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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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The relevant question at the motion-to-dismiss stage is not whether Plaintiffs have alleged an exact sum of money in their complaint. Indeed, the case primarily relied upon by Defendants shows that alleging an exact sum of money is not itself enough to support a conversion claim. See, e.g., High View Fund, L.P. v. Hall, 27 F.Supp.2d 420, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (dismissing conversion claim seeking $1 million because “plaintiffs do not claim ownership of a specifically identifiable, segregated $1 million” (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted)). Rather, the question is whether the money alleged to have been converted is specifically “identifiable” or, put another way, whether it is capable of “being desc l & Vaccaro, 187 A.D.2d 384, 385, 590 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1992) ; Brennan’s Bus Serv., Inc. v. Brennan, 107
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that notwithstanding the chapter 7 trustees postpetition settlement of state court litigation attorney had a valid charging lien in settlement proceeds for the attorneys prepetition services where services were beneficial to the estate
B. holding that contract debt was not subject to an act in tort for conversion
C. holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an identifiable fund and thus a proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim
D. holding that the entirety of litigation settlement proceeds was taxable income to client not net after payment of attorney fees
E. holding that defendant was entitled to summary judgment on conversion claim because the claim seeks merely to recover an allegedly unpaid debt and does not seek to recover money from a discrete identifiable fund
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | C | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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strike defendant's arguments in this regard. Plaintiff's motion to strike is denied. 5 . The asserted independent claims are 30, 102, 317, 414 and the asserted dependent claims are 31, 34, 106, 122, 324, 343, 416, and 422. 6 . Defendant provides similar comparisons for independent claims 102, 317, and 414. (D.I. 139 at 16-21) 7 . Plaintiff advances the same argument, i.e., that the claims use- "special purpose computers,” to assert that the claims are "tied to a particular machine or apparatus,” and satisfy the first prong of the machine-or-transformation test. Using the same analysis, the court disagrees. 8 . The preemption inquiry focuses on whether the patent “would risk disproportionately ty ing up the use of the underlying ideas.” Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2354; Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1294 ; Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., Civ. No.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that in patent infringement eases a finding of noninfringement prevents a court from reaching an affirmative defense asserting the patents invalidity because the validity issue becomes immaterial to the disposition of the case and that any determination of the patents validity by the district court in such a case should be vacated
B. holding that the complaint placed the defendant on notice when it alleged ownership of the asserted patent named the individual defendants cited the patents that are allegedly infringed described the means by which the defendants allegedly infringed the patents and pointed to specific sections of the patent law invoked
C. holding that patents that would disproportionately tie up the use of the underlying natural laws are invalid for lacking patentable subject matter
D. holding that because a valid arbitration clause existed the parties had to arbitrate all disputes when the subject matter of the dispute has a reasonable relationship to the subject matter of the contract
E. holding a procedure for molding rubber that included a computer program is within patentable subject matter
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | C | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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agent” that has been designated by the plaintiffs to appoint licensees of their merchandise, and receives a royalty for the licensing fees that are generated. The only exceptions to CLC’s exclusive agency designations are for certain non-retail sales such as “university purchases for internal consumption” or “student organization use.” Section 1125(a)(1) of the Lanham Act specifically provides that a cause of action may be asserted by “any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged” by infringing conduct, and the Fifth Circuit has held on several occasions that this provision permits the assertion of unfair competition claims by exclusive trademark licensees. See Martin’s Herend Imports v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA, 112 F.3d 1296, 1301 n. 10 (5th Cir.1997) ; Norman M. Morris Corp. v. Weinstein, 466 F.2d
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the plaintiff an exclusive licensee of the mark had standing to bring a claim under 43a
B. holding that exclusive importer had standing to sue for unfair competition under 1125a
C. holding the homeowners association had standing to sue under the theory of promissory estoppel
D. holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue
E. holding that employers have standing to sue
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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basis, but displayed poor focus, grandiosity and religiosity, id. at 448, and appeared to display disorganized thought pattern and loose associations, id. at 449. The ALJ explained that he gave very little weight to Dr. Johnson-Miller’s evidence because it was quite conclusory and provided very little explanation of the evidence relied upon, and because her opinions departed substantially from the rest of the evidence. Mr. Akers argues on appeal that Dr. Johnson-Miller’s report was not conclusory. We disagree. Dr. Johnson-Miller expressly relied quite heavily on Mr. Akers’ subjective complaints and provided little or no explanation of the basis of her conclusions, thus, the ALJ was entitled to give her report little weight. See Bernal v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 297, 301 (10th Cir.1988) . We find no merit in Mr. Akers’ claim that the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a treating physicians diagnosis could be rejected for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record
B. holding that the weight given to a treating physicians opinion is limited if the opinion consists only of conclusory statements
C. holding that a conclusory opinion may be rejected
D. holding that the weight given a treating physicians opinion is limited if the opinion consists only of conclusory statements
E. holding that a treating physicians opinion may be rejected if it is brief conclusory and unsupported by medical evidence
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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a witness to answer questions must be obeyed, and a failure to obey such order subjects the witness to a contempt citation, even if the order was erroneous or improvident.” Minnesota State Bar Ass’n v. Divorce Assistance Ass’n, Inc., 311 Minn. 276, 283, 248 N.W.2d 733, 740 (1976) (emphasis added). The doctrine of absolute privilege may apply if a person voluntarily makes a statement that later is the basis of a civil action, Mahoney & Hagberg, 729 N.W.2d at 306, albeit within “narrow limits,” Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219,' 223, 67 N.W.2d 413, 417 (1954). And there are even stronger reasons to apply the doctrine of absolute privilege if a person involuntarily makes a statement that later is the basis of a civil action. See Johnson v. Dirkswager, 315 N.W.2d 215, 223 (Minn. 1982) . Thus, Mattson is entitled to the protections
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that state official was entitled to absolute privilege because he was required by law ie data privacy act to disclose reason for termination of plaintiffs employment
B. holding that because a city inspector was not entitled to official immunity the city was not entitled to vicarious official immunity
C. holding that although a reason was provided in the termination letter the without cause termination provision was applicable
D. holding that a judge was not entitled to absolute immunity for firing an employee
E. holding that city council is entitled to absolute legislative immunity from claim under the age discrimination in employment act
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Commission. 6 James v. Jane was decided June 6, 1980. The trial court announced its decision in the present case on June 9, 1980. It does not appear that our decision was called to the trial court’s attention. 7 On the same day we decided James v. Jane, we also decided Freeman v. City of Norfolk, 221 Va. 57, 266 S.E.2d 885 (1980) (upholding city’s immunity from liability for alleged negligence in providing or failing to provide traffic lights and other traffic controls). Since then, we have decided Banks v. Sellers, 224 Va. 168, 294 S.E.2d 862 (1982) (upholding immunity of division superintendent of schools and high school principal from liability for alleged negligence in failing to provide a safe school environment), and First Virginia Bank v. Baker, 225 Va. 72, 301 S.E.2d 9 (1983) . None of these decisions affects the outcome
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding state immune from suit brought in state court
B. recognizing that a judge is not absolutely immune from criminal liability
C. holding that the government is immune from liability for its choice of traffic protection devices
D. holding clerk of court not immune from liability for negligent misindexing by deputy
E. holding that a city could not be held vicariously liable for the act of a magistrate who was immune from liability
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | D | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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of unconscionability based upon the UCC is preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985), the Supreme Court held that the policies underlying § 301 “require that the relationships created by a collective bargaining agreement be defined by application of an evolving federal common law grounded in national labor policy,” so that “questions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and wha l Union of North America, 2 Fed.Appx. 157, 160 (2d Cir.2001) (“Section 301 of the [LMRA] confers jurisdiction in the federal courts for ‘[s]uits] for violation of contracts between ... labor organizations.’ Such suits based upon the terms of union constitutions fall within the sweep of § 301.”) (citation omitted) . While “[t]he principles for deciding when a
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding union members state law claims for defamation against union preempted
B. holding that a rico action by union members was properly dismissed where any financial improprieties occurred with union funds and directly injured solely the union
C. holding that the plaintiffs acted on behalf of all union members and reimbursing the attorneys fees from the union treasury such that all union members in effect equally contributed to the costs of litigation
D. recognizing union members vital concern in preserving jobs for union members
E. recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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of his codefendants, we conclude that Pedraza’s sufficiency challenge is also without merit. Gonzalez identified Pedraza as one of the men who converged at Shorty Pedraza’s home and helped unload the marijuana from Garcia’s trailer. Gonzalez also testified that Pedraza was part owner of the truck used during the first conspiracy and that Pedraza and Garcia argued on one occasion when Pedraza wanted Garcia to finish paying Pedraza for the truck. Thus, Gonzalez’s testimony, if believed, established more than Pedraza’s mere presence at the scene of conspiratorial activity. Pedraza’s complaint that the jury could not have rationally convicted him and at the same'time acquitted Shorty Pedraza is without merit. See United States v. Zuniga-Salinas, 952 F.2d 876, 877 (5th Cir.1992) (en banc) . Because a rational jury could have found that
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a party waived its objection to the jurys verdict by not objecting to an alleged inconsistency prior to the dismissal of the jury
B. holding that if the alleged misrepresentations are material a plaintiff is entitled to recovery whether or not the misrepresentations caused the alleged damage
C. holding that a verdict convicting one alleged conspirator can stand even if the jury acquits the sole alleged eoconspirator
D. holding that the lack of evidence of the alleged principals control over the alleged agent precludes the finding of an agency relationship
E. holding that the verdict must be sustained if there is any competent evidence to support the verdict
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | C | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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most likely would have found no structural error. 4 . Of course, in an absence of counsel case, to determine that structural error has occurred it may be necessary for a court to find facts related to whether counsel was absent and whether inculpatory evidence was presented during the absence. But once a court answers “yes" to these preliminary questions, no case-by-case determination is permitted. 5 . I agree with the majority that the presence of lawyers for co-defendantS' — even when a co-defendant’s lawyer agrees to cover for an absent defense lawyer — is irrelevant to the structural error inquiry unless the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives the right to the presence of his own lawyer. See Maj. Op. at 1158-59; Olden v. United States, 224 F.3d 561, 568-69 (6th Cir. 2000) ; United States v. Russell, 205 F.3d 768,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that defendant was denied counsel even though his lawyer asked another defendants lawyer to take notes or whatever in the defendants lawyers temporary absence
B. holding that a request for a lawyer requires the police to cease questioning until the accused consults with his or her lawyer unless the defendant initiates further conversation
C. recognizing that providing defendant with hobsons choice between incompetent lawyer or no lawyer violates right to counsel
D. holding that there is an inference from the existence of a blank for the name of defendants lawyer and from the absence of any evidence to the contrary that defendant was not represented by counsel
E. holding that even where a client was more sophisticated in business matters than the lawyer himself the lawyer should have assumed the client was relying on the lawyer for the legal aspects of the loan from the client to the lawyer to the same extent that the client would rely on the lawyer for advice were the client making the loan to a third person
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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allowing other claimants to potentially receive a distribution from the overpayment refund. The court therefore concludes that the Applicant’s request for an administrative expense was timely. C. The Right to Payment Although the Applicant has been awarded compensation entitled to be paid as an administrative expense, the Applicant is not necessarily entitled to be paid by the Trustee, the Debtor, or any other person. As the Applicant notes in its supplemental brief, the allowance of an administrative expense is one thing, while payment of an administrative expense is another. In re Sweports, Ltd., 777 F.3d at 366-67 (bankruptcy court could approve fees and expenses even though no funds were available for distribution after dismissal); In re Fox, 140 B.R. 761, 765 (Bankr.D.S.D.1992) . The same holds true for compensation which,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that no private right of action exists for subsection a violations
B. holding that such a duty exists
C. recognizing that no guarantee of payment exists even if administrative expense allowed
D. holding that no private right of action exists
E. recognizing that representation of a corporation by its officers in administrative proceedings is allowed
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | C | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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CURIAM. Affirmed. See Almond v. State, 89 So.3d 1056, 1058 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) ; Moore v. State, 880 So.2d 826, 828-29 (Fla.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a conviction and sentence for a predicate offense that is entered after the commission of the current offense does not qualify as a prior felony within the meaning of the sexual predator statute
B. holding that when a criminal court still has jurisdiction over a defendant whose criminal record mandates the court to classify him as a sexual predator the criminal court may designate the defendant as a sexual predator even though the designation was overlooked at sentencing many years earlier
C. holding that an offender who violates section 7940115 must have a prior enumerated conviction to qualify as a sexual predator
D. holding that individual civilly detained as a sexually violent predator is not a 1915h prisoner because the plra applies only to persons incarcerated as punishment for a criminal conviction
E. holding that a criminal defendant has a sixth amendment right to counsel at trial
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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6 . The appellant raises the following AOEs: 1) The guilty findings for all child pornography offenses are legally insufficient because the Government failed to introduce evidence that 18 U.S.C. § 2252A existed at the time of the appellant’s offenses; 2) The specification alleging an attempt to entice a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity fails to state an offense by not expressly alleging an underlying state statute criminalizing the activity; 3) The military judge erred when he admitted over defense objection evidence of uncharged misconduct from the appellant's statements to Naval Criminal Investigative Service; 4) The military judge erred where he admitted over defense objection at *10-12, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11429, at *32-38 (E.D.Wis. Feb. 16, 2007) . 15 . Although we decline to accept the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that boards findings were insufficient where they merely repeated language of relevant statute and rejecting claim that voting foims of the members of the board which also simply mirrored the language of the relevant statute without specific findings were findings sufficient to permit judicial review
B. holding when a statute defines manner or means of committing an offense indictment need not allege matters beyond the language of the statute
C. recognizing that a 2422b indictment that merely tracks the language of the statute without identifying an underlying statute may be insufficient
D. recognizing that an indictment may be dismissed in part
E. holding that the statute qualifies as an exemption 3 statute
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | C | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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concept of implied-consent laws that impose civil penalties and eviden-tiary consequences on motorists who refuse to comply . .. and nothing we say here should be read to cast doubt on them."). 14 4 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 8.2(1) at 164-65 (5th ed. 2012). 15 The Supreme Court of Georgia has explained: "To hold that the legislature could nonetheless pass laws stating that a person 'impliedly' consents to searches under certain circumstances where a search would otherwise be unlawful would be to condone an unconstitutional bypassing of the Fourth Amendment." Cooper v. State, 587 S.E.2d 605, 612 (Ga. 2003) (quoting Hannoy v. State, 789 N.E.2d 977, 987 (Ind. App. 2003)). 16 Aviles v. State, 443 S.W.3d 291, 294 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014) . 17 The Birchfield Court noted that "[t]here
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that consent is an exception to the warrant requirement and that voluntariness of consent depends on the totality of the circumstances
B. holding that the implied consent law allows law enforcement officers to obtain blood in circumstances in which a warrant or actual consent may otherwise be required
C. holding that implied consent and blood draw statutes are not permissible exceptions to the warrant requirement and stating that to hold otherwise flies in the face of mcneelys repeated mandate that courts must consider the totality of the circumstances of each case
D. holding that independent of the implied consent law the fourth amendment requires an arrestees consent to be voluntary to justify a warrantless blood draw
E. holding that the implied consent statutes are irrelevant when the defendant gives actual consent to a blood or breath test
