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lex_glue

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ecthr_a · 11k rows

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train · 9k rows

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[ "9. The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Laukaa.", "10. On 5 January 1987 criminal investigations were instituted against the applicant who was taken into police custody the same day in respect of, inter alia, alleged tax frauds. He was released on 16 January 1987.", "11. On 5 July and 31 August 1990 the applicant was summoned to appear before the Helsinki City Court (raastuvanoikeus, rådstuvurätt, as from 1 December 1993 Helsinki District Court, käräjäoikeus, tingsrätt) indicted for several aggravated tax frauds. The alleged offences concerned the importation of parts of vehicles and failure to pay relevant tax for them. The relevant decisions of the tax authorities after the clearance of the taxes were not yet final as the applicant had appealed against them. The first hearing before the District Court was held on 14 November 1990. The complainants and one of the four defendants, MI, had not yet been summoned. The Public Prosecutor charged the applicant with ten aggravated tax frauds, some of which he had allegedly committed together with other defendants, including MI. The applicant’s lawyer asked to be allowed to reply to the charges later. At the request of the Public Prosecutor the case was adjourned until 3 April 1991.", "12. At the second hearing, on 3 April 1991, the applicant denied all the charges. Concerning the alleged offences in complicity with MI, the applicant stressed MI’s role in the events and his greater knowledge of the subject. Two complainants and the defendant MI had still not been summoned. At the request of the Public Prosecutor and the National Board of Customs, which was one of the complainants, the case was adjourned until 29 May 1991.", "13. At the third hearing on 29 May 1991 the National Board of Customs submitted claims for damages. The applicant’s lawyer opposed the claims and said he would revert to the question of damages in a later hearing. The defendant MI had still not been summoned to appear before the City Court. The Public Prosecutor requested an adjournment in order to have MI summoned and to submit further clarification to certain questions. His request was not opposed. The next hearing was ordered to be on 16 October 1991.", "14. At the fourth hearing on 16 October 1991 the applicant was heard in person. His lawyer also clarified the reply to the claims of the National Board of Customs. The Public Prosecutor stated that MI had not yet been contacted and requested an adjournment in order to have him summoned. The applicant left the request for an adjournment to the City Court’s discretion. The case was adjourned until 4 December 1991.", "15. At the fifth hearing on 4 December 1991 the Public Prosecutor stated that MI had still not been summoned and requested a further adjournment. The applicant left the request to the City Court’s discretion. The case was adjourned until 13 May 1992.", "16. At the sixth hearing on 13 May 1992 the Public Prosecutor requested the case to be adjourned until further notice since MI’s place of residence was not known. The applicant left the case to be decided for his part. The City Court considered that it was necessary to hear MI before giving a decision on the charges against the applicant. Furthermore, the National Board of Customs had not yet given its decision concerning the appeals against the decisions of the tax authorities after the clearance of the taxes. The City Court, therefore, adjourned the case until further notice of the date of the next hearing would be given.", "17. The National Board of Customs and the Supreme Administrative Court gave decisions concerning the appeals against the post-clearance decisions on 20 April 1993 and 15 December 1993 respectively.", "18. In March 1994 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Chancellor of Justice (oikeuskansleri, justitiekansler). The complaint concerned the City Court’s decision to adjourn his case until further notice.", "19. The seventh hearing before the District Court (the former City Court) was held on 31 August 1994. MI had been summoned but he was absent from the hearing. At the request of the public prosecutor, which was not objected to, the case was adjourned until 21 September 1994.", "20. At the eighth hearing on 21 September 1994 MI appeared before the District Court to reply to the charges. He and the applicant were examined as regards their complicity in the alleged offences. At the request of MI, which was not objected to, the case was adjourned until 9 November 1994.", "21. At the last hearing on 9 November 1994 the applicant submitted that the length of the proceedings should be taken into account when assessing his possible punishment. The District Court convicted the applicant of a repetitive offence, consisting of four tax frauds, an aggravated tax fraud and aiding and abetting in two tax frauds and in two aggravated tax frauds, and sentenced him to six months’ suspended imprisonment. In the reasons given for the sentence the length of the proceedings was not mentioned explicitly. It was, however, noted that the fact that the offences had been committed a long time ago was one of the reasons for the court’s decision to impose a suspended sentence.", "22. On 17 October 1995 the Deputy Chancellor of Justice (apulaisoikeuskansleri, justitiekanslersadjoint) gave his decision on the applicant’s complaint, finding no breach of official duties on the part of the City Court’s members or of the public prosecutor nor any reason to take further measures in the matter.", "23. The public prosecutor and the defendants appealed to the Helsinki Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätt). The applicant requested, inter alia, that the length of the proceedings should be taken into consideration when assessing his sentence. On 4 June 1996 the Court of Appeal, as regards the applicant, upheld the District Court’s decision without giving any further reasons.", "24. The applicant sought leave to appeal from the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) renewing his request that the length of the proceedings be taken into account in the assessment of his sentence. On 26 November 1996 the Supreme Court refused the applicant leave to appeal." ]	[ 3 ]
[ "9. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Zürich, Switzerland.", "10. The applicant intended to set up a “specialised television programme”, Car TV AG, limited to a particular subject (Spartenfernsehprogramm), namely all aspects of car mobility and private road traffic, including news on cars, car accessories, traffic and energy policies, traffic security, tourism, automobile sport, relations between railways and road traffic and environmental issues. The television programme was to be broadcast via cable television in German in the German-speaking areas of Switzerland, and in French in the French-speaking areas. Initially, the programme was to last two hours, to be repeated continuously over the next twenty-four hours and a new one shown once a week; later it was to be extended in duration. The applicant was to be the company's managing director. The programme was to be prepared in close cooperation with industry, automobile associations and the specialist media.", "11. On 10 August 1995 the applicant filed with the government in the name of Car TV AG a request for a licence (Konzessionsgesuch) to broadcast the intended programme. The Federal Office for Communication replied on 16 August 1995, pointing out the lack of prospects of success of such a request. By a letter of 7 September 1995 the applicant informed the Federal Office that he wished to pursue his request and submitted further documents. From the latter it transpired that Car TV AG would now include in its programme matters concerning the transport needs of non-motorists and set up an independent programme commission.", "12. On 16 June 1996 the Swiss Federal Council (Bundesrat) dismissed the request. The Federal Council noted that there was no right, either under Swiss law or Article 10 of the Convention, to obtain a broadcasting licence. With reference to the instructions for radio and television listed in section 3(1) of the Federal Radio and Television Act (Bundesgesetz über Radio und Fernsehen – “the RTA”; see “Relevant domestic law” below) the decision continued:\n“... The electronic media have the task of conveying content that serves the development of informed democratic opinion. They should furthermore actively contribute to a culture of communication serving as the basis for cultural development and for an integral democratic discourse. 4. Under section 11(1)(a) of the RTA, a licence shall only be granted if radio and television can achieve the aims mentioned in section 3(1) of the RTA as a whole. It is unnecessary that each venture comply with all aspects of the instructions mentioned. Rather, a positive contribution is required which will further the culture of communication in our country and which will under no circumstances run counter to the aims of the RTA. 5. A comprehensive and broad-based democratic discourse is guaranteed first of all by means of programmes which are committed to a public service and can be considered to be comprehensive. These are directed at the entire public and have as their subject matter all aspects of political and social life. Specialised programmes concentrate on particular themes and are directed at particularly interested sectors of the public. The result may be the formation of public opinion influenced by the media by way of specific content, and no longer primarily by way of broad-based, comprehensive programmes. Such a development indubitably has consequences for the culture of communication. Communicative integration via the electronic media is impaired, and leads to a society increasingly shaped by segmentation and atomisation. 6. Against this background, the broadcasting of specialised programmes runs counter to the democratic considerations of the general instructions for radio and television (Section 3(1) of the RTA). These instructions are oriented towards the integration and promotion of an integral culture of communication. As a result, stricter conditions must apply to specialised programmes than would be required for a programme with a varied content. Therefore, when examining the conditions for a licence under section 11(1)(a) of the RTA, qualified criteria shall be adduced, since the active contribution of specialised programmes towards the culture of communication must generally be called into question. 7. Nevertheless, granting a licence to specialised programmes continues to remain possible under qualified conditions. A licence shall be considered if the negative effects of the programme are at least compensated by its valuable contents within the meaning of section 3(1) of the RTA. This could be the case with programmes in the areas of culture (music, films, etc.) or the formation of political opinions (parliamentary broadcasts, etc.). 8. The request for a licence by Car TV AG aims at a specialised programme which has car mobility as its content and places the car at its centre. According to the criteria set out in subsections (4)-(6), it must be considered with the greatest restraint. As a result, granting a licence will only be considered if the disadvantages resulting from a specialised programme are compensated by its valuable contents, offering a particular contribution to the general instructions mentioned in section 3(1). 9. However, the orientation of the programme of Car TV AG is not able to offer the required valuable contribution to comply with the general instructions for radio and television. The programme focuses mainly on entertainment or on reports about the automobile. Car TV AG does not therefore meet the requirements for a licence under section 11(1)(a) of the RTA.”" ]	[]
[ "8. In 1959, the applicant acquired freehold ownership of plot 565, Nicosia, with a frontage on Jason Street, which is now called Georgios Grivas Digenis Avenue. She was also issued with a Certificate of Registration of Immovable Property by the Land Registry Office, Registration No. B662, dated 28 April 1959. The surface area of plot 565 was 23,488 square feet. On 16 September 1959 the applicant leased plot 565 to Mobil Oil Cyprus Ltd. On 7 October 1959 Mobil, in its capacity as the representative of the applicant, applied to the municipality of Nicosia and obtained a building permit for the construction of a petrol-station, a car‑wash and other ancillary structures. In 1969 the lease was renewed until September 1973, with the option to extend until September 1977. In paragraph 1 of the third page of the lease, the rented property was described as being “situated at Grivas Digenis Avenue on plot 565”. Paragraph 5(e) of the lease provided that the landlord authorised the tenant as her agent to sign all applications concerning the plants and works which Mobil would construct, reconstruct, operate and continue to operate on the plot, and generally to do all things necessary on her behalf.", "9. On 30 March 1973, Notice No. 612 was published in the Official Gazette of the Republic No. 1002, pursuant to the Streets and Buildings Regulation Law, Cap. 96, by the Municipal Committee of Nicosia, aimed at widening Grivas Digenis Avenue.", "10. According to the text of paragraph 1 of the Notice, the affected plots were the following: all plots with frontage on a certain specified part of the Avenue (that is, the part of the Avenue between Prodromos Street and Th. Dervis Street) and certain plots with frontage on both the Avenue and other side roads. (The numbers of these “corner plots” were expressly set out in the Notice.)", "11. However, the Notice did not mention that plot 565 was part of the land taken for the widening of the street.", "12. The Notice provided that any objection against the widening scheme should be raised within seventy-five days of the publication of the Notice in the Official Gazette.", "13. On 11 July 1973, Mobil filed with the Municipality an application for a building permit to make minor alterations to a station built in 1959, the pumps’ shelter and an oil ditch. The distance of the new construction from the newly aligned Grivas Digenis Avenue was more than 10 feet, the distance required by Regulation 6(3) of the Streets and Buildings Regulations.", "14. Upon receipt of the application, the Municipality addressed to the applicant, through her duly authorised agent, a letter dated 24 July 1973. It was expressly provided in that letter that the plans of the street-widening scheme relating to the Grivas Digenis Avenue should be taken into account. A copy of the official plan which showed the effect of the street-widening scheme was attached to the letter.", "15. According to the Government neither the applicant nor Mobil protested.", "16. On 27 March 1978 the building permit was issued. By letter of 28 March 1978, the Municipality of Nicosia requested the Office of the Land Registry and Survey to register as part of the public domain, by virtue of section 13 (1) of the Streets and Buildings Regulation Law, Cap. 96, the part of plot 565 affected by the street-widening scheme. At some time between 1978 and 