Datasets:

coastalcph

/

lex_glue

like 45

[ "4. The applicant is a limited liability company with its seat in Austria.", "5. On 26 August 1993 the applicant company instituted civil proceedings against 16 clients (hereafter the “defendants”), claiming approximately two million Austrian schillings (about 145 000 €) for work effected in the construction of semi-detached houses.", "6. On 12, 13 and 15 October 1993 the defendants filed their submissions. On 18 November 1993 the applicant company filed further submissions.", "7. On 2 December 1993 the St. Pölten Regional Court (Landesgericht) held an oral hearing and adjourned the case to 28 February 1994 in order to hear a witness on the question whether the applicant company had properly effected the construction work.", "8. On 24 February 1994 the applicant company filed further submissions.", "9. On 28 February 1994 the St. Pölten Regional Court heard a witness and adjourned the hearing in order to hear an expert. On 28 March 1994 the court appointed an expert. On 30 March 1994 the defendants filed further submissions. On 6 June 1994 the expert visited the locus in quo (Befundaufnahme).", "10. On 26 January 1996 the expert submitted his report, comprising some 200 pages. The report dealt inter alia with the question to what extent the ascertained deficiencies had to be attributed to the applicant company, which had carried out the construction work, or to the planning engineer, the building supervisor, other craftsmen or the defendants.", "11. On 30 January 1996 the court asked the parties of the proceedings to file comments on the expert opinion within two weeks. Upon the requests of the applicant company and the defendants the court subsequently extended the time-limit to six weeks. On 12 and 18 March 1996, respectively, the defendants and the applicant company filed their comments on the expert opinion. Upon the court’s request the applicant company, on 9 April 1996, supplemented its comments.", "12. On 12 December 1996 the St. Pölten Regional Court held another hearing and adjourned the case to 10 March 1997 to hear further witnesses.", "13. On 14 January 1997 the court ordered the expert to supplement his opinion. On 5 March 1997 the expert submitted his supplementary findings.", "14. On 10 March 1997 the court heard two witnesses and adjourned the case to 26 June 1997.", "15. On 26 June 1997 the court held another hearing and adjourned the case in order to hear further witnesses.", "16. On 18 July 1997 the court granted the application of two defendants to order the expert to prepare an opinion on moisture in their houses for the purpose of preserving evidence (Beweissicherungsantrag). On 22 December 1998 the expert submitted his opinion.", "17. In March and April 1999 the defendants’ counsel informed the court that discussions concerning a friendly settlement were underway.", "18. On 30 April 1999 the applicant company filed an application for accelaration of the proceedings under Section 91 (Fristsetzungsantrag) of the Courts Act (Gerichtsorganisationsgesetz) and asked that a time-limit be set for the Regional Court to hold another hearing or to issue the decision.", "19. On 25 May 1999 the court scheduled another hearing for 14 October 1999. Due to the absence of a witness the hearing was later postponed to 11 November.", "20. On 11 November 1999 the St. Pölten Regional Court heard further witnesses. The applicant company and the defendants filed further submissions.", "21. On 25 November 1999 the court ordered the expert to submit a further opinion for the purpose of preserving evidence. On 23 February 2000 the court visited the locus in quo for the purpose of preserving evidence. On 8 August 2000 the expert submitted his opinion.", "22. On 7 February 2001 the applicant company filed further submissions.", "23. On 12 February 2001 the court held a hearing, at which the applicant company and the defendants each submitted a private expert opinion. On 20 March 2001, the applicant company filed further submissions. On 18 June 2001 the court held a further hearing. A hearing scheduled for 8 October 2001 was cancelled due to an illness of the applicant company’s counsel.", "24. On 21 January 2002 the court held a further hearing, and dismissed the applicant company’s motion for bias against the court-appointed expert. It further granted the defendants’ request to supplement the expert opinion, ordered them to pay an advance to the expert’s fees and adjourned the case for an indefinitive time.", "25. On 22 April 2002 the defendants paid the advance to the expert’s fees. Subsequently, on 25 April 2002 the court ordered the expert to supplement his opinion.", "26. On 13 September 2002 the court, upon the expert’s request, asked the Central Institute for Meteorolgy and Geodynamics (Zentralanstalt für Meteorologie und Geodynamik) to provide information on a number of issues. On 9 October 2002 the said institute submitted the requested information.", "27. On 10 October 2002 the applicant company filed a further application under Section 91 of the Courts Act requesting that a time-limit of four weeks be set for the submission of the supplementary expert opinion.", "28. On 15 October 2002 the Regional Court, upon the defendants’ request of 10 September 2002, ordered the expert to submit a further opinion for the purpose of preserving evidence.", "29. On 9 December 2002 the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) dismissed the applicant’s request under Section 91 of the Courts Act. Having regard to the complexity of the case and the multitude of submissions filed by the parties, it found that the Regional Court had not been dilatory.", "30. On 28 January 2003 the expert submitted his opinion on the purpose of preserving evidence. He further requested the applicant company to submit missing accounting documents concerning the constructions.", "31. On 19 February 2003 the court ordered the applicant company to submit the requested documents and dismissed the applicant company’s further motion for bias against the expert.", "32. On 25 March 2003 the defendants filed further submissions.", "33. On 14 May 2003 the applicant company filed another application under Section 91 of the Courts Act requesting that a time-limit of four weeks be set for the submission of the supplementary expert opinion. On 14 July 2003 the Vienna Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant company’s request, again finding that the court had not been dilatory.", "34. On 30 September 2003 the competent judge retired.", "35. On 3 October 2003 the expert submitted his supplementary opinion.", "36. On 16 October 2003 the new judge in charge of the case requested the applicant company and the defendants to submit their comments to the supplemented expert opinion within four weeks. It subsequently granted the parties’ requests to extend the time-limit to 4 and 5 December 2003 respectively. On 1 December 2003 the applicant company submitted its comments to the supplemented expert opinion.", "37. On 30 December 2003 the court scheduled a further hearing for 18 February 2004.", "38. Currently, the proceedings are still pending before the St. Pölten Regional Court." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "9. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Bourg-en-Bresse.", "10. On 27 November 1991 the applicant, Mrs Thi-Nho Vo, who is of Vietnamese origin, attended Lyons General Hospital for a medical examination scheduled during the sixth month of pregnancy.", "11. On the same day another woman, Mrs Thi Thanh Van Vo, was due to have a contraceptive coil removed at the same hospital. When Dr G., who was to remove the coil, called out the name “Mrs Vo” in the waiting-room, it was the applicant who answered.\nAfter a brief interview, the doctor noted that the applicant had difficulty in understanding French. Having consulted the medical file, he sought to remove the coil without examining her beforehand. In so doing, he pierced the amniotic sac causing the loss of a substantial amount of amniotic fluid.\nAfter finding on clinical examination that the uterus was enlarged, the doctor ordered a scan. He then discovered that one had just been performed and realised that there had been a case of mistaken identity. The applicant was immediately admitted to hospital.\nDr G. then attempted to remove the coil from Mrs Thi Thanh Van Vo, but was unsuccessful and so prescribed an operation under general anaesthetic for the following morning. A further error was then made when the applicant was taken to the operating theatre instead of Mrs Thi Thanh Van Vo, and only escaped the surgery intended for her namesake after she protested and was recognised by an anaesthetist.", "12. The applicant left the hospital on 29 November 1991. She returned on 4 December 1991 for further tests. The doctors found that the amniotic fluid had not been replaced and that the pregnancy could not continue further. The pregnancy was terminated on health grounds on 5 December 1991.", "13. On 11 December 1991 the applicant and her partner lodged a criminal complaint, together with an application to join the proceedings as civil parties, alleging unintentional injury to the applicant entailing total unfitness for work for a period not exceeding three months and unintentional homicide of her child. Three expert reports were subsequently filed.", "14. The first, which was filed on 16 January 1992, concluded that the foetus, a baby girl, was between 20 and 21 weeks old, weighed 375 grams, was 28 centimetres long, had a cranial perimeter of 17 centimetres and had not breathed after delivery. The expert also concluded that there was no indication that the foetus had been subjected to violence or was malformed and no evidence that the death was attributable to a morphological cause or to damage to an organ. Further, the autopsy performed after the abortion and an anatomico-pathological examination of the body indicated that the foetal lung was 20 to 24 weeks old.", "15. On 3 August 1992 a second report was filed concerning the applicant’s injuries:\n“(a) There is a period of temporary total unfitness for work from 27 November 1991 to 13 December 1991, when the patient was admitted to the Tonkin Clinic with an entirely unconnected pathology (appendectomy)\n(b) the date of stabilisation can be put at 13 December 1991\n(c) there is no loss of amenity\n(d) there is no aesthetic damage\n(e) there is no occupational damage\n(f) there is no partial permanent unfitness for work\nDamage in terms of pain and suffering resulting from this incident still has to be assessed. The assessment should be carried out with a doctor of Vietnamese extraction specialising in psychiatry or psychology.”", "16. The third report, which was issued on 29 September 1992, referred to the malfunctioning of the hospital department concerned and to negligence on the part of the doctor:\n“1. The manner in which appointments in the departments run by Professors [T.] and [R.] at Lyons General Hospital are organised is not beyond reproach, in particular in that namesakes are common among patients of foreign origin and create a risk of confusion, a risk that is undoubtedly increased by the patients’ unfamiliarity with or limited understanding of our language. 2. The fact that patients were not given precise directions and the consulting rooms and names of the doctors holding surgeries in them were not marked sufficiently clearly increased the likelihood of confusion between patients with similar surnames and explains why, after Dr [G.] had acquainted himself with Mrs Thi Thanh Van Vo’s medical file, it was [the applicant] who came forward in response to his call. 3. The doctor acted negligently, by omission, and relied solely on the paraclinical examinations. He did not examine his patient and by an unfortunate error ruptured the amniotic sac, causing the pregnancy to terminate at five months. He is accountable for that error, although there are mitigating circumstances.”", "17. On 25 January 1993, and also following supplemental submissions by the prosecution on 26 April 1994, Dr G. was charged with causing unintentional injury at Lyons on 27 November 1991 by:\n(i) through his inadvertence, negligent act or inattention, perforating the amniotic sac in which the applicant’s live and viable foetus was developing, thereby unintentionally causing the child’s death (a criminal offence under Article 319 of the former Criminal Code – which was applicable at the material time – now Article 221-6 of the Criminal Code);\n(ii) through his inadvertence, negligent act, inattention, negligent omission or breach of a statutory or regulatory duty of protection or care, causing the applicant bodily injury that resulted in her total unfitness for work for a period not exceeding three months (a criminal offence under Article R. 40, sub-paragraph 4, of the former Criminal Code – which was applicable at the material time – now Articles R. 625-2 and R. 625-4 of the Criminal Code).", "18. By an order of 31 August 1995, Dr G. was committed to stand trial in the Lyons Criminal Court on counts of unintentional homicide and unintentionally causing injuries.", "19. By a judgment of 3 June 1996, the Criminal Court found that the accused was entitled as of right to an amnesty under the Amnesty Law of 3 August 1995 in respect of the offence of unintentionally causing injuries entailing temporary unfitness for work of less than three months. As to the offence of unintentional homicide of the foetus, it held:\n“The issue before the Court is whether the offence of unintentional homicide or the unintentional taking of the foetus’s life is made out when the life concerned is that of a foetus – if a 20 to 21 week-old foetus is a human person (‘another’ within the meaning of Article 221-6 of the Criminal Code).\n...\nThe expert evidence must be accepted. The foetus was between 20 and 21 weeks old.\nAt what stage of maturity can an embryo be considered a human person?\nThe Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy Act of 17 January 1975 provides: ‘The law guarantees respect of every human being from the beginning of life.’\nThe Law of 29 July 1994 (Article 16 of the Civil Code) provides: ‘The law secures the primacy of the person, prohibits any assault on human dignity and guarantees the respect of every human being from the beginning of its life’.\nThe laws of 29 July 1994 expressly employed the terms ‘embryo’ and ‘human embryo’ for the first time. However, the term ‘human embryo’ is not defined in any of them.\nWhen doing the preparatory work for the legislation on bioethics, a number of parliamentarians (both members of the National Assembly and senators) sought to define ‘embryo’. Charles de Courson proposed the following definition: ‘Every human being shall be respected from the start of life; the human embryo is a human being.’ Jean-François Mattéi stated: ‘The embryo is in any event merely the morphological expression of one and the same life that begins with impregnation and continues till death after passing through various stages. It is not yet known with precision when the zygote becomes an embryo and the embryo a foetus, the only indisputable fact being that the life process starts with impregnation.’\nIt thus appears that there is no legal rule to determine the position of the foetus in law either when it is formed or during its development. In view of this lack of a legal definition it is necessary to return to the known scientific facts. It has been established that a foetus is viable at 6 months and on no account, on present knowledge, at 20 or 21 weeks.\nThe Court must have regard to that fact (viability at 6 months) and cannot create law on an issue which the legislators have not yet succeeded in defining.\nThe Court thus notes that a foetus becomes viable at the age of 6 months; a 20 to 21 week-old foetus is not viable and is not a ‘human person’ or ‘another’ within the meaning of former Article 319 and Article 221-6 of the Criminal Code.\nThe offence of unintentional homicide or of unintentionally taking the life of a 20 to 21 week-old foetus has not been made out, since the foetus was not a ‘human person’ or ‘another’...\nAcquits Dr G. on the charge without penalty or costs ...”", "20. On 10 June 1996 the applicant appealed against that judgment. She argued that Dr G. had been guilty of personal negligence severable from the functioning of the public service and sought 1,000,000 French francs (FRF) in damages, comprising FRF 900,000 for the death of the child and FRF 100,000 for the injury she had sustained. The public prosecutor’s office, as second appellant, submitted that the acquittal should be overturned. It observed: “By failing to carry out a clinical examination, the accused was guilty of negligence that caused the death of the foetus, which at the time of the offence was between 20 and 24 weeks old and following, normally and inexorably, the path of life on which it had embarked, there being no medical doubt over its future.”", "21. In a judgment of 13 March 1997, the Lyons Court of Appeal upheld the judgment in so far as it had declared the prosecution of the offence of unintentionally causing injuries time-barred but overturned the remainder of the judgment and found the doctor guilty of unintentional homicide. It imposed a six-month suspended prison sentence and a fine of FRF 10,000, holding:\n“... In the instant case Dr [G.]’s negligence is characterised in particular by the fact that the patient’s knowledge of French was insufficient to enable her to explain her condition to him, to answer his questions or to give him the date of her last period, circumstances that should have further impressed upon him the need for a thorough clinical examination. The assertion that he was entitled to rely on the medical records alone shows that, though an able scientist, this young doctor was nonetheless unaware of one of the essential skills of the practice of medicine: listening to, getting to know and examining the patient. Indeed, before this Court Dr [G.] said that the accident had impressed upon him how vital it was to take precautions before operating.\nThere is a clear causal link between this negligent act and omission and the death of the child Mrs Vo was carrying. The accused has himself acknowledged, with commendable honesty, that a clinical examination would have alerted him to the fact that the patient was pregnant and had been mistaken for another patient.\nAs regards the classification of the offence as unintentional homicide, it is first necessary to reiterate the legal principles governing this sphere.\nVarious provisions of international treaties, such as Article 2 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 6 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child signed in New York on 26 January 1990, recognise a right to life protected by law for everyone, and notably children.\nUnder domestic law, section 1 of the Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy Act (Law no. 75-17 of 17 January 1975) specifies: ‘The law guarantees respect of every human being from the beginning of life ... this principle may only be derogated from in the event of necessity and in accordance with the conditions set out in this statute.’\nFurther, Law no. 94-653 of 29 July 1994 on the respect of the human body lays down in Article 16 of the Civil Code: ‘The law secures the primacy of the person, prohibits any assault on human dignity and guarantees the respect of every human being from the beginning of its life.’\nThese statutory provisions cannot be regarded as mere statements of intent, devoid of any legal effect, since Article 16-9 of the Civil Code indicates that the provisions of Article 16 are mandatory.\nFor its part the Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation applied these rules of international and domestic law in two judgments it delivered on 27 November 1996, specifying that the Act of 17 January 1975 only permits derogation from the rule stated in section 1 thereof that every human being is entitled to respect from the beginning of life in cases of necessity and subject to the conditions and limitations set out in it.\nThe Court of Cassation added that, having regard to the conditions laid down by the legislature, the provisions of that statute and of the law of 31 December 1979 on the voluntary termination of pregnancy, taken as a whole, were not incompatible with the aforementioned treaty provisions.\nIn a different case, moreover, the Court of Cassation pointed out that on signing the Convention on the Rights of the Child in New York on 26 January 1990, France made a declaration concerning interpretation in which it stated that the convention could not be interpreted as constituting any obstacle to the implementation of the provisions of French legislation on the voluntary termination of pregnancy. That reservation shows, by converse implication, that that convention could concern a foetus aged less than 10 weeks, the statutory maximum foetal age in France for a voluntary termination of pregnancy.\nIt follows that, subject to the provisions on the voluntary termination of pregnancies and therapeutic abortions, the right to respect for every human being from the beginning of life is guaranteed by law, without any requirement that the child be born as a viable human being, provided it was alive when the injury occurred.\nIndeed, viability is a scientifically indefinite and uncertain concept, as the accused, who is currently studying in the United States, himself acknowledged, informing the Court that foetuses born between 23 and 24 weeks after conception could now be kept alive, a situation that was inconceivable a few years ago. In the opinion prepared by Professor [T.] and adduced in evidence by Dr [G.], reference is made to a report by Professor Mattéi in which it is indicated that the embryo is merely the morphological expression of one and the same life that begins with impregnation and continues till death after passing through various stages. It is not yet known with precision when the zygote becomes an embryo and the embryo a foetus, the only indisputable fact being that the life process starts with impregnation. ...\nThus the issue of viability at birth, a notion that is uncertain scientifically, is in addition devoid of all legal effect, as the law makes no distinction on that basis.\nIn the instant case it has been established that when the scan was performed on 27 November 1991 – before the amniotic fluid was lost later that day – the [applicant’s] pregnancy had been proceeding normally and the child she was carrying was alive. When the therapeutic abortion was performed on 5 December 1991, it was noted that a comparison of the child’s measurements with published tables suggested that the foetus was between 20 and 21 weeks old and possibly older, as it is not certain that the tables take into account the specific morphology of children of Vietnamese origin. Dr [G.], when questioned on this point at the hearing, was unable to provide any further information. The conclusion from the anatomo-pathological examination was that the foetal lung indicated an age of between 20 and 24 weeks, its measurements suggesting that an age at the lower end of that range was the most likely. In any event, as Dr [G.] said in evidence, the age of the foetus was very close to that of certain foetuses that have managed to survive in the United States. The photographs at page D 32 of the trial bundle show a perfectly formed child whose life was cut short by the accused’s negligence.\nAs the Douai Court of Appeal observed in its judgment of 2 June 1987, had the assault on the child concerned inflicted a non-fatal wound, it would have been classified without any hesitation as an offence of unintentionally causing injuries. A fortiori, an assault leading to the child’s death must be classified as unintentional homicide.\nThus, the strict application of the legal principles, established scientific fact and elementary common sense all dictate that a negligent act or omission causing the death of a 20 to 24 week-old foetus in perfect health should be classified as unintentional homicide.\nConsequently, the impugned judgment must be overturned ...\nWhile [the applicant’s] civil action is admissible, if only to corroborate the prosecution case, this Court has no jurisdiction to hear the claim for reparation. This is because despite the serious nature of the negligent act and omission of Dr [G.], a doctor in a public hospital, they do not constitute personal misconduct of such exceptional gravity entailing a total disregard for the most elementary principles and duties inherent in his function as to make them severable from public service.\nNonetheless, it is appropriate to order Dr [G.] to pay to this civil party compensation in the sum of 5,000 francs under Article 475-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on account of costs which she has incurred, but which have not been paid by the State.\n...”", "22. On 30 June 1999, on an appeal on points of law by the doctor, the Court of Cassation reversed the judgment of the Lyons Court of Appeal and ruled that there was no reason to remit the case for retrial:\n“Having regard to Article 111-4 of the Criminal Code:\nCriminal-law provisions must be strictly construed.\n...\nIn convicting [the doctor] of unintentional homicide, the appellate court noted that Article 2 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognise the existence for all persons of a right to life protected by law. The appellate court stated that the Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy Act of 17 January 1975 establishes the rule that the life of every human being must be respected from the beginning of life. That rule is now restated in Article 16 of the Civil Code as worded following the amendment made by the Law of 29 July 1994. The appellate court went on to state that, by operating without performing a prior clinical examination, the doctor was guilty of a negligent act or omission that had a definite causal link with the death of the child the patient was carrying.\nHowever, by so holding, when the matters of which the defendant was accused did not come within the definition of the offences set out in former Article 319 and Article 221-6 of the Criminal Code, the Court of Appeal misinterpreted the aforementioned provisions.\n...”" ]

[]

[ "19. The applicants, who were Moldovan nationals when the application was lodged, were born in 1952, 1955, 1961 and 1963 respectively. At the time when they lodged their application, they were detained in the Transdniestrian part of Moldova.", "20. Although detained, Mr Ilaşcu was twice elected to the Moldovan parliament, from 1994 to 2000. As a member of parliament, he was appointed to form part of the Moldovan delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. On 4 October 2000 Mr Ilaşcu acquired Romanian nationality. In December 2000 he was elected to the Senate of the Romanian parliament and appointed as a member of the Romanian delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.", "21. Mr Leşco and Mr Ivanţoc acquired Romanian nationality in 2001.", "22. Mr Ilaşcu was released on 5 May 2001; since then he has lived in Bucharest (Romania). The second and third applicants' homes are in Chişinău (Moldova), whereas the fourth applicant lives in Tiraspol (Transdniestria, Moldova). At present all three of them are detained in Tiraspol.", "23. In view of the fact that, in the applicants' submission, it was impossible for them to apply to the Court directly, the application was lodged by their wives, Mrs Nina Ilaşcu, Mrs Tatiana Leşco and Mrs Eudochia Ivanţoc, and by the fourth applicant's sister, Mrs Raisa Petrov-Popa.", "24. The second applicant was represented before the Court by Mr A. Tănase, of the Chişinău Bar. The other applicants were represented by Mr C. Dinu, of the Bucharest Bar, until his death in December 2002. Since January 2003 they have been represented by Mr V. Gribincea, of the Chişinău Bar." ]

[ 1, 2 ]

[ "4. The applicant, Leokadia Guzicka, is a Polish national, who was born in 1949 and lives in Kąty Wrocławskie, Poland.", "5. On 19 April 1994 the applicant brought a claim against her former employer, the “Perspektywa” Co-operative, to the Opole District Court (Sąd Rejonowy). She sought the annulment of the Co-operative Board’s resolution depriving her of her membership of the co-operative, and reinstatement.", "6. On 26 February 1997 the District Court found that it was not competent to deal with the claim and referred the case to the Opole Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki).", "7. On 22 June 1998, following the applicant’s complaint, the District Court sent the case-file to the Regional Court.", "8. The first hearing was set down for 18 September 1998.", "9. On 23 October, 23 November and 21 December 1998 the court held hearings.", "10. On 29 January 1999 the court allowed the applicant’s claim." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "7. The applicant was born in 1922 and lives in Frankfurt am Main.", "8. In 1948 the applicant and his family left Poland and settled in Israel. His father appointed a representative to deal with all legal and financial matters in Poland. Despite that representative's opposition, in 1965 the State authorities expropriated a part of the property belonging to the applicant's family. The applicant could not take part in the proceedings concerning the expropriation, because the Polish authorities refused to grant him a visa to enter the territory of Poland.", "9. On 24 March 1998 the applicant filed with the Łódź Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) an action in which he claimed compensation for the allegedly unlawful use of his estate by the State Treasury.", "10. In December 1998 the Łódź District Office (Urząd Rejonowy) filed with the same court an action in which it sought a declaration that the State Treasury had acquired the ownership of that estate on the basis of the 1946 decree on abandoned property (dekret o majątkach opuszczonych i poniemieckich). The District Office submitted that the estate had been abandoned following the Second World War and in 1953 taken over by the State. It pointed out that until 1992 none of the previous owners had raised any claims in respect of that estate.", "11. In the proceedings concerning the applicant's action the court held hearings on 19 February and 1 December 1999, as well as on 5 January 2000. According to the Government, the applicant failed to attend the hearing of 19 February 1999. The applicant submits that he attended it.", "12. On 23 February 2000 the Łódź Town Office (Urząd Miasta) requested that the applicant's proceedings be stayed until the proceedings initiated in March 1998 had been completed, submitting that the outcome of those proceedings depended on the court's findings in the latter. On 6 March 2000 the court stayed these proceedings.", "13. In his pleadings of 1 June 2000 the applicant's lawyer submitted that after the war the applicant's predecessor in title had resumed possession of the estate and in 1948 court proceedings concerning his title had been conducted.", "14. On 7 August 2000 the court stayed also the proceedings instituted by the applicant, relying on the fact that inheritance proceedings concerning one of the heirs to the estate in question were pending. The applicant's lawyer unsuccessfully appealed against that decision, pointing out that the applicant's share in the estate was 127/144 and thus the necessity to conduct those inheritance proceedings could not be reasonably invoked as the reason for staying the main proceedings.", "15. On 31 January 2002 the court gave judgment in the proceedings instituted in December 1998 by the Łódź District Office. It dismissed the claim that the State Treasury had acquired the property of the applicant's late father by prescription.", "16. On 8 April 2002 the Łódź Regional Court resumed the compensation proceedings instituted by the applicant in March 1998. On 17 April 2002 the applicant requested that an expert opinion be ordered concerning the value of the property under dispute.", "17. On 14 May 2002 the court held a hearing.", "18. On 3 July 2002 an expert held a viewing of the property.", "19. The compensation proceedings are pending.", "20. On an unspecified date in 2003 the applicant instituted a new set of proceedings against the Łódź municipality, in which he claimed release of the property concerned. On 19 April 2003 the court allowed the applicant's claim.", "21. On 25 August 1995 the applicant filed with the Katowice District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) a request to reopen the proceedings concerning his estate which had terminated in 1965. In those proceedings the State Treasury had acquired the ownership of the estate through acquisitive prescription. The applicant submitted that the heirs to the estate had been deprived of the right to participate in those proceedings as the Polish authorities had refused to grant them the visa. He submitted that he had found out about that fact only in 1995.", "22. On 12 October 1995 the court stayed the proceedings until the completion of the procedure for reconstruction of the case-file of the proceedings terminated in 1965.", "23. On 30 April 1996 the court resumed the proceedings.", "24. In September 1997 an expert submitted his opinion ordered by the court.", "25. On 20 June 1998 the court fixed a court fee to be paid by the applicant. The applicant's lawyer challenged that decision. On 13 October 1998 the Katowice Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) quashed it.", "26. On 16 March 1999 the District Court refused the applicant's request for an interim measure. His appeal against that decision was dismissed.", "27. On 12 January 2000 the court held a hearing.", "28. On 10 February 2000 the court decided to transfer the case to a different department, considering that it should be dealt with by way of a contentious procedure. On 17 May 2000 the Katowice Regional Court dismissed the applicant's appeal against that decision.", "29. On 23 March 2000 the Katowice Town Office submitted its pleadings, in which it petitioned that the applicant's request be rejected. It noted that the applicant had been aware of the fact that the proceedings concerning the acquisition of the estate had been pending in 1965. The Office further observed that the applicant had corresponded with the representative appointed by his family and thus could not claim that he had found out about the expropriation proceedings only in 1995.", "30. On 27 October 2000 the court stayed the proceedings until inheritance proceedings in respect of one of the parties to the proceedings at issue were completed. On 30 January 2001 the Katowice Regional Court upheld this decision.", "31. On 9 April 2002 the final decision was given in the inheritance proceedings. On 24 June 2002 the District Court resumed the examination of the applicant's case.", "32. On 31 July 2002 the court gave judgment, in which it refused the applicant's request for re-opening. In November 2002 the applicant lodged an appeal against that judgment.", "33. On 8 April 2003 the Katowice Regional Court dismissed his appeal. The applicant subsequently submitted an appeal on points of law. By a decision of 30 July 2003 the Katowice Regional Court exempted the applicant from the obligation to pay a relevant court fee.", "34. On 20 April 2004 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on points of law." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "10. The first applicant, Mr Antoni Pla Puncernau, who was born in 1966, is the adopted son of the second applicant, Mrs Roser Puncernau Pedro. The second applicant was the first applicant’s supervisor, as Mr Pla Puncernau is mentally handicapped. They both lived in Andorra. She died when the proceedings were still pending before the Court.", "11. In 1949 Mrs Carolina Pujol Oller, the widow of Francesc Pla Guash, died leaving three children: Francesc-Xavier, Carolina and Sara. She had made a will before a notary in 1939. Under the seventh clause of her will, she settled her estate on her son, Francesc-Xavier, as tenant for life. Should he be unable to inherit, the estate was to pass to his sister, Carolina, and if she was also unable to inherit, it was to pass to Sara’s son, Josep Antoni Serra Pla.", "12. The testatrix indicated that Francesc-Xavier, the beneficiary and life tenant under her will, was to transfer the estate to a son or grandson of a lawful and canonical marriage. To that effect she had inserted the following clause in her will: “The future heir to the estate must leave it to a son or grandson of a lawful and canonical marriage ...” (“El qui arribi a ésser hereu haurà forçosament de transmetre l’herència a un fill o net de legítim i canònic matrimoni ...)”.\nShould those conditions not be met, the testatrix had stipulated that the children and grandchildren of the remaindermen under the settlement would be entitled to her estate.", "13. The beneficiary under the will, Francesc-Xavier, contracted canonical marriage to the second applicant, Roser Puncernau Pedro. By deed drawn up on 11 November 1969 before a notary in La Coruña (Spain), they adopted a child, Antoni, in accordance with the procedure for full adoption. They subsequently adopted a second child.", "14. In 1995 Francesc-Xavier Pla Pujol made a will in which he left 300,506 euros (EUR) to his son, Antoni (the first applicant), and EUR 180,303 to his daughter. He named his wife, Roser (the second applicant), sole heir to the remainder of his estate. In a codicil of 3 July 1995, Francesc-Xavier Pla Pujol left the assets he had inherited under his mother’s will to his wife for life and to his adopted son, Antoni, as remainderman. The assets in question consisted of real estate. On 12 November 1996 Francesc-Xavier Pla Pujol died. The codicil was opened on 27 November 1996.", "15. Accordingly, the only potential heirs to the estate under the will are the applicants, Antoni Pla Puncernau and his mother, and two sisters, Carolina and Immaculada Serra Areny, who are the great-grandchildren of the testatrix.", "16. On 17 July 1997 Carolina and Immaculada Serra Areny brought proceedings in the Tribunal des Batlles of Andorra to have the codicil of 3 July 1995 declared null and void and seeking an order requiring the applicants, as defendants in the proceedings, to return to the plaintiffs all the assets of the estate of Carolina Pujol Oller, their great-grandmother, and to pay them damages for unlawful possession of the assets.", "17. In a judgment delivered on 14 October 1999, after hearing submissions from both sides, the Civil Division of the Tribunal des Batlles of Andorra dismissed the action for the following reasons:\n“ ...\nIII. Both parties agree that it is the contents of the will that determine the testatrix’s intention at the time of making it, so that the will has to be interpreted in accordance with that intention, which is to be inferred from the words used in the will (Digest 50, 16, 219). Since 1941 it has been apparent from the case-law of the Andorran courts (judgment of the Judge of Appeals dated 3 February 1941) that ‘on both a partially intestate and a testate succession it is principally the testator’s intention that must be taken into account, as can be inferred from many provisions of Roman and canon law ...’\nIV. In her will dated 12 October 1939, the testatrix stipulated that ... ‘The future heir to the estate must leave it to a son or grandson of a lawful and canonical marriage ...’ [‘El qui arribi a ésser hereu haurà forçosament de transmetre l’herència a un fill o net de legítim i canònic matrimoni ...’].\nIn doing so, the will in question set up a family settlement si sine liberis decesserit. An analysis of this type of settlement shows that the purpose is to secure and preserve the estate by keeping it in the settlor’s family.", "18. The Serra Areny sisters appealed to the High Court of Justice of Andorra. In a judgment delivered on 18 May 2000, after hearing submissions from both sides, the High Court set the lower court’s judgment aside. It allowed the appeal, set aside the codicil of 3 July 1995, declared that the appellants were the legitimate heirs to their great-grandmother’s estate and ordered the applicants to return the property in question. The grounds for the court’s judgment were as follows:\n“II. ... Accordingly, the fundamental question to be resolved in the instant case is whether a child who has been adopted in accordance with the procedure for full adoption can be regarded as a child of a lawful and canonical marriage, as required by the testatrix ...\nIII. This question has to be resolved in accordance with the legal rules on the relationship of adopted children to their adoptive parents that were in force in 1939 and 1949, that is, between the time when Mrs Carolina Pujol i Oller made her will and the date of her death. A will becomes a legal deed from the date on which it is made in accordance with the statutory formalities. Accordingly, in interpreting the testamentary dispositions, regard must be had in the instant case to the legal position of adopted children in the social and family conditions existing in 1939 when the will was made and possibly in 1949 when the testatrix died ...\nLegal commentators with first-hand experience of Andorran life stress that adoption is practically unheard of in Andorra (Brutails: ‘Andorran customs’, p. 122). That assertion is borne out by all the Andorran case-law reports, in which there is no reference to adoption. This silence on the subject is perfectly understandable, moreover, given that the provisions of Roman law on adoption could not easily be transposed to Andorran families living in the first half of the twentieth century for the following reasons: since the nineteenth century it could be regarded as an institution that had become obsolete and, to a certain extent, unnecessary given that the main purpose – to appoint a successor or heir – had been achieved in the Principality of Andorra through the institution of heretament (agreement, specific to Catalan law, on the succession of a living person), introduced by customary law. In that social and family context, it is difficult to sustain the proposition that, in setting up a family settlement in case her heir should die without leaving offspring of a lawful and canonical marriage, the testatrix was also referring to adopted children, given that, at the time, adoption was not an established institution in the Principality of Andorra.\nThe fact that in the instant case the adoptive parents were married to each other does not make their adopted child a legitimate child or a child born of the marriage. The distinction according to whether a child was born in or out of wedlock is relevant only to illegitimate children ... with regard to adopted children, the distinction according to whether a child was born in or out of wedlock does not apply. Accordingly, a child adopted by a couple is an adopted child and not a legitimate child or a child of the marriage.\nFurthermore, the notarially recorded deed of adoption was drawn up in Spain in accordance with the Spanish procedure for full adoption ... The Law of 24 April 1958, amending the Civil Code, is applicable to the conditions and general effects of full adoption. Under that Law, the act of adopting a child gave him or her the status of the adoptive father/mother’s child, but did not give the child family status with regard to the adoptive parents’ family. Under Article 174-VII of the Spanish Civil Code, adoption created a filial tie between the adoptive parent, the adopted child and his or her legitimate descendants, but not with the adoptive parent’s family. Moreover, the inheritance rights were also limited in the present case: the deed of adoption referred to the relevant 1960 Catalan legislation, that is, a compilation of 1960 Catalan civil law. Article 248 provided that on an intestate succession adopted children were entitled to inherit only from their adoptive father or mother and not from the rest of their adoptive parents’ family. That rule reflected the idea that adoption created only a filial status and not a family status.\nIV. Accordingly, from a legal standpoint, the adopted children of persons on whom an estate was settled by their father or mother were unconnected with the family circle with regard to the beneficiary’s ascendants. That approach can largely be explained by the minimal impact of adoption on the social and family consciousness in Andorra, both at the time when the will was made and when the testatrix died. The testatrix’s presumed intention has to be established in the light of the circumstances existing at the time of her death. The adopted children of her legitimate son or of the marriage were unconnected with the family circle both from a legal and a sociological point of view.\nThe purpose of a family settlement si sine liberis decesserit under Catalan law is to keep the family estate in the legitimate or married family and Catalan legal tradition has always favoured the exclusion of adopted children from such family settlements ... Thus, in order for adopted children to inherit under this type of settlement, there must be no doubt as to the testatrix’s intention to depart from the usual nature of this institution. In the instant case, the expression ‘offspring of a lawful and canonical marriage’, which appears in the 1939 will, does not suffice to infer that the testatrix intended to depart from the usual meaning given to family settlements si sine liberis decesserit under the Catalan and Andorran law of succession.", "19. The applicants lodged an application with the High Court of Justice to have the proceedings set aside. They submitted that the latter had breached the principle of equality before the law enshrined in Article 6 of the Andorran Constitution and that they had breached Article 10 (right to judicial protection and to a fair trial) of the Andorran Constitution. In a decision of 28 June 2000, the High Court of Justice dismissed their application as ill-founded.", "20. The applicants lodged an empara appeal with the Constitutional Court against the decisions of the High Court of Justice. They alleged a violation of Article 13 § 3 (principle of children’s equality before the law regardless of filiation) and Article 10 (right to judicial protection and a fair trial) of the Andorran Constitution. In a decision of 13 October 2000, the Constitutional Court declared their appeal inadmissible for the following reasons:\n“... It seems clear that the judgment of the High Court of Justice is limited to clarifying and determining, that is, interpreting, a specific point concerning the testatrix’s intention, as expressed in her will in the form of a family settlement in favour of a child or grandson of a lawful and canonical marriage.\nThe High Court of Justice does not at any point suggest that there is general discrimination against, or inequality between, children according to whether they are biological or adopted. Such an assertion would evidently amount to a flagrant breach of Article 13 § 3 of the Constitution and would also be contrary to the prevailing legal opinion according to which legal systems must always be interpreted, which is that all children are equal, irrespective of their origin. However, as submitted in substance by State Counsel, ‘discrimination against adopted children as compared to biological children does not in the instant case derive from an act of the public authorities, that is, from the judgment of the Civil Division of the High Court of Justice, but from the intention of the testatrix or settlor regarding who should inherit under her will’ in accordance with the principle of freedom to make testamentary dispositions, which is a concrete manifestation of the general principle of civil liberty.\nIn its judgment, the High Court of Justice confined itself to interpreting a testamentary disposition. It did so from the legal standpoint it considered adequate and in accordance with its unfettered discretion, seeing that the interpretation of legal instruments is a question of fact which, as such, falls under the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts.\n...”", "21. The applicants lodged an appeal (recurso de súplica) with the Constitutional Court, which dismissed it on 17 November 2000." ]

[ 8, 4 ]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Trebišov.", "5. The applicant was employed at the Mining Faculty of the Technical University in Košice. On 29 March 1993 she was given a notice concerning termination of her employment as, due to restructuring, her position had become redundant.", "6. On 24 April 1993 the applicant challenged the dismissal before the Košice I District Court (Okresný súd).", "7. On 28 July 1993 the District Court sent a copy of the action to the defendant – the applicant’s employer – and requested that it submit its observations in reply within ten days. The defendant did so on 3 August 1993.", "8. On 3 September 1993 the District Court requested that the defendant submit documentary evidence within seven days. The defendant replied on 10 September 1993.", "9. On 20 October 1993 the District Court requested that the defendant submit further documentary evidence within five days.", "10. On 25 October 1993 the defendant informed the District Court that the applicant’s action was identical with another action before the same court and proposed that both actions be joined. On 2 November 1993 it replied to the District Court’s request of 20 October 1993.", "11. On 31 January 1994 the President of the District Court assigned the case to another Chamber of that court.", "12. A hearing listed for 12 January 1995 had to be adjourned as the applicant did not appear. A new hearing was called for 2 February 1995.", "13. On 2 February 1995 the District Court held a hearing at which it heard the parties. It was adjourned until 23 March 1995. The parties were invited to submit documentary evidence and the District Court decided to call witnesses.", "14. On 9 February 1995 the applicant extended the scope of her action in that she also claimed compensation for wages lost as a consequence of her dismissal.", "15. On 22 March 1995 the defendant requested that the hearing listed for the following day be postponed as two of the witnesses who had been called and who were its employees could not attend. The hearing scheduled for 23 March 1995 was consequently adjourned sine die.", "16. On 8 June 1995 the District Court held another hearing at which the parties and one witness were heard. Another witness who had apologised for being unable to attend did not appear. The hearing was adjourned until 28 September 1995 with a view to calling that witness.", "17. On 28 September 1995 another hearing was held at which the District Court heard the above witness. It was adjourned until 23 November 1995 in order that the defendant might submit additional documentary evidence.", "18. On 23 November 1995 the District Court held another hearing which the applicant did not attend. Following this hearing, on the same day, the District Court dismissed the action. It found that the procedural and material legal requirements for a dismissal had been satisfied in the applicant’s case. The judgment was served on the defendant on 12 January and on the applicant on 13 January 1996.", "19. On 19 January 1996 the applicant lodged an appeal. She submitted the reasons for her appeal on 13 February 1996. She contested the District Court’s judgment on the grounds that it was based on findings which, according to her, were not proven by the evidence submitted. In the event that the court of appeal upheld the District Court’s judgment, the applicant requested that it grant her leave to appeal on points of law.", "20. On 26 February 1996 the District Court invited the defendant to file its observations in reply to the appeal. The defendant replied on 11 March 1996.", "21. On 12 March 1996 the applicant submitted further reasons for her appeal. In substance, she contested the District Court’s judgment on the ground that, in her opinion, there was not enough evidence to prove that her dismissal had been in accordance with the relevant law.", "22. On 2 April 1996 the District Court transmitted the case‑file to the Košice Regional Court (Krajský súd) for a decision on the appeal.", "23. In a letter of 23 May 1997 the applicant demanded that the Regional Court deal with her case promptly.", "24. On 30 October 1997 the Regional Court held a hearing on the appeal at which the parties were heard. The hearing was adjourned and the Regional Court invited the defendant to submit further evidence within fifteen days. The defendant replied on 10 November 1997.", "25. A hearing on the appeal scheduled for 17 November 1997 had to be adjourned as the applicant did not appear and it was not clear whether the summons had been duly served on her. The Regional Court however again requested the defendant to submit further evidence. The defendant replied on 28 November 1997.", "26. Further hearings on the appeal which were fixed for 18 December 1997 and 29 January 1998 had to be cancelled as the applicant did not appear and, again, it was not clear whether the summons had been duly served on her.", "27. On 22 April 1998 the Regional Court listed a hearing on the appeal for 28 May 1998. On 4 May 1998 the Regional Court requested that the summons for that hearing be served on the applicant by the Police. On 17 May 1998 the Košice – Staré mesto County Police Department informed the Regional Court that, despite several attempts, they had been unable to reach the applicant at her permanent residence.", "28. On 28 May 1998 the Regional Court held further hearing on the appeal. The applicant did not attend. The Regional Court was however satisfied that the summons had been duly served on her by alternative means, i.e. that it had been deposited with the competent post office and the applicant had duly been given a written notice to that effect at the address of her permanent residence. Following this hearing, on the same day, the Regional Court upheld the judgment of the District Court. It found the latter’s judgment factually and legally correct and considered the appeal unfounded. The Regional Court did not address the applicant’s request for leave to appeal on points of law. The judgment of the Regional Court was served on the defendant on 23 July 1998 and on the applicant on 5 August 1998. No appeal lay against it and, upon its service on the parties, it became final and binding.", "29. On 24 August 1998 the applicant filed an appeal on points of law (dovolanie) arguing that the District Court and the Regional Court had assessed the evidence incorrectly and had drawn wrongful legal conclusions.", "30. On 14 September 1998 the District Court instructed the applicant to appoint a lawyer within ten days as legal representation was mandatory in proceedings on appeals on points of law. On the same day, it sent a copy of this appeal to the defendant and invited the latter to present observations in reply within ten days. The defendant replied on 28 September 1998.", "31. As it was not possible to serve the request of 14 September 1998 on the applicant by regular means, on 28 October 1998 the District Court requested that it be served by the Police. The County Police Department informed the District Court on 9 November 1998 that the request had not been served as the applicant was not staying at her permanent residence.", "32. In the meantime, on 19 October 1998, the applicant’s lawyer submitted further reasons for the appeal on points of law.", "33. On 1 December 1998 the applicant’s lawyer appeared before the District Court and confirmed that she was representing the applicant in the proceedings on her appeal on points of law. On 10 December 1998 the District Court submitted the case‑file to the Supreme Court for a decision on that appeal.", "34. On 17 December 1998 the Supreme Court declared the applicant’s appeal on points of law inadmissible. By virtue of Article 242 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure it examined ex officio whether the proceedings were not vitiated by the procedural flaws set out in Article 237 of that Code. It found no such flaws and observed that the appeal was neither admissible on any of the admissibility grounds pursuant to Article 238 of the Code. The Supreme Court thus did not examine the merits of the case. The decision was served on the defendant on 9 February and on the applicant’s lawyer on 10 February 1999." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "4. The first applicant was born in 1932, lives in Bratislava and is of fragile health. The second applicant was born in 1941 and also lived in Bratislava. She died on 28 October 2001 during the proceedings before the Court. In a letter of 2 April 2004 the first applicant informed the Court that he wished to pursue the application also in the name of the late second applicant.", "5. In 1989 the applicants concluded a contract with the State represented by the Bratislava II Housing Administration (bytový podnik) under which they purchased a family house located in Bratislava. The house had originally belonged to spouses S. Mrs S was a foreign national. The spouses S. had left the former Czechoslovakia in 1982. Mr S. was subsequently convicted of having stayed abroad illegally and sentenced to forfeiture of all his property. The house thus passed to the State.", "6. In 1990 the Bratislava II District Court (okresný súd) rehabilitated Mr S. by cancelling his criminal conviction.", "7. On 24 April 1991 the spouses S. lodged a civil action against the applicants and the State in the person of the Housing Administration with the Bratislava II District Court seeking a judicial ruling declaring the purchase contract of 1989 void.", "8. On 18 March 1992 the Convention entered into force in respect of the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, to which Slovakia is one of the successor states. Prior to this date, the parties appointed lawyers to represent them in the proceedings, the Housing Administration submitted written observations in reply, the District Court held three hearings and sought information from the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Finance as to what legal status had Mrs S. had as a foreigner in the former Czechoslovakia and whether this legal status had qualified her under the applicable foreign exchange rules to acquire immovable property.", "9. On 15 July 1992 the District Court requested information about the legal status of Mrs S. from the Police.", "10. On 23 September 1992 the District Court held a hearing at which the plaintiffs were not present in person. They were however represented by their lawyer. The Housing Administration was not present. The hearing was adjourned with a view to summoning the legal representative of the applicants.", "11. On 14 December 1992, following a hearing, the District Court declared the purchase contract of 1989 void. It found that Mrs S. had not been entitled to acquire the ownership of the house. Spouses S. thus had not become its legal owners. All later dispositions concerning the house had consequently been void. On 12 March 1993 the applicants appealed. On 4 June 1993 the Housing Administration also appealed.", "12. On 30 September 1993 the Bratislava Regional Court (then mestský súd, at present krajský súd) quashed the District Court’s judgment. It held that the first instance court had failed to establish the facts of the case sufficiently and to give adequate reasons for its decision which thus could not be reviewed. The case‑file was returned to the District Court on 9 December 1993.", "13. On 10 November 1994 the District Court listed a hearing for 18 January 1995. The plaintiffs were represented at this hearing by their lawyer. The case was adjourned and the District Court ordered the plaintiffs to submit further documentary evidence.", "14. On 18 October 1995 the District Court judge dealing with the case was replaced by another judge as the former had left for legal training at the Ministry of Justice. The new judge made requests for further information to the plaintiffs and the Police.", "15. On 28 November 1995 and 5 May 1996 the District Court repeatedly requested information from the Police concerning the legal status of Mrs S. as a foreigner at the relevant time. The Police replied on 31 May 1996.", "16. On 9 October 1996 the District Court held another hearing. One of the plaintiffs attended accompanied by their lawyer. The representative of the Housing Administration was not present. The hearing was adjourned with a view to obtaining further information concerning Mrs S.", "17. In a letter of 12 November 1996 the Police informed the District Court that, between 1974 and 1982, Mrs S. had been a lawful permanent resident in Czechoslovakia.", "18. In a letter of 24 July 1996 the President of the District Court informed the applicants that she had found no unjustified delays in the proceedings. The letter stated that the judge dealing with the case had a heavy workload and that a hearing was scheduled for 9 October 1996.", "19. In a letter of 2 August 1996 the applicants disagreed with the President’s reply and argued that the last hearing in the case had been held more than three and a half years ago. In a letter of 6 August 1996 the Vice‑President of the District Court informed the applicants that she had found no reasons for changing the position taken by the President of the District Court on 24 July 1996.", "20. On 22 January 1997, following another hearing, the District Court delivered a new judgment by which it dismissed the action. It found that Mr S. had lost his share of the ownership of the house by the forfeiture imposed on him in his criminal proceedings. It further found that Mrs S. had lost her share in the house by abandoning it (derelictio) and by taking up residence abroad. The District Court concluded that the title to the house had lawfully passed to the State and that it was later properly conveyed to the applicants by means of sale.", "21. On 13 March 1997 the plaintiffs appealed. On 6 May 1997 the Housing Authority filed its observations in reply.", "22. On 18 June 1997 the Bratislava Regional Court (krajský súd) held a hearing on the appeal. One of the plaintiffs attended accompanied by their lawyer. The applicants were represented by their lawyer. The hearing was adjourned and the plaintiffs were ordered to submit further documentary evidence. They did so on 24 June 1997.", "23. On 24 September 1997, following a hearing, the Bratislava Regional Court overturned the District Court’s judgment of 22 January 1997. It found that the house had originally belonged to spouses S. as their undivided matrimonial co‑ownership. The conviction of Mr S. entailed the dissolution of this co‑ownership and the passing of his share in the house to the State. However, the share of Mrs S. remained unaffected. Any dispositions concerning the house therefore necessitated her consent. As the contract of 1989 was concluded without her consent, it was void.", "24. On 3 December 1997 the applicants filed an appeal on points of law. On 22 December 1997 and on 17 February 1998 they were requested to pay the court fees which they did on 24 February 1998. In the meantime, on 23 February 1998, the plaintiffs filed their observations in reply.", "25. On 23 April 1998, in reply to their complaint, the President of the District Court dismissed the applicants’ complaint about the length of the proceedings as being unsubstantiated. The letter stated that the case‑file had been submitted to the Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd) for a decision on the appeal on points of law on 14 April 1998.", "26. On 16 December 1998 the Supreme Court quashed the Regional Court’s judgment of 24 September 1997 as well as the District Court’s judgment of 22 January 1997. It remitted the case to the District Court for a new adjudication. It expressed the view that the contract in question was unlawful only to the extent that it concerned the share of Mrs S. However, it was lawful in so far it concerned the share of Mr S. This share had lawfully passed from him to the State by means of forfeiture and from the State to the applicants by means of sale. In the given circumstances, the latter transfer did not necessitate the consent of Mrs S. The judgment and the case‑file were transmitted to the District Court on 8 February 1999.", "27. The hearing listed by the District Court for 13 September 1999 was adjourned at the applicants’ request, as, due to his health problems, the first applicant could not appear.", "28. On 22 November 1999 the District Court held a hearing at which the plaintiffs were represented by their lawyer. The representative of the Housing Authority was not present. At the hearing the applicants withdrew the power of attorney from their lawyer and objected that they had not been served a copy of the Supreme Court’s judgment. The hearing was adjourned until 10 February 2000.", "29. On 21 December 1999 the applicants filed a counter‑claim seeking compensation for the house in question and for pecuniary and non‑pecuniary damage they alleged that they had suffered.", "30. On 10 February 2000 the District Court held a hearing at which the applicants withdrew their counter‑claim. The proceedings on it were consequently discontinued.", "31. On 6 April 2000, following a hearing, the District Court gave a new judgment. It found that the contract of 1989 was void to the extent that it concerned the half of the property which belonged to Mrs S as that part of the property had not been transferred to State ownership prior to the sale to the applicant. After the judgment had been served on the parties and the period for filing an appeal had expired, the judgment became final and binding on 6 June 2000.", "32. On 13 March 2000 the applicants filed a submission with the Bratislava II District Court in which they maintained that the State was responsible for the extensive length of the proceedings concerning the validity of the purchase contract of 1989. They also maintained that the State was responsible for the fact that the contract was void. They sought to be provided with appropriate accommodation and compensated for both material and moral damage. On 10 August 2000 the District Court informed the applicants that the submission was unclear and that it did not meet the formal requirements for commencing proceedings. The District Court invited the applicants to remedy the shortcomings within 10 days. On 16 October 2000 the applicants filed further submissions and, on 18 November 2000, they demanded that the District Court deal with the case speedily.", "33. In a letter of 8 March 2001, in reply to the applicants’ complaint, the President of the District Court acknowledged that there had been undue delays in the proceedings in that the judge responsible for the case had taken no procedural steps and, since December 2000, she had been on maternity leave. On 23 March 2001 the President of the Regional Court sent a letter to the President of the District Court in which she referred to the latter’s response to the applicants’ complaint. She found that, despite her previous notice, the applicants’ case was still not being dealt with. She requested that the President of the District Court take effective measures in the matter and advised him that a failure to do so would entail consequences.", "34. On 7 September 2001 the District Court discontinued the proceedings on the ground that the applicants’ submissions were confused and did not meet the statutory requirements. The decision became formally final and binding on 17 October 2001 (see below).", "35. In a letter dated 15 October 2001 the applicants requested the District Court that the time‑limit for eliminating shortcomings in their submissions be extended to 30 October 2001. On the same day, they requested the Slovak Bar Association that a lawyer be appointed to represent them ex officio and free of charge. On 5 November 2001 the first applicant again requested an extension of the above time‑limit until 1 December 2001.", "36. On the advice of the Bar Association, the first applicant asked the District Court to grant him free legal assistance and to assign a lawyer to him on 15 November 2001 and on 8 January 2002.", "37. On 12 February 2002 the first applicant requested that the District Court re‑open the proceedings on his claim against the State and that it grant him free legal assistance. On 12 April 2002 the District Court invited the first applicant to pay the court fee.", "38. On 6 August 2002 the District Court dismissed the first applicant’s request for free legal assistance. It observed that the re‑opening of proceedings which had been discontinued on the grounds of formal defects in the action was inadmissible under the applicable procedural rules. The District Court therefore considered the first applicant’s request for re‑opening devoid of any prospect of success, in which case no free legal aid could be granted.", "39. On 29 October 2002, on the first applicant’s appeal, the Regional Court quashed the District Court’s decision of 6 August 2002. It considered that the first applicant’s submissions were incomprehensible. They could only be decided upon once the District Court further explored and safely established their legal nature which the Regional Court instructed it to do.", "40. The District Court summoned the first applicant for 17 March and for 5 May 2003 for an informative hearing in order to determine the legal nature of his submissions. The first applicant apologised for not being able to take part in the hearing of 17 March due to his health problems. In a letter of 9 April 2003 he again requested that the District Court grant him free legal aid and appoint a legal representative to him.", "41. On 26 August 2003 the District Court acceded to the first applicant’s request and assigned an advocate to assist him in formulating his claim. The case‑file contains no further information concerning the development, current state and possible outcome of the proceedings on the first applicant’s claim.", "42. In a letter of 23 November 2000 the applicants demanded that the Constitutional Court “assist them in expediting the proceedings concerning the validity of the purchase contract of 1989”. In a letter of 27 December 2000 a single Constitutional Court judge informed the applicants that the expediting of court proceedings fell outside the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction. In a letter of 15 January 2001 the applicants reiterated their request. On 6 February 2001 the Constitutional Court judge informed them that he had found no reasons to change his previous position.", "43. On 6 September 2001 the applicants again requested that the Constitutional Court expedite the proceedings concerning the validity of the purchase contract of 1989. In a letter of 20 September 2001 the constitutional judge informed the applicants that their submission did not meet the requirements for a formal constitutional complaint. At the same time the judge advised the applicants of the requirements in question and requested that he remedy his submission accordingly within 15 days. On 15 October 2001 the Constitutional Court judge granted the applicants’ request to extend the time‑limit for remedying his submission until 26 October 2001.", "44. On 13 November 2001 the first applicant asked the Constitutional Court to assign a lawyer ex officio and free of charge to him. By a decision of 4 December 2001 the Constitutional Court granted the request. On 8 January 2002 the first applicant again requested that the Constitutional Court assign a lawyer ex officio and free of charge to him. The case‑file contains no further information concerning the development, current state and possible outcome of the proceedings before the Constitutional Court." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "10. The applicant was born in 1926 and lives in Gliwice, Poland.", "11. On 18 September 1985 the applicant sued the “Domek” building co‑operative (Spółdzielcze Zrzeszenie Budowy Domków Jednorodzinnych “Domek”) in the Kraków Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki), seeking damages for the incomplete and defective construction of her house.", "12. Before 1 May 1993 the Court held eight hearings and obtained several expert opinions.", "13. On 3 June, 27 September and 25 November 1993 the Regional Court held hearings.", "14. On 25 January 1994 the trial court stayed the proceedings, finding that the applicant had not specified her claim. On 17 February 1995 the court resumed the proceedings. The court held further hearings on 10 April and 30 October 1995.", "15. On 10 October 1996 the applicant challenged the impartiality of the presiding judge. On 7 November 1996 the Kraków Regional Court dismissed her challenge. On 9 May 1997 the Kraków Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) dismissed the applicant’s further appeal.", "16. At the hearing held on 18 September 1997 the court heard evidence from an expert. Further hearings were held on 2 October and 24 November 1997.", "17. On 8 December 1997 the Kraków Regional Court gave judgment and dismissed the applicant’s claim. On 9 February 1998 the applicant lodged an appeal against this decision.", "18. On 9 October and 8 December 1998 the Kraków Court of Appeal held hearings. On 18 December 1998 the Kraków Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance judgment.", "19. On 12 March 1999 the applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court. The proceedings were terminated by a decision of the Supreme Court of 26 October 2001.", "20. On 9 May 1990 the applicant sued the “Domek” building co‑operative in the Kraków District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) seeking annulment of a resolution divesting her of membership in the co-operative.", "21. The court held hearings on 19 June and 18 September 1990. On 26 November 1990 the trial court stayed the proceedings as it considered that their determination depended on the outcome of the proceedings concerning the action for damages (described above). On 20 March 1991 the Kraków Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against this decision.", "22. On 27 June 1993 the applicant asked the President of the Kraków Regional Court to resume the proceedings. On 6 July 1993 the President replied that he was not competent to make procedural decisions in the proceedings.", "23. On 28 December 1993 the applicant asked the Kraków District Court to resume the proceedings. On 30 December 1993 the court refused her request, referring to the reasons given in the decision of 26 November 1990. On 31 May 1994 the Kraków Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s further appeal.", "24. On 18 June 1997 the District Court discontinued the proceedings finding that they had been stayed for over three years and that the parties had not requested that they be resumed. On 1 July 1997 the applicant appealed against this decision. On 8 October 1997 the Regional Court quashed it.", "25. On 5 June 1998 the applicant again asked the trial court to resume the proceedings. On 16 June 1998 the Kraków District Court refused her request.", "26. On 15 October 2002 the District Court resumed the proceedings. On 30 January 2003 the court gave judgment and dismissed the applicant’s claim. On 12 March 2003 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Regional Court.", "27. It appears that they are still pending." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "10. The applicants, who were born in 1962 and 1966 respectively, live in Mardin.", "11. On 4 January 1998 police officers from the Mardin Security Directorate, together with soldiers from the gendarmerie station, arrived in Yüceli village and gathered the villagers in the village square. 20 villagers, including the applicants, were asked to indicate the places where PKK members were hiding. Subsequently the applicants were taken to the Mardin Security Directorate.", "12. On 5 January 1998 the applicants were examined by a forensic doctor. According to the medical report, the first applicant bore a swelling measuring 8 by 3 cm on the right side of his chin, a laceration and bruising measuring 4 by 3 cm on the back of his right shoulder, a laceration measuring 6 by 2 cm on the left tibia, widespread old scars measuring 8 and 3 cm on the right knee, a laceration measuring 4 by 3 cm on the left calf and widespread lacerations around the lips. Another report was prepared for the second applicant, which noted the presence of old abrasions measuring 4 by 3 cm on his left tibia and 2 by 2 cm on his right tibia and 13 or 14 old scars on his right arm.", "13. Following the medical examinations, the applicants were brought back to the Mardin Security Directorate and placed in custody. During their custody period, the applicants were blindfolded, stripped naked, subjected to verbal abuse, hosed with cold water, beaten with a truncheon, strung up by their arms and electric shocks were administered on their bodies. They were also threatened with death and forced to sign statements.", "14. On 8 January 1998 the applicants were medically examined by a doctor once again. The doctor drew up reports and noted the presence of various injuries similar to those recorded in the medical reports of 5 January 1998.", "15. On 8 January 1998 the applicants were brought before the Mardin Magistrate Court in Criminal Matters. The first applicant admitted before the judge that he had helped the PKK in the past by buying and transferring food for its members. The second applicant denied the charges against him however accepted that he had bought food for PKK members on one occasion. The court ordered their detention on remand.", "16. On 21 January 1998 the chief public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court filed an indictment with the court and charged the applicants with membership of the PKK. The charges were brought under Article 168 § 2 of the Criminal Code and Article 5 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713).", "17. On 23 January 1998 the applicants were brought before the Diyarbakır State Security Court for a preliminary hearing. In view of the nature of the offence and the evidence contained in the file, the court ordered the applicants to remain in detention on remand.", "18. On 19 March 1998, the applicants’ lawyer asserted before the court that the applicants had been tortured by police officers from the Mardin Security Directorate. He accordingly requested that criminal proceedings be instigated against the police officers. The court decided to consider this request at a later stage.", "19. On 28 May 1998 the applicants argued before the court that their police statements had been extracted under torture. As the second applicant was suffering from tuberculosis, they asked the court to release the second applicant on bail. This request was rejected.", "20. On 26 November 1998 the Diyarbakır State Security Court found the first applicant guilty of aiding and abetting a terrorist organisation under Article 169 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to three years and nine months’ imprisonment. The court further acquitted the second applicant of the charges against him.", "21. The first applicant appealed against the judgment. He submitted to the Court of Cassation that he had been subjected to torture under custody and that the ill-treatment was proved by two medical reports.", "22. On 6 July 1999 the Court of Cassation rejected the appeal.", "23. No criminal proceedings have been brought against the police officers who had allegedly tortured the applicants." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "10. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Ankara.", "11. On 23 March 1995 the applicant was arrested and placed in police custody by police officers from the Ankara Security Directorate. He was accused of aiding and abetting an illegal organisation, the DHKP-C (Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front).", "12. On 6 April 1995 the public prosecutor attached to the Ankara State Security Court filed an indictment with the latter charging the applicant, under Articles 168 § 2 and 169 of the Criminal Code and Article 5 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, with membership of an illegal organisation.", "13. On 10 April 1996 the Ankara State Security Court found the applicant guilty of aiding and abetting an illegal organisation, the DHKP-C, and sentenced him to three years and nine months’ imprisonment and debarred him from public service for three years.", "14. The applicant appealed. On 11 June 1997 the chief public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation submitted his written opinion (tebliğname) on the merits of the appeal to the Court of Cassation. The chief public prosecutor proposed that the first instance court’s judgment be upheld. The written opinion of the chief public prosecutor was read out during the hearing before the Court of Cassation.", "15. On 10 July 1997 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s appeal upholding the Ankara State Security Court’s judgment." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "6. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Zadar, Croatia.", "7. On 1 November 1991 the applicant’s house in Starigrad was set on fire by unknown members of the local police.", "8. On 12 April 1994 the applicant instituted civil proceedings before the Zadar Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zadru) seeking damages from the Republic of Croatia for her damaged property.", "9. Pursuant to the Civil Obligations (Amendments) Act 1999 (Zakon o dopunama Zakona o obveznim odnosima, Official Gazette no. 112/1999), the Zadar Municipal Court stayed the proceedings on 10 March 2000. The applicant appealed against that decision. On 17 May 2001 the Zadar County Court (Županijski sud u Zadru) rejected her appeal. On 30 January 2002 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) dismissed her appeal on the points of law as inadmissible.", "10. Pursuant to the Damage Caused by Members of the Croatian Army and Police during the Homeland War Act 2003 (Zakon o odgovornosti Republike Hrvatske za štetu uzrokovanu od pripadnika Hrvatskih oružanih i redarstvenih snaga tijekom Domovinskog rata, Official Gazette no. 117/2003), the proceedings resumed on 3 December 2003." ]

[ 3, 9 ]

