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14.4k
| text
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889
| entities
list | relations
list | Comments
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|---|---|---|---|---|
5,416 | Asus is likely only one of the vendors that is currently being targeted by Cyclops Blink. | [
{
"id": 51420,
"label": "identity",
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},
{
"id": 51421,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 75,
"end_offset": 88
}
] | [
{
"id": 1094,
"from_id": 51421,
"to_id": 51420,
"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
5,438 | While the Cyclops Blink malware variant that we analyzed in this report is complicated in nature, one thing proves to be unmistakable when it comes to the Sandworm group that created it: Sandworm is a persistent and sophisticated group whose motives are clearly at odds with those that would be expected from groups that are primarily financially motivated. | [
{
"id": 51438,
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"end_offset": 163
},
{
"id": 51437,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 10,
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},
{
"id": 51439,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 187,
"end_offset": 195
}
] | [
{
"id": 1095,
"from_id": 51437,
"to_id": 51438,
"type": "attributed-to"
}
] | [] |
5,462 | We stumbled upon the Confucius hacking group while delving into Patchwork’s cyberespionage operations, and found a number of similarities. | [
{
"id": 51448,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 64,
"end_offset": 73
},
{
"id": 51449,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 21,
"end_offset": 30
}
] | [
{
"id": 1096,
"from_id": 51449,
"to_id": 51448,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
5,469 | While Patchwork may be more straightforward with its predominantly malware-based attacks, Confucius’ can be inferred to be more nuanced, relying heavily on social engineering. | [
{
"id": 51455,
"label": "threat-actor",
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"end_offset": 99
},
{
"id": 51456,
"label": "attack-pattern",
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"end_offset": 174
},
{
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"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 67,
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},
{
"id": 51454,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 6,
"end_offset": 15
}
] | [
{
"id": 1097,
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"type": "uses"
},
{
"id": 1098,
"from_id": 51455,
"to_id": 51456,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
5,482 | hayat22, supposedly a female student, engaged in an online romance with a target whose handle was love, describing himself as living in South Asia working in garments manufacturing and wholesaling. | [
{
"id": 51475,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 0,
"end_offset": 7
},
{
"id": 51476,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 136,
"end_offset": 146
},
{
"id": 51482,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 98,
"end_offset": 102
}
] | [
{
"id": 1099,
"from_id": 51475,
"to_id": 51476,
"type": "located-at"
}
] | [] |
5,499 | Compared to Patchwork, whose Trojanized documents exploit at least five security flaws, Confucius’ backdoors are delivered through Office files exploiting memory corruption vulnerabilities CVE-2015-1641 and CVE-2017-11882. | [
{
"id": 51507,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 144,
"end_offset": 172
},
{
"id": 51504,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 88,
"end_offset": 97
},
{
"id": 51503,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 12,
"end_offset": 21
},
{
"id": 51505,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 189,
"end_offset": 202
},
{
"id": 51506,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 207,
"end_offset": 221
}
] | [
{
"id": 1100,
"from_id": 51504,
"to_id": 51507,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
13,006 | Recently observed Ghostwriter credential phishing domains and emails: Curious Gorge, a group TAG attributes to China's PLA SSF, has remained active against government, military, logistics and manufacturing organizations in Ukraine, Russia and Central Asia. | [
{
"id": 48807,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 243,
"end_offset": 255
},
{
"id": 48810,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 70,
"end_offset": 83
},
{
"id": 48811,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 111,
"end_offset": 119
},
{
"id": 48809,
"label": "location",
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"end_offset": 239
},
{
"id": 48808,
"label": "location",
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},
{
"id": 48813,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 119,
"end_offset": 126
},
{
"id": 48812,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 119,
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},
{
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"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 18,
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},
{
"id": 40520,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 41,
"end_offset": 49
}
] | [
{
"id": 466,
"from_id": 48810,
"to_id": 48812,
"type": "attributed-to"
}
] | [] |
13,023 | Here is a deeper look at the campaign activity TAG has observed over the past two weeks: Curious Gorge, a group TAG attributes to China's PLA SSF, has conducted campaigns against government and military organizations in Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Mongolia. | [
{
"id": 48841,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 130,
"end_offset": 145
},
{
"id": 48843,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 220,
"end_offset": 227
},
{
"id": 48840,
"label": "threat-actor",
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},
{
"id": 48842,
"label": "identity",
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},
{
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"label": "location",
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},
{
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"label": "identity",
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},
{
"id": 48844,
"label": "location",
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"end_offset": 235
},
{
"id": 48846,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 253,
"end_offset": 261
}
] | [
{
"id": 467,
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"type": "attributed-to"
},
{
"id": 468,
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"to_id": 48843,
"type": "duplicate-of"
},
{
"id": 469,
"from_id": 48840,
"to_id": 48844,
"type": "duplicate-of"
},
{
"id": 470,
"from_id": 48840,
"to_id": 48845,
"type": "duplicate-of"
},
{
"id": 471,
"from_id": 48840,
"to_id": 48846,
"type": "duplicate-of"
}
] | [] |