1979, the District Land Registry Office of Nicosia registered the disputed area of 2,060 square feet as part of Grivas Digenis Avenue.", "17. According to the applicant, the Government Survey Plan and the applicant’s title were amended without anyone notifying her. In the Land Register, the ceding of the disputed area to the road was described as follows : “By purchase from the Government after compulsory acquisition + By grant. A public road. Fees: gratis”. The applicant alleges that she was never notified about this amendment of the Register which contains a false declaration. Moreover, Mobil was never notified, as no mention of the expropriation was made in the conditions attached to the building permit which had been granted. Even the letter sent to Mobil on 24 July 1973 only stated that the street-widening scheme would have to be taken into consideration, giving no specific indication that the disputed area would be compulsorily ceded to the road.", "18. Although the street-widening plan was made in 1978, the actual widening was not effected until September 1989. On 5 September 1989 Notice of Acquisition No. 1391 was published in Gazette No. 2439. Again, however, the applicant’s plot did not appear to be affected. According to the Government, this was due to the fact that the part of the plot affected by the street-widening scheme had already become part of the street through the earlier procedure, pursuant to sections 12 and 13 of the Streets and Buildings Regulation Law, Cap. 96.", "19. The applicant claims that the first time she became aware of the situation was after receiving a Government Survey Plan on 4 September 1989 which she had requested from the Land Registry for the purpose of filing an objection to taxes imposed on some of her immovable property.", "20. As the original 1959 registration certificate for plot 565 was lost, the applicant requested a further official copy, which she received on 30 December 1992. However, the certificate had been changed in relation to the surface area of the plot and contained the declaration – “Mode of Acquisition: By virtue of purchase by the Government after Compulsory Acquisition and by virtue of cession to the public road”.", "21. On 17 November 1989 the applicant lodged an application with the Supreme Court of Cyprus, sitting at first instance, against both the Municipality of Nicosia and the Republic. She asked the court to declare the Land Registry’s Office decision to take away 2,060 square feet of her land, as well as the decision to declare that piece of land to be part of a public road, void and without any legal effect. The applicant invoked Article 23 (2) and (4) of the Constitution (see Relevant Law below).", "22. On 22 January 1990 the application was fixed for directions before the Supreme Court on 16 March 1990. On 23 January 1990 the Republic filed its opposition. On 16 March 1990 the court directed the Municipality to file its opposition by 23 April 1990. On that date as well as on 15 May 1990 and 11 June 1990, the Municipality applied for consecutive extensions. The applicant’s lawyer stated on each occasion that he did not object. On 20 June 1990 the Municipality filed its opposition. On 19 September 1990 the applicant filed her observations. On 6 December 1990 and 8 February 1991 the Republic and the Municipality applied for an extension of the time-limit for filing their observations in reply. These observations were filed on 14 April 1991 and 8 May 1991. On 12 June 1991 and 13 September 1991 the applicant’s lawyer was granted two further extensions for submitting additional observations.", "23. On 22 January 1992 the Supreme Court reserved its decision, which was not rendered until 2 February 1993.", "24. On 8 December 1992 the applicant transferred the ownership of plot 565 to her children by way of donation. According to the relevant Declaration of Transfer submitted by the Government, she transferred the totality of her legal title in plot 565 without any reservation whatsoever. This fact was not brought to the knowledge of the Supreme Court by the applicant.", "25. According to the applicant, as she was seriously ill, she transferred the ownership of 21,428 square feet of land out of the total 23,488 square feet which she had originally held in 1959, with a half share to each to her two children – Mrs A. Christoforou and Dr G.A. Serghides. The remaining 2,060 square feet which she did not transfer is the disputed area. The entry of this transfer in the Land Registry Office appears to have been made on 23 February 1993.", "26. On 2 February 1993, the Supreme Court rejected the application as out of time, it having been filed more than seventy-five days after Notice No. 612 had been published in the Official Gazette. It held that the letter of 24 July 1973 to Mobil from the Municipality constituted sufficient notice. It further held that the acts and/or actions of the Municipality of Nicosia and the Republic of Cyprus as regards the expropriation of 2060 square feet of the applicant’s land were not executory administrative acts, and thus could not be annulled by virtue of Article 146 of the Constitution. It concluded that the street-widening scheme did not amount to a deprivation of property but only to a restriction on property having regard to the total surface area of the property and the affected land.", "27. On 9 March 1993, the applicant filed an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court.", "28. On 5 September 1996 the parties were notified by the Registrar that the appeal was fixed for hearing on 12 December 1996. On that date the lawyer for the Municipality applied for an adjournment of the hearing, to which the applicant’s lawyer did not object. On 20 January 1997 the Supreme Court adjourned the hearing for want of time. On 3 April 1997 the hearing commenced but was not completed. On 15 May 1997 then on 1 July 1997 the hearing was further adjourned upon applications made by the lawyers of the applicant and the Municipality respectively. The hearing was completed on 10 September 1997 and judgment was reserved.", "29. On 27 February 1998 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on a procedural point, without examining the merits of the case. It held that, as the applicant had transferred her property, she no longer had locus standi in respect of the land taken by the Municipality in 1978.", "30. In neither of the procedures before the Supreme Court did the applicant ever contend that she had had no notice of the publication of the street-widening scheme that affected her property." ]	[ 3, 9 ]
[ "9. The applicant was born in 1934 and lives in Katowice, Poland.", "10. On 13 November 1981 the Katowice District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) declared the applicant the sole heir of his mother’s estate. Consequently, he became a co-owner of an apartment building situated in Katowice. The building was owned in equal parts by the applicant and his brother, Mr M. P., who had inherited his share of the property from their father in 1973. It consisted of two separate apartments, a staircase and several rooms situated in the basement and in the attic.", "11. On 10 January 1983 Mr M.P. instituted non-contentious proceedings (postępowanie nieprocesowe) before the Katowice District Court in which he sought a ruling on how the property should be used by the co-owners.", "12. The Government averred that the proceedings were stayed between 1 March and 11 November 1983 because the parties had failed to make a downpayment to cover expert fees. The applicant claimed that he had made the required payment on time.", "13. The Government submitted that before 1 May 1993 the trial court had held fifteen hearings and that the applicant had failed to attend six of them. The applicant contested that submission.", "14. Before 1 May 1993 the presiding judge on two occasions inspected the property.", "15. Between 17 August and 7 December 1993 the trial court held five hearings. The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to attend three of them and that one of these absences had not been justified. The applicant claimed that he had attended all five hearings.", "16. During the hearing held on 11 January 1994 the trial court dismissed two requests concerning evidence submitted by the applicant. It also suggested a friendly settlement to the parties, but to no avail.", "17. On 25 January 1994 the Katowice District Court decided that the applicant should have exclusive access to a room situated in the attic and that he should share a garden with his brother. Both parties appealed to the Katowice Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) against that decision.", "18. On 25 October 1994 the Regional Court held the first hearing, which was adjourned because of the applicant’s absence. The applicant submitted that he had not attended the hearing because he had not been served with the summons.", "19. On 24 November 1994 the Katowice Regional Court quashed the judgment of the District Court except for a part concerning the division of the garden and remitted the case to the first-instance court. The Regional Court considered that the decision to award the applicant exclusive access to a room situated in the attic could lead to further conflicts between the parties. It also pointed out that on several occasions the applicant had changed his claims and that the District Court had failed to take into account certain proposals submitted by the plaintiff in the first-instance proceedings.", "20. On 28 January 1995 Mr M. P. died and was replaced as a party to the proceedings by his widow, Mrs K. P. and his son, Mr L. P. During the hearing held on 14 March 1995 the District Court stayed the proceedings to allow them to obtain a declaration of heirs. The proceedings were resumed on 21 August 1995.", "21. The next hearing was held on 19 October 1995. On 13 November 1995 the judge visited the property.", "22. The Government submitted that during the hearing held on 19 March 1996 the applicant had asked the court to take evidence from two expert witnesses. The applicant disputed that submission.", "23. Between 1 August and 28 November 1996 the District Court held four hearings. The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to attend the first of these hearings. The applicant disagreed with that submission.", "24. During the hearing held on 4 March 1997 the court allowed the applicant’s request and appointed an expert witness. On 23 December 1997 the witness submitted his report. The Government submitted that a delay in taking evidence from the expert witness resulted from the trial court’s “unsuccessful attempts to find an expert who was able to prepare the opinion”.", "25. On 10 March and 7 May 1998 the District Court held hearings.", "26. On 27 May 1998 the presiding judge and the parties visited the property. The applicant refused to sign the record of the survey because he considered that it was not objective.", "27. The next hearing was held on 16 June 1998. The applicant was absent for health reasons.", "28. On 19 August 1998 the applicant challenged the presiding judge. On 24 August 1998 the challenge was dismissed by the District Court but the applicant appealed to the Katowice Regional Court.", "29. On 25 August 1998 the District Court held a hearing. The Government submitted that it had been adjourned since the applicant had failed to attend it and his challenge to the judge had not been decided. The applicant claimed that he had not received the summons for that hearing.", "30. On 14 October 1998 the Katowice Regional Court dismissed as manifestly ill-founded the applicant’s appeal against the District Court’s decision of 24 August 1998.", "31. On 16 December 1998 the applicant filed with the Katowice District Court a written statement in which he complained about a delay in the proceedings and submitted several requests concerning evidence.", "32. On 17 December 1998 and 25 February 1999 the District Court held hearings.", "33. On 5 March 1999 the President of the Katowice Regional Court responded to the applicant’s complaint of 5 January 1999 about the excessive length of the proceedings in his case. He pointed out that the case involved both legal and factual complexity and that both parties had changed their claims on many occasions. Furthermore, he noted that fifteen hearings had taken place since 24 November 1994. The inspection of the property on 27 May 1998 had been necessary since a new judge had taken over the case and in order to establish the actual condition of the house. The President concluded that in those circumstances the court could not be blamed for the lack of activity in the case.", "34. On 11 March 1999 the Katowice District Court decided that rooms situated in the attic should be used exclusively by the plaintiffs, whereas a room in the basement should be shared with the applicant. Both parties appealed to the Katowice Regional Court.", "35. On 16 June 1999 the Katowice Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the District Court’s decision rejecting as lodged out of time his request to supplement the judgment (wniosek o uzupełnienie wyroku).", "36. On 7 July 1999 the Katowice Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The court pointed out that the applicant contributed to a delay in the proceedings by submitting and changing numerous requests and appeals and refusing to settle the case.", "37. On 6 September 1999 the applicant filed a cassation appeal but it was rejected by the Katowice Regional Court on 29 September 1999.", "38. On 11 October 1999 the applicant lodged with the Supreme Court an appeal against the Regional Court’s decision rejecting his cassation appeal. On 2 February 2000 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal." ]	[ 3 ]
