(2) of Annex II to Regulation No 1164/94, as amended, read in conjunction with Article 18(3) of Regulation No 1386/2002, provides that, in order to adopt a decision on financial corrections, the Commission is required to comply with a time limit of three months from the date of the hearing (see judgments of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraphs 95 and 102, and of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraphs 95 and 102). | 102. Contrary to what the Commission has claimed, the fact that the relevant rules do not expressly provide that, in the event of non-compliance with the time-limit laid down for adopting a decision on financial corrections, the Commission may no longer adopt such a decision is irrelevant, since the setting of a time-limit within which a decision of that nature must be adopted is in itself sufficient. | 29. Thus, the Court may reject a request for a preliminary ruling submitted by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it ( Alassini and Others , paragraph 26). |
41. As regards application of the principle of effectiveness, the Court has held that every case in which the question arises as to whether a national procedural provision makes the application of EU law impossible or excessively difficult must be analysed by reference to the role of that provision in the procedure, its conduct and its special features, viewed as a whole, before the various national bodies. In that context, it is necessary to take into consideration, where relevant, the principles which lie at the basis of the national legal system, such as the protection of the rights of the defence, the principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct of the proceedings (see, to that effect, judgments in Fallimento Olimpiclub , C‑2/08, EU:C:2009:506, paragraph 27, and Târșia , C‑69/14, EU:C:2015:662, paragraphs 36 and 37 and the case-law cited). | 37. For those purposes, account must be taken, where appropriate, of the principles which form the basis of the national judicial system concerned, such as protection of the rights of the defence, the principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct of proceedings (see, inter alia, judgments in Fallimento Olimpiclub , C‑2/08, EU:C:2009:506, paragraph 27, and Agrokonsulting-04 , C‑93/12, EU:C:2013:432, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited). | 17 It follows that a taxable person acting as such is entitled to deduct the VAT payable or paid for goods or services supplied to him for the purpose of investment work intended to be used in connection with taxable transactions. |
135. As is confirmed by the second subparagraph of Article 22(2) of Regulation No 1408/71, the sole purpose of Article 22(1)(c)(i) of that regulation is to confer on patients covered by the legislation of one Member State and granted authorisation by the competent institution the right to have access to ‘treatment’ in another Member State on conditions for reimbursement as favourable as those enjoyed by patients covered by the legislation of that other State (see Vanbraekel , paragraph 32, and Inizan , paragraph 21). | 32 As regards the extent of the rights conferred by Article 22(1)(c) on an insured person who has been granted such authorisation, it follows from paragraph 1(i) that the insured person must in principle be entitled to the benefits in kind provided on behalf of the competent institution by the institution of the place where the insured person is staying, in accordance with the provisions of the legislation of the State in which the benefits are provided, as if the covered person were insured in that State. Only the length of the period during which benefits are provided remains to be governed by the legislation of the competent State. By guaranteeing that insured persons covered by the legislation of one Member State and granted authorisation have access to treatment in the other Member States on conditions as favourable as those enjoyed by persons covered by the legislation of those other States, that provision helps to facilitate the free movement of persons covered by social insurance. | 100. The fifth plea must therefore be rejected.
Sixth plea: failure to take into consideration the appellant’s ability to pay
Arguments of the parties |
19 There is nothing, on the basis of the actual wording of Articles 3a and 12(c) of Regulation No 857/84, to preclude an initial lessee who is eligible for a special reference quantity from carrying on his milk production activity within the framework of an association or a group of persons formed by him and other persons for the purposes of operating a tenanted holding. However, the Court has held (see the judgment in von Deetzen II, cited above, paragraph 38), that a special reference quantity can be allocated only if the association or group of persons was not formed for the sole purpose of realizing, for the benefit of the initial lessee, the marketable value of that special reference quantity. | 38 The term "similar transaction" must be interpreted as referring to any transaction, whatever its legal basis, which produces effects comparable to those of inheritance. It thus embraces, in particular, transactions concluded in respect of the holding concerned between a producer and the potential beneficiary of his estate, provided that the terms of the transaction in question are such that, according to its purpose and subject-matter, the main intention is that the holding should continue to be exploited by the potential beneficiary and not that the marketable value of the holding should be realized by the person from whom he stands to inherit. | 116 Since none of the pleas put forward by the German Government is well founded, the application must in consequence be dismissed. |
38. Furthermore, the fact that a Member State does not grant to a non-resident certain tax benefits which it grants to a resident is not, as a rule, discriminatory, having regard to the objective differences between the situation of residents and that of non-residents, from the point of view both of the source of their income and of their personal ability to pay tax or their personal and family circumstances ( Schumacker , paragraph 34; Gerritse , paragraph 44; and Commission v Spain , paragraph 47). | 47. Thus, the fact that a Member State does not grant to a non-resident certain tax benefits which it grants to a resident is not, as a rule, discriminatory, having regard to the objective differences between the situations of residents and of non‑residents, from the point of view both of the source of their income and of their personal ability to pay tax or their personal and family circumstances ( Schumacker , paragraph 34, and Gerritse , paragraph 44). | 18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts. |
79 It is true that Article 10 of Directive 68/360 and Article 8 of Directive 73/148 do not prevent the Member States from derogating from those directives on grounds of public policy, public security or public health, while Article 3(1) of Directive 64/221 lays down that measures taken on grounds of public policy or of public security are to be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned. However, failure to comply with the legal formalities concerning the entry, movement and residence of aliens cannot in itself give rise to application of the measures referred to in Article 3 of Directive 64/221 (Royer, paragraphs 47 and 48). | 47 NEVERTHELESS IT IS EVIDENT FROM THE FOREGOING THAT THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE LEGAL FORMALITIES CONCERNING THE ENTRY , MOVEMENT AND RESIDENCE OF ALIENS DOES NOT IN ITSELF CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO PUBLIC POLICY AND PUBLIC SECURITY WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE TREATY .
