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On information and belief, Defendants received some or all of the revenues from the sale of the products, goods and services advertised on Exhibit A, and Defendants profit and benefit from the sale of the products, goods and services advertised on Exhibit A. Plaintiff did not give prior express invitation or permission to Defendants to send the fax. On information and belief, Defendants faxed the same and other unsolicited facsimiles with opt-out language identical or substantially similar to the opt-out language of the fax advertisement attached hereto as Exhibit A to Plaintiff and at least 40 other recipients or sent the same and other advertisements by fax with the required opt-out language but without first receiving the recipients’ express invitation or permission and without having an established business relationship as defined by the TCPA and its regulations because the opt-out language was not compliant. There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other class member) to avoid receiving unauthorized faxes. Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the urgent communications their owners desire to receive. Defendants’ facsimile attached as Exhibit A does not display a proper opt-out notice as required by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. Class Size (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of persons and entities of the Plaintiff Class is numerous and joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of class members is at least forty. Typicality (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (3)): The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of all class members. The Plaintiff received the same or similar faxes as the faxes sent by or on behalf of the Defendants advertising products, goods and services of the Defendants during the Class Period. The Plaintiff is making the same claims and seeking the same relief for itself and all class members based upon the same federal statute. The Defendants have acted in the same or in a similar manner with respect to the Plaintiff and all the class members by sending Plaintiff and each member of the class the same or similar faxes or faxes which did not contain the proper opt-out language or were sent without prior express invitation or permission. Need for Consistent Standards and Practical Effect of Adjudication (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (1)): Class certification is appropriate because the prosecution of individual actions by class members would: (a) create the risk of inconsistent adjudications that could establish incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendants, and/or (b) as a practical matter, adjudication of the Plaintiff's claims will be dispositive of the interests of class members who are not parties. Common Conduct (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (2)): Class certification is also appropriate because the Defendants have acted in the same or similar manner with respect to all class members thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate. The Plaintiff demands such relief as authorized by 47 U.S.C. § 227. The JFPA makes it unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). Defendants’ Other Violations. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that during the period preceding four years of the filing of this Complaint and repeatedly thereafter, Defendants have sent via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to telephone facsimile machines of members of the Plaintiff Class other faxes that constitute advertisements under the JFPA that were transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express invitation or permission (and/or that Defendants are precluded from asserting any prior express invitation or permission or that Defendants had an established business relationship because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements in connection with such transmissions). By virtue thereof, Defendants violated the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that Defendants may be continuing to send unsolicited advertisements via facsimile transmission in violation of the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and absent intervention by this Court, will do so in the future. The TCPA/JFPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf of Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class to redress Defendants’ violations of the Act, and provides for statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The Act also provides that injunctive relief is appropriate. Id. The JFPA is a strict liability statute, so the Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff and the other class members even if their actions were only negligent.

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a statement that the recipient is legally entitled to opt-out of receiving future faxed advertisements – knowing that he or she has the legal right to request an opt-out gives impetus for recipients to make such a request, if desired; On or about August 13, 2014, Defendants transmitted by telephone facsimile machine an unsolicited fax to Plaintiff. A copy of the facsimile is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Plaintiff had not invited or given permission to Defendants to send the fax. On information and belief, Defendants faxed the same and other unsolicited facsimiles without the required opt-out language to Plaintiff and more than 40 other recipients without first receiving the recipients’ express permission or invitation. There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other class member) to avoid receiving unauthorized faxes. Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the urgent communications their owners desire to receive. Defendants’ facsimiles did not display a proper opt-out notice as required by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 because it does not contain: a) a toll free fax number to opt out, b) a statement explaining that a recipient is legally entitled to opt out, c) a statement that the sender must honor the request within 30 days and that failure to do so is unlawful, d) a statement advising recipient how he or she may opt out all his or her fax numbers, and e) the notice is not clear and conspicuous. a statement that the sender must honor a recipient’s opt-out request within 30 days and the sender’s failure to do so is unlawful – thereby encouraging recipients to opt-out, if they did not want future faxes, by advising them that their opt-out requests will have legal “teeth”; Class Size (F. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of persons and entities of the Plaintiff Class is numerous and joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of class members is over forty. Typicality (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (3)): The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of all class members. The Plaintiff received the same faxes as the faxes sent by or on behalf of the Defendants advertising goods and services of the Defendants during the Class Period. The Plaintiff is making the same claims and seeking the same relief for itself and all class members based upon the same federal statute. The Defendants have acted the same or in a similar manner with respect to the Plaintiff and all the class members by sending Plaintiff and each member of the class the same faxes. Fair and Adequate Representation (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (4)): The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class. It is interested in this matter, has no conflicts and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the class. Common Conduct (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (2)): Class certification is also appropriate because the Defendants have acted and refused to act in the same or similar manner with respect to all class members thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate. The Plaintiff demands such relief as authorized by 47 U.S.C. §227. The JFPA makes unlawful for any person to "use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement …" 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). The JFPA defines "unsolicited advertisement" as "any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person's prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise." 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a) (5). The Fax. Defendants sent the on or about August 13, 2014, advertisement via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to the telephone lines and facsimile machines of Plaintiff and members of the Plaintiff Class. The Fax constituted an advertisement under the Act. Defendants failed to comply with the Opt-Out Requirements in connection with the Fax as previously set forth herein. The Fax was transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express permission or invitation and/or Defendants are precluded from asserting any prior express permission or invitation because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements. By virtue thereof, Defendants violated the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder by sending the Fax via facsimile transmission to Plaintiff and members of the Class. The TCPA/JFPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf of Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class to redress Defendants’ violations of the Act, and provides for statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The Act also provides that injunctive relief is appropriate. Id. The JFPA is a strict liability statute, so the Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff and the other class members even if their actions were only negligent. The Defendants knew or should have known that (a) the Plaintiff and the other class members had not given express invitation or permission for the Defendants or anybody else to fax advertisements about the Defendants’ goods or services; (b) the Plaintiff and the other class members did not have an established business relationship; (c) Defendants transmitted an advertisement; (d) the Faxes did not contain the required Opt-Out Notice; and (e) Defendants’ transmission of advertisements that did not contain the required Opt-Out Notice was unlawful.

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Caduceus is an Occupational Medicine Practice with eight locations in Georgia. At all relevant times, Caduceus employed, and continues to employ, “Medical Assistants.” Caduceus employed Chavis as a “Medical Assistant.” Chavis regularly worked more than forty (40) hours in a workweek. Caduceus did not pay Chavis the overtime wage differential required by the FLSA on the occasions that he worked over forty (40) hours in a workweek. Chavis worked primarily at Caduceus’ midtown office location, but he also floated between offices as needed. Throughout Chavis’ employment with Caduceus, he has not been customarily or regularly engaged away from Caduceus’ place of business. Chavis’ job duties did not require the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. Chavis did not manage any of Caduceus’ offices. Throughout Chavis’ employment with Caduceus, he has not customarily or regularly directed the work of at least two or more other full-time employees or their equivalent. Throughout Chavis’ employment with Caduceus, he has not had the authority to hire or fire any other employee. Throughout Chavis’ employment with Caduceus, his primary job duty has not been, and has not included, the performance of office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of Caduceus or Caduceus’s clients or customers. Throughout Chavis’ employment with Caduceus, his primary job has not been, and has not included, the performance of work requiring advanced technical knowledge, defined as work which has been predominately intellectual in character and which has included work requiring the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment. Based upon the duties assigned to Chavis, Caduceus has willfully failed and refused to pay Chavis one and one half times his regular rate for hours that he has worked in excess of forty (40) hours per work week. On or about January 26, 2010, Caduceus terminated Chavis’ employment after Chavis went out on medical leave on December 30, 2009. Chavis files this Complaint as a collective action pursuant to Section 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of himself and on behalf of the Collective Plaintiffs. At all relevant times Chavis and the Collective Plaintiffs are / were1 similarly situated, have / had substantially similar job requirements and pay provisions, and are / were subject to Caduceus’ common decisions, policies, plans, programs, practices, procedures, protocols, routines and rules. Chavis’ claim / cause of action against Caduceus for willfully failing and refusing to pay him one and one half times their regular rate for hours that he worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek in violation of the FLSA is essentially the same as that of the Collective Plaintiffs. The Collective Plaintiffs’ primary or exclusive duties are / were answering the phone, taking x-rays, taking vital signs, performing agility tests, and medical assistant duties. The Collective Plaintiffs’ primary job is not / was not, and does not / did not include the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. The Collective Plaintiffs do not / did not customarily or regularly direct the work of at least two or more other full-time employees or their equivalent. The Collective Plaintiffs do not / did not have the authority to hire or fire any other employee. The Collective Plaintiffs do not / did not provide suggestions or recommendations as to the hiring, firing, advancement, promotion or any other change of status of any other employee. The Collective Plaintiffs’ primary job is not / was not, and does not / did not include the performance of work requiring advanced technical knowledge, defined as work which has been predominately intellectual in character and which has included work requiring the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment. The Collective Plaintiffs’ primary job is not / was not, and does not / did not include, the performance of work requiring invention, imagination, originality or talent in a recognized field or artistic or creative endeavor. Caduceus regularly suffers or permits / regularly suffered or permitted the Collective Plaintiffs to work in excess of forty (40) hours per work week. Caduceus has willfully misclassified some Collective Plaintiffs as being exempt from overtime. There are at least approximately thirty (30) potential Collective Plaintiffs (i.e., similarly situated current and former individuals employed by Caduceus with the title / in the position “Medical Assistant” on or after the date that is three years prior to the date of the filing of this Complaint). Each of these potential Collective Plaintiffs would benefit from the issuance of Notice of this Complaint and the opportunity to opt in / join this Complaint. The potential Collective Plaintiffs’ names, current or last known telephone numbers, and current or last known addresses are readily available from Caduceus. Notice of this Complaint and the opportunity to opt in / join this Complaint can be provided to all of the potential Collective Plaintiffs via first class mail to each Collective Plaintiffs’ current or last known address. Chavis realleges and incorporates as if fully set forth herein the allegations set forth in all of the above paragraphs. Caduceus regularly suffers or permits / regularly suffered or permitted Chavis and the Collective Plaintiffs to work in excess of forty (40) hours per work week. Caduceus has failed and refused to pay Chavis and the Collective Plaintiffs one and one half times their regular rate for hours that they worked in excess of forty (40) hours per work week. Caduceus has misclassified some Collective Plaintiffs as being exempt from overtime. As a result of Caduceus’ violations of the FLSA, Chavis and the Collective Plaintiffs have suffered damages. Caduceus’ conduct in refusing to pay Chavis and the Collective Plaintiffs overtime compensation was a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a), entitling Chavis and the Collective Plaintiffs to the benefit of the three-year statute of limitations and unpaid compensation with interest to date plus liquidated damages all pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 207, 215, 216(b), and 255. Caduceus’ failure or refusal to pay Chavis and the Collective Plaintiffs the overtime compensation owed further entitles them to recover attorneys’ fees and costs of this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

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Defendant Radius Agent develops software for real estate agents. One of their software programs, Radius Assist, generates leads for real estate agents by automatically sending out text messages. To advertise its software and demonstrate its functionality, Defendant used its software to automatically text thousands of cellular phones across the country. On September 28, 2020, Plaintiff received a text on his cell phone ending number in 1146 from Defendant from the phone number (720) 549-4205. The text message that Plaintiff received said “Hey Terry, I’m Mari with Radius Assist. We call and text your old and real-time leads for you,[sic] and increase your conversion rates. May I send you info?” Plaintiff responded to the message and was then solicited further for Defendant’s software. Plaintiff never consented to be contacted by Defendant and had no knowledge of Defendant whatsoever prior to receiving the unsolicited text message. Class Definition: Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of Plaintiff and a class defined as follows: Monetary Relief Class. All persons in the United States who: (1) from November 9, 2016 to the present; (2) were sent text message(s); (3) on his or her cellular telephone; (4) promoting the products or services of Radius Agent. Injunctive Relief Class. All persons who did not give express written consent prior to receiving texts advertising Defendant’s products or services on their cellular telephone numbers. Numerosity: The exact number of the Class members is unknown and not available to Plaintiff, but it is apparent that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendant sent text messages to thousands of consumers who fall into the definition of the Class. Members of the Class can be identified through Defendant’s records. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Class, in that Plaintiff and the Class members sustained damages arising out of Defendant’s uniform wrongful conduct and unsolicited text messages. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff’s claims are made in a representative capacity on behalf of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the interests of the other members of the proposed Class and is subject to no unique defenses. Plaintiff has retained competent counsel to prosecute the case on behalf of Plaintiff and the proposed Class. Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Class and have the financial resources to do so. Policies Generally Applicable to the Class: This class action is appropriate for certification because Defendant have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the Class members and making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. Defendant’s practices challenged herein apply to and affect the Class members uniformly, and Plaintiff’s challenge of those practices hinge on Defendant’s conduct with respect to the Class as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. Using sophisticated software that it developed, Defendant sent automated text messages to Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ cellular telephones without having their prior express written consent to do so. Defendant used an automatic telephone dialing system as proscribed by 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(A). Defendant’s texts were made for a commercial purpose. As a result of its unlawful conduct, Defendant repeatedly invaded Plaintiff’s and the Class’s personal privacy, causing them to suffer damages and, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), entitling them to recover $500 in civil fines for each violation and an injunction requiring Defendant to stop their illegal texting campaign. Defendant and/or its agent made the violating texts “willfully” and/or “knowingly” under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). If the court finds that Defendant willfully and/or knowingly violated this subsection, the court may increase the civil fine from $500 to $1500 per violation under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. Each of Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(A)(iii) constitute separate and cumulative violations of §17200. Plaintiff is authorized to pursue a private right of action for injunctive relief against Defendant under §17204. Unlawful Violation of California Unfair Competition Law Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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Defendant has employed in excess of 200 non-exempt Right of Way Agents who have been subject to the same policies (payment of day rate, no salary, non-payment of overtime despite having the primary duty of performing non-exempt work) at all times relevant to this matter (since May 2011). Defendant has violated §207(a) of the FLSA and the PMWA by failing to pay Plaintiff, and all other similarly situated non-exempt Right of Way Agents, who have performed work in excess of forty (40) hours in workweeks since May 2011 at a rate of time-and-one-half (1½) their regular rate of pay for the overtime hours worked. Prosecuting this case as a collective action under the FLSA and a class action under the PMWA for similarly situated non-exempt Right of Way Agents who have been unlawfully denied overtime wages will promote judicial efficiency and will best protect the interest of the class members. There are no conflicts of interest among the class members. Counsel for the Representative Plaintiff, Joseph H. Chivers and John R. Linkosky, are experienced in the field of employment law (including FLSA and PMWA wage claims), and collective/class actions, and will fairly and competently represent the interests of the class members. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable [numerosity]. - As noted above, there are in excess of 200 class members and it would be impractical - if not impossible - to join them all individually. The claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class [typicality]. - As noted above, the claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the other Right of Way Agents, i.e., failure to pay overtime in accordance with the FLSA/PMWA. The defenses to Plaintiff’s claims (proper classification as exempt) are typical of any defenses to the claims of the class. The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class [adequacy]. - As noted above, counsel for the representative Plaintiffs, Joseph H. Chivers and John R. Linkosky, are experienced in the field of wage and hour law, and collective/class actions, and will fairly and competently represent the interests of the class members. In light of the above (numerosity, commonality, impracticability of joinder of separate actions), prosecuting this case as a collective/class action for similarly situated non- exempt Right of Way Agents who have been unlawfully denied overtime wages will promote judicial efficiency and will best protect the interests of the class members. Common issues predominate. A collective/class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating this controversy, and would avoid duplicative and potentially inconsistent or varying adjudications that could impair or impede the ability of either party to protect its interests. Proof of liability for Defendant’s conduct depends on the conduct of Defendant, not on the conduct of the individual class members. Defendant has acted on grounds that apply generally to the class of non-exempt Right of Way Agents, making declaratory relief appropriate respecting the class as a whole. There are no conflicts of interest among the class members. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1 through 57 of his Complaint as though the same were more fully set forth herein. Defendant is an employer within the meaning of the FLSA and the PMWA. Plaintiff, and all other similarly situated non-exempt Right of Way Agents, are not paid a salary. The primary duties of Plaintiff, and all other similarly situated non-exempt Right of Way Agents, are non-exempt duties within the meaning of the FLSA and the PMWA. These non-exempt primary duties are the result of common policies and practices applied by Defendant to Plaintiff, and all other similarly situated non-exempt Right of Way Agents. Plaintiff, and all other similarly situated non-exempt Right of Way Agents, have worked in excess of 40 hours in workweeks since May 2011. Plaintiff, and all other similarly situated non-exempt Right of Way Agents, have been paid no overtime pay since May 2011. Plaintiff, and all other similarly situated non-exempt Right of Way Agents, have been subject to the same common policies and practices since May 2011. Plaintiff, and all other similarly situated non-exempt Right of Way Agents, are entitled to be paid overtime compensation at time-and-one-half (1½) their regular rate of pay pursuant to the FLSA and the PMWA for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in workweeks since May 2011. Defendant has violated the FLSA and the PMWA by not paying Plaintiff, and all other similarly situated non-exempt Right of Way Agents, overtime compensation at time-and- one-half their regular rate of pay in workweeks in which the non-exempt Right of Way Agents have worked more than 40 hours since May 2011. Plaintiff, and all other similarly situated non-exempt Right of Way Agents, are also, under the FLSA, entitled to liquidated damages in an amount equal to the unpaid overtime. Defendant has also failed to maintain accurate time records regarding Plaintiff, and all other similarly situated non-exempt Right of Way Agents, in accordance with 29 CFR §516. Defendant’s failure to pay overtime at time-and-one-half (1½) the regular rate of pay, and to maintain accurate time records, is knowing and willful. Defendant’s failure to pay overtime at time-and-one-half (1½) the regular rate of pay, and to maintain accurate time records, is a violation of the FLSA and the PMWA. FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME (INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE/CLASS ACTION)

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TransUnion routinely reports information about tax liens on consumer reports and continues to report tax liens for a specified number of years after they have been paid, satisfied or released. On or about May 5, 2016, a Massachusetts state tax lien in the amount of $500 was entered against the property where Plaintiff lives in Worcester County, Northern District, Massachusetts. On or about June 28, 2016, Plaintiff caused payment in full to be sent to the proper authority, and on July 18, 2016, the lien was released. The “Status Date” for the lien record listed on the August 2017 report was “06/16,” which indicates that TransUnion had made no effort to check for updated public records on Plaintiff for over a year. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) Despite the satisfaction of the tax lien, as reflected on Massachusetts public records, and pursuant to its usual and systemic practice, TransUnion did not remove the tax lien public record from Plaintiff’s credit reports, nor update it to show it as satisfied, released or paid. Massachusetts maintains online registries per county that are searchable by name or address. (See www.masslandrecords.com.) These records can be searched for free. Worcester County, Northern District maintains its online searchable records at www.fitchburgdeeds.com, which is also accessible through the site www.masslandrecords.com, once “North Worcester” is selected as the County to search. These records can be searched for free. Both from the face of the search results and from the underlying records, it is clear that Plaintiff’s tax lien has been paid and released. It is also clear that this release occurred in July 2016. The FCRA provides: “Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). TransUnion is well aware that it has problems with failing to accurately report public record information. In fact, it has been sued multiple times for reporting out-of-date tax lien information in particular. See Matthews v. Trans Union, LLC, No. 17-cv-01825 (E.D. Penn.); Dennis v. Trans Union, LLC, No. 14-cv-2865 (E.D. Penn.); Anderson v. Trans Union, LLC, No. 16-cv-558 (W.D. Va.); Clark v. Trans Union, LLC, No. 15-cv-391 (E.D. Va.). These suits were filed well in advance of the reporting of Plaintiff’s lien here. TransUnion receives its public record information that it includes on its reports from a third party. TransUnion knows that the tax lien information it obtains from this third party are often inaccurate, out of date, and/or stale. Yet, TransUnion does not take any action to ensure that the information it receives is accurate before reporting it. These rules were supposed to be in effect as of July 1, 2017, a month prior to TransUnion’s inaccurate reporting of Plaintiff’s lien status, and a year after the date of the release of the lien public record. However, the rules were clearly not in effect, because Plaintiff’s lien was more than a year out of date, and the face of the report indicated the record had not been updated since June of 2016. TransUnion’s failure to accurately report Plaintiff’s tax lien occurred because it failed to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy in the preparation of reports. Specifically, TransUnion does not obtain up to date information on the status of tax lien releases, even though such information is freely available online. Indeed, TransUnion has no systematic procedure to assure that, when tax liens are paid, satisfied or released, the updated status is promptly obtained and reflected upon a consumer’s credit report. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as alleged above. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of the following Class: All consumers who: (i) had a tax lien recorded in the State of Massachusetts; (ii) the tax lien appeared on a TransUnion consumer report dated within two years prior to the filing of this Complaint and continuing through the resolution of this case; (iii) the State of Massachusetts public record indicated that the tax lien had been paid, satisfied, or released on a date prior to the date of the TransUnion consumer report, and (iv) the TransUnion consumer report incorrectly identified the tax lien as not released, unpaid, or with an unpaid balance. TransUnion likely possesses data for consumers that include name, address, date of birth, Social Security Number, case numbers/lien identifiers, lien amounts, jurisdiction of liens, disposition of the liens, date of file in public record, date of disposition in public record, and dates consumers had credit inquiries where such information was reported. TransUnion is likely able to produce this data in standardized spreadsheet form. Massachusetts, in turn, maintains electronic records of liens, easily accessible and reviewable, that are searchable by name, and include record descriptions, file dates, disposition dates, lien identifiers, and other identifying information. The Massachusetts data can be easily compared to TransUnion’s data to ascertain which consumers would meet the definition of the Class above. Existence and Predominance of Common Questions of Law and Fact. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class, and predominate over the questions affecting only individual members. The common legal and factual questions include, among others: a. Whether TransUnion willfully violated the FCRA by reporting tax liens which, according to Massachusetts public records, were paid; and b. Whether TransUnion willfully violated the FCRA by failing to follow reasonable procedures to assure the maximum possible accuracy of the Massachusetts tax lien information it reported. Adequacy. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class. Her interests are aligned with, and are not antagonistic to, the interests of the members of the Class she seeks to represent. She has retained counsel competent and experienced in such litigation, and intends to prosecute this action vigorously. Plaintiff and her counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of members of the Class. Predominance and Superiority. Questions of law and fact common to the class members predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. TransUnion’s conduct described in this Complaint stems from common and uniform practices, resulting in common violations of the FCRA. Members of the Class do not have an interest in pursuing separate actions against TransUnion, as the amount of each class member’s individual claim is small compared to the expense and burden of individual prosecution. Class certification also will obviate the need for unduly duplicative litigation that might result in inconsistent judgments concerning TransUnion’s practices. Moreover, management of this action as a class action will not likely present any difficulties. In the interests of justice and judicial efficiency, it would be desirable to concentrate the litigation of all class members’ claims in a single forum. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as alleged above. TransUnion failed to comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) by failing to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the tax lien information in the consumer reports it prepared regarding Plaintiff and the other class members. The foregoing violations were negligent. The foregoing violations were willful. TransUnion’s inaccurate reporting of Plaintiff and class members’ lien information harmed, and/or created a risk of real harm to, their concrete interests under the FCRA. TransUnion is one of the “big three” credit reporting agencies in the United States. TransUnion sells consumer reports (commonly called “credit reports”) about millions of consumers annually. TransUnion is regulated by the FCRA.

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J.T.L. is a subscriber to and beneficiary of the Eaton Vance Management Health Benefit Plan. J.T.L. is an eight-year-old boy who has been diagnosed with autism by his treating physician. His treating physician referred J.T.L. to a Board Certified Behavior Analyst for clinical ABA therapy to treat his autism. J.T.L.’s treating physician has approved the treatment plan developed by his ABA therapist. J.T.L. receives ABA therapy from Apple Consulting in Bellevue, Washington. J.T.L.’s therapy is overseen by a Board Certified Behavior Analyst. J.T.L.’s ABA therapist is a covered provider under the terms of the plan. J.T.L.’s treatment plan calls for 6 hours per week of ABA therapy provided in a clinical setting and 20 hours per week of ABA therapy provided in a school setting. J.T.L.’s therapist does not work for, is not affiliated with, and is not paid by J.T.L.’s school. J.T.L.’s therapist provides services to him both in a clinical setting and in a school setting. Class Definition: The Class consists of all individuals who: (1) have been, are, or will be beneficiaries of an ERISA-governed health plan that has been or will be delivered, issued for delivery, or renewed by defendant BCBS-MA; (2) have been or will be diagnosed with an autism spectrum disorder; and (3) have required at any time within six years prior to the filing of this complaint, require, or will require ABA therapy in a school setting as part of a treatment plan approved by their treating physician. The definition of the Class is clear and members of the Class are easily identifiable on the basis of objective information. BCBS-MA maintains records of its subscribers and coverage determinations. Children who have been diagnosed with an autism spectrum disorder and whose providers have sought authorization or reimbursement for ABA therapy provided in school as part of a physician-approved treatment plan can be identified from BCBS-MA’s records through use of diagnostic and procedure codes. The number of children whose treatment for autism spectrum disorder calls for ABA therapy delivered in school as part of a physician-approved treatment plan and who are beneficiaries of an ERISA-governed health plan insured by BCBS-MA is expected to number in the hundreds and is so large that joinder of all Class members is impracticable. Plaintiffs re-allege each and every allegation set forth in the proceeding paragraphs. ERISA provides that a participant or beneficiary may bring an action to “recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.” ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to recover benefits they have been denied on the basis of the improper exclusion for medically-necessary ABA therapy provided in a school setting, as described above. Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to a declaration of present and future rights to benefits for medically-necessary ABA therapy that is part of a treatment plan approved by a treating physician, without regard to whether the therapy is provided in a school setting. Plaintiffs re-allege each and every allegation set forth in the proceeding paragraphs. ERISA provides that a participant or beneficiary may “enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of [ERISA] or the terms of the plan.” ERISA § 502(a)(3); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(A). A participant or beneficiary may also obtain appropriate equitable relief to redress violations of those provisions. ERISA § 502(a)(3)(B); 29 U.S.C. § 132(a)(3)(B). Plaintiffs re-allege each and every allegation set forth in the proceeding paragraphs. BCBS-MA is a fiduciary under ERISA because it makes benefit determinations and reviews and finally decides appeals of denied claims under the ERISA plans it insures. 29 Breach of Fiduciary Duties ERISA § 502(a)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2); ERISA § 404(A)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 1104(A) Claim for Recovery of Benefits, Clarification of Rights under the Plan, and Clarification of Right to Future Benefits under the Plan ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) Claim to Enjoin Acts and Practices in Violation of the Terms of the Plan, to Obtain Other Equitable Relief, and to Enforce the Terms of the Plan ERISA § 502(a)(3); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)

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Allegations concerning each Plaintiff are based on personal knowledge. All other allegations are based on investigation by Plaintiffs’ counsel. Plaintiffs propose a class consisting of: All residents of the United States who are members of the British Airways Executive Club, who purchased a Reward Ticket with frequent flier miles from November 9, 2006 to the present (the “Proposed Class”), and who paid a purported “fuel surcharge” when making the purchase. B. The Class is so Numerous that Individual Joinder is Impractical. According to its 2011 annual report, BA “is the UK’s largest international scheduled airline and one of the world’s leading global premium airlines.” On information and belief, there are at least hundreds of thousands of Executive Club Members within the United States. On information and belief, no fewer than tens of thousands of those Members have redeemed Miles for Reward Tickets and paid the “fuel surcharges” during the relevant time period. C. The Answers to Questions Common to the Proposed Class will Drive the Resolution of this Litigation, and Common Questions Predominate over Individual Questions. The answer to two questions will determine BA’s liability to all (or nearly all) Class Members. -12- 1061826.5 Plaintiffs contend that the Contract does not permit BA to impose any charge that is not an “incidental fee[] or tax[] charged by any person or relevant authority or body.” Whether or not the Contract permits such a charge is a legal question that is common to all Class Members, the answer to which would drive resolution of the litigation. If a judge and/or jury were to agree with Plaintiffs, BA would be liable to all Class Members for imposition of its “fuel surcharge.” Plaintiffs also contend that the “fuel surcharge” is not a “fuel surcharge” at all, because it is unrelated to the fluctuating price of worldwide oil; and that even if BA were contractually permitted to impose its own fuel surcharge, such a charge would only be proper if it were based on BA’s actual fuel costs. The issue of whether the “fuel surcharges” are based on BA’s fuel costs presents a question of fact that is common to all Class Members, the answer to which would drive resolution of the litigation. Should a judge and/or jury agree with Plaintiffs on this issue, BA would be liable to all Class Members for imposition of the “fuel surcharges.” Put more broadly, this litigation focuses entirely on whether BA’s conduct was in breach of the Contract, as interpreted under the law of a single jurisdiction. Should a judge and/or jury find BA liable for breach of the Contract, it is a ministerial task to determine damages for Plaintiffs and Class Members because, on information and belief, BA maintains electronic records of the ”fuel surcharges” it assessed against each and every Plaintiff and Class Member. D. Plaintiffs’ Claims are Typical of the Claims of all Class Members. Plaintiffs, like all Class Members, are Executive Club Members. Plaintiffs’ relationship with BA, like the relationship between all Class Members and BA, is governed by the terms of the Contract. Plaintiffs, like all Class Members, redeemed Miles for Reward Tickets. -13- 1061826.5 Plaintiffs, like all Class Members, paid a “fuel surcharge” when purchasing their Reward Tickets. If BA is liable to Plaintiffs for the claim enumerated in this Complaint, it also is liable to all Class Members for that claim. E. Plaintiffs and their Counsel Will Adequately Represent the Proposed Class. Plaintiffs will put the interests of the Class Members on equal footing with their own interests, and Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit out of a desire to help all Class Members, not merely out of a desire to recover their own damages. Plaintiffs’ counsel are highly experienced class action litigators who are well- prepared to represent the interests of the Class Members. F. A Class Action is Superior to Individual Actions. BA is a sophisticated party with substantial resources. Each individual Proposed Class Member’s damages are relatively small. On information and belief, relatively few Proposed Class Members will have more than $2000 in damages. Prosecution of this litigation is likely to be expensive. For example, Plaintiffs’ counsel anticipate that to fully analyze BA’s “fuel surcharge” and fuel cost data, expert analysis alone will cost at least tens of thousands of dollars. Given the high cost of litigation, relatively low individual damages, and the fact that an individual litigating against BA would have to hire an expert to perform an analysis regarding BA fuel costs and “fuel surcharges” that would be similar to the analysis required to prove the claims of an entire Class, it would not make economic sense for any (or almost any) Class Member to pursue this litigation as an individual action. -14- 1061826.5 V. A. Proposed Class Definition.

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Between November 2, 2017 and April 1, 2018, Peterson’s sent at least 5 texts to Plaintiff’s cellular phone number, from short code 599-25, without Plaintiff’s consent: Peterson’s unsolicited texts were a nuisance that aggravated Plaintiff, wasted his time, invaded his privacy, diminished the value of the cellular services he paid for, caused him to temporarily lose the use and enjoyment of his phone, and caused wear and tear to his phone’s data, memory, software, hardware, and battery components. In sending the unsolicited text messages at issue, Peterson’s, or a third party acting on its behalf, utilized an automatic telephone dialing system; hardware and/or software with the capacity to store or produce cellular telephone number to be called, using a random or sequential number generator. This is evident from the circumstances surrounding the text messages, including the ability to trigger an automated response by replying “Y,” the text messages’ commercial and generic content, that substantively identical texts were sent to multiple recipients, and that they were sent from a short code, which is consistent with the use of an automatic telephone dialing system to send text messages. Accordingly, Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated and seeks certification of the following Class: All persons who, on or after four years prior to the filing of the initial complaint in this action, (1) were sent a text message to their cellular telephone number by or on behalf of Peterson’s, (2) using an automatic telephone dialing system, (3) for the purpose of soliciting their purchase of Peterson’s products, and (4) from whom Peterson’s (a) does not allege to have consent, or (b) alleges to have obtained consent in the same manner it alleges to have obtained consent from Plaintiff. Numerosity: The exact size of the Class is unknown and unavailable to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendant sent unsolicited text messages to thousands of individuals who fall into the Class definition. Class membership can be easily determined from Defendant’s records. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff is a member of the Class, and if Defendant violated the TCPA with respect to Plaintiff, then it violated the TCPA with respect to the other members of the Class. Plaintiff and the Class sustained the same damages as a result of Defendant’s uniform wrongful conduct. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include, but are not necessarily limited to the following: a) How Defendant gathered, compiled, or obtained the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiff and the Class; b) Whether the text messages were sent using an automatic telephone dialing system; c) Whether Defendant’s text messages were sent for the purpose of marketing Defendant’s products; d) Whether Defendant sent some or all of the text messages without the consent of Plaintiff and the Class; and e) Whether Defendant’s conduct was willful and knowing such that Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to treble damages. Policies Generally Applicable to the Class: This class action is appropriate for certification because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the members of the Class, and making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. Defendant’s practices challenged herein apply to and affect the members of the Class uniformly, and Plaintiff’s challenge of those practices hinges on Defendant’s conduct with respect to the Class as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 22 of this complaint and incorporates them by reference. Defendant and/or its agents agent transmitted text messages to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class using an automatic telephone dialing system. These solicitation text messages were sent without the consent of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. Defendant has, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), and as a result, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. In the event that the Court determines that Defendant’s conduct was wilful and knowing, it may, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the Class. Peterson’s is one of the oldest Harley Davidson dealers in the country. As part of its marketing plan, Peterson’s sends consumers text messages promoting Peterson’s Harley Davidson motorcycles, apparel, and other merchandise. Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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Violation of Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (On behalf of the Nationwide Class) 11. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, comprising a Class and Subclass, which are defined as follows: a. Nationwide Class: All persons and entities in the United States who purchased or owned, not for resale, during the four years preceding the date of the filing of this putative class action through the present, a Pulse X2 or X26P model CEW manufactured by Taser. b. California Subclass: All persons and entities in the State of California who purchased or acquired during the four years preceding the date of the filing of this putative class action through the present, a Pulse, X2 or X26P model CEW manufactured by Taser. c. California Consumer Subclass: All members of the California Subclass who purchased or acquired for personal, family or household use during the four years preceding the date of the filing of this putative class action through the present, a Pulse, X2 or X26P model CEW manufactured by Taser. Plaintiff is a member of the Nationwide Class and the California Subclass. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference as though the same were set forth below at length. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference as though the same were set forth below at length. Plaintiff brings this count individually and on behalf of the members of the Nationwide Class. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference as though the same were fully set forth at length. Plaintiff brings this count individually and on behalf of the members of the California Consumer Subclass. Plaintiff and members of the California Consumer Subclass are “buyers” within the meaning of Cal. Civ. Code § 1791. The CEWs are “consumer goods” within the meaning of Cal. Civ. Code § 1791. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference as though the same were fully set forth below at length. Plaintiff brings this count individually and on behalf of the members of the California Subclass. Plaintiff and members of the California Subclass are “buyers” within the meaning of Cal. Civ. Code § 1791. The CEWs are “consumer goods” within the meaning of Cal. Civ. Code § 1791. Taser is a “manufacturer” of the CEWs within the meaning of Cal. Civ. Code § 1791. Taser impliedly warranted to Plaintiff and the California Subclass members that the CEWs were “merchantable” within the meaning of Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1791.1(a) and 1792. Cal. Civ. Code § 1791.1 states that: “Implied warranty of merchantability” or “implied warranty that goods are merchantable” means that the consumer goods meet each of the following: (1) Pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; (2) Are fit for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used; (3) Are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled; and (4) Conform to the promises of affirmations of fact made on the container or label. The CEWs would not pass without objection because they share a common design defect in that they are prone to firing with the safety mechanism engaged. Because of the defect, the CEWs are not fit for their ordinary purpose. The CEWs were not adequately labeled because the labeling failed to disclose the defects described herein. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference as though the same were fully set forth below at length. Plaintiff brings this count individually and on behalf of the members of the California Subclass. Taser was aware of the CEWs defect when it marketed and sold the CEWs to Plaintiff and the California Subclass members. FRAUDULENT OMISSION (On Behalf of the California Subclass) UNJUST ENRICHMENT (On Behalf of the California Subclass) VIOLATION OF THE SONG-BEVERLY CONSUMER WARRANTY ACT FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY Cal. Civ. Code § 1790, et seq. (Brought on behalf of the California Consumer Subclass) VIOLATION OF THE SONG-BEVERLY CONSUMER WARRANTY ACT FOR BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY Cal. Civ. Code § 1790, et seq. (On behalf of the California Consumer Subclass)

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Defendants have been attempting to collect from plaintiff an alleged credit card debt incurred, if at all, for personal, family or household purposes and not for business purposes. The alleged original creditor was Credit One Bank, which is also part of the Sherman Financial Group. Credit One Bank reported the debt to Experian and possibly other credit bureaus (consumer reporting agencies) as delinquent beginning in March 2016. LVNV began reporting the debt (or Resurgent reported it for LVNV) to Experian and possibly other credit bureaus in October 2016, as a “collection account” held by a “debt buyer.” Resurgent, on behalf of LVNV, placed the alleged debt with Frontline for collection. On or about November 4, 2016, after the debt had already been reported by both LVNV and Credit One Bank, Frontline sent plaintiff the letter attached as Exhibit A. LVNV and Credit One Bank have standardized credit reporting practices, in terms of the time at which a debt is reported to credit bureaus. Exhibit A is a form letter. Exhibit A offers a settlement and asks plaintiff to make payment arrangements. It also states: “In order to prevent any further action, please contact us so that we may assist you in resolving this debt. Please note that a negative credit bureau report reflecting on your credit record may be submitted to a credit reporting agency by the current account holder if you fail to fulfill the terms of your credit obligations.” The quoted statement seeks to induce payment by telling the least sophisticated consumer that payment of the debt will avoid a negative credit bureau report. The quoted statement is false and misleading, and omits to state material facts 5 necessary to make the statements made not misleading, in that a negative credit bureau report has already been made and will not be avoided by payment. The quoted statement was made by Frontline as authorized agent of Resurgent and LVNV. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1-42. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. §1692e, 1692e(2), 1692e(5), and 1692e(10) by making the statements quoted above. Section 1692e provides: § 1692e. False or misleading representations [Section 807 of P.L.] A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: . . . (2) The false representation of-- (A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt; . . . (5) The threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken. . . . (10) The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer. . . . Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of a class and subclass, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). The class consists of (a) all individuals (b) to whom Frontline sent a letter in the form represented by Exhibit A (c) relating to a debt that had already been reported to a credit bureau by the current owner of the debt or an affiliate (d) which letter was sent at any time during a period beginning one year prior to the filing of this action and ending 20 days after the filing of this action. 6 The subclass consists of class members whose debts were allegedly owned by LVNV at the time the letter was sent. On information and belief, based on the use of a form letter, the class and subclass are so numerous that joinder of all members is not practicable. There are questions of law and fact common to the class members, which common questions predominate over any questions relating to individual class members. The predominant common questions are: a. Whether defendants represent that negative credit bureau reporting may be avoided by payment, when it has already occurred; b. Whether such representation violates the FDCPA. Plaintiff’s claim is typical of the claims of the class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the class members. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in class actions and FDCPA litigation. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of this matter, in that: a. Individual actions are not economically feasible. b. Members of the class are likely to be unaware of their rights; c. Congress intended class actions to be the principal enforcement mechanism under the FDCPA. 7 WHEREFORE, the Court should enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and the class members and against defendants for: i. Statutory damages; ii. Attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit; iii. Such other and further relief as the Court deems proper. s/Tiffany N. Hardy Tiffany N. Hardy Tiffany N. Hardy

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Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of all persons and/or entities that own AS&E common stock (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants and their affiliates, immediate families, legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns and any entity in which Defendants have a controlling interest. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have sustained damages as a result of Defendants’ wrongful conduct as alleged herein. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class, and has no interests contrary to or in conflict with those of the Class that Plaintiff seeks to represent. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty to be encountered in the management of this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. On November 5, 2015, the Board “discussed the competitive environment, potential consolidation in the detection equipment industry and the effects that these factors may have on the Company.” The Board also discussed strategic alternatives for the Company going forward, including possible acquisitions or a sale of the Company. To this end, the Board authorized the Company’s management to retain a financial advisor and to report back to the Board on potential acquisitions or a sale. Subsequently, the Company’s management retained Evercore as the Company’s financial advisor. On February 4, 2016, Evercore reviewed certain strategic alternatives with the Board and, in response to a question by the Board, recommended that the Board consider a targeted outreach to potential partners were it to pursue a sales process. On February 9, 2016, Sanders was contacted by Deepak Chopra (“Chopra”), the President and CEO of OSI. Chopra informed Sanders that OSI was interested in making an offer to acquire the Company. Shortly thereafter, on February 10, 2016, Chopra contacted Dougherty and stated that OSI would be sending a written proposal subject to completion of a diligence investigation. On a follow-up call on February 12, 2016, with Dougherty, Chopra expressed the importance and potential for meaningful synergies that could inure for OSI. The Board met on February 22, 2016, to discuss OSI’s proposal, and came to a consensus that the proposed price range was not sufficient to commence negotiations. The Board directed Evercore to reach out to four potential strategic bidders in the detection equipment industry. On February 23, 2016, Dougherty informed Chopra that, while the Company was still considering the proposal, the current valuation range was not sufficient to engage in diligence, but a higher range might cause the Company to entertain further discussions. Chopra told Dougherty that OSI would be willing to increase the proposed purchase price range to between $37.00 and $42.00 per share of Company common stock, representing a 45% to 64% premium to the closing price of Company common stock on the day prior. Evercore contacted the four parties—Company A, Company B, Company C, and Company D—on February 24 and 25, 2016, to gauge their interest in a potential transaction with Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. As alleged herein, Defendants have failed to provide AS&E’s stockholders with material information concerning the Proposed Transaction, including, inter alia, the potential conflicts of interest affecting the Company’s management, the process leading to the Merger Agreement, the financial analysis of Evercore, and the Company’s financial projections. Instead, Defendants are soliciting stockholders’ votes via a materially misleading and incomplete Proxy Statement. Further, Defendants have accepted an offer to sell AS&E at a price that fails to reflect the true value of the Company, thus depriving common stock stockholders of the reasonable, fair and adequate value of their shares. The Proposed Transaction consideration being offered and accepted represents a meager premium over the closing share price as compared to like transactions. There is no indication the Proposed Transaction was the result of a competitive bidding process or arms’-length negotiation where all reasonably available synergistic acquirers were vetted. As such, unless the Individual Defendants’ conduct is enjoined by the Court, they will continue to breach their fiduciary duties to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, and will further a process that inhibits the maximization of stockholder value and the disclosure of material information. AS&E Background CLAIM FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AGAINST DEFENDANTS

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Defendant owns and operates a telecommunication company that specializes in selling minutes for overseas phone calls. Plaintiff himself was sent at least two marketing text messages without his express written consent. Below is a depiction of an actual text message received by Plaintiff from Defendant: Defendant’s text messages constitute telemarketing because they encourage the future purchase of Defendant’s products by consumers. Plaintiff received the subject text messages within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with his express written consent to be contacted by text for marketing purposes. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the ***-***-5833 phone number. Some, if not all of the messages originated from “305-520-7863.” Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendant, through their direction, utilized a combination of hardware and software systems to send the text messages at issue in this case. The systems utilized by Defendant have the current capacity or present ability to generate or store random or sequential numbers or to dial sequentially or randomly at the time the call is made, and to dial such numbers, en masse, in an automated fashion without human intervention. Defendant’s unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of his privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s text messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to his daily life. See Patriotic Veterans, Inc. v. Zoeller, No. 16-2059, 2017 WL 25482, at *2 (7th Cir. Jan. 3, 2017) (“Every call uses some of the phone owner’s time and mental energy, both of which are precious.”). Plaintiff received the subject text message while he was at work, causing him to stop his work activities to check his phone. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. Defendant and their employees or agents, Plaintiff’s attorneys and their employees, the Judge to whom this action is assigned and any member of the Judge’s staff and immediate family, and claims for personal injury, wrongful death, and/or emotional distress are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiffs and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-48 as if fully set forth herein. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system . . . to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). “Automatic telephone dialing system” refers to any equipment that has the “capacity to dial numbers without human intervention.” See, e.g., Hicks v. Client Servs., Inc., No. 07-61822, 2009 WL 2365637, at *4 (S.D. Fla. June 9, 2009) (citing FCC, In re: Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Request of ACA International for Clarification and Declaratory Ruling, 07–232, ¶ 12, n.23 (2007)). Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant– used equipment having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make marketing telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined above. Defendant therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make marketing telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and Class Members without their prior express written consent. All possible Defendants are directly, jointly, or vicariously liable for each such violation of the TCPA. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-48 as if fully set forth herein. At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that their conduct as alleged herein violated the TCPA. Defendant knew that they did not have prior express written consent to send these text messages. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and Class Members had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls to their cellular telephones, the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA. As a result of Defendant violations, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, MARIO GUERRA, on behalf of herself and the other members of the Class, prays for the following relief: a. A declaration that Defendant practices described herein violate the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227; b. A declaration that Defendant violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, were willful and knowing; c. An injunction prohibiting Defendant from using an automatic telephone dialing system to call and text message telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephones without the prior express consent of the called party; d. An award of actual, statutory damages, and/or trebled statutory damages; and e. Such further and other relief the Court deems reasonable and just. Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) PROPOSED CLASS Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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Plaintiff Stancu was hired by Defendant Ethos in or around September of 2015. Plaintiff Stancu was required to perform all relevant tasks in the front of the restaurant including acting as a bartender, waiter, busser and food runner. He also cleaned and stocked the bar and kitchen. Plaintiff worked hard and diligently within the restaurant. Due to his hard work, in or around May of 2016, Plaintiff was asked to work a few days a week in Defendants’ other food establishment, Pathos Café, located on 932 1st Ave, New York, NY 10022. Throughout his employment, Plaintiff Stancu worked anywhere from thirty (30) to sixty (60) hours a week. Throughout his employment, Plaintiff Stancu worked only as tipped employee. However, Defendants required that Plaintiff Stancu share his tips with other employees, including the manager. He was not paid any hourly wage for hours worked, nor any overtime wage for hours worked over forty (40). Defendants never provided a wage statement or pay stub detailing hours worked or amount of tips accumulated. Defendants did not have a systematic way of fairly paying their workers. Tips were always kept in house and distributed unevenly between managers and other employees. Throughout his employment, Plaintiff Stancu was never paid on time or on a regular basis. While the tips collected by Defendant Ethos would often be more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) per week, Plaintiff Stancu would only be paid that much or less for the entire week no matter how much he actually accumulated. Despite his hard work and long shifts, Plaintiff Stancu was not properly compensated and had his tips stolen from him on a regular basis through a tip pool which included members of management. Defendants often threatened to fire Plaintiff Stancu if he did not agree with their way of payment. Mr. Chatiris was rude and malignant when Plaintiff insisted on being paid on time. Due to the fact Plaintiff was persistent, Mr. Chatiris began to harass him making his work unbearable. Mr. Chatiris often cursed at him in front of other employees and assigned Plaintiff to as much heavy lifting as possible knowing he had a persistent back pain. When Plaintiff asked for help from other workers, Mr., Chatiris refused to let anyone help him. On some occasions Plaintiff had to call out of work due to horrible back pains and soreness. In or around the end of May of 2016, Plaintiff Stancu demanded that he be paid in full and on time because he needed the money. Mr. Chatiris ignored his request and told Plaintiff his pay was not ready. When Plaintiff Stancu insisted that he be paid, Mr. Chatiris responded with “I will give you the money now but you are fired”. If Plaintiff Stancu had not complained about Defendants’ violations of the law then he would not have been terminated. In fact, this was the explicit reason given for his termination. As a result, Plaintiff Stancu has lost pay to which he is entitled under the FLSA and NYLL and has been damaged in an amount yet to be determined. Defendants’ violations of the FLSA and NYLL were done with knowledge of the law and with full understanding that this policy violated the law. Plaintiff Stancu has lost income due to the loss of his job as he has suffered a period of unemployment. Defendant Ethos is an employer under the FLSA and NYLL. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation made in the above paragraphs of this complaint as if same were set forth herein fully at length. Defendants willfully employed Plaintiff, Class Plaintiffs and Rule 23 Class Plaintiffs in the afore-mentioned enterprise and failed to compensate them for all hours worked during their employment. Defendants failed to pay any wages for hours worked by Plaintiff, Class Plaintiffs and Rule 23 Class Plaintiffs. Defendants failed to pay any wages for hours worked by Plaintiff, Class Plaintiffs and Rule 23 Class Plaintiffs. Defendants also failed to provide any pay the overtime premium rate of one and a half times their regular hourly rate as is required by the FLSA. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation made in the above paragraphs of this complaint as if same were set forth herein fully at length. Plaintiff, Class Plaintiffs and Rule 23 Class Plaintiffs were employees of Defendants within the meaning of New York Wage Regulations (NYCRR Labor Section 138 et seq.). Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff, Class Plaintiffs and Rule 23 Class Plaintiffs any rate of pay for certain hours when they were required to be at work, ready to work, and actually performing work. Defendants’ failure to comply with the New York Labor Law minimum wage protections caused Plaintiff, Class Plaintiffs and Rule 23 Class Plaintiffs to suffer loss of wages and interest thereon. Defendants’ failure to pay proper wages for each hour worked was willful. Defendants also failed to pay overtime pay as is required by the New York Labor Law. Defendants also stole tips which were owed to Plaintiff due to the work he performed, which were paid to Plaintiff by clients and to which he is entitled. Defendants also failed to pay any spread of hours pay to Plaintiff for days in which he worked more than ten (10) hours. On account of such violations, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for actual, statutory and liquidated damages. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation made in the above paragraphs of this complaint as if same were set forth herein fully at length. Defendants then retaliated against Plaintiff by immediately terminating his employment. This action violates the New York Labor Law § 215. As a result of this violation, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer loss of wages, benefits and emotional damages for which Defendants are liable. Plaintiff is further entitled to reinstatement, liquidated damages, injunctive relief and attorneys’ fees and costs. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation made in the above paragraphs of this complaint as if same were set forth herein fully at length. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff was employed by Defendants within the meaning of New York Labor Law §§ 190 et seq., including §§ 191, 193, 195, 198 and the applicable regulations thereunder. At all times relevant herein, Defendants, individually and/or jointly, failed and willfully failed to provide Plaintiff with the notice(s) required by NYLL 195(1) – Plaintiff is therefore entitled to and seeks to recover in this action the maximum recovery for this violation, plus attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to NYLL 198 including NYLL 198(1-b). At all times relevant herein, Defendants failed and willfully failed to provide Plaintiff with the statement(s) required by NYLL 195(3) – Plaintiff is therefore entitled to and seeks to recover in this action the maximum recovery for this violation, plus attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to NYLL 198 including NYLL 198(1-d) VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT VIOLATION OF NEW YORK LABOR LAW VIOLATION OF NEW YORK LABOR LAW (wage notice and statement) VIOLATION OF NEW YORK LABOR LAW