[ "6. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Sesvete, Croatia.", "7. On 7 April 1994 the applicant’s house in Sesvete was destroyed by fire as a result of an explosion in a military depot.", "8. On 20 September 1994 the applicant instituted civil proceedings before the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu) seeking damages from the Republic of Croatia for his damaged property.", "9. Pursuant to the Civil Obligations (Amendments) Act 1999 (Zakon o dopunama Zakona o obveznim odnosima, Official Gazette no. 112/1999), the Zagreb Municipal Court stayed the proceedings on 2 March 2000.", "10. The proceedings resumed on 20 November 2003 pursuant to the “Damage Caused by Members of the Croatian Army and Police during the Homeland War Act 2003” (Zakon o odgovornosti Republike Hrvatske za štetu uzrokovanu od pripadnika Hrvatskih oružanih i redarstvenih snaga tijekom Domovinskog rata, Official Gazette no. 117/2003)." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "8. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Košice.", "9. At the relevant time the applicant was the publisher and editor in chief of the weekly Domino efekt. In 1994 and 1995 the weekly published three articles which concerned civil proceedings for defamation pending before the Slovakian courts. The proceedings were between Mr Slobodník, a Minister who became later a Member of Parliament, and Mr Feldek, a poet and publicist who had published a statement alleging, inter alia, that Mr Slobodník had a fascist past. The relevant parts of the articles, which were not written by the applicant, read as follows. 1. Article published on 1 April 1994\n“Quo vadis, Slovakian justice? (A shameful judgment delivered by the Supreme Court)\nWhen the Bratislava City Court put an end to the first round of the judicial dispute between Mr Slobodník and Mr Feldek dismissing the former minister’s action for protection of his personality rights, voices could be heard alleging that the outcome of the appellate proceedings before the Supreme Court would be different. They argued that [the Supreme Court] judges were ‘different’. Those views came true and Slovakia faces further ridicule at the international level. The Supreme Court chamber presided over by [judge Š. - the article mentioned the full name of the judge] did not disappoint.\nA tragicomic farce\nThe Slovakian poet and writer Ľubomír Feldek (who opted for Czech nationality in the meantime) stated in 1992 that Mr Dušan Slobodník, who had just become the Minister of Culture of the Slovak Republic, should not exercise the post of a minister in a democratic state as he had a fascist past... The statement was based on facts which were generally known: during World War II Slobodník had been a member of the Hlinka Youth and he had participated in a terrorist course in Sekule organised under the auspices of that organisation. Several participants in that course (it should be mentioned that Dušan Slobodník was not among them) had been later involved in the killing of the inhabitants of [a] village...\nFeldek, who never alleged that Slobodník was a murderer or a criminal ... expressed the view of a citizen of a free society who considered that a person who had belonged to the Hlinka Youth and who had been close to people who later killed members of the civilian population, should not be a minister of a democratic state. Nothing more and nothing less...\n[Instead of retiring from the post] Slobodník filed an action for protection of his personality rights and thus gave rise to a case which, in a certain way, is tragicomic... [and in the course of which Mr Slobodník] failed to show that he had not been a member of the Hlinka Youth and that he had not participated in the course in Sekule. [Mr Slobodník] thus failed to disprove the facts on the basis of which Feldek had declared that he had a fascist past. We simply recall that a decree by President Beneš of 1945 provided that the Hlinka Youth was to be considered as a fascist organisation.\nStrange reasoning\nThe Bratislava City Court took all the above facts into account and ... dismissed the action of Slobodník. [The City Court judge] ...thus established the very best case-law for the newly born democracy and warned every politician that his or her past may and even must be the object of an increased interest by the public.\nAt the hearing held on 22 March 1994 [the Supreme Court] judge Š. took the opposite approach in that he ordered Feldek to pay 200,000 Slovakian korunas [SKK] to Slobodník and to apologise to the latter [in the press]... Thus [judge Š.] warned all citizens of the Slovak Republic that, should they come to the conclusion that the moral profile of a politician is incompatible with the exercise of the public function entrusted to him or her, they had better keep quiet.\n[Judge Š.] also showed the strength of his spirit when giving reasons for the judgment. 1. Hlinka Youth ... was, in principle, a very good organisation which had been abused by politicians, 2. Feldek not only caused damage to Slobodník, but also to the whole of Slovakia, the Prime Minister, the Movement for a Democractic Slovakia, the Government and the Parliament, ... 4. the post-war retribution decrees enacted in Czechoslovakia were the result of a conspiracy between President Beneš and the communists.\n[Judge Š.] revises history\n...\n[It should be recalled that] the Czechoslovak legal rules on retribution, of which the decrees by President Beneš form a part, were adopted in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes established in London on 20 October 1943. They were further based on the ... agreement on the establishment of the International Military Tribunal of 8 August 1945 and the Report on the Berlin Conference held in Potsdam... Such retribution rules were adopted by practically all European states which had been occupied by Nazi Germany during the war and which had to take a position with respect to collaborators and traitors.\nThe words which [judge Š.] used in order to justify his judgment directly call in question the attitude which, after World War II, the democratic states in Europe took towards fascism and those who had served it.\nIt should be said, however, that [judge Š.] had no choice. When he wanted to reach the decision which he reached, no other reasoning was available – it simply did not exist... When I wish to say A, that is that the past of a person who was a member of the Hlinka Youth and who took part in the course in Sekule is not a fascist one, I am obliged to say also B, that is that I do not recognise the law which defines the Hlinka Youth as a fascist organisation. As the case may be, I will add that the Hlinka Youth was a good organisation and things are settled.\nThus, quo vadis, Slovakian justice? Slobodník is said to look forward to the international court in Strasbourg. However, a Slovakian citizen, having in mind such ‘objective’ decisions of the ‘independent’ and ‘impartial’ Supreme Court does not have many reasons for being pleased. Even if he or she is successful at first instance, the chances of obtaining justice after a possible appeal to the Supreme Court are slight as has been shown by the case Feldek v. Slobodník.” 2. Interview published on 12 August 1994\nOn 12 August 1994 the weekly Domino efekt published an interview with the former president of the Constitutional Court who was the lawyer of Mr Feldek in the defamation proceedings brought by Mr Slobodník. It was entitled “Slovakia is governed by an absolute legal chaos” and the relevant parts read:\n- “The press stated that [judge Š.], who decided the case of Slobodník against Feldek in the way he did and in which you were the advocate of the poet, is a candidate of the Christian-Social Union in the [parliamentary] election. What do you think about it?\n- ... It is ... unusual that a judge, whose task it is to guarantee the objectiveness and impartiality in a democratic society, manifests his political views in public. Having one’s name included in the list of candidates of a political party undoubtedly represents such a manifestation of political views.\n- Let’s talk about the particular inscription of [judge Š.] on the election list of a particular party, namely the Christian-Social Union...\n- One should see that that party has a clear position as regards the period between 1939 and 1945. To put it mildly - it does not condemn that period. And this is the core of the problem - [judge Š.], who decided the case of Slobodník against Feldek, that is a dispute in which one of the main points at issue had been the behaviour of one of the participants during the period of the Slovakian State, is the candidate of a party which does not condemn the Slovakian State or the regime by which it was governed, on the contrary...\n... Section 54 of the Judiciary and Judges Act clearly provides that one of the principal obligations of judges is that ‘a judge shall abstain from any action which could impair the dignity of the judicial function or jeopardise the trust in independent, impartial and just decision-making of the courts’...\n- Do you think that [judge Š.] had internally decided ‘the case of Feldek’ long before the delivery of the judgment and that all the fuss in the court room served nothing?\n- There is nothing else that I can think. The performance of that judge has no other explanation. In particular, I can say that, after the delivery of the judgment, I learned that the Supreme Court judges had expected such a decision to be taken. The views of [judge Š.] as regards the case or as regards the existence of the Slovakian State during World War II were known... \nThe appeal against the Bratislava City Court judgment, which was in favour of Mr Feldek, was transmitted to the Supreme Court on 22 February 1994... The case was decided upon on 23 March ... that is with the rapidity of a missile, and one can hardly find another case examined by the Supreme Court which was dealt with the same promptness.” 3. Article published on 16 June 1995\n“See you soon in Strasbourg (Not even death will separate the couple Slobodník – Feldek)\nThe judicial proceedings in the case Slobodník v. Feldek which have lasted three years have not been ended by the decision delivered by the cassation chamber of the Supreme Court. Even the latter has not found the courage to quash in full the legal farce (‘paškvil’ [The Short Dictionary of the Slovakian Language (Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava, 1989, p. 282) defines “paškvil” as (i) a satirical and offensive piece of writing or as (ii) an unsuccessful imitation of something.]) produced by [judge Š.] on 23 March 1994. The aforesaid judge quashed the decision delivered by the City Court in Bratislava and granted the whole claim lodged by Slobodník.\nTwo jokes were thus produced out of one... [To the extent that the claim by Mr Slobodník was granted by the cassation chamber of the Supreme Court], Feldek will bring the case ... before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.\nThus Slovakian justice was open to ridicule. To make things clear – the Slovak Republic has no chances of success in Strasbourg. The existing case-law of [the European Court of Human Rights] comprises a sufficient number of examples where that court used a phrase protecting freedom of expression as such, which every politician in a democratic state should be acquainted with: ‘The limits of admissible criticism are wider as regards a politician and narrower in the case of a private person’. It is easy and clear at the same time and the cassation chamber of the Supreme Court (like [Mr] Slobodník) has not grasped it...\nA different fact is relevant: Feldek has to apologise for a civic ‘value judgment’ whereas this is not acceptable for the free world. ‘Value judgments’ expressed publicly are not, in accordance with the established European practice and also in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights, susceptible of proof...\nShould we admit (as we did in fact) [that a journalist who publishes his or her value judgments in respect of a public figure be obliged to prove the truth of such statements], a situation would arise which has nothing to do with democracy and with the principles of a democratic society. Citizens will simply fear making ‘value judgments’ because they will be under the threat of a sanction. As a result, the vital sap of democracy will dry out – namely an open debate on issues of public interest.\nThe Supreme Court failed to understand these principles which ... are simple and easy to understand and which are respected by the democratic world as something that is ‘given’. Or, as the case might be, it did not want to understand. P.S. I will dare make a ‘value judgment’ despite the position which ‘value judgments’ have in this country thanks to this case law. In my view, the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic did NOT WANT to respect the European principles of the protection of the freedom of expression. It would have sufficed if the judges had read the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. In particular Article 11 where it is written in black and white.”", "10. On 20 September 1995 judge Š. filed an action under Article 11 et seq. of the Civil Code for protection of his personal rights against the applicant. The plaintiff claimed that the above articles interfered grossly with his civil and professional honour and also with his authority as a Supreme Court judge. The plaintiff further claimed that the applicant be ordered to publish an apology and to pay him SKK 150,000 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage.", "11. In his reply the applicant stated that the author of the above articles had informed the public about the judicial proceedings in a case which attracted public attention. The contested statements were value judgments and the articles contained permissible criticism of a public figure.", "12. On 3 July 1996 the Košice 1 District Court delivered a judgment in which it ordered the applicant to publish, in the weekly Domino efekt, the following statement:\n“a) ... the article ‘A shameful judgment delivered by the Supreme Court; Quo vadis, Slovakian justice’, which presented [judge Š.], the president of a chamber of the Supreme Court in a negative light and which ridiculed the proceedings conducted by him,\nb) ... the interview with the former president of the Constitutional Court published on 12 August 1994 in which it is stated that [judge Š.] made up his mind on the outcome of the proceedings long before the delivery of the judgment,\nc) the phrase ... ‘Even the latter has not found courage to quash in full the legal farce produced by [judge Š.] on 23 March 1994’ which was published in the article ‘Not even death will separate the couple Slobodník – Feldek; See you soon in Strasbourg’ published on 16 June 1995,\ninterfere grossly and without any justification with the civil and professional honour of [judge Š.] for which [the applicant], as the editor of the newspaper Domino efekt makes a public apology to [judge Š.]...”", "13. The applicant was further ordered to pay the plaintiff SKK 50,000 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage and to pay the court fees and the plaintiff’s costs.", "14. The District Court found that the limits of objective and acceptable criticism had been exceeded in that the above articles comprised such expressions as “tragicomic farce”, “shameful judgment”, “strange reasoning” and “legal farce”. The first and the third article were capable of giving the readers the impression that the plaintiff had been biased. The District Court further recalled that the judgment criticised in the articles was delivered by an appellate chamber of three judges. However, the articles referred to the plaintiff as if he were the only author of the judgment. The District Court recalled that a chamber of the appellate court always decides after deliberations in the presence of a typist. A majority of votes is required and the presiding judge is the last to vote. The District Court also recalled that judges are independent when deciding on matters before them and that the cassation chamber of the Supreme Court had not found any procedural shortcomings in the proceedings leading to the judgment criticised in the above articles.", "15. When deciding to grant non-pecuniary damages to the plaintiff the District Court noted that the above articles criticised, repeatedly and without justification, a judge of the Supreme Court whereby his dignity and position in the society had been considerably affected.", "16. The applicant and the plaintiff appealed. The applicant argued that the District Court had failed to apply the law correctly and that it had decided arbitrarily. The applicant submitted that the statements in question were value judgments which were based on facts explicitly set out in the articles. He therefore requested that the first instance judgment, to the extent that it granted the action, be overturned. The plaintiff failed to submit any reasons and subsequently he maintained that he had not appealed.", "17. On 24 June 1997 the Košice Regional Court overturned the first instance judgment in that it dismissed the action of judge Š. The Regional Court’s judgment stated that the applicant had ceased being the editor of Domino efekt in February 1997. As he was not the author of the articles in question, he no longer had standing to be a defendant in the case. The new editor could not be sued as he was not a general successor to the rights and obligations relating to the weekly. The plaintiff’s claim that an apology be published in the weekly could not, therefore, be granted.", "18. The Regional Court also examined the merits of the case and found that the phrase “Even the latter has not found courage to quash in full the legal farce produced by [judge Š.] on 23 March 1994” published on 16 June 1995 represented an attack against the authority of the courts as such and that it was not proportionate to the aim pursued, namely to criticise the reasons for the Supreme Court judgment presented orally by judge Š. However, no satisfaction could be granted in this respect as the applicant had lost standing in the case.", "19. On 9 September 1997 the plaintiff filed an appeal on points of law in which he challenged the conclusions reached by the Regional Court.", "20. On 29 May 1998 the cassation chamber of the Supreme Court quashed the Regional Court’s judgment of 24 June 1997. The Supreme Court held that the appellate court had decided erroneously and instructed the latter to take further evidence. As regards the merits of the case in particular, the court of cassation held that because of their expressive character the applicant’s statements were disproportionate to the aim pursued, namely to criticise a judicial decision or the public activities of judge Š. In the Supreme Court’s view, those statements clearly indicated that the applicant had intended to offend judge Š., to humiliate and discredit him. Limits of acceptable criticism had been thereby exceeded.", "21. On 11 March 1999 the Košice Regional Court upheld the part of the Košice 1 District Court’s judgment of 3 July 1996 by which the applicant had been ordered to pay SKK 50,000, together with the statutory default interest, to the defendant in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The Regional Court further dismissed the remainder of the plaintiff’s action.", "22. The judgment stated that the plaintiff had failed to submit reasons for his appeal. Accordingly, the Regional Court could review the first instance judgment only to the extent that it had been appealed against by the applicant. The Regional Court dismissed the claim that an apology be published in Domino efekt as (i) the editing rights had been transferred to a different person and the name of the weekly had changed and (ii) the plaintiff had failed to amend his action so that a judgment in this respect could be enforced. The Regional Court noted that the plaintiff had failed to specify which parts of the article published on 1 April 1994 interfered with his personal rights. The relevant part of the action was therefore also dismissed.", "23. As regards the merits of the remaining part of the case, the Regional Court recalled, with reference to Article 10 of the Convention and the relevant provisions of the Constitution, that judges enjoyed special protection as regards the criticism of the way in which they exercised their function. This was dictated by the requirement of impartiality of judges. The latter could be jeopardised if the society tolerated unjustified criticism of a judge for a decision delivered by him or her.", "24. The judgment further stated that the situation is different in cases where a judge makes public his or her intention to become involved in politics, and where the decision on a case to be subsequently taken by such a judge is linked to the political views presented by him or her. By failing to withdraw from a case in such circumstances the judge concerned deliberately exposes himself or herself to the threat of criticism by the public, notwithstanding that the decision in question was lawful. The Regional Court therefore held that, when a judge decided to become involved in politics, he or she became a person of public interest and, as such, he or she no longer enjoyed special protection as regards the limits of acceptable criticism.", "25. The Regional Court recalled that it was bound by the views expressed in the judgment delivered by the cassation chamber of the Supreme Court on 29 May 1998. It therefore concluded that the contested statements in the articles published on 12 August 1994 and on 16 June 1995 interfered with the personal rights of the plaintiff, whereby his dignity and the esteem for his person in society had been considerably diminished. The expressive character of the terms used was disproportionate to the aim pursued, namely the criticism of a judicial decision or the plaintiff’s involvement in public life. Those terms clearly showed that the purpose of the statements was to offend, to humiliate and to discredit the criticised person. Accordingly, the plaintiff was entitled to compensation for non-pecuniary damage which he had thus suffered.", "26. On 19 April 1999 judge Š. filed an appeal on points of law. It was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 28 September 2000." ]

[ 6 ]

[ "9. The applicant, a Polish citizen living in Katowice, Poland, and Mr P., an Italian citizen living in Italy, are the parents of a daughter who was born out of wedlock on 19 November 1988. The latter was registered with the registry of births, deaths and marriages as the child of the applicant and Mr P. Since the child’s birth, Mr P. has not assumed any parental duties.", "10. The applicant instituted proceedings against Mr P. in the Katowice District Court, claiming maintenance for her minor daughter.\nOn 23 June 1993 the Katowice District Court ordered the defendant in absentia to pay maintenance in an amount equivalent to 350 zlotys (PLN) (approximately 73 euros (EUR)) per month from 19 November 1988, plus statutory interest should he default. This decision became final on 15 July 1993.", "11. Having received no payments, on 30 May 1994 the applicant sought to avail herself of the United Nations Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance of 20 June 1956. She applied to the Katowice District Court (acting as the Transmitting Agency) for the recovery of maintenance through the Italian Ministry of the Interior (acting as the Receiving Agency), as provided for by that convention.\nIn her request, the applicant first asked for payment of the sum due of PLN 350 per month plus default interest which, by 1 January 1994, came to a total of PLN 21,350 (approximately EUR 4,495). The applicant also requested an increase in maintenance from PLN 350 per month to PLN 650 (approximately EUR 137) per month, on the grounds that she had learnt that Mr P. was earning 3,000 United States dollars per month and that the costs of bringing up the child were constantly rising. Finally, she asked the Italian authorities to start judicial proceedings against Mr P. to execute the decision of the Katowice District Court, and to recover her court costs if Mr P. refused to comply with the judgment.", "12. On 30 May 1994 the Katowice District Court sent the applicant’s request to the Italian Ministry of the Interior.", "13. In a letter sent to the Katowice District Court on 18 October 1994, the Ministry of the Interior confirmed that it had received the applicant’s request on 7 October 1994 and had referred it to the Prefecture of Terni. It added that, in so far as the existing decision obliged Mr P. to pay PLN 350 per month, a different amount could not be claimed. On 3 May 1996 the Ministry of the Interior sent another letter to the Katowice District Court informing it that Perugia District State Counsel had been appointed to initiate proceedings for the execution of the decision.", "14. On 27 December 1996 Perugia District State Counsel informed the Ministry of the Interior that he had started these proceedings in November 1996.", "15. On 27 February 1997 the Perugia Court of Appeal held a hearing at which it decided that the parties had to make their final submissions on 15 May 1997. On that date the court adjourned the case to 30 October 1997 and reserved judgment, which, by law, could not be delivered before the expiry of a period of eighty days. On 21 January 1998 the Perugia Court of Appeal declared the Katowice District Court decision enforceable in Italy. On 30 March 1999 the Ministry of the Interior invited the debtor to comply with his obligations. On 2 April 1999 the decision of the Perugia Court of Appeal became final.", "16. On 2 May 2000 the Italian Ministry of the Interior asked the Polish authorities for an updated calculation of the debt, which the Polish authorities furnished on 27 September 2000.", "17. On 27 November 2000 the Prefecture of Terni informed the Ministry that on 6 July 1999 and 23 October 2000 it had formally invited the debtor to pay the amounts due. As he did not do so, Perugia District State Counsel was asked on 18 December 2000 to start enforcement proceedings. The first attempt at enforcement was unsuccessful, as Mr P. had no possessions. On 20 December 2002 a new set of enforcement proceedings – started on 10 July 2002 – led to the seizure of property and a priority notice being entered in the land register. According to information submitted by the Government, Mr P.’s lawyer made an informal request to be allowed to pay the arrears in instalments, but did not file a formal request with the courts.", "18. The Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance was adopted and opened for signature on 20 June 1956 by the United Nations Conference on Maintenance Obligations. This conference had been convened by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (see United Nations, Treaty Series, 1957, pp. 4-11 and 32-47). The convention came into force on 25 May 1957. Italy and Poland ratified it on 28 July 1958 and 21 March 1968 respectively. The relevant provisions of the convention read as follows:\nArticle 1\n“1. The purpose of [the] Convention is to facilitate the recovery of maintenance to which a person, hereinafter referred to as claimant, who is in the territory of one of the Contracting Parties, claims to be entitled from another person, hereinafter referred to as the respondent, who is subject to the jurisdiction of another Contracting Party. This purpose shall be effected through the offices of agencies, which will hereinafter be referred to as Transmitting and Receiving Agencies. 2. The remedies provided for in this Convention are in addition to, and not in substitution for, any remedies available under municipal or international law.”\nArticle 2 §§ 1 and 2\n“1. Each Contracting Party shall, at the time when the instrument of ratification or accession is deposited, designate one or more judicial or administrative authorities, which shall act in its territory as Transmitting Agencies. 2. Each Contracting Party shall, at the time when the instrument of ratification or accession is deposited, designate a public or private body, which shall act in its territory as Receiving Agency.”\nArticle 3 § 1\n“Where a claimant is on the territory of one Contracting Party, hereinafter referred to as the State of the claimant, and the respondent is subject to the jurisdiction of another Contracting Party, hereinafter referred to as the State of the respondent, the claimant may make application to a Transmitting Agency in the State of the claimant for the recovery of maintenance from the respondent.”\nArticle 4 § 1\n“The Transmitting Agency shall transmit the documents to the Receiving Agency of the State of the respondent, unless satisfied that the application is not made in good faith.”\nArticle 5 § 1\n“The Transmitting Agency shall, at the request of the claimant, transmit, under the provision of Article 4, any order, final or provisional, and any other judicial act, obtained by the claimant for the payment of maintenance in the competent tribunal of any Contracting Party, and, where necessary and possible, the record of the proceedings in which such order was made.”\nArticle 6\n“1. The Receiving Agency shall, subject always to the authority given by the claimant, take on behalf of the claimant, all appropriate steps for the recovery of maintenance, including the settlement of the claim and, where necessary, the institution and prosecution of an action for maintenance and the execution of any order or other judicial act for the payment of maintenance. 2. The Receiving Agency shall keep the Transmitting Agency currently informed. If it is unable to act, it shall inform the Transmitting Agency of its reason and return the documents. 3. Notwithstanding anything in this Convention, the law applicable in the determination of the questions arising in such action or proceedings shall be the law of the State of the respondent, including its private international law.”", "19. Section 64 of Law no. 218 of 1995 indicates the cases in which a judgment delivered by a foreign court will be recognised in Italy without recourse to a specific procedure. Section 67 contains provisions on the execution of judgments and decisions following the voluntary assumption of jurisdiction and in cases of refusal to comply.", "20. This Act, which came into force on 18 April 2001, completes Article 111 of the Italian Constitution, which provides that the right to have proceedings conducted within a reasonable time shall be guaranteed by legislation. The new Act enables a claim for compensation to be made in the Court of Appeal, which will apply the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, by anyone who has sustained pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage as a result of the inordinate length of proceedings.\nSection 2 (Entitlement to just satisfaction)\n“1. Anyone sustaining pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage as a result of a violation of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ratified by Law no. 848 of 4 August 1955, on account of a failure to comply with the ‘reasonable time’ requirement in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, shall be entitled to just satisfaction. 2. In determining whether there has been a violation, the court shall have regard to the complexity of the case and, in the light thereof, the conduct of the parties and of the judge deciding procedural issues, and also the conduct of any authority required to participate in or contribute to the resolution of the case. 3. The court shall assess the quantum of damage in accordance with Article 2056 of the Civil Code and shall apply the following rules:\n(a) only damage attributable to the period beyond the reasonable time referred to in subsection 1 may be taken into account;\n(b) in addition to the payment of a sum of money, reparation for non-pecuniary damage shall be made by giving suitable publicity to the finding of a violation.”\nSection 3 (Procedure)\n“1. Claims for just satisfaction shall be lodged with the court of appeal in which the judge sits who has jurisdiction under Article 11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to try cases concerning members of the judiciary sitting in the district where the case in which the violation is alleged to have occurred was decided or discontinued at the merits stage or is pending. 2. The claim shall be made on an application lodged with the registry of the court of appeal by a lawyer holding a special authority containing all the information prescribed by Article 125 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 3. The application shall be made against the Minister of Justice where the alleged violation has taken place in proceedings in the ordinary courts, the Minister of Defence where it has taken place in proceedings before the military courts and the Finance Minister where it has taken place in proceedings before the tax commissioners. In all other cases, the application shall be made against the Prime Minister. 4. The court of appeal shall hear the application in accordance with Articles 737 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure. The application and the order setting the case down for hearing before the relevant chamber shall be served by the applicant on the defendant authority at its elected domicile at the offices of State Counsel [Avvocatura dello Stato] at least fifteen days prior to the date of the hearing before the Chamber. 5. The parties may apply to the court for an order for production of all or part of the procedural and other documents from the proceedings in which the violation referred to in section 2 is alleged to have occurred and they and their lawyers shall be entitled to be heard by the court in private if they attend the hearing. The parties may lodge memorials and documents up until five days before the date set for the hearing or until expiry of the time allowed by the court of appeal for that purpose on application by the parties. 6. The court shall deliver a decision within four months after the application is lodged. An appeal shall lie to the Court of Cassation. The decision shall be enforceable immediately. 7. To the extent that resources permit, payment of compensation to those entitled shall commence on 1 January 2002.”\nSection 4 (Time-limits and procedures for lodging applications)\n“A claim for just satisfaction may be lodged while the proceedings in respect of which a violation is alleged to have occurred are pending or within six months from the date when the decision ending the proceedings becomes final. Claims lodged after that date shall be time-barred.”\nSection 5 (Communications)\n“If the court decides to grant an application, its decision shall be communicated by the registry to the parties, to State Counsel at the Audit Court to enable him to start an investigation into liability, and to the authorities responsible for deciding whether to institute disciplinary proceedings against the civil servants concerned by the proceedings.”\nSection 6 (Transitional provisions)\n“1. Within six months [extended to twelve by Law no. 432 of 2001] after the entry into force of this Act, anyone who has lodged an application with the Court of Human Rights in due time complaining of a violation of the ‘reasonable time’ requirement contained in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ratified by Law no. 848 of 4 August 1955, shall be entitled to lodge a claim under section 3 hereof provided that the application has not by then been declared admissible by the European Court. In such cases, the application to the court of appeal must state when the application to the said European Court was made. 2. The registry of the relevant court shall inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs without delay of any claim lodged in accordance with section 3 and within the period laid down in subsection 1 of this section.”" ]

[ 3 ]

[ "7. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in St Petersburg.", "8. In February 1995 the applicant, a former naval officer, joined an environmental project conducted by Bellona, a Norwegian non-governmental organisation, to work on a report entitled “The Russian Northern Fleet – Sources of Radioactive Contamination” (“the report”).", "9. On 5 October 1995 Bellona’s Murmansk office was searched by the Federal Security Service (ФСБ РФ – “the FSB”). The FSB seized the draft report, interrogated the applicant and instituted criminal proceedings on suspicion of treason, since the draft report allegedly contained information, classified as officially secret, concerning accidents on Russian nuclear submarines.", "10. On 20 October 1998 the applicant’s trial on a charge of treason through espionage and a charge of aggravated disclosure of an official secret began before St Petersburg City Court. After four days of hearings, the case was remitted for further investigation on 29 October 1998. The court considered that the indictment was vague, which impaired the applicant’s defence and prevented the court from carrying out an examination on the merits. It also found that the investigation file left open the question whether the report contained any official secrets as such, and that it did not contain a “proper and complete” expert evaluation of possible public sources of the information in question or of the estimated damage. The court ordered the prosecution to conduct an additional expert examination into the possibility that the applicant had obtained the disputed information from public sources and to take other steps to complete the investigation.", "11. On 3 November 1998 the prosecution appealed against this decision, claiming that the case was clear enough for determination by a court and that there was no need for further investigation.", "12. On 4 February 1999 the order for further investigation was upheld by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (“the Supreme Court”).", "13. On 23 November 1999 the St Petersburg City Court resumed the applicant’s trial on the same charges.", "14. On 29 December 1999 the St Petersburg City Court acquitted the applicant on all the charges, having found that the applicant had been prosecuted on the basis of secret and retroactive decrees.", "15. The prosecution appealed.", "16. On 17 April 2000 the Supreme Court upheld the acquittal. The court found that the charges were based on secret and retroactive decrees which were incompatible with the Constitution. The acquittal thus became final.", "17. On 30 May 2000 the Procurator General filed a request with the Presidium of the Supreme Court to review the case in supervisory proceedings (протест на приговор, вступивший в законную силу). He challenged the judgment on the grounds of wrongful application of the law governing official secrets, the vagueness of the indictment – which had led to procedural prejudice against the applicant – and other defects in the criminal investigation, in particular the lack of an expert report as to whether the disputed information had originated from public sources. He called for a reassessment of the applicable law and of the facts and evidence in the case file, and for the case’s remittal for fresh investigation.", "18. On 13 September 2000 the Presidium of the Supreme Court dismissed the Procurator General’s request and upheld the acquittal. While it acknowledged that the investigation had been tainted with flaws and shortcomings, it found that the prosecution could not rely on them in calling for a remittal, as it had been entirely within the prosecution’s control to redress them at an earlier stage in the proceedings. Moreover, the Presidium pointed out that the investigation authority had earlier been required to remedy exactly the same defects as those relied on in the request to quash the acquittal. It observed that on 29 October 1998 the court had expressly instructed the investigating authority, inter alia, to conduct a study of information in the public domain in order to ascertain whether the applicant could have obtained the disputed data from public sources.", "19. On 17 July 2002 the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation examined the applicant’s challenge to the laws which allowed supervisory review of a final acquittal.", "20. In its ruling of the same date, the Constitutional Court declared incompatible with the Constitution the legislative provisions permitting the re-examination and quashing of an acquittal on the grounds of a prejudicial or incomplete investigation or court hearing or on the ground of inaccurate assessment of the facts of the case, save in cases where new evidence had emerged or there had been a fundamental defect in the previous proceedings.", "21. The Constitutional Court’s judgment stated, inter alia:\n“... Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention provides that the right not to be tried or punished twice does not prevent the reopening of the case in accordance with the law and criminal procedure of the State concerned, if there is evidence of new or newly discovered facts, or if there has been a fundamental defect in the previous proceedings, which could affect the outcome of the case.\nIt follows ... that, subject to the above requirements, the national legislation may provide for a system by which a case may be reopened and a final judgment be quashed, and may specify where, depending on the case, a procedure for reopening on the grounds of new or newly discovered evidence or a supervisory review should apply.\nAny exemption from the general prohibition on resuming proceedings to the detriment of the acquitted or convicted person may be justified only in exceptional circumstances, where a failure to rectify a miscarriage of justice would undermine the very essence of justice and the purpose of a verdict as a judicial act and would upset the required balance between the constitutionally protected values involved, including the rights and legitimate interests of convicted persons and those of the victims of crime. In the absence of any possibility of reversing a final judgment resulting from proceedings tainted by a fundamental defect that was crucial for the outcome of the case, an erroneous judgment of this type would continue to have effect notwithstanding the principle of general fairness ... and the principle of judicial protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. 3.2. Under the [Constitution and the Convention] any possibility provided for at national level of quashing a final judgment and reviewing a criminal case must be subject to strict conditions and criteria clearly defining the grounds for such review, given that the judgment concerned is already binding and determinative of the individual’s guilt and sentence.\nHowever, the grounds for review of final judgments provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure [of 1960] go beyond these limits. When establishing a procedure for the review of final convictions and, especially, acquittals ... definite grounds should have been formulated to ensure that such a procedure would be implemented with sufficient distinctness, precision and clarity to exclude its arbitrary application by the courts. In failing to do so, [the legislature] misapplied the criteria which derive from [the Constitution] and Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the quashing of final judgments in criminal cases ...\nFurthermore, [the power] of a supervisory instance to remit a case for fresh investigation where it concludes, through its own assessment of evidence, that the previous investigation has been prejudicial or incomplete, is incompatible with the constitutional principles of criminal procedure and with the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence, in that it gives the prosecution an unfair advantage by providing it with additional opportunities to establish guilt even after the relevant judgment has become operative. It follows that a court of supervisory instance cannot quash a final acquittal only on the ground of its being unfounded ... Accordingly, the prosecutor is not entitled to request the supervisory review of such a judgment on the ground that it is unfounded ...”" ]

[]

[ "8. The applicant has a dual Polish and Austrian citizenship. He was born in 1955 and resides permanently in Austria. At present he is living in Płock, Poland.", "9. In 1989 the applicant entered into a contract with a limited liability company Unirol (hereinafter “Unirol Ltd.”) in Płock. Under the terms of the contract, Unirol Ltd. was to sell in Poland satellite dishes supplied by the applicant from Austria. On 25 March 1994 Unirol Ltd. filed an action with the Płock District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) against the applicant. It sought damages for breach of contract.", "10. On 21 April 1994 the plaintiff modified its claim. On 21 June 1994 the District Court found that, in view of the value of the claim, it was no longer competent to deal with the subject matter and referred the case to the Płock Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki).", "11. On 18 November 1994 the Regional Court exempted Unirol Ltd. from court fees.", "12. On 16 December 1994 the court held the first hearing. At that hearing the applicant submitted a counterclaim, seeking payment of profits to which he was entitled under the terms of the contract. He also applied for an exemption from court fees but to no avail. The hearing was adjourned at the request of Unirol Ltd.", "13. On 17 March 1995 the trial court held a hearing. The plaintiff was absent at that hearing. On 24 March 1995 the plaintiff’s representative informed the court that, due to his illness, he would not be able to appear before it until the end of June. On 14 July 1995 the court adjourned the hearing, as it appeared that Unirol Ltd. had not received the summons. The hearing listed for 4 September 1995 was adjourned due to the illness of Unirol Ltd.’s representative.", "14. The court adjourned three further hearings listed for 12 January, 16 February and 10 May 1996 due to the absence of the plaintiff’s representative. On 2 August 1996 the court held a hearing but the plaintiff’s representative again failed to attend it. The court ordered him to appear at the next hearing on pain of staying the proceedings. The hearings listed for 18 October and 8 November 1996 were adjourned at the request of Unirol Ltd.", "15. On 4 November 1996 the trial court dismissed the applicant’s challenge of the presiding judge. On 20 December 1996 the court held a hearing.", "16. At the hearing held on 28 February 1997 the court closed the examination of the case and informed the parties that the judgment would be delivered on 5 March 1997. On 5 March 1997 the court decided that it would not deliver the final decision and resumed the proceedings.", "17. The hearing listed for 23 May 1997 was cancelled because the judges dealing with the case had withdrawn.", "18. At the hearing held on 14 November 1997 the court heard a witness. Further hearings were held on 8 May and 5 June 1998.", "19. In the meantime, the court had lost part of the case-file. For that reason, the hearing listed for 10 July 1998 was cancelled. On 27 August 1998 the Regional Court ordered that the lost case-file be reconstituted.", "20. On 9 June 1999 the court held a hearing and ordered the parties to specify their claims.", "21. On 15 October 1999 the court held the next hearing and ordered that an expert opinion be obtained. On 12 April 2000 the expert submitted the relevant opinion to the court.", "22. On 20 September 2000 Unirol Ltd. asked the court to appoint another expert. On 8 November 2000 the court held a hearing and heard evidence from the expert.", "23. On 22 November 2000 the Płock Regional Court delivered a judgment. Both parties appealed. On 6 May 2002 Unirol Ltd. asked the Court of Appeal to secure the claim. On 17 May 2002 the Court of Appeal held a hearing.", "24. On 12 June 2002 the Warsaw Court of Appeal gave judgment. On 13 December 2002 copies of the judgment were served on the parties. On 20 and 29 January 2003 respectively, the plaintiff and the applicant lodged their cassation appeals with the Supreme Court. On 27 June 2003 the Supreme Court dismissed both cassation appeals." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "9. The applicant was born in 1929 and lives in Konin.", "10. He was not legally represented before the Court. The respondent Government were represented by Mr Krzysztof Drzewicki, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.", "11. In 1992 the applicant was the manager of a state-owned bank, located in Kramsk. On 18 March 1992 the Konin Regional Prosecutor (Prokurator Wojewódzki) instituted an investigation concerning the applicant. Between 18 March 1992 and 2 June 1992 the prosecutor heard twenty-six witnesses in the case.", "12. On 2 June 1992 the investigation was stayed until the completion of a control of the bank in Kramsk by experts of the National Bank of Poland. The investigation was resumed on 7 October 1992.", "13. Between 15 October and 18 December 1992 the prosecutor heard a further eight witnesses.", "14. On the latter date the prosecutor charged the applicant with accepting bribes and mismanagement of the bank.", "15. On the same day he placed the applicant under police supervision and imposed bail in the amount of 100,000,000 old Polish zlotys. Subsequently, the applicant’s car was impounded.", "16. On 28 December 1992 the prosecutor stayed the investigation because of the applicant’s state of health.", "17. On 29 January 1993 the applicant added to the case-file a medical certificate stating that he was unable to take part in the proceedings for an indefinite period of time.", "18. On 11 February 1993 the prosecutor, at the request of the applicant’s counsel, released the applicant from police supervision.", "19. On 15 May 1993 the expert appointed by the prosecutor submitted his opinion to the effect that the applicant was able to participate in the proceedings.", "20. On 28 May 1993 the prosecutor heard a witness. In November 1993 he heard four further witnesses and requested the receiver in bankruptcy of the bank in Kramsk to submit certain documents concerning the bank.", "21. On 18 October and 27 December 1993 the applicant was questioned by the prosecutor. On the latter date the prosecutor laid additional charges against the applicant. On 29 December 1993 he decided to submit to the court a separate bill of indictment against the other suspects in the applicant’s case.", "22. On 30 December 1993 the prosecutor discontinued the part of the investigation concerning the alleged accepting of bribes.", "23. On 31 December 1993 he submitted to the Konin Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) the bill of indictment.", "24. On 8 March 1994 the court transferred the case to the Konin District Court (Sąd Rejonowy), considering that it had no jurisdiction over that type of offences.", "25. On 22 June 1994 the District Court ordered a psychiatric examination of the applicant.", "26. On 15 July 1994 it appointed a legal-aid counsel for the applicant. Subsequently, the counsel informed the court that due to a conflict of interests he could not defend the applicant. On 20 October 1994 it appointed another defence counsel for the applicant. Subsequently, after that counsel’s refusal to defend the applicant, the court appointed another one.", "27. In August 1994 the court mistakenly scheduled a hearing for 31 October 1994, which was a public holiday. In reply to the applicant’s complaint, on 2 December 1994 the President of the Konin District Court apologised to him for that mistake.", "28. The hearing scheduled for 22 December 1994 was adjourned at the request of the applicant’s counsel.", "29. On 13 February 1995 the court refused the applicant’s request for release from the preventive measures. On 9 March 1995 the Konin Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against that decision.", "30. On 27 February and 6 March 1995 the District Court held hearings.", "31. On 29 March 1995 the applicant’s counsel informed the court that the applicant was in hospital. On 24 May 1995 he submitted medical certificates confirming the applicant’s inability to participate in the proceedings.", "32. On 29 May 1995 the court dismissed the applicant’s further request for release from the preventive measures. On 22 June 1995 the Regional Court upheld that decision.", "33. On 5 June 1995 a hearing was adjourned because of the applicant’s illness. The court ordered an expert opinion on the applicant’s health. On 21 August 1995 the experts submitted their opinion, in which they stated that the applicant’s illness made it impossible for him to participate in the proceedings.", "34. On 28 August 1995 the court stayed the proceedings, relying on the experts’ opinion as to the applicant’s health. The applicant’s counsel appealed against that decision.", "35. The Konin Regional Court ordered the preparation of a supplementary opinion on the applicant’s health. It further requested the Department of Forensic Medicine of the Poznań Medical Academy to give their opinion. According to the latter opinion, the applicant could participate in the proceedings.", "36. On 13 November 1995 the Konin Regional Court allowed the appeal and quashed the District Court’s decision by which the proceedings had been stayed.", "37. The hearing scheduled for 19 December 1995 was adjourned at the request of the applicant’s counsel.", "38. A hearing was held on 30 January 1996.", "39. The applicant’s counsel requested the adjournment of the hearing scheduled for 5 March 1996, submitting that he would have a hearing in another case at the same time.", "40. The hearing scheduled for 26 March 1996 was adjourned due to the absence of the applicant’s counsel.", "41. Further hearings were held on 9 and 30 April 1996.", "42. The hearing scheduled for 11 June 1996 was adjourned at the request of the applicant’s counsel.", "43. At the hearing held on 13 August 1996 the witnesses whose examination the applicant had requested failed to appear. The court adjourned the hearing until 10 September 1996 and ordered the police to bring those witnesses to the subsequent hearing.", "44. On 10 September 1996 the witnesses were not brought to the court and the police stated that one of them lived in Germany.", "45. The witnesses also failed to attend the hearing of 4 October 1996. Subsequently, the applicant’s counsel requested the examination of two further witnesses.", "46. On 14 October 1996 the Ministry of Justice, in reply to the District Court’s enquiry, informed it that the witness who was detained in Belarus could not be extradited to Poland.", "47. On 7 November 1996, in reply to the applicant’s complaint, the Ministry of Justice found the proceedings lengthy. It considered that the delay was caused, inter alia, by his illness and witnesses’ failure to attend hearings. The Ministry informed the applicant that it would take the proceedings under its administrative supervision.", "48. On 10 December 1996 and 14 January 1997 the court held further hearings.", "49. On 17 January 1997 it ordered an expert opinion, at the request of the applicant’s counsel. The opinion was submitted to the court on 29 September 1997.", "50. At the hearing held on 16 December 1997 an expert was questioned and a supplementary opinion was ordered, at the request of the applicant’s counsel.", "51. On 18 February 1998, in reply to the court’s request, the Department of Accountancy of the Poznań Academy of Economics informed the court that due to their enormous workload nobody had agreed to prepare the requested opinion. In March 1998 the court asked the expert already appointed in the case to supplement his previously submitted opinion. The supplementary opinion was submitted on 7 September 1998.", "52. The hearing scheduled for 13 October 1998 was adjourned because of that expert’s failure to attend it.", "53. The court held a hearing on 20 November 1998. Subsequently, it again requested the Academy of Economy to indicate an expert who could prepare an opinion in the case, but to no avail.", "54. The hearing scheduled for 18 December 1998 was adjourned because of the absence of the applicant’s counsel.", "55. The hearing scheduled for 2 February 1999 was adjourned, as the court decided to appoint another expert in accountancy. The opinion of that expert was submitted to the court on 30 August 1999.", "56. Subsequently, the court fixed the date of the following hearing for 19 October 1999. The applicant’s counsel requested that a hearing be held on another date, submitting that he would not be able to participate on the date indicated by the court.", "57. Hearings were held on 7 and 17 December 1999.", "58. On 23 December 1999 the Konin District Court gave a judgment. The applicant was acquitted." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "7. The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Bishops Stortford, Hertfordshire.", "8. The Blackspur group of companies (collectively, “Blackspur”), was formed by the applicant and others in September 1987 and at various times the applicant acted as director. Blackspur went into receivership in July 1990 with an estimated deficit of GBP 34 million.", "9. On 1 July 1992, on the last day of the applicable two year limitation period, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (“the Secretary of State”) issued proceedings against the applicant and four others (“the Blackspur proceedings”) under section 6 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (“the CDDA”: see below).", "10. The Secretary of State’s evidence was not complete at the time he commenced proceedings, and he applied for an extension of time for the serving of evidence (see below). The defendants refused to consent to an extension being granted and instead, on 13 October 1992, three of the defendants (but not, at this stage, the applicant) applied to strike out the proceedings.", "11. The Secretary of State’s evidence was completed and served on the applicant on 14 December 1992. On 13 May 1993 the applicant applied to strike out the proceedings. The Secretary of State’s application for permission to file the evidence out of time, and the cross-application to strike out the proceedings by the applicant and other defendants, were heard by the Registrar on 20 May 1993, when they were adjourned to 29 July 1993. On 27 January 1994 the Registrar granted the Secretary of State’s application for an extension of time and dismissed the strike-out application. Two of the applicant’s co-defendants appealed to the High Court. On 12 April 1995 the applicant also lodged an appeal.", "12. Related criminal charges had been brought against the applicant and three other defendants in the Blackspur proceedings on 1 July 1992. In May 1993 the applicant and other defendants had applied to stay the disqualification proceedings pending the conclusion of the criminal proceedings. The criminal trial took place between March and June 1994, during which period the disqualification proceedings were adjourned generally, with liberty to restore. At the conclusion of the criminal trial, the applicant and one other defendant were acquitted, and two defendants were convicted. On appeal, the two convictions were quashed in February 1995.", "13. By a letter dated 16 September 1994 the applicant invited the Secretary of State to reconsider whether, in the light of the acquittals in the criminal trial, it was in the public interest to carry on with the disqualification proceedings. On 15 December 1994 the Treasury Solicitor replied that the Secretary of State had decided that it remained expedient in the public interest to continue.", "14. Once the criminal trial had been concluded, the appeal to the High Court brought by the first defendant to the disqualification proceeding, Mr Davies, against the Registrar’s decision of 27 January 1994, could proceed and was dismissed on 2 May 1995. In November 1995 Mr Davies was granted leave to appeal out of time to the Court of Appeal, and his substantive appeal was dismissed by that court on 24 May 1996. The Court of Appeal found that the reasons for the Secretary of State’s failure to complete his evidence before the proceedings were commenced had been “far from satisfactory”, but considered nonetheless that the case should proceed since it was in the public interest to determine the “particularly serious” allegations of false accounting and trading while insolvent made against the defendants. In addition, the court observed that the delay by the Secretary of State had not affected the timing of the hearing or prejudiced the applicant, and that, once the proceedings had commenced, “the respondents’ main concern was to delay the proceedings until after the conclusion of the criminal trial, not to hurry them on”.", "15. On 1 July 1996 the Registrar directed that the defendants should serve their evidence in response to that of the Secretary of State by 29 November 1996.", "16. On 18 November 1996 the applicant wrote to the Secretary of State offering to settle the case by giving an undertaking not to act as a company director in the future. The Secretary of State refused to settle the case on that basis, insisting instead on a “Carecraft” settlement. This procedure, named after the case of Re Carecraft Construction Co. Ltd [1994] 1 WLR 172, allows the parties to proceedings under the CDDA to submit to the court an agreement that a disqualification order should be made for a specified period on the basis of undisputed (but not necessarily agreed) facts.", "17. On 9 December 1996 the Registrar ordered that if the defendants had not served their evidence by 17 January 1997, they would be debarred from adducing any evidence.", "18. The defendants served their evidence on 17 January 1997. On 20 January 1997 the Registrar directed that the Secretary of State should serve his evidence in reply by 17 March 1997. On 14 April 1997 the Registrar granted the Secretary of State a time-extension for the serving of evidence in reply until 30 June 1997, and this evidence was in fact served on 10 July 1997. At a further directions hearing on 4 August 1997 the defendants were given permission to adduce additional evidence in rejoinder by 1 December 1997. The defendants failed to comply with this order and on 8 December 1997 they were granted an extension of time until 9 February 1998.", "19. On 30 January 1998 the applicant asked the Secretary of State to reconsider the continuance of the disqualification proceedings against him. On 6 February 1998 the Secretary of State informed the applicant that he intended to continue. On 9 February 1998 there was a further directions hearing, when the applicant was ordered to serve further evidence by 9 March 1998.", "20. On 17 February 1998 the applicant’s solicitors informed the Secretary of State’s solicitor that the applicant was willing to negotiate a “Carecraft” settlement. On 5 March 1998 the Secretary of State replied that he would accept a settlement based on a disqualification period of five years.", "21. In the light of these negotiations, at a directions hearing on 23 March 1998, the time-limit for the applicant’s further evidence was extended indefinitely.", "22. On 17 June 1998 the Secretary of State’s solicitor sent a draft “Carecraft” statement. On 30 July 1998 the parties met to discuss it, and a revised statement was prepared. On 4 October 1998 the applicant broke off the settlement negotiations", "23. On 8 December 1998 the matter was set down for trial on 4 October 1999.", "24. On 23 April 1999 the applicant’s solicitors again wrote to the Secretary of State asking him to discontinue the proceedings, on the ground that they had already exceeded the “reasonable time” provision in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. On 30 June 1999 the Secretary of State informed the applicant that he had decided not to discontinue them.", "25. Meanwhile, on 10 June 1999 the applicant contacted the Secretary of State to resume negotiations on the “Carecraft” settlement.", "26. On 29 July 1999 there was a pre-trial review in the disqualification proceedings, at which the court gave detailed trial directions. The trial was set down to begin on 4 October 1999.", "27. On 18 August 1999 the applicant applied for judicial review of the legality of the Secretary of State’s decision of 30 June 1999, not to discontinue the proceedings on grounds of delay.", "28. On 13 September 1999 the applicant agreed that he would sign the “Carecraft” statement if he failed in the judicial review proceedings. The disqualification proceedings were adjourned.", "29. On 15 September 1999 the application for leave to apply for judicial review was refused. On 27 January 2000, following an oral hearing, leave was again refused.", "30. On 2 February 2000, the applicant renewed his judicial review application before the Court of Appeal. It was refused by the Court of Appeal on 15 March 2000, following an oral hearing. In the course of a considered judgment, Lord Justice Buxton described the application as “misconceived”, because the arguments on delay could, and should, have been made in the course of the disqualification proceedings and not in separate proceedings for judicial review. On 23 March 2000 Buxton LJ refused leave to appeal to the House of Lords.", "31. The applicant appealed to the House of Lords, which granted leave on 11 July 2000. The House heard the applicant’s appeal on 18 October 2000, and on 2 November 2000 delivered judgment dismissing it on the grounds that the House had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal refusing leave to apply for judicial review (R v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte Eastaway [2000] 1 WLR 2222).", "32. On 6 November 2000 the Secretary of State wrote to the applicant indicating that he wished to fix a hearing at which the “Carecraft” order could be made.", "33. The Human Rights Act 1998 came into force on 2 October 2000, and on 10 November 2000 the applicant issued an application in the Companies Court to strike out or dismiss the disqualification proceedings on the ground of violation of the reasonable time provision in Article 6 § 1.", "34. The application was heard by the Vice-Chancellor on 7 February 2001, and judgment was delivered dismissing it on 15 February 2001, because the Vice-Chancellor did not find a violation of Article 6 § 1 (Re Blackspur Group plc and Others; Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v. Eastaway and Others [2001] 1 BCLC 653). The Vice-Chancellor held, inter alia:\n“It is true that the events in question occurred over ten years ago. It is also true that eight and a half years have now elapsed since the proceedings were commenced. In those circumstances it is necessary to look critically at the events of the intervening period to determine whether more than a reasonable time has elapsed so as to constitute an infringement of Mr Eastaway’s Convention rights. In my view most of the time elapsed is to be attributed either to the requirements of justice down to the conclusion of the criminal proceedings in June 1994 or to the conduct of Mr Eastaway. Such conduct includes the attempt to strike out the proceedings concluded in May 1996; Mr Davies’ unsuccessful attempt, with which Mr Eastaway was associated, from October 1996 to November 1997 to have the proceedings stayed; the negotiations for a summary disposal under the Carecraft procedure from February to October 1998; the renewed attempts for that purpose between June and September 1999 and Mr Eastaway’s unsuccessful attempts between August 1999 and November 2000 to obtain a judicial review of the decision of the Secretary of State to continue. \nIn the judgments of the Court of Appeal given in November 1997 in Re Blackspur Group [1998] 1 WLR 422, 427H and 433B it was recorded that Mr Davies did not suggest then that a fair trial was impossible. Mr Eastaway does not now suggest that the delay has been such that a fair trial is impossible. A very large proportion of the undoubtedly long time which has elapsed since these proceedings were commenced is due to the various actions taken by Mr Eastaway. Those actions were taken not to obtain but to avoid a fair and public hearing by an independent or impartial tribunal either within a reasonable time or at all. In my view there has been no breach of Mr Eastaway’s Convention rights under Article 6 and for the Secretary of State now to proceed with these proceedings would not be incompatible with them.”", "35. The Vice-Chancellor refused leave to appeal, so the applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal, which also refused leave. The applicant renewed his application at an oral hearing on 6 April 2001, at which the Court of Appeal again refused leave to appeal, on the basis that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1.", "36. On 8 March 2001 the applicant issued a further action for a declaration that the continuation of the disqualification proceedings would be contrary to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Secretary of State applied to have these proceedings struck out, on the grounds that they raised identical issues to the application dismissed by the Vice-Chancellor the previous month.", "37. The applicant responded with three further applications. In the first, dated 9 April 2001, he sought to be released from his undertaking of 13 September 1999; in the second, on 18 April 2001, he sought a stay or dismissal of the proceedings on the grounds that the Secretary of State should now accept a far more limited undertaking from him in place of the agreed “Carecraft” statement; in the third application, issued 24 April 2001, he applied for judicial review of the Secretary of State’s refusal to accept his newly proffered undertakings.", "38. On 23 May 2001 Patten J struck out the applicant’s new action and dismissed his further three applications. Patten J’s decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal on 13 September 2001.", "39. Meanwhile, on 31 May 2001 the applicant signed an undertaking which provided for an agreed period of disqualification of four and a half years, commencing on 25 June 2001. The undertaking was accepted and the proceedings against the applicant were terminated on 4 June 2001." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "5. The applicant, Mr Anatoliy Afanasiyovych Shmalko, is a Ukrainian national, who was born in 1930 and currently resides in Dnepropetrovsk. He is a disabled pensioner and a veteran of the Second World War. He suffers from myasthenia.", "6. In March 1999 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Babushkinsky District Court of Dnepropetrovsk against the Dnepropetrovsk City Health Protection Department (“HPD”) and the Dnepropetrovsk City Hospital No. 1 (the “Hospital”), seeking compensation for moral and material damage caused by their refusal between 1996 and 1998 to provide him with the prescription drug Kalimin-60. He alleged that the State authorities had failed to provide him with this drug free of charge, contrary to Resolution No. 1303 of the Cabinet of Ministers of 17 August 1998. He further complained that because this drug was not provided to him, he had to buy it in Moscow, Germany and the United Kingdom. He requested reimbursement of the costs incurred.", "7. On 29 September 2000 the Babushkinsky District Court of Dnepropetrovsk (the “Babushkinsky Court”) rejected the applicant’s claims as being unsubstantiated. It found that the HPD and the Hospital could not be held responsible for the failure to provide a drug simply because it was not available in the Dnepropetrovsk Region.", "8. On 13 November 2000 the Dnepropetrovsk Regional Court allowed the applicant’s appeal, quashed the decision of 29 September 2000 and remitted the case for fresh consideration.", "9. On 22 February 2001 the Babushkinsky Court rejected the applicant’s claims as being unsubstantiated.", "10. On 26 March 2001, following an appeal filed by the applicant, the Dnepropetrovsk Regional Court quashed the decision of 22 February 2001 and again remitted the case for fresh consideration.", "11. On 13 July 2001 the Babushkinsky Court rejected the applicant’s claims as being unsubstantiated.", "12. On 10 October 2001 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Dnepropetrovsk Regional Court of Appeal under the new appeal procedure introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure on 21 June 2001. On 29 November 2001 the Dnepropetrovsk Regional Court of Appeal allowed the applicant’s claims in part. The court ordered HPD to pay the applicant UAH 722.70 and UAH 750 (a total of UAH 1,509.95 [EUR 237.37]) in compensation for material and moral damage, respectively. It also ordered the Hospital to pay the applicant UAH 393.65, UAH 750 and UAH 22.25 (a total of UAH 1,165.9 [EUR 183.28]) in compensation for material and moral damage, costs and expenses.", "13. On 19 April 2002 the Bailiffs’ Service of the Babushkinsky District Department of Justice (the “Bailiffs’ Service”) instituted enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 29 November 2001.", "14. On 15 May 2002 the Bailiffs’ Service ordered that the funds awarded by the judgment of 29 November 2001 be transferred to the applicant’s bank account.", "15. On 27 May 2002 a panel of three judges of the Supreme Court rejected the cassation appeal lodged by the Chief Doctor of the Hospital against the judgment of 29 November 2001 for want of substantiation. The institution of the cassation proceedings did not suspend the enforcement of the judgment of 29 November 2001.", "16. On 17 October 2002 the writ of execution and the payment request were returned to the applicant because of the Hospital’s lack of funds.", "17. On 21 October 2002 the Bailiffs’ Service requested the Dnepropetrovsk Regional State Treasury to inform it about the possibility of obtaining funds from the Hospital in order to enforce the judgment.", "18. On 26 November 2002 the Bailiffs’ Service terminated the enforcement proceedings after UAH 1,165.9 had been transferred to the applicant’s bank account. The judgment was fully executed in so far as it concerned the Hospital.", "19. On 25 December 2002 the Bailiffs’ Service requested the HPD to comply with the judgment of 29 November 2001 and to transfer the amount due to the applicant to his bank account.", "20. On 16 January 2003 the HPD paid UAH 862.75 [EUR 135.63] to the applicant.", "21. On 20 January 2003 the Bailiffs’ Service received the payment request and the writ of execution back from the HPD, with a statement that the judgment could not be fully enforced due to the HPD’s lack of funds.", "22. On 21 January 2003 the Bailiffs’ Service requested the HPD to pay the applicant the remainder of the judgment debt.", "23. On 7 February 2003 the HPD transferred the remainder of the funds (UAH 647.2 [EUR 101.74]) to the applicant’s account. The Bailiffs’ Service terminated the enforcement proceedings.", "24. On 19 May 2003 the Babushkinsky Court rejected for lack of substantiation the applicant’s claims against the Dnepropetrovsk Regional Department of the State Treasury for an award of compensation for the moral damage he had allegedly suffered due to the lengthy period of non-enforcement of the judgment of 29 November 2000. This judgment was not appealed and thus became final." ]

[ 3, 9 ]

[ "9. The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Diyarbakır. He was a student at the Medical Faculty of the Diyarbakır Dicle University at the time of the events described below.", "10. On 4 April 1997 the applicant was arrested and placed in custody by police officers from the Diyarbakır Security Directorate. He was accused of membership of an illegal organisation, the YEKBUN (Kurdistan United People’s Party).", "11. The police officers interrogated the applicant in relation to his alleged involvement in the YEKBUN. The applicant alleged that he had been subjected to ill-treatment by the officers during the interrogation which caused an oedema, a bruised nose and a broken tooth. According to the Government, the applicant’s injuries occurred when, due to lack of sleep, he inadvertently fell and hit his nose on a sink.", "12. On 6 April 1997 the applicant signed a statement according to which he hit his nose on a sink while washing his face. The applicant claims that he was forced to sign the statement. He was then taken to the Diyarbakır State Hospital and examined by Dr. R.C. who noted the following:\n“An oedema and an ecchymosed lesion as a result of trauma have been identified on the nose.\n...”", "13. On the same day, the applicant was brought before the Diyarbakır State Security Court. Before the court, he denied being a member of an illegal organisation. He stated that he had been subjected to various forms of ill‑treatment during his detention in police custody and that the statement which he had signed did not reflect the truth of what had happened to him. The court ordered his release pending trial.", "14. On 8 April 1997 the applicant filed a criminal complaint with the chief public prosecutor’s office in Diyarbakır against the police officers who had allegedly ill-treated him. The chief public prosecutor ordered that the applicant be examined by a medical expert from the Forensic Medicine Institute. On the same day, he was examined by a forensic medical expert. The expert’s report stated the following: \n“...\nThere is an abrasion of 1 x 0,5 cm on the left side of the tip of the nose. Furthermore, there is a minimal fracture on the front of the 8th of the lower teeth.\nThere is no danger to the individual’s life. However, the injuries render him unfit for work for two days.”", "15. On 15 April 1997 the Diyarbakır public prosecutor issued a decision of non-jurisdiction in respect of the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment and referred the investigation file to the Diyarbakır District Administrative Council in accordance with the Law on the Prosecution of Civil Servants (Memurin Muhakematı Kanunu).", "16. On 13 June 1997 the Diyarbakır State Security Court acquitted the applicant of the charges against him. The court took note in its judgment of the applicant’s statement that he had been interrogated by police officers under duress.", "17. On 26 June 1997 the Diyarbakır Administrative Council decided that, due to lack of evidence, the police officers who had allegedly ill‑treated the applicant should not be prosecuted.", "18. On 6 August 1997 the applicant filed an objection with the Supreme Administrative Court against the decision of the Diyarbakır Administrative Council. He also lodged a petition with the Diyarbakır Administrative Council and requested a copy of the investigation file. He received no response to his petition.", "19. On 14 May 1999 the Supreme Administrative Court confirmed the Administrative Council’s decision of non-prosecution.", "20. On 26 July 1999 the Supreme Administrative Court’s decision was served on the applicant." ]

[ 1 ]

[ "8. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Miskolc, Hungary. He is of Roma ethnic origin.", "9. On 9 August 1995 the applicant, accompanied by Ms B. and Mr S., was selling coal from a truck on a door-to-door basis in Orosháza. After an aborted transaction, some would-be purchasers reported to the local police that the three had left their yard without having returned their fuel vouchers. At about 5.45 p.m. two local police officers halted the applicant’s truck and instructed the applicant and his companions to report to the Orosháza Police Station. The applicant was interrogated there by police officers S. and K.", "10. The applicant stated that during the interrogation one of the police officers repeatedly slapped him across the face and left ear while the other punched him on the shoulder. The officers demanded that he reveal where the stolen vouchers had been hidden.", "11. On being released after two hours of interrogation, the applicant was met on the ground floor of the police station by Ms B. and Mr S., as well as by Mr B. and Mr M., both of whom were acquaintances of the applicant and his companions.\nThe applicant stated that when he and his companions were leaving the police station, a police officer issued the following warning to them: “Tell the Miskolc gypsies that they had better not set foot in Orosháza”.", "12. Having returned to his home in Miskolc on 11 August 1995, the applicant consulted Dr V., the local doctor, who advised him to report to the Ear, Nose and Throat Department of Diósgyőr Hospital. On 14 August 1995 Dr C. carried out an operation to reconstruct the applicant’s ear drum which had been damaged as a result of a traumatic perforation. On 16 August 1995 Dr C. reported the case to the police.", "13. On 28 August 1995 the applicant was discharged from hospital. His medical report stated, without reference to any precise date, that he had sustained a traumatic perforation of the left tympanic membrane. This conclusion also figured in two further medical reports issued later by Dr C. on 25 August 1995 and by Dr V. on 29 September 1995. The applicant’s injury was described in a follow-up medical report dated 10 September 1997 as “low-to-medium-grade loss of sound perception” in the left ear.", "14. On 25 September 1995 the Szeged Investigation Office informed the applicant that criminal proceedings had been opened against the police officers involved on the basis of information submitted by Dr C. on 16 August. The police officers were charged with the offences of “forced interrogation” and “ill-treatment committed in the course of official proceedings”.", "15. The Investigation Office heard the applicant and several witnesses. Four persons were heard from the applicant’s side. \nMr S. stated as follows:\n“[In the building of the police station] I met [the applicant] [...] whose face had a bluish colour in the area under his left ear and was somewhat swollen. I then asked him if they had hurt him. He answered that they had hurt him a little and pointed to the left side of his face saying that it was hurting there. He said that he had no hearing on that side.”\nMs B. stated as follows:\n“[When the applicant was escorted down to the ground floor], it struck me that the left side of his face and his left ear were swollen. I thought that he had been beaten. I asked him about it, to which he only answered that he had been beaten a little. [...] I remember well that the left side of his face was red and I even saw the traces of fingers on it.”\nMr M. stated as follows:\n“[When at last the applicant came down to the ground floor], it struck me immediately that his skin was reddish-bluish around his left ear and even underneath his neck. I had no doubt that his face was swollen as a result of a blow. I then asked him if they had hurt him, [...], he only answered: ‘A little’.” \nMr B. stated as follows:\n[When the applicant was escorted down to the ground floor], it was apparent at once that the left side of his face and his left ear were red. It was obvious that he had been hit. Ms. B. even asked him if he had been hurt. He first answered in the negative. Then I asked him the same question. Then he answered: ‘A little’.”\nThe Investigation Office also heard Dr V. and four police officers who had been on duty at the police station at the time of the applicant’s interrogation. \nThe police witnesses denied any knowledge of ill-treatment having been inflicted on the applicant. \nThe suspected police officers S. and K. consistently denied the applicant’s accusations when questioned on 15 November 1995. \nPolice officer S. stated, inter alia, as follows:\n“I remember [the applicant] having said something of the sort that he was working for those persons as a lorry-driver [...] to set off debts incurred by his wife. [...] He was blaming [his companions] for forcing him to work a lot more than if he had been working for money; and he even mentioned to one of my colleagues that they would either leave him behind or beat him up on the way home because of this.”\nPolice officer K. stated, inter alia, as follows:\n“After the interrogation police officer S. told me that [the persons interrogated] had also quarrelled amongst themselves, maybe they had not properly paid [the applicant], they had a dispute about money or something of the sort [...]”", "16. On 16 November 1995 a medical expert appointed by the Investigation Office expressed the opinion that it could not be excluded that the applicant’s injury had been caused as alleged. However, in the expert’s opinion it could not be determined whether the injury in question had been caused to his ear before, during or after the applicant’s interrogation.", "17. On 30 November 1995 the Investigation Office discontinued the criminal proceedings against police officers K. and S. for lack of any conclusive evidence. On 12 December 1995 the applicant filed a complaint against the discontinuation order.", "18. On 24 January 1996 the Orosháza District Public Prosecutor’s Office ordered the investigation to be resumed and that confrontations be organised between the applicant and the police officers concerned and between various witnesses. It also ordered that further witnesses be heard.", "19. In the framework of the resumed proceedings, the Csongrád County Investigation Office, on 1 March 1996, confronted the applicant with the suspected police officers as well as a third police officer who had been heard as a new witness.", "20. On 6 March 1996 the Investigation Office discontinued the investigation. \nRelying on the testimonies given, on the one hand, by the applicant – who had consistently maintained his assertions during the proceedings – and by his companions and, on the other hand, by the police officers concerned, as well as on a confrontation involving all three of them, the Investigation Office found that although the applicant’s injuries might have been inflicted as alleged, it could not be excluded beyond all doubt that the injuries had been sustained before or after his interrogation.\nSince there was no direct witness to the alleged incident and the medical opinion in the case was not conclusive as to the time when the applicant’s injury had been inflicted, the Investigation Office was obliged to dismiss the applicant’s accusations as unsubstantiated and to discontinue the proceedings.\nThe order drew the applicant’s attention to his right to file a complaint with the Public Prosecutor’s Office under section 148 §§ 1 and 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if he wished to challenge the decision to discontinue the case. This order was served on the applicant on 11 March 1996. \nThe applicant did not file a complaint against this order.\nAs of 1 August 1996 the applicant’s working capacity was declared to have diminished by 50% on account of asthma bronchiale and impaired hearing; the respective significance of these two factors was not specified. As a consequence, he was unable to have his lorry driver’s licence renewed or to obtain employment as a driver.", "21. On 30 March 1998 the applicant claimed damages from the Ministry of the Interior. In reply, on 16 April 1998 he was informed by the competent Békés County Police Department that he was not eligible for compensation because he had failed to file a complaint against the discontinuation order of 6 March 1996 and thus to avail himself of an ordinary legal remedy, which was a precondition for establishing official liability.", "22. On 22 April 1998 the applicant appointed the NEKI to take his case. A further medical opinion obtained by the NEKI on 19 August 1998 stated that a traumatic perforation of the tympanic membrane was usually caused by a slap on the ear. Although he did not have the earlier medical expert’s opinion at hand, the expert went on to qualify the applicant’s version of how he had sustained his injury as plausible.", "23. Relying on this new evidence, the NEKI lodged on 25 August 1998 a complaint against the decision of 6 March 1996 with the Attorney General’s Office requesting that the criminal proceedings be re-opened in accordance with section 141 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.", "24. On 5 October 1998 the Csongrád County Public Prosecutor’s Office finally dismissed this complaint. In its reasoned decision, the Public Prosecutor’s Office stated that:\n“[it] had thoroughly examined all the documents in the case file.”\nThe decision mentioned that in the absence of coherent testimonies or a conclusive medical expert opinion it was impossible to prove either that the applicant’s injury had been caused during his police detention or that it had been inflicted by the suspected police officers. The Public Prosecutor’s Office noted the delay between the applicant’s interrogation on 9 August and his decision to seek medical help only on 11 August 1995. The decision stated that the new expert opinion did not contain any new facts which warranted the continuation of the investigation or the laying of charges against the suspects. The Public Prosecutor’s Office concluded that the case should be discontinued since it was impossible to prove the applicant’s allegations. The decision was served on the NEKI on 14 October 1998." ]