| 53. It sho uld also be noted that aid may be selective in the light of Article 87(1) EC even where it concerns a whole economic sector (see, inter alia, Case C-75/97 Belgium v Commissio n [1999] ECR I-3671, paragraph 33). |
51. Consequently, the concept of the value of sales referred to in point 13 of those Guidelines encompasses the sales made on the market concerned by the infringement in the EEA, and it is not necessary to determine whether those sales were genuinely affected by that infringement, since the proportion of the overall turnover deriving from the sale of goods in respect of which the infringement was committed is best able to reflect the economic importance of that infringement (see, to that effect, judgments in Team Relocations and Others v Commission , C‑444/11 P, EU:C:2013:464, paragraphs 75 to 78; Guardian Industries and Guardian Europe v Commission , C‑580/12 P, EU:C:2014:2363, paragraphs 57 to 59; Dole Food and Dole Fresh Fruit Europe v Commission , C‑286/13 P, EU:C:2015:184, paragraphs 148 and 149; and LG Display and LG Display Taiwan v Commission , C‑227/14 P, EU:C:2015:258, paragraphs 53 to 58 and 64). | 76. It follows that point 13 of the 2006 Guidelines pursues the objective of adopting as the starting point for the calculation of the fine imposed on an undertaking an amount which reflects the economic significance of the infringement and the size of the undertaking’s contribution to it. Consequently, while the concept of the value of sales referred to in point 13 of those guidelines admittedly cannot, extend to encompassing sales made by the undertaking in question which do not fall within the scope of the alleged cartel, it would however be contrary to the goal pursued by that provision if that concept were understood as applying only to turnover achieved by the sales in respect of which it is established that they were actually affected by that cartel. | 29. Thus, the Court may reject a request for a preliminary ruling submitted by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it ( Alassini and Others , paragraph 26). |
Or, une information qui s’avère incomplète, ambiguë ou trompeuse et qui peut induire le consommateur en erreur ne saurait être protégée au titre de la liberté d’expression et d’information de l’entrepreneur et de la liberté d’entreprendre de celui–ci (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 17 décembre 2015, Neptune Distribution, C‑157/14, EU:C:2015:823, points 74 à 78). | 75. In those circumstances, the determination of the validity of the contested provisions must be carried out in accordance with the need to reconcile the requirements of the protection of those various fundamental rights protected by the EU legal order, and striking a fair balance between them (see, to that effect, judgment in Deutsches Weintor , C‑544/10, EU:C:2012:526, paragraph 47). | 15 As observed by most of the parties who commented on this point, the mere fact that the service provided by the old and the new awardees of a contract is similar does not therefore support the conclusion that an economic entity has been transferred. An entity cannot be reduced to the activity entrusted to it. Its identity also emerges from other factors, such as its workforce, its management staff, the way in which its work is organized, its operating methods or indeed, where appropriate, the operational resources available to it. |
45. The same applies, even in the absence of any express provision authorising its institutions to negotiate with non-member countries, where the Community has achieved complete harmonisation in a given area, because the common rules thus adopted could be affected within the meaning of the ERTA judgment if the Member States retained freedom to negotiate with non-member countries ( Commission v Luxembourg , paragraph 90). | 90 The same applies, even in the absence of any express provision authorising its institutions to negotiate with non-member countries, where the Community has achieved complete harmonisation in a given area, because the common rules thus adopted could be affected within the meaning of the AETR judgment if the Member States retained freedom to negotiate with non-member countries (Opinion 1/94, paragraph 96; Opinion 2/92, paragraph 33). | 54. Since Article 24(2) is a derogation from the principle of equal treatment provided for in Article 18 TFEU, of which Article 24(1) of Directive 2004/38 is merely a specific expression, it must be interpreted narrowly. |
78. In that regard, it should be recalled that in paragraph 19 of Hopkins and Others , the Court of Justice observed that in order to ensure the effectiveness of the prohibition laid down in Article 4(b) of the ECSC Treaty, the powers conferred on the Commission by Article 63(1) of that treaty must be such as to enable it not only to oblige the authorities of the Member States to bring to an end for the future any systematic discrimination which the Commission has found to exist, but also, on the basis of that finding, to draw all the consequences as regards the effects which such discrimination may have had in relationships between purchasers and producers within the meaning of Article 4(b) even before the Commission took action. | 19 In order to ensure the effectiveness of the prohibition laid down in Article 4(b), the powers conferred by Article 63(1) on the Commission must be such as to enable it, not only to oblige the authorities of the Member States to bring to an end for the future any systematic discrimination which the Commission has found to exist, but also, on the basis of that finding, to draw all the consequences as regards the effects which such discrimination may have had in relationships between purchasers and producers within the meaning of Article 4(b) even before the Commission took action. That same finding may be relied on by the persons concerned before the national courts. | 43. As the Court has consistently held, that right to deduct is an integral part of the VAT scheme and as a general rule may not be limited. In particular, that right is exercisable immediately in respect of all the taxes charged on transactions relating to inputs (see, inter alia, Case C‑62/93 BP Supergas [1995] ECR I‑1883, paragraph 18; Case C‑392/09 Uszodaépítő [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 34, and Enel Maritsa Iztok 3 , paragraph 32). |
29
It should be recalled that the conditions that must be satisfied in order for the European Union to incur non-contractual liability, under the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, include the requirement of a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law that is intended to confer rights on individuals (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 April 2012, Artegodan v Commission, C‑221/10 P, EU:C:2012:216, paragraph 80 and the case-law cited). | 80. It should be borne in mind that where the unlawfulness of a legal act is in issue, the non-contractual liability of the European Union depends on the fulfilment of a set of conditions, including the existence of a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law that is intended to confer rights on individuals (see Case C‑352/98 P Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission [2000] ECR I‑5291, paragraphs 41 and 42; Case C‑282/05 P Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission [2007] ECR I‑2941, paragraph 47; and Joined Cases C‑120/06 P and C‑121/06 P FIAMM and Others v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I‑6513, paragraphs 172 and 173). | 51. To oblige taxable persons to provide conclusive proof that the goods have physically left the Member State of supply does not ensure the correct and straightforward application of the exemptions. On the contrary, that obligation places them in an uncertain situation as regards the possibility of applying the exemption to their intra-Community supplies or as regards the need to include VAT in the sale price. |
36. It should be borne in mind in that regard that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, it is the acquisition of the goods by a taxable person acting as such that gives rise to the application of the VAT system and therefore of the deduction mechanism. The use to which the goods are put, or intended to be put, merely determines the extent of the initial deduction to which the taxable person is entitled under Article 17 of the Sixth Directive and the extent of any adjustments in the course of the following periods ( Lennartz , paragraph 15). By contrast, where a taxable person acquires goods solely for his private requirements, he is acting in a private capacity and not as a taxable person for the purposes of that directive (Case C‑20/91 de Jong [1992] ECR I‑2847, paragraph 17). | 17 Where a taxable person acquires goods solely for his private requirements, he is acting in a private capacity and not as a taxable person within the meaning of the Sixth Directive. Consequently, the various provisions of the Sixth Directive concerning the acquisition of goods by a business, in particular Article 17(2), which confers on taxable persons the right to deduct VAT, and the administrative and accounting rules laid down in Articles 18 and 22 of the Sixth Directive, do not apply. | 29. Thus, the Court may reject a request for a preliminary ruling submitted by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it ( Alassini and Others , paragraph 26). |
14 It should be recalled that, strictly speaking, Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty are concerned solely with the conduct of undertakings and not with measures adopted by Member States by law or regulation. The Court has consistently held, however, that read in conjunction with Article 5, Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty require Member States to refrain from introducing or maintaining in force measures, even of a legislative nature, which may render ineffective the competition rules applicable to undertakings (as regards Article 85 of the Treaty, see the judgments in Case 267/86 Van Eycke v Aspa [1988] ECR 4769, paragraph 16, Case C-185/91 Reiff [1993] ECR I-5801, paragraph 14 and Case C-153/93 Germany v Delta Schiffahrts- und Speditionsgesellschaft [1994] ECR I-2517, paragraph 14; as regards Article 86 of the Treaty, see the judgment in Case 13/77 NV GB-INNO-BM v ATAB [1977] ECR 2115, paragraph 31). | 31 ACCORDINGLY , WHILE IT IS TRUE THAT ARTICLE 86 IS DIRECTED AT UNDERTAKINGS , NONETHELESS IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT THE TREATY IMPOSES A DUTY ON MEMBER STATES NOT TO ADOPT OR MAINTAIN IN FORCE ANY MEASURE WHICH COULD DEPRIVE THAT PROVISION OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS .
| 29. It follows that, if a public authority becomes a minority shareholder in a company limited by shares with wholly public capital for the purpose of awarding the management of a public service to that company, the control that the public authorities which are members of that company exercise over it may be categorised as similar to the control they exercise over their own departments when it is exercised by those authorities jointly ( Sea , paragraph 63). |
17 As noted in paragraph 6 above, care allowance is included on the list of special non-contributory cash benefits within the meaning of Article 4(2a) of Regulation No 1408/71 which forms Annex IIa to that regulation. The Austrian Government submits that the inclusion of a benefit in that list suffices for it to be classified as a special non-contributory benefit. It bases its argument on the judgments in Case C-20/96 Snares [1997] ECR I-6057, Case C-297/96 Partridge [1998] ECR I-3467 and Case C-90/97 Swaddling [1999] ECR I-1075. In paragraph 30 of Snares the Court held that the fact that legislation on disability living allowance is referred to in Annex IIa to Regulation No 1408/71 is to be accepted as establishing that benefits granted under that legislation are special non-contributory benefits. In paragraph 31 of Partridge and paragraph 24 of Swaddling the Court used that analysis to determine the legal regime governing, respectively, attendance allowance and income support. It should also be observed that in those three cases the special non-contributory character of the benefits in question was not discussed. | 30 The fact that the Community legislature refers to legislation, such as that relating to DLA, in Annex IIa to Regulation No 1408/71 must be accepted as establishing that benefits granted pursuant to that legislation are special non-contributory benefits falling within the scope of Article 10a of Regulation No 1408/71 (see, in particular, to that effect, Case 24/64 Dingemans v Bestuur der Sociale Verzekeringsbank [1964] ECR 647, at p. 654). | 91. Or, même à considérer de telles indications comme des assurances précises aptes à faire naître dans le chef des destinataires une confiance légitime, il y a lieu d’exclure, ainsi que l’a fait le Tribunal au point 95 de l’arrêt attaqué, que les requérants puissent se prévaloir de celle-ci pour contester la légalité de la règle juridique sur laquelle se fondent les décisions litigieuses. En effet, les particuliers ne sauraient se prévaloir du principe de protection de la confiance légitime pour s’opposer à l’application d’une disposition réglementaire nouvelle, surtout dans un domaine dans lequel le législateur dispose d’un large pouvoir d’appréciation (voir, notamment, arrêt du 19 novembre 1998, Espagne/Conseil, C-284/94, Rec. p. I‑7309, point 43). |
25. En outre, la République hellénique fait valoir qu’il ressort de l’arrêt Standley e.a. (C-293/97, EU:C:1999:215, points 35 à 39) que la directive 91/676 ne s’applique qu’aux seuls cas où la pollution d’origine agricole contribue de manière significative à la pollution des eaux. Il ressortirait de cette même jurisprudence que cette directive peut être appliquée de manière différente par les États membres et que le droit de l’Union ne pourrait fournir de critères précis permettant de vérifier, dans chaque cas d’espèce, si la pollution d’origine agricole contribue de manière significative à la pollution des eaux. | 38 However, Community law cannot provide precise criteria for establishing in each case whether the discharge of nitrogen compounds of agricultural origin makes a significant contribution to the pollution. | 51. Secondly, as is apparent from paragraphs 45 and 46 of the present judgment, account must also be taken of the actual application of the national provisions on exclusions from the right to a deduction of VAT and the effects which follow for the taxable persons. |
41. However, the fact that a number of other Member States reimburse blood donors’ costs may be relevant when assessing the objective justification put forward in relation to the Austrian legislation, and, particularly, concerning the assessment of its proportionality (see, in that regard, Case C‑333/08 Commission v France [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 105). | 105. It should also be noted, as the French Republic has pointed out, that the mere fact that one Member State imposes less strict rules than those applicable in another Member State does not mean that the latter are incompatible with Articles 28 EC and 30 EC (see, to that effect, Case C‑514/03 Commission v Spain [2006] ECR I-963, paragraph 49). However, the absence of a prior authorisation scheme with regard to the use of processing aids in the preparation of foodstuffs in all or nearly all of the other Member States may be relevant when assessing the objective justification put forward in relation to the French legislation, and, particularly, with regard to the assessment of its proportionality. | 24 The provisions of the Regulation disclose an intention on the part of the Community legislator to include non-contributory old-age benefits, such as the guaranteed income, within the scope of Article 46. |
35. La Cour a jugé que la prise en considération de l’expérience spécifique pour le travail à réaliser est fondée sur la capacité technique des soumissionnaires et cette expérience constitue un critère pertinent pour vérifier l’aptitude des entrepreneurs au regard des dispositions portant plus particulièrement sur les critères dits de «sélection qualitative» (voir, en ce sens et par analogie, arrêt Beentjes, EU:C:1988:422, point 24). | 24 In this case specific experience relating to the work to be carried out was a criterion for determining the technical knowledge and ability of the tenderers . It is therefore a legitimate criterion for checking contractors' suitability under Articles 20 and 26 of the directive . | 60. Therefore, given its general context and objective, the three-month period set out in Article 6(5) of the sixth steel aid code cannot be regarded as a prescription period linked to loss of competence. |
70. It is true that the Court’s case-law provides that in proceedings under Article 258 TFEU for failure to fulfil obligations it is for the Commission to prove the allegation that the obligation has not been fulfilled. It is therefore the Commission’s responsibility to place before the Court the information needed to enable the Court to establish that the obligation has not been fulfilled, and in so doing the Commission may not rely on any presumptions (see, inter alia, Case C-494/01 Commission v Ireland [2005] ECR I-3331, paragraph 41; Commission v Portugal , paragraph 32; Case C-335/07 Commission v Finland [2009] ECR I-9459, paragraph 46; and the judgment of 10 December 2009 in Case C-390/07 Commission v United Kingdom , paragraph 43). | 32. Selon une jurisprudence constante, dans le cadre d’un recours en manquement, il incombe à la Commission d’établir l’existence du manquement allégué. C’est elle qui doit apporter à la Cour les éléments nécessaires à la vérification par celle-ci de l’existence de ce manquement, sans pouvoir se fonder sur une présomption quelconque (voir, notamment, arrêts du 25 mai 1982, Commission/Pays-Bas, 96/81, Rec. p. 1791, point 6; du 26 juin 2003, Commission/Espagne, C‑404/00, Rec. p. I‑6695, point 26, et du 26 avril 2007, Commission/Italie, C‑135/05, Rec. p. I‑3475, point 26). | 70. It follows from the above that, whilst EU law does not preclude an internal allocation of competences whereby certain games of chance are a matter for the Länder and others for the federal authority, the fact remains that, in such a case, the authorities of the Land concerned and the federal authorities are jointly required to fulfil the obligation on the Federal Republic of Germany not to infringe Article 49 EC. It follows that, in the full measure to which compliance with that obligation requires it, those various authorities are bound, for that purpose, to coordinate the exercise of their respective competences. |
52. It follows that the General Court infringed Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94 (see, to that effect, Case C-383/99 P Procter & Gamble v OHIM [2001] ECR I‑6251, paragraph 45). | 45 The Court of First Instance therefore erred in law in holding that the OHIM'S First Board of Appeal was right to find that BABY-DRY was not capable of constituting a Community trade mark on the basis of that provision. | 54 In particular, it is contrary to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty to levy a tax on imported used vehicles based on a value which is higher than the real value of the vehicle with the result that imported used vehicles are taxed more heavily than similar used vehicles which are on sale on the domestic market (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark, paragraph 22). In taxing used vehicles, their actual depreciation must therefore be taken into account. |
