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36 The Court has consistently held that it follows from the need for uniform application of EU law and from the principle of equality that the terms of a provision of that law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union, having regard to the context of the provision and the objective pursued by the legislation in question (judgment of 5 December 2013 in Vapenik, C‑508/12, EU:C:2013:790, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).

29. In the case of the Austrian compensatory supplement, the costs are borne by a social institution which then receives reimbursement in full from the relevant Land, which in turn receives from the Federal budget the sums necessary to finance the benefit. At no time do the contributions of insured persons form part of this financing arrangement.

55. Thus, where a Member State has a system for preventing or mitigating a series of charges to tax or economic double taxation for dividends paid to residents by resident companies, it must treat dividends paid to residents by non-resident companies in the same way (see, to that effect, Case C-315/02 Lenz [2004] ECR I‑7063, paragraphs 27 to 49, and Case C-319/02 Manninen [2004] ECR I‑7477, paragraphs 29 to 55).

43. Accordingly, the Austrian legislation must be regarded as having existed on 31 December 1993 for the purposes of Article 57(1) EC.

30. It follows that, first, the provisions of Article 6(2) of Decision No 1/80 are in no case applicable in the context of Article 7. It is solely for the purpose of calculating the periods of employment necessary to acquire the rights provided for in Article 6(1) that Article 6(2) sets out the effects, for the purposes of that calculation, of the various causes of interruption of employment (see Dogan , paragraph 15).

84 It follows that a sectoral pension fund of the kind at issue in the main proceedings engages in an economic activity in competition with insurance companies.

48. It follows from the case-law of the Court that, in the case of a mixed contract, the different aspects of which are, in accordance with the contract notice, inseparably linked and thus form an indivisible whole, the transaction at issue must be examined as a whole for the purposes of its legal classification and must be assessed on the basis of the rules which govern the aspect which constitutes the main object or predominant feature of the contract (see, to that effect, Case C‑3/88 Commission v Italy [1989] ECR 4035, paragraph 19; Case C‑331/92 Gestión Hotelera Internacional [1994] ECR I‑1329, paragraphs 23 to 26; Case C‑220/05 Auroux and Others [2007] ECR I‑385, paragraphs 36 and 37; Case C‑412/04 Commission v Italy [2008] ECR I‑619, paragraph 47; and Case C‑536/07 Commission v Germany [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 28, 29, 57 and 61).

27 NEVERTHELESS , THE EXERCISE OF THAT RIGHT MIGHT FALL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF THE PROHIBITIONS CONTAINED IN THE TREATY IF IT WERE TO MANIFEST ITSELF AS THE SUBJECT , THE MEANS , OR THE CONSEQUENCE OF A RESTRICTIVE PRACTICE .

25. It should be noted that the first subparagraph of Article 3(3) of Directive 92/12 could apply only if the requirement to submit a declaration were to be regarded as a ‘border-crossing formality’ giving rise to the levying of excise duty (Case C‑313/05 Brzeziński [2007] ECR I‑513, paragraph 45).

42. The measures adopted by the Member States must be appropriate for the purpose of establishing the normal conditions of competition which were distorted by the grant of the unlawful aid the recovery of which has been ordered by a Commission decision (judgment in Scott and Kimberly Clark , EU:C:2010:294, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).

59. In that connection, it should be borne in mind, first of all, that the Court has already ruled that Article 16(4) of Directive 2004/38 refers to loss of the right of permanent residence by reason of absences of more than two consecutive years from the host Member State and that such a measure may be justified because, after an absence of that duration, the link with the host Member State is loosened (see Lassal , paragraph 55).

43. However, the activities in question in the main proceedings, as carried out by FHT, namely the dispatch of a kit for collecting umbilical cord blood and the testing and processing of that blood and, where appropriate, the storage of stem cells contained in it, whether taken together or separately, do not appear to have as their direct purpose any actual diagnosis, treatment or cure of diseases or health disorders, or any actual protection, maintenance or restoration of health.

26 Thus, in certain labour-intensive sectors, a group of workers engaged in a joint activity on a permanent basis may constitute an economic entity. Such an entity is, therefore, capable of maintaining its identity after it has been transferred where the new employer does not merely pursue the activity in question but also takes over a major part, in terms of their numbers and skills, of the employees specially assigned by his predecessor to that task (Süzen, paragraph 21). Thus, an organised grouping of wage earners who are specifically and permanently assigned to a common task may, in the absence of other factors of production, amount to an economic entity (Hernández Vidal and Others, cited above, paragraph 26).

43. In the light of the foregoing it may reasonably be considered that a period of 15 months for carrying over the right to paid annual leave, such as the period at issue in the main proceedings, is not contrary to the purpose of that right, in that it ensures that the latter retains its positive effect for the worker as a rest period.

34. The third paragraph of Article 249 EC expressly provides that Member States may choose the form and methods for implementing directives which best ensures the result to be achieved by the directives. It follows from that provision that the implementation in domestic law of a directive does not necessarily require legislative action in each Member State. Thus, the Court has repeatedly held that it is not always necessary formally to enact the requirements of a directive in a specific express legal provision, since the general legal context may be sufficient for implementation of a directive, depending on its content. In particular, the existence of general principles of constitutional or administrative law may render superfluous transposition by specific legislative or regulatory measures provided, however, that those principles actually ensure the full application of the directive by the national authorities and that, where the relevant provision of the directive seeks to create rights for individuals, the legal situation arising from those principles is sufficiently precise and clear and that the persons concerned are put in a position to know the full extent of their rights and, where appropriate, to be able to rely on them before the national courts (see, inter alia, Case 29/84 Commission v Germany [1985] ECR 1661, paragraphs 22 and 23; Case C‑217/97 Commission v Germany [1999] ECR I‑5087, paragraphs 31 and 32; and Case C‑233/00 Commission v France , paragraph 76).

28. À cet égard, il y a lieu de rappeler que, en l’absence d'une harmonisation au niveau de l'Union, les désavantages pouvant découler de l’exercice parallèle des compétences fiscales des différents États membres, pour autant qu’un tel exercice n’est pas discriminatoire, ne constituent pas des restrictions aux libertés de circulation (voir arrêt du 8 décembre 2011, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, C‑157/10, Rec. p. I‑13023, point 38).

25. It is nevertheless necessary to ascertain, according to the actual wording of the provision, whether the means used to achieve those aims are ‘appropriate and necessary’. In the present case, it must be examined whether Paragraph 2a(2) of the Law on salaried employees enables the employment policy objectives pursued by the legislature to be attained without unduly prejudicing the legitimate interests of workers who, as a result of that provision, find themselves deprived of the severance allowance on the ground that they are entitled to a State retirement pension to which the employer has contributed (see, to that effect, judgment in Ingeniørforeningen i Danmark , EU:C:2010:600, paragraph 32).

35. À titre liminaire, il convient de rappeler que, en devenant partie à la convention d’Aarhus, l’Union européenne s’est engagée à assurer, dans le champ d’application du droit de l’Union, un accès de principe aux informations sur l’environnement détenues par les autorités publiques ou pour le compte de celles-ci (voir, en ce sens, arrêts du 22 décembre 2010, Ville de Lyon, C‑524/09, Rec. p. I‑14115, point 36, et du 14 février 2012, Flachglas Torgau, C‑204/09, point 30).

39 As noted by the Advocate General in points 98 to 100 of his Opinion, Articles 34 to 36 TFEU do not apply to the main proceedings because, first, all the elements are confined within a single Member State (see, to that effect, judgments of 30 November 1995, Esso Española, C‑134/94, EU:C:1995:414, paragraph 13, and of 15 November 2016, Ullens de Schooten, C‑268/15, EU:C:2016:874, paragraph 47) and, second, the provisions of the LFGB, at issue in the main proceedings, do not have as object or effect disadvantaging exports vis-à-vis internal commerce (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 December 2008, Gysbrechts and Santurel Inter, C‑205/07, EU:C:2008:730, paragraph 40).

98 Where, following the annulment of a decision in a competition matter, the Commission chooses to rectify the illegality or illegalities found and to adopt a new identical decision which is not vitiated by those illegalities, that decision relates to the same objections as those in respect of which the undertakings have already submitted observations. Elf Atochem cannot therefore validly maintain that the PVC I and the PVC II decisions each refer to separate sets of complaints.

26. According to the case-law of the Court, the basis of assessment for a supply of services is everything which makes up the consideration for the service supplied and a supply of services is taxable only if there is a direct link between the service supplied and the consideration received by the supplier (see, to that effect, Case 102/86 Apple and Pear Development Council [1988] ECR 1443, paragraphs 11 and 12, and Tolsma , paragraph 14).

22 As the Court held in Case C-279/93 Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v Schumacker [1995] ECR I-225, paragraph 30, discrimination can arise only through the application of different rules to comparable situations or the application of the same rule to different situations.

33. In the present case, the referring court – which alone has jurisdiction both to in terpret the national law and to find and assess the facts in the case before it and, in particular, the way in which that law is applied by the tax authority (see, to that effect, Case C-594/10 van Laarhoven [2012], paragraph 36, and Case C-618/10 Banco Español de Crédito [2012] ECR, paragraph 76) – states that the VID applies Article 285 of Decree No 933 in a general and preventative manner, purely on the basis of the arithmetical finding that the excess VAT at issue is over the percentage specified in that provision, without undertaking any specific analysis of the circumstances, in the course of which the taxable person concerned would have a chance to demonstrate that there was no risk of tax evasion or avoidance.

38. Therefore, the answer to the fourth question is that clause 4(1) of the framework agreement must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘employment conditions’ covers the compensation that the employer must pay to an employee on account of the unlawful insertion of a fixed‑term clause into his employment contract. The fifth question

59. Consequently, where the tax authority has the information necessary to establish that the substantive requirements have been satisfied, it cannot, in relation to the right of the taxable person to deduct that tax, impose additional conditions which may have the effect of rendering that right ineffective for practical purposes (see judgment in Idexx Laboratories Italia , C‑590/13, EU:C:2014:2429, paragraph 40).

37 Furthermore, the obligation on all traders to have their products distributed by authorized retailers applies without distinction as to the origin of the products in question and does not affect the marketing of goods from other Member States differently from that of domestic products.

24 It is, furthermore, clear from, in particular, the judgment in Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association and Others v Bosman and Others [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraphs 84 to 86, that justifications on grounds of public policy, public security or public health, as envisaged in Article 48(3) of the Treaty, may be relied upon not only by Member States in order to justify limitations on freedom of movement for workers under their laws, regulations or administrative provisions but also by individuals in order to justify such limitations under agreements or other measures adopted by persons governed by private law. Thus, if an employer may rely on a derogation under Article 48(3), he must also be able to rely on the same principles under, in particular, Article 48(1) and (2).

