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The federal government's immunity from state and local taxation is based upon the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. Art. VI, el. 2, and is therefore absolute. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "958 F.2d 555, 558",
"parenthetical": "noting that the Supreme Court has adopted a broad reading of \"the Supremacy Clause, viewing all state taxes on federal entities as insults to national sovereignty and impermissible burdens on federal operations\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Delaware, 958 F.2d 555, 558 (3d Cir.1992) (noting that the Supreme Court has adopted a broad reading of “the Supremacy Clause, viewing all state taxes on federal entities as insults to national sovereignty and impermissible burdens on federal operations”); see also United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 733, 102 S.Ct. 1373, 71 L.Ed.2d 580 (1982) (noting that “the Court has never questioned the propriety of absolute federal immunity from state taxation”); United States v. City of Columbia, 914 F.2d 151, 153 (8th Cir.1990) (“Unlike the states’ immunity from federal taxation, which is somewhat limited, the United States’ immunity from state taxation is a ‘blanket immunity.’ ”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the Court has never questioned the propriety of absolute federal immunity from state taxation\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Delaware, 958 F.2d 555, 558 (3d Cir.1992) (noting that the Supreme Court has adopted a broad reading of “the Supremacy Clause, viewing all state taxes on federal entities as insults to national sovereignty and impermissible burdens on federal operations”); see also United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 733, 102 S.Ct. 1373, 71 L.Ed.2d 580 (1982) (noting that “the Court has never questioned the propriety of absolute federal immunity from state taxation”); United States v. City of Columbia, 914 F.2d 151, 153 (8th Cir.1990) (“Unlike the states’ immunity from federal taxation, which is somewhat limited, the United States’ immunity from state taxation is a ‘blanket immunity.’ ”) (citation omitted)."
} | 4,124,920 | a |
The federal government's immunity from state and local taxation is based upon the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. Art. VI, el. 2, and is therefore absolute. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the Court has never questioned the propriety of absolute federal immunity from state taxation\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Delaware, 958 F.2d 555, 558 (3d Cir.1992) (noting that the Supreme Court has adopted a broad reading of “the Supremacy Clause, viewing all state taxes on federal entities as insults to national sovereignty and impermissible burdens on federal operations”); see also United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 733, 102 S.Ct. 1373, 71 L.Ed.2d 580 (1982) (noting that “the Court has never questioned the propriety of absolute federal immunity from state taxation”); United States v. City of Columbia, 914 F.2d 151, 153 (8th Cir.1990) (“Unlike the states’ immunity from federal taxation, which is somewhat limited, the United States’ immunity from state taxation is a ‘blanket immunity.’ ”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "958 F.2d 555, 558",
"parenthetical": "noting that the Supreme Court has adopted a broad reading of \"the Supremacy Clause, viewing all state taxes on federal entities as insults to national sovereignty and impermissible burdens on federal operations\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Delaware, 958 F.2d 555, 558 (3d Cir.1992) (noting that the Supreme Court has adopted a broad reading of “the Supremacy Clause, viewing all state taxes on federal entities as insults to national sovereignty and impermissible burdens on federal operations”); see also United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 733, 102 S.Ct. 1373, 71 L.Ed.2d 580 (1982) (noting that “the Court has never questioned the propriety of absolute federal immunity from state taxation”); United States v. City of Columbia, 914 F.2d 151, 153 (8th Cir.1990) (“Unlike the states’ immunity from federal taxation, which is somewhat limited, the United States’ immunity from state taxation is a ‘blanket immunity.’ ”) (citation omitted)."
} | 4,124,920 | b |
The federal government's immunity from state and local taxation is based upon the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. Art. VI, el. 2, and is therefore absolute. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "914 F.2d 151, 153",
"parenthetical": "\"Unlike the states' immunity from federal taxation, which is somewhat limited, the United States' immunity from state taxation is a 'blanket immunity.' \"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Delaware, 958 F.2d 555, 558 (3d Cir.1992) (noting that the Supreme Court has adopted a broad reading of “the Supremacy Clause, viewing all state taxes on federal entities as insults to national sovereignty and impermissible burdens on federal operations”); see also United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 733, 102 S.Ct. 1373, 71 L.Ed.2d 580 (1982) (noting that “the Court has never questioned the propriety of absolute federal immunity from state taxation”); United States v. City of Columbia, 914 F.2d 151, 153 (8th Cir.1990) (“Unlike the states’ immunity from federal taxation, which is somewhat limited, the United States’ immunity from state taxation is a ‘blanket immunity.’ ”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "958 F.2d 555, 558",
"parenthetical": "noting that the Supreme Court has adopted a broad reading of \"the Supremacy Clause, viewing all state taxes on federal entities as insults to national sovereignty and impermissible burdens on federal operations\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Delaware, 958 F.2d 555, 558 (3d Cir.1992) (noting that the Supreme Court has adopted a broad reading of “the Supremacy Clause, viewing all state taxes on federal entities as insults to national sovereignty and impermissible burdens on federal operations”); see also United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 733, 102 S.Ct. 1373, 71 L.Ed.2d 580 (1982) (noting that “the Court has never questioned the propriety of absolute federal immunity from state taxation”); United States v. City of Columbia, 914 F.2d 151, 153 (8th Cir.1990) (“Unlike the states’ immunity from federal taxation, which is somewhat limited, the United States’ immunity from state taxation is a ‘blanket immunity.’ ”) (citation omitted)."
} | 4,124,920 | b |
The extent to which the benefits administrator must exercise discretion in the discharge of his duties is likewise a significant factor in determining a question of ERISA preemption because it is indicative of the complexity of the benefit program. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "251 F.3d 267, 267",
"parenthetical": "\"The determination of what constitutes an ERISA plan thus turns most often on the degree of an employer's discretion in administering the plan.\"",
"sentence": "See O’Connor, 251 F.3d at 267 (“The determination of what constitutes an ERISA plan thus turns most often on the degree of an employer’s discretion in administering the plan.”); Bogue, 976 F.2d at 1323 (ruling that a plan requiring “case-by-case, discretionary application” of the terms required an administrative scheme, and thus brought the benefits plan within the scope of ERISA even though the term of the employer’s obligation to pay was short and the number of participants was small); see also Rodowicz, 192 F.3d at 171; Belanger, 71 F.3d at 455 (holding benefit program that entailed a “purely mechanical determination of eligibility” and did not require any discretionary judgment on the part of the administrator was not an ERISA plan)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "71 F.3d 455, 455",
"parenthetical": "holding benefit program that entailed a \"purely mechanical determination of eligibility\" and did not require any discretionary judgment on the part of the administrator was not an ERISA plan",
"sentence": "See O’Connor, 251 F.3d at 267 (“The determination of what constitutes an ERISA plan thus turns most often on the degree of an employer’s discretion in administering the plan.”); Bogue, 976 F.2d at 1323 (ruling that a plan requiring “case-by-case, discretionary application” of the terms required an administrative scheme, and thus brought the benefits plan within the scope of ERISA even though the term of the employer’s obligation to pay was short and the number of participants was small); see also Rodowicz, 192 F.3d at 171; Belanger, 71 F.3d at 455 (holding benefit program that entailed a “purely mechanical determination of eligibility” and did not require any discretionary judgment on the part of the administrator was not an ERISA plan)."
} | 908,155 | a |
The extent to which the benefits administrator must exercise discretion in the discharge of his duties is likewise a significant factor in determining a question of ERISA preemption because it is indicative of the complexity of the benefit program. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "71 F.3d 455, 455",
"parenthetical": "holding benefit program that entailed a \"purely mechanical determination of eligibility\" and did not require any discretionary judgment on the part of the administrator was not an ERISA plan",
"sentence": "See O’Connor, 251 F.3d at 267 (“The determination of what constitutes an ERISA plan thus turns most often on the degree of an employer’s discretion in administering the plan.”); Bogue, 976 F.2d at 1323 (ruling that a plan requiring “case-by-case, discretionary application” of the terms required an administrative scheme, and thus brought the benefits plan within the scope of ERISA even though the term of the employer’s obligation to pay was short and the number of participants was small); see also Rodowicz, 192 F.3d at 171; Belanger, 71 F.3d at 455 (holding benefit program that entailed a “purely mechanical determination of eligibility” and did not require any discretionary judgment on the part of the administrator was not an ERISA plan)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "976 F.2d 1323, 1323",
"parenthetical": "ruling that a plan requiring \"case-by-case, discretionary application\" of the terms required an administrative scheme, and thus brought the benefits plan within the scope of ERISA even though the term of the employer's obligation to pay was short and the number of participants was small",
"sentence": "See O’Connor, 251 F.3d at 267 (“The determination of what constitutes an ERISA plan thus turns most often on the degree of an employer’s discretion in administering the plan.”); Bogue, 976 F.2d at 1323 (ruling that a plan requiring “case-by-case, discretionary application” of the terms required an administrative scheme, and thus brought the benefits plan within the scope of ERISA even though the term of the employer’s obligation to pay was short and the number of participants was small); see also Rodowicz, 192 F.3d at 171; Belanger, 71 F.3d at 455 (holding benefit program that entailed a “purely mechanical determination of eligibility” and did not require any discretionary judgment on the part of the administrator was not an ERISA plan)."
} | 908,155 | b |
Such a threat is considered especially substantial when the administrative agency "ha[s] not disavowed enforcement if [the plaintiffs] make similar statements in the future." Moreover, the threat need not stem from a criminal action: "[A]dminis-trative action, like arrest or prosecution, may give rise to harm sufficient to justify pre-enforcement review." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "134 S.Ct. 2345, 2345",
"parenthetical": "noting that the threat of administrative proceedings was \"a substantial one\" but declining to \"decide whether that threat standing alone gives rise to an Article III injury\"",
"sentence": "SBA List, 134 S.Ct. at 2345 (noting that the threat of administrative proceedings was “a substantial one” but declining to “decide whether that threat standing alone gives rise to an Article III injury”); see also Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schs., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 625-26 n. 1, 106 S.Ct. 2718, 91 L.Ed.2d 512 (1986) (“If a reasonable threat of prosecution creates a ripe controversy, we fail to see how the actual filing of the administrative action threatening sanctions in this case does not.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"If a reasonable threat of prosecution creates a ripe controversy, we fail to see how the actual filing of the administrative action threatening sanctions in this case does not.\"",
"sentence": "SBA List, 134 S.Ct. at 2345 (noting that the threat of administrative proceedings was “a substantial one” but declining to “decide whether that threat standing alone gives rise to an Article III injury”); see also Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schs., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 625-26 n. 1, 106 S.Ct. 2718, 91 L.Ed.2d 512 (1986) (“If a reasonable threat of prosecution creates a ripe controversy, we fail to see how the actual filing of the administrative action threatening sanctions in this case does not.”)."
} | 4,184,610 | a |
Such a threat is considered especially substantial when the administrative agency "ha[s] not disavowed enforcement if [the plaintiffs] make similar statements in the future." Moreover, the threat need not stem from a criminal action: "[A]dminis-trative action, like arrest or prosecution, may give rise to harm sufficient to justify pre-enforcement review." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "134 S.Ct. 2345, 2345",
"parenthetical": "noting that the threat of administrative proceedings was \"a substantial one\" but declining to \"decide whether that threat standing alone gives rise to an Article III injury\"",
"sentence": "SBA List, 134 S.Ct. at 2345 (noting that the threat of administrative proceedings was “a substantial one” but declining to “decide whether that threat standing alone gives rise to an Article III injury”); see also Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schs., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 625-26 n. 1, 106 S.Ct. 2718, 91 L.Ed.2d 512 (1986) (“If a reasonable threat of prosecution creates a ripe controversy, we fail to see how the actual filing of the administrative action threatening sanctions in this case does not.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"If a reasonable threat of prosecution creates a ripe controversy, we fail to see how the actual filing of the administrative action threatening sanctions in this case does not.\"",
"sentence": "SBA List, 134 S.Ct. at 2345 (noting that the threat of administrative proceedings was “a substantial one” but declining to “decide whether that threat standing alone gives rise to an Article III injury”); see also Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schs., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 625-26 n. 1, 106 S.Ct. 2718, 91 L.Ed.2d 512 (1986) (“If a reasonable threat of prosecution creates a ripe controversy, we fail to see how the actual filing of the administrative action threatening sanctions in this case does not.”)."
} | 4,184,610 | a |
Such a threat is considered especially substantial when the administrative agency "ha[s] not disavowed enforcement if [the plaintiffs] make similar statements in the future." Moreover, the threat need not stem from a criminal action: "[A]dminis-trative action, like arrest or prosecution, may give rise to harm sufficient to justify pre-enforcement review." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"If a reasonable threat of prosecution creates a ripe controversy, we fail to see how the actual filing of the administrative action threatening sanctions in this case does not.\"",
"sentence": "SBA List, 134 S.Ct. at 2345 (noting that the threat of administrative proceedings was “a substantial one” but declining to “decide whether that threat standing alone gives rise to an Article III injury”); see also Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schs., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 625-26 n. 1, 106 S.Ct. 2718, 91 L.Ed.2d 512 (1986) (“If a reasonable threat of prosecution creates a ripe controversy, we fail to see how the actual filing of the administrative action threatening sanctions in this case does not.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "134 S.Ct. 2345, 2345",
"parenthetical": "noting that the threat of administrative proceedings was \"a substantial one\" but declining to \"decide whether that threat standing alone gives rise to an Article III injury\"",
"sentence": "SBA List, 134 S.Ct. at 2345 (noting that the threat of administrative proceedings was “a substantial one” but declining to “decide whether that threat standing alone gives rise to an Article III injury”); see also Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schs., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 625-26 n. 1, 106 S.Ct. 2718, 91 L.Ed.2d 512 (1986) (“If a reasonable threat of prosecution creates a ripe controversy, we fail to see how the actual filing of the administrative action threatening sanctions in this case does not.”)."
} | 4,184,610 | b |
Many courts have used the rationale of Lockett to uphold prosecutorial comment on the lack of evidence supporting a defendant's theory of the case when the defendant does not testify. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "706 F.2d 161, 166",
"parenthetical": "prosecutor's remarks that government's evidence was uncontra-dicted reversible error where only defendant could have testified to contrary",
"sentence": "But see Raper v. Mintzes, 706 F.2d 161, 166 (6th Cir.1983) (prosecutor’s remarks that government’s evidence was uncontra-dicted reversible error where only defendant could have testified to contrary). Other decisions have upheld the propriety of such remarks under similar reasoning."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "890 F.2d 1233, 1241-42",
"parenthetical": "prosecutor's comments not improper if invited by defense counsel's argument",
"sentence": "See United States v. Burnett, 890 F.2d 1233, 1241-42 (D.C.Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments not improper if invited by defense counsel’s argument); United States v. Percy, 765 F.2d 1199, 1204 (4th Cir.1985) (prosecutor’s characterization of state’s evidence as “unrefuted and unrebutted” not error); Bontempo v. Fenton, 692 F.2d 954, 958-59 (3d Cir.1982) (prosecutor’s comments on absence of facts in record supporting defendant’s theory not violative), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1055, 103 S.Ct. 1506, 75 L.Ed.2d 935 (1983); Butler v. Rose, 686 F.2d 1163, 1171-72 (6th Cir.1982) (prosecutorial commentary not error where defense counsel told jury he expected defendant to give exculpatory testimony)."
} | 10,508,456 | b |
Many courts have used the rationale of Lockett to uphold prosecutorial comment on the lack of evidence supporting a defendant's theory of the case when the defendant does not testify. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "706 F.2d 161, 166",
"parenthetical": "prosecutor's remarks that government's evidence was uncontra-dicted reversible error where only defendant could have testified to contrary",
"sentence": "But see Raper v. Mintzes, 706 F.2d 161, 166 (6th Cir.1983) (prosecutor’s remarks that government’s evidence was uncontra-dicted reversible error where only defendant could have testified to contrary). Other decisions have upheld the propriety of such remarks under similar reasoning."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "765 F.2d 1199, 1204",
"parenthetical": "prosecutor's characterization of state's evidence as \"unrefuted and unrebutted\" not error",
"sentence": "See United States v. Burnett, 890 F.2d 1233, 1241-42 (D.C.Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments not improper if invited by defense counsel’s argument); United States v. Percy, 765 F.2d 1199, 1204 (4th Cir.1985) (prosecutor’s characterization of state’s evidence as “unrefuted and unrebutted” not error); Bontempo v. Fenton, 692 F.2d 954, 958-59 (3d Cir.1982) (prosecutor’s comments on absence of facts in record supporting defendant’s theory not violative), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1055, 103 S.Ct. 1506, 75 L.Ed.2d 935 (1983); Butler v. Rose, 686 F.2d 1163, 1171-72 (6th Cir.1982) (prosecutorial commentary not error where defense counsel told jury he expected defendant to give exculpatory testimony)."
} | 10,508,456 | b |
Many courts have used the rationale of Lockett to uphold prosecutorial comment on the lack of evidence supporting a defendant's theory of the case when the defendant does not testify. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "706 F.2d 161, 166",
"parenthetical": "prosecutor's remarks that government's evidence was uncontra-dicted reversible error where only defendant could have testified to contrary",
"sentence": "But see Raper v. Mintzes, 706 F.2d 161, 166 (6th Cir.1983) (prosecutor’s remarks that government’s evidence was uncontra-dicted reversible error where only defendant could have testified to contrary). Other decisions have upheld the propriety of such remarks under similar reasoning."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "692 F.2d 954, 958-59",
"parenthetical": "prosecutor's comments on absence of facts in record supporting defendant's theory not violative",
"sentence": "See United States v. Burnett, 890 F.2d 1233, 1241-42 (D.C.Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments not improper if invited by defense counsel’s argument); United States v. Percy, 765 F.2d 1199, 1204 (4th Cir.1985) (prosecutor’s characterization of state’s evidence as “unrefuted and unrebutted” not error); Bontempo v. Fenton, 692 F.2d 954, 958-59 (3d Cir.1982) (prosecutor’s comments on absence of facts in record supporting defendant’s theory not violative), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1055, 103 S.Ct. 1506, 75 L.Ed.2d 935 (1983); Butler v. Rose, 686 F.2d 1163, 1171-72 (6th Cir.1982) (prosecutorial commentary not error where defense counsel told jury he expected defendant to give exculpatory testimony)."
} | 10,508,456 | b |
Many courts have used the rationale of Lockett to uphold prosecutorial comment on the lack of evidence supporting a defendant's theory of the case when the defendant does not testify. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prosecutor's comments on absence of facts in record supporting defendant's theory not violative",
"sentence": "See United States v. Burnett, 890 F.2d 1233, 1241-42 (D.C.Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments not improper if invited by defense counsel’s argument); United States v. Percy, 765 F.2d 1199, 1204 (4th Cir.1985) (prosecutor’s characterization of state’s evidence as “unrefuted and unrebutted” not error); Bontempo v. Fenton, 692 F.2d 954, 958-59 (3d Cir.1982) (prosecutor’s comments on absence of facts in record supporting defendant’s theory not violative), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1055, 103 S.Ct. 1506, 75 L.Ed.2d 935 (1983); Butler v. Rose, 686 F.2d 1163, 1171-72 (6th Cir.1982) (prosecutorial commentary not error where defense counsel told jury he expected defendant to give exculpatory testimony)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "706 F.2d 161, 166",
"parenthetical": "prosecutor's remarks that government's evidence was uncontra-dicted reversible error where only defendant could have testified to contrary",
"sentence": "But see Raper v. Mintzes, 706 F.2d 161, 166 (6th Cir.1983) (prosecutor’s remarks that government’s evidence was uncontra-dicted reversible error where only defendant could have testified to contrary). Other decisions have upheld the propriety of such remarks under similar reasoning."