46. Moreover, the restriction at issue in the main proceedings cannot be justified by the need to ensure the coherence of the national tax system, which the Court has acknowledged constitutes an overriding reason in the public interest (see, to that effect, Case C-204/90 Bachmann [1992] ECR I-249, paragraph 28, and Case C-300/90 Commission v Belgium [1992] ECR I-305, paragraph 21). | 28 In the light of the foregoing, it must be recognized that, in the field of pensions and life assurance, provisions such as those contained in the Belgian legislation at issue are justified by the need to ensure the cohesion of the tax system of which they form part, and that such provisions are not, therefore, contrary to Article 48 of the Treaty. | 32. With regard to the objective element, it must be apparent from a combination of objective circumstances that, despite formal observance of the conditions laid down by EU rules, the purpose of those rules has not been achieved (see, inter alia, Case C‑110/99 Emsland-Stärke [2000] ECR I‑11569, paragraph 52, and Case C‑515/03 Eichsfelder Schlachtbetrieb [2005] ECR I‑7355, paragraph 39). |
38. In the absence of that limit, the exercise of the applicant’s right to obtain a reasoned decision within the mandatory 90-day time-limit, which may be extended by a further 90 days, would be excessively difficult (see Case C-255/00 Grundig Italiana [2002] ECR I-8003, paragraph 33, and Case C-129/00 Commission v Italy [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 25). In effect, the Member States could impose a longer time-limit for implementation of the decision annulling the initial decision than that which the Directive prescribes for the closure of the administrative procedure. In that case, the decision of annulment would not protect the applicant’s right. | 33 In the absence of Community rules on the recovery of national charges levied though not due, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from Community law, provided, first, that such rules are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and, secondly, that they do not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (principle of effectiveness) (see, inter alia, Aprile, cited above, paragraph 18). | 24 However, as the Advocate General notes in point 36 of his Opinion, traders such as hoteliers who provide services habitually associated with travel frequently make use of services bought in from third parties which take up a small proportion of the package price compared to the accommodation and are among the tasks traditionally entrusted to such traders. Those bought-in services do not therefore constitute for customers an aim in itself, but a means of better enjoying the principal service supplied by the trader. |
29 In order to determine whether the conditions for the transfer of an entity are met, it is necessary to consider all the facts characterising the transaction in question, including in particular the type of undertaking or business, whether or not its tangible assets, such as buildings and movable property, are transferred, the value of its intangible assets at the time of the transfer, whether or not the majority of its employees are taken over by the new employer, whether or not its customers are transferred, the degree of similarity between the activities carried on before and after the transfer, and the period, if any, for which those activities were suspended. However, all those circumstances are merely single factors in the overall assessment which must be made and cannot therefore be considered in isolation (see, in particular, Spijkers and Süzen, paragraphs 13 and 14 respectively). | 13 IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER THOSE CONDITIONS ARE MET , IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER ALL THE FACTS CHARACTERIZING THE TRANSACTION IN QUESTION , INCLUDING THE TYPE OF UNDERTAKING OR BUSINESS , WHETHER OR NOT THE BUSINESS ' S TANGIBLE ASSETS , SUCH AS BUILDINGS AND MOVABLE PROPERTY , ARE TRANSFERRED , THE VALUE OF ITS INTANGIBLE ASSETS AT THE TIME OF THE TRANSFER , WHETHER OR NOT THE MAJORITY OF ITS EMPLOYEES ARE TAKEN OVER BY THE NEW EMPLOYER , WHETHER OR NOT ITS CUSTOMERS ARE TRANSFERRED AND THE DEGREE OF SIMILARITY BETWEEN THE ACTIVITIES CARRIED ON BEFORE AND AFTER THE TRANSFER AND THE PERIOD , IF ANY , FOR WHICH THOSE ACTIVITIES WERE SUSPENDED . IT SHOULD BE NOTED , HOWEVER , THAT ALL THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE MERELY SINGLE FACTORS IN THE OVERALL ASSESSMENT WHICH MUST BE MADE AND CANNOT THEREFORE BE CONSIDERED IN ISOLATION .
| 129. Consequently, the claims in the Commission’s application seeking a declaration that the Federal Republic of Germany has failed to fulfil its obligations under Directive 2005/36 are in principle admissible, on condition that the obligations arising under that directive are analogous to those arising under Directive 89/48 (see, by analogy, Case C‑416/07 Commission v Greece , paragraph 29). |
40. In the context of an appeal, the purpose of review by the Court of Justice is, inter alia, to consider whether the General Court responded to the requisite legal standard to all the arguments raised by the appellant (see, to that effect, Case C‑185/95 P Baustahlgewebe v Commission [1998] ECR I‑8417, paragraph 128; Case C-359/01 P British Sugar v Commission [2004] ECR I-4933, paragraph 47; and Joined Cases C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C‑213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission [2005] ECR I-5425, paragraph 244). | 244. It should be borne in mind, second, that in the context of an appeal the purpose of review by the Court of Justice is, first, to examine to what extent the Court of First Instance took into consideration, in a legally correct manner, all the essential factors to assess the gravity of particular conduct in the light of Article 85 of the Treaty and Article 15 of Regulation No 17 and, second, to consider whether the Court of First Instance responded to a sufficient legal standard to all the arguments raised by the appellant with a view to having the fine cancelled or reduced (see, in particular, Baustahlgewebe v Commission , cited above, paragraph 128, and Case C-359/01 P British Sugar v Commission [2004] ECR I-4933, paragraph 47). | 43. Where the competent OHIM bodies are called upon to rule, initially, on an application for a declaration of invalidity of a Community mark based on an earlier copyright protected by a rule of national law, their decision may have the effect of depriving the proprietor of the Community trade mark of a right that has been granted to him. The scope of such a decision necessarily implies that the authority which takes it is not limited to the role of mere validation of the national law as submitted by the applicant for a declaration of invalidity. |
32. According to the case-law of the Court, it follows from the wording of that provision that the notion of supply of goods does not refer to the transfer of ownership in accordance with the procedures prescribed by the applicable national law but covers any transfer of tangible property by one party which empowers the other party actually to dispose of it as if he were the owner of the property. The purpose of the Sixth Directive might be jeopardised if the requirements for there to be a supply of goods, which is one of the three taxable transactions, were to differ according to the civil law of the Member State concerned (see, to that effect, Case C‑320/88 Shipping and Forwarding Enterprise Safe [1990] ECR I‑285, paragraphs 7 and 8; Case C‑291/92 Armbrecht [1995] ECR I‑2775, paragraphs 13 and 14; Case C‑185/01 Auto Lease Holland [2003] ECR I‑1317, paragraphs 32 and 33; and Case C‑25/03 HE [2005] ECR I‑3123, paragraph 64). | 32. As the Court found in paragraphs 7 and 8 of Shipping and Forwarding Enterprise Safe , it is clear from the wording of that provision that "supply of goods" does not refer to the transfer of ownership in accordance with the procedures prescribed by the applicable national law but covers any transfer of tangible property by one party which empowers the other party actually to dispose of it as if he were the owner of the property. The purpose of the Sixth Directive might be jeopardised if the preconditions for a supply of goods ─ which is one of the three taxable transactions ─ varied from one Member State to another, as do the conditions governing the transfer of ownership under civil law. | 54 In particular, it is contrary to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty to levy a tax on imported used vehicles based on a value which is higher than the real value of the vehicle with the result that imported used vehicles are taxed more heavily than similar used vehicles which are on sale on the domestic market (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark, paragraph 22). In taxing used vehicles, their actual depreciation must therefore be taken into account. |
10. With regard to the interests which Article 4(6) of the regulation seeks to safeguard, the derogations provided for in that provision are based on the nature of the services in connection with which the vehicles are used. In that respect it is apparent from the list in Article 4(6) that the services envisaged by that provision are all general services performed in the public interest (see Licensing Authority South Eastern Traffic Area v British Gas , cited above, paragraph 13). | 13 With regard to the interests which Article 4(6) of Regulation No 3820/85 seeks to safeguard, the derogations provided for in that provision are based on the nature of the services in connection with which the vehicles are used. In that respect it is apparent from the list in Article 4(6) that the services envisaged by that provision are all general services performed in the public interest. | 21. The presumption that questions referred by national courts for a preliminary ruling are relevant may be rebutted only in exceptional cases, where it is quite obvious that the interpretation which is sought of the provisions of European Union law referred to in the questions bears no relation to the purpose of the main action (see Case C-283/09 Weryński [2011] ECR I-601, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited). |
