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A parent's broad general policy statements regarding employment matters are not enough to satisfy this prong. To satisfy the control prong, a parent must control the day-to-day employment decisions of the subsidiary." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "51 F.Supp.2d 1028, 1034",
"parenthetical": "\"although a court must consider each of the factors [in the integrated enterprise test], the critical inquiry requires an examination of which entity made the final decisions regarding employment matters.\"",
"sentence": "Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1363 (10th Cir.1993)); Cellini v. Harcourt Brace & Co., 51 F.Supp.2d 1028, 1034 (S.D.Cal.1999) (“although a court must consider each of the factors [in the integrated enterprise test], the critical inquiry requires an examination of which entity made the final decisions regarding employment matters.”); cf. Singh v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 2007 WL 715488 *7 (N.D.Cal.2007) (“California courts have consistently recognized that the principle test for determining employment relationships is the right of control over the manner or means of accomplishing the result desired.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "2007 WL 715488, *7",
"parenthetical": "\"California courts have consistently recognized that the principle test for determining employment relationships is the right of control over the manner or means of accomplishing the result desired.\"",
"sentence": "Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1363 (10th Cir.1993)); Cellini v. Harcourt Brace & Co., 51 F.Supp.2d 1028, 1034 (S.D.Cal.1999) (“although a court must consider each of the factors [in the integrated enterprise test], the critical inquiry requires an examination of which entity made the final decisions regarding employment matters.”); cf. Singh v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 2007 WL 715488 *7 (N.D.Cal.2007) (“California courts have consistently recognized that the principle test for determining employment relationships is the right of control over the manner or means of accomplishing the result desired.”)."
} | 4,166,892 | a |
The undisputed evidence in this case reveals that neither Arbaney, Lakey, nor Couch was similarly situated to Ramon. Ramon was younger and not as close to being eligible for retirement as were Arbaney and Lakey, and there is no evidence that Continental uncovered any wrongdoing by Couch. These differences between Ramon's situation and that of her comparators justified the differential treatment, and Ramon cannot demonstrate that she was "similarly situated" to them. See Wyvill v. United Cos. Life Ins.. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that younger employee not similarly situated to older employee who committed similar infraction and was allowed to remain on job for a few extra months and obtain retirement eligibility",
"sentence": "Co., 212 F.3d 296, 305 (5th Cir.2000) (affirming summary judgment where “the striking differences between the two men’s situations more than account for the different treatment they received”); see also Nelson v. Gen. Elec. Co., 2 Fed. Appx. 425 (6th Cir.2001) (unpublished) (holding that younger employee not similarly situated to older employee who committed similar infraction and was allowed to remain on job for a few extra months and obtain retirement eligibility); Thomas v. Hilts, No. 224690, 2002 WL 234757, at *4 (MichApp. Feb.15, 2002) (unpublished) (holding that plaintiff who was not of retirement age and comparator who was of retirement age were not similarly situated where comparator was allowed to voluntarily retire while plaintiff was terminated)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "212 F.3d 296, 305",
"parenthetical": "affirming summary judgment where \"the striking differences between the two men's situations more than account for the different treatment they received\"",
"sentence": "Co., 212 F.3d 296, 305 (5th Cir.2000) (affirming summary judgment where “the striking differences between the two men’s situations more than account for the different treatment they received”); see also Nelson v. Gen. Elec. Co., 2 Fed. Appx. 425 (6th Cir.2001) (unpublished) (holding that younger employee not similarly situated to older employee who committed similar infraction and was allowed to remain on job for a few extra months and obtain retirement eligibility); Thomas v. Hilts, No. 224690, 2002 WL 234757, at *4 (MichApp. Feb.15, 2002) (unpublished) (holding that plaintiff who was not of retirement age and comparator who was of retirement age were not similarly situated where comparator was allowed to voluntarily retire while plaintiff was terminated)."
} | 562,479 | b |
Here, the police presented a clear show of authority when they approached Lowe. The only issue is whether (and when) Lowe submitted to that authority. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "499 U.S. 621, 626",
"parenthetical": "explaining that a seizure is effected when a suspect evinces submission to a \"show of authority\"",
"sentence": "See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (explaining that a seizure is effected when a suspect evinces submission to a “show of authority”). Remaining in place in response to an officer’s show of authority can alone be sufficient for submission."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "551 U.S. 249, 262",
"parenthetical": "\"But what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir.2003) (concluding seizure occurred when individual remained in his vehicle yet refused to comply with an officer’s orders to roll down the window); see also Brend- lin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 262, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (“But what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.”); United States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir.2010) (“It would be an unnatural reading of the case law to hold that a defendant who is ordered to stop is not seized until he stops and complies with a subsequent order to raise his hands.” (emphasis in original))."
} | 4,157,598 | a |
Here, the police presented a clear show of authority when they approached Lowe. The only issue is whether (and when) Lowe submitted to that authority. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"But what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir.2003) (concluding seizure occurred when individual remained in his vehicle yet refused to comply with an officer’s orders to roll down the window); see also Brend- lin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 262, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (“But what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.”); United States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir.2010) (“It would be an unnatural reading of the case law to hold that a defendant who is ordered to stop is not seized until he stops and complies with a subsequent order to raise his hands.” (emphasis in original))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "499 U.S. 621, 626",
"parenthetical": "explaining that a seizure is effected when a suspect evinces submission to a \"show of authority\"",
"sentence": "See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (explaining that a seizure is effected when a suspect evinces submission to a “show of authority”). Remaining in place in response to an officer’s show of authority can alone be sufficient for submission."
} | 4,157,598 | b |
Here, the police presented a clear show of authority when they approached Lowe. The only issue is whether (and when) Lowe submitted to that authority. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "499 U.S. 621, 626",
"parenthetical": "explaining that a seizure is effected when a suspect evinces submission to a \"show of authority\"",
"sentence": "See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (explaining that a seizure is effected when a suspect evinces submission to a “show of authority”). Remaining in place in response to an officer’s show of authority can alone be sufficient for submission."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"But what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir.2003) (concluding seizure occurred when individual remained in his vehicle yet refused to comply with an officer’s orders to roll down the window); see also Brend- lin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 262, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (“But what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.”); United States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir.2010) (“It would be an unnatural reading of the case law to hold that a defendant who is ordered to stop is not seized until he stops and complies with a subsequent order to raise his hands.” (emphasis in original))."
} | 4,157,598 | a |
Here, the police presented a clear show of authority when they approached Lowe. The only issue is whether (and when) Lowe submitted to that authority. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "620 F.3d 685, 691",
"parenthetical": "\"It would be an unnatural reading of the case law to hold that a defendant who is ordered to stop is not seized until he stops and complies with a subsequent order to raise his hands.\" (emphasis in original",
"sentence": "See Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir.2003) (concluding seizure occurred when individual remained in his vehicle yet refused to comply with an officer’s orders to roll down the window); see also Brend- lin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 262, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (“But what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.”); United States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir.2010) (“It would be an unnatural reading of the case law to hold that a defendant who is ordered to stop is not seized until he stops and complies with a subsequent order to raise his hands.” (emphasis in original))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "499 U.S. 621, 626",
"parenthetical": "explaining that a seizure is effected when a suspect evinces submission to a \"show of authority\"",
"sentence": "See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (explaining that a seizure is effected when a suspect evinces submission to a “show of authority”). Remaining in place in response to an officer’s show of authority can alone be sufficient for submission."
} | 4,157,598 | b |
Here, the police presented a clear show of authority when they approached Lowe. The only issue is whether (and when) Lowe submitted to that authority. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "551 U.S. 249, 262",
"parenthetical": "\"But what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir.2003) (concluding seizure occurred when individual remained in his vehicle yet refused to comply with an officer’s orders to roll down the window); see also Brend- lin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 262, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (“But what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.”); United States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir.2010) (“It would be an unnatural reading of the case law to hold that a defendant who is ordered to stop is not seized until he stops and complies with a subsequent order to raise his hands.” (emphasis in original))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that a seizure is effected when a suspect evinces submission to a \"show of authority\"",
"sentence": "See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (explaining that a seizure is effected when a suspect evinces submission to a “show of authority”). Remaining in place in response to an officer’s show of authority can alone be sufficient for submission."
} | 4,157,598 | b |
Here, the police presented a clear show of authority when they approached Lowe. The only issue is whether (and when) Lowe submitted to that authority. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"But what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir.2003) (concluding seizure occurred when individual remained in his vehicle yet refused to comply with an officer’s orders to roll down the window); see also Brend- lin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 262, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (“But what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.”); United States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir.2010) (“It would be an unnatural reading of the case law to hold that a defendant who is ordered to stop is not seized until he stops and complies with a subsequent order to raise his hands.” (emphasis in original))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that a seizure is effected when a suspect evinces submission to a \"show of authority\"",
"sentence": "See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (explaining that a seizure is effected when a suspect evinces submission to a “show of authority”). Remaining in place in response to an officer’s show of authority can alone be sufficient for submission."
} | 4,157,598 | b |
Here, the police presented a clear show of authority when they approached Lowe. The only issue is whether (and when) Lowe submitted to that authority. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that a seizure is effected when a suspect evinces submission to a \"show of authority\"",
"sentence": "See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (explaining that a seizure is effected when a suspect evinces submission to a “show of authority”). Remaining in place in response to an officer’s show of authority can alone be sufficient for submission."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"But what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir.2003) (concluding seizure occurred when individual remained in his vehicle yet refused to comply with an officer’s orders to roll down the window); see also Brend- lin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 262, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (“But what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.”); United States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir.2010) (“It would be an unnatural reading of the case law to hold that a defendant who is ordered to stop is not seized until he stops and complies with a subsequent order to raise his hands.” (emphasis in original))."
} | 4,157,598 | a |
Here, the police presented a clear show of authority when they approached Lowe. The only issue is whether (and when) Lowe submitted to that authority. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that a seizure is effected when a suspect evinces submission to a \"show of authority\"",
"sentence": "See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (explaining that a seizure is effected when a suspect evinces submission to a “show of authority”). Remaining in place in response to an officer’s show of authority can alone be sufficient for submission."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "620 F.3d 685, 691",
"parenthetical": "\"It would be an unnatural reading of the case law to hold that a defendant who is ordered to stop is not seized until he stops and complies with a subsequent order to raise his hands.\" (emphasis in original",
"sentence": "See Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir.2003) (concluding seizure occurred when individual remained in his vehicle yet refused to comply with an officer’s orders to roll down the window); see also Brend- lin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 262, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (“But what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.”); United States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir.2010) (“It would be an unnatural reading of the case law to hold that a defendant who is ordered to stop is not seized until he stops and complies with a subsequent order to raise his hands.” (emphasis in original))."
} | 4,157,598 | a |
Here, the police presented a clear show of authority when they approached Lowe. The only issue is whether (and when) Lowe submitted to that authority. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "551 U.S. 249, 262",
"parenthetical": "\"But what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir.2003) (concluding seizure occurred when individual remained in his vehicle yet refused to comply with an officer’s orders to roll down the window); see also Brend- lin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 262, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (“But what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.”); United States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir.2010) (“It would be an unnatural reading of the case law to hold that a defendant who is ordered to stop is not seized until he stops and complies with a subsequent order to raise his hands.” (emphasis in original))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that a seizure is effected when a suspect evinces submission to a \"show of authority\"",
"sentence": "See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (explaining that a seizure is effected when a suspect evinces submission to a “show of authority”). Remaining in place in response to an officer’s show of authority can alone be sufficient for submission."
} | 4,157,598 | b |
Here, the police presented a clear show of authority when they approached Lowe. The only issue is whether (and when) Lowe submitted to that authority. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"But what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir.2003) (concluding seizure occurred when individual remained in his vehicle yet refused to comply with an officer’s orders to roll down the window); see also Brend- lin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 262, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (“But what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.”); United States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir.2010) (“It would be an unnatural reading of the case law to hold that a defendant who is ordered to stop is not seized until he stops and complies with a subsequent order to raise his hands.” (emphasis in original))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that a seizure is effected when a suspect evinces submission to a \"show of authority\"",
"sentence": "See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (explaining that a seizure is effected when a suspect evinces submission to a “show of authority”). Remaining in place in response to an officer’s show of authority can alone be sufficient for submission."
} | 4,157,598 | b |
Here, the police presented a clear show of authority when they approached Lowe. The only issue is whether (and when) Lowe submitted to that authority. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"But what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir.2003) (concluding seizure occurred when individual remained in his vehicle yet refused to comply with an officer’s orders to roll down the window); see also Brend- lin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 262, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (“But what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.”); United States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir.2010) (“It would be an unnatural reading of the case law to hold that a defendant who is ordered to stop is not seized until he stops and complies with a subsequent order to raise his hands.” (emphasis in original))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that a seizure is effected when a suspect evinces submission to a \"show of authority\"",
"sentence": "See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (explaining that a seizure is effected when a suspect evinces submission to a “show of authority”). Remaining in place in response to an officer’s show of authority can alone be sufficient for submission."
} | 4,157,598 | b |
Here, the police presented a clear show of authority when they approached Lowe. The only issue is whether (and when) Lowe submitted to that authority. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that a seizure is effected when a suspect evinces submission to a \"show of authority\"",
"sentence": "See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (explaining that a seizure is effected when a suspect evinces submission to a “show of authority”). Remaining in place in response to an officer’s show of authority can alone be sufficient for submission."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "620 F.3d 685, 691",
"parenthetical": "\"It would be an unnatural reading of the case law to hold that a defendant who is ordered to stop is not seized until he stops and complies with a subsequent order to raise his hands.\" (emphasis in original",
"sentence": "See Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir.2003) (concluding seizure occurred when individual remained in his vehicle yet refused to comply with an officer’s orders to roll down the window); see also Brend- lin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 262, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (“But what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.”); United States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir.2010) (“It would be an unnatural reading of the case law to hold that a defendant who is ordered to stop is not seized until he stops and complies with a subsequent order to raise his hands.” (emphasis in original))."
} | 4,157,598 | a |
Here, the police presented a clear show of authority when they approached Lowe. The only issue is whether (and when) Lowe submitted to that authority. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "551 U.S. 249, 262",
"parenthetical": "\"But what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir.2003) (concluding seizure occurred when individual remained in his vehicle yet refused to comply with an officer’s orders to roll down the window); see also Brend- lin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 262, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (“But what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.”); United States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir.2010) (“It would be an unnatural reading of the case law to hold that a defendant who is ordered to stop is not seized until he stops and complies with a subsequent order to raise his hands.” (emphasis in original))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "332 F.3d 199, 206",
"parenthetical": "concluding seizure occurred when individual remained in his vehicle yet refused to comply with an officer's orders to roll down the window",
"sentence": "See Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir.2003) (concluding seizure occurred when individual remained in his vehicle yet refused to comply with an officer’s orders to roll down the window); see also Brend- lin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 262, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (“But what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.”); United States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir.2010) (“It would be an unnatural reading of the case law to hold that a defendant who is ordered to stop is not seized until he stops and complies with a subsequent order to raise his hands.” (emphasis in original))."
