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Such language is inflammatory, particularly to the extent that it attributes improper motives to Appellants. Thus, we admonish counsel to refrain from needlessly inflaming the passions of the jury. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "841 A.2d 1007, 1007",
"parenthetical": "\"Strict liability focuses solely on the product ... and is divorced from the conduct of the manufacturer.\"",
"sentence": "See Young, 761 A.2d at 563 (noting that “an appeal to passion or prejudice is improper and will not be countenanced” and equating a verdict obtained by such arguments to “one obtained by false testimony”); see also Schmidt, 11 A.3d at 939 (recognizing a “central premise that negligence concepts have no place in Pennsylvania’s strict liability law”); Phillips, 841 A.2d at 1007 (“Strict liability focuses solely on the product ... and is divorced from the conduct of the manufacturer.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "761 A.2d 563, 563",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"an appeal to passion or prejudice is improper and will not be countenanced\" and equating a verdict obtained by such arguments to \"one obtained by false testimony\"",
"sentence": "See Young, 761 A.2d at 563 (noting that “an appeal to passion or prejudice is improper and will not be countenanced” and equating a verdict obtained by such arguments to “one obtained by false testimony”); see also Schmidt, 11 A.3d at 939 (recognizing a “central premise that negligence concepts have no place in Pennsylvania’s strict liability law”); Phillips, 841 A.2d at 1007 (“Strict liability focuses solely on the product ... and is divorced from the conduct of the manufacturer.”)."
} | 6,891,264 | b |
When an appellate court vacates a lower court's order, it renders the lower court's order null and void. However, a state court's factual determination may be given effect even if its order has been rendered a nullity on other grounds. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "387 F.3d 210, 236-40",
"parenthetical": "deferring to state courts' factual findings despite concluding that state courts lacked jurisdiction under Pennsylvania law",
"sentence": "Dickerson v. Vaughn, 90 F.3d 87, 90-91 (3d Cir.1996) (Weis, J.) (Superior Court’s factual determination entitled to deference where reversal order by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court left factual determination undisturbed); see also Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 236-40 (3d Cir.2004) (deferring to state courts’ factual findings despite concluding that state courts lacked jurisdiction under Pennsylvania law); Pursell v. Horn, 187 F.Supp.2d 260, 292, 308-12 (W.D.Pa.2002) (according deference to PCRA court’s factual findings where state appellate court found PCRA court lacked jurisdiction); Com. v. Pate, 421 Pa.Super. 122, 617 A.2d 754, 760 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "90 F.3d 87, 90-91",
"parenthetical": "Superior Court's factual determination entitled to deference where reversal order by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court left factual determination undisturbed",
"sentence": "Dickerson v. Vaughn, 90 F.3d 87, 90-91 (3d Cir.1996) (Weis, J.) (Superior Court’s factual determination entitled to deference where reversal order by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court left factual determination undisturbed); see also Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 236-40 (3d Cir.2004) (deferring to state courts’ factual findings despite concluding that state courts lacked jurisdiction under Pennsylvania law); Pursell v. Horn, 187 F.Supp.2d 260, 292, 308-12 (W.D.Pa.2002) (according deference to PCRA court’s factual findings where state appellate court found PCRA court lacked jurisdiction); Com. v. Pate, 421 Pa.Super. 122, 617 A.2d 754, 760 (1992)."
} | 2,914,270 | b |
When an appellate court vacates a lower court's order, it renders the lower court's order null and void. However, a state court's factual determination may be given effect even if its order has been rendered a nullity on other grounds. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "90 F.3d 87, 90-91",
"parenthetical": "Superior Court's factual determination entitled to deference where reversal order by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court left factual determination undisturbed",
"sentence": "Dickerson v. Vaughn, 90 F.3d 87, 90-91 (3d Cir.1996) (Weis, J.) (Superior Court’s factual determination entitled to deference where reversal order by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court left factual determination undisturbed); see also Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 236-40 (3d Cir.2004) (deferring to state courts’ factual findings despite concluding that state courts lacked jurisdiction under Pennsylvania law); Pursell v. Horn, 187 F.Supp.2d 260, 292, 308-12 (W.D.Pa.2002) (according deference to PCRA court’s factual findings where state appellate court found PCRA court lacked jurisdiction); Com. v. Pate, 421 Pa.Super. 122, 617 A.2d 754, 760 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "187 F.Supp.2d 260, 292, 308-12",
"parenthetical": "according deference to PCRA court's factual findings where state appellate court found PCRA court lacked jurisdiction",
"sentence": "Dickerson v. Vaughn, 90 F.3d 87, 90-91 (3d Cir.1996) (Weis, J.) (Superior Court’s factual determination entitled to deference where reversal order by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court left factual determination undisturbed); see also Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 236-40 (3d Cir.2004) (deferring to state courts’ factual findings despite concluding that state courts lacked jurisdiction under Pennsylvania law); Pursell v. Horn, 187 F.Supp.2d 260, 292, 308-12 (W.D.Pa.2002) (according deference to PCRA court’s factual findings where state appellate court found PCRA court lacked jurisdiction); Com. v. Pate, 421 Pa.Super. 122, 617 A.2d 754, 760 (1992)."
} | 2,914,270 | a |
. Because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is "one of congressional intent ... where Congress has specifically granted jurisdiction to the federal courts, the doctrine does not apply." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding Rooker-Feld-man does not apply to disputes arising under Hague Convention because \"Congress has expressly granted the federal courts jurisdiction to vindicate rights arising under the Convention.\"",
"sentence": "Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1085 n. 55 (9th Cir.2001) (concluding Rooker-Feld-man does not apply to disputes arising under Hague Convention because \"Congress has expressly granted the federal courts jurisdiction to vindicate rights arising under the Convention.”); see also In re Gruntz, 202 F.3d at 1078-79 (Rooker-Feldman does not preclude collateral challenges to state court modification of automatic stay in bankruptcy)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "202 F.3d 1078, 1078-79",
"parenthetical": "Rooker-Feldman does not preclude collateral challenges to state court modification of automatic stay in bankruptcy",
"sentence": "Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1085 n. 55 (9th Cir.2001) (concluding Rooker-Feld-man does not apply to disputes arising under Hague Convention because \"Congress has expressly granted the federal courts jurisdiction to vindicate rights arising under the Convention.”); see also In re Gruntz, 202 F.3d at 1078-79 (Rooker-Feldman does not preclude collateral challenges to state court modification of automatic stay in bankruptcy)."
} | 9,318,791 | a |
P 11 The most common examples are cases in which a trial court's findings are deemed insufficient to comply with Rule 52(a). | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "87 Ariz. 227, 234",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e feel that if an intelligent disposition is to be made and justice done the judgment must be reversed and the case sent back to the trial court for more specific findings, these to be based upon the evidence already adduced -- or the taking of such additional testimony as may be deemed advisable by the trial court____\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fritts v. Ericson, 87 Ariz. 227, 234, 349 P.2d 1107, 1111 (1960) (“[W]e feel that if an intelligent disposition is to be made and justice done the judgment must be reversed and the case sent back to the trial court for more specific findings, these to be based upon the evidence already adduced — or the taking of such additional testimony as may be deemed advisable by the trial court____”); Miller v. McAlister, 151 Ariz. 435, 437, 728 P.2d 654, 656 (App.1986) (reversing because the trial court failed to comply with Rule 52(a) and remanding with directions stating that the trial court “is free to formulate its findings and conclusions on the basis of the existing record and transcripts, or it may conduct further hearings or direct counsel to submit proposed findings and conclusions with accompanying legal memoranda and oral argument, if necessary”); see also Miller v. Bd. of Supervisors of Pinal County, 175 Ariz. 296, 300, 855 P.2d 1357, 1361 (1993) (“Where possible, when a trial court in a non-jury ease fails to make or makes insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court should remand the case to the trial court for further findings.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "175 Ariz. 296, 300",
"parenthetical": "\"Where possible, when a trial court in a non-jury ease fails to make or makes insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court should remand the case to the trial court for further findings.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fritts v. Ericson, 87 Ariz. 227, 234, 349 P.2d 1107, 1111 (1960) (“[W]e feel that if an intelligent disposition is to be made and justice done the judgment must be reversed and the case sent back to the trial court for more specific findings, these to be based upon the evidence already adduced — or the taking of such additional testimony as may be deemed advisable by the trial court____”); Miller v. McAlister, 151 Ariz. 435, 437, 728 P.2d 654, 656 (App.1986) (reversing because the trial court failed to comply with Rule 52(a) and remanding with directions stating that the trial court “is free to formulate its findings and conclusions on the basis of the existing record and transcripts, or it may conduct further hearings or direct counsel to submit proposed findings and conclusions with accompanying legal memoranda and oral argument, if necessary”); see also Miller v. Bd. of Supervisors of Pinal County, 175 Ariz. 296, 300, 855 P.2d 1357, 1361 (1993) (“Where possible, when a trial court in a non-jury ease fails to make or makes insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court should remand the case to the trial court for further findings.”)."
} | 3,236,341 | a |
P 11 The most common examples are cases in which a trial court's findings are deemed insufficient to comply with Rule 52(a). | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "855 P.2d 1357, 1361",
"parenthetical": "\"Where possible, when a trial court in a non-jury ease fails to make or makes insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court should remand the case to the trial court for further findings.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fritts v. Ericson, 87 Ariz. 227, 234, 349 P.2d 1107, 1111 (1960) (“[W]e feel that if an intelligent disposition is to be made and justice done the judgment must be reversed and the case sent back to the trial court for more specific findings, these to be based upon the evidence already adduced — or the taking of such additional testimony as may be deemed advisable by the trial court____”); Miller v. McAlister, 151 Ariz. 435, 437, 728 P.2d 654, 656 (App.1986) (reversing because the trial court failed to comply with Rule 52(a) and remanding with directions stating that the trial court “is free to formulate its findings and conclusions on the basis of the existing record and transcripts, or it may conduct further hearings or direct counsel to submit proposed findings and conclusions with accompanying legal memoranda and oral argument, if necessary”); see also Miller v. Bd. of Supervisors of Pinal County, 175 Ariz. 296, 300, 855 P.2d 1357, 1361 (1993) (“Where possible, when a trial court in a non-jury ease fails to make or makes insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court should remand the case to the trial court for further findings.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "87 Ariz. 227, 234",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e feel that if an intelligent disposition is to be made and justice done the judgment must be reversed and the case sent back to the trial court for more specific findings, these to be based upon the evidence already adduced -- or the taking of such additional testimony as may be deemed advisable by the trial court____\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fritts v. Ericson, 87 Ariz. 227, 234, 349 P.2d 1107, 1111 (1960) (“[W]e feel that if an intelligent disposition is to be made and justice done the judgment must be reversed and the case sent back to the trial court for more specific findings, these to be based upon the evidence already adduced — or the taking of such additional testimony as may be deemed advisable by the trial court____”); Miller v. McAlister, 151 Ariz. 435, 437, 728 P.2d 654, 656 (App.1986) (reversing because the trial court failed to comply with Rule 52(a) and remanding with directions stating that the trial court “is free to formulate its findings and conclusions on the basis of the existing record and transcripts, or it may conduct further hearings or direct counsel to submit proposed findings and conclusions with accompanying legal memoranda and oral argument, if necessary”); see also Miller v. Bd. of Supervisors of Pinal County, 175 Ariz. 296, 300, 855 P.2d 1357, 1361 (1993) (“Where possible, when a trial court in a non-jury ease fails to make or makes insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court should remand the case to the trial court for further findings.”)."
} | 3,236,341 | b |
P 11 The most common examples are cases in which a trial court's findings are deemed insufficient to comply with Rule 52(a). | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "349 P.2d 1107, 1111",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e feel that if an intelligent disposition is to be made and justice done the judgment must be reversed and the case sent back to the trial court for more specific findings, these to be based upon the evidence already adduced -- or the taking of such additional testimony as may be deemed advisable by the trial court____\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fritts v. Ericson, 87 Ariz. 227, 234, 349 P.2d 1107, 1111 (1960) (“[W]e feel that if an intelligent disposition is to be made and justice done the judgment must be reversed and the case sent back to the trial court for more specific findings, these to be based upon the evidence already adduced — or the taking of such additional testimony as may be deemed advisable by the trial court____”); Miller v. McAlister, 151 Ariz. 435, 437, 728 P.2d 654, 656 (App.1986) (reversing because the trial court failed to comply with Rule 52(a) and remanding with directions stating that the trial court “is free to formulate its findings and conclusions on the basis of the existing record and transcripts, or it may conduct further hearings or direct counsel to submit proposed findings and conclusions with accompanying legal memoranda and oral argument, if necessary”); see also Miller v. Bd. of Supervisors of Pinal County, 175 Ariz. 296, 300, 855 P.2d 1357, 1361 (1993) (“Where possible, when a trial court in a non-jury ease fails to make or makes insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court should remand the case to the trial court for further findings.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "175 Ariz. 296, 300",
"parenthetical": "\"Where possible, when a trial court in a non-jury ease fails to make or makes insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court should remand the case to the trial court for further findings.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fritts v. Ericson, 87 Ariz. 227, 234, 349 P.2d 1107, 1111 (1960) (“[W]e feel that if an intelligent disposition is to be made and justice done the judgment must be reversed and the case sent back to the trial court for more specific findings, these to be based upon the evidence already adduced — or the taking of such additional testimony as may be deemed advisable by the trial court____”); Miller v. McAlister, 151 Ariz. 435, 437, 728 P.2d 654, 656 (App.1986) (reversing because the trial court failed to comply with Rule 52(a) and remanding with directions stating that the trial court “is free to formulate its findings and conclusions on the basis of the existing record and transcripts, or it may conduct further hearings or direct counsel to submit proposed findings and conclusions with accompanying legal memoranda and oral argument, if necessary”); see also Miller v. Bd. of Supervisors of Pinal County, 175 Ariz. 296, 300, 855 P.2d 1357, 1361 (1993) (“Where possible, when a trial court in a non-jury ease fails to make or makes insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court should remand the case to the trial court for further findings.”)."
} | 3,236,341 | a |
P 11 The most common examples are cases in which a trial court's findings are deemed insufficient to comply with Rule 52(a). | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "855 P.2d 1357, 1361",
"parenthetical": "\"Where possible, when a trial court in a non-jury ease fails to make or makes insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court should remand the case to the trial court for further findings.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fritts v. Ericson, 87 Ariz. 227, 234, 349 P.2d 1107, 1111 (1960) (“[W]e feel that if an intelligent disposition is to be made and justice done the judgment must be reversed and the case sent back to the trial court for more specific findings, these to be based upon the evidence already adduced — or the taking of such additional testimony as may be deemed advisable by the trial court____”); Miller v. McAlister, 151 Ariz. 435, 437, 728 P.2d 654, 656 (App.1986) (reversing because the trial court failed to comply with Rule 52(a) and remanding with directions stating that the trial court “is free to formulate its findings and conclusions on the basis of the existing record and transcripts, or it may conduct further hearings or direct counsel to submit proposed findings and conclusions with accompanying legal memoranda and oral argument, if necessary”); see also Miller v. Bd. of Supervisors of Pinal County, 175 Ariz. 296, 300, 855 P.2d 1357, 1361 (1993) (“Where possible, when a trial court in a non-jury ease fails to make or makes insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court should remand the case to the trial court for further findings.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "349 P.2d 1107, 1111",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e feel that if an intelligent disposition is to be made and justice done the judgment must be reversed and the case sent back to the trial court for more specific findings, these to be based upon the evidence already adduced -- or the taking of such additional testimony as may be deemed advisable by the trial court____\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fritts v. Ericson, 87 Ariz. 227, 234, 349 P.2d 1107, 1111 (1960) (“[W]e feel that if an intelligent disposition is to be made and justice done the judgment must be reversed and the case sent back to the trial court for more specific findings, these to be based upon the evidence already adduced — or the taking of such additional testimony as may be deemed advisable by the trial court____”); Miller v. McAlister, 151 Ariz. 435, 437, 728 P.2d 654, 656 (App.1986) (reversing because the trial court failed to comply with Rule 52(a) and remanding with directions stating that the trial court “is free to formulate its findings and conclusions on the basis of the existing record and transcripts, or it may conduct further hearings or direct counsel to submit proposed findings and conclusions with accompanying legal memoranda and oral argument, if necessary”); see also Miller v. Bd. of Supervisors of Pinal County, 175 Ariz. 296, 300, 855 P.2d 1357, 1361 (1993) (“Where possible, when a trial court in a non-jury ease fails to make or makes insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court should remand the case to the trial court for further findings.”)."
} | 3,236,341 | b |
P 11 The most common examples are cases in which a trial court's findings are deemed insufficient to comply with Rule 52(a). | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "175 Ariz. 296, 300",
"parenthetical": "\"Where possible, when a trial court in a non-jury ease fails to make or makes insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court should remand the case to the trial court for further findings.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fritts v. Ericson, 87 Ariz. 227, 234, 349 P.2d 1107, 1111 (1960) (“[W]e feel that if an intelligent disposition is to be made and justice done the judgment must be reversed and the case sent back to the trial court for more specific findings, these to be based upon the evidence already adduced — or the taking of such additional testimony as may be deemed advisable by the trial court____”); Miller v. McAlister, 151 Ariz. 435, 437, 728 P.2d 654, 656 (App.1986) (reversing because the trial court failed to comply with Rule 52(a) and remanding with directions stating that the trial court “is free to formulate its findings and conclusions on the basis of the existing record and transcripts, or it may conduct further hearings or direct counsel to submit proposed findings and conclusions with accompanying legal memoranda and oral argument, if necessary”); see also Miller v. Bd. of Supervisors of Pinal County, 175 Ariz. 296, 300, 855 P.2d 1357, 1361 (1993) (“Where possible, when a trial court in a non-jury ease fails to make or makes insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court should remand the case to the trial court for further findings.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "151 Ariz. 435, 437",
"parenthetical": "reversing because the trial court failed to comply with Rule 52(a",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fritts v. Ericson, 87 Ariz. 227, 234, 349 P.2d 1107, 1111 (1960) (“[W]e feel that if an intelligent disposition is to be made and justice done the judgment must be reversed and the case sent back to the trial court for more specific findings, these to be based upon the evidence already adduced — or the taking of such additional testimony as may be deemed advisable by the trial court____”); Miller v. McAlister, 151 Ariz. 435, 437, 728 P.2d 654, 656 (App.1986) (reversing because the trial court failed to comply with Rule 52(a) and remanding with directions stating that the trial court “is free to formulate its findings and conclusions on the basis of the existing record and transcripts, or it may conduct further hearings or direct counsel to submit proposed findings and conclusions with accompanying legal memoranda and oral argument, if necessary”); see also Miller v. Bd. of Supervisors of Pinal County, 175 Ariz. 296, 300, 855 P.2d 1357, 1361 (1993) (“Where possible, when a trial court in a non-jury ease fails to make or makes insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court should remand the case to the trial court for further findings.”)."
} | 3,236,341 | b |
P 11 The most common examples are cases in which a trial court's findings are deemed insufficient to comply with Rule 52(a). | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "151 Ariz. 435, 437",
"parenthetical": "reversing because the trial court failed to comply with Rule 52(a",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fritts v. Ericson, 87 Ariz. 227, 234, 349 P.2d 1107, 1111 (1960) (“[W]e feel that if an intelligent disposition is to be made and justice done the judgment must be reversed and the case sent back to the trial court for more specific findings, these to be based upon the evidence already adduced — or the taking of such additional testimony as may be deemed advisable by the trial court____”); Miller v. McAlister, 151 Ariz. 435, 437, 728 P.2d 654, 656 (App.1986) (reversing because the trial court failed to comply with Rule 52(a) and remanding with directions stating that the trial court “is free to formulate its findings and conclusions on the basis of the existing record and transcripts, or it may conduct further hearings or direct counsel to submit proposed findings and conclusions with accompanying legal memoranda and oral argument, if necessary”); see also Miller v. Bd. of Supervisors of Pinal County, 175 Ariz. 296, 300, 855 P.2d 1357, 1361 (1993) (“Where possible, when a trial court in a non-jury ease fails to make or makes insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court should remand the case to the trial court for further findings.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "855 P.2d 1357, 1361",
"parenthetical": "\"Where possible, when a trial court in a non-jury ease fails to make or makes insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court should remand the case to the trial court for further findings.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fritts v. Ericson, 87 Ariz. 227, 234, 349 P.2d 1107, 1111 (1960) (“[W]e feel that if an intelligent disposition is to be made and justice done the judgment must be reversed and the case sent back to the trial court for more specific findings, these to be based upon the evidence already adduced — or the taking of such additional testimony as may be deemed advisable by the trial court____”); Miller v. McAlister, 151 Ariz. 435, 437, 728 P.2d 654, 656 (App.1986) (reversing because the trial court failed to comply with Rule 52(a) and remanding with directions stating that the trial court “is free to formulate its findings and conclusions on the basis of the existing record and transcripts, or it may conduct further hearings or direct counsel to submit proposed findings and conclusions with accompanying legal memoranda and oral argument, if necessary”); see also Miller v. Bd. of Supervisors of Pinal County, 175 Ariz. 296, 300, 855 P.2d 1357, 1361 (1993) (“Where possible, when a trial court in a non-jury ease fails to make or makes insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court should remand the case to the trial court for further findings.”)."