85 UEFA objects that such an interpretation makes Article 48 of the Treaty more restrictive in relation to individuals than in relation to Member States, which are alone in being able to rely on limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health.

72 As the Court has previously observed, for those facilities to be applied, the TIR Convention requires, inter alia, that transport operations be guaranteed by associations approved by the contracting parties, in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 of the convention (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 September 2003, BGL, C‑78/01, EU:C:2003:490, paragraph 5).

226 As points 51 and 52 of the contested decision show, K+S/MdK and SCPA will hold shares of the relevant market, after the concentration, of 23% and 37% respectively, calculated on the basis of sales. A market share of approximately 60%, subdivided in that way, cannot of itself point conclusively to the existence of a collective dominant position on the part of those undertakings.

53. On the other hand, it is apparent from the case-law that the need to safeguard the balanced allocation between the Member States of the power to tax may be accepted, in particular, where the system in question is designed to prevent conduct capable of jeopardising the right of a Member State to exercise its powers of taxation in relation to activities carried out in its territory (see Oy AA , paragraph 54; Case C-379/05 Amurta [2007] ECR I-9569, paragraph 58; Case C-303/07 Aberdeen Property Fininvest Alpha [2009] ECR I-5145, paragraph 66; Case C‑284/09 Commission v Germany [2011] ECR I-0000, paragraph 77; and Joined Cases C-338/11 to C-347/11 Santander Asset Management SGIIC and Others [2012] ECR I-0000, paragraph 47).

77. En effet, la réglementation litigieuse considère, en principe, les héritiers ou les donataires tant résidents que non-résidents comme assujettis aux fins de la perception de droits de succession ou de mutation sur des biens immeubles situés en Espagne. Partant, il n’existe entre un résident et un non-résident aucune différence de situation objective de nature à fonder une différence de traitement (voir, en ce sens, arrêt Schumacker, EU:C:1995:31, point 37).

66. That said, the Court’s interpretation of Regulation No 1408/71 in response to the first question submitted for a preliminary ruling must be understood without prejudice to the solution which flows from the potential applicability of provisions of primary law (see, by way of analogy, Acereda Herrera , cited above, paragraph 38). The finding that a national measure may be consistent with a provision of a secondary law measure, in this case Regulation No 1408/71, does not necessarily have the effect of removing that measure from the scope of the Treaty’s provisions (see, to that effect, Case C‑158/96 Kohll [1998] ECR I‑1931, paragraph 25, and Case C‑372/04 Watts [2006] ECR I‑4325, paragraph 47). It follows that the applicability, as the case may be, of Articles 19 or 22 of Regulation No 1408/71 to a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings does not of itself prevent the person concerned from claiming, pursuant to primary law, the payment of certain costs relating to care received in a care home situated in another Member State, under rules different to those provided for in those articles (see, by analogy, Case C‑368/98 Vanbraekel and Others [2001] ECR I‑5363, paragraphs 37 to 53, along with Watts , cited above, paragraph 48).

22 It is clear from the wording of those provisions that a milk product, in which one or other constituent of milk has been replaced, if only partially, may not be designated by one of the designations referred to in the first indent of the second subparagraph of Article 2(2) of the Regulation.

60 Lastly, in the light of developments in the Dublin system as a result of Regulation No 604/2013, the fact that the rules applicable to asylum applications have been harmonised, albeit to a minimal degree (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 November 2010 in B and D, C‑57/09 and C‑101/09, EU:C:2010:661, paragraph 114), cannot, in itself, result in an interpretation that limits the scope of the remedy provided for in Article 27 of the regulation.

19 It is settled case-law that provisions which are in the nature of exceptions to a principle must be interpreted strictly (see, inter alia, Case C-399/93 Oude Luttikhuis and Others v Coberco [1995] ECR I-4515, paragraph 23, Case C-92/96 Commission v Spain [1998] ECR I-505, paragraph 31, and Case C-216/97 Gregg v Customs and Excise [1999] ECR I-4947, paragraph 12).

40. According to settled case-law, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs tariff purposes is in general to be found in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and of the notes to the sections or chapters (see, in particular, Case C‑42/99 Eru Portuguesa [2000] ECR I-7691, paragraph 13; Case C‑495/03 Intermodal Transports [2005] ECR I-8151, paragraph 47; Case C‑445/04 Possehl Erzkontor [2005] ECR I-0000, paragraph 19; and Case C-500/04 Proxxon [2006] ECR I-0000, paragraph 21).

55. As recital 10 in the preamble to Regulation No 1049/2001 emphasises, it is precisely the concern to improve the transparency of the Community decision-making process that explains that, as provided by Article 2(3) of the regulation, the right of access to documents held by the Parliament, the Council and the Commission extends not only to documents drawn up by those institutions but also to documents received from third parties, including the Member States, as expressly stated by Article 3(b) of the regulation.

35. However, as the Advocate General observed, in point 35 of her Opinion, provisions in an Act of Accession which permit exceptions to or derogations from rules laid down by the EC Treaty must be interpreted restrictively with reference to the Treaty provisions in question and must be limited to what is absolutely necessary in order to attain its objective (see, by analogy, Case 231/78 Commission v United Kingdom [1979] ECR 1447, paragraph 13; Case 77/82 Peskeloglou [1983] ECR 1085, paragraph 12; Case 11/82 Piraiki-Patraiki and Others v Commission [1985] ECR 207, paragraph 26; Case C‑3/87 Agegate [1989] ECR 4459, paragraph 39, and Case C-233/97 KappAhl [1998] ECR I‑8069, paragraph 18).

46. The imposition of a penalty payment is not, therefore, justified.

14. In that context, the tax authority begins by stating, according to the Augstākās tiesas Administratīvo lietu departaments (Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Court), that the Administratīvā apgabaltiesa (Regional Administrative Court) did not take into account the fact that, when the tax authority first conducted the examination of the customs declaration filed by Veloserviss, it did not have the communication from OLAF and, accordingly, it was not in a position to find that the submitted certificate of origin was incorrect. Next, it maintains that the Administratīvā apgabaltiesa (Regional Administrative Court) did not take into consideration the fact that Article 78(3) of the Customs Code is lex specialis in relation to Article 23(1) of the Latvian Law on duties and taxes. Lastly, it asserts that the Court of Justice, in paragraph 40 of the judgment in Greencarrier Freight Services Latvia (C‑571/12, EU:C:2014:102), stated that the customs authorities may communicate a new customs debt within a period of three years from the date on which that debt was incurred and that, consequently, the tax authority could supplement the original examination decision.

25 In the case of a breach of Community law attributable to a Member State acting in a field in which it has a wide discretion to make legislative choices the Court has held, at paragraph 51 of its judgment in Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, cited above, that such a right to reparation must be recognized where three conditions are met: the rule of law infringed must be intended to confer rights on individuals; the breach must be sufficiently serious; and there must be a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation resting on the State and the damage sustained by the injured parties.

133. Subparagraph (c) of the second paragraph of Article 82 EC prohibits any discrimination on the part of an undertaking in a dominant position which consists in the application of dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage (Case C‑163/99 Portugal v Commission [2001] ECR I‑2613, paragraph 46).

74. Thus, it is apparent from paragraphs 20 and 25 of Lady & Kid and Others that the only exception to the right to repayment of taxes levied in breach of EU law is in a case in which a charge that was not due has been directly passed on by the taxable person to the purchaser.

33. With regard to objective justification of such a restriction, it is to be borne in mind that the Court has on several occasions held that planning requirements relating, on the one hand, to the object of ensuring sufficient and permanent access to a balanced range of high-quality treatment in the Member State concerned and, on the other, to the wish to control costs and avoid, so far as possible, any waste of financial, technical and human resources may justify the requirement of prior authorisation for financial responsibility on the part of the competent institution for treatment proposed in another Member State (see, to that effect, Case C‑157/99 Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I‑5473, paragraphs 76 to 81; Müller-Fauré and van Riet , paragraphs 76 to 81, and Watts , paragraphs 108 to 110).

39. For the sake of completeness, it must be noted that, as recitals 3, 21 and 24 in the preamble to Regulation No 1782/2003 make clear, environmental protection forms part of the objectives of the single payment scheme. The Court has also held that environmental protection, one of the essential objectives of the European Union, must be regarded as forming part of the common agricultural policy (Case C-428/07 Horvath [2009] ECR I-6355, paragraph 29). Moreover, Article 2 point (1) of Regulation No 796/2004 expressly provides that arable land, and consequently agricultural areas pursuant to Article 2(a) of Regulation No 795/2004, is land maintained in good agricultural and environmental condition within the meaning of Article 5 of Regulation No 1782/2003.

31 Thus, as the Court has recognized on many occasions, the specific subject-matter of a trade mark is in particular to guarantee to the owner that he has the exclusive right to use that trade mark for the purpose of putting a product on the market for the first time and therefore to protect him against competitors wishing to take advantage of the status and reputation of the trade mark by selling products bearing it illegally (see Case 102/77 Hoffmann-La Roche v Centrafarm [1978] ECR 1139, paragraph 7; Case 1/81 Pfizer v Eurim-Pharm [1981] ECR 2913, paragraph 7; HAG II, paragraph 14; and IHT Internationale Heiztechnik, paragraph 33).

438. It is true that the Guidelines contain important details on that point and that it may be desirable that the Commission should provide the undertakings with those details, provided that that does not mean that it anticipates its decision in an inappropriate manner.

25. In relation to VAT, it follows, first, from Articles 2, 250(1) and 273 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1), which reproduce inter alia the provisions of Article 2 of the Sixth Directive and of Article 22(4) and (8) of that directive in the version resulting from Article 28h thereof, and second, from Article 4(3) TEU that every Member State is under an obligation to take all legislative and administrative measures appropriate for ensuring collection of all the VAT due on its territory and for preventing evasion (see Case C-132/06 Commission v Italy [2008] ECR I-5457, paragraphs 37 and 46).

121. Bien que la République de Pologne n’ait pas soulevé de fin de non‑recevoir tirée de l’irrecevabilité de ce grief, il convient néanmoins de relever, à titre liminaire, que la Cour peut examiner d’office si les conditions prévues à l’article 258 TFUE pour l’introduction d’un recours en manquement sont remplies (voir, notamment, arrêts du 8 mars 2012, Commission/Portugal, C‑524/10, point 64, et du 15 novembre 2012, Commission/Portugal, C‑34/11, point 42).