} | 4,157,598 | b |
Here, the police presented a clear show of authority when they approached Lowe. The only issue is whether (and when) Lowe submitted to that authority. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"But what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir.2003) (concluding seizure occurred when individual remained in his vehicle yet refused to comply with an officer’s orders to roll down the window); see also Brend- lin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 262, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (“But what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.”); United States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir.2010) (“It would be an unnatural reading of the case law to hold that a defendant who is ordered to stop is not seized until he stops and complies with a subsequent order to raise his hands.” (emphasis in original))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "332 F.3d 199, 206",
"parenthetical": "concluding seizure occurred when individual remained in his vehicle yet refused to comply with an officer's orders to roll down the window",
"sentence": "See Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir.2003) (concluding seizure occurred when individual remained in his vehicle yet refused to comply with an officer’s orders to roll down the window); see also Brend- lin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 262, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (“But what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.”); United States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir.2010) (“It would be an unnatural reading of the case law to hold that a defendant who is ordered to stop is not seized until he stops and complies with a subsequent order to raise his hands.” (emphasis in original))."
} | 4,157,598 | b |
Here, the police presented a clear show of authority when they approached Lowe. The only issue is whether (and when) Lowe submitted to that authority. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"But what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir.2003) (concluding seizure occurred when individual remained in his vehicle yet refused to comply with an officer’s orders to roll down the window); see also Brend- lin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 262, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (“But what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.”); United States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir.2010) (“It would be an unnatural reading of the case law to hold that a defendant who is ordered to stop is not seized until he stops and complies with a subsequent order to raise his hands.” (emphasis in original))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "332 F.3d 199, 206",
"parenthetical": "concluding seizure occurred when individual remained in his vehicle yet refused to comply with an officer's orders to roll down the window",
"sentence": "See Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir.2003) (concluding seizure occurred when individual remained in his vehicle yet refused to comply with an officer’s orders to roll down the window); see also Brend- lin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 262, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (“But what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.”); United States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir.2010) (“It would be an unnatural reading of the case law to hold that a defendant who is ordered to stop is not seized until he stops and complies with a subsequent order to raise his hands.” (emphasis in original))."
} | 4,157,598 | b |
Here, the police presented a clear show of authority when they approached Lowe. The only issue is whether (and when) Lowe submitted to that authority. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "620 F.3d 685, 691",
"parenthetical": "\"It would be an unnatural reading of the case law to hold that a defendant who is ordered to stop is not seized until he stops and complies with a subsequent order to raise his hands.\" (emphasis in original",
"sentence": "See Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir.2003) (concluding seizure occurred when individual remained in his vehicle yet refused to comply with an officer’s orders to roll down the window); see also Brend- lin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 262, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (“But what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.”); United States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir.2010) (“It would be an unnatural reading of the case law to hold that a defendant who is ordered to stop is not seized until he stops and complies with a subsequent order to raise his hands.” (emphasis in original))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "332 F.3d 199, 206",
"parenthetical": "concluding seizure occurred when individual remained in his vehicle yet refused to comply with an officer's orders to roll down the window",
"sentence": "See Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir.2003) (concluding seizure occurred when individual remained in his vehicle yet refused to comply with an officer’s orders to roll down the window); see also Brend- lin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 262, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (“But what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.”); United States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir.2010) (“It would be an unnatural reading of the case law to hold that a defendant who is ordered to stop is not seized until he stops and complies with a subsequent order to raise his hands.” (emphasis in original))."
} | 4,157,598 | b |
Hence, consistent with our discussion above, we interpret the document's explicit, and broad, power to create "rules" governing "conditions of eligibility" as carrying with it a similarly broad implied power to interpret those rules. And, the existence of such a delegated power seems to be what Firestone had in mind when it called for "evidence" of a grant of discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "877 F.2d 159, 161",
"parenthetical": "holding that plan language giving plan administrator power to determine \"which Employees are eligible to participate in the Plan\" and \"pro-vid[ing] all parties dealing with the Plan an interpretation of Plan provisions on request\" indicates deferential standard of review of trustee eligibility decisions",
"sentence": "Firestone, 489 U.S. at 111, 109 S.Ct. at 954; cf. Curtis v. Noel, 877 F.2d 159, 161 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that plan language giving plan administrator power to determine “which Employees are eligible to participate in the Plan” and “pro-vid[ing] all parties dealing with the Plan an interpretation of Plan provisions on request” indicates deferential standard of review of trustee eligibility decisions); Jett v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc., 890 F.2d 1137, 1138-39 (11th Cir.1989) (same for plan language giving “Claims Administrator” power to make “final and conclusive” determinations “in the administration of the [plan],” so long as such determinations are “reasonable”); but cf. Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis v. SwedishAmerican Group Health Benefit Trust, 901 F.2d 1369, 1371 (7th Cir.1990) (explaining that circuit courts appear split over the degree of plan language specificity required to trigger deferential review of trustee determinations)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "901 F.2d 1369, 1371",
"parenthetical": "explaining that circuit courts appear split over the degree of plan language specificity required to trigger deferential review of trustee determinations",
"sentence": "Firestone, 489 U.S. at 111, 109 S.Ct. at 954; cf. Curtis v. Noel, 877 F.2d 159, 161 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that plan language giving plan administrator power to determine “which Employees are eligible to participate in the Plan” and “pro-vid[ing] all parties dealing with the Plan an interpretation of Plan provisions on request” indicates deferential standard of review of trustee eligibility decisions); Jett v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc., 890 F.2d 1137, 1138-39 (11th Cir.1989) (same for plan language giving “Claims Administrator” power to make “final and conclusive” determinations “in the administration of the [plan],” so long as such determinations are “reasonable”); but cf. Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis v. SwedishAmerican Group Health Benefit Trust, 901 F.2d 1369, 1371 (7th Cir.1990) (explaining that circuit courts appear split over the degree of plan language specificity required to trigger deferential review of trustee determinations)."
} | 1,834,553 | a |
Hence, consistent with our discussion above, we interpret the document's explicit, and broad, power to create "rules" governing "conditions of eligibility" as carrying with it a similarly broad implied power to interpret those rules. And, the existence of such a delegated power seems to be what Firestone had in mind when it called for "evidence" of a grant of discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "901 F.2d 1369, 1371",
"parenthetical": "explaining that circuit courts appear split over the degree of plan language specificity required to trigger deferential review of trustee determinations",
"sentence": "Firestone, 489 U.S. at 111, 109 S.Ct. at 954; cf. Curtis v. Noel, 877 F.2d 159, 161 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that plan language giving plan administrator power to determine “which Employees are eligible to participate in the Plan” and “pro-vid[ing] all parties dealing with the Plan an interpretation of Plan provisions on request” indicates deferential standard of review of trustee eligibility decisions); Jett v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc., 890 F.2d 1137, 1138-39 (11th Cir.1989) (same for plan language giving “Claims Administrator” power to make “final and conclusive” determinations “in the administration of the [plan],” so long as such determinations are “reasonable”); but cf. Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis v. SwedishAmerican Group Health Benefit Trust, 901 F.2d 1369, 1371 (7th Cir.1990) (explaining that circuit courts appear split over the degree of plan language specificity required to trigger deferential review of trustee determinations)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "890 F.2d 1137, 1138-39",
"parenthetical": "same for plan language giving \"Claims Administrator\" power to make \"final and conclusive\" determinations \"in the administration of the [plan],\" so long as such determinations are \"reasonable\"",
"sentence": "Firestone, 489 U.S. at 111, 109 S.Ct. at 954; cf. Curtis v. Noel, 877 F.2d 159, 161 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that plan language giving plan administrator power to determine “which Employees are eligible to participate in the Plan” and “pro-vid[ing] all parties dealing with the Plan an interpretation of Plan provisions on request” indicates deferential standard of review of trustee eligibility decisions); Jett v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc., 890 F.2d 1137, 1138-39 (11th Cir.1989) (same for plan language giving “Claims Administrator” power to make “final and conclusive” determinations “in the administration of the [plan],” so long as such determinations are “reasonable”); but cf. Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis v. SwedishAmerican Group Health Benefit Trust, 901 F.2d 1369, 1371 (7th Cir.1990) (explaining that circuit courts appear split over the degree of plan language specificity required to trigger deferential review of trustee determinations)."
} | 1,834,553 | b |
We agree that wife's future anticipated interest in the German "social security" benefits was an economic circumstance that could be considered in the equitable division of the marital estate. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "because no evidence was presented concerning the present value of wife's anticipated social security retirement benefits, court declined to address whether such benefits may be considered as an economic circumstance",
"sentence": "See In re Marriage of Jones, 812 P.2d 1152 (Colo.1991) (although spouse’s expectancy interest in a trust was not property, it should be considered as an economic circumstance under § 14-10-113(l)(c) in determining a just division of marital property); In re Marriage of Simon, 856 P.2d 47 (Colo.App.1993)(receipt of social security disability benefits may be considered as an economic circumstance in the division of property); cf. In re Marriage of James, 950 P.2d 624 (Colo.App.1997)(because no evidence was presented concerning the present value of wife’s anticipated social security retirement benefits, court declined to address whether such benefits may be considered as an economic circumstance); see also In re Marriage of Boyer, 538 N.W.2d 293 (Iowa 1995); In re Marriage of Knipp, 15 Kan. App.2d 494, 809 P.2d 562 (1991); Pongonis v. Pongonis, 606 A.2d 1055 (Me.1992); Elliott v. Elliott, 274 N.W.2d 75 (Minn.1978); Hogan v. Hogan, 796 S.W.2d 400 (Mo.App.1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "although spouse's expectancy interest in a trust was not property, it should be considered as an economic circumstance under SS 14-10-113(l",
"sentence": "See In re Marriage of Jones, 812 P.2d 1152 (Colo.1991) (although spouse’s expectancy interest in a trust was not property, it should be considered as an economic circumstance under § 14-10-113(l)(c) in determining a just division of marital property); In re Marriage of Simon, 856 P.2d 47 (Colo.App.1993)(receipt of social security disability benefits may be considered as an economic circumstance in the division of property); cf. In re Marriage of James, 950 P.2d 624 (Colo.App.1997)(because no evidence was presented concerning the present value of wife’s anticipated social security retirement benefits, court declined to address whether such benefits may be considered as an economic circumstance); see also In re Marriage of Boyer, 538 N.W.2d 293 (Iowa 1995); In re Marriage of Knipp, 15 Kan. App.2d 494, 809 P.2d 562 (1991); Pongonis v. Pongonis, 606 A.2d 1055 (Me.1992); Elliott v. Elliott, 274 N.W.2d 75 (Minn.1978); Hogan v. Hogan, 796 S.W.2d 400 (Mo.App.1990)."
} | 11,593,308 | b |
We agree that wife's future anticipated interest in the German "social security" benefits was an economic circumstance that could be considered in the equitable division of the marital estate. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "receipt of social security disability benefits may be considered as an economic circumstance in the division of property",
"sentence": "See In re Marriage of Jones, 812 P.2d 1152 (Colo.1991) (although spouse’s expectancy interest in a trust was not property, it should be considered as an economic circumstance under § 14-10-113(l)(c) in determining a just division of marital property); In re Marriage of Simon, 856 P.2d 47 (Colo.App.1993)(receipt of social security disability benefits may be considered as an economic circumstance in the division of property); cf. In re Marriage of James, 950 P.2d 624 (Colo.App.1997)(because no evidence was presented concerning the present value of wife’s anticipated social security retirement benefits, court declined to address whether such benefits may be considered as an economic circumstance); see also In re Marriage of Boyer, 538 N.W.2d 293 (Iowa 1995); In re Marriage of Knipp, 15 Kan. App.2d 494, 809 P.2d 562 (1991); Pongonis v. Pongonis, 606 A.2d 1055 (Me.1992); Elliott v. Elliott, 274 N.W.2d 75 (Minn.1978); Hogan v. Hogan, 796 S.W.2d 400 (Mo.App.1990)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "because no evidence was presented concerning the present value of wife's anticipated social security retirement benefits, court declined to address whether such benefits may be considered as an economic circumstance",
"sentence": "See In re Marriage of Jones, 812 P.2d 1152 (Colo.1991) (although spouse’s expectancy interest in a trust was not property, it should be considered as an economic circumstance under § 14-10-113(l)(c) in determining a just division of marital property); In re Marriage of Simon, 856 P.2d 47 (Colo.App.1993)(receipt of social security disability benefits may be considered as an economic circumstance in the division of property); cf. In re Marriage of James, 950 P.2d 624 (Colo.App.1997)(because no evidence was presented concerning the present value of wife’s anticipated social security retirement benefits, court declined to address whether such benefits may be considered as an economic circumstance); see also In re Marriage of Boyer, 538 N.W.2d 293 (Iowa 1995); In re Marriage of Knipp, 15 Kan. App.2d 494, 809 P.2d 562 (1991); Pongonis v. Pongonis, 606 A.2d 1055 (Me.1992); Elliott v. Elliott, 274 N.W.2d 75 (Minn.1978); Hogan v. Hogan, 796 S.W.2d 400 (Mo.App.1990)."
} | 11,593,308 | a |
The Supreme Court has routinely recognized that because disclosure requirements occasion a lesser burden on speech, it is constitutionally permissible to require disclosure for a wider variety of speech than mere electioneering. Citizens United only confirmed the breadth of Congress' power in this regard. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "649 F.3d 34, 70",
"parenthetical": "holding that state \"express advocacy\" definition without an \"electioneering communication\" limitation was not vague",
"sentence": "See Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 915 (“Even if the ads only pertain to a commercial transaction, the public has an interest in knowing who is speaking about a candidate shortly before an election”); see also Doe v. Reed, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 2811, 2819-22, 177 L.Ed.2d 493 (2010) (upholding disclosure requirement for petition signatories); Natn’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 70 (1st Cir.2011) (holding that state “express advocacy” definition without an “electioneering communication” limitation was not vague)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "130 S.Ct. 915, 915",
"parenthetical": "\"Even if the ads only pertain to a commercial transaction, the public has an interest in knowing who is speaking about a candidate shortly before an election\"",
"sentence": "See Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 915 (“Even if the ads only pertain to a commercial transaction, the public has an interest in knowing who is speaking about a candidate shortly before an election”); see also Doe v. Reed, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 2811, 2819-22, 177 L.Ed.2d 493 (2010) (upholding disclosure requirement for petition signatories); Natn’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 70 (1st Cir.2011) (holding that state “express advocacy” definition without an “electioneering communication” limitation was not vague)."
} | 3,885,259 | b |
As a court of appeals, we have "an inherent discretionary power to transfer the proceeding to another circuit in the interest of justice and sound judicial administration." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "614 F.2d 299, 301",
"parenthetical": "court does not have power to transfer if it does not have subject matter jurisdiction",
"sentence": "Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 354 F.2d 507, 510 (D.C.Cir.1965); see also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 465 F.2d 492, 495-96 (1st Cir.1972) (courts of appeals may transfer petitions for review of agency decisions); Pearce v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 603 F.2d 763, 771 n. 3 (9th Cir.1979) (listing cases in eight circuits holding that courts of appeals have inherent power to transfer cases); cf. Dantes v. Western Found. Corp., 614 F.2d 299, 301, 301 n. 1 (1st Cir.1980) (court does not have power to transfer if it does not have subject matter jurisdiction)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "465 F.2d 492, 495-96",
"parenthetical": "courts of appeals may transfer petitions for review of agency decisions",
"sentence": "Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 354 F.2d 507, 510 (D.C.Cir.1965); see also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 465 F.2d 492, 495-96 (1st Cir.1972) (courts of appeals may transfer petitions for review of agency decisions); Pearce v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 603 F.2d 763, 771 n. 3 (9th Cir.1979) (listing cases in eight circuits holding that courts of appeals have inherent power to transfer cases); cf. Dantes v. Western Found. Corp., 614 F.2d 299, 301, 301 n. 1 (1st Cir.1980) (court does not have power to transfer if it does not have subject matter jurisdiction)."