} | 3,236,341 | a |
P 11 The most common examples are cases in which a trial court's findings are deemed insufficient to comply with Rule 52(a). | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "728 P.2d 654, 656",
"parenthetical": "reversing because the trial court failed to comply with Rule 52(a",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fritts v. Ericson, 87 Ariz. 227, 234, 349 P.2d 1107, 1111 (1960) (“[W]e feel that if an intelligent disposition is to be made and justice done the judgment must be reversed and the case sent back to the trial court for more specific findings, these to be based upon the evidence already adduced — or the taking of such additional testimony as may be deemed advisable by the trial court____”); Miller v. McAlister, 151 Ariz. 435, 437, 728 P.2d 654, 656 (App.1986) (reversing because the trial court failed to comply with Rule 52(a) and remanding with directions stating that the trial court “is free to formulate its findings and conclusions on the basis of the existing record and transcripts, or it may conduct further hearings or direct counsel to submit proposed findings and conclusions with accompanying legal memoranda and oral argument, if necessary”); see also Miller v. Bd. of Supervisors of Pinal County, 175 Ariz. 296, 300, 855 P.2d 1357, 1361 (1993) (“Where possible, when a trial court in a non-jury ease fails to make or makes insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court should remand the case to the trial court for further findings.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "175 Ariz. 296, 300",
"parenthetical": "\"Where possible, when a trial court in a non-jury ease fails to make or makes insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court should remand the case to the trial court for further findings.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fritts v. Ericson, 87 Ariz. 227, 234, 349 P.2d 1107, 1111 (1960) (“[W]e feel that if an intelligent disposition is to be made and justice done the judgment must be reversed and the case sent back to the trial court for more specific findings, these to be based upon the evidence already adduced — or the taking of such additional testimony as may be deemed advisable by the trial court____”); Miller v. McAlister, 151 Ariz. 435, 437, 728 P.2d 654, 656 (App.1986) (reversing because the trial court failed to comply with Rule 52(a) and remanding with directions stating that the trial court “is free to formulate its findings and conclusions on the basis of the existing record and transcripts, or it may conduct further hearings or direct counsel to submit proposed findings and conclusions with accompanying legal memoranda and oral argument, if necessary”); see also Miller v. Bd. of Supervisors of Pinal County, 175 Ariz. 296, 300, 855 P.2d 1357, 1361 (1993) (“Where possible, when a trial court in a non-jury ease fails to make or makes insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court should remand the case to the trial court for further findings.”)."
} | 3,236,341 | a |
P 11 The most common examples are cases in which a trial court's findings are deemed insufficient to comply with Rule 52(a). | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "855 P.2d 1357, 1361",
"parenthetical": "\"Where possible, when a trial court in a non-jury ease fails to make or makes insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court should remand the case to the trial court for further findings.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fritts v. Ericson, 87 Ariz. 227, 234, 349 P.2d 1107, 1111 (1960) (“[W]e feel that if an intelligent disposition is to be made and justice done the judgment must be reversed and the case sent back to the trial court for more specific findings, these to be based upon the evidence already adduced — or the taking of such additional testimony as may be deemed advisable by the trial court____”); Miller v. McAlister, 151 Ariz. 435, 437, 728 P.2d 654, 656 (App.1986) (reversing because the trial court failed to comply with Rule 52(a) and remanding with directions stating that the trial court “is free to formulate its findings and conclusions on the basis of the existing record and transcripts, or it may conduct further hearings or direct counsel to submit proposed findings and conclusions with accompanying legal memoranda and oral argument, if necessary”); see also Miller v. Bd. of Supervisors of Pinal County, 175 Ariz. 296, 300, 855 P.2d 1357, 1361 (1993) (“Where possible, when a trial court in a non-jury ease fails to make or makes insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court should remand the case to the trial court for further findings.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "728 P.2d 654, 656",
"parenthetical": "reversing because the trial court failed to comply with Rule 52(a",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fritts v. Ericson, 87 Ariz. 227, 234, 349 P.2d 1107, 1111 (1960) (“[W]e feel that if an intelligent disposition is to be made and justice done the judgment must be reversed and the case sent back to the trial court for more specific findings, these to be based upon the evidence already adduced — or the taking of such additional testimony as may be deemed advisable by the trial court____”); Miller v. McAlister, 151 Ariz. 435, 437, 728 P.2d 654, 656 (App.1986) (reversing because the trial court failed to comply with Rule 52(a) and remanding with directions stating that the trial court “is free to formulate its findings and conclusions on the basis of the existing record and transcripts, or it may conduct further hearings or direct counsel to submit proposed findings and conclusions with accompanying legal memoranda and oral argument, if necessary”); see also Miller v. Bd. of Supervisors of Pinal County, 175 Ariz. 296, 300, 855 P.2d 1357, 1361 (1993) (“Where possible, when a trial court in a non-jury ease fails to make or makes insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court should remand the case to the trial court for further findings.”)."
} | 3,236,341 | b |
The issue raised by this case is appropriate for certification. First, since Suklji-an, the New York Court of Appeals has not had an opportunity to address a case like the hypothetical posed by Galindo. Indeed, it appears to remain an open question in New York whether strict products liability can attach to a regular seller of used goods at all, let alone companies like the one envisioned by the Galindo court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "81 N.Y.2d 951, 951",
"parenthetical": "leaving open question whether used goods dealers may be held strictly liable",
"sentence": "See Stiles, 81 N.Y.2d at 951, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 667, 613 N.E.2d 572 (leaving open question whether used goods dealers may be held strictly liable); but see Gonzalez v. Rutherford Corp., 881 F.Supp. 829, 836-41 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (Raggi, /.) (discussing cases extending strict liability to used goods dealers, including two Appellate Division cases)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "881 F.Supp. 829, 836-41",
"parenthetical": "discussing cases extending strict liability to used goods dealers, including two Appellate Division cases",
"sentence": "See Stiles, 81 N.Y.2d at 951, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 667, 613 N.E.2d 572 (leaving open question whether used goods dealers may be held strictly liable); but see Gonzalez v. Rutherford Corp., 881 F.Supp. 829, 836-41 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (Raggi, /.) (discussing cases extending strict liability to used goods dealers, including two Appellate Division cases)."
} | 5,764,632 | a |
The issue raised by this case is appropriate for certification. First, since Suklji-an, the New York Court of Appeals has not had an opportunity to address a case like the hypothetical posed by Galindo. Indeed, it appears to remain an open question in New York whether strict products liability can attach to a regular seller of used goods at all, let alone companies like the one envisioned by the Galindo court. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "881 F.Supp. 829, 836-41",
"parenthetical": "discussing cases extending strict liability to used goods dealers, including two Appellate Division cases",
"sentence": "See Stiles, 81 N.Y.2d at 951, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 667, 613 N.E.2d 572 (leaving open question whether used goods dealers may be held strictly liable); but see Gonzalez v. Rutherford Corp., 881 F.Supp. 829, 836-41 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (Raggi, /.) (discussing cases extending strict liability to used goods dealers, including two Appellate Division cases)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "597 N.Y.S.2d 667, 667",
"parenthetical": "leaving open question whether used goods dealers may be held strictly liable",
"sentence": "See Stiles, 81 N.Y.2d at 951, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 667, 613 N.E.2d 572 (leaving open question whether used goods dealers may be held strictly liable); but see Gonzalez v. Rutherford Corp., 881 F.Supp. 829, 836-41 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (Raggi, /.) (discussing cases extending strict liability to used goods dealers, including two Appellate Division cases)."
} | 5,764,632 | b |
The issue raised by this case is appropriate for certification. First, since Suklji-an, the New York Court of Appeals has not had an opportunity to address a case like the hypothetical posed by Galindo. Indeed, it appears to remain an open question in New York whether strict products liability can attach to a regular seller of used goods at all, let alone companies like the one envisioned by the Galindo court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "leaving open question whether used goods dealers may be held strictly liable",
"sentence": "See Stiles, 81 N.Y.2d at 951, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 667, 613 N.E.2d 572 (leaving open question whether used goods dealers may be held strictly liable); but see Gonzalez v. Rutherford Corp., 881 F.Supp. 829, 836-41 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (Raggi, /.) (discussing cases extending strict liability to used goods dealers, including two Appellate Division cases)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "881 F.Supp. 829, 836-41",
"parenthetical": "discussing cases extending strict liability to used goods dealers, including two Appellate Division cases",
"sentence": "See Stiles, 81 N.Y.2d at 951, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 667, 613 N.E.2d 572 (leaving open question whether used goods dealers may be held strictly liable); but see Gonzalez v. Rutherford Corp., 881 F.Supp. 829, 836-41 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (Raggi, /.) (discussing cases extending strict liability to used goods dealers, including two Appellate Division cases)."
} | 5,764,632 | a |
In his report and recommendation, Judge Jarvey thoroughly discussed Davis, Bell and O'Neal. Although he acknowledged Davis represents contrary authority, Judge Jarvey noted a majority of courts "hold a conviction under a statute forbidding possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony does not violate the [e]x [p]ost [f]acto [c]lause even when the felony for which the defendant was convicted took place before the statute was enacted." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "820 F.2d 1524, 1527",
"parenthetical": "holding no ex post facto violation because enhancement provision was already on the books when the defendant committed the 1985 firearm offense",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Etheridge, 932 F.2d 318, 321-23 (4th Cir.1991) (assuming no violation of the ex post facto clause regarding the defendant’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) (concluding no violation of the ex post facto clause when the district court enhanced the defendant’s sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) because the temporal focus is the date of the present offense, not the date of the prior felony convictions); United States v. Jordan, 870 F.2d 1310, 1314-15 (7th Cir.1989) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1), the predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and the enhancement provision added to 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1), the predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 924) (stating the defendant is being punished because he violated 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1)) (holding n@o violation of ex post facto clause because enhancement provision “increases the punishment for [being a felon in possession of a firearm that traveled in or affected interstate commerce]” and “[i]t does not affect the punishment previously meted out to [the defendant] for the ... [crimes] he committed prior to the effective date of the [statute]”); United States v. Patterson, 820 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir.1987) (holding no ex post facto violation because enhancement provision was already on the books when the defendant committed the 1985 firearm offense)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "26 F.3d 282, 291",
"parenthetical": "holding the use of a 1951 felony conviction as a predicate for a violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 922(g",
"sentence": "See United States v. Brady, 26 F.3d 282, 291 (2d Cir.1994) (holding the use of a 1951 felony conviction as a predicate for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) did not violate the ex post facto clause because the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm was not committed until after the effective date of the statute under which he was convicted); United States v. Huss, 7 F.3d 1444, 1447 (9th Cir.1993), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Sanchez-Rodriguez, 161 F.3d 556, 563 (9th Cir.1998), (concluding no ex post facto problem because Oregon weapons restriction does not impose punishment for prior crimes, but rather furthers the substantial and legitimate safety interest in preventing the misuse of firearms) (declining to follow Davis or Roehl v. United States, 977 F.2d 375 (7th Cir.1992) and finding persuasive Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir.1942)); Roehl, 977 F.2d at 377-78 (stating 1966 conviction and 1974 conviction could be used as predicates for conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and for enhancement under 18 U.S.C. 924(e) because each could be a predicate for criminal liability under Wis. Stat. 941.29, which makes it illegal for a convicted felon to possess a gun) (rejecting the defendant’s ex post facto argument because, if prosecuted for violating Wis. Stat. 941.29, his earlier felony convictions could have been predicates without violating the ex post facto clause); United States v. Matassini, 565 F.2d 1297, 1307 (5th Cir.1978) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1), the predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)) (determining Congress intended statutes prohibiting felons from possessing firearms to reach “persons convicted of felonies prior to [the effective date of the statute]”); Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 921 (1st Cir.1942) (finding, if a statute “is a bona fide regulation of conduct which the legislature has power to regulate, it is not bad as an ex post facto law even though the right to engage in the conduct is made to depend on past behavi-our, even behaviour before the passage of the regulatory act”)."
} | 9,299,476 | b |
In his report and recommendation, Judge Jarvey thoroughly discussed Davis, Bell and O'Neal. Although he acknowledged Davis represents contrary authority, Judge Jarvey noted a majority of courts "hold a conviction under a statute forbidding possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony does not violate the [e]x [p]ost [f]acto [c]lause even when the felony for which the defendant was convicted took place before the statute was enacted." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "131 F.2d 916, 921",
"parenthetical": "finding, if a statute \"is a bona fide regulation of conduct which the legislature has power to regulate, it is not bad as an ex post facto law even though the right to engage in the conduct is made to depend on past behavi-our, even behaviour before the passage of the regulatory act\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Brady, 26 F.3d 282, 291 (2d Cir.1994) (holding the use of a 1951 felony conviction as a predicate for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) did not violate the ex post facto clause because the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm was not committed until after the effective date of the statute under which he was convicted); United States v. Huss, 7 F.3d 1444, 1447 (9th Cir.1993), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Sanchez-Rodriguez, 161 F.3d 556, 563 (9th Cir.1998), (concluding no ex post facto problem because Oregon weapons restriction does not impose punishment for prior crimes, but rather furthers the substantial and legitimate safety interest in preventing the misuse of firearms) (declining to follow Davis or Roehl v. United States, 977 F.2d 375 (7th Cir.1992) and finding persuasive Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir.1942)); Roehl, 977 F.2d at 377-78 (stating 1966 conviction and 1974 conviction could be used as predicates for conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and for enhancement under 18 U.S.C. 924(e) because each could be a predicate for criminal liability under Wis. Stat. 941.29, which makes it illegal for a convicted felon to possess a gun) (rejecting the defendant’s ex post facto argument because, if prosecuted for violating Wis. Stat. 941.29, his earlier felony convictions could have been predicates without violating the ex post facto clause); United States v. Matassini, 565 F.2d 1297, 1307 (5th Cir.1978) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1), the predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)) (determining Congress intended statutes prohibiting felons from possessing firearms to reach “persons convicted of felonies prior to [the effective date of the statute]”); Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 921 (1st Cir.1942) (finding, if a statute “is a bona fide regulation of conduct which the legislature has power to regulate, it is not bad as an ex post facto law even though the right to engage in the conduct is made to depend on past behavi-our, even behaviour before the passage of the regulatory act”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "820 F.2d 1524, 1527",
"parenthetical": "holding no ex post facto violation because enhancement provision was already on the books when the defendant committed the 1985 firearm offense",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Etheridge, 932 F.2d 318, 321-23 (4th Cir.1991) (assuming no violation of the ex post facto clause regarding the defendant’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) (concluding no violation of the ex post facto clause when the district court enhanced the defendant’s sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) because the temporal focus is the date of the present offense, not the date of the prior felony convictions); United States v. Jordan, 870 F.2d 1310, 1314-15 (7th Cir.1989) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1), the predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and the enhancement provision added to 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1), the predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 924) (stating the defendant is being punished because he violated 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1)) (holding n@o violation of ex post facto clause because enhancement provision “increases the punishment for [being a felon in possession of a firearm that traveled in or affected interstate commerce]” and “[i]t does not affect the punishment previously meted out to [the defendant] for the ... [crimes] he committed prior to the effective date of the [statute]”); United States v. Patterson, 820 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir.1987) (holding no ex post facto violation because enhancement provision was already on the books when the defendant committed the 1985 firearm offense)."
} | 9,299,476 | a |
Here the trial court properly awarded prejudgment interest from the date of the original verdict. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "294 Minn. 406, 408",
"parenthetical": "\"interest should be calculated from the date the liability is established by the rendition of the verdict\"",
"sentence": "See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 281 Minn. 571, 161 N.W.2d 523 (1968) (when jury verdict is erroneously overturned by grant of post-trial motion, but later reinstated on appeal, prejudgment interest is awarded from date of original verdict); see also Bastianson v. Forschen, 294 Minn. 406, 408, 202 N.W.2d 667, 668 (1972) (“interest should be calculated from the date the liability is established by the rendition of the verdict”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "when jury verdict is erroneously overturned by grant of post-trial motion, but later reinstated on appeal, prejudgment interest is awarded from date of original verdict",
"sentence": "See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 281 Minn. 571, 161 N.W.2d 523 (1968) (when jury verdict is erroneously overturned by grant of post-trial motion, but later reinstated on appeal, prejudgment interest is awarded from date of original verdict); see also Bastianson v. Forschen, 294 Minn. 406, 408, 202 N.W.2d 667, 668 (1972) (“interest should be calculated from the date the liability is established by the rendition of the verdict”)."
} | 10,658,715 | b |
Here the trial court properly awarded prejudgment interest from the date of the original verdict. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "when jury verdict is erroneously overturned by grant of post-trial motion, but later reinstated on appeal, prejudgment interest is awarded from date of original verdict",
"sentence": "See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 281 Minn. 571, 161 N.W.2d 523 (1968) (when jury verdict is erroneously overturned by grant of post-trial motion, but later reinstated on appeal, prejudgment interest is awarded from date of original verdict); see also Bastianson v. Forschen, 294 Minn. 406, 408, 202 N.W.2d 667, 668 (1972) (“interest should be calculated from the date the liability is established by the rendition of the verdict”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "202 N.W.2d 667, 668",
"parenthetical": "\"interest should be calculated from the date the liability is established by the rendition of the verdict\"",
"sentence": "See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 281 Minn. 571, 161 N.W.2d 523 (1968) (when jury verdict is erroneously overturned by grant of post-trial motion, but later reinstated on appeal, prejudgment interest is awarded from date of original verdict); see also Bastianson v. Forschen, 294 Minn. 406, 408, 202 N.W.2d 667, 668 (1972) (“interest should be calculated from the date the liability is established by the rendition of the verdict”)."
} | 10,658,715 | a |
Here the trial court properly awarded prejudgment interest from the date of the original verdict. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "294 Minn. 406, 408",
"parenthetical": "\"interest should be calculated from the date the liability is established by the rendition of the verdict\"",
"sentence": "See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 281 Minn. 571, 161 N.W.2d 523 (1968) (when jury verdict is erroneously overturned by grant of post-trial motion, but later reinstated on appeal, prejudgment interest is awarded from date of original verdict); see also Bastianson v. Forschen, 294 Minn. 406, 408, 202 N.W.2d 667, 668 (1972) (“interest should be calculated from the date the liability is established by the rendition of the verdict”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "when jury verdict is erroneously overturned by grant of post-trial motion, but later reinstated on appeal, prejudgment interest is awarded from date of original verdict",
"sentence": "See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 281 Minn. 571, 161 N.W.2d 523 (1968) (when jury verdict is erroneously overturned by grant of post-trial motion, but later reinstated on appeal, prejudgment interest is awarded from date of original verdict); see also Bastianson v. Forschen, 294 Minn. 406, 408, 202 N.W.2d 667, 668 (1972) (“interest should be calculated from the date the liability is established by the rendition of the verdict”)."