18 It follows that in the event of the transfer of an undertaking the contract of employment or employment relationship between the staff employed by the undertaking transferred may not be maintained with the transferor and is automatically continued with the transferee (Case C-362/89 D' Urso and Others v Ercole Marelli Elettromecanica Generale and Others [1991] ECR I-4105, paragraph 12). The Court concluded that the contracts of employment and employment relationships existing on the date of the transfer of an undertaking between the transferor and the workers employed in the undertaking transferred are automatically transferred to the transferee by the mere fact of the transfer (D' Urso, paragraph 20).

61. À cet égard, il convient de rappeler qu’il résulte des articles 256 TFUE, 58, premier alinéa, du statut de la Cour et 112, paragraphe 1, sous c), du règlement de procédure de cette dernière qu’un pourvoi doit indiquer de façon précise les éléments critiqués de la décision du Tribunal dont l’annulation est demandée ainsi que les arguments juridiques qui soutiennent de manière spécifique cette demande (voir, notamment, arrêts du 23 avril 2009, AEPI/Commission, C-425/07 P, Rec. p. I-3205, point 25, et du 9 juin 2011, Evropaïki Dynamiki/BCE, C‑401/09 P, non encore publié au Recueil, point 55).

33. Secondly, it should be noted, on the one hand, that the Court has already held that use of a trade mark to inform the public that the advertiser is specialised in the sale, or that he carries out the repair and maintenance, of products bearing that trade mark which have been marketed under that mark by its owner or with his consent, constitutes a use indicating the intended purpose of a product within the meaning of Article 6(1)(c) of Directive 89/104 (see BMW , paragraphs 54 and 58 to 63). That information is necessary in order to preserve the system of undistorted competition in the market for that product or service.

134. In that respect, as the Court's case-law makes clear, a distinction must be drawn between the obligations which the State must assume as owner of the share capital of a company and its obligations as a public authority (Spain v Commission , paragraph 22).

30. It must be recalled in this regard that, within the framework of the cooperation between the Court and national courts and tribunals established by Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court, before which the dispute has been brought and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of European Union law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling (see, inter alia, Case C‑415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I‑4921, paragraph 59, and Case C‑45/09 Rosenbladt [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 32).

12 QUE L ' ABOLITION DES BARRIERES DOUANIERES NE VISE DONC PAS EXCLUSIVEMENT A ELIMINER LEUR CARACTERE PROTECTEUR , LE TRAITE AYANT AU CONTRAIRE ENTENDU DONNER A LA REGLE DE L ' ELIMINATION DES DROITS DE DOUANE ET DES TAXES D ' EFFET EQUIVALENT UNE PORTEE ET UN EFFET GENERAUX EN VUE D ' ASSURER LA LIBRE CIRCULATION DES MARCHANDISES ;

24. The fact that a levy is categorised as a tax under national legislation does not mean that, in respect of Regulation No 1408/71, that same levy cannot be regarded as falling within the scope of that regulation (judgments in Commission v France , EU:C:2000:84, paragraph 34, and Commission v France , EU:C:2000:85, paragraph 32).

26 IT MUST BE EMPHASIZED , MOREOVER , THAT FINANCIAL NEUTRALITY - THE PRINCIPLE ON WHICH THE SYSTEM FOR OFFSETTING STORAGE COSTS IS BASED - IS ACHIEVED PRECISELY BY THE FACT THAT STORAGE COSTS ARE REIMBURSED ONLY IN RESPECT OF PRODUCTS ON WHICH A LEVY MAY BE COLLECTED FOLLOWING THEIR DISPOSAL AND , CONVERSELY , BY THE FACT THAT A LEVY IS COLLECTED ONLY IN RESPECT OF PRODUCTS WHICH ARE CAPABLE OF QUALIFYING FOR THE REIMBURSEMENT OF STORAGE COSTS , WITHOUT THERE BEING ANY NEED FOR SUCH A REIMBURSEMENT ACTUALLY TO BE MADE IN RESPECT OF THE PRODUCT IN QUESTION . THAT PRINCIPLE IS COMPLIED WITH WHERE THE PRODUCTS SUBJECT TO THE LEVY ARE CAPABLE OF QUALIFYING FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF STORAGE COSTS AT ANY MANUFACTURING STAGE ; SUCH A STAGE MAY BE DIFFERENT FROM THAT AT WHICH THE LEVY IS COLLECTED .

18 As the Court has emphasized on numerous occasions, in interpreting a provision of Community law it is necessary to consider its wording, its context and its aims (Case C-84/95 Bosphorus v Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications, Ireland and the Attorney General [1996] ECR I-3953, paragraph 11).

31 By contrast, the terms ‘cancellation’ and ‘refusal’ in Article 90(1) of the VAT Directive refer to situations in which, following either cancellation with retroactive effect or refusal with effect in the future only, the debtor’s obligation to discharge his or her debt is either fully extinguished or set at a definitive level, with corresponding consequences for the creditor.

62. However, a mechanism of that kind can function only if the customs authorities of the importing State accept the determinations legally made by the authorities of the exporting State (see, to that effect, Les Rapides Savoyards and Others , paragraph 27, and Joined Cases C‑23/04 to C‑25/04 Sfakianakis [2006] ECR I‑1265, paragraph 23).

62 It follows that the obligation for the national court to exclude an unfair contract term imposing the payment of amounts that prove not to be due entails, in principle, a corresponding restitutory effect in respect of those same amounts.

26. From this the Court has inferred that, in ensuring compliance with commitments a rising from an agreement concluded by the Community institutions, the Member States fulfil, within the Community system, an obligation in relation to the Community, which has assumed responsibility for the due performance of the agreement ( Demirel , cited above, paragraph 11, and Commission v Ireland , cited above, paragraph 15).

45. As to the means assigned to the ESCB by primary law for the purpose of achieving those objectives, Chapter IV of the Protocol on the ESCB and the ECB, which describes the monetary functions and operations assured by the ESCB, sets out the instruments to which the ESCB may have recourse in the framework of monetary policy. – The delimitation of monetary policy

44. It follows that, if the transaction at issue in the main proceedings is categorised as a ‘service contract’ within the meaning of Directive 2004/17, such a contract must, in principle, be concluded in accordance with the procedures laid down in Articles 31 and 32 thereof. On the other hand, under Article 18 of that directive, if that transaction is categorised as a service concession, the directive is not applicable to it. In such circumstances, the awarding of the concession remains subject to the fundamental rules of the Treaty, in general, and to the principles of equal treatment and of non-discrimination on the ground of nationality, and the concomitant obligation of transparency, in particular (see, to that effect, Case C‑324/98 Telaustria and Telefonadress [2000] ECR I‑10745, paragraphs 60 to 62; Case C‑231/03 Coname [2005] ECR I‑7287, paragraphs 16 to 19; Case C‑458/03 Parking Brixen [2005] ECR I‑8585, paragraphs 46 to 49; and Case C‑324/07 Coditel Brabant [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 25).

47. The prohibition on any discrimination on grounds of nationality is set out in Article 12 EC. The provisions of the Treaty which are more specifically applicable to public service concessions include, in particular, Article 43 EC, the first paragraph of which states that restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State are to be prohibited, and Article 49 EC, the first paragraph of which provides that restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Community are to be prohibited in respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a State of the Community other than that of the person for whom the services are intended.

37. With respect to the legitimate expectations of those concerned, such as Mr Sudholz, it must be pointed out that if the taxable person chooses to treat goods used both for business and private purposes as business goods, the VAT due as input tax on the acquisition of those goods is in principle wholly and immediately deductible (see, inter alia, Case C‑97/90 Lennartz [1991] ECR I-3795, paragraph 26, and Case C-269/00 Seeling [2003] ECR I-4101, paragraph 41). In the absence of any provision empowering the Member States to limit the right to deduct, that right must be exercised immediately in respect of all the taxes charged on transactions relating to inputs (see, inter alia, Lennartz , paragraph 27, and Case C‑37/95 Ghent Coal Terminal [1998] ECR I-1, paragraph 16).

65. As regards the wording of that provision in its different language versions, there are no divergences comparable to those described in paragraphs 53 and 54 above.

15 Moreover, according to the settled case-law of the Court (see, inter alia, judgments in Case 24/75 Petroni v ONPTS [1975] ECR 1149, at paragraph 13 and in Case C-302/90 CAAMI v Faux [1991] ECR 4875, at paragraph 27), the aim of Articles 48 to 51 would not be attained if, as a consequence of the exercise of their right to freedom of movement, workers were to lose advantages in the field of social security guaranteed to them in any event by the laws of a single Member State.

22. The function of those rules is precisely to prevent competition from being distorted to the detriment of the public interest, individual undertakings and consumers, thereby ensuring the well-being of the European Union (see, to that effect, Case C‑94/00 Roquette Frères [2002] ECR I‑9011, paragraph 42).

13 Community law does not prevent a Member State from carrying out checks on compliance with the obligation to be able to produce a residence permit at all times, provided that it imposes the same obligation on its own nationals as regards their identity card (Case 321/87 Commission v Belgium [1989] ECR 997, paragraph 12).

22 In the Walder judgment of 7 June 1973 (Case 32/72, [1973] ECR 599, at paragraphs 6 and 7) concerning the interpretation of Articles 6 and 7 of Regulation No 1408/71, the Court ruled that it was clear from those articles that the replacement by the regulation of the provisions of social security conventions between Member States was mandatory in nature and did not allow of exceptions, save for the cases expressly set out in the regulation.

109. Thus, the Court of Justice has held, first, that prices below average variable costs must be considered prima facie abusive inasmuch as, in applying such prices, an undertaking in a dominant position is presumed to pursue no other economic objective save that of eliminating its competitors. Secondly, prices below average total costs but above average variable costs are to be considered abusive only where they are fixed in the context of a plan having the purpose of eliminating a competitor (see AKZO v Commission , paragraphs 70 and 71, and Tetra Pak v Commission , paragraph 41).

56. It would in no way lead to a conviction of the accused for an act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national law at the time when it was committed (see, by analogy, judgment in Niselli , C‑457/02, EU:C:2004:707, paragraph 30), nor to the application of a penalty which, at that time, was not laid down by national law. On the contrary, the acts which the accused are alleged to have committed constituted, at the time when they were committed, the same offence and were punishable by the same criminal penalties as those applicable at present.

85. Furthermore, the discretion conferred on the Member States under clause 5(1) of the Framework Agreement must also be exercised in compliance with Community law and, in particular, its general principles as well as the other provisions of the Framework Agreement (see, to that effect, Mangold , paragraphs 50 to 54 and 63 to 65).

53. Now, it is clear from both the order for reference and the observations submitted by the German Government at the hearing that, as the Advocate General has noted in paragraphs 75 to 77 of his Opinion, the successive reductions of the age above which the conclusion of a fixed-term contract is permissible without restrictions are justified, not by the need to put the Framework Agreement into effect but by the need to encourage the employment of older persons in Germany.