} | 1,662,635 | b |
As a court of appeals, we have "an inherent discretionary power to transfer the proceeding to another circuit in the interest of justice and sound judicial administration." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "614 F.2d 299, 301",
"parenthetical": "court does not have power to transfer if it does not have subject matter jurisdiction",
"sentence": "Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 354 F.2d 507, 510 (D.C.Cir.1965); see also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 465 F.2d 492, 495-96 (1st Cir.1972) (courts of appeals may transfer petitions for review of agency decisions); Pearce v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 603 F.2d 763, 771 n. 3 (9th Cir.1979) (listing cases in eight circuits holding that courts of appeals have inherent power to transfer cases); cf. Dantes v. Western Found. Corp., 614 F.2d 299, 301, 301 n. 1 (1st Cir.1980) (court does not have power to transfer if it does not have subject matter jurisdiction)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "listing cases in eight circuits holding that courts of appeals have inherent power to transfer cases",
"sentence": "Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 354 F.2d 507, 510 (D.C.Cir.1965); see also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 465 F.2d 492, 495-96 (1st Cir.1972) (courts of appeals may transfer petitions for review of agency decisions); Pearce v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 603 F.2d 763, 771 n. 3 (9th Cir.1979) (listing cases in eight circuits holding that courts of appeals have inherent power to transfer cases); cf. Dantes v. Western Found. Corp., 614 F.2d 299, 301, 301 n. 1 (1st Cir.1980) (court does not have power to transfer if it does not have subject matter jurisdiction)."
} | 1,662,635 | b |
Additionally, they maintain the award of interest at the rate of one percent per day was grossly disproportionate to the amount of the principal, making it punitive in nature, and violative of the United States Constitution and the public policy of this state. Appellants present these arguments for the very first time on appeal. As a result, they were not ruled upon by the circuit court, and are not preserved for our review. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding constitutional arguments are no exception to the rule, and if not raised to the trial court are deemed waived on appeal",
"sentence": "See Hubbard v. Rowe, 192 S.C. 12, 5 S.E.2d 187 (1939) (stating the questions presented for appellate review must first have been fairly and properly raised in the circuit court and passed upon by that court); see also State v. Powers, 331 S.C. 37, 501 S.E.2d 116 (1998) (finding constitutional arguments are no exception to the rule, and if not raised to the trial court are deemed waived on appeal)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating the questions presented for appellate review must first have been fairly and properly raised in the circuit court and passed upon by that court",
"sentence": "See Hubbard v. Rowe, 192 S.C. 12, 5 S.E.2d 187 (1939) (stating the questions presented for appellate review must first have been fairly and properly raised in the circuit court and passed upon by that court); see also State v. Powers, 331 S.C. 37, 501 S.E.2d 116 (1998) (finding constitutional arguments are no exception to the rule, and if not raised to the trial court are deemed waived on appeal)."
} | 3,710,254 | b |
Additionally, they maintain the award of interest at the rate of one percent per day was grossly disproportionate to the amount of the principal, making it punitive in nature, and violative of the United States Constitution and the public policy of this state. Appellants present these arguments for the very first time on appeal. As a result, they were not ruled upon by the circuit court, and are not preserved for our review. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating the questions presented for appellate review must first have been fairly and properly raised in the circuit court and passed upon by that court",
"sentence": "See Hubbard v. Rowe, 192 S.C. 12, 5 S.E.2d 187 (1939) (stating the questions presented for appellate review must first have been fairly and properly raised in the circuit court and passed upon by that court); see also State v. Powers, 331 S.C. 37, 501 S.E.2d 116 (1998) (finding constitutional arguments are no exception to the rule, and if not raised to the trial court are deemed waived on appeal)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding constitutional arguments are no exception to the rule, and if not raised to the trial court are deemed waived on appeal",
"sentence": "See Hubbard v. Rowe, 192 S.C. 12, 5 S.E.2d 187 (1939) (stating the questions presented for appellate review must first have been fairly and properly raised in the circuit court and passed upon by that court); see also State v. Powers, 331 S.C. 37, 501 S.E.2d 116 (1998) (finding constitutional arguments are no exception to the rule, and if not raised to the trial court are deemed waived on appeal)."
} | 3,710,254 | a |
Additionally, they maintain the award of interest at the rate of one percent per day was grossly disproportionate to the amount of the principal, making it punitive in nature, and violative of the United States Constitution and the public policy of this state. Appellants present these arguments for the very first time on appeal. As a result, they were not ruled upon by the circuit court, and are not preserved for our review. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating the questions presented for appellate review must first have been fairly and properly raised in the circuit court and passed upon by that court",
"sentence": "See Hubbard v. Rowe, 192 S.C. 12, 5 S.E.2d 187 (1939) (stating the questions presented for appellate review must first have been fairly and properly raised in the circuit court and passed upon by that court); see also State v. Powers, 331 S.C. 37, 501 S.E.2d 116 (1998) (finding constitutional arguments are no exception to the rule, and if not raised to the trial court are deemed waived on appeal)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding constitutional arguments are no exception to the rule, and if not raised to the trial court are deemed waived on appeal",
"sentence": "See Hubbard v. Rowe, 192 S.C. 12, 5 S.E.2d 187 (1939) (stating the questions presented for appellate review must first have been fairly and properly raised in the circuit court and passed upon by that court); see also State v. Powers, 331 S.C. 37, 501 S.E.2d 116 (1998) (finding constitutional arguments are no exception to the rule, and if not raised to the trial court are deemed waived on appeal)."
} | 3,710,254 | a |
Additionally, they maintain the award of interest at the rate of one percent per day was grossly disproportionate to the amount of the principal, making it punitive in nature, and violative of the United States Constitution and the public policy of this state. Appellants present these arguments for the very first time on appeal. As a result, they were not ruled upon by the circuit court, and are not preserved for our review. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating the questions presented for appellate review must first have been fairly and properly raised in the circuit court and passed upon by that court",
"sentence": "See Hubbard v. Rowe, 192 S.C. 12, 5 S.E.2d 187 (1939) (stating the questions presented for appellate review must first have been fairly and properly raised in the circuit court and passed upon by that court); see also State v. Powers, 331 S.C. 37, 501 S.E.2d 116 (1998) (finding constitutional arguments are no exception to the rule, and if not raised to the trial court are deemed waived on appeal)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding constitutional arguments are no exception to the rule, and if not raised to the trial court are deemed waived on appeal",
"sentence": "See Hubbard v. Rowe, 192 S.C. 12, 5 S.E.2d 187 (1939) (stating the questions presented for appellate review must first have been fairly and properly raised in the circuit court and passed upon by that court); see also State v. Powers, 331 S.C. 37, 501 S.E.2d 116 (1998) (finding constitutional arguments are no exception to the rule, and if not raised to the trial court are deemed waived on appeal)."
} | 3,710,254 | a |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Taylor's discrimination claims because Taylor failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants' legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their adverse employment actions, including the failure to provide a salary increase and a bonus, were pretextual. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "546 U.S. 454, 456",
"parenthetical": "noting that use of the term \"boy\" will \"not always be evidence of racial animus\"",
"sentence": "See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456, 126 S.Ct. 1195, 163 L.Ed.2d 1053 (2006) (noting that use of the term “boy” will “not always be evidence of racial animus”); Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 640-42 & n. 5 (listing elements of a discrimination claim under Title VII and explaining that circumstantial evidence of pretext must be specific and substantial); Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir.1996) (an ambiguous comment that is not tied directly to an alleged adverse employment action is “weak evidence and not enough to create an inference of [race] discrimination”); Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir.1990) (“ ‘stray' remarks are insufficient to establish discrimination”); see also Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Ariz., Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 850 (9th Cir.2004) (“Analysis of an employment discrimination claim under § 1981 follows the same legal principles as those applicable in a Title VII disparate treatment case.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "374 F.3d 840, 850",
"parenthetical": "\"Analysis of an employment discrimination claim under SS 1981 follows the same legal principles as those applicable in a Title VII disparate treatment case.\"",
"sentence": "See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456, 126 S.Ct. 1195, 163 L.Ed.2d 1053 (2006) (noting that use of the term “boy” will “not always be evidence of racial animus”); Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 640-42 & n. 5 (listing elements of a discrimination claim under Title VII and explaining that circumstantial evidence of pretext must be specific and substantial); Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir.1996) (an ambiguous comment that is not tied directly to an alleged adverse employment action is “weak evidence and not enough to create an inference of [race] discrimination”); Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir.1990) (“ ‘stray' remarks are insufficient to establish discrimination”); see also Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Ariz., Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 850 (9th Cir.2004) (“Analysis of an employment discrimination claim under § 1981 follows the same legal principles as those applicable in a Title VII disparate treatment case.”)."
} | 3,774,691 | a |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Taylor's discrimination claims because Taylor failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants' legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their adverse employment actions, including the failure to provide a salary increase and a bonus, were pretextual. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "374 F.3d 840, 850",
"parenthetical": "\"Analysis of an employment discrimination claim under SS 1981 follows the same legal principles as those applicable in a Title VII disparate treatment case.\"",
"sentence": "See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456, 126 S.Ct. 1195, 163 L.Ed.2d 1053 (2006) (noting that use of the term “boy” will “not always be evidence of racial animus”); Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 640-42 & n. 5 (listing elements of a discrimination claim under Title VII and explaining that circumstantial evidence of pretext must be specific and substantial); Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir.1996) (an ambiguous comment that is not tied directly to an alleged adverse employment action is “weak evidence and not enough to create an inference of [race] discrimination”); Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir.1990) (“ ‘stray' remarks are insufficient to establish discrimination”); see also Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Ariz., Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 850 (9th Cir.2004) (“Analysis of an employment discrimination claim under § 1981 follows the same legal principles as those applicable in a Title VII disparate treatment case.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that use of the term \"boy\" will \"not always be evidence of racial animus\"",
"sentence": "See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456, 126 S.Ct. 1195, 163 L.Ed.2d 1053 (2006) (noting that use of the term “boy” will “not always be evidence of racial animus”); Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 640-42 & n. 5 (listing elements of a discrimination claim under Title VII and explaining that circumstantial evidence of pretext must be specific and substantial); Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir.1996) (an ambiguous comment that is not tied directly to an alleged adverse employment action is “weak evidence and not enough to create an inference of [race] discrimination”); Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir.1990) (“ ‘stray' remarks are insufficient to establish discrimination”); see also Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Ariz., Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 850 (9th Cir.2004) (“Analysis of an employment discrimination claim under § 1981 follows the same legal principles as those applicable in a Title VII disparate treatment case.”)."
} | 3,774,691 | b |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Taylor's discrimination claims because Taylor failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants' legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their adverse employment actions, including the failure to provide a salary increase and a bonus, were pretextual. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "374 F.3d 840, 850",
"parenthetical": "\"Analysis of an employment discrimination claim under SS 1981 follows the same legal principles as those applicable in a Title VII disparate treatment case.\"",
"sentence": "See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456, 126 S.Ct. 1195, 163 L.Ed.2d 1053 (2006) (noting that use of the term “boy” will “not always be evidence of racial animus”); Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 640-42 & n. 5 (listing elements of a discrimination claim under Title VII and explaining that circumstantial evidence of pretext must be specific and substantial); Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir.1996) (an ambiguous comment that is not tied directly to an alleged adverse employment action is “weak evidence and not enough to create an inference of [race] discrimination”); Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir.1990) (“ ‘stray' remarks are insufficient to establish discrimination”); see also Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Ariz., Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 850 (9th Cir.2004) (“Analysis of an employment discrimination claim under § 1981 follows the same legal principles as those applicable in a Title VII disparate treatment case.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that use of the term \"boy\" will \"not always be evidence of racial animus\"",
"sentence": "See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456, 126 S.Ct. 1195, 163 L.Ed.2d 1053 (2006) (noting that use of the term “boy” will “not always be evidence of racial animus”); Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 640-42 & n. 5 (listing elements of a discrimination claim under Title VII and explaining that circumstantial evidence of pretext must be specific and substantial); Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir.1996) (an ambiguous comment that is not tied directly to an alleged adverse employment action is “weak evidence and not enough to create an inference of [race] discrimination”); Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir.1990) (“ ‘stray' remarks are insufficient to establish discrimination”); see also Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Ariz., Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 850 (9th Cir.2004) (“Analysis of an employment discrimination claim under § 1981 follows the same legal principles as those applicable in a Title VII disparate treatment case.”)."
} | 3,774,691 | b |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Taylor's discrimination claims because Taylor failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants' legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their adverse employment actions, including the failure to provide a salary increase and a bonus, were pretextual. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "374 F.3d 840, 850",
"parenthetical": "\"Analysis of an employment discrimination claim under SS 1981 follows the same legal principles as those applicable in a Title VII disparate treatment case.\"",
"sentence": "See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456, 126 S.Ct. 1195, 163 L.Ed.2d 1053 (2006) (noting that use of the term “boy” will “not always be evidence of racial animus”); Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 640-42 & n. 5 (listing elements of a discrimination claim under Title VII and explaining that circumstantial evidence of pretext must be specific and substantial); Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir.1996) (an ambiguous comment that is not tied directly to an alleged adverse employment action is “weak evidence and not enough to create an inference of [race] discrimination”); Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir.1990) (“ ‘stray' remarks are insufficient to establish discrimination”); see also Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Ariz., Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 850 (9th Cir.2004) (“Analysis of an employment discrimination claim under § 1981 follows the same legal principles as those applicable in a Title VII disparate treatment case.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "listing elements of a discrimination claim under Title VII and explaining that circumstantial evidence of pretext must be specific and substantial",
"sentence": "See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456, 126 S.Ct. 1195, 163 L.Ed.2d 1053 (2006) (noting that use of the term “boy” will “not always be evidence of racial animus”); Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 640-42 & n. 5 (listing elements of a discrimination claim under Title VII and explaining that circumstantial evidence of pretext must be specific and substantial); Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir.1996) (an ambiguous comment that is not tied directly to an alleged adverse employment action is “weak evidence and not enough to create an inference of [race] discrimination”); Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir.1990) (“ ‘stray' remarks are insufficient to establish discrimination”); see also Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Ariz., Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 850 (9th Cir.2004) (“Analysis of an employment discrimination claim under § 1981 follows the same legal principles as those applicable in a Title VII disparate treatment case.”)."