[ "9. The applicant, born in 1959, was an Egyptian national at the time of the events complained of. He has since obtained Netherlands nationality and, as far as the Court is aware, is at present living in the Netherlands.", "10. The applicant first arrived in the Netherlands in 1985. That year he met Ms R., a Netherlands national. On 16 January 1987 a daughter, S., was born to the couple, who were not married and were not living together. By a decision of 12 February 1987, the Deventer District Court judge (kantonrechter) appointed the applicant as the auxiliary guardian (toeziend voogd) of S., Ms R. as her mother ipso jure being her guardian (voogdes).", "11. At some time in or around August 1987, the applicant moved in with Ms R. and their daughter in the house of Ms R.’s mother. They lived together for about a year.", "12. The applicant went to the Middle East in July 1988 and stayed there for some two and a half years. During this time, contact between the applicant on the one hand and Ms R. and S. on the other was limited to the exchange of some letters.", "13. The applicant returned to the Netherlands in early 1991. The applicant states that he saw S. every two weeks until 1993. Despite the applicant’s repeated requests, Ms R. refused to give him permission to recognise (erkennen) S.", "14. Ms R. contracted a terminal illness. On 9 June 1993 she made a will in which she expressed the wish that, after her death, her brother Mr H.R. should have guardianship of her daughter, S. In January 1994 the applicant instigated summary injunction proceedings (kort geding) before the President of the Zwolle Regional Court (arrondissementsrechtbank), seeking an order for Ms R. to give him permission to recognise S. On 25 January 1994 the President gave a judgment refusing to grant the injunction sought. The President considered that Ms R. had not abused her power to withhold permission to the applicant’s recognition of S., since the change of surname which such recognition would entail for S. could not be deemed to be in her best interests. However, the President added by way of obiter dictum that it was important for both the applicant and his daughter that contacts between them be continued. The President therefore thought it desirable that S. spend every other weekend with her father.", "15. In a further, supplementary will dated 7 February 1994 Ms R. stated that she had agreed with another of her brothers, Mr J.R., that after her death S. would be placed with his family. Ms R. further stated that it was her express wish that the applicant should not visit her daughter as this would seriously disrupt the life of the family in which S. was to be raised. Ms R. also expressed the opinion that it would be contrary to the best interests of her daughter if the applicant were to obtain access to S. According to Ms R., the applicant had no fixed abode, no residence permit, no employment and no financial means; he would only use the care for his daughter as a pretext for obtaining a residence permit in the Netherlands and thus be entitled to social-security benefits. Prior to her illness, the applicant had not shown much interest in S., nor had he contributed financially to S.’s upbringing.", "16. Ms R. died on 15 February 1994. In conformity with her wishes, her brother, Mr H.R., was granted guardianship of S. and she was placed in Mr J.R.’s family. The applicant saw S. once every three weeks under an arrangement with the R. family.", "17. Following Ms R.’s death, the applicant requested the Deventer Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages (ambtenaar van de burgerlijke stand – “the Deventer Registrar”) to draw up a deed of recognition and to enter this into the register of births. By a letter of 18 February 1994, the Deventer Registrar notified the applicant of his refusal to do so, being of the opinion that Egyptian law, which did not provide for the recognition of children, applied.", "18. On 28 February 1994 the applicant lodged a request pursuant to Article 1:29 of the Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek) with the Zwolle Regional Court asking that the Deventer Registrar be ordered to draw up the deed of recognition and enter it in the appropriate registers. Although the Regional Court agreed with the applicant that Netherlands law applied, it nevertheless refused to grant the request on 19 October 1994. It considered that, when alive, Ms R. had always withheld her permission for the applicant’s recognition of S.; it had not been established that there was family life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention; following Ms R.’s death somebody other than the applicant had been granted the guardianship of S.; and S. was, moreover, not living with the applicant.", "19. Meanwhile, in June 1994, the applicant requested the Maastricht Regional Court to grant him access to S. every other weekend, as had been recommended by the President of the Zwolle Regional Court. He submitted that Mr H.R. was frustrating his right to regular and undisturbed access to his daughter. At the hearing in those proceedings on 3 October 1994, Mr H.R. and Mr J.R. stated that there was not and never had been family life between the applicant and S.; that the applicant only wanted regular access to S. in order to obtain a residence permit; that S. was settling into her new family; that S. called Mr J.R. “Daddy”; that S. did not enjoy the applicant’s visits; and that she did not trust him. In reply, the applicant stated that S. was very important to him; that the late Ms R. had been heavily influenced by her overbearing mother; that unbeknownst to Ms R.’s mother the applicant had continued the relationship with Ms R. after they had stopped living together; and that it was Ms R.’s mother who had told S. not to call the applicant “Daddy”.", "20. At the conclusion of the hearing the Regional Court, being of the opinion that there was “family life” between the applicant and S., decided provisionally that the contacts between the applicant and S. were to continue at the offices of the Child Welfare Board (Raad voor de Kinder-bescherming), and that it would take a decision based on a report to be drawn up by that organisation.", "21. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeal (gerechtshof) of Arnhem against the decision of the Zwolle Regional Court not to order the Deventer Registrar to draw up a deed of recognition. He argued that Ms R.’s refusal to consent to his recognition of S. no longer had any effect after her death. That being so, there was no call for the courts to go into the question whether or not there existed family life between the applicant and S. Should the Court of Appeal nevertheless be of the opinion that it ought to examine this question and that a balancing exercise as required by Article 8 of the Convention was called for, the applicant submitted that he was the natural father of S.; that not only had there been a meaningful relationship between Ms R. and himself, they had also lived together as a family for some time and they had contributed equally to the care and upbringing of S. The applicant also referred to his request lodged with the Maastricht Regional Court to have his rights of access to S. increased. While he conceded that during the mother’s lifetime an unwanted recognition might have constituted a disproportionate interference with her private and family life, after her death only the interests of the applicant and the child remained to be balanced against each other, and there were no weighty interests on the side of the child which militated against recognition.", "22. The applicant lastly submitted that it had been his desire from the outset to obtain guardianship (voogdij) of S. after her mother’s death and that S. should live with him. In order for a request for a change of guardianship to stand any chance of success, the applicant ought first to have recognised his daughter. The applicant urged the Court of Appeal to deal with his request speedily as he was being threatened with expulsion, the Deputy Minister of Justice (Staatssecretaris van Justitie) not accepting that there was family life between the applicant and S. Recognition would serve to confirm officially the natural ties between father and daughter.", "23. At the hearing before the Court of Appeal on 8 December 1994, the applicant submitted, inter alia, that he had always done everything possible to ensure S.’s happiness but that Ms R.’s family had never accepted him. However, the relationship between S. and him was very strong.", "24. In a decision of 17 January 1995 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It held that the explicit refusal of Ms R. to consent to the applicant’s recognition of S. had not ceased to have effect after her death, as she had stated in her will that she maintained the refusal which she had considered to be in the best interests of S.", "25. The Court of Appeal further found that, even assuming that family life had at one time existed between the applicant and S., that tie had been broken by subsequent events. The contacts which had taken place between the applicant on the one hand and Ms R. and S. on the other had been so sparse and irregular, and so devoid of mutual commitment, that they could no longer be regarded as constituting family life. The Court of Appeal went on to hold, however, that even if it had to be assumed that family life still existed, the interests of the child should be its foremost consideration. These interests would be best served by allowing S. to grow up in the family where she had been placed after the death of her mother and in accordance with her mother’s explicit last wishes, and where she received the care she needed. The recognition intended by the applicant was aimed at bringing about a change in this situation and, for that reason, could not be held to be in the best interests of S. The Court of Appeal found that this was all the less so as the applicant had never had the care of S., had not previously indicated that he actually wished to care for her and, in addition, had not substantiated his claim that he would be able to discharge his duty of care in a responsible manner. Moreover, recognition would mean that S. would automatically take the applicant’s surname, whereas she now had the same surname as the other members of the family in which she was growing up.", "26. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), arguing, inter alia, that the Court of Appeal had been wrong to hold that the refusal of Ms R. to consent to the applicant’s recognition of S. could still have effect after her death. Moreover, the relevant legal provisions did not require that, in order for the natural father to recognise a child following the death of the mother, there should be family life between them. In any event, contrary to what the Court of Appeal had found, there was family life between the applicant and S., so that the Court of Appeal’s finding on this point was incomprehensible.", "27. According to the applicant, the Court of Appeal had also been wrong to hold that it would be in the best interests of S. to be raised in Mr J.R.’s family. The legislature had, on the contrary, deemed that recognition by the natural father would serve a child’s interests in a case such as the present where the mother had died. Moreover, recognition as such would not entail any changes in the child’s living arrangements. Such changes could only be brought about if the applicant were to file a request for a change in the guardianship arrangements, in which event the interests of the child could be assessed at that time. Finally, the applicant submitted that the Court of Appeal could not have properly assessed what was in the best interests of S. without having sought the opinion of the Child Welfare Board.", "28. By a decision of 8 December 1995, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on points of law. It agreed with the applicant that Ms R.’s refusal to consent to his recognition of S. – to which she had been entitled, such a right having been provided by law in order to protect the interests of mothers in her position – was no longer valid after her death. The Court of Appeal had given additional reasons for its decision not to order the Deventer Registrar to draw up a deed of recognition, even assuming that family life did exist. This reasoning, in the view of the Supreme Court, was sufficient in itself to support the Court of Appeal’s decision. In this regard the Supreme Court pointed out that, as a result of a valid recognition, legally recognised family ties (familierechtelijke betrekkingen) would be created between the child and the person who had recognised the child. This far-reaching consequence meant that recognition could affect interests of the child which were protected by Article 8 of the Convention. Although recognition could serve these interests, it could similarly harm them. Article 8 had thus required the Court of Appeal to balance the applicant’s interest in having the relationship between himself and S. confirmed as a legally recognised family tie, assuming that this relationship constituted family life, against the interest of the child in continuing to live with the legal family in which she had lived ever since her mother had died, and to keep that family’s surname. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeal had adequately acquitted itself of this task.", "29. Given that the applicant had never made a secret of the fact that he intended to obtain guardianship of S. and to have her live with him, the Court of Appeal had been correct to take into account S.’s interest in not having her residence with Mr J.R.’s family threatened by the outcome of further legal proceedings. Finally, the legal provisions in force had not required the Court of Appeal to seek advice from the Child Welfare Board, and it had been up to the Court of Appeal itself to determine whether or not it needed such advice.", "30. During and following the proceedings before the Supreme Court, a change in S.’s living arrangements occurred; the Supreme Court was unable to take these new circumstances into account as, pursuant to Article 419 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering), it was bound by the facts as established by the Court of Appeal and contained in the case file.", "31. In September 1995 S. returned to live with her maternal grandmother. According to the Child Welfare Board, one of the reasons for this was the distress caused to the family of her uncle, Mr J.R., by the applicant’s seeking access to S. On 31 January 1996 the Child Welfare Board requested the juvenile judge (kinderrechter) of the Amsterdam Regional Court to issue a supervision order (ondertoezichtstelling) in respect of S. During a hearing on 21 February 1996, the juvenile judge stated that for the time being it would be best if S. stayed with her grandmother, but that there should be contact between the applicant and S. and that the applicant’s future role in the life of S. should be further examined. On 6 March 1996 the juvenile judge issued a supervision order and appointed a family guardian (gezinsvoogd).", "32. On 6 November 1996 the Deventer Registrar refused to comply with a new request from the applicant to draw up a deed of recognition and enter it in the register of births. The applicant again turned to the Zwolle Regional Court, submitting that the circumstances leading to the rejection of his first request had changed as S. was no longer living with her uncle. He further stated that he was concerned about his daughter’s well-being in view of the advanced age of the grandmother and the latter’s overbearing character. Moreover, the applicant submitted that he was capable of looking after S. himself.", "33. The Regional Court rejected the applicant’s request on 26 May 1997. It considered that the change in S.’s living arrangements had been brought about by the juvenile judge and could not be held to be to the detriment of S. Moreover, the persons responsible for the care and upbringing of S. were in receipt of assistance as a result of the supervision order. The change in the living arrangements could therefore not, as such, alter the result in the balancing exercise that had been carried out by the Arnhem Court of Appeal. Noting that the applicant was still attempting to obtain guardianship of S., the Regional Court finally considered that the recognition of S. by the applicant would not be in her best interests.", "34. The applicant did not file an appeal against the Regional Court’s decision of 26 May 1997.", "35. Following the entry into force of the Law of 6 April 1995, which abolished the institution of auxiliary guardianship, the applicant is no longer S.’s auxiliary guardian.", "36. The applicant, who since the events complained of has taken Netherlands nationality, has married another woman by whom he has a son." ]	[]