160 Nor can the Court accept the argument that the objective pursued could be achieved by other, less restrictive measures, such as regulating the use of the elements and features referred to in Article 13 of Directive 2014/40, instead of prohibiting them, or adding certain supplementary health warnings. Such measures would not be as effective for ensuring the protection of consumers’ health, since the elements and features referred to in Article 13 are, by their very nature, likely to encourage smoking (see, to that effect, judgment in British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco, C‑491/01, EU:C:2002:741, paragraph 140). It cannot be accepted that those elements and features may be included for the purpose of giving consumers clear and precise information, inasmuch as they are intended more to exploit the vulnerability of consumers of tobacco products who, because of their nicotine dependence, are particularly receptive to any element suggesting there may be some kind of benefit linked to tobacco consumption, in order to vindicate or reduce the risks associated with their habits.

140. It is not clear that merely regulating the use of the descriptions referred to in Article 7, as proposed by the claimants in the main proceedings and by the German, Greek and Luxembourg Governments, or saying on the tobacco products' packaging, as proposed by Japan Tobacco, that the amounts of noxious substances inhaled depend also on the user's smoking behaviour would have ensured that consumers received objective information, having regard to the fact that those descriptions are in any event likely, by their very nature, to encourage smoking.

23 The aim of that provision is to prevent account from being taken of prices and costs in non-market-economy countries which are not normally the result of market forces ( judgment in Joined Cases 294/86 and 77/87 Technointorg v Commission and Council [1988] ECR 6077, paragraph 29 ).

24. In that regard, it is unnecessary to show that natural persons in fact make copies for private purposes with the aid of such equipment. Those persons are rightly presumed to benefit fully from the making available of that equipment, that is to say, they are deemed to take full advantage of the functions associated with that equipment, including copying (see, to that effect, judgment in Padawan , EU:C:2010:620, paragraphs 54 and 55).

It should be pointed out that, in accordance with the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, pursuant to Article 256(1) TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, an appeal is limited to points of law. The General Court has exclusive jurisdiction to find and appraise the relevant facts and assess the evidence. The appraisal of those facts and evidence does not, therefore, save where they have been distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice on appeal (see, inter alia, judgments of 28 May 1998, New Holland Ford v Commission, C‑8/95 P, EU:C:1998:257, paragraph 25, and of 2 September 2010, Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v OHIM, C‑254/09 P, EU:C:2010:488, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).

25 It also follows from the foregoing provisions that an appeal may be based only on grounds relating to the infringement of rules of law, to the exclusion of any appraisal of the facts. The Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction, first, to establish the facts except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it and, second, to assess those facts. When the Court of First Instance has established or assessed the facts, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction under Article 168a of the Treaty to review the legal characterisation of those facts by the Court of First Instance and the legal conclusions it has drawn from them (see, in particular, the order in San Marco v Commission, cited above, paragraph 39).

21. However, a requirement such as that in issue can only be justified on one of the public-interest grounds set out in Article 30 EC, such as the protection of health and life of humans, or by an imperative requirement relating, inter alia , to consumer protection (see, among others, Case 120/78 REWE-Zentral [1979] ECR 649 ( " Cassis de Dijon " ), paragraph 8, and Case C-420/01 Commission v Italy [2003] ECR I-6445, paragraph 29).

39. In that regard, in the same way as Directive 85/337, the amended directive adopts an overall assessment of the effects of projects or the alteration thereof on the environment. It would be simplistic and contrary to that approach to take account, when assessing the environmental impact of a project or of its modification, only of the direct effects of the works envisaged themselves, and not of the environmental impact liable to result from the use and exploitation of the end product of those works (see, as regards Directive 85/337, Abraham and Others , paragraphs 42 and 43).

87. In that regard, the Court has held, firstly, that res judicata extends only to the matters of fact and law actually or necessarily settled by the judicial decision in question ( Commission v Luxembourg paragraph 27; and Thyssenkrupp Nirosta v Commission paragraph 123) and, secondly, that the force of res judicata attaches not only to the operative part of that decision, but also to the ratio decidendi of that decision which is inseparable from it (Joined Cases C‑442/03 P and C‑471/03 P P & O European Ferries (Vizcaya) and Diputación Foral de Vizcaya v Commission [2006] ECR I‑4845, paragraph 44).

18 Consequently, the requirement that the wine be bottled in the region of production, in so far as it constitutes a condition for the use of the name of that region as a registered designation of origin, would be justified by the concern to ensure that that designation of origin fulfilled its specific function if bottling in the region of production endowed the wine originating in that region with particular characteristics, of such a kind as to give it individual character, or if bottling in the region of production were essential in order to preserve essential characteristics acquired by that wine.

32 An industrial process differs from an artisanal process in the means of production used and, consequently, in the quantities produced. The Court has thus held that an industrial process is characterised in general by a succession of operations, which may, in particular, be mechanical or chemical, in order to obtain a significant quantity of a standardised product (judgment of 16 July 2015, Abcur, C‑544/13 and C‑545/13, EU:C:2015:481, paragraph 50).

25 Similarly, Directive 77/187 must be capable of applying where, as in these cases before the national courts, an undertaking which used to have recourse to another undertaking for the cleaning of its premises or part of them decides to terminate its contract with that other undertaking and in future to carry out that work itself.

35. So far as concerns a reply to the referring court, it must be recalled that, as a general rule, it is not for the Court of Justice, pursuant to the division of jurisdiction between the EU Courts and national courts, to rule on the question whether the labelling of certain products is likely to mislead the purchaser or consumer or to determine whether a sales description is potentially misleading. That task is for the national court. When giving a preliminary ruling on a reference, however, the Court of Justice may, in appropriate cases, give further clarification as guidance to the national court in its decision (see, in particular, judgments in Geffroy , C‑366/98, EU:C:2000:430, paragraphs 18 to 20, and Severi , C‑446/07, EU:C:2009:530, paragraph 60).

64. Il est de jurisprudence constante qu’une mesure qui est susceptible d’entraver la liberté d’établissement consacrée à l’article 49 TFUE ne saurait être admise que si elle poursuit un objectif légitime compatible avec le traité et est justifiée par des raisons impérieuses d’intérêt général. Encore faut-il, en pareil cas, que son application soit propre à garantir la réalisation de l’objectif ainsi poursuivi et n’aille pas au-delà de ce qui est nécessaire pour atteindre celui-ci (voir, notamment, arrêts de Lasteyrie du Saillant, précité, point 49; du 13 décembre 2005, Marks & Spencer, C‑446/03, Rec. p. I‑10837, point 35, ainsi que du 21 janvier 2010, SGI, C‑311/08, Rec. p. I‑487, point 56).

43. In relation to international conventions in general, it should be noted that, according to the case-law of the Court, if the Community is not a Contracting Party to a convention, in principle the Court is not competent to interpret the provisions of that convention in the context of preliminary proceedings (Case 130/73 Vandeweghe and Others [1973] ECR 1329, paragraph 2; Order C‑162/98 Hartmann [1998] ECR I-7083, paragraph 9; Case C-301/08 Bogiatzi [2009] ECR I-10185, paragraph 24; and Case C-533/08 TNT Express Nederland [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraph 61).

43. Accordingly, the Austrian legislation must be regarded as having existed on 31 December 1993 for the purposes of Article 57(1) EC.

46. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, the condition that the contested decision must be of direct concern to a natural or legal person, as laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, requires that the contested EU measure must directly affect the legal situation of the individual and leave no discretion to its addressees responsible for implementing it, such implementation being purely automatic and resulting from EU rules without the application of other intermediate rules (see judgments in Glencore Grain v Commission , C‑404/96 P, EU:C:1998:196, paragraph 41; Front national v Parliament , C‑486/01 P, EU:C:2004:394, paragraph 34; Commission v Ente per le Ville Vesuviane and Ente per le Ville Vesuviane v Commission , C‑445/07 P and C‑455/07 P, EU:C:2009:529, paragraph 45, and Stichting Woonpunt and Others v Commission , C‑132/12 P, EU:C:2014:100, paragraph 68).

68. Secondly, the appellants must, under the second limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, be concerned not only individually but also directly by the act which they are seeking to have annulled, in the sense that that act must directly affect the legal situation of those parties and leave no discretion to the authorities responsible for implementing that act, such implementation being purely automatic and resulting from European Union law alone, without the application of other intermediate rules (see, to that effect, Commission v Koninklijke FrieslandCampina , paragraphs 48 and 49).

30 It is clear from Case C-314/89 Rauh v Hauptzollamt Nürnberg-Fürth [1991] ECR I-1647, paragraph 10, that the latter article seeks essentially to ensure that, in certain circumstances, producers who did not deliver milk during the reference year, pursuant to an undertaking entered into under Council Regulation (EEC) No 1078/77 of 17 May 1977 introducing a system of premiums for the non-marketing of milk and milk products and for the conversion of dairy herds (OJ 1977 L 131, p. 1), obtain a special reference quantity.

65. In the third situation described, a regional or local authority adopts, in the exercise of sufficiently autonomous powers in relation to the central power, a tax rate lower than the national rate and which is applicable only to undertakings present in the territory within its competence.

43. Nor may such use affect the value of the trade mark by taking unfair advantage of its distinctive character or repute ( BMW , paragraph 52).

52 Such advertising is not essential to the further commercialisation of goods put on the Community market under the trade mark by its proprietor or with his consent or, therefore, to the purpose of the exhaustion rule laid down in Article 7 of the directive. Moreover, it is contrary to the obligation to act fairly in relation to the legitimate interests of the trade mark owner and it affects the value of the trade mark by taking unfair advantage of its distinctive character or repute. It is also incompatible with the specific object of a trade mark which is, according to the case-law of the Court, to protect the proprietor against competitors wishing to take advantage of the status and reputation of the trade mark (see, inter alia, Case C-10/89 HAG GF [1990] ECR I-3711, `HAG II', paragraph 14).

33. As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that, in accordance with the Court’s case-law, the exemptions laid down in Article 135(1) of the VAT Directive constitute independent concepts of EU law whose purpose is to avoid divergences in the application of the VAT system as between one Member State and another (see, inter alia, judgments of Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken , C‑540/09, EU:C:2011:137, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited, and DTZ Zadelhoff , C‑259/11, EU:C:2012:423, paragraph 19).

19. It must be borne in mind, first, that, in accordance with the Court’s case-law, the exemptions referred to in Article 13 of the Sixth Directive constitute independent concepts of European Union law whose purpose is to avoid divergences in the application of the VAT system as between one Member State and another (see, in particular, Case C-349/96 CPP [1999] ECR I-973, paragraph 15, and Case C-540/09 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken [2011] ECR I-1509, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).