} | 3,774,691 | b |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Taylor's discrimination claims because Taylor failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants' legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their adverse employment actions, including the failure to provide a salary increase and a bonus, were pretextual. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "374 F.3d 840, 850",
"parenthetical": "\"Analysis of an employment discrimination claim under SS 1981 follows the same legal principles as those applicable in a Title VII disparate treatment case.\"",
"sentence": "See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456, 126 S.Ct. 1195, 163 L.Ed.2d 1053 (2006) (noting that use of the term “boy” will “not always be evidence of racial animus”); Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 640-42 & n. 5 (listing elements of a discrimination claim under Title VII and explaining that circumstantial evidence of pretext must be specific and substantial); Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir.1996) (an ambiguous comment that is not tied directly to an alleged adverse employment action is “weak evidence and not enough to create an inference of [race] discrimination”); Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir.1990) (“ ‘stray' remarks are insufficient to establish discrimination”); see also Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Ariz., Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 850 (9th Cir.2004) (“Analysis of an employment discrimination claim under § 1981 follows the same legal principles as those applicable in a Title VII disparate treatment case.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "113 F.3d 912, 919",
"parenthetical": "an ambiguous comment that is not tied directly to an alleged adverse employment action is \"weak evidence and not enough to create an inference of [race] discrimination\"",
"sentence": "See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456, 126 S.Ct. 1195, 163 L.Ed.2d 1053 (2006) (noting that use of the term “boy” will “not always be evidence of racial animus”); Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 640-42 & n. 5 (listing elements of a discrimination claim under Title VII and explaining that circumstantial evidence of pretext must be specific and substantial); Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir.1996) (an ambiguous comment that is not tied directly to an alleged adverse employment action is “weak evidence and not enough to create an inference of [race] discrimination”); Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir.1990) (“ ‘stray' remarks are insufficient to establish discrimination”); see also Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Ariz., Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 850 (9th Cir.2004) (“Analysis of an employment discrimination claim under § 1981 follows the same legal principles as those applicable in a Title VII disparate treatment case.”)."
} | 3,774,691 | b |
The propriety of the warrantless "entry" and arrest is a separate question. (Italics ours.) | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warrantless entry into apartment to arrest robbery suspect justified by exigent circumstances",
"sentence": "Seattle v. Altschuler, 53 Wn. App. 317, 319, 766 P.2d 518 (1989) (hot pursuit or fleeing suspect did not constitute exigent circumstances justifying warrantless entry into home to make an arrest for traffic violation); see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980); State v. Machado, 54 Wn. App. 771, 775 P.2d 997 (1989) (warrantless entry into apartment to arrest robbery suspect justified by exigent circumstances), review denied, 114 Wn.2d 1009 (1990); see generally Utter, Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law: 1988 Update, 11 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 411, 506 (1988)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "53 Wn. App. 317, 319",
"parenthetical": "hot pursuit or fleeing suspect did not constitute exigent circumstances justifying warrantless entry into home to make an arrest for traffic violation",
"sentence": "Seattle v. Altschuler, 53 Wn. App. 317, 319, 766 P.2d 518 (1989) (hot pursuit or fleeing suspect did not constitute exigent circumstances justifying warrantless entry into home to make an arrest for traffic violation); see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980); State v. Machado, 54 Wn. App. 771, 775 P.2d 997 (1989) (warrantless entry into apartment to arrest robbery suspect justified by exigent circumstances), review denied, 114 Wn.2d 1009 (1990); see generally Utter, Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law: 1988 Update, 11 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 411, 506 (1988)."
} | 1,757,150 | b |
The propriety of the warrantless "entry" and arrest is a separate question. (Italics ours.) | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warrantless entry into apartment to arrest robbery suspect justified by exigent circumstances",
"sentence": "Seattle v. Altschuler, 53 Wn. App. 317, 319, 766 P.2d 518 (1989) (hot pursuit or fleeing suspect did not constitute exigent circumstances justifying warrantless entry into home to make an arrest for traffic violation); see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980); State v. Machado, 54 Wn. App. 771, 775 P.2d 997 (1989) (warrantless entry into apartment to arrest robbery suspect justified by exigent circumstances), review denied, 114 Wn.2d 1009 (1990); see generally Utter, Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law: 1988 Update, 11 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 411, 506 (1988)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "53 Wn. App. 317, 319",
"parenthetical": "hot pursuit or fleeing suspect did not constitute exigent circumstances justifying warrantless entry into home to make an arrest for traffic violation",
"sentence": "Seattle v. Altschuler, 53 Wn. App. 317, 319, 766 P.2d 518 (1989) (hot pursuit or fleeing suspect did not constitute exigent circumstances justifying warrantless entry into home to make an arrest for traffic violation); see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980); State v. Machado, 54 Wn. App. 771, 775 P.2d 997 (1989) (warrantless entry into apartment to arrest robbery suspect justified by exigent circumstances), review denied, 114 Wn.2d 1009 (1990); see generally Utter, Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law: 1988 Update, 11 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 411, 506 (1988)."
} | 1,757,150 | b |
The propriety of the warrantless "entry" and arrest is a separate question. (Italics ours.) | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "53 Wn. App. 317, 319",
"parenthetical": "hot pursuit or fleeing suspect did not constitute exigent circumstances justifying warrantless entry into home to make an arrest for traffic violation",
"sentence": "Seattle v. Altschuler, 53 Wn. App. 317, 319, 766 P.2d 518 (1989) (hot pursuit or fleeing suspect did not constitute exigent circumstances justifying warrantless entry into home to make an arrest for traffic violation); see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980); State v. Machado, 54 Wn. App. 771, 775 P.2d 997 (1989) (warrantless entry into apartment to arrest robbery suspect justified by exigent circumstances), review denied, 114 Wn.2d 1009 (1990); see generally Utter, Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law: 1988 Update, 11 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 411, 506 (1988)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warrantless entry into apartment to arrest robbery suspect justified by exigent circumstances",
"sentence": "Seattle v. Altschuler, 53 Wn. App. 317, 319, 766 P.2d 518 (1989) (hot pursuit or fleeing suspect did not constitute exigent circumstances justifying warrantless entry into home to make an arrest for traffic violation); see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980); State v. Machado, 54 Wn. App. 771, 775 P.2d 997 (1989) (warrantless entry into apartment to arrest robbery suspect justified by exigent circumstances), review denied, 114 Wn.2d 1009 (1990); see generally Utter, Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law: 1988 Update, 11 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 411, 506 (1988)."
} | 1,757,150 | a |
The propriety of the warrantless "entry" and arrest is a separate question. (Italics ours.) | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warrantless entry into apartment to arrest robbery suspect justified by exigent circumstances",
"sentence": "Seattle v. Altschuler, 53 Wn. App. 317, 319, 766 P.2d 518 (1989) (hot pursuit or fleeing suspect did not constitute exigent circumstances justifying warrantless entry into home to make an arrest for traffic violation); see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980); State v. Machado, 54 Wn. App. 771, 775 P.2d 997 (1989) (warrantless entry into apartment to arrest robbery suspect justified by exigent circumstances), review denied, 114 Wn.2d 1009 (1990); see generally Utter, Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law: 1988 Update, 11 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 411, 506 (1988)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "hot pursuit or fleeing suspect did not constitute exigent circumstances justifying warrantless entry into home to make an arrest for traffic violation",
"sentence": "Seattle v. Altschuler, 53 Wn. App. 317, 319, 766 P.2d 518 (1989) (hot pursuit or fleeing suspect did not constitute exigent circumstances justifying warrantless entry into home to make an arrest for traffic violation); see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980); State v. Machado, 54 Wn. App. 771, 775 P.2d 997 (1989) (warrantless entry into apartment to arrest robbery suspect justified by exigent circumstances), review denied, 114 Wn.2d 1009 (1990); see generally Utter, Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law: 1988 Update, 11 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 411, 506 (1988)."
} | 1,757,150 | b |
The propriety of the warrantless "entry" and arrest is a separate question. (Italics ours.) | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warrantless entry into apartment to arrest robbery suspect justified by exigent circumstances",
"sentence": "Seattle v. Altschuler, 53 Wn. App. 317, 319, 766 P.2d 518 (1989) (hot pursuit or fleeing suspect did not constitute exigent circumstances justifying warrantless entry into home to make an arrest for traffic violation); see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980); State v. Machado, 54 Wn. App. 771, 775 P.2d 997 (1989) (warrantless entry into apartment to arrest robbery suspect justified by exigent circumstances), review denied, 114 Wn.2d 1009 (1990); see generally Utter, Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law: 1988 Update, 11 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 411, 506 (1988)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "hot pursuit or fleeing suspect did not constitute exigent circumstances justifying warrantless entry into home to make an arrest for traffic violation",
"sentence": "Seattle v. Altschuler, 53 Wn. App. 317, 319, 766 P.2d 518 (1989) (hot pursuit or fleeing suspect did not constitute exigent circumstances justifying warrantless entry into home to make an arrest for traffic violation); see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980); State v. Machado, 54 Wn. App. 771, 775 P.2d 997 (1989) (warrantless entry into apartment to arrest robbery suspect justified by exigent circumstances), review denied, 114 Wn.2d 1009 (1990); see generally Utter, Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law: 1988 Update, 11 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 411, 506 (1988)."
} | 1,757,150 | b |
The propriety of the warrantless "entry" and arrest is a separate question. (Italics ours.) | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warrantless entry into apartment to arrest robbery suspect justified by exigent circumstances",
"sentence": "Seattle v. Altschuler, 53 Wn. App. 317, 319, 766 P.2d 518 (1989) (hot pursuit or fleeing suspect did not constitute exigent circumstances justifying warrantless entry into home to make an arrest for traffic violation); see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980); State v. Machado, 54 Wn. App. 771, 775 P.2d 997 (1989) (warrantless entry into apartment to arrest robbery suspect justified by exigent circumstances), review denied, 114 Wn.2d 1009 (1990); see generally Utter, Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law: 1988 Update, 11 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 411, 506 (1988)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "hot pursuit or fleeing suspect did not constitute exigent circumstances justifying warrantless entry into home to make an arrest for traffic violation",
"sentence": "Seattle v. Altschuler, 53 Wn. App. 317, 319, 766 P.2d 518 (1989) (hot pursuit or fleeing suspect did not constitute exigent circumstances justifying warrantless entry into home to make an arrest for traffic violation); see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980); State v. Machado, 54 Wn. App. 771, 775 P.2d 997 (1989) (warrantless entry into apartment to arrest robbery suspect justified by exigent circumstances), review denied, 114 Wn.2d 1009 (1990); see generally Utter, Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law: 1988 Update, 11 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 411, 506 (1988)."
} | 1,757,150 | b |
Furthermore, where a third party is not covered by the insurance policy, it cannot argue based on the certificate of insurance that the insurer is estopped from denying coverage. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2000 WL 1013945, at *6",
"parenthetical": "noting that the only exception to this rule is when the insurer's actions caused the third party to rely to its detriment on coverage",
"sentence": "American Ref-Fuel Co., 671 N.Y.S.2d at 96 (noting that “the doctrine of estoppel may not be invoked to create coverage where none exists under the policy”); see First Financial, 2000 WL 1013945 at *6 (noting that the only exception to this rule is when the insurer’s actions caused the third party to rely to its detriment on coverage)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "671 N.Y.S.2d 96, 96",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the doctrine of estoppel may not be invoked to create coverage where none exists under the policy\"",
"sentence": "American Ref-Fuel Co., 671 N.Y.S.2d at 96 (noting that “the doctrine of estoppel may not be invoked to create coverage where none exists under the policy”); see First Financial, 2000 WL 1013945 at *6 (noting that the only exception to this rule is when the insurer’s actions caused the third party to rely to its detriment on coverage)."
} | 9,179,782 | b |
Compliance with procedures merely tends to ensure the intrusion is limited to carrying out the government's caretaking function. This does not mean that inventory searches are always unreasonable when standard procedures are not followed, however. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "831 F.2d 1390, 1394",
"parenthetical": "failure of police to complete inventory of arrestee's belongings as policy provided after finding drugs in arrestee's suitcase did not render inventory search unreasonable where police changed plans and decided to transfer arrestee to federal authorities",
"sentence": "See United States v. Woolbright, 831 F.2d 1390, 1394 (8th Cir.1987) (failure of police to complete inventory of arrestee’s belongings as policy provided after finding drugs in arrestee’s suitcase did not render inventory search unreasonable where police changed plans and decided to transfer arrestee to federal authorities); United States v. Trullo, 790 F.2d 205, 206 (1st Cir.1986); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 816, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (although adherence to procedures shows lack of pretext, deviation from procedures does not prove pretext)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "517 U.S. 806, 816",
"parenthetical": "although adherence to procedures shows lack of pretext, deviation from procedures does not prove pretext",
"sentence": "See United States v. Woolbright, 831 F.2d 1390, 1394 (8th Cir.1987) (failure of police to complete inventory of arrestee’s belongings as policy provided after finding drugs in arrestee’s suitcase did not render inventory search unreasonable where police changed plans and decided to transfer arrestee to federal authorities); United States v. Trullo, 790 F.2d 205, 206 (1st Cir.1986); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 816, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (although adherence to procedures shows lack of pretext, deviation from procedures does not prove pretext)."
} | 1,366,624 | a |
Compliance with procedures merely tends to ensure the intrusion is limited to carrying out the government's caretaking function. This does not mean that inventory searches are always unreasonable when standard procedures are not followed, however. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "although adherence to procedures shows lack of pretext, deviation from procedures does not prove pretext",
"sentence": "See United States v. Woolbright, 831 F.2d 1390, 1394 (8th Cir.1987) (failure of police to complete inventory of arrestee’s belongings as policy provided after finding drugs in arrestee’s suitcase did not render inventory search unreasonable where police changed plans and decided to transfer arrestee to federal authorities); United States v. Trullo, 790 F.2d 205, 206 (1st Cir.1986); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 816, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (although adherence to procedures shows lack of pretext, deviation from procedures does not prove pretext)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "831 F.2d 1390, 1394",
"parenthetical": "failure of police to complete inventory of arrestee's belongings as policy provided after finding drugs in arrestee's suitcase did not render inventory search unreasonable where police changed plans and decided to transfer arrestee to federal authorities",
"sentence": "See United States v. Woolbright, 831 F.2d 1390, 1394 (8th Cir.1987) (failure of police to complete inventory of arrestee’s belongings as policy provided after finding drugs in arrestee’s suitcase did not render inventory search unreasonable where police changed plans and decided to transfer arrestee to federal authorities); United States v. Trullo, 790 F.2d 205, 206 (1st Cir.1986); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 816, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (although adherence to procedures shows lack of pretext, deviation from procedures does not prove pretext)."
} | 1,366,624 | b |
Compliance with procedures merely tends to ensure the intrusion is limited to carrying out the government's caretaking function. This does not mean that inventory searches are always unreasonable when standard procedures are not followed, however. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "831 F.2d 1390, 1394",
"parenthetical": "failure of police to complete inventory of arrestee's belongings as policy provided after finding drugs in arrestee's suitcase did not render inventory search unreasonable where police changed plans and decided to transfer arrestee to federal authorities",
"sentence": "See United States v. Woolbright, 831 F.2d 1390, 1394 (8th Cir.1987) (failure of police to complete inventory of arrestee’s belongings as policy provided after finding drugs in arrestee’s suitcase did not render inventory search unreasonable where police changed plans and decided to transfer arrestee to federal authorities); United States v. Trullo, 790 F.2d 205, 206 (1st Cir.1986); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 816, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (although adherence to procedures shows lack of pretext, deviation from procedures does not prove pretext)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "although adherence to procedures shows lack of pretext, deviation from procedures does not prove pretext",
"sentence": "See United States v. Woolbright, 831 F.2d 1390, 1394 (8th Cir.1987) (failure of police to complete inventory of arrestee’s belongings as policy provided after finding drugs in arrestee’s suitcase did not render inventory search unreasonable where police changed plans and decided to transfer arrestee to federal authorities); United States v. Trullo, 790 F.2d 205, 206 (1st Cir.1986); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 816, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (although adherence to procedures shows lack of pretext, deviation from procedures does not prove pretext)."