13,025 | Recently observed IPs used in Curious Gorge campaigns: COLDRIVER, a Russian-based threat actor sometimes referred to as Calisto, has launched credential phishing campaigns, targeting several US based NGOs and think tanks, the military of a Balkans country, and a Ukraine based defense contractor. | [
{
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},
{
"id": 48849,
"label": "campaign",
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},
{
"id": 48853,
"label": "location",
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},
{
"id": 48854,
"label": "location",
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},
{
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},
{
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},
{
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"label": "identity",
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},
{
"id": 48858,
"label": "location",
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},
{
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"label": "threat-actor",
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},
{
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},
{
"id": 48859,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 226,
"end_offset": 235
}
] | [
{
"id": 473,
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"type": "located-at"
},
{
"id": 474,
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"to_id": 48858,
"type": "located-at"
},
{
"id": 475,
"from_id": 48857,
"to_id": 48858,
"type": "located-at"
},
{
"id": 472,
"from_id": 48855,
"to_id": 48854,
"type": "located-at"
},
{
"id": 476,
"from_id": 48850,
"to_id": 48851,
"type": "uses"
},
{
"id": 477,
"from_id": 48850,
"to_id": 48856,
"type": "duplicate-of"
},
{
"id": 478,
"from_id": 48850,
"to_id": 48857,
"type": "duplicate-of"
},
{
"id": 479,
"from_id": 48850,
"to_id": 48859,
"type": "duplicate-of"
},
{
"id": 480,
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"to_id": 48855,
"type": "duplicate-of"
},
{
"id": 481,
"from_id": 48850,
"to_id": 48849,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
13,026 | However, for the first time, TAG has observed COLDRIVER campaigns targeting the military of multiple Eastern European countries, as well as a NATO Centre of Excellence. | [
{
"id": 48860,
"label": "campaign",
"start_offset": 46,
"end_offset": 56
},
{
"id": 48861,
"label": "identity",
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},
{
"id": 48862,
"label": "identity",
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},
{
"id": 48863,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 101,
"end_offset": 117
}
] | [
{
"id": 482,
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},
{
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"type": "targets"
},
{
"id": 483,
"from_id": 48860,
"to_id": 48861,
"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
13,029 | Recently observed COLDRIVER credential phishing domains: Ghostwriter, a Belarusian threat actor, recently introduced a new capability into their credential phishing campaigns. | [
{
"id": 48866,
"label": "campaign",
"start_offset": 18,
"end_offset": 28
},
{
"id": 48867,
"label": "attack-pattern",
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},
{
"id": 48868,
"label": "threat-actor",
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},
{
"id": 48869,
"label": "location",
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},
{
"id": 48870,
"label": "attack-pattern",
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"end_offset": 164
}
] | [
{
"id": 485,
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"to_id": 48867,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
13,146 | Tropic Trooper, a threat actor group that targets government, military, healthcare, transportation, and high-tech industries in Taiwan, the Philippines, and Hong Kong, has been active since 2011. | [
{
"id": 48920,
"label": "identity",
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},
{
"id": 48922,
"label": "location",
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},
{
"id": 48924,
"label": "TIME",
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},
{
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"label": "identity",
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},
{
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},
{
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},
{
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},
{
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"label": "identity",
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},
{
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"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 84,
"end_offset": 98
},
{
"id": 48923,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 157,
"end_offset": 166
}
] | [
{
"id": 491,
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"type": "located-at"
},
{
"id": 492,
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"type": "located-at"
},
{
"id": 487,
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"type": "targets"
},
{
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"type": "targets"
},
{
"id": 489,
"from_id": 48915,
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"type": "targets"
},
{
"id": 494,
"from_id": 48916,
"to_id": 48922,
"type": "located-at"
},
{
"id": 495,
"from_id": 48916,
"to_id": 48923,
"type": "located-at"
},
{
"id": 496,
"from_id": 48917,
"to_id": 48921,
"type": "located-at"
},
{
"id": 497,
"from_id": 48915,
"to_id": 48916,
"type": "targets"
},
{
"id": 498,
"from_id": 48915,
"to_id": 48924,
"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 493,
"from_id": 48918,
"to_id": 48922,
"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
13,147 | The group was reportedly using spear-phishing emails with weaponized attachments to exploit known vulnerabilities. | [
{
"id": 48925,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 31,
"end_offset": 45
},
{
"id": 48926,
"label": "threat-actor",
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"end_offset": 10
}
] | [
{
"id": 499,
"from_id": 48926,
"to_id": 48925,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
13,149 | We found that Tropic Trooper’s latest activities center on targeting Taiwanese and the Philippine military’s physically isolated networks through a USBferry attack (the name derived from a sample found in a related research). | [
{
"id": 48927,
"label": "threat-actor",
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},
{
"id": 48928,
"label": "location",
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},
{
"id": 48929,
"label": "location",
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},
{
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"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 98,
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},
{
"id": 48930,
"label": "malware",
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"end_offset": 163
}
] | [
{
"id": 500,
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"type": "located-at"
},
{
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"type": "located-at"
},
{
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"type": "uses"