} | 10,508,456 | a |
Many courts have used the rationale of Lockett to uphold prosecutorial comment on the lack of evidence supporting a defendant's theory of the case when the defendant does not testify. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prosecutor's comments on absence of facts in record supporting defendant's theory not violative",
"sentence": "See United States v. Burnett, 890 F.2d 1233, 1241-42 (D.C.Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments not improper if invited by defense counsel’s argument); United States v. Percy, 765 F.2d 1199, 1204 (4th Cir.1985) (prosecutor’s characterization of state’s evidence as “unrefuted and unrebutted” not error); Bontempo v. Fenton, 692 F.2d 954, 958-59 (3d Cir.1982) (prosecutor’s comments on absence of facts in record supporting defendant’s theory not violative), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1055, 103 S.Ct. 1506, 75 L.Ed.2d 935 (1983); Butler v. Rose, 686 F.2d 1163, 1171-72 (6th Cir.1982) (prosecutorial commentary not error where defense counsel told jury he expected defendant to give exculpatory testimony)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "706 F.2d 161, 166",
"parenthetical": "prosecutor's remarks that government's evidence was uncontra-dicted reversible error where only defendant could have testified to contrary",
"sentence": "But see Raper v. Mintzes, 706 F.2d 161, 166 (6th Cir.1983) (prosecutor’s remarks that government’s evidence was uncontra-dicted reversible error where only defendant could have testified to contrary). Other decisions have upheld the propriety of such remarks under similar reasoning."
} | 10,508,456 | a |
Many courts have used the rationale of Lockett to uphold prosecutorial comment on the lack of evidence supporting a defendant's theory of the case when the defendant does not testify. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "706 F.2d 161, 166",
"parenthetical": "prosecutor's remarks that government's evidence was uncontra-dicted reversible error where only defendant could have testified to contrary",
"sentence": "But see Raper v. Mintzes, 706 F.2d 161, 166 (6th Cir.1983) (prosecutor’s remarks that government’s evidence was uncontra-dicted reversible error where only defendant could have testified to contrary). Other decisions have upheld the propriety of such remarks under similar reasoning."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prosecutor's comments on absence of facts in record supporting defendant's theory not violative",
"sentence": "See United States v. Burnett, 890 F.2d 1233, 1241-42 (D.C.Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments not improper if invited by defense counsel’s argument); United States v. Percy, 765 F.2d 1199, 1204 (4th Cir.1985) (prosecutor’s characterization of state’s evidence as “unrefuted and unrebutted” not error); Bontempo v. Fenton, 692 F.2d 954, 958-59 (3d Cir.1982) (prosecutor’s comments on absence of facts in record supporting defendant’s theory not violative), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1055, 103 S.Ct. 1506, 75 L.Ed.2d 935 (1983); Butler v. Rose, 686 F.2d 1163, 1171-72 (6th Cir.1982) (prosecutorial commentary not error where defense counsel told jury he expected defendant to give exculpatory testimony)."
} | 10,508,456 | b |
Many courts have used the rationale of Lockett to uphold prosecutorial comment on the lack of evidence supporting a defendant's theory of the case when the defendant does not testify. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "706 F.2d 161, 166",
"parenthetical": "prosecutor's remarks that government's evidence was uncontra-dicted reversible error where only defendant could have testified to contrary",
"sentence": "But see Raper v. Mintzes, 706 F.2d 161, 166 (6th Cir.1983) (prosecutor’s remarks that government’s evidence was uncontra-dicted reversible error where only defendant could have testified to contrary). Other decisions have upheld the propriety of such remarks under similar reasoning."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "686 F.2d 1163, 1171-72",
"parenthetical": "prosecutorial commentary not error where defense counsel told jury he expected defendant to give exculpatory testimony",
"sentence": "See United States v. Burnett, 890 F.2d 1233, 1241-42 (D.C.Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments not improper if invited by defense counsel’s argument); United States v. Percy, 765 F.2d 1199, 1204 (4th Cir.1985) (prosecutor’s characterization of state’s evidence as “unrefuted and unrebutted” not error); Bontempo v. Fenton, 692 F.2d 954, 958-59 (3d Cir.1982) (prosecutor’s comments on absence of facts in record supporting defendant’s theory not violative), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1055, 103 S.Ct. 1506, 75 L.Ed.2d 935 (1983); Butler v. Rose, 686 F.2d 1163, 1171-72 (6th Cir.1982) (prosecutorial commentary not error where defense counsel told jury he expected defendant to give exculpatory testimony)."
} | 10,508,456 | b |
Because of the imminent threat of a serious conflict, disqualification would have been appropriate here even before any proceedings began. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "521 F.Supp. 87, 88-90",
"parenthetical": "granting motion to disqualify in virtually identical case because of \"high potential for conflicting loyalties\"",
"sentence": "See Shadid v. Jackson, 521 F.Supp. 87, 88-90 (E.D.Tex.1981) (granting motion to disqualify in virtually identical case because of “high potential for conflicting loyalties”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "625 F.2d 433, 444-46",
"parenthetical": "disqualification appropriate when conflict will taint a trial by affecting attorney's presentation of a case",
"sentence": "Cf. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 444-46 (2d Cir.1980) (en banc) (disqualification appropriate when conflict will taint a trial by affecting attorney’s presentation of a case), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106, 101 S.Ct. 911, 66 L.Ed.2d 835 (1981)."
} | 1,938,882 | a |
Because of the imminent threat of a serious conflict, disqualification would have been appropriate here even before any proceedings began. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "disqualification appropriate when conflict will taint a trial by affecting attorney's presentation of a case",
"sentence": "Cf. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 444-46 (2d Cir.1980) (en banc) (disqualification appropriate when conflict will taint a trial by affecting attorney’s presentation of a case), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106, 101 S.Ct. 911, 66 L.Ed.2d 835 (1981)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "521 F.Supp. 87, 88-90",
"parenthetical": "granting motion to disqualify in virtually identical case because of \"high potential for conflicting loyalties\"",
"sentence": "See Shadid v. Jackson, 521 F.Supp. 87, 88-90 (E.D.Tex.1981) (granting motion to disqualify in virtually identical case because of “high potential for conflicting loyalties”)."
} | 1,938,882 | b |
Because of the imminent threat of a serious conflict, disqualification would have been appropriate here even before any proceedings began. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "disqualification appropriate when conflict will taint a trial by affecting attorney's presentation of a case",
"sentence": "Cf. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 444-46 (2d Cir.1980) (en banc) (disqualification appropriate when conflict will taint a trial by affecting attorney’s presentation of a case), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106, 101 S.Ct. 911, 66 L.Ed.2d 835 (1981)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "521 F.Supp. 87, 88-90",
"parenthetical": "granting motion to disqualify in virtually identical case because of \"high potential for conflicting loyalties\"",
"sentence": "See Shadid v. Jackson, 521 F.Supp. 87, 88-90 (E.D.Tex.1981) (granting motion to disqualify in virtually identical case because of “high potential for conflicting loyalties”)."
} | 1,938,882 | b |
Because of the imminent threat of a serious conflict, disqualification would have been appropriate here even before any proceedings began. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "521 F.Supp. 87, 88-90",
"parenthetical": "granting motion to disqualify in virtually identical case because of \"high potential for conflicting loyalties\"",
"sentence": "See Shadid v. Jackson, 521 F.Supp. 87, 88-90 (E.D.Tex.1981) (granting motion to disqualify in virtually identical case because of “high potential for conflicting loyalties”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "disqualification appropriate when conflict will taint a trial by affecting attorney's presentation of a case",
"sentence": "Cf. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 444-46 (2d Cir.1980) (en banc) (disqualification appropriate when conflict will taint a trial by affecting attorney’s presentation of a case), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106, 101 S.Ct. 911, 66 L.Ed.2d 835 (1981)."
} | 1,938,882 | a |
Having dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint, the district court acted within its discretion in granting Defendants' application for attorneys' fees. The district court properly concluded that Plaintiffs' claims were objectively unreasonable, "as the profound dissimilarity between their works and Heroes was indeed 'obvious.' " Given this conclusion, the district court did not abuse its discretion granting Defendants' application for attorneys' fees. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "approving of the district court's consideration of a party's \"objective unreasonableness\" when exercising discretion in award-' ing attorneys' fees under the Copyright Act",
"sentence": "See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n. 19, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994) (approving of the district court’s consideration of a party’s “objective unreasonableness” when exercising discretion in award-' ing attorneys’ fees under the Copyright Act); see also Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 240 F.3d 116, 121 (2d Cir.2001) (“Subsequent to FogeHy, several other circuits have accorded the objective reasonableness factor substantial weight in determinations whether to award attorneys’ fees”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "240 F.3d 116, 121",
"parenthetical": "\"Subsequent to FogeHy, several other circuits have accorded the objective reasonableness factor substantial weight in determinations whether to award attorneys' fees\"",
"sentence": "See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n. 19, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994) (approving of the district court’s consideration of a party’s “objective unreasonableness” when exercising discretion in award-' ing attorneys’ fees under the Copyright Act); see also Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 240 F.3d 116, 121 (2d Cir.2001) (“Subsequent to FogeHy, several other circuits have accorded the objective reasonableness factor substantial weight in determinations whether to award attorneys’ fees”)."
} | 4,260,147 | a |
Having dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint, the district court acted within its discretion in granting Defendants' application for attorneys' fees. The district court properly concluded that Plaintiffs' claims were objectively unreasonable, "as the profound dissimilarity between their works and Heroes was indeed 'obvious.' " Given this conclusion, the district court did not abuse its discretion granting Defendants' application for attorneys' fees. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "240 F.3d 116, 121",
"parenthetical": "\"Subsequent to FogeHy, several other circuits have accorded the objective reasonableness factor substantial weight in determinations whether to award attorneys' fees\"",
"sentence": "See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n. 19, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994) (approving of the district court’s consideration of a party’s “objective unreasonableness” when exercising discretion in award-' ing attorneys’ fees under the Copyright Act); see also Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 240 F.3d 116, 121 (2d Cir.2001) (“Subsequent to FogeHy, several other circuits have accorded the objective reasonableness factor substantial weight in determinations whether to award attorneys’ fees”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "approving of the district court's consideration of a party's \"objective unreasonableness\" when exercising discretion in award-' ing attorneys' fees under the Copyright Act",
"sentence": "See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n. 19, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994) (approving of the district court’s consideration of a party’s “objective unreasonableness” when exercising discretion in award-' ing attorneys’ fees under the Copyright Act); see also Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 240 F.3d 116, 121 (2d Cir.2001) (“Subsequent to FogeHy, several other circuits have accorded the objective reasonableness factor substantial weight in determinations whether to award attorneys’ fees”)."
} | 4,260,147 | b |
Having dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint, the district court acted within its discretion in granting Defendants' application for attorneys' fees. The district court properly concluded that Plaintiffs' claims were objectively unreasonable, "as the profound dissimilarity between their works and Heroes was indeed 'obvious.' " Given this conclusion, the district court did not abuse its discretion granting Defendants' application for attorneys' fees. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "approving of the district court's consideration of a party's \"objective unreasonableness\" when exercising discretion in award-' ing attorneys' fees under the Copyright Act",
"sentence": "See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n. 19, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994) (approving of the district court’s consideration of a party’s “objective unreasonableness” when exercising discretion in award-' ing attorneys’ fees under the Copyright Act); see also Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 240 F.3d 116, 121 (2d Cir.2001) (“Subsequent to FogeHy, several other circuits have accorded the objective reasonableness factor substantial weight in determinations whether to award attorneys’ fees”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "240 F.3d 116, 121",
"parenthetical": "\"Subsequent to FogeHy, several other circuits have accorded the objective reasonableness factor substantial weight in determinations whether to award attorneys' fees\"",
"sentence": "See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n. 19, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994) (approving of the district court’s consideration of a party’s “objective unreasonableness” when exercising discretion in award-' ing attorneys’ fees under the Copyright Act); see also Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 240 F.3d 116, 121 (2d Cir.2001) (“Subsequent to FogeHy, several other circuits have accorded the objective reasonableness factor substantial weight in determinations whether to award attorneys’ fees”)."
} | 4,260,147 | a |
. When pendant jurisdiction extends to joined state-law claims, federal courts still retain discretion not to exercise it. For example, when state claims substantially predominate the federal court may decline to hear those claims. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "383 U.S. 726, 726",
"parenthetical": "\"if the federal claims are dismissed before trial ... the state claims should be dismissed as well.\"",
"sentence": "Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (\"if it appears that the state issues substantially predominate ... the state claims may be ... left for resolution to state tribunals”); see § 1367(c)(2). Moreover, if the claim on which federal jurisdiction was founded has been dismissed, the court may, in its discretion, dismiss the state law claims as well. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (\"if the federal claims are dismissed before trial ... the state claims should be dismissed as well.\"); see § 1367(c)(3). Thus, if pendant jurisdiction here had extended to plaintiff’s remaining state claims, and if no other independent basis for jurisdiction was found, then remand of the claims would have been appropriate, particularly in light of the efficiencies to be gained by returning this action to state court where the other individual actions against Stepan have been consolidated for the purposes of discovery. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "383 U.S. 726, 726-27",
"parenthetical": "\"if it appears that the state issues substantially predominate ... the state claims may be ... left for resolution to state tribunals\"",
"sentence": "Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (\"if it appears that the state issues substantially predominate ... the state claims may be ... left for resolution to state tribunals”); see § 1367(c)(2). Moreover, if the claim on which federal jurisdiction was founded has been dismissed, the court may, in its discretion, dismiss the state law claims as well. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (\"if the federal claims are dismissed before trial ... the state claims should be dismissed as well.\"); see § 1367(c)(3). Thus, if pendant jurisdiction here had extended to plaintiff’s remaining state claims, and if no other independent basis for jurisdiction was found, then remand of the claims would have been appropriate, particularly in light of the efficiencies to be gained by returning this action to state court where the other individual actions against Stepan have been consolidated for the purposes of discovery. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988)."
} | 1,626,315 | b |
. When pendant jurisdiction extends to joined state-law claims, federal courts still retain discretion not to exercise it. For example, when state claims substantially predominate the federal court may decline to hear those claims. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"if the federal claims are dismissed before trial ... the state claims should be dismissed as well.\"",
"sentence": "Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (\"if it appears that the state issues substantially predominate ... the state claims may be ... left for resolution to state tribunals”); see § 1367(c)(2). Moreover, if the claim on which federal jurisdiction was founded has been dismissed, the court may, in its discretion, dismiss the state law claims as well. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (\"if the federal claims are dismissed before trial ... the state claims should be dismissed as well.\"); see § 1367(c)(3). Thus, if pendant jurisdiction here had extended to plaintiff’s remaining state claims, and if no other independent basis for jurisdiction was found, then remand of the claims would have been appropriate, particularly in light of the efficiencies to be gained by returning this action to state court where the other individual actions against Stepan have been consolidated for the purposes of discovery. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "383 U.S. 726, 726-27",
"parenthetical": "\"if it appears that the state issues substantially predominate ... the state claims may be ... left for resolution to state tribunals\"",
"sentence": "Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (\"if it appears that the state issues substantially predominate ... the state claims may be ... left for resolution to state tribunals”); see § 1367(c)(2). Moreover, if the claim on which federal jurisdiction was founded has been dismissed, the court may, in its discretion, dismiss the state law claims as well. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (\"if the federal claims are dismissed before trial ... the state claims should be dismissed as well.\"); see § 1367(c)(3). Thus, if pendant jurisdiction here had extended to plaintiff’s remaining state claims, and if no other independent basis for jurisdiction was found, then remand of the claims would have been appropriate, particularly in light of the efficiencies to be gained by returning this action to state court where the other individual actions against Stepan have been consolidated for the purposes of discovery. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988)."
} | 1,626,315 | b |
. When pendant jurisdiction extends to joined state-law claims, federal courts still retain discretion not to exercise it. For example, when state claims substantially predominate the federal court may decline to hear those claims. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"if it appears that the state issues substantially predominate ... the state claims may be ... left for resolution to state tribunals\"",
"sentence": "Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (\"if it appears that the state issues substantially predominate ... the state claims may be ... left for resolution to state tribunals”); see § 1367(c)(2). Moreover, if the claim on which federal jurisdiction was founded has been dismissed, the court may, in its discretion, dismiss the state law claims as well. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (\"if the federal claims are dismissed before trial ... the state claims should be dismissed as well.\"); see § 1367(c)(3). Thus, if pendant jurisdiction here had extended to plaintiff’s remaining state claims, and if no other independent basis for jurisdiction was found, then remand of the claims would have been appropriate, particularly in light of the efficiencies to be gained by returning this action to state court where the other individual actions against Stepan have been consolidated for the purposes of discovery. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "383 U.S. 726, 726",
"parenthetical": "\"if the federal claims are dismissed before trial ... the state claims should be dismissed as well.\"",
"sentence": "Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (\"if it appears that the state issues substantially predominate ... the state claims may be ... left for resolution to state tribunals”); see § 1367(c)(2). Moreover, if the claim on which federal jurisdiction was founded has been dismissed, the court may, in its discretion, dismiss the state law claims as well. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (\"if the federal claims are dismissed before trial ... the state claims should be dismissed as well.\"); see § 1367(c)(3). Thus, if pendant jurisdiction here had extended to plaintiff’s remaining state claims, and if no other independent basis for jurisdiction was found, then remand of the claims would have been appropriate, particularly in light of the efficiencies to be gained by returning this action to state court where the other individual actions against Stepan have been consolidated for the purposes of discovery. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988)."
} | 1,626,315 | a |
. When pendant jurisdiction extends to joined state-law claims, federal courts still retain discretion not to exercise it. For example, when state claims substantially predominate the federal court may decline to hear those claims. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"if the federal claims are dismissed before trial ... the state claims should be dismissed as well.\"",
"sentence": "Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (\"if it appears that the state issues substantially predominate ... the state claims may be ... left for resolution to state tribunals”); see § 1367(c)(2). Moreover, if the claim on which federal jurisdiction was founded has been dismissed, the court may, in its discretion, dismiss the state law claims as well. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (\"if the federal claims are dismissed before trial ... the state claims should be dismissed as well.\"); see § 1367(c)(3). Thus, if pendant jurisdiction here had extended to plaintiff’s remaining state claims, and if no other independent basis for jurisdiction was found, then remand of the claims would have been appropriate, particularly in light of the efficiencies to be gained by returning this action to state court where the other individual actions against Stepan have been consolidated for the purposes of discovery. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"if it appears that the state issues substantially predominate ... the state claims may be ... left for resolution to state tribunals\"",
"sentence": "Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (\"if it appears that the state issues substantially predominate ... the state claims may be ... left for resolution to state tribunals”); see § 1367(c)(2). Moreover, if the claim on which federal jurisdiction was founded has been dismissed, the court may, in its discretion, dismiss the state law claims as well. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (\"if the federal claims are dismissed before trial ... the state claims should be dismissed as well.\"); see § 1367(c)(3). Thus, if pendant jurisdiction here had extended to plaintiff’s remaining state claims, and if no other independent basis for jurisdiction was found, then remand of the claims would have been appropriate, particularly in light of the efficiencies to be gained by returning this action to state court where the other individual actions against Stepan have been consolidated for the purposes of discovery. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988)."