} | 1,366,624 | a |
Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978 (" SS 530") provides for the termination of tax liability if "for purposes of employment taxes, the taxpayer did not treat an individual as an employee for any period"; "all Federal tax returns (including information returns) required to be filed by the taxpayer with respect to such individual for such period are filed on a basis consistent with the taxpayer's treatment of such individual as not being an employee"; and the employer had a "reasonable basis for not treating such individual as an employee." Pub.L. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "275 F.3d 560, 563",
"parenthetical": "noting, in the Fourth Amendment context, that \"[t]he question of whether a belief is reasonable is one we review de novo, since the reasonableness test is objective, not subjective\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 2885. Whether Peno Trucking can satisfy the “reasonable basis” requirement of § 530 is a question of law that we review de novo. See Spicer Accounting v. United States, 918 F.2d 90, 94 (9th Cir.1990) (applying de novo review to whether the appellant had a “reasonable basis” for not treating the individuals in question as employees); cf. United States v. Talley, 275 F.3d 560, 563 (6th Cir.2001) (noting, in the Fourth Amendment context, that “[t]he question of whether a belief is reasonable is one we review de novo, since the reasonableness test is objective, not subjective”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "918 F.2d 90, 94",
"parenthetical": "applying de novo review to whether the appellant had a \"reasonable basis\" for not treating the individuals in question as employees",
"sentence": "Id. at 2885. Whether Peno Trucking can satisfy the “reasonable basis” requirement of § 530 is a question of law that we review de novo. See Spicer Accounting v. United States, 918 F.2d 90, 94 (9th Cir.1990) (applying de novo review to whether the appellant had a “reasonable basis” for not treating the individuals in question as employees); cf. United States v. Talley, 275 F.3d 560, 563 (6th Cir.2001) (noting, in the Fourth Amendment context, that “[t]he question of whether a belief is reasonable is one we review de novo, since the reasonableness test is objective, not subjective”)."
} | 3,223,346 | b |
. Minnesota courts have likewise turned to the IAD when interpreting the UMDDA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "632 N.W.2d 230, 230",
"parenthetical": "We \"look for guidance from the UMDDA's counterpart, the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD)\"",
"sentence": "See Wilson, 632 N.W.2d at 230 (We \"look for guidance from the UMDDA’s counterpart, the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD)”); see also State v. Kurz, 685 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Minn.App.2004) (using the IAD for guidance when interpreting an issue under the UMD-DA), review denied (Minn. Oct. 27, 2004)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "685 N.W.2d 447, 450",
"parenthetical": "using the IAD for guidance when interpreting an issue under the UMD-DA",
"sentence": "See Wilson, 632 N.W.2d at 230 (We \"look for guidance from the UMDDA’s counterpart, the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD)”); see also State v. Kurz, 685 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Minn.App.2004) (using the IAD for guidance when interpreting an issue under the UMD-DA), review denied (Minn. Oct. 27, 2004)."
} | 7,081,131 | a |
Although a lender does not violate the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing merely by exercising express contractual rights, Massachusetts courts have left open the possibility that in certain circumstances lenders may violate the implied covenant by the manner with which they exercise express contractual rights. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "614 N.E.2d 672, 672",
"parenthetical": "\"We, therefore, need not consider whether good faith is a necessary element of the setting of the terms of a demand for payment when dealing with a demand note....\"",
"sentence": "See Miller, 614 N.E.2d at 672 (“We, therefore, need not consider whether good faith is a necessary element of the setting of the terms of a demand for payment when dealing with a demand note....”); cf. Shawmut Bank v. Flynn, 1993 WL 818771, *3 (Mass.Super.) (noting, but not addressing, argument that “Miller only establishes the irrelevancy of Shawmut’s good or bad faith and motivation in its decision to demand payment on the loan, but that Miller does not immunize the plaintiffs conduct in demanding or collecting payment”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "1993 WL 818771, *3",
"parenthetical": "noting, but not addressing, argument that \"Miller only establishes the irrelevancy of Shawmut's good or bad faith and motivation in its decision to demand payment on the loan, but that Miller does not immunize the plaintiffs conduct in demanding or collecting payment\"",
"sentence": "See Miller, 614 N.E.2d at 672 (“We, therefore, need not consider whether good faith is a necessary element of the setting of the terms of a demand for payment when dealing with a demand note....”); cf. Shawmut Bank v. Flynn, 1993 WL 818771, *3 (Mass.Super.) (noting, but not addressing, argument that “Miller only establishes the irrelevancy of Shawmut’s good or bad faith and motivation in its decision to demand payment on the loan, but that Miller does not immunize the plaintiffs conduct in demanding or collecting payment”)."
} | 883,407 | a |
Stopping Rivera at the "baggage screening checkpoint" and preventing him from leaving the airport also constituted a seizure of his person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "449 U.S. 411, 417",
"parenthetical": "\"The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981) (“The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.”); see Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (“It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (“[A] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); United States v. Odum, 72 F.3d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "531 U.S. 40, 40",
"parenthetical": "\"It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981) (“The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.”); see Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (“It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (“[A] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); United States v. Odum, 72 F.3d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area)."
} | 4,345,442 | a |
Stopping Rivera at the "baggage screening checkpoint" and preventing him from leaving the airport also constituted a seizure of his person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "449 U.S. 411, 417",
"parenthetical": "\"The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981) (“The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.”); see Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (“It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (“[A] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); United States v. Odum, 72 F.3d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "496 U.S. 444, 450",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] Fourth Amendment 'seizure' occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981) (“The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.”); see Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (“It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (“[A] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); United States v. Odum, 72 F.3d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area)."
} | 4,345,442 | a |
Stopping Rivera at the "baggage screening checkpoint" and preventing him from leaving the airport also constituted a seizure of his person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] Fourth Amendment 'seizure' occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981) (“The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.”); see Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (“It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (“[A] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); United States v. Odum, 72 F.3d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "449 U.S. 411, 417",
"parenthetical": "\"The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981) (“The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.”); see Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (“It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (“[A] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); United States v. Odum, 72 F.3d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area)."
} | 4,345,442 | b |
Stopping Rivera at the "baggage screening checkpoint" and preventing him from leaving the airport also constituted a seizure of his person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] Fourth Amendment 'seizure' occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981) (“The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.”); see Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (“It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (“[A] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); United States v. Odum, 72 F.3d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "449 U.S. 411, 417",
"parenthetical": "\"The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981) (“The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.”); see Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (“It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (“[A] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); United States v. Odum, 72 F.3d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area)."
} | 4,345,442 | b |
Stopping Rivera at the "baggage screening checkpoint" and preventing him from leaving the airport also constituted a seizure of his person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "72 F.3d 1279, 1284",
"parenthetical": "Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area",
"sentence": "United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981) (“The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.”); see Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (“It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (“[A] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); United States v. Odum, 72 F.3d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "449 U.S. 411, 417",
"parenthetical": "\"The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981) (“The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.”); see Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (“It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (“[A] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); United States v. Odum, 72 F.3d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area)."
} | 4,345,442 | b |
Stopping Rivera at the "baggage screening checkpoint" and preventing him from leaving the airport also constituted a seizure of his person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "531 U.S. 40, 40",
"parenthetical": "\"It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981) (“The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.”); see Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (“It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (“[A] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); United States v. Odum, 72 F.3d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981) (“The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.”); see Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (“It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (“[A] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); United States v. Odum, 72 F.3d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area)."
} | 4,345,442 | b |
Stopping Rivera at the "baggage screening checkpoint" and preventing him from leaving the airport also constituted a seizure of his person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981) (“The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.”); see Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (“It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (“[A] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); United States v. Odum, 72 F.3d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "496 U.S. 444, 450",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] Fourth Amendment 'seizure' occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981) (“The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.”); see Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (“It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (“[A] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); United States v. Odum, 72 F.3d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area)."
} | 4,345,442 | a |
Stopping Rivera at the "baggage screening checkpoint" and preventing him from leaving the airport also constituted a seizure of his person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981) (“The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.”); see Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (“It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (“[A] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); United States v. Odum, 72 F.3d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] Fourth Amendment 'seizure' occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981) (“The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.”); see Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (“It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (“[A] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); United States v. Odum, 72 F.3d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area)."
} | 4,345,442 | a |
Stopping Rivera at the "baggage screening checkpoint" and preventing him from leaving the airport also constituted a seizure of his person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] Fourth Amendment 'seizure' occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981) (“The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.”); see Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (“It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (“[A] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); United States v. Odum, 72 F.3d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981) (“The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.”); see Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (“It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (“[A] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); United States v. Odum, 72 F.3d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area)."
} | 4,345,442 | b |
Stopping Rivera at the "baggage screening checkpoint" and preventing him from leaving the airport also constituted a seizure of his person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981) (“The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.”); see Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (“It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (“[A] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); United States v. Odum, 72 F.3d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "72 F.3d 1279, 1284",
"parenthetical": "Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area",
"sentence": "United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981) (“The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.”); see Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (“It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (“[A] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); United States v. Odum, 72 F.3d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area)."
} | 4,345,442 | a |
Stopping Rivera at the "baggage screening checkpoint" and preventing him from leaving the airport also constituted a seizure of his person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "531 U.S. 40, 40",
"parenthetical": "\"It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981) (“The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.”); see Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (“It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (“[A] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); United States v. Odum, 72 F.3d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981) (“The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.”); see Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (“It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (“[A] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); United States v. Odum, 72 F.3d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area)."
} | 4,345,442 | b |
Stopping Rivera at the "baggage screening checkpoint" and preventing him from leaving the airport also constituted a seizure of his person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981) (“The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.”); see Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (“It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (“[A] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); United States v. Odum, 72 F.3d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "496 U.S. 444, 450",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] Fourth Amendment 'seizure' occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981) (“The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.”); see Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (“It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (“[A] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); United States v. Odum, 72 F.3d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area)."
} | 4,345,442 | a |
Stopping Rivera at the "baggage screening checkpoint" and preventing him from leaving the airport also constituted a seizure of his person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981) (“The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.”); see Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (“It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (“[A] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); United States v. Odum, 72 F.3d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] Fourth Amendment 'seizure' occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981) (“The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.”); see Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (“It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (“[A] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); United States v. Odum, 72 F.3d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area)."
} | 4,345,442 | a |
Stopping Rivera at the "baggage screening checkpoint" and preventing him from leaving the airport also constituted a seizure of his person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] Fourth Amendment 'seizure' occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981) (“The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.”); see Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (“It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (“[A] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); United States v. Odum, 72 F.3d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981) (“The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.”); see Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (“It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (“[A] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); United States v. Odum, 72 F.3d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area)."
} | 4,345,442 | b |
Stopping Rivera at the "baggage screening checkpoint" and preventing him from leaving the airport also constituted a seizure of his person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981) (“The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.”); see Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (“It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (“[A] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); United States v. Odum, 72 F.3d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "72 F.3d 1279, 1284",
"parenthetical": "Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area",
"sentence": "United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981) (“The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops.”); see Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (“It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (“[A] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); United States v. Odum, 72 F.3d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment seizure occurred while defendant questioned by law enforcement at baggage claim area)."
} | 4,345,442 | a |
Other Washington decisions have employed a more complete analysis to uphold the same statute on the ground that threats themselves are nonprotected speech. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "83 Wn.2d 937, 941-42",
"parenthetical": "holding that RCW 9.61.160 does not prohibit advocating use of force but, rather, prohibits threats",
"sentence": "See State v. Young, 83 Wn.2d 937, 941-42, 523 P.2d 934 (1974) (holding that RCW 9.61.160 does not prohibit advocating use of force but, rather, prohibits threats); State v. Brown, 50 Wn. App. 405, 411, 748 P.2d 276 (1988) (holding that bomb threat statute is not overbroad because it can be narrowly interpreted to prohibit only nonprotected threats); see also Knowles, 91 Wn. App. at 373-74 (analyzing overbreadth of RCW 9A.72.160 (intimidating a judge) by considering whether speech was nonprotected “true threat”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "91 Wn. App. 373, 373-74",
"parenthetical": "analyzing overbreadth of RCW 9A.72.160 (intimidating a judge) by considering whether speech was nonprotected \"true threat\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Young, 83 Wn.2d 937, 941-42, 523 P.2d 934 (1974) (holding that RCW 9.61.160 does not prohibit advocating use of force but, rather, prohibits threats); State v. Brown, 50 Wn. App. 405, 411, 748 P.2d 276 (1988) (holding that bomb threat statute is not overbroad because it can be narrowly interpreted to prohibit only nonprotected threats); see also Knowles, 91 Wn. App. at 373-74 (analyzing overbreadth of RCW 9A.72.160 (intimidating a judge) by considering whether speech was nonprotected “true threat”)."
} | 48,768 | a |
Other Washington decisions have employed a more complete analysis to uphold the same statute on the ground that threats themselves are nonprotected speech. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that RCW 9.61.160 does not prohibit advocating use of force but, rather, prohibits threats",
"sentence": "See State v. Young, 83 Wn.2d 937, 941-42, 523 P.2d 934 (1974) (holding that RCW 9.61.160 does not prohibit advocating use of force but, rather, prohibits threats); State v. Brown, 50 Wn. App. 405, 411, 748 P.2d 276 (1988) (holding that bomb threat statute is not overbroad because it can be narrowly interpreted to prohibit only nonprotected threats); see also Knowles, 91 Wn. App. at 373-74 (analyzing overbreadth of RCW 9A.72.160 (intimidating a judge) by considering whether speech was nonprotected “true threat”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "91 Wn. App. 373, 373-74",
"parenthetical": "analyzing overbreadth of RCW 9A.72.160 (intimidating a judge) by considering whether speech was nonprotected \"true threat\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Young, 83 Wn.2d 937, 941-42, 523 P.2d 934 (1974) (holding that RCW 9.61.160 does not prohibit advocating use of force but, rather, prohibits threats); State v. Brown, 50 Wn. App. 405, 411, 748 P.2d 276 (1988) (holding that bomb threat statute is not overbroad because it can be narrowly interpreted to prohibit only nonprotected threats); see also Knowles, 91 Wn. App. at 373-74 (analyzing overbreadth of RCW 9A.72.160 (intimidating a judge) by considering whether speech was nonprotected “true threat”)."
} | 48,768 | a |
Other Washington decisions have employed a more complete analysis to uphold the same statute on the ground that threats themselves are nonprotected speech. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "91 Wn. App. 373, 373-74",
"parenthetical": "analyzing overbreadth of RCW 9A.72.160 (intimidating a judge) by considering whether speech was nonprotected \"true threat\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Young, 83 Wn.2d 937, 941-42, 523 P.2d 934 (1974) (holding that RCW 9.61.160 does not prohibit advocating use of force but, rather, prohibits threats); State v. Brown, 50 Wn. App. 405, 411, 748 P.2d 276 (1988) (holding that bomb threat statute is not overbroad because it can be narrowly interpreted to prohibit only nonprotected threats); see also Knowles, 91 Wn. App. at 373-74 (analyzing overbreadth of RCW 9A.72.160 (intimidating a judge) by considering whether speech was nonprotected “true threat”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "50 Wn. App. 405, 411",
"parenthetical": "holding that bomb threat statute is not overbroad because it can be narrowly interpreted to prohibit only nonprotected threats",
"sentence": "See State v. Young, 83 Wn.2d 937, 941-42, 523 P.2d 934 (1974) (holding that RCW 9.61.160 does not prohibit advocating use of force but, rather, prohibits threats); State v. Brown, 50 Wn. App. 405, 411, 748 P.2d 276 (1988) (holding that bomb threat statute is not overbroad because it can be narrowly interpreted to prohibit only nonprotected threats); see also Knowles, 91 Wn. App. at 373-74 (analyzing overbreadth of RCW 9A.72.160 (intimidating a judge) by considering whether speech was nonprotected “true threat”)."