},
{
"id": 502,
"from_id": 48927,
"to_id": 48931,
"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
13,156 | A sample scenario of the USBferry attack Tropic Trooper is well aware that military or government organizations may have more robust security in their physically isolated environments (i.e., the use of biometrics or USB use in a quarantined machine before an air-gapped environment). | [
{
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},
{
"id": 48939,
"label": "malware",
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}
] | [
{
"id": 504,
"from_id": 48939,
"to_id": 48940,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
13,472 | We continue to see attacks from groups like Charming Kitten on medical and healthcare professionals, including World Health Organization (WHO) employees. | [
{
"id": 51544,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 44,
"end_offset": 59
},
{
"id": 51545,
"label": "identity",
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"end_offset": 142
}
] | [
{
"id": 1101,
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"to_id": 51545,
"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
13,474 | As one example, we've seen new activity from “hack-for-hire” firms, many based in India, that have been creating Gmail accounts spoofing the WHO. | [
{
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"label": "threat-actor",
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},
{
"id": 51547,
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},
{
"id": 51548,
"label": "identity",
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}
] | [
{
"id": 1102,
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"type": "targets"
},
{
"id": 1103,
"from_id": 51546,
"to_id": 51547,
"type": "located-at"
}
] | [] |
13,499 | While it offers standard mailbox copies that was likely stolen with the help of credential phishing, Void Balaur also offers copies of mailboxes that have not been interacted with — for a higher price. | [
{
"id": 51567,
"label": "threat-actor",
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},
{
"id": 51568,
"label": "attack-pattern",
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"end_offset": 99
}
] | [
{
"id": 1104,
"from_id": 51567,
"to_id": 51568,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
13,539 | The campaign initially compromised e-commerce online shops in Japan, Australia, and European countries via spam emails with malicious attachments. | [
{
"id": 51605,
"label": "attack-pattern",
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"end_offset": 118
},
{
"id": 51606,
"label": "campaign",
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},
{
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},
{
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},
{
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"end_offset": 78
},
{
"id": 51603,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 84,
"end_offset": 92
}
] | [
{
"id": 1105,
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"type": "targets"
},
{
"id": 1106,
"from_id": 51607,
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"type": "located-at"
},
{
"id": 1107,
"from_id": 51607,
"to_id": 51602,
"type": "located-at"
},
{
"id": 1108,
"from_id": 51607,
"to_id": 51603,
"type": "located-at"
},
{
"id": 1110,
"from_id": 51606,
"to_id": 51605,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
13,541 | Victims are now mainly located only in Japan. | [
{
"id": 51611,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 39,
"end_offset": 44
},
{
"id": 51612,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 0,
"end_offset": 7
}
] | [
{
"id": 1111,
"from_id": 51612,
"to_id": 51611,
"type": "located-at"
}
] | [] |
13,543 | Instead, malicious scripts are being executed when the administrators look into customer orders in their online shop’s administration panel. | [
{
"id": 51614,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 55,
"end_offset": 69
},
{
"id": 51615,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 105,
"end_offset": 139
},
{
"id": 51616,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 9,
"end_offset": 26
}
] | [
{
"id": 1112,
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"type": "targets"
},
{
"id": 1113,
"from_id": 51614,
"to_id": 51615,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
13,545 | The Water Pamola attack chain After further searching, we noticed that an online store administrator asked about a strange online order that contains JavaScript code inserted into the field where the customer’s address or company name would normally be located. | [
{
"id": 51617,
"label": "campaign",
"start_offset": 4,
"end_offset": 16
},
{
"id": 51618,
"label": "identity",
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"end_offset": 105
},
{
"id": 51620,
"label": "attack-pattern",
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}
] | [
{
"id": 1114,
"from_id": 51617,
"to_id": 51620,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
13,546 | This script is likely activated by exploiting a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the said store’s administration portal. | [
{
"id": 51622,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 101,
"end_offset": 130
},
{
"id": 51623,
"label": "malware",
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},
{
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"label": "attack-pattern",
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"end_offset": 74
}
] | [
{
"id": 1115,
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"to_id": 51622,
"type": "targets"
},
{
"id": 1116,
"from_id": 51623,
"to_id": 51621,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
13,551 | The script connects to the Water Pamola’s server and downloads additional payloads. | [
{
"id": 51627,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 4,
"end_offset": 10
},
{
"id": 51626,
"label": "Infrastucture",
"start_offset": 27,
"end_offset": 48
}
] | [
{
"id": 1117,
"from_id": 51627,
"to_id": 51626,
"type": "beacons-to"
}
] | [] |
13,552 | Taken together, this led us to believe that Water Pamola places orders with this embedded XSS script across many targeted online shops. | [
{
"id": 51628,
"label": "campaign",
"start_offset": 44,
"end_offset": 56
},
{
"id": 42261,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 90,
"end_offset": 93
}
] | [
{
"id": 1118,
"from_id": 51628,
"to_id": 42261,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
13,561 | As previously mentioned, Water Pamola sent online shopping orders appended with a malicious XSS script to attack e-commerce administrators. | [
{
"id": 51638,
"label": "campaign",
"start_offset": 25,
"end_offset": 37
},
{
"id": 51639,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 92,
"end_offset": 95
},
{
"id": 51640,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 113,
"end_offset": 138
}
] | [
{
"id": 1119,
"from_id": 51638,
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"type": "targets"
},
{
"id": 1120,
"from_id": 51638,