} | 1,626,315 | b |
Even if the phrase were ambiguous, both Jones and the government agree that they intended Jones to be sentenced to the lowest number in the applicable Guideline range. In light of the evidence of the parties' intent before the district court at the sentence hearing, the court clearly erred when it imposed a sentence contrary to that unified intent. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "381 F.3d 1105, 1105-06",
"parenthetical": "noting that we look to the parties' intent in construing an ambiguous plea agreement",
"sentence": "See Copeland, 381 F.3d at 1105-06 (noting that we look to the parties’ intent in construing an ambiguous plea agreement); United States v. Yesil, 991 F.2d 1527, 1532-33 (11th Cir.1992) (reversing where the district court failed to follow the terms of the plea agreement); see also United States v. Vallejo, 463 Fed.Appx. 849, 852 (11th Cir.2012) (noting that, if a plea agreement was ambiguous, it would be error for a court to impose a sentence contrary to the intent of the parties to the agreement because the defendant “would not have reasonably understood ... that the Court was going to override the terms of the plea agreement it had already accepted”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "463 Fed.Appx. 849, 852",
"parenthetical": "noting that, if a plea agreement was ambiguous, it would be error for a court to impose a sentence contrary to the intent of the parties to the agreement because the defendant \"would not have reasonably understood ... that the Court was going to override the terms of the plea agreement it had already accepted\"",
"sentence": "See Copeland, 381 F.3d at 1105-06 (noting that we look to the parties’ intent in construing an ambiguous plea agreement); United States v. Yesil, 991 F.2d 1527, 1532-33 (11th Cir.1992) (reversing where the district court failed to follow the terms of the plea agreement); see also United States v. Vallejo, 463 Fed.Appx. 849, 852 (11th Cir.2012) (noting that, if a plea agreement was ambiguous, it would be error for a court to impose a sentence contrary to the intent of the parties to the agreement because the defendant “would not have reasonably understood ... that the Court was going to override the terms of the plea agreement it had already accepted”)."
} | 3,894,547 | a |
Even if the phrase were ambiguous, both Jones and the government agree that they intended Jones to be sentenced to the lowest number in the applicable Guideline range. In light of the evidence of the parties' intent before the district court at the sentence hearing, the court clearly erred when it imposed a sentence contrary to that unified intent. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "991 F.2d 1527, 1532-33",
"parenthetical": "reversing where the district court failed to follow the terms of the plea agreement",
"sentence": "See Copeland, 381 F.3d at 1105-06 (noting that we look to the parties’ intent in construing an ambiguous plea agreement); United States v. Yesil, 991 F.2d 1527, 1532-33 (11th Cir.1992) (reversing where the district court failed to follow the terms of the plea agreement); see also United States v. Vallejo, 463 Fed.Appx. 849, 852 (11th Cir.2012) (noting that, if a plea agreement was ambiguous, it would be error for a court to impose a sentence contrary to the intent of the parties to the agreement because the defendant “would not have reasonably understood ... that the Court was going to override the terms of the plea agreement it had already accepted”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "463 Fed.Appx. 849, 852",
"parenthetical": "noting that, if a plea agreement was ambiguous, it would be error for a court to impose a sentence contrary to the intent of the parties to the agreement because the defendant \"would not have reasonably understood ... that the Court was going to override the terms of the plea agreement it had already accepted\"",
"sentence": "See Copeland, 381 F.3d at 1105-06 (noting that we look to the parties’ intent in construing an ambiguous plea agreement); United States v. Yesil, 991 F.2d 1527, 1532-33 (11th Cir.1992) (reversing where the district court failed to follow the terms of the plea agreement); see also United States v. Vallejo, 463 Fed.Appx. 849, 852 (11th Cir.2012) (noting that, if a plea agreement was ambiguous, it would be error for a court to impose a sentence contrary to the intent of the parties to the agreement because the defendant “would not have reasonably understood ... that the Court was going to override the terms of the plea agreement it had already accepted”)."
} | 3,894,547 | a |
We agree with defendant that, on the record here, the court committed plain error in imposing attorney fees in the absence of evidence that defendant "is or may be able" to pay them. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that the trial court committed plain error under similar circumstances",
"sentence": "See State v. Coverstone, 260 Or App 714, 716, 320 P3d 670 (2014) (the burden is on the state to prove that a defendant is or may be able to pay costs, and it is plain error to impose such costs in the absence of evidence of ability to pay); see also State v. Brown, 272 Or App 321, 355 P3d 129 (2015) (concluding that the trial court committed plain error under similar circumstances)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "260 Or App 714, 716",
"parenthetical": "the burden is on the state to prove that a defendant is or may be able to pay costs, and it is plain error to impose such costs in the absence of evidence of ability to pay",
"sentence": "See State v. Coverstone, 260 Or App 714, 716, 320 P3d 670 (2014) (the burden is on the state to prove that a defendant is or may be able to pay costs, and it is plain error to impose such costs in the absence of evidence of ability to pay); see also State v. Brown, 272 Or App 321, 355 P3d 129 (2015) (concluding that the trial court committed plain error under similar circumstances)."
} | 12,413,845 | b |
Turner cited Bell with approval and did not at any point suggest that Bell's approach to Fourth Amendment claims should no longer be controlling law. This Court will not disregard controlling Supreme Court precedent that has not been specifically overruled by subsequent Supreme Court cases. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "543 U.S. 499, 509-10",
"parenthetical": "holding that Turner did not \"cast doubt on\" the Court's previous holding that strict scrutiny applies to racial classifications in prisons",
"sentence": "See Powell, 541 F.3d at 1302 (declining to apply the Turner test to custodial strip searches on this ground); cf. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509-10, 125 S.Ct. 1141, 160 L.Ed.2d 949 (2005) (holding that Turner did not “cast doubt on” the Court’s previous holding that strict scrutiny applies to racial classifications in prisons). Like the many courts that have addressed the constitutionality of custodial strip searches, this Court is guided by Bell and its progeny-"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "541 F.3d 1302, 1302",
"parenthetical": "declining to apply the Turner test to custodial strip searches on this ground",
"sentence": "See Powell, 541 F.3d at 1302 (declining to apply the Turner test to custodial strip searches on this ground); cf. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509-10, 125 S.Ct. 1141, 160 L.Ed.2d 949 (2005) (holding that Turner did not “cast doubt on” the Court’s previous holding that strict scrutiny applies to racial classifications in prisons). Like the many courts that have addressed the constitutionality of custodial strip searches, this Court is guided by Bell and its progeny-"
} | 4,215,327 | b |
Turner cited Bell with approval and did not at any point suggest that Bell's approach to Fourth Amendment claims should no longer be controlling law. This Court will not disregard controlling Supreme Court precedent that has not been specifically overruled by subsequent Supreme Court cases. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "541 F.3d 1302, 1302",
"parenthetical": "declining to apply the Turner test to custodial strip searches on this ground",
"sentence": "See Powell, 541 F.3d at 1302 (declining to apply the Turner test to custodial strip searches on this ground); cf. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509-10, 125 S.Ct. 1141, 160 L.Ed.2d 949 (2005) (holding that Turner did not “cast doubt on” the Court’s previous holding that strict scrutiny applies to racial classifications in prisons). Like the many courts that have addressed the constitutionality of custodial strip searches, this Court is guided by Bell and its progeny-"
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Turner did not \"cast doubt on\" the Court's previous holding that strict scrutiny applies to racial classifications in prisons",
"sentence": "See Powell, 541 F.3d at 1302 (declining to apply the Turner test to custodial strip searches on this ground); cf. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509-10, 125 S.Ct. 1141, 160 L.Ed.2d 949 (2005) (holding that Turner did not “cast doubt on” the Court’s previous holding that strict scrutiny applies to racial classifications in prisons). Like the many courts that have addressed the constitutionality of custodial strip searches, this Court is guided by Bell and its progeny-"
} | 4,215,327 | a |
Turner cited Bell with approval and did not at any point suggest that Bell's approach to Fourth Amendment claims should no longer be controlling law. This Court will not disregard controlling Supreme Court precedent that has not been specifically overruled by subsequent Supreme Court cases. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Turner did not \"cast doubt on\" the Court's previous holding that strict scrutiny applies to racial classifications in prisons",
"sentence": "See Powell, 541 F.3d at 1302 (declining to apply the Turner test to custodial strip searches on this ground); cf. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509-10, 125 S.Ct. 1141, 160 L.Ed.2d 949 (2005) (holding that Turner did not “cast doubt on” the Court’s previous holding that strict scrutiny applies to racial classifications in prisons). Like the many courts that have addressed the constitutionality of custodial strip searches, this Court is guided by Bell and its progeny-"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "541 F.3d 1302, 1302",
"parenthetical": "declining to apply the Turner test to custodial strip searches on this ground",
"sentence": "See Powell, 541 F.3d at 1302 (declining to apply the Turner test to custodial strip searches on this ground); cf. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509-10, 125 S.Ct. 1141, 160 L.Ed.2d 949 (2005) (holding that Turner did not “cast doubt on” the Court’s previous holding that strict scrutiny applies to racial classifications in prisons). Like the many courts that have addressed the constitutionality of custodial strip searches, this Court is guided by Bell and its progeny-"
} | 4,215,327 | b |
Both before and after Kovacevich, we have issued several opinions saying that we must address the sovereign-immunity issue first. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "314 F.3d 262, 265",
"parenthetical": "\"We must therefore address the jurisdictional [Eleventh Amendment] question that clearly exists, even though it was not addressed by the court below.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Angel v. Kentucky, 314 F.3d 262, 265 (6th Cir.2002) (“We must therefore address the jurisdictional [Eleventh Amendment] question that clearly exists, even though it was not addressed by the court below.”); Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Engler, 304 F.3d 616, 618 (6th Cir.2002) (stating that “jurisdictional issues,” including an Eleventh Amendment defense, must “be addressed prior to reaching the merits”); Rossborough Mfg. Co. v. Trimble, 301 F.3d 482, 489 (6th Cir.2002) (“As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the Treasurer and the Administrator are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 570 (6th Cir. 2000) (“We first address Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment immunity defense because this defense raises a question of federal jurisdiction.”); Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 592-93 (6th Cir.1989) (“We are required to decide [the Eleventh Amendment] issue before we decide the merits.”); Childs v. Koosed, No. 90-3449, 1991 WL 33133, at *4 (6th Cir. Mar.13, 1991) (“In view of the District Court’s disposition of the claims on eleventh amendment grounds, the District Court was without jurisdiction to make the alternative ruling on the merits.”); see also Haas v. Quest Recovery Servs., Inc., 338 F.Supp.2d 797, 799 (N.D.Ohio 2004) (“Although Ohio couches its Eleventh Amendment argument as an alternative basis for dismissal, the Court addresses jurisdictional arguments first.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "338 F.Supp.2d 797, 799",
"parenthetical": "\"Although Ohio couches its Eleventh Amendment argument as an alternative basis for dismissal, the Court addresses jurisdictional arguments first.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Angel v. Kentucky, 314 F.3d 262, 265 (6th Cir.2002) (“We must therefore address the jurisdictional [Eleventh Amendment] question that clearly exists, even though it was not addressed by the court below.”); Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Engler, 304 F.3d 616, 618 (6th Cir.2002) (stating that “jurisdictional issues,” including an Eleventh Amendment defense, must “be addressed prior to reaching the merits”); Rossborough Mfg. Co. v. Trimble, 301 F.3d 482, 489 (6th Cir.2002) (“As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the Treasurer and the Administrator are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 570 (6th Cir. 2000) (“We first address Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment immunity defense because this defense raises a question of federal jurisdiction.”); Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 592-93 (6th Cir.1989) (“We are required to decide [the Eleventh Amendment] issue before we decide the merits.”); Childs v. Koosed, No. 90-3449, 1991 WL 33133, at *4 (6th Cir. Mar.13, 1991) (“In view of the District Court’s disposition of the claims on eleventh amendment grounds, the District Court was without jurisdiction to make the alternative ruling on the merits.”); see also Haas v. Quest Recovery Servs., Inc., 338 F.Supp.2d 797, 799 (N.D.Ohio 2004) (“Although Ohio couches its Eleventh Amendment argument as an alternative basis for dismissal, the Court addresses jurisdictional arguments first.”)."
} | 6,045,956 | a |
Both before and after Kovacevich, we have issued several opinions saying that we must address the sovereign-immunity issue first. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "338 F.Supp.2d 797, 799",
"parenthetical": "\"Although Ohio couches its Eleventh Amendment argument as an alternative basis for dismissal, the Court addresses jurisdictional arguments first.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Angel v. Kentucky, 314 F.3d 262, 265 (6th Cir.2002) (“We must therefore address the jurisdictional [Eleventh Amendment] question that clearly exists, even though it was not addressed by the court below.”); Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Engler, 304 F.3d 616, 618 (6th Cir.2002) (stating that “jurisdictional issues,” including an Eleventh Amendment defense, must “be addressed prior to reaching the merits”); Rossborough Mfg. Co. v. Trimble, 301 F.3d 482, 489 (6th Cir.2002) (“As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the Treasurer and the Administrator are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 570 (6th Cir. 2000) (“We first address Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment immunity defense because this defense raises a question of federal jurisdiction.”); Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 592-93 (6th Cir.1989) (“We are required to decide [the Eleventh Amendment] issue before we decide the merits.”); Childs v. Koosed, No. 90-3449, 1991 WL 33133, at *4 (6th Cir. Mar.13, 1991) (“In view of the District Court’s disposition of the claims on eleventh amendment grounds, the District Court was without jurisdiction to make the alternative ruling on the merits.”); see also Haas v. Quest Recovery Servs., Inc., 338 F.Supp.2d 797, 799 (N.D.Ohio 2004) (“Although Ohio couches its Eleventh Amendment argument as an alternative basis for dismissal, the Court addresses jurisdictional arguments first.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "304 F.3d 616, 618",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"jurisdictional issues,\" including an Eleventh Amendment defense, must \"be addressed prior to reaching the merits\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Angel v. Kentucky, 314 F.3d 262, 265 (6th Cir.2002) (“We must therefore address the jurisdictional [Eleventh Amendment] question that clearly exists, even though it was not addressed by the court below.”); Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Engler, 304 F.3d 616, 618 (6th Cir.2002) (stating that “jurisdictional issues,” including an Eleventh Amendment defense, must “be addressed prior to reaching the merits”); Rossborough Mfg. Co. v. Trimble, 301 F.3d 482, 489 (6th Cir.2002) (“As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the Treasurer and the Administrator are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 570 (6th Cir. 2000) (“We first address Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment immunity defense because this defense raises a question of federal jurisdiction.”); Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 592-93 (6th Cir.1989) (“We are required to decide [the Eleventh Amendment] issue before we decide the merits.”); Childs v. Koosed, No. 90-3449, 1991 WL 33133, at *4 (6th Cir. Mar.13, 1991) (“In view of the District Court’s disposition of the claims on eleventh amendment grounds, the District Court was without jurisdiction to make the alternative ruling on the merits.”); see also Haas v. Quest Recovery Servs., Inc., 338 F.Supp.2d 797, 799 (N.D.Ohio 2004) (“Although Ohio couches its Eleventh Amendment argument as an alternative basis for dismissal, the Court addresses jurisdictional arguments first.”)."
} | 6,045,956 | b |
Both before and after Kovacevich, we have issued several opinions saying that we must address the sovereign-immunity issue first. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "338 F.Supp.2d 797, 799",
"parenthetical": "\"Although Ohio couches its Eleventh Amendment argument as an alternative basis for dismissal, the Court addresses jurisdictional arguments first.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Angel v. Kentucky, 314 F.3d 262, 265 (6th Cir.2002) (“We must therefore address the jurisdictional [Eleventh Amendment] question that clearly exists, even though it was not addressed by the court below.”); Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Engler, 304 F.3d 616, 618 (6th Cir.2002) (stating that “jurisdictional issues,” including an Eleventh Amendment defense, must “be addressed prior to reaching the merits”); Rossborough Mfg. Co. v. Trimble, 301 F.3d 482, 489 (6th Cir.2002) (“As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the Treasurer and the Administrator are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 570 (6th Cir. 2000) (“We first address Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment immunity defense because this defense raises a question of federal jurisdiction.”); Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 592-93 (6th Cir.1989) (“We are required to decide [the Eleventh Amendment] issue before we decide the merits.”); Childs v. Koosed, No. 90-3449, 1991 WL 33133, at *4 (6th Cir. Mar.13, 1991) (“In view of the District Court’s disposition of the claims on eleventh amendment grounds, the District Court was without jurisdiction to make the alternative ruling on the merits.”); see also Haas v. Quest Recovery Servs., Inc., 338 F.Supp.2d 797, 799 (N.D.Ohio 2004) (“Although Ohio couches its Eleventh Amendment argument as an alternative basis for dismissal, the Court addresses jurisdictional arguments first.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "301 F.3d 482, 489",
"parenthetical": "\"As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the Treasurer and the Administrator are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Angel v. Kentucky, 314 F.3d 262, 265 (6th Cir.2002) (“We must therefore address the jurisdictional [Eleventh Amendment] question that clearly exists, even though it was not addressed by the court below.”); Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Engler, 304 F.3d 616, 618 (6th Cir.2002) (stating that “jurisdictional issues,” including an Eleventh Amendment defense, must “be addressed prior to reaching the merits”); Rossborough Mfg. Co. v. Trimble, 301 F.3d 482, 489 (6th Cir.2002) (“As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the Treasurer and the Administrator are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 570 (6th Cir. 2000) (“We first address Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment immunity defense because this defense raises a question of federal jurisdiction.”); Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 592-93 (6th Cir.1989) (“We are required to decide [the Eleventh Amendment] issue before we decide the merits.”); Childs v. Koosed, No. 90-3449, 1991 WL 33133, at *4 (6th Cir. Mar.13, 1991) (“In view of the District Court’s disposition of the claims on eleventh amendment grounds, the District Court was without jurisdiction to make the alternative ruling on the merits.”); see also Haas v. Quest Recovery Servs., Inc., 338 F.Supp.2d 797, 799 (N.D.Ohio 2004) (“Although Ohio couches its Eleventh Amendment argument as an alternative basis for dismissal, the Court addresses jurisdictional arguments first.”)."
} | 6,045,956 | b |
Both before and after Kovacevich, we have issued several opinions saying that we must address the sovereign-immunity issue first. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "338 F.Supp.2d 797, 799",
"parenthetical": "\"Although Ohio couches its Eleventh Amendment argument as an alternative basis for dismissal, the Court addresses jurisdictional arguments first.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Angel v. Kentucky, 314 F.3d 262, 265 (6th Cir.2002) (“We must therefore address the jurisdictional [Eleventh Amendment] question that clearly exists, even though it was not addressed by the court below.”); Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Engler, 304 F.3d 616, 618 (6th Cir.2002) (stating that “jurisdictional issues,” including an Eleventh Amendment defense, must “be addressed prior to reaching the merits”); Rossborough Mfg. Co. v. Trimble, 301 F.3d 482, 489 (6th Cir.2002) (“As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the Treasurer and the Administrator are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 570 (6th Cir. 2000) (“We first address Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment immunity defense because this defense raises a question of federal jurisdiction.”); Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 592-93 (6th Cir.1989) (“We are required to decide [the Eleventh Amendment] issue before we decide the merits.”); Childs v. Koosed, No. 90-3449, 1991 WL 33133, at *4 (6th Cir. Mar.13, 1991) (“In view of the District Court’s disposition of the claims on eleventh amendment grounds, the District Court was without jurisdiction to make the alternative ruling on the merits.”); see also Haas v. Quest Recovery Servs., Inc., 338 F.Supp.2d 797, 799 (N.D.Ohio 2004) (“Although Ohio couches its Eleventh Amendment argument as an alternative basis for dismissal, the Court addresses jurisdictional arguments first.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "215 F.3d 561, 570",
"parenthetical": "\"We first address Defendants' Eleventh Amendment immunity defense because this defense raises a question of federal jurisdiction.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Angel v. Kentucky, 314 F.3d 262, 265 (6th Cir.2002) (“We must therefore address the jurisdictional [Eleventh Amendment] question that clearly exists, even though it was not addressed by the court below.”); Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Engler, 304 F.3d 616, 618 (6th Cir.2002) (stating that “jurisdictional issues,” including an Eleventh Amendment defense, must “be addressed prior to reaching the merits”); Rossborough Mfg. Co. v. Trimble, 301 F.3d 482, 489 (6th Cir.2002) (“As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the Treasurer and the Administrator are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 570 (6th Cir. 2000) (“We first address Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment immunity defense because this defense raises a question of federal jurisdiction.”); Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 592-93 (6th Cir.1989) (“We are required to decide [the Eleventh Amendment] issue before we decide the merits.”); Childs v. Koosed, No. 90-3449, 1991 WL 33133, at *4 (6th Cir. Mar.13, 1991) (“In view of the District Court’s disposition of the claims on eleventh amendment grounds, the District Court was without jurisdiction to make the alternative ruling on the merits.”); see also Haas v. Quest Recovery Servs., Inc., 338 F.Supp.2d 797, 799 (N.D.Ohio 2004) (“Although Ohio couches its Eleventh Amendment argument as an alternative basis for dismissal, the Court addresses jurisdictional arguments first.”)."