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On or about January 16, 2019, Plaintiff responded to Defendant’s text messages with the word “Stop” as shown below, “Stop” was the “opt-out” preference provided by Defendant in its text messages: Defendant’s text messages constitute telemarketing and advertising because they promote Defendant’s business, goods and services. The text messages also include a hyperlink to a landing page website (www.govideodeal.com) which upon information and belief, is owned and/or operated by or on behalf of Defendant. Plaintiff received the subject text message within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her express consent to be contacted by text messages using an ATDS. Plaintiff is the sole user of the 1992 Number. The number used by Defendant (480-977-0116) is known as a “long code,” a standard 10-digit code that enables Defendant to send SMS text messages en masse, while deceiving recipients into believing that the message was personalized and sent from a telephone number operated by an individual. Long codes work as follows: Private companies known as SMS gateway providers have contractual arrangements with mobile carriers to transmit two-way SMS traffic. These SMS gateway providers send and receive SMS traffic to and from the mobile phone networks' SMS centers, which are responsible for relaying those messages to the intended mobile phone. This allows for the transmission of a large number of SMS messages to and from a long code. Upon information and belief, the number (480-977-0116) that transmitted the text messages is operated by or on behalf of Defendant. To send the text messages, Defendant used a messaging platform (the “Platform”) that permitted Defendant to transmit thousands of automated text messages without any human involvement. The Platform has the capacity to store telephone numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. The Platform has the capacity to generate sequential numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers in sequential order, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers from a list of numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. The Platform has the capacity to schedule the time and date for future transmission of text messages, which occurs without any human involvement. Additionally, the Platform has an auto-reply function that results in the transmission of text messages to individual’s cellular telephones automatically from the system, and with no human intervention, in response to a keyword (e.g. “STOP”) being sent by a consumer. Defendant then created the content of the text messages, selected the telephone numbers to transmit the messages to, and selected a date and time for transmission. In making these selections, Defendant was simply creating a set of instructions that were subsequently executed automatically (i.e. with no human intervention), by the Platform. The Platform automatically executed Defendant’s instructions as follows: (1) The Platform retrieved each telephone number from the list of numbers uploaded by Defendant in the sequential order the numbers were listed by Defendant; (2) The Platform then generated each number in the sequential order listed by Defendant and combined each number with the content of Defendant’s message to create “packets” consisting of one telephone number and the message content; (3) Each packet was then transmitted in the sequential order listed by Defendant to an SMS aggregator, which acts an intermediary between the Platform, mobile carriers (e.g. AT&T), and consumers. (4) Upon receipt of each packet, the SMS aggregator transmitted each packet – automatically and with no human intervention – to the respective mobile carrier for the telephone number, again in the sequential order listed by Defendant. Each mobile carrier then sent the message to its customer’s mobile telephone. Further, the Platform “throttles” the transmission of the text messages depending on feedback it receives from the mobile carrier networks. In other words, the platform controls how quickly messages are transmitted depending on network congestion. The platform performs this throttling function automatically and does not allow a human to control the function. The following graphic summarizes the above steps and demonstrates that the dialing of the text messages at issue was done by the Platform automatically and without any human intervention: Defendant’s unsolicited text message caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of her privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s text messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to her daily life. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff and Class members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS; (2) Whether Defendant can meet their burden of showing that they obtained prior express written consent to make such calls; (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). The TCPA defines an “automatic telephone dialing system” (hereinafter “ATDS”) as “equipment which has the capacity – (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” Id. at § 227(a)(1). Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the capacity to store telephone numbers, using a random or sequential generator, and to dial such numbers and/or to dial numbers from a list automatically, without human intervention, to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. Defendant violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express consent. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Elizabeth Boriskin, on behalf of herself and the other members of the Class, prays for the following relief: a. A declaration that Defendant’s practices described herein violate the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227; b. A declaration that Defendant’s violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, were willful and knowing; c. An injunction prohibiting Defendant from using an automatic telephone dialing system to call and text message telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephones without the prior express consent of the called party; d. An award of actual, statutory damages, and/or trebled statutory damages; and e. Such further and other relief the Court deems reasonable and just. PROPOSED CLASS Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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The amount of the debt; Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e and 1692g. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. The name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; Some time prior to October 25, 2019, an obligation was allegedly incurred to Salal Credit Union by Plaintiff. The Salal Credit Union obligation arose out of transactions in which money, property, insurance or services which are the subject of the transactions were primarily for personal, family or household purposes. The alleged Salal Credit Union obligation is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(5). Salal Credit Union is a “creditor” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(4). Defendant FAI was contracted by Salal Credit Union to collect the alleged debt. On or about October 25, 2019, Defendant FAI sent Plaintiff an initial collection letter (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt currently owed. See Exhibit A. The FDCPA further provides that ''if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty day period . . . that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed . . . the debt collector shall cease collection . . . until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt . . . and a copy of such verification is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector.'' 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). Although a collection letter may track the statutory language, ''the collector nevertheless violates the Act if it conveys that information in a confusing or contradictory fashion so as to cloud the required message with uncertainty.'' Russell v. EQUIFAX A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 1996) (''It is not enough for a debt collection agency to simply include the proper debt validation notice in a mailing to a consumer-- Congress intended that such notice be clearly conveyed.''). Put differently, a notice containing ''language that 'overshadows or contradicts' other language informing a consumer of her rights . . . violates the Act.'' Russell, 74 F.3d at 34. This language completely overshadows the “G-Notice” by scaring Plaintiff into making payment immediately to avoid negative credit reporting instead of exercising her statutory right to dispute the debt as provided by the Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. A statement that the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Defendant violated said section by: a. Making a false and misleading representation in violation of §1692e(10). By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. Pursuant to 15 USC §1692g, a debt collector: Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing – The Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §1692g, by threatening negative credit reporting, which overshadows the ''g-notice'' language and coerces the consumer not to exert its rights under the FDCPA. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. A statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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Defendant Exit Realty is a real estate agent or brokerage. Defendant John Doe 1 is an authorized agent of Defendant Exit Realty. As a way to cut corners yet also increase its advertising reach, Defendant and its authorized agents, including John Doe 1, repeatedly called thousands of cellular and residential phones at a time using an automatic telephone dialing system in violation of the TCPA. When the Class members answered their cellular phones, they heard silence for several seconds and a distinct “click” sound before being transferred to a live agent, which denotes the use of an automatic telephone dialing system. On or about July 3, 2019, Plaintiff received a call on his cellular phone number ending in 1146. The Caller ID displayed that the phone number originated from 520-277-9156. When Plaintiff answered his phone, Plaintiff said “hello” several times, but there was silence for approximately 4 seconds. Plaintiff then heard a “click” sound. There was an additional silent delay after the distinct “click” before a live agent answered. Upon information and belief, the technology used to robocall Plaintiff had the capability to store phone numbers and dial those numbers automatically. The live agent informed Plaintiff that he was calling on behalf of Defendant Exit Realty and advertising Defendant’s Exit Realty’s services. The live agent gave Plaintiff some information about Defendant Exit Realty and asked if Plaintiff would be interested in more information. In order to investigate the company calling, Plaintiff agreed to receive more information about Defendant Exit Realty. The live agent told Plaintiff that he would be sending Plaintiff a video regarding Defendant Exit Realty and that one of his partners would follow up. On or about July 10, 2019, Plaintiff received a follow up telephone call from a real estate agent with Defendant Exit Realty. Plaintiff did not answer the telephone call as Plaintiff did not recognize the telephone number 612-702-1869. Defendant’s voicemail stated, in pertinent part, “Hi this is for Terry. This is Cade from Upper Midwest Realty. We had one of our associates reach out and connect with you here last week …” Plaintiff never consented to be contacted by Defendants. Prior to the robocall, Plaintiff had no relationship with Defendants. Class Definition: Plaintiff Shanahan brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2), and/or 23(b)(3) on behalf of himself and a class defined as follows: TCPA Class. All persons in the United States who: (1) from the last 4 years to present (2) who received at least one telephone call; (3) on his or her cellular or residential telephone; (4) that used an automatic telephone dialing system; (5) for the purpose of promoting Defendant’s services; (6) where Defendant did not first obtain the person’s express written consent. The following people are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendants, Defendants’ subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendants or their parents have a controlling interest and its current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (4) persons whose claims in this matter have been finally adjudicated on the merits or otherwise released; (5) Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendants’ counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such excluded persons. Numerosity: The exact number of the Class members is unknown and not available to Plaintiff, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendants placed telephone calls to thousands of consumers who fall into the definition of the Class. Members of the Class can be identified through Defendants’ records. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Class, in that Plaintiff and the Class members sustained damages arising out of Defendants’ uniform wrongful conduct and unsolicited telephone calls. Policies Generally Applicable to the Class: This class action is appropriate for certification because Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the Class members and making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. Defendants’ practices challenged herein apply to and affect the Class members uniformly, and Plaintiff’s challenge of those practices hinge on Defendants’ conduct with respect to the Class as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff. Superiority: This case is also appropriate for class certification because class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy as joinder of all parties is impracticable. The damages suffered by the individual members of the Class will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendant Exit Realty and Defendant John Doe 1’s actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the individual members of the Class to obtain effective relief from Defendant Exit Realty and Defendant John Doe 1’s misconduct. Even if members of the Class could sustain such individual litigation, it would still not be preferable to a class action, because individual litigation would increase the delay and expense to all parties due to the complex legal and factual controversies presented in this Complaint. By contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single Court. Economies of time, effort and expense will be fostered, and uniformity of decisions ensured. The May 2013 FCC Ruling rejected a narrow view of TCPA liability, including the assertion that a seller’s liability requires a finding of formal agency and immediate direction and control over the third-party who placed the telemarketing call. Id. at 6587 n. 107. Prior to conducting discovery in this litigation, due to the anonymous nature of robocalling, Plaintiff has no way to identify the exact party who called his cellular phone whether it was Defendant Exit Realty, Defendant John Doe 1 or some other unknown company. However, for the purposes of TCPA liability, Plaintiff is not expected to know this information at the pleading stage. Even if Defendant Exit Realty alleges that it did not personally make the TCPA-violating calls, Defendant Exit Realty is liable because it took steps to cause the calls to be made by hiring a third party to market the services Defendant Exit Realty, or because the calls were made pursuant to Defendant Exit Realty’s actual authority, apparent authority and/or ratification, or pursuant to joint enterprise or acting in concert liability. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. Defendants and/or its agents placed calls using an automatic telephone dialing system to Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ cellular telephones without having their prior express written consent to do so. The system used by Defendants to place such automated calls had the capability to store a list of numbers and automatically dial those numbers. Defendant Exit Realty’s and Defendant John Doe’s calls were made for the purpose of advertising and marketing employment opportunities and realty services with Defendant Exit Realty. Defendants used an automatic telephone dialing system as proscribed by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) to generate Plaintiff’s phone number as well as the phone numbers of the Class members. Defendants made the violating calls “willfully” and/or “knowingly” under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). If the court finds that Defendants willfully and/or knowingly violated this subsection, the court may increase the civil fine from $500 to $1500 per violation under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 Telecommunications Consumer Protection Act (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class against all Defendants)

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On information and belief, on or about March 14, 2011, April-May, 2012, May 10, 2012, October 19, 2012, September 30, 2013 and October 8, 2013, Defendants transmitted by telephone facsimile machine seven (7) unsolicited advertisements to Plaintiff. Copies of the facsimiles are attached hereto as Exhibit A. Plaintiff did not invite or give permission to Defendants to send the faxes. On information and belief, Defendants faxed the same and other unsolicited facsimiles without the required opt out language to Plaintiff and more than 25 other recipients without first receiving the recipients’ express permission or invitation. Defendants’ facsimile did not display a proper opt-out notice as required by 47 In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3), Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to the JFPA, on behalf of the following class of persons: All persons in the United States who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action until the date of class certification, (2) were sent telephone facsimile messages of material advertising the commercial availability of any property, goods, or services by or on behalf of Defendants, and (3) which did not display a proper opt-out notice. Excluded from the Class are the Defendants, their employees, agents and members of the Judiciary. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the class definition upon completion of class certification discovery. Class Size (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of persons and entities of the Plaintiff Class is numerous and joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of class members is more than 100. Typicality (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (3)): The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of all class members. The Plaintiff received the same faxes as the faxes sent by or on behalf of the Defendants advertising goods and services of the Defendants during the Class Period. The Plaintiff is making the same claims and seeking the same relief for itself and all class members based upon the same federal statute. The Defendants have acted in the same or in a similar manner with respect to the Plaintiff and all the class members by sending Plaintiff and each member of the class the same faxes. Need for Consistent Standards and Practical Effect of Adjudication (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (1)): Class certification is appropriate because the prosecution of individual actions by class members would: (a) create the risk of inconsistent adjudications that could establish incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendants, and/or (b) as a practical matter, adjudication of the Plaintiff's claims will be dispositive of the interests of class members who are not parties. Common Conduct (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (2)): Class certification is also appropriate because the Defendants have acted and refused to act in the same or similar manner with respect to all class members thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate. The Plaintiff demands such relief as authorized by 47 U.S.C. §227. All Paragraphs of the Complaint are incorporated herein by reference. The JFPA makes it unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). The Faxes. Defendants, upon information and belief, sent on or about March 14, 2011, April-May, 2012, May 10, 2012, October 19, 2012, September 30, 2013 and October 8, 2013, advertisements via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to the telephone lines and facsimile machines of Plaintiff and members of the Plaintiff Class. The Faxes constituted an advertisement under the Act. Defendants failed to comply with the Opt-Out Requirements in connection with the Faxes. The Faxes were transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express permission or invitation and/or Defendants are precluded from asserting any prior express permission or invitation because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements. Defendants violated the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder by sending the Faxes via facsimile transmission to Plaintiff and members of the Class. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that Defendants may be continuing to send unsolicited advertisements via facsimile transmission in violation of the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and absent intervention by this Court, will do so in the future. The TCPA/JFPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf of Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class to redress Defendants’ violations of the Act, and provides for statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The Act also provides that injunctive relief is appropriate. Id. The JFPA is a strict liability statute, so the Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff and the other class members even if their actions were only negligent.

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Defendant has been sending repeated, unsolicited marketing text messages to the Plaintiffs’ cellular telephone numbers, XXX-XXX-8117 (Huron), and XXX-XXX-2457 (Wright). True and correct copies of some of the text messages received by Plaintiffs from Defendant are produced below: Defendant’s text messages to Plaintiffs advertised promotions for the sale of Jo- Ann Stores goods. Defendant’s text messages did not include an automated mechanism through which the Plaintiffs, or any consumer, could reply “stop” to force the texts to cease. Plaintiffs never provided Defendant with their cell phone numbers or their prior express consent to call their cell phone numbers with automated text messages. The text messages sent to Plaintiffs’ cellular phones were made with an ATDS as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). The ATDS has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator. The telephone numbers messaged by Defendant were assigned to cellular telephone services for which Plaintiffs incur charges for incoming messages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). The messages from Defendant to Plaintiffs were not placed for “emergency purposes” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(i). Plaintiffs have received hundreds of such text messages. The messages are annoying, frustrating to the Plaintiffs and are an invasion of their privacy. Plaintiffs bring this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated. Plaintiffs represent, and are members of the following class: All persons within the United States who did not provide Defendant clear and conspicuous prior express written consent to send automated telemarketing text messages and who received one or more automated telemarketing text messages, from or on behalf of Defendant, to said person’s cellular telephone, made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system within four years prior to the filing of the Complaint Upon information and belief, Defendant sent automated telemarketing text messages to cellular telephone numbers belonging to thousands of consumers throughout the United States without their prior express written consent. The members of the Class, therefore, are believed to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The exact number and identities of the Class members are unknown at this time and can only be ascertained through discovery. Identification of the Class members is a matter capable of ministerial determination from Defendant’s records. C. Common Questions of Law and Fact There are questions of law and fact common to the Class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members. These questions include: a. Whether Defendant sent non-emergency text messages to Plaintiffs and Class members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS; b. Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing it obtained prior express written consent to send each message; c. Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and/or willful; d. Whether Defendant are liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and e. Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Class members, as they are all based on the same factual and legal theories. E. Protecting the Interests of the Class Members Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and have retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither Plaintiffs nor their counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. F. Proceeding via Class Action is Superior and Advisable A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecutions of separate claims against Defendant is small because it is not economically feasible for Class members to bring individual actions. Management of this class action is unlikely to present any difficulties. Several courts have certified classes in TCPA actions. These cases include, but are not limited to: Mitchem v. Ill. Collection Serv., 271 F.R.D. 617 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Sadowski v. Med1 Online, LLC, 2008 WL 2224892 (N.D. Ill., May 27, 2008); CE Design Ltd. V. Cy’s Crabhouse North, Inc., 259 F.R.D. 135 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Lo v. Oxnard European Motors, LLC, 2012 WL 1932283 (S.D. Cal., May 29, 2012). Defendant sent multiple automated text messages to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class without their prior express written consent. Each of the aforementioned messages by Defendant constitutes a violation of the Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporate them herein by reference. Defendant knowingly and/or willfully sent multiple automated text messages to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class without their prior express consent. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to an award of treble damages up to $1,500.00 for each call in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). Additionally, Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct by Defendant in the future. Plaintiffs and the Class are also entitled to and do seek a declaration that: a. Defendant knowingly and/or willfully violated the TCPA; b. Defendant knowingly and/or willfully placed telemarketing text messages to Plaintiffs and the Class; c. Defendant knowingly and/or willfully obtained the telephone numbers of non- customers; d. Defendant willfully placed telemarketing text messages to non-customers such as Plaintiffs and the Class, knowing they did not have prior express written consent to do so; and e. It is Defendant’s practice and history to place telemarketing text messages to non- customers without their prior express consent. A. The Class Dated: June 16, 2016 Respectfully submitted, PLAINTIFFS, LAURA WRIGHT AND DEBRA Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq.

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) Defendants allege Plaintiff owes a debt (“the alleged Debt”). The alleged Debt is an alleged obligation of Plaintiff to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. The alleged Debt does not arise from any business enterprise of Plaintiff. The alleged Debt is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). At an exact time known only to Defendants, the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendants for collection. At the time the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendants for collection, the alleged Debt was in default. In its efforts to collect the alleged Debt, Defendants contacted Plaintiff by email (“the Email”) dated October 1, 2019. (A true and accurate copy is annexed hereto as “Exhibit The Email conveyed information regarding the alleged Debt. The Email is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). The Email was the initial written communication Plaintiff received from Defendants concerning the alleged Debt. The Email was received and read by Plaintiff. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g protects Plaintiff's concrete interests. Plaintiff has the interest and right to receive a clear, accurate and unambiguous validation notice, which allows a consumer to confirm that he or she owes the debt sought to be collected by the debt collector. As set forth herein, Defendants deprived Plaintiff of this right. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e protects Plaintiff's concrete interests. Plaintiff has the interest and right to be free from deceptive and/or misleading communications from Defendants. As set forth herein, Defendants deprived Plaintiff of this right. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) provides if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, or that the consumer requests the name and address of the original creditor, the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment, or the name and address of the original creditor, is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) prohibits the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. Plaintiff disputed the alleged Debt by email on September 30, 2019. In response to Plaintiffs dispute, a representative for Defendants contacted Plaintiff by email, to notify her that the dispute would be filed immediately. Additionally Defendants’ representative informed Plaintiff that they would be reaching out to Plaintiff once they received adequate information from LVNV Funding LLC. Defendants again contacted Plaintiff by the Email on October 1, 2019, luring her into an offer for flexible payment options. The Email further stated, that it was an attempt to collect a debt. Defendants failed to respond to Plaintiffs dispute on the alleged Debt but instead continued collection efforts on such alleged Debt. As a result of the foregoing Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) by failing to cease collection efforts after receiving Plaintiff’s written dispute on the alleged Debt. As a result of the foregoing Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e by falsely representing that it was entitled to continue collection efforts and were not required to cease communication after receiving such dispute from Plaintiff. As a result of the foregoing Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) by attempting to collect on the alleged Debt through false representation that such efforts were legitimate. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all persons similarly situated in the State of North Carolina. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class of: All consumers to whom Defendants sent a collection letter in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b), substantially and materially similar to the Letter sent to Plaintiff, which letter was sent on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action to the present. This action seeks a finding that Defendants' conduct violates the FDCPA, and asks that the Court award damages as authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. The Class consists of more than thirty-five persons. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Common questions of law or fact raised by this action affect all members of the Class and predominate over any individual issues. Common relief is therefore sought on behalf of all members of the Class. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, and a risk that any adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class would, as a practical matter, either be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class not party to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Defendants have acted in a manner applicable to the Class as a whole such that declaratory relief is warranted. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the Class. The management of the class is not extraordinarily difficult, and the factual and legal issues raised by this action will not require extended contact with the members of the Class, because Defendants' conduct was perpetrated on all members of the Class and will be established by common proof. Moreover, Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in actions brought under consumer protection laws.

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(Plaintiff Individually and on Behalf of All Similarly Situated Employees Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216) (Rule 23 Claim) Plaintiff and other similarly situated current and former employees in the asserted class regularly worked over 40 hours per week and earned the additional $1.25 per hour shift differential. At all times material to this Complaint, Defendant failed to comply with the FLSA in that Plaintiff and those similarly situated to Plaintiff performed services for Defendant for which no provision was made by Defendant to pay Plaintiffs and similarly situated persons the correct overtime rate of pay. Plaintiff and asserted members of the collective are similarly situated because, inter alia, they were all were not paid the required overtime rate but were entitled under the FLSA to the paid overtime rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all work in excess of 40 hours per week; and had such rights undermined and neglected by Defendants’ unlawful prac- tices and policies. Defendant encouraged, permitted, and required the Class to work without required overtime compensation of one and one-half times the normal wages. Defendant knows that Plaintiff and other members of the FLSA Class have been deprived of required overtime compensation. Nonetheless, Defendant has operated under a scheme to deny the Plaintiff and the Class required compensation of one and one-half time regular rate of pay for work in excess of 40 hours of the FLSA Class. Defendant’s conduct, as alleged herein, was willful and has caused significant dam- age to Plaintiff and other members of the FLSA class. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of each proposed class mem- ber and have retained counsel that is experienced in class/collective actions and employment lit- igation. Plaintiff has no interest that is contrary to, or in conflict with, members of the collective. The Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 32, as if fully set forth herein. At all relevant times, RCI employed and/or continued to employ Plaintiff and each member of the proposed class of hourly employees within the meaning of the FLSA. Defendant has a policy and practice of not paying the proper overtime rate. Under the FLSA, Plaintiff and the Class (hereinafter referred to as “The FLSA Class”) were entitled to be paid at the overtime rate by Defendants for each hour worked in excess of 40 hours each work week. The overtime rate is computed by multiplying 1.5 times an employee’s regular hourly rate, which includes all non-discretionary compensation paid to employees, including any shift differential. Upon information and belief, Defendant’s practices were not based upon Defend- ant’s review of any policy or publication of the United States Department of Labor and therefore were willful and deliberate. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §255(a). Due to Defendant’s violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff alleges on behalf of the mem- bers of the proposed class that they have suffered damages and are entitled to recover damages from Defendant. WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff requests the following relief, individually and on behalf of similarly situated employees: a.) A declaratory judgment that Defendant violated the overtime wage provisions of the FLSA as to the Plaintiff and the Class; b.) A declaratory judgment that Defendant’s violations were willful; c.) A judgment of unpaid overtime compensation; b.) A judgement of an additional equal amount as liquidated damages; c.) Prejudgment interest; and d.) Reasonable attorneys’ fees, and costs and disbursements of this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b). This count arises from Defendants’ violation of the overtime compensation provi- sions of the IMWL, 820 ILCS § 105/1 et seq. Under the IMWL, Defendants were and remain obligated to compensate Plaintiff for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in any individual work week. Overtime compensation must be paid at a rate of not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay, which includes the shift differential. Plaintiff was regularly permitted, encouraged and/or required to work in excess of 40 hours per week but was not compensated at the required one and one-half times regular hourly rate for such overtime work. By failing to pay overtime compensation due to Plaintiff, Defendants willfully, knowingly and/or recklessly violated the IMWL which requires overtime compensation of one and one-half times normal rate to be paid. As a result of Defendants’ policy and practice of withholding overtime compensa- tion, Plaintiff has been damaged in that he has not received wages due to him pursuant to the

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During Plaintiffs’ employment as Field Service Engineers, Defendant paid Plaintiffs and other Field Service Engineers on a salary basis and classified them as exempt under the FLSA. Defendant has employed, on average, six (6) or so Field Service Engineers at any given time over the last three (3) years. Defendant has employed Field Service Engineers in many states across the country, including in California, Washington, Oregon, Utah, Delaware, Colorado, Texas, Kansas, Illinois, Georgia, and Florida. Defendant subjects all Field Service Engineers, including Plaintiffs, to the same employment policies and procedures. Plaintiffs and other Field Service Engineers all reported to the same Field Engineering Manager. During Plaintiffs’ employment, Field Service Engineers reported to Defendant’s Field Engineering Manager, Jireh Providencia (“Providencia”). Field Service Engineers were expected to work before, during, and after Defendant’s scheduled business hours (i.e., Monday through Friday 8:00 am to 5:00pm PT). Plaintiffs, and those similarly situated, were regularly forced to work in excess of forty (40) hours per week without overtime compensation. In addition to their primary job duties noted above, Field Service Engineers were regularly required to answer calls and follow any and all instructions from Defendant, make or respond to customer calls, draft or respond to e-mails, prepare weekly reports, handle and request parts (or “trunk stock”) as necessary to perform maintenance and repair services, and travel extensively for service calls throughout the United States, during and outside of Defendant’s scheduled business hours. Defendant established a policy and practice of requiring Field Service Engineers, like Plaintiffs, to work in excess of forty (40) hours per week, without overtime compensation, in order to maintain a satisfactory level of job performance with Defendant. Plaintiffs and other Field Service Engineers were uniformly misclassified by Defendant as exempt from overtime compensation. Defendant failed to post or provide notice to its Field Service Engineers of their federal wage and hour rights under the FLSA. 29 C.F.R. § 516.4. Defendant has instructed Field Service Engineers to not record their hours worked. Defendant uses ADP for payroll processing services. Defendant’s Field Service Engineers have access to an ADP interface wherein they can see their payroll information. This interface also allows Field Service Engineers to enter information about their hours worked into the ADP system, which Defendant can see or access. On at least one occasion, Defendant—through Providencia— explicitly instructed Grey to not enter his hours worked into the ADP system and to delete any hours worked information he had already put into the ADP system. Following their conversation, by the time Grey went to check on the hours worked information that he had previously entered into the ADP system, Providencia had already deleted from the ADP system the hours worked information that Grey had entered. Plaintiffs are representative of those similarly situated Field Service Engineers employed by Defendant who are current or former employees of Defendant who were required to work in excess of forty (40) hours per week and who did not receive overtime compensation. Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated Field Service Engineers, seek relief on a collective basis, challenging, among other FLSA violations, Defendant’s uniform misclassification of Field Service Engineers as exempt employees, Defendant’s policy and/or practice of failing to make and maintain accurate records of their hours worked, and Defendant’s failure to pay them for all overtime hours worked. Plaintiffs and other Field Service Engineers have together been the victim of these common policies or plans of Defendant that violate the FLSA. Plaintiffs bring this case as an “opt-in” collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of all those who file a Consent to Join form with the Court. Plaintiffs’ Consent to Join Forms are attached as Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the above-stated paragraphs as if set forth fully hereunder. Plaintiffs and other Field Service Engineers of Defendant are entitled to the rights, protections and benefits provided under the FLSA. The FLSA requires employers to pay non-exempt employees one and one-half times the regular rate of pay at which they are employed for all hours worked over forty (40) hours per workweek. 29 U.S.C. § 207. The FLSA also requires employers to make and maintain accurate records of hours worked each workweek, and to post or provide notice of employee rights under the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c); 29 C.F.R. § 516.4. Defendant’s actions, policies and/or practices violated the FLSA’s requirements by failing to compensate Plaintiffs and other Field Service Engineers for time spent on work activities as described in this Complaint. Defendant further violated the FLSA by failing to make and maintain accurate records of hours worked by Field Service Engineers and to post or provide notice to Field Service Engineers of their federal wage and hour rights under the FLSA. Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiffs and other Field Service Engineers were non-exempt employees entitled to overtime compensation. Defendant had knowledge of and information on the job duties and expectations for Field Service Engineers, their hours worked exceeding forty (40) per workweek, and their complaint(s) of not being paid overtime compensation for such hours. Defendant knowingly and willfully violated the FLSA by failing to pay overtime compensation to Plaintiffs and other Field Service Engineers, by failing to make and maintain accurate records of their hours worked, and by failing to post or provide notice of their federal wage and hours rights under the FLSA. Defendant has deliberately sought to conceal these violations rather than remedy them and has refused to fully remedy and correct the issues when brought to Defendant’s attention for out-of-court resolution. FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME IN VIOLATION OF THE FLSA

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At all times relevant, Plaintiff was the sole operator, possessor, and subscriber of the number ending in 5290. At all times relevant, Plaintiff’s number ending in 5290 was assigned to a cellular telephone service as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). Plaintiff applied for and received a Mastercard issued by Celtic Bank Corporation. Over time, Plaintiff made personal charges on this credit card. Plaintiff defaulted on payments. Plaintiff’s account, once unpaid, was referred for collection. Plaintiff started to receive phone calls from Defendant seeking to collect on Plaintiff’s $746.71 balance. On numerous occasions, Plaintiff answered. Often times, Plaintiff was met by an automated, machine-operated voice prompting Plaintiff to: “... please return this call …” On multiple occasions, Plaintiff returned Defendant’s call only to tell them to stop calling. Unfortunately, these phone calls continue. To date, dozens of phone calls have been received from number(s) leading back to Defendant – including, (563) 217-4577 and (563)-514-4664. Defendant’s phone calls resulted in aggravation that accompanies persistent and unwanted phone calls, anxiety, distress, increased risk of personal injury resulting from distraction, intrusion upon and occupation of Plaintiff’s cellular telephone capacity, invasion of privacy, loss of concentration, nuisance, stress, and wasted time. Accordingly, Plaintiff is forced to expend energy and/or time consulting with attorneys to put an end to Defendant’s unlawful collection practices. All paragraphs of this Complaint are expressly adopted and incorporated herein as though fully set forth herein. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated (the “Putative Classes”) defined as follows: FDCPA Class All persons throughout the United States (1) to whom Defendant placed, or caused to be placed, a call; (2) within the one year preceding the date of this complaint through the date of class certification; (3) in connection with the collection of a consumer debt; (4) after he/she requested that Defendant cease calls to his/her telephone number. TCPA Class All persons throughout the United States (1) to whom Defendant placed, or caused to be placed, a call; (2) directed to a number assigned to a cellular telephone service; (3) using an artificial or prerecorded voice; (4) within the four years preceding the date of this complaint through the date of class certification; (5) after he/she requested that Defendant cease calls to his/her telephone number. Upon information and belief, the members of the Putative Classes are so numerous that joinder of them is impracticable. The exact number of the members of the Putative Classes is unknown to Plaintiff at this time, and can be determined only through appropriate discovery. The members of the Putative Classes are ascertainable because the classes are defined by reference to objective criteria. The members of the Putative Classes are identifiable in that their names, addresses and telephone numbers can be identified in business records maintained by Defendant. B. Commonality and Predominance There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Putative Classes, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Putative Classes. C. Typicality This case is also appropriate for class certification as class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the efficient and fair adjudication of this controversy. The damages suffered by the individual members of the Putative Classes will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense required for individual prosecution. By contrast, a class action provides the benefits of single adjudication, economies of scale and comprehensive supervision by a single court. Economies of effort, expense, and time will be fostered and uniformity of decisions ensured. E. Adequate Representation Plaintiff will adequately and fairly represent and protect the interests of the Putative Classes. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Putative Classes, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. Plaintiff has retained competent and experienced counsel in consumer class action litigation. In Colorado, “to prevail on a claim for intrusion upon seclusion as a violation of one’s privacy, a plaintiff must show that another has intentionally intruded, physically or otherwise, upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, and that such intrusion would be considered offensive by a reasonable person.” Doe v. High-Tech Inst., Inc., 972 P.2d 1060, 1065 (Colo. App. 1998), cert. denied (Colo. Mar. 1, 1999). This tort can encompass conduct such as persistent and unwanted telephone calls. Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 1044, 1073 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing High- Tech Inst., 972 P.2d, at 1067. Defendant’s persistent and unwanted phone calls to Plaintiff violated Plaintiff’s right to privacy based on an intrusion upon her seclusion. See Dunlap v. McCarthy, 284 Ark. 5, 678 S.W.2d 361 (1984); see generally W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Torts 117 (5th ed. 1984) (examples of intrusion upon seclusion include eavesdropping by wiretapping and persistent and unwanted telephone calls). All paragraphs of this Complaint are expressly adopted and incorporated herein as though fully set forth herein. Violation(s) of 15 U.S.C. § 1692d Section 1692d provides: [a] debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: (5) Causing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(5). Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(5) by repeatedly or continuously calling Plaintiff after being asked to stop. See Chiverton v. Federal Financial Group, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D. Conn. 2005) (finding that repeated calls after the consumer had asked debt collector to stop calling amounted to harassment). The phone calls at issue were intended to be annoying, abusive, or harassing. All paragraphs of this Complaint are expressly adopted and incorporated herein as though fully set forth herein. Defendant placed or caused to be placed dozens of non-emergency calls, including but not limited to the aforementioned collection calls, to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone utilizing an artificial or prerecorded voice without Plaintiff’s consent in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A)(iii). As plead above, Defendant used an artificial or pre-recorded voice which automatically played once Plaintiff answered Defendant’s phone calls. As result of Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. §227 (b)(1)(A)(iii). Plaintiff is entitled to receive $500.00 in damages for each violation. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.) (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Members of FDCPA Class) Invasion of Privacy by Seclusion (On behalf of Plaintiff) Telephone Consumer Protection Act (47 U.S.C. § 227 et. seq.) (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Members of TCPA Class)

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Plaintiff is not a customer of Verde. Plaintiff has not sought Verde’s services online or otherwise. On or around September of 2015, Verde began calling Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, number 413-xxx-4923. Verde called Plaintiff from telephone number 978-253-4077. At all times mentioned herein, Verde contacted Plaintiff using an automated telephone dialer system (“ATDS” or “predictive dialer”) and/or by using an artificial or prerecorded voice. When Plaintiff answered calls from Verde, she heard a prerecorded message instructing Plaintiff to hold for the next available operator. Plaintiff did not provide her cellular telephone number to Verde and does not know how they obtained it. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the following class: All persons within the United States to whom Defendant or its agent/s and/or employee/s made telephone calls using an ATDS or prerecorded or artificial messages and (1) such call was to a cellular telephone number and (2) such person did not provide prior express consent to receive such a call. The class period encompasses the four year period preceding the filing of this complaint. Defendants and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. This suit seeks only damages and injunctive relief for recovery of economic injury on behalf of the Class, and it expressly is not intended to request any recovery for personal injury and claims related thereto. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify or expand the Class definitions to seek recovery on behalf of additional persons as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. B. Numerosity The exact number and identities of the Class members are unknown at this time and can only be ascertained through discovery. Identification of the Class members is a matter capable of ministerial determination from Defendant’s call records. C. Common Questions of Law and Fact There are questions of law and fact common to the Class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members. These questions include: a. Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff and Class members’ cellular telephones using an artificial or prerecorded voice; b. Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff and the Class members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS; c. Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing it obtained prior express consent to make each call; d. Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and/or willful; e. Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and f. Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely places unauthorized automated calls to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. D. Typicality Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel has any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. F. Proceeding Via Class Action is Superior and Advisable A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecutions of separate claims against Defendant is small because it is not economically feasible for Class members to bring individual actions. Management of this class action is unlikely to present any difficulties. Several courts have certified classes in TCPA actions. These cases include, but are not limited to: Mitchem v. Ill. Collection Serv., 271 F.R.D. 617 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Sadowski v. Med1 Online, LLC, 2008 WL 2224892 (N.D. Ill., May 27, 2008); CE Design Ltd. V. Cy’s Crabhouse North, Inc., 259 F.R.D. 135 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Lo v. Oxnard European Motors, LLC, 2012 WL 1932283 (S.D. Cal., May 29, 2012). Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them herein by reference. Each of the aforementioned calls by Defendant constitutes a negligent violation of the TCPA. Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each call in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). Additionally, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct by Defendant in the future. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to and do seek a declaration that: • Defendant violated the TCPA; • Defendant used prerecorded voices and/or artificial voices; and • Defendant placed calls to the Plaintiff and the Class without prior express consent. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them herein by reference. Defendant knowingly and/or willfully placed multiple prerecorded or artificial calls to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class without their prior express consent. Each of the aforementioned calls by Defendant constitutes a knowing and/or willful violation of the TCPA. Additionally, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct by Defendant in the future. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to and do seek a declaration that: • Defendant knowingly and/or willfully violated the TCPA; • Defendant knowingly and/or willfully used prerecorded voices and/or artificial voices on calls to Plaintiff and the Class; • Defendant knowingly and/or willfully obtained the cell phone numbers of Plaintiff and the Class from third parties; • Defendant willfully placed automated calls to the Plaintiff and the Class at the numbers received from those third parties, knowing it did not have prior express consent to do so; and • It is Defendant’s practice and history to place automated telephone calls to consumers without their prior express consent. A. The Class Dated: December 20, 2015 Respectfully submitted, By /s/ Sergei Lemberg Sergei Lemberg (BBO# 650671) Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq.

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Plaintiffs and those they seek to represent in this action were employed to perform work on various jobs for Defendant as part of its contracting business. Defendant paid Plaintiffs and those they seek to represent “straight time”—i.e., the same hourly wage for every hour worked, regardless of whether such hours were in excess of 40 in a workweek. Plaintiffs and those they seek to represent regularly worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. Defendant labeled the hourly payments for hours in excess of 40 in a workweek as “bonus” payments on the pay statements of Plaintiffs and those they seek to represent. A pay statement of Charles Clouse from July 2017, which shows such a “bonus” payment, is attached hereto as Exhibit A as an example of the pay practice which applied to Plaintiffs and those they seek to represent. The “bonus” payment of $143.00 shown on Exhibit A is actually a payment for 13 hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek made at Plaintiff Clouse’s then-current hourly rate of $11 per hour ($11/hour x 13 hours = $143.00). The FLSA and KWHA require employers to pay employees at one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours in excess of 40 in a workweek. By failing to pay Plaintiffs and those they seek to represent at one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours in excess of 40 in a workweek, Defendant violated the overtime pay requirements of the FLSA and KWHA. Defendant labeled these straight-time hourly payments for hours over 40 in a workweek, which it made to Plaintiffs and those they seek to represent at their regular rate of pay, as “bonus” payments, in order to conceal its violation of the overtime pay requirements of Case: 5:20-cv-00011-KKC Doc #: 1 Filed: 01/10/20 Page: 3 of 9 - Page ID#: 3 4 the FLSA and KWHA. Defendant also continued these practices despite formal and informal complaints by Plaintiffs about not receiving time-and-a-half and despite inquiries and investigations by the Kentucky Labor Cabinet. Accordingly, Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiffs and those they seek to represent were entitled to one and one-half times their regular hourly rate for hours over 40 in a workweek and therefore acted willfully in failing to compensate all work time by these employees at the proper overtime rate. Plaintiffs asserts their FLSA claims pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as a collective action on behalf of the following individuals: All current and former hourly-paid employees of Defendant at any time since January 10, 2017. (the “Collective Class”). Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims should proceed as a collective action because Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees were paid in the same manner as described herein, and are, therefore, “similarly situated” as that term is defined in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and the associated decisional law. Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf and, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of the following class of individuals: All current and former hourly-paid employees of Defendant at any time since January 10, 2015.1 (the “Rule 23 Class”). 1 The statute of limitations under the KWHA is five years. KRS 413.120(2). Case: 5:20-cv-00011-KKC Doc #: 1 Filed: 01/10/20 Page: 4 of 9 - Page ID#: 4 5 Plaintiffs are members of the Rule 23 Class they seek to represent. Since January 9, 2015, Defendant has employed more than 50 individuals who it paid in the manner described above and who therefore fall within the Rule 23 Class definition. Thus, the Rule 23 Class is sufficiently numerous that joinder of all members is impractical, satisfying Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). Plaintiffs and the members of the Rule 23 Class share the same pivotal questions of law and fact, satisfying Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Defendant failed to pay Plaintiffs and the members of the Rule 23 Class all overtime wages owed, pursuant to the same policies and in the same manner. As a result, the Rule 23 Class shares several factual and legal questions, including, for example: (1) whether they were entitled to one and one-half times their regular rate for hours over 40 in a workweek; and (2) whether Defendant violated the KWHA by paying purported “bonus” payments at their regular rate of pay for hours over 40 in a workweek. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Rule 23 Class, satisfying Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Defendant’s violation of the overtime pay requirements of the KWHA was not the result of any Plaintiff-specific circumstances. Rather, it arose from Defendant’s common pay policies and practices, which Defendant applied generally to all of the hourly-paid employees who worked on jobs as part of its contracting business, including Plaintiffs. Thus, in advancing their own claims, Plaintiffs will also be advancing the claims of the Rule 23 Class. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Rule 23 Class, satisfying Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Plaintiffs’ interests are shared with the Rule 23 Class and Plaintiffs have no interests that conflict with those of the Rule 23 Class. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have retained competent counsel experienced in representing classes of employees against their employers related to their employers’ failure to pay them properly under the law. Case: 5:20-cv-00011-KKC Doc #: 1 Filed: 01/10/20 Page: 5 of 9 - Page ID#: 5 6 By failing to pay hourly paid employees all required overtime wages pursuant to its common pay practices and policies, Defendant has created a scenario where questions of law and fact common to the Rule 23 Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. Thus, a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this matter. Plaintiffs are entitled to pursue their claims as a class action, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. Plaintiffs assert this claim on behalf of themselves and members of the Collective Class who opt into this action by filing a consent form, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Plaintiffs and the Collective Class are employees entitled to the FLSA’s protections. Defendant is an employer covered by the FLSA. The FLSA requires that covered employees receive overtime compensation “not less than one and one-half times” their regular rate of pay for hours over 40 in a workweek. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. Plaintiffs assert this claim on behalf of themselves and members of the Rule 23 Class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class are employees entitled to the KWHA’s protections. Defendant is an employer covered by the KWHA. The KWHA requires that covered employees receive overtime compensation “not less than one and one-half times” their regular rate of pay for hours over 40 in a workweek. KRS 337.285. Defendant pays Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class the same hourly rate for every hour worked including hours over 40 in a workweek and does not pay them at one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for hours over 40 in a workweek, in violation of the KWHA. In violating the KWHA, Defendant has acted willfully and with reckless disregard of clearly applicable KWHA provisions, for example, by seeking to conceal its violation on the pay statements of Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class members and by ignoring formal and informal complaints from Plaintiffs and the Kentucky Labor Cabinet. Case: 5:20-cv-00011-KKC Doc #: 1 Filed: 01/10/20 Page: 2 of 9 - Page ID#: 2 3 VIOLATION OF THE OVERTIME REQUIREMENTS OF THE KWHA VIOLATION OF THE OVERTIME REQUIREMENTS OF THE FLSA

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Identify that the call was an attempt to collect a debt; The message did not identify that the call was an attempt to collect a debt, that any information obtained will be used for that purpose, or that the communication was from a debt collector. Upon information and belief, that same day DEFENDANT also left the following message on PLAINTIFF’S work phone number: Confidential and important message for Ashley Coleman. Chris ____ calling from Central Portfolio Control. Please contact me at 1-888-351-1975. Thank you. This message also failed to identify that the call was an attempt to collect a debt, that any information obtained will be used for that purpose, or that the communication was from a debt collector. PLAINTIFF called DEFENDANT back. During the subsequent conversation, DEFENDANT again failed to disclose that the call was an attempt to collect a debt and/or that any information obtained would be used for that purpose. DEFENDANT never sent an initial 1692g collection letter to PLAINTIFF. PLAINTIFF is informed and believes and therefore alleges that PLAINTIFF and the class members are entitled to statutory damages and may have also suffered actual damages in other ways and to other extents not presently known to PLAINTIFF, and not specified herein. PLAINTIFF reserves the right to assert additional facts and damages not referenced herein, and/or to present evidence of the same at the time of trial. PLAINTIFF repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference, paragraphs 1 through 16 inclusive, above. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of the class members’ claims as Congress specifically envisioned class actions as a principal means of enforcing the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C.§ 1692k. The members of the class are generally unsophisticated consumers, whose rights will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the classes would also create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications resulting in the establishment of inconsistent or varying standards and would not be in the best interest of judicial economy. Identify that any information obtained will be used for that purpose; and/or PLAINTIFF repeats, re-alleges and incorporates by reference, paragraphs 1 through 20 inclusive, above. A debt collector is required to disclose in the initial communication “that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose” and in subsequent communications “that the communication is from a debt collector”. 15 U.S.C. §1692e(11). In December of 2014, DEFENDANT began placing calls to PLAINTIFF’s phone number, in an attempt to collect a consumer debt from PLAINTIFF. DEFENDANT left the following message on PLAINTIFF’S cell phone: Confidential and important message for Ashely Coleman. This is Chris ______ calling from Central Portfolio Control. Please contact me at 1-888-351-1975 that’s 888-351-1975. Thank you. The message did not identify that the call was an attempt to collect a debt, that any information obtained will be used for that purpose, or that the communication was from a debt collector. That same day DEFENDANT also left the following message on PLAINTIFF’S work phone number: Confidential and important message for Ashley Coleman. Chris ____ calling from Central Portfolio Control. Please contact me at 1-888-351-1975. Thank you. When PLAINTIFF called DEFENDANT back, DEFENDANT again failed to disclose that the call was an attempt to collect a debt and/or that any information obtained would be used for that purpose. As a result of the FDCPA violations by DEFENDANT, PLAINTIFF is entitled to an award of actual and statutory damages. It has been necessary for PLAINTIFF to obtain the services of an attorney to pursue this claim, on behalf of herself and those similarly situated, and is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees therefor. Identify that the communication was from a debt collector. b. Class Number Two: A class consisting of nationwide consumers who: i. Within one year prior to the filing of this action; ii. Were not provided 1692g(a) notices; iii. Within 5 days from the initial communication with DEFENDANT. PLAINTIFF repeats, re-alleges and incorporates by reference, paragraphs 1 through 29 inclusive, above. Here, DEFENDANT failed to send PLAINTIFF an initial collection letter notifying PLAINTIFF of her rights pursuant to §1692g(a). As a result of the FDCPA violations by DEFENDANT, PLAINTIFF is entitled to an award of actual and statutory damages. It has been necessary for PLAINTIFF to obtain the services of an attorney to pursue this claim, on behalf of herself and those similarly situated, and is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees therefor. PLAINTIFF repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference, paragraphs 1 through 8 inclusive, above. VIOLATIONS OF THE FDCPA 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(11) BROUGHT BY PLAINTIFF INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF CLASSES NUMBERS ONE VIOLATION OF THE FDCPA 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) BROUGHT BY PLAINTIFF INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF CLASS NUMBER TWO