[ "6. The applicant was born in 1915 and lives in Kraków, Poland.", "7. The proceedings in question, which concerned the distribution of an inheritance, began on 10 September 1986. On that date the applicant’s sister-in-law, Z.S.-G. filed with the Warsaw District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) an application for distribution of the estate left by the applicant’s deceased brother.", "8. Between 10 September 1986 and 11 June 1991 the court held seven hearings (of which two were adjourned) and obtained four expert reports.", "9. On 11 June 1991 the District Court gave a partial decision (postanowienie częściowe). On 14 April 1992 that decision was quashed on appeal by the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki). The case was remitted to the District Court.", "10. In the course of the subsequent proceedings the District Court held a number of hearings and obtained several expert reports.", "11. On 18 November 1998 the District Court gave its second partial decision, determining the assets which constituted the estate left by the applicant’s brother. It further proceeded to the sharing out of the property in the estate. It that connection, it needed to obtain fresh evidence from experts.", "12. On 28 May 2001 the Warsaw District Court gave a decision. On 26 June 2001 E.D., one of the parties to the proceedings, appealed. The applicant appealed on 28 June 2001. On 6 August 2001 the District Court refused to proceed with her appeal as she had failed to comply with a number of procedural requirements. \nIt appears that the proceedings are pending." ]	[ 1 ]
[ "9. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Bielsko-Biała.", "10. On 10 August 1991 the applicant was arrested by the police on suspicion of having committed homicide. On 12 August 1991 the Bielsko-Biała District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy) charged the applicant with homicide and uttering threats, and detained him on remand.", "11. On 30 April 1992 the Bielsko-Biała Regional Prosecutor lodged a bill of indictment with the Bielsko-Biała Regional Court (Sąd Rejonowy). The applicant was indicted on the charges of homicide and uttering threats.", "12. The trial began on 16 June 1992.", "13. On 14 October 1992 Court quashed the order for the applicant’s detention and released him. The Regional Prosecutor appealed. \nThe Katowice Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on 4 November 1992. It held that a “reasonable suspicion” that the applicant had committed the offences with which he had been charged was no longer justified because S.U., the witness who had incriminated him in the investigation, had fundamentally changed his original testimony.", "14. Between 16 June 1992 and 1 May 1993 the trial court held fourteen hearings. It heard evidence from twenty lay witnesses and one expert witness.", "15. Between 4 May 1993 and 25 May 1994 the Bielsko-Biała Regional Court held ten hearings and heard evidence from forty-one witnesses and two experts. It needed to rehear evidence from some witnesses several times.", "16. On 25 May 1994 the court acquitted the applicant on all charges. On 12 October 1994 the Bielsko-Biała Regional Prosecutor appealed against the acquittal.", "17. The appeal was heard before the Katowice Court of Appeal on 9 March 1995. The court quashed the contested judgment and remitted the case to the Bielsko-Biała Regional Prosecutor, holding that a further investigation should be carried out. In particular, the Court of Appeal ordered the prosecutor to reconstruct the scene of the crime and to obtain evidence from experts in psychology. It considered that in order to assess the credibility of evidence given by S.U., the main prosecution witness, it was necessary to diagnose his personality and establish his perception skills.", "18. On 12 May 1995 the Bielsko-Biała Regional Prosecutor asked the Institute of Forensic Experts (Instytut Ekspertyz Sądowych) in Cracow to prepare a comprehensive report on S.U.’s psychological profile. Furthermore, since in the course of the original investigation the prosecution had already obtained two, albeit inconsistent, reports from psychologists, the prosecutor also adduced copies of those reports and asked experts from the Institute to resolve contradictions.", "19. The experts set the dates of the examination for 19 December 1995 and for 12 February 1996 respectively. However, S.U. did not keep his appointment for the examination on either of these dates. Eventually, he appeared before the experts on 9 May 1996 and was examined by them on that day. Their report was ready on 6 September 1996.", "20. On 30 December 1996 the Bielsko-Biała Regional Prosecutor lodged a new bill of indictment with the Bielsko-Biała Regional Court. The applicant was again indicted on the charges of homicide and uttering threats.", "21. On 27 March 1997 the trial court remitted the case to the Bielsko-Biała Regional Prosecutor, holding that the prosecution had not complied with the orders given by the Katowice Court of Appeal on 9 March 1995. They had not, among other things, reconstructed the scene of the crime.", "22. On 30 April 1997 the Bielsko-Biała Regional Prosecutor indicted the applicant on the same charges for the third time.", "23. The retrial started on 4 September 1997. The subsequent hearings were held on 4 November 1997, 6 January and 8 April 1998. On 12 February 1998 the court cancelled a hearing because the applicant was ill.", "24. On 9 June 1998 the trial was adjourned since a new judge rapporteur had in the meantime been appointed and needed to study the case-file.", "25. The trial was to be resumed on 26 March 1999 but it was again postponed. The applicant was absent at that hearing. He was also absent at the hearing listed for 7 May 1999. The applicant’s lawyer informed the court that he had left for Greece in search of odd jobs and that he would be absent for some four months. In fact, the applicant returned after three weeks. \nAlso, at that time, the court found that the witness S.U. had left his place of residence without indicating his new address and that his whereabouts were unknown. In the circumstances, the court stayed the proceedings.", "26. On 7 November 2000, at the applicant’s request, the proceedings were resumed. In 2001 the Regional Court held three hearings. They took place on 20 April, 15 June and 31 October respectively.", "27. Further hearings were scheduled for 4 January, 6 February, 6 March, 9 April and 14 May 2002. The court heard evidence from twenty witnesses. \nAt the hearing held on 9 April 2002 the court, at the Regional Prosecutor’s request, ordered that evidence from a DNA identification test of several hairs found on the victim be obtained to determine whether they belonged to the applicant. However, on 13 May 2002, experts from the Forensic Laboratory of the Silesian Regional Police Headquarters informed the court that it was not possible for them to make any DNA identification of the specimens as they had to be analysed through a chondrosome test, which only the Cracow Institute of Forensic Experts or the Bydgoszcz Forensic Institute could carry out. On 20 May 2002 the court asked the Cracow Institute to make the relevant test and adjourned the trial sine die. \nIn the meantime, the Regional Court had tried to establish the whereabouts of S.U., who was a homeless person. It appears that those efforts have so far been unsuccessful.\nThe proceedings are pending." ]	[ 3 ]
[ "8. The applicant was born in 1918 and lives in Kraków, Poland.", "9. On 28 May 1971 the Chrzanów District Court (Sąd Powiatowy) gave a decision (postanowienie) declaring that, under the will of M.H. (the applicant’s mother-in-law), her estate be inherited by her three daughters Z.Z., H.Ś.-Z. and M.K. (the applicant’s wife) and by her granddaughter (M.S.). \nOn 30 June 1977 the Kraków-Śródmieście District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) declared that the applicant had inherited the estate of his late wife.", "10. On 15 October 1977 Z.Z., H.Ś.-Z. and M.S. (“the petitioners”) filed with the Kraków District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) an application for distribution of the estate of M.H. The estate consisted of three plots of land and a house and had so far been held in individual shares. The applicant was a party to these proceedings as a successor to his wife.", "11. On 30 May 1979 the Kraków District Court gave a decision (postanowienie) distributing the estate. Upon the applicant’s appeal, on 16 November 1979 the Kraków Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) partly amended the first-instance decision.", "12. On 3 October 1980, on an extraordinary appeal lodged by the Minister of Justice, the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) set aside both above decisions and remitted the case to the court of first instance.", "13. On 29 January 1985 the District Court gave a decision. On 11 September 1985 the Regional Court quashed that decision and remitted the case. On 16 June 1986 the District Court gave a subsequent decision. On 18 September 1987 the Regional Court set it aside.", "14. On 26 October 1988 the District Court gave a decision. On 3 February 1989 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s further appeal against that decision.", "15. On 14 September 1989, on an extraordinary appeal lodged by the Minister of Justice, the Supreme Court partly quashed the decisions of both lower courts, and remitted the case to the District Court. On 14 September 1989 the decision of the District Court of 26 October 1988, in respect of the manner in which the estate was distributed, became final. The subsequent proceedings concerned solely the amount of payments for the respective shares in the estate.", "16. Prior to 1 May 1993 there were 38 hearings held in the case before the District Court, the Regional Court and the Supreme Court. During that period the courts dealing with the case heard evidence from at least fifteen witnesses and five experts. There were eleven expert reports submitted to the courts and five inspections of the site took place. On five occasions the applicant challenged the judges dealing with the case which resulted in a delay of approximately ten months. The proceedings were stayed on two occasions (on 23 May 1980 by the Supreme Court and on 13 July 1982 by the District Court) which resulted in a delay of approximately eleven months.", "17. On 1 July 1993 the District Court ordered that a fresh report from expert R.L be obtained. On 15 September 1993 the applicant challenged that expert and requested the court to obtain an additional report from expert A.S.", "18. On 11 October 1993 expert R.L. submitted his report to the District Court. There were certain difficulties in the preparation of that report which were caused by the parties. On 6 November 1993 the applicant again requested the court to obtain a report from another expert.", "19. On 10 November 1993 the applicant challenged the presiding judge. On 18 November 1993 the District Court dismissed that challenge as unfounded.", "20. On 30 November 1993 the applicant requested the court to issue an interim order and to enter a warning in the land register about the proceedings related to the estate.", "21. On 1 December 1993 the petitioners submitted their observations on the expert report. On 10 January 1994 the applicant submitted his observations. He also requested the court to obtain a report from another expert. On 11 January 1994 the applicant filed further pleadings with the court.", "22. On 17 January 1994 the District Court held a hearing. It dismissed the applicant’s request of 30 November 1993. On 18 February 1994 the applicant asked the court to call a witness and submitted his further observations on the expert report.", "23. On 10 March 1994 expert R.L. submitted to the court yet another report. On 21 April 1994 the petitioners submitted their observations on that report. In principle, they agreed with its conclusions but requested that a further supplementary report be prepared.", "24. On 4 July 1994 the applicant requested the court to issue an interim order. The District Court set a hearing for 15 July 1994. It was adjourned to 9 September 1994 at the petitioners’ request. On 22 August 1994 the applicant challenged the presiding judge.", "25. On 9 September 1994 the court held a hearing and heard the expert. On 21 September 1994 the court dismissed the applicant’s request of 4 July 1994. On 30 September 1994 the expert submitted his reply to the applicant’s observations on his report.", "26. On 19 October 1994 the applicant appealed against the decision of 21 September 1994. On 5 December 1994 the applicant rectified procedural defects in his appeal and paid the fee due for lodging the appeal. On 22 December 1994 the Kraków Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. On 2 January 1995 the case file was received at the registry of the District Court.", "27. On 28 April 1995 the applicant filed with the court his reply to the submissions of the expert of 30 September 1994. On 5 May 1995 the court held a hearing and heard evidence from two witnesses and the expert R.L.", "28. On 16 August 1995 the applicant asked the court to obtain a report from another expert. On 18 September 1995 the applicant asked the court to issue an interim order to secure his claims in the proceedings. On 22 September 1995 the court held a hearing. It refused the applicant’s request for an interim order and invited the parties to settle the case. On the same date, on the joint request of the parties, the court stayed the proceedings.", "29. On 22 November 1995 the applicant asked the court that the proceedings be resumed as he disagreed with the amount of payment proposed to him by other petitioners (within the framework of the settlement). On 6 December 1995 the court refused.", "30. On 17 January 1996 the applicant again asked the court – this time successfully – to resume the proceedings. On 16 February 1996 the court held a hearing. It heard evidence from two witnesses and imposed a fine on another witness who did not appear at the hearing. A hearing fixed for 22 March 1996 was adjourned at the petitioners’ request.", "31. At the hearing held on 23 April 1996 the court heard evidence from one witness. The court gave all petitioners a time-limit of fourteen days for the submission of their proposals concerning re-evaluation of items included in the expert report.", "32. On 6 May 1996 the applicant asked the court to obtain a report from another expert. The court granted that request and attempted to find an expert. Two experts refused to prepare a report. On some later unspecified date expert J.W. agreed to prepare a report.", "33. On 11 February 1997 expert J.W. submitted his report to the court. On 14 April 1997 the petitioners contested the report.", "34. On 29 April 1997 the court ordered expert J.W. to prepare a supplementary report, taking into account the market value of the estate. On 19 May 1997 the expert replied that he was not able to do so. On the same day the court ordered yet another expert, W.O., to prepare a report in order to determine the market value of the estate (taking as the starting point 26 October 1988, the date on which the court had decided to grant the estate to S.Z.).", "35. On 12 June 1997 the court, in the presence of the expert and the petitioners, held a view of the estate. On 27 June 1997 the expert submitted his report. On 25 July 1997 the petitioners requested the court to reschedule a hearing fixed for 11 September 