} | 6,045,956 | b |
Both before and after Kovacevich, we have issued several opinions saying that we must address the sovereign-immunity issue first. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "891 F.2d 591, 592-93",
"parenthetical": "\"We are required to decide [the Eleventh Amendment] issue before we decide the merits.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Angel v. Kentucky, 314 F.3d 262, 265 (6th Cir.2002) (“We must therefore address the jurisdictional [Eleventh Amendment] question that clearly exists, even though it was not addressed by the court below.”); Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Engler, 304 F.3d 616, 618 (6th Cir.2002) (stating that “jurisdictional issues,” including an Eleventh Amendment defense, must “be addressed prior to reaching the merits”); Rossborough Mfg. Co. v. Trimble, 301 F.3d 482, 489 (6th Cir.2002) (“As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the Treasurer and the Administrator are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 570 (6th Cir. 2000) (“We first address Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment immunity defense because this defense raises a question of federal jurisdiction.”); Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 592-93 (6th Cir.1989) (“We are required to decide [the Eleventh Amendment] issue before we decide the merits.”); Childs v. Koosed, No. 90-3449, 1991 WL 33133, at *4 (6th Cir. Mar.13, 1991) (“In view of the District Court’s disposition of the claims on eleventh amendment grounds, the District Court was without jurisdiction to make the alternative ruling on the merits.”); see also Haas v. Quest Recovery Servs., Inc., 338 F.Supp.2d 797, 799 (N.D.Ohio 2004) (“Although Ohio couches its Eleventh Amendment argument as an alternative basis for dismissal, the Court addresses jurisdictional arguments first.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "338 F.Supp.2d 797, 799",
"parenthetical": "\"Although Ohio couches its Eleventh Amendment argument as an alternative basis for dismissal, the Court addresses jurisdictional arguments first.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Angel v. Kentucky, 314 F.3d 262, 265 (6th Cir.2002) (“We must therefore address the jurisdictional [Eleventh Amendment] question that clearly exists, even though it was not addressed by the court below.”); Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Engler, 304 F.3d 616, 618 (6th Cir.2002) (stating that “jurisdictional issues,” including an Eleventh Amendment defense, must “be addressed prior to reaching the merits”); Rossborough Mfg. Co. v. Trimble, 301 F.3d 482, 489 (6th Cir.2002) (“As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the Treasurer and the Administrator are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 570 (6th Cir. 2000) (“We first address Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment immunity defense because this defense raises a question of federal jurisdiction.”); Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 592-93 (6th Cir.1989) (“We are required to decide [the Eleventh Amendment] issue before we decide the merits.”); Childs v. Koosed, No. 90-3449, 1991 WL 33133, at *4 (6th Cir. Mar.13, 1991) (“In view of the District Court’s disposition of the claims on eleventh amendment grounds, the District Court was without jurisdiction to make the alternative ruling on the merits.”); see also Haas v. Quest Recovery Servs., Inc., 338 F.Supp.2d 797, 799 (N.D.Ohio 2004) (“Although Ohio couches its Eleventh Amendment argument as an alternative basis for dismissal, the Court addresses jurisdictional arguments first.”)."
} | 6,045,956 | a |
Both before and after Kovacevich, we have issued several opinions saying that we must address the sovereign-immunity issue first. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1991 WL 33133, at *4",
"parenthetical": "\"In view of the District Court's disposition of the claims on eleventh amendment grounds, the District Court was without jurisdiction to make the alternative ruling on the merits.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Angel v. Kentucky, 314 F.3d 262, 265 (6th Cir.2002) (“We must therefore address the jurisdictional [Eleventh Amendment] question that clearly exists, even though it was not addressed by the court below.”); Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Engler, 304 F.3d 616, 618 (6th Cir.2002) (stating that “jurisdictional issues,” including an Eleventh Amendment defense, must “be addressed prior to reaching the merits”); Rossborough Mfg. Co. v. Trimble, 301 F.3d 482, 489 (6th Cir.2002) (“As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the Treasurer and the Administrator are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 570 (6th Cir. 2000) (“We first address Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment immunity defense because this defense raises a question of federal jurisdiction.”); Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 592-93 (6th Cir.1989) (“We are required to decide [the Eleventh Amendment] issue before we decide the merits.”); Childs v. Koosed, No. 90-3449, 1991 WL 33133, at *4 (6th Cir. Mar.13, 1991) (“In view of the District Court’s disposition of the claims on eleventh amendment grounds, the District Court was without jurisdiction to make the alternative ruling on the merits.”); see also Haas v. Quest Recovery Servs., Inc., 338 F.Supp.2d 797, 799 (N.D.Ohio 2004) (“Although Ohio couches its Eleventh Amendment argument as an alternative basis for dismissal, the Court addresses jurisdictional arguments first.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "338 F.Supp.2d 797, 799",
"parenthetical": "\"Although Ohio couches its Eleventh Amendment argument as an alternative basis for dismissal, the Court addresses jurisdictional arguments first.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Angel v. Kentucky, 314 F.3d 262, 265 (6th Cir.2002) (“We must therefore address the jurisdictional [Eleventh Amendment] question that clearly exists, even though it was not addressed by the court below.”); Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Engler, 304 F.3d 616, 618 (6th Cir.2002) (stating that “jurisdictional issues,” including an Eleventh Amendment defense, must “be addressed prior to reaching the merits”); Rossborough Mfg. Co. v. Trimble, 301 F.3d 482, 489 (6th Cir.2002) (“As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the Treasurer and the Administrator are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 570 (6th Cir. 2000) (“We first address Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment immunity defense because this defense raises a question of federal jurisdiction.”); Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 592-93 (6th Cir.1989) (“We are required to decide [the Eleventh Amendment] issue before we decide the merits.”); Childs v. Koosed, No. 90-3449, 1991 WL 33133, at *4 (6th Cir. Mar.13, 1991) (“In view of the District Court’s disposition of the claims on eleventh amendment grounds, the District Court was without jurisdiction to make the alternative ruling on the merits.”); see also Haas v. Quest Recovery Servs., Inc., 338 F.Supp.2d 797, 799 (N.D.Ohio 2004) (“Although Ohio couches its Eleventh Amendment argument as an alternative basis for dismissal, the Court addresses jurisdictional arguments first.”)."
} | 6,045,956 | a |
Finally, he admonished the jury to find the defendant guilty of those crimes. The remark, "the community enforces the law, you represent the community, you decide," was not improper in this context. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "414 F.3d 954, 960",
"parenthetical": "reasoning even if the district court failed to sustain an objection to the single improper use of a word, defendants' substantial rights would not have been so affected as to deprive them of a fair trial",
"sentence": "See United States v. Lopez, 414 F.3d 954, 960 (8th Cir.2005) (reasoning even if the district court failed to sustain an objection to the single improper use of a word, defendants’ substantial rights would not have been so affected as to deprive them of a fair trial)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "547 F.2d 1030, 1036-37",
"parenthetical": "finding a plea to the jury to be the conscience of the community is not impermissible unless it is calculated to inflame, and an appeal to the jury to be the \"public's last shield\" did not \"exceed permissible bounds of advocacy\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Lewis, 547 F.2d 1030, 1036-37 (8th Cir.1976) (finding a plea to the jury to be the conscience of the community is not impermissible unless it is calculated to inflame, and an appeal to the jury to be the “public’s last shield” did not “exceed permissible bounds of advocacy”). This single remark by the prosecutor did not prejudice Levering’s right to a fair trial."
} | 1,618,059 | b |
As to the plaintiffs' retention argument, an employer replaces an employee by hiring or reassigning someone "to perform the plaintiffs duties." In considering the charge that the defendant reassigned younger employees to perform the plaintiffs' duties, "the relevant inquiry concerns the functions which the terminated employee[s] performed in [their] 'position[s]' and what happened to those functions after the termination." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "6 F.3d 846, 846",
"parenthetical": "employee \"not replaced when another employee is assigned to perform the plaintiffs duties in addition to other duties, or when the work is redistributed among other existing employees already performing related work\"",
"sentence": "Shenker v. Lockheed Sanders Inc., 919 F.Supp. 55, 60 (D.Mass.1996). Accordingly, the plaintiffs must demonstrate “that younger employees, who prior to the reduction in force were not performing the primary functions of the plaintiff[s’] job[s], had these functions transferred to them.” Id.; see LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 846 (employee “not replaced when another employee is assigned to perform the plaintiffs duties in addition to other duties, or when the work is redistributed among other existing employees already performing related work”); see also Hindman v. Transkrit Corp., 145 F.3d 986, 992 (8th Cir.1998) (ADEA plaintiff “effectively replaced by many individuals adopting his duties may still be able to establish that he was the object of impermissible discrimination related to his age”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "145 F.3d 986, 992",
"parenthetical": "ADEA plaintiff \"effectively replaced by many individuals adopting his duties may still be able to establish that he was the object of impermissible discrimination related to his age\"",
"sentence": "Shenker v. Lockheed Sanders Inc., 919 F.Supp. 55, 60 (D.Mass.1996). Accordingly, the plaintiffs must demonstrate “that younger employees, who prior to the reduction in force were not performing the primary functions of the plaintiff[s’] job[s], had these functions transferred to them.” Id.; see LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 846 (employee “not replaced when another employee is assigned to perform the plaintiffs duties in addition to other duties, or when the work is redistributed among other existing employees already performing related work”); see also Hindman v. Transkrit Corp., 145 F.3d 986, 992 (8th Cir.1998) (ADEA plaintiff “effectively replaced by many individuals adopting his duties may still be able to establish that he was the object of impermissible discrimination related to his age”)."
} | 11,542,053 | a |
Appellees merely stated they did not make misrepresentations to Hoagland in Texas regarding the business transaction made the basis of the captioned case. We conclude these statements are unsupported factual and legal conclusions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding nonresident's statement that he had committed no torts in Texas was properly excluded as conclusory",
"sentence": "See Ennis, 164 S.W.3d at 703-04 (affirming trial court’s exclusion of nonresident’s statements that he did not have a substantial connection with Texas, plaintiffs’ claims did not result from and were not related to any of affiant’s activities in Texas, affiant did not have any continuing or systematic contacts with Texas, and affiant did not commit any tort in Texas); see also Wright, 137 S.W.3d at 250 n. 8 (holding nonresident’s statement that he had committed no torts in Texas was properly excluded as conclusory)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "164 S.W.3d 703, 703-04",
"parenthetical": "affirming trial court's exclusion of nonresident's statements that he did not have a substantial connection with Texas, plaintiffs' claims did not result from and were not related to any of affiant's activities in Texas, affiant did not have any continuing or systematic contacts with Texas, and affiant did not commit any tort in Texas",
"sentence": "See Ennis, 164 S.W.3d at 703-04 (affirming trial court’s exclusion of nonresident’s statements that he did not have a substantial connection with Texas, plaintiffs’ claims did not result from and were not related to any of affiant’s activities in Texas, affiant did not have any continuing or systematic contacts with Texas, and affiant did not commit any tort in Texas); see also Wright, 137 S.W.3d at 250 n. 8 (holding nonresident’s statement that he had committed no torts in Texas was properly excluded as conclusory)."
} | 7,093,044 | b |
Here, the defendant was charged with scheduled violations, yet the State sought to have him sentenced to jail on the basis it had proved he committed nonscheduled simple misdemeanors. Because the defendant had no notice he was being charged with the greater offenses, he clearly did not have constitutionally sufficient notice of the charges against him. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "390 U.S. 544, 551",
"parenthetical": "holding procedural due process requires that \"[t]he charge must be known before the proceedings commence\"",
"sentence": "See In re Matter of Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226, 20 L.Ed.2d 117, 122 (1968) (holding procedural due process requires that “[t]he charge must be known before the proceedings commence”); State v. Hibler, 5 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Mo.1999) (“Due process requires that a defendant may not be convicted of an offense not charged in the information or indictment.”); cf. State v. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d 458, 467 (Tenn.2002) (finding no due process violation when defendant given pretrial notice of prosecution’s intent to seek enhanced sentence and of factual basis for enhancement)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "79 S.W.3d 458, 467",
"parenthetical": "finding no due process violation when defendant given pretrial notice of prosecution's intent to seek enhanced sentence and of factual basis for enhancement",
"sentence": "See In re Matter of Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226, 20 L.Ed.2d 117, 122 (1968) (holding procedural due process requires that “[t]he charge must be known before the proceedings commence”); State v. Hibler, 5 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Mo.1999) (“Due process requires that a defendant may not be convicted of an offense not charged in the information or indictment.”); cf. State v. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d 458, 467 (Tenn.2002) (finding no due process violation when defendant given pretrial notice of prosecution’s intent to seek enhanced sentence and of factual basis for enhancement)."
} | 8,893,156 | a |
Here, the defendant was charged with scheduled violations, yet the State sought to have him sentenced to jail on the basis it had proved he committed nonscheduled simple misdemeanors. Because the defendant had no notice he was being charged with the greater offenses, he clearly did not have constitutionally sufficient notice of the charges against him. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "79 S.W.3d 458, 467",
"parenthetical": "finding no due process violation when defendant given pretrial notice of prosecution's intent to seek enhanced sentence and of factual basis for enhancement",
"sentence": "See In re Matter of Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226, 20 L.Ed.2d 117, 122 (1968) (holding procedural due process requires that “[t]he charge must be known before the proceedings commence”); State v. Hibler, 5 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Mo.1999) (“Due process requires that a defendant may not be convicted of an offense not charged in the information or indictment.”); cf. State v. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d 458, 467 (Tenn.2002) (finding no due process violation when defendant given pretrial notice of prosecution’s intent to seek enhanced sentence and of factual basis for enhancement)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226",
"parenthetical": "holding procedural due process requires that \"[t]he charge must be known before the proceedings commence\"",
"sentence": "See In re Matter of Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226, 20 L.Ed.2d 117, 122 (1968) (holding procedural due process requires that “[t]he charge must be known before the proceedings commence”); State v. Hibler, 5 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Mo.1999) (“Due process requires that a defendant may not be convicted of an offense not charged in the information or indictment.”); cf. State v. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d 458, 467 (Tenn.2002) (finding no due process violation when defendant given pretrial notice of prosecution’s intent to seek enhanced sentence and of factual basis for enhancement)."
} | 8,893,156 | b |
Here, the defendant was charged with scheduled violations, yet the State sought to have him sentenced to jail on the basis it had proved he committed nonscheduled simple misdemeanors. Because the defendant had no notice he was being charged with the greater offenses, he clearly did not have constitutionally sufficient notice of the charges against him. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "20 L.Ed.2d 117, 122",
"parenthetical": "holding procedural due process requires that \"[t]he charge must be known before the proceedings commence\"",
"sentence": "See In re Matter of Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226, 20 L.Ed.2d 117, 122 (1968) (holding procedural due process requires that “[t]he charge must be known before the proceedings commence”); State v. Hibler, 5 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Mo.1999) (“Due process requires that a defendant may not be convicted of an offense not charged in the information or indictment.”); cf. State v. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d 458, 467 (Tenn.2002) (finding no due process violation when defendant given pretrial notice of prosecution’s intent to seek enhanced sentence and of factual basis for enhancement)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "79 S.W.3d 458, 467",
"parenthetical": "finding no due process violation when defendant given pretrial notice of prosecution's intent to seek enhanced sentence and of factual basis for enhancement",
"sentence": "See In re Matter of Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226, 20 L.Ed.2d 117, 122 (1968) (holding procedural due process requires that “[t]he charge must be known before the proceedings commence”); State v. Hibler, 5 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Mo.1999) (“Due process requires that a defendant may not be convicted of an offense not charged in the information or indictment.”); cf. State v. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d 458, 467 (Tenn.2002) (finding no due process violation when defendant given pretrial notice of prosecution’s intent to seek enhanced sentence and of factual basis for enhancement)."
} | 8,893,156 | a |
Here, the defendant was charged with scheduled violations, yet the State sought to have him sentenced to jail on the basis it had proved he committed nonscheduled simple misdemeanors. Because the defendant had no notice he was being charged with the greater offenses, he clearly did not have constitutionally sufficient notice of the charges against him. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "79 S.W.3d 458, 467",
"parenthetical": "finding no due process violation when defendant given pretrial notice of prosecution's intent to seek enhanced sentence and of factual basis for enhancement",
"sentence": "See In re Matter of Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226, 20 L.Ed.2d 117, 122 (1968) (holding procedural due process requires that “[t]he charge must be known before the proceedings commence”); State v. Hibler, 5 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Mo.1999) (“Due process requires that a defendant may not be convicted of an offense not charged in the information or indictment.”); cf. State v. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d 458, 467 (Tenn.2002) (finding no due process violation when defendant given pretrial notice of prosecution’s intent to seek enhanced sentence and of factual basis for enhancement)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "5 S.W.3d 147, 150",
"parenthetical": "\"Due process requires that a defendant may not be convicted of an offense not charged in the information or indictment.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Matter of Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226, 20 L.Ed.2d 117, 122 (1968) (holding procedural due process requires that “[t]he charge must be known before the proceedings commence”); State v. Hibler, 5 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Mo.1999) (“Due process requires that a defendant may not be convicted of an offense not charged in the information or indictment.”); cf. State v. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d 458, 467 (Tenn.2002) (finding no due process violation when defendant given pretrial notice of prosecution’s intent to seek enhanced sentence and of factual basis for enhancement)."
} | 8,893,156 | b |
Given the unusually intrusive nature of computer searches, confirmation of the validity of third-party consent is worth the additional time and effort even during the pressures of arrest and investigation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "720 F.3d 436, 446-47",
"parenthetical": "where \"property to be searched is a computer hard drive, the particularity requirement [for search warrants] assumes even greater importance\" because the \"potential for privacy violations ... is enormous\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ganias, 824 F.3d 199, 231 (2d Cir. 2016) (Chin, J., dissenting) (“Virtually the entirety of a person’s life may be captured as [computer] data.”); United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859, 861-62 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[C]omputers are capable of storing immense amounts of information and often contain a great deal of private information.”); cf. United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 446-47 (2d Cir. 2013) (where “property to be searched is a computer hard drive, the particularity requirement [for search warrants] assumes even greater importance” because the “potential for privacy violations ... is enormous”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "573 F.3d 859, 861-62",
"parenthetical": "\"[C]omputers are capable of storing immense amounts of information and often contain a great deal of private information.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ganias, 824 F.3d 199, 231 (2d Cir. 2016) (Chin, J., dissenting) (“Virtually the entirety of a person’s life may be captured as [computer] data.”); United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859, 861-62 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[C]omputers are capable of storing immense amounts of information and often contain a great deal of private information.”); cf. United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 446-47 (2d Cir. 2013) (where “property to be searched is a computer hard drive, the particularity requirement [for search warrants] assumes even greater importance” because the “potential for privacy violations ... is enormous”)."