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The amount of the debt; Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). The Class consists of: a. all individuals with addresses in the State of Texas; b. to whom Defendant Law Offices sent an initial collection letter attempting to collect a consumer debt; c. on behalf of Defendant Westhill; d. that included a false and misleading statements regarding consumers rights to dispute the debt as outlined in §1692g; e. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (2l) days after the filing of this action. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. The name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. The MidAmerica Bank & Trust obligation arose out of transactions where Plaintiff used MidAmerica Bank & Trust funds primarily for personal, family or household purposes. The alleged MidAmerica Bank & Trust obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). MidAmerica Bank & Trust is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4). Defendant Westhill, a debt collector and the subsequent owner of the MidAmerica Bank & Trust debt, contracted with Defendant Law Offices to collect the alleged debt. Defendants collect and attempt to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation – September 25, 2017 Collection Letter On or about September 25, 2017, Defendant Law Offices sent the Plaintiff an initial contact notice (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt owed to Defendant Westhill. See Letter at Exhibit A. A statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt-collector; This letter is commonly referred to as the “G notice.” The “G-Notice” in the September 25, 2017 letter does not meet the required guidelines of the FDCPA and falsely state the requirements of the consumer. Firstly, the “G-Notice” wrongfully advises the consumer that she must “notify [Defendants] in writing that she disputes the debt or Defendants will assume the debt to be valid.” This language is false and misleading to the Plaintiff since a consumer may dispute the debt with Defendants by any method in order to be a valid dispute. (See §1692g(a)(3)). Defendants letter then improperly advises the consumer as to her rights under §1692g as when it fails to properly state when notification in writing is required. Defendants wrongfully advise the consumer that “if you notify us of a dispute, we will obtain verification of the debt and mail a copy of such verification to you.” Defendants’ letter fails on all accounts to inform the Plaintiff of her fundamental rights as a consumer to dispute the debt, and the methods in which different disputes and information requested must occur. Plaintiff incurred an informational injury as Defendants falsely stated her rights under §1692g of the FDCPA which put her at imminent risk of losing her right to validate and dispute the debt. As a result of Defendants’ deceptive, misleading and unfair debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Defendants’ debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Defendants violated §1692e : a. By making a false and misleading representation in violation of §1692e(10). By reason thereof, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendants’ conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Defendants’ debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. Pursuant to 15 USC §1692g, a debt collector: Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing – The Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. §1692g, by wrongfully advising Plaintiff of her rights and responsibilities as set forth in this section of the FDCPA. A statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty- day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. By reason thereof, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendants’ conduct violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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Plaintiff brings this action on his own behalf and as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of all holders of Dawson common stock who are being and will be harmed by Defendants’ actions described below (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants herein and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with any of the Defendants. On November 12, 2013, Dawson announced impressive operating results for its fiscal fourth quarter and 2013 year-end results. Specifically, the Company reported that EBITDA increased by 15%, to a record $57.2 million and income from operations increased 22% over 2012 to $20.1 million. The Company also reported significant capital investments including 12,000 single-channel Geospace GSX units, 1,000 three-channel GSX units, 2,500 channels of the Wireless Seismic RT System 2 recording system and 10 INOVA vibrator energy source units to increase recording capacity and improve efficiency. The year-end results further indicated the Company’s strong financial position, “[t]he Company’s balance sheet remains strong with approximately $79,000,000 of working capital, $13,000,000 of debt, $76,000,000 of cash and cash equivalents and short-term investments, and $115,000,000 of retained earnings. In addition, the Company has $20,000,000 available under its undrawn revolving line of credit. The Company anticipates financing its recent purchase of GSX equipment with a mixture of cash and debt.” Commenting on the 2014 fiscal second-quarter financial results, Defendant Jumper stated: While we are pleased with our return to profitability, the declaration of our second quarterly dividend payment and our ability to maintain our strong balance sheet, we are disappointed to have another short term utilization issue. We believe the issue will clear itself during the quarter. We continue to explore ways to right size our operation to fit current demand and project readiness timing while maintaining a high resolution product that continually meets client needs. Based on recent bid activity, we believe market conditions in the United States indicate signs of improvement for the second half of calendar 2014. In sum, Dawson is well positioned to generate significant earnings in the foreseeable future. Despite Dawson’s bright financial prospects, the Board has now agreed to the merger with TGC which will dilute the share value of Dawson’s current shareholders, provide no premium and subject Dawson shareholders to the downward pull on the deal value based on the plummeting share price of TGC and the Board’s failure to require a collar. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation contained above as though fully set forth herein. The Individual Defendants have violated fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, good faith, and candor owed to Dawson shareholders. As demonstrated by the allegations above, the Individual Defendants failed to exercise the care required, and breached their duties of loyalty, good faith, independence, and candor owed to Dawson shareholders because, among other reasons, they failed to take reasonable steps to obtain and/or ensure that Dawson shareholders receive adequate consideration for their shares, agreed to restrictive deal protection devices that deter other suitors from making a superior bid for the Company, and caused a materially incomplete and misleading Definitive Proxy concerning the Proposed Transaction to be filed with the SEC. By reason of the foregoing acts, practices, and courses of conduct, the Individual Defendants have failed to exercise ordinary care and diligence in the exercise of their fiduciary obligations toward Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. As a result of the actions of Defendants, Plaintiff and the Class will suffer irreparable injury in that they have not and will not receive their fair portion of the value of Dawson assets and businesses, have been and will be prevented from obtaining a fair price for their Dawson common shares, and will not be able to cast an informed vote the Proposed Transaction. Unless the Court enjoins Defendants, they will continue to breach their fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff and the members of the Class, all to the irreparable harm of the members of the Class. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation contained above as though fully set forth herein. Dawson, TGC, and Merger Sub have acted and are acting with knowledge of, or with reckless disregard to, the fact that the Individual Defendants are in breach of their fiduciary duties to Dawson’s shareholders, and have participated in such breaches of fiduciary duties. Dawson, TGC, and Merger Sub knowingly aided and abetted the Individual Defendants’ wrongdoing alleged herein. In so doing, Dawson, TGC, and Merger Sub rendered substantial assistance in order to effectuate the Individual Defendants’ plan to consummate the Proposed Transaction in breach of their fiduciary duties. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation contained above as though fully set forth herein. Defendants have issued the Definitive Proxy with the intention of soliciting shareholder support for the Proposed Transaction. Specifically, the Definitive Proxy violates Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 because it omits material facts as set forth supra. Moreover, in the exercise of reasonable care, Defendants should have known that the Definitive Proxy is materially misleading and omits material facts that are necessary to render it non-misleading. The misrepresentations and omissions in the Definitive Proxy are material to Plaintiff and the Class, who will be deprived of his entitlement to cast a fully informed vote if such misrepresentations and omissions are not corrected prior to the vote on the Proposed Transaction. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff and the Class will be irreparably harmed. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation contained above as though fully set forth herein. The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of Dawson within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as alleged herein. By virtue of their positions as officers and/or directors of Dawson, and participation in and/or awareness of the Company’s operations and/or intimate knowledge of the false statements contained in the Definitive Proxy filed with the SEC, they had the power to influence and control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision making of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the various statements which Plaintiff and the Class contend are false or materially incomplete and therefore misleading. A. Dawson’s Recent Financial Performance On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class Against Dawson, TGC, and Merger Sub for Aiding and Abetting the Individual Defendants’ Breaches of Fiduciary Duty On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class Against the Individual Defendants for Breach of Fiduciary Duties On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class for Violations of Sections 14(a) and of the Exchange Act Against the Company and the Individual Defendants On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class for Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act Against the Individual Defendants

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Plaintiff desires to attend the aqua classes at the Sunrise, Florida location. Plaintiff previously explained to Defendant’s personnel at the front desk that her PCA is required in order to assist her in getting dressed prior to and after the aqua class in the locker room. Plaintiff is partially paralyzed in her left side and cannot get into and out of a swimsuit without the assistance of her PCA. Plaintiff explained in detail that her PCA would be coming into the locker room to assist with dressing, and would in no way be availing herself of the services offered at the gym. On or about Wednesday, July 30, 2014, the Defendant’s front desk at the Sunrise, Florida location would not let Plaintiff’s PCA onto the premises to assist Plaintiff in changing clothes. Plaintiff immediately brought this issue to the attention of the manager, Maurice, and explained that her PCA would have to be allowed into and out of the locker room to assist with changing in and out of Plaintiff’s bathing suit. The manager of the location (Maurice) instructed Plaintiff that either the PCA would have to buy a gym membership, or Plaintiff would be required to pay a personal trainer to assist when inside the gym. Plaintiff replied that a personal trainer does not assist with dressing and undressing disabled individuals in the locker room. Plaintiff insisted that it was discriminatory to disallow the PCA from entering the premises to assist Plaintiff with changing clothes, which Plaintiff cannot undertake on her own due to disability. Defendant’s manager then stated “have a nice day” and walked away without any further communication. Accordingly, so as to continue to make use of the Sunrise, Florida, 24 HOUR FITNESS location, and so as to be assured that her PCA will be granted entry to change Plaintiff’s clothing within the locker room (without being stopped, impeded, or harassed), Plaintiff has been left with no choice but to file this lawsuit seeking an injunction, and mandating that the gym comply with its legal obligations as it relates to policies and procedures applicable to disabled gym members such as Plaintiff. Plaintiff brings this action on her own behalf and as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, on behalf of the following class of individuals: All members of any 24 HOUR FITNESS gym nationwide, who by virtue of physical disability, require the assistance of a Personal Care Attendant while on gym property (the “Class”). The Class includes all individuals who have been forced to pay membership fees for their PCA in order to secure entry for the PCA onto gym property. Plaintiff has personal knowledge that there exist other 24 HOUR FITNESS members who have been told or forced to buy memberships for their PCAs, so the PCAs can provide disability-related assistance within the gym premises. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all Class members is not practical; the exact size of the Class can be determined only through discovery. Plaintiff can adequately protect the interest of the members of the Class and has retained competent counsel experienced in ADA and class action litigation. Plaintiff has no interest that is contrary to or in conflict with the interests of the members of the Class. A class action is superior to other methods of adjudicating this controversy. The expense and burden of individual litigation over this issue makes it virtually impossible for the Class members to individually seek redress for all violations across the country, and it would be highly inefficient for the Defendant, the Class, and the Court system, for all Class members to individually seek redress for the issue raised herein. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over questions solely affecting any individual Class member. Among such questions of law and fact is whether or not Defendant has violated one or more statutory obligations by failing to accommodate disabled gym members in need of assistance (relating to a function of daily living) from a PCA. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that would be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. The names and addresses of disabled individuals who have been excluded from fair and equal access is obtainable through traditional channels used to identify members of any class; notice can be delivered to all such individuals by U.S. Mail or electronic mail using techniques and in a form of notice similar to those customarily used in class action litigation. The subject 24 HOUR FITNESS location in Sunrise, Florida, is a place of public accommodation as defined by the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12181. Plaintiff has been a long term member of the 24 HOUR FITNESS gym, and was a bona fide visitor to the subject Sunrise, Florida location on July 30, 2014, and intends to continue visiting the Sunrise, Florida location and making use of aqua classes into the foreseeable future, and thus desires to use the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and/or accommodations offered at the Sunrise, Florida gym. In light of her disabilities, Plaintiff will be unable to fully, properly, safely, and equally access the subject facility and/or the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and/or accommodations therein, unless and until Defendant is required to modify its policies and procedures so as to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act, or if such policies and procedures already exist, is required by injunction to enforce those policies and procedures at the Sunrise, Florida location, and at every location used by any member of the Class. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiff and all others with similar disabilities by denying full and equal access and enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and/or accommodations at the subject gym. Defendant will continue to discriminate against Plaintiff and all others similarly situated requiring the assistance of a PCA in the locker room (or elsewhere), unless and until it is compelled by this Court to remove barriers to access by either implementing appropriate policies and procedures or enforcing policies and procedures that are not being followed by the Sunrise, Florida location and its management. This Court is vested with authority to grant injunctive relief sought by Plaintiff herein including entry of an order requiring creation, implementation, and/or enforcement of applicable policies, practices, and procedures necessary to provide full and equal access to Plaintiff and all those similarly situated. As a corollary to the injunctive relief sought herein, Plaintiff seeks disgorgement of profits garnered through enjoined and unlawful misconduct. Both the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal and the U.S. Supreme Court have been clear that a Court sitting in equity has at its disposal a full range equitable remedies, including the power to disgorge funds previously garnered through enjoined activities. This Court’s equitable jurisdiction has been invoked through Plaintiff’s filing of a claim for violation of the ADA (which provides for injunctive relief). As an adjunct to this Court’s authority to award an injunction in this case, the Court is fully vested with jurisdiction to disgorge Defendant of all funds collected as direct result of its own discriminatory and enjoined misconduct. Plaintiff has been a member of the 24 HOUR FITNESS gym for years, and for years has made use of the Miramar, Florida location, with the assistance of her personal care attendant (“PCA”), without any issue. VIOLATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

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Defendant owns and operates a restaurant known as Bluefin Bar & Grill. Defendant employs several servers, bartenders, hosts, bussers, and runners. As a server, Plaintiff was responsible for serving food and beverages, explaining the menu and taking orders from guests, and adhering to company standards for food and beverages. Plaintiff typically worked thirty (30) to forty (40) hours per week. Defendant paid Plaintiff an hourly wage less than federal minimum wage (approximately $5.60). In addition, Plaintiff earned tips as a server. Defendant paid Plaintiff according to what is commonly referred to as the “tip credit.” Throughout Plaintiff’s employment Defendant failed to notify Plaintiff of the provisions of FLSA § 3(m), 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). Throughout Plaintiff’s employment Defendant required Plaintiff to share her tips with other workers. Specifically, Defendant required Plaintiff to tip out other “back of house,” non- tipped employees. Servers should not share tips with back of the house employees. As a result, Defendants were not entitled to utilize the FLSA’s tip credit provision to credit Plaintiff’s tips towards a portion of their minimum wage obligations. VI. Defendant employs other servers as part of its business operations. Servers perform similar job duties as Plaintiff in that they explain the menu and take orders from guests, serve beverages and keep their area clean. Servers are paid less than minimum wage, plus tips (“the tip credit”). Servers typically work thirty (30) to forty (40) hours per week. Servers are required to tip out “back of house” employees in a manner similar to Plaintiff. Defendant’s servers are the putative class members for this potential collective action. Plaintiff and the class members performed the same or similar job duties as one another in that they provided services for Defendants. Plaintiff and the class members were required to tip back of house employees each shift in violation of the FLSA’s requirement that minimum wages be paid “free and clear.” Shortly after being hired, Defendant explains it policy that servers are required to tip out dishwashers. The tip out is mandatory and affects all servers. Further, Plaintiff and the class members were subjected to the same pay provisions in that they were subject to working without receiving proper compensation in the form of a free and clear minimum wage. Defendants’ common policy violations have caused Plaintiff and the class members to receive less than minimum wage for all hours worked. Thus, the class members are similar with regard to their wages for the same reasons as Plaintiff. Defendant knowingly, willfully, or with reckless disregard carried out its illegal pattern or practice of failing to pay Plaintiff and the class members at a rate of at least the statutorily prescribed minimum wage. Defendant did not act in good faith or reliance upon any of the following in formulating its pay practices: (a) case law, (b) the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., (c) Department of Labor Wage & Hour Opinion Letters or (d) the Code of Federal Regulations. During the relevant period, Defendant violated § 7(a)(1), § 15(a)(2) and § 203(m), by employing employees in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA as aforesaid, for one or more workweeks without compensating such employees for their work at the statutorily prescribed minimum wage within a work week during one or more weeks. Defendant has acted willfully in failing to pay Plaintiff and the class members in accordance with the law. Plaintiff reincorporates and readopts all allegations contained within Paragraphs 1-27 above as though fully stated herein. Plaintiff and the class members are entitled to be paid minimum wage for each hour worked during their employment with Defendant. Because of Defendant’s improper tip out policy in this regard, Plaintiff and the class members have not been paid the minimum wage for each hour worked during one or more weeks of employment with Defendant. Defendant willfully failed to pay Plaintiff and the class members minimum wage for one or more weeks of work contrary to 29 U.S.C. § 206 because it was aware of the minimum wage law requirements but continued its violations. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s deliberate underpayment of wages, Plaintiff and the class members have been damaged in the loss of minimum wages for one or more weeks of work with Defendant. Plaintiff demands a trial by jury.

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Monsanto is one of the world’s largest agricultural companies, and has long been manufacturing and selling herbicides to control weeds. Monsanto’s leading herbicide is called Roundup, whose active ingredient is called glyphosate. Monsanto first introduced Roundup in the mid-1970s for the agricultural community, and then in the mid-1980s for residential use. Roundup has been a dramatically successful product, and is one of the most widely-used herbicides in the world for residential use. Monsanto manufactures, markets, and sells Roundup in various formulations, including Roundup Ready-to-Use (“Ready-to-Use”) formulations, which are intended simply to be sprayed directly out of the bottle in which the product is purchased; and concentrated versions of the Roundup, such as the Roundup Concentrates, which the purchaser must first dilute with water before using with a tank sprayer. Specifically, Monsanto manufactures, markets and sells Roundup Concentrate Plus in 32-, 36.8- and 64-ounce bottles (as pictured in the introduction above), and Roundup Super Concentrate in 35.2-, 64-, and 128-ounce bottles, as pictured below. 4 Martin v. Monsanto Company, Case No. 16-cv-2168 While reserving the right to redefine or amend the class definition prior to seeking class certification, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, plaintiff seeks to represent a class of all persons in the United States who, on or after October 13, 2012 (the “Class Period”), purchased the Roundup Concentrates for personal or household use (the “Class” or “Nationwide Class”). 17 Martin v. Monsanto Company, Case No. 16-cv-2168 Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations elsewhere in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein. The Roundup Concentrates are consumer products within the meaning of 15 Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations elsewhere in the Complaint as if set forth in full herein. The CLRA prohibits deceptive practices in connection with the conduct of a business that provides goods, property, or services primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. Monsanto’s false and misleading labeling and other policies, acts, and practices described herein were designed to, and did, induce the purchase and use of Monsanto’s Roundup Concentrates for personal, family, or household purposes by plaintiff and other Subclass members, and violated and continue to violate at least the following sections of the Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations elsewhere in the Complaint as if set forth in full herein. Under the FAL, “[i]t is unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or association, or any employee thereof with intent directly or indirectly to dispose of real or personal property or to perform services” to disseminate any statement “which is untrue or misleading, and which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue or misleading.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500. As alleged herein, the advertisements, labeling, policies, acts, and practices of Monsanto relating to its Roundup Concentrates misled consumers acting reasonably as to the amount purchased and efficacy of Roundup Concentrates. Plaintiff suffered injury in fact as a result of Monsanto’s actions as set forth herein because plaintiffs purchased Roundup Super Concentrate in reliance on Monsanto’s false and misleading marketing claims that the products “Make Up to” a certain volume when the instructions on the back panel are followed and/or when a purchaser seeks to obtain “best results” as instructed and advertised by Monsanto. 23 Martin v. Monsanto Company, Case No. 16-cv-2168 Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability, Cal. Com. Code § 2314 (By the California Subclass) 120. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations elsewhere in the Complaint as if set forth in full herein. 121. Monsanto, through its acts set forth herein, in the sale, marketing, and promotion of the Roundup Concentrates, made representations to plaintiff and the Subclass that, among other things, the products yield a certain volume by gallons of product that is effective at killing all weeds and grass. 122. Monsanto is a merchant with respect to the goods of this kind which were sold to plaintiff and the Subclass, and there was, in the sale to plaintiff and other consumers, an implied warranty that those goods were merchantable. 123. However, Monsanto breached that implied warranty in that Roundup Concentrates do not yield the volume by gallons and are not effective at killing all weeds and grass to the extent claimed, as set forth in detail herein. 124. As an actual and proximate result of Monsanto’s conduct, plaintiff and the Subclass did not receive goods as impliedly warranted by Monsanto to be merchantable in that they did not conform to promises and affirmations made on the container or label of the goods. 125. Plaintiff and the Subclass have sustained damages as a proximate result of the foregoing breach of implied warranty in the amount of Roundup Concentrates’ purchase price, or some portion thereof. 27 Martin v. Monsanto Company, Case No. 16-cv-2168 Breaches of Express Warranties, Cal. Com. Code § 2313(1) (By the Subclass) 115. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations elsewhere in the Complaint as if set forth in full herein. 116. Through the Roundup Concentrates’ labels, Monsanto made affirmations of fact or promises, or description of goods, that, inter alia, the products will yield a certain number of gallons in volume when used in an ordinary and reasonable manner, that the products will yield a certain number of gallons in volume if the instructions for mixing on the back panel were followed, and that the products would be effective in killing all weeds and grass. These and other representations were part of the basis of the bargain, in that plaintiff and the Subclass purchased the Roundup Concentrates in reasonable reliance on those statements. Cal. Com. Code § 2313(1). 117. Monsanto breached its express warranties by selling Roundup Concentrates that cannot yield the promised volume in gallons when used reasonably and ordinarily, cannot yield the promised volume in gallons when mixed according to the instructions on the back panel or by a purchaser seeking “best results” as instructed by Monsanto, and which is not effective at killing weeds and grass when mixed to the stated volume on the labels and/or pamphlets. 26 Martin v. Monsanto Company, Case No. 16-cv-2168 VIOLATIONS OF THE MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 ET SEQ. (By the Nationwide Class) Violations of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750 et seq. (By the California Subclass) Violations of the False Advertising Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500 et seq. (By the California Subclass)

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At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of California. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, “persons” as defined by 47 Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the Class”). Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Class, consisting of: a. All persons within the United States who had or have a number assigned to a cellular telephone service, who received at least one call using an ATDS and/or an artificial prerecorded voice from MAIN STREET MARKETING, INC., or its agents, calling on behalf of MAIN STREET MARKETING, INC., between the date of filing this action and the four years preceding, where such calls were placed for marketing purposes, to non-customers of MAIN STREET MARKETING, INC., at the time of the calls. MSM and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. This suit seeks only damages and injunctive relief for recovery of economic injury on behalf of the Class and it expressly is not intended to request any recovery for personal injury and claims related thereto. Plaintiff reserves the right to expand the Class definition to seek recovery on behalf of additional persons as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. The joinder of the Class members is impractical and the disposition of their claims in the Class action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and to the Court. The Class can be identified through Defendant’s records and/or Defendant’s agent’s records. As a person that received numerous calls from Defendant in which Defendant used an ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice, without Plaintiff’s prior express consent, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class in that Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to any member of the Class. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have all suffered irreparable harm as a result of the Defendant’s unlawful and wrongful conduct. Absent a class action, the Class will continue to face the potential for irreparable harm. In addition, these violations of law will be allowed to proceed without remedy and Defendant will likely continue such illegal conduct. The size of Class member’s individual claims causes, few, if any, Class members to be able to afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and claims involving violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00 for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. VIOLATION OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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Upon information and belief, other similarly situated employees are also uniformly paid in a fashion similar to Plaintiff and not compensated for the expenses associated with performing their job duties. As a matter of economic reality, DoorDash advertises, on the "About Us" section of its website, that "through the DoorDash marketplace, people can purchase goods from local merchants and have them delivered in less than 45 minutes—thanks to our revolutionary logistics technology." Specifically, DoorDash is in the business of delivering goods to its customers—the very task that drivers are hired to perform. The work performed by drivers is integral to Defendant's business in that DoorDash simply could not function without its drivers. Defendant did not pay Plaintiff and others similarly situated one-and-one-half times their regular rates of pay for hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week. Defendant violated the FLSA because it did not pay Plaintiff and others similarly situated the overtime pay they should have received for the hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek. Plaintiff and others similarly situated did not receive minimum wage for hours worked for DoorDash. As a result, Plaintiff and others similarly situated did not receive compensation they were legally entitled to receive. The work performed by Plaintiff and others similarly situated was with Defendant's knowledge. Defendant approved driver's schedules, assigned work and supervised the work. Defendant's violations of the FLSA were committed knowingly, willfully, and/or with reckless disregard to Plaintiff and similarly situated employees' rights. V. Plaintiff reasserts and incorporate by reference all of the above numbered paragraphs. Plaintiff and others similarly situated were employees of DoorDash, Inc., as set forth above. As employees of DoorDash, Plaintiff and others similarly situated were legally entitled to be paid at one-and-one-half times their regular rates of pay for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per each seven (7) day workweek. As employees of DoorDash, Plaintiff and others similarly situated were legally entitled to minimum wage. As a result, Plaintiff and others similarly situated did not receive the compensation they were legally entitled to receive. Defendant's violations of the FLSA were committed knowingly, willfully, and/or with reckless disregard to Plaintiff's and other similarly situated employees’ rights. As a result of Defendant's willful violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff and others similarly situated are entitled to reimbursement of unpaid overtime, an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, and reasonable attorneys fees, costs and disbursements incurred in this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). VI. Plaintiff reasserts and incorporate by reference all of the above numbered paragraphs. The FLSA requires employers to keep accurate records of hours worked by nonexempt employees. 29 U.S.C. §211(c); 29 C.F.R. pt 516. In addition to the pay violations of the FLSA described above, Defendant also failed to keep proper time records as required by the FLSA. Plaintiff reasserts and incorporate by reference all of the above numbered paragraphs. Upon information and belief, many other similarly situated employees employed by Defendant over the last three (3) years have been victimized by Defendant's violations of the At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Defendant was, and remains, an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 203, and is subject to the FLSA. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Defendant was, and remains, an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 203, and is subject to the FLSA. Defendant, DoorDash, Inc. is a food delivery service that allows customers to place food orders, through a mobile phone application or through its website, from various restaurants in the "DoorDash marketplace". DoorDash, Inc. then utilizes its "Dashers" (i.e. delivery drivers) to deliver those food orders to its customer's homes or businesses. Defendant employed Plaintiff and others similarly situated at all relevant times within the meaning of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). Defendant's annual revenues far exceeded $500,000 during the relevant time period. In performing his duties for Defendant, Plaintiff and others similarly situated were employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. Specifically, Defendant has employees utilizing interstate telephone and broadband communications for the commercial purposes of Defendant's enterprise. Moreover, Defendant required that Plaintiff regularly travel through the corridors of interstate commerce as they traveled from customer to customer to make deliveries. Plaintiff and others similarly situated are paid a flat fee for every delivery completed plus gratuity added by the customer. Often drivers do not make minimum wage for every hour worked during their shifts. DoorDash does not compensate drivers for the expenses associated with using their own vehicles, cell phone data, car insurance (though a requirement of employment if you use a car to make deliveries), gas, parking, and other expenses.

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The Class Period begins on March 27, 2015. On that date, Care.com filed on Form 10-K with the SEC its annual report for the period ended December 27, 2014, which stated in pertinent part: We have invested in building a differentiated member experience for finding and managing care. This investment includes the ongoing prioritization of features and processes that we believe contribute to the quality of our marketplace. Examples of these investments include the manual review of all job and profile postings for suspicious or inappropriate content, tools for members to review and report other members, a monitored messaging system that allows members to communicate without sharing their personal email, the proactive screening of certain member information against various databases and other sources for criminal or other inappropriate activity and the use of technology to help identify and prevent inappropriate activity through our platform. We believe these product investments, combined with our investments in national brand advertising and our domain name itself, have established the Care.com brand as a leading and trusted brand for finding care. (emphasis added). On March 9, 2017, Care.com filed on Form 10-K with the SEC its annual report for the period ended December 31, 2016, which stated in pertinent part: We have invested in building a differentiated member experience for finding and managing care. This investment includes the ongoing prioritization of features and processes that we believe contribute to the quality of our marketplace. Examples of these investments include the review of all job and profile postings for suspicious or inappropriate content, tools for members to review and report other members, a monitored messaging system that allows members to communicate without sharing their personal email, the proactive screening of certain member information against various databases and other sources for criminal or other inappropriate activity, the use of technology to help identify and prevent inappropriate activity through our platform and a safety center that provides resources and information designed to help families and caregivers make more informed hiring and job selection decisions [.] We believe these product investments, combined with our investments in national brand advertising and our domain name itself, have established the Care.com brand as a leading and trusted brand for finding care. (emphasis added). On March 7, 2019, Care.com filed on Form 10-K with the SEC its annual report for the period ended December 29, 2018, which stated in pertinent part: We have invested in building a differentiated member experience for finding and managing care. This investment includes the ongoing prioritization of features and processes that we believe contribute to the quality of our marketplace. Examples of these investments include the review of all job and profile postings for suspicious or inappropriate content, tools for members to review and report other members, a monitored messaging system that allows members to communicate without sharing their personal contact information, the proactive screening of certain member information against various databases and other sources for criminal or other inappropriate activity, the use of technology to help identify and prevent inappropriate activity through our platform and a safety center that provides resources and information designed to help families and caregivers make more informed hiring and job selection decisions [.] We believe these product investments, combined with our investments in national brand advertising and our domain name itself, have established the Care.com brand as a leading and trusted brand for finding care. (emphasis added). Defendant Marcelo signed certifications for the Form 10-K referenced in paragraph 16 above. Among other things, this certification, which was made pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, required the signer to attest that they have reviewed the report, that it does not contain untrue statements, that it fairly represents the financial condition of the company, and that the company’s internal controls are effective. The statements set out above in paragraphs 15 to 19 were materially false and misleading, and omitted material information necessary to make the statements not misleading in that, in fact, the Company did not effectively screen member information “against various databases and other sources for criminal or other inappropriate activity.” The Company and the Individual Defendants knew that such statements or documents would be issued or disseminated to the investing public; and knowingly and substantially participated or acquiesced in the issuance or dissemination of such statements or documents as primary violations of the federal securities laws. As set forth elsewhere herein in detail, Defendants, by virtue of their receipt of information reflecting the true facts regarding the Company, their control over, and/or receipt and/or modification of the Company’s allegedly materially misleading statements and/or their associations with the Company that made them privy to confidential proprietary information concerning the Company, participated in the fraudulent scheme alleged herein. Following the release of the Friday, March 8, 2019, Wall Street Journal article, the Company’s common stock declined, closing down almost 13%, to close at $20.48 per share on Monday, March 11, 2019. Then, on March 31, 2019, the Wall Street Journal reported that “hundreds of day- care centers” listed as “state licensed” on the Care.com website did not appear to be, and that tens of thousands of unverified day-care center listings were scrubbed from the Care.com website just before the March 8, 2019 Wall Street Journal article was published. Following the release of the Sunday, March 31, 2019, Wall Street Journal article, the Company’s common stock declined, closing down almost 7%, to close at $18.45 per share on Monday, April 1, 2019. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a class of all persons and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired the Company’s common stock between March 27, 2015 and April 1, 2019, inclusive. Excluded from the Class are Defendants, directors and officers of the Company, as well as their families and affiliates. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The disposition of their claims in a class action will provide substantial benefits to the parties and the Court. More than 24 million Care.com shares trade on the New York Stock Exchange. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class because Plaintiff and the Class sustained damages from Defendants’ wrongful conduct alleged herein. Plaintiff will adequately protect the interests of the Class and has retained counsel who are experienced in class action securities litigation. Plaintiff has no interests that conflict with those of the Class. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy.

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At no time was plaintiff liable for Morrison’s “seizure” or “service” fees, or for “towing” or “storage” charges, since none of said fees had been approved by the Newton District Court. Morrison misrepresented the amount of the debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e(2)(A). The allegations of paragraphs 1 – 14 are incorporated herein as if fully set forth. By charging plaintiff “seizure” and “service” fees, Morrison misrepresented the compensation which she could lawfully receive, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e(2)(B). The allegations of paragraphs 1 – 14 are incorporated herein as if fully set forth. Morrison used a false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect a debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e(10). The allegations of paragraphs 1 – 14 are incorporated herein as if fully set forth. The fees and charges which Morrison charged and collected from plaintiff were not expressly permitted by any agreement creating the debt (the “debt” having been reduced to judgment) or Massachusetts law, and Morrison therefore violated 15 U.S.C. §1692f(1). Class Allegations There are issues of law and fact common to the class, which issues predominate over any questions particular to individual class members. Common issues include whether defendants are debt collectors under the FDCPA, whether defendants were engaged in trade or commerce in Massachusetts, whether defendants’ conduct violated the FDCPA as alleged, and whether defendants may be held jointly and severally liable for harm suffered by plaintiff and class members. Plaintiff’s claims are typical in that they arise from the same unlawful conduct as the claims of class members. Plaintiff and class members seek, and are entitled to, similar relief. A class action is manageable, and is also a superior method for resolving this controversy since the claims all arise from a standard business practice and class members are unlikely to file individual actions. WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that this Honorable Court: (i) certify plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23; (ii) appoint plaintiff as class representative and the undersigned as class counsel; (iii) enjoin defendants from continuing to engage in the unlawful conduct complained of; (iv) rescind all unlawful charges imposed by defendants against class members; (v) award plaintiff and class members actual and statutory damages under the FDCPA against defendants, jointly and severally; (vi) award costs and attorney’s fees against defendants, jointly and severally; (vii) award such further relief as shall be just and proper. Excessive seizure and service fees The allegations of paragraphs 1 – 14 are incorporated herein as if fully set forth. If plaintiff was liable to Morrison for any “service fee” or “seizure fee” without the necessity of court approval, the fees charged by Morrison exceeded any amounts permitted by Massachusetts law. As a result of said unlawful conduct, plaintiff suffered financial loss. The allegations of paragraphs 1 – 14 and 30 are incorporated herein as if fully set forth. By charging and collecting from plaintiff the sum of $55.00 as a “service fee” and the sum of $600.00 as a “seizure fee,” Morrison misrepresented the compensation which she could lawfully receive in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e(2)(B). As a result of said unlawful conduct, plaintiff suffered financial loss. The allegations of paragraphs 1 – 14 and 33 are incorporated herein as if fully set forth. Morrison used a false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect a debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e(10). As a result of said unlawful conduct, plaintiff suffered financial loss. The allegations of paragraphs 1 – 14 and 33 are incorporated herein as if fully set forth. The fees which Morrison attempted to collect and did collect from plaintiff were not expressly permitted by any agreement creating the debt (the “debt” having been reduced to judgment) or Massachusetts law, and Morrison therefore violated 15 U.S.C. §1692f(1). Plaintiff brings counts V – VIII of this complaint on behalf of herself and classes of persons similarly situated, as follows: Class B and sub-classes: “Class B” consists of all Massachusetts residents whose motor vehicles were seized on execution by Morrison within one year of the filing of this action pursuant to an execution issued on a judgment on an alleged consumer debt, and who were charged any “service” or “seizure” fee in excess of that permitted by Massachusetts law. Members of “Sub-class B-1” are all members of “Class B” whose motor vehicles were seized at the request of Forsyth/Brugnoli. Excluded from each class and sub-class are defendants and their current and former officers, directors, employees, and agents. Plaintiff alleges that the practice described herein is a standard one employed by defendants and therefore the class is sufficiently numerous such that joinder is impracticable. There are issues of law and fact common to the class, which issues predominate over any questions particular to individual class members. Common issues include whether defendants are debt collectors under the FDCPA, whether defendants’ conduct violated the FDCPA as alleged, and whether defendants may be held jointly and severally liable for harm suffered by plaintiff and class members.. Plaintiff’s claims are typical in that they arise from the same unlawful conduct as the claims of class members. Plaintiff and class members seek, and are entitled to, similar relief.

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Plaintiff Gellatly has visited Defendant’s facilities at 1467 S Arlington Street, Akron, OH; 716 E Market Street, Akron, OH; 117 S Walnut Street, Ligonier, PA, including within the last year. Additionally, Plaintiff Nario-Redmond has visited Defendant’s facilities at 3709 W Dublin Grandville Road, Columbus, OH; 1467 S Arlington Street, Akron, OH; 716 E Market Street, Akron, OH; 117 S Walnut Street, Ligonier, PA, including within the last year. Plaintiffs experienced unnecessary difficulty and risk at Defendant’s facilities due to excessive slopes in the purportedly accessible parking spaces and access aisles and because of various other ADA accessibility violations as set forth in more detail below. Despite these difficulties, Plaintiff Gellatly plans to return to Defendant’s facilities. Plaintiff Gellatly will be attending college in Western Pennsylvania this fall and regularly travels throughout Pennsylvania and Ohio visiting friends and family. Furthermore, Plaintiff Gellatly intends to return to Defendant’s facilities to ascertain whether Defendant’s facilities remain in violation of the ADA. As a result of Defendant’s non-compliance with the ADA, Plaintiffs’ ability to access and safely use Defendant’s facilities has been significantly impeded. Plaintiffs will be deterred from returning to and fully and safely accessing Defendant’s facilities, however, so long as Defendant’s facilities remain non-compliant, and so long as Defendant continues to employ the same policies and practices that have led, and in the future will lead, to inaccessibility at its facilities. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiffs will continue to be unable to fully and safely access Defendant’s facilities in violation of her rights under the ADA. As individuals with a mobility disability who is dependent upon a wheelchair, Plaintiffs are directly interested in whether public accommodations, like Defendant, have architectural barriers that impede full accessibility to those accommodations by individuals with mobility-related disabilities. II. Defendant Repeatedly Denies Individuals With Disabilities Full and Equal Access to its Facilities. Defendant is engaged in the ownership, management and development of properties, including shopping centers and restaurants. As the owner and manager of its properties, Defendant employs centralized policies, practices and procedures with regard to the design, construction, alteration, maintenance and operation of its facilities. On Plaintiffs’ behalf, investigators examined multiple locations owned, controlled, and/or operated by Defendant, and found the following violations, which are illustrative of the fact that Defendant implements policies and practices that routinely result in accessibility violations: a) 3709 W Dublin Grandville Road, Columbus, OH i. The surfaces of one or more purportedly accessible parking spaces had slopes exceeding 2.1%; ii. The surfaces of one or more access aisles had slopes exceeding 2.1%; and iii. A portion of the route to the store entrance had a cross slope exceeding The fact that individuals with mobility-related disabilities are denied full and equal access to numerous of Defendant’s facilities, and the fact that each of these facilities deny access by way of inaccessible parking facilities, is evidence that the inaccessibility Plaintiffs experienced is not isolated, but rather, caused by Defendant’s systemic disregard for the rights of individuals with disabilities. Defendant’s systemic access violations demonstrate that Defendant either employs policies and practices that fail to design, construct and alter its facilities so that they are readily accessible and usable, and/or that Defendant employs maintenance and operational policies and practices that are unable to maintain accessibility. As evidenced by the widespread inaccessibility of Defendant’s parking facilities, absent a change in Defendant’s corporate policies and practices, access barriers are likely to reoccur in Defendant’s facilities even after they have been remediated. Plaintiffs bring this class action, pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of themselves and the following nationwide class: all wheelchair users who have attempted, or will attempt, to utilize the parking facilities at all locations within the United States for which Defendant owns and/or controls the parking facilities. Numerosity: The class described above is so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable. The disposition of the individual claims of the respective class members through this class action will benefit both the parties and this Court, and will facilitate judicial economy. Typicality: Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the members of the class. The claims of Plaintiffs and members of the class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. Common Questions of Fact and Law: There is a well-defined community of interest and common questions of fact and law affecting members of the class in that they all have been and/or are being denied their civil rights to full and equal access to, and use and enjoyment of, Defendant’s facilities and/or services due to Defendant’s failure to make their facilities fully accessible and independently usable as above described. Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiffs and the Class as a whole. I. Plaintiffs Have Been Denied Full and Equal Access to Defendant’s Facilities.

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(Conversion) (Private Nuisance) (Trespass to Chattels) (Violations of the TCPA) On or about April 16, 2018 and May 1, 2018, Plaintiff received the unsolicited fax advertisements attached as Exhibit A on its facsimile machine # 212-960-8745. Discovery may reveal the transmission of additional faxes as well. Defendants are responsible for sending or causing the sending of the faxes. Defendants, as the entities whose products or services were advertised in the faxes, derived economic benefit from the sending of the faxes. Plaintiff had no prior relationship with defendant and had not authorized the sending of faxes advertisements to Plaintiff. The faxes did not contain an opt-out notice, as is required by 47 U.S.C. §227 and violates all of the opt-out requirements of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(2)(D), 47 C.F.R. §64.1200(a)(3)(iii), and GBL §396-aa(2). On information and belief, the faxes attached hereto was sent as part of a mass broadcasting of faxes. On information and belief, defendants transmitted similar unsolicited fax advertisements to at least 40 other persons. There are no reasonable means for plaintiff or other recipients of defendants’ unsolicited advertising fax to avoid receiving illegal faxes. Fax machines must be left on and ready to receive the urgent communications authorized by their owners. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 36 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. By Defendants’ conduct, as described above, Defendants committed thousands of violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b) against Plaintiff and each class member, to wit: the fax advertisement Defendants sent and/or caused to be sent to Plaintiff and each class member were unsolicited and did not contain an opt-out notice meeting the requirements of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(2)(D) and/or 47 C.F.R. 64.1200(a)(3)(iii). Plaintiff and each class member suffered actual damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes, in the form of paper and ink or toner consumed as a result. Furthermore, plaintiff’s statutory right of privacy was invaded. Plaintiff and each class member is entitled to statutory damages. Defendants violated the TCPA even if their actions were only negligent. Defendants should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 42 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. As described above, upon information and belief, Defendants committed thousands of violations of GBL §396-aa. Accordingly, pursuant to GBL §396-aa(3), Plaintiff and each class member are entitled to statutory damages. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 45 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. By sending Plaintiff and the class members unlawful faxes, Defendants converted to their own use ink or toner and paper belonging to plaintiff and the class members. Immediately prior to the sending of the unlawful faxes, Plaintiff and the class members owned and had an unqualified and immediate right to the possession of the paper and ink or toner used to print the faxes. By sending the unlawful faxes, defendants appropriated to their own use the paper and ink or toner used to print the faxes and used them in such manner as to make them unusable. Such appropriation was wrongful and without authorization. Defendants knew or should have known that such appropriation of the paper and ink or toner was wrongful and without authorization. Defendants should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 51 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. Defendants’ sending plaintiff and the class members unlawful faxes was an unreasonable invasion of the property of plaintiff and the class members and constitutes a private nuisance. Congress determined, in enacting the TCPA, that the prohibited conduct was a “nuisance.” Universal Underwriters, Ins. Co. v. Lou Fusz Automotive Network, Inc., 401 F.3d 876, 882 (8th Cir. 2005). Defendants acted either intentionally or negligently in creating the nuisance. Plaintiff and each class member suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unlawful faxes. Defendants should be enjoined from continuing their nuisance. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 58 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. Plaintiff and the class members were entitled to possession of the equipment they used to receive faxes. Defendants acted either intentionally or negligently in engaging in such conduct. Plaintiff and each class member suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unlawful faxes. Defendants should be enjoined from continuing trespasses. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and (b)(3), plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of a class. The class consists of (a) all persons and entities with fax numbers (b) who, on or after a date four years prior to the filing of this action (28 U.S.C. §1658), or such shorter period during which faxes were sent by or on behalf of Defendants (c) were sent faxes by or on behalf of Defendants promoting its goods or services for sale (d) and who were not provided an “opt out” notice as described in 47 U.S.C. §227. The class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that there are more than 40 members of the class. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class members. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither plaintiff nor defendants’ counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. A class action is superior to other alternative methods of adjudicating this dispute. Individual cases are not economically feasible. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully demands judgment in favor of Plaintiff and the class and against the Defendants as follows: a) Statutory damages; b) Attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit; c) An injunction against the further transmission of unsolicited fax advertising; and d) For such other and further relief which this court deems just and proper. Dated: Brooklyn, New York July 6, 2018