21. Thus, a sign which, in relation to the goods or services in respect of which its registration as a mark is applied for, has descriptive character for the purposes of Article 3(1)(c) of the directive is therefore necessarily devoid of any distinctive character as regards those goods or services, within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of that directive (see Koninklijke KPN Nederland , paragraph 86, and Case C‑51/10 P Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol v OHIM [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited). | 86. In particular, a word mark which is descriptive of characteristics of goods or services for the purposes of Article 3(1)(c) of the Directive is, on that account, necessarily devoid of any distinctive character with regard to the same goods or services within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Directive. A mark may none the less be devoid of any distinctive character in relation to goods or services for reasons other than the fact that it may be descriptive. | 29. Thus, the Court may reject a request for a preliminary ruling submitted by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it ( Alassini and Others , paragraph 26). |
46. It is thus clear from case-law that, whatever the mechanism adopted for preventing or mitigating the imposition of a series of charges to tax or economic double taxation, the freedoms of movement guaranteed by the Treaty preclude a Member State from treating foreign-sourced dividends less favourably than nationally-sourced dividends, unless such a difference in treatment concerns situations which are not objectively comparable or is justified by overriding reasons in the general interest (see, to that effect, Case C‑315/02 Lenz [2004] ECR I‑7063, paragraphs 20 to 49, and Case C‑319/02 Manninen [2004] ECR I‑7477, paragraphs 20 to 55). Likewise, as regards the decisions which Directive 90/435 leaves in the hands of the Member States, the Court has pointed out that these may be exercised only in compliance with the fundamental provisions of the Treaty, in particular those relating to freedom of establishment ( Keller Holding , paragraph 45). | 31. However, both revenue from capital of Austrian origin and such revenue originating in another Member State are capable of being the subject of double taxation. In both cases, the revenue is, in principle, subject first to corporation tax and then, to the extent to which it is distributed in the form of dividends, to income tax. | 15. It is appropriate also to note that, in respect of the relationship between Article 9(1) and (2) of the Sixth Directive, the Court has held that Article 9(1) in no way takes precedence over Article 9(2). In every situation, the question which arises is whether that situation is covered by one of the instances mentioned in Article 9(2) of that directive. If not, it falls within the scope of Article 9(1) ( Dudda , paragraph 21; Linthorst, Pouwels en Scheres , paragraph 11; and RAL (Channel Islands) and Others , paragraph 24). |
71. It is established case‑law that the principle of legal certainty requires that European Union legislation must be certain and its application foreseeable by those subject to it (see, in particular, Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission , paragraph 69, and Case C‑67/09 P Nuova Agricast and Cofra v Commission [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 77). The right to rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations extends to any person in a situation in which a European Union institution has caused him to entertain expectations which are justified by precise assurances provided to him. However, if a prudent and alert economic operator could have foreseen the adoption of a European Union measure likely to affect his interests, he cannot plead that principle if the measure is adopted (see Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission, paragraph 147; Case C‑519/07 P Commission v Koninklijke FrieslandCampina [2009] ECR I‑8495, paragraph 84; and Case C‑537/08 P Kahla Thüringen Porzellan v Commission [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 63). | 69. In order to determine whether the Commission was entitled to carry out such a new investigation, it should be noted not only that the principle of legal certainty requires that Community legislation must be certain and its application foreseeable by those subject to it (Case 325/85 Ireland v Commission [1987] ECR 5041, paragraph 18, and Case C‑63/93 Duff and Others [1996] ECR I‑569, paragraph 20), but also that its application must be combined with that of the principle of legality (Joined Cases 42/59 and 49/59 SNUPAT v High Authority [1961] ECR 53, 87). | 45. It does not follow from these provisions, or from any other provision of the Montreal Convention, that the authors of the Convention intended to shield those carriers from any other form of intervention, in particular action which could be envisaged by the public authorities to redress, in a standardised and immediate manner, the damage that is constituted by the inconvenience that delay in the carriage of passengers by air causes, without the passengers having to suffer the inconvenience inherent in the bringing of actions for damages before the courts. |
26. The matter would be different only if the provision of European Union law which was submitted for interpretation by the Court were not applicable to the facts of the main proceedings, which had occurred before the accession of a new Member State to the Union, or if such provision was manifestly incapable of applying ( Telefónica O2 Czech Republic , paragraph 23). | 23. The matter would be different only if the provision of Community law which was submitted for interpretation by the Court was not applicable to the facts of the main proceedings, which had occurred before the accession of a new Member State to the Union (see, to this effect, Case C‑302/04 Ynos [2006] ECR I‑371, paragraphs 35 and 36) or if such provision was manifestly incapable of applying (see Reisdorf , paragraph 16). | 19 It is true that the profit margin of 5% was applied without any differentiation between the various traders concerned for the purpose of constructing the normal value of plain paper photocopiers . However, the traders in question, who are limited in number, were identified by the institutions, and it was precisely in order to reflect the particular features of their business dealings with producers that the profit margin used was set at 5 %. |
79. Even if the referring tribunal has limited its question to the interpretation of Regulation No 1408/71, such a situation does not prevent the Court from providing the national court or tribunal with all the elements of interpretation of EU law which may enable it to rule on the case before it, whether or not reference is made thereto in the question referred (see, to that effect, Case C‑241/89 SARPP [1990] ECR I‑4695, paragraph 8; Case C‑152/03 Ritter-Coulais [2006] ECR I‑1711, paragraph 29; and Case C‑392/05 Alevizos [2007] ECR I‑3505, paragraph 64). | 8 By way of a preliminary observation, it should be pointed out that although the Court may not, within the framework of Article 177 of the Treaty, rule on the compatibility of a provision of national law with the Treaty, it may provide the national court with all those elements by way of interpretation of Community law which may enable it to assess that compatibility for the purposes of the case before it . Moreover, in doing so it may deem it necessary to consider provisions of Community law to which the national court has not referred in its question . | 73. This is indeed borne out by recital 17 in the preamble to Directive 93/83, according to which the right holders concerned must be ensured an appropriate remuneration for the communication to the public by satellite of their works that takes account of all aspects of the broadcast, such as its actual audience and its potential audience (see, to this effect, Football Association Premier League and Others , paragraphs 108 and 110). |
56. With regard, secondly, to the consequences for national courts of such an infringement of Article 6(b) of Directive 2003/88, the Court has consistently held that, whenever the provisions of a directive appear, so far as their subject-matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, they may be relied upon by individuals as against the State, including in its capacity as an employer, in particular when it has failed to transpose that directive into national law within the time-limit or has transposed it incorrectly (see, to that effect, Case 152/84 Marshall [1986] ECR 723, paragraphs 46 and 49, and Joined Cases C‑378/07 to C‑380/07 Angelidaki and Others [2009] ECR I‑3071, paragraphs 193 and 194). | 49 IN THAT RESPECT IT MUST BE POINTED OUT THAT WHERE A PERSON INVOLVED IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS ABLE TO RELY ON A DIRECTIVE AS AGAINST THE STATE HE MAY DO SO REGARDLESS OF THE CAPACITY IN WHICH THE LATTER IS ACTING , WHETHER EMPLOYER OR PUBLIC AUTHORITY . IN EITHER CASE IT IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT THE STATE FROM TAKING ADVANTAGE OF ITS OWN FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH COMMUNITY LAW .
