elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports · Datasets at Hugging Face

1857520

202111

0601-1200

TPA.TRACON

FL

2000.0

TRACON TPA

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Final Approach

Other Instrument Approach

Class D PIE

Tower SPG

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Initial Climb

None

Class D SPG

Facility TPA.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

1857520

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Aircraft X on an IFR flight plan on ILS to PIE. I switched communication to PIE outside of SONES. VFR Aircraft Y departed SPG and climbed westbound at Aircraft X; causing a conflict alert. Aircraft Y appeared to stop climb at 1;800. I spoke to Aircraft X after his missed approach at PIE and he indicated that he saw Aircraft Y and he was really close;" about 200 ft. below him. Either lower the Class Bravo shelf or put in a procedure for VFR's departing SPG."

Tampa TRACON Controller reported an NMAC between two aircraft as one was landing PIE and the other was departing SPG airport.

1349456

201604

0601-1200

VMC

Daylight

Personal

Amateur/Home Built/Experimental

1.0

Part 91

Personal

Final Approach

FBO

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

1.0

Part 91

Training

Final Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Sea

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1349456

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

I was shooting a practice GPS into an uncontrolled airport. I was making position calls every two to three miles out starting at 11 miles out. A flight school plane; from another airport; entered the pattern (non standard) and turned based over the numbers to cut me off; even though I had just called my position and was about 400 feet lower. I broke off the approach; kept an eye on the flight school plane and was sure not to land; until they had cleared the runway. [They] took a great deal of time on runway and I called and they said they were going to do a full stop. I landed without incident and the other aircraft took off and left the pattern. There was no danger; as I had the other aircraft in visual site; but it seemed strange to me that an instructor would teach a student to fly that way. I realize it was an uncontrolled airport; but that is even more reason to do things in a standard proper way.

The pilot of a small aircraft reported an airborne conflict with another aircraft; identified to be from a flight school located at another airport.

1684415

201909

1201-1800

ATL.Airport

GA

Mixed

Cloudy

Daylight

4500

TRACON A80

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class B ATL

ILS/VOR

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 396

Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1684415

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Weather; Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft

On the GLAVN 1 RNAV Arrival we expected Runway 08L; we were assigned the ILS PRM Approach Runway 09R upon check-in with ATL Approach. We set up and briefed the new approach. We were then given a vector to a new fix down the arrival and cleared ILS PRM 09R. It was at that point the PF (Pilot Flying) armed VOR/LOC. Further down course it became clear we would be flying right into a rapidly developing buildup. We asked for a left deviation to the next fix on the approach to avoid the buildup; which was denied for traffic. We then requested right deviations; and after some back and forth about how everyone was getting through; we were given up to 10 right. At that point we were very close to the buildup. The PF selected HDG SEL and we avoided the buildup largely; but we were in and out of IMC. The Controller did say 'Approach clearance canceled' but did inquire as to when we could take a turn back in. In our minds the plan was still Runway 09R. While deviating; the Controller was asking when we could turn back towards the field; I was looking out the window for a break in the clouds in order to provide him an answer. The PF was trying to keep his course as close to the original track while staying clear of the buildup. At the point we both agreed we could turn back; I relayed that to the Controller and simultaneously noticed the FMA in VOR/LOC; and we were beginning a turn to join the LOC. I told the PF and he immediately took action by putting us back in to HDG mode and turning back to our original heading. The aircraft was slow to respond so the PF disengaged the autopilot and hand flew us back to our original heading. This did get us pointed in the right direction faster. At the same time; ATC noticed our track and reiterated that we were not cleared to join the LOC. I believe he also gave a new heading and maybe further descent; along with a new runway. This was a very condensed; high-workload few seconds. We complied as fast as we could and setup for the Visual Approach RWY 10. We briefed it; confirmed our performance; and landed uneventfully on 10 shortly thereafter. Upon taxi in to the ramp with Ground Control we were alerted to a possible Pilot Deviation and giving a number to call. We should have de-selected VOR/LOC in this situation as soon as we heard the words 'Approach clearance canceled'. Better balance of PM skills between looking out the window for a gap to get to around the buildup and [indications] on the FMA with regards to VOR/LOC. The plan to send us to a new runway could have been communicated sooner. Started a turn to join the localizer when controller wanted us to stay on heading.

Air Carrier First Officer reported that; while on assigned vectors; aircraft automation turned to join the LOC; resulting in a heading deviation.

1188407

201407

1801-2400

ZDV.ARTCC

CO

23000.0

Center ZDV

Military

Medium Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZDV

Center ZDV

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Cruise

Class A ZDV

Facility ZDV.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.5

Training / Qualification

1188407

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Procedure; Equipment / Tooling

Procedure

TAD radar search and beacon were out of service requiring non-radar routes for all aircraft at or below FL220. There were multiple areas of moderate to heavy precipitation in Sector 41 requiring aircraft to deviate. There were multiple aircraft in and out of PUB; ALS; MVI; COS; and RCA (non-radar). There were departures out the south gate as well. The radar outage required multiple position reports using multiple frequency sites (aircraft cannot hear each other and you depending on which transmitter site you use). Aircraft X was requesting a GPS practice approach into ALS; due to the radar outage; I was unable to provide this service (you are required to be in radar at the IAF for GPS approach). Aircraft X changed plans and requested direct CIM rest of flight plan to CVS. Aircraft Y was an APA arrival at FL220 direct BRK. Aircraft X was level FL180; requested FL230 and weather deviations. Aircraft Y was radar contact lost at this point; while Aircraft X was still in radar. I climbed Aircraft X and approved weather deviations knowing I would loose Aircraft X for a short period of time until reaching FL230. I had numerous other situations going on at this time. I called radar contact lost on Aircraft X. Shortly after; Aircraft Y popped up in radar close to the same time as Aircraft X. At this time; they were approximately 8 miles apart laterally enclosing and 400 FT apart vertically. I radar identified them; asked Aircraft X to expedite and report reaching FL230. He did this before separation was lost. Without the weather deviations; Aircraft X would never have been in conflict with Aircraft Y. If TAD had been in service; while this would have still been a complex session on Sector 41; it would have however been without question a very reasonable task. You cannot allow for weather deviations with non-radar situations. However; you cannot force an aircraft through weather. It is completely unacceptable to put controllers and aircraft into these situations on a daily basis with TAD being out of service. I know this is not the only unsafe situation that has occurred on that sector. All area 3 controllers know this is unsafe and cannot understand how it can take over 3 months to fix a radar outage. TAD needs to be back in service.

ZDV Controller reports of a radar outage that is causing problems in the sector. Two aircraft are being worked non-radar; then appear on the radar and are on a conflicting course. Controller resolves the issue without a separation loss.

1463971

201707

0601-1200

ZLA.ARTCC

CA

20000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZLA

Corporate

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Climb

Direct; SID PADRZ1

Class A ZLA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1463971

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

The preferred routing between [two California cities includes the waypoints OROSZ and COREZ]. The intersections OROSZ and COREZ present a huge confusion potential. Air traffic controllers are pronouncing the intersections 'Or-os' and 'Cor-os.' Over the radio; it's virtually impossible to distinguish between the two intersections. I believe that one of the two intersections should be renamed immediately to prevent confusion.

Corporate jet Captain reported a common route between two airports involves the waypoints OROSZ and COREZ which can sound similar over the radio. This can potentially create confusion for pilots.

1603487

201812

1201-1800

D10.TRACON

TX

6000.0

TRACON D10

Air Carrier

B767-300 and 300 ER

Part 121

IFR

Descent

Vectors

Class B DFW

TRACON D10

Citation V/Ultra/Encore (C560)

IFR

Cruise

Vectors

Class B DFW

Facility D10.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8

Situational Awareness; Workload

1603487

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors

I was working Meacham South. I had just started talking to Aircraft X west bound on the south airway at 8;000 feet. I descended him to 6;000 feet on initial contact because it was coordinated to leave him at 6;000 feet and hand him off to Meacham North to by-pass all the GKY traffic I was working. Unknown to me; and my hand-off; there was Aircraft Y level at 6;000 feet right under Aircraft X. Aircraft Y was going to GKY; but we didn't see him since he wasn't in hand-off status and there were numerous aircraft tags in the same area. Once we seaw Aircraft Y; Aircraft X was descending through 7;200 feet; and I told him to maintain 7;000 feet. He was descending too rapidly and went down to 6;600 feet then climbed back up. Dallas South turned Aircraft Y north to avoid Aircraft X.The whole GKY arrival push was the busiest I've seen since I've been here; busier than the Super Bowl! The traffic display over-head was completely full of GKY traffic! We needed to open Meacham North; Meacham West; Meacham South; Hand-off Meacham South and AR9. There was no pre-planning for this event at all. ZFW had to stop the corners a couple times for the GKY arrivals because we had too many aircraft landing there in our airspace. We had to slow aircraft to 170 knots on initial contact; and I was vectoring into 2 down-winds. Aircraft were being vectored so many more miles; a lot declared minimum fuel; and a few had to divert to other airports. The south airway crossing traffic (southeast corner to FTW; AFW; etc. and southwest corner to DAL; ADS; etc.) should have been routed around outside of our airspace to eliminate the crossing of traffic and the congestion by GKY. During major events at AT&T stadium; more needs to be done to set flow in GKY and eliminate the congestion around the GKY airport. The crossing traffic on the south airway should not be occurring either. The Meacham positions need to be split and opened a lot sooner.

TRACON Controller reported a loss of separation due to traffic volume and workload.

1860761

202112

0601-1200

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

3000.0

VMC

Windshear; Turbulence; 10

5000

Tower ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B767-300 and 300 ER

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Initial Approach

Direct; Oceanic; Vectors; Visual Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 9000; Flight Crew Type 200

Situational Awareness

1860761

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Air Traffic Control Military 6; Flight Crew Last 90 Days 28; Flight Crew Total 22000; Flight Crew Type 550

1861053.0

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Weather

During approach to Runway XX into ZZZZ; controller assigned us to descend to 3;000 ft. reported wind shear and turbulence in the area; we lost 500 ft. due to moderate turbulence and wind shear. Controller advised us of our lower than assigned altitude; we were in visual conditions and had the landing runway in sight. Continued approach and landed without further incident.

Descended below assigned altitude approximately 500 ft due to turbulence and wind shear just prior to glideslope intercept. Instead of climbing back up; just intercepted glideslope at that altitude..aircraft was below clouds with runway in sight.

Pilots reported losing 500 feet of altitude on final approach due to moderate turbulence and wind shear.

1199563

201408

1201-1800

OMDB.Airport

FO

VMC

CLR

Tower OMDB

Air Carrier

MD-11

2.0

Part 121

Climb

Tower OMDB

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

Climb

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1199563

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1199561.0

Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Ambiguous

Momentary stick shaker occurred on departure. We were heavy; 612k; and used max power to obtain a stop margin of 190 FT. Our takeoff sequence put us in trail of a heavy B-777 by about 5 miles. Shortly after takeoff; we encountered wake turbulence that rolled the aircraft right and left about 15 degrees; but was manageable. After accelerating; and cleaning up on schedule; with clean configuration; well above [slat retraction] speed; but not yet to [clean maneuvering speed]; we encountered wake turbulence again; this time a bit more severe; the aircraft rolling right to a bank of about 25 degrees. As advertised; when passing the bank limiter; stick shaker occurred momentarily. I unloaded the aircraft slightly; continued to accelerate; and rolled the aircraft back to level flight. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. Cause: Departure Control sequenced us too close in trail to previous heavy jet departure.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

MD-11 flight crew reported encountering wake turbulence on departure from OMDB in trail of a B777 that resulted in a momentary stick shaker.

1707544

201911

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

IMC

Snow

Temperature - Extreme; Poor Lighting

Night

100

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Direct

Nosewheel Steering

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 271; Flight Crew Type 16000

Confusion; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1707544

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Weather

Ambiguous

We pulled into ZZZ for an unscheduled plane change. The weather was cold; with 'heavy' horizontally-blowing snow and a layer of ice covering the whole ramp. After we pushed back; the four ramp agents walked away and stuck their hands up over their heads; while facing the other way. With the blowing snow and darkness; it was hard to see if they were showing me a pin or just waving goodbye. As we began the turn to the right; the nosewheel was unusually difficult to move with the tiller; and we decided that was probably due to sliding on the icy ramp. I used appropriate differential power to start the turn; and the nosewheel followed; but not perfectly. I told the FO (First Officer) we would try to complete the turn and see if the nosewheel straightened out and acted normally if I taxied forward. As I rolled out of the turn; the nosewheel was still extremely hard to move; and I decided it wasn't the icy ramp; it was a loss of hydraulic power to the nosewheel. I called Ops to have a Ramp Agent come check the nosewheel for a forgotten bypass pin. Eventually a Ramp Supervisor came out; went under the nosewheel; and came out and gave me a thumbs up. Sure enough; I had nosewheel steering back. We went over for a lengthy deice; and I called Ops on my cell phone and then the Ramp Supervisor who had come out to the airplane to find out what had happened. He explained to me that the handle had frozen in the 'BYPASS' position when the pin was removed due to a large chunk of windblown ice and snow. After he moved the handle back and forth a few times; the hydraulic piston popped out to the 'NORMAL' position. I had never heard of this before. The next day; in the daylight; I went out and asked a Ramp Agent to demonstrate the use of the bypass pin to me. I understand now how this could happen--it is a very subtle movement from bypass to normal. In BYPASS; the handle is vertical; pointing up. A protuberance on the handle pushes the inner piston. This is the BYPASS state. When the bypass pin is removed; the handle should swing to point forward at about a 10 degree angle off of vertical; and the piston should pop out about [distance]'; no more. This is the NORMAL; full hydraulic pressure position. In the dark; with a buildup of snow and ice; this would be very difficult to see--I think a Ramp Agent would have to take off his glove and feel the button; or use a flashlight; to make sure it popped out. I think this (relatively) new bypass pin procedure has some complications that were not considered when this change several years ago was forced down from above. The Ramp Supervisor explained that they had a lot of new Ramp Agents; and they were trying to tell all of them to insure when they removed the pin that the lever moved to the NORMAL position and the button popped out. Please make sure this makes it into the ASAP publication and a Flight Ops memo to let Pilots know about this--no one I have talked to in the last week has ever heard of this. I have been flying here over 20 years now; and have never heard of it. I will ask the pushback crew to verify the handle and button were in the right position from now on when it is cold outside; and especially if there is snow and ice.

B737-700 Captain reported the nosewheel steering bypass handle was frozen in the bypass position after the pin was removed. The ground crew was unaware this problem could occur in freezing weather.

1125955

201310

1201-1800

FAI.Airport

AK

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

8000

Tower FAI

Air Taxi

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 135

VFR

Passenger

Taxi

Direct

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 350; Flight Crew Total 12500; Flight Crew Type 2200

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

1125955

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Y

Person Air Traffic Control

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Weather; Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors

Procedure

I taxied the Helio Courier from the east ramp at Fairbanks International Airport for take off with two passengers and gear on board. Prior to take off; a complete warm up of the engine was preformed along with an engine run up according to the checklist. Full movement of the controls was performed and remaining items on the checklist complete prior to calling for takeoff as I held short of the runway. The Control Tower advised me that I was cleared for takeoff. As I taxied forward across the hold short line; the Control Tower quickly canceled my take off clearance and informed me that the aircraft had the nylon horizontal stabilator frost covers on. Glancing back at the stabilator I noticed that indeed the covers were on and upon instruction from tower I made a 180 degree turn to exit the runway. I then taxied clear of the active taxiway and shut the aircraft down. I exited the aircraft and removed the stabilator frost covers and properly stowed them inside the aircraft cabin. I did a complete walk around and visual inspection of the aircraft. I then climbed back in the aircraft; restarted and proceeded to taxi back out to the active runway. After making a radio call for take off; I departed off of Runway 2R and proceeded with the chartered flight. Being a cool morning with the temperature just below freezing; I had decided to leave the frost covers on the wing and tail surfaces until just after the airplane was loaded and prior to boarding passengers. Just before passengers boarded the aircraft; the wing covers were removed. I then boarded the rear seat passenger; gave a briefing and closed the right rear exit door. The second passenger and myself walked around the right front of the aircraft to the left side and boarded through the pilot side door. Note that checking the controls for freedom of movement; even though completed per the checklist; the nylon covers offered no resistance to the one piece stabilator control.

A Helio Courier pilot; who had inadvertently left the frost covers on the horizontal surface for protection during passenger boarding on a cold morning; was distracted and failed to remove the covers on the horizontal tail prior to departure from the gate area. Fortunately; the Tower noted them right after issuing a takeoff clearance; canceled the clearance and the pilot removed them prior to takeoff.

1245255

201503

1201-1800

SFO.Airport

CA

650.0

VMC

Tower SFO

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

IFR

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 28R

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class B SFO

MCP

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 3500

Situational Awareness

1245255

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Total 28000; Flight Crew Type 11000

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

1246407.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

After a normal flight we were cleared to fly the FMS BRIDGE VISUAL 28R into SFO. VMC prevailed. LNAV and VNAV was selected with approximately 180-190 KIAS selected in the MCP. The autopilot was on. Everything was normal until around 1100 feet. The flying pilot had commanded landing gear down at 1500 MSL and 180 knots; which I knew was going to make fully configuring by 1000 difficult. I was in the middle of the landing checklist; waiting on the final flaps; around 1200 MSL when NORCAL APP switched us to the tower. I dialed the frequency and was looking at our DME when it seemed we were unusually low for being 5 miles out. I computed that we should be at least 500-600 feet higher than we were; and looked at the MCP. It was in FLCH instead of the VNAV that it had been before; and our speed was at 180. The throttles were at idle. I called out 'You're in flight level change!' just as the tower called our flight; in the blind; to advise us of a low altitude alert and to check our altitude immediately. The flying pilot leveled off at 650 MSL. I told him that we were still at 180; and needed final flaps still. He seemed confused at first; but then slowed and called for flaps 25 and then 30. We rejoined the ILS 28R glideslope from below; and all checklists were complete before 500 feet MSL. Not helping matters was the tone this captain had set during the previous five days. He was prone to anger quickly; and did little to foster any type of 'crew concept.' Instead; there was quite a hierarchical divide between us. I felt as if I was a 'required nuisance' to him. It made communication difficult since I felt that my input was not wanted nor appreciated.

On approach to SFO in VFR weather we were initially issued the FMS visual 28R clearance. ATC asked if we had the bridge or airport in sight. We stated we had both. I assumed we were cleared visually at that point with no altitude restrictions. I descended the aircraft to 600 feet setting off a tower altitude warning. We were in altitude hold with the autopilot on. The tower told us to check our altitude which we did. Landed uneventfully at SFO with what we thought were no ATC concerns.

B757 flight crew describes a FMS Bridge Visual Approach; which in their perspective becomes unstable and is allowed to get too low. The Tower issues a low altitude alert on final and the flying Captain regains the glideslope and completes configuration for landing. CRM issues were described by the First Officer.

1663222

201906

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Personal

DA42 Twin Star

Part 91

VFR

Training

Landing

Visual Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 65

1663222

Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing

Person Flight Crew

Other Landing

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Human Factors

Gear up landing during single engine visual approach and landing.

DA-42 Instructor Pilot reported gear up landing during training flight.

1323594

201601

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

IMC

Icing; Thunderstorm; Turbulence

Night

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1323594

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1323597.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Long story short; we took off with the wrong flap setting of 8 [when it] should have been 20.The first factor is my FO. He's a great guy; but he's really behind the airplane. He's missing flows and very very slow on getting checklists done. I took this into consideration and always try to give him time. It just seems it's never enough. So; at the gate; I knew we were going to get Runway XYC to fly to airport ZZZ. I put in the numbers for XYC ; XYC [intersection takeoff]; and XYR. When we pushed off the gate; they told us to expect XYR. So; we changed everything and bugged it. We taxied out and contacted Ground. They told us to expect XYC now. So; we changed everything again and bugged XYC.We're taxing down Runway XX. I saw no line and I know he needed time. So; I asked for delayed engine start and we cranked engine #1. In my opinion; my FO just looks lost. And I'm trying to help him. This is day 2; leg 2 of 4. It's night; bad weather; etc.We turn on [the] Taxiway to head to XYC. I ask for 'Airport Runway XYC; flaps 8 taxi checklist'. He reads it to me; albeit very slow. Tower comes on and asks why we are taxing so slow. He's flustered. I say I'm giving my FO time to run a checklist. Tower instructs me to pull into XYC intersection taxiway to let a MedEvac airplane behind me takeoff.No problem; I do as I'm told and pull in to taxiway. So; now I ask him to bug those numbers! Because we have them. He's barely through before takeoff checks. We get those done and now were ready.What I failed to see XYC [intersection takeoff] was flaps 20. Not flaps 8. If I had made him read and do all the taxi checks over again; I guarantee I would have seen it. And I didn't. We did a normal takeoff. Got to 1;000 feet. Accelerated to 200 KTS. VT 10 I call for flaps up. Well; I glanced down and saw 20. I was sick to my stomach. I can't believe I made such an error. All I could think about was the CRJ -200 that went off the runway when was in ground school.That said; the airplane flew fine. We got it cleaned up. We flew to ZZZ as normal. Still; I'm not happy with what happened and want to admit to it. I have learned from this; that from now on; when ATC changes my runways 3 times and we're under pressure; I'm stopping that airplane and redoing the whole checklist over again. No question about it. Because if I had; I would of caught that.Lastly; my FO. As I stated earlier; he's a great guy; very nice; but he is behind that airplane. I almost feel at times I'm single pilot. Flying to ZZZ; he goes on this rant about '%^$% Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) and #%@& Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA); changing runways is ##%' etc. I told him to calm down and not worry about it and I needed him to focus on flying the plane and helping me. I could tell this flustered him. He missed all his after takeoff flows even though I asked for them. I looked up and see a green light and I ask 'why is the APU still on?' I check Crew Alert System (CAS) and ask why the thrust reversers are still armed. He throws his hands up and says I'm not thinking right. I didn't yell or say anything. I just got the airplane configured correctly.So; we land in ZZZ and we still have to do one more ZZZ1 to ZZZ turn for the night. It's his leg to ZZZ1 and we're taxing out. He's not organized. He has no charts out. He's fumbling for them. He couldn't brief me. I look at him and ask if he's okay and if he wants me to fly the leg to ZZZ1 and back to ZZZ. He said he thinks that would be best. We flew (well; I was pilot flying) the last two legs without incident.I think it might be best for my FO to have a review or maybe some more training. I say it out of Safety. Not to be mean. The CRJ is a huge learning curve. I was there once myself; so; I get it.