[ 1 ]

[ "13. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Karperö. In 1988 and 1989 he and another person contracted to guarantee a bank loan granted to N. As N. was eventually unable to meet the reimbursement conditions, the applicant and his co-guarantor each paid the bank approximately 113,000 Finnish markkas (FIM) (approximately 19,000 euros (EUR)), excluding interest, in 1991.", "14. In 1995 N. applied for a debt adjustment in accordance with the 1993 Adjustment of Debts (Private Individuals) Act (laki yksityishenkilön velkajärjestelystä, lag om skuldsanering för privatpersoner 57/1993 – “the 1993 Act”) and proposed a payment schedule for the court’s approval. The applicant opposed the request, arguing that such an adjustment could lead to an unjustified deprivation of his property, consisting of his claim against N. The applicant argued that N. was young and healthy and could be expected to be able to reimburse his debts to the guarantors in due course. In the alternative, the applicant requested that the adjustment of N.’s debts be postponed.", "15. On 19 April 1996, after N. had found employment, the District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten) of Korsholm granted him a debt adjustment and adopted a payment schedule which was to take effect on 1 June 1996 and remain in force for five years. The applicant’s claim against N. was reduced to FIM 2,168 (EUR 365). The District Court considered that N.’s solvency had been significantly weakened on account of his previous unemployment and unsuccessful business activities. Given that N. was already able to reimburse FIM 420 (EUR 71) per month to his creditors at the time of the court’s examination, it was not possible under the 1993 Act to postpone the entry into force of the payment schedule. The District Court gave the following reasons:\n“... With reference to Tomas Bäck’s submission, the District Court notes that under the Adjustment of Debts (Private Individuals) Act it is possible to reduce the amount of a claim and even to write a claim off. Considering that a guarantee always involves a risk as to the possible obligation to pay the creditor and the possibility of recourse against the principal debtor, the District Court finds that the claim in question cannot be considered as a possession that would enjoy inviolable protection under the European Convention on Human Rights. ...”", "16. Among N.’s seventy other creditors was F. bank, with a claim amounting to FIM 231,722 (EUR 38,973), of which the District Court retained FIM 4,510 (EUR 759) as part of his payment schedule.", "17. The applicant appealed, contending that the almost total extinction of his claim against N. violated his property rights under the Convention. No legislation on debt adjustment had existed at the time when the applicant had contracted to guarantee N.’s debts. Furthermore, the extreme step of writing off his claim discriminated against him as a private creditor who, unlike creditor banks, would receive no compensation from the State.", "18. On 14 October 1996 the Vasa Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten) upheld the District Court’s decision and its reasoning. The applicant was refused leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) on 19 February 1997." ]

[]

[ "6. The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Älvsjö.", "7. In the autumn of 1994, as part of a large-scale investigation into taxicab operators, the Tax Authority (skattemyndigheten) of the County of Stockholm carried out a tax audit of the applicant’s taxi firm. By decisions of 14 December 1995 and 8 February 1996 the Tax Authority increased the applicant’s liability to income tax, value-added tax and employer’s contributions. Moreover, as the information supplied by the applicant in his tax returns was found to be incorrect and the turnover of the applicant’s business had been revised upwards under a discretionary assessment procedure, the Tax Authority ordered him to pay tax surcharges (skattetillägg, avgiftstillägg) amounting to 20% or 40% of the increased tax liability, depending on the type of tax involved. The additional taxes levied on the applicant, including interest and surcharges, totalled SEK 566,967 Swedish kronor (SEK), of which SEK 99,507 were surcharges. The amounts were payable in February and May 1996.", "8. The applicant appealed against the Tax Authority’s decisions on 4 March 1996. As the appeal had no suspensive effect on the obligation to pay the taxes and tax surcharges, he also requested a stay of execution in respect of the amounts assessed. As the applicant was unable to provide security for the amounts in question, his request was rejected, the final decision being taken by the Supreme Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten) on 17 September 1997.", "9. Meanwhile, the debts relating to the taxes and tax surcharges imposed by the Tax Authority essentially remained outstanding. On 15 April 1997 the Enforcement Office (kronofogdemyndigheten) of the County of Stockholm, representing the State, filed a petition with the District Court (tingsrätten) of Stockholm, requesting that the applicant be declared bankrupt. The Office stated that an investigation had revealed that the value of the applicant’s property was insufficient to cover the debts. By a decision of 12 June 1997 the District Court declared the applicant bankrupt. The declaration was upheld on appeal, the final decision being taken by the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen) on 26 September 1997.", "10. Moreover, on 31 January 1997 the County Administrative Board (länsstyrelsen) of the County of Stockholm revoked the applicant’s traffic licence (trafiktillstånd) and decided that he was unsuitable to run a commercial taxi business for a period of three years on the ground that he had failed to fulfil his obligations with respect to the payment of taxes and other charges. The decision was upheld on appeal, the final decision being taken by the Supreme Administrative Court on 17 December 1997.\n 11. On 5 September 1997 the Public Prosecution Office (åklagar-myndigheten) in Stockholm indicted the applicant for a suspected bookkeeping offence related to the amounts which were subject to determination in the taxation proceedings. By a judgment of 13 January 1998 the District Court found the applicant guilty of having intentionally failed to enter certain income and salary payments in the books. He was sentenced to two months’ imprisonment. The applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal but subsequently withdrew his appeal. Accordingly, on 14 December 1998 the case was struck out of the appellate court’s list.", "12. By a judgment of 2 December 1998 the County Administrative Court upheld the Tax Authority’s taxation decisions. The judgment was upheld by the Administrative Court of Appeal on 15 February 2001. On 7 May 2002 the Supreme Administrative Court refused the applicant leave to appeal." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "9. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Kiev, Ukraine.", "10. On 16 February 1994 the applicant, who was then residing in Bulgaria, was questioned as a suspect in the embezzlement of 20,000 Bulgarian levs (BGL) from a cooperative farm in liquidation whose legal counsel he had been.", "11. On 30 March 1994 criminal proceedings were opened against the applicant.", "12. On 27 July 1994 he was questioned.", "13. On 29 July 1994 a graphological expert report was drawn up.", "14. On 12 December 1994 the applicant was charged with embezzlement, falsification of official documents and false accusation of another. He was ordered to post bail in the amount of BGL 2,000. Under the then applicable provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”), an accused on bail could leave the country only with the prosecutor’s or the court’s permission.", "15. On 23 February 1995 the applicant’s apartment was attached by order of the investigator in charge of the case, apparently as a security for an impending civil claim by the victim of the offences alleged against the applicant. On the same date the applicant was allowed to consult the case file and was questioned.", "16. On 15 March 1995 the applicant was detained. He was released on 21 March 1995.", "17. On 15 March 1995 a technical expert report was drawn up.", "18. On 27 March 1995 the applicant was questioned.", "19. On 30 March 1995 another expert report was drawn up.", "20. On 4 April 1995 the applicant was questioned.", "21. On 5 April 1995 the investigator completed his work on the case and recommended that the applicant be indicted.", "22. On 4 May 1995 the applicant was questioned.", "23. On 2 June 1995 a prosecutor of the Popovo District Prosecutor’s Office presented the applicant with amended charges and questioned him.", "24. By a decree of 28 March 1996 the Popovo District Prosecutor’s Office, finding that the applicant had not obstructed the criminal proceedings and that there was no danger of him absconding, allowed him to leave Bulgaria for one and a half months to visit his parents in Kiev, Ukraine.", "25. The prohibition against the applicant leaving the country without prior permission by the prosecutor or the court was in force at least until 1 January 2000, when the CCP was amended.", "26. On 12 September 2001 a prosecutor of the Popovo District Prosecutor’s Office presented all materials in the case file to the applicant.", "27. On 14 September 2001 the Popovo District Prosecutor’s Office, noting that the relevant limitation period had expired, decided to drop the charges of falsification of official documents. On the same date it indicted the applicant for having embezzled BGL 20,000 and having falsely accused another of a serious offence.", "28. On 15 December 2001 the applicant left Bulgaria and went to Ukraine, where he has resided ever since.", "29. The first hearing in the applicant’s case, listed by the Popovo District Court for 17 December 2001, was adjourned because the applicant and several witnesses, despite being duly summoned, were absent.", "30. A hearing fixed for 8 April 2002 was also adjourned because the applicant was not present.", "31. A hearing listed for 3 June 2002 was likewise adjourned because of the applicant’s absence.", "32. At the time of the latest relevant information from the parties (June 2002) the proceedings were still pending before the Popovo District Court." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "10. The first applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Šiauliai. The second applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Vilnius.\nThe facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.", "11. In 1974 the first applicant graduated from the Lithuanian Physical Culture Institute, qualifying as a certified sports instructor.", "12. From 1975 to 1986 he was an employee of the Lithuanian branch of the Soviet Security Service (the KGB). After Lithuania declared its independence in 1990, he found employment as a tax inspector at the Inland Revenue.", "13. On 31 May 1999 two authorities – the Lithuanian State Security Department and the Centre for Research into the Genocide and Resistance of the Lithuanian People – jointly concluded that the first applicant was subject to the restrictions provided under section 2 of the Law on the evaluation of the USSR State Security Committee (NKVD, NKGB, MGB, KGB) and the present activities of former permanent employees of the organisation (“the KGB Act” – see paragraph 24 below). The conclusion confirmed that the first applicant had the status of a “former KGB officer” (see paragraphs 26-27 below). On 2 June 1999 the first applicant was dismissed from the Inland Revenue on the basis of that conclusion.", "14. The first applicant brought an administrative action against the security intelligence authorities, claiming that he had been engaged only in counterintelligence and ideology work while employed by the KGB, and that he had not been involved in the violation of individual rights by that organisation. He argued that his dismissal under section 2 of the KGB Act and the resultant inability to find employment were therefore unlawful.", "15. On 9 September 1999 the Higher Administrative Court found that the conclusion of 31 May 1999 had been substantiated and that the first applicant was subject to the restrictions provided under section 2 of the KGB Act. In this respect, the court held that the applicant had the status of a “former KGB officer” within the meaning of the KGB Act, since he had occupied one of the positions mentioned in the list of 26 January 1999.", "16. On 19 October 1999 the Court of Appeal dismissed the first applicant’s appeal. It found that he had not occupied a KGB position dealing only with criminal investigations and could not therefore benefit from the exceptions listed under section 3 of the KGB Act.", "17. On an unspecified date in the 1980s, the second applicant graduated from Vilnius University as a qualified lawyer.", "18. From 11 February 1991 he worked as a prosecutor at the Office of the Prosecutor General of Lithuania, investigating primarily cases of organised crime and corruption.", "19. On 26 May 1999 the Lithuanian State Security Department and the Centre for Research into the Genocide and Resistance of the Lithuanian People jointly concluded that from 1985 to 1991 the second applicant had been an employee of the Lithuanian branch of the KGB, that he had the status of a “former KGB officer” and that he was thereby subject to the restrictions provided under section 2 of the KGB Act. On 31 May 1999 the second applicant was dismissed from his job at the Office of the Prosecutor General on the basis of that conclusion.", "20. The second applicant brought an administrative action against the security intelligence authorities and the Office of the Prosecutor General. He claimed that from 1985 to 1990 he had merely studied at a special KGB school in Moscow and that from 1990 to 1991 he had worked in the KGB as an informer for the Lithuanian security intelligence authorities and should therefore be entitled to benefit from the exceptions under section 3 of the KGB Act. He claimed that his dismissal under the Act and his resultant inability to find employment were unlawful.", "21. On 6 August 1999 the Higher Administrative Court allowed the second applicant’s claim, quashed the conclusion of 26 May 1999 and ordered him to be reinstated. The court found that the period of the second applicant’s studies at the KGB school from 1985 to 1990 was not to be taken into account for the purposes of the KGB Act, that he had worked in the KGB for a period of five months in 1990-91, that he had not occupied a KGB position dealing with political investigations and that, in any event, he had been a secret informer for the Lithuanian authorities. The court concluded that the exceptions under section 3 of the KGB Act applied to the second applicant and that his dismissal had therefore been unlawful.", "22. Following an appeal by the security intelligence authorities, on 25 October 1999 the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 6 August 1999. It held that, although the first-instance court had properly found that the second applicant had worked at the KGB for only five months, it had not been established that he had worked there as a secret informer for the Lithuanian authorities. Accordingly, he could not benefit from the exceptions under section 3 of the KGB Act.", "23. The second applicant appealed against the Court of Appeal’s judgment. By a decision of 28 January 2000, the President of the Supreme Court allowed the appeal. However, by a final decision of 20 April 2000, the full Supreme Court refused to examine the appeal and discontinued the proceedings for lack of jurisdiction." ]

[ 8, 4 ]

[ "9. The applicants were born in 1933 and 1974 respectively and live in Diyarbakır.", "10. The facts surrounding the arrest and subsequent death of Mehmet Şah İkincisoy (“Mehmet Şah”) are in dispute between the parties.", "11. On 22 November 1993 at about 1 a.m. plain-clothes police officers arrived at the first applicant, Abdurrazak İkincisoy's (“Abdurrazak”)[2], apartment in Diyarbakır. They entered the apartment, carried out a quick search and inquired about Mehmet Şah. Abdurrazak informed them that Mehmet Şah was spending the night in his uncle Abdülkadir İkincisoy's apartment. Leaving one of the officers with Abdurrazak1, Garipşah İkincisoy, Hüseyin İkincisoy, Makbule İkincisoy and Nefise İkincisoy, the rest of the officers left taking the second applicant, Halil İkincisoy (“Halil”), with them to show them the way.", "12. When they arrived at Abdülkadir İkincisoy's apartment, one of the police officers remained at the entrance of the building. Halil and two officers went up to the second floor. When they entered the apartment, the police officers carried out a search and an identity check. Several members of the İkincisoy family were present in the apartment, namely Mehmet Şah, Abdülkadir, Nasır, Adile, Sabriye, and Bilgi İkincisoy, as well as fourteen grandchildren of Abdülkadir İkincisoy and two of Mehmet Şah's friends. One of the police officers interrogated these two men in one of the rooms. The rest of the group was held in the sitting room. Suddenly, a gun shot was heard from the room and an armed clash broke between the police officers and the two men. The police officer who was interrogating the two men was shot dead. When the shooting started, the second police officer grabbed Mehmet Şah by his arm and dragged him downstairs. Halil and the others saw the two men try to escape. They heard further gunshots from downstairs. The group subsequently learnt that one of the men had died, the other had escaped and the officer who was waiting outside the building had been wounded.", "13. Approximately ten minutes following the incident, several police teams surrounded the building. Halil, Abdülkadir, Adile, Nasır, Sabriye and Bilgi İkincisoy were arrested and taken to the Çarşı Police Station by a minibus. When they arrived at the Çarşı Police Station, they were detained in the entrance hall. On the right hand side of the entrance hall, there were three rooms, two of which were used for interrogation and the third was the office of the superintendent. Halil was called in to one of the small rooms for interrogation. When he entered the room, he saw his brother Mehmet Şah, lying on the floor face down, with his red leather jacket pulled over his head. In the meantime Abdurrazak[3], Hüseyin, Makbule, Nefise and Garipşah İkincisoy were also arrested and brought to the Çarşı Station by another minibus. When the second group entered the station, they were told to cover their heads with their jackets. Abdurrazak1 however was able to see through the parting of his jacket. He also saw his son Mehmet Şah standing behind him. The group was subsequently transferred to another location by a minibus. Abdurrazak1 saw Mehmet Şah also in this second location. They were then brought to the Rapid Intervention Headquarters for interrogation, where the applicants heard the cries of Mehmet Şah.", "14. The first applicant was held in custody until 25 November 1995. When he was released, the police officers told him that if anyone asked about his son Mehmet Şah, the applicant had to say that he had fled to the mountains to join the guerrillas. The second applicant was released on 3 December 1993, eleven days after his arrest.", "15. On 6 December 1993 the first applicant went to the Diyarbakır State Security Court Public Prosecutor and submitted a petition outlining his concerns for the fate of his son. The public prosecutor showed him some photographs and from these photos the first applicant identified the body of Mehmet Şah. The public prosecutor informed him that Mehmet Şah had died in an armed clash on 25 November 1993 and that his body had been buried. When Abdurrazak[4] went to the cemetery, two unmarked graves were shown to him and he was told that one of them belonged to Mehmet Şah. On 13 December 1993 Abdurrazak1 submitted a petition to the Diyarbakır State Security Court Chief Public Prosecutor's office and requested permission to open his son's grave. His request was rejected verbally. On 13 December 1993 Abdurrazak1 lodged two petitions with the Diyarbakır State Security Court Chief Public Prosecutor's Office. He requested that an autopsy be conducted on Mehmet Şah's body in order to learn the true circumstances surrounding his death. He was told to go to the court to get permission for an autopsy. He filed another petition with the State Minister responsible for human rights and requested an investigation of the circumstances surrounding the death of his son. On 21 March 1993 the Ministry replied that Mehmet Şah had never been taken into custody.", "16. Following the communication of the application to the Government, Abdurrazak1 was summoned to the Diyarbakır public prosecutor's office on 6 June 1995. He was questioned about his application to the Commission and was forced to sign a statement in which he expressed his wish to retract his application. Thereafter he went to the Diyarbakır Human Rights Association and informed them about this incident.", "17. The Government stated that while the Anti-Terrorism Department of the Diyarbakır Security Court was taking a statement from an arrested person in connection with an ongoing investigation, they were informed that a person called Mehmet Şah İkincisoy was aiding and abetting the PKK. Accordingly a team of police officers went to Abdurrazak's1 apartment searching for his son Mehmet Şah. When they arrived at the apartment, the officers were informed that Mehmet Şah was spending the night at his uncle's apartment. Taking Halil with them to show them the way, the officers subsequently went to Abdulkadir İkincisoy's apartment. The officers carried out a search and found four men sleeping in one of the rooms. As they interrogated them, one of the men opened fire and killed one of the police officers. Another officer was wounded during the incident. The Government further stated that the four men tried to escape however one of them was shot dead.", "18. The Government further submitted that on 23 November 1993 the security forces received an anonymous telephone call, informing them that two armed men had been seen hiding in a hut near the Ongözlü Bridge. Accordingly, an operation was conducted. When the officers arrived near the hut, an armed clash broke out and lasted approximately twenty minutes. Following the clash, two men were found dead in the hut. The officers took photographs of the bodies to enable their identification. On 24 November 1993 an autopsy was conducted on one of the bodies, which was later identified as Mehmet Şah from the photographs. Furthermore, according to the ballistic examination reports, the guns that were found in the hut matched those used on 22 November 1993 in Abdulkadir İkincisoy's apartment.", "19. The parties submitted various documents to the Court. While delivering its judgment, the Court had particular regard to the following documents:", "20. The report stated that in connection with an ongoing investigation, a search was conducted in a house on 22 November 1993. The officers were looking for Hanefi İkincisoy[5] however they were informed that Hanefi İkincisoy was at his uncle's house. Accordingly, taking Halil with them to show them the way, the police officers left the apartment. When they arrived at the second apartment, the officers conducted a quick search and found four or five men sleeping in one of the rooms. When the officers asked the men to show their identification paper, they were attacked and a gun was fired. One person was arrested and while he was being taken to the police vehicle downstairs, another police officer was shot and wounded. The arrested person escaped and the person who had shot the officer was killed.", "21. According to the report, which was signed by officer Mustafa Şen, on 23 November 1993 at about 3 a.m. the anti-terrorism department received an anonymous telephone call informing them that the perpetrators of the incident of the previous day, who had caused the death of a police officer and the wounding of another, had been seen in a hut near the Ongözlü Brigde.", "22. The report states that following information from an anonymous telephone call at about 3 a.m. that two armed men were hiding in a hut near the Öngözlü Bridge, a police operation was carried out. Taking the necessary safety precautions, the officers positioned themselves 15 metres away from the hut and ordered the two men to surrender. Shots were fired from the hut in the direction of the security forces and a clash broke out. The clash lasted approximately twenty minutes. When the firing ceased, police officers entered the hut and found two dead bodies. One of the bodies had an ammunition belt with four cartridge clip holders, a Kalashnikov rifle and a cartridge clip. A Browning pistol was found on the second body. There were no identity cards on the bodies, which were subsequently taken to the State Hospital morgue.", "23. The autopsy report stated that rigor mortis had set in and bruising had appeared on the body. Two bullet entrance holes on the back side of the neck and two exit holes in the chest were noted. The report further stated that no other signs were observed. As the gunshot wounds were the certain cause of death, it was not considered necessary to carry out a full post-mortem examination. Finally, the estimated time of death was given as thirty-six hours before the autopsy was carried out.", "24. The Government have provided the photographs of the three dead bodies and photographs taken in the hut where Mehmet Şah was shot.", "25. The custody records of the Diyarbakır Security Directorate concerning the period of 21 November and 26 November 1993 do not contain the name of Mehmet Şah İkincisoy. They further indicate that Adile, Nefise, Bilgin, Garipşah, Makbule, Sabriye, Halil, Abdülkadir, Abdurrazak[6], Nasır and Hüseyin İkincisoy were taken in custody on 22 November 1993 at 3 a.m.", "26. In their police statements, Abdurrazak1, Makbule, Hüseyin and Garipşah İkincisoy submitted that on the night of the incident at about 1 a.m. police officers had arrived at their apartment, looking for Mehmet Şah. Abdurrazak1 informed them that Mehmet Şah was spending the night at his uncle's house. Accordingly, the police officers left, taking Halil with them to show them the way. About an hour later, the police officers returned and arrested them.", "27. The report which was delivered by the Diyarbakır State Hospital indicates that there were no signs of ill-treatment on the bodies of Bilgin, Adile, Nefise, Makbule, Hüseyin, Garipsah and Abdurrazak İkincisoy[7].", "28. In his police statement Halil explained that on the night of the incident, he was at his father Abdurrazak's1 house. At about 1 a.m. police officers arrived looking for his brother Mehmet Şah. Abdurrazak1 informed the officers that Mehmet Şah was spending the night at his uncle Abülkadir's house. Accordingly, Halil went with the officers to show them the way. When they arrived at Abdülkadir's apartment, the police officers asked for Mehmet Şah and they were told that he was sleeping in one of the rooms. Halil waited in the living room together with the other family members while the officers entered the room where Mehmet Şah and his friends were sleeping. A few minutes later a gun shot was heard and everyone in the living room fled to the neighbour's apartment. Halil further stated seeing Mehmet Şah and his two friends running away.", "29. As to the police statements of Abdülkadir, Nasır and Sabriye İkincisoy, they all stated that on the day of the incident Mehmet Şah had been staying at their apartment together with his two friends. At about 2 a.m. the same night, police officers came looking for Mehmet Şah. They conducted a search in the apartment and one of the officers entered the room where Mehmet Şah and his two friends were sleeping. A few minutes later, they heard a gun shot. All the family members fled to the neighbour's apartment whereas Mehmet Şah and his two friends tried to run away.", "30. The report of the Diyarbakır State Hospital indicates that there were no signs of ill-treatment on the bodies of Halil, Abdülkadir and Sabriye İkincisoy. The report further stated that there were certain marks on the body of Nasır İkincisoy. 11. Statements of Halil İkincisoy, Abdülkadir İkincisoy, Nasır İkincisoy and Sabriye İkincisoy taken by the public prosecutor, dated 3 December 1993", "31. In their statements to the public prosecutor, Halil, Abdülkadir and Nasır İkincisoy essentially repeated their police statements. As to Sabriye İkincisoy, while she reiterated the general account of the events, in her statement to the public prosecutor she did not mention that she had seen Mehmet Şah running away.", "32. In their statements Abdülkadir and Nasır İkincisoy stated that on 22 November 1993, while they were sleeping at home, police officers had come to their apartment looking for Mehmet Şah. He and his two friends had been spending the night with them. Nasır and Abdülkadir İkincisoy further explained that while the officers interrogated Mehmet Şah and his two friends in one of the rooms, a gun shot was heard. The family members fled to the neighbours' apartment and they were all subsequently arrested by the police. Nasır and Abdülkadir İkincisoy further denied their statements taken by the police and the public prosecutor.", "33. According to the report, prepared by the Regional Criminal Police Laboratory, a Kalashnikov automatic rifle, a Browning semi-automatic pistol, 251 bullet cases, and 12 bullets were taken into examination following the clash of 23 November 1993. It was further established that the bullets fired by the Kalashnikov rifle had been used in the killing of police officer Alişan Eol on 22 November 1993. The report further concluded that the Browning pistol had not been used in any previous incidents.", "34. According to the report prepared by the Diyarbakır State Security Court Public Prosecutor, Abdurrazak[8] identified the body of Mehmet Şah from the photographs.", "35. The first applicant requested information about the fate of his son, who had been arrested on 22 November 1993 at Abdülkadir İkincisoy's apartment.", "36. Upon learning from the public prosecutor that his son, Mehmet Şah, had died in a clash on 25 November 1993, the first applicant submitted to the prosecutor that he believed that his son had died in custody. He accordingly requested that an autopsy be conducted on the body of Mehmet Şah to clarify the exact cause of his death.", "37. The first applicant maintained that his son was taken into custody on 22 November 1993 together with twelve members of his family. He further stated that he had seen him both at the Çarşı Police Station and at the Rapid Intervention Headquarters. Although the first applicant was informed by the Diyarbakır State Security Court Public Prosecutor that his son had died in a clash on 25 November 1993, he requested the Minister to conduct a further investigation into the real circumstances surrounding the death.", "38. In his letter the Minister informed the first applicant that Mehmet Şah was never taken into custody. 19. Letter of the Ministry of Justice International Law and Foreign Affairs Directorate to the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor, dated 25 May 1995", "39. In their letter, the Ministry of Justice requested the Diyarbakır Chief Public Prosecutor to conduct an investigation concerning the individual application of Abdurrazak1 and Halil İkincisoy to the European Commission of Human Rights. The prosecutor was asked to take statements from the two applicants concerning certain documents that they had sent to the Commission.", "40. In response to the public prosecutor's question about the individual application that he had lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights, the first applicant explained that following the death of his son, Mehmet Şah, he had gone to the Diyarbakır Human Rights Association where he had signed certain documents. However he stated that he did not recall giving authorisation to British lawyers to initiate proceedings in Europe. He further indicated that he wished to retract his application.", "41. In his statement, which was addressed to the European Commission of Human Rights, the first applicant stated that he had been taken by plain-clothes police officers to the public prosecutor's office in May 1995. On the way to the public prosecutor's office, the officers forced him to deny that he wanted to pursue his application with the Commission. He maintained that he had to sign a statement in the public prosecutor's office out of fear and without knowing its content as he is illiterate.", "42. The facts of the case being in dispute between the parties, three Delegates of the Commission took oral evidence in Ankara between 28 June and 2 July 1999 from ten witnesses, including the applicants. The evidence of those who attended the hearing may be summarised as follows:", "43. The witness, who is the first applicant, stated that on the day of the incident at about 1 a.m. police officers had come to his house, looking for his son Mehmet Şah. He informed the officers that Mehmet Şah was staying at his uncle's house and told his other son Halil to show them the way. About half an hour after they had left, police officers came back and arrested everyone in the apartment, namely Hüseyin, Nefise, Makbule and Garipşah İkincisoy. They were first taken to the Çarşı Police Station. The police officers forced them to cover their heads with their jackets but the witness was able to see through the parting of his jacket. He saw that his two sons Halil and Mehmet Şah were also in the station. Thereafter, they were taken to the police headquarters by minibus. The witness further recalled seeing Mehmet Şah in the minibus. They waited for about half an hour at the police headquarters before being taken to the Rapid Intervention Force Headquarters, where they were blindfolded and the witness was able to hear the cries of Mehmet Şah. The witness and his daughters were released from custody three days after their arrest. At the time of his release, the officers told him that his son had fled to the mountains. They gave him Mehmet Şah's leather jacket but the witness refused to take it stating that his son would be cold without his jacket. The younger son of the witness, Halil, was released fourteen days after his arrest. When Mehmet Şah did not return home, the witness went to the Diyarbakır public prosecutor and asked about his son's whereabouts. The public prosecutor showed him some photos and asked him whether any of were of his son Mehmet Şah. The applicant identified his son's body. The prosecutor informed him that his son had died during an armed clash between the PKK and the security forces.", "44. The witness further explained that after he filed his application with the European Commission of Human Rights, he was summoned to the public prosecutor's office in 1995. The public prosecutor was angry with him for filing an application with the Commission. Out of fear, the witness stated before the public prosecutor that he would retract his application. However, before the Delegates, the witness affirmed that he intended to pursue his application. Finally he stated that he was able to visit his son's grave and pray for him.", "45. The witness, who is the second applicant, stated that on 22 November 1993 police officers had come to their house at about 1 a.m. He saw Feyzi Tatlı, a distant relative, with the police officers. The police officers carried out a quick search in the house and asked for his brother Mehmet Şah. His father, Abdurrazak[11], told them that Mehmet Şah was staying at his uncle's house. Accordingly, the witness accepted to accompany the three police officers to his uncle's house. When they arrived, the witness knocked on the door. Sabriye İkincisoy answered the door and let them in. One of the police officers remained outside and two of them entered. The officers conducted a search and carried out an identity check. When they found Mehmet Şah, they arrested him. Taking Mehmet Şah by his arm, one of the officers went out. The witness followed them. As they were walking along the corridor, they heard gunshots. The police officer, who was holding Mehmet Şah by his arm, dragged him downstairs. At that time, the witness saw Mehmet Şah's two friends running downstairs but he did not see where they went. The witness then fled to the neighbour's flat. His uncle Abdülkadir, his cousin Nasır, Nasır's wife and Abdülkadir's wife also joined him. Some time later, they were all arrested by the police and taken to the Çarşı Police Station. The police officers told them to cover their heads with their jackets. When they arrived at the Çarşı Station, they were forced to wait in a corridor. He described the entrance of the station and stated that there was a small hall followed by a long corridor, at the end of which there was a room. The witness saw Mehmet Şah lying face down on the floor in that room. Mehmet Şah was wearing a shirt, a pull over, a brownish leather jacket and denim jeans.", "46. The witness further confirmed seeing his father and sisters in the Çarşı Station. Subsequently, they were taken to a second place in a car, where they waited for a few minutes. The witness stated that he did not see Mehmet Şah in the second place. Then they were taken to a third place. The witness did not see anyone in this third place but heard the voices of his uncle, Feyzi Tatlı, and Mehmet Şah. Mehmet Şah was screaming in pain. The witness was kept there for thirteen days and he was allegedly ill-treated. The officers told him that his brother had escaped to the mountains. He was forced to sign a statement without reading its content. When he was released from custody, the witness went to the public prosecutor with his father to discover the fate of Mehmet Şah. The witness stated that when Mehmet Şah's body was identified from the photographs, they were told that he had been buried. An officer showed them two graves and informed them that he did not know which one was Mehmet Şah's.", "47. The witness, who is the first applicant's nephew, stated that on the night of 22 November 1993, he was at his father's house. His father (Abdülkadir İkincisoy), his mother (Adile), his wife (Sabriye), his children, his brother (Muhlis), and his brother's children were also at home. He recalled that his uncle's son, Mehmet Şah and his two friends had spent the night with them. The witness maintained that at about 1 a.m. two plain-clothes police officers had come to their house, together with his cousin Halil, searching for Mehmet Şah. At that time Mehmet Şah was sleeping in the guest room, together with his two friends and the brother of the witness, Muhlis. The police officers carried out an identity check and then told Mehmet Şah and his two friends that they had to come to the police station for interrogation. One of the officers held Mehmet Şah by the arm. At that moment they heard a gun shot. The police officer who was holding Mehmet Şah also started shooting. Mehmet Şah tried to prevent the police officer from shooting but the same police officer dragged him down the stairs. The witness further recalled that the family members fled to their neighbour's to protect themselves. After some time, more police officers arrived and arrested everyone. While they were being taken to the police station, the witness saw that one of the persons who had come with Mehmet Şah had been shot dead. The witness was put in a car and taken to the Rapid Intervention Headquarters. He remembered standing in a long corridor. Despite the fact that he was blindfolded, the witness was able to see around. He saw that his mother, his wife, the daughter of Muhlis and his uncle were also there. He also saw Feyzi Tatlı, a distant cousin. The witness said that he was taken to a room which was wet, where he saw Mehmet Şah, who was being tortured. Mehmet Şah was lying on the floor. He said to the witness “Our family is ruined. They will kill us all. What is this we are going through?”. The witness stated that this was the last time he saw Mehmet Şah.", "48. The witness, who is the daughter of the first applicant and the sister of the second, was at her father's house on the night of the incident. She said that while they were sleeping at home, some police officers came to their house and asked about her brother Mehmet Şah. When her father explained to the police officers that Mehmet Şah was staying at his uncle's house, the police officers left the house, taking Halil with them. Some time after, the police officers came back and arrested everyone in the house, including the witness. They were first taken to Çarşı Police Station and then to the police headquarters. The witness explained that she had not seen Mehmet Şah in the Çarşı Station but she had seen him at the police headquarters. When they arrived at the police headquarters, they walked upstairs and were taken into a hall. Their eyes were not covered but they were forced to hold their hands behind the back of their necks. They were made to stand facing the wall. When the witness glanced over her shoulder, she saw that Mehmet Şah was standing next to her. This was the last time she saw him. However she recalled hearing his voice at the Rapid Intervention Force, which was the third place they were taken to. He was moaning. She was kept in a cell, together with Makbule, Nefise, Adile, Bilge and Sabriye İkincisoy. At some point, Sabriye and Makbule were taken out of the cell and when they came back they were shivering. They therefore requested a blanket from the guardians and the guardians gave them a brown leather jacket which belonged to Mehmet Şah.", "49. The witness affirmed that he was a police officer at the Anti-Terrorism Branch of Diyarbakır Security Directorate at the time of the events. He recalled that after receiving information from Feyzi Tatlı, a person who was under custody, that Mehmet Şah had been aiding and abetting the PKK, an operation was prepared. Feyzi Tatlı was asked to point out the house of Mehmet Şah to a group of five police officers, including the witness. On 22 November 1993 at about 1 a.m. they arrived at the apartment of Abdurrazak[12], the father of Mehmet Şah. Abdurrazak1 told them that his son was staying at his uncle's house. Accordingly, taking a young person with them to show them the way, and leaving one police officer in the house of Abdurrazak1, they left. When they arrived at Mehmet Şah's uncle's house, one police officer remained near the patrol car, and the witness stayed outside the building. Two police officers went upstairs. A few minutes later the witness heard gun shots from upstairs. One of the police officers, Mustafa Hünerlitürkoğlu, came downstairs, holding someone by the wrist. He told the witness that the third police officer, Alişan, had been shot. The witness entered the building to help his colleague. At that time Mustafa went outside, still holding the detainee by the wrist. The witness then heard footsteps and he hid under the stairs. A person fired a Kalashnikov rifle at the witness and wounded him in the abdomen. The witness fired back and killed the person who had fired at him. He then went out of the building to get help. When officer Mustafa saw that the witness was wounded, he left the detainee and ran towards him. The person who had been in custody ran away. The witness was subsequently taken to hospital, where he underwent an operation. When he regained consciousness in the hospital, his colleagues asked him to sign the incident report they had prepared. The public prosecutor further took his statement while he was still in intensive care. The witness accepted that there had been a mistake in the names that appeared in the incident report. He agreed that instead of Hanefi İkincisoy, the name should have read Mehmet Şah İkincisoy. The witness further explained that he had not been involved in the arrests or interrogations of the people who had been in the house at the time of the incident.", "50. The witness confirmed that he was one of the five police officers who had gone to Mehmet Şah's apartment on 22 November 1993 at about 1 a.m. He recalled that after Feyzi Tatlı, a detainee, confessed during a police interrogation that Mehmet Şah was aiding and abetting the PKK, an operation was conducted to apprehend this person. Feyzi Tatlı showed them where Mehmet Şah lived. When they set off to arrest Mehmet Şah, the officers did not know what he looked like. One of the police officers stayed in the car, and the other four went into the house. Feyzi Tatlı was sent back to the police station in another vehicle. An elderly person opened the door, and informed them that Mehmet Şah was staying at his uncle's house that night. A young person accompanied the officers to the house in question. One of the police officers stayed behind in the house to ensure that no one could call Mehmet Şah to warn him. Accordingly, the three police officers and the young person went to the house of Mehmet Şah's uncle. A middle aged lady opened the door. The witness stated that they told the lady they would carry out an identity check and they entered the apartment. The witness went inside the room that was on the opposite side of the entrance. In that room, there were women and children. In the meantime, his colleague Alişan went inside another room from which an old man and a younger man had come out. The officers found a third room, in which four persons were sleeping. The witness made them stand in the corridor, while Alişan stayed in the room and called them in one by one for an identity check. A few minutes later, the witness heard noises coming from the third room and when he went in, he saw that a man was struggling with officer Alişan. The witness tried to help however the other persons interfered. One of the men had a Kalashnikov rifle and he fired at Alişan. When the witness saw that Alişan was shot, he grabbed one of the men, who did not have a gun, to use him as a shield. The witness ran downstairs to get help, still holding that man by his wrist. Downstairs, he met the third officer, Şerif, and told him that an armed clash had broken out upstairs and that Alişan had been shot. The witness then went outside the building to go to the car to use the radio. At that time, he heard Şerif ordering someone to surrender and subsequently he heard gun shots. The witness ran back to the building, letting go off the person he was holding. When he entered the building he saw that Şerif had been shot and the person who had shot at him had been killed. They called for reinforcements. 15 to 20 minutes after the incident, they were able to send Şerif to the hospital and thereafter he drafted the incident report by hand. The witness further explained that he had given the incident report to his colleagues who had arrived at the scene of incident and they had typed it up. He remembered signing the typed incident report at the hospital. When asked about the names indicated in the incident report, the witness admitted that there was a mistake. He had written Mehmet Şah's name as Hanefi İkincisoy. The witness further maintained that he had given a statement to the public prosecutor in the hospital. The witness also stated that he had not seen the photos of the two terrorists who were killed in a clash, the day after the incident.", "51. The witness confirmed that he had signed the autopsy report of Mehmet Şah İkincisoy. He is a doctor specialised in forensic medicine and pathology. He has been a forensic doctor since 1991. The witness did not recall the autopsy of Mehmet Şah however by looking at the documents he explained that the estimated time of death was 36 hours before the autopsy was carried out. There were no bruises on the body. There were certain discoloured spots but these were not signs of beating or force. The cause of death was the two bullets that had entered from the upper back region. There was an exit hole around the left breast, and another exit hole on the upper right side of the chest. Dr Eğilmez concluded that the entry and exit holes made it clear that the person had not been shot at close range.", "52. The witness affirmed that he was the head of Diyarbakır Anti-Terrorism Department at the time of the incident. He recalled that on the basis of information received from a detainee, Feyzi Tatlı, an operation was carried out to apprehend certain people. The witness was the head of the Central Branch however the interrogation office was located in the Rapid Intervention Force Building, which was also known as the police school. Officer Sürücü stated that as a general rule, the detainees were taken directly to the police school for interrogation. When asked about the armed clash, during which Mehmet Şah had allegedly been killed, the witness stated that he had not been directly involved in the operation. Although his name appeared on the incident report, he explained that these reports were usually signed by the officers who were replacing him and who had the power to sign for him. He remembered however that, on the day of the clash, they had received an anonymous call indicating that the two terrorists, who had escaped the day before, were hiding in a hut.", "53. The witness further confirmed that he had never been interrogated concerning the allegation that Mehmet Şah had died under torture.", "54. The witness, who is a police officer, stated that he was serving at the interrogation office of the Anti-Terrorism Department of Diyarbakır police headquarters in November 1993. He was police superintendent. The witness explained that, at that time, there were three interrogation teams and he was in charge of the first team. When asked about the general procedure that was followed after a person was arrested, he explained that before being brought for interrogation, all arrested persons were first sent for a medical examination. He emphasized the fact that the detainees were not blindfolded during the interrogation and that no one had been ill-treated. The interrogation office command was located in the headquarters of the Rapid Intervention Force in Diyarbakır. All the interrogations were conducted there. He refused the suggestion that the detainees could first be taken to the Çarşı Police Station. When a detainee was interrogated, the officers first asked about his past, and then certain questions were put to him. There was no standard form of procedure for interrogation.", "55. The witness affirmed that he had been involved in the interrogation of Feyzi Tatlı as well as the İkincisoy family members. However he could not remember the interrogation of the İkincisoy family members very clearly as it was almost six years ago. He recalled that upon receipt of intelligence to the effect that the two persons who had escaped the day before had been seen in a hut, an operation was conducted to apprehend them. The witness further took part in the operation together with 14 police officers. They were all wearing bullet proof vests. Before the armed clash, the officers asked the two persons to surrender but the two men started shooting at the officers. The clash lasted for about twenty minutes. They were about 15 metres away from the hut. No officer was wounded. When no-one returned their fire, the officers entered the hut and found two bodies. The hut was about ten square metres, it had a wooden door and a small window. Shortly after the armed clash, another team arrived and took photographs in the hut. The witness explained that he had never referred to this incident or showed the photographs to the İkincisoy family members during their interrogation.", "56. The witness affirmed that he had been the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor from December 1993 to September 1995. He recalled that he had taken a statement from the first applicant concerning his application to the European Commission of Human Rights on 6 June 1995. The witness explained that, by a letter dated 24 May 1995 from the International Law and Foreign Affairs Directorate of the Ministry of Justice, he was instructed to take the applicant's statement concerning his application to Strasbourg and to verify certain signatures on some documents. Accordingly, he had written to the Diyarbakır Security Department to notify the applicant that he was called to the office of the public prosecutor. The public prosecutor stated that the applicant had come to his office alone, of his own free will. No police officer had accompanied him to the public prosecutor's office. His statement was taken in the office of the clerks and not in the interrogation room. While they were in the office, the applicant seemed relaxed. The public prosecutor showed him certain documents, which were annexed to the letter from the Ministry. While accepting that these signatures belonged to him, the applicant stated that he did not remember signing these documents. The public prosecutor further recalled that the applicant had clearly stated that he did not want any foreign lawyers to make any applications before international bodies. The public prosecutor wrote down everything the applicant told him and read it out. The applicant accordingly signed his statement. The public prosecutor further admitted that he had not taken any steps to investigate the complaint, mentioned in the applicant's statement, that he had been ill-treated in custody and that his ribs had been broken." ]

[ 0, 2 ]

[ "8. The applicants were born in 1944 and they live in Malatya.", "9. On the evening of 5 November 1996, ten PKK members came to the applicants’ house. The same day, security forces were informed that a group of PKK members were hiding in the applicants’ village and they carried out an operation in the village to apprehend the PKK members.", "10. At around 11 p.m. the security forces surrounded the applicants’ house and requested them to come out. The applicants and their sons Bülent, born in 1974, and Turabi, born in 1977, emerged from their house. They showed the security forces the direction in which the PKK members had fled. A clash broke out and the security forces fired a rocket which killed Bülent.", "11. Following the death of his son, the first applicant stated before the Doğanşehir public prosecutor that his son had been killed by the security forces. The applicant asked the prosecutor to initiate criminal proceedings.", "12. A preliminary investigation into the incident was commenced by the Doğanşehir public prosecutor. The prosecutor subsequently decided that he had no jurisdiction to prosecute and transferred the case file to the Doğanşehir District Administrative Council.", "13. On 31 July 1997 the Doğanşehir District Administrative Council issued a decision stating that no prosecution should be brought against the members of the security forces. The Council concluded that the applicants’ son had died in the course of a confrontation between PKK members and the security forces.", "14. The applicants filed an objection with the Malatya Regional Administrative Court against the decision of 31 July 1997.", "15. On 29 September 1997 the Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicants’ objection." ]

[]

[ "4. The applicants M.Ł and A.Ł were born in 1952 and 1975 respectively. They both live in Warsaw, Poland.", "5. On 2 December 1994 the first applicant lodged a claim for maintenance against her ex-husband (“J.Ł”) with the Warsaw District Court (Sąd Rejonowy).", "6. On 22 February 1995 the court held a hearing and ordered an expert opinion. It was submitted to the court on 1 April 1995.", "7. At a hearing held on 9 June 1995 the trial court refused to issue an interim measure in order to secure the claim. The first applicant appealed. On 3 August 1995 the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) dismissed the appeal. Further hearings were held on 16 January, 16 September and 1 October 1996.", "8. On 10 October 1996 the District Court gave judgment. On 7 November 1996 the first applicant filed an appeal. On 25 March, 20 May and 29 September 1997 the Warsaw Regional Court held hearings. On 13 October 1997 it gave judgment and dismissed the appeal. On 5 January 1998 the first applicant lodged a cassation appeal.", "9. On 7 October 1999 the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) gave judgment and remitted the case to the Regional Court. On 22 December 1999 the Regional Court remitted the case to the District Court. On 8 May 2000 the first applicant modified her claim. On 10 May 2000 the District Court held a hearing in the applicant’s case.", "10. On 8 June 2000 the District Court refused to issue an interim measure in order to secure the claim. The applicant appealed. On 20 September 2000 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. Subsequent hearings were held on 9 January and 22 February 2001.", "11. On 22 January 2001 the President of the Warsaw District Court informed the applicant that he would supervise the case in order to expedite the proceedings. On 29 March 2001 the trial court held a hearing and ordered a joint opinion from three experts. On 10 May 2001 the court changed its previous order and decided that three expert opinions be obtained.", "12. On 8 July 2001 the first applicant complained to the President of the Warsaw Regional Court about the delay in the proceedings. On 27 July 2001, in reply to her complaints, the President observed that the proceedings were conducted without any delay.", "13. On 7 August 2001 the first applicant challenged an expert opinion. She further requested the court to exclude a certain expert from giving an opinion in her case. On 10 August 2001 the trial court dismissed her request. On 28 August 2001 the first applicant appealed against the decision. On the same date she challenged the impartiality of the presiding judge and requested his withdrawal from sitting in the case. On 7 September 2001 the District Court dismissed her request. The first applicant appealed.", "14. Subsequent hearing was held on 7 November 2002. On 15 April 2003 the Warsaw District Court gave judgment. The judgment is final.", "15. On 11 May 1993 the applicants lodged a claim with the Warsaw Regional Court, seeking annulment of a contract of sale of real estate.", "16. On 1 June 1993 the court exempted the applicants from court fees. On 26 January 1994 the court fixed the date of a first hearing for 9 March. The trial court held hearings on the following dates: 9 March 1994; 2 June 1995; 22 August and 24 October 1997; 29 March, 22 June, 10 October and 26 November 1999.", "17. On 10 December 1999 the Regional Court gave judgment and dismissed the claim. The applicants appealed.", "18. On 21 June 2000 the Warsaw Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) gave judgment. The applicants lodged a cassation appeal. On 11 July 2002 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.", "19. On 16 September 1996 the second applicant lodged a claim with the Warsaw District Court, seeking a higher amount of child maintenance. On 13 November 1996 the first applicant lodged a similar claim acting on behalf of her second daughter – “MA.Ł”. On 9 June 1997 the trial court joined the proceedings. On 27 June 1997 the court gave judgment. The applicants appealed. On 1 April 1998 the Warsaw District Court dismissed the applicants’ appeal and the judgment became final.", "20. On 7 November 1994 the first applicant lodged a claim against her ex‑husband - J.Ł. with the Warsaw District Court, seeking a removal of his parental rights over MA.Ł. On 6 February 1994 the first applicant modified her claim. On 3 March 1995 the ex-husband lodged a counter claim (wniosek wzajemny). On 7 November 1996 and 4 April 1997 respectively, the first applicant again modified her claim.", "21. In the meantime, the trial court had obtained a number of expert opinions concerning MA.Ł.’s state of health. On 25 May 1997 the court dismissed the first applicant’s claim. On 16 June 1997 the first applicant appealed. On 21 January 1998 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed the appeal. On 22 July 1998 the applicant lodged a cassation appeal against the judgment. On 25 May 1999 the Supreme Court dismissed the cassation appeal.", "22. On 14 December 1993 a bill of indictment was lodged with the Warsaw District Court against J.Ł. He was charged with uttering threats and failure to pay child maintenance. On 14 March 1994 the court allowed the first applicant to take part in the proceedings as an auxiliary prosecutor (oskarżyciel posiłkowy). On 2 December 2002 the Warsaw District Court convicted J.Ł as charged. On 30 October 2003 the Warsaw Regional Court quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case. The proceedings are pending before the Regional Court." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "9. The facts of the case, in particular the circumstances surrounding the death of the applicant’s brother İrfan Ağdaş on 13 May 1996, are disputed by the parties.", "10. On 13 May 1996, at about 7.00 p.m., the applicant’s brother İrfan Ağdaş, aged 17, was walking through the Alibeyköy neighbourhood. Three plain-clothed police officers, who were patrolling the neighbourhood in an unmarked car, noticed the newspaper which İrfan was carrying in his hand and began to follow him. The newspaper was Zafer Yolunda Kurtuluş (Salvation in the Path of Glory) known for its leftist point of view. When İrfan noticed that he was being followed, he started to run. At that moment two of the police officers got out of the car and opened fire. İrfan was shot and he fell to the ground.", "11. The police officers proceeded to kick him where he lay on the ground. A woman, A.B., a witness to the incident, ran to İrfan to help him. However, the police officers pushed her aside and put İrfan in the car. One of the police officers sat on him as they drove away. After an hour or so they left İrfan’s body near the Eyüp SSK Hospital.", "12. On 13 May 1996, at about 8.00 p.m., three plain-clothed police officers from the anti-terrorist branch of the Istanbul Security Directorate, who were patrolling the Alibeyköy neighbourhood in an unmarked car, approached four suspects in order to carry out an identity control and a body search. The suspects, among whom was the applicant’s brother, İrfan Ağdaş, attempted to run away. During their flight, İrfan opened fire at the police officers. The police officers called them all to surrender and returned fire. The police officers did not aim at İrfan Ağdaş but fired warning shots. The other three suspects fled into the side streets and disappeared. During the exchange of fire, the applicant’s brother was wounded and died after his transfer to hospital by the police officers.", "13. The police found twenty-seven copies of the newspaper Zafer Yolunda Kurtuluş in the black plastic bag that İrfan had been carrying.", "14. Another patrolling police squad, informed about the armed incident through the police radio communications, arrived at the scene of the shooting. The witnesses told them that İrfan had been taken to hospital by the police officers present during the incident.", "15. Upon the request of the Head of Eyüp Security Directorate, a doctor from the Eyüp SSK Hospital performed a post-mortem examination at 8.20 p.m. In the report drafted by the doctor, two bullet entry wounds were recorded. It was also stated in the report that İrfan was already dead when he was brought to the hospital.", "16. At 8.50 p.m. the second police squad which arrived at the scene drafted an incident report and drew a sketch of the scene of the incident. The police squad directly involved in the alleged armed clash drafted an incident report at 9.20 p.m.", "17. At around 9.30 p.m., the second police squad submitted to the police station the following items found at the scene of the incident: one 9 mm calibre Browning gun, six empty 9 mm calibre cartridges, seventeen empty 9 mm calibre cartridges, one cartridge clip and twenty‑seven copies of the Zafer Yolunda Kurtuluş newspaper.", "18. On 14 May 1996 the applicant’s other brother Cemal Ağdaş identified the body in the morgue of the Forensic Institute. Subsequently, he lodged a complaint with the Eyüp Public Prosecutor, requesting that an on-site inspection of the scene of the incident be conducted and that the eyewitnesses be heard.", "19. On the same day, the Fatih Public Prosecutor opened a criminal investigation into the death of İrfan Ağdaş. He requested the forensic department to carry out an autopsy on the body of the applicant’s brother and send the autopsy report to his office.", "20. At 11.00 a.m., a preliminary autopsy on İrfan Ağdaş was carried out by a forensic expert at the Fatih Forensic Medicine Institute. In the autopsy report it was recorded that there was one bullet wound to the left side of his chest, two bullet wounds to his left elbow and one to his right scapula. It was concluded that a final autopsy should be carried out in order to determine the cause of death.", "21. Later on the same day, the final autopsy was carried out by three forensic experts, in the presence of the Fatih Public Prosecutor. In the autopsy report which was drafted at a later date (5 July 1996) it was concluded that İrfan had died of a haemorrhage due to his bullet wounds. One bullet entry wound from the left elbow, one bullet exit wound from the left arm, one bullet entry wound from the left nipple and one bullet exit wound from the back were found on the body. Although it was not possible to establish the exact shooting range, the bullet wounds suggested that İrfan was not shot at close range which was considered to be within 30 to 40 cm. The chemical analysis indicated that neither alcohol nor any other narcotic substances had been found in his blood. Furthermore, no nitrate or nitrite ion was found on the skin samples taken from İrfan’s hands.", "22. Meanwhile, two eyewitnesses gave statements at the Istanbul branch of the Human Rights Association.", "23. S.M. stated as follows:\n“At around 7.00 p.m. I saw a young man walking in front of my house. [At that moment I saw] a white Toros car coming very fast towards the young man, from the top end of the street. The license plate of the car was 34 FT 322. There were three plain-clothed men in the car. One of them got out of the car and fired a few shots from 4 to 5 meters. I believe that the young man was hurt on the leg. He started to run down the street. One of the men, who was already out of the car, ran after him and continued shooting with a gun and an automatic weapon. At that moment there were many children on the street. They ran approximately 150 or 200 meters. Afterwards I saw the young man fall on the ground. He had been shot in the back. The three men kicked him as he was lying on the ground. They put him in the car and sat on him.”", "24. A.B. stated as follows:\n“Everything took place before my eyes. I was walking on the street with my grandchild. When I heard some shots, first I thought the children were playing a game. Then I saw a young man lying on the street. He was bleeding. There was blood on his chest and on his back. When I saw two men kicking him in the head I bent down over him. However, they pushed me aside, put him in the car and drove away.”", "25. On the same day, the 9 mm calibre Browning gun together with its six cartridges, one cartridge clip and seventeen empty cartridges of 9 mm calibre were submitted to the Criminal Police Laboratory of Istanbul for a ballistics examination. The report concluded that seven of the bullets had been discharged from the Browning gun and that ten of the bullets had been fired from the weapons used by the police officers.", "26. In a letter dated 14 May 1996, replying to an inquiry initiated by the Eyüp Security Directorate, Istanbul Security Directorate stated that a confiscation order had been pronounced by the Istanbul State Security Court in respect of the issue of the newspaper collected at the scene of the incident.", "27. On 15 May 1996, upon the public prosecutor’s request, the Eyüp Security Directorate drafted an incident report and submitted it, together with the newspapers and the weapons collected at the scene of the incident, to his office.", "28. On 16 May 1996 the Eyüp Public Prosecutor issued a decision of non-jurisdiction. The public prosecutor stated that İrfan Ağdaş had opened fire on the police officers after they had requested to see his identity card. The police officers had returned fire in order to arrest him. However, as a result of their careless shooting, İrfan Ağdaş had been killed. The public prosecutor decided to transfer the case-file to the office of the Eyüp District Governor pursuant to the provisions of Law on Prosecution of Civil Servants since the alleged crime had been committed while the police officers were on duty.", "29. On 20 May 1996 the Eyüp District Governor forwarded the case-file to the office of the Istanbul Governor.", "30. On 23 May 1996 the applicant’s other brother Cemal Ağdaş lodged an objection with the Eyüp Assize Court against the Eyüp Public Prosecutor’s decision of non-jurisdiction. He stated that the public prosecutor had decided to transfer the case-file to the office of the Eyüp District Governor without conducting a serious investigation.", "31. On the same day, Cemal Ağdaş also lodged a complaint with the Eyüp Magistrate’s Court. He requested that an on-site inspection be conducted into his brother’s death and that the eyewitnesses be heard by the court in accordance with Article 158 of the Law on Criminal Prosecution which provides that the Magistrate’s Court can conduct a criminal investigation in cases where a delay may cause a setback in the investigation.", "32. On 27 May 1996 the Eyüp Magistrate’s Court rejected Cemal Ağdaş’s complaint of 23 May 1996 on the grounds that the administrative and judicial authorities had already initiated an investigation into the matter. On 3 June 1996 Cemal Ağdaş lodged an objection with the Eyüp Assize Court against the Eyüp Magistrate’s Court’s decision of 27 May 1996, arguing that the Magistrates were entitled to conduct an ex officio investigation in urgent matters pursuant to Article 158 of the Law on Criminal Procedure. On 4 June 1996 Eyüp Assize Court decided that the decision of the Eyüp Magistrate’s Court was in accordance with the law and dismissed Cemal Ağdaş’s objection.", "33. On 11 June 1996 the Eyüp Assize Court rejected the objection filed against the public prosecutor’s decision of non-jurisdiction.", "34. On 13 August 1996 the transcripts of police radio communications, recorded on the day of the incident, at approximately 8.00 p.m., were drafted. The following conversations are extracts from these records:\n“(20.09 a.m.)\n4032: HQ\nHQ: I am listening\n4032: there was a person carrying a plastic bag. We opened fire at him. We captured the wounded person. Now we are on our way to ...\nHQ: indicate the address\n4032: it is up the Saya Hill. There is chaos in the neighbourhood. We shot the man.\n(...)\n(20.11 a.m.)\nHQ: (...) our TEM team has captured a person in a mixed 502 situation. (...) the police squads which are nearby should provide help.\n(20.14)\nHQ: On Gülistan Street the TEM team opened fire without a 502 situation. A wounded person has been captured. Now all the patrolling squads are going back to their normal routine. We will only have to take some precautions at the hospital.”", "35. On 17 August 1996 A.B. and two persons who did not want to disclose their names gave statements to the applicant’s representative. A.B. stated as follows:\n“I was sitting, together with my neighbours, on Gülistan Street where the incident occurred. I saw two plain-clothed persons who were running after a 16-17 years old boy. It was starting to get dark. It was around 7.00 p.m. [...] They were shooting at the boy from behind. There were approximately 15 meters [between the two men and the boy]. As a result of the shooting the boy fell on the ground. When he was falling he turned himself around and fell on his face. There were 10 meters between me and the boy. When I ran and bent down over him in order to take him to a hospital, one of the men said “Lady! Stay back!” They immediately took him by his hands and legs, put him on the back seat of their white car and drove away. During the chase I saw very clearly that the boy did not posses any weapon or anything like it. I also saw very clearly that the boy was shot in the back. When they were putting him in the car he was still alive. I learned afterwards that he died at the hospital. I learned from the press that his name was İrfan Ağdaş.”", "36. The two other witnesses, who wished to remain anonymous because of their fear of police, stated that they had heard shootings at around 7.00 p.m. on the day of the incident and that they saw two men in plain-clothes, holding large weapons, standing next to a boy who was lying on the ground. One of the witnesses stated that the boy was lying on his back. When the two men noticed the people were coming out of their houses, they immediately put him into their car and drove away. They further stated that they learned the identity of the boy and the profession of the two men from the press.", "37. Between 22 August and 9 September 1996, police superintendent Sebahattin Hacıoğlu, in his capacity of investigator, took statements from the applicant, the applicant’s wife, Cemal Ağdaş and the police officers, A.K., B.M. and A.Y. The police officers stated that when they were on patrol on 13 May 1996 in the Alibeyköy neighbourhood they had requested to see the identity cards of four suspicious individuals. Instead of complying with the request, the individuals started to run and one of them opened fire. When the police officers returned his fire in order to arrest him, he was wounded. They seized his gun and twenty-seven copies of a newspaper called Zafer Yolunda Kurtuluş that he had with him. They took the wounded man to the Eyüp SSK Hospital.", "38. On 23 October 1996 the police superintendent drafted a recommendation report (fezleke) concerning the death of İrfan. In his report he concluded that the police officers had performed their duty with diligence and that no fault or negligence could be attributed to them. The use of force by the police officers was in accordance with the law. He suggested not to bring any prosecution or disciplinary proceedings against them.", "39. On 14 November 1996, despite the police superintendent’s submission, the Istanbul Provincial Administrative Council decided that the police officers A.K., B.M. and A.Y. should be prosecuted pursuant to Article 455 of the Criminal Code. It was further decided that the proceedings should be brought against the police officers before the Istanbul Criminal Court of First Instance.", "40. On 3 February 1997 the Istanbul Criminal Court of First Instance decided that it had no jurisdiction to examine the case. It stated that although the incident concerned death due to negligence, as the real perpetrator of the killing was unknown, the matter should be examined by the Istanbul Assize Court. It therefore, transferred the case-file to the Istanbul Assize Court.", "41. On 6 March 1997 the Istanbul Assize Court decided that it had no jurisdiction to examine the matter as it fell under the jurisdiction of the Eyüp Assize Court. It transferred the case-file to the office of the Eyüp Public Prosecutor.", "42. On 3 April 1997 the Eyüp Public Prosecutor filed an indictment charging the three police officers with “intentional homicide” under Article 448 of the Criminal Code.", "43. On 14 April 1997 the first hearing took place before the Eyüp Assize Court. The court summoned the police officers A.K., B.M. and A.Y. since they had not been present at the hearing. As A.K. had been appointed to a post at the Şırnak Security Directorate the court requested the Şırnak Assize Court to take his statement.", "44. On 13 May 1997 the Şırnak Assize Court summoned A.K. As he did not attend the hearing of 30 May 1997, the court repeated its request.", "45. On 17 June 1997 the second hearing took place. The court accepted requests from the applicant, his wife Şükran Ağdaş and his other brother Cemal Ağdaş to intervene in the proceedings. All three interveners and the eye-witness A.B. gave oral evidence before the court. They all refuted the allegation that there had been an armed clash.", "46. A.B.’s statement given before the court was as follows:\n“On the day of the incident, at around 5.00 or 6.00 p.m. I was sitting in front of my house. Children were playing on the street. When I heard the shootings I wanted to bring my grandchildren home. I saw two plain-clothed policemen. One of them was holding a gun in one hand and a big weapon in the other hand. The big weapon was almost half a meter long. He was shooting with both of them. He shot İrfan with the big weapon from a distance of approximately 10 meters. I was 3 to 4 meters away from İrfan. When he was wounded he fell to the ground. I went next to him. I asked the police officers why they had shot him. They did not let me [help him]. I went to inform the neighbours about what had happened. When I came back, the police officers had put İrfan into a white car. Only one of the bullets hit İrfan although they had fired a lot. I don’t think that he was dead. I believe that they shot him again in the car and killed him. (...) I did not see any weapon in İrfan’s hand.”", "47. The police officers B.M. and A.Y. did not attend the hearing. The applicant requested the court to detain the accused police officers on remand. The court dismissed his request holding that it was not necessary to arrest them at that stage of the proceedings.", "48. On 18 June, 18 July, 1 August and 1 September 1997 hearings were held before the Şırnak Assize Court in order to take A.K.’s statements. However, the latter failed to attend the hearings held on the afore-mentioned dates.", "49. During the hearing of 9 September 1997 there was a big crowd in front of the court room, protesting about the incident. Moreover the case also attracted the attention of the media. The Eyüp Assize Court decided to ask the Court of Cassation’s opinion on whether it was necessary to transfer the case-file to a different court for security reasons.", "50. On 16 September 1997 A.K. appeared before the Şırnak Assize Court. He reiterated his statements given at the Security Directorate and pleaded not guilty.", "51. On 17 December 1997 the Court of Cassation decided that the Eyüp Assize Court should continue with the proceedings.", "52. On 4 March 1998 A.K. was called once again before the Şırnak Assize Court. He only reiterated his previous statements and made no further comments.", "53. On 17 March 1998 the accused police officers B.M. and A.Y. testified before the Eyüp Assize Court for the first time. The summary of B.M.’s testimony is as follows:\n“On the day of the incident I was on patrol with my colleagues on the Gülistan Street in the Karadolap neighbourhood where there are terrorist activities. At around 8.00 p.m. we saw three men and one woman who looked suspicious. One of them was holding a bag. First I went out of the car, and then my colleagues followed me. We told them that we were police officers and that we wanted to make [an identity check and] a body search. We were standing within hearing range. At that moment one of the men and the woman started to run into the side streets. The other man ran towards Gülistan Street. He took out a gun. We were not running after him. I do not remember the distance between us. He opened fire. Actually I only heard shots. I knelt down [in order to protect myself]. My colleagues were behind me. When the man did not stop shooting I returned fire without really targeting. I noticed at that moment that my colleagues were shooting as well. After a while we realised that the man was wounded. We took the man to the hospital. As I stated before, the two men and the woman had run away. A crowded group of people began to come towards us. In order to protect ourselves from another possible attack, we quickly put the wounded person into the car and took him to hospital. I acted in accordance with the law [and used my right of self-defence]. He shot at us first. We did not intend to kill him. “", "54. A.Y. reiterated B.M.’s testimony and added the following statement:\n“(...) When I went close to the wounded person he told me that he was shot in the left arm. It did not seem to be a serious wound. I seized his gun. [Later on] I handed it over to my supervisor. I do not know if a fingerprint examination was conducted later on. We had no time to collect the empty cartridges. We informed headquarters about the incident and that we were taking him to hospital.”", "55. At the same hearing the court decided that the officers who had collected the empty cartridges should be summoned to appear before the court. The court further requested the transcripts of the police radio communications which were recorded on the day of the incident.", "56. On 22 April 1998 the Eyüp Police Headquarters submitted the verbatim transcripts of the police radio communications to the Eyüp Assize Court.", "57. At the hearing of 28 May 1998, the police officers’ representative asked the court to request the Eyüp Police Headquarters to inform them whether the transcripts submitted on 22 April 1998 were the full version of the radio communications and whether the accused police officers had been part of the TEM team (Terörle Mücadele – Struggle with Terrorism) mentioned in the transcripts as the team present at the crime scene. The court also asked for the meaning of a “502” situation which was often referred to in the transcripts. Moreover, at the same hearing, the court dismissed once again the applicant’s request to detain the accused officers on remand. The officers who had collected the empty cartridges from the scene of the incident did not appear before the court to give their testimonies.", "58. In the Eyüp Security Directorate’s reply to the court, dated 30 June 1998, it was stated that the transcripts were the full version of the radio communications and that a “502” situation indicated an armed conflict with policemen.", "59. At the hearing dated 7 July 1998 the court again dismissed the applicant’s request to detain the accused police officers on remand. Moreover it repeated its request to the Eyüp Police. The officers who had collected the empty cartridges did not appear before the court.", "60. On 21 August 1998, the Eyüp Security Directorate confirmed that the three accused police officers were the TEM team mentioned in the transcripts.", "61. At the hearing dated 10 September 1998 the Eyüp Assize Court ordered the accused policemen’s detention on remand in absentia as they had not appeared before the court despite having been summoned to do so. Moreover, the court was unable to take statements from the members of the second police squad, as they also, once again, did not reply to the summons.", "62. On 11 September 1998 the Istanbul Security Directorate informed the court that the accused police officers A.Y. and A.K. were doing their military service in Amasya and in Şırnak respectively, and that they were no longer attached to their directorate. However, as the accused police officer B.M. was still working at the Istanbul Security Directorate he would be able to appear before the court when necessary.", "63. On 16 September 1998 B.M. appeared before the court to give his statement. He denied the authenticity of his signature on the bottom of the incident report drafted on 13 May 1996 at 8.50 p.m.", "64. On 2 November 1998 A.K. appeared before the Şırnak Assize Court once again and repeated his previous statements, stressing that there had been an armed clash. He pleaded not guilty to the charges brought against him.", "65. On 23 November 1998 the court repeated its call for the two police officers to testify before the court.", "66. On 25 November 1998, following the Eyüp Assize Court’s order of detention on remand in absentia, A.K. appeared before the Şırnak Assize Court once again. After reiterating his previous statements, he was released. The Şırnak Assize Court stated that as the only reason for issuing an order of detention on remand was to take A.K.’s statements, there was no need to detain him.", "67. On 16 February 1999 E.A., who was one of the police officers who had collected the empty cartridges after the incident, testified before the Eyüp Assize Court. He maintained that upon hearing the radio communication on the armed clash, they had gone to the scene of the incident and collected seventeen empty cartridges at the crime scene.", "68. On 19 April 1999 the court once again dismissed the applicant’s persistent request to detain the accused policemen. It reaffirmed that as the court had taken the statements of all three accused there was no need to detain them at that stage of the proceedings. However, the applicant further alleged that the empty cartridges kept in the security directorate were not the same as those mentioned in the ballistics report. He therefore requested to see the empty cartridges. The court communicated this request to the Security Directorate.", "69. At the hearing held on 23 June 1999 the Eyüp Security Directorate did not respond to the court’s demand to obtain the empty cartridges. On 8 September 1999 the Eyüp Security Directorate informed the court that as the police station was under renovation they had been unable to find the requested cartridges.", "70. On 27 October 1999 the court asked the Eyüp Public Prosecutor the identity and the address of the three people who were together with İrfan at the time of the incident. These people had allegedly been taken into police custody at a later date. The court again dismissed the applicant’s request to detain the police officers on remand.", "71. At the hearing dated 29 December 1999 both the Security Directorate and the Eyüp Public Prosecutor did not reply to the court’s inquiry. The applicant and the Public Prosecutor repeated their request to detain on remand the accused police officers. The court dismissed their request.", "72. On 24 February 2000 the Istanbul Security Directorate, informed the court about the identity of two of the individuals who were with İrfan at the time of the incident. According to this information, both ‘terrorists’ had been killed in an operation carried out on 20 August 1996 in Eyüp.", "73. At the hearings which took place on 22 March 2000 and 15 May 2000 the Security Directorate failed once again to submit the requested items.", "74. On 19 July 2000 the Eyüp Assize Court repeated its order to have a ballistics examination of the three weapons belonging to the accused policemen, in order to determine from which of these weapons the empty cartridges found at the scene of the incident had been discharged. On 7 August 2000 the ballistic exam was conducted by the experts at the Criminal Police Laboratory of Istanbul.", "75. On 23 October 2000 the ballistic report was read out before the court. According to this report only four of the seventeen empty cartridges matched one of the identified weapons. Of the remaining cartridges, six came from a different weapon and seven yet another. However, none of these weapons were those submitted for the ballistics examination. During this hearing the applicant complained that despite his requests, both the Fatih Public Prosecutor and the Eyüp Magistrate’s Court had not conducted an on-site inspection of the scene of the incident and he repeated the same request before the court. The Eyüp Assize Court dismissed the applicant’s request considering that to carry out an on-site inspection almost five years after the incident would not shed light on the facts of the case.", "76. On 22 January 2001 the applicant raised an objection to the ballistics report. He complained before the court that the report did not indicate from which weapon the empty cartridges had been discharged. Moreover, he stated that as there had been no examination of the weapon allegedly used by İrfan, it could be concluded that he had not used any arm.", "77. At the same hearing the public prosecutor submitted his opinion. In view of the transcripts of the police radio communications recorded on the day of the incident, the public prosecutor advised the court to convict the accused police officers as charged. However, he also maintained that Law No. 4616 on the suspension of sentences regarding the offences committed before 23 April 1999 should be applicable to the accused.", "78. On 19 February 2001, as the accused police officers and their lawyer were absent, the court requested the concluding remarks of the parties for the next hearing.", "79. On 2 April 2001 the Eyüp Assize Court delivered its final judgment. By making reference to the ballistics reports dated 14 May 1996 and 7 August 2000, the autopsy report, the transcripts of the police radio communications and the statements of the accused police officers, the interveners and the witnesses, it concluded that İrfan Ağdaş had died in an armed clash. It consequently acquitted the police officers on the ground that they had acted in self defence.\nIn the detailed reasoning of the judgment, which was four pages long, the court held that A.B.’s testimony was not reliable as she failed to provide the exact time of the incident. Moreover it observed that according to A.B. when she saw İrfan he had only one bullet wound. She therefore testified that İrfan must have been shot dead in the car. However according to the autopsy report dated 5 July 1996, İrfan had more than one bullet wound on his body and although it was not possible to establish the exact shooting range, the wounds suggested that İrfan was not shot at close range defined as being between 30 to 40 cm. In the light of these considerations, the court did not find A.B.’s evidence convincing.\nThe court also held that although all three members of the deceased’s family argued that there had been no armed clash between the accused and the victim, since they had not witnessed the incident, their arguments could not be sustained.\nOn the other hand, the court examined the statements of the accused police officers and concluded that they corresponded to the findings of the autopsy report. It maintained that as İrfan was carrying a plastic bag in his left hand and was shooting with his right hand, as described by the accused, it was logical that he was wounded on the left side of his chest and on his left elbow. Moreover it emphasized that, it was only in the heat of the moment that the police officers informed the headquarters that a mixed 502 situation had occurred.", "80. Both the applicant and the Eyüp Public Prosecutor appealed against the decision of the Eyüp Assize Court. On 1 July 2002 the Court of Cassation upheld the decision of the assize court." ]