} | 10,658,715 | b |
Here the trial court properly awarded prejudgment interest from the date of the original verdict. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "202 N.W.2d 667, 668",
"parenthetical": "\"interest should be calculated from the date the liability is established by the rendition of the verdict\"",
"sentence": "See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 281 Minn. 571, 161 N.W.2d 523 (1968) (when jury verdict is erroneously overturned by grant of post-trial motion, but later reinstated on appeal, prejudgment interest is awarded from date of original verdict); see also Bastianson v. Forschen, 294 Minn. 406, 408, 202 N.W.2d 667, 668 (1972) (“interest should be calculated from the date the liability is established by the rendition of the verdict”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "when jury verdict is erroneously overturned by grant of post-trial motion, but later reinstated on appeal, prejudgment interest is awarded from date of original verdict",
"sentence": "See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 281 Minn. 571, 161 N.W.2d 523 (1968) (when jury verdict is erroneously overturned by grant of post-trial motion, but later reinstated on appeal, prejudgment interest is awarded from date of original verdict); see also Bastianson v. Forschen, 294 Minn. 406, 408, 202 N.W.2d 667, 668 (1972) (“interest should be calculated from the date the liability is established by the rendition of the verdict”)."
} | 10,658,715 | b |
Although appellants at all times treated the May 24 "Memorandum and Order" as an appealable order, the "separate document" rule is to be strictly applied as concerns the commencement of the appeal period. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "960 F.2d 237, 237",
"parenthetical": "emphasizing that the \"separate document\" requirement \"should always be interpreted 'to prevent loss of the right to appeal, not to facilitate loss' \"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216, 221-22, 93 S.Ct. 1562, 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 202 (1973) (per curiam) (applying rule 58 mechanically notwithstanding previous aborted appeal by same appellant within appeal period); Fiore, 960 F.2d at 235 (discussing technicality of rule 58); Gregson & Assocs. Architects v. Government of the V.I., 675 F.2d 589, 592-93 (3d Cir.1982) {Indrelunas applied despite both parties’ treatment of memorandum opinion as appealable order); Caperton v. Beatrice Pocahontas Coal Co., 585 F.2d 683, 688-90 (4th Cir.1978) (“nor are we free to penalize plaintiffs ... by binding them to their erroneous assertion that judgments” had been entered); see also Fiore, 960 F.2d at 237 (emphasizing that the “separate document” requirement “should always be interpreted ‘to prevent loss of the right to appeal, not to facilitate loss’ ”) (quoting Bankers Trust, 435 U.S. at 386, 98 S.Ct. at 1121); Willhauck v. Halpin, 919 F.2d 788, 792 (1st Cir.1990) (same); 9 Moore’s Federal Practice 1158.02.1[2], at 58-20 to 21. Nevertheless, a notice of appeal deemed premature due to noncompliance with the “separate document” rule does not deprive the appellate court of subject matter jurisdiction, Bankers Trust, 435 U.S. at 384, 385, 98 S.Ct. at 1120; see also Smith, 936 F.2d at 1394 (applying Bankers Trust), and the appeal may proceed in the normal course where the court of appeals determines that the “separate document” requirement was waived by the parties."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "585 F.2d 683, 688-90",
"parenthetical": "\"nor are we free to penalize plaintiffs ... by binding them to their erroneous assertion that judgments\" had been entered",
"sentence": "See United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216, 221-22, 93 S.Ct. 1562, 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 202 (1973) (per curiam) (applying rule 58 mechanically notwithstanding previous aborted appeal by same appellant within appeal period); Fiore, 960 F.2d at 235 (discussing technicality of rule 58); Gregson & Assocs. Architects v. Government of the V.I., 675 F.2d 589, 592-93 (3d Cir.1982) {Indrelunas applied despite both parties’ treatment of memorandum opinion as appealable order); Caperton v. Beatrice Pocahontas Coal Co., 585 F.2d 683, 688-90 (4th Cir.1978) (“nor are we free to penalize plaintiffs ... by binding them to their erroneous assertion that judgments” had been entered); see also Fiore, 960 F.2d at 237 (emphasizing that the “separate document” requirement “should always be interpreted ‘to prevent loss of the right to appeal, not to facilitate loss’ ”) (quoting Bankers Trust, 435 U.S. at 386, 98 S.Ct. at 1121); Willhauck v. Halpin, 919 F.2d 788, 792 (1st Cir.1990) (same); 9 Moore’s Federal Practice 1158.02.1[2], at 58-20 to 21. Nevertheless, a notice of appeal deemed premature due to noncompliance with the “separate document” rule does not deprive the appellate court of subject matter jurisdiction, Bankers Trust, 435 U.S. at 384, 385, 98 S.Ct. at 1120; see also Smith, 936 F.2d at 1394 (applying Bankers Trust), and the appeal may proceed in the normal course where the court of appeals determines that the “separate document” requirement was waived by the parties."
} | 1,871,505 | b |
That evidence included the plaintiffs own testimony, which the trial court credited, that, prior to the defendant's construction of the pillars, no one ever had objected to her use of the right-of-way, and she had never sought permission from anyone to use it. It is well established that evidence that the party claiming a prescriptive use never asked for or was given permission to use the property will support a finding that the use was adverse. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "78 Conn. App. 288, 296",
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs testimony that \"she never asked for permission to use\" property at issue supported trial court's determination that use was adverse",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gallow-Mure v. Tomchik, 78 Conn. App. 699, 708, 829 A.2d 8 (2003) (“[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made ‘as of right’ is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way”); id., 709 (plaintiffs testimony that she did not need permission to use right-of-way supported trial court’s determination that she “used [it] as if it were her own property, which is the primary indication that the use was not permissive”); see also McManus v. Roggi, 78 Conn. App. 288, 296, 826 A.2d 1275 (2003) (plaintiffs testimony that “she never asked for permission to use” property at issue supported trial court’s determination that use was adverse); Lisiewski v. Seidel, supra, 72 Conn. App. 874 (testimony that “permission [to use driveway] was never granted” supported determination that use was adverse); DiSorbo v. Grand Associates One Ltd. Partnership, 8 Conn. App. 203, 206, 512 A.2d 940 (1986) (testimony by plaintiffs husband that he used defendant’s driveway “whenever he wanted to and that he never sought permission to use [it]” supported determination of adverse possession)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "78 Conn. App. 699, 708",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made 'as of right' is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gallow-Mure v. Tomchik, 78 Conn. App. 699, 708, 829 A.2d 8 (2003) (“[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made ‘as of right’ is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way”); id., 709 (plaintiffs testimony that she did not need permission to use right-of-way supported trial court’s determination that she “used [it] as if it were her own property, which is the primary indication that the use was not permissive”); see also McManus v. Roggi, 78 Conn. App. 288, 296, 826 A.2d 1275 (2003) (plaintiffs testimony that “she never asked for permission to use” property at issue supported trial court’s determination that use was adverse); Lisiewski v. Seidel, supra, 72 Conn. App. 874 (testimony that “permission [to use driveway] was never granted” supported determination that use was adverse); DiSorbo v. Grand Associates One Ltd. Partnership, 8 Conn. App. 203, 206, 512 A.2d 940 (1986) (testimony by plaintiffs husband that he used defendant’s driveway “whenever he wanted to and that he never sought permission to use [it]” supported determination of adverse possession)."
} | 5,767,752 | b |
That evidence included the plaintiffs own testimony, which the trial court credited, that, prior to the defendant's construction of the pillars, no one ever had objected to her use of the right-of-way, and she had never sought permission from anyone to use it. It is well established that evidence that the party claiming a prescriptive use never asked for or was given permission to use the property will support a finding that the use was adverse. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "78 Conn. App. 699, 708",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made 'as of right' is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gallow-Mure v. Tomchik, 78 Conn. App. 699, 708, 829 A.2d 8 (2003) (“[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made ‘as of right’ is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way”); id., 709 (plaintiffs testimony that she did not need permission to use right-of-way supported trial court’s determination that she “used [it] as if it were her own property, which is the primary indication that the use was not permissive”); see also McManus v. Roggi, 78 Conn. App. 288, 296, 826 A.2d 1275 (2003) (plaintiffs testimony that “she never asked for permission to use” property at issue supported trial court’s determination that use was adverse); Lisiewski v. Seidel, supra, 72 Conn. App. 874 (testimony that “permission [to use driveway] was never granted” supported determination that use was adverse); DiSorbo v. Grand Associates One Ltd. Partnership, 8 Conn. App. 203, 206, 512 A.2d 940 (1986) (testimony by plaintiffs husband that he used defendant’s driveway “whenever he wanted to and that he never sought permission to use [it]” supported determination of adverse possession)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs testimony that \"she never asked for permission to use\" property at issue supported trial court's determination that use was adverse",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gallow-Mure v. Tomchik, 78 Conn. App. 699, 708, 829 A.2d 8 (2003) (“[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made ‘as of right’ is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way”); id., 709 (plaintiffs testimony that she did not need permission to use right-of-way supported trial court’s determination that she “used [it] as if it were her own property, which is the primary indication that the use was not permissive”); see also McManus v. Roggi, 78 Conn. App. 288, 296, 826 A.2d 1275 (2003) (plaintiffs testimony that “she never asked for permission to use” property at issue supported trial court’s determination that use was adverse); Lisiewski v. Seidel, supra, 72 Conn. App. 874 (testimony that “permission [to use driveway] was never granted” supported determination that use was adverse); DiSorbo v. Grand Associates One Ltd. Partnership, 8 Conn. App. 203, 206, 512 A.2d 940 (1986) (testimony by plaintiffs husband that he used defendant’s driveway “whenever he wanted to and that he never sought permission to use [it]” supported determination of adverse possession)."
} | 5,767,752 | a |
That evidence included the plaintiffs own testimony, which the trial court credited, that, prior to the defendant's construction of the pillars, no one ever had objected to her use of the right-of-way, and she had never sought permission from anyone to use it. It is well established that evidence that the party claiming a prescriptive use never asked for or was given permission to use the property will support a finding that the use was adverse. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "testimony that \"permission [to use driveway] was never granted\" supported determination that use was adverse",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gallow-Mure v. Tomchik, 78 Conn. App. 699, 708, 829 A.2d 8 (2003) (“[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made ‘as of right’ is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way”); id., 709 (plaintiffs testimony that she did not need permission to use right-of-way supported trial court’s determination that she “used [it] as if it were her own property, which is the primary indication that the use was not permissive”); see also McManus v. Roggi, 78 Conn. App. 288, 296, 826 A.2d 1275 (2003) (plaintiffs testimony that “she never asked for permission to use” property at issue supported trial court’s determination that use was adverse); Lisiewski v. Seidel, supra, 72 Conn. App. 874 (testimony that “permission [to use driveway] was never granted” supported determination that use was adverse); DiSorbo v. Grand Associates One Ltd. Partnership, 8 Conn. App. 203, 206, 512 A.2d 940 (1986) (testimony by plaintiffs husband that he used defendant’s driveway “whenever he wanted to and that he never sought permission to use [it]” supported determination of adverse possession)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "78 Conn. App. 699, 708",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made 'as of right' is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gallow-Mure v. Tomchik, 78 Conn. App. 699, 708, 829 A.2d 8 (2003) (“[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made ‘as of right’ is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way”); id., 709 (plaintiffs testimony that she did not need permission to use right-of-way supported trial court’s determination that she “used [it] as if it were her own property, which is the primary indication that the use was not permissive”); see also McManus v. Roggi, 78 Conn. App. 288, 296, 826 A.2d 1275 (2003) (plaintiffs testimony that “she never asked for permission to use” property at issue supported trial court’s determination that use was adverse); Lisiewski v. Seidel, supra, 72 Conn. App. 874 (testimony that “permission [to use driveway] was never granted” supported determination that use was adverse); DiSorbo v. Grand Associates One Ltd. Partnership, 8 Conn. App. 203, 206, 512 A.2d 940 (1986) (testimony by plaintiffs husband that he used defendant’s driveway “whenever he wanted to and that he never sought permission to use [it]” supported determination of adverse possession)."
} | 5,767,752 | b |
That evidence included the plaintiffs own testimony, which the trial court credited, that, prior to the defendant's construction of the pillars, no one ever had objected to her use of the right-of-way, and she had never sought permission from anyone to use it. It is well established that evidence that the party claiming a prescriptive use never asked for or was given permission to use the property will support a finding that the use was adverse. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "78 Conn. App. 699, 708",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made 'as of right' is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gallow-Mure v. Tomchik, 78 Conn. App. 699, 708, 829 A.2d 8 (2003) (“[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made ‘as of right’ is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way”); id., 709 (plaintiffs testimony that she did not need permission to use right-of-way supported trial court’s determination that she “used [it] as if it were her own property, which is the primary indication that the use was not permissive”); see also McManus v. Roggi, 78 Conn. App. 288, 296, 826 A.2d 1275 (2003) (plaintiffs testimony that “she never asked for permission to use” property at issue supported trial court’s determination that use was adverse); Lisiewski v. Seidel, supra, 72 Conn. App. 874 (testimony that “permission [to use driveway] was never granted” supported determination that use was adverse); DiSorbo v. Grand Associates One Ltd. Partnership, 8 Conn. App. 203, 206, 512 A.2d 940 (1986) (testimony by plaintiffs husband that he used defendant’s driveway “whenever he wanted to and that he never sought permission to use [it]” supported determination of adverse possession)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "8 Conn. App. 203, 206",
"parenthetical": "testimony by plaintiffs husband that he used defendant's driveway \"whenever he wanted to and that he never sought permission to use [it]\" supported determination of adverse possession",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gallow-Mure v. Tomchik, 78 Conn. App. 699, 708, 829 A.2d 8 (2003) (“[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made ‘as of right’ is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way”); id., 709 (plaintiffs testimony that she did not need permission to use right-of-way supported trial court’s determination that she “used [it] as if it were her own property, which is the primary indication that the use was not permissive”); see also McManus v. Roggi, 78 Conn. App. 288, 296, 826 A.2d 1275 (2003) (plaintiffs testimony that “she never asked for permission to use” property at issue supported trial court’s determination that use was adverse); Lisiewski v. Seidel, supra, 72 Conn. App. 874 (testimony that “permission [to use driveway] was never granted” supported determination that use was adverse); DiSorbo v. Grand Associates One Ltd. Partnership, 8 Conn. App. 203, 206, 512 A.2d 940 (1986) (testimony by plaintiffs husband that he used defendant’s driveway “whenever he wanted to and that he never sought permission to use [it]” supported determination of adverse possession)."
} | 5,767,752 | a |
That evidence included the plaintiffs own testimony, which the trial court credited, that, prior to the defendant's construction of the pillars, no one ever had objected to her use of the right-of-way, and she had never sought permission from anyone to use it. It is well established that evidence that the party claiming a prescriptive use never asked for or was given permission to use the property will support a finding that the use was adverse. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "testimony by plaintiffs husband that he used defendant's driveway \"whenever he wanted to and that he never sought permission to use [it]\" supported determination of adverse possession",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gallow-Mure v. Tomchik, 78 Conn. App. 699, 708, 829 A.2d 8 (2003) (“[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made ‘as of right’ is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way”); id., 709 (plaintiffs testimony that she did not need permission to use right-of-way supported trial court’s determination that she “used [it] as if it were her own property, which is the primary indication that the use was not permissive”); see also McManus v. Roggi, 78 Conn. App. 288, 296, 826 A.2d 1275 (2003) (plaintiffs testimony that “she never asked for permission to use” property at issue supported trial court’s determination that use was adverse); Lisiewski v. Seidel, supra, 72 Conn. App. 874 (testimony that “permission [to use driveway] was never granted” supported determination that use was adverse); DiSorbo v. Grand Associates One Ltd. Partnership, 8 Conn. App. 203, 206, 512 A.2d 940 (1986) (testimony by plaintiffs husband that he used defendant’s driveway “whenever he wanted to and that he never sought permission to use [it]” supported determination of adverse possession)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "78 Conn. App. 699, 708",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made 'as of right' is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gallow-Mure v. Tomchik, 78 Conn. App. 699, 708, 829 A.2d 8 (2003) (“[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made ‘as of right’ is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way”); id., 709 (plaintiffs testimony that she did not need permission to use right-of-way supported trial court’s determination that she “used [it] as if it were her own property, which is the primary indication that the use was not permissive”); see also McManus v. Roggi, 78 Conn. App. 288, 296, 826 A.2d 1275 (2003) (plaintiffs testimony that “she never asked for permission to use” property at issue supported trial court’s determination that use was adverse); Lisiewski v. Seidel, supra, 72 Conn. App. 874 (testimony that “permission [to use driveway] was never granted” supported determination that use was adverse); DiSorbo v. Grand Associates One Ltd. Partnership, 8 Conn. App. 203, 206, 512 A.2d 940 (1986) (testimony by plaintiffs husband that he used defendant’s driveway “whenever he wanted to and that he never sought permission to use [it]” supported determination of adverse possession)."
} | 5,767,752 | b |
That evidence included the plaintiffs own testimony, which the trial court credited, that, prior to the defendant's construction of the pillars, no one ever had objected to her use of the right-of-way, and she had never sought permission from anyone to use it. It is well established that evidence that the party claiming a prescriptive use never asked for or was given permission to use the property will support a finding that the use was adverse. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made 'as of right' is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gallow-Mure v. Tomchik, 78 Conn. App. 699, 708, 829 A.2d 8 (2003) (“[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made ‘as of right’ is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way”); id., 709 (plaintiffs testimony that she did not need permission to use right-of-way supported trial court’s determination that she “used [it] as if it were her own property, which is the primary indication that the use was not permissive”); see also McManus v. Roggi, 78 Conn. App. 288, 296, 826 A.2d 1275 (2003) (plaintiffs testimony that “she never asked for permission to use” property at issue supported trial court’s determination that use was adverse); Lisiewski v. Seidel, supra, 72 Conn. App. 874 (testimony that “permission [to use driveway] was never granted” supported determination that use was adverse); DiSorbo v. Grand Associates One Ltd. Partnership, 8 Conn. App. 203, 206, 512 A.2d 940 (1986) (testimony by plaintiffs husband that he used defendant’s driveway “whenever he wanted to and that he never sought permission to use [it]” supported determination of adverse possession)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "78 Conn. App. 288, 296",
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs testimony that \"she never asked for permission to use\" property at issue supported trial court's determination that use was adverse",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gallow-Mure v. Tomchik, 78 Conn. App. 699, 708, 829 A.2d 8 (2003) (“[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made ‘as of right’ is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way”); id., 709 (plaintiffs testimony that she did not need permission to use right-of-way supported trial court’s determination that she “used [it] as if it were her own property, which is the primary indication that the use was not permissive”); see also McManus v. Roggi, 78 Conn. App. 288, 296, 826 A.2d 1275 (2003) (plaintiffs testimony that “she never asked for permission to use” property at issue supported trial court’s determination that use was adverse); Lisiewski v. Seidel, supra, 72 Conn. App. 874 (testimony that “permission [to use driveway] was never granted” supported determination that use was adverse); DiSorbo v. Grand Associates One Ltd. Partnership, 8 Conn. App. 203, 206, 512 A.2d 940 (1986) (testimony by plaintiffs husband that he used defendant’s driveway “whenever he wanted to and that he never sought permission to use [it]” supported determination of adverse possession)."
} | 5,767,752 | a |
That evidence included the plaintiffs own testimony, which the trial court credited, that, prior to the defendant's construction of the pillars, no one ever had objected to her use of the right-of-way, and she had never sought permission from anyone to use it. It is well established that evidence that the party claiming a prescriptive use never asked for or was given permission to use the property will support a finding that the use was adverse. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs testimony that \"she never asked for permission to use\" property at issue supported trial court's determination that use was adverse",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gallow-Mure v. Tomchik, 78 Conn. App. 699, 708, 829 A.2d 8 (2003) (“[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made ‘as of right’ is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way”); id., 709 (plaintiffs testimony that she did not need permission to use right-of-way supported trial court’s determination that she “used [it] as if it were her own property, which is the primary indication that the use was not permissive”); see also McManus v. Roggi, 78 Conn. App. 288, 296, 826 A.2d 1275 (2003) (plaintiffs testimony that “she never asked for permission to use” property at issue supported trial court’s determination that use was adverse); Lisiewski v. Seidel, supra, 72 Conn. App. 874 (testimony that “permission [to use driveway] was never granted” supported determination that use was adverse); DiSorbo v. Grand Associates One Ltd. Partnership, 8 Conn. App. 203, 206, 512 A.2d 940 (1986) (testimony by plaintiffs husband that he used defendant’s driveway “whenever he wanted to and that he never sought permission to use [it]” supported determination of adverse possession)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made 'as of right' is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gallow-Mure v. Tomchik, 78 Conn. App. 699, 708, 829 A.2d 8 (2003) (“[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made ‘as of right’ is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way”); id., 709 (plaintiffs testimony that she did not need permission to use right-of-way supported trial court’s determination that she “used [it] as if it were her own property, which is the primary indication that the use was not permissive”); see also McManus v. Roggi, 78 Conn. App. 288, 296, 826 A.2d 1275 (2003) (plaintiffs testimony that “she never asked for permission to use” property at issue supported trial court’s determination that use was adverse); Lisiewski v. Seidel, supra, 72 Conn. App. 874 (testimony that “permission [to use driveway] was never granted” supported determination that use was adverse); DiSorbo v. Grand Associates One Ltd. Partnership, 8 Conn. App. 203, 206, 512 A.2d 940 (1986) (testimony by plaintiffs husband that he used defendant’s driveway “whenever he wanted to and that he never sought permission to use [it]” supported determination of adverse possession)."