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | C | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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also raised usury as a defense, arguing that requiring the Borschows to promise to pay Eureka’s ac count with BI in order to get the new terms to retire the January 2007 note constituted usury. However, this defense was not raised in Defendants’ Answer to the Complaint or in the Defendants’ Pre-trial Order; thus the Court finds that the Defendants waived their right to assert a defense based on usury. See Cadles Grassy Meadows II, L.L.C. v. Gervin (In re Gervin), 300 Fed.Appx. 293 (5th Cir.2008) citing Harris v. Sec’y, U.S. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 126 F.3d 339, 343 (D.C.Cir.1997) ("[A] party’s failure to plead an affirmative defense ... generally results in waiver of that defense and its exclusion from the case.”); Najarro v. SASI Intern., Ltd., 904 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir.1990) . 3 . On re-direct examination at trial, Omar
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that laches is an affirmative defense
B. recognizing the affirmative defense of usury
C. holding that the running of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense
D. recognizing laches as an affirmative defense
E. holding that fair use is an affirmative defense
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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a specific duty to cooperate with BRA’s investigation, intentionally and without sufficient excuse. “Given that [BRA] bore the burden of proving misconduct of either kind, we see no need to reopen the hearing, thereby giving the employer a second bite at the proverbial apple; rather, the agency on remand shall make the necessary finding[s] based on the existing record.” So ordered. 1 . Neither witness identified any written documentation referring to the five-day requirement or otherwise describing investigation procedure uard's taking of unauthorized break, during which he placed his gun in a desk drawer at his security post (after removing the bullets), took off his shoes, and prayed briefly at his desk, constituted simple, not gross, misconduct); Doyle, 991 A.2d at 1182, 1184 (internal quotation marks omitted); Odeniran,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that employees failure to comply with employers rule requiring employees to notify employer when a temporary job placement ended did not constitute gross misconduct because the violation was an isolated incident and employer did not try to show that its staffing ability had suffered serious or indeed any consequences as a result of employees unavailability
B. holding that under the first amendment speech can be pursuant to a public employees official job duties even though it is not required by or included in the employees job description or in response to a request by the employer
C. holding that employers policy which required employee to work without pay in violation of federal law was unreasonable and employees refusal to comply was not misconduct
D. holding unconscionable an arbitration agreement requiring employees to arbitrate claims against the employer but not requiring the employer to arbitrate claims against the employees
E. holding that the employer had not demonstrated the employee was discharged for gross misconduct because the conduct was an isolated incident and the employer did not try to show that its staffing ability had suffered serious or indeed any consequences as a result of the employees conduct
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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of the debtor” to “an interest of the debtor in property,” but the Supreme Court stated that, because this alteration was a “clarifying change,” the older language and the newer language are “coextensive.” Id. at 59 n. 3, 110 S.Ct. at 2263 n. 3. In Nordberg v. Sanchez (In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.), 813 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir.1987), which involved fraudulent transfers, we discussed “[t]he rules established in the avoidable preference cases” and explained that “any funds under the control of the debtor, regardless of the source, are properly deemed to be the debtor’s property, and any transfers that diminish that property are subject to avoidance.” See Andreini & Co. v. Pony Express Delivery Services, Inc. (In re Pony Express Delivery Servs., Inc.), 440 F.3d 1296, 1300 (11th Cir.2006) ; Walker v. Wilkinson, 296 F. 850, 852 (5th
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a transferee is an initial transferee under the bankruptcy code if they exercise legal control over the assets received
B. holding that agent of corporation who used corporate funds to secure personal loan was initial transferee
C. holding a party to be an initial transferee because she was given legal title to the funds
D. holding that a trustee is not required to avoid the initial transfer from the initial transferee before seeking to avoid it and recover from subsequent transferees and noting that this conclusion is consistent with case law that has disallowed automatic recovery from a subsequent transferee following the avoidance of an initial transfer through a stipulated judgment or default when the transferee had not been a party to the underlying avoidance proceeding
E. holding that a trustee may settle with an initial transferee and still pursue recovery against a subsequent transferee but notwithstanding the trustee will still be required to prove that the transfers were fraudulent and improper in connection with its suit against the subsequent transferee because the trustees settlement with the initial transferee did not involve any determination on the merits as to the initial transfers and in this way the subsequent transferee will be afforded its due process rights to contest the avoidability of these initial transfers
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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any time, including within one year of the purchase. Contrary to plaintiffs' assertion, there is no evidence that Father and the Company agreed that he would hold legal title "indefinitely.” Rather, all evidence suggests that this issue simply fell through the proverbial cracks until it surfaced in preparation for the merger with Darling in 2010. 16 . Inasmuch as plaintiffs' substantive allegations against Robert relate solely to his role in the 2010 merger and the Cold Spring title transfer, the Court also finds that Robert should be dismissed as a defendant as a matter of law. 17 . Further, the Court rejects defendants’ argument that plaintiffs' claims are barred by the probate exception to federal subject-matter jurisdiction. See Wisecarver v. Moore, 489 F.3d 747, 750 (6th Cir.2007) . 18 . Although Keating argues that Griffin
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a probate court lacked jurisdiction over a proceeding to declare heirship because a court empowered with probate jurisdiction may only exercise its probate jurisdiction over matters incident to an estate when a probate proceeding related to such matters is already pending in that court emphasis added quoting bailey v cherokee cty appraisal dist 862 sw2d 581 585 tex 1993
B. holding that a suit for compensatory and punitive damages against various probate judges for conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of property during the probate proceedings was not barred by the probate exception or rookerfeldman abstention doctrine
C. holding that texass probate statute does not affect whether the probate exception to federal jurisdiction applies to a case
D. holding that breach of fiduciary claim falls outside probate exception
E. holding that probate exception does not apply where plaintiffs assert claims for breach of fiduciary duty seek in personam jurisdiction over defendants and do not seek to probate or annul a will
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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purposes of setting alimony award); Steiner v. Steiner, 788 So 2d 771, 778 (Miss 2001) (same); Holmes v. Holmes, 7 Va App 472, 485, 375 SE2d 387, 395 (1988) (same); Weberg v. Weberg, 158 Wis 2d 540, 544-45,463 NW2d 382, 384 (Ct App 1990) (same); see also Clauson v. Clauson, 831 P2d 1257, 1263 n 9 (Alaska 1992) (stating in dicta that a “state court is clearly free to consider post-divorce disability income and order a disabled veteran to pay spousal support even where disability benefits will be used to make such payments’’); Davis v. Davis, 777 SW2d 230, 232 (Ky 1989) (noting that, although VA disability benefits were not divisible as property, courts could resolve an inequitable property division with a spousal support award); but see Ex parte Billeck, 777 So 2d 105, 109 (Ala 2000) . Based on our reading of Mansell — and our
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding military service disability payments are community property
B. holding that wife was entitled to prejudgment interest on alimony and child support arrearages from the date those payments were due
C. holding that alimony obligation was discharged by social security payments received by the wife
D. holding social security disability payments and military disability payments are separate property after dissolution of marriage
E. holding that federal law precludes courts from considering va disability payments in awarding alimony
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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plaintiffs’ expert report was deficient as to Agrawal, the court ultimately held that the trial court did not err in dismissing the claims against the association. Id. at 843. Thus, although the Kettle court appears to conclude that an expert report is required whenever a professional association is sued, it also recognizes that the liability of the professional association depends on the conduct of the association’s physician, and its holding is based on the inadequacy of the expert report as to that physician. Therefore, Kettle is not persuasive on the question before us. McCoy’s petitions alleged, under a section entitled “Vicarious Liability,” that OGA was “vicariously liable for the conduct 2671863, at *1 (Tex.App.-Beaumont Nov.23, 2004, orig. proceeding) (mem. op., per curiam) . Here, McCoy seeks to hold OGA liable under a
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the expert report adequate as to the vicarious liability claim against the hospital based on the actions of the doctors plaintiffs suit against the hospital including her claim that the hospital was vicariously hable for the actions of its nurses could proceed
B. holding that no expert reports specifically addressing conduct of professional corporation and professional association were required when plaintiffs alleged only vicarious liability based on medical negligence of entities physicians explaining that the entities conduct is not measured by a medical standard of care but rather their liability was solely vicarious
C. holding that expert report addressing hospitals conduct was not required when plaintiffs sole theory against hospital was vicarious liability based on ostensible agency and explaining that the conduct by the hospital on which the agency relationship depends is not measured by a medical standard of care these are principles of agency law on which no expert report is required
D. holding that medical center was not required to be named in expert report addressing its residents conduct because plaintiffs alleged no directliability claims against it and noting that medical center was implicated in report and so waived all its objections when it failed to object to sufficiency of report within twentyone days after service
E. holding expert report requirement fulfilled in claim against nurse by providing expert report of nurse as to standard of care and expert report of medical doctor as to causation
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | C | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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— and that he once agreed to store some cocaine. Because Landrau was charged with conspiracy to knowingly possess cocaine with the intent to distribute it, and because he defended by claiming ignorance of the cocaine, Landrau’s reading of the Rule 404(b) exceptions is too restrictive. See United, States v. Flores Perez, 849 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1988) (“[W]here ... the other bad act evidence is introduced to show knowledge, motive, or intent, the Rule 404(b) exceptions to the prohibition against character evidence have been construed broadly.”). The other bad act need not be identical to the crime charged so long as it is sufficiently similar to allow a juror to draw a reasonable inference probative of knowledge or intent. See United States v. Spinosa, 982 F.2d 620, 628 (1st Cir.1992) ; United States v. Nickens, 955 F.2d 112,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that evidence of prior drug sales was sufficiently similar to the crimes charged to be probative of the fact that the defendant was not merely an innocent driver who was involved in the drug transaction by accident
B. holding that evidence of violent crimes and other illegal activities of defendants gang was not unduly prejudicial because defendant was not directly implicated and the evidence was probative of elements of the crimes that the defendant was charged with
C. holding that where defendant was charged with drug conspiracy it was unnecessary for the government to prove defendants presence at the sales and hence the alibi defense was not supported by the law and no instruction was required
D. holding a fiveyear old drug conviction is probative of a defendants state of mind in a drug conspiracy case
E. holding prior drug deals admissible to prove knowledge of the drug trade
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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immunity insulates the State and its agencies from liability based on vague or principled notions [of government responsibility].” Id. at 574, 746 S.E.2d at 565. 34 . Respondent urges that J.H. v. West Virginia Div. of Rehabilitation Svcs., 224 W.Va. 147, 680 S.E.2d 392 (2009) stands for the proposition that the special duty doctrine creates a separate cause of action. J.H. involved a patient at a rehab center who was sexually molested by another resident. First, we note that J.H. is a per curiam decision which does, in fact, cite to the special duty doctrine as a basis to reverse the circuit court's 12(b)(6) dismissal of the case. However, it is clear that J.H. is contrary to the well-established and predominant application of the special duty doctrine. See also Lavender, supra . The overwhelming bulk of our jurisprudence
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing public policy exception to atwill doctrine
B. holding that the public duty doctrine applied to claims against the town and fire chief for negligence in responding to a fire call although plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to show the special duty exception applied
C. holding that the special duty doctrine as an exception to the public duty doctrine was a concept distinct from immunity and did not serve to resurrect an otherwise immune claim
D. recognizing doctrine
E. holding that liability foreclosed because there exists no class in the sense that would justify invoking the special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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States, 781 F.2d 752, 754 (9th Cir.1986), we affirmed dismissal of a suit alleging negligent inspection of a cargo compartment in the aircraft certification process. We emphasized that “[although Varig involved an alleged negligent failure to inspect, the Supreme Court wrote broadly in concluding that ‘the discretionary function exception precludes a tort action based on the conduct of the FAA in certificating ... aircraft for use in commercial aviation.’ ” Id. at 753 (quoting Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 815-16, 104 S.Ct. 2755). Finally, in West v. FAA, 830 F.2d 1044, 1048-49 (9th Cir.1987), we held that the FAA’s adoption of airport d e FAA’s actions are not susceptible to policy analysis because they were based on objective scientific standards. See Glacier Bay, 71 F.3d at 1453-54 ; Kennewick Irrigation Dist. v. United States,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the decision not to remove materials during canal construction was based not on policy judgments but on technical scientific engineering considerations and thus is not susceptible to policy considerations
B. holding that an agent acting outside his delegated authority is not protected by the discretionary function exception
C. holding that scientific hydrographic judgment and purely scientific considerations do not involve policy considerations and are not protected by the discretionary function exception
D. holding that a negligent guard theory would not fall under the discretionary function exception because sjuch negligent acts neither involve an element of judgment or choice within the meaning of gaubert nor are grounded in considerations of governmental policy
E. recognizing a discretionary function exception to that waiver
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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193 (1942) (permanent or indefinite employment); Miller v. Riata Cadillac Co., 517 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1974) (indefinite employment); Cooper v. Vitraco, Inc., 320 F.Supp. 239 (D.V.I. 1970) (Virgin Islands law) (lifetime employment); Silverman v. Bemot, 218 Va. 650, 239 S.E.2d 118 (1977) (lifetime employment); Rua v. Bowyer Smokeless Coal Co., 84 W.Va. 47, 99 S.E. 213 (1919); Dow v. Shoe Corp. of America, F.2d 165 (7th Cir.1960) (Wisconsin law) (lifetime employment). 3 . In Easter v. Kass-Berger, Inc., 121 A.2d 868, 870 (D.C.Mun.App.1956), for example, a local trial court held that an employment contract for an express term of two years fell within the statute. This holding is entirely consistent with the conventional interpretation accepted by local courts. See Cooper, 365 A.2d at 629 ; see also Farrow, 663 F.2d at 207 n. 29
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims
B. holding that the convention and us implementing statutes do not recognize an exception for seaman employment contracts and concluding that such contracts are commercial for purposes of same
C. holding that asbestosrelated losses to building are intangible or incorporeal and are thus excluded from insurance coverage
D. holding that if an insurer denies coverage based on an assertion that the underlying claim is excluded from coverage there is a presumption that the insurer did not suffer prejudice because prompt notice would have merely resulted in an earlier denial of coverage
E. holding that contracts for an indefinite period are excluded from the statutes coverage
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Before trial, defendant objected to the state’s proposed use of Wilcox’s testimony to demonstrate that defendant’s physical condition corroborated the BAC test result. The trial court ruled before trial that the testimony was admissible. At trial, the prosecutor asked Wilcox in the state’s case in chief: “Q. The .081 blood alcohol content, was that consistent with the defendant’s behavior that you observed personally? “A. Yes, it was.” On appeal, defendant assigns Wilcox’s trial testimony as error. His argument under his assignment presents two issues: (1) whether the evidence is admissible under ORS 813.010(1)(a); and (2) whether Wilcox was qualified to express the opinion that defendant’s behavior was consistent with his BAC. See State v. Jacobs, 109 Or App 444, 819 P2d 766 (1991) . Arguably, the case law is in conflict in
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to pose a hypothetical seenario to an expert witness consisting of the exact actions of which the defendant was accused in order to ask the expert to give an opinion as to whether the actions were illegal emphasis omitted
B. holding that an arresting officers participation in numerous duii investigations was insufficient to qualify him as an expert to give an opinion based on observable signs of intoxication as to the defendants bac
C. recognizing officers qualification to offer nonscientific expert opinion of intoxication based on training and experience
D. recognizing that the expert was particularly qualified to give his opinion
E. holding that an expert opinion on a question of law is inadmissible
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the zipper missing at the crotch.” Docket # 65 at 17. At the end of the day, the Court commented to defense counsel, ‘You will deal with the clothing issue, so I won’t have to hear about that tomorrow morning?” T.217. Counsel replied that he would do so. Thus, Van Gorder apparently registered a complaint about his clothing that day, but it was not placed on the record. During the rest of the trial, there were no further objections from Van Gorder or defense counsel regarding Van Gorder’s attire. Van Gorder was not prejudiced by appellate counsel’s omission of this issue on direct appeal. First of all, the state appellate court would have dismissed the claim as unpreserved due to the defendant’s failure to object. E.g., People v. Brown, 259 A.D.2d 985, 688 N.Y.S.2d 861 (4th Dep’t 1999) (citing N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law §§ 470.05(2),
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the defendant failed properly to preserve assignment of error for appellate review because the trial court had no opportunity to consider the defendants contention as presented on appeal
B. holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion for a continuance when record showed that contrary to defendants contention state did not fail to comply with discovery duties and that defendant failed to show that denial resulted in harm to his case
C. holding that defendant did not preserve for review his contention that he was compelled to wear prison clothing and handcuffs during trial and declining to address claim as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice
D. holding that defendant did not preserve his challenge to alleged prosecutorial misconduct where he did not timely object