[ 0 ]

[ "5. The applicant, Mr Viktor Petrovich Romashov, is a Ukrainian national, who was born in 1954 and currently resides in Lysychansk, Ukraine. The applicant is a pensioner.", "6. In May 1998 the applicant filed an application with the labour disputes commission of the Lysychans’ke Derzhavne Shakhtobudivne Upravlinnia (the “DSU”) to recover unpaid salary from a State-run coal mine.", "7. On 16 June 1998 the labour disputes commission of the DSU allowed his claims and ordered the DSU to pay the applicant UAH 8,783.39[1] in compensation. On the same date the commission issued a certificate to the applicant, which had the same status as a writ of execution.", "8. On 27 July 1998 the DSU’s property was attached by the tax inspectorate.", "9. On 9 June, 7 July and 19 November 1999 the applicant was paid UAH 500[2], UAH 300[3] and UAH 210[4] respectively.", "10. On 30 April 2000 the Lysychansk Department of Justice informed the applicant that there was a tax lien over the DSU’s property and it was therefore not possible to attach it. It also informed the applicant that there was no funding in the State budget to execute the decision of 16 June 1998.", "11. On 14 June 2000 the applicant was informed that the labour commission decision of 16 June 1998 could not be executed due to the Coal Mining Ministry’s lack of funds.", "12. On 23 January 2002 the Lysychansk City Court awarded the applicant UAH 2,282.21 to compensate for the loss of value of the sum awarded to him due to inflation. The applicant submitted that this judgment has remained unenforced.", "13. On 10 January 2003 the applicant informed the Court that the execution proceedings in his case were still pending.", "14. On 28 November 2003 the DSU paid the applicant the full amount of the debt awarded by the decision of 16 June 1998.", "15. On 1 December 2003 the Execution Service terminated the enforcement proceedings as the judgment of 16 June 1998 had been enforced in full (UAH 8,783.39[5])." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "9. The applicants (Desmond O’Reilly, James McGurren, Carol Moore, William Moore, Kevin Ludlow, Patrick Leddy, Patrick Brady and John Wilson) live in Belturbet, Ireland and all have homes, farms or business premises on a public road in Belturbet.", "10. On 21 July 1994 certain residents on the road (including the applicants) applied on an ex parte basis for leave to take judicial review proceedings. The relief sought was an order of mandamus compelling the Council to repair the road and put it in good condition, a declaration that the Council had failed in its statutory duty to maintain the road in good repair and condition together with damages for breach of statutory duty and costs.", "11. On 25 July 1994 leave was granted to apply for judicial review by way of an order of mandamus. By letter dated 4 August 1994 the applicants served the proceedings on the Council. On 5 December 1994 the Council served its statement of opposition. On 14 December 1994 the Council filed an affidavit of the County Engineer, on 20 February 1995 the applicants filed an affidavit in response, on 29 March 1995 the County Engineer filed a further affidavit and on 31 March 1995 the applicants filed a final responding affidavit. The pleadings thereby closed.", "12. On 4 and 5 April 1995 the application for judicial review was heard by the High Court. Judgment was reserved.", "13. Some months thereafter, senior counsel for both parties requested an early judgment of the relevant High Court judge who indicated that she could not given the extent of her commitments.", "14. In November 1996 one of the applicants wrote to the President of the High Court requesting that arrangements be made to have the judgment delivered quickly. The President of the High Court responded that he would endeavour to have the judgment delivered speedily.", "15. By judgment delivered on 6 December 1996 the High Court made an order of mandamus requiring the Council to repair the road and to put it into good condition. The court found that the Council had a statutory obligation to repair the road and keep it in good condition and that the Council’s lack of resources could not constitute a defence. An order for costs was made in the applicants’ favour.", "16. The Council requested a stay on the order of the High Court and this application was adjourned until 20 December 1996, when the High Court judge ordered that execution on foot of the order be stayed for six months from the date of perfection of the High Court order, that any application for an extension of the stay be made to the Supreme Court and that, in the event of an appeal by the Council, the stay on the order for costs would remain pending final determination of the appeal.", "17. On 9 January 1997 the Council appealed to the Supreme Court. On 16 January 1997 the Council requested the applicants’ consent to the Council amending its notice of appeal. The applicants so consented.", "18. In 1997 the Council commenced repair work on the relevant road, which was completed by the end of 1998.", "19. On 11 March 1997 the Attorney General applied for liberty to appear as amicus curiae and be heard in the proceedings. By affidavit dated 1 May 1997 the applicants objected to the application and to the arguments the Attorney General was proposing to make. A hearing took place on this point on 22 July 1997 following which the Attorney General was given leave to appear and address the Supreme Court at the appeal hearing.", "20. A date for the hearing of the appeal was fixed for December 1997 but this was vacated to accommodate an urgent case. On 18 February 1998 the Supreme Court started but did not finish the appeal hearing. It could not finish it on the next day because of other pre-assigned business. The next available hearing date was over a year later on 26 February 1999. On that date the appeal hearing resumed and concluded. Although the repair work on the road had been completed by that time, the Supreme Court considered that the appeal should proceed given the public importance of the issues.", "21. On 17 June 1999 the Supreme Court delivered its judgment allowing the appeal. The court noted that the Council did not have the financial resources necessary to repair the estimated 600 roads in poor condition in the area and considered that the courts should not make orders of mandamus where it is acknowledged that the public authority did not have the resources to comply with the order and where the implementation of the order depended on the co-operation of other Government bodies.", "22. The case was adjourned to 22 June 1999 for submissions on ancillary orders to be made. On that day the Supreme Court confirmed its decision to allow the appeal. No order as to the costs (of the High or Supreme Court) was made so that the parties were responsible for their own costs." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "9. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Istanbul. He is the widower of the deceased Sariye Yılmaz. He introduced this application on his own behalf and on behalf of his family and deceased spouse. At the time of the events at issue the applicant was residing in the village of Bayırlı (Karıncak) attached to the Lice district.", "10. In June 1996 the commander of the Lice Gendarme Station, Hacı İlbaş, ordered all the villagers from Bayırlı village to evacuate their homes. This instruction was communicated to the villagers by the headman (muhtar) of the village. In response, the villagers requested the commander's permission to remain in the village long enough to harvest their crops.", "11. Commander Hacı İlbaş began to pressurise and intimidate the villagers. No cars were allowed in or out of the village. The livestock was taken away from the villagers. A food embargo was imposed. At the beginning of October 1996 soldiers told the villagers that should they fail to evacuate the village by 15 October, their houses would be burned down.", "12. On 7 October 1996 an armed clash broke out between members of the PKK (proscribed as a terrorist organisation under Turkish law) and the security forces stationed on Cüm Hill, which is situated between the applicant's village and Lice.", "13. When the clash was over, at about 3 a.m. soldiers who were stationed at the Lice Boarding School fired four artillery shells towards the village. A piece of shrapnel wounded one of the villagers, Hürriyet Doğan, in the foot. Hearing Hürriyet Doğan's screams, the applicant attempted to leave his house to help her. However his wife, Sariye Yılmaz, tried to pull him back. At that moment a second artillery shell landed six to seven metres from their house and a piece of shrapnel struck the applicant's wife in the abdomen.", "14. Around 5 p.m., when the shooting was over, the applicant and his elder brother, Adil Yılmaz, together with some other relatives, Mehmet Tataş, Ramazan Yaşar, Abdullah Doğan and a group of women set out for Lice in order to take Sariye Yılmaz to the local health clinic. She died on the way.", "15. On 7 October 1996 a group of terrorists attacked the security forces which were stationed near the village of Bayırlı in the Lice district. At around 4.30 a.m. terrorists tried to escape through the village. When they arrived in Bayırlı the terrorists fired randomly at the houses. The applicant's wife and another villager were wounded in the incident. The security forces identified the footprints of members of the PKK in the village.", "16. When the applicant and his relatives were returning to their village they were stopped on Cüm Hill by the security forces. The senior lieutenant examined the corpse of the applicant's wife. According to the applicant, the senior lieutenant drafted a report which stated that Sariye Yılmaz had died due to a shrapnel wound caused by an artillery shell fired by the soldiers. However, the applicant did not submit this report to the Court and the Government claimed that it did not exist.\nThe applicant requested to have an autopsy performed before burying the corpse. The senior lieutenant told him that there was no need to carry out an autopsy and reassured him that his report would be given to the relevant authorities.", "17. On 7 October 1996 Sergeant Nuri Yüksel and a unit of soldiers arrived in the village to investigate the circumstances of the incident. Four villagers, namely Abdullah Doğan, Hürriyet Doğan, Ahmet Doğan and Sait Doğan, gave statements to the sergeant. They all stated that at around 3 a.m., 25 to 30 terrorists arrived in the village and indiscriminately opened fire with rockets and long-barrel guns. Hürriyet Doğan had been wounded and the applicant's wife had died in the incident.", "18. According to the applicant, he expressly told the sergeant that the artillery shell that caused the death of his wife had been fired by the soldiers. He also told the sergeant that the senior lieutenant had seen the corpse and confirmed this fact in his report. The sergeant contacted the senior lieutenant by radio. According to the applicant, the senior lieutenant verbally confirmed his version of the facts.", "19. The sergeant drew a sketch map of the scene of the incident and drafted two incident reports. The more detailed report stated as follows:\n“... When the members of the PKK failed to strike the security forces, they ran away towards Bayırlı village. When they entered the village, they yelled 'you still have not evacuated the village! Because of you very many of us have been wounded and we have lost very many soldiers!' and they started to shoot at random using heavy weapons and missile launchers. ... two persons were wounded. Two of the places where the missiles fell, as well as bullet marks on the houses, have been noted. Moreover, according to the footprints left by the PKK members they ran off towards the forest near the village. As far as it could be construed by looking at the footprints, they were around 25-30 people. ...”\nThe houses of the applicant and the other witnesses, the sites where the shells fell and the footprints of members of the PKK were indicated in the sketch map. All the statements and reports were co-signed by Sergeant Nuri Yüksel and non-commissioned officer Yusuf Denden.", "20. Upon the applicant's request to have an autopsy carried out on the corpse, the sergeant told him that this was not possible, as the public prosecutor and the doctor refused to come to the village for security reasons. He reassured the applicant that he would make sure that the senior lieutenant's report was forwarded to the public prosecutor. Later on the same day, the applicant buried his wife.", "21. On 8 October 1996 Feyzi Doğan, the father of Hürriyet Doğan, and the applicant gave statements to the sergeant. The applicant's statement was as follows:\n“On 7 October 1996, at around 3 a.m., I heard guns being fired from the direction of Cüm Hill, which is located to the south of our village. Everybody was sleeping. I went out of the house. It was silent in the village. At around 4 a.m. I heard [people] screaming in the village. These sounds were coming from a distance. Then I heard firing coming from the village. My wife came outside to look for me. There was random gun fire. My wife was wounded in the abdomen. I took her into the house but I wasn't able to do anything as the shooting continued. I waited at home until 5 a.m. When the shooting was over I called my relatives and we set off for Lice in order to take my wife to the hospital. She died when we reached Cüm Hill. After a short while another group of people who was transporting Hürriyet Doğan came along. They went to Lice. We returned to Bayırlı village. We buried my wife in the village ...”\nFeyzi Doğan stated as follows:\n“... terrorists were shouting in the middle of the village. After yelling 'you still have not evacuated the village! Because of you very many of us have been wounded and we have lost very many soldiers!' They started to shoot at random. ... My daughter Hürriyet Doğan was wounded in her foot. I saw three of the terrorists with my own eyes. I believe there were in total twenty to thirty people. ... After we waited for a while we set off for Lice. ... When we were almost on Cüm Hill we saw another wounded person being transported. ... I am complaining about those terrorists who attacked our village and who are responsible for wounding my daughter.”", "22. A preliminary investigation into the incident was initiated by the Lice Public Prosecutor.", "23. On 10 October 1996 the applicant went to see the Lice Gendarmerie Commander, Hacı İlbaş. The applicant alleged that Hacı İlbaş prepared a petition for him, the contents of which laid blame on the PKK for the incident. He refused to sign it. On 15 October 1996 Hacı İlbaş sent all the documents concerning the incident to the office of the Lice Public Prosecutor along with an explanatory letter. In his letter he explained that the death of Sariye Yılmaz and Hürriyet Doğan's injuries were the result of random shooting by the terrorists. The annexed documents consisted of five witness statements, two incident reports and one medical report about Hürriyet Doğan's state of health, drafted on 7 October 1997 by a doctor at the Lice Health Clinic.", "24. On 16 October 1996 the applicant filed petitions with the offices of the Diyarbakır District Governor and the State of Emergency Region Governor. He stated that his wife had died during an artillery attack launched from the direction of the Lice Boarding School. A senior lieutenant, after examining the corpse, confirmed that she had been killed by artillery fire. He further stated that he had had to move to Diyarbakır with his seven children following the evacuation of his village. The applicant requested that an investigation be initiated in order to find those responsible. He also requested compensation.", "25. On 19 October 1996 the applicant filed similar petitions with the Diyarbakır State Security Court and the Lice Public Prosecutor. On the same day he went to see the Lice Public Prosecutor and the Lice District Governor personally.", "26. On 21 October 1996 the applicant submitted a petition to the Lice Governorship about the death of Sariye Yılmaz. In the petition he stated that his wife died on 7 October 1996 during an operation carried out against terrorists. Moreover, he stated that neither the public prosecutor nor a doctor had examined the corpse. The Lice Governor transferred the applicant's petition to the Registry Office. On the same day the Registry Office requested the Lice District Gendarmerie to provide information about the death of Sariye Yılmaz.", "27. On 23 October 1996 the Lice District Gendarmerie informed the Registry Office in a letter that Sariye Yılmaz had been wounded on 7 October 1996 due to random shooting by terrorists who entered the village, that she died while being transferred to a hospital and that she had been buried in the village cemetery. The district gendarmerie had also provided the Registry Office with reports and written statements which confirmed the accuracy of these findings.", "28. Following the applicant's petitions filed with the Lice Public Prosecutor and the Lice District Governor, the Lice Social Help and Solidarity Fund decided to grant the applicant the sum of 15,000,000 Turkish liras. This sum was paid to the applicant on 1 November 1996.", "29. On 5 November 1996 the applicant filed petitions with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In these petitions he maintained that his wife died during an artillery attack by the security forces and he requested that an investigation be initiated into the killing of his wife. He stated that he was stunned to find out that in the case file at the office of the Lice Public Prosecutor the perpetrators of the incident were stated to be members of the PKK. Moreover, he maintained that he had had to move to Diyarbakır with his seven children following the evacuation of his village. The applicant also informed the authorities in his petition that he would lodge an application with the European Commission of Human Rights.", "30. On 13 December 1996 the Lice Public Prosecutor issued a decision of non-jurisdiction as the death of the applicant's wife fell within the jurisdiction of the Diyarbakır State Security Court. In his decision the public prosecutor maintained that after engaging in a combat with the security forces, terrorists retreated to Bayırlı village. When they arrived in the village they started shooting at random using large weapons to force the villagers to evacuate. The applicant's wife was killed as a result of this random shooting.", "31. On 17 December 1996 the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court also issued a decision of non-jurisdiction and referred the case file back to the office of the Lice Public Prosecutor. The decision on lack of jurisdiction indicated that Sariye Yılmaz was killed by an artillery shell fired from the Lice Boarding School.", "32. On 25 March 1997 the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court, seeing that an investigation had already been initiated by his office into the same incident, decided to join the two case files within the jurisdiction of the Lice Public Prosecutor's Office. The decision joining the case files named the defendant(s) as “member(s) of the illegal PKK organisation” and the offence as “engaging in acts aimed at the separation of a part of the territory of the State”.", "33. On 20 February 1998 the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court issued a search warrant for the terrorist(s) who wounded Hürriyet Doğan and killed Sariye Yılmaz on 7 October 1996. According to this order the Lice Public Prosecutor, together with the Lice District Gendarmerie and the Diyarbakır Security Directorate, had to carry out a rigorous investigation so as to identify the perpetrator(s) by the date fixed for the expiry of the warrant. He further requested to be kept informed of the outcome of the investigation every three months.", "34. On 9 September 1998 the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court requested from the Registry Office a copy of Sariye Yilmaz's details of birth. On 21 September 1998 the Registry Office submitted the information requested.", "35. By a letter dated 5 October 1999, the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court requested the Lice Public Prosecutor to conduct an investigation in order to identify the officials who had failed to carry out an autopsy on Sariye Yılmaz.", "36. By a letter dated 6 October 1999 the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court, referring to the applicant's application to the European Commission of Human Rights, requested authorisation from the Ministry of Justice to initiate an investigation against the Lice Public Prosecutor who had failed to organise an autopsy on the applicant's wife's body.", "37. On 1 November 1999 and on 13 December 2000 the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court renewed the warrant issued on 20 February 1998.", "38. On 12 February 2001, in accordance with Law no. 4616, the Lice Public Prosecutor postponed the criminal proceedings initiated against Sergeant Nuri Yüksel and the non-commissioned officer Yusuf Denden who had allegedly failed to carry out an autopsy on the applicant's wife's body.", "39. On 23 July 2001, upon the Lice District Governor's inquiry, the Lice Gendarmerie Commander sent him a letter stating that it was clear from the incident report and the witness statements that the applicant's wife was killed by members of the PKK. He maintained that there was no documentation in their files which proved that, after examining the corpse of the applicant's wife, a senior lieutenant drafted a report in which the cause of death was described as resulting from artillery shell fire. Moreover, he stated that the letter sent by them to the Registry Office in which the PKK was stated to be responsible for the death of Sariye Yılmaz, had not been found in their files. However, he indicated that this letter could be located at the Registry Office.", "40. On 3 August 2001 a letter from the gendarmerie headquarters in Ankara was sent to the Ministry of Interior Affaires. The letter was a reply to an inquiry made by the Ministry of Foreign Affaires following the communication of the applicant's case by the Court to the respondent Government. It was stated in the letter that on 7 October 1996, following an armed clash between terrorists and the security forces, terrorists fled to Bayırlı village and killed the applicant's wife by firing at random with rockets and long-barrel guns in the middle of the village. Moreover, it was incorrect that a senior lieutenant had examined the corpse of the applicant's wife and drafted a report which concluded that she had died due to a shrapnel wound caused by an artillery shell fired by soldiers. Such a report did not exist. It was apparent from the witness statements and from the incident report that the perpetrators of the incident were members of the PKK. It was also stated in the letter that the Lice Gendarmerie Command submitted the document concerning the death of Sariye Yılmaz to the Registry Office." ]

[ 0 ]

[ "7. The applicant is a private company located in the town of Hal Kirkop, Malta.", "8. On 30 December 1986 the Housing Secretary of Malta issued a requisition order in respect of a tenement in Hal Kirkop. The applicant company occupied the tenement in question. The requisition order had the effect of protecting its occupation.", "9. On 16 October 1987 the owners of the tenement, the V. brothers, instituted civil proceedings before the First Hall of the Civil Court against the Housing Secretary and the applicant company. They requested that the requisition order of 30 December 1986 be declared null and void as being contrary to section 4 of the 1949 Housing Act, and sought to regain possession of the tenement. They also requested compensation for the damage allegedly sustained.", "10. In a judgment of 9 October 1991, the First Hall of the Civil Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim.", "11. The V. brothers appealed against that decision.", "12. In a judgment of 30 December 1993, the Court of Appeal declared that the requisition order was null and void and ordered that the appellants be given possession of the premises within six months. It sent the case back to the First Hall of the Civil Court regarding compensation for the damage allegedly sustained by the appellants.", "13. On 21 March 1994 the applicant company lodged an application with the Court of Appeal for a new trial. It alleged that the judgment of 30 December 1993 had been based on a wrong application of the law, as the requisition order had been issued in the public interest and the powers of the Housing Secretary in this field could not be reviewed by the Court of Appeal.", "14. The V. brothers intervened in the proceedings, requesting that the application be rejected. They argued that the law had in fact been duly applied and interpreted and that the applicant company was trying to lodge another appeal, inadmissible under Maltese law, against the judgment of 9 October 1991.", "15. On 14 December 1994 the Court of Appeal invited the parties to file written submissions and adjourned the case to 6 February 1995.", "16. The applicant company filed a note of submissions in which it requested, inter alia, that the judges of the Court of Appeal examining the request for a retrial withdraw from the case, as they were the same judges who had sat on the bench when the impugned judgment of 30 December 1993 had been delivered.", "17. On 13 March 1995 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant company’s plea challenging the judges. It also observed that, under Article 816 of the Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure (Chapter 12 of the Laws of Malta – “the COCP”), where the ground for a judicial request was the wrong application of the law, the relevant party should make reference to the law which should have been applied. As the applicant company had failed to do so, its submissions were manifestly defective.", "18. In a judgment of 17 January 1996, the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant company’s request for a new trial.", "19. In the meantime, on 19 April 1995, the applicant company had initiated proceedings in the First Hall of the Civil Court sitting in its constitutional capacity. It alleged that the decision taken by the three judges composing the Court of Appeal rejecting the plea for their withdrawal had violated Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, as the court in question could not be considered an “impartial tribunal” within the meaning of that provision.", "20. In a judgment of 22 April 1997, the Civil Court found for the applicant company and declared that the failure to withdraw by the judges composing the Court of Appeal had violated Article 6 of the Convention. It observed that the same judges had been called upon to rule twice on a case concerning the same facts and the same parties. Moreover, in a judgment given on 10 October 1991 in Frank Cachia v. the Honourable Prime Minister, the Constitutional Court had held that Article 814 of the COCP (in accordance with which the same judges may sit when the request for a new trial is based on an alleged wrong application of the law) was contrary to Article 6 of the Convention.", "21. The V. brothers appealed to the Constitutional Court. They alleged, in particular, that the question dealt with by the Court of Appeal when examining the request for a retrial, namely whether there had been a wrong application of the law, was not in any way connected with the merits previously dealt with by the same court.", "22. In a judgment of 31 July 2000, the Constitutional Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of 22 April 1997 and rejected all the pleas raised by the applicant company.", "23. The Constitutional Court observed that the possibility of a new trial provided the remedy of revision of a final judgment in order to rectify evident and gross errors leading to a miscarriage of justice. However, Maltese law restricted the application of this remedy to specific situations. As a retrial was an extraordinary remedy which entailed a derogation from the principle that res judicata decisions were legally binding between the parties, the relevant legal provisions had always been interpreted restrictively.", "24. Under Maltese law, a new trial could be conducted by the same court that had pronounced the judgment complained of, and the same judges could sit. This meant that the judges were given the option of deciding whether to hear the case or not. In the Constitutional Court’s view, this rule was consistent with the Convention and justified by the fact that a retrial was not a third-instance procedure and that the court that had pronounced the judgment was in the best position to identify any mistake and to grant expeditiously an appropriate and fast remedy.", "25. The Constitutional Court noted that, when a request for a new trial appeared unfounded and was accompanied by a dubious demand that the judges withdraw, it was likely that an abuse of the judicial system might occur. This would be prejudicial to the other party, who had the right to have his or her case heard within a reasonable time. After the delivery of its judgment in Frank Cachia (cited above), the Constitutional Court had observed a systematic abuse of the remedy of retrial. In particular, some parties had been attempting to obtain a third-instance appeal in cases in which a final decision had already been made.", "26. In order to avoid such abuses, the Maltese courts had interpreted the judgment in Frank Cachia to mean that the judges who had previously adjudicated the case should examine the admissibility of the request for a retrial in order to determine whether it met the requirements laid down in domestic law. If it did, they should withdraw; if it did not, they should simply reject the request. The Constitutional Court considered that these principles were correct and in conformity with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.", "27. In the particular circumstances of the case before it, the Constitutional Court found that there were reasons to believe that the applicant company was trying to prolong the proceedings in order to delay vacating the premises for as long as possible and that its request for a retrial was procedurally inadmissible. In particular, the request did not correctly quote the section of law which, according to the applicant company, had been wrongly applied, it did not indicate which provision ought to have been applied, and it was essentially based on the assumption that the Court of Appeal had given a wrong interpretation of the notion of “public interest”. The admissibility examination by the three judges of the Court of Appeal had dealt merely with points of fact and had therefore been different in nature from the examination by the same judges previously.", "28. Finally, there were no grounds to believe that the judges in question had some personal or real interest in the outcome of the case other than that of ensuring that justice was done." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "9. The applicant, Zvonko Čevizović, is a Croatian national born in 1966. When lodging his application, he was detained in Oldenburg, Germany. He is presently living in Rogaška Slatina, Slovenia.", "10. On 17 June 1996 the applicant was arrested in Wilhelmshaven. On 18 June 1996 the Wilhelmshaven District Court issued a warrant of arrest against the applicant on the ground that he was strongly suspected of having committed, with others, robbery connected with attempted murder.", "11. On 4 November 1996 the Oldenburg Public Prosecutor’s Office charged the applicant with attempted murder, aggravated robbery, grievous physical injury and unauthorised carrying of weapons.", "12. On 18 February 1997 the Oldenburg Regional Court admitted the indictment without modifications and decided to open the trial against the applicant and two other accused. The trial started on 14 March 1997 and took place on fifty-six days with an average duration of ninety minutes. On 22 May 1998 a lay assessor fell ill. As the additional lay assessor who was supposed to replace her had also fallen sick earlier on, the trial had to begin anew.", "13. On 28 May 1998 the Oldenburg Regional Court upheld the arrest warrant against the applicant. It found that irrespective of the delay occasioned by the assessors’ illness, the applicant’s continued detention was proportionate given the serious nature of the crimes he was accused of.", "14. On 2 June 1998 the trial reopened with two additional lay assessors.", "15. On 22 June 1998 the Oldenburg Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal against the Oldenburg Regional Court’s decision to uphold the arrest warrant.", "16. On 25 March 1999 the Oldenburg Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s renewed request to suspend the warrant of arrest of 18 June 1996 on the ground that the applicant remained under strong suspicion of having committed the crimes that he was accused of. On 7 May 1999 the Oldenburg Regional Court, upon the applicant’s appeal, reconsidered and confirmed its decision of 25 March 1999. It held that the delay in the trial had been caused by exceptional circumstances such as the difficulty in taking evidence, which required further investigations during the trial, and the illness of a lay assessor as well as the temporary illness of the presiding judge. The strong suspicion that the applicant had committed the serious crimes he was accused of had not been invalidated during the trial. As the applicant’s partner and son lived in Slovenia, the applicant was also likely to abscond if released.", "17. On 1 June 1999 the Oldenburg Court of Appeal confirmed the decision of the lower court, stating that although the applicant had at that point already been in custody for nearly three years, this did not justify his release.", "18. On 9 July 1999 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to entertain the applicant’s constitutional complaint.", "19. On 14 June 2000 the Oldenburg Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s new request to suspend the warrant of arrest of 18 June 1996 on the ground that the allegedly new evidence submitted by the applicant did not justify such a suspension. It found that if released, the applicant was very likely to abscond, given the circumstances of his arrest and the sentence which he risked incurring if found guilty as charged. The Regional Court noted that the applicant was residing illegally in Germany and that an expulsion order had been issued against him. The length of the applicant’s detention on remand did not compare to the risk mentioned above. The Regional Court included a detailed account of the trial, explaining the continued conduct of the proceedings, which disclosed that on several occasions witnesses could not be questioned by the court because they either did not come to the hearing or made use of their right not to testify. Furthermore, the applicant and his co-accused had, often later than necessary, filed numerous motions for evidence to be taken. It observed that at the present time, it was not possible to disjoin the applicant’s case from those of the other accused, as they were accused of committing the offences jointly.", "20. On 21 June 2000, following the applicant’s appeal, the Oldenburg Regional Court confirmed its original decision. It pointed out that the prolonged investigations by way of letters rogatory in Macedonia and the summoning of witnesses from abroad, which were necessitated by the belated alibi produced by one of the applicant’s co-accused, did not warrant the applicant’s release.", "21. On 27 June 2000 the Oldenburg Court of Appeal confirmed this decision.", "22. On 10 August 2000 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to entertain the applicant’s constitutional complaint.", "23. On 26 September 2000 the Oldenburg Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s further request to suspend the arrest warrant on the grounds that contrary to his allegations, the suspicion persisted that he had committed the crimes he was accused of and was still likely to abscond if released, especially considering the high prison sentence he risked incurring if found guilty according to the indictment.", "24. On 20 March 2001 the Oldenburg Regional Court pronounced its judgment after having held an average of less than four hearings per month with an average duration of less than two and a half hours each. It convicted the applicant of attempted murder, aggravated robbery and grievous physical injury as well as of unauthorised carrying of weapons and sentenced him to ten years and six months’ imprisonment. In fixing the length of the applicant’s sentence, the Regional Court took into consideration the inordinate length of his detention and of the criminal proceedings, in particular the delay occasioned by the sickness of the lay assessor and the ensuing suspension of proceedings.", "25. On 21 March 2001, the applicant appealed against the Regional Court’s judgment. In the negotiations that followed between the applicant’s legal counsel and the Prosecutor’s Office, the latter eventually consented to the applicant’s expulsion to his country of origin in lieu of serving his prison sentence in Germany. In exchange for this, and due to the increasing length of his detention on remand, which would have continued during the appeal proceedings, the applicant agreed to withdraw his appeal.", "26. On 4 April 2001, the applicant withdrew his appeal. On 5 April 2001 the Oldenburg Regional Court made an order for costs following the applicant’s withdrawal of the appeal. On 28 May 2001, the Prosecutor’s Office suspended the further execution of the applicant’s prison sentence and agreed to his expulsion to Croatia. A new arrest warrant was issued to the effect that, upon returning to Germany before the year 2026, the applicant would be arrested and imprisoned instantly in order to complete his prison sentence. On 25 July 2001, the applicant was expelled to Croatia." ]

[ 2, 3 ]

[ "9. The applicant was born in 1968 and is currently detained in Batman “E” Type Prison.", "10. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.", "11. On 2 September 1997 the applicant was arrested in Istanbul on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation, namely the PKK. 4,000 German Marks and 2,600 US Dollars in cash were found in his possession. During his questioning at the Istanbul Police Headquarters, the applicant stated that he had joined the PKK in 1992 and that the money found in his possession at the time of his arrest had been given to him by the PKK to obtain a false passport. He also added that he had been trained in Syria and that he had carried out activities on behalf of the PKK in Germany, the Netherlands and France.", "12. On 3 September 1997 the applicant’s detention period was extended for two days with the permission of the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court.", "13. On 6 September 1997 the applicant was handed over to the Siirt Police Headquarters in whose jurisdiction the applicant had allegedly committed a number of offences. On the same day the Siirt public prosecutor authorised the applicant’s detention for a further two days.", "14. On 7 September 1997 a statement was taken from the applicant by the Siirt Police. The applicant reiterated the confessions he had made in his statement at the Istanbul Police Headquarters.", "15. The applicant was subsequently handed over to the Batman Police in whose jurisdiction he had allegedly carried out certain illegal activities. On his arrival in Batman the applicant was given a medical examination by a doctor. No signs of ill-treatment were observed on his body according to the medical report drawn up on 7 September 1997.", "16. On 8 September 1997, at the request of the Batman public prosecutor and without the applicant being brought before him, a judge at the Batman Magistrates’ Court in Criminal Matters authorised the applicant’s detention until 12 September 1997.", "17. On 11 September 1997 a statement was taken from the applicant by the Batman Police. The applicant gave a detailed account of his involvement within the PKK and of the activities he had carried out on behalf of that organisation. He further described the structure of the PKK in detail.", "18. On 12 September 1997 the applicant gave a statement before the Batman public prosecutor. He maintained that his police statements were correct and that he had nothing to add to them.", "19. On the same day the applicant was taken before the Batman Magistrates’ Court in Criminal Matters and subsequently remanded in detention.", "20. On 2 October 1997 the public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Diyarbakır State Security Court against the applicant and requested the court to sentence him pursuant to Article 168 § 2 of the Criminal Code and Article 5 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act.", "21. In the proceedings before the Diyarbakır State Security Court, which was composed of three judges including a military judge, the applicant mainly repeated the statements he had made to the police.", "22. In a supplementary indictment submitted to the trial court on 30 May 2000, the prosecutor accused the applicant of carrying out activities aimed at breaking up the unity of the State and removing part of the national territory from the State’s control. He requested the court to sentence the applicant in accordance with Article 125 of the Criminal Code.", "23. On 2 November 2000 the Diyarbakır State Security Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to the death penalty under Article 125 of the Criminal Code. Taking into account the applicant’s good conduct during the trial, the death penalty was commuted to a life sentence.", "24. The applicant’s appeal against the judgment was rejected by the Court of Cassation on 22 May 2001." ]

[ 2, 3 ]

[ "9. The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Dublin.", "10. In 1982 he issued nuisance proceedings against his landlord. Those proceedings were settled in July 1985. Subsequently, and as a result of alleged further nuisance problems and new evidence, he unsuccessfully attempted to re-enter the nuisance proceedings in 1987.", "11. On 29 June 1988 he issued negligence proceedings in the High Court against the firm of solicitors (“KC”) who had acted for him in the above-described nuisance action. He took issue with the advice given to him by KC during the settlement and, in particular, in relation to the possibility of re-entering his nuisance action. KC filed an appearance dated 26 October 1988. The applicant’s statement of claim was filed on 21 December 1988 and on 9 March 1989 he filed an application seeking judgment in default of defence which he obtained from the High Court on 10 April 1989. However, KC filed its defence on 18 April 1989 and sought an order to set aside the default judgment. On 1 May 1989 the default judgment was set aside. Further particulars of the applicant’s claim were requested by KC on 10 May 1989 and the applicant responded on 30 June 1989. On 15 May 1989 KC applied for discovery and on 2 June 1989 the High Court refused that application.", "12. On 18 July 1989 the applicant applied for discovery by KC. On 5 October 1989 the High Court ordered discovery to be made by KC within six weeks. On 28 November 1989 he applied to strike out the defence of KC as they had not made discovery as ordered. That application was adjourned on 11 December 1989 and on 15 January 1990 his strike out application was refused. On 22 February 1990 he applied for further discovery from KC and on 5 March 1990 the High Court ordered KC to make further discovery within four weeks. KC filed affidavits of discovery on 26 February and 23 April 1990. On 21 November 1990 the applicant applied for further discovery to be made by KC. The hearing of this application was adjourned on 4 and 10 December 1990 and was considered on 14 January 1991. While the specific directions of the High Court after that hearing are not known, costs were awarded against KC.", "13. On 28 June 1991 a notice of trial was filed by the applicant. On 21 August 1991 KC filed a motion for discovery by the applicant. On 24 October 1991 the High Court struck out this motion and costs were awarded against KC. The applicant then lodged a notice to amend his statement of claim on 5 May 1992. The action was put in a list to fix a hearing date three times (between July and December 1991). On the latter occasion the hearing date was fixed for 20 February 1992. However, on that date the High Court was informed of settlement negotiations and in March or April 1992 the case was accorded a further hearing date in May 1992. \nThe High Court heard the case on 5-7 May 1992, legal submissions were heard on 23 June 1992 and the court reserved its judgment. Judgment was delivered on 13 July 1993 dismissing the applicant’s case. The High Court judge found the evidence of a senior counsel (who had acted for the applicant in the nuisance proceedings – “SC”) more convincing than that of the applicant and found that KC had simply relied on the SC’s advice during the nuisance proceedings. Accordingly, it was found that no negligence could be attributed to KC. Costs were awarded to KC “when taxed and ascertained”.", "14. On 30 August 1993 the applicant lodged his appeal to the Supreme Court: he argued that the High Court should not have relied on evidence of SC which was given in breach of SC’s privilege of confidentiality to the applicant.", "15. SC was the subject of a complaint by the applicant to the Barristers Professional Conduct Tribunal of the Bar Council of Ireland. On 24 April 1995 the tribunal found that SC had been in breach of the Code of Conduct and by decision of 24 June 1995 he was formally admonished by the tribunal for dealing directly with the applicant and for giving evidence in court as to the advice he had given to the applicant without any protest as to confidentiality or privilege. On 21 November 1995 the Barristers’ Professional Conduct Appeals Board rejected an appeal and upheld the tribunal’s decisions.", "16. On 12 July 1995 his representatives confirmed that all documents for the appeal had been filed. A letter of 20 November 1996 confirmed to the applicant that his appeal had been listed for hearing on 3 March 1997.", "17. However, it was then listed for mention on 21 March 1997 when the applicant’s solicitors applied and were allowed to come off record. On that date the appeal hearing was adjourned (to 11 June 1997) and final submissions were ordered to be lodged by 14 May 1997. The applicant was not represented for the remainder of the proceedings. On 10 April 1997 the applicant applied for leave to amend his appeal and on 18 April 1997 the Supreme Court granted him leave.", "18. The appeal came on for hearing on 11 June 1997. Since one of the judges had previously participated in a High Court action brought by the applicant, the applicant was given the opportunity of having the appeal heard by a differently constituted Supreme Court, the applicant accepted and the hearing was adjourned for mention on 20 June 1997. On that latter date, the appeal was listed for hearing on 17 October 1997.", "19. On 18 July 1997 the Supreme Court adjourned the applicant’s request for leave to introduce fresh evidence until the date fixed for the hearing of the action. Due to the illness of one of the Supreme Court judges, that hearing date was vacated. A further hearing date was set for 16 December 1997. The hearing took place on 16 December 1997 and judgment was reserved. Judgment was delivered on 27 January 1998 rejecting the applicant’s appeal. The Court found that the applicant had impliedly waived his privilege by instituting the proceedings. The court noted that, even if the alleged negligence had been established, it was questionable whether he had suffered loss as the original nuisance action on which KC had advised him was more likely to fail than to succeed. The costs of the appeal were also awarded to KC “when taxed and ascertained”.", "20. On 20 December 1998 KC filed a note of their High and Supreme Court costs. In the absence of the applicant’s agreement on the level of the costs, on 12 January 1999 KC issued a summons to taxation, returnable for 11 February 1999. On 29 January 1999 the parties consented to the matter being adjourned until 9 March 1999. On 24 February 1999 the applicant issued a motion for an order staying the taxation of costs. On 5 March 1999 the Supreme Court dismissed his application for a stay. On 9 March 1999 the taxation matter was adjourned on a consent basis until 28 April 1999. On that date taxation of the High Court costs commenced and concluded with a stay agreed on the issuance of the taxation certificate for fourteen days on the applicant’s request. On that date also (28 April 1999) the taxation of the Supreme Court costs also commenced, but was not finalised as some information was outstanding. On 14 May 1999 the taxation of the Supreme Court costs was concluded and, on the applicant’s request, a stay was put on the issuance of the relevant certificate until 21 June 1999.", "21. On 21 June 1999 the applicant requested and obtained a further stay until 6 July 1999. On that date leave was granted by the taxing master to KC to take up both certificates of taxation. On 30 September 1999 those certificates were taken up by KC and were served on the applicant with a demand for payment by 4 October 1999. The costs payable by the applicant amounted to almost 70,000.00 pounds sterling inclusive of value added taxation. Further demands were sent to the applicant on 15 October and 1 November 1999 indicating that KC would apply for his bankruptcy should he not discharge the sums due.", "22. On 28 January 2000 KC issued and served a “notice of the particulars of demand and requiring payment prior to the issue of a bankruptcy summons”, a notice which was updated with the interest accrued and served on the applicant on 12 September 2000. KC then filed affidavits dated 16 October and 3 November 2000 and on 20 October 2000 the High Court issued a bankruptcy summons on the application of KC.", "23. The applicant applied on 6 December 2000 to dismiss the summons. KC filed an affidavit in response on 27 February 2001 to which the applicant replied by affidavits filed on 13 March and 10 December 2001. KC therefore filed an affidavit in response on 21 December 2001. On 22 January 2002 the High Court gave the applicant time to submit a further replying affidavit. The applicant submitted this affidavit on 4 February 2002. The matter was heard by the High Court on 19 and 20 March 2002 (by a judge different from the judge sitting 22 January 2002). The detailed judgment delivered on the latter date acceded to the request for the applicant’s bankruptcy and refused his application to dismiss the summons. Noting that KC had undertaken not to take steps to enforce the bankruptcy summons for six weeks, the High Court put no stay on its order.", "24. On 29 April 2002 the applicant appealed, requesting the Supreme Court to dismiss and stay indefinitely the bankruptcy summons. On 8 May 2002 he also issued a notice of motion before the Supreme Court requesting a stay on the order of the High Court of 20 March 2002 pending the finalisation of his appeal. On 7 June 2002 the Supreme Court rejected that motion, finding that it was not possible to stay a summons and that an injunction restraining KC from taking any action on foot of the bankruptcy summons would not be justified. In any event, it was extremely unlikely that KC could take any further action based on the existing bankruptcy summons since there was a three-month time-limit from the date of issue of the summons, within which KC should have applied for adjudication against the applicant. On 30 June 2003 KC issued and served a further “notice of the particulars of demand and requiring payment” of the costs award plus relevant interest, amounting to the sum of 104,185.48 euros (EUR)." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "4. The applicants were born in 1943, 1943 and 1944 and live in Dunavecse and Budapest, respectively.", "5. By a judgment of 30 June 1988 delivered by the Budapest Regional Court the applicants were registered as the inventors of a tool called the “sledge”. Their shares in the invention were 35%, 20% and 40%, respectively, leaving 5% to a fourth person who is not a party to the proceedings before the Court.", "6. On 5 October 1993 Mr Nagy and Mr Veizer brought an action before the Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg County Regional Court, sitting as a first-instance court, against an agricultural co-operative. They sought royalties and requested that they be given possession of the tool.", "7. On 16 March and 25 May 1994 the Regional Court held hearings. On the latter date the court requested the defendant to submit certain documents. Having failed to comply with the order, on 16 September 1994 the court imposed a fine on the defendant.", "8. On 2 March 1995 the Regional Court heard the parties.", "9. On 9 March 1995 the Regional Court granted royalties and interest thereon to the plaintiffs and obliged the defendant to hand over the tool to Mr Veizer.", "10. On appeals of March 1995, on 29 May 1996 the Supreme Court, sitting as a second-instance court, heard several witnesses. On 11 September 1996 the Supreme Court, in a partial decision, confirmed the first-instance judgment concerning the return of the tool but quashed the remainder and remitted it to the Regional Court.", "11. Although the partial decision became final, the defendant failed to hand over the tool to Mr Veizer. The subsequent enforcement proceedings were unsuccessful. Consequently, Mr Nagy and Mr Veizer extended their action, claiming damages and unrealised profits resulting from the inability to use the tool.", "12. In the resumed proceedings, on 6 January 1997 the Regional Court appointed an expert engineer. He submitted his opinion on 17 March 1997 and amended it on 10 June 1997.", "13. The parties having failed to appear at the hearing on 14 October 1997, the Regional Court ordered the suspension of the proceedings. On Mr Veizer’s request of 29 January 1998 the proceedings were resumed.", "14. On 26 March and 9 June 1998 the Regional Court held hearings. On the latter date the court heard the expert and requested him to complete his opinion.", "15. On 2 September 1998 the Regional Court put further questions to the expert, to which he replied on 25 September 1998. At the hearing on 30 September 1998 the court requested the parties to submit their observations on the completed expert opinion.", "16. On 16 November 1998 the third applicant, Mrs Veizer, also brought an action on the same ground against the co-operative. Her action was joined to the remitted proceedings.", "17. The Regional Court held hearings on 3 and 24 March 1999.", "18. On 28 April 1999, the Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg County Regional Court accepted part of the applicants’ claims. On 11 June 1999 the applicants appealed.", "19. On 14 November 2001, the Supreme Court, sitting as a second instance court, confirmed the first-instance judgment. This decision became final." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Bytom, Poland.", "5. The applicant worked as the head of the sales department in a coal mine “Rozbark” in Bytom. On 24 August 1994 she was dismissed from her job.", "6. On 2 September 1994 she lodged a claim for compensation and reinstatement with the Bytom District Court of Labour (Sąd Rejonowy Wydział Pracy). Before 26 January 1995 the trial court held four hearings and heard evidence from one witness.", "7. On 2 March 1995 the parties reached a friendly settlement and the District Court discontinued the proceedings. On 16 March 1995 the applicant’s lawyer asked the court to resume the proceedings, as the defendant company had failed to comply with the terms of the settlement. On 27 June 1995 the Katowice Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) quashed the decision of 2 March and resumed the proceedings.", "8. On 21 September 1995 the District Court held a hearing. On 23 October 1995 it stayed the proceedings until the conclusion of criminal proceedings against the applicant (referred to below). The applicant’s further appeal against that decision was dismissed by the Katowice Regional Court of Labour on 28 December 1995.", "9. On 28 January 1999 the applicant asked the court to resume the proceedings. On 25 March 1999 the court held a hearing. On 29 October 1999 it dismissed her application. On 29 December 1999, on the applicant’s appeal, the Katowice Regional Court resumed the proceedings.", "10. Between 9 March and 5 December 2000 the court held five hearings and heard evidence from five witnesses. On 5 December 2000 the Bytom District Court gave judgment. The court granted the applicant compensation and dismissed her claim for reinstatement. Both parties appealed.", "11. On 8 May and 5 June 2001 the Regional Court held hearings. On 15 October 2001 the applicant sent a letter to the President of the Katowice Regional Court asking for a hearing date to be set.", "12. On 21 November 2001 the Regional Court dismissed the defendant’s appeal. 20 December 2001 the Regional Court gave judgment and dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The judgment is final.", "13. On 30 December 1995 the Bytom District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy) submitted to the Bytom District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) a bill of indictment against the applicant and three other employees of the “Rozbark” coal mine. The applicant was charged with carrying out fraudulent financial operations. On 14 March 1996 the Bytom District Court returned the case-file to the District Prosecutor instructing him to complete the investigation. The District Prosecutor appealed. On 3 April 1996 the Katowice Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) ordered the District Court to proceed with the case.", "14. During the proceedings the District Court held fifteen hearings and heard evidence from several witnesses.", "15. On 23 September 1998 the Bytom District Court delivered a judgment and acquitted the applicant. The District Prosecutor appealed.", "16. On 8 February 1999 the Katowice Regional Court quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case to the prosecution authorities for a further investigation.", "17. On 10 July 1999 the District Prosecutor ordered an expert opinion to be obtained. The expert submitted his opinion on 22 October 1999. On 2 August 1999 the Bytom District Prosecutor decided to stay the investigation until an expert on management prepared an opinion.", "18. On 15 December 1999 the applicant sent a letter to the Regional Prosecutor complaining about the slow progress of the proceedings. On 20 March 2000 she sent another letter to the Minister of Justice (Minister Sprawiedliwości) asking about the progress of the investigation proceedings. In a letter of 14 March 2000 the Bytom District Prosecutor informed the applicant that there were difficulties in finding an expert competent to prepare an opinion.", "19. On 30 April 2001 the expert on management submitted his opinion to the Prosecutor. The investigation was resumed on 2 July 2001.", "20. On 28 December 2001 the District Prosecutor submitted to the Bytom District Court a bill of indictment against the applicant and three other persons.", "21. On 28 August 2003 the Bytom District Court discontinued the criminal proceedings against the applicant." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "6. The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Åkarp.", "7. He owns a piece of real property in central Lund. Wishing to make an extension to the residential house situated on that property – a construction requiring a building permit under the Planning and Building Act (Plan- och bygglagen, 1987:10) – he applied, on 2 April 1990, to the Building Committee (byggnadsnämnden) of Lund for a tentative approval (förhandsbesked) of the permissibility of this project. The purpose of such an approval is to give a property owner, who is planning a building project for which the grant of a building permit is uncertain, the possibility to obtain an advance assessment of whether the planned measures may at all be permitted, thereby avoiding unnecessary projecting work and costs. In assessing an application for a building permit made within two years after the issuance of a tentative approval, the building committee is bound by the determinations made in that approval.", "8. On 19 August 1992 the Building Committee, having obtained the opinions of some neighbours and several municipal offices, declared that a building permit could not be expected. It did not therefore give a tentative approval of the construction project.", "9. The applicant appealed against the Building Committee’s decision. On 16 May 1994 the County Administrative Board (länsstyrelsen) of the County of Malmöhus, having obtained the observations of the Committee and the applicant on several occasions and visited the location of the property, upheld the appealed decision.", "10. Upon the applicant’s further appeal, the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) in Gothenburg held an oral hearing at the location of the applicant’s property on 29 March 1995. By a judgment of 21 April 1995 it rejected the appeal.", "11. The applicant then appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten) which, by a decision of 15 October 1996, granted him leave to appeal. The court obtained the opinions of the Building Committee and the National Board of Housing, Building and Planning (Boverket). By a judgment of 25 November 1997 it rejected the appeal." ]

[ 2 ]

[ "5. The applicant, Mr Alexandru Ţîmbal, is a Moldovan national, who was born in 1944 and lives in Chişinău, Moldova.", "6. The applicant was an employee of the Ministry of the Interior from 1963. In December 1994 he retired. In 1999 he lodged with the Chişinău District Court a civil action against the Ministry of the Interior seeking the difference between the pension he had received and the amount to which he was entitled (calculated pursuant to the Law of 23 June 1993 fixing the pensions for servicemen and military personnel of the Ministry of the Interior).", "7. On 16 September 1999 the District Court awarded the applicant compensation in the amount of 8,394.40 Moldovan lei (MDL) (the equivalent of 737.37 euros (EUR) at the time). No appeal was lodged and the judgment became final.", "8. On 1 October 1999 the District Court issued an enforcement warrant and sent it to the State Treasury for enforcement. However, enforcement was refused because of a lack of funds on the account of the Ministry of the Interior.", "9. In November 1999 the applicant lodged an administrative action with the Court of Appeal seeking to compel the Ministry of Justice to enforce the judgment. On 24 November 2000 the Court of Appeal dismissed the action finding that jurisdiction in the matter lay with the competent district court.", "10. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court against this decision. On 27 December 2000 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal.", "11. Throughout 2001 the applicant complained about the failure to enforce the judgment to the bailiff assigned to the case, but to no avail. He also complained to various judicial and executive authorities including the Chişinău District Court, the Ministry of Finance, the Parliament, the State Chancellery, the Office of the President of Moldova, the Ministry of the Interior, the Office of the Prosecutor General and the Ministry of Justice. In a letter of 30 January 2002 the Ministry of Justice informed the applicant that the judgment of 16 September 1999 could not be enforced due to the lack of funds on the bank account of the Ministry of the Interior.", "12. The judgment was enforced on 25 April 2003, following communication of this application to the Government by this Court in February 2003." ]

[ 3, 9 ]

[ "7. In 1964 the administrative authorities handed over to the applicant association the management and use of a property that had been expropriated from a religious association by the State Treasury in 1962. The decision concerning the transfer stipulated inter alia that, on termination of the use of the property, the applicant association would be entitled to recuperate the outlays incurred in connection with any construction work carried out on the buildings, less the normal costs of upkeep.", "8. On 20 October 1992 the Warsaw Property Commission (“the Property Commission”), set up pursuant to the Law on relations between the State and the Catholic Church in Poland, returned the property to the religious association. The Property Commission ordered the latter to reimburse the applicant association its outlay to the sum of 420,353,658 old zlotys (PLZ) (42,035 new zlotys (PLN))[1]. That amount was based on a calculation prepared by experts. The applicant association challenged the amount and proposed its own calculation. However, the Property Commission declared that it lacked jurisdiction to examine further claims. Its decision contained a clause to the effect that the decision did not affect the applicant association’s right to make further claims relating to the 1964 decision in accordance with the general provisions of law.", "9. The applicant association subsequently filed an action against the State Treasury with the Przemyśl Regional Court (sąd wojewódzki), in which it applied for reimbursement of the outstanding outlays, relying on the text of the 1964 decision in which the administrative authorities had established its right to those outlays. The applicant association also referred to the Property Commission’s decision of 20 October 1992.", "10. On 15 December 1995 the court awarded the applicant association the sum of PLN 546,133.02[2] by way of reimbursement of its outlays. The court referred to the part of the 1964 decision which stated that the applicant association would be entitled to recover the outlays incurred in connection with any construction work carried out on the buildings, less the normal costs of upkeep.\nBoth parties to the proceedings appealed against this judgment.", "11. On 13 June 1996 the Rzeszów Court of Appeal (sąd apelacyjny) decided to submit to the Supreme Court the question whether the 1989 Law on the relations between the State and the Catholic Church in Poland excluded the possibility of submitting to a civil court claims arising out of the use of a property that was returned to its original owner on the strength of a decision by a property commission.", "12. On 27 June 1996 the Supreme Court replied in the affirmative to the Court of Appeal’s question.", "13. The Supreme Court observed that the 1989 Law was a statute which addressed, inter alia, an exceptional matter, namely the regularisation of property issues created by expropriations carried out in the past against the Catholic Church. It noted that the proceedings before a property commission involved the participation of all parties concerned. The decisions of those commissions were intended to settle all property claims arising out of past expropriations. Such claims – including claims concerning outlays incurred by a former user of a property – could be brought before a civil court only in those exceptional cases provided for in section 64 of the 1989 Law where a property commission was unable to restore a property to its original owner. The Supreme Court pointed out that, following the Property Commission’s decision, the State Treasury had ceased to own the property. Accordingly, there were no grounds on which a claim against the Treasury could be brought before a civil court after that date.", "14. The decision further read:\n“The clause contained in the decision of the Property Commission to the effect that that decision ‘[did] not hinder the applicant association’s right to make further possible claims relating to the 1964 decision in accordance with the generally applicable provisions of law’ cannot be interpreted as allowing the plaintiff to vindicate its claims before a civil court. The application of generally applicable provisions of law [concerning financial settlements between the State Treasury as the owner of land and the users of land] is out of the question in the present case. The clause in question cannot be interpreted as an undertaking by the State Treasury to satisfy any possible and unspecified claims of the plaintiff association.”", "15. The relevant section of the operative part of the decision read:\n“A decision by the Property Commission, set up under the provisions of the Law on relations between the State and the Catholic Church in Poland, to the effect that the ownership of real property was returned to its original owner, a church entity, and which contains a ruling on the obligation to reimburse the outlays to the entity which has used such property hitherto, also rules out any possibility of bringing [before a civil court] any claims between the user and the State Treasury.”", "16. On 5 December 1996 the Court of Appeal, having regard to the Supreme Court’s decision, quashed the judgment of the Regional Court and dismissed the applicant association’s action. Both parties to the proceedings appealed.", "17. On 20 June 1997 the Supreme Court dismissed both parties’ cassation appeals. It noted that the applicant association’s cassation appeal was in fact directed against the Supreme Court’s decision of 27 June 1996, whereas that decision was binding on all the courts dealing with the case." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "9. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Poznań.", "10. In March 1988 the applicant got divorced. She has two children, who were at that time about two years old and four years old respectively.", "11. On 22 May 1988 she filed with the Poznań District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) a petition in which she sought the division of the shared property of her and her former husband.", "12. The court held hearings on 29 September and 11 November 1988, 4 April and 30 May 1989, 24 March, 24 May, 28 August and 25 October 1990, 4 February, 24 August and 18 November 1992, 27 January, 12 May and 19 August 1993, 9 November 1994, 11 January, 22 February, 26 April, 21 June and 25 August 1995, 9 February, 3 July, 16 October and 15 November 1996, 23 May and 31 December 1997, as well as 16 January 1998.", "13. The court ordered 6 expert opinions concerning the value of the disputed property, out of which 3 had been prepared with a delay of five months.", "14. On 16 January 1998 the court gave judgment. It granted the applicant, inter alia, the right to the flat in a housing co-operative and several objects located there. Her husband was granted, inter alia, a car and he was supposed to pay a certain sum to the applicant. The court pointed out that the parties to the proceedings had contested each other's statements with respect to most of the objects and on a few occasions had changed their own statements." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "6. In 1996 the applicant filed with the Warsaw District Court (sąd rejonowy) an action in which she requested the eviction of Ms J. from a flat she owned. She also claimed payment of overdue rent, in the amount of 4,371.17 Polish zlotys (PLN). She submitted that she had given notice of termination of the lease contract after J's recurrent failure to pay the rent on time. J. had been occupying the flat on the basis of an administrative decision, given under a so-called special lease scheme (see § 18 below). This administrative decision had created a protected tenancy contract between the parties, on the basis of which controlled rent was to be paid by the tenant and the tenancy could not be terminated by the owner.", "7. In January 1999 the applicant, having offered Ms J. an alternative flat, added a new eviction application, which was based on article 56 of the Law on the Lease of Dwellings and Housing Allowances (Ustawa o najmie lokali mieszkalnych i dodatkach mieszkaniowych). Subsequently, she withdrew the claim related to her tenant's failure to pay the rent.", "8. On 6 August 1999 the court gave judgment. It ordered Ms J. to pay overdue rent in the amount of PLN 459,15 and dismissed the eviction application. The court admitted that the applicant had offered J. an alternative flat before seeking her eviction. It pointed out, however, that Article 56 § 7 of the 1994 Law on the Lease of Dwellings provided that a flat offered to a tenant as alternative lodging had to be owned by the person seeking eviction (see § 20 below). However, the flat which the applicant had offered J. was owned by a housing co-operative and the applicant had only a limited right to it. The court considered that:\n“The plaintiff has a co-operative quasi-proprietorial right to that flat, which, although relatively extensive, is yet limited by a number of provisions of the Co-operative Law and cannot be equated with ownership. This court is bound by laws, and the relevant provision of the Law on the Lease of Dwellings [concerning the requirements that an alternative dwelling had to meet] is unequivocal.”", "9. The court further considered that it was not empowered to assume that the legislature had made the reference to mandatory ownership of the alternative accommodation by mistake. Neither could it accept that this reference should be understood as covering also the quasi-proprietorial co‑operative right to an apartment.", "10. The court finally considered that, pursuant to the 1994 Law on the Lease of Dwellings, eviction of a tenant, if preceded by the offer of an alternative flat, was an exception to the general rule that an owner could not evict a tenant who complied with his or her statutory duties. Accordingly, the provisions covering such exceptions could not be given an extensive interpretation.", "11. In the same judgment the District Court discontinued the proceedings in so far as they related to the withdrawn application.", "12. The applicant appealed. She submitted that the Law on the Lease of Dwellings should not have been interpreted in her case in the literal manner proposed by the District Court. She argued that the main objective of the provisions concerning eviction of tenants was to protect the property rights of owners. On the other hand, those provisions were also aimed at guaranteeing tenants an effective right to continued and peaceful enjoyment of accommodation and thus required the owners to secure alternative flats for them. In the light of that aim of the Law, the interpretation made by the court had been too restrictive. As a result, only the rights of the tenant were protected by the judgment under appeal, to the detriment of the owner's rights. The applicant pointed out that the alternative lodging which she had offered J. made it possible for her to enjoy peaceful accommodation. The purpose of the provision applied in the case was essentially to secure the position of tenant in an alternative dwelling and to prevent him or her being evicted from it. The apartment offered by the applicant guaranteed such certainty, notwithstanding the fact that she did not own that apartment, but had another right in rem to it, close in its nature to ownership. For those reasons the applicant considered that the dismissal of her eviction application, which made it impossible for her to live in her own apartment, amounted to an infringement of her property rights.", "13. The applicant also resubmitted a declaration of the housing co-operative by which it had agreed that the applicant's apartment be let to Ms J. until the end of 2004, i.e. until the time-limit set by the 1994 Law on Lease of Dwellings for the prolongation of the system of protected tenancies.", "14. On 20 December 1999 the Warsaw Regional Court (sąd okręgowy) dismissed the applicant's appeal. It pointed out that the underlying purpose of a law could be examined as an aid to its interpretation only if an analysis of a literal meaning of its text proved ineffective. Having regard to the clear wording of the provision at issue and to an unequivocal reference to 'ownership' of the alternative accommodation, the court found that this was not the case. The provision on which the District Court had relied conferred special rights on the owner, in that she was entitled to offer alternative accommodation to the tenant who had been fully complying with the conditions of the tenancy contract. These special rights could not be interpreted in an open-ended manner to the detriment of the tenant.", "15. On 14 March 2000 the Warsaw Regional Court rejected the applicant's appeal against the judgment of 20 December 1999, as it was not provided for by law in that case.", "16. On 28 February 2001 the Supreme Court dismissed her appeal against the Regional Court's decision of 14 March 2000." ]

