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I would say the simple ways. We say that there are only three types of systems. And our first job is to identify that problem. And that's the diagnosis and characterization. So simple problems but this causal relationships are well understood. Complicated is often ambiguous but not easily identified but you can see identify this. Then you have complex problems not easily identifiable only perceivable in retrospect. So a good example of this would be like flushing your toilet. You can go and buy a basically a toilet system from Home Depot for $100. It will work out very nicely. No problem. Bringing water to your home from Kauban like about 50 miles away and taking the water on the 16th floor if you room and you get out you get warm water, that's a complicated system. I need lots of pumps and pipes and then chlorination and heating and so on. Complex problem is the one then when we created this Kauvan Reservoir we have also eliminated four villages from Kaua because we wanted to create a large reservoir. A lot of people has lost their homes and they had to be bought out so was this the to do? Because you are basically removing human beings from four towns for 200 years because Boston has to grow. Boston needed more water

they needed to create a co-op undesirp in 1920s. So they created these by eliminating four villages. And there are still people complaining that that was not the right thing to do. So that's a complex problem where you have basically coupled a natural system with human systems. Now the system is in this case is knowable and predictable. The flashing at all is predictable. This is complicated but it's still more or less predictable. Not always but this one is most of the time unpredictable and emergent meaning that things will just emerge that you had no idea really it was going to come and from your arsenic problem you have seen some of this emergence we'll talk about a little bit more. If you have to intervene in these systems, this will work with best practices. And this is where I think most of the people got it wrong and I think we want you to be very careful. What we are saying here is that your best practices will apply very well for simple systems. If you go into complicated system you need some expert knowledge now and some contextual knowledge. If you go into complex system now you need something totally different. You need a synthesis of scientific facts and social facts. You simply cannot use best practices because there is no best practices for complex systems. And although you will hear this time often, that give me a road map

no I cannot give you a road map. Roadmap assumes that I know the road. So how do I know the road? I know the road because I've seen it in the past. So that means I'm assuming the past will essentially be similar in the future as well. If the future is a little bit different than the past, my past knowledge is not going to be very useful. I cannot have a roadmap. So to hope for a roadmap, to hope for a best practices is in illusion, we must abandon to deal with complex problems. Is that making sense? This is very important because we need to make a distinction between these three class of problems. Your first job would be to essentially decide which one is simple, which one is complicated, which is complex. And then you cannot use the tool, those will be applicable for simple system when the problem is actually complex or vice versa. So, to assume that everybody's working on very complex problems. Each of the cases you heard about the beginning that people describe, they're all complex. They may have simple components within them, but basically the conflicts and what's at the heart of the conflicts are complex. It sounds from your description like it's not really possible to be usefully prescriptive in a situation in which the problems you're dealing with are highly complex. Do you think that's right or? No, I think no, that we're in trouble. At some level it is, but at some level it is not. So let me see what I can explain. So the story that what has to happen then is when you are confronted with a problem like

so let's say that we are confronted with the problem of Ganges Water Treaty. So let's take this as an example. Then we have to decide really when we talk about Ganges Water Treaty what are we talking about? So if you ask me right now I will say Ganges Water Treaty should primarily focus on the dry season flow. So now I'm trying to make the problem a little bit sharper. Why dry season flow? In the wet season I have about 70 to 80,000 cubic meter per second of water flow. That is a flood season. Flood season lasts for a few weeks but it creates a problem but that is a recurring phenomenon. Then in the dry season is almost about eight to nine months. That creates significant problem both from water availability for ecosystems to irrigation to navigability so many many things so I will focus on that part. Then my question would be the okay so given that dry season flow is only 4,000 as opposed to 80,000 now what can I do? How do I basically resolve this complexity of the problem? Now we have to come up with India and sit down and see really what are the options can I have? What are the options those are possible so that we both can come up with some options where we know we're not going to get 80,000 we need it clearly to the 20

000 we only have four. How do I solve this problem? It's not easily resolvable then where essentially this whole idea of mutual value creation negotiation and discussion has to come in rooted in scientific facts. That's basically where I think you can think of really how to get around this mess because otherwise it becomes such a complex problem that nothing can be done. So are you saying that when you face a complex problem, try to only work on part of it? No. What I would say that the approach should be problem driven, meaning that you have to define a particular problem that you want to solve. So here I have defined the problem and that I want to resolve the dry season flow in the Ganges. That is my problem. Right, but isn't that really a part of the larger problem of managing the Ganges? It is. It is no question about it. No question about it. And I don't think there is any way to disentangle this. Can you take it all separately? No, you cannot. So then what do you do? So at one extreme then you can think of really that everything is interconnected with everything else. If that is the case, then you are in a mass. That mess simply cannot be untangled. And you can argue that no, no, you are essentially being reductionist because you are trying to reduce the problem to something that is simpler. To some extent, yes. But what we want to be careful really when I'm defining the problem for the dry season

I don't want it to be a reductionist problem that basically it will not get affected by flood. So I need to be careful really. The lesser that dry season is eight months. These eight months will affected by other four months too. How that is the question. If they're cleanly separable, then it's easy, but they are not cleanly separable. They will not be. So this is where the complexity will come. I don't think how hard we try you will be able to go in. That's the reason scientific method is important because you need to keep this idea of experimentation valid. So you observe, you ask questions, you hypothesize, you experiment, analyze, analyze, you analyze, and keep doing this. Then you go here. So I think that this, I don't think we need to go this because this is more into. Recognize that basically there is no penasi here. See if there is no penasi, then what is there? What I am saying that we need to be precise in diagnosing the problem. So here the whole approach that we are trying to take is that it is a problem-driven approach. It is not a theory-driven approach. So I have a problem. That problem is to solve dry season water problem in Bangladesh or in India. Now to do this, then I, so that is my diagnosis of the problem. Now what are the facets of the diagnosis? What are the aspects of the diagnosis? What the aspect do I need to do? Is it really to keep Calcutta port navigable or is it really to stop salt water in Tucson, or both are important? If both are important

then how do I try to see really given the limited amount of water that I have, can I do both? If I cannot then do I have other options? What if I use groundwater? Can I use groundwater in a year and next year basically I have more rain it gets filled? With ground water also I cannot use it forever because it will get depleted. So those are the type of discussion that has to happen. So precisely the point with complex system is that complex systems will not allow you to give a solution that is static. It will give you a solution given that particular problem, given that time and space scale. Then what we need to be careful is that we monitor and we keep adapting to the changing situations. So that brings us, you say we have to embrace complexity with humility there. That is not that basically I'm going to give a solution that you have it. There is no prescription that is universal. I cannot do it. I'm just being very honest and blunt. But at the same time I'm giving you a framework. That framework will allow you to do things in certain ways. Then you think in a systematic way. What does that mean? That means that you try to define what your system boundary is. What are the notes and links in that system? So that when you get this spaghetti diagram, what are the notes and links that create this spaghetti diagram and that is understandable and systematically manageable? Then you say, okay, I diagnose and prescribe. So I'm saying you need to prescribe. So what do you

how do you prescribe then? The way you prescribe by understanding the capacity of the system, as well as the constraints that system imposes on you. What that means really, the capacity and constant for the Ganges between Bangladesh, India, will be quite different if you are trying to do it for the Nile between Egypt and Ethiopia. So the challenge here is that you have diagnosed the problem. Now you have to give you to give some prescription. That prescription must be consistent with the capacity that your system has. And that capacity can involve basically from human capital to basically actual assets of money to cultural values and everything else. But not all of them are important at a given time. The challenge for us is water diplomat is to find out what those are and try to define that subset. Otherwise, this set is very large. You can go to the Ganges and assume that the Ganges water is probably one of the most polluted water in the world but it is the most holy water for Hindus in India. So I cannot basically start questioning the cultural value. That has to be taken into account. So that is the capacity and constant. The system is imposing on me. Then I say that there is no penancia. So let's be clear about this, that there is no simple, generalizable best practices. Then I said, okay, Pete. Excuse me, Shafi, when you say diagnosed and prescribed using capacity and constraints, you don't mean that you can't enhance the capacity with resources from outside the system, right? No

right? No, I don't. I think very good point. No question. So I think we have to be exactly, I think we need to bring in other, capacity is not fixed. Capacity can be enhanced, capacity can be reinforced, even I think can be built and even can be taken as an outside energy. So World Bank can create more basically can put in money. Absolutely. I think I need to be a little bit more careful there. It's not that, so no, let's not assume that the system capacity and constants are fixed. So the question basically, do we need anything else? Because I'm also teaching this similar class at top. So I think we did pose this question. So, and I'm asking maybe you guys also also that okay. So is this a more or less general abstract level of things that we need to do to start addressing the problem? Then we'll get into very quickly our arsenic problem, how this can be applied in real time. So I don't know how much time do we have on image? We have about 10 or 15 minutes. Okay. Yeah. All right. So let's do the I think maybe I'll just go into this. Could you could you just go back one for a minute to the diagram to the list you had you said is you know the question marks at the end is that is that is that sufficient is that do we need anything else like one question you raise I think I need to use my uneasiness with that list is that if you're going to act adapt, adaptively, if you're going to continue to review and change what you're doing

you need to have the institutional capacity to do that. Sure. To build the institutional capacity to think and act systematically, to build the capacity to adapt, adapt, act adaptively. And so the person who's talking about taking action, I think, needs to think about the institutional design could the process that makes this list possible and that itself becomes an item on the list. Sure, good point. Any other thoughts? All right, let's see whether we can. So essentially that what we are arguing, so I hope I convince you that there is no established methodology exists to resolve complex problem because these problems are not deterministic not random. So that means you cannot use classical physics or you cannot use statistical mechanics to do this. Then at the same time these problems can neither be fully explored by the positive is meaning this hypothesis testing type of framework that I was arguing that with five senses so you cannot just use scientific methods nor can you use just interpretations. So it's not that basically you can use either or methods really. So you cannot use purely scientific method, you cannot use purely subjective ethnographic matters to address these problems. What then you have to do really is some way to basically combine your scientific facts and social facts. So that's what is all about. And if you look at the paper that I sent you to read the arsenic contamination problem essentially tries to do this is to explain the problem. So

to explain the problem. So let's explain from a scientific facts perspective. Then use the understanding, meaning the social facts, to actually address the problem. So what that means today is so let's this, you've seen before you will not go here. So I go here. So I use an illustrative case. The illustrative case is that it can support a theory. So the arsenic contamination problem is used here as an illustrative case, meaning that it illustrates that it's a complex problem. But it does not really provide any validation of the theory. But we've also used it as an extended case, meaning that if I take this case and I look at all the features, what I see really here is this is a coupled natural and human system problem. In this coupled natural and human system problem when I intervene it gives rise to emergent properties and then it becomes a complex problem so that means I can use this to show really when you have this type of coupling you will expect these type of things to happen. So now if you take actually what happened then there is so you have basically Bangladesh has decided that they would promote groundwater use as a case study that we are using it here. There were two policy goals. They want to increase agricultural productivity and reduce infant mortality. So these were the policy goals they wanted to do. A very sharp, very well defined, easily measurable. And then you go and then you see this. So this is where essentially now if you try to link all this different component, different variables processes

now you see this is a mess. And this is not new. And this is not even our mess. I think many people have created this type of mess. They call the system diagram and interaction diagram, whatever. And we are saying that this is really so old. Basically, it doesn't allow me to do anything. I just totally get paralyzed. So it's not going to work because things are interconnected. We understand that part. The question then is becomes how do you diagnose or sharply define the problem that not all of these links and notes are equally important. Only some are. The question is which are. So in the case of like diocesan flow, we get you an example relief. That is what we want to do. So that's a much simpler definition of the problem with the interconnections and interdependency those will be needed. Once you have that, then you can go here. So if you look at what Bangladesh has done, they wanted to have two policy goals and these were achieved really with tremendous success. It has increased agricultural productivity, decreased infant mortality. Agricultural productivity has gone up by almost 100%. Infant mortality was the lowest in South Asia. So in those terms, it was very good really, very basically successful story from 1960s to almost 1980s. Then what you started seeing the arsenic contamination emerges now. In 1960 they did not expect that arsenic contamination will come. The difficulty they have created, they have not measured so they were not following it. So they were not really monitoring the progress, they are not being adaptive