19 In that regard, first, it must be borne in mind that the concept of ‘technical specification’ presupposes that the national measure necessarily refers to the product or its packaging as such and therefore lays down one of the characteristics required of a product. In contrast, where a national measure lays down conditions governing the establishment of undertakings, such as provisions making the exercise of a business activity subject to prior authorisation, those conditions do not constitute technical specifications (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 April 2005, Lindberg, C‑267/03, EU:C:2005:246, paragraphs 57 and 59 and the case-law cited).

43. Or, dans le cadre du présent recours, qui a pour objet un manquement à l’exécution d’une décision en matière d’aides d’État et qui n’a pas été déférée devant la Cour par l’État membre qui en est destinataire, ce dernier ne saurait être fondé à contester la légalité d’une telle décision (voir arrêt du 12 mai 2005, Commission/Grèce, C‑415/03, Rec. p. I‑3875, point 38 et jurisprudence citée).

72. In that regard it is sufficient to note that the right of an economic operator, established in a Member State, to provide services in another Member State, which Article 56 TFEU lays down, is not subject to the condition that the said operator also provides such services in the Member State in which he is established. Article 56 TFEU requires only that the provider be established in a Member State other than that of the recipient (see Case C‑46/08 Carmen Media Group EU:C:2010:505, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).

18 It follows from the foregoing that the action is admissible. Substance

9. Selon une jurisprudence constante, l’existence d’un manquement doit être appréciée en fonction de la situation de l’État membre telle qu’elle se présentait au terme du délai fixé dans l’avis motivé et les changements intervenus par la suite ne sauraient être pris en compte par la Cour (voir, notamment, arrêts du 14 septembre 2004, Commission/Espagne, C‑168/03, Rec. p. I‑8227, point 24, et du 27 septembre 2007, Commission/France, C-9/07, point 8).

97. Accordingly, tax legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which is not accompanied by any technical specification or any other requirement with which it is purportedly intended to ensure compliance, cannot be described as a ‘ de facto technical regulation’.

35 In paragraph 34 of the judgment of 18 July 2007, Lakebrink and Peters-Lakebrink (C‑182/06, EU:C:2007:452), the Court explained that the scope of the case-law cited in paragraphs 27 to 32 of the present judgment extends to all the tax advantages connected with the non-resident’s ability to pay tax which are not granted either in the Member State of residence or in the Member State where a worker is employed (judgment of 18 June 2015, Kieback, C‑9/14, EU:C:2015:406, paragraph 27).

32. In order for OHIM to refuse to register a trade mark under Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 40/94, it is not necessary that the signs and indications composing the mark that are referred to in that article actually be in use at the time of the application for registration in a way that is descriptive of goods or services such as those in relation to which the application is filed, or of characteristics of those goods or services. It is sufficient, as the wording of that provision itself indicates, that such signs and indications could be used for such purposes. A sign must therefore be refused registration under that provision if at least one of its possible meanings designates a characteristic of the goods or services concerned.

37 It is clear, however, from the judgments in Case C-57/93 Vroege [1994] ECR I-4541, paragraphs 20 to 27, Case C-128/93 Fisscher [1994] ECR I-4583, paragraphs 17 to 24, and Case C-246/96 Magorrian and Cunningham v EHSSB and DHSS [1997] ECR I-7153, paragraphs 27 to 35, that the limitation in time of the effects of Article 119 resulting from both the Barber judgment and the Protocol concerns only those kinds of discrimination which employers and pension schemes could reasonably have considered to be permissible owing to the transitional derogations for which Community law provided and which were capable of being applied to occupational pensions (see Case C-435/93 Dietz v Stichting Thuiszorg Rotterdam [1996] ECR I-5223, paragraph 19).

176 FOR THE PURPOSE OF FIXING THE AMOUNT OF THE FINE, THE GRAVITY OF THE INFRINGEMENT IS TO BE APPRAISED BY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT IN PARTICULAR THE NATURE OF THE RESTRICTIONS ON COMPETITION, THE NUMBER AND SIZE OF THE UNDERTAKINGS CONCERNED, THE RESPECTIVE PROPORTIONS OF THE MARKET CONTROLLED BY THEM WITHIN THE COMMUNITY AND THE SITUATION OF THE MARKET WHEN THE INFRINGEMENT WAS COMMITTED .

32. Therefore, in order to ensure the protection of the rights conferred by the trade mark and to make possible the further marketing of goods bearing a trade mark without the proprietor of the trade mark being able to oppose that, it is essential that the proprietor can control the first placing of those goods on the market in the EEA, irrespective of the fact that they may have first been marketed outside that area (see, to that effect, Sebago and Maison Dubois , paragraphs 20 and 21; Zino Davidoff and Levi Strauss , paragraph 33; Van Doren + Q , paragraph 26; and Peak Holding , paragraphs 36 and 37).

143. Therefore, the Court is empowered, in exercising the discretion conferred on it in the field in question, to impose a penalty payment and a lump sum payment cumulatively. b) Whether the imposition of a lump sum payment is appropriate

38. It must also be pointed out that it is settled case-law that the mere acquisition and holding of shares in a company is not to be regarded as an economic activity within the meaning of the Sixth Directive, conferring on the holder the status of a taxable person. The mere acquisition of financial holdings in other undertakings does not amount to the exploitation of property for the purpose of obtaining income therefrom on a continuing basis because any dividend yielded by that holding is merely the result of ownership of the property and is not the product of any economic activity within the meaning of that directive (see Harnas & Helm , paragraph 15, and Case C-442/01 KapHag [2003] ECR I-6851, paragraph 38). I II f, therefore, such activities do not in themselves constitute an economic activity within the meaning of that directive, the same must be true of activities consisting in the sale of such holdings (see Wellcome Trust , paragraph 33, and KapHag , paragraph 40).

89 As such, that principle forms part of the rules of international law applicable to relations between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco, which the General Court was obliged to take into account.

33 Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty apply only to anti-competitive conduct engaged in by undertakings on their own initiative (see to that effect, as regards Article 86 of the Treaty, Case 41/83 Italy v Commission [1985] ECR 873, paragraphs 18 to 20; Case C-202/88 France v Commission - the so-called `telecommunications terminals' judgment - [1991] ECR I-1223, paragraph 55; and Case C-18/88 GB-Inno-BM [1991] ECR I-5941, paragraph 20). If anti-competitive conduct is required of undertakings by national legislation or if the latter creates a legal framework which itself eliminates any possibility of competitive activity on their part, Articles 85 and 86 do not apply. In such a situation, the restriction of competition is not attributable, as those provisions implicitly require, to the autonomous conduct of the undertakings (see also Joined Cases 40/73 to 48/73, 50/73, 54/73 to 56/73, 111/73, 113/73 and 114/73 Suiker Unie and Others v Commission [1975] ECR 1663, paragraphs 36 to 72, and more particularly paragraphs 65, 66, 71 and 72).

40. It is settled case-law that, as a general rule, the principle of legal certainty precludes a European Union measure from taking effect from a point in time before its publication, but it may exceptionally be otherwise where the purpose to be achieved so demands and where the legitimate expectations of those concerned are duly respected. In that regard, in order to ensure observance of the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations, the substantive rules of European Union law must be interpreted as applying to situations existing before their entry into force only in so far as it clearly follows from their terms, objectives or general scheme that such effect must be given to them (see Joined Cases C‑74/00 P and C‑75/00 P Falck and Acciaierie di Bolzano v Commission [2002] ECR I‑7869, paragraph 119 and the case-law cited).

19. As a preliminary point, it is to be noted that, according to settled case-law, although direct taxation falls within their competence, Member States must none the less exercise that competence consistently with Community law (see, to that effect, in particular, Case C-250/95 Futura Participations and Singer [1997] ECR I-2471, paragraph 19; Case C‑294/97 Eurowings Luftverkehr [1999] ECR I-7447, paragraph 32; Case C‑55/98 Vestergaard [1999] ECR I-7641, paragraph 15; Case C‑141/99 AMID [2000] ECR I-11619, paragraph 19; and Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer [2005] ECR I-10837, paragraph 29).

13 In the second place, whereas the object of Article 69 of Regulation No 1408/71 is to encourage the mobility of persons seeking employment, the result of the interpretation advocated by the Office national de l' emploi would be to discourage it by making it more difficult for a worker who has exercised the right given to him by Article 69(1 ) to retain his entitlement to unemployment benefit than for workers in Belgium as a whole .

41. Although it is true that the criteria of small numbers as defined by the ORNIS committee is not legally binding on the Member States concerned, in this instance it can, by reason of the acknowledged scientific value of that committee’s opinions and the absence before the Court of any element of scientific proof to the contrary, be used by the Court as a basis of reference for assessing whether the derogation granted by the defendant Member State under Article 9(1)(c) of the directive fulfils the condition that the capture of the birds in question should be carried out in small numbers (see, to this effect, Case C-3/96 Commission v Netherlands [1998] ECR I-3031, paragraphs 69 and 70).

8 It should however be noted that this last letter merely replied, in detail, to a complaint made by the applicant in letters of 3 June and 20 June 1986 in which he stressed the fact that since 1 August 1984 he had been carrying out accountancy duties in the Social Affairs Division of the European Parliament which, he maintained, had helped to provide him with sufficient specific experience in the field of accountancy . Far from being contradictory, the explanation given merely clarified, at the applicant' s request, the reasons which led the Selection Board to reject his candidature .

36 As regards the claims alleging infringement of essential procedural requirements and of Regulation No 1 and Article 3 TEU and Article 41(4) of the Charter, it is clear from the case-law of the Court of Justice, referred to by the General Court in paragraph 115 of the judgment under appeal, that the use of the language laid down in Article 3 of Regulation No 1 does not constitute an essential procedural requirement, within the meaning of Article 263 TFEU, the infringement of which necessarily affects the validity of any document addressed to a person in another language (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 July 1970 in ACF Chemiefarma v Commission, 41/69, EU:C:1970:71, paragraphs 47 to 52). According to that case-law, where an institution sends a person within the jurisdiction of a Member State a document which is not drawn up in the language of that State, such a process vitiates the procedure only if it gives rise to harmful consequences for that person in the course of the administrative procedure.

21. It is apparent from that judgment that the Court did not hold that any service whatsoever provided by a travel agent which is unrelated to a journey falls under the special scheme provided for in Article 26 of the Sixth Directive, but that the provision by a travel agent of accommodation comes within the scope of that provision, even if that service covers accommodation only and not transport.