1997. On 29 July 1997 the court refused that request.", "36. On 8 August 1997 the applicant submitted his observations on the expert report, in which he objected to its findings. On 27 August 1997 the applicant requested the court to summon expert J.W. in order to explain the differences in the value of the estate between the two expert reports.", "37. On 11 September 1997 the court held a hearing. The court closed the examination of the case. On 12 September 1997 the applicant requested the court to obtain yet another expert report.", "38. On 25 September 1997 the District Court gave a decision and ordered S.Z. to pay off the applicant’s share in the estate. It dismissed the applicant’s claim for the maintenance expenses and for the house to be divided because these issues had already been determined in the decision of 26 October 1988 (res iudicata). The court based its decision exclusively on the report of 27 June 1997 prepared by expert W.O., which assessed the market value of the estate. It regarded the reports prepared by experts A.S. and J.W. outdated. In respect of the report prepared by expert R.L. the court considered that it should not have been taken into account.", "39. On 16 October 1997 the applicant appealed and asked the court to exempt him from a fee due for lodging an appeal. On 22 and 23 October the petitioners filed their appeals. On 25 November 1997 the District Court decided to exempt the applicant from the appeal fee.", "40. On 17 December 1997 the case file was transferred to the Regional Court. On 18 December 1997 the applicant challenged the impartiality of two judges of that court. On 19 February 1998 the Regional Court held a hearing. It was adjourned until 3 April 1998 due to the absence of a witness. On the latter date the court heard evidence from a witness and expert W.O. The court closed examination of the case and adjourned delivery of a decision until 8 April 1998. On 7 April 1998 the court dismissed the applicant’s challenge of 18 December 1997. On 8 April 1998 the Regional Court dismissed both appeals.", "41. On 9 April 1998 the applicant filed a notice of cassation appeal. On 19 May 1998 he requested the Regional Court to be exempted from a court fee due for lodging a cassation appeal. On 1 June 1998 the applicant lodged his cassation appeal. On 5 June 1998 the Regional Court refused the applicant’s request for exemption from the fee. On 10 June 1998 the applicant paid the fee himself.", "42. On 9 December 1998 the Supreme Court heard, and dismissed the applicant’s cassation appeal." ]	[ 3 ]
[ "9. The applicant, Josef Müller, is a Swiss citizen born in 1924. A businessman by profession, he resides in Zurich in Switzerland.", "10. In 1957 and 1959 the applicant acquired three adjacent properties, used for farming purposes, in Niederhasli in the vicinity of Zurich airport. The combined surfaces of the properties amount to approximately 25,500m2. During the ensuing proceedings at issue, there were, apart from an empty storehouse, no constructions on the properties.", "11. In 1966 these properties were attributed to the residential zone, and in 1984 to the commercial zone.", "12. Meanwhile, in 1983, the area of these properties was designated as pertaining to Security Zone I of Zurich airport and therefore the construction height of any new buildings was to be limited to between 21 and 38 meters.", "13. On 8 July 1983 the applicant applied to the President of the Federal Assessment Commission (Eidgenössische Schätzungskommission), requesting the institution of compensation proceedings on account of an alleged de facto expropriation (materielle Expropriation). The request was refused by the Commission in 1984 and, upon appeal, by the Federal Court (Bundesgericht) on 29 May 1986.", "14. On 7 March 1986 the applicant filed a new request for compensation which was declared inadmissible by the Commission “for the time being” (zur Zeit) on 4 February 1987 although, following the designation of new noise protection zones, the Commission decided to resume proceedings in 1988. Against both decisions the applicant filed administrative law appeals which were dismissed by the Federal Court in 1989.", "15. Meanwhile the applicant requested compensation from the Niederhasli municipality for the change in zone of his properties. The case was transmitted successively to the Federal Assessment Commission, the Dielsdorf District Council and the Government of the Canton of Zurich, which in 1990 ordered the Niederhasli municipality to institute compensation proceedings. Against this last decision the applicant filed an appeal with the Administrative Court of the Canton of Zurich, which in 1992 found that it was up to the Cantonal Assessment Commission rather than the Niederhasli municipality to conduct the compensation proceedings. These proceedings were then instituted before the Cantonal Assessment Commission, though on 30 June 1995 the Federal Assessment Commission decided to suspend the proceedings until the Federal Court had given its judgment.", "16. Meanwhile, the Federal Assessment Commission dismissed on 26 October 1990 the applicant’s request for compensation of 7 March 1986 as, inter alia, there were still adequate possibilities for the applicant to use his properties.", "17. On 6 February 1991 the applicant filed an administrative law appeal (Verwaltungsgerichtsbeschwede) with the Federal Court against this decision, requesting compensation for the depreciation in value of his properties on account of the extension and operations of Zurich airport. He also challenged all the Federal Court judges as they had previously sat in other proceedings concerning himself.", "18. By decision of 5 June 1991, the Federal Court dismissed the applicant’s challenge.", "19. The Federal Court then brought the applicant’s administrative appeal to the attention of the Government of the Canton of Zurich, which in its observations requested the court to dismiss the appeal. The Federal Assessment Commission refrained from filing observations. Upon the applicant’s request, the court authorised a further exchange of observations between the parties.", "20. On 19 August 1993 a delegation of the Federal Court visited the applicant’s properties. On that occasion he was informed that other cases concerning noise protection zones at Geneva airport raised similar problems as the applicant’s case, and that they all had to be dealt with together.", "21. On 14 March 1995 the applicant went bankrupt. The proceedings before the Federal Court were suspended and the bankruptcy office of the Küsnacht municipality was requested to inform the court whether the bankruptcy estate, or individual creditors, wished to continue the proceedings. Following an extension of the time-limit, the Küsnacht bankruptcy office filed its reply on 29 January 1997 whereupon the Federal Court resumed proceedings. On 11 March 1997 the applicant informed the court that he wished to continue the proceedings.", "22. On 4 June 1997, upon the Federal Court’s request, the Federal Agency for Examining Materials and Research (Eidgenössische Materialprüfungs- und Forschungsanstalt) submitted a report on the noise nuisance affecting the applicant’s properties. By letter dated 11 June 1997, the applicant expressed his disagreement with the report, whereas the Government of the Canton of Zurich accepted it on 26 June 1997.", "23. On 17 September 1997 the Federal Court conducted a hearing at which the applicant took the floor, complaining, inter alia, of the duration of the proceedings. The court then deliberated in public, whereby the Rapporteur (Referent) explained the legal considerations of his report and proposed to dismiss the applicant’s appeal. In the further discussion, it transpired that the other four judges shared the Rapporteur’s opinion. The presiding judge then read out the operative part of the judgment.", "24. The judgment, numbering 30 pages, was served on the applicant on 9 October 1997. The Federal Court concluded that the situation of the applicant’s properties did not warrant compensation." ]	[ 3 ]
[ "10. The first to fifth applicants were born in 1929, 1970, 1934, 1929 and 1934 respectively and live in Zagreb.", "11. During 1992 the applicants lent various sums of money to a number of agencies that were supposed to pay back the loans within periods ranging from 2 to 12 months and at interest rates ranging from 10 to 30 % per month (so called “financial engineering”). As these agencies failed to re-pay the loans, the applicants instituted civil proceedings against the agencies and their alleged owners.", "12. On 18 October 1993 the applicant filed an action with the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu) seeking payment of his loan in the amount of 10,000 German Marks (DEM).", "13. The preliminary hearing scheduled for 24 January 1994 was adjourned.\nAs on 15 February 1994 the presiding judge resigned from her office, the case was transferred to another judge in October 1996.", "14. The next hearing scheduled for 6 December 2000 was adjourned because the presiding judge was absent.", "15. The hearing scheduled for 20 April 2001 was adjourned because B.J. did not appear. As the documents indicated that she had been released from detention on remand, the court invited the applicant to submit her new address. When the applicant informed the court that he did not know B.J.’s new address, the court requested the Ministry of Interior (Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova Republike Hrvatske) to submit B.J.’s new address. The Ministry of Interior informed the court that B.J. had changed her name into B.Č.", "16. The hearings scheduled for 21 September 2001 and 4 April 2002 were adjourned because B.J. had not collected a notice of the hearing date.\nIt appears that the proceedings are pending before the court of first instance.\nb. Proceedings against B.B.", "17. On 18 October 1993 the applicant filed an action with the Zagreb Municipal Court for re-payment of his loan in the amount of DEM 20,000.", "18. Before the period to be examined by the Court several hearings were held and several adjourned. The hearing scheduled for 18 June 1997 was adjourned because B.B. did not appear. The court invited the applicant to submit the number of the case-file concerning criminal proceedings against B.B. before the same court.\nAs the applicant failed to do so, the court itself found the file number, but was unable to review that file because it was sent to the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu) on 13 June 1997. The court repeated its request to examine the file on 15 November 1998, 15 September 1999 and 5 September 2000.", "19. As neither party appeared at the hearing scheduled for 11 April 2001 the court found that the applicant had withdrawn his claim.\nThe applicant appealed against that decision stating that he had been ill on the date of the hearing. On 23 May 2001 the court invited the applicant to submit evidence as to the fact that he had been ill. The applicant appeared before the court on 13 June 2001 and stated that he had no medical documentation.\nOn 5 July the court sent the case-file to the Zagreb County Court as the appellate court. However that court found that the applicant’s appeal in effect had been a request to resume the proceedings. Consequently, on 22 October 2001 the case-file was returned to the Zagreb Municipal Court.\nIt appears that the proceedings are pending before the Zagreb Municipal Court.", "20. On 6 May 1993 the applicant, together with 244 other plaintiffs, filed an action for re-payment of their loans with the Zagreb Municipal Court. The applicant claimed a sum of DEM 28,000.", "21. Before the period to be examined by the Court two hearings were held.\nOn 17 July 1997 the court dismissed the claims of 43 plaintiffs, but not in respect of the second applicant. As on 24 September 1997 the plaintiffs whose claims were dismissed appealed against that decision, the case file was sent to the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu) on 29 September 1997, for consideration on appeal.", "22. On 14 July 1998 the Zagreb County Court upheld the first instance decision except in respect of one of the plaintiffs.", "23. On 10 February 1999 the Zagreb Municipal Court invited the plaintiffs’ counsel to submit a certificate from the registry of the Zagreb Commercial Court (Trgovački sud u Zagrebu) regarding the legal status of F.I.M.\nOn 10 March 1999 the plaintiffs’ counsel withdrew the claim in respect of F.I.M.", "24. The next hearing took place on 18 June 1999.", "25. At the hearing on 14 October 1999 the court heard Đ.M. and then adopted judgment rejecting all claims. The judgment was served on the plaintiffs’ counsel on 26 September 2000. On 4 October 2000 the plaintiffs’ counsel appealed against the judgment.\nThe Zagreb County Court, as the appellate court, found that the appeal was submitted by Mr Lajnert on behalf of all plaintiffs although he had not had a power of attorney. The case file was therefore returned to the Zagreb Municipal Court on 20 September 2001. On 27 September 2001 the Zagreb Municipal Court invited Mr Lajnert to submit a power of attorney to represent the other plaintiffs. \nIt appears that the proceedings are pending on appeal before the Zagreb County Court.", "26. On 1 June 1993 the applicant, together with 603 other plaintiffs, filed an action with the Zagreb Municipal Court for re-payment of their loans. The applicant claimed DEM 16,500.", "27. Before the period to be taken into account one hearing was held and one was adjourned.", "28. At the next hearing on 2 February 1998 the court invited the plaintiffs to submit additional documentation.\nAlthough they failed to submit that documentation, the next hearing was held on 10 April 2000. The plaintiffs asked the court to hear several witnesses but were unable to submit their addresses.\nOn 10 November 2000 the court invited the plaintiffs to submit further evidence necessary to proceed with the case. The plaintiffs claimed that they were members of the “Association of the Financial Engineering Investors V.M.M.”, but did not submit either its registration certificate or its articles of association. Furthermore, three plaintiffs failed to submit evidence as to their investments into the “financial engineering” and seven plaintiffs failed to submit their addresses.", "29. At the hearing on 15 December 2000 the plaintiffs’ counsel submitted the registration certificate and the articles of association as well as the addresses of the witnesses to be heard.", "30. At the hearing on 31 January 2001 the court heard one witness. It invited again the plaintiffs’ counsel to submit evidence in respect of three plaintiffs as to their investments into the “financial engineering” as well as the addresses of seven plaintiffs.\nOn 22 February 2001 the plaintiffs submitted the requested addresses and asked the court to allow them an additional period of 30 days to submit evidence in respect of three plaintiffs as to their investments into “financial engineering”.\nOn 2 May 2001 the plaintiffs submitted evidence in respect of two plaintiffs as to their investments but were unable to produce such evidence for the third plaintiff. They also changed their claims.", "31. At the next hearing scheduled for 17 September 2001 the court stayed the proceedings because the plaintiffs’ representative did not appear. \nOn 1 October 2001 the applicant filed a request to resume the proceedings.