"to_id": 51639,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
13,563 | If the store’s e-commerce system is vulnerable to XSS attacks, the malicious script will be loaded and executed on the merchant’s management panel once someone (like a system administrator or store employee) opens the said order. | [
{
"id": 51641,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 50,
"end_offset": 53
},
{
"id": 51642,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 67,
"end_offset": 83
},
{
"id": 51643,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 130,
"end_offset": 147
}
] | [
{
"id": 1121,
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"type": "targets"
},
{
"id": 1122,
"from_id": 51642,
"to_id": 51641,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
13,565 | The source code of this framework is shared across many Chinese public forums. | [
{
"id": 51646,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 56,
"end_offset": 63
},
{
"id": 51647,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 24,
"end_offset": 33
}
] | [
{
"id": 1123,
"from_id": 51647,
"to_id": 51646,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
13,576 | If the victim enters the credential in the fake form and clicks anywhere on the page, the script will take the credentials, encode them using base64, replace some characters with custom substrings, and then upload these to Water Pamola’s server. Figure 4. | [
{
"id": 51656,
"label": "Infrastucture",
"start_offset": 223,
"end_offset": 244
},
{
"id": 51657,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 90,
"end_offset": 96
}
] | [
{
"id": 1124,
"from_id": 51657,
"to_id": 51656,
"type": "communicates-with"
}
] | [] |
13,581 | Some of the delivered malicious scripts attempt to install backdoors to the websites built with the EC-CUBE framework, which is popular in Japan. | [
{
"id": 51662,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 100,
"end_offset": 117
},
{
"id": 51664,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 22,
"end_offset": 39
},
{
"id": 51663,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 139,
"end_offset": 144
}
] | [
{
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},
{
"id": 1126,
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"to_id": 51662,
"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
13,585 | The name of the web shell file is hardcoded to be either “ec_ver.php,” “log3.php,” or “temp.php.” | [
{
"id": 51670,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 58,
"end_offset": 69
},
{
"id": 51671,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 72,
"end_offset": 80
},
{
"id": 51672,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 87,
"end_offset": 95
},
{
"id": 42348,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 16,
"end_offset": 25
}
] | [
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{
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"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 1129,
"from_id": 42348,
"to_id": 51672,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
13,588 | The blog post describes a web shell with two components — a PHP script and an HTML uploading file — however, the second one is not needed as the proper POST request can be created with any custom or third-party tool (e.g., Fiddler). Figure 6. | [
{
"id": 51676,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 26,
"end_offset": 35
},
{
"id": 51677,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 60,
"end_offset": 71
},
{
"id": 51678,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 78,
"end_offset": 97
}
] | [
{
"id": 1130,
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"type": "consists-of"
},
{
"id": 1131,
"from_id": 51676,
"to_id": 51678,
"type": "consists-of"
}
] | [] |
13,595 | The plugin has been designed to drop multiple PHP web shell files on the server. | [
{
"id": 51684,
"label": "Infrastucture",
"start_offset": 73,
"end_offset": 79
},
{
"id": 42379,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 50,
"end_offset": 59
}
] | [
{
"id": 1132,
"from_id": 42379,
"to_id": 51684,
"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
13,600 | (Note that Flash has been declared end-of-life by Adobe since December 31, 2020.) If the victim downloads and executes the installer downloaded from this page, the victim will be infected with a variant of Gh0stRat malware, previously also named Gh0stCringe or CineregRAT. | [
{
"id": 51687,
"label": "TIME",
"start_offset": 62,
"end_offset": 79
},
{
"id": 51688,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 207,
"end_offset": 215
},
{
"id": 51689,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 247,
"end_offset": 258
},
{
"id": 51690,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 262,
"end_offset": 272
}
] | [
{
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"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 1134,
"from_id": 51688,
"to_id": 51690,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
13,602 | The Gh0st RAT samples related to this campaign are obfuscated executable files, which decrypt the main payload in memory and execute its main export function named “Shellex.” Figure | [
{
"id": 51695,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 165,
"end_offset": 172
},
{
"id": 51694,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 4,
"end_offset": 13
}
] | [
{
"id": 1135,
"from_id": 51694,
"to_id": 51695,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
13,610 | In this example, AdobeAirFlashInstaller.exe (legitimate file) sideloads xerces-c_2_1_0.dll (patched legitimate file), which then sideloads ulibs.dll (malicious file). | [
{
"id": 51698,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 139,
"end_offset": 148
},
{
"id": 51696,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 17,
"end_offset": 43
},
{
"id": 51697,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 72,
"end_offset": 90
}
] | [
{
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"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 1137,
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"to_id": 51698,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
13,615 | Here, svchost.exe (renamed legitimate and signed Launcher.exe file from Tencent) sideloads Utility.dll (patched legitimate file). | [
{
"id": 51704,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 49,
"end_offset": 61
},
{
"id": 51705,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 91,
"end_offset": 102
},
{
"id": 51703,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 6,
"end_offset": 17
}
] | [
{
"id": 1138,
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"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 1139,
"from_id": 51703,
"to_id": 51704,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
13,632 | The code used to obtain user QQ numbers Protecting e-commerce platforms from Water Pamola’s attacks Water Pamola attacked online merchants with an XSS script appended onto online shopping orders. | [
{
"id": 51716,
"label": "campaign",
"start_offset": 81,