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(All Plaintiffs individually and on behalf of the FLSA collective v. All Defendants) (All Plaintiffs individually and on behalf of the FLSA collective v. All Defendants) (Plaintiff Muhammad on behalf of himself and similarly-situated officers v. All Defendants) This is a collective action brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act by Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all others similarly-situated for the recovery of compensation for time spent engaging in washing-up activities after the end of their shifts within the Cook County Department of Corrections (“CCDOC”), including washing and sanitizing their uniforms, sanitizing their persons, sanitizing and maintaining personal protective equipment (“PPE”), and showering. Specifically, the activities for which minimum and overtime compensation are due to Plaintiffs and similarly-situated officers are: 5 a. Sanitizing and washing their uniforms, gear, belts and equipment, boots and shoes, and bags for necessary items, such as with Lysol, Clorox, or other chemicals and then washing their uniforms after each shift; b. Sanitizing their vehicles with Lysol, Clorox, or other chemicals either before or after (or both) their shifts to avoid contamination within their vehicles present due to working in Plaintiff Rashid Muhammad received an email on March 27, 2020 offering time-and-a- half-pay for officers who volunteer to work at the MHTC while COVID-19 positive detainees are housed there: From: Rashid Muhammad (Sheriff) <Rashid.Muhammad@cookcoun tyi l.gov> Sent: Friday, March 27, 2020 11:44:26 PM To: Martha Yoksoulian (Sheriff) <Mart ha.Yoksoulian@ cookcount yil.gov> Subject: Re: Mental Health Transiti on Center Assignments Available Hello Supt. I am interested in volunteering for the 11-7 shift if and only if the time and a half is for pay. I'm not interested in putting myself in potential harms way for time on the books. Dep. R. Muhammad #17016 From: Martha Yoksoulian (Sheriff) <Mart ha.Yoksoulian@cookcountyi l.gov> Sent: Friday, March 27, 2020 12:46 PM To: Division 10 Supervisors <divison10supervi sors@ cookcounty.onmicrosoft.co m>; Division Ten Officers <divisi ontenofficers@cook county .onmicrosoft. com> Subject: Mental Health Transiti on Center Assignments Available Hello all, As some of you may have heard on the news, the sheriff is opening some of the barrack's at the Mental Health Transition Center for the inmates that have tested positive for the COVID-19 virus. We are asking if anyone wants to volunteer working at MHTC for a while until we pass this crisis. It will be all three shifts 11-7, 7-3 and 3-11. 11-7 will be placed in details 1 and 7. 7-3 will be placed in details 2 and 7 as well as 3-11 details 2 and 7. You will receive time and a half pay however, it has not been decided if it will be in time or pay. As always you will have protective gear to protect to work with and you will be stationed a minimum of ten feet away from the inmates. We need both officers and supervisors. We are looking from 3-5 officers per division. If you are intere sted , please reply to this email. Thank you, Superintende nt Martha Yoksoulian Cook County Sheriff's Office Division 10 2700 S California Avenue Chicago, II 60608 12 Office (773) 674-4429 Mobile (312) 758-5029 Email: Martha .Yoksoulian@cookcountyil.gov The contents of this e-mail message and any attachments are intended solely for the addressee(s) named in this message. This communication is intended to be and to remain confidential and may be subject to applicable work product privileges. If you are not the intended recipient of this message or if this message has been addressed to you in error, please alert the sender immediately by reply e-mail and then delete this message and its attachments. Do not deliver, distribute or copy this message and/or any attachments and if you are not the intended recipient, do not disclose the contents or take any action in reliance upon the information contained in this communication or any attachments. Thank you As noted above, Muhammad replied to the email that he would volunteer for the MHTC if he received pay. The CCSO accepted Muhammad’s offer and transferred him to MHTC starting March 30, 2020, in the following memorandum: Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference all other paragraphs of this Complaint in this Count. The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206, requires that an employer compensate an employee a minimum hourly rate for all hours suffered or permitted to work. Defendants suffered or permitted Plaintiffs and similarly-situated officers to work at the beginning of, and after, their shifts, in sanitizing activities, including by washing and sanitizing their uniforms, sanitizing their persons, sanitizing and maintaining PPE, and showering. Each Plaintiff, and all similarly-situated officers, are due to be paid wages for approximately 20 - 30 minutes of sanitation activities at the beginning of, and the end of, each shift worked between March 9, 2020 and through the cessation of the COVID-19 protocols at Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference all other paragraphs of this Complaint in this Count. The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207, requires that an employer compensate an employee one-and- one-half-times the regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) hours in a given workweek. Defendants suffered or permitted Plaintiffs and similarly-situated officers to work at the beginning of, and after, their shifts, in sanitizing activities, including by washing and sanitizing their uniforms, sanitizing their persons, sanitizing and maintaining PPE, and showering without paying them for such activities that were performed at an overtime rate of pay where the Plaintiffs had performed over forty (40) hours of work in the workweek. Each Plaintiff, and all similarly-situated officers, are due to be paid wages for approximately 30 minutes of sanitation activities at the beginning of, and the end of, each shift worked between March 9, 2020 and through the cessation of the COVID-19 protocols at Plaintiff Muhammad restates and incorporates by reference all other paragraphs of this Complaint in this Count. Plaintiff Muhammad and similarly-situated officers entered into an agreement with Defendant Sheriff to voluntarily work at the MHTC for time-and-a-half pay (in Muhammand’s case), or time-and-a-half pay or comp time (in others’). Via email on March 27, 2020, Plaintiff Muhammad notified the Sheriff, through his Superintendent, that he would work at the MHTC if he received pay for doing so. On March 30, 2020, Defendant Sheriff transferred Plaintiff Muhammad to MHTC, where he then worked, including by providing safety and security, and welfare, functions for COVID- 19 positive detainees at great risk of exposure to himself. As of payday on April 17, 2020, Defendant Sheriff failed to pay Plaintiff Muhammad, or any similarly-situated officer assigned to MHTC, the time-and-a-half pay owed under the transfer agreement. Plaintiff Muhammad and similarly-situated officers are entitled to recover all amounts owed under the transfer agreement for time spent assigned at MHTC, two percent of the amount of such underpayments for each month they remain unpaid, costs, and reasonable attorneys’ fees. WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Muhammad requests that this Honorable Court enter judgment in his favor, and against Defendants, and order that Defendants pay him and all similarly-situated officers for all underpaid overtime wages between March 30, 16 2020 and the date of cessation of his assignment at MHTC, two percent of the amount of such underpayments for each month they remain unpaid, costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees, the certification of a class for purposes of this IWPCA claim, and for such other relief as this Court deems just and proper. I. FACTS RELATING TO ALL PLAINTIFFS AND SIMILARLY-SITUATED OFFICERS. PERSONNEL MEMORANDUM DISTRIBUTION A

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Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants’ written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e & 1692g. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither Plaintiff nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Some time prior to February 10, 2021, an obligation was allegedly incurred to HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A. The HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A. obligation arose out of a transaction in which involved the transaction of money, property, insurance or services primarily for personal, family or household purposes. The alleged HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A. obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A. is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4). Defendant LVNV, a debt collector and subsequent owner of the HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A. debt, contracted with Defendant TrueAccord to collect the alleged debt. On or about February 10, 2021, Defendant TrueAccord sent Plaintiff a collection letter (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt owed. A true and accurate copy of the Letter is attached as Exhibit A. The Letter states a balance of $731.92. The Letter further states: “The law limits how long you can be sued on a debt. Because of the age of your debt, LVNV Funding LLC cannot report it to any credit reporting agency.” The Letter is materially deceptive as it fails to disclose that the previously-lapsed statute of limitations to file a lawsuit to collect the debt will recommence upon payment by Plaintiff. Therefore, the Letter puts the Plaintiff at material risk of making a partial payment and thereby unknowingly recommencing the lapsed statute of limitations. Plaintiff sustained an informational injury in that she was deceptively misled about the true legal nature of the alleged debt and was not advised that making payment on the debt would restart the statute of limitations. As a result of Defendants’ deceptive, misleading and unfair debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Defendants violated §1692e: a. by omitting material information creating a false and misleading representation of the status of the debt in violation of §1692e(10); and b. by falsely representing the character, amount or legal status of the debt in violation of §1692e(2)(A). By reason thereof, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendants conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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(Fair Labor Standards Act - Unpaid Overtime) (NJWHL/NJWPL- Unpaid Overtime) The claims in this Complaint arising out of the FLSA, New Jersey Wage and Hour Law and New Jersey Wage and Payment Law are brought by Plaintiff under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of himself and of a class consisting of all similarly situated non-exempt employees (i.e. cashier, cleaning worker, maintenance worker, care service worker, marketing and accounting clerks) who work or have worked at King Spa for the past six years (the "Rule 23 Class"). The employees in the Rule 23 Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The size of the Rule 23 Class is at least forty (40) individuals, although the precise number of such employees is unknown Facts supporting the calculation of that number are presently within the sole control of defendants. Defendants have acted or have refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Rule 23 Class, thereby malting appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Rule 23 Class as a whole. The claims of the Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the Rule 23 Class he seeks to represent. Plaintiff and the members of the Rule 23 Class work or have worked for defendants within the six years prior to the filing of this action. They enjoy the same statutory rights under the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law and New Jersey Wage and Payment Law to be paid at the correct overtime wage for all hours worked and to keep the gratuities they earn. Plaintiff and the members of the Rule 23 Class have sustained similar types of damages as a result of defendants' failure to comply with the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law and New Jersey Wage and Payment Law. Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class have all been injured in that they have been under-compensated due to defendants' common policies, practices, and patterns of conduct. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Rule 23 Class. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in wage and hour litigation and class action litigation. There is no conflict between Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class members. This action is properly maintainable as a class action under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The claims in this Complaint arising out of the FLSA are brought by the Plaintiff on behalf of himself and all similarly situated non-exempt employees (i.e. cashier, cleaning worker, maintenance worker, care service worker, marketing and accounting clerks) who work or have worked at King Spa within three years of the date of the filing of this action and who elect to opt-in to this action (the "FLSA Collective"). The FLSA Collective consists of approximately one hundred similarly situated current and former non-exempt employees of King Spa, who have been victims of defendants' common policy and practices that have violated their rights under the FLSA by, inter alia, willfully denying them overtime pay and other monies. As part of their regular business practices, defendants have intentionally, willfully, repeatedly, and in bad faith harmed Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective by engaging in a pattern, practice, and/or policy of violating the FLSA, New Jersey Wage and Hour Law and New Jersey Wage and Payment Law. This policy and pattern or practice include, inter alia: a. failing to pay employees the proper overtime pay for all hours worked over forty; b. failing to pay non-exempt employees one hour's pay at the minimum hourly wage rate for each day during which employees worked more than ten hours; c. failing to keep accurate records of hours worked by employees as required by the FLSA and the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law and New Jersey Wage and Payment Law. The FLSA Collective would benefit from the issuance of a court-supervised notice of the present lawsuit and the opportunity to join the present lawsuit. Those similarly situated employees are known to defendants, are readily identifiable by defendants and are locatable through defendants' records. These similarly situated employees should be notified of and allowed to opt into this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Rhee worked as a cashier throughout his time employed by defendants. Working as a cashier, Rhee fell into the category of "non-exempt" employee pursuant to the FLSA. Rhee’s starting and ending times varied depending on his shift. He regularly worked at least 9 hours a day for 6 days a week and sometimes for 7 days a week. Defendants failed to compensate Rhee at one and one-half times his hourly rate for the hours he worked in excess of forty per workweek. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. Defendants are required to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective one and one- half (1 ½ ) times the regular rate at which Plaintiff was employed for all hours worked in excess of forty hours in a workweek pursuant to the overtime wage provisions set forth in the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207, et seq. Defendants have failed to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective the overtime wages to which they are entitled under the FLSA. Defendants have willfully violated the FLSA by knowingly and intentionally failing to pay Plaintiff and FLSA Collective overtime wages. Due to defendants' violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective are entitled to recover their unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of the action, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. Under the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law and supporting New Jersey State Department of Labor Regulations, defendants were required to pay Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class one and one half (1 ½ ) times the regular rate of pay for all hours they worked in excess of forty. Defendants have failed to pay Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class the overtime wages to which they were entitled under the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law. Defendants have willfully violated the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law by knowingly and intentionally failing to pay Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class overtime wages. Due to defendants' willful violations of the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law, Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class are entitled to recover their unpaid overtime wages, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of the action, liquidated damages and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.

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Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). The Class consists of: a. all individuals with addresses in the State of Virginia; b. to whom Defendant MLR sent an initial collection letter attempting to collect a consumer debt; c. that falsely and misleadingly states the consumer’s right to dispute the debt; d. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (2l) days after the filing of this action. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692g, 1692e. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Some time prior to June 5, 2020, an obligation was allegedly incurred to ALTEON - EMA_25_Bon Secours Mary Immaculate Hospital by the Plaintiff. The ALTEON - EMA_25_Bon Secours Mary Immaculate Hospital obligation arose out of transactions in which money, property, insurance or services which are the subject of the transactions were primarily for personal, family or household purposes, specifically medical services. The alleged ALTEON - EMA_25_Bon Secours Mary Immaculate Hospital obligation is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(5). ALTEON - EMA_25_Bon Secours Mary Immaculate Hospital is a “creditor” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(4). Defendant MLR, a debt collector, was contracted to collect the alleged debt which originated with ALTEON - EMA_25_Bon Secours Mary Immaculate Hospital. On or about June 5, 2020, Defendant MLR sent Plaintiff a collection letter (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt currently owed to Defendant ALTEON - EMA_25_Bon Secours Mary Immaculate Hospital See Exhibit A. When a debt collector solicits payment from a consumer, it must, within five days of an initial communication (1) the amount of the debt; (2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; (3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector; (4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty- day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of the judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and (5) a statement that, upon the consumer's written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). These disclosures are commonly known as the “G-Notice.” A statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt-collector; In addition, Defendant’s letter does not advise that that the consumer must dispute the debt in writing to be provided with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. Defendant’s letter merely says: “If you contact this office within 30 days after receiving this notice, this office will provide you with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor.” The language “if you contact this office” does not properly convey that the dispute must be in writing. These false and inaccurate statements and omissions are deceptive and misleading as Defendant fails to advise Plaintiff of the proper method for exercising her validation rights under the FDCPA. Plaintiff sustained an informational injury as she was not fully apprised of his rights and responsibilities necessary to exercise her rights under the G-Notice. Plaintiff effectively waived her rights to this statutorily available information because she was not properly informed of the G-Notice requirements set forth in the FDCPA. As a result of Defendant's deceptive, misleading and unfair debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. A statement that the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and Defendant violated §1692e : a. As the Letter it is open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate. b. By making a false and misleading representation in violation of §1692e(10). By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. Pursuant to 15 USC §1692g, a debt collector: Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing – The Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §1692g, by Falsely and inaccurately stating the Plaintiff’s rights and responsibilities of the G-Notice as required by the FDCPA. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. A statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty- day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Rule 23, FRCivP, as a class action for himself and as representative of and for, and on behalf of, all other similarly situated persons ("Class Members"). The Class Members are defined as participants in EMSA’s Utility Fee Program from 2008 through 2013 who were detrimentally affected by Defendants’ fraud, conspiracy to defraud, and violations of other State and Federal laws which Defendants engaged in in furtherance of their conspiracy to defraud, as alleged herein. The Class excludes officers or employees of Defendants and any person or entity whom Plaintiffs' counsel is prohibited from representing under the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct. Plaintiff has been informed and believes, and on such information and belief allege, that the individual loss and potential recovery of each Class Member is such that each is precluded from individually litigating the claims asserted herein by reason of the burdens, costs and expenses involved and that many Class Members will never have their day in court unless this action proceeds as a class action. This action is governed by Federal law. There are substantial questions of law and fact common to the claims of the Class Members against defendants. The claims of Class Plaintiff is typical of the claims of each and all of the Class Members and are based upon and arise out of the identical facts concerning the conduct of the defendants. Plaintiff is situated to, capable of, and will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class Members. Because of the similarity and identity of claims of Plaintiff and the individual Class Members, the successful assertion of Plaintiffs' claims herein will result in the determination of law and facts adequate to prove the liability of defendants to each Class Member. The prosecution of separate actions by the individual Class Members, even if possible, would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications or verdicts that may establish incompatible standards of conduct for defendants. Defendants’ acts alleged herein are applicable to all Class Members, making the relief sought generally applicable to all of the Class Members. A class action is superior to other available methods, if in fact any such other methods are available (which Plaintiffs deny), for the fair and efficient adjudication of the matters alleged herein. EMSA was established in 1977, and operates a Public Utility Model of ambulance services in Tulsa and Oklahoma City. As a public trust, EMSA does not provide the ambulance services, but contracts with a private contractor to provide ambulance services in Tulsa and Oklahoma City. From 1994 to 1998, EMSA’s private contractor was American Medical Response Plaintiff has been a resident of the City of Tulsa during the relevant time period and paid the TotalCare Fee on his monthly water bill. Plaintiff relied on the representation from Defendants that the amount of the TotalCare fee was an accurate representation of the cost of the program. Plaintiff relied on Defendants to protect his interests and accurately represent the costs of providing ambulance services. In paying the TotalCare fee, Plaintiff did not consent to the scheme orchestrated by Defendants. Plaintiff did not consent to being overcharged for the TotalCare program, and does not consent to the money received from the TotalCare program being used as kickbacks and for various expenses. Plaintiff did not consent to the TotalCare fees being used, in part, to contribute to political campaigns. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all prior allegations set forth above. Count I is for fraud and arises under the common law of Oklahoma. Defendants, and each of them, intentionally misrepresented to Plaintiffs that the charges being paid for emergency ambulance services were being paid pursuant to a legal contract, and not an illegal kickback scheme. Throughout the Claim Period, Defendants, and each of them, made at least one false material misrepresentation to Plaintiffs through solicitations of Plaintiffs to pay to participate in the EMSA TotalCare Program; which misrepresentation was made as a positive assertion which was known by Defendants to be false when made; which misrepresentation was made with the intention that Plaintiffs would act on it and participate in the EMSA TotalCare Program; and which Plaintiffs relied on to their detriment in enrolling (and continuing to enroll) in the EMSA TotalCare Program; and which caused Plaintiffs actual hard and damages. Plaintiffs did not know, and could not have known of the illegal acts of the defendants herein alleged until the Qui Tam Complaint had been unsealed, on January 17, 2017. Each class member has suffered actual damages because the illegal and fraudulent kickback scheme alleged herein directly caused the cost of the TotalCare charged to each Class Member to be higher than it otherwise would have been. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all prior allegations set forth above. Count II is for conspiracy to defraud and arises under the common law of Oklahoma. Defendants Williamson, Torrence, EMSA, ETMC System and ETMC Services all conspired together to do an unlawful act, that is, violate the federal Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7b (the “AKS”) Each class member has suffered actual damages because the illegal and fraudulent kickback scheme alleged herein directly caused the cost of the TotalCare charged to each Class Member to be higher than it otherwise would have been. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all prior allegations set forth above. Count III is for violation of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.A. Section 1962, et seq (the “RICO” statute). RICO provides a private right of action in federal court for individuals injured in their business or property through fraudulent conduct. Here, Defendants Williamson, Torrence, ETMC System, ETMC Services and EMSA, through a conspiracy to defraud, did: actively and intentionally defraud Plaintiffs and others; through a criminal enterprise to violate the AKS, succeed in having EMSA award an over-cost contract to EMTC, in violation of the Federal kickback statute, and to renew that illegal contract through additional criminal conduct which was also in violation of the criminal anti-kickback statute; and, all of which conduct constituted a pattern of racketeering activity. Each class member has suffered actual damages because the illegal and fraudulent kickback scheme alleged herein directly caused the cost of the Utility Fee Program charged to each Class Member to be higher than it otherwise would have been. Defendant EMSA’s inadequate policies, practices and procedures oversight of its officers and employees resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiffs’ well established Constitutional rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendant EMSA’s failure to supervise its officers and employees amounts to deliberate indifference. Defendant EMSA made a conscious choice by failing to adequately supervise its officers and employees which resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiffs’ well established Constitutional rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendant EMSA’s policy, practices, customs and procedures are nonexistent or wholly inadequate given the great power, authority and deference given to its officers and/or employees. Defendant EMSA knew or should have known that Defendants Williamson and/or Torrence were likely to engage in the acts set forth above. Defendant EMSA authorized or ratified the actions of Defendants Williamson and/or Torrence As a result of Defendant EMSA’s actions, policies, procedures and customs, Plaintiffs suffered damages. Defendant Williamson is the Chief Executive Officer of Defendant EMSA. As Chief Executive Officer of Defendant EMSA, Defendant Williamson acted under color of state law. Defendant Williamson’s actions led to a violation of Plaintiffs’ well established Constitutional rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendant Williamson’s actions are in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983. Defendant Torrence is the Chief Financial Officer of Defendant EMSA. As Chief Financial Officer of Defendant EMSA, Defendant Torrence acted under color of state law. Defendant Torrence’s actions were in violation of the policies and procedures of Defendant EMSA. Defendant Torrence’s actions led to a violation of Plaintiffs’ well established Constitutional rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendant Torrence’s actions are in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983. CONSPIRACY TO DEFRAUD FRAUD VIOLATION OF THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED CORRUP ORGANIZATIONS ACT Violation of Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Rights by Defendant EMSA (42 U.S.C. §1983) Violation of Plaintiffs Constitutional Rights by Defendant Williamson (42 U.S.C. §1983) Violation of Plaintiffs Constitutional Rights by Defendant Torrence (42 U.S.C. §1983)

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Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). The Class consists of: a. all individuals with addresses in the state of New York; b. to whom Defendant EOS sent a collection letter; c. On behalf of Defendant US Asset; d. attempting to collect a consumer debt; e. which debt was past the statute of limitation for filing suit thereon; f. without disclosing that the statute of limitations for suing to collect the debt had expired; g. without disclosing that if a payment is made it could restart the statute of limitations; h. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (21) days after the filing of this action. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692f. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor his attorneys have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well- defined community interest in the litigation: a. Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the Plaintiff Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. b. Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff Class and those questions predominance over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692e and §1692f. c. Typicality: The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. The Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff Class have claims arising out of the Defendants' common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. d. Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the absent class members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor his counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. e. Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). Plaintiff repeats the above paragraphs as if set forth here. On a date better known to the original creditor, Verizon, Plaintiff incurred a debt. The obligation arose out of a transaction allegedly incurred by Plaintiff in which money, property, insurance or services which are the subject of the transaction were incurred solely for personal purposes, specifically for personal cellphone service. The alleged Verizon obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (5). Verizon is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (4). Defendant EOS collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of itself or others using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Defendant US Asset collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of itself or others using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Upon information and belief, Defendant EOS contracted with Defendant US Asset to collect the alleged debt. Violation – July 2, 2020 Collection Letter On or about July 2, 2020, Defendant sent the Plaintiff an initial collection letter regarding the alleged debt. A copy of the letter is attached as Exhibit A. The letter states a balance of $40.14 and states that the Plaintiff’s payment is past due. The letter fails to disclose that the statute of limitations to file a lawsuit to collect the debt had already expired. The statute of limitations for commencing suit on this debt is two years after default on the account, the time of which has already passed. This material omission misleads the consumer into potentially paying a time-barred debt, which will restart the statute of limitations. The letter fails to state that if a partial payment is made the statute of limitations may restart, thus allowing for a lawsuit to occur. The letter further fails to clearly and adequately inform the consumer of the true legal status of the debt and potential ramifications of making a payment and restarting the statute of limitations. As a result of Defendant’s deceptive, misleading, and unfair debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. Plaintiff repeats the above paragraphs as if set forth here. Defendants’ debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Defendants violated said section by: a. omitting material information creating a false and misleading representation of the debt in violation of §1692e (10); and b. falsely representing the character, amount or legal status of the debt in violation of §1692e (2)(A). By reason thereof, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendants’ conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff repeats the above paragraphs as if set forth here. Defendants’ debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f, a debt collector may not use any unfair or unconscionable means in connection with the collection of any debt. Defendants violated this section by omitting material information that gave Plaintiff a false understanding of her rights under the FDCPA. By reason thereof, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendants’ conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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The exact number of FLSA Collective members is unknown to plaintiffs at this time, but there are believed to be at least 25 such persons who have been victims of defendants’ common policy and practices that have violated their rights under the FLSA by willfully denying them overtime pay and other wages. The identities of the FLSA Collective members are known to the defendants and is contained in the employment records that the defendants are required to create and maintain pursuant to the FLSA and NJWHL. As part of their regular business practice, defendants have intentionally, willfully, and repeatedly harmed the FLSA Collective by engaging in a pattern, practice, and/or policy of violating the FLSA. This policy, pattern, or practice includes, inter alia, failing to pay overtime at the rate of one and one-half times the FLSA Collective’s regular hourly rate for hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek. Defendants’ unlawful conduct has been intentional, willful, and in bad faith and has caused significant damage to the FLSA Collective. Defendants did not keep complete records, as required by law, of hours worked and wages earned by the plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective. Silva brings the Second Claim and both named plaintiffs bring the Third Claim against defendants as a class action for unpaid minimum wage and unpaid overtime on behalf of themselves and other employees similarly situated pursuant Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a25. N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a25 provides in pertinent part, “An employee shall be entitled to maintain the action for and on behalf of himself or other employees similarly situated, and such employee and employees may designate an agent or representative to maintain such action for and on behalf of all employees similarly situated.” Plaintiffs are a member of a class of employees of similarly situated individuals which includes current and former non-tipped, non-exempt restaurant employees, including Chefs, Cooks, Salad Preparers, Food Preparers, Pizza Makers and Dishwashers employed by defendants at Buongusto at any time, during the period permitted by N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a25.1 prior to the filing of the action through entry of judgment in this action (the “New Jersey Class”). The identities of the New Jersey Class members are known to the defendants and are contained in the employment records that the defendants are required to create and maintain pursuant to the FLSA and NJWHL. Plaintiffs are similarly situated to the New Jersey Class because plaintiffs and the New Jersey Class performed similar work under similar terms and conditions of employment, and sustained similar damages arising out of defendants’ policies and conduct in violation of the At all relevant times, Ghobrial operated and managed Buongusto. At all relevant times, Youssef operated and managed Buongusto. At all relevant times, Habib operated and managed Buongusto. Throughout her employment, Silva’s primary duties included slicing tomatoes, preparing pizza dough and preparing the pizza sauce. Throughout his employment, Salmeron’s primary duties included preparing for and making the meatballs, pasta, chicken, salad, wraps and paninis. At all relevant times, defendants recorded plaintiffs’ and other restaurant workers’ hours of work first by having the workers orally notifying the managers when they arrived at the restaurant and when they were leaving the restaurant, which the managers recorded. Thereafter, in or about 2018, a Point of Sale (POS) electronic system was installed at Buongusto, which recorded hours of work for each restaurant worker. At all relevant times, plaintiffs and other restaurant workers typically worked 74 hours per workweek. Throughout their employment, plaintiffs and other restaurant workers generally worked six days per week with the following, or close to the following schedule: Sunday through Thursday, 10:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. and Friday through Saturday 10:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m., with one day off per week. Plaintiffs and other restaurant workers did not receive any uninterrupted meal or rest breaks during the workday. Any food eaten was done so while working. The pay period at Buongusto was from Monday to Sunday. Non-Tipped restaurant workers were generally paid once a week on Tuesdays. All of the restaurant workers, except for the pizza makers, were paid on a flat salary basis, regardless of the number of hours they worked in a week. Pizza makers were paid on an hourly basis the same hourly rate, regardless of the number of hours they worked in a work week. Effective January 1, 2015, the New Jersey minimum wage became $8.38, and effective January 1, 2017, the New Jersey minimum wage became $8.44. Effective January 1, 2018, the New Jersey minimum wage became $8.60, and effective July 1, 2019, the New Jersey minimum wage became $10.00. Silva was initially paid $550 per week, which increased over time to $700 per week for all hours worked, all in violation of the applicable New Jersey state minimum wage rate. Defendants failed to pay plaintiffs and other restaurant workers overtime pay at one and one half (1 ½) times their hourly rate for hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek. Defendants failed to pay plaintiffs New Jersey and federal overtime for each and every pay period they worked at the Buongusto beginning June 2017 to September 2019. Examples of such weekly pay periods in 2019 include pay periods ending on March 4, May 20, June 24, August 19, and October 7, 2019. Examples of such weekly pay periods in 2018 include pay periods ending on March 5, May 21, June 18, August 27, and October 1, 2018. In each of the identified pay periods above, plaintiffs worked at least 74 hours. Defendants did not provide the plaintiffs or the other restaurant workers any written notification of the hours they worked or wages paid in a workweek. Defendants have violated the recordkeeping requirements of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §211(c), N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a20 and N.J.A.C. 12:56-4.1 and 4.2 Defendants failed to post, in a conspicuous, unobstructed place, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a21, the “New Jersey State Wage and Hour Law Abstract,” prescribed by the NJDOL, setting forth the state minimum wage and overtime requirements in English and Spanish. Defendants failed to post in a conspicuous, unobstructed, place pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §516.4, a poster prescribed by the U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, setting forth federal minimum wage and overtime requirements in English and Spanish.

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Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants’ written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e & 1692f. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. The Sprint Nextel obligation arose out of a transaction in which involved the transaction of money, property, insurance or services primarily for personal, family or household purposes. The alleged Sprint Nextel obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). Sprint Nextel is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4). Defendant LVNV, a debt collector and subsequent owner of the Sprint Nextel debt, contracted with Defendant TrueAccord to collect the alleged debt. Defendants collects and attempt to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation – February 10, 2021 Collection Letter On or about February 17, 2021, Defendant TrueAccord sent Plaintiff a collection letter (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt owed. A true and accurate copy of the Letter is attached as Exhibit A. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f, a debt collector may not use any unfair or unconscionable means in connection with the collection of any debt. The letter states a balance of $770.75. The letter states: “We are TrueAccord, a third party debt collection agency. We are working on behalf of LVNV Funding LLC (current creditor of your original Sprint Nextel Corporation account) to collect on your balance of $770.75. Upon information and belief, the statute of limitations to file a lawsuit on this debt has long passed. The letter fails to clearly and adequately inform the consumer as to the true legal status of the debt and potential ramifications of making a payment with a written acknowledgement of the debt and thereby restarting the statute of limitations. Therefore, the letter puts the Plaintiff at material risk of making a partial payment and thereby unknowingly recommencing the lapsed statute of limitations. Plaintiff sustained an informational injury in that he was deceptively misled about the true legal nature of the alleged debt and was not advised that making payment on the debt would restart the statute of limitations. As a result of Defendants’ deceptive, misleading and unfair debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Defendants debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Defendant violated this section by omitting material information that gave Plaintiff a false understanding of the rights provided him under the FDCPA. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq.

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Plaintiff received a series of automated calls on his cell phone seeking to sell him life insurance including at least the following: August 11, 2016, at 11.04 am from 978-213-8332 (Exhibit A); a. August 10, 2016, at 9.52 am from 517-208-0209 (Exhibit B); b. August 10, 2016 at 11.43 am from 952-777-1698 (Exhibit C); c. August 10, 2016, at 11.09 am from 303-214-0430 (Exhibit D); d. August 5, 2016 at 3.14 pm from 303-214-0430 (Exhibit D); e. August 5, 2016 at 2.46 pm from 603-263-3019 (Exhibit E); f. August 4, 2016, at 4.35 pm from 303-214-0430 (Exhibit D). Each call began with a pause and then delivered a recorded message. A person who calls 517-208-0209 or 603-263-3019 or 952-777-1698 or 303- 214-0430 gets a recorded message inviting the caller to press “1” in order to learn about saving money on life insurance, substantially as follows: 2 Hello. I’m calling because I believe I can save you money on your life insurance. If you can spare a few seconds, we offer a valuable free service. Studies have shown that people are paying up to 40% too much for life insurance and they’re very happy to find out that they may be able to pay a lot less for the same or better coverage. We are local representatives for a major insurer and we offer a free comparison quote just to see if we can save you money. There is no cost or obligation. If you would like a free quote on life insurance, please press the “1” key on your telephone now. You may also press “9” to be added to our no call list, but press “1” to hear more. On information and belief, based on the content of the message (“I’m calling . . . ”), the identical message is played regardless of whether one answers or returns the call. A person who presses “1” is transferred to a live person who, if the caller expresses interest, transfers the caller to an insurance representative at the Life Insurance Center, who takes down information about the proposed insured and type and amount of coverage sought. The insurance representative provides 800-286-7842 as a callback number. The number 800-286-7842 is issued to or used by The Life Insurance Center, LLC. (Exhibit F) The Life Insurance Center, LLC is held out (Exhibit F) as “division of InsureNOW Direct”. InsureNOW Direct is a trade name used by Crump Life Insurance Services, Inc. (Exhibit G). The relationship between Crump Life Insurance Services, Inc., and The Life Insurance Center, LLC is described in Exhibit H. Crump Life Insurance Services, Inc., is therefore liable for the conduct of its “division,” The Life Insurance Center, LLC. On information and belief, the calls were placed using an automated dialer and a recorded voice. Plaintiff did not authorize the automated placement of calls to his cell phone. Plaintiff may have received other automated calls from the same source. Plaintiff did not furnish his cell phone number to defendant. 3 Defendants’ calls harmed plaintiff by causing the very harm Congress sought to prevent – a “nuisance and invasion of privacy.” Defendants’ calls harmed plaintiff by intruding upon his seclusion. Defendants’ calls harmed plaintiff by distracting him from work and causing him aggravation and annoyance. Defendants’ calls harmed plaintiff by wasting his time. Defendants’ calls harmed plaintiff by using data storage space and the battery on the cellular telephone. Plaintiff and each class member is entitled to statutory damages. Defendants violated the TCPA even if their actions were only negligent. Defendants should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1-32. The TCPA, 47 U.S.C. §227, provides: § 227. Restrictions on use of telephone equipment . . . (b) Restrictions on use of automated telephone equipment. (1) Prohibitions. It shall be unlawful for any person within the United States, or any person outside the United States if the recipient is within the United States– (A) to make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice– (iii) to any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service for which the called party is charged for the call; . . . The TCPA, 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3), further provides: Private right of action. 4 A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State– (A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) both such actions. If the Court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount available under the subparagraph (B) of this paragraph. Defendant violated the TCPA by placing automated calls using a recorded message to plaintiff’s cell phone. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1-32. Defendants engaged in unfair acts and practices, in violation of ICFA §2, 815 ILCS 505/2, by making unauthorized robocalls to plaintiff’s cell phone. Defendants’ conduct is contrary to public policy, as set forth in the TCPA. Plaintiff suffered damages as a result of receipt of the call. Defendants engaged in such conduct in the course of trade and commerce. Defendants should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of a class, consisting of (a) all persons with phone numbers in the Illinois area codes (b) who, on or after a date three years prior to the filing of this action, (c) received calls on their cell phones soliciting business for the Life Insurance Center, (d) placed using an automated dialer or a prerecorded or artificial voice. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that there are more than 40 members of the class. There are questions of law and fact common to the class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The predominant common questions include: a. Whether defendants engaged in a pattern of using automated equipment to place calls to cellular telephones; b. The manner in which defendants compiled or obtained their list of telephone numbers; and c. Whether defendants thereby violated the ICFA. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither plaintiff nor plaintiff’s counsel has any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The interest of class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against defendant is small because it is not economically feasible to bring individual actions. Management of this class action is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties that those presented in many class actions, e.g. for securities fraud. 8 WHEREFORE, plaintiff requests that the Court enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and the class and against defendants for: (1) Statutory damages; (2) An injunction against further violations; (3) Costs of suit; (4) Such other or further relief as the Court deems just and proper. s/ Daniel A. Edelman Daniel A. Edelman Daniel A. Edelman Cathleen M. Combs Julie Clark Michelle A. Alyea 7

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(42 U.S.C. § 1983; Violation of the Help America Vote Act Against Defendants Reagan, Maricopa County, and Fontes) (42 U.S.C. § 1983; Violation of Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution Against Defendants Reagan, Maricopa County, and Fontes) (42 U.S.C. § 1983; Violation of the National Voter Registration Act Against Defendants Reagan, Maricopa County, and Fontes) For an order certifying a Class and Subclass pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2); To be eligible to vote in a particular election, Arizona law requires that the voter’s registration form be “received by the county recorder . . . prior to midnight of the twenty-ninth day” before that election. A.R.S. § 16-120. Columbus Day is a state and federal holiday. See A.R.S. § 1-301(A); 5 For compensatory and punitive damages in an amount to be determined according to proof; For costs of suit and attorneys’ fees as provided by law; and For such other relief as the Court deems just and proper. Plaintiff is a United States Citizen living in Arizona. He brings this action against the Defendants both as an individual and as a representative of a class of all Arizona voters who had their ballots discarded due to the unlawful October 10, 2016 Policy, which set an unlawful voter registration deadline. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) to certify a class of individuals who did not have their ballots counted due to the unlawful October 10, 2016 voter registration deadline. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of all Arizona voters who registered to vote on October 11, 2016 and cast a provisional ballot in the November 8, 2016 General Election. The members of the Class and Subclass are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The Class and Subclass consist of hundreds of individuals who registered to vote on October 11, 2016 and cast a provisional ballot in the November 8, 2016 General Election. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class and Subclass, including: a. Whether the Defendants violated the Class and Subclass members’ right to register to vote by adopting a voter registration deadline that did not comply with the National Voter Registration Act; b. Whether the Defendants violated Class and Subclass members’ right to vote by refusing to count their ballots and certifying election results that did comply with the Help America Vote Act; c. Whether the Defendants violated Class and Subclass members’ federal and constitutional rights by engaging in conduct that led to the disenfranchisement of all voters who registered on October 11, 2016. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class and Subclass because the policies, practices, and conduct that violated Plaintiff’s rights are the same as those that were applied to all members of the Class and Subclass. Plaintiff is a member of the Class and Subclass he seeks to represent. Defendants have acted on grounds applicable to the Class and Subclass, in that their policies, practices, and conduct have affected all Class and Subclass members. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all prior paragraphs of this Complaint and the paragraphs in the counts below as though fully set forth herein. The purpose of the National Voter Registration Act (“NVRA”) is to, among other things, “establish procedures that will increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in elections for Federal office.” 52 U.S.C. § 20501(b)(1). To accomplish this, the NVRA requires that states provide for voter registration via several methods: registration with an application for a driver’s license, 52 U.S.C. § 20504; registration by mail, 52 U.S.C. § 20505; and in-person registration at registration sites or government offices, 52 U.S.C. § 20506. Arizona law requires that voter registration forms be “received . . . prior to midnight of the twenty-ninth day preceding the date of the election.” A.R.S. § 16-120. Twenty-nine days before the November 2016 Election was October 10, 2016, which is the registration deadline the Defendants set. That date, however, fell on Columbus Day. It was thus impossible for Arizonans to register using certain NVRA-mandated methods on that date. For example, MVD and post offices were closed on Columbus Day. The same was true of October 9, 2016 because it was a Sunday. Therefore, Arizonans were required to register to vote via these methods, by the latest, Saturday, October 8, 2016. This deadline was 31 days before the election and violates the NVRA. See 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(1). Put differently, given that 29 days before the November 2016 Election fell on Columbus Day, the first available day to require voters to register through the NVRA methods that was “not later” than 29 days before the election was Tuesday, October 11, 2016. Accordingly, Defendants’ insistence that voters who registered by October 11, 2016 were ineligible vote in the November 2016 Election was inconsistent with, and a violation of, the NVRA and Arizona law. Defendants’ violations of 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(1) directly and proximately caused Plaintiff to suffer injuries and damages. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all prior paragraphs of this Complaint and the paragraphs in the counts below as though fully set forth herein. Under the Help America Vote Act (“HAVA”), “[i]f the appropriate State or local election official to whom [a] [provisional] ballot or voter information is transmitted … determines that the individual is eligible under State law to vote, the individual’s provisional ballot shall be counted as a vote in that election in accordance with State law.” 52 U.S.C. § 21082(a)(4). Because all of the provisional ballots described herein were cast by voters, who should have been eligible to vote under state law, the plain language of 52 U.S.C. § 21082(a)(4) required that those votes should have been counted. Defendants’ violation of 52 U.S.C. § 21082(a)(4) directly and proximately caused Plaintiff to suffer injuries and damages. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all prior paragraphs of this Complaint and the paragraphs in the counts below as though fully set forth herein. Article I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.” Article I, Section 2 secures the right of qualified voters within a state to cast their ballots and have them counted in Congressional elections. Because all of the provisional ballots described herein were cast by qualified voters within the State of Arizona, Article I, Section 2 required Defendants to count their vote. Defendants’ violation of Article I, Section 2 directly and proximately caused Plaintiff to suffer injuries and damages. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays as follows: I. BACKGROUND

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Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendant and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. Excluded from the Plaintiff Classes are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Classes, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s written communications to consumers, in the form attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e and 1692f. The Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Classes defined in this complaint. The Plaintiffs have retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiffs nor his attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiffs may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Some time prior to November 3, 2020, an obligation was allegedly incurred to Synchrony Bank. The Synchrony Bank obligation arose out of a transaction in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for personal, family or household purposes, specifically a Wal-Mart credit card. The alleged Synchrony Bank obligation is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(5). Defendant PRA, a debt collector and the subsequent owner of the alleged Synchrony Bank, is collecting the alleged debt. On or about November 3, 2020, Defendant PRA sent the Plaintiff a notice (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt owed to Synchrony Bank. See Attached hereto as Exhibit A. The Letter states a balance of $ 5,069.20. The Letter offers two options regarding the balance: Pay the full amount in either one, six or twelve payments or choose a “savings plan” that allows the consumer to pay the balance for a discounted amount in one, twelve or eighteen consecutive months. Defendant’s offer is illogical. Why choose to pay the full balance when there is an offer to pay less than the full balance? The only answer would be that paying in full would receive some form of added benefit. Defendant’s letter does not make any mention of any benefit or incentive to pay the full balance rather than the discounted amount. Therefore, the consumer is left confused and misled which option to choose; on the one hand the discounted amount saves him money but on the other hand, the full payment option must have some benefit or else it would not even be a consideration. Yet Defendant’s letter mentions no benefit whatsoever of paying the full balance, making the letter illogical and leaving the consumer wondering if there is a “catch” or if this is a real offer. Defendant’s letter it is open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate As a result of Defendant’s deceptive, misleading and unfair debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Defendants’ debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Defendant violated §1692e : a. As the Letter it is open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate. b. By making a false and misleading representation in violation of §1692e(10). By reason thereof, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendants’ conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. Defendants’ debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f, a debt collector may not use any unfair or unconscionable means in connection with the collection of any debt. Defendants violated this section by omitting material information that gave Plaintiff a false understanding of the offers in the Letter. By reason thereof, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendants’ conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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Plaintiff brings this action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of a proposed class defined as: Plaintiff and all persons within the United States, within the four years immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint, Defendant or some person acting on Defendant’s behalf sent a text message to their cellular telephone advertising Defendant’s political campaign, through the use of the same or materially similar telephone dialing equipment as that which was used to send the texts at issue to the Plaintiff. (the “Class”) Excluded from this class are Defendant and any entities in which Defendant have a controlling interest; Defendant’s agents and employees; any Judge and Magistrate Judge to whom this action is assigned and any member of their staffs and immediate families; and any claims for personal injury, wrongful death, and/or emotional distress. The Class members for whose benefit this action is brought are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The Class is comprised of hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals nationwide. As a person that received at least one unsolicited text message without Plaintiff’s prior express written consent, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class in that Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to any member of the Class. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have all suffered irreparable harm as a result of the Defendant’s unlawful and wrongful conduct. Absent a class action, the Class will continue to face the potential for irreparable harm. In addition, these violations of law will be allowed to proceed without remedy and Defendant will likely continue such illegal conduct. Because of the size of the individual Class member’s claims, few, if any, Class members could afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to, or in conflict with, the Class. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and claims involving violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Defendant has acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate for the Class as a whole. The prosecution of separate actions by individual class members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy since, inter alia, the damages suffered by each class member make individual actions uneconomical. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs one (1) through thirty-nine (39) of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. Common questions will predominate, and there will be no unusual manageability issues. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. Defendant sent text messages to Plaintiff and Class members on their cellular telephone numbers. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. The text messages were sent using an “automatic telephone dialing system.” The text messages were not sent for “emergency purposes” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(i). As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. An award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. An award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227(B)(1)(A)(III) TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. VIOLATIONS OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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Upon information and belief, the individual identified in the above prerecorded messages is Armando Tello, one of the general managers of South Houston Nissan. The prerecorded telemarketing call was transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, and within the time frame relevant to this action. Defendant’s prerecorded telemarketing call constitutes telemarketing because it encouraged the future purchase, sell, or investment in property, goods, and/or services, i.e., selling Plaintiff one of Defendant’s vehicles. The prerecorded telemarketing call originated from telephone a telephone number which upon information and belief is owned and/or operated by or on behalf of Defendant. Plaintiff received the subject prerecorded telemarketing call within this District and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this District. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other prerecorded telemarketing calls to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her express consent to be contacted using an ATDS. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 9787 Number and is financially responsible for phone service to the 9787 Number. Defendant’s prerecorded calls caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of her privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s prerecorded calls also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to her daily life. Defendant’s prerecorded calls caused Plaintiff actual harm. Specifically, Plaintiff estimates that she spent approximately fifteen minutes investigating the unwanted prerecorded calls including how they obtained her number and who the Defendant was. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a Class defined as follows: No Consent Class: All persons within the United States who, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, were sent a prerecorded message, from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s behalf, to said person’s cellular telephone number, without emergency purpose and without the recipient’s prior express written consent. Excluded from the Class is Defendant, its officers, directors, affiliates, legal representatives, employees, successors, subsidiaries and assigns, as well as the judge and court staff to whom this case is assigned. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the right to amend the Class definition if discovery of further investigation reveals that the Class should be modified. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency prerecorded telemarketing calls to Plaintiff’s and Class members’ cellular telephones; (2) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express written consent to make such calls; (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits prerecorded telemarketing calls to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – transmitted calls using an artificial or prerecorded voice to the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiff and members of the putative class. These calls were made without regard to whether Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an artificial or prerecorded voice to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express consent. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. Id. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate paragraphs 1-45 as if fully set forth herein. At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as alleged herein violated the TCPA. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to transmit artificial or prerecorded voice calls and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the PROPOSED CLASS

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(Willful and Knowing Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. – Telephone Consumer Protection Act) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) In early 2018, Nelly Garcia provided her cellular telephone number to Fashion Nova when she purchased clothing items at its website. On or about June 20, 2018 at approximately 6:06 p.m. Central Standard Time (CST), Ms. Garcia received the following text message from Fashion Nova at her cellular telephone number ending in “-5462”: None of the above-described text messages addressed her by name. Ms. Garcia has never provided her consent, orally or in writing, to receive text advertisements from Fashion Nova on her cellular phone. Class members received the same or similar unsolicited text advertisements. Defendant did not obtain prior express written consent from Plaintiff or Class members to send the above-described text messages to their cellular telephones. Plaintiff and Class members suffered injuries in the form of invasion of privacy, aggravation, and nuisance. The text messages alleged herein were exclusively made by, or on behalf of Defendant. Defendant was and is aware that it was making the above-described text message calls on a widespread basis to consumers who had not provided prior express written consent to receive them/ Numerosity: The exact number of Class members is unknown and not available to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendant has sent text messages to thousands of consumers who fall into the definition of the Class. Class members can be identified through Defendant’s records. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Class in that Plaintiff and the Class members sustained damages arising out of Defendant’s uniform wrongful conduct and unsolicited text message calls. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex litigation and class actions. Plaintiff’s claims are representative of the claims of the other members of the Class. That is, Plaintiff and the Class members sustained damages as a result of Defendant’s conduct and received substantially the same text messages. Plaintiff also has no interests antagonistic to those of the Class, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. Plaintiff and her counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Class, and have the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel has any interest adverse to the Class. Plaintiff reserves the right to revise the foregoing "Class Allegations" and "Class Definition" based on facts learned through additional investigation and in discovery. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. Defendant made unwanted, unsolicited text message advertisements to Plaintiff and the Class members’ cellular telephones without their prior express written consent. Defendant sent these text messages to Plaintiff and the Class' cellular telephone numbers using equipment with the ability to store or produce cellular telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator and to dial such numbers without human intervention. The equipment used by Defendant to send text messages to Plaintiff and Class’ cellular telephone numbers qualifies as an ATDS as defined by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(2) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). As a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the members of the putative Class suffered actual damages and also have had their rights to privacy adversely impacted. Plaintiff and the Class are therefore entitled to, among other things, a minimum of $500 in statutory damages for each such violation under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). Because Defendant’s misconduct was willful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class. Alternatively, because Defendant’s misconduct was negligent, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), award statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class. Additionally, as a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class are entitled to an injunction under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A) and § 227(c)(5)(A) to ensure that Defendant’s violations of the TCPA do not continue into the future.

