In 1966 the U.S. Supreme Court wrote, “The basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth.”  This is Larry Laudan's guiding premise in his “essay on legal epistemology.”  Without ascertaining the facts about a crime, he writes, it is impossible to achieve justice, since a just resolution crucially depends on correctly figuring out who did what to whom.  Thus, he continues, “it is entirely fitting to ask whether the procedures and rules that govern a trial are genuinely truth-conducive.” (...)  In chapter 1 of the book, Laudan identifies one of the most important and legitimate methods for finding truth, namely, ensuring that the jury hears all and only relevant evidence.  Laudan bemoans the fact, however, that “legal texts and the practices of courts routinely flout” this principle.  Much of the rest of the book is devoted to the other tests for admissibility that the system imposes, tests that Laudan often regards as misguided. ( shrink)

Traditionally pragmatists have been favorably disposed to improving our understanding of agency and ethics through the use of empirical research.  In the last two decades simulation theory has been championed in certain cognitive science circles as a way of explaining how we attribute mental states and predict human behavior.  Drawing on research in psychology and neuroscience, Alvin I. Goldman and Robert M. Gordon have not only used simulation theory to discuss how we “mindread”, but have suggested that the theory (...) has implications for ethics.  The limitations of simulation theory for “mindreading” and ethics are addressed in this article from an interactionist or neo-Meadian pragmatic perspective.  To demonstrate the limitations of simulation theory scenes from the television show Mad Men are used as “thought-experiments”. ( shrink)

Philosophical interest in introspection has a long and storied history, but only recently – with the 'scientific turn' in philosophy of mind – have philosophers sought to ground their accounts of introspection in psychological data.  In particular, there is growing awareness of how evidence from clinical and developmental psychology might be brought to bear on long-standing debates about the architecture of introspection, especially in the form of apparent dissociations between introspection and third-person mental-state attribution.  It is less often noticed that (...) this evidence needs to be interpreted with due sensitivity to distinctions between different types of introspection, for example, introspection of propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires) vs. introspection of phenomenally conscious states (pains, emotional feelings).  As contemporary debates about the machinery of introspection – and debates about mindreading in general – move forward, these distinctions are likely to figure more prominently.  Author Recommends: Peter Carruthers, 'Simulation and Self-Knowledge: A Defense of Theory-Theory', in Theories of Theories of Mind, eds.  P. Carruthers and P. K. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 22–38.  Defends a sophisticated form of the theory-theory of introspection, according to which we come to know at least some of our mental states (e.g., propositional attitudes) by reasoning from an innate folk-psychological theory.  Fred Dretske, 'Introspection', in Naturalizing the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 39–63.  Introduces and defends the idea of introspection as 'displaced perception'.  Alvin Goldman, 'Self-Attribution', in Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 223–57.  Defends a version of the 'inner sense' view of introspection in which mental state types are classified via their neural properties, and mental contents are classified via 'redeployment'.  Alison Gopnik, 'How We Read Our Own Minds: The Illusion of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality', Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1993): 1–14.  A noted psychologist defends a version of the theory-theory of introspection, citing evidence of developmental symmetries between first-person and third-person mental-state attribution.  Robert Gordon, 'Simulation without Introspection or Inference from Me to You', in Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications, eds.  T. Stone and M. Davies (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 53–67.  Develops the idea of ascent routines – the rough analog of 'displaced perception' for the introspection of propositional attitudes.  Uta Frith and Francesca Happé, 'Theory of Mind and Self-Consciousness: What Is It Like to Be Autistic?'Mind and Language 14 (1999): 1–14.  Appeals to evidence from autism to motivate the idea that first-person and third-person mental-state attribution have a common basis.  Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich, 'Reading One's Own Mind', in Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-awareness, and Understanding other Minds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 150–99.  Presents a comprehensive critique of leading theories of introspection (especially the theory-theory), then introduces and defends the authors' preferred alternative, the 'monitoring mechanism' account.  Jesse Prinz, 'The Fractionation of Introspection', Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (2004): 40–57.  Develops the idea that introspection admits of several varieties.  Philip Robbins, 'Knowing Me, Knowing You: Theory of Mind and the Machinery of Introspection', Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (2004): 129–43.  Defends a hybrid view of introspection for propositional attitudes, according to which both theoretic inference and monitoring play a role.  Sample Syllabus: Week 1: Theory-theory Alison Gopnik, 'How We Read Our Own Minds: The Illusion of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality', Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1993): 1–14.  Peter Carruthers, 'Simulation and Self-Knowledge: A Defense of Theory-Theory', in Theories of Theories of Mind, eds.  P. Carruthers and P. K. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 22–38.  Week 2: Displaced perception and semantic ascent Fred Dretske, 'Introspection', in Naturalizing the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 39–63.  Robert Gordon, 'Simulation without Introspection or Inference from Me to You', in Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications, eds.  T. Stone and M. Davies (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 53–67.  Week 3: Monitoring theory Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich, 'Reading One's Own Mind', in Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-awareness, and Understanding Other Minds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 150–99.  Week 4: Hybrid approaches Alvin Goldman, 'Self-Attribution', in Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 223–57.  Philip Robbins, 'Knowing Me, Knowing You: Theory of Mind and the Machinery of Introspection', Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (2004): 129–43.  Focus Questions:1.  What distinguishes 'inside access' from 'outside access' views of introspection?2.  To what extent is the theory-theoretic approach to introspection wedded to the idea that first-person and third-person mindreading are mechanistically symmetric capacities?3.  What reasons are there for distinguishing between different types of introspection, and why might those taxonomic distinctions matter for theory construction in this area?4.  In what sense, if any, are personality traits introspectible?5.  Debates about third-person mindreading have revolved around the relative merits of theory-theory and simulation theory, whereas debates about introspection have taken a slightly different focus.  For example, no one has defended a simulation-theoretic account of introspection.  Why might that be? ( shrink)