} | 5,767,752 | b |
That evidence included the plaintiffs own testimony, which the trial court credited, that, prior to the defendant's construction of the pillars, no one ever had objected to her use of the right-of-way, and she had never sought permission from anyone to use it. It is well established that evidence that the party claiming a prescriptive use never asked for or was given permission to use the property will support a finding that the use was adverse. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made 'as of right' is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gallow-Mure v. Tomchik, 78 Conn. App. 699, 708, 829 A.2d 8 (2003) (“[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made ‘as of right’ is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way”); id., 709 (plaintiffs testimony that she did not need permission to use right-of-way supported trial court’s determination that she “used [it] as if it were her own property, which is the primary indication that the use was not permissive”); see also McManus v. Roggi, 78 Conn. App. 288, 296, 826 A.2d 1275 (2003) (plaintiffs testimony that “she never asked for permission to use” property at issue supported trial court’s determination that use was adverse); Lisiewski v. Seidel, supra, 72 Conn. App. 874 (testimony that “permission [to use driveway] was never granted” supported determination that use was adverse); DiSorbo v. Grand Associates One Ltd. Partnership, 8 Conn. App. 203, 206, 512 A.2d 940 (1986) (testimony by plaintiffs husband that he used defendant’s driveway “whenever he wanted to and that he never sought permission to use [it]” supported determination of adverse possession)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "testimony that \"permission [to use driveway] was never granted\" supported determination that use was adverse",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gallow-Mure v. Tomchik, 78 Conn. App. 699, 708, 829 A.2d 8 (2003) (“[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made ‘as of right’ is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way”); id., 709 (plaintiffs testimony that she did not need permission to use right-of-way supported trial court’s determination that she “used [it] as if it were her own property, which is the primary indication that the use was not permissive”); see also McManus v. Roggi, 78 Conn. App. 288, 296, 826 A.2d 1275 (2003) (plaintiffs testimony that “she never asked for permission to use” property at issue supported trial court’s determination that use was adverse); Lisiewski v. Seidel, supra, 72 Conn. App. 874 (testimony that “permission [to use driveway] was never granted” supported determination that use was adverse); DiSorbo v. Grand Associates One Ltd. Partnership, 8 Conn. App. 203, 206, 512 A.2d 940 (1986) (testimony by plaintiffs husband that he used defendant’s driveway “whenever he wanted to and that he never sought permission to use [it]” supported determination of adverse possession)."
} | 5,767,752 | a |
That evidence included the plaintiffs own testimony, which the trial court credited, that, prior to the defendant's construction of the pillars, no one ever had objected to her use of the right-of-way, and she had never sought permission from anyone to use it. It is well established that evidence that the party claiming a prescriptive use never asked for or was given permission to use the property will support a finding that the use was adverse. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made 'as of right' is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gallow-Mure v. Tomchik, 78 Conn. App. 699, 708, 829 A.2d 8 (2003) (“[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made ‘as of right’ is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way”); id., 709 (plaintiffs testimony that she did not need permission to use right-of-way supported trial court’s determination that she “used [it] as if it were her own property, which is the primary indication that the use was not permissive”); see also McManus v. Roggi, 78 Conn. App. 288, 296, 826 A.2d 1275 (2003) (plaintiffs testimony that “she never asked for permission to use” property at issue supported trial court’s determination that use was adverse); Lisiewski v. Seidel, supra, 72 Conn. App. 874 (testimony that “permission [to use driveway] was never granted” supported determination that use was adverse); DiSorbo v. Grand Associates One Ltd. Partnership, 8 Conn. App. 203, 206, 512 A.2d 940 (1986) (testimony by plaintiffs husband that he used defendant’s driveway “whenever he wanted to and that he never sought permission to use [it]” supported determination of adverse possession)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "8 Conn. App. 203, 206",
"parenthetical": "testimony by plaintiffs husband that he used defendant's driveway \"whenever he wanted to and that he never sought permission to use [it]\" supported determination of adverse possession",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gallow-Mure v. Tomchik, 78 Conn. App. 699, 708, 829 A.2d 8 (2003) (“[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made ‘as of right’ is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way”); id., 709 (plaintiffs testimony that she did not need permission to use right-of-way supported trial court’s determination that she “used [it] as if it were her own property, which is the primary indication that the use was not permissive”); see also McManus v. Roggi, 78 Conn. App. 288, 296, 826 A.2d 1275 (2003) (plaintiffs testimony that “she never asked for permission to use” property at issue supported trial court’s determination that use was adverse); Lisiewski v. Seidel, supra, 72 Conn. App. 874 (testimony that “permission [to use driveway] was never granted” supported determination that use was adverse); DiSorbo v. Grand Associates One Ltd. Partnership, 8 Conn. App. 203, 206, 512 A.2d 940 (1986) (testimony by plaintiffs husband that he used defendant’s driveway “whenever he wanted to and that he never sought permission to use [it]” supported determination of adverse possession)."
} | 5,767,752 | a |
That evidence included the plaintiffs own testimony, which the trial court credited, that, prior to the defendant's construction of the pillars, no one ever had objected to her use of the right-of-way, and she had never sought permission from anyone to use it. It is well established that evidence that the party claiming a prescriptive use never asked for or was given permission to use the property will support a finding that the use was adverse. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "testimony by plaintiffs husband that he used defendant's driveway \"whenever he wanted to and that he never sought permission to use [it]\" supported determination of adverse possession",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gallow-Mure v. Tomchik, 78 Conn. App. 699, 708, 829 A.2d 8 (2003) (“[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made ‘as of right’ is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way”); id., 709 (plaintiffs testimony that she did not need permission to use right-of-way supported trial court’s determination that she “used [it] as if it were her own property, which is the primary indication that the use was not permissive”); see also McManus v. Roggi, 78 Conn. App. 288, 296, 826 A.2d 1275 (2003) (plaintiffs testimony that “she never asked for permission to use” property at issue supported trial court’s determination that use was adverse); Lisiewski v. Seidel, supra, 72 Conn. App. 874 (testimony that “permission [to use driveway] was never granted” supported determination that use was adverse); DiSorbo v. Grand Associates One Ltd. Partnership, 8 Conn. App. 203, 206, 512 A.2d 940 (1986) (testimony by plaintiffs husband that he used defendant’s driveway “whenever he wanted to and that he never sought permission to use [it]” supported determination of adverse possession)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made 'as of right' is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gallow-Mure v. Tomchik, 78 Conn. App. 699, 708, 829 A.2d 8 (2003) (“[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made ‘as of right’ is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way”); id., 709 (plaintiffs testimony that she did not need permission to use right-of-way supported trial court’s determination that she “used [it] as if it were her own property, which is the primary indication that the use was not permissive”); see also McManus v. Roggi, 78 Conn. App. 288, 296, 826 A.2d 1275 (2003) (plaintiffs testimony that “she never asked for permission to use” property at issue supported trial court’s determination that use was adverse); Lisiewski v. Seidel, supra, 72 Conn. App. 874 (testimony that “permission [to use driveway] was never granted” supported determination that use was adverse); DiSorbo v. Grand Associates One Ltd. Partnership, 8 Conn. App. 203, 206, 512 A.2d 940 (1986) (testimony by plaintiffs husband that he used defendant’s driveway “whenever he wanted to and that he never sought permission to use [it]” supported determination of adverse possession)."
} | 5,767,752 | b |
This court previously has stated that the failure to provide notice to all interested parties in a declaratory judgment action deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction of the action. In recent years, however, the court has been willing to remand such cases to allow the defect to be cured, signaling a shift in the court's understanding of the nature of the defect. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "211 Conn. 51, 56",
"parenthetical": "because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties",
"sentence": "See Serrani v. Board of Ethics, 225 Conn. 305, 309 n.5, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993) (“[u]nlike other jurisdictional defects implicating the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction,” failure to comply with notice requirement can be cured); Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Raymark Corp., 215 Conn. 224, 230, 575 A.2d 693 (1990) (“[t]he conclusion we have reached that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render its declaratory judgment does not require that the action be dismissed upon remand, because the jurisdictional defect can be cured by further proceedings in the trial court”); cf. Gianetti v. Norwalk Hospital, 211 Conn. 51, 56, 557 A.2d 1249 (1989) (because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[u]nlike other jurisdictional defects implicating the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction,\" failure to comply with notice requirement can be cured",
"sentence": "See Serrani v. Board of Ethics, 225 Conn. 305, 309 n.5, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993) (“[u]nlike other jurisdictional defects implicating the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction,” failure to comply with notice requirement can be cured); Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Raymark Corp., 215 Conn. 224, 230, 575 A.2d 693 (1990) (“[t]he conclusion we have reached that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render its declaratory judgment does not require that the action be dismissed upon remand, because the jurisdictional defect can be cured by further proceedings in the trial court”); cf. Gianetti v. Norwalk Hospital, 211 Conn. 51, 56, 557 A.2d 1249 (1989) (because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties)."
} | 3,950,402 | b |
This court previously has stated that the failure to provide notice to all interested parties in a declaratory judgment action deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction of the action. In recent years, however, the court has been willing to remand such cases to allow the defect to be cured, signaling a shift in the court's understanding of the nature of the defect. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[u]nlike other jurisdictional defects implicating the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction,\" failure to comply with notice requirement can be cured",
"sentence": "See Serrani v. Board of Ethics, 225 Conn. 305, 309 n.5, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993) (“[u]nlike other jurisdictional defects implicating the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction,” failure to comply with notice requirement can be cured); Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Raymark Corp., 215 Conn. 224, 230, 575 A.2d 693 (1990) (“[t]he conclusion we have reached that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render its declaratory judgment does not require that the action be dismissed upon remand, because the jurisdictional defect can be cured by further proceedings in the trial court”); cf. Gianetti v. Norwalk Hospital, 211 Conn. 51, 56, 557 A.2d 1249 (1989) (because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties",
"sentence": "See Serrani v. Board of Ethics, 225 Conn. 305, 309 n.5, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993) (“[u]nlike other jurisdictional defects implicating the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction,” failure to comply with notice requirement can be cured); Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Raymark Corp., 215 Conn. 224, 230, 575 A.2d 693 (1990) (“[t]he conclusion we have reached that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render its declaratory judgment does not require that the action be dismissed upon remand, because the jurisdictional defect can be cured by further proceedings in the trial court”); cf. Gianetti v. Norwalk Hospital, 211 Conn. 51, 56, 557 A.2d 1249 (1989) (because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties)."
} | 3,950,402 | a |
This court previously has stated that the failure to provide notice to all interested parties in a declaratory judgment action deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction of the action. In recent years, however, the court has been willing to remand such cases to allow the defect to be cured, signaling a shift in the court's understanding of the nature of the defect. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "211 Conn. 51, 56",
"parenthetical": "because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties",
"sentence": "See Serrani v. Board of Ethics, 225 Conn. 305, 309 n.5, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993) (“[u]nlike other jurisdictional defects implicating the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction,” failure to comply with notice requirement can be cured); Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Raymark Corp., 215 Conn. 224, 230, 575 A.2d 693 (1990) (“[t]he conclusion we have reached that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render its declaratory judgment does not require that the action be dismissed upon remand, because the jurisdictional defect can be cured by further proceedings in the trial court”); cf. Gianetti v. Norwalk Hospital, 211 Conn. 51, 56, 557 A.2d 1249 (1989) (because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[u]nlike other jurisdictional defects implicating the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction,\" failure to comply with notice requirement can be cured",
"sentence": "See Serrani v. Board of Ethics, 225 Conn. 305, 309 n.5, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993) (“[u]nlike other jurisdictional defects implicating the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction,” failure to comply with notice requirement can be cured); Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Raymark Corp., 215 Conn. 224, 230, 575 A.2d 693 (1990) (“[t]he conclusion we have reached that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render its declaratory judgment does not require that the action be dismissed upon remand, because the jurisdictional defect can be cured by further proceedings in the trial court”); cf. Gianetti v. Norwalk Hospital, 211 Conn. 51, 56, 557 A.2d 1249 (1989) (because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties)."
} | 3,950,402 | b |
This court previously has stated that the failure to provide notice to all interested parties in a declaratory judgment action deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction of the action. In recent years, however, the court has been willing to remand such cases to allow the defect to be cured, signaling a shift in the court's understanding of the nature of the defect. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[u]nlike other jurisdictional defects implicating the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction,\" failure to comply with notice requirement can be cured",
"sentence": "See Serrani v. Board of Ethics, 225 Conn. 305, 309 n.5, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993) (“[u]nlike other jurisdictional defects implicating the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction,” failure to comply with notice requirement can be cured); Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Raymark Corp., 215 Conn. 224, 230, 575 A.2d 693 (1990) (“[t]he conclusion we have reached that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render its declaratory judgment does not require that the action be dismissed upon remand, because the jurisdictional defect can be cured by further proceedings in the trial court”); cf. Gianetti v. Norwalk Hospital, 211 Conn. 51, 56, 557 A.2d 1249 (1989) (because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties",
"sentence": "See Serrani v. Board of Ethics, 225 Conn. 305, 309 n.5, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993) (“[u]nlike other jurisdictional defects implicating the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction,” failure to comply with notice requirement can be cured); Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Raymark Corp., 215 Conn. 224, 230, 575 A.2d 693 (1990) (“[t]he conclusion we have reached that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render its declaratory judgment does not require that the action be dismissed upon remand, because the jurisdictional defect can be cured by further proceedings in the trial court”); cf. Gianetti v. Norwalk Hospital, 211 Conn. 51, 56, 557 A.2d 1249 (1989) (because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties)."
} | 3,950,402 | a |
This court previously has stated that the failure to provide notice to all interested parties in a declaratory judgment action deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction of the action. In recent years, however, the court has been willing to remand such cases to allow the defect to be cured, signaling a shift in the court's understanding of the nature of the defect. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "211 Conn. 51, 56",
"parenthetical": "because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties",
"sentence": "See Serrani v. Board of Ethics, 225 Conn. 305, 309 n.5, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993) (“[u]nlike other jurisdictional defects implicating the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction,” failure to comply with notice requirement can be cured); Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Raymark Corp., 215 Conn. 224, 230, 575 A.2d 693 (1990) (“[t]he conclusion we have reached that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render its declaratory judgment does not require that the action be dismissed upon remand, because the jurisdictional defect can be cured by further proceedings in the trial court”); cf. Gianetti v. Norwalk Hospital, 211 Conn. 51, 56, 557 A.2d 1249 (1989) (because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "215 Conn. 224, 230",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he conclusion we have reached that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render its declaratory judgment does not require that the action be dismissed upon remand, because the jurisdictional defect can be cured by further proceedings in the trial court\"",
"sentence": "See Serrani v. Board of Ethics, 225 Conn. 305, 309 n.5, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993) (“[u]nlike other jurisdictional defects implicating the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction,” failure to comply with notice requirement can be cured); Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Raymark Corp., 215 Conn. 224, 230, 575 A.2d 693 (1990) (“[t]he conclusion we have reached that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render its declaratory judgment does not require that the action be dismissed upon remand, because the jurisdictional defect can be cured by further proceedings in the trial court”); cf. Gianetti v. Norwalk Hospital, 211 Conn. 51, 56, 557 A.2d 1249 (1989) (because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties)."
} | 3,950,402 | b |
This court previously has stated that the failure to provide notice to all interested parties in a declaratory judgment action deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction of the action. In recent years, however, the court has been willing to remand such cases to allow the defect to be cured, signaling a shift in the court's understanding of the nature of the defect. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "215 Conn. 224, 230",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he conclusion we have reached that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render its declaratory judgment does not require that the action be dismissed upon remand, because the jurisdictional defect can be cured by further proceedings in the trial court\"",
"sentence": "See Serrani v. Board of Ethics, 225 Conn. 305, 309 n.5, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993) (“[u]nlike other jurisdictional defects implicating the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction,” failure to comply with notice requirement can be cured); Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Raymark Corp., 215 Conn. 224, 230, 575 A.2d 693 (1990) (“[t]he conclusion we have reached that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render its declaratory judgment does not require that the action be dismissed upon remand, because the jurisdictional defect can be cured by further proceedings in the trial court”); cf. Gianetti v. Norwalk Hospital, 211 Conn. 51, 56, 557 A.2d 1249 (1989) (because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties",
"sentence": "See Serrani v. Board of Ethics, 225 Conn. 305, 309 n.5, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993) (“[u]nlike other jurisdictional defects implicating the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction,” failure to comply with notice requirement can be cured); Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Raymark Corp., 215 Conn. 224, 230, 575 A.2d 693 (1990) (“[t]he conclusion we have reached that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render its declaratory judgment does not require that the action be dismissed upon remand, because the jurisdictional defect can be cured by further proceedings in the trial court”); cf. Gianetti v. Norwalk Hospital, 211 Conn. 51, 56, 557 A.2d 1249 (1989) (because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties)."
} | 3,950,402 | a |
This court previously has stated that the failure to provide notice to all interested parties in a declaratory judgment action deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction of the action. In recent years, however, the court has been willing to remand such cases to allow the defect to be cured, signaling a shift in the court's understanding of the nature of the defect. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "211 Conn. 51, 56",
"parenthetical": "because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties",
"sentence": "See Serrani v. Board of Ethics, 225 Conn. 305, 309 n.5, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993) (“[u]nlike other jurisdictional defects implicating the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction,” failure to comply with notice requirement can be cured); Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Raymark Corp., 215 Conn. 224, 230, 575 A.2d 693 (1990) (“[t]he conclusion we have reached that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render its declaratory judgment does not require that the action be dismissed upon remand, because the jurisdictional defect can be cured by further proceedings in the trial court”); cf. Gianetti v. Norwalk Hospital, 211 Conn. 51, 56, 557 A.2d 1249 (1989) (because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he conclusion we have reached that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render its declaratory judgment does not require that the action be dismissed upon remand, because the jurisdictional defect can be cured by further proceedings in the trial court\"",
"sentence": "See Serrani v. Board of Ethics, 225 Conn. 305, 309 n.5, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993) (“[u]nlike other jurisdictional defects implicating the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction,” failure to comply with notice requirement can be cured); Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Raymark Corp., 215 Conn. 224, 230, 575 A.2d 693 (1990) (“[t]he conclusion we have reached that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render its declaratory judgment does not require that the action be dismissed upon remand, because the jurisdictional defect can be cured by further proceedings in the trial court”); cf. Gianetti v. Norwalk Hospital, 211 Conn. 51, 56, 557 A.2d 1249 (1989) (because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties)."
} | 3,950,402 | b |
This court previously has stated that the failure to provide notice to all interested parties in a declaratory judgment action deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction of the action. In recent years, however, the court has been willing to remand such cases to allow the defect to be cured, signaling a shift in the court's understanding of the nature of the defect. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties",
"sentence": "See Serrani v. Board of Ethics, 225 Conn. 305, 309 n.5, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993) (“[u]nlike other jurisdictional defects implicating the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction,” failure to comply with notice requirement can be cured); Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Raymark Corp., 215 Conn. 224, 230, 575 A.2d 693 (1990) (“[t]he conclusion we have reached that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render its declaratory judgment does not require that the action be dismissed upon remand, because the jurisdictional defect can be cured by further proceedings in the trial court”); cf. Gianetti v. Norwalk Hospital, 211 Conn. 51, 56, 557 A.2d 1249 (1989) (because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he conclusion we have reached that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render its declaratory judgment does not require that the action be dismissed upon remand, because the jurisdictional defect can be cured by further proceedings in the trial court\"",
"sentence": "See Serrani v. Board of Ethics, 225 Conn. 305, 309 n.5, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993) (“[u]nlike other jurisdictional defects implicating the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction,” failure to comply with notice requirement can be cured); Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Raymark Corp., 215 Conn. 224, 230, 575 A.2d 693 (1990) (“[t]he conclusion we have reached that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render its declaratory judgment does not require that the action be dismissed upon remand, because the jurisdictional defect can be cured by further proceedings in the trial court”); cf. Gianetti v. Norwalk Hospital, 211 Conn. 51, 56, 557 A.2d 1249 (1989) (because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties)."