} | 48,768 | b |
Other Washington decisions have employed a more complete analysis to uphold the same statute on the ground that threats themselves are nonprotected speech. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "91 Wn. App. 373, 373-74",
"parenthetical": "analyzing overbreadth of RCW 9A.72.160 (intimidating a judge) by considering whether speech was nonprotected \"true threat\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Young, 83 Wn.2d 937, 941-42, 523 P.2d 934 (1974) (holding that RCW 9.61.160 does not prohibit advocating use of force but, rather, prohibits threats); State v. Brown, 50 Wn. App. 405, 411, 748 P.2d 276 (1988) (holding that bomb threat statute is not overbroad because it can be narrowly interpreted to prohibit only nonprotected threats); see also Knowles, 91 Wn. App. at 373-74 (analyzing overbreadth of RCW 9A.72.160 (intimidating a judge) by considering whether speech was nonprotected “true threat”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that bomb threat statute is not overbroad because it can be narrowly interpreted to prohibit only nonprotected threats",
"sentence": "See State v. Young, 83 Wn.2d 937, 941-42, 523 P.2d 934 (1974) (holding that RCW 9.61.160 does not prohibit advocating use of force but, rather, prohibits threats); State v. Brown, 50 Wn. App. 405, 411, 748 P.2d 276 (1988) (holding that bomb threat statute is not overbroad because it can be narrowly interpreted to prohibit only nonprotected threats); see also Knowles, 91 Wn. App. at 373-74 (analyzing overbreadth of RCW 9A.72.160 (intimidating a judge) by considering whether speech was nonprotected “true threat”)."
} | 48,768 | b |
Despite the foregoing, however, DeShaney also included language indicating that its holding did not necessarily apply to all circumstances. The Court acknowledged that if the state takes a person into custody and holds that person involuntarily, the Constitution imposes a duty to assume responsibility for the person's care and well-being. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that government has obligation to provide for health needs of incarcerated prisoners",
"sentence": "Id. at 199-200, 109 S.Ct. at 1005-1006 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2458-2459, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (“When a person is institutionalized — and wholly dependent on the State[,] ... a duty to provide certain services and care does exist.”)); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (holding that government has obligation to provide for health needs of incarcerated prisoners)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "457 U.S. 307, 317",
"parenthetical": "\"When a person is institutionalized -- and wholly dependent on the State[,] ... a duty to provide certain services and care does exist.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 199-200, 109 S.Ct. at 1005-1006 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2458-2459, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (“When a person is institutionalized — and wholly dependent on the State[,] ... a duty to provide certain services and care does exist.”)); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (holding that government has obligation to provide for health needs of incarcerated prisoners)."
} | 11,899,298 | b |
Despite the foregoing, however, DeShaney also included language indicating that its holding did not necessarily apply to all circumstances. The Court acknowledged that if the state takes a person into custody and holds that person involuntarily, the Constitution imposes a duty to assume responsibility for the person's care and well-being. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "457 U.S. 307, 317",
"parenthetical": "\"When a person is institutionalized -- and wholly dependent on the State[,] ... a duty to provide certain services and care does exist.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 199-200, 109 S.Ct. at 1005-1006 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2458-2459, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (“When a person is institutionalized — and wholly dependent on the State[,] ... a duty to provide certain services and care does exist.”)); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (holding that government has obligation to provide for health needs of incarcerated prisoners)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that government has obligation to provide for health needs of incarcerated prisoners",
"sentence": "Id. at 199-200, 109 S.Ct. at 1005-1006 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2458-2459, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (“When a person is institutionalized — and wholly dependent on the State[,] ... a duty to provide certain services and care does exist.”)); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (holding that government has obligation to provide for health needs of incarcerated prisoners)."
} | 11,899,298 | a |
Despite the foregoing, however, DeShaney also included language indicating that its holding did not necessarily apply to all circumstances. The Court acknowledged that if the state takes a person into custody and holds that person involuntarily, the Constitution imposes a duty to assume responsibility for the person's care and well-being. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "457 U.S. 307, 317",
"parenthetical": "\"When a person is institutionalized -- and wholly dependent on the State[,] ... a duty to provide certain services and care does exist.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 199-200, 109 S.Ct. at 1005-1006 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2458-2459, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (“When a person is institutionalized — and wholly dependent on the State[,] ... a duty to provide certain services and care does exist.”)); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (holding that government has obligation to provide for health needs of incarcerated prisoners)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that government has obligation to provide for health needs of incarcerated prisoners",
"sentence": "Id. at 199-200, 109 S.Ct. at 1005-1006 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2458-2459, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (“When a person is institutionalized — and wholly dependent on the State[,] ... a duty to provide certain services and care does exist.”)); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (holding that government has obligation to provide for health needs of incarcerated prisoners)."
} | 11,899,298 | a |
Despite the foregoing, however, DeShaney also included language indicating that its holding did not necessarily apply to all circumstances. The Court acknowledged that if the state takes a person into custody and holds that person involuntarily, the Constitution imposes a duty to assume responsibility for the person's care and well-being. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "102 S.Ct. 2452, 2458-2459",
"parenthetical": "\"When a person is institutionalized -- and wholly dependent on the State[,] ... a duty to provide certain services and care does exist.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 199-200, 109 S.Ct. at 1005-1006 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2458-2459, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (“When a person is institutionalized — and wholly dependent on the State[,] ... a duty to provide certain services and care does exist.”)); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (holding that government has obligation to provide for health needs of incarcerated prisoners)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that government has obligation to provide for health needs of incarcerated prisoners",
"sentence": "Id. at 199-200, 109 S.Ct. at 1005-1006 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2458-2459, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (“When a person is institutionalized — and wholly dependent on the State[,] ... a duty to provide certain services and care does exist.”)); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (holding that government has obligation to provide for health needs of incarcerated prisoners)."
} | 11,899,298 | a |
Despite the foregoing, however, DeShaney also included language indicating that its holding did not necessarily apply to all circumstances. The Court acknowledged that if the state takes a person into custody and holds that person involuntarily, the Constitution imposes a duty to assume responsibility for the person's care and well-being. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "102 S.Ct. 2452, 2458-2459",
"parenthetical": "\"When a person is institutionalized -- and wholly dependent on the State[,] ... a duty to provide certain services and care does exist.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 199-200, 109 S.Ct. at 1005-1006 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2458-2459, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (“When a person is institutionalized — and wholly dependent on the State[,] ... a duty to provide certain services and care does exist.”)); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (holding that government has obligation to provide for health needs of incarcerated prisoners)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that government has obligation to provide for health needs of incarcerated prisoners",
"sentence": "Id. at 199-200, 109 S.Ct. at 1005-1006 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2458-2459, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (“When a person is institutionalized — and wholly dependent on the State[,] ... a duty to provide certain services and care does exist.”)); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (holding that government has obligation to provide for health needs of incarcerated prisoners)."
} | 11,899,298 | a |
Despite the foregoing, however, DeShaney also included language indicating that its holding did not necessarily apply to all circumstances. The Court acknowledged that if the state takes a person into custody and holds that person involuntarily, the Constitution imposes a duty to assume responsibility for the person's care and well-being. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "102 S.Ct. 2452, 2458-2459",
"parenthetical": "\"When a person is institutionalized -- and wholly dependent on the State[,] ... a duty to provide certain services and care does exist.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 199-200, 109 S.Ct. at 1005-1006 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2458-2459, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (“When a person is institutionalized — and wholly dependent on the State[,] ... a duty to provide certain services and care does exist.”)); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (holding that government has obligation to provide for health needs of incarcerated prisoners)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that government has obligation to provide for health needs of incarcerated prisoners",
"sentence": "Id. at 199-200, 109 S.Ct. at 1005-1006 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2458-2459, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (“When a person is institutionalized — and wholly dependent on the State[,] ... a duty to provide certain services and care does exist.”)); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (holding that government has obligation to provide for health needs of incarcerated prisoners)."
} | 11,899,298 | a |
Despite the foregoing, however, DeShaney also included language indicating that its holding did not necessarily apply to all circumstances. The Court acknowledged that if the state takes a person into custody and holds that person involuntarily, the Constitution imposes a duty to assume responsibility for the person's care and well-being. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"When a person is institutionalized -- and wholly dependent on the State[,] ... a duty to provide certain services and care does exist.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 199-200, 109 S.Ct. at 1005-1006 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2458-2459, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (“When a person is institutionalized — and wholly dependent on the State[,] ... a duty to provide certain services and care does exist.”)); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (holding that government has obligation to provide for health needs of incarcerated prisoners)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that government has obligation to provide for health needs of incarcerated prisoners",
"sentence": "Id. at 199-200, 109 S.Ct. at 1005-1006 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2458-2459, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (“When a person is institutionalized — and wholly dependent on the State[,] ... a duty to provide certain services and care does exist.”)); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (holding that government has obligation to provide for health needs of incarcerated prisoners)."
} | 11,899,298 | a |
Despite the foregoing, however, DeShaney also included language indicating that its holding did not necessarily apply to all circumstances. The Court acknowledged that if the state takes a person into custody and holds that person involuntarily, the Constitution imposes a duty to assume responsibility for the person's care and well-being. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that government has obligation to provide for health needs of incarcerated prisoners",
"sentence": "Id. at 199-200, 109 S.Ct. at 1005-1006 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2458-2459, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (“When a person is institutionalized — and wholly dependent on the State[,] ... a duty to provide certain services and care does exist.”)); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (holding that government has obligation to provide for health needs of incarcerated prisoners)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"When a person is institutionalized -- and wholly dependent on the State[,] ... a duty to provide certain services and care does exist.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 199-200, 109 S.Ct. at 1005-1006 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2458-2459, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (“When a person is institutionalized — and wholly dependent on the State[,] ... a duty to provide certain services and care does exist.”)); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (holding that government has obligation to provide for health needs of incarcerated prisoners)."
} | 11,899,298 | b |
Despite the foregoing, however, DeShaney also included language indicating that its holding did not necessarily apply to all circumstances. The Court acknowledged that if the state takes a person into custody and holds that person involuntarily, the Constitution imposes a duty to assume responsibility for the person's care and well-being. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that government has obligation to provide for health needs of incarcerated prisoners",
"sentence": "Id. at 199-200, 109 S.Ct. at 1005-1006 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2458-2459, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (“When a person is institutionalized — and wholly dependent on the State[,] ... a duty to provide certain services and care does exist.”)); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (holding that government has obligation to provide for health needs of incarcerated prisoners)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"When a person is institutionalized -- and wholly dependent on the State[,] ... a duty to provide certain services and care does exist.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 199-200, 109 S.Ct. at 1005-1006 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2458-2459, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (“When a person is institutionalized — and wholly dependent on the State[,] ... a duty to provide certain services and care does exist.”)); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (holding that government has obligation to provide for health needs of incarcerated prisoners)."
} | 11,899,298 | b |
(iv)Finally, in upholding the presidential-candidate financing system, Buckley instructed that courts should avoid reasoning based on speculation and should, instead, require tangible evidence of the "practical effects" of the public financing system. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding the system in part because \"[a]ny risk of harm to minority interests is speculative due to [a general] lack of knowledge of the practical effects of public financing\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 101, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding the system in part because “[a]ny risk of harm to minority interests is speculative due to [a general] lack of knowledge of the practical effects of public financing”); see also id. at 97 n. 131, 96 S.Ct. 612 (declining to “rule out the possibility of concluding in some future case, upon an appropriate factual demonstration, that the public financing system invidiously discriminates against nonmajor parties” (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to \"rule out the possibility of concluding in some future case, upon an appropriate factual demonstration, that the public financing system invidiously discriminates against nonmajor parties\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See id. at 101, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding the system in part because “[a]ny risk of harm to minority interests is speculative due to [a general] lack of knowledge of the practical effects of public financing”); see also id. at 97 n. 131, 96 S.Ct. 612 (declining to “rule out the possibility of concluding in some future case, upon an appropriate factual demonstration, that the public financing system invidiously discriminates against nonmajor parties” (emphasis added))."
} | 6,049,648 | a |
Even if the jury's punitive damages award could not withstand due process review, if only "proportionality" and "reprehensibility" were considered, the jury's award does withstand due process scrutiny when "deterrence" is considered. The jury's punitive damages award is appropriate to deter a company of the size and with the financial resources of ASARCO from similar conduct in the future, particularly in a case in which there is evidence that ASARCO is a serial violator of antidiscrimination laws. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "540 F.3d 1122, 1122",
"parenthetical": "considering, in a constitutional excessiveness analysis, whether a small award would be \"sufficient to deter other [defendants] from engaging in similar conduct in the future\"",
"sentence": "See Mendez, 540 F.3d at 1122 (considering, in a constitutional excessiveness analysis, whether a small award would be “sufficient to deter other [defendants] from engaging in similar conduct in the future”); see also Bains, 405 F.3d at 775 (post-BMW case considering, in an excessiveness analysis, whether a jury could properly have concluded that the defendant failed to remedy or address the effects of discrimination, so that punitive damages were necessary to prevent such discrimination from occurring in the future)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "405 F.3d 775, 775",
"parenthetical": "post-BMW case considering, in an excessiveness analysis, whether a jury could properly have concluded that the defendant failed to remedy or address the effects of discrimination, so that punitive damages were necessary to prevent such discrimination from occurring in the future",
"sentence": "See Mendez, 540 F.3d at 1122 (considering, in a constitutional excessiveness analysis, whether a small award would be “sufficient to deter other [defendants] from engaging in similar conduct in the future”); see also Bains, 405 F.3d at 775 (post-BMW case considering, in an excessiveness analysis, whether a jury could properly have concluded that the defendant failed to remedy or address the effects of discrimination, so that punitive damages were necessary to prevent such discrimination from occurring in the future)."
} | 4,258,667 | a |
Since the jury chosen was not sworn, jeopardy had not yet attached. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that, for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn",
"sentence": "See Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 83 S.Ct. 1033, 10 L.Ed.2d 100 (1963) (concluding that, for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn); see also Proctor v. State, 841 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (concluding that for purposes of the federal constitution and the state constitution, jeopardy attaches at the time the jury is sworn). Because jeopardy had not attached at the time the trial judge dismissed the jury, appellant is left to claim harm through a denial of due process for purposes of his federal constitution claim and denial of due course of law for purposes of his state constitutional claim."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "841 S.W.2d 1, 4",
"parenthetical": "concluding that for purposes of the federal constitution and the state constitution, jeopardy attaches at the time the jury is sworn",
"sentence": "See Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 83 S.Ct. 1033, 10 L.Ed.2d 100 (1963) (concluding that, for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn); see also Proctor v. State, 841 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (concluding that for purposes of the federal constitution and the state constitution, jeopardy attaches at the time the jury is sworn). Because jeopardy had not attached at the time the trial judge dismissed the jury, appellant is left to claim harm through a denial of due process for purposes of his federal constitution claim and denial of due course of law for purposes of his state constitutional claim."