they did not care. So as a result it emerges. Even that emergence did not really lead to any action. It took another 15 years before the day first the arsenic was detected in water then to actually create something at the government level. It took 15 years. Why did it that long? So that's what basically the system failed. Then you have taken interventions which left even more unintended emergence. If you remember really you looked at this basically they put red and green wells. Now the villages that had read wells now have problems with basically girls getting married because they have a stigma. So you have created a social stigma by creating a solution that you wanted to do because you wanted to let people know that there is this well is red, meaning it has high arsenic concentration. So where did that come from? What I argue that basically this was also really, what we learned from this, this was a theory-driven causality-based reasoning. Where did that come from? So that really came from if you know the story of cholera in London in 1854. In John Snow found out that he was an epidemiologist, he found out that there is a cholera outbreak in London and they cannot find out what is going on. So he did a very systematic way of finding out who has cholera, where they get drinking water is coming from, and he found out a well. And he went and basically shut that well down, cholera went away. So that is basically my theory or by basically scientific knowledge that I used in Bangladesh also

without understanding anything else. So I basically went and started painting everything red. Because it's not in it, and it stopped cholera. So if I do this, arsenic will be stopped. Yes, it will be. The only difficulty there is that this is rural Bangladesh, number one. I have over 10 million wealth right now and not one. So as a result, really, my theory doesn't go with actually what is happening on the ground. So we got into serious mess and that took another 20 years to unfold. So what would happen really in a principle of pragmatic approach really you want to do really you want to find out a problem different question. So the question was that really okay so I have infant mortality problem in Bangladesh. So to solve that infant mortality problem I found out the quickest solution. What was the quickest solution? They dig some shallow wells. It's cheaper, it's quicker, fine. And we've done that. And that is perfectly fine. What was missing there is that they did not monitor really the progression of this. They just assumed that it's a simple solution it will stay forever. If they have monitored this, they would have found out long ago. That's where basically this problem-driven question with hypothesis consistent with observed signals. I need to keep observing the system as it evolves. If I can do this, then I have an approach that is more or less functional. So to summarize, then basically what we need to do really

we need to first find out a very sharp definition of the problem that you want to address. Then find out whether is this a simple problem, complicated problem or a complex problem. Then find out if it is a complex problem that what is the complexity coming from? Is the complexity coming from the scientific unknown or is it coming from the social fact those are alternatives? Then try to synthesize these two, then design an intervention with some basically targeted metric that this is what I want to do and then monitor this as you go along. Then you could be adaptive and find out a solution that will basically be resilient and change also over time. There is no universal solution. See if you want to take I think that would be that there is no universal generalizable solution for complex systems. Complex systems will bring even more problems once you try to solve them. By the time you have solved them

you have given rise to another set of problems. And this is also nothing new really. This has been done in with ladies department for many years from like Sean to other people. They have talked about these problems almost 50 years ago. That the idea of really when you're trying to do these social problems really by the time you solve the problem you have given rise to another set of problems. So the challenge is to essentially be very aware of that problem nature will change and if it does really how do I detect them early on so that I can be adaptive and act accordingly. We'll stop here. So do you have any final question to Shophic? What are your thoughts about the enabling conditions between India and Pakistan on the on taking up the revisions and then it's what a pretty? Enabling conditions should be those will remain three. What you want to do really hopefully I think is that what are the main issues of contentions right now? That needs to be discussed. Because I have not following recently about the industry. So what would be good, I think, if you can identify one or two things that both countries are in disagreement with. What is that really? So I can give you one example, for example, for Brahma Putra is that what I followed recently is, say for example, India is claiming that China is holding all the water and then it will create problem. Physically that is not true because the amount of water that is coming from Bromaputu for China, even if China, we did this study with domination with another Chinese student we had

even if they decide to keep all the water in China, it will have no impact in India, although they are making that claim. So this is essentially a social myth they want to create. That China is creating a problem. But these are not based on facts. So what you want to do really with India is it possible to find some very sharp scientific facts those are observable. Like one example I use with Bangladesh and India for the Ganges even if I give all the water to India in the dry season India will still not be able to basically make their Calcutta for Navigov during the dry season. So that means this is a non-starter. Why we start fighting with this? Try to find something else then. Although of course it is a serious problem if India keeps all the water in the dry season. But even if Bangladesh decided I'll give you everything, still will not solve the problem. So that means you need alternative sources now. That part has not been explored. Before we finish, I just want to thank Shaftiq again. We I work together a long time on this, and I'm always learning something new each time I hear him present this material. So thank you for taking the time, Shafi, to meet with the class and for sharing your ideas. And thank you for having such good ideas. Yeah. No, thank you very much. No, this I think no, I don't want to embarrass Larry. Larry has been an inspirational mentor. So because many of the things that I discussed today I did not know about maybe 15 years ago and I started talk so we have been talking for a long time now. So yeah

if you look at this guy, you say that you need 10,000 hours to develop any sort of expertise. So between both of us, we probably spend more than 10,000 hours now. Hopefully we have some level of at least understanding expertise. Yeah, also, yeah, from our side. Yeah. For everybody in the class, right? The other people in this class are potentially the person you'll find yourself coming back to and working with. When Chaffeak and I, we did not know each other when we first encountered some overlap in our interests and we just kept creating opportunities to exchange our thoughts and that sort of animish then gets added to the mix and now extends both of our ideas and our work and his own work. So everybody in the class should imagine that you, it's through these interactions with your colleagues that you shape and sharpen your ideas. So I think, thank you. Yeah. So for the class I think I have a challenge for you. So since you did not share much of your thoughts, maybe you're too shy. So think about the arsenic paper that you read. I want you to find out at least one whole. One thing that you found that this is really outrageously stupid. It's not going to work. I gave the same challenge to my students also. So there are few things that I have issues. I did not share those with you, but I will not tell you right now. But I want you to see really what, like Larry raised something very interesting here that if the institutional mechanism is not there, if the capacity is constant

it's not going to work. So we need to refine that. But are there anything else you see really in terms of making it operational? What we are saying that, see at one point I said the complex systems, you don't have generalizable solutions, you don't have any prescription, but then we are giving you prescription too. So the line is very subtle here, but at the same time I don't see a way around it. So the question is basically how do I bring in these ideas of principles of scientific methods which are more replicable, more reproducible with the social effects which are going to be continuously subjective, continuously contentious. But at the same time, this has to be made. So that's where basically where are the hiccups or where are the binding constant that will essentially let it fail. If you can think of one or two ideas that will be good or maybe an example that you have seen in your real life where you try to apply this and see did not work. He wants you to be a white hat hacker of his work. Yep, that'll be good. Find programming problems. Exactly. So find you find your hole and then the,that will be very nice. That's the way ideas get shorthy. Otherwise, because you are stagnate. Yeah, and also apart from that, even if you have your one specific issue regarding auto diplomacy that can be related to the theory that Shophic mentioned. You can also write him an email so that yeah. Sure, please, please feel free. All right

I'm gonna disappear but thank you so much. Thank you very much. I look forward to the presentation starting next week. Okay. Bye bye. All right.. Bye-bye. Yeah. Thank you. Thank you.

So thank you very much for the opportunity of the presentation. So today I would be presenting about the Gangesh water conflicts between India and Bangladesh, which is actually one of the major boon of contents that's happening between the two neighboring countries. So I would be speaking about, it is basically, it follows three flows. The first part would speak about from where the problem originated. And the second part would say that what is the present condition and the third part would discuss which I think would be the most relevant part for our past, that is the water diplomacy part on how we can actually approach the problem and how we can try to find a solution. So let me go to the next slide. So I would be putting a little bit of disclaimer. Some part of my discussion might not match with Bangladesh's government's official view. So I would, this is important because of years of training, because I'm not an academic, because of years of training, two things happens. The first one is subconsciously, and I have found it even when I've taken classes in Japan or in the US, that's automatically I actually reflect the views of a typical Bangladeshi bureaucrat, the particular government's point of view. It is very, I had to train myself to, I mean, stay away from that view and try to match with the academic standard and come up with as much as objective point of view as possible. So here I would try deliberately

I mean not to match the typical staffs that is said by the Bangladesh government or any government to per se. So that is one thing. So and the second part is the political history because although it's a treaty, it's a river treaty, but it is very sensitive both for Bangladesh and India, and the political history between Bangladesh and India has sort of influence in this whole discussion. So knowingly or unknowingly, sometimes that political history will visit us in my presentation. So with these two disclaimers, I start my presentation. So first a little bit of history and geography. So you all know about the Indian subcontinent that there are many countries. It was basically under the British rule for 200 years and before that it was 600 years under the Mughals or the Muslims. So before 1947 at the leftmost the huge map that you see total blue this is the situation of Indian subcontinent. And in 1947, right after the Second World World, the Indian subcontinent was divided into two, and that is after the partition in 1947, you can see the green part still stays the India, the present-day India, and the orange part, a deep orange part, that is on the upper side it's West Pakistan and on the lower side, the small country, it's East Pakistan, which is the modern day Bangladesh. So in 1971, we had a war against the western part of Western part of Pakistan. It was actually very natural. You see that there is like almost 2,000 miles gap between the two parts. So it was sort of obvious for many reasons. So in 1971

this first one single country that is India, second India and Pakistan, and after 71, it became three countries, that is India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. So this is the case, and here I'm bringing this little bit of a little bit of history to explain the relationship dynamics of Bangladesh and India, because without bringing the relationship dynamics between Bangladesh and India, it is kind of tough to understand that how and why this treaty is so sensitive. So here we can see that in 16 December, 1971, you can say this is the surrender ceremony, this is the surrender ceremony of the occupying force in 16 December. And on the left side, 3 million people, that is the official number Bangladesh claims. It is disputed, but this is the official number that it was killed. So there was, we said that there has been genocide and murders, which happens almost in all the words. So this is the surrender ceremony and there is an interesting fact, you will see that in the left side, someone who is signing for Bangladesh. This is an Indian, Indian general, General Jaljit Singh, Aurora. So you can understand the historical connection between India and Bangladesh. It's very deep. And it used to be, and during the liberation war, India, India helped us militarily. And later, after the independence, which both the parties considered that both India and Bangladesh should be very friendly

but after the independence that actually changed and major anti-Indian sentiment has been present there. And one of the reasons this happened is the the Faraka Dam which has created serious trouble for Bangladesh. And for that, gradually there has been some treaties, and it was so serious that, let me explain the basin a little bit first. So I would be reading from an article by Saito-Roman. So this is the Ganges Water Basin. You can see that from the Ganges is coming and coming and coming and it is entering from the Hoogli. Hoogli falls in the West Bengal. So previously before the partition, Bengal was united. So there was no East Bengal or West Bengal. So after the partition, one part of Bengal fall into India. We speak the same language. Our culture is almost same. The religion is a little bit different. A little religion, the Hindu majority is in the Western part, the West Bengal and the Muslim majority is in the Eastern part, because the partition happened for the two nations theory that the Muslims will be living in Pakistan and the Hindus and other religions will be living in India so that was a theory but that was a the theory but that was a the ganges river originates in the central Himalan at the altitude of 7,010 meters and extends into the Aluvian Gangesic plains and drains into the Indian Ocean at the Bay of Bengal. The Ganges is a transboundary river which has a total length of approximately 2,600 kilometers and a total catchment area of 1,087,000 square kilometer. The river basin spreads across India, Nepal, China, and Bangladesh

where India shares the major portion, which is 79% of the total basin area. And in contrast, Bangladesh is the furthest downstream country of the basin and shares only about 4% of the basin area, which nevertheless represents 37% of the total area of Bangladesh. The hydrological cycle and water resources of the Ganges Basin are governed by southwest monsoon, characterized by high temperature, heavy rainfall, strong seasonal variations. The region is characterized by flooding in the wet season, which is June to October and water scarcity in the dry season, which is November 2 May. During the monson season, there is an abundance of water, but during non-moonson season, lower precipitation causes reduced flow in the basin. The insufficient supply of water in the downstream during the dry season causes significant socioeconomic impacts through disruption to the agriculture, fisheries, forestry, andthis of this region. So here we can see a little bit more details of the close-up that the the Ganges river that is entering. Here is the Farakadam and here it's it's it's Ganges enter Bangladesh through the West Bengal the Huggli area, and it enters and it becomes Podda, which is the biggest river in Bangladesh, also which is the economically most significant river in Bangladesh. And the impact you can see in the next picture, you can see that in the lower part, which means this whole part, this Ganges delta, the lower part, the Ganges River when it enters Bangladesh

it becomes Podha and any change in the flow or any climatic change or any man-made change has serious impact in the lower region of the southern part of Bangladesh. And I actually have seen directly because my hometown is actually in the Bagheera area which is in this region. So although it's like anecdotal experience but I can actually see that like our village area it was it was actually very of flora and funa, but with time it actually reduced and now that when I go to go to the village after like five or ten years, we see that it has totally changed. So this actually matches with the academic articles that I've read here. So what are the major water diplomacy events between Bangladesh and India since 1971? As you know that in 1971, Bangladesh became independent and India had direct help, India had direct contribution towards that. So in 1972, right after Bangladesh became independent in 1971 December, and in 1972, the Bangladesh father of the nation Sheikh Mujib Roman and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, they sat down, water was actually an issue back then, what was actually an issue back then between India and Pakistan, especially this Farakadam, the Ganges River Water Sharing Treaty. So for the first time, this actually sat down immediately after the independence in 1972, which actually shows that how important it is for this

for the region to maintain the peace and tranquility between the two countries. So the first joint water commission between India and Bangladesh was established in 1972. And this newly made joint water commission between India and Bangladesh actually tried to survey and they try to determine what are the course of actions that can be taken because for decades, decades for India-Pakistan rivalry, no development actually happened. So in 1974, it was declared by that commission that there was this joint declaration to resolve water sharing issues, the existing issues that were there. But in 1975, Bangladesh Shikmujibur Rahman was killed with his family and there was a coup d'etat and the military took over. So in 1976, India unilaterally withdrew from this declaration. So after this happened in 1977, there was this temporary five-year treaty which ended in 1982, which started in 1977 during the Bangladesh National Party regime which is the which is historically considered as anti-India. So in 1982 it was not renewed and after that after long break in 1996 there was this treaty between India and Bangladesh which is a Ganges water sharing treaty between Bangladesh in India which was signed by Dev Gowdhav Gowdh, the Biden Prime Minister of India and the present Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina Wazed. So this is more or less the major developments and there is this interesting, interesting fact that is there, that from India to Bangladesh

