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4d02ad51-d3a9-45ff-8576-7a310f4aaf40

57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

In October the Warrant Officer rotated home and was replaced by an Armor officer.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

Throughout 1963, the enlisted strength of the detachment hovered around the TO&E authorized strength of 23.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

Extensive scheduled training operations as understood in most army circles were not included in the detachment's yearly plan from the time they began operations in 1962 until they began training the Republic of Vietnam Air Force in Medical Evacuation Operations in 1970. There were two basic reasons for this. First, the realization that the entire deployment in Vietnam was a continual practical exercise, and second the desire to keep non-essential flights to an absolute minimum. Training focused on pilot and crew preparation and certification for their duties, such as Pilot in Command, Instructor Pilot, and so on, or training in new systems.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

Maintenance support for the detachment's organic aircraft remained above the army's stated minimum goal of 68% aircraft availability during 1963, despite the detachment's heavy workload of 2,094 flying hours for the year. This was especially significant since the detachment was designed to operate from one location but was operating from three for the majority of the year. Close coordination with field maintenance units at the locations where aircraft were stationed through the headquarters section at Tan Son Nhut was a dominant factor in maintaining this achievement. However, the crux of all maintenance support rested with the detachment itself and this was where the problems had to be resolved. A heavy work schedule was maintained to keep as many aircraft as possible available for flight. The major burden fell on the two single-ship sections.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

Requests for aeromedical evacuation were channeled through both Army (Combat Operations Center) and Air Force (Air Operations Center) communications systems to the 57th Medical Detachment as directed in USASGV Regulation 59-1. Action on these requests then became the responsibility of the commanding officer of the 57th Medical Detachment.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

During 1963, night medical evacuation had become a regular service of the detachment and by the end of the year was considered its forte. Due to both the detachment's experience and willingness to fly at night most requests for night evacuations came straight to the detachment. An aircraft and crew—a pilot in command, pilot, crew chief, and medic—at all three locations was continually made available for night operations.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

Major evacuation for U.S. casualties was provided in the Saigon area. These patients were brought directly to the Tan Son Nhut airfield whenever feasible. On assault operation coverage, medical aid was usually first administered to the casualty by the Medical Corps officer that accompanied the assaulting unit into the staging area.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

Vietnamese casualties were usually transported to the nearest field hospital. If further evacuation to the rear was requested by Vietnamese medical personnel and was not contrary to USASCV Regulation 59-1, the request was honored.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

Patient care as provided by the 57th Medical Detachment in 1963 consisted mainly of in-flight and emergency medical treatment. Many times, this treatment was the very first the casualty received and consequently turned out to be a definite lifesaving step. The flight medic also provided limited first aid to patients waiting in the staging areas for further rearward evacuation when time permitted.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

Throughout the war, although medical evacuation of patients constituted the major workload for the detachment, there were considerable missions in other areas. Aeromedical evacuation helicopters provided coverage for armed and troop transport helicopters during combat heliborne assaults, U.S. Air Force defoliation missions, training parachute jumps, convoys of troop and equipment carrying vehicles, and transport of key medical personnel and emergency medical material.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

Of the many problems evolving from the operation of any unit, there is one that usually stands before all others. The foible that plagued the 57th Medical Detachment was that of providing total aeromedical coverage to both American and Vietnamese combatants and noncombatants in the Republic of Vietnam. Although the Vietnamese were responsible for evacuating their own casualties, many contingencies came into play that prevented them from doing so, such as large numbers of casualties, lack of sufficient aircraft, or large areas to be covered. To better enable the 57th Medical Detachment to provide this vital coverage, it was necessary to split the unit into three operational sections. This resulted in coverage of a greater area, but also resulted in reduced coverage in Saigon and areas further South. However, this was regarded as the lesser of the two operational constraints.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

This then was the nature of the problem. As evacuation assets were arrayed in 1963, many of the aviation companies were forced to provide tactical aircraft to supplement aeromedical aircraft whenever helicopter ambulances of the 57th Medical Detachment were not available due to either prior commitments or the restrictions imposed by aircraft maintenance. This condition would be relieved to a great extent by the augmentation of another helicopter ambulance unit. At the end of 1963 a study was in preparation by the United States Army Support Group, Vietnam to evaluate such a proposal.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

Another area that caused problems for the 57th Medical Detachment in 1963 was the matter of having to justify the unit's existence to higher headquarters on the basis of yearly flying hours. This was interpreted by the 57th to mean that a unit's worth was solely dependent on the number of hours flown in a given period and not in the actual accomplishments of the unit—for example, the number of patients evacuated or lives saved. This demonstrated that some individuals did not fully understand the real value of having a trained aeromedical evacuation unit available for immediate response to evacuation requests. Since the detachment performed missions for medical evacuation only, the yearly flight time on aircraft depended solely on the number of evacuations requested. Unlike other aviation units, no administrative or logistical missions were performed, and consequently, the detachment's flight time was less than most other units then serving in the Republic of Vietnam. Because of this shortcoming, another study was directed by the U.S. Support Group, Vietnam to determine the feasibility of integrating the 57th Medical Detachment with those of other logistical units for the purpose on increasing its effectiveness.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

The last problem area identified in 1963 that was worth of mention was that concerning maintenance. As mentioned above, the problem was a result of operating from three distinct sections at Qui Nhon, Pleiku, and Saigon. To maintain a flyable aircraft at all times in all sections required more man hours than if the aircraft were concentrated in one location. Thus, a heavier than normal schedule was required by the maintenance personnel at all locations. Despite this, at times no amount of manpower could an aircraft flyable and in this case another aircraft would have to be borrowed from a unit in the immediate vicinity, The limitations on this type of arrangement are readily apparent. The detachment's recommended solution was the deployment of a second air ambulance detachment to Vietnam and the concentration of the 57th's aircraft at one location.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