\nIt appears that the proceedings are pending before the court of first instance.\nb. Proceedings against company F.I.S. and its owner, J.S.", "32. On 21 December 1994 the applicant filed an action with the Zagreb Municipal Court for re-payment of his loan in the amount of Swiss Francs (CHF) 15,000.", "33. Before the period to be examined by the Court two hearings were adjourned. It turned out that F.I.S. had ceased to exist and that J.S. had changed her address. In 1995 the court invited the applicant to submit her correct address within 30 days.\nOn 14 May 1998 the court repeated its request.\nOn 25 May 1998 the applicant submitted J.S.’s new address.", "34. On 21 July 1998 the court ordered the applicant to request the Social Welfare Centre (Centar za socijalnu skrb) to appoint a legal representative for J. S.\nOn 11 December 1998 the Zagreb Social Welfare Centre informed the court that by a decision of 8 December 1998 it had appointed a legal representative for J.S.", "35. At the next hearing on 7 April 1999 the representative gave her reply to the applicant’s claim. The applicant informed the court that he had obtained J.S.’s new address and asked the court to invite J.S. to the next hearing.", "36. At the next hearing on 21 May 1999 the applicant was heard. J.S. failed to appear. Her representative asked the court to enclose the case-file concerning the criminal proceedings against J.S. before the same court.\nHowever, the court was unable to enclose the criminal case file as the criminal proceedings against J.S. were still pending.\nAccording to the Government, on 28 December 2000 the court requested the Zagreb Commercial Court’s registry to submit a certificate regarding the legal status of F.I.S. It turned out that on 18 July 2001 the Zagreb Commercial Court had instituted ex officio proceedings for liquidation of F.I.S.", "37. At the next hearing on 19 December 2001 the court concluded the proceedings.", "38. On 5 October 1995 the applicant, together with five other plaintiffs, filed an action with the Zagreb Municipal Court for re-payment of their loans. The applicant claimed a sum of DEM 5,000.", "39. Before the period to be examined by the Court one hearing was adjourned.", "40. A hearing scheduled for 14 May 1998 was adjourned because the defendants did not appear. T.I.A. had ceased to exist and I.A. had failed to collect the notice of the hearing date.", "41. At the hearing on 22 October 1998 the defendants’ counsel gave his reply to the plaintiffs’ claim. The court invited I.A. to give his additional detailed reply to the plaintiffs’ claim within 8 days.", "42. The next hearing scheduled for 7 June 1999 was adjourned because four plaintiffs, including the applicant, who were supposed to be heard, failed to appear. It turned out that the applicant had failed to collect the notice of the hearing date as well as another plaintiff, while two other plaintiffs had changed their addresses.\nOn 21 July 1999 the plaintiffs’ counsel submitted their addresses.", "43. The next hearing scheduled for 2 April 2001 was adjourned because I.A. did not appear.", "44. At hearing on 15 October 2001 the court heard one of the plaintiffs and then asked the plaintiffs to specify their claims and submit further documents.\nIt appears that the proceedings are pending before the court of first instance.\nb. Proceedings against company M.J.B. and its owner, B.J.", "45. On 5 October 1995 the applicant, together with ten other plaintiffs, filed an action for re-payment of their loans with the Zagreb Municipal Court. The applicant claimed a sum of DEM 5,000.", "46. Before the period to be examined by the Court one hearing was adjourned.", "47. On 12 January 1998 the court requested the Ministry of Interior to submit B.J.’s correct address.\nOn 3 February 1998 the Ministry of Interior informed the court that B.J.’s address was unknown.", "48. The next hearing scheduled for 2 April 2001 was adjourned as B.J. did not appear. The documents showed that she was unknown at the address indicated. According to the registry of the Ministry of Interior, however, she remained registered at the same address.\nOn 21 May 2001 the plaintiffs’ counsel asked the court to request the Social Welfare Centre to appoint a legal representative for B.J.\nOn 24 May 2001 the court invited again the Ministry of Interior to submit B.J.’s address.\nOn 7 September 2001 the court ordered the Zagreb Police Department (Policijska uprava zagrebačka) to make an on the spot inquiry about B.J.’s address. The police found out that she had left the address where she was registered and that her new address was unknown.\nIt appears that the proceedings are pending before the court of first instance.\nc. Proceedings against company M.B.B. and its owner, B.B.", "49. On 5 October 1995 the applicant, together with ten other plaintiffs, filed an action for re-payment of their loans with the Zagreb Municipal Court. The applicant claimed a sum of DEM 6,000.", "50. Before the period to be examined by the Court two hearings were adjourned.", "51. The court scheduled the next hearing for 6 November 1997 and invited B.B. to submit the evidence he relied on in his written reply to the plaintiffs’ claims. However, he failed to do so and also did not appear at the hearing. The plaintiffs’ counsel submitted that B.B. was found guilty for fraud in criminal proceedings conducted before the same court in connection with the plaintiffs’ loans. On 10 November 1997 the plaintiffs’ counsel submitted the number of the criminal case-file against B.B.\nOn 14 November 1997 the court requested the criminal case-file against B.B. from the criminal division of the Zagreb Municipal Court, but the case-file was at the Zagreb County Court pending decision on appeal.\nThe court repeated its request to enclose the criminal case-file on 22 October 1998, 11 March and 22 November 1999 and 24 October 2000, but the case-file was at the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ured državnog odvjetništva).", "52. At the next hearing on 2 April 2001 the court invited the applicant to submit a copy of the judgment finding B.B. guilty for fraud.\nOn 17 April 2001 the applicant informed the court that the first instance judgment in the criminal proceedings against B.B. had been quashed and the case remitted to the court of first instance for re-trial.\nIt appears that the proceedings are pending before the court of first instance.\nd. Proceedings against company T.K.M. and its owner, T.K.", "53. On 5 October 1995 the applicant filed an action with the Zagreb Municipal Court for re-payment of his loan in the amount of DEM 7,000.", "54. Before the period to be examined by the Court one hearing was held and one was adjourned.", "55. On 29 October 1999 the court invited the applicant’s counsel to submit T.K.’s address within 30 days.\nOn 25 November 1999 the applicant’s counsel submitted T.K.’s new address.\nOn 28 June 2000 the court invited the applicant’s counsel to submit within 30 days a notice from the registry of the Zagreb Commercial Court concerning the legal status of T.K.M.\nIt appears that the proceedings are pending before the court of first instance.", "56. On 24 January 1994 the applicant filed an action for re-payment of his loan, in the amount of DEM 13,540, with the Zagreb Municipal Court.", "57. Before the period to be examined by the Court, first instance judgment awarding the applicant’s claim in part and rejecting it in part was adopted. This judgment was quashed on appeal in the part rejecting the applicant’s claim and the case was remitted for re-trial to the court of first instance.", "58. The hearings scheduled for 19 March, 7 and 20 April 1998 before the Zagreb Municipal Court were adjourned since S.D. failed to appear.", "59. At the next hearing on 7 May 1998 the court adopted a judgment awarding the rest of the applicant’s claim. The judgment became final on 16 June 1998.\nAccording to the Government, the applicant has not sought to enforce the judgment.\nb. Proceedings against B.B.", "60. On 27 January 1994 the applicant filed an action with the Zagreb Municipal Court for re-payment of his loan in the amount of DEM 11,052.", "61. Before the period to be examined by the Court several hearing were held and several adjourned and on 14 May 1997 the court adopted judgment rejecting the applicant’s claim.\nOn 18 September 1997 the applicant appealed against the judgment.\nOn 21 November 2000 the proceedings ended by the Zagreb County Court’s decision upholding the first instance judgment.\nc. Proceedings against M.J.B. and its owner, B.J.", "62. On 5 July 1994 the applicant filed an action with the Zagreb Municipal Court for re-payment of his loan in the amount of DEM 10,000; 980,000 HRK; and CHF 18,350.", "63. The preliminary hearings scheduled for 8 November 1994, 26 September 1995, 7 February, 24 April, 10 September and 2 December 1996 and 12 February 1998 were adjourned as B.J. failed to appear.", "64. At the hearing on 22 April 1998 B.J. replied to the applicant’s claim.\nOn 26 June 1998 the applicant specified his claim.", "65. At the hearing on 1 July 1998 the applicant and a witness were heard.\nFrom 10 September 1998 to 12 October 2000 the court unsuccessfully attempted on many occasions to consult the case-file concerning criminal proceedings against B.J. before the same court.", "66. At the hearing on 12 October 2000 the court adopted a judgment finding in favour of the applicant. The judgment became final on 16 January 2001.\nAccording to the Government, the applicant has not sought the enforcement of the judgment. \nd. Proceedings against F.I.M. and its owner, Ð.M.", "67. On 5 July 1994 the applicant filed an action for re-payment of his loan in the amount of DEM 23,800 with the Zagreb Municipal Court.", "68. Before the period to be examined by the Court several hearings were held and several adjourned.", "69. The hearing scheduled for 5 December 1997 was adjourned because the witnesses invited did not appear.", "70. At the hearing on 18 April 1998 one witness was heard. The court requested the Varaždin Police Department (Policijska uprava varaždinska) to submit the address of another witness.\nOn 9 July 1998 the Varaždin Police Department submitted the requested address.", "71. At the hearing on 5 March 1999 Ð.M. gave her testimony. The court invited the Zagreb Commercial Court to submit a certificate from its registry regarding the legal status of F.I.M. and decided to examine the criminal case-file against Ð.M. However, the criminal case-file could not be consulted because the criminal proceedings were pending.", "72. The hearings scheduled for 15 December 2000 and 22 February 2001 were adjourned because Ð.M. did not appear.", "73. At the next hearing the court heard the applicant and Ð. M.", "74. At the next hearing on 2 October 2001 the court stayed the proceedings because the applicant did not appear.\nOn 2 November 2001 the applicant filed a request to resume the proceedings.\nIt appears that the proceedings are pending before the court of first instance." ]	[ 3 ]
[ "7. Mr E.B. was the owner of an apartment in Rome, which he had let to F.G.", "8. In a writ served on the tenant on 24 July 1986, he communicated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Rome Magistrate.", "9. By a decision of 12 February 1987, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 November 1988.", "10. On 9 March 1990, Mr E.B. served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises. On 23 May 1990, he served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 7 June 1990.", "11. Between 7 June 1990 and 30 April 1991, the bailiff made ten attempts to recover possession.", "12. On 14 May 1991, the applicant became the owner of the apartment.", "13. Between 28 May 1991 and 16 November 1994, the bailiff made thirty-three attempts to recover possession.", "14. On 1 December 1994, the applicant made a statutory declaration that she urgently required the premises as accommodation for herself.", "15. Between 26 January 1995 and 7 May 1997, the bailiff made eleven attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.", "16. On 10 May 1997, the tenant vacated the premises." ]	[ 4 ]
[ "7. In 1964 the applicant inherited from her father the title over an apartment in Florence; her mother L. inherited a life and controlling interest in that apartment, i.e. the right to use it and derive any benefits therefrom. L. let the apartment to D.D.C. The lease was due to expire on 31 December 1987. In a writ served on the tenant on 9 January 1986, L. communicated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Florence Magistrate.", "8. On 12 February 1986, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1988. That decision was made enforceable on 21 March 1988.", "9. On 5 October 1990, L. served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. On 14 November 1990, she served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 21 November 1990.", "10. Between 21 November 1990 and 19 November 1996, the bailiff made eleven attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as L. was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.", "11. In the meantime, on 28 February 1991, the applicant in her capacity as the owner of the apartment, made a statutory declaration that she urgently required the premises as accommodation for her son.", "12. On 28 November 1996 L. died and the applicant acquired the interest in the apartment. She pursued the proceedings in her own name.", "13. Between 17 March 1997 and 22 January 1999, the bailiff made five further attempts to recover possession, which attempts were unsuccessful due to the lack of police assistance.", "14. Under the newly enacted Law 431/1998, the tenant proposed to the applicant that they enter into a new lease. On 1 July 1999, the applicant informed the tenant that she intended to repossess the apartment.", "15. On 27 July 1999, the tenant requested the Florence District Court, under Section 6 of Law 431/98, to set a new date for the eviction.", "16. On 27 December 1999, reaching a friendly agreement with the tenant, the applicant recovered possession of her apartment." ]	[ 2 ]