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(Fair Labor Standards Act Violations) (Violations of Ohio Revised Code 4111.03) Defendant Larchwood Health Group LLC d/b/a Larchwood Village Retirement Community is an assisted living facility/nursing home. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a State Tested Nurses Aide (“STNA”) between August 2017 and September 2017. Other similarly-situated employees were employed by Defendant as activity assistants and caregivers. Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees were classified by Defendant as non-exempt employees. Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees were paid by Defendant on an hourly basis. (Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation) Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees worked more than 40 hours per week, but Defendants failed to pay them overtime compensation for the hours they worked over 40 each workweek. Rather than paying overtime compensation, Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees were only paid straight time for the hours they worked over 40 each workweek. 4 (Failure to Keep Accurate Records) Defendant failed to make, keep and preserve accurate records of the unpaid work performed by Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees. (Defendants Willfully Violated the FLSA) Defendant knowingly and willfully engaged in the above-mentioned violations of the FLSA. Plaintiff brings Count One of this action on her own behalf pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 216(b), and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated who have been, are being, or will be adversely affected by Defendant’s unlawful conduct. The class which Plaintiff seeks to represent and for whom Plaintiff seeks the right to send “opt-in” notices for purposes of the collective action, and of which Plaintiff is herself a member, is composed of and defined as follows: All current and former non-exempt hourly employees employed by Larchwood Health Group LLC at any time between May 18, 2015 and the present. The amount of overtime hours Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees worked are reflected on their time sheets and pay stubs. Plaintiff estimates, that on average she worked between five (5) and ten (10) overtime hours per week. Plaintiff is unable to state at this time the exact size of the potential class, by upon information and belief, avers that is consists of at least 50 persons. This action is maintainable as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 216(b) as to claims for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and 5 costs under the FLSA. In addition to Plaintiff, numerous current and former employees are similarly situated with regard to their wages and claims for unpaid wages and damages. Plaintiff is representative of those other employees and is acting on behalf of their interests as well as her own in bringing this action. These similarly-situated employees are known to Defendant and are readily identifiable through Defendant’s payroll records. These individuals may readily be notified of this action, and allowed to opt in pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 216(b), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their claims for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. Plaintiff brings Count Two of this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of herself and all other members of the class (“the Ohio Class”) defined as: All current and former non-exempt hourly employees employed by Larchwood Health Group LLC at any time between May 18, 2015 and the present. The Ohio Class is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. Plaintiff is unable to state at this time the exact size of the potential Ohio Class, but upon information and belief, avers that it consists of at least 50 persons. There are questions of law or fact common to the Ohio Class, including but not limited to the following: (a) whether Defendant failed to pay overtime compensation to their non-exempt employees for hours worked in excess of 40 each workweek; and (b) what amount of monetary relief will compensate Plaintiff Tanisha Jackson and other members of the class for Defendant’s violation of R.C. 4111.03 and 4111.10. 6 The claims of the named Plaintiff Tanisha Jackson are typical of the claims of other members of the Ohio Class. Named Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the same uniform course of conduct by Defendant, and are based on the same legal theories, as the claims of the other Ohio Class members. Named Plaintiff Tanisha Jackson will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Ohio Class. Her interests are not antagonistic to, but rather are in unison with, the interests of the other Ohio Class members. The named Plaintiff’s counsel has broad experience in handling class action wage-and-hour litigation, and is fully qualified to prosecute the claims of the Ohio Class in this case. The questions of law or fact that are common to the Ohio Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. The primary questions that will determine Defendant’s liability to the Ohio Class, listed above, are common to the class as a whole, and predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Requiring Ohio Class members to pursue their claims individually would entail a host of separate suits, with concomitant duplication of costs, attorneys’ fees, and demands on court resources. Many Ohio Class members’ claims are sufficiently small that they would be reluctant to incur the substantial cost, expense, and risk of pursuing their claims individually. Certification of this case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 will enable the issues to be adjudicated for all class members with the efficiencies of class litigation. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 7 Defendant’s practice and policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly- situated home health aides overtime compensation at the rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for the hours they worked over 40 each workweek violated the FLSA, 29 Plaintiff in corporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. Defendant’s practice and policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly- situated home health aides overtime compensation at the rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for the hours they worked over 40 each workweek violated the OMFWSA,

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(INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAIMS) (INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CLAIMS) (INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CLAIMS) (DISPARATE TREATMENT AND DISPARATE IMPACT DISCRIMINATION) Dr. Ahad is female and a citizen of Pakistan. She is a member of protected classes, as recognized by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.). Dr. Ahad was well-qualified for her work duties described herein. Based on her accomplishments, in June 2008, Dr. Ahad started work as an Assistant Professor for Surgery/Bariatric Surgeon for Defendants via an O-1 visa, which is approved only for individuals with extraordinary ability or achievement. She executed employment contracts (Exhibit A) in 2008 and 2011 that referenced obligations of SIU Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. and SIU School of Medicine, which are both affiliated entities of Dr. Ahad incorporates all prior paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. Defendants have discriminated against Dr. Ahad and similarly-situated female workers in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), as amended by the Equal Pay Act of 1963, by subjecting them to unequal pay on the basis of sex. Defendants have discriminated against Dr. Ahad and similarly-situated female workers by treating them differently from and less preferably than similarly-situated male employees who performed jobs which required equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which were performed under similar working conditions. Defendants so discriminated by subjecting them to lesser (discriminatory) pay and benefits in violation of the Equal Pay Act. Defendants caused, attempted to cause, contributed to, or caused the continuation of, the wage rate discrimination based on sex in violation of the Equal Pay Act. Further, Defendants knew of or showed reckless disregard for the fact their conduct was in violation of the Equal Pay Act. Dr. Ahad and similarly-situated female workers should be awarded all legal and equitable remedies, including underpaid wages, doubled compensatory awards for all willful violations and reasonable attorneys’ fees under 29 U.S.C. §§ 216, et seq. Dr. Ahad incorporates all prior paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. This Count is brought on behalf of Dr. Ahad and all members of the class. Defendants’ conduct above has discriminated between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to female employees, including Dr. Ahad and similarly-situated female workers, at rates less than the rates at which Defendants paid wages to male employees for the same or substantially similar work on jobs the performance of which required equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which were performed under similar working conditions. Defendants thereby violated the IL Equal Pay Act at 820 ILCS 112/ et seq. Dr. Ahad and similarly-situated female workers should be awarded the entire amount of underpayment, interest, costs, reasonable attorneys’ fees and other statutory penalties or relief as may be allowed by the court. Dr. Ahad incorporates all prior paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. This Count is brought on behalf of Dr. Ahad and all members of the class. Defendants have discriminated against Dr. Ahad and similarly-situated female workers by treating them differently from and less preferably than similarly-situated male employees and by subjecting them to discriminatory (lesser) pay and benefits, discriminatory terms and conditions of employment, and other forms of discrimination, in violation of Title VII. Defendants’ conduct has been intentional, deliberate, willful, malicious, reckless and conducted in callous disregard of the rights of Dr. Ahad and similarly-situated female workers, entitling them to punitive damages. By reason of the continuous nature of Defendants’ discriminatory conduct, which persisted throughout the employment of Dr. Ahad and similarly-situated female workers, they are entitled to application of the continuing violations doctrine to all violations alleged herein. Additionally, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, specifically invokes the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act provisions of Title VII. As a result of Defendants’ conduct alleged in this complaint, Dr. Ahad and similarly-situated female workers have suffered and continue to suffer harm, including but not limited to lost wages and benefits, diminished employment opportunities, and humiliation, embarrassment, emotional and physical distress, and mental anguish. By reason of Defendants’ discrimination, Dr. Ahad and similarly-situated female workers are entitled to all remedies available for violations of Title VII, including an award of punitive damages. Reasonable attorneys’ fees should be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Dr. Ahad’s Employment Background

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24 Hour Fitness operates a chain of more than 400 fitness clubs in 18 states, including Texas. 24 Hour Fitness has 89 locations within the State of Texas currently registered with the Texas Secretary of State. 24 Hour Fitness has purported written contracts with its members for access to its health/fitness clubs and for its provision of fitness and other services. On or about October 17, 2010, Plaintiff Wendt entered into a Club Membership Agreement with 24 Hour Fitness (the “Wendt Contract”). A true and correct copy of the Wendt Contract is attached hereto as Exhibit 1 and incorporated herein by reference. Under the Wendt Contract, Plaintiff Wendt’s club of enrollment was 24 Hour Fitness’ club number 00307, located at 7622 Campbell Road, Dallas, Texas 75248. The Wendt Contract is 24 Hour Fitness version 24HR-V.07.10-TEX. Pursuant to the terms of the Wendt Contract, Plaintiff Wendt paid a total amount of $72.62 upfront for (1) $3.10 in dues for prorated days, (2) first month’s dues in the amount of $31.99, (3) last month’s dues in the amount of $31.99 and (4) taxes in the amount of $5.54. Plaintiff Wendt’s monthly dues under the Wendt Contract are $31.99, which he has paid on a regular basis since the Wendt Contract was entered into. Under the Jasso Contract, Plaintiff Jasso’s club of enrollment was 24 Hour Fitness’ club number 00344, located at 2407 West Airport Freeway, Irving, Texas 75062. The Jasso Contract is 24 Hour Fitness version 24HR-V.07.11-TX. Pursuant to the terms of the Jasso Contract, Plaintiff Jasso paid a total amount of $154.29 upfront for (1) an initiation fee in the amount $99.98, (2) first month’s dues in the amount of $20.57, (3) last month’s dues in the amount of $21.99 and (4) taxes in the amount of $11.75. Plaintiff Jasso’s monthly dues under the Jasso Contract are $21.99, which he has paid on a regular basis since the Jasso Contract was entered into. B. Mandatory Requirements for Health Spa Act Contracts. Subchapter G of the Health Spa Act, entitled “CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS,” sets forth specific language that must be included verbatim in a contract for membership in a health club or spa. Health Spa Act § 702.304 provides as follows: Sec. 702.304. CANCELLATION AND REFUND NOTICE. (a) Except as provided by Subsection (b), a contract must state in at least 10-point type that is boldfaced, capitalized, underlined, or otherwise conspicuously distinguished from surrounding written material: This class action is filed on behalf of all persons who, within two years prior to the filing of this action, paid dues and/or fees for services to 24 Hour Fitness (“dues and services fees”) pursuant to contracts with 24 Hour Fitness for membership in or access to any 24 Hour Fitness location in Texas or for the provision of services at any 24 Hour Fitness location in Texas (the “Class”). Pursuant to § 702.003(14) of the Health Spa Act and for purposes of this action, “services” means the “programs, plans, guidance, or instruction” that 24 Hour Fitness provides for its members, including “diet planning, exercise instruction and programs, and instructional classes.” The Class Period runs from two years before the date this action was filed until the date of class certification. Plaintiffs reserve the right to modify or amend the definition of the proposed Class before the Court determines whether certification is appropriate. The Class as defined is identifiable and unambiguous based on objective information and criteria, including the computer and paper records regularly maintained by 24 Hour Fitness in its regular course of business. Upon information and belief, 24 Hour Fitness has collected dues and services fees pursuant to purported written contracts with hundreds of thousands of Texas residents during the Class Period within the last two years. The Class is thus so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring all members of the Class individually before the Court. Plaintiffs are members of the Class. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of, if not identical to, the claims of the rest of the Class. Plaintiffs entered into the Contracts with 24 Hour Fitness which violated the Health Spa Act and are therefore void. The other members of the Class also entered into contracts with 24 Hour Fitness that violated the Health Spa Act in the exact same manner and which, therefore, are also void. Plaintiffs’ claims thus arise from the same factual pattern and under the same legal theories as all of the other members of the Class. A class action provides a fair and efficient method for adjudicating this controversy. The substantive claims of Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class are identical and will require evidentiary proof of the same kind and application of the same law to those facts. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because the Class members number in the hundreds of thousands and individual damages are relatively low compared to the cost of suit. The expense and burden of individual litigation would make it impracticable or impossible for Class members to prosecute their claims individually. Trial of Plaintiffs’ and the Class’ claims is manageable. Damages can be precisely calculated based upon objective data and criteria. Absent certification of a class, the Class members will be effectively precluded from protecting and enforcing their legal rights, and 24 Hour Fitness would be permitted to retain the illegal charges it collected from Plaintiffs and the other Class members. A. Contracts Between 24 Hour Fitness and Plaintiffs THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S INTERNET WEBSITE." (4) "IF YOU DIE OR BECOME TOTALLY AND PERMANENTLY DISABLED AFTER THE DATE THIS CONTRACT

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Plaintiff received the subject text messages within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. The purpose of Defendant’s text message was to promote and advertise its restaurant. 12 . Upon information and belief, Defendant caused similar text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. Plaintiff never voluntarily disclosed his telephone number to Defendant. Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number has consistently been registered on the National Do Not Call Registry since 2 007. Plaintiff solely uses his cellular telephone for personal purposes. To send the text messages, Defendant used a text messaging platform (the “Platform”) that permitted Defendant to transmit bulk SMS text messages. Systems like the Platform utilized by Defendant have the capacity to transmit thousands of messages per second and are technologically more sophisticated in their availability to transmit messages than a traditional smartphone. Moreover, Defendant utilized a “short-code” to transmit the messages, which cannot be done using a regular smartphone. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: [1] Whether Defendant initiated telemarketing calls to telephone numbers; [2 ] Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it had express consent to make such calls; [3] Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; [4 ] Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and [5] Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 32 . The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. Defendant violated 4 7 U.S.C. § 2 2 7(c)(5) because Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class received more than one telephone call in a 12 -month period made by or on behalf of Defendant in violation of 4 7 C.F.R. § 64 .12 00, as described above. As a result of Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein, Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class suffered actual damages and, under section 4 7 U.S.C. § 2 2 7(c), are entitled, inter alia, to receive up to $500 in damages for such violations of 4 7 C.F.R. § 64 .12 00. 52 . To the extent Defendant’s misconduct is determined to be willful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to 4 7 U.S.C. § 2 2 7(c)(5), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the members of the Do Not Call Registry Class. On or about March 2 7, 2 02 1 and April 2 , 2 02 1, Defendant sent the following text messages to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone: CASE NO. WILLIAM WARNER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, PROPOSED CLASS 2 7. Plaintiff brings this lawsuit as a class action on behalf of himself individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated persons as a class action pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.2 2 0(b)(2 ) and (b)(3). The “Class” that Plaintiff seeks to represent is comprised of class two classes and defined as: NO CONSENT CLASS: All persons in the United States who, within four years prior to the filing of this action, (1) were sent a text message by or on behalf of Defendant, (2) using the same equipment or type of equipment utilized to text message Plaintiff, (3) regarding Defendant’s property, goods, and/or services. DO NOT CALL REGISTRY CLASS: All persons in the United States who from four years prior to the filing of this action: (1) were sent a text message, prerecorded message or phone call by or on behalf of Defendant; (2) more than one time within any 12-month period; (3) where the person’s telephone number had been listed on the National Do Not Call Registry for at least thirty days; (4) for the purpose of advertising and/or promoting Defendant’s products and services. 2 8. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. VIOLATION OF 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) and 47 C.F.R. § 64.120 0 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the No Consent Class) Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class) 4 5. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the allegations of paragraphs 1-36 as if fully set forth herein. 4 6. The TCPA’s implementing regulation, 4 7 C.F.R. § 64 .12 00(c), provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.” 4 7. 4 7 C.F.R. § 64 .12 00(e), provides that § 64 .12 00(c) and (d) “are applicable to any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone numbers.” 4 8. 4 7 C.F.R. § 64 .12 00(d) further provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any call for telemarketing purposes to a residential telephone subscriber unless such person or entity has instituted procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls made by or on behalf of that person or entity.” 4 9. Any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12 - month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” may bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 4 7 U.S.C. § 2 2 7(c).

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The amount of the debt; Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). The Class consists of: a. all individuals with addresses in the State of New Jersey; b. to whom Defendant sent an initial collection letter; c. attempting to collect a consumer debt; d. providing multiple addresses; e. without identifying the correct address to which to send a dispute; and f. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (21) days after the filing of this action. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendant and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class is the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendant and its respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor his attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth herein. The name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; The obligation arose out of a transaction involving a consumer debt to BMW Financial Services in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, were incurred solely for personal purposes, specifically a personal automobile. The alleged BMW Financial Services obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a (5). BMW Financial Services is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (4). Upon information and belief, BMW Financial Services contracted with the Defendant to collect the alleged debt. Therefore, Defendant is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (6). Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation – October 12, 2020 Collection Letter On or about October 12, 2020, Defendant sent the Plaintiff an initial collection letter regarding the alleged debt owed to BMW Financial Services. (See “Letter” attached as Exhibit A). The letter ostensibly provides the notices as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g regarding disputing the debt. However, there are three addresses listed for Defendant in two different states: a. 9 Wills Way, Piscataway, NJ 08854 b. PO Box 1121, Charlotte, NC 28201 c. PO Box 55, 3 Skiles Ave, Piscataway, NJ 08855 A statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt- collector; Plaintiff was therefore confused as to how to properly dispute the debt and exercise his rights under § 1692g. Upon information and belief, disputes sent to one or more of these addresses will not be honored by Defendant. Listing these incorrect addresses(es) misled Plaintiff into believing a proper dispute cannot be sent there. Plaintiff was therefore unable to straightforwardly dispute the debt resulting in wasted time. Plaintiff was therefore unable to evaluate his options of how to handle this debt. Because of this, Plaintiff expended time, money, and effort in determining the proper course of action. As Plaintiff did not understand how to dispute the debt, Plaintiff paid off the balance of the debt out of fear of further accrual of interest and fees and damage to his credit score. However, Plaintiff wanted to dispute the debt and would have done so if the dispute process was comprehendible. These violations by Defendant were knowing, willful, negligent and/or intentional, and Defendant did not maintain procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such violations. Defendant’s collection efforts with respect to this alleged debt from Plaintiff caused Plaintiff to suffer concrete and particularized harm, inter alia, because the FDCPA provides Plaintiff with the legally protected right not to be misled or treated unfairly with respect to any action regarding the collection of any consumer debt. A statement that the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and Defendant’s actions created an appreciable risk to Plaintiff of being unable to properly respond or handle Defendant’s debt collection. Plaintiff was confused and misled to his detriment by the statements in the dunning letter, and relied on the contents of the letter to his detriment. Plaintiff would have pursued a different course of action were it not for Defendant’s statutory violations. As a result of Defendant’s deceptive, misleading and false debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth herein. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Defendant violated said section by deceptively and/or misleadingly providing multiple addresses and not identifying which one should be used to dispute the debt, in violation of § 1692e (10). Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth herein. A statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. In the alternative, Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f, a debt collector may not use any unfair or unconscionable means in connection with the collection of any debt. Defendant violated this section by unfairly providing multiple addresses and not identifying which one to use for disputing a debt. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment in that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth herein. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment in that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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(BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE) (BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY) (BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY) (VIOLATION OF MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT) Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of itself and as a class action, pursuant to the provisions of Rules 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of the following classes: All persons or entities in the United States who are current or former owners and/or lessees of a Class Vehicle (the “Nationwide Class”). All persons or entities who purchased or leased a Class Vehicle in the State of California (the “California Class”). (collectively, the “Class,” unless otherwise noted). Excluded from the Class are individuals who have personal injury claims resulting from the defect in the MyFord Touch system. Also excluded from the Class are Ford and its subsidiaries and affiliates; all persons who make a timely election to be excluded from the Class; governmental entities; and the judge to whom this case is assigned and his/her immediate family. Plaintiff reserves the right to revise the Class definition based upon information learned through discovery. Certification of Plaintiff’s claims for class-wide treatment is appropriate because Plaintiff can prove the elements of his claims on a class-wide basis using the same evidence as would be used to prove those elements in individual actions alleging the same claim. This action has been brought and may be properly maintained on behalf of each of the Classes proposed herein under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all allegations of Paragraphs 1-71 as though fully set forth herein. Plaintiff brings this Count on behalf of the Nationwide Class. Plaintiff is a “consumer” within the meaning of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3). Ford is a “supplier” and “warrantor” within the meaning of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(4)-(5). Plaintiff incorporates by reference all allegations of Paragraphs 1-71 as though fully set forth herein. Plaintiff brings this Count on behalf of the Nationwide Class. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all allegations of Paragraphs 1-71 as though fully set forth herein. Plaintiff brings this Count on behalf of the Nationwide Class. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all allegations of Paragraphs 1-71 as though fully set forth herein. Plaintiff brings this Count on behalf of the Nationwide Class. Ford is and was at all relevant times a merchant with respect to MyFord Touch-equipped motor vehicles. A. Introduction of MyFord Touch A.  Introduction of MyFord Touch ................................................................ 5  B.  Description of MyFord Touch ................................................................. 7  C.  MyFord Touch Has Been Plagued with Serious Defects ...................... 11  D.  The TSBs and Warranty Extension ........................................................ 12  E.  Similar Experiences and Complaints by Consumers ............................. 16  F.  Fallout From the MyFord Touch Problems ........................................... 22  VI.  ACT) ................................................................................................................. 27  COUNT II: (BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY) .................................. 29  COUNT III: (BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS MERCHANTABILITY) .................................................................................. 31  B.  Claims Brought on Behalf of the California Class ................................ 32  NOW THEY FINALLY DO BUT DO NOT SAY WHEN A FIX WILL BE AVAILABLE. I SHOULD HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT OPTION WAS NOT WORKING BEFORE THEY HAD ME SIGN A LEASE FOR THE CAR. ALOT THE MEMORY. IT HELPED, BUT IT STILL FAILED, AT TIMES. THE SECOND TIME, HE RETURNED TO THE DEALER, THEY INSTALLED AN UPDATED PROGRAM FROM FORD THAT WAS SUPPOSED TO CORRECT THE MALFUNCTIONING SYSTEM. A TYPICAL PROBLEM WAS THE SYSTEM LOCKING UP, THE SCREEN WOULD FREEZE AND THERE WAS NO CONTROL OVER THE HEATER/AIR CONDITIONER OR RADIO VII.  CLAIMS FOR RELIEF .................................................................................... 27  A.  Claims Brought on Behalf of the Nationwide Class .............................. 27 

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13 20 24 PROPOSED CLASS 25 26 On January 5, 2018, Defendant transmitted a call to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone 14 number ending in 3092 (the “3092 Number”) and left the following prerecorded message on 15 Plaintiff’s phone: 16 ….your energy supply charges on your electric account. Please call 17 me back at 609-201-1785 and have a copy of your electric statement 18 handy to review. Your reference number is NJ7741002. 19 20 The above referenced call originated from telephone number 609-201-1785, 21 which is owned and/or operated by Defendant, and answered by a representative who announces 22 Defendant’s name upon answering. 23 The above call was transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, and within the 24 time frame relevant to this action. 25 Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other prerecorded calls to be 2 made to individuals residing within this judicial district. 3 Upon information and belief, Defendant has received one or more complaints 4 from recipients of its prerecorded calls who do not reside within Defendant’s service area, placing 5 Defendant on notice that its telemarketing activities are impacting residents of states outside of 6 Defendant’s service area. 7 At the time Defendant caused the subject prerecorded call to be made to 8 Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, Defendant knew or should have known, or was willfully ignorant, that 9 Plaintiff was a resident of Nevada. 10 At the time Defendant caused prerecorded calls to be made to the cellular 11 telephones of other individuals residing in Nevada, Defendant knew or should have known, or was 12 willfully ignorant, that these individuals were residents of Nevada. 13 Plaintiff has never had any type of relationship with Defendant. 14 Plaintiff never provided his telephone number to Defendant. 15 At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with his express written 16 consent or express consent to be contacted using a prerecorded message. 17 Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 3092 Number, and is financially 18 responsible for phone service to the 3092 Number. 19 The fact that other individuals have received the same message as Plaintiff 11 demonstrates that Defendant used prerecorded messages to harass thousands of individuals. 12 Through its telemarketing calls, Defendant violated Plaintiff’s substantive rights 13 under the TCPA. 14 Defendant’s TCPA violation caused Plaintiff a particularized and concrete injury, 15 including: 16 a. Invasion of privacy; 17 b. Inconvenience; 18 c. Unwanted occupation of his time and mental energy; 19 d. Unwanted occupation of his cellular telephone; 20 e. Nuisance; 21 f. Trespass; and 22 g. Aggravation and annoyance. 23 6 Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) 7 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 8 9 Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a Class defined as follows: 1 All persons within the United States who, within the four 2 years prior to the filing of this Complaint, received a 3 telephone call through the use of an artificial or 4 prerecorded voice, from Defendant or anyone on 5 Defendant’s behalf, promoting Defendant’s services, to 6 said person’s cellular telephone number, who had not 7 expressly consented in writing to receiving such calls. 8 Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does 9 not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several 10 thousands, if not more. 11 The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If 5 Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely violates the TCPA, Plaintiff and the Class members will 6 have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 7 8 Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth 10 herein. 11 It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for 12 emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic 13 telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice…to any telephone number assigned to 14 a…cellular telephone service….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 15 Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – made prerecorded or 16 artificial voice calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and Class Members. 17 These calls were made without regard to whether Defendant had first obtained 18 express written consent to make such calls. In fact, Defendants did not have prior express written 19 consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and Class Members when the subject calls were made. 20 Defendant violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an artificial or 21 prerecorded voice to make marketing telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and Class 22 Members without their prior express written consent. 23

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(VIOLATION OF THE FAIR STANDARDS ACT, FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME) (On behalf of the Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective) The named Plaintiffs and members of the proposed FLSA Collective and Rule 23 Class are individuals, who were, or are employed by the Defendant, as School Bus Drivers ("Employees"); and their job duties, as drivers, are non-exempt; and in fact, the Defendant has paid time and one half of the Employees' regular hourly rate, for a portion of their hours worked on a weekly basis. The named Plaintiffs and members of the proposed FLSA Collective and Rule 23 Class are, and were, paid at the normal rate of $14.00, per hour for their work as School Bus Drivers; and for a portion of their hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in any work week, they were paid in accordance with the FLSA premium rate, time and one half of their regular hourly rate, for all hours worked in excess of the regular rate, in any particular work week. The named Plaintiffs and members of the proposed FLSA Collective and Rule 23 Class worked, on average, fifty (50) hours per week; however, for each additional ten (10) hour overtime period per week, they would only be paid three (3) hours of overtime compensation; and for the remaining seven (7) hours of overtime worked per week, they would be paid straight time. Although the SCHOOL BOARD classified the Employees as non-exempt workers, the named Plaintiffs and members of the proposed FLSA Collective and Rule 23 Class are, and were, permitted and authorized, to work on average, fourteen (14) overtime hours, during any two (2) week pay period; without overtime pay. Defendant was aware, or should have been aware, that the named Plaintiffs and members of the proposed FLSA Collective and Rule 23 Class, performed non-exempt work, during these additional fourteen (14) overtime times hours, which were performed by the Employees, during any two (2) week pay period. The named Plaintiffs bring this Complaint on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated individuals. The Proposed FLSA Collective Class is defined as follows: All persons who worked in the position of School Bus Driver for the School Board of Palm Beach County, Florida, at any time in the two years prior to the filing of this Complaint. The named Plaintiffs have consented in writing, to be part of this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b); and Plaintiffs' signed consent forms are attached hereto, as The named Plaintiffs bring this Complaint, on behalf of themselves, and all similarly situated individuals. The proposed Rule 23 Class is defined as follows: All persons who worked in the position of School Bus Driver for the School Board of Palm Beach County, Florida, at any time in the two years prior to the filing of this Complaint. The persons in the proposed Rule 23 Class are so numerous that joinder of all of the proposed Rule 23 Class members is impracticable. There are questions of law and fact common to the proposed Rule 23 Class that predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the proposed Class, including, but not limited to: a. Whether Defendant violated the FLSA, by failing to pay the Employees overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty hours in any individual work week; b. Whether the Defendant knew that the Employees were not being paid overtime pay, for all hours worked in excess of forty hours per week, in any work week; c. The proper measure of damages for the representative Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the class; d. Whether the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class; and e. Whether the Defendant should be enjoined from such violations in the future. The named Plaintiffs' claims are typical of those of the proposed Rule 23 Class; Plaintiffs, like other members of the Rule 23 Class, worked as School Bus Drivers for the Defendant; and furthermore, Plaintiffs, like other members of the Rule 23 Class, were not paid overtime compensation for approximately fourteen (14) hours of overtime work, during any applicable pay period, or for approximately seven (7) hours of overtime work in any work week. This action is properly maintainable as a class action under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 (b)(l')(A) because prosecuting separate actions by individual class members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendant. This action is properly maintainable as a class action under Fed.R. Civ.P. 23 (b)(2) because the Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief, or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole. This action is properly maintainable as a class action under Fed.R. Civ.P. 23 (b)(3) because questions of law or fact predominate over any questions affecting individual class members, and a class action is superior to other methods in order to ensure a fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because, in the context of wage and hour litigation, individual plaintiffs lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute separate lawsuits against large employers. Class action litigation is also superior because it will preclude the need for unduly disruptive litigation resulting in inconsistent judgments pertaining to Defendant's policies and practices. The named Plaintiffs restate and re-aver the allegations of Paragraphs 1-46 of the Complaint, as if fully set forth herein. The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Section 207, requires employers to pay non-exempt employees one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) hours per work week. As described in the preceding paragraphs, Defendant permitted the named Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective to work more than forty hours per week; and Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective were not fully compensated for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week, in any particular work week. The named Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective are not exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA, see, 29 U.S.C. Section 213. Defendant's actions, policies and practices as described herein, violate the FLSA's overtime requirement by regularly and repeatedly failing to compensate Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective at the required overtime rate. As a direct and proximate cause of the Defendant's unlawful conduct, the named Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective have suffered and will continue to suffer a loss of income and other damages. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. Section 255 (a); Defendant knew or showed reckless disregard for the fact that its compensation policies and practices were in violation of the FLSA. FLORIDA, CASE NO. COLLECTIVE AND CLASS

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At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of California. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, “persons” as defined by Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the Class”). Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Class, consisting of: a. All persons within the United States who had or have a number assigned to a cellular telephone service, who received at least one call using an ATDS and/or an artificial prerecorded voice from CapitoHomes, LLC, or Jipal Bhalodwala, or their agents, calling on behalf of CapitoHomes, LLC, or Jipal Bhalodwala, between the date of filing this action and the four years preceding, where such calls were placed for marketing purposes, to non-customers of CapitoHomes, LLC, or Jipal Bhalodwala, at the time of the calls. Jipal Bhalodwala and CapitoHomes, LLC and their employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendants in at least the following ways: Defendants illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class members via their cellular telephones thereby causing Plaintiff and the Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiff and the Class members previously paid, by having to retrieve or administer messages left by Defendants or their agents, during those illegal calls, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and the Class members. Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby. The joinder of the Class members is impractical and the disposition of their claims in the Class action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and to the Court. The Class can be identified through Defendants’s records and/or Defendants’ agent’s records. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented. The questions of law and fact to the Class predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members, including the following: i. Whether, within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint, Defendants made any call(s) (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) to the Class members using any ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice to any telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service; ii. Whether Defendants called non-customers of Defendants for marketing purposes; iii.Whether Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby, and the extent of damages for such violation(s); and iv.Whether Defendants should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have all suffered irreparable harm as a result of the Defendants’s unlawful and wrongful conduct. Absent a class action, the Class will continue to face the potential for irreparable harm. In addition, these violations of law will be allowed to proceed without remedy and Defendants will likely continue such illegal conduct. The size of Class member’s individual claims causes, few, if any, Class members to be able to afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and claims involving violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Class-wide damages are essential to induce Defendants to comply with federal and California law. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendants is small because the maximum statutory damages in an individual action for violation of privacy are minimal. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than those that would be presented in numerous individual claims. Defendants has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. As a result of Defendants's negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. As a result of Defendants's knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and each of the Class are entitled to treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. As a result of Defendants' negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) As a result of Defendants' willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00 for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. VIOLATION OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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(Against the Individual Defendants for Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act) (Against All Defendants for Violations of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9 Promulgated Thereunder) Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of herself and the other public shareholders of Orbital ATK (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants herein and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with any Defendant. Orbital ATK, is an aerospace and defense systems company and supplier of related products to the United States Government, allied nations, prime contractors and other customers. The Company's segments include Flight Systems Group, Defense Systems Group, Space Systems Group, and Corporate. Its products include launch vehicles and related propulsion systems; satellites and associated components and services; tactical missiles, subsystems and defense electronics, precision weapons, armament systems, and ammunition. The Flight Systems Group segment consists of Launch Vehicles Division, Propulsion Systems Division, and Aerospace Structures Division. The Defense Systems Group segment consists of Armament Systems Division, Defense Electronic Division, Missile Products Division, and Small Caliber Systems Division. The Space Systems Group consists of Commercial Satellites Division, Government Satellites Division, Space Components Division, and Technical Services Division. The Merger Consideration is inadequate given Orbital ATK’s recent financial performance and strong growth prospects. In the year leading up to the announcement of the Proposed Merger, Orbital ATK’s stock price increased over 50%, going from $72.48 on September 16, 2016 to $110.04 on September 15, 2017, illustrated by the chart below: Orbital ATK’s good news has continued since announcing the deal. On September 19, 2017, the Company announced that the U.S. Army placed an additional $123 million in orders under production contract Option 2 for the Precision Guidance Kit (PGK) that will continue to deliver PGK’s to the warfighter. Orbital ATK had previously signed a $69 million production option in July 2016 under the same Option 2. Additionally, on October 24, 2017, the Company announced they received a $24 million contract from Lockheed Martin to produce additional composite components for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Finally, Citigroup valued the Company at a higher price than the Merger Consideration. Citigroup calculated an implied equity value per share of up to $157.15, substantially higher than the $134.50 Merger Consideration. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. Section 14(a)(1) of the Exchange Act makes it “unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to section 78l of this title.” 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)(1). The omission of information from a proxy statement will violate Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 if other SEC regulations specifically require disclosure of the omitted information. Defendants have issued the Proxy with the intention of soliciting shareholder support for the Proposed Merger. Each of the Defendants reviewed and authorized the dissemination of the Proxy, which fails to provide critical information regarding, amongst other things: (i) financial projections for the Company; and (ii) the valuation analyses performed by Citigroup in support of its fairness opinion. In so doing, Defendants made untrue statements of fact and/or omitted material facts necessary to make the statements made not misleading. Each of the Individual Defendants, by virtue of their roles as officers and/or directors, were aware of the omitted information but failed to disclose such information, in violation of Section 14(a). The Individual Defendants were therefore negligent, as they had reasonable grounds to believe material facts existed that were misstated or omitted from the Proxy, but nonetheless failed to obtain and disclose such information to shareholders although they could have done so without extraordinary effort. The Individual Defendants knew or were negligent in not knowing that the material information identified above has been omitted from the Proxy, rendering the sections of the Proxy identified above to be materially incomplete and misleading. Indeed, the Individual Defendants were required to review Citigroup’s analyses in connection with their receipt of the fairness opinion, question Citigroup as to its derivation of fairness, and be particularly attentive to the procedures followed in preparing the Proxy and review it carefully before it was disseminated, to corroborate that there are no material misstatements or omissions. The Individual Defendants were, at the very least, negligent in preparing and reviewing the Proxy. The preparation of a proxy statement by corporate insiders containing materially false or misleading statements or omitting a material fact constitutes negligence. The Individual Defendants were negligent in choosing to omit material information from the Proxy or failing to notice the material omissions in the Proxy upon reviewing it, which they were required to do carefully as the Company’s directors. Indeed, the Individual Defendants were intricately involved in the process leading up to the signing of the Merger Agreement and the preparation of the Company’s financial projections. Orbital ATK is also deemed negligent as a result of the Individual Defendants’ negligence in preparing and reviewing the Proxy. The misrepresentations and omissions in the Proxy are material to Plaintiff and the Class, who will be deprived of their right to cast an informed vote if such misrepresentations and omissions are not corrected prior to the vote on the Proposed Merger. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of Orbital ATK within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as alleged herein. By virtue of their positions as officers and/or directors of Orbital ATK, and participation in and/or awareness of the Company’s operations and/or intimate knowledge of the incomplete and misleading statements contained in the Proxy filed with the SEC, they had the power to influence and control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision making of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the various statements that Plaintiff contends are materially incomplete and misleading. Each of the Individual Defendants was provided with or had unlimited access to copies of the Proxy and other statements alleged by Plaintiff to be misleading prior to and/or shortly after these statements were issued and had the ability to prevent the issuance of the statements or cause the statements to be corrected. In particular, each of the Individual Defendants had direct and supervisory involvement in the day-to-day operations of the Company, and, therefore, is presumed to have had the power to control or influence the particular transactions giving rise to the Exchange Act violations alleged herein, and exercised the same. The Proxy at issue contains the unanimous recommendation of each of the Individual Defendants to approve the Proposed Merger. They were thus directly involved in preparing this document. By virtue of the foregoing, the Individual Defendants have violated Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. As set forth above, the Individual Defendants had the ability to exercise control over and did control a person or persons who have each violated Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 by their acts and omissions as alleged herein. By virtue of their positions as controlling persons, these Defendants are liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. As a direct and proximate result of Individual Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff and the Class will be irreparably harmed. Plaintiff and the Class have no adequate remedy at law. Only through the exercise of this Court’s equitable powers can Plaintiff and the Class be fully protected from the immediate and irreparable injury that Defendants’ actions threaten to inflict. I. Background and the Proposed Transaction

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Defendants manufacture, distribute, market, and sell the IGF-1 Plus line of health supplements on a nationwide basis. Defendants presently offer six forms of the IGF-1 Plus products: (a) Super Max 200,000ng; (b) Maximum 100,000ng; (c) Ultra Plus 25,000ng; (d) Ultra 10,000ng; (e) Starter Plus 5,000ng; and (f) Starter 3,000ng. The products are nearly identical in their chemical composition: they each contain deer antler velvet (cervidae parvum comu) and stevia extract (leaves). The only differences are the amounts of deer antler velvet and stevia extract, and that the Super Max and Maximum IGF-1 Plus products come in a dropper form rather than a spray. The advertising and marketing messages for the products are nearly identical. See Exhibit A. All IGF-1 Plus products claim to have clinically tested components, and all products claim they build lean muscle mass, speed recovery time, promote healthy joints, and increase libido. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the actual quantity of deer antler velvet in any of the products is irrelevant because it is completely ineffectual when delivered to the human body in the droplet form. The IGF-1 Plus products are sold throughout California and the United States via the Nutronics website. Since the launch of the IGF-1 Plus products, Defendants have consistently conveyed the message to consumers throughout California and nationwide that the IGF-1 Plus products ingredients will help “build lean muscle mass and speed[] their recovery time,” “boost your energy levels,” and “promote sexual performance and function by raising libido.” While the main component of the IGF-1 Plus products, IGF-1, has been Case No. 6 Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and seeks certification of the following Class: All persons who purchased the IGF-1 Plus products in California. Excluded from the Class are Defendants, their parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, and directors, those who purchased the IGF-1 Plus products for the purpose of resale, and those who assert claims for personal injury. Numerosity. Members of the Class are so numerous and geographically dispersed that joinder of all Class members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the proposed Class contains many thousands of members. The precise number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff. Existence and Predominance of Common Questions of Law and Fact. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members. The common legal and factual questions include, but are not limited to, the following: Case No. 14 Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. Plaintiff seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive and equitable relief on behalf of the entire Class, on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class, to enjoin and prevent Defendants from engaging in the acts described, and requiring Defendants to provide full restitution to Plaintiff and Class members. Unless a Class is certified, Defendants will retain monies that were taken from Plaintiff and Class members as a result of their conduct. Unless a Class-wide injunction is issued, Defendants will continue to commit the violations alleged, and the members of the Class and the general public will continue to be misled. This cause of action is brought under the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code § 1750, et seq. (the “Act”). Plaintiff and the proposed Class are consumers as defined by California Civil Code § 1761(d). Defendants’ IGF-1 Plus products are goods within the meaning of the Act. Case No. 16 Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. As alleged herein, Plaintiff has suffered injury in fact and lost money or property as a result of Defendants’ conduct because he purchased the IGF-1 Plus products. In the course of conducting business, Defendants committed unlawful business practices by, inter alia, making the representations (which also constitute advertising within the meaning of § 17200) and omissions of material facts, as set forth more fully herein, and violating Civil Code §§ 1572, 1573, 1709, 1711, 1770, Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq., 17500, et seq., and the common law. Plaintiff and the Class reserve the right to allege other violations of law, which constitute other unlawful business acts or practices. Such conduct is ongoing and continues to this date. Defendants’ acts, omissions, misrepresentations, practices and non- disclosures as alleged herein also constitute “unfair” business acts and practices within the meaning of Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq., in that their conduct is substantially injurious to consumers, offends public policy, and is immoral, unethical, Case No. 18 Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. Plaintiff, and each member of the Class, formed a contract with Defendants at the time Plaintiff and the other members of the Class purchased the IGF-1 Plus products. The terms of that contract include the promises and affirmations of fact made Case No. 19 Breach of Express Warranty The IGF-1 Plus products Violation of Business & Professions Code § 17200, et seq. Violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act –Civil Code § 1750, et seq.

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Plaintiffs have retained the services of the undersigned attorneys and are obligated to pay the undersigned a reasonable fee for their services. Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all claims alleged herein. Plaintiffs sue under Rule 23(a) and (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for violations of the WARN Act, on behalf of themselves, and a class of employees who were laid off by Defendants as part of a reasonably foreseeable result of shutdowns or mass layoffs (“Class”) during the weeks of September 30, 2019, through October 14, 2019. The persons in the Class (“Class Members”) are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable as there are, upon information and belief, approximately one-hundred or more (100) potential class members. The claims of the representative Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the Class, as she/they were laid off as part of the shutdown or mass layoff, and did not receive the requisite notice. The representative Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. The named Plaintiff retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class action employment litigation. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy—particularly in the context of WARN Act and wage litigation – where the individual Plaintiff and class members may lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit in federal court against corporate defendants and separate actions would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members and the adjudications with respect to individual class members would be dispositive of the interests of other members. Defendants have acted on grounds that apply generally to the class. Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees were laid off as part of plant shutdowns or mass layoffs of a single site of employment as defined by the WARN Act, for which they were entitled to receive 60 days advance written notice under the WARN Act. At all relevant times, Defendants employed three hundred (300) or more employees, exclusive of part-time employees, or employed 100 or more employees who in the aggregate worked at least 4,000 hours per week exclusive of hours of overtime within the United States as defined by the WARN Act. At all relevant times, Defendants were “employers” as that term is defined by the WARN Act. During the weeks of September 30, 2019, through October 14, 2019, Defendants ordered “shutdowns” or “mass layoffs” as that term is defined by the WARN Act. Defendants’ actions resulted in an “employment loss” as that term is defined by the WARN Act for at least 33% of its workforce, and at least 50 of its employees, excluding (a) employees who worked less than six of the twelve months prior to the date WARN notice was required to be given and (b) employees who worked an average of less than 20 hours per week during the 90-day period prior to the date WARN notice was required to be given. Defendants’ termination of the Class Members’ employment constituted plant shutdowns or mass layoffs at a single site of employment as defined by the WARN Act. The Plaintiff and each of the Class Members are “aggrieved employees” of Defendants as that term is defined by the WARN Act. Pursuant to the WARN Act, Defendants were required to provide at least 60 days prior written notice of the layoff, or notice as soon as practicable, to the affected employees, or their representative, explaining why the sixty (60) days prior notice was not given. Defendants failed to give at least sixty (60) days prior notice of the layoff in violation of the WARN Act. Defendants failed to pay the Plaintiff and each of the Class Members their respective wages, salary, commissions, bonuses, accrued holiday pay and accrued vacation for 60 working days following their respective layoffs, and failed to make the pension and 401(k) contributions, provide other employee benefits under ERISA, and pay their medical expenses for 60 calendar days from and after the dates of their respective terminations. As a result of Defendants’ failure to pay the wages, benefits and other monies as asserted, the Plaintiff and Class Members were damaged in an amount equal to the sum of the members’ unpaid wages, accrued holiday pay, accrued vacation pay, accrued sick leave pay and benefits which would have been paid for a period of sixty (60) calendar days after the date of the their terminations. All administrative notice requirements and prerequisites have been satisfied. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 33 as if fully stated herein. Plaintiffs were employed by Defendants. During the weeks of October 7 and October 14, 2019, Defendants, without warning, and despite having knowledge of their intention to conduct mass lay-offs, engaged in a mass lay off without properly notifying Plaintiffs. No prior written notice was provided to the Plaintiffs as required by the WARN act. VIOLATIONS OF THE WARN ACT AGAINST DEFENDANT

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Plaintiff brings claims, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “FRCP”) Rule 23, individually and on behalf of the following New York consumer class (the “Class”):  All New York consumers who were sent collection letters and/or notice from 3 Defendant attempting to collect an obligation owed to or allegedly owed to Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., that contain at least one of the alleged violations arising from Defendant's violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692 et seq..  The Class period begins one year to the filing of this Action. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “12” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. The Class satisfies all the requirements of Rule 23 of the FRCP for maintaining a class action:  Upon information and belief, the Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable because there are hundreds and/or thousands of persons who have received debt collection letters and/or notices from the Defendant that violate specific provisions of the FDCPA. Plaintiff is complaining of a standard form letter and/or notice that is sent to hundreds of persons (See Exhibit A, except that the undersigned attorney has, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2 partially redacted the financial account numbers in an effort to protect Plaintiff’s privacy);  There are questions of law and fact which are common to the Class and which predominate over questions affecting any individual Class member. These common questions of law and fact include, without limitation: a. Whether Defendant violated various provisions of the FDCPA; b. Whether Plaintiff and the Class have been injured by Defendant’s conduct; c. Whether Plaintiff and the Class have sustained damages and are entitled to restitution as a result of Defendant’s wrongdoing and if so, what is the proper measure and appropriate statutory formula to 4 be applied in determining such damages and restitution; and d. Whether Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to declaratory and/or injunctive relief.  Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class, which all arise from the same operative facts and are based on the same legal theories.  Plaintiff has no interest adverse or antagonistic to the interest of the other members of the Class.  Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the Class and has retained experienced and competent attorneys to represent the Class.  A Class Action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims herein asserted. Plaintiff anticipates that no unusual difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action.  A Class Action will permit large numbers of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would engender. Class treatment will also permit the adjudication of relatively small claims by many Class members who could not otherwise afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. Absent a Class Action, class members will continue to suffer losses of statutory protected rights as well as monetary damages. If Defendant’s conduct is allowed proceed to without remedy they will continue to reap and retain the proceeds of their ill-gotten gains. 5  Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. Some time prior to June 24, 2014, an obligation was allegedly incurred to Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. (“Capital”) The Capital obligation arose out of a transaction in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for personal, family or household purposes. The alleged Capital obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). Capital is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4). Defendant contends that the Capital debt is past due. Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Capital directly or through an intermediary contracted Defendant to collect the Capital debt. On or about June 24, 2014, the Defendant caused to be delivered to the Plaintiff a collection letter in an attempt to collect the alleged Capital debt. See Exhibit A. The June 24, 2014 letter was sent or caused to be sent by persons employed by Defendant 6 as a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6). The June 24, 2014 letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2). The June 24, 2014 letter was sent in an envelope that contained a glassine window. Visible through the glassine window in the return address the Plaintiff’s account number was shown. The account number constitutes personal identifying information. The account number is not meaningless – it is a piece of information capable of identifying [the consumer] as a debtor, and its disclosure has the potential to cause harm to a consumer that the FDCPA was enacted to address. Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing, 765 F. 3d 299 (Third Cir. 2014). Defendant’s actions as described herein are part of a pattern and practice used to collect consumer debts. Defendant could have taken the steps necessary to bring its actions within compliance with the FDCPA, but neglected to do so and failed to adequately review its actions to ensure compliance with the law. On information and belief, Defendant sent a written communication, in the form annexed hereto as Exhibit A to at least 50 natural persons in the State of New York within one year of the date of this Complaint. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “30” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 7 Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f(8), a debt collector is prohibited from using any language or symbol, other than the debt collector’s address, on any envelope when communicating with the consumer by use of mails. The Defendant violated said section by putting the Plaintiff’s account number visible on the June 24, 2014 letter. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq.