41 In order for it to be concluded that there is a sufficiently serious breach of the Ombudsman’s duty to act diligently, it is therefore necessary to establish that, by failing to act with all the requisite care and caution, the Ombudsman gravely and manifestly disregarded the limits on her discretion in the exercise of her powers of investigation. Whilst having regard to that context, account must, to that end, be taken of all aspects characterising the situation concerned, including, in particular, the obviousness of the lack of care shown by the Ombudsman in the conduct of the investigation (see, to that effect, inter alia, judgments of 30 January 1992, Finsider and Others v Commission, C‑363/88 and C‑364/88, EU:C:1992:44, paragraph 22, and of 10 July 2003, Commission v Fresh Marine, C‑472/00 P, EU:C:2003:399, paragraph 31), whether it was excusable or inexcusable (see, to that effect, inter alia, judgments of 30 January 1992, Finsider and Others v Commission, C‑363/88 and C‑364/88, EU:C:1992:44, paragraph 22, and of 4 July 2000, Haim, C‑424/97, EU:C:2000:357, paragraphs 42 and 43), or whether the conclusions drawn from the Ombudsman’s examination were inappropriate and unreasonable (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 October 1991, Nölle, C‑16/90, EU:C:1991:402, paragraph 13).

67. As it is, it must be noted in that regard that the legislation at issue is capable, in various ways, of hindering — at least indirectly and potentially — imports of electricity, especially green electricity, from other Member States.

76. In that context, it should be noted that those two conditions, in this case the same taxpayer and the same taxation, were considered sufficient by the Court to establish the existence of such a link (see, to that effect, Verkooijen , paragraph 58; Bosal , paragraphs 29 and 30; and Krankenheim Ruhesitz am Wannsee-Seniorenheimstatt , paragraph 42). Furthermore, it is important to emphasise that the Commission does not dispute, and has even admitted in its response, that the tax advantage at issue is granted to the same taxpayer and in the context of the same tax.

25. It follows that, as regards the application of Directive 2003/88, the concept of a ‘worker’ may not be interpreted differently according to the law of Member States but has an autonomous meaning specific to EU law (judgment in Union syndicale Solidaires Isère , C‑428/09, EU:C:2010:612, paragraph 28).

80. Consequently, the interpretation given to the provisions of European Union law concerning the internal market cannot be automatically applied by analogy to the interpretation of the EC‑Switzerland Air Transport Agreement, unless there are express provisions to that effect laid down in the Agreement itself (see, to that effect, Grimme , paragraph 29; Fokus Invest , paragraph 28; and Hengartner and Gasser , paragraph 42).

48 In BSH’s submission, where the earlier mark is a readily recognisable variant of a descriptive indication and the later mark contains the descriptive indication itself, even the existence of major similarities between the signs and identity of the goods which the opposing marks cover are not capable of permitting the conclusion that there is a likelihood of confusion if the similarities of the signs are limited to the descriptive indications and concern only goods which are described by the indication. The public does not perceive any indication of origin in a descriptive indication, but is guided by the other elements of the mark. Furthermore, according to this argument, the extent of the protection of the earlier mark is not limited generally, but only as regards the descriptive indication itself, so that it remains intact in relation to other goods or other similar signs.

41. First of all, the Court has already held that the fact that the plaintiff acts on the basis of a claim which arises from an act in the exercise of public powers is sufficient for his action, whatever the nature of the proceedings afforded by national law for that purpose, to be treated as being outside the scope of the Brussels Convention (see Rüffer , paragraphs 13 and 15). The fact that the proceedings brought before the referring court are presented as being of a civil nature in so far as they seek financial compensation for the material loss and non-material damage caused to the plaintiffs in the main proceedings is consequently entirely irrelevant.

22 In order to fall within the scope of Regulation No 1408/71, legislation must in particular cover one of the risks expressly specified in Article 4(1) of that regulation. That list is exhaustive, so that a branch of social security not mentioned does not fall within that category even if it confers upon individuals a legally defined position entitling them to benefits (see in particular Hoeckx, paragraph 12, and Scrivner, paragraph 19).

28. The assessments made in the statement of objections provided for under Community rules are intended to define the scope of the administrative procedure vis-à-vis the undertakings in respect of which it was initiated (see, in particular, Joined Cases 142/84 and 156/84 British American Tobacco and Reynolds Industries v Commission [1987] ECR 4487, paragraph 70). To that end, the statement of objections must set forth clearly all the essential facts upon which the Commission is relying at that stage of the procedure. It has consistently been held that that may be done summarily, since the statement of objections is a preparatory document containing assessments of fact and of law which are purely provisional in nature (see, in particular, Joined Cases 100/80 to 103/80 Musique Diffusion française and Others v Commission [1983] ECR 1825, paragraph 14, and Joined Cases C‑204/00 P, C‑205/00 P, C‑211/00 P, C‑213/00 P, C‑217/00 P and C‑219/00 P Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission [2004] ECR I‑123, paragraph 67).

17. Finally, it is settled case‑law that all of the provisions of the EC Treaty relating to freedom of movement for persons have the purpose of facilitating the pursuit by Community nationals of occupational activities of all kinds throughout the Community and preclude measures which might place Community nationals at a disadvantage when they wish to pursue an economic activity in the territory of another Member State (Case C‑302/98 Sehrer [2000] ECR I‑4585, paragraph 32, and Case C‑209/01 Schilling and Fleck-Schilling [2003] ECR I‑13389, paragraph 24).

52. Article 87(1) EC prohibits State aid ‘favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’, that is to say, selective aid (Case C-66/02 Italy v Commission [2005] ECR I-10901, paragraph 94). However, according to settled case-law, the concept of State aid does not refer to State measures which differentiate between undertakings and which are, therefore, prima facie selective where that differentiation arises from the nature or the overall structure of the system of charges of which they are part (see, to that effect, Case 173/73 Italy v Commission , paragraph 33, and Case C-148/04 Unicredito Italiano [2005] ECR I-11137, paragraph 51).

23 The prohibition covers not only charges paid for the registration of new companies, but also duties payable by companies for the registration of increases in capital since these, too, are levied on account of an essential formality connected with the legal form of the companies in question. While registration of an increase in capital is not, strictly speaking, a formality required before the commencement of business by a capital company, it is none the less necessary for the carrying on of that business (Case C-188/95 Fantask and Others v Industriministeriet [1997] ECR I-6783, paragraph 22, and Modelo I, paragraph 25).

16 As the Court has stated in its judgments in Case 352/85 Bond van Adverteerders v Netherlands State ([1988] ECR 2085, paragraphs 32 to 34) and in Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda (paragraph 10) and Commission v Netherlands (paragraph 15), previously cited, national rules which are not applicable to services without distinction whatever their origin are compatible with Community law only if they can be brought within the scope of an express derogation such as Article 56 of the Treaty, to which Article 66 refers. It may also be seen from those judgments that objectives of an economic nature cannot constitute grounds of public policy within the meaning of that article.

67. In that regard, the Court observes that, although admittedly certain portions of the line of argument put forward by the appellants in their pleas may lack rigour, that line of argument does, however, appear overall to be sufficiently clear for the purposes of identifying with the necessary precision the elements of the judgment under appeal which are being challenged, and the legal arguments relied on in support of that challenge, and thus enables the Court to carry out its review of the lawfulness thereof.

45. That was the case in Rosenbladt , in which the Court held, in paragraphs 43 and 45 of its judgment, that aims such as those relied on by the German Government could be regarded as being among the aims referred to in Article 6(1) of Directive 2000/78.

56. First, there must be intervention by the State or through State resources. Second, the intervention must be liable to affect trade between Member States. Third, it must confer an advantage on the recipient. Fourth, it must distort or threaten to distort competition.

178. In that regard, as is apparent from paragraph 166 of this judgment, it is settled case-law, first, that the purpose of the statement of reasons required by Article 253 EC is to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent Community Court to exercise its power of review and, secondly, that the requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons must be appraised by reference to the nature of the measure at issue and the context in which it was a dopted (see also Case 32/86 SISMA v Commission [1987] ECR 1645, paragraph 8; Case C-181/90 Consorgan v Commission [1992] ECR I-3557, paragraph 14; Case C-22/94 Irish Farmers Association and Others [1997] ECR I‑1809, paragraphs 39 to 41; Case C-114/00 Spain v Commission [2002] ECR I‑7657, paragraphs 62 and 63; Case C-195/99 P Krupp Hoesch v Commission [2003] ECR I-10937, paragraph 110; and Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission , paragraph 372).

43. Accordingly, the Austrian legislation must be regarded as having existed on 31 December 1993 for the purposes of Article 57(1) EC.

49 The Court has consistently held that the prohibition of discrimination set out in Article 40(3) of the EC Treaty is merely a specific expression of the general principle of equal treatment in Community law, according to which comparable situations must not be treated differently and different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (see, in particular, Case 106/83 Sermide v Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero and Others [1984] ECR 4209, paragraph 28).

52. Il s’ensuit que ledit argument doit être déclaré irrecevable, dès lors que, dans le cadre d’un pourvoi, la compétence de la Cour est, en principe, limitée à l’appréciation de la solution légale qui a été donnée aux moyens débattus devant les juges du fond.

84 The same applies, even in the absence of any express provision authorising its institutions to negotiate with non-member countries, where the Community has achieved complete harmonisation in a given area, because the common rules thus adopted could be affected within the meaning of the AETR judgment if the Member States retained freedom to negotiate with non-member countries (Opinion 1/94, paragraph 96; Opinion 2/92, paragraph 33).

39. The choice as to whether to tax income from Italy in the other Member State, or the level at which it is to be taxed, depends not on the Italian Republic but on the tax rules laid down by the other Member State. The Italian Republic is therefore wrong to argue that set-off of the tax withheld at source in Italy against the tax due in the other Member State, pursuant to the provisions of conventions for the avoidance of double taxation, allows in all cases for the difference in treatment arising from the application of national legislation to be compensated for.

11 THIS CLAIM CONCERNS THE REJECTION OF THE APPLICANT ' S SUBMISSION , PLEADED IN SUPPORT OF HIS CLAIM FOR ANNULMENT , THAT THE COMMISSION COULD NOT LAWFULLY FIND THAT HIS ABSENCE WAS UNAUTHORIZED , SINCE HE HAD PRODUCED MEDICAL CERTIFICATES PROVING THAT HIS HEALTH DID NOT ALLOW HIM TO RETURN TO WORK AT ISPRA . IN PARTICULAR , HE HAD PRODUCED A CERTIFICATE FROM HIS OWN DOCTOR WHICH BORE THE DATE OF 14 DECEMBER 1980 AND WAS THEREFORE ISSUED AFTER THE REPORT MADE BY DR DE GEYTER ON 15 NOVEMBER 1980 .