During its first year in country, the 57th worked without a tactical call sign, simply using "Army" and the tail number of the aircraft. For example, if a pilot were flying a helicopter with the serial number 62-12345, his call sign would be "Army 12345". The 57th communicated internally on any vacant frequency it could find. Major Lloyd Spencer, the 57th's second detachment commander in Vietnam, decided that this improvised system needed to be replaced by something more formal. He visited the Navy Support Activity, Saigon, which controlled all the call signs in South Vietnam. He received a Signal Operations Instructions book that listed all the unused call signs. Most, like "Bandit", were more suitable for assault units than for medical evacuation units. But one entry, "Dust Off", epitomized the 57th's medical evacuation missions. Since the countryside then was dry and dusty, helicopter pickups in the fields often blew dust, dirt, blankets, and shelter halves all over the men on the ground. By adopting "Dust Off", Spencer found for Army aeromedical evacuation in Vietnam a name that lasted the rest of the war.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

Although unit callsigns at the time were rotated periodically to preserve operations security, it was determined that having a fixed callsign for medical evacuation—and a fixed frequency—would be more advantageous for medical evacuation operations, and so the 57th's callsign was not changed as it normally would have been at the end of the period for the Signal Operations Instructions.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

January 1964 found the 57th Medical Detachment located at Tan Son Nhut airport, Saigon. Two air ambulances and crews were attached to the 52d Aviation Battalion, with one helicopter and crew each located at Pleiku and Qui Nhon to provide aeromedical evacuation support within the II Corps area. The remaining three air ambulances and personnel were attached to the 45th Transportation Battalion at Tan Son Nhut providing aeromedical evacuation support within the III and IV Corps areas.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

The mission of the detachment was to provide aeromedical evacuation support to U.S. Forces in the Republic of Vietnam and aeromedical evacuation assistance to the Republic of Vietnam as requested. Before the month of January ended the unit was detached from the 145th Aviation Battalion (previously the 45th Transportation Battalion) and attached to Headquarters Detachment, United States Army Support Group, Vietnam. As a result of the new attachment to Headquarters Detachment, U.S. Army Support Group, Vietnam, the unit enlisted personnel moved into new quarters in the Support Group Compound.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

During the latter part of February consideration was given to relocating the Flight Section in the II Corps area to the IV Corps area because of increased activity in the lower Mekong Delta. This trend of increased activity in IV Corps continued and consequently on 1 March, Detachment A, 57th Medical Detachment (Helicopter Ambulance), (Provisional), was organized and stationed at Sóc Trăng Airfield with attachment to the Delta Aviation Battalion. This reorganization and relocation placed two aircraft with crews in Soc Trang with the remaining aircraft and personnel located at Tan Son Nhut. A sharp increase in the number of patients evacuated during the month of March demonstrated that the relocation was well justified. The increase of patients evacuated in March initiated an upward trend that reached a peak in July with 768 patients evacuated.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

With the upward trend in flight time, patients evacuated, and missions flown there was also a corresponding undesirable upward trend in the number of aircraft hit by enemy fire. On 3 April 1964, First Lieutenant Brian Conway had the dubious distinction of being the first Medical Service Corp Aviator to be wounded in action in Vietnam. A .30-caliber round passed through his ankle as he terminated an approach into a field location for a patient pick-up. This wound resulted in Lt. Conway's evacuation to the United States.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

Other statistics which reflected an upward trend during the spring and early summer of 1964 were night flying time and missions. The evacuation of patients at night became routine. These missions were accomplished with a single helicopter flying blackout. It was in­teresting to note that throughout the entire year, only one hit was received at night although searching fire was often observed. Much of the success of the detachment's night operations was due to the excellent U.S. Air Force radar coverage of the III and IV Corps area. Paris and Paddy Control consistently placed unit aircraft over the target.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

Although the number of Vietnamese casualties rose in 1963, the South Vietnamese military refused to set up its own aeromedical evacuation unit. The VNAF response to requests for medical evacuation depended on aircraft availability, the security of the landing zone, and the mood and temperament of the VNAF pilots. If the South Vietnamese had no on-duty or standby aircraft ready to fly a medical evacuation mission, they passed the request on to the 57th. Even when they accepted the mission themselves, their response usually suffered from a lack of leadership and poor organization. Since South Vietnamese air mission commanders rarely flew with their flights, the persons responsible for deciding whether to abort a mission often lacked the requisite experience. As a MACV summary said: "Usually the decision was made to abort, and the air mission commander could do nothing about it. When an aggressive pilot was in the lead ship, the aircraft came through despite the firing. American advisers reported that on two occasions only the first one or two helicopters landed; the rest hovered out of reach of the wounded who needed to get aboard."

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

An example of the poor quality of VNAF medical evacuation occurred in late October 1963, when the ARVN 2d Battalion, 14th Regiment, conducted Operation LONG HUU II near O Lac in the Delta. At dawn the battalion began its advance. Shortly after they moved out, the Viet Cong ambushed them, opening fire from three sides with automatic weapons and 81 -mm. mortars. At 0700 casualty reports started coming into the battalion command post. The battalion commander sent his first casualty report to the regimental headquarters at 0800: one ARVN soldier dead and twelve wounded, with more casualties in the paddies. He then requested medical evacuation helicopters. By 0845 the casualty count had risen to seventeen lightly wounded, fourteen seriously wounded, and four dead. He sent out another urgent call for helicopters. The battalion executive officer and the American adviser prepared two landing zones, one marked by green smoke for the seriously wounded and a second by yellow smoke for the less seriously wounded. Not until 1215 did three VNAF H-34's arrive over O Lac to carry out the wounded and dead. During the delay the ARVN battalion stayed in place to protect their casualties rather than pursue the retreating enemy. The American adviser wrote later: "It is common that, when casualties are sustained, the advance halts while awaiting evacuation. Either the reaction time for helicopter evacuation must be improved, or some plan must be made for troops in the battalion rear to provide security for the evacuation and care of casualties."