[ "9. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Tartu, Estonia. He is the owner of the company AS Giga, with a registered office in Tartu. The company has been involved in reconstructing the public heat supply of the city.", "10. On 14 November 1995 the Tartu police initiated criminal proceedings against the head of the Energy Department of the Tartu City Government. The proceedings concerned the alleged abuse of his position in contracting a loan with the Ministry of Finance for reconstructing the city's heat supply in an amount higher than approved and guaranteed by the City Council. In the context of these criminal proceedings the Tartu Public Prosecutor (Tartu prokurör) approved a search of the applicant's company's premises on 14 November 1995 in order to determine whether there were any original bookkeeping documents which might provide information with regard to the unauthorised use of the loan.", "11. On 15 and 20 November 1995 the Tartu police searched the company's premises and seized respectively 36 and 50 files of documents, which comprised practically all of the company's bookkeeping records from the years 1994 and 1995. The documents seized were recorded by the files and not individually. The applicant estimates that their total number amounted to approximately 10,000.\nAll seized files were placed in a separate room in the Tartu Police Prefecture for examination by the State auditors, who were assisted by staff of the financial department of the Tartu City Government.", "12. On 16 November 1995 the applicant filed a complaint with the Tartu Public Prosecutor alleging that the police search and seizure of documents had been unlawful. On 17 November 1995 he complained also to the State Public Prosecutor (Riigiprokurör), submitting that the wholesale nature of the seizure and the failure to make an individual record of the seized items were inconsistent with the requirements of Articles 139 and 140 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.", "13. On 22 November 1995 the police informed the applicant that he was free to consult the seized documents at the police station for the continued activities of his company.", "14. On 23 November 1995 the Tartu Public Prosecutor instructed the police to make a record of the individual characteristics of the seized documents and to return the documents irrelevant to the criminal investigation.", "15. On 24 November 1995, in response to the applicant's complaint, the Tartu Public Prosecutor informed him of his instructions to the police to correct the deficiencies in the recording of documents and pointed out that the police had given the applicant access to the documents with the possibility of making photocopies. The prosecutor also stated that his action was open to appeal to the State Public Prosecutor.", "16. On 27 November 1995 the applicant filed a complaint with the State Public Prosecutor. On the same day the police returned to the applicant's company three previously seized files.", "17. By a letter of 30 November 1995 the Deputy State Public Prosecutor informed the applicant that he had examined the complaint. He noted that the searches had been approved by the prosecutor, but acknowledged that, due to the large number of documents, their recording had been deficient. He further noted that the Tartu Public Prosecutor had ordered the police to remove the shortcomings. He accepted the measures of the Tartu Public Prosecutor and the reply issued to the applicant on 24 November 1995. It was also noted that the applicant was free to use the documents during their examination by the State auditors.", "18. On 10 January 1996 the applicant's company filed a complaint with the Tartu Administrative Court (Tartu Halduskohus) asking it to declare unlawful the measures of the Tartu City Council in connection with the inspection of the company's records as well as the police search and seizure of documents.", "19. By a judgment of 13 September 1996 the Administrative Court dismissed both parts of the company's complaint. Regarding the impugned police acts the court found that, according to Article 3 § 2(3) of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure, it lacked competence to deal with complaints which fell under civil and criminal procedure. The Administrative Court could not interfere with criminal proceedings and examine the lawfulness of the acts of the bodies of preliminary investigation.", "20. In an appeal against the judgment the applicant argued that the police had abused its powers and that its actions violated the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Constitution and the Convention.", "21. On 22 November 1996 the Tartu Court of Appeal (Tartu Ringkonnakohus) confirmed the lack of competence to review police actions in criminal proceedings. It held that in the administrative proceedings it could not be examined whether the police, in effecting the search and seizures, had acted contrary to the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Constitution or the Convention. According to Article 120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, supervision over the lawfulness of measures taken by the police in the context of criminal proceedings rested with the public prosecutor, not with the administrative court. The Court of Appeal quashed in part the judgment of the first instance court and terminated the administrative proceedings in respect of the complaint concerning the police actions.", "22. On 15 January 1997 the Supreme Court (Riigikohus) refused to grant the company leave to appeal.", "23. In the meantime, on 23 October 1996, the police decided to return twelve previously seized files. The applicant refused in writing to accept them, stating that their seizure had not been documented and that the act of return did not describe each document individually.\nOn 22 November 1996 these documents were sent to the Tartu City Court (Tartu Linnakohus), where the applicant's criminal case was pending (see paragraph 26 below). The applicant agreed to accept the documents in 1997. \nOf the 86 files seized from the applicant's company on 15 and 20 November 1995, 28 files have been returned to the company. The applicant estimates that at least 5000 – 6000 documents are still not returned.", "24. On 4 December 1995, following the seizure of documents, the Tartu police initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant on the suspicion of having misused his official position in the company.\nOn 22 March 1996 the applicant was formally charged with misusing his position as well as with tax evasion and falsification of documents, but on 28 June 1996 the charge concerning misuse of position was dropped.\nOn 1 July 1996 a further charge of fraud was brought against the applicant.", "25. On 31 October 1996 the preliminary investigation was complete and the case was sent to the Tartu City Court for trial.", "26. By a judgment of 13 October 1997 the City Court convicted the applicant of the charges and imposed a suspended sentence of 3 years and 6 months' imprisonment. It did find that in seizing of documents from the applicant's company the preliminary investigation authorities had infringed upon the procedural requirements stipulated in Article 140 of the Criminal Code. In particular, they had seized documents which were not relevant as evidence in the criminal case, had failed to record the documents individually and had taken away entire files. This had hampered the preliminary investigation of the case as well as its examination by the court.", "27. On 18 October 1997 the applicant lodged an appeal against the judgement with the Tartu Court of Appeal. He contended, inter alia, that the indiscriminate seizure of documents from his company AS Giga on 15 and 20 November 1995 violated his rights of defence since he was deprived of the opportunity to submit necessary documents which were in the hands of the police.", "28. By a judgment of 12 January 1998 the Tartu Court of Appeal rejected the applicant's appeal on the procedure and upheld his conviction. As regards the procedure, it found that the seizure of documents was conducted in accordance with the requirements of Article 140 of the Criminal Code. The records contained a description of the seized files, their number and the number of pages therein. The documents were thus sufficiently individualised.", "29. On 17 September 1998 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court, challenging his conviction as well as the procedure, claiming that the manner in which the seizure had been carried out had adversely affected his defence rights.", "30. On 8 April 1998 the Supreme Court upheld the judgments of the lower courts with regard to the applicant's conviction. It acknowledged that in effecting the seizure of documents the procedural norms were not strictly followed, but found that such infringement was not substantial and did not hinder the thorough, complete and objective examination of the case or prevent the court from rendering a lawful and substantiated judgment. It considered that a detailed description of documents in the record of seizure was necessary only when they were used as evidence in the criminal case." ]	[ 3 ]
[ "8. The applicant was born in 1951 and is presently serving a prison sentence in the Lepoglava State Prison (hereinafter the “LSP”).", "9. In 1994 the applicant was found guilty on one account of murder. During the process he was diagnosed with the post-traumatic stress disorder and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. Since 3 March 2000 he has been in the LSP where he was placed in the B wing.", "10. The LSP consists of a radial building comprising four wings, each of four storeys, and a two-storey annex. Three wings were renovated, wing E is currently under renovation. B-wing has not yet been renovated.", "11. From May 2001 until June 2002 the applicant was placed in cell number 17 in the B wing. Most of the time there was another inmate sharing the cell with the applicant. It measured 3,50 meters by 1,60 meters. There were no in-cell sanitary facilities. There were two non-working electrical outlets. There was a dim light on the ceiling. The window on the wall opposite the door measured 80 cm². There was one wooden chair and a metal locker. There was one set of bunk beds. The cell smelled strongly of moisture. The cement walls were damp to the touch.", "12. The applicant stated that the mattresses were dirty and bloodstained and the food served to the inmates was insufficient and of low quality.\nMedical assistance was provided once a week, on an assigned day, regardless of his health. The applicant stated that he could not address himself to the social services in the prison. There were no entertainment or other activities in the prison.\nIn general, the prison was overcrowded. The prison buildings had been built about two hundred years ago and are in a very poor state.\nCases of ill-treatment by the guards were allegedly not uncommon.\nThe applicant alleged further that the halls where the inmates work were cold.", "13. According to the Government the food served to the inmates complied with the prescribed calories value. In general, the inmates had not complained about the quality of food, nor had there been objections in that respect in the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Report (hereinafter the “CPT Report”).\nMedical assistance was provided according to the needs of each inmate. The conditions had improved after the CPT Report in so far as one general practitioner and one dentist had been employed full time. If there was a need, specialist treatment was available in the hospital for prisoners or in any regular hospital.\nThe inmates have an opportunity to work if they wish. There are wood and metal processing plants as well as some service-providing jobs. About 50% of the inmates worked. The applicant expressed a wish not to work.\nThe inmates were allowed to watch television, use a library, exercise or choose among several other activities such as art work, barrel-making, literature or music classes. On Sundays and public holidays there were film projections; sometimes concerts and theatre plays were organised.", "14. The applicant was involved in therapeutic sessions concerning inmates suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder and in outdoor exercising.", "15. In June 2002 the applicant was moved to another cell in one of the renovated wings." ]	[ 3, 9 ]
[ "8. The applicants have been members of the Homeopathic Association (Homeopatická společnost) since 1991. The Homeopathic Association is in turn a member of the Czech Medical Society J.E. Purkyně (Česká lékařská společnost J.E. Purkyně – “the Medical Society”), an independent association made up of private individuals – doctors, chemists, and other people in the medical or paramedical profession – and companies. The Medical Society's objects include developing and disseminating knowledge obtained from the field of medical science and related spheres, using that knowledge in the public-health sector, improving the professional skills of its members, creating a suitable environment in which its members and other similar organisations and institutions in the Czech Republic and overseas can exchange information, and supporting the activity of professional partnerships, medical practices and other groups employed in the medical and paramedical sectors.", "9. On 20 November 1996 the Medical Society resolved in congress to amend its internal rules (stanovy) by adding Rule 2 § 8, which provided: “The Czech Medical Society J.E. Purkyně shall ensure that its members only use diagnostic, preventive or curative methods that are based on currently recognised scientific evidence, as regards both their characteristics and their effects.” The congress made a recommendation to the executive board of the Medical Society for the Homeopathic Association to be expelled from its membership, on the ground that it did not satisfy the conditions laid down by Rule 2 § 8.", "10. On 30 December 1996 the executive board of the Medical Society resolved to expel the Homeopathic Association from the Medical Society under Rule 2 § 8 with effect from 31 December 1996. It informed the applicants of that resolution in a letter of 30 December 1996.", "11. On 20 January 1997 eleven members of the Homeopathic Association, including the applicants, brought an action against the Medical Society under section 15 of the Citizens' Associations Act (Law no. 83/1990) and Article 80 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. They sought declarations that the amendment of 20 November 1996 to the internal rules and, consequently, the decision to expel their association were nullities (neplatnost) and that the Homeopathic Association remained a member of the Medical Society. They maintained that the Medical Society's decision had damaged the reputation of the Homeopathic Association and had caused patients to become wary of doctors practising homeopathy (a fact which they submitted gave them a relevant interest for the purposes of Article 80 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure). They said that the decision had been arbitrary, unlawful and subjective, as it had been taken without the benefit of expert professional or scientific advice and was liable to cause unjustified discrimination against certain healing methods.", "12. In a judgment of 2 October 1997, Prague 2 Municipal Court (obvodní soud) dismissed the applicants' action without examining the merits, holding:\n“The Court finds that [the applicants] are not entitled [in their action for a declaration of nullity under Article 80 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure] ... to an order negating the alleged illegality of the resolution adopted by the organ of the society or any inconsistency with the internal rules [of the Medical Society]. [Section 15(1) of Law no. 83/1990] only gives the court power to review an impugned decision, not to vary or uphold it. The review procedure is now set out in Chapters I and II of Part Five of the Code of Civil Procedure, which defines jurisdiction in administrative appeals on points of law and requires the review [of a decision] within the meaning of section 15 to be interpreted by analogy. Support for that view is also to be found in other provisions of Law no. 83/1990, which confer on the district court certain powers with respect to associations formed under that Act (see sections 11(2) and 13(3), it being understood that section 12(4) refers to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure governing the review of decisions by other authorities).”", "13. On 