E. holding that a defendant was not entitled to the affirmative defense where the evidence did not support his contention that he did not aid in the homicidal act
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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in the manner described, it shall set forth its reasons in a supporting memorandum by March 21, 2008, to which the Bank and/or IRS may respond by April 4, 2008. If — given the particular facts of this case — DOR is content to abide by the court’s ruling, it shall so notify the other parties and, with the consent of those parties, provide to the court the figures to be distributed out of the fund as of March 28, 2008. IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . It should be noted that DOR asserts no claim of sovereign immunity, thereby conceding the power of the court to resolve the parties' dispute in this forum. Compare Hudson Sav. Bank v. Austin, 479 F.3d 102, 108-09 (1st Cir.2007). 2 . See also Bridgewater Sav. Bank v. United States, 42 A.F.T.R.2d. 78-5133, 1978 WL 4507, at *3, (D.Mass. May 11, 1978) . The court’s ruling, however, did not, as a
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a judgment resolving the question of the priority of the federal tax lien constitutes a final and appealable order over which we have jurisdiction
B. holding that the united states court of federal claims does not have jurisdiction to enter declaratory judgment that taxpayers were not liable for any type of federal income tax or to issue injunction permanently removing the tax liens on property and levies on wages
C. holding that two federal tax liens had priority as a matter of law over the competing claims for fees and costs of a stakeholderbank
D. holding that priority unsecured claimants are entitled to payment only to the extent of the amount of the tax hens then if such claims happen to equal or exceed the amount of statutory tax liens the statutory tax hens are paid behind the claims of junior consensual henholders
E. holding that the court of federal claims had pendant jurisdiction over a state law contract claim that was part of the same case as a claim over which the court of federal claims had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 usc 1498b
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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... the school’s administration refused to take action”; (4) “[h]e continued to experience discrimination following his graduation from college”; and (5) “he was denied employment on account of his religious affiliation.” Based on these incidents, the BIA found that Soccer failed to demonstrate past persecution because the “discrimination” he faced “in his school, neighborhood, and employment opportunities concerned harassment from private individuals” and because it did not “rise to the level of persecution.” Admittedly, the BIA did not attempt to reconcile its conclusion that the school-related conduct was carried out by “private individuals” with the uncertainty about whether Soccer attended private or government schools. Cf. Sotelo-Aquije v. Slattery, 17 F.3d 33, 37 (2d Cir.1994) . But regardless of whether Soccer’s
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that delays by the government in processing an immigration application did not qualify as affirmative misconduct
B. holding that when the government takes property by flooding it the government is also liable for the cost of protective measures by landowners in preventing erosion caused by raised water levels
C. holding that an applicants wealth in the absence of evidence to suggest other motivations will not support a finding of persecution within the meaning of the immigration and nationality act
D. holding that in order to demonstrate a pattern and practice of persecution against a particular group petitioner must demonstrate that persecution is systemic pervasive or organized and is committed by the government or forces the government is either unable or unwilling to control
E. holding that the immigration and nationality act protects against persecution not only by government forces but also by nongovernmental groups that the government cannot control
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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training on the use of force demonstrate that at the time of Sample’s shooting, there was a clearly established constitutional right for a suspect to be free from deadly force except where the suspect poses an imminent or immediate threat either to officers or others. One of the first articulations of this right came in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). Under Gamer, the police may not use deadly force against a citizen unless “the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.” Id. at 3, 105 S.Ct. 1694. This same standard has been repeatedly followed by the Sixth Circuit in deadly force cases. Whitlow, 39 Fed.Appx. 297, 302-03, 2002 WL 1455317, at *5 ; Sova v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 142 F.3d 898
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that expert testimony on what constitutes deadly physical force and whether the use of force was justified should have been excluded
B. recognizing that deadly force is only justified where a suspect poses an immediate threat
C. holding that deadly force was justified where a suspect violently resisted arrest physically attacked the officer and grabbed the officers gun
D. holding the use of deadly force is constitutionally permissible only if the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm either to the officer or to others
E. holding that an officer cannot use deadly force unless a suspect poses an imminent threat of serious physical harm
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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original; citation and internal quotation marks omitted). All reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at trial must be drawn in favor of the Government. Id. First, Wagner argues that the Government failed to prove the existence of a RICO enterprise because, he maintains, it presented no evidence of an enterprise distinct from the alleged predicate acts, and, further, the predicate acts alleged were nothing more than a discontinuous series of individual crimes. Neither of these arguments has merit. Contrary to Wagner’s first argument, neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has required that the Government’s proof of the alleged enterprise be distinct from the racketeering conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981) ; United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that while both the enterprise and pattern of racketeering elements must each be proven the proof used to establish these separate elements may in particular cases coalesce
B. holding that 111 establishes three separate crimes each consisting of the elements of the preceding category of crime but adding an element or elements that must be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt resulting in an increased penalty
C. holding elements of rescission are 1
D. holding that medical expenses must be proven to be both reasonable and necessary
E. holding that the creditor must prove the elements of actual fraud
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Robideau intended D.C. to find his mother’s dead body. II. Was there sufficient notice of this reason for departure? The prosecution is required to notify the defendant of its intent to seek an upward departure. Minn.Stat. § 244.10, subd. 4 (2010); Minn. R.Crim. P. 7.03. Because the construction of procedural rules is reviewed de novo, we review de novo whether the notice in this case fulfills that required in the rules. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d at 923. Robideau argues that this departure basis was not included in the original notice of intent to seek an aggravated sentence. As a result, Robideau argues that it is an impermissible basis for departure and that he did not waive his jury trial right on this issue. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) ; State v. Shattuck, 689 N.W.2d 785, 786
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that criminal defendants have a right to a jury trial as to the facts on which a court bases an upward departure
B. recognizing that a criminal defendants right to a fair trial is fundamental
C. holding jury trial waiver valid despite defendants argument that district court failed to clearly distinguish between jury trial bench trial and the use of stipulated facts
D. holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings
E. recognizing the right to waive a jury trial
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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366 F.3d at 150; see also Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 147 (2d Cir.2003). Although the Second Circuit has held that there is no “magic” threshold number of harassing incidents that are required, as a matter of law, to state a claim, see Richardson, 180 F.3d at 439, “[isolated instances of harassment ordinarily do not rise to this level.” Cruz, 202 F.3d at 570. Generally, however, a hostile work environment is determined by “all the circumstances,” including “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; [and] whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance .... ” Howley, 217 F.3d at 154 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367); see Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Edüd 662, (1998) ; Brennan v. Met. Opera Ass’n, Inc., 192 F.3d
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that simple teasing offhand comments isolated incidents unless extremely serious are not discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment
B. holding teasing and offhand comments even if offensive are not actionable harassment
C. recognizing that the seventh circuit consistently has held that isolated comments that are no more than stray remarks in the work place are insufficient to establish that a particular decision was motivated by discriminatory animus
D. holding that isolated remarks are insufficient to prove discriminatory intent
E. holding no joint employer status despite some isolated incidents of supervision
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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J. Appellants, Eric Russell Lewis and Mary Loughran Lewis (the Lewises) were injured when the car in which they were riding was struck by a vehicle which was being chased by appellee, Officer Robert Epstein (Epstein). Epstein was employed by appellee, The Seminole Department of Law Enforcement (SDLE). The Lewises’ filed suit against Epstein and SDLE; the complaint was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. We affirm the dismissal of the complaint against SDLE. See Houghtaling v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 611 So.2d 1235 (Fla.1993); see also Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Mfg.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that tribal sovereign immunity did not bar rico suit only after concluding that sue and be sued clause in tribal ordinance unequivocally expressed waiver of sovereign immunity
B. recognizing that tribal sovereign immunity extends to agencies and subdivisions of the tribe
C. holding that an indian tribe is subject to suit only where congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity
D. holding that as a matter of federal law an indian tribe is subject to suit only where congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity
E. holding that florida does not have jurisdiction in a suit by other persons against an indian tribe absent express waiver of tribal sovereign immunity
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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of limitations and granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. See Bi-beau, 980 F.Supp. at 358. II Bibeau claims he was the victim of a conspiracy to fraudulently induce him to participate in the experiments, and that he was lied to about the possible side effects of the radiation and about the nature and purpose of the experiments. He also brings related state-law claims for fraud, battery, breach of fiduciary duty, strict liability for ultrahazardous activity and intentional infliction of emotional distress. These claims have their roots in the events of over three decades ago, and the parties agree that the statute of limitations applicable to both the federal and the state claims is two years. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) ; Or.Rev.Stat. § 12.110 (1997). The question
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the statute of limitations for 1983 claims is the most closely analogous state limitations period for general personal injury claims
B. holding that the appropriate state statute of limitations to borrow for section 1983 actions is that for recovery of damages for personal injuries
C. holding that even though constitutional claims alleged under 1983 encompass numerous and diverse topics and subtopics the state statute of limitations governing tort actions for the recovery of damages for personal injuries provides the appropriate limitation period
D. holding that if state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions the general or residual statute for personal injury actions should be used for 1983 actions
E. holding that federal courts apply the forum states personal injury statute of limitations for section 1983 claims
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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to alter its decision denying the petition for rehearing or substituting the opinion. This Court granted Shirley’s petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. II. Standard of Review Declaratory judgments are neither legal nor equitable. Felts v. Richland Cnty., 303 S.C. 354, 400 S.E.2d 781 (1991); Wiedemann v. Town of Hilton Head Island, 344 S.C. 233, 542 S.E.2d 752 (Ct.App.2001). The standard of review for a declaratory judgment action is, therefore, determined by the nature of the underlying issue. Doe v. S.C. Med. Malpractice Liab. Joint Underwriting Ass’n, 347 S.C. 642, 557 S.E.2d 670 (2001); Wiedemann, 344 S.C. at 236, 542 S.E.2d at 753; see Travelers Indem. Co. v. Auto World of Orangeburg, Inc., 334 S.C. 137, 511 S.E.2d 692 (Ct.App.1999) . The determination of the existence of an
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that a suit for declaratory judgment is neither legal nor equitable but is determined by the nature of underlying issue
B. recognizing that the declaratory judgment act is procedural in nature and not an extension of federal court jurisdiction
C. holding that the nature of the taxpayers legal interest in the subject property is determined by reference to state law
D. holding that the declaratory judgment act is remedial only and the party seeking declaratory relief must have an underlying cause of action
E. holding that neither injunctive nor declaratory relief is available to private litigants under the fdcpa
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 830 P.2d 236, 240 (Utah 1992). In addition, the plaintiff must experience either physical or mental symptoms as a result of the incident. Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 974-75 (Utah 1993). The undisputed facts demonstrate that James and Cheryl Lawson did not actually witness the event in which their daughter was hit. Because they did not even see the foul ball, they cannot claim that the accident caused emotional distress from fear of injury; the speed of the accident actually prevented any apprehension or anticipation of harm. Furthermore, even if James and Cheryl Lawson had anticipated the harm, they do not proffer any evidence indicating that they experienced severe mental illness as a result of the incident. See Hansen, 858 P.2d at 975 . Thus, as a matter of law, the Lawsons do not
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding in a fcra case that plaintiffs may not rely on mere conclusory statements rather they must sufficiently articulate true demonstrable emotional distress including the factual context in which the emotional distress arose evidence corroborating the testimony of the plaintiff the nexus between the conduct of the defendant and the emotional distress the degree of such mental distress mitigating circumstances if any physical injuries suffered due to the emotional distress medical attention resulting from the emotional duress psychiatric or psychological treatment and the loss of income if any
B. holding that plaintiffs outsized emotional reaction to car accident was not allowed as basis for emotional distress damages where reasonable person would have experienced some anger or been upset but would not have suffered severe distress
C. holding emotional distress suffered must be severe and not trivial
D. holding that the plaintiff had placed her medical condition in controversy by alleging that she had suffered severe mental or emotional distress
E. holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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inference of fraud or it will not satisfy even a relaxed pleading standard’ and it must also ‘allege that the necessary information lies within the defendant’s control, and then allegations must be accompanied by a statement of facts upon which allegations are based.’ ” United States ex rel. Sanders, 953 F.Supp. at 1413 (quoting United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ga., 755 F.Supp. 1040, 1052 (S.D.Ga.1990)). Such “specific facts supporting a strong inference of fraud” are absent in Morrow’s complaint. Nonetheless, the complaint’s lack of particularity with respect to the allegation of fraudulent concealment need not necessitate the dismissal of that claim. It is true that a “district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave 409 (9th Cir.1994) ; Alexander v. Vesta Ins. Group, Inc., 147
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that aims of wage and overtime provisions of flsa were not sufficiently connected to fourteenth amendment concerns so as to fall under congress 5 powers
B. holding that the flsa preempts certain state law claims
C. holding that the flsa does not prohibit changes in wage rates it prohibits the payment of overtime at less than one and onehalf times the regular wage rate
D. holding that the question of whether any employees were actually deprived of overtime compensation because of employers no overtime policy in violation of the flsa should have been addressed only at the damages stage of the proceedings
E. holding that flsa which provides an exemption from the acts wage and overtime provisions for fishermen preempts claims under alaskas minimumwage and overtime statute
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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of damage ... is satisfied by ... proof of some damage flowing from the unlawful conspiracy; inquiry beyond this minimum point goes only to the amount and not the fact of damage” (emphasis added)). In sum, Dr. Beyer’s declaration provides a reasonable basis and a feasible means for plaintiffs to prove impact on a class-wide basis. At the class certification stage, the court’s task is not to determine whether his opinion will ultimately be persuasive, but rather to evaluate whether his declaration is sufficient to demonstrate common questions of fact warranting class certification. See In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Lit., 280 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir.2001). The court is satisfied that his declaration satisfies this criteria. See, e.g., Linerboard Antitrust Lit., 203 F.R.D. at 220 ; In re Vitamins Antitrust Lit., 209 F.R.D.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that claims must put parties on sufficient notice of underlying arguments or arguments are deemed waived
B. holding that where counsel failed to articulate below the arguments they urged on appeal regarding sufficiency of the evidence the arguments were waived
C. holding arguments not raised on appeal waived
D. recognizing products liability and products actions based on negligence as part of the general maritime law
E. holding plaintiffs demonstrated a means of proving impact on a classwide basis despite defendants arguments regarding variations in products and pricing
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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see also Wis. Stat. § 273.06 (1935). ¶ 36. The language that remained after the legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 273.06 (1933) is identical to the language contained in § 816.06 (2007-08). See Wis. Stat. § 273.06 (1935). Therefore, since 1935, Wisconsin's supplemental proceeding law has been bereft of any language that would grant a judgment creditor the right to compel a non-judgment debtor third party to testify at a supplemental proceeding. 3. THE RESULT OF THE 1935 REVISIONS ¶ 37. We conclude that the legislature has deliberately removed the statutory right of judgment creditors to compel a non-judgment debtor third party to testify at a supplemental proceeding. As a general matter, courts may not find a statutory right in legislative silence alone. See Harvot, 320 Wis. 2d 1, ¶ 50, . This is so because statutory rights "are
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that another courts decision is a proper subject of judicial notice
B. holding that the courts should not undertake ad hoc judicial discovery of implied statutory rights
C. recognizing that courts routinely take judicial notice of documents filed in other courts
D. holding order of contempt sentence without statutory opportunity for appeal was in error but nevertheless involved a judicial act subject to judicial immunity
E. recognizing that courts should exercise judicial restraint in a facial challenge