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

The ARVN medical services also proved inadequate to handle the large numbers of casualties. In the Delta, ARVN patients were usually taken to the Vietnamese Provincial Hospital at Can Tho. As the main treatment center for the Delta, it often had a backlog of patients. At night only one doctor was on duty, for the ARVN medical service lacked physicians. If Dustoff flew in many casualties, that doctor normally treated as many as he could; but he rarely called in any of his fellow doctors to help. In return they would not call him on his night off. Many times at night Dustoff pilots would have to make several flights into Can Tho. On return flights the pilots often found loads of injured ARVN soldiers lying on the landing pad where they had been left some hours earlier. After several such flights few pilots could sustain any enthusiasm for night missions.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

Another problem was that the ARVN officers sometimes bowed to the sentiments of their soldiers, many of whom believed that the soul lingers between this world and the next if the body is not properly buried. They insisted that Dustoff ships fly out dead bodies, especially if there were no seriously wounded waiting for treatment. Once, after landing at a pickup site north of Saigon, a Dustoff crew saw many ARVN wounded lying on the ground. But the other ARVN soldiers brought bodies to the helicopter to be evacuated first. As the soldiers loaded the dead in one side of the ship, a Dustoff medical corpsman pulled the bodies out the other side. The pilot stepped out of the helicopter to explain in halting French to the ARVN commander that his orders were to carry out only the wounded. But an ARVN soldier manning a .50-caliber machine gun on a nearby armored personnel carrier suddenly pointed his weapon at the Huey. This convinced the Dustoff crew to fly out the bodies. They carried out one load but did not return for another.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

Early in 1964 the growing burden of aeromedical evacuation fell on the 57th's third group of new pilots, crews, and maintenance personnel. The helicopters were still the 1963 UH-1B models, but most of the new pilots were fresh from flight school. Kelly was described as "a gruff, stubborn, dedicated soldier who let few obstacles prevent him from finishing a task." Within six months he set an example of courage and hard work that Dustoff pilots emulated for the rest of the war, and into the 21st Century.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

Kelly quickly took advantage of the 57th's belated move to the fighting in the south. On 1 March 1964 the U.S. Army Support Group, Vietnam ordered the aircraft at Pleiku and Qui Nhon to move to the Delta. Two helicopters and five pilots, now called Detachment A, 57th Medical Detachment (Helicopter Ambulance), Provisional, flew to the U.S. base at Soc Trang. Once a fighter base for both the French and the Japanese, Soc Trang was a compound roughly 1,000 by 3,000 feet, surrounded by rice paddies.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

Unit statistics soon proved the wisdom of the move south: the number of Vietnamese evacuees climbed from 193 in February to 416 in March. Detachment A continued its coverage of combat in the Delta until October 1964, when the 82nd Medical Detachment (Helicopter Ambulance) from the States took over that area. Major Kelly, who had taken command of the 57th on 11 January, moved south with Detachment A, preferring the field and flying to ground duty in Saigon.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

Detachment A in Soc Trang lived in crude "Southeast Asia" huts with sandbags and bunkers for protection against enemy mortar and ground attack. The rest of the 57th in Saigon struggled along with air conditioning, private baths, a mess hall, and a bar in their living quarters. In spite of the contrast, most pilots preferred Soc Trang. It was there that Major Kelly and his pilots forged the Dustoff tradition of valorous and dedicated service.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

Kelly and his teams also benefited from two years of growing American involvement in Vietnam. By the spring of 1964 the United States had 16,000 military personnel in South Vietnam (3,700 officers and 12,300 enlisted men). The Army, which accounted for 10,100 of these, had increased its aircraft in South Vietnam from 40 in December 1961 to 370 in December 1963. For the first time since its arrival two years ago the 57th was receiving enough Dustoff requests to keep all its pilots busy.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

Kelly faced one big problem when he arrived: the helicopters that the 57th had received the year before were showing signs of age and use, and Brigadier General Joseph Stilwell Jr., the Support Group commander, could find no new aircraft for the detachment. Average flight time on the old UH-1Bs was 800 hours. But this did not deter the new pilots from each flying more than 100 hours a month in medical evacuations. Some of them stopped logging their flight time at 140 hours, so that the flight surgeon would not ground them for exceeding the monthly ceiling.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

The new team continued and even stepped-up night operations. In April 1964, the detachment flew 110 hours at night while evacuating ninety-nine patients. To aid their night missions in the Delta the pilots made a few special plotting flights, during which they sketched charts of the possible landing zones, outlined any readily identifiable terrain features, and noted whether radio navigational aid could be received. During one such flight Major Kelly and his copilot heard on their radio that a VNAF T-28, a fixed-wing plane, had gone down. After joining the search, Kelly soon located the plane. While he and his crew circled the area trying to decide how to approach the landing zone, the Viet Cong below opened fire on the helicopter. One round passed up through the open cargo door and slammed into the ceiling. Unfazed, Kelly shot a landing to the T-28, taking fire from all sides. Once down, he, his crew chief, and his medic jumped out and sprayed submachine gun fire at the Viet Cong while helping the VNAF pilot destroy his radios and pull the M60 machine guns from his plane. Kelly left the area without further damage and returned the VNAF pilot to his unit. Kelly and his Dustoff crew flew more than 500 miles that day.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

On 2 April one of the Detachment A crews flying to Saigon from Soc Trang received a radio call that a village northwest of them had been overrun. Flying up to the area where the Mekong River flows into South Vietnam from Cambodia, they landed at the village of Cai Cai, where during the night Viet Cong had killed or wounded all the people. Soldiers lay at their fighting positions where they had fallen, women and children where they had been shot. The Dustoff teams worked the rest of the day flying out the dead and wounded, putting two or three children on each litter.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