[ 9 ]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Bielawa, Poland.", "6. Between 18 and 21 February 1992 “Ekspres Sudecki”, a local newspaper, published letters of certain M.W. and A.P. The authors accused the applicant, at the time the Deputy Mayor of Bielawa, of fraud and called him a “liar”.", "7. On 6 March 1992 the applicant brought a private prosecution on charges of libel against M.W. and A.P. to the Dzierżoniów District Court (Sąd Rejonowy).", "8. The trial began on 18 May 1992. The court adjourned the hearing due to the absence of one of the defendants.", "9. Further hearings were listed for 8 and 30 June, 20 July, 20 August and 22 September 1992, 11 February and 28 April 1993, but most of them were adjourned because of the parties' or their lawyers' absence.", "10. On 20 May 1993 the Court adjourned the trial because the defendants had failed to appear.", "11. The next hearing, set down for 24 June 1993, was cancelled because of the absence of the lay judge.", "12. Further hearings, scheduled for 8 July 1993, 25 March 1994, 31 May and 14 June 1995 were adjourned because of the absence of the defendants, their counsel, a witness and the applicant. The court decided to impose a fine on one of the witnesses who had failed to appear.", "13. At the hearing on 29 June 1995 the defendants' counsel informed the court that he would not represent them any longer.", "14. On 20 July 1995 the trial was adjourned because the defendants had failed to appear. The court ordered that both defendants be subjected to police supervision in order to ensure the proper course of the proceedings.", "15. On 18 October 1995 the court lifted police supervision in respect of M.W.", "16. A hearing set down for 1 March 1996 was adjourned since the defendants and a witness had failed to appear before the court. The court ordered that A.P. be detained on remand to ensure his presence at hearings.", "17. A hearing scheduled for 29 March 1996 was adjourned because M.W., the applicant and witnesses had failed to appear.", "18. On 4 April 1996 M.W. challenged the impartiality of all the judges sitting in the Dzierżoniów District Court. The challenge was dismissed as unfounded by the Wałbrzych Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) on 24 May 1996.", "19. At a hearing on 5 April 1996 the Dzierżoniów District Court decided to re-hear evidence due to the change of the composition of the court. It also lifted A.P.'s detention and ordered that he be subjected to police supervision.", "20. Hearings scheduled for 26 September and 10 October 1996 were adjourned because of M.W.'s and his counsel's absence.", "21. On 24 October 1996 the court held a hearing.", "22. The next hearing, which was to be held on 7 November 1996, was adjourned because A.P. had failed to appear. The court ordered that he be brought to the court by the police for the next hearing.", "23. At the hearing on 15 November 1996 M.W.'s counsel asked the court to allow him time to inspect new documentary evidence and to adjourn the trial.", "24. The proceedings were subsequently stayed because the applicant's lawyer was ill.", "25. A hearing scheduled for 29 January 1998 was adjourned because of the absence of M.W., his lawyer and witnesses.", "26. The court resumed the proceedings at a hearing on 19 February 1998. It also imposed a fine on one of the witnesses who had failed to appear.", "27. On 6 March 1998 the court held that the conduct of M.W. made it impossible for it to try the case and decided to sever the charges against him. On the same day M.W.'s counsel refused to represent him any longer.", "28. A hearing set down for 19 March 1998 was adjourned because a witness had not appeared.", "29. A hearing scheduled for 9 April 1998 was cancelled due to the judge's absence.", "30. On 23 April 1998 the Dzierżoniów District Court convicted M.W. as charged and ordered that he publish an official apology to the applicant in a local newspaper. It also conditionally discontinued the proceedings against A.P.", "31. Both defendants appealed against that judgment.", "32. On 27 October 1998 the Wałbrzych Regional Court quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case.", "33. On 3 March 1999 the Dzierżoniów District Court discontinued the proceedings against both defendants, as the statutory period of limitation for imposing a sentence had expired.", "34. On 9 March 1999 the applicant appealed against that decision.", "35. The case was again remitted on 20 July 1999.", "36. On 25 August 1999 the Dzierżoniów District Court stayed the proceedings because A.P. had absconded and a warrant to search for him by a “wanted notice” had been issued.", "37. Hearings set down for 5 April and 7 May 2001 were adjourned due to the defendants' absence.", "38. On 6 June 2001 the Dzierżoniów District Court discontinued the proceedings on the same grounds as before.", "39. The Świdnica Regional Court upheld that decision on 7 September 2001." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1925 and lived in Jankowice, Poland.", "6. On 6 February 1973 the applicant applied to the Gliwice District Commission for Mining Damage (Okręgowa Komisja do Spraw Szkód Górniczych) for compensation for damage caused to her property and her plantation of fruit trees. The case was directed against the Rybnik Mining Company “Chwalowice”.", "7. Between 20 September 1982 and 21 October 1991 the applicant on five occasions lodged similar applications.", "8. On 15 January 1990 the District Commission for Mining Damage examined one of her applications. It partly allowed it and awarded the applicant compensation.", "9. It appears that following the applicant's appeal, on 12 November 1991, the District Commission for Mining Damage amended its own decision.", "10. The applicant appealed against this decision. She submitted, inter alia, that the Commission failed to examine her four applications lodged in 1982, 1983, 1984 and 1988.", "11. On 30 September 1992 the Katowice Appellate Commission for Mining Damage (Odwoławcza Komisja do spraw Szkód Górniczych) quashed the impugned decision and remitted the case to the District Commission. It ordered the Commission to examine all applications for compensation lodged by the applicant between 1973 and 1991.", "12. On 24 March 1993 the District Commission for Mining Damage gave its decision. The applicant appealed against it.", "13. On 2 September 1994 a new law entered into force which provided that the civil courts would be competent to examine the applications for compensation for mining damage and abolished the Commissions for Mining Damage (Ustawa z dnia 4 lutego 1994, Prawo geologiczne i górnicze).", "14. Accordingly, the applicant's case was transferred to the Rybnik District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) which, on 24 January 1995, decided that the Katowice Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) would be competent to examine the case.", "15. On 5 April 1995 the court held a hearing.", "16. Between 7 June 1995 and 4 April 1996 the proceedings were stayed since the applicant's counsel had apparently failed to specify her claims.", "17. Subsequently, the trial court ordered that an expert opinion be obtained.", "18. On 19 November 1996 the expert submitted his opinion to the court.", "19. On 20 December 1996 the trial court held the second hearing at which it heard the expert. The court further decided to prepare another expert opinion.", "20. On 21 January 1997 the applicant challenged the trial judge on the grounds that as a former member of the District Commission for Mining Damage he had given decisions in her case.", "21. On 28 March 1997 the Katowice Regional Court dismissed the challenge.", "22. On 28 May 1997 the Katowice Regional Court held a hearing and on 4 June 1997 it gave judgment. The court partly allowed the applicant's action and awarded her compensation for damage sustained between 1972 and 1996.", "23. On 17 July 1997 the applicant lodged an appeal against this judgment.", "24. On 20 January 1998 the Katowice Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) held a hearing and on 29 January 1998 it quashed a part of the impugned judgment and remitted it to the Regional Court. The appellate court upheld the remainder of the judgment.", "25. On 11 March 1998 the applicant lodged a cassation appeal against this judgment with the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy).", "26. At the hearing held on 22 April 1999 the Supreme Court dismissed her cassation appeal.", "27. Following the partial remittal of the case, the Katowice Regional Court scheduled a hearing for 22 December 1999. It appears that this hearing was adjourned. Subsequently, the court ordered that an expert opinion be obtained.", "28. On 15 March 2000 the Katowice Regional Court held a hearing at which it gave judgment.", "29. The applicant lodged an appeal against this judgment.", "30. On 4 August 2000 the Katowice Court of Appeal held a hearing and gave judgment. The appellate court established that the trial court had failed to inform the applicant and her representative about the hearings. As a result, the court quashed the Regional Court's judgment and remitted the case to the first-instance court.", "31. On 13 December 2000 a hearing was held.", "32. On 1 February 2001, the court ordered that another expert opinion be prepared. Subsequently, on several occasions, the court asked the expert to finish preparation of his opinion.", "33. On 23 November 2001 the expert submitted his opinion to the court. Both parties challenged it.", "34. On 25 January, 19 April, 24 May and 13 December 2002 the court held hearings. It ordered several new expert opinions.", "35. On 20 December 2002 the Katowice Regional Court gave judgment. The court partly allowed the applicant's action.", "36. On 8 February 2003 the applicant lodged an appeal against this judgment.", "37. On 9 October 2003 the Katowice Court of Appeal held a hearing and gave judgment. The appellate court quashed the Regional Court's judgment and remitted the case to the first-instance court.", "38. The proceedings are pending before the Katowice Regional Court." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Zakopane, Poland.", "5. The applicant and a co-operative “PSS Społem” were co-owners of an estate in Zakopane. On 29 November 1995 the co-operative filed with the Zakopane District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) an application for dissolution of the co-ownership of the estate.", "6. The court held hearings on 10 and 24 January 1996. On the latter date it ordered an expert opinion. On 21 February 1996 the court held a viewing of the site. On 19 April 1996 the expert submitted his opinion to the trial court. On 27 May 1996 the court ordered that a supplementary expert opinion be obtained. It was submitted to the court on 28 June 1996.", "7. At the hearing held on 18 September 1996 the court heard evidence from an expert. The court further ordered him to prepare a supplementary opinion. It was submitted to the court on 10 October 1996.", "8. On 3 February 1997 the court held a hearing and appointed a new expert. On 30 June 1997 the new expert submitted his opinion to the court.", "9. At the hearing held on 21 January 1998 the court decide to obtain evidence from yet another expert. The opinion was submitted to the court on 17 June 1998.", "10. In her pleading of 3 September 1998 the applicant submitted a new proposal concerning the division of the estate. On 28 September 1998 she revoked it.", "11. The court held hearings on 16 December 1998, 22 February and 7 April 1999. On 17 December 1999 the court held a hearing and heard evidence from an expert. At that hearing the applicant authorised her father, who was a court expert, to represent her in the proceedings. As a result, the judge rapporteur asked to be excluded from dealing with the case. On 7 January 2000 the District Court acceded to his request.", "12. On 24 January 2000 the applicant challenged the impartiality of all judges sitting in the Zakopane District Court. On 7 March 2000 the Nowy Sącz Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) dismissed the applicant's challenge.", "13. On 15 September 2000 the court held a hearing and ordered another expert opinion. Subsequent hearings were held on 23 April and 23 May 2001. On 6 June 2001 the District Court gave judgment. The applicant appealed. It appears that the proceedings are pending." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "5. The applicants were born in 1954 and 1956 respectively and live in Bełchatów, Poland.", "6. The applicants bought a second-hand car on 19 July 1992.", "7. Their car was seized by the German Border Guard on 13 April 1993, as it appeared that it had been stolen.", "8. On 15 April 1993, at the second applicants' request, the Radom District Police instituted criminal proceedings against R.G., a car dealer from whom the applicants had bought the car.", "9. On 14 July 1993 the second applicant informed the Radom District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy) that he wished to join the proceedings as a civil party and asked the prosecution to forward his civil claim to the court together with the bill of indictment.", "10. The Radom District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) convicted the accused on 19 August 1993.", "11. The Radom District Prosecutor forwarded the applicant's claim to the Radom District Court on 27 August 1993. Since the criminal proceeding had already been terminated, the criminal court could not deal with the claim. Accordingly, it referred the claim to the Civil Division of the Radom District Court on 17 June 1994.", "12. On 15 November 1994 the President of the Radom District Court informed the applicant that his statement of claim and accompanying documentary evidence had been lost. He asked the applicant to provide copies of documents in order to reconstruct the case-file.", "13. On 7 December 1994 the District Court found that it was not competent to deal with the claim and referred the case to the Radom Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki).", "14. On 16 January 1995 the second applicant asked the court to exempt them from payment of the court fees. The court partly granted his request on 2 February 1995.", "15. On 27 February 1995, at the applicant's request, the court issued an interim order to secure his claim.", "16. On an unspecified date the second applicant appointed the first applicant as his representative. From then on she took part in the proceedings.", "17. The first hearing before the Regional Court was set down for 17 May 1995.", "18. The court held hearings on 28 June and 13 September 1995. They were adjourned because witnesses, J.N. and J.M., had failed to appear.", "19. At the hearing on 30 October 1995 the court imposed fines on J.N. and J.M.", "20. The court held hearings on 4 December 1995, 27 March and 12 April 1996.", "21. A hearing scheduled for 3 July 1996 was adjourned due to the defendant's absence.", "22. On 21 August 1996 the court held a hearing.", "23. The proceedings were stayed on 27 November 1996 because the criminal proceedings against J.N. and J.M had been instituted in the meantime.", "24. On 21 March 1997 the court, at the applicants' request, called J.N. as a co-defendant.", "25. On 18 September 1997 the court stayed the proceedings for the same reasons as above. They were resumed on 15 October 1998.", "26. A hearing scheduled for 1 December 1998 was adjourned because both parties had failed to appear.", "27. At the hearing on 18 December 1998 the court ordered that an expert report on the value of the disputed car be obtained. The report was submitted to the court on 27 January 1999.", "28. The next hearing took place on 15 February 1999.", "29. On 18 February 1999 the Radom Regional Court allowed the applicants' claim." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "4. The applicants are a married couple. The first applicant was born in 1945 and the second in 1940. They both live in Ożarów, Poland.", "5. Civil proceedings concerning delimitation of various plots of land belonging to the applicants began on 22 May 1982. On 22 September 1982 the Pruszkόw District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) gave a decision. The applicants appealed. On 9 December 1982 the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Wojewόdzki) set aside the first-instance decision and remitted the case.", "6. Following the remission of the case, the Pruszkόw District Court held a number of hearings and ordered that several expert reports be prepared. On 30 September 1985 the Pruszkόw District Court gave a decision. Upon the applicants' appeal, on 10 February 1986 the Warsaw Regional Court set aside the decision and remitted the case for re-examination.", "7. Between 1986 and 1 May 1993 the District Court held 11 hearings.", "8. After 1 May 1993 the Pruszkόw District Court held hearings on the following dates: 29 September, 18 November, 28 December 1993, 1 February, 4 March, 25 March and 20 April 1994.", "9. On 31 May 1994 the court held a viewing of the site. The next hearing was held on 21 October 1994.", "10. On 29 March 1995 the trial court held a hearing and stayed the proceedings because M.K., a party to the proceedings, had died. The applicants requested that the proceedings be resumed. On 5 January 1996 the court refused to resume the proceedings.", "11. On 20 March 1996 the applicants complained to the Ministry of Justice about the delay in the proceedings. On an unspecified date their complaints were referred to the President of the Warsaw Regional Court, who replied thereto on 4 July 1996. He acknowledged that the proceedings were indeed lengthy and promised to supervise their conduct.", "12. On 18 June 1996, on the applicants' appeal, the Warsaw Regional Court amended the decision of 5 January 1996 and resumed the proceedings.", "13. Subsequently, the Pruszkόw District Court held hearings on the following dates: 9 December 1996, 4 September, 21 October and 3 December 1997.", "14. On 3 December 1997 the case file was sent to an expert who was to prepare an opinion. The expert returned the case-file on 20 May 1999.", "15. On 1 June 1999 the court delivered a supplementary expert report and ordered the parties to submit their observations on it. On 23 September and 19 November 1999 the court held hearings. On 19 November 1999 the court gave a decision and ordered a certain M.G. to join the proceedings. On 7 February 2000 the court held a further hearing.", "16. On 18 February 2000 the applicants again complained to the President of the Warsaw Regional Court about the delay in the proceedings.", "17. On 23 May 2001 the court stayed the proceedings. The applicants appealed on 8 June 2001. On 11 December 2001 the court dismissed their appeal.", "18. On 19 September 2001, in reply to the applicants' complaint about the length of the proceedings, the Minister of Justice admitted that there was a certain delay in the proceedings. He further observed that the President of the Warsaw Regional Court and the President of the Pruszkόw District Court had supervised the conduct of the proceedings and had made reports on their progress.", "19. It appears that the proceedings are still stayed and, therefore, pending." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "8. The applicant was born in 1919 and lives in Berdyansk, Ukraine.", "9. The facts of the case are partially disputed by the parties. They may be summarised as follows.", "10. The applicant’s father was subjected to repression in 1929-1930 as a rich peasant (“kulak”). In 1930 the family property, including a two-storey house in Sorochinsk, Orenburg Region, Russia, was confiscated. In 1989 the applicant’s father was rehabilitated post mortem. The family house remains intact in Sorochinsk, where it is used by the Sorochinsk Veterinary College to house its employees. At some point during the proceedings the families who lived in the house were permitted to acquire their flats.", "11. The applicant lives in Berdyansk, Ukraine, and the train journey to Sorochinsk takes about two and a half days.", "12. In 1990 the applicant and her sister, Mrs Mikhaylishina, initiated proceedings to have their property right to the house recognised. On 26 October 1990 the Sorochinsk Town Court rejected their request and advised them to seek compensation for the property from the Orenburg Regional financial department. It appears that the department refused their request for compensation.", "13. In January 1992 the applicant’s sister died and the applicant remained the sole party to the proceedings.", "14. At some point in March 1992 the applicant submitted new claims to the Leninskiy District Court of Orenburg. On 24 September 1992 the Leninskiy District Court rejected both her complaint about the decision of the Regional financial department and her civil claim to have her property right to the house confirmed. On 6 May 1993 the Orenburg Regional Court quashed the decision of 24 September 1992 and remitted the case to the District Court. On 15 September 1993 the Leninskiy District Court ordered the transfer of the case to the Sorochinsk Town Court which had territorial jurisdiction for the dispute over the building.", "15. On 20 January 1995 the Head of the Sorochinsk Town administration issued an order, requesting the Veterinary College to pay the applicant the maximum compensation allowed by the national legislation, which would later be reimbursed to the College by the regional budget. The order was never complied with. On 10 April 1995 the Sorochinsk Town Court ordered the closure of the civil case as the applicant had been awarded the compensation. On 25 September 1995 the Presidium of the Orenburg Regional Court, acting by way of supervisory review, quashed the order of 10 April 1995 and returned the case to the Town Court.", "16. On 27 December 1995 the Sorochinsk Town Court rejected the applicant’s claim against the Town administration as having no basis in the national legislation and because she had already been awarded the compensation. On 9 April 1996 the Orenburg Regional Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case.", "17. On 24 July 1996 the Sorochinsk Town Court confirmed that the applicant’s family had been the owners of the property and that the confiscation had taken place, but rejected the applicant’s claim to have the house returned. On 27 August 1996 the Orenburg Regional Court quashed this judgment and remitted the case.", "18. On 13 February 1997 the Sorochinsk Town Court again confirmed the family’s previous ownership of the property and the fact of confiscation, but rejected the applicant’s claim to have the house returned. On 24 April 1997 the Orenburg Regional Court quashed this judgment. The applicant was then informed that the Orenburg Regional Court would consider her case as the first instance court.", "19. On 28 April 1998 the Civil College of the Orenburg Regional Court rejected the applicant’s claim for compensation filed against the Regional financial department and refused to return the house in natura. It ordered the Sorochinsk Town administration to pay the applicant the maximum compensation for the confiscated property in the amount of RUR 8,349 (100 “units” of the minimum monthly wage), plus travel expenses and legal fees in the amount of RUR 3,540. The applicant submits that she was served with the decision on 6 May 1998.", "20. On 7 May 1998 the applicant received RUR 3,540, representing travel fees and legal costs, at the Town administration.", "21. On 14 May 1998 the applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Orenburg Regional Court, which was to be forwarded together with the case file to the Supreme Court. The applicant then wrote to the Orenburg Regional Court to inquire about the progress of the case on 21 August 1998 and 24 March 1999, but received no reply. She also wrote directly to the Supreme Court on several occasions, including on 21 August and 26 November 1998, 6 May, 21 June, 2 August, 18 August and 16 December 1999. She received standard replies from the Supreme Court on 5 November 1998, 19 July 1999 and 19 January 2000, stating that her appeal could not be considered as no case file had been attached. On at least one occasion, in May 1999, the applicant copied the decisions of the courts and her appeal and forwarded the copies to the Supreme Court herself. Her letters to other bodies, including the Ministry of Justice, the High Qualification Board of Judges, the President’s administration, the Constitutional Court, prosecutors’ offices of various levels were either not answered or forwarded to the Orenburg Regional Court. The applicant submits that she was not aware of any procedural orders issued by the Regional Court in respect of her appeal.", "22. According to the Government’s submissions filed after the communication of the complaint, the Orenburg Regional Court pronounced its judgment on 28 April 1998 in short form (without reasoning), and then on 29 April 1998 in full. The decision was served on the applicant on 6 May 1998. She thus missed the ten-days time-limit for filing a cassation appeal, which was eventually lodged on 15 May and arrived at the Orenburg Regional Court on 25 May 1998. As a result, on 1 June 1998 the Regional Court issued a procedural order adjourning her appeal and requesting the applicant to submit reasons for the delay. This decision was forwarded to the applicant by a letter of 3 June 1998.", "23. On 21 June 1998 the Orenburg Regional Court again adjourned the appeal and requested reasons for the delay from the applicant. A letter, dated by mistake 21 July 1998, was sent to the applicant. The applicant failed to respond.", "24. The Government also submit that the court decision was executed in full in April 2000, when the sum of RUR 8,349 (one hundred minimum monthly wages) was transferred to a new account opened in the applicant’s name in the Sorochinsk branch of Sberbank. The applicant was informed accordingly by a letter. The applicant had already received the RUR 3,539 to cover her travel expenses.", "25. In February 2004, upon the Court’s request, the Government submitted copies of documents supporting their submissions. These included, notably, the Orenburg Regional Court’s decision of 1 June 1998, a letter from the same court dated 21 July 1998 informing the applicant about the adjournment and documents from the Sorochinsk Town Administration concerning execution of the judgment in April 2000.", "26. The applicant claims that she did not receive the letters of 3 June and 21 June (July) 1998. With respect to the award, the applicant submits that she only learned of the transfer to a bank account opened in her name in 2002, after receipt of the Government’s memorandum.", "27. The complaint was communicated to the Russian Government in September 2001.", "28. On 21 January 2002 the Presidium of the Orenburg Regional Court, acting upon the Regional Prosecutor’s application for supervisory review, quashed and remitted for procedural reasons the decision of the Sorochinsk Town Court of 26 October 1990. On 30 January 2002 the applicant was informed of this.", "29. On 12 February 2002 the Sorochinsk Town Court issued an order by which the applicant and her sister were instructed to update their claim of 1990 and to submit the applicant’s sister’s birth certificate before 15 March 2002. On 13 February 2002 the order was forwarded to the applicant. On 26 April 2002 the applicant replied to the Sorochinsk Town Court that her sister had died in 1992 and forwarded a copy of her death certificate. On 16 May 2002 the judge of the Town Court confirmed receipt of her letter and again requested her to update the claim initially submitted in August 1990 and to clarify if she wanted the case to be reviewed in her absence. It appears that a court hearing was scheduled for 22 August 2002. The applicant responded in July 2002 that she was not interested in a new review of the case, since it had lost its meaning. Her new claims against the defendants had been submitted in 1992 to the Sorochinsk Town Court, and these proceedings were the issue of her complaint.", "30. On 18 September 2002 the Orenburg Regional Court issued an information note, stating that the hearing in the applicant’s claim against the Sorochinsk Town administration was adjourned to 27 September 2002, due to the non-appearance of the claimant. On 14 October 2002 the applicant requested the court to terminate these proceedings." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "8. The applicants were born in 1955 and 1979 respectively and live in Sofia.", "9. On 1 July 1988 the applicants were hit by a taxi driven by a Mr V.G. The first applicant’s injuries, although serious, were not life-threatening, whereas the second applicant, who was at the time nine years old, sustained life-threatening injuries. Subsequently her spleen had to be surgically removed. Apparently her health is still seriously affected by the aftermath of the accident.", "10. Criminal proceedings were brought against Mr V.G. By a judgment of the competent criminal court of 8 December 1988 he was found guilty of negligently causing serious bodily injury to the second applicant and sentenced to one year’s imprisonment, suspended. The first applicant took part in these criminal proceedings, but only as a private prosecutor on behalf of the second applicant and not as a civil claimant, which would have been possible under the applicable law.", "11. On 17 June 1991 the first applicant filed with the Sofia City Court a tort action against Mr V.G. and the taxi enterprise where the latter had been employed at the time of the accident. She was acting on her own behalf and on behalf of the second applicant who was at the time still a minor. Both applicants claimed pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages.", "12. On 12 August 1991 Mr V.G. filed third-party claims against another person involved in the accident, Ms V.B., and against the State Insurance Company. These claims were based on Mr V.G.’s assertions that Ms V.B.’s improper crossing of the street had been the cause of the accident and that the State Insurance Company was liable to indemnify the damage under his road accident insurance.", "13. The first hearing was held on 4 October 1991. Finding that the applicants had not paid the requisite fee for filing the action, the court directed them to do so or to make a request to be exempted from payment of the fee. It also instructed Mr V.G. to provide the exact names and addresses of the third-party defendants. The court suspended the proceedings pending compliance with its instructions.", "14. The proceedings resumed on 21 October 1991 after the applicants had successfully filed a request for exemption from fees and Mr V.G. had provided the names and addresses of the third-party defendants. A hearing was listed for 10 December 1991.", "15. On 10 December 1991 the case had to be adjourned until 28 February 1992 as the taxi enterprise employing Mr V.G. at the time of the accident had in the meantime been reorganised into a commercial company[1] and had not received a copy of the applicants’ complaint. The applicants were instructed by the court to produce evidence that the taxi company listed as a defendant – Taxi Express – was the successor of the taxi enterprise, and to provide an additional copy of the complaint for it.", "16. At the hearing on 28 February 1992 the court noted that there was no evidence as to identify of the successor of the taxi enterprise. It requested Taxi Express to provide information on whether it was the successor. At that hearing the State Insurance Company intervened in the initial action in support of Mr V.G.", "17. At the next hearing, held on 21 April 1992, the court ruled on the successor of the taxi enterprise. It found that the successor was not the company listed as a defendant, Taxi Express, but another company, Softaxi. Accordingly, the court excluded the first defendant from the proceedings and constituted the second as a defendant, ordering that a copy of the applicants’ complaint be served on Softaxi. The case was adjourned.", "18. At the next hearing, which took place on 12 June 1992, the court agreed to examine Mr V.G.’s third-party claims together with the original tort action and admitted certain documents in evidence. It also ordered a medical expert report to be drawn up on the injuries sustained by the applicants and a technical expert report to be prepared on the cause of the accident. Both reports were to be drafted by court-appointed experts. Finally, the court directed Mr V.G. to pay the requisite fee for his third‑party claims, instructed the applicants to provide a breakdown of the pecuniary damages claimed, and gave the parties leave to call witnesses.", "19. The next hearing was held on 27 October 1992. The court noted that the medical expert report submitted had not been dated, with the result that it was impossible to establish whether it had been brought to the attention of Softaxi, which defendant had not appeared at the hearing. The court also noted that the technical expert who had been commissioned to draw up the report on the cause of the accident was absent. Accordingly, the court adjourned the case. It gave Mr V.G. leave to call one witness.", "20. On 5 February 1993 the court admitted in evidence the newly submitted medical expert report and questioned the medical expert who had prepared it. The court requested the applicants to specify and itemise, in the light of the medical expert’s report, the amount of compensation for pecuniary damages sought. The technical expert, Softaxi and Mr V.G.’s witness did not appear at the hearing, although they had been duly summoned. The court adjourned the case and fined the witness but not the technical expert.", "21. At the hearing held on 30 March 1993 the court questioned Mr V.G.’s witness. It then adjourned the case as Softaxi, despite having been duly summoned, did not appear and as the technical expert arrived at the hearing too late to be questioned.", "22. At the next hearing, which took place on 28 September 1993, the applicants increased their claims for non-pecuniary damages in order to take account of inflation. Softaxi and the technical expert did not appear, although they had been duly summoned. On the motion of Mr V.G.’s lawyer the court ordered the technical expert to answer an additional question regarding the causal link between Ms V.B.’s conduct and the accident. It adjourned the case with a view to receiving the technical expert’s report.", "23. A hearing listed for 10 December 1993 was adjourned as the technical expert, although having been duly subpoenaed, did not show up.", "24. On 25 February 1994 the technical expert finally showed up and was questioned. His report was admitted in evidence. As the expert had apparently not provided an answer to the additional question put to him on 28 September 1993, the court ordered him to supplement his report. The court also authorised Mr V.G. to increase his third-party claims against Ms V.B. and the State Insurance Company.", "25. A hearing listed for 20 May 1994 was adjourned as Softaxi had not been duly summoned and did not appear. The technical expert was also absent.", "26. A hearing fixed for 7 October 1994 was adjourned because the applicants’ lawyer, having had a road accident on 25 September, was ill and could not attend.", "27. At the hearing which took place on 20 December 1994 the court again gave the applicants leave to increase their claims for non-pecuniary damages, ordering that a copy of their request be served on Softaxi, which had failed to appear at the hearing. It noted that the supplementary technical expert report, ordered on 25 February 1994, had not yet been drawn up and adjourned the case.", "28. The next hearing was held on 17 March 1995. Despite having been duly summoned, the applicants, Softaxi, Ms V.B. and the State Insurance Company failed to appear. The technical expert was also absent. The court gave Mr V.G. leave to increase his third-party claims for a second time. The court adjourned the case. It ordered that the subpoena to be served on the technical expert should expressly mention that the case had had to be adjourned many times and that the court’s request for the presentation of his supplementary report had been made a long time ago.", "29. The next hearing took place on 19 June 1995. Softaxi and the State Insurance Company, despite having been duly summoned, did not appear. The technical expert was also absent. Ms V.B.’s lawyer submitted that Mr V.G.’s third-party claims had been made after the first hearing and for that reason should not have been examined jointly with the applicants’ tort action. Mr V.G.’s lawyer objected, stating that the claim had been presented prior to the first hearing. The court ruled that it would determine the point later in private. It adjourned the case, holding that this was necessary because of the technical expert’s absence and his failure to draw up his supplementary report, which was essential for the determination of the facts of the case. It fined the expert.", "30. The next hearing was held on 5 November 1995. Softaxi did not appear and the technical expert was also absent. Ms V.B.’s, Mr V.G.’s and the State Insurance Company’s lawyers all insisted that the technical expert report was needed so as to enable the facts of the case to be established properly. The court agreed. Noting that the technical expert had repeatedly failed to show up, the court replaced him with another expert.", "31. The new expert’s report on the cause of the accident was ready on 10 January 1996.", "32. The next hearing was held on 26 January 1996. Softaxi and Ms V.B. did not appear. The newly-appointed technical expert presented his report and was questioned. The applicants increased their claims for non-pecuniary damages for a third time. Mr V.G. also increased his third-party claims. The court ordered that copies of the requests to increase the claims be served on the absent parties and adjourned the case.", "33. The next hearing took place on 27 September 1996. Softaxi and Ms V.B. did not appear. The applicants increased their claims for non‑pecuniary damages for a fourth time. As a result, Mr V.G. increased his third-party claims as well. The court adjourned the case, ordering that copies of the requests for leave to increase the claims be served on the absent parties. It also requested that a copy of Softaxi’s certificate of company registration be produced by the parties.", "34. The next hearing was held on 11 February 1997. The applicants’ lawyer informed the court that Softaxi had been transformed into a joint‑stock company under the name of Softaxi EAD. The court listed Softaxi EAD as a defendant in the place of Softaxi but requested the applicants to produce certified copies of its registration documents. It also instructed them to provide a detailed breakdown of their claims for pecuniary damages and adjourned the case.", "35. The hearing listed for 11 March 1997 failed to take place. Despite having been duly summoned, the second applicant and Softaxi EAD did not appear. The court adjourned the case to allow the second applicant to countersign the complaint, since she had already turned eighteen and had thus obtained the capacity to sue on her own behalf.", "36. At the hearing which took place on 11 April 1997 the second applicant countersigned the complaint. The applicants tried to increase their claims for non‑pecuniary damages for a fifth time. The court rejected their request, holding that they had not paid the requisite fee for increasing the claims. It instructed them to pay the fee or to request an exemption. The court also found that the applicants had failed to provide a detailed breakdown of their claims for pecuniary damages. It directed them to do so within seven days, warning them that non-compliance could result in the dismissal of the claims.", "37. The next hearing took place on 31 October 1997. Softaxi EAD, Ms V.B. and the State Insurance Company, despite having been duly summoned, did not appear. Finding that the applicants had not complied with its instructions to provide a detailed breakdown of their claims for pecuniary damages, the court dismissed the claims. It gave the applicants leave to increase their claims for non-pecuniary damages and acceded to Mr V.G.’s follow-up request to increase his third‑party claims. The court ordered that copies of the requests be served on the absent parties. The applicants’ request for a new medical expert report was rejected. The court issued the applicants a certificate enabling them to obtain a copy of Softaxi EAD’s registration documents. The case was adjourned.", "38. The last hearing was held on 31 March 1998. Although duly summoned, Softaxi EAD and the State Insurance Company did not appear. The court rejected the applicants’ request to be allowed once again to increase their claims for non-pecuniary damages, holding that this would further complicate the examination of the case. The court heard the parties’ closing arguments.", "39. The Sofia City Court gave judgment on 15 April 1998. It allowed in part the applicants’ claims for non‑pecuniary damages against Mr V.G. and Softaxi EAD, holding them jointly and severally liable. The court also found that Ms V.B. had contributed to the accident and ordered her to pay Mr V.G. one third of the amount he had to pay the applicants. Finally, it held that Mr V.G.’s third-party claim against the State Insurance Company was statute-barred and, in any event, ill-founded because only the owner of the insured vehicle – Mr V.G.’s employer – could make such a claim.", "40. The second applicant was notified of the Sofia City Court’s judgment on 28 June 1999 and on 5 July 1999 she appealed against it to the Sofia Court of Appeals. She demanded that her claim for non-pecuniary damages be granted in full. She requested a new expert report on her medical condition.", "41. The first applicant was notified of the Sofia City Court’s judgment on 26 July 1999 and appealed against it the same day. She demanded that her claim for non-pecuniary damages be granted in full. She requested that a new expert report be prepared on her medical condition and sought leave to be allowed to call two witnesses.", "42. On 26 November 1999 the Sofia Court of Appeals, sitting in private, declared the appeals admissible. Finding the applicants’ requests for the gathering of additional evidence well-founded, it ordered a new medical expert report to determine the applicants’ present state of health, whether their health had deteriorated since the accident and what their health prospects were. The court also gave the first applicant leave to call the requested witnesses. It listed a hearing for 3 February 2000.", "43. The first hearing took place on 3 February 2000. Despite having been duly summoned, Mr V.G. and the State Insurance Company did not appear. The medical expert appointed by the court on 26 November 1999 was also absent. The applicants’ lawyer stated that she had spoken to the expert and had found that his field of expertise was different from the one needed for the preparation of an opinion on the applicants’ injuries. The court agreed and replaced the expert. It also questioned the two witnesses called by the applicants. It adjourned the case.", "44. The hearing listed for 23 March 2000 could not take place because the State Insurance Company had not been duly summoned.", "45. The next hearing was held on 18 May 2000. The court questioned the medical expert and admitted his report in evidence. Softaxi EAD’s lawyer presented a document purporting to prove that the taxi enterprise where Mr V.G. had been employed at the time of the accident had been split into two commercial companies following its reorganisation in 1991, and that Softaxi was only one of the two companies. The court adjourned the case to allow Softaxi EAD to produce the court decision on the reorganisation of its predecessor.", "46. The last hearing was held on 20 September 2000. The court admitted in evidence documents presented by Softaxi EAD on the strength of which it tried to prove that it was not the successor of the taxi enterprise where Mr V.G. had been employed at the time of the accident. The court heard the parties’ closing arguments. The parties presented written observations. In its observations Softaxi EAD argued that the applicants’ increased claims for non-pecuniary damages were time-barred because the increases had been made at various times during the proceedings but more than five years (the relevant limitation period) after the accident.", "47. The Sofia Court of Appeals gave judgment on 29 September 2000. It held that Softaxi EAD was indeed the successor of Mr V.G.’s employer at the time of the accident. It also held that the applicants’ increased claims for non-pecuniary damages were not time‑barred. It found that the pain and suffering sustained by the first and especially by the second applicant warranted a higher amount of compensation for non-pecuniary damages and, accordingly, awarded them such, but not the full amount claimed by the applicants. Finally, the court ordered Ms V.B. to pay Mr V.G. one third of the increased amount of compensation he had to pay the applicants.", "48. The applicants, Ms V.B. and Softaxi EAD lodged appeals on points of law with the Supreme Court of Cassation.", "49. The Supreme Court of Cassation held a hearing on 4 December 2001, at which it heard oral argument.", "50. The Supreme Court of Cassation gave judgment on 2 January 2002. It found that the applicants’ appeals were out of time. It proceeded to examine Softaxi EAD’s and Ms V.B.’s appeals on the merits. It dismissed Ms V.B.’s appeal but held, pursuant to Softaxi EAD’s appeal, that the Sofia Court of Appeals had erred in holding that the applicants’ increased claims for non-pecuniary damages had not been time‑barred. In fact, any increase in a claim was tantamount to the bringing of a new claim representing the difference between the original claim and the increased one. Accordingly, it remitted the case to a different panel of the Sofia Court of Appeals with instructions to analyse the dates of the increases in the applicants’ claims for non-pecuniary damages and to determine which had been made in good time and which had not.", "51. The Sofia Court of Appeals listed a hearing for 7 June 2002. At the hearing the court heard the parties’ arguments and reserved judgment.", "52. The Sofia Court of Appeals gave judgment on 17 October 2002. It held that the limitation period for claiming damages for the accident of 1 July 1988 had been five years and had expired on 1 July 1993, whereas all increases of the applicants’ claims for non‑pecuniary damages had been made after the latter date. Therefore, only the original claims could be allowed. Accordingly, the court upheld the Sofia City Court’s judgment of 15 April 1998.", "53. The applicants did not lodge an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Sofia Court of Appeals’ judgment became final on an unspecified date in December 2002 or January 2003.", "54. On 24 January 2003 the Sofia Court of Appeals issued to the applicants writs of execution against Mr V.G. and Softaxi EAD. The two were ordered to pay jointly and severally 400 new Bulgarian levs (“BGN”) plus interest from 1 July 1988 until settlement to the first applicant and BGN 2,500 plus interest from 1 July 1988 until settlement to the second applicant, plus costs and expenses for the proceedings.", "55. On 21 April 2003 the applicants entered into an agreement with Softaxi whereby the company agreed to pay BGN 2,817.60 and BGN 17,608.80, which represented the sum of the award of damages and the interest from 1 July 1988 until 15 April 2005, to the first and the second applicant respectively. Thereafter Softaxi started paying the amounts due in monthly instalments of BGN 117 to the first applicant and BGN 734 to the second applicant." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "7. The applicants were born in 1958 and 1964 respectively and live in the village of Aleko Konstantinovo, the Pazardjik region.", "8. In December 1993 the applicants were questioned as suspects in the destruction of a walnut tree owned by a State‑owned company.", "9. On 16 February 1994 the Pazardjik District Prosecutor’s Office opened criminal proceedings against the applicants.", "10. The first applicant was charged on 11 December 1995. The second applicant was charged on an unspecified date in December 1995. Immediately after the charging the applicants were ordered not to leave the town without authorisation as a measure to secure appearance before the competent authority (see paragraph 21 below).", "11. On 21 December 1995 the applicants were indicted. The prosecutor, acting on behalf of the State‑owned company, also brought a civil claim for damages against them.", "12. The Pazardjik District Court held its first hearing on 18 March 1996. It heard the applicants and questioned three witnesses. Finding that the facts of the case were in need of further clarification, the court ordered an expert report on the value of the walnut tree timber and decided to call another witness. It adjourned the case.", "13. The expert report was ready on 9 April 1996.", "14. The next hearing took place on 23 April 1996. The court heard the expert and admitted his report in evidence. It held that the facts were in need of further elucidation, ordered the expert to supplement his report and adjourned the case.", "15. The supplementary expert report was ready on 3 June 1996.", "16. A hearing listed for 25 June 1996 failed to take place because the applicants’ lawyer was absent.", "17. The next hearing was held on 9 August 1996. The prosecutor requested an additional expert report. The applicants’ lawyer agreed. The court ordered an additional expert report and adjourned the case.", "18. The next hearing took place on 26 September 1996. The court repealed its prior order for an additional expert report, admitted certain documents gathered during the investigation in evidence and heard the parties’ closing argument. After deliberating in private, it found that a material breach of the rules of procedure had taken place during the investigation. In particular, the applicants had not been properly charged, which had infringed their defence rights. Accordingly, the court remitted the case to the prosecution authorities with instructions to rectify this shortcoming and also to gather additional evidence.", "19. Since no progress took place in the remitted case, in August 1999 the applicants complained about the length of the proceedings to the Pazardjik Regional Prosecutor’s Office and to the Chief Prosecutor’s Office. On 24 August 1999 the Pazardjik Regional Prosecutor’s Office sent the applicants’ complaint to the Pazardjik District Prosecutor’s Office. On 14 September 1999 the Chief Prosecutor’s Office sent the applicants’ complaint to the Pazardjik Regional Prosecutor’s Office, ordering the prompt completion of the case. On 23 September 1999 the Pazardjik District Prosecutor’s Office informed the Pazardjik Regional Prosecutor’s Office and the applicants that the reason for the delay had been the failure of a witness to appear. It stated that measures had been taken for the speedy finalisation of the case.", "20. On 18 March 2002 the Pazardjik District Prosecutor’s Office, finding that the relevant limitation period had expired, discontinued the criminal proceedings against the applicants. It also lifted the prohibition on the applicants to leave the town without authorisation (see paragraph 21 below)." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "8. The applicant was born in 1934 and lives in Sofia.", "9. In March 1991 a statute providing for the restitution of agricultural lands collectivised during the communist regime, the Agricultural Lands Act of 1991, entered into force (see paragraphs 45‑47 below).", "10. Between 19 November 1991 and 2 June 1992 the applicant filed seven applications with the competent agricultural lands’ commission, requesting the restitution of certain plots of agricultural land allegedly owned by his wife’s grandfather.", "11. On 16 September 1992 the commission refused to restitute 492.3 decares claimed by the applicant. Apparently by mistake in the text of its decision the commission referred to a non‑existing application by the applicant. The applicant was informed of the decision by a letter dated 16 February 1993.", "12. On 11 March 1993 the applicant lodged an application for judicial review of the refusal with the Tervel District Court, arguing that he was entitled to the restitution of the 492.3 decares.", "13. The court held its first hearing on 26 September 1994. Counsel for the applicant presented certain written evidence and requested an adjournment, so as to be able to adduce further written evidence and call certain witnesses. The court granted the request and adjourned the case.", "14. The second hearing, listed for 14 November 1994, was adjourned by request of the counsel for the applicant who stated that he was encountering difficulties with the gathering of certain written evidence.", "15. The third hearing was held on 13 March 1995. Counsel for the applicant presented certain written evidence. The court heard two witnesses called by the applicant and the parties’ closing argument.", "16. The Tervel District Court dismissed the application for judicial review in a judgment of 15 March 1995, holding that there was insufficient evidence that the applicant’s ancestor had owned the land. The applicant was notified of the judgment in writing on 11 April 1995.", "17. On 12 May 1995 the applicant filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, arguing that the Tervel District Court had erred in assessing the evidence and that his ancestor had owned the land in issue.", "18. At the end of 1996 the Supreme Court was divided into a Supreme Court of Cassation and a Supreme Administrative Court. The applicant’s case was taken up by the Supreme Administrative Court.", "19. The Supreme Administrative Court held a hearing on 13 March 1997. At the hearing counsel for the applicant presented additional written observations in which he pointed out that the agricultural lands’ commission’s file had not been appended to the court case file and that the Tervel District Court had hence decided the case without acquainting itself with all relevant documents.", "20. On 25 March 1997 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the Tervel District Court’s judgement and remitted the case, holding that the non-appending of the commission’s file to the court’s case file had entailed a serious breach of the rules of procedure.", "21. On remittal the Tervel District Court examined the case in three hearings.", "22. The first hearing, listed for 22 May 1997, was adjourned because of the applicant’s request to adduce additional evidence and the agricultural lands’ commission’s failure to produce its file.", "23. The second hearing, listed for 18 July 1997, was adjourned due to the failure of the lands’ commission to produce its file.", "24. On 14 August 1997 the applicant complained to the Supreme Administrative Court about the delay in the proceedings.", "25. The third hearing was held on 2 October 1997. The court examined all evidence, heard the parties’ closing argument and reserved judgment.", "26. On 19 October 1998 the applicant complained to the Ministry of Justice about the delay in the delivery of judgment. The Ministry of Justice notified the chairperson of the Dobrich Regional Court (in whose region the Tervel District Court was) about the complaint. The chairperson of the Dobrich Regional Court eventually sent a letter to the applicant, stating that his complaint was well‑founded and that following his intervention the district court judge had promptly completed the case.", "27. Indeed, on 10 November 1998 judgement was delivered. The Tervel District Court dismissed the application for judicial review, holding that 492.3 decares of the applicant’s ancestor’s land had been confiscated in 1923 by the Romanian State after the Romanian occupation of the northern part of Bulgaria (the so‑called South Dobrudja). Thereafter, in 1942, pursuant to an international treaty concluded between Bulgaria and Romania („Крайовска спогодба“), a statute providing for the restitution of these lands had been adopted. The court noted that the applicant had not produced evidence that in 1942 his ancestor had requested the restitution of the land in accordance with the procedure set forth in that statute. The court therefore found that the applicant had not proved that his ancestor had been the owner of the land which had been collectivised after 1944.", "28. On 30 November 1998 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Dobrich Regional Court.", "29. The Dobrich Regional Court held one hearing on 14 May 1999. At the hearing counsel for the applicant presented written observations in which she pointed out, inter alia, that the agricultural lands’ commission had issued a decision pursuant to a non‑existent application by the applicant. The applicant had filed several applications for restitution, none of which had borne the number or had related to the quantity of land mentioned in the commission’s decision. The decision was thus invalid. Accordingly, counsel invited the court to quash the lower court’s judgment and remit the case to the agricultural lands’ commission for a fresh examination of the applicant’s applications for restitution.", "30. In a judgment of 3 July 1999 the Dobrich Regional Court quashed the Tervel District Court’s judgment and remitted the case to the agricultural lands’ commission. It held that the commission’s decision had not been issued pursuant to the applicant’s applications and was thus void.", "31. On unspecified dates in 1999 and 2000 the commission issued six separate decisions pursuant to the respective applications of the applicant. The applicant was notified of the decisions by a letter dated 26 April 2000.", "32. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged applications for judicial review of all six decisions with the Tervel District Court.", "33. The court fixed a hearing for 7 July 2000. At that hearing it ordered the lands’ commission to produce copies of the decisions and adjourned the case.", "34. Two hearings listed for 27 October and 24 November 2000 were adjourned, because counsel for the applicant could not attend.", "35. The next hearing took place on 18 December 2000. On the motion of the lands’ commission the court decided to hold separate proceedings in respect of each of the commission’s decisions. It instructed the applicant to provide separate applications for judicial review of each decision and adjourned the case.", "36. On an unspecified date in December 2000 the applicant complied with the instructions of the court. Thereafter the court opened six new case files in respect of each of the applications for judicial review.", "37. The court held two further hearings on 9 and 23 March 2001.", "38. On 20 August 2002 the Tervel District Court delivered six judgments, granting the applicant’s restitution claims.", "39. The agricultural lands’ commission lodged appeals on points of law against all six judgments with the Dobrich Regional Court.", "40. The Dobrich Regional Court opened six separate case files and held two hearings on 19 and 26 February 2003.", "41. On 10 March 2003 the Dobrich Regional Court delivered a judgment pursuant to the first appeal. It held that the first judgment of the Tervel District Court had been delivered with respect to the agricultural lands’ commission’s decision of 16 September 1992, which had already been declared void by the Dobrich Regional Court in July 1999 (see paragraph 30 above). It therefore vacated the Tervel District Court’s judgment and discontinued the proceedings.", "42. On 17 March 2003 the Dobrich Regional Court delivered five judgments pursuant to the remainder of the appeals. It held that the Tervel District Court had made material breaches of the rules of procedure. It therefore quashed its judgments and remitted the cases for a fresh examination.", "43. In April 2003 the applicant requested the Tervel District Court to join the proceedings in the five remitted cases. However, in May 2003 he withdrew his request and thereafter withdrew his applications for judicial review, thereby terminating the proceedings.", "44. On an unspecified date, probably in May 2003, the applicant instituted separate proceedings for a declaratory judgment under section 11(2) of the Agricultural Lands Act of 1991. He sought a declaration against the agricultural lands’ commission that he was entitled to restitution. The Tervel District Court held a hearing on 16 June 2003. At the time of the latest information from the parties (5 September 2003) the court had scheduled a hearing for 29 September 2003 and the proceedings were still pending." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Budapest.\n (1) Criminal proceedings instituted in 1993", "5. On 18 February 1993 the applicant, an examiner at the Road Authority, was arrested by officers of the Veszprém County Police Department. He was charged with having issued false certificates in his role as a member of an organised group involved in the legalisation of unlawfully acquired cars. He was in pre-trial detention between 22 February and 7 May 1993 and interrogated on 19 and 24 February, 9 and 26 March, 7 May and 29 June 1993. The investigations were closed on 13 December 1993. By then, more than 100 suspects and 250 witnesses had been heard, house searches were carried out and expert opinions were obtained.", "6. On 9 June 1994 the Veszprém District Public Prosecutor's Office preferred a bill of indictment against the applicant and 88 other defendants.", "7. Between 22 November 1994 and 1 December 1995 the Veszprém District Court held 68 hearings. The District Court heard the defendants and 77 witnesses. The case-file of the trial amounted to 2,000 pages. It delivered and read out its 245-page long judgment on 1 and 14 December 1995 and on 30 January 1996. The District Court convicted the applicant of charges of bribery, forgery and misuse of fire arms and ammunition, and sentenced him to 2 years and 6 months' imprisonment. The applicant appealed, together with numerous other defendants.", "8. The competent Veszprém County Regional Court held six hearings. On 9 February 1997 it quashed the District Court's judgment in respect of eleven defendants, including the applicant, and remitted the case to the first-instance court. On 16 July 1998 the Veszprém District Public Prosecutor's Office preferred a supplementary bill of indictment extending the charges against the applicant to an offence of receiving stolen goods of considerable value.", "9. In the resumed proceedings, the District Court held hearings on 6 and 7 October 1998, 25 February, 15 June, 7 July, 26 October and 16 November 1999. On 15 December 1999 it delivered a judgment. The applicant was convicted of charges of bribery, forgery of official documents, receiving stolen goods and abuse of fire-arms. Despite the applicant's conviction for a further offence, the Regional Court reduced his sentence to 2 years' imprisonment, suspended for a 4-year probationary period. The Regional Court emphasised that the reduction of the sentence was exclusively due to the “unreasonably long duration of the proceedings”.", "10. The applicant appealed. On 12 October 2000 the Regional Court upheld his conviction. This judgment was served on the applicant on 12 June 2001.\n(2) Criminal proceedings instituted in 1994", "11. On 9 May 1994 another set of criminal proceedings was instituted against the applicant in Budapest. In January 1996 the Budapest XIV District Public Prosecutor's Office preferred a bill of indictment charging the applicant with offences committed in a context similar to that under (1) above.", "12. On 2 April, 9 September and 10 December 1997, 31 March, 10 September and 2 November 1998 and 5 January 1999, the Pest Central District Court held hearings in the case. On 25 January 1999 the District Court delivered a judgment. It convicted the applicant of bribery and forgery of official documents, and sentenced him to a fine and 1 year and 2 months' imprisonment. The execution of the prison sentence was suspended for 4 years.", "13. The applicant appealed. On 11 February 2000 the Budapest Regional Court upheld his conviction. The judgment was served on the applicant on 21 March 2000. The Government submitted the reception notice which was stamped at the despatching Budapest Post Office on 21 March 2000. The handwritten note showing its receipt by the addressee bears the same date.\n(3) Labour law proceedings", "14. On 10 May 1993 disciplinary proceedings were instituted against the applicant on account of the criminal proceedings brought against him. On 10 June 1993 the applicant's employer terminated his employment as a disciplinary measure. The applicant challenged this decision before the Budapest Labour Court on 24 June 1993.", "15. The Labour Court held hearings on 20 October 1993, 30 March and 6 May 1994. On the latter date, the Labour Court allowed the applicant's challenge. The applicant's employer appealed.", "16. The Regional Court held hearings on 22 March and 1 November 1995. On 17 November 1995 the Budapest Regional Court modified the Labour Court's decision and dismissed the applicant's claim. On 16 January 1996 the applicant pursued a petition for review.", "17. On 26 June 1996 the Supreme Court quashed the Labour and Regional Courts' decisions and remitted the case to the first-instance court, holding that the outcome of the criminal proceedings should be taken into account when delivering the judgment.", "18. On 29 April 1997 the applicant requested the postponement of a hearing scheduled for 11 June 1997 and requested that the proceedings be suspended. On 11 June 1997 the Labour Court suspended the proceedings pending the outcome of the criminal case and ordered the parties to submit all relevant documents without delay when the latter was concluded.", "19. On 12 April 2001 the applicant informed the Labour Court that his legal counsel had ceased to represent him. He failed to mention that, meanwhile, the criminal proceedings had ended.", "20. On 15 February 2002 the defendant submitted the final judgment convicting the applicant and requested that the case be continued.", "21. In the resumed proceedings, on 27 February 2002, the Labour Court ordered the parties to submit their motions for evidence. At the hearing on 24 June 2002 the Labour Court repeatedly ordered the applicant to submit his motion for evidence. The applicant complied with the order on 16 September 2002.", "22. On 21 October 2002 the Labour Court dismissed the applicant's action. The judgment was served on the applicant on 4 November 2002 and became final on 22 November 2002." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "4. The applicant, Renovit Építőipari Kft, is a Hungarian limited liability company, with its seat in Budapest.", "5. On 24 August 1990 the I. Company brought an action against the applicant company before the Budapest Regional Court, claiming compensation in the amount of 106,493 Hungarian forints (HUF).", "6. On 30 October 1991 the Regional Court accepted the plaintiff's claims. The applicant appealed on 6 December 1991.", "7. On 11 May 1994 the plaintiff's successor entered the proceedings.", "8. On 12 May 1994 the Supreme Court quashed the Regional Court's judgment and remitted the case to the first instance court.", "9. On 30 November 1994 the competent Pest Central District Court held a hearing and requested the plaintiff to specify its claims. On 15 December 1994 the plaintiff complied with this order and extended its action to include a second defendant.", "10. On 10 January 1995 the District Court requested the applicant to submit observations on the specified claims. The applicant complied with this order on 20 January 1995.", "11. On 8 March 1995 the District Court heard witnesses and requested the parties to submit further documents. The plaintiff and the applicant complied with this order on 9 March and 5 May 1995, respectively.", "12. The District Court held hearings on 16 May and 26 September 1995, and 12 January, 10 April and 14 May 1996.", "13. In the meantime, on 16 April and 26 August 1996, the court instructed the plaintiff to request that its legal predecessor be discharged from the proceedings. The plaintiff complied with the instruction on 20 September 1996.", "14. On 6 November 1996 none of the parties appeared at the hearing. Consequently, the District Court stayed the proceedings.", "15. On 8 April 1997 the plaintiff requested that the proceedings be continued. In the resumed proceedings, on 22 October 1997 the District Court held a hearing and requested the applicant to submit some documents.", "16. On 6 February and 14 May 1998 the District Court held further hearings.", "17. On 22 October 1998 the District Court delivered a judgment and ordered the applicant to pay HUF 106,493 to the plaintiff. The applicant appealed on 2 January 1999, outside the statutory time-limit. On 6 April 1999 the District Court decided to accept the applicant's explanation for the delay and transferred the case to the Budapest Regional Court.", "18. At the hearing on 4 May 2000 the Regional Court upheld the first-instance decision." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "4. The applicants were born in 1975, 1947, 1961 and 1985 respectively and live in Zgierz, Poland.", "5. On 8 July 1992 the company with which the applicants had concluded a lease contract sued them for payment before the Łódź Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki).", "6. On 9 March 1993 the court held the first hearing.", "7. At a hearing on 6 April 1993 the applicant brought a counterclaim for payment.", "8. On 27 April 1993 the court held a hearing.", "9. On 17 March 1994 the court held a hearing.", "10. A hearing scheduled for 21 April 1994 was adjourned because the judge was ill.", "11. A hearing set down for 18 May 1994 was adjourned because witnesses failed to appear.", "12. On 18 January 1995 the applicants sent a letter to the court asking for a hearing date to be fixed.", "13. On 21 June, 10 July and 3 September 1996 and 17 March 1997 were adjourned because the parties had started friendly settlement negotiations.", "14. On 18 June, 28 October and 11 December 1997, 19 February, 20 April and 17 July 1998 the court held hearings.", "15. On an unspecified date in 1999 the composition of the court changed.", "16. On 11 February 1999 the court ordered that expert evidence be obtained. The expert report was submitted to the court on 20 April 1999.", "17. On 9 June, 6 September, 4 October and 20 December 1999 the court held hearings.", "18. On 21 December 1999 the court allowed the plaintiff's claim and dismissed the applicants' counterclaim.", "19. On 19 May 2000 the Łódź Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) dismissed the applicants' appeal against the first-instance judgment.", "20. On 30 June 2000 the applicants lodged a cassation appeal.", "21. On 11 January 2002 the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) refused to deal with the appeal. A copy of the decision was served on the applicants on 27 March 2002." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "4. The applicants were born in 1955 and 1959, respectively, and live in Székesfehérvár, Hungary. They represent their minor daughter, Sz.K. before the Court. Sz.K. was born in 1985.", "5. In 1986 Sz.K. suffered paralysis as a consequence of a compulsory polio inoculation. In 1987 the applicants, as her representatives, brought an action against the Hungarian State claiming compensation and a monthly allowance. The parties reached a friendly settlement. On the applicants' request, in 1991 the compensation and the allowance were raised. In 1993 the Supreme Court partly accepted their claim for the value of a special car.", "6. On 26 November 1993 the applicants brought an action before the Fejér County Regional Court, sitting as a first instance court, claiming a raise in the monthly allowance as a result of inflation and the high cost of schooling.", "7. Following the court's order, on 27 June 1994 an expert submitted an opinion on the matter.", "8. On 7 January 1995 the applicants modified their action.", "9. On 10 February 1995 the Regional Court partly granted the applicants' claims.", "10. Upon the applicants' appeal, on 25 January 1996 the Supreme Court quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case to the Regional Court.", "11. In the resumed proceedings, on 12 June 1997 the expert submitted another opinion. On 8 August 1997 the applicants clarified their claims about inflation.", "12. On 19 September 1997 the Regional Court partly accepted the applicants' claims.", "13. On 12 October 1997 the applicants appealed to the Supreme Court for the full claim.", "14. On 22 July 1998 the applicants requested the court to deliver a judgment, and modified their claims in view of the lapse of time since their appeal had been lodged.", "15. On 9 January 2000 the applicants again requested the court to deliver a judgment and modified their claims, given the time lag.", "16. On 3 February and 30 March 2000 the Supreme Court held hearings. In a judgment of 6 April 2000, the Supreme Court partly modified the first-instance decision.", "17. On the applicants' petition for review, on 14 May 2001 the Supreme Court's review bench increased the award." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Łódź, Poland.", "5. On 4 November 1993 the applicant lodged with the Łódź Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) a civil action against the State Treasury – the Zgierz Hospital. She claimed compensation and a monthly pension for damage she had sustained as a result of a medical treatment at the Zgierz Hospital.", "6. On 5 November 1993 the court exempted the applicant from the court‑fees.", "7. On 20 March 1995 the trial court held the first hearing.", "8. Subsequently, hearings were held on 12 June and 13 November 1995.", "9. On 27 November 1995 the Łódź Regional Court gave judgment. It dismissed the applicant's action. The trial court found no fault on the part of the doctors concerned and accordingly dismissed the liability of the State Treasury for the damage.", "10. The applicant appealed against this judgment.", "11. On 28 February 1996 the Lodz Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) quashed the impugned judgment and remitted the case to the Regional Court.", "12. The trial court held the first hearing on 2 October 1996.", "13. At the subsequent hearings which were held on 29 August and 12 November 1997 the trial court ordered an expert opinion and heard an expert witness.", "14. At the hearing held on 23 January 1998 the defendant asked the court to prepare another expert opinion.", "15. Between 24 January 1998 and 18 January 1999 no hearings were held.", "16. Subsequently, the Łódź Regional Court held six hearings and on 22 July 1999 it gave judgment. The trial court again dismissed the action.", "17. The applicant appealed against the judgment.", "18. The Łódź Court of Appeal held five hearings and on 9 October 2001 it gave judgment. The appellate court partly allowed the appeal and awarded the applicant PLN 4,000 in compensation. The court found, inter alia, that the doctors had failed to act diligently; consequently, the State Treasury was liable for the damage sustained by the applicant.", "19. On 29 January 2002 the applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court.", "20. On 29 October 2002 the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) rejected her cassation appeal." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Góra Kalwaria, Poland.", "5. On 16 December 1987 the applicant filed with the Warsaw District Court ( Sąd Rejonowy) an application for division of matrimonial property.", "6. On 12 March 1993 the Warsaw District Court gave a partial decision (postanowienie częściowe).", "7. Prior to 1 May 1993 the trial court held 20 hearings and obtained four expert opinions.", "8. The court scheduled further hearings for 28 April 1995 and 26 May 1995 but the applicant due to her sick leave failed to appear. The hearings listed for 14 February 1996, 19 February 1997 and 16 May 1997 were adjourned.", "9. On 18 July 1997 the court held a hearing and heard evidence from the parties. A hearing listed for 1 August 1997 was cancelled.", "10. The applicant complained to the President of the District Court alleging inactivity on the part of that court in handling her case. In a reply of 9 February 1998 the President informed her that the next hearing was scheduled for 29 April 1998. However, that hearing was adjourned as the defendant and his counsel had not been present. They had not been served with the summons. The next hearing was held on 19 May 1998.", "11. On 27 May 1998 the Warsaw District Court gave a decision (postanowienie końcowe). The applicant appealed.", "12. The Warsaw Regional Court held hearings on 1 April, 20 July, 30 September, 24 November and 9 December 1999. The applicant was not present at any of the hearings despite being properly summoned.", "13. On 4 January 2000 the Warsaw Regional Court gave a final decision." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Wrocław, Poland.", "5. On 30 May 1994 the Puławy District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy) detained the applicant on remand on suspicion of his having committed fraud.", "6. The Puławy District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) upheld that decision on 10 June 1994.", "7. Subsequently the applicant's detention was prolonged several times. He unsuccessfully appealed against those decisions.", "8. On 3 January 1995 the Puławy District Court convicted the applicant of fraud.", "9. On 28 April 1995 the Lublin Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) quashed that judgment and remitted the case.", "10. The applicant remained in detention throughout the subsequent proceedings.", "11. On 1 September 1995 the Puławy District Court upheld its original judgment.", "12. Following the applicant's further appeals, that conviction was eventually quashed by the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) on 25 April 1996.", "13. On 7 April 1997 the applicant filed an application for compensation for wrongful conviction and unjustified detention with the Lublin Regional Court.", "14. On 16 February 1999 the Lublin Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) referred the case to the Warsaw Regional Court.", "15. The applicant repeatedly asked both courts to fix a date for a hearing. On March 2000 the Warsaw Regional Court informed the applicant that, due to the heavy case-load and a shortage of staff in the court, it was not possible to accelerate the proceedings.", "16. The first hearing on the merits was held on 2 December 2002. The court then adjourned the proceedings sine die.", "17. On 23 June 2003 the court held a hearing.", "18. The proceedings are pending." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "4. The applicants were born in 1935 and 1939 respectively and live in Szabadbattyán, Hungary.", "5. In 1991 the applicants bought a flat from A.B. In the contract of sale A.B. agreed that the sum of 1,000,000 Hungarian forints (HUF) would be paid by the purchasers at a later date. However, the applicants refused to pay the amount, claiming that the house had turned out to be in a worse condition than they had thought at the time of the purchase and, therefore, its value was less than that agreed in the contract.", "6. Consequently, on 13 December 1992 A.B. brought an action against the applicants before the Székesfehérvár District Court for the payment of the outstanding amount, plus interest.", "7. On 22 June 1993 the District Court heard the plaintiff, whereas the applicants' lawyer failed to appear.", "8. At the hearing on 16 December 1993 the plaintiff refused to give statements in the absence of her counsel. The District Court therefore ordered the lawyer to justify his absence. On 24 January 1994 the plaintiff appointed a new legal representative.", "9. At the hearing on 8 March 1994 the plaintiff and her legal representative failed to appear. Consequently, the court stayed the proceedings. On 8 September 1994 the plaintiff requested that the case be continued.", "10. In the resumed proceedings, on 5 December 1994 and 29 March 1995 the District Court requested further documents from the plaintiff. The plaintiff submitted them on 27 March and 4 May 1995, respectively.", "11. A hearing scheduled for 22 June 1995 was postponed on the parties' request.", "12. On 10 October and 5 December 1995 the court heard the parties and, on the latter date, witnesses as well.", "13. As the parties failed to appear at the hearing on 20 February 1996, while trying to settle the case, the District Court stayed the proceedings.", "14. Having failed to settle the case, the parties requested that the proceedings be continued. In the resumed proceedings, the District Court postponed the hearing that had been scheduled for 27 June 1996, as a witness failed to appear. At the hearing on 29 October 1996 the witness, who had repeatedly failed to be present, was fined. The applicants requested that a real-estate expert be appointed in the case. They deposited the expert's costs on 3 December 1996. Consequently, on 16 December 1996 the District Court appointed an expert.", "15. Following an on-site inspection of 1 March 1997, on 28 March 1997 the expert submitted his opinion.", "16. In a judgment on 22 October 1997, the District Court ordered the applicants to pay the plaintiff HUF 850,000, plus interest. The court relied on the expert's opinion and testimonies given by the parties and several witnesses.", "17. On the applicants' appeal, on 8 December 1997 the Fejér County Regional Court partially modified the first-instance judgment and reduced the court fees.", "18. The applicants' petition for review of 21 September 1998 was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 18 May 2000, the final judgment having been delivered in accordance with the law.", "19. The applicants were represented by a lawyer of their choice throughout the proceedings." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Warszawa.", "5. On 15 October 1993 the Warsaw District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) declared that the heirs to the applicant late mother's estate were the applicant, her father, and her sister. The estate consisted of a house and a plot of land located in Warsaw.", "6. On 14 November 1994 the applicant's sister (“the petitioner”) instituted non-contentious proceedings (postępowanie nieprocesowe) before the Warsaw District Court (Sąd Rejonowy w Warszawie) in which she requested that the co-ownership of the house and the land be dissolved.", "7. On 22 March 1995 the court held the first hearing.", "8. Subsequently, hearings were held on 1 February, 7 March and 15 October 1996.", "9. On 6 January 1997 the court, sitting in camera, decided to obtain an expert opinion. On 15 February 1997 an expert prepared the opinion. On 21 February 1997 the District Court, sitting in camera, gave a decision regarding the fee for the expert.", "10. Between 16 October 1996 and 28 October 1997 no hearings were held.", "11. The hearings scheduled for 29 October and 16 December 1997 were adjourned because of the absence of the petitioner.", "12. Subsequently, hearings were held on 4 February, 19 June and 31 July 1998.", "13. On 22 October 1998 the court ordered a second expert opinion. The opinion was submitted to the court on 20 January 1999.", "14. Between 1 August 1998 and 15 April 1999 no hearings were held.", "15. Hearings scheduled for 16 April, 2 June, and 9 September 1999 were adjourned because of the absence of the petitioner and expert witnesses.", "16. On 22 November 1999 the District Court held the next hearing at which it ordered that a fourth expert opinion be prepared.", "17. Between 23 November 1999 and 8 November 2001 no hearings were held.", "18. Subsequently, the court held hearings on 9 November and 5 December 2001 as well as 21 February 2002.", "19. On 24 January and 7 April 2003 the Warsaw District Court held hearings.", "20. The proceedings are pending." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Warsaw, Poland.", "5. On 21 February 1994 the applicant sued a certain E.K. (“the defendant”) in the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy), seeking payment for works which he had carried out for her. On 17 March 1994 the applicant was partly exempted from the payment of court fees.", "6. The first hearing was fixed for 26 January 1995, but was eventually adjourned since the defendant was ill.", "7. On 22 February 1995 the defendant lodged a counterclaim. The trial court held hearings on: 2 March, 18 April, 6 June and 3 October 1995 and on 16 January and 16 April 1996. The court heard evidence from several witnesses and from the defendant.", "8. On 16 April 1996 the court ordered that expert evidence be obtained. On 10 May 1996 the expert submitted his opinion to the court. On 24 September 1996 the court held a hearing and heard evidence from the expert. The applicant requested the court to take new expert evidence.", "9. During the hearing held on 24 April 1997 the court heard several witnesses. The applicant asked the court to appoint another expert. On 16 June 1997 the applicant applied for an exemption from the costs involved in obtaining an expert opinion. His request was granted on 28 October 1997. On 28 October 1997 another expert submitted his opinion to the trial court.", "10. On 17 July 1998 the applicant asked the court to set a date for a hearing. He stressed that the court had only held two hearings per year. The next hearing was fixed for 9 November 1998, but was adjourned at the parties' request.", "11. On 16 April 1999 the applicant again asked the court to obtain new expert evidence and set a date for a hearing as soon as possible. He submitted that he had been suffering from various ailments and for that reason the court should give priority to his case.", "12. On 8 October 1999 the court, sitting in camera, decided to obtain an opinion from another expert. On 14 December 1999 the expert submitted his opinion to the court.", "13. On an unspecified later date the applicant complained to the Ombudsman about the length of the proceedings. On 22 October 1999 the Ombudsman informed the applicant that his complaint had been referred to the President of the Warsaw Regional Court.", "14. During the hearing held on 15 March 2000 the court heard an expert and ordered the parties to state their position within two weeks. The applicant submitted his pleadings on 27 March 2000.", "15. On 25 August 2000 the applicant complained to the Minister of Justice, maintaining that the court was particularly slow in dealing with the case. In a letter to the applicant of 29 September 2000 the Minister of Justice conceded that the length of the proceedings was excessive.", "16. On 11 October 2000 the Regional Court held a hearing. On 7 November 2000 the court held a viewing of the site. On 8 January 2001 and 12 March 2002 the court held further hearings.", "17. On an unknown later date the Regional Court and the Court of Appeal gave judgments. Upon the applicant's subsequent cassation appeal, the proceedings are pending before the Supreme Court." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "6. The applicant lives in Piotrków Trybunalski, Poland.", "7. On 28 December 1993 the applicant sued the Polmozbyt State Enterprise (\"the Polmozbyt\") in the Łódź District Court (Sąd Rejonowy), seeking return of payment made for an allegedly defective car.", "8. On 21 June 1994 the court ordered an expert opinion to be obtained. It was submitted to the court on 28 September 1994.", "9. On 18 January 1995, FSO Warszawa, the manufacturer of the car, joined the proceedings as an intervener (interwenient uboczny) on behalf of the defendant.", "10. The court held hearings on 30 June, 9 August and 6 October 1995.", "11. On 19 October 1995 the court ordered that another expert opinion be obtained. It was submitted to the court on 29 November 1995. On 1 March and 29 April 1996 the court held hearings.", "12. On 2 July 1996 the court requested the laboratory of the Łódź Regional Police Headquarters (Wojewódzka Komenda Policji) to prepare an expert report in respect of the defects of the car paint. On 25 July 1996 the laboratory informed the court that it was not competent to prepare the report. On 23 December 1996 the court quashed its order of 2 July 1996. On the same date it also ordered that the report at issue be obtained from the Institute of Forensic Experts (Instytut Ekspertyz Sądowych) in Cracow. The applicant could not place his car at the disposal of the Institute because the car registration book had not been renewed due to technical defects of the car.", "13. The court held hearings on 5 December 1997 and on 20 January, 24 February and 22 September 1999.", "14. On 29 September 1999 the Łódź District Court gave judgment and dismissed the applicant's claim. On 16 February 2000 the applicant asked the court to grant him leave to appeal out of time. On 20 June 2000 the court refused his request." ]