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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invoked to artificially limit a trial court’s examination of the factors necessary to a reasoned determination of whether a plaintiff has met her burden of establishing each of the Rule 23 class action requirements.” Castano, 84 F.3d at 744 n. 17 (quoting Love v. Turlington, 733 F.2d 1562, 1564 (11th Cir.1984)). Appellants contend that the Supreme Court’s June 6, 2011 decision in Halliburton, 131 S.Ct. 2179, precludes district courts from rendering merits-based conclusions at the class stage. We disagree. In Halliburton, the Supreme Court does not state that merits inquiries or conclusions cannot occur, or must be ignored, in the fact-intensive Rule 23 analysis. Instead, the Supreme Court’s holding was specific to the securities fraud context in Halliburton. 131 S.Ct. at 2183 . This distinction, in fact, was expressly
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the securities fraud exception by pleading mail fraud or wire fraud if the conduct giving rise to those offenses also amounts to securities fraud
B. holding two days is sufficient to prove causation
C. holding that we erred by requiring securities fraud plaintiffs to prove loss causation in order to obtain class certification
D. holding that tolling applies to a subsequent class action when class certification was granted in a prior case
E. holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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regulations”); Marotta, 214 So.3d at 599, 2017 WL 1282111, at *7 (“Thus, Congress clearly intended to ‘protect the national economy from the burden imposed by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations,’ but did not clearly intend to extend broad immunity from common law liability to cigarette manufacturers.” (citation omitted)). Nothing in these six statutes reflects a federal objective to permit the sale or manufacture of cigarettes. As a result, we cannot say that Congress created a regulatory scheme that does not tolerate tort liability based on the dangerousness of all cigarettes manufactured by the tobacco companies but tolerates tort actions based on theories with a more limited scope. Cf. Altria Grp., 555 U.S. at 90, 129 S.Ct. 538 ; Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co.,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the federal cigarette labeling and advertising act did not preempt state law damages actions
B. holding that the federal cigarette labeling and advertising act did not preempt plaintiffs state law claims
C. holding that federal law did not preempt commonlaw fraud claim against cigarette manufacturer based on advertising of light cigarettes
D. holding that the labeling act did not preempt design defect claim against cigarette manufacturer
E. holding flsa did not preempt state law fraud claim
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the defendant did not know the nature of the act; (2) even if the defendant did, the defendant did not understand that the act was wrong; and (3) the defendant’s failure to know the nature of the act or that it was wrong was the result of a defect of reason caused by mental illness or mental deficiency. See State v. Persitz, 518 N.W.2d 843 (Minn.1994). The law presumes sanity and the defendant has the burden of proving each element of the defense of mental illness or mental deficiency by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Bouwman, 354 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn.1984). Regarding defenses relying upon a defendant’s use of alcohol or drugs, we have consistently held that mental illness caused by voluntary intoxication is not a defense. See State v. Patch, 329 N.W.2d 833, 836 (Minn.1983) ; see also State v. darken, 260 N.W.2d 463, 463
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that defense counsels failure to present voluntary intoxication as a defense in a capitalmurder prosecution was not beyond the range of reasonable professional judgment and thus did not amount to ineffective assistance in view of inconsistency of intoxication defense with deliberateness of the defendants actions during the shootings
B. holding that insanity is a complete defense to the criminal charge
C. holding such intoxication to be voluntary
D. holding that a defendants insanity due to voluntary intoxication is not a defense
E. holding that under florida precedent trial court erred in excluding expert testimony on intoxication as voluntary intoxication was a valid defense to a specific intent crime and expert testimony is relevant to a disputed voluntary intoxication defense
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Szpunar next argues that Indiana Code section 23-2-1-3 is unconstitutionally vague because it does not specifically define the term security. He contends that application of the statute in this case is void for vagueness because it " 'fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute," " and "because it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions." Br. of Appellant at 21 (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954)). Initially we note that this claim is waived because it was not properly raised in the trial court. See Vaillancourt v. State, 695 N.E.2d 606, 610 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied (citing Regan v. State, 590 N.E.2d 640, 645-46 (Ind.Ct.App.1992) ). However, we choose to address this claim on
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that defendants failure to file a motion to sever waives objection to single trial on multiple charges
B. holding that failure to raise issue at district court forecloses party from raising same issue on appeal
C. holding the failure to comply with the act does not bar defendant from raising a constitutional challenge to jury selection procedures
D. holding that although a defendant filed a motion in limine on an evidentiary issue a failure to object to the evidence at trial waives the issue for appeal
E. holding that the failure to file a proper motion to dismiss raising a constitutional challenge to a criminal statute waives the issue on appeal
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the right to tell a Labor Ready employee not to return to the shipyard if they were unsatisfied with the employee’s job performance. Although Lomeli speculated that he would follow Labor Ready’s instructions if they conflicted with Southwest’s instructions, he presented no evidence beyond this speculation that Labor Ready ever gave him any specific instructions on what to do at Southwest and how to do the work that Southwest employees assigned to him, let alone any instructions that conflicted with South west’s instructions. Instead, the only instructions Labor Ready gave to Lomeli were to be at Southwest at 3:30 on November 13, 2007, and to perform the work assigned to him by the Southwest supervisors. See Melancon, 834 F.2d at 1245; Capps, 784 F.2d at 617; cf. Brown, 984 F.2d at 677 . We conclude that Southwest “clearly had
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding injured employee who asked his employer for medical assistance and employer refused and employee then went to physician of his own choice employee could recover medical benefits
B. holding employee could proceed against employer in action for fraudulent misrepresentation where employees complaint alleged inter alia employee was regularly exposed to lead fumes and dust at place of employment employer tested employees blood to monitor lead levels employer willfully and intentionally withheld employees test results which showed employee had developed leadrelated diseases and employer subsequently altered those results to induce employee to continue working for employer employee further alleged employers concealment of employees condition prevented employee from reducing his exposure to lead and obstructed him from receiving appropriate medical treatment and that delay in treatment resulted in aggravation of employees injury
C. holding that fact issue raised when brown presented evidence that he was supervised by employee of his original employer and received instructions from that employee while working at union oil
D. holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between eeoc and employer employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree
E. holding that an employee could not establish pretext when the employer in good faith believed that the employee engaged in misconduct regardless whether the employee in fact engaged in the misconduct
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the extent they have been named in their individual capacities. With regard to that claim, the Court will proceed to consider the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and the Plaintiffs Motion to Strike. II. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # s 19 and 28) and Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Affidavit of Samuel D. Faulkner (Doc. # 87) Although Johnson cannot proceed against the ODNR, nor the individual De fendants to the extent they have been sued in their official capacities and to the extent they have been sued under the common law of Ohio, he may proceed against Weaver and Wolgemuth in his § 1983 action (Fourth Cause of Action), to the extent they have been named in their individual capacities. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-27, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991) . After setting forth the facts and the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the acts of a corporate officer done in his or her official capacity are acts of the corporation
B. holding that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is a suit against the state itself and not cognizable under 1983
C. holding that punitive damages are not recoverable against a state official sued in his or her official capacity
D. holding that a defendant can only be sued in his official capacity under 1983 if he acted pursuant to an official policy or custom in causing the constitutional injury
E. holding that a state official can be held individually hable under 1983 for acts taken within the scope of his or her official duties
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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court is without jurisdiction to hear the claim until administrative review is complete. See Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc., — U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 1084, 1089, 146 L.Ed.2d 1 (2000); Thunder Basin Coal Co., 510 U.S. at 202, 207, 218, 114 S.Ct. 771. Section 925(c) explicitly limits the scope of district court jurisdiction to the “judicial review of [a] denial” by the Secretary of the Treasury of an application for relief. The statutory scheme set forth in Section 925(c) makes it not only “fairly discernible” but abundantly clear that Congress intended to confine the initial adjudication of § 925(c) applications to the Secretary of the Treasury. First, § 925(c) is not written so as to create a freestanding opportunity for relief fr 120 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir.1997) ; United States v. McGill, 74 F.3d 64, 66 (5th
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that there must first be a denial by atf for the district court to review
B. holding that the federal district court had no subject matter jurisdiction to review the courts denial of a particular application for admission to the district of columbia bar
C. holding that the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review plaintiffs complaint to the extent they sought review of the district of columbia court of appeals denial of their petitions
D. holding that congress intended for district courts to review only the secretarys denial
E. holding that appeal from denial of rule 60b motion raised for review only the district courts order of denial and not the underlying judgment itself
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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We will affirm summary judgment if it is correct for any reason. City of Tempe v. Outdoor Sys., Inc., 201 Ariz. 106, 111, ¶ 14, 32 P.3d 31, 36 (App.2001). ¶4 Newman asserts that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment for Cornerstone. She argues that to comply with AR.S. § 20-259.01 the insurer must “make available” and “offer” UIM coverage, which she argues must necessarily include providing definite terms such as a premium quote in the blank space provided on the form approved by the Arizona Department of Insurance. To this end, Newman cites, generally, to Tallent v. National Gen. Ins. Co., 185 Ariz. 266, 915 P.2d 665 (1996) and Ballesteros, 226 Ariz. 345, 248 P.3d 193, and, more specifically, to Melendez v. Hallmark Ins. Co., 232 Ariz. 327, 305 P.3d 392 (App. 2013) (depublished by order of the Arizona Supreme
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that no binding insurance contract took effect because the initial premium was not paid
B. holding that district judge did not err in declining to apply a control premium where party advocating application of such a premium did not prove existence of prospective buyer who was willing to pay a premium
C. holding that wyeth failed to demonstrate that it was impossible for itto comply with both federal and state requirements and reasoning that it offered no such evidence and never argued that it attempted to give a warning but was prohibited from doing so by the fda
D. holding funds received by plaintiff from an insurance policy that was procured by the defendant and for which a premium was paid are not a collateral source
E. holding insurers uim offer was ineffectual when it offered no premium price and was on a form that failed to comply with department of insurance guidelines
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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it because Grilauskaite failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d) (“A court may review a final order of removal only if—(1) the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.”); Zara v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 927, 930 (9th Cir.2004) (“failure to raise an issue in an appeal to the BIA constitutes failure to exhaust remedies with respect to that question and deprives this court of jurisdiction to hear the matter” (citation omitted)). Grilauskaite argues here, as she did before the BIA, that she was denied due process because the IJ did not act as a neutral fact-finder. However, we do not have jurisdiction over this claim because it is not a colorable due process claim. Torres-Aguilar v. I.N.S., 246 F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir.2001) . Accordingly, we AFFIRM. ** This disposition
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that to invoke our jurisdiction a petitioner must allege at least a colorable constitutional violation
B. holding that a plaintiff in a bivens action must allege that the individual defendant was personally involved in the constitutional violation
C. holding a plaintiffs complaint must allege compliance with the signature and certification requirements of the wyoming constitution in order to invoke the courts subject matter jurisdiction
D. holding that the petitioner could demonstrate its constitutional standing for the first time on judicial review of an order of the land use board of appeals because the need to do so first arose when the petitioner sought to invoke the courts jurisdiction on judicial review
E. holding that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff failed to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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indicated that he was pressured into pleading guilty. Movant stated to the plea court that he had spoken with his counsel enough to know whether he wanted to plead guilty, his decision to plead guilty was of his own free will, and nobody threatened him to do so. After he was sentenced, Movant was again given the opportunity to indicate whether his pleas of guilty were coerced. Instead, he specifically stated that his pleas were not a result of threats or promises. He further stated that his lawyer answered all his questions, he was afforded enough time to discuss his charges with his lawyer, and aside from a delay in paperwork granting him access to the prison law library, his lawyer “fulfilled everything else” asked of him. See Nesbitt v. State, 335 S.W.3d 67, 69 (Mo.App.E.D.2011) . Because the record here clearly refutes
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion to substitute counsel on the strength of gonzalezs sworn responses at the pleataking that no one was threatening him or forcing him to plead where the defendant alleged that his attorney forced him to plead guilty and threatened him if he did not take the plea
B. holding that appellant was entitled to evidentiary hearing based on allegation his trial counsel told him he would most likely face a life sentence if he went to trial when the maximum sentence for the charge he plead guilty to was eleven years
C. holding no coercion where counsel told movant his conviction was likely because movant stated he understood full range of punishment and no one threatened him to plead guilty
D. holding that where interest was supposed to have run from the date of judgment but movant never asked for it and had accepted full payment of the judgment without it movant had forever waived his right to receive it
E. holding that the movant failed to establish that plea counsel coerced him to plead guilty to avoid taking the case to trial
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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for COA purposes, Gutierrez has not adequately shown pursuant t ns, Gutierrez claimed Harrell made a material misrepresentation when she stated: in the jury questionnaire, that she had never been charged, or arrested, with theft or shoplifting; and, during voir dire, that, although she had been charged with theft in 1979, the charges had been dismissed, and she had not been arrested. Gutierrez asserted Harrell had been arrested, charged, and convicted of theft, making her ineligible for jury service under Texas law. Furthermore, under McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, Gutierrez claimed his due-process rights were violated, because his trial counsel did not make a for-cause challenge based on Harrell’s voir-dire answers. 464 U.S. 548, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984) . The state-habeas court held Gutierrez had
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the trial courts order violated due process because it was unclear whether or not the defendant was required to appear on the date in question
B. holding that the due process clause is violated if the prosecution fails to disclose material evidence that is favorable to a criminal defendant
C. holding that due process was violated where a death sentence was imposed based on information in a presentence report and the defendant was not given an opportunity to deny or explain the information
D. holding due process violated where a potential jurors failure to answer a material question on voir dire deprived the defendant of information permitting a valid forcause challenge
E. holding that in a military criminal trial the governments use of classified information without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information did not violate the defendants due process rights
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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specific content of Karl’s testimony independently exposed potential government wrongdoing or even “whether it had an impact on the result” of Wender’s litigation. Robinson, 566 F.3d at 823. Finally, we see no material distinction between subpoenaed deposition testimony and testimony in open court, where both are offered in the context of a judicial or administrative proceeding alleging government misconduct. Caw argues that testimony given during a deposition, which is often conducted in the private confines of a law firm, differs from testimony elicited in court, which is open to the public. We have recognized that the public has a lesser First Amendment interest in accessing pretrial discovery materials. See Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1179-80 (9th Cir.2006) ; see also Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a district court could properly designate the magistrate to make a nonbinding recommendation on nondispositive motions under section 636b3 but such matters are reviewed de novo
B. holding parties to a lower standard when they seek to file under seal documents attached to nondispositive rather than dispositive motions
C. holding that it was appropriate for the district court to refer to the documents attached to the motion to dismiss since the documents were referred to in the complaint
D. holding that hearing requirement for summary judgment motions is satisfied by courts review of documents submitted by parties
E. holding in part that the presumption of public access attaches to pretrialnondiscovery motions whether preliminary or dispositive and the materials briefs and documents filed with the court in support of or in opposition to such motions but not to pretrial discovery motions
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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2145, 165 L.Ed.2d 92 (2006) (noting that SLUSA “does not itself displace state law with federal law but mak urt observed, the complaints alleged that “the false promise of best execution .,. induce[d] [Plaintiffs] to purchase or sell securities through Schwab for a fee, and [] caused losses directly resulting from what clients believed . to be legitimate securities transactions.” The net price obtained when purchasing or selling a security is plainly material to a buyer or seller, and the alleged breach here coincided with-securities transactions. See Kurz, 556 F.3d at 641 (finding that an argument “that the duty of best execution is not in connection with the purchase or sale of securities ... is frivolous, given Dabit ”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Newton, 135 F.3d at 270 ; Rayner, 248 F.Supp.3d at 504 (holding that