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Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibits A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e and 1692f. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Some time prior to May 3, 2019, an obligation was allegedly incurred by Plaintiff. The alleged obligation arose out of a transaction involving a debt allegedly incurred by Plaintiff with Augusta, Realtors in which the subject of the transaction was primarily for personal, family or household purposes. The alleged obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). The owner of the alleged obligation is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4). The owner of the obligation contracted with the Defendant Hunter to collect the alleged debt. On or about May 3, 2019, Defendant sent the Plaintiff a collection letter (the “Letter”) seeking to collect an alleged debt. See Collection Letter – Attached hereto as Exhibit A. The letter warned: “Your account is now in final review. This account meets the guidelines for legal action set by the creditor, but they have not yet referred your account to an attorney or made a decision to file a lawsuit. … If we cannot resolve this matter, the creditor may refer your account to an attorney to review their ability to recover your unpaid balance through litigation. If an action is commenced and a judgment is sought, you will be given notice and the opportunity to raise a legal defense. Accordingly, demand is hereby made for full payment of your past due amount to avoid the possibility of additional costs if the creditor chooses to proceed with legal action.” The threat that Plaintiff’s account is in “final review” and “meets the guidelines for legal action” is harassing and only serves to scare Plaintiff into making immediate payment. Further, the implication is that litigation is imminent, due to the account “meeting the guidelines for legal action,” yet the Defendant is not an attorney and cannot make the decision if and when a lawsuit may occur. In addition, neither the Defendant nor the creditor are attorneys, yet the letter goes into detail regarding the legal process discussing what the attorney will be reviewing in litigation, legal defenses and possibilities of additional costs through litigation, all in furtherance of harassing and intimidating the Plaintiff into making an immediate payment due to fear of litigation and higher costs and fees. These threats only serve to coerce Plaintiff into paying immediately to avoid the threat of legal action. As a result of Defendant’s deceptive misleading and false debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Defendant violated said section a. by making a false and misleading representation in violation of §1692e(10); b. by falsely representing the character, amount of legal status of the debt in violation of §1692e(2)(A); c. my making the threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken in violation of §1692e(5). By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f, a debt collector may not use any unfair or unconscionable means in connection with the collection of any debt. Defendant violated this section by falsely threatening and harassing Plaintiff with the letter containing false threats. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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Market Volume Increases ......................................................................... 26  Relationship Between Secondary Market Trading and Primary Market Issuing ....................................................................................................... 29  Regulatory Changes .................................................................................. 29  A Perfect Storm for Collusion .................................................................. 31  Dealers Collude to Increase Spreads ......................................................... 35  C.  News Reports of Regulatory Investigations into the SSA Market ....................... 36  D.  Defendants Terminate or Suspend SSA Traders as the Government Investigations Are Revealed ......................................................................................................... 38  VI.  Class Definition. Pursuant to Rules 23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of itself and on behalf of the following “Class”: All persons who, between January 1, 2010 and April 27, 2014 (inclusive) purchased or sold a U.S. dollar-denominated SSA bond in the secondary SSA bond market directly to or from a Defendant, where such persons were either domiciled in the United States or its territories or, if domiciled outside the United States or its territories, purchased or sold (as set forth above) one or more USD-denominated SSA bond in the United States or its territories. Exclusions from the Class. Excluded from the Class are Defendants and their co- conspirators. For the Bank Defendants and their co-conspirators, this includes their subsidiaries and affiliates, as well as the directors, members, partners, managers, officers, employees, and agents of both the Bank Defendants and their subsidiaries and affiliates. For the Trader Defendants, this includes any entity in which they have a controlling interest, their legal representatives, heirs, assigns or any other person acting on their behalf. Also excluded from the Class are any judicial officer presiding over this action and the members of his/her immediate family and judicial staff, and any juror assigned to this action. Ascertainability. Using, among other things, Defendants’ records, the Class members are readily ascertainable. Typicality. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of Class members. Defendants’ wrongful common course of conduct in violation of the law directly and proximately caused the damages and injuries of Plaintiff and each member of the Class. There are no defenses that are unique to Plaintiff. Adequacy. Plaintiff will protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff’s interests are aligned with, and not antagonistic to, the Class members. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in the prosecution of class actions and antitrust litigation to represent itself and the other Class members. Commonality. There are one or more questions of law or fact common to the Class, including, but not limited to: a. whether Defendants and their co-conspirators engaged in an agreement, combination, or conspiracy to fix, raise, elevate, maintain, or stabilize USD-denominated SSA bond bid/ask spreads in interstate commerce in the United States; b. the identity of the participants of the conspiracy or manipulative scheme; c. the duration of the conspiracy scheme alleged herein and the acts performed by Defendants and their co-conspirators in furtherance thereof; d. whether the alleged conspiracy violated Sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1 and 3; e. whether the conduct of Defendants and their co-conspirators, as alleged in this Complaint, caused injury to Plaintiff and Class members; and f. the appropriate measures of damages for the Class. Predominance. Questions of law or fact common to Class members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members. The Class is defined herein based on currently available information and Plaintiff hereby reserves the right to amend the definition of members of the Class, including, without limitation, the Class Period. V. The SSA bond market is a large global market. According to Bloomberg estimates, the SSA bond market is valued from $9 trillion to $15 trillion. The SSA bond market experienced significant growth in the past decade, having tripled from 2005 to 2012. In 2015, new issues in SSA bonds reached $843.35 billion.8 Governmental or quasi-governmental, supranationals, sub-sovereigns, and agencies issue SSA bonds to raise capital for a variety of public (i.e., social, infrastructure, policy, economic development) purposes worldwide. 8 See Abhinav Ramnarayan and Helene Durand., DoJ investigates bond traders over market-rigging, A. The SSA Bond Market V.  SUBSTANTIVE FACT ALLEGATIONS ....................................................................... 22  A.  The SSA Bond Market .......................................................................................... 22  B.  Changes Affecting the SSA Bond Market ............................................................ 26 

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As of May 31, 2019, more than 190,000 people had a South Carolina driver’s license under indefinite suspension for failure to pay traffic fines and fees pursuant to Section 56-25-20. South Carolina suffers from one of the highest poverty rates in the nation. According to 2017 U.S. Census estimates, South Carolina has the eleventh highest population of people living in poverty in the United States, with 16.6% of South Carolinians earning less than the Federal Poverty Guideline for their household.10 Even South Carolinians with incomes above the federal poverty level may experience significant day-to-day financial hardship. For example, people are generally eligible for free legal assistance from South Carolina Legal Services, a federally-funded “legal aid” organization, if their household income is at or below 125% of the relevant Federal Poverty Guideline and may be eligible if their income is at or below 200% of the relevant Federal Poverty Guideline.11 Similarly, food assistance is provided to people whose household income is at or below 130% of the relevant Federal Poverty Guideline.12 South Carolina’s indefinite suspension of driver’s licenses for nonpayment of traffic fines and fees under Section 56-25-20 disproportionately harms Black people. Analysis of DMV data, which is described below, reveals that Black people are around 3.4 times more likely than non-Latinx white people to have their South Carolina driver’s license indefinitely suspended for failure to pay traffic tickets pursuant to Section 56-25-20. According to 2017 U.S. Census estimates, non-Latinx Black people make up 27% and non-Latinx white people make up 64% of the South Carolina population.15 But DMV data shows that, as of May 31, 2019, Black people made up 48% and white people made up only 35% of all people with driver’s licenses indefinitely suspended for failure to pay traffic tickets under Section 56-25-20. These racial disparities are linked to the longstanding racial gaps in poverty and unemployment discussed above. The suspension of a driver’s license for nonpayment of traffic fines and fees has devastating consequences on the ability of people to pursue a livelihood, to meet basic needs for themselves and their families, and to meaningfully participate in civic life. Eighty-six percent of Americans describe a car as a “necessity of life.”16 In a 2013 survey of 2,459 South Carolina residents concerning transportation options, 92% of respondents reported using a personal vehicle for travel.17 The South Carolina Department of Transportation (“SC DOT”) estimated in a 2014 report that only 44% of statewide public transit demands were met in fiscal year 2011.18 In the same 2014 report, the SC DOT recognized that an increase in low-income households presented a need for public transit. The report concluded that South Carolina lacked sufficient public transportation options to serve second- and third-shift workers, lacked “coordinated/scheduled services and coverage” in rural areas, and had “[l]imited scheduled public transit routes outside urban areas.”19 In parts of South Carolina, major employers have openly acknowledged that the lack of public transportation hinders the ability of employees to get to work.20 Research from across the country also underscores the critical link between a person’s ability to maintain a valid driver’s license and employment and financial stability. The American Association of Motor Vehicles Administrators (“AAMVA”) has recognized that “[p]eople who are able to legally drive are more likely to have stable employment.”29 In response to a Rutgers University survey of suspended New Jersey driver’s license holders, 42% of respondents reported losing jobs after their driver’s licenses were suspended.30 Forty-five percent of the respondents who lost their jobs following driver’s license suspensions reported that they were unable to find new jobs.31 Of those who were able to find employment, 88% reported a decrease in income.32 The AAMVA has recognized that “[s]uspending a person’s driving privilege makes it less likely that fines will be paid if the person is unable to get to work and to pursue other daily activities such as attending school, going to medical appointments, and so on. This is compounded for individuals who live in areas where other transportation options are not readily available.”35 The indefinite suspension of driver’s licenses for nonpayment of traffic fines and fees confronts indigent people with an impossible decision: lose their jobs, face barriers to finding employment, and fail to care for themselves and their families, or drive illegally and risk further legal consequences for driving on a suspended license (“DUS”), including fines, fees, jail time, and extension of probation or parole. Faced with such difficult choices, most people whose licenses are suspended continue to drive. A 2003 report by the National Cooperative Highway Research Program estimated that as many as 75% of people with suspended and revoked licenses continue to drive while under suspension.37 Similarly, a study commissioned by the AAMVA Suspended and Revoked Working Group, which analyzed 114,626 driver records from eight geographically and demographically diverse states, concluded that people with suspended licenses continue to drive despite the seriousness of the consequences for driving on a suspended license.38 In South Carolina, the steep penalties associated with driving on a suspended license push people who live with such suspensions deeper into cycles of poverty, debt, and entanglement with the criminal legal system. Under South Carolina law, a person who is convicted of DUS three or more times in three years is designated a “habitual offender.”43 And a person who is convicted of driving on a suspended license while designated a habitual offender may be charged with a felony and face up to five years of incarceration.44 The DMV indefinitely suspends driver’s licenses for failure to pay traffic tickets in an exercise of its discretion under South Carolina Code Section 56-25-20.45 %.24 Section 56-25-20 vests the DMV with the sole authority and discretion to suspend the driver’s licenses of South Carolina residents and driver’s license holders for noncompliance with traffic citations and littering summonses. Section 56-25-20 does not require the DMV to suspend driver’s licenses. Rather, the statute permits the agency to indefinitely suspend a driver’s license if it is notified, within twelve months of the issuance of a traffic citation or littering summons, that a South Carolina resident or driver’s license holder has failed to comply with the citation or summons (“NRVC procedures”). As described in detail below, the DMV has a policy and practice of exercising its Section 56-25-20 authority to indefinitely suspend driver’s licenses after a report of failure to pay a traffic citation without ensuring the license holder is able to pay. The DMV does this in response to reports of nonpayment, whether the reports are issued by South Carolina courts or by a court or motor vehicle department in another NRVC-participating state. Section 56-25-20 permits the DMV to impose indefinite license suspensions for failure to comply with a littering summons, but data disclosed by the DMV reveals that the agency does not exercise this authority in practice. As of November 2018, there was no one with a driver’s license suspended indefinitely by the DMV under Section 56-25-20 for failure to comply with a littering summons. NRVC procedures are not used when a defendant in a traffic case pays fines and fees at, or before, their court date. A. A driver’s license is necessary for economic self-sufficiency, to care for one’s self and family, and to meaningfully participate in society.

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This Action is properly maintained as a class action. The Class is initially defined as:  All New Jersey consumers who were sent letters and/or notices from AUDIT SYSTEMS concerning a debt owed to PERSONAL SUPPORT MEDICAL SUPPLIERS, which included the alleged conduct and practices described herein.  The class definition may be subsequently modified or refined.  The Class period begins one year to the filing of this Action. Plaintiff is at all times to this lawsuit, a "consumer" as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). At some time prior to May 10, 2017, Plaintiff allegedly incurred a financial obligation to PERSONAL SUPPORT MEDICAL SUPPLIERS. The PERSONAL SUPPORT MEDICAL SUPPLIERS obligation arose out of a transaction, in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for personal, family or household purposes. The PERSONAL SUPPORT MEDICAL SUPPLIERS obligation did not arise out of a transaction that was for non-personal use. The PERSONAL SUPPORT MEDICAL SUPPLIERS obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). PERSONAL SUPPORT MEDICAL SUPPLIERS is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4). On or before May 10, 2017, the PERSONAL SUPPORT MEDICAL SUPPLIERS obligation was sent to AUDIT SYSTEMS for the purpose of collection. At the time the PERSONAL SUPPORT MEDICAL SUPPLIERS obligation was sent to AUDIT SYSTEMS the PERSONAL SUPPORT MEDICAL SUPPLIERS obligation was past due. At the time the PERSONAL SUPPORT MEDICAL SUPPLIERS obligation was sent to AUDIT SYSTEMS the PERSONAL SUPPORT MEDICAL SUPPLIERS obligation was in default pursuant to the terms of the agreement creating the obligation and/or by operation of law. Defendants caused to be delivered to Plaintiff a letter dated May 10, 2017, which was addressed to Plaintiff. A copy of said letter is annexed hereto as Exhibit A, which is fully incorporated herein by reference. The May 10, 2017 letter was sent to Plaintiff in connection with the collection of the PERSONAL SUPPORT MEDICAL SUPPLIERS obligation. The May 10, 2017 letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). The May 10, 2017 letter is the initial written communication sent from Defendant to the Plaintiff. The May 10, 2017 letter contained the Defendant’s contact information at the top of the letter: Collection letters and/or notices, such as those sent by Defendants, are to be evaluated by the objective standard of the hypothetical “least sophisticated consumer.” The May 10, 2017 letter fails to properly inform the least sophisticated consumer that to effectively dispute the alleged debt, such dispute must be in writing. The least sophisticated consumer upon reading the May 10, 2017 letter would be confused as to what he or she must do to effectively dispute the alleged debt. The least sophisticated consumer wishing to dispute the alleged debt would be confused as to what steps he or she should take to notify Defendants of his or her dispute. The least sophisticated consumer upon reading the instructions in the May 10, 2017 letter would be misled into believing that if he or she wished to effectively dispute the alleged debt or any portion thereof, he or she may: (1) notify AUDIT SYSTEMS by calling the toll free telephone number provided of (800) 741-1969, between during the business hours Monday through Thursday 8:00 am - 9:00 pm EST, or on Friday between 8:00am - 7:00pm EST; or (2) write to AUDIT SYSTEMS at the address listed on the letter. AUDIT SYSTEMS' instructions in the May 10, 2017 letter would cause least sophisticated consumer to be unsure as to what he or she must do to effectively dispute the alleged debt. A dispute of a debt, to be effective, in the Third Circuit, must be in writing. Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 112 (3d Cir. 1991). Caprio v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Group, 709 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. March 1, 2013). AUDIT SYSTEMS violated 15 U.S.C. §1692e(10) by falsely representing and misleading Plaintiff into believing that if he wished to dispute the alleged debt or any portion thereof, that he may (1) notify AUDIT SYSTEMS by calling the toll free telephone number provided of (800) 741-1969, between during the business hours Monday through Thursday 8:00 am - 9:00 pm EST, or on Friday between 8:00am - 7:00pm EST; or (2) write to AUDIT SYSTEMS at the address listed on the letter. The May 10, 2017 letter is misleading because the instructions can be read to have two or more meaning, which one is inaccurate. The May 10, 2017 letter can be read to mean that the least sophisticated consumer may dispute the alleged debt by calling AUDIT SYSTEMS at the toll free telephone number provided of (800) 741-1969, between during the business hours Monday through Thursday 8:00 am - 9:00 pm EST, or on Friday between 8:00am - 7:00pm EST. Congress enacted the FDCPA in part to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have a right to free from abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have a right to receive proper notices mandated by the FDCPA. Plaintiff and others similarly situated were sent letters, which would have affected their decision-making with regard to the debt. Plaintiff has suffered damages and other harm as a direct result of AUDIT SYSTEMS actions, conduct, omissions and violations of the FDCPA described herein. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants as follows: (a) Declaring that this action is properly maintainable as a Class Action and certifying Plaintiff as Class representative and the attorney(s), Joseph K. Jones, Esq., as Class Counsel; (b) Awarding Plaintiff and the Class statutory damages; (c) Awarding Plaintiff and the Class actual damages; (d) Awarding pre-judgment interest; (e) Awarding post-judgment interest. (f) Awarding Plaintiff costs of this Action, including reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses; and (g) Awarding Plaintiff and the Class such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. Dated: November 15, 2017 s/ Joseph K. Jones Joseph K. Jones, Esq. FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. VIOLATIONS

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Defendants are engaged in the petroleum industry. Particularly, they are a petroleum and fracking proppant distributor. Defendants are headquartered in Sandy, Utah, but operate at numerous fracking sites throughout the United States, including within the state of Texas and within this Judicial District. Defendants also maintain satellite offices near their fracking sites. QCMs operate out of the satellite offices, but report to both their satellite office and Defendants’ headquarters. The satellite offices report directly to Defendants’ headquarters. QCMs are required to contact Defendants’ headquarters for trucking dispatch. Furthermore, QCMs constantly communicate employment-related issues with Defendants’ headquarters via email and text message. Defendants employed Plaintiff Hunter and those similarly situated as quality control managers. Despite the title, QCMs are not administrative employees. QCMs are blue collar workers who performed repetitive operations outdoors with their hands. Moreover, QCMs were prohibited from exercising their discretion and independent judgment on significant matters. For example, QCMs were not permitted to discipline employees, even for safety violations such as being intoxicated while driving a truck. QCM’s were also not permitted to cure contaminated sand containers. Instead, they were only permitted to report these and other types of incidents to their field operations manager. Furthermore, QCMs did not have the power to hire or fire employees. Defendants did not require an advanced degree or specialized academic training for employment as a quality control manager. A. Facts Pertaining to Defendants’ Pay Scheme QCMs work twelve (12) hour shifts. QCMs are required to work twenty-two (22) days straight per month and have the remaining eight/nine (8/9) days off. QCMs worked one (1) shift per workday. If a QCM does not request the eight/nine (8/9) days off in advance, that QCM is required to work those days. QCMs are paid semi-monthly. Defendants issue QCMs their paychecks from their headquarters in Sandy, Utah. Defendants state to QCMs that they are paid on a “salary” basis. However, it is a far more complex pay scheme. If a QCM does not work twenty-two (22) days straight per month, they are only paid their pro-rata rate calculated based upon the amount of days worked, effectively paying QCMs on a shift rate basis. For example, if a QCM only works twenty (20) straight days in a month he is paid a recalculated rate based upon the twenty (20) shifts worked. Additionally, QCMs are paid at a rate of approximately $230.00 per day when they work in excess of the twenty-two (22) days straight, effectively paying QCMs on a shift rate basis. This additional pay of $230.00 per day worked in excess of twenty-two (22) is paid to QCMs as a “bonus.” Accordingly, despite Defendants’ contention, QCMs are not compensated on a salary basis. QCMs are not compensated on a fee basis. Defendants pay scheme is a corporate policy. Upon information and belief, Defendants’ pay scheme policy was conceived at their corporate headquarters. Defendants’ pay scheme is implemented throughout its various fracking sites. B. Facts Pertaining to Defendants’ FLSA Violations Defendants do not maintain a formal system of recording the QCMs time. QCMs work approximately three (3) weeks straight every month. QCMs are required to work twelve (12) hour shifts. On average, QCMs work approximately eighty-four (84) hours per workweek. QCMs are not paid the statutorily required rate of one-and-one-half (1½) times their hourly rate for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek. Defendants titled QCMs’ pay basis as salary to knowingly skirt the overtime provisions of the FLSA. Defendants titled QCMs as managers and their pay basis as salary, despite the fact that their duties do not qualify them as exempt, to knowingly skirt the statutory provisions of the Plaintiff Hunter seeks to bring this suit as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on his own behalf as well as those in the following collective: All quality control managers employed by Defendants during the past three (3) years through the final date of disposition of this action, who are or were required to work in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek without compensation at the statutorily required rate of one-and-one-half (1½) times their hourly rate for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek. At all relevant times, Plaintiff Hunter was similarly situated to all such individuals in the FLSA Overtime Collective1 because, while employed by Defendants, Plaintiff Hunter and all FLSA Plaintiffs performed similar tasks, were subject to the same laws and regulations, were paid in the same or substantially similar manner, were paid the same or similar rate, were required to work in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek and were subject to Defendants’ policies and practices of willfully failing to pay them at the statutorily required rate of one-and-one-half (1½) times their hourly rate for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek. A. FLSA OVERTIME COLLECTIVE I. General Facts Violation of The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., Made by Plaintiff Hunter on Behalf of All FLSA Plaintiffs (Failure to Pay Overtime) 108. Plaintiff Hunter and the FLSA Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 109. Throughout the period covered by the applicable statute of limitations, Plaintiff Hunter and other FLSA Plaintiffs were required to work and did in fact work in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 110. Defendants knowingly failed to pay Plaintiff Hunter and the FLSA Plaintiffs the statutorily required rate of one-and-one-half (1½) times their hourly rate for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek. 111. Defendants’ conduct was willful and lasted for the duration of the relevant time periods. 112. Defendants’ conduct was in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

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Plaintiff worked as a Utilization Review Employee for Defendant within the last three years. Utilization Review Employees’ job duties were routine and rote and did not include the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. Utilization Review Employees’ duties and responsibilities did not involve the management of the enterprise or any particular department, and Plaintiff did not direct the work of other employees. Nor were any Utilization Review Employees involved in setting the management policies or general business operations of Defendant or its patients. The minimum clinical certification required to perform the Utilization Review Work performed by Plaintiff is Licensed Practical Nurse (“LPN”) or Licensed Vocational Nurse (“LVN”) credentials. In fact, URAC Health Plan Accreditation Guidelines explicitly provide that an “LPN/LVN meets the URAC definition of health professional and this licensure category may conduct initial clinical review.”3 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) COLLECTIVE ACTION VIOLATION OF FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME WAGES Although Plaintiff and other Utilization Review Employees were licensed nurses, they were not certified nurse midwives, nurse anesthetists, or nurse practitioners. Defendant employed Utilization Review Employees, including Plaintiff, who held LPN licensure, but no other clinical licensure such as a Registered Nurse license. During Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant, Defendant required Plaintiff and other Utilization Review Employees to perform their job duties in accordance with its corporate policies, procedures, guidelines, and guidelines embedded in Defendant’s computer software. The policies, procedures and guidelines followed by Plaintiff and other Utilization Review Employees in performing Utilization Review Work were designed to comply with the accreditation guidelines for a national accreditation organization, the NCQA.4 During Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant, Plaintiff’s and other Utilization Review Employees’ job duties did not involve creating or drafting corporate policies, procedures or guidelines pertaining to Utilization Review Work. In fact, during Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant, Plaintiff’s job duties did not involve creating or drafting any corporate policies, procedures or guidelines of any kind for Defendant or its employees. Defendant misclassified Plaintiff and other Utilization Review Employees as exempt employees for the purposes of the FLSA. Defendant paid Plaintiff and other Utilization Review Employees a salary, at the same amount of compensation each week, regardless of the number of hours they worked each week during their employment. When Plaintiff worked over 40 hours in individual workweeks, Defendant did not pay Plaintiff overtime at one-and-one-half times the “regular rate” at which she was employed. As non-exempt employees, Defendant’s Utilization Review Employees were entitled to full compensation for all overtime hours worked. Under the FLSA, employees are entitled to “not less than one and one-half times the regular rate” at which they are employed for work in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). The “regular rate” shall be deemed to include bonuses, commissions, nondiscretionary incentive compensation and other remuneration paid to the employee. 29 U.S.C. § 207(e). When Plaintiff and Utilization Review Employees worked over 40 hours in one or more individual workweeks, Defendant did not pay them overtime at one-and-one-half times the “regular rate” at which they were employed. C. Defendant Benefited from the Uncompensated Overtime Work and Suffered and Permitted it to Happen At all relevant times, Defendant directed and directly benefited from the Utilization Review Work performed by Plaintiff and the Utilization Review Employees. At all relevant times, Defendant controlled the work schedules, duties, protocols, applications, assignments and employment conditions of Plaintiff and the Utilization Review Employees. At all relevant times, Defendant was able to track the amount of time Plaintiff and the Utilization Review Employees spent in connection with the performance of their Utilization Review Work. However, Defendant failed to do so and failed to properly compensate Plaintiff and the Utilization Review Employees for the overtime work they performed. Defendant expressly trained, instructed and permitted Plaintiff and the Utilization Review Employees to perform more than 40 hours of Utilization Review Work during numerous individual workweeks. Because Plaintiff and the Utilization Review Employees typically worked more than 40 hours in a workweek, Defendant’s policies and practices deprived Plaintiff and the Utilization Review Employees of overtime wages for the Utilization Review Work they performed Defendant knew or should have known that the Utilization Review Work performed by Plaintiff and the Utilization Review Employees did not qualify for the FLSA’s administrative, executive or professional exemption. Indeed, given the routine and rote nature of the Utilization Review Work, the lack of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance, and the strict guidelines the Utilization Review Employees were required to adhere to, there is no conceivable way for Defendant to establish that its classification scheme was enacted in good faith. Despite knowing Plaintiff and the Utilization Review Employees performed more than 40 hours of Utilization Review Work in numerous individual workweeks, Defendant failed to make any effort to stop or disallow the overtime work and instead suffered and permitted it to happen. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the FLSA on her own behalf and on behalf of: All similarly situated current and former Utilization Review Employees who work or have worked for Defendant in the last three years and who were paid a salary and classified as exempt from overtime. (hereinafter referred to as the “FLSA Collective”). Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this definition if necessary. Defendant is liable under the FLSA for, inter alia, failing to properly compensate Plaintiff and other similarly situated Utilization Review Employees. Excluded from the FLSA Collective are Defendant’s executive, administrative and professional employees, including computer professionals and outside salespersons. Consistent with Defendant’s policy and pattern or practice, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective were not paid premium overtime compensation when they worked beyond 40 hours in a workweek. As part of its regular business practices, Defendant intentionally, willfully and repeatedly engaged in a pattern, practice and/or policy of violating the FLSA with respect to Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective. This policy and pattern or practice includes, but is not limited to: a. Willfully misclassifying Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective as exempt employees under the FLSA; b. Willfully failing to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective premium overtime wages for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek; and c. Willfully failing to record all of the time that Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective worked for the benefit of Defendant. Defendant is aware or should have been aware that Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective were non-exempt employees and that federal law required it to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective overtime premiums for hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek. Defendant’s unlawful conduct has been widespread, repeated and consistent. The employment relationships between Defendant and every proposed FLSA Collective member are the same. The key issue – whether the Utilization Review Work performed by Utilization Review Employees qualifies for the professional, executive or administrative exemption – is identical among the proposed FLSA Collective members. Many similarly situated current and former Utilization Review Employees have been underpaid in violation of the FLSA and would benefit from the issuance of a court-supervised notice of this lawsuit and the opportunity to join it. Court-supervised notice of this lawsuit should be sent to the FLSA Collective pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Those similarly situated employees are known to Defendant, are readily identifiable, and can be located through Defendant’s personnel and payroll records. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant was engaged in interstate commerce, or in the production of goods for commerce, as defined by the FLSA. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective were “employees” of Defendant within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) of the A. Defendant Misclassified Its Utilization Review Employees

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All prior paragraphs are hereby incorporation by reference as though each were fully set forth herein. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated. Plaintiff’s class consists of all individuals in Pennsylvania who are residents of Long Term Care Facilities (LTCFs) who are disabled within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act, for the reasons as aforesaid. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Upon information and belief, based on the number of LTCF residents and the number of LTCFs in Pennsylvania, and the highly infectious nature of SARS-COV-2, that every LTCF resident is at incipient risk for infection with SARS-COV-2, and subsequent community transmission to others. These residents are also at immediate risk for exploitation via unauthorized biomedical research. The laws and regulations which address the nature of this action and that form the basis of this complaint are common to all members of the class. The relief sought will apply to all of them. The claims of the Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the entire class. Defendant’s violation of the laws as alleged herein has deprived Plaintiff and members of the class to be deprived of the safety and wellbeing afforded to the rest of the public by the PA DOH. Therefore, all class members will suffer the same or similar injuries for the purposes of the injunctive and declaratory relief sought. The named plaintiff is capable of fairly and adequately representing the class and protecting interests. Counsel for the Plaintiff are attorneys with substantial class action litigation experience as well as substantial experience in litigating on behalf of plaintiffs with disabilities. Counsel are aware of no conflicts among members of the proposed plaintiff class. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would create a risk of inconsistent and varying adjudications that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the defendant. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would also create a risk of adjudications with respect to individual members which would, as a practical matter, substantially impair the ability of other members to protect their interests. Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, making appropriate injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole. All prior paragraphs are hereby incorporated by reference as though each were fully set forth at length herein. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant’s actions and inactions, the Plaintiffs and their class members have been harmed or are in danger of incipient harm as aforesaid. All prior paragraphs are hereby incorporated by reference as though each were fully set forth at length herein. As a result of Defendant’s policy and practice of segregating Plaintiffs and their class members, and as a result of denying appropriate safeguards to the residents of LTCFs, Defendant has failed to care for its most fragile citizens and discriminated against them because of their disability. Defendant has excluded them from appropriate oversight, protection, care, safety, wellbeing, and all other protections afforded to the public, and those not confined to a LTCF. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant’s actions and inactions, the Plaintiffs and their class members have been harmed or are in danger of incipient harm as aforesaid. All prior paragraphs are hereby incorporated by reference as though each were fully set forth at length herein. As a result of Defendant’s policy and practice of segregating Plaintiffs and their class members, and as a result of denying appropriate safeguards to the residents of LTCFs, Defendant has failed to care for its most fragile citizens and discriminated against them because of their disability. Defendant has excluded them from appropriate oversight, protection, care, safety, wellbeing, and all other protections afforded to the public, and those not confined to a LTCF. All prior paragraphs are hereby incorporated by reference as though each were fully set forth at length herein. As a result of Defendant’s policy and practice of segregating Plaintiffs and their class members, and as a result of denying appropriate safeguards to the residents of LTCFs, Defendant has failed to care for its most fragile citizens and discriminated against them because of their disability. Defendant has excluded them from appropriate oversight, protection, care, safety, wellbeing, and all other protections afforded to the public, and those not confined to a LTCF. Defendants are obligated to conduct appropriate inspections and enforcement under the SSA which responsibility they have abrogated to the detriment of the Plaintiffs and class members. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant’s actions and inactions, the Plaintiffs and their class members have been harmed or are in danger of incipient harm as aforesaid. All prior paragraphs are hereby incorporated by reference as though each were fully set forth at length herein. As a result of Defendant’s policy and practice of segregating Plaintiffs and their class members, and as a result of denying appropriate safeguards to the residents of LTCFs, Defendant has failed to care for its most fragile citizens and discriminated against them because of their disability. Defendant has excluded them from appropriate oversight, protection, care, safety, wellbeing, and all other protections afforded to the public, and those not confined to a LTCF. Defendants are obligated to conduct appropriate inspections and enforcement under the SSA which responsibility they have abrogated to the detriment of the Plaintiffs and class members. All prior paragraphs are hereby incorporated by reference as though each were fully set forth at length herein. As a result of Defendant’s policy and practice of segregating Plaintiffs and their class members, and as a result of denying appropriate safeguards to the residents of LTCFs, Defendant has failed to care for its most fragile citizens and discriminated against them because of their disability. Defendant has excluded them from appropriate oversight, protection, care, safety, wellbeing, and all other protections afforded to the public, and those not confined to a LTCF. Defendant is required under the DPCL to take all action required to prevent, identify, examine, diagnose ad cause to be treated every potential communicable disease within the Commonwealth. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant’s actions and inactions, the Plaintiffs and their class members have been harmed or are in danger of incipient harm as aforesaid. All prior paragraphs are hereby incorporated by reference as though each were fully set forth at length herein. The common law has recognized the standards of the Nuremburg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki as a source of the right of every human subject to be treated with dignity in the conduct of a clinical trial. The Plaintiff and the class members were not afforded these basic rights and suffered as a result. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant’s actions and inactions, the Plaintiffs and their class members have been harmed or are in danger of incipient harm as aforesaid. Violation of the Pennsylvania Disease Prevention and Control Law Violation of 29 U.S.C. 794 – Rehabilitation Act Violation of the Federal Nursing Home Reform Amendments (1983 Action) Violations of the Nuremburg Code and Declaration of Helsinki Violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act Violation of the Social Security Act Violation of the Affordable Care Act

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Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated under rules 23(a) and 23(b)(1)-(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Numerosity: The Classes are so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable. The disposition of the individual claims of the respective class members through this class action will benefit the parties and this Court. Upon information and belief there are, at a minimum, thousands of class members of Classes A, B and C. Upon information and belief, the Classes’ sizes and the identities of the individual members thereof are ascertainable through Defendant’s records, including Defendant’s fax and marketing records. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of Class A because the claims of Plaintiff and members of Class A are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. Among other things, Plaintiff and members of Class A were sent or caused to be sent by Defendant at least one fax advertisement advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which did not contain an opt-out notice. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of Class B because the claims of Plaintiff and members of Class B are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. Among other things, Plaintiff and the members of Class B were sent or caused to be sent by Defendant, without Plaintiff’s or the Class B members’ express permission or invitation, at least one fax advertisement advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which did not contain an opt-out notice. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of Class C because the claims of Plaintiff and members of Class C are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. Among other things, Plaintiff and members of Class C were sent or caused to be sent by Defendant, without Plaintiff’s or the Class C members’ express permission or invitation, at least one fax advertisement advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which did not contain an opt-out notice. The questions of fact and law common to Plaintiff and Class A predominate over questions that may affect individual members, and include: (a) Whether Defendant’s sending and/or causing to be sent to Plaintiff and the members of Class A, by facsimile, computer or other device, fax advertisements advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods or services which did not contain opt-out notices violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) and the regulations thereunder; (b) Whether Defendant’s sending and/or causing to be sent such fax advertisements was knowing or willful; (c) Whether Plaintiff and the members of Class A are entitled to statutory damages, triple damages and costs for Defendant’s conduct; (d) Whether Plaintiff and members of Class A are entitled to multiple statutory damages per fax advertisement Defendant sent or caused to be sent to them because each fax advertisement contains multiple violations of the TCPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder; and (e) Whether Plaintiff and members of Class A are entitled to a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant from continuing to engage in its unlawful conduct. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Classes because its interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the Classes. Plaintiff will fairly, adequately and vigorously represent and protect the interests of the members of the Classes and has no interests antagonistic to the members of the Classes. Plaintiff has retained counsel who is competent and experienced in litigation in the federal courts, class action litigation, and TCPA cases. Superiority: A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the Classes’ claims. While the aggregate damages that may be awarded to the members of the Classes are likely to be substantial, the damages suffered by individual members of the Classes are relatively small. The expense and burden of individual litigation makes it economically infeasible and procedurally impracticable for each member of the Classes to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. The likelihood of the individual Class members’ prosecuting separate claims is remote. Plaintiff is unaware of any other litigation concerning this controversy already commenced against Defendant by any member of the Classes. Injunctive Relief: Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the members of Classes A and B, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to Classes A and B. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1-34. By the conduct described above, Defendant committed more than five thousand (5,000) violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) against Plaintiff and the members of Class A, to wit: the fax advertisements Defendant sent and/or caused to be sent to Plaintiff and the members of Class A were either (a) unsolicited and did not contain notices satisfying the requirements of the TCPA and regulations thereunder, or (b) solicited and did not contain notices satisfying the requirements of the TCPA and regulations thereunder. Plaintiff and the members of Class A are entitled to statutory damages under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) in an amount greater than two million, five hundred thousand dollars ($2,500,000). Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1-34. By the conduct described above, Defendant committed more than five thousand (5,000) violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) against Plaintiff and the members of Class B, to wit: the fax advertisements Defendant sent and/or caused to be sent to Plaintiff and the members of Class B were unsolicited and did not contain notices satisfying the requirements of the TCPA and regulations thereunder. Plaintiff and the members of Class B are entitled to statutory damages under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) in an amount greater than two million, five hundred thousand dollars ($2,500,000). If it is found that Defendant willfully and/or knowingly sent and/or caused to be sent unsolicited fax advertisements that did not contain notices satisfying the requirements of the TCPA and regulations thereunder to Plaintiff and the members of Class B, Plaintiff requests that the Court increase the damage award against Defendant to three times the amount available under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), as authorized by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1-34. Defendant committed thousands of violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b). Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1-34. By the conduct described above, Defendant committed numerous violations of GBL § 396-aa against Plaintiff and the members of Class C, to wit: the fax advertisements Defendant sent and/or caused to be sent to Plaintiff and the members of Class C were unsolicited and/or did not contain notices satisfying the requirements of GBL § 396-aa. Pursuant to GBL § 396-aa, Plaintiff and the members of Class C are entitled to statutory damages in an amount to be determined at trial.

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In approximately early 2017, Plaintiff began receiving telephone calls on her cellular telephone number ending in 9464. These calls came from Defendants’ telephone number 1-800-228-7676. Defendants, as part of their “Dream Sweepstakes” promotion, place prerecorded telephone calls to individuals. These calls also used an automatic telephone dialing system, as evidenced by a brief and unnatural pause prior to the prerecorded message beginning to play. These telephone calls contain several advertisements for various products and services, making the calls telemarketing. The calls Plaintiff answered contained such prerecorded messages and advertisements. Because the calls constitute telemarketing, Defendants were required to obtain prior express written consent from the persons to whom they made calls. “Prior express written consent” is specifically defined by statute as: [A]n agreement, in writing, bearing the signature of the person called that clearly authorizes the seller to deliver or cause to be delivered to the person called advertisements or telemarketing messages using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, and the telephone number to which the signatory authorizes such advertisements or telemarketing messages to be delivered. Indeed, a review of the “Dream Sweepstakes” website shows that Defendants’ did not obtain such consent. On the main page, there are links to “Home”, “How To Play”, and “Support”. On the “Home” page, it states “Subscribe now by calling 1_800_228_7676. There are no written disclosures authorizing Defendants to deliver or cause to be delivered advertisements or telemarketing messages using an artificial or prerecorded voice. On the “How to Play” page there are instructions on how to subscribe (but none on how to opt out). There are no written disclosures authorizing Defendants to deliver or cause to be delivered advertisements or telemarketing messages using an artificial or prerecorded voice. On the Support Page, there is a contact form. There are no written disclosures authorizing Defendants to deliver or cause to be delivered advertisements or telemarketing messages using an artificial or prerecorded voice. On the Support Page, however, there is a link to “Official Rules.” This is the only link to the Official Rules on the site. The Official Rules page discloses that “by clicking the SUBSCRIBE button, I hereby consent to receive … pre-recorded telemarketing calls from or on behalf of Intelemedia Premier Leads, LLC at the telephone number provided above[.]” There is no “subscribe” button to click, nor is the telephone number provided anywhere on the site. In the “How to Enter” section, it states that “[b]y confirming your subscription over the phone or online at www.dreamsweepstakes.net, you are providing your express written consent to receive weekly phone numbers to the phone you use to subscribe with[.]” Notwithstanding the facts that burying consent language in the “Official Rules” found only on the support page and that simply stating that a telephone call is written consent cannot override the statutory definition of “written consent”, the language itself is deficient, as it does not disclose the possibility or pre-recorded telemarketing calls. Nevertheless, the language quoted above indicates Defendants’ awareness of its obligations under the TCPA, and its intentional disregard of those obligations. Plaintiff brings this action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of a proposed class defined as: Plaintiff and all persons within the United States to whose telephone number Defendants placed a prerecorded telemarketing call or to whose cellular telephone number Defendants placed a call using an automatic telephone dialing system. (“Class”) Excluded from this class are Defendants and any entities in which Defendants have a controlling interest; Defendants’ agents and employees; any Judge and Magistrate Judge to whom this action is assigned and any member of their staffs and immediate families, and any claims for personal injury, wrongful death, and/or emotional distress. The Class members for whose benefit this action is brought are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The exact number and identities of the persons who fit within the class are ascertainable in that Defendants maintains written and electronically stored data showing: a. The time period(s) during which Defendants placed their calls; b. The telephone numbers to which Defendants placed their calls; c. The content of the calls; d. The equipment and methods for making the calls; The Class is comprised of hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals nationwide. Plaintiff is a member of the Class in that Defendants made prerecorded telemarketing calls made using an automatic telephone dialing system to her cellular telephone. The claims of Plaintiff are typical of the Class members in that they arise from Defendants’ uniform conduct and are based on the same legal theories of all Class members. Plaintiff and all putative Class members have also necessarily suffered actual damages in addition to statutory damages, as the calls used Class members’ cellular telephone plans, caused a nuisance to Class members, and invaded Class members’ privacy. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to, or in conflict with, the Class. Plaintiff will thoroughly and adequately protect the interests of the Class, having retained qualified and competent legal counsel to represent himself and the Class. Defendants have acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate for the Class as a whole. The prosecution of separate actions by individual class members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications. Common questions will predominate, and there will be no unusual manageability issues. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. Defendants placed prerecorded and autodialed telemarketing telephone calls to the telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. These calls were made in the absence of prior express written consent from Plaintiff and Class members. Defendants have therefore violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b). As a result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the members of the putative Class are each entitled to, inter alia, a minimum of $500 in damages for each such violation under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). Should the Court determine that Defendants’ conduct was willful and/or knowing, Plaintiff and each member of the Class are entitled to treble damages in the amount of $1,500 per call, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, the subscriber of the cellular telephone number (715) 245-0640 (the "0640 Number"). The 0640 Number is, and at all times mentioned herein was, assigned to a cellular telephone service as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b )(1 )(A)(iii). Between in or about early March 2016 and the date of the filing of this Class Action Complaint, Defendant transmitted or caused to be transmitted, by itself or through an intermediary or intermediaries, approximately fifty (50) SMS text message advertisements to the 0640 Number without Plaintiffs express consent, written or otherwise. The source of each of the unsolicited SMS text messages sent by Defendant to the 0640 Number was "65017", which is an SMS short code leased by Defendant or Defendant's agent(s) or affiliate(s), and is used for operating Defendant's text message marketing program. The 0640 Number continues to receive Defendant's unsolicited SMS text message advertisements on a daily basis. Specifically, Defendant utilized an "automated telephone dialing system" because the SMS messages to the 0640 Number were sent from "65017", which is a short code telephone number used to message consumers en masse, and because the hardware and software used by Defendant to send such messages have the capacity to store, produce, and dial random or sequential numbers, and/ or receive and store lists of telephone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse, in an automated fashion and without human intervention. Defendant's automated dialing equipment includes features substantially similar to a predictive dialer, inasmuch as it is capable of making numerous calls and/ or texts simultaneously (all without human intervention). The complained of SMS messages to the 0640 Number constituted calls not made for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(i). The complained of SMS messages to the 0640 Number constituted telephone solicitations as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4). The complained of SMS messages to the 0640 Number constituted advertisements as defined by 47 C.F.R. 64.1200(£)(1). Plaintiff never provided "prior express written consent" or any other form of consent allowing Defendant and/ or any affiliate, subsidiary, or agent of Defendant to transmit SMS messages to the 0640 Number by means of an "automatic telephone dialing system," within the meaning of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). At no time did Plaintiff ever provide Defendant with the 0640 Number. Defendant, its employees and agents are excluded &om the Class. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify the definition of the Class (or add one or more subclasses) after further discovery. Plaintiff and all Class members have been impacted and harmed by the acts of Defendant and/ or their affiliates or subsidiaries. This Class Action Complaint seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages. This action may properly be brought and maintained as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b). This class action satisfies the numerosity, typicality, adequacy, commonality, predominance and superiority requirements. Upon application by Plaintiffs counsel for certification of the Class, the Court may also be requested to utilize and certify subclasses in the interests of manageability, justice and/ or judicial economy. Numerosity. The number of persons within the Class is substantial, believed to amount to tens of thousands of persons dispersed throughout the United States. It is, therefore, impractical to join each member of the Class as a named Plaintiff. Further, the size and relatively modest value of the claims of the individual members of the Class renders joinder impractical. Accordingly, utilization of the class action mechanism is the most economically feasible means of determining and adjudicating the merits of this litigation. Adequacy. As Class representative, the Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to, or which conflict with, the interests of the absent members of the Class and is able to fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of such a Class. Plaintiff has raised viable statutory claims of the type reasonably expected to be raised by members of the Class, and will vigorously pursue those claims. If necessary, Plaintiff may seek leave to amend this Class Action Complaint to add additional Class representatives or assert additional claims. Competency of qass Counsel. Plaintiff has retained and is represented by experienced, qualified and competent counsel committed to prosecuting this action. These counsel are experienced in handling complex class action claims. Superiority. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual litigation of the claims of all Class members is impracticable. Even if every member of the Class could afford to pursue individual litigation, the Court system could not. It would be unduly burdensome to the courts in which individual litigation of numerous cases would proceed. Individualized litigation would also present the potential for varying, inconsistent or contradictory judgments, and would magnify the delay and expense to all parties and to the court system resulting from multiple trials of the same factual issues. By contrast, the maintenance of this action as a class action, with respect to some or all of the issues presented herein, presents few management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and of the court system and protects the rights of each member of the Class. Plaintiff anticipates no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. Class wide relief is essential to compel compliance with the · TCP A. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims is small because the statutory damages in an individual action for violation of the TCP A are small. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than are presented in many class claims because the text messages at issue are all automated and the Class members, by definition, did not provide the prior express written consent required under the statute to authorize such text messages to their cellular telephones. The Class members can be readily located and notified of this class action through Defendant's records and, if necessary, the records of cellular telephone providers. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Class Action Complaint as if fully stated herein. The foregoing acts and onuss1ons constitute negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227. As a result of the alleged negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, Plaintiff and all Class members are entitled to, and do seek, injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct violating the TCP A in the future. Plaintiff and all Class members are also entitled to, and do seek, an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each and every SMS message transmitted in violation of the TCP A pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Class Action Complaint as if fully stated herein. The foregoing acts and omissions constitute knowing and/ or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227. As a result of alleged knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, Plaintiff and all Class members are entitled to, and do seek, injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct violating the TCP A in the future. Plaintiff and all Class members are also entitled to, and do seek, treble damages of up to $1,500.00 for each and every SMS message transmitted in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 u.s.c. § 227(b)(3). Plaintiff and Class members also seek an award of attorneys' fees and costs. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATION OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (47 u.s.c. § 227) NEGLIGENT VIOLATION OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (47 u.s.c. § 227)

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The Q50 is a luxury sedan that debuted in the United States in August 2013. Since then, it has become Infiniti’s best-selling vehicle in the United States. More than 40,000 Q50s have been sold in the United States since its introduction. This action is brought as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3), on behalf of a Class defined as follows: All persons and entities that purchased or leased a 2014 Infiniti Q50 for end use and not for resale. Excluded from the Class are: (i) Defendant and its officers and directors, agents, affiliates, subsidiaries, authorized distributors and dealers, (ii) all Class Members that timely and validly request exclusion from the Class, and (iii) the Judge presiding over this action. Plaintiffs also seek certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3) of the following proposed state classes (“State Classes”): All persons and entities that purchased or leased a 2014 Infiniti Q50 for end us and not for resale in the State of California. All persons and entities that purchased or leased a 2014 Infiniti Q50 for end use and not for resale in the State of Nevada. Excluded from the State Classes are: (i) Defendant and its officers and directors, agents, affiliates, subsidiaries, authorized distributors and dealers, (ii) all State Class Members that timely and validly request exclusion from the State Class, and (iii) the Judge presiding over this action. Certification of Plaintiffs’ claims for classwide treatment is appropriate because Plaintiffs can prove the elements of their claims on a classwide basis using the same evidence as would be used to prove those elements in individual actions alleging the same claims. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. Each Plaintiff is a “consumer” within the meaning of the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3). Defendant is a “supplier” and “warrantor” within the meaning of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(4)-(5). The Q50 is a “consumer product” within the meaning of the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1). 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) provides a cause of action for any consumer that is damaged by the failure of a warrantor to comply with a written warranty. Defendant’s representations as described herein, such as on Defendant’s website and brochures, that Plaintiffs and the other Class members would be able to access the Advertised App/Functions through Q50s’ InTouch are written warranties within the meaning of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. Plaintiffs and the other Class members individually formed contracts with Defendant for the purchase of a Q50 equipped with an InTouch system. The contract included terms regarding delivery of an InTouch system capable of running the Advertised Apps/Functions on a certain date. Plaintiffs and the other Class members bargained for this term in the sales contract. Defendant breached each of these contracts when it failed to deliver an InTouch system capable of running the Advertised Apps/functions on that certain date. Although Defendant eventually delivered portions of the Advertised Apps/Functions, the delivery was nearly a year overdue and did not meet specifications. Plaintiffs and the other Class members have been without the Advertised Apps/Functions from the time they took delivery to about late- September 2014 at the earliest. Certain features, including but not limited to certain music apps and e-mail capabilities are still unavailable or substandard. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. Defendant’s conduct, as described herein, in misrepresenting Q50s’ technological features and emphasizing Q50s’ InTouch system as capable of performing certain tasks it was unable to perform, while omitting the fact that InTouch could not access the Advertised Apps/Functions, violates the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, et seq. Specifically, Defendant violated the CLRA through advertisements, promotional material, packaging materials, such as vehicle inserts, and statements by salespersons when it portrayed the InTouch system as capable of interfacing with several popular mobile phone apps, by engaging in the following practices proscribed by California Civil Code § 1770(a) in transactions that were intended to result in, and did result in, the sale of the product: a. representing that the Q50 has characteristics, uses and benefits which it does not have; b. representing that the Q50 is of a particular standard, quality, or grade, when it is not; c. advertising the Q50 with intent not to sell it as advertised; and d. representing that the Q50 has been supplied in accordance with previous representations when it has not. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. Breach of Express Warranty (National Class or, in the Alternative, the California Class) Breach of Contract under California Law (National Class or, in the Alternative, the California Class) The Q50 and the InTouch System Violation of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act (National Class or, in the Alternative, the California Class) Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (National Class or, in the Alternative, the California Class) Violation of Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (National Class or, in the Alternative, Each State Class)

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In accordance with F.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3), plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to the JFPA, on behalf of the following class of persons: All persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, (2) were sent telephone facsimile messages of material advertising the commercial availability of any property, goods, or services by or on behalf of defendant, (3) from whom defendant did not obtain prior express permission or invitation to send those faxes, and (4) did not display a proper opt-out notice. Excluded from the Class are the defendant, their employees, agents and members of the Judiciary. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the class definition upon completion of class certification discovery. Class Size (F.R.Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of persons and entities of the Plaintiff Class is numerous and joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of class members is at least forty. a statement that the sender must honor a recipient’s opt-out request within 30 days and the sender’s failure to do so is unlawful - thereby encouraging recipients to opt-out, if they did not want future faxes, by advising them that their opt-out requests will have legal “teeth”; Fair and Adequate Representation (F.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4)): The plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class. It is interested in this matter, has no conflicts and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the class. Need for Consistent Standards and Practical Effect of Adjudication (F.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(1)): Class certification is appropriate because the prosecution of individual actions by class members would: (a) create the risk of inconsistent adjudications that could establish incompatible standards of conduct fo the defendant and/or (b) as a practical matter, adjudication of the plaintiff’s claims will be dispositive of the interests of class members who are not parties. Common Conduct (F.R.Civ.P.23(b)(2)): Class certification is also appropriate because the defendant has acted and refused to act in the same or similar manner with respect to all class members thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate. The plaintiff demands such relief as authorized by 47 U.S.C. § 227. The JFPA makes unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement...” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 26. The JFPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods or services which is transmitted to any person without that person’s prior express invitation or permission in writing or otherwise.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(5). Opt-Out Notice Requirements. The JFPA strengthened the prohibitions against the sending of unsolicited advertisements by requiring, in §(b)(1)(C)(iii) of the Act, that senders of faxed advertisements place a clear and conspicuous notice on the first page of the transmission that contains the following among other things (hereinafter collectively the “Opt-Out Notice Requirements”): The fax defendant sent on February 5, 2015 a facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to the telephone facsimile machines of plaintiff and members of the plaintiff class. The fax constituted an advertisement under the Act. Defendant failed to comply with the Opt-Out Requirements in connection with the Fax. The Fax was transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express permission or invitation and/or Defendant are precluded from asserting any prior express permission or invitation because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements. By virtue thereof, defendant violated the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder by sending the Fax via facsimile transmission to plaintiff and members of the class. a statement advising the recipient that he or she may opt-out with respect to all of his or her facsimile telephone numbers and not just the ones that receive a faxed advertisements from the sender - thereby instructing a recipient on how to make a valid opt-out request for all of his or her fax machines; The requirement of (1) above is incorporated from §(b)(D)(ii) of the Act. The requirement of (2) above is incorporated from §(b(D)(ii) of the Act and rules and regulations of the Federal Communications Commission (the “FCC”) in ¶31 of its 2006 Report and Order (In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, Junk Prevention Act ov 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 3787, 2006 WL 901720, which rules and regulations took effect on August 1, 2006). The requirements of (3) above are contained in §(b)(2)(E) of the Act and incorporated into the Opt-Out Notice requirements via §(b)(2)(D)(ii). Compliance with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements is neither difficult no costly. The Opt-Out Notice Requirements are important consumer protections bestowed by Congress upon the owners of fax machines giving them the right and means to stop unwanted faxed advertisements. The TCPA/JFPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf of plaintiff and the plaintiff class to redress defendant’s violations of the Act and provides for statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3). The Act also provides that the injunctive relief is appropriate. Id. The JFPA is a strict liability statute, so the defendant are liable to plaintiff and the other class members even if their actions were only negligent. The defendant knew or should have known that (a) the plaintiff and the other class members had not given express invitation or permission for the defendant or anybody else to fax advertisements about the defendant’s goods or services; (b) defendant transmitted an advertisements; and (c) the faxes did not contain the required Opt-Out Notice.