[ 0, 1, 2 ]

[ "12. On 12 February 1959 the applicant’s father was convicted of keeping, contrary to the regulations then in force, 131 gold coins and 2,151 silver coins of numismatic value. He was sentenced to one year’s imprisonment. He was also fined, and the coins were confiscated.", "13. On 1 April 1992, in the context of judicial rehabilitation provided for by the Judicial Rehabilitation Act 1990, the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic (Najvyšší súd) quashed the judgment of 12 February 1959 and all consequential decisions, and discharged the applicant’s late father.", "14. On 30 September 1992 the applicant claimed the restitution of his father’s coins under the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act 1991 (“the 1991 Act”).", "15. On 19 September 1995 the Senica District Court (Okresný súd) granted the action and ordered the Ministry of the Interior to restore the coins to the applicant. The court established, with reference to the relevant records, that the coins had been taken away from the applicant’s father on 21 November 1958 and transmitted to the Regional Administration of the Ministry of the Interior in Bratislava on 12 December 1958. On 19 December 1958 the coins had been examined by an expert and inventoried on the premises of the Regional Administration in Bratislava.", "16. The relevant part of the District Court’s judgment reads as follows:\n“It is true that the law requires that a person claiming restitution of movable property should indicate and show where such property is. However, in the present case the plaintiff undoubtedly has no possibility of inspecting the premises or safes of the former Public Security Regional Administration in Bratislava as he is not allowed to enter those premises. By insisting that the applicant should show that the coins are at the last known place, the Court would impose a burden of proof on him which it is practically impossible to fulfil. On the contrary ... the Ministry of the Interior neither showed that the former Public Security Regional Administration in Bratislava had transferred the coins to a different authority nor did it propose to take evidence to that effect ...\nThe Court has established that the last time [their exact location was known] the coins ... had been held on the premises of the Public Security Regional Administration in Bratislava to which the Ministry of the Interior is a successor, and it has not been shown that the coins were not on those premises when the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act became operative, that is, on 1 April 1991.”", "17. On 1 December 1995 the Ministry of the Interior appealed. Its representative argued that all relevant documents had been destroyed and that the onus of proof as to where the coins had been deposited lay on the applicant.", "18. On 29 January 1997 the Bratislava Regional Court (Krajský súd) ruled in favour of the Ministry of the Interior. It found, with reference to sections 4(1), 5(1) and 20(1) of the 1991 Act, that the applicant had failed to show where the coins had been deposited when that Act had become operative on 1 April 1991.", "19. In the judgment, the Regional Court admitted that the applicant had limited possibilities of locating his father’s property. It had therefore taken further evidence on its own initiative. In particular, the Regional Court noted that, in accordance with the relevant practice, the confiscated property should have been handed over to the public prosecutor and, after the relevant judgment had became final, to the financial department of the competent local government authority. The Regional Court therefore examined the criminal file concerning the case of the applicant’s father. It further established that the archives of the Senica District Office, the Ministry of the Interior, the National Bank of Slovakia and the State Regional Archives in Bratislava contained no document relating to the coins in question. The Regional Court also heard a witness who had worked at the Myjava District Office of the Ministry of the Interior in 1958; the latter had no knowledge of the case, however. It did not consider it necessary to hear two other persons, one of whom had been present when the coins were inventoried and taken over by the Regional Administration, as those persons had been dismissed from service in 1958 and in 1960 respectively. Their statements would not, therefore, make it possible to establish the relevant facts of the case.", "20. On 27 January 1998 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. It shared the Regional Court’s view that the applicant had failed to produce evidence that the defendant Ministry was in possession of the coins, as required by section 5(1) of the 1991 Act.", "21. In the judgment, the Supreme Court further stated:\n“The allegation that the movable property in question had been taken over by an employee of the Public Security Regional Administration in Bratislava on 12 December 1958 and that ... it had been examined there by an expert on 19 December 1958 cannot suffice. Since then, a considerable period has lapsed, during which the gold and silver coins in question could have been alienated, destroyed or lost. The legislator, however, explicitly included in section 5(1) of the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act the obligation to show where the movable property in question was at the time of the entry into force of that Act.\n... It follows from a logical and systematic interpretation of section 5(1) of the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act that a restitution claim can only concern the same property which was taken over by the State and not a different object of the same kind. Only movable property which can be individually identified by specific features which mean that it cannot be confused with other objects is therefore liable to restitution ...”" ]

[]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Gdynia, Poland. She is a historian by profession and used to work as a curator in the Gdynia City Museum.", "5. On 10 September 1996 the applicant brought a private prosecution on charges of libel against S.L. the director of the Gdynia City Museum to the Gdynia District Court (Sąd Rejonowy).", "6. On 24 April 1997 the court held a conciliatory hearing. The applicant requested that S.L. retract in the press her defamatory statements. The defendant refused.", "7. The trial began on 27 May 1997 but the applicant failed to appear. The court discontinued the proceedings on the ground that the applicant had been duly summoned. The court considered that the applicant had been notified about the service of the summons but failed to collect it from the post office. On 19 June 1997 the applicant appealed against this decision. On 2 September 1997 the Gdańsk Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) quashed that decision and ordered that the District Court proceed with the case.", "8. On 20 July 1998 the applicant filed a complaint with the District Court submitting that the length of the proceedings in her case had exceeded any reasonable time limit. On 31 July 1998 the president of the Criminal Division of the District Court informed her that the delay in the proceedings was caused by the presiding judge's illness.", "9. On 25 October 1999 the president of the Criminal Division of the District Court ordered that the case be transferred to another judge.", "10. The next hearing was held on 17 March 2000. On that date upon the court's order, the applicant specified the charges against S.L. Consequently, the court adjourned the hearing to consider discontinuation of the proceedings.", "11. On 28 March 2000 the Gdynia District Court discontinued the proceedings, as the offence was time-barred. The court held that the applicant submitted her private prosecution after the time-limit of 3 months from the date on which she had become aware of the identity of the defendant." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "8. The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Plovdiv.", "9. The applicant used to work as a cashier and accountant in a state‑owned company.", "10. An audit of the company at the beginning of 1995 revealed a cash deficit of 1,290,059 old Bulgarian levs.", "11. In February 1995 the applicant was given a copy of the audit’s final act, which contained the auditors’ opinion that, inter alia, during the period 1991‑94 she had deliberately made false entries in the accounting books and had thus misappropriated funds.", "12. On 15 March 1995 the Plovdiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office opened a preliminary investigation in respect of the applicant and three other employees of the company. It seems that the applicant became aware of the investigation soon after its opening. The case was sent for investigation to the Plovdiv Regional Investigation Service. The prosecutor in charge of the case indicated a number of specific facts which the investigator had to establish and ordered that the investigation be completed within sixty days.", "13. On 10 August 1995 the Regional Prosecutor’s Office, noting that no investigative steps had been taken until that moment despite its instructions of 15 March 1995, directed the investigator immediately to start working on the case and finalise the investigation within sixty days.", "14. In the following months the applicant was questioned several times. The investigation authorities also questioned a number of witnesses and gathered documents and other evidence.", "15. On 24 October 1995 the applicant was charged under Article 203 § 1 in conjunction with Articles 202 § 1 (1) and 201 of the Criminal Code (“CC”) with particularly aggravated misappropriation of funds in particularly large amounts, the commission of which had been facilitated by other offences (making of official documents containing false information and abuse of office) carrying a lesser penalty.", "16. On 6 November 1995 the Regional Investigation Service asked the Regional Prosecutor’s Office for a sixty‑day extension of the time‑limit for the completion of the investigation. On 14 November 1995 the Regional Prosecutor’s Office granted the extension.", "17. On 11 January 1996 the Regional Investigation Service asked the Chief Prosecutor’s Office to extend the time-limit for the completion of the investigation with a further sixty days. It stated that all witnesses had already been questioned and a vast amount of accounting and other documents relating to the applicant’s criminal activity spanning over three years had been seized. A graphological expert report had been drawn up in respect of some of these documents. An accounting expert report was in the works, but would not be ready within the time-limit previously set for the completion of the investigation, because it required the processing of a large number of accounting documents. On 18 January 1996 the Chief Prosecutor’s Office acceded to this request.", "18. On 25 June 1996 the investigator reformulated the charges against the applicant and notified her accordingly.", "19. On 2 July 1996 the investigator allowed the applicant and her counsel to acquaint themselves with the case file.", "20. A few days later the investigator concluded his work on the case and sent the file to the Regional Prosecutor’s Office with the proposal to commit the applicant for trial.", "21. On 27 November 1997 the Regional Prosecutor’s Office found that the evidence thus far collected indicated that the misappropriation of funds allegedly committed by the applicant and by one of her co-accused was not particularly aggravated. Moreover, in the meantime she had restored part of the money. Accordingly, it decided to prosecute the applicant for non‑aggravated misappropriation of funds (Article 202 of the CC). As this offence fell within the jurisdiction of the District Court, it sent the file to the District Prosecutor’s Office.", "22. On 30 March 1998 the District Prosecutor’s Office discontinued the criminal proceedings against two of the co-accused, as it found that the minor nature of the offences allegedly committed by them allowed an administrative prosecution. It decided to pursue the case against the applicant and the fourth co-accused.", "23. On 1 January 2000 amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCP”) entered into force, providing, inter alia, that criminal proceedings could be discontinued before the end of the trial with a plea agreement between the prosecution and the defence.", "24. On 7 January 2000 the District Prosecutor’s Office indicted the applicant.", "25. On 25 January 2000 the prosecution and the applicant entered into a plea agreement whereby the applicant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, suspended for five years, and occupational disbarment for a period of five years.", "26. On 2 February 2000 the plea agreement was approved by the District Court and the proceedings were discontinued.", "27. On 24 October 1995 the applicant was arrested and remanded in custody. As grounds for her detention the investigator cited the seriousness of the offence charged against her.", "28. On 6 November 1995 the applicant appealed against her detention to the Regional Prosecutor’s Office. She stated that she had not attempted to abscond or obstruct the investigation during the six months since she had become aware of the criminal charges against her, that she was no longer working as a cashier or accountant and could not, therefore, commit other offences, and that she had undergone gynaecological surgery in 1994 and had still not recovered completely.", "29. On 9 November 1995 the Regional Prosecutor’s Office confirmed the decision to detain the applicant. It found that she had been charged with a serious offence punishable by more than ten years’ imprisonment and that “therefore, the [detention] [was] lawful: it [was] based on the imperative provision of Article 152 § 1 of the CCP”. It further stated that the question whether or not Article 152 § 2 of the CCP should be applied was to be assessed by the investigator and by the supervising prosecutor. In the applicant’s case the investigator and the supervising prosecutor had not applied Article 152 § 2 of the CCP “in view of the current stage of the proceedings”. It followed that the applicant’s detention was lawful. By a decision of 15 December 1995 the Chief Prosecutor’s Office rejected the applicant’s ensuing appeal against this decision.", "30. A further appeal against the applicant’s detention was rejected by the Chief Prosecutor’s Office on 12 January 1996.", "31. On 18 January 1996 the Chief Prosecutor’s Office confirmed the applicant’s detention of its own motion.", "32. In the meantime, on 14 November 1995, the applicant appealed against her detention to the Regional Court. In his written submissions to the Court the applicant’s counsel stated, in particular, that the decision to detain the applicant had been based solely on the gravity of the charges against her, whereas other important factors had not been taken into account. For instance, the applicant had a permanent address where she lived with her husband and two daughters. Also, she had known about the criminal charges against her for more than six months prior to her arrest but had made no attempt to abscond or obstruct the investigation. Furthermore, the evidence against the applicant was weak, it having been established that six other persons had access to keys to the cashier’s office. The prosecutor had blindly followed the conclusions of the auditors who had pointed to the applicant on the sole ground that she had been the person in charge. However, no proof was found that the applicant herself had made false entries in the accounting books. The applicant’s counsel also referred to her medical condition and enclosed medical certificates.", "33. On 11 December 1995 the court rejected the appeal. It held, inter alia:\n“[The charges against the applicant] concern a serious offence within the meaning of Article 93 § 7 of the CC, that is, an offence under Article 203 of the CC, punishable by ten or more years’ imprisonment. In this respect there exists the requirement, under Article 152 § 1 of the CCP, that detention be imposed.\n... [The medical certificates submitted by the applicant] reflect her state of health during a past period of time. No information concerning her present state of health has been submitted. It follows that at present there exist no circumstances requiring the modification of the measure ‘pre-trial detention’ imposed on the [applicant]. Therefore the appeal is ill-founded and must be dismissed.”", "34. On 11 January 1996 the applicant’s counsel requested the investigator in charge of the case to order a medical examination of the applicant with a view to establishing whether the conditions of detention were dangerous for her health. On 19 January 1996 upon the investigator’s order the applicant was examined by three medical experts. In a report of the same date the experts found that the problems related to the surgery which the applicant had undergone more than a year ago (in 1994) did not affect her condition and that she could remain in custody.", "35. On 5 February 1996 the applicant was urgently transferred to a hospital due to pain in her gall bladder. She underwent surgery. On the same day her counsel submitted to the Regional Prosecutor’s Office a request for her release in view of her poor health. In addition, he argued that there was no risk of the applicant absconding, obstructing the investigation or committing an offence, because she had become aware of the charges against her six months prior to her arrest but had not attempted to commit any of these acts.", "36. On 6 February 1996 the Regional Prosecutor’s Office requested the Regional Investigation Service to comment on the request for the applicant’s release. In particular, the Service was requested to address the issue whether the applicant’s continuing detention was justified in view of the surgery she had undergone. On 13 February 1996 the Regional Prosecutor’s Office ordered the Regional Investigation Service to request an expert medical opinion on the above issue. On 15 February 1996 a group of medical experts was appointed to examine the applicant. The experts found that the applicant needed a convalescence period which was incompatible with the conditions in detention.", "37. Following this opinion, on 19 February 1996 the Regional Prosecutor’s Office decided to discontinue the applicant’s pre-trial detention in view of her ill health, which was found incompatible with the conditions in detention. It further found that the applicant’s state of health made it impossible for her to flee, obstruct the investigation or commit an offence. Also, the investigation had almost been completed.", "38. The same day the applicant was released from custody and placed under house arrest.", "39. On an unspecified later date the applicant submitted to the Regional Prosecutor’s Office a request for release. The request was rejected on 14 March 1996. The Regional Prosecutor’s Office held that the applicant’s pre-trial detention had been replaced by house arrest because it had been found that the applicant’s health was incompatible with the conditions in detention and, moreover, the risk of her absconding or re-offending was objectively excluded in view of her illness. Unlike pre-trial detention, house arrest was not incompatible with her state of health, because there she could undergo medical examinations and treatment. The applicant had not requested permission to leave her house for specified periods of time to undergo treatment. Thus, there was no need for her to be released.", "40. Later in March 1996 the applicant appealed against her house arrest to the Chief Prosecutor’s Office. She argued that there was no risk of her absconding or re-offending. She also referred to her poor health. By a decision of 5 April 1996 the Chief Prosecutor’s Office rejected the appeal, apparently without giving any specific reasons.", "41. On 25 June 1996 the investigator confirmed the applicant’s house arrest of his own motion, without giving reasons.", "42. On 27 November 1997 the Regional Prosecutor’s Office confirmed the applicant’s house arrest of its own motion, without giving reasons.", "43. On 30 March 1998 the District Prosecutor’s Office confirmed the applicant’s house arrest of its own motion, without giving reasons.", "44. On 7 April 1998 the applicant’s counsel appealed to the Regional Prosecutor’s Office against the District Prosecutor’s Office’s decision to confirm the house arrest. He stated that it had lasted for over two years and that there was no indication that the applicant would abscond or re-offend. Moreover, all relevant evidence had already been gathered.", "45. On 16 April 1998, apparently before transmitting the appeal to the Regional Prosecutor’s Office, the District Prosecutor’s Office reviewed the matter and decided to grant bail. It stated that the investigation authorities had sent the case to the prosecution twice and it had been returned for further clarifications each time. As of that time the file was at the investigation and there was no indication that it would be received at the District Prosecutor’s Office any time soon. The further continuation of the house arrest would amount to mere repression, since all relevant evidence had already been gathered and there was no risk of the applicant obstructing the investigation. It also added that the requests for release submitted in early 1996 were apparently rejected because at that time the applicant’s deprivation of liberty had not lasted very long." ]

[ 2, 3 ]

[ "9. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Ankara.", "10. On 18 October 1992 the applicant was arrested by police officers from the Ankara Security Directorate following a search conducted in his house.", "11. On 2 November 1992 the public prosecutor attached to the Ankara State Security Court laid charges against the applicant and six other persons for having formed an illegal organisation (“Partiye Rizgariye Kurdistan”: hereinafter “PRK”) whose aim was to undermine the territorial integrity of the State by illegal means. The applicant and his co-accused were also charged with distributing illegal leaflets and carrying identification cards and driving licences belonging to third parties.", "12. The public prosecutor requested the court to convict the applicant and his co-accused under Article 125 of the Criminal Code with reference to Articles 171 § 1, 350 § 2 and 536 §§ 2 and 3 of the same Code as well as Article 5 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713 of 12 April 1991). The public prosecutor relied on the leaflets, the internal regulations of the PRK as well as the latter’s political programme and flag, all of which were seized during the search of the applicant’s and his co-accused’s houses.", "13. On 7 November 1996 the Ankara State Security Court found the applicant and four of his co-accused guilty of an offence under Article 168 § 2 of the Criminal Code and Article 5 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The search of their houses had uncovered the internal regulations of the party whose aim was to establish an independent Kurdish State on the territory of the Turkish State through dissemination of propaganda. The court also noted that the aim of the party was to set up by means of force an independent socialist and united State of Kurdistan within the territories of Iran, Iraq and Syria.", "14. The court sentenced the applicant and four of his co-accused to twelve years and six months’ imprisonment and debarred them from public service indefinitely. The applicant appealed.", "15. On 7 October 1997 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s appeal." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "7. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Sofia.", "8. The applicant is a high‑school teacher. At about 11.45 a.m. on 2 March 1995 he went to a café with two of his work colleagues.", "9. At about 12 noon seven or eight police officers with masks on their heads rushed into the café.", "10. Subsequently it was established that they were officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Special Anti-Terrorism Squad („Специализиран отряд за борба с тероризма“) and the Central Service for Combating Organised Crime („Централна служба за борба с организираната престъпност“) and that they were conducting an operation for the arrest of several persons suspected of criminal offences who were apparently known to go regularly to that café.", "11. The officers shouted “Police!” and ordered everyone in the café to lie down, put their hands up and close their eyes. The applicant asked where exactly he should put his hands. One of the officers told him that he should put his hands behind his neck. The applicant did so and lay down on the bench on which he had been sitting. He remained in this position for about two or three minutes, during which he was hit two or three times on the head with a solid object. After that he was ordered to go out of the café. The applicant asked why he had been hit, since he had done nothing to provoke this. He also said that he had difficulties moving because he was feeling a strong pain in his head and was losing blood. The police officers threatened the applicant and swore at him, using abusive language. They dragged him outside the café, hit him several times and threw him down on the ground. The applicant was hit several times in the head with the butt of a gun and received several kicks in the ribs. After that the officers ordered the applicant to produce his identity papers. He handed his wallet to an officer who checked the papers. At that point the applicant’s colleagues managed to explain that there had apparently been some kind of confusion as to the applicant’s identity and the beating stopped. The officers told the applicant that they had mistaken him for another person and apologised.", "12. The applicant crossed the street with the help of his two colleagues and then lost consciousness. An ambulance was called which brought him to the neurosurgical ward of the Medical Academy in Sofia.", "13. The applicant was examined by the emergency ward team. It was found that he had a cerebral trauma with an epidural haematoma in his left temporal area, cerebral contusion, polyfragmentary fracture of the left temporal bone, fracture of the ninth rib on the right side of the thorax and a subcutaneous emphysema in the right thoracic half. Six hours after his admission to hospital it was decided that urgent head surgery was needed. The applicant underwent decompressive craniotomy in the left temporal area, evacuation of the epidural haematoma and coagulation of the damaged arteria meningica media at the left side of his head.", "14. The applicant remained in hospital until 13 March 1995.", "15. During the following five or six months he was experiencing pain and had to be treated with analgesics and vasodilatory drugs. He was on sick leave until 27 November 1995.", "16. The applicant was directed for another operation, which he could not afford financially.", "17. On 10 September 1998 the competent commission for assessing disability issued a decision stating that the applicant suffered from second degree disability. The diagnosis on which this decision was based was the following: traumatic subdural subarachnoid and extradural haemorrhage, posttraumatic and postoperative status in respect of an acute epidural haematoma in the left temporal area, defect after a depressive polyfragmentary fracture of the left temporal bone, posttraumatic encephalopathy, quadripyramidal syndrome, latent hemiparesis on the right side, central subcompensated otoneurological syndrome, neuritis of the left auditory nerve (light degree), postfractural status of the ninth rib at the right side, arterial hypertension.", "18. On 26 May 1995 the applicant took proceedings under the State Responsibility for Damage Act against the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Central Service for Combating Organised Crime, the Specialised Anti‑Terrorism Squad and the Sofia City Directorate of Internal Affairs. He alleged, in particular, that officers of those entities had ill‑treated him in violation of the relevant rules for the use of force by the police. He claimed 500,000 Bulgarian levs (BGL) as compensation for non‑pecuniary damage and BGL 100,000 as compensation for pecuniary damage.", "19. A prosecutor took part in the proceedings ex officio, as required by section 10(1) of the State Responsibility for Damage Act (see paragraph 46 below).", "20. The first hearing was held on 2 October 1995. The applicant provided particulars of his claim for compensation for pecuniary damage. The defendants did not dispute most of the facts alleged by the applicant, but maintained, inter alia, that he had provoked the beating through his inadequate behaviour, that the use of force by the police had been lawful and that they were not liable for damage caused in the course of police operations. They also disputed the amount of compensation sought. The Sofia City Directorate of Internal Affairs submitted that it was not liable because it had not participated in the planning or the execution of the operation on 2 March 1995. The applicant requested the defendants to provide a copy of the order pursuant to which the operation had been carried out, in order to clarify whose officers had participated in it. He also presented written evidence and asked for leave to call witnesses. The court admitted the written evidence, gave leave to the applicant to call witnesses, ordered an accounting and a medical expert reports and directed the defendants to provide a copy of the order pursuant to which the operation had been carried out.", "21. The next hearing was held on 19 February 1996. The court heard a witness called by the applicant, the applicant in person, and the medical and accounting experts. It admitted their reports in evidence. Counsel for the Specialised Anti‑Terrorism Squad stated that the order pursuant to which the 2 March 1995 operation had been carried out was classified and a copy could be produced only if the court made a special ruling to that effect. The court agreed and adjourned the case.", "22. The third hearing took place on 20 May 1996. The order pursuant to which the operation of 2 March 1995 had been carried out was admitted in evidence. The court allowed the applicant to adduce further written evidence and adjourned the case.", "23. The hearing listed for 10 June 1996 did not take place because the Sofia City Directorate of Internal Affairs had not been duly summoned.", "24. The fourth and last hearing was held on 30 September 1996. The court heard the parties’ closing arguments. In his observations the prosecutor who participated in the proceedings ex officio concluded that the applicant’s averments of ill‑treatment were true and that his action was well‑founded.", "25. The Sofia City Court gave judgment on 4 November 1996. It found that the police officers involved in the 2 March 1995 incident had used force uncalled for, in breach of the National Police Act which regulated the use of force by the police. It further found that the use of force had not been provoked in any way by the applicant and accordingly rejected the defendants’ argument of contributory negligence. The court found that the police officers had been employed by the first three defendants (the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Central Service for Combating Organised Crime and the Specialised Anti-Terrorism Squad), but not by the fourth defendant (the Sofia City Directorate of Internal Affairs). Finally, it found that the applicant had sustained damage due to the unlawful behaviour of the officers. It awarded the applicant the whole amount of the compensation for non‑pecuniary damage sought (BGL 500,000) and partially dismissed his claim for compensation for pecuniary damage, awarding him BGL 63,064.57 under that head. The court ordered that both amounts should bear interest at the statutory rate starting from 2 March 1995 until settlement. The first three defendants were ordered to pay jointly and severally.", "26. On 26 November 1996 the Ministry of the Internal Affairs appealed against the judgment to the Supreme Court. The Central Service for Combating Organised Crime also appealed on 2 December 1996. The Ministry’s appeal concerned only the amount of the compensation for non‑pecuniary damage awarded to the applicant, whereas the Central Service for Combating Organised Crime’s appeal concerned the awards of compensation for both pecuniary and non‑pecuniary damage.", "27. Copies of the appeals were served on the other parties to the case. As the Specialised Anti‑Terrorism Squad had changed its address, the initial service of process, having been made at its old address, had to be repeated at the new one.", "28. On 28 October 1997 the case file was sent to the Supreme Court.", "29. In December 1997 the Code of Civil Procedure (“the CCP”) was amended to provide for three‑instance proceedings. Accordingly, all appeals which had been filed with the Supreme Court prior to the amendment were to be forwarded to the newly created courts of appeals. The amendment entered into force on 1 April 1998.", "30. On 1 April 1998 the Supreme Court of Cassation[1] forwarded the appeals to the newly created Sofia Court of Appeals.", "31. On 9 July 1998 the Sofia Court of Appeals, acting in pursuance of the new rules of civil procedure adopted with the 1997 amendment of the CCP, instructed the appellants – the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Central Service for Combating Organised Crime – to indicate which parts of the judgment below they were appealing against and why they considered that that judgment was erroneous.", "32. On 29 July 1998 the Central Service for Combating Organised Crime complied with the court’s instructions, submitting an amended appeal in which it specified that it was appealing only against the amount of non‑pecuniary compensation awarded to the applicant, because it considered that the Sofia City Court had erroneously assessed the extent of the damage suffered by him.", "33. On 30 July 1998 the Ministry of Internal Affairs withdrew its appeal and on 24 August 1998 the Sofia Court of Appeals discontinued the proceedings in respect of that appellant.", "34. A hearing listed for 29 October 1998 did not take place, because the Sofia Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, which had to participate in the proceedings ex officio, had not been duly summoned.", "35. A hearing fixed for 18 February 1999 was adjourned because counsel for the applicant was ill and could not attend.", "36. A hearing was held on 15 April 1999. The parties did not submit additional evidence. The court heard their closing argument and accepted their written observations. The Central Service for Combating Organised Crime reiterated its position that the claim for compensation for non‑pecuniary damage, allowed in full by the Sofia City Court, was excessive, in particular because the applicant had contributed to the inflicting of his injuries through his inadequate behaviour during the 2 March 1995 incident.", "37. The Sofia Court of Appeals gave judgment on 5 May 1999. It held that the applicant had been ill‑treated by police officers, that he had not contributed in any way to that and that as a result of the ill‑treatment he had sustained serious injuries. Accordingly, the court upheld the Sofia City Court’s judgment. No appeal having been lodged within the statutory time‑limit, the judgment entered into force on 27 May 1999.", "38. On 24 June 1999 the applicant’s lawyer requested the Sofia City Court to issue a writ of execution pursuant to the judgment. On 29 June the court issued such a writ against the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Central Service for Combating Organised Crime and the Specialised Anti‑Terrorism Squad.", "39. On 5 July 1999 a monetary reform took place, whereby BGL 1,000 became 1 new Bulgarian lev (BGN).", "40. On 12 July 1999 the applicant presented the writ of execution to the financial department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and four days later, on 16 July, he received the compensation awarded to him by the courts together with the interest accrued. He was altogether paid BGN 2249.84, BGN 563.06 representing the principal amount of compensation awarded by the courts (BGN 500 for non‑pecuniary damage and BGN 63.06 for pecuniary damage), BGN 1,570.80 representing interest, and the remainder costs and expenses for the proceedings.", "41. The Government submitted that an internal inquiry had been carried out by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in relation to the events of 2 March 1995, but that they had not been able to find any documents relating to that inquiry in the archive of the Ministry. The applicant submitted that he knew of the existence of a preliminary inquiry carried out by the prosecution authorities, but that he had no information about it." ]

[ 1, 3 ]

[ "8. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Plovdiv.", "9. On 8 April 1993 a preliminary investigation was opened against the applicant who was suspected of forgery of bank guarantees with a view to obtaining loans for himself and one of his business partners (Article 212 of the Penal Code).", "10. On 14 July 1993 an investigator charged the applicant and ordered his detention pending trial. A prosecutor approved the detention order on an unspecified date.", "11. Between an unspecified date in 1993 and September 1996 the applicant resided in the Netherlands. He applied unsuccessfully for asylum there. Upon his return to Bulgaria, on 11 September 1996, he was arrested and detained pending trial.", "12. Between September 1996 and March 1997 the investigator examined documentary material, heard ten witnesses, appointed experts, examined their reports and questioned the applicant.", "13. On 31 March 1997 the Sofia City Prosecutor’s Office submitted an indictment against the applicant to the Sofia City Court.", "14. A hearing was listed for 4 July 1997. In preparation therefor, in April and May 1997 the Sofia City Court summoned the civil plaintiff and ten witnesses and sought police assistance for the establishment of the address of one of them.", "15. The Sofia City Court held five trial hearings.", "16. On 4 July 1997 the Sofia City Court heard four witnesses, the applicant and two experts. Several witnesses did not appear. Both the prosecution and the applicant sought to adduce additional evidence. The hearing was adjourned until 12 September 1997.", "17. On 12 September 1997 the court heard one witness. The remaining witnesses did not appear. The prosecution requested an adjournment as it considered important the examination of the witnesses who had not appeared. The applicant objected. The court granted the prosecutor’s request and listed the next hearing for 10 December 1997.", "18. On that day the Sofia City Court heard one witness. The other witnesses failed to appear. The prosecutor insisted on them being heard and sought an adjournment. The applicant’s lawyers objected, stating that reading out those witnesses’ testimony given before the investigator would be sufficient. The court granted the prosecutor’s request for an adjournment and scheduled the next hearing for 26 January 1998.", "19. On 26 January 1998 the court heard two witnesses. One witness did not appear. The applicant’s lawyers stated that they considered the examination of the remaining witness important and sought an adjournment. The court granted the request. It fixed the next hearing for 15 June 1998.", "20. On the day of the last trial hearing, 15 June 1998, the applicant was found guilty under Articles 212 § 2 and 308 of the Penal Code and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. He was acquitted on certain of the initial charges. The court reserved its reasoning.", "21. On 25 June 1998 the applicant appealed to the Sofia Appellate Court. The prosecution also appealed.", "22. On an unspecified date in September 1998 the Sofia City Court delivered the reasoning of its judgment of 15 June 1998.", "23. The Sofia Appellate Court listed a hearing for 12 February 1999 which was however cancelled as the prosecution had not supplemented its appeal following the delivery of the reasoning of the first instance judgment.", "24. The hearing took place on 28 May 1999. On the same day the Sofia Appellate Court upheld the applicant’s conviction of forgery of bank guarantees with intention to use them (Article 308 of the Penal Code) and acquitted him for the remainder. It accordingly reduced the applicant’s sentence to three years’ imprisonment.", "25. On 25 June 1999 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court of Cassation. It was dismissed on 10 December 2000.", "26. On an unspecified date in 1992 the applicant was sentenced by the Peshtera District Court to a suspended term of imprisonment. It appears that this conviction concerned facts linked to those which were the subject matter of the 1993 - 2000 criminal proceedings.", "27. Separately, on 27 January 1997 the Pazardzik Regional Court found the applicant guilty of mismanagement of assets belonging to a cooperative for which he had been working during the period 1986-1988. He was sentenced to ten months’ imprisonment. The applicant appealed. On 13 October 1997 the Supreme Court of Cassation quashed the judgment and terminated the criminal proceedings as the prosecution had become time‑barred.", "28. On 11 September 1996 the applicant was arrested. On the following day he was placed under pre-trial detention. The parties have not submitted details as regards the applicant’s detention during the preliminary investigation stage of the criminal proceedings.", "29. On 23 April 1997, shortly after the case was brought before the Sofia City Court for trial, the applicant filed with that court an application for release on bail stating that his wife was seriously ill and could not look after their two children.", "30. On 2 May 1997 the judge-rapporteur dismissed the application in private. She found that since other criminal proceedings were pending against the applicant, those concerning mismanagement of assets of a cooperative, Article 152 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCP”) made his remand in custody mandatory. Therefore, it was “not possible to substitute pre-trial detention for a more lenient measure despite the information concerning the [applicant’s] difficult family circumstances”.", "31. The applicant’s appeal against the above decision was not examined owing to a clerical error of the Sofia City Court.", "32. On 2 July 1997 and at the hearing on 4 July 1997 the applicant reiterated his arguments seeking release on bail. He also made extensive additional submissions arguing that Article 152 § 3 CCP, which provided for a mandatory detention of persons against whom more than one set of criminal proceedings were pending and of recidivists, was incompatible with the Convention. Further, he maintained that there was insufficient evidence that he had committed the offence he was charged with.", "33. On the same day, 4 July 1997, the Sofia City Court dismissed the renewed application for bail. It stated, inter alia:\n“The court finds that there is a danger of the applicant’s absconding as ... he and his wife sought asylum in the Netherlands at the time when ... the investigation proceedings were pending ... The charges ... concern an offence allegedly committed during the operational period of [the applicant’s] suspended [imprisonment sentence]... of 1992. That fact is sufficient to justify a finding that there is a danger of reoffending...”", "34. Addressing the applicant’s arguments against mandatory detention under Article 152 § 3 CCP, the Sofia City Court stated that it had no power to disregard the law on the ground that it was contrary to the Constitution or international treaties and noted that the Supreme Court had submitted the matter to the Constitutional Court.", "35. On 7 July 1997 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court of Cassation on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence that he had committed the offence and that there was no danger of his obstructing the course of justice. Confiscation of his passport and bail would be sufficient guarantees against absconding.", "36. On 11 August 1997, pursuant to an amendment to the CCP, mandatory detention under paragraph 3 of Article 152 was abolished.", "37. On 12 September 1997, before transmitting the appeal of 7 July 1997 to the Supreme Court of Cassation, the Sofia City Court sitting in private refused to reconsider its decision of 4 July 1997.", "38. In the end of September and the beginning of October 1997 the applicant submitted additional appeals against his detention pending trial.", "39. On 23 October 1997 the Supreme Court of Cassation examined the appeal of 7 July 1997 in closed session in the presence of a prosecutor and in the absence of the applicant or his representative. The prosecutor submitted written comments and made an oral statement inviting the court to dismiss the appeal. The applicant was not informed thereof and could not comment in reply.", "40. The Supreme Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal and upheld the Sofia City Court’s decision of 4 July 1997 finding that the applicant’s detention was justified under Article 152 § 1 CCP. It also upheld the Sofia City Court’s findings that there was a danger of the applicant’s absconding or committing further offences.", "41. The Supreme Court of Cassation also stated that issues of “sufficient evidence” within the meaning of domestic law or “reasonable suspicion” within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention could not be considered in proceedings on applications for bail. They could only be decided by way of judgment on the merits of the criminal case.", "42. At the hearing on 10 December 1997 before the Sofia City Court the applicant renewed his appeal against detention. He referred to the fact that on 13 October 1997 his conviction of 27 January 1997 had been quashed as the prosecution had become time-barred. He also reiterated his previous arguments.", "43. On the same day the Sofia City Court dismissed the appeal, stating that the applicant’s attempt to remain in the Netherlands and the fact that the charges against him concerned an offence allegedly committed during the operational period of his 1992 suspended imprisonment sentence (see above) indicated that there was a danger of his absconding and re-offending. The court also confirmed its earlier position that in the context of the applicant’s appeal against detention it would not entertain arguments as to whether or not the charges were well founded, that being an issue going to the merits of the criminal case.", "44. On 16 December 1997 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court of Cassation against the decision of 10 December 1997.", "45. The Supreme Court of Cassation examined the appeal on 15 January 1998 sitting in closed session in the presence of a prosecutor and in the absence of the applicant and his representative. The court heard the prosecutor’s opinion that the appeal should be dismissed. The court dismissed the appeal.", "46. It stated that remand in custody was justified under Article 152 § 1 CCP as the applicant was charged with a serious offence within the meaning of the Code. Furthermore, the applicant’s attempt to settle in the Netherlands with his family demonstrated a clear danger of absconding. The court also found that there had been no unjustified delays in the criminal proceedings.", "47. At the hearing on 26 January 1998 before the Sofia City Court the applicant again requested his release. He argued that the facts had been clarified and that therefore there would be no danger of him obstructing the course of justice.", "48. The appeal was dismissed on the same day. The Sofia City Court reiterated the reasoning of the previous decisions.", "49. On 29 January 1998 the applicant appealed against the above decision to the Supreme Court of Cassation. On 11 March 1998 the appeal was dismissed on the same grounds. The appeal was dealt with in closed session in the presence of a prosecutor who sought its dismissal and in the absence of the applicant and his representative.", "50. On 15 June 1998 the Sofia City Court convicted the applicant on some of the charges and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment." ]

[ 2 ]

[ "8. The applicant is a Bulgarian national, who was born in 1968 and at the relevant time lived in Svoboda, the region of Haskovo.", "9. The applicant used to work in the village of Svoboda, with the Home Patronage branch of the Chirpan District Social Care Centre (Домашен социален патронаж, Общински център за социални грижи). At the relevant time, Social Care Centres were State administrative bodies funded by the State and municipal budgets.", "10. On 3 December 1992 the applicant suffered an accident at work. Subsequently she underwent surgical operations. She was unfit for work for at least six months and continued experiencing health problems for several years thereafter.", "11. On 20 July 1993 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against her former employer, the local Home Patronage, claiming pecuniary and non‑pecuniary damages. A representative for Home Patronage took part in the proceedings apparently maintaining that the applicant was responsible for the accident and that the claims were excessive.", "12. On 31 March 1995 the Chirpan District Court partially granted the applicant’s claim and awarded her 15,000 Bulgarian levs (“BGL”) in non‑pecuniary damages and BGL 4,500 in costs, plus statutory interest.", "13. On 20 April 1995 the defendant, the Home Patronage, lodged an appeal with the Stara Zagora Regional Court.", "14. According to the Government, on 17 July 1995 the Social Care Centre sent to the applicant a registered letter inviting her “to collect BGL 15,000” but the applicant refused receipt of the letter.", "15. According to the applicant, as of 30 September 1995 the proceedings before the Regional Court were still pending.", "16. On an unspecified date these proceedings ended and the District Court’s judgment became final and enforceable.", "17. Following a conversation between the applicant and employees of the Social Care Centre, on 5 May 1996 the Social Care Centre sent to the applicant a letter inviting her “to collect BGL 15,000”.", "18. On 9 May 1996 the applicant submitted a written request to the District Social Care Centre insisting on payment in compliance with the District Court’s judgment, including all interest and costs. She offered her calculation of the interest that had accrued since the relevant starting date, 20 July 1993, and stated that the amount due was BGL 40,620.", "19. The applicant, who at that time lived in another town, authorised another person to receive the money.", "20. According to “minutes”, drawn up by the accountant and two other employees of the Social Care Centre, on 15 May 1996 they withdrew BGL 15,000 from the Centre’s bank account but the applicant’s representative refused to accept the money.", "21. On 3 June 1996 the Social Care Centre wrote to the applicant stating that they “wished to pay the damage sustained, in the amount of BGL 15,000”, and invited her to visit the Centre for that purpose on 7 June 1996. The letter also stated that the Centre was “free from any obligation to pay interest on the amount since the date of the conversation with [the applicant] held in the presence of [the Centre’s] employees”.", "22. On 6 June 1996, upon the applicant’s request, the Chirpan District Court issued a writ of execution ordering the Home Patronage to pay to the applicant BGL 15,000 principal, BGL 4,500 in costs, and interest as from 20 July 1993.", "23. On 6 June 1996 the applicant submitted a request to the competent enforcement judge seeking the institution of enforcement proceedings. That was refused and the applicant was informed, upon her complaints to the enforcement judge, the Regional Court and the Ministry of Justice, that under Article 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure execution of judgments against state bodies was only possible through submission of the writ of execution directly to the state organ concerned. Enforcement proceedings were not provided for. An attachment of the defendant’s bank account was not possible.", "24. The applicant was also informed that the refusal to execute a final judgment could be a punishable criminal offence.", "25. On an unspecified date the applicant complained to the Ministry of Labour and Social Care, which invited the mayor of the Chirpan municipality to comment.", "26. On 15 October 1996 the mayor wrote the following to the Ministry and to the applicant:\n“Having studied the [applicant’s] request and having discussed the matter with the management of the municipal Social Care Centre, we reached the conclusion that the problem is under the jurisdiction of the judicial authorities. The municipal Social Care Centre considers that the civil proceedings had been handled wrongly: the [defendant] had been Home Patronage, which has no legal personality and does not have its own bank account. For this reason, the Social Care Centre sees no legal grounds, for purposes of the financial authorities, to effect the payment. Apparently the matter should be examined additionally by the courts. The municipal administration cannot interfere in this matter.”", "27. In 1996 the applicant submitted a complaint to the prosecution authorities requesting the punishment of those responsible for the failure to enforce the judicial award.", "28. In April or May 1997 she complained of the inactivity of the prosecution authorities.", "29. On 19 May 1998 a prosecutor requested information from the Social Care Centre. On 29 May 1998 the Centre replied to the prosecutor, with a copy to the mayor of Chirpan. It stated that Home Patronage was not a separate legal person but formed a part of the Social Care Centre which, in turn, was under the administration and budgetary control of the municipality. Therefore, the applicant could obtain payment by submitting her documents to the municipality of Chirpan. The date on which that information was transmitted to the applicant is unclear.", "30. On 6 April 1999 the applicant was heard by a prosecutor.", "31. On 17 March 2000 the prosecutor terminated the inquiry noting that the applicant had been informed that she had to submit her writ of execution and a copy of the judgment to the municipality of Chirpan.", "32. During the relevant period inflation in Bulgaria was running high and the national currency was depreciating. In particular, on 31 March 1995, the date on which the District Court’s judgment was delivered, BGL 66 were necessary to buy one United States dollar (USD), in May 1996, at the time of the applicant’s attempts to obtain payment, that figure was BGL 92, on 15 October 1996, the date on which the mayor refused to execute the judgment, it was BGL 216 and in May 1998 the exchange rate was BGL 1,782 for USD 1.", "33. As of 1 July 1999, BGL 1,000 became 1 new Bulgarian lev (BGN). On 17 March 2000, the date on which the applicant was invited to renew her request for payment before the Chirpan municipality, USD 1 was exchangeable for BGN 1.62 (i.e., for BGL 1,620).", "34. For the period May 1996 – March 2000 the statutory interest rate in Bulgaria varied significantly, reaching during a period of several months in the end of 1996 and the beginning of 1997 an average of approximately 200% per annum. That was however insufficient to compensate for the loss of value of the Bulgarian lev during that period.", "35. Following the admissibility decision in the present case, on 21 February 2003 the municipality of Chirpan paid BGN 68.69 into a bank account opened by them in the applicant’s name. The amount included BGN 15 in principal, BGN 49.19 in interest for the period 20 July 1993 – 20 February 2003 and BGN 4.50 in costs. The applicant was informed by letter." ]

[ 3, 9 ]

[ "8. The applicant was born in 1948. He worked as chief financial expert at the Municipal Privatisation Agency in Plovdiv. In the end of 1995 the competent financial control authority commenced an audit in the course of which it was established that public funds might have been misappropriated by the applicant. He was questioned several times. On 10 May 1996 criminal proceedings were opened against him.", "9. On 14 May 1996 the applicant was arrested and brought before an investigator who charged him and decided to remand him in custody. The detention order was approved by a prosecutor on the same day. The charges concerned misappropriation of public funds by means of several separate acts between 1994 and 1996. Charges were also brought against two other persons.", "10. On 17 June 1996 the applicant requested the Regional Prosecutor to release him. He stated that there was no danger of him absconding, committing an offence or obstructing the course of justice as he did not have a criminal record, had a permanent address and a family and, ever since his daughter’s tragic death, had been taking care of his five years’ old grand‑daughter. The applicant’s daughter had been killed by her husband. Their child, the applicant’s granddaughter, had thus remained without parents, her father being in prison for the murder of her mother.", "11. The request was dismissed on 21 June 1996 by the Regional Public Prosecutor who stated that the danger of absconding could not be excluded in view of the large amounts that the applicant might have misappropriated.", "12. On 15 July 1996 the applicant appealed that decision to the Chief Public Prosecutor, adding that he had never attempted to abscond during the financial audit and had even collaborated actively and had arranged for the reimbursement of certain amounts. The applicant also stated that his health was unstable and that his wife was ill.", "13. The appeal was dismissed by decision of the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office of 31 July 1996, registered on 2 August 1996. The decision stated that an exception from the mandatory detention under Article 152 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was only possible on health grounds. However, no such grounds had been established.", "14. On 20 December 1996 the applicant appealed against his pre-trial detention. On 11 March 1997 the Regional Prosecutor’s Office confirmed the applicant’s remand in custody without giving reasons.", "15. On an unspecified date the applicant again requested that his pre-trial detention be substituted by a more lenient measure.", "16. On 12 May 1997 the Regional Public Prosecutor dismissed the applicant’s request stating that the fact that the applicant had been taking care of his grand-daughter could not lead to the conclusion that no danger of his absconding existed. Furthermore, the medical doctors who had examined the applicant had found that he was healthy.", "17. The applicant’s ensuing appeal of 19 May 1997, in which he submitted, inter alia, that the investigation had been unreasonably lengthy, was dismissed on 11 June 1997 by the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office. The decision stated that only exceptional circumstances, excluding any hypothetical danger of absconding, reoffending or obstructing the course of justice, could warrant the applicant’s release. The applicant’s reference to the length of the investigation, to “justice” and international treaties could not be taken into consideration.", "18. On 29 June 1997 the applicant appealed to the Chief Public Prosecutor against the decision of 11 June 1997. He reiterated his arguments that during the 6-months investigation conducted by the financial authorities he had reported regularly when summoned and had never attempted to suppress evidence or evade justice. On 16 July 1997 the applicant’s appeal was dismissed on the ground that no exceptional circumstances warranting release had been established.", "19. In July 1997 the investigator completed his work on the case. During the preliminary investigation he questioned 23 witnesses, appointed 5 experts and examined their reports and studied numerous financial, commercial and other documents.", "20. On 6 October 1997 the competent prosecutor submitted an indictment to the Plovdiv Regional Court against the applicant and two other persons.", "21. The fist hearing was listed for 3 November 1997 but could not proceed as one of the accused persons had not been allowed sufficient time to prepare his defence. The case was adjourned until 10 December 1997.", "22. On 24 November 1997 the applicant lodged an application for release with the Regional Court, claiming that his health had deteriorated and that he had to take care of his granddaughter. On 27 November 1997, at a public hearing, that court dismissed the application on the ground that the criminal offence with which he was charged was very serious and that he might tamper with evidence or influence witnesses.", "23. On 10 and 11 December 1997 the Regional Court began the examination of the criminal case. The applicant and the other two accused persons were questioned and nineteen witnesses and two experts were heard. The hearing was adjourned as some of the witnesses had not appeared and the parties sought to call additional witnesses.", "24. At the next hearing, on 5 and 6 February 1998, the Regional Court heard twelve witnesses and several experts. Three witnesses and one expert had not been summoned which necessitated an adjournment. Before closing the hearing, the Regional Court heard the applicant’s renewed appeal against detention and dismissed it, stating that remand in custody was mandatory in all cases where the charges concerned a serious offence. The case did not fall within the exception from that rule, as provided under Article 152 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.", "25. The hearing resumed on 10 April 1998. The Regional Court heard an expert and accepted the request of the accused persons for the appointment of three additional experts in banking and finance. It again dismissed the applicant’s application for release on the grounds that there were no new circumstances warranting release and that, since new experts would be working on the case, there was a danger of the applicant tampering with evidence.", "26. On 22 April 1998 the applicant’s lawyer lodged an appeal with the Appellate Court against the decision of 10 April 1998 concerning his detention. He reiterated the arguments stated in previous appeals, stressing that all facts had been clarified, that he had cooperated with the financial auditing authorities and did not dispute their findings and that he could not possibly tamper with evidence since he had been dismissed from his job. Before transmitting the appeal to the Appellate Court, on 27 April 1998 the Plovdiv Regional Court confirmed its decision.", "27. On 12 May 1998 the Appellate Court, sitting in private, dismissed the appeal. It stated that Article 152 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was incompatible with Article 5 of the Convention, which was directly applicable. The applicant’s appeal was however ill founded in any event. That was so because the applicant was charged with the misappropriation of approximately 16 million old Bulgarian levs (at a time when this amount was the equivalent of about 200,000 US dollars). Therefore, there was a real danger of absconding. Furthermore, the trial was close to conclusion.", "28. The hearing listed for 19 and 20 May 1998 was adjourned until 17 June 1998 as the lawyer of one the applicant’s co-accused could not attend.", "29. On 15 June 1998 the applicant complained against his detention, arguing that it was not reasonable to believe that he could forge documents to be examined by the experts or influence witnesses. He also invoked the fact that he had already been detained for two years and several months.", "30. The appeal was dismissed at the hearing on 17 June 1998 before the Regional Court on the ground that the applicant might forge some important financial documents and obstruct the fact-finding, taking into consideration that there were more witnesses and expert-witnesses to be heard. The hearing was again adjourned as the lawyer of one of the applicant’s co‑accused had not appeared. The court also decided to summon another witness.", "31. The applicant’s ensuing appeal was dismissed on 24 July 1998 by the Appellate Court, sitting in private. Referring to the statement of one of the other accused persons that shortly before his arrest in May 1996 the applicant had asked him to forge or destroy banking documents, the court stated that the applicant could obstruct the course of justice. Further, it has not been established that no danger of the applicant’s absconding or committing an offence existed. Finally, the Regional Court was trying to conduct a prompt trial, but the investigation activities and examination of evidence were too complex.", "32. The next hearing in the criminal case took place on 9 September 1998. The Regional Court heard two witnesses and adjourned the hearing, as the experts had not deposited their report. The applicant renewed his appeal against detention. He reiterated that he would not abscond as he had to look after his granddaughter and stated that there was no danger of him tampering with evidence at that advanced stage of the proceedings. The appeal was dismissed on the ground that under Article 152 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure release was only possible if the existence of any danger of absconding, committing an offence or obstruction was excluded beyond doubt. Furthermore, it was not true that the applicant’s detention had become unreasonably lengthy.", "33. On 10 September 1998 the applicant appealed to the Appellate Court reiterating detailed arguments with reference to his previous appeals. Relying on Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, he insisted that the court should reply in concreto.", "34. On 19 October 1998 the Appellate Court, sitting in private, dismissed the applicant’s appeal holding that in view of the seriousness of the case and the applicant’s behaviour during the preliminary investigation, there was a danger of obstructing the course of justice. As to the allegedly excessive length of the detention, the requirements of the Convention in this respect did not mean that the provisions of domestic law on pre-trial detention could be ignored. Finally, the trial was approaching its end.", "35. The hearing in the criminal case resumed on 14 December 1998 before the Regional Court but was adjourned as some important issues were yet to be tackled by the experts. In particular, no annual statement, declaration of funds or the text of certain regulations of the Privatisation Agency could be found. Other vital documents from the Privatisation Agency and from a bank were missing and some important documents could only be obtained as copies.", "36. At that hearing the applicant’s renewed request for release on bail was dismissed as he was charged with a serious criminal offence for which pre-trial detention was mandatory by law. He could not rely on the exception provided for under Article 152 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the experts had yet to prepare their report and, therefore, there was a danger of the applicant obstructing the course of justice. The length of the applicant’s detention was not excessive in view of the gravity of the charges.", "37. On 21 December 1998 the applicant filed an appeal against the above decision with the Appellate Court.", "38. On 26 January 1999 that court, sitting in chambers, dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The court stated that under the Code of Criminal Procedure preventive measures were imposed on the basis of the gravity of the charges. It was for the prosecution authorities to charge the accused and to decide on the corresponding preventive measures, having regard to the gravity of the charges and the personal circumstances of the accused. The trial court, pending the determination of the criminal charges, was bound by the terms of the indictment as there was a presumption that the prosecution authorities had the necessary evidence to charge the accused. Therefore, since the applicant was charged with a serious offence and no exceptional circumstances under Article 152 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been established, there were no grounds to order release on bail. In any event, the case would soon be decided.", "39. The next hearing before the Regional Court took place on 9 February 1999. A completed expert’s report was examined. The applicant sought an adjournment as his second lawyer was absent. The court noted that no good cause had been shown for his absence, but acceded to the request in view of the applicant’s insistence that his second lawyer should make final oral pleadings on his behalf.", "40. The applicant again requested to be released, considering that the detention exceeded the reasonable time and that it was unreasonable to believe that he could commit further offences or evade justice. The court again dismissed the applicant’s request.", "41. On 10 February 1999 the applicant filed an appeal with the Appellate Court against the refusal of the Regional Court to release him. On 19 March 1999 that court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on the ground that the fact that the expert’s report was completed did not constitute a new fact in favour of the applicant’s release. It further held that there were no exceptional circumstances within the meaning of Article 152 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The length of the detention could not be relied upon by the applicant as the applicant’s lawyer had caused a delay by failing to appear in court.", "42. The next hearing was scheduled for 12 April 1999 and then adjourned to 12 May 1999, apparently owing to the failure of the Appellate Court to return the case file in due time.", "43. On 12 May 1999 the Regional Court heard the final oral pleadings of the parties and dismissed the applicant’s request for release on bail.", "44. On 17 May 1999 the applicant was found guilty and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment.", "45. Upon the applicant’s appeal, on 14 December 1999 the Plovdiv Appellate Court upheld his conviction and mitigated the sentence to five years’ imprisonment.", "46. On 12 January 2000 the applicant filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court of Cassation.", "47. On 6 July 2000 the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the Appellate Court’s judgment." ]

[ 2 ]

[ "7. The applicant party was based in the Republic of Mordovia, a constituency of the Russian Federation.", "8. On 15 March 1994 the applicant party was registered with the Ministry of Justice of Mordovia as a “Mordovian All-Republican Socio‑Political Association - the Presidential Party of Mordovia” (Республиканская общественно-политическая организация республики Мордовия – Президентская Партия Мордовии).", "9. On 14 April 1995 the State Duma adopted a new Federal Law on Public Associations (Федеральный Закон «Об общественных объединениях – “the Federal Law on Associations”) which came into force on 19 May 1995. Article 52 of the Federal Law on Associations required public associations registered before 19 May 1995 to ensure that their articles of association complied with the Federal Law on Associations and to renew their registration by 1 July 1999.", "10. On 30 June 1999 the applicant party applied to the Ministry of Justice of Mordovia to renew its registration. It presented its Articles of Association which contained the following provisions:\n“2. The party’s objectives 2.1. The party’s aims are:\n- assisting in the formation of a free democratic society in the Republic of Mordovia and Russia;\n- strengthening Russia’s unity;\n- fighting against the separatism of the Republic of Mordovia;\n- enhancing the separation of the executive, legislative and judicial powers;\n- creating a strong executive power headed by the directly elected President of the Republic of Mordovia, integrated in the executive power of the Russian Federation;\n- building a highly developed market economy;\n- striving to achieve the individual’s social protection.\nIn order to meet these objectives the party: 2.1.1. participates in presidential, parliamentary and local elections in the Republic of Mordovia by selecting and nominating candidates and assisting in their electoral campaigns. 2.1.2. carries out programmes and initiatives directed at professional training, provides assistance to members of parliament and party members in the fields of economy, law, administration, mass media and the arts to support the preparation and running of electoral campaigns. 2.1.3. develops a scheme to select a list of candidates and to establish the liability to the party of its members of parliament. 2.1.6. assists individuals, public and private organisations, research and educational bodies in their activities concurring with the party’s aims.”", "11. On 30 June 1999 the Minister of Justice of Mordovia refused to renew the applicant party’s registration with reference to the Federal Law on Associations and to the Law of the Republic of Mordovia on Becoming an All-Republican Public Association (Закон Республики Мордовия «О приобретении общественным объединением регионального (республиканского) статуса» - the Association Law of Mordovia). The decision stated that the applicant party had failed to create branches in more than half of the districts and cities of Mordovia to qualify for the title “All-Republican”. Furthermore, it stated that the applicant party’s Articles of Association did not comply with the requirement to include among its objectives participation in the political life of society and in elections.", "12. On 8 July 1999 the applicant party filed its objections with the Ministry of Justice of Mordovia. It maintained that the requirement to establish branches contained in Article 21 of the Federal Law on Associations applied exclusively to international, all-Russian or inter-regional public associations. It also contended that its Articles of Association provided for the applicant party’s participation in the political life of society and in elections.", "13. On the same day the applicant party filed a new application for the renewal of its registration with the Ministry of Justice of Mordovia. The newly submitted Articles of Association contained the following statements:\n“2.1. The main objective of the party is participation in the political life of society through influencing and generating the citizens’ political will, participation in elections to the State authorities and local government by nominating candidates and organising their electoral campaign, and taking part in the setting-up and activities of the said bodies.”", "14. On 19 July 1999 the Deputy Minister of Justice of Mordovia informed the applicant that it had missed the deadline for renewal of its registration.", "15. In August 1999 the Ministry of Justice of Mordovia applied to the Leninsky District Court of Saransk for the dissolution of the applicant party on the ground that it had failed to re‑register. The applicant party filed a counter-claim in which it challenged the refusal to renew its registration and sought an order requiring the Ministry of Justice to register it.", "16. On 29 December 1999 the Leninsky District Court of Saransk dismissed the request for dissolution. It held that it was sufficiently clear from the applicant party’s Articles of Association that it intended to engage in activities amounting to “participation in the political life of society” in accordance with the Federal Law on Associations. The court also found that the requirement to establish branches applied only to all-Russian, inter-regional and international public associations. It declared the refusal to renew the registration of the applicant party unlawful and ordered the Ministry of Justice of Mordovia to renew the registration.", "17. The Minister of Justice of Mordovia appealed.", "18. On 14 March 2000 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Mordovia acting as an appeal instance quashed the judgment of 29 December 1999 and substituted its own decision. It found that the applicant party had failed to declare expressly its “participation in the political life of society” as a statutory objective. It rejected the finding made by the first-instance court that the activities listed in Article 2.1.1 of the applicant party’s Articles of Association could qualify as “participation in the political life of society” for the purposes of the Federal Law on Associations. The court found the refusal to renew the registration of the applicant party lawful and, in accordance with Article 52 of the Federal Law on Associations, ordered its dissolution. This decision became final on the same day.", "19. On 20 August 2002, after communication of the case to the respondent Government by the Court, the acting President of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Mordovia brought on his own motion an application for supervisory review of the decision of 14 March 2000.", "20. On 5 September 2002 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Mordovia granted the application by quashing the decision of 14 March 2000 and upholding the judgment of the Leninsky District Court of Saransk dated 29 December 1999. The latter judgment declaring the refusal to renew the registration unlawful and requiring the Ministry of Justice of Mordovia to register the Presidential Party of Mordovia entered into force.", "21. On 29 October 2002 the Department of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation in respect of the Republic of Mordovia sought a court order in respect of the enforcement of the judgment of 29 December 1999. It claimed that, following legislative changes, it could not register the Presidential Party of Mordovia pursuant to the judgment. Firstly, on 17 May 2002 the competence to register legal persons had been transferred to the tax authorities. Secondly, the Law on Political Parties of 11 July 2001 changed the requirements for establishing political parties, and the application for registration of the applicant party had not taken account of these requirements. In particular, under the new law no regional political parties could be created and existing regional parties were deprived of their current status.", "22. On 30 October 2002 the Leninsky District Court of Saransk examined the request and terminated the execution of the judgment of 29 December 1999. The court accepted that both reasons prevented the party’s registration pursuant to the judgment. It also took into account that the applicant’s president, Mr V. Guslyannikov, had consented to the termination of the enforcement proceedings in view of the legislative changes." ]