"end_offset": 93
},
{
"id": 51717,
"label": "campaign",
"start_offset": 104,
"end_offset": 116
},
{
"id": 51718,
"label": "identity",
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"end_offset": 142
},
{
"id": 51719,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 151,
"end_offset": 154
}
] | [
{
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"type": "uses"
},
{
"id": 1140,
"from_id": 51717,
"to_id": 51718,
"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
13,640 | A series of ongoing business email compromise (BEC) campaigns that uses spear-phishing schemes on Office 365 accounts has been seen targeting business executives of over 1,000 companies across the world since March 2020. | [
{
"id": 51722,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 72,
"end_offset": 86
},
{
"id": 51723,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 98,
"end_offset": 117
},
{
"id": 51724,
"label": "TIME",
"start_offset": 203,
"end_offset": 219
},
{
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},
{
"id": 51726,
"label": "campaign",
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}
] | [
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},
{
"id": 1144,
"from_id": 51726,
"to_id": 51724,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
13,641 | The recent campaigns target senior positions in the United States and Canada. | [
{
"id": 51729,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 28,
"end_offset": 44
},
{
"id": 51731,
"label": "location",
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"end_offset": 76
},
{
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},
{
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}
] | [
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"type": "located-at"
},
{
"id": 1147,
"from_id": 51729,
"to_id": 51731,
"type": "located-at"
}
] | [] |
13,642 | The fraudsters, whom we named “Water Nue,” primarily target accounts of financial executives to obtain credentials for further financial fraud. | [
{
"id": 51732,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 31,
"end_offset": 40
},
{
"id": 51734,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 72,
"end_offset": 92
}
] | [
{
"id": 1148,
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"to_id": 51734,
"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
13,651 | We first noticed the campaign from a large group of email domains used in phishing attempts. | [
{
"id": 51739,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 74,
"end_offset": 82
},
{
"id": 51738,
"label": "campaign",
"start_offset": 21,
"end_offset": 29
}
] | [
{
"id": 1149,
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"to_id": 51739,
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}
] | [] |
13,653 | In one of the first cases we encountered, the senior financial officer of a bank located in Africa purportedly sent a PDF invoice to a colleague, specifying a bank account in Hong Kong. | [
{
"id": 51742,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 46,
"end_offset": 70
},
{
"id": 51740,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 92,
"end_offset": 98
},
{
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"label": "location",
"start_offset": 175,
"end_offset": 184
},
{
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"label": "identity",
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"end_offset": 144
}
] | [
{
"id": 1150,
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"to_id": 51740,
"type": "located-at"
}
] | [] |
13,657 | The attackers use cloud-based email distribution services like SendGrid to deliver emails with a clickable link that redirects targets to a fake Office 365 page. | [
{
"id": 51745,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 4,
"end_offset": 13
},
{
"id": 51746,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 63,
"end_offset": 71
}
] | [
{
"id": 1151,
"from_id": 51745,
"to_id": 51746,
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}
] | [] |
13,663 | In a July email sent to a C-level executive, we learned that the base domain URL is U10450540[.]ct[.]sendgrid[.]net, with the final URL being *getting-panes[.]sfo2*. Figure 3. | [
{
"id": 51748,
"label": "URL",
"start_offset": 84,
"end_offset": 116
},
{
"id": 51749,
"label": "URL",
"start_offset": 142,
"end_offset": 164
},
{
"id": 51750,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 26,
"end_offset": 43
}
] | [
{
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},
{
"id": 1153,
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"to_id": 51749,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
13,715 | It is associated with the cyberespionage group BlackTech, which mainly targets technology companies and government agencies in East Asia (specifically Taiwan, and in some instances, Japan and Hong Kong) and is responsible for some infamous campaigns such as PLEAD and Shrouded Crossbow. | [
{
"id": 51763,
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"end_offset": 56
},
{
"id": 51764,
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},
{
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},
{
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"label": "location",
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},
{
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},
{
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},
{
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},
{
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}
] | [
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{
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},
{
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"type": "located-at"
},
{
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"to_id": 51766,
"type": "located-at"
},
{
"id": 1158,
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"to_id": 51767,
"type": "located-at"
},
{
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"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 1160,
"from_id": 51763,
"to_id": 51770,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
13,800 | Therefore, the first-stage shellcode takes the PID of the Windows Service — which the first-stage shellcode and the succeeding backdoor both inject into — hides the target process, and embeds that PID into the second-stage shellcode. | [
{
"id": 48789,
"label": "tools",
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},
{
"id": 48790,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
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"end_offset": 73
},
{
"id": 48791,
"label": "attack-pattern",
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}
] | [
{
"id": 464,
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"type": "duplicate-of"
},
{
"id": 465,
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"to_id": 48791,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
13,913 | It is interesting to note that DarkSide’s ransom note is similar to that of Babuk, which might indicate that these two families share a link. | [
{