| 32. Such requirements necessarily entail that the particular circumstances of each breach of the principle of equal treatment should be taken into account. In the event of discriminatory dismissal, a situation of equality could not be restored without either reinstating the victim of discrimination or, in the alternative, granting financial compensation for the loss and damage sustained (judgment in Marshall , C‑271/91, EU:C:1993:335, paragraph 25). |
27. However, the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding the rights which taxpayers derive from EU law must not be any less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and must not be framed in such a way as to render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by the legal order of the European Union (principle of effectiveness) (see, to that effect, inter alia, judgments in Rewe-Zentralfinanz and Rewe-Zentral , 33/76, EU:C:1976:188, paragraph 5; Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales , C‑118/08, EU:C:2010:39, paragraph 31; and Test Claimants in the Franked Investment Income Group Litigation , C‑362/12, EU:C:2013:834, paragraph 32). | 32. Les modalités procédurales des recours destinés à assurer la sauvegarde des droits que les contribuables tirent du droit de l’Union ne doivent ainsi pas être moins favorables que celles concernant des recours similaires de droit interne (principe d’équivalence) ni aménagées de manière à rendre impossible en pratique ou excessivement difficile l’exercice des droits conférés par l’ordre juridique de l’Union (principe d’effectivité) (voir, notamment, arrêt du 18 mars 2010, Alassini e.a., C‑317/08 à C‑320/08, Rec. p. I‑2213, point 48 et jurisprudence citée, ainsi que arrêt Agrokonsulting-04, précité, point 36). | 54 In particular, it is contrary to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty to levy a tax on imported used vehicles based on a value which is higher than the real value of the vehicle with the result that imported used vehicles are taxed more heavily than similar used vehicles which are on sale on the domestic market (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark, paragraph 22). In taxing used vehicles, their actual depreciation must therefore be taken into account. |
66. Various factors, set out in paragraphs 291 to 327 of the Kadi judgment, were advanced in support of the position stated by the Court in that judgment, and there has been no change in those factors which could justify reconsideration of that position, those factors being, essentially, bound up with the constitutional guarantee which is exercised, in a Union based on the rule of law (see Case C‑550/09 E and F [2010] ECR I‑6213, paragraph 44, and the judgment of 26 June 2012 in Case C‑335/09 P Poland v Commission [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 48), by judicial review of the lawfulness of all European Union measures, including those which, as in the present case, implement an international law measure, in the light of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the European Union. | 325. Moreover, those Guidelines do not require the Sanctions Committee to communicate to the applicant the reasons and evidence justifying his appearance in the summary list or to give him access, even restricted, to that information. Last, if that Committee rejects the request for removal from the list, it is under no obligation to give reasons. | 25. The equal treatment rule laid down in Article 45 TFEU and in Article 7 of Regulation No 492/2011 prohibits not only overt discrimination by reason of nationality but also all covert forms of discrimination which, through the application of other distinguishing criteria, lead in fact to the same result (see, inter alia, Case C‑237/94 O’Flynn [1996] ECR I‑2617, paragraph 17, and Case C‑172/11 Erny [2012] ECR, paragraph 39). |
106. The Court added, in paragraph 21 of Daily Mail and General Trust , that the EEC Treaty had taken account of that variety in national legislation. In defining, in Article 58 of that Treaty (later Article 58 of the EC Treaty, now Article 48 EC), the companies which enjoy the right of establishment, the EEC Treaty placed on the same footing, as connecting factors, the registered office, central administration and principal place of business of a company. | 21 The Treaty has taken account of that variety in national legislation . In defining, in Article 58, the companies which enjoy the right of establishment, the Treaty places on the same footing, as connecting factors, the registered office, central administration and principal place of business of a company . Moreover, Article 220 of the Treaty provides for the conclusion, so far as is necessary, of agreements between the Member States with a view to securing inter alia the retention of legal personality in the event of transfer of the registered office of companies from one country to another . No convention in this area has yet come into force . | 14. À cet égard il convient de rappeler qu’il résulte de l’article 38, paragraphe 1, sous c), du règlement de procédure de la Cour et de la jurisprudence y relative que toute requête introductive d’instance doit indiquer l’objet du litige et l’exposé sommaire des moyens, et que cette indication doit être suffisamment claire et précise pour permettre à la partie défenderesse de préparer sa défense et à la Cour d’exercer son contrôle. Il en découle que les éléments essentiels de fait et de droit sur lesquels un recours est fondé doivent ressortir d’une façon cohérente et compréhensible du texte de la requête elle-même et que les conclusions de cette dernière doivent être formulées de manière non équivoque afin d’éviter que la Cour ne statue ultra petita ou bien n’omette de statuer sur un grief (voir arrêt du 26 avril 2007, Commission/Finlande, C‑195/04, Rec. p. I‑3351, point 22 et jurisprudence citée). |
47. First of all, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, while direct taxation, as EU law currently stands, falls within the competence of the Member States, they must none the less exercise that competence consistently with EU law (see, inter alia, Case C-155/09 Commission v Greece [2011] ECR I-65, paragraph 39; Case C-10/10 Commission v Austria [2011] ECR I-5389, paragraph 23; Case C-250/08 Commission v Belgium [2011] ECR I-12341, paragraph 33; and Case C-253/09 Commission v Hungary [2011] ECR I-12391, paragraph 42). | 39. It should be recalled at the outset that, according to settled case-law, although direct taxation falls within their competence, the Member States must none the less exercise that competence consistently with EU law (see, inter alia, Case C‑334/02 Commission v France [2004] ECR I-2229, paragraph 21; Case C‑104/06 Commission v Sweden [2007] ECR I‑671, paragraph 12, and Case C‑152/05 Commission v Germany [2008] ECR I‑39, paragraph 16). | 75 Accordingly, it must be accepted that the requirement at issue, whose aim is to preserve the considerable reputation of Rioja wine by strengthening control over its particular characteristics and its quality, is justified as a measure protecting the denominación de origen calificada which may be used by all the producers concerned and is of decisive importance to them. |