} | 12,271,031 | b |
Oregon appellate courts have not previously considered the issue youth now raises -- i.e., whether the award of restitution in a juvenile delinquency proceeding is "civil" or "penal" in nature. In the adult criminal context, though, the Supreme Court has held restitution to be a sentencing device, not a "quasi-civil recovery device." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "299 Or 128, 138-39",
"parenthetical": "analyzing whether the same restitution statutes entitled the defendant to a jury trial",
"sentence": "See State v. Dillon, 292 Or 172, 180, 637 P2d 602 (1981) (analyzing the penal nature of ORS 137.103 to 137.109 (1977)); see also State v. Hart, 299 Or 128, 138-39, 699 P2d 1113 (1985) (analyzing whether the same restitution statutes entitled the defendant to a jury trial)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "292 Or 172, 180",
"parenthetical": "analyzing the penal nature of ORS 137.103 to 137.109 (1977",
"sentence": "See State v. Dillon, 292 Or 172, 180, 637 P2d 602 (1981) (analyzing the penal nature of ORS 137.103 to 137.109 (1977)); see also State v. Hart, 299 Or 128, 138-39, 699 P2d 1113 (1985) (analyzing whether the same restitution statutes entitled the defendant to a jury trial)."
} | 4,219,885 | b |
(Ex. A to Horbatiuk Aff. at LINA 1242.) Plaintiff did not receive the ACF until discovery, despite earlier requests for his entire claim file, and defendant has not attempted to show that the ACF complied with the amendment rule. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2011 WL 4102143, at *4",
"parenthetical": "holding in the alternative that the ACF was unenforceable because it was \"neither attached to nor endorsed on the policy\"",
"sentence": "See Francis, 2011 WL 4102143, at *4 (holding in the alternative that the ACF was unenforceable because it was \"neither attached to nor endorsed on the policy”); see also Heim v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No Civ.A. 10-1567, 2010 WL 5300537, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 22, 2010) (finding ACF not a plan document where it was not attached to the policy or part of the claim file plaintiff was provided)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2010 WL 5300537, at *2",
"parenthetical": "finding ACF not a plan document where it was not attached to the policy or part of the claim file plaintiff was provided",
"sentence": "See Francis, 2011 WL 4102143, at *4 (holding in the alternative that the ACF was unenforceable because it was \"neither attached to nor endorsed on the policy”); see also Heim v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No Civ.A. 10-1567, 2010 WL 5300537, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 22, 2010) (finding ACF not a plan document where it was not attached to the policy or part of the claim file plaintiff was provided)."
} | 4,310,011 | a |
The McFadden Court, which dealt with the federal Analogue Act, interpreted the scienter mandate as to controlled-substance analogues as meaning that the government must show that the defendant either knew that the substance was a controlled-substance analogue regardless of his .knowledge of its identity, or knew that it satisfied the specific statutory prerequisites making it a controlled substance analogue. Those prerequisites include a substantially similar chemical structure to that of a scheduled controlled substance. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "43 N.E.3d 1259, 1265",
"parenthetical": "relying on an express scienter requirement in rejecting a vagueness challenge to a counterfeit-controlled-substance statute",
"sentence": "Id.; see also Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 & n.14, 102 S.Ct. at 1193 & n.14 (reciting that the Supreme Court “has recognized that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that- his conduct is proscribed,” and citing cases); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342, 72 S.Ct. 329, 331-32, 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952) (indicating that a “knowingly” mens rea requirement “does much to destroy any force in the argument” that enforcement of the regulation in question would violate due process on vagueness grounds); United States v. Novak, 841 F.3d 721, 728-29 (7th Cir. 2016) (summarizing the McFadden scienter analysis, including the mandate that the government prove the accused knew the chemical structure was substantially similar to that of a scheduled controlled substance); cf. Tiplick v. State, 43 N.E.3d 1259, 1265 (Ind. 2015) (relying on an express scienter requirement in rejecting a vagueness challenge to a counterfeit-controlled-substance statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reciting that the Supreme Court \"has recognized that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law's vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that- his conduct is proscribed,\" and citing cases",
"sentence": "Id.; see also Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 & n.14, 102 S.Ct. at 1193 & n.14 (reciting that the Supreme Court “has recognized that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that- his conduct is proscribed,” and citing cases); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342, 72 S.Ct. 329, 331-32, 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952) (indicating that a “knowingly” mens rea requirement “does much to destroy any force in the argument” that enforcement of the regulation in question would violate due process on vagueness grounds); United States v. Novak, 841 F.3d 721, 728-29 (7th Cir. 2016) (summarizing the McFadden scienter analysis, including the mandate that the government prove the accused knew the chemical structure was substantially similar to that of a scheduled controlled substance); cf. Tiplick v. State, 43 N.E.3d 1259, 1265 (Ind. 2015) (relying on an express scienter requirement in rejecting a vagueness challenge to a counterfeit-controlled-substance statute)."
} | 12,317,030 | b |
The McFadden Court, which dealt with the federal Analogue Act, interpreted the scienter mandate as to controlled-substance analogues as meaning that the government must show that the defendant either knew that the substance was a controlled-substance analogue regardless of his .knowledge of its identity, or knew that it satisfied the specific statutory prerequisites making it a controlled substance analogue. Those prerequisites include a substantially similar chemical structure to that of a scheduled controlled substance. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "43 N.E.3d 1259, 1265",
"parenthetical": "relying on an express scienter requirement in rejecting a vagueness challenge to a counterfeit-controlled-substance statute",
"sentence": "Id.; see also Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 & n.14, 102 S.Ct. at 1193 & n.14 (reciting that the Supreme Court “has recognized that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that- his conduct is proscribed,” and citing cases); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342, 72 S.Ct. 329, 331-32, 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952) (indicating that a “knowingly” mens rea requirement “does much to destroy any force in the argument” that enforcement of the regulation in question would violate due process on vagueness grounds); United States v. Novak, 841 F.3d 721, 728-29 (7th Cir. 2016) (summarizing the McFadden scienter analysis, including the mandate that the government prove the accused knew the chemical structure was substantially similar to that of a scheduled controlled substance); cf. Tiplick v. State, 43 N.E.3d 1259, 1265 (Ind. 2015) (relying on an express scienter requirement in rejecting a vagueness challenge to a counterfeit-controlled-substance statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reciting that the Supreme Court \"has recognized that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law's vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that- his conduct is proscribed,\" and citing cases",
"sentence": "Id.; see also Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 & n.14, 102 S.Ct. at 1193 & n.14 (reciting that the Supreme Court “has recognized that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that- his conduct is proscribed,” and citing cases); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342, 72 S.Ct. 329, 331-32, 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952) (indicating that a “knowingly” mens rea requirement “does much to destroy any force in the argument” that enforcement of the regulation in question would violate due process on vagueness grounds); United States v. Novak, 841 F.3d 721, 728-29 (7th Cir. 2016) (summarizing the McFadden scienter analysis, including the mandate that the government prove the accused knew the chemical structure was substantially similar to that of a scheduled controlled substance); cf. Tiplick v. State, 43 N.E.3d 1259, 1265 (Ind. 2015) (relying on an express scienter requirement in rejecting a vagueness challenge to a counterfeit-controlled-substance statute)."
} | 12,317,030 | b |
The McFadden Court, which dealt with the federal Analogue Act, interpreted the scienter mandate as to controlled-substance analogues as meaning that the government must show that the defendant either knew that the substance was a controlled-substance analogue regardless of his .knowledge of its identity, or knew that it satisfied the specific statutory prerequisites making it a controlled substance analogue. Those prerequisites include a substantially similar chemical structure to that of a scheduled controlled substance. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "342 U.S. 337, 342",
"parenthetical": "indicating that a \"knowingly\" mens rea requirement \"does much to destroy any force in the argument\" that enforcement of the regulation in question would violate due process on vagueness grounds",
"sentence": "Id.; see also Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 & n.14, 102 S.Ct. at 1193 & n.14 (reciting that the Supreme Court “has recognized that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that- his conduct is proscribed,” and citing cases); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342, 72 S.Ct. 329, 331-32, 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952) (indicating that a “knowingly” mens rea requirement “does much to destroy any force in the argument” that enforcement of the regulation in question would violate due process on vagueness grounds); United States v. Novak, 841 F.3d 721, 728-29 (7th Cir. 2016) (summarizing the McFadden scienter analysis, including the mandate that the government prove the accused knew the chemical structure was substantially similar to that of a scheduled controlled substance); cf. Tiplick v. State, 43 N.E.3d 1259, 1265 (Ind. 2015) (relying on an express scienter requirement in rejecting a vagueness challenge to a counterfeit-controlled-substance statute)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "43 N.E.3d 1259, 1265",
"parenthetical": "relying on an express scienter requirement in rejecting a vagueness challenge to a counterfeit-controlled-substance statute",
"sentence": "Id.; see also Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 & n.14, 102 S.Ct. at 1193 & n.14 (reciting that the Supreme Court “has recognized that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that- his conduct is proscribed,” and citing cases); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342, 72 S.Ct. 329, 331-32, 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952) (indicating that a “knowingly” mens rea requirement “does much to destroy any force in the argument” that enforcement of the regulation in question would violate due process on vagueness grounds); United States v. Novak, 841 F.3d 721, 728-29 (7th Cir. 2016) (summarizing the McFadden scienter analysis, including the mandate that the government prove the accused knew the chemical structure was substantially similar to that of a scheduled controlled substance); cf. Tiplick v. State, 43 N.E.3d 1259, 1265 (Ind. 2015) (relying on an express scienter requirement in rejecting a vagueness challenge to a counterfeit-controlled-substance statute)."
} | 12,317,030 | a |
The McFadden Court, which dealt with the federal Analogue Act, interpreted the scienter mandate as to controlled-substance analogues as meaning that the government must show that the defendant either knew that the substance was a controlled-substance analogue regardless of his .knowledge of its identity, or knew that it satisfied the specific statutory prerequisites making it a controlled substance analogue. Those prerequisites include a substantially similar chemical structure to that of a scheduled controlled substance. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "72 S.Ct. 329, 331-32",
"parenthetical": "indicating that a \"knowingly\" mens rea requirement \"does much to destroy any force in the argument\" that enforcement of the regulation in question would violate due process on vagueness grounds",
"sentence": "Id.; see also Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 & n.14, 102 S.Ct. at 1193 & n.14 (reciting that the Supreme Court “has recognized that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that- his conduct is proscribed,” and citing cases); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342, 72 S.Ct. 329, 331-32, 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952) (indicating that a “knowingly” mens rea requirement “does much to destroy any force in the argument” that enforcement of the regulation in question would violate due process on vagueness grounds); United States v. Novak, 841 F.3d 721, 728-29 (7th Cir. 2016) (summarizing the McFadden scienter analysis, including the mandate that the government prove the accused knew the chemical structure was substantially similar to that of a scheduled controlled substance); cf. Tiplick v. State, 43 N.E.3d 1259, 1265 (Ind. 2015) (relying on an express scienter requirement in rejecting a vagueness challenge to a counterfeit-controlled-substance statute)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "43 N.E.3d 1259, 1265",
"parenthetical": "relying on an express scienter requirement in rejecting a vagueness challenge to a counterfeit-controlled-substance statute",
"sentence": "Id.; see also Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 & n.14, 102 S.Ct. at 1193 & n.14 (reciting that the Supreme Court “has recognized that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that- his conduct is proscribed,” and citing cases); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342, 72 S.Ct. 329, 331-32, 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952) (indicating that a “knowingly” mens rea requirement “does much to destroy any force in the argument” that enforcement of the regulation in question would violate due process on vagueness grounds); United States v. Novak, 841 F.3d 721, 728-29 (7th Cir. 2016) (summarizing the McFadden scienter analysis, including the mandate that the government prove the accused knew the chemical structure was substantially similar to that of a scheduled controlled substance); cf. Tiplick v. State, 43 N.E.3d 1259, 1265 (Ind. 2015) (relying on an express scienter requirement in rejecting a vagueness challenge to a counterfeit-controlled-substance statute)."
} | 12,317,030 | a |
The McFadden Court, which dealt with the federal Analogue Act, interpreted the scienter mandate as to controlled-substance analogues as meaning that the government must show that the defendant either knew that the substance was a controlled-substance analogue regardless of his .knowledge of its identity, or knew that it satisfied the specific statutory prerequisites making it a controlled substance analogue. Those prerequisites include a substantially similar chemical structure to that of a scheduled controlled substance. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "indicating that a \"knowingly\" mens rea requirement \"does much to destroy any force in the argument\" that enforcement of the regulation in question would violate due process on vagueness grounds",
"sentence": "Id.; see also Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 & n.14, 102 S.Ct. at 1193 & n.14 (reciting that the Supreme Court “has recognized that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that- his conduct is proscribed,” and citing cases); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342, 72 S.Ct. 329, 331-32, 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952) (indicating that a “knowingly” mens rea requirement “does much to destroy any force in the argument” that enforcement of the regulation in question would violate due process on vagueness grounds); United States v. Novak, 841 F.3d 721, 728-29 (7th Cir. 2016) (summarizing the McFadden scienter analysis, including the mandate that the government prove the accused knew the chemical structure was substantially similar to that of a scheduled controlled substance); cf. Tiplick v. State, 43 N.E.3d 1259, 1265 (Ind. 2015) (relying on an express scienter requirement in rejecting a vagueness challenge to a counterfeit-controlled-substance statute)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "43 N.E.3d 1259, 1265",
"parenthetical": "relying on an express scienter requirement in rejecting a vagueness challenge to a counterfeit-controlled-substance statute",
"sentence": "Id.; see also Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 & n.14, 102 S.Ct. at 1193 & n.14 (reciting that the Supreme Court “has recognized that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that- his conduct is proscribed,” and citing cases); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342, 72 S.Ct. 329, 331-32, 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952) (indicating that a “knowingly” mens rea requirement “does much to destroy any force in the argument” that enforcement of the regulation in question would violate due process on vagueness grounds); United States v. Novak, 841 F.3d 721, 728-29 (7th Cir. 2016) (summarizing the McFadden scienter analysis, including the mandate that the government prove the accused knew the chemical structure was substantially similar to that of a scheduled controlled substance); cf. Tiplick v. State, 43 N.E.3d 1259, 1265 (Ind. 2015) (relying on an express scienter requirement in rejecting a vagueness challenge to a counterfeit-controlled-substance statute)."
} | 12,317,030 | a |
The McFadden Court, which dealt with the federal Analogue Act, interpreted the scienter mandate as to controlled-substance analogues as meaning that the government must show that the defendant either knew that the substance was a controlled-substance analogue regardless of his .knowledge of its identity, or knew that it satisfied the specific statutory prerequisites making it a controlled substance analogue. Those prerequisites include a substantially similar chemical structure to that of a scheduled controlled substance. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "841 F.3d 721, 728-29",
"parenthetical": "summarizing the McFadden scienter analysis, including the mandate that the government prove the accused knew the chemical structure was substantially similar to that of a scheduled controlled substance",
"sentence": "Id.; see also Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 & n.14, 102 S.Ct. at 1193 & n.14 (reciting that the Supreme Court “has recognized that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that- his conduct is proscribed,” and citing cases); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342, 72 S.Ct. 329, 331-32, 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952) (indicating that a “knowingly” mens rea requirement “does much to destroy any force in the argument” that enforcement of the regulation in question would violate due process on vagueness grounds); United States v. Novak, 841 F.3d 721, 728-29 (7th Cir. 2016) (summarizing the McFadden scienter analysis, including the mandate that the government prove the accused knew the chemical structure was substantially similar to that of a scheduled controlled substance); cf. Tiplick v. State, 43 N.E.3d 1259, 1265 (Ind. 2015) (relying on an express scienter requirement in rejecting a vagueness challenge to a counterfeit-controlled-substance statute)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "43 N.E.3d 1259, 1265",
"parenthetical": "relying on an express scienter requirement in rejecting a vagueness challenge to a counterfeit-controlled-substance statute",
"sentence": "Id.; see also Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 & n.14, 102 S.Ct. at 1193 & n.14 (reciting that the Supreme Court “has recognized that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that- his conduct is proscribed,” and citing cases); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342, 72 S.Ct. 329, 331-32, 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952) (indicating that a “knowingly” mens rea requirement “does much to destroy any force in the argument” that enforcement of the regulation in question would violate due process on vagueness grounds); United States v. Novak, 841 F.3d 721, 728-29 (7th Cir. 2016) (summarizing the McFadden scienter analysis, including the mandate that the government prove the accused knew the chemical structure was substantially similar to that of a scheduled controlled substance); cf. Tiplick v. State, 43 N.E.3d 1259, 1265 (Ind. 2015) (relying on an express scienter requirement in rejecting a vagueness challenge to a counterfeit-controlled-substance statute)."
} | 12,317,030 | a |
The degree of authority granted to Puerto Rico to regulate its local affairs is very different from Congress's exclusive powers over the District of Columbia, the other territory excluded by SS 101(52) from authorizing its municipalities under SS 109(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "977 F.2d 8, 8",
"parenthetical": "\"If the government of Puerto Rico were nothing other than the alter ego or imme diate servant of the federal government, then the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine would have no pertinence, for a doctrine designed to safeguard federal authority against usurpation has no role when the federal government itself is effectively the actor.\"",
"sentence": "See Trailer Marine Transp. Corp., 977 F.2d at 8 (“If the government of Puerto Rico were nothing other than the alter ego or imme diate servant of the federal government, then the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine would have no pertinence, for a doctrine designed to safeguard federal authority against usurpation has no role when the federal government itself is effectively the actor.”); cf. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 36 L.Ed.2d 342 (1973) (“Not only may statutes of Congress of otherwise nationwide application be applied to the District of Columbia, but Congress may also exercise all the police and regulatory powers which a state legislature or municipal government would have in legislating for state or local purposes.”); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954) (“The power of Congress over the District of Columbia includes all the legislative powers which a state may exercise over its affairs.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "411 U.S. 389, 397",
"parenthetical": "\"Not only may statutes of Congress of otherwise nationwide application be applied to the District of Columbia, but Congress may also exercise all the police and regulatory powers which a state legislature or municipal government would have in legislating for state or local purposes.\"",
"sentence": "See Trailer Marine Transp. Corp., 977 F.2d at 8 (“If the government of Puerto Rico were nothing other than the alter ego or imme diate servant of the federal government, then the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine would have no pertinence, for a doctrine designed to safeguard federal authority against usurpation has no role when the federal government itself is effectively the actor.”); cf. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 36 L.Ed.2d 342 (1973) (“Not only may statutes of Congress of otherwise nationwide application be applied to the District of Columbia, but Congress may also exercise all the police and regulatory powers which a state legislature or municipal government would have in legislating for state or local purposes.”); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954) (“The power of Congress over the District of Columbia includes all the legislative powers which a state may exercise over its affairs.”)."