Taxiing to Runway XYC with the flaps set correctly at 8 degrees for XYC and while performing the before takeoff checklist Tower asked if we could turn onto XYC intersection taxiway in order to give way to a MedEvac aircraft taxiing behind us and accept a XYC intersection [takeoff] departure. After the Captain told the Tower we could; the MedEvac aircraft was given a takeoff clearance behind us from [a further down] XYC intersecting taxiway so in fact our intersection departure was no longer a necessity. Nevertheless; Captain turned onto [intersecting runway] and after stopping short of XYC changed the Automatic Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) takeoff data from XYC to XYC [intersection takeoff]; informed me that he had bugged the speeds and asked me to finish the before takeoff checklist and call ready for takeoff. During the climb the Captain pointed to the ACARS and stated that we should have used flaps 20 instead of 8.

CRJ-900 flight crew reported taking off with flaps set to 8 when they should have been set to 20; after several runway changes by ATC during taxi out. The Captain described the First Officer as being well behind the aircraft.

1365538

201606

0.0

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 25000; Flight Crew Type 7404

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

1365538

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Company Policy; Manuals

Manuals

On our 777 flight we were presented with a [different] 777 model. I realized this when we saw the interior configuration and cockpit differences. Specifically; Weather (WX) radar; door panel and Take Off Warning config button. As we began the cockpit prep it was immediately apparent neither of us (Cap or First Officer) knew how to test or operate this version of the WX radar. Compounding this is the fact that we had no idea how to test and operate the cockpit door and controls. I pushed a button on the door panel thinking it was a test button and the whole latch mechanism feel out of its recess. Obviously we didn't know what we were doing. We both were in the manuals attempting to figure out how to fly these systems.We had a 767 Captain on the jumpseat with his manual open thinking that the radar on the 767 was the same. We are reading another aircraft FM to try and learn on the fly how to operate our 777 WX radar. We needed it to get across the country with lines of thunderstorms developing. Red flags are flying! We do not feel qualified to fly this aircraft. I stopped the show and called a timeout. I called Dispatch; Chief Pilot and got the 777 fleet on SATCOM. 777 fleet manager tried but could not find the FM reference for the radar. A 777 [instructor] was on the line and attempted to teach us the radar system over the SATCOM. We had no idea what the controls and letters on the buttons indicated or operated. All of us scoured the FM. The [instructor] was verbally guiding us through a test. As I sat back and observed this all unfold I realized that our training is severely lacking on the 777 differences. I was very close to walking off the airplane because I did not feel qualified to fly it.At this point I asked the fleet to standby on the radar and move to an easier system...I thought. Cockpit door and controls. Once again we were instructed over SATCOM on how to test the door and controls. Later on we found out that the door does not require a test. Only an open light on the panel. However the FM tells us to push the flight deck emergency switch. We did not know where this was located. The test switch is on the outside of the door not on the flush panel lights we were being told to push to test. I bring this all up to show how confusion and frustration was setting in.A Flight Attendant had to show us how to SOP the door entry. I understand that in the FM small footnotes on the [this version 777] model are there buried in the text. This is not the time to be trying to find these little footnotes while sitting in the cockpit. We need a reference that is [this 777 model] only. All in one place for reference. We found the FM ref for the Take Off warning config button but did not know exactly how to use it and when. It's not that difficult but when you never have seen any of this things start to pile up and overload the crew. The hand mike was even different. I was talking into the wrong end thinking the small hole was the mike. It isn't. It's on the back side and looks like a small screen. I know somewhere 5 years ago we saw a slide show or bulletin on the differences on the [this 777 version]. That was the extent of the exposure to the differences. I don't remember it and neither did my First Officer. Our 767 Captain on the jumpseat helped us to the point of feeling somewhat comfortable with the operation of the radar. The doors panel we figured out that the Hard Lock function is the DENY on our [other modeled] 777s. The hand mike; seat belt sign announcement; engine instruments {EPR is missing}; doors; radar and other systems are so different the airplane should require a continuous training module and at least 1 Line Check Airman (LCA) ride for training. If I had followed our recently completed training I should have walked off and asked for help. All new [777] model pilots should be afforded the opportunity to fly with an LCA to train to proficiency the model differences. Training by bulletin and slide show5 years ago doesn't work.I am writing this a couple of weeks after the event and during this time had a line check with an LCA. I learned in 1 hour how to operate the systems and even our LCA struggled a bit with the WX radar! I later discovered by trial and error that [this 777 model] radar description is in the Warnings chapter! The search engine could not find it. Who would think to look in Warnings? The panel is there with definitions of the buttons but not how to operate the system. Bottom line is that the differences are so many and require a complete understanding to integrate the systems into the actual operation of the airplane that training needs to be revised to get us to proficiency.

Air carrier Captain reported being confronted with operational issues with a B777 model with which they were unfamiliar. Pilot handbooks provided scant information on the aircraft differences.

1451432

201705

0601-1200

LAS.Airport

NV

17000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON L30

Air Carrier

A321

2.0

Part 119

IFR

FMS Or FMC

Climb

SID BOACH

Class E L30

TRACON L30

Small Transport

Part 91

VFR

Skydiving

Cruise

Class E L30

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 6500

Workload; Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness

1451432

Facility L30.TRACON

Government

Approach; Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

1450323.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Airspace Structure

Climbing out of LAS on the BOACH7 departure off RWY 01R; after checking in with departure we were cleared to climb unrestricted to FL190. Somewhere in the vicinity of WITLA we were cleared direct BOACH. Climbing through approximately 17;000 feet at 300 knots the TCAS issued a TA; we both reduced range on the Navigation Display (ND); the target showed ahead and slightly to our right and less than 1000 feet above. The TA changed to an RA very quickly. The RA was initially monitor vertical speed I believe; and then changed to descend. The Captain was flying and had disconnected the autopilot immediately upon the RA issuance. He did reduce the pitch attitude but the actual vertical speed never reached the green band on the VSI which was a strong descend command. I turned off the flight directors a few seconds after the RA started; and said something like 'get the nose down' as we were not in the green VSI band but there was so much going on I don't know if he heard me.I had then tentatively started to make a nose down input on my own side stick but discontinued as I had the thought 'don't make simultaneous inputs'. The captain reminded me to tell ATC in the middle of all this; which I had not thought of; so I did notify Las Vegas we were in a TCAS directed descent. We both saw the other aircraft pass off the right side and slightly above. We then got the 'Clear of Conflict' and resumed our climb to FL190. Time from the initial TA to clear of conflict was very short; I would say 15-30 seconds total event duration.The Captain called LAS Approach after we blocked in [at destination] and they said a sky dive aircraft was where they should not have been; apologized and stated we were not at fault.I can't comment on avoiding GA aircraft we don't know are there; however I was less than happy with my own performance in the situation. The Pilot Flying (PF) was responding to the RA command in the correct direction but not to an adequate degree; and I didn't act assertively enough to address this. I believe I felt inhibited partly because it's a big step to directly intervene as a First Officer; and also because we have been taught that after two challenges then you intervene; however there was absolutely no time available for this routine to play out. I would very much like to see TCAS RA scenarios in training that are not easily anticipated; happen quickly; and I highly recommend we specifically practice Pilot Monitoring (PM) intervention when the PF actions are not adequate; appropriate or correct; each and all of which could conceivably occur with very little time available for the PM to recognize and address or correct.

I was working dag CONFIG 3; Aircraft X was on the BOACH7 departure. I took a point out from GNT [internal position at L30] on Aircraft Y [a] jump aircraft. Aircraft Y was climbing and jumping over Jean Airport and I was not expecting them to be there or was I made aware of it by GNT. Also no two minute warning was given to me. I noticed Aircraft X was right below Aircraft Y by the time I was going to issue the traffic Aircraft X was in a descent responding to a TCAS RA. Aircraft Y was in a position and altitude I was not expecting.We should not allow sky dive operations over Jean Airport period. It is a very unsafe and dangerous location. It is a major conflict no matter what runway configuration we are in.

Air carrier flight crew and a Controller reported an unsafe situation where an air carrier and a sky diving aircraft became to close; resulting in a Resolution Alert for the carrier.

1763130

202009

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Aircraft X

Cabin Jumpseat

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Safety Related Duties

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Other

1763130

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Y

Person Flight Attendant

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

I was distracted by requests being made by other passengers; as well as trying to maintain social distancing regarding my jumpseat. Maintain focus and slow down if I feel I am in the 'red' zone.

Flight Attendant reported having difficulty maintaining social distancing while at the jumpseat.

1873300

202201

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

FBO

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Training

Takeoff / Launch

Other Landing pattern training

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Student

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 34.9; Flight Crew Total 37.5; Flight Crew Type 37.5

Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Workload

1873300

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Ambiguous

Student pilot practiced takeoffs and landings dual instruction the morning of Date. After practicing traditional landings and go-arounds; [the] instructor was dropped off at [the] hangar for first solo flight. Student executed first solo take off; trip around airport pattern and full-stop landing in a successful and skilled fashion. Taxi back to Runway XX for second solo. After clearance; full throttle applied; right rudder as needed; all gauges and systems indicating appropriately. Just prior to the intersection with Taxiway XX; plane veers to the left just prior to full rotation speed; and rumbling sensation was described by student pilot on left side of plane just aft of the pilot. Student pilot successfully pulled throttle idle while trying to maintain control of the aircraft. Aircraft exited Runway XX through the grass median; and onto Taxiway XY. The plane briefly left Taxiway XY to the grass before the pilot was able to regain full control and return the plane to the Taxiway XY in a south facing direction. Plane came to rest on Taxiway XY while still in motion and pilot regaining control. Discussion with ZZZ tower followed; and pilot verified plane systems [were] able to return aircraft to hangar. The plane was returned to the hangar by the student pilot; normal shutdown via the checklist; and inspection with the instructor.After a successful and well executed first solo; the incident occurred on the second solo. Student pilot described the situation above. Factors contributing are unknown; but [the] plane was examined after the incident. The question being what caused the plane to abruptly veer left after an initial centerline beginning. ZZZ safety surveyed [the] field; for potential causes; as well as identified the damage to one runway light. Potential causes include mechanical dysfunction; field obstruction; or error in pilot control input. Final cause is unable to be determined; but actions include: Plane was inspected by [a] mechanic; and cosmetic damage was observed to left gear strut probably from impact of runway light with yellow paint noted.Student pilot has a clear training history; currency; and practice prior to the solo today. No prior difficulty with takeoffs or landings. Student pilot reviewed potential input errors with CFI; and will continue to be vigilant in control habits as he has in the past.Student pilot called and discussed incident with tower ATC; and provided any information needed; as well as contact information. Plan is to continue satisfactory completion of PPL with CFI.

GA student pilot reported a runway excursion just prior rotation on takeoff. Pilot regained directional control on adjacent taxiway and was cleared to taxi to hangar where a mechanic noted cosmetic damage to left gear. No determination of why the aircraft suddenly veered left.

1082203

201304

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

15000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-83

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class E ZZZ

Generator Drive

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Distraction; Troubleshooting

1082203

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Accelerating and climbing through about 15;000 FT I felt and heard a deep vibration in the aircraft. I asked my First Officer if he noticed anything. He said he did. I looked over all the engine gauges and they all looked normal. I felt the flight controls and they seemed normal except for the vibration. I didn't have any uncommanded movements. As we were looking for signs of the source of the vibration; the Lead Flight Attendant called up and asked if we noticed a vibration. With that many people confirming an abnormal situation and not knowing what it was; I thought it was prudent to return to the field to have it inspected. We informed ATC that we wanted to return and also called the departure Operations to let them know. As we were in our turn we lost the right generator. Assuming it was related; but not sure; we declared an emergency so as to get an expedited return back to the runway. We landed uneventfully. Upon discussion with Maintenance afterward; they believed that bearings inside the generator went bad and that is what was causing the vibration we felt.

During climb a MD-83 flight crew and flight attendant noticed an airframe vibration and decided on a precautionary return to land but the right generator failed so an emergency was declared followed by a normal landing. Maintenance discovered failed generator bearings.

1672862

201908

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

CLR

Tower ZZZ

Air Taxi

PC-12

1.0

Part 135

IFR

Takeoff / Launch

Direct

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 16

Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

1672862

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

I was taking off at ZZZ on an IFR flight to ZZZ1. After I completed my before takeoff check I was cleared for takeoff and began to taxi onto the runway. As I lined up for takeoff I switched from ground idle to flight idle. During this process it appears that I knocked the flaps out of takeoff position. I added power and during rotation I realized that the lift I needed for takeoff wasn't there. I immediately looked to the flap position and noticed it was out of the detent and half way between 15 degrees and 0 degrees. I knocked it back into 15 degrees but in the moment of confusion had let up on right rudder pressure. Meanwhile the plane turned slightly to the left as the plane built up speed. At this time I corrected with right rudder and slowly rotated and made a safe takeoff.In order to prevent this situation from occurring again I will put the plane into flight idle prior to completing my pre-take off check. This way there will be no way of me accidentally knocking the flap lever out of position. I will also double check that the flaps are in position as part of my flow prior to adding take off power.

PC-12 pilot reported inadvertently knocking the flap handle out of the 15 degree detent just prior to departure; which resulted in an unsafe takeoff configuration.

1001020

201203

1201-1800

IAH.Airport

TX

0.0

Daylight

Ground IAH

Air Carrier

McDonnell Douglas Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1001020

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

N

Person Air Traffic Control

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Human Factors; Airport

Airport

After landing on 26L [at IAH]; I was instructed to exit at Taxiway NR. After exiting; Ground first instructed us to taxi via NA-NE-WA-to parking. After read back it was changed to NR-WW-WA-to parking. Looking at diagram we appeared to be on NE; so I taxied straight ahead looking for WW. The intersection of NR and WW is not marked. After we passed it Ground instructed us to continue and join WB to parking; which we did.

An air carrier Captain advised that Taxiway WW at NR is not marked at IAH. As a result he missed the turn given by Ground Control after exiting Runway 26L.

1593198

201811

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

7000.0

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Taxi

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Climb

Class B ZZZ

Powerplant Lubrication System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

1593198

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1593190.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft

On climbout; we experienced a Low Oil Quantity indication; and then shortly after a Low Oil Pressure indication for the number 2 engine. We initially assumed that we were having an oil gulping situation so we lowered the deck angle. The quantity continued to decrease and then we experienced the Low Oil Pressure indication for the number 2 engine. When we received the red Low Oil Pressure indication; we ran the QRH Checklist and were instructed to shut down the number 2 engine.After shutting down the number 2 engine; we contacted ATC. We then contacted Dispatch; Operations and the flight attendants. After landing flaps 15; we exited the runway and obtained the brake cooling data. We were given a 30 minute cooling time before going to the gate. We had Crash Fire Rescue check the brake temperatures and were told that the brakes were cool. We relayed this information to Maintenance Control and were advised to continue to the gate. The passengers were advised of the low oil situation via the PA and then deplaned. I should have immediately taken the radios and controls while the First Officer ran the checklists; contacted Operations; flight attendants and ran the landing data.

The situation happened very quickly and in busy airspace with lots of radio congestion. At first; it was hard to tell if it was an indication issue. The QRH doesn't show anything regarding low oil quantity; so it's only with low pressure we realized there was a legitimate loss of oil occurring. I think given the time to accomplish and delegate tasks; we did well.

B737-700 flight crew reported returning to departure airport after shutting down #2 engine due to low oil quantity and pressure.

1108757

201308

0601-1200

ZLA.ARTCC

CA

36000.0

VMC

Center ZLA

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZLA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 21000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Distraction; Physiological - Other

1108757

Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

On J6 in the EED area and continuing for several minutes; a blinding reflection occurred from an apparent solar array WSW of LAS (NW of our position). The effect was similar to a LASER illumination when glancing toward the vicinity of the reflection.

A B757 Captain reported a blinding reflection that lasted several minutes from an apparent solar array in the vicinity of EED.

1309423

201511

1201-1800

JFK.Airport

NY

VMC

Daylight

TRACON N90

Fractional

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Climb

SID KENNEDY2

Class B JFK

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Attendant

1309423

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Procedure; Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication

Chart Or Publication

After an exhausting morning we arrived [at] JFK for a passenger trip to ZZZ. The FMS would not accept the pre departure clearance so I did the clearance via radio with ATC. We were given the departure. I verified the clearance twice with ATC. The FMS was loaded both crew verified the clearance. After takeoff we were following the FMS for the departure; after CRI we were planning on the right turn to NEION intersection; that's when ATC questions our turn and he immediately assigned us a south bound heading. ATC gave us a telephone number to call after we arrive at ZZZ. We complied after landing at ZZZ. There was no threat to persons or property during this event. ATC needs to be more specific during the clearance; he should have stated radar vectors after a heading off of CRI. Or there needs to be a waypoint after CRI. The climb and heading of is stated further down the SID but we missed it. (Possible fatigue onset) the heading needs to be more obvious. It was also communicated to the pilot in command by ATC personnel via the phone conversation that this departure has also been causing 'problems' for the airlines. This incident seems to happen once or twice a week says ATC. The crew fatigued upon reaching ZZZ.

An aircraft on a SID proceeded to a point on their flight plan after the SID transition. The aircraft are supposed to stay on the SID heading expecting radar vectors. This is not indicated clearly on the SID and causes confusion for aircraft on a regular basis.

1452376

201705

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

CLR

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

High

128.0

118.0

5.0

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Airline Total 2; Flight Attendant Number Of Acft Qualified On 7; Flight Attendant Total 2

Boarding

1452376

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Y

Person Flight Attendant

Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Procedure

Company Policy

Prior to door closure; a passenger asked to get off the flight with not much of an explanation. The pilots requested to have the passenger's bags removed from the aircraft and agents /operations denied the request as it was a domestic flight and they wished to avoid a delay. There seems to be a pattern with passengers asking to deplane at the very last minute with little to no explanation as of recent. Crew members were uncomfortable with their luggage remaining on board. I believe situations like this; airlines should be required to make sure all bags on board are accounted for when a passenger exits and checked bags removed whether international or domestic.

A Flight Attendant reported that a passenger requested to get off the airplane without claiming their luggage.

1765081

202010

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Dawn

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Landing

Class B ZZZ

Tower ZZZ

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

2.0

IFR

Taxi

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Time Pressure; Workload; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

1765081

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

Human Factors

ZZZ Arrival ATIS C was current; advertising visual approaches to Runways XYL; XXL; and XXR. Prior to descent the Captain and I had thoroughly briefed visual approaches to both Runway XYL and Runway XXL. We requested Runway XXL on initial contact with ZZZ TRACON and were granted the request before ZZZZZ on the ZZZZZ2 STAR. We were vectored after ZZZZZ1 onto a left base to Runway XXL; then a turn to join final; which accompanied the visual approach clearance and change to Tower on [frequency]. I called Tower advising we were on a visual approach to Runway XXL and would be parking at gate. Tower responded with 'Runway XXL; cleared to land.' About a minute later; I noted that Tower instructed traffic to cross Runway XXL downfield at either Taxiway V or Taxiway R without referencing us; which I noted as strange. While on final; I noticed that a different aircraft had pulled up to the hold short line for Runway XXL at Taxiway Y10; and that I had not yet heard that crew interact with Tower. When we were on approximately a 1-mile final; the crew of the aircraft holding short called Tower advising they were ready for departure. Without referencing us; Tower stated 'RNAV to ZZZZZ3; Runway XXL; cleared for takeoff.' As soon as we heard this; the Captain stated to me that we would be going around; and we recited the first 3 calls we would make when that happened. I keyed up on the radio and stated 'Traffic on short final; Runway XXL.' By then the departing aircraft had entered the runway. Tower responded with go around instructions including a right turn to a 270 heading and a climb to 4;000. I read them back; and the Captain and I properly executed a go-around. I cleared the right side of the aircraft for any traffic landing XXR; noted there was none; and stated 'Clear on the right.' As we began the turn; TCAS sounded a traffic advisory. I noted the yellow target on TCAS was indicating 800 feet; and stated aloud that the traffic had just lifted off and that we could disregard the advisory; as we were turning away. Tower apologized for the mistake and sent us to approach for re-sequencing and an uneventful visual approach and landing on Runway XXR.The crew of the departing aircraft appears to have failed to visually check the final for traffic before calling Tower for a takeoff clearance; and again prior to taxiing onto the runway for departure. The Air Traffic Controller appears to have forgotten about having cleared us to land; or appears to have been situationally unaware of our position prior to issuing the takeoff clearance. The Runway Status Lights (RWSL) on Runway XXL appear not to have worked; either because my aircraft's position on short final failed to trigger the red stop bars; because the departing aircraft ignored the RWSL red stop bars; the RWSL malfunctioned; or because the system was improperly overridden by the Controller. Another system that appears to have failed is the Controller's ASDE-X safety logic; because it appears my radio transmission was the primary reason he initiated the go-around instructions. Typically; when departing traffic crosses the hold short line with an arriving aircraft on short final; ASDE-X safety logic sounds an alarm. An additional contributing factor is the resurgence of traffic levels after a significant prolonged drop stemming from the outbreak of COVID-19; which may have led to complacency on the part of the departing crew and the Controller.Departing crews need to diligently check the final for traffic before taxiing onto the runway for takeoff; and ideally before even calling ready for departure. Failing to do so before calling ready violates basic airmanship and sets the Controller up for failure. That said; the Controller should have had use of a memory aid or reliable automation to indicate and help him remember that Runway XXL was being used as an active arrival runway; that we had been issued a clearance to land; and that we were on short final to that runway at the time heissued the departing aircraft's takeoff clearance. Interviewing the crew of the departing aircraft would also shed light on whether the RWSL had illuminated and; if so; whether they proceeded onto the runway with the RWSL stop bars illuminated. If this is the case; retraining would mitigate this event from happening again. Interviewing the Controller would provide insight as to whether he overrode the RWSL; whether the ASDE-X safety logic worked properly; and other details about the work conditions that shift including staffing and fatigue; which; if undesirable; could be corrected to help mitigate the recurrence of this event.

Air carrier First Officer reported a go-around due to ATC clearing another aircraft for takeoff while reporter's flight was on short final.