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On or about February 15, 2019, Defendant caused the following automated text message to be transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 1175 (“1175 Number”): Long codes work as follows: Private companies known as SMS gateway providers have contractual arrangements with mobile carriers to transmit two-way SMS traffic. These SMS gateway providers send and receive SMS traffic to and from the mobile phone networks' SMS centers, which are responsible for relaying those messages to the intended mobile phone. This allows for the transmission of a large number of SMS messages to and from a long code. The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant’s text message, demonstrates that Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages. To send the text messages, Defendant used a messaging platform (the “Platform”) that permitted Defendant to transmit thousands of automated text messages without any human involvement. The Platform has the capacity to store telephone numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. The Platform has the capacity to generate sequential numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers in sequential order, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers from a list of numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. The Platform has the capacity to schedule the time and date for future transmission of text messages, which occurs without any human involvement. Additionally, the Platform has an auto-reply function that results in the transmission of text messages to individual’s cellular telephones automatically from the system, and with no human intervention, in response to a keyword (e.g. “STOP”) being sent by a consumer, which function was also utilized by Defendant on February 17, 2019. As shown below: The above execution these instructions occurred seamlessly, with no human intervention, and almost instantaneously. Indeed, the Platform is capable of transmitting thousands of text messages following the above steps in minutes, if not less. Further, the Platform “throttles” the transmission of the text messages depending on feedback it receives from the mobile carrier networks. In other words, the platform controls how quickly messages are transmitted depending on network congestion. The platform performs this throttling function automatically and does not allow a human to control the function. The following graphic summarizes the above steps and demonstrates that the dialing of the text messages at issue was done by the Platform automatically and without any human intervention: Defendant’s unsolicited text message caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of her privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s text message also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to his daily life. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of the below defined Class: All persons within the United States who, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, were sent a text message using the same type of equipment used to text message Plaintiff, from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s behalf, to said person’s cellular telephone number. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). The TCPA defines an “automatic telephone dialing system” (hereinafter “ATDS”) as “equipment which has the capacity – (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” Id. at § 227(a)(1). These calls were made without regard to whether Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. Defendant violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express consent. Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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ERIC is the owner of commercial property located at 4600 Lancaster Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19131 (“Subject Property” or “Property”), as well as other commercial properties in Philadelphia and Pennsylvania (“ERIC Properties”). On or around January 25, 2012, Seneca issued Policy No. SSP1501079, an all-risk commercial property policy (“Policy”), to ERIC. A true and correct copy of the Policy is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit “A.” The ERIC Properties, including the Subject Property, are each separately enumerated on the declarations page of the Policy. The Subject Property’s “Limit of Insurance” is listed at $212,180. The Policy provides for replacement cost coverage, but allows ERIC to, at its option, recover on an actual cash value (when abbreviated, “ACV”) basis. Most pertinently to this litigation, the Policy includes a coinsurance term providing that, if the insured fails to purchase high enough limits, it must act as a co-insurer in the event of a loss. See Exhibit A, page 46. It is well understood and accepted in the insurance industry that there will be many instances in which an insured will “do better” by recovering on an actual cash value basis than a replacement cost basis, because, where the recovery is on an actual cash value basis, the coinsurance penalty similarly calculated on actual cash value is limited or nonexistent. II. On August 23, 2012, a motor vehicle crashed into the Property, causing it to sustain substantial damage. ERIC notified Seneca of the loss in a timely and proper fashion, and the claim was assigned Claim No. 12HHN260 (“Claim”). In its handling of the Claim, Seneca has breached the terms and conditions of the Policy and acted in bad faith. Seneca determined that the replacement cost value of the Property at the time of the loss was $395,486, ERIC was required to carry limits of $356,261, and ERIC would therefore only be able to recover 59.56% of the damages it sustained. This would only be correct if ERIC was making a claim for replacement cost value. Other insurance companies interpret coinsurance provisions in this manner; that is, when a claim is made on actual cash value basis, the required amount of coverage to avoid a coinsurance penalty is similarly calculated on an actual cash value basis. One reason for this, among others, is that an insured pays extra for replacement cost coverage, so presumably it is receiving more coverage not less than if the insured purchased only an actual cash value policy. Moreover, courts have uniformly held that when an insured elects coverage under an actual cash value basis, the replacement coverage provisions are irrelevant. On December 10, 2012, Seneca issued a letter to ERIC’s public adjuster improperly rejecting ERIC’s Claim (“December 10 Letter”). A true and correct copy of the December 10 Letter is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit “B.” According to Seneca, “Although the policy permits the insured to submit its claim on an actual cash value basis, that option does not alter the method by which the ‘value of the covered property’ is determined for purposes of calculating coinsurance.” See Exhibit B, page 5. This is simply untrue. Seneca then reiterated that the replacement cost value of the Property at the time of the loss was $395,486, ERIC was required to carry limits of $356,261, and ERIC would therefore only be able to recover 59.56% of the damages it sustained. See Exhibit B, pages 5-6. Seneca’s interpretation of its Policy is arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, contrary to the plain language of the Policy and the reasonable expectations of its insured, and in bad faith; if such an interpretation were to stand, Seneca would in effect have been charging a higher premium to its insureds for less coverage. On information and belief, Seneca has interpreted its policies in this manner with regard to hundreds, if not thousands, of insureds throughout the country who elected to make a claim on an ACV basis. This action is being brought as a class action under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), 23(b)(l), 23(b)(2), and 23(b)(3), on behalf of a class (“Class”) consisting of the following: All Seneca policyholders and insureds that, following a property loss, have elected to recover on an actual cash value basis, and have been assessed a coinsurance penalty based upon the replacement cost of the property. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1). The exact size of the Class and the members thereof are ascertainable through Seneca’s business records. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over any questions effecting solely individual members of the Class. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2). The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class, as the Plaintiff and all other members of the Class were damaged in the same way. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(3). The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class action litigation. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4). The Plaintiff and its counsel are committed to vigorously pursuing this matter, and have the financial resources to do so. The Plaintiff has no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with those of the Class. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). Since the damage suffered by individual class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it virtually impossible for the Class members individually to seek redress for the unlawful conduct alleged. Moreover, as set forth above, common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over any questions that solely effect individual members of the Class. See id. These common questions include the question of whether Seneca’s method of calculating a coinsurance penalty is wrongful. The Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. The Policy is a valid and enforceable contract between ERIC, on the one hand, and Seneca, on the other hand. The members of the Class also possess (and/or possessed) valid and enforceable contracts with Seneca. ERIC has complied with all of the applicable terms and conditions of the Policy. The members of the Class also complied with all of the applicable terms and conditions of their contracts with Seneca. Seneca has breached the Policy (and the policies it issued to members of the Class) by, among other things, using the irrelevant replacement cost of a property, rather than the applicable actual cash value, to calculate whether enough insurance had been purchased. The aforesaid breach has directly and proximately caused ERIC and the members of the Class to sustain damages. The Plaintiff repeats each of the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. Seneca has no actual basis for declining full coverage to ERIC and the members of the Class. Seneca has acted in bad faith by knowingly taking actions that lacked a reasonable basis, and frivolously and unfoundedly refusing to pay policy proceeds due and owing to policyholders, including ERIC and the members of the Class. Seneca’s actions run contrary to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8371 and other applicable statutes and common law governing first-party bad faith. This is a class action brought on behalf of the Plaintiff and all Seneca policyholders and insureds that, following a property loss, have elected to recover on an actual cash value basis, and have been assessed a “coinsurance penalty” based upon the property’s replacement cost. I.

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Plaintiff sent Defendant written communication dated August 7, 2012, and demanded that Defendant cease and desist from any and all further communications with Plaintiff. (See August 7, 2012 Correspondence, attached as Exhibit A). Defendant received Plaintiff’s cease and desist correspondence on August 14, 2012 at 8:32 A.M. (See USPS Delivery Confirmation, attached as Exhibit B). During the September 17, 2012 telephone call, Plaintiff answered and listened to a pre-recorded message until Plaintiff was transferred to a live person. During the September 17, 2012 telephone call, Plaintiff spoke with Defendant and again demanded that Defendant cease and desist from placing any and all further calls to Plaintiff. During the September 17, 2012 conversation, Defendant advised Plaintiff that it would remove her name from its calling list. Despite Plaintiff’s repeated cease and desist demands, Defendant placed calls to Plaintiff on September 18, 2012 at 8:54 A.M., September 18, 2012 at 12:25 P.M, October 2, 2012 at 3:04 P.M., October 9, 2012 at 12:10 P.M., October 10, 2012 at 9:56 A.M., October 10, 2012 at 10:42 A.M., October 11, 2012 at 6:36 P.M. and October 15, 2012 at 5:41 P.M. Upon information and good-faith belief, Defendant placed the telephone calls identified above to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number using an automatic telephone dialing system and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice. Defendant did not place any telephone calls to Plaintiff for emergency purposes. Defendant did not have Plaintiff’s prior express consent to make any telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number—any consent, if it existed, having been expressly revoked via the August 7, 2012 letter and again during the September 17, 2012 conversation. Upon information and good-faith belief, Defendant placed the telephone calls identified above to Plaintiff voluntarily. Upon information and good-faith belief, Defendant placed the telephone calls identified above to Plaintiff under its own free will. Upon information and good-faith belief, Defendant had knowledge that it was using an automatic telephone dialing system and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice to make and/or place each of the telephone calls identified above. Upon information and good-faith belief, Defendant intended to use an automatic telephone dialing system and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice to make and/or place each of the telephone calls identified above. The proposed Class specifically excludes the United States of America, the State of Texas, counsel for the parties, the presiding United States District Court Judge, the Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and the Justices of the United States Supreme Court, any entity in which Defendant has or had a controlling interest, all officers and agents of Defendant, and all persons related to within the third degree of consanguinity or affection to any of the foregoing individuals. The Class is averred to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The exact number of members of the Class is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can be ascertained only through appropriate discovery. Upon information and good-faith belief, the proposed Class is ascertainable in that the names and addresses of all members of the Class can be identified in business records maintained by Defendant. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class she seeks to represent. Plaintiff and all members of the Class’s claims originate from the same conduct, practice, and procedure on the part of Defendant, and Plaintiff possesses the same interests and has suffered the same injuries as each Class member. Like all proposed members of the Class, Plaintiff received telephone calls from Defendant using an automatic telephone dialing system, and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice, in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227. Thus, if brought and prosecuted individually, the claims of each of the members of the Class would require proof of the same material and substantive facts. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and has no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with the members of the Class. Plaintiff is willing and prepared to serve this Court and the proposed Class. Plaintiff has retained the services of counsel who are experienced and competent in consumer protection claims, as well as complex class action litigation, will adequately prosecute this action, and will assert, protect, and otherwise represent Plaintiff and all absent Class members. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the proposed Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the parties opposing the Class. Such incompatible standards of conduct and varying adjudications, on what would necessarily be the same essential facts, proof, and legal theories, would also create and allow the existence of inconsistent and incompatible rights within the Class. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) in that Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the proposed Class, making final declaratory or injunctive relief appropriate. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) in that the questions of law and fact that are common to members of the proposed Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. Absent a class action, Defendant’s violations of the law will be allowed to proceed without a full, fair, judicially supervised remedy. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation above. Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) by utilizing an automatic telephone dialing system and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice to make and/or place telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number. Defendant willingly or knowingly violated 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) as Defendant was advised that it did not have consent to call Plaintiff’s cellular telephone on two separate occasions, yet repeatedly used an automatic telephone dialing system and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice to make and/or place telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number anyway. VIOLATION OF 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(a)(iii)

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On or about August 14, 2020, Defendant caused a call with a prerecorded message to be transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 9590 (the “9590 Number”). Because Plaintiff did not answer her telephone after it rang, a voicemail containing a prerecorded message was left on Plaintiff’s phone. The following is a transcript of the voicemail that was left in Plaintiff’s voicemail box: Hey, it’s me. I’m really sorry that I’m calling again, but I forgot to tell that you that I’m going to the new recreational dispensary tomorrow called Doja. They’re in Portage and they are giving out like a free 50-inch TV and like free tacos for an entire year from Taco Bob’s and I really want to get out there. I don’t want to miss it. So you should meet up with me tomorrow like a little before eleven because they are going to be really busy. I think they are on like 4203 East Centre Avenue. If you can’t make it just give me a holler, but otherwise I just wanted to let you know why I’m going to be a little late tomorrow. Alright, talk soon. Bye. The prerecorded call at issue, which was left as a voicemail, was transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, and within the time frame relevant to this action. Defendant’s prerecorded calls constitute telemarketing because they encourage the future purchase or investment in property, goods, and/or services, i.e., selling cannabis products. The prerecorded calls Plaintiff received originated from telephone number 269- 459-6462, a telephone number owned and/or operated by or on behalf of Defendant. Plaintiff received the subject call with a prerecorded voice within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other prerecorded messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her express consent to be contacted with a prerecorded call. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 9590 Number and is financially responsible for phone service to the 9590 Number. Defendant’s unsolicited prerecorded call caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of her privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. See Patriotic Veterans, Inc. v. Zoeller, No. 16- 2059, 2017 WL 25482, at *2 (7th Cir. Jan. 3, 2017) (“Every call uses some of the phone owner's time and mental energy, both of which are precious.”). Defendant’s unsolicited voice messages caused Plaintiff actual harm. Specifically, Plaintiff estimates that she has wasted fifteen minutes reviewing all of Defendant’s unwanted messages. Each time, Plaintiff had to stop what she was doing to either retrieve her phone and/or look down at the phone to review the message. Defendant’s voice messages also can slow cell phone performance by taking up space on the recipient phone’s memory. See https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0350-text-message- spam#text (finding that spam text messages can slow cell phone performance by taking up phone memory space). Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a Class defined as follows: No Consent Class: All persons within the United States who, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, were sent a call using an artificial or prerecorded voice, from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s behalf, to said person’s cellular telephone number, without emergency purpose and without the recipient’s prior express written consent. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency prerecorded telemarketing calls to Plaintiff’s and Class members’ cellular telephones; (2) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express written consent to make such calls; (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits prerecorded messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – transmitted calls using an artificial or prerecorded voice to the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiff and members of the putative class. These calls were made without regard to whether Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an artificial or prerecorded voice to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express consent. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that it was using an artificial or prerecorded voice. The violations were therefore willful or knowing. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class had not given prior express consent to receive its prerecorded calls to their cellular telephones the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA. Plaintiff re-allege and incorporates paragraphs 1-50 as if fully set forth herein. At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as alleged herein violated the TCPA. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to transmit artificial or prerecorded voice calls, and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class) PROPOSED CLASS Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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Defendant’s text messages were transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, and within the time frame relevant to this action. Defendant’s text messages constitute telemarketing because they encouraged the future purchase or investment in property, goods, or services, i.e., selling Plaintiff group fitness classes. The information contained in the text message advertises Defendant’s “Special Memorial Day sales” and “Special Labor Day Sale”, which Defendant sends to promote its business. Plaintiff received the subject texts within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 2385 Number, and is financially responsible for phone service to the 2385 Number. The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant’s text messages demonstrates that Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages. See Jenkins v. LL Atlanta, LLC, No. 1:14- cv-2791-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30051, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2016) (“These assertions, combined with the generic, impersonal nature of the text message advertisements and the use of a short code, support an inference that the text messages were sent using an ATDS.”) (citing Legg v. Voice Media Grp., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to infer text messages were sent using ATDS; use of a short code and volume of mass messaging alleged would be impractical without use of an ATDS); Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding it "plausible" that defendants used an ATDS where messages were advertisements written in an impersonal manner and sent from short code); Hickey v. Voxernet LLC, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130; Robbins v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 13-CV-132-IEG NLS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72725, 2013 WL 2252646, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2013) (observing that mass messaging would be impracticable without use of an ATDS)). The text messages originated from telephone number 727-888-6781, a number which upon information and belief is owned and operated by Defendant. The number used by Defendant (727-888-6781) is known as a “long code,” a standard 10-digit phone number that enabled Defendant to send SMS text messages en masse, while deceiving recipients into believing that the message was personalized and sent from a telephone number operated by an individual. Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendant utilized a combination of hardware and software systems to send the text messages at issue in this case. The systems utilized by Defendant have the capacity to store telephone numbers using a random or sequential generator, and to dial such numbers without human intervention. Defendant’s unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of his privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s text messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to his daily life. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a Class defined as follows: All persons within the United States who, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, were sent a text message, from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s behalf, to said person’s cellular telephone number, advertising Defendant’s services, without the recipients’ prior express written consent. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff’s and Class members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS; (2) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express written consent to make such calls; (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined below. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express written consent. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that it was using equipment that at constituted an automatic telephone dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing. Plaintiff re-allege and incorporate paragraphs 1-46 as if fully set forth herein. At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as alleged herein violated the TCPA. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the TCPA. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and Class Members had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls, the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA. Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) PROPOSED CLASS Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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Ms. Meadows files this case as an “opt-in” collective action, as is specifically allowed by the collective action provisions of the FLSA (See, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)). For purposes of this action, the “relevant period” or “class period” is the period of time commencing on the date that is three years prior to the filing of this action, and continuing thereafter until time of trial. Ms. Meadows, for instance, routinely worked 42 to 44 hours a week during each workweek of her employment with KPMG. She was termed a “Seasonal, Professional Level” employee, but KPMG never intended her employment to be seasonal, sporadic or part-time. Other similarly situated employees have, and are, being denied their lawful overtime wages by having to work hours off-the-clock and by being required to certify that they have worked exactly 40 hours each and every week of their employment. Thus, Plaintiff’s experience is typical of the experience of members of the Plaintiff Class as it pertains to unpaid overtime wages and unpaid employment benefits. The job titles or specific job requirements of the numerous members of the Plaintiff Class do not prevent collective treatment because each non-exempt employee, regardless of job title, job requirements, or rate of pay, who was / is denied overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 in one or more workweek is similarly situated to Plaintiff, resulting solely from Defendant’s deliberate denial of overtime wages by way of a systematic and consistently applied company policy in violation of the FLSA. Further, although the quantum of damages may vary among the individual members of the Plaintiff Class, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. Thus, the unpaid overtime class Ms. Meadows seeks to represent is comprised of all current and former employees that KPMG LLP employed as hourly or non-exempt workers 1) who were categorized as “Seasonal, Professional Level” employees; 2) who were based in, and/or worked in the United States during any workweek falling within the class period; 3) who worked off-the-clock hours during any workweek falling within the class period; and 4) who were not paid their overtime wages during any workweek falling within the class period. Each individual who opts into this litigation will be added as a party, evidenced by the timely filing of his or her written consent to join this collective action. V. During the relevant period, Defendant has been subject to the requirements of the FLSA. On October 29, 2013, KPMG offered Ms. Meadows employment (See Offer Letter attached hereto as Exhibit – A). Among other things, the Offer Letter stated that Ms. Meadows would be compensated at a rate of $80.00 per hour; that she was a non-exempt employee for purposes of federal wage-hour law; and that KPMG would deduct and withhold income, social security and Medicare taxes from her compensation (and presumably, she would receive an IRS Form W-2 on an annual basis, which she did). Id. The Offer Letter further stated that “As an employee who will work less than 1,000 hours a year, you will not be eligible for firm provided benefits (unless required by applicable law). In the event that you work 1,000 hours or more during a calendar year with approval from your manager, your status may be changed, and you may then become eligible for firm provided benefits.” Id. Further, KPMG claimed to employ Ms. Meadows as a “Seasonal, Professional Level” employee based out of Houston, Texas. However, as noted above, there was nothing seasonal, sporadic or part-time about Ms. Meadows’ employment. Ms. Meadows worked for KPMG from November 11, 2013, until September 30, 2016. During this time, she was termed a “Contract Recruiting Manager” (November 11, 2013 – March 15, 2016), and as “Research Manager” (March 16, 2016 – September 30, 2016). On average, Ms. Meadows worked between 42 and 44 hours a week, but KPMG required her to report only 40 of those hours on her timesheet each week. She was repeatedly, purposefully and willfully required to underreport her weekly hours worked in violation of the FLSA, despite knowing full well that her job duties could not be completed within 40 hours a week. When Ms. Meadows asked to be paid her overtime wages, KPMG’s management refused to address the matter. Admittedly, no FLSA exemption applied to Ms. Meadows’ employment, and Plaintiff now sues for her unpaid wages. Thus, as victims of a common and uniformly applied policy that violated the FLSA, Plaintiff and all other similarly situated non-exempt employees of the Defendant may properly be joined as a class under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Plaintiff and all other similarly situated employees now sue KPMG, as a class, for their unpaid overtime wages owed to them under the FLSA. VI.

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Plaintiff had an account with AT&T Mobility. Thereafter, AT&T Mobility claimed Plaintiff incurred a debt of $82.42 (“the alleged Debt”). Defendant alleges Plaintiff owes a debt (“the alleged Debt”). The alleged Debt is an alleged obligation of Plaintiff to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. The alleged Debt does not arise from any business enterprise of Plaintiff. The alleged Debt is a “debt” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). At an exact time known only to Defendant, the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection. At the time the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection, the alleged Debt was in default. In its efforts to collect the alleged Debt, Defendant decided to contact Plaintiff by written correspondence. Rather than preparing and mailing such written correspondence to Plaintiff on its own, Defendant decided to utilize a third-party vendor to perform such activities on its behalf. As part of its utilization of the third-party vendor, Defendant conveyed information regarding the alleged Debt to the third-party vendor. 4 The information conveyed by Defendant to the third-party vendor included Plaintiff’s status as a debtor, the precise amount of the alleged Debt, the entity to which Plaintiff allegedly owed the debt, among other things. Defendant’s conveyance of the information regarding the alleged Debt to the third- party vendor is a “communication” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). The third-party vendor then populated some or all this information into a prewritten template, printed, and mailed the letter to Plaintiff at Defendant’s direction. That letter, dated June 10, 2020, was received and read by Plaintiff. (A true and accurate copy of that collection letter (the “Letter”) is annexed hereto as “Exhibit 1.”) The Letter, which conveyed information about the alleged Debt, is a “communication” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). The Letter was the initial written communication Plaintiff received from Defendant concerning the alleged Debt. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) provides that, subject to several exceptions not applicable here, “a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt,” with anyone other than the consumer “without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector.” The third-party vendor does not fall within any of the exceptions provided for in 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b). Plaintiff never consented to Defendant’s communication with the third-party vendor concerning the alleged Debt. 5 Plaintiff never consented to Defendant’s communication with the third-party vendor concerning Plaintiff’s personal and/or confidential information. Plaintiff never consented to Defendant’s communication with anyone concerning the alleged Debt or concerning Plaintiff’s personal and/or confidential information. Upon information and belief, Defendant has utilized a third-party vendor for these purposes thousands of times. Defendant utilizes a third-party vendor in this regard for the sole purpose of maximizing its profits. Defendant utilizes a third-party vendor without regard to the propriety and privacy of the information which it discloses to such third-party. Defendant utilizes a third-party vendor with reckless disregard for the harm to Plaintiff and other consumers that could result from Defendant’s unauthorized disclosure of such private and sensitive information. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) when it disclosed information about Plaintiff’s alleged Debt to the third-party vendor. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f provides that a debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. The unauthorized disclosure of a consumer’s private and sensitive information is both unfair and unconscionable. Defendant disclosed Plaintiff’s private and sensitive information to the third-party vendor. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) when it disclosed information about Plaintiff’s alleged Debt to the third-party vendor. 6 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(b) and 1692f and is liable to Plaintiff therefor. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all consumers similarly situated in the State of New York. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class of: i. All consumers where Defendant sent information concerning the consumer’s debt to a third-party vendor without obtaining the prior consent of the consumer, which disclosure was made on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action to the present. This action seeks a finding that Defendant’s conduct violates the FDCPA and asks that the Court award damages as authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. The Class consists of more than thirty-five persons. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Common questions of law or fact raised by this action affect all members of the Class and predominate over any individual issues. Common relief is therefore sought on behalf of all members of the Class. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, and a risk that any adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class would, as a practical matter, either be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class not party to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Defendant has acted in a manner applicable to the Class as a whole such that declaratory relief is warranted. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the Class. The management of the class is not extraordinarily difficult, and the factual and legal issues raised 7 by this action will not require extended contact with the members of the Class, because Defendant’s conduct was perpetrated on all members of the Class and will be established by common proof. Moreover, Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in actions brought under consumer protection laws. Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) and § 1692f

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Supercuts has over 2,700 salons across the U.S. that provide haircut services to consumers that are either corporate-owned or owned by a franchisee.3 As part of its business practice, Supercuts places solicitation text messages to consumers in order to solicit them to purchase haircutting services from Supercuts locations across the country. For example, in Plaintiff Shipman’s case, Defendant sent multiple unsolicited text messages to his number registered on the national do not call registry. Consumers have posted complaints online about unsolicited text messages they received from Supercuts including: • “Spam text from Supercuts”4 • “Received a text asking to reply Y to sign up for rewards at Supercuts….Delete”5 In response to these text messages, Plaintiff Shipman files this lawsuit seeking monetary and injunctive relief requiring the Defendant to cease from violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, as well as an award of statutory damages to the members of the Class and costs. Plaintiff Shipman registered his phone number on the DNC on August 27, 2011. Plaintiff Shipman’s phone number is not associated with a business and is used for personal use only. At the beginning of November 2020, Plaintiff Shipman received an unsolicited text message from Supercuts using shortcode 71441 stating, “Supercuts Supercuts Pick 2! Get your coupon at: https://mcpn.us/x?i=904894&c=13f27 OR to redeem by text reply: 81703.” On December 14, 2020 at 9:03 AM, Plaintiff Shipman received a fourth unsolicited text message from Supercuts, again from shortcode 71441: None of the text messages that Plaintiff received provide instructions on how to opt-out of receiving additional text messages. When the links in any of the first 3 text messages that Plaintiff received are visited, they showed 2 coupons that Plaintiff could redeem until the end of November 2020. The December 14th text message shows that the coupon can be redeemed until the end of December 2020 and is valid at participating locations without indicating any specific location. Plaintiff has never provided Defendant with consent to send him unsolicited text messages or calls to his cell phone. The unauthorized solicitation text messages that Plaintiff received from Supercuts, as alleged herein, have harmed Plaintiff Shipman in the form of annoyance, nuisance, and invasion of privacy, and disturbed the use and enjoyment of his phone, in addition to the wear and tear on the phone’s hardware (including the phone’s battery) and the consumption of memory on the phone. Plaintiff Shipman brings this action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) and seek certification of the following Class: Do Not Call Registry Class: All persons in the United States who from four years prior to the filing of this action through class certification (1) Defendant (or an agent acting on behalf of the Defendant) texted more than one time, (2) within any 12-month period, (3) where the person’s telephone number had been listed on the National Do Not Call Registry for at least thirty days, (4) for substantially the same reason Defendant texted Plaintiff, and (5) for whom Defendant claims (a) they obtained prior express written consent in the same manner as Defendant claim they supposedly obtained prior express written consent to text Plaintiff, or (b) they did not obtain prior express written consent. The following individuals are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, their subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which either Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) Plaintiff’s attorneys; (4) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (5) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such excluded persons; and (6) persons whose claims against Defendant have been fully and finally adjudicated and/or released. Plaintiff Shipman anticipates the need to amend the Class definitions following appropriate discovery. Numerosity: On information and belief, there are hundreds, if not thousands of members of the Class such that joinder of all members is impracticable. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff Shipman will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class actions. Plaintiff Shipman has no interests antagonistic to those of the Class, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. Plaintiff Shipman and his counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Class, and have the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiff Shipman nor his counsel have any interest adverse to the Class. Appropriateness: This class action is also appropriate for certification because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class and as a whole, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the members of the Class and making final class-wide injunctive relief appropriate. Defendant’s business practices apply to and affect the members of the Class uniformly, and Plaintiff’s challenge of those practices hinges on Defendant’s conduct with respect to the Class as wholes, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff Shipman. Additionally, the damages suffered by individual members of the Class will likely be small relative to the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendant’s actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the members of the Class to obtain effective relief from Defendant’s misconduct on an individual basis. A class action provides the benefits of single adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. Plaintiff Shipman repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 41 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference. The TCPA’s implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or his telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.” Any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” may bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c). Defendant violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) by initiating, or causing to be initiated, telephone solicitations to telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class members who registered their respective telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry, a listing of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government. Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) because Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class received more than one text message in a 12-month period made by or on behalf of the Defendant in violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, as described above. As a result of Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein, Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class suffered actual damages and, under section 47 U.S.C. § 227(c), are entitled, inter alia, to receive up to $500 in damages for such violations of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200.

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On or about December 24, 2015, Defendant sent a written communication to Plaintiff in connection with the collection of the Debt. A true and correct copy of the relevant page of the December 24, 2015 communication is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The December 24, 2015 communication was the first communication Plaintiff received from Defendant concerning the Debt. Plaintiff did not receive any additional communications from Defendant within five days of the December 24, 2015 communication. The December 24, 2015 communication to Plaintiff stated, “Your Sam’s Club MasterCard Account, which was issued by and owed to Synchrony Bank, has been referred to us by our client for collection.” See Ex. A. Further, Defendant’s December 24, 2015 communications also violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5) by failing to inform Plaintiff that Defendant need only provide him the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor, if he notified Defendant of such request, in writing. Defendant’s misstatement of the rights afforded by the FDCPA would cause the least-sophisticated consumer to understand, incorrectly, that validation of the debt, or a request for the name and address of the original creditor, could be obtained through an oral request, or by means other than in writing. Such a misunderstanding could lead the least-sophisticated consumer to waive or otherwise not properly vindicate her rights under the FDCPA. Indeed, failing to dispute the debt in writing, or failing to request the name and address of the original creditor, in writing, would cause a consumer to waive the important protections afforded by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b)—namely, that a debt collector cease contacting the consumer until the debt collector provides the consumer with verification of the alleged debt and/or the original creditor’s name and address, as requested. Plaintiff bring this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a class consisting of: (a) All persons with a Florida address, (b) to whom GC Services Limited Partnership mailed an initial debt collection communication that stated: (1) “if you do dispute all or any portion of this debt within 30 days of receiving this letter, we will obtain verification of the debt from our client and send it to you,” and/or (2) “if within 30 days of receiving this letter you request the name and address of the original creditor, we will provide it to you in the event it differs from our client,” (c) in the one year preceding the date of this complaint, (d) in connection with the collection of a consumer debt. Excluded from the class is Defendant, its officers and directors, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors, or assigns, and any entity in which Defendant has or had controlling interests. The proposed class satisfies Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) because, upon information and belief, it is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The exact number of class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery. The proposed class is ascertainable in that, upon information and belief, the names and addresses of all members of the proposed class can be identified in business records maintained by Defendant. The proposed class satisfies Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) and (3) because Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the class. To be sure, the claims of Plaintiff and all of the members of the class originate from the same conduct, practice and procedure on the part of Defendant, and Plaintiff possesses the same interests and has suffered the same injuries as each member of the proposed class. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as the damages suffered by individual members of the class may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impracticable for the members of the class to individually redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. Issues of law and fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions that may affect only individual members, in that Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the class. Among the issues of law and fact common to the class are: a. Defendant’s violations of the FDCPA as alleged herein; b. Defendant’s failure to properly provide in its initial debt collection letter the disclosures required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g; c. Whether Defendant is a debt collector as defined by the FDCPA; d. the existence of Defendant’s identical conduct particular to the matters at issue; e. the availability of statutory penalties; and f. the availability of attorneys’ fees and costs. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 36. Defendant’s December 24, 2015 communication did not contain the proper disclosures required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4), and Defendant did not provide such disclosures within five days thereafter. Specifically, the December 24, 2015 communication violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) by failing to inform Plaintiff that Defendant need only mail verification of the Debt to him, and a copy of any judgment, if he notified Defendant that he disputed the Debt, or any portion thereof, in writing. As a result, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4). Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 36. Defendant’s December 24, 2015 communication did not contain the proper disclosures required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5), and Defendant did not provide such disclosures within five days thereafter. Specifically, the December 24, 2015 communication violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5) by failing to inform Plaintiff that Defendant need only provide him the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor, if he notified Defendant of his request for that information in writing. As a result, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5). Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 36. The FDCPA at 15 U.S.C. § 1692e provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” Defendant’s December 24, 2015 communication did not contain the proper disclosures required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) and 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5), and Defendant did not provide such disclosures within five days thereafter. PRACTICES ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e PRACTICES ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) PRACTICES ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5)

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Plaintiffs bring this action individually, and on behalf of the following Pennsylvania state-wide class of similarly situated individualc;, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: All ind1v1duals who were employed by Defendants at "Han Dynasty of University City Inc." at 371 I Vlarket Street, Philadelphia PA 19104 and "\:ew Han Dynasty lnc ··at 70 Buckwalter Rd, L1rner1ck PA 19468, Since \1ay I, 2016 (the "Clas<,'') There are questions of law and fact common to the Class. including, without limitation: a. whether Defendants, based on its uniform and company-wide policies and practices, have failed to pay wages and overtime to Plaintiff~ and the Class pursuant to the P'\t1WA, b. whether Plamt1ffs and the Class are entitled to overtime compensation for services rendered in excess of 40 hours per week under the P'\t1W A, c. whether Defendants acted knowingly, willfully or recklessly in v10lat111g the P'\t1W A, d whether Plaintiffs and the Class have ">uffered and are entitled to damage">. and. 1f so, 111 what amount, e. Whether liquidated, punitive damages, or special damages are warranted under the PMWA, and f Whether Plamtiffs and the Clac-,s are entitled to declaratory or 1111unct1ve relief under the Plaintiff Pan was employed as a cook at "\Jew Han Dynasty Inc " located at 70 Buckwalter Rd, Limerick PA 19468 from \'larch 2. 2016 until \'lay 2. 2018. He was primarily responsible for frying food for the Defendants' re!'itaurant patrons Throughout that time and, upon information belief. both before that time (throughout the Class Period) and continuing unti I present, the Defendants have likewise employed other individuals, like the Plaintiff (the Collective Action \'!embers/the Class) in positions that required little skill and no capital providing chef. server, deli..,ery and other general restaurant services. From March 2, 2016 until May 2, 2018. Plaintiff Pan worked at "'\ew Han Dynasty Inc." He w,as paid $4,500 per month from '.\'larch 2, 2016 to December 31, 2017 and was paid $4,700 per month from January I, 2018 to 'v1ay 2. 2018 by cash only Throughout that time and, upon information belie( both before that time (throughout the Class Period) and continuing until present, the Defendants have likewise employed other individuals, like the Plaintiffs (the Collective Action \!!embers/the Class) in positions that required little skill and no capital providing chef, server, delivery and other general restaurant services. During the employment of Plaintiff by Defendants, Plaintiff Zhang was paid $2,700 per month by a combination of cash and check from December, 2015 to October, 2016. From October, 2016 to October, 2017, Plaintiff Zhang was paid $2,800 per month by a combination of cash and check. From October, 2017 to ~ovember, 2017, he was paid $2,850 per month by a combinati<)n of cash and check. From '.\:ovember, 2017 to \!larch. 2018, Plaintiff Zhang was paid $2,950 pel' month by a combination of cash and check. rrom \!larch, 2018 to present, Plaintiff Zhang was paid $3,000 by a combination of cash and check. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference, all preceding paragraphs Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees for actual damages, liquidated damages and equitable relief. pursuant to 29 lJ S.C. § 2 I 6(b), as \\<ell as reasonable' attorneys' fees. costs and expenses. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference. all preceding paragraphs. ·y he PMW A requires that covered employees he compensated for every hour worked in a workweek. See 43 P.S. § 333.104(a). The P\tlWA requires that employees receive overtime compensation "not less than one and one-half times" the employee's regular rate of pay for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek. See 43 P.S. § 333.104(c). Plaintiffs and the Class are covered employees entitled to the P\tlW A's protections. Plaintiffs and other members of the Class are not exempt from receiving P\tf WA overtime b¢nefits. Defendants are employers required to comply with the P\tl WA's mandates. Defendants violated the PMWA by failing to pay Plaintiffs and other members of the Class proper compensation for all hours worked and for time spent working in excess of 40 hours during the workweek. FAIRLABORSTA~DARDSACT 29 C.S.C. § 201 et seq. (UNPAID WAGES/OVERTL\1E) PENNSYLVANIA '.\11~1'.\HJ'.\1 WAGE ACT 43 P.S. §§ 333.10 I et seq. (lJNPAID WAGES!OVERTI'.\1.E)

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Ms. Haynes-Glenn also seeks to represent a subclass defined as all Class members who reside in New York who possess Laundry Cards that are maintained by Defendant (the “New York Subclass”). Members of the Class and New York Subclass are so numerous that their individual joinder herein is impracticable. On information and belief, members of the Class and New York Subclass number in the millions. The precise number of Class members and their identities are unknown to Plaintiff at this time but may be determined through discovery. Class members may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail and/or publication through the distribution records of Defendant and third-party retailers and vendors. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all Class members and predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members. Common legal and factual questions include, but are not limited to whether Defendant’s Laundry Card refund policy is false and misleading. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the Class in that the named Plaintiff was exposed to Defendant’s false and misleading marketing and promotional materials and representations, possess Laundry Cards, and suffered a loss as a result of Defendant’s possible prepayment amount and refund policies. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class and Subclass because her interests do not conflict with the interests of the Class members she seeks to represent, she has retained competent counsel experienced in prosecuting class actions, and she intends to prosecute this action vigorously. The interests of Class members will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiff and her counsel. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and re-alleges each and every allegation set forth above as though fully set forth herein. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of members of the New York Subclass against Defendant. By the acts and conduct alleged herein, Defendant committed unfair or deceptive acts and practices by making false representations in the marketing of Defendant’s Laundry Card. The foregoing deceptive acts and practices were directed at consumers. Plaintiff and members of the New York Subclass were injured as a result because (a) spent money to fill up their Laundry Card, and (b) were charged a hidden fee in the form of a balance that was economically impractical to access. On behalf of herself and other members of the New York Subclass, Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the unlawful acts and practices described herein, to recover their actual damages or fifty dollars, whichever is greater, three times actual damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and re-alleges each and every allegation set forth above as though fully set forth herein. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of members of the Class and New York Subclass against Defendant. Plaintiff and Class members conferred benefits on Defendant by paying money to Defendant in the form of adding prepayments to their Laundry Cards. Defendant has knowledge of such benefits. Defendant has been unjustly enriched in retaining the revenues derived from Plaintiff’s and Class members’ Laundry Card balance remainders. Retention of those moneys under these circumstances is unjust and inequitable because Defendant did not disclose that their prepayment, refund policies, and Laundry Card reader replacements were structured in way that maximized the balance remainders and then made these balances economically unfeasible to access by requiring a processing and handling fee. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and re-allege each and every allegation set forth above as though fully set forth herein. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of members of the Class and New York Subclass against Defendant. As discussed above, Defendant misrepresented that its prepayment, refund policies, and Laundry Card reader replacements were for reasons other than a hidden policy to generate profits at the expense of Plaintiff and members of the Class and New York Subclass. The false and misleading representations and omissions were made with knowledge of their falsehood. The false and misleading representations and omissions were made by Defendant, upon which Plaintiff and members of the Class and New York Subclass reasonably and justifiably relied, and were intended to induce and actually induced Plaintiff and members of the Class and New York Subclass to add money to their Laundry Cards. The fraudulent actions of defendant caused damage to Plaintiff and members of the Class and New York Subclass, who are entitled to damages and other legal and equitable relief as a result. Deceptive Acts Or Practices, New York Gen. Bus. Law § 349 Fraud Unjust Enrichment

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(Against the Individual Defendants for Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act) (Against All Defendants for Violations of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9 and 17 C.F.R. § 244.100 Promulgated Thereunder) Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of himself and the other public shareholders of Beneficial (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants herein and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with any Defendant. WSFS is a savings and loan holding company headquartered in Wilmington, Delaware and the parent to WSFS Bank, one of the ten oldest bank and trust companies in the United States continuously operating under the same name. WSFS Bank is also the largest locally- managed bank and trust company headquartered in the Delaware Valley. On August 8, 2018, Beneficial and WSFS issued a joint press release announcing the Proposed Transaction. The press release stated, in relevant part: WSFS Financial Corporation Announces Combination with Beneficial Bancorp, Inc., Creating the Largest, Premier, Locally-Headquartered Community Bank for the Greater Delaware Valley Concurrently executing a technology transformation to secure a competitive advantage and meet fast-changing Customer needs. WILMINGTON, Del. and PHILADELPHIA, Pa. — WSFS Financial Corporation (NASDAQ: WSFS) and Beneficial Bancorp, Inc. (NASDAQ: BNCL), jointly announced today the signing of a definitive agreement whereby WSFS Financial Corporation Plaintiff incorporate each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. Rule 14a-9, promulgated by the SEC pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, provides that proxy communications shall not contain “any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9. The omission of information from a proxy will violate Section 14(a) and Rule 14a- 9 if other SEC regulations specifically require disclosure of the omitted information. Defendants have issued the Proxy with the intention of soliciting the Company’s common shareholders’ support for the Proposed Transaction. Each of the Defendants reviewed and authorized the dissemination of the Proxy, which fails to provide critical information regarding, amongst other things: (i) financial projections for Beneficial; and (ii) the valuation analyses performed by Beneficial’s financial advisor, Sandler, in support of their fairness opinion. In so doing, Defendants made untrue statements of fact and/or omitted material facts necessary to make the statements made not misleading. Each of the Individual Defendants, by virtue of their roles as officers and/or directors, were aware of the omitted information but failed to disclose such information, in violation of Section 14(a). The Individual Defendants were therefore negligent, as they had reasonable grounds to believe material facts existed that were misstated or omitted from the Proxy, but nonetheless failed to obtain and disclose such information to the Company’s shareholders although they could have done so without extraordinary effort. The Individual Defendants were, at the very least, negligent in preparing and reviewing the Proxy. The preparation of a proxy statement by corporate insiders containing materially false or misleading statements or omitting a material fact constitutes negligence. The Individual Defendants were negligent in choosing to omit material information from the Proxy or failing to notice the material omissions in the Proxy upon reviewing it, which they were required to do carefully as the Company’s directors. Indeed, the Individual Defendants were intricately involved in the process leading up to the signing of the Merger Agreement. Beneficial is also deemed negligent as a result of the Individual Defendants’ negligence in preparing and reviewing the Proxy. Plaintiff incorporate each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of Beneficial within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as alleged herein. By virtue of their positions as officers and/or directors of Beneficial, and participation in and/or awareness of the Company’s operations and/or intimate knowledge of the incomplete and misleading statements contained in the Proxy filed with the SEC, they had the power to influence and control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision making of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the various statements that Plaintiff contends are materially incomplete and misleading. Each of the Individual Defendants was provided with or had unlimited access to copies of the Proxy and other statements alleged by Plaintiff to be misleading prior to and/or shortly after these statements were issued and had the ability to prevent the issuance of the statements or cause the statements to be corrected. In addition, as the Proxy sets forth at length, and as described herein, the Individual Defendants were involved in negotiating, reviewing, and approving the Merger Agreement. The Proxy purports to describe the various issues and information that the Individual Defendants reviewed and considered. The Individual Defendants participated in drafting and/or gave their input on the content of those descriptions. By virtue of the foregoing, the Individual Defendants have violated Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. As set forth above, the Individual Defendants had the ability to exercise control over and did control a person or persons who have each violated Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 by their acts and omissions as alleged herein. By virtue of their positions as controlling persons, these Defendants are liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. As a direct and proximate result of Individual Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff will be irreparably harmed. Plaintiff and the Class have no adequate remedy at law. Only through the exercise of this Court’s equitable powers can Plaintiff and the Class be fully protected from the immediate and irreparable injury that Defendants’ actions threaten to inflict. I. Company Background and the Proposed Transaction