} | 4,358,040 | a |
The degree of authority granted to Puerto Rico to regulate its local affairs is very different from Congress's exclusive powers over the District of Columbia, the other territory excluded by SS 101(52) from authorizing its municipalities under SS 109(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "977 F.2d 8, 8",
"parenthetical": "\"If the government of Puerto Rico were nothing other than the alter ego or imme diate servant of the federal government, then the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine would have no pertinence, for a doctrine designed to safeguard federal authority against usurpation has no role when the federal government itself is effectively the actor.\"",
"sentence": "See Trailer Marine Transp. Corp., 977 F.2d at 8 (“If the government of Puerto Rico were nothing other than the alter ego or imme diate servant of the federal government, then the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine would have no pertinence, for a doctrine designed to safeguard federal authority against usurpation has no role when the federal government itself is effectively the actor.”); cf. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 36 L.Ed.2d 342 (1973) (“Not only may statutes of Congress of otherwise nationwide application be applied to the District of Columbia, but Congress may also exercise all the police and regulatory powers which a state legislature or municipal government would have in legislating for state or local purposes.”); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954) (“The power of Congress over the District of Columbia includes all the legislative powers which a state may exercise over its affairs.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Not only may statutes of Congress of otherwise nationwide application be applied to the District of Columbia, but Congress may also exercise all the police and regulatory powers which a state legislature or municipal government would have in legislating for state or local purposes.\"",
"sentence": "See Trailer Marine Transp. Corp., 977 F.2d at 8 (“If the government of Puerto Rico were nothing other than the alter ego or imme diate servant of the federal government, then the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine would have no pertinence, for a doctrine designed to safeguard federal authority against usurpation has no role when the federal government itself is effectively the actor.”); cf. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 36 L.Ed.2d 342 (1973) (“Not only may statutes of Congress of otherwise nationwide application be applied to the District of Columbia, but Congress may also exercise all the police and regulatory powers which a state legislature or municipal government would have in legislating for state or local purposes.”); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954) (“The power of Congress over the District of Columbia includes all the legislative powers which a state may exercise over its affairs.”)."
} | 4,358,040 | a |
The degree of authority granted to Puerto Rico to regulate its local affairs is very different from Congress's exclusive powers over the District of Columbia, the other territory excluded by SS 101(52) from authorizing its municipalities under SS 109(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Not only may statutes of Congress of otherwise nationwide application be applied to the District of Columbia, but Congress may also exercise all the police and regulatory powers which a state legislature or municipal government would have in legislating for state or local purposes.\"",
"sentence": "See Trailer Marine Transp. Corp., 977 F.2d at 8 (“If the government of Puerto Rico were nothing other than the alter ego or imme diate servant of the federal government, then the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine would have no pertinence, for a doctrine designed to safeguard federal authority against usurpation has no role when the federal government itself is effectively the actor.”); cf. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 36 L.Ed.2d 342 (1973) (“Not only may statutes of Congress of otherwise nationwide application be applied to the District of Columbia, but Congress may also exercise all the police and regulatory powers which a state legislature or municipal government would have in legislating for state or local purposes.”); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954) (“The power of Congress over the District of Columbia includes all the legislative powers which a state may exercise over its affairs.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "977 F.2d 8, 8",
"parenthetical": "\"If the government of Puerto Rico were nothing other than the alter ego or imme diate servant of the federal government, then the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine would have no pertinence, for a doctrine designed to safeguard federal authority against usurpation has no role when the federal government itself is effectively the actor.\"",
"sentence": "See Trailer Marine Transp. Corp., 977 F.2d at 8 (“If the government of Puerto Rico were nothing other than the alter ego or imme diate servant of the federal government, then the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine would have no pertinence, for a doctrine designed to safeguard federal authority against usurpation has no role when the federal government itself is effectively the actor.”); cf. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 36 L.Ed.2d 342 (1973) (“Not only may statutes of Congress of otherwise nationwide application be applied to the District of Columbia, but Congress may also exercise all the police and regulatory powers which a state legislature or municipal government would have in legislating for state or local purposes.”); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954) (“The power of Congress over the District of Columbia includes all the legislative powers which a state may exercise over its affairs.”)."
} | 4,358,040 | b |
The degree of authority granted to Puerto Rico to regulate its local affairs is very different from Congress's exclusive powers over the District of Columbia, the other territory excluded by SS 101(52) from authorizing its municipalities under SS 109(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "348 U.S. 26, 31",
"parenthetical": "\"The power of Congress over the District of Columbia includes all the legislative powers which a state may exercise over its affairs.\"",
"sentence": "See Trailer Marine Transp. Corp., 977 F.2d at 8 (“If the government of Puerto Rico were nothing other than the alter ego or imme diate servant of the federal government, then the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine would have no pertinence, for a doctrine designed to safeguard federal authority against usurpation has no role when the federal government itself is effectively the actor.”); cf. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 36 L.Ed.2d 342 (1973) (“Not only may statutes of Congress of otherwise nationwide application be applied to the District of Columbia, but Congress may also exercise all the police and regulatory powers which a state legislature or municipal government would have in legislating for state or local purposes.”); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954) (“The power of Congress over the District of Columbia includes all the legislative powers which a state may exercise over its affairs.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "977 F.2d 8, 8",
"parenthetical": "\"If the government of Puerto Rico were nothing other than the alter ego or imme diate servant of the federal government, then the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine would have no pertinence, for a doctrine designed to safeguard federal authority against usurpation has no role when the federal government itself is effectively the actor.\"",
"sentence": "See Trailer Marine Transp. Corp., 977 F.2d at 8 (“If the government of Puerto Rico were nothing other than the alter ego or imme diate servant of the federal government, then the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine would have no pertinence, for a doctrine designed to safeguard federal authority against usurpation has no role when the federal government itself is effectively the actor.”); cf. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 36 L.Ed.2d 342 (1973) (“Not only may statutes of Congress of otherwise nationwide application be applied to the District of Columbia, but Congress may also exercise all the police and regulatory powers which a state legislature or municipal government would have in legislating for state or local purposes.”); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954) (“The power of Congress over the District of Columbia includes all the legislative powers which a state may exercise over its affairs.”)."
} | 4,358,040 | b |
The degree of authority granted to Puerto Rico to regulate its local affairs is very different from Congress's exclusive powers over the District of Columbia, the other territory excluded by SS 101(52) from authorizing its municipalities under SS 109(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "977 F.2d 8, 8",
"parenthetical": "\"If the government of Puerto Rico were nothing other than the alter ego or imme diate servant of the federal government, then the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine would have no pertinence, for a doctrine designed to safeguard federal authority against usurpation has no role when the federal government itself is effectively the actor.\"",
"sentence": "See Trailer Marine Transp. Corp., 977 F.2d at 8 (“If the government of Puerto Rico were nothing other than the alter ego or imme diate servant of the federal government, then the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine would have no pertinence, for a doctrine designed to safeguard federal authority against usurpation has no role when the federal government itself is effectively the actor.”); cf. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 36 L.Ed.2d 342 (1973) (“Not only may statutes of Congress of otherwise nationwide application be applied to the District of Columbia, but Congress may also exercise all the police and regulatory powers which a state legislature or municipal government would have in legislating for state or local purposes.”); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954) (“The power of Congress over the District of Columbia includes all the legislative powers which a state may exercise over its affairs.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The power of Congress over the District of Columbia includes all the legislative powers which a state may exercise over its affairs.\"",
"sentence": "See Trailer Marine Transp. Corp., 977 F.2d at 8 (“If the government of Puerto Rico were nothing other than the alter ego or imme diate servant of the federal government, then the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine would have no pertinence, for a doctrine designed to safeguard federal authority against usurpation has no role when the federal government itself is effectively the actor.”); cf. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 36 L.Ed.2d 342 (1973) (“Not only may statutes of Congress of otherwise nationwide application be applied to the District of Columbia, but Congress may also exercise all the police and regulatory powers which a state legislature or municipal government would have in legislating for state or local purposes.”); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954) (“The power of Congress over the District of Columbia includes all the legislative powers which a state may exercise over its affairs.”)."
} | 4,358,040 | a |
The degree of authority granted to Puerto Rico to regulate its local affairs is very different from Congress's exclusive powers over the District of Columbia, the other territory excluded by SS 101(52) from authorizing its municipalities under SS 109(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The power of Congress over the District of Columbia includes all the legislative powers which a state may exercise over its affairs.\"",
"sentence": "See Trailer Marine Transp. Corp., 977 F.2d at 8 (“If the government of Puerto Rico were nothing other than the alter ego or imme diate servant of the federal government, then the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine would have no pertinence, for a doctrine designed to safeguard federal authority against usurpation has no role when the federal government itself is effectively the actor.”); cf. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 36 L.Ed.2d 342 (1973) (“Not only may statutes of Congress of otherwise nationwide application be applied to the District of Columbia, but Congress may also exercise all the police and regulatory powers which a state legislature or municipal government would have in legislating for state or local purposes.”); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954) (“The power of Congress over the District of Columbia includes all the legislative powers which a state may exercise over its affairs.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "977 F.2d 8, 8",
"parenthetical": "\"If the government of Puerto Rico were nothing other than the alter ego or imme diate servant of the federal government, then the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine would have no pertinence, for a doctrine designed to safeguard federal authority against usurpation has no role when the federal government itself is effectively the actor.\"",
"sentence": "See Trailer Marine Transp. Corp., 977 F.2d at 8 (“If the government of Puerto Rico were nothing other than the alter ego or imme diate servant of the federal government, then the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine would have no pertinence, for a doctrine designed to safeguard federal authority against usurpation has no role when the federal government itself is effectively the actor.”); cf. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 36 L.Ed.2d 342 (1973) (“Not only may statutes of Congress of otherwise nationwide application be applied to the District of Columbia, but Congress may also exercise all the police and regulatory powers which a state legislature or municipal government would have in legislating for state or local purposes.”); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954) (“The power of Congress over the District of Columbia includes all the legislative powers which a state may exercise over its affairs.”)."
} | 4,358,040 | b |
In order to create a valid contract, the parties must come to a "meeting of the minds." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "101 F.3d 1034, 1034",
"parenthetical": "holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement",
"sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement); United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35, 36 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendant’s testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point); cf. United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir.) (“When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.”), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 156, 117 S.Ct. 156, 136 L.Ed.2d 101 (1996); United States v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612, 613 (6th Cir.1991) (holding that there can be no plea agreement without a meeting of the minds)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "83 F.3d 934, 938",
"parenthetical": "\"When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.\"",
"sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement); United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35, 36 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendant’s testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point); cf. United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir.) (“When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.”), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 156, 117 S.Ct. 156, 136 L.Ed.2d 101 (1996); United States v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612, 613 (6th Cir.1991) (holding that there can be no plea agreement without a meeting of the minds)."
} | 238,082 | a |
In order to create a valid contract, the parties must come to a "meeting of the minds." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "101 F.3d 1034, 1034",
"parenthetical": "holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement",
"sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement); United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35, 36 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendant’s testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point); cf. United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir.) (“When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.”), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 156, 117 S.Ct. 156, 136 L.Ed.2d 101 (1996); United States v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612, 613 (6th Cir.1991) (holding that there can be no plea agreement without a meeting of the minds)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.\"",
"sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement); United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35, 36 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendant’s testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point); cf. United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir.) (“When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.”), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 156, 117 S.Ct. 156, 136 L.Ed.2d 101 (1996); United States v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612, 613 (6th Cir.1991) (holding that there can be no plea agreement without a meeting of the minds)."
} | 238,082 | a |
In order to create a valid contract, the parties must come to a "meeting of the minds." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "101 F.3d 1034, 1034",
"parenthetical": "holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement",
"sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement); United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35, 36 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendant’s testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point); cf. United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir.) (“When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.”), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 156, 117 S.Ct. 156, 136 L.Ed.2d 101 (1996); United States v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612, 613 (6th Cir.1991) (holding that there can be no plea agreement without a meeting of the minds)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.\"",
"sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement); United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35, 36 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendant’s testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point); cf. United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir.) (“When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.”), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 156, 117 S.Ct. 156, 136 L.Ed.2d 101 (1996); United States v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612, 613 (6th Cir.1991) (holding that there can be no plea agreement without a meeting of the minds)."
} | 238,082 | a |
In order to create a valid contract, the parties must come to a "meeting of the minds." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "101 F.3d 1034, 1034",
"parenthetical": "holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement",
"sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement); United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35, 36 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendant’s testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point); cf. United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir.) (“When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.”), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 156, 117 S.Ct. 156, 136 L.Ed.2d 101 (1996); United States v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612, 613 (6th Cir.1991) (holding that there can be no plea agreement without a meeting of the minds)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.\"",
"sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement); United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35, 36 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendant’s testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point); cf. United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir.) (“When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.”), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 156, 117 S.Ct. 156, 136 L.Ed.2d 101 (1996); United States v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612, 613 (6th Cir.1991) (holding that there can be no plea agreement without a meeting of the minds)."
} | 238,082 | a |
In order to create a valid contract, the parties must come to a "meeting of the minds." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "924 F.2d 612, 613",
"parenthetical": "holding that there can be no plea agreement without a meeting of the minds",
"sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement); United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35, 36 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendant’s testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point); cf. United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir.) (“When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.”), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 156, 117 S.Ct. 156, 136 L.Ed.2d 101 (1996); United States v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612, 613 (6th Cir.1991) (holding that there can be no plea agreement without a meeting of the minds)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "101 F.3d 1034, 1034",
"parenthetical": "holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement",
"sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement); United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35, 36 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendant’s testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point); cf. United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir.) (“When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.”), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 156, 117 S.Ct. 156, 136 L.Ed.2d 101 (1996); United States v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612, 613 (6th Cir.1991) (holding that there can be no plea agreement without a meeting of the minds)."
} | 238,082 | b |
In order to create a valid contract, the parties must come to a "meeting of the minds." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "83 F.3d 934, 938",
"parenthetical": "\"When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.\"",
"sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement); United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35, 36 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendant’s testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point); cf. United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir.) (“When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.”), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 156, 117 S.Ct. 156, 136 L.Ed.2d 101 (1996); United States v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612, 613 (6th Cir.1991) (holding that there can be no plea agreement without a meeting of the minds)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "709 F.2d 35, 36",
"parenthetical": "holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendant's testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point",
"sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement); United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35, 36 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendant’s testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point); cf. United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir.) (“When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.”), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 156, 117 S.Ct. 156, 136 L.Ed.2d 101 (1996); United States v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612, 613 (6th Cir.1991) (holding that there can be no plea agreement without a meeting of the minds)."
} | 238,082 | b |
In order to create a valid contract, the parties must come to a "meeting of the minds." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.\"",
"sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement); United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35, 36 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendant’s testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point); cf. United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir.) (“When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.”), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 156, 117 S.Ct. 156, 136 L.Ed.2d 101 (1996); United States v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612, 613 (6th Cir.1991) (holding that there can be no plea agreement without a meeting of the minds)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "709 F.2d 35, 36",
"parenthetical": "holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendant's testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point",
"sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement); United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35, 36 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendant’s testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point); cf. United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir.) (“When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.”), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 156, 117 S.Ct. 156, 136 L.Ed.2d 101 (1996); United States v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612, 613 (6th Cir.1991) (holding that there can be no plea agreement without a meeting of the minds)."
} | 238,082 | b |
In order to create a valid contract, the parties must come to a "meeting of the minds." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "709 F.2d 35, 36",
"parenthetical": "holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendant's testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point",
"sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement); United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35, 36 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendant’s testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point); cf. United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir.) (“When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.”), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 156, 117 S.Ct. 156, 136 L.Ed.2d 101 (1996); United States v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612, 613 (6th Cir.1991) (holding that there can be no plea agreement without a meeting of the minds)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.\"",
"sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement); United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35, 36 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendant’s testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point); cf. United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir.) (“When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.”), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 156, 117 S.Ct. 156, 136 L.Ed.2d 101 (1996); United States v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612, 613 (6th Cir.1991) (holding that there can be no plea agreement without a meeting of the minds)."
} | 238,082 | a |
In order to create a valid contract, the parties must come to a "meeting of the minds." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "709 F.2d 35, 36",
"parenthetical": "holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendant's testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point",
"sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement); United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35, 36 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendant’s testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point); cf. United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir.) (“When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.”), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 156, 117 S.Ct. 156, 136 L.Ed.2d 101 (1996); United States v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612, 613 (6th Cir.1991) (holding that there can be no plea agreement without a meeting of the minds)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.\"",
"sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement); United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35, 36 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendant’s testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point); cf. United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir.) (“When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.”), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 156, 117 S.Ct. 156, 136 L.Ed.2d 101 (1996); United States v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612, 613 (6th Cir.1991) (holding that there can be no plea agreement without a meeting of the minds)."
} | 238,082 | a |
In order to create a valid contract, the parties must come to a "meeting of the minds." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "709 F.2d 35, 36",
"parenthetical": "holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendant's testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point",
"sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement); United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35, 36 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendant’s testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point); cf. United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir.) (“When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.”), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 156, 117 S.Ct. 156, 136 L.Ed.2d 101 (1996); United States v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612, 613 (6th Cir.1991) (holding that there can be no plea agreement without a meeting of the minds)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "924 F.2d 612, 613",
"parenthetical": "holding that there can be no plea agreement without a meeting of the minds",
"sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement); United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35, 36 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendant’s testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point); cf. United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir.) (“When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.”), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 156, 117 S.Ct. 156, 136 L.Ed.2d 101 (1996); United States v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612, 613 (6th Cir.1991) (holding that there can be no plea agreement without a meeting of the minds)."
} | 238,082 | a |
This is because any reliance on post-1995 amended portions of chapter 51 did not inordinately burden the Bairs' property "apart from the law, rule, regulation, or ordinance being amended." SS 70.001(12). Rather, the reliance on those amended portions of chapter 51 was part of the City's overall decision to require compliance with the 50 percent Rule, a rule that was enacted prior to May 11, 1995. Because the City established that there was no genuine issue of. material fact regarding whether section 70.001(12) applied, the burden shifted to the Bairs to prove that there was- a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the application of any newly amended sections of chapter 51 imposed an inordinate burden on their real property. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "120 So.3d 27, 29",
"parenthetical": "noting that plaintiff who brought Bert Harris Act claim had burden of proving that town's actions constituted inordinate burden on plaintiffs vested right to use its property",
"sentence": "See Landers v. Milton, 370 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla.1979) (explaining that once a movant for summary judgment has met its burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to prove that such an issue does exist); Pelz v. City of Clearwater, 568 So.2d 949, 951 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (citing DeMesme v. Stephenson, 498 So.2d 673, 675 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), for the same proposition); see also Town of Ponce Inlet v. Pacetta, LLC, 120 So.3d 27, 29 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (noting that plaintiff who brought Bert Harris Act claim had burden of proving that town’s actions constituted inordinate burden on plaintiffs vested right to use its property)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "370 So.2d 368, 370",
"parenthetical": "explaining that once a movant for summary judgment has met its burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to prove that such an issue does exist",
"sentence": "See Landers v. Milton, 370 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla.1979) (explaining that once a movant for summary judgment has met its burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to prove that such an issue does exist); Pelz v. City of Clearwater, 568 So.2d 949, 951 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (citing DeMesme v. Stephenson, 498 So.2d 673, 675 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), for the same proposition); see also Town of Ponce Inlet v. Pacetta, LLC, 120 So.3d 27, 29 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (noting that plaintiff who brought Bert Harris Act claim had burden of proving that town’s actions constituted inordinate burden on plaintiffs vested right to use its property)."