1089613

201305

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

17000.0

Center ZZZ

HS 125 Series

IFR

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1089613

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

Aircraft X checked on frequency from TRACON. TRACON owns airspace up to and including FL190. I was working R-Side ZZZ Center Sector 29. Aircraft in this sector are climbed to FL190 off the area East Bound by the TRACON and are given to ZZZ Center Sector 29 for additional climb. My position at Sector 29 has 'control on contact' from the TRACON per LOA. TRACON must give Center '3 miles separation and increasing.' Aircraft X checked on climbing to FL180; not FL190. I missed that and heard what I had expected to hear him check on climbing to as FL190. I immediately climbed the aircraft to FL290. A few moments later; the TRACON called me on the landline and said he had 'prematurely' shipped Aircraft X to me and said that he had another aircraft at FL190. I said I had already climbed Aircraft X not seeing the FL190 limited underneath. Once he said that; I observed their limited at FL190 diverging from Aircraft X but still very close. I told the TRACON I would quickly stop Aircraft X at FL180. When I issued the clearance to stop Aircraft X at FL180; the observed altitude was FL177. Pilot read it back and said he might 'go through the altitude' but would go back down. I observed Aircraft X (with a 5 mile J-ring I put up) climb to FL181. Aircraft appeared to be at 3 miles diverging at that point. Next update Aircraft X was at FL184; again with under 5 miles separation but I believe was greater than 3 miles. Next update indicated the descent of Aircraft X. Loss of separation never happened in the Center stratum; but I was unsure if we had actually breached the 3 mile separation rule for the TRACON while the vertical loss of separation was occurring; I called over my Supervisor to turn the event in. After the event occurred with no further issues; the TRACON called me back to thank me for helping out. He followed up saying that he thought he had stopped Aircraft X at FL180 (he did) and then made the mistake of changing frequencies prematurely to me. I missed the lower check on altitude of FL180 (expecting to hear FL190) which caused the event. If I had caught the initial check on correctly; I would have immediately called the TRACON to request control for further climb and been referenced traffic. I am not sure if a separation error actually occurred in the TRACON. Both aircraft were below my stratum of FL200 and above. Hearback/readback error on my part. If I had caught the initial check on as being different that what I was expecting; I would have never climbed Aircraft X without getting control. This is a very uncommon incident in this sector. I need to focus more intently on the check on altitude and be diligent not to process what I 'expect' to hear.

Enroute Controller described a near loss of separation event when assuming climbing traffic had reported an 'expected' altitude but in fact stated a different altitude.

1261588

201505

1801-2400

EWR.Airport

NJ

0.0

VMC

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Cockpit Door

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 27000; Flight Crew Type 4700

1261588

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Aircraft

Procedure

This aircraft had a history of keypad cockpit door chime failures. The keypad had been replaced earlier in the day. Upon arrival to the airplane I tested the cockpit door chime and it failed to ring. Maintenance was called where the Technician advised he was going to MEL the door chime which required the removal of power to the entire keypad. So; with power removed from the keypad emergency access to the cockpit is inhibited. There would be no way to enter the cockpit should there be an incapacitation of both crew members. There is no key access in this design on the Airbus. This MEL on the Airbus should be eliminated. With it; a flight deck crew is sealed off from the cabin without an option for emergency access should the need arise. I would have refused this aircraft had the Technician not been able to fix the chime; resulting in this MEL being applied.

A320 Captain reported concern about an MEL on the fleet that allows aircraft to be dispatched with the cockpit access keypad inoperative; since that would preclude any emergency access to the cockpit.

1835217

202108

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

Center ZZZ

Medium Transport

2.0

IFR

Descent

Vectors

Class A ZZZ

Center ZZZ

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

1.0

Class A ZZZ

Facility ZAB.ARTCC

Government

Enroute; Supervisor / CIC

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Radar 28

Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1835217

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Airspace Structure; Procedure; Weather

Ambiguous

I was on Center [sector] ZZZ. Aircraft X was handed off to me from ZLA [sector] ZZZ1 on the ARLIN3 arrival; assigned a 070 heading left of course for weather. When the aircraft checked on; I called the weather [and] told them I would need to vector them north of the weather but south of the GLADDEN MOA/ATCAA (Air Traffic Control Assigned Airspace) that was active. I turned them to a 085; trying to aim them towards the 2-mile gap between the north side of the weather and the 3 miles I needed to keep from GLADDEN. The last vector; I think a 100; I needed to clear GLADDEN by 3 miles; the aircraft refused and I ended up 2 miles from GLADDEN. On their refusal; they said they were in weather and the chop was pretty bad. The pilot was pretty willing to work with me on vectors as I was trying to front-load them with information on the military airspace and the need for expedited compliance on the vectors. I think I even mentioned the two-mile gap I had to play with.Prior to all of this and taking over Center [sector] ZZZ; I took over the area as CIC. As I took the area; the FLM told me that he needed to go to breakout briefly; but was going to stop by the northwest area to have them recall GLADDEN because the weather was building north of the R2306/8 restricted areas which were hot FL800 and below and GLADDEN and YARNELL; and we were running out of room for the arrivals. Soon after; the Area X FLM at ZLA called me to ask about the weather and said they had one SDL and one PHX arrival heading our way. We still had room at the time to wedge them north of the weather and get into the terminal area without risk of hitting the 3-mile buffer of GLADDEN; but I was worried about weather building as the R-side on the sector at the time had told me that the weather had doubled in size in about ten minutes. Aircraft up as high as FL410 were also deviating. I told the Area X Supervisor that we still had room and that we could vector nort; plus it was too late for them to move them as they were out of room.Soon after; the STMC (Supervisor Traffic Management Coordinator) called me to ask me about the weather and I mentioned that the FLM had tried to get the northwest area to recall GLADDEN; a recently changed local procedure about recall of airspace. The STMC said that they needed GLADDEN - I think that was what he mentioned - and that they would be shutting off the IZZZO/KEENS departure because of the weather and that they would also be turning off the HYDRR arrival. He asked about the FYRBD departure because of weather over MOHAK and the J2 corridor - a single corridor that goes between two restricted areas - and said that aircraft were getting through so long as they were above FL280.After that I took over Center [sector] ZZZ; and I alerted the FLMs. The swing Supervisor had just arrived; and the previous FLM had just shown up from breakout to a IWA on the IZZZO departure. ZZZ3 sector; south departure; called the D-side Trainee on the sector to ask about them since they said the IZZZO was shut off; and had asked about a 270 heading. Swing Supervisor said put them over IZZZO since; at the time; we still had some room to go north of the weather. I had a subsequent SDL aircraft in addition to an aircraft at 110; Aircraft Y I think was the callsign; that I had to vector in the same basic spot. Bottom line; someone; or multiple someones; missed at least three aircraft at higher altitude on these routes - seemed to be the satellite airports. Additionally; there were three aircraft; one Aircraft Z; on routes below 140 that were also missed. As I was leaving the sector; there was Aircraft A on the BLH arrival going to PHX; that was attempted to be handed off to me with a DL (Departure List) in the 4th line. I tried to call ZLA ZZZ2 about them twice; they didn't answer; and then I saw the aircraft turning north; so I believe they finally turned them north go to north of all the ATCAAs. When I left the sector; the entire gap between GLADDEN and R2306/8 was fully blocked with weather and was completely impassable.First; R2306/8 was hot FL800 and below for a solar powered UAV at FLXXX; operating in various altitudes. I'm not really sure why the restricted areas needed to be blocked off at such a large altitude for one aircraft. We could have deviated to the right into the restricted areas if ZLA was more dynamic in scheduling the restricted areas; something like FLZZZBDDD.Second; TMU at both Center and ZLA have been behind the power curve this year in being dynamic and proactive in trying the move aircraft for weather. Arguably; our monsoon weather this year has been particularly brutal; and our traffic is up at our highest levels; 10% above our norms according to our ATM. However; moving aircraft in a dynamic manner due to how fast our monsoon weather develops is vital; and it has been absolutely abysmal this year.Third; recall of military airspace and the ability to change military airspace in an unorthodox manner has been something of a disappointment this year. Our Safety Representative has been trying to effect change through a process that would better coalesce procedures for recall of airspace into one unified procedure and one point of contact per area.Fourth; moving aircraft is good for weather; but TMU missed all of the satellite airports - at least that is how it appeared - and all of the Category C aircraft. When ZLA [sector] ZZZ1 called about Aircraft X; the D-side OJTI told them that the arrival was shut off; and ZLA [sector] ZZZ1 said they hadn't even been told.

ATC Center Controller reported experiencing issues working traffic around weather and airspace constraints.

1497657

201711

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

ATR 42

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb; Descent

Class B ZZZ

Y

Fuel Quantity-Pressure Indication

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1497657

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew; Person Maintenance

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

When I arrived for duty; I put a fuel request in for 3000 LBS. I was informed that the current fuel load was 3900LBS with a 900-1000LBS fuel imbalance. I was informed that since the imbalance was less than the limitation of 1212LBS that I was good to dispatch. I questioned why the aircraft had 3900LBS of fuel on board; and was informed that due to maintenance/engine runs during the previous night; the night maintenance fueled the aircraft incorrectly. I contacted Dispatch; informed [them] that the aircraft was fueled incorrectly; and now had 3900LBS of fuel on board. I explained that I would have to balance the fuel load and that there could be a loading issue/delay...due to the reduced payload capacity because of the higher fuel load. This was all noted and my flight was released for departure. My first turn...was completed with no additional issues.I refueled for my [next] flight...with 3100LBS of fuel and departed. No issues were detected on the first leg. On the second leg on climb out a 'Low Level Fuel Light' local alert illuminated with fuel light on the Captain`s [side] and Right Engine Electric Fuel Pump turned on. We performed the Fuel Lo LVL following Failures Procedures. We checked the Fuel Quantities and had over 1000LBS of fuel in both tanks (Total Fuel on board over 2000LBS). We completed the procedure for 'If LO LVL light on one side only.' We had no indication of a Fuel Leak. We completed the procedure per 'No Fuel Leak and if FQI (Fuel Quantity Indicators) is equal or greater than 352 LBS;' 'Feeder Jet pump malfunction is suspected.' We monitored Fuel consumption and burn rate was normal in both engines. We contacted Dispatch and informed them of the malfunction; indications; the procedure performed and our ETA. During the descent at around 900LBS of fuel in the right tank (Total Fuel On board over 1800LBS) the right engine flamed out. We contacted Center.... We performed the Engine Flame-Out procedure then the Single Engine Operation Procedure. We received or clearance to land...and executed the landing with no further issues. Maintenance inspected the aircraft and found the right fuel tank showed 900LBS of fuel indicating on the FQI but no fuel in the right wing.

ATR42 Captain reported that on descent for landing; the right engine flamed out with 900 pounds of fuel indicated in the right tank. Tank was subsequently found to be empty.

1212293

201410

1201-1800

JAX.Airport

FL

Center ZJX

Air Carrier

MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

FMS Or FMC

Descent

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1212293

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

MARQO ONE RNAV STAR: Runway 8 was closed. We were set up for the RWY 14 transition; then somewhere before COROE; without enough time we were told descend and use the RWY 8 transition. I tried to set up the transition on an FMS system because the pilot not flying was new and wasn't acting fast enough. I told him to fly and attempted the modification. I then found myself too close to COROE without a transition route and quickly requested a heading. ATC reiterated his instructions and we went back and forth wasting time with me trying to explain we couldn't navigate it and needed a heading and altitude. He didn't get that we lost our FMS routing because of his late request. THEY SHOULDN'T ISSUE these changes so late in the game as well as keep us high too long which was another issue adding to the complications. While this was going on I selected heading hold after COROE which was basically the runway 8 transition until I finally got a heading and new altitude.They shouldn't be allowed to issue a different transition while landing another runway; besides adding distraction and confusion. Our systems won't do it unless we have much more time to set it up and figure out we will have to plan on raw data approach if it isn't an RNAV or RNAV back up. RNAV is not allowed on an FMS airplane anyway.Tell ATC to learn and understand our aircraft and pilot capabilities and that the more complex the request; the more dangerous it is since we may not know until after we have gone through the distracting procedure of attempting to comply; that it is too late to do anything. And in our case; left without a route in the FMS while crossing the initial waypoint of the arrival transition. (Thus my reason for requesting a heading of which they fought and took too long to provide.)Bottom line; special changes and requests to these very specific and restricted arrivals should not be issued or expected to comply with. Either have us fly the arrivals as is or provide vectors; speeds; and altitudes. My future response in this situation will be; 'UNABLE RNAV' and if that doesn't elicit radar vectors I will have to declare an emergency.

MD-80 Captain reported struggling to get the FMS re-programmed after a late runway change from ATC. Reporter recommended ATC stick with the original clearance and minimize short-notice changes.

1431017

201703

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Night

Ground ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 98; Flight Crew Type 13000

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant

1431017

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Type 6800

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant

1430087.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Y

Person Flight Attendant

Taxi

Human Factors

After boarding was complete ATC notified us of a 50 minute gate hold. I made appropriate periodic PAs to Passengers. Our wheels up was :50 so I told Agent and Crew to plan to push at :40. At push time no one was ready. I had to go to the top of the jet way to find the Agent and there was no Pushback Crew. As a result we were rushed despite the 50 minute delay. At this point there was a serious chance that we would not make our wheels up time. At the last moment the A Flight Attendant tossed the napkin on to the console and closed the cockpit door. The last digit of the count was illegible and I made the mistake of assuming it was correct. As we approached the runway we were cleared for immediate takeoff. I rang the cabin to notify the Flight Attendants and as we took the runway the A called up to tell us that there was a Passenger that thought he might be on the wrong aircraft. I had the First Officer instruct everyone to remain seated and that we would sort it out in the air. Above 10;000 feet I confirmed the load sheet count of 46 and compared it to the napkin count of 4 (illegible). I contacted the A who said her count was 47. Further investigation revealed that our extra Passenger was a connect for [a different airport] that had failed to exit at the last stop and remained on the aircraft despite the numerous PAs referring to our destination. I suspect that he was in the lav during the through count process. We coordinated with Dispatch to have a [customer service agent] meet him.Slow down; it's always wise to slow down. Also; our procedure of verifying the count as the very last thing to occur before push; seems like there could be a better time to discover this showstopper; especially when faced with a potentially significant delay if an error is detected. Maybe I haven't been paying attention but I ride other airlines and I've never seen flight attendants actually count Passengers before pushback. The potential error chain has too many links with our system.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737NG flight crew reported they departed with an unaccounted passenger onboard.

1492801

201710

1801-2400

HNL.Airport

HI

0.0

VMC

Night

Tower HNL

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 231

Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1492801

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Total 5118; Flight Crew Type 450

Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1492464.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

We were late off the gate due to the boarding process and then we encountered multiple errors during taxi out while trying to gather takeoff numbers. We tried to determine which issue was the culprit but could not get problem resolved. While holding short of runway 8L at RB we informed ATC we needed a minute. I used my cell phone to call dispatcher and he read me the numbers for our flight. He mentioned there was something on his end that was holding up the numbers. He also sent me the numbers via ACARS which printed automatically. They read assume weight 140;700 (red flag); assume temp. 61C; EPR 91.2; V speeds 148-149-154. In haste we pressed on trying to get back on schedule and missed the RED FLAG threat of the wrong weight which was a 40;000 lb difference; our actual takeoff weight was 180;000. Obvious to us after action but blind to us in the moment of trying to get back our time lost loading and during the error problem.During the takeoff roll the aircraft was sluggish in accelerating and took excessive time to Vr. FO rotated to 9.8 (via pitch angle report) and slightly scraped the tail. I initially felt like it was a possibility but was not 100% sure and did not mention anything at that moment as we were climbing out facing the mountains directly ahead. After accelerating and the initial climb. Our attention started to be saturated with ETOPS information and ATC communication. The Lead Flight attendant called the flight deck and I answered she told me the aft galley attendants heard an audible scraping sound during lift off under their feet. This confirmed my suspicions of a tail strike. We continued the climb as we reassessed our thoughts on the matter. FO looked up Tail Strike in the manual and this lead him to the QRH which stated do not pressurize (we were already pressurized) so I looked at the gauges and made sure that that was not an additional problem and decided to leave the pressurization alone at that time. The QRH says to land at nearest suitable airport so I told ATC we needed to return to HNL and let him know our problem and that it was not currently an emergency. I contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control to let them know and also to decide what to do about overweight landing. I asked FO to handle the radios and ask for a hold to burn fuel while I talked to Dispatch; Maintenance Control; FAs; passengers; and station. During that time ATC gave us hold as published at (they claim) BAMBO intersection and FO read back CKH (Koko head) I had my attention diverted in conversation with Dispatch and Maintenance Control at the moment of the clearance. As we leveled and started to get to the holding fix I was trying to find the published fix on the low enroute and said something is wrong here I asked FO the clearance again and just as I did ATC asked us 'how much more time on our heading?' I responded we were entering the hold at CKH and asked him to verify that's where he wanted us to hold and he said the original clearance was BAMBO but that holding at CKH was approved so we continued. After that communication I continued with Maintenance Control and Dispatch they said they'd rather us land and write up the overweight landing so we asked for vectors for the approach. We landed without incident.Maintenance assessed the write up and noted that it was a slight scrape and that they were able to differ the paint on the skid and that the green/red sticker was not damaged therefore the skid was not crushed or depressed. They also did an overweight inspection and we gathered a new release and fueled up then continued without issue.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737NG flight crew reported returning to the departure airport due to a tail strike on takeoff.

1043873

201210

1201-1800

TMB.Airport

FL

2000.0

Tower TMB

Personal

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Initial Climb

Class D TMB

Facility TMB.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

1043873

ATC Issue All Types

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

I was working Local Control South on Runway 9R at TMB on an East configuration. I had an IFR practice approach a PA28 complete his low approach and was instructed to fly runway heading and maintain 2;000 FT. I had a successive IFR Departure a CL60 which was released by MIA Departure with a left turn to heading 300. Once I had more than 3 miles of separation from the PA28 off the departure end of the runway; I cleared the CL60 on runway heading initially in order to avoid Cessna's in the traffic pattern on 9L. After coordinating with Local North; I instructed the CL60 to start the left 300 turn and issued traffic of a Cessna in the left crosswind indicating 1;000 FT; the pilot replied he had the aircraft insight. Immediately after that traffic call; I issued the second traffic call which was the PA28 that was already talking to MIA Approach. The pilot first responded with 'looking' followed by 'got him insight.' Once I saw the CL60 in his turn I then switched him to MIA Approach. AT all times the operation was safe; no form of separation was broken; and I had all aircraft in sight at all times. This was also the first time on position I had to work with the new RADAR system 'FUSION'. I had to adapt to the new RADAR that I had never seen before prior to being on position this time. My recommendation is before implementing a new RADAR and having to use it without ever seen it before; familiarization time must be given to the Controller before getting on position and working traffic.

TMB Controller described a near separation loss when utilizing FUSION RADAR equipment for the first time. The reporter noted some familiarization with the new equipment should have been in place before usage.

1246629

201503

0601-1200

ZZZ.TRACON

US

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

AC Generation

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Training / Qualification; Confusion

1246629

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors

Aircraft

While on the arrival into IAD we got a GEN 2 OFF master caution message. My First Officer (FO) was pilot flying. I told him he had the radios and then looked up GEN 2 OFF. The procedure in the QRH had me select the generator to OFF/RESET then AUTO. Looking at EICAS I was hoping to see the GEN 2 OFF message extinguish. Instead both EICAS displays filled up with messages and the ADG deployed. After a few moments of processing what had happened I looked up and found my hand on GEN switch 1. Power was restored to both generators. The APU was started in case GEN 2 should fail again. ATC was informed but an emergency was not declared as power was restored.Looking back I should have slowed down and gotten confirmation from my FO that I had the correct switch and not be in such a hurry to complete the checklist.QRH improvement for GEN 2 OFF.1. If APU is available for use....START (If the APU generator is running and a pilot accidentally switches off the wrong generator; there will be no interruption to electrical power and the ADG will not deploy.)2. Affected generator switch.....CONFIRM then OFF/RESET then AUTO The preface in the QRH mentions that thrust levers and guarded switches should be confirmed before moving or selecting. When a pilot is using the QRH in flight (s)he is not reading the preface. They are using a checklist in the QRH to troubleshoot or solve a problem. Seems the word confirm should be used in the checklist since that is what the pilot is reading.

A CRJ-700 GEN 2 Master Caution alerted so the Captain; with the QRH; began the Reset procedure but turned GEN 1 OFF. GEN 1 was quickly re-establish now with the ADG deployed. Both generators were eventually re-established.

1596495

201811

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

35000.0

VMC

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Oceanic

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 9500; Flight Crew Type 250

Distraction; Workload; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

1596495

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Y

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Diverted

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

After learning of the passengers seizure; we tried to get a Sat Link phone call to Med Link; but were having difficulty finding the right point of contact in directory. We had a jumpseater (not familiar with the B777; but familiar with Sat Com) and none of us could quite figure out who to use for a Sat phone call to Dispatch/Med Link. The registered nurse (passenger) on board recommended we land ASAP as the seizure passenger's vital signs were crashing. I was the Pilot Flying and the Captain was managing coordination. We obtained a clearance back to ZZZ as we were still at least 45 minutes from the CP and headed back direct. We also [advised ATC] via our ATC data link. Captain was able to work an HF phone patch to Med Link but the radios were very difficult to hear and transfer information. Everything had to be repeated several times. Additionally; the flight attendants were bombarding us with information. I was flying and trying to set up for recovery into ZZZ. The jumpseater was trying to help the Captain by relaying information to and from the flight attendants. It was at this point that Captain decided that to minimize the chaos and communication difficulties by exercising his [Captain's] authority and bring the registered nurse up to the flight deck to work directly with Med Link. She was not an [air carrier] employee and did not have a badge giving her cockpit access; but given all that was going on; it was better to have her where she could talk directly to Med Link. A Flight Attendant accompanied her on to the flight deck; the door was closed; and she was able to (although with great communication difficulty) work with Med Link to help the patient. By this time; the passenger's vitals had stabilized some and Med Link recommended we continue to [destination] which of course was now impossible. The registered nurse returned to the cabin to help the passenger/patient until we landed and EMTs boarded the aircraft. I support the Captain's decision to have brought the registered nurse up to the flight deck as there was so much going on just recovering the aircraft including dumping fuel that required his attention more than being a conduit of medical data.

B777 First Officer reported a medical diversion while in oceanic airspace.

1619974

201902

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Rain

Temperature - Extreme

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Scheduled Maintenance

Work Cards

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Other / Unknown

1619974

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Maintenance

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Company Policy; Manuals; Procedure

Company Policy

Aircraft X was parked on gate XX and required [multiple work cards] to be accomplished. We notified management the outside temperature was 27 degrees and greasing could not be accomplished IAW (In Accordance With) [the AMM; Aircraft Maintenance Manual]. Management insisted on accomplishing the work cards so we then informed management the aircraft must go inside the hangar. Management informed the probationary AMT (Aviation Maintenance Technician) to accomplish the job outside; which he did.Management was notified of the current outside temperatures at ZZZ were 27 degrees and well below the AMM limit of 32 degrees for greasing but still wanted the [work] cards accomplished. When management was notified that the aircraft would have to go into the hangar they pressured the probationary AMT to accomplish the job on the gate to avoid getting a delay for the morning departure.Management should stop harassing the AMT's and to follow the IAW procedures of the maintenance manuals that all maintenance personnel are required to follow including management!Management knew of the assigned work cards and forecasted weather at ZZZ and should have planned to have the aircraft brought into the hangar in the beginning of the night to avoid pressuring the AMT's to accomplish this task outside.

Mechanic reported that management disregarded Maintenance Manual procedures and assigned a maintenance task to be accomplished in conflict with published procedures.