A short time later Brady accompanied an ARVN combat assault mission near Phan Thiet, northeast of Saigon. While Brady's Dustoff ship circled out of range of enemy ground fire, the transport helicopters landed and the troops moved out into a wooded area heavily defended by the Viet Cong. The ARVN soldiers immediately suffered several casualties and called for Dustoff. Brady's aircraft took hits going into and leaving the landing zone, but he managed to fly out the wounded. In Phan Thiet, while he was assessing the damage to his aircraft, an American adviser asked him if he would take ammunition back to the embattled ARVN unit when he returned for the next load of wounded. After discussing the propriety of carrying ammunition in an aircraft marked with red crosses, Brady and his pilots decided to consider the ammunition as "preventive medicine" and fly it into the LZ for the ARVN troops. Back at the landing zone Brady found that Viet Cong fire had downed an L-19 observation plane. Brady ran to the crash site, but both the American pilot and the observer had been killed. The medical corpsman and crew chief pulled the bodies from the wreckage and loaded them on the helicopter. Brady left the ammunition and flew out with the dead.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

By the time the helicopter had finished its mission and returned to Tan Son Nhut, most of the 57th were waiting. News of an American death traveled quickly in those early days of the war. Later, reflecting on the incident, Kelly praised his pilots for bringing the bodies back even though the 57th's mission statement said nothing about moving the dead. But he voiced renewed doubts about the ferrying of ammunition.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

Brady later explained what actually happened behind the scenes. Upon landing, Brady was met by Kelly and called aside. Expecting to be sternly counseled, Brady was surprised when Kelly simply asked why he had carried in ammunition and carried out the dead. Brady replied that the ammunition was "preventive medicine" and that the dead "were angels", and he couldn't refuse them. Kelly simply walked back to the group involved in that day's missions and told them that it was the type of mission he wanted the 57th to be flying. Brady realized the significance of Kelly's statement, as Kelly would be responsible for any fallout from Brady's actions.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

In fact, the Dustoff mission was again under attack. When Support Command began to pressure the 57th to place removable red crosses on the aircraft and begin accepting general purpose missions, Kelly stepped up unit operations. Knowing that removable red crosses had already been placed on transport and assault helicopters in the north, Kelly told his men that the 57th must prove its worth-and by implication the value of dedicated medical helicopters-beyond any shadow of doubt.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

If any of the stops had patients to be evacuated, Kelly's crew loaded them on the aircraft and continued on course, unless a patient's condition warranted returning immediately to Soc Trang. After delivering the patients, they would sometimes resume the circuit. Many nights they carried ten to fifteen patients who otherwise would have had to wait until daylight to receive the care they needed. In March, this flying from outpost to outpost, known as "scarfing", resulted in seventy-four hours of night flying that evacuated nearly one-fourth of that month's 448 evacuees. The stratagem worked; General Stilwell dropped the idea of having the 57th use removable red crosses.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

Although most of Dustoff's work in the Delta was over flat, marshy land, Detachment A sometimes had to work the difficult mountainous areas near the Cambodian border. Late on the afternoon of 11 April Kelly received a mission request to evacuate two wounded ARVN soldiers from Phnom Kto Mountain of the Seven Mountains of An Giang Province. When he arrived he found that the only landing zone near the ground troops was a small area surrounded by high trees below some higher ground held by the Viet Cong. Despite the updrafts common to mountain flying, the mists, and the approaching darkness, Kelly shot an approach to the area. The enemy opened fire and kept firing until Kelly's ship dropped below the treetops into the landing zone. Kelly could set the aircraft down on only one skid; the slope was too steep. Since only one of the wounded was at the landing zone, Kelly and his crew had to balance the ship precariously while waiting for the ARVN troops to carry the other casualty up the mountain. With both patients finally on board, Kelly took off and again flew through enemy fire. The medical corpsman promptly began working on the Vietnamese, one of whom had been wounded in five places. Both casualties survived.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

When Kelly flew such a mission he rarely let bad weather darkness, or the enemy stop him from completing it. He fought his way to the casualties and brought them out. On one mission the enemy forced him away from the landing zone before he could place the patients on board. An hour later he tried to land exactly the same way, through enemy fire, and this time he managed to load the patients safely. The Viet Cong showed their indifference to the red crosses on the aircraft by trying to destroy it with small arms, automatic weapons, and mortars, even while the medical corpsman and crew chief loaded the patients. One round hit the main fuel drain valve and JP-4 fuel started spewing. Kelly elected to fly out anyway, practicing what he had preached since he arrived in Vietnam by putting the patients above all else and hurrying them off the battlefield. He radioed the Soc Trang tower that his ship was leaking fuel and did not have much left, and that he wanted priority on landing. The tower operator answered that Kelly had priority and asked whether he needed anything else. Kelly said, "Yes, bring me some ice cream." just after he landed on the runway the engine quit, fuel tanks empty. Crash trucks surrounded the helicopter. The base commander drove up, walked over to Kelly, and handed him a quart of ice cream.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

Apart from the Viet Cong, the 57th's greatest problem at that time was a lack of pilots. After Kelly reached Vietnam he succeeded in having the other nine Medical Service Corps pilots who followed him assigned to the 57th. He needed more, but the Surgeon General's Aviation Branch seemed to have little understanding of the rigors of Dustoff flying. In the spring of 1964 the Aviation Branch tried to have new Medical Service Corps pilots assigned to nonmedical helicopter units in Vietnam, assuming that they would benefit more from combat training than from Dustoff flying.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

On 15 June 1964, Kelly gave his response:

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

"As for combat experience, the pilots in this unit are getting as much or more combat-support flying experience than any unit over here. You must understand that everybody wants to get into the Aeromedical Evacuation business. To send pilots to U.T.T. [the Utility Tactical Transport Helicopter Company, a nonmedical unit] or anywhere else is playing right into their hands. I fully realize that I do not know much about the big program, but our job is evacuation of casualties from the battlefield. This we are doing day and night, without escort aircraft, and with only one ship for each mission. Since I have been here we have evacuated 1800 casualties and in the last three months we have flown 242.7 hours at night. No other unit can match this. The other [nonmedical] units fly in groups, rarely at night, and always heavily armed."