} | 6,783,131 | b |
The decision to admit or exclude opinion testimony generally involves the routine exercise of discretion by the trial court under, among other rules, ER 401, 403, 701, 702 and 704. These rules govern evidentiary questions that do not necessarily implicate constitutional rights. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "55 Wn. App. 299, 299",
"parenthetical": "erroneous admission of expert testimony under ER 702 is not of constitutional magnitude",
"sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a)(3)), review denied, 113 Wn.2d 1027 (1989); see also Wilber, 55 Wn. App. at 299 (erroneous admission of expert testimony under ER 702 is not of constitutional magnitude); State v. Chase, 59 Wn. App. 501, 508, 799 P.2d 272 (1990) (errors under ER 403 are not of constitutional magnitude and cannot be raised under RAP 2.5(a))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "54 Wn. App. 479, 484",
"parenthetical": "contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a",
"sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a)(3)), review denied, 113 Wn.2d 1027 (1989); see also Wilber, 55 Wn. App. at 299 (erroneous admission of expert testimony under ER 702 is not of constitutional magnitude); State v. Chase, 59 Wn. App. 501, 508, 799 P.2d 272 (1990) (errors under ER 403 are not of constitutional magnitude and cannot be raised under RAP 2.5(a))."
} | 1,745,499 | b |
The decision to admit or exclude opinion testimony generally involves the routine exercise of discretion by the trial court under, among other rules, ER 401, 403, 701, 702 and 704. These rules govern evidentiary questions that do not necessarily implicate constitutional rights. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "54 Wn. App. 479, 484",
"parenthetical": "contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a",
"sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a)(3)), review denied, 113 Wn.2d 1027 (1989); see also Wilber, 55 Wn. App. at 299 (erroneous admission of expert testimony under ER 702 is not of constitutional magnitude); State v. Chase, 59 Wn. App. 501, 508, 799 P.2d 272 (1990) (errors under ER 403 are not of constitutional magnitude and cannot be raised under RAP 2.5(a))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "59 Wn. App. 501, 508",
"parenthetical": "errors under ER 403 are not of constitutional magnitude and cannot be raised under RAP 2.5(a",
"sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a)(3)), review denied, 113 Wn.2d 1027 (1989); see also Wilber, 55 Wn. App. at 299 (erroneous admission of expert testimony under ER 702 is not of constitutional magnitude); State v. Chase, 59 Wn. App. 501, 508, 799 P.2d 272 (1990) (errors under ER 403 are not of constitutional magnitude and cannot be raised under RAP 2.5(a))."
} | 1,745,499 | a |
The decision to admit or exclude opinion testimony generally involves the routine exercise of discretion by the trial court under, among other rules, ER 401, 403, 701, 702 and 704. These rules govern evidentiary questions that do not necessarily implicate constitutional rights. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "errors under ER 403 are not of constitutional magnitude and cannot be raised under RAP 2.5(a",
"sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a)(3)), review denied, 113 Wn.2d 1027 (1989); see also Wilber, 55 Wn. App. at 299 (erroneous admission of expert testimony under ER 702 is not of constitutional magnitude); State v. Chase, 59 Wn. App. 501, 508, 799 P.2d 272 (1990) (errors under ER 403 are not of constitutional magnitude and cannot be raised under RAP 2.5(a))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "54 Wn. App. 479, 484",
"parenthetical": "contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a",
"sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a)(3)), review denied, 113 Wn.2d 1027 (1989); see also Wilber, 55 Wn. App. at 299 (erroneous admission of expert testimony under ER 702 is not of constitutional magnitude); State v. Chase, 59 Wn. App. 501, 508, 799 P.2d 272 (1990) (errors under ER 403 are not of constitutional magnitude and cannot be raised under RAP 2.5(a))."
} | 1,745,499 | b |
The decision to admit or exclude opinion testimony generally involves the routine exercise of discretion by the trial court under, among other rules, ER 401, 403, 701, 702 and 704. These rules govern evidentiary questions that do not necessarily implicate constitutional rights. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "55 Wn. App. 299, 299",
"parenthetical": "erroneous admission of expert testimony under ER 702 is not of constitutional magnitude",
"sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a)(3)), review denied, 113 Wn.2d 1027 (1989); see also Wilber, 55 Wn. App. at 299 (erroneous admission of expert testimony under ER 702 is not of constitutional magnitude); State v. Chase, 59 Wn. App. 501, 508, 799 P.2d 272 (1990) (errors under ER 403 are not of constitutional magnitude and cannot be raised under RAP 2.5(a))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a",
"sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a)(3)), review denied, 113 Wn.2d 1027 (1989); see also Wilber, 55 Wn. App. at 299 (erroneous admission of expert testimony under ER 702 is not of constitutional magnitude); State v. Chase, 59 Wn. App. 501, 508, 799 P.2d 272 (1990) (errors under ER 403 are not of constitutional magnitude and cannot be raised under RAP 2.5(a))."
} | 1,745,499 | b |
The decision to admit or exclude opinion testimony generally involves the routine exercise of discretion by the trial court under, among other rules, ER 401, 403, 701, 702 and 704. These rules govern evidentiary questions that do not necessarily implicate constitutional rights. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a",
"sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a)(3)), review denied, 113 Wn.2d 1027 (1989); see also Wilber, 55 Wn. App. at 299 (erroneous admission of expert testimony under ER 702 is not of constitutional magnitude); State v. Chase, 59 Wn. App. 501, 508, 799 P.2d 272 (1990) (errors under ER 403 are not of constitutional magnitude and cannot be raised under RAP 2.5(a))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "59 Wn. App. 501, 508",
"parenthetical": "errors under ER 403 are not of constitutional magnitude and cannot be raised under RAP 2.5(a",
"sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a)(3)), review denied, 113 Wn.2d 1027 (1989); see also Wilber, 55 Wn. App. at 299 (erroneous admission of expert testimony under ER 702 is not of constitutional magnitude); State v. Chase, 59 Wn. App. 501, 508, 799 P.2d 272 (1990) (errors under ER 403 are not of constitutional magnitude and cannot be raised under RAP 2.5(a))."
} | 1,745,499 | a |
The decision to admit or exclude opinion testimony generally involves the routine exercise of discretion by the trial court under, among other rules, ER 401, 403, 701, 702 and 704. These rules govern evidentiary questions that do not necessarily implicate constitutional rights. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a",
"sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a)(3)), review denied, 113 Wn.2d 1027 (1989); see also Wilber, 55 Wn. App. at 299 (erroneous admission of expert testimony under ER 702 is not of constitutional magnitude); State v. Chase, 59 Wn. App. 501, 508, 799 P.2d 272 (1990) (errors under ER 403 are not of constitutional magnitude and cannot be raised under RAP 2.5(a))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "errors under ER 403 are not of constitutional magnitude and cannot be raised under RAP 2.5(a",
"sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a)(3)), review denied, 113 Wn.2d 1027 (1989); see also Wilber, 55 Wn. App. at 299 (erroneous admission of expert testimony under ER 702 is not of constitutional magnitude); State v. Chase, 59 Wn. App. 501, 508, 799 P.2d 272 (1990) (errors under ER 403 are not of constitutional magnitude and cannot be raised under RAP 2.5(a))."
} | 1,745,499 | a |
The decision to admit or exclude opinion testimony generally involves the routine exercise of discretion by the trial court under, among other rules, ER 401, 403, 701, 702 and 704. These rules govern evidentiary questions that do not necessarily implicate constitutional rights. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a",
"sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a)(3)), review denied, 113 Wn.2d 1027 (1989); see also Wilber, 55 Wn. App. at 299 (erroneous admission of expert testimony under ER 702 is not of constitutional magnitude); State v. Chase, 59 Wn. App. 501, 508, 799 P.2d 272 (1990) (errors under ER 403 are not of constitutional magnitude and cannot be raised under RAP 2.5(a))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "55 Wn. App. 299, 299",
"parenthetical": "erroneous admission of expert testimony under ER 702 is not of constitutional magnitude",
"sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a)(3)), review denied, 113 Wn.2d 1027 (1989); see also Wilber, 55 Wn. App. at 299 (erroneous admission of expert testimony under ER 702 is not of constitutional magnitude); State v. Chase, 59 Wn. App. 501, 508, 799 P.2d 272 (1990) (errors under ER 403 are not of constitutional magnitude and cannot be raised under RAP 2.5(a))."
} | 1,745,499 | a |
The decision to admit or exclude opinion testimony generally involves the routine exercise of discretion by the trial court under, among other rules, ER 401, 403, 701, 702 and 704. These rules govern evidentiary questions that do not necessarily implicate constitutional rights. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "59 Wn. App. 501, 508",
"parenthetical": "errors under ER 403 are not of constitutional magnitude and cannot be raised under RAP 2.5(a",
"sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a)(3)), review denied, 113 Wn.2d 1027 (1989); see also Wilber, 55 Wn. App. at 299 (erroneous admission of expert testimony under ER 702 is not of constitutional magnitude); State v. Chase, 59 Wn. App. 501, 508, 799 P.2d 272 (1990) (errors under ER 403 are not of constitutional magnitude and cannot be raised under RAP 2.5(a))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a",
"sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a)(3)), review denied, 113 Wn.2d 1027 (1989); see also Wilber, 55 Wn. App. at 299 (erroneous admission of expert testimony under ER 702 is not of constitutional magnitude); State v. Chase, 59 Wn. App. 501, 508, 799 P.2d 272 (1990) (errors under ER 403 are not of constitutional magnitude and cannot be raised under RAP 2.5(a))."
} | 1,745,499 | b |
The decision to admit or exclude opinion testimony generally involves the routine exercise of discretion by the trial court under, among other rules, ER 401, 403, 701, 702 and 704. These rules govern evidentiary questions that do not necessarily implicate constitutional rights. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "errors under ER 403 are not of constitutional magnitude and cannot be raised under RAP 2.5(a",
"sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a)(3)), review denied, 113 Wn.2d 1027 (1989); see also Wilber, 55 Wn. App. at 299 (erroneous admission of expert testimony under ER 702 is not of constitutional magnitude); State v. Chase, 59 Wn. App. 501, 508, 799 P.2d 272 (1990) (errors under ER 403 are not of constitutional magnitude and cannot be raised under RAP 2.5(a))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a",
"sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a)(3)), review denied, 113 Wn.2d 1027 (1989); see also Wilber, 55 Wn. App. at 299 (erroneous admission of expert testimony under ER 702 is not of constitutional magnitude); State v. Chase, 59 Wn. App. 501, 508, 799 P.2d 272 (1990) (errors under ER 403 are not of constitutional magnitude and cannot be raised under RAP 2.5(a))."
} | 1,745,499 | b |
Specifically, Shanks alleges that Defendants' ban on motorcycles infringes upon his fundamental rights of interstate and intrastate travel. The Supreme Court has long recognized a fundamental right to interstate travel. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "394 U.S. 618, 629",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.\"",
"sentence": "See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (stating that “[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.”); see also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1177, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966) (stating that “the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "383 U.S. 745, 757",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.\"",
"sentence": "See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (stating that “[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.”); see also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1177, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966) (stating that “the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.”)."
} | 7,849,272 | a |
Specifically, Shanks alleges that Defendants' ban on motorcycles infringes upon his fundamental rights of interstate and intrastate travel. The Supreme Court has long recognized a fundamental right to interstate travel. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "86 S.Ct. 1170, 1177",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.\"",
"sentence": "See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (stating that “[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.”); see also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1177, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966) (stating that “the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "394 U.S. 618, 629",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.\"",
"sentence": "See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (stating that “[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.”); see also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1177, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966) (stating that “the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.”)."
} | 7,849,272 | b |
Specifically, Shanks alleges that Defendants' ban on motorcycles infringes upon his fundamental rights of interstate and intrastate travel. The Supreme Court has long recognized a fundamental right to interstate travel. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "394 U.S. 618, 629",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.\"",
"sentence": "See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (stating that “[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.”); see also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1177, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966) (stating that “the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.\"",
"sentence": "See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (stating that “[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.”); see also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1177, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966) (stating that “the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.”)."
} | 7,849,272 | a |
Specifically, Shanks alleges that Defendants' ban on motorcycles infringes upon his fundamental rights of interstate and intrastate travel. The Supreme Court has long recognized a fundamental right to interstate travel. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "383 U.S. 745, 757",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.\"",
"sentence": "See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (stating that “[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.”); see also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1177, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966) (stating that “the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.\"",
"sentence": "See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (stating that “[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.”); see also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1177, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966) (stating that “the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.”)."
} | 7,849,272 | b |
Specifically, Shanks alleges that Defendants' ban on motorcycles infringes upon his fundamental rights of interstate and intrastate travel. The Supreme Court has long recognized a fundamental right to interstate travel. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "86 S.Ct. 1170, 1177",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.\"",
"sentence": "See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (stating that “[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.”); see also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1177, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966) (stating that “the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.\"",
"sentence": "See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (stating that “[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.”); see also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1177, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966) (stating that “the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.”)."
} | 7,849,272 | b |
Specifically, Shanks alleges that Defendants' ban on motorcycles infringes upon his fundamental rights of interstate and intrastate travel. The Supreme Court has long recognized a fundamental right to interstate travel. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.\"",
"sentence": "See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (stating that “[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.”); see also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1177, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966) (stating that “the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.\"",
"sentence": "See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (stating that “[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.”); see also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1177, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966) (stating that “the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.”)."
} | 7,849,272 | a |
Specifically, Shanks alleges that Defendants' ban on motorcycles infringes upon his fundamental rights of interstate and intrastate travel. The Supreme Court has long recognized a fundamental right to interstate travel. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "383 U.S. 745, 757",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.\"",
"sentence": "See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (stating that “[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.”); see also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1177, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966) (stating that “the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.\"",
"sentence": "See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (stating that “[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.”); see also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1177, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966) (stating that “the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.”)."
} | 7,849,272 | b |
Specifically, Shanks alleges that Defendants' ban on motorcycles infringes upon his fundamental rights of interstate and intrastate travel. The Supreme Court has long recognized a fundamental right to interstate travel. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "86 S.Ct. 1170, 1177",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.\"",
"sentence": "See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (stating that “[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.”); see also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1177, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966) (stating that “the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.\"",
"sentence": "See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (stating that “[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.”); see also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1177, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966) (stating that “the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.”)."
} | 7,849,272 | b |
Specifically, Shanks alleges that Defendants' ban on motorcycles infringes upon his fundamental rights of interstate and intrastate travel. The Supreme Court has long recognized a fundamental right to interstate travel. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.\"",
"sentence": "See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (stating that “[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.”); see also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1177, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966) (stating that “the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.\"",
"sentence": "See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (stating that “[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.”); see also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1177, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966) (stating that “the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.”)."
} | 7,849,272 | a |
Courts in the Sixth Circuit have also declined to apply the first-to-file rule when a declaratory judgment action is filed before a coercive action involving the same parties and issues. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "16 Fed. Appx. 437, 437",
"parenthetical": "\"A plaintiff, even one who files first, does not have a right to bring a declaratory judgment action in the forum of his choosing.\"",
"sentence": "AmSouth Bank, 386 F.3d at 791 (“In any case, the first-to-file rule is not a strict rule and more often than not gives way in the context of a coercive action filed subsequent to a declaratory action.”); see also Zide, 16 Fed. Appx. at 437 (“A plaintiff, even one who files first, does not have a right to bring a declaratory judgment action in the forum of his choosing.”); UAW v. Dana Corp., 1999 WL 33237054 at *6 (N.D.Ohio 1999) (“Cases construing the interplay between declaratory judgment actions and suits based on the merits of underlying substantive claims create, in practical effect, a presumption that a first filed declaratory judgment action should be dismissed or stayed in favor of the substantive suit”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "386 F.3d 791, 791",
"parenthetical": "\"In any case, the first-to-file rule is not a strict rule and more often than not gives way in the context of a coercive action filed subsequent to a declaratory action.\"",
"sentence": "AmSouth Bank, 386 F.3d at 791 (“In any case, the first-to-file rule is not a strict rule and more often than not gives way in the context of a coercive action filed subsequent to a declaratory action.”); see also Zide, 16 Fed. Appx. at 437 (“A plaintiff, even one who files first, does not have a right to bring a declaratory judgment action in the forum of his choosing.”); UAW v. Dana Corp., 1999 WL 33237054 at *6 (N.D.Ohio 1999) (“Cases construing the interplay between declaratory judgment actions and suits based on the merits of underlying substantive claims create, in practical effect, a presumption that a first filed declaratory judgment action should be dismissed or stayed in favor of the substantive suit”)."
} | 5,605,728 | b |
Courts in the Sixth Circuit have also declined to apply the first-to-file rule when a declaratory judgment action is filed before a coercive action involving the same parties and issues. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "386 F.3d 791, 791",
"parenthetical": "\"In any case, the first-to-file rule is not a strict rule and more often than not gives way in the context of a coercive action filed subsequent to a declaratory action.\"",
"sentence": "AmSouth Bank, 386 F.3d at 791 (“In any case, the first-to-file rule is not a strict rule and more often than not gives way in the context of a coercive action filed subsequent to a declaratory action.”); see also Zide, 16 Fed. Appx. at 437 (“A plaintiff, even one who files first, does not have a right to bring a declaratory judgment action in the forum of his choosing.”); UAW v. Dana Corp., 1999 WL 33237054 at *6 (N.D.Ohio 1999) (“Cases construing the interplay between declaratory judgment actions and suits based on the merits of underlying substantive claims create, in practical effect, a presumption that a first filed declaratory judgment action should be dismissed or stayed in favor of the substantive suit”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1999 WL 33237054, at *6",
"parenthetical": "\"Cases construing the interplay between declaratory judgment actions and suits based on the merits of underlying substantive claims create, in practical effect, a presumption that a first filed declaratory judgment action should be dismissed or stayed in favor of the substantive suit\"",
"sentence": "AmSouth Bank, 386 F.3d at 791 (“In any case, the first-to-file rule is not a strict rule and more often than not gives way in the context of a coercive action filed subsequent to a declaratory action.”); see also Zide, 16 Fed. Appx. at 437 (“A plaintiff, even one who files first, does not have a right to bring a declaratory judgment action in the forum of his choosing.”); UAW v. Dana Corp., 1999 WL 33237054 at *6 (N.D.Ohio 1999) (“Cases construing the interplay between declaratory judgment actions and suits based on the merits of underlying substantive claims create, in practical effect, a presumption that a first filed declaratory judgment action should be dismissed or stayed in favor of the substantive suit”)."