1076501

201303

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

1000.0

VMC

10

Daylight

3500

Tower ZZZ

Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Other Aerial Survey

Initial Climb

Class C ZZZ

Aileron

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

1076501

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft; Weather

Ambiguous

On initial climb passing through an altitude of approximately 700 - 1;000 FT AGL; I noticed a hesitation through the control yoke while manipulating the ailerons. This hesitation was only present upon initial deflection from the centered position and did not affect any controls aside from the ailerons. Upon instruction from the Tower to contact Departure; I asked the Tower for permission to enter a right downwind and return for landing. When inquired about the nature of my return; I stated the aircraft flight controls were 'sticking.' I believe an emergency was declared on my behalf and I was cleared to land on the same runway previously departed from. I used minimum control deflection needed to execute a normal approach and landing where I was followed back to the local FBO by emergency vehicles. Outside temperature was slightly below freezing. Aircraft was placed in a hangar for approximately one hour fifteen minutes prior to flight. Problem was only discovered upon initial climb. No abnormalities were discovered during pre-flight; aileron deflection during taxi or full control manipulation after run-up prior to takeoff. Aircraft was placed in a hangar for the remainder of that day in addition to another day. Flight controls were tested again after a period of approximately 36 hours with no abnormalities detected. Later; an A&P Mechanic was also consulted regarding the abnormality. I believe that despite a thorough pre-flight inspection along with a visual and tactile inspection of the aircraft fuselage and control surfaces; residual water migrated to the control cables or pulleys. This water was not detected until the aircraft reached an altitude more conducive for freezing. As the residual water began to freeze on the controls; a 'sticking' or hesitation manifested when trying to deflect the ailerons from the centered position. This theory was deemed likely by an A&P Mechanic. I will remain vigilant about the potential hazards of cold weather operations and continue to educate myself using faasafety.gov in addition to participating in online safety seminars. To prevent a problem like this from happening again; I will place extra emphasis on the amount of time aircraft spend in the hangar in relation to outside air temperature.

C210 pilot experiences aileron 'sticking' shortly after takeoff in freezing conditions and elects to return to the departure airport. Ice is assumed to be the cause of the problem and the aircraft is placed in a warm hanger for 36 hours and no further problems are noted.

1757267

201810

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

N

Y

N

Scheduled Maintenance

Inspection; Installation; Work Cards; Testing

Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Other Exterior

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Confusion; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Workload

1757267

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Person Maintenance

Routine Inspection

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Company Policy; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Manuals; Procedure

Procedure

I was tasked with changing the #200 main landing gear assembly which involves replacing the main side strut assembly. The lower portion of the side strut was found to be installed backwards.An FCD was issued the inspect the fleet for this problem. It was found on a RON.The task is very lengthy; taking more than one shift to complete; and the work card that is used requires you to refer to one of the many figures in the back often or just says refer to the AMM. We receive the upper and lower main side strut as a single unit already assembled and cotter pinned from stock. The work card step only indicated; if necessary; invert the articulation nut. It did not specify the need to rotate the lower strut or give any installation procedures. The note regarding the bearing is vague and relies solely on the image given.I was informed it was found while preforming the FCD at another base. Include steps and figures for installing the articulating nut and make it a step on the work card to inspect the orientation of the side strut instead of just a note. Have the assembly come from stock with the nut loose and no safety pre-installed.

Technician reported installing a main landing gear side strut assembly backwards; citing unclear documentation.

1244954

201503

0001-0600

LAS.Airport

NV

0.0

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Cabin Jumpseat

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

1244954

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Y

Person Flight Attendant

Pre-flight

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Aircraft

Upon boarding the aircraft to do preflight duties we immediately encountered a rancid heavy pungent odor permeating the entire aircraft. It smelled of rotten eggs; wet socks or dirty laundry smell. Even with heavy deodorizers the smell continued. We began to feel very nauseated. We reported it to the Captain who said it was fine and we were taking it as is.We then taxied out onto the runway and mid demo the engine roared to make a turn. Then the air from the bleed air in the aft galley vent blew air onto my face while reading the demo. I lost my breath; became dizzy; started coughing and wheezing and had difficulty breathing. I felt disoriented with a severe migraine; nausea and tremor on the left side of my body. My heart began racing and I felt very ill. I tried to finish the demo as quickly as possible. We made an Emergency call to Captain stating that myself and several passengers in the aft cabin were feeling very ill from the noxious fumes. He decided that a gate return was in order. I felt as though I was losing consciousness so with the assistance of [another] Flight Attendant I obtained a POB and took oxygen which helped the racing sensation in my heart and the dizzy disorientation.Maintenance did not replace or address the Wet Seals where the toxins were coming from. Instead they simply ran the engines for 20 minutes and changed the filters. After this I was told that there was no Flight Attendant available and if I went home sick then the flight would cancel. So I felt pressured to continue the trip. I arrived very sick from the chemical exposure. I will work my flight home and then will go to a [facility] for chemical exposure testing upon arrival [at home].We need a Cabin Air Quality program at the airline and a mandated mandatory Wet Seal change out program for our aircraft bleed air systems in order to prevent future Fume Events and Aerotoxic Syndrome exposures to our Cabin Crews and Passengers.

Flight Attendant reported becoming ill from noxious fumes (that smelled of rotten eggs or dirty socks) in the cabin.

1153487

201403

0001-0600

SBN.Airport

IN

11000.0

TRACON SBN

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

Part 121

IFR

FMS Or FMC

Descent

STAR FISSK 2

Class E SBN

Facility SBN.Tracon

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Confusion

1153487

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Human Factors; Procedure; Chart Or Publication

Human Factors

This is a general report regarding multiple events on the FISSK 2 Arrival into MDW. The times noted are estimated and refer to the most recent of several events. Chicago Center issues aircraft to cross the FISSK waypoint on the FISSK 2 arrival at 11;000 FT and hand them off to us; South Bend Approach. I have noticed on more than one occasion aircraft cross the FISSK waypoint at 11;000 FT; and without ATC instruction; begin to descend or ask if they are allowed to descend. The pilots are instructed to fly a transition after the HALIE intersection. When they review the transition; some confusion may occur. The arrival says to cross HILLS waypoint at 5;000 FT or SAILZ waypoint at 3;000 FT (depending on the transition). The pilots think they are free to descend at that time. I caught one pilot starting to descend as I was issuing a descent clearance from 11;000 FT to 10;000 FT. I asked the pilot if he was already starting to descend seconds before I was talking. He said he was and explained the confusion on the altitudes posted on the transition. There was no deviation since he had only dropped 100 FT and I was descending him anyways. There have been several other pilots that question ATC about whether or not they are allowed to descend. From what I have experienced; every aircraft was being operated by a single air carrier. Note: South Bend has a LOA with Chicago Approach to hand off aircraft at 6 or 7 thousand FT. The transitions show 5 and 3; therefore South Bend never issues a 'Descend Via' clearance. Remove the crossing restrictions since we don't issue them (due to LOA). Change the 'Note:' on the arrival to say 'Expect' instead of 'Cross'; Contact this Air Carrier and see if they are receiving the proper training on arrival procedures.

SBN Approach Controller reports many pilots becoming confused during the FISSK 2 RNAV arrival into MDW and descending before being cleared to do so. A descend via clearance is never issued for this arrival due to the LOA with Chicago Approach and the reporter believes the altitude restrictions at HILLS and SAILZ should be changed to expect altitudes.

1465226

201707

ZZZ.Airport

US

Marginal

Haze / Smoke; 6

Daylight

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Piper Aircraft Corp Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Landing

Direct

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 165; Flight Crew Total 2800; Flight Crew Type 600

1465226

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 2500; Vertical 100

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Human Factors

Human Factors

I was on short final to runway XX at ZZZ. I was broadcasting on UNICOM and the only other traffic was a Robinson helicopter air taxiing on parallel taxiway. Just prior to landing the two vans that shuttle skydivers around (there were skydivers next to the approach end) entered the access road that circles close to the runway and were directly in my path. I pulled up; went over them and landed further down the runway. This is not the first time. The skydiving vans drive in the approach path; kicking up dust; without using a radio and without regard for any aircraft on final.

A Piper pilot reported that two vehicles entered the approach end of the runway during final approach.

1045697

201210

1201-1800

TEB.Airport

NJ

1500.0

IMC

6

Daylight

1500

TRACON N90

Corporate

Gulfstream IV / G350 / G450

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

SID RUUDY4

Class B EWR; Class D TEB

Autopilot

X

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 140; Flight Crew Total 19500; Flight Crew Type 4000

Human-Machine Interface

1045697

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

Departing TEB Runway 24 on the RUUDY4 departure; WENTZ intersection has a mandatory crossing restriction of 1;500 FT. After liftoff and gear retraction; I asked for the autopilot to be engaged at approximately 900 FT to insure that the aircraft leveled at 1;500 FT at WENTZ. As the aircraft approached 1;500 FT; the climb rate was such that the autopilot overshot the altitude by 100 FT. I disconnected the autopilot and manually flew the aircraft back to 1;500 FT. The Departure Controller then cleared us to 10;000 FT with no further comment. I relied on the autopilot to level the aircraft at 1;500 FT assuming that would be the case. In the future; I will be more vigilant that the autopilot will comply with the performance that I expect.

G450 First Officer reports overshooting the 1;500 FT initial level off altitude on the RUUDY4 departure from TEB. The autopilot was engaged at 900 FT and was unable to make to make the level off precisely.

993153

201202

1801-2400

PBI.Airport

FL

2500.0

TRACON PBI

Fractional

Learjet 40

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class C PBI

Facility PBI.TRACON

Government

Approach; Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Situational Awareness

993153

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

I was vectoring a LR40 to a south downwind; I instructed him to descend and maintain 2;500. I had other things going on and I looked up and saw that he had descended to 1;500 just south of the localizer.

PBI Controller described an unauthorized descent below assigned altitudes resulting in a MVA infraction.

1702822

201911

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Q400

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Class B ZZZ

Landing Gear

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

1702822

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

1703061.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

On departure the gear lever was brought up but the gear stayed down. N door amber light on landing gear panel followed by landing gear inoperative. First Officer leg so Captain began part of the E&A checklist for associated caution (landing gear inoperative) as well as completing the landing gear failed to retract checklist. Captain asked the flight attendants to verify that the landing gear was still down in which the flight attendants called back and verified. He then contacted Maintenance Control then Dispatch. When the Captain came back; the flight crew switched controls and the Captain became the Pilot Flying and First Officer the Pilot Monitoring. A decision was made by the flight crew and Dispatch to continue the flight. Enroute the First Officer continued the checklist where the Captain left off with the Alternate gear extension and Dispatch called through the EFB and this time it was another Dispatcher and he said he agreed with the decision to go to ZZZ. Once completing all required checklists and comfortable with the landing the Captain performed a normal landing and was able to taxi clear of the runway and also taxi into the gate.

On normal takeoff at positive rate/gear up call/landing gear failed to retract. N door amber caution light on Landing Gear Panel illuminated; followed by illumination of Landing Gear INOP Master Caution light. Captain (Pilot Monitoring) referenced Landing Gear Fail to Retract checklist first; followed by LDG Gear INOP Caution checklist and finally the Alternate Gear Extension checklist. Captain asked the Flight Attendant to visually verify that the landing gear was still down; which they confirmed. Advised Flight Attendant that they would be updated with more information after coordinating with Dispatch; Maintenance Control and checklist completion. Captain called Maintenance Control to notify them of gear problem. Captain then contacted Dispatch to advise them of situation and crew's desire to continue to ZZZ. Dispatch and crew mutually agreed with decision. The Captain made the decision to be the Pilot Flying and have the First Officer switch to the Pilot Monitoring; as First Officer would be better suited to complete the Alternate Gear Extension checklist. During the first phase of Alternate Gear Extension checklist a call came in from dispatch through the EFB SatCom from a different Dispatcher (identified himself as filling in for original Dispatcher). Captain briefed Dispatcher and all parties mutually agreed on continuing to ZZZ. Checklists were completed and crew coordinated landing while also [requesting priority handling] with ZZZ approach control. Flight Attendant were told to prepare for a normal landing and given a time frame for landing in ZZZ. PA was made to passengers. Rationale to Continue to ZZZ: #1 priority to operate the flight safely; make the best decision based on the current conditions and situation at hand. Considerations were taken for additional fuel burn with gear down and current weather conditions. Based on prior experience conducting a maintenance ferry flight w/gear down in similar conditions with regard to fuel burn and performance. On taxi out prior to departure observed a lower cloud layer developing over the approach end. Had the appearance that ZZZ1 may be trending towards fog conditions.

Q400 flight crew reported landing gear failed to raise during climbout.

1479775

201709

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Dusk

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B767-300 and 300 ER

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Hydraulic Main System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1479775

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1479996.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

[Enroute] we got L HYD QTY alert. We observed left hydraulic fluid quantity continually and steadily decrease from 0.70 to 0.0. When quantity went to zero; we got a L HYD PRIM PUMP alert; with PRESS light on left engine hydraulic pump; with left QTY light on overhead panel. Complied with QRH for left hydraulic quantity and Left Hydraulic Primary Pump procedures. Engine driven pump was secured. Left hydraulic pressure remained at 3000 +/- 100 PSI. Left hydraulic electric pump remained in AUTO. [We advised] Center; and a normal visual approach was conducted. Configuration to flaps 30; approach; rollout; and clearing runway were all normal. Fire/Rescue looked over aircraft from their vehicles and found no irregularities. Captain elected to taxi in without escort. Taxi to parking was normal. All hydraulic systems performed normally to block in. Left system hydraulic quantity depleted to zero. Maintenance verified left hydraulic reservoir empty. No suggestions. This aircraft has approximately 2500 TTSN (Total Time Since New). I wouldn't expect any hydraulic components to fail at this point in the airframe life.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B767-300 flight crew reported diverting following loss of the left hydraulic system.

1453928

201706

1201-1800

ZZZ.Tower

US

Windshear; 10

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Corporate

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Other banner

Initial Climb

None

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 52; Flight Crew Total 272; Flight Crew Type 39

Situational Awareness

1453928

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Weather

Ambiguous

Had a one hour banner flight. Upon return I was instructed to do a low pass of 250 ft over the banner box field following company operating procedures so a picture could be taken. Once I reached my altitude of 250 ft I put in full power to begin my climb but experienced wind shear [and] the plane [was] unable to climb or gain airspeed. My banner detached hitting another parked airplane causing minor damage to its right wing.

Banner tow pilot reported encountering wind shear that limited the climb capability; causing the banner to detach and hit a parked aircraft.

1680201

201908

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

300.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Cessna 162 Skycatcher

2.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Takeoff / Launch

Direct

Class D ZZZ

Other unknown

Small Aircraft

Part 91

Other unknown

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 1; Flight Crew Total 435; Flight Crew Type 1

1680201

Conflict Airborne Conflict

Horizontal 1000; Vertical 300

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

We were returning to ZZZ1 from ZZZ on Saturday afternoon in a Cessna Skycatcher 162; flying VFR. Active runways for departures from ZZZ were [Runway] XXL and XXR. ATIS wind was 110 @ 8kts; but Ground was calling 110. The aircraft owner (right seat) requested and received permission to use Runway XX due to crosswind concerns. We taxied and did the run-up on taxiway 'F' near Runway XX. After waiting for several departures from Runway XY; we were cleared for takeoff on Runway XX with a left turn on course.We took the runway; accelerated; and rotated. About 1/2 down the runway; a dark blue single engine; low wing aircraft crossed in front of us about 1;000 feet ahead and 300 feet above. I arrested my climb and held level at about 300 feet AGL until well past the crossing point. I then began a shallow climbing left turn. At XA:06; Tower requested our on course heading and provided a traffic advisory. The rest of the departure proceeded normally.

Cessna 162 Pilot reported an airborne conflict immediately after takeoff rotation from crossing runway traffic.

1771156

202011

0001-0600

ZFW.ARTCC

TX

36000.0

Center ZFW

Air Carrier

Widebody Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class A ZFW

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Other / Unknown; Troubleshooting

1771156

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Human Factors

40 minutes out of ZZZ near Abilene TX; received ATC transponder 1 and 2 Fail. Followed by a GNS 1 and 2 Fail. Reported event to ATC and Maintenance Control; followed QRH procedures. Another aircraft in the area reported same thing. ATC suspected GPS jamming event. GPS military jamming.

Air Carrier Captain reported multiple flight deck electronic component failure to ATC. ATC stated very likely caused by GPS jamming.

1226839

201412

1801-2400

LAX.Airport

CA

0.0

VMC

Night

Ground LAX

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 31; Flight Crew Total 16500; Flight Crew Type 1880

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

1226839

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 9000; Flight Crew Type 2000

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

1226843.0

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Ambiguous

Aircraft taxiing south on taxiway R cannot see westbound vehicular traffic on the access road approaching taxiway R until they are immediately adjacent to taxiway R near the southwest corner of the hanger. This blind spot is due to the close proximity of the hanger to taxiway R. After the First Officer (FO) contacted South Ground near check point 2 on taxiway R and told them that we were parking at gate XX; the controller responded that the gate was occupied and instructed us to turn right onto taxiway B to hold short of taxiway U (pointed west). The South Ground frequency was congested but the FO was able acknowledge the clearance back to ground. FO told me that he would contact company/ramp to determine when the gate and ally would clear. I would continue to monitor ground control frequency.We were approaching the southwest corner of the hanger (on my left) and access road on taxiway R; when out of the corner of my eye I picked up a westbound black pickup vehicle moving at high speed (estimated 40 -50 mph) headed for the access road. I uttered an expletive and immediately jammed on the brakes to try to stop but by this time we were on top of the access road. Hearing my expletive; the FO then also saw the vehicle. The driver didn't appear to notice us until he was on the taxiway directly in front of us and only then appeared to swerve before disappearing under the nose of the aircraft. Both FO and I momentarily braced for collision until we saw the vehicle re-emerge under the right side of the nose and continue west to the southern hardstand area. Due to the aggressive braking; the aircraft came to an abrupt stop on the access road but once we saw the vehicle head for the hardstand we continued taxi as instructed. The FO who had switched his audio panel to make the gate query call inadvertently reported the 'near-miss' to ramp before switching back to ground to report the incident to the ground controller. Ground responded that they would report the vehicle to Airport Ops; but he was very busy working other aircraft and we knew that this report was a low priority for him.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

An air carrier crew took evasive action to avoid a collision with a speeding vehicle on taxiway R near the maintenance hangar.

1029285

201208

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Fuel Booster Pump

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 85; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure; Workload; Troubleshooting

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel; Party2 Dispatch

1029285

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Declared Emergency; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Ambiguous

Aircraft [was] given to us with the Number 2 Center tank pump inoperative; MEL 2821D. Center tank fuel is structural so the fuel weight in the center tank had to be added to zero fuel weight per the Flight Operations Manager. I contacted Dispatch to ensure that Load Planning had accomplished this task. The Dispatcher told me that he was 'just coming on shift and that he was sure a note had been passed to Load Planning to accomplish the added center tank fuel to the ZFW. I asked him to check personally and to ACARS me the fact that this had been accomplished. I then went back to the gate to begin preparing aircraft for pushback and subsequent flight. I received ACARS message confirming that Center Tank fuel had been added to ZFW. Fueler came into cockpit with fuel sheet and stated that there was fuel dripping from the right wing. First Officer said that no fuel was leaking when he accomplished his walk around. I sent the First Officer out to check and he notified me that fuel was streaming from the right air scoop. I directed the flight attendants to deplane passengers and coordinated with Customer Service. We shut down the APU and by this time; the Fire Department had responded. Not sure who called Fire Department out. Maintenance was notified and contract Maintenance was sent to our aircraft. It was decided to transfer right wing fuel to the center tank. Contract Maintenance notified me that the over pressure light was illuminated for the right wing. Aircraft fuel leak stopped when approximately 500 LBS of fuel was transferred to the center tank. I updated Dispatcher with the new center tank fuel amount. Passengers were reboarded and I was told that two or three people had chosen to go on other airlines or were not going. No extra cargo added and no additional fuel added. Approximately 200-300 LBS of fuel burned from APU plus whatever fuel had leaked out of the wing. Customer Service closed the doors. Moved the jetway back and then returned the jetway to the aircraft. I opened my sliding window and was told by Customer Service that he was being told we were overweight. I contacted Dispatch and asked him to check with Load Planning because we had only reduced our gross weight and we were OK to Dispatch before the fuel leak and now we weren't. Dispatcher told me that 'I'm kinda working a lot of issues and don't know if I can help you right now.' I told him to find someone in Dispatch that would help me and to start with his Supervisor as I had a plane full of passengers. Dispatcher then enlisted a couple of Dispatchers to talk to Load Planning on his behalf and he continued to help us. He then requested a passenger count; our cargo pit load of bags; cargo and mail. We gave him all the requested information and we were finally told we had to reduce our gross weight by 68 LBS. Our performance data for takeoff Runway 24L always showed us well under Structural limits. Takeoff was normal. My only other item of interest is that it was difficult to contact Dispatch through a land line phone. I could not use the phone system in the station's Flight Planning area to contact Dispatch and I had to use my personal cell phone; and it took us over 20 minutes to contact Dispatch via an airborne VHF frequency.

An air carrier aircraft's #2 Center Fuel Tank pump MEL'ed fuel was part of the ZFW but; after an over board vent fuel leak; Load Planning decided the aircraft was overweight. Dispatch was reluctant to help because of workloads.

1120436

201310

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Marginal

Fog

Night

UNICOM ZZZ

Air Taxi

Learjet 55

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 9850; Flight Crew Type 3050

Situational Awareness

1120436

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 2300; Flight Crew Type 400

1121452.0

Ground Excursion Taxiway

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General Maintenance Action

Airport; Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

After landing I exited on Taxiway A3. As I made the right-hand turn onto Taxiway A; the right main gear departed the pavement and sank into soft mud. The effect was equal to applying full right differential braking and overpowered the nose wheel steering. In an instant; all three landing gear were in the mud. The aircraft had to be extracted with a tug and one taxiway light was knocked over. There was no damage to the aircraft. A combination of factors contributed to this incident: Patchy fog congregating at the edges of the runway and taxiways; my failure to keep the yellow stripe in sight and the nose-wheel on it; the unexpectedly sharp right turn (approximately 135 degrees) required and the resulting sharp point of unpaved area extending into the turn radius.

A landing was made and the aircraft exited on A3 which was the last high-speed taxiway. After clearing the runway I began the After Landing checklist and the Captain made a 135 degree right turn onto Taxiway A. While making the turn the aircraft cut the corner too tight and right main gear left the taxiway which yawed the aircraft to the right pulling all of the aircraft's wheels off of the paved surface. Since we stopped in soft mud we required an airport tug to pull us out. After getting pulled out of the mud we thoroughly cleaned the wheels with a high pressure water hose and carefully inspected the landing gear. No damage was found. I believe that poor visibility; low light; unfamiliarity with the airport were contributing factors. The incident would have been less likely to occur if the After Landing checklist was completed before we began taxi allowing the all attention of both crew members to be outside the aircraft while making the turn.