5857a1de-efb3-4b99-adba-3b2dc646f083

57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

He continued:

176de25e-48e9-429a-86e6-75e80f465802

57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

"If you want the MSC Pilots to gain experience that will be worthwhile, send them to this unit. It is a Medical Unit and I don't want to see combat arms officers in this unit. I will not mention this again. However, for the good of the Medical Service Corps Pilots and the future of medical aviation I urge you to do all that you can to keep this unit full of MSC Pilots."

526542c4-390d-4ff2-af1c-76f49ea8b5fe

57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

Perhaps presciently, Kelly closed his letter as follows:

f12691a9-a160-4ffd-aeb2-0df584b7a292

57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

"Don't go to the trouble of answering this letter for I know that you are very busy. Anyhow, everything has been said. I will do my best, and please remember 'Army Medical Evacuation FIRST'."

1f85756f-52f4-44a5-bd58-dcab85e5134b

57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

With more and more fighting occurring in the Delta and around Saigon, the 57th could not always honor every evacuation request. U.S. Army helicopter assault companies were forced to keep some of their aircraft on evacuation standby, but without a medical corpsman or medical equipment. Because of the shortage of Army aviators and the priority of armed combat support, the Medical Service Corps did not have enough pilots to staff another Dustoff unit in Vietnam. Most Army aeromedical evacuation units elsewhere already worked with less than their permitted number of pilots. Although Army aviation in Vietnam had grown considerably since 1961, by the summer of 1964 its resources fell short of what it needed to perform its missions, especially medical evacuation.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

Army commanders, however, seldom have all the men and material they can use, and Major Kelly knew that he had to do his best with what he had.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

Kelly had begun to realize that, although he preferred flying and being in the field to Saigon, he could better influence things by returning to Tan Son Nhut. After repeated requests from Brady, Kelly told him that he would relinquish command of Detachment A of the 57th at Soc Trang to Brady on 1 July and return to Saigon—although he then later told Brady he was extending his stay in the Delta for at least another month.

5c982e73-c79e-412e-8485-f4964dac8fc5

57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

The second half of the year began with the sad event of the death of the detachment commander, Major Charles L. Kelly on 1 July 1964. He was struck in the chest by a Viet Cong bullet while attempting a patient pick-up. The aircraft crashed with the other three crewmembers receiving injuries. His dying words, "When I have your wounded," would become both a creed and rallying cry for both the 57th and all other Dustoff units to follow them.

6c43a7c7-5b74-4ac4-93d0-322d545e38de

57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

Captain Paul A. Bloomquist assumed command of the detachment and remained as commander until the arrival of Major Howard A. Huntsman Jr. on 12 August.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

Evacuation workload began a downward toward trend in August from the high reached in July. September showed a slight gain over August, but the trend downward continued for the remainder of the year. Two factors were pertinent in the downward trend. First, the Vietnamese Air Force began playing an increasing role in the evacuation of Vietnamese patients. Although the evacuation of Vietnamese personnel was a secondary mission this in reality constituted the major portion of the workload for the 57th. The second factor was the arrival of the 82d Medical Detachment (Helicopter Ambulance) in October. This detachment was located in Soc Trang. This relieved Detachment A of the 57th and the unit was reconsolidated as a complete unit at Tan Son Nhut on 7 October 1964. This was the first time that the unit had operated from one location in entirety since its arrival in Vietnam.

dbebe331-887e-48ce-a7cd-06fa06b61af2

57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

There was a personnel exchange between the 82nd and the 57th. This involved six officers and was accomplished in order to better distribute rotation dates for the 82d Medical Detachment. Four enlisted personnel were also exchanged. Transferred from the 82d to the 57th were Captain Raymond A. Jackson, Captain Douglas E. Moore, and Lieutenant John J. McGowan. Transferred to the 82nd were Lieutenant Armond C. Simmons, Lieutenant Ernest J. Sylvester, and Lieutenant Bruce C. Zenk. In October the detachment was relieved from attachment to Headquarters Detachment, U.S. Army Support Command, Vietnam and attached to the 145th Aviation Battalion for rations and quarters. This involved a move of both officer and enlisted personnel into new quarters with the 145th Aviation Battalion. This resulted in an upgrading in living conditions which was appreciated by all.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Advisory Support, 1962-1964

Although the evacuation of patients was to constitute the major workload for the unit, there was considerable workload in other allied areas. Aeromedical evacuation helicopters of the unit provided medical coverage for armed and troop transport helicopter during air assaults. As a result the unit has been involved in every air mobile operation in the III Corps area, and in the IV Corps area until relieved of that responsibility by the 82nd MD (HA) in October. Medical coverage was also provided to aircraft engaged in the defoliation mission. This became almost a daily activity in the last few months of the year. Unit aircraft also became involved in many search and rescue missions. This often led to the depressing job of extracting remains from crashed aircraft.