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(FMLA – Unlawful Disclosure of Medical Information) As to Plaintiff Melissa Wolfe 357. Plaintiff Melissa Wolfe realleges and incorporates by reference each allegation in the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 358. At all times relevant, Plaintiff Melissa Wolfe was “eligible” under the definition of the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and was entitled to take unpaid leave. 359. Plaintiff gave notice to Defendant that she intended to take leave for a serious medical condition. 360. Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff by, inter alia, failing to treat her medical information as a confidential record and by disclosing such information to persons with no lawful privilege to receive such information in violation of 29 C.F.R. § 825.500(g). 361. Defendant’s actions were intentional and in reckless disregard of the health and well being of the Plaintiff. As a result of these acts, the Plaintiff Melissa Wolfe has suffered grievous, extensive and continuing damages, including, but not limited to, lost wages and benefits, liquidated damages, attorney’s fees and the costs of this action. (FMLA – Willfulness) As to Plaintiff Melissa Wolfe 362. Plaintiff Melissa Wolfe realleges and incorporates by reference each allegation in the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 363. Defendant’s acts complained of herein with regard to the FMLA were willful. The persons in the New York Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although, the precise number of such persons is unknown, and facts upon which the calculation of that number are presently within the sole control of Defendant, there are approximately more than 40 members of the New York Class. The New York Class Representative fairly and adequately protects the interests of the New York Class and has no interests antagonistic to the class. The Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys who are experienced and competent in both class litigation and employment litigation. A class is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, particularly in the context of wage-and-hour litigation where individual plaintiffs lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit in federal court against a corporate defendant. The damages sustained by individual class members are small, compared to the expense and burden of individual prosecution of this litigation. Class action treatment will obviate unduly duplicative litigation and the possibility of inconsistent judgments. Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the New York Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class was a whole. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those of the class. Plaintiffs and the New York Class members were subjected to Defendant’s policies, practices, programs, procedures, protocols and plans alleged herein concerning the failure to pay wages at the applicable minimum wage rate and/or the failure to pay overtime at the applicable rate, the failure to provide accurate wage notices and statements, the failure to keep adequate records, and the failure to compensate or reimburse Plaintiffs’ for purchases of music and athletic uniforms made for Defendant’s benefit. The job duties of Plaintiffs are typical of those of the class members. The New York Class Representative intends to send notice to all members of the New York Class to the extent required by Rule 23. Plaintiffs and the members of the FLSA Collective and New York Class (collectively “Class Members”) are victims of Defendant’s common policy and plan that violated their rights under the FLSA and NYLL by denying them wages at the applicable minimum wage and/or overtime rates. At all times relevant, Defendant’s unlawful policy and pattern or practice was willful. Upon information and belief, Defendant failed to pay each Class Member, including Plaintiffs any wages for all hours worked during a training period that Defendant required of each instructor, including Plaintiffs, pursuant to Defendant’s policy and/or practice. Upon information and belief, pursuant to Defendant’s policy and/or practice, after the training period, Plaintiffs and each Class Member were/are paid on piece-rate basis, per class they taught. Generally, classes lasted 45-60 minutes. Defendant also required Plaintiffs and each Class Member to arrive half-hour before class and stay after class to provide feedback to customers. Upon information and belief, following the training period, Plaintiffs and each Class Member were/are required not only to teach classes, but also perform a variety of other tasks, such as, but not limited to opening/unlocking the studio, setting up the computer systems, answering phones, checking in clients at the front desk, preparing for classes, developing routines, compiling playlists, communicating with customers, attending meetings, and engaging in marketing on behalf of the company, amounting to an approximately 15 to 28 hours per week of work in addition to teaching classes, and Defendant was/is aware of this fact. Upon information and belief, Plaintiffs and each Class Member was/is required to incur business expenses for items necessary to perform their job, including during the training period, and afterward, which included, but is not limited to making purchases of music and athletic uniforms. Plaintiffs and each Class Member were never compensated or reimbursed for these expenses. As a result of Defendant’s piece-rate compensation scheme, Plaintiffs and each Class Member that was paid under the piece-rate compensation scheme were not paid at the applicable overtime rate for hours worked over 40 per week. As part of its regular business practice, Defendant intentionally, willfully, and repeatedly engaged in a pattern, practice, and/or policy that violated the FLSA and NYLL. Defendant’s policy and pattern or practice includes but is not limited to: a. Willfully failing to keep accurate payroll records of its instructors, including Plaintiffs and Class Members, as required by the FLSA and NYLL; b. Willfully failing to pay its instructors, including Plaintiffs and Class Members, wages at the applicable minimum wage rate; c. Willfully failing to pay its instructors, including Plaintiffs and Class Members, wages at the applicable overtime rate; c. Willfully failing to provide its instructors, including Plaintiffs and Class Members, accurate wage notices and statements pursuant to N.Y. Lab. Law §§ 195(1) and (3); and d. Willfully failing to compensate or reimburse its instructors, including Plaintiffs and Class Members, for purchases of music and athletic uniforms for the benefit of Defendant, pursuant to N.Y. Lab. Law § 193. Defendant is or should have been aware that the FLSA and NYLL required Defendant to pay Plaintiffs and the Class Members at the applicable minimum wage and/or overtime rates. Defendant’s failure to pay Plaintiffs and the Class Members wages at the applicable minimum wage and/or overtime rates, was willful, intentional, and in bad faith. Defendant failed to provide Plaintiffs and members of the Wage Notice Class with accurate and proper wage notice pursuant to N.Y. Lab. Law § 195(1). Defendant failed to compensate or reimburse Plaintiffs and members of the Wage Deduction Class for purchases of music and athletic uniforms Defendant required they make for the benefit of Defendant, pursuant to N.Y. Lab. Law § 195(3). Defendant’s unlawful conduct has been widespread, repeated, and consistent. At all times relevant, Mr. Montalvo was an employee of Defendant, working under Defendant’s direct supervision, and was classified as non-exempt from the FLSA and the At all times relevant, Ms. Wolfe was an employee of Defendant, working under Defendant’s direct supervision, and was classified as non-exempt from the FLSA and the ACTION COMPLAINT JURY TRIAL DEMANDED Plaintiff Melissa Wolfe (herein “Ms. Wolfe”) and Plaintiff Bryant Montalvo (herein “Mr. Montalvo”), on behalf of themselves, and a class of all others similarly situated, by and through their attorneys, Liszka & Gray, LLC, as and for the Complaint in this action against Defendant Flywheel Sports, Inc. (herein “Defendant”), hereby alleges upon personal knowledge as to some, and information and belief as to the rest, as follows:

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Lyft is a $7.5 billion dollar transportation services company that develops, markets and operates the Lyft App. In order to maximize its efforts to market to potential drivers, upon information and belief, Lyft contracted with Jobcase to market its services to potential drivers like Plaintiff. Under the terms of this contract, Lyft encourages and incentivizes Jobcase to market Lyft’s services to drivers by providing Jobcase with a unique URL that tracks the number of potential drivers that access Lyft’s website via advertisements disseminated by Jobcase, and compensating Jobcase based on this number. As a result, on or about August 10, 2017 at 11:26 a.m., Jobcase, using an automated text-messaging platform, caused a text message to be transmitted, on Lyft’s behalf, to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 4187 (“4187 Number”): The website promoted in the text message is owned and operated by Lyft Defendants’ text message constitutes telemarketing because it encouraged the future purchase of Lyft’s services by potential drivers. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendants with her express written consent to be contacted by text using an ATDS. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 7883 Number. The impersonal and generic nature of Defendants’ text messages demonstrates that Defendants utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages. See Jenkins v. LL Atlanta, LLC, No. 1:14- cv-2791-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30051, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2016) (“These assertions, combined with the generic, impersonal nature of the text message advertisements and the use of a short code, support an inference that the text messages were sent using an ATDS.”) (citing Legg v. Voice Media Grp., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to infer text messages were sent using ATDS; use of a short code and volume of mass messaging alleged would be impractical without use of an ATDS); Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding it “plausible” that defendants used an ATDS where messages were advertisements written in an impersonal manner and sent from short code); Robbins v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 13-CV-132- IEG NLS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72725, 2013 WL 2252646, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2013) (observing that mass messaging would be impracticable without use of an ATDS)). Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendants utilized a combination of hardware and software systems to send the text messages at issue in this case. The systems utilized by Defendant have the current capacity or present ability to generate or store random or sequential numbers or to dial sequentially or randomly at the time the call is made, and to dial such numbers, en masse, in an automated fashion without human intervention. As outlined above, upon information and belief, Jobcase was acting as an agent of, or as part of a joint venture with Lyft, for each other’s mutual benefit, within the course and scope of their agreement and with each other’s full knowledge and consent. Plaintiff is informed and believes that each of Jobcase’s acts and/or omissions complained of herein were known, consented to, and/or ratified by Lyft. Further, Lyft knowingly received and retained the monetary benefit from drivers it contracted with as a result of Jobcase’s unlawful calling and telemarketing practices on Lyft’s behalf. Upon information and belief, at all times relevant, Lyft had the ability and right to control Jobcase’s conduct as it pertained to marketing Lyft’s services and/or use of Lyft’s trade-name. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. Defendants and their employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiffs and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-58 as if fully set forth herein. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). “Automatic telephone dialing system” refers to any equipment that has the “capacity to dial numbers without human intervention.” See, e.g., Hicks v. Client Servs., Inc., No. 07-61822, 2009 WL 2365637, at *4 (S.D. Fla. June 9, 2009) (citing FCC, In re: Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Request of ACA International for Clarification and Declaratory Ruling, 07–232, ¶ 12, n.23 (2007)). Defendants – or third parties directed by Defendants – used equipment having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make marketing telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined above. Defendants therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make marketing telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and Class Members without their prior express written consent. All Defendants are directly, jointly, or vicariously liable for each such violation of the TCPA. As a result of Defendants’ conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-58 as if fully set forth herein. At all times relevant, Defendants’ knew or should have known that their conduct as alleged herein violated the TCPA. Defendants knew that they did not have prior express written consent to send these text messages. Because Defendants knew or should have known that Plaintiff and Class Members had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls to their cellular telephones, the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA. As a result of Defendants’ violations, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Mary Fente, on behalf of herself and the other members of the Class, prays for the following relief: a. A declaration that Defendants’ practices described herein violate the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227; b. A declaration that Defendants’ violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, were willful and knowing; c. An injunction prohibiting Defendants from using an automatic telephone dialing system to call and text message telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephones without the prior express consent of the called party; d. An award of actual, statutory damages, and/or trebled statutory damages; and e. Such further and other relief the Court deems reasonable and just. Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) PROPOSED CLASS Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although the precise number of Class members is known only to Defendants, Plaintiff upon information and belief asserts that the Class numbers in the hundreds, if not thousands. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members. The questions include, but are not limited to: a. Whether, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(A) and 12 C.F.R. § 205.16, Defendants were ATM operators at all relevant times during the Class period that imposed a fee on consumers for providing host transfer services to those consumers; b. Whether, at all relevant times during the class period, Defendants failed to comply with the notice requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3) and 12 C.F.R. § 205.16(c); and c. The appropriate measure of damages sustained by Plaintiff and other members of the Class. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class, which all arise from the same operative facts and are based on the same legal theories, including: a. Plaintiff and all putative Class members used an ATM operated by Defendants; b. Defendants failed to provide notices compliant with 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3) and 12 C.F.R. § 205.16(c) to Plaintiff and all putative Class members; and c. Defendants illegally imposed a fee on Plaintiff and all putative Class members for their respective use of the ATM. This action should be maintained as a class action because the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the parties opposing the Class, as well as a risk of adjudications with respect to individual members which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunction relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against the Defendants are small. Management of the Class claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than those presented in many individual claims. The identities of the Class members may be obtained from Defendants’ records. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully stated herein. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(D)(i) and 12 C.F.R. § 205.16(a), Defendants were ATM operators at all times relevant to this action. Defendants were the operators of the ATM (Terminal #LK823326) located at Fairmont Battery Wharf, Three Battery Wharf, Boston, Massachusetts, at all times relevant to this action. Defendants failed to comply with the notice requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3) and 12 C.F.R. § 205.16(c) when providing ATM services to Plaintiff and all putative Class members. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(C) and 12 C.F.R. § 205.16(e), Defendants, therefore, illegally imposed a fee on Plaintiff and all putative Class members for their respective use of the ATM. The Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq. (“EFTA”), and its implementing Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. § 205.1 et seq., require an automated teller machine operator to provide notice to consumers that the operator will impose a fee on consumers for conducting a transaction at an ATM and the amount of such a fee. Specifically, 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3) and 12 C.F.R. § 205.16(c) require that an ATM operator disclose (a) on the ATM (via placard/sticker) that a fee will be imposed and (b) on the ATM screen that a fee will be imposed and the amount of such a fee. VIOLATION OF ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER ACT & REGULATION E U.S.C. §1693 et seq. & 12 C.F.R. §205.1 et seq.

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Upon the opening of the account, Plaintiff was registered for Online Banking by providing his cellphone number as instructed by SunTrust. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff began receiving text messages from SunTrust on his cellular phone. The Plaintiff’s cellular phone number is identified as 757-###-6812. Based upon information and belief, the Defendant sent the text messages using an automatic dialing system as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). On or about December 2, 2019, the Plaintiff texted “STOP” from his cell phone to “shortcode” 786411 as instructed by the SunTrust Online Services Agreement that governed his banking relationship with SunTrust. Plaintiff thereafter continued to receive text messages from the Defendant. On December 13, 2019, Plaintiff sent a letter to Truist requesting that it stop sending text messages to his cell phone. This letter was received by the Defendant. The Plaintiff thereafter continued to receive text messages from the Defendant. On or about December 17, 2019, the Plaintiff sent a second letter to Truist via its registered agent in Raleigh, North Carolina, requesting that it stop sending text messages to his cell phone. This letter was received by the Defendant. The Plaintiff thereafter continued to receive text messages from the Defendant. The Plaintiff continued to receive text messages from the Defendant. On or about March 26, 2020, the Plaintiff sent a fourth letter by registered mail addressed to Truist Bank via its registered agent in Glen Allen, Virginia requesting that it stop sending text messages to his cell phone. The Plaintiff continued to receive text messages from the Defendant. Despite the Defendant receiving multiple notifications from the Plaintiff that he did not want to receive text messages from Truist, the Defendant continued to send text messages to the Plaintiff’s cellular phone. The Defendant failed to comply with the requirements of the TCPA and associated governing F.C.C. Rules and Regulations by continuing to transmit unwanted text messages via an ATDS to the Plaintiff after he had revoked his consent, causing the Plaintiff to sustain damages to include, but not limited to: intrusion on the Plaintiff’s privacy, occupation of the capacity of the Plaintiff’s cell phone, loss of the Plaintiff’s time, additional cellular charges, and accompanying emotional distress. The Defendant is aware of its obligations under the TCPA. Despite knowing these legal obligations, the Defendant acted consciously in breaching its known duties and violated the Plaintiff’s rights by failing to cease sending text messages to Plaintiff’s cell phone using an ATDS after the Plaintiff revoked his consent. The Defendant’s conduct was not a mere mistake or accident. Instead, it was the intended result of its standard operating procedures, and the Defendant’s violations were willfully and knowingly committed. The Plaintiff restates each of the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 33 as if set forth at length herein. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Plaintiff brings this action for himself and on behalf of a class defined as follows: All natural persons residing in the United States (a) who opened a Truist checking account, (b) within the four-year period preceding the filing of this action and during its pendency, (c) to whom Truist thereafter sent text messages using an ATDS, (d) after such date as the class member revoked his or her consent. Excluded from the class definition are any employees, officers, or directors of Truist, any attorney appearing in this case, and any judge assigned to hear this action. The Plaintiff also bring this action on behalf of a portion of the Class described as the following subclass: The Short Code Subclass All natural persons residing in the United States (a) who opened a SunTrust/Truist checking account, (b) within the four-year period preceding the filing of this action and during its pendency, and (c) to whom Truist thereafter sent text messages using an ATDS, (d) after such date as the class member revoked his or her consent by sending the word “STOP” or any sentence, word, phrase or string of letters containing the word “STOP” to short code 786411. Excluded from the class definition are any employees, officers, or directors of Truist, any attorney appearing in this case, and any judge assigned to hear this action. The Plaintiff’s claim is typical of those of the class members. All are based on the same facts and legal theories. Truist’s failure to stop sending text messages using an ATDS after a person revokes consent is typical of its regular business practices and policies. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. The Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor his counsel has any interests that might cause them to not vigorously pursue this action. The Plaintiff is aware of his responsibilities to the putative class and has accepted such responsibilities. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is proper. Prosecuting separate actions would create a risk of adjudications that would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair their ability to protect their interests. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate in that the Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole. Truist violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) by using an ATDS to send text messages to the Plaintiff and purported class members’ phones lines after they revoked their consent. The Defendant’s conduct was not a mere mistake or accident. Instead, it was the intended result of their standard operating procedures As a result of Truist’s conduct and actions, the Plaintiff and purported class members suffered actual damages. As a result of Truist’s conduct and actions, the Plaintiff and purported class members are entitled to statutory damages. Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) were willfully and knowingly committed, rendering the Defendant liable for actual or statutory damages, and treble damages under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)

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At all times relevant herein, Defendant operated a willful scheme to deprive their ANCs and others similarly situated of overtime compensation. Plaintiff and the similarly situated individuals worked or work as ANCs or other job positions performing similar duties for Defendant. As ANCs, their primary job duty was non-exempt work consisting of applying pre-determined criteria and guidelines to medical authorization request appeals for health insurance coverage and payment purposes. Plaintiff and the similarly situated individuals were paid a salary with no overtime pay. Defendant suffered and permitted Plaintiff and the similarly situated individuals to work more than forty (40) hours per week without overtime pay. Defendant also employed licensed practical nurses (“LPNs”) or licensed vocational nurses (“LVNs”) who had the same principle job duties as ANCs. Unlike the ANCs, however, LPNs or LVNs, were paid hourly and eligible for overtime wages. Defendant has been aware, or should have been aware, that Plaintiff and the similarly situated individuals performed non-exempt work that required payment of overtime compensation. For instance, Defendant set productivity goals for Plaintiff and other similarly situated individuals. Plaintiff and the similarly situated individuals were required to work long hours, including overtime hours, to complete all of their job responsibilities and to meet and/or exceed their goals. Defendant did not make, keep, or preserve accurate records of the hours worked by Plaintiff and the similarly situated individuals. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all similarly situated individuals, restates and incorporates by reference the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. Plaintiff files this action on behalf of herself and all similarly situated individuals. The proposed collective class for the FLSA claims is defined as follows: All persons who worked as Appeals Nurse Consultants (or other job positions performing similar duties) for Defendant at any time from three years prior to the filing of this Complaint through the entry of judgment (the “FLSA Collective”). Plaintiff has consented in writing to be a part of this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Plaintiff’s signed consent form is attached as Exhibit A. As this case proceeds, it is likely that other individuals will file consent forms and join as “opt-in” Plaintiffs. During the applicable statutory period, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective routinely worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek without receiving overtime compensation for their overtime hours worked. Plaintiff estimates that she typically worked on average between fifty and sixty hours per week. Defendant willfully engaged in a pattern of violating the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., as described in this Complaint in ways including, but not limited to, failing to pay its employees overtime compensation. Defendant knew that it was subject to the FLSA; it knew that its ANCs worked more than forty-hours per week; and it knew that they were not receiving overtime premiums for this work. Defendant is liable under the FLSA for failing to properly compensate Plaintiff and the similarly situated individuals. Accordingly, notice should be sent to the FLSA Collective. There are numerous similarly situated current and former employees of Defendant who have suffered from the Defendant’s practice of denying overtime pay, and who would benefit from the issuance of court-supervised notice of this lawsuit and the opportunity to join. Those similarly situated employees are known to Defendant, and are readily identifiable through Defendant’s records. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all members of the FLSA Collective, restates and incorporates by reference the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207, requires employers to pay employees one and one- half (1.5) times the regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) hours per workweek. Defendant suffered and permitted Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective to routinely work more than forty (40) hours per week without overtime compensation. Defendant’s actions, policies, and practices described above violate the FLSA’s overtime requirement by regularly and repeatedly failing to compensate Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective overtime compensation. Defendant knew, or showed reckless disregard for the fact, that it failed to pay these individuals overtime compensation in violation of the FLSA. By failing to accurately record, report, and/or preserve records of hours worked by Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective, Defendant has failed to make, keep, and preserve records with respect to each of its employees sufficient to determine their wages, hours, and other conditions and practice of employment, in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME (on behalf of Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective)

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Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e provides, generally, that a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. An overstatement of the amount of a debt is a false representation made in connection with the collection of any debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. An overstatement of the amount of a debt is a deceptive representation made in connection with the collection of any debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. An overstatement of the amount of a debt is a misleading representation made in connection with the collection of any debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) prohibits the false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any debt. An overstatement of the amount of a debt is a false representation of the character of the debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). An overstatement of the amount of a debt is a false representation of the amount of the debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). An overstatement of the amount of a debt is a false representation of the legal status of the debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) prohibits the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. An overstatement of the amount of a debt is a false representation made in an attempt to collect the debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). An overstatement of the amount of a debt is a deceptive means used in an attempt to collect the debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). Defendant’s overstatement of the amount owed by Plaintiff – specifically, that Plaintiff owed an inflated amount of money to the creditor is a false representation made by Defendant in connection with Defendant’s collection of the alleged Debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 69 Defendant’s overstatement of the amount owed by Plaintiff – specifically, thatPlaintiff owed an inflated amount of money to the creditor is a deceptive representation made by Defendant in connection with Defendant’s collection of the alleged Debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Defendant’s overstatement of the amount owed by Plaintiff – specifically, that Plaintiff owed an inflated amount to the creditor is a misleading representation made by Defendant in connection with Defendant’s collection of the alleged Debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Defendant’s overstatement of the amount owed by Plaintiff specifically, that Plaintiff owed money to the creditor when Plaintiff did not owe any money to the creditor is a false representation of the character of the alleged Debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). Defendant’s overstatement of the amount owed by Plaintiff specifically, that Plaintiff owed money to the creditor when Plaintiff did not owe any money to the creditor is a false representation of the amount of the alleged Debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). Defendant’s overstatement of the amount owed by Plaintiff specifically, that Plaintiff owed money to the creditor when Plaintiff did not owe any money to the creditor is a false representation of the legal status of the alleged Debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). Defendant’s overstatement of the amount owed by Plaintiff specifically, that Plaintiff owed money to the creditor when Plaintiff did not owe any money to the creditor is a false representation made in an attempt to collect the alleged Debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e(10). Defendant’s overstatement of the amount owed by Plaintiff specifically, that Plaintiff owed money to the creditor when Plaintiff did not owe any money to the creditor is a deceptive means used in an attempt to collect the alleged Debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e(10). For the foregoing reasons, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10) and is liable to Plaintiff therefor. Violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10)

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Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein. Plaintiffs have a right against wealth-based detention. In the pretrial detention context, courts have regularly found that setting arbitrary monetary release conditions that exceed an individual’s ability to pay violates the equal protection clause. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses prohibit jailing a person because of her inability to make a monetary payment. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983). Because Plaintiffs are detained based solely on their inability to pay, heightened scrutiny is implicated. ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147, 161 (5th Cir. 2018) ( “[T]he Supreme Court has found that heightened scrutiny is required when criminal laws detain poor defendants because of their indigence.”); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 397-99 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 241- 42 (1970). Defendants violate Plaintiffs’ substantive rights by enforcing against them a system of wealth-based detention that keeps them in jail solely because they cannot afford to make a monetary payment. 23 Defendants do not inquire into an individual’s ability to afford monetary release conditions or consider less restrictive alternatives before recommending or setting unaffordable monetary bail. Defendants’ actions fail any form of scrutiny, as empirical research indicates no correlation between monetary release conditions and an individual’s likelihood to appear in court. Here, Defendants’ policies and practice result in poor arrestees being detained when similarly situated wealthy arrestees are not, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Commissioner of Corrections and Sheriff enforce these unconstitutional detention orders. Thus Defendants deny individuals their equal protection and due process rights. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein. Defendants, acting under color of law, deny pretrial detainees their constitutionally protected right to liberty without any compelling state interest. It is well settled that freedom from imprisonment “lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 679, 690 (2001); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 117, 80 (1992) (“Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.”). Pretrial detention infringes upon this right and may only be applied if it is “narrowly focuse[d]” to serve “compelling” interests. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987). 24 The state’s interest at the pretrial bond stage is limited to ensuring the accused will appear for trial and protecting the public from danger associated specifically with that individual’s release. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 452-54 (2013). Here, the City’s Bond Commissioner and individual judges fail to consider a particular detainee’s likelihood to appear or whether that individual poses any danger to the community, and make no findings regarding the necessity of detention, before setting de facto detention orders through imposition of unaffordable monetary conditions of release. The Commissioner of Corrections and Sheriff enforce these unconstitutional detention orders. Thus Defendants deny pretrial detainees their fundamental right to liberty in the absence of any compelling government interest and in violation of their substantive due process rights. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein. Defendants provide absolutely no process before detaining individuals for weeks on unaffordable monetary release conditions. No hearing occurs, much less a hearing with sufficient process. Since no hearing occurs, no determination is made that any government interests require detention, in violation of Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights. Before an individual may be detained pretrial, procedural due process requires an individual be given the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 25 manner” before being deprived of liberty. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)). Defendants’ total lack of procedures—including no notice that a hearing will occur, no notice that the issue at the hearing will be whether the individual arrested is a flight risk or poses a danger to the community, no hearing with the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, and no hearing with counsel present—flagrantly violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Individuals who qualify for public defenders remain incarcerated an average of 4- 5 weeks before they are given any hearing to challenge or modify their release conditions. Individuals who do not qualify for the public defender, but cannot afford to hire a private attorney, fair even worse—often being denied an opportunity to address their release conditions or discuss their financial status even longer. Conversely, wealthier individuals can obtain almost immediate release or obtain counsel to immediately challenge release conditions. Defendants Violate Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Rights to Equal Protection and Due Process through a Policy or Practice that Jails Individuals Based on their Poverty under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 By Named Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, against all Defendants Defendants Violate Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Right to Liberty under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 By Named Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, against all Defendants Defendants Violate Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Right to Procedural Due Process 42 U.S.C. § 1983 By Named Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, against all Defendants

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Tim Ables Trucking Company, LLC was established in 1988 and provides, among other things, frac sand and cement transportation services to the oil and gas industry throughout the State of Texas and New Mexico.2 To provide its services, Tim Ables employed (and continues to employ) numerous hourly paid workers—including Plaintiff and the individuals that make up the putative class. While exact job titles may differ, these employees were subjected to the same or similar illegal pay practices for similar work in the oilfield. Plaintiff Stickell worked for Tim Ables as a Sand Coordinator from approximately May 2017 until August 2018. As a Sand Coordinator, Plaintiff Stickell was tasked with ensuring the required frac sand was unloaded from the delivery trucks and then loaded into the blender for use as a proppant. Specifically, Plaintiff assisted in getting trucks into position, inspected the sand that had been delivered, and hooked up hoses to the trucks that delivered the sand. Sand is a critical part of the hydraulic fracturing process. Once sand is unloaded into the blender, it is then used in the well. As such, Sand Coordinators are an integral part of the hydraulic fracturing crew. Tim Ables paid Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members a straight hourly wage for all hours worked. Specifically, Plaintiff Stickell was paid $40.00 per hour worked but did not receive overtime compensation at the required rate of time and one-half for all hours worked over forty (40) each week. 2 https://www.timablestrucking.com. Original Collective Action Complaint Page 5 Although it is well-known that blue-collar oilfield workers like Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are not exempt from overtime, Tim Ables did not pay Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members the additional overtime premium required by the FLSA for hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ primary job duties included performing daily checklists, assisting with the preparation of equipment, and performing other oilfield related functions on various job sites. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members would conduct their day-to-day activities within mandatory and designed parameters and in accordance with pre- determined operational plans created by Tim Ables and/or its clients. Upon further information and belief, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ daily and weekly activities were routine and largely governed by standardized plans, procedures, and checklists created by Tim Ables and/or its clients. Virtually every job function was pre-determined by Tim Ables and/or its clients, including the tools to use at a job site, the schedule of work, and related work duties. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were prohibited from varying their job duties outside of the predetermined parameters. Moreover, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ job functions were primarily routine and manual labor in nature, requiring little to no official training, much less a college education or other advanced degree. Indeed, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are blue-collar workers. They rely on their hands, physical skills, and energy to perform manual and routine labor in the oilfield. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ duties did not (and currently do not) include managerial responsibilities or the exercise of independent discretion or judgment. Original Collective Action Complaint Page 6 Tim Ables determined the hours Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members worked. Tim Ables set Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ pay and controlled the number of hours they worked. Tim Ables set all employment-related policies applicable to Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members. Tim Ables maintained control over pricing and marketing. Tim Ables also chose equipment and product suppliers. Tim Ables owned or controlled the equipment and supplies that Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members used to perform their work. Tim Ables had the power to hire and fire Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members. Tim Ables made all personnel and payroll decisions with respect to Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members, including but not limited to, the decision to pay Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members an hourly wage with no overtime pay. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members did not employ their own workers. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members worked exclusively for Tim Ables on a permanent full-time basis. Tim Ables, instead of Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members, paid operating expenses like rent, payroll, marketing, insurance, and bills. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members relied on Tim Ables for their work. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members did not market any business or services of their own. Instead, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members worked the hours assigned by Tim Ables, performed duties assigned by Tim Ables, worked on projects assigned by Tim Ables, and worked for the benefit of Tim Ables and its customers. Original Collective Action Complaint Page 7 Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members did not earn a profit based on any business investment of their own. Rather, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ only earning opportunity was based on the number of hours they were allowed to work, which was controlled by Tim Ables and/or its customers. Tim Ables improperly classified Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members as independent contractors. The classification was improper because Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were not in business for themselves. Instead, they were economically dependent upon Tim Ables for their work. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ duties did not (and currently do not) include managerial responsibilities or the exercise of independent discretion or judgment. The FLSA mandates that overtime be paid at one and one-half times an employee’s regular rate of pay. Tim Ables denied Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members overtime pay as a result of a widely applicable, illegal pay practice. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members regularly worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week but never received overtime compensation. Tim Ables applied this pay practice despite clear and controlling law that states that the manual labor/technical, routine duties which were performed by Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members consisted of non-exempt work. Accordingly, Tim Ables’ pay policies and practices blatantly violated (and continue to violate) the FLSA. V. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this collective claim is made on behalf of all those who are (or were) similarly situated to Plaintiff. Other similarly situated employees have been victimized by Tim Ables’ patterns, practices, and policies, which are in willful violation of the FLSA. The FLSA Collective Members are defined in Paragraph 57. Tim Ables’ failure to pay any overtime compensation results from generally applicable policies and practices and does not depend on the personal circumstances of the individual FLSA Collective Members. Original Collective Action Complaint Page 11 Thus, Plaintiff’s experiences are typical of the experiences of the FLSA Collective Members. The specific job titles or precise job requirements of the various FLSA Collective Members does not prevent collective treatment. All of the FLSA Collective Members—regardless of their specific job titles, precise job requirements, rates of pay, or job locations—are entitled to be properly compensated for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. Although the issues of damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. Indeed, the FLSA Collective Members are blue-collar oilfield workers entitled to overtime after forty (40) hours in a week. Tim Ables employed a substantial number of similarly situated workers since August 9, 2015. Upon information and belief, these workers are geographically dispersed, residing and working in locations across the United States. Because these workers do not have fixed work locations, they may work in different states across the country in the course of a given year. Absent a collective action, many members of the proposed FLSA collective likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and Tim Ables will retain the proceeds of its rampant violations. Moreover, individual litigation would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims of the individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency. Accordingly, the FLSA collective of similarly situated plaintiffs should be certified as defined as in Paragraph 57 and notice should be promptly sent. VI.

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Defendant Princess sent multiple unsolicited text messages to consumer phone numbers, regardless of whether they were registered on the DNC. Plaintiff Received Unsolicited Autodialed Text Messages to Her Cell Phone Despite Being on the DNC List Plaintiff Wammack’s cell phone number was registered on the DNC on April 5, 2013. Her cell phone number is not associated with a business and is for personal use. The text message shown above directs the recipient to call Sam Nguyen at 919- 589-1759. When 919-589-1759 is called, it is directed to Sam Nguyen, a Princess employee. On July 26, 2019 at 5:49 PM, Wammack received a second autodialed text message from Defendant, this time from phone number 919-446-5486: Plaintiff has never had a relationship with Princess and has never provided Princess with express written consent to contact her. The unauthorized text messages sent by Princess, as alleged herein, have harmed Plaintiff in the form of annoyance, nuisance, and invasion of privacy, and disturbed Wammack’s use and enjoyment of her cellular phone, in addition to the wear and tear on the phone’s hardware (including the phone’s battery) and the consumption of memory on the phone. Seeking redress for these injuries, Wammack, on behalf of herself and two Classes of similarly situated individuals, brings suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., which prohibits unsolicited autodialed text messages to cellular telephones, including solicitation text messages to a phone number protected by the DNC. The following individuals are excluded from the Classes: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, its subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) Plaintiff’s attorneys; (4) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Classes; (5) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such excluded persons; and (6) persons whose claims against Defendant have been fully and finally adjudicated and/or released. Plaintiff anticipates the need to amend the Class definition following appropriate discovery regarding the type of equipment used, the purpose of the text messages, and other appropriate discovery. Numerosity: On information and belief, there are hundreds, if not thousands of members of the Classes such that joinder of all members is impracticable. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Classes and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class actions. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Classes, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. Plaintiff and her counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Classes, and they have the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiff nor her counsel has any interest adverse to the Classes. Appropriateness: This class action is also appropriate for certification because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Classes as respective wholes, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the members of the Classes and making final class-wide injunctive relief appropriate. Defendant’s business practices apply to and affect the members of the Classes uniformly, and Plaintiff’s challenge of those practices hinges on Defendant’s conduct with respect to the Classes, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff. Additionally, the damages suffered by individual members of the Classes will likely be small relative to the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendant’s actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the members of the Classes to obtain effective relief from Defendant’s misconduct on an individual basis. A class action provides the benefits of single adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. Defendant and/or its agents sent unwanted solicitation text messages to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class using an autodialer. These solicitation text messages were sent en masse without the consent of the Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class to receive such solicitation text messages. The equipment used to send the text messages had the present capacity to transmit text messages en masse and did not function similar to a simple cellphone. The text messages were sent without human intervention. Defendant’s conduct was wilful or knowing. Defendant knew or should’ve known that its text messages violated the TCPA. Defendant has, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class are each entitled to between $500 and $1,500 for each and every text message. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the paragraphs 1 through 38 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e), provides that § 64.1200(c) is “applicable to any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone numbers.”3 Any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” may bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c). Defendant violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) by initiating, or causing to be initiated, repeated telephone solicitations to telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class members who registered their respective telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry, a listing of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government. Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) because Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class received more than one phone call/text message in a 12-month period by or on behalf of Defendant in violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, as described above. As a result of Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein, Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class suffered actual damages and are entitled to $500 per violation. Defendant’s conduct was wilful or knowing. Defendant knew or should’ve known that its text messages violated the TCPA. Class Treatment Is Appropriate for Plaintiff’s TCPA Claims Princess Sends Unsolicited Text Messages Using an Autodialer Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class) Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Autodial No Consent Class)

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Defendant Brake Check is a chain automotive repair shop for brake service, oil changes and alignment. 0 In order to perform their job duties, Plaintiff and the Class Members follow procedures that are outlined in Defendant’s manuals and guidelines and/or learned during training. It is Plaintiff’s understanding that Defendant expects its Store Managers to follow the procedures and policies provided to complete their work. 3 As Service Managers, Plaintiff and Class Members regularly work/worked more than forty (40) hours per workweek. Neither he nor any of the other Class Members had authority to (nor did they): manage an enterprise, hire or fire other employees, set the pay rates of other employees, create policies or procedures to govern Defendant’s employees, handle employee grievances, determine the type of equipment or materials that Defendant could use in its operations, enter into contracts on behalf of Defendant or otherwise have operational control over Defendant’s business operations and practices. Moreover, Plaintiff and the Class Members did not perform office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of Defendant or its customers, nor did they exercise discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance in the conduct of Defendant’s business. 7 Plaintiff and the Class Members worked/work over forty hours per work week and Defendant fails/failed to pay Plaintiff and the Class Members overtime compensation. Plaintiff and the Class Members were paid the same amount no matter how many hours they worked for Defendant. 8 Throughout Plaintiff’s tenure working for Defendant, Service Managers who are subject to the same pay policy/plan described herein, work/worked overtime hours, and were/are not compensated in accordance with the FLSA by Defendant. Over the past three (3) years there have been other Service Managers who were subject to the same policy and plan as described herein. Plaintiff is aware of other individuals who worked for Defendant within the past three years and were not compensated in accordance with the FLSA for hours worked in excess of forty-hours per work week. 1 Plaintiff and the Class Members routinely receive instructions as to what jobs are to be completed and how by their supervisor. Plaintiff and the Class Members are not allowed to make unilateral decisions about the tasks assigned or the manner in which such tasks are completed without the approval of their supervisor. 5 Plaintiff and the Class Members were at all times “non-exempt” employees and eligible to receive overtime pay pursuant to Section 207 of the FLSA. 4 Plaintiff and the Class Members are subject to a single policy and pay plan that they are paid the same amount no matter how many hours they work. Defendant had a plan/policy in place which applied to Plaintiff and the Class Members that they were misclassified as exempt and thus were not compensated for any hours worked over 40 hours per week. Plaintiff works as a Service Manager for Defendant Brake Check. He began working for Brake Check on May 2016 and is still currently employed. He is wrongfully classified by Defendant as exempt from overtime compensation however, he is expected to work and does in fact work over forty (40) hours per work week. He reports to and is supervised by the Store Director, Derrick Carter. Other individuals who work/worked with Plaintiff, perform the same or similar job duties and are paid similarly. Plaintiff and the Class Members input their actual time worked when they clocked in and out on Defendant’s computer system. However, on Plaintiff’s pay stub Defendant changes/changed the hours worked to twelve (12) hours for the entire two-week pay period at a rate of $100.00 to equal $1,200.00 paid for each two-week pay period, no matter how many hours were actually worked. Plaintiff works six (6) days a week. Plaintiff and the Class Members are not paid for all hours actually worked and do not receive overtime compensation. Defendant dictates what hours Plaintiff works, provides the tools for him to do his job, tells him what work he is required to complete and the specifications on how the work is to be completed. On most weeks during his employment over the last three (3) years Plaintiff worked and continues to work over forty (40) hours per week. The overtime hours Plaintiff works are necessary to meet the demands of the job. On average, Plaintiff and the Class Members work approximately 30-35 hours per week of overtime. Defendant controlled all the conditions of Plaintiff’s employment. Defendant determines Plaintiff’s pay rate, the schedule he works, and the policies and procedures Plaintiff and the other Class Members are/were required to follow. As a Service Manager, Plaintiff’s primary duties include but are not limited to, brake repairs, alignments, answering phones, ordering parts at the direction of the Store Director, and completing paperwork related to material ordered from vendors. Over fifty percent (50%) of Plaintiff and the Class Members time was spent working on and repairing cars and trucks, the same functions performed by the technicians. These same job duties are also performed by all of Defendant’s Service Managers at every location. Plaintiff and the Class Member do not; (1) interview or select other employees; (2) set or adjust the rates of pay and hours of work of other employees; (3) appraise other employees' productivity and efficiency for the purpose of recommending promotions or other changes in their status; (4) handle employee complaints and grievances and/or discipline employees; (5) determine the techniques, policies or procedures to be used or followed by Defendant’s employees; and/or (6) determine the types of materials, supplies, machinery, or tools to be used or merchandise to be bought, stocked, and sold. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations in the preceding paragraph as if fully set forth herein. Plaintiff brings this suit as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b) on behalf of himself and all other persons employed by Defendant as Service Managers within three (3) years from the filing of this suit who, like Plaintiff, (1) have not been compensated for all hours worked and/or (2) have not been compensated at one and a half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a single work week. Defendant’s Service Managers all perform the same/similar essential job functions and duties, notwithstanding the fact that one employee might have more tenure or experience than another employee in the same or similar position. Plaintiff and the Class Members were also paid in the same manner by Defendant. Therefore, the Class Members are similarly situated to Plaintiff. The damages for each individual can easily be calculated using the same methodology and formula although the exact amount of the damages may vary. Defendant possesses the names and addresses of Class Members in its records. The Class Members should be allowed to receive notice about this lawsuit and given an opportunity to join. Like Plaintiff, these similarly situated workers are entitled to recover their unpaid wages, overtime wages, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and other damages. Therefore, notice is appropriately sent to the following class: All Service Managers that worked for Defendant at any of its locations any time during the three years preceding the filing of this lawsuit to the present that worked over forty (40) hours in any workweek. Defendant misclassified Plaintiff and the Class Members as exempt from receiving overtime compensation, failed to pay them wages for all hours worked and failed to pay them overtime wages required by the FLSA for all hours worked over forty (40) hours per work week. Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to wages for all hours worked, overtime wages for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek, an amount equal to all of their unpaid wages as liquidated damages, as well as their reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees and costs of this action. 29 U.S.C. §216(b).

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(Against All Defendants For Violations of Section 10(b) And Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder) (Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act Against The Individual Defendants) Education Management Corporation is a publicly traded, for-profit education company. The company offers academic programs to students through campus-based and online instruction to earn undergraduate and graduate degrees, including doctoral degrees, and specialized non-degree diplomas in a range of disciplines. The company operates 110 locations across 32 states of the United States and Canada. Education Management Corporation was founded in 1962, is headquartered in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and its shares trades on the NASDAQ under the ticker symbol The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Throughout the Class Period, EDMC securities were actively traded on the NASDAQ. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can be ascertained only through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes that there are hundreds or thousands of members in the proposed Class. Record owners and other members of the Class may be identified from records maintained by EDMC or its transfer agent and may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, using the form of notice similar to that customarily used in securities class actions. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class as all members of the Class are similarly affected by defendants’ wrongful conduct in violation of federal law that is complained of herein. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to or in conflict with those of the Class. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as the damages suffered by individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impossible for members of the Class to individually redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to a presumption of reliance upon the integrity of the market. Alternatively, Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to the presumption of reliance established by the Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens of the State of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 92 S. Ct. 2430 (1972), as Defendants omitted material information in their Class Period statements in violation of a duty to disclose such information, as detailed above. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. This Count is asserted against defendants and is based upon Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the SEC. Pursuant to the above plan, scheme, conspiracy and course of conduct, each of the defendants participated directly or indirectly in the preparation and/or issuance of the quarterly and annual reports, SEC filings, press releases and other statements and documents described above, including statements made to securities analysts and the media that were designed to influence the market for EDMC securities. Such reports, filings, releases and statements were materially false and misleading in that they failed to disclose material adverse information and misrepresented the truth about EDMC’s finances and business prospects. By virtue of their positions at EDMC, defendants had actual knowledge of the materially false and misleading statements and material omissions alleged herein and intended thereby to deceive Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, or, in the alternative, defendants acted with reckless disregard for the truth in that they failed or refused to ascertain and disclose such facts as would reveal the materially false and misleading nature of the statements made, although such facts were readily available to defendants. Said acts and omissions of defendants were committed willfully or with reckless disregard for the truth. In addition, each defendant knew or recklessly disregarded that material facts were being misrepresented or omitted as described above. Information showing that defendants acted knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth is peculiarly within defendants’ knowledge and control. As the senior managers and/or directors of EDMC, the Individual Defendants had knowledge of the details of EDMC’s internal affairs. The Individual Defendants are liable both directly and indirectly for the wrongs complained of herein. Because of their positions of control and authority, the Individual Defendants were able to and did, directly or indirectly, control the content of the statements of EDMC. As officers and/or directors of a publicly-held company, the Individual Defendants had a duty to disseminate timely, accurate, and truthful information with respect to EDMC’s businesses, operations, future financial condition and future prospects. As a result of the dissemination of the aforementioned false and misleading reports, releases and public statements, the market price of EDMC securities was artificially inflated throughout the Class Period. In ignorance of the adverse facts concerning EDMC’s business and financial condition which were concealed by defendants, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class purchased or otherwise acquired EDMC securities at artificially inflated prices and relied upon the price of the securities, the integrity of the market for the securities and/or upon statements disseminated by defendants, and were damaged thereby. By reason of the conduct alleged herein, defendants knowingly or recklessly, directly or indirectly, have violated Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. As a direct and proximate result of defendants’ wrongful conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their respective purchases, acquisitions and sales of the Company’s securities during the Class Period, upon the disclosure that the Company had been disseminating misrepresented financial statements to the investing public. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. Background

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(Breach of Express Warranty) (Breach of Implied Warranties) (Fraudulent Concealment) (Product Liability – Design Defect) (Violation of Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.SC. § 2301, et seq.) (California Unfair Competition Law – Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.) (Negligence) (Violation of Consumer Legal Remedies Act – Civil Code § 1750, et seq.) The Mini Cooper is a distinctive vehicle that has been a popular automotive icon since the 1960s. Defendant acquired Mini Cooper in 2002 and marketed it as a new class of high-end vehicles that were affordable. In 2007, Defendant released its second generation of Mini vehicles, featuring a four-stroke engine (the “Prince engine”). The Defective Vehicles were manufactured with the Prince engine. Unlike most engines made for the consumer market, the Prince engine uses a metal timing chain rather than a “belt” made of composite materials. When the Prince engine was first introduced in 2004, Defendant touted the timing chain’s durability compared to a timing belt, and indicated that the timing chain would remain maintenance-free throughout the full running life of the engine. One of the features of the Prince engine Defendant has promoted is that the timing chain and tensioner are located inside the engine block. However, actual road use has shown a significant drawback to this design: if the chain fails, damage to the engine can be catastrophic. Plaintiffs seek relief in their individual capacity and seek to represent a class consisting of all others who are similarly situated. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(2) and/or (b)(3), Plaintiffs seek certification of a class initially defined as follows: All persons who formerly or currently own or lease the following Mini Cooper vehicles in California: 2007 through 2010 Hardtop (R56), 2008 through 2010 Clubman (R55), and 2009 through 2010 Convertible (R57). Excluded from the Class are Defendant and its subsidiaries and affiliates, Defendant’s executives, board members, legal counsel, the judges and all other court personnel to whom this case is assigned, their immediate families, and those who purchased the Product for the purpose of resale. Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend or modify the Class definition with greater specificity or division into subclasses after they have had an opportunity to conduct discovery. Numerosity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is unfeasible and not practicable. While the precise number of Class members has not been determined at this time, Plaintiffs are informed and believes that many thousands of consumers have purchased the Products. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and re-allege the preceding paragraphs. Plaintiffs bring this claim individually and on behalf of the Class. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and re-allege the preceding paragraphs. Defendant engaged in unlawful, unfair, and/or fraudulent conduct under California Business & Professional Code § 17200, et seq. Defendant’s conduct is unlawful in that it violates the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code § 1750, et seq. (as set forth in the first cause of action), and the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability and Documentation Act (the “TREAD Act”), 49 U.S.C. § 30101, et seq. (by failing to timely inform the NHTSA of the Defect and allowing the Defective Vehicles to be sold with the Defect). Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and re-allege the preceding paragraphs. Plaintiffs bring this claim individually and on behalf of the Class. Defendant had a duty to its customers as a manufacturer of motor vehicles to design, manufacture, market, and provide vehicles that, in their ordinary operation, are reasonably safe for their intended uses. Defendant had a duty to adequately test its vehicles’ safety before selling millions to consumers worldwide. Defendant had a duty to test vehicles for timing chain tensioner problems once Defendant was on notice that its vehicles had a propensity to have timing chain tensioner issues leading to catastrophic engine failure, which can cause bodily injury, death, and property damage. Moreover, Defendant had a duty to provide true and accurate information to the public to prevent undue risks arising from the foreseeable use of its products. At all times relevant, Defendant sold, marketed, advertised, distributed, and otherwise placed Defective Vehicles into the stream of commerce in an unlawful, unfair, fraudulent, and/or deceptive manner that was likely to deceive the public. Defendant was negligent, and breached the above duties owed to Plaintiffs and Class members. As direct and proximate causes of Defendant’s breaches, Plaintiffs and the Class have been damaged including, but not limited to, the cost of repairs required due to timing chain tensioner problems, the financial loss of owning the Defective Vehicles that are unsafe, and being subjected to potential risk of injury. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and re-allege the preceding paragraphs. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and re-allege the preceding paragraphs. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and re-allege the preceding paragraphs. Plaintiffs and Class members are “consumers” within the meaning of the Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and re-allege the preceding paragraphs. Plaintiffs bring this claim individually and on behalf of the Class. Plaintiffs, and each member of the Class, formed a contract with Defendant at the time Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class purchased the Defective Vehicles. The terms of that contract include the promises and affirmations to provide vehicles free of “defects in materials or workmanship.” This express warranty became part of the basis of the bargain and is part of a standardized contract between Plaintiffs and the members of the Class on the one hand, and Defendant on the other. All conditions precedent to Defendant’s liability under this contract have been performed by Plaintiffs and the Class. Plaintiffs purchased an extended, 100,000-mile warranty, which was still in effect at the time the Defect manifested (at approximately 91,000 miles). Defendant breached the terms of this contract, including the express warranty, with Plaintiffs and the Class by not providing a vehicle that could provide the benefits described above (being free from defects). As a result of Defendant’s breach of its express warranty, Plaintiffs and the Class have been damaged in the amount of the repair costs associated with the Defect, as well as their vehicles’ diminished value as a result of the Defect. SYSTEMATICALLY FAIL AND CAN CAUSE CATASTROPHIC ENGINE FAILURE

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