} | 3,950,402 | b |
No. 92-318, tit. We believe that this evidence is sufficient to support the limited action taken by Congress in its passage of the Equal Pay Act, particularly given the well-documented history of gender discrimination in this Nation, a history that is embodied in the Supreme Court's own jurisprudence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "109 F.3d 1281, 1283",
"parenthetical": "arguing that it would be difficult \"to understand how a statute enacted specifically to combat [gender] discrimination could fall outside the authority granted to Congress by SS 5\"",
"sentence": "See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531, 116 S.Ct. 2264 (stating that “skeptical scrutiny of official action denying rights or opportunities based on sex responds to volumes of history”); J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 136, 114 S.Ct. 1419 (stating that “ ‘our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.’ ”) (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973)); see also Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281, 1283 (8th Cir.1997) (arguing that it would be difficult “to understand how a statute enacted specifically to combat [gender] discrimination could fall outside the authority granted to Congress by § 5”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "518 U.S. 531, 531",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"skeptical scrutiny of official action denying rights or opportunities based on sex responds to volumes of history\"",
"sentence": "See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531, 116 S.Ct. 2264 (stating that “skeptical scrutiny of official action denying rights or opportunities based on sex responds to volumes of history”); J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 136, 114 S.Ct. 1419 (stating that “ ‘our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.’ ”) (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973)); see also Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281, 1283 (8th Cir.1997) (arguing that it would be difficult “to understand how a statute enacted specifically to combat [gender] discrimination could fall outside the authority granted to Congress by § 5”)."
} | 11,234,183 | b |
No. 92-318, tit. We believe that this evidence is sufficient to support the limited action taken by Congress in its passage of the Equal Pay Act, particularly given the well-documented history of gender discrimination in this Nation, a history that is embodied in the Supreme Court's own jurisprudence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"skeptical scrutiny of official action denying rights or opportunities based on sex responds to volumes of history\"",
"sentence": "See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531, 116 S.Ct. 2264 (stating that “skeptical scrutiny of official action denying rights or opportunities based on sex responds to volumes of history”); J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 136, 114 S.Ct. 1419 (stating that “ ‘our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.’ ”) (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973)); see also Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281, 1283 (8th Cir.1997) (arguing that it would be difficult “to understand how a statute enacted specifically to combat [gender] discrimination could fall outside the authority granted to Congress by § 5”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "109 F.3d 1281, 1283",
"parenthetical": "arguing that it would be difficult \"to understand how a statute enacted specifically to combat [gender] discrimination could fall outside the authority granted to Congress by SS 5\"",
"sentence": "See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531, 116 S.Ct. 2264 (stating that “skeptical scrutiny of official action denying rights or opportunities based on sex responds to volumes of history”); J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 136, 114 S.Ct. 1419 (stating that “ ‘our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.’ ”) (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973)); see also Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281, 1283 (8th Cir.1997) (arguing that it would be difficult “to understand how a statute enacted specifically to combat [gender] discrimination could fall outside the authority granted to Congress by § 5”)."
} | 11,234,183 | a |
The old federal rule and the present Court of Federal Claims rule are therefore identical. When interpreting the old federal rule, at least one appellate court held that state holidays were legal holidays for purposes of the federal rule. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "261 F.2d 627, 627",
"parenthetical": "allowing a motion to be filed one day after the filing deadline when the deadline fell on a Utah state holiday",
"sentence": "See, Prudential Oil, 261 F.2d at 627 (allowing a motion to be filed one day after the filing deadline when the deadline fell on a Utah state holiday); cf., Reyes-Cardona v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.1982) (excluding a Puerto Rican state holiday from computation after F.R.C.P. was amended to expressly include state holidays), Ohio Inns, Inc. v. Nye, 542 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946, 97 S.Ct. 1583, 51 L.Ed.2d 794 (1977) (excluding a state observance of Martin Luther King, Jr."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "excluding a Puerto Rican state holiday from computation after F.R.C.P. was amended to expressly include state holidays",
"sentence": "See, Prudential Oil, 261 F.2d at 627 (allowing a motion to be filed one day after the filing deadline when the deadline fell on a Utah state holiday); cf., Reyes-Cardona v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.1982) (excluding a Puerto Rican state holiday from computation after F.R.C.P. was amended to expressly include state holidays), Ohio Inns, Inc. v. Nye, 542 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946, 97 S.Ct. 1583, 51 L.Ed.2d 794 (1977) (excluding a state observance of Martin Luther King, Jr."
} | 777,711 | a |
The old federal rule and the present Court of Federal Claims rule are therefore identical. When interpreting the old federal rule, at least one appellate court held that state holidays were legal holidays for purposes of the federal rule. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "261 F.2d 627, 627",
"parenthetical": "allowing a motion to be filed one day after the filing deadline when the deadline fell on a Utah state holiday",
"sentence": "See, Prudential Oil, 261 F.2d at 627 (allowing a motion to be filed one day after the filing deadline when the deadline fell on a Utah state holiday); cf., Reyes-Cardona v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.1982) (excluding a Puerto Rican state holiday from computation after F.R.C.P. was amended to expressly include state holidays), Ohio Inns, Inc. v. Nye, 542 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946, 97 S.Ct. 1583, 51 L.Ed.2d 794 (1977) (excluding a state observance of Martin Luther King, Jr."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "542 F.2d 673, 676",
"parenthetical": "excluding a Puerto Rican state holiday from computation after F.R.C.P. was amended to expressly include state holidays",
"sentence": "See, Prudential Oil, 261 F.2d at 627 (allowing a motion to be filed one day after the filing deadline when the deadline fell on a Utah state holiday); cf., Reyes-Cardona v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.1982) (excluding a Puerto Rican state holiday from computation after F.R.C.P. was amended to expressly include state holidays), Ohio Inns, Inc. v. Nye, 542 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946, 97 S.Ct. 1583, 51 L.Ed.2d 794 (1977) (excluding a state observance of Martin Luther King, Jr."
} | 777,711 | a |
The old federal rule and the present Court of Federal Claims rule are therefore identical. When interpreting the old federal rule, at least one appellate court held that state holidays were legal holidays for purposes of the federal rule. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "261 F.2d 627, 627",
"parenthetical": "allowing a motion to be filed one day after the filing deadline when the deadline fell on a Utah state holiday",
"sentence": "See, Prudential Oil, 261 F.2d at 627 (allowing a motion to be filed one day after the filing deadline when the deadline fell on a Utah state holiday); cf., Reyes-Cardona v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.1982) (excluding a Puerto Rican state holiday from computation after F.R.C.P. was amended to expressly include state holidays), Ohio Inns, Inc. v. Nye, 542 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946, 97 S.Ct. 1583, 51 L.Ed.2d 794 (1977) (excluding a state observance of Martin Luther King, Jr."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "excluding a Puerto Rican state holiday from computation after F.R.C.P. was amended to expressly include state holidays",
"sentence": "See, Prudential Oil, 261 F.2d at 627 (allowing a motion to be filed one day after the filing deadline when the deadline fell on a Utah state holiday); cf., Reyes-Cardona v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.1982) (excluding a Puerto Rican state holiday from computation after F.R.C.P. was amended to expressly include state holidays), Ohio Inns, Inc. v. Nye, 542 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946, 97 S.Ct. 1583, 51 L.Ed.2d 794 (1977) (excluding a state observance of Martin Luther King, Jr."
} | 777,711 | a |
The old federal rule and the present Court of Federal Claims rule are therefore identical. When interpreting the old federal rule, at least one appellate court held that state holidays were legal holidays for purposes of the federal rule. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "excluding a Puerto Rican state holiday from computation after F.R.C.P. was amended to expressly include state holidays",
"sentence": "See, Prudential Oil, 261 F.2d at 627 (allowing a motion to be filed one day after the filing deadline when the deadline fell on a Utah state holiday); cf., Reyes-Cardona v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.1982) (excluding a Puerto Rican state holiday from computation after F.R.C.P. was amended to expressly include state holidays), Ohio Inns, Inc. v. Nye, 542 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946, 97 S.Ct. 1583, 51 L.Ed.2d 794 (1977) (excluding a state observance of Martin Luther King, Jr."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "261 F.2d 627, 627",
"parenthetical": "allowing a motion to be filed one day after the filing deadline when the deadline fell on a Utah state holiday",
"sentence": "See, Prudential Oil, 261 F.2d at 627 (allowing a motion to be filed one day after the filing deadline when the deadline fell on a Utah state holiday); cf., Reyes-Cardona v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.1982) (excluding a Puerto Rican state holiday from computation after F.R.C.P. was amended to expressly include state holidays), Ohio Inns, Inc. v. Nye, 542 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946, 97 S.Ct. 1583, 51 L.Ed.2d 794 (1977) (excluding a state observance of Martin Luther King, Jr."
} | 777,711 | b |
The old federal rule and the present Court of Federal Claims rule are therefore identical. When interpreting the old federal rule, at least one appellate court held that state holidays were legal holidays for purposes of the federal rule. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "261 F.2d 627, 627",
"parenthetical": "allowing a motion to be filed one day after the filing deadline when the deadline fell on a Utah state holiday",
"sentence": "See, Prudential Oil, 261 F.2d at 627 (allowing a motion to be filed one day after the filing deadline when the deadline fell on a Utah state holiday); cf., Reyes-Cardona v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.1982) (excluding a Puerto Rican state holiday from computation after F.R.C.P. was amended to expressly include state holidays), Ohio Inns, Inc. v. Nye, 542 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946, 97 S.Ct. 1583, 51 L.Ed.2d 794 (1977) (excluding a state observance of Martin Luther King, Jr."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "excluding a Puerto Rican state holiday from computation after F.R.C.P. was amended to expressly include state holidays",
"sentence": "See, Prudential Oil, 261 F.2d at 627 (allowing a motion to be filed one day after the filing deadline when the deadline fell on a Utah state holiday); cf., Reyes-Cardona v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.1982) (excluding a Puerto Rican state holiday from computation after F.R.C.P. was amended to expressly include state holidays), Ohio Inns, Inc. v. Nye, 542 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946, 97 S.Ct. 1583, 51 L.Ed.2d 794 (1977) (excluding a state observance of Martin Luther King, Jr."
} | 777,711 | a |
An agreement between the defendants to violate the law is an essential element, which must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "494 F.2d 1246, 1249",
"parenthetical": "mere knowledge of or acquiescence in the object of a conspiracy does not make one a coconspirator",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Butler, 494 F.2d 1246, 1249 (10th Cir.1974) (mere knowledge of or acquiescence in the object of a conspiracy does not make one a coconspirator). In United States v. Nall, 949 F.2d 301, 305-06 (10th Cir.1991), we concluded that the government’s proof that the defendants, a buyer and seller of real estate, left a meeting together to make a deposit at a bank was insufficient to prove a conspiracy existed to circumvent the cash transaction reporting requirements of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5324(a)(3) and 5313(a)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "965 F.2d 804, 814",
"parenthetical": "holding various actions of state insurance commissioner insufficient evidence of agreement to bribe a public official",
"sentence": "United States v. Davis, 965 F.2d 804, 814 (10th Cir.1992) (holding various actions of state insurance commissioner insufficient evidence of agreement to bribe a public official)."
} | 10,532,795 | b |
An agreement between the defendants to violate the law is an essential element, which must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "965 F.2d 804, 814",
"parenthetical": "holding various actions of state insurance commissioner insufficient evidence of agreement to bribe a public official",
"sentence": "United States v. Davis, 965 F.2d 804, 814 (10th Cir.1992) (holding various actions of state insurance commissioner insufficient evidence of agreement to bribe a public official)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "949 F.2d 301, 305-06",
"parenthetical": "mere knowledge of or acquiescence in the object of a conspiracy does not make one a coconspirator",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Butler, 494 F.2d 1246, 1249 (10th Cir.1974) (mere knowledge of or acquiescence in the object of a conspiracy does not make one a coconspirator). In United States v. Nall, 949 F.2d 301, 305-06 (10th Cir.1991), we concluded that the government’s proof that the defendants, a buyer and seller of real estate, left a meeting together to make a deposit at a bank was insufficient to prove a conspiracy existed to circumvent the cash transaction reporting requirements of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5324(a)(3) and 5313(a)."
} | 10,532,795 | a |
Thus, any further attempts to argue the merits of Rosete are deemed frivolous and an abuse of the judicial process. Furthermore, if Baylon files another document with this court and, upon review, it is determined that the arguments are frivolous, this court will consider the imposition of monetary sanctions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "45 F.3d 14, 17",
"parenthetical": "appellate court has inherent authority to dismiss appeal as frivolous when appeal presents no arguably meritorious issue for consideration",
"sentence": "See In re Solerwitz, 848 F.2d 1573, 1575 (Fed.Cir.1988) (counsel sanctioned for filing and maintaining frivolous appeals in air traffic controller cases that presented legal issues and fact patterns indistinguishable from those presented and decided in the precedents represented by the lead cases); see also Pillay v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 45 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir.1995) (appellate court has inherent authority to dismiss appeal as frivolous when appeal presents no arguably meritorious issue for consideration)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "848 F.2d 1573, 1575",
"parenthetical": "counsel sanctioned for filing and maintaining frivolous appeals in air traffic controller cases that presented legal issues and fact patterns indistinguishable from those presented and decided in the precedents represented by the lead cases",
"sentence": "See In re Solerwitz, 848 F.2d 1573, 1575 (Fed.Cir.1988) (counsel sanctioned for filing and maintaining frivolous appeals in air traffic controller cases that presented legal issues and fact patterns indistinguishable from those presented and decided in the precedents represented by the lead cases); see also Pillay v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 45 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir.1995) (appellate court has inherent authority to dismiss appeal as frivolous when appeal presents no arguably meritorious issue for consideration)."
} | 1,006,610 | b |
It was for the court to then apply that percentage to the total damages. Plainly, the jury's finding of zero dollars in damages resulting from Knowlton's death is drastically deficient. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "907 So.2d 1213, 1215",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"where the evidence is undisputed or substantially undisputed that a plaintiff has experienced and will experience pain and suffering as a result of an accident, a zero award for pain and suffering is inadequate as a matter of law\"",
"sentence": "See Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Merker, 907 So.2d 1213, 1215 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (noting that “where the evidence is undisputed or substantially undisputed that a plaintiff has experienced and will experience pain and suffering as a result of an accident, a zero award for pain and suffering is inadequate as a matter of law”); see also Westminster Cmty. Care Servs., Inc. v. Mikesell, 12 So.3d 838, 842 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (holding “the damages award of zero dollars was clearly inadequate in light of the substantial evidence at trial of economic and noneconomic damages” resulting from husband’s wrongful death); Snoozy v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 695 So.2d 767, 768 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (holding zero-damages award inadequate because “substantial, undisputed, and un-rebutted testimony” showed that deceased father “had a close relationship with his children, and that [the children] suffered a great loss as a result of their father’s death”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "12 So.3d 838, 842",
"parenthetical": "holding \"the damages award of zero dollars was clearly inadequate in light of the substantial evidence at trial of economic and noneconomic damages\" resulting from husband's wrongful death",
"sentence": "See Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Merker, 907 So.2d 1213, 1215 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (noting that “where the evidence is undisputed or substantially undisputed that a plaintiff has experienced and will experience pain and suffering as a result of an accident, a zero award for pain and suffering is inadequate as a matter of law”); see also Westminster Cmty. Care Servs., Inc. v. Mikesell, 12 So.3d 838, 842 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (holding “the damages award of zero dollars was clearly inadequate in light of the substantial evidence at trial of economic and noneconomic damages” resulting from husband’s wrongful death); Snoozy v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 695 So.2d 767, 768 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (holding zero-damages award inadequate because “substantial, undisputed, and un-rebutted testimony” showed that deceased father “had a close relationship with his children, and that [the children] suffered a great loss as a result of their father’s death”)."
} | 4,065,352 | a |
It was for the court to then apply that percentage to the total damages. Plainly, the jury's finding of zero dollars in damages resulting from Knowlton's death is drastically deficient. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "907 So.2d 1213, 1215",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"where the evidence is undisputed or substantially undisputed that a plaintiff has experienced and will experience pain and suffering as a result of an accident, a zero award for pain and suffering is inadequate as a matter of law\"",
"sentence": "See Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Merker, 907 So.2d 1213, 1215 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (noting that “where the evidence is undisputed or substantially undisputed that a plaintiff has experienced and will experience pain and suffering as a result of an accident, a zero award for pain and suffering is inadequate as a matter of law”); see also Westminster Cmty. Care Servs., Inc. v. Mikesell, 12 So.3d 838, 842 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (holding “the damages award of zero dollars was clearly inadequate in light of the substantial evidence at trial of economic and noneconomic damages” resulting from husband’s wrongful death); Snoozy v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 695 So.2d 767, 768 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (holding zero-damages award inadequate because “substantial, undisputed, and un-rebutted testimony” showed that deceased father “had a close relationship with his children, and that [the children] suffered a great loss as a result of their father’s death”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "695 So.2d 767, 768",
"parenthetical": "holding zero-damages award inadequate because \"substantial, undisputed, and un-rebutted testimony\" showed that deceased father \"had a close relationship with his children, and that [the children] suffered a great loss as a result of their father's death\"",
"sentence": "See Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Merker, 907 So.2d 1213, 1215 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (noting that “where the evidence is undisputed or substantially undisputed that a plaintiff has experienced and will experience pain and suffering as a result of an accident, a zero award for pain and suffering is inadequate as a matter of law”); see also Westminster Cmty. Care Servs., Inc. v. Mikesell, 12 So.3d 838, 842 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (holding “the damages award of zero dollars was clearly inadequate in light of the substantial evidence at trial of economic and noneconomic damages” resulting from husband’s wrongful death); Snoozy v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 695 So.2d 767, 768 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (holding zero-damages award inadequate because “substantial, undisputed, and un-rebutted testimony” showed that deceased father “had a close relationship with his children, and that [the children] suffered a great loss as a result of their father’s death”)."
} | 4,065,352 | a |
Opp'n to Furse & Covington Mot. to Dismiss at 12-17. Yet the plaintiffs entirely fail to demonstrate how the central holding of Gray -- that government attorneys enjoy absolute immunity from civil suits based on their conduct in initiating and prosecuting child neglect actions -- does not apply to their claims against defendant Furse. Furthermore, even if it were the case that defendant Furse had acted in bad faith and fallen under the "spell" of Carolina Lundebye, such behavior would not vitiate the absolute immunity conferred under Gray and Butz. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "65 F.3d 189, 194",
"parenthetical": "holding that prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for their \"knowing or inadvertent\" failure to disclose materially exculpatory evidence",
"sentence": "See Gray, 243 F.3d at 575 (noting that \"[w]here absolute immunity is deemed appropriate, an official is protected from all suits attacking conduct within the scope of the immunity, even if the official is alleged to have acted in bad faith”); cf. Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189, 194 (D.C.Cir.1995) (holding that prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for their \"knowing or inadvertent” failure to disclose materially exculpatory evidence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "243 F.3d 575, 575",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"[w]here absolute immunity is deemed appropriate, an official is protected from all suits attacking conduct within the scope of the immunity, even if the official is alleged to have acted in bad faith\"",
"sentence": "See Gray, 243 F.3d at 575 (noting that \"[w]here absolute immunity is deemed appropriate, an official is protected from all suits attacking conduct within the scope of the immunity, even if the official is alleged to have acted in bad faith”); cf. Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189, 194 (D.C.Cir.1995) (holding that prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for their \"knowing or inadvertent” failure to disclose materially exculpatory evidence)."