1 Cf.  D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of Mind (London, 1968), Chapter 9; 'A Causal Theory of Knowledge' by Alvin I. Goldman, The Journal of Philosophy , Vol.  LXIV, No.  12, June 22, 1967.  A striking parallelism would appear to exist between 'the causal theory of knowledge' and the orthodox Stoic doctrine regarding the kataleptike phantasia .  See, for example, Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 7.248 (reprinted in Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta , edited by H. F. A. von Arnim, Leipzig, (...) 1921, Volume I, page 18, 59C): 'An apprehensive appearance is one which has been stamped and sealed by the actual, and in accordance with the actual thing itself, in such a way that it would not be produced by what is not (the) actual' (I am indebted for the wording of this somewhat controversial translation to my colleague Mr. M. B. Wallace).  See the discussion and additional ref. ( shrink)

Knowing as having the right to be sure, by A. J. Ayer.--Knowledge and belief, by N. Malcolm.--Is justified true belief knowledge?  By E. L. Gettier.--The foundation of empirical statements, by R. M. Chisholm.--Knowledge, truth, and evidence, by K. Lehrer.--A causal theory of knowing, by A. I. Goldman.--The explication of 'X knows that p', by B. Skyrms.--An analysis of factual knowledge, by P. Unger.--Why I know so much more than you do, by W. W. Rozeboom.--Does knowing imply believing?  By J. (...) Harrison.--Knowledge, by examples, by C. Radford.--The logic of knowing, by R. M. Chisholm.--Bibliography (p. 221-224). ( shrink)

An ascent routine (AR) allows a speaker to self-ascribe a given propositional attitude (PA) by redeploying the process that generates a corresponding lower level utterance.  Thus, we may report on our beliefs about the weather by reporting (under certain constraints) on the weather.  The chief criticism of my AR account of self-ascription, by Alvin Goldman and others, is that it covers few if any PA’s other than belief and offers no account of how we can attain reliability in identifying (...) our attitude as belief, desire, hope, etc.,  without presupposing some sort of recognition process.  The criticism can be answered, but only by giving up a tacit—and wholly unnecessary—assumption that has influenced discussions of ascent routines.  Abandoning the assumption allows a different account of ARs that avoids the criticism and even provides an algorithm for finding a corresponding lower level utterance for any PA.  The account I give is supported by research on children’s first uses of a propositional attitude vocabulary. ( shrink)

Alvin Goldman's early work in action theory and theory of knowledge was a major influence on my own thinking and writing about emotions.  For that reason and others, it was a very happy moment in my professional life when I learned, in 1988, that in his presidential address to the Society for Philosophy and Psychology Goldman endorsed and defended the “simulation” theory I had put forward in a 1986 article.  I discovered afterward that we share a strong conviction (...) that empirical evidence is relevant to a full assessment of the theory.  We both find the burgeoning evidence from cognitive neuroscience to be of particular interest, I believe, in part because it makes possible a major departure for the philosophy of mind: turning its attention from

The debate over off-line simulation has largely focussed on the capacity to predict behavior, but the basic idea of off-line simulation can be cast in a much broader framework.  The central claim of the off-line account of behavior prediction is that the practical reasoning mechanism is taken off-line and used for predicting behavior.  However, there's no reason to suppose that the idea of off-line simulation can't be extended to mechanisms other than the practical reasoning system.  In principle, any cognitive component (...) can be taken off-line and used to perform some other function.  On this view of off-line simulation, such accounts differ radically from traditional information-based accounts of cognitive capacities.  And cognitive penetrability provides a wedge for empirically determining whether a capacity requires an information-based account or an off-line simulation account.  Stich and Nichols (1992) argued that the simulation theory of behavior prediction was inadequate because behavior prediction seemed to be cognitively penetrable.  We present empirical evidence that supports the claim that the behavior prediction is cognitively penetrable.  As a result, the simulation account of behavior prediction still seems unpromising.  However, off-line simulation might provide accounts of other cognitive capacities.  Indeed, off- line simulation accounts have recently been offered for a strikingly diverse set of capacities including counterfactual reasoning, empathy and mental imagery.  Goldman, for instance, maintains that counterfactual reasoning and empathy clearly demand off-line simulation accounts.  We argue that there are alternative information-based explanations of these phenomena.  Nonetheless, the off-line accounts of these phenomena are interesting and clearly worthy of further exploration. ( shrink)

In the last few years, off-line simulation has become an increasingly important alternative to standard explanations in cognitive science.  The contemporary debate began with Gordon (1986) and Goldman's (1989) off-line simulation account of our capacity to predict behavior.  On their view, in predicting people's behavior we take our own decision making system `off line' and supply it with the `pretend' beliefs and desires of the person whose behavior we are trying to predict; we then let the decision maker reach (...) a decision on the basis of these pretend inputs.  Figure 1 offers a `boxological' version of the off-line simulation theory of behavior prediction.(1). ( shrink)

In this article, the author focuses on Philip Kitcher's and Alvin Goldman's economic models of the social character of scientific knowledge production.  After introducing some relevant methodological issues in the social sciences and characterizing Kitcher's and Goldman's models, the author goes on to show that special problems arise directly from the concept of an agent invoked in the models.  The author argues that the two distinct concepts of agents, borrowed from economics and cognitive psychology, are inconsistent.  Finally, the (...) author discusses some of the normative implications that arise from adopting economic concepts of agents in the study of science. ( shrink)