} | 5,605,728 | a |
For purposes of determining a spouse's ability to pay, and for purposes of calculating an appropriate amount of periodic alimony, the trial court should ordinarily use the spouse's net income as the starting point for these evaluations. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "567 So.2d 867, 868",
"parenthetical": "evaluating the responding spouse's ability to pay based on the responding spouse's net income",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Jackson, 567 So.2d 867, 868 (Ala.1990) (evaluating the responding spouse’s ability to pay based on the responding spouse’s net income); see also J.D.A. v. A.B.A., 142 So.3d 603, 614 (Ala.Civ.App.2013) (“Because ... the trial court implicitly relied ... on the wife’s erroneous estimation of the husband’s net monthly income, we reverse the periodic-alimony award and remand the cause to the circuit court to reconsider the alimony award.”); Kiel v. Kiel, 51 So.3d 1058, 1068 (Ala.Civ.App.2010) (using the responding spouse’s net income as the basis for evaluating the financial impact that the alimony payment would have); Wheeles v. Wheeles, 770 So.2d 635, 637 (Ala.Civ.App.2000) (reversing the trial court’s judgment that required the husband to pay $1,150 in alimony because the judgment “eripple[d] him financially,” leaving him with $80 per month after his living expenses and court-ordered financial obligations, including periodic alimony, were deducted from “[h]is net income”); and Rubert v. Rubert, 709 So.2d 1283, 1285 (Ala.Civ.App.1998) (holding that the trial court exceeded its discretion because its judgment created financial obligations for the husband that, after deducting the wife’s periodic-alimony award from the husband’s net income, exceeded his remaining income)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "142 So.3d 603, 614",
"parenthetical": "\"Because ... the trial court implicitly relied ... on the wife's erroneous estimation of the husband's net monthly income, we reverse the periodic-alimony award and remand the cause to the circuit court to reconsider the alimony award.\"",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Jackson, 567 So.2d 867, 868 (Ala.1990) (evaluating the responding spouse’s ability to pay based on the responding spouse’s net income); see also J.D.A. v. A.B.A., 142 So.3d 603, 614 (Ala.Civ.App.2013) (“Because ... the trial court implicitly relied ... on the wife’s erroneous estimation of the husband’s net monthly income, we reverse the periodic-alimony award and remand the cause to the circuit court to reconsider the alimony award.”); Kiel v. Kiel, 51 So.3d 1058, 1068 (Ala.Civ.App.2010) (using the responding spouse’s net income as the basis for evaluating the financial impact that the alimony payment would have); Wheeles v. Wheeles, 770 So.2d 635, 637 (Ala.Civ.App.2000) (reversing the trial court’s judgment that required the husband to pay $1,150 in alimony because the judgment “eripple[d] him financially,” leaving him with $80 per month after his living expenses and court-ordered financial obligations, including periodic alimony, were deducted from “[h]is net income”); and Rubert v. Rubert, 709 So.2d 1283, 1285 (Ala.Civ.App.1998) (holding that the trial court exceeded its discretion because its judgment created financial obligations for the husband that, after deducting the wife’s periodic-alimony award from the husband’s net income, exceeded his remaining income)."
} | 6,915,860 | a |
For purposes of determining a spouse's ability to pay, and for purposes of calculating an appropriate amount of periodic alimony, the trial court should ordinarily use the spouse's net income as the starting point for these evaluations. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "567 So.2d 867, 868",
"parenthetical": "evaluating the responding spouse's ability to pay based on the responding spouse's net income",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Jackson, 567 So.2d 867, 868 (Ala.1990) (evaluating the responding spouse’s ability to pay based on the responding spouse’s net income); see also J.D.A. v. A.B.A., 142 So.3d 603, 614 (Ala.Civ.App.2013) (“Because ... the trial court implicitly relied ... on the wife’s erroneous estimation of the husband’s net monthly income, we reverse the periodic-alimony award and remand the cause to the circuit court to reconsider the alimony award.”); Kiel v. Kiel, 51 So.3d 1058, 1068 (Ala.Civ.App.2010) (using the responding spouse’s net income as the basis for evaluating the financial impact that the alimony payment would have); Wheeles v. Wheeles, 770 So.2d 635, 637 (Ala.Civ.App.2000) (reversing the trial court’s judgment that required the husband to pay $1,150 in alimony because the judgment “eripple[d] him financially,” leaving him with $80 per month after his living expenses and court-ordered financial obligations, including periodic alimony, were deducted from “[h]is net income”); and Rubert v. Rubert, 709 So.2d 1283, 1285 (Ala.Civ.App.1998) (holding that the trial court exceeded its discretion because its judgment created financial obligations for the husband that, after deducting the wife’s periodic-alimony award from the husband’s net income, exceeded his remaining income)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "51 So.3d 1058, 1068",
"parenthetical": "using the responding spouse's net income as the basis for evaluating the financial impact that the alimony payment would have",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Jackson, 567 So.2d 867, 868 (Ala.1990) (evaluating the responding spouse’s ability to pay based on the responding spouse’s net income); see also J.D.A. v. A.B.A., 142 So.3d 603, 614 (Ala.Civ.App.2013) (“Because ... the trial court implicitly relied ... on the wife’s erroneous estimation of the husband’s net monthly income, we reverse the periodic-alimony award and remand the cause to the circuit court to reconsider the alimony award.”); Kiel v. Kiel, 51 So.3d 1058, 1068 (Ala.Civ.App.2010) (using the responding spouse’s net income as the basis for evaluating the financial impact that the alimony payment would have); Wheeles v. Wheeles, 770 So.2d 635, 637 (Ala.Civ.App.2000) (reversing the trial court’s judgment that required the husband to pay $1,150 in alimony because the judgment “eripple[d] him financially,” leaving him with $80 per month after his living expenses and court-ordered financial obligations, including periodic alimony, were deducted from “[h]is net income”); and Rubert v. Rubert, 709 So.2d 1283, 1285 (Ala.Civ.App.1998) (holding that the trial court exceeded its discretion because its judgment created financial obligations for the husband that, after deducting the wife’s periodic-alimony award from the husband’s net income, exceeded his remaining income)."
} | 6,915,860 | a |
For purposes of determining a spouse's ability to pay, and for purposes of calculating an appropriate amount of periodic alimony, the trial court should ordinarily use the spouse's net income as the starting point for these evaluations. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "567 So.2d 867, 868",
"parenthetical": "evaluating the responding spouse's ability to pay based on the responding spouse's net income",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Jackson, 567 So.2d 867, 868 (Ala.1990) (evaluating the responding spouse’s ability to pay based on the responding spouse’s net income); see also J.D.A. v. A.B.A., 142 So.3d 603, 614 (Ala.Civ.App.2013) (“Because ... the trial court implicitly relied ... on the wife’s erroneous estimation of the husband’s net monthly income, we reverse the periodic-alimony award and remand the cause to the circuit court to reconsider the alimony award.”); Kiel v. Kiel, 51 So.3d 1058, 1068 (Ala.Civ.App.2010) (using the responding spouse’s net income as the basis for evaluating the financial impact that the alimony payment would have); Wheeles v. Wheeles, 770 So.2d 635, 637 (Ala.Civ.App.2000) (reversing the trial court’s judgment that required the husband to pay $1,150 in alimony because the judgment “eripple[d] him financially,” leaving him with $80 per month after his living expenses and court-ordered financial obligations, including periodic alimony, were deducted from “[h]is net income”); and Rubert v. Rubert, 709 So.2d 1283, 1285 (Ala.Civ.App.1998) (holding that the trial court exceeded its discretion because its judgment created financial obligations for the husband that, after deducting the wife’s periodic-alimony award from the husband’s net income, exceeded his remaining income)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "770 So.2d 635, 637",
"parenthetical": "reversing the trial court's judgment that required the husband to pay $1,150 in alimony because the judgment \"eripple[d] him financially,\" leaving him with $80 per month after his living expenses and court-ordered financial obligations, including periodic alimony, were deducted from \"[h]is net income\"",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Jackson, 567 So.2d 867, 868 (Ala.1990) (evaluating the responding spouse’s ability to pay based on the responding spouse’s net income); see also J.D.A. v. A.B.A., 142 So.3d 603, 614 (Ala.Civ.App.2013) (“Because ... the trial court implicitly relied ... on the wife’s erroneous estimation of the husband’s net monthly income, we reverse the periodic-alimony award and remand the cause to the circuit court to reconsider the alimony award.”); Kiel v. Kiel, 51 So.3d 1058, 1068 (Ala.Civ.App.2010) (using the responding spouse’s net income as the basis for evaluating the financial impact that the alimony payment would have); Wheeles v. Wheeles, 770 So.2d 635, 637 (Ala.Civ.App.2000) (reversing the trial court’s judgment that required the husband to pay $1,150 in alimony because the judgment “eripple[d] him financially,” leaving him with $80 per month after his living expenses and court-ordered financial obligations, including periodic alimony, were deducted from “[h]is net income”); and Rubert v. Rubert, 709 So.2d 1283, 1285 (Ala.Civ.App.1998) (holding that the trial court exceeded its discretion because its judgment created financial obligations for the husband that, after deducting the wife’s periodic-alimony award from the husband’s net income, exceeded his remaining income)."
} | 6,915,860 | a |
For purposes of determining a spouse's ability to pay, and for purposes of calculating an appropriate amount of periodic alimony, the trial court should ordinarily use the spouse's net income as the starting point for these evaluations. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "567 So.2d 867, 868",
"parenthetical": "evaluating the responding spouse's ability to pay based on the responding spouse's net income",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Jackson, 567 So.2d 867, 868 (Ala.1990) (evaluating the responding spouse’s ability to pay based on the responding spouse’s net income); see also J.D.A. v. A.B.A., 142 So.3d 603, 614 (Ala.Civ.App.2013) (“Because ... the trial court implicitly relied ... on the wife’s erroneous estimation of the husband’s net monthly income, we reverse the periodic-alimony award and remand the cause to the circuit court to reconsider the alimony award.”); Kiel v. Kiel, 51 So.3d 1058, 1068 (Ala.Civ.App.2010) (using the responding spouse’s net income as the basis for evaluating the financial impact that the alimony payment would have); Wheeles v. Wheeles, 770 So.2d 635, 637 (Ala.Civ.App.2000) (reversing the trial court’s judgment that required the husband to pay $1,150 in alimony because the judgment “eripple[d] him financially,” leaving him with $80 per month after his living expenses and court-ordered financial obligations, including periodic alimony, were deducted from “[h]is net income”); and Rubert v. Rubert, 709 So.2d 1283, 1285 (Ala.Civ.App.1998) (holding that the trial court exceeded its discretion because its judgment created financial obligations for the husband that, after deducting the wife’s periodic-alimony award from the husband’s net income, exceeded his remaining income)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "709 So.2d 1283, 1285",
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court exceeded its discretion because its judgment created financial obligations for the husband that, after deducting the wife's periodic-alimony award from the husband's net income, exceeded his remaining income",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Jackson, 567 So.2d 867, 868 (Ala.1990) (evaluating the responding spouse’s ability to pay based on the responding spouse’s net income); see also J.D.A. v. A.B.A., 142 So.3d 603, 614 (Ala.Civ.App.2013) (“Because ... the trial court implicitly relied ... on the wife’s erroneous estimation of the husband’s net monthly income, we reverse the periodic-alimony award and remand the cause to the circuit court to reconsider the alimony award.”); Kiel v. Kiel, 51 So.3d 1058, 1068 (Ala.Civ.App.2010) (using the responding spouse’s net income as the basis for evaluating the financial impact that the alimony payment would have); Wheeles v. Wheeles, 770 So.2d 635, 637 (Ala.Civ.App.2000) (reversing the trial court’s judgment that required the husband to pay $1,150 in alimony because the judgment “eripple[d] him financially,” leaving him with $80 per month after his living expenses and court-ordered financial obligations, including periodic alimony, were deducted from “[h]is net income”); and Rubert v. Rubert, 709 So.2d 1283, 1285 (Ala.Civ.App.1998) (holding that the trial court exceeded its discretion because its judgment created financial obligations for the husband that, after deducting the wife’s periodic-alimony award from the husband’s net income, exceeded his remaining income)."
} | 6,915,860 | a |
We conclude that they were not. Instead, we find that, as in Hyder, the assignments at issue specifically provide for the allocation of post-production costs based on the manner in which the royalty is taken--in-kind or in cash. In particular, the plain language of the assignments unambiguously provides that, when the royalty is taken in cash and the minerals are sold at an arm's-length sale, as here, the royalty is based on the "amount realized" by Burlington from the sale, and is therefore free of post-production costs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "247 S.W.3d 690, 699",
"parenthetical": "\" 'Proceeds' or 'amount realized' clauses require measurement of the royalty based on the amount the lessee in fact receives under its sales contract for the gas.\"",
"sentence": "See Hyder, 483 S.W.3d at 873 (noting, with respect to the 25% gas royalty owed to the Hyders, that “the price-received basis for payment in the lease is sufficient in itself to excuse the lessors from bearing post[-]production costs,” and that such a clause is often referred to as a “proceeds lease”); see also Bowden v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 247 S.W.3d 690, 699 (Tex. 2008) (“ ‘Proceeds’ or ‘amount realized’ clauses require measurement of the royalty based on the amount the lessee in fact receives under its sales contract for the gas.”); Occidental Permian Ltd. v. Helen Jones Found., 333 S.W.3d 392, 399 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, pet. denied) (“ ‘Amount realized’ means the proceeds received from the sale of gas or oil.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "483 S.W.3d 873, 873",
"parenthetical": "noting, with respect to the 25% gas royalty owed to the Hyders, that \"the price-received basis for payment in the lease is sufficient in itself to excuse the lessors from bearing post[-]production costs,\" and that such a clause is often referred to as a \"proceeds lease\"",
"sentence": "See Hyder, 483 S.W.3d at 873 (noting, with respect to the 25% gas royalty owed to the Hyders, that “the price-received basis for payment in the lease is sufficient in itself to excuse the lessors from bearing post[-]production costs,” and that such a clause is often referred to as a “proceeds lease”); see also Bowden v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 247 S.W.3d 690, 699 (Tex. 2008) (“ ‘Proceeds’ or ‘amount realized’ clauses require measurement of the royalty based on the amount the lessee in fact receives under its sales contract for the gas.”); Occidental Permian Ltd. v. Helen Jones Found., 333 S.W.3d 392, 399 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, pet. denied) (“ ‘Amount realized’ means the proceeds received from the sale of gas or oil.”)."
} | 12,376,947 | b |
In November 2005, the case law from this Court and the Supreme Court was ambiguous concerning whether asking demonstrators to remove such signs would be an impermissible infringement of their First Amendment rights. For example, there was no clear holding concerning whether such restrictions might be deemed content-based or content-neutral, a sometimes difficult and thorny question. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "469 F.3d 625, 630",
"parenthetical": "noting the fine distinction between a restriction to alleviate traffic concerns that is content-neutral if due to the distracting presence of pro testers with such signs, but content-based if the message was what angered and distracted drivers",
"sentence": "See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (“Deciding whether a particular regulation is content based or content neutral is not always a simple task.”); see also Ovadal v. City of Madison, Wis., 469 F.3d 625, 630 (7th Cir.2006) (noting the fine distinction between a restriction to alleviate traffic concerns that is content-neutral if due to the distracting presence of pro testers with such signs, but content-based if the message was what angered and distracted drivers)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "512 U.S. 622, 642",
"parenthetical": "\"Deciding whether a particular regulation is content based or content neutral is not always a simple task.\"",
"sentence": "See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (“Deciding whether a particular regulation is content based or content neutral is not always a simple task.”); see also Ovadal v. City of Madison, Wis., 469 F.3d 625, 630 (7th Cir.2006) (noting the fine distinction between a restriction to alleviate traffic concerns that is content-neutral if due to the distracting presence of pro testers with such signs, but content-based if the message was what angered and distracted drivers)."
} | 3,735,909 | b |
In November 2005, the case law from this Court and the Supreme Court was ambiguous concerning whether asking demonstrators to remove such signs would be an impermissible infringement of their First Amendment rights. For example, there was no clear holding concerning whether such restrictions might be deemed content-based or content-neutral, a sometimes difficult and thorny question. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Deciding whether a particular regulation is content based or content neutral is not always a simple task.\"",
"sentence": "See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (“Deciding whether a particular regulation is content based or content neutral is not always a simple task.”); see also Ovadal v. City of Madison, Wis., 469 F.3d 625, 630 (7th Cir.2006) (noting the fine distinction between a restriction to alleviate traffic concerns that is content-neutral if due to the distracting presence of pro testers with such signs, but content-based if the message was what angered and distracted drivers)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "469 F.3d 625, 630",
"parenthetical": "noting the fine distinction between a restriction to alleviate traffic concerns that is content-neutral if due to the distracting presence of pro testers with such signs, but content-based if the message was what angered and distracted drivers",
"sentence": "See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (“Deciding whether a particular regulation is content based or content neutral is not always a simple task.”); see also Ovadal v. City of Madison, Wis., 469 F.3d 625, 630 (7th Cir.2006) (noting the fine distinction between a restriction to alleviate traffic concerns that is content-neutral if due to the distracting presence of pro testers with such signs, but content-based if the message was what angered and distracted drivers)."
} | 3,735,909 | a |
In November 2005, the case law from this Court and the Supreme Court was ambiguous concerning whether asking demonstrators to remove such signs would be an impermissible infringement of their First Amendment rights. For example, there was no clear holding concerning whether such restrictions might be deemed content-based or content-neutral, a sometimes difficult and thorny question. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Deciding whether a particular regulation is content based or content neutral is not always a simple task.\"",
"sentence": "See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (“Deciding whether a particular regulation is content based or content neutral is not always a simple task.”); see also Ovadal v. City of Madison, Wis., 469 F.3d 625, 630 (7th Cir.2006) (noting the fine distinction between a restriction to alleviate traffic concerns that is content-neutral if due to the distracting presence of pro testers with such signs, but content-based if the message was what angered and distracted drivers)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "469 F.3d 625, 630",
"parenthetical": "noting the fine distinction between a restriction to alleviate traffic concerns that is content-neutral if due to the distracting presence of pro testers with such signs, but content-based if the message was what angered and distracted drivers",
"sentence": "See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (“Deciding whether a particular regulation is content based or content neutral is not always a simple task.”); see also Ovadal v. City of Madison, Wis., 469 F.3d 625, 630 (7th Cir.2006) (noting the fine distinction between a restriction to alleviate traffic concerns that is content-neutral if due to the distracting presence of pro testers with such signs, but content-based if the message was what angered and distracted drivers)."
} | 3,735,909 | a |
Furthermore, the plaintiffs cannot connect any of their losses to E & Y on a materialization of the risk theory, whether those losses purportedly arose out of the 6/30/99 AOL Opinion or out of any other allegedly false audit opinions. In each of the cases in which the Second Circuit has employed a materialization of the risk analysis, it has considered a particular risk that was allegedly concealed by the defendant's actions and which then materialized to cause a market loss. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "476 F.3d 157, 157-58",
"parenthetical": "risk of impending bankruptcy was not concealed by audit opinion",
"sentence": "See Lattanzio, 476 F.3d at 157-58 (risk of impending bankruptcy was not concealed by audit opinion); Lentell, 396 F.3d at 177 (risk of stock volatility was not concealed by “buy” and “accumulate” recommendations); Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 197-98 (2d Cir.2003) (risk of defendants’ “dumping” their own shares of company stock was concealed by failure to reveal previous “pump and dump” schemes by the defendants); Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 97-98 (2d Cir.2001) (risk of liquidity crisis was concealed by edited background report omitting important negative events in executive’s financial and business history); see also In re Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig. (“In re IPO II”), 399 F.Supp.2d 298, 308-09 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (risk that a complicated scheme misled the public as to the true value of securities failed to materialize to cause the plaintiffs’ losses)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "399 F.Supp.2d 298, 308-09",
"parenthetical": "risk that a complicated scheme misled the public as to the true value of securities failed to materialize to cause the plaintiffs' losses",
"sentence": "See Lattanzio, 476 F.3d at 157-58 (risk of impending bankruptcy was not concealed by audit opinion); Lentell, 396 F.3d at 177 (risk of stock volatility was not concealed by “buy” and “accumulate” recommendations); Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 197-98 (2d Cir.2003) (risk of defendants’ “dumping” their own shares of company stock was concealed by failure to reveal previous “pump and dump” schemes by the defendants); Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 97-98 (2d Cir.2001) (risk of liquidity crisis was concealed by edited background report omitting important negative events in executive’s financial and business history); see also In re Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig. (“In re IPO II”), 399 F.Supp.2d 298, 308-09 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (risk that a complicated scheme misled the public as to the true value of securities failed to materialize to cause the plaintiffs’ losses)."
} | 5,702,798 | a |
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