} | 4,026,691 | b |
Defendant is also correct that the trial court did not instruct the jury accordingly. However, assuming, without deciding, that the trial court thus committed plain error, we decline to exercise our discretion to correct the error. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "327 Or 99, 106",
"parenthetical": "instructional error \"requires reversal only if the jury instructions given by the trial court, considered as a whole, cause prejudice to the party requesting the instruction\"",
"sentence": "See Ailes, 312 Or at 382 (stating that an appellate court “must exercise its discretion to consider or not to consider the error”); see also Hernandez v. Barbo Machinery Co., 327 Or 99, 106, 957 P2d 147 (1998) (instructional error “requires reversal only if the jury instructions given by the trial court, considered as a whole, cause prejudice to the party requesting the instruction”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "312 Or 382, 382",
"parenthetical": "stating that an appellate court \"must exercise its discretion to consider or not to consider the error\"",
"sentence": "See Ailes, 312 Or at 382 (stating that an appellate court “must exercise its discretion to consider or not to consider the error”); see also Hernandez v. Barbo Machinery Co., 327 Or 99, 106, 957 P2d 147 (1998) (instructional error “requires reversal only if the jury instructions given by the trial court, considered as a whole, cause prejudice to the party requesting the instruction”)."
} | 5,768,631 | b |
We disagree. A jury's understanding of whether testimony is scientific is not based exclusively on whether the expert witness uses scientific-sounding jargon or words that are susceptible to only scientific meanings. Juries are capable of recognizing scientific substance when they hear it. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "167 Or App 496, 496-97",
"parenthetical": "explaining the scientific principles underlying DRE evidence and noting that \"it is clear that DRE draws its authority from scientific principles\"",
"sentence": "Sampson, 167 Or App at 496-97 (explaining the scientific principles underlying DRE evidence and noting that “it is clear that DRE draws its authority from scientific principles”); see also O'Key, 321 Or at 296-97 (holding that HGN-test evidence is “scientific” because such evidence “purports to draw its convincing force from” the scientific proposition that there is “a causal relationship between consumption of alcohol and the type of nystagmus measured by the HGN test” and that relationship “is not within the realm of common knowledge of the average person”); Branch, 243 Or App at 315 (the jury will perceive distance evidence based on lidar as scientific because lidar uses a scientific principle— the speed of light—to measure distance)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "321 Or 296, 296-97",
"parenthetical": "holding that HGN-test evidence is \"scientific\" because such evidence \"purports to draw its convincing force from\" the scientific proposition that there is \"a causal relationship between consumption of alcohol and the type of nystagmus measured by the HGN test\" and that relationship \"is not within the realm of common knowledge of the average person\"",
"sentence": "Sampson, 167 Or App at 496-97 (explaining the scientific principles underlying DRE evidence and noting that “it is clear that DRE draws its authority from scientific principles”); see also O'Key, 321 Or at 296-97 (holding that HGN-test evidence is “scientific” because such evidence “purports to draw its convincing force from” the scientific proposition that there is “a causal relationship between consumption of alcohol and the type of nystagmus measured by the HGN test” and that relationship “is not within the realm of common knowledge of the average person”); Branch, 243 Or App at 315 (the jury will perceive distance evidence based on lidar as scientific because lidar uses a scientific principle— the speed of light—to measure distance)."
} | 12,414,372 | a |
We disagree. A jury's understanding of whether testimony is scientific is not based exclusively on whether the expert witness uses scientific-sounding jargon or words that are susceptible to only scientific meanings. Juries are capable of recognizing scientific substance when they hear it. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "167 Or App 496, 496-97",
"parenthetical": "explaining the scientific principles underlying DRE evidence and noting that \"it is clear that DRE draws its authority from scientific principles\"",
"sentence": "Sampson, 167 Or App at 496-97 (explaining the scientific principles underlying DRE evidence and noting that “it is clear that DRE draws its authority from scientific principles”); see also O'Key, 321 Or at 296-97 (holding that HGN-test evidence is “scientific” because such evidence “purports to draw its convincing force from” the scientific proposition that there is “a causal relationship between consumption of alcohol and the type of nystagmus measured by the HGN test” and that relationship “is not within the realm of common knowledge of the average person”); Branch, 243 Or App at 315 (the jury will perceive distance evidence based on lidar as scientific because lidar uses a scientific principle— the speed of light—to measure distance)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "243 Or App 315, 315",
"parenthetical": "the jury will perceive distance evidence based on lidar as scientific because lidar uses a scientific principle-- the speed of light--to measure distance",
"sentence": "Sampson, 167 Or App at 496-97 (explaining the scientific principles underlying DRE evidence and noting that “it is clear that DRE draws its authority from scientific principles”); see also O'Key, 321 Or at 296-97 (holding that HGN-test evidence is “scientific” because such evidence “purports to draw its convincing force from” the scientific proposition that there is “a causal relationship between consumption of alcohol and the type of nystagmus measured by the HGN test” and that relationship “is not within the realm of common knowledge of the average person”); Branch, 243 Or App at 315 (the jury will perceive distance evidence based on lidar as scientific because lidar uses a scientific principle— the speed of light—to measure distance)."
} | 12,414,372 | a |
Although the broadest reading of the opinion might suggest a far-reaching cause of action, in fact, its impact has been relatively modest. Appellate Division decisions since LoBiondo I have not interpreted it expansively, but have instead given it limited application. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03",
"parenthetical": "concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I), certif. denied, 169 N.J. 607, 782 A.2d 425, appeal dismissed, 169 N.J. 608, 782 A.2d 425 (2001); see Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08, 832 A.2d 340 (App.Div.2003) (extending LoBiondo I’s special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08",
"parenthetical": "extending LoBiondo I's special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I), certif. denied, 169 N.J. 607, 782 A.2d 425, appeal dismissed, 169 N.J. 608, 782 A.2d 425 (2001); see Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08, 832 A.2d 340 (App.Div.2003) (extending LoBiondo I’s special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim)."
} | 4,141,696 | a |
Although the broadest reading of the opinion might suggest a far-reaching cause of action, in fact, its impact has been relatively modest. Appellate Division decisions since LoBiondo I have not interpreted it expansively, but have instead given it limited application. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "extending LoBiondo I's special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I), certif. denied, 169 N.J. 607, 782 A.2d 425, appeal dismissed, 169 N.J. 608, 782 A.2d 425 (2001); see Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08, 832 A.2d 340 (App.Div.2003) (extending LoBiondo I’s special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03",
"parenthetical": "concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I), certif. denied, 169 N.J. 607, 782 A.2d 425, appeal dismissed, 169 N.J. 608, 782 A.2d 425 (2001); see Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08, 832 A.2d 340 (App.Div.2003) (extending LoBiondo I’s special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim)."
} | 4,141,696 | b |
Although the broadest reading of the opinion might suggest a far-reaching cause of action, in fact, its impact has been relatively modest. Appellate Division decisions since LoBiondo I have not interpreted it expansively, but have instead given it limited application. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I), certif. denied, 169 N.J. 607, 782 A.2d 425, appeal dismissed, 169 N.J. 608, 782 A.2d 425 (2001); see Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08, 832 A.2d 340 (App.Div.2003) (extending LoBiondo I’s special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08",
"parenthetical": "extending LoBiondo I's special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I), certif. denied, 169 N.J. 607, 782 A.2d 425, appeal dismissed, 169 N.J. 608, 782 A.2d 425 (2001); see Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08, 832 A.2d 340 (App.Div.2003) (extending LoBiondo I’s special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim)."
} | 4,141,696 | a |
Although the broadest reading of the opinion might suggest a far-reaching cause of action, in fact, its impact has been relatively modest. Appellate Division decisions since LoBiondo I have not interpreted it expansively, but have instead given it limited application. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I), certif. denied, 169 N.J. 607, 782 A.2d 425, appeal dismissed, 169 N.J. 608, 782 A.2d 425 (2001); see Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08, 832 A.2d 340 (App.Div.2003) (extending LoBiondo I’s special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "extending LoBiondo I's special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I), certif. denied, 169 N.J. 607, 782 A.2d 425, appeal dismissed, 169 N.J. 608, 782 A.2d 425 (2001); see Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08, 832 A.2d 340 (App.Div.2003) (extending LoBiondo I’s special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim)."
} | 4,141,696 | a |
Although the broadest reading of the opinion might suggest a far-reaching cause of action, in fact, its impact has been relatively modest. Appellate Division decisions since LoBiondo I have not interpreted it expansively, but have instead given it limited application. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08",
"parenthetical": "extending LoBiondo I's special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I), certif. denied, 169 N.J. 607, 782 A.2d 425, appeal dismissed, 169 N.J. 608, 782 A.2d 425 (2001); see Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08, 832 A.2d 340 (App.Div.2003) (extending LoBiondo I’s special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I), certif. denied, 169 N.J. 607, 782 A.2d 425, appeal dismissed, 169 N.J. 608, 782 A.2d 425 (2001); see Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08, 832 A.2d 340 (App.Div.2003) (extending LoBiondo I’s special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim)."
} | 4,141,696 | b |
Although the broadest reading of the opinion might suggest a far-reaching cause of action, in fact, its impact has been relatively modest. Appellate Division decisions since LoBiondo I have not interpreted it expansively, but have instead given it limited application. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "extending LoBiondo I's special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I), certif. denied, 169 N.J. 607, 782 A.2d 425, appeal dismissed, 169 N.J. 608, 782 A.2d 425 (2001); see Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08, 832 A.2d 340 (App.Div.2003) (extending LoBiondo I’s special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I), certif. denied, 169 N.J. 607, 782 A.2d 425, appeal dismissed, 169 N.J. 608, 782 A.2d 425 (2001); see Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08, 832 A.2d 340 (App.Div.2003) (extending LoBiondo I’s special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim)."
} | 4,141,696 | b |
Although the broadest reading of the opinion might suggest a far-reaching cause of action, in fact, its impact has been relatively modest. Appellate Division decisions since LoBiondo I have not interpreted it expansively, but have instead given it limited application. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I), certif. denied, 169 N.J. 607, 782 A.2d 425, appeal dismissed, 169 N.J. 608, 782 A.2d 425 (2001); see Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08, 832 A.2d 340 (App.Div.2003) (extending LoBiondo I’s special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08",
"parenthetical": "extending LoBiondo I's special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I), certif. denied, 169 N.J. 607, 782 A.2d 425, appeal dismissed, 169 N.J. 608, 782 A.2d 425 (2001); see Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08, 832 A.2d 340 (App.Div.2003) (extending LoBiondo I’s special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim)."
} | 4,141,696 | a |
Although the broadest reading of the opinion might suggest a far-reaching cause of action, in fact, its impact has been relatively modest. Appellate Division decisions since LoBiondo I have not interpreted it expansively, but have instead given it limited application. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I), certif. denied, 169 N.J. 607, 782 A.2d 425, appeal dismissed, 169 N.J. 608, 782 A.2d 425 (2001); see Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08, 832 A.2d 340 (App.Div.2003) (extending LoBiondo I’s special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "extending LoBiondo I's special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I), certif. denied, 169 N.J. 607, 782 A.2d 425, appeal dismissed, 169 N.J. 608, 782 A.2d 425 (2001); see Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08, 832 A.2d 340 (App.Div.2003) (extending LoBiondo I’s special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim)."
} | 4,141,696 | a |
Although the broadest reading of the opinion might suggest a far-reaching cause of action, in fact, its impact has been relatively modest. Appellate Division decisions since LoBiondo I have not interpreted it expansively, but have instead given it limited application. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I), certif. denied, 169 N.J. 607, 782 A.2d 425, appeal dismissed, 169 N.J. 608, 782 A.2d 425 (2001); see Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08, 832 A.2d 340 (App.Div.2003) (extending LoBiondo I’s special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08",
"parenthetical": "extending LoBiondo I's special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I), certif. denied, 169 N.J. 607, 782 A.2d 425, appeal dismissed, 169 N.J. 608, 782 A.2d 425 (2001); see Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08, 832 A.2d 340 (App.Div.2003) (extending LoBiondo I’s special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim)."
} | 4,141,696 | a |
Although the broadest reading of the opinion might suggest a far-reaching cause of action, in fact, its impact has been relatively modest. Appellate Division decisions since LoBiondo I have not interpreted it expansively, but have instead given it limited application. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "extending LoBiondo I's special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I), certif. denied, 169 N.J. 607, 782 A.2d 425, appeal dismissed, 169 N.J. 608, 782 A.2d 425 (2001); see Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08, 832 A.2d 340 (App.Div.2003) (extending LoBiondo I’s special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I), certif. denied, 169 N.J. 607, 782 A.2d 425, appeal dismissed, 169 N.J. 608, 782 A.2d 425 (2001); see Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08, 832 A.2d 340 (App.Div.2003) (extending LoBiondo I’s special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim)."
} | 4,141,696 | b |
Although the broadest reading of the opinion might suggest a far-reaching cause of action, in fact, its impact has been relatively modest. Appellate Division decisions since LoBiondo I have not interpreted it expansively, but have instead given it limited application. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08",
"parenthetical": "extending LoBiondo I's special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I), certif. denied, 169 N.J. 607, 782 A.2d 425, appeal dismissed, 169 N.J. 608, 782 A.2d 425 (2001); see Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08, 832 A.2d 340 (App.Div.2003) (extending LoBiondo I’s special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I), certif. denied, 169 N.J. 607, 782 A.2d 425, appeal dismissed, 169 N.J. 608, 782 A.2d 425 (2001); see Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08, 832 A.2d 340 (App.Div.2003) (extending LoBiondo I’s special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim)."
} | 4,141,696 | b |
Although the broadest reading of the opinion might suggest a far-reaching cause of action, in fact, its impact has been relatively modest. Appellate Division decisions since LoBiondo I have not interpreted it expansively, but have instead given it limited application. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "extending LoBiondo I's special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I), certif. denied, 169 N.J. 607, 782 A.2d 425, appeal dismissed, 169 N.J. 608, 782 A.2d 425 (2001); see Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08, 832 A.2d 340 (App.Div.2003) (extending LoBiondo I’s special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I), certif. denied, 169 N.J. 607, 782 A.2d 425, appeal dismissed, 169 N.J. 608, 782 A.2d 425 (2001); see Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08, 832 A.2d 340 (App.Div.2003) (extending LoBiondo I’s special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim)."
} | 4,141,696 | b |
"[W]hen crimes involve 'indirect or secondary victims'," or where society at large is the victim, the crime is treated as a "victimless crime" for purposes of the grouping rules. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "56 F.3d 536, 538-42",
"parenthetical": "affirming separate grouping of firearms offenses based on differences including place, time, nature of guns, and purposes of acts",
"sentence": "United States v. Bush, 56 F.3d 536, 538-42 (3d Cir.1995) (affirming separate grouping of firearms offenses based on differences including place, time, nature of guns, and purposes of acts). For such “victimless crimes”, “the grouping decision must be based primarily upon the nature of the interest invaded by each offense.”"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "960 F.2d 965, 967-69",
"parenthetical": "finding district court properly did not group two obstruction convictions for acts that arose out of same scheme but occurred two years apart and involved different harms-- one involved interfering with proper sentencing of another defendant, and the other involved attempt to suborn perjury before grand jury",
"sentence": "Id. at 538 (quotation and citation omitted); United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289, 1304 (3d Cir.1991); see Boggi, 74 F.3d at 473-74, 478-79 (district court separated racketeering and substantive counts of unlawful receipt of payments by union official into three groups based on different payors; ruling not challenged on appeal; circuit court approved of abuse of trust enhancements in all three groups but remanded for resentencing on other grounds); United States v. Beard, 960 F.2d 965, 967-69 (11th Cir.1992) (finding district court properly did not group two obstruction convictions for acts that arose out of same scheme but occurred two years apart and involved different harms— one involved interfering with proper sentencing of another defendant, and the other involved attempt to suborn perjury before grand jury)."
} | 4,162,830 | a |
I would therefore hold that when a lawyer breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client has an absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship. And that right cannot be burdened by any claim from the lawyer for compensation or other damages. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "145 Minn. 281, 284",
"parenthetical": "\"[Because] the client has the right to terminate the relation of attorney and client at any time[,] ... it follows as a natural consequence that [the client] cannot be compelled to pay damages for exercising that right .... \"",
"sentence": "See Lawler v. Dunn, 145 Minn. 281, 284, 176 N.W. 989, 990 (1920) (“[Because] the client has the right to terminate the relation of attorney and client at any time[,] ... it follows as a natural consequence that [the client] cannot be compelled to pay damages for exercising that right .... ”); cf. Perl v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 345 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Minn.1984) (“The law treats a client’s right to an attorney’s loyalty as a kind of ‘absolute’ right in the sense that if the attorney breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client is deemed injured even if no actual loss results.”); Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407, 411 (Minn.1982) (holding that an attorney who breaches a fiduciary duty to a client forfeits his right to compensation without any requirement that the client prove actual harm)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "345 N.W.2d 209, 212",
"parenthetical": "\"The law treats a client's right to an attorney's loyalty as a kind of 'absolute' right in the sense that if the attorney breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client is deemed injured even if no actual loss results.\"",
"sentence": "See Lawler v. Dunn, 145 Minn. 281, 284, 176 N.W. 989, 990 (1920) (“[Because] the client has the right to terminate the relation of attorney and client at any time[,] ... it follows as a natural consequence that [the client] cannot be compelled to pay damages for exercising that right .... ”); cf. Perl v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 345 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Minn.1984) (“The law treats a client’s right to an attorney’s loyalty as a kind of ‘absolute’ right in the sense that if the attorney breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client is deemed injured even if no actual loss results.”); Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407, 411 (Minn.1982) (holding that an attorney who breaches a fiduciary duty to a client forfeits his right to compensation without any requirement that the client prove actual harm)."
} | 7,081,130 | a |
I would therefore hold that when a lawyer breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client has an absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship. And that right cannot be burdened by any claim from the lawyer for compensation or other damages. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "320 N.W.2d 407, 411",
"parenthetical": "holding that an attorney who breaches a fiduciary duty to a client forfeits his right to compensation without any requirement that the client prove actual harm",
"sentence": "See Lawler v. Dunn, 145 Minn. 281, 284, 176 N.W. 989, 990 (1920) (“[Because] the client has the right to terminate the relation of attorney and client at any time[,] ... it follows as a natural consequence that [the client] cannot be compelled to pay damages for exercising that right .... ”); cf. Perl v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 345 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Minn.1984) (“The law treats a client’s right to an attorney’s loyalty as a kind of ‘absolute’ right in the sense that if the attorney breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client is deemed injured even if no actual loss results.”); Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407, 411 (Minn.1982) (holding that an attorney who breaches a fiduciary duty to a client forfeits his right to compensation without any requirement that the client prove actual harm)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "145 Minn. 281, 284",
"parenthetical": "\"[Because] the client has the right to terminate the relation of attorney and client at any time[,] ... it follows as a natural consequence that [the client] cannot be compelled to pay damages for exercising that right .... \"",
"sentence": "See Lawler v. Dunn, 145 Minn. 281, 284, 176 N.W. 989, 990 (1920) (“[Because] the client has the right to terminate the relation of attorney and client at any time[,] ... it follows as a natural consequence that [the client] cannot be compelled to pay damages for exercising that right .... ”); cf. Perl v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 345 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Minn.1984) (“The law treats a client’s right to an attorney’s loyalty as a kind of ‘absolute’ right in the sense that if the attorney breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client is deemed injured even if no actual loss results.”); Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407, 411 (Minn.1982) (holding that an attorney who breaches a fiduciary duty to a client forfeits his right to compensation without any requirement that the client prove actual harm)."
} | 7,081,130 | b |
I would therefore hold that when a lawyer breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client has an absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship. And that right cannot be burdened by any claim from the lawyer for compensation or other damages. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "387 N.W.2d 412, 417",
"parenthetical": "authorizing only partial forfeiture of previously earned fees when there is no bad faith involved, no actual harm to the client and \"particularly where there are multiple potential plaintiffs\"",
"sentence": "But see Gilchrist v. Perl, 387 N.W.2d 412, 417 (Minn.1986) (authorizing only partial forfeiture of previously earned fees when there is no bad faith involved, no actual harm to the client and “particularly where there are multiple potential plaintiffs”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "145 Minn. 281, 284",
"parenthetical": "\"[Because] the client has the right to terminate the relation of attorney and client at any time[,] ... it follows as a natural consequence that [the client] cannot be compelled to pay damages for exercising that right .... \"",
"sentence": "See Lawler v. Dunn, 145 Minn. 281, 284, 176 N.W. 989, 990 (1920) (“[Because] the client has the right to terminate the relation of attorney and client at any time[,] ... it follows as a natural consequence that [the client] cannot be compelled to pay damages for exercising that right .... ”); cf. Perl v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 345 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Minn.1984) (“The law treats a client’s right to an attorney’s loyalty as a kind of ‘absolute’ right in the sense that if the attorney breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client is deemed injured even if no actual loss results.”); Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407, 411 (Minn.1982) (holding that an attorney who breaches a fiduciary duty to a client forfeits his right to compensation without any requirement that the client prove actual harm)."