LR55 flight crew reports becoming stuck when the right main gear leaves the paved surface during a 135 degree turn from a high speed exit to the parallel taxiway. Darkness and fog contributed to the incident. A tug is required to extract the aircraft.

1504383

201712

14000.0

VMC

Air Carrier

Widebody Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 6855; Flight Crew Type 2502

1504383

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

N

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure

Flying [this leg] we are generally over the Terrain Critical Depressurization Procedure (TCDP) area of Greenland. The TCDP is simple; if west of W040 descend to FL140 and proceed to the west coast of Greenland; if east of W040 descend to FL140 and proceed to the east coast of Greenland.For my flight; the original route had an ETOPS Critical Point (CP) west of W040 with an ETOPS alternate east of W040. Thus the ETOPS solution conflicted with the TCDP. I can find no guidance that says that an ETOPS solution can ignore TCDP requirements; nor does it say that an ETOPS solution must comply with a TCDP; however since both are in the manuals and both address the same contingency; a decompression; it seems a reasonable inference that an ETOPS solution should comply with a TCDP. From a practical standpoint it also seems reasonable.

Air Carrier Captain reported the Terrain Critical Depressurization Procedure conflicts with the ETOPS Critical Point on a specific transatlantic route.

1150244

201402

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

10000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class E ZZZ

Autoflight Yaw Damper

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 4800

Distraction; Confusion; Troubleshooting

1150244

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Distraction; Confusion; Troubleshooting

1150248.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

On climb in VMC conditions; Captain and I felt a noticeable left and right yawing motion of the aircraft. We had no yaw damper INOP indications or EICAS indications. We initially thought maybe an engine issue but all indications were normal. We leveled off at 17;000 FT; turned on the autopilot but condition continued. We both agreed we did not want to take an unknown flight control issue any further and returned to the departure airport. Condition continued till landing.

QRH was consulted but not relevant for the issue. Condition continued and the decision was made to return to departure airport. Told Center but did not declare an emergency. Aircraft was always controllable; but when confronted with taking an aircraft with control issues to altitude and then into a mountain airport; the decision was easier. We did attempt to call Dispatch. After informing the flight attendants and passengers the descent and uneventful landing was made. On landing sent Maintenance a message 'uncommanded yaw left and right.'

A B757 crew reported uncommanded left and right yaw motions during climb with no EICAS or other malfunction indications so as a precaution; the crew returned to the departure airport

988615

201201

1801-2400

ZMA.ARTCC

FL

Center ZMA

Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG

1.0

VFR

Initial Climb

Class E ZMA

Facility ZMA.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Workload; Confusion; Situational Awareness

988615

Facility ZMA.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

988624.0

ATC Issue All Types

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

A C182 made his initial call to request flight following. The R-Side asked the aircraft to say again. The aircraft then repeated his callsign and the R-Side advised him that he was unable flight following at the moment. The aircraft advised that he was a new pilot and asked again if he could please receive flight following. So the R-Side issued him a discrete beacon code. The R-Side then asked the pilot the type of aircraft and destination. The pilot advised that he was a C182 Skylane and his destination was VNC. The R-Side asked the C182 to say position. The C182 replied that he was 12 NM north northeast of EYW. The R-Side then asked the pilot if he was familiar with R2916 and the pilot said that he was. The R-Side issued the C182 a 360 heading immediately so that he could exit R2916. The R-Side advised the aircraft of the Weather Balloon and the cable in the Restricted Area and later gave him the phone number for the supervisor at Miami Center. This aircraft was well in the Restricted Area when he called Miami Center for flight following and there is no telling how close he actually got to the cable for the Weather Balloon. The Transponder on the Weather Balloon read 9;500 FT and the aircraft was way below this altitude; so we don't know if he was going to be able to even see the cable. I recommend that Navy Key West Approach becomes a Civil Approach Control instead of a Navy Approach Control. The Navy has been taking all of the Holidays off and closing early when ever they please. I don't know what the legalities are in this matter but I do know that as a Center Controller; we are not trained to practice the same rules as an Approach Controller. When they close for the Holidays; the airspace reverts back to Miami Center and there have been numerous deals and delays because of this. If we wouldn't have been so caught up in trying to work an Approach Facility; we might have recognized the danger that the C182 was in a lot sooner. Better yet; if Navy Key West Approach was there; this would have never happened. Because once the aircraft departed from Key West International; the Tower would have given the Aircraft Navy Key West's frequency and they would've been able to provide adequate service. Instead; this new pilot had to call us in the blind to see if we could even provide Flight Following. A lot of the times; especially when we're working Navy Key West Approach Airspace; we don't have time to provide this additional service. Who knows what would've happened if the pilot wouldn't have told us that he was a new pilot. We really didn't have the time at the moment. There has been Fatal Accidents previously recorded in R2916 because of this same situation and it would be a shame if another accident has to occur before action is taken. My suggestion is to make Navy Key Approach a Civil Approach just like the Key West International Tower.

[Narrative #2 had no additional information.]

ZMA Controller described a Restricted Airspace (R2916) entry event by an unfamiliar pilot; the reporter alleging that if NAVY Key West were to change to civilian control these types of event would be minimized.

1500229

201711

1801-2400

LFPG.Airport

FO

0.0

Night

Air Carrier

Widebody Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Taxi

Tires

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1500229

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1500232.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Taxiway

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Airport; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

Chart Or Publication

Blocked out of Paris and departed Paris via non-standard exit Point M; due to de-icing; blocking route to Point B. Contacted DeGaulle Ground Control at Point M and was instructed to continue taxiing via taxiway M; and Ground Control would call us back. Approaching the Fire Station; DeGualle Ground cleared us to taxi via taxiways M; D; Q; Q4 to Holding Point Runway 27L. No route was given as to how to proceed from taxiway M to taxiway D. Passing the Fire Station we continued straight ahead on MD2 in order to transition from taxiway M to taxiway D. We noted that the taxiway was marked as authorized for aircraft up to 65m maximum wingspan. I had the Airport taxi chart for Runway 27L (20-9B) on my EFB and noted that there was a ball note prohibiting turning right from taxiway MD2 to taxiway B. There was no such ball note for a turn from MD2 to taxiway D. While turning right from taxiway MD2 to taxiway D I felt a slight jog which I thought was the nose tire skipping in the turn. We proceeded a few hundred feet down taxiway D when we received a TIRE PRESS EICAS message. At that point we stopped the airplane; reviewed the electronic checklist; and then brought up the GEAR synopsis page on the center/lower screen. We noted that both tires Number 8 and Number 11 indicated 1 psi of tire pressure. At this point the Captain directed me to call Ground Control and ask for taxi back to the ramp. I completed the After Landing Checklist and notified Ramp of our return.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Large Turbojet flight crew reported a taxiway excursion at LFPG resulting in damage to two main wheels.

1045325

201210

1201-1800

ZMA.ARTCC

FL

10000.0

Center ZMA

Corporate

Learjet 31

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Climb

Class E ZMA

Center ZMA

Corporate

Beechjet 400

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Cruise

Vectors

Class E ZMA

Facility ZMA.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Situational Awareness

1045325

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

A BE40 was a BCT departure. Our LOA states that PBI [TRACON] will climb the aircraft into our airspace to 10;000 once a hand-off is accepted. MIA Approach gave a late hand-off on a LJ31 which was an FXE departure; which is the reason for the late hand-off. When I realized the potential situation; I called Miami Approach and requested the LJ31 be stopped at 11;000 thinking I would be able to top the BE40. When I realized this would not be possible; I stopped the BE40 at 10;000 and I finally I received communications with the LJ31 on the boundary and immediately turned him left to a heading of 290 and climbed the aircraft. Lateral separation was lost as the LJ31 climbed through 10;800. I think it would be better to climb the BCT departure to 7;000 and give the Sector Control for climb in case there is a late hand-off like in this situation.

ZMA Controller experienced a loss of separation event when departure traffic from both PBI and MIA TRACON's conflicted with no time to issue separation vectors. The reporter suggested alternate procedures.

1814743

202106

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

CLR

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG

2.0

Part 91

VFR

Training

Takeoff / Launch

Class G ZZZ

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Class G ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Student; Other Student pilot solo

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 50

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1814743

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Ground Incursion Runway

Horizontal 1500; Vertical 0

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Runway incursion by unidentified single engine airplane during reporting pilot's takeoff roll; causing reporting aircraft to have to abort takeoff at approximate rotation speed. No radio calls appear to have been made by offending aircraft prior to entering runway. Offending pilot's intention appears to have been to depart runway in opposite direction of reporting aircraft's departure direction.

C172 pilot reported a Rejected Take Off near rotation speed after another aircraft entered the runway without communication.

1343816

201601

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

50

Night

CLR

CTAF ZZZ

Corporate

PA-34-200 Seneca I

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Landing Gear

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 16; Flight Crew Total 1390; Flight Crew Type 290

Situational Awareness; Distraction

1343816

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Human Factors

I was flying on an IFR flight. I was doing the RNAV GPS approach. ATC pointed out traffic close by. My ADSB also indicated several targets. I canceled IFR to approach the field VFR to enter the pattern in sequence. As I was approaching the field I announced my intentions to cross over midfield and enter left traffic (there were other planes in the final approach). Someone called and advised that the airport has right traffic to 21. So I entered right traffic to 21. Not used to right traffic; I usually put the gear down as soon as I am over midfield. I kept watching for the traffic since they appeared to be slower. The wind was gusting to 21 knots so I decided to use only 25 degrees flaps. As soon as I dropped the flaps and the speed went to 110 I placed my hand on the landing gear; as is customary midfield. However; I got distracted by an announcement indicating someone was entering the pattern and started looking for the traffic. Usually in the phase of flight I use my checklist again; I did not. I turned base and final. Contrary to my practice (and training) I did not check the checklist required three green lights indicating gear down. The stall horn sounded at the same time that the gear up; but it was too late. The plane slid straight on the runway. As we started sliding on the runway I secured the plane turning off all electrical equipment.In the future; I plan to drop down the gear as soon as I get to 120 knots (usually 10 miles out) on approach to a non-controlled airport. I will also check and re-check my checklist.

The pilot of a PA34 reported the circumstances that led to a gear-up landing.

1580918

201809

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Fractional

Challenger 350

2.0

Part 91

Passenger

Taxi

Electrical Power

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Distraction; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1580918

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Y

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Evacuated; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Approximately 45 min prior to passengers arrival; we were scheduled to ground move. My SIC and I had offered to fly a trip on Aircraft X to ZZZ. We had more duty time than the current crew. Originally; Scheduling declined. Then; we received the trip. The aircraft was handed off to us. The previous crew had made all preparations for flight. Although; we were time compressed; all items in the Normal Procedures Checklist Power On and Cockpit Preparations sections were again completed. The PDC clearance was reviewed and accepted. Dual verification accomplished. Our passengers arrived before other flight deck briefings were started. Standard SOPs were followed to board passengers; load bags; etc. Each crew member accomplished a Final Walk-Around. With the main cabin and baggage compartment doors secured and both crew members on the flight deck; my SIC reviewed the ATIS and general flight deck set up. Next; I performed the required Crew; Departure and Takeoff Briefings per the Normal Procedures Checklist. We were taxiing from the Ramp to the Runway with two passengers aboard. Both engines and the APU were operating. The ECS was on the APU. On taxiway 'N' we crossed [an adjacent runway] and were instructed to switch to the Tower. My SIC made the frequency change and I called for the Before Takeoff Checklist. As that action was completed; an unusual odor became apparent. My SIC asked me if I smelled that. I replied yes. I directed my SIC to inform ATC that we needed to investigate an issue. The controller instructed us to turn onto taxiway 'N1'.I looked at the CB panel behind the copilot's seat and my SIC looked at the CB panel behind the Captain's seat. Nothing was amiss. Concurring; my SIC left the flight deck to check other circuit breaker panels; the galley; cabin; lavatory and baggage compartment. With his departure the fumes subsided. Unknown to me at the time; he was met by the lead passenger who also smelled the odor. Walking forward from the rear of the cabin my SIC saw a gray haze in the entire galley. With my head set on; I never heard my SIC reporting smoke in the cabin.The odor; much stronger than before; returned to the flight deck. In my right peripheral vision I saw a gray cloud. Simultaneously; I advised ATC to roll the equipment and informed them that we would be evacuating onto the taxiway; [with] four souls on board and 7 hours of fuel. Almost automatically; my First Officer (FO) secured AC and DC electrical power as he returned to the SIC seat. I called for the Evacuation QRC. We completed the checklist. I sent my SIC to open the main cabin door. I reviewed my QRF one last time. My FO led the passengers outside and I followed them. Fire Rescue arrived on scene. The unusual odor was still present inside and outside the aircraft (fire rescue; crew and passengers could smell it). At the direction of Fire Rescue; my SIC escorted their personnel through the cabin. Fire Rescue members and myself confirmed that our passengers were not in distress. Both indicated that they did not require medical attention. External access panels were opened for Fire Rescue but nothing unusual was discovered.The airport authority provided a vehicle and driver for our passengers. Accompanied by my SIC; our passengers and their bags were returned to the FBO. My SIC and the [company] managed their needs.With Fire Rescue in custody of Aircraft; I made a preliminary phone call to the [company]. My SIC returned from the FBO. Gear pins were inserted and the aircraft chocked.Eventually; Fire Rescue released Aircraft. All parties agreed that no power would be put on the aircraft. Aircraft was put under tow with appropriate escort and tugged to the ramp. There the emergency lights expired due to depleted batteries. The aircraft was secured and turned over to maintenance with a technician already on scene. Appropriate entries were made in the aircraft log book. The evacuation went well. My SIC's performance was trulyoutstanding!!! I hardly had to direct him. The passengers; crew and aircraft are safe. We can always do better. As professionals these matters are reviewed to enhance safety and improve performance. When requesting the rescue equipment; I forgot that we were already on tower frequency and called them ground. I did not vocalize the Evacuation QRC with clarity. We missed shutting down the APU from the fire control panel... I used the rotating APU on/off/start switch instead. I observed my SIC place the QRH in the slot by his seat as he maneuvered toward the main cabin door. Only then did I realize that we had used the evacuation checklist from the QRH. Consequently; I reviewed the QRC items. These items were my responsibility and they are my errors alone. Even with the time compression; I felt that we were ready to fly.

Challenger 350 Captain reported electrical fumes in the aircraft during taxi for takeoff resulted in the passengers being deplaned on the taxiway.

1416876

201701

1201-1800

LAS.Airport

NV

10500.0

Daylight

TRACON L30

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

FMS Or FMC

Descent

STAR KEPEC3

Class E L30

TRACON L30

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Class E L30

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 161; Flight Crew Type 161

Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1416876

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 201; Flight Crew Type 8500

Time Pressure; Confusion

1416885.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Y

Automation Aircraft RA

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

Descending into LAS in the vicinity or IPUMY fix; we received a 'traffic; traffic' TCAS TA warning. The associated traffic showed 3500 feet below our current altitude and climbing. Neither Captain nor I could visually acquire the traffic. Sometime later we received a 'Climb' RA and the Captain disconnected the autopilot and complied with the RA. During this time I visually acquired the aircraft in question passing our 3 o'clock at a distance I would assess between 1/2 mile to a mile slightly below our altitude and by the time it reached my 4 o'clock it was co-altitude and still climbing. The radios were busy and I couldn't get an advisory call to ATC yet. At this point the RA audibly gave another command I believe was 'monitor Vertical Speed' quickly followed by clear of conflict. At this point we told ATC of our maneuver and they responded that aircraft had violated their clearance and wasn't answering. I assume they were on a different Approach/Departure frequency than we were. We were given a new descent clearance; the Captain reengaged the autopilot; and the flight proceeded uneventfully the rest of the way to the gate.We were never advised by ATC of the conflict due to multiple frequencies and congestion on the radios. I also am unaware of the assigned altitude that the other aircraft violated; but altitude closures happen quickly when one is descending in idle; and another is climbing at climb thrust! TCAS worked as advertised.

While descending on the KEPEC3 Arrival we got a Traffic Alert for an aircraft at our 12 o'clock; 3400 feet below us. The alert became an RA requiring a climb of 1000 FPM. I immediately complied and initiated the climb. The First Officer (FO) told ATC that we were performing a TCAS maneuver. ATC responded that the other aircraft busted his clearance. We were between 9000 feet and 10;000 feet when the maneuver began and received 'clear of conflict' at about 10;500 feet. The FO saw the other aircraft pass by at our altitude 'no more than one mile.' Opinion: We suspect this Crew busted their 7000 feet restriction at ROPER. We were cleared to 8000 feet and our paths could have crossed. They were climbing like a missile. It's careless and reckless to be climbing so rapidly in crowded airspace. It leaves no room for error. No one can anticipate or react to what they are doing fast enough to get out of the way. It's only by luck that we had some lateral separation; their error and arrogance almost cost many lives. I would prefer to not share airspace with that Crew ever again. Let them check out the rodeo; a profession for which they seem especially well suited.This event shakes my faith in TCAS. It's only luck that our paths did not cross like our altitudes did. Next generation of TCAS should provide lateral as well as vertical guidance. This happened so fast and unexpectedly that I don't think ATC could have provided a turn to help maintain separation. Also; we could not see him with our nose in a climb attitude. We couldn't have known which way to turn. Perhaps arrivals and departures should be on the same frequency. We heard nothing from or about the other aircraft. Increased situational awareness may have helped us maneuver more effectively to avoid a midair collision.

B737NG flight crew reported that while descending into LAS they received and responded to an RA with a climbing resolution. Shortly after; ATC came on to advise them the other aircraft overshot their altitude causing the conflict.

1208999

201410

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Ground ZZZ

Air Carrier

SA-227 AC Metro III

Part 135

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Taxi

None

Nosewheel Steering

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 1850; Flight Crew Type 450

Other / Unknown

1208999

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Excursion Taxiway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

While taxiing out for departure when it appeared the nose wheel steering failed and turned to the left about 30-40 percent of full travel (estimated). The aircraft was traveling at approximately 10-15 knots and the reported winds were 230 at 8 kts. The aircraft veered sharply to the left at which time I placed both engines in full reverse and used full braking in an attempt to stop. The aircraft continued forward and began to exit the taxiway into the grass at which point I pulled both engine stop and feather knobs and tried using braking to avoid runway and taxiway lights. After coming to a stop ATC notified me that airport operations was en route at which time I powered down the plane. After a thorough inspection from both myself and Maintenance it was determined that no obstacles (lights; signs; etc) were struck by the prop or the landing gear. Airport operations reported no damage to airport property and the plane was then towed to the FBO and was turned over to Maintenance for further inspections.

SA-227 Captain experiences a sudden loss of nose wheel steering control during taxi out; resulting in a sharp swerve to the left and a taxiway excursion before the aircraft can be stopped.

1858607

202111

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

5700.0

10

Daylight

CLR

Center ZZZ

FBO

Cessna 150

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Initial Climb

Visual Approach

AC Generator/Alternator

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

FBO

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Student

Flight Crew Total 86

1858607

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

Solo cross country flight (short)Upon take off from ZZZ the radio lights began to flicker. I turned them off and checked the masters and fuses and found no problem. Turned the radio back on and it was still blinking. I ran my checklist at this time. I was on the crosswind section of the pattern and decided to stay in the pattern with minimal power and land as soon as safely possible to investigate the issue. After landing I turned the engine off. It would not start. I called my CFI and told him that I was broken down in ZZZ. I then called the flight club and told them that I was also broke down in ZZZ. Upon preflight inspection I could not feel the alternator belt and reported this to the safety officer at the club. They messaged that they were sending someone to get me. An hour passed and then they said they were sending a plane with recovery pilot to me. Finally after 3 hours they said that they (Safety; Chief Pilot instructor; my CFI and Maintenance) had discussed it and it was fine for me to fly the plane back under VFR rules. The planes battery was charged. I started the plane and sent a message that I was leaving ZZZ and for someone to please watch FlightAware and text me if there was an issue.My CFI instructed me in challenges of no flaps landings; how to avoid getting lost and what to do if that happens; we discussed flight altitudes and best ways to spot potential places to set the plane down if an emergency did arise. I was instructed to reserve battery power for emergency radio communications and squawks. I have flown Aircraft X for appr. 70 hours and I was confident in her ability to make the trip. I have flown the same trip with instructors 4 separate times and I'm familiar with the terrain. I departed ZZZ at XA00 and landed safely in ZZZ1 at XB35 (appr). Name from flying club was waiting on me and making radio calls while I was entering the pattern and landing. The flight was made without any other events or incidents. I felt safe in making the flight and confident that I followed all safety rules applicable.

Student pilot flying a C-150 aircraft reported alternator malfunction in flight.

1330024

201601

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Dusk

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

N

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Maintenance Technician 36

Situational Awareness

1330024

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Person Maintenance

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

I was working this flight and was accomplishing a bird strike inspection and was almost blasted with vomit from a passenger that was allowed to stand on platform between aircraft and jetbridge with canopy retracted. This just seems be all wrong to me; for a crew to allow a passenger to stand where he was; off the aircraft to vomit numerous times onto ground; that's my work area; where I work; it's disgusting; then allow the passenger to re-board and fly out sick next to other passengers. Who knows if the passenger has a disease of some sort; after reading the protocol to follow from CDC; the incident wasn't handled properly; isn't this a public health issue. Then the vomit was allowed to stay on ground for about 3 hours; no concern for clean-up; till a midnight crew chief refused to accomplish any maintenance on aircraft from that gate.

Maintenance technician reported a passenger being allowed to vomit from the jet bridge to the ramp below then board the aircraft and depart.

1692544

201910

1201-1800

HPN.Airport

NY

VMC

Dusk

Tower HPN

Corporate

Challenger 300

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach; Landing

Class D HPN

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Flying

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1692544

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

Aircraft

While on approach the local area was saturated with both VFR and IFR traffic. The vectors to the approach to landing phase continued normally with us slowing our airspeed and configuring the aircraft earlier at the request of Approach. There were numerous heading changes and we were told that we were number four for the airport; number three initially. There were numerous aircraft on Tower and the frequency was congested. While on approach; we observed the aircraft in front of us land and exit. We then observed another aircraft land on the intersecting runway and clear the intersection of the two runways so we continued the approach to landing as we were now number one for the airport. We were fully configured; stabilized; and had a visual on the runway. At approximately 600 ft. we received a Traffic Alert. Both myself as Pilot Flying and the Pilot Monitoring looked up and tried to acquire the traffic that had triggered the traffic alert. It was difficult due to the time of day with our heading northwest and the sun just off of our left side but in less than an estimated two seconds we both visually acquired the traffic which was approximately 200 ft. above us and directly in front of us at less than one quarter mile laterally. It was a high-wing single engine aircraft that was flying a visual traffic pattern and was in the left downwind for the intersecting runway. Due to the location and proximity of the traffic that we had now visually acquired; we had zero options for avoidance other than to continue a descent. Climbing was out of the question and banking to avoid at less than what was now an estimated 400 ft. was not an option either. I initiated a momentary descent below the PAPI in an order to increase vertical separation from the traffic. I leveled off momentarily to recapture the PAPI and having maintained a visual with the runway I continued and landed without further incident. After clearing the runway; I requested the Pilot Monitoring ask Ground Control for a phone number to the Tower Cab. After shutdown and postflight I did call the Tower Cab regarding the issue and requested that they advise aircraft of traffic that will be overflying final approach paths. I would classify this as a loss of separation due to lack of communication from the controlling facility. Due to the phase of flight we had no good options and only one poor option that we undertook in order to increase separation.Traffic that is landing should be notified of aircraft that are in the pattern for an intersecting runway and if they're expected to overfly another aircraft in the course of their pattern work. This was a loss of separation incident that left us no options.