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding breach of best execution duty is a material misrepresentation in connection with the purchase or sale of the securities
B. recognizing a duty of best execution under federal securities law
C. recognizing a 10b claim for breach of duty of best execution
D. holding that a plaintiff alleging securities fraud must show that a defendant 1 made a material misrepresentation or a material omission as to which he or she had a duty to speak 2 with scienter 3 in connection with the purchase or sale of securities
E. holding that slusa preempts claims which allege a material misrepresentation or omission in connection with the purchase or sale of securities whether or not that allegation is an element of or otherwise necessary to the putative state claim
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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used in practice”). Further, the district court’s reliance on the testimony of MEEI’s patent law expert to support its conclusion that Dr. Levy made a significant contribution is misplaced. The patent law expert testified that a proposed experiment to test 200 mW/cm2, 250 mW/cm2, 300 mW/cm2, and 600 mW/cm2 could not serve as the basis for conception of a range of 300 mW/cm2 to 900 mW/cm2 because the experiments did not test beyond 600 mW/ cm2. Based on this testimony, the district court improperly concluded that an inventor must actually test at 900 mW/cm2 to conceive a range of 300 mW/cm2 to 900 mW/cm2. Testing at exactly the end points of a range is not necessarily required for a conception of that range. See Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, Inc., 772 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed.Cir.1985) . Because a trier of fact could conclude that
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that an agreed order with a state administrative agency was a public record and thus did not need to be disclosed
B. holding that an applicants failure to include specific issues in his petition for review results in abandonment of any claims of error he might have raised regarding the decisions related to those issues
C. holding that an agency need not credit an applicants explanations for inconsistencies in the record unless those explanations would compel a reasonable factfinder to do so
D. holding that ranges found in an applicants claims need not correspond exactly to those disclosed in a parent application
E. holding that the agency need not credit an applicants explanations unless those explanations would compel a reasonable factfinder to do so
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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husband for wrongful death and also asserted causes of action against the insurance company for bad faith and misrepresentation based on its refusal to properly settle her claim. Id. at ¶ 5. ¶ 13 In Speiry, we determined that the plaintiffs “wrongful death claim [submitted to the insurer] was not based upon her own coverage but on [her husband’s] liability coverage for negligence.” Id. at ¶ 10. Thus, we concluded that the plaintiff could not be considered a party to the insurance contract for purposes of her bad faith action against the insurer since the insurer, in its capacity as the liability insurer of her husband, owed her no contractual good faith duties to settle her claim. Id. at ¶ 11; see also Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746, 749-50 (Utah Ct.App.1991) . ¶ 14 Allstate argues that, like the plaintiff
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that there is an actual controversy between an insurer and the party injured by the insured
B. holding that an injured party in an underlying tort action was not a necessary party in an action by an insurer for declaratory judgment of nonliability where the injured person had not obtained judgment against the insured
C. holding that an insurer which insures a tortfeasor under a liability policy has no obligation of good faith and fair dealing to an injured third party even where the injured third party also carries a separate policy with the insurer
D. holding that an injured third party does not have the right to bring a direct action against a tortfeasors liability insurer
E. holding assignable to injured party insureds claim against insurer for judgment in excess of policy limits
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Supreme Court cases narrowing general jurisdiction’s scope. See Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 761; Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919, 131 S.Ct. 2846. But Gorman’s reasoning remains valid as applied to specific jurisdiction, so long as that the cause of action "arises out of” District residents’ internet transactions with the defendant. 6 . The Supreme Court reversed Shute v, Carnival Cruise Lines on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585, 111 S,Ct. 1522, 113 L,Ed.2d 622 (1991), but the Ninth Circuit held that its "but for test” was unaffected, Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995). 7 . It is unclear whether. Shoppers held that "discernable relationship” is the appropriate standard for the nexus requirement under the D.C. long-arm statute,' the Due Process Clause, or both. See 746 A.2d at 335 . In any event, because the Court’s opinion
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that we are to apply the legislative intent underlying a statute and to construe the statute in such a way as to prevent absurdity
B. recognizing that courts should not construe statutes in a way that leads to absurd results
C. recognizing that the same term appearing in two prior art patents listing the same inventor should be construed the same way
D. holding that the court will not interpret the law in such a way as to render a jurisdictional statute a nullity
E. holding that the nexus requirement in the longarm statute should be interpreted in the same way as the supreme courts due process nexus requirement and that that way is the discernable relationship test
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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was 14 days, but that she advised 59, at 93,858, 1985 WL 17668 (finding breach was not material where contractor did not pursue payment or assert any urgency). 2. Retainages and Withholdings a. Retainages for Lack of Progress The court also finds that the FBOP’s practice of retaining money from progress payments did not amount to a material breach. The parties agree that beginning in May 1995, the FBOP began to retain “portions of Morganti’s progress payments under F.A.R. 52.232-5(e), based on Morganti’s failure to make progress. Under F.A.R. 52.232-5(e), the contracting officer “may retain a maximum of 10 percent of the amount of the [progress] payment until satisfactory progress is achieved.” Nexus Constr. Co., ASBCA No. 31070, 91-3 BCA ¶ 24,303, at 121,461, 1991 WL 179322(1991) . The evidence presented at trial established
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that in certain circumstances fraud can be prosecuted under the statute
B. recognizing that the government may suspend or withhold progress payments under certain circumstances depending on the contracts provisions
C. recognizing that in certain circumstances inquiry notice may be determined as a matter of law
D. recognizing that the waiver rule is procedural not jurisdictional and we may suspend it in our discretion citations omitted
E. holding consumer debtors may be eligible for chapter 11 under certain circumstances
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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59.27(4). Again, in an effort to ascertain the scope of Sheriff Clarke's constitutional authority, our inquiry focuses on the nature of the task involved, as opposed to Sheriff Clarke's general power of appointment or his ability to assign a task. See Kocken, 301 Wis. 2d 266, ¶ 54 n.37 (discussing the inquiry to be made, pursuant to WPPA I); see also id., ¶ 67 ("Adhering to case law, we focus on the nature of the job assigned, that is, providing food, rather than the general power of job assignment."). ¶ 24. DSA casts a wide net in its effort to liken this case to Kocken by contending that "as was the case in Kocken, the real issue is whether Sheriff Clarke has constitutional authority to hire and fire personnel to transport prisoners under § 59.27(4)." See Kocken, 301 Wis. 2d 266, ¶ 4 . We are not convinced that this case can
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that sheriffs deputies were not employed in the service of marshall county and that the county personnel board therefore had no jurisdiction to review their respective terminations ordered by the sheriff
B. holding that under north carolina law a sheriff is an agent of the office of the sheriff and an officialcapacity suit against him is a suit against that office
C. holding that in south carolina sheriffs and deputies are state officials
D. holding that the constitutional qualifications for the office of sheriff were exclusive and the general assembly had no authority to impose additional qualifications as a prerequisite to holding the office of county sheriff
E. holding that the sheriffs hiring and firing of personnel to provide food service to the county jail is not a time immemorial principal and important duty that characterizes and distinguishes the office of sheriff and as such is not within the sheriffs constitutional powers
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the Twenty-first Amendment, which concerns alcoholic beverages, provides: “The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.” U.S. Const. amend. XXI, § 2. 4 . The Eighth Circuit’s consideration of a First Amendment challenge to an across-the-board prohibition of "adult uses” at establishments holding liquor licenses also suggests that such prohibitions implicate the First Amendment, since the court rejected the challenged based on LaRue. See BZAPS, Inc. v. City of Mankato, 268 F.3d 603, 607-08 (8th Cir.2001). 5 . The State does not argue that rational basis scrutiny, as used in LaRue, applies. See LaRue, 409 U.S. at 118, 93 S.Ct. 390 . Even if it had, we agree'with the Third,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that factor 10 should not be applied when the victim is the only one at risk
B. holding that californias conclusion that sexual performances should not be offered where liquor is sold was not an irrational one
C. holding that plaintiffs had constructive knowledge of infringement where they were shareholders in the defendants organization the defendants had openly sold merchandise bearing the mark at performances for years and one of the plaintiffs had attended performances where such merchandise was sold
D. holding that statements offered to establish defendants state of mind in making an employment decision and not offered for the truth of the matter asserted are not hearsay
E. holding that a state may only partly ameliorate a perceived evil at one time and that the failure of a regulation to eliminate all of an evil at one step does not make the regulatory classification irrational
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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testimony of various witnesses. We have examined those portions of the record, and we have determined that Culver failed to object to the testimony that adult magazines were found in the attic and placed on K.W.’s bed for the photographs (R. 932, 1173-74) and that he failed to object to the testimony about the recovery of a canvas bag that contained adult material. (R. 1184-85). Furthermore, the photographic exhibits about which the witnesses testified, and that we understand to be those to which Culver now objects, were admitted into evidence without objection at trial. (R. 1135, 1185.) By failing to object to the photographs when they were offered and admitted, Culver has waived appellate review of this argument. See, e.g., Shouldis v. State, 953 So.2d 1275, 1284 (Ala.Crim.App.2006) . Moreover, we note that, during his closing
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that in order to preserve an issue for review a party must make a timely and specific objection at trial
B. holding that where defense counsel made a timely objection and it was overruled by the trial court a further request for a mistrial was unnecessary and futile since the reasons for the objection were apparent and the trial courts denial of the objection indicated its belief the jury could properly hear the matter which was the subject of the objection
C. holding that for error to be preserved on appeal with regard to admission of evidence in violation of a ruling on a motion in limine that the evidence is inadmissible an objection should be made at the time the evidence is offered
D. holding timely and sufficiently specific objection is required to preserve error
E. holding that to preserve an alleged error in the admission of evidence a timely objection must be made to the introduction of the evidence specific grounds for the objection should be stated and a ruling on the objection must be made by the trial court
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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450 (Ala.Civ.App.2006), this court issued a writ of mandamus instructing the trial court to vacate its order granting leave for Envision to amend its pleadings in the case to add a new counterclaim, reasoning that “[t]he philosophy favoring finality of judgments dictates that Envision should not be allowed to amend its pleadings on remand to assert a counterclaim.” See also Eskridge v. Allstate Ins. Co., 855 So.2d 469, 473 (Ala.2003) (quoting Karagan v. Bryant, 537 So.2d 10, 11 (Ala.1988), quoting in turn other authorities) (emphasizing that “““the liberal amendment policy of Rule 15(a)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] [is not] to be employed in a way that is contrary to the philosophy favoring finality of judgments and the expeditious termination of litigation’ ” ’ ”); Karagan v. Bryant, supra ; and Costellos v. Jebeles, 406 So.2d 393
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a lessors interest can only be subject to liens arising from improvements performed on the leased property if the lease required the improvements or if under judicial interpretation the improvements were the pith of the lease
B. holding that a defendant in an action to redeem property from a tax sale was barred from asserting on remand a counterclaim for the value of improvements made to the property
C. holding that in determining the value of a partys nonmarital contribution to hybrid property under code 201073a3 the important factor is the value that improvements add to the property not their cost
D. holding the aggregate value of the land and its improvements is the controlling value
E. holding that plaintiff lacked standing after foreclosure sale to set aside the sale arid reinstate her right to redeem property based upon arguments that events surrounding the closing of the sale were improper
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
Supreme Court determined that the "no set of facts" language set forth in Conley, 355 U.S. at 45, 78 S.Ct. 99, "has earned its retirement,” Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S.Ct. at 1969. 23 . The decision in Bannum was based upon RCFC 56.1, which was abrogated and replaced by RCFC 52.1. RCFC 52.1, however, was designed to incorporate the decision in Bannum. See RCFC 52.1, Rules Committee Note (June 20, 2006). 24 . As defendant notes, plaintiff does not cite 37 U.S.C. § 204 in his complaint. See Def.’s Mot. 6 n. 2. However, because 37 U.S.C. § 204 is the only money-mandating statute that could provide the basis for the relief sought by plaintiff, the court presumes that plaintiff's claim for back pay is premised on 37 U.S.C. § 204. See Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1315 (Fed.Cir. 2003) ; see also Metz v. United States, 466 F.3d 991,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that 28 usc 2636c did not modify the filing requirement in 19 usc 1516aa2a
B. holding that 10 usc 1201 is a moneymandating statute
C. holding that visa revocations pursuant to 8 usc 1155 are not made unreviewable by either 8 usc 1252a2bii or 5 usc 701a2
D. holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc 1983
E. holding that 37 usc 204 is moneymandating
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
any event, the Government’s failures occurred after plaintiff failed to act with reasonable diligence to preserve her rights. This is an important distinction. Had plaintiff acted within a reasonable time period to exhaust her administrative remedies, the Government’s failure to respond might have caused a different outcome here. However, that is not the case at bar and I need not decide that question. I am sympathetic to the fact that plaintiff here acted (or failed to act, as it were) based on the representations of her former employers and her current counsel. Nevertheless, I cannot dispense freely with the 45-day time limit, which the Supreme Court has held must be strictly construed. Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1994) . Accordingly, I hold as a matter of law that
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that remand was necessary when the alj failed to adhere to 4041527d2s procedural requirements and noting that a de minimis violation of those procedural requirements may qualify as harmless error
B. holding that the requirements of title iii apply and must be satisfied
C. holding that requirements of rule 683 are mandatory and must be strictly followed
D. holding that nonmonetary claims are not subject to these requirements
E. holding that courts must strictly adhere to title viis procedural requirements and stating that these requirements are not to be disregarded by courts out of a vague sympathy for particular litigants
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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” Id. (quoting Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798 n. 4, 103 S.Ct. 2706, 77 L.Ed.2d 180 (1983)). Reasonable diligence does not require a debtor to conduct “ ‘impracticable and extended searches ... in the name of due process.’ ” Id. (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317, 70 S.Ct. 652). To that end, “[a] debtor does not have a ‘duty to search out each conceivable or possible creditor and urge that person or entity to make a claim against it.’ ” Id. (quoting Charter, 125 B.R. at 654). Efforts beyond a careful examination of a debtor’s own books and records are generally not required. Id. at 347. For unknown claimants or creditors, it is well established that “constructive notice of the bar claims date by publication satisfies the requirements of due process.” Id. at 348 ; see Brown v. Seaman Furniture Co., 171 B.R.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding publication in local and national editions of the new york times sufficient notice to claimant in pennsylvania
B. holding death caused by unknown object provides sufficient notice
C. holding that notice published in the new york times and the wall street journal was sufficient to satisfy due process owed to unknown creditors
D. holding publication in the wall street journal sufficient notice to unknown creditor injured in louisiana
E. holding publication notice in the wall street journal adequate under bankruptcy law
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
the district court record indicate not only that the district court considered the defendant’s argument but it must also explain why the district court decided to reject that argument. We do not require district courts to be automatons in their discussion of the Section 3553(a) factors. Rather, the focus is on substance rather than form and no “ritual incantation” of the factors is required. Instead, the record must simply be sufficiently clear to allow us to be assured that the district court considered all the arguments before it and to understand how those arguments factored into the district court’s ultimate sentencing determination. This is required even where the district court’s sentence of a defendant is presumptively reasonable under Williams. See e.g., Moms, 448 F.3d at 931 . Applying our past jurisprudence to this case,
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding presumption of reasonableness exists but still noting that a district court must consider the 3553 factors
B. holding that the rebuttable presumption of reasonableness does not relieve the district court of the obligation to consider other relevant statutory factors or sufficiently articulate its reasoning so as to permit reasonable appellate review
C. holding that any sentence that is properly calculated under the guidelines is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness
D. recognizing a presumption of reasonableness
E. holding that guidelines create a rebuttable presumption
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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have many statutory duties, the performance of which are mandatory to the administration of a bankruptcy estate, but whieh nevertheless may not yield a specific monetary recovery. Debtors’ counsel in Chapter 11 cases are not insurers of a successful reorganization and may be entitled to reasonable compensation even in a failed case. See Matters of Coastal Nursing Center, Inc., and Tybee Island Nursing Center, Inc., Ch. 11 Cases No. 93-40898 & 93-40899, slip op. at 5-9 (Bankr.S.D.Ga., Oct. 10, 1993) (Davis, J.). Nevertheless, where a debtor litigates distinct and separate claims within a Chapter 11 case, compensation is still dependent on whether the services were reasonable and necessary, which includes the factor of results obtained. See Resolution Trust Corporation, 996 F.2d at 1150 . Thus, while good faith, unsuccessful