12ba4d36-a650-4a85-b2b6-e9f5aa47baab

57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

By 1965, the mission of the 57th Medical Detachment (Helicopter Ambulance) was established as "to provide medical air ambulance support within capabilities to U.S. and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) personnel, and back-up service to Republic of Vietnam Air Force (VNAF) personnel as directed within III Corps Tactical Zone, ARVN 7th Division Tactical Zone within the IV Corps Tactical Zone, and back-up support for the 498th Medical Company (Air Ambulance) operating within the II Corps Tactical Zone in coordination with the Commanding Officers of the 254th and 283d Medical Detachments (Helicopter Ambulance)." Their responsibilities included:

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57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

Although the units supported, and the units they coordinated with, would change from year to year, the mission remained essentially unchanged until the detachment redeployed form Vietnam in 1973.

cace4d8a-e806-42d0-8532-e2c2a0b8fca8

57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

At the end of 1965, the detachment was awaiting approval of its request to be reorganized under TO&E 8-500D which would authorize six UH-1D helicopter ambulances and a corresponding increase in aviator and enlisted personnel. The 8-500C TO&E authorized only 5 aircraft.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

General Order Number 75, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, dated 13 December 1965, organized the Medical Company (Air Ambulance) (Provisional) and assigned the new company the mission of providing command and control of the 57th Medical Detachment (Helicopter Ambulance) in the aeromedical evacuation support of counterinsurgency operations within the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones. The company was created in response to the obvious need for a command and control headquarters.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

The personnel authorized under TO&E 8-500C with Change 2 was augmented by General Order Number 143, Headquarters, U.S. Army Pacific, dated 31 July 1964. This augmentation increased the unit strength by three additional Medical Service Corps Aviators, MOS 1981, which brought the total authorization for the detachment to ten aviators. This allowed the detachment to meet the command requirement that each aircraft have two aviators aboard for each flight. This was considered essential in combat flying and especially so in Vietnam in order that one aviator would be available to take control of the aircraft in the event the other was hit by enemy fire and was not a requirement in the continental United States when the UH-1 was fielded.

57e3bce9-d8f9-497d-b953-6fea6f5a7b36

57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

Under the reorganization the detachment had pending on 31 December 1965, authorized aviator personnel would increase to eight rotary wing aviators, which would have to be augmented by four additional aviators to meet the command requirement of two aviators per aircraft. A proposed TOE Unit Change Request would be submitted upon reorganization which would increase the total number of authorized aviators to fourteen, providing for a full complement of medical evacuation pilots plus a commander and operations officer.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

Enlisted personnel strength remained at a satisfactory level throughout 1965, which was considered an essential factor to the accomplishment of the unit's mission. A full complement of qualified aircraft maintenance personnel and senior medical aidmen was constantly required as they participated in every evacuation flight.

a4d28e73-3091-4096-b9bd-894f0df95295

57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

Aircraft maintenance support and availability of spare parts required to maintain unit aircraft in operational status was adequate, considering the increased load placed on both maintenance facilities and aircraft parts because of the influx of aviation units into Vietnam in 1965. Aircraft availability averaged 86% for the year.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

Air evacuation of casualties in the Republic of Vietnam was routine in 1965, as highway insecurity and frequent enemy ambushes along traveled routes prohibited evacuation by ground vehicles.

3f9c1f8a-3498-46b5-afac-320b7b2da98c

57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

The majority of aeromedical evacuations were accomplished from field locations at or near the place of injury or from forward medical clearing stations. Initial treatment of the patient was normally affected by air ambulance crew and the ground unit's medical personnel. This may have included bandaging, splinting, positioning, airway control, and the administration of a blood expander and/or pain-killer drug, as indicated. Treatment may have been rendered while in the pickup area or in the air. Crewmembers may also have had the task of assigning evacuation priorities in semi-mass casualty situations where a limited number of evacuation aircraft were available for the number of patients involved.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

Medical regulating for American patients had become well established with the induction of more qualified medical personnel and well-equipped installations. Patients may have been evacuated to brigade clearing stations, the 3d Surgical Hospital, 93d Evacuation Hospital, 3d Field Hospital, or the Saigon Navy Hospital as dictated by the nature of the patient's wound and patient density at a specific hospital. Coordination between the Surgeon, U.S. Army Vietnam and the Medical Regulating Officer, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam effectively controlled the balance between in-country facilities.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

Vietnamese patients were evacuated to specific hospitals only as dictated by the initial location of the patient in relation to Saigon's Cong Hoa Hospital and a Korean surgical located in Vung Tau. Degree of injury is a factor in medical regulating for Vietnamese patients only when the patient load includes killed in action, who were taken directly to the Tan Son Nhut ARVN Cemetery.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

During 1965, the major workload of the unit shifted from the support of the detachment's secondary mission, which had generated the largest activity since the unit arrived in the Republic of Vietnam, to accomplishment of the primary mission, corresponding to the introduction in the Spring of large American combat units.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

USARPAC General Order 37, dated 25 February 1966, authorized the 57th Medical Detachment to operate under TO&E 8-500D. This authorized the detachment to augment this TO&E in three areas:

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57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

Problems encountered or areas of concern the detachment experienced included:

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57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

Area Coverage: Supported units did not understand the concept of area coverage. This term meant that a Dustoff aircraft would respond to an emergency by proximity and speed, and not necessarily in direct support of a specific unit. At the same time, the 57th was in favor of providing as much close-in direct support as possible when the tactical situation requires it, but not at the expense of the Area Coverage concept. In previous years in Vietnam, commanders had utilized Dustoff aircraft in accordance with this Area Coverage concept. However, there was a case under consideration at the end of 1966 which challenged this concept as compared to direct individual unit coverage. The consequences of this problem area became increasingly important as more and more units arrived in South Vietnam. It would be impossible to provide every major commander with an individual Dustoff and still efficiently meet mission requirements in the country. In addition, it was felt that Dustoff operations had been highly successful in the past, and that the 57th could continue to provide a high caliber evacuation system in the future, provided evacuations continue to be administered through medical channels.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

Hoist Missions: The S7th Medical Detachment had equipment and trained personnel capable of performing hoist missions when required. However, problems had arisen in this area which deserve mention here. On some occasions ground commanders had requested hoist missions in areas where a suitable landing zone was close by. At other times hoist missions were requested from an area suitable for a helicopter to land in. Also, the inherent dangers of this type of operation, for the aircraft, crew, and patients could not be overemphasized. In almost all cases, it was evident that continued emphasis was needed in this area, especially by ground commanders and individual requesters.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