[ 7 ]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1935 and lives in Sopot, Poland", "5. In October 1988 the applicant lodged with the Gdańsk District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) an application for division of the matrimonial property. Her former husband, Mr R.B., whom she divorced in 1988, was a party to those proceedings. The matrimonial property consisted, inter alia, of a house in Gdańsk.", "6. The District Court held several hearings. Some of them were adjourned because of the applicant's former husband's absence. The court ordered several expert opinions.", "7. The hearings scheduled for 20 September and 13 October 1993 were adjourned. The applicant failed to appear at these hearings due to the illness and subsequent death of her daughter.", "8. On 22 November 1993 the court held a hearing.", "9. Subsequently, hearings were held on 21 February, 31 May and 29 September 1994. The court heard witnesses and imposed a fine on a witness who failed to appear before the court.", "10. In 1995 the court held six hearings at which it heard the parties and witnesses. It further decided that a new expert opinion should be obtained.", "11. The inspection of the property scheduled for 5 February 1996 did not take place because the applicant's former husband had refused to let her and her lawyer enter the property in question.", "12. On 4 April 1996 the court ordered another expert report and a court‑expert inspected the property. He submitted his expert opinion to the court on 23 May 1996.", "13. Subsequently, both parties challenged the expert opinion.", "14. The hearings scheduled for 13 August and 13 September 1996 were adjourned upon the application of the applicant's former husband. The subsequent hearings scheduled for 25 October and 29 November 1996 were also adjourned since the expert witness had failed to appear before the court.", "15. The court held a hearing on 7 January 1997. It heard an expert witness and ordered that a supplementary opinion be prepared.", "16. At the hearing held on 25 March 1997 the applicant's former husband requested the court to stay the proceedings.", "17. On 3 June 1997 the court decided to stay the proceedings since it established that the determination of the case depended on the outcome of another set of proceedings.", "18. On 9 December 1997 the applicant applied to resume the proceedings because the reason for staying had ceased to exist as the other set of proceedings had ended with the Supreme Court's judgment of 13 August 1997.", "19. On 16 March 1998 the Gdańsk District Court resumed the proceedings.", "20. On 19 June and 5 November 1998 the court held hearings. Subsequently, the trial court decided to hold a view of the estate and to obtain an additional expert opinion. Two views of the property scheduled for 6 and 26 January 1999 did not take place.", "21. Subsequently, the court held hearings on 17 January and 3 April 2000. It heard an expert witness and ordered that two new experts' opinions be prepared.", "22. It appears that the experts refused to prepare their opinions and on 24 October 2000 the court ordered another expert to prepare an additional opinion.", "23. On 30 May 2001 the court held the next hearing.", "24. Subsequently, hearings were held on 11 July and 17 August 2001.", "25. Subsequently, hearings were held on 27 February, 26 June and 27 October 2002. The trial court decided that an expert opinion should be obtained.", "26. On 15 and 29 January 2003 the court held a hearing and heard expert witnesses.", "27. Subsequently, hearings were held on 12 March, 14 May, 2 July, 5 August, 18 September, 9 November and 16 December 2003. Some of the hearings were adjourned.", "28. On 29 January 2004 the Gdańsk District Court held a hearing and on 1 April 2004 it gave judgment.", "29. On 31 May 2004 both parties lodged appeals.", "30. The proceedings are pending." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Budapest.", "5. On 6 November 1995 the applicant, a stoker, brought an action against his employer seeking the invalidation of the termination of his employment.", "6. The Labour Court held hearings on 17 January, 17 April and 19 June 1996. On the latter occasion, it dismissed the applicant’s action.", "7. On appeal, on 26 March 1997 the Budapest Regional Court quashed the first-instance decision and discontinued the proceedings, holding that the applicant’s action was time-barred.", "8. In review proceedings, on 10 December 1997 the Supreme Court quashed the Regional Court’s decision and remitted the case to the first-instance court.", "9. In the resumed proceedings, the Labour Court held hearings on 5 May, 30 June and 24 November 1998. On 26 May 1998 the court appointed a graphology expert who submitted his opinion on 24 September 1998. On the applicant’s request, a further expert was appointed who submitted his opinion on 15 February 1999. The Labour Court held hearings on 2 September and 4 November 1999, 20 January, 29 February and 6 June 2000. On 7 December 2000 the Labour Court partly admitted the applicant’s claim.", "10. On the parties’ appeal, the Budapest Regional Court held hearings on 3 April and 22 May 2001. On the latter occasion, the Regional Court upheld the Labour Court’s decision.", "11. On 31 August 2001 the applicant pursued a petition for review before the Supreme Court.", "12. On 10 July 2002 the Supreme Court upheld the Regional Court’s decision in essence and increased the interest rate to be applied." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "4. The applicant is a member of the Roma ethnic minority, who was born in 1943 and lives in Budapest.", "5. On 3 October 1996 the applicant brought an action requesting that a flat which she had purchased from a third person, Mrs I.S., be vacated.", "6. In the meantime, Mrs I.S. brought an action before the same court challenging the validity of the contract of sale.", "7. On 2 April 1997 the Pest Central District Court suspended the proceedings relating to the applicant's action pending the outcome of the dispute over the validity of the contract of sale.", "8. In the proceedings instituted by Mrs I.S., the Pest Central District Court held six hearings until 12 January 1999, when it dismissed the plaintiff's action. On 28 October 1999 the Budapest Regional Court quashed the District Court's decision and remitted the case to first instance. Following five hearings, on 6 February 2001 the District Court dismissed Mrs I.S.'s action. This judgment was finally confirmed by the Budapest Regional Court on 13 September 2001.", "9. On the applicant's request, on 2 May 2002 the District Court held a hearing in the case concerning the evacuation of the flat in question. With an order, the court again suspended the proceedings until the applicant's ownership had been registered by the Budapest Land Registry.", "10. The applicant appealed against this order on 15 May 2002, submitting that the original copy of the contract of sale could not be located at the Land Registry with the result that the applicant's ownership of the flat could not be registered.", "11. On 29 May 2002 the Budapest Land Registry informed the District Court that the original copy of the contract had been sent to the District Court in the context of the case terminated on 13 September 2001. It requested the court to return the contract to it.", "12. On 9 July 2002 the Budapest Regional Court dismissed the applicant's appeal of 15 May 2002, holding that the registration of her ownership had to be dealt with as a preliminary question.", "13. On 4 September 2002 the Land Registry informed the applicant that the District Court had not replied to its request to date.", "14. On 17 September 2002 the applicant also requested the District Court to return the contract in question to the Land Registry.", "15. In February 2004 the applicant was informed that the contract in question had been found at the court. The proceedings are apparently either still suspended or pending." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1939 and lives in Ołdrzychowice, Poland.", "5. On 2 April 1985 the applicant applied to the Wrocław District Commission for Mining Damages (Okręgowa Komisja do spraw Szkód Górniczych) for compensation for damage caused to her house.", "6. On 25 September 1985 the Commission dismissed her application.", "7. The applicant appealed against this decision. Subsequently, on 7 July 1987 the Supreme Administrative Court (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny) and on 24 August 1988 the Appellate Commission for Mining Damage (Odwoławcza Komisja do spraw Szkód Górniczych) quashed previous decisions given in the case.", "8. On 7 April 1992 the District Commission for Mining Damage gave its decision in which it partly allowed the applicant’s action. The applicant appealed against this decision.", "9. On 8 December 1993 the Wrocław Regional Commission held a hearing.", "10. On 2 September 1994 a new law entered into force which provided that the civil courts would be competent to examine applications for compensation for mining damage and abolished the Commission for Mining Damage (Ustawa z dnia 4 lutego 1994, Prawo geologiczne i górnicze).", "11. Accordingly, the applicant’s case was transferred to the Świdnica Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki).", "12. The first hearing was held on 24 April 1995. The court ordered that an expert opinion be prepared. The opinion was submitted to the court on 26 April 1996.", "13. Subsequently, hearings were held on 18 November 1996, 17 March and 19 September 1997, 13 February 1998 and 10 February 1999. The court ordered several new expert opinions.", "14. On 17 February 1999 the Świdnica Regional Court gave judgment in which it dismissed the applicant’s action.", "15. On 10 March 1999 the applicant lodged an appeal against this judgment.", "16. On 11 May 1999 the Wrocław Court of Appeal quashed the impugned judgment and remitted the case.", "17. On 1 October 1999 the Świdnica Regional Court held a hearing. The trial court ordered that new expert opinions be prepared. The hearing scheduled for 19 January 2000 was adjourned.", "18. At the hearing held on 16 February 2000 the Świdnica Regional Court gave judgment. The court partly allowed the applicant’s action and granted her compensation.", "19. The applicant lodged an appeal against this judgment.", "20. On 31 May 2000 the Wrocław Court of Appeal dismissed her appeal." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1929 and lives in Komárom, Hungary.", "5. On 29 April 1991 the applicant brought an action against his former spouse seeking the division of the matrimonial property.", "6. Following three hearings, the District Court was inactive between 9June 1993 and 19 October 1995. The District Court then held four more hearings. On 13 March 1997 the defendant requested that a real-estate expert be appointed. Due to a delay in depositing the expert’s costs attributable to the parties, the expert was only appointed on 19 January 1998. Having obtained evidence from numerous witnesses as well as from a judicial real-estate expert, on 4 June 1998 the Komárom District Court ruled on the division of the property.", "7. On 10 February 1999 the Komárom-Esztergom County Regional Court confirmed the first-instance decision in substance.", "8. On 30 April 1999 the applicant filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, which on 29 December 2000 upheld the Regional Court’s judgment. This decision was served on the applicant on 16 January 2001." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1925 and lives in Praszka.", "5. On 28 March 1991 the applicant lodged a motion with the Oleśno District Court, claiming a division of inheritance and dissolution of co-ownership of a certain property.", "6. The court held hearings on: 15 May 1991, 28 August 1991, 29 January 1992, 10 April 1992, 18 May 1992, 24 August 1992, 30 September 1992, 23 February 1993, 7 June 1993 and 28 March 1994.", "7. Having regard to the lack of progress in the proceedings, and apparently aiming at obtaining possession of the property by other legal means, on 13 April 1993 the applicant lodged a motion with the Oleśno District Court, claiming acquisitive prescription of half of the property in question. By a decision of 11 May 1994 the Oleśno District Court dismissed her motion. By a decision of 27 September 1994 the Częstochowa Regional Court dismissed her further appeal and upheld the contested decision.", "8. Further hearings in the dissolution case were held on 3 June 1998, 30 December 1999, 29 March 2000 and 23 May 2000.", "9. The court ordered a number of expert opinions. They were submitted to the court on: 22 December 1991, 3 July 1992, 8 September 1997, 12 May 1998, 16 June 1998, 9 December 1998, 9 February 1999, 16 April 1999, 11 May 1999, 8 October 1999 and 27 November 2000.", "10. By a decision of 10 January 2001 the Oleśno District Court stayed the proceedings due to the fact that one of the parties to the proceedings had died. By virtue of the same decision the court resumed the proceedings, having regard to his heirs' request that the proceedings be resumed.", "11. On 3 June 2003 the Oleśno District Court gave a judgment on the merits.", "12. On 16 December 2003 the Opole Regional Court dismissed the applicant's appeal.", "13. By a decision of 28 June 2004 the Supreme Court declined to examine the cassation appeal, considering that it had not been shown that arguable public interest grounds existed which would justify the examination of the appeal." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Kielce, Poland.", "5. On 8 and 9 November 1993 the national newspaper A published articles about unemployment and unfair treatment of employees by certain employers.", "6. On 9 December 1993 the applicant lodged with the Kielce Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) a civil action for protection of his personal rights (o ochronę dóbr osobistych) against the newspaper A and journalists B and C. The applicant, who at that time was the president of the “P” company and the president of the Polish Party of Unemployed, claimed that the articles included untrue information about him.", "7. On 11 March 1994 the applicant was partly exempted from the court-fees.", "8. On 8 June 1994 the trial court held the first hearing.", "9. Subsequently, hearings were held on 14 November and 5 December 1994.", "10. In 1995 the trial court held six hearings and heard several witnesses.", "11. On 30 January, 18 April, 6 September and 3 October 1996 the court held hearings.", "12. On 10 October 1996 the Kielce Regional Court gave judgment. It dismissed the applicant's action.", "13. On 30 December 1996 the applicant lodged an appeal against this judgment.", "14. On 28 February 1997 the Kraków Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) held a hearing and dismissed his appeal.", "15. On 5 May 1997 the applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy).", "16. On 22 December 1997 the Supreme Court allowed his appeal, quashed the impugned judgment and remitted the case.", "17. On 3 July 1998 the Court of Appeal held a hearing and gave judgment. It again dismissed the applicant's appeal.", "18. On 10 December 1998 the applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court.", "19. On 4 July 2001 the Supreme Court refused to entertain the cassation appeal as it raised no important legal issues and was manifestly ill-founded." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Dębno, Poland.", "5. In 1989 the applicant was injured in a traffic accident. Later, a medical board assessed his disability as being of the first degree (serious) and he was granted a disability pension. The applicant also applied to PZU S.A., an insurance company, for a monthly allowance compensating him for his loss of ability to work (renta uzupełniająca). The company refused his request.", "6. On 14 May 1991 the applicant sued PZU S.A. in the Gorzów Wielkopolski Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki), seeking an award of a monthly allowance. On 23 November 1992 the court partly granted his claim. The applicant appealed.", "7. On 19 May 1993 the Poznań Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) partly quashed the contested judgment and remitted the case.", "8. The Regional Court held hearings on 13 January and 25 August 1994. At the hearing held on 27 October 1994 the applicant modified his claim. On 24 March 1995 the trial court asked the applicant to specify his claim. On 9 May 1995 the applicant submitted to the court his modified statement of claim.", "9. The court held hearings on 8 June 1995, 7 December 1995 and 29 February 1996. On 5 April 1996 the court ordered an expert opinion. It was submitted to the court on 31 May 1996. On 17 July 1996 the court ordered an opinion from yet another expert. The expert submitted it to the court on 27 July 1996.", "10. The court held a hearing on 20 February 1997. The hearing scheduled for 22 May 1997 was cancelled. On 15 December 1997 a supplementary opinion was submitted to the court.", "11. Further hearings were held on 29 January 1998 and 20 April 1999. On 17 June 1999 yet another supplementary expert opinion was submitted to the court. On 4 November 1999 the court held a hearing.", "12. On 18 November 1999 the Regional Court gave judgment and dismissed the applicant’s claim. The applicant appealed. On 13 June 2000 the Poznań Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance judgment. The judgment is final." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1920 and lives in Katowice, Poland.", "5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.", "6. Since 1965, the applicant’s relatives, Z.D. and L.D, have occupied a part of the applicant’s property, with the agreement of the applicant. It appears that Z.D. and L.D. carried out construction work on the property which provoked a conflict between them and the applicant.", "7. On 4 January 1994 the applicant lodged a civil action with the Katowice District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) in which he asked the court to order the eviction of Z.D. and L.D from his property.", "8. On 31 January 1994 the trial court held a hearing at which it gave a default judgment (wyrok zaoczny). The court allowed the applicant’s action and ordered that the judgement be immediately enforceable.", "9. The defendants lodged an objection against the judgment.", "10. On 7 March 1994 the Katowice District Court held a hearing at which it allowed the applicant’s motions to hear witnesses and to hold a viewing of the property. Subsequently, the trial court requested a copy of the case‑file concerning another set of civil proceedings instituted by the defendants against the applicant.", "11. On 27 April 1994 the court decided to stay the proceedings until the termination of the second set of proceedings, instituted by the defendants, in which they claimed that they had acquired the title to the property in question by prescription (stwierdzenie nabycia własności poprzez zasiedzenie).", "12. The applicant appealed against the decision to stay the proceedings; however, on 6 July 1994 the Katowice Regional Court dismissed his appeal.", "13. Subsequently on several occasions, the applicant applied to resume the proceedings.", "14. In August 1994, February 1995, February, June, October and December 1996 and May 1997 the trial court requested the Second Division of the Katowice District Court to provide information concerning the state of the proceedings concerning the acquisition of property by prescription.", "15. On 10 October 1997 the applicant applied to resume the proceedings. He submitted that the second set of proceedings for acquisitive prescription had ended on 24 September 1997 with the second‑instance court’s decision.", "16. On 15 October 1997 the Katowice District Court allowed his application and resumed the proceedings.", "17. At the hearing held on 9 December 1997 the defendants informed the court that the second set of proceedings was still pending because they had lodged a cassation appeal. Consequently, on 12 January 1998, the District Court again decided to stay the proceedings.", "18. The applicant appealed against this decision, but on 23 March 1998 his appeal was rejected as he had failed to pay the fees for the appeal.", "19. Subsequently, the applicant applied to the court to issue a writ of enforcement of the default judgment of 31 January 1994. On 22 May 1998 the Katowice District Court dismissed his application on the grounds that the proceedings were stayed.", "20. The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision.", "21. On 8 October 1998 the Katowice Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) quashed the decision of 22 May 1998 and remitted the application concerning the writ of enforcement for reconsideration.", "22. On 11 January 1999 the applicant applied to resume the proceedings. He submitted that the second set of the proceedings had ended with the Supreme Court’s decision of 14 October 1998.", "23. On 12 January 1999 the court allowed the application and resumed the proceedings.", "24. On 26 February 1999 the Katowice District Court held a hearing and gave judgment. It upheld the default judgment of 31 January 1994 and suspended the enforcement order.", "25. The defendants lodged an appeal against the judgment with the Katowice Regional Court.", "26. On 17 December 1999 the appellate court stayed the proceedings because the defendants had instituted yet another set of proceedings against the applicant. They sought a judgment stipulating that the applicant was obliged to make a declaration of will (oswiadczenie woli) in the form of a consent to the sale of the property in question. The Regional Court found that the proceedings for eviction should be stayed as the determination of the case depended on the outcome of this third set of proceedings.", "27. In March 2001 the applicant applied to resume the proceedings.", "28. Several times in 2001 and 2002 the trial court requested information regarding the state of the third set of proceedings. Apparently, they were still pending at the time.", "29. On 6 March 2003 the Katowice Regional Court was informed that the third set of proceedings had ended. As a result, on 10 March 2003, the court resumed the eviction proceedings.", "30. On 10 March 2003 the court held a hearing at which it appointed a lawyer under the legal aid scheme for the defendants.", "31. On 28 August 2003 the Katowice Regional Court gave judgment in which it dismissed the defendants’ appeal.", "32. It appears that subsequently the defendants tried to re-open the proceedings." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Piotrków Trybunalski, Poland.", "5. In December 1993 the applicant, at that time seventeen years old, was hit by a car driven by a certain Mr R.Z. As a consequence of the accident, his left leg had to be amputated.", "6. On 17 June 1994 the applicant, represented by his mother, lodged with the Piotrków Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) a civil action against the State Insurance Company (Powszechny Zakład Ubezpieczeń). He claimed 800,000,000 old zlotys in compensation for pecuniary and non‑pecuniary damage.", "7. On 18 June 1994 the trial court exempted the applicant from payment of court-fees.", "8. On 24 August 1994 the first hearing was held. The trial court requested the applicant's medical file from a hospital and ordered an expert opinion.", "9. At the next hearing held on 1 February 1995 the court heard an expert witness and requested a second expert opinion.", "10. Between 2 February and 21 November 1995 no hearings were held.", "11. At the hearing held on 22 November 1995 the trial court gave the parties a time-limit for reaching a friendly settlement.", "12. Subsequently, hearings were held on 11 March and 27 November 1996. At those hearings the court heard the applicant's mother and an expert witness.", "13. The hearing scheduled for 26 February 1997 was cancelled due to illness of the applicant's counsel.", "14. On 27 February 1997 the applicant modified his claim. He in addition sought a monthly allowance.", "15. Afterwards, hearings were held on 5 March and 9 April 1997. Mr. R.Z., the driver responsible for the accident, joined the proceedings as an intervener.", "16. Between 10 April 1997 and 10 September 1998 no hearings were held.", "17. On 11 September and 9 October 1998 the trial court held hearings at which it heard an expert witness and the applicant.", "18. On 2 December 1998 the Piotrków Trybunalski Regional Court gave judgment. The trial court awarded the applicant compensation and a monthly pension.", "19. On 28 January 1999 the defendant lodged an appeal against this judgment.", "20. On 16 April 1999 the Łódź Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) held a hearing and gave judgment. It amended the first-instance judgment regarding interest and ordered the applicant to reimburse the costs of the proceedings incurred by the defendant.", "21. On 1 June 1999 the applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy).", "22. On 23 January 2002 the Supreme Court held a hearing and gave judgment. The Supreme Court partly allowed his cassation appeal." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "9. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Surrey. He has suffered from autism since birth. He is unable to speak and his level of understanding is limited. He is frequently agitated and has a history of self-harming behaviour. He lacks the capacity to consent or object to medical treatment. For over thirty years he was cared for in Bournewood Hospital (“the hospital”), a National Health Service Trust hospital. He was an in-patient at the Intensive Behavioural Unit (“IBU”) of the hospital from its inception in or around 1987. The applicant’s responsible medical officer (who had cared for him since 1977) was Dr M. (clinical director of learning disabilities, deputy medical director and consultant psychiatrist for psychiatry of learning disabilities).", "10. In March 1994 he was entrusted on a trial basis to paid carers, Mr and Mrs E., with whom he successfully resided until 22 July 1997. He was not formally discharged, and the hospital remained responsible for his care and treatment. From 1995 onwards the applicant attended on a weekly basis a day-care centre run by the local authority.", "11. On 22 July 1997 the applicant was at the day-care centre when he became particularly agitated, hitting himself on the head with his fists and banging his head against the wall. Staff could not contact Mr and Mrs E. and got in touch with a local doctor, who administered a sedative. The applicant remained agitated and, on the recommendation of the local authority care services manager (A.F.) with overall responsibility for the applicant, he was taken to the accident and emergency unit at the hospital.", "12. At the hospital, the applicant remained agitated and anxious and was received and assessed by Dr P. (acting consultant psychiatrist – learning disabilities services) as being in need of in-patient treatment. He was transferred, with the physical support of two nursing assistants, to the hospital’s IBU. He was recorded as making no attempt to leave. Having consulted, Dr P. and Dr M. considered that the best interests of the applicant required his admission for in-patient treatment. Dr M. did consider his committal under the Mental Health Act 1983 (“the 1983 Act”) but concluded that that was not necessary as the applicant was compliant and did not resist admission. The applicant was therefore admitted as an “informal patient”. Dr M. later confirmed (in her submissions in the judicial review proceedings referred to below) that, if the applicant had resisted admission, she would have detained him compulsorily under the 1983 Act as she was firmly of the view that he required in-patient treatment.", "13. Dr M.’s personal attendance notes for that day record the reports she had received of extremely disturbed behaviour at the day-care centre on that day and previously; the suggestion by A.F. that the applicant may have been suffering from a cyclical mood disorder and the recommendation that the applicant be assessed to establish any action required; Dr M.’s detailed consultation throughout the day with the applicant’s local doctor, Dr P., A.F., ward staff and other care professionals; the conclusion that, given the escalation of behavioural problems, the applicant required readmission for “thorough investigation and treatment” but that he would not be “sectioned” as he was “quite compliant” and had “not attempted to run away”; the numerous unsuccessful attempts to contact the applicant’s carers; and the decision to discourage visits by the applicant’s carers as it risked causing them and the applicant distress.\nHer notes for the following day, 23 July 1997, recorded that the applicant was calm, had complied with all care needs and accepted the change without problem; that his carers were “happy with [the] suggestion not to visit for a few days”; and the clinical opinion that, given the reports of escalating behavioural problems and self-harm and the suggestion by A.F. of a cyclical mood disorder, time was needed to observe, assess and administer appropriate treatment. Various tests were proposed to rule out any “organic pathology”. The applicant was to be referred to the psychology and speech therapist for assessment and a care plan was to be drawn up as appropriate “for maintenance purposes on discharge”. His carers were to be made aware of the need not to visit until the team treating the applicant felt confident for them to do so.", "14. In its letter dated 23 July 1997 to the applicant’s social worker (copied to Dr P.), the day-care centre enclosed a detailed report of the incident that had occurred the previous day and outlined serious behavioural issues to be considered by the applicant’s health care professionals before he could be allowed to return to the day-care centre. It was noted that the applicant’s outbursts had increased over the previous few months and that he had been finding it increasingly difficult to cope with his environment and group. A summary of the applicant’s behaviour and attendance at the day-care centre between January and July 1997 was also included.", "15. On 18 August 1997 Dr M. prepared a detailed report on the applicant’s history, care and progress for the manager (learning disabilities) of the local health authority as a follow-up to their recent discussions regarding the applicant. Dr M. indicated that the hospital was coming to the conclusion that the applicant, as well as being autistic, suffered from a mood disorder, and noted that his discharge at that time would be against medical opinion.", "16. On 22 August 1997 a consultant psychiatrist in learning disabilities (Dr G.) assessed the applicant at the request of Mr and Mrs E. His report described the applicant as suffering from a severe learning disability, autistic traits and a possible cyclical mood disorder. That psychiatrist recommended further assessment of the applicant in the IBU and better cooperation between the hospital’s professional team, the day-care centre and Mr and Mrs E.", "17. On 29 October 1997 the Court of Appeal indicated (see the proceedings detailed below) that the applicant’s appeal would be decided in his favour. Accordingly, on that day the applicant was detained in the hospital under section 5(2) of the 1983 Act (following receipt of a notice from a doctor in charge of an in-patient that an application ought to be made for the latter’s detention for, inter alia, treatment under section 3 of the 1983 Act, the patient may be detained for up to seventy-two hours to allow for that application to be processed). On 31 October 1997 the applicant was admitted for treatment as an involuntary patient under section 3 of the 1983 Act (two medical practitioners having recently examined the applicant would have certified his detention for treatment as necessary).", "18. On 2 November 1997 the applicant’s carers visited him for the first time since his readmission in July 1997.", "19. On 4 November 1997 the applicant’s legal representatives applied for a review of his detention by a Mental Health Review Tribunal (“MHRT”). Legal aid was granted to instruct an independent psychiatrist to prepare a report. The psychiatric report, dated 27 November 1997, was prepared jointly by a consultant psychiatrist and a registrar in the psychiatry of learning disability, both attached to the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Cambridge. The psychiatrists recommended the applicant’s discharge because they were of the opinion that his mental disorder was “currently neither of a nature or degree to warrant continued detention in hospital, nor [was] it necessary for his health or safety or for the protection of others”.\nOn 4 December 1997 the applicant’s representatives applied to the hospital managers for his release (section 23 of the 1983 Act), a meeting of the managers taking less time to convene than a meeting of the MHRT.", "20. The multidisciplinary team responsible for the applicant’s care and treatment decided that he had settled enough to be managed at home, and on 5 December 1997 he was released on leave of absence (under section 17 of the 1983 Act) into the care of Mr and Mrs E.", "21. On 9 December 1997 Dr P. prepared a report for the forthcoming managers’ review meeting. He noted that the applicant’s discharge on 5 December 1997 under section 17 of the 1983 Act was to be complemented by weekly psychiatric outpatient follow-up appointments, continued medication and monitoring by a community nurse. Dr P. was hopeful that the community team and their consultant psychiatrist could take over the applicant’s care so that he could be formally discharged from the hospital.", "22. On 12 December 1997 the hospital managers decided to formally discharge the applicant to the carers (section 23 of the 1983 Act).", "23. The first letter from Dr M. to Mr and Mrs E. after the applicant’s admission to the hospital was dated 23 July 1997. Having noted the attempts made to contact them on 22 July 1997, Dr M. outlined in detail what had happened and how the applicant was progressing. Dr M. indicated that, while the aim was to discharge the applicant to them as soon as possible, she was unable to predict the length of his stay as it depended on the completion of all necessary investigations and assessments. Dr M. indicated that visits would be unwise until the hospital staff felt that it would be appropriate, in order to avoid the applicant thinking that he could go home with Mr and Mrs E. following each visit at a time when he was “not clinically fit for discharge”. Dr M. invited Mr and Mrs E. to contact her about meeting her the following week.", "24. Dr M. sent a further detailed update on the applicant’s care, assessments and progress to Mr and Mrs E. on 31 July 1997. Having noted Mr and Mrs E.’s requests to staff to visit the applicant, Dr M. indicated that the current serious observational assessment would be prejudiced by such visits and suggested that the situation be reviewed the following week. Dr M. pointed out that the applicant was not clinically fit for discharge.", "25. Since Mr and Mrs E. had expressed concerns to staff at the hospital about the applicant’s care and treatment, Dr M. sent a long letter to Mr and Mrs E. on 6 August 1997 in which she explained the clinical team’s responsibility to provide the applicant with the care and clinical input he required. In particular, Dr M. noted:\n“I would like to take the opportunity to stress, through this correspondence, that we, as a Clinical Team, within the [IBU], are here, primarily to provide the treatment for [the applicant] who was admitted under our care, as an emergency. It would be extremely irresponsible of us not to provide [the applicant] with the care and the clinical input that he deserves and is in need of. His disposal/discharge from within the unit is dependent ... on the Multidisciplinary Clinical Professionals’ considered views, following their assessment and the work that they intend doing with [the applicant], specifically, in relation to his challenging behaviour and/or mental health needs. As I have stressed, in my earlier correspondence, these things do take time and unfortunately we have to be a little patient to allow the professionals some room and space to carry on with their work in the provision of care ... [The applicant] has been admitted to the [IBU] on an ‘informal’ basis and this is not a time-limited admission. I am not sure if you have misunderstood his status and are under the impression that perhaps he was admitted and held under ‘the Mental Health Act’. Even then, there is no ‘one month’ time-limit, as it all depends on the patient’s fitness for discharge ... On behalf of the Clinical Team, I would like to stress that [the applicant] is being treated within the [IBU] and once he is fit for discharge, he will be discharged back to the address from where he was admitted, with a ‘Treatment Plan’ which will include all aspects of his care and a ‘maintenance plan’ prescribed.”\nGiven the ongoing treatment and assessments, it was not possible to specify a discharge date. Dr M. repeated her offer to meet Mr and Mrs E. to discuss the applicant’s care.", "26. In a further letter of 2 September 1997, Dr M. confirmed to Mr and Mrs E. that the conclusions drawn from the assessments to date meant, and the recent clinical professionals’ meeting had decided, that the applicant was to be “fully” referred for care and treatment to the IBU and that his stay was likely to be a long one. She invited Mr and Mrs E. to attend a clinical meeting about the applicant’s care and treatment on 18 September 1997 and offered to meet Mr and Mrs E. separately to discuss, inter alia, the subject of visits.", "27. Mr and Mrs E. replied in a letter of 5 September 1997 that they could not agree with the suggested plan for the applicant and would be in touch again prior to the relevant meeting. By a letter dated 16 September 1997, Mr and Mrs E. confirmed that they would not be able to attend the meeting on 18 September 1997 as they were seeking legal advice. Dr M. responded by letter dated 19 September 1997 expressing regret that Mr and Mrs E. felt that their attendance at the clinical meeting could jeopardise the applicant’s position. In a separate letter of the same date, Dr M. outlined the results of the clinical meeting, including a recommendation that Mr and Mrs E. visit the applicant once a week, and requested them to contact her to arrange this.", "28. On 20 October 1997 Dr M. reassured Mr and Mrs E. that the subject of them visiting the applicant had been discussed at the hospital at some length and encouraged Mr and Mrs E. to meet her to discuss the applicant’s needs.", "29. Detailed behaviour management guidelines were issued on 27 November 1997 by the psychology service of the hospital to, among others, Dr M., Mr and Mrs E., the applicant’s social worker and other therapeutic services that were to be involved in the applicant’s future care. Appendix 1 was a detailed clinical description of the applicant’s mental state (autism and a cyclical mood disorder), needs and reactions prepared on the basis of extensive psychiatric and behavioural observations and assessments, with a view to achieving a global approach to his condition, treatment and care. Appendix 2 contained an extremely detailed “communication dictionary” which was designed to enhance communication with the applicant through voice, action and routine. Appendix 3 contained recording charts.", "30. By a letter of 2 December 1997 to the applicant’s legal representatives, Dr M. acknowledged receipt of the guidelines of 27 November 1997 (described above) and explained the clinical team’s plans regarding the applicant’s release on leave of absence in the near future with a view to a possible full discharge at a later date.", "31. In or around September 1997, the applicant, represented by his cousin and “next friend”, applied for leave to apply for judicial review of the hospital’s decision to admit him on 22 July 1997, for a writ of habeas corpus and for damages for false imprisonment and assault (a technical assault associated with his admission).", "32. The High Court refused the application. It found that, although the 1983 Act provided a comprehensive statutory regime for those formally admitted to psychiatric care, section 131(1) of the 1983 Act preserved the common-law jurisdiction in respect of informal patients. Since the applicant had not been “detained” but had been informally admitted and since the requirements of the common-law principle of necessity had been satisfied, his application was rejected. 2. The Court of Appeal’s judgment of 2 December 1997 (R v. Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L. [1998] 2 Weekly Law Reports 764).", "33. Lord Woolf, Master of the Rolls, delivered the principal judgment. On the question of whether the applicant was “detained”, he noted that it was agreed that this was a question of objective fact which did not depend on the presence or absence of consent or knowledge. He considered that a person was detained in law if those who had control over the premises in which he was situated intended that he should not be permitted to leave and had the ability to prevent him doing so. He went on:\n“We do not consider that the [High Court] judge was correct to conclude that [the applicant] was ‘free to leave’. We think it is plain that, had he attempted to leave the hospital, those in charge of him would not have permitted him to do so. ... Mr and Mrs E. had looked after [the applicant], as one of the family, for over three years. They had made it plain that they wanted to take him back into their care. It is clear that the hospital was not prepared to countenance this. If they were not prepared to release [the applicant] into the custody of his carers, they were not prepared to let him leave the hospital at all. He was and is detained there.”", "34. Lord Woolf also found that the right to detain a patient for treatment for mental disorder was to be found only in the 1983 Act, the provisions of which applied to the exclusion of the common-law principle of necessity. Section 131 which preserved the right to admit a patient informally applied only to a patient who had the capacity to and did consent to his admission. Since the applicant had been admitted for treatment without his consent and the other formalities required by the 1983 Act, his detention was unlawful:\n“It follows from our judgment that the whole approach of the [hospital] in this case was based on a false premise. It was based on the belief that they were entitled to treat [the applicant] as an in-patient without his consent as long as he did not dissent. That was a wrong approach. They were only allowed to admit him for treatment if they complied with the statutory requirements. ... [W]here [the 1983 Act] covers the situation, no necessity to act outside the statute can arise. The [hospital’s] powers to act under the common-law doctrine of necessity can arise only in relation to situations not catered for by [the 1983 Act].”", "35. The Court of Appeal awarded nominal damages and granted leave to appeal to the House of Lords. 3. The House of Lords’ judgment of 25 June 1998 (R v. Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L. [1999] Appeal Cases 458).", "36. The House of Lords granted leave to, among others, the Mental Health Act Commission to intervene in the proceedings. In its submissions to the House of Lords, the Commission outlined the beneficial consequences to patients of the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that persons in the applicant’s position were “detained” for the purposes of the 1983 Act, which included the application to such persons of the substantive and procedural safeguards of the Act. The Commission also described the survey it had completed since the Court of Appeal’s judgment by sending a questionnaire to all National Health Service Trust hospitals (and registered nursing homes). Sixty-two percent of those establishments responded, from which the Commission was able to submit that, if the Court of Appeal’s judgment were applied to patients such as the applicant, there would be an additional 22,000 detained patients resident on any one day and an additional 48,000 compulsory admissions per year under the 1983 Act.", "37. The House of Lords gave judgment on 25 June 1998 and unanimously allowed the appeal. Lord Goff (with whom Lords Lloyd and Hope agreed) delivered the principal judgment. Lords Nolan and Steyn also agreed that the appeal should be allowed but for different reasons.", "38. Having considered the drafting history of section 131 of the 1983 Act, Lord Goff disagreed with the Court of Appeal and concluded that section 131 applied to patients who consented as well as to compliant but incapacitated patients. He underlined, however, that the statutory history of the section, which put the matter beyond all doubt, appeared not to have been drawn to the attention of the Court of Appeal and that the Court of Appeal did not have the benefit, as did the House of Lords, of assistance from counsel appearing for the Secretary of State. As to the basis upon which a hospital was entitled to treat, and to care for, patients who were admitted as informal patients under section 131(1) but lacked the capacity to consent to such treatment or care, Lord Goff stated as follows:\n“It was plainly the statutory intention that such patients would indeed be cared for, and receive such treatment for their condition as might be prescribed for them in their best interests. Moreover, the doctors in charge would, of course, owe a duty of care to such a patient in their care. Such treatment and care can, in my opinion, be justified on the basis of the common-law doctrine of necessity ... (Re F. (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1) It is not therefore necessary to find such justification in the [1983 Act] itself, which is silent on the subject. It might, I imagine, be possible to discover an implication in the statute providing similar justification; but even assuming that to be right, it is difficult to imagine that any different result would flow from such a statutory implication. For present purposes, therefore, I think it appropriate to base justification for treatment and care of such patients on the common-law doctrine.”", "39. Lord Goff then considered whether the applicant had been “unlawfully detained” as alleged and as found by the Court of Appeal. He pointed out that for the tort of false imprisonment to be committed there must, in fact, be a complete deprivation of, or restraint on liberty: an actual and not a potential deprivation of liberty went towards constituting the tort. Lord Goff then turned to the facts and quoted extensively from the affidavit (sworn on 3 October 1997) of Dr M.:\n“At 11 o’clock on 22 July 1997 I was contacted by ... [the] social worker and [the applicant’s] case manager. She advised me that there had been an incident at Cranstock Day Centre, where [the applicant] had been attending since 1995, when [the applicant] had seriously self-harmed and was extremely disturbed. She said that he had to be sent to the Accident & Emergency Department and she requested assistance from the psychiatric services to assess [the applicant] with a view to admitting him if necessary. One of my team members, [Dr P.], staff grade psychiatrist, attended the Accident & Emergency Department as requested. His notes state that he took a history from ... the team manager at Cranstock Day Centre who reported that since March 1997 [the applicant’s] episodes of self-injurious behaviour had increased in severity. On 22 July 1997 whilst he was at Cranstock he had been agitated, hyperventilating, pacing up and down and hitting himself on the head with his fists. He was also banging his head on the wall. The whole area had to be evacuated to avoid disturbance and assure the safety of others. He was given 4 mgs of Diazepam to try to calm him down at the time but this had no effect. The GP was therefore called who administered 5 mgs of Zimovane. However he still remained agitated in the Accident & Emergency Department. He was assessed and treated at A & E. [Dr P.] later assessed [the applicant] as being agitated and very anxious. He noted redness of both his temples, that he was punching his head with both his fists at times and hyperventilating. [Dr P.] assessed that [the applicant] required in-patient treatment and transferred [the applicant] to the Behavioural Unit. [Dr P.] noted that [the applicant] ‘makes no attempt to leave’. I recorded that we considered whether it was necessary to detain [the applicant] under the Mental Health Act 1983 but it was decided that this was not necessary as he was, as I noted at the time, ‘quite compliant’ and had ‘not attempted to run away’. He was therefore admitted as an informal patient. If [the applicant] had resisted admission I would certainly have detained him under the [1983] Act as I was firmly of the view that he required in-patient treatment. This was clearly thought through and supported following discussion with [Dr P.], ward staff, other professionals and the Care Services Manager. An appropriate framework of care and treatment was implemented.”", "40. Lord Goff then noted how Dr M. had then\n“... described how Mr and Mrs E. were informed on 22 July of [the applicant’s] admission, as was [the applicant’s] next of kin. At first, with the agreement of Mr and Mrs E., it was arranged that they would not visit [the applicant] for a few days, in accordance with the usual clinical practice. On 23 July Dr M. wrote to Mr and Mrs E. and in her letter invited them to come and meet her the following week when it was her intention to discuss the possibility of phased visits, but they did not accept this invitation to meet her. On the same day an advocacy worker was appointed as [the applicant’s] advocate. [The applicant] was again assessed. A programme of tests and observations was then put into effect.”", "41. Lord Goff continued to quote from Dr M.’s affidavit:\n“As [the applicant] is an informal patient there has never been any attempt to detain him against his will or carry out any tests, observations or assessments to which he indicated a dislike or with which he refused to cooperate. [The applicant] has always accepted his medication which has always been administered orally. He was also fully compliant when blood was taken from him for testing. He did not however cooperate with the attempts that were made to carry out a CT scan and EEG, which were necessary in view of his old history of fits and temporal lobe abnormality, on 5 and 6 August 1997 and so these tests were abandoned. [The applicant] cooperated to a certain extent with the speech therapy assessment which was carried out on 15 September 1997 and the occupational therapy assessment. However, as soon as he showed any signs of distress the assessments were postponed and reviewed. [The applicant] is accommodated on an unlocked ward and has never attempted to leave the hospital but has accepted the change in his environment very well and is not distressed by it ... It was, in my professional opinion, in [the applicant’s] best interests to be admitted on 22 July 1997 and it is also in his best interests to continue with in-patient treatment to prevent further deterioration of his mental health. His discharge at this point in time would therefore be against medical advice. At the time of and since admission [the applicant] has been fully compliant with treatment and never indicated that he wishes to leave the hospital. In view of this it has not been necessary to detain him under the Act ... If [the applicant] stopped cooperating or indicated a wish to leave then I would have to consider at that time whether his condition warranted detention under section 3 of the Act. As these circumstances have not so far arisen detention has not been necessary.”", "42. Lord Goff considered that, in the light of the above account by Dr M., the following conclusions might be drawn:\n“The first is that, as I have already recorded, although [the applicant] had been discharged from hospital into the community on a trial basis, and on that basis had gone to live with Mr and Mrs E. as his paid carers, nevertheless he had not been finally discharged. It followed that the appellant trust remained responsible for his treatment, and that it was in discharge of that responsibility that the steps described by Dr M. were taken. The second is that when, on 22 July, [the applicant] became agitated and acted violently, an emergency in any event arose which called for intervention, as a matter of necessity, in his best interests and, at least in the initial stages, to avoid danger to others. Plainly it was most appropriate that the appellant trust, and Dr M. in particular, should intervene in these circumstances; certainly Mr and Mrs E., as [the applicant’s] carers, could not assert any superior position. Third, I have no doubt that all the steps in fact taken, as described by Dr M., were in fact taken in the best interests of [the applicant] and, in so far as they might otherwise have constituted an invasion of his civil rights, were justified on the basis of the common-law doctrine of necessity.\nI wish to add that the latter statement is as true of any restriction upon his freedom of movement as then occurred, as it is of any touching of his person. There were times during the episode when it might be said that [the applicant] was ‘detained’ in the sense that, in the absence of justification, the tort of false imprisonment would have been committed. I have particularly in mind the journey by ambulance from the Day Centre to the Accident and Emergency Unit. But that journey was plainly justified by necessity, as must frequently be so in the case of removal to hospital by ambulance of unfortunate people who have been taken ill or suffered injury and as a result are incapacitated from expressing consent. I wish further to add that I cannot see that Dr M.’s statements to the effect that she would if necessary have taken steps compulsorily to detain [the applicant] under the Act of 1983 have any impact on the above conclusions. Those concerned with the treatment and care of mentally disordered persons must always have this possibility in mind although, like Dr M., they will know that this power is only to be exercised in the last resort and they may hope, as in the present case, that it would prove to be unnecessary to exercise it. Such power, if exercised in accordance with the statute, is of course lawful. In the present case all the steps in fact taken by Dr M. were, in my opinion, lawful because justified under the common-law doctrine of necessity, and this conclusion is unaffected by her realisation that she might have to invoke the statutory power of detention.\nFinally, the readmission of [the applicant] to hospital as an informal patient under section 131(1) of the Act of 1983 could not, in my opinion, constitute the tort of false imprisonment. His readmission, as such, did not constitute a deprivation of his liberty. As Dr M. stated in paragraph 9 of her affidavit, he was not kept in a locked ward after he was admitted. And the fact that she, like any other doctor in a situation such as this, had it in her mind that she might thereafter take steps to detain him compulsorily under the Act, did not give rise to his detention in fact at any earlier date. Furthermore, his treatment while in hospital was plainly justified on the basis of the common-law doctrine of necessity. It follows that none of these actions constituted any wrong against [the applicant].”", "43. For these reasons, Lord Goff allowed the appeal. He had two “subsidiary points”, the second one being as follows:\n“... the function of the common-law doctrine of necessity [lies] in justifying actions which might otherwise be tortious, and so has the effect of providing a defence to actions in tort. The importance of this was, I believe, first revealed in the judgments in Re F. (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1. I wish, however, to express my gratitude to counsel for the appellants ... for drawing to our attention three earlier cases in which the doctrine was invoked, viz. Rex v. Coate (1772) Lofft 73, especially at p. 75, per Lord Mansfield, Scott v. Wakem (1862) 3 F. and F. 328, 333, per Bramwell B., and Symm v. Fraser (1863) 3 F. and F. 859, 883, per Cockburn CJ, all of which provide authority for the proposition that the common law permitted the detention of those who were a danger, or potential danger, to themselves or others, in so far as this was shown to be necessary. I must confess that I was unaware of these authorities though, now that they have been drawn to my attention, I am not surprised that they should exist. The concept of necessity has its role to play in all branches of our law of obligations – in contract (see the cases on agency of necessity), in tort (see Re F. (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1), and in restitution (see the sections on necessity in the standard books on the subject) – and in our criminal law. It is therefore a concept of great importance. It is perhaps surprising, however, that the significant role it has to play in the law of torts has come to be recognised at so late a stage in the development of our law.”", "44. Lord Nolan, for his part, agreed with the Court of Appeal that the applicant had been detained: he referred to the contents of Dr M.’s long letter of 6 August 1997 and to the additional matters on which the Court of Appeal had relied in this respect (and quoted above). Nevertheless, he allowed the appeal as he was satisfied that\n“the trust and its medical staff behaved throughout not only in what they judged to be the best interests of [the applicant], but in strict accordance with their common-law duty of care and the common-law principle of necessity”.", "45. Lord Steyn also allowed the appeal. He recognised that to uphold the decision of the Court of Appeal would be to ensure that a number of important protections applied to the applicant and that to allow the appeal would result in an indefensible gap in mental health law. However, he considered that it was possible, on a contextual interpretation of the 1983 Act, to allow the appeal.", "46. In the first place, he found that the applicant had been detained:\n“It is unnecessary to attempt a comprehensive definition of detention. In my view, this case falls on the wrong side of any reasonable line that can be drawn between what is or what is not imprisonment or detention. The critical facts are as follows: (1) When on 22 July 1997 at the Day Centre [the applicant] became agitated and started injuring himself, he was sedated and then physically supported and taken to the hospital. Even before sedation he was unable to express dissent to his removal to hospital. (2) Health care professionals exercised effective power over him. If [the applicant] had physically resisted, the psychiatrist would immediately have taken steps to ensure his compulsory admission. (3) In hospital staff regularly sedated him. That ensured that he remained tractable. This contrasts with the position when he was with carers: they seldom resorted to medication and then only in minimal doses. (4) The psychiatrist vetoed visits by the carers to [the applicant]. She did so, as she explained to the carers, in order to ensure that [the applicant] did not try to leave with them. The psychiatrist told the carers that [the applicant] would be released only when she, and other health care professionals, deemed it appropriate. (5) While [the applicant] was not in a locked ward, nurses closely monitored his reactions. Nurses were instructed to keep him under continuous observation and did so.\nCounsel for the Trust and the Secretary of State argued that [the applicant] was in truth always free not to go to the hospital and subsequently to leave the hospital. This argument stretches credulity to breaking point. The truth is that for entirely bona fide reasons, conceived in the best interests of [the applicant], any possible resistance by him was overcome by sedation, by taking him to hospital and by close supervision of him in hospital. And if [the applicant] had shown any sign of wanting to leave, he would have been firmly discouraged by staff and, if necessary, physically prevented from doing so. The suggestion that [the applicant] was free to go is a fairy tale. ... In my view [the applicant] was detained because the health care professionals intentionally assumed control over him to such a degree as to amount to complete deprivation of his liberty”.", "47. Secondly, he found that detention to be justified under the common-law doctrine of necessity:\n“It is now necessary to consider whether there was lawful authority to justify the detention and any treatment of [the applicant]. This is a matter of statutory construction. But it is important to approach the mental health legislation against the context of the principles of the common law. The starting-point of the common law is that when a person lacks capacity, for whatever reason, to take decisions about medical treatment, it is necessary for other persons, with appropriate qualifications, to take such decision for him: Re F. (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, at 55H, per Lord Brandon of Oakbrook. The principle of necessity may apply. For the purposes of the present case it has been assumed by all counsel that the requirements of the principle are simply that (1) there must be ‘a necessity to act when it is not practicable to communicate with the assisted person’ and (2) ‘that the action taken must be such as a reasonable person would in all circumstances take, acting in the best interests of the assisted person’: Re F., supra, per Lord Goff of Chieveley, at 75H. There was not unanimity on this point in Re F. But I am content to approach the matter in the same way as counsel did ... Against this common-law background the Percy Report recommended a shift from the ‘legalism’ whereby hospital patients were ‘certified’ by special procedures, to a situation in which most patients would be ‘informally’ received in hospital, the term ‘informally’ signifying ‘without any legal formality’. This was to be achieved by replacing the existing system ‘by the offer of care, without deprivation of liberty, to all who need it and are not unwilling to receive it’: see Report of the Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency (1954-1957) ... The desired objective was to avoid stigmatising patients and to avoid where possible the adverse effects of ‘sectioning’ patients. Where admission to hospital was required compulsion was to be regarded as a measure of last resort. The Mental Health Act of 1959 introduced the recommended changes. Section 5(1) was the critical provision. ... Counsel appearing on behalf of [the applicant] accepted that the effect of section 5 was to leave in place the common-law principle of necessity as a justification for informally receiving in hospital or mental nursing homes compliant incapacitated patients.\nIn 1982 Parliament substantially amended the Act of 1959. In 1983 Parliament enacted a consolidating statute with amendments, namely the Mental Health Act 1983. By section 131(1) of the Act of 1983 the provisions of section 5(1) of the Act of 1959 were re-enacted verbatim. ... Prima facie section 131(1) must be given the same meaning as section 5(1). On this basis, section 131(1) also preserved the common-law principle of necessity as a means of admitting compliant incapacitated individuals. But counsel for [the applicant] submitted that section 131(1), unlike its predecessor, only applies to consenting capacitated patients. He argued that contextual differences between the statutes of 1959 and 1983 required the court to interpret the language of section 131(1) of the Act of 1983 in a narrower sense than section 5(1) of the Act of 1959. ... On orthodox principles of statutory interpretation the conclusion cannot be avoided that section 131(1) permits the admission of compliant incapacitated patients where the requirements of the principle of necessity are satisfied. Having had the benefit of the fuller argument produced by the intervention of the Secretary of State, I have to accept that the view of the Court of Appeal on the meaning of section 131(1) cannot be upheld.”", "48. Accordingly, the common-law doctrine of necessity had been preserved by section 131(1) of the 1983 Act and the applicant’s detention and treatment were justified on that basis.", "49. Lord Steyn went on to note that the effect of the House of Lords’ judgment was to leave compliant incapacitated patients without the safeguards enshrined in the 1983 Act:\n“This is an unfortunate result. The common-law principle of necessity is a useful concept, but it contains none of the safeguards of the 1983 Act. It places effective and unqualified control in the hands of the hospital psychiatrist and other health care professionals. It is, of course, true that such professionals owe a duty of care to patients and that they will almost invariably act in what they consider to be the best interests of the patient. But neither habeas corpus nor judicial review are sufficient safeguards against misjudgments and professional lapses in the case of compliant incapacitated patients. Given that such patients are diagnostically indistinguishable from compulsory patients, there is no reason to withhold the specific and effective protections of [the 1983 Act] from a large class of vulnerable mentally incapacitated individuals. Their moral right to be treated with dignity requires nothing less. The only comfort is that counsel for the Secretary of State has assured the House that reform of the law is under active consideration.”", "50. In March 2000 Mr and Mrs E. complained to the Commissioner about the applicant’s readmission to hospital. The complaints subjected to investigation were: (a) that the clinical decision to admit the applicant on 22 July 1997 was unreasonable; and (b) that the clinical management of his admission was inadequate. The independent assessors investigated. In their report, they considered that the applicant’s admission to the IBU on 22 July 1997 was “probably unavoidable”. He had a significantly better quality of life with his carers and more serious consideration should have been given to sending him home on the day his carers had been located or, at least, the following day. The assessors considered that it was difficult to see why, even if it was necessary to retain him overnight, he was not discharged the following day and his subsequent evaluation conducted on an outpatient basis. The process of assessment of the applicant had been too long and resources should have been available to speed up that process. In this latter respect, the assessors did not believe that any of the clinicians were acting irresponsibly or maliciously and their main recommendation for the future was that admissions to the IBU be “strictly time-limited” and that adequate resources be made available to enable a multi-disciplinary assessment to be carried out if at all possible on an outpatient basis and, if not, as speedily as possible.", "51. The Commissioner, in his report of 15 November 2001, agreed with the assessors’ conclusions, adopted their recommendations and conveyed the hospital’s apologies to Mr and Mrs E. for the shortcomings identified. The hospital had also informed the Commissioner that, through the Intensive Assessment and Treatment Service, the assessors’ recommendations for outpatient assessment had been implemented." ]

[ 2 ]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Cracow, Poland.", "5. On 5 February 1987 the applicant lodged a claim for division of her matrimonial property with the Cracow District Court (Sąd Rejonowy).", "6. The court held the first hearing on 15 July 1987.", "7. Between 1987 and 1991 the court held 14 hearings (6 in 1987, 1 in 1988, 4 in 1989, 2 in 1990 and 1 in 1991).", "8. On 16 November 1993 and 23 September 1994 the court held hearings.", "9. On 5 June 1995 the court ordered that expert evidence be obtained. The expert opinion was delivered to the court on 11 January 1996.", "10. On 25 August 1995, 17 April, 24 June and 23 September 1997 the court held hearings.", "11. On an unspecified date in May 1998 the court decided to obtain fresh expert evidence. The expert submitted his report to the court on 26 June 1998.", "12. On 31 August 1998 the court held a hearing.", "13. On 29 December 1998 the court gave judgment.", "14. During the proceedings the composition of the court changed 9 times.", "15. The applicant several times complained to the President of the Cracow Regional Court about the slow conduct of the proceedings. In reply, the President admitted that the proceedings were indeed too long and informed the applicant that he would supervise their further conduct.", "16. On an unspecified date in 1999 the applicant’s husband lodged an appeal against the first-instance judgment with the Cracow Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy).", "17. On 15 February 2000 the court dismissed the appeal." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Lublin, Poland.", "5. On 4 January 1994 Ms A.O-K. and Ms G.T. (“the plaintiffs”) instituted civil proceedings against the applicant before the Lublin District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) in which they sought a ruling on how the property co-owned by the applicant should be used by all co-owners.", "6. On 20 May 1994 the court held the first hearing.", "7. In November 1994 the plaintiffs modified their application and requested that co-ownership of the plot of the land and a building be dissolved (zniesienie współwłasności).", "8. Subsequently, hearings were held on 9 December 1994, 13 and 27 January 1995.", "9. In August 1994, the applicant lodged with the Lublin District Court a civil action for payment against Ms A.O-K. and Ms G.T. She sought reimbursement of maintenance costs in respect of the property and payment of rent for their office. On 28 November 1994 the Lublin District Court decided to join the case with the proceedings concerning the dissolution of co-ownership.", "10. Between 28 January and 16 October 1995 no hearings were held.", "11. At the next hearing held on 17 October 1995 the court decided to hold a view of the property.", "12. On 8 November 1995 the judge with an expert viewed the house.", "13. In December 1995 the parties challenged the judge. On 31 January 1996 the Lublin District Court dismissed the application. On 21 March 1996 the Lublin Regional Court dismissed their appeal.", "14. On 26 April 1996 the applicant applied to the court for an interim ruling on her claim for payment lodged in August 1994.", "15. In 1996 the Lublin District Court held three hearings and ordered expert opinions.", "16. Subsequently, the court held hearings on 28 January and 25 February 1997. The court heard an expert witness and requested the third expert opinion.", "17. Between February 1997 and February 1998 the court, sitting in camera, gave several decisions concerning expert opinions. No hearings were held.", "18. On 19 February, 10 April, 14 May, 4 and 26 June 1998 the court held hearings at which it heard several expert witnesses.", "19. No hearings were held between 27 June 1998 and 10 February 1999.", "20. At the hearings held on 11 February and 25 March 1999 the court heard two expert witnesses and ordered that the sixth expert opinion be obtained.", "21. Between 29 September 1999 and 7 January 2000 the court held four hearings at which it heard expert witnesses.", "22. At the hearing held on 20 January 2000 the Lublin District Court gave a preliminary decision (postanowienie wstępne) and allowed Ms A.O-K. and Ms G.T. to carry out some construction work in the house.", "23. The applicant and other co-owners appealed against this decision.", "24. The Lublin Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) held several hearings and on 27 March 2001 it quashed the preliminary decision of the Lublin District Court.", "25. In 2000 the applicant complained to the Minister of Justice about the length of the proceedings.", "26. On 31 August and 10 December 2001 the trial court held hearings.", "27. In 2002 the Lublin District Court held seven hearings and on 10 October 2002 it gave decision and dissolved the co‑ownership of the building.", "28. Both parties lodged appeals against this decision.", "29. On 6 March 2003 the Lublin Regional Court held a hearing.", "30. At the subsequent hearing held on 9 April 2003 the parties concluded a friendly settlement. Subsequently, the Lublin Regional Court discontinued the proceedings." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Budapest.", "5. In the context of an inheritance dispute, two civil proceedings were brought against the applicant.", "6. On 2 July 1990 Mr J.F.J. brought an action against the applicant before the Budapest XVIII/XIX District Court challenging her status as an heiress. On 10 November 1993 the District Court dismissed the action.", "7. On 12 July 1990 Mrs T.K. brought another action against Mr J.F.J., Mr F.J. and the applicant before the Pest Central District Court.", "8. On 4 September 1990 the District Court held a hearing and requested the parties to submit motions.", "9. On 26 October and 12 December 1990 the District Court held hearings. At the hearings some of the parties did not appear since the District Court had failed to summon them in accordance with the procedural rules. A hearing scheduled for 8 February 1991 was re-scheduled.", "10. On 10 April and 20 June 1991 the District Court held hearings. On the latter date it stayed the proceedings pending the outcome of the proceedings before the XVIII/XIX District Court. In the latter proceedings, on 24 November 1992 the court held a hearing. On 27 May 1993 the District Court appointed an expert. On 10 November 1993 the court dismissed the plaintiff's claim. The judgment became final on 15 April 1994.", "11. At the plaintiff's request, on 13 October 1994 the Pest Central District Court resumed its proceedings. Subsequently, another judge was appointed to hear the case.", "12. On 24 January 1995 the District Court held a hearing. At the hearing the plaintiff withdrew her action in respect of Mr J.F.J. and Mr F.J.", "13. On 18 May 1995 the District Court discontinued the proceedings in respect of Mr J.F.J. and Mr F.J. and ordered the applicant to submit further documents.", "14. On 26 October 1995 the District Court delivered a judgment and partly admitted the plaintiff's claims. The applicant appealed.", "15. On 20 June 1996 the Budapest Regional Court held a hearing and delivered a judgment which was pronounced on 27 June 1996. It partly quashed the District Court's decision and remitted the case to the first-instance court.", "16. In the resumed proceedings, on 30 January, 28 February, 24 June and 18 November 1997, the District Court held hearings.\nSubsequently, another judge was appointed to hear the case. On 30 January 1998 the District Court heard three witnesses.", "17. On 22 July 1998 the District Court appointed a real-estate expert.\nSubsequently, yet another judge was appointed to hear the case. On 23 June 1999 the District Court held a hearing.", "18. On 1 July 1999 the District Court delivered a judgment. The applicant appealed.\nIn the appeal proceedings, the hearings scheduled for 10 February and 6 July 2000 were re-scheduled due to the illness of one of the judges.", "19. On 16 May and 26 October 2000 the Regional Court held hearings. On the latter date it delivered a judgment which was pronounced on 2 November 2000." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "7. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Yaroslavl.", "8. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.", "9. On 26 October 1998 the applicant was convicted by the Yaroslavl Regional Court and sentenced to 13 years’ imprisonment for participation in an organised armed gang. On 22 February 1999 the conviction was upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. The applicant serves his sentence in a correctional colony (the prison).", "10. On 25 May 1999 and 14 December 1999 the applicant submitted letters addressed to the European Court of Human Rights, in which he complained under Article 6 of the Convention that he had not had a fair trial in the above domestic proceedings, to the prison’s Special Department, the office exercising censorship and general supervision over all inmates’ correspondence. On 8 June 1999 and 30 December 1999 the prison administration refused to dispatch the letters. The competent officials, the head of the Special Department major K. and the deputy warden of the prison major O., pointed out that the application to the Court would not be accepted for dispatch unless and until the applicant applied to the Chairman of the Supreme Court and to the Prosecutor General with requests for a supervisory review of his conviction, or filed an application with the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. The applicant complied, as he had no other means to have his mail sent outside prison. However, his applications were unsuccessful.", "11. On 1 February 2000 the applicant sent an application to the Court, in which he complained of an unfair trial. He also explained that he had exceeded the six months time-limit set out in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, as he had been prevented by the prison administration from dispatching his application earlier.", "12. After the questions were put by the Rapporteur to the respondent Government under Rule 49 § 2 (a) of the Rules of Court, on 23 October 2001 the Chief Penitentiary Directorate of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation (Главное управление исполнения наказаний Министерства юстиции Российской Федерации) issued a circular letter to its subordinate departments and bodies prohibiting hindering the dispatch of applications addressed to the Court.", "13. On 22 February 2002 the Chief Penitentiary Directorate of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation designated officials authorised to monitor the unhindered dispatch of applications to the Court from penitentiary institutions.", "14. On 29 March 2002 the Deputy Prosecutor General issued a circular letter calling upon the regional prosecutors to take measures to secure unhindered exercise of the right of individual petition by detainees. It mentioned in particular that any pressure, including intimidation, discouragement or dissuasion, was unacceptable.", "15. On 14 June 2002 a commission of the Yaroslavl Regional Prosecutor’s office visited the prison to conduct an inquiry into the refusal of the prison administration to post the applicant’s letters to the Court. The result of this inquiry, if any, remains unknown to the Court.", "16. On 13 February 2003 the prison director classified the applicant as a persistent contravener of prison discipline, and on 26 February 2003 transferred him to a stricter security level.", "17. On 4 March 2003 the applicant was transferred to another penitentiary institution, following his request based on allegations of a conflict with the prison administration.", "18. At present the applicant continues to serve his sentence." ]