54 rivers actually come. And Bangladesh is in the downstream and India is in the upstream. 54 rivers from India. Bangladesh is a riverine country. There is like hundreds of rivers. 54 of them actually comes from India. And it is spread in Bangladesh throughout just like a net. But unfortunately, so far there has been only one treaty, one proper treaty, which is the Ganges Water Treaty with Treaty Sharing. And out of, for last quarter century, there has been no treaty. And another water treaty, the Thista Water Treaty, there has been many talks, but still there has been no development. So we can actually understand that why we are speaking about this Ganges Water Sharing Treaty, and its significance. So what do we find in 1996 water treaty between Bangladesh and India? So this was the treaty. This is the very, very minimum that treaty was there. The first, the first, the first, the sharing calculation was like this,000 a QZX or less water when it's available 50% will go to India 50% will go to Bangladesh if it's between 70,000 to 75,000 the India will maintain the balance of the flow and the Bangladesh will have remaining 35,000 QSX and 75,000 QZX or more when when there is water availability, 40,000 QSX will go to India and Bangladesh will maintain balance of the flow. So that was the basic, that was the very basic and the very minimum of the water sharing, what a treaty between Bangladesh and India. So what are the real scenario? I mean, this is the treaty that we have got

but what is the real scenario? So here we can see the real scenario that Bangladesh has been frequently deprived of its minimum share during the most critical periods of the dry season, and which has caused the loss of agricultural land, created created problems in salination, the wellness of the people has decreased, and which has created such a huge issue that in every election that Bangladesh happens, this repeatedly comes. And during the March 21 to 31, the 10-day cycle in the year 2010, the actual release to Bangladesh was 44% lower than the indicative release. And in 2016, the situation became even worse than that, even worse. The actual release during March 21 to 31 was 47% lower than the indicative share, followed by a further 34% and 49% decrease of flows during the other alternate critical periods. So we can see that whatever that is written there in the treaty, unfortunately this is not the real scenario is very very different, which is why I mean we have to look into these issues very seriously and we have to decide because this is going to end in 2025. This is 2021 and if it is not renewed, a very different scenario might happen. We don't know what is going to happen, but now is actually the perfect time to think about this particular scenario and think of different possibilities, especially from the conflict resolution point of view. And what are the problems with the treaty that we can see that it underestimated the impact of climate variability, the frequency of low flow events and increased water extractions upstream

and the future climate change and higher upstream water demand were not predicted. And also on several locations, neither Bangladesh. This is very interesting, that I was speaking about the problem that Bangladesh is facing, but a few articles actually indicated that the treaty was made in such a way that in several locations, not only once, not only twice, but several locations, neither Bangladesh nor India was able to receive their respective shares as a stipulate, as stipulate in the treaty. And some other problems that we can discuss with the treaty is that Bangladesh frequently did not receive its fair share during the most critical periods of the dry season when water demand is relatively high in both countries. And there was no guarantee clause for Bangladesh, no guarantee clause for Bangladesh, which would ensure that, I mean, although there is treaty, but if Bangladesh does not get, there is no guarantee that is ensured for Bangladesh. So that became another major problem. And the opponents of the current government, they used to say things like, there is no guarantee, which means this is just a show-off. So which also created huge political turmoil in Bangladesh scenario. And it is evident that the advanced hydrological models were not used. And because if there was, I mean, there was advanced hydrological models were used, the prediction would not be, I mean, creating so much trouble. If there was, if there was deliberate error, then maybe one side would be benefited and one side would not be benefited. But unfortunately

the standard was set in such a way, it shows that none of the countries several times do not get what they're supposed to get according to the treaty. So some of the authors like Sajdul Islam, he actually questioned the hydrological models that has been used to deal with the treaty. And he also claimed that the advanced models were not used, which is why the treaty is in the pen and paper, but in reality, the quantitative distribution of water has not taken place properly. So this is, we can see, there are some picture, two pictures actually that I've picked, that what happened during the, what happened during the dry season. So Bangladesh is a country which is, which used to be full of blessings from the nature, a lot of, I mean, you wouldn't see dry lands very often, but after this barrage actually happened and during the dry season, this actually happened and what happened is the poor farmers, I mean many of them actually lost their lands and they had to, I mean, some of them actually, there has been cases that some of them could not even survive, physically they couldn't survive. And many of them in those areas, they left their lands and they came to the capital city, and which is why after they came to the capital city, they didn't know anything but agriculture, but they started to find a job, they didn't find it. So they try to do other things which it didn't work. And at one point, what happened, that crime rate increased very high, because because because because they cannot survive in their area

and they come to the capital city or the big cities, and they start committing crime. So that is how actually indirectly, even with the crime perspective, even the law enforcement perspective, this Farakka is actually affecting Bangladesh. So let's see the ground realities. So now that we will enter into the third part of our presentation, which is the water diplomacy part. So let us check out some of the ground realities. The first of all, I mean, India has economic, political, geographical and military advantage and not only that, it has been very few, I mean for last, last almost 15 years the present government is in the power and they have very strong tie with Indians and many of the many of the political experts they say that without India's support and backing this government wouldn't probably survive. So some of the political scientists they actually come up with that that sort analysis. So I mean, whether this is true or false, that is a separate issue. But one thing that is clear, that a huge, huge population, I mean, a major population group, they actually believe this. And once they believe this, they automatically have the anti-India sentiment. And India, by cashing out on this sentiment, even the political leaders, they also get paranoid. They also think that if we try to take any decision that does not divaically go in favor of India, maybe India will try to pressure the Bangladesh politics and the Bangladeshi political leaders will lose their seat. So with this fear

very little instances are there that Bangladesh actually confronted India. And I'm sure that this situation is not uncommon in other parts of the world. So also like in 1971, India was directly supporting Bangladesh to become independent. Their soldiers actually died with our freedom fighters. So what happened that when the war ended, immediately there was a there was a joint commission initiated, but it is very unlikely that that sort of warmth of relationship between the two countries is going to come back in the near future and even there is a strong political will there is animosity both from Bangladesh, Bangladesh side and Indian side and as I say that there is very strong anti-Indian sentiment currently given in Bangladesh. And this feelings is mutual due to the political scenario both in India and in Bangladesh. The present government in India and they try to, they're a populist government and there is us versus them

this sentiment is being very much played in India and also in Bangladesh. So these are the ground realities. So what are the things that we can do that is what are the things that is I'm trying to portray. The first water diplomacy approach that I try to find is the finding common grounds. What are the common grounds that we can say because Bangladesh actually stands no chance by confronting India saying that you have to give us. India would just say that like well we wouldn't give you do whatever you want. So here this international water management is still. So from there I actually I actually brought this and so these the issues that we can see that low dry season fresh water flow the increasing siltation accumulation of sediments water resources along the areas of the river basin are depleting the small rivers on the distributor is getting dried and disconnected reduced length of waterways used for negotiation and reverberation formation of a formation of drylands and the socio-economic vulnerabilities. So the problems that has been there, Gorae is actually a variant of the Ganges River on the middle side, middle side of the Bangladesh. And Haura Bhoegroet River is in the West Bengal, another river. So these common issues that is actually there, both between Indian and Bangladesh. So the joint water commission that we have and in our water diplomacy syllabus, what we have studied in various times

that an emphasis on joint water commission and finding the common challenges is very much stressed in water diplomacy. So I think these are the issues that happens both for India and Bangladesh during the dry seasons in West Bengal and in Bangladesh. So these are the things that both the parties can discuss and they can try to share some common ground which can be exported and that is how the treaty can be, the treaty can be upgraded. So another water diplomacy approach is the indicating India's own problems with Farakka. This is a 2017 newspaper article with some references. So there was this Indian chief engineer. He actually discussed when this plan was happening in 1961. So he actually pointed out some various problems, for example the drought and the climate change. These are the things he actually pointed out to the Indian government. He's a Bengali guy, Krishna Bhattacharya. So he actually pointed out those problems, but back then his career took a, he was a chief engineer on the West Bengal side when this Farakada was happening. And when he indicated those problems, for example, the different parts of Ferman and 12 other districts in Bihar, the flooding, the drought and the drought, the flooding, the drought, the floodgates, the drought, the floodgate, the 6.4 million cubic meter to 21.88 million cubic meter till 2003. So this sort of things happened and these were actually predicted. So this problem not only is from an academic report, this was so serious that the Bihar, in the Bihar area, some very influential politicians

the chief ministers and they actually saved the central government that why don't you, I mean, demolish the Farakadam. So the way Bangladesh wants a solution for this Farakka problem, even some parts of India, they actually wants the same. So when there would be a discussion, maybe from Bangladesh's perspective, this India's own interest can be exploited and come to a middle ground. And this is something which Bangladesh repeatedly failed and India became repeatedly successful. Bangladesh, since after the 1982, when another party, which is historically considered as anti-India, they came to power, they tried to internationalize the Faraka situation. They tried to, I mean, the SARC was built and then this issue was taken. But India was actually stressing that no, this is a bilateral issue. But if you look at the basin, you will see that there is China, Bhutan, Nepal, and Bangladesh. Well, Bhutan and Nepal, their cases exactly like Bangladesh. But the surprising new scenario is that now that China has global aspirations. China, more than once, they came out with a Tista river, which is another river in the northern part of Bangladesh. They came up with the proposal that we would help you with the technology and the money so that you can build another branch on another side. So this became another bargaining chief for Bangladesh that using the China factor, I would, using the China factor and building an international, the joint commission can be international, It needs not to be bilateral, it can be international, bringing China

since the China is actually trying to provide Bangladesh with some new options. And they are actually saying that China's water weapon, that is the word they have used. So this is, this is a concept that I've borrowed from the syphilislam the the Shavigal slums are a class the bringing other bargaining chips that is not usually considered. For example this is Bangladesh on the on the left side the West Bengal is there you can see the Jorn, Bihar, and this is Nepal Bhutan. This is Bangladesh, and you see a huge part of India is actually there, and the majority of the border is in, is with Bangladesh. And there is, I mean, sentiment, there is strong sentiment against the Central Indian government because it is very much, I mean, it is called the Seven Sisters, and the Seven Sisters, well, this is far from the Central Government and which is why the control is very much, I mean, not as strong as Delhi or the nearby states. So, and many of these states, they actually want independence of their own. And which is why, and even when at present, Bangladesh and India has a very strong tie because of the historical reasons, the present Prime Minister, he, when his whole family was killed, for six years, he actually lived under the Indian protection. So it is considered that she would probably never go against the interest of India. But when anti-Indian sentiment comes with a new political party, there is always threat that this part of India would be very much tumultus, there will be terrorism, and many of the terrorist leaders