} | 7,081,130 | b |
I would therefore hold that when a lawyer breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client has an absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship. And that right cannot be burdened by any claim from the lawyer for compensation or other damages. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "176 N.W. 989, 990",
"parenthetical": "\"[Because] the client has the right to terminate the relation of attorney and client at any time[,] ... it follows as a natural consequence that [the client] cannot be compelled to pay damages for exercising that right .... \"",
"sentence": "See Lawler v. Dunn, 145 Minn. 281, 284, 176 N.W. 989, 990 (1920) (“[Because] the client has the right to terminate the relation of attorney and client at any time[,] ... it follows as a natural consequence that [the client] cannot be compelled to pay damages for exercising that right .... ”); cf. Perl v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 345 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Minn.1984) (“The law treats a client’s right to an attorney’s loyalty as a kind of ‘absolute’ right in the sense that if the attorney breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client is deemed injured even if no actual loss results.”); Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407, 411 (Minn.1982) (holding that an attorney who breaches a fiduciary duty to a client forfeits his right to compensation without any requirement that the client prove actual harm)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "345 N.W.2d 209, 212",
"parenthetical": "\"The law treats a client's right to an attorney's loyalty as a kind of 'absolute' right in the sense that if the attorney breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client is deemed injured even if no actual loss results.\"",
"sentence": "See Lawler v. Dunn, 145 Minn. 281, 284, 176 N.W. 989, 990 (1920) (“[Because] the client has the right to terminate the relation of attorney and client at any time[,] ... it follows as a natural consequence that [the client] cannot be compelled to pay damages for exercising that right .... ”); cf. Perl v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 345 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Minn.1984) (“The law treats a client’s right to an attorney’s loyalty as a kind of ‘absolute’ right in the sense that if the attorney breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client is deemed injured even if no actual loss results.”); Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407, 411 (Minn.1982) (holding that an attorney who breaches a fiduciary duty to a client forfeits his right to compensation without any requirement that the client prove actual harm)."
} | 7,081,130 | a |
I would therefore hold that when a lawyer breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client has an absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship. And that right cannot be burdened by any claim from the lawyer for compensation or other damages. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "176 N.W. 989, 990",
"parenthetical": "\"[Because] the client has the right to terminate the relation of attorney and client at any time[,] ... it follows as a natural consequence that [the client] cannot be compelled to pay damages for exercising that right .... \"",
"sentence": "See Lawler v. Dunn, 145 Minn. 281, 284, 176 N.W. 989, 990 (1920) (“[Because] the client has the right to terminate the relation of attorney and client at any time[,] ... it follows as a natural consequence that [the client] cannot be compelled to pay damages for exercising that right .... ”); cf. Perl v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 345 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Minn.1984) (“The law treats a client’s right to an attorney’s loyalty as a kind of ‘absolute’ right in the sense that if the attorney breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client is deemed injured even if no actual loss results.”); Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407, 411 (Minn.1982) (holding that an attorney who breaches a fiduciary duty to a client forfeits his right to compensation without any requirement that the client prove actual harm)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "320 N.W.2d 407, 411",
"parenthetical": "holding that an attorney who breaches a fiduciary duty to a client forfeits his right to compensation without any requirement that the client prove actual harm",
"sentence": "See Lawler v. Dunn, 145 Minn. 281, 284, 176 N.W. 989, 990 (1920) (“[Because] the client has the right to terminate the relation of attorney and client at any time[,] ... it follows as a natural consequence that [the client] cannot be compelled to pay damages for exercising that right .... ”); cf. Perl v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 345 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Minn.1984) (“The law treats a client’s right to an attorney’s loyalty as a kind of ‘absolute’ right in the sense that if the attorney breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client is deemed injured even if no actual loss results.”); Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407, 411 (Minn.1982) (holding that an attorney who breaches a fiduciary duty to a client forfeits his right to compensation without any requirement that the client prove actual harm)."
} | 7,081,130 | a |
I would therefore hold that when a lawyer breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client has an absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship. And that right cannot be burdened by any claim from the lawyer for compensation or other damages. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "176 N.W. 989, 990",
"parenthetical": "\"[Because] the client has the right to terminate the relation of attorney and client at any time[,] ... it follows as a natural consequence that [the client] cannot be compelled to pay damages for exercising that right .... \"",
"sentence": "See Lawler v. Dunn, 145 Minn. 281, 284, 176 N.W. 989, 990 (1920) (“[Because] the client has the right to terminate the relation of attorney and client at any time[,] ... it follows as a natural consequence that [the client] cannot be compelled to pay damages for exercising that right .... ”); cf. Perl v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 345 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Minn.1984) (“The law treats a client’s right to an attorney’s loyalty as a kind of ‘absolute’ right in the sense that if the attorney breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client is deemed injured even if no actual loss results.”); Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407, 411 (Minn.1982) (holding that an attorney who breaches a fiduciary duty to a client forfeits his right to compensation without any requirement that the client prove actual harm)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "387 N.W.2d 412, 417",
"parenthetical": "authorizing only partial forfeiture of previously earned fees when there is no bad faith involved, no actual harm to the client and \"particularly where there are multiple potential plaintiffs\"",
"sentence": "But see Gilchrist v. Perl, 387 N.W.2d 412, 417 (Minn.1986) (authorizing only partial forfeiture of previously earned fees when there is no bad faith involved, no actual harm to the client and “particularly where there are multiple potential plaintiffs”)."
} | 7,081,130 | a |
I would therefore hold that when a lawyer breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client has an absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship. And that right cannot be burdened by any claim from the lawyer for compensation or other damages. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "345 N.W.2d 209, 212",
"parenthetical": "\"The law treats a client's right to an attorney's loyalty as a kind of 'absolute' right in the sense that if the attorney breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client is deemed injured even if no actual loss results.\"",
"sentence": "See Lawler v. Dunn, 145 Minn. 281, 284, 176 N.W. 989, 990 (1920) (“[Because] the client has the right to terminate the relation of attorney and client at any time[,] ... it follows as a natural consequence that [the client] cannot be compelled to pay damages for exercising that right .... ”); cf. Perl v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 345 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Minn.1984) (“The law treats a client’s right to an attorney’s loyalty as a kind of ‘absolute’ right in the sense that if the attorney breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client is deemed injured even if no actual loss results.”); Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407, 411 (Minn.1982) (holding that an attorney who breaches a fiduciary duty to a client forfeits his right to compensation without any requirement that the client prove actual harm)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "387 N.W.2d 412, 417",
"parenthetical": "authorizing only partial forfeiture of previously earned fees when there is no bad faith involved, no actual harm to the client and \"particularly where there are multiple potential plaintiffs\"",
"sentence": "But see Gilchrist v. Perl, 387 N.W.2d 412, 417 (Minn.1986) (authorizing only partial forfeiture of previously earned fees when there is no bad faith involved, no actual harm to the client and “particularly where there are multiple potential plaintiffs”)."
} | 7,081,130 | a |
I would therefore hold that when a lawyer breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client has an absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship. And that right cannot be burdened by any claim from the lawyer for compensation or other damages. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "320 N.W.2d 407, 411",
"parenthetical": "holding that an attorney who breaches a fiduciary duty to a client forfeits his right to compensation without any requirement that the client prove actual harm",
"sentence": "See Lawler v. Dunn, 145 Minn. 281, 284, 176 N.W. 989, 990 (1920) (“[Because] the client has the right to terminate the relation of attorney and client at any time[,] ... it follows as a natural consequence that [the client] cannot be compelled to pay damages for exercising that right .... ”); cf. Perl v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 345 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Minn.1984) (“The law treats a client’s right to an attorney’s loyalty as a kind of ‘absolute’ right in the sense that if the attorney breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client is deemed injured even if no actual loss results.”); Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407, 411 (Minn.1982) (holding that an attorney who breaches a fiduciary duty to a client forfeits his right to compensation without any requirement that the client prove actual harm)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "387 N.W.2d 412, 417",
"parenthetical": "authorizing only partial forfeiture of previously earned fees when there is no bad faith involved, no actual harm to the client and \"particularly where there are multiple potential plaintiffs\"",
"sentence": "But see Gilchrist v. Perl, 387 N.W.2d 412, 417 (Minn.1986) (authorizing only partial forfeiture of previously earned fees when there is no bad faith involved, no actual harm to the client and “particularly where there are multiple potential plaintiffs”)."
} | 7,081,130 | a |
However, even for the non-overlapping period, all plaintiffs and movants rely on a common pattern in their allegations: that defendants' statements to the investing public misrepresented or omitted to state material facts about the financial status of IMAX. Further, these matters share a common legal question: whether defendants' misrepresentations violated federal securities laws. In other words, the actions are all "securities fraud claims that arise from a common course of conduct. The dates on which the misrepresentations occurred do not change their nature." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "182 F.R.D. 476, 478",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"[cjourts which have addressed the issue have held that differing class periods alone will not defeat consolidation or create a conflict\"",
"sentence": "In re Cendant Corp. Lit., 182 F.R.D. 476, 478 (D.N.J.1998) (noting that “[cjourts which have addressed the issue have held that differing class periods alone will not defeat consolidation or create a conflict”); see also In re Olsten Corp. Sec. Litig., 3 F.Supp.2d. 286, 293 (E.D.N.Y.1998) (consolidating actions alleging violations of section 10(b) and 20(a) under Securities Exchange Act of 1934, despite the fact that one of the four complaints specified a class period which began before and ended during the class period alleged in the other three complaints); Dolan v. Axis Capital Holdings Ltd., Nos. 04 Civ. 8564(RJH) et al., 2005 WL 883008, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.13, 2005) (finding consolidation of cases with “similar or overlapping claims” under Section 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, along with Rule 10b-5, appropriate pursuant to Rule 42(a) despite different but “coextensive” class periods)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2005 WL 883008, at *2",
"parenthetical": "finding consolidation of cases with \"similar or overlapping claims\" under Section 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, along with Rule 10b-5, appropriate pursuant to Rule 42(a) despite different but \"coextensive\" class periods",
"sentence": "In re Cendant Corp. Lit., 182 F.R.D. 476, 478 (D.N.J.1998) (noting that “[cjourts which have addressed the issue have held that differing class periods alone will not defeat consolidation or create a conflict”); see also In re Olsten Corp. Sec. Litig., 3 F.Supp.2d. 286, 293 (E.D.N.Y.1998) (consolidating actions alleging violations of section 10(b) and 20(a) under Securities Exchange Act of 1934, despite the fact that one of the four complaints specified a class period which began before and ended during the class period alleged in the other three complaints); Dolan v. Axis Capital Holdings Ltd., Nos. 04 Civ. 8564(RJH) et al., 2005 WL 883008, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.13, 2005) (finding consolidation of cases with “similar or overlapping claims” under Section 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, along with Rule 10b-5, appropriate pursuant to Rule 42(a) despite different but “coextensive” class periods)."
} | 3,967,571 | a |
Tenant's claim under the Residential Rental Agreements Act is for breach of a warranty based on landlords' failure to keep the premises safe and clean. There is no indication that by enacting the Residential Rental Agreements Act, the Legislature intended to deny tenants the additional protections provided by the Consumer Fraud Act. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "547 A.2d 1141, 1141",
"parenthetical": "reversing trial court, which held specific landlord-tenant statutes precluded claim under general consumer fraud law",
"sentence": "See 49 Prospect Street, 547 A.2d at 1141 (reversing trial court, which held specific landlord-tenant statutes precluded claim under general consumer fraud law); see also McGrath v. Mishara, 434 N.E.2d 1215, 1221 (Mass. 1982) (“mere fact that these statutes contain some overlapping prohibitions and remedies does not establish a legislative intent to preclude their concurrent application”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "434 N.E.2d 1215, 1221",
"parenthetical": "\"mere fact that these statutes contain some overlapping prohibitions and remedies does not establish a legislative intent to preclude their concurrent application\"",
"sentence": "See 49 Prospect Street, 547 A.2d at 1141 (reversing trial court, which held specific landlord-tenant statutes precluded claim under general consumer fraud law); see also McGrath v. Mishara, 434 N.E.2d 1215, 1221 (Mass. 1982) (“mere fact that these statutes contain some overlapping prohibitions and remedies does not establish a legislative intent to preclude their concurrent application”)."
} | 4,849,013 | a |
This court has repeatedly held that a person is not entitled to be notified of her Miranda rights before an interrogation if that person is not "in custody." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "923 F.2d 1193, 1196",
"parenthetical": "warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); United States v. Macklin, 900 F.2d 948, 950-951 (6th Cir.1990) (“A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 116, 112 L.Ed.2d 86 (1990); United States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 285, 291-292 (6th Cir.1988) (“ Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom, as to render him in custody.’ ”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977)), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 1742, 104 L.Ed.2d 179 (1989); see also United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193,1196 (6th Cir.1991) (warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2824, 115 L.Ed.2d 995 (1991)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "900 F.2d 948, 950-951",
"parenthetical": "\"A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); United States v. Macklin, 900 F.2d 948, 950-951 (6th Cir.1990) (“A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 116, 112 L.Ed.2d 86 (1990); United States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 285, 291-292 (6th Cir.1988) (“ Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom, as to render him in custody.’ ”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977)), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 1742, 104 L.Ed.2d 179 (1989); see also United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193,1196 (6th Cir.1991) (warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2824, 115 L.Ed.2d 995 (1991)."
} | 10,518,111 | b |
This court has repeatedly held that a person is not entitled to be notified of her Miranda rights before an interrogation if that person is not "in custody." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "900 F.2d 948, 950-951",
"parenthetical": "\"A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); United States v. Macklin, 900 F.2d 948, 950-951 (6th Cir.1990) (“A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 116, 112 L.Ed.2d 86 (1990); United States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 285, 291-292 (6th Cir.1988) (“ Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom, as to render him in custody.’ ”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977)), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 1742, 104 L.Ed.2d 179 (1989); see also United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193,1196 (6th Cir.1991) (warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2824, 115 L.Ed.2d 995 (1991)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); United States v. Macklin, 900 F.2d 948, 950-951 (6th Cir.1990) (“A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 116, 112 L.Ed.2d 86 (1990); United States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 285, 291-292 (6th Cir.1988) (“ Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom, as to render him in custody.’ ”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977)), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 1742, 104 L.Ed.2d 179 (1989); see also United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193,1196 (6th Cir.1991) (warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2824, 115 L.Ed.2d 995 (1991)."
} | 10,518,111 | a |
This court has repeatedly held that a person is not entitled to be notified of her Miranda rights before an interrogation if that person is not "in custody." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "900 F.2d 948, 950-951",
"parenthetical": "\"A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); United States v. Macklin, 900 F.2d 948, 950-951 (6th Cir.1990) (“A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 116, 112 L.Ed.2d 86 (1990); United States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 285, 291-292 (6th Cir.1988) (“ Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom, as to render him in custody.’ ”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977)), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 1742, 104 L.Ed.2d 179 (1989); see also United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193,1196 (6th Cir.1991) (warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2824, 115 L.Ed.2d 995 (1991)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); United States v. Macklin, 900 F.2d 948, 950-951 (6th Cir.1990) (“A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 116, 112 L.Ed.2d 86 (1990); United States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 285, 291-292 (6th Cir.1988) (“ Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom, as to render him in custody.’ ”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977)), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 1742, 104 L.Ed.2d 179 (1989); see also United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193,1196 (6th Cir.1991) (warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2824, 115 L.Ed.2d 995 (1991)."
} | 10,518,111 | a |
This court has repeatedly held that a person is not entitled to be notified of her Miranda rights before an interrogation if that person is not "in custody." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "923 F.2d 1193, 1196",
"parenthetical": "warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); United States v. Macklin, 900 F.2d 948, 950-951 (6th Cir.1990) (“A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 116, 112 L.Ed.2d 86 (1990); United States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 285, 291-292 (6th Cir.1988) (“ Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom, as to render him in custody.’ ”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977)), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 1742, 104 L.Ed.2d 179 (1989); see also United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193,1196 (6th Cir.1991) (warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2824, 115 L.Ed.2d 995 (1991)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); United States v. Macklin, 900 F.2d 948, 950-951 (6th Cir.1990) (“A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 116, 112 L.Ed.2d 86 (1990); United States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 285, 291-292 (6th Cir.1988) (“ Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom, as to render him in custody.’ ”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977)), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 1742, 104 L.Ed.2d 179 (1989); see also United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193,1196 (6th Cir.1991) (warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2824, 115 L.Ed.2d 995 (1991)."
} | 10,518,111 | b |
This court has repeatedly held that a person is not entitled to be notified of her Miranda rights before an interrogation if that person is not "in custody." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); United States v. Macklin, 900 F.2d 948, 950-951 (6th Cir.1990) (“A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 116, 112 L.Ed.2d 86 (1990); United States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 285, 291-292 (6th Cir.1988) (“ Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom, as to render him in custody.’ ”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977)), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 1742, 104 L.Ed.2d 179 (1989); see also United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193,1196 (6th Cir.1991) (warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2824, 115 L.Ed.2d 995 (1991)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); United States v. Macklin, 900 F.2d 948, 950-951 (6th Cir.1990) (“A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 116, 112 L.Ed.2d 86 (1990); United States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 285, 291-292 (6th Cir.1988) (“ Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom, as to render him in custody.’ ”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977)), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 1742, 104 L.Ed.2d 179 (1989); see also United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193,1196 (6th Cir.1991) (warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2824, 115 L.Ed.2d 995 (1991)."
} | 10,518,111 | b |
This court has repeatedly held that a person is not entitled to be notified of her Miranda rights before an interrogation if that person is not "in custody." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); United States v. Macklin, 900 F.2d 948, 950-951 (6th Cir.1990) (“A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 116, 112 L.Ed.2d 86 (1990); United States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 285, 291-292 (6th Cir.1988) (“ Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom, as to render him in custody.’ ”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977)), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 1742, 104 L.Ed.2d 179 (1989); see also United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193,1196 (6th Cir.1991) (warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2824, 115 L.Ed.2d 995 (1991)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); United States v. Macklin, 900 F.2d 948, 950-951 (6th Cir.1990) (“A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 116, 112 L.Ed.2d 86 (1990); United States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 285, 291-292 (6th Cir.1988) (“ Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom, as to render him in custody.’ ”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977)), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 1742, 104 L.Ed.2d 179 (1989); see also United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193,1196 (6th Cir.1991) (warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2824, 115 L.Ed.2d 995 (1991)."
} | 10,518,111 | b |
This court has repeatedly held that a person is not entitled to be notified of her Miranda rights before an interrogation if that person is not "in custody." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); United States v. Macklin, 900 F.2d 948, 950-951 (6th Cir.1990) (“A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 116, 112 L.Ed.2d 86 (1990); United States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 285, 291-292 (6th Cir.1988) (“ Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom, as to render him in custody.’ ”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977)), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 1742, 104 L.Ed.2d 179 (1989); see also United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193,1196 (6th Cir.1991) (warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2824, 115 L.Ed.2d 995 (1991)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "923 F.2d 1193, 1196",
"parenthetical": "warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); United States v. Macklin, 900 F.2d 948, 950-951 (6th Cir.1990) (“A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 116, 112 L.Ed.2d 86 (1990); United States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 285, 291-292 (6th Cir.1988) (“ Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom, as to render him in custody.’ ”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977)), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 1742, 104 L.Ed.2d 179 (1989); see also United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193,1196 (6th Cir.1991) (warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2824, 115 L.Ed.2d 995 (1991)."