Field Standby: The 57th routinely Supplied a field standby crew for the 196th Light Infantry Brigade at Tay Ninh, and on various occasions had provided crews to the 25th Infantry Division at Cu Chi, the 1st Infantry Division at Lai Khe, and the 4th Infantry Division at Dau Tieng. This close liaison support worked well during 1965, although at times the detachment had been over committed when combat operations (i.e. Operation Attleboro, etc.) required still additional ships in addition to those already at field standby locations. With the tremendous influx of additional units into Vietnam, this field standby support area was likely to become an acute problem in the future, unless the area coverage concept was fully accepted by the supported units.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

Early in 1966 the 57th relocated from the Tan Son Nhut Airport to the Saigon Heliport. This move was considered temporary, pending the final move to Long Binh Post, However, this temporary category extended for more than six months and resulted in many operational restrictions within the detachment, such as back-up reaction time and muster capability. As problems mounted with the construction of a heliport at the new location, billets and other facilities at Long Binh Post were erected by individuals of the 57th. It was anticipated that the move to Long Binh would be completed by mid-January 1967, all but eliminating the many problems that arose out of operating in the highly congested city of Saigon.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

Aircraft maintenance support and availability of spare parts required to maintain unit aircraft in operational status was adequate, considering the increased load placed on both maintenance facilities and aircraft parts because of the continued influx of aviation units into the Republic of Vietnam. Aircraft availability average for 1966 was 80.5%

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57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

General supply support continued to be a problem because of the escalating numbers of U.S. Forces introduced into the combat zone.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

Air evacuation of casualties in the Republic of Vietnam was routine, as general insecurity and frequent ambushes along the traveled routes prohibited evacuation by ground.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

The majority of aeromedical evacuations were accomplished from field locations at or near the place of injury or from forward medical clearing stations. Initial treatment of the patients were normally performed by the air ambulance crew and the ground unit's medical personnel. This may have included bandaging, splinting, positioning, airway control, application of oxygen and the administration of a blood expander and/or analgesic, as indicated. Treatment may have been rendered while in the pick-up area or in the air. Crew members may also have the task of assigning evacuation priorities in semi-mass casualty situations where limited numbers of evacuation aircraft were available for the number of patients involved.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

Medical regulating for U.S. patients was well established by the end of 1966. Patients may be evacuated to brigade clearing stations, Surgical Hospitals, Evacuation Hospitals, and Field Hospitals as directed by the nature of the patient's wound and the patient density at a specific hospital. Coordination between the Surgeon, U.S. Army, Vietnam and the Medical Regulating Officer, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam effectively controlled the balance between in-country facilities.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

Vietnamese patients were evacuated to specific hospitals according to the nature of the injury, proximity of medical facilities, and as directed by initial treatment facility.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

During 1966, the major workload of the detachment more than doubled from the patient load generated during 1965. In November, the 57th evacuated more than 1,000 patients for the highest monthly total since arriving in country This tremendous increase in patient load directly corresponded to the increase of American units and combat operations during the year.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

The 57th Medical Detachment was organized under TO&E 8-500D implemented by USARPAC General Order number 37 dated 25 February 1966. This was changed by USARPAC General Order number 218, dated 26 October 1967, authorizing the unit to operate under MTOE 8-500D.

3c28f33b-6fdc-4cd5-8ac6-3852117fabe2

57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

From l January to 22 October 1967 the 57th was under the command and control of the 68th Medical Group, 44th Medical Brigade. From 23 October 1967 through the end of 1967 the 57th Medical Detachment was assigned to the 67th Medical Group under the 44th Medical Brigade.

b3b2a1db-ff8f-4614-934d-8a7db3dac53a

57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

Field Standby: The 57th routinely supplied a field standby crew for 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division at Dau Tieng in 1967. This close liaison support worked very well during 1967 and continued to do so through the end of the year. At times the detachment had been heavily committed when combat operations (for example, Operation Yellowstone, Operation Manhattan, and Operation Junction City) required aircraft in addition to those already at field standby locations. The 57th Medical Detachment successfully completed a move from the Saigon heliport to Long Binh Post in February 1967. The heliport, billets, BOQs and other facilities at Long Binh were erected by the detachment personnel.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

The TO&E authorization of 14 aviators was considered adequate. However, the detachment did not have more than 11 aviators assigned at any time for more than short periods. During 1967 the detachment's commitments steadily increased and with casualties and other unforeseen circumstances the assigned aviators were subjected to periods of extremely heavy workload. Although unit aviators did not accumulate high monthly total flying hours in comparison to other aviation units, the medical evacuation mission, (consisting of standby, 24 hours at a time, extensive night flying, periodic extended operations during mass casualty situations, and marginal weather) effectively limited the detachment's ability to schedule a pilot for duty on a continuous basis.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

The 57th Medical Detachment received 6 UH-1H aircraft in December equipped with L-13 engines. The 1400 horsepower developed by this engine proved invaluable to the detachment's crews when operating in small, confined areas in the jungle. All the aircraft were equipped with the Decca Navigator System.

b09944a4-3102-467e-a12b-28e83c901537

57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

Aircraft maintenance support and availability of spare parts required to maintain the detachment's aircraft in operational status was adequate, considering the increased workload placed on both maintenance facilities and aircraft parts because of the influx of aviation units into the Republic of Vietnam. Aircraft availability average for 1967 was an overall 74.8%.

aef6f6fa-77f1-42bc-9fbe-4da6be4dacbc

57th_Medical_Detachment

The Build-up, 1965-1967

During 1967, the increase in the patient load continued to directly correspond to the increase of American units and combat operations during the year.