} | 7,301,602 | a |
Since the jury chosen was not sworn, jeopardy had not yet attached. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "841 S.W.2d 1, 4",
"parenthetical": "concluding that for purposes of the federal constitution and the state constitution, jeopardy attaches at the time the jury is sworn",
"sentence": "See Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 83 S.Ct. 1033, 10 L.Ed.2d 100 (1963) (concluding that, for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn); see also Proctor v. State, 841 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (concluding that for purposes of the federal constitution and the state constitution, jeopardy attaches at the time the jury is sworn). Because jeopardy had not attached at the time the trial judge dismissed the jury, appellant is left to claim harm through a denial of due process for purposes of his federal constitution claim and denial of due course of law for purposes of his state constitutional claim."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that, for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn",
"sentence": "See Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 83 S.Ct. 1033, 10 L.Ed.2d 100 (1963) (concluding that, for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn); see also Proctor v. State, 841 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (concluding that for purposes of the federal constitution and the state constitution, jeopardy attaches at the time the jury is sworn). Because jeopardy had not attached at the time the trial judge dismissed the jury, appellant is left to claim harm through a denial of due process for purposes of his federal constitution claim and denial of due course of law for purposes of his state constitutional claim."
} | 7,301,602 | b |
Since the jury chosen was not sworn, jeopardy had not yet attached. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "841 S.W.2d 1, 4",
"parenthetical": "concluding that for purposes of the federal constitution and the state constitution, jeopardy attaches at the time the jury is sworn",
"sentence": "See Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 83 S.Ct. 1033, 10 L.Ed.2d 100 (1963) (concluding that, for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn); see also Proctor v. State, 841 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (concluding that for purposes of the federal constitution and the state constitution, jeopardy attaches at the time the jury is sworn). Because jeopardy had not attached at the time the trial judge dismissed the jury, appellant is left to claim harm through a denial of due process for purposes of his federal constitution claim and denial of due course of law for purposes of his state constitutional claim."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that, for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn",
"sentence": "See Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 83 S.Ct. 1033, 10 L.Ed.2d 100 (1963) (concluding that, for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn); see also Proctor v. State, 841 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (concluding that for purposes of the federal constitution and the state constitution, jeopardy attaches at the time the jury is sworn). Because jeopardy had not attached at the time the trial judge dismissed the jury, appellant is left to claim harm through a denial of due process for purposes of his federal constitution claim and denial of due course of law for purposes of his state constitutional claim."
} | 7,301,602 | b |
Seitz's] rights." The Supreme Court has held that qualified immunity attaches not only when the police officer acted reasonably and thus did not violate an established constitutional right, but also when he reasonably believed that his conduct did not violate that right. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force",
"sentence": "Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1967) (“The relevant question ... is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the officer’s warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The relevant question ... is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the officer's warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed.\"",
"sentence": "Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1967) (“The relevant question ... is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the officer’s warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force)."
} | 3,835,710 | b |
Seitz's] rights." The Supreme Court has held that qualified immunity attaches not only when the police officer acted reasonably and thus did not violate an established constitutional right, but also when he reasonably believed that his conduct did not violate that right. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The relevant question ... is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the officer's warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed.\"",
"sentence": "Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1967) (“The relevant question ... is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the officer’s warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force",
"sentence": "Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1967) (“The relevant question ... is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the officer’s warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force)."
} | 3,835,710 | a |
Seitz's] rights." The Supreme Court has held that qualified immunity attaches not only when the police officer acted reasonably and thus did not violate an established constitutional right, but also when he reasonably believed that his conduct did not violate that right. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force",
"sentence": "Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1967) (“The relevant question ... is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the officer’s warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The relevant question ... is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the officer's warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed.\"",
"sentence": "Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1967) (“The relevant question ... is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the officer’s warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force)."
} | 3,835,710 | b |
Seitz's] rights." The Supreme Court has held that qualified immunity attaches not only when the police officer acted reasonably and thus did not violate an established constitutional right, but also when he reasonably believed that his conduct did not violate that right. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force",
"sentence": "Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1967) (“The relevant question ... is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the officer’s warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The relevant question ... is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the officer's warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed.\"",
"sentence": "Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1967) (“The relevant question ... is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the officer’s warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force)."
} | 3,835,710 | b |
Seitz's] rights." The Supreme Court has held that qualified immunity attaches not only when the police officer acted reasonably and thus did not violate an established constitutional right, but also when he reasonably believed that his conduct did not violate that right. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The relevant question ... is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the officer's warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed.\"",
"sentence": "Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1967) (“The relevant question ... is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the officer’s warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force",
"sentence": "Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1967) (“The relevant question ... is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the officer’s warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force)."
} | 3,835,710 | a |
Seitz's] rights." The Supreme Court has held that qualified immunity attaches not only when the police officer acted reasonably and thus did not violate an established constitutional right, but also when he reasonably believed that his conduct did not violate that right. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force",
"sentence": "Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1967) (“The relevant question ... is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the officer’s warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The relevant question ... is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the officer's warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed.\"",
"sentence": "Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1967) (“The relevant question ... is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the officer’s warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force)."
} | 3,835,710 | b |
Such a rule is not inconsistent with our prior decisions, which have never expressly addressed the question, but point in the same general direction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "801 F.2d 1080, 1102-03",
"parenthetical": "habeas not exclusive remedy where prisoners seek only to be moved from one location to another within a prison",
"sentence": "See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1102-03 (9th Cir.1986) (habeas not exclusive remedy where prisoners seek only to be moved from one location to another within a prison), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069, 107 S.Ct. 2462, 95 L.Ed.2d 871 (1987); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 682 (9th Cir.1984) (federal court may not rule on prisoner’s section 1983 claim where “[although he does not specifically request release, the finding of such declaratory relief in his favor would show that release was required”); Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, 812-14 (9th Cir.1974) (prisoner may bring section 1983 action to challenge disciplinary procedures having only “speculative and incidental effect” on length of sentence without first exhausting state remedies), modified, 510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.1975), rev’d on different grounds sub nom. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "881 F.2d 719, 720, 722",
"parenthetical": "permitting section 1983 suit for deprivation of good-time credits to proceed where plaintiff no longer serving prison sentence",
"sentence": "See also Bergen v. Spaulding, 881 F.2d 719, 720, 722 (9th Cir.1989) (permitting section 1983 suit for deprivation of good-time credits to proceed where plaintiff no longer serving prison sentence)."
} | 10,540,550 | a |
Such a rule is not inconsistent with our prior decisions, which have never expressly addressed the question, but point in the same general direction. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "881 F.2d 719, 720, 722",
"parenthetical": "permitting section 1983 suit for deprivation of good-time credits to proceed where plaintiff no longer serving prison sentence",
"sentence": "See also Bergen v. Spaulding, 881 F.2d 719, 720, 722 (9th Cir.1989) (permitting section 1983 suit for deprivation of good-time credits to proceed where plaintiff no longer serving prison sentence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "habeas not exclusive remedy where prisoners seek only to be moved from one location to another within a prison",
"sentence": "See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1102-03 (9th Cir.1986) (habeas not exclusive remedy where prisoners seek only to be moved from one location to another within a prison), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069, 107 S.Ct. 2462, 95 L.Ed.2d 871 (1987); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 682 (9th Cir.1984) (federal court may not rule on prisoner’s section 1983 claim where “[although he does not specifically request release, the finding of such declaratory relief in his favor would show that release was required”); Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, 812-14 (9th Cir.1974) (prisoner may bring section 1983 action to challenge disciplinary procedures having only “speculative and incidental effect” on length of sentence without first exhausting state remedies), modified, 510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.1975), rev’d on different grounds sub nom. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976)."
} | 10,540,550 | b |
Such a rule is not inconsistent with our prior decisions, which have never expressly addressed the question, but point in the same general direction. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "881 F.2d 719, 720, 722",
"parenthetical": "permitting section 1983 suit for deprivation of good-time credits to proceed where plaintiff no longer serving prison sentence",
"sentence": "See also Bergen v. Spaulding, 881 F.2d 719, 720, 722 (9th Cir.1989) (permitting section 1983 suit for deprivation of good-time credits to proceed where plaintiff no longer serving prison sentence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "habeas not exclusive remedy where prisoners seek only to be moved from one location to another within a prison",
"sentence": "See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1102-03 (9th Cir.1986) (habeas not exclusive remedy where prisoners seek only to be moved from one location to another within a prison), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069, 107 S.Ct. 2462, 95 L.Ed.2d 871 (1987); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 682 (9th Cir.1984) (federal court may not rule on prisoner’s section 1983 claim where “[although he does not specifically request release, the finding of such declaratory relief in his favor would show that release was required”); Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, 812-14 (9th Cir.1974) (prisoner may bring section 1983 action to challenge disciplinary procedures having only “speculative and incidental effect” on length of sentence without first exhausting state remedies), modified, 510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.1975), rev’d on different grounds sub nom. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976)."
} | 10,540,550 | b |
Such a rule is not inconsistent with our prior decisions, which have never expressly addressed the question, but point in the same general direction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "habeas not exclusive remedy where prisoners seek only to be moved from one location to another within a prison",
"sentence": "See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1102-03 (9th Cir.1986) (habeas not exclusive remedy where prisoners seek only to be moved from one location to another within a prison), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069, 107 S.Ct. 2462, 95 L.Ed.2d 871 (1987); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 682 (9th Cir.1984) (federal court may not rule on prisoner’s section 1983 claim where “[although he does not specifically request release, the finding of such declaratory relief in his favor would show that release was required”); Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, 812-14 (9th Cir.1974) (prisoner may bring section 1983 action to challenge disciplinary procedures having only “speculative and incidental effect” on length of sentence without first exhausting state remedies), modified, 510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.1975), rev’d on different grounds sub nom. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "881 F.2d 719, 720, 722",
"parenthetical": "permitting section 1983 suit for deprivation of good-time credits to proceed where plaintiff no longer serving prison sentence",
"sentence": "See also Bergen v. Spaulding, 881 F.2d 719, 720, 722 (9th Cir.1989) (permitting section 1983 suit for deprivation of good-time credits to proceed where plaintiff no longer serving prison sentence)."
} | 10,540,550 | a |
Such a rule is not inconsistent with our prior decisions, which have never expressly addressed the question, but point in the same general direction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "723 F.2d 675, 682",
"parenthetical": "federal court may not rule on prisoner's section 1983 claim where \"[although he does not specifically request release, the finding of such declaratory relief in his favor would show that release was required\"",
"sentence": "See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1102-03 (9th Cir.1986) (habeas not exclusive remedy where prisoners seek only to be moved from one location to another within a prison), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069, 107 S.Ct. 2462, 95 L.Ed.2d 871 (1987); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 682 (9th Cir.1984) (federal court may not rule on prisoner’s section 1983 claim where “[although he does not specifically request release, the finding of such declaratory relief in his favor would show that release was required”); Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, 812-14 (9th Cir.1974) (prisoner may bring section 1983 action to challenge disciplinary procedures having only “speculative and incidental effect” on length of sentence without first exhausting state remedies), modified, 510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.1975), rev’d on different grounds sub nom. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "881 F.2d 719, 720, 722",
"parenthetical": "permitting section 1983 suit for deprivation of good-time credits to proceed where plaintiff no longer serving prison sentence",
"sentence": "See also Bergen v. Spaulding, 881 F.2d 719, 720, 722 (9th Cir.1989) (permitting section 1983 suit for deprivation of good-time credits to proceed where plaintiff no longer serving prison sentence)."
} | 10,540,550 | a |
Such a rule is not inconsistent with our prior decisions, which have never expressly addressed the question, but point in the same general direction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "497 F.2d 809, 812-14",
"parenthetical": "prisoner may bring section 1983 action to challenge disciplinary procedures having only \"speculative and incidental effect\" on length of sentence without first exhausting state remedies",
"sentence": "See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1102-03 (9th Cir.1986) (habeas not exclusive remedy where prisoners seek only to be moved from one location to another within a prison), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069, 107 S.Ct. 2462, 95 L.Ed.2d 871 (1987); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 682 (9th Cir.1984) (federal court may not rule on prisoner’s section 1983 claim where “[although he does not specifically request release, the finding of such declaratory relief in his favor would show that release was required”); Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, 812-14 (9th Cir.1974) (prisoner may bring section 1983 action to challenge disciplinary procedures having only “speculative and incidental effect” on length of sentence without first exhausting state remedies), modified, 510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.1975), rev’d on different grounds sub nom. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "881 F.2d 719, 720, 722",
"parenthetical": "permitting section 1983 suit for deprivation of good-time credits to proceed where plaintiff no longer serving prison sentence",
"sentence": "See also Bergen v. Spaulding, 881 F.2d 719, 720, 722 (9th Cir.1989) (permitting section 1983 suit for deprivation of good-time credits to proceed where plaintiff no longer serving prison sentence)."
} | 10,540,550 | a |
Such a rule is not inconsistent with our prior decisions, which have never expressly addressed the question, but point in the same general direction. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "881 F.2d 719, 720, 722",
"parenthetical": "permitting section 1983 suit for deprivation of good-time credits to proceed where plaintiff no longer serving prison sentence",
"sentence": "See also Bergen v. Spaulding, 881 F.2d 719, 720, 722 (9th Cir.1989) (permitting section 1983 suit for deprivation of good-time credits to proceed where plaintiff no longer serving prison sentence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prisoner may bring section 1983 action to challenge disciplinary procedures having only \"speculative and incidental effect\" on length of sentence without first exhausting state remedies",
"sentence": "See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1102-03 (9th Cir.1986) (habeas not exclusive remedy where prisoners seek only to be moved from one location to another within a prison), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069, 107 S.Ct. 2462, 95 L.Ed.2d 871 (1987); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 682 (9th Cir.1984) (federal court may not rule on prisoner’s section 1983 claim where “[although he does not specifically request release, the finding of such declaratory relief in his favor would show that release was required”); Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, 812-14 (9th Cir.1974) (prisoner may bring section 1983 action to challenge disciplinary procedures having only “speculative and incidental effect” on length of sentence without first exhausting state remedies), modified, 510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.1975), rev’d on different grounds sub nom. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976)."
} | 10,540,550 | b |
Such a rule is not inconsistent with our prior decisions, which have never expressly addressed the question, but point in the same general direction. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "881 F.2d 719, 720, 722",
"parenthetical": "permitting section 1983 suit for deprivation of good-time credits to proceed where plaintiff no longer serving prison sentence",
"sentence": "See also Bergen v. Spaulding, 881 F.2d 719, 720, 722 (9th Cir.1989) (permitting section 1983 suit for deprivation of good-time credits to proceed where plaintiff no longer serving prison sentence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prisoner may bring section 1983 action to challenge disciplinary procedures having only \"speculative and incidental effect\" on length of sentence without first exhausting state remedies",
"sentence": "See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1102-03 (9th Cir.1986) (habeas not exclusive remedy where prisoners seek only to be moved from one location to another within a prison), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069, 107 S.Ct. 2462, 95 L.Ed.2d 871 (1987); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 682 (9th Cir.1984) (federal court may not rule on prisoner’s section 1983 claim where “[although he does not specifically request release, the finding of such declaratory relief in his favor would show that release was required”); Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, 812-14 (9th Cir.1974) (prisoner may bring section 1983 action to challenge disciplinary procedures having only “speculative and incidental effect” on length of sentence without first exhausting state remedies), modified, 510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.1975), rev’d on different grounds sub nom. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976)."
