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{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "exercising jurisdiction over surfer's SS 3344 claim against clothing retailer", "sentence": "See, e.g., DeMando v. Morris, 206 F.3d 1300, 1303 (9th Cir.2000) (“[Plaintiff] has suffered the loss of a statutory right to disclosure [under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693] and has therefore suffered injury in fact for purposes of Article III standing.”); see also Graczyk v. W. Publ’g Co., 660 F.3d 275, 278 (7th Cir.2011) (holding that plaintiffs had constitutional standing where plaintiffs alleged that defendant engaged in bulk compilation and distribution of their personal information contained in motor vehicle records, in violation of the Drivers’ Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2722); In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F.Supp.2d 705, 711-13 (N.D.Cal.2011) (Ware, C.J.) (holding that plaintiffs had constitutional standing where they alleged violation of their rights under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, et seq., even though dismissal was warranted for failure to state a claim for relief thereunder); cf. Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994 (9th Cir.2001) (exercising jurisdiction over surfer’s § 3344 claim against clothing retailer)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "791 F.Supp.2d 705, 711-13", "parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs had constitutional standing where they alleged violation of their rights under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. SSSS 2510, et seq., even though dismissal was warranted for failure to state a claim for relief thereunder", "sentence": "See, e.g., DeMando v. Morris, 206 F.3d 1300, 1303 (9th Cir.2000) (“[Plaintiff] has suffered the loss of a statutory right to disclosure [under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693] and has therefore suffered injury in fact for purposes of Article III standing.”); see also Graczyk v. W. Publ’g Co., 660 F.3d 275, 278 (7th Cir.2011) (holding that plaintiffs had constitutional standing where plaintiffs alleged that defendant engaged in bulk compilation and distribution of their personal information contained in motor vehicle records, in violation of the Drivers’ Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2722); In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F.Supp.2d 705, 711-13 (N.D.Cal.2011) (Ware, C.J.) (holding that plaintiffs had constitutional standing where they alleged violation of their rights under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, et seq., even though dismissal was warranted for failure to state a claim for relief thereunder); cf. Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994 (9th Cir.2001) (exercising jurisdiction over surfer’s § 3344 claim against clothing retailer)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "271 Kan. 877, 881", "parenthetical": "in plea bargain, State agreed not to prosecute murder charge against accomplice on condition he pled guilty to aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary and testified truthfully in the codefendants' trials", "sentence": "See State v. Walker, 260 Kan. 803, 808, 926 P.2d 218 (1996) (a probationer may have his or her probation revoked, and conditional freedom ended, when he or she “has failed to comply with the conditions of probation”); In re Tabor, 173 Kan. 686, 250 P.2d 793 (1952) (upon violation of conditions of parole, court is authorized to revoke and cause the convict to be imprisoned under sentence as though no parole had been granted); cf. State v. Branning, 271 Kan. 877, 881, 26 P.3d 673 (2001) (in plea bargain, State agreed not to prosecute murder charge against accomplice on condition he pled guilty to aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary and testified truthfully in the codefendants’ trials)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "260 Kan. 803, 808", "parenthetical": "a probationer may have his or her probation revoked, and conditional freedom ended, when he or she \"has failed to comply with the conditions of probation\"", "sentence": "See State v. Walker, 260 Kan. 803, 808, 926 P.2d 218 (1996) (a probationer may have his or her probation revoked, and conditional freedom ended, when he or she “has failed to comply with the conditions of probation”); In re Tabor, 173 Kan. 686, 250 P.2d 793 (1952) (upon violation of conditions of parole, court is authorized to revoke and cause the convict to be imprisoned under sentence as though no parole had been granted); cf. State v. Branning, 271 Kan. 877, 881, 26 P.3d 673 (2001) (in plea bargain, State agreed not to prosecute murder charge against accomplice on condition he pled guilty to aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary and testified truthfully in the codefendants’ trials)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "260 Kan. 803, 808", "parenthetical": "a probationer may have his or her probation revoked, and conditional freedom ended, when he or she \"has failed to comply with the conditions of probation\"", "sentence": "See State v. Walker, 260 Kan. 803, 808, 926 P.2d 218 (1996) (a probationer may have his or her probation revoked, and conditional freedom ended, when he or she “has failed to comply with the conditions of probation”); In re Tabor, 173 Kan. 686, 250 P.2d 793 (1952) (upon violation of conditions of parole, court is authorized to revoke and cause the convict to be imprisoned under sentence as though no parole had been granted); cf. State v. Branning, 271 Kan. 877, 881, 26 P.3d 673 (2001) (in plea bargain, State agreed not to prosecute murder charge against accomplice on condition he pled guilty to aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary and testified truthfully in the codefendants’ trials)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "in plea bargain, State agreed not to prosecute murder charge against accomplice on condition he pled guilty to aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary and testified truthfully in the codefendants' trials", "sentence": "See State v. Walker, 260 Kan. 803, 808, 926 P.2d 218 (1996) (a probationer may have his or her probation revoked, and conditional freedom ended, when he or she “has failed to comply with the conditions of probation”); In re Tabor, 173 Kan. 686, 250 P.2d 793 (1952) (upon violation of conditions of parole, court is authorized to revoke and cause the convict to be imprisoned under sentence as though no parole had been granted); cf. State v. Branning, 271 Kan. 877, 881, 26 P.3d 673 (2001) (in plea bargain, State agreed not to prosecute murder charge against accomplice on condition he pled guilty to aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary and testified truthfully in the codefendants’ trials)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "271 Kan. 877, 881", "parenthetical": "in plea bargain, State agreed not to prosecute murder charge against accomplice on condition he pled guilty to aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary and testified truthfully in the codefendants' trials", "sentence": "See State v. Walker, 260 Kan. 803, 808, 926 P.2d 218 (1996) (a probationer may have his or her probation revoked, and conditional freedom ended, when he or she “has failed to comply with the conditions of probation”); In re Tabor, 173 Kan. 686, 250 P.2d 793 (1952) (upon violation of conditions of parole, court is authorized to revoke and cause the convict to be imprisoned under sentence as though no parole had been granted); cf. State v. Branning, 271 Kan. 877, 881, 26 P.3d 673 (2001) (in plea bargain, State agreed not to prosecute murder charge against accomplice on condition he pled guilty to aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary and testified truthfully in the codefendants’ trials)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "a probationer may have his or her probation revoked, and conditional freedom ended, when he or she \"has failed to comply with the conditions of probation\"", "sentence": "See State v. Walker, 260 Kan. 803, 808, 926 P.2d 218 (1996) (a probationer may have his or her probation revoked, and conditional freedom ended, when he or she “has failed to comply with the conditions of probation”); In re Tabor, 173 Kan. 686, 250 P.2d 793 (1952) (upon violation of conditions of parole, court is authorized to revoke and cause the convict to be imprisoned under sentence as though no parole had been granted); cf. State v. Branning, 271 Kan. 877, 881, 26 P.3d 673 (2001) (in plea bargain, State agreed not to prosecute murder charge against accomplice on condition he pled guilty to aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary and testified truthfully in the codefendants’ trials)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "a probationer may have his or her probation revoked, and conditional freedom ended, when he or she \"has failed to comply with the conditions of probation\"", "sentence": "See State v. Walker, 260 Kan. 803, 808, 926 P.2d 218 (1996) (a probationer may have his or her probation revoked, and conditional freedom ended, when he or she “has failed to comply with the conditions of probation”); In re Tabor, 173 Kan. 686, 250 P.2d 793 (1952) (upon violation of conditions of parole, court is authorized to revoke and cause the convict to be imprisoned under sentence as though no parole had been granted); cf. State v. Branning, 271 Kan. 877, 881, 26 P.3d 673 (2001) (in plea bargain, State agreed not to prosecute murder charge against accomplice on condition he pled guilty to aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary and testified truthfully in the codefendants’ trials)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "in plea bargain, State agreed not to prosecute murder charge against accomplice on condition he pled guilty to aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary and testified truthfully in the codefendants' trials", "sentence": "See State v. Walker, 260 Kan. 803, 808, 926 P.2d 218 (1996) (a probationer may have his or her probation revoked, and conditional freedom ended, when he or she “has failed to comply with the conditions of probation”); In re Tabor, 173 Kan. 686, 250 P.2d 793 (1952) (upon violation of conditions of parole, court is authorized to revoke and cause the convict to be imprisoned under sentence as though no parole had been granted); cf. State v. Branning, 271 Kan. 877, 881, 26 P.3d 673 (2001) (in plea bargain, State agreed not to prosecute murder charge against accomplice on condition he pled guilty to aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary and testified truthfully in the codefendants’ trials)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "upon violation of conditions of parole, court is authorized to revoke and cause the convict to be imprisoned under sentence as though no parole had been granted", "sentence": "See State v. Walker, 260 Kan. 803, 808, 926 P.2d 218 (1996) (a probationer may have his or her probation revoked, and conditional freedom ended, when he or she “has failed to comply with the conditions of probation”); In re Tabor, 173 Kan. 686, 250 P.2d 793 (1952) (upon violation of conditions of parole, court is authorized to revoke and cause the convict to be imprisoned under sentence as though no parole had been granted); cf. State v. Branning, 271 Kan. 877, 881, 26 P.3d 673 (2001) (in plea bargain, State agreed not to prosecute murder charge against accomplice on condition he pled guilty to aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary and testified truthfully in the codefendants’ trials)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "271 Kan. 877, 881", "parenthetical": "in plea bargain, State agreed not to prosecute murder charge against accomplice on condition he pled guilty to aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary and testified truthfully in the codefendants' trials", "sentence": "See State v. Walker, 260 Kan. 803, 808, 926 P.2d 218 (1996) (a probationer may have his or her probation revoked, and conditional freedom ended, when he or she “has failed to comply with the conditions of probation”); In re Tabor, 173 Kan. 686, 250 P.2d 793 (1952) (upon violation of conditions of parole, court is authorized to revoke and cause the convict to be imprisoned under sentence as though no parole had been granted); cf. State v. Branning, 271 Kan. 877, 881, 26 P.3d 673 (2001) (in plea bargain, State agreed not to prosecute murder charge against accomplice on condition he pled guilty to aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary and testified truthfully in the codefendants’ trials)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "in plea bargain, State agreed not to prosecute murder charge against accomplice on condition he pled guilty to aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary and testified truthfully in the codefendants' trials", "sentence": "See State v. Walker, 260 Kan. 803, 808, 926 P.2d 218 (1996) (a probationer may have his or her probation revoked, and conditional freedom ended, when he or she “has failed to comply with the conditions of probation”); In re Tabor, 173 Kan. 686, 250 P.2d 793 (1952) (upon violation of conditions of parole, court is authorized to revoke and cause the convict to be imprisoned under sentence as though no parole had been granted); cf. State v. Branning, 271 Kan. 877, 881, 26 P.3d 673 (2001) (in plea bargain, State agreed not to prosecute murder charge against accomplice on condition he pled guilty to aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary and testified truthfully in the codefendants’ trials)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "upon violation of conditions of parole, court is authorized to revoke and cause the convict to be imprisoned under sentence as though no parole had been granted", "sentence": "See State v. Walker, 260 Kan. 803, 808, 926 P.2d 218 (1996) (a probationer may have his or her probation revoked, and conditional freedom ended, when he or she “has failed to comply with the conditions of probation”); In re Tabor, 173 Kan. 686, 250 P.2d 793 (1952) (upon violation of conditions of parole, court is authorized to revoke and cause the convict to be imprisoned under sentence as though no parole had been granted); cf. State v. Branning, 271 Kan. 877, 881, 26 P.3d 673 (2001) (in plea bargain, State agreed not to prosecute murder charge against accomplice on condition he pled guilty to aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary and testified truthfully in the codefendants’ trials)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "271 Kan. 877, 881", "parenthetical": "in plea bargain, State agreed not to prosecute murder charge against accomplice on condition he pled guilty to aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary and testified truthfully in the codefendants' trials", "sentence": "See State v. Walker, 260 Kan. 803, 808, 926 P.2d 218 (1996) (a probationer may have his or her probation revoked, and conditional freedom ended, when he or she “has failed to comply with the conditions of probation”); In re Tabor, 173 Kan. 686, 250 P.2d 793 (1952) (upon violation of conditions of parole, court is authorized to revoke and cause the convict to be imprisoned under sentence as though no parole had been granted); cf. State v. Branning, 271 Kan. 877, 881, 26 P.3d 673 (2001) (in plea bargain, State agreed not to prosecute murder charge against accomplice on condition he pled guilty to aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary and testified truthfully in the codefendants’ trials)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "upon violation of conditions of parole, court is authorized to revoke and cause the convict to be imprisoned under sentence as though no parole had been granted", "sentence": "See State v. Walker, 260 Kan. 803, 808, 926 P.2d 218 (1996) (a probationer may have his or her probation revoked, and conditional freedom ended, when he or she “has failed to comply with the conditions of probation”); In re Tabor, 173 Kan. 686, 250 P.2d 793 (1952) (upon violation of conditions of parole, court is authorized to revoke and cause the convict to be imprisoned under sentence as though no parole had been granted); cf. State v. Branning, 271 Kan. 877, 881, 26 P.3d 673 (2001) (in plea bargain, State agreed not to prosecute murder charge against accomplice on condition he pled guilty to aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary and testified truthfully in the codefendants’ trials)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "upon violation of conditions of parole, court is authorized to revoke and cause the convict to be imprisoned under sentence as though no parole had been granted", "sentence": "See State v. Walker, 260 Kan. 803, 808, 926 P.2d 218 (1996) (a probationer may have his or her probation revoked, and conditional freedom ended, when he or she “has failed to comply with the conditions of probation”); In re Tabor, 173 Kan. 686, 250 P.2d 793 (1952) (upon violation of conditions of parole, court is authorized to revoke and cause the convict to be imprisoned under sentence as though no parole had been granted); cf. State v. Branning, 271 Kan. 877, 881, 26 P.3d 673 (2001) (in plea bargain, State agreed not to prosecute murder charge against accomplice on condition he pled guilty to aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary and testified truthfully in the codefendants’ trials)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "in plea bargain, State agreed not to prosecute murder charge against accomplice on condition he pled guilty to aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary and testified truthfully in the codefendants' trials", "sentence": "See State v. Walker, 260 Kan. 803, 808, 926 P.2d 218 (1996) (a probationer may have his or her probation revoked, and conditional freedom ended, when he or she “has failed to comply with the conditions of probation”); In re Tabor, 173 Kan. 686, 250 P.2d 793 (1952) (upon violation of conditions of parole, court is authorized to revoke and cause the convict to be imprisoned under sentence as though no parole had been granted); cf. State v. Branning, 271 Kan. 877, 881, 26 P.3d 673 (2001) (in plea bargain, State agreed not to prosecute murder charge against accomplice on condition he pled guilty to aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary and testified truthfully in the codefendants’ trials)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "333 F.3d 372, 381-82", "parenthetical": "involving misapplication as a career offender, but pointing out that there was no suggestion the crimes were not violent felonies", "sentence": "See also United States v. Pettiford, 612 F.3d 270, 284 (4th Cir.2010) (holding under ACCA that the actual innocence of sentence exception “applies in the context of habitual offender provisions only where the challenge to eligibility stems from factual innocence of the predicate crimes, and not from the legal classification of the predicate crimes.”); cf. Poindexter v. Nash, 333 F.3d 372, 381-82 (2d Cir.2003) (involving misapplication as a career offender, but pointing out that there was no suggestion the crimes were not violent felonies)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "612 F.3d 270, 284", "parenthetical": "holding under ACCA that the actual innocence of sentence exception \"applies in the context of habitual offender provisions only where the challenge to eligibility stems from factual innocence of the predicate crimes, and not from the legal classification of the predicate crimes.\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Pettiford, 612 F.3d 270, 284 (4th Cir.2010) (holding under ACCA that the actual innocence of sentence exception “applies in the context of habitual offender provisions only where the challenge to eligibility stems from factual innocence of the predicate crimes, and not from the legal classification of the predicate crimes.”); cf. Poindexter v. Nash, 333 F.3d 372, 381-82 (2d Cir.2003) (involving misapplication as a career offender, but pointing out that there was no suggestion the crimes were not violent felonies)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "62 F.3d 323, 327", "parenthetical": "'Without any showing that ... such plea would have .been acceptable to the court, or that the resulting sentence would have been different than that imposed ... all that the Defendant urges is speculation.\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Boone, 62 F.3d 323, 327 (10th Cir.1995) (‘Without any showing that ... such plea would have .been acceptable to the court, or that the resulting sentence would have been different than that imposed ... all that the Defendant urges is speculation.”). He additionally claims the district court should have scheduled an evidentiary hearing, but we see no basis for concluding that such a hearing would have advanced his argument." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "676 F.3d 1211, 1214", "parenthetical": "\"Given the conclusory nature of Defendant's allegations, the district court's denial of an evi- dentiary hearing was not an abuse of discretion\"", "sentence": "Cf. United States v. Moya, 676 F.3d 1211, 1214 (10th Cir.2012) (“Given the conclusory nature of Defendant’s allegations, the district court’s denial of an evi- dentiary hearing was not an abuse of discretion”)-" }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "409 U.S. 57, 57-59, 61-62", "parenthetical": "where mayor had obligation to maintain village finances, a major portion of which were derived from the fines levied by the mayor's court, mayor was disqualified from acting as judge", "sentence": "Id. at 579-80, 93 S.Ct. at 1698-99; see also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531-35, 47 S.Ct. 437, 444-45, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) (judge received portion of fines and fees assessed in addition to his salary); cf. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 57-59, 61-62, 93 S.Ct. 80, 81-83, 83-84, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972) (where mayor had obligation to maintain village finances, a major portion of which were derived from the fines levied by the mayor’s court, mayor was disqualified from acting as judge)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "273 U.S. 510, 531-35", "parenthetical": "judge received portion of fines and fees assessed in addition to his salary", "sentence": "Id. at 579-80, 93 S.Ct. at 1698-99; see also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531-35, 47 S.Ct. 437, 444-45, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) (judge received portion of fines and fees assessed in addition to his salary); cf. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 57-59, 61-62, 93 S.Ct. 80, 81-83, 83-84, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972) (where mayor had obligation to maintain village finances, a major portion of which were derived from the fines levied by the mayor’s court, mayor was disqualified from acting as judge)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "93 S.Ct. 80, 81-83, 83-84", "parenthetical": "where mayor had obligation to maintain village finances, a major portion of which were derived from the fines levied by the mayor's court, mayor was disqualified from acting as judge", "sentence": "Id. at 579-80, 93 S.Ct. at 1698-99; see also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531-35, 47 S.Ct. 437, 444-45, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) (judge received portion of fines and fees assessed in addition to his salary); cf. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 57-59, 61-62, 93 S.Ct. 80, 81-83, 83-84, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972) (where mayor had obligation to maintain village finances, a major portion of which were derived from the fines levied by the mayor’s court, mayor was disqualified from acting as judge)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "273 U.S. 510, 531-35", "parenthetical": "judge received portion of fines and fees assessed in addition to his salary", "sentence": "Id. at 579-80, 93 S.Ct. at 1698-99; see also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531-35, 47 S.Ct. 437, 444-45, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) (judge received portion of fines and fees assessed in addition to his salary); cf. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 57-59, 61-62, 93 S.Ct. 80, 81-83, 83-84, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972) (where mayor had obligation to maintain village finances, a major portion of which were derived from the fines levied by the mayor’s court, mayor was disqualified from acting as judge)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "where mayor had obligation to maintain village finances, a major portion of which were derived from the fines levied by the mayor's court, mayor was disqualified from acting as judge", "sentence": "Id. at 579-80, 93 S.Ct. at 1698-99; see also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531-35, 47 S.Ct. 437, 444-45, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) (judge received portion of fines and fees assessed in addition to his salary); cf. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 57-59, 61-62, 93 S.Ct. 80, 81-83, 83-84, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972) (where mayor had obligation to maintain village finances, a major portion of which were derived from the fines levied by the mayor’s court, mayor was disqualified from acting as judge)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "273 U.S. 510, 531-35", "parenthetical": "judge received portion of fines and fees assessed in addition to his salary", "sentence": "Id. at 579-80, 93 S.Ct. at 1698-99; see also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531-35, 47 S.Ct. 437, 444-45, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) (judge received portion of fines and fees assessed in addition to his salary); cf. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 57-59, 61-62, 93 S.Ct. 80, 81-83, 83-84, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972) (where mayor had obligation to maintain village finances, a major portion of which were derived from the fines levied by the mayor’s court, mayor was disqualified from acting as judge)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "409 U.S. 57, 57-59, 61-62", "parenthetical": "where mayor had obligation to maintain village finances, a major portion of which were derived from the fines levied by the mayor's court, mayor was disqualified from acting as judge", "sentence": "Id. at 579-80, 93 S.Ct. at 1698-99; see also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531-35, 47 S.Ct. 437, 444-45, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) (judge received portion of fines and fees assessed in addition to his salary); cf. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 57-59, 61-62, 93 S.Ct. 80, 81-83, 83-84, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972) (where mayor had obligation to maintain village finances, a major portion of which were derived from the fines levied by the mayor’s court, mayor was disqualified from acting as judge)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "47 S.Ct. 437, 444-45", "parenthetical": "judge received portion of fines and fees assessed in addition to his salary", "sentence": "Id. at 579-80, 93 S.Ct. at 1698-99; see also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531-35, 47 S.Ct. 437, 444-45, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) (judge received portion of fines and fees assessed in addition to his salary); cf. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 57-59, 61-62, 93 S.Ct. 80, 81-83, 83-84, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972) (where mayor had obligation to maintain village finances, a major portion of which were derived from the fines levied by the mayor’s court, mayor was disqualified from acting as judge)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "47 S.Ct. 437, 444-45", "parenthetical": "judge received portion of fines and fees assessed in addition to his salary", "sentence": "Id. at 579-80, 93 S.Ct. at 1698-99; see also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531-35, 47 S.Ct. 437, 444-45, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) (judge received portion of fines and fees assessed in addition to his salary); cf. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 57-59, 61-62, 93 S.Ct. 80, 81-83, 83-84, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972) (where mayor had obligation to maintain village finances, a major portion of which were derived from the fines levied by the mayor’s court, mayor was disqualified from acting as judge)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "93 S.Ct. 80, 81-83, 83-84", "parenthetical": "where mayor had obligation to maintain village finances, a major portion of which were derived from the fines levied by the mayor's court, mayor was disqualified from acting as judge", "sentence": "Id. at 579-80, 93 S.Ct. at 1698-99; see also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531-35, 47 S.Ct. 437, 444-45, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) (judge received portion of fines and fees assessed in addition to his salary); cf. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 57-59, 61-62, 93 S.Ct. 80, 81-83, 83-84, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972) (where mayor had obligation to maintain village finances, a major portion of which were derived from the fines levied by the mayor’s court, mayor was disqualified from acting as judge)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "where mayor had obligation to maintain village finances, a major portion of which were derived from the fines levied by the mayor's court, mayor was disqualified from acting as judge", "sentence": "Id. at 579-80, 93 S.Ct. at 1698-99; see also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531-35, 47 S.Ct. 437, 444-45, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) (judge received portion of fines and fees assessed in addition to his salary); cf. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 57-59, 61-62, 93 S.Ct. 80, 81-83, 83-84, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972) (where mayor had obligation to maintain village finances, a major portion of which were derived from the fines levied by the mayor’s court, mayor was disqualified from acting as judge)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "47 S.Ct. 437, 444-45", "parenthetical": "judge received portion of fines and fees assessed in addition to his salary", "sentence": "Id. at 579-80, 93 S.Ct. at 1698-99; see also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531-35, 47 S.Ct. 437, 444-45, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) (judge received portion of fines and fees assessed in addition to his salary); cf. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 57-59, 61-62, 93 S.Ct. 80, 81-83, 83-84, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972) (where mayor had obligation to maintain village finances, a major portion of which were derived from the fines levied by the mayor’s court, mayor was disqualified from acting as judge)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "409 U.S. 57, 57-59, 61-62", "parenthetical": "where mayor had obligation to maintain village finances, a major portion of which were derived from the fines levied by the mayor's court, mayor was disqualified from acting as judge", "sentence": "Id. at 579-80, 93 S.Ct. at 1698-99; see also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531-35, 47 S.Ct. 437, 444-45, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) (judge received portion of fines and fees assessed in addition to his salary); cf. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 57-59, 61-62, 93 S.Ct. 80, 81-83, 83-84, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972) (where mayor had obligation to maintain village finances, a major portion of which were derived from the fines levied by the mayor’s court, mayor was disqualified from acting as judge)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "judge received portion of fines and fees assessed in addition to his salary", "sentence": "Id. at 579-80, 93 S.Ct. at 1698-99; see also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531-35, 47 S.Ct. 437, 444-45, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) (judge received portion of fines and fees assessed in addition to his salary); cf. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 57-59, 61-62, 93 S.Ct. 80, 81-83, 83-84, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972) (where mayor had obligation to maintain village finances, a major portion of which were derived from the fines levied by the mayor’s court, mayor was disqualified from acting as judge)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "93 S.Ct. 80, 81-83, 83-84", "parenthetical": "where mayor had obligation to maintain village finances, a major portion of which were derived from the fines levied by the mayor's court, mayor was disqualified from acting as judge", "sentence": "Id. at 579-80, 93 S.Ct. at 1698-99; see also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531-35, 47 S.Ct. 437, 444-45, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) (judge received portion of fines and fees assessed in addition to his salary); cf. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 57-59, 61-62, 93 S.Ct. 80, 81-83, 83-84, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972) (where mayor had obligation to maintain village finances, a major portion of which were derived from the fines levied by the mayor’s court, mayor was disqualified from acting as judge)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "judge received portion of fines and fees assessed in addition to his salary", "sentence": "Id. at 579-80, 93 S.Ct. at 1698-99; see also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531-35, 47 S.Ct. 437, 444-45, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) (judge received portion of fines and fees assessed in addition to his salary); cf. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 57-59, 61-62, 93 S.Ct. 80, 81-83, 83-84, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972) (where mayor had obligation to maintain village finances, a major portion of which were derived from the fines levied by the mayor’s court, mayor was disqualified from acting as judge)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "judge received portion of fines and fees assessed in addition to his salary", "sentence": "Id. at 579-80, 93 S.Ct. at 1698-99; see also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531-35, 47 S.Ct. 437, 444-45, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) (judge received portion of fines and fees assessed in addition to his salary); cf. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 57-59, 61-62, 93 S.Ct. 80, 81-83, 83-84, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972) (where mayor had obligation to maintain village finances, a major portion of which were derived from the fines levied by the mayor’s court, mayor was disqualified from acting as judge)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "where mayor had obligation to maintain village finances, a major portion of which were derived from the fines levied by the mayor's court, mayor was disqualified from acting as judge", "sentence": "Id. at 579-80, 93 S.Ct. at 1698-99; see also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531-35, 47 S.Ct. 437, 444-45, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) (judge received portion of fines and fees assessed in addition to his salary); cf. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 57-59, 61-62, 93 S.Ct. 80, 81-83, 83-84, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972) (where mayor had obligation to maintain village finances, a major portion of which were derived from the fines levied by the mayor’s court, mayor was disqualified from acting as judge)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "864 So.2d 22, 24", "parenthetical": "stating that bridge-the-gap alimony is appropriate where the spouse holds an advanced degree in genetics, had worked in that field, and only needed support in reentering the field", "sentence": "See Salazar, 976 So.2d 1155; Byers, 910 So.2d at 344; Knoff, 751 So.2d at 169; see also Young v. Young, 677 So.2d 1301, 1306 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (“Personal or career sacrifices of a spouse during the period the other spouse achieves superior earning power should weigh in favor of an award of permanent alimony.”); cf. Weintraub v. Weintraub, 864 So.2d 22, 24 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (stating that bridge-the-gap alimony is appropriate where the spouse holds an advanced degree in genetics, had worked in that field, and only needed support in reentering the field)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "677 So.2d 1301, 1306", "parenthetical": "\"Personal or career sacrifices of a spouse during the period the other spouse achieves superior earning power should weigh in favor of an award of permanent alimony.