45. In that regard, the training and employment of teaching staff and the application of a specific labour market policy which takes account of the specific situation of the staff in the discipline concerned, put forward by the University and the Bulgarian Government, may be consonant with the intention of allocating the posts for professors in the best possible way between the generations, in particular by appointing young professors. As regards the latter aim, the Court has already held that encouragement of recruitment undoubtedly constitutes a legitimate aim of Member States’ social or employment policy ( Palacios de la Villa , paragraph 65), in particular when the promotion of access of young people to a profession is involved (see, to that effect, Petersen , paragraph 68). Consequently, encouragement of recruitment in higher education by means of the offer of posts as professors to younger people may constitute such a legitimate aim. | 68. The Court has previously held that the encouragement of recruitment undeniably constitutes a legitimate social policy or employment policy objective of the Member States, and that that assessment must evidently apply to instruments of national employment policy designed to improve opportunities for entering the labour market for certain categories of workers (see Palacios de la Villa , paragraph 65). Similarly, a measure intended to promote the access of young people to the profession of dentist in the panel system may be regarded as an employment policy measure. | 31
By contrast, the terms ‘cancellation’ and ‘refusal’ in Article 90(1) of the VAT Directive refer to situations in which, following either cancellation with retroactive effect or refusal with effect in the future only, the debtor’s obligation to discharge his or her debt is either fully extinguished or set at a definitive level, with corresponding consequences for the creditor. |
86
It must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law of the Court, the duty incumbent upon the General Court under Article 36 and the first paragraph of Article 53 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union to state reasons for its judgments does not require the General Court to provide an account that follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments articulated by the parties to the case. The reasoning may therefore be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to understand the grounds of the General Court’s judgment and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient information to exercise its powers of review on appeal (judgment of 8 March 2016, Greece v Commission, C‑431/14 P, EU:C:2016:145, paragraph 38). | 38
As regards the second part of the first ground of appeal, it must be recalled that, according to the settled case-law of the Court, the duty incumbent upon the General Court under Article 36 and the first paragraph of Article 53 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union to state reasons for its judgments does not require the General Court to provide an account that follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments articulated by the parties to the case. The reasoning may therefore be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to understand the grounds of the General Court’s judgment and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient information to exercise its powers of review on appeal (see, inter alia, judgment in A2A v Commission, C‑320/09 P, EU:C:2011:858, paragraph 97). | 37. Or, en ce qui concerne, en l’espèce, les éléments susceptibles de justifier une limitation des effets dans le temps de l’arrêt de la Cour, force est de constater qu’Allianz, qui n’a pas fourni de preuves à cet égard, s’est bornée à mentionner un nombre très élevé de contrats d’assurance qui auraient été conclus sous le régime dit de «remise de la police» et en vertu desquels des primes représentant, au total, une somme très élevée auraient été payées. Allianz n’a toutefois pas fourni de données concernant le nombre, seul pertinent dans la présente affaire, de contrats d’assurance pour lesquels le preneur n’a pas été informé de son droit de renonciation, et elle n’a pas davantage chiffré le risque économique lié, pour Allianz, à la possibilité, pour les preneurs concernés, de renoncer à ces contrats. Dans ces conditions, l’existence d’un risque de répercussions économiques graves n’est pas établie. |
30
For the purposes of answering that question, it must be borne in mind, first, that the Court has already held that Article 22(4) of Regulation No 44/2001 reflects the same system as Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention and is, moreover, drafted in almost identical terms so that it is necessary to ensure continuity in the interpretation of those provisions (judgment of 12 July 2012, Solvay, C‑616/10, EU:C:2012:445, paragraph 43). | 43. Article 22(4) of Regulation No 44/2001, relevant to the examination of this question, reflects the same system as Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention and is, moreover, drafted in almost identical terms. In the light of such similarity, it is necessary to ensure, in accordance with recital 19 in the preamble to this regulation, continuity in their interpretation (see, by analogy, Case C-167/08 Draka NK Cables and Others [2009] ECR I-3477, paragraph 20; Case C-180/06 Ilsinger [2009] ECR I-3961, paragraph 58; and Zuid-Chemie , paragraph 19). | 33 As the Commission appositely pointed out, if such activities do not in themselves constitute an economic activity within the meaning of the Directive, the same must be true of activities consisting in the sale of such holdings. |
28. The fact that the amount of the usage fees is not determined unilaterally by the provider of the rescue services, but by agreement with the social security institutions which themselves have the status of a contracting authority (see, to that effect, Case C-300/07 Hans & Christophorus Oymanns [2009] ECR I-4779, paragraphs 40 to 59), and that those fees are not paid directly by the users of those services to the selected provider but through a central settlement office which is in charge of collecting and remitting those fees, by regular payments on account, does not affect that finding. The fact remains that all the remuneration obtained by the provider of the services comes from persons other than the contracting authority which awarded it the contract. | 59. The answer to be given to the first question referred is therefore that the first alternative of letter (c) of the second subparagraph of Article 1(9) of Directive 2004/18 must be interpreted as meaning that there is financing, for the most part, by the State when the activities of statutory sickness insurance funds are chiefly financed by contributions payable by members, which are imposed, calculated and collected according to rules of public law such as those in the main proceedings. Such sickness insurance funds are to be regarded as bodies governed by public law and therefore as contracting authorities for the purposes of the application of the rules in that directive.