many of the nationalist leaders of those parties, they actually, I mean, they used to operate from Bangladesh. And one famous incident that I can say, that in 2004, 10 trucks, 10 truck load of, most advanced military weapons were passing towards Bangladesh, but it was a fluke that it was caught, so it became a huge case. So I mean, it can be a huge trouble for India. So this particular issue can actually can be brought in the negotiation table by saying that well, we would provide you full support with safety and security of your the Seven Sisters part in exchange. Maybe we can discuss about the sharing of the water treaty. So this is a one bargaining chip which I think can be exported. I try to see that to check the literature, but so far I haven't seen that Bangladesh has went through that path. And another chip can be, there are some articles from the Indian sides. They actually claim that the Bengal, Bengal means the West Bengal, they need Tista and the Tista, we have a barrage in Tista, we have a dam in Tista, and still there has been many talks but so far there has been no treaty. So I mean, although we are speaking about the advancement of Ganges Treaty, the abrog, the upgradation of Ganges treaty, maybe the Tista River Treaty, Bangladesh actually can think of, discussing with Ida Ida, whether they can bring this Tista River Treaty with them as well. Tista is very sensitive because Tistha is actually, it has originated in Sikkim, which is very close to China, and this is the Tista river, especially for which the Chinese

the Chinese actually offered Bangladesh a technical support to bring further dams and by doing that, changing the course of the river. So it became a very serious issue between Bangladesh and India and the diplomatic talks are still going on. So these are actually the steps that we can think of using as the bargaining chief so that a new joint commission can be made and the things like climate change and other problems which was not considered in 1996 can be considered now because in 30, 35 years, in 30, almost 30 years, the technology has changed, the GPS has come and many other, the scientific scenario has changed. So maybe by bringing all these things together, a better solution can be said. And before I finish with all the criticisms, I would actually, I would actually again say that, which I feel and I also read from the Ahmed's article, that this this Ganges Water Treaty is probably it is not perfect. It is definitely not perfect, but if it was not there, the situation for both the countries would probably worse. So the treaty should be there and we should try our best to, we have four years, maybe we can try our best to think of the advancement of the treaty, the, and also addressing the, addressing the limitations that we are currently facing. Thank you very much. If you have any comments and if you have any questions

I'd like to answer them. Thank you. Thank you. Omar Shook for the nice presentation. So now I'd like to ask others to make comments like Aaron and Jima. Do you have any comments or feedback? Thank you for a really great presentation. I learned a lot. I really appreciated how much sort of geographic and geopolitical context you brought in. I thought that was really helpful. And I really liked the sort of back third of your presentation where you really kind of got through all of the water diplomacy framework elements. So yeah, great job. I think my feedback as you're thinking about writing your paper would be, there's, I was a little confused at times about sort of how the treaty has failed to be implemented, thinking about like, most, most specifically around like how neither country is able to receive their respective shares it was stipulated in the treaty is that technical problem is that a diplomatic problem. I think you could maybe identify like where the specific sort of limitations or weaknesses of the treaty are in terms of how that actually is sort of manifested on the ground. So that's one thing that keep in mind. Yeah, I don't know if you could talk about that at all. Like are there sort of technical flaws or political flaws that might be sort of fault to understand. Well, the technical flaws, I actually accept my limitation. I'm not really a technical guy. I tried to read some technical papers. And I actually read one of Professor Onimation's paper, which gave me some insight. So the one technical paper that I read

they said that in last two decades, almost last two decades, very few, very few, I mean, very few papers or very few research has been done to actually try to quantify, the quantify the amount of water that has been there. One of the reasons was there, but initially the historical data was not there. For example, in first five years, probably, I mean, first one or two years, the type of precision that you need to get that what is going to happen through the history. Now that we have it, fortunately, because it has been quite long, so the research has already started. So maybe I will try to put that. And the diplomatic problems that we're saying that, one major problem that I can say, I mean, since this is an, I would never say this outside the classroom, that for example, US, it has a national policy. The government changes, but the policy, the main theme of the policy remains, maybe some sides changes, but if you have to change the main theme of the policy, for example, US has a defense policy, right? US is a defense policy, that we would do this, who's do that. How we would do that, maybe that can be discussed. And maybe different governments can do it in a different way. So in India, of course, Indian democracy is not as strong as the US or the UK, but in India, in some basic factors, for example, the defense or whether they would share this or that, they also have some sort of policy. They also have some sort of strict policy that even though the political government changes

this doesn't change much. And they strongly uphold the Constitution. And one of the reasons is that there has not been in the history of India more than 60 years, from 47 to 2021, more than 60 years. No military takeover was there and because of India is so huge, military takeover is actually not very much feasible. But in Bangladesh, it's a country 50 years of age. Out of 50 years, more than 15 years there were military governments, and I would be very blunt here. At present, we are also have some sort of autocratic government and the system has become such that, I mean, it is very tough for Bangladesh to come out from this political. So when you speak of diplomacy, we have some wonderful diplomats, really well-trained diplomats, but the decision actually comes from the politicians. I would not blame them. They definitely have their point of view, but due to this lack of a political culture of having a straight aim, I mean, it is like, I mean, total one government comes comes. So for the five or ten years, one policy was going. The government changes, it goes backwards. So it's zigzag, zigzag. So I mean, it is an issue, but thank you very much for the input because I would try to address these things. Specifically, maybe I wouldn't be speaking too much about diplomacy because I work for the government and they read those papers. But the technical part

maybe I will seek help from Larry and Professor Gain to include more the technical parts in my paper. Thank you very much. I'm Mushroof. I also echoed I learned a huge amount of your presentation. The question I have, and perhaps you addressed this somewhat, but I like to speak more to it, maybe I missed it, but is it does the current, does the current treaty have, like, how does it manage water measurement and the processes for actually determining how much water there is at the times of year and how much water there is over time? Because you've talked about the ways in which the amount of water has changed, partially as a result of droughts and the different piece of infrastructure that have been built. But I'm interested in what, if there's any ongoing collaboration or shared effort, or even individual kind of national efforts to quantify how the water, both quantity and quality is changing over time? Well, I do not know very details of the technicalities, but I can give you some very basics which is there on the treaty. So the geography of the two regions is more or less same, and the West Bengal and Bangladesh. So although we are speaking of India, India is a very big country, right? So 28 states, but ultimately Bangladesh and Bangladesh shares with West Bengal. From where this, the Ganges River comes. So I mean, by studying the, by studying Bangladesh or by studying West Bengal, a very basic idea actually can be found. For example, the dry season in Bangladesh from January to May

it is same in West Bengal. And the West season in Bangladesh, which falls up to December, so from July to December, that is also that is also same in both the parties. So the joint committee, they probably use some hydraulic models to to actually set the amount of water. For example, it is 70,000 cubics. The basic standard is the first one is if if there is 70,000 cubic seconds, QSEC, the unit is QSAC is there, both the countries will share 50%, 50%, so thi thi thousand QSAC is there, both the countries will share 50%, 50, 50%. So this is how they have made. And from 70 to 75, so there would be, the balance ratio would be for India and Bangladesh would get a minimum 34,000 QSACs. And if it's 75 to 75 and above, then the same kind of ratio is there. So this much ongoing, is there, for example, you mentioned that there have been years in which neither side has gotten the amounts is allocated. Have there have there been any ongoing efforts to, you know, if there's under 70,000 to quantify how much is flowing? And yes, I think that Bangladesh, we have an agency, Bangladesh, England Water Authority, we have Bangladesh Water Development Board. So they actually conduct some scientific studies. And based on those, I would be honest with you that those, the government organizations, I mean, for example, the scientists, scientists who have that sort of expertise, the Bangladesh

those organizations are not really the most lucrative jobs for them. So we do what we can and sometimes we bring foreign consultants and with those some studies are made and based on that actually this sort of distributions are made. But then again, there are flaws in this. I think in terms of measurement, the Joint River Commission is so there is joint collaboration between India and Bangladesh, the Joint River Commission is responsible for measuring the things. So in terms of theory, both the Indian side, there is a Joint River Commission and in the Bangladesh side, there is Joint River Commission. So both parties, in terms of theoretically, they measure and in terms of dry season prior, they measure the flow and they agree on that. So I think in terms of agreement, they do have this kind of things. But in reality, this kind of collaboration, although they exist, but this kind of enforcement is they rely only on the Indian side that maybe they don't regularly go to the Faraka point to measure the things but they I think the the way that Indian Joint River Commission communicate to the Bangladesh Joint River Commission they agree onthat kind of measurement. So that's the idea. I was actually looking for some articles whether the the State Water Department, I'm not sure that whether the Indian states have separate water departments or not or whether it's a federal, I'm not sure. So I try to find whether there is any collaboration between not only the state level but also the not only the federal level but also the state

the West Bengal state and Bangladesh, but probably I, I probably I, I, I, I, I, I didn't find it in such a collaboration. So is there any other feedback that you would like to being like Councilmore, um, uh, as fine. Well, Mashro, congratulations on your presentation. I learned a lot from you today. Thank you. Especially the visual was very rich, your presentation. I just have one quick suggestion because you said that you are not going to mention a lot about the diplomacy because you are part of the governor. But when you read the Larry's book, specifically the page 133, 133, he mentioned about that water manager and the stakeholder can approach to the conflict using the traditional way or they can use the non-zero sum approach. And I think that's very interesting if you can include in your final paper. Yeah. Specifically when they talk about the water management that's falling two categories. A high authority can enforce a decision or the other parties themselves can negotiate a settlement that formal authority helped to implement. I think this chapter is very interesting for your presentation. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. I'll look into better. I'll try to incorporate. You have page one, 32, 33. Thank you very much. Yes. Yeah

Ladi. Thanks for the presentation. I'm hoping that you can synthesize the diplomacy discussion in the final version of the paper and it would be wonderful if you had a one-page introduction to your discussion about diplomacy that highlighted two or three ideas about what's new or different with regard to diplomacy that could be tried, that hasn't been tried, without going into all the explanation in this summary of how this would be done, but to just highlight, you're talking about bargaining chips, you're talking about linking other issues, it's a lot. Pick two or three things that you want to suggest that are new and say, I think the focus should shift to involving all of the states and not just the national governments. Okay, if that's, if that's one of your proposals, then state that as a, as a, a new emphasis that should, that might change the whole story. If you think, as Aaron was implying

that a new approach to joint measurement would provide timely and believable information in a different way and that with that information new joint management under different sets of circumstances would be improved even if the treaty isn't changed then say that but not more than two or three ideas that could be expressed in a couple of sentences as the contribution to your discussion about diplomacy. Because otherwise it's too much. Okay. It's impossible to follow all the different lines of diplomacy that are implied by the different maps and the different bargaining chips and the different relationships and what might be done and it's just too much. Just choose two, no more than three, but even those two ideas about changed diplomacy and highlight those, okay? I know that you have lots of other stuff. I think for the paper, the power of the paper will be improved if you zero in on just a couple of ideas about changes in the diplomacy going forward that haven't been given enough or the right attention in the past. Professor, in that case, maybe I will try to speak about the, I mean, one point that I said, maybe instead of three or two, I will just focus on one. That is the bargaining chips, the alternate bargaining chips. Maybe I can choose just this one and go deeper on that. What do you think? I think that there are different bargaining chips that are more or less attractive to one country or another, and that instead of saying bargaining chips is one thing, I would specify the bargaining chip. Pick one bargaining chip. Which ones

which I mean, I thought the idea that you have all these states, they're not happy with their own national government. It's possible that a negotiation involving those states could change what gets talked about and shift the balance of power and provide an opportunity for a sub-regional piece of the treaty to go ahead. So that's about bargaining chips, but it's about the involvement of subnational units on the India side and why their involvement could make a difference. So I'm really saying, don't just talk about things at the level of bargaining chips. It's too broad. Pick a couple of bargaining ships that you think are most promising and say who should do what with this new bargaining chip that might lead to either a new treaty or better administration of the existing treaty or a completely different kind of treaty. I mean, not keep the one you have and in addition, adopt maybe a new treaty about this additional river. Maybe that's what opens things, but take specific bargaining chips and make them into your recommendations, okay? Okay, so thank you. Yeah, so in a line with Larry's succession, so my succession would be, so you mentioned only the state versus state diplomacy, but you know the India's order resource responsibility is given to the state, I mean not federal state. So most, mass of the water power is given to the state. I mean

West Bengal state has the power for managing water resources in the West Bengal. So the central government cannot intervene anything regarding the decision of the West Bengal water resources issues. So in that case, one of the key stakeholders would be the West Bengal. And I mean, you know the how the, this the water treaty didn't work, although the central government was agreed with the Bangladesh government, but because of the West Bengal government, it didn't happen. So I think this, as Larry mentioned, if we can incorporate, you can incorporate the state as a stakeholders, maybe that can also important. And I think that is essential, not important, because without a state, you cannot negotiate with the central government. So this is on point and in terms of identifying issues, already if you ask some of the people's key peoples, they need to be easier for you. So you already identified several cases. One of the issues is the, is Bangladesh is concerned regarding the climate sense and its impact on the future river flow. And so this is one of the key aspects, but also other aspect for the Musolgan. You already mentioned the incorporating how the seven sisters and the transit where Bangladesh can help achieving this, this, yeah, the new water treaty that incorporates the future ensuring future river flow. But also, you know, the last few years, there was a discussion for developing a barriers in the Ganges within the Bangladesh part

which India denied and with India opposed and that plan has been hard deep sea base the deep sea berries in the Oh, the village. Yeah, the fresh order flow. Barriers in the Bangladesh to a store of fresh order for for southwest part of the Bangladesh. So this kind of option, creation can be helpful for treaty negotiations. So I believe if you can ask some of the people that I already mentioned to you, if you interview them, I think you can have more, much more insight. But for the paper, you might not consider them given the time limit, but there's Larry mentioned if you consider only two or three specific point that can be helpful for incorporating. So one could be the climate sense, other could be the engaging as stakeholders like a state level stakeholders and interacting with the seven sister state for the transit and how this can help treaty negotiation. So this kind of this specific aspects you can consider. Thank you very much.