\"", "sentence": "See Salazar, 976 So.2d 1155; Byers, 910 So.2d at 344; Knoff, 751 So.2d at 169; see also Young v. Young, 677 So.2d 1301, 1306 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (“Personal or career sacrifices of a spouse during the period the other spouse achieves superior earning power should weigh in favor of an award of permanent alimony.”); cf. Weintraub v. Weintraub, 864 So.2d 22, 24 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (stating that bridge-the-gap alimony is appropriate where the spouse holds an advanced degree in genetics, had worked in that field, and only needed support in reentering the field)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "507 U.S. 619, 631", "parenthetical": "stating that if a decision does not \"squarely address[] [an] issue,\" a court remains \"free to address the issue on the merits\" in a subsequent case", "sentence": "See, e.g., Sacco v. United States, 452 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed.Cir.2006) (finding that a prior case \"is not binding precedent on [a] point because the court did not address the issue” in that prior case); Boeing N. Am., Inc. v. Roche, 298 F.3d 1274, 1282 (Fed.Cir.2002) (\"[W]e are not bound by [a prior opinion] on the issue ... since [that] issue was neither argued nor discussed in our opinion.”); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (stating that if a decision does not \"squarely address[] [an] issue,” a court remains \"free to address the issue on the merits” in a subsequent case)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "452 F.3d 1305, 1308", "parenthetical": "finding that a prior case \"is not binding precedent on [a] point because the court did not address the issue\" in that prior case", "sentence": "See, e.g., Sacco v. United States, 452 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed.Cir.2006) (finding that a prior case \"is not binding precedent on [a] point because the court did not address the issue” in that prior case); Boeing N. Am., Inc. v. Roche, 298 F.3d 1274, 1282 (Fed.Cir.2002) (\"[W]e are not bound by [a prior opinion] on the issue ... since [that] issue was neither argued nor discussed in our opinion.”); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (stating that if a decision does not \"squarely address[] [an] issue,” a court remains \"free to address the issue on the merits” in a subsequent case)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "452 F.3d 1305, 1308", "parenthetical": "finding that a prior case \"is not binding precedent on [a] point because the court did not address the issue\" in that prior case", "sentence": "See, e.g., Sacco v. United States, 452 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed.Cir.2006) (finding that a prior case \"is not binding precedent on [a] point because the court did not address the issue” in that prior case); Boeing N. Am., Inc. v. Roche, 298 F.3d 1274, 1282 (Fed.Cir.2002) (\"[W]e are not bound by [a prior opinion] on the issue ... since [that] issue was neither argued nor discussed in our opinion.”); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (stating that if a decision does not \"squarely address[] [an] issue,” a court remains \"free to address the issue on the merits” in a subsequent case)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that if a decision does not \"squarely address[] [an] issue,\" a court remains \"free to address the issue on the merits\" in a subsequent case", "sentence": "See, e.g., Sacco v. United States, 452 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed.Cir.2006) (finding that a prior case \"is not binding precedent on [a] point because the court did not address the issue” in that prior case); Boeing N. Am., Inc. v. Roche, 298 F.3d 1274, 1282 (Fed.Cir.2002) (\"[W]e are not bound by [a prior opinion] on the issue ... since [that] issue was neither argued nor discussed in our opinion.”); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (stating that if a decision does not \"squarely address[] [an] issue,” a court remains \"free to address the issue on the merits” in a subsequent case)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "452 F.3d 1305, 1308", "parenthetical": "finding that a prior case \"is not binding precedent on [a] point because the court did not address the issue\" in that prior case", "sentence": "See, e.g., Sacco v. United States, 452 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed.Cir.2006) (finding that a prior case \"is not binding precedent on [a] point because the court did not address the issue” in that prior case); Boeing N. Am., Inc. v. Roche, 298 F.3d 1274, 1282 (Fed.Cir.2002) (\"[W]e are not bound by [a prior opinion] on the issue ... since [that] issue was neither argued nor discussed in our opinion.”); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (stating that if a decision does not \"squarely address[] [an] issue,” a court remains \"free to address the issue on the merits” in a subsequent case)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that if a decision does not \"squarely address[] [an] issue,\" a court remains \"free to address the issue on the merits\" in a subsequent case", "sentence": "See, e.g., Sacco v. United States, 452 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed.Cir.2006) (finding that a prior case \"is not binding precedent on [a] point because the court did not address the issue” in that prior case); Boeing N. Am., Inc. v. Roche, 298 F.3d 1274, 1282 (Fed.Cir.2002) (\"[W]e are not bound by [a prior opinion] on the issue ... since [that] issue was neither argued nor discussed in our opinion.”); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (stating that if a decision does not \"squarely address[] [an] issue,” a court remains \"free to address the issue on the merits” in a subsequent case)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "507 U.S. 619, 631", "parenthetical": "stating that if a decision does not \"squarely address[] [an] issue,\" a court remains \"free to address the issue on the merits\" in a subsequent case", "sentence": "See, e.g., Sacco v. United States, 452 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed.Cir.2006) (finding that a prior case \"is not binding precedent on [a] point because the court did not address the issue” in that prior case); Boeing N. Am., Inc. v. Roche, 298 F.3d 1274, 1282 (Fed.Cir.2002) (\"[W]e are not bound by [a prior opinion] on the issue ... since [that] issue was neither argued nor discussed in our opinion.”); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (stating that if a decision does not \"squarely address[] [an] issue,” a court remains \"free to address the issue on the merits” in a subsequent case)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "298 F.3d 1274, 1282", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e are not bound by [a prior opinion] on the issue ... since [that] issue was neither argued nor discussed in our opinion.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Sacco v. United States, 452 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed.Cir.2006) (finding that a prior case \"is not binding precedent on [a] point because the court did not address the issue” in that prior case); Boeing N. Am., Inc. v. Roche, 298 F.3d 1274, 1282 (Fed.Cir.2002) (\"[W]e are not bound by [a prior opinion] on the issue ... since [that] issue was neither argued nor discussed in our opinion.”); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (stating that if a decision does not \"squarely address[] [an] issue,” a court remains \"free to address the issue on the merits” in a subsequent case)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "298 F.3d 1274, 1282", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e are not bound by [a prior opinion] on the issue ... since [that] issue was neither argued nor discussed in our opinion.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Sacco v. United States, 452 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed.Cir.2006) (finding that a prior case \"is not binding precedent on [a] point because the court did not address the issue” in that prior case); Boeing N. Am., Inc. v. Roche, 298 F.3d 1274, 1282 (Fed.Cir.2002) (\"[W]e are not bound by [a prior opinion] on the issue ... since [that] issue was neither argued nor discussed in our opinion.”); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (stating that if a decision does not \"squarely address[] [an] issue,” a court remains \"free to address the issue on the merits” in a subsequent case)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that if a decision does not \"squarely address[] [an] issue,\" a court remains \"free to address the issue on the merits\" in a subsequent case", "sentence": "See, e.g., Sacco v. United States, 452 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed.Cir.2006) (finding that a prior case \"is not binding precedent on [a] point because the court did not address the issue” in that prior case); Boeing N. Am., Inc. v. Roche, 298 F.3d 1274, 1282 (Fed.Cir.2002) (\"[W]e are not bound by [a prior opinion] on the issue ... since [that] issue was neither argued nor discussed in our opinion.”); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (stating that if a decision does not \"squarely address[] [an] issue,” a court remains \"free to address the issue on the merits” in a subsequent case)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that if a decision does not \"squarely address[] [an] issue,\" a court remains \"free to address the issue on the merits\" in a subsequent case", "sentence": "See, e.g., Sacco v. United States, 452 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed.Cir.2006) (finding that a prior case \"is not binding precedent on [a] point because the court did not address the issue” in that prior case); Boeing N. Am., Inc. v. Roche, 298 F.3d 1274, 1282 (Fed.Cir.2002) (\"[W]e are not bound by [a prior opinion] on the issue ... since [that] issue was neither argued nor discussed in our opinion.”); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (stating that if a decision does not \"squarely address[] [an] issue,” a court remains \"free to address the issue on the merits” in a subsequent case)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "298 F.3d 1274, 1282", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e are not bound by [a prior opinion] on the issue ... since [that] issue was neither argued nor discussed in our opinion.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Sacco v. United States, 452 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed.Cir.2006) (finding that a prior case \"is not binding precedent on [a] point because the court did not address the issue” in that prior case); Boeing N. Am., Inc. v. Roche, 298 F.3d 1274, 1282 (Fed.Cir.2002) (\"[W]e are not bound by [a prior opinion] on the issue ... since [that] issue was neither argued nor discussed in our opinion.”); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (stating that if a decision does not \"squarely address[] [an] issue,” a court remains \"free to address the issue on the merits” in a subsequent case)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "531 U.S. 4, 9", "parenthetical": "noting that in context of AED-PA's tolling provision for a properly filed application for state postconviction relief, \"the question whether an application has been 'properly filed' is quite separate from the question whether the claims contained in the application are meritorious\"", "sentence": "Id. at 655; see also Latham v. United States, 527 F.3d 651, 653 (7th Cir.2008) (noting that a “defendant who forswears appellate review as part of a plea bargain remains entitled to file a notice of appeal” even if “that appeal is doomed unless the guilty plea is involuntary”); Mark v. Thaler, 646 F.3d 191, 194 (5th Cir.2011) (“The relevant question is whether -Mark was entitled to file a petition, not whether a hypothetical petition would have been successful.”); cf. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 9, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000) (noting that in context of AED-PA’s tolling provision for a properly filed application for state postconviction relief, “the question whether an application has been ‘properly filed’ is quite separate from the question whether the claims contained in the application are meritorious”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "527 F.3d 651, 653", "parenthetical": "noting that a \"defendant who forswears appellate review as part of a plea bargain remains entitled to file a notice of appeal\" even if \"that appeal is doomed unless the guilty plea is involuntary\"", "sentence": "Id. at 655; see also Latham v. United States, 527 F.3d 651, 653 (7th Cir.2008) (noting that a “defendant who forswears appellate review as part of a plea bargain remains entitled to file a notice of appeal” even if “that appeal is doomed unless the guilty plea is involuntary”); Mark v. Thaler, 646 F.3d 191, 194 (5th Cir.2011) (“The relevant question is whether -Mark was entitled to file a petition, not whether a hypothetical petition would have been successful.”); cf. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 9, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000) (noting that in context of AED-PA’s tolling provision for a properly filed application for state postconviction relief, “the question whether an application has been ‘properly filed’ is quite separate from the question whether the claims contained in the application are meritorious”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that in context of AED-PA's tolling provision for a properly filed application for state postconviction relief, \"the question whether an application has been 'properly filed' is quite separate from the question whether the claims contained in the application are meritorious\"", "sentence": "Id. at 655; see also Latham v. United States, 527 F.3d 651, 653 (7th Cir.2008) (noting that a “defendant who forswears appellate review as part of a plea bargain remains entitled to file a notice of appeal” even if “that appeal is doomed unless the guilty plea is involuntary”); Mark v. Thaler, 646 F.3d 191, 194 (5th Cir.2011) (“The relevant question is whether -Mark was entitled to file a petition, not whether a hypothetical petition would have been successful.”); cf. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 9, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000) (noting that in context of AED-PA’s tolling provision for a properly filed application for state postconviction relief, “the question whether an application has been ‘properly filed’ is quite separate from the question whether the claims contained in the application are meritorious”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "527 F.3d 651, 653", "parenthetical": "noting that a \"defendant who forswears appellate review as part of a plea bargain remains entitled to file a notice of appeal\" even if \"that appeal is doomed unless the guilty plea is involuntary\"", "sentence": "Id. at 655; see also Latham v. United States, 527 F.3d 651, 653 (7th Cir.2008) (noting that a “defendant who forswears appellate review as part of a plea bargain remains entitled to file a notice of appeal” even if “that appeal is doomed unless the guilty plea is involuntary”); Mark v. Thaler, 646 F.3d 191, 194 (5th Cir.2011) (“The relevant question is whether -Mark was entitled to file a petition, not whether a hypothetical petition would have been successful.”); cf. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 9, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000) (noting that in context of AED-PA’s tolling provision for a properly filed application for state postconviction relief, “the question whether an application has been ‘properly filed’ is quite separate from the question whether the claims contained in the application are meritorious”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that in context of AED-PA's tolling provision for a properly filed application for state postconviction relief, \"the question whether an application has been 'properly filed' is quite separate from the question whether the claims contained in the application are meritorious\"", "sentence": "Id. at 655; see also Latham v. United States, 527 F.3d 651, 653 (7th Cir.2008) (noting that a “defendant who forswears appellate review as part of a plea bargain remains entitled to file a notice of appeal” even if “that appeal is doomed unless the guilty plea is involuntary”); Mark v. Thaler, 646 F.3d 191, 194 (5th Cir.2011) (“The relevant question is whether -Mark was entitled to file a petition, not whether a hypothetical petition would have been successful.”); cf. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 9, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000) (noting that in context of AED-PA’s tolling provision for a properly filed application for state postconviction relief, “the question whether an application has been ‘properly filed’ is quite separate from the question whether the claims contained in the application are meritorious”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "527 F.3d 651, 653", "parenthetical": "noting that a \"defendant who forswears appellate review as part of a plea bargain remains entitled to file a notice of appeal\" even if \"that appeal is doomed unless the guilty plea is involuntary\"", "sentence": "Id. at 655; see also Latham v. United States, 527 F.3d 651, 653 (7th Cir.2008) (noting that a “defendant who forswears appellate review as part of a plea bargain remains entitled to file a notice of appeal” even if “that appeal is doomed unless the guilty plea is involuntary”); Mark v. Thaler, 646 F.3d 191, 194 (5th Cir.2011) (“The relevant question is whether -Mark was entitled to file a petition, not whether a hypothetical petition would have been successful.”); cf. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 9, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000) (noting that in context of AED-PA’s tolling provision for a properly filed application for state postconviction relief, “the question whether an application has been ‘properly filed’ is quite separate from the question whether the claims contained in the application are meritorious”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "531 U.S. 4, 9", "parenthetical": "noting that in context of AED-PA's tolling provision for a properly filed application for state postconviction relief, \"the question whether an application has been 'properly filed' is quite separate from the question whether the claims contained in the application are meritorious\"", "sentence": "Id. at 655; see also Latham v. United States, 527 F.3d 651, 653 (7th Cir.2008) (noting that a “defendant who forswears appellate review as part of a plea bargain remains entitled to file a notice of appeal” even if “that appeal is doomed unless the guilty plea is involuntary”); Mark v. Thaler, 646 F.3d 191, 194 (5th Cir.2011) (“The relevant question is whether -Mark was entitled to file a petition, not whether a hypothetical petition would have been successful.”); cf. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 9, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000) (noting that in context of AED-PA’s tolling provision for a properly filed application for state postconviction relief, “the question whether an application has been ‘properly filed’ is quite separate from the question whether the claims contained in the application are meritorious”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "646 F.3d 191, 194", "parenthetical": "\"The relevant question is whether -Mark was entitled to file a petition, not whether a hypothetical petition would have been successful.\"", "sentence": "Id. at 655; see also Latham v. United States, 527 F.3d 651, 653 (7th Cir.2008) (noting that a “defendant who forswears appellate review as part of a plea bargain remains entitled to file a notice of appeal” even if “that appeal is doomed unless the guilty plea is involuntary”); Mark v. Thaler, 646 F.3d 191, 194 (5th Cir.2011) (“The relevant question is whether -Mark was entitled to file a petition, not whether a hypothetical petition would have been successful.”); cf. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 9, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000) (noting that in context of AED-PA’s tolling provision for a properly filed application for state postconviction relief, “the question whether an application has been ‘properly filed’ is quite separate from the question whether the claims contained in the application are meritorious”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "646 F.3d 191, 194", "parenthetical": "\"The relevant question is whether -Mark was entitled to file a petition, not whether a hypothetical petition would have been successful.\"", "sentence": "Id. at 655; see also Latham v. United States, 527 F.3d 651, 653 (7th Cir.2008) (noting that a “defendant who forswears appellate review as part of a plea bargain remains entitled to file a notice of appeal” even if “that appeal is doomed unless the guilty plea is involuntary”); Mark v. Thaler, 646 F.3d 191, 194 (5th Cir.2011) (“The relevant question is whether -Mark was entitled to file a petition, not whether a hypothetical petition would have been successful.”); cf. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 9, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000) (noting that in context of AED-PA’s tolling provision for a properly filed application for state postconviction relief, “the question whether an application has been ‘properly filed’ is quite separate from the question whether the claims contained in the application are meritorious”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that in context of AED-PA's tolling provision for a properly filed application for state postconviction relief, \"the question whether an application has been 'properly filed' is quite separate from the question whether the claims contained in the application are meritorious\"", "sentence": "Id. at 655; see also Latham v. United States, 527 F.3d 651, 653 (7th Cir.2008) (noting that a “defendant who forswears appellate review as part of a plea bargain remains entitled to file a notice of appeal” even if “that appeal is doomed unless the guilty plea is involuntary”); Mark v. Thaler, 646 F.3d 191, 194 (5th Cir.2011) (“The relevant question is whether -Mark was entitled to file a petition, not whether a hypothetical petition would have been successful.”); cf. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 9, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000) (noting that in context of AED-PA’s tolling provision for a properly filed application for state postconviction relief, “the question whether an application has been ‘properly filed’ is quite separate from the question whether the claims contained in the application are meritorious”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "646 F.3d 191, 194", "parenthetical": "\"The relevant question is whether -Mark was entitled to file a petition, not whether a hypothetical petition would have been successful.\"", "sentence": "Id. at 655; see also Latham v. United States, 527 F.3d 651, 653 (7th Cir.2008) (noting that a “defendant who forswears appellate review as part of a plea bargain remains entitled to file a notice of appeal” even if “that appeal is doomed unless the guilty plea is involuntary”); Mark v. Thaler, 646 F.3d 191, 194 (5th Cir.2011) (“The relevant question is whether -Mark was entitled to file a petition, not whether a hypothetical petition would have been successful.”); cf. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 9, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000) (noting that in context of AED-PA’s tolling provision for a properly filed application for state postconviction relief, “the question whether an application has been ‘properly filed’ is quite separate from the question whether the claims contained in the application are meritorious”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that in context of AED-PA's tolling provision for a properly filed application for state postconviction relief, \"the question whether an application has been 'properly filed' is quite separate from the question whether the claims contained in the application are meritorious\"", "sentence": "Id. at 655; see also Latham v. United States, 527 F.3d 651, 653 (7th Cir.2008) (noting that a “defendant who forswears appellate review as part of a plea bargain remains entitled to file a notice of appeal” even if “that appeal is doomed unless the guilty plea is involuntary”); Mark v. Thaler, 646 F.3d 191, 194 (5th Cir.2011) (“The relevant question is whether -Mark was entitled to file a petition, not whether a hypothetical petition would have been successful.”); cf. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 9, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000) (noting that in context of AED-PA’s tolling provision for a properly filed application for state postconviction relief, “the question whether an application has been ‘properly filed’ is quite separate from the question whether the claims contained in the application are meritorious”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "790 F.2d 1273, 1279", "parenthetical": "assignment editors were not supervisors when they served primarily as a conduit for decisions already made by manager", "sentence": "See NLRB v. KDFW-TV, Inc., 790 F.2d 1273, 1279 (5th Cir.1986) (assignment editors were not supervisors when they served primarily as a conduit for decisions already made by manager); cf. American Diversified Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 893, 896 (7th Cir.1981) (fast food shift manager responsible for assigning fast food workers to particular tasks on a shift held to be supervisor because shift manager exercised independent judgment based on requirements of job and his opinion of individual employee’s capabilities); Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 228, 231-32 (9th Cir.1971) (employee was supervisor where he had power to “choose which lineman are to work, when and where”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "640 F.2d 893, 896", "parenthetical": "fast food shift manager responsible for assigning fast food workers to particular tasks on a shift held to be supervisor because shift manager exercised independent judgment based on requirements of job and his opinion of individual employee's capabilities", "sentence": "See NLRB v. KDFW-TV, Inc., 790 F.2d 1273, 1279 (5th Cir.1986) (assignment editors were not supervisors when they served primarily as a conduit for decisions already made by manager); cf. American Diversified Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 893, 896 (7th Cir.1981) (fast food shift manager responsible for assigning fast food workers to particular tasks on a shift held to be supervisor because shift manager exercised independent judgment based on requirements of job and his opinion of individual employee’s capabilities); Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 228, 231-32 (9th Cir.1971) (employee was supervisor where he had power to “choose which lineman are to work, when and where”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "790 F.2d 1273, 1279", "parenthetical": "assignment editors were not supervisors when they served primarily as a conduit for decisions already made by manager", "sentence": "See NLRB v. KDFW-TV, Inc., 790 F.2d 1273, 1279 (5th Cir.1986) (assignment editors were not supervisors when they served primarily as a conduit for decisions already made by manager); cf. American Diversified Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 893, 896 (7th Cir.1981) (fast food shift manager responsible for assigning fast food workers to particular tasks on a shift held to be supervisor because shift manager exercised independent judgment based on requirements of job and his opinion of individual employee’s capabilities); Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 228, 231-32 (9th Cir.1971) (employee was supervisor where he had power to “choose which lineman are to work, when and where”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "453 F.2d 228, 231-32", "parenthetical": "employee was supervisor where he had power to \"choose which lineman are to work, when and where\"", "sentence": "See NLRB v. KDFW-TV, Inc., 790 F.2d 1273, 1279 (5th Cir.1986) (assignment editors were not supervisors when they served primarily as a conduit for decisions already made by manager); cf. American Diversified Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 893, 896 (7th Cir.1981) (fast food shift manager responsible for assigning fast food workers to particular tasks on a shift held to be supervisor because shift manager exercised independent judgment based on requirements of job and his opinion of individual employee’s capabilities); Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 228, 231-32 (9th Cir.1971) (employee was supervisor where he had power to “choose which lineman are to work, when and where”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"In order for the [putative class action] complaint to surr vive this motion to dismiss, the allegations of at least one named plaintiff must state a claim for relief.\"", "sentence": "See Hardy v. Fischer, 701 F.Supp.2d 605, 611 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“In order for the [putative class action] complaint to surr vive this motion to dismiss, the allegations of at least one named plaintiff must state a claim for relief.”); Pruell v. Caritas Christi, No. 09-cv-11466, 2010 WL 3789318, at *4 (D. Mass. Sept. 27, 2010) (“To survive a motion to dismiss [in a putative class action], the allegations of at least one named plaintiff must state a claim for relief.”); Sheet Metal Workers 441 Health & Welfare Plan v. GlaxoSmithKline, 263 F.R.D. 205, 210 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (“[W]hen the named plaintiffl&cks a cause of action, the Court should dismiss the action before proceeding to class certification.”); Burks v. Arvest Bank, No. 4:06-cv-00551, 2006 WL 3512478, at *2(E.D. Ark. Dec. 6, 2006) (“Since the Court has dismissed the sole named Plaintiffs individual claims, the Court must dismiss the class allegations as well and no notice of this involuntary dismissal need be given' to any alleged unnamed class members.”); see also Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group, 834 F.2d 1163, 1169 (3d Cir. 1987).(“[T]o be a class representative on a particular claim, the plaintiff himself must have a cause of action on that claim.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "834 F.2d 1163, 1169", "parenthetical": "\"[T]o be a class representative on a particular claim, the plaintiff himself must have a cause of action on that claim.\"", "sentence": "See Hardy v. Fischer, 701 F.Supp.2d 605, 611 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“In order for the [putative class action] complaint to surr vive this motion to dismiss, the allegations of at least one named plaintiff must state a claim for relief.”); Pruell v. Caritas Christi, No. 09-cv-11466, 2010 WL 3789318, at *4 (D. Mass. Sept. 27, 2010) (“To survive a motion to dismiss [in a putative class action], the allegations of at least one named plaintiff must state a claim for relief.”); Sheet Metal Workers 441 Health & Welfare Plan v. GlaxoSmithKline, 263 F.R.D. 205, 210 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (“[W]hen the named plaintiffl&cks a cause of action, the Court should dismiss the action before proceeding to class certification.”); Burks v. Arvest Bank, No. 4:06-cv-00551, 2006 WL 3512478, at *2(E.D. Ark. Dec. 6, 2006) (“Since the Court has dismissed the sole named Plaintiffs individual claims, the Court must dismiss the class allegations as well and no notice of this involuntary dismissal need be given' to any alleged unnamed class members.”); see also Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group, 834 F.2d 1163, 1169 (3d Cir. 1987).(“[T]o be a class representative on a particular claim, the plaintiff himself must have a cause of action on that claim.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "834 F.2d 1163, 1169", "parenthetical": "\"[T]o be a class representative on a particular claim, the plaintiff himself must have a cause of action on that claim.\"", "sentence": "See Hardy v. Fischer, 701 F.Supp.2d 605, 611 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“In order for the [putative class action] complaint to surr vive this motion to dismiss, the allegations of at least one named plaintiff must state a claim for relief.”); Pruell v. Caritas Christi, No. 09-cv-11466, 2010 WL 3789318, at *4 (D. Mass. Sept. 27, 2010) (“To survive a motion to dismiss [in a putative class action], the allegations of at least one named plaintiff must state a claim for relief.”); Sheet Metal Workers 441 Health & Welfare Plan v. GlaxoSmithKline, 263 F.R.D. 205, 210 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (“[W]hen the named plaintiffl&cks a cause of action, the Court should dismiss the action before proceeding to class certification.”); Burks v. Arvest Bank, No. 4:06-cv-00551, 2006 WL 3512478, at *2(E.D. Ark. Dec. 6, 2006) (“Since the Court has dismissed the sole named Plaintiffs individual claims, the Court must dismiss the class allegations as well and no notice of this involuntary dismissal need be given' to any alleged unnamed class members.”); see also Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group, 834 F.2d 1163, 1169 (3d Cir. 1987).(“[T]o be a class representative on a particular claim, the plaintiff himself must have a cause of action on that claim.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "2010 WL 3789318, at *4", "parenthetical": "\"To survive a motion to dismiss [in a putative class action], the allegations of at least one named plaintiff must state a claim for relief.\"", "sentence": "See Hardy v. Fischer, 701 F.Supp.2d 605, 611 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“In order for the [putative class action] complaint to surr vive this motion to dismiss, the allegations of at least one named plaintiff must state a claim for relief.”); Pruell v. Caritas Christi, No. 09-cv-11466, 2010 WL 3789318, at *4 (D. Mass. Sept. 27, 2010) (“To survive a motion to dismiss [in a putative class action], the allegations of at least one named plaintiff must state a claim for relief.”); Sheet Metal Workers 441 Health & Welfare Plan v. GlaxoSmithKline, 263 F.R.D. 205, 210 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (“[W]hen the named plaintiffl&cks a cause of action, the Court should dismiss the action before proceeding to class certification.”); Burks v. Arvest Bank, No. 4:06-cv-00551, 2006 WL 3512478, at *2(E.D. Ark. Dec. 6, 2006) (“Since the Court has dismissed the sole named Plaintiffs individual claims, the Court must dismiss the class allegations as well and no notice of this involuntary dismissal need be given' to any alleged unnamed class members.”); see also Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group, 834 F.2d 1163, 1169 (3d Cir. 1987).(“[T]o be a class representative on a particular claim, the plaintiff himself must have a cause of action on that claim.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "834 F.2d 1163, 1169", "parenthetical": "\"[T]o be a class representative on a particular claim, the plaintiff himself must have a cause of action on that claim.\"", "sentence": "See Hardy v. Fischer, 701 F.Supp.2d 605, 611 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“In order for the [putative class action] complaint to surr vive this motion to dismiss, the allegations of at least one named plaintiff must state a claim for relief.”); Pruell v. Caritas Christi, No. 09-cv-11466, 2010 WL 3789318, at *4 (D. Mass. Sept. 27, 2010) (“To survive a motion to dismiss [in a putative class action], the allegations of at least one named plaintiff must state a claim for relief.”); Sheet Metal Workers 441 Health & Welfare Plan v. GlaxoSmithKline, 263 F.R.D. 205, 210 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (“[W]hen the named plaintiffl&cks a cause of action, the Court should dismiss the action before proceeding to class certification.”); Burks v. Arvest Bank, No. 4:06-cv-00551, 2006 WL 3512478, at *2(E.D. Ark. Dec. 6, 2006) (“Since the Court has dismissed the sole named Plaintiffs individual claims, the Court must dismiss the class allegations as well and no notice of this involuntary dismissal need be given' to any alleged unnamed class members.”); see also Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group, 834 F.2d 1163, 1169 (3d Cir. 1987).(“[T]o be a class representative on a particular claim, the plaintiff himself must have a cause of action on that claim.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "263 F.R.D. 205, 210", "parenthetical": "\"[W]hen the named plaintiffl&cks a cause of action, the Court should dismiss the action before proceeding to class certification.\"", "sentence": "See Hardy v. Fischer, 701 F.Supp.2d 605, 611 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“In order for the [putative class action] complaint to surr vive this motion to dismiss, the allegations of at least one named plaintiff must state a claim for relief.”); Pruell v. Caritas Christi, No. 09-cv-11466, 2010 WL 3789318, at *4 (D. Mass. Sept. 27, 2010) (“To survive a motion to dismiss [in a putative class action], the allegations of at least one named plaintiff must state a claim for relief.”); Sheet Metal Workers 441 Health & Welfare Plan v. GlaxoSmithKline, 263 F.R.D. 205, 210 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (“[W]hen the named plaintiffl&cks a cause of action, the Court should dismiss the action before proceeding to class certification.”); Burks v. Arvest Bank, No. 4:06-cv-00551, 2006 WL 3512478, at *2(E.D. Ark. Dec. 6, 2006) (“Since the Court has dismissed the sole named Plaintiffs individual claims, the Court must dismiss the class allegations as well and no notice of this involuntary dismissal need be given' to any alleged unnamed class members.”); see also Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group, 834 F.2d 1163, 1169 (3d Cir. 1987).(“[T]o be a class representative on a particular claim, the plaintiff himself must have a cause of action on that claim.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "834 F.2d 1163, 1169", "parenthetical": "\"[T]o be a class representative on a particular claim, the plaintiff himself must have a cause of action on that claim.\"", "sentence": "See Hardy v. Fischer, 701 F.Supp.2d 605, 611 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“In order for the [putative class action] complaint to surr vive this motion to dismiss, the allegations of at least one named plaintiff must state a claim for relief.”); Pruell v. Caritas Christi, No. 09-cv-11466, 2010 WL 3789318, at *4 (D. Mass. Sept. 27, 2010) (“To survive a motion to dismiss [in a putative class action], the allegations of at least one named plaintiff must state a claim for relief.”); Sheet Metal Workers 441 Health & Welfare Plan v. GlaxoSmithKline, 263 F.R.D. 205, 210 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (“[W]hen the named plaintiffl&cks a cause of action, the Court should dismiss the action before proceeding to class certification.”); Burks v. Arvest Bank, No. 4:06-cv-00551, 2006 WL 3512478, at *2(E.D. Ark. Dec. 6, 2006) (“Since the Court has dismissed the sole named Plaintiffs individual claims, the Court must dismiss the class allegations as well and no notice of this involuntary dismissal need be given' to any alleged unnamed class members.”); see also Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group, 834 F.2d 1163, 1169 (3d Cir. 1987).(“[T]o be a class representative on a particular claim, the plaintiff himself must have a cause of action on that claim.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "2006 WL 3512478, at *2", "parenthetical": "\"Since the Court has dismissed the sole named Plaintiffs individual claims, the Court must dismiss the class allegations as well and no notice of this involuntary dismissal need be given' to any alleged unnamed class members.\"", "sentence": "See Hardy v. Fischer, 701 F.Supp.2d 605, 611 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“In order for the [putative class action] complaint to surr vive this motion to dismiss, the allegations of at least one named plaintiff must state a claim for relief.”); Pruell v. Caritas Christi, No. 09-cv-11466, 2010 WL 3789318, at *4 (D. Mass. Sept. 27, 2010) (“To survive a motion to dismiss [in a putative class action], the allegations of at least one named plaintiff must state a claim for relief.”); Sheet Metal Workers 441 Health & Welfare Plan v. GlaxoSmithKline, 263 F.R.D. 205, 210 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (“[W]hen the named plaintiffl&cks a cause of action, the Court should dismiss the action before proceeding to class certification.”); Burks v. Arvest Bank, No. 4:06-cv-00551, 2006 WL 3512478, at *2(E.D. Ark. Dec. 6, 2006) (“Since the Court has dismissed the sole named Plaintiffs individual claims, the Court must dismiss the class allegations as well and no notice of this involuntary dismissal need be given' to any alleged unnamed class members.”); see also Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group, 834 F.2d 1163, 1169 (3d Cir. 1987).(“[T]o be a class representative on a particular claim, the plaintiff himself must have a cause of action on that claim.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "475 Mass. 817, 817-818", "parenthetical": "considering circumstances of crime, as well as motive, in finding sufficiency of evidence of criminal responsibility", "sentence": "See Lawson, 475 Mass. at 817-818 (considering circumstances of crime, as well as motive, in finding sufficiency of evidence of criminal responsibility)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "370 Mass. 516, 538", "parenthetical": "evidence of planning and motive supports criminal responsibility of defendant", "sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 538 (1976) (evidence of planning and motive supports criminal responsibility of defendant)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana", "sentence": "See Greebel State ex. rel. v. Endsley, 269 Ind. 174, 379 N.E.2d 440 (1978) (once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana); In re Marriage of Aron, 224 Cal.App.3d 1086, 274 Cal.Rptr. 357 (1st Dist.1990) (upon a foreign support order’s registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor’s modification motion, a normal defense under California law); Hartley v. Hartley, 465 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla.App.1985) (URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances); Contra Costa County Ex Rel. Tuazon v. Caro, 802 P.2d 1212 (Hawaii App.1990) affd., 72 Haw. 1, 802 P.2d 1202 (father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages); see also Helmick v. Helmick, 436 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Fla.App.1983) (Cowart, concurring specially) and cases cited therein." }