Challenger 300 Captain on short final reported taking evasive action to avoid traffic crossing their course.

1594283

201811

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Small Aircraft

2.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Normal Brake System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 50

1594283

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 2500

1594291.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Aircraft

During roll out after landing. The aircraft's left brake locked and slowly pulled the aircraft to the left. The aircraft completed a slow ground loop and came to rest beside the runway. The aircraft was not damaged. Runway edge lights X3 may have been damaged - unknown.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Globe Swift pilot and instructor reported the left brake malfunction on landing resulted in a runway excursion.

1484734

201709

0601-1200

FAR.Tower

ND

1000.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower FAR

Military

UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

1.0

Part 91

Training

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class D FAR

Tower FAR

Air Taxi

Small Transport

1.0

Part 135

IFR

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class D FAR

Facility FAR.Tower

Government

Ground; Instructor; Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

1484734

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Airspace Structure

Procedure

I was conducting training during a session on LC/GC. My trainee was working Aircraft X in the local traffic pattern on runway 36. He also had Aircraft Z in the traffic pattern on runway 36 and Aircraft Y was inbound on a visual approach to runway 9. Aircraft X was in the right downwind and told to extend downwind; the purpose of this was for Aircraft X to do his option after Aircraft Y had landed and exited the runway. The military flies the UAVs and is restricted to only flying in the Class Delta. The trainee had timed it appropriately so he would turn Aircraft X's base prior to the edge of the Delta and the conflict would be resolved. The pilot of Aircraft X said they needed to turn their base early (about 2 miles from the airport). The trainee reluctantly told Aircraft X to turn their base. The supervisor in the tower cab immediately spoke up that the UAVs shouldn't be extended in that area as they 'could lose their engine over populated areas' and would rather do 360's in the downwind or enter high key over the airport. Aircraft X was short final runway 36 and was a conflict with Aircraft Y landing runway 9. The trainee initiated a go around to Aircraft X. This created an unsafe situation as we didn't know these unmanned planes had these special restrictions. This situation wasn't busy or complex; but it created a situation where if Aircraft Y needed to go around for any reason; he would have been in conflict with Aircraft X; who was also going around; they would have met airborne over the intersection of runway 36 and 9. To make it worse; Aircraft Z was in the right downwind across the departure path of runway 9.I have only worked the local unmanned aircraft flown by our military while training and only a few times; but I have noticed the extra care that needs to be taken while working these aircraft. These are VFR aircraft in the traffic pattern; but they are unable to see and avoid. They cannot follow traffic and their traffic patterns need to be completely controlled by the controllers; their bases need to be called to follow traffic and for wake turbulence delays. Not only is this extra work to be constantly watching and timing their patterns; we also need to be mindful if the aircraft goes lost link; where it will fly the shortest route to its lost link orbit location. This could mean the aircraft will immediately make a turn across the airport; if we don't see it happen soon enough and take action to move everyone else; we could have an unmanned aircraft cutting off and flying into arrivals or departures from any one of our three runways. Now management is telling us also that we also need to keep them away from populated areas and that they worry about their engines quitting. I'm not sure why these aircraft are more susceptible to lose an engine than any other single engine aircraft; but if they are and the operators want to remain clear of populated areas; that needs to be addressed in the LOA that they have with tower. The military unit has been vocal about wanting to fly both of their UAVs in the pattern at the same time. There are times without them when it is busy and we don't have much room in our local traffic pattern. Sometimes aircraft need to extend and sometimes they need to exit the delta. This is something we expect all aircraft in our pattern to be able to accept and we shouldn't have to make exceptions that jeopardize the safety of others; whether it be the flying public or people on the ground.

FAR Local Controller reported an operation involving a military UAV that was being conducted not in accordance with the LOA.

1666723

201907

1201-1800

ZDC.ARTCC

VA

22000.0

Marginal

Turbulence

Center ZDC

Military

IFR

Cruise

Class A ZDC

Facility ZDC.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.0

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload

1666723

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airspace Structure; Weather; Human Factors

Human Factors

While working four sectors combined it started to get busier than normal when the high sectors began to refuse hand-offs for higher because of weather in the western part of the Center; pushing higher volume into their sectors and my low sectors. When I started to feel overwhelmed I alerted the CIC (Controller in Charge) that it was getting out of control and should probably get a D-side(Assist). The CIC stated that he was splitting the sector instead because it showed the numbers continuing to grow. With the controller starting to bug me for a briefing and the CIC telling me he was going to start making handoffs to the sector splitting for me; I started to get very uncomfortable and told them both to hold on. I took care of everything I thought I needed to do then quickly briefed the controller splitting the sector. After that was completed; I heard the adjacent Center calling the sector that split off about Aircraft X. I then answered the line because I noticed at that time they did not have the hand-off on the aircraft which was my fault. During the madness of splitting the sector I specifically remember taking the hand-off back because it was handing off to the wrong sector initially. I believe that I re-flashed it to the appropriate sector. Whether I messed up the keyboard entry or if the CIC messed with the data block is a mystery to me. While the other sector did have communication with the aircraft it was a clear airspace violation. When I talked to the controller on the line he said that the aircraft was being turned away from the Warning Area. The problem here is that when the entry was made to split the sector by the CIC it dropped the Warning Area depiction from my scope. It did not occur to me that Aircraft X was routed through the warning area. I am most disappointed in myself for allowing the CIC to put me in a position where I made an error. In the back of my mind I knew it would have been better to have a D-side (Assist Controller) before splitting the sectors. When a sector gets split where there is active airspace depicted on the scope it should remain on the originating scope until that controller adjusts the map for that single sector. I believe I may have been more alert to the situation had the red line still been depicted.

ZDC Center Controller reported while de-combining sectors he allowed an aircraft to fly into a Warning Area without handing it off to the controlling facility.

1852079

202111

1801-2400

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

0.0

Tower ZZZZ

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

APU Pneumatic System & Ducting

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Physiological - Other

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

1852079

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Work Refused; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

After landing in ZZZZ with a faulty weather radar. We turned on the APU clearing the runway with a five minute taxi to the gate. We informed Maintenance Control airborne of our radar issue; and contract maintenance technicians were there when the boarding door was opened. After a couple minutes speaking to contract maintenance and while deplaning we began to smell a sweet odor followed by dirty socks smell; which began to intensify. We immediately shut off the APU bleed to stop contaminating the aircraft. After deplaning the Flight Attendant 3 in the back of the aircraft had the same experience. Maintenance troubled shot and found leaking oil in the seal of the APU duct. They requested us to return to the aircraft and upon reaching the jetbridge we could smell the dirty sock smell immediately at the top of the jetbridge and stronger as we got to the aircraft door. Maintenance also tried to cover the smell with air freshener. We told them this was unacceptable and the odor irritated my nose and throat at this point. We informed Maintenance Control we would not be performing an engine runup as this had led to serious incapacitation previously at [company name].

A320 pilot reported a 'dirty socks' fumes event during passenger deplaning. Maintenance determined the fumes were caused by an APU oil leak.

1787050

202102

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Initial Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Workload; Time Pressure

1787050

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Human Factors

While on approach to ZZZ in day VMC conditions; crew was instructed to fly direct 'ZZZZZ' - the FAF for ILS XX - for a visual approach to [Runway] XX. The crew had been left high by both Center and Approach; but was able to reach the 5;000 ft. and slow prior to intercept. The PIC/PF (Pilot Flying) briefed the SIC/PM (Pilot Monitoring) on speed/energy management and airspeed 'windows' prior to the approach. After reporting runway in sight and receiving the approach clearance; the PF initiated descent to 4;500 ft. (the FAF altitude) and began to lessen the intercept angle; and PM prompted gear down and flaps 22. Aircraft still slightly overshot the localizer but was able to capture both LOC and GS which happened simultaneously. 4;500 ft. is within 1;300 ft. AGL of field elevation; and due to the short distance both vertically to the runway and laterally (just outside 4 miles); the PM/PIC anticipated an unstable approach and called a go around. The PF pressed the TOGA (Takeoff Go-Around); disconnected the autopilot; and called 'check thrust flaps nine' and the PM set flaps 9 and checked the thrust to discover the PF had not yet increased thrust to detents. Concurrently with the 'check thrust flaps 9 actions'; and 'Sink Rate' EGPWS warning occurred; and momentary hesitation by PF prompted PM/PIC to take control and initiate the immediate action in response to the 'sink rate' AURAL as required for the EGPWS escape; with a 'Pull Up' Aural warning occurring concurrently with the initiation of the EGPWS escape procedure. (At the time of initiation the EGPWS escape; PIC noted an 1;800 fpm descent rate). Upon reaching a safe altitude; the aircraft configuration was cleaned up in line as normal; and flight continued back for ILS without further incident. One error was made during EGPWS escape; which was PIC only increasing thrust to detents and not to max. Upon completion of the flight; crew debriefed on a number of key items. These included energy management and the approach profile in the AOM; go around procedure and ensuring power is set concurrently with pitch and callout when conducting a missed; and the EGPWS escape maneuver.Crews should act very early to mitigate unstable approach situations; including in a situation like this requesting a lower altitude earlier and a vector out to the IAF in lieu of the FAF; this can alleviate the chances of an unstable approach long before the issue manifests. Missed approaches should be initiated immediately upon identification of an unstable approach. In the event of a missed approach; crews should ensure the action is taken decisively including the increase of power; and both pilots should remain involved in the process. Should a GPWS warning be received; decisive; immediate action should be taken - as per the AOM - superseding normal missed approach actions due to the time critical nature of high vertical speed close to the ground. Captains especially should keep a close eye on FOs conducting operations at outstations - in this situation; having approach offer a better vector to join or taking an actual ILS clearance may have prevented the situation from manifesting at all.

EMB-XRJ Captain reported that while conducting a go-around from an unstabilized approach an EGPWS warning occurred.

1124999

201310

0601-1200

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Unscheduled Maintenance

Lifevest/Jacket

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Other / Unknown

1124999

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Upon arrival the Flight Attendant brought a passenger life jacket to me from the back stating that it was found in a compartment by the [forward left] door and unsure if it was an extra life vest or one that had been knocked out of its stowage compartment on an earlier flight. Upon looking at the life jacket I noted that it was out of date. I called Maintenance to have it replaced and to find out where it came from. Maintenance brought a new serviceable life jacket and the Mechanic and I started to look for where it may have come from. We found a missing life vest at seat 8D. Now wondering why we had an out of service date life vest on board I randomly checked two other underseat life vests and found an additional out of date life vest. At that point I wrote up the two out of date life vests and requested that all life vests on the aircraft be checked before our [next] flight. At that point Maintenance had found 26 out of date life vests and 4 missing life vests. I also notified the Chief Pilot's office as to what was going on with our flight. After have all missing life vest and out of date life vest replaced we left approximately 45 minutes late. Our flight had a security inspection before our departure and no discrepancies or missing life vests were reported. Another Security Check was performed prior to our international departure; and no discrepancies were reported. The security check is suppose to check the life vest stowage compartments to make sure nothing that is not supposed to be there is. Along with checking to make sure a life vest is installed. Additionally; I was told by our Maintenance people that Maintenance is supposed to check the service dates of the life vests on a regular a frequent basis. The date on the out of date life vests was a couple of months out of date! Looks to me like [procedures] were not followed by Security Inspectors and Maintenance. Additionally; I was told by the Assistant Chief Pilot that the Security Inspectors are not required to notify the Captain of any discrepancies found; only their Lead or Supervisor. (No way to know if this information is passed on or not at this point.) This makes it nearly impossible for the Captain to actively be involved in resolving any problems or even being able to determine if there is a problem to address if the information is not shared with the him. This is a safety issue and a schedule issue both of which are negatively affected by this misguide process. The flight is not supposed to leave until the Captain is satisfied that the aircraft is safe and in compliance with FARs; Company SOPs; and is properly equipped and serviced for the intended route of flight. Clearly this is not possible if information or items found defective by personnel working on the aircraft do not share the information and keep it a secret from the Captain. This is counter productive and potentially a very unsafe procedure.

A Flight Attendant notified that Captain that a stray life vest was found in a compartment; and that the vest was out of date. When Maintenance personnel identified the location of the missing vest; they also discovered that many more life vests were out of date. The Captain was concerned about the maintenance procedures that allowed this to occur as well as the security inspections that did not uncover the discrepancy.

1311285

201511

1201-1800

R90.TRACON

NE

2300.0

TRACON R90

Personal

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Initial Climb

Other SWT ODP

Class E R90

Facility R90.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3.0

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1311285

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Procedure

Procedure

Aircraft was given an IFR clearance off of a satellite airport via Flight Service with an initial altitude of 4;000 feet. The aircraft departed and appeared to make a right hand turn in a slow climb and contacted me at 2;300 feet in a higher MVA (4;000 feet). The airport has an obstacle departure procedure.Issue a heading to fly when entering controlled airspace.

An aircraft departed an airport with a clearance received from a Flight Service Station. The aircraft did not comply with the published departure procedure and turned while still 1;700 feet below the minimum vectoring altitude.

1232463

201501

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

600.0

VMC

Dusk

CTAF ZZZ

FBO

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Takeoff / Launch

Class G ZZZ

CTAF ZZZ

Other Banner Tow

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Class G ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 85; Flight Crew Total 750; Flight Crew Type 250

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1232463

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 0; Vertical 200

Y

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Human Factors

Human Factors

A Cessna 172 was on final and the banner tow was on a high slow left base for runway 25. We were holding short of runway 25. The Cessna 172 landed and taxied clear of runway 25. The banner tower aircraft was on final and I thought there was enough room to depart. I told my student to immediately takeoff. The banner tow aircraft was dropping the banner towards the departure end of the runway between the taxiway and the grass. As we were taking off; I had misjudged the speed of the banner tow aircraft dropping the banner. As we rotated; the banner tow aircraft was 200 ft. above us and descending. The banner tow aircraft then said on the CTAF 'do you have me in sight? I'm right above you'. I repeated by saying 'yes we have you in sight'. The contributing factors were the banner tow aircraft entering the pattern on a left base to runway 25 as opposed to a 45 degree entry for 25; poor judgement on my part; and an invulnerability attitude towards the banner tow aircraft. Now; I don't know if I had broken a regulation but there was a loss of separation between us and the banner tow aircraft. In addition; the incident took place at an uncontrolled Class G airport.

When the instructor pilot aboard a C172 misjudged the spacing between a landing Cessna and a following banner tow plane entering the pattern on a left base to drop the banner he told his student to takeoff immediately. During their initial climbout from the non-towered airport the pilot of the banner two advised on CTAF that they were climbing immediately below him.

1764168

202009

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Vectors

Y

N

Scheduled Maintenance

Work Cards; Inspection; Testing

Aircraft Logbook(s)

X

Improperly Operated

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

1764168

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Maintenance

Routine Inspection

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure; Logbook Entry; Company Policy

Procedure

I have made a mistake on the Deferred in Place (DIP) for Aircraft X; Engineering Change Release Authorization (ECRA) X.The 8110-3 is good 12 months; but mistakenly; I asked planning to contact us after 24 months for revised ECRA.As of DATE X (2019) the aircraft had a total of 25;904 total aircraft flight cycles.As of today the aircraft the aircraft has 26;568 total aircraft flight cycles.The aircraft has been over flown by 664 Flight Cycles.The aircraft is in storage at ZZZ.We have received the revised 8110-3 for stage 2 and 3.The initial inspection is required at 32;041 Total Aircraft Flight Hours.As of today the aircraft the aircraft has 26;568 total aircraft flight cycles.So we haven't skipped any required inspection.

Technician reported an aircraft in storage had an inspection come due without being placed back in service.

1107909

201308

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

5.0

600.0

Mixed

Rain; 10

Daylight

700

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Twin Beech 18

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Climb

None

Class D ZZZ; Class G ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Glider

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 7000; Flight Crew Type 20

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1107909

Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace

Aircraft; Weather; Procedure; Human Factors

Weather

I am instrument rated and current. The aircraft I was flying is equipped for instrument flight; but did not have a current altimeter and static system inspection; which prevented filing an IFR flight plan. The weather at [in the area] was generally IMC with low ceilings; good visibility and occasional light rain showers. I completed a detailed analysis of the weather which indicated a thin overcast layer with bases that varied between 500 and 900 above ground level with a second overcast layer at around 7;000 FT. Good VMC conditions existed 30 NM to the northeast; the direction of my flight. The forecast indicated the low cloud layer would dissipate leaving good VMC conditions before the layer would reform with IMC persisting for the remained of the day and upcoming night. My plan was to be ready to go when the low cloud layer opened up and allowed a VMC climb. I was comfortable with the fact that I could end up between layers because there was plenty of cloud clearance and visibility for VFR flight between layers that would allow flight to clear weather along my course. I am quite familiar with FAR 91.119; Minimum Safe Altitudes and FAR 91.155; Basic VFR Weather Minimums and intended to comply with both. I considered the area I would be flying over to be 'other than congested' and so I just needed to be 500 FT above the ground. I was also going to be in Class G airspace which only required me to be clear of clouds. When the lower layer opened up; the clouds became scattered at 500 FT. The higher layer was visible at around 7;000 FT with good visibilities. I saw this as my chance to depart before the weather returned to IMC. I got into the airplane; started up and called Ground Control. I asked them if they had updated the weather to reflect the improved conditions. They indicated they had not because they could see the opening would not last long. I felt the conditions were adequate for a VFR departure and so I asked for; and was granted; a Special VFR clearance in accordance with FAR 91.157. Moments prior to takeoff; the lower layer closed back up and the Tower advised the ceiling was 700 broken. I thought that I could takeoff; remain clear of the clouds; fly to the open area (which I thought had moved east) safely and climb above the lower layer all while complying with FARs. I was wrong. After takeoff; I headed generally east out of the Class D airspace. However; I was flying at low altitude; navigating visually and trying to fly toward the area where the lower cloud layer was open. As a result; I'm sure that my heading wandered quite a bit. As I pressed on; I realized that the open area I intended to climb through was gone. However; I felt okay as I was still 600 to 700 FT above the ground and clear of clouds. That didn't last long. The ceiling began to lower and my comfort level rapidly decreased. A realistic assessment showed I was unable to maintain a minimum safe altitude and remain clear of the clouds. I had lost track of where to turn toward better weather. While I was high enough that I was not concerned about flying into terrain; I became very concerned about radio towers that could rise higher than I was flying. I realized that I could become a VFR into IMC statistic. My only remaining option was to initiate a climb through the lower layer up to good VMC which I knew was above. As I entered the clouds; I began to think about calling center to confess my predicament and declare an emergency if necessary. The good news is that after climbing 500 FT; I broke out between layers in good VMC. Since I was still below any usable IFR altitudes and no longer needing any assistance; I did not call Center. I determined my position by referencing VOR and GPS and proceeded on course. In reviewing the airspace around I realized that I probably went through the edges of their Class D and Class E as I searched for the opening in the lower layer. I have flown many years and I am very comfortable flying VFR and IFR; even VFR when the ceiling is low as long as the visibility is good as it was this day. However; I let my comfort level lull me into departing without a viable Plan A and no Plan B.

C-45 pilot took off on a Special VFR clearance and encountered deteriorating conditions in which he was unable to maintain Minimum Safe Altitude and remain clear of clouds. Pilot climbed through overcast into VFR conditions.

1030538

201208

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

Part 91

Parked

Testing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Situational Awareness

1030538

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Lead Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Situational Awareness

1030539.0

Ground Event / Encounter FOD

Person Other Person

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related

Environment - Non Weather Related

A fellow Mechanic and I were performing a high power engine run. Debris was thrown from the ramp behind the aircraft and struck another aircraft parked on the ramp. Ramp behind the runup area is falling apart and needs repair.

[A fellow Mechanic] and I performed engine runs on aircraft per the task card. All checks were good. Four days later I was asked by my supervisor who ran the aircraft. He notified me that damage occurred to another carrier's aircraft parked on their ramp. I told him we were on our designated run pad and performed the tasks required. I was unaware that debris from the aft area of the ramp; which is coming apart; was being blown into the aero flight aircraft. I do not know extent of damage to other aircraft. Clean up the unused areas of FOD from ramp space we do not use.

Two mechanics report that after high powered engine runs; debris from the poorly maintained ramp surface damaged another aircraft.

1685615

201909

1201-1800

ZZZZ.ARTCC

FO

VMC

Center ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B767-300 and 300 ER

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

APU

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

1685615

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Relief Pilot; Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

686113.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

In level cruise flight with right engine generator on MEL; APU shut down with APU fault message. Contacted Dispatch and diverted to ZZZZ for an overweight landing.

Dispatched with inoperative main engine generator on MEL. APU started at gate; planned to run APU the entire flight per MEL. APU faulted and shutdown in cruise. Dispatch and [Maintenance Control] on SAT phone decided ZZZZ best divert field. Proceeded to ZZZZ; [requested priority handling] to land 25;000 lbs. overweight and avoid having to dump fuel. Touchdown at 150 fpm; all entered into logbook. I was [Relief Pilot] on the flight; recalled from 1st break. Assisted with monitoring the flying pilot and communicated with cabin team and ZZZZ.

B767 flight crew reported APU failure during cruise resulting in a diversion.

1586503

201810

1801-2400

GTF.Airport

MT

5.0

6000.0

TRACON GTF

Personal

Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Final Approach

Direct

Class E GTF

Pitot-Static System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 22000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

1586503

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Aircraft; Weather

Human Factors

On approach to ILS crossing FAF and airspeed indicator started to decrease as [I was] descending. [I] pushed nose over to increase speed and realized pitot must have frozen over. Reached for CB's and switched [them on and off] to re-energize and was blown off localizer and descended [below] localizer minimums. I tried to activate iPad map function to verify position adding distraction.Was alerted by Tower they had an alarm for low altitude and to climb. I had ground contact and proceeded to airport and landed. Later told to call Tower and informed they would have to report to supervisor.Felt pressure to meet appointment time.