} | 10,518,111 | a |
This court has repeatedly held that a person is not entitled to be notified of her Miranda rights before an interrogation if that person is not "in custody." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); United States v. Macklin, 900 F.2d 948, 950-951 (6th Cir.1990) (“A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 116, 112 L.Ed.2d 86 (1990); United States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 285, 291-292 (6th Cir.1988) (“ Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom, as to render him in custody.’ ”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977)), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 1742, 104 L.Ed.2d 179 (1989); see also United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193,1196 (6th Cir.1991) (warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2824, 115 L.Ed.2d 995 (1991)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); United States v. Macklin, 900 F.2d 948, 950-951 (6th Cir.1990) (“A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 116, 112 L.Ed.2d 86 (1990); United States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 285, 291-292 (6th Cir.1988) (“ Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom, as to render him in custody.’ ”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977)), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 1742, 104 L.Ed.2d 179 (1989); see also United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193,1196 (6th Cir.1991) (warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2824, 115 L.Ed.2d 995 (1991)."
} | 10,518,111 | b |
This court has repeatedly held that a person is not entitled to be notified of her Miranda rights before an interrogation if that person is not "in custody." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); United States v. Macklin, 900 F.2d 948, 950-951 (6th Cir.1990) (“A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 116, 112 L.Ed.2d 86 (1990); United States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 285, 291-292 (6th Cir.1988) (“ Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom, as to render him in custody.’ ”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977)), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 1742, 104 L.Ed.2d 179 (1989); see also United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193,1196 (6th Cir.1991) (warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2824, 115 L.Ed.2d 995 (1991)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); United States v. Macklin, 900 F.2d 948, 950-951 (6th Cir.1990) (“A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 116, 112 L.Ed.2d 86 (1990); United States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 285, 291-292 (6th Cir.1988) (“ Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom, as to render him in custody.’ ”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977)), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 1742, 104 L.Ed.2d 179 (1989); see also United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193,1196 (6th Cir.1991) (warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2824, 115 L.Ed.2d 995 (1991)."
} | 10,518,111 | a |
The Financing Order follows the same structure as countless other orders and contracts, i.e., a more specific provision follows the more general provision. A court does not violate contract interpretation principles simply because it finds a more detailed provision to control the outcome over a general provision that has panoptic applicability. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "3 F.3d 11, 17",
"parenthetical": "noting the rule of contract interpretation that the specific controls the general",
"sentence": "See Parkhurst v. Gibson, 133 N.H. 57, 63, 573 A.2d 454 (1990) (noting the accepted interpretive rule that a general, preliminary clause does not take priority over specific provisions of a contract); 11 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 32:10 (4th ed. 1999) (“Where general and specific clauses conflict, the specific clause governs the meaning of the contract.”); see also Lawson v. FDIC, 3 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir.2003) (noting the rule of contract interpretation that the specific controls the general)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "450 F.3d 36, 36",
"parenthetical": "interpreting a stipulation allowing a chapter 11 debtor to retain a portion of one of its businesses and finding the paragraph that generally characterized the business the debtor was to retain did not control because the paragraphs that followed more precisely explained what fit within the general rubric and specified the parties' rights",
"sentence": "See New Seabury, 450 F.3d at 36 (interpreting a stipulation allowing a chapter 11 debtor to retain a portion of one of its businesses and finding the paragraph that generally characterized the business the debtor was to retain did not control because the paragraphs that followed more precisely explained what fit within the general rubric and specified the parties’ rights)."
} | 5,673,751 | b |
The Financing Order follows the same structure as countless other orders and contracts, i.e., a more specific provision follows the more general provision. A court does not violate contract interpretation principles simply because it finds a more detailed provision to control the outcome over a general provision that has panoptic applicability. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "3 F.3d 11, 17",
"parenthetical": "noting the rule of contract interpretation that the specific controls the general",
"sentence": "See Parkhurst v. Gibson, 133 N.H. 57, 63, 573 A.2d 454 (1990) (noting the accepted interpretive rule that a general, preliminary clause does not take priority over specific provisions of a contract); 11 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 32:10 (4th ed. 1999) (“Where general and specific clauses conflict, the specific clause governs the meaning of the contract.”); see also Lawson v. FDIC, 3 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir.2003) (noting the rule of contract interpretation that the specific controls the general)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "133 N.H. 57, 63",
"parenthetical": "noting the accepted interpretive rule that a general, preliminary clause does not take priority over specific provisions of a contract",
"sentence": "See Parkhurst v. Gibson, 133 N.H. 57, 63, 573 A.2d 454 (1990) (noting the accepted interpretive rule that a general, preliminary clause does not take priority over specific provisions of a contract); 11 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 32:10 (4th ed. 1999) (“Where general and specific clauses conflict, the specific clause governs the meaning of the contract.”); see also Lawson v. FDIC, 3 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir.2003) (noting the rule of contract interpretation that the specific controls the general)."
} | 5,673,751 | b |
The Financing Order follows the same structure as countless other orders and contracts, i.e., a more specific provision follows the more general provision. A court does not violate contract interpretation principles simply because it finds a more detailed provision to control the outcome over a general provision that has panoptic applicability. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "3 F.3d 11, 17",
"parenthetical": "noting the rule of contract interpretation that the specific controls the general",
"sentence": "See Parkhurst v. Gibson, 133 N.H. 57, 63, 573 A.2d 454 (1990) (noting the accepted interpretive rule that a general, preliminary clause does not take priority over specific provisions of a contract); 11 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 32:10 (4th ed. 1999) (“Where general and specific clauses conflict, the specific clause governs the meaning of the contract.”); see also Lawson v. FDIC, 3 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir.2003) (noting the rule of contract interpretation that the specific controls the general)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting the accepted interpretive rule that a general, preliminary clause does not take priority over specific provisions of a contract",
"sentence": "See Parkhurst v. Gibson, 133 N.H. 57, 63, 573 A.2d 454 (1990) (noting the accepted interpretive rule that a general, preliminary clause does not take priority over specific provisions of a contract); 11 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 32:10 (4th ed. 1999) (“Where general and specific clauses conflict, the specific clause governs the meaning of the contract.”); see also Lawson v. FDIC, 3 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir.2003) (noting the rule of contract interpretation that the specific controls the general)."
} | 5,673,751 | b |
As articulated in our case law, to determine whether a person's consent was voluntarily given or coerced, the proper analytical framework is whether a person has knowingly waived his right to refuse to consent to the search. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "68 N.J. 353, 353-54",
"parenthetical": "establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Paragraph 7, as knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes knowledge of right to refuse consent",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-54, 346 A.2d 66 (establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Paragraph 7, as knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes knowledge of right to refuse consent); State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352-53, 209 A.2d 110 (1965) (setting forth various non-exhaustive factors supporting either voluntary or coerced nature of consent). Free choice remains an indispensable tenet of our law — for example, the choice to submit to interrogation or to consent to a search. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 707 (1966); Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 355, 346 A.2d 66 (Schreiber, J., concurring) (“Consent contemplates the exercise of a choice” and free choice is “effectively safeguarded if the occupant of the premises knows that the search may be refused.”); see also King, supra, 44 N.J. at 353, 209 A.2d 110 (noting that “many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "44 N.J. 353, 353",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-54, 346 A.2d 66 (establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Paragraph 7, as knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes knowledge of right to refuse consent); State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352-53, 209 A.2d 110 (1965) (setting forth various non-exhaustive factors supporting either voluntary or coerced nature of consent). Free choice remains an indispensable tenet of our law — for example, the choice to submit to interrogation or to consent to a search. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 707 (1966); Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 355, 346 A.2d 66 (Schreiber, J., concurring) (“Consent contemplates the exercise of a choice” and free choice is “effectively safeguarded if the occupant of the premises knows that the search may be refused.”); see also King, supra, 44 N.J. at 353, 209 A.2d 110 (noting that “many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested”)."
} | 3,762,445 | a |
As articulated in our case law, to determine whether a person's consent was voluntarily given or coerced, the proper analytical framework is whether a person has knowingly waived his right to refuse to consent to the search. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-54, 346 A.2d 66 (establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Paragraph 7, as knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes knowledge of right to refuse consent); State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352-53, 209 A.2d 110 (1965) (setting forth various non-exhaustive factors supporting either voluntary or coerced nature of consent). Free choice remains an indispensable tenet of our law — for example, the choice to submit to interrogation or to consent to a search. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 707 (1966); Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 355, 346 A.2d 66 (Schreiber, J., concurring) (“Consent contemplates the exercise of a choice” and free choice is “effectively safeguarded if the occupant of the premises knows that the search may be refused.”); see also King, supra, 44 N.J. at 353, 209 A.2d 110 (noting that “many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "68 N.J. 353, 353-54",
"parenthetical": "establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Paragraph 7, as knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes knowledge of right to refuse consent",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-54, 346 A.2d 66 (establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Paragraph 7, as knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes knowledge of right to refuse consent); State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352-53, 209 A.2d 110 (1965) (setting forth various non-exhaustive factors supporting either voluntary or coerced nature of consent). Free choice remains an indispensable tenet of our law — for example, the choice to submit to interrogation or to consent to a search. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 707 (1966); Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 355, 346 A.2d 66 (Schreiber, J., concurring) (“Consent contemplates the exercise of a choice” and free choice is “effectively safeguarded if the occupant of the premises knows that the search may be refused.”); see also King, supra, 44 N.J. at 353, 209 A.2d 110 (noting that “many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested”)."
} | 3,762,445 | b |
As articulated in our case law, to determine whether a person's consent was voluntarily given or coerced, the proper analytical framework is whether a person has knowingly waived his right to refuse to consent to the search. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Paragraph 7, as knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes knowledge of right to refuse consent",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-54, 346 A.2d 66 (establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Paragraph 7, as knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes knowledge of right to refuse consent); State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352-53, 209 A.2d 110 (1965) (setting forth various non-exhaustive factors supporting either voluntary or coerced nature of consent). Free choice remains an indispensable tenet of our law — for example, the choice to submit to interrogation or to consent to a search. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 707 (1966); Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 355, 346 A.2d 66 (Schreiber, J., concurring) (“Consent contemplates the exercise of a choice” and free choice is “effectively safeguarded if the occupant of the premises knows that the search may be refused.”); see also King, supra, 44 N.J. at 353, 209 A.2d 110 (noting that “many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "44 N.J. 353, 353",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-54, 346 A.2d 66 (establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Paragraph 7, as knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes knowledge of right to refuse consent); State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352-53, 209 A.2d 110 (1965) (setting forth various non-exhaustive factors supporting either voluntary or coerced nature of consent). Free choice remains an indispensable tenet of our law — for example, the choice to submit to interrogation or to consent to a search. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 707 (1966); Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 355, 346 A.2d 66 (Schreiber, J., concurring) (“Consent contemplates the exercise of a choice” and free choice is “effectively safeguarded if the occupant of the premises knows that the search may be refused.”); see also King, supra, 44 N.J. at 353, 209 A.2d 110 (noting that “many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested”)."
} | 3,762,445 | a |
As articulated in our case law, to determine whether a person's consent was voluntarily given or coerced, the proper analytical framework is whether a person has knowingly waived his right to refuse to consent to the search. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Paragraph 7, as knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes knowledge of right to refuse consent",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-54, 346 A.2d 66 (establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Paragraph 7, as knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes knowledge of right to refuse consent); State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352-53, 209 A.2d 110 (1965) (setting forth various non-exhaustive factors supporting either voluntary or coerced nature of consent). Free choice remains an indispensable tenet of our law — for example, the choice to submit to interrogation or to consent to a search. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 707 (1966); Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 355, 346 A.2d 66 (Schreiber, J., concurring) (“Consent contemplates the exercise of a choice” and free choice is “effectively safeguarded if the occupant of the premises knows that the search may be refused.”); see also King, supra, 44 N.J. at 353, 209 A.2d 110 (noting that “many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-54, 346 A.2d 66 (establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Paragraph 7, as knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes knowledge of right to refuse consent); State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352-53, 209 A.2d 110 (1965) (setting forth various non-exhaustive factors supporting either voluntary or coerced nature of consent). Free choice remains an indispensable tenet of our law — for example, the choice to submit to interrogation or to consent to a search. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 707 (1966); Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 355, 346 A.2d 66 (Schreiber, J., concurring) (“Consent contemplates the exercise of a choice” and free choice is “effectively safeguarded if the occupant of the premises knows that the search may be refused.”); see also King, supra, 44 N.J. at 353, 209 A.2d 110 (noting that “many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested”)."
} | 3,762,445 | a |
As articulated in our case law, to determine whether a person's consent was voluntarily given or coerced, the proper analytical framework is whether a person has knowingly waived his right to refuse to consent to the search. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "44 N.J. 353, 353",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-54, 346 A.2d 66 (establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Paragraph 7, as knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes knowledge of right to refuse consent); State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352-53, 209 A.2d 110 (1965) (setting forth various non-exhaustive factors supporting either voluntary or coerced nature of consent). Free choice remains an indispensable tenet of our law — for example, the choice to submit to interrogation or to consent to a search. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 707 (1966); Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 355, 346 A.2d 66 (Schreiber, J., concurring) (“Consent contemplates the exercise of a choice” and free choice is “effectively safeguarded if the occupant of the premises knows that the search may be refused.”); see also King, supra, 44 N.J. at 353, 209 A.2d 110 (noting that “many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "44 N.J. 346, 352-53",
"parenthetical": "setting forth various non-exhaustive factors supporting either voluntary or coerced nature of consent",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-54, 346 A.2d 66 (establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Paragraph 7, as knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes knowledge of right to refuse consent); State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352-53, 209 A.2d 110 (1965) (setting forth various non-exhaustive factors supporting either voluntary or coerced nature of consent). Free choice remains an indispensable tenet of our law — for example, the choice to submit to interrogation or to consent to a search. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 707 (1966); Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 355, 346 A.2d 66 (Schreiber, J., concurring) (“Consent contemplates the exercise of a choice” and free choice is “effectively safeguarded if the occupant of the premises knows that the search may be refused.”); see also King, supra, 44 N.J. at 353, 209 A.2d 110 (noting that “many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested”)."
} | 3,762,445 | b |
As articulated in our case law, to determine whether a person's consent was voluntarily given or coerced, the proper analytical framework is whether a person has knowingly waived his right to refuse to consent to the search. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "44 N.J. 346, 352-53",
"parenthetical": "setting forth various non-exhaustive factors supporting either voluntary or coerced nature of consent",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-54, 346 A.2d 66 (establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Paragraph 7, as knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes knowledge of right to refuse consent); State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352-53, 209 A.2d 110 (1965) (setting forth various non-exhaustive factors supporting either voluntary or coerced nature of consent). Free choice remains an indispensable tenet of our law — for example, the choice to submit to interrogation or to consent to a search. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 707 (1966); Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 355, 346 A.2d 66 (Schreiber, J., concurring) (“Consent contemplates the exercise of a choice” and free choice is “effectively safeguarded if the occupant of the premises knows that the search may be refused.”); see also King, supra, 44 N.J. at 353, 209 A.2d 110 (noting that “many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-54, 346 A.2d 66 (establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Paragraph 7, as knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes knowledge of right to refuse consent); State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352-53, 209 A.2d 110 (1965) (setting forth various non-exhaustive factors supporting either voluntary or coerced nature of consent). Free choice remains an indispensable tenet of our law — for example, the choice to submit to interrogation or to consent to a search. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 707 (1966); Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 355, 346 A.2d 66 (Schreiber, J., concurring) (“Consent contemplates the exercise of a choice” and free choice is “effectively safeguarded if the occupant of the premises knows that the search may be refused.”); see also King, supra, 44 N.J. at 353, 209 A.2d 110 (noting that “many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested”)."
} | 3,762,445 | a |
As articulated in our case law, to determine whether a person's consent was voluntarily given or coerced, the proper analytical framework is whether a person has knowingly waived his right to refuse to consent to the search. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "setting forth various non-exhaustive factors supporting either voluntary or coerced nature of consent",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-54, 346 A.2d 66 (establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Paragraph 7, as knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes knowledge of right to refuse consent); State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352-53, 209 A.2d 110 (1965) (setting forth various non-exhaustive factors supporting either voluntary or coerced nature of consent). Free choice remains an indispensable tenet of our law — for example, the choice to submit to interrogation or to consent to a search. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 707 (1966); Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 355, 346 A.2d 66 (Schreiber, J., concurring) (“Consent contemplates the exercise of a choice” and free choice is “effectively safeguarded if the occupant of the premises knows that the search may be refused.”); see also King, supra, 44 N.J. at 353, 209 A.2d 110 (noting that “many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "44 N.J. 353, 353",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-54, 346 A.2d 66 (establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Paragraph 7, as knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes knowledge of right to refuse consent); State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352-53, 209 A.2d 110 (1965) (setting forth various non-exhaustive factors supporting either voluntary or coerced nature of consent). Free choice remains an indispensable tenet of our law — for example, the choice to submit to interrogation or to consent to a search. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 707 (1966); Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 355, 346 A.2d 66 (Schreiber, J., concurring) (“Consent contemplates the exercise of a choice” and free choice is “effectively safeguarded if the occupant of the premises knows that the search may be refused.”); see also King, supra, 44 N.J. at 353, 209 A.2d 110 (noting that “many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested”)."
} | 3,762,445 | a |
As articulated in our case law, to determine whether a person's consent was voluntarily given or coerced, the proper analytical framework is whether a person has knowingly waived his right to refuse to consent to the search. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "setting forth various non-exhaustive factors supporting either voluntary or coerced nature of consent",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-54, 346 A.2d 66 (establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Paragraph 7, as knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes knowledge of right to refuse consent); State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352-53, 209 A.2d 110 (1965) (setting forth various non-exhaustive factors supporting either voluntary or coerced nature of consent). Free choice remains an indispensable tenet of our law — for example, the choice to submit to interrogation or to consent to a search. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 707 (1966); Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 355, 346 A.2d 66 (Schreiber, J., concurring) (“Consent contemplates the exercise of a choice” and free choice is “effectively safeguarded if the occupant of the premises knows that the search may be refused.”); see also King, supra, 44 N.J. at 353, 209 A.2d 110 (noting that “many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-54, 346 A.2d 66 (establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Paragraph 7, as knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes knowledge of right to refuse consent); State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352-53, 209 A.2d 110 (1965) (setting forth various non-exhaustive factors supporting either voluntary or coerced nature of consent). Free choice remains an indispensable tenet of our law — for example, the choice to submit to interrogation or to consent to a search. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 707 (1966); Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 355, 346 A.2d 66 (Schreiber, J., concurring) (“Consent contemplates the exercise of a choice” and free choice is “effectively safeguarded if the occupant of the premises knows that the search may be refused.”); see also King, supra, 44 N.J. at 353, 209 A.2d 110 (noting that “many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested”)."
} | 3,762,445 | a |
As articulated in our case law, to determine whether a person's consent was voluntarily given or coerced, the proper analytical framework is whether a person has knowingly waived his right to refuse to consent to the search. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "384 U.S. 436, 444",
"parenthetical": "setting forth various non-exhaustive factors supporting either voluntary or coerced nature of consent",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-54, 346 A.2d 66 (establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Paragraph 7, as knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes knowledge of right to refuse consent); State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352-53, 209 A.2d 110 (1965) (setting forth various non-exhaustive factors supporting either voluntary or coerced nature of consent). Free choice remains an indispensable tenet of our law — for example, the choice to submit to interrogation or to consent to a search. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 707 (1966); Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 355, 346 A.2d 66 (Schreiber, J., concurring) (“Consent contemplates the exercise of a choice” and free choice is “effectively safeguarded if the occupant of the premises knows that the search may be refused.”); see also King, supra, 44 N.J. at 353, 209 A.2d 110 (noting that “many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "44 N.J. 353, 353",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-54, 346 A.2d 66 (establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Paragraph 7, as knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes knowledge of right to refuse consent); State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352-53, 209 A.2d 110 (1965) (setting forth various non-exhaustive factors supporting either voluntary or coerced nature of consent). Free choice remains an indispensable tenet of our law — for example, the choice to submit to interrogation or to consent to a search. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 707 (1966); Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 355, 346 A.2d 66 (Schreiber, J., concurring) (“Consent contemplates the exercise of a choice” and free choice is “effectively safeguarded if the occupant of the premises knows that the search may be refused.”); see also King, supra, 44 N.J. at 353, 209 A.2d 110 (noting that “many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested”)."
} | 3,762,445 | a |
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