{ "signal": "contra", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages", "sentence": "See Greebel State ex. rel. v. Endsley, 269 Ind. 174, 379 N.E.2d 440 (1978) (once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana); In re Marriage of Aron, 224 Cal.App.3d 1086, 274 Cal.Rptr. 357 (1st Dist.1990) (upon a foreign support order’s registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor’s modification motion, a normal defense under California law); Hartley v. Hartley, 465 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla.App.1985) (URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances); Contra Costa County Ex Rel. Tuazon v. Caro, 802 P.2d 1212 (Hawaii App.1990) affd., 72 Haw. 1, 802 P.2d 1202 (father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages); see also Helmick v. Helmick, 436 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Fla.App.1983) (Cowart, concurring specially) and cases cited therein." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana", "sentence": "See Greebel State ex. rel. v. Endsley, 269 Ind. 174, 379 N.E.2d 440 (1978) (once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana); In re Marriage of Aron, 224 Cal.App.3d 1086, 274 Cal.Rptr. 357 (1st Dist.1990) (upon a foreign support order’s registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor’s modification motion, a normal defense under California law); Hartley v. Hartley, 465 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla.App.1985) (URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances); Contra Costa County Ex Rel. Tuazon v. Caro, 802 P.2d 1212 (Hawaii App.1990) affd., 72 Haw. 1, 802 P.2d 1202 (father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages); see also Helmick v. Helmick, 436 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Fla.App.1983) (Cowart, concurring specially) and cases cited therein." }