C182 pilot reported being alerted to a low altitude situation on approach to GTF after his pitot/static system exhibited symptoms of frozen blockage.

1756077

202008

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

25000

Personal

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Part 91

None

Personal

Takeoff / Launch

None

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 12600; Flight Crew Type 2

Training / Qualification

1756077

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Flight Crew

Other Post Flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Human Factors

On Day 3; I flew as pilot in command [of] a local flight with two family members; and a personal/business friend as passengers. A violation of FAR 61.57 may have occurred on Day 3. I fly fixed wing aircraft and helicopters as pilot-in-command. While I had flown the fixed wing aircraft several times in the 90 day period preceding Day 3; my flights of the helicopter in the 90 day period preceding Day 3 may not be sufficient to satisfy FAR 61.57. In anticipation of the flight; I had flown the helicopter as pilot in command on Day 1. During the Day 1 flight to ZZZ; I made 4 to 7 practice takeoffs and landings and conducted various maneuvers including pedal turns. This Day 1 flight also included flight at near cruise speed and flight at altitudes up to 800 feet to 1;000 feet AGL. There were no abnormalities observed. Nor did I experience any difficulty maneuvering or controlling the aircraft. I then took off again and flew to my home landing site where I had performed takeoff and landings approximately 10 times per year for 10 years. On Day 3; the planned flight with passengers was conducted.I am concerned about whether I have complied with the three takeoff and landing requirement of FAR 61.57. When I conducted the flight on Day 3; I presumed that the Day 1 flight was sufficient to establish compliance with FAR 61.57. However; upon review of the flight and the regulation; I am uncertain as to whether compliance was established by the Day 1 flight although it included maneuvers. To avoid this issue in the future; compliance can be established by recording detailed flight information needed to establish currency; reviewing records of flights for compliance; and conducting full takeoff and landing sequences in the helicopter to establish currency.Contributing factors would include disruption of normal flying routines due to COVID-19.

Pilot reported flying in possible violation of FAR 61.57 attributed to COVID-19 related disruptions.

1105958

201307

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

APU

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting; Workload; Confusion

1105958

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Shortly before dusk we were pushing back for a flight. As we started to pushback; about 40 yards into the push; the tug driver reported he could see fluid coming from the back of the aircraft. I requested he tow us back into the gate; so I could investigate. Once back into the gate I ask the First Officer to brief the passengers that we are checking out a possible fluid leak. I then went to the aft of the airplane and noticed the fluid was fuel. My concern at this point was to get the APU shut down to prevent a fire. I went back to the cockpit and briefed the First Officer. We asked to have ground power hooked up. While this was taking place the First Officer went to look at the leak. I was preparing to shutdown the APU. The APU then shutdown on its own and a LO APU BTL light caution message appeared. I then wanted to evacuate the passengers. I ask ground personnel if we could have the passengers use the outside stairs. I was informed security had to open that door. I could see this would take too much time. I had them hook up the jet bridge and deplane. They did so. At no time did I see or have a fire indication other than the BTL LO message. The First Officer reported to me that he heard the bottle pop. He also did not see the fire. This happened very quickly and we had the people off as fast as possible. The entire event took around 6 minutes. I then called our Dispatcher and was transferred to Maintenance Control. I reported the situation to them and Dispatch. At this point I still did not know we had a fire but thought there may have been. I talked with Contract Maintenance and they said the did not see a fire or signs of a fire. We were then released and sent to the hotel for the night.

A CRJ-200 ground crew reported an aft fuselage fluid drainage during pushback so the Captain requested a tow to the gate where an apparent APU fuel leak was detected followed by an APU auto-shutdown and a LO APU BTL alert.

1147404

201401

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Turbulence

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Dash 8-400

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Spoiler System

X

Improperly Operated; Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface

1147404

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated

Aircraft

On departure the aircraft required excessive RWD [Right Wing Down] roll trim in cruise and the control yoke was turned to the right about 20 degrees. We did not observe any indication of spoilers deployed on the PFCS [Primary Flight Control System] display panel or a spoiler push off button illuminated on the glare shield.After approximately 20 minutes in flight the aircraft rolled to the left abruptly and needed to be re-trimmed. Aileron trim was closer to normal position when trimmed and the roll control was normal. After further research it was determined from the flight [data] recorder system that one of the in- board roll spoilers did not stow on takeoff and was deployed approximately 20 degrees. I was the pilot flying during this takeoff and normally the flying pilot does not check the indication of the roll spoilers on power up. Better training of how the roll spoiler system works and how to determine if a spoiler is deployed would be beneficial to improved flight crew understanding.

When their Dash 8 required excessive right wing down roll trim after takeoff the flight crew trimmed as necessary and continued their flight. Later the aircraft rolled abruptly left and the trim returned to a more normal centered condition. Post flight FDR investigation revealed that one inboard roll spoiler had failed to stow on takeoff and; subsequently did stow itself resulting in the two trim anomalies.

1099572

201307

0001-0600

MEM.Airport

TN

280.0

VMC

Night

Tower MEM

Air Carrier

Widebody Transport

2.0

Part 121

Initial Approach

Class B MEM

Tower MEM

Air Carrier

Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

Landing

Class B MEM

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1099572

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1099569.0

Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Ambiguous

At 320 FT AGL (radar altimeter); we encountered the wake from the preceding Airbus which caused our aircraft to roll left and right greater than I could control. At 280 FT AGL I elected to go-around. The cause of the strong wake turbulence was the Airbus we were following and the wind which was 040 at 7 KTS on the surface and 040 10-15 KTS on approach. We were told that we were 4.9 miles behind the Airbus when we asked the Controller about our sequence to the runway prior to calling the airfield in sight. We were told that our speeds were matched and we were told to slow to 170 KIAS and then slowed to 160 and finally to our final approach speed and told to hold that speed until five miles on final. We were stable with all checklists complete prior to 1;000 FT AGL while flying down the glide path. The go-around was uneventful. Tower asked us why we went around and we informed then it was for a wake encounter at low altitude on final. We then got vectors to an uneventful landing. RECAT wake turbulence separation does not work when there is a quartering headwind. Please consider not using the closer spacing during these wind events.

[Narrative 2 had no additional information.]

Wide body flight crew reported wake vortex encounter in trail of an Airbus on final approach to MEM that was strong enough to trigger a go-around.

1059420

201301

0001-0600

ZZZ.TRACON

US

4500.0

VMC

Night

TRACON ZZZ

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Descent

Class E ZZZ

Engine

X

Failed

Facility ZZZ.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Radar 6.0

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Workload

1059420

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Aircraft

A C172 pilot informed me that his engine hadn't quit; but was missing and would be 'going fast.' I informed the pilot of the position of the nearest airport; his destination; and asked if he had it in sight. I believed he had enough altitude to reach it; but he did not have it in sight. Two minutes later; the pilot informed me that he would not make the airport and intended to land on the interstate. The map confirmed his position over the interstate. I issued the wind at my airport and updated his position with respect to the nearest airport. Another aircraft checked in and asked if anyone was out to assist. One minute later; I informed the distressed aircraft that they were; 'Radar contact lost;' with a last observed altitude of 1;200 feet and asked the pilot to stay in communication with us as long as possible. One minute later; the monitoring pilot relayed communication that the C172 was safe on the ground and was asking for a phone number. I relayed the facility recorded phone number and attempted to establish the number of passengers. The pilot immediately telephoned and spoke with the Front Line Manager. Having the other aircraft assist with relaying communication greatly improved the situation; since we were able to verify the status of the aircraft and communicate a phone number to the pilot.

Near midnight; a VFR C172 engine failed while the pilot was talking with ATC who advised him about location until loosing radar. Then another pilot relayed the distress aircraft position until it landed safely on an Interstate Freeway.

1698471

201911

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

4000.0

Clear; 20

Center ZZZ

Corporate

Baron 58/58TC

1.0

Part 91

None

Passenger

Descent

Direct

Class E ZZZ

Fuel Quantity-Pressure Indication

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 24000; Flight Crew Type 200

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1698471

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

I was acting as pilot in command of BE58. I was enroute ZZZ. This was a Part 91 flight. When on descent to ZZZ my #2 engine began to run rough and surge. I immediately went full rich with the mixture and turned on the boost pump; first to low then high without a positive result. Shortly after this the # 1 engine did the same thing and again I did the same procedure. I advised Center of my situation and he suggested ZZZ1 airport about 5 miles north of my position. I concurred started my turn; feathered the props; set the mixtures to cutoff and set my glide speed to 120 knots. I switched over to the UNICOM frequency and advised my position and intentions. After ensuring that I had the runway made I lowered the landing gear and made a normal flaps up landing. I had enough speed left to taxi clear of the runway. Neither my passengers nor I received any injuries. The airplane suffered no damage. After landing I determined that I had run out of fuel. Later investigation it was determined that line service had not fueled the airplane. As PIC I always check the fuel load. The BE58 has two fuel gauges on the wing located just outboard of the engine nacelles. When the tanks are full (81 gal usable) the arrow goes beyond the 60 gal mark to the full down position. It does not show 80 gal as that part of the fuel gage is black. I believed I had full tanks. They were; in fact; almost empty. Both indications read about the same. I believe the outside gauges to be more accurate than the panel mount fuel gauges and used use them to determine my exact fuel load. In the future I am going to require a receipt from the FBO telling me who fueled my airplane; how much fuel they put on and the time they did it. By keeping a positive flow of information I hope to never experience another incident like this again.

BE58 pilot reported engine failure due to fuel exhaustion.

1623276

201902

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

11000.0

IMC

Turbulence; 4

Daylight

1000

Center ZZZ

Personal

Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

GPS; FMS Or FMC

Initial Approach

Class E ZZZ

Aileron Control System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 1750; Flight Crew Type 1400

1623276

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft

While flying the initial part of the arrival in mild turbulence and IMC; my autopilot failed. The failure resulted in a full and hard left bank. The roll servo locked in a complete hard left bank and required pilot override. While struggling with controlling the aircraft and trying to prevent inversion; I had significant altitude and course deviations. Once I was able to diagnose the condition (locked roll servo) and pull the correct autopilot circuit breaker; I was able to regain proper control of the aircraft and shoot an RNAV approach to the closest airport. During this time; I informed Center; asked for a delay vector; and was given the same. ATC helped me identify the closest airport with a published approach.

C210 pilot reported a temporary loss of control due to the failure of the autopilot roll servo.

1482338

201706

1801-2400

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

VMC

Night

Center ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B747-400

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Cruise

Fuel System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Check Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1482338

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure

Procedure

Prior to departing; maintenance was being performed to address a status message regarding the number four fuel transfer valve. The mechanic and maintenance control had elected to defer the item. During this period; the local mechanic ask the senior FO and myself; which valves he should safety wire closed. We both replied to him that we were not mechanics and that he should refer his question to [Company] maintenance control. It occurred to me then that perhaps this mechanic did not fully understand the [maintenance document]; since English was not his primary language and the manual was written in English. Losing confidence in his ability to successfully complete the procedure; I called [Company] maintenance control to speak with the administrative mechanic on duty. The mechanic on duty told me that he was working with the local mechanic. He told me that the local mechanic had understood which electrical cannon plugs to remove; which fuel transfer valves to close and assured me that it was safe for us to depart. After an hour and fifty minutes past our scheduled departure time; with the maintenance log book signed off; we pushed back; started engines and began our flight.After reaching cruise altitude while resting in the crew bunk; I received an unscheduled wake-up call from the cockpit asking me to come forward to address a problem. [The other crewmembers] explained to me that an uncontrollable fuel imbalance existed between main tanks one and four as well as between main tanks two and three as shown on the fuel synoptic page as well as EICAS messages. They further explained that the number four main tank quantity was dropping significantly more than the number one tank. It appeared the number one tank fuel quantity was being burned at a normal rate. Furthermore; the fuel quantity in main tank number three was increasing over time and the fuel quantity in main tank number two was dropping at a normal rate. Please note that the center fuel tank was now at 1.0 and the center fuel tank boost pump switches were off in accordance with procedures. Additionally; the calculated fuel versus the fuel quantity on Progress page 2 showed nearly the same amount; indicating that a fuel leak was unlikely. [They] also explained that even after manipulating the fuel cross feed valves and boost pumps on the fuel panel; they were unable to stop the increasing fuel imbalance between all four main fuel tanks. I also attempted to correct this situation by opening fuel cross-feed valves one and four; closing cross-feed valves two and three and switching off both boost pumps in the number four main tank; thus trying to feed engines one and four from main tank number one. Even under these conditions; the fuel quantity in the number four main tank continued to drop. We tried other combinations of opening and closing fuel cross feed valves and switching on and off fuel boost pumps to correct the increasing imbalance to no avail.At this time; after our crew exhausted QRH and [flight manual] procedures available to us; I called Dispatch via satellite phone to speak with maintenance control. I explained the situation to them and they advised me to follow the procedures outlined in the QRH and [flight manual]. I told them we had; but that the procedure was not working. Dispatch then added [the] Chief Pilot to our sat phone conversation. We had a detailed conversation to troubleshoot the problem. He came to the same conclusion that our crew had already come to; that the number four transfer valve had been mistakenly safety wired to the open position rather than the closed position as had been directed by the [manual procedure] by the mechanic in [departure station]. This was causing the fuel in the number four main tank to gravity feed into the number three main tank; as space became available in the number three main tank. Naturally; all of us realized that we could not continue with this situation. I asked Dispatch to select a diversion airport. ATC was notified and we were rerouted to [the diversion airport]. Upon arriving into Approach Control airspace; we asked for and were given holding instructions to jettison fuel down to a landing gross weight below the max landing weight. This action of jettisoning fuel also resolved most of the fuel imbalance issue. An additional 10 knots was carried on final to remain just above the maneuvering caution zone on the airspeed indicator ('yellow pencil') which was needed due to the remaining fuel imbalance between main tanks one and four. The approach and landing was uneventful.After securing the aircraft in the parking bay; I spoke with the mechanic on duty to explain the problem. He investigated and discovered that the number four transfer valve had indeed been mistakenly safety wired in the open position rather than the closed position. Our crew went into crew rest. The next day; the local mechanic explained to us that he had replaced the number four transfer valve and the deferral was now cleared. It is clear to our crew that this event could have been easily avoided by following the proper maintenance procedures by the local mechanic and by proper oversight by [Company] Maintenance Control.It is important to note that upon landing in [the diversion airport]; we still had about 1.1 of fuel in the number four main fuel tank. Had this situation occurred further away from a suitable airfield; it would have required more fuel burn to reach such an airport. The fuel quantity in main tank number four would inevitably drop to zero; due to the uncommanded fuel transfer and fuel burn prior to making an approach. In such a scenario the number four engine would have continued to run due to fuel flowing from main tank number three through the number three and four cross-feed valves. However; once the flaps begin to extend in preparation for landing; the number three cross-feed valve closes automatically by the fuel management computer. This would cut off the fuel supply to engine number four; causing an engine flameout. Obviously; this would have added to the complexity of the situation. Luckily; we were fairly close to a suitable landing airport.

B747 Captain reported diverting to an alternate airport after it became clear the fuel system was compromised by improper maintenance at a foreign station.

1779401

202012

1801-2400

ZZZ.Tower

US

500.0

VMC

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

Part 121

IFR

Other unknown

Final Approach

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 148.28; Flight Crew Total 22000; Flight Crew Type 13200

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Training / Qualification; Workload; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1779401

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

On final; Runway XXL; ZZZ; Night; 1000 foot ceiling; Me (Captain) flying; gusty winds; very light load; FO low currency- only 150 hrs in type since hired 1 year ago; and has not been flying much. I was hand flying at 2;000 feet on normal ILS. Called for gear down; flaps 15 at approximately 2;000 feet and flaps 30 landing; check at about 1500 feet. FO ran check list; while I hand flew the approach. The winds were gusty; our target was +15 ref and it was night. I saw flap refs change on airspeed tape; and glanced at gear lights when FO ran checklist; but I did not have full attention to FO duties since it was dark and gusty. We broke out at 1;000 feet; I called clear to land and set missed approach altitude. At 500 feet we simultaneously got the 500 auto call out and Too Low Flaps. I simultaneously; started a Go-Around (finger to toga button) and looked at flap gauge - which was at 25. But I hesitated on the go-around when I saw why we got the GPWS. I commanded flaps set to 30; which the FO immediately did. We were then about 350-400 feet and stable; and I continued to a normal landing. After landing I realized; even though there was adequate time to set the flaps to 30; I should have gone around. We debriefed after parking. The FO said he just missed the flaps in setting and checking on the checklist; most likely due to being low time in aircraft and rusty from time off. I missed his wrong setting; due to the dark and the gusty winds requiring my attention. I said I should have gone around; and that he as well should have told me to. I am confident if I had not immediately recognized why we got the too low flaps and immediately corrected it; I would not have continued.

Air Carrier Captain reported a TOO LOW FLAPS warning and an Unstabilized Approach.

1019538

201206

0001-0600

CNM.Airport

NM

1000.0

Daylight

CTAF CNM

Air Taxi

PC-12

2.0

Part 135

Initial Climb

Class E CNM

CTAF CNM

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Initial Climb

Class E CNM

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1019538

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

After take off turned left cross wind; after passing 1;000 AGL engaged autopilot. TAS system detected a target on a crossing course. Disconnected autopilot; when TAS turned black and gave audible warning put aircraft in climbing turn to avoid target. TAS indicated a '00' solid diamond passing underneath us; made numerous attempts to [contact] incoming pilot; 'No Joy'. Contacted FBO and told them of situation and to ask pilot why he wasn't communicating. Pilot stated to FBO that he was on frequency 122.95; this is our old CTAF frequency. One year ago frequency was changed.

PC-12 pilot reported NMAC with an inbound aircraft at CNM when the inbound was apparently using an outdated CTAF frequency.

1162006

201404

0601-1200

LAL.Airport

FL

10.0

4000.0

25

CLR

TRACON TPA

Corporate

Cessna 340/340A

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Initial Approach

Direct; Visual Approach

Class E TPA

TRACON TPA

Military

1.0

Part 91

Class E TPA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Total 1100; Flight Crew Type 400

1162006

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 100; Vertical 0

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Airport

Human Factors

IFR southbound to LAL via Lake Parker cancelled IFR about 8 miles out at maybe 5;000 FT. During descent deviated east about a mile to hit Lake Parker steam plant on a westward heading. [I] directed passenger in right seat to assist in watching for traffic. Suddenly a warbird A4 or L39 type jet passed to the right side at an extremely high rate of speed at the same altitude; perhaps 100 FT or less in distance. Paint scheme appeared to be navy grey with navy like numbers. Rate of passage was way too fast to take evasive maneuvers or to see other identifying information.Ways to prevent it:Maintain IFR all the way to the field. Have ATC provide traffic advisories prior to cancellation. Jet traffic obey NOTAM to stay away from LAL. (I assume the traffic was departing LAL.)Turbine traffic departed IFR.Better traffic vigilance from both cockpits. Leave transponders on during LAL departure/arrival. (I was enough shook up that I failed to complete the task of setting 1200 and turning the transponder to standby; hence my transponder was active at the time of the incident).

A CE340 pilot inbound to LAL for an air show suffered an NMAC with an unidentified turbine powered aircraft apparently departing from LAL.

1844438

202109

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

15.0

23000.0

VMC

10

Daylight

23000

Center ZZZ

Corporate

Citation V/Ultra/Encore (C560)

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Direct

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 2800; Flight Crew Type 400

Troubleshooting

1844438

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Evacuated; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft

2 Crew on board only. We departed ZZZ after all normal flight occurrences and procedures. During climb out through 23;000 ft. we hit a cloud layer and per the OAT we turned on the engine anti ice. After turned off a couple minutes later we got a right engine fire light. As PIC I performed the immediate action items. The light remained on and per procedures I activated the Engine Fire Bottle. The light went out momentarily and by then we had shut down the affected right engine per the checklist. At this point we had [requested priority handling] and headed back for ZZZ. The fire light came back on and we decided to expel the second Fire Bottle. The light remained on so I initiated a rapid descent to influence air flow to extinguish the fire. We proceeded to ZZZ and the fire light extinguished and was intermittently coming on and off. We followed the Engine Fire Checklist and One Engine Inoperative Approach and Landing Checklist. We discussed Landing and Evacuation Procedures before landing and decided not to use speed brakes or thrust reversers on landing. We landed and stopped with approximately 1000 ft. of runway left and evacuated on the runway to ensure the safety of both crew members as we were the only two onboard. I spoke to ATC after wards and they did not need anything from us.

C560 Captain reported a right hand engine fire warning; causing an in flight shut down and an air turn back to a precautionary landing.

1666376

201907

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Horizontal Stabilizer Trim

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

1666376

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

1666381.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

Aircraft; Procedure; Logbook Entry; Company Policy

Aircraft

I aborted a takeoff at approximately 100 kts. for a triple chime and master warning / red warning lights. A few seconds after I executed the abort with the thrust levers at idle and reverses deployed; I heard the aural warning indicating 'Trim'. I was anticipating a possible master warning and an abort for a bleed air leak; but that was not the case. I had been dealing with a bleed # 1 leak for the prior 45 minutes which in talking with Maintenance; it had been decided that the bleed air leak was entered in error. Basically they talked me into writing [override] in the log with the promise that it would be fixed [at destination]. Upon arriving; I did write it up in the log. I will execute an abort above 80 kts. for five items: 1. Engine Fire; 2. Engine Failure; 3. Loss of directional control; 4. Deployment of a TR (Thrust Reverser); and 5. Airplane unsafe to fly. In this pilot's opinion at the moment of the triple chime / master warning; the airplane was NOT safe to fly. As pilots we have a split second to make a critical decision. All my years of training and experience has taught me to be SAFE; and error on the side of safety. I do not regret my decision to abort. I would do it again; all things considered. I do regret giving in to the pressures of the company to have me cut corners; just so they can keep their operation on time and profitable. This is not the first time this has happened; but it is definitely the last! You are hereby notified that I will not be intimated; in the many ways that the company likes to intimidate the pilots. I have experienced this intimidation first hand. I have experienced their negative consequences for doing what I was trained to do. What you can expect from me is the following. I will protect and defend; in this order. 1. [Expletive]. 2. License. 3. Job.... Let me explain... 1. Protect your [expletive] means protecting human life. The lives of the crew and passengers. Human life ALWAYS comes first. 2. Protect my license. I have had a pilot certificate for 33 years; and I intend on keeping it! 3. Protect my job. Yes the job; is last and least important of the three. I will do my best to serve my company and passengers; but not at the expense of Safety or my Certificate. I can always find another job. This philosophy may not sound politically correct; but I don't care about being politically correct. I care about Safety. The entire content of this narrative will be copied into a [reporting service]. I will not be intimidated. I will not surrender my principals. I stand fast and will defend my position. I choose my battles carefully. If you want to fight me on this; directly or passive aggressively; then be prepared for a fight. I am here to be a safe pilot. If you can profit from that; then good for you. If you can't; then too bad. Respectfully; Captain ZZZZZ..... HAVE A NICE DAY! My suggestion is that you get the upper management out of the office once a month; and have them sit in the jump seat and observe actual line operations and see the real day to day issues that the pilots face. They need to stop counting money and start paying attention to what we really deal with.

While sitting at the gate we had a 'Engine 1 Bleed leak' while just the APU was running. We ran the QRH and followed the procedures. Captain called Maintenance to let them know that she was writing the airplane up. As she was on the phone; the same message came up and we ran the QRH again. Note that no engines were running; just the APU. We managed to board up the passengers as it seemed to fix the problem running the QRH for the second time. We pushed off the gate and started up engine two and ATC told us that there was a ground delay into ZZZ1 so we went and sat at a hold area in ZZZ. We had some time so we looked over the QRH again to see what could have happened if the steps didn't resolve the issue; and it would have led to shutting down an engine in flight. So we were both on edge. She had called Maintenance back and they told her to write 'enter in error' in the logbook in the corrective actions area. So when it was our time for departure; we had both engines running and rolling down the runway after 80 kts. but before V1 I heard the warning bell go off and figured it was the bleed failing again so I called 'abort abort abort.' Captain had the throttles and brought them back and I had my feet on the brakes. As we were slowing down is when we got the 'trim' sound. I looked down and the trim was in the 8 position that it was supposed to be in. But it was a high speed abort so we had to return to the gate and Captain called Dispatch and was also transferred to Maintenance.

EMB-145 flight crew reported a high speed rejected takeoff.

1712650

201912

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

Dash 8-400

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Direct

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Confusion

1712650

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate; Routine Inspection

Aircraft; Human Factors; MEL

MEL

Reference Q400 MEL 28-XX-XX:The table needs to be more explicit and the pilots need instructions as to how to utilize the table. It is extremely confusing.After a call to the [Chief Pilot] (and 20 minutes of discussion with him; my First Officer; and a maintainer) we determined the fuel from the nacelle (refuel/defuel) panel for the inoperative/malfunctioning gauge should be written in 'A'; and the fuel from the operative gauge should be listed in 'B'. The table can be misinterpreted as written and can lead to operating a flight with less than required fuel. Small mistakes can lead to fuel starvation in flight. Write detailed instructions on exactly what needs to be written in each block.

DH8-400 Captain reported difficulty understanding the MEL procedure and the need for instruction.

1607993

201901

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Situational Awareness

1607993

Company

Air Carrier

Dispatcher; First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Dispatch Dispatcher; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1607994.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Human Factors

While at the gate in ZZZ; I noticed the fuel was below legal mins arriving at destination. I called Dispatch and while on the phone; First Officer told me he had put 67000 lbs ZFW [Zero Fuel Weight] (average ZFW based on experience) in the FMS instead of the PZFW of 51640 lbs on the release; Not realizing the error on the release; of a projected payload 1700 lbs; I told the dispatcher we made a mistake since the FMS showed us landing with 4000 lbs with the PZFW [Projected Zero Fuel Weight]. After final numbers; our ZFW was much closer to the figure my First Officer had placed to begin with. The projected numbers for fuel were between 2000 lbs and 2200 lbs of fuel. Not having caught the error regarding the payload; I determined this lower fuel estimate was due to my conservative wind estimate plus the step climbs down the road. Shortly after departing the airspace; the projected fuel went down to 1700-1800 lbs. Even taking the step climb early and getting a more accurate assessment of the winds we could not get the fuel at destination to go above 2000 lbs. I took a second look at the paperwork and realized the error regarding the expected payload. At this point; we decided to communicate with Dispatch that we may need a fuel stop. After some coordination; we opted to divert to ZZZ1; fueled at the de-ice pad and departed with no further issues. Dispatcher communicated to me that the payload error had been a missing zero on his end; however; I assume the responsibility of not catching this prior to departure. The error could have been mitigated any number of ways. A PZFW of less than 52000 lbs should have set off common sense alarms to me; I also should have investigated further when ACARS showed a discrepancy in PZFW and ZFW; however; I misread the value and thought it was far less. Once the error was caught; the safest course was action to divert; but earlier detection would have presented a more favorable outcome.

En route; Captain reported fuel burn was not as planned on paperwork. Flight diverted for fuel stop due to insufficient fuel to get to destination.Captain reported that fuel was off and suggested an alt. During preflight planning; payload was planned for 17;000 lbs; however; [it] mistakenly entered as 1700 (missing an extra 0). Issue went unnoticed during preflight.

Air carrier Dispatcher and EMB-175 Captain reported it was necessary to divert to an enroute alternate airport for a fuel stop because an error was made during preflight planning.

1184574

201406

0001-0600

ZZZZ.ARTCC

FO

38000.0

VMC

Center ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Cruise

Oceanic

Powerplant Fuel System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 8000; Flight Crew Type 600

1184574

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Type 8500

1184891.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft

Enroute during maintenance ferry we received an EICAS message of fuel imbalance; we executed the checklist and noted how long it should take to balance the fuel based on fuel flow. It took half the expected time to balance the fuel; also we received another message of Fuel Disagree; After Electronic Checklist execution we now felt we had a possible fuel leak. We notified the Captain (who was on break) of the situation and he came to the cockpit. We inspected the left engine and noticed fuel was leaking from the fan section of the aircraft. We declared an emergency and initiated a turn towards a suitable diversion airport. We descended while executing the checklist which required engine shut down. We planned a single engine landing and the approach and landing were uneventful.

[Over the Pacific] heading east we had a Fuel Imbalance Checklist icon.Fuel Imbalance Checklist considered fuel leaks if one or more of the following was present: 1. Fuel spray observed from an engine2. A change in fuel imbalance of 1;000 or more within 30 minutes or less 3. EICAS fuel remaining different than calculated fuel on the FMCWe had all three.We declared a mayday via both CPDLC and voice with ATC. [We] then requested and received a return clearance to ZZZZ via CPDLC as well as via voice on HF. We followed all checklists and notified all personnel. The checklist directed an engine shutdown to stop the fuel leak. It worked. We continued on the diversion with no other problems. Landed uneventfully. Taxiied (followed by the fire trucks) to the ramp where Maintenance met us and saw it was indeed a leak.

B777 flight crew experiences a fuel imbalance during a ferry flight over the Pacific Ocean. After rebalancing a Fuel Disagree message is displayed and the electronic checklist indicates a fuel leak is likely. Fuel is visually confirmed to be coming from the left engine which is shut down and the flight diverts to a suitable airport.

1161441

201403

1201-1800

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

1900.0

Tower ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B767-300 and 300 ER

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Climb

Engine Control

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Workload; Distraction; Confusion

1161441

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 17000

1161428.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight; Taxi

General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure

Aircraft

I was the pilot not flying on this westbound transatlantic leg. After push back we started the engines and noticed both left and right EEC INOP lights on the EICAS display. Indeed; both EEC INOP lights were illuminated on the switches with the switches in the ON position. We stopped the aircraft to consult the MEL. As per MEL instruction both EECs are crew placardable. We placarded the EECs and proceeded to the runway for takeoff. We discussed the use of autothrottles on takeoff and departure. We elected to use the autothrottles in accordance with the MEL. The takeoff was normal; LNAV was selected at 400; and the left autopilot was engaged shortly thereafter. At 1;900 FT; in accordance with the noise abatement procedure the pilot flying called for VNAV. VNAV was selected and CLB power noted on the EICAS display. However; the power levers did not retard to climb power. At 3;400 FT the aircraft did not accelerate for cleanup and the pilot flying engaged FLCH. FLCH; although illuminated and engaged; seemed to have no effect on the aircraft (Note: the VNAV light was also illuminated at the same time as FLCH; but neither system was directing autoflight performance). Next; the pilot flying selected [and was able to utilize VS to command] the aircraft to accelerate for cleanup. (Note: at this point all three climb modes were illuminated on the mode control panel: VNAV; FLCH and V/S). During our initial turn on the SID the aircraft rolled out on an approximate heading of 280 with LNAV engaged. Because of the distraction of the various climb modes and acceleration issues we began to fly wide of the SID track. Simultaneously; the pilot flying clicked off the autopilot and autothrottles and began a manual turn back; back to track as ATC called and gave us instructions to stop our climb at FL100 and then gave us a heading of 240 toward [the next waypoint]. LNAV was reengaged once on course and the flight was continued with autothrottle off. Upon arrival at our destination the engines were secured. At this point many warning horns sounded and lights began to illuminate. When the mechanic arrived at the gate he told us the EEC INOP issue; warning horns; and autothrottle problems were caused by a single switch that was activated in the cockpit. This switch is located below the right sidewall in the cockpit. He told us that the switch was a 'maintenance only' switch and that it had apparently been activated some time prior to our flight. When he closed the switch; the warning horns stopped; the EEC INOP lights extinguished and I assume the autothrottle was restored. That [position of that] one switch caused a great deal of distraction at a critical time in the flight and may have lead to a mishap. Although; the mechanic immediately knew what the problem was; no mention of that switch was made in the MEL or QRH. There should be a note in both the MEL and QRH that if BOTH EEC INOP lights are illuminated at the same time check the red guarded switch on the right sidewall.

At this point; VNAV; FLCH; and V/S all indicated engaged. The aircraft; on autopilot; began a left 180 degree turn per the SID but the aircraft rolled out 50 degrees short of the required heading to our the next waypoint. Because of the distraction stemming from the climb/auto throttle issues we were experiencing; we were late noticing we had not completed the turn. ATC called us; instructing us to stop our climb and gave us a heading towards [the next waypoint]; and from there we proceeded on course and completed the flight with the auto throttles off.

An improperly positioned 'maintenance only' switch resulted in multiple warning lights and compromised autothrottle/autoflight functionality for a B767-300ER flight crew while conducting a complex SID from an overseas airport prior to an Atlantic crossing.

1589358

201810

0601-1200

CPM.Airport

CA

50.0

VMC

10

Daylight

12000

CTAF CPM

Personal

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Takeoff / Launch

None

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 2775; Flight Crew Type 1430

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1589358

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 100; Vertical 50

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Human Factors

Ambiguous

I waited for a helicopter to land. After it did and it was no longer visible on the runway; I announced my takeoff; taxied on the runway; and started my takeoff run. The helicopter was still at the far end of the runway; apparently practicing hovering; and had not been apparent to me. [Due to the paint color; it] disappeared in the background clutter. I climbed away to the left and it veered off to the right.Helicopters are asked not to hover taxi on the runways; but they do. When done at the far end of a 3;300-foot runway they are difficult to see against the background. In this case; I should have repeated my calls and specifically asked for verification that the helicopter was clear of the runway.

GA pilot reported a NMAC with a helicopter doing hover work on the runway during takeoff at CPM non-towered field.

1068227

201302

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

18000.0

VMC

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B747-400

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class A ZZZ

Hydraulic System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 21000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

1068227

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Automation Aircraft Other Automation

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

During initial climb; HYD OVHT SYS 4 EICAS displayed. Accomplished HYD OVHT SYS 4 QRH. Per procedure; when HYD OVHT SYS 4 messaged blanked; selected Demand Pump to AUTO. After several minutes; HYD OVHT SYS 4 EICAS displayed again. We contacted Dispatch with a patch to Maintenance Control; discussed the operational impact of inoperative systems and elected not to conduct further trouble shooting procedures as aircraft was currently in a stabilized configuration. My primary concern was the need for alternate gear extension at destination which would preclude gear retraction in the event of a go around or missed approach. Destination weather forecast for our arrival required naming ZZZ as an alternate. Planned fuel at destination would be insufficient for a gear extended diversion to ZZZ. Based on lack of adequate fuel for a diversion from planned destination to the named alternate; I made the decision not to continue to destination. [We all agreed] a return to our departure airport to be the safest course of action. We requested and received an ATC clearance for our return and coordinated the dumping of 198.0 pounds of fuel to reduce the aircraft to below maximum structural landing weight. At the suggestion of Maintenance Control and based on my systems knowledge; I exercised Emergency Authority to modify the QRH procedure for alternate gear extension and initial flap selection. During the initial HYD OVHT SYS 4 procedure; it took approximately fifteen minutes for the system to overheat after returning the Demand Pump to AUTO per the procedure. To avoid the mechanical stress of a free fall extension of the wing gear and to reduce cockpit workload by simplifying the flap extension procedure; I selected Demand Pump four to AUTO for approximately one minute while extending the gear normally and selecting flaps 5. Once the gear and flaps were in this position; I turned off Demand Pump 4. During this time I monitored the HYD SYS page and noted System 4 hydraulic temperature remained in the normal range with no EICAS displayed. Final flap selection was conducted in secondary mode and the aircraft configured per the HYD OVHT SYS 4 QRH procedure. Dispatch provided landing data for landing on longest available runway and a normal landing below maximum landing weight was accomplished.

A B747-400 flight crew dumped fuel and returned to their departure airport after suffering an Hydraulic System four overheat.

1606702

201812

1801-2400

ORD.Airport

IL

TRACON ORD

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class B ORD

Tower ORD

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

Initial Approach

Class B ORD

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1606702

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Weather; Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

While enroute [to] ORD; we utilized Auto-Updates for ATIS through ACARS as to elevate our situational awareness of the changing conditions at our destination where it was actively snowing. During holding on the arrival; we briefed the arrival; anticipated runways; A320 Land App; expected taxi route; and threats. The ATIS had provided information that braking action advisories were in effect while the reported braking action for Runway 28C 5;5;3 and all other runways 5;5;5. While computing our minimum landing distance; we computed the worst case minimum landing friction needed for both runways in use. At our weight and configuration; [Runway] 27L needed a minimum 4 medium to good braking for us to accept that runway. [Runway] 28C needed a minimum 2 poor or better braking action to accept that runway. Once released from the hold and continuing on the arrival; I selected Com2 to the Tower frequency for our anticipated planned Runway 27L. We were approximately 15-20 minutes from landing. While monitoring the frequency; I heard the Tower Controller give unconventional instructions. They were telling pilots; 'Cleared to land; plan to exit Alpha One; braking action reported GOOD till alpha one and POOR beyond alpha one within the last 20 minutes.' I could hear pilots question the Controller about the braking action. To which the Controller responded; 'The braking action is GOOD till alpha one; everyone else is making alpha one you are cleared to land.'I immediately informed the Captain of the situation and contradicting information being provided on the ATIS that we have been monitoring for the past few hours through multiple normal and special updates. We tried to calculate the distance from the threshold to alpha one on [Runway] 27L realizing that the planned exit leaves 20 to 30 percent of the runway unusable. As we could not calculate the distance from the threshold to alpha one nor could we land full length on such a short runway under poor braking conditions; we prepared for a possible discontinuation of the approach if conditions remained unchanged by the time we arrived.While on downwind; the Captain asked the Approach Controller if they had the braking action for [Runway] 27L. The Controller responded with 5;5;5. When we were cleared and established on the ILS 27L we were instructed to contact Tower. The Tower Controller said; 'Cleared to land 27L; plan to exit Alpha One.' When the Controller didn't provide the information that they had earlier to previous arrivals; the Captain then asked; 'Why the planned exit Alpha One?' The Controller then responded; 'Braking action GOOD till alpha one; and POOR beyond alpha one reported by a previous arrival.' The Captain informed Tower we were unable to accept the landing clearance and requested to discontinue the approach and get vectors for [Runway] 28C.Essentially; the Controller was issuing an indirect request to Land and Hold Short Alpha one intersection with a contaminated runway. Also; the Tower had not been providing this essential information to the flight crews nor the Approach controllers. Telling pilots in a critical phase of flight after being fully configured and on the approach provided very little opportunity to evaluate and judge whether using the intended runway was the correct and safest course of action. Monitoring the frequency during the descent; it seemed to me by my observation that once pilots started questioning the information and runway condition given to them by the Tower Controller; the Tower Controller willfully and consciously began to withhold the details as to why the alpha one request was being made. Once we discontinued the approach; the [air carrier] flight behind us discontinued also. However; the aircraft that had yet to check in with Tower continued the approach as the Tower did not tell them the runway conditions. The Tower only told them to plan to exit Alpha One.O'hare Tower did not provide the correct and timely informationabout the safety conditions of their runways to the flight crews nor the Approach controllers. They withheld information and continued to do so even after bringing this information to their attention in order to facilitate getting aircraft on the ground. They removed the ability for pilots at [Company] to properly assess policy and procedures to ensure that we operate our aircraft safely. An un-forecasted snow event left the airport unprepared and they chose to push and exceed the limits of safe operation for operational need.Provide accurate information to pilots as soon as possible. Knowing that the runway was marginal and possibly unsatisfactory while still talking to the Center Controllers before talking to Approach; provided our team the opportunity to plan and discuss our intentions. We could address proper policies and procedures to make sure we were working within the guidelines that the FAA and the company have provided. We would have been at a serious disadvantage had we been blindsided by the information on final 10 miles from landing or worse not known to ask the Tower Controller WHY they wanted us to plan alpha one?

Air carrier First Officer reported confusing information from the ORD Tower Controller related to braking action on the runway in use.

1746532

202006

1801-2400

ZMA.ARTCC

FL

19000.0

Marginal

Thunderstorm; Turbulence

Center ZMA

Corporate

Medium Transport

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZMA

Facility ZMA.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Developmental

Workload; Situational Awareness

1746532

ATC Issue All Types; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Weather; Company Policy

Weather

At the start of the shift; convective weather was rapidly forming moving slowly north and east near where the incident occurred. Cells were intensifying rapidly due to daytime heating and resulted in many pop-up cells that were causing deviations within the sector. At the time of the incident; we were running both departures from the ZZZ area and arrivals into the ZZZ area through the same 20 to 25 mile gap where weather was least impacting the aircraft. All overflights were also transiting through the same area; adding to the complexity.Aircraft X; entered my airspace at 21;000 feet and was assigned a heading from the previous sector to avoid a cell that was building in his vicinity. I issued a routing which at the time was south and west of the precipitation that was depicted on my scope and that I knew was clear based on pilot reports that I had solicited. Weather was issued to the aircraft as well as left and right deviations as necessary. He was issued a descent to 19;000 feet; pointed out to another sector; and was handed off with no issues in my airspace. Upon entering the next Controller's airspace; the pilot reported that he had hit severe turbulence; gashed his head open and was bleeding. The pilot advised ATC and landed safely. The complexity of having to essentially 'play chicken' with arrivals and departures added immensely to the complexity of the sector. Earlier in the session; I mentioned to the TMU (Traffic Management Unit) Supervisor who came into the area that we should consider closing the arrival; but that happened too late. About 10 to 15 minutes prior to this event occurring; we finally closed the arrival down but allowed three aircraft to continue on the arrival; which jammed up the already small lane that I had to work with.This weather had been building throughout the day; and the fact that it took so long to move planes away from the affected arrival is a constant issue that we have in this facility. This sector is one of the smallest in the facility; and arguably one of the most complex; so adding in weather and unusual operations increases complexity immensely. We generally know when the weather is going to be there and how it's going to affect our operations; so steps should be preemptively taken to reroute these aircraft into better weather and not have to deal with the potential for having these incidents occur.

A Center Controller reported a pilot reported severe turbulence that caused an injury.

1302666

201510

0001-0600

ZZZ.TRACON

US

Air Carrier

DC-10 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Company

Air Carrier

Dispatcher

Dispatch Dispatcher

1302666

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Aircraft

Received in flight engine failure report. I was about to query crew with regards to it and concluded not to as they were under 15k ft with their tag changing back to [departure airport]. Upon receiving the engine failure message; I informed the [appropriate managers]. Due to the low alt; I asked the ATC coordinator to call ATC and inquire about an emergency being declared. None was declared. [About ten minutes later] crew sent ACARS 'rtb eng fail.' Due to them being under 10k ft; I acknowledged the message and asked them to give me a call upon block in. After landing; I overheard on the radio that the crew thought they had 'compressor stalls and thought they were throwing some blades.' Crew did not declare an emergency; but [airport] fire department sent trucks anyway. Awaiting call from crew for further details.[About an hour later] Captain called with details. Climbing through FL260 the airplane began to vibrate. Completed compressor stall QRH as number 3 engine ceased vibrating when throttle at idle. Engine was not shut down until landed. Confirmed that emergency was not declared by crew even though trucks were rolled by airport ops. Crew had dumped 6k of fuel.

Air carrier Dispatcher reported an aircraft he was monitoring experienced an engine problem and returned to the departure airport.

1560608

201807

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

35000.0

VMC

Night

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-11

2.0

Part 121

IFR

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Speed (Rate Sensing)

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1560608

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

1560612.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Aircraft

At FL350; M0.82; received Flap Disagree Level 2 Alert. The throttles then immediately went to idle thrust and the upper and lower foot on the CA (Captain) PFD (Primary Flight Display) came together. The flaps were indicating 0/ret on both the handle and the configuration page. Hydraulics were normal. All three airspeed indicators were indicating the same airspeed. All of these alerts were occurring intermittently but frequently and at a fast pace. Although I had disengaged the autothrottles to prevent them from going to idle; when the alerts occurred the autothrottles would re-engage as though the airplane was trying to go into High Speed Protection with no aural alerts. Because none of the checklists led us down the proper path; and we could not ascertain which pilot's side was the problem. We decided to return to ZZZ.We [advised ATC] and coordinated the return. The flight back was uneventful with the alerts occurring two more times. Things considered were the availability other airports enroute; the loss of a CADC (Central Air Data Computer) in RVSM airspace; and that it was a night oceanic flight. Maintenance is not sure. No faults were recorded. They did a precautionary replacement of CADC 1 and replaced FCC (Flight Control Computer) 2.

Cruise @ FL350; night VMC; approximately 1 hour after departing ZZZ. Airplane showed FLAP DISAG; and CA's (Captain) airspeed erroneously showed lower and upper feet meeting together on speed tape. Airspeed still correctly showed M0.82 on CA; FO (First Officer); and standby instruments. Airplane thought it had a speed problem due to CA's side airspeed; and autothrottles came to idle to correct that problem. We clicked off the autothrottles and pushed the power back up. After a few minutes; all errors disappeared. We started to run the FLAP DISAG checklist; but the erroneous indications disappeared before we finished that QRH checklist. Errors noted above continued to pop back up; then resolve on their own. We did not have erratic airspeed at any point; but the airplane transiently presented bad stall data on the CA's side. Crew elected to [advise ATC] and return to ZZZ. During the return; the same transient errors would reappear at irregular intervals. Once on final and configured to land; no errors reappeared. Approach and landing were uneventful.Exact cause unknown. Maintenance was unable to duplicate the errors. We left the aircraft after they had swapped a CADC (Central Air Data Computer) and were proceeding with checking the flap system due to the FLAP DISAG.

MD-11 flight crew reported experiencing intermittent airspeed related malfunction alerts.