The second question | 27. The place where the damage occurred must not, however, be confused with the place where the event which damaged the product itself occurred, the latter being the place of the event giving rise to the damage. By contrast, the ‘place where the damage occurred’ (see Mines de potasse d'Alsace , paragraph 15, and Shevill and Others , paragraph 21) is the place where the event which gave rise to the damage produces its harmful effects, that is to say, the place where the damage caused by the defective product actually manifests itself. |
45. It follows both from the requirements of the uniform application of Community law and the principle of equality that the terms of a provision of Community law which make no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the Community; that interpretation must take into account the context of the provision and the purpose of the legislation in question (Case C-287/98 Linster [2000] ECR I-6917, paragraph 43, and Case C‑40/01 Ansul [2003] ECR I-2439, paragraph 26). | 43 The need for uniform application of Community law and the principle of equality require that the terms of a provision of Community law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the Community; that interpretation must take into account the context of the provision and the purpose of the legislation in question (Case 327/82 Ekro v Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees [1984] ECR 107, paragraph 11). | 55. That public interest requires that all signs or indications which may serve to designate characteristics of the goods or services in respect of which registration is sought remain freely available to all undertakings in order that they may use them when describing the same characteristics of their own goods. Therefore, marks consisting exclusively of such signs or indications are not eligible for registration unless Article 3(3) of the Directive applies. |
38. In the same way, as stated in point VIII of the explanatory note to the HS on general rule 3(b), the factor which determines the essential character of the goods may, depending on the type of goods, be determined for example by the nature of the constituent material or components, its bulk, quantity, weight or value, or the role of a constituent material in relation to the use of the goods ( Turbon International , paragraph 22, and Kloosterboer Services , paragraph 32). | 22. In the same way, as stated by paragraph VIII of the explanatory note to the HS on general rule 3(b), the factor which determines the essential character of the goods may, depending on the type of goods, be determined for example, by the nature of the material or component, its bulk, quantity, weight or value, or the role of a constituent material in relation to the use of the goods. | 56
Decisions adopted by the competent national authorities within the framework of Article 6(3) of Directive 92/43, whether they concern a request to participate in the authorisation procedure, the assessment of the need for an environmental assessment of the implications of a plan or project for a protected site, or the appropriateness of the conclusions drawn from such an assessment as regards the risks of that plan or project for the integrity of the site, and whether they are autonomous or integrated in a decision granting authorisation, are decisions which fall within the scope of Article 9(2) of the Aarhus Convention. |
34. Accordingly, the main objective pursued in recovering unlawfully paid State aid is to eliminate the distortion of competition caused by the competitive advantage which such aid affords (Case C‑277/00 Germany v Commission [2004] ECR I‑3925, paragraph 76, and Case C-520/07 P Commission v MTU Friedrichshafen [2009] ECR I‑8555, paragraph 57). By repaying the aid, the beneficiary forfeits the advantage which it had over its competitors on the market, and the situation prior to payment of the aid is restored (Case C‑350/93 Commission v Italy [1995] ECR I‑699, paragraph 22). | 57. Such considerations are even more relevant where the Commission orders, as in the present case, the recovery of the aid from the beneficiary, since the very aim of such reimbursement is to eliminate the distortion of competition brought about by a certain competitive advantage and, thus, to re-establish the status quo before the aid was granted (see, to that effect, inter alia Joined Cases C‑328/99 and C‑399/00 Italy and SIM 2 Multimedia v Commission [2003] ECR I‑4035, paragraph 66, and Case C‑277/00 Germany v Commission [2004] ECR I‑3925, paragraphs 74 to 76). | 95. As to the Community legislation, it is true that the name ‘feta’ is used without further specification as to the Member State of origin in the combined customs nomenclature and in the Community legislation relating to export refunds. |
108
First of all, it should be borne in mind that the General Court is the sole judge of any need to supplement the information available to it in respect of the cases before it. Whether or not the evidence before it is sufficient is a matter to be appraised by it alone and is not subject to review by the Court of Justice on appeal, except where that evidence has been distorted or the substantive inaccuracy of the findings of the General Court is apparent from the documents in the case (see judgment of 12 June 2014, Deltafina v Commission , C‑578/11 P, EU:C:2014:1742, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited). | 67. It is settled case-law that the General Court is the sole judge of any need to supplement the information available to it in respect of the cases before it. Whether or not the evidence before it is sufficient is a matter to be appraised by it alone and is not subject to review by the Court of Justice on appeal, except where that evidence has been distorted or the substantive inaccuracy of the findings of the General Court is apparent from the documents in the case (Case C‑385/07 P Der Grüne Punkt — Duales System Deutschland v Commission , EU:C:2009:456, paragraph 163 and the case-law cited). | 13. In those circumstances a Member State may not reduce the surface area of an SPA or alter its boundaries unless the areas excluded from the SPA are no longer the most suitable territories for the conservation of species of wild birds within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the Directive. |
29. Consequently, the Austrian Government cannot successfully contend that it is for the Member States to provide the definition of the concept of ‘reproduction in part’ in Article 2 of Directive 2001/29 (see, to that effect, with respect to the concept of ‘public’ as referred to in Article 3 of the same directive, SGAE , paragraph 31).
The first question | 31. Next, it should be noted that the need for uniform application of Community law and the principle of equality require that where provisions of Community law make no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining their meaning and scope, as is the case with Directive 2001/29/EC, they must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the Community (see, in particular, Case C-357/98 Yiadom [2000] ECR I‑9265, paragraph 26, and Case C-245/00 SENA [2003] ECR I‑1251, paragraph 23). It follows that the Austrian Government cannot reasonably maintain that it is for the Member States to provide the definition of ‘public’ to which Directive 2001/29 refers but does not define.
The first and third questions | 56. Il appartient à la Cour, dans l’exercice de son pouvoir d’appréciation, de fixer le montant de la somme forfaitaire de sorte qu’elle soit, d’une part, adaptée aux circonstances et, d’autre part, proportionnée au manquement constaté ainsi qu’à la capacité de paiement de l’État membre concerné. Figurent notamment au rang des facteurs pertinents à cet égard des éléments tels que la période durant laquelle le manquement reproché a persisté depuis l’arrêt l’ayant constaté et la gravité de l’infraction (arrêt Commission/Belgique, C‑533/11, EU:C:2013:659, point 53 et jurisprudence citée). |
74 As stated at paragraph 32 above, on 28 October 1996 the Council adopted Regulation No 2200/96 on the common organisation of the market in the fruit and vegetable sector. Since that regulation established an integrated regulatory framework that already contains measures of financial support for the sector concerned, a Member State may not unilaterally award aid related to production, even if the aid is limited to certain specific products intended for industrial processing and even though the quantity is subject to a ceiling. According to settled case-law, it is for the Community to seek solutions to the problems which might arise in the context of the common agricultural policy once, as in this case, it has established a common organisation of the market in a given sector (see, inter alia, to that effect, Case 90/86 Zoni [1988] ECR 4285, paragraph 26, and Italy v Commission, cited above, paragraph 19). | 19 It should also be pointed out that, as the Court has consistently held ( see, in particular, the judgment in Case 90/86 Criminal Proceedings against Zoni [1988] ECR 4285 ), once the Community has established a common market organization in a particular sector, it is for the Community to seek solutions to problems, such as those posed by wine surpluses, arising in the context of the common agricultural policy . Member States must therefore refrain from taking any unilateral measure even if that measure is likely to support the common policy of the Community . | 76. En l’occurrence, ainsi qu’il a été constaté dans l’arrêt attaqué, les réunions du comité logistique de la FNAS, tenues entre entreprises concurrentes, dont Comap, et portant sur des éléments sensibles de la politique commerciale, notamment sur les prix, avaient un caractère anticoncurrentiel. Par conséquent, afin de renverser la présomption du caractère illicite de sa participation à ces réunions, Comap devrait apporter la preuve qu’elle s’est distancée publiquement du contenu de celles‑ci. |
34. However, Member States are obliged to ensure that the civil liability arising under their domestic law is covered by insurance which complies with the provisions of the three abovementioned directives ( Farrell , paragraph 33). | 33. In that regard, the Court has already held that the First, Second and Third Directives do not seek to harmonise the rules of the Member States governing civil liability and that, as Community law stands at present, the Member States are free to determine the rules of civil liability applicable to road traffic accidents. However, the Member States must ensure that the civil liability arising under their domestic law is covered by insurance which complies with the provisions of the three directives in question (Case C-348/98 Mendes Ferreira and Delgado Correia Ferreira [2000] ECR I-6711, paragraphs 23 and 29, and Case C-537/03 Candolin and Others [2005] ECR I-5745, paragraph 24). | 57 B - APART FROM THESE CONSIDERATIONS THE SAID REGULATIONS - TOGETHER WITH THE INFLUENCE EXERTED BY THE ITALIAN AUTHORITIES ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE PRODUCERS CONCERNED - WERE IN MANY RESPECTS LIKELY TO BRING ABOUT THE CONCENTRATION OF DEMAND IN ITALY IN THE HANDS OF THE LARGE PRODUCERS AND THE FORMATION OF GROUPS OF PRODUCER-IMPORTERS AND ALSO OF SUPPLIER-EXPORTERS . |