{ "signal": "contra", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages", "sentence": "See Greebel State ex. rel. v. Endsley, 269 Ind. 174, 379 N.E.2d 440 (1978) (once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana); In re Marriage of Aron, 224 Cal.App.3d 1086, 274 Cal.Rptr. 357 (1st Dist.1990) (upon a foreign support order’s registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor’s modification motion, a normal defense under California law); Hartley v. Hartley, 465 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla.App.1985) (URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances); Contra Costa County Ex Rel. Tuazon v. Caro, 802 P.2d 1212 (Hawaii App.1990) affd., 72 Haw. 1, 802 P.2d 1202 (father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages); see also Helmick v. Helmick, 436 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Fla.App.1983) (Cowart, concurring specially) and cases cited therein." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana", "sentence": "See Greebel State ex. rel. v. Endsley, 269 Ind. 174, 379 N.E.2d 440 (1978) (once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana); In re Marriage of Aron, 224 Cal.App.3d 1086, 274 Cal.Rptr. 357 (1st Dist.1990) (upon a foreign support order’s registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor’s modification motion, a normal defense under California law); Hartley v. Hartley, 465 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla.App.1985) (URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances); Contra Costa County Ex Rel. Tuazon v. Caro, 802 P.2d 1212 (Hawaii App.1990) affd., 72 Haw. 1, 802 P.2d 1202 (father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages); see also Helmick v. Helmick, 436 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Fla.App.1983) (Cowart, concurring specially) and cases cited therein." }

{ "signal": "contra", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages", "sentence": "See Greebel State ex. rel. v. Endsley, 269 Ind. 174, 379 N.E.2d 440 (1978) (once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana); In re Marriage of Aron, 224 Cal.App.3d 1086, 274 Cal.Rptr. 357 (1st Dist.1990) (upon a foreign support order’s registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor’s modification motion, a normal defense under California law); Hartley v. Hartley, 465 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla.App.1985) (URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances); Contra Costa County Ex Rel. Tuazon v. Caro, 802 P.2d 1212 (Hawaii App.1990) affd., 72 Haw. 1, 802 P.2d 1202 (father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages); see also Helmick v. Helmick, 436 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Fla.App.1983) (Cowart, concurring specially) and cases cited therein." }

{ "signal": "contra", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages", "sentence": "See Greebel State ex. rel. v. Endsley, 269 Ind. 174, 379 N.E.2d 440 (1978) (once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana); In re Marriage of Aron, 224 Cal.App.3d 1086, 274 Cal.Rptr. 357 (1st Dist.1990) (upon a foreign support order’s registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor’s modification motion, a normal defense under California law); Hartley v. Hartley, 465 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla.App.1985) (URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances); Contra Costa County Ex Rel. Tuazon v. Caro, 802 P.2d 1212 (Hawaii App.1990) affd., 72 Haw. 1, 802 P.2d 1202 (father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages); see also Helmick v. Helmick, 436 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Fla.App.1983) (Cowart, concurring specially) and cases cited therein." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana", "sentence": "See Greebel State ex. rel. v. Endsley, 269 Ind. 174, 379 N.E.2d 440 (1978) (once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana); In re Marriage of Aron, 224 Cal.App.3d 1086, 274 Cal.Rptr. 357 (1st Dist.1990) (upon a foreign support order’s registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor’s modification motion, a normal defense under California law); Hartley v. Hartley, 465 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla.App.1985) (URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances); Contra Costa County Ex Rel. Tuazon v. Caro, 802 P.2d 1212 (Hawaii App.1990) affd., 72 Haw. 1, 802 P.2d 1202 (father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages); see also Helmick v. Helmick, 436 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Fla.App.1983) (Cowart, concurring specially) and cases cited therein." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana", "sentence": "See Greebel State ex. rel. v. Endsley, 269 Ind. 174, 379 N.E.2d 440 (1978) (once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana); In re Marriage of Aron, 224 Cal.App.3d 1086, 274 Cal.Rptr. 357 (1st Dist.1990) (upon a foreign support order’s registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor’s modification motion, a normal defense under California law); Hartley v. Hartley, 465 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla.App.1985) (URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances); Contra Costa County Ex Rel. Tuazon v. Caro, 802 P.2d 1212 (Hawaii App.1990) affd., 72 Haw. 1, 802 P.2d 1202 (father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages); see also Helmick v. Helmick, 436 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Fla.App.1983) (Cowart, concurring specially) and cases cited therein." }

{ "signal": "contra", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages", "sentence": "See Greebel State ex. rel. v. Endsley, 269 Ind. 174, 379 N.E.2d 440 (1978) (once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana); In re Marriage of Aron, 224 Cal.App.3d 1086, 274 Cal.Rptr. 357 (1st Dist.1990) (upon a foreign support order’s registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor’s modification motion, a normal defense under California law); Hartley v. Hartley, 465 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla.App.1985) (URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances); Contra Costa County Ex Rel. Tuazon v. Caro, 802 P.2d 1212 (Hawaii App.1990) affd., 72 Haw. 1, 802 P.2d 1202 (father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages); see also Helmick v. Helmick, 436 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Fla.App.1983) (Cowart, concurring specially) and cases cited therein." }

{ "signal": "contra", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages", "sentence": "See Greebel State ex. rel. v. Endsley, 269 Ind. 174, 379 N.E.2d 440 (1978) (once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana); In re Marriage of Aron, 224 Cal.App.3d 1086, 274 Cal.Rptr. 357 (1st Dist.1990) (upon a foreign support order’s registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor’s modification motion, a normal defense under California law); Hartley v. Hartley, 465 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla.App.1985) (URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances); Contra Costa County Ex Rel. Tuazon v. Caro, 802 P.2d 1212 (Hawaii App.1990) affd., 72 Haw. 1, 802 P.2d 1202 (father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages); see also Helmick v. Helmick, 436 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Fla.App.1983) (Cowart, concurring specially) and cases cited therein." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana", "sentence": "See Greebel State ex. rel. v. Endsley, 269 Ind. 174, 379 N.E.2d 440 (1978) (once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana); In re Marriage of Aron, 224 Cal.App.3d 1086, 274 Cal.Rptr. 357 (1st Dist.1990) (upon a foreign support order’s registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor’s modification motion, a normal defense under California law); Hartley v. Hartley, 465 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla.App.1985) (URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances); Contra Costa County Ex Rel. Tuazon v. Caro, 802 P.2d 1212 (Hawaii App.1990) affd., 72 Haw. 1, 802 P.2d 1202 (father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages); see also Helmick v. Helmick, 436 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Fla.App.1983) (Cowart, concurring specially) and cases cited therein." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "upon a foreign support order's registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor's modification motion, a normal defense under California law", "sentence": "See Greebel State ex. rel. v. Endsley, 269 Ind. 174, 379 N.E.2d 440 (1978) (once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana); In re Marriage of Aron, 224 Cal.App.3d 1086, 274 Cal.Rptr. 357 (1st Dist.1990) (upon a foreign support order’s registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor’s modification motion, a normal defense under California law); Hartley v. Hartley, 465 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla.App.1985) (URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances); Contra Costa County Ex Rel. Tuazon v. Caro, 802 P.2d 1212 (Hawaii App.1990) affd., 72 Haw. 1, 802 P.2d 1202 (father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages); see also Helmick v. Helmick, 436 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Fla.App.1983) (Cowart, concurring specially) and cases cited therein." }

{ "signal": "contra", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages", "sentence": "See Greebel State ex. rel. v. Endsley, 269 Ind. 174, 379 N.E.2d 440 (1978) (once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana); In re Marriage of Aron, 224 Cal.App.3d 1086, 274 Cal.Rptr. 357 (1st Dist.1990) (upon a foreign support order’s registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor’s modification motion, a normal defense under California law); Hartley v. Hartley, 465 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla.App.1985) (URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances); Contra Costa County Ex Rel. Tuazon v. Caro, 802 P.2d 1212 (Hawaii App.1990) affd., 72 Haw. 1, 802 P.2d 1202 (father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages); see also Helmick v. Helmick, 436 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Fla.App.1983) (Cowart, concurring specially) and cases cited therein." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "upon a foreign support order's registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor's modification motion, a normal defense under California law", "sentence": "See Greebel State ex. rel. v. Endsley, 269 Ind. 174, 379 N.E.2d 440 (1978) (once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana); In re Marriage of Aron, 224 Cal.App.3d 1086, 274 Cal.Rptr. 357 (1st Dist.1990) (upon a foreign support order’s registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor’s modification motion, a normal defense under California law); Hartley v. Hartley, 465 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla.App.1985) (URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances); Contra Costa County Ex Rel. Tuazon v. Caro, 802 P.2d 1212 (Hawaii App.1990) affd., 72 Haw. 1, 802 P.2d 1202 (father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages); see also Helmick v. Helmick, 436 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Fla.App.1983) (Cowart, concurring specially) and cases cited therein." }

{ "signal": "contra", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages", "sentence": "See Greebel State ex. rel. v. Endsley, 269 Ind. 174, 379 N.E.2d 440 (1978) (once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana); In re Marriage of Aron, 224 Cal.App.3d 1086, 274 Cal.Rptr. 357 (1st Dist.1990) (upon a foreign support order’s registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor’s modification motion, a normal defense under California law); Hartley v. Hartley, 465 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla.App.1985) (URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances); Contra Costa County Ex Rel. Tuazon v. Caro, 802 P.2d 1212 (Hawaii App.1990) affd., 72 Haw. 1, 802 P.2d 1202 (father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages); see also Helmick v. Helmick, 436 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Fla.App.1983) (Cowart, concurring specially) and cases cited therein." }

{ "signal": "contra", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages", "sentence": "See Greebel State ex. rel. v. Endsley, 269 Ind. 174, 379 N.E.2d 440 (1978) (once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana); In re Marriage of Aron, 224 Cal.App.3d 1086, 274 Cal.Rptr. 357 (1st Dist.1990) (upon a foreign support order’s registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor’s modification motion, a normal defense under California law); Hartley v. Hartley, 465 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla.App.1985) (URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances); Contra Costa County Ex Rel. Tuazon v. Caro, 802 P.2d 1212 (Hawaii App.1990) affd., 72 Haw. 1, 802 P.2d 1202 (father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages); see also Helmick v. Helmick, 436 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Fla.App.1983) (Cowart, concurring specially) and cases cited therein." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "upon a foreign support order's registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor's modification motion, a normal defense under California law", "sentence": "See Greebel State ex. rel. v. Endsley, 269 Ind. 174, 379 N.E.2d 440 (1978) (once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana); In re Marriage of Aron, 224 Cal.App.3d 1086, 274 Cal.Rptr. 357 (1st Dist.1990) (upon a foreign support order’s registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor’s modification motion, a normal defense under California law); Hartley v. Hartley, 465 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla.App.1985) (URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances); Contra Costa County Ex Rel. Tuazon v. Caro, 802 P.2d 1212 (Hawaii App.1990) affd., 72 Haw. 1, 802 P.2d 1202 (father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages); see also Helmick v. Helmick, 436 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Fla.App.1983) (Cowart, concurring specially) and cases cited therein." }

{ "signal": "contra", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages", "sentence": "See Greebel State ex. rel. v. Endsley, 269 Ind. 174, 379 N.E.2d 440 (1978) (once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana); In re Marriage of Aron, 224 Cal.App.3d 1086, 274 Cal.Rptr. 357 (1st Dist.1990) (upon a foreign support order’s registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor’s modification motion, a normal defense under California law); Hartley v. Hartley, 465 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla.App.1985) (URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances); Contra Costa County Ex Rel. Tuazon v. Caro, 802 P.2d 1212 (Hawaii App.1990) affd., 72 Haw. 1, 802 P.2d 1202 (father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages); see also Helmick v. Helmick, 436 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Fla.App.1983) (Cowart, concurring specially) and cases cited therein." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "upon a foreign support order's registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor's modification motion, a normal defense under California law", "sentence": "See Greebel State ex. rel. v. Endsley, 269 Ind. 174, 379 N.E.2d 440 (1978) (once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana); In re Marriage of Aron, 224 Cal.App.3d 1086, 274 Cal.Rptr. 357 (1st Dist.1990) (upon a foreign support order’s registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor’s modification motion, a normal defense under California law); Hartley v. Hartley, 465 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla.App.1985) (URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances); Contra Costa County Ex Rel. Tuazon v. Caro, 802 P.2d 1212 (Hawaii App.1990) affd., 72 Haw. 1, 802 P.2d 1202 (father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages); see also Helmick v. Helmick, 436 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Fla.App.1983) (Cowart, concurring specially) and cases cited therein." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "upon a foreign support order's registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor's modification motion, a normal defense under California law", "sentence": "See Greebel State ex. rel. v. Endsley, 269 Ind. 174, 379 N.E.2d 440 (1978) (once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana); In re Marriage of Aron, 224 Cal.App.3d 1086, 274 Cal.Rptr. 357 (1st Dist.1990) (upon a foreign support order’s registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor’s modification motion, a normal defense under California law); Hartley v. Hartley, 465 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla.App.1985) (URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances); Contra Costa County Ex Rel. Tuazon v. Caro, 802 P.2d 1212 (Hawaii App.1990) affd., 72 Haw. 1, 802 P.2d 1202 (father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages); see also Helmick v. Helmick, 436 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Fla.App.1983) (Cowart, concurring specially) and cases cited therein." }

{ "signal": "contra", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages", "sentence": "See Greebel State ex. rel. v. Endsley, 269 Ind. 174, 379 N.E.2d 440 (1978) (once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana); In re Marriage of Aron, 224 Cal.App.3d 1086, 274 Cal.Rptr. 357 (1st Dist.1990) (upon a foreign support order’s registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor’s modification motion, a normal defense under California law); Hartley v. Hartley, 465 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla.App.1985) (URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances); Contra Costa County Ex Rel. Tuazon v. Caro, 802 P.2d 1212 (Hawaii App.1990) affd., 72 Haw. 1, 802 P.2d 1202 (father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages); see also Helmick v. Helmick, 436 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Fla.App.1983) (Cowart, concurring specially) and cases cited therein." }

{ "signal": "contra", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages", "sentence": "See Greebel State ex. rel. v. Endsley, 269 Ind. 174, 379 N.E.2d 440 (1978) (once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana); In re Marriage of Aron, 224 Cal.App.3d 1086, 274 Cal.Rptr. 357 (1st Dist.1990) (upon a foreign support order’s registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor’s modification motion, a normal defense under California law); Hartley v. Hartley, 465 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla.App.1985) (URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances); Contra Costa County Ex Rel. Tuazon v. Caro, 802 P.2d 1212 (Hawaii App.1990) affd., 72 Haw. 1, 802 P.2d 1202 (father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages); see also Helmick v. Helmick, 436 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Fla.App.1983) (Cowart, concurring specially) and cases cited therein." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "upon a foreign support order's registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor's modification motion, a normal defense under California law", "sentence": "See Greebel State ex. rel. v. Endsley, 269 Ind. 174, 379 N.E.2d 440 (1978) (once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana); In re Marriage of Aron, 224 Cal.App.3d 1086, 274 Cal.Rptr. 357 (1st Dist.1990) (upon a foreign support order’s registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor’s modification motion, a normal defense under California law); Hartley v. Hartley, 465 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla.App.1985) (URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances); Contra Costa County Ex Rel. Tuazon v. Caro, 802 P.2d 1212 (Hawaii App.1990) affd., 72 Haw. 1, 802 P.2d 1202 (father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages); see also Helmick v. Helmick, 436 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Fla.App.1983) (Cowart, concurring specially) and cases cited therein." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "465 So.2d 592, 593", "parenthetical": "URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances", "sentence": "See Greebel State ex. rel. v. Endsley, 269 Ind. 174, 379 N.E.2d 440 (1978) (once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana); In re Marriage of Aron, 224 Cal.App.3d 1086, 274 Cal.Rptr. 357 (1st Dist.1990) (upon a foreign support order’s registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor’s modification motion, a normal defense under California law); Hartley v. Hartley, 465 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla.App.1985) (URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances); Contra Costa County Ex Rel. Tuazon v. Caro, 802 P.2d 1212 (Hawaii App.1990) affd., 72 Haw. 1, 802 P.2d 1202 (father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages); see also Helmick v. Helmick, 436 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Fla.App.1983) (Cowart, concurring specially) and cases cited therein." }

{ "signal": "contra", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages", "sentence": "See Greebel State ex. rel. v. Endsley, 269 Ind. 174, 379 N.E.2d 440 (1978) (once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana); In re Marriage of Aron, 224 Cal.App.3d 1086, 274 Cal.Rptr. 357 (1st Dist.1990) (upon a foreign support order’s registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor’s modification motion, a normal defense under California law); Hartley v. Hartley, 465 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla.App.1985) (URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances); Contra Costa County Ex Rel. Tuazon v. Caro, 802 P.2d 1212 (Hawaii App.1990) affd., 72 Haw. 1, 802 P.2d 1202 (father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages); see also Helmick v. Helmick, 436 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Fla.App.1983) (Cowart, concurring specially) and cases cited therein." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "465 So.2d 592, 593", "parenthetical": "URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances", "sentence": "See Greebel State ex. rel. v. Endsley, 269 Ind. 174, 379 N.E.2d 440 (1978) (once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana); In re Marriage of Aron, 224 Cal.App.3d 1086, 274 Cal.Rptr. 357 (1st Dist.1990) (upon a foreign support order’s registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor’s modification motion, a normal defense under California law); Hartley v. Hartley, 465 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla.App.1985) (URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances); Contra Costa County Ex Rel. Tuazon v. Caro, 802 P.2d 1212 (Hawaii App.1990) affd., 72 Haw. 1, 802 P.2d 1202 (father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages); see also Helmick v. Helmick, 436 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Fla.App.1983) (Cowart, concurring specially) and cases cited therein." }

{ "signal": "contra", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages", "sentence": "See Greebel State ex. rel. v. Endsley, 269 Ind. 174, 379 N.E.2d 440 (1978) (once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana); In re Marriage of Aron, 224 Cal.App.3d 1086, 274 Cal.Rptr. 357 (1st Dist.1990) (upon a foreign support order’s registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor’s modification motion, a normal defense under California law); Hartley v. Hartley, 465 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla.App.1985) (URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances); Contra Costa County Ex Rel. Tuazon v. Caro, 802 P.2d 1212 (Hawaii App.1990) affd., 72 Haw. 1, 802 P.2d 1202 (father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages); see also Helmick v. Helmick, 436 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Fla.App.1983) (Cowart, concurring specially) and cases cited therein." }

{ "signal": "contra", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages", "sentence": "See Greebel State ex. rel. v. Endsley, 269 Ind. 174, 379 N.E.2d 440 (1978) (once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana); In re Marriage of Aron, 224 Cal.App.3d 1086, 274 Cal.Rptr. 357 (1st Dist.1990) (upon a foreign support order’s registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor’s modification motion, a normal defense under California law); Hartley v. Hartley, 465 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla.App.1985) (URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances); Contra Costa County Ex Rel. Tuazon v. Caro, 802 P.2d 1212 (Hawaii App.1990) affd., 72 Haw. 1, 802 P.2d 1202 (father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages); see also Helmick v. Helmick, 436 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Fla.App.1983) (Cowart, concurring specially) and cases cited therein." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "465 So.2d 592, 593", "parenthetical": "URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances", "sentence": "See Greebel State ex. rel. v. Endsley, 269 Ind. 174, 379 N.E.2d 440 (1978) (once court confirms a foreign support order, such order has the same effect and may, under URESA, be enforced as if originally entered in Indiana); In re Marriage of Aron, 224 Cal.App.3d 1086, 274 Cal.Rptr. 357 (1st Dist.1990) (upon a foreign support order’s registration, a California court could entertain a support obligor’s modification motion, a normal defense under California law); Hartley v. Hartley, 465 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla.App.1985) (URESA registered support order can be modified upon substantial change in circumstances); Contra Costa County Ex Rel. Tuazon v. Caro, 802 P.2d 1212 (Hawaii App.1990) affd., 72 Haw. 1, 802 P.2d 1202 (father entitled to prove essential elements of waiver, estoppel, or laches in defense to enforcement of registered decree on arrearages); see also Helmick v. Helmick, 436 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Fla.App.1983) (Cowart, concurring specially) and cases cited therein." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "806 F.2d 801, 804", "parenthetical": "pro se litigants are not excused from compliance with procedural law", "sentence": "See Carter v. Lutheran Med. Ctr., 87 F.3d 1025, 1026 (8th Cir.1996) (per curiam) (dismissing pro se appeal where brief presented no question for court to decide; among other shortfalls, brief did not provide statement of issues presented for review or identify any basis of alleged error by district court); Brown v. Frey, 806 F.2d 801, 804 (8th Cir.1986) (pro se litigants are not excused from compliance with procedural law); cf. Puckett v. Cook, 864 F.2d 619, 620 n. 2 (8th Cir.1989) (to extent appellant was challenging dismissal of federal claims, he failed to show precisely and with reference to record why findings were clearly wrong, and this court would not search record for error relative to claims). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal, and we deny Burke’s pending motion." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "to extent appellant was challenging dismissal of federal claims, he failed to show precisely and with reference to record why findings were clearly wrong, and this court would not search record for error relative to claims", "sentence": "See Carter v. Lutheran Med. Ctr., 87 F.3d 1025, 1026 (8th Cir.1996) (per curiam) (dismissing pro se appeal where brief presented no question for court to decide; among other shortfalls, brief did not provide statement of issues presented for review or identify any basis of alleged error by district court); Brown v. Frey, 806 F.2d 801, 804 (8th Cir.1986) (pro se litigants are not excused from compliance with procedural law); cf. Puckett v. Cook, 864 F.2d 619, 620 n. 2 (8th Cir.1989) (to extent appellant was challenging dismissal of federal claims, he failed to show precisely and with reference to record why findings were clearly wrong, and this court would not search record for error relative to claims). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal, and we deny Burke’s pending motion." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "500 U.S. 90, 99", "parenthetical": "\"When an issue or claim is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law.\"", "sentence": "Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99, 111 S.Ct. 1711, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991) (“When an issue or claim is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law.”); Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 800 (Fed.Cir.1990) (stating that “practice of [waiving an issue not raised by an appellant in its opening brief] is, of course, not governed by a rigid rule but may as a matter of discretion not be adhered to where circumstances indicate that it would result in basically unfair procedure”); cf. Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc., 417 F.3d 1241, 1251-52 (Fed.Cir.2005) (stating that “[a]n appellate court retains case-by-case discretion over whether to apply waiver,” and holding that claim construction arguments “advocating the same concept” are properly addressed)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "417 F.3d 1241, 1251-52", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[a]n appellate court retains case-by-case discretion over whether to apply waiver,\" and holding that claim construction arguments \"advocating the same concept\" are properly addressed", "sentence": "Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99, 111 S.Ct. 1711, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991) (“When an issue or claim is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law.”); Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 800 (Fed.Cir.1990) (stating that “practice of [waiving an issue not raised by an appellant in its opening brief] is, of course, not governed by a rigid rule but may as a matter of discretion not be adhered to where circumstances indicate that it would result in basically unfair procedure”); cf. Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc., 417 F.3d 1241, 1251-52 (Fed.Cir.2005) (stating that “[a]n appellate court retains case-by-case discretion over whether to apply waiver,” and holding that claim construction arguments “advocating the same concept” are properly addressed)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "417 F.3d 1241, 1251-52", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[a]n appellate court retains case-by-case discretion over whether to apply waiver,\" and holding that claim construction arguments \"advocating the same concept\" are properly addressed", "sentence": "Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99, 111 S.Ct. 1711, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991) (“When an issue or claim is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law.”); Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 800 (Fed.Cir.1990) (stating that “practice of [waiving an issue not raised by an appellant in its opening brief] is, of course, not governed by a rigid rule but may as a matter of discretion not be adhered to where circumstances indicate that it would result in basically unfair procedure”); cf. Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc., 417 F.3d 1241, 1251-52 (Fed.Cir.2005) (stating that “[a]n appellate court retains case-by-case discretion over whether to apply waiver,” and holding that claim construction arguments “advocating the same concept” are properly addressed)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"When an issue or claim is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law.\"", "sentence": "Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99, 111 S.Ct. 1711, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991) (“When an issue or claim is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law.”); Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 800 (Fed.Cir.1990) (stating that “practice of [waiving an issue not raised by an appellant in its opening brief] is, of course, not governed by a rigid rule but may as a matter of discretion not be adhered to where circumstances indicate that it would result in basically unfair procedure”); cf. Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc., 417 F.3d 1241, 1251-52 (Fed.Cir.2005) (stating that “[a]n appellate court retains case-by-case discretion over whether to apply waiver,” and holding that claim construction arguments “advocating the same concept” are properly addressed)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"When an issue or claim is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law.\"", "sentence": "Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99, 111 S.Ct. 1711, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991) (“When an issue or claim is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law.”); Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 800 (Fed.Cir.1990) (stating that “practice of [waiving an issue not raised by an appellant in its opening brief] is, of course, not governed by a rigid rule but may as a matter of discretion not be adhered to where circumstances indicate that it would result in basically unfair procedure”); cf. Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc., 417 F.3d 1241, 1251-52 (Fed.Cir.2005) (stating that “[a]n appellate court retains case-by-case discretion over whether to apply waiver,” and holding that claim construction arguments “advocating the same concept” are properly addressed)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "417 F.3d 1241, 1251-52", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[a]n appellate court retains case-by-case discretion over whether to apply waiver,\" and holding that claim construction arguments \"advocating the same concept\" are properly addressed", "sentence": "Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99, 111 S.Ct. 1711, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991) (“When an issue or claim is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law.”); Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 800 (Fed.Cir.1990) (stating that “practice of [waiving an issue not raised by an appellant in its opening brief] is, of course, not governed by a rigid rule but may as a matter of discretion not be adhered to where circumstances indicate that it would result in basically unfair procedure”); cf. Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc., 417 F.3d 1241, 1251-52 (Fed.Cir.2005) (stating that “[a]n appellate court retains case-by-case discretion over whether to apply waiver,” and holding that claim construction arguments “advocating the same concept” are properly addressed)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "417 F.3d 1241, 1251-52", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[a]n appellate court retains case-by-case discretion over whether to apply waiver,\" and holding that claim construction arguments \"advocating the same concept\" are properly addressed", "sentence": "Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99, 111 S.Ct. 1711, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991) (“When an issue or claim is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law.”); Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 800 (Fed.Cir.1990) (stating that “practice of [waiving an issue not raised by an appellant in its opening brief] is, of course, not governed by a rigid rule but may as a matter of discretion not be adhered to where circumstances indicate that it would result in basically unfair procedure”); cf. Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc., 417 F.3d 1241, 1251-52 (Fed.Cir.2005) (stating that “[a]n appellate court retains case-by-case discretion over whether to apply waiver,” and holding that claim construction arguments “advocating the same concept” are properly addressed)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "922 F.2d 792, 800", "parenthetical": "stating that \"practice of [waiving an issue not raised by an appellant in its opening brief] is, of course, not governed by a rigid rule but may as a matter of discretion not be adhered to where circumstances indicate that it would result in basically unfair procedure\"", "sentence": "Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99, 111 S.Ct. 1711, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991) (“When an issue or claim is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law.”); Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 800 (Fed.Cir.1990) (stating that “practice of [waiving an issue not raised by an appellant in its opening brief] is, of course, not governed by a rigid rule but may as a matter of discretion not be adhered to where circumstances indicate that it would result in basically unfair procedure”); cf. Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc., 417 F.3d 1241, 1251-52 (Fed.Cir.2005) (stating that “[a]n appellate court retains case-by-case discretion over whether to apply waiver,” and holding that claim construction arguments “advocating the same concept” are properly addressed)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "393 U.S. 23, 29", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, SS 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "396 Md. 53, 73", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution\"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "89 S.Ct. 5, 10", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, SS 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "396 Md. 53, 73", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution\"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "396 Md. 53, 73", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution\"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, SS 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "396 Md. 53, 73", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution\"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "80 Md. 518, 527", "parenthetical": "\"But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "396 Md. 53, 73", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution\"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "31 A. 300, 301-02", "parenthetical": "\"But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "74 Md. 326, 328", "parenthetical": "\"[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "396 Md. 53, 73", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution\"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "396 Md. 53, 73", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution\"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "22 A. 137, 137", "parenthetical": "\"[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "393 U.S. 23, 29", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, SS 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "912 A.2d 674, 685", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution\"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "89 S.Ct. 5, 10", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, SS 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "912 A.2d 674, 685", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution\"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, SS 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "912 A.2d 674, 685", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution\"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "912 A.2d 674, 685", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution\"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "80 Md. 518, 527", "parenthetical": "\"But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "912 A.2d 674, 685", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution\"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "31 A. 300, 301-02", "parenthetical": "\"But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "74 Md. 326, 328", "parenthetical": "\"[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "912 A.2d 674, 685", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution\"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "22 A. 137, 137", "parenthetical": "\"[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "912 A.2d 674, 685", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution\"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "393 U.S. 23, 29", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, SS 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "386 Md. 516, 546", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution\"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "386 Md. 516, 546", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution\"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "89 S.Ct. 5, 10", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, SS 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "386 Md. 516, 546", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution\"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, SS 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "386 Md. 516, 546", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution\"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "80 Md. 518, 527", "parenthetical": "\"But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "386 Md. 516, 546", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution\"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "31 A. 300, 301-02", "parenthetical": "\"But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "74 Md. 326, 328", "parenthetical": "\"[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "386 Md. 516, 546", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution\"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "386 Md. 516, 546", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution\"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "22 A. 137, 137", "parenthetical": "\"[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "393 U.S. 23, 29", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, SS 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "873 A.2d 1122, 1140", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution\"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "873 A.2d 1122, 1140", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution\"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "89 S.Ct. 5, 10", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, SS 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, SS 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "873 A.2d 1122, 1140", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution\"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "80 Md. 518, 527", "parenthetical": "\"But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "873 A.2d 1122, 1140", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution\"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "31 A. 300, 301-02", "parenthetical": "\"But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "873 A.2d 1122, 1140", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution\"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "873 A.2d 1122, 1140", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution\"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "74 Md. 326, 328", "parenthetical": "\"[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "873 A.2d 1122, 1140", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution\"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "22 A. 137, 137", "parenthetical": "\"[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "393 U.S. 23, 29", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, SS 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "285 Md. 393, 411", "parenthetical": "noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a \"license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... \"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "89 S.Ct. 5, 10", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, SS 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "285 Md. 393, 411", "parenthetical": "noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a \"license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... \"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "285 Md. 393, 411", "parenthetical": "noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a \"license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... \"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, SS 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "285 Md. 393, 411", "parenthetical": "noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a \"license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... \"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "80 Md. 518, 527", "parenthetical": "\"But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "31 A. 300, 301-02", "parenthetical": "\"But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "285 Md. 393, 411", "parenthetical": "noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a \"license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... \"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "74 Md. 326, 328", "parenthetical": "\"[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "285 Md. 393, 411", "parenthetical": "noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a \"license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... \"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "285 Md. 393, 411", "parenthetical": "noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a \"license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... \"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "22 A. 137, 137", "parenthetical": "\"[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "393 U.S. 23, 29", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, SS 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "404 A.2d 1027, 1037", "parenthetical": "noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a \"license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... \"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "89 S.Ct. 5, 10", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, SS 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "404 A.2d 1027, 1037", "parenthetical": "noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a \"license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... \"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "404 A.2d 1027, 1037", "parenthetical": "noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a \"license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... \"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, SS 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "404 A.2d 1027, 1037", "parenthetical": "noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a \"license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... \"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "80 Md. 518, 527", "parenthetical": "\"But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "404 A.2d 1027, 1037", "parenthetical": "noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a \"license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... \"", "sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "31 A. 300, 301-02", "parenthetical": "\"But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State", "sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)." }