34. National rules such as those at issue in the main proceedings, which prohibit the marketing of foodstuffs to which nutrients have been added, such foodstuffs being lawfully manufactured and/or marketed in the exporting Member State but prohibited in the importing Member State, or which require that such substances have been previously included on a national list provided for for that purpose in order that the marketing of the foodstuffs to which they have been added may be authorised, can be justified, as a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction within the meaning of Article 28 EC, in so far as they comply with the requirements of Article 30 EC, as interpreted by the Court.

52. As regards Article 4 TEU, it should be recalled that according to settled case-law, under the principle of sincere cooperation laid down in paragraph 3 of that article, it is for the Member States to ensure judicial protection of an individual’s rights under EU law (see, to that effect, inter alia the judgment in Unibet , C‑432/05, EU:C:2007:163, paragraph 38). In addition, Article 19(1) TEU requires Member States to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by EU law.

27. S’agissant des caractéristiques d’une telle démonstration, la Cour a jugé que, lorsqu’il allègue une dénaturation d’éléments de preuve par le Tribunal, un requérant doit, en application des articles 256 TFUE, 58, premier alinéa, du statut de la Cour et 169, paragraphe 2, du règlement de procédure de cette dernière, indiquer de façon précise les éléments qui auraient été dénaturés par celui-ci et démontrer les erreurs d’analyse qui, dans son appréciation, auraient conduit le Tribunal à cette dénaturation (voir arrêt du 17 juin 2010, Lafarge/Commission, C‑413/08 P, Rec. p. I‑5361, point 16 et jurisprudence citée).

44. On this point, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law of the Court, when interpreting a provision of EU law account must be taken of its wording, its context and its aims (see, to that effect, judgments in United Kingdom v Council , C‑77/05, EU:C:2007:803, paragraph 55, and van der Helder and Farrington , C‑321/12, EU:C:2013:648, paragraph 36).

43. Accordingly, the Austrian legislation must be regarded as having existed on 31 December 1993 for the purposes of Article 57(1) EC.

38. In relation to the competence of the Member States to determine the location of the Parliament’s seat, the Court has held that, given a plurality of working places, the exercise of that competence involved not only the obligation to determine the location of the seat of the Parliament but also the implied power to give precision to that term by indicating the activities which must take place there (see the judgment in France v Parliament , paragraph 24).

38. Third, the regime applicable to persons entrusted with the retail supply of medicinal products varies from one Member State to another. Whereas, in certain Member States, only self-employed pharmacists can own and operate pharmacies, other Member States accept that persons not having the status of self-employed pharmacist may own a pharmacy while entrusting its management to employed pharmacists.

69. It is however open to the EU institution concerned to base its decisions in that regard on general presumptions which apply to certain categories of documents, as considerations of a generally similar kind are likely to apply to requests for disclosure relating to documents of the same nature (judgment in Commission v EnBW , C‑365/12 P, EU:C:2014:112, paragraph 65 and case-law cited).

60. However, it must be observed that a system of organisation of the emergency ambulance services such as that at issue in the main proceedings, consisting, for the competent authorities, in recourse on a preferential basis to voluntary associations, must actually contribute to the social purpose and the pursuit of the objectives of the good of the community and budgetary efficiency on which that system is based.

86. In accordance with the Court’s case-law, it is for the Member States, in the absence of harmonisation and to the extent that uncertainties continue to exist in the current state of scientific research, to decide on the level of protection of human health and life they wish to ensure and on whether to require prior authorisation for the marketing of foodstuffs, always taking into account the requirements of the free movement of goods within the Community (see Commission v Denmark , paragraph 42; Commission v France , paragraph 49; and Commission v Germany , paragraph 86).

21 IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES , AND IN THE PARTICULAR CONTEXT OF THE MAKING OF DECISIONS RELATING TO THE CLEARANCE OF ACCOUNTS , THE CONTESTED DECISION MUST BE HELD TO CONTAIN A SUFFICIENT STATEMENT OF THE REASONS UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED .

84. As regards the derogations permitted under Article 58 EC, it cannot be denied that the objective invoked by the Portuguese Republic to ensure a secure energy supply in that Member State in case of crisis, war or terrorism may constitute a ground of public security (see Case C‑274/06 Commission v Spain , paragraph 38, and Case C‑171/08 Commission v Portugal , paragraph 72) and possibly justify an obstacle to the free movement of capital. The importance attached by Member States and the European Union to the protection of a secure energy supply can moreover be seen, for example, in Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC (OJ 2009 L 211, p. 55).

58 A possible reduction in their earnings cannot therefore be contrary to the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations.

13 In that respect, it must be stated that the freedom to pursue a trade or profession, which, according to the consistent case-law of the Court (see, in particular, the judgments in Case 44/79 Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727, paragraphs 31 to 33, and in Case 265/87 Schraeder v Hauptzollamt Gronau [1989] ECR 2237, paragraph 15), forms part of the general principles of Community law, includes, as a specific expression of that freedom, the freedom to choose whom to do business with. That freedom of choice would not be guaranteed if a change of dairy by a producer, of his own volition, were capable of leading to a reduction in his individual reference quantity as a result of the allocation of a part thereof to the national reserve, when no such reduction can be made where the producer continues to supply the same dairy. Rules to that effect would be such as to discourage producers from changing purchaser in order to supply the dairy offering them the most favourable conditions.

38. However, as regards the latter aspect, it must be pointed out at the outset that, as follows from both the purpose and the actual wording of its provisions, Directive 93/104 does not apply to the remuneration of workers.

49. It is for the referring court to ascertain, in the light of the foregoing elements, in the context of a global assessment of all the facts characterising the transaction in question in the main proceedings (see, to that effect, Spijkers , paragraph 13; Case C‑29/91 Redmond Stichting [1992] ECR I‑3189, paragraph 24; Süzen , paragraph 14; and Allen and Others , paragraph 26) whether the identity of the economic entity transferred was preserved.

49. The differences in treatment authorised by Article 58(1)(a) must thus be distinguished from the forms of discrimination prohibited by Article 58(3). The case-law shows that, for national tax legislation such as that at issue here to be capable of being regarded as compatible with the provisions of the Treaty on the free movement of capital, the difference in treatment must concern situations which are not objectively comparable or be justified by an overriding reason in the public interest (Case C‑35/98 Verkooijen [2000] ECR I‑4071, paragraph 43; Case C‑319/02 Manninen [2004] ECR I‑7477, paragraph 29; and Case C‑512/03 Blanckaert [2005] ECR I‑7685, paragraph 42).

86 In that regard, it must be noted that Article 64(1) TFEU enshrines the power of the Member State, in its relations with non-member States, to apply restrictions on capital movements which come within the substantive scope of that provision, even though they contravene the principle of the free movement of capital laid down under Article 63(1) TFEU, provided that those restrictions already existed on 31 December 1993 (judgments of 12 December 2006, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, C‑446/04, EU:C:2006:774, paragraph 187, and of 24 May 2007, Holböck, C‑157/05, EU:C:2007:297, paragraph 39).

21 Accordingly, given that there is no specific tariff heading under which the product may be classified, it is necessary, thirdly, to establish whether it may be classified under heading 6307 or 7616 by applying the general rules.

30. In that regard, it must, however, be borne in mind that, in accordance with its very wording, the first subparagraph of Article 78(2)(a) and (b) of Regulation No 1408/71 governs only the right to benefits for the ‘orphan of a deceased employed person’ (see Case 1/88 Baldi [1989] ECR 667, paragraph 15, and Case C-619/11 Dumont de Chassart [2013] ECR, paragraph 35).

93 In the alternative, the Parliament submits that the reasonable time principle was not disregarded by the General Court.

164 In the third place, it is accepted that national legislation such as that at issue, under which exclusive rights to carry on an economic activity are conferred on a single, private or public, operator, constitutes a restriction both of the freedom of establishment and of the freedom to provide services (see to that effect, inter alia, judgments in Läärä and Others, C‑124/97, EU:C:1999:435, paragraph 29; Servizi Ausiliari Dottori CommercialistiC‑451/03, EU:C:2006:208, paragraphs 33 and 34; and Stoß and Others, C‑316/07, C‑358/07 to C‑360/07, C‑409/07 and C‑410/07, EU:C:2010:504, paragraphs 68 and 107).

26. As regards the question of whether the legal relationship at issue in the main proceedings is covered by the concept of ‘leasing or letting of immovable property’ within the meaning of Article 13B(b) of the Sixth Directive, it must be noted, first, that according to settled case-law the exemptions provided for in Article 13 of the Directive have their own independent meaning in Community law and must therefore be given a Community definition (see Case C‑275/01 Sinclair Collis [2003] ECR I‑5965, paragraph 22; Case C‑284/03 Temco Europe [2004] ECR I‑11237, paragraph 16; Case C‑428/02 Fonden Marselisborg Lystbådehavn [2005] ECR I‑1527, paragraph 27).

10 It should be observed in limine that, whereas it is not for the Court, in the context of Article 177 of the Treaty, to rule on the compatibility of national legislation with Community law, it does have jurisdiction to provide the national court with all the elements of interpretation under Community law to enable it to assess such compatibility for the purpose of deciding the case before it (see in particular the judgment in Case C-369/89 Piageme and Others v BVBA Peeters [1991] ECR I-2971, paragraph 7).

22 That situation therefore objectively justifies a difference in treatment between resident and non-resident offenders, the obligation imposed on the latter to pay a sum by way of security being appropriate to prevent them from avoiding an effective penalty simply by declaring that they do not consent to the immediate levying of the fine and opting for the continuation of normal criminal proceedings.

56. As is clear, in particular, from the 12th recital in the preamble to Directive 93/36, the negotiated procedure is exceptional in nature and may be applied only in cases which are set out in an exhaustive list. To that end, Article 6(2) and (3) of Directive 93/36 exhaustively and expressly lists the only exceptions for which recourse to the negotiated procedure is allowed (see, to that effect, as regards Directive 77/62, Case C‑71/92 Commission v Spain [1993] ECR I‑5923, paragraph 10; as regards Directive 93/36, see Teckal , paragraph 43, and Case C‑84/03 Commission v Spain , cited above, paragraph 47).

11 In view of the complexity of the cabotage sector, considerable difficulties still stand in the way of the achievement of freedom to provide services in that sphere. This can be done in an orderly fashion only in the context of a common transport policy which takes into consideration the economic, social and ecological problems and ensures equality in the conditions of competition.

11 As the Court has previously held, when the wording of secondary Community law is open to more than one interpretation, preference should be given to the interpretation which renders the provision consistent with the Treaty (see, inter alia, the judgment in Case 218/82 Commission v Council [1983] ECR 4063, paragraph 15). An implementing regulation must also be given, if possible, an interpretation consistent with the provisions of the basic regulation (see, in that regard, the judgment in Case 38/70 Tradax [1971] ECR 145, paragraph 10).