"id": 48734,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 31,
"end_offset": 42
},
{
"id": 48735,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 76,
"end_offset": 81
}
] | [
{
"id": 450,
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"to_id": 48735,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
13,919 | The actors behind Darkside have stated that they avoid targeting companies in certain industries, including healthcare, education, the public sector, and the nonprofit sector. | [
{
"id": 48741,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 18,
"end_offset": 27
},
{
"id": 48744,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 0,
"end_offset": 10
}
] | [
{
"id": 451,
"from_id": 48741,
"to_id": 48744,
"type": "attributed-to"
}
] | [] |
13,921 | Based on Trend Micro data, the US is by far DarkSide’s most targeted country, at more than 500 detections, followed by France, Belgium, and Canada. | [
{
"id": 48745,
"label": "malware",
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},
{
"id": 48748,
"label": "location",
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},
{
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{
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},
{
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}
] | [
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},
{
"id": 454,
"from_id": 48745,
"to_id": 48748,
"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
13,922 | As previously mentioned, DarkSide avoids victimizing companies in CIS countries. | [
{
"id": 48750,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 25,
"end_offset": 34
},
{
"id": 48751,
"label": "location",
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"end_offset": 79
}
] | [
{
"id": 456,
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"to_id": 48751,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
13,924 | That the group admittedly spares companies in CIS countries could be a clue to where DarkSide actors are residing. | [
{
"id": 48752,
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"end_offset": 94
},
{
"id": 48753,
"label": "location",
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}
] | [
{
"id": 457,
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"to_id": 48753,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
13,940 | Jon Clay, Director of Global Threat Communications at Trend Micro, outlines the phases of ransomware: | [
{
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},
{
"id": 48759,
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}
] | [
{
"id": 458,
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"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
13,960 | In a US Senate hearing on cybersecurity threats, Senator Rob Portman of Ohio described the strike on Colonial Pipeline as “potentially the most substantial and damaging attack on US critical infrastructure ever.” | [
{
"id": 48769,
"label": "identity",
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},
{
"id": 48768,
"label": "identity",
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},
{
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},
{
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"label": "location",
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}
] | [
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},
{
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"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
13,996 | While analyzing the technical details of this malware, which includes two new espionage backdoors, we noticed striking similarities to other malware attributed to the threat actor known as APT37, also known as Reaper or Group 123. | [
{
"id": 48781,
"label": "threat-actor",
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"end_offset": 194
},
{
"id": 48782,
"label": "threat-actor",
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"end_offset": 217
},
{
"id": 48783,
"label": "threat-actor",
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}
] | [
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"type": "duplicate-of"
},
{
"id": 462,
"from_id": 48781,
"to_id": 48783,
"type": "duplicate-of"
}
] | [] |
13,999 | It is important to note that previous analysis of suspected APT37 activities from different security vendors date from 2016, and the captured samples for the Operation Earth Kitsune have been developed recently. | [
{
"id": 48786,
"label": "threat-actor",
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},
{
"id": 48787,
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"end_offset": 123
},
{
"id": 48788,
"label": "campaign",
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}
] | [
{
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"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
14,071 | Figure 9 shows that SLUB used “Windows-RT-KB-2937636.dll,” while Freenki used “Windows-KB275122-x86.exe.” Figure 9 Naming convention for persistence. | [
{
"id": 47392,
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},
{
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{
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"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 20,
"end_offset": 24
}
] | [
{
"id": 316,
"from_id": 43549,
"to_id": 47389,
"type": "uses"
},
{
"id": 317,
"from_id": 47395,
"to_id": 47392,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
14,072 | We can see how the Freenki malware, previous SLUB campaigns, and Operation Earth Kitsune share many common TTPs in their delivery and persistence mechanisms. | [
{
"id": 47402,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 23,
"end_offset": 31
},
{
"id": 47403,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 49,
"end_offset": 54
},
{
"id": 47425,
"label": "campaign",
"start_offset": 69,
"end_offset": 92
}
] | [
{
"id": 344,
"from_id": 47402,
"to_id": 47403,
"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 345,
"from_id": 47402,
"to_id": 47425,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
14,077 | In the blog describing Operation Earth Kitsune, we noted sites using the GNUBoard Content Management System (CMS) had been compromised and were used to host malware. | [
{
"id": 48008,
"label": "campaign",
"start_offset": 23,
"end_offset": 46
},
{
"id": 48009,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 73,
"end_offset": 90
},
{
"id": 48010,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 157,
"end_offset": 164
}
] | [
{
"id": 370,
"from_id": 48010,
"to_id": 48009,
"type": "compromises"
},
{
"id": 376,
"from_id": 48009,
"to_id": 48010,
"type": "hosts"
}
] | [] |
14,081 | The SLUB campaign also exploited and used GNUBoard websites as part of the infrastructure. | [
{
"id": 48160,
"label": "campaign",
"start_offset": 4,
"end_offset": 17
},
{
"id": 48161,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 42,
"end_offset": 51
}
] | [
{
"id": 389,
"from_id": 48160,
"to_id": 48161,
"type": "exploits"
}
] | [] |
14,123 | Mattermost was being used as a C2 channel for the malware. | [
{
"id": 48188,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 0,