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that absent other evidence of prevailing market rates the district judge may establish a reasonable rate based on his familiarity with the prevailing rates in the area
B. holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees
C. holding that successful party is one who is the ultimate prevailing party in the litigation
D. holding that federal prevailing wage rate statutes requirement that contractor pay not less specified minima presupposes possibility that successful bidder may have to pay higher rate to workers and that bidders reliance on governments representation of prevailing rate in computing its bid cannot be said to have been justified
E. holding that a court first should determined the reasonable hours and rate and then it may adjust the lodestar if the prevailing party was not completely successful in its efforts
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
writ denied). An appellate court has no jurisdiction to consider the merits of an appeal from a void judgment. Eubanks, 578 S.W.2d at 517. In such an instance the appellate court must set aside the trial court’s judgment and dismiss the appeal. Id. Mellon’s affidavits relate the factual circumstances surrounding the summary judgment hearing and entry of judgment. Under rule 19(d), motions, dependent on facts not apparent in the record, must be supported by affidavits or other satisfactory evidence. O’Connor v. Sam Houston Medical Hosp., Inc., 802 S.W.2d 247, 250 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 807 S.W.2d 574 (Tex.1991); Tex.R.App.Proc. 19(d). Other courts are in accord. See, e.g., Aycock v. Pannill, 853 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1993, writ denied) . It is axiomatic that an appellate court has
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding appellate court by virtue of rule 19d can consider materials not in the record that are filed in support of a motion to dismiss
B. holding that the trial court did not violate due process in considering the defendants motion to dismiss because the defendant had corrected its error in not serving its motion to dismiss on the plaintiff and because the plaintiff had received adequate time to consider and respond to the arguments made in the motion
C. holding that a motion court is compelled to dismiss late filed claims
D. holding that the court implicitly denied the plaintiffs motion to strike certain submissions because the court in its opinion granting defendants motion to dismiss relied on defendants materials
E. holding appellants issue was rendered moot because appellant was given the opportunity to make a record in support of his motion for new trial and appellate court considered that record in disposing of only issue raised in the motion for new trial
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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provision is unambiguous in setting forth, “We do not cover loss caused by mold”); Lundstrom v. United Services Auto. Ass’n-CIC, 192 S.W.3d 78, 91 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (presuming without deciding that even if the mold were a covered loss under the policy, the mold is not negligence claims can sometimes be asserted in the claims-handling context. See St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Dai-Worth Tank Co., Inc., 917 S.W.2d 29, 53-54 (Tex.App.Amarillo 1995); aff'd in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 974 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam). 19 .See Tex.R.App. P. 38.1(h) ("The brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.”); San Saba Energy, L.P., 171 S.W.3d at 338 ; Wright v. Greenberg, 2 S.W.3d 666, 673
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that parties asserting error on appeal must put forth some specific argument and analysis citing the record and authorities in support of the parties argument
B. holding that appellate court will not consider an argument on appeal that is different from the specific argument presented to the trial court even if it relates to the same general issue
C. holding that the defendant waived argument on appeal by failing to develop a cogent argument
D. holding that the appellant waived an argument listed only in his summary of the argument
E. holding party must support argument with legal authority
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Blackmon-Malloy, 575 F.3d at 713 (quoting President, 627 F.2d at 362). 14 . To the extent that Hyson argues that the application score or interview should have played a larger role in the hiring decision, the Court "defer[s] to the Government's decision of what nondiscriminatory qualities it ... seek[s] in filling the ... position.” Stewart v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 422, 429 (D.C.Cir.2003). 15 . This is especially true in the context of the prima facie burden-shifting scheme and the direct-versus-indirect evidence inquiry. See Wicks, 701 F.Supp.2d at 44 (" '[DJirect evidence does not include stray remarks in the workplace' " (quoting Ayala-Gerena v. Bristol Myers-Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 86, 96 (1st Cir.1996))); Prater v. FedEx Corp. Servs., Inc., 2009 WL 1725978, at *6-7 (D.D.C. June 18, 2009) . Once the focus shifts to the ultimate inquiry
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding because libels erisa claim is based on alleged circumstantial evidence we analyze it under the mcdonnell douglas framework
B. holding that absent a casual link between supervisors isolated racial remarks and employers decision to promote stray remarks cannot support a verdict for race discrimination
C. holding because the plaintiffs erisa claim is based on alleged circumstantial evidence the eighth circuit analyzed the claim under the mcdonnell douglas framework
D. holding that stray comments without more cannot establish a case of employment discrimination but if other indicia of discrimination are properly presented the remarks can no longer be deemed stray and the jury has a right to conclude that they bear a more ominous significance
E. holding that without a link to the challenged decision stray remarks did not constitute indirect evidence of discrimination sufficient to satisfy the final prong of the mcdonnell douglas framework
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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issued several non-precedential opinions granting motions to reopen that were filed with the BIA before Dada but not adjudicated by the BIA until after Dada that provide apt comparison to Patel’s situation. In these cases, the BIA has construed the motion to reopen as an “implicit” request for withdrawal of voluntary departure because the alien was unaware of his/her right to request withdrawal at the time of filing the motion to reopen and because the motion coupled with the alien’s “decision to remain in the United States, clearly reflect that [the alien] was more interested in pursuing the underlying application for relief than in pursuing voluntary departure.” In re Surujpaul Persaud, 2009 WL 3335993 (BIA Oct. 7, 2009); see also In re Mahmood, 2009 WL 5252795 (BIA Dec. 10, 2009) ; In re Rodenau, 2009 WL 2171614 (BIA July 9,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding the bia did not err in denying aliens motion to stay voluntary departure period pending determination on the motion to reopen
B. holding bia did not err in determining request for stay of voluntary departure is not an implicit request for a withdrawal of voluntary departure
C. holding that the bias denial of a motion to reopen based on the merits of the underlying application for adjustment of status was a discretionary decision under the adjustment of status statute and this court therefore did not have jurisdiction over an appeal of the bias ruling
D. holding motion to reopen seeking adjustment of status constituted a withdrawal of the request for voluntary departure and the adjustment motion was therefore not barred based on failure to depart within the voluntary departure time allowed
E. holding that bia did not err in denying motion to reopen that was filed after expiration of aliens voluntary departure period because alien had failed to depart
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.... When the government targets not subject matter but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant. Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination. The government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction. Id. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 2516 (citations omitted). 12 . The district court and the Building Authority rely on Lubavitch Chabad House, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 917 F.2d 341 (7th Cir.1990), as relevant authority. This reliance is misplaced; the legal d.2d 897 (1992); Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024, 1030 (2d Cir.1989) , cert. denied, 496 U.S. 926, 110 S.Ct. 2619,
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that display of unattended menorah in city hall park quite close to seat of government violated establishment clause because its combination alongside a secular holiday display did not cause a viewer to see the exhibit as a whole or as a unitary symbol
B. holding that display of solitary semipermanent menorah in city hall park closely associated with seat of city government violates the establishment clause
C. holding that rluipa violates establishment clause
D. holding there was no establishment clause violation in displaying a privately funded menorah during chanukah in the public plaza on which city hall and county building are located
E. holding that a city owned creche and christmas tree erected in a public park adjacent to another park with a christmas tree lights and a privately owned menorah did not offend the establishment clause
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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appeal that decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), and if need be thereafter, to an appropriate federal Court of Appeals. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5); see also Ramani v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 554, 559 (6th Cir.2004) (noting that the purpose of the I.N.A.’s exhaustion requirement is to “allow the BIA to compile a record which is adequate for judicial review” (citation omitted)). This review process, not surprisingly, is exclusive. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(9) and (d)(1). Thus, other courts who have confronted this issue have reached the same conclusion. See Howell v. INS, 72 F.3d 288, 293 (2d Cir.1995) (finding jurisdiction lacking where removal proceedings had begun because denials of status adjustment may be reviewed by immigration judges); cf. Pinho, 432 F.3d at 200-201 . CONCLUSION Thus, having failed to exhaust her
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that an aao eligibility determination is final and ripe for district court review if removal proceedings have not been initiated but noting that judicial review is barred in cases where removal proceedings have begun
B. holding the district court did not have jurisdiction to review denial of adjustment of status where removal proceedings are pending
C. holding that court lacked jurisdiction to review merits of question of whether immigration officer correctly initiated expedited removal proceedings
D. holding that review of an original removal decision and a subsequent removal order are distinct
E. holding that a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the apa to review the denial of an aliens application for adjustment of status where the alien is in removal proceedings
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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of Criminal Procedure — Part III: Right to Jury Trial, Peremptory Challenges: Equal Protection Issues, 85 Geo. L.J. 1240, 1257 n. 1734 (1997). In addition, United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir.1987), provides that if “the Government used its peremptory challenges to strike the last remaining juror of defendant’s race” (two were challenged for cause and one could have been challenged for cause — id. at 1312) it “raise[s] an inference” that that “juror was excluded” because of his race (Native American). Id. at 1314. In addition, United States v. Wills, 88 F.3 lding uncounseled Article 15s and summaty courts-martial may not be used as sentence enhancers). Counsel's conflict of interest. Compare Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 783, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 3120, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987) with United States v. Smith, 36 MJ 455, 457
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding the existence of a possible conflict required remand for a determination of whether an actual conflict of interest existed and holding a new trial would be required if an actual conflict existed
B. holding defendant must demonstrate an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyers performance
C. holding that defendant must demonstrate both that counsel actively represented conflicting interests and that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyers performance to establish a sixth amendment violation
D. holding that inmates must demonstrate an actual injury
E. holding that defense counsels performance was adversely affected by an actual conflict of interest if a specific and seemingly valid or genuine alternative strategy or tactic was available to defense counsel but it was inherently in conflict with his duties to others
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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stolen the money, and that he was acting in his private (vice duty) capacity in going to the appellant’s room. Record at 101-02. His primary motive was to be reimbursed for the money he had given LCpl Woods. The appellant was gone, but his roommate invited Cpl Cervantes into the room. Cpl Cervantes told the roommate he was looking for an envelope LCpl Woods’s wife had left, and asked if he could look in appellant’s “cammies” to see if perhaps it was there. The roommate agreed. Cpl Cervantes found the envelope — torn open — in the appellant’s cammies. The money was missing. Record at 102. We review the military judge’s decision on a suppression motion for an abuse of discretion, applying a clearly erroneous standard to his essential findings of fact, and we conduct a de novo re 1996); United States v. Portt, 21 M.J. 333, 334
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that fourth amendment claims are not cognizable on habeas review because the fourth amendment exclusionary rule does not relate to the accuracy of the factfinding process
B. recognizing good faith exception to fourth amendment exclusionary rule
C. holding that the exclusionary rule under the fourth amendment applies to civil forfeiture proceedings
D. holding that the fourth amendment and the exclusionary rules are not implicated by a private search
E. holding that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule should not bar the use of evidence obtained by police officers acting in good faith and with reasonable reliance on a facially valid search warrant
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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a news show as such. The fact remains, however, that it depicted, in Best’s case, an arrest on criminal charges and facts concerning prior arrests or citations. These are legitimate matters of public concern, even if Best’s encounters with the police involved conduct that was arguably toward the lower end of the spectrum of criminality. With these principles in mind, the Court turns to defendants’ argument regarding the construction of IRPA. Federal courts generally “interpret laws consistent with their meaning, but with an eye towards avoiding exposing any constitutional infirmities.” Dean Foods Co. v. Brancel, 187 F.3d 609, 614 (7th Cir.1999). Illinois adheres to this canon as well. See, e.g., In re Estate of Poole, 207 Ill.2d 393, 409, 278 Ill.Dec. 532, 799 N.E.2d 250, 259 (2003) (citing People v. Fisher, 184 Ill.2d 441, 448,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that courts must construe the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff by giving the plaintiff the benefit of all the inferences that can be reasonably drawn from the pleaded facts
B. recognizing the courts duty to construe a statute in a manner that upholds its validity and constitutionality if it can reasonably do so
C. recognizing courts obligation to construe meaning of relatives
D. recognizing courts special duty to construe liberally a pro se plaintiffs pleadings
E. holding that courts are to construe statutes so as to harmonize with other relevant laws if possible
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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delayed opening of the restaurant when the subcontractor misread the building plans and constructed the building foundation in the wrong location. See id. at 1302. The court cited the economic loss rule as the basis for its holding: As a general rule, no cause of action lies in tort when purely economic damage is caused by negligent breach of a contractual duty. This economic loss rule prevents recovery for negligence when the duty breached is a contractual duty and the harm incurred is the result of failure of the purpose of the contract. Id. at 1303. A number of courts of appeals cases have applied the economic loss rule in varying contexts since the decision in Jardel. See, e.g., Town of Alma, 985 P.2d at 57 (this appeal); Grynberg v. Agri Tech, Inc., 985 P.2d 59, 63 (Colo.App.1999) ; Terrones v. Tapia, 967 P.2d 216, 220
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding economic loss doctrine bars negligence claim based on service contract
B. holding that the economic loss rule bars negligence claim for failure to receive a particular return on cattle investment program
C. holding that subject to certain exceptions the economic loss rule bars recovery in tort for economic damages arising out of matters governed by contract
D. holding that economic loss doctrine bars negligence claims as to engineering services related to roof repair and reconstruction
E. holding that the preclusion of tort remedies for only economic loss extended to negligence claims
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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jurisdiction over the industry.” Connecticut Light, 324 U.S. at 531, 65 S.Ct. 749. Additionally, the Court was especially cognizant of the legislative history of the FPA in which Congress communicated its belief that the FPA did not give the FPC “jurisdiction over local rates.” Id. at 525-28, 65 S.Ct. 749. The Court also cited a House of Representatives report which stated that “no jurisdiction is given over local distribution of electric energy, and the authority of States to fix local rates is not disturbed even in those cases where the energy is brought in from another state.” Id. at 527, 65 S.Ct. 749 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 1318, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 8, 27 (1935)); cf. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Ind., 332 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 190, 92 L.Ed. 128 (1947) . With this background in mind, we believe that
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that state court could not have unreasonably applied federal law if no clear supreme court precedent existed
B. holding that requiring a permit and the restoration of the land after the mining operations had concluded did not preempt federal law however the court did recognize that where a state regulation rendered it impossible to exercise a right granted through federal legislation that state regulation would be in conflict with the federal right
C. holding nga extended federal regulation only to area which supreme court had held state could not reach and did not usurp state authority
D. holding that state could not assert sovereign immunity defense where the state had waived immunity in state court and agreed to remove suit to federal court
E. recognizing that the district court did not reach the merits
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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in Greaves met the requirements of effective service by having an alias summons issued before they made their second attempt at process, an action Miller & Custom failed to take. Thus, Miller & Custom’s first attempt at service failed because notice was not sent to the Debtor’s attorney. Their second effort by personal service was not attempted until long after the 10 day period after the summons was issued, in violation of the mandate of the last sentence of Bankruptcy Rule 7004(f). Thus, at best, Miller & Custom contend that proper in person-am jurisdiction over the Debtor is deriv ervice of process is defective, any default judgment is void because the court had no jurisdiction over the parties. Kaczmarczik v. Van Meter (In re Van Meter), 175 B.R. 64, 67 (9th Cir. BAP 1994) ; Cossio v. Cate (In re Cossio), 163 B.R. 150,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding pursuant to bankruptcy rule 7004b9 that because the creditor mailed the complaint and summons to the debtors attorney and to the address listed in the debtors bankruptcy petition service of process was sufficient even if the debtors were out of the country and did not actually receive notice of the complaint and summons
B. recognizing that a default judgment based on improper service is void