55. Consequently, irrespective of whether freedom of establishment or freedom to provide services in invoked, it is only where the activity in question is the corollary of the exercise of an economic activity that the ‘standstill’ clause may relate to the conditions of entry and residence of Turkish nationals within the territory of the Member States.

19. It must be noted, as a preliminary point, that Community law does not detract from the power of the Member States to organise their social security systems and to adopt, in particular, provisions intended to govern the consumption of pharmaceutical products in order to promote the financial stability of their health‑care insurance schemes (Case 238/82 Duphar and Others [1984] ECR 523, paragraph 16; Case C‑249/88 Commission v Belgium [1991] ECR I‑1275, paragraph 31; Joined Cases C‑159/91 and C‑160/91 Poucet and Pistre [1993] ECR I‑637, paragraph 6; Case C‑70/95 Sodemare and Others [1997] ECR I‑3395, paragraph 27; Case C‑158/96 Kohll [1998] ECR I‑1931, paragraph 17; Case C‑245/03 Merck, Sharp & Dohme [2005] ECR I‑637, paragraph 28; and Case C‑141/07 Commission v Germany [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 22).

70. Given that the undertaking which suffered the loss could not reasonably foresee such litigation at the time that it agreed to the jurisdiction clause and that that undertaking had no knowledge of the unlawful cartel at that time, such litigation cannot be regarded as stemming from a contractual relationship. Such a clause would not therefore have validly derogated from the referring court’s jurisdiction.

44. Such restrictions may nevertheless be permitted provided that the national measures concerned pursue an objective in the public interest, are applied in a non-discriminatory manner and comply with the principle of proportionality, that is to say, are appropriate for securing the attainment of that objective and do not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (see, to that effect, Konle , cited above, paragraph 40; Case C-390/99 Canal Satélite Digital [2002] ECR I-607, paragraph 33; Reisch and Others , paragraph 33; and Salzmann , paragraph 42).

43 DE LA MEME FACON , UN JUSTICIABLE NE PEUT SE VOIR OPPOSER PAR UNE AUTORITE NATIONALE DES DISPOSITIONS LEGISLATIVES OU ADMINISTRATIVES QUI NE SERAIENT PAS CONFORMES A UNE OBLIGATION INCONDITIONNELLE ET SUFFISAMMENT PRECISE DE LA DIRECTIVE .

48. On that basis, as is apparent from well-established case-law, the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding an individual’s rights under EU law must be no less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and must not make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness) (see, to that effect, Impact , paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).

17 The reply to the first question must therefore be that a national of a Member State who has worked in another Member State in the context of occupational training must be regarded as a worker within the meaning of Article 48 of the EEC Treaty and of Regulation No 1612/68 if he has performed services in return for which he has received remuneration, provided that his activities are genuine and effective. The second question

18 It is clear from Minalmet, paragraphs 19 and 20, that in order to enable the defendant to arrange for his defence, service of the document which instituted the proceedings or an equivalent document within the meaning of Article 27(2) of the Convention must be effected before an enforceable judgment is given in the State of origin.

42. In addition, in order to be consistent with the principle of equal treatment and to meet the obligation of transparency which flows from that principle, an authorisation scheme for betting and gaming must be based on objective, non-discriminatory criteria known in advance, in such a way as to circumscribe the exercise by the authorities of their discretion so that it is not used arbitrarily (see, to that effect, Sporting Exchange , paragraph 50).

33. Furthermore, even though the national legislature must ensure the effective implementation of that objective, it remains the case that it is required, in that regard, to respect the requirements of effective judicial protection of the rights that individuals derive from EU law, as guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment in Banif Plus Bank , C‑472/11, EU:C:2013:88, paragraph 29 and case-law cited).

23 Third, it should be observed that that duty is imposed on goods, both domestic and imported, at the same time and in accordance with the same objective criteria, namely when they are taken on board or put ashore and according to the type of goods and their weight.

56. In the absence of a provision of the FEU Treaty expressly permitting it to do so, a Member State cannot, therefore, properly plead the unlawfulness of a directive addressed to it as a defence in an action for a declaration that it has failed to fulfil its obligations arising out of its failure to implement that directive. The position could be different only if the act in question contained such particularly serious and manifest defects that it could be categorised as a non-existent act, defects which the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg does not claim exist (see judgment in Commission v Austria , C‑189/09, EU:C:2010:455, paragraphs 15 to 17 and the case-law cited).

46. It should also be borne in mind that the provisions of Regulation No 1408/71 must be interpreted in the light of the purpose of Article 48 TFEU, which is to contribute to the establishment of the greatest possible freedom of movement for migrant workers (see Hudzinski and Wawrzyniak , paragraph 53).

104. As regards the Council’s assertion in its defence before the General Court that the contested acts were based solely on the order of the court hearing the application for interim measures, the Court of Justice recalls the function of the reference to a national decision, made by Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931, of establishing the existence of evidence or serious and credible clues as to the involvement of the person concerned in terrorist activities, regarded as reliable by the national authorities. In addition, the statement of reasons which was communicated to the appellant on two occasions, by letters of 23 April and 29 June 2007, refers to the Sanctieregeling. Accordingly, that assertion of the Council constitutes only an argument raised in support of its claims which are not binding on the Court of Justice when evaluating the legality of the contested acts (see, by analogy, Joined Cases C‑514/07 P, C‑528/07 P and C‑532/07 P Sweden and Others v API and Commission [2010] ECR I‑8533, paragraph 65).

64 Second, it is incumbent on the parallel importer itself to give notice to the trade mark proprietor of the intended repackaging. It is not sufficient that the proprietor be notified by other sources, such as the authority which issues a parallel import licence to the importer.

35 According to the settled case-law of the Court, where there is divergence between the various language versions of an EU legislative text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (judgment in Jakutis and Kretingalės kooperatinė ŽŪB, C‑103/14, EU:C:2015:752, paragraph 103).

10 NOTHING PREVENTED IT AT THE TIME OF THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT FROM TAKING THE STEPS WHICH RESULTED IN THE COMMUNICATION OF THAT REPORT ON 16 JULY 1970 .

49. On the other hand, a Member State will be in breach of the prohibitions laid down by those two provisions if the undertaking in question, merely by exercising the special or exclusive rights conferred upon it, is led to abuse its dominant position or where such rights are liable to create a situation in which that undertaking is led to commit such abuses ( Höfner and Elser , cited above, paragraph 29; ERT , cited above, paragraph 37; Case C‑179/90 Merci convenzionali porto di Genova [1991] ECR I-5889, paragraphs 16 and 17; and Case C‑323/93 Centre d’insémination de la Crespelle [1994] ECR I-5077, paragraph 18). In this respect, it is not necessary that any abuse should actually occur (see, to that effect, Case C‑55/96 Job Centre [1997] ECR I‑7119, paragraph 36).

43. In that connection, it is clear from the case-law of the Court that, within the framework of the VAT system, taxable transactions presuppose the existence of a transaction between the parties in which a price or consideration is stipulated. Thus, where a person’s activity consists exclusively in providing services for no direct consideration, there is no basis of assessment and the services are therefore not subject to VAT (see Case 89/81 Hong Kong Trade Development Council [1982] ECR 1277, paragraphs 9 and 10; and Case C‑16/93 Tolsma [1994] ECR I‑743, paragraph 12).

22. By laying down the procedural rules for proceedings designed to ensure protection of the rights which individuals acquire through the direct effect of Community law, Member States must ensure that such rules are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and are not framed in such a way as to render impossible in practice the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (principle of effectiveness) (see, to that effect, Case C-78/98 Preston and Others [2000] ECR I-3201, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited). However, compliance with the limits of the power of the Member States in procedural matters has not been called into question in the dispute in the main proceedings as regards appeal proceedings.

41. À cet égard, si l’objectif de prévenir l’entrée et le séjour irréguliers constitue une raison impérieuse d’intérêt général, il importe également que la mesure en cause soit propre à garantir la réalisation de cet objectif et qu’elle n’aille pas au-delà de ce qui est nécessaire pour l’atteindre.

52. According to settled case-law, the principle of proportionality is one of the general principles of European Union law and requires that measures implemented through provisions of European Union law be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them (Case C‑491/01 British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco [2002] ECR I‑11453, paragraph 122; Joined Cases C‑453/03, C‑11/04, C‑12/04 and C‑194/04 ABNA and Others [2005] ECR I‑10423, paragraph 68; and Case C‑58/08 Vodafone and Others [2010] ECR I‑4999, paragraph 51).

17 Following the Vroege and Fisscher judgments, some 60 000 part-time workers in the United Kingdom in both the public and the private sectors commenced proceedings before industrial tribunals. Relying on Article 119 of the Treaty, they claimed that they had been unlawfully excluded from membership of the various occupational pension schemes of the kind described in paragraphs 10 to 14 of this judgment. The defendants in those cases are their employers or, in some cases, former employers.

45 Taking account of the latest medical research on the subject, and also the difficulty of establishing the threshold above which exposure to trichloroethylene poses a serious health risk to humans, given the present state of the research, there is no evidence in this case to justify a conclusion by the Court that national legislation such as that at issue in the case in the main proceedings goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective in view (see, to that effect, Joined Cases 266/87 and 267/87 Association of Pharmaceutical Importers [1989] ECR 1295, paragraph 22).

23. In accordance with Article 4(2) of the Directive, the assessment of the unfair nature of terms is to relate neither to the definition of the main subject-matter of the contract nor to the adequacy of the price and remuneration, on the one hand, as against the services or goods supplied in exchange, on the other, in so far as those terms are in plain and intelligible language. However, this exclusion cannot apply to a term relating to a mechanism for amending the prices of the services provided to the consumer.

24 It is true that the exception to the application of the rules of EU law in cases where the ‘in-house’ award conditions are fulfilled may apply in situations coming within the scope of application of Directive 2004/18 as well as in situations falling outside that scope (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 November 2012, Econord, C‑182/11 and C‑183/11, EU:C:2012:758, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited). However, in the latter case, the application of that exception will be relevant to the dispute in the main proceedings only in so far as the contract at issue is subject to the fundamental rules and general principles of the FEU Treaty, which presupposes that it is of certain cross-border interest (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2016, Tecnoedi Costruzioni, C‑318/15, EU:C:2016:747, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).

20 A leg to which a piece of back remains attached must therefore be described as a leg, within the meaning of tariff subheadings 02.02 B II e) 3 of the old nomenclature and 0207 41 51 000 of the new, if that piece of back is not sufficiently large to give the product its essential character.