"end_offset": 11
},
{
"id": 48189,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 50,
"end_offset": 57
}
] | [
{
"id": 390,
"from_id": 48189,
"to_id": 48188,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
14,126 | At the same time, we were able to locate the Mattermost server hosted in Greece, and that gave us the current time zone of the Mattermost server. | [
{
"id": 48192,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 73,
"end_offset": 79
},
{
"id": 48191,
"label": "Infrastucture",
"start_offset": 127,
"end_offset": 144
},
{
"id": 48193,
"label": "Infrastucture",
"start_offset": 45,
"end_offset": 62
}
] | [
{
"id": 392,
"from_id": 48191,
"to_id": 48192,
"type": "located-at"
},
{
"id": 393,
"from_id": 48193,
"to_id": 48192,
"type": "located-at"
}
] | [] |
14,220 | The payload is a file named loadoerf.ini that contains decryption, run, and code injection functions. | [
{
"id": 48249,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 28,
"end_offset": 40
},
{
"id": 48250,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 76,
"end_offset": 90
}
] | [
{
"id": 394,
"from_id": 48249,
"to_id": 48250,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
14,221 | When it is loaded by the system, DLLMain decrypts the payload via CryptUnprotectData. | [
{
"id": 48251,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 66,
"end_offset": 84
},
{
"id": 48252,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 33,
"end_offset": 41
}
] | [
{
"id": 395,
"from_id": 48252,
"to_id": 48251,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
14,253 | Nearly all the C&C servers are hosted in the U.S., while two are located in Japan. | [
{
"id": 48448,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 45,
"end_offset": 49
},
{
"id": 48449,
"label": "Infrastucture",
"start_offset": 15,
"end_offset": 26
}
] | [
{
"id": 410,
"from_id": 48449,
"to_id": 48448,
"type": "located-at"
}
] | [] |
14,259 | Related Hashes (SHA256) detected as BKDR64_WINNTI.ONM: 06b077e31a6f339c4f3b1f61ba9a6a6ba827afe52ed5bed6a6bf56bf18a279ba — cryptbase.dll 1e63a7186886deea6c4e5c2a329eab76a60be3a65bca1ba9ed6e71f9a46b7e9d – loadperf.dll 7c37ebb96c54d5d8ea232951ccf56cb1d029facdd6b730f80ca2ad566f6c5d9b – loadoerf.ini 9d04ef8708cf030b9688bf3e8287c1790023a76374e43bd332178e212420f9fb — wbemcomn.ini b1a0d0508ee932bbf91625330d2136f33344ed70cb25f7e64be0620d32c4b9e2 — cryptbase.ini e5273b72c853f12b77a11e9c08ae6432fabbb32238ac487af2fb959a6cc26089 — wbemcomn.dll Tags Malware | APT & Targeted Attacks | Endpoints | Research | [
{
"id": 48453,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 36,
"end_offset": 53
},
{
"id": 48457,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 283,
"end_offset": 295
},
{
"id": 48459,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 524,
"end_offset": 537
},
{
"id": 48460,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 443,
"end_offset": 456
},
{
"id": 48455,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 122,
"end_offset": 135
},
{
"id": 48456,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 203,
"end_offset": 215
},
{
"id": 48463,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 363,
"end_offset": 376
},
{
"id": 44129,
"label": "SHA1",
"start_offset": 55,
"end_offset": 119
},
{
"id": 44130,
"label": "SHA1",
"start_offset": 136,
"end_offset": 200
},
{
"id": 44131,
"label": "SHA1",
"start_offset": 216,
"end_offset": 280
},
{
"id": 44132,
"label": "SHA1",
"start_offset": 296,
"end_offset": 360
},
{
"id": 44133,
"label": "SHA1",
"start_offset": 376,
"end_offset": 440
},
{
"id": 44134,
"label": "SHA1",
"start_offset": 457,
"end_offset": 521
}
] | [
{
"id": 412,
"from_id": 48453,
"to_id": 48455,
"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 414,
"from_id": 48456,
"to_id": 48453,
"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 416,
"from_id": 48453,
"to_id": 48457,
"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 415,
"from_id": 48460,
"to_id": 48456,
"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 418,
"from_id": 48453,
"to_id": 48459,
"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 419,
"from_id": 44129,
"to_id": 48455,
"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 420,
"from_id": 44130,
"to_id": 48456,
"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 421,
"from_id": 44132,
"to_id": 48463,
"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 422,
"from_id": 44133,
"to_id": 48460,
"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 423,
"from_id": 44134,
"to_id": 48459,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [
{
"id": 2,
"comment": "Schau mal bitte drüber"
}
] |
14,263 | Our analysis of the latest Maikspy variants revealed that users contracted the spyware from hxxp://miakhalifagame[.]com/, a website that distributes malicious apps (including the 2016 adult game) and connects to its C&C server to upload data from infected devices and machines. | [
{
"id": 48474,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 27,
"end_offset": 35
},
{
"id": 48475,
"label": "URL",
"start_offset": 92,
"end_offset": 120
},
{
"id": 48477,
"label": "Infrastucture",
"start_offset": 216,
"end_offset": 226
},
{
"id": 48476,
"label": "TIME",
"start_offset": 179,
"end_offset": 183
}
] | [
{
"id": 424,
"from_id": 48474,
"to_id": 48475,
"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 425,
"from_id": 48475,
"to_id": 48477,
"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 426,
"from_id": 48477,
"to_id": 48474,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
14,265 | Figure 1. Tweets that mention Virtual Girlfriend and the short link of hxxp://miakhalifagame[.]com/ Maikspy on the Android platform Figure 2. | [
{
"id": 48479,
"label": "URL",
"start_offset": 71,
"end_offset": 99
},
{
"id": 48480,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 100,
"end_offset": 108
},
{
"id": 48481,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 115,
"end_offset": 123
}
] | [
{
"id": 427,
"from_id": 48479,
"to_id": 48480,
"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 428,
"from_id": 48480,
"to_id": 48481,
"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
14,267 | Based on the analysis of samples that were last seen in the wild in March 2018, the Maikspy variant (detected by Trend Micro as AndroidOS_MaikSpy.HRX) that runs on Android poses as Virtual Girlfriend to lure users into visiting the attackers’ malicious domain. | [
{
"id": 48487,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 128,
"end_offset": 149
},
{
"id": 48488,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 164,
"end_offset": 172
},
{
"id": 48486,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 113,
"end_offset": 124
},
{
"id": 48489,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 181,
"end_offset": 200
},
{
"id": 48484,
"label": "TIME",
"start_offset": 68,
"end_offset": 78
},
{
"id": 48485,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 84,
"end_offset": 92
}
] | [
{
"id": 429,
"from_id": 48487,
"to_id": 48489,
"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 430,
"from_id": 48484,