C. holding that a motion to modify a divorce decree was filed for purposes of rule 5105 when summons was issued
D. holding that default judgment could not be rendered after the defendant had served plaintiff with a copy of a motion to dismiss that had not then been filed
E. holding that failure to serve debtors with filed complaint and issued summons rendered default judgment void
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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it. Because we find that H.B. 1544 attempts to regulate the use of the information legally obtained, we turn to Anderson Courier’s second issue involving commercial free speech. In determining whether a regulation of commercial speech survives First Amendment scrutiny, we look to the factors set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980). Under the Central Hudson test, if a state wishes to regulate truthful, non-deceptive speech relating to a commercial transaction, the state bears the burden of showing that: (1) the state has a substantial interest in supporting the regulation; (2) the regulation directly and materially advances that interest; and (3) the regulatio 1792, 123 L.Ed.2d 543 (1993) . Despite its substantial interests, the State
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that preventing fraud maintaining ethical standards and privacy were substantial interests
B. recognizing that preventing gang activity and maintaining order in the prison population were legitimate penological goals
C. holding that the government interest in preventing crime is compelling
D. recognizing a broader ethical duty of confidentiality
E. holding that privacy and maintaining ethical standards in statelicensed professions were substantial interests
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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officers’ comments were not particularly “evocative.” Id. As such, the defendant “was not subjected/by the police to words or actions that the police should have known were likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Id. Innis clearly establishes that interrogation includes express questioning or its functional equivalent — any words or actions that police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Id. at 300-02, 100 S.Ct. 1682. The Supreme Court has provided little additional guidance on what constitutes the functional equivalent of express questioning, although it has suggested that interrogation may be limited to “compelling influences, psychological ploys, or direct questioning.” Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 529, 107 S.Ct. 1931, 95 L.Ed.2d 458 (1987) . Innis thus provides a very general rule, and
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that defendants request to speak to his parents was not an invocation of the right to remain silent because defendant never gave the police any indication that he wanted to stop talking only indicating he wanted to take a break from the interrogation to speak with his parents
B. holding that allowing suspect to speak with his wife in the presence of a police officer was not interrogation as it did not fall into any of these categories
C. holding that questioning of a juvenile by a principal in presence of a police officer did not constitute an interrogation because principal was sole questioner and was not acting as an agent for police
D. holding that fifth amendment protection against selfincrimination requires police to notify suspect of right to counsel and to cut off interrogation once suspect invokes the right absent counsel further interrogation may not occur unless suspect initiates subsequent conversation if police initiate subsequent interrogation there can be no valid waiver of counsel even though police advise suspect of his or her constitutional rights and suspect acquiesces in the interrogation
E. holding that discharge of a police officer for the choice to enter into a relationship with the wife of his superior officer on the force was rational
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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basis of injuries to third parties, unless the plaintiff additionally demonstrates “a close relation to the injured third party and a hindrance to that party’s ability to protect its own interests.” Mid-Hudson Catskill Rural Migrant Ministry, Inc. v. Fine Host Corp., 418 F.3d 168, 174 (2d Cir. 2005). Here, however, Salim is not suing on his parents’ behalf; instead, he seeks to assert his rights under a contract he allegedly formed with the Trustee. And while Sal-im’s parents may have been beneficiaries of this alleged agreement, insofar as it purported to shield them from suit, Salim brings this action as the contract’s principal. Moreover, Salim seeks to recover damages for his own injuries, not for any injuries his parents may have sustained. See, e.g., Leibovitz, 252 F.3d at 188 . Accordingly, the doctrine of third-party
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing a hostile work environment claim under section 1983
B. holding that plaintiffs allegations of loosely related actions that she perceived to be hostile to her based on her race are insufficient to meet the heavy burden required to prove hostile environment
C. holding that two alleged incidents of hostile treatment in which a supervisor made a comment about the plaintiffs body and touched her breasts with some papers did not constitute a hostile work environment
D. holding that a viable hostile work environment claim requires an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive
E. holding that a plaintiffs psychological distress was not vicarious in a hostile work environment case where she experienced her workplace as hostile by reason of the alleged harassment of other women out of her presence
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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2. Thus, the RLCWA has satisfied the pipes-in-the-ground test. The parties disagree, however, over whether the RLCWA has the legal right to serve Fox Run. Ohio law gives water districts plenary authority “[t]o supply water to users within and without the district.” Le-Ax, 346 F.3d at 707 (quoting O.R.C. § 6119.01(A)). Because the RLCWA is a regional water district in the State of Ohio, and because Fox Run is located within the RLCWA’s service district, the Court concludes that the RLCWA has the legal right to serve Fox Run. Id. While Grafton admits that “Fox Run was an area within the water district served by RLCWA and was included in the or exation of land within area served by water district did not act to remove that land from water district’s service area). Cf. Wayne, 36 F.3d 517 ; Lexington-South Elkhom, 93 F.3d 230 (holding
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that article x 2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially
B. holding substantial completion had occurred because water district took possession of all the lines filled them with water and began using them to serve the customers of the water district
C. holding that 1926b prohibited munici pality from using its annexation of territory within rural water district as springboard for providing its own water service to residents
D. holding that village could not condition provision of water services on annexation where prospective customer was within a rural water associations service area and the water association was federally indebted
E. holding that clean water acts notice provision is a condition precedent to all claims
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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with its NEPA obligations when implementing a land-use program.” Id. We have recently confirmed that these holdings apply at least to areas of greater than 5,000 acres, even if they have not previously been inventoried for wilderness consideration, and also to inventoried areas of under 5,000 acres. Lands Council v. Martin, 479 F.3d 636, 640 (9th Cir.2007). Because “[r]oadless areas ... also help conserve some of the last unspoiled wilderness in our country,” Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1121 (9th Cir.2002), there is no reason to suppose that such characteristics, when they appear on BLM land, rather than on Forest Service land, do not implicate the planning process. They therefore also implicate NEPA. An ater, 173 F.3d 1033, , 174 F.3d 180, 187 (4th Cir.1999) ; Sierra Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d 623, 631 (6th
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding a rod to be final agency action
B. holding that the rod and eis for a program were final agency action
C. holding that ftc issuance of a complaint meets the apa definition of order and therefore is agency action even if not final agency action
D. holding that it appears wellestablished that a final eis or the rod issued thereon constitute the final agency action for purposes of the apa and collecting cases
E. holding that the designation of the rod as final agency action under the apa is generally recognized
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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by the arbitrator. Arbitrators have wide latitude in how they conduct proceedings. See Association of Flight Attendants v. USAir, Inc., 960 F.2d 345, 349 (3d Cir.1992) (“Once the parties are obligated to submit a dispute to arbitration, then ‘procedural questions’ growing out of the dispute and bearing on its final disposition are to be left to the arbitrator.”); Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n Local Union No. 420 v. Kinney Air Conditioning Co., 756 F.2d 742, 744 (9th Cir.1985) (noting that procedural questions are “part of the bundle of issues committed to decision by the arbitrator”). The institutional role of the judiciary with respect to the conduct of the arbitral process is a limited one. See John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 84 S.Ct. 909, 11 L.Ed.2d 898 (1964) ; Association of Flight Attendants, 960 F.2d at
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that upon vacating an arbitration award the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator
B. holding that while the determination of the scope of an arbitration agreement is for the court the enforcement of pleading requirements before the arbitrator is a procedural matter for the arbitrator
C. holding that because the parties agreed to arbitrate and both placed the issue before the arbitrator the issue of consolidation was for the arbitrator
D. holding that questions of procedure are for the arbitrator not the courts
E. recognizing that questions of arbitrability canbe delegated to the arbitrator but concluding that the parties did not agree to submit any issues to the arbitrator because the agreement never came into existence by its terms
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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a final order for purposes of the Gaming Act, 4 Pa.C.S. § 1506, by reference to the Judicial Code’s definitions, 42 Pa.C.S. § 102); Bray v. McKeesport Housing Auth., 114 A.3d 442, 446 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (defining housing authority as a local agency for purposes of the Local Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 752, by turning to the definition of "Commonwealth government” in the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 102); Frazier v. Phila. Cnty. Office of Prothonotary, 58 A.3d 858, 859 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (defining "unified judicial system” in Section 102 of the Right to Know Law, 65 P.S, § 67.102, by relying upon the definitions provided in the Rules of Judicial Administration, Pa.R.J. A. 102); Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna Cnty. v. Pennsylvania Office of Open Records, 2 A.3d 810 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) . This is a reasonable and intuitive approach,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that federal law applies because judicial estoppel relates to protection of the integrity of the federal judicial process
B. recognizing judicial immunity for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction
C. holding that the director of the office of domestic relations was a judicial agency pursuant to the rtkl because the director was administrative staff of the unified judicial system as defined in the judicial code 42 pacs 102
D. holding that despite the merits of the argument the appellant raised on appeal the issue was not preserved for judicial review because it was not raised before the administrative agency
E. holding that the director of the office of domestic relations of a court of common pleas was administrative staff of the court and thus a judicial agency under the rtkl
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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control inquiry would be focused on the performance of the work and the condition of the premises. Unless specific facts (e.g., a contract which required the Space Needle to provide for the safety of the workers) pointed to retained right of control, the principal would have no liability. Here the alleged dangerous condition relates to a condition of the work site and the failure to provide protective barriers, so our scope of retained control inquiry must focus on the elevators. Within the scope of that limited control, the Space Needle had a duty of care. Accord Phillips, 74 Wn. App. at 751; Greenleaf v. Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co., 58 Wn.2d 647, 652, 364 P.2d 796 (1961) (finding the common law duty was breached by failing to provide proper lighting); Doss, 60 Wn. App. at 130 . The Space Needle retained sufficient control
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that summary judgment was improper because the common law duty might have been breached by failing to provide a safety net above the worker to guard against falling slag
B. holding that the issue of whether or not a defendant airline breached its duty of due care by failing to transfer a pregnant employee from a flight precluded summary judgment for the defendant on plaintiffs negligence claim
C. holding that the trial court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of defendant and denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment where plaintiff failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that defendant breached its duty to act in good faith
D. holding on summary judgment before the question of the insurers obligation to indemnify was decided that the insurer was liable for the costs of the insured in defending the declaratory judgment action because it breached its duty to defend
E. holding that the rule bars subcontractors negligence claim because no independent duty was breached
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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an injury to her leg (a scheduled member) so that § 42-9-10 controls her compensation. We agree, and join those courts which have held that the hip socket is part of the pelvis and not part of the leg for workers’ compensation purposes. See e.g. Blackburn v. Allied Chemical Corp., 616 S.W. (2d) 600 (Tenn. 1981) (finding the hip socket itself is part of the pelvis); Scamperino v. Federal Envelope Co., 205 Neb. 508, 288 N.W. (2d) 477 (1980) (stating that the hip is neither a part of the leg nor a scheduled member); Milburn v. Concrete Fabricators, Inc., 18 Ark. App. 23, 709 S.W. (2d) 822 (1986) (stating that medically speaking the hip may be considered part of the leg, but from a legal view it is part of the body as a whole); Lauhoff Grain Co. v. McIntosh, 395 N.W. (2d) 834 (Iowa 1986) ; Altus House Nursing v. Roberts, 646 P. (2d) 9
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that although there was no property in a dead body at common law the one whose duty it is to care for the body of the deceased is entitled to possession of the body as it is when death comes and that it is an actionable wrong for another to interfere with that right by withholding the body or mutilating it in any way
B. holding that the hip is part of the body as opposed to part of the leg and where the effects of the loss of a member extend to other parts of the body and interfere with their efficiency the scheduled allowance for the lost member is not exclusive
C. holding that the degree of the loss of use of a body part is a question of fact whether the loss is for all practical intents and purposes is a question of law
D. holding that the effects of the victims deaths upon the families is part of the circumstances of the crime and is properly presented to the jury at the penalty phase
E. holding that teeth are separate definable parts of the body sufficient to bring them within the statutory term bodily member or organ
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Cir.2001)). Therefore, any potential contacts by DSM Dyneema, B.V. with South Carolina or Virginia are irrelevant to this Court’s analysis of whether a federal court in North Carolina has personal jurisdiction over these claims. As to the availability of goods in North Carolina, the Supreme Court noted in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro that “[t]he defendant’s transmission of goods permits the exercise of jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to have targeted the forum; as a general rule, it is not enough that the defendant might have predicted that its goods will reach the forum State.” Nicastro, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2780, 2788, 180 L.Ed.2d 765 (2011); see also Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2852, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011) . Absent any indication that DSM Dyneema B.V.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that because north carolina has opted out of the exemptions provided under 11 usc 522d the exemptions available for bankruptcy debtors in north carolina depend upon the law of north carolina
B. holding that a foreign subsidiary that is not registered to do business in north carolina has no place of business employees or bank accounts in north carolina does not design manufacture or advertise its products in north carolina and does not solicit business in north carolina cannot be subject to personal jurisdiction in north carolina even if some of the companys products do enter north carolina through the stream of commerce
C. holding that a debtor is required to claim any exemptions under north carolina law because north carolina is an opt out state under 11 usc 522b
D. holding that north carolina court lacked personal jurisdiction over illinois bank even though some of its customers resided in north carolina and loan proceeds were used in north carolina
E. holding that north carolina has jurisdiction over a claim arising from an accident in mississippi because the original offer of employment was accepted over the telephone while the employee was in north carolina
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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impossible to ascertain the precise economic consequences of intangible harms, such as damage to reputation and loss of goodwill, caused by such violations. Abbott Laboratories, 971 F.2d at 16. The Tenth Circuit has limited this presumption to the following circumstances: In any event, the presumption is properly limited to circumstances in which injury would indeed likely flow from the defendant’s objectionable statements, i.e., when the defendant has explicitly compared its product to the plaintiffs or the plaintiff is an obvious competitor with respect to the misrepresented product. See Ortho, 32 F.3d at 694; Porous, 110 F.3d at 1335. Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 211 F.3d 515, 522 (10th Cir.2000); See Western Chemical Pumps, Inc. v. Superior Mfg., Inc., 989 F.Supp. 1112, 1130 (D.Kan.1997) Here, defendant’s # 1 burst does not refer
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a cause of action on the theory of strict liability may be properly pled by alleging 1 the manufacturers relationship to the product in question 2 the unreasonably dangerous condition of the product and 3 the existence of a proximate causal connection between the condition of the product and the plaintiffs injury
B. holding that whether a product is within comment k should be determined on a case by case basis where it is shown that the product is unavoidably unsafe and product of exceptional social need
C. holding statements of product superiority and that product was industry approved were puffery
D. holding that plaintiffs infringement claim against defendants laterdeveloped product would be barred by laches and estoppel found applicable to earlier product if subsequent product is equivalent to earlier one under doctrine of equivalents
E. holding that irreparable harm may be presumed if the challenged advertisement directly but falsely proclaims the superiority of defendants product over plaintiffs product
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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by the court. See Thomas v. Bracey, 940 S.W.2d 340, 343 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1997, no pet.); see also Russell v. Clark, 620 S.W.2d 865, 870 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1981, writ refd n.r.e.). All doubt should be resolved in favor of the communication’s relation to the proceeding. See id. “It is a verity of life that all things human, including lawsuits, have a beginning and end. These two aspects define the thing involved, and in defining it, they are inextricably related to and become a part of it.” Bennett v. Computer Associates Intern., Inc., 932 S.W.2d 197, 201 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1996, writ denied). Courts have deemed conduct related to the initiation of a suit as sufficiently related to a judicial proceeding and, therefore, absolutely privileged. See Thomas, 940 S.W.2d at 343 ; see also Russell, 620 S.W.2d at 868 (holding