} | 10,540,550 | b |
Such a rule is not inconsistent with our prior decisions, which have never expressly addressed the question, but point in the same general direction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prisoner may bring section 1983 action to challenge disciplinary procedures having only \"speculative and incidental effect\" on length of sentence without first exhausting state remedies",
"sentence": "See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1102-03 (9th Cir.1986) (habeas not exclusive remedy where prisoners seek only to be moved from one location to another within a prison), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069, 107 S.Ct. 2462, 95 L.Ed.2d 871 (1987); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 682 (9th Cir.1984) (federal court may not rule on prisoner’s section 1983 claim where “[although he does not specifically request release, the finding of such declaratory relief in his favor would show that release was required”); Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, 812-14 (9th Cir.1974) (prisoner may bring section 1983 action to challenge disciplinary procedures having only “speculative and incidental effect” on length of sentence without first exhausting state remedies), modified, 510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.1975), rev’d on different grounds sub nom. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "881 F.2d 719, 720, 722",
"parenthetical": "permitting section 1983 suit for deprivation of good-time credits to proceed where plaintiff no longer serving prison sentence",
"sentence": "See also Bergen v. Spaulding, 881 F.2d 719, 720, 722 (9th Cir.1989) (permitting section 1983 suit for deprivation of good-time credits to proceed where plaintiff no longer serving prison sentence)."
} | 10,540,550 | a |
Such a rule is not inconsistent with our prior decisions, which have never expressly addressed the question, but point in the same general direction. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "881 F.2d 719, 720, 722",
"parenthetical": "permitting section 1983 suit for deprivation of good-time credits to proceed where plaintiff no longer serving prison sentence",
"sentence": "See also Bergen v. Spaulding, 881 F.2d 719, 720, 722 (9th Cir.1989) (permitting section 1983 suit for deprivation of good-time credits to proceed where plaintiff no longer serving prison sentence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prisoner may bring section 1983 action to challenge disciplinary procedures having only \"speculative and incidental effect\" on length of sentence without first exhausting state remedies",
"sentence": "See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1102-03 (9th Cir.1986) (habeas not exclusive remedy where prisoners seek only to be moved from one location to another within a prison), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069, 107 S.Ct. 2462, 95 L.Ed.2d 871 (1987); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 682 (9th Cir.1984) (federal court may not rule on prisoner’s section 1983 claim where “[although he does not specifically request release, the finding of such declaratory relief in his favor would show that release was required”); Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, 812-14 (9th Cir.1974) (prisoner may bring section 1983 action to challenge disciplinary procedures having only “speculative and incidental effect” on length of sentence without first exhausting state remedies), modified, 510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.1975), rev’d on different grounds sub nom. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976)."
} | 10,540,550 | b |
Although Ruth is not named as a party in the suit, contestants point to Ruth's presence and gifts of a bible and wheelchair to Estha from Ruth and Cook shortly before the execution of the will and codicil as evidence of some influence. As to Schreiner, contestants allege that the visits from the college development officer beginning in 1994 constituted an undue influence over Estha who was 98 years old at the tune, lonely, isolated, and plagued with physical infirmities. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "390 S.W.2d 47, 47",
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that in the absence of facts showing a weak mind, no evidence existed that the seventy-seven year old testator succumbed to undue influence",
"sentence": "See Green, 840 S.W.2d at 122 (recognizing that factors such as physical and mental condition of the maker of the instrument at the time of its execution, including age, any weakness or infirmity are probative evidence of undue influence); but see Garza, 390 S.W.2d at 47 (acknowledging that in the absence of facts showing a weak mind, no evidence existed that the seventy-seven year old testator succumbed to undue influence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "840 S.W.2d 122, 122",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that factors such as physical and mental condition of the maker of the instrument at the time of its execution, including age, any weakness or infirmity are probative evidence of undue influence",
"sentence": "See Green, 840 S.W.2d at 122 (recognizing that factors such as physical and mental condition of the maker of the instrument at the time of its execution, including age, any weakness or infirmity are probative evidence of undue influence); but see Garza, 390 S.W.2d at 47 (acknowledging that in the absence of facts showing a weak mind, no evidence existed that the seventy-seven year old testator succumbed to undue influence)."
} | 11,488,813 | b |
The plain language of section 669.4 limits waiver of Iowa's sovereign immunity to lawsuits brought in Iowa state courts. It is important to note that the Supreme Court recognized in Feeney that a state can create a limited waiver of this immunity by consenting to be sued in its own state courts without waiving its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal courts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"States have real and vital interests in preferring their own forum [over a federal forum] in suits brought against them, interests that ought not to be disregarded based upon a waiver [of immunity in the state forum]\"",
"sentence": "Feeney, 495 U.S. at 306, 110 S.Ct. 1868 (“A State does not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by consenting to suit only in its own courts,” quoting Florida Dep’t of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. 147, 150, 101 S.Ct. 1032, 67 L.Ed.2d 132 (1981)); Welch v. Texas Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 473-74, 107 S.Ct. 2941, 97 L.Ed.2d 389 (1987) (noting that state does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal courts merely by waiving sovereign immu nity in state court); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (noting that Court has consistently held that state’s waiver of sovereign immunity in state courts is not waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal courts); In re Secretary of Dep’t of Crime Control and Public Safety, 7 F.3d 1140, 1147 (4th Cir.1993) (quoting Feeney, 495 U.S. at 305-06, 110 S.Ct. 1868), cert. denied sub nom. Barfield v. Secretary, North Carolina Dep’t of Crime Control, 511 U.S. 1109, 114 S.Ct. 2106, 128 L.Ed.2d 667 (1994); Harrison v. Hickel, 6 F.3d 1347, 1354 (9th Cir.1993) (quoting Feeney, 495 U.S. at 305-06, 110 S.Ct. 1868); Kroll v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 934 F.2d 904, 910 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 941, 112 S.Ct. 377, 116 L.Ed.2d 329 (1991); Riggle v. California, 577 F.2d 579, 585 (9th Cir.1978) (“A state may waive immunity from suit in its own courts without thereby waiving its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal courts.”); see also Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 2036, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997) (“States have real and vital interests in preferring their own forum [over a federal forum] in suits brought against them, interests that ought not to be disregarded based upon a waiver [of immunity in the state forum]”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "483 U.S. 468, 473-74",
"parenthetical": "noting that state does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal courts merely by waiving sovereign immu nity in state court",
"sentence": "Feeney, 495 U.S. at 306, 110 S.Ct. 1868 (“A State does not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by consenting to suit only in its own courts,” quoting Florida Dep’t of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. 147, 150, 101 S.Ct. 1032, 67 L.Ed.2d 132 (1981)); Welch v. Texas Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 473-74, 107 S.Ct. 2941, 97 L.Ed.2d 389 (1987) (noting that state does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal courts merely by waiving sovereign immu nity in state court); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (noting that Court has consistently held that state’s waiver of sovereign immunity in state courts is not waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal courts); In re Secretary of Dep’t of Crime Control and Public Safety, 7 F.3d 1140, 1147 (4th Cir.1993) (quoting Feeney, 495 U.S. at 305-06, 110 S.Ct. 1868), cert. denied sub nom. Barfield v. Secretary, North Carolina Dep’t of Crime Control, 511 U.S. 1109, 114 S.Ct. 2106, 128 L.Ed.2d 667 (1994); Harrison v. Hickel, 6 F.3d 1347, 1354 (9th Cir.1993) (quoting Feeney, 495 U.S. at 305-06, 110 S.Ct. 1868); Kroll v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 934 F.2d 904, 910 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 941, 112 S.Ct. 377, 116 L.Ed.2d 329 (1991); Riggle v. California, 577 F.2d 579, 585 (9th Cir.1978) (“A state may waive immunity from suit in its own courts without thereby waiving its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal courts.”); see also Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 2036, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997) (“States have real and vital interests in preferring their own forum [over a federal forum] in suits brought against them, interests that ought not to be disregarded based upon a waiver [of immunity in the state forum]”)."
} | 9,133,490 | b |
The plain language of section 669.4 limits waiver of Iowa's sovereign immunity to lawsuits brought in Iowa state courts. It is important to note that the Supreme Court recognized in Feeney that a state can create a limited waiver of this immunity by consenting to be sued in its own state courts without waiving its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal courts. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "483 U.S. 468, 473-74",
"parenthetical": "noting that state does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal courts merely by waiving sovereign immu nity in state court",
"sentence": "Feeney, 495 U.S. at 306, 110 S.Ct. 1868 (“A State does not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by consenting to suit only in its own courts,” quoting Florida Dep’t of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. 147, 150, 101 S.Ct. 1032, 67 L.Ed.2d 132 (1981)); Welch v. Texas Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 473-74, 107 S.Ct. 2941, 97 L.Ed.2d 389 (1987) (noting that state does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal courts merely by waiving sovereign immu nity in state court); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (noting that Court has consistently held that state’s waiver of sovereign immunity in state courts is not waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal courts); In re Secretary of Dep’t of Crime Control and Public Safety, 7 F.3d 1140, 1147 (4th Cir.1993) (quoting Feeney, 495 U.S. at 305-06, 110 S.Ct. 1868), cert. denied sub nom. Barfield v. Secretary, North Carolina Dep’t of Crime Control, 511 U.S. 1109, 114 S.Ct. 2106, 128 L.Ed.2d 667 (1994); Harrison v. Hickel, 6 F.3d 1347, 1354 (9th Cir.1993) (quoting Feeney, 495 U.S. at 305-06, 110 S.Ct. 1868); Kroll v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 934 F.2d 904, 910 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 941, 112 S.Ct. 377, 116 L.Ed.2d 329 (1991); Riggle v. California, 577 F.2d 579, 585 (9th Cir.1978) (“A state may waive immunity from suit in its own courts without thereby waiving its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal courts.”); see also Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 2036, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997) (“States have real and vital interests in preferring their own forum [over a federal forum] in suits brought against them, interests that ought not to be disregarded based upon a waiver [of immunity in the state forum]”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "117 S.Ct. 2028, 2036",
"parenthetical": "\"States have real and vital interests in preferring their own forum [over a federal forum] in suits brought against them, interests that ought not to be disregarded based upon a waiver [of immunity in the state forum]\"",
"sentence": "Feeney, 495 U.S. at 306, 110 S.Ct. 1868 (“A State does not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by consenting to suit only in its own courts,” quoting Florida Dep’t of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. 147, 150, 101 S.Ct. 1032, 67 L.Ed.2d 132 (1981)); Welch v. Texas Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 473-74, 107 S.Ct. 2941, 97 L.Ed.2d 389 (1987) (noting that state does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal courts merely by waiving sovereign immu nity in state court); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (noting that Court has consistently held that state’s waiver of sovereign immunity in state courts is not waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal courts); In re Secretary of Dep’t of Crime Control and Public Safety, 7 F.3d 1140, 1147 (4th Cir.1993) (quoting Feeney, 495 U.S. at 305-06, 110 S.Ct. 1868), cert. denied sub nom. Barfield v. Secretary, North Carolina Dep’t of Crime Control, 511 U.S. 1109, 114 S.Ct. 2106, 128 L.Ed.2d 667 (1994); Harrison v. Hickel, 6 F.3d 1347, 1354 (9th Cir.1993) (quoting Feeney, 495 U.S. at 305-06, 110 S.Ct. 1868); Kroll v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 934 F.2d 904, 910 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 941, 112 S.Ct. 377, 116 L.Ed.2d 329 (1991); Riggle v. California, 577 F.2d 579, 585 (9th Cir.1978) (“A state may waive immunity from suit in its own courts without thereby waiving its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal courts.”); see also Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 2036, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997) (“States have real and vital interests in preferring their own forum [over a federal forum] in suits brought against them, interests that ought not to be disregarded based upon a waiver [of immunity in the state forum]”)."
} | 9,133,490 | a |
The plain language of section 669.4 limits waiver of Iowa's sovereign immunity to lawsuits brought in Iowa state courts. It is important to note that the Supreme Court recognized in Feeney that a state can create a limited waiver of this immunity by consenting to be sued in its own state courts without waiving its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal courts. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "483 U.S. 468, 473-74",
"parenthetical": "noting that state does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal courts merely by waiving sovereign immu nity in state court",
"sentence": "Feeney, 495 U.S. at 306, 110 S.Ct. 1868 (“A State does not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by consenting to suit only in its own courts,” quoting Florida Dep’t of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. 147, 150, 101 S.Ct. 1032, 67 L.Ed.2d 132 (1981)); Welch v. Texas Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 473-74, 107 S.Ct. 2941, 97 L.Ed.2d 389 (1987) (noting that state does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal courts merely by waiving sovereign immu nity in state court); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (noting that Court has consistently held that state’s waiver of sovereign immunity in state courts is not waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal courts); In re Secretary of Dep’t of Crime Control and Public Safety, 7 F.3d 1140, 1147 (4th Cir.1993) (quoting Feeney, 495 U.S. at 305-06, 110 S.Ct. 1868), cert. denied sub nom. Barfield v. Secretary, North Carolina Dep’t of Crime Control, 511 U.S. 1109, 114 S.Ct. 2106, 128 L.Ed.2d 667 (1994); Harrison v. Hickel, 6 F.3d 1347, 1354 (9th Cir.1993) (quoting Feeney, 495 U.S. at 305-06, 110 S.Ct. 1868); Kroll v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 934 F.2d 904, 910 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 941, 112 S.Ct. 377, 116 L.Ed.2d 329 (1991); Riggle v. California, 577 F.2d 579, 585 (9th Cir.1978) (“A state may waive immunity from suit in its own courts without thereby waiving its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal courts.”); see also Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 2036, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997) (“States have real and vital interests in preferring their own forum [over a federal forum] in suits brought against them, interests that ought not to be disregarded based upon a waiver [of immunity in the state forum]”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"States have real and vital interests in preferring their own forum [over a federal forum] in suits brought against them, interests that ought not to be disregarded based upon a waiver [of immunity in the state forum]\"",
"sentence": "Feeney, 495 U.S. at 306, 110 S.Ct. 1868 (“A State does not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by consenting to suit only in its own courts,” quoting Florida Dep’t of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. 147, 150, 101 S.Ct. 1032, 67 L.Ed.2d 132 (1981)); Welch v. Texas Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 473-74, 107 S.Ct. 2941, 97 L.Ed.2d 389 (1987) (noting that state does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal courts merely by waiving sovereign immu nity in state court); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (noting that Court has consistently held that state’s waiver of sovereign immunity in state courts is not waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal courts); In re Secretary of Dep’t of Crime Control and Public Safety, 7 F.3d 1140, 1147 (4th Cir.1993) (quoting Feeney, 495 U.S. at 305-06, 110 S.Ct. 1868), cert. denied sub nom. Barfield v. Secretary, North Carolina Dep’t of Crime Control, 511 U.S. 1109, 114 S.Ct. 2106, 128 L.Ed.2d 667 (1994); Harrison v. Hickel, 6 F.3d 1347, 1354 (9th Cir.1993) (quoting Feeney, 495 U.S. at 305-06, 110 S.Ct. 1868); Kroll v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 934 F.2d 904, 910 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 941, 112 S.Ct. 377, 116 L.Ed.2d 329 (1991); Riggle v. California, 577 F.2d 579, 585 (9th Cir.1978) (“A state may waive immunity from suit in its own courts without thereby waiving its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal courts.”); see also Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 2036, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997) (“States have real and vital interests in preferring their own forum [over a federal forum] in suits brought against them, interests that ought not to be disregarded based upon a waiver [of immunity in the state forum]”)."
} | 9,133,490 | a |
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