So. So, today we are going to talk about the evolution of water resources management and at the end of the class you will be able to describe paradigm shift and evolution of water resources management in general. But also you can critically evaluate the importance of IWRM for water diplomacy and also water energy food nexus and its relation with water diplomacy and also importance of water diplomacy for SCE being sustainable development goals. Today's talk is regarding a new process, recent a process of order resources management and sustainable development goals and its relation with water diplomacy. In this figure, I try to summarize from taken from this references how the water resource management has evolved throughout the time. It has four metrics. You can see that from the centralized management to decentralized management in the vertical axis. And from centralized management, it means a centralized form of governance, where a stakeholder engagement and participation is the possibility of stakeholder engagement is very low. But when it moves to the decentralized form of governance, it can include stakeholder engagement from local peoples and local participations. And in the horizontal axis, you can see from the supply side management to the demand side management. In the left upper corner, this is the traditional development of water resources management, not only water resources management

any development started from this side. So it's highly centralized and supply side approach. So this is the first development pattern of water resources. So for example, in this case, only option is to invest how to create dams, construction, reservoirs. So this is the only consideration for the water resources management. And it considered only engineering based approach and it's very technocratic approach without considering societal aspects or economic aspects. Mainly how to make the development and how the development pattern is started and how the engineering structures can can help to make the development effective. So this is the only only consideration in this phase. And then so this is the position of A in the left left and side upper corner. And, but slowly, it moves from A to B. And in that case, the, from investment oriented decision, it moves it takes consideration of the societal issues slowly. And then, so initial management paradigm considers mainly engineers, hydrologists and technocrats, but slowly they can understand that this may create, this can create consequences to the society and they can try to understand the demand of the local people slowly and so they try to incorporate the, they try to realize that order is not only the, what is not only the development pattern or supply side management, it needs to consider also societal and economic aspect and thus demand side options started and demand side management started. And then slowly it moves to the C and in that case, institutional reformation start, for example

decentralized form of governance institution and yeah, so the from engineering based structure of the management paradigms more shift towards different disciplinary bodies in the management body, but also local engagement can also take place. So this is the overall broader evolution of the water resources management happens internationally and also many countries. So here I can give an example, how it happens in Bangladesh because I know this context of Bangladesh water resources management, how it happens throughout the time. So I can also explain the graph that I have shown and what happens practically in Bangladesh case. So before 1947, Bangladesh was a part of the British colony. And during that time, there was no embankment to protect flooding in Bangladesh. So in that time, local people manage the embankment during the dry season to grow the crops. And in that case, landlords, the British emperor provide ownership to the landlord to manage a specific area of land and through engaging local farmers, the landlords was responsible for managing flood protection embankments only during the dry season for growing crops. But during rainy season, that embankment was vanished because of the rainfall and the river water could enter into the floodplain and it helps sedimentation and it increases the, yeah, so land formation was happening during that time because sediment could come into the floodplain. And so this was kind of natural process was maintained during that period. But after 1947

the British colony ended and there was no institution like the landlord management territory was not there. And since then, this part of land was part of Indian estate. So it was, so India and Pakistan was divided and Bangladesh was part of the East Pakistan during that time. And so during that time, there was no responsible authority to managing the embankment or flood plan. And during that time in 1954 and 55, there was a major flood events. And after that flood events, flood protection embankments was constructed in 1960s. And you see during that, we were heavy engineering works started. And in that case, the embankment protects the flooding from the river, but also it helps initially the agricultural production highly. But slowly after few years, you know, this is, this river carries huge amount of sediment and that's sediment deposited in the flat plane and that makes the land formation in the flat plane. But due to the embankment, this process was was not taken place due to the construction of the embankment. And then the sedimentation was happening in the riverbed, a riverbed instead of the flood plain. So the floodplain, the land formation was not happening in the floodplain, but those sediment was deposited in the riverbed and that increased the reverber and it reduces the navigability. At the same time, the internal water logging started. So in 1980s

this whole area of floodplain becomes water logged and permanent flooding was happening because of this construction of embankments. So you see how the consequence started from the supply side approach without considering only the narrow focus of the supply side process. So initially it helps improving the agricultural production, but in the long run, it created a disaster to the local people. So local people understood this process and they really understood what is happening there. So going against the government, they try to cut the embankment and bring the river water inside the floodplain. And process they called is tidal river management in 1990s. So they try to implement this process going against government process and they try to implement locally with self-organizing capacity and they implemented in one flat plane and they were successful and after two years they were able to see the major impact like navigability of in the riverbed is increased and also the floodplain, the sedimentation was happening in the floodplain. So then the government could also see the positive benefits. So then they try to institutionalize these approves in the government approach. So you can see how the transformation or evolution happened in this context. Similar explanation that I just gave in the previous slide

just to show how the evolution was happening. I also try to explain how paradigm shift in water resources management happened through the literature provided by Claudia Paul Bossum. She's one of the experts on adaptive water resources management or integrated auto resources management. And so in her work, she tried to categorize or explain different dimensions of order resources management from control, command and control approach to the integrated approach. So in the governance dimensions that the measure paradigm shift has been from centralized form of governance to the to the police-centric form of governance, incorporates both integration of top-down and bottom-up approach. And also in terms of sectoral integration, in the case of command and control approach, in that case, the sectoral integration was not possible and it gives policy conflicts, but in the integrated form, integrated and adaptive form of management, the cross-sectoral integration is possible and that also integrates policy implementation. So in the case of scale of analysis and operations, this trans boundary problems emerge when reverse sub-basins are exclusive scale of analysis and management. But in the integrated form of governance, the trans boundary issues address by multiple scale of analysis and management. And in the case of information management, understanding fragmented by gaps and lack of integration of appropriate or proprietary information sources, but in the case of integrated form of governance

this comprehensive understanding achieved by open shared information sources that feel gaps and facilitate integration. And there are also three other dimensions. So as infrastructure, you can see that in the first cases, only the command and control approach massive centralized infrastructure design and engineering-based structure is dominant. But in the case of integrative and adaptive order resource management, this incorporates combination of centralized and diverse source of design and power delivery is very important. And in terms of financial and risk management, this case is only structural protection and its risks are considered, but in the case of integrative management, diversified financial resources are considered for by considering broad set of private and public financial instruments. And important aspect is dealing with uncertainty. In the case of command and control approach, it is considered that uncertainty is considered as undesirable sign of incomplete knowledge. So they don't know what will happen and how to manage the uncertainty. And this will create major problem, but adaptive and integrative management, the irreducible uncertainties are acceptable and the adaptive approach are taken, how to deal with the future uncertain outcomes by considering different scenarios. For example, different perspectives of explicit, different perspectives are explicitly acknowledged. So here you can see differentiation

difference between the two approaches from command and control to the integrative approach. So now we would like to introduce one of the major paradigm shift and major dominant paradigm of water resources management, which is integrated water resources management. And of course, this falls in the right-hand side, the characteristics that I have shown here. So integrative and integrated water resources management. Integrated water resources management is not new, although the internationalists conceptualized recently in the twenteenth century and at the end of 20th century is introduced in the international arena, but there are ancient practices that incorporates the integrated, the major dimensions of integrated water resources management has been considered. For example, in 9th century, suburb irrigation system in Bali is one of the ancient irrigation practices which practiced this integrated water resources management. Of course, without knowing the concept, but they try to incorporate the integration, self-organization for managing the Bali irrigation systems through ancient practices. Here I wanted to share a video, very short video, but you can find interesting how they were able to manage this subacrigation system in the Balinese agricultural practices. So let me share this. You can see how self-organization and cooperative management of cooperative water management has taken place since that ancient time. And not only the Sobak system

but also there are other historical practices that incorporates this integrated form of resource management practices. Another water resource management practices in Valencia, Spain, the Monte Stakeholder Participatory Water Tribunal have operated at least since 10th century. But also, the modern form of integrated water resources management was influenced mainly by Tenezza Valley Authority created in 1933 to holistically manage water resources. So I don't know whether you are familiar with the Teneze Valley Authority. Did some of you are familiar with this? Larry, do you know, I know some information, but probably you know better than me regarding the TVA form of management approach? Well, TBA wasn't just set up as a water management body. The Tennessee Valley Authority had enormous scope of development, power, and responsibility. And one of the few times in the United States where there was development across a large region, more than just a city or a metropolitan area. This covered much more of an area and it attempted to give public management to infrastructure at a scale that the United States wasn't used to. And it, as you point out, it was credited with being a planning mechanism. But given how anti-planning the United States has always been, I think it's more helpful to think about it as a development mechanism. And we had, and still have, but we had then lagging regions in terms of economic development. And the strategy was, let's make a massive investment in a lagging region. Let's have all of the infrastructure

roads that connect it to other places, water that it needs, electricity or hydropower that it needs. Let's have all of the infrastructure done simultaneously and let's invest government funding at a large enough scale that it would then promote subsequent private investment and make it a sustainable place but with a much larger role for government managed infrastructure that never took off as an idea. We don't see other regions of the United States where lagging areas were targeted by an economic development strategy that said let's have a massive public investment in all of the infrastructure, job creation, training, and let's not worry about state and local government, and let's do it at a scale that turns around a lagging region because smaller scale efforts to turn around lagging regions don't work. So the way to understand the TVA story, and there are many books written about TVA, sort of longing for a regional, publicly managed, massive infrastructure project that would stimulate the economy in a way that wouldn't happen otherwise. Yeah, yeah, so yeah, also in the IWRM literature globally, this TBA approach is highly acknowledged and it says that the TBL-like approach must room all over the world for developing, mainly agricultural development in the developing countries. So that culture has been practiced is also in other places and the regional development plan through incorporating, for example, power generation, flood control, and how this integration happens. And also the concept

integration of multiple sectors in the IWRM also came from this TBI-like approach that is mentioned in the IWRM literature. Yeah, so before going to IWRM principles, maybe we can have a participatory discussion here. Why IWRM is important for water diplomacy in your opinion. I wanted to make it a breakout group, but as we are only five people, so maybe we can discuss why in your opinion. Also, there was a memo question on this, so maybe we can discuss here, discuss here why IWRM is important for water diplomacy. Well, I guess first, do you think it is? What is it about integrated management of water resources that makes it an important element of dealing with transboundary waters? This is a little bit of low-hanging fruit, but one of the readings observed that it's the dominant paradigm for water management globally, so it sort of is therefore important to diplomacy. But I think one of the other things that stood out to me, and I wrote a little bit about this in my memo is just sort of efforts to move beyond diplomatic silos. There was a example in the loop at all piece that like really stood out to me about biofuels and how like the development of biofuels sort of subsequently catalyzed or exacerbated existing problems with water and food scarcity. So the need for like a more integration

a more integrated management approach felt sort of urgent and necessary as we as we move towards perhaps greater scarcity in certain water systems. But how would that work or theoretically how might that work in context in which we do have siloed entities responsible for things like water. And if you say, well, integrated management is the key to managing water in the future so that you can connect water with energy, with food, with land, but that's not how those entities are set up. Right. Yeah. Isn't aren't we basically setting up systems to fail if we say that they have to be integrated in order to do water management when we know that they're not, therefore what are we hoping for? That was a good question. I don't know if I have an immediate answer. I'll think about that though. I'm not sure there's a right answer. It seems to me that from a planning perspective, urban regional planning perspective, not a water perspective, there's always an argument for centuries that the way to plan cities effectively is to start with a clean, empty area and have a designer make a comprehensive