"to_id": 48485,
"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 431,
"from_id": 48485,
"to_id": 48487,
"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 432,
"from_id": 48487,
"to_id": 48488,
"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
14,296 | Maikspy on the Windows platform Figure 7. | [
{
"id": 48501,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 0,
"end_offset": 8
},
{
"id": 48502,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 15,
"end_offset": 23
}
] | [
{
"id": 433,
"from_id": 48501,
"to_id": 48502,
"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
14,297 | Infection chain of Maikspy Windows variant Figure 8. | [
{
"id": 48503,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 19,
"end_offset": 27
},
{
"id": 48504,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 27,
"end_offset": 35
}
] | [
{
"id": 434,
"from_id": 48503,
"to_id": 48504,
"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
14,299 | In the case of the Windows variant (WORM_INFOKEY.A) of Maikspy last seen in April 2017, the user will be tricked into downloading a MiaKhalifa.rar file, which contains the files seen in the screenshot below: | [
{
"id": 48510,
"label": "TIME",
"start_offset": 76,
"end_offset": 86
},
{
"id": 48507,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 19,
"end_offset": 27
},
{
"id": 48508,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 36,
"end_offset": 50
},
{
"id": 48509,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 55,
"end_offset": 63
},
{
"id": 48511,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 132,
"end_offset": 152
}
] | [
{
"id": 435,
"from_id": 48508,
"to_id": 48509,
"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 436,
"from_id": 48508,
"to_id": 48507,
"type": "duplicate-of"
},
{
"id": 437,
"from_id": 48509,
"to_id": 48510,
"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 438,
"from_id": 48508,
"to_id": 48511,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
14,301 | Content of the MiaKhalifa.rar file README.txt provides instructions teaching the user how to turn off the anti-virus software and how to turn on the network, which the attacker needs to steal and upload data to its C&C server. | [
{
"id": 48512,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 15,
"end_offset": 29
},
{
"id": 48515,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 106,
"end_offset": 125
},
{
"id": 48513,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 34,
"end_offset": 45
},
{
"id": 48514,
"label": "Infrastucture",
"start_offset": 215,
"end_offset": 225
}
] | [
{
"id": 439,
"from_id": 48512,
"to_id": 48513,
"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 440,
"from_id": 48513,
"to_id": 48515,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
14,303 | Content of README.txt register.bat is used to gain administrator privilege. | [
{
"id": 48516,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 11,
"end_offset": 21
},
{
"id": 48518,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 22,
"end_offset": 34
},
{
"id": 48519,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 51,
"end_offset": 74
}
] | [
{
"id": 441,
"from_id": 48518,
"to_id": 48519,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
14,305 | Code snippet of register.bat Uninstall.exe is a copy of the open-source hacking tool Mimikatz (https://github[.]com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz). | [
{
"id": 48520,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 16,
"end_offset": 28
},
{
"id": 48521,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 29,
"end_offset": 42
},
{
"id": 48522,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 88,
"end_offset": 89
},
{
"id": 48524,
"label": "URL",
"start_offset": 95,
"end_offset": 135
},
{
"id": 48523,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 85,
"end_offset": 94
}
] | [
{
"id": 442,
"from_id": 48521,
"to_id": 48523,
"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 443,
"from_id": 48520,
"to_id": 48521,
"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 444,
"from_id": 48523,
"to_id": 48524,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
14,309 | Like the Android Maikspy, it first sends a notification to its C&C server to register the device. | [
{
"id": 48530,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 9,
"end_offset": 17
},
{
"id": 48531,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 17,
"end_offset": 24
},
{
"id": 48532,
"label": "Infrastucture",
"start_offset": 63,
"end_offset": 73
}
] | [
{
"id": 445,
"from_id": 48531,
"to_id": 48532,
"type": "beacons-to"
}
] | [] |
14,337 | Based on these findings, it’s possible that the attackers behind Maikspy operate //www[.]roundyearfun[.]org/ and hxxp://miakhalifagame[.]com/. | [
{
"id": 48565,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 65,
"end_offset": 73
},
{
"id": 48568,
"label": "URL",
"start_offset": 113,
"end_offset": 141
},
{
"id": 48566,
"label": "URL",
"start_offset": 83,
"end_offset": 108
}
] | [
{
"id": 446,
"from_id": 48565,
"to_id": 48566,
"type": "beacons-to"
},
{
"id": 447,
"from_id": 48565,
"to_id": 48568,
"type": "beacons-to"
}
] | [] |
14,341 | The first variant of Maikspy appeared on the Windows platform in December 2016. | [
{
"id": 48576,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 21,
"end_offset": 29
},
{
"id": 48578,
"label": "TIME",
"start_offset": 65,
"end_offset": 78
},
{
"id": 48577,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 45,
"end_offset": 53
}
] | [
{
"id": 448,
"from_id": 48576,
"to_id": 48577,
"type": "duplicate-of"
},
{
"id": 449,
"from_id": 48576,
"to_id": 48578,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
14,364 | Figure 21. Connection of Maikspy variants to 107[.]180[.]46[.]243 and hxxp://fakeomegle[.]com Figure 22. Connection of Maikspy variants to 198[.]12[.]149[.]13and hxxp://miakhalifagame[.]com/ | [
{
"id": 51779,
"label": "URL",
"start_offset": 163,
"end_offset": 191
},
{
"id": 51777,
"label": "URL",
"start_offset": 70,
"end_offset": 93
},
{
"id": 51781,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 120,
"end_offset": 127
},
{
"id": 51778,
"label": "IPV4",
"start_offset": 140,
"end_offset": 159
},
{
"id": 51780,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 25,
"end_offset": 32
},
{
"id": 44372,
"label": "IPV4",
"start_offset": 45,
"end_offset": 65
}
] | [
{
"id": 1161,
"from_id": 51780,
"to_id": 44372,
"type": "communicates-with"
},
{
"id": 1162,
"from_id": 51780,
"to_id": 51777,
"type": "communicates-with"
},
{
"id": 1163,
"from_id": 51781,
"to_id": 51778,
"type": "communicates-with"
},
{
"id": 1164,
"from_id": 51781,
"to_id": 51779,
"type": "communicates-with"
}
] | [] |
14,408 | Leverage WMI for fileless intrusion Execute Powershell script for fileless intrusion | [
{
"id": 47166,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 66,
"end_offset": 84
},
{
"id": 44534,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 44,
"end_offset": 54
}
] | [
{
"id": 309,
"from_id": 44534,
"to_id": 47166,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |