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<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> In 2019 95% of the estimated $366 billion in revenue earned in the space sector was from the space-for-earth economy: that is goods or services produced in space for use on earth. The space-for-earth economy includes telecommunications and internet infrastructure earth observation capabilities national security satellites and more. This economy is booming and though research shows that it faces the challenges of overcrowding and monopolization that tend to arise whenever companies compete for a scarce natural resource projections for its future are optimistic. Decreasing costs for launch and space hardware in general have enticed new entrants into this market and companies in a variety of industries have already begun leveraging satellite technology and access to space to drive innovation and efficiency in their earthbound products and services. </source> [/INST] <claim>Only commercial space can facilitate space-for-space industry---that solves economic sustainability. </claim> <psg>space This economy is booming and though research shows that it faces the challenges of overcrowding and monopolization projections for its future are optimistic. Decreasing costs for launch and space hardware in general have enticed new entrants into this market and companies in a variety of industries have already begun leveraging satellite tech and access to space to drive innovation and efficiency</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> 3. Potential Approaches to Overcome These Challenges Academic and government researchers have begun work on a number of techniques and methodologies that might help to overcome these core challenges. Current efforts fall into four primary categories: formal methods cognitive instrumentation adversarial testing and run-time monitoring. We discuss each of these below then consider the question of how well they cover the full set of capability gaps implied by the challenge list. A. Formal Methods 1. Summary Formal methods in software development allow developers to specify certain properties that the software should have produce the software and verify that it does have those properties without needing to confirm that empirically by testing for them. Properties to be specified might be things like: Property 1: the weapon cannot fire while turret is still rotating Property 2: the course-of-action selector can never get into an infinite loop There are two approaches to formal methods for autonomous systems verification: (1) formal methods can be used after the fact as an analytic tool to verify some properties of existing software or more importantly (2) formal methods can be used as a design and development process that can assure much more about the behavior of the software to be developed. Formal methods of the second kind are most commonly used in the development of complex safety-critical or security-critical systems or for expensive one-time development efforts (e.g. deep space probes). Applying formal methods to complex AI and autonomous systems is a natural extension of this. 2. Limitation Although formal methods can be extremely useful there are significant constraints on the current state of the art. These include the following: Scalability: There are currently fairly tight bounds on the size of development effort (or state space) that the techniques can be applied to. 3-2 Scope: Not all desired properties can be assured through formal methods and there may be performance trades associated with achieving assurance. Rigidity: Any change to a system developed using formal methods risks invalidating the assurance proofs unless the formal methods are reapplied to the new specification. Given that not all desired behaviors can be assured using formal methods there are also open research questions concerning how to combine formal methods with empirical TEV&V techniques or run-time monitoring strategies. </source> [/INST] <claim>No Solvency - TEVV does not pair well with formal methods of research </claim> <psg>Formal methods in software development allow developers to specify certain properties that the software should have produce the software and verify that it does have those properties without needing to confirm that empirically by testing for them. formal methods can be used as a design and development process that can assure much more about the behavior of the software to be developed Formal methods of the second kind are most commonly used in the development of complex safety-critical or security-critical systems Applying formal methods to complex AI and autonomous systems is a natural extension of this. Given that not all desired behaviors can be assured using formal methods there are also open research questions concerning how to combine formal methods with empirical TEV&V techniques</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Michael Horowitz describes AI as “the ultimate enabler” for automating decision-making tasks in everything from public administration and commercial business to strategic intelligence and military combat.5 In 2018 the Department of Defense observed that “AI is poised to transform every industry and is expected to impact every corner of the Department spanning operations training sustainment force protection recruiting healthcare and many others.”6 We would be surprised however if AI transformed all these activities to the same degree for all actors who use it. One of the key insights from the literature on the economics of technology is that the complements to a new technology determine its impact.7 AI from this perspective is not a simple substitute for human decision-making. Rapid advances in machine learning have improved statistical prediction but prediction is only one aspect of decision-making. Two other important elements of decision-making—data and judgment—represent the complements to prediction. Just as cheaper bread expands the market for butter advances in AI that reduce the costs of prediction are making its complements more valuable. AI prediction models require data and accurate prediction requires more and better data. Quality data provide plentiful and relevant information without systemic bias. Data-driven machine prediction can efficiently fill in information needed to optimize a given utility function but the specification of the utility function ultimately relies on human judgment about what exactly should be maximized or minimized. Judgment determines what kinds of patterns and outcomes are meaningful and what is at stake for whom and in which contexts. Clear judgments are well specified in advance and agreed upon by relevant stakeholders. When quality data are available and an organization can articulate clear judgments then AI can improve decision-making. We argue that if AI makes prediction cheaper for military organizations then data and judgment will become both more valuable and more contested. This argument has two important strategic implications. First the conditions that have made AI successful in the commercial world—quality data and clear judgment—may not be present or present to the same degree for all military tasks. In military terms judgment encompasses command intentions rules of engagement administrative management and moral leadership. These functions cannot be automated with narrow AI technology. Increasing reliance on AI therefore will make human beings even more vital for military power not less. Second the importance of data and judgment creates incentives for strategic competitors to improve protect and interfere with information systems and command institutions. As a result conflicts over information will become more salient and organizational coordination will become more complex. In contrast with assumptions about rapid robot wars and decisive shifts in military advantage we expect AI-enabled conflict to be characterized by environmental uncertainty organizational friction and political controversy. The contestation of AI complements therefore is likely to unfold differently than the imagined wars of AI substitutes.8 </source> [/INST] <claim>Effective AI requires enormous amounts of data inputs which are less available and more protected in the military sphere. </claim> <psg>AI is not a simple substitute for human decision-making. Rapid advances in machine learning have improved statistical prediction but prediction is only one aspect of decision-making. We argue that if AI makes prediction cheaper for military organizations then data and judgment will become both more valuable and more contested . In military terms judgment encompasses command intentions rules of engagement administrative management and moral leadership. These functions cannot be automated with narrow AI technology. Increasing reliance on AI therefore will make human beings even more vital for military power not less. Second the importance of data and judgment creates incentives for strategic competitors to improve protect and interfere with information systems and command institutions. As a result conflicts over information will become more salient and organizational coordination will become more complex</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> As noted above one might be opposed to dialogue on AI safety with China and Russia fearing that it could reveal information that China and Russia would use to make their military applications of AI more reliable meaning they would be more effective. However these proposed discussions would not include methods to make algorithms more reliable or divulge details on how TEVV works. Dialogues of that nature might provide China and Russia with a roadmap to make their algorithms more effective. Instead dialogue would focus on ideas about strategic stability and areas of mutual interest such as reducing the chance of inadvertent escalation. Communicating the importance the United States places on safety and reliability and emphasizing already public information on US safety checks before deploying weapons could also generate the advantages described above. </source> [/INST] <claim>The counterplan solves for AI safety without revealing TEVV secrets to Russia and China.</claim> <psg>one might be opposed to dialogue on AI safety with China and Russia fearing that it could reveal information that China and Russia would use to make their military applications of AI more effective. However these proposed discussions would not include methods to make algorithms more reliable or divulge details on how TEVV works Instead dialogue would focus on ideas about strategic stability and areas of mutual interest such as reducing the chance of inadvertent escalation. Communicating the importance the United States places on safety and reliability and emphasizing already public information on US safety checks before deploying weapons could also generate the advantages described above.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Psychoanalytic writing on nuclear war has to date mainly concentrated on the variety of defenses people have against the realization that a nuclear holocaust will mean the real death of hundreds of millions of people and the end of most of civilization as we know it. Lifton's work on 'numbing ' for instance has eloquently described the numerous denials evasions idealizations displacements and other defenses so often used by those in power and by the average person when thinking about the nuclear holocaust (Lifton and Falk 1982). Mack (1981) Brenman-Gibson (1986) and other psychoanalysts have made telling cases for the proposition that most people have severe emotional resistances against acknowledging the ghastly realities of nuclear war. In each of these works however the assumption has been made that the reason people so badly distort their perceptions of reality in the case of nuclear weapons is that the reality of nuclear war is so horrifying. Yet I know of no other clinical psychoanalytic studies that trace the source of psychic defenses to fear of reality. Defenses are usually thought to be constructed against wishes against the unacceptable Id wishes not against unpleasant reality. If a patient denies the destructiveness of his or her current actions it is because he or she feels guilty about the wish to destroy someone. The Journal of Psychohistory 42 (4) Spring 2015 Nuclear War as an Anti-S exual Group Fantasy 321 If this is equally true in thinking about nuclear war then one must suspect that the defenses have in fact been constructed against a wish to have a nuclear holocaust. Could this be possible? Could it be that the world's greatest fear is also unconsciously the world's greatest wish? Is it possible that we are mesmerized by nuclear weapons because the promise of a nuclear war is for some reason overwhelmingly attractive to us and plays an extremely important intrapsychic role in our lives? Carrying the parallel between the clinical and the social one step further the following question might be asked: Is it possible that the world's addiction to nuclear weapons might be fueled by both aggressive and sexual drives both destructive and erotic wishes as in the case of other addictions? Most analysts do not usually consider that the drive toward a nuclear holocaust might have sexual origins. To begin with it seems too obvious too “pop-psychological ' to point out that the language of those proposing nuclear war is filled with continuous phallic references such as 'standing tall ' 'displays of firmness ' 'stiffening of the national will ' 'making the Russians impotent.' 'knocking their balls off ' and so on (Caldicott 1984. deMause 1985b). When those who imagine or witness nuclear explosions describe the 'beauty' of the phallic mushroom cloud or the 'orgiastic release' of the explosion (Chernus 1986) it seems almost embarrassing to draw attention to the all-too-obvious sexual language being used. And when a magazine describes a nuclear bomber as 'a breathtakingly beautiful airplane with slim-silhouette wings that meld into a fuselage that breathes speed the swanlike aircraft is designed to penetrate Soviet air defenses unleashing nuclear-tipped missiles at targets deep inside the country' (Time 1987) it seems almost superfluous to point out that the bomber in question is in fact an ugly world-destroyer not a 'swanlike' phallus depositing its load 'deep inside” its target. Sensitive reporters who interview hundreds of nuclear war planners are not too embarrassed to observe that these experts are mainly people sublimating sexual—indeed often homosexual—preoccupations. Thomas Allen describes the world of those in the War College who play nuclear war games: There is a football-stadium excitement about the game . . . the players get together in a kind of locker-room camaraderie. (The towel-snapping image is not overly drawn. Women players are as rare in the male world of the war game as they are in football locker rooms. To further the jock image players call their post game analysis a 'hot wash-up.') (Allen 1987) 322 Lloyd deMause Carol Cohn in reporting on her experiences in observing the nearly all-male world of nuclear war experts found their language dominated by sexual imagery. 'Feminists have often suggested that an important aspect of the arms race is phallic worship ' she begins. 'I have always found this an uncomfortably reductionist explanation and hoped that my research at the Center would yield a more complex analysis.' Yet she found no way to sidestep the fact that while rational analysis was in short supply the subject of male potency appeared to be the central topic of every lecture: I thought that at least at some point in a long talk about 'penetration aids ' someone would suddenly look up slightly embarrassed to be caught in such blatant confirmation of feminist analyses of What's Going On Here. Of course I was wrong. There was no evidence that any feminist critiques had ever reached the ears much less the minds of these men. American military dependence on nuclear weapons was explained as 'irresistible because you get more bang for the buck.' Another lecturer solemnly and scientifically announced 'to disarm is to get rid of all your stuff.' Other lectures were filled with discussion of vertical erector launchers thrust-to-weight ratios soft lay downs deep penetration and the comparative advantages of protracted versus spasm attacks—or what one military adviser to the National Security Council has called 'releasing 70 to 80 percent of our megatonnage in one orgasmic whump.' There was serious concern about the need to harden our missiles and the need to 'face it the Russians are a little harder than we are.' Disbelieving glances would occasionally pass between me and my one ally in the summer program another woman but no one else seemed to notice. (Cohn 1987) If even untrained journalists notice that nuclear war discussions are filled with 'homoerotic excitement' (Cohn 1987 p. 695) need the psychoanalyst be so inhibited in investigating the possible sexual sources of war? What surprised me most in preparing this paper is that when I finished reading through most of the several hundred books and articles written by psychoanalysts on the causes of war since Freud's 1932 essay 'Why War?' I found that clinical studies of the actual words and motivations of real people going to actual wars were exceedingly rare. Most psychoanalytic theories of war are non-clinical and repeat in one form or another Freud's conclusion that war is caused by 'the instinct for hatred and aggression' (Freud 19321 p. 209). But this conclusion is not based on empirical studies of the actual words used by people as they bring about wars. </source> [/INST] <claim>Sexual desires lead to arms buildup and subsequent war</claim> <psg>Psychoanalytic writing on nuclear war has to date mainly concentrated on the variety of defenses people have against the realization that a nuclear holocaust will mean the real death of hundreds of millions of people and the end of most of civilization as we know it. Lifton's work on 'numbing ' for instance has eloquently described the numerous denials evasions idealizations displacements and other defenses so often used by those in power and by the average person when thinking about the nuclear holocaust Yet I know of no other clinical psychoanalytic studies that trace the source of psychic defenses to fear of reality. Defenses are usually thought to be constructed against wishes against the unacceptable Id wishes not against unpleasant reality. Could this be possible? Could it be that the world's greatest fear is also unconsciously the world's greatest wish? Is it possible that we are mesmerized by nuclear weapons because the promise of a nuclear war is for some reason overwhelmingly attractive to us and plays an extremely important intrapsychic role in our lives? Is it possible that the world's addiction to nuclear weapons might be fueled by both aggressive and sexual drives both destructive and erotic wishes as in the case of other addictions? Most analysts do not usually consider that the drive toward a nuclear holocaust might have sexual origins. it seems almost embarrassing to draw attention to the all-too-obvious sexual language being used. And when a magazine describes a nuclear bomber as 'a breathtakingly beautiful airplane with slim-silhouette wings that meld into a fuselage that breathes speed the swanlike aircraft is designed to penetrate Soviet air defenses unleashing nuclear-tipped missiles at targets deep inside the country' Sensitive reporters who interview hundreds of nuclear war planners are not too embarrassed to observe that these experts are mainly people sublimating sexual—indeed often homosexual—preoccupations. Feminists have often suggested that an important aspect of the arms race is phallic worship ' she begins. 'I have always found this an uncomfortably reductionist explanation and hoped that my research at the Center would yield a more complex analysis.' Yet she found no way to sidestep the fact that while rational analysis was in short supply the subject of male potency appeared to be the central topic of every lecture: I thought that at least at some point in a long talk about 'penetration aids ' someone would suddenly look up slightly embarrassed to be caught in such blatant confirmation of feminist analyses of What's Going On Here. National Security Council has called 'releasing 70 to 80 percent of our megatonnage in one orgasmic whump.' There was serious concern about the need to harden our missiles and the need to 'face it the Russians are a little harder than we are.' If even untrained journalists notice that nuclear war discussions are filled with 'homoerotic excitement' (Cohn 1987 p. 695) need the psychoanalyst be so inhibited in investigating the possible sexual sources of war? What surprised me most in preparing this paper is that when I finished reading through most of the several hundred books and articles written by psychoanalysts on the causes of war since Freud's 1932 essay 'Why War?' I found that clinical studies of the actual words and motivations of real people going to actual wars were exceedingly rare.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> After months of amassing troops around Ukraine’s borders Russia’s invasion of its neighbor was met with frantic condemnation from world leaders and an outpouring of support on social media. Russia has long been priming the information environment for this invasion identifying and exploiting regional grievances in eastern and southern Ukraine since the country’s independence in 1991 and more recently in fabricating pretenses for starting a war of its own making. While Russian narratives continue to be amplified by state media as well as American politicians seizing the opportunity to attack opponents at home Western democracies must not be sucked into merely refuting Russian claims. They must shift focus to the disastrous consequences of this war. At the same time they must not lose sight of other pressure points Russia has been pushing in its digital sovereignty efforts. </source> [/INST] <claim>Debates on the topic are key to learning to spot and combat Russian disinformation</claim> <psg>Russia’s invasion was met with frantic condemnation from world leaders and support on social media Russia has been priming information environment for this exploiting grievances in Ukraine and more recently in fabricating pretenses for starting a war of its own making Western democracies must not be sucked into merely refuting Russian claims must shift focus to disastrous consequences of war must not lose sight of pressure points Russia has been pushing in digital sovereignty</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Federal agencies Congress and the White House must jointly foster improved research and development for pandemic preparedness and response experts said during a recent webinar hosted by the Capitol Hill Steering Committee on Pandemic Preparedness & Health Security. </source> [/INST] <claim>R&D solves pandemic preparedness</claim> <psg>Federal agencies Congress and the White House must jointly foster improved research and development for pandemic preparedness and response</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> In a global crisis involving a highly transmissible novel pathogen some heterogeneity in national responses is to be expected. Yet the current pandemic demonstrates that an international framework for pandemic detection and response that relies so heavily on the transparency judgment and discretion of individual national governments leaves too many opportunities for failure. The Task Force recommends the following measures to improve the availability and reliability of early epidemic threat surveillance and to enable rapid identification characterization and tracking of emerging infectious diseases. First the United States should work with other governments and civil society partners to build and integrate national and global epidemic surveillance systems which would detect share and publicize early signs of an outbreak in near real time. This framework should establish a voluntary international sentinel surveillance network founded on health-care facilities around the world that regularly share hospitalization data using anonymized patient information to identify unusual trends. National voluntary sentinel surveillance systems could target vulnerable communities—such as nursing homes or low-income neighborhoods—which could allow for the detection of new dangerous outbreaks within these groups before they became unstoppable. Participation in these international and national sentinel networks should be incentivized with grants and technology transfers. Other surveillance methods being used in this and previous outbreaks are worth expanding. Wastewater surveillance to detect the presence of certain viruses was pioneered in polio eradication and is now being harnessed in some settings to track coronavirus trends. Kinsa which uses internet-connected thermometers to predict the spread of the flu has been used to identify anomalous fever spikes that could be COVID-19 related. These and similar methods known as syndromic surveillance could be used more broadly to identify presence of pathogens with outbreak potential even before people start becoming sick. Just as national security agencies have expanded their activities to include and rely on data surveillance expertise so should public health communities. Since 2013 the CDC has fostered an open collaboration called FluSight to improve the science and usability of epidemic forecasts of influenza for public health decision-making. Proposals to create similar systems for sharing data on epidemic threats are worthy of support.125 This data should feed into an integrated global disease surveillance data platform created under the auspices of the Health Security Coordination Committee. This platform should enlist participating government agencies and relevant nongovernmental agencies to standardize assessment of data and characterization of threats. It should share the results of those assessments and raise the alarm over any unusual trends with the UN coordinator WHO Emergency Program and the general public. This global surveillance architecture should be linked to public health agencies in participating nations including the CDC so that the data can be used to directly inform preparedness and response activities to both global and domestic threats. </source> [/INST] <claim>Using data science solves</claim> <psg>an international framework for pandemic detection and response that relies so heavily on the transparency judgment and discretion of individual national governments leaves too many opportunities for failure. The Task Force recommends the following measures to improve the availability and reliability of early epidemic threat surveillance the United States should work with other governments and civil society partners to build and integrate national and global epidemic surveillance systems which would detect share and publicize early signs of an outbreak in near real time. This framework should establish a voluntary international sentinel surveillance network Other surveillance methods being used in this and previous outbreaks are worth expanding. Wastewater surveillance to detect the presence of certain viruses was pioneered in polio eradication and is now being harnessed in some settings to track coronavirus trends. These and similar methods known as syndromic surveillance could be used more broadly to identify presence of pathogens with outbreak potential even before people start becoming sick. This data should feed into an integrated global disease surveillance data platform created under the auspices of the Health Security Coordination Committee. This platform should enlist participating government agencies and relevant nongovernmental agencies to standardize assessment of data and characterization of threats This global surveillance architecture should be linked to public health agencies in participating nations including the CDC so that the data can be used to directly inform preparedness and response activities to both global and domestic threats.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> COVID-19 vaccine research and development (R&D) regulation manufacture and purchase have been largely supported by a collaboration among several federal agencies including the National Institutes of Health (NIH) the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) FDA DOD and others (formerly OWS). Six vaccines were chosen for coordinated federal support under OWS. Some vaccine R&D has been supported by NIH BARDA and DOD separately from the OWS efforts. For R&D funding has been provided to accounts at NIH DOD and the Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund (PHSSEF. parent account for BARDA) for COVID-19 related R&D including vaccine R&D. In addition over $50 billion in PHSSEF funding has been made available until September 24 2024 for a broad set of medical countermeasures and surge capacity purposes including for the development manufacture and purchase of vaccines and related supplies. Separately FDA has received broad supplemental appropriations for its regulatory and other activities. ARPA (P.L. 117-2) further provides appropriations that can be used for activities under this heading (all ARPA funds are mandatory appropriations): • Section 2303 provides $6.05 billion to HHS available until expended for research development manufacturing production and the purchase of vaccines therapeutics and ancillary medical products and supplies—available for COVID-19 (or SARS-CoV-2) its variants and any disease with potential for creating a pandemic. • Section 2304 provides $500 million to FDA available until expended for a broad set of activities including for its review of the performance safety and effectiveness of vaccines. inspection of vaccine manufacturing facilities. and oversight of the vaccine supply chain. • Section 3101 provides $10 billion available until September 30 2025 for activities under the Defense Production Act with respect to medical supplies and equipment for the pandemic including for vaccines and related supplies. Funds can support the purchase production and distribution of such supplies. After September 30 2022 funds can be used to meet critical public health needs with respect to any pathogen that the President has determined has the potential for creating a public health emergency. </source> [/INST] <claim>Funding comes from other agencies besides the DoD</claim> <psg>COVID-19 vaccine research and development (R&D) regulation manufacture and purchase have been largely supported by a collaboration among several federal agencies including the National Institutes of Health (NIH) the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) FDA DOD and others (formerly OWS). Some vaccine R&D has been supported by NIH BARDA and DOD separately from the OWS efforts. For R&D funding has been provided to accounts at NIH DOD and the Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund (PHSSEF. parent account for BARDA) for COVID-19 related R&D including vaccine R&D. In addition over $50 billion in PHSSEF funding has been made available for a broad set of medical countermeasures and surge capacity purposes including for the development manufacture and purchase of vaccines and related supplies. FDA has received broad supplemental appropriations for its regulatory and other activities ARPA (P.L. 117-2) further provides appropriations that can be used for activities under this heading Section 2303 provides $6.05 billion to HHS Section 2304 provides $500 million to FDA Section 3101 provides $10 billion for activities under the Defense Production Act with respect to medical supplies and equipment for the pandemic</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Science diplomacy (SD) a transformative tool of soft power that combines knowledge-based technologically enabled problem-solving with international political agency is underutilized but indispensable.  In the face of the negative attributes of globalization – including polarization and the tendency to socialize the costs while privatizing benefits – SD alone offers the prospect of engaging shared interests to overcome political constraints and enlarge international cooperation.  Notwithstanding conventional convictions and the present spike in the incidence of armed conflict there are no military solutions to the world’s most pressing problems – security is much more than a martial art.  Accordingly sustaining broadly based development bridging digital divides and responding to the needs of the poor must become priorities for both diplomacy and international policy. Unfortunately they are not. </source> [/INST] <claim>DoS solves science diplomacy</claim> <psg>Science diplomacy (SD) a transformative tool of soft power that combines knowledge-based technologically enabled problem-solving with international political agency is underutilized but indispensable SD alone offers the prospect of engaging shared interests to overcome political constraints and enlarge international cooperation. sustaining broadly based development bridging digital divides and responding to the needs of the poor must become priorities for both diplomacy and international policy.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> In most circumstances the Department of Defense (DoD) should not serve as the most visible face of the United States overseas. This is particularly true in areas where the public feels threatened by American power. </source> [/INST] <claim>The DoS is comparatively better for international diplomacy</claim> <psg>the Department of Defense (DoD) should not serve as the most visible face of the United States overseas.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Throughout the Covid-19 pandemic the Department of Defense (DOD) has made major contributions both domestically and internationally to civilian-led preparedness and response particularly in logistics and planning and numerous biomedical arenas including research direct clinical care and all aspects of public health including a worldwide network of infectious disease research laboratories. Certainly DOD will be called upon to augment civil authorities for future similar crises both at home and abroad as it has been so often in the past with Ebola SARS MERS and numerous other outbreaks. Often however these contributions arise amid sudden emergency demands in an ad hoc fashion without adequate forward mission planning and budgeting and without clear backing in U.S. national security doctrine. And often DOD actions have deliberately low visibility—they are soon out of sight out of mind—and are neither appropriately acknowledged nor well understood. At the recent second Global Covid-19 Summit organized by the White House in collaboration with heads of state representing the G7 G20 African Union and Caribbean Community (CARICOM) there was no mention of DOD’s special assets and recent performance no DOD presence among participants and no consideration of DOD’s current and future contributions to the global response. At some level that omission is no surprise: the summit is first and foremost about the civilian response. At another it is a sign of an enduring problem. Multiple factors account for why the DOD role is so often obscured: DOD is typically called upon at short notice to play a temporary role addressing critical often embarrassing gaps indeed failures in the civilian sphere. DOD is itself hesitant and ambivalent: many within DOD do not regard its support of pandemic response as part of its core mission even though its special expertise in intentional or accidental biological events is well recognized. Medical and public health capabilities overwhelmed by a pandemic are fundamentally no different from other disasters for which militaries routinely prepare and respond both domestically and internationally when civilian capabilities are insufficient. Yet significant preparation and planning are regularly exercised for many likely scenarios such as wildfires tropical storms and earthquakes while the same is not true for biological events. Certain live sensitivities are always at play. DOD commitments cannot be open-ended otherwise they will compromise DOD’s core readiness and operational missions. The commitments cannot be seen either at home or abroad as militarizing and dominating the pandemic response. To answer these concerns it is critically important to clarify early what the likely required capabilities are and how they will be resourced. When that step has not been taken ahead of a sudden emergency hesitation can follow. These many important considerations notwithstanding DOD remaining in relative obscurity also carries a price. Often DOD’s capacities are allowed to wither after the emergency has faded particularly if DOD is not at the interagency table—before during and after the crisis—to contribute in a sustained way to strategic planning for future pandemics with adequate forward budgeting. If DOD’s special assets are not operationally integrated with other agencies well in advance into overall U.S. health security strategies both at home and abroad hesitation ambivalence and ad hoc decisionmaking will follow. This all contributes to high inefficiency and confusion impeding an effective DOD role. </source> [/INST] <claim>The aff is resource intensive</claim> <psg>Throughout the Covid-19 pandemic the Department of Defense (DOD) has made major contributions both domestically and internationally to civilian-led preparedness and response particularly in logistics and planning and numerous biomedical arenas including research direct clinical care and all aspects of public health including worldwide laboratories these contributions arise amid sudden emergency demands without adequate forward mission planning and budgeting and without clear backing DOD is typically called upon at short notice to play a temporary role addressing critical often embarrassing gaps DOD is itself hesitant and ambivalent Medical and public health capabilities overwhelmed by a pandemic are fundamentally no different from other disasters significant preparation and planning are regularly exercised for many likely scenarios such as wildfires tropical storms and earthquakes while the same is not true for biological events. DOD commitments cannot be open-ended otherwise they will compromise DOD’s core readiness and operational missions. DOD remaining in relative obscurity also carries a price. Often DOD’s capacities are allowed to wither after the emergency has faded particularly if DOD is not at the interagency table—before during and after the crisis—to contribute in a sustained way to strategic planning for future pandemics with adequate forward budgeting This all contributes to high inefficiency and confusion impeding an effective DOD role.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Over the past 10 years the global north has been increasingly bombarded by news of impending epidemics: SARS in 2003 avian flu in 2005 Ebola in 2013 and Zika in 2015. One thing that has helped to stoke the fear is that these are not simply viruses but zoonoses—infectious diseases that are transmitted between species or more specifically from nonhuman animals or birds to humans. Although zoonoses are clearly not unknown phenomena—an earlier example is HIV/ AIDS—transformations associated with the scope and speed of human mobility and with climate change have led these infections to spread more quickly and widely leading to a fear not simply of epidemics but of global pandemics. </source> [/INST] <claim>Approaching disease through military planning leads to militarized disease response and turns the case</claim> <psg>the global north has been increasingly bombarded by news of impending epidemics: SARS avian flu Ebol Zika One thing that has helped to stoke the fear is zoonoses spread more quickly and widely leading to a fear of global pandemics</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The globalization of economies has produced accelerated patterns of movements of capital goods services materials and labor simultaneously resulting in the accelerated production and circulation of anxieties constituted around these movements. Neoliberal organizing of health manifests itself in the development and deployment of surveillance management and coordination networks that see health primarily in the realm of threats posed by diseases dispersed through global networks networks of bioterror emerging infectious diseases and biowarfare (Salinsky 2002). The response of health systems therefore is formulated in the form of network structures of biodefense and homeland security performing functions of surveillance information gathering and information dissemination constituted around the economic logics of growth and efficiency. The protection of the economic opportunities of globalization becomes the function of public health systems formulated in the narrative of geosecurity and implemented in the form of programs controlled by the police-military complex within structures of biodefense biosecurity and geosecurity. With this emphasis on security the mandate for health depicts continuity with colonial implementations of public health administration to manage erstwhile colonies increasingly being set within the military metaphor of health turning health into a geosecurity threat for the new configurations of empire and therefore deploying military interventions to address health issues. Consider the following depiction in a report issued by the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) that offers a picture of the global health threats posed by infectious diseases: New and reemerging infectious diseases will pose a rising global health threat and will complicate U.S. and global security over the next twenty years. These diseases will endanger U.S. citizens at home and abroad threaten U.S. armed forces deployed overseas and exacerbate social and political instability in key countries and regions in which the United States has significant interests. (Gordon 2000) [END PAGE 167] The protection of human health is seen as a function of the military tied to the goals of defending global capitalism against the threats to health and reflecting the colonial undertones of health containment measures deployed by the instruments of empire. In this instance of the report published by the NIC knowledge about health is constituted in the realm of intelligence gathering to protect the interests of national security of the United States. Framed as threats to the health of citizens at home and abroad and to the health of the armed forces deployed overseas infectious diseases are seen as contributors to social and political instability in key strategic regions of significant value to the United States. International relations are understood in the language of security casting interpenetrating networks as targets of surveillance and management. The portrayal of infectious diseases as threats to geosecurity deploys valuable health resources into the hands of the military placing the power of disease management under military structures and framing the responses to disease in military interpretations. Moreover the juxtaposition of epidemic narratives amid narratives of war and bioterror heighten the concerns for geosecurity foregrounding and necessitating a variety of military response strategies (Aaltola 2012). The interpenetrating relationship between health and the military constitute one element of the consolidation of power in the hands of the global elite achieved through neoliberal transformations. The military emerges as a global organizational structure for the management of health simultaneously justifying the deployment of resources to the military and the deployment of military strategies to address health issues. This emphasis on the military framed within the realm of protecting geostrategic interests constructs health in the realm of threats simultaneously erasing questions of fundamental human rights to health. Similarly in the president's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief a significant proportion of resources are housed in the military in order to deploy military-to-military interventions within the broader umbrella of protecting the geostrategic interests of the United States. Consider for instance the workings of the U.S. Africa Command to address HIV/ AIDS prevention as a security threat in Africa. The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) is the result of an internal reorganization of the U.S. military command structure creating one administrative headquarters that answers to the Secretary of Defense and is responsible for U.S. military relations with 53 African countries. AFRICOM recognizes that HIV/AIDS has an enormous impact on economic and political stability across the continent and by degrading military medical readiness weakens the national security of individual countries. HIV/ AIDS programming will be a key component of AFRICOM's security cooperation and humanitarian assistance activities. (www.pepfar.gov/about/agencies/ cl 9397.htm) [END PAGE 168] Critical to the deployment of a militarized form of governance in addressing health is the consolidation of power within elite structures working through militarized systems of governance to control disease to protect the economic interests of the status quo. The military as an instrument of power and control functions within the narratives of security cooperation and humanitarian assistance activities to assert its power and control in global governance. Intelligence gathering emerges as an instrument for the generation of data to secure and protect zones of economic function. This gathering of targeted intelligence and the deployment of targeted interventions becomes particularly critical within the context of maintaining open zones of communication and economic exchange within the neoliberal structuring of economic relationships. Knowledge and technical interventions in this sense are constituted amid the paradoxical agenda of needing to protect boundaries and at the same time ensuring transnational spaces of movement of capital labor services materials and markets. In this chapter we closely interrogate the meanings that circulate around the militarization of health and attend to the communicative processes through which the militarization of health is achieved. The surveillance of spaces and the militarization of responses I argue are continuous with colonial logics of controlling spaces in distant locales of imperial governance and are discontinuous from the colonial forms of governance because of the paradoxes of networked flows in neoliberal governance. </source> [/INST] <claim>Securitizing biological risks ties health to the protection of global capitalism.</claim> <psg>globalization has produced accelerated movements of capital goods and labor resulting in accelerated circulation of anxieties constituted around these movements. Neoliberal organizing of health manifests itself in the surveillance management and coordination networks that see health primarily in the realm of threats posed by networks of bioterror emerging infectious diseases and biowarfare The response of health systems therefore is formulated in the form of network structures of biodefense and homeland security surveillance information gathering and dissemination constituted around the economic logics of growth and efficiency protection of globalization becomes the function of public health systems formulated in the narrative of geosecurity and implemented in the form of programs controlled by the police-military complex within structures of biosecurity With this emphasis on security the mandate for health depicts continuity with colonial public health administration to manage colonies turning health into a geosecurity threat for the new configurations of empire and deploying military interventions to address health issues The protection of human health is seen as a function of the military tied to the goals of defending global capitalism against the threats to health and reflecting the colonial undertones of health containment measures deployed by empire knowledge about health is constituted in the realm of intelligence gathering to protect the national security of the U S Framed as threats to health infectious diseases are seen as contributors to social and political instability in key strategic regions of value to the U S portrayal of infectious diseases as threats deploys health resources into the hands of the military placing the power of disease management under military structures and framing the responses to disease in military interpretations The military emerges as a global organizational structure for the management of health justifying the deployment of resources to the military and the deployment of military strategies to address health issues. This constructs health in the realm of threats erasing questions of fundamental human rights to health Critical to the deployment of militarized governance in addressing health is the consolidation of power within elite structures working through militarized systems to protect the economic interests of the status quo. The military functions within the narratives of security cooperation and humanitarian assistance activities to assert its power and control Intelligence gathering emerges as an instrument for the generation of data to secure zones of economic function. This gathering of intelligence and the deployment of interventions becomes critical within the context of maintaining open zones of communication and economic exchange within neoliberal economic relationships surveillance of spaces and the militarization of responses are continuous with colonial logics of controlling spaces in distant locales of imperial governance and are discontinuous from the colonial forms of governance because of the paradoxes of networked flows in neoliberal governance</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Royal Air Force Air Chief Marshall Sir Stuart Peach opened today's virtual meeting of the alliance's 30 chiefs of defense to discuss the response to COVID-19 and all the other aspects of security in which the military alliance is involved. Army Gen. Mark A. Milley the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is attending the virtual meeting from the Pentagon. Peach said the unprecedented virtual meeting demonstrates 'that despite the challenging times that we are all currently facing the core mission of NATO continues unchanged: to deliver credible and effective deterrence and defense.' Afghanistan Iraq Kosovo Baltic air policing and NATO's forward battlegroups are all on the table for the alliance military leaders. ... Our forces are ready vigilant and prepared to respond to any threat.' Royal Air Force Air Chief Marshall Sir Stuart Peach NATO is not a primary first responder to the pandemic but it is doing its part Peach said. 'Allies are standing together and acting together in solidarity ' he noted in his opening remarks. 'Allied national armed forces are supporting national civilian efforts and are playing a key role in slowing the pandemic.' Military forces from across the alliance have flown more than 100 missions to transport medical personnel supplies and treatment capabilities he said. Military forces have also facilitated the construction of field hospitals adding tens of thousands of treatment beds. 'So our alliance is helping to get the right support to the right place at the right time ' he said. 'Helping our nations our allies save lives. This is also a time when our resilience is being tested.' </source> [/INST] <claim>NATO response is coordinated now</claim> <psg>Royal Air Force Air Chief Peach opened today's virtual meeting of the alliance's 30 chiefs of defense to discuss the response to COVID-19 and other aspects of security in which the military alliance is involved. the unprecedented virtual meeting demonstrates 'that despite the challenging times that we are all currently facing the core mission of NATO continues unchanged: to deliver credible and effective deterrence and defense NATO is not a primary first responder to the pandemic but it is doing its part Allies are standing together and acting together in solidarity ' Allied national armed forces are supporting national civilian efforts and are playing a key role in slowing the pandemic.' Military forces from across the alliance have flown more than 100 missions to transport medical personnel supplies and treatment capabilities So our alliance is helping to get the right support to the right place at the right time</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> During the COVID pandemic the current role of MMCC/EMC has been to use lessons identified for its future work to support military medical collaboration and coordination across our participating nations NATO and the EU. Our Telehealth Workshop in May 2021 is an excellent example. Telehealth has been a game-changer during the COVID pandemic and the use of telehealth has increased in different areas of medical support. Telehealth provides significant means to measure the health of our soldiers and to improve the outcome of their medical treatment. COVID has been a trigger for transformation in telemedicine and telehealth. A follow-on Biosensor and Telehealth Workshop is planned in June 2022 We have just finalised an overview of COVID vaccination policies. The most notable finding is that most nations have not made COVID vaccination compulsory for members of the armed forces (as of Sep 2021). This may be hampering the success of vaccination programmes and reducing benefits for this population of risk. However the vaccines’ success in preventing COVID infection and their limited side effects may change the situation until a new variant of the virus appears. MMCC/EMC is increasing its work in civil-military cooperation for the evacuation of patients in large-scale emergencies and in crises including a higher number of infectious patients. We are working in close cooperation with the NATO Joint Healthcare Working Group and other participating nations on this issue. A workshop on this topic with participants of the responsible civilian and military stakeholders is planned in June 2022. The MMCC/EMC was able to gain initial experience in stockpiling concepts in April 2020 when it was asked by the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) of NATO to develop a medical stockpiling concept for the NATO COVID Trust Fund. An important part of the concept is a calculator that can be used to compute costs storage space and required personnel for each module. The NATO COVID Trust Fund has provided many donations based on this concept. Based on these experiences the MMCC/EMC has extended this medical stockpiling concept to the Military Modular Multipurpose Epidemic/Pandemic Stockpiling (M3-EPS) Concept which can be used by EU and NATO nations and medical stakeholders. As a surge capacity rapidly deployable and modular standard packages of medical materiel have been identified and defined for stockpiling. The seven modular standard packages such as support for intensive care units can be used to support both military and civilian medical facilities. For example the bilateral support that the Bundeswehr Medical Service provided to Portugal was based on the principles of M3-EPS and included an ICU capability to enhance a civilian hospital. The French medical services use a similar approach. We hope to bring these results into NATO standardisation work and into national developments. We also aim to increase our preparedness with regard to the stockpiling of CBRN chemical and radiation antidotes. If the MMCC/EMC has the time and resources it will develop technical guidelines - based on existing NATO STANAGS - for deployed outbreak investigation team which can be used for both infectious diseases and CBRN agents. We would like to combine deployable medical CBRN capabilities and public health capabilities. Civil-military collaboration regarding reachback laboratories with their sophisticated diagnostic capabilities has to be included in this concept. </source> [/INST] <claim>Disease telemedicine framework is being developed now</claim> <psg>During the COVID pandemic the current role of MMCC/EMC has been to use lessons identified for its future work to support military medical collaboration and coordination across our participating nations NATO and the EU. . Telehealth has been a game-changer during the COVID pandemic and the use of telehealth has increased in different areas of medical support Telehealth provides significant means to measure the health of our soldiers and to improve the outcome of their medical treatment. COVID has been a trigger for transformation in telemedicine and telehealth. We have just finalised an overview of COVID vaccination policies MMCC/EMC is increasing its work in civil-military cooperation for the evacuation of patients in large-scale emergencies and in crises including a higher number of infectious patients. We are working in close cooperation with the NATO Joint Healthcare Working Group and other participating nations . A workshop on this topic with participants of the responsible civilian and military stakeholders is planned in June 2022. The MMCC/EMC was able to gain initial experience in stockpiling concepts in April 2020 when it was asked by the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) to develop a medical stockpiling concept for the NATO COVID Trust Fund. The NATO COVID Trust Fund has provided many donations based on this concept. the MMCC/EMC has extended this medical stockpiling concept to the Military Modular Multipurpose Epidemic/Pandemic Stockpiling (M3-EPS) Concept . As a surge capacity rapidly deployable and modular standard packages of medical materiel have been identified and defined for stockpiling. We hope to bring these results into NATO standardisation work and into national developments. We also aim to increase our preparedness with regard to the stockpiling of CBRN chemical and radiation antidotes. If the MMCC/EMC has the time and resources it will develop technical guidelines - based on existing NATO STANAGS - for deployed outbreak investigation team which can be used for both infectious diseases and CBRN agents. Civil-military collaboration regarding reachback laboratories with their sophisticated diagnostic capabilities has to be included in this concept.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Social distancing and stay-at-home orders in the United States have slowed the infection rate of SARS-CoV-2 the pathogen that causes COVID-19. This has halted the immediate threat to the U.S. healthcare system but consensus on a long-term plan or solution to the crisis remains unclear. As the reality settles in that there are no quick fixes and that therapies and vaccines will take several months if not years to invent validate and mass produce this is a good time to consider another question: How can data science and technology help us endure the pandemic while we develop therapies and vaccines? Before policymakers reopen their economies they must be sure that the resulting new COVID-19 cases will not force local healthcare systems to resort to crisis standards of care. Doing so requires not just prevention and suppression of the virus but ongoing measurement of virus activity assessment of the efficacy of suppression measures and forecasting of near-term demand on local health systems. This demand is highly variable given community demographics the prevalence of pre-existing conditions and population density and socioeconomics. Data science can already provide ongoing accurate estimates of health system demand which is a requirement in almost all reopening plans. We need to go beyond that to a dynamic approach of data collection analysis and forecasting to inform policy decisions in real time and iteratively optimize public health recommendations for re-opening. While most reopening plans propose extensive testing contact tracing and monitoring of population mobility almost none consider setting up such a dynamic feedback loop. Having such feedback could determine what level of virus activity can be tolerated in an area given regional health system capacity and adjust population distancing accordingly. We propose that by using existing technology and some nifty data science it is possible to set up that feedback loop which would maintain healthcare demand under the threshold of what is available in a region. Just as the maker community stepped up to cover for the failures of the government to provide adequate protective gear to health workers this is an opportunity for the data and tech community to partner with healthcare experts and provide a measure of public health planning that governments are unable to do. Therefore the question we invite the data science community to focus on is: How can data science help forecast regional health system resource needs given measurements of virus activity and suppression measures such as population distancing? For the data science effort to work first and foremost we need to fix delays in data collection and access introduced by existing reporting processes. Currently most departments of public health are collecting and reporting metrics that are not helpful and are reporting them with 48 hour delays and often with errors. Although there are examples of regional excellence in such reporting by and large the recommendations from the health IT community around accurate and fast public health reporting remain ignored. For instance consider the number of COVID-19 hospitalizations which is the best indicator of the disease’s burden on the regional health system. At the present time due to time lags in confirming and reporting cases and a failure to distinguish between current and cumulative hospitalizations even regions that report hospitalization data often provide only a blurry picture of the burden on the regional health system. Regions should ideally report both suspected and confirmed hospital cases and indicate the date of admission in addition to the date of report or confirmation. Even with perfect reporting there are fundamental delays in what such data can tell us. For example new admissions to a hospital today reflect virus activity as of 9 to 13 days ago (which depends in turn on social distancing interventions from up to 17 days prior). Not factoring in such considerations have led to significant over-estimation of hospitalization needs nationwide. We therefore need to measure virus activity via proxy measures that are indicative early in the lifecycle of the virus. We must benchmark these against the number of new and total COVID-19 hospitalizations as well as ideally the number of new infections assuming it is accurately measured through large scale testing. Available proxy measures include test positivity rates in health systems case counts deaths and perhaps seropositivity rates. Ongoing symptom tracking via smartphone apps daily web or phone surveys or cough sounds can identify potential hotspots where virus transmission rates are high. Contact tracing which currently requires significant human effort can also help tracking of potential cases if it can be scaled using technology under development by major American tech companies. With reliable tracking and benchmarking in place we can calculate infection prevalence as well as daily growth and transmission rates which is essential for determining if policies are working. This is a problem not only of data collection but also data analysis. Issues of sensitivity daily variability time lags and confounding need to be studied before such data can be used reliably. For instance symptom tracking is nonspecific and may have difficulty tracking virus activity at low prevalence. Other emerging data sources such as wastewater and smart thermometer data hold similar promise but will have to grapple with these same issues. We then need to estimate the regional effects of policy interventions such as shelter-in-place orders (via mobility reduction) and contact tracing (via reductions in new cases) first as simple forecasts and eventually maturing to what-if analyses. Several efforts have quantified the impact of mobility on virus transmission and some have suggested “safe” forms of mobility. While there are many potential ways to quantify population mobility — such as via traffic patterns internet bandwidth usage by address and location of credit card swipes — the most scalable mechanism to measure mobility appears to be via tracking of smartphones. Groups such as the COVID-19 Mobility Data Network provide such data daily in anonymized aggregated reports. Once the ability to project from mobility to transmission to health system burden is constructed we can “close the loop” by predicting how much mobility we can afford given measured virus activity and anticipated health system resources in the next two weeks. Researchers have already attempted to calculate “tolerable transmission” in the form of maximum infection prevalence in a given geography that would not overload health systems. Coupling such tolerable transmission estimates with daily assessments of a valid sample of the population (via testing via daily surveys via electronic health record-based surveillance) would allow monitoring of changes in transmission which can alert us to the need to intervene such as by reducing mobility. As new measures such as contact tracing cut transmission rates these same monitoring systems can tell us that it is safe to increase mobility further. Continuously analyzing current mobility as well as virus activity and projected health system capacity can allow us to set up “keep the distance” alerts that trade off tolerable transmission against allowed mobility. Doing so will allow us to intelligently balance public health and economic needs in real time. Concretely then the crucial “data science” task is to learn the counterfactual function linking last week’s population mobility and today’s transmission rates to project hospital demand two weeks later. Imagine taking past measurements of mobility around April 10 in a region (such as the Santa Clara County’s report from COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports) the April 20 virus transmission rate estimate for the region (such as from http://rt.live) and the April 25 burden on the health system (such as from the Santa Clara County Hospitalization dashboard) to learn a function that uses today’s mobility and transmission rates to anticipate needed hospital resources two weeks later. It is unclear how many days of data of each proxy measurement we need to reliably learn such a function what mathematical form this function might take and how we do this correctly with the observational data on hand and avoid the trap of mere function-fitting. However this is the data science problem that needs to be tackled as a priority. Adopting such technology and data science to keep anticipated healthcare needs under the threshold of availability in a region requires multiple privacy trade-offs which will require thoughtful legislation so that the solutions invented for enduring the current pandemic do not lead to loss of privacy in perpetuity. However given the immense economic as well as hidden medical toll of the shutdown we urgently need to construct an early warning system that tells us to enhance suppression measures if the next COVID-19 outbreak peak might overwhelm our regional healthcare system. It is imperative that we focus our attention on using data science to anticipate and manage regional health system resource needs based on local measurements of virus activity and effects of population distancing. </source> [/INST] <claim>Data collaboration fails – effective surveillance is too hard to achieve</claim> <psg>data science and technology help us endure the pandemic while we develop therapies and vaccines Before policymakers reopen their economies they must be sure that new COVID-19 cases will not force local healthcare systems to resort to crisis Doing so requires not just prevention and suppression but ongoing measurement of virus activity assessment of the efficacy of suppression measures and forecasting of near-term demand on local health systems. Data science can already provide ongoing accurate estimates of health system demand which is a requirement in almost all reopening plans. We need to go to a dynamic approach of data collection analysis and forecasting to inform policy decisions in real time and optimize public health recommendations by using existing technology and some nifty data science it is possible to maintain healthcare demand under the threshold of what is available this is an opportunity for the data and tech community to partner with healthcare experts and provide a measure of public health planning that governments are unable to do. we need to fix delays in data collection and access introduced by existing reporting processes. Although there are examples of regional excellence in such reporting by and large the recommendations from the health IT community around accurate and fast public health reporting remain ignored. due to time lags in confirming and reporting cases and a failure to distinguish between current and cumulative hospitalizations even regions that report hospitalization data often provide only a blurry picture of the burden on the regional health system Even with perfect reporting there are fundamental delays in what such data can tell us. For example new admissions to a hospital today reflect virus activity as of 9 to 13 days ago Available proxy measures include test positivity rates in health systems case counts deaths and perhaps seropositivity rates. Ongoing symptom tracking via smartphone apps daily web or phone surveys can identify potential hotspots where virus transmission rates are high With reliable tracking and benchmarking in place we can calculate infection prevalence as well as daily growth and transmission rates This is a problem not only of data collection but also data analysis. Issues of sensitivity daily variability time lags and confounding need to be studied before such data can be used reliably. For instance symptom tracking is nonspecific and may have difficulty tracking virus activity at low prevalence Other emerging data sources such as wastewater and smart thermometer data hold similar promise Once the ability to project from mobility to transmission to health system burden is constructed we can “close the loop” by predicting how much mobility we can afford given measured virus activity and anticipated health system resources then the crucial “data science” task is to learn the counterfactual function linking last week’s population mobility and today’s transmission rates to project hospital demand two weeks later. this is the data science problem that needs to be tackled as a priority. we urgently need to construct an early warning system that tells us to enhance suppression measures if the next COVID-19 outbreak peak might overwhelm our regional healthcare system. It is imperative that we focus our attention on using data science to anticipate and manage regional health system resource needs based on local measurements of virus activity and effects of population distancing.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The US tried and failed to intercept a missile on Wednesday and also announced it would spend another $6.5 billion on missile defense interceptors. The US has spent more than $40 billion on missile defense projects over the last 15 years and has no real credible capability to show for it. Ballistic missile defense plays into the complicated game of nuclear deterrence which some say provides theoretical protection but nobody can prove that. The US public learned on Wednesday that the US Navy tried and failed for the second time in a year to intercept a missile with an SM-III missile from the defense contractor Raytheon. On the same day the Pentagon announced it would spend another $6.5 billion on 20 more missile interceptors for the ground-based midcourse defense system (GMD) which is meant to protect the US homeland from missile attacks from North Korea or Russia. But the GMD has a bad track record. It recently had a successful test that may have calmed the fears of some in the US amid nuclear tensions with North Korea but a recent paper on the test shows it was unrealistically generous. Laura Grego and David Wright leading experts in the field of ballistic missiles writing for the Union of Concerned Scientists found that the so-called intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) the GMD knocked down was flown on a favorable trajectory slower than the real thing and without any of the tricks or savvy North Korea might use in an actual attack. The paper concludes the US has no reliable ballistic missile defense capability for the homeland. That capability or lack thereof comes after the US has spent more than $40 billion over the last decade in a half on ballistic missile defense. During that time Boeing Raytehon and Lockheed Martin key players in the BMD scene have all posted record profits — and they continue to get contracts with the Pentagon. To be clear the US can defend against some shorter-range missiles. Aegis-equipped ballistic missile destroyers at sea have a good track record of defending themselves but they're not meant to go after ICBMs. Patriot missiles have saved some lives from short-range missile attacks on the battlefield though that has been historically over-hyped or just lied about. </source> [/INST] <claim>Even if funding goes into BMD recent testing proves they are ineffective </claim> <psg>US has spent more than $40 billion on missile defense projects over the last 15 years and has no real credible capability to show for it. Ballistic missile defense plays into the complicated game of nuclear deterrence which some say provides theoretical protection but nobody can prove that. US Navy tried and failed for the second time in a year to intercept a missile with an SM-III missile from the defense announced it would spend another $6.5 billion on 20 more missile interceptors for the ground-based midcourse defense system GMD has a bad track record but a recent paper on the test shows it was unrealistically generous experts in the field of ballistic missiles found that the so-called intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) the GMD knocked down was flown on a favorable trajectory slower than the real thing and without any of the tricks or savvy North Korea might use in an actual attack the US has no reliable ballistic missile defense capability for the homeland US has spent more than $40 billion over the last decade in a half on ballistic missile defense the US can defend against some shorter-range missiles. Aegis-equipped ballistic missile destroyers at sea have a good track record of defending themselves but they're not meant to go after ICBMs</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Where dissuasion is concerned many factors inform a country’s decision making about whether to develop ICBM technology and at what cost. But a strategic missile defense system would have to be very effective to alter an adversary’s cost-to-benefit calculation. A marginally effective missile defense system or a system of unknown effectiveness may well create an incentive to build more or more sophisticated missiles than states would otherwise build. No evidence suggests that building or improving the GMD system has had or will have any appreciable effect on potential adversaries’ decisions to develop long-range missiles. The dramatic increase in tempo in North Korea’s missile testing program happened after the GMD’s nominal deployment and development. Similarly Iran has continued to develop its long-range missile technology launching four small satellites into orbit between 2009 and 2015 and developing its more capable Simorgh booster. What about deterrence? The primary way a missile defense system helps deter an attack is by creating uncertainty in the adversary’s mind about whether that attack would succeed in achieving its goals. Under Cold War thinking if a peer adversary such as the Soviet Union (or Russia) contemplated a carefully planned strike against hardened US military targets and if effective missile defenses existed the adversary might be uncertain how much of the US retaliatory force would remain intact after the attack. According to this logic missile defense would help deter an adversary’s nuclear first strike. The same logic does not apply to an attack that a country such as North Korea Iran or even China might consider. These countries’ missile arsenals are too small and inaccurate to mount an effective counterforce strike on hardened US military targets. they would necessarily target cities and civilian infrastructure. Central in deterring North Korea from launching nuclear weapons against the United States is the certainty of a devastating US response. The presence or absence of US missile defense has no meaningful effect on the deterrence already afforded by US offensive nuclear and conventional forces. That brings the discussion to defense against a missile attack. While North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests of the last few years indicate that Pyongyang is within reach of the ability to build a nuclear-armed missile that can reach the United States these missiles are and will remain relatively inaccurate – whether or not North Korea ceases its test program. North Korean missiles cannot be used to credibly threaten hardened targets such as US nuclear command and control or missile silos and would instead be targeted on larger less protected sites such as cities. For this reason the GMD system would need to be very effective if it were to influence US decision making as even one nuclear-armed missile could devastate a city. Reliably defending against an all-out assault is not feasible. While President Trump stated on television17 last October that “We have missiles that can knock out a missile in the air 97 percent of the time ” testing data show there is no basis for expecting interceptors to work more than 40 to 50 percent of the time even under the easiest and most generous conditions.18 Using multiple interceptors against each target can improve these odds but this approach does not fundamentally change the situation. the chance of a nuclear weapon getting through would still be dangerously high. Consider an attack with five missiles.19 Using four interceptors against each target each with a kill probability of 50 percent the odds that one warhead would get through are 28 percent – or higher if the failure modes are not independent of each other (for example if the guidance systems of all the interceptors are faulty in the same way). The odds may yet be worse if the adversary uses numerous credible decoys that the GMD system cannot distinguish from legitimate targets and so must engage. Thus while the GMD system may provide some defense against the simplest threats it cannot provide the type of robust defense necessary to substantially change decision making calculus.20 </source> [/INST] <claim>An improvement in missile defense still won’t be effective- chances of nuclear weapons hitting are high and outweigh </claim> <psg>But a strategic missile defense system would have to be very effective to alter an adversary’s cost-to-benefit calculation. No evidence suggests that building or improving the GMD system has had or will have any appreciable effect on potential adversaries’ decisions to develop long-range missiles. increase in tempo in North Korea’s missile testing program happened after the GMD’s nominal deployment and development The primary way a missile defense system helps deter an attack is by creating uncertainty in the adversary’s mind about whether that attack would succeed in achieving its goals if a peer adversary such as the Soviet Union or Russia) contemplated a carefully planned strike against hardened US military targets and if effective missile defenses existed the adversary might be uncertain how much of the US retaliatory force would remain intact after the attack. According to this logic missile defense would help deter an adversary’s nuclear first strike. The same logic does not apply to an attack that a country such as North Korea Iran or even China might consider inaccurate to mount an effective counterforce strike on hardened US military targets. they would necessarily target cities and civilian infrastructure. The presence or absence of US missile defense has no meaningful effect on the deterrence already afforded by US offensive nuclear and conventional forces. . North Korean missiles cannot be used to credibly threaten hardened targets such as US nuclear command and control or missile silos and would instead be targeted on larger less protected sites such as cities. the GMD system would need to be very effective if it were to influence US decision making as even one nuclear-armed missile could devastate a city. Reliably defending against an all-out assault is not feasible but this approach does not fundamentally change the situation. the chance of a nuclear weapon getting through would still be dangerously high</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> This somewhat sanguine conclusion is far from certain however. It hinges in part on a willingness in Washington to accept many thousands of American battlefield dead and at least some risk of nuclear escalation. Even though U.S. nuclear forces far exceed those of the PLA China might conclude that its disproportionate interests in the Taiwan issue warranted nuclear brinkmanship especially if China had already possibly lost thousands of its own people in conventional combat which would heighten the stakes as well as the reputational importance of the outcome of the conflict. These concerns could be amplified if the United States intentionally or not began to strike the nuclear assets of the PLA in the course of conventional fighting near Taiwan. If that happened China might face a “use them or lose them” dilemma.101 Nuclear attack against a carrier or a high-altitude nuclear airburst over a base like Kadena (designed to destroy people and equipment immediately below without generating lots of fallout) might seem particularly attractive options to Beijing. </source> [/INST] <claim>Yes nuc retal !</claim> <psg>China might conclude that its disproportionate interests in Taiwan warranted nuclear brinkmanship especially if China had already lost thousands concerns could be amplified if U S began to strike the nuclear assets of the PLA If that happened China might face a “use them or lose them” dilemma Nuclear attack might seem particularly attractive options to Beijing.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Finally inadvertent escalation may occur when conventional attacks put the adversary’s nuclear force at risk. Under these conditions the target state might reasonably worry that the attack is only the first phase of a larger war. There may be no way to offer credible reassurances that it is not. Fearing the destruction or incapacitation of its nuclear deterrent the target state might face a “use it or lose it” dilemma. Inadvertent escalation is especially likely if key command and control nodes are vulnerable or if conventional and nuclear target sets are indistinguishable. The danger also increases if military organizations indulge organizational preferences for offensive action. This encourages planners to err on the side of attacking all available targets. While it might sense to allow the adversary to retain some capabilities in order to reduce the incentives for escalation planners may bridle at the thought of consciously allowing the enemy to retain the capacity for attack.14 </source> [/INST] <claim>First strike causes retal – “use it or lose it” dilemma and planners favor offensive action</claim> <psg>inadvertent escalation may occur when conventional attacks put the adversary’s nuclear force at risk target state might reasonably worry that the attack is only the first phase of a larger war no way to offer credible reassurances that it is not. Fearing the destruction or incapacitation of its nuclear deterrent the target state might face a “use it or lose it” dilemma Inadvertent escalation is especially likely if key command and control nodes are vulnerable or if conventional and nuclear target sets are indistinguishable danger also increases if military organizations indulge organizational preferences for offensive action planners to err on the side of attacking all available targets planners may bridle at the thought of consciously allowing the enemy to retain the capacity for attack</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The first is psychological. Cognitive biases may cause leaders to misperceive rival intentions mistaking signals of restraint for signs of danger. Prewar expectations strongly influence how individuals interpret new information and they will ignore or reframe dissonant information so it fits into their existing beliefs. Misperceptions intensify after the shooting starts when information is ambiguous and incomplete. Carl von Clausewitz dwelt on the problem in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars noting that intelligence reports were often contradictory and unreliable “in the thick of fighting.” Despite advances in intelligence and communications the fog of war remains an enduring problem. Organized violence is an iterative process and each side has incentives to hide its actions and deceive its adversary. Violence also unleashes intense emotions that obscure the material effects of battle. Commanders may not understand whether they are winning or losing and in lieu of reliable intelligence they are likely to let passion overtake good judgment. “In short ” Clausewitz concluded “most intelligence is false and the effect of fear is to multiply lies and inaccuracies.” 9 </source> [/INST] <claim>Laundry list of psychological factors.</claim> <psg>Cognitive biases may cause leaders to misperceive rival intentions mistaking signals of restraint for signs of danger. Prewar expectations strongly influence how individuals interpret new information and they will ignore or reframe dissonant information so it fits into their existing beliefs. Misperceptions intensify after the shooting starts when information is ambiguous and incomplete. Despite advances in intelligence and communications the fog of war remains an enduring problem each side has incentives to hide its actions and deceive its adversary Violence also unleashes intense emotions that obscure the material effects of battle. Commanders may not understand whether they are winning or losing and in lieu of reliable intelligence they are likely to let passion overtake good judgment most intelligence is false and the effect of fear is to multiply lies and inaccuracies</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> In its recent annual threat assessment the U.S. intelligence community described how China is pursuing “the most rapid expansion and platform diversification of its nuclear arsenal in its history” and is intending to “at least double the size of its nuclear stockpile during the next decade.” Although deeply concerning this description should be put in context. The U.S. Department of Defense estimates China’s deployed nuclear forces to number in the low 200s. Even if doubled this is substantially lower than the approximately 1 500 deployed strategic nuclear forces the United States maintains on alert daily under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Despite the rising numbers China seems unlikely to quantitatively outpace U.S. nuclear forces in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless China’s capabilities represent a substantial threat that must not be ignored. Quantitative comparisons of nuclear arsenals are a relatively crude manner of understanding nuclear risks and in the case of the U.S.-Chinese relationship wholly insufficient. More than ever U.S. policymakers need to understand Chinese nuclear strategy. In the U.S.-Chinese context policymakers should be more focused on how conventional weapons and related strategies could impact the nuclear calculus between the two countries. Chinese Nuclear Strategy Unlike Russia and the United States China has found nuclear weapons to be of rather limited utility in war-fighting. It built what it describes as a “lean and effective” nuclear deterrent with the intentions of deterring a nuclear attack and preventing nuclear coercion.1 Strategists in Beijing have long thought that the destructive force of nuclear weapons limits their utility while conventional forces are more flexible and usable in conflict. Conventional forces are thought to be where wars are won or lost.2 In that sense China’s nuclear forces are intended to check U.S. nuclear dominance while winning conventional conflicts at lower levels of escalation. To make that happen China is seeking to build a nuclear force capable of surviving a nuclear first strike and retaliating with an unacceptable level of damage. Experts have perhaps best described China’s nuclear strategy as one of “assured retaliation.”3 Instead of seeking parity with other nuclear states and being able to engage in counterforce campaigns China finds it sufficient to maintain a more modest secure and survivable force. If China can sufficiently absorb a first strike and retaliate even with only a few warheads Beijing believes an adversary is unlikely to decide that the risk of attacking China is worth the benefit. Since China’s first nuclear test in 1964 it has consistently maintained a public declaratory no-first-use policy adhering to what it describes as a “self-defensive nuclear strategy” that would anticipate using nuclear weapons only as a “counterattack in self-defense.”4 Western analysts have rightfully pointed out that a no-first-use pledge may not be entirely credible on its own. Although the pledge may be sincerely held during a crisis escalation could be unpredictable. Additionally a small number of Chinese analysts have suggested that what China defines as a counterattack may be ambiguous under certain limited conditions such as conventional attacks seeking to neutralize China’s nuclear forces.5 Despite Western doubts the fact remains that Chinese strategists believe that the pledge holds true. An unambiguous no-first-use stance remains the official stance of the Chinese government and China’s nuclear strategy is built around this concept. Authoritative texts on Chinese military thinking have described three major missions for Chinese nuclear forces. In peacetime they seek to deter enemies from launching a nuclear war with China. In wartime they constrain the scope of war preventing a conventional conflict from escalating to a nuclear exchange. If war does escalate to nuclear conflict they serve to conduct nuclear counterattacks.6 The texts consistently describe only one envisioned use of nuclear weapons the nuclear counterattack operation in response to a nuclear strike.7 Operational practices have reinforced this. Beijing maintains a highly centralized nuclear warhead storage and handling system with warheads typically thought to be stored unmated from their delivery vehicles rather than loaded and ready for launch.8 Further training for nuclear brigades reflects the practice of counterattacking under nuclear conditions. Yet there are indications of evolution. Recent U.S. government reports have suggested that some People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) brigades may spend time on higher alert and may seek to shift to a launch-on-warning posture in the future in order to increase survivability under nuclear attack. China has been developing a space-based early-warning system with assistance from Russia that could support this.9 Nuclear Force Projections As the U.S. annual threat assessment noted there are signs of recent substantial changes in Chinese nuclear forces. The most important changes have been primarily qualitative but notable quantitative changes are also occurring. These are understandably alarming to U.S. policymakers. Although the size of Chinese nuclear forces may still be dwarfed by the U.S. arsenal its growth represents a substantial complication for the United States. Further although the United States and Russia are modernizing their arsenals they have been reducing their stockpiles over the past few decades slowly but significantly. China’s nuclear expansion represents a concerning shift away from its obligations under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to reduce its arsenal and that is likely to impact U.S. and Russian decision-making. Yet understanding these changes in the context of China’s nuclear strategy is important. Instead of trying to reach parity with or exceed the U.S. nuclear arsenal China seems intent on ensuring that it has an assured retaliatory capability following U.S. strikes. Given U.S. nuclear and technological superiority China likely has never had a sufficiently survivable nuclear deterrent against the United States a goal that was more aspirational than anything else. Revolutions in intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance technologies coupled with advances in conventional precision weapons have long rendered China’s nuclear forces vulnerable. The U.S. ballistic missile defense program threatens to intercept any surviving retaliatory force further jeopardizing China’s retaliatory capability. For the first time in history the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) seems to be moving toward a survivable nuclear force capable of executing a second strike. Research suggests that Chinese nuclear expansions and modernization are oriented toward creation of a more mobile and redundant force that can survive U.S. counterforce capabilities including conventional systems such as the Conventional Prompt Global Strike system and its missiles being able to penetrate U.S. missile defense systems.10 Consequently although China’s nuclear force size will expand it does not appear likely to expand to the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal in the near future. There is understandable doubt about the claim of China doubling its nuclear arsenal but it does not appear to be out of the question. China is fielding an increasing number of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle weapons such as the DF-5B deployed in 2015 and the recently deployed DF-5C and DF-41 that improve the ability of China’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) arsenal to penetrate the U.S. missile defense system.11 Defense Department estimates do not appear to include the DF-41 which is just starting to be deployed. Installing multiple warheads on these weapons will quickly expand the number of nuclear weapons in China’s arsenal. Further PLARF brigades have been increasing at an unprecedented rate. The number of PLARF brigades reportedly increased from 29 to 40 between 2017 and 2020 and brigades continue to be added as new missile types are fielded.12 China’s shift to a nuclear triad will further increase the number of its nuclear warheads as these new systems are equipped. China is creating a more survivable nuclear submarine force expanding the number of Type 094 ballistic missile submarines and developing the quieter Type 096 submarine with the JL-3 sea-launched ballistic missile as a complement. The PLA Air Force is also adopting a nuclear mission by developing a new air-launched ballistic missile that may be nuclear capable as well as the nuclear-capable H-20 strategic bomber.13 Significantly not all of China’s nuclear weapons are intercontinental forces capable of striking targets located in the continental United States. China has invested in nuclear weapons that specifically threaten the immediate region. Its new air capabilities along with recently deployed midrange and intermediate-range ballistic missiles such as the DF-21E and the DF-26 hold regional adversaries and U.S. overseas bases at risk. China also recently deployed a new hypersonic glide vehicle the DF-17 that may be nuclear capable. Importantly although China’s nuclear expansion may be oriented toward a strategy of assured retaliation that does not prevent Beijing from orienting its expanding nuclear capabilities toward a more threatening posture in the future. As China’s capabilities expand its operational doctrine may well follow suit. </source> [/INST] <claim>The US has fundamentally misunderstood Chinese nuclear strategy – they have centered resources on establishing a survivable nuclear arsenal rather than quantitative increases – and they’ve succeeded</claim> <psg>In its recent annual threat assessment the U.S. intelligence community described how China is pursuing “the most rapid expansion and platform diversification of its nuclear arsenal in its history” and is intending to “at least double the size of its nuclear stockpile during the next decade.” Although deeply concerning this description should be put in context. Nevertheless China’s capabilities represent a substantial threat that must not be ignored. Quantitative comparisons of nuclear arsenals are a relatively crude manner of understanding nuclear risks and in the case of the U.S.-Chinese relationship wholly insufficient. More than ever U.S. policymakers need to understand Chinese nuclear strategy. In the U.S.-Chinese context policymakers should be more focused on how conventional weapons and related strategies could impact the nuclear calculus between the two countries. Unlike Russia and the United States China has found nuclear weapons to be of rather limited utility in war-fighting. It built what it describes as a “lean and effective” nuclear deterrent with the intentions of deterring a nuclear attack and preventing nuclear coercion.1 Strategists in Beijing have long thought that the destructive force of nuclear weapons limits their utility while conventional forces are more flexible and usable in conflict. Conventional forces are thought to be where wars are won or lost.2 In that sense China’s nuclear forces are intended to check U.S. nuclear dominance while winning conventional conflicts at lower levels of escalation. To make that happen China is seeking to build a nuclear force capable of surviving a nuclear first strike and retaliating with an unacceptable level of damage. Experts have perhaps best described China’s nuclear strategy as one of “assured retaliation.”3 Instead of seeking parity with other nuclear states and being able to engage in counterforce campaigns China finds it sufficient to maintain a more modest secure and survivable force. If China can sufficiently absorb a first strike and retaliate even with only a few warheads Beijing believes an adversary is unlikely to decide that the risk of attacking China is worth the benefit. Recent U.S. government reports have suggested that some People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) brigades may spend time on higher alert and may seek to shift to a launch-on-warning posture in the future in order to increase survivability under nuclear attack. China has been developing a space-based early-warning system with assistance from Russia that could support this.9 Yet understanding these changes in the context of China’s nuclear strategy is important. Instead of trying to reach parity with or exceed the U.S. nuclear arsenal China seems intent on ensuring that it has an assured retaliatory capability following U.S. strikes. Given U.S. nuclear and technological superiority China likely has never had a sufficiently survivable nuclear deterrent against the United States a goal that was more aspirational than anything else. Revolutions in intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance technologies coupled with advances in conventional precision weapons have long rendered China’s nuclear forces vulnerable. The U.S. ballistic missile defense program threatens to intercept any surviving retaliatory force further jeopardizing China’s retaliatory capability. For the first time in history the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) seems to be moving toward a survivable nuclear force capable of executing a second strike Chinese nuclear expansions and modernization are oriented toward creation of a more mobile and redundant force that can survive U.S. counterforce capabilities including conventional systems such as the Conventional Prompt Global Strike system and its missiles being able to penetrate U.S. missile defense systems.10 Consequently although China’s nuclear force size will expand it does not appear likely to expand to the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal in the near future. China’s shift to a nuclear triad will further increase the number of its nuclear warheads as these new systems are equipped. China is creating a more survivable nuclear submarine force expanding the number of Type 094 ballistic missile submarines and developing the quieter Type 096 submarine with the JL-3 sea-launched ballistic missile as a complement. The PLA Air Force is also adopting a nuclear mission by developing a new air-launched ballistic missile that may be nuclear capable as well as the nuclear-capable H-20 strategic bomber.13</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Abstract: A counterforce attack intends to disable an opponent’s nuclear arsenal to limit potential damage from that adversary. We postulate a future when harden- ing and deeply burying fixed sites transition to mobile strategic systems and improved defences make execut- ing a counterforce strategy against an adversary’s nuclear forces extremely difficult. Additionally our postulated future has multiple nations possessing nuclear weapons. Consequently each country needs to consider multi- ple actors when addressing the question of how to deter a potential adversary’s nuclear attack. We examine six nuclear targeting alternatives and consider how to deter them. These strategies include nuclear demonstration conventional military targets and attacks consisting of communications/electronics economic infrastructure and population centers that a nation might consider strik- ing with nuclear weapons. Since these alternative strikes require only a few nuclear weapons executing one of them would not significantly shift the balance of nuclear forces. The attacking country’s remaining nuclear forces may inhibit the attacked country or its allies from respond- ing. How can nations deter these limited nuclear attacks? Potentially threatening economic counter-strikes seems to be the best alternative. How might escalation be con- trolled in the event of a limited attack? Other instruments of power such as political or economic might be employed to bolster deterrence against these types of nuclear strikes. 1 Introduction Nuclear deterrence is based on the threat of retaliation if attacked (Lieber and Press 2017). Mazarr (1991) states ‘one of the crucial aspects of nuclear deterrence is a strategy for targeting a retaliation to achieve the greatest deterrent effect.’ Gray (2007) concludes ‘there has to be a nuclear strategy’ indicating the intended response to a nuclear strike to deter an adversary. The goal of counterforce attacks is to disarm the adversary’s nuclear forces. The United States and the Soviet Union transitioned from targeting cities to a coun- terforce strategy during the Cold War as weapon delivery accuracy improved and weapon yields increased. Argu- ments for a counterforce strategy include limiting nuclear retaliation by destroying an adversary’s offensive nuclear capabilities. Ewers (2016) contends ‘The United States should maintain a counterforce targeting strategy to hold the nuclear forces at risk and provide restraint from esca- lation with the peers and near-peers.’ Additionally attack- ing an adversary’s nuclear weapons is considered a more moral approach than targeting cities. A common current nuclear approach contends that adversaries are deterred from attacking a country with nuclear weapons because the attacked country could respond with any of their surviving nuclear weapons (Ewers 2016). In other words if an adversary cannot execute a counterforce strategy that completely cripples their target’s nuclear capabilities they will not attack with nuclear weapons. This article challenges the notion that a counterforce strategy which targets an adversary’s nuclear capabilities effectively deters all nuclear attacks. Consider a hypothetical situation where two coun- tries each have over a thousand nuclear weapons. One country attacks the other with a single nuclear weapon. Would the attacked country strike back or be deterred by their adversary’s remaining arsenal? What if the nuclear attack caused significant economic damage but didn’t directly kill anyone? Would the attacked country strike back against the other’s population? If neither side can destroy the other side’s nuclear weapons what types of targets might they attack? This paper examines targets that do not fall under the current counterforce strategy not as advocates of these targets but to ensure that all types of nuclear attacks are deterred. Before discussing possible attack and appropri- ate responses we first examine three trends which may undermine a country’s ability to execute a counterforce strategy improved weapon system survivability enhanced defences and expanded proliferation (Gallagher and Sorice 2014). 1.1 Survivability States with nuclear weapons have improved the surviv- ability of their nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems in case of an adversary attack even with nuclear weapons. The initial efforts included reinforcing fixed sites to withstand nuclear blasts. These efforts have expanded into creating deeply buried facilities. Another approach has been to increase the mobility of strategic nuclear delivery systems thus ensuring that they are challenging to find and target. For example aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons have always been mobile targets that could shift from one airfield to another to reduce the chance of being destroyed. Additionally land-based ballistic missile launchers are being deployed on either trucks or trains to make them difficult to target. The sea-launched ballistic missile submarines have combined mobility and hardening. the submarine’s strength to withstand water pressure is also effective pro- tection against nuclear blast overpressure and dynamic pressure. Additionally these submarines operate in the world’s largest thermal sink which reduces their suscep- tible range to thermal effects. Hence submarines are not only challenging to find but they are also highly resistant to nuclear weapon effects should they be detected. While decreasing their nuclear forces in total numbers the United States and Russia have steadily increased the percentages of their nuclear forces that are survivable through mobility. Lieber and Press (2017) and Long and Green (2015) contend that improvements in intelligence technology will eventually track and target current mobile delivery methods. however future sensing capabilities may be rapidly overwhelmed with decoys and other new countermeasures. We also presume that a country initiating a strike would expend their vulnerable weapons and maintain their more survivable weapons in reserve. For this article we postulate a future where hard- ening mobility deception and other means will con- tinue to make targeting an adversary’s strategic systems increasingly much more difficult. 1.2 Defences Nations are also increasing their defences to reduce any adversary’s ability to penetrate to their targets. Defences are not new (Cimbala and McDermott 2015). Countries threatened by adversaries attacking with bombers and cruise missiles have established air defence networks. For a while stealth technology mitigated the advances of air defences. however the improved sophistication of integrated air defence networks may significantly reduce the ability of bombers and cruise missiles to penetrate to targets. Along with enhanced detection the range of inter- ceptor missiles has dramatically increased. Local area defences against ballistic missiles have existed for decades. Recent trends have indicated an increase in the size of the defended area and the effective- ness of the interceptors (Lowther and Cimbala 2017). For example the Office of the Secretary of Defense (2019) in the 2019 Missile Defense Review states ‘The United States is protected against a limited ICBM [inter-continental bal- listic missile] attack.’ One possible counter to improved defences is faster penetrators such as hypersonic weapons. A few weapons with such advanced penetrative capabilities may even be able to assist in deterring an attack from a country with an extensive defence network. Zala (2019) concludes the ‘new non-nuclear weapon technologies – such as bal- listic missile defense anti-satellite weapons and pre- cision-strike missile technology – will make nuclear deterrence relationships that were once somewhat stable less so.’ 1.3 Proliferation Proliferation is another challenge to a counterforce strat- egy (Mazarr 1995. Jo and Gartzke 2007). During the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union only had to be concerned about the size of their arsenal relative to their single adversary. Now each country must also consider its nuclear arsenal relative to all potential nuclear-armed adversaries and coalitions. An extensive exchange between two countries might leave the third country with the most remaining nuclear weapons (Kristensen and Norris 2018). 1.4 Study assumptions For this discussion we postulate a future world where the following holds. Multiple states have nuclear weapons. No state or coalition of states can execute a counterforce first strike that sufficiently eliminates an adversary’s nuclear weapons to not be concerned about a nuclear counter-strike in response. No countries have an effective global defence system rendering all vulner- able to strategic attacks. Each nation needs to consider multiple adversaries. Contrary to our assumptions Lieber and Press (2017) contend that ‘hardening and concealment—have been undercut by leaps in weapons accuracy and a revolution in remote sensing’ and further ‘countries that have considerable resources can buck these trends and keep their forces survivable albeit with considerable cost and effort.’ In contrast Mazarr (2007) states that the United States cannot achieve any of its counterforce goals. </source> [/INST] <claim>Deeply buried facilities mobile strategic systems improved defenses and increased proliferation means counterforce is a fantasy</claim> <psg>: A counterforce attack intends to disable an opponent’s nuclear arsenal to limit potential damage from that adversary. We postulate a future when harden- ing and deeply burying fixed sites transition to mobile strategic systems and improved defences make execut- ing a counterforce strategy against an adversary’s nuclear forces extremely difficult. This article challenges the notion that a counterforce strategy which targets an adversary’s nuclear capabilities effectively deters all nuclear attacks. we first examine three trends which may undermine a country’s ability to execute a counterforce strategy improved weapon system survivability enhanced defences and expanded proliferation 1.1 Survivability States with nuclear weapons have improved the surviv- ability of their nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems in case of an adversary attack even with nuclear weapons. The initial efforts included reinforcing fixed sites to withstand nuclear blasts. These efforts have expanded into creating deeply buried facilities. Another approach has been to increase the mobility of strategic nuclear delivery systems thus ensuring that they are challenging to find and target. For example aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons have always been mobile targets that could shift from one airfield to another to reduce the chance of being destroyed. Additionally land-based ballistic missile launchers are being deployed on either trucks or trains to make them difficult to target. The sea-launched ballistic missile submarines have combined mobility and hardening. the submarine’s strength to withstand water pressure is also effective pro- tection against nuclear blast overpressure and dynamic pressure. Additionally these submarines operate in the world’s largest thermal sink which reduces their suscep- tible range to thermal effects. Hence submarines are not only challenging to find but they are also highly resistant to nuclear weapon effects should they be detected. . however future sensing capabilities may be rapidly overwhelmed with decoys and other new countermeasures. We also presume that a country initiating a strike would expend their vulnerable weapons and maintain their more survivable weapons in reserve. For this article we postulate a future where hard- ening mobility deception and other means will con- tinue to make targeting an adversary’s strategic systems increasingly much more difficult. 1.2 Defences Nations are also increasing their defences to reduce any adversary’s ability to penetrate to their targets Countries threatened by adversaries attacking with bombers and cruise missiles have established air defence networks. For a while stealth technology mitigated the advances of air defences. however the improved sophistication of integrated air defence networks may significantly reduce the ability of bombers and cruise missiles to penetrate to targets. Along with enhanced detection the range of inter- ceptor missiles has dramatically increased. Recent trends have indicated an increase in the size of the defended area and the effective- ness of the interceptors (Lowther and Cimbala 2017). For example the Office of the Secretary of Defense (2019) in the 2019 Missile Defense Review states ‘The United States is protected against a limited ICBM [inter-continental bal- listic missile] attack.’ 1.3 Proliferation Proliferation is another challenge to a counterforce strat- egy (Mazarr 1995. Jo and Gartzke 2007). During the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union only had to be concerned about the size of their arsenal relative to their single adversary. Now each country must also consider its nuclear arsenal relative to all potential nuclear-armed adversaries and coalitions. An extensive exchange between two countries might leave the third country with the most remaining nuclear weapons (Kristensen and Norris 2018). No state or coalition of states can execute a counterforce first strike that sufficiently eliminates an adversary’s nuclear weapons to not be concerned about a nuclear counter-strike in response.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> We stand on the cusp of a Third Nuclear Age. If this new era comes to pass the main characteristics of the global nuclear order are likely to see considerable challenge.1 This shift is being driven by the development of a suite of strategic non-nuclear weaponry (SNNW)2 and enabling technologies in conjunction with a fundamental political shift relating to perceptions of nuclear threats and debates about how they should be addressed. Together these trends fundamentally challenge the canon of academic and policy thinking about nuclear weapons and nuclear stability and mean that decision-makers must contemplate new risks of inadvertent escalation miscalculation and nuclear use and the possibility of counterforce missions unencumbered by the political and moral restraints associated with the nuclear taboo.3 Essentially we are set to move from a global nuclear order based on the assumption that developments in nuclear weapons are the primary driver of stability and instability to one in which non-nuclear capabilities play an equally if not more important role. Thus the defining feature of the Third Nuclear Age will be that nuclear geopolitics risks crises deployments postures balances arms control and non-proliferation will all be shaped as much by developments in SNNW capabilities as by nuclear weapons. </source> [/INST] <claim>Tech has changed counterforce calculations – nuclear capability alone is insufficient</claim> <psg> the main characteristics of the global nuclear order are is being driven by the development of a suite of strategic non-nuclear weaponry in conjunction with a fundamental political shift relating to perceptions of nuclear threats these trends fundamentally challenge policy thinking about nuclear weapons and nuclear stability decision-makers must contemplate new risks of inadvertent escalation miscalculation and nuclear use and the possibility of counterforce missions unencumbered by the nuclear taboo. we are set to move from a global nuclear order based on nuclear weapons to one in which non-nuclear capabilities play a more important role</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> China’s emphasis on rapid and significant improvements in its missile capabilities is driven by the strategic desire to hold at risk US and allied naval forces throughout North and Southeast Asia. China’s so-called anti-access/area-denial strategy seeks to deny the United States and its allies the secure use of the sea and reduce their operating capacity on land (Congressional Research Service 2022 4). Conceptually this would allow China to rapidly achieve military objectives while holding off immediate efforts to counter them. The range of these missile systems would include the East and South China Seas (the first Island chain) and arguably extend into the Western Pacific in the open seas between Japan and Guam. To enact such a strategy China must have the ability to overwhelm missile defenses and still disrupt significant facilities such as airfields C4 ISR (Command Control Communications Computers [C4] Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance [ISR]) nodes ports and ships at sea. The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Forces’ (PLARF) conventional missile capabilities therefore provide Beijing with either a powerful tool to shape the operational picture should war break out or a potent first-strike capability aimed at degrading the enemy’s capabilities before they can respond. China’s current phase of modernization seems to have made substantial inroads into undermining traditional areas of US military strength. Numerous reports now suggest that China has attained the capability to overwhelm US naval platforms and facilities in Japan and the ROK potentially destroying capabilities before they are deployed (Shugart and Gonzalez 2017. Townshend Thomas-Noone and Steward 2019). Targeting moving naval vessels is a harder proposition. However China now possesses increasing numbers of advanced sensors capable of covering multiple domains including over-the-horizon radar and surveillance satellites that when networked with other capabilities and effective data processing and analytics provide near-constant coverage of strategically important areas such as the East and South China Seas and the Western Pacific (Bowers and Kirchberger 2021 629). China’s military modernization over the preceding 20 years has resulted in rapid developments in its missile and rocket capabilities. China reportedly possesses a potent array of intercontinental intermediate medium and short-range ballistic missiles alongside a large inventory of air- sea- and ground-launched cruise missiles. One analysis suggests that these numbers have risen significantly over the past fifteen years (US Department of Defense 2019a 47). Numerical growth is only one element of China’s missile modernization. Recently introduced capabilities include multiple and maneuverable terminal stages/warheads deep penetrating warheads and increased accuracy (Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment 2018). China’s inventory of SRBMs (short-range ballistic missiles) include the DF-11 DF-12 DF-15 and DF-16 family of missiles with ranges between 250 and 1000 km. These missiles are capable of carrying multiple types of warheads and incremental developments indicate a focus on increased accuracy (later models of the DF-11 and −15 may have a circular error probability of 50 m) maneuverability and stealth (Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment 2018). The medium-range DF-21 series has also seen substantial development since its introduction in 1991. The DF-21C introduced in 2006 reportedly possesses greater accuracy and greater range than the original missile. The 1500-km range DF-21D is an anti-ship ballistic missile that has attained some notoriety in US defense and media circles gaining the moniker “carrier killer” due to its suspected mission of targeting US aircraft carriers operating in waters proximate to China (Missile Defense Project 2016). Similarly the DF26 which entered service in 2015 has a range of 3000– 4000 km. It is the first conventional Chinese missile to be able to target Guam and if deployed at Chinese facilities in the South China Sea US facilities in Australia (Gomez 2017). It has been reported that in the summer of 2020 China successfully tested the DF-21D and the ASBM variant DF-26B against a moving target in the South China Sea (Kaziani 2020). Importantly the DF-26 is capable of both nuclear and conventional capabilities. some analysis suggests that DF-26 units in the field have both warheads available to them (Pollack and LaFoy 2020). Exactly why China would do this is impossible to fully explain. One possible reason is to hide the number of nuclear missiles that China has in a form of shell game. A second is protection: To reduce the risk of US attack a dual capability puts doubt in the minds of opposition tactical planners about the nature of the target and the potential of uncontrolled escalation from conventional to nuclear war (Pollack and LaFoy 2020). This would make a conventionally armed DF-26 more survivable in any conventional war-fighting scenario as targeting it would be fraught with potential risk. </source> [/INST] <claim>China’s missile modernization means counterforce fails</claim> <psg>China’s emphasis on rapid and significant improvements in its missile capabilities anti-access/area-denial strategy seeks to deny the United States and its allies the secure use of the sea and reduce their operating capacity on land allow China to rapidly achieve military objectives while holding off immediate efforts to counter them People’s Liberation Army conventional missile capabilities provide Beijing with either a powerful tool to shape the operational picture should war break out or a potent first-strike capability aimed at degrading the enemy’s capabilities before they can respond China’s made substantial inroads into undermining traditional areas of US military strength China has attained the capability to overwhelm US naval platforms and facilities in Japan and the ROK destroying capabilities before they are deployed increasing numbers of advanced sensors capable of covering multiple domains provide near-constant coverage of strategically important areas rapid developments in its missile and rocket capabilities potent array of intercontinental and short-range ballistic missiles alongside cruise missiles numbers have risen significantly multiple and maneuverable terminal stages/warheads deep penetrating warheads and increased accuracy DF-21D gaining the moniker “carrier killer” targeting US aircraft carriers DF-26 is capable of both nuclear and conventional capabilities China would do this to hide the number of nuclear missiles that China has a dual capability puts doubt in the minds of opposition tactical planners DF-26 more survivable in any conventional war-fighting scenario as targeting it would be fraught with potential risk.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> There are two ways to think of the nuclear revolution. One of them is the simple destructiveness of a general war fought with ballistic missiles and thermonuclear weapons. No one has put this better than Daniel Deudney: In an age when the term “revolution” is used indiscriminately few have hesitated to use such language with full seriousness to describe the impact of nuclear weapons upon the state-centered world security order. This sense of the revolutionary stems from certain awesome facts that are beyond controversy: nuclear science and technology have given us the capability to wreak violence at an unprecedented scale and speed. To find historical analogies for a full-scale nuclear war one must look to great cataclysms like the Fall of Rome the Mongol Invasions the Black Plague the European Invasion of the Americas and the world wars and imagine several of them occurring at once and greatly compressed in time perhaps into a single afternoon.1 A general nuclear war fought in the all-out manner of other major wars like World War Two would not only wreak this kind of destruction in days if not hours. it could also eradicate human civilisation forever and possibly even kill every human being and most other forms of life on the planet. It hard to see how anyone could deny that this constitutes a revolution and the authors of the book under review here Keir Lieber and Daryl Press do not try to do that. It is the second way of thinking about the nuclear revolution that comprises the real debate and this is how it has shaped the practice of international politics. Earlier theorists most notably Robert Jervis argued that the prospect of nuclear omnicide would discourage the world’s states and especially those in possession of nuclear arsenals from competing with one another intensively. They would avoid serious security competition and war: international politics at the greatpower level would settle into a condition of stability and peace. This claim has led many scholars interested in this second way of thinking to question how ‘revolutionary’ the nuclear revolution actually has been. During the late Cold War as Brendan Rittenhouse Green has clearly demonstrated in a recent book the United States abandoned the policy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and sought nuclear superiority over the USSR apparently a plain disconfirmation of Jervis’s theory.2 And in the post-Cold War era as the present authors under review argue the U.S. is pursuing new counterforce and defence systems with the evident aim of achieving war-winning capability against nuclear rivals such as Russia and China. If the nuclear revolution has so radically transformed international politics these scholars insist why have nuclear powers and especially the United States continued to engage in intense security competition with their rivals and sought to deploy war-winning nuclear arsenals? It is an exceedingly important question. In The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution Lieber and Press develop a careful answer. Operating from the structural realist assumption that states face a world of constant danger and security competition with their major rivals they make two overarching claims. The first is that the development of nuclear missiles and thermonuclear bombs during the Cold War did not completely transform international politics. To be sure nuclear weapons make deterrence far easier to achieve and the prospect of general war far more grim but the world has not changed as radically as proponents of the nuclear revolution claim. The second as we have already noted is that in the post-Cold War era new military technologies may soon enable states namely the US to wage nuclear war without initiating a global apocalypse either by using very small nuclear weapons in a minor war or by launching a counterforce attack against a larger rival that would eliminate its ability to retaliate. We should note at the outset that we do not intend to dispute the book’s technical claims that the US may be on the verge of developing such war-winning military capabilities and therefore will not be engaging with some of the book (parts of chapters 3–4) in any detail. For the purposes of our argument we concede this point. Rather we will deal with the book’s two larger if sometimes implicit claims: that the nuclear revolution has not transformed international politics. and that for the first time the United States can and should reject nuclear stalemate and seek the ability to wage a winning nuclear war. (1) The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution? In the first part of their book Lieber and Press make several points that seek to show that international politics under the spectre of nuclear war is not all that different from pre-nuclear eras. We have chosen three that are clearly contestable and will deal with each in turn. The first point deals with problem of annihilation. As everyone agrees a nuclear war threatens not simply to deliver defeat to an attacked nation but to eradicate it completely. While this might be debatable with respect to continental-size nations like the US Russia or Canada it is not when it comes to compact countries like Japan Great Britain or the Czech Republic. The British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan told President Eisenhower at the height of the Berlin Ultimatum crisis in 1959 that ‘eight bombs’ would put an end to the United Kingdom and it is likely that in the event of a general war the Soviet Union would have targeted Britain with many times that number. Such an attack would have killed just about everyone in that country and destroyed its political and economic institutions beyond repair. Is this not a revolutionary development? Lieber and Press maintain that is not: nations at war have been annihilated before. It was a common practice in the classical world most notoriously at Melos and Carthage. during the Second World War the allies bombed Germany and Japan into submission and the Soviet Union ravaged its sector of Germany and other states during the war’s last days. ‘Yet the possibility of suffering such serious losses ’ Lieber and Press state ‘did not deter the combatants from going to war’ (p. 13). This is not a convincing argument. On one hand the sacking of city-states of Carthage and Melos was a political decision made by leaders intent on punishing their adversaries. other defeated states during the Greek and Roman empires suffered far less and had the leaders of these two city-states known for sure what was coming they might have made different decisions. On the other while it is true that (west) Germany and Japan were viciously attacked by their enemies during World War Two it is equally true that they were hardly annihilated and indeed prospering not long after 1945. That would not have been the case with Great Britain after a general nuclear attack. There is a larger point. The difference between annihilation in the pre-nuclear era and nuclear annihilation today is that the latter is a function of the weaponry itself. Rome’s brutalisation of Carthage was not about the weaponry the Romans deployed but their determination to eradicate a recalcitrant enemy. The situation could not be more different in a putative nuclear war. Had the United States and the Soviet Union gone to a general nuclear war they would have destroyed not simply one another but allied states like Poland or Italy without necessarily having any interest whatsoever in punishing these or indeed any nation’s populations. It would be nothing other than an unavoidable consequence of a large-scale nuclear war. This is a revolutionary development that distinguishes the nuclear era from previous ones. A second point is one often used by nuclear revolution sceptics from many different sides of the debate: that nuclear states have been attacked before. If Egypt and Syria were so afraid of nuclear retaliation why did they attack Israel? Argentina sought to take the Falkland Islands from Great Britain another nuclear power. In late 1950 China entered the Korean War: its main adversary was the United States. This demonstrates Lieber and Press maintain that the fear of nuclear attack is not as powerful as revolution advocates claim. This argument made too often simply does not speak to the relevant claim made by nuclear revolution advocates: that nuclear powers will not wage major war upon one another for fear of unleashing a conflagration that would kill not only themselves but trigger the kind of apocalypse described by Deudney. Since the beginning of modern international history large powers have repeatedly attacked others with the aim of defeating and conquering them. This happened twice in the space of 30 years during the early twentieth century but has not happened or even come very close to happening since then. If the fear of nuclear war explains this as Lieber and Press seem to acknowledge (p. 18) it also surely constitutes a revolutionary development in international politics. The final point is perhaps the most important one. This is the assertion that the pursuit of arms-racing and nuclear superiority by major powers though again primarily the United States demonstrates in itself the fallacy of the nuclear revolution. Lieber and Press make their case clearly: We are seventy-five years into the nuclear era and nuclear-armed states are still competing as if they lived in a pre-nuclear world. Could it really be that leaders are still misperceiving the core strategic factors that allegedly define the nuclear age (p. 5 italics in original)? This argument echoing that made by Green and others assumes that when states make important decisions like building lots of nuclear weapons and they do so consistently over years it must be rational and strategic. There are two crucial problems with this assertion. On one hand in referring to ‘nucleararmed states’ it does not distinguish between military planners and political decision-makers. The U.S. military developed plans to win nuclear war throughout the Cold War. Yet when the possibility of actual war loomed for example during the Berlin and Cuban crises the United States made major concessions to the USSR in order to avoid war despite its massive nuclear superiority at that time. After Cuba American and Soviet leaders steered clear of direct showdowns for the rest of the Cold War. They did so because they lived in a nuclear world.3 If ‘states’ mean military bureaucracies and not their political leaders then perhaps Lieber and Press’s claim may be true. But that is an odd way to define a state. On the other hand the very claim that any policy adhered to over decades must be strategic is also debatable. The United States refused to recognise communist China for thirty years and there was no shortage of supporters of this policy who defended it upon strategic grounds. Then it abandoned that policy and the isolation of China is now seen by most historians as a mistake driven primarily by domestic politics. For roughly twenty years the US regarded the survival of South Vietnam as a core national security interest and it fought a ground war for a decade to pursue this goal. American leaders repeatedly argued throughout this period that staying in Vietnam was strategically rational and important. Then the US abandoned South Vietnam and the war is widely seen today as an irrational disaster. These examples and others that could be mentioned 4 show that it is entirely plausible that a state might pursue a particular policy even for a long time for reasons that turn out to be not strategic and rational. As Dwight D. Eisenhower suggested sixty years ago this is particularly likely to occur when the policy relates to basic issues of national security and when it at the same time provides employment wealth and influence to powerful leaders and constituencies.5 We are not claiming here that the US decision to engage in nuclear security competition during the late Cold War or in the contemporary era must be attributed to the military-industrial complex and cannot have been driven by genuine strategic reasons. This is a very difficult argument to prove. Rather we contend that the Lieber and Press claim that consistent behaviour over the years demonstrates eo ipso strategic rationality is clearly disproven by many counter-examples and appears to rule out by assertion other explanations. It runs the risk of tautology. The Defensive Realist Stability and Offensive Realist Instability of MAD On their way to demonstrating the myth of nuclear revolution Lieber and Press investigate ‘how much is enough’ to preserve stalemate among nucleararmed states. This they present as a technical question with multiple parts. How many weapons with what specifications must survive a first strike in order to guarantee devastating retaliation? How survivable are the nation’s secondstrike weapons? What degree of survivability is sufficient to deter others’ aggression? The authors treat this question of how the quantity and quality of nuclear fire power affects strategic stability as a technical question with two extremes: ‘even small potentially vulnerable arsenals are enough ’ or ‘nuclear-armed countries [must] build truly survivable arsenals’ grounding ‘assured retaliation’ (32). They deviate from earlier studies by analysing the impact of Soviet arms build up on US strategy rather than vice versa. Furthermore they assess the efficacy of deterrence under conditions of peace and war. They identify four US theories of deterrence: existential deterrence minimum deterrence assured retaliation and assured destruction. They then provide a chronology of the development of US strategic postures: 1945–1949 US nuclear monopoly. 1950–1955 Soviet existential deterrent. 1956–1960 Soviet minimum deterrent. 1962–1964 Soviet assured retaliation. 1965–1990 mutual assured destruction. Lieber and Press argue that despite appearances to the contrary including the fallacious ‘Missile Gap’ alarmism of the late 1950s that US defence analysts ‘had accurate intelligence assessments of existing Soviet strategic forces’ (49). The implication here is that it is strictly a technical question of ‘how much is enough.’ It is not a question of policy choice for example between whether defensive realism (Robert Jervis) or offensive realism (John Mearsheimer) provides a more efficacious security posture. Lieber and Press assume that US strategic intelligence is complete and that defence officials’ response to that intelligence is fully rational. They hold that assured retaliation and assured destruction will both result in competitive security politics. In the first case nations vie to achieve assured retaliatory capability and to deny it to others. In the second case security competition is intense because states will seek damage limitation capabilities as well as greater offensive capability. Lieber and Press argue that during the early Cold War the US planned an overwhelming preemptive strike on the Soviet Union were they to threaten attack (57–58). With increasing nuclear parity between the two countries the US had to settle for assured retaliation in the 1960s. The US realized threats of initiating general nuclear war were incredible because they were suicidal. Therefore the US explored limited nuclear options to be integrated into a flexible response and graduated war plan (53). Even in the 1960s US leaders upheld the goal of winning a war against the Soviets through a ‘rapid nuclear disarming strike’ (63). Counterforce weapons were developed to challenge the Soviets’ assured retaliatory power. Satisfied that the US strategic response to the Soviets throughout the Cold War demonstrates the instability of mutual deterrence via assured retaliation or destruction the authors move on to argue that security competition in this dynamic and unstable equilibrium can be reversed. As a step to making this argument they conclude there were defence pessimists who endorse a strategic stance consistent with offensive realism. These pessimists take two actions which Lieber and Press deem rational: they endorse limited nuclear options to introduce into conventional conflict. and they back this flexible response approach with ‘substantial nuclear capabilities’ to achieve escalation dominance (96 104). Here they accurately discuss the US persistent rejection of mutual assured destruction in favor of striving to achieve strategic dominance. Yet they refer to the Cold War years 1965–1990 as characterized by MAD (48). This is a curious and telling assertion. The authors have argued that despite the existential condition of mutual assured destruction US defence pessimists who controlled nuclear policy by 1980 in fact treated nuclear war as winnable and developed weapons capability and a strategic posture to support their aim. Lieber and Press position themselves as neutral social scientists analysing the US response to USSR nuclear weapons development to conclude that the nuclear revolution is a myth. Intense security competition throughout the Cold War they argue proves nuclear weapons do not offer nations the promise of stable security even given their acquisition of a secure second-strike capability. Their evidence is the US response to Soviet military innovations. Although they acknowledge the United States turn to flexible response and limited nuclear options they fail to recognize or discuss the fifth nuclear strategy of preparing to fight and win a nuclear war (p. 140 fn 4). Thus they fail to recount the intense nuclear security debate within the US between proponents of assured retaliation and advocates of the war fighting school advocated by Albert Wohlstetter Herman Kahn Colin Gray and James R. Schlesinger during the last three decades of the Cold War. Perceptions about the precarity of MAD supported concrete bureaucratic steps to shift the US strategic posture away from accepting the stalemate imposed by assured destruction. James Schlesinger Secretary of Defence under Richard Nixon was a chief architect of the war fighting stance. He played a fundamental role in shifting Jimmy Carter’s erstwhile support of the MAD doctrine to that of the offensive countervailing posture with the Commander in Chief’s signature on Presidential Directive 59 in 1980. This historical evidence which Lieber and Press interestingly do not mention complicates their straightforward account that intense security competition underneath mutual retaliatory capability refutes the concept of nuclear revolution. This is not only because the US decision to pursue a countervailing strategy in the 1970s belies their claim that the period 1965–90 was defined by mutual assured destruction. Even more important is the fact that this new strategy was not advocated as a response to new Soviet technological and military capabilities but rather was a policy choice based upon political factors unrelated to the nuclear balance. This undermines the authors’ claim that the United States declined to overturn MAD during the Cold War because of technological limitations and the size of the Soviet arsenal.6 In the end their assessment of US nuclear policy during the Cold War is unclear. Did the two Cold War superpowers engage in an intense security competition during its last three decades under a condition of MAD as they state in the book and also in their famous 2006 article ‘The End of MAD?’7 Or did the United States decide to pursue a war-winning strategy in the late 1970s which by definition entailed a rejection of MAD and the associated logic of the nuclear revolution? And if the latter answer is correct why do they not discuss it at all in the book? The question is not just an academic one. The United States found itself after the end of the Cold War in a position of tremendous preponderance unprecedented in the history of modern international relations. Its erstwhile rival Russia was in free fall after the USSR’s collapse and China remained a modest military power. Other powerful states around the world were allied with the US. But America could not translate its preponderance into primacy because both Russia and China retained their second-strike nuclear arsenals making it too dangerous not only to invade either state but even to seriously coerce them. The obvious way to overcome this problem of course is to develop a warwinning nuclear policy for the post-Cold War world. And as Lieber and Press show better than anyone else the United States has gravitated toward this objective over the past two decades with its acquisition of advanced new weaponry defence systems and sensory and other counterforce technologies. Supporters and critics of MAD alike all acknowledge that it only holds if states possess invulnerable second-strike arsenals. If the United States becomes able to eliminate that condition with technology then MAD does come to an end as the two authors precisely argued in 2006. The problem here even more so than in the late 1970s is that such a policy cannot in any way be characterised as defensive. Neither China nor Russia possess or are seeking to possess a nuclear arsenal that could prevail over the United States so by pursuing a war-winning strategy the US would be clearly announcing its interest in global primacy. This would be a policy choice not a response to Russian or Chinese capabilities. Indeed and following Lieber and Press’s own reasoning China’s ongoing commitment to a basic nuclear deterrent and Russian political and economic weakness means that the conditions could not be more suitable for the re-establishment of Schelling’s and Jervis’s defensive and mutually stable condition of MAD. If the United States rejects that it will be because it chose to do so not because it had no alternative. An implausible almost surreal disinclination to acknowledge that the US is facing a strategic choice about what to do about its nuclear policy and that what it decides to do will be far more important than anything else in affecting the policies of other nations pervades much of the book. In their conclusion Lieber and Press state that a ‘policy implication’ of their analysis is that ‘in some cases ’ countries will work hard to create truly survivable retaliatory forces while their rivals will strive to hone counterforce capabilities to keep those retaliatory forces vulnerable. For example we expect that China will continue to add significant nuclear capabilities (such as new mobile missiles) to its arsenal as well as bolster its command-and-control capabilities—all part of a traditional path to developing a secure survivable second-strike force. In turn the United States will continue to modernize its nuclear arsenal and develop offensive (e.g. long-range precision conventional strike systems) and defensive (e.g. missile defence) means to counter Chinese retaliatory capabilities.8 For example? IR scholarship has long been plagued by prescription masquerading as description but this passage takes the cake. The United States is a preponderant unipole which at present spends more on its military than the next ten or so nations combined. It is the only state on earth which now or in the foreseeable future could possibly ‘hone counterforce capabilities’ in order to make other large states’ ‘retaliatory forces vulnerable’ as everyone even vaguely familiar with nuclear politics today knows. The debate in Washington about what nuclear posture the US should not ‘will ’ adopt a debate in which Lieber and Press themselves have long been active participants is how determinedly the US should pursue war-winning capabilities over other large nuclear states.9 No other nation is having this debate or is even capable of doing so. Moreover everyone knows that China’s future nuclear decisions will be made entirely in response to what the United States does because if the US develops the capability to ‘counter’ Chinese retaliatory forces China will become vulnerable to US predation and it will surely take the necessary steps to deal with this threat that any Realist student of international relations would expect.10 Committing fully to a comprehensive war-winning strategy therefore will not only cost the US untold billions of dollars in new military spending over the next years and decades. it is also likely to trigger an arms race and intense security competition with China that the latter state has signalled over decades it would prefer to avoid. Following this dangerous course of action is a policy choice the United States does not have to make particularly given the fiscal demands created by the Covid-19 pandemic and the massive domestic programmes the new Biden administration has embarked upon. This is precisely why the question is so heavily debated in Washington. Lieber and Press have long made a powerful case that new US technological capabilities threaten to overturn MAD. However their prediction of a policy outcome for which they have long advocated damages the logical consistency of their argument. </source> [/INST] <claim>Counterforce fails – Lieber and Press’s analysis is flawed </claim> <psg>A general nuclear war would not only wreak this kind of destruction in hours. it could also eradicate human civilisation forever and possibly even kill every human being and most other forms of life on the planet. Lieber and Press insist nuclear powers especially the United States continued to engage in intense security competition and sought to deploy war-winning nuclear arsenals Lieber and Press make two overarching claims The first the development of nuclear missiles did not completely transform international politics The second new military technologies may soon enable states to wage nuclear war without initiating a global apocalypse by launching a counterforce attack a nuclear war threatens not simply to deliver defeat but to eradicate ‘eight bombs’ would put an end to the United Kingdom Is this not a revolutionary development Lieber and Press maintain that is not nations at war have been annihilated before Melos and Carthage The difference between annihilation in the pre-nuclear era and today is the weaponry itself. Rome’s brutalisation of Carthage was about their determination to eradicate a recalcitrant enemy in a putative nuclear war they would have destroyed not simply one another but allied states without necessarily having any interest in punishing these in referring to ‘nucleararmed states’ it does not distinguish between military planners and political decision-makers The U.S. military developed plans to win nuclear war when the possibility of actual war loomed the United States made major concessions to the USSR despite its massive nuclear superiority the very claim that any policy adhered to over decades must be strategic is debatable. the Lieber and Press claim that consistent behaviour demonstrates strategic rationality is clearly disproven by many counter-examples Lieber and Press argue that despite appearances to the contrary defence analysts ‘had accurate intelligence of existing Soviet strategic forces’ It is not a question of policy choice . Lieber and Press assume that US strategic intelligence is complete and that defence officials’ response to that intelligence is fully rational Neither China nor Russia possess or are seeking to possess a nuclear arsenal that could prevail over the United States pursuing a war-winning strategy the US would be clearly announcing its interest in global primacy This would be a policy choice not a response to Russian or Chinese capabilities following Lieber and Press’s own reasoning the conditions could not be more suitable for the re-establishment mutually stable condition of MAD. The debate about what posture the US should not ‘will ’ adopt is how determinedly the US should pursue war-winning capabilities China’s future nuclear decisions will be made entirely in response to the United States if the US develops the capability to ‘counter’ Chinese retaliatory forces China will take the necessary steps to deal with this threat Committing to a comprehensive war-winning strategy will not only cost the US untold billions it is also likely to trigger an arms race with China would prefer to avoid this dangerous course of action is a policy choice the United States does not have to make</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Stationary Jammer Arrays A jammer array is a collection of jammers which are used to collectively deny radar operations in an area. Taking advantage of the huge disparity in the 𝐽𝑆𝑅 jammers can reach signal-equivalence at very modest powers and gains. If attempting to jam multiple satellites at once jammers could be directed to cover the entire upward facing 2𝜋 steradian. More complicated arrays could use directed apertures such as parabolic dish reflectors to directly illuminate overflying satellites. These would be more complex and costly but would avoid inadvertently jamming other systems. A jammer array could be conceived of on two scales jamming a local area and overcoming array adaptation. The more modest approach is to jam radar operations in a local area. This could be accomplished by distributing a number of low-power jammers in an area where the hider wishes to deny the seeker the ability to observe.20 One possibility would be to mount these jammers on shelters. If the shelter spacing 𝑠 is similar to or less than the beam swath width then this would prevent the seeker from observing those shelters or the avenues between them. The jammers could be run continuously or toggled. If run continuously the area spanned by the local jammer array would be a permanent gap in coverage. In effect this would create a single distributed shelter where the TEL could operate without risk of being detected so long as the jammers were operating. If toggled the jammers could be turned on when a TEL deployed to the local area kept on for long enough for the TEL to be able to move anywhere within the local jammer array area.21 The jammers could then be toggled off and the seeker would not know which of the shelters covered by the jammer array housed the TEL. The TEL could remain in that shelter throughout its patrol lifetime without needing to move. This would change the dynamics of how the seeker’s uncertainty would accrue over time. Rather than organically accruing over time the seeker’s uncertainty would grow linearly with time proportional to TEL velocity from when the jammer array was activated until the array was deactivated or the boundary of the jammer array was reached. The hider would have a strong incentive not to move after this point (so as not to risk detection) so the uncertainty would not necessarily grow thereafter. Utilizing a local jammer array the hider has the ability to generate positional uncertainty effectively on demand limited only by the costs of emplacing the jammers and the provocativeness of utilizing them (discussed below). One such array would be needed for each TEL patrol to be protected. </source> [/INST] <claim>Can’t find their nukes.</claim> <psg>A jammer array is a collection of jammers which are used to collectively deny radar operations in an area jammers can reach signal-equivalence at very modest powers and gains More complicated arrays could use directed apertures such as parabolic dish reflectors to directly illuminate overflying satellites. . If run continuously the area spanned by the local jammer array would be a permanent gap in coverage. In effect this would create a single distributed shelter where the TEL could operate without risk of being detected so long as the jammers were operating toggled the jammers could be turned on when a TEL deployed to the local area kept on for long enough for the TEL to be able to move anywhere within the local jammer array area the seeker’s uncertainty would grow linearly with time proportional to TEL velocity from when the jammer array was activated until the array was deactivated or the boundary of the jammer array was reached. the hider has the ability to generate positional uncertainty effectively on demand </psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> TEL-Shaped Decoy An average RCS decoy is capable of deceiving SMTI which only measures the RCS distribution. SAR and ISAR instead measure the spatial distribution of the scattering centers of the target which can be used to form an image. An average RCS decoy can be constructed from a small number of corner reflectors while a TEL-shaped decoy mimics not just the sizes of the scattering centers but also their spatial distribution. One of the challenges of creating a TEL-shaped decoy is that TELs are large objects. Decoys are ideally easily and cheaply built so that many can be used in conjunction (discussed in detail below). A shape decoy must be able to approximate the physical size of a real TEL meaning that it will be on the order of tens of meters in length. The challenges of creating a TEL-shaped decoy mirror those of shaping an actual TEL for RCSR. The same set of radar reflective materials metal sheets or mesh can be used to control the RCS of a decoy. In the case of TEL RCSR the TEL itself is large and can serve as a skeleton on which the outer radar reflective skin can be mounted. One possible decoy design would be to utilize an interior scaffolding made of inexpensive and lightweight material such as PVC tubing or aluminum struts to form the scaffold over which a wire mesh could be stretched. Integrating the mesh with a fabric or plastic liner the same color as a TEL would make the decoy difficult to identify with optical modalities in the case it was moved during the day.16 In order to make such a simple decoy indistinguishable from an actual TEL the same procedure could be used on actual TELs i.e. decoys are made more convincing when used in conjunction with RCSR shaping. Making the TEL decoy mobile would allow the hider additional modes for deceiving the seeker. Two simple methods for making a shape decoy mobile are mounting it on a smaller vehicle or on a trailer. In both cases the decoy needs to be made lightweight enough that it can be carried by a vehicle such as one of the TEL convoy support vehicles. A TEL sized decoy could be skinned with 60–180 kg of material.17 If scaffolding were constructed from aluminum tubing it could weigh on the order of a few hundred kilograms.18 Collectively the decoy material would weight half a ton approximately the payload weight capacity of a half-ton pickup truck. Such a decoy could be fabricated for roughly the cost of the pickup truck itself on the order of tens of thousands of dollars. A less expensive option would be to mount the decoy on a trailer that could be towed by a security vehicle. This would have the advantage of being able to be disconnected and left in a shelter indefinitely. </source> [/INST] <claim>3. TEL shaped decoys.</claim> <psg>An average RCS decoy is capable of deceiving SMTI which only measures the RCS distribution. An average RCS decoy can be constructed from a small number of corner reflectors while a TEL-shaped decoy mimics not just the sizes of the scattering centers but also their spatial distribution . Decoys are ideally easily and cheaply built so that many can be used in conjunction (discussed in detail below). . The same set of radar reflective materials metal sheets or mesh can be used to control the RCS of a decoy One possible decoy design would be to utilize an interior scaffolding made of inexpensive and lightweight material such as PVC tubing or aluminum struts to form the scaffold over which a wire mesh could be stretched. Integrating the mesh with a fabric or plastic liner the same color as a TEL would make the decoy difficult to identify with optical modalities in the case it was moved during the day. Making the TEL decoy mobile would allow the hider additional modes for deceiving the seeker. Two simple methods for making a shape decoy mobile are mounting it on a smaller vehicle or on a trailer</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Radar-Absorbing Material There are two primary approaches for modulation of the surface reflection characteristics radar-absorbing materials (RAM) and surface-shape modulation. TELs are primarily made from metal which is a near-perfect reflector of radio waves. Metal can be coated with RAM which absorbs a portion of the incident field decreasing the magnitude of the reflected electric field. RAM operate by diminishing the magnitude of radar reflections by coupling the incident field into a partially conductive lossy medium [116]. At a boundary between two media (such as air and a TEL) some fraction of the incident energy will reflect off of the boundary and some will transmit into the second medium. Figure 6-5 shows a schematic of a wave approaching a boundary. At normal incidence for a wave traveling from medium 1 to medium 2 𝑅 = 𝜂2 − 𝜂1 𝜂2 + 𝜂1 𝑇 = 2𝜂2 𝜂2 + 𝜂1 (6.6) where 𝑅 is the reflection coefficient 𝜂𝑖 is the wave impedance of the 𝑖 th medium.10 The reflectivity (𝑟) and transmissivity 𝑡 of the boundary are 𝑟 = |𝑅| 2 𝑡 = |𝑇| 2 . (6.7) </source> [/INST] <claim>5. Radar Absorbing Material.</claim> <psg>There are two primary approaches for modulation of the surface reflection characteristics radar-absorbing materials (RAM) and surface-shape modulation. TELs are primarily made from metal which is a near-perfect reflector of radio waves. Metal can be coated with RAM which absorbs a portion of the incident field decreasing the magnitude of the reflected electric field</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The silos will significantly complicate counterforce options. What can Washington do? The Washington Post recently reported that over 100 missile silos have been discovered being built in a desert near the city of Yumen in China. Chinese media have since claimed that the structures are actually part of a wind farm but the experts behind the Post piece stand by their analysis. Analysts indicate that these silos will probably house the newest intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in the Chinese strategic nuclear arsenal the DF-41. This ICBM can reach the continental United States is solid-fueled and is believed to eventually be a replacement for the liquid-fueled silo-based DF-5 ICBM. Estimates vary but the DF-41 is rumored to be able to carry anywhere from three to 10 nuclear warheads. This is a formidable strategic weapon seemingly designed to be utilized as a component of a launch-on-warning policy while deployed in hardened silos. What threat do these ICBM silos pose for the United States and what should the U.S. do to counter the threat? Let’s start by putting ourselves in China’s position. There could be two primary reasons why President Xi Jinping has decided to build over 100 new ICBM silos. These reasons are not mutually exclusive. The first reason could simply be to adopt a launch-on-warning policy. This would mean most if not all the silos will probably be filled with the DF-41 and China will utilize an early warning system to detect an enemy attack and respond by launching its ICBMs before they can be destroyed in the silos. Adding strength to this theory are reports that Russia has been assisting China to build a ballistic missile early warning system. The adoption of a launch-on-warning policy would increase the survivability of China’s strategic nuclear weapons and bring them closer to the standard of the United States and Russia. The second reason could be to complicate U.S. counterforce targeting meaning the targeting of the enemy’s military infrastructure. Under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) the United States and Russia are each allowed to have 1 550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads. The introduction of over 100 ICBM silos significantly adds to potential targets that the U.S. must consider in planning for a nuclear attack. In the event of a strategic nuclear conflict it is expected that at least two warheads would be utilized for hardened counterforce targets reducing the U.S. arsenal by over 200 weapons. A recent statement by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressed the growth and advancement of the Russia-China comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination. While this is not technically an alliance at this stage it is highly plausible that the cooperation between the two countries could include deliberately complicating U.S. targeting plans and degrading the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal. In this scenario the Chinese silos could collectively contain just a handful of ICBMs. The United States would still be required to target each silo as there would be no certainty regarding which of the over 100 silos contained missiles. With the element of having to allocate at least two warheads to ensure the destruction of hardened targets it’s evident that the U.S. arsenal will be stretched thin as it still needs to maintain a credible deterrent against Russia. It will be further stretched if China decides to continue building ICBM silos. One can see how this is an effective strategy designed to complicate a U.S. strategic response. So what can the United States do about it? It’s critical that the U.S. builds and maintains a robust nuclear warfighting capability. With an effective triad of air sea and land based strategic nuclear weapons the United States is illustrating that it has options available for different contingencies. Added to this capability are tactical nuclear weapons based in Europe and the introduction of the low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile deployed on the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines. As diverse as this force is it still does not adequately deal with the addition of Chinese silos due to New START limitations. A possible option is the introduction and deployment of land based nuclear medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles within range of Chinese strategic weapons. These could be positioned in countries willing to accept them and due to the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019 the quantity deployed would not be subject to restrictions. The deployment of INF range nuclear weapons would resolve the issue of stretching the U.S. strategic arsenal thin. A step forward for the Biden administration would be to publicly commence negotiations with countries willing to house these weapons while keeping the door open to China for a diplomatic solution. The potential threat of being surrounded by U.S.-controlled INF range weapons could result in China re-thinking its opposition to entering into New START negotiations with the United States and Russia. If nothing is done to counter China’s rapid nuclear weapons increase we could see hundreds more ICBM silos being built rendering the U.S. strategic arsenal inadequate to deal with multiple threats in addition to fulfilling its extended deterrence role to allies including South Korea Japan and Australia. China and Russia have demonstrated that they are united in reducing the influence and power of the United States in order to achieve their own strategic goals. A future strategic nuclear alliance between China and Russia is not a fantasy. China has the technological and economic capability to continue modernizing and increasing the size of its nuclear forces exponentially. While it is seemingly lagging behind in an effective ballistic missile early warning system and ballistic missile submarines it already possesses a robust nuclear force including INF range weapons and mobile ICBM launchers. It will not take China long to bridge the gap and the United States may find itself dangerously outnumbered against two major nuclear powers. The Biden administration needs to proactively deal with this now because China is steamrolling ahead to catch up. </source> [/INST] <claim>New Chinese nuclear silos destroy counterforce options</claim> <psg>The silos will significantly complicate counterforce options. What can Washington do? The Washington Post recently reported that over 100 missile silos have been discovered being built in a desert near the city of Yumen in China. Chinese media have since claimed that the structures are actually part of a wind farm but the experts behind the Post piece stand by their analysis. Analysts indicate that these silos will probably house the newest intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in the Chinese strategic nuclear arsenal the DF-41. This ICBM can reach the continental United States is solid-fueled and is believed to eventually be a replacement for the liquid-fueled silo-based DF-5 ICBM. Estimates vary but the DF-41 is rumored to be able to carry anywhere from three to 10 nuclear warheads. This is a formidable strategic weapon seemingly designed to be utilized as a component of a launch-on-warning policy while deployed in hardened silos. This would mean most if not all the silos will probably be filled with the DF-41 and China will utilize an early warning system to detect an enemy attack and respond by launching its ICBMs before they can be destroyed in the silos. Adding strength to this theory are reports that Russia has been assisting China to build a ballistic missile early warning system. The adoption of a launch-on-warning policy would increase the survivability of China’s strategic nuclear weapons and bring them closer to the standard of the United States and Russia. The second reason could be to complicate U.S. counterforce targeting meaning the targeting of the enemy’s military infrastructure The introduction of over 100 ICBM silos significantly adds to potential targets that the U.S. must consider in planning for a nuclear attack. In the event of a strategic nuclear conflict it is expected that at least two warheads would be utilized for hardened counterforce targets reducing the U.S. arsenal by over 200 weapons. In this scenario the Chinese silos could collectively contain just a handful of ICBMs. The United States would still be required to target each silo as there would be no certainty regarding which of the over 100 silos contained missiles. having to allocate at least two warheads to ensure the destruction of hardened targets it’s evident that the U.S. arsenal will be stretched thin as it still needs to maintain a credible deterrent against Russia It will be further stretched if China decides to continue building ICBM silos. It’s critical that the U.S. builds and maintains a robust nuclear warfighting capability. With an effective triad of air sea and land based strategic nuclear weapons the United States is illustrating that it has options available for different contingencies. Added to this capability are tactical nuclear weapons based in Europe and the introduction of the low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile deployed on the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines. As diverse as this force is it still does not adequately deal with the addition of Chinese silos due to New START limitations China is steamrolling ahead to catch up.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The People’s Republic of China is fielding newer submarine-launched ballistic missiles that can fly farther distances. China is developing submarines with the ability to put the United States at risk of catastrophic nuclear attack from submarines according to a Pentagon report. China already operates six Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines armed with JL-2 intercontinental-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Now the People’s Liberation Army is preparing to produce a far more lethal longer-range JL-3 nuclear-armed ballistic missile variant. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is fielding newer SLBMs that can fly farther distances such as the JL-3 China “will gain the ability to target the continental United States from littoral waters and thus may consider bastion operations to enhance the survivability of its sea-based deterrent ” according to the Defense Department’s 2021 report on Military and Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China. Unlike the JL-2 which fires at more limited ranges the JL-3 will reportedly operate with an ability to travel as far as fifty-six hundred miles. That means Jin-class submarines will not need to operate close to the shore in order to pose a threat to the United States. “The current range limitations of the JL-2 will require the JIN to operate in areas north and east of Hawaii if the PRC seeks to target the east coast of the United States ” according to the report. The JL-3 substantially changes this calculus. The PRC currently operates six Jin-class SSBNs equipped to carry up to twelve JL-2 missiles. The range of these weapons restricts the geographical flexibility of Chinese commanders which would have a higher chance of being detected. This range extension of the JL-3 is significant because it enables the newer Chinese submarine-launched nuclear missiles to outrange the U.S. Navy’s Trident II D5 missiles which reportedly operate at ranges up to four thousand miles. Inland portions of mainland China are roughly ten thousand kilometers or so from the California coast. The math shows the JL-3 missiles will likely allow China’s nuclear-armed submarines to attack California or other parts of the United States from almost anywhere in the Pacific Ocean. </source> [/INST] <claim>China has already developed nuclear submarines far more powerful than US tech – Generals are SWEATING</claim> <psg>The People’s Republic of China is fielding newer submarine-launched ballistic missiles that can fly farther distances. China is developing submarines with the ability to put the United States at risk of catastrophic nuclear attack from submarines according to a Pentagon report. China already operates six Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines armed with JL-2 intercontinental-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Now the People’s Liberation Army is preparing to produce a far more lethal longer-range JL-3 nuclear-armed ballistic missile variant. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is fielding newer SLBMs that can fly farther distances such as the JL-3 China “will gain the ability to target the continental United States from littoral waters and thus may consider bastion operations to enhance the survivability of its sea-based deterrent ” according to the Defense Department’s 2021 report on Military and Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China. . That means Jin-class submarines will not need to operate close to the shore in order to pose a threat to the United States. The JL-3 substantially changes this calculus. This range extension of the JL-3 is significant because it enables the newer Chinese submarine-launched nuclear missiles to outrange the U.S. Navy’s Trident II D5 missiles which reportedly operate at ranges up to four thousand miles. Inland portions of mainland China are roughly ten thousand kilometers or so from the California coast. The math shows the JL-3 missiles will likely allow China’s nuclear-armed submarines to attack California or other parts of the United States from almost anywhere in the Pacific Ocean.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Word has it that China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy) has staged a breakthrough in submarine propulsion. Here's What You Need To Remember: The PLA Navy may be poised to overcome a technological and tactical defect that has plagued it since its founding. Word has it that China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy) has staged a breakthrough in submarine propulsion. At any rate that’s the word from marine engineer Rear Admiral Ma Weiming a specialist in electromagnetic systems. Admiral Ma recently reported on state-run CCTV that shipwrights are installing shaftless rim-driven pumpjets in China’s “next-generation nuclear submarines ” meaning attack or ballistic-missile boats. (Click here for a layman’s description of pumpjet technology.) Ma crowed that Chinese engineers are “now way ahead of the United States which has also been developing similar technology.” If Admiral Ma is playing it straight—rather than hyping promising but yet-to-be-proven gadgetry—then the PLA Navy is poised to overcome a technological and tactical defect that has plagued it since its founding. American submariners long lampooned Soviet and Chinese nuclear boats for being noisy and easy to detect. PLA Navy boats remained backward long after the Cold War. Ultraquiet propulsion though would put an end to unquestioned U.S. acoustic supremacy opening up new operational and strategic vistas before the PLA Navy while ushering in a deadlier phase of U.S.-China strategic competition. The rim-driven pumpjet is an electrically driven “propulsor” that simplifies and thus quiets an engineering plant. Older technology typically uses gears to connect the elements of a drive train. Steam spins the innards of high-speed turbines. Turbines spin far too fast for any main propulsion shaft or propeller however so ships outfitted with traditional engineering plants have “main reduction gears” that step down the speed of rotation drastically to speeds useful for the shaft that turns the screw and impels the hull through the water. Gears are noisemakers. Pumpjet technology dispenses with them simplifying and silencing plant operations. The design also reduces cavitation—bubbles churned up when a propeller turns rapidly underwater leaving low-pressure zones behind the blades where water can boil. Cavitation emits noise that enemy sonar operators may hear. Thus it can alert hostile anti-submarine-warfare (ASW) forces helping them find track and target the emitter. Hence the allure of novel technology that suppresses cavitation. Now there are ample grounds for skepticism toward Admiral Ma’s claims. New technology remains a hypothesis until tested out in real-world operations. But at the same time it’s doubtful Ma was simply showboating for Chinese TV viewers. Rising competitors have caught up with established navies before or even leapfrogged them in certain areas. The Imperial Japanese Navy defied expectations devising the Long Lance torpedo that it deployed to devastating effect at Pearl Harbor. The Soviet Navy concocted antiship missiles and torpedoes that give the U.S. Navy fits to this day. Thus it behooves us to ask what if: what if China pulls off a technological leap of similar magnitude? Set aside the question of whose submarines are quieter than whose. Boastfulness—the urge to be the biggest best and most of everything and to have others acknowledge it—forms a strand in China’s cultural DNA. Ma is indulging in it. But no one is going to hold a contest to measure noise given off by U.S. Navy and PLA Navy boats and award victory to the quietest fleet. Combat is the true arbiter of military effectiveness—and undersea combat hinges on whether “hiders” or “finders” prevail. It pits a sub’s capacity for silent running against the acuity of ASW sensors and operators trying to ferret it out. In other words if American hiders remain quiet enough to evade Chinese finders they hold the advantage of stealth. If acoustics has befriended the PLA Navy then American finders have a problem. And if both submarine services can elude ASW hunters then both they and surface fleets are in dire peril. “Peer” submarines could engage one another at close proximity in the deep or strike against surface vessels without warning. Indeed the surface of embattled oceans could verge on no-go territory. That prospect makes this thought experiment about the future of subsurface warfare worthwhile. Suppose rim-driven pumpjet propulsors do pan out for China’s navy. How might commanders use newly elusive boats? First of all they might afford nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs known to U.S. submariners as “boomers”) precedence when installing newfangled propulsion hardware. The PLA Navy already operates a sizable fleet of diesel-electric attack subs that satisfices for antiaccess/area-denial purposes. They can make shift until silent-running nuclear-powered attack subs (SSNs) join the fleet. SSNs can wait. By contrast the navy stands at the brink of fielding its first effective SSBNs. Fabricating a new capability would seem to take precedence over improving an old but adequate one—especially if the nation’s nuclear deterrent depends on the new capability. If this logic prevails how will the PLA Navy employ working boomers? To all appearances it envisions employing the South China Sea as an offshore “bastion” for SSBNs much as the Soviet Navy of yesteryear made semienclosed waters into protected bastions for its missile boats. Undersea deterrence then probably numbers among the motives impelling the PLA to transform rocks and atolls into fortified outposts acquaint itself with underwater hydrography and so forth. China’s Type 094 SSBNs or their pumpjet-equipped descendants could slip out of the sub base on Hainan Island descend into South China Sea waters lose themselves in the depths and dare rival navies to come into China’s “near seas”—expanses that fall under the shadow of land-based PLA missiles and aircraft—to hunt them. Or if Chinese Communist Party leaders feel comfortable granting SSBN skippers the liberty to venture outside the near seas (though that’s a lot of atomic firepower to entrust to a naval officer whose loyalties might prove suspect) the Luzon Strait affords a convenient entryway to the western Pacific. Within the strait lies the Bashi Channel a deep underwater thoroughfare into the Pacific. The weather between Luzon and the southern tip of Taiwan often works against airborne ASW. subs transiting the channel can conceal their whereabouts by diving beneath thermal layers that play tricks with sound. An ultraquiet SSBN in short could thrive in South China Sea patrol grounds—and beyond. Second PLA Navy commanders doubtless salivate at the prospect of ultraquiet attack boats. They could merge new SSNs—presumably the Type 095s under development—into their antiaccess defenses against the U.S. Pacific Fleet. They could package new with old units inventively. For example they could station a picket line of diesel boats and older Type 093 SSNs along likely axes of approach from Hawaii or U.S. West Coast seaports. Speedy but quiet Type 095s could act as “skirmishers ” operating forward of the pickets. SSNs could snipe at the Pacific Fleet’s flanks during its westward voyage while scouting for the rest of the fleet and for shore-based PLA defenders. They could mount piecemeal attacks against the American fleet or even try to herd it toward the picket line for additional punishment. PLA commanders thus could use ultramodern platforms to wring new value out of legacy platforms. Such an approach would harness the latest technology while staying true to China’s Maoist tradition of “active defense.” Active defense—which as Chinese military folk remind us remains the “essence” of Chinese military strategy decades after Mao Zedong’s demise—envisions luring foes deep into Chinese-held territory. PLA defenders stage tactical actions to weary enemies as they come. They fall on isolated units and try to smash them. Successive small-scale attacks enfeeble enemy forces setting the stage for decisive battle on Chinese ground. Think about the options that may become available to Chinese skippers as propulsor technology matures. Diesel boats could act as western Pacific pickets or congregate in wolfpacks to concentrate firepower from multiple axes. Relatively noisy Type 093s could act as decoys distracting American ASW hunters while Type 095s spring ambushes at opportune moments. And on and on. Commanders could combine and recombine forces in limitless ways—in keeping with China’s way of war. Call it undersea active defense. Third the advent of quiet-running SSNs would let the PLA Navy play submarine-on-submarine games reminiscent of those once played by U.S. and Soviet boats. To date lacking a peer to U.S. Navy Los Angeles– or Virginia-class SSNs the PLA Navy has employed its submarine fleet mainly as an antisurface force. It waits offshore for hostile forces to approach then does its best to pummel them with missiles or torpedoes. American submariners by contrast will tell you the best ASW weapon is another submarine. They view hunting subs as their chief contribution to high-seas warfare. Chinese submariners might follow suit if their boats ran quiet enough and boasted sensors sensitive enough to make sub-on-sub ASW an option. Or they might incorporate ASW into their operational portfolio while retaining the emphasis on antiship missions. Either way PLA submarine operations would take on an intensely offensive hue. No longer would the sub force be a mostly static force lofting antiship missiles toward adversary surface task forces. It would seek out adversary subs as well—and if successful project China’s antiaccess defenses into the depths in a serious way for the first time. No longer could the United States’ silent service prowl Asian waters with impunity. Indeed if both fleets were comparable in stealth cat-and-mouse games might predominate. This would be a dangerous business. Reaction times would be minimal if boats could only detect and track one another at intimate range. Proximity would magnify the prospect of collisions accidents of other types or even inadvertent exchanges of fire. Both navies and their political masters must think ahead about how to manage close-quarters encounters in the deep. And fourth the debut of pumpjet-equipped SSNs would empower Beijing to mount a standing presence in faraway recesses of the South China Sea and Indian Ocean for the first time. Diesel boats have ventured into the “far seas” in recent years but they must put into port at regular intervals to refuel. This exposes them to detection. SSNs can remain at sea and undersea as long as their food and stores hold out. The crew—not the engineering plant—thus constitutes the limiting factor on a nuclear-powered boat’s at-sea endurance. The Indian Navy has taken notice of PLA Navy forays into India’s home region and grasps the implications of high-tech Chinese SSNs cruising the Indian Ocean. Indeed some Indian mariners deem such a presence a red line for competition between the two navies. It can be no accident then that there’s an antisubmarine flair to this summer’s Malabar exercises among the Indian Navy U.S. Navy and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. All three navies dispatched aircraft carriers for maneuvers for the first time. The Japanese flattop JS Izumo is a euphemistically dubbed “helicopter destroyer” optimized for hunting submarines. What hostile subs may lurk in the Bay of Bengal where the exercises are underway apart from China’s? Hider-finder competition it seems has come to the Indian Ocean. Does new engineering technology herald an age of Chinese maritime supremacy? Of course not. Carl von Clausewitz portrays martial strife as constant struggle between “wrestlers” striving to “throw” each other for strategic gain. That goes for acoustic one-upmanship as well. One contender innovates. the other resolves to outdo it. It appears consequently that more equal undersea competition lies in store. To prepare for it U.S. Navy submariners must learn to think of PLA Navy subs not as prey to be devoured by American predators but as worthy foes capable of some sub hunting of their own. The silent service must adjust to the new old reality of peer competition beneath the waves. The game’s afoot. </source> [/INST] <claim>Ultraquiet propulsion means the Navy can’t detect them – proves counterforce fails</claim> <psg>China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy) has staged a breakthrough in submarine propulsion. The PLA Navy may be poised to overcome a technological and tactical defect that has plagued it since its founding. Word has it that China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy) has staged a breakthrough in submarine propulsion. At any rate that’s the word from marine engineer Rear Admiral Ma Weiming a specialist in electromagnetic systems. Admiral Ma recently reported on state-run CCTV that shipwrights are installing shaftless rim-driven pumpjets in China’s “next-generation nuclear submarines ” meaning attack or ballistic-missile boats. (Click here for a layman’s description of pumpjet technology.) Ma crowed that Chinese engineers are “now way ahead of the United States which has also been developing similar technology.” American submariners long lampooned Soviet and Chinese nuclear boats for being noisy and easy to detect. PLA Navy boats remained backward long after the Cold War. Ultraquiet propulsion though would put an end to unquestioned U.S. acoustic supremacy opening up new operational and strategic vistas before the PLA Navy while ushering in a deadlier phase of U.S.-China strategic competition. The design also reduces cavitation—bubbles churned up when a propeller turns rapidly underwater leaving low-pressure zones behind the blades where water can boil. Cavitation emits noise that enemy sonar operators may hear. Thus it can alert hostile anti-submarine-warfare (ASW) forces helping them find track and target the emitter. Hence the allure of novel technology that suppresses cavitation. The Imperial Japanese Navy defied expectations devising the Long Lance torpedo that it deployed to devastating effect at Pearl Harbor. The Soviet Navy concocted antiship missiles and torpedoes that give the U.S. Navy fits to this day. Thus it behooves us to ask what if: what if China pulls off a technological leap of similar magnitude? Either way PLA submarine operations would take on an intensely offensive hue. No longer would the sub force be a mostly static force lofting antiship missiles toward adversary surface task forces. It would seek out adversary subs as well—and if successful project China’s antiaccess defenses into the depths in a serious way for the first time. No longer could the United States’ silent service prowl Asian waters with impunity. Indeed if both fleets were comparable in stealth cat-and-mouse games might predominate. This would be a dangerous business. Reaction times would be minimal if boats could only detect and track one another at intimate range. Proximity would magnify the prospect of collisions accidents of other types or even inadvertent exchanges of fire. Both navies and their political masters must think ahead about how to manage close-quarters encounters in the deep. To prepare for it U.S. Navy submariners must learn to think of PLA Navy subs not as prey to be devoured by American predators but as worthy foes capable of some sub hunting of their own. The silent service must adjust to the new old reality of peer competition beneath the waves. The game’s afoot.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> China's push for mass military modernization includes new more advanced submarines to add to the world's largest navy causing U.S. partners in the region to scramble to acquire new capabilities of their own. Their answer to the rising underwater threat is a passenger plane-sized submarine killer called the P-8 Poseidon and orders for the aircraft are pouring in from countries like Australia and India. Both are members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue which also includes the U.S. and Japan as part of a quasi-alliance that seeks to enforce a 'free and open Indo-Pacific.' And countries as far away as Germany Norway and the United Kingdom have also purchased the aircraft. One senior Pentagon intelligence official said it's no coincidence that countries were buying up the anti-submarine warfare platform. 'China is expanding their undersea warfare capability to extend beyond the South China Sea which presents a strategic threat to not only nations with territorial disputes but throughout the entire Pacific area ' the official told Newsweek. 'It is essential for the national security of partner nations to have the ability to detect and monitor Chinese submarines. The P-8 Poseidon is the best capability to perform that task.' 'With an advanced anti-submarine warfare suite ' the official added 'the P-8 is the best answer to countering Chinese submarines.' A spokesperson for Boeing the U.S. aerospace company that produces the P-8 and its submarine-fighting P-8A variant said the aircraft was 'deployed around the world with more than 135 aircraft in service and over 400 000 collective mishap-free flight hours.' But even with these new capabilities in stock China's prowess continues to multiply presenting a formidable competitor as tensions simmer across the seas of Asia. The U.S. military's latest assessment of Chinese military power published in September 2020 estimated that China had 50 diesel-powered attack submarines six nuclear-powered attack submarines and four nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. The U.S. is estimated to possess roughly 68 submarines all nuclear-powered but China's fleet is expanding rapidly. The report described submarine development as a 'high priority' for the People's Liberation Army Navy and estimated that the force 'will likely maintain between 65 and 70 submarines through the 2020s replacing older units with more capable units on a near one-to-one basis.' China has set out to update two key submarine models the Xia-class Type 092 and the Jin-class Type 094 according to a report published last month by French submarine expert Eric Genevelle and retired U.S. Navy submarine sonar technician Richard W. Stirn. This campaign includes vessels equipped with nuclear-capable submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) as well as an array of other weapons such as anti-ship missiles and torpedos. The latest Chinese SLBM known as JL-2A has a range of nearly 8 600 kilometers more than 5 340 miles putting potential targets as far as the U.S. mainland within range as estimated in Genevelle and Stirn's paper. China's submarine fleet serves another important strategic function. These quiet undersea craft traverse the depths largely undetected making them ideal for gathering intelligence as they conduct missions as far out as the Indian Ocean. They also can serve to fortify Beijing's broad territorial claims across geopolitically sensitive spots in the South China Sea and East China Sea where Japan last month sent both warplanes and warships in response to a suspected Chinese submarine spotted too close for Tokyo's comfort to islands claimed by both countries. With the U.S. and partnered nations seeking to challenge China's version of the world map the People's Republic views submarines as a key asset. Using advanced monitoring equipment China seeks to establish what it refers to as a 'Great Underwater Wall' to keep tabs on some of the world's busiest waterways in the South China Sea. </source> [/INST] <claim>Chinese nuclear submarines are undetectable and numbers are increasing</claim> <psg>China's push for mass military modernization includes new more advanced submarines to add to the world's largest navy causing U.S. partners in the region to scramble to acquire new capabilities of their own. But even with these new capabilities in stock China's prowess continues to multiply presenting a formidable competitor as tensions simmer across the seas of Asia. The U.S. is estimated to possess roughly 68 submarines all nuclear-powered but China's fleet is expanding rapidly. The report described submarine development as a 'high priority' for the People's Liberation Army Navy and estimated that the force 'will likely maintain between 65 and 70 submarines through the 2020s replacing older units with more capable units on a near one-to-one basis.' This campaign includes vessels equipped with nuclear-capable submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) as well as an array of other weapons such as anti-ship missiles and torpedos. The latest Chinese SLBM known as JL-2A has a range of nearly 8 600 kilometers more than 5 340 miles putting potential targets as far as the U.S. mainland within range as estimated in Genevelle and Stirn's paper. These quiet undersea craft traverse the depths largely undetected making them ideal for gathering intelligence as they conduct missions as far out as the Indian Ocean. Using advanced monitoring equipment China seeks to establish what it refers to as a 'Great Underwater Wall' to keep tabs on some of the world's busiest waterways in the South China Sea.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> SAN FRANCISCO CALIFORNIA — A mysterious incident involving an American nuclear submarine in the South China Sea has analysts weighing the risk that a similar mishap — perhaps involving a U.S. treaty partner — could spark an unwanted conflagration between the United States and China. Experts say the danger is growing as Beijing aggressively advances its territorial claims in the South and East China seas while Western nations counter with a growing number of naval passages designed to support freedom of navigation through the contested waters. The stakes were further raised last month with the announcement of the new AUKUS alliance among the United States Britain and Australia which will provide Australia with 10 new nuclear-powered submarines. In the latest incident a U.S. nuclear-powered submarine hit an unknown underwater object on October 2 the U.S. Navy's Pacific Fleet said in a news release. The Navy said crewmembers aboard its Seawolf-class submarine USS Connecticut were hurt though no one's life was threatened and that it is investigating what happened. But an analysis published on the Chinese state-controlled CGTN news website said last week that the U.S. use of nuclear submarines to 'secretly infringe on China's maritime territory in the South China Sea runs the risk of triggering a war between these two major powers by miscalculation.' The CGTN analyst is not the only one who is worried. Other experts tell VOA they fear that a more serious incident between China and a U.S. treaty ally such as Japan or the Philippines could under certain circumstances trigger a severe response from Washington. The exact U.S. recourse would depend on the details of the actual incident said Scott Harold Washington-based senior political scientist with the Rand Corporation research organization. 'Is a bump an attack or does it have to result in an injury or an actual death or a sinking?' Harold asked. 'I think those would be areas where U.S. policymakers and in particular U.S. defense officials and military officers would be very quickly trying to assess what is the intention what is the threshold is the host nation — meaning the third-party Japan or the Philippines — is it able to respond without the United States?' The U.S. Indo Pacific Command in Hawaii did not answer requests for comment on the risk of accidents near China. China's neighbors US alliances China calls about 90% of the South China Sea its own despite competing claims from the Philippines and three other Southeast Asian countries that are sympathetic to the West. Beijing claims all of Taiwan a self-ruled island that's supported by Washington and vies with Japan for control over parts of the East China Sea. Successive U.S. presidents have seen their Asian allies as buffers against China in any showdown between superpowers. Treaties obligate Washington to consider helping its allies in military crises. Increasing numbers of Chinese military flights near Taiwan where the island's air force sometimes chases the planes away is raising the specter of a mishap now analysts believe. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act gives Washington the option of intervening on Taipei's behalf. 'How long do you keep poking your fist in Taiwan's face before you miscalculate at one point?' asked Carl Thayer emeritus professor of politics at the University of New South Wales in Australia. 'The aircraft could cross a line or Taiwan's air defenses which have been turned on and locked onto some of these flights as a warning could lead to firing missiles.' News reports this month saying the United States has stationed troops in Taiwan for at least a year could prompt an angry China to send more planes toward the island said Oh Ei Sun senior fellow at the Singapore Institute of International Affairs. The Philippines for its part might risk an accident with Chinese vessels even if warned against it by the United States Oh said. The 2022 Philippine presidential race could be a trigger point he added if Sino-Philippine relations become a campaign issue. Vessels from China and the Philippines got into a protracted standoff in 2012 over Scarborough Shoal a fisheries-rich feature that each side claims as its own. 'I think the Filipinos they are very independent minded and when something happened the U.S. may be obligated by treaty obligation to come to their rescue ' Oh said. A miscalculation involving China and Japan would probably prompt the United States to examine 'gray zone contingencies' before responding Harold said. Those would mean learning for example whether the mishap involved Chinese naval boats or fishing boats Harold said. U.S. officials would explore further whether Japan needed U.S. help or could follow up on its own he said. Allies including the United States U.K. and Australia are making ever clearer to China that they would 'react in a contingency ' Harold said. Informal Sino-foreign channels to bury accidents China and the United States have their own informal resolution channel for collisions and accidental misfires lowering the risk of conflict analysts believe. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command holds regular maritime consultations with the PLA to boost sea and air safety while reviewing any incidents a command spokesperson said. “U.S. Indo-Pacific Command vessels and aircraft comply with international laws and norms that guide safe and professional operations in international waters and airspace and we rely on other nations operating in the Indo-Pacific to do the same ” the spokesperson said. Beijing hopes to avoid war but will fume and blame the United States over any accidents they say. China did both after the deadly U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999 during a war over Kosovo — Washington called the strike accidental — and after the 2001 emergency landing of a U.S. reconnaissance plane that two Chinese fighter jets had chased near China's south coast. 'The situation has become a chicken game basically and countries are just shadowing each other ' said Eduardo Araral associate professor at the National University of Singapore's public policy school. 'There's no intention to harm each other probably but accidents can and do happen.' </source> [/INST] <claim>Independently China’s development of nuclear subs causes miscalc – extinction</claim> <psg>A mysterious incident involving an American nuclear submarine in the South China Sea has analysts weighing the risk that a similar mishap — perhaps involving a U.S. treaty partner — could spark an unwanted conflagration between the United States and China. But an analysis published on the Chinese state-controlled CGTN news website said last week that the U.S. use of nuclear submarines to 'secretly infringe on China's maritime territory in the South China Sea runs the risk of triggering a war between these two major powers by miscalculation.' Other experts tell VOA they fear that a more serious incident between China and a U.S. treaty ally such as Japan or the Philippines could under certain circumstances trigger a severe response from Washington. 'Is a bump an attack or does it have to result in an injury or an actual death or a sinking?' Harold asked. 'I think those would be areas where U.S. policymakers and in particular U.S. defense officials and military officers would be very quickly trying to assess what is the intention what is the threshold is the host nation — meaning the third-party Japan or the Philippines — is it able to respond without the United States?' Beijing hopes to avoid war but will fume and blame the United States over any accidents they say. China did both after the deadly U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999 during a war over Kosovo — Washington called the strike accidental — and after the 2001 emergency landing of a U.S. reconnaissance plane that two Chinese fighter jets had chased near China's south coast. 'The situation has become a chicken game basically and countries are just shadowing each other 'There's no intention to harm each other probably but accidents can and do happen.'</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> SQUID-based magnetometers still suffer from major disadvantages: they require extreme cooling and can be challenging to set up.40 Together with their detection range this currently makes it unlikely that SQUIDs will be put on satellites anytime soon. While cryogenic cooling is already used in space for astronomy missions it remains overly expensive. Moreover space radiation seriously affects superconductive technology generated signals.41 Another problem is the lack of market proof processing solutions to image and identify findings. Furthermore submarines can apply magnetic shielding. Similarly to preventing acoustic detection stealth technology can minimise their magnetic signature. Deploying magnetometers on planes ships or unmanned aerial surface or underwater vehicles (UAV UUS UUV respectively) could provide more of a step-development in anti-submarine warfare. But these platforms also pose some constraints. UAVs require lightweight small volume and very low power consumption devices.42 UUVs’ limiting factor is its battery life determined by the power demands of the propulsion and onboard systems.43 As one sensor produces too much noise it requires spatial correlation of a signal from more detectors. An array of detectors is necessary. Yet networked UAVs or UUV’s covering a specific area to find a submarine could prove too costly especially if they turn easy to defeat. As such quantum magnetometers will unlikely be a game-changer for now. Even if they improve the location range to say 100 kilometres this remains a location which requires prior knowledge of the submarine’s rough position </source> [/INST] <claim>Wrong. Major disadvantages like cooling and stealth technology.</claim> <psg>SQUID-based magnetometers still suffer from major disadvantages they require extreme cooling and can be challenging to set up. Together with their detection range this currently makes it unlikely that SQUIDs will be put on satellites anytime soon. space radiation seriously affects superconductive technology generated signals Another problem is the lack of market proof processing solutions to image and identify findings Furthermore submarines can apply magnetic shielding stealth technology can minimise their magnetic signature. UAVs require lightweight small volume and very low power consumption devices.42 UUVs’ limiting factor is its battery life determined by the power demands of the propulsion and onboard systems networked UAVs or UUV’s covering a specific area to find a submarine could prove too costly especially if they turn easy to defeat. As such quantum magnetometers will unlikely be a game-changer for now</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Quantum gravity gradiometers will be very sensitive. That creates two problems. First although putting them in space would solve the issue of their subsequent sensitivity to ground noise space-based quantum gravity sensing or mapping is unlikely to detect submarines. Due to a combination of instrument sensitivity and satellite altitude satellite gravity sensing will have a limited spatial resolution on the ground. Even if the currently estimated achievable resolution of around 100 km could be reduced up to 10 km it would still be a few orders of magnitude the size of a submarine.46 Whether further improvements will be possible remains to be seen after the first quantum gravity gradiometers are put into space. Second even if the spatial resolution would improve gravity gradiometers would see a lot from space as a lot is happening in and above waters – think for instance of commercial underwater infrastructure surface ships planes etc. Even if a gravity gradiometer would be able to detect and distinguish a submarine further intelligence will need to determine whose and what type of submarine it sees. Yet classification is tough. Like with birdwatching one needs to know very well what to look for. Next to SSBNs waters are crowded with commercial research and conventional military submarines. In 2019 militaries of 40 states operated 491 conventional and nuclear subs.47 That number excludes those owned privately or by research institutions. Distinguishing a strategic nuclear submarine would thus most likely make only sense through continuous tracking so tracing nuclear submarines down from their known ports/bastions. While submarines can shield themselves from magnetic or acoustic detection there are no methods to shield from gravity gradiometers. Simply because such methods have not been necessary so far. Should this change however in the first instance decision-makers will likely do all possible to hide their submarines better. One could design ways to decrease the detectable gravity signature by improving mass distribution on a submarines’ hull. That would need to happen at the already overly complex design stage of a submarine. Correcting mass distribution in hindsight could turn out very tricky. Moving masses in a significant way on a vessel is not easy in itself and might upset other optimisation efforts. States building new SSBNs today would need to consider this in advance. </source> [/INST] <claim>Sensibility issues and adversaries adapt.</claim> <psg>space-based quantum gravity sensing or mapping is unlikely to detect submarines Due to a combination of instrument sensitivity and satellite altitude satellite gravity sensing will have a limited spatial resolution on the ground Second even if the spatial resolution would improve gravity gradiometers would see a lot from space as a lot is happening in and above waters Even if a gravity gradiometer would be able to detect and distinguish a submarine further intelligence will need to determine whose and what type of submarine it sees Should this change however in the first instance decision-makers will likely do all possible to hide their submarines better One could design ways to decrease the detectable gravity signature by improving mass distribution on a submarines’ hull</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Most research across disciplines unanimously agrees that it is immoral to detonate an atomic weapon due to both short and long-term catastrophic effects. Therefore this piece shall not focus on the actual use of nuclear weapons but instead analyze the latter question. Using various philosophical concepts it will explore the fundamental question as to whether any implementation of nuclear deterrence that involves a risk to civilians is morally acceptable. The models though differing in origin and rationale provide a unique lens from which to view this ethical dilemma. </source> [/INST] <claim>Utilization of nuclear weapons is unethical – puts innocent lives at risk which is intrinsically wrong. </claim> <psg>Most research across disciplines unanimously agrees that it is immoral to detonate an atomic weapon due to both short and long-term catastrophic effects.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> With issues such as the Syrian Civil War taking a central role in current political discussion it is important to understand fully what is occurring in the conversations surrounding them. As some people call for an attack on Syria to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction or the nation being used as an Al Qaeda base to attack the United States others call for an overthrow of the current regime because its actions to date have been unethical. What exactly does this mean? When analyzing warfare how can one frame ethics in such a way as to capture the nuance that goes into warfare? This becomes even more relevant when assessing the potential threats posed by North Korea and Iran. Whether it is regarding the use of a computer virus to attack an Iranian nuclear centrifuge or a missile to level a regime facility in Syria the issue at hand remains the same. whether preemptive warfare is ever ethically justifiable. Nations like Iran Syria and North Korea could all pose very real and imminent threats and it is important to understand the proper way to approach that problem just like any other. Should there be room in ethics for the preemptive strike? The answer is no. There are three philosophies that represent the ethics of war. These schools are Realism Pacifism and Just War Theory. There could be other names for methods of approaching and viewing war and peace but they will always fall into one of the three previously mentioned traditional philosophies based on the ethical criteria and principles of each. These approaches are evidently dominant in this regard. First it is important to understand what makes each idea distinct and different from the other. Pacifism1 is unique in positing that no use of force is ever ethically justified. In Pacifism the thoughts and notions of what is or is not ethical is applied broadly to relationships between nation-states. In this school of thought it would not make sense to try to determine whether a war is just. This is because the result of every attempt to make a determination would yield the same result. that war is not just and therefore not ever ethically justifiable. By contrast Just War Theory2 is on occasion favorable toward war and conflict. For Pacifism war is always and continually wrong. War can never be a solution and there is always a better way to resolve the problem that is generating the conflict rather than fighting. </source> [/INST] <claim>Preemptive strikes are not ethically justified—other ways to resolve conflict</claim> <psg>With issues such as the Syrian Civil War taking a central role in current political discussion it is important to understand fully what is occurring in the conversations surrounding them. ? When analyzing warfare how can one frame ethics in such a way as to capture the nuance that goes into warfare? . Nations like Iran Syria and North Korea could all pose very real and imminent threats and it is important to understand the proper way to approach that problem just like any other. Should there be room in ethics for the preemptive strike? The answer is no. no use of force is ever ethically justified. Pacifism the thoughts and notions of what is or is not ethical is applied broadly to relationships between nation-states. In this school of thought it would not make sense to try to determine whether a war is just. This is because the result of every attempt to make a determination would yield the same result. that war is not just and therefore not ever ethically justifiable War can never be a solution and there is always a better way to resolve the problem that is generating the conflict rather than fighting.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The most immediate effect of a nuclear explosion is an intense burst of nuclear radiation primarily gamma rays and neutrons. This direct radiation is produced in the weapon’s nuclear reactions themselves and lasts well under a second. Lethal direct radiation extends nearly a mile from a 10-kiloton explosion. With most weapons though direct radiation is of little significance because other lethal effects generally encompass greater distances. An important exception is the enhanced-radiation weapon or neutron bomb which maximizes direct radiation and minimizes other destructive effects. </source> [/INST] <claim>Nuclear explosions lead to dangerous after effects – nuclear radiation produces lethal effects that encompass greater distances </claim> <psg>The most immediate effect of a nuclear explosion is an intense burst of nuclear radiation primarily gamma rays and neutrons This direct radiation is produced in the weapon’s nuclear reactions themselves and lasts well under a second direct radiation is of little significance because other lethal effects generally encompass greater distances</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Chinese research indicates that its pursuit of artificial intelligence (AI) crosses a broad spectrum of both civilian and military arenas. Currently the indication is that the vast majority of Chinese investment of labor and cost is being trained on unmanned systems and surveillance capabilities that aid in policing and counterterrorism activities. When it comes to its nuclear arsenal much like the majority of other countries with nuclear weapons there are no indications at this time that AI would be directly integrated into a nuclear platform. </source> [/INST] <claim>AI is being developed for domestic capabilities – not nuclear usage. </claim> <psg>artificial intelligence crosses a broad spectrum of both civilian and military arenas indication is that the vast majority of Chinese investment is being trained on unmanned systems and surveillance capabilities that aid in policing and counterterrorism When it comes to its nuclear arsenal much like the majority of other countries there are no indications at this time that AI would be directly integrated into a nuclear platform.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> In this light as a horizontal technology that can be applied across all sectors artificial intelligence (AI) has become a strategic priority and the Chinese focus on superiority in this field is touted as something about which the U.S. should be concerned. Some have gone so far as to conclude that the West has already lost the AI race. </source> [/INST] <claim>China won’t outpace US AI – strategic disadvantages constraining their manufacturing sector prevents industry dominance. </claim> <psg>In this light as a horizontal technology that can be applied across all sectors artificial intelligence (AI) has become a strategic priority and the Chinese focus on superiority i . Some have gone so far as to conclude that the West has already lost the AI race.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> When it comes to advancements in artificial intelligence technology China does have a lead in some places — like spying on its own people and using facial recognition technology to identify political dissenters. But those are areas where the U.S. simply isn't pointing its investments in artificial intelligence said director of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center. Where it counts the U.S. leads he said. </source> [/INST] <claim>Even if China is ahead in some places there’s no impact – the US is ahead in places it counts. </claim> <psg>China does have a lead in some places — like spying on its own people and using facial recognition technology to identify political dissenters. But those are areas where the U.S. simply isn't pointing its investments in artificial intelligence said director of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center. Where it counts the U.S. leads he said.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> In July 2017 the Chinese government under President Xi Jinping released a development plan for the nation to become the world leader in AI by 2030 including investing billions of dollars in AI startups and research parks. </source> [/INST] <claim>China lags behind the US despite President Xi’s plans</claim> <psg>In July 2017 the Chinese government under President Xi Jinping released a development plan for the nation to become the world leader in AI by 2030</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> China is poised to introduce a new regulation on gene editing in humans. A draft of the country’s new civil code lists human genes and embryos in a section on personality rights to be protected. Experiments on genes in adults or embryos that endanger human health or violate ethical norms can accordingly be seen as a violation of a person’s fundamental rights. Lawyers say the regulation would mean that anyone who manipulates genes in humans is responsible for what happens to a person. “The law makes clear that those who do research with human genes and embryos cannot endanger human health or violate ethics ” says Zhang Peng a criminal-law scholar at Beijing Wuzi University. China has been revising its civil code — the overarching legal framework that governs non-criminal disputes in areas such as marriage inheritance and personal rights — since 2002. The latest draft was submitted last month to the country’s chief legislative body the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and is likely to be adopted next March. The inclusion of gene editing in the latest draft of the new civil code was a last-minute addition however — prompted by uproar over gene-editing experiments carried out last November by Chinese biophysicist He Jiankui. He claimed to have done experiments on human embryos that resulted in twin girls whose DNA had been engineered to make them less susceptible to contracting HIV. The controversial experiments drew condemnation in China and internationally and led to He’s sacking from the Southern University of Science and Technology in Shenzhen in January. He was also censured by Chinese authorities but it was not clear whether he had broken any of the country’s laws. The revised civil code places experiments using human genes or embryos under the section of the code that ensures a person’s right to physical well-being freedom privacy and dignity. It is the first time that regulations relating to genomes have been included in the civil code says Zhang. If the new code had been in effect when He was considering his experiments it might have dissuaded him says Zhang. Even if He’s work did make the twin girls less likely to get HIV it’s possible that he inadvertently increased their susceptibility to other infectious diseases. But there’s also a danger that his experiments made unintended modifications in their genomes as often happens in gene-editing experiments in the laboratory leaving the twins vulnerable to genetic diseases. Under these regulations such gene-editing experiments would be illegal says Zhang. In March the health ministry also drafted regulations that would require scientists to get approval before editing human embryos and would impose penalties for those who broke the rules. </source> [/INST] <claim>No CRISPR impact – China regulating in squo</claim> <psg>China is to introduce a new regulation on gene editing in humans. Experiments on genes in adults or embryos that endanger human health or violate ethical norms can accordingly be seen as a violation of a person’s fundamental rights. the regulation would mean that anyone who manipulates genes in humans is responsible for what happens to a person. China has been revising its civil code The latest draft was submitted last month to the country’s chief legislative body biophysicist He Jiankui was censured by Chinese authorities The revised civil code places experiments using human genes or embryos under the section of the code that ensures a person’s right to physical well-being freedom privacy and dignity. It is the first time that regulations relating to genomes have been included in the civil code the health ministry also drafted regulations that would require scientists to get approval before editing human embryos and would impose penalties for those who broke the rules.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> John Ratcliffe is particularly concerned about China’s rapid advancements in ‘CRISPR-Cas9’ genetic engineering technology. CRISPR-Cas9 is a revolutionary technology that enables geneticists and medical researchers to edit specific regions of the genome by deleting inserting or modifying DNA sequences. This is a very strong tool for a genetic alteration that was initially designed with the goal of curing hereditary illnesses. In 2020 two biologists were given the Noble Prize for this technology: Emmanuelle Charpentier and Jennifer Doudna. In 2018 He Jian Kui a researcher working in China claimed to have used this procedure to create two genetically modified human infants named ‘Lulu’ and ‘Nina’. Initially this achievement was lauded throughout the world but subsequently as experts dug deeper into He Jian Kui’s method they harshly criticized it for ethical reasons. Without any methodical approach and without investigating the consequences of these experiments can result in fatal diseases in humans. In response to the global outrage He Jian Kui was sentenced to three years imprisonment by a Chinese court. Later in the year the Chinese government committed to enacting legislation governing human gene editing. However Ratcliffe’s accusation that China conducts biological tests on its soldiers has dragged back China into the argument. Ratcliffe is not the only one to make such claims. Earlier this year two researchers Elsa Kania and Wilson Vorndick expressed concern about China’s possible use of ‘CRISPR-Cas9’ technology to weaponize its soldiers. Additionally they asserted that China is attempting to connect biotechnology supercomputing and cognitive sciences. Furthermore both researchers asserted that ‘Biotechnology’ was a primary priority area for China’s strategic and defence development. One point worth noting is that neither Elsa Kania nor Wilson Vorndick claimed that China has achieved any success with these methods of genetically engineering their army. They only stated that the Chinese army is actively engaged in genetic engineering. Ambition Vs Reality Wilson Vorndick a former navy officer seemed more concerned with the future consequences of gene editing than with China’s ability to build super-soldiers. In 2019 the science journal ‘Nature’ expressed concern that gene-editing techniques could have negative consequences for humans. These approaches have the potential to cause major mutations posing harm to the entire humanity. Additionally the mutation created by the technique will be very difficult to be detected. Although China has denied all of these allegations and described the US as a malicious propagandist. However due to China’s lack of transparency verifying the veracity of claims is exceedingly difficult. However some experts suggest it is exceedingly unlikely that China will succeed in such endeavours in the near future. Let's understand why? Possibility of Super-Soldier In a report published in BBC Elsa Kania disagrees with Ratcliff’s assertions believing that China is only conducting field trials for exploratory purposes and developing a super-soldier is not easy for any nation across the world. Because our resources are insufficient to develop a super-soldier via genetic engineering at the moment. Additionally she cites the ineffectiveness of gene editing techniques in mature adults when compared to embryonic gene editing. Dr. Helen O’Neill a molecular geneticist at University College London also disagrees with Ratcliff’s claim she is more worried about the possibilities of such technology than with the production of super-soldiers. Pointing out the limitation of gene-editing technology scientists Christophe Galichet underscores the lack of precision of these technologies. He continued ‘Although gene editing is conceivable we are still unknown about the complete function of genes. if we change a sequence of DNA it is possible that it may confer additional strength on the subject but it is also possible that it will have unintended consequences. Additionally some experts believe that China is being inspired by the west in these initiatives. According to a 2017 report from ‘The Guardian ’ US military agencies are investing millions of dollars in gene extinction technologies that can be used to eradicate malarial mosquitoes invasive rodents and other species.’ This has raised concerns because while they intend to use the technology to eradicate invasive species but it has the potential to be misused. France and the United Kingdom both issued guidelines in 2020 directing researchers to conduct research on enhanced soldiers within critical boundaries. Although numerous western countries conducted genetic engineering research none aroused as many ethical concerns as China. Impact on Geopolitics BGI (Beijing Genomics Institute) a Chinese genome sequencing company had marketed millions of COVID-19 test kits outside of China. Apart from this BGI’s parental test kits are quite well-known worldwide. However Reuters uncovered in an independent study that ‘this Chinese corporation is selling prenatal tests globally manufacturing these kits in partnership with the country’s military and utilizing them to harvest genetic data from millions of women for large-scale population studies. US security officials warned American labs against using such China-made testing kits as these can be leveraged for the collection of genetic data in order to push genome research in China. Even though BGI rejects these charges Reuter stated that the evidence in hand is insufficient to prove anything but the connections between BGI and the Chinese PLA are deeper. China has strengthened the linkages between its commercial firms and military-related research activities in recent years. Previously BGI collaborated with the PLA on the development of technology to prevent altitude sickness among Chinese soldiers. The majority of China’s population lives in Western China whereas their most significant borders with India are in the south and west. these borders are characterized by high altitude topography. According to ‘The New Indian Express ’ China is currently constructing multiple permanent military structures around the India-China border named the LAC(Line of Actual Control). China attempted to intrude on the Indian side of the border on numerous occasions resulting in numerous clashes the most notable one was the ‘Galwan Clashes.’ Both sides suffered huge losses in the ‘Galwan clashes’ due to the high altitude and rough terrain. The higher altitude on the Chinese side across LAC gives China an operational advantage during times of conflict. However the Chinese army suffers a lot to defend these posts along LAC because of high altitude sickness and related health problems. PLA has performed a variety of scientific studies in the past to address concerns about China’s west and south-west border’s higher altitude. Even if this doesn't conclude the possibility of a super-soldier experts say this is alarming because it is the first step toward a military-genetic engineering link. Conclusion Although Ratcliff’s assertions appear a little far-fetched China’s suspicious practices refocus analysts’ attention on them. Even if they succeed in generating mutant super-soilers it will take them a minimum of a century of time because our existing scientific understanding is insufficient to accomplish such a feat. However due to China’s lack of transparency we would never know what is truly going on inside the country. </source> [/INST] <claim>No super soldiers – insufficient knowledge and it takes at least a century to develop.</claim> <psg>Ratcliffe is concerned about China’s rapid advancements in ‘CRISPR-Cas9’ genetic engineering technology Elsa Kania and Wilson Vorndick expressed concern about China’s possible use of ‘CRISPR-Cas9’ technology to weaponize its soldiers One point worth noting is that neither Elsa Kania nor Wilson Vorndick claimed that China has achieved any success with these methods of genetically engineering their army. They only stated that the Chinese army is actively engaged in genetic engineering it is exceedingly unlikely that China will succeed in such endeavours China is only conducting field trials for exploratory purposes and developing a super-soldier is not easy for any nation across the world Because our resources are insufficient to develop a super-soldier via genetic engineering at the moment e cites the ineffectiveness of gene editing techniques in mature adults when compared to embryonic gene editing Although gene editing is conceivable we are still unknown about the complete function of genes. if we change a sequence of DNA it is possible that it may confer additional strength on the subject but it is also possible that it will have unintended consequences Ratcliff’s assertions appear a little far-fetched Even if they succeed in generating mutant super-soilers it will take them a minimum of a century of time because our existing scientific understanding is insufficient to accomplish such a feat</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> However an advanced biological weapons program is not enough to classify as a threat. there also needs to be a real intent to use those weapons. When it comes to China’s intention it is possible that China would not choose to use biological weapons in any capacity because of the suffering the country saw due to Japan’s use of Shigella and plague against the nation. During the 1991 BTWC Review Conference the Chinese delegation stated “Of bacteriological weapons China has always advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of biological weapons and pursues a policy of not developing producing or stockpiling this type of weapon.”20 More recently the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated in 2011 that China continues to support the “complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction including biological weapons.”21 At the same time China was not involved in the BTWC negotiations and before signing the treaty ensured the inclusion of a clause that meant the treaty was only binding if all other countries in the treaty were also following the guidelines essentially giving the state an out to not only pursue biological weapons but to use them if necessary.22 This action indicates that the Chinese wish to leave the possibility of using biological weapons open as a policy option which in turns means a certain amount of willingness to utilize the weapons if the need arose. Overall China may have the capability but Beijing may not have the will to put its own people at risk which is what makes the new subfield of genetic weapons both fascinating and frightening. </source> [/INST] <claim>No impact to Chinese bioweapons.</claim> <psg>an advanced biological weapons program is not enough to classify as a threat. there also needs to be a real intent to use those weapons. China would not choose to use biological weapons in any capacity because of the suffering the country saw due to Japan’s use of Shigella and plague against the nation. During the 1991 BTWC Review Conference China advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of biological weapons and pursues a policy of not developing producing or stockpiling this type of weapon China continues to support the “complete prohibition and thorough destruction of biological weapons Overall China may have the capability but Beijing may not have the will to put its own people at risk</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> China is now taking substantial and decided steps forward to solidify the air-leg of a “nuclear triad” with the addition of a nuclear-capable H-6N bomber according to the Pentagon’s recently released 2021 report on China’s military capability. </source> [/INST] <claim>China already has the nuclear triad.</claim> <psg>China is now taking substantial steps to solidify the “nuclear triad” with the addition of a nuclear-capable H-6N bomber according to the Pentagon’s recently released 2021 report on China’s military capability.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Will India Side With the West Against China? A Test Is at Hand The United States and its allies have long wanted India’s help in confronting China. Now a deadly border clash seems likely to push India in that direction. For years the United States and its allies have tried to persuade India to become a closer military and economic partner in confronting China’s ambitions painting it as a chance for the world’s largest democracy to counterbalance the largest autocracy. Last week the idea of such a confrontation became more real as Indian and Chinese soldiers clashed in the worst violence on the countries’ border in 45 years leaving 20 Indian troops dead and causing an unknown number of Chinese casualties. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has publicly reveled in the prospect of a more muscular role for India in the region and the world. But analysts say the new tensions with China will be the starkest test yet of whether India is ready — or truly willing — to jostle with a rising power bent on expanding its interests and territory. With China facing new scrutiny and criticism over the coronavirus pandemic Indian officials have recently seemed emboldened taking steps that made Western diplomats feel that their goal of an India closer to the West was starting to be realized. And some believe the friction with China will push India even further in that direction. This month India signed a major defense agreement with Australia that allows both countries to use each other’s military bases. And it is expected to invite Australia to join naval exercises it conducts with Japan and the United States to strengthen efforts by the so-called Quad — Australia Japan the United States and India — to counter China’s projection of sea power in the region. India’s campaign for a larger profile in multinational organizations has also moved quickly. On Wednesday it was elected unopposed to a nonpermanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. And in May it won the chair of the World Health Organization’s executive board where it promptly supported calls to investigate the origins of the coronavirus — an inquiry China had fought to block. But India is still well behind China when it comes to military and economic power. That may give India’s leaders pause over the prospect of an armed escalation on their disputed Himalayan border where the bloody clashes broke out last week. “India will have to deploy all three — military economic and political options ” said Samir Saran the president of the Observer Research Foundation an influential think tank in Delhi. “China is a large and powerful country and a sustained response to their aggression will have to include all of these.” “The defense of liberalism and democracy and an international open system will play out between India and China ” he said. Chinese and Indian generals continue to meet along the border to discuss de-escalation efforts. And Indian officials acknowledged on Friday that the night before China released 10 Indian soldiers seized during the fighting. (Later China’s foreign ministry spokesman said he did not know of any prisoners being taken but did not explicitly deny India’s announcement.) But the troop buildup is continuing with villagers in the area and satellite imagery indicating that both sides are still sending in reinforcements. On Saturday the Indian government released a statement blaming China for trying to erect structures across the disputed border in territory Delhi considers its own. The government added that it would not allow China to make any unilateral changes to the border. Though India denies it independent military analysts have estimated that Chinese troops have seized control of about 23 square miles of Indian territory in the past two months But India’s military ability to retaliate may be limited for now. While its military is one of the world’s largest it has failed to modernize and stay competitive watching as China rapidly surpassed it over recent decades. This year India announced a military budget of nearly $74 billion compared with Beijing’s $178 billion. In India’s case much of that spending is going to pay pensions. Economically India has become more willing to use its vast market as a lever to pressure China. In April it passed legislation requiring government approval for any investments from Chinese entities a setback for China as its companies look abroad for growth. And Reuters reported on Thursday that India planned to raise tariffs on Chinese goods. Diplomats expect India to prevent the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei from entering its market to build a 5G wireless network. The United States accuses Huawei of aiding the Chinese government in cyberespionage and it has urged its allies to block the company’s 5G development. Although India’s potential buying power gives it one way to slap at China it has nowhere near the spending and lending capacity that China has used to increase its global influence. Still Indian officials have embraced the idea of being a democratic counterbalance to China and the coronavirus has offered a chance to push that narrative as countries fume over Beijing’s handling of the pandemic. Indian political figures went on the offensive after the pandemic began criticizing China’s authoritarian system and its lack of transparency as the coronavirus spread beyond the city of Wuhan where it is widely thought to have begun. Vijay Gokhale who recently retired as India’s foreign secretary and is still close to the government wrote a lengthy opinion piece this month in which he blasted China’s handling of the pandemic. “The shortcomings of the regime ” he wrote “will further fuel a debate on the superiority of the Chinese model as an alternative to democracy. Will this form the ideological underpinning for the birth of a new Cold War?” The pandemic also gave Mr. Modi a chance to tap his country’s giant pharmaceutical industry to strengthen diplomatic ties. Diplomats stationed in India say that in the early days of the crisis he and his foreign minister were “constantly working the phones” to offer countries help with medicines. One Western diplomat felt that the coronavirus crisis had made India more eager to build stronger relationships to help it deal with China and that diplomacy with India was going more smoothly than ever before. “Everyone is more willing privately to talk about what to do with China in a post-Covid world ” the diplomat said speaking on condition of anonymity. “The ways that China has influenced that world order can now more easily be discussed as we are all trying to figure out what the new world order is. “India represents one path ” the diplomat added “and China represents another.” More immediately India faces the prospect of an escalation at the border where China had been building up its forces before the violence last week. “India wants peace ” Mr. Modi said Wednesday “but if provoked India is capable of giving a befitting reply.” China’s push at the border is not an isolated show of strength. Since the pandemic’s start China has flexed harder on many different fronts: It sank a Vietnamese shipping boat harassed Malaysian oil rig operations and tightened its control over Hong Kong in hopes of stamping out the pro-democracy movement there. But India has several reasons to feel particularly hemmed in by China. Over the past decade China has heavily courted India’s neighbors unraveling New Delhi’s influence on its own doorstep. As Indian and Chinese troops clashed in the Himalayas Nepal’s government simultaneously claimed a sliver of territory on its border that India considers its own. India’s defense minister recently suggested that Nepal’s border actions were taken at the behest of China. In Pakistan India’s archrival China is building huge infrastructure projects some in territory that the Indian government disputes. With every project built China is making it harder for India to hold on to its territorial claims. And right off India’s southern coast China took possession of a port in Sri Lanka after that country could not pay its debt to Beijing. Some Indian officials fear that China could militarize the port which Sri Lanka denies. “India went from having a monopoly of political and military power in the region to dealing with a marketplace of competition where China is increasingly predominant ” said Constantino Xavier a fellow at the Brookings Institution. He predicted that the new wave of border violence would prompt India to push back harder. Some see China’s buildup on the border as a calculated effort to keep India’s aspirations in check. “China doesn’t particularly want India to succeed ” said Tanvi Madan the director of the India Project at the Brookings Institution. “A weaker India will do less strategically in its own neighborhood allowing China to step in more. and it will engage less in places like East Africa or in regional institutions posing little challenge to China.” China has also been sensitive about the prospects of closer ties between India and the West. On Wednesday Global Times a mouthpiece for the Chinese Communist Party published an editorial claiming that the United States had given Mr. Modi’s government false confidence and that it would ultimately abandon India. “The resources that the U.S. would invest in China-India relations are limited ” the editorial read. “What the U.S. would do is just extend a lever to India which Washington can exploit to worsen India’s ties with China.” Despite warm meetings between Mr. Modi and President Trump their countries’ relationship has at times been rocky. But given China’s increasingly hard line in territorial disputes some Indian officials fear there may be little choice but to look West. In an opinion piece last week Mr. Gokhale the former Indian foreign secretary said that countries could no longer ignore Beijing’s transgressions and must choose between the United States and China. “In the post-Covid age ” he wrote “enjoying the best of both worlds may no longer be an option.” </source> [/INST] <claim>Sino-India relations are irredeemable – India sides with the West in a conflict which causes escalation</claim> <psg>The United States and its allies have long wanted India’s help in confronting China. a deadly border clash seems likely to push India in that direction the United States have tried to persuade India to become a closer military and economic partner a chance for the world’s largest democracy to counterbalance the largest autocracy Western diplomats feel that their goal of an India closer to the West was starting to be realized. And some believe the friction with China will push India even further in that direction. And it is expected to invite Australia to join naval exercises it conducts with Japan and the United States to strengthen efforts by the so-called Quad — Australia Japan the United States and India — to counter China’s projection of sea power in the region. Everyone is more willing to talk about what to do with China The ways China has influenced world order can now be discussed India represents one path China represents another “but if provoked India is capable of giving a befitting reply.” But India has several reasons to feel particularly hemmed in by China China has heavily courted India’s neighbors Nepal’s government claimed a sliver of territory Nepal’s border actions were taken at the behest of China In Pakistan China is building huge infrastructure projects With every project built China is making it harder for India to hold on to its territorial claims China took possession of a port in Sri Lanka China could militarize the port India went from having a monopoly of political and military power in the region to competition where China is increasingly predominant China doesn’t particularly want India to succeed ” China has also been sensitive about the prospects of closer ties between India and the West. “What the U.S. would do is just extend a lever to India which Washington can exploit to worsen India’s ties with China.” “In the post-Covid age ” he wrote “enjoying the best of both worlds may no longer be an option.”</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Overall the decline in U.S. warfighting advantages does not mean China can win a war that the United States is willing to fight. By 2025 a war could be a military standoff with major weapon-platform losses on both sides in addition to losses in cyberspace and space. Yet neither side would fare so much worse than the other that it would feel compelled to concede raising the probability that a war would be both severe and long. Such a war could be decided by economic costs domestic political effects and international responses. Japan’s </source> [/INST] <claim>US-China war would draw in Russia – making the conflict even more severe</claim> <psg>the decline in U.S. warfighting advantages does not mean China can win a war that the United States is willing to fight. By 2025 a war could be a military standoff with major weapon-platform losses on both sides in addition to losses in cyberspace and space. Yet neither side would fare so much worse than the other that it would feel compelled to concede raising the probability that a war would be both severe and long.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Ties between Russia and China are deepening. The relationship between Russia and China has improved steadily since the waning years of the Cold War. This trend accelerated in the last decade and especially since 2014 when Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea shut down Russian opportunities in and cooperation with the West. Indicators across virtually every dimension of the bilateral relationship highlight their growing alignment.1 Economically China is the largest purchaser of Russian crude oil and has surpassed Germany as Russia’s largest trading partner. Militarily their defense cooperation continues to grow including through defense dialogues joint exercises and regional security cooperation. Russia continues to sell China increasingly sophisticated military technologies though that aspect of the relationship has diminished in relative importance as China has enhanced its capabilities in this area. Politically Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping enjoy close relations and exchanges and interactions at lower levels of the Russian and Chinese governments are frequent. 2. Russia-China relations will continue to deepen as the key drivers of their relationship strengthen and constraints erode. Both Putin and Xi view the United States as a significant threat to their power. Their shared perception of the United States as a threat is an important driver of their relationship. U.S. actions such as sanctions against Russia and the administration’s trade war with China are justified approaches to addressing hostile adversaries but also serve to push the two countries closer together. The strong consensus in Washington around great power competition as the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy is likely to continue to provide incentive for greater alignment between Russia and China. The growing similarity between the Putin and Xi regimes is also likely to provide a basis for future cooperation. Xi has consolidated power and dismantled the consensus-based decision making that has dominated China’s post-Mao political system. While meaningful distinctions between the governments remain China’s political system more closely resembles the Putin-dominated Russian regime.2 Research suggests that shared regime type enhances cooperation between states.3 Not only are the key drivers of bilateral relations strengthening but many of the factors that observers long assessed would constrain the relationship are eroding. First analysts have long held that Russian concerns about insecurity in its far east would stymie cooperation. However the Kremlin’s concerns about this source of insecurity have diminished. today the Russian and Chinese governments are moving ahead with infrastructure projects in border regions that had long been delayed. Moreover Putin likely understands that China constitutes a long-term threat to Russia but appears to calculate that a far-off and uncertain threat from China is more acceptable than the immediate and certain threat he perceives from the United States. Cultural factors and historical enmity are likely to be enduring constraints on Russia-China relations. However Xi and Putin dominate the media environments in their countries and are capable of slowly turning public opinion over time. Such a process would be hard and slow but Beijing and Moscow have the capacity to re-shape public attitudes should they decide to. Already surveys show that 69 percent of Russians hold a positive view of China—the same percentage of Russians that hold negative views of the United States.4 3. Russia and China are united in their discontent with U.S. dominance—a marriage of convenience—but sustained cooperation and repeated interaction raise the likelihood of more meaningful alignment. Putin and Xi prioritize their own survival in office above all else. They both judge that the United States and its efforts to support democracy present a threat to their hold on power and that the U.S.-dominated international order disadvantages them and fails to accommodate their interests. They are united in their discontent and share an interest in weakening Western cohesion and subverting many of the values and rules that define the post-World War II order. Although they have banded together in discontent there is potential that their repeated interactions will foster a deeper and more enduring partnership over time. Already Russian and Chinese values and views of the way the world should be ordered are significantly aligned. Russia and China are likely to continue to work together and potentially coordinate their efforts to create an environment that is conducive to both of their development goals. 4. Deepening relations between Russia and China will be among the most significant U.S. foreign policy challenges in the coming decade. Russia and China are unlikely to forge a formal military alliance. But even short of such an alliance their growing alignment and coordination will present a significant challenge for U.S. national security in the coming years. The Director of National Intelligence warned in his 2019 Annual Threat Assessment that strengthening ties between China and Russia will present a “wide variety of economic political counterintelligence military and diplomatic challenges to the United States and its allies.”5 If Russia-China relations continue to grow it would harm U.S. interests by enhancing their mutual capabilities and stretching U.S. capabilities complicating U.S. strategic planning by potentially dividing U.S. power emboldening them to act knowing they will have each other’s support enhancing the perceived legitimacy of the alternative they provide and diluting U.S leverage over countries willing to play the United States off Russia and China.6 Russia and China are also poised to challenge U.S. interests through the complementarity of their actions.7 Russia and China take different approaches to pursuing their foreign policy objectives. Russian foreign policy is confrontational and brazen. So far China has used a subtler and more risk-averse strategy preferring stability that is conducive to building economic ties and influence. Although their tactics are different they have the potential to converge in synergistic ways such that the combined effects on U.S. interests is greater than the sum of their individual efforts. This dynamic is most evident in Europe but there is potential for greater synergies between Russia and China to create new challenges for the United States. </source> [/INST] <claim>Russia would get drawn in – growing alliance with China</claim> <psg>Ties between Russia and China are deepening accelerated when Crimea shut down Russian opportunities in and cooperation with the West Indicators across virtually every dimension highlight their growing alignment China is the largest purchaser of Russian crude oil and has surpassed Germany as Russia’s largest trading partner their defense cooperation continues to grow Russia continues to sell China increasingly sophisticated military technologies Putin and Xi enjoy close relations relations will continue to deepen Both view the United States as a significant threat to their power factors that would constrain the relationship are eroding Russian concerns about insecurity in its far east have diminished Russia and China are united in their discontent with U.S. dominance sustained cooperation and repeated interaction raise the likelihood of more meaningful alignment Deepening relations between Russia and China will be among the most significant U.S. foreign policy challenges even short of such an alliance their growing alignment and coordination will present a significant challenge for U.S. national security would harm U.S. interests by enhancing their mutual capabilities and stretching U.S. capabilities tactics converge in synergistic ways to create new challenges</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> If one of the established nuclear weapons states uses nuclear weapons the strength of the nuclear taboo would be greatly undermined. As Mark Fitzpatrick concludes ‘the rupture to the system would be strongest if it were committed by one of the charter members of the nuclear club’. 36 The moral norm is arguably strongest among this grouping. And nuclear use by one of these powerful states makes it less likely that there would be a strong and organized international response to the violation. The established nuclear powers all sit as permanent members of the U.N. Security Council making costly action more complicated. Moreover use by a nuclear weapons state in cases other than in the darkest of circumstances when state survival is at stake could undermine the nonproliferation regime and ultimately the durability of norm against nuclear use. </source> [/INST] <claim>The nuclear taboo is not durable. A first strike would let all hell break loose.</claim> <psg>If one of the established nuclear weapons states uses nuc s the strength of the nuclear taboo would be greatly undermined the rupture to the system would be strongest if it were committed by one of the charter members of the nuclear club’ nuclear use by one of these powerful states makes it less likely that there would be a strong and organized international response to the violation The established nuclear powers all sit as permanent members of the U.N. Security Council use by a nuclear weapons state in cases other than in the darkest of circumstances when state survival is at stake could undermine the nonproliferation regime and ultimately the durability of norm against nuclear use.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The extent of collateral damage caused by a nuclear weapon would likely play a significant role in determining the durability of a nuclear non-use norm based on moral considerations. If a nuclear detonation resulted in great destruction and many non-combatant causalities as would likely be the case with an attack that targeted a city or generated substantial lethal nuclear fallout one might expect that the moral underpinnings of the norm would remain intact – and perhaps even be bolstered. That is a dramatic demonstration of the abhorrent consequences of nuclear weapons use could serve to reinforce subsequent adherence to the norm. By contrast a nuclear attack that resulted in very few casualties – for example as might conceivably occur with a limited counterforce strike using a few precise low-yield weapons – would appear to weaken the normative constraint against nuclear use.30 That is if the non-use norm were driven by revulsion at the expected massive and indiscriminate devastation that would occur if nuclear weapons were used an instance of nuclear use that generated only modest collateral damage would undermine the norm.31 </source> [/INST] <claim>A counterforce strike would have less casualties – weakens the justification for the taboo.</claim> <psg>The extent of collateral damage would play a significant role in determining the durability of a nuclear non-use norm If a nuclear detonation resulted in great destruction the norm would remain intact By contrast a limited counterforce strike using a few precise low-yield weapons would weaken the norm against nuclear use an instance of nuclear use that generated only modest collateral damage would undermine the norm.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The effects of nuclear weapons are not limited to radiation.24 A single nuclear weapon detonated above a city will ignite mass fire over an area of 50–500 km2 from which living things have little chance to escape.25 Vast areas of forests will go up in smoke and fires would burn for weeks in cities and industrial centers and vast stored fossil fuels. The fires will produce a thick smoke layer that will drastically reduce the amount of sunlight reaching the earth’s surface. Darkness would persist for many weeks rendering agricultural activity in the Northern Hemisphere virtually impossible if the war takes place during the growing season (Crutzen and Birks 1982). The release of dust ash particulate black carbon and sulphur dioxide from the fires would plunge large regions of the world into atmospheric conditions described as nuclear winter (Turco et al. 1983) threatening the survival of civilization and many species over large parts of Earth. Despite a two-thirds reduction in global nuclear arsenals since 1986 the environmental consequences of nuclear war can still end human history as even a tiny fraction of the global nuclear arsenal exploded in large urban centers would result in catastrophic disruptions of the global climate and the protective stratospheric ozone layer. A nuclear war fought with several thousand weapons could even leave much of the Earth uninhabitable.26 </source> [/INST] <claim>Yes nuc winter !</claim> <psg>A single nuclear weapon detonated above a city will ignite mass fire living things have little chance to escape forests will go up in smoke burn industrial centers and stored fossil fuels produce a thick smoke layer that will drastically reduce the amount of sunlight reaching the earth’s surface Darkness would persist rendering agricultural activity impossible would plunge large regions of the world into atmospheric conditions described as nuclear winter threatening the survival of civilization Despite reduction in arsenals the environmental consequences of nuclear war end human history even a tiny fraction of the global nuclear arsenal exploded in large urban centers would result in catastrophic disruptions of the global climate and the ozone A nuclear war fought with several thousand weapons could even leave much of the Earth uninhabitable</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The tabletop military exercise proceeds as follows. During a freedom of navigation exercise in the South China Sea taking place in the year 2034 a group of US frigates board a Chinese civilian vessel in distress. The Americans learn the vessel houses sensitive technology and seize it. While the operation is underway the US vessels are attacked by a Chinese fleet which totally paralyzes them using advanced cyberweapons. When the US dispatches two aircraft carrier battle groups to the Pacific in a show of force a total of 40 American ships are sunk with negligible Chinese losses. The numbers are not quantified but some tens of thousands of American sailors airmen and marines must have lost their lives. In response Washington launches a nuclear weapon at a Chinese coastal city against which Beijing retaliates by launching a nuclear attack on San Diego California and Galveston Texas. The US retaliates by obliterating Shanghai one of the world’s largest and most important cities. Stavridis writes that after an American nuclear attack on Shanghai “These many months later the city remained a charred radioactive wasteland. The death toll had exceeded thirty million. After each of the nuclear attacks international markets plummeted. Crops failed. Infectious diseases spread. Radiation poisoning promised to contaminate generations. The devastation exceeded… capacity for comprehension.” The American survivors of a Chinese nuclear attack on San Diego are left to live in “wretched camps ” where “cyclical outbreaks of typhus measles and even smallpox often sprouted from the unbilged latrines and rows of plastic tenting.” This appears to be a vision of hell. But it must be stated bluntly that even this depiction falls far far short of the actual effects of a nuclear world war. By training and temperament Stavridis is largely incapable of viewing the world through the eyes of anyone besides a military officer or “national security” bureaucrat. “Ordinary” people are not described. The various protagonists take the lives of millions and it is very hard on them and the reader is supposed to sympathize. In Stavridis’ account the decisions governing the conflict are made by largely rational and analytical military technocrats. Elected leaders notionally exist and they sometimes take actions that impinge upon the narrative but it is the military officials that largely guide the action. Just as politicians have little impact on the plot social dynamics and popular opinion are largely ignored. The United States carries out a nuclear attack on a Chinese port city and it appears to have no domestic social effect except to lead the public to bray for blood. Millions are killed tens of millions are displaced domestically in the United States. In one single incident—the nuclear bombing of Shanghai—the United States carries out an act of mass murder surpassing in scale the vernichtungskrieg (war of extermination) waged by Nazi Germany in the Eastern front over four years. Amid all of this there is no domestic social response. The end of World War I toppled the Russian Austrian Ottoman and German empires in a massive revolutionary upheaval. The end of the Second World War completely redrew the map of Europe. But in Stavridis’ account the population somehow remains complacent throughout a third world war while millions are slaughtered. This has nothing to do with the real world dominated by class polarization and conflict. War will be accompanied by massive state repression. The pretext for a domestic crackdown and the need to divert intense internal social conflicts outward are in fact among the major unstated reasons why ruling classes are embarking upon military confrontations that can end in the acts of mass murder depicted in 2034. Finally the military dynamics are themselves totally unrealistic. The central assumption of the book is that there exists such a thing as a “tactical” nuclear war. Military actions are calmly and rationally discussed and deliberated. Even so it is only through an absurd and unbelievable plot twist that a strategic nuclear exchange is avoided. In a ridiculous deus ex machina India attacks both Chinese and US vessels bringing about an end to the war. There is no such thing as a “tactical” nuclear world war. There has never been a full-scale war between two countries armed with nuclear weapons. More importantly there has never been a full-scale war between “great powers” armed with 21st century technology. The range cheapness and speed of offensive weapons including drones and high-speed missiles will mean that a third world war will be conducted everywhere at once at dizzying speed and complexity. The logic of these phenomena—the complexity of global relations and domestic opposition the expansion of the battlefield to the entire globe the delegation of warfare to artificial intelligence—makes nuclear war impossible to control and limit to the “tit-for-tat” military exchanges depicted in the book. </source> [/INST] <claim>US-China war goes immediately existential – even the worst theoretical accounts fall short because nuclear war cannot be controlled.</claim> <psg>tabletop military exercise proceeds as follows US dispatches two aircraft carrier battle groups to the Pacific in a show of force numbers are not quantified but some tens of thousands of American must have lost their lives In response Washington launches a nuclear weapon at a Chinese coastal city against which Beijing retaliates by launching a nuclear attack on San Diego California and Galveston Texas. The US retaliates by obliterating Shanghai one of the world’s largest and most important cities These many months later the city remained a charred radioactive wasteland. The death toll had exceeded thirty million. After each of the nuclear attacks international markets plummeted. Crops failed. Infectious diseases spread. Radiation poisoning promised to contaminate generations. The devastation exceeded… capacity for comprehension American survivors are left to live in “wretched camps ” where “cyclical outbreaks of typhus measles and even smallpox often sprouted from the unbilged latrines and rows of plastic tenting even this depiction falls far far short of the actual effects of a nuclear world war decisions governing the conflict are made by largely rational and analytical military technocrats. Elected leaders notionally exist and they sometimes take actions that impinge upon the narrative social dynamics and popular opinion are largely ignored United States carries out a nuclear attack on a Chinese port city Millions are killed tens of millions are displaced domestically in the United States the real world dominated by class polarization and conflict military dynamics are themselves totally unrealistic. The central assumption of the book is that there exists such a thing as a “tactical” nuclear war There is no such thing as a “tactical” nuclear world war range cheapness and speed of offensive weapons including drones and high-speed missiles will mean that a third world war will be conducted everywhere at once at dizzying speed and complexity expansion of the battlefield to the entire globe the delegation of warfare to artificial intelligence—makes nuclear war impossible to control and limit to the “tit-for-tat” military exchanges depicted in the book</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> As China’s power has grown in recent years so too has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping u has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil. A war between the two countries remains unlikely but the prospect of a military confrontation—resulting for example from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think. Members of China’s strategic com­munity tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015 Dennis Blair the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.” This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan Iraq Libya and Serbia none of which was a nuclear power. If deployed against China the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. China by contrast not only has nuclear weapons. it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to. As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political economic and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place. There are some reasons for optimism. For one China has long stood out for its nonaggressive nuclear doctrine. After its first nuclear test in 1964 China largely avoided the Cold War arms race building a much smaller and simpler nuclear arsenal than its resources would have allowed. Chinese leaders have consistently characterized nuclear weapons as useful only for deterring nuclear aggression and coercion. Historically this narrow purpose required only a handful of nuclear weapons that could ensure Chinese retaliation in the event of an attack. To this day China maintains a “no first use” pledge promising that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The prospect of a nuclear conflict can also seem like a relic of the Cold War. Back then the United States and its allies lived in fear of a Warsaw Pact offensive rapidly overrunning Europe. NATO stood ready to use nuclear weapons first to stalemate such an attack. Both Washington and Moscow also consistently worried that their nuclear forces could be taken out in a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear strike by the other side. This mutual fear increased the risk that one superpower might rush to launch in the erroneous belief that it was already under attack. Initially the danger of unauthorized strikes also loomed large. In the 1950s lax safety procedures for U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on NATO soil as well as minimal civilian oversight of U.S. military commanders raised a serious risk that nuclear escalation could have occurred without explicit orders from the U.S. president. The good news is that these Cold War worries have little bearing on U.S.-Chinese relations today. Neither country could rapidly overrun the other’s territory in a conventional war. Neither seems worried about a nuclear bolt from the blue. And civilian political control of nuclear weapons is relatively strong in both countries. What remains in theory is the comforting logic of mutual deterrence: in a war between two nuclear powers neither side will launch a nuclear strike for fear that its enemy will respond in kind. The bad news is that one other trigger remains: a conventional war that threatens China’s nuclear arsenal. Conventional forces can threaten nuclear forces in ways that generate pressures to escalate—especially when ever more capable U.S. conventional forces face adversaries with relatively small and fragile nuclear arsenals such as China. If U.S. operations endangered or damaged China’s nuclear forces Chinese leaders might come to think that Washington had aims beyond winning the conventional war—that it might be seeking to disable or destroy China’s nuclear arsenal outright perhaps as a prelude to regime change. In the fog of war Beijing might reluctantly conclude that limited nuclear escalation—an initial strike small enough that it could avoid full-scale U.S. retaliation—was a viable option to defend itself. </source> [/INST] <claim>War goes existential – China doesn’t go nuclear immediately but conventional war sets off spirals that escalate – no chance for a limited war.</claim> <psg>As China’s power has grown so too has the risk of war with the United States has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait to loud protests from Beijing fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea prospect of a military confrontation no longer seems as implausible as it once did odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict This assurance is misguided the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation If deployed against China the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation China by contrast not only has nuclear weapons. it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal Faced with such a threat Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation consequences for the region and the world would be devastating leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war one other trigger remains conventional war that threatens China’s nuclear arsenal generate pressures to escalate—especially when ever more capable U.S. conventional forces face adversaries with relatively small and fragile nuclear arsenals In the fog of war Beijing might reluctantly conclude that limited nuclear escalation—an initial strike small enough that it could avoid full-scale U.S. retaliation—was a viable option to defend itself</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> A war using even a small percentage of the world's nuclear weapons threatens the lives of two billion people a new report warns. The findings in the report issued by International Physicians for Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) and Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) are based on studies by climate scientists that show how nuclear war would alter the climate and agriculture thereby threatening one quarter of the world's population with famine. Nuclear Famine: Two Billion People at Risk? offers an updated edition to the groups' April of 2012 report which the groups say 'may have seriously underestimated the consequences of a limited nuclear war.' 'A nuclear war using only a fraction of existing arsenals would produce massive casualties on a global scale—far more than we had previously believed ' Dr. Ira Helfand the report’s author and IPPNW co-president said in a statement. As their previous report showed years after even a limited nuclear war production of corn in the U.S. and China's middle season rice production would severely decline and fears over dwindling food supplies would lead to hoarding and increases in food prices creating further food insecurity for those already reliant on food imports. The updated report adds that Chinese winter wheat production would plummet if such a war broke out. Based on information from new studies combining reductions in wheat corn and rice this new edition doubles the number of people they expect to be threatened by nuclear-war induced famine to over two billion. 'The prospect of a decade of widespread hunger and intense social and economic instability in the world’s largest country has immense implications for the entire global community as does the possibility that the huge declines in Chinese wheat production will be matched by similar declines in other wheat producing countries ' Helfand stated. The crops would be impacted the report explains citing previous studies because of the black carbon particles that would be released causing widespread changes like cooling temperatures decreased precipitation and decline in solar radiation. In this scenario of famine epidemics of infectious diseases would be likely the report states and could lead to armed conflict. From the report: Within nations where famine is widespread there would almost certainly be food riots and competition for limited food resources might well exacerbate ethnic and regional animosities. Among nations armed conflict would be a very real possibility as states dependent on imports attempted to maintain access to food supplies. While a limited nuclear war would bring dire circumstances the impacts if the world's biggest nuclear arms holders were involved would be even worse. 'With a large war between the United States and Russia we are talking about the possible —not certain but possible—extinction of the human race ' Helfand told Agence-France Presse. </source> [/INST] <claim>Even limited nuclear arsenals cause extinction through chain reactions – multiple risk scenarios</claim> <psg>war using even a small percentage of the world's nuclear weapons threatens the lives of two billion people findings in the report issued by International Physicians for Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) and Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) are based on studies by climate scientists that show how nuclear war would alter the climate and agriculture thereby threatening one quarter of the world's population groups say 'may have seriously underestimated the consequences of a limited nuclear war.' nuclear war using only a fraction of existing arsenals would produce massive casualties on a global scale after even a limited nuclear war production of corn in the U.S. and China's middle season rice production would severely decline and fears over dwindling food supplies would lead to hoarding and increases in food prices creating further food insecurity Chinese winter wheat production would plummet combining reductions in wheat corn and rice this new edition doubles the number of people they expect to be threatened by nuclear-war intense social and economic instability in the world’s largest country has immense implications for the entire global community huge declines in Chinese wheat production will be matched by similar declines in other wheat producing countries because of the black carbon particles that would be released causing widespread changes like cooling temperatures decreased precipitation and decline in solar radiation epidemics of infectious diseases would be likely competition for limited food resources might well exacerbate ethnic and regional animosities armed conflict would be a very real possibility as states dependent on imports attempted to maintain access to food supplies impacts if the world's biggest nuclear arms holders were involved would be even worse</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> U.S. competition with China is real serious and bound to increase. That is inevitable both for economic reasons and because of the incompatibility between Chinese ambitions and the U.S. establishment’s determination to maintain U.S. global leadership. However it is not an existential struggle between two fundamentally opposed systems nor is it a universal struggle that must be fought in every corner of the world. A comparison with basic features of the Cold War should make the difference clear. China is not promoting communist revolution around the world. In fact there is no evidence at all that it is aiming at the overthrow of existing states. As a great capitalist trading power it has a strong stake in the stability of markets and the safety of Chinese investments. If the Chinese government in principle prefers authoritarian states it has as yet done nothing to foster such systems. Chinese influence operations in the West are real and should be resisted but they are intended to influence Western policies toward China not cause state collapse and revolution. And the United States has an old and tried arsenal of international influence operations of its own that it can deploy in response. As to the U.S. political system the impact of Chinese (and Russian) covert propaganda on U.S. politics has been minimal compared to the impact of the United States’ own domestic problems. It was not China that killed George Floyd. As a capitalist trading state China is dependent on the health and stability of the international capitalist system. Unlike the Soviet Union it needs a degree of rules-based international order—though not if (as seen from China) this means a system in which the United States sets all the rules and then breaks them whenever it wishes. On the other hand China has certainly sought with great determination to increase its international influence through international capitalism. Some of these efforts (like Huawei’s role in fifth-generation telecommunications technology) must be strongly resisted. They do not however as yet greatly exceed past U.S. patterns of international economic influence. The defense and strengthening of U.S. capitalism in competition with China is indeed essential but needs to be seen not just in terms of tariffs on Chinese imports (as the Trump administration has seen it) but as requiring a massive program of U.S. domestic economic reform and investment in infrastructure and technology—in other words the way the Chinese government conducts this competition. </source> [/INST] <claim>An increase of China and US tension is inevitable but conflict is not inevitable</claim> <psg>competition is bound to increase. That is inevitable . However it is not an existential struggle between two fundamentally opposed systems nor is it a universal struggle that must be fought in every corner of the world. China is not promoting communist revolution around the world As a great capitalist trading power it has a strong stake in the stability of markets and the safety of Chinese investments. If the Chinese government in principle prefers authoritarian states it has as yet done nothing to foster such systems. And the United States has an old and tried arsenal of international influence operations of its own that it can deploy in response. As to the U.S. political system the impact of Chinese (and Russian) covert propaganda on U.S. politics has been minimal compared to the impact of the United States’ own domestic problems China is dependent on the health and stability of the international capitalist system They do not however as yet greatly exceed past U.S. patterns of international economic influence. the way the Chinese government conducts this competition</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The parameters to test whether China is altering the military order include – distribution of power and territorial disputes. Distribution of power measures whether China has “extraordinary growth in military expenditures” and whether such military expenditures affect the balance of power (BoP) in the South-East Asian region. Official estimates suggest that Chinese military expenditures “multiplied by almost 12 times in nominal terms between 1994 and 2012 – a double-digit annual growth rate”. But in sharp contrast for nearly a decade (2009-2017) Chinese military expenditures remained at “1.9 percent of Chinese GDP“. This suggests in recent times Chinese expenditure has relatively softened but not absolutely. Moreover China is financing much more defensive capabilities rather than offensive capabilities. US “offensive defence” strategy has compelled China to invest heavily in A2/AD defensive capabilities to deter American aggression. In short China is defensively balancing against American offence in the East Asian region. In response to China’s growth most of the countries in the Southeast Asian region have increased their defense budget. This suggests regional BoP is heavily skewed towards defence while measuring offence-defence balance. To conclude as Michael Beckley puts it “balance of power will remain stable for years to come” in the region. Regarding territorial disputes we assess the issue of sovereignty of Taiwan past disputes in the South China Sea and its outcome. China lacks actual control over Taiwan and won’t accept its formal independence. But the accusation that China is violating the “norm of self-determination” is misconstrued. UN documents on decolonization and national liberation in the 1960s acknowledged the right of oppressed people to set up their own sovereign state but “it also attempted to protect newly independent decolonized states from further dismemberment”. China’s case is similar to other countries like India thus any conclusion based on this fact is incomplete. At this moment China’s coercive diplomacy in the South China Sea is getting a lot of attention. But such coercive measures are evident in the past also (such behaviour is observed in any states involved in territorial disputes). In the 1970s to 1990s China used its naval power “ to violently push other claimants off ” the ” territorial features (Parcels 1974 Johnson South reef 1988) and established a new presence on “Mischief reef in 1990s”. China enhanced its military and naval presence in the South China sea in 2009 and 2010 as a response to more assertive “proactive diplomacy by other claimants to establish legal boundaries of their claims”. Similarly in 2012 when Japan nationalized Senkaku islands (disputed territory between China and Japan) China responded with the coast guard to “symbolically challenge Japan’s control“. Moreover when Japan extended its ADIZ to monitor control over Senkaku China responded with its own ADIZ move. Regionally China has taken unilateral action to resolve the existing disputes even though it neglected the judgement given by the international arbitration tribunal in 2016 challenging the UN Convention on the Law of Sea to resolve disputes. In short since the past three decades China is actively present in the South China Sea thus claims that China is “more assertive” in the region at this moment is simply exaggerated. Moreover China in the above two cases responded to the actions of other claimants to establish control over disputed territory. Thus revisionist tendencies are seen only when China is provoked. Politico-economic order The parameters to test whether China is revising the politico-economic order include – first cooperation with the hegemon (US) second China’s approach to various international institutions. Cooperation with the hegemon measures cooperative actions over a range of issues and voting congruence in the UN. Cooperative actions and congruence in multiple issues between the US and China are measured with the help of the dataset provided by the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS – (Fig 1 below)). Contrary to the current narrative where China is projected as more assertive Chinese statements and actions towards the US are “overwhelmingly cooperative“. The second measure is the degree of voting congruence between the US and China. This is measured through UNGA ideal point data (Fig 2 below) which captures China’s position vis-a-vis the US. The absolute distance between the US and China’s ideal points varied across time but as compared to the 1990s the gap in 2015 has narrowed. China’s approach to international institutions includes first China’s participation rate in international institutions and second whether China challenges or breaks the rules and norms of such institutions. Between the 1960s and 1990s Chinese membership to international organizations jumped from zero to 80 percent of compared states. Some international organizations like IMF the World Bank and the WTO are supported by both the US and China while other institutions are more or less opposed by both including ICJ ICC. Most importantly the common method to check a state’s compliance with international organizations is to compare that state’s approach to the US. But the US has consistently opposed the rules and norms of international order. For instance China’s rejection to comply with the decision of the International arbitration tribunal in 2016 concerning the South China Sea dispute is regarded as violative of an international norm then why not the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and its adventure in Afghanistan. As regards institutions such as UNSC China remains a staunch defender of it. China has contributed to the peacemaking mission at the behest of the UN. China is currently involved in major arms control institutions. But both China and the US remained outside of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and opposed the Treaty of Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. In short as Steve Chan concluded participation in IGO’s reflects national satisfaction with the world order though the evidence regarding the breaking of rules and norms remains contested (should be analyzed relative to other states’ response to international institutions). Conclusion To sum up the above pieces of evidence suggest that the “revisionist” narrative is much more exaggerated and overstated. In some domains China’s assertiveness to some degree has increased but in other domains it remained satisfied with other liberal orders. In other words the overall picture remains pretty complex and “revisionist characterization” is simply a conjecture. </source> [/INST] <claim>“Chinese revisionism” oversimplifies prefer an analysis of all factors.</claim> <psg>Distribution of power measures whether China has “extraordinary growth in military expenditures” and whether such military expenditures affect the balance of power estimates suggest that Chinese military expenditures “multiplied by almost 12 times But in sharp contrast for nearly a decade (2009-2017) Chinese military expenditures remained at “1.9 percent of Chinese GDP in recent times Chinese expenditure has relatively softened China is financing much more defensive capabilities rather than offensive capabilities US “offensive defence” strategy has compelled China to invest heavily in A2/AD defensive capabilities to deter American aggression balance of power will remain stable for years to come the accusation that China is violating the “norm of self-determination” is misconstrued documents on decolonization and national liberation in the 1960s attempted to protect newly independent decolonized states from further dismemberment any conclusion based on this fact is incomplete coercive measures are evident in the past also such behaviour is observed in any states involved in territorial disputes China enhanced its military and naval presence as a response to more assertive “proactive diplomacy by other claimants to establish legal boundaries when Japan nationalized Senkaku islands China responded with the coast guard to “symbolically challenge Japan’s control claims that China is “more assertive” in the region at this moment is simply exaggerated revisionist tendencies are seen only when China is provoked Cooperative actions and congruence in multiple issues between the US and China are measured with the help of the dataset provided by the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System Chinese statements and actions towards the US are “overwhelmingly cooperative“ China’s approach to international institutions includes participation rate in international institutions and whether China challenges or breaks the rules and norms of such institutions Chinese membership to international organizations jumped from zero to 80 percent of compared states common method to check a state’s compliance with international organizations is to compare that state’s approach to the US the US has consistently opposed the rules and norms of international order China’s rejection to comply with the decision of the International arbitration tribunal in 2016 concerning the South China Sea dispute is regarded as violative of an international norm then why not the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and its adventure in Afghanistan China remains a staunch defender of it China has contributed to the peacemaking mission at the behest of the UN. China is currently involved in major arms control institutions the “revisionist” narrative is much more exaggerated and overstated the overall picture remains pretty complex and “revisionist characterization” is simply a conjecture</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> A central premise of the Biden foreign-policy team is that China is trying to challenge the status quo which is defined as US primacy in the world system. China is seen as a rising power with a huge grudge against the existing international system. In short it could be said that there are parallels between the second decade of the twenty-first century and the early twentieth century when a democratic England struggled with a rising economically powerful but authoritarian Germany. This analogy however that of a “Wilhelmine China” is flawed: it is hardly obvious in the year 2021 just who is defending the status quo. The irony is at the very moment of China’s decision to integrate fully into the international system the United States seems to have started the process of changing that system. It is abandoning the rules it established at the end of the Second World War especially the liberal international economic order which was based on free trade and the mechanism of market competition. After more than forty years of reform and opening China is on the verge of becoming a lead player in the existing international economic system. Just as China aspires to become a “normal state” for the first time in its long and self-isolated history the criterion for “normal” is changing. When China became multilateral in its foreign relations America became unilateral under the Trump administration and this policy has continued under Biden. There’s no question that the US rather than China is a leading revisionist power today because the Washington establishment of both political parties is trapped in another wave of panic: the morbid fear of a US decline. How do good times happen? What makes the bad times come? Why do we fall and who helps us come back if anyone can? Declinism has the same fascination for historians that love has for romantic poets. The people who want to set up China as the new monster are obliged to explain why the US is declining. Ironically they cannot do it convincingly since the intellectual predecessors of the new declinist Joe Biden are all declinists too. He has to face insurmountable logical absurdity by insisting that the previous era was actually a peak rather than the valley that the previous declinists thought were actually valleys. The popularity of declinism was established in 1918 in the book that gave decline a profitable name in publishing: the German historian Oswald Spengler’s best-selling work “The Decline of the West”. For many in Washington Spengler was far-sighted in his pessimism and attempt to foretell the decline of liberalism in the face of the spread of totalitarianism. But this is not enough — they have also to revive Spenger’s racism to justify their animosity toward China. Hence the Yellow Peril narrative came in handy for the Trump administration. Trumpism is stoking a fierce racial war in the United States and abroad. hostility towards the Yellow Peril has been kindled simultaneously. This is no accident. While Trump’s China policy was openly racist (phrases such as “Kung Flu” have certainly been responsible for current anti-Asian hate crimes) Biden’s China policy is more subtle. However its Yellow Peril undertone is unmistakable. Since the political elite in Washington are horrified by a crumbling world order built on “unipolar fantasy” it is not surprising that they are subconsciously perhaps seeking inspiration from Spengler the guru of the racialist school of decline. The combination of declinism and the Yellow Peril narrative produces a perfect rhetorical tool for China-bashing today. Spengler the original prophet of a declining West left a horrible proposition for the Western people over a century ago: if the decline of the West is caused by its own doing i.e. internecine wars then you have no one to blame. But if the rise of the non-white peoples causes the West to decline how should the white world deal with them? Either by eliminating them or simply retarding the advancement of their societies. The worst solution according to Spengler is to ‘integrate’ them. The America Firsters have peddled this message loud and clear. Nazi Germany chose to eliminate an entire ethnic group while the US prefers to return to the idea of economic retardation and launch a military chokehold against the most advanced non-white country China. Not by accident Spengler also provided a handy theory for technological “decoupling” with China. He vehemently opposed technological advances in general for fear of non-White people getting hold of them to destroy Western civilisation. More importantly the China-bashing campaign is shrouded in a moralistic halo. Despite the volumes of Western books that have been written on Chinese foreign policy a serious study of the conceptual history of China’s foreign relations has barely begun. The US administration fails to understand the fact that the meaning of Chinese foreign relations can only be grasped in a specific Chinese context of political legitimacy not through some universal principles that allegedly guide the international behaviour of states. Confucian culture stresses that endogenous factors dictate the rise and decay of a state system based on moral standards. Traditionally Chinese do not believe that a regime’s legitimacy can be enhanced through the expansion of the Mandate of Heaven into an outer sphere beyond Chinese culture either through the conquest of outlying territories or legitimate states inhabited by non-Chinese. Foreign adventure and territorial expansion for resettlement purposes had never occurred to Chinese rulers as an effective medicine to cure immanent moral illnesses that inevitably give rise to political chaos at home. The non-expansionist attitude contrasts sharply with the persistent missionary zeal in the Christian West which at least from the Crusades onwards has been obsessed with “spiritual” promotion (today it is also called democratic promotion) in faraway foreign lands often with military force. A traditional consensus is that if a morally corrupt system (the US is no exception) does not undergo serious reforms it will not be able to sustain itself for long. Jim Crowism is alive and strong in the US but it is not the fault of the Chinese. Even though little morality has been demonstrated by the recent foreign policies of the United States not many in Washington are willing to admit that the US as a self-appointed moral leader faces a major crisis and that the existing global system long characterised by benign US hegemonic control is in need of fundamental reforms. If the current US-China tension continues we are sleepwalking into 1914. </source> [/INST] <claim>It’s the US that’s revisionist not China – their evidence is classic threat projection influenced by Yellow Peril narratives.</claim> <psg>central premise of the Biden foreign-policy team is that China is trying to challenge the status quo This analogy that of a “Wilhelmine China” is flawed: it is hardly obvious in the year 2021 just who is defending the status quo at the very moment of China’s decision to integrate fully into the international system the United States seems to have started the process of changing that system It is abandoning the rules it established at the end of the Second World War especially the liberal international economic order which was based on free trade and the mechanism of market competition Just as China aspires to become a “normal state” for the first time in its long and self-isolated history the criterion for “normal” is changing When China became multilateral in its foreign relations America became unilateral under the Trump administration and this policy has continued under Biden There’s no question that the US rather than China is a leading revisionist power today because the Washington establishment of both political parties is trapped in another wave of panic the morbid fear of a US decline. people who want to set up China as the new monster are obliged to explain why the US is declining they cannot do it convincingly since the intellectual predecessors of the new declinist Joe Biden are all declinists too He has to face insurmountable logical absurdity by insisting that the previous era was actually a peak rather than the valley the Yellow Peril narrative came in handy for the Trump administration Trumpism is stoking a fierce racial war in the United States and abroad. hostility towards the Yellow Peril has been kindled simultaneously While Trump’s China policy was openly racist Biden’s China policy is more subtle. its Yellow Peril undertone is unmistakable. Since the political elite in Washington are horrified by a crumbling world order built on “unipolar fantasy” it is not surprising that they are subconsciously perhaps seeking inspiration from Spengler combination of declinism and the Yellow Peril narrative produces a perfect rhetorical tool for China-bashing today serious study of the conceptual history of China’s foreign relations has barely begun US administration fails to understand the fact that the meaning of Chinese foreign relations can only be grasped in a specific Chinese context of political legitimacy not through some universal principles that allegedly guide the international behaviour of states Chinese do not believe that a regime’s legitimacy can be enhanced through the expansion into an outer sphere beyond Chinese culture either through the conquest of outlying territories or legitimate states inhabited by non-Chinese Foreign adventure and territorial expansion for resettlement purposes had never occurred to Chinese rulers as an effective medicine to cure immanent moral illnesses that inevitably give rise to political chaos at home non-expansionist attitude contrasts sharply with the persistent missionary zeal in the Christian West which at least from the Crusades onwards has been obsessed with “spiritual” promotion</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The first relates to China’s intentions. As former Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade secretary Peter Varghese among others has argued there is no evidence that Beijing seeks to remodel the world in its image. China is not like the Soviet Union in its heyday which really did aim to make the world communist. The CCP will do whatever it can to protect its own system from being undermined from without but unlike the Soviet Union – and many in the West – it does not seem to believe that this requires the rest of the world to adopt its model. </source> [/INST] <claim>China is not attempting to undermine western governance AND doesn’t have the requisite capability. </claim> <psg>The first relates to China’s intentions The CCP will do whatever it can to protect its own system</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Lack of Regional Integration: Explanations and Examples If Chinese exhortations about “win–win” cooperation on the regional level fall flat it is because China and Russia lack a shared sense of regional identity leading to incompatible security interests at least where identity issues are concerned. This means that even projects that provide mutual benefit may raise challenges to Russia’s identity undermining its commitment to regional integration (Russo and Stoddard 2018 34). Jennifer Mitzen argues that states seek identity security not just physical security. In fact Mitzen argues that states may be willing to forego cooperation and tolerate interstate conflict if the price is greater stability in their identity (Mitzen 2016 342). Security dilemmas may emerge when a group’s action taken to secure its identity cause a reaction in another group thereby resulting in the insecurity of both (Olesker 2011 382). </source> [/INST] <claim>No China-Russia alliance – identity and border disputes outweigh regional security concerns</claim> <psg>China and Russia lack a shared sense of regional identity leading to incompatible security interests even projects that provide mutual benefit may raise challenges to Russia’s identity undermining its commitment to regional integration states seek identity security not just physical security states may be willing to forego cooperation and tolerate interstate conflict if the price is greater stability in their identity</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Another day another warning from the West about China’s upcoming invasion of Taiwan. That has been the pattern ever since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in late February. It’s really not about China learning the right or wrong lesson from Russia’s invasion but for Western pundits making this improbable warning to learn some military basics. </source> [/INST] <claim>An invasion would be impossible – island chains AND favorable urban defenses mean Xi will prioritize peaceful diplomacy over war. </claim> <psg>Another day another warning about China’s upcoming invasion of Taiwan Western pundits making this improbable warning to learn some military basics.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The definitive document on what size force would be required to seize Taiwan in a full-out landing was drafted by the US military in the late stages of World War II in the Pacific. In 1944 Operation Causeway was the US plan for retaking Formosa as it was then called from 30 000 starving Japanese soldiers. The planned invasion force was double the size of Operation Overlord the Normandy landing: 400 000 soldiers and marines deployed on 4 000 ships. With a potential defending force of 450 000 Taiwanese today using the traditional three-to-one ratio of attackers to defenders taught at war colleges China would need to deploy over 1.2 million soldiers (out of a total active force of over 2 million). Many thousands of ships would be required to land all those forces and doing so would take weeks. How many occupation forces would be required to pacify the Taiwanese? Surely the lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq are not lost on the PLA leadership. </source> [/INST] <claim>China lacks the logistical and naval capabilities for an invasion – prefer war college calculations.</claim> <psg>definitive document on what size force would be required to seize Taiwan was drafted by the US military With a defending force of 450 000 Taiwanese using the traditional three-to-one ratio of attackers to defenders taught at war colleges China would need to deploy over 1.2 million soldiers (out of 2 million). Many thousands of ships would be required to land all those forces lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq are not lost on the PLA</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Discussion and conclusion Does achieving nuclear superiority lead to a reduced risk of nuclear crisis? This article finds that there is no statistical evidence for this proposition: a favorable balance of nuclear forces fails to produce the predicted effect on the probability of the initiation of nuclear crises. These null results are not artifacts of using a particular measure of the nuclear balance and a specific model specification. even after using alternative model specifications and new indicators of nuclear superiority that capture important dimensions of nuclear capabilities that the total warhead count cannot capture those results remain unaltered. Furthermore more qualified hypotheses that posit the conditional effects of nuclear superiority also do not find empirical support. By directly testing a key prediction of the nuclear competition school in a new empirical context this article attempts to shed new light on the theoretical debate over the political benefits of a superior nuclear arsenal. Although my article does not conclusively disconfirm the validity of the nuclear competition school as a whole it encourages researchers to reconsider the benefit of maintaining a favorable nuclear balance of power which has been argued by the nuclear competition school. </source> [/INST] <claim>No war from tech race – robust studies prove deterrence is credible – even when asymmetric</claim> <psg>Does achieving nuclear superiority lead to a reduced risk of nuclear crisis there is no statistical evidence for this proposition even after using alternative model specifications that capture important dimensions of nuclear capabilities those results remain unaltered more qualified hypotheses that posit the conditional effects of nuclear superiority also do not find empirical support this article encourages researchers to reconsider the benefit of maintaining a favorable nuclear balance of power</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The alarming possibility of a major conflict between the US and China has been framed as a likely consequence of a pattern of great power behaviour first identified by the fifth-century BCE historian Thucydides. In his study of the Peloponnesian War the Greek wrote: “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.” This argument is now most associated with the Harvard academic Graham Allison who claims to have identified 16 instances in which a dominant power has sought to suppress an emerging rival before they became too strong. He notes disconcertingly that 12 of these ended in war. </source> [/INST] <claim>China is declining now – asymmetric alliances and domestic crises.</claim> <psg>alarming possibility of a major conflict between the US and China has been framed as a likely consequence of great power behaviour first identified by the historian Thucydides</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> This logic has not been well-recognized by either US foreign policymakers or scholars of US-China relations however. On economic issues the US adopted a strategy of unconditional cooperation for the first two decades of China’s rise. This strategy was not necessarily misguided. However absent any degree of hedging by the US China’s cooperation with the US-led economic order should have been seen as largely non-credible. A rising China had strong incentives to misrepresent any hypothetically-revisionist intentions it might have held as long as doing so would elicit continued US accommodation that facilitated China’s rapid power gains. Yet many China experts took China’s cooperative behavior during this period at face value ignoring its incentives to misrepresent and drawing overly optimistic conclusions that China truly shared American preferences for the international order [29 32 56 61]. Even more troublingly the Trump administration has recently expressed confident beliefs that China’s intentions are hostile and consequently begun to implement policies of escalating economic containment toward China. Yet this conclusion is also unwarranted: China’s revisionist behavior has been generally limited to its territorial disputes in the South China Sea whereas its economic and institutional actions are either ambiguous or supportive of the US-led liberal order [31]. Ironically the Trump administration’s emerging strategy of economic containment which has been adopted due to ill-formed pessimistic beliefs about China’s intentions lends considerable (though incomplete) credibility to China’s cooperative signals on economic and institutional dimensions. To the extent that China continues to defend and advocate a rules-based liberal economic order in the face of Trump’s economic containment this is a much more credible signal of China’s benign intentions than its previous cooperation under unconditional US accommodation. Thus current US foreign policy turns the logic of hedging on its head: rather than hedging due to uncertainty and updating their beliefs in response to China’s subsequent behavior policymakers have assumed China’s hostility and are initiating what appears to be a strategy of unconditional containment. Power Shifts Uncertainty and US-China Relations The Thucydides trap is not a new concept – it is fundamentally equivalent to what Jack Levy referred to more than three decades ago as the preventive motivation for war [9 42]. When a declining state knows that its preferences conflict with those of a rising state war can occur due to the well-known “commitment problem ” which refers to a rising state’s inability to commit to not use its future power gains to exploit the declining state [13 54]. Under complete information there is always a range of peaceful bargains that both the riser and decliner would prefer to war if the bargain could be guaranteed to endure into the future. However as the rising state gains power its bargaining leverage would increase giving it an ex post incentive to revise the settlement in its own favor at the decliner’s expense. Thus when the power shift is sufficiently large the declining state prefers a winner-take-all war in the present to the eventual settlement the riser will impose in the future if the decliner were to acquiesce to the power shift. Note however that the commitment problem obtains only when the rising and declining states have sufficiently divergent preferences over the shape of the international order. If the rising and declining states have highly compatible preferences the decliner sacrifices little by allowing the riser to gain power. This “benign” riser (from the decliner’s perspective) would simply use its power to maintain the same order that the decliner prefers. Conversely however if the riser’s preferences are highly incompatible with the decliner’s then it will use its power gains to radically revise the international order in ways that are at odds with the decliner’s preferences. It is with this sort of “hostile” rising state that commitment problems obtain under complete information yielding strong incentives for the decliner to initiate preventive war. Commitment problems do not obtain when the rising state is known to be benign ([36]:119. [67]). This raises the question of what the decliner should do when it is uncertain about the compatibility of the rising state’s preferences with its own. As discussed below this is the situation that characterizes contemporary US-China relations. It is this sort of uncertainty that lies at the heart of the security dilemma the phenomenon by which conflict can occur even between states with mutually-compatible preferences due to misplaced (but rational) distrust of the other’s intentions. Under the combination of shifting power and uncertainty commitment problems potentially obtain if the rising state turns out to be hostile. In this case the decliner may not be willing to risk accommodating the rising state if the consequences of exploitation by a hostile riser outweigh the benefits of cooperation with a benign one. Instead the decliner would initiate preventive conflict. Yet because there is some probability that the rising state is actually benign this opens up the possibility of “tragic” conflict between truly compatible states. If uncertainty about the riser’s intentions cannot be overcome or at least mitigated a sufficiently large power shift would produce war even between rational states whose interests do not conflict at all. A prominent subset of realist scholars has compellingly argued that this is often the case: large power shifts engender formidable barriers to the credibility of rising states’ cooperative signals such that uncertainty about others’ intentions is intractable and declining states must make worst-case assumptions about rising states’ intentions [9 12 45 53]. This is because hostile rising states have strong incentives to misrepresent their intentions while relatively weak by mimicking the cooperative behaviors of benign risers and refraining from attempting to revise the international order. These realists argue that for hostile risers the costs of foregoing immediate revision are outweighed by the prospects of avoiding opposition from the decliner and attempting revision under a more favorable distribution of power in the future. As such if cooperative signals are likely to be sent by both benign and hostile risers alike such signals are non-credible and declining states should remain highly uncertain about any rising state’s future intentions. This exacerbates the security dilemma and gives declining states strong incentives to take preventive action even against risers that have exhibited cooperative behavior. This barrier to credible signaling during power shifts has also been applied to contemporary US-China relations. For many realists it is entirely possible that “China is just practicing common sense and behaving itself until it is a more powerful and consolidated entity” ([33]:203) and “pursuing a peaceful policy today in order to strengthen itself to confront the United States tomorrow” ([40]:14). As such a common conclusion has been that “we cannot tell much about China’s future behavior because it [currently] has such limited capacity to act aggressively” ([46]:385). </source> [/INST] <claim>China war is inevitable – it’s only a question of when</claim> <psg>. A rising China had strong incentives to misrepresent any hypothetically-revisionist intentions it might have held as doing so would elicit continued US accommodation that facilitated China’s rapid power gains many China experts took China’s cooperative behavior at face value ignoring its incentives to misrepresent and drawing overly optimistic conclusions that China truly shared American preferences for the international order the Trump administration has recently expressed confident beliefs that China’s intentions are hostile and consequently begun to implement policies of escalating containment toward China if the riser’s preferences are incompatible with the decliner’s then it will use its power gains to radically revise the international order in ways that are at odds with the decliner’s preferences yielding strong incentives for the decliner to initiate war raises the question of what the decliner should do when it is uncertain about the compatibility of the rising state’s preferences with its own this is the situation that characterizes contemporary US-China relations. It is this sort of uncertainty that lies at the heart of the security dilemma by which conflict can occur even between states with mutually-compatible preferences due to distrust of the other’s intentions the decliner not be willing to risk accommodating the rising state Instead the decliner would initiate conflict a sufficiently large power shift would produce war even between rational states whose interests do not conflict at all large power shifts engender formidable barriers to the credibility of rising states’ cooperative signals and declining states must make worst-case assumptions about rising states’ intentions because hostile rising states have strong incentives to misrepresent their intentions while relatively weak by mimicking the cooperative behaviors of benign risers and refraining from attempting to revise the international order avoiding opposition from the decliner and attempting revision under a more favorable distribution of power in the future if cooperative signals are likely to be sent by both benign and hostile risers such signals are non-credible and declining states remain highly uncertain about any rising state’s intentions. This exacerbates the security dilemma and gives declining states strong incentives to take action even against risers that have exhibited cooperative behavior This barrier to credible signaling during power shifts has been applied to contemporary US-China relations it is entirely possible that China is just practicing common sense and behaving itself until it is a more powerful and consolidated entity and pursuing a peaceful policy today in order to strengthen itself to confront the United States tomorrow</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> This is the real trap the United States should worry about regarding China today—the trap in which an aspiring superpower peaks and then refuses to bear the painful consequences of descent. </source> [/INST] <claim>An anemic Chinese economy makes war inevitable.</claim> <psg>This is the real trap the U S should worry about regarding China the trap in which an aspiring superpower peaks and then refuses to bear descent</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> It’s the summer of 2026 five years after the Biden administration identified the People’s Republic of China as the principal threat to US security and Congress passed a raft of laws mandating a society-wide mobilization to ensure permanent US domination of the Asia-Pacific region. Although major armed conflict between the United States and China has not yet broken out numerous crises have erupted in the western Pacific and the two countries are constantly poised for war. International diplomacy has largely broken down with talks over climate change pandemic relief and nuclear nonproliferation at a standstill. For most security analysts it’s not a matter of if a US-China war will erupt but when. </source> [/INST] <claim>War’s inevitable – excessive DoD expenditure Taiwanese commitments anti-Chinese sentiment.</claim> <psg>It’s the summer of 2026 five years after the Biden identified the People’s Republic of China as the principal threat to US security numerous crises have erupted in the western Pacific and the two countries are constantly poised for war. diplomacy has largely broken down it’s not a matter of if US-China war but when.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> China and the United States are both in the midst of modernizing their nuclear arsenals and adding capabilities that concern the other. In the early 2010s the United States embarked on a US$1.2 trillion nuclear modernization program over the next three decades. More recently the United States has enhanced its non-strategic nuclear weapons primarily to deter a perceived Russian willingness to use nuclear weapons first in a limited manner. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review called for low-yield submarine-launched “supplemental capabilities” to enhance US options for limited nuclear strikes.17 The United States has also enhanced its missile defense capabilities primarily to counter North Korean nuclear missiles. It plans to increase the number of its ground-based mid-course interceptors for homeland missile defense from 44 to 64 indicated that it would study options for space-based missile defense and tested its SM-3 Block IIA interceptors on an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) for the first time.18 The US modernization plan supplemental capabilities and growing homeland missile defenses are frequently cited by Chinese experts as evidence of a destabilizing US pursuit of nuclear superiority.19 </source> [/INST] <claim>War inevitable – Modernization</claim> <psg>China and the United States are both in the midst of modernizing their nuclear arsenals and adding capabilities that concern the other. In the early 2010s the United States embarked on a US$1.2 trillion nuclear modernization program over the next three decades. The US modernization plan supplemental capabilities and growing homeland missile defenses are frequently cited by experts as evidence of a destabilizing US pursuit of nuclear superiority</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> ‘China considers establishing full control over Taiwan to be its number one priority” said Admiral John Aquilno during a Congressional hearing in March confirming him as the next commander of US forces in the Pacific. “We ought to be prepared today as in my opinion this problem is much closer to us than most think.” Retired General H.R. McMaster agrees. “Taiwan is the most significant flashpoint now that could lead to a large scale war” said the former US National Security Adviser last month. </source> [/INST] <claim>TECH SHIFTS and CULTURAL PROMISES cause war.</claim> <psg>China considers establishing over Taiwan to be its number one priority Taiwan is the most significant flashpoint that could lead to a large scale war</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> War between the United States and China is not inevitable. But U.S.-China relations continue to spiral downward their strategic relationship adrift and buffeted by growing global crises. Muddling through will be wholly insufficient to avoid conflict. To avoid sleepwalking into a war both countries must construct a joint strategic framework to maintain the peace—and quickly. </source> [/INST] <claim>DECLINING RELATIONS make war structurally inevitable.</claim> <psg>War between the U S is not inevitable But relations continue to spiral downward relationship buffeted by growing global crises Muddling will be wholly insufficient to avoid conflict To avoid sleepwalking into a war both countries must construct peace</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> During the past several years the U.S.-China relationship has reached its lowest point in decades. This week after a virtual summit with Xi Jinping that lasted more than three hours President Biden referred to “commonsense guardrails” that were needed to keep the relationship from spiralling further downward. But the summit did not end with any concrete agreements—or even a joint statement—on the issues affecting the relationship which run from trade and technological development to human rights in Hong Kong and Xinjiang to the future of Taiwan. The lack of agreement underscored the reality that the problems between the two countries appear largely intractable despite an urgent need for coöperation on issues such as climate change. </source> [/INST] <claim>Relations collapse is inevitable – China and the US are locked in an ideological battle that prevents regime cooperation.</claim> <psg>During the past several years the U.S.-China relationship has reached its lowest point Biden referred to “commonsense guardrails” that were needed to keep the relationship from spiralling summit did not end with any concrete agreements lack of agreement underscored the reality that the problems between the two countries appear largely intractable</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Many China experts in government and academia and anti-nuclear activists such as the Union of Concerned Scientists and the Federation of American Scientists appear not to be worried by China’s rapidly growing nuclear capabilities because Beijing’s official policy promises that China will not be the first to employ nuclear weapons in a conflict. Beijing promises that its nuclear forces are for deterrence and retaliation only not for aggression. Western analysts consistently fail to understand that for both Beijing and Moscow nuclear war plans are national security “crown jewels” that they try to protect and conceal behind a bodyguard of lies and disinformation. Trusting open sources and commentary — especially when they are intended to cast nuclear doctrine in the most benign possible way — is a big mistake. For example during the Cold War the USSR went to extraordinary lengths to misinform Western policymakers and the public that Moscow had a nuclear “no first use” doctrine. This was intended to conceal its real nuclear war plans — that we now know entailed a massive nuclear first strike early in a conflict. The “no first use” disinformation campaign also was intended to mobilize Western anti-nuclear activists in and out of government to constrain U.S. nuclear programs and operational plans. China’s alleged nuclear “no first use” doctrine like the USSR’s during the Cold War is almost certainly disinformation. “No first use” for China does not withstand the test of common sense. No conservative military planner would adopt “no first use” when China lacks ballistic missile early warning system (BMEWS) radars and satellite early warning systems that would enable China to launch on tactical warning. “No first use” would doom China’s nuclear deterrent to certain destruction by a U.S. or Russian conventional or nuclear first strike or to a nuclear first strike by India. China’s nuclear posture especially the lack of early warning radars and satellites is “use it or lose it ” which logically should drive Chinese military planners toward nuclear first use — indeed toward surprise first use early in a crisis or conflict based on strategic warning. Regardless of China’s “no first use” declaration it strains credulity that Beijing’s political leaders would adhere to such a policy if confronted with compelling political and military intelligence of an imminent U.S. attack. Such strategic warning was the basis for the former USSR’s secret plans for a disarming nuclear first strike under their VRYAN (surprise nuclear missile attack) intelligence program that nearly resulted in a nuclear apocalypse during NATO’s theater nuclear exercise Able Archer 83. Fortunately at least some U.S. military leaders are not as naïve as academics about China’s “no first use” pledge. Adm. Charles Richard chief of U.S. Strategic Command testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee in February that he could “drive a truck through China’s ‘no first use’ policy.” China’s unprecedented rapid expansion of its nuclear and missile capabilities is not consistent with a belief in “minimum deterrence” and “no first use.” It looks imitative of Russia’s policy seeking escalation dominance for nuclear diplomacy and nuclear warfighting. Lt. Gen. Robert Ashley director of the Defense Intelligence Agency warned in May 2019: “China is likely to at least double the size of its nuclear stockpile in the course of implementing the most rapid expansion and diversification of its nuclear arsenal in China’s history. … China launched more ballistic missiles for testing and training than the rest of the world combined.” China’s political and military leaders often have threatened nuclear war. In 2011 columnist Gordon Chang reported: “Former Chinese general Xu Guangyu … suggested China was planning a surprise missile attack on the American homeland.” The People’s Liberation Army Second Artillery Corps — now the PLA Rocket Force equivalent to U.S. Strategic Command — leaked a planning document “Lowering the Threshold of Nuclear Threats ” that stipulated some conditions under which in response to U.S. conventional attacks China would launch a nuclear first strike. For example: “Targets that could draw such a response include any of China’s leading urban centers or its atomic or hydroelectric power facilities.” China’s military doctrine — including numerous examples of using nuclear EMP attack to win on the battlefield defeat U.S. aircraft carriers and achieve against the U.S. homeland a surprise “Pearl Harbor” writ large — is replete with technical and operational planning consistent with a nuclear first strike. Indeed China’s classification of nuclear EMP attack in military doctrine as “electronic warfare” or “information warfare” indicates that EMP is not even considered a form of nuclear attack but would be equivalent to non-nuclear EMP weapons and cyber warfare. In March a panel of China’s military experts threatened to punish U.S. Navy ships for challenging China’s illegal annexation of the South China Sea by making an EMP attack — one of the options they considered least provocative because the crew would be unharmed but most effective because the ship would be disabled. Like other evidence this too suggests Beijing considers EMP attack as something short of nuclear or even kinetic conflict akin to “gray zone” threats such as electronic and cyber warfare. </source> [/INST] <claim>China’s NFU is a sham – they are modernizing to bloody nose nuclear first strike the United States homeland </claim> <psg>Beijing promises that its nuclear forces are for deterrence and retaliation only not for aggression. nuclear war plans are national security “crown jewels” that they try to protect and conceal behind a bodyguard of lies and disinformation China’s alleged nuclear “no first use” doctrine like the USSR’s during the Cold War is almost certainly disinformation. “No first use” for China does not withstand the test of common sense. No conservative military planner would adopt “no first use” when China lacks ballistic missile early warning system (BMEWS) radars and satellite early warning systems that would enable China to launch on tactical warning China’s nuclear posture especially the lack of early warning radars and satellites is “use it or lose it ” which logically should drive Chinese military planners toward nuclear first use — indeed toward surprise first use early in a crisis or conflict based on strategic warning. China’s unprecedented rapid expansion of its nuclear and missile capabilities is not consistent with a belief in “minimum deterrence” and “no first use.” China is likely to at least double the size of its nuclear stockpile in the course of implementing the most rapid expansion and diversification of its nuclear arsenal in China’s history. … China launched more ballistic missiles for testing and training than the rest of the world combined.” In 2011 columnist Gordon Chang reported: “Former Chinese general Xu Guangyu … suggested China was planning a surprise missile attack on the American homeland.” China’s military doctrine and achieve against the U.S. homeland a surprise “Pearl Harbor” writ large — is replete with technical and operational planning consistent with a nuclear first strike. In March a panel of China’s military experts threatened to punish U.S. Navy ships for challenging China’s illegal annexation of the South China Sea by making an EMP attack</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> One might think that only weak countries need to worry about an adversary “escaping stalemate”. surely powerful countries have the resources to thwart any adversary’s efforts to attain nuclear superiority. But history is not reassuring. In the Cold War once the Soviet Union had built robust nuclear retaliatory forces many observers assumed that stalemate could not be undermined and that U.S. leaders would recognize and respect the “objective” reality that mutual assured destruction was a permanent fact. Instead American officials constantly sought counterforce weapons and technologies to gain a disarming first-strike or significant damage-limitation capability—such as more accurate missiles missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) sensors for hunting mobile missiles at sea and on land and a variety of weapons and innovations designed to undermine Soviet command and control and early warning systems. By the end of the Cold War Soviet leaders had little faith in their own retaliatory capabilities. </source> [/INST] <claim>Counterforce can thwart nuclear superiority empirics prove – the US dismantled Soviet command and control systems. </claim> <psg>One might think that only weak countries need to worry about an adversary “escaping stalemate”. surely powerful countries have the resources to thwart any adversary’s efforts to attain nuclear superiority. But history is not reassuring once the Soviet Union had built robust nuclear retaliatory forces many observers assumed that stalemate could not be undermined erican officials constantly sought counterforce weapons and technologies to gain a disarming first-strike or significant damage-limitation capability—such as more accurate missiles missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) sensors for hunting mobile missiles and a variety of weapons and innovations designed to undermine Soviet command and control and early warning systems. By the end of the Cold War Soviet leaders had little faith in their own retaliatory capabilities. </psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Geography lends various advantages to the United States’ and its allies’ efforts to block Chinese SSBNs from patrolling in the Pacific Ocean. The biggest roadblock is the existence of major chokepoints separating China’s coastal waters from the Pacific Ocean. Along the First Island Chain there are only a limited number of waterways—including the Miyako Strait and the Bashi Channel (in the Luzon Strait near the Philippines)—through which Chinese SSBNs can transit. All of these waterways are adjacent to land features possessed or controlled by U.S. allies so the passages are under close surveillance by U.S. or U.S.-friendly ASW forces. </source> [/INST] <claim>Deterrence against China submarines is successful—ASW forces prove</claim> <psg>Geography lends various advantages to the United States’ and its allies’ efforts to block Chinese SSBNs from patrolling in the Pacific Ocean The biggest roadblock is the existence of major chokepoints separating China’s coastal waters from the Pacific Ocean. . All of these waterways are adjacent to land features possessed or controlled by U.S. allies so the passages are under close surveillance by U.S. or U.S.-friendly ASW forces.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Five trends are ushering in an age of unprecedented transparency. First sensor platforms have become more diverse. The mainstays of Cold War tech- nical intelligence—satellites submarines and piloted aircraft—continue to play a vital role and they are being supplemented by new platforms. For example remotely piloted aircraft and underwater drones now gather in- telligence during peacetime and war. Autonomous sensors hidden on the ground or tethered to the seabed monitor adversary facilities forces and operations. Additionally the past two decades have witnessed the development of a new “virtual” sensing platform: cyberspying. Second sensors are collecting a widening array of signals for analysis using a growing list of techniques. Early Cold War strategic intelligence relied heavily on photoreconnaissance underwater acoustics and the col- lection of adversary communications all of which remain important. Now modern sensors gather data from across the entire electromagnetic spec- trum. they employ seismic and acoustic sensors in tandem. and they emit radar at various frequencies depending on their purpose—for example to maximize resolution or to penetrate foliage. Modern remote sensing exploits an increasing number of analytic techniques including spectroscopy to identify the vapors leaking from faraway facilities interferometry to discover underground structures and signals-processing techniques (such as those underpinning synthetic aperture radars) that allow radars to perform better than their antenna size would seem to permit. Third remote-sensing platforms increasingly provide persistent observation. At the beginning of the Cold War strategic intelligence was hobbled by sensors that collected snapshots rather than streams of data. Spy planes sprinted past targets and satellites passed overhead and then disappeared over the horizon. Over time those sensors were supplemented with plat- forms that remained in place and soaked up data such as signals-intelligence antennas undersea hydrophones and geostationary satellites. The trend toward persistence is continuing. Today remotely piloted vehicles can loiter near enemy targets and autonomous sensors can monitor critical road junctures for months or years. Persistent observation is essential if the goal is not merely to count enemy weapons but also to track their movement. The fourth factor in the ongoing remote sensing revolution is the steady improvement in sensor resolution. In every field that employs remote-sensing technology including medicine geology and astronomy improved sensors and advanced data processing are permitting more accurate measures and fainter signals to be discerned from background noise. The leap in satellite image resolution is but one example. The first U.S. reconnaissance satellite (Corona) could detect objects as small as 25 feet wide. today commercial sat- ellites (e.g. DigitalGlobe’s WorldView-3 and WorldView-4) can collect im- ages with 1-foot resolution and U.S. spy satellites are reportedly capable of resolutions of less than 4 inches. Advances in resolution are not merely transforming optical remote-sensing systems. they are extending what can be seen by infrared sensors advanced radars interferometers and spectro- graphs and many other sensors. The fifth key trend is the huge increase in data transmission speed. During the first decades of the Cold War it took days or longer to transmit information from sensors to analysts. At least a full day passed before the photographs snapped by U-2 aircraft were developed and analyzed. Early satellites were slower: the satellite had to finish its roll of film and then eject the canister which would be caught midair and flown to a facility for development and analysis. all told it might take weeks before images collected at the begin- ning of a satellite mission arrived at an analyst’s desk. Today by contrast intelligence gathered by aircraft satellites and drones can be transmitted in nearly real time. The data can be transmitted to intelligence analysts to politi- cal leaders and in some cases directly to military commanders conducting operations. </source> [/INST] <claim>Growing transparency over military operations has increased counterforce effectiveness – especially over remote-sensing </claim> <psg>Five trends are ushering in an age of unprecedented transparency. First sensor platforms have become more diverse. The mainstays of Cold War tech- nical intelligence—satellites submarines and piloted aircraft—continue to play a vital role and they are being supplemented by new platforms. For example remotely piloted aircraft and underwater drones now gather in- telligence during peacetime and war sensors hidden on the ground or tethered to the seabed monitor adversary facilities forces and operations. Additionally the past two decades have witnessed the development of a new “virtual” sensing platform: cyberspying. Second sensors are collecting a widening array of signals for analysis using a growing list of techniques modern sensors gather data from across the entire electromagnetic spec- trum. they employ seismic and acoustic sensors in tandem. and they emit radar at various frequencies depending on their purpose—for example to maximize resolution or to penetrate foliage Modern remote sensing exploits an increasing number of analytic techniques including spectroscopy to identify the vapors leaking from faraway facilities interferometry to discover underground structures Third remote-sensing platforms increasingly provide persistent observation. At the beginning of the Cold War strategic intelligence was hobbled by sensors that collected snapshots rather than streams of data. Over time those sensors were supplemented with plat- forms that remained in place and soaked up data such as signals-intelligence antennas undersea hydrophones and geostationary satellites fourth factor in the ongoing remote sensing revolution is the steady improvement in sensor resolution. improved sensors and advanced data processing are permitting more accurate measures and fainter signals to be discerned from background noise Advances in resolution are not merely transforming optical remote-sensing systems. they are extending what can be seen by infrared sensors advanced radars interferometers and spectro- graphs and many other sensors. The fifth key trend is the huge increase in data transmission speed. During the first decades of the Cold War it took days or longer to transmit information from sensors to analysts Today by contrast intelligence gathered by aircraft satellites and drones can be transmitted in nearly real time. The data can be transmitted to intelligence analysts to politi- cal leaders and in some cases directly to military commanders conducting operations.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> China’s initial approach to AI has been heavily influenced by its assessment of U.S. military initiatives. in particular those associated with the DoD’s Third Offset Strategy and more recently “Project Maven” (e.g. human-machine collaboration. convolutional neural networks. big-data analytics. machine-learning. human-assisted operations. combat-teaming. and autonomous weapons).108 108. China’s long-standing approach to military innovation has been based on a “leap-frogging” strategy. designed to encourage civil-military collaboration in the development of dual-use asymmetric capabilities. View all notes As China’s approach to AI matures however it will more likely align closer with the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) unique organisational command and control and strategic cultural traditions.109 109. Johnson The US-China Military and Defense Relationship during the Obama Presidency chap. 4. View all notes Beijing like the U.S. has yet to formally articulate a coherent strategic framework operational concepts or the establishment of institutions and mechanisms to support the use of AI for warfighting.110 110. For a recent study on Chinese approaches to weapon system-related operational concepts see Jeffrey Engstrom Systems confrontation and system destruction warfare (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 2018). View all notes That said the intensity of discussion and research within the PLA surrounding military-use AI is indicative of the high-level importance attached to this ubiquitous dual-use technology.111 111. ‘National People’s Congress Representative Liu Guozhi: Artificial Intelligence Will Accelerate the Process of Military Transformation’ PLA Daily March 7 2017 http://jz.chinamil.com.cn/zhuanti/content/2017-03/07/content_7517615.htm/. View all notes As China and the U.S. internalise these emerging technological trends it is likely that each side will conceptualise them very differently. Scholarship on military innovation has demonstrated that – with the possible exception of nuclear weapons – technological innovation alone rarely causes the military balance to shift. rather how militaries employ a technology usually proves critical.112 112. See Barry R. Posen The sources of military doctrine: France Britain and Germany between the world wars (Ithaca: Cornell Studies in Security Affairs 1986). View all notes A major cause for concern is that if the many national cultural and normative differences that separate Sino-American approaches to military innovation are reflected in the software used to teach AI programmes the resultant prejudices and preferences might become baked into the weapon systems they support. 113 113. For example Microsoft’s racist “Chatbot Tay” is the most infamous example of this kind of prejudice displayed based on the data and parameters used by developers. View all notes As a corollary even if AI systems are designed to produce bias-free analysis human bias inherent in data sampling sensor types and other uncontrollable factors might nonetheless result in subjective decision-making.114 114. However if future AI is able to collect and categorise its own data via sensors then the susceptibility of machines to human biases will likely decrease. For a history of AI and the military see Ayoub and Payne ‘Strategy in the Age of Artificial Intelligence’ 793–819. View all notes Under crisis and conflict conditions these kinds of cognitive biases might exacerbate underlying U.S.-China mutual mistrust suspicion and misperceptions. In the race to innovate in AI uncertainties surrounding U.S and China progress (and setbacks) will have profound and potentially destabilising implications for the strategic balance.115 115. China and the United have developed the capability to leverage AI to achieve asymmetric combat advantages but its employment will also introduce certain vulnerabilities. Moreover there will likely be continued obstacles to the effective sharing acquisition and fielding of AI systems for military applications. View all notes For now at least the U.S. retains the upper-hand in AI innovation 116 116. The U.S. leads China in the number of AI patent applications the number of AI-related organisations the amount of funding provided but China is quickly closing this gap. View all notes but in this emerging innovation arms-race China is no longer the inferior party. Instead China is fast becoming a true peer-competitor in AI and is expected to soon overtake the U.S. in this emerging strategic domain.117 117. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) The Military Balance 2018 (London: IISS 2018) 10–3. View all notes By its own estimates Beijing has set 2020 as a target to achieve “major breakthroughs in a series of landmark AI products” and to establish an “international competitive advantage” in the development of dual-use technologies and applications – especially those which target the United States.118 118. From 2014 China has surpassed the United States in the output of published research papers on deep learning - by circa 20 per cent in 2016 alone. While increases in the quantity of AI-related publications do not necessarily correspond to advances in quality this trajectory nonetheless clearly demonstrates that China is resolutely committed to its AI development agenda. View all notes To be sure China’s innovation ambitions could be expedited by a fundamental mismatch (even dissonance) analysts have identified between the rapid pace of commercial innovation and academic research into AI and the lagging timescales and assumptions that underpin the Pentagon’s existing procurement processes and practices.119 119. Andrew Ilachinski AI Robots and Swarms - Issues Questions and Recommended Studies (Washington: CNA Analysis and Solutions 2017) xiv. View all notes Chinese centralised planning socialist market economy and in particular a vast pool of data-sets could offer Beijing significant scope to leverage China’s market forces and human capital to realise its “civil-military fusion” objective in AI.120 120. Beijing’s approach to AI is however far from perfect. Chinese state-led resource management characterised as inefficient and intrinsically corrupt (with government-favoured research institutions receiving a disproportionate share of state-funding) might cause the government to misallocate resources over-invest in non-productive and poorly conceptualised AI projects. View all notes While vast data is clearly an advantage however it remains an open question whether China’s national strategic planning and socialist market economy will prove advantageous in the development of AI. According to a recent report China is on track to possess twenty per cent of the world’s entire data by 2020 – and thirty per cent by 2030.121 121. In contrast between 2012–2017 U.S. DoD expenditure on AI-related contracts was relatively flat. Govini ‘Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence Big Data and Cloud Taxonomy’ December 3 2017 9 http://www.govini/home/insights/. View all notes The head of the U.S. DoD’s Strategic Capabilities Office William Roper highlighted the pivotal role the accumulation of and competition for information for machine learning will play in future warfare. Roper stated: “It’s wealth and fuel. Your data keeps working for you. You stockpile the most data that you can and train that to teach and train autonomous systems”.122 122. Patrick Tucker ‘The Next Big War Will Turn on AI Says US Secret-Weapons Czar’ Defense One 28 March 2017 https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/03/next-big-war-will-turn-ai-says-pentagons-secret-weapons-czar/136537/. View all notes In contrast to the nuclear arms race that defined the Cold War-era states competing in the AI arms race will be less concerned with sustaining the qualitative and quantitative lead in warheads but instead will be more concerned with maintaining information superiority – to feed machine-learning algorithms.123 123. Sharikov ‘Artificial intelligence cyberattack and nuclear weapons - A dangerous combination’ 370. View all notes Chinese President Xi Jinping recently stated that AI “big data” cloud storage cyberspace and quantum communications were amongst the “liveliest and most promising areas for civil-military fusion” and towards this end he pledged additional state support and resources.124 124. For example in collaboration with Baidu Beijing established a “National Engineering Laboratory of Deep Learning Technology” initiative. Robin Li ‘China brain project seeks military funding as Baidu makes artificial intelligence plans’ South China Morning Post 3 March 2015 https://www.scmp.com/lifestyle/article/1728422/china-brain-project-seeks-military-funding-baidu-makes-artificial. View all notes In contrast the increasingly strained relationship between the Trump administration and Silicon Valley will likely pose additional challenges to this critical partnership in the development of AI technologies for the U.S. military.125 125. For example when Google acquired DeepMind it specifically prohibited the use of its research for military purposes. Loren DeJonge Schulman Alexandra Sander and Madeline Christian ‘The Rocky Relationship Between Washington & Silicon Valley: Clearing the Path to Improved Collaboration’ (Washington: CNAS July 2015). View all notes Following a recent high-profile backlash from employees at Google the company recently announced that it would discontinue its work with the Pentagon on Project Maven.126 126. Jeremy White ‘Google Pledges not to work on weapons after Project Maven backlash’ The Independent 7 June 2018 https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/google-ai-weapons-military-project-maven-sundar-pichai-blog-post-a8388731.html. View all notes As a first mover AI-power therefore China will likely chart a course to be at the vanguard in the development of technical standards mechanisms and governance of AI that will likely strengthen the competitiveness and quality of China’s military capabilities.127 127. Given the lack of empirical open-sources that relates to Chinese view on military applications of AI this paper highlights some of the key observable trends and proffers areas for future research that relates to these issues. View all notes China’s early approach to AI suggests a wide-reaching conceptualisation that the PLA will synthesise into its entire force structure. to support future “intelligentised” operations and seise the “commanding heights” of future strategic competition.128 128. ‘National People’s Congress Representative Liu Guozhi: Artificial Intelligence Will Accelerate the Process of Military Transformation’ PLA Daily March http://jz.chinamil.com.cn/zhuanti/content/2017-03/07/content_7517615.htm/. View all notes Specifically Chinese researchers have focused on AI applications for war-gaming training command and control intelligence analysis and augmenting autonomous weapons systems.129 129. Shou Xiaosong ed. The Science of Military Strategy 3rd ed. (Beijing: Military Science Press 2013). View all notes President Xi’s “One Belt One Road” and the virtual dimension the “digital Silk Road” are high-level efforts designed to ensure that the mechanisms co-ordination and support for this agenda will become increasingly normalised.130 130. China’s recent five-year plan reportedly committed over USD$100 billion to AI. Moreover as China moves forward with its One Belt One Road related projects that extend to potentially more than eighty countries AI would become an integral part of these international infrastructure projects. Wenyuan Wu ‘China’s Digital Silk Road: Pitfalls Among High Hopes’ The Diplomat 3 November 2017 https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/chinas-digital-silk-road-pitfalls-among-high-hopes/. View all notes Moreover in 2017 Xi explicitly called for the acceleration of the military “intelligentisation” agenda to better prepare China for future warfare against a near-peer adversary like the United States.131 131. ‘Xi Jinping’s Report at the 19th Chinese Communist Party National Congress’ Xinhua October 27 2017 http://www.china.com.cn/19da/2017-10/27/content_41805113_3.htm. View all notes China’s pursuit of AI (especially dual-use capabilities) will fuel the perception (accurate or otherwise) in Washington that Beijing is intent on exploiting this strategically critical technology to fulfil its broader revisionist goals. Despite a brief pause in the development of the U.S.’s AI strategic roadmap the White House recently announced the creation of a new committee of AI experts to advise it on policy choices.132 132. Aaron Boyd ‘White House Announces Select Committee of Federal AI Experts’ Nextgov May 10 2018 https://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2018/05/white-house-announces-select-committee-federal-ai-experts/148123/. View all notes In 2017 following the recommendation of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. President Trump blocked a Chinese firm from acquiring Lattice Semiconductor. a company that manufactures chips critical in the operation of AI applications.133 133. Ana Swanson ‘Trump Blocks China-Backed Bid to Buy U.S. Chip Maker’ The New York Times September 13 2017 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/business/trump-lattice-semiconductor-china.html. View all notes This action typifies a broader concern that synergies created by China’s civil-military fusion strategy could allow the technology expertise and intellectual property shared between American and Chinese commercial entities to be transferred to the PLA.134 134. Bartholomew and Shea U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission - 2017 Annual Report 507. View all notes Though Chinese strategic writings have emphasised the importance of human-machine collaboration and teaming (or keeping humans “in the loop”) 135 135. “Keeping humans in the loop” refers to maintaining human control of autonomous weapons. both in the design of the rules that govern these systems and the execution of those rules when firing. That said human decision-making and automation are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example the human-machine teaming cognitive design envisaged by the Pentagon in theory at least could leverage the predictability reliability and speed of full-automation while retaining the robustness and flexibility of human intelligence. View all notes the PLA’s historical resistance to command and control decentralisation and general mistrust of human personnel could prompt military leaders to gravitate more quickly towards full-battlefield autonomy.136 136. For a recent comprehensive examination of the PLA’s shortcomings see Michael S. Chase Jeffrey Engstorm Tai Ming Cheung Kirsten A. Gunness Scott W. Harold Susan Puska and Samuel K. Berkowitz China's incomplete military transformation- assessing the weaknesses of the people's liberation army (PLA) (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 2015). View all notes The opposite conclusion could also be drawn however: if Chinese commanders were unwilling to give up centralised control to junior officers why would they give such control to machines? Recent reports indicate China’s navy is contemplating fitting its nuclear-powered submarines (and possibly nuclear-armed ones) with a so-called “AI-augmented brainpower”.137 137. Stephen Chen ‘China’s plan to use artificial intelligence to boost the thinking skills of nuclear submarine commanders’ South China Morning Post 4 February 2018 https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2131127/chinas-plan-use-artificial-intelligence-boost-thinking-skills. View all notes This capacity could in theory synthesise and interpret large quantities of data generated by sonar signals and sound pulses to detect submerged objects and support a broad range of maritime operations. To be sure the kinds of operations and the level of autonomy afforded to AI-augmented systems to support China’s strategic underwater forces will have profound implications for future crisis and conflict in the increasingly contested undersea domain. In extremis if military command and control systems came under attack (possibly from AI-augmented cyber-weapons) military commanders may decide to pre-delegate decision-making to machine-learning systems. Russia for example operates a so-called “dead hand” designed to automatically launch its nuclear missiles at hyper-speed if its pressure sensors were to detect an imminent nuclear attack.138 138. Fontaine and Miller A new era in U.S.-Russian strategic stability 26. View all notes The evidence suggests that China (and Russia) has relatively few moral legal or ethical qualms in deploying lethal autonomous weapons.139 139. To date there have been few publications on the legal and ethical implications for military-use AI which have dominated the discourse in the West. Bendett ‘Get Ready NATO.’ View all notes Moreover and in contrast to the U.S. discussion on the potential limitations and risks associated with AI autonomy and cyber-warfare appears largely absent from Chinese open-sources.140 140. For example Johnson The US-China Military and Defense Relationship during the Obama Presidency chap. 4. View all notes Reports suggest that China has already begun to incorporate AI into its next-generation conventional missiles and missile-defense intelligence gathering systems to enhance their precision and lethality.141 141. Kania Battlefield singularity. View all notes By contrast the U.S. will likely be much more constrained in the development of these technologies. Resistance within the U.S. military to incorporate AI stems in large part from the prevailing liberal-democratic norms governing the use of military force and the growing concerns surrounding the many “black box” aspects of AI-machine learning and in particular to avoid the so-called “Terminator Conundrum” – the implications of weapons that could operate independently and beyond the control of their developers.142 142. Colin Clark ‘“The Terminator Conundrum:” VCJCS Selva On Thinking Weapons’ Breaking Defense January 21 2016 https://breakingdefense.com/2016/01/the-terminator-conundrum-vcjcs-selva-on-thinking-weapons/. View all notes Chinese analysts by overlooking the potential shortcomings uncertainties and vulnerabilities associated with AI and overstating (even overdramatising) the utility of AI and autonomy (or taking humans “out of the loop”) could under crisis and conflict conditions complicate escalation management 143 143. For example whilst much has been written by Chinese analysts on the Pentagon’s Third Offset Strategy programmes (including AI) there has been very little discussion on the potential limitations of these advanced systems - including those associated with reducing human control. View all notes and worsen strategic stability in future warfare.144 144. Geist and Lohn How might artificial intelligence affect the risk of nuclear war? (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 2018) 5. View all notes That said given the aggressive pursuit of military-use AI by its strategic rivals America’s current commitment to having humans in charge might waver.145 145. It remains unclear however what operational contexts and applications and to what degree China and Russian might pursue fully autonomous weapon systems. View all notes Moreover international law remains unclear and indeterminate on lethal autonomy and in its absence militaries (including the U.S.) will continue to develop weapon systems with varying degrees of autonomy.146 146. Kelsey Atherton ‘3 big takeaways from the Navy’s new robot road map’ C4ISRnet 30 May 2018 https://www.c4isrnet.com/unmanned/2018/05/30/three-big-takeaways-from-the-navys-new-robot-roadmap/. View all notes Ultimately militaries will need to consider the trade-off between the risks associated with autonomous weapons with the possibility of affording an adversary using fully autonomous weapons the asymmetric upper hand. At this early stage it is impossible to know for certain when whether and under what circumstances greater degrees of autonomy in human-machine collaboration will provide a distinct strategic battlefield advantage. </source> [/INST] <claim>Chinese lead encourages the worst misuses of AI – extinction</claim> <psg>China’s initial approach to AI has been heavily influenced by its assessment of U.S. military initiatives Project Maven China’s long-standing approach to military innovation has been based on a “leap-frogging” strategy. designed to encourage civil-military collaboration in the development of dual-use asymmetric capabilities Artificial Intelligence Will Accelerate the Process of Military Transformation even if AI systems are designed to produce bias-free analysis human bias inherent in data sampling sensor types and other uncontrollable factors might nonetheless result in subjective decision-mak ese kinds of cognitive biases might exacerbate underlying U.S.-China mutual mistrust suspicion and misperceptions. In the race to innovate in AI uncertainties surrounding U.S and China progress will have destabilising implications For now at least the U.S. retains the upper-hand in AI innovation but China is quickly closing this gap. China is no longer the inferior party. Instead China is fast becoming a true peer-competitor in AI and is expected to soon overtake the U.S. in this emerging strategic domain Beijing has set 2020 as a target to achieve “major breakthroughs in a series of landmark AI products” and to establish an “international competitive advantage” in the development of dual-use technologies and applications – especially those which target the United States China has surpassed the United States in the output of published research papers on deep learning - by circa 20 per cent China’s innovation ambitions could be expedited by a fundamental mismatch analysts identified academic research into AI and the lagging timescales and assumptions that underpin the Pentagon’s existing procurement processes Beijing significant scope to leverage China’s market forces and human capital to realise its “civil-military fusion” objective Chinese state-led resource management characterised as corrupt vast data is clearly an advantage national strategic planning and socialist market economy China is on track to possess twenty per cent of the world’s entire data by 2020 – and thirty per cent by 2030 states competing in the AI arms race will be less concerned with sustaining the qualitative and quantitative lead in warheads but instead will be more concerned with maintaining information superiority – to feed machine-learning algorithms As a first mover AI-power therefore China will likely chart a course to be at the vanguard in the development of technical standards mechanisms and governance of AI Given the lack of empirical open-sources that relates to Chinese view on military applications of AI this paper highlights some of the key observable trends and proffers areas for future research that relates to these issues Keeping humans in the loop” refers to maintaining human control of autonomous weapons. both in the design of the rules that govern these systems and the execution of those rules when firing if military command and control systems came under attack military commanders may decide to pre-delegate decision-making to machine-learning systems. The evidence suggests that China has relatively few moral legal or ethical qualms in deploying lethal autonomous weapons there have been few publications on the legal and ethical implications for military-use AI which have dominated the discourse in the West. China has already begun to incorporate AI into its next-generation conventional missiles and missile-defense intelligence gathering systems to enhance their precision and lethality Resistance within the U.S. military to incorporate AI stems in large part from the prevailing liberal-democratic norms governing the use of military force and the growing concerns surrounding the many “black box” aspects</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> GENEVA (AP) — A U.S. diplomat focusing on disarmament said Thursday that China is “looking at” developing naval and aerial autonomous nuclear weapons systems warning any such development could disrupt strategic stability. </source> [/INST] <claim>China is developing autonomous nuclear weapons that will upend strategic stability.</claim> <psg>U.S. diplomat said China is developing naval and aerial autonomous nuclear weapons any development could disrupt strategic stability.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> With the rise of artificial intelligence supercomputing and data analytics the world today is at a crucial turning point in the national security and the conduct of war. Sometimes known as the AI triad these characteristics and other weapons systems such as hypersonics are accelerating both the speed with which warfare is waged and the speed with which warfare can escalate. Called “hyperwar” by Amir Husain and one of us (John R. Allen) this new form of warfare will feature levels of autonomy including the potential for lethal autonomous weapons without humans being in the loop on decision-making. </source> [/INST] <claim>AI-controlled nuclear weapons auto-launch at the slightest provocation.</claim> <psg>With the rise of a i supercomputing and data analytics the world today is at a crucial turning point known as the AI triad are accelerating both the speed with which warfare is waged Called “hyperwar</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The world may be inching closer to an era where a Terminator-style apocalyptic nuclear war could be possible due to yielding control over nuclear weapons to artificial intelligence (AI) according to publications by nuclear scientists and defense experts. </source> [/INST] <claim>AI risks accidental launches AND hair-trigger readiness posture – extinction.</claim> <psg>world may be inching closer to an era where a Terminator-style apocalyptic nuclear war could be possible due to yielding control over nuclear weapons to artificial intelligence (AI) </psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> WASHINGTON — U.S. intelligence shows that China has conducted 'human testing' on members of the People's Liberation Army in hope of developing soldiers with 'biologically enhanced capabilities ' the top U.S. intelligence official said Friday. </source> [/INST] <claim>China is developing groundbreaking biotechnology results in the most dangerous versions of CRISPR nanotech super soldiers and cognitive warfare.</claim> <psg>U.S. intelligence shows that China has conducted 'human testing' on members of the P L A in hope of developing soldiers with 'biologically enhanced capabilities</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The conventional wisdom on biotechnology has held that coming decades will see Western nations increasingly vulnerable to ever-more sophisticated biological weapons attacks by non-state actors and rogue states. As recombinant genetic technology proliferates a greater number of actors will possess genetic engineering capabilities that will enhance the lethality and durability of their biological weapons. Proponents of this perspective note that the overwhelming technological advantage in conventional forces enjoyed by the United States creates the incentive for competitors to develop effective asymmetric responses and that the affordability accessibility and relatively easy preparation of biological weapons make them a likely means of doing so. In this view the superior conventional capabilities of the US military not only fail to deter the proliferation of biological weapons but encourage their development. Western states will face an increasing number of biologically armed opponents and will remain on the defensive. The priority for military biotech research is therefore the development of protective equipment and vaccines antibiotics and antivirals (Department of Defense 1998). However this scenario requires the presumption that military applications of biotechnology will simply be a secular progression from the bacteriological warfare that has existed throughout history. Even when analysts have factored in the vast possibilities of genetic engineering it has usually only been to the extent that they can breed deadlier pathogens and that the growing availability of technology means that it may be used by a broader spectrum of actors. Conventional wisdom therefore predicts an unstable future for the international system a Hobbesian world in which the weakest have power to kill the strongest. Rather than rogue states and non-state terrorists it is the most powerful and resource-laden actors in the international system that will enjoy the advantages of “biological warfare” in the twenty-first century as they continuously integrate emergent biotechnologies into their military and national defense infrastructures and extend their dominance. This process will closely resemble the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) that occurred during the last 30 years of the twentieth century as the United States adapted its forces to exploit advances in new information technologies. The RMA first described by the Soviet military intelligence in the 1970s and then witnessed by the world during the unexpectedly uneven 1991 Gulf War occurred because the United States employed its competitive advantage in integrated computer systems. Rather than a single transformative device like the atomic bomb the steady accretion of advanced technologies augmenting existing equipment came to inform doctrine and strategies. The term asymmetric warfare is meant to describe efforts by weaker participants in military confrontations to frustrate the advantages of the stronger power by guerilla tactics or other unconventional methods not envisioned in force planning (Mack 1975). However high technology also offers asymmetric advantages to the best-equipped actors and American military planners sought to use the advances of the RMA to field forces that no state competitor could match. Their goals included “dominant maneuver” capability on the battlefield in bringing dispersed resources to bear against targets “precision engagement” capability delivered by smart weapons and “full dimension force protection” against all anticipated threats (Rizwan 2000). The ultimate expression of this vision would be a fighter comparable to a “Jedi knight” from the Star Wars films: a super-empowered solider dressed in a protective stealth cloak and commanding an armed companion drone able to perform solo missions and to transmit data back to headquarters (Hundley and Gritton 1994). Coincidentally or not this is precisely how Darth Maul was depicted in 1999’s The Phantom Menace. Military planners likewise foresee similar advantages conferred by developments across the various biotech fields. In coming decades biotechnology is forecast to bring advances such as “rugged computers” made from biological components that will provide situational awareness to individual soldiers on the battlefield camouflaged materials and lightweight armor incorporating the properties of living organisms and ingested biological markers to distinguish friendlies which would be of particular use in counterinsurgency (Purdue University 2001). From the perspective of those involved in force planning the anticipated future is not one of vulnerability but unassailability. Defense R&D While some military (or potentially military) applications of biotechnology are indeed products of the private sector it is no state secret that militaries actively sponsor their own biotech research and development programs. The United States Department of Defense in particular is open about the large number of such projects that it oversees. And while most of these are described as intended for troop protection many are clearly intended to enhance combat operations. As with pathogen stockpiles maintained ostensibly for defensive research it is only the intent of the wielder that determines whether or not they are offensive. And as the 2001 anthrax case illustrates even projects officially intended for defensive purposes may be misapplied. Much of the biotech research is conducted under the auspices of the Pentagon’s DARPA rather than legacy programs remaining from the era of bacteriological weapons stockpiles. Established in 1958 as a response to the launch of the first Sputnik satellite by the Soviet Union the year before DARPA was intended to promote “high-risk – high-payoff” R&D in areas beyond the immediate envisioned needs of military planners. The Agency’s singular most influential project has undoubtedly been a communications system that came to be known as DARPANET before penetrating – and transforming – the commercial sector as the internet (Van Atta 2008 pp. 20 23 27). While a reported 90% of its projects fail to come to fruition high-profile DARPA research that has had a significant impact on United States military capability includes Saturn rockets ground radar stealth fighters Predator missiles and drones. The agency’s budget of $3 billion is small compared to intelligence agencies but it supports an “open culture” promoting “radical innovation” praised by participant scientists most of whom are university researchers (Moreno 2006 pp. 12–13 Basken 2013). In 2014 DARPA announced the creation of a new Biological Technologies Division built from existing research units and new programs intended to ensure that biotechnology is not merely an aspect of various research programs but that “biology takes its place among the core sciences that represent the future of defense technology.” The new division’s primary goals include to “restore and maintain warfighter abilities ” and “to enhance global-scale stability” (DARPA 2014). Similarly the Pentagon Office of Net Assessment (ONA) which envisions potential future strategic environments and challenges has also promoted biotech R&D as a defense priority. In 2002 the ONA recommended revising Federal regulations to allow experimental biotechnologies to be brought to the battlefield more readily. It also called for facilitating a greater partnership with private sector researchers by restricting anti-trust laws to permit quicker product development (Armstrong and Warner 2003). In biotech in particular the military has an advantage over the private sector because it does not have to go through the lengthy and rigorous clinical testing and approval process for medical devices and treatments (Wheelis in Pearson et al. 2007 p. 4). The future is now: from lab to battlefield Whether in collaboration with the private sector or directly from their own research facilities leading state military programs are implementing biotech innovations that have already had significant impacts beyond the realistic aspirations of non-state actors. The lives of thousands of Coalition troops have been saved by biotechnologies deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan and other projects being implemented will enable soldiers to fight more effectively under more adverse conditions than previously possible. In short rather than being curtailed by asymmetric defenses the power projection capabilities of the strongest actors in the international system will increase markedly during the twenty-first century. Troop health and survivability Despite the mechanization and increased destructive power of warfare in the midnineteenth century it was not until World War II that wartime combat deaths exceeded those off the battlefield. This shift due to advances in combat medicine permitted American and British forces to conduct forward operations with reduced fatalities. Advances in biotechnology are responsible for the continuation of this trend into more current conflicts with similar results (Frank 2007). When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003 many of its soldiers and Marines were treated with $90 HemCon bandages. The military ordered 26 000 of these dressings made from a shrimp shell extract called chitosan which stopped arterial bleeding within a minute of application to wounds. Another bandage developed by the American Red Cross but with limited use because of its $1000 price tag was made of clotting proteins extracted from human blood. By contrast a powdered coagulant manufactured by Z-Medica called QuikClot that could be poured directly onto wounds was issued in first-aid kits initially to Marines and then across service branches. QuikClot is a granular substance that can be poured directly onto a wound almost instantly forming a clot that stops bleeding. A hemostatic agent in QuikClot draws water molecules out of blood and promotes accelerated clotting (Allen 2003). By 2010 both the United States Army and Marines had switched to providing QuikClot Combat Gauze in first aid kits instead (Cavallaro 2010). Other options are available as well: DARPA has tasked partner company Arsenal Medical with developing its hemostatic foam into a product that could be used to stop internal bleeding even without direct access to the combat wound (DARPA “Wound Stasis System” 2013). The use of biotechnologically advanced coagulants to treat severe combat injuries had a substantial effect on the first wars of the twenty-first century: “The ratio of [American] combat-zone deaths to those wounded has dropped from 24% in Vietnam to 13% in Iraq and Afghanistan. In other words the numbers of those killed as a percentage of overall casualties is lower” (Knickerbocker 2006). By the time of the War on Terror 55% of battlefield deaths were due to excessive blood loss (Armstrong and Warner 2003). But the development of rapid coagulants sharply reduced the rate of combat deaths and may have sustained the American public’s tolerance for the Iraq and Afghanistan missions. The potential implication is that democracies may become more willing to engage in future wars if the human costs of doing so are minimized. Biotech is being employed along these lines across a variety of projects: “Technologies are under investigation to fully restore complex tissues (muscle nerves skin etc.) after traumatic injury and most dramatically to develop neural-controlled upper extremity prostheses that fully recapitulate the motor and sensory functions of a natural limb” (DARPA “Restorative Biomedical Technologies” 2010). In the area of combat medicine DARPA is moving beyond coagulants. Its projects involve blood “pharming” that will produce engineered red blood cells (DARPA “Blood Pharm” 2010) that can be preserved for delivery to the front lines to enable transfusions for wounded troops despite the “austere conditions of forward deployment” (DARPA “Long-Term Storage of Blood Products” 2010). A related program would use hormone therapy to extend the survivability of combatants losing critical amounts of blood before fluids and transfusions can reach them: “Achieving this goal will allow increased time – perhaps many hours or even days – for evacuation triage and initiation of supportive therapies” (DARPA “Surviving Blood Loss” 2010). To better treat other battlefield wounds and reduce rehabilitation needs “DARPA seeks to create a dynamic putty-like material which when packed in/around a compound bone fracture provides full load-bearing capabilities within days creates an osteoconductive bone-like internal structure and degrades over time to harmless resorbable by-products as normal bone regenerates” (DARPA “Fracture Putty” 2010). In vivo biomaterials or compounds directly incorporated by a living organism would regenerate tissue and then be fully absorbed (Armstrong and Warner 2003). An additional development that could reduce infection and mortality among burn victims is a “self-medicating” bandage. “Laced with nanoparticles it detects harmful bacteria in a wound and responds by secreting antibiotics” (De Lange 2010). A fully functional prosthetics program termed HAND: is developing the fundamental research that will enable the use of neural activity to … restore natural function through assistive devices. By directly harnessing the ability of neural pathways to operate natural systems the HAND program seeks to provide means of restoring the lives of injured warfighters. (DARPA “Human-Assisted Neural Devices” 2010 DARPA “Reliable Neural Interface Technology” 2013). Clinical trials are underway on accompanying neural-controlled prosthetic devices “almost identical to a natural limb in terms of motor control and dexterity sensory feedback … weight and environmental resilience” (DARPA “Revolutionizing Prosthetics” 2010). And in 2013 DARPA-funded research enabled amputees to experience partial sensations of touch through prosthetic limbs via neural interfaces (DARPA “New Nerve and Muscle Interfaces and Wounded Warrior Amputees” 2013). That such research is being conducted by the Pentagon speaks to its perceived strategic value. This line of research connects with the 2003 DARPA Strategic Plan coinciding with Director Goldblatt’s speech which also called for creating “U.S. warfighters that only need use of the power of their thoughts to do things at great distances.” Enabling the human brain to directly control a peripheral device such as an artificial limb also means that it could control robots on the battlefield that could fight without risk to soldiers Moreno (2006 pp. 9 39). Such avatars would be the infantry equivalent of drone aircraft and would profoundly change the nature of soldiering more than UAVs are now doing with piloting. Other developments in preventing or restoring injuries to troops are more overtly related to battlefield performance. DARPA in noting that “the negative impact that stress has on the cognitive emotional and physical well-being of warfighters is irrefutable ” proposes that “Novel molecular biological techniques coupled with in-vivo measurement technologies can allow for management of the stress pathways and behavioral analysis in real time” (DARPA “Enabling Stress Resistance” 2010). Already studies conducted with trauma victims have demonstrated that Propranolol administered shortly after the incident can mitigate the occurrence of PTSD (Dando in Pearson et al. 2007 pp. 133–134) 138–139). In the treatment of injuries human stem cells that can regenerate and replace otherwise irreparably damaged cells could be used to potentially replace impaired organs (Committee on Opportunities in Biotechnology for Future Army Applications [hereafter Committee] 2001 p. 37). Another option is using engineered viruses for delivery of genes. In 2005 researchers were able to restore enough damaged cochlear hair cells in deafened guinea pigs to recover 50–80% of their hearing levels. The therapy was delivered by adenoviruses engineered both to render them harmless and to produce a hair growth stimulant (Coghlan 2005). Some analysts expect that advances in somatic genetics will render even therapeutic implants unnecessary because “gene therapy agents could be transfected into cells by bombarding a patch of skin with DNA-coated pellets from a gene gun” (Committee 2001 p. 70). Another possibility is neural or cortical implants such as prosthetic retinas both to treat injuries and to offer enhanced abilities. “As the risks and costs associated with neural implants are reduced they may be used to increase the visual and hearing acuity of unimpaired individuals to levels well above average. Soldiers possessing these extraordinary faculties would be well suited to gathering intelligence and performing long range reconnaissance missions” (Committee 2001 p. 38). Human enhancement Efforts to field augmented troops represent new approaches to the use of biotechnology in warfare a qualitative shift away from traditional but uncertain bacteriological weapons to entirely new strategies for assuring battlefield dominance. As proponents of this biotech approach envision it “futuristic ‘superhuman’ capabilities of individual soldiers could enable small units to operate for extended periods of time carry the fight to remote locales and endure harsh extremes of climate” (Committee 2001 p. 7). Moreno (2006 p. 114) argues that “The first state (or nonstate) actor to build a better soldier will have taken an enormous leap in the arms race.” Although seemingly fantastic billions of dollars have already been spent on several programs directed toward fielding various types of “Augments.” As with biotechnologies to increase survivability introducing mechanically or biologically augmented living soldiers offers multiple benefits for states with the capacity to do so. It also raises a host of political and ethical questions without clear answers. Certainly there would be tactical advantages for militaries whose personnel are able to operate more effectively than their adversaries under difficult conditions. And the boon of losing fewer servicemen to injury and being able to return those who are injured to the front lines more quickly is evident. But there are also broader potential national and international political impacts. Democratic governments which endeavor to avoid costly or risky wars (Gartner and Segura 1998 Reiter and Stamm 2002) might be tempted to exert their power as their conventional force advantages grow and as the costs of providing for disabled veterans diminish. Duncan (2012) writes about the ethics of augmentation when everyone else is doing it. Parents might balk initially at the idea of using technology to increase their children’s cognitive performances but not if it means that they fall behind their augmented classmates. Citizens might hesitate to vote for presidential candidates with neural implants to enhance their reflexes and decision-making capabilities during a crisis. But at some point the question becomes “Would you vote for a commander in chief who wasn’t equipped with such a device?” This hypothetical involving heads of state is about as far as most of the ethicist approaches make toward questions of international security. But it raises the question and particularly if rival hegemons are dispatching Augments with advanced bioweapons and biomedicines to the battlefield what country with the capability to do so could justify sending its soldiers into harm’s way without the best advantages possible? The edited volume Human Enhancement presents opposing arguments over biopolitics between enthusiastic “transhumanists” and skeptical “bioconservatives” (Bostrom and Savulescu in Savulescu and Bostrom 2009 p. 1). Yet for all of the discussion about practical issues and debates over social and ethical considerations ranging over hundreds of pages there is no consideration that enhanced soldiers are at least as likely as enhanced athletes and national security is not cited among the social obligations that transhumanists claim justify even heritable germline modifications. Fukuyama (2004 pp. 42–43) noted that because “The new procedures and technologies emerging from research laboratories and hospitals … can as easily be used to ‘enhance’ the species as to ease or ameliorate illness…. The first victim of transhumanism might be equality ” an implication even more troubling at the international level when considering what this might do to the already yawning resource gap between the richest and poorest countries. George Annas contended that: Ultimately it almost seems inevitable that genetic engineering would move homo sapiens into two separable species: the standard-issue human beings would be seen by the new genetically enhanced neo-humans as heathens who can properly be slaughtered and subjugated. It is this genocidal potential that makes species-altering genetic engineering a potential weapon of mass destruction and the unaccountable genetic engineer a potential bioterrorist. (Juengst in Savulescu and Bostrom 2009 p. 48) Major powers with both conventional and asymmetric biotechnological edges over rivals may similarly be open to the use of force to maintain their positions if they are secure in the knowledge that they are well beyond the capabilities of opponents to match them. The advent of nuclear weapons is credited with reducing the number of interstate wars with the effect of entrenching the hegemony of the technologically advanced states that wield them. RMA advances gave the United States a lopsided advantage in its early post-Cold War interventions (zero combat deaths during nearly three months of NATO missions during the Kosovo War) and its initial easy success in toppling Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq led temporarily to rapprochement efforts by “rogue” regimes Iran and Libya to avoid the same fate. While advanced equipment is responsible for these successes biotech now offers the opportunity to enhance the performance of the combatants themselves. [DARPA] is engaged in the development of designer drugs that will increase cognitive functioning including attention span and alertness after periods of sleep deprivation. Another area for future research is “neural prostheses” that will enable commanders to monitor the vital signs of soldiers in the field or even to permit the control of UAVs directly by pilots in remote locations. (Huang and Kosal 2008) “In 2002 DARPA launched the Augmented Cognition (or AugCog) initiative a project dedicated to developing a headband that monitors brain activity.” With sensory input controlled remotely subjects doubled their recall and improved working memory by 500% (The Economist 2010). Research on reducing the amount of sleep that soldiers and pilots require to function effectively has become a global enterprise with countries including France Canada Singapore and Taiwan establishing military research units in this area. In the language of these projects fatigue and even sleep are described as operational weaknesses preventing humans from taking full advantage of their equipment weaknesses that intervention can ameliorate. Some major powers have already begun the attempt: during the Iraq War the British Ministry of Defense had purchased 24 000 tablets of one of the most promising drugs modafinil and the United States and France both began to routinely supply it to pilots. The use of stimulants by militaries is so widely entrenched with amphetamines in regular prescribed use for decades (Saletan 2013) that Bostrom and Savulescu (in Savulescu and Bostrom 2009 p. 2) question whether the use of modafinil is qualitatively different from “a good cup of tea.” But the premise of reducing or eliminating the need for sleep as a component of troop health is a recent development. Additionally DARPA has provided congressional testimony about its Continuous Assistance Program that would “make the individual warfighter stronger more alert more endurant and better able to heal … prevent fatigue and enable soldiers to stay awake alert and effective for up to seven days straight without suffering any deleterious mental or physical effects and without using any of the current generation of stimulants.” Potential approaches include the use of transcranial magnetic and electrical stimulation to activate brain pathways and to enhance learning (Moreno 2006 pp. 11 118). Lab mice that have been altered as embryos with extra copies of a memory-related gene “learn more quickly and remember things longer than normal mice … and the improvement was passed on to offspring” (Sandel in Savulescu and Bostrom 2009 p. 74). In the meantime the military relies on more conventional stimulants and the results might give pause to planners considering more radical medical interventions. B-1 bomber pilots who operate 19-h flights between the Persian Gulf and United States take Dexedrine an amphetamine known as speed or “go pills.” One such pilot who subsequently went drinking with buddies before attacking them in a fit of paranoid delusions in which he seemed to believe he was in the television series 24 was acquitted by a court-martial after military psychiatrists concluded that he suffered from a “substanceinduced delirium” (Murphy 2012). American pilots who killed Canadian soldiers in a 2003 friendly fire incident in Afghanistan had also been on Dexedrine during 30-h missions (Moreno 2006 p. 115). Another DARPA neural program with battlefield applications is Silent Talk which would develop the capability to communicate without speaking by recognizing the neural signals for specific words. Linked devices would permit troops in the field to recognize the signals for the “intended speech” of at least 100 words commonly used by troops in combat operations (Warwick 2009). Beyond the advantages of silent communication and preventing hostile forces from intercepting messages such technology would effectively produce electronic telepathy and have a tremendous commercial sector potential for hands-free communication. While Augments would be able to receive more situational information on the battlefield through neural devices processing it effectively is another matter. Technologies developed through the AugCog and Enabling Stress Resistance projects might alert commanders that individuals are suffering mental or physical exhaustion. Another approach would be to “develop quantitative and integrative neuroscience-based approaches for measuring tracking and accelerating skill acquisition and learning while producing a twofold increase in progression in an individual’s progress through stages of task learning.” Reminiscent of the neural training uploads for particular weapons systems and martial arts in the science fiction Matrix films results would be achieved through the “development of neurally based techniques for maintenance of acquired skills [and on] preferential brain network activation” (DARPA “Accelerated Learning” 2010). Another program with the goal of “enhancing combat performance” studies the influences of biological clocks on soldier health (DARPA “Biochronicity” 2013). Other biotechnologies would provide physical enhancements to Augments. The field of biomimetics seeks to mimic useful naturally occurring characteristics in living organisms. For example ants and spiders can lift loads dozens of times their own weight and horses can withstand freezing temperatures without thick hair. “Understanding how horses and other animals overcome drastic changes in their environment would be extremely useful. As a measure of the importance of biomimesis the Army has declared biomimetics one of its Strategic Research Objectives (primary focus areas for basic research)” (Committee 2001 pp.14–15). Already researchers have developed synthetic genes that repair damaged muscles and improve healthy ones in mice (Sandel in Savulescu and Bostrom 2009 p. 73). Another project at least at the prototype stage for humans utilizes an electrically charged under suit “focusing on the soft tissues that connect and interface with the skeletal system.” The goal of Warrior Web is “augmenting the work of Soldiers’ own muscles to significantly boost endurance carrying capacity and warfighter effectiveness” (DARPA “Warrior Web” 2013 DARPA “Warrior Web Prototype Takes Its First Steps” 2013). Power projection Unless the R&D invested in these projects proves futile the United States Department of Defense is indeed on its way to developing not just super-soldiers but essentially comic book super-heroes. Mentally and physically enhanced soldiers with access to regenerative medical treatments not available to their enemies will be far from the full extent of the impact of the biotech RMA. One $3 billion program begun in 2002 is intended to create a “metabolically dominant soldier” who will be enabled by gene therapy to lift up to 800lbs block pain receptors for days and “run at Olympic sprint speeds for 15 minutes on one breath of air” (Sokolove 2007). And if neural or cybernetic prostheses and gene therapy do not eventually produce a Captain America the contributions of other research programs may still permit the fielding of a biomimetic Spiderman: The Z-Man program will develop biologically inspired climbing aids that will enable an individual soldier to scale vertical walls constructed of typical building materials without the need for ropes or ladders. The inspiration for these climbing aids is the way geckos spiders and small animals scale vertical surfaces…. The overall goal of the program is to enable an individual soldier using Z-Man technologies to scale a vertical surface while carrying a full combat load. (DARPA “Z-Man” 2010) DARPA has offered “a proof-of-concept demonstration of a 16-square-inch sheet of Geckskin adhering to a vertical glass wall while supporting a static load of up to 660 pounds” (DARPA “Z-Man” 2013). This is perhaps the most outlandish example of how biotechnologies are being developed to aid in military power projection capabilities but it is by no means the only one. Another completed biomimetic project increased the efficiency of human swimmers by 80% and more than doubled their speed by giving them oscillating foils based on the propulsion mechanisms used by some fish and sea birds (DARPA “PowerSwim” 2010). And a project to achieve Rapid Altitude and Hypoxia Acclimatization would permit the fielding of troops (perhaps in potential battle zones such as the Hindu Kush or the Himalayas) with “novel pharmacological biological and technological approaches to adapt to high altitudes (4000–6000 meters)” (DARPA “RAHA” 2010). The adoption of biotechnology to enable force projection began during the colonial era when Europeans discovered that quinine could prevent malaria thus opening the door for the Scramble for Africa. Shortages of anti-malarial drugs during World War II caused such high morbidity rates among American personnel serving in the Pacific that General Douglas MacArthur remarked that the campaign would be a slow one unless additional measures were taken (Marble 2010). In the twenty-first century anti-malarial drugs remain a challenge to force projection. Mefloquine a comparatively affordable anti-malarial also marketed as Lariam has severe psychiatric side effects first noted in the Vietnam War. Problems include psychotic behavior paranoia and hallucinations. A 2003 report indicated that “Mefloquine use was a factor in half of the suicides among troops in Iraq in 2003 – and how suicides dropped by 50% after the Army stopped handing out the drug.” Its use was also linked to murders and suicides by Special Forces personnel in Afghanistan 2002–2004 (Benjamin 2012). In 2012 Roche Pharmaceuticals the maker of Lariam notified the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) that it had been alerted by a physician that a patient with traumatic brain injury taking the drug presumed to be a serviceman charged in a high-profile massacre of civilians had committed a homicide involving 17 victims (Ritchie 2013). When difficulties with malaria mounted during the Vietnam War including transmission back to America the United States Navy utilized recombinant technology to develop a DNA vaccine to prevent malaria infections. When the program began in the 1990s the majority of troop deployments aside from Bosnia were to malarial regions and the Plasmodium parasites were the top cause of casualties in Somalia. In tests announced in 1998 research teams were immunized with Plasmodium DNA with the majority of participants developing T-cells that function as antibodies when confronted with malarial parasites. This development involved the creation of malaria vectors that functioned like common vaccines potentially opening the way to safer deployments for American Marines (Gillert 1998). The advent of DNA vaccines of this type theoretically allows scientists to develop vaccinations against all known diseases. The Naval Medical Research Institute therefore created a “phage library” for the purposes of developing antibodies to all possible strains of infectious agents (Wang 1998). As the technology is further developed the militaries of advanced states will increasingly turn to active biotech solutions to biological threats rather than pharmaceutical prophylactics. However with defense planners concerned by the possibility of the use of genetically modified bioweapons by rogue and non-state actors they will also conduct further research into countering genetically engineered vectors that might be created to replace the naturally occurring agents against which American forces are already protected (Department of Defense 1998). DARPA’s (2013) “7 Day Biodefense” program seeks to develop persistent and transient immunities to unspecified pathogens out of the recognition that unfamiliar agents would likely be employed in a major biowarfare attack. Benign uses of Frankenfoods The apparent arrival of the end of germ warfare for military biotech purposes does not portend the resolution of the dual-use dilemma. As the planners of the AMP project note it is still necessary to work with deadly pathogens if one is to find treatments for them. Another commercial sector field that is experiencing securitization and is already highly controversial in its own right is genetically modified food. Called “Frankenfoods” by their vocal detractors and genetically modified organisms (GMOs) by agribusiness they represent a growing number of plant and animal products that have been the recipients of recombinant engineering to among other results increase their yield improve their flavor or lengthen their shelf lives. GMOs potentially hold a number of possibilities for military purposes. As far back as 1960 the United States Air Force and Navy funded studies to determine whether ions accelerated plant growth and could thereby feed troops on forward deployments (Krueger et al. 1962). More recently the Army has initiated programs to develop crops with enhanced levels of nutritional components built-in vaccines or edible factors that impart resistance to spoilage (Committee 2001 p. 53). In particular “functional foods” are expected to reduce logistical demands which would enable more efficient power projection. Such foods have been modified to provide more than their normal nutritional value. Instead they can contain nutraceuticals “such as naturally occurring antimicrobials that inhibit certain pathogens known to exist in a given operational area. Or foods could be designed with vaccines in them and an army could be vaccinated quickly and efficiently by distributing genetically engineered food” (Armstrong and Warner 2003). Genetically modified food is also being developed to be highly digestible to reduce the quantity of rations that require transportation and with biomarkers to distinguish the ingestor as friendly under battlefield or peacekeeping scans (Egudo 2004 p. 14). Future plans call for each soldier to be outfitted with [such] a wearable computer system to provide situational awareness displays analysis of sensor and targeting data and communications. [The prototype] is capable of withstanding virtually any environmental abuse including extended submersion in water … Such devices take an input data block and scan it against stored images. One practical military application is for the rapid battlefield identification of friend or foe. (Armstrong and Warner 2003) The Army Land Warrior Program is scheduled to provide each combat soldier with a wearable computer to assist with the processing of sensor and targeting data situational awareness displays and communications. As the use of graphical formats to facilitate the assimilation of information in real time increases the Army will have a growing need for computer memory capacity on the battlefield. In principle an optical 3-D memory based on bacteria polymers can store roughly three orders of magnitude more information in the same size enclosure than a two-dimensional optical disk. (Committee 2001 pp. 27–28) These advancements were followed by the use of a single gram of synthetic DNA to store 700 terabytes of data – or the equivalent of 70 000 movies – indefinitely in a transportable freeze-dried form (Ingham 2013). While new biomaterials (incorporating biological organisms or their outputs) must be reviewed and approved by the Federal FDA for safety and efficacy substances that are merely biomimetic (or “bioinspired”) do not face this hurdle. One such example developed by the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration is the fastener Velcro. In addition to augmenting soldiers by giving them the proportional strength of insects military planners also hope to endow them with lightweight body armor that absorbs impacts as efficiently as the exoskeletons of mollusks (Armstrong and Warner 2003). “On a strength-to-weight basis the abalone shell has armor protection capabilities equal to or greater than those of existing materials … When laminated hierarchical structures of biological systems (e.g. the nacre of abalone shell) are mimicked … significant improvements in the composite mechanical properties have been observed” (Committee 2001 p. 43). Imaging and surveillance Enzyme research also entails the development of “bioreceptors” comprised of thin films with photoelectronic properties. Processes recently developed include integrating lightsensitive proteins into optical devices particularly for laser eye protection polymerbased batteries and electromagnetic shielding. Bioreceptors can also detect the presence of selected DNA which makes them useful in identifying infectious agents (United States Army: New Materials Development Using Biotechnology Process 1998). “A network of biosensors could considerably improve a commander’s view of the battlefield. Some researchers envision soldiers wearing wristwatch-style biosensors that are sensitive to a variety of target molecules. In effect each solider would become a detection device and warn of a possible biological or chemical attack. Also such sensors could be used to monitor the health and well-being of entire units” (Armstrong and Warner 2003). But still other efforts have made tremendous progress in reducing the role of humans in collecting data and replacing them with other agents: insects. Although the United States Army may have experimented with mosquitoes as bioweapon delivery systems in the 1960s (Maurer in Maurer 2009 p. 96). in 2009 DARPA-funded engineers at the University of California Berkeley announced that they had developed cyborg beetles that they could direct by remote control. The researchers implanted electrodes into the brains and muscles of two species of beetle which could then be made to fly and maneuver on command for use in recover and spying missions (Callaway 2009). DARPA describes its Hybrid Insect MEMS Program as follows: The animal world has provided mankind with locomotion over millennia…. The HI-MEMS program is aimed to develop technology that provides more control over insect locomotion just as saddles and horseshoes are needed for horse locomotion control … The realization of cyborgs with most of the machine component inside the insect body will provide stealthy robots that use muscle actuators which have been developed over millions of years of evolution. (DARPA “HI-MEMS” 2010) Prior to the insect agents DARPA had already created a “roborat ” a rodent controlled by a neural prosthesis via a laptop keyboard so that it could climb stairs and navigate mazes which Director Goldblatt compared to a child’s remote-controlled car. Further developments included mounted cameras for visual data collection and prostheses implanted along the rat’s belly so that it would not be observed. The neural prostheses stimulated the rats’ pleasure centers motivating them on in their tasks and Moreno (2006 pp. 43–44) notes that there are obvious implications for how such prostheses could be adapted to human subjects as well. Exotic weaponry Whether commanding a fleet of drone bees along with drone aircraft or a company of super-soldier Augments with the abilities of insects the United States and its technologically advanced allies and competitors are assuming the capacity to wage conventional warfare and espionage in a manner that will not soon be available to internal or regional adversaries or to non-state antagonists. But it is in the area of novel bioweapons where hegemonic actors stand poised to offer attacks against which their adversaries could mount no possible defense. Currently many potential lines of research are banned under the terms of the BWC but even if state actors abide by its terms private sector breakthroughs will continue to have dual-use capabilities that can be studied. Indeed some of them have already caused outbursts of political violence internationally. Genetic weapons Until the end of the twentieth century bioweapons meant pathogens (and possibly animal delivery systems). The biotech revolution and particularly the ability to sequence and translate entire genomes has altered that equation. Some state militaries notably China’s are already publicly expressing an interest in attacking targets by reordering their bodily functions through what is known in more benign applications as gene therapy. Planners in the United States also note that: The long term implications of genomics will present the Army with opportunities and challenges even in the next decade … The Army can however promote development of new products and processes that will be consistent with or specific to its missions and needs. This will require that the Army be fully aware of the synergistic effects of biological tools. (Committee 2001 p. 15) “The goal of gene therapy is to effect a change in the genetic makeup of an individual by introducing new information designed to replace or repair a faulty gene.” This is accomplished by using the same principle employed since the first smallpox vaccination: the use of a harnessed crippled virus to serve as a “Trojan horse” vector in this case bearing replacement or supplemental genes to alter cell functioning. Somatic cell therapy affects only the cells of the individual receiving it and for reasons of ethics and technical feasibility most therapeutic research has been of this type. But there is also the technique of germline cell therapy which might “lead to a heritable change that could repair problems for all future generations” (Block in Drell et al. 1999 pp. 60–62). Although American military planners are bullish on the potential for gene therapy to improve the lots of wounded servicemen in the near future the technologies are not yet universally acclaimed nor even accepted. The United States Department of Energy (2009) noted that the FDA “has not yet [as of 2014] approved any human gene therapy product for sale. Current gene therapy is experimental and has not proven very successful in clinical trials. Little progress has been made since the first gene therapy clinical trial began in 1990.” This reaction stems in part from the death and illness of several children who had received gene therapies to treat life-threatening chronic conditions. At the same time however researchers elsewhere announced that gene therapy safely and successfully restored partial sight to congenitally blind test subjects. The results were accomplished by inserting healthy copies of a missing gene into patient retina cells via a vector manufactured by a private American company called Targeted Genetics (University College of London 2008). Vector-delivered gene therapies remain an emerging biotechnology but cases such as these demonstrate both that vectors can be used to create significant physical alterations in targets and that these changes can be deadly. The discovery that viruses can be carried airborne for considerable distances even after the droplets of fluid constituting their transmission media have fallen to the ground provides further evidence that vectors might soon be used to deliver genetic therapies – or maladies – to wide target populations (The Medical News 2007). With the genetic maps of entire organisms now available – the full genome for the plague bacterium was decoded in 2001 – it is inevitable that researchers will develop the means to rewrite specified segments of targeted genes (Preston 2009 p. 296). Direct effect weapons The United States military is currently developing “a set of design and synthesis processes that will enable the specification of a desired function and be able to rapidly synthesize a protein that performs the function.” Rather than modifying existing proteins this biotechnology would allow the creation of new proteins based on specific performance objectives (DARPA “Protein Design Processes” 1998). The field of genetic protein decoding and engineering of this kind is known as proteomics (Committee 2001 p. 15). Understanding the functions of proteins is key to opening entirely new frontiers in medicine – and warfare. Already researchers have destroyed targeted cancer cells by using engineered nanoparticles to deliver genes only to the tumor and not to healthy neighboring tissue. Once the genes were inserted they stimulated the production of a protein that selectively destroys the cancer (BBC News 2009). However proteomics also opens a different avenue of potential development in biotechnological attacks in shifting away from infectious agents to targeting human bioregulators natural substances in the body that control automatic processes such as blood pressure and immune responses. Alibek (1999) claimed that the Soviet Union pursued this research into “direct effect weapons” in the 1980s to circumvent the BWC. The result would not actually be an illness but the turning of the body against itself through disruption and projects along these lines have at least been considered (Huang and Kosal 2008 p. 9 Preston 2009 pp. 313–314). Interfering with some of the body’s neurotransmitters for example could cause memory loss panic disorder or depression (Dando in Pearson et al. 2007 pp. 133–134). NATO has listed “chemical technologies that could act on the central nervous system” as “technologies of interest” (Pearson in Pearson et al. 2007 p. 89). Chinese researchers Guo and Yang (2005) directly addressed the security applications of such efforts in proteomics arguing: Direct-effect weapons … can cause destruction that is both more powerful and more civilized than that caused by conventional killing methods like gunpowder or nuclear weapons … A military attack therefore might wound an enemy’s genes proteins cells tissues and organs causing more damage than conventional weapons could. However such devastating nonlethal effects will require us to pacify the enemy through postwar reconstruction efforts and hatred control … [W]e could create a microbullet out of a 1 micron tungsten or gold ion on whose surface plasmid DNA or naked DNA could be precipitated and deliver the bullet via a gunpowder explosion electron transmission or high-pressured gas to penetrate the body surface. We could then release DNA molecules to integrate with the host’s cells through blood circulation and cause disease or injury by controlling genes. Around the same time an American biodefense expert added that: If one can disrupt unit loyalty through fear or another emotion the army would cease to exist as a fighting force. Claustrophobia would make soldiers tear off their protective face mask. Fear thirst accelerated heart rate hypermotility of the gut – these would be the desired peptide effects. Delivery would be accomplished using engineered pathogens and their primary role in biowarfare would be as delivery systems for direct effect weapons rather than the transmission of infectious disease (Moreno 2006 pp. 178–179). The international balance of power With the emergence of advanced biotechnologies many of which already exist or are being developed for expressly military purposes the United States holds the potential for achieving a decisive advantage in power projection capabilities beyond the reach of its current adversaries and most of its likely potential competitors. Besides the United States other actors are expanding their biotech R&D sectors notably the emerging great powers China and India where force planners must consider the usage of bioweapons in Asian theaters of combat in both classical and modern times (Clunan et al. 2008). China is developing its military capabilities to become a regional power at the least and advanced biotechnologies could play a role in this effort. “As the Chinese military expands its power projection capabilities it will concentrate on creating asymmetrical advantages in the face of superior US conventional technology” (NTI 2003). Chinese military medical researchers have written a number of articles proposing the use of proteomic weapons to engage in non-lethal “precision injury” attacks that could be healed upon enemy surrender as evidence of hegemonic “mercifulness.” Despite the evident offensive strategic potential of such research – one such article is titled “The Command of Biotechnology and Merciful Conquest” – there is still evidence of the constraints of international norms against biowarfare. Indeed the author claims that biotech warfare approaches “abide by the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention more effectively and strike a blow on the traditional bioweapons therefore welcoming new military progresses and reforms and changing the notions and civilization level of war” (Guo 2006 pp. 1152–1154). India with its reliance on the Green revolution to attempt to achieve food sufficiency has spent the last two decades encouraging the development of agricultural biotechnologies. Many of these advances were facilitated using extensive knowledge of genetic engineering which in turn provided information on the de novo synthesis of biological agents. Whether such synthesis has actually been done is uncertain. India has made substantial efforts to prepare its military force for a biological attack. In December of 1998 India began to train its medical personnel to deal with the eventualities of such an attack. (NTI 2009) India’s equivalent of DARPA the Defense Research & Development Organization operates a network of 52 laboratories whose research includes life sciences for military purposes. These include the Defense Institute of High-Altitude Research and the Defense Food Research Laboratory (Department of Biotechnology Government of India 2013 p. 20). Its reported products parallel those investigated by its American counterparts including treatments to combat altitude sickness transgenic crops and protective polymers for uniforms although products are frequently described in terms of their commercial rather than strategic potentials (Defense Research & Development Organization 2015). One widely cited potential threat to international security from biotechnology is that as more actors become involved in research into militarized biotechnology the threat of dissemination to non-state actors increases through the increased availability of production equipment and available data. Maurer (in Maurer 2009 p. 86) notes that commercially available micronizers are sold that can produce 1–10 μm particles and in their advertising material the “companies boast that they can be operated by ‘anyone … in their garage.’” And non-state actors with interests in such technologies have been quite busy utilizing such machinery in the past decade with individuals referred to as “garage hackers” operating autonomously with small pieces of equipment and biological material that can be purchased from suppliers over the internet (United States House of Representatives 2005 p. 30). Still because such proliferation occurs over time and because research by defense establishments will continue during this period including in biodefense the most sophisticated uses of biotech will remain in the arsenals of advanced state actors just as they do with conventional armaments today despite the proliferation of surplus conventional arms. Rather than being the “poor man’s nuclear weapon ” twenty-first-century biotechnology will actually provide a decided asymmetrical advantage to major powers that will complement their superiority in conventional forces. Technologically advanced states will be far more likely to be able to counter classical “germ warfare” like anthrax attacks by rogue states and non-state groups than will be actors bereft of a biotech industry to mount defenses against vectors that introduce engineered viruses or proteomic weapons that disrupt human bioregulators. Re-evaluating Human Security after the Biotech RMA It might be asked whether for all the novelty of the particular technologies described there is anything genuinely qualitatively different from any other technological developments that improved the effectiveness and reach of fighters going back to clubs and spears. In describing efforts to enhance cognitive functioning Bostrom and Savulescu (cited in Savulescu and Bostrom 2009 p. 2) ask “How is taking modafinil fundamentally different from imbibing a good cup of tea? How is either morally different from getting a good night’s sleep?” They note that even simple shoes can arguably be called a technological human enhancement over bare feet. Sandel (in Savulescu and Bostrom 2009 pp. 73–74) adds that it is otherness rather than fairness that is the objection to human enhancement in sports because different athletes have different physical capabilities to begin with. Certainly this distinction would apply to states as well. Wheelis (in Pearson et al. 2007 p. 4) argues that there is no real incentive for states to spend billions of dollars in a bid to develop lethal neurotransmitter disruptors when they have effective conventional armaments. He does however note the potential power of such technology for purposes of incapacitation. A natural extension would be the use of coercion against the incapacitated (e.g. Tell us where the rebels are hiding and your blood pressure will return to normal). Perhaps the greatest threat to international stability in the genomic age is the international emergence of two classes of humankind separated by disparities in living conditions far wider than those between the developed and developing worlds today. Described by biologist Lee Silver this would be “a two-class system with rich genetically enhanced ‘GenRich’ types lording it over poorer inferior ‘Naturals ’” on a global scale (Armstrong and Warner 2003). Ultimately the perception of injustice by the multitude of the have-nots would render such a system unstable (Carr 1964 Bull 2002). What these biotechnologies do not disrupt is order within the international system. In the past advances in weapons technology have been condemned as immoral in part because the most powerful actors whether states or rulers viewed them as challenges to their hegemony. Today terrorists and rogue states are imputed to have a desire to use bioweapons meaning to release pathogens against civilian targets but few outcries have been heard over the legitimacy of the advantages conferred by other biotechnologies upon what are already the strongest actors. In this sense the biotech RMA is more akin to the development of status quo-reinforcing asymmetric weapons technologies like machine guns which were not condemned by hegemonic powers than by potentially status quo-disruptive asymmetric technologies such as chemical warfare (Price 1997 pp. 2–6). While matching advanced technology is a challenge to would-be competitors it is not an insurmountable one (Quille in Lewer 2002 p. 45). And it might actually inspire new forms of lower cost asymmetric counter-attacks as attempts to use model airplanes as drones to attack American targets by would-be terrorists demonstrates. But for now as with the nuclear club with their overwhelming edge in both offensive and defensive capabilities the United States and other advanced industrial nations can rest assured that their military and economic dominance of the international system is in no jeopardy. Biotechnology often cited as an asymmetric threat to conventional power projection capabilities is being harnessed by those very militaries as a force multiplier and their R&D and production capabilities far outstrip those of any possible combination of rogue states and terrorist groups. The biotech RMA is well underway and states are free to shift their attention from international to internal biological threats. Many of these developments are already occurring without an informed public debate and indeed many of the biotechnologies outlined in this paper doubtless seem too fantastical to warrant serious consideration. But just as most of the public and decision- makers would have dismissed the plausibility of atomic weapons before Hiroshima and were unaware before the invasion of Afghanistan that drones were already in existence so too are the seemingly far-fetched qualities of advanced biotechnology already manifesting themselves in super-solider planning and budgeting in the United States and elsewhere. </source> [/INST] <claim>Ensures a China war fought by bio-engineered soldiers which outweighs nuclear use</claim> <psg>conventional wisdom on biotechnology has held that coming decades will see Western nations increasingly vulnerable to ever-more sophisticated biological weapons attacks As recombinant genetic technology proliferates a greater number of actors will possess genetic engineering that will enhance the lethality and durability of their biological weapons. Proponents note that the overwhelming technological advantage enjoyed by the United States creates the incentive for competitors to develop effective asymmetric responses and that affordability accessibility and relatively easy preparatio make them a likely means of doing so this view the superior conventional capabilities not only fail to deter the proliferation of biological weapons but encourage their development The priority for military biotech research is therefore the development of protective equipment and vaccines antibiotics and antivirals this scenario requires the presumption that military applications of biotech will simply be a secular progression from the bacteriological warfare that has existed throughout Conventional wisdom therefore predicts an unstable future for the international system a Hobbesian world in which the weakest have power to kill the strongest. Rather than rogue states and non-state terrorists it is the most powerful in the international system that will enjoy the advantages of “biological warfare” as they continuously integrate emergent biotechnologies into their military and national defense process will closely resemble the Revolution in Military Affairs Rather than a single transformative device like the atomic bomb the steady accretion of advanced technologies augmenting existing equipment came to inform doctrine and strategies asymmetric warfare is meant to describe efforts by weaker participants in military confrontations to frustrate stronger power by guerilla tactics ). However high technology also offers asymmetric advantages to the best-equipped actors The ultimate expression of this vision would be a fighter comparable to a “Jedi knight” from the Star Wars films: a super-empowered solider dressed in a protective stealth cloak and commanding an armed companion drone able to perform solo missions and to transmit data back to headquarters Military planners foresee similar advantages conferred by developments across biotech fields. biotechnology is forecast to bring advances such as “rugged computers” that will provide situational awareness to individual soldiers the anticipated future is not one of vulnerability but unassailability. in collaboration with the private sector leading state military programs are implementing biotech innovations that have already had significant impacts beyond realistic aspirations of non-state actors thousands of Coalition troops have been saved by biotech in Iraq and Afghanistan projects being implemented will enable soldiers to fight more effectively under more adverse conditions rather than being curtailed by asymmetric defenses the power projection capabilities of the strongest actors in the international system will increase markedly during the twenty-first century Biotech is being employed fully restore complex tissues after traumatic injury Its projects involve blood “pharming” that will produce engineered red blood cells that can be preserved for delivery to the front lines to enable transfusions for wounded troops Achieving this goal will allow increased time – perhaps many hours or even days – for evacuation triage and initiation of supportive therapies research enabled amputees to experience partial sensations of touch through prosthetic limbs via neural interfaces Enabling the human brain to directly control a peripheral device such as an artificial limb also means that it could control robots on the battlefield that could fight without risk to soldiers Such would be the infantry equivalent of drone aircraft and would profoundly change the nature of soldiering more than UAVs are now doing with piloting Efforts to field augmented troops represent new approaches to the use of biotech in warfare qualitative shift away from traditional weapons to entirely new strategies for assuring battlefield dominance The first state actor to build a better soldier will have taken an enormous leap in the arms race Although seemingly fantastic billions have already been spent on several programs directed toward Augments if rival hegemons are dispatching Augments with advanced bioweapons what country with the capability to do so could justify sending its soldiers into harm’s way without the best advantages possible? Major powers with both conventional and asymmetric biotechnological edges over rivals may similarly be open to the use of force to maintain their positions if they are well beyond the capabilities of opponents to match them. The advent of nuclear weapons is credited with reducing the number of interstate wars entrenching the hegemony of the technologically advanced states that wield them RMA advances gave the United States a lopsided advantage in its early post-Cold War interventions While advanced equipment is responsible for these successes biotech now offers the opportunity to enhance the performance of the combatants themselves development of designer drugs will increase cognitive functioning including attention span and alertness after periods of sleep deprivation neural prostheses” will enable commanders to monitor the vital signs of soldiers epartment of Defense is indeed on its way to developing not just super-soldiers but essentially comic book super-heroes Mentally and physically enhanced soldiers with access to regenerative medical treatments not available to their enemies will be far from the full extent of the impact of the biotech RMA. One program is intended to create a “metabolically dominant soldier” who will be enabled by gene therapy to lift up to 800lbs block pain receptors and “run at Olympic sprint speeds for 15 minutes if gene therapy do not eventually produce a Captain America research programs may still permit the fielding of a biomimetic Spiderman -Man program will develop biologically inspired climbing aids that will enable an individual soldier to scale vertical walls Another completed biomimetic project increased efficiency of human swimmers by 80% and more than doubled their speed with defense planners concerned by the possibility of the use of genetically modified bioweapons by rogue and non-state actors they will also conduct further research into countering genetically engineered vectors that might be created to replace the naturally occurring agents against which American forces are already protected to develop persistent and transient immunities to unspecified pathogens Some state militaries notably China’s are already publicly expressing an interest in attacking targets by reordering their bodily functions through gene therapy The long term implications of genomics will present the Army with opportunities and challenges Army can however promote development of new products and processes that will be consistent with or specific to its missions and needs Chinese researchers addressed the security applications of such efforts in proteomics arguing: Direct-effect weapons … can cause destruction more powerful and more civilized than that caused by conventional killing methods like nuclear weapons A military attack might wound an enemy’s genes causing more damage than conventional weapons could. Around the same time an American biodefense expert added that: If one can disrupt unit loyalty through fear or another emotion the army would cease to exist as a fighting force. Delivery would be accomplished using engineered pathogens and their primary role in biowarfare would be as delivery systems for direct effect weapons rather than the transmission of infectious disease the emergence of advanced biotechnologies many of which already exist or are being developed for expressly military purposes the United States holds the potential for achieving a decisive advantage in power projection capabilities Besides the United States other actors are expanding their biotech R&D sectors notably the emerging great powers China where force planners must consider the usage of bioweapons in Asian theaters of combat China is developing its military capabilities to become a regional power at the least and advanced biotechnologies could play a role in this effort it will concentrate on creating asymmetrical advantages in the face of superior US conventional technology One widely cited potential threat to international security from biotechnology is that as more actors become involved in research into militarized biotechnology threat of dissemination to non-state actors increases because such proliferation occurs over time and because research by defense establishments will continue including in biodefense the most sophisticated uses of biotech will remain in the arsenals of advanced state actors Rather than being the “poor man’s nuclear weapon ” twenty-first-century biotechnology will actually provide a decided asymmetrical advantage to major powers that will complement their superiority Technologically advanced states will be far more likely to be able to counter classical “germ warfare” by rogue states and non-state groups than will be actors bereft of a biotech industry What these biotechnologies do not disrupt is order within the international system In the past powerful actors viewed them as challenges to their hegemony terrorists and rogue states are imputed to have a desire to use bioweapons but few outcries have been heard over the legitimacy of the advantages conferred by other biotechnologies upon what are already the strongest actors the biotech RMA is more akin to the development of status quo-reinforcing asymmetric weapons technologies like machine guns which were not condemned by hegemonic powers While matching advanced technology is a challenge to would-be competitors it is not an insurmountable one But for now as with the nuclear club with their overwhelming edge in both offensive and defensive capabilities the United States and other advanced industrial nations can rest assured that their military and economic dominance is in no jeopardy Biotech is being harnessed by those very militaries as a force multiplier and their R&D and production capabilities far outstrip those of any possible combination of rogue states and terrorist groups ust as most of the public and decision- makers would have dismissed the plausibility of atomic weapons before Hiroshima and were unaware before the invasion of Afghanistan that drones were already in existence so too are the seemingly far-fetched qualities of advanced biotech already manifesting themselves in super-solider planning and budgeting in the United States and elsewhere.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The arrest of Harvard Professor Charles Lieber for failing to reveal his work for the Chinese is more than alarming. One of the world’s leading experts in nanotechnology Mr. Lieber contributed to China’s Thousand Talents Program and assisted China in its military arms race with the United States whether knowingly or not. Americans should be concerned that China is pursuing military nanotechnology solutions including linking soldiers’ brains directly to computers.  </source> [/INST] <claim>Nanotech and cognitive warfare causes dangerous arms racing and machinic warfare.</claim> <psg>Lieber contributed to China’s Thousand Talents Program and assisted China in its military arms race Americans should be concerned that China is pursuing military nanotechnology solutions including linking soldiers’ brains directly to computers</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Biological weapons are considered the most dangerous of all known weapons of mass destruction. They are used to deliberately cause epidemics among humans. destroy the environmental components including water air and soil. and target crops and livestock. Examples of diseases used in biological warfare include anthrax smallpox plague cholera and avian flu. In addition to the catastrophic effects of biological warfare on the biodiversity and the environment their danger lies in their low cost and rapid spread as well as their easy preparation transport and use. </source> [/INST] <claim>Guarantees extinction – defense doesn’t assume cascading effects.</claim> <psg>Biological weapons are the most dangerous of all known weapons of mass destruction. They are used to deliberately cause epidemics among humans. destroy the environmental components including water air and soil. and target crops and livestock. anthrax smallpox plague cholera and avian flu catastrophic effects of biological warfare on biodiversity and the environment</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The combined effects of SNNW and the implications for the Third Nuclear Age The move towards a Third Nuclear Age has four significant technological developments each facilitated by the latest information technology revolution and by enormous shifts in computing processing and sensing power. Taken together these dynamics are continuing to push the policy focus away from nuclear punishment towards non-nuclear denial blurring the distinction between offence and defence and creating a more fluid complex and potentially dangerous nuclear order. </source> [/INST] <claim>Must act now – new tech developments will undermine second strike</claim> <psg>The move towards a Third Nuclear Age has four significant technological developments facilitated by enormous shifts in computing processing and sensing power these dynamics are continuing to push the policy focus non-nuclear denial and creating a more dangerous nuclear order</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> China’s nuclear arsenal appears to be expanding substantially for the first time in years. Over the past few decades China had maintained only about twenty silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). But recent evidence from independent U.S. experts shows that the country is likely constructing more than 200 new missile silos. China’s current program to modernize and update its nuclear weapons is moving at an unprecedented speed and scale. </source> [/INST] <claim>China’s rapidly modernizing making escalation inevitable – only striking now avoids extinction.</claim> <psg>China’s nuclear arsenal appears to be expanding substantially China is constructing more than 200 new missile silos. China’s current program to modernize and update its nuclear weapons is moving at an unprecedented speed and scale.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Nuclear weapons have already shown that it is possible to convert matter into large amounts of heat and light but doing it the other way around converting heat and light into matter is much more difficult — but this is exactly what laboratories in China and the UK hope to achieve. </source> [/INST] <claim>China is on the brink of developing super lasers – they’ll break the quantum vacuum literally next year.</claim> <psg>it is possible to convert matter into large amounts of heat and light but doing it the other way around converting heat and light into matter is much more difficult — but this is exactly what laboratories in China hope to achieve.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> China is building new nuclear weapons much faster than previously predicted already has a “nascent nuclear triad ” and will field more than 1 000 nuclear warheads by 2030 according to the Pentagon’s 2021 report on China’s military power released Nov. 3. </source> [/INST] <claim>They’re on the cusp of second-strike capabilities – it’s now or never!</claim> <psg>China is building new nuclear weapons much faster than previously predicted already has a “nascent nuclear triad ” and will field more than 1 000 nuclear warheads by 2030 according to the Pentagon’s 2021</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> First while the common estimate of China’s nuclear weapons is approximately three hundred due to China’s lack of transparency it is possible that China has significantly more than this estimate. This month there have been calls within China for expanding its nuclear arsenal to one thousand strategic warheads to say nothing of nuclear weapons on intermediate-range or other forces. While the United States has taken a “strategic holiday ” the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has used the opportunity to expand their arsenals as well as cyber and conventional capabilities. When one reflects upon the considerable effort to create strategic systems as well as cyber and conventional capabilities inescapable conclusions are first that the causes of their expansion is rooted in their own grand strategic objectives of achieving hegemony and second the decision to expand their forces was sown long ago. China has used our strategic passivity to expand.  What Reagan’s Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger said in the Soviet context remains true today: 'When we build they build when we stop they build.”  The growth of Chinese arsenals cannot be divorced from other evidence of China’s expansion. They are expanding their bases for example in Djibouti and Gwadar and alliance networks including through the Belt and Road Initiative and “debt diplomacy ” the creation of new international institutions to supplant extant ones and aggressive intelligence operations.  These measures indicate that China is a non-status quo great power but is a revisionist—and one that seeks change immediately. This bodes ill for strategic stability. Most concerning is that China’s build-up might allow it to race to parity or superiority with the United States which would result in an intense arms race. China’s actions make it a threat to strategic stability. To maintain strategic stability requires modernizing U.S. strategic systems including missile defenses and conventional capabilities.  Not to do so invites a direct and existential strategic challenge to the security of our allies and ourselves. Second the form of China’s build-up is notable. Always secretive the Chinese have occluded their nuclear expansion as they do not want to provoke a premature reaction from the United States or its allies. More damning is that the Chinese are secretly “preparing the battlefield” to ensure that they have the ability to damage the United States through other nonnuclear means. These nonnuclear avenues of attack include cyber control of space supply chain dominance economic influence technological mastery of 5G and increasingly artificial intelligence soft power and the continued legal and illegal access to America’s knowledge intellectual property finance and technology to facilitate Beijing’s growth. This would ensure the United States could be damaged sufficiently—in effect a near equivalent of a major nuclear attack—to cause U.S. political leaders to yield in a crisis or limited war without the employment of nuclear weapons. China might launch one or more cyber attacks on the electrical grid and on the ability of the United States to recover and rebuild its electrical grid after a significant cyber attack. This is likely to be a direct attack in the cyber realm but the damage might also be inadvertent due to the unintended consequences of an attack against another target. Moreover the risks of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) to the U.S. electrical grid is also a possibility. The vulnerability of America electricity to EMP—whether from deliberate EMP attack cyber attack or solar activity—and the ability to recover the electrical grid in the wake of an event is an issue that must be solved now.  Third China rejects arms control in practice and in principle. Thus far Beijing will not unilaterally reduce or limit its arsenal or enter into arms control talks. That is a worrisome sign and suggests that U.S. assumptions about the causes of stability in a great power relationship are only its own and not shared by China. A major objective of arms control is that it can promote stability in the relations between states. The state willingly abandons or limits a class of weapons to demonstrate to other actors that its ambitions are limited and it supports strategic stability. By entering an arms control regime China could show that it accepts the value of arms control and seeks confidence-building measures which aids stability while demonstrating that China is a status quo power. Fundamentally it would allow China to signal its peaceful intentions and in turn have an important stabilizing effect on states concerned with China’s increasing power. The fact that China rejects arms control is troubling and suggests first it is a revisionist power and second that it wants to be unfettered as it expands its arsenal. These developments mean that strategic stability is unlikely to obtain. China is likely to race for superiority and that is destabilizing and the United States must ensure this never occurs and must prepare itself for the return of an arms race. Given the PRC’s unprecedented expansion the United States must respond by modernizing its capabilities to deter them from threatening the homeland U.S. military and its alliance commitments. These are critical steps to deter them from the temptation to race to parity or superiority which could result in the collapse of U.S. credibility and alliances. Lastly the United States must ensure that its vulnerability to non-nuclear forms of major economic and societal damage to the U.S. homeland is addressed. </source> [/INST] <claim>Waiting causes a Chinese race to parity – that collapses strategic stability and east Asian alliances </claim> <psg>This month there have been calls within China for expanding its nuclear arsenal to one thousand strategic warheads 'When we build they build when we stop they build.”  The growth of Chinese arsenals cannot be divorced from other evidence of China’s expansion.  These measures indicate that China is a non-status quo great power but is a revisionist—and one that seeks change immediately. This bodes ill for strategic stability. Most concerning is that China’s build-up might allow it to race to parity or superiority with the United States which would result in an intense arms race. China’s actions make it a threat to strategic stability  Not to do so invites a direct and existential strategic challenge to the security of our allies and ourselves. Beijing will not unilaterally reduce or limit its arsenal or enter into arms control talks The fact that China rejects arms control is troubling and suggests first it is a revisionist power and second that it wants to be unfettered as it expands its arsenal. These developments mean that strategic stability is unlikely to obtain. China is likely to race for superiority and that is destabilizing and the United States must ensure this never occurs and must prepare itself for the return of an arms race These are critical steps to deter them from the temptation to race to parity or superiority which could result in the collapse of U.S. credibility and alliances</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Similarly US alliance guarantees in the Asia-Pacific were designed in part to create a climate of security in which Japan could be revived economically without threatening its neighbors just as the expansion of NATO after the Cold War helped prevent incipient rivalries and territorial irredentism among former members of the Warsaw Pact.41 US alliances keep things quiet in regions Washington cannot ignore thereby fostering a climate of peace in which America and its partners can flourish. Fourth US alliances impede dangerous geostrategic phenomena such as nuclear proliferation. As scholars such as Francis Gavin have emphasized US security guarantees and forward deployments have played a critical role in convincing historically insecure technologically advanced countries—Germany Japan Taiwan South Korea among others—to forego possession of the world’s absolute weapon. In several of these cases moreover the United States has used the security leverage provided by alliance guarantees to dissuade allies from pursuing the bomb after they had given indications of their intent to start down that path.42 If as seems likely a world with more nuclear powers is likely to be a more dangerous world in which crises more frequently take on a nuclear dimension and the risk of nuclear conflict is higher then the value of American alliances looms large indeed. In sum as the framers of the post-World War II order understood phenomena such as massive instability arms racing and violence in key regions would eventually imperil the United States itself. </source> [/INST] <claim>Nuclear war – East Asia is uniquely escalatory</claim> <psg>US alliance guarantees in the Asia-Pacific were designed to create a climate of security in which Japan could be revived economically without threatening its neighbors US alliances keep things quiet in regions Washington cannot ignore fostering a climate of peace US alliances impede dangerous geostrategic phenomena such as nuclear proliferation US security guarantees have played a critical role in convincing historically insecure technologically advanced countries Germany Japan Taiwan South Korea to forego possession of the world’s absolute weapon the U S has used the security leverage provided by alliance guarantees to dissuade allies from pursuing the bomb after they had given indications of their intent to start down that path If a world with more nuclear powers is likely to be a more dangerous world in which crises more frequently take on a nuclear dimension and the risk of nuclear conflict is higher then the value of American alliances looms large indeed as the framers of the post-World War II order understood phenomena such as massive instability arms racing and violence would eventually imperil the U S itself.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Persistent debates over the meaning of the “liberal” or “rules-based” international order demonstrate a point of agreement among scholars and policymakers: the real power of the concept when employed as a metaphor for a disrupted global order. </source> [/INST] <claim>China is joining international initiatives to destroy the order them from the inside.</claim> <psg>liberal” or “rules-based” international order demonstrate a point of agreement among scholars</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The liberal world order which came into being at the end of World War II under American leadership has been going through a radical transformation in recent years mostly owing to China's spectacular rise. In parallel to its increasing material power capability China is also posing fundamental challenges to the normative fabric of the liberal world order. </source> [/INST] <claim>Beijing is actively repositioning economic and governmental priorities towards a new Chinese led order. </claim> <psg>The liberal world order has been going through a radical transformation in recent years mostly owing to China's spectacular rise. China is also posing fundamental challenges to the normative fabric of the liberal world order.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> In the U.S. and much of the liberal West the concept of the “rule of law” is vital to a properly functioning society—the idea (at least in theory) that the law is impartial independent and applied evenly and consistently to all and that it serves to protect the innocent including from the state. China’s leaders however follow the concept of the “rule by law ” in which the legal system is a tool used to assure Communist Party dominance. courts are forums for imposing the government’s will. The state can do just about anything it wants and then find some helpful language in the “laws” to justify it. </source> [/INST] <claim>Institutional hijacking covert influence projects maritime claims.</claim> <psg>In the U.S. and much of the liberal West rule of law” is vital to a properly functioning society law is impartial and applied evenly China’s leaders follow the concept of the “rule by law ” in which the legal system is a tool used to assure Communist Party dominance. courts are forums for imposing the government’s will</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Defenders of the west have a tendency to gaze wistfully at the past lamenting how far today’s leaders have fallen. Where America and its allies used to build things create institutions and win wars now they seek only to hold ground conserve what they have and escape conflicts. </source> [/INST] <claim>Ukraine proves China is the core threat to the international order. </claim> <psg>Defenders of the west have a tendency to gaze wistfully at the Where America and its allies used to build institutions now they seek only to hold ground and escape conflicts.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The Pentagon thinks Beijing may build 1 000 or more weapons by 2030. But it’s the new technologies that worry strategists. </source> [/INST] <claim>China’s getting ready to first strike us!</claim> <psg>Beijing may build 1 000 or more weapons by 2030. But it’s the new technologies that worry strategists.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> One factor that gives evidence of China’s establishment of economic hegemony is their goal of surpassing the United States as the largest economy in terms of nominal gross domestic product (GDP). I believe that China will surpass the nominal GDP of the U.S. GDP refers to the total value of everything produced in a country regardless of if its citizens or foreigners produced it (Amadeo 2020 Par. 1). It can be calculated 2 ways: nominal or PPP. China has already surpassed the GDP of the U.S. in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP refers to the comparison of currencies of different countries through a ‘basket of goods’ approach (Hall 2020 Par. 1). According to the concept 2 currencies are in equilibrium-when a basket of goods is priced the same in both countries taking into account the exchange rates (Hall 2020 Par. 1). China is on course to be the world’s largest economy by 2030 (Kennedy 2018 Par. 1). According to U.K. based financial services firm Standard Chartered the U.S. will drop to 3rd place in the global ranking of the world’s largest economies falling behind China and India (Paton 2019 Par. 1). The projections suggest China’s GDP will stand at $26 trillion in 2030 up from $14.1 trillion today (Kennedy 2018 Par. 1). The U.S. will see its GDP rise more slowly to $25.2 trillion from $20.4 trillion (Kennedy 2018 Par. 1). China is in the process of replacing the U.S. as the engine of the global economy providing by far the largest contribution to growth in recent years and pulling along the world’s smaller economies in its train (Kemp 2019 Par. 1). China accounted for 28% of all growth worldwide in the 5 years between 2013 to 2018 (Kemp 2019 Par. 1). This was more than twice the share of the U.S. according to the International Monetary Fund (Kemp 2019 Par. 1). The IMF predicts China will account for a similar share of growth over the next 5 years between 2019 and 2024 (Kemp 2019 Par. 1). China India Indonesia Russia and Brazil collectively will account for more than half of all global growth through 2024 (Kemp 2019 Par. 2). There is no scenario where the global economy can achieve healthy growth unless these 5 economies especially China see their output and incomes rise strongly (Kemp 2019 Par. 2). Between the 1970s and 1990s it was common to characterize the U.S. as the locomotive of the world economy (Kemp 2019 Par. 3). U.S. fiscal and economic policy usually played a decisive role in the development of the global economic cycle via trade and financial links to smaller countries (Kemp 2019 Par. 3). The U.S. is still important and the Federal Reserve still remains at the center of global markets (Kemp 2019 Par. 4). Despite this the U.S. economy is no longer large enough or growing fast enough to act as the sole locomotive for the world economic train (Kemp 2019 Par. 4). China on its own and the other major emerging markets collectively are now more important drivers of the global economy (Kemp 2019 Par. 4). China and the other major emerging markets are themselves increasingly interdependent since China is both a major importer of raw materials and supplier of manufactured products and onward investment (Kemp 2019 Par. 4). China’s cyclical position is also important because its rapidly growing middle class is at the stage of economic development where demand for oil cars air travel tourism and other industries is booming (Kemp 2019 Par. 5). </source> [/INST] <claim>China is in the process of replacing US as the global economic hegemon </claim> <psg>China’s establishment of economic hegemony is their goal of surpassing the United States as the largest economy in terms of nominal gross domestic product ( China will surpass the nominal GDP of the U.S. GDP refers to the total value of everything produced in a country China has already surpassed the GDP of the U.S. in terms of purchasing power parity ). China is on course to be the world’s largest economy by 2030 U.S. will drop to 3rd place in the global ranking of the world’s largest economies falling behind China and India suggest China’s GDP will stand at $26 trillion in 2030 China is in the process of replacing the U.S. as the engine of the global economy providing by far the largest contribution to growth in recent years and pulling along the world’s smaller economies in its train China accounted for 28% of all growth worldwide in the 5 years between 2013 to 2018 This was more than twice the share of the U.S. according to the International Monetary Fund China India Indonesia Russia and Brazil collectively will account for more than half of all global growth through 2024 U.S. fiscal and economic policy usually played a decisive role in the development of the global economic cycle via trade and financial links to smaller countries and the Federal Reserve still remains at the center of global markets Despite this the U.S. economy is no longer large enough or growing fast enough to act as the sole locomotive for the world economic train China on its own and the other major emerging markets collectively are now more important drivers of the global economy China is both a major importer of raw materials and supplier of manufactured products and onward investmen</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> China’s growing economy growing political influence in the developing world growing human rights violations and growing military might show it is a truly rising power meant to compete with the U.S. The United States must face the music that it is not the sole economic political and military hegemon of the world anymore. We have re-entered a bipolar world with two competing global powers. Instead of the Soviet Union during the Cold War it is now China as the main competitor to the U.S. The difference now is that China possesses more resources that the U.S.S.R never had. This competition is quite different and more complex than the U.S. faced during the Cold War. The U.S. must realize this to prevent itself from falling behind. During the Cold War if a country instituted a political or economic change contrary to American or Soviet interests the U.S or U.S.S.R would use political/military intervention to reverse it. For China they are utilizing their economic influence to force political changes in other countries favorable to Chinese interests. To successfully compete with China the U.S. must use its existing advancements and improve upon them if it wants to successfully compete with the Chinese. In order to compete with China’s broadening economic and geopolitical ambitions the U.S. needs to articulate a clearer end game for this competition and a corresponding strategy for arriving there (Kroenig 2020 Par. 2) </source> [/INST] <claim>China is growing its economic and military power to exceed the US </claim> <psg>China’s growing economy growing political influence in the developing world growing human rights violations and growing military might show it is a truly rising power meant to compete with the U.S. We have re-entered a bipolar world with two competing global powers. it is now China as the main competitor to the U.S. The difference now is that China possesses more resources that the U.S.S.R never had if a country instituted a political or economic change contrary to American or Soviet interests they are utilizing their economic influence to force political changes in other countries favorable to Chinese interests.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> China also notoriously uses artificial intelligence to track and control its population (Ioanes 2019 Par. 6). It is also betting that AI (artificial intelligence) like autonomous unmanned systems and intelligent robotics are the future both of economic advancement and warfighting (Ioanes 2019 Par. 6). China’s tactic of military and civil fusion also works here as advancements in the civilian sector will be easily adapted to military capabilities (Ioanes 2019 Par. 6). As China’s economy is the 2nd largest in the world and on the path to overtake the U.S. by 2030 it gives them the ability to spend far more resources on its military than in previous decades (Ioanes 2019 Par. 7). Between 1996 and 2015 China increased its military spending by 620% (Ioanes 2019 Par. 7). China’s Ministry of Finance said the 2019 defense budget was $177 billion (Maizland 2020 Par. 4). However analysts’ estimates are often higher than what Beijing reports (Maizland 2020 Par. 4). Defense spending increase more than sevenfold from $31 billion in 1998 to $239 billion in 2018 (Maizland 2020 Par. 4). For much of its history the PLA relied on foreign military equipment especially from Russia (Maizland 2020 Par. 5). But in recent decades the Chinese government invested heavily in state-owned and private-sector defense companies (Maizland 2020 Par. 5). Xi has pushed to reduce barriers between the two emphasizing what he calls military-civil fusion (Maizland 2020 Par. 5). Much of the PLA’s equipment is now built domestically (Maizland 2020 Par. 5). China is estimated to be the world’s second-largest arms producer trailing the U.S. and ahead of Russia (Maizland 2020 Par. 5). After decades of primacy and focusing on conflicts in the Middle East the U.S. is unprepared for the kind of military power China is building (Ioanes 2019 Par. 8). To counter this the U.S. should study and exploit weaknesses in China’s military strategy (Ioanes 2019 Par. 8). We should also weaken China’s confidence in their own ability to drive the narrative of conflict and weapons developments by showing our own military prowess and understanding of the Chinese strategy (Ioanes 2019 Par. 8). We must also ensure that U.S. technology strategy doctrine and organizations fit together seamlessly to achieve the American desired end state (Ioanes 2019 Par. 8). Despite China’s military buildup I believe the U.S. will remain on top in terms of military might. The U.S. has historically devoted a larger share of its economy than many of its allies (“U.S. Defense Spending...” 2020 Par. 1). The U.S spends more on national defense than China India Russia Saudi Arabia France Germany U.K Japan South Korea and Brazil— combined (“U.S. Defense Spending...” 2020 Par. 1). Defense spending accounts for 15% of all federal spending and roughly half of discretionary spending (“U.S. Defense Spending...” 2020 Par. 1). China is still in a distant 2nd place when it comes to defense spending. This still does not mean that the U.S. should let their guard down when it comes to military strength. Total discretionary spending—for both defense and nondefense purposes—represents only about 1/3 of the annual federal budget (“U.S. Defense Spending...” 2020 Par. 2). It is currently below its historical average as a share of GDP and is projected to decline further (“U.S. Defense Spending...” 2020 Par. 2). </source> [/INST] <claim>US is unprepared for military buildup in China- China’s economic leadership allows them to spend more on military</claim> <psg>China also notoriously uses artificial intelligence to track and control its population like autonomous unmanned systems and intelligent robotics are the future both of economic advancement and warfighting China’s tactic of military and civil fusion also works here as advancements in the civilian sector will be easily adapted to military capabilities China’s economy is the 2nd largest in the world and on the path to overtake the U.S. by 2030 spend far more resources on its military than in previous decades Defense spending increase more than sevenfold from $31 billion in 1998 to $239 billion in 2018 the PLA relied on foreign military equipment especially from Russia the Chinese government invested heavily in state-owned and private-sector defense companies China is estimated to be the world’s second-largest arms producer trailing the U.S. and ahead of Russia the U.S. is unprepared for the kind of military power China is building</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Last year the United Kingdom and the United States agreed to transfer some of their nuclear-powered submarines to Australia a country that at that time possessed none. On hearing the announcement Bernadette Cogswell and Patrick Huber of Virginia Tech in Blacksburg say that they were immediately concerned as there is currently no easy way to safeguard a nuclear reactor aboard a submarine. Now the duo has come up with a technique that could solve that problem [1]. They say that the method could be used to confirm the presence of a submarine’s nuclear core without the need for onboard monitoring. </source> [/INST] <claim>Simple physics proves sub detection.</claim> <psg>On hearing the announcement Bernadette Cogswell and Patrick Huber of Virginia Tech in Blacksburg say that they were immediately concerned as there is currently no easy way to safeguard a nuclear reactor aboard a submarine.</psg></s>