integrated plan so that the land is used efficiently so that all the uses are appropriately laid out and separate from each other when that's appropriate and that you don't have to have holes in the plan where there's private ownership or other things that happen and you don't have to worry over time because you just started building in one corner and by the time it was done it was just a giant pattern that's of uncontrolled development. The idea has always been that you should plan whole cities in a comprehensive way. To me, IWRM has some of the same resonance. Okay? Now, we know in real life, there are very, very few planned cities where the whole city was laid out and all of its evolution was guided by or controlled by the original plan. And it's very hard to have in a democratic context and one in which this private land ownership, continuity with a single plan. And even in some parts of the world where historically there were efforts to plan whole new capitals, whole new cities, where they brought in a famous architect who made a beautiful plan for the whole place. Over decades, the place changes from what the original design was for all kinds of reasons, not the least of which people want to have choice about what things are going to look like and what it can do with what their land is and what say they have in a democratic context. So just for purposes of pursuing further, the question that I ask you, J Gemma, is do you imagine that people in a democratic context can live and work and build in a way that's comprehensive, integrated

and planned when all the forces of democracy, privatization, individuality, and all the unexpected things that happen organically pull in the opposite direction. I mean, I think I have to say yes, but that's sort of my prerogative as a first semester urban planning student. Like, if you, I've already given up on the field, then it may be too late for me. Um, I think the some healthy skepticism isn't uncalled for, I guess. I mean, it's, I don't know. I guess it's what is sort of resonant about IWRM and like the water nexus approach and like sort of science policy interfaces more broadly is the kind of potential to reimagine existing diplomatic regimes, but I don't know whether that actually will work in practice. So maybe it's just an intellectual exercise, but I think it's a useful intellectual exercise. Well, it's only useful if it inspires something in practice that can be done, right? It's not useful if it alludes to something in theory that can't be done in practice and everybody's just thwarted and can't achieve what they're supposed to or the ideal. And just to loop back around again to urban planning, nobody in urban planning teaches about comprehensive, planned cities anymore except as an intriguing historical artifact. Nobody would imagine that you would build a place according to a plan at time one and expect at time two a decade, two decades, a century later

that the place is going to have anything to do with what that original plan was. And yet they still think there's planning going on. The planning is about the process of adaptation. Yeah. The planning is to create the institutions to be able to modify what you're doing collectively. So it's still planning. It's not planning it to achieve a preordained comprehensive idea. And I would argue in the water realm we ought to be worried about IWRM as an ideal because it presumes there are institutions with the authority, the power, with the knowledge to integrate across all of these multiple dimensions in spite of the fact that we have created the silos that you alluded to and that there are contending interests trying to pursue and maximize different outcomes for from their standpoint that are good from their standpoint. So for the reasons I worry about comprehensive planning, I worry about IWRM. So any other thoughts regarding IWRM? I think something related to what we were just talking about is like the interesting fact that in some ways the IWRM is like very broad but then in other ways a lot of people criticize it for not being broad enough, saying that like the adaptive water management system, like needs to replace or augment the IWRM because that is moving toward that like can we not only create water management

but can we make sure that this water management system is also going to be adaptable to the future because we have to assume that it's not constant when we look at these extreme weather patterns or like changes in the nature of a conflict, some of these IWRM like management scenarios are just not like actively trying to adapt and become better to adjust to these changes. So in a lot of ways people are saying like, oh, the IWRM's not enough, like what about the nexus? What about this like adaptive water management system? And so like in my memo I talked a lot about how, I think one of the readings tried to analyze whether or not like you could replace the IWRM and I thought it was really interesting that they touched on like the social value of the IWRM like it's taken a long time to be adopted because like a lot of the water policy water diplomacy sector is like if well respected water diplomats use a certain water management system then like it's more likely to be used somewhere else, not just, I guess, like how some business models or other like sectors might transfer a certain system. So I just think that the IWRM's value, the fact that it is water-centric is like, I think very, like a strength of the IWRM, and then the fact that in the nexus, water is not considered more valuable or important than these other like sectors that you're considering in the nexus

whether or not it's like the food water energy nexus where like every sector needs to be treated equally. I think like the fact that the IWRM puts the water like as the most important entity even though it is maybe creating some boundaries that the nexus wants to like get rid of, I think it's still really valuable because if you like get too broad, it's hard to make any progress, but maybe I've misinterpreted. I don't know. It seems like the future needs to be like more understanding and expansive and multi-centric, but also like how do we make progress if we can't get all those people to sit at the table and make an agreement in any regard. Yeah, I think in terms of the the aspect, of course, the IWRM is very interesting, but in terms of practice, this is the main limitations that to implement this theoretical framework in practice, this is highly criticized and this implementation through following the actual process of the framework. I haven't done, I haven't seen any studies that really went through the IWRM implementation. So that is the main challenging thing that the implementation of IWRM is very difficult and is one of the unassived goal of the IWRM. That's the main criticism. But in terms of the theoretical contribution that has been done, I think is highly valuable at the broader level. But for implementing, it needs kind of, yeah, some kind of implementation oriented approach. That's how I see. So, yeah. Any thought at the on? In practice, I guess, I mean, in practice

I guess you would hope that negotiators would have enough or be able to bring enough, I mean, this is obviously very dependent on what the kind of initiating circumstances are of any negotiation, but have enough flexibility to draw upon kind of various frameworks as they, as needed and as beneficial to a specific dispute, whether or not, you know, they call it IWRM or not, you know, the limitations of the IWRM, or not, you know, the limitations of the IWRM, whether it's in terms of scale or in terms of kind of what's not included because of its water-centric focus, like, can be supplemented by drawing off some of the other nexus, some of the next approaches as, you know, the others have said already that if you kind of in the process of negotiating a dispute, you ideally should be able to kind of pick and choose to an extent and not not be totally didactic about about how you apply these frameworks. I mean, I guess I don't know how you analyze it then if you're looking at it so ballistically, but it's hard for me to imagine any one framework being able to wholly encompass kind of all the possibilities of a water dispute. I think starting with a dispute is going to get you into a corner you don't need to be in. Start with the fact that you need to manage water. There's not a dispute. You just, you have water and you have competing demands and you have competing interests and you have to manage the water. Okay, what would be a good way to manage the water? To involve entities with broad authority or multiple authorities or narrow, just water

to involve only the most expert people to make the decisions or to engage the stakeholders affected by the decisions so there's support for whatever the decision is to go ahead with. Would it make more sense to look just narrowly at the water that you have responsibility for because you're within a political boundary? Or would it make more sense to look at the water system moving underground or above ground that affects the water that you have responsibility for? Because the answers to those three kinds of questions almost always lead to people saying broader, linked, more comprehensive, more participatory, more completely engaged, because it seems like a better way to manage water. Now, assume there's a dispute within that water management system, how would you expect it to be resolved? Well, if you had pulled in all of those actors and all of those interests and all of that knowledge and all of that authority to manage the water and there was a dispute within that, you'd probably have to engage all of those same elements in sorting out a dispute that emerged. It would be hard to say, oh, there's a dispute. Now, all of you were involved in the planning of this and the management of this, go away, and the three of us will solve this. It's not going to happen. So IWRM isn't a dispute resolution mechanism. IWRM isn't an approach to water management. And when disputes come up, it's all tangled up in the dispute resolution process because of what it took to do IWRM as the planning, as the management scheme. It's never

it was never meant to be a dispute resolution strategy or mechanism, but it's tangled up with efforts at dispute resolution because it's kind of hard to shrink any of the dimensions, the parties, the interests, the scope of the problem, the institutional powers for purposes of resolving a dispute that's come up within the IWRM process. Are there models, I mean, could you, could you differentiate and say the, you know, the initial, as you said, any, you know, anyone who thinks through the three questions you asked is going to move out and say, you know, broader, more inclusive, greater scope for this. Could you differentiate and say, okay, the initial water management consider, like, you know, negotiations will kind of exist on this macro level and incorporate kind of many different kind of facets of of the economy and kind of secondary tertiary effects of water management. But then you say after that, you basically incorporate dispute resolution processes that are hyperlocal that are specific specific to kind of the area where the resolution or where the dispute is taking place and don't require, you know, completely remapping all of the old terra. That historically, that's what the law and regulation have in fact done. Gotcha. Right? We have a system of water rights that has nothing to do with IWRM. I'm just take California or take Western United States. IWRM, you plan that water in a certain way, but you can't in a system that's defined senior water rights where people who got there first, got the water

and then nobody can tell them what to do with it and they can waste it they can do anything they want. It's completely contrary to the ideas of IWRM and until relatively recently the whole water law around the world is not connected to water management. The rules of water law come down almost in the way Aaron you're describing. It's just how can I localize this and situated in the way we deal with other property rights? And that's how we'll handle the dispute. But it doesn't fit with what we imagine is the broader scope and the need to take account of more interests and the desire to look at the interconnectedness of things and the need to look ahead, not back at who had what rights, but forward in terms of who has what needs. And yet we're stuck with it. So again, IWRM is a water management approach. It's easy to see how it evolved. And it seems perfectly logical. And it doesn't offer an obvious or easy way of handling disputes over water within systems that are managed by IWRM. And if you just try to solve this water disputes in a purely legal fashion that determines who has what senior rights and hey, that's it, it's property. But that doesn't take account of water as a shared human resource or as a human right. And now how do we solve disputes over the allocation of water? We can't use the property rights law. we need something else. Yeah, that makes sense. And Amish, how do you react to what I just said? Yeah, I, so in terms of a relation with IWRM and water diplomacy, I see that IWRM says, according to IWRM principle or dimensions

water should be managed in a trans boundary or watershed or ecological boundary. So in that case, I can see the relation with the IWRM and water diplomacy because when I say that water should be managed in a watershed or trans boundary scale, that means it definitely crosses boundary of ecological boundary with the political boundary. And it can immediately create institutional mismatch. And that can be managed through water diplomacy approach. So that's how I can see a relation with IWRM. So I can see auto diplomacy can be useful for the difficulties that have IWRM implementation can be somehow implemented through incorporating water diplomacy, of course. That's how I feel the relation of IWRM and order diplomacy. Do you want to go to your next slide and look at the principles of IWRM explicitly in light of the general discussion we've had. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, so these are just a historical perspective of IWRM. So according to, so it just started from the UN conference on Water in Marth del Plata in 1977, then in 1992 Dublin conference. This is the main building block for developing the IWRM principles. And in this conference, these four principles has been considered. So the principle number one is the fresh order is finite and vulnerable resources, essential to sustain life

development and the environment. So here you can compare the thinking of the water diplomacy. So it's completely opposite of the thinking of the Dublin principle where outer diplomacy framework considered water is the flexible resource instead of finite and vulnerable resource. So how the conflicting situation can be, yeah, can be considered as the cooperative thinking. That can be a major shift of thinking in terms of principles of IWRM and water diplomacy. So in terms of principle number two, water diplomacy and management should be based on a participatory approach involving users, planners and policy makers at all levels. And another important principle is the women should be a part of the decision-making process like provision, management and safeguarding of water, specifically considering the role of women in the developing country, how they are involved, closely involved with the water resource management and services of the water resources. And the fourth and final principle is that water has an economic value in all its components recognized as an economic resource. So these are the four principles of Dublin Conference in 1992. And then another event where IWRM was first established is second World Order from a Mysterial Conference in the Hague, where I was considered the equity criteria along with subsidiary subsidies to poor. This is also considered as a principle of IWRM. And then it is declared in the International Conference on Freshwater in Bonn, 2001, and then World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002. So now

based on this principles, IWRM has been, as you can see, from the Global Order Partnership definition, that IWRM is considered as a process which promotes the coordinated development and management of water, land and related resources. In order to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner and without compromising the sustainability of the vital ecosystems. So it incorporates theoretically multiple aspects like it is considered as a planning process as Larry already mentioned and it incorporates the coordinated development like TBA kind of development pattern which incorporates not only water resources, but also water and related resources that are linked with water can be managed together for maximizing the economic and social welfare with an equity basis of considering the sustainability of the ecosystems. So that is the broader definition of IWRM. And probably you have reading this criticism by Osithbusus, and where he mainly criticized the vague definition of integration, what issues needs to be integrated, and how it can be a process. And so in terms of operational point of view, he identified this vagueness. And in terms of theory, it's fine, but in terms of implementation, how this can be applied in a given context, this is completely vague. That's what his message is broadly regarding IWRM. So we try to identify main dimensions of IWRM. So these are the dimensions that in our studies that we try to identify. So first

our dimension is integrated management. And the second dimension is the river basin or watershed should be the special scale for managing water resources. And water governance or institutional mechanism for governing water is very important and involving stakeholders and public participations is also one of the key dimensions of IWRM and consideration of water as an economic good is an important consideration of IWRM and also ensuring gender equity and social, yes, social capital is one of the main dimensions. So these are the seven dimensions of the IWRM. Here I can see as I was mentioning that river basin as a specialist scale and to implement this river basin for water resources management, it certainly creates conflict and for managing that auto diplomacy can play an important role for managing water resources. For integrated management, there are criticisms that needs to be integrated, and that also depends on the specific context and a specific context by engaging stakeholders, what issues needs to be integrated can be decided and can be, yeah, it can be considered in a negotiation table. That can be part of the implementation part of the IWRM through order diplomacy approach. So that's how I consider that for implementing IWRM, the criticism that has in the literature, some of the criticism can be overcome when we consider the water diplomacy approach. That's that's how I see. I don't know. Larry, what would be your opinion on the linkage between IWRM and water diplomacy? Well, I thought your description was very reasonable. I'm