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that statements typically found in an attorneys demand letter related to an imminent judicial proceeding absolutely privileged
B. holding demand letter written prior to and during litigation absolutely privileged
C. holding absolutely privileged a communication to an administrative agency designed to prompt action by that agency
D. holding absolutely privileged the filing of a mechanics lien prior to the judicial proceeding to foreclose it
E. holding that prosecutors defamatory statements to the press after plaintiff was pardoned were absolutely privileged
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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is not an element weighing against allowing summary judgment. Rather, it is an issue with respect to the amount of damages to which TKO is entitled that still must be assessed by a finder of fact. Although TKO anticipates it, Reilly does not raise the issue of duress. Therefore, I do not address it. However, given the fact that Reilly held the agreement for a period of one to six months before signing it, and that Reilly had the assistance of counsel during that time period, I note that it would be difficult for Reilly to maintain that he was under such pressure as to have been deprived of his free will or free agency in signing the agreement. See Mills v. Swords Lumber Co., 63 Conn. 103, 105 (1893). See also Zebedeo v. Martin E. Segal Co., Inc., 582 F.Sup. 1394, 1417 (D. Conn. 1984)
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that it is peculiarly the jurys function to pass upon what would meet the requirements or satisfy the mind of the theoretical reason able ordinary person which the law gives to the jury as a standard by which to measure human conduct
B. holding that the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts in his complaint to state a claim for wrongful discharge where he alleged he was discharged due to his political affiliation and activities
C. holding that alleged wrongful conduct must induce a fearful state of mind in the person signing which makes it impossible for him to exercise his own free will
D. holding that a prisoner stated a valid free exercise of religion claim where he alleged that prison officials refused to allow him to receive certain religious books
E. holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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courts are widely acknowledged to possess the power to enter summary judgments sua sponte, so long as the losing party was on notice that she had to come forward with all of her evidence.”). Even assuming that Tate was not on notice about the fact that he had no competent summary judgment evidence to support his claims eight months after he filed his complaint, he had about a month after the magistrate judge’s report to sign his complaint, but did not do so, and, as will be discussed, it was his own fault that the district court granted summary judgment. 4 . See, e.g., Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4) (“An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge. ... ”); Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc. v. Lindquist, 592 F.3d 838, 845-46 (8th Cir.2010) ; Brainard v. Am. Skandia Life Assur. Corp.,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the failure of an affidavit to be made on personal knowledge or specify how the affiant had personal knowledge of the facts asserted is a defect in substance and need not be objected to at trial to be a ground for reversal
B. holding that attorneys affidavit was not competent evidence of his clients agreement or communications with the defendants because it was not based on personal knowledge
C. holding that the affidavit in question did not satisfy the burden of the party moving for summary judgment where affiants eonclusory statement failed to indicate personal knowledge of the circumstances in question and personal knowledge could not be reasonably inferred from the contents of the affidavit
D. holding that district court properly ignored attorneys affidavit because he did not assert personal knowledge of the transaction
E. holding that a district court may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to the extent permissible under the law of the state in which the district court sits
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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weigh the evidence and draw justifiable inferences of fact.’ ” United States v. Branham, 515 F.3d 1268, 1273 (D.C.Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Dykes, 406 F.3d 717, 721 (D.C.Cir.2005)). To prove that a defendant entered into a narcotics conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the government must prove that he did so knowingly. See, e.g., United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 708-09 (D.C.Cir.1995). Knowledge alone, however, is not enough. Id. The government must also prove that the defendant had the “specific intent to further the conspiracy’s objective.” Id. at 708; see United States v. Wilson, 160 F.3d 732, 737 (D.C.Cir.1998); United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1392 (D.C.Cir.1988); see also Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672, 678, 79 S.Ct. 1314, 3 L.Ed.2d 1503 (1959) . Accordingly, to sustain Gaskins’ conviction,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the maximum possible sentence provided by law for conviction of the offense charged is the most important consequence of the plea internal quotation marks omitted
B. holding that a rule 26b application based on ineffective assistance cannot function to save the underlying substantive claim from procedural default internal quotation marks omitted
C. holding with respect to the application of whartons rule that where it is impossible under any circumstances to commit the substantive offense without cooperative action the preliminary agreement between the same parties to commit the offense is not an indictable conspiracy
D. holding that conspiracy to commit a particular substantive offense cannot exist without at least the degree of criminal intent necessary for the substantive offense itself internal quotation marks omitted
E. recognizing that the declaratory judgment act is only procedural and does not create substantive rights internal quotation marks and citations omitted
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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and (5) violated section 546.001 of the transportation code, which permits proceeding past a red light “after slowing as necessary for safe operation.” See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 546.001. In his deposition testimony, Price was asked the basis for his conclusion that Hallett violated section 546.001. Price responded, “[sjolely the fact that another car hit him.” Price stated that Hallett failed to properly clear the intersection before entering, but declined to characterize such conduct as “reckless.” Price agreed that an officer has a responsibility to refrain from entering an intersection against t states that Hallett failed to exercise due caution by disregarding the red light and that he should not have entered the intersection until he was certain t .App. LEXIS 2286, at **12-14 . We hold that Garrett’s statements are
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding written reprimand stating that officer failed to exercise due care and failed to comply with transportation code did not raise fact issue on reckless disregard
B. holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus waived appellate review of that issue
C. holding that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion by stating that it did not have the ability to present the transcript to the jury
D. holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus failed to preserve the issue for appellate review
E. holding officers failure to adhere to policy requiring emergency vehicles to come to complete stop and failure to remember looking both ways before entering intersection did not raise fact issue as to whether officer acted in conscious indifference to or reckless disregard for safety of others
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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in the facility. Thus, we find that the agreement was a contract of adhesion. B. Unconscionability A contract of adhesion is not ipso facto unenforceable. It is unenforceable only to the extent that it is found to be unconscionable. Lytle v. Citifinancial Services Inc., 810 A.2d 643 (Pa. Super. 2002). “Once a contract is deemed to be one of adhesion, its terms must be analyzed to determine whether the contract as a whole, or specific provisions of it, are unconscionable.” Denlinger Inc. v. Dendler, 415 Pa. Super. 164, 176, 608 A.2d 1061, 1067 (1992). A contract term is unconscionable if (1) the party challenging it had no reasonable choice in accepting it, as in the case of a contract of adhesion, and (2) the provision unreasonably favors the other party. Huegel, 796 A.2d at 357 . Although we have found the agreement to be a
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding an entire arbitration clause is void and arbitration cannot be compelled where contract contained unconscionable clause and has a nonseverability clause
B. holding arbitration clause in credit card agreement unconscionable
C. holding that arbitration provisions that preclude class actions are not unconscionable
D. holding that an arbitration clause was not unconscionable because it did not unreasonably favor the defendants
E. holding that an arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable because it did not attach the aaa rules
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 43 F.3d 1471, 1994 WL 705073, *2 (6th Cir.1994) (Table) (applying Webster’s Third International Dictionary’s definition of contamination as “unfit for use by the introduction of unwholesome or undesirable elements” to find that insured’s home was “contaminated” where it had been negligently treated for termites with chlordane, resulting in adverse health effects and forced insureds to move from home); Hartory v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 50 Ohio App.3d 1, 552 N.E.2d 223 (1988) (applying Webster’s definition and holding that contamination exclusion precluded coverage for damages resulting when methane gas from a neighboring landfill penetrated the plaintiffs’ home forcing them to evacuate); Auten v. Employers Nat. Ins. Co., 722 S.W.2d 468 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1986) ; St. Mary’s Area Water Auth. v. St. Paul Fire
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that where only one interpretation of contractual terms is possible a court may decide the meaning of those terms as a matter of law
B. holding that insureds loss resulting from exterminators misapplication of pesticides which rendered their home uninhabitable was caused as matter of law by contamination and thus was excluded under terms of allrisks homeowners policy
C. holding that unintended damage to a pipeline caused by the defective coating supplied by insureds subsidiary was caused by an occurrence within the meaning of the liability policy
D. holding under the policy language that diminution of market value is not a cause of loss but a measure of a loss caused by something else
E. holding that the misapplication of case law may not be reviewed
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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with the policy against restraints on alienation, even where the mortgage explicitly states there is no right to prepay the note, if the mortgagor can provide the mortgagee with the benefit of his bargain under the terms of the note, he will be allowed to have a release of his land following the substitution of security or other arrangement. Id. at 66 n. 1, 468 A.2d at 461 n. 1. In arguing that the restraint is unreasonable, Warrington relies in part on California case law that holds due-on-sale and due-on-encumbrance clauses, though not per se unreasonable, to be unreasonable where enforcement is unnecessary to protect the lender’s security interest. E.g., Tucker v. Lassen Savings and Loan Ass’n, 12 Cal.3d 629, 635-36, 526 P.2d 1169, 1173-74, 116 Cal.Rptr. 633, 637-38 (1974) ; La Sala v. American Savings & Loan Ass’n, 5
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding as an unreasonable restraint on alienation the automatic enforcement of a dueonsale clause where the borrower has entered into an installment land contract to sell the secured property
B. holding that a contract to sell real property was unenforceable because it did not contain a sufficient description of land subject to contract
C. holding that a suit for one installment payment does not preclude suit for a later installment
D. holding that the date of sale for an installment contract was the date of contract formation not the date of the last payment due
E. holding the enforcement of a dueonencumbrance clause to be an unreasonable restraint on alienation unless the borrowers conduct endangers the lenders security
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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with the adjacent channel, “making it difficult to determine where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.” Id. at 742,126 S.Ct. 2208. The plurality explained that “[a]n intermittent, physically remote hydro-logic connection” would be inadequate to meet this prong of its test. See id. 2. Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence Justice Kennedy set forth a different test for analyzing whether the wetlands at issue in Rapanos fell under the jurisdiction of the CWA. Seizing upon language contained in SWANCC, he stated that “the Corps’ jurisdiction over wetlands depends upon the existence of a significant nexus between the wetlands in question and navigable waters in a traditional sense.” Id. at 779, 126 S.Ct. 2208. He fur r.2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 948, 128 S.Ct. 375, 169 L.Ed.2d 260 (2007) . In the present case, it is unnecessary for us
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that justice kennedys test provides the controlling rule for determining jurisdiction
B. recognizing that other courts have found the type of test reliable but finding that this particular urinalysis test was unreliable since the lab did not perform a backup test or identify lab test results and state left questions about how probationers diabetes affected the results
C. holding that the ordinary observer test should be the sole test for determining whether a design patent has been infringed
D. holding that jurisdiction exists if either the pluralitys test or kennedys test is met
E. holding that a defendants right to an independent blood alcohol test means the right to a test that is not subject to government manipulation
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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(Tex.Crim.App. 2002). In the context of a guilty plea, an error affects substantial rights when, considering the record as a whole, we do not have a fair assurance that the defendant’s decision to plead guilty would not have changed had the trial court properly admonished him. Anderson v. State, 182 S.W.3d 914, 919 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). 2. Analysis Prior to accepting his plea, the trial court admonished appellant, but failed to admonish him on the range of punishment. Appellant contends the trial court’s error in failing to admonish him on the applicable range of punishment requires reversal without a harm analysis. In support of his position, appellant relies on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Boykin. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) . We agree with the appellant that the trial
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that for a trial judge to accept a defendants guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary violates the defendants constitutional rights
B. holding that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge
C. holding that a guilty plea must be both knowing and voluntary and must be a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action available to a defendant
D. holding that due process requires state courts to make an affirmative showing that a guilty plea is intelligent and voluntary
E. holding that factual basis inquiry is one way of satisfying the constitutional requirement that a guilty plea be voluntary and intelligent but it is not mandated by due process
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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A state court’s decision whether to recognize and enforce an employer’s cause of action for reimbursement, which is ere- ated by statute in another state, is an issue of conflict of laws rather than subject matter jurisdiction. See Hoffman v. Henderson, 355 N.W.2d 322, 324 (Minn.Ct.App.), pet. for review denied, (Minn. Dec. 20, 1984), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 2326, 85 L.Ed.2d 844 (1985) (applying Alaska law to govern attorney-client fee agreement pertaining to an Alaska worker’s compensation action); Shelby Mutual Insurance Co. v. Girard Steel Supply Co., 224 F.Supp. 690, 695 (D.Minn.1963) (declining to enforce in Minnesota a Wisconsin employer’s right to reimbursement under Wisconsin law); cf. Barry v. Baker Electric Cooperative, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 666, 668-73 (N.D.1984) . See also Hile v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing a right to contribution
B. holding that contribution will lie where no statute precludes recovery from the joint tortfeasor against whom contribution is sought
C. holding north dakota law which precludes a negligent employer from being liable for contribution applicable as against minnesota law which permits limited contribution liability even thought the injure employee received benefits under the minnesota workers compensation act
D. holding that injured employee has right to settle with thirdparty tortfeasor claims not covered by minnesota workers compensation act
E. holding that thirdparty tortfeasor has right to contribution from employer up to amount of employers workers compensation liability
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | C | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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said that it was not asking for a competency trial, and defense counsel said he was not sure that a competency hearing or trial was necessary. 2 . The parties also agreed that they would need to have a competency trial. Arid the trial court reiterated that it was suggesting the issue of competency sua sponte, "not after any kind of error or caused by the State or by' the Defense, for that matter." 3 . See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 36.29(a) (providing the general rule that "after the trial of any felony case begins and a juror dies or, as determined by the judge, becomes disabled from sitting at any time before the charge of the court is read to the jury, the remainder of the jury shall have the power to render the verdict”); Hill v. State, 90 S.W.3d 308, 315-16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) . 4 . Defense counsel later told the trial
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that double jeopardy barred the second prosecution when one of the jurors in the first trial became disabled and the trial court declared a mistrial instead of proceeding with eleven jurors
B. holding that trial court abused its discretion in failing to make a proper inquiry of jurors andor failing to strike jurors for cause after jurors explicitly expressed bias
C. holding that the trial court should have granted the defendants motion for mistrial after it was revealed that a police officer who also was a prosecution witness had sat with several jurors during a lunch break even though the witness testified that he did not discuss the business of the case with the jurors
D. holding that the double jeopardy clause precludes a second trial once the reviewing court has found the evidence legally insufficient
E. holding that a prosecution for the same offense was barred by double jeopardy where a mistrial was declared without manifest necessity
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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“there is evidence upon which the jury could rationally sustain the defense.” United States v. Jackson, 726 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.1984) (per curiam). On the other hand, a trial court may preclude a defense theory where “the evidence, as described in the defendant’s offer of proof, is insufficient as a matter of law to support the proffered defense.” United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 430 (9th Cir.1985). Counsel must also “articulate every ground on which the evidence is admissible, since a ground not identified at trial will not provide a basis for reversal on appeal.” Jack B. Weinstein and Margaret Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence, § 130.20[5], p. 103-39 (Joseph M. McLaughlin, ed., Matthew Bender 2d. ed.2008); see also Hudspeth v. Comm’r, 914 F.2d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir.1990) . In support of his assertion of the return of
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the failure to grant a sentencing departure on an unrequested ground is reviewable only for plain error
B. holding that failure to define knowingly was not plain error
C. holding that forfeiture which is a simple failure to raise an issue merits plain error review
D. holding that failure to identify ground of admissibility limited appellate review to plain error
E. holding that failure to define possession was not plain error
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | D | casehold |