[]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Vienna.\nProceedings concerning the division of the matrimonial property and savings (the first round)", "5. On 4 December 1987 the applicant’s former husband A., and on 15 December 1987 the applicant herself, requested the division of the matrimonial property and savings (Aufteilung des ehelichen Gebrauchsvermögens und der ehelichen Ersparnisse) following their divorce.", "6. On 13 March 1989 the Döbling District Court (Bezirksgericht), after having held seven hearings, divided the matrimonial property. It decided, inter alia, to transfer A.’s title concerning the land and the house to the applicant, who was ordered to pay to A. the sum of 2,876,000 Austrian Schilling (ATS) by way of compensation. The applicant and A. appealed against this decision.", "7. On 31 August 1989 the Vienna Regional Civil Court (Landesgericht für Zivilrechtssachen) allowed the appeals due to procedural deficiencies and remitted the case to the District Court. Both parties filed an appeal on points of law (Revisionsrekurs) against this decision.", "8. On 29 January 1991 the Supreme Court dismissed these appeals.\nThe second round of the proceedings", "9. Subsequently, due to the District Court’s rule concerning the distribution of cases (Geschäftsverteilung), another judge was assigned who held three more hearings, heard additional witnesses in order to assess the applicant’s contribution to the matrimonial property and obtained an expert opinion concerning the value of the property at issue.", "10. On 24 July 1991 the District Court divided the matrimonial property. It decided, inter alia, to transfer the applicant’s title concerning the land and the house to A., who was ordered to pay the applicant the sum of ATS 3,358,200 by way of compensation. Both parties appealed.", "11. On 18 March 1992 the Regional Civil Court allowed the appeals and remitted the case to the District Court. It found that the District Court had failed to consider the applicant’s observations on the expert opinion.\nThe third round of the proceedings", "12. On 23 October 1992 the District Court, after having held two hearings on 19 May and 22 July 1992, took a partial decision and decided, inter alia, to transfer the applicant’s title concerning the land and the house to A., who was ordered to pay to the applicant the sum of ATS 4,000,000 by way of compensation. As regards the applicant’s additional claim for compensation for her contribution to A.’s business, it decided to suspend the proceedings as tax assessment proceedings against A. were pending. The outcome of the tax assessment had to be taken into account in the instant proceedings. The applicant and A. again appealed.", "13. On 10 March 1993 the Regional Civil Court allowed the appeals and remitted the case to the District Court. It found that the District Court had failed to calculate properly the value of the house.\nThe fourth round of the proceedings", "14. Subsequently, the case was assigned to another judge due to the court’s rule concerning the distribution of cases. On 16 July, 13 September, 14 October, 3 and 17 November 1993, A. requested extensions of time-limits for the submission of documents or comments, respectively.", "15. On 27 September 1993 and 19 January 1994 the District Court held another two hearings.", "16. On 21 July 1994 the applicant filed a request for the acceleration of the proceedings under Section 91 of the Austrian Court Act (Fristsetzungsantrag). In particular she requested that a time limit be set for the District Court to reach its decision.", "17. On 12 August 1994 the District Court took a partial decision and decided, inter alia, to transfer the applicant’s title concerning the land and the house to A., who was ordered to pay to the applicant the sum of ATS 4,300,000 by way of compensation. As regards the applicant’s additional claim, the court again decided to suspend the proceedings until the termination of the tax assessment proceedings. Both parties appealed.", "18. On 13 February 1995 the applicant filed a further request for an acceleration of the proceedings under Section 91 of the Court Act. In particular, she requested that a time limit be set for the Regional Court to determine her appeal against the decision of 12 August 1994.", "19. On 22 February 1995 the Regional Civil Court partly confirmed the decision of 12 August 1994. It allowed the applicant’s appeal as regards the interest to be paid on the award of compensation, but dismissed the remainder as being otherwise unfounded or out of time. A request by A. for his reinstatement in the proceedings was unsuccessful.", "20. On 20 September 1995 the Supreme Court rejected A.’s appeal on points of law. Thereby, the proceedings were terminated concerning the transfer of the land and the house and the related compensation payment. As regards possible further compensation to the applicant for her contribution to A.’s business, the proceedings remained pending until the termination of the tax assessment.\nThe applicant’s claim for further compensation", "21. On 11 October 1995 the applicant asked the court to obtain information on the current state of the tax assessment proceedings. This the court did and the applicant commented on it.", "22. On 3 June 1996 the applicant asked the court to take a final decision.", "23. On 4 July 1996 the District Court replied that the tax assessment proceedings were still pending.", "24. On 30 July 1996 the applicant filed a request to continue the suspended proceedings.", "25. On 28 November 1996 the District Court dismissed the request as the tax assessment proceedings were still pending.", "26. On 13 October 1997 the District Court held a hearing and decided to continue the suspension of the proceedings.", "27. On 21 April 1998 the District Court dismissed a further request by the applicant to continue the proceedings.", "28. In August 1998 the Vienna Tax Office (Finanzamt) determined A.’s tax liability. This decision became final.", "29. On 1 September 1998 the applicant requested the resumption of the suspended proceedings and submitted that, meanwhile, the tax assessment proceedings against A. had been terminated.", "30. On 3 November 1998 A. requested the postponement of a hearing until after 7 January 1999, on the ground that his counsel was unable to attend.", "31. On 12 January and 21 October 1999 the District Court held two hearings.", "32. On 15 May 2000 the District Court partly allowed the applicant’s additional claims and awarded her ATS 300,000. It found that each party had to bear its own costs.", "33. On 13 June 2000 the applicant filed an appeal. She submitted that the court should have awarded her ATS 550,000 and that the costs decision was unreasonable.", "34. On 8 November 2000 the Regional Civil Court partly allowed the applicant’s appeal and awarded her ATS 550,000, but dismissed the complaint against the costs order. Further, it ordered A. to pay the applicant’s legal costs in the appeal proceedings. It found that, when taking a decision about such costs under Section 234 of the Non-Contentious Proceedings Act (Außerstreitgesetz), it had to take into account, inter alia, the outcome of the proceedings, the financial standing of the parties and their conduct in the proceedings. Given that neither party could be regarded as being predominantly successful in the case, that both parties had about the same income and that neither of them had made any marked contribution to the acceleration of the proceedings, the decision that each party bear its own legal costs appeared equitable. A. appealed on points of law against this decision.", "35. On 2 May 2001 the Regional Civil Court refused leave to appeal on points of law. This decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 22 May 2001." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "4. The applicants were born in 1975 and 1970 respectively.", "5. On 19 and 20 August 1995 respectively the applicants were taken into custody by police officers from the Anti-Terrorism Department of the Aydın Security Directorate on suspicion of their membership to an illegal organisation, namely the DHKP/C.", "6. In their police statements the applicants accepted the accusations against them.", "7. On 22 August 1995 the applicants were brought before the investigating judge at the Aydın Magistrate’s Court, where they repeated the statements they had made to the police. The investigating judge ordered that they be placed in detention on remand.", "8. In an indictment dated 6 September 1995, the public prosecutor at the Izmir State Security Court initiated criminal proceedings against the applicants. He charged the first applicant with being member of an armed gang under Article 168 § 2 of the Criminal Code and the second applicant with aiding and abetting an armed gang under Article 169 of the Criminal Code.", "9. During the hearings before the Izmir State Security Court, the applicants denied the statements they had made to the police and the investigating judge.", "10. On 25 March 1997 the Izmir State Security Court, composed of two civilian judges and a military judge, convicted the applicants as charged and sentenced the first applicant to three years and nine months’ imprisonment and the second applicant to twelve years and six months’ imprisonment. Neither the applicants nor their lawyers were present in this last hearing.", "11. The applicants appealed. On 12 November 1997 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicants’ appeal, upholding the Izmir State Security Court’s reasoning and assessment of evidence. The decision, which was pronounced in the absence of the applicants and their lawyers, was deposited with the Registry of the Izmir State Security Court on 21 November 1997." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "8. On 29 April 1994 Vatan was registered as a political party with the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation.", "9. According to Vatan’s constitutional charter, it was founded “to support the renascence of the Tartar nation, to enhance the latter’s political activity and to protect Tartars’ political, socio-economic and cultural rights”. The name “Tartar” applies to the peoples of Turkic origin who speak a language which belongs to the Ural-Altaic language family. Four-fifths of the Tartars (about 5.5 million people) live in the Russian Federation: the majority live in the Republic of Tatarstan and the Republic of Bashkortostan, and the rest are dispersed across the Ural Mountains and in the Volga region. The Tartars are Muslims.", "10. On 12 August 1994 the Simbirsk (Ulyanovsk) Regional Organisation of the People’s Democratic Party Vatan (“the Regional Organisation”) was registered with the Ulyanovsk Regional Department of Justice. Vatan claims that this was a branch of its party.", "11. On 12 October 1997 the Regional Organisation made an appeal (“the appeal”) to the “peoples of the Volga region, to all oppressed peoples of the empire, to the Ulyanovsk Regional and City authorities, to historians, students of local lore, archaeologists and scientists”, entitled “Prevention and cancellation of the forthcoming witches’ Sabbath arranged by reactionary forces – ‘the war party’- the so-called ‘350th anniversary of the founding of the town of Simbirsk’ which is in fact an approximate date of the colonisation of Shekhry Sember”.", "12. The appeal contained, inter alia, the following statements:\n“To the indigenous population of the Volga Region: tartars, chuvash, erzya, moksha, mari, bashkir. 1. Never allow desecration or mockery of the memory of your ancestors; do not allow the reactionary Nazi forces to celebrate the date of colonisation of Sember. Shekhry Sember is a thousand-year-old town of your glorious ancestors. In the town centre, on Simbirskaya Hill and in the outskirts lie their graves – do not allow them to be defiled. Be prepared for the anniversary of the colonisation of Shekhry Sember. On the ancestors’ Memorial Day, 31 May 1998 at 9 a.m., all come out to our sacred Sember Hill – to the ancestors’ graves – between the Memorial and Lenin square. A trip to the ancestors’ graves and the ruins of the Shekhry Kalman will also be on offer and everyone who wishes will have an opportunity to turn to Islam. Let us stand up for the honour and dignity of our peoples. Let us celebrate the 1350th Anniversary of Shekhry Sember in a dignified manner, inshallah. Strive for decolonisation of the peoples who are prisoners of Moscow-Shaitan Kala, the Russian empire. 2. Who knows how much loss, humiliation, suffering, deprivation and sacrifice our peoples have endured: racial discrimination, employment discrimination, the ban on education in our native language, forced service in the occupiers’ army? 3. Strive for legitimisation of indigenous languages. Strive for the holding of fair municipal elections on the basis of national communities. Strive for education for every child in the national language from primary level to higher education. Strive for satellite channels broadcasting from Kazan, Ufa, Cheboksary, Saransk, Yoshkar-Ola, Tashkent, Bishkek, Alma-Aty, Ankara, Istanbul, Teheran, Riyadh and Mecca. 4. Indigenous peoples idel-uras-seber-krym iort, and in particular semberile and even American Indians – you are the heirs of the great Islamic culture. Come back to Islam. There will be more than a thousand million of us.\nTo the Ulyanovsk Regional administration, to Mr Goryachev and Mr Marusin personally, to historians, students of local lore, archaeologists and scientists of the region: 1. Mr Goryachev, Mr Marusin and their subordinates,\nDo not fall under the influence of pseudo-historians, the “war party” from Moscow, the local liberal democratic party, pseudo-scientists and Nazis. Stop the witches’ Sabbath in celebration of the 350th anniversary of the colonisation of Simbirsk. Even the colonisation date is intentionally confusing. The real colonisation date is the end of May 1666 - 1999 is a good round figure of colonisation, i.e. 333 years. Do not stir up the Russian population against the indigenous peoples of the Volga Region – you will not succeed. God be with us, inshallah. 2. Mr Goryachev, Mr Marusin and local governors,\nStop wasting our regional budget on the creation of monuments to an apostate and traitor of his peoples, the converted Christian Tartar Bogdan Khitrovo ..., in accordance with the directions of the “war party” in Moscow. The money saved on the witches’ Sabbath should be invested in founding a Volga peoples’ University and introducing TV broadcasting in the local languages. Bring back education in the national language for every child. 3. On the sacred Sember Hill between the Memorial and Lenin Square, on the burial place of our sacred ancestors, restore the remembrance tombstone destroyed by your administration ... Restore or allow to be restored the main temple Shekhry Sember on Sember Hill. 4. Mr Goryachev, have the courage to apologise on behalf of all your predecessors to the peoples of the Region for the centuries of humiliation, suffering, deprivation and sacrifices, since you are their successor. Someone must put an end to it. 5. ... There is no point in hiding, and it is common knowledge that there are only 10 million Russians, with the remaining 130 million being Russian speakers who do not remember their ancestors and historical-ethnic origin. Deprivation of historical and ethnic roots, of memory and the motherland is the sad result of the violence imposed in order to create a mono-ethnic and monolingual empire. \nWe, the peoples of the Volga region, were, are, and always will be, inshallah.\nGiven his 30 years of experience in the national liberation movement, his courage, his knowledge of the region and his understanding of people, the Ulyanovsk Regional Branch of Vatan empowers Iskhan Nailbek Mikey to be at the head of the national liberation fight and to form a brigade of trustworthy, courageous, consecrated and resistant people.\nLet us shorten the arms of the “war party” in Moscow! Free the empire’s peoples! Decolonise Russia! Bring Islamic education in the national language to all children! These are the common slogans of all peoples - prisoners of Moscow.”", "13. On 19 May 1998 the Regional Organisation asked the mayor of Ulyanovsk to authorise a ceremony dedicated to the 1350th anniversary of the founding of Sember. On 22 May 1998 the mayor gave permission for the ceremony to be held in places of worship belonging to religious organisations and in cemeteries.", "14. On 31 May 1998 the Regional Organisation held a memorial ceremony in the city centre, where, according to Vatan, an ancient Muslim cemetery was formerly located.", "15. On 3 June 1998 the prosecutor of the Ulyanovsk Region applied to the Ulyanovsk Regional Court to have the Regional Organisation’s activities suspended on the ground that it had called for violence, contrary to the federal legislation and the Constitution.", "16. On 13 July 1998 the Ulyanovsk Regional Court examined the prosecutor’s claim.", "17. Firstly, the court considered various statements made by the Regional Organisation in the light of their conformity with the Constitution, in particular, the appeal of 12 October 1997 and noted that the Regional Organisation:\n- referred to the State institutions responsible for the public celebration of the 350th anniversary of Simbirsk as “Nazis”;\n- called for “decolonisation of the peoples who are prisoners of Moscow–Shaitan Kala, the Russian empire”;\n- referred to the Russian Federation as “the enemy of humankind”;\n- referred to Russian citizens as “Russian speakers who do not remember their ancestors and historical-ethnic origin”;\n- urged the authorities “to stop the witches’ Sabbath in celebration of the 350th anniversary of the colonisation of Simbirsk” and “to stop wasting [the] regional budget”;\n- empowered the Regional Organisation’s secretary, Mr Mikeyev, “to be at the head of the national liberation fight and to form a brigade of trustworthy, courageous, consecrated and resistant people”.", "18. The court also found that the Regional Organisation had called for recognition of the independence of the Republic of Chechnya and for a return by the peoples of the Volga region to Islam (conference minutes of 26 May 1996), and that it had called on the Sember peoples to join the Tartar Muslims in their national liberation fight (minutes of the Regional Organisation General Meeting of 12 October 1997). A reference was also made to the Annual Report of the Regional Organisation’s activities, where the court found calls to “decolonise Russia”, to form military forces “on the basis of religious confessions” and to “abolish the neo-imperialistic emblem depicting crosses and passports which gave no indication of ethnic origin”.", "19. The court held that all of the above statements were incompatible with the Constitution. The court stated, inter alia, the following: \n“...the Ulyanovsk Regional Organisation of the People’s Democratic Party Vatan openly calls for violation of the integrity of Russia, for violent alteration of the foundations of constitutional governance and for the creation of an Islamic State in the Volga Region. The Regional Organisation proclaims the idea of a national liberation fight and calls for the formation of a brigade of trustworthy, courageous and resistant people. The activities and opinions of the Regional Organisation’s leaders and members are of an extreme nationalist nature, inciting people to national and religious discord and denigrating the Russian speaking population and non-adherents of Islam.”", "20. Secondly, the court found that the memorial ceremony of 31 May 1998 held by the Regional Organisation in the centre of Ulyanovsk was in breach of the mayor’s permit.", "21. The court concluded that the activities of the Regional Organisation did not correspond to the purposes declared in its Charter and violated Section 16 of the Federal Law on Public Associations, which prohibits the establishment and activities of public associations whose aims and actions are directed at the violent alteration of the foundations of constitutional governance, violation of the integrity of the Russian Federation and the undermining of state security, the forming of armed units and incitement to social, racial, national and religious strife. The court allowed the prosecutor’s appeal and suspended the Regional Organisation’s activities for 6 months.", "22. Ipso jure, the Regional Organisation was prohibited from holding meetings, demonstrations and other public actions, taking part in elections and disposing of its bank accounts other than for the payment of expenses incurred in the course of normal activities, payment of labour contracts, damages and fines.", "23. The Regional Organisation challenged the judgment of 13 July 1998 before the Supreme Court of Russia, contending that the Ulyanovsk Regional Court had misinterpreted the meaning of the appeal, which reflected the Tartars’ history and that there had been no incitement to national or religious strife or anything which might insult the dignity of Russians. The Regional Organisation insisted that the ceremony of 31 May 1998 had been held at the site of the ancient Muslim cemetery.", "24. On 3 September 1998 the Supreme Court upheld the first instance judgment. An application for supervisory review was dismissed by the same court on 13 October 1998.", "25. On 12 January 2000 the Ulyanovsk Regional Court allowed a claim by the Department of Justice of the Ulyanovsk Regional Administration to dissolve the Regional Organisation on account of its failure to bring its Charter in compliance with new legislation. This decision has not been appealed against.", "26. The relevant provisions of Vatan’s constitutional charter read as follows:\n“The Charter of the People’s Democratic Party Vatan ... 1.2 Vatan carries out its activities on the territory of the Russian Federation, where regional organisations are created (Omsk, Ulyanovsk, Nizhniy Novgorod Regions, Moscow, the Republics of Bashkortostan and Mordovia and the Chuvash Republic) ... 3.4 All party organisations shall be autonomous in taking decisions concerning local matters in so far as these do not conflict with the party’s Charter or its Programme. \n... 4.1 Vatan has been set up for the protection of citizens of Tartar origin, citizens of other origin and of their political, economic, social and cultural rights and freedoms, in order to promote their active participation in the governing of the state and social affairs. 4.2 To achieve its goals Vatan shall pursue the following objectives:\n- participating as prescribed by law in the state legislative and executive bodies, by nominating its candidates to express the political will of its members;\n- promoting the creation of ethnic districts, circuits and country councils in those places where Tartars are concentrated within the Russian Federation;\n- carrying out organisational activities, campaigns, propaganda and other information activities for educational and pedagogical purposes, promoting the return of the Arabic script;\n- organising lectures, seminars, talks, round-table discussions, mass and collective actions and other events, in accordance with the law and the party’s goals and objectives; ...\n- representing its members’ interests before state bodies and public institutions; ... 5.1 The party shall be organised on a territorial basis. The primary party units, namely the district, town, circuit and regional organisations, shall form the party’s base. 5.2 Regional organisations shall be set in accordance with the administrative and territorial division of the Russian Federation and shall draw up their action programmes in accordance with local circumstances and shall elect delegates to the party’s Congress (Kurultay); in accordance with the law, they shall participate in local government structures. The regional organisations shall establish themselves as legal persons in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. Where this is done, they shall adopt their own Charter, which may not be contrary to the party’s Charter and its Programme, and shall register it in accordance with the law. \n... 6.7 The party’s President shall be in charge of the party’s general management between the meetings of the party’s Congress ... he shall speak on the party’s behalf ... and represent the party without power of attorney in any state bodies and public institutions ...”", "27. The relevant provisions of the Regional Organisation’s constitutional charter read as follows:\n“Charter of the Simbirsk (Ulyanovsk) Regional Organisation of the People’s Democratic Party Vatan ... 1.1 The Simbirsk Regional Organisation of the People’s Democratic Party Vatan is a party political organisation ... 2.5 Membership of the party may be terminated by the Simbirsk Regional Committee... for non-compliance with the party’s Charter and its Programme; this decision is subject to appeal to the party’s higher organs, including the Central Co-ordination Board. \n... 4.1 The Simbirsk Regional Organisation of the People’s Democratic Party Vatan has been set up for the protection of citizens of Tartar origin, citizens of other origin and their political, economic, social and cultural rights and freedoms, in order to promote their active participation in the governing of the state and social affairs. 4.2 To achieve its goals the Simbirsk Regional Organisation of the People’s Democratic Party Vatan sets the following objectives:\n- participating as prescribed by law in the structures of state legislative and executive bodies, by nominating its candidates to express the political will of its members;\n- promoting the creation of ethnic districts, circuits and country councils in those places where Tartars are concentrated within the Russian Federation; \n- carrying out organisational activities, campaigns, propaganda and other information activities for educational and pedagogical purposes, promoting the return of the Arabic script; \n- organising lectures, seminars, talks, round-table discussions, mass and collective actions and other events, in accordance with the law and the party’s goals and objectives;\n- representing its members’ interests before state bodies and public institutions.\n... 6.6 During the intervals between the [Regional Organisation’s] conferences the Regional Committee of the People’s Democratic Party Vatan shall be in charge of the [Regional Organisation’s] activities.”" ]

[ 6 ]

[ "8. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Reykjavik.\nIn 1969, at the age of 20, the applicant completed his training as a navigation officer at the Icelandic College of Navigation and started work as a seaman. This he continued to do until 1978, when he sustained a serious work accident on board a trawler. His right leg was struck by a 200 kg stone object, causing a compound fracture of his ankle. As a result, he had to give up work as a seaman. His disability was assessed at 100%, which made him eligible for a disability pension from the Seamen’s Pension Fund (“the Pension Fund”), to which he paid premiums intermittently from 1969 until 1981. The assessment was made on the basis of the criteria that applied under section 13(1) and (4) of the Seamen’s Pension Fund Act (Law no. 49/1974 – “the 1974 Act”), notably that the claimant was unable to carry out the work he had performed before his disability, that his participation in the Fund had been intended to insure against this contingency, and that he had a sustained loss of fitness for work (of 35% or more).\nThe applicant underwent regular disability assessments by a physician accredited by the Pension Fund and was each time assessed as 100% disabled in relation to his previous job.", "9. After his accident the applicant joined a transport company, Samskip Ltd, as an office assistant, and is still employed there as head of the claims department.", "10. In 1992 the 1974 Act was amended by sections 5 and 8 of Law no. 44/1992 (“the 1992 Act”), which considerably altered the basis for the assessment of disability in that the assessment was to be based not on the Pension Fund beneficiaries’ inability to perform the same work but work in general. The new provisions had been enacted on the initiative of the Pension Fund and in view of the Fund’s financial difficulties (according to an audit, at the beginning of 1990 the Pension Fund had a deficit of at least 20,000,000,000 Icelandic krónur (ISK)). The Pension Fund applied the new provisions not only to persons who had claimed a disability pension after the date of their entry into force but also to persons who were already in receipt of a disability pension before that date.", "11. Under an interim provision in section 5, the above change to the reference criteria was not to apply for the first five years after the commencement of the 1992 Act to a person who, before its entry into force, was already receiving a disability pension.", "12. Under the new rules, a fresh assessment of the applicant’s disability was carried out by an officially accredited Pension Fund physician, who concluded that the applicant’s loss of capacity for work in general was 25%, and thus did not reach the minimum level of 35%. As a result, from 1 July 1997 onwards the Pension Fund stopped paying the applicant the disability pension and related child benefits he had been receiving for nearly twenty years since the accident in 1978.", "13. According to information obtained by the Government from the Pension Fund and submitted to the Court, the applicant had been one of 336 Fund members who were receiving disability pensions in June 1992 under the interim provision in section 5 of the 1992 Act (see paragraph 21 below). On 1 July 1997 the total number of disability pension recipients was 689. This included Fund members who had not become entitled to a disability pension until after the commencement of the 1992 Act in June 1992. The cases of the aforementioned 336 persons receiving disability pensions from the Fund, who had acquired their entitlement before that time and were still drawing disability pensions in 1996, were reviewed in late 1996 and early 1997 in the light of their capacity for work in general. Altogether, 104 members of this group of disability pensioners had their benefits reduced in July 1997 as a result of the new rules on disability assessment under the 1992 Act. In the case of 54 Fund members, including the applicant, the disability rating for work in general did not reach the level of 35% required under the Act to retain entitlement to disability benefit, and so benefit payments were discontinued. The disability ratings of 29 members were reduced from 100% to 50% and those of 21 members from 100% to 65%.", "14. The applicant instituted proceedings against the Pension Fund and, in the alternative, against both the Fund and the Icelandic State, challenging the Fund’s decision to discontinue the payments to him. In a judgment of 12 May 1999, the Reykjavik District Court found for the defendants.", "15. The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court, which by a judgment of 9 December 1999 upheld the judgment of the District Court.", "16. The Supreme Court accepted that the applicant’s pension rights under the 1974 Act were protected by the relevant provisions of the Icelandic Constitution as property rights. However, it considered that the measures taken by virtue of the 1992 Act had been justified by the Pension Fund’s financial difficulties. The Supreme Court stated:\n“The pension rights that the appellant had earned under Law no. 49/1974 were protected under what was then Article 67 of the Constitution (currently Article 72 of the Constitution – see section 10 of the Constitutional Law Act, Law no. 87/1995). Under the constitutional provision referred to above, he could not be deprived of those rights except under an unequivocal provision of law. The Court does not consider that section 8 of Law no. 49/1974 provided authorisation for the [Pension Fund] Board to curtail the benefit provisions; this could only be done under an unequivocal provision of law. Nor can the Court accept that the wording of subsection (1) of section 13 of Law no. 49/1974 meant that the Fund member did not have an unequivocal right to have his disability assessed in terms of his capacity to do his previous job.\nThe evidence in the case shows that the Pension Fund was operated at a considerable deficit, and that at the end of 1989 more than ISK 20,000,000,000 would have been needed for the principal of the Fund, together with the premiums that it could expect, to cover its commitments, this estimate being based on an annual interest rate of 3%. In order to tackle this large deficit, the Fund’s Board asked for amendments to be made to the Act under which the Fund operated. It is clear that the reduction of the pension rights that resulted from Law no. 44/1992 was based on relevant considerations. Even though that Act was repealed by Law no. 94/1994, this does not change the fact that the appellant’s legal position had already been determined by Law no. 44/1992. The Court concurs with the District Court’s view that Law no. 94/1994 did not constitute a valid legal authorisation for making amendments to the rights that the Fund member had earned during the period of validity of the former legislation.\nThe reduction according to Act no. 44/1992 was of a general nature as it treated in a comparable manner all those who enjoyed or could enjoy pension rights. An adaptation period of five years applied to all pensioners, as stated above. All those who can be considered to be in a comparable situation have been treated equally ...”", "17. On 1 July 1997 the applicant lost pension rights (disability and children’s annuity benefits) amounting to ISK 12,637,600. He presented the following breakdown of this figure:\nValue of the principal, based on disability pension payment of ISK 61,356 per month until he reached the age of 65: ISK 9,373,300\nValue of the principal of child benefit based on the same premises, until the children reached the age of 18:\nKristinnJuly 1997-March 1998ISK 136,100\nAnna Margrét July 1997-August 2006ISK 1,469,600\nAsmundur July 1997-January 2009ISK 1,658,600\nTotalISK 12,637,600", "18. The applicant has supplied the following information about his income from 1997 onwards:\n \n1997ISK 2,789,995\n1998 ISK 3,305,268\n1999ISK 3,454,445\n2000 ISK 3,774,248\n2001 ISK 4,187,987\n2002 ISK 4,558,248\nTotal ISK 22,050,191", "19. The applicant has also submitted certain figures from a survey of seamen’s salaries obtained from the Icelandic Merchant Navy and Fishing Vessels Officers’ Guild:\n“Ordinary seaman” Second mate First mateMaster\n19975,153,4246,441,7807,730,13710,306,849\n19985,580,7956,975,9948,371,19311,161,590\n19996,166,0297,707,5379,249,04412,332,059\n20005,949,0757,436,3448,923,61311,898,150\n20016,415,2528,019,0649,622,87712,830,503\n20025,654,7567,068,4458,482,13411,309,513\nTotal 34,919,33243,649,16452,378,99769,838,663\nIncome derived by the applicant from office work:\n22,050,19122,050,19122,050,19122,050,191\nDifference12,869,14121,598,97330,328,80647,788,472" ]

[ 9 ]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1933 and lives in Milan.", "5. He is the owner of a flat in Milan, which he had let to G.R. and R.M.", "6. In a writ served on the tenants on 8 February 1983, the applicant informed them of his intention to terminate the lease and summoned them to appear before the Milan Magistrate.", "7. By a decision of 8 March 1983, which was made enforceable on 8 May 1983, the Milan Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 July 1984.", "8. On 14 January 1985, the applicant served notice on the tenants requiring them to vacate the premises.", "9. On 8 February 1986, he informed the tenants that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 25 February 1986.", "10. Between 25 February 1986 and 1 July 1999, the bailiff made fifty-five attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.", "11. On 28 July 1999, the applicant sold the flat." ]

[ 3, 9 ]

[ "7. On 20 October 1992 the first applicant, as the owner of 3 freshwater fish farms, was charged with offences against the Act on freshwater fish farms of 5 April 1989 (bekendtgørelse nr. 224), henceforth also called the 1989 Act, as allegedly he had intentionally exceeded the fixed feed quotas with danger or risk thereof to the environment, and with enrichment for himself.", "8. On 13 September 1993 an indictment was submitted to the City Court in Fjerritslev (retten i Fjerritslev) before which the trial was scheduled for 9 December 1993. However, the trial was adjourned awaiting the outcome of a corresponding pending criminal case, considered to be a “test-case”, in which the defendant had alleged inter alia that the 1989 Act had no legal authority as it contravened articles of the Penal Code and provisions of the Environmental Protection Act (Miljøbeskyttelsesloven). The Government claimed that the adjournment was initiated by the first applicant’s counsel. The applicant contested this. It is undisputed, however, that the parties agreed to the adjournment and that no objections were raised against it. The proceedings in the test-case were finally determined on appeal by a High Court judgment of 21 September 1995.", "9. Subsequent to a preliminary hearing held in the applicant’s case on 18 December 1995 it was decided to adjourn his case anew awaiting another corresponding pending criminal case, considered to be a test-case, in which the defendant had alleged that the 1989 Act had no legal authority as the European Commission had not been notified of it as allegedly prescribed by the 83/189/EEC Council Directive of 28 March 1983 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations, amended by the 88/182/EEC Council Directive of 22 March 1988. The proceedings in the corresponding case were finally determined on appeal in the autumn of 1996 when a High Court delivered its judgment.", "10. The applicant’s trial commenced on 8 April 1997. Since a witness on the applicant’s behalf was prevented from appearing on that day, the trial continued and ended on 14 May 1997. By judgment of 28 May 1997 the City Court in Fjerritslev convicted the applicant and sentenced him to pay a fine of 68,000 Danish kroner (DKK). In addition a profit estimated to DKK 275,000 was confiscated.", "11. On 9 June 1997 the applicant appealed against the judgment to the High Court of Western Denmark (Vestre Landsret) before which he was granted permission to procure an expert witness, who during the preparation of the case was requested to reply in writing to specific questions formulated by counsel, and approved by the prosecutor.", "12. By judgment of 29 June 1998 the High Court of Western Denmark upheld the applicant’s conviction, but increased the fine to DKK 95,000 and the amount to be confiscated to DKK 384,000.", "13. The applicant’s request of 7 July 1998 for leave to appeal against the High Court’s judgment to the Supreme Court (Højesteret) was granted by the Leave to Appeal Board (Procesbevillingsnævnet) on 23 November 1998.", "14. The case was brought before the Supreme Court on 15 January 1999, where it was joined with the second applicant’s appeal (see below).\n \nII", "15. On 26 October 1993, the second applicant, as manager of two limited companies which each owned a freshwater fish farm, was charged with offences against the amended Act of 31 September 1994 on freshwater fish farms partly in conjunction with the former Act of 5 April 1989 (bekendtgørelse nr. 900 jfr. tildels bekendtgørelse nr. 224), as allegedly he had intentionally exceeded the fixed feed quotas with danger or risk thereof to the environment, and with enrichment for the companies.", "16. The case was brought before the City Court in Mariager (retten i Mariager) by the prosecution’s submission of an indictment of 8 March 1994, which was later extended by supplementary indictments.", "17. In the period between September 1994 and October 1995 the case was adjourned awaiting the outcome of a corresponding pending criminal case, which was considered to be a test-case.", "18. On 3 November 1995 the proceedings were adjourned at the request of the applicant’s counsel, who wished to submit a written pleading. On 21 November 1995 counsel requested an extension of the time-limit for submitting his pleading. On 12 February 1996 he stated that his pleading was approaching. On 21 March 1996 he was granted yet another extension of the time‑limit, and on 17 April 1996 the pleading was submitted.", "19. Further pleadings were submitted and additional preliminary issues were dealt with, inter alia with regard to counsel’s request that the applicant’s case be joined with another corresponding pending case.", "20. On 4 October 1996 counsel was granted an extension of the time‑limit to submit his rejoinder within eight weeks.", "21. A hearing was held on 24 February 1997 and the case was scheduled to commence on 8 September 1997 as counsel had stated that he was unable to appear before that date.", "22. On 16 September 1997 the City Court in Mariager convicted the applicant and sentenced him to pay a fine of DKK 275,000. In addition profits estimated to DKK 900,000 and DKK 200,000, respectively, were confiscated in the companies.", "23. On 23 September 1997 the applicant appealed against the judgment to the High Court of Western Denmark, before which the case was ready to be listed for trial on 27 November 1997. As counsel was unable to appear on the proposed dates in January, February and May 1998, the case was scheduled for trial on 27 August 1998.", "24. By judgment of 3 September 1998 the High Court of Western Denmark upheld the applicant’s conviction, but increased the fine to DKK 345,000 and the amounts to be confiscated to DKK 1,158,000 and DKK 240,000 respectively.", "25. The applicant’s request of 11 September 1998 for leave to appeal against the High Court’s judgment to the Supreme Court was granted by the Leave to Appeal Board on 23 November 1998.", "26. The case was brought before the Supreme Court on 15 January 1999, where it was joined with the first applicant’s appeal. The applicants jointly argued that the Act of 1989 had no legal authority as the European Commission had not been notified of it as allegedly prescribed by the 83/189/EEC Council Directive of 28 March 1983 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations, amended by the 88/182/EEC Council Directive of 22 March 1988, and that accordingly they should be acquitted. Moreover, they requested that the Supreme Court referred the question of the legal consequences of the non-notification to the European Court of Justice pursuant to the former Article 177 of the EC Treaty.", "27. As to the latter the Prosecutor General procured an opinion from the Ministry of Justice of 29 January 1999, finding no basis for a preliminary reference, an opinion he endorsed. On 4 February 1999 the Supreme Court requested counsel’s comment on this issue.", "28. On 17 February 1999 the applicants requested that an additional counsel be assigned to plead on the EU-law issues of the case. This was refused by the Supreme Court on 24 February 1999. The following day, the applicants requested that a named attorney substitute their counsel as to the EU‑law issues. This request was granted on 18 April 1999 and the proceedings were adjourned for eight weeks pending comments from the substituting counsel.", "29. It appears that the substituting counsel three times was granted an extension of the time-limit to submit his comments, thus his first written pleading was submitted on 5 October 1999.", "30. The Prosecutor General stated definitively on 3 November 1999 that he found no basis for referring the case to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.", "31. The exchange of pleadings on this question continued until 7 April 2000, as the substitute counsel three times requested that the Prosecutor General submit written replies to various questions put by counsel on the issue. Each time the replies were followed by a comprehensive pleading by the substitute counsel.", "32. On 22 August 2000 the Supreme Court decided not to refer the case to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, as it found that there was no obligation to notify the European Commission of the specific section of the Act on freshwater fish farms of 5 April 1989, with which the applicants were charged, and that there was no reasonable doubt that the section in question was in accordance with European Community legislation.", "33. By judgment of 16 February 2001 the Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s judgment in respect of the first applicant, but reduced the amount to be confiscated to DKK 240,000, and by judgment of the same date the Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s judgment in its entirety in respect of the second applicant." ]

[]

[ "4. The applicant, who was born in 1971, lives in Ankara.", "5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.", "6. On 12 November 1991 the applicant was arrested and placed in police custody by police officers from the Ankara Security Directorate on suspicion of his involvement in the activities of an illegal organisation, namely the TDKP/GKB (Turkish Revolutionary Communist Party / Young Communist Union).", "7. On 19 November 1991 the applicant gave a statement to the police, allegedly under duress and confessed that he had been involved in certain illegal activities organised by the TDKP/GKB.", "8. On 25 November 1991 the public prosecutor at the Ankara State Security Court questioned the applicant in relation to his involvement in the TDKP/GKB. The applicant denied the content of his written statement of 19 November 1991 and alleged that it had been taken under duress.", "9. On 26 November 1991 the applicant was brought before a single judge of the Ankara State Security Court, who after taking his statement ordered his release.", "10. On 30 December 1991 the public prosecutor at the Ankara State Security Court filed an indictment against the applicant and fourteen other defendants, accusing them of membership of an illegal organisation. The prosecution requested that the applicant be convicted and sentenced pursuant to Article 7 § 1 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act.", "11. On 13 April 1993 the Ankara State Security Court, composed of three judges including a military judge, convicted the applicant as charged. The court held that there was sufficient and satisfactory evidence to disclose that he had committed the alleged offences. It accordingly sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment. Both the applicant and the public prosecutor appealed.", "12. On 8 February 1994 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first instance court on the ground that the applicant should have been convicted under Article 168 § 2 of the Criminal Code on account of his membership to an illegal organisation.", "13. On 16 March 1994 the Ankara State Security Court, to which the case had been remitted, held its first hearing and asked the accused persons to submit their final observations. On 27 May 1994 the applicant submitted his final observations and denied the charges against him. The court held thirty-three more hearings after this date, in search of one of the accused persons, who was on the run.", "14. On 27 November 1997 the Ankara State Security Court applied the decision of the Court of Cassation and sentenced the applicant to twelve years and six months’ imprisonment under Article 168 § 2 of the Criminal Code", "15. On 17 September 1998 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s request for appeal." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "4. The applicants were born in 1980, 1977, 1979 and 1979 respectively.", "5. On 27 and 28 April 1998 respectively the applicants were taken into police custody by police officers from the Anti-Terrorism Department of the Ankara Security Directorate.", "6. On 7 May 1996 the applicants were brought before the public prosecutor at the Ankara State Security Court and subsequently before the investigating judge. After taking their statements, the investigating judge ordered that the applicants be placed in detention on remand.", "7. In an indictment dated 23 May 1996, the public prosecutor at the Ankara State Security Court initiated criminal proceedings against the applicants and accused them of being members of an illegal armed organisation, namely the TIKP (the Revolutionary Communists’ Union of Turkey). The applicants were further accused of carrying out activities on behalf of the TIKB, such as taking part in demonstrations on 1 May and 8 March (Women’s Day) during which they had chanted slogans and distributed TIKB leaflets. The public prosecutor asked the court to convict the applicants pursuant to Article 168 § 2 of the Criminal Code.", "8. On 9 October 1996 the Ankara State Security Court, composed of two civilian judges and a military judge, held that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the applicants were members of the TIKP, but found them guilty under Article 169 of the Criminal Code for aiding and abetting an illegal organisation. The first, second and third applicants were sentenced to two years and six months’ imprisonment, while the second applicant was sentenced to three years and nine months’ imprisonment.", "9. The applicants appealed. The chief public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation submitted his opinion on the merits of the appeal on 24 December 1997. This opinion was not served on the applicants, but read out during the hearing which took place on 18 March 1998.", "10. On 20 May 1998 the Court of Cassation, upholding the Ankara State Security Court’s reasoning and assessment of evidence, dismissed the applicants’ request for appeal. The decision was pronounced on 10 June 1998.", "11. The applicants’ request for rectification was further rejected on 30 June 1998." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "4. The applicant, Ms Efrosini Yorgiyadis, was born in 1964 and lives in Istanbul.", "5. On 25 October 1982 by signing a contract of adoption before a notary public in Bakırköy, Semiramis Gradlekova adopted the applicant. Semiramis Gradlekova died on 18 November 1982. The applicant was left as the only legal heir to her property.", "6. On 17 May 1983 the Treasury filed an action with the Şişli First Instance Court in Civil Matters requesting the annulment of the above-mentioned contract of adoption. The Treasury alleged that the contract did not comply with the necessary requirements and was not therefore a valid contract of adoption. They requested that Mrs Gradlekova's property be transferred to the State.", "7. On 3 August 1983 the public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Bakırköy Assize Court accusing the applicant and four other persons of fraudulent misrepresentation and forgery.", "8. On 10 October 1983 experts in handwriting analysis produced a report in which they concluded that the signature of Semiramis Gradlekova appearing on the contract of adoption was authentic. The applicant submitted this report to the Şişli First Instance Court in Civil Matters. The court requested the opinion of another group of experts. On 27 November 1985 the second group of experts confirmed the findings contained in the first report.", "9. On 17 December 1986 the Şişli First Instance Court in Civil Matters held that the contract satisfied the necessary requirements of a valid contract of adoption and rejected the Treasury's claims.", "10. The Treasury appealed. On 20 December 1987 the Court of Cassation quashed the decision of the Şişli First Instance Court. It held that the first-instance court should have adjourned the examination of the case pending the decision of the Bakırköy Assize Court in the criminal proceedings. The applicant requested rectification of the Court of Cassation's ruling. On 17 October 1988 the Court of Cassation rejected her request.", "11. On 21 April 1989 the Şişli First Instance Court in Civil Matters decided not to follow the decision of the Court of Cassation. The Treasury lodged an appeal with the Joint Civil Chambers of the Court of Cassation (Yargıtay Hukuk Genel Kurulu), which quashed the decision of the Şişli First Instance Court in Civil Matters on 21 February 1990.", "12. On 4 February 1991, at the request of the Bakırköy Assize Court, the Forensic Medicine Institute drew up a report which concluded that the signature of Semiramis Gradlekova on the contract of adoption was authentic. However, in a further report dated 28 August 1991 the Forensic Medicine Institute noted that its examination of 4 February 1991 had been based on a comparison between the signature of Semiramis Gradlekova on the contract of adoption and her signature on documents submitted in furtherance of her request for permission to draw up and conclude a contract of adoption. The examination of other materials bearing the signature of Semiramis Gradlekova revealed in fact that the signature on the contract of adoption was not her signature.", "13. On 13 May 1992 five experts from the Forensic Medicine Institute prepared another report. According to the experts, the signature of Semiramis Gradlekova on the contract of adoption was not authentic.", "14. The applicant sought the opinion of another group of handwriting experts. On 20 May 1993 the experts, a graphologist and two professors, finalised their analysis and drafted a report. According to the experts, the reports submitted by the Forensic Medicine Institute experts were contradictory. In their opinion, the signature of Semiramis Gradlekova on the contract of adoption was genuine. \nOn 16 July 1993 the Bakırköy Assize Court requested the Forensic Medicine Institute to clarify whether or not the signature of Semiramis Gradlekova on the contract of adoption was authentic. On 10 August 1993 seven experts belonging to the Forensic Medicine Institute, having considered the findings contained in the previous expert reports, concluded that the signature of Semiramis Gradlekova on the contract of adoption was authentic. Five of the experts who signed this report had also signed the report dated 13 May 1992.", "15. On 6 September 1993, after requesting several reports from different handwriting experts and from the Forensic Medicine Institute, the Bakırköy Assize Court decided to discontinue the proceedings against the applicant and her co-accused on the ground that the offences of which they were charged had become time-barred since a period of ten years had elapsed since the date of the charges. The court further held that, having regard to the apparent inconsistency between the two reports of the Forensic Medicine Institute dated 13 May 1992 and 10 August 1993, the Bakırköy Public Prosecutor should open criminal proceedings against the five experts who had signed both reports.", "16. The applicant lodged an appeal against the decision of the Bakırköy Assize Court. On 7 June 1994 the Court of Cassation rejected the applicant's appeal.", "17. On 15 December 1994 the Şişli First Instance Court in Civil Matters held that the expert reports had established that the Treasury had failed to substantiate the allegations of forgery and thus rejected their claim. The Treasury appealed. On 20 April 1995 the Court of Cassation quashed the decision of the Şişli First Instance Court in Civil Matters.", "18. On 18 April 1996 the Şişli First Instance Court in Civil Matters decided not to follow the decision of the Court of Cassation. The Treasury lodged an appeal with the Joint Civil Chambers of the Court of Cassation. On 12 March 1997 it quashed the decision of the Şişli First Instance Court in Civil Matters.", "19. On 9 December 1997 the Şişli First Instance Court in Civil Matters decided to abide by the decision of the Joint Civil Chambers of the Court of Cassation. On 7 May 1998 the Court of Cassation upheld the decision of the Şişli First Instance Court in Civil Matters.", "20. On 15 November 1998 the Court of Cassation rejected the applicant's request for rectification of the judgment." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "7. The first applicant was born in 1942 and the second applicant was born in 1944. They both live in Wrocław, Poland.", "8. On 19 May 1994 the applicants, employees of the Wrocław Technical University (Politechnika Wrocławska) and members of a trade union, were informed by their employer that as from 1 September 1994 their employment contracts would be modified and that they would be transferred.", "9. On 24 May 1994 the applicants sued the Wrocław Technical University in the Wrocław-Śródmieście District Court (Sąd Rejonowy), seeking the annulment of the employer's decisions. The court joined their actions.", "10. As a result of the applicants' refusal to accept the proposed changes to their employment contracts, they were dismissed from their jobs with effect from 31 August 1994. Subsequently, the applicants modified their claims and filed actions for reinstatement with the Wrocław-Śródmieście District Court.", "11. On 15 September 1994 the court held a first hearing in the case. It imposed a fine on the defendant for having failed to appear before the court. The court held hearings on 20 October and 6 December 1994, and 10 January 1995. The hearing listed for 27 January 1995 was cancelled because the judge rapporteur was ill.", "12. On 24 February 1995 the court held a hearing and heard evidence from the parties and witnesses. On 10 March 1995 the second applicant asked the court not to fix hearings on Wednesdays and Fridays, since she would not be able to appear before the court. At the hearing held on 1 June 1995 the court heard evidence from other witnesses. On 16 June 1995 the court ordered that the case file be obtained from the Wrocław-Śródmieście District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy).", "13. On 6 July, 28 September and 7 December 1995, and 5 January 1996 the court held hearings.", "14. On 16 January 1996 the District Court gave judgment. The applicants appealed.", "15. On 16 April 1996 the Wrocław Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) held a hearing. On 30 April 1996 the Regional Court quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case.", "16. The hearing before the District Court listed for 31 July 1996 was adjourned because the defendant's lawyer had failed to appear before the court. On 4 October 1996 the court held a hearing and heard evidence from a witness. The hearing listed for 5 December 1996 was adjourned because a witness had not appeared before it.", "17. On 7 February 1997 the District Court gave judgment and ordered that the applicants be reinstated. The defendant appealed.", "18. On 27 January and 28 April 1998 the Wrocław Regional Court held hearings. On 9 July 1998 the court ordered the defendant's lawyer to produce certain documentary evidence.", "19. On 17 September 1998 the court adjourned a hearing because a summoned witness had not appeared before the court. On 26 November 1998 the court held a hearing and heard a witness.", "20. On 10 December 1998 the Regional Court gave judgment. It set aside the first-instance judgment in respect of the applicants' reinstatement and awarded them compensation for unlawful dismissal.", "21. The applicants lodged their cassation appeals with the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy). On 15 October 1999 the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Regional Court and remitted the case.", "22. On 9 May and 5 September 2000 the court held hearings. At the hearing held on 28 November 2000 the applicants challenged two judges of the Regional Court. On 12 December 2000 the court dismissed their request as unfounded.", "23. Subsequently, on 2 February 2001 the applicants challenged seven judges of the Wrocław Regional Court. On 15 March 2001 the court dismissed this request as unfounded. Another hearing was held on 26 June 2001.", "24. At the hearing held on 5 July 2001 the Regional Court gave judgment.", "25. On 28 September 2001 the applicants lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court.", "26. On 5 December 2002 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicants' cassation appeal. The judgment is final." ]

[ 3 ]

[ "7. The applicant was born on 18 October 1966 in the village of Zapadynka, district of Vasylkiv, in the Kyiv region. He currently resides in the United States of America, where he has refugee status.", "8. The applicant served in the Department of Security of the President of Ukraine. He was responsible for guarding the office of the President. In the course of his work, he allegedly made tape recordings of the President’s personal conversations with third persons relating to the President’s possible involvement in the disappearance of the journalist Georgiy Gongadze.", "9. Mr Gongadze was a political journalist and editor-in-chief of the internet journal Ukrayinska Pravda. He was known for his criticism of those in power and for his active involvement in awareness-raising in Ukraine and abroad concerning issues of freedom of speech. He disappeared on 16 September 2000 after complaining for months of being subjected to threats and surveillance. On 2 November 2000 the decapitated body of an unknown person, later identified by forensic medical tests as Mr Gongadze, was discovered in the vicinity of the town of Tarashcha, in the Kyiv region. His widow has lodged an application with the Court (application no. 34056/02).", "10. On 26 November 2000 the applicant left Ukraine, as he was afraid of political persecution following the public disclosure of the aforementioned tapes.", "11. On 28 November 2000 the Chairman of the Socialist Party of Ukraine, Mr O. Moroz, publicly announced during a session of the Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada (Верховна Рада України), the existence of audio recordings secretly made in the office of the President and implicating the President and other high-level State officials in the disappearance of Georgiy Gongadze. According to a report by “Reporters sans frontières” published on 22 January 2001, the recorded conversations mentioned different ways of getting rid of Mr Gongadze. In one of those conversations, allegedly between the President and the Minister of the Interior, the Minister said that he knew people capable of performing this task, people whom he called “real eagles”, ready to do whatever was required. (The “real eagles” were purportedly an illegal squad of former or current members of the security forces.) This disclosure led to a major political scandal.", "12. Two days later, on 30 November 2000, the Pechersky District Court of Kyiv instituted criminal proceedings against Mr O. Moroz for defamation with regard to the tapes.", "13. The applicant fled Ukraine. However, he still held an internal passport indicating his registered Kyiv address for administrative purposes (the “propiska”, as it was called at the time – see paragraphs 40-42 below).", "14. The applicant applied for political asylum in the United States. On 27 April 2001 the Immigration and Naturalisation Service of the United States Department of Justice recognised the applicant as a refugee under the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 (“the Geneva Convention”). The Department of Justice issued him with a travel document and granted him the right to stay in the United States indefinitely.", "15. On 4 January 2001 the investigator at the General Prosecutor’s Office (“the GPO”) decided to initiate criminal proceedings against the applicant concerning allegations of defamation of the President of Ukraine, Mr L. Kuchma, as well as Mr V. Lytvyn and Mr Y. Kravchenko, who were at the material time Head of the Administration of the President of Ukraine and Minister of the Interior respectively. Proceedings were also initiated for forgery in respect of the official application the applicant had made for his passport, as he had failed to disclose the fact that he knew certain State secrets by virtue of his employment (see paragraph 34 below). On the same date the GPO investigator ordered a search for the applicant.", "16. On 14 February 2001 the GPO investigator initiated further criminal proceedings against the applicant for his alleged involvement in disclosing State secrets and an abuse of power. On 15 February 2001 the applicant was to be formally charged with all four offences, jointly. On 19 October 2001 the indictment was reissued by the GPO in accordance with the new Criminal Code. The defamation charge was dropped, as the new Code had decriminalised libel. On 24 January 2002 the Pechersky District Court of Kyiv, in the applicant’s absence, issued a warrant for his arrest and detention pending trial.", "17. On 12 January 2002 the 9th Congress of the Socialist Party of Ukraine nominated the applicant as candidate no. 15 on the Socialist Party list for election to the Verkhovna Rada.", "18. On 22 January 2002 the Socialist Party submitted his application to the Central Electoral Commission (Центральна Виборча Комісія) for his formal registration as a candidate. In the registration request the applicant gave his propiska address as his place of residence in Ukraine for the previous five years.", "19. On 26 January 2002 the Central Electoral Commission adopted Resolution no. 94 on the refusal to register candidates for the election on 31 March 2002 of the people’s members of the Verkhovna Rada.", "20. This resolution was based on the verbatim record of a discussion on the applicant’s request for registration and was adopted following a proposal by Ms I. Stavniychuk, a member of the Central Electoral Commission, who claimed that registration should be refused for the following reasons:\n“... It ensues from what has been specified above that the provision of subsection (2) of section 8 of the Law on the election of the people’s members of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, which concerns residence in accordance with the international treaties in force in Ukraine, does not extend to M.I. Melnychenko.\nFrom a legal point of view, M.I. Melnychenko’s stay in the United States prevents him being recognised as permanently resident in Ukraine, as prescribed by section 8 of the Law ...\n... M.I. Melnychenko remains abroad on other grounds; those grounds are not covered by subsection (2) of section 8 of the Law ...\n... any break in residence in Ukraine on grounds other than those for residence or stay listed in subsection (2) of section 8 of the Law ... rules out the possibility for that person to exercise his right to be elected as a people’s member of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, since [a break in residence] cannot constitute residence in Ukraine ...\n... On this account and due to the fact that M.I. Melnychenko has submitted inaccurate information about his habitual place of residence or stay for the past five years, as established by the Central Electoral Commission, we propose that the Commission refuse M.I. Melnychenko’s registration as a candidate for the election of the people’s members of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine ...”", "21. The Central Electoral Commission therefore adopted Ms I. Stavniychuk’s proposal and refused the registration of thirteen potential candidates, including the applicant. In particular, it decided:\n“... 2. To refuse to register, as a candidate for election to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in the multi-mandate all-State electoral constituency, Mykola Ivanovych Melnychenko, enrolled under number 15 on the list of candidates for the election of the people’s members of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on 31 March 2002, whose documents, as submitted to the Central Electoral Commission, contain substantially inaccurate data about his place and period of residence for the past five years.”", "22. During its meeting, the Commission had distinguished the applicant’s situation from that of a certain Mr Y.M. Zviahilsky, who had been allowed to stand as a parliamentary candidate in a previous election under different regulations despite having spent more than two years abroad for medical treatment in Israel on a temporary basis. The applicant contended that Mr Zviahilsky, who was prosecuted for abuse of power during his office as Acting Prime Minister of Ukraine, had fled to Israel during the suspension of his parliamentary immunity.", "23. The other twelve candidates were refused registration because they had not filled in the necessary registration documents properly.", "24. On 30 January 2002 the Socialist Party lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court of Ukraine against the Central Electoral Commission’s Resolution no. 94 of 26 January 2002. It sought to have the resolution declared unlawful and annulled.", "25. On 8 February 2002 the Supreme Court of Ukraine dismissed the appeal for the following reasons:\n“... the information about M.I. Melnychenko’s habitual place of residence for the past five years in Ukraine, referred to in the said documents, is contested by the Central Electoral Commission and the Court. This information is substantially lacking in truth in respect of a candidate for election as a member of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and therefore paragraph 2 of the Central Electoral Commission’s Resolution no. 94 of 26 January 2002 complies with the requirements of subsection (2) of section 8 and sections 41 and 47 of the Law on the election of the people’s members of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.\nOn the basis of the foregoing, ... the Court\nHolds:\nthat the complaint of the Socialist Party of Ukraine concerning paragraph 2 of the Central Electoral Commission’s Resolution no. 94 of 26 January 2002 on the refusal to register M.I. Melnychenko as a candidate for election to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in the multi-mandate all-State electoral constituency should be dismissed.”", "26. On 21 November 2002 the applicant informed the Court that he resided in the United States, where he had refugee status. As his case had received much media attention, this was common knowledge in Ukraine.", "27. Article 25 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Ukraine is a party, guarantees the right to vote and to stand for public office for citizens of a country.", "28. As regards the participation of refugees in elections in their country of origin, the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment 25 (1996) on Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, while noting that Article 25 prohibited arbitrary discrimination between citizens, considered that a registration requirement, itself dependent on residence, would be justifiable. Thus, States do have a right to limit voting in general to those citizens habitually resident in their territory. This Comment also stated that:\n“15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for elective office ensures that persons entitled to vote have a free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the right to stand for election, such as minimum age, must be justifiable on objective and reasonable criteria. Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or descent, or by reason of political affiliation. No person should suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because of that person’s candidacy. States Parties should indicate and explain the legislative provisions which exclude any group or category of persons from elective office.”", "29. Relevant extracts from the Guidelines on Elections of 5-6 July 2002 read as follows (footnotes omitted):\nPrinciples of Europe’s electoral heritage (Draft Explanatory Report)\n“... Thirdly, the right to vote and/or the right to stand for election may be subject to residence requirements, residence in this case meaning habitual residence. ... Conversely, quite a few States grant their nationals living abroad the right to vote, and even to be elected. ... Registration could take place where a voter has his or her secondary residence, if he or she resides there regularly and it appears, for example, on local tax payments; the voter must not then of course be registered where he or she has his or her principal residence.\nThe free movement of citizens within the country is one of the fundamental rights necessary for truly democratic elections. However, if persons have been displaced against their will, they should, for a certain time, have the possibility of being considered as resident at their former place of residence. This possibility ought to be open for a minimum of five years but for no more than fifteen years to persons displaced within the national territory.\nLastly, provision may be made for clauses suspending political rights. Such clauses must, however, comply with the usual conditions under which fundamental rights may be restricted; in other words, they must:\n– be provided for by law;\n– observe the principle of proportionality;\n– be based on mental incapacity or a criminal conviction for a serious offence.\nFurthermore, the withdrawal of political rights may only be imposed by express decision of a court of law. However, in the event of withdrawal on grounds of mental incapacity, such express decision may concern the incapacity and entail ipso jure deprivation of civic rights.\nThe conditions for depriving individuals of the right to stand for election may be less strict than for disenfranchising them, as the holding of a public office is in issue and it may be legitimate to debar persons whose activities in such an office violate a greater public interest.”", "30. There is no uniform State practice with regard to participation in elections by expatriate citizens. Although many States do not impose any residence requirement (for example, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Cyprus, Finland, Italy, France, Greece, Poland, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Spain, Portugal, Estonia, Latvia, Croatia, Moldova, Switzerland, Austria and Turkey), other States continue to impose such a requirement for presidential elections (for example, Germany, Bulgaria, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Azerbaijan, Albania and Russia) or parliamentary elections (Malta and Iceland – presidential systems; Liechtenstein, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway and Sweden – non-presidential systems) or for both types of election (for example, Hungary, Slovakia, Armenia, Romania, Georgia, Lithuania and Ukraine).", "31. Relevant extracts from the Constitution of Ukraine read as follows:\nArticle 8\n“...\nThe Constitution of Ukraine has the highest legal force. ...\n...\nThe norms of the Constitution of Ukraine have direct effect. ...”\nArticle 9\n“International treaties that are in force and are accepted as binding by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine are part of the national legislation of Ukraine.\n...”\nArticle 22\n“...\nConstitutional rights and freedoms are guaranteed and shall not be abolished.\n...”\nArticle 24\n“...\nThere shall be no privileges or restrictions based on ... political ... and other beliefs..., [or] place of residence ...\n...”\nArticle 38\n“Citizens have the right to participate in the administration of State affairs, in all Ukrainian and local referenda, to elect freely and to be elected to bodies exercising State power as well as local self-government bodies.\nCitizens enjoy an equal right of access to the civil service and to service in local self-government bodies.”\nArticle 64\n“Constitutional human and citizens’ rights and freedoms shall not be restricted, except in cases envisaged by the Constitution of Ukraine.\nIn conditions of martial law or a state of emergency, specific restrictions on rights and freedoms may be authorised, with an indication of the period of effectiveness of these restrictions. The rights and freedoms envisaged in Articles 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 40, 47, 51, 52, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62 and 63 of this Constitution shall not be restricted.”\nArticle 76\n“...\nA citizen of Ukraine who has attained the age of 21 on the date of elections has the right to vote and, if that citizen has resided in the territory of Ukraine for the past five years, may become a member of the Verkhovna Rada ...\nA citizen who has a criminal record for having committed an intentional crime shall not be elected to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine if the record is not cancelled and erased by the procedure established by law.\n...”\nArticle 77\n“...\nThe procedure for the election of the People’s members of the Verkhovna Rada ... shall be governed by the law.”", "32. Relevant extracts from the Law on the Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine of 17 December 1997 read as follows:\nSection 1 Status of the Central Electoral Commission\n“The Central Electoral Commission is a permanent State body which, in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine, this and other laws of Ukraine, ensures the organisation, preparation and conduct of the elections of the President of Ukraine, the people’s members of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and also all-Ukrainian referenda.”\nSection 14 Powers of the Central Electoral Commission\n“The Central Electoral Commission\n ...\n(11) registers in accordance with the laws of Ukraine the lists of candidates for election to the Verkhovna Rada from political parties or electoral groups of parties, and issues to political parties and electoral groups a copy of its decision on the registration of these lists; it also issues formal proof of registration to the candidates.”", "33. Relevant extracts from the Civil Code read as follows:\nArticle 17 Place of residence\n“The place of residence is generally the place where a citizen permanently or temporarily resides.\n...”", "34. The Law on the procedure for leaving and entering Ukraine for Ukrainian citizens contains a reference in its section 12 to the Law on State secrets. Persons who hold State secrets are more strictly controlled should they apply for an external passport or permanent residence abroad. The Ministry of the Interior makes a systematic check with the State Intelligence Service of all persons applying for such a passport.", "35. Relevant extracts from the Law on elections read as follows:\nSection 8The right to be elected\n“(1) A citizen of Ukraine who has attained the age of 21 on the day of the elections has the right to vote, and, [if he or she] has resided in the territory of Ukraine for the past five years, may be elected as a member of parliament.\n(2) Residence in Ukraine under this Law means residence in the territory within Ukraine’s State borders or aboard vessels sailing under the Ukrainian State Flag, and the stay of Ukrainian citizens, in accordance with the procedure established by law, in Ukrainian diplomatic and consular missions, international organisations and their bodies, and at Ukraine’s polar stations, as well as the stay of Ukrainian citizens beyond Ukraine’s borders in accordance with the international treaties in force in respect of Ukraine.”\nSection 41Conditions for the registration of a candidate for election to parliament who is on the electoral list of a party\n“...\n(8) the curricula vitae of persons on the electoral list of a party (block), which must not exceed 2,000 characters, shall include: the surname, name, patronymic name, day, month, year and place of birth, citizenship, information concerning education, labour activity, position (occupation), place of work, public employment (including dates of elected positions), party membership, family status, address of residence with an indication of the period of residence in Ukraine, [and any] criminal record;\n...”\nSection 47Refusal to register a candidate for election to parliament\n“The Electoral Commission shall refuse to register a person standing for election to parliament in the event of the:\n...\n(4) ... improper presentation of the documents specified in section 41 ... of the present Law;\n...\n(6) emigration of the person nominated for election to another country for permanent residence;\n...\n(8) finding by the appropriate electoral commission that the information about the candidate submitted in accordance with the law was substantially inaccurate;\n...”", "36. Relevant extracts from the Code of Civil Procedure read as follows:\nArticle 243-16 Jurisdiction over complaints or appeals\n“Complaints against decisions, actions or omissions by the Central Electoral Commission shall be considered by the Supreme Court of Ukraine.”\n \nArticle 243-17Lodging a complaint or appeal\n“A complaint against a decision, act or omission by the Central Electoral Commission, excluding those determined in Chapters 30-Б and 30-В of this Code, shall be lodged with the Supreme Court of Ukraine within seven days from the date of adoption of the decision by the Central Electoral Commission, or performance of the act or omission. Participants in the electoral process may lodge a complaint with the Supreme Court of Ukraine where they consider that their rights or legal interests have been violated by a decision, act or omission of the Central Electoral Commission.”\nArticle 243-20The decision of the [Supreme] Court\n“The court delivers a judgment after considering the complaint. If the complaint is substantiated the court declares the act or omission of the Central Electoral Commission unlawful, quashes the decision, allows the applicant’s claim and remedies the violation. If the impugned decision or act of the Central Electoral Commission is found to be in conformity with the law, the court shall adopt a decision rejecting the complaint. The court’s decision is final and is not subject to appeal. ...”", "37. The relevant part of this Law reads as follows:\n“The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine resolves to accede to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees.”\nThe instrument of ratification for the protocol was deposited on 4 April 2002 with immediate effect. The instrument of ratification for the convention was deposited on 10 June 2002 and came into force on 8 September 2002.", "38. Relevant extracts from the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 14 March 2002 read as follows:\n“The Law on Ukrainian citizenship establishes that a person’s residence in the territory of Ukraine is deemed to be continuous if the time he or she has spent abroad on private matters has not exceeded 90 consecutive days or a total of 180 days throughout the year. The requirement of continuous residence shall not be considered as not being satisfied where the person is on a business trip, studying abroad, receiving treatment on the recommendation of a medical institution or changes his or her place of residence within the territory of Ukraine (section 1 of the aforementioned Law) ...”", "39. Relevant extracts from the judicial practice of the Supreme Court read as follows: 1. Judgment of the Supreme Court of 25 March 2002 in the case of Mr Victor Chayka\n“The substantial inaccuracy of the information about the candidate for election to parliament must be related to intentional acts aimed at concealing from the Central Electoral Commission and the electorate true data that would exclude his or her election ...” 2. Judgment of the Supreme Court of 13 February 2002 in the case of Mr Yuri Buzdugan\n“A clerical error in the documents submitted for registration to the Central Electoral Commission is not a ground for refusal to register a candidate for election to the parliament of Ukraine.” 3. Judgment of the Supreme Court of 25 March 2002 in the case of Mr Oleksandr Vasko\n“The substantial inaccuracy of the information ... may relate to ... the candidate’s biography and financial status ... leading the electorate to form an untrue picture of the particular candidate’s decency, qualifications, economic independence or lack of financial capacity. However, in each individual case, the Commission’s conclusion concerning the substantial inaccuracy of such information shall be based on the results of an overall examination of all the information contained in the documents filed by the candidate and the circumstances that led to the provision of such false information.” 4. Judgment of the Supreme Court of 25 March 2002 in the case of Mr Stepan Khmara\n“... the inaccurate information supplied by a candidate distorting facts that might exclude the possibility of his or her election as a people’s member of parliament may concern his or her age, citizenship, period of residence in Ukraine or previous convictions for intentional crimes ... The Court considers that the candidate’s failure to include in the list of his property private, non-residential premises that belonged to him ... was not as such substantially inaccurate information that could lead to the annulment of his registration as a candidate for election.”", "40. The relevant extracts from the recommendation of 28 December 2001 on the completion of property declarations by election candidates read as follows[2]:\n“B. Recommendation on the method of completion ...\n... 1.2. This paragraph [concerning the place of residence] must be filled out on the basis of the propiska or temporary propiska (registration) contained in the [ordinary citizen’s] passport.”", "41. The regulations governing applications for telephone services required citizens to provide the address of their permanent residence (the propiska, that is, the passport address). Similar requirements may be found in the regulations governing unemployment benefits, census lists, the issue of passports, etc.", "42. According to the Koretsky Institute of State and Law (National Academy of Sciences), an eminent legal institution, a passport was an official document certifying the identity of its owner, confirming Ukrainian citizenship and registering his or her permanent place of residence. A person was deemed to have been resident in Ukraine for the preceding five years if he or she held a passport containing a propiska for the preceding five years. Neither the Constitution nor the Law on elections required information about actual residency, but only information about formal residency on the basis of the propiska in the passport. The Civil Division of the Supreme Court followed this opinion in Case no. 6-110y98 (decision of 10 June 1998):\n “ ... Only documented data collected in a manner prescribed by law regarding the residence of a people’s member of parliament, or of a candidate for such membership, or of another person in connection with elections, shall have validity, since this constitutes the essential data about a person ...\n... a passport is a general document that certifies the identity of its owner, confirms Ukrainian citizenship and registers the permanent place of residence of a citizen (see section 5 of the Law on Ukrainian citizenship and Articles 1 and 6 of the Regulations on the passport of a citizen of Ukraine, 2 September 1993, no. 3423-XII) ...\nA person is deemed to have been resident in Ukraine for the preceding five years if he or she possesses a Ukrainian citizen’s passport that contains a propiska for the preceding five years. The propiska constitutes the fact of registration of the permanent place of residence.”" ]

[]

[ "6. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Budapest, Hungary.", "7. The applicant used to work in the Budapest office of the company “Ars Antiqua Restauro” (“A.A.R.”) registered in Poland. On 17 May 1995 he was dismissed from his job. On 27 May 1995 he lodged a claim for reinstatement with the Warsaw District Court (Sąd Rejonowy).", "8. The court held hearings on 27 July and 5 December 1995. On 1 February 1996 the applicant asked the court to issue an interim order to safeguard his claim in the proceedings. On 2 April 1996 the court refused his request. On 14 May 1996 the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) dismissed the applicant's appeal against that decision.", "9. On 2 April 1996 the court held a hearing. At the next hearing held on 23 July 1996 the applicant modified his claim. As a consequence, the case was transferred to the Regional Court.", "10. The court held further hearings on 5 November and 17 December 1996. It also decided that two witnesses should be heard by two other courts. The witnesses were heard by the Cracow District Court and the Wrocław District Court on 30 June and 3 September 1997, respectively. On 26 November 1997 and 20 January 1998 the Regional Court held hearings. The hearing listed for 2 February 1998 was cancelled.", "11. At the hearing held on 7 April 1998 the Regional Court ordered the applicant to specify his claim. On 27 April 1998 the applicant modified his claim.", "12. On 27 May 1998 the court stayed the proceedings on the ground that the applicant had not complied with the order of 7 April 1998.", "13. Upon the applicant's appeal, on 9 July 1998 the Warsaw Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) quashed the decision of 27 May 1998.", "14. On 30 March 1999 the Regional Court ordered the applicant to specify his claim. On 4 April 1999 he submitted his pleading to the court.", "15. On 1 June 1999 the court held a hearing.", "16. On 9 November 1999 the Regional Court stayed the proceedings because the president of the defendant company, who was its representative, had died. Upon the applicant's appeal the Warsaw Court of Appeal quashed that decision on 28 December 1999.", "17. On 27 September 2000 the court again stayed the proceedings, since the defendant company had not yet appointed a new representative. That decision was set aside by the Warsaw Court of Appeal on 21 November 2000.", "18. On 15 February 2001, for the third time, the Regional Court stayed the proceedings. On 26 May 2001 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal.", "19. On 27 August 2001 the applicant's lawyer asked the trial court to appoint a guardian to act on behalf of the “A.A.R.“", "20. On 4 December 2002 the Warsaw District Court appointed a guardian. The proceedings were resumed at a later unknown date.", "21. On 11 February 2003 the Warsaw Regional Court gave judgment. The applicant lodged an appeal against this judgment.", "22. On 3 December 2003 the Warsaw Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance judgment.", "23. The applicant filed a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court. It appears that the cassation proceedings are pending." ]

[ 3 ]