I start with the problems in practice. And maybe that's why I'm less tolerant of some of the fuzziness and some of the ambiguity in IWRM the way it's been written about and the way it emerged. I mean calling water and economic good leads to the notion that you should get the prices right if you want to protect the environment, if you want to protect the water. But as soon as you start talking about getting the prices right, you're assuming water is a commodity. And if you think water should be a right, then the price is not relevant. And thinking of it as an economic good is not helpful. And some of you know, I'm working on the problem of water shutoffs in American cities, where people who can't pay their bill for their water for a month or two have their water shut off. Well, they can't pay their bill because they're out of work. And telling them they have to pay their bill isn't going to make it possible for them to pay their bill. And then the next thing that the water department does is it calls the family services department and says take the children out of that home. There's no water there. It's that's not hygienic. So their kids are taken away. They still can't pay the bill. And then the next thing that happens is the city puts, sells the lien, it's an economic instrument, on the debt. Because the city needs money to pay to maintain the water system. And if people don't pay their bills, it doesn't have the money

it can't maintain the system. So it sells the debt to private moneylenders who then come after the person on our daily basis and saying, not only do you owe us the $900 from the last four months, now the interest rate and we've just increased it to 10% interest. They can't pay the debt, they can't pay the interest. And then after a year, the city says we're going to sell your house. To recoup the amount mounting debt. We have all kinds of cities in the United States where the water authority sells liens and forecloses on homes all because people could pay the fee for water because they lost their job. Now, we have laws that don't allow the electricity company to turn off electricity in the winter if you can't pay your bill, because the presumption is you'll die. But we don't have comparable laws that say you can't shut off people's water. Now during COVID, very interestingly, we have had a moratorium on water shutoffs in some cities because now the presumption is people have a good excuse for being unable to pay their bills. But before, somehow, they didn't have an excuse, like, they lost their job. This is all a function of thinking of water as an economic good. What if we said every residential property gets a certain minimum amount of water that you need to stay alive? It doesn't cost anything. And then all the water above that, you pay a price relative to your ability to pay. Well

we never had in the United States a system of water fees based on ability to pay until last year when Philadelphia passed the first municipal law saying that they wanted to move in a different direction and have people pay for some portion of their water relative to their ability to pay. And you can imagine the legal battle that's now ongoing about whether that's okay or not. But all of that stems from the idea that water is a commodity and we should have to buy and sell it. And Australia, when it saw that it was running out of water, fresh water, and had all terrible forest fires and other difficulties, bought, as a government, all the water rights in one state back from the owners at a prevailing price per hectare. And then it paid back the money by selling back the water rights, but on a different basis to people to try to have greater equity in the availability of water. So it built a whole system based on water as an economic good in order to address a common need where if we thought of water as a natural resource and as a common resource, pricing wouldn't be the focus. And we've tried to make a market out of everything in the Western capitalist countries. And so now we have problems of water being unavailable to different groups of people. And I worry that IWRM is about maximizing water as an economic good. That's one of the seven principles or whatever that you had listed. What is an economic good? And there are several of the principles I understand completely where they came from. But when I look in practice

the problem is we have underinvestment in the capital improvements necessary to get water to people that need it. And there's not a way to solve that through integrated water resource management. That's a political, ethical, moral decision. So a lot of the conflicts, some of which don't rise to the level of a formal conflict because the poor, the disadvantaged, the marginalized, don't have the political cloud to make a fight. But in fact, there's a conflict with very large numbers of people in different parts of the world unable to get adequate water because there's no way to pay the capital cost to build the desolination plant, to build the water movement system to get water from one place to another. So that's what I worry about IWRM causing conflict and not providing a pathway to resolution of conflicts, given some of the principles it includes. Yeah. I had a different perspective to what you just said. For example, if a poor person in my country doesn't have access to clean water, he's like installing a hand pump or something at the cost of $1,000 or something

it's an additional burden to his daily income. What if the state would have provided him a water supply network with a certain pricing and the state had ensured that that water was clean enough to drink like for example I in Pakistan can't drink water directly from tap I'm not sure about drinking water directly from the tap but here in in my residence in Ithaca I drink water directly from tap. So by this I'm saving money from the bottle water and then I'm saving money for installing my own boring system or pumping system. So if the state provided me with clean water with certain price in which they are maintaining the infrastructure, which is lesser than the amount which I am spending back home on bottled water and boring water costs like do well or something like that. Then do you don't think that the approach would be most better, the pricing, water pricing approach would be better in this scenario? You're paying rent in Ithaca that includes water cost. And if you lived in Flint, Michigan, you would be paying not that much different rent, but you couldn't drink the water from the top because it's been allowed to become contaminated. And the city doesn't have the resources to rebuild the whole system. So we've pushed on to individuals the cost of getting water in some cities where we've allowed the water to become contaminated. Maintaining clean water is, I would argue, a common cost, not an individualized cost. While you can go buy water in bottles, we still expect the availability of clean water from the tap

drinkable water that won't kill you, to be a common cost. If it's a common cost, then we should collect taxes from everybody in a progressive way and take care of building the things that are common like clean water system. So I know, I heard the comparison you're making, but I would argue both in Pakistan and in the United States that the responsibility of local government should be to provide drinkable water for people as a capital cost that's a collective cost. And whether that cost is paid for from taxes, which could be collected in a progressive way, or fees, which typically are not collected in a progressive way. They don't look at ability to pay. I think we can have that debate about what's the fair way to collect the money. But once the money is collected, it should be used to get everybody a minimum amount of clean water. That's my argument. Yeah, and I think that also fits with the IWRM principle, like social equity and yeah, so. Yes, and to add to your point that, I mean, it is a IWRM is a collective approach. It's not about governments only. It's about people also, society, societal education. For example, if you're doing, you just said, use the word contamination. Who is doing contamination? We are doing contamination. We are mixing water water with water. We are doing water thefts. We are doing hold to the main water supply line to get more water for ourselves. That is something related to the societal education. If we do not educate people that water should be treated as a precious resource that it should not be contaminated

it's like a joint responsibility, not the responsibility of government only. I agree. I agree. You'll have to excuse me. I'm trying desperately to get the folks planning Glasgow to approach the problem in a different way than they did in Paris. And they have chosen this hour, at least I have a chance to talk to them. I'm not making any progress. This is the third try, but I feel obliged. If they just meet in Glasgow and do again what they did in Paris, we're doomed. And there has to be a different discussion. And there's a group of us who are trying to promote a different global discussion on this question. So I'm going to disappear. But the conversation about IWRM is important because you need, each of you, needs to formulate, to take a stand, to formulate an idea of how you think water should be managed and how you think disputes over the management of water should be resolved. And I don't think either Anamesh or I thinks we know all the answers and I don't think there's only one solution for all places and all times, but we need to be thinking prescriptively. And if the best language we could say is social needs are important, common goods should be taken into account. Water should be managed in a comprehensive fashion. Look at the linkage between water and everything. I don't think that inspires action or policy. I think it's too vague. So I'm pushing you to think in more explicit, prescriptive terms and then to be able to argue for it, for that view. Before you leave

can you just tell me the question you are you're going to address in this meeting? Yes. What should be done before the meeting by the people who will be coming to the meeting while they can still formulate new policy choices? Because once you're at the meeting, all you do is argue about the text that's been sent out, and every 197 delegations have been sent there with very explicit instructions by their country. There's no problem solving that can happen at the meeting. But before the meeting, everyone is busy figuring out what they want everybody else to do. There's no joint planning beforehand that, and it, because it can't be done in an official way. If it's done an official way, then everybody's there reading the script from their country saying everybody else is responsible, this is a problem, that's a problem, nothing can happen. So we're trying to get a different kind of conversation amongst a substantial number of the people who will be at the conference representing their countries into conversations between now and the summer, not in their official capacity, just in terms of problem solving and not just technical, the others as well. But people say, well, how would you decide who participates? And my argument is it doesn't matter. They're not going to decide anything. They're just going to put forward good proposals. Let's just have a diverse group that wants to put forward proposals in the collective interest. Well, where would you have it? When would you have it? I said

it doesn't matter. We do it online. We just need to start work on new proposals of a different kind. And the question that I'm saying that the proposal should be about, what help does your country need to get to net zero by 2030? Not what's your responsibility for cutting stuff. What help do you say you need to get to net zero by 2030? And collect that and look at the differences amongst what countries say they want to need. And then figure out how different countries can help each other work toward that as the goal. 2030 net zero. That's what we have to aim for. But now what we have is how much of the overrun will you agree to accept no matter what it costs you. And the answer is you can't make me do it. That's Paris. And we're going to get it again in Glasgow. So that's what I'm the conversation I'm trying to promote. Forgive me. Yeah. I will see you all next week. So, um, Mastupi wanted to say something. Maybe quickly because we only have an hour left. I have a very small question that is, I agree with the with Marriza argument that there should be a minimum amount of water for every household or every person instead of putting them extreme pressure through the capitalistic system. This is a completely agree, but at the same time in my country I've seen and probably have seen also that when something is free, or whatever the amount that is, when something is free, most of the people, and that is, I have seen from my observation, and I'm sure that the research, if anyone does it, would give the similar data, that when something is free

there is a tendency to waste. And in Bangladesh or in developing country, a huge number of people, they would be not that rich to afford it. So the government would be giving them a massive amount of water in total. And if everybody wastes just a little or the majority of the people waste just a little, that's a huge amount of water being wasted., because it's free and just because it's free people do not evaluate that much. So I was thinking that how do we make a mechanism to stop that? Is there any mechanism at all? So that was my question. Yeah, I think that in terms of IWRM, principle, the mechanism is there. So we need to, yeah, place a price on the water and yeah, on equity basis, the price could be different for different group of people and that that can help efficiency of water use and that that is kind of demand side management of water resources that is needed for yeah increasing water use efficiency. So yeah, the mechanism is there in terms of theoretical aspect, but for implementing in Bangladesh or any specific countries is, yeah, there are problems. So maybe now we can discuss water energy and food nexus. The still any food. So water energy and food nexus. This is another important paradigm of water resources management. Sometimes it's called separate paradigm, but sometimes it's within integrated water resources management, where the integration was vague in the IWRM. And in this case, this sectoral integration is explicitly mentioned, like integration of water energy and food. But it could be also water energy food climate

water energy, climate ecosystem. So it depends on the context, but the thinking of the nexus is it comes from system integration. So how the global systems are interconnected and how the traditional silo process is diminishing the importance of system level outcome. And that's why the nexus concept can. So for example, if I ask you what you have eaten in the breakfast, maybe a banana. And in that, banana is not only food, but also it incorporates huge amount of water for producing the banana, but also transportation, and also from the agricultural field to coming into the food breakfast table, it consumes huge amount of energy. And if you don't, if you waste that banana, then you can calculate how much energy and water has also been wasted from producing to, so this kind of thinking is the nexus thinking so if you can increase the efficiency of water use in one sector that can also helps increasing efficiency in the energy sector and also food sector and that that's how the water energy food nexus concept came, not only in the household perspective, not only in the urban aspect