2ac6a31a-9842-48b7-a0df-1e72bc51921e

57th_Medical_Detachment

Sustained Combat Operations, 1968-1969

Effective 16 February 1968, the detachment was released from the 67th Medical Group, and assigned to the 68th Medical Group, 44th Medical Brigade, by General Order number 174, dated 14 February 1968. Also effective 16 February 1968, the detachment was attached to the 45th Medical Company (Air Ambulance); 68th Medical Group, by General Order number 17, dated 1 March 1968. The transition was carried out smoothly and without major problems.

cae2fd3c-b7ce-4502-96ec-e8c25f0257f8

57th_Medical_Detachment

Sustained Combat Operations, 1968-1969

The detachment operated under TO&E 8-500D throughout most of 1968. Reorganization took place under Department of the Army General Order number 542, dated 13 September 1968, authorizing the detachment to operate under MTO&E 8-500G effective 2 October 1968. Though it was too early as of the end of 1968 to tell, no foreseeable difficulties were expected under the new TO&E.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Sustained Combat Operations, 1968-1969

In 1968, he 57th Medical Detachment provided coverage to U.S. and Allied Forces operating within their area of responsibility which included III Corps Tactical Zone and the northern part of IV Corps Tactical Zone. The detachment provided a standby crew for its home base at Long Binh Post where it was co-located with the 45th Medical Company (Air Ambulance). In addition, it provided a permanent standby crew at Dau Tieng during the first half of the year; but lost this standby requirement and reverted to providing crews at Saigon, Tan An, Dong Tam and Phan Thiet on a rotational basis with the 45th during the last half of the year. Dustoff operations under this area support concept were extremely effective and were recognized as a tremendous morale factor to all combat troops operating in this area.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Sustained Combat Operations, 1968-1969

Air evacuation of casualties proved itself in the Republic of Vietnam as a highly effective means of evacuating patients. The majority of aeromedical evacuations were accomplished from field locations at or near the place of injury. Medical Regulations pertaining to the disposition of U.S. patients was well established by 1968. Patients could be evacuated to clearing stations, surgical stations, surgical hospitals, evacuation hospitals, or field hospitals as dictated by the patient's wound and the patient density at a specific hospital. Coordination with the Medical Groups at the time of evacuation effectively controlled the balance between in-country facilities.

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57th_Medical_Detachment

Sustained Combat Operations, 1968-1969

Vietnamese civilian and military personnel could be evacuated to U.S. facilities depending upon the proximity of the various Vietnamese hospitals. Vietnamese hospital quality had improved over 1968 and greater emphasis was placed on evacuating Vietnamese casualties to those hospitals as they became more self-supporting. Life and limb saving procedures could still be undertaken at U.S. facilities if the situation warranted but the majority of those patients were then furtl1er evacuated to Vietnamese hospitals.

36e88e1c-5483-4597-ae49-4c6d373e3138

57th_Medical_Detachment

Sustained Combat Operations, 1968-1969

Security of landing zones was generally very good but presented problems at times. Enemy capabilities could be underestimated, and it had to be stressed to ground units that even in areas where it may not have seemed necessary, such as "friendly" villages, especially at night. It is also worth mentioning that a brief but honest description of the tactical situation given by the ground commanders when applicable prior to landing of the helicopter could often be advantageous.

48a4ac25-0740-4210-bc67-423480d310a9

57th_Medical_Detachment

Sustained Combat Operations, 1968-1969

The Tet Offensive of January - February 1968 tested the capabilities of the detachment to a maximum. The entire detachment met the challenge with determination. Five out of six aircraft remained flyable with the pilots and crews flying steadily on eight-hour shifts around the clock. Most of the time the crews changed without shutting down the aircraft, and during the entire crisis, the unit was able to perform its mission flawlessly.

2118199c-5dd6-4daa-8381-b428d0757386

57th_Medical_Detachment

Sustained Combat Operations, 1968-1969

On 15 February 1969 the detachment relocated from Long Binh Post to Lai Khe, replacing the 4th Flight Platoon, 45th Medical Company (Air Ambulance) due to increased mission requirements in that area. From Lai Khe, it continued throughout the year to support elements of the 1st Infantry Division, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Forces operating in the area.

10cfcf4b-3f22-4567-a086-c6b789310cda

57th_Medical_Detachment

Sustained Combat Operations, 1968-1969

Aircraft maintenance and supply support received from the 605th Transportation Company (Direct Support) was outstanding. Maintenance down time was drastically reduced by technical assistance visits and close maintenance coordination between the detachment and Direct Support element.

a9d5a502-50c7-433a-9ca5-b8223ad50836

57th_Medical_Detachment

The Drawdown, 1970-1972

On 15 February 1970 the detachment relocated from Lai Khe to Binh Thuy to augment the Dustoff mission in the Military Region IV. From Binh Thuy the detachment supported the ARVN 9th, 21st Divisions and the 44th Special Tactical Zone, and the U.S. and Vietnamese Navies, plus U.S. Advisory Teams.

95171be5-6e97-4420-aaa0-991ee2b0ac64

57th_Medical_Detachment

The Drawdown, 1970-1972

The Commanding Officer of the 57th Medical Detachment also commanded the 43d Medical Detachment (RB) which provided ground ambulance support on an assigned basis. The 82d Medical Detachment (Helicopter Ambulance) was also under the operational control of the 57th.

25bca7c2-0303-461b-a940-ee57f0007922

57th_Medical_Detachment

The Drawdown, 1970-1972

A strenuous effort was being made to get the VNAF to perform medical evacuation in Military Region IV. At the end of 1970, there were 3 squadrons of VNAF helicopters in Military Region IV; 2 fully active at Binh Thuy Air Base and 1 at Soc Trang. Senior VNAF officers and USAF advisors revealed a lack of expertise in the area of aeromedical evacuation. Tentative plans were made to provide ground schooling for selectec1 VNAF pilots and then furnish the VNAF with qualified aircraft commanders from the 57th and 82d Medical Detachments to fly combat missions with mixed crews. Considerable interest had been shown by both VNAF and USAF advisors in creating a special unit to conduct medical evacuations.