but also in the transboundary water resources management aspect. So the nexus concept builds on many of this approaches and it also incorporates this integrated process. I already shared this article. Probably you have read this article and it's interesting because it clearly identifies the synergies and trade-offs of water resources management within water energy and food nexus and how how the incorporating nexus thinking can help increase the efficiency of water resources management. So for example, this nexus thinking can uncover synergies and co-benefits. The example that is given in the London urine separation technology that helps reducing 10% of water needs reduction, but also eventually this also helps reducing energy use in water supply by 10% and waste water treatment by 25%. So by using simple urine separation technology, this helps reducing water needs, energy needs and waste water treatment, but also it helps capturing nutrient. For example, 2,300 tons of phosphorus and 24,000 tons of nitrogen annually can be separated. That can be utilized for producing a million tons of wheat in UK. So you can see how the synergies and co-benefits can be achieved by applying this water energy food nexus approach. Also, it can detect harmful trade-off. For example, in Egypt and Spain, the water demand comparison is 75% higher than a span in Egypt. But because in Egypt, it considers gravity-oriented irrigation system, which requires a mass water. But at the same time, it can, the energy consumption is three times lower than the spend

because in Spain, it considers not the gravity irrigation, but energy driven drip irrigation systems. So if we convert the irrigation system in Egypt, then the water is saved, but at the same time, the energy and carbon dioxide production rate has increased significantly. So this kind of trade-up can be considered by considering this nexus apples. And also, I think, Jim Aver was mentioning about the biofuel. And here is the example of biofuel, how the increased consumption of biofuel is promoted as an alternative of oil and gas. But at the same time, it can create a huge amount of water scarcity and food sustainability in the United States, but also in the other countries. So the unexpected consequences can be taken into account by considering this nexus approach. So also in terms of integrated planning and decision making and governance, this order energy food nexus is very important. Let's consider the trans boundaryary aspect. So here in terms of water energy and food nexus in the trans boundary context, if you see the relation between water and food and for the food production, you must need water. And in the upstream, water uses for the agriculture can affect also in the downstream. And this can, so the water and food are highly relevant in the trans boundary context, but also food affect water resources. For example, it can through intensifying agricultural practices and land use changes by agricultural expansion, this can affect water quantity by changing the runoff

but also it can affect eutrophication and salinization and affects water quality. But at the same time, if you see the relation between water and energy, for the energy production, of course, you need water. And energy production also affects water quality and quantity. For example, the hydropower production for energy affects water quality in terms of changing water temperature and also so the water temperature can change quickly by storing water in a in a dam and that can also affect changing the water quality parameter. So thus you can see that this linkages are important for trans boundary context. In this study done by the Kaskin and Etel, they try to compare three transboundary areas in the Central Asia, mainly the Aral Sea, South Asia context, Ganges, Brahmaputro, and in the Meekong region, the Meekong River Basin. And they try to qualitatively analyze this interrelation between the water energy and food and the thickness of the line can determine how the relationship established and what are the strength of the relationships are determined by the thickness of the aligned. For example, in the case of Central Asia, the impact of food on water is highly important there, but also impact of energy production on downstream water flow is also important. In the case of South Asia

the impact of the importance of water on agricultural production between the upstream and downstream is very important. So that's how they found. So this kind of qualitative relationships for water resources management within the water energy food nexus has been established. So in terms of how the water energy food nexus is important for water diplomacy. So as you have seen that the identifying synergies and trade-offs beyond water and river basin management scale is provide an scope for water diplomacy, but also the mutual benefit and promoting value creation, the water energy food nexus, give a clear value added for water negotiation. For example, hydro power, linking hydropower, agricultural production and water management can help creating multiple benefits and multiple co-benefits and multiple value that helps order negotiation very easily. But also, Water Energy Food Nexus promote business idea and that can also link into the negotiation table and can help reducing the conflict and can can be can create an cooperative environment. So these are the ideas that water energy food nexus can support promoting the water diplomacy. That's how I see. So here is a reference. I'll put them in the canvas site. I found just recently so I can share this article so that you can have an understanding how water energy food nexus can be useful for water diplomacy and also how water diplomacy can help implementing water energy food nexus approach. Just quickly sustainable development goals. You know

the sustainable development goal has been considered in 2015 to meet the target by 2030. And in order to move from M disease to S disease, it considers 17 S disease and with 169 targets. And S disease 6 is the ensuring availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all. And it incorporates SDG 6.5 that we need to implement IWRM through transboundary cooperation. So the goal 6.5 or target 6.5 specifically on implementation of IWRM for cooperation incorporating trans boundary cooperation. So here is the linkage of S-DIS and and IWRMs, but also the way IWRM is considered as an indicator, it is kind of, there is criticism on this because IWRM is very broader concept and theoretical concept but the way the IWRM is considered as UN sustainable goals, there are a strong criticism on that because it considers very vague way of putting numbers on IWRM and how they measuring the progress is very, yeah, it's very debatable. But you know, this is one of the major paradigm that internationally acknowledged and that's why IWRM is very important and also with relation to SDGs and water diplomacy. I see that many SDG goals are interlinked and it can create synergies and trade-offs. So for example, if I can meet one SDG target, for example, renewable energy production and for the renewable energy production

it's not specifically defined which kind of renewable energy can be produced. So that can promote the idea of hydroelectric electricity generation. So that can also affect implementation of IWRMs because if you promote upstream water development projects for hydroelectricity, then this can affect a relationship with the downstream countries. So this kind of synergies and trade-offs are very important and that can be reduced or that can be resolved through diplomacy approach broadly. So that's how I can see the link between the AIDS disease and and what are diplomacy aspect in in general. So that's that's we wanted to discuss today classes. So first we already discussed the evolution of water resources management, how it came from the supply side approach to the demand and decentralized approach with an example. But then we already discussed IWRM and its importance in the international water resource management aspect and its relation with the water diplomacy, but also we discussed water energy food nexus and sustainable development goals and its relation with water diplomacy. Yes, so the next class will be the week after and that class will play a-play simulation. Practically how we can resolve water conflicts. We'll play the game, Indo-Potomia, Arrival Basin Management. And for the role-play simulation, we will need nine players, but we have six players. So do you know, is there any of your friend could be interested in the roleplay simulation? If you don't find, I will try to find three other players

but yeah you have interesting colleagues that are highly interested to the to understand the role play game you can let me know yeah so another notice our announcement is that next week, Larry and me are going to talk on transbound water resources management. Larry will discuss mainly the theoretical aspect and I will describe the Bromaputro river basin case. So if you are interested you can join in this event I can share the link for the registration. It's the EU time, so it's the European time. So in US time, it could be 11, 11 a.m. or yeah. So if you are interested, you feel free to join this in this event. Yeah. Another announcement, sorry, I wanted to put in the, put it in here. There is a discussion paper on water energy and food nexus and there is a discussion series is taking place by one of our colleague, who is the editor of the journal, Water Hydrological Sciences Journal. And in that discussion paper, there is a topic on water energy and food nexus. And if you are interested, and if you feel it's fit in your area of interest, there is a paper on water quality and water energy food nexus. And if you can criticize or comment on that paper, that can also be published if this is a concise and, yeah in a written in a scientific way so I can share that link if you are interested in participating this kind of writing you can let me know I I have the link is with the editor of that journal so I can share with you if you are interested. So the write-up should be one or two page

but it should be written in a scientific way. Yeah. So I will share those two links and also I will share the role play simulation with the general instruction, but also confidential instruction for his player. I will share with you in next few days. So, bye.

So hi everyone, today I'm new talking about the ongoing efforts to modernize the Columbia River Treaty, sort of the agenda. The Columbia River Treaty was originally signed in 1961, so I'm going to go through the historical context that led to that signature, talk about the 1961 treaty negotiations and outcomes. And then I'm also going to talk about the ongoing case for modernization and the ongoing treaty negotiation process, so covering a lot of time periods here. So a little bit of sort of a geographical overview. The Columbia River Basin is over 250,000 square miles, which is larger than the entire area of France. The basin includes more than half of Washington and Oregon, almost all of Idaho and parts of Montana, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming. And approximately 15% of the basin is in the Canadian province of British Columbia, where the Columbia River, which you can see here on this map in purple, originates. And then in southeastern Washington, the Columbia River meets the Snake River and together that feeds into the Pacific Ocean. So, the United States and Canada have a long history of bilateral cooperation. They share the longest international border between two countries and they're sort of bilateral negotiations date back for centuries. As far as water diplomacy goes, the origin of this is the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty

which was signed to kind of come up with an approach for preventing and resolving disputes over the use of shared waters. It was it established an international joint commission to help the two countries carry out its provisions. And at the time disputes over water, most notably on the Niagara River and the East Coast, were already creating tension along the border. So the treaty provided this framework to deal with these disputes. It held its first meeting in 1912 and it has worked over the last century plus to resolve more than 100 matters raised by the two federal governments. So the Columbia River Treaty more specifically came about during this era of hydropower expansion in the United States and Canada, which is sort of symbolized in the 1930s with the construction of the Grand Coulee Dam in Washington. And during about a 20 year period, more than a dozen large dams were built in the Columbia River Basin, mostly for hydroelectric power purposes. They also benefited flood control, navigation, and other irrigation projects. The construction of these dams had and continues to have a negative impact on the ecosystems of the Bayeson. For example, the completion of the Grand Coulee Dam eliminated salmon runs from the mainstream Columbia River and tributaries in British Columbia. So the specific impetus for the Columbia River Treaty was a major flood in 1948. The river was abnormally high due to deep snowfall and large rainstorms and it breached a dike in Randport, Oregon

Oregon, which is an industrial suburb outside of Portland and the town was completely submerged. 18,000 residents were displaced, 51 people will killed and the estimated property damage was over $100 million. So you can see here on the right picture of the town right after the flood. So the original treaty emerged in response to these two sort of one trend of hydropower development and then the specific flood control needs that were raised by the Vanport flood. So agreeing to agree. In 1944, Canada and the US had requested that the IJC determine whether a greater use than is now being made of the waters of the Columbia Rivers system would be feasible and advantageous, and then four years later after the Vanport flood detailed studies began. And what followed was 11 years of discussions and analysis, two requests by the US for approval of the Libby Dam in Montana, which is pictured behind me in my virtual background. Two proposals by Columbia River companies to build Canadian dams, committee hearings in the US Senate and the Canadian Parliament, and a gradual acceptance by the US of the idea of sharing downstream US hydroelectric benefits. So 11 years of negotiations, and then another round of formal negotiations begin in February of 1960. And then ultimately the Columbia River Treaty is signed by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Defen Baker in January 17, 1961. The US Senate approved it almost immediately, but ratification took an additional three years in Canada

largely due to British Columbia needing to negotiate with the Canadian federal government to clarify issues of authority and responsibility. So that was sort of the original round of negotiation processes. And the treaty as it emerged has two primary focuses, hydroelectric power and flood control. The terms of the tree specified that Canada would provide about 15 million acre feet of storage usable for improving the flow of the Columbia River. This is really for flood control purposes to minimize downstream flood damages in both the US and Canada. And as compensation, the US made three lump sum payments totaling $64.4 million to Canada when the dams were completed. And that amount was based on an estimate of half of the present value of future US flood damages prevented. So the operation of the Columbia Retreaty storage creates hydropower benefits in both countries. And the CRT requires that the downstream power benefits in the US due to the operation of the Canadian storage be shared equally between the two countries. This is known as the Canadian entitlement and under the terms of the treaty, Canada can opt to sell the entitlement back to buyers in the US. And actually to pay for construction of the dams. British Columbia sold the Canadian entitlement to a consortium of utilities in the US for 30 years beginning in 1964. So the treaty really is sort of premised on this idea of mutual gains to both countries both in terms of flood control and hydroelectricity. However, there were also sort of losses created. Most notably

the treaty made no explicit provision for other values such as water flow benefits for salmon and steelheads, continuing to exacerbate these ecosystem problems created by this era of hydropower expansion. So these are the three. Here you can see a map of all of the dams in this in the system. The three dams in Canada up here. Can you see my mouse in purple and the Libby Dam in Montana. So those were the four dam that were built as a result of the Columbia River Treaty, but the consequences of the treaty affect the entire hydroelectric power generation across the entire base. So it's like, very involved, even though there were only three dams actually generated as a result of the treaty. So the treaty has been sort of widely regarded as an example of successful cooperation and successful transbound renegotiations really built on this foundation of mutual gains. In 2011 when the renegotiation process began, the British Columbia government came out with a statement saying that the Columbia River is known it throughout the world is sort of the most successful models of a transboundary water treaty. Other countries see the agreement as a benchmark on cooperation to create and share benefits. So I thought that was sort of an interesting statement. And while the treaty did authorize this equal sharing of additional hydropower results from additional water storage and coordinated water releases