19 December 1997 the applicants appealed against that judgment, arguing in particular that section 15 of Law no. 83/1990 did not specify under which provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure they should have brought their action and that, since the Medical Society was not an administrative authority, Part Five of the Code of Civil Procedure, which only applied to the judicial review of decisions of the administrative authorities, could not be applicable in their case. They further submitted that having found that it had no jurisdiction to decide the case on the basis of the pleaded provision, the court should have declined jurisdiction, not dismissed their claim. They were not required by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure governing the conditions of form applicable to actions to bring their claims under specific statutory provisions or to specify the procedure the court should follow, as the court was required first and foremost to consider the substance of their claim.", "14. In a judgment of 16 April 1998, the Prague City Court (městský soud) upheld the Municipal Court's judgment. It found that the applicants should have brought an action for a review of the impugned resolutions. Had they done so, the Municipal Court would have decided the case in accordance with Article 250j § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, either dismissing the action if it considered that the resolutions were lawful or quashing the resolutions on one of the grounds set out in section 15(2), if that was appropriate. The City Court also dismissed an application by the applicants for leave to appeal on points of law (dovolání) against its decision.", "15. On 29 January 1998 the applicants lodged a constitutional appeal (ústavní stížnost) with the Constitutional Court (Ústavní soud). They filed a supplemental pleading on 9 July 1998. They submitted that, by an erroneous construction of section 15 of Law no. 83/1990, the Prague 2 City Court had restricted, and even deprived them of, their right to the protection of the courts, as guaranteed by Article 36 of the Charter on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (Listina základních práv a svobod). They complained that the City Court had failed to respond to their arguments that Part Five of the Code of Civil Procedure was inapplicable in their case. They further submitted that the impugned decisions of the Medical Society had infringed their right to freedom of choice of their profession for the purposes of Article 26 of the charter and Article 8 of the Convention, to scientific freedom, as guaranteed by Article 25 of the charter, and to freedom of association, as guaranteed by Article 20 of the charter and Article 11 of the Convention. They added that the domestic courts' failure to examine the merits of their action meant that the alleged violations were continuing.", "16. On 12 August 1998 the Constitutional Court declared the applicants' appeal inadmissible for failure to exhaust statutory remedies by appealing on points of law. It referred to Article 239 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure." ]	[ 3 ]
[ "8. By a provisional decision of 25 April 1990 the Social Insurance Office (försäkringskassan; hereinafter “the Office”) of the County of Stockholm decided that payments of industrial injury benefits to the applicant, who was born in 1954, should be discontinued as from 1 March 1990. This decision was confirmed by a final decision of 2 July 1990. The Office considered that the applicant’s ability to work was not reduced due to her back problems to such an extent that she was entitled to the benefits in question under the applicable rules of the Act on Industrial Injury Insurance (Lagen om arbetsskadeförsäkring, 1976:380; hereinafter “the 1976 Act”)", "9. The applicant later requested the Office to review its decision, which it did on 20 November 1991. Save for the grant of benefits for the period 1 March – 27 April 1990, the Office upheld its previous decision and also found that the applicant was not entitled to a life annuity.", "10. The applicant appealed to the County Administrative Court (länsrätten) of the County of Stockholm, claiming that she was entitled to continued benefits after 27 April 1990. She maintained that the medical evidence, on which the Office’s decision was based, in fact showed that she was entitled to the benefits sought.", "11. By a judgment of 8 April 1992 the County Administrative Court upheld the Office’s decision. The court’s assessment was based on medical certificates from three different physicians who all stated that the applicant was able to work and thus was not entitled to the benefits in question. It did not hold an oral hearing, nor did the applicant request one.", "12. The applicant then appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) in Stockholm. In support of her appeal she invoked medical certificates issued by three other physicians. Furthermore, without stating any reasons for her request, she asked the court to hold an oral hearing.", "13. On 5 November 1992 the appellate court rejected the request for an oral hearing. After having restated section 9 of the Administrative Court Procedure Act (Förvaltningsprocesslagen, 1971:291; hereinafter “the 1971 Act”; see further paragraph 28 below), it gave the following reasons:\n“Having regard to the subject-matter at issue and the information that has so far come to hand in the case, [the court] finds that an oral hearing is at present unnecessary. [The applicant] is invited to submit her final written observations in the case within two weeks after having been notified of this decision.\nThe case can be determined notwithstanding a failure to submit such written observations.”", "14. On 25 February 1994 the Administrative Court of Appeal, relying on the medical evidence submitted in the case, rejected the applicant’s appeal. It also rejected her renewed request for an oral hearing.", "15. The applicant appealed against the judgment to the Supreme Social Insurance Court (Försäkringsöverdomstolen). She complained about the lack of oral hearings in the lower courts. In that respect, she maintained that the case had not been adequately investigated and that an oral hearing had been necessary for her to explain matters of importance to the courts’ assessment.", "16. By a letter of 9 February 1995 the Supreme Social Insurance Court informed the applicant that an oral hearing in the case appeared to be unnecessary. She was given the opportunity to submit further observations on the question of leave to appeal.", "17. On 8 June 1995 the Supreme Social Insurance Court refused the applicant leave to appeal.", "18. The applicant was on sick-leave between 1 May and 30 June 1991, during which period she received per diem sickness benefits under the Social Insurance Act (Lagen om allmän försäkring, 1962:381; hereinafter “the 1962 Act”). However, by a decision of 7 August 1991 the Office found that she was no longer entitled to such benefits. At the applicant’s request, the Office reviewed its decision on 10 June 1992 but did not change it.", "19. On 15 September 1993 the County Administrative Court, upon the applicant’s appeal, found that the available medical evidence did not show that she was entitled to benefits as from 1 July 1991. The appeal was thus rejected. It does not appear that the applicant asked for an oral hearing before this instance.", "20. The applicant appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal. She requested also in this case that the appellate court hold an oral hearing and, moreover, asked it to obtain further medical evidence. On 2 December 1993 the court rejected the requests, giving the same reasons on the issue of an oral hearing as in its decision of 5 November 1992 (see paragraph 13 above).", "21. On 25 February 1994 the Administrative Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal and her renewed request for an oral hearing.", "22. The applicant appealed against the judgment to the Supreme Social Insurance Court. She requested again that an oral hearing be held in the case. She also complained about the lack of oral hearings in the lower courts.", "23. By a letter of 9 February 1995 the Supreme Social Insurance Court informed the applicant that an oral hearing in the case appeared to be unnecessary. She was given the opportunity to submit further observations on the question of leave to appeal.", "24. On 8 June 1995 the Supreme Social Insurance Court refused the applicant leave to appeal." ]	[]
[ "8. On 6 October 1986 the applicant, who was born in 1919, applied for disability benefits under the Social Insurance Act (Lagen om allmän försäkring, 1962:381; hereinafter “the 1962 Act”). He claimed that he was in need of assistance and had additional costs due to a speech impediment caused by a laryngectomy operation in 1979.", "9. By a decision of 24 April 1987 the Social Insurance Office (försäkringskassan; hereinafter “the Office”) of the County of Västmanland rejected the application, finding that the applicant’s needs or costs were not such as to make him eligible for disability benefits.", "10. On 27 December 1990 the applicant requested the Office to review its decision under chapter 20, section 10 a of the 1962 Act. He claimed that he had failed to fully state his need of assistance and his additional costs in the original application. On 27 April 1991 he asked the Office, alternatively, to consider his request as a new application and to grant him benefits as from November 1988.", "11. On 12 July 1991 the Office found that there was no basis for a review of its earlier decision. Further, in regard to the applicant’s alternative claim, the Office noted that the applicant had reached the age of 65 in 1984 and that information relating to the time that followed could not be taken into account under the relevant rules. Consequently, the applicant’s alternative claim was rejected.", "12. The applicant appealed to the County Administrative Court (länsrätten) of the County of Västmanland. On 13 November 1992 the court gave judgment in his favour. It considered that the Office’s first decision had been based on insufficient information and that the Office should therefore have reviewed that decision at the applicant’s request. It noted that, according to the two medical certificates in the case, the applicant had considerable additional costs due to his handicap. Consequently, he was entitled to disability benefits as long as his need of assistance and his additional costs, taken together, attained the level required under the 1962 Act. Accepting the information submitted by the applicant in this regard, the court found that that level had been attained and granted him a disability allowance as from July 1986. The court did not hold an oral hearing nor, apparently, did the applicant request one.", "13. The National Social Insurance Board (Riksförsäkringsverket; hereinafter “the Board”) appealed against the County Administrative Court’s judgment to the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) in Stockholm, requesting that the Office’s decision of 12 July 1991 be confirmed. The Board claimed that the information in the case showed that, before the age of 65, the applicant had not suffered a functional impairment to such an extent that his need of assistance and extra expenses on account thereof had made him eligible for a disability allowance. Thus, the Office’s first decision could not be considered to have been incorrect due to it being based on incorrect or incomplete material. Consequently, there were no grounds for a review under the 1962 Act. The Board further requested the appellate court to stay the enforcement of the appealed judgment. The latter request was granted by a decision of 30 December 1992.", "14. The applicant made submissions in response to the Board’s appeal. On 25 February 1993 he requested the Administrative Court of Appeal to hold an oral hearing in the case during which the person in charge of the case at the Office should give evidence relating to the meaning of its decision and the information on which it had been based. The applicant also asked the court to obtain the opinion of a medical expert.", "15. On 12 November 1993 the Administrative Court of Appeal rejected both requests. In regard to the request for an oral hearing, the court, after having restated section 9 of the Administrative Court Procedure Act (Förvaltningsprocesslagen, 1971:291; hereinafter “the 1971 Act”; see further paragraph 23 below), gave the following reasons:\n“Having regard to the subject-matter at issue and the information that has come to hand in the case, [the court] finds that an oral hearing is unnecessary and rejects the request to that effect.\n[The applicant] is invited to state the further circumstances he wishes to invoke and submit his final written observations in the case within two weeks after having been notified of this decision.\nThe case can be determined notwithstanding a failure to submit such written observations.”", "16. The applicant and the Board made further submissions. The applicant maintained that the Board had failed to adequately explain the reasons for its appeal and posed several questions to the Board. He requested that the court order the Board to clarify its position in the case. The court did not do so, however. The applicant’s submissions were, however, forwarded to the Board which replied that it maintained its position in the case. On account of the court’s refusal to order the Board to clarify its position and to hold a hearing, the applicant called into question the impartiality of the proceedings. By letters of 16 September 1994 and 10 January 1995 he reiterated his request for an oral hearing, stating that a hearing would give him the opportunity to ask questions to the Board and to present judgments in similar cases in support of his application for disability benefits. Furthermore, in assessing his condition, the court would benefit from having met him in person.", "17. On 1 November 1995 the Administrative Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s renewed requests for an oral hearing and gave judgment in favour of the Board. Thus, by 3 votes to 2, it quashed the County Administrative Court’s judgment and confirmed the Office’s decision of 12 July 1991. Without giving any further reasons, it considered that there had been no basis for a review of the Office’s first decision. The dissenting judges considered that the applicant was entitled to the disability allowance granted to him by the County Administrative Court and that, for this reason, there were exceptional reasons to change the Office’s decision.", "18. The applicant appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten). He requested that the case be referred back to the Administrative Court of Appeal for re-examination or, alternatively, that the Supreme Administrative Court confirm the County Administrative Court’s judgment. He complained about the lack of an oral hearing in the Administrative Court of Appeal and also requested the Supreme Administrative Court to hold an oral hearing. On 24 February 1997 the Supreme Administrative Court refused the applicant leave to appeal.", "19. On 9 October 1996 the applicant made a renewed request for a disability allowance. By a decision of 12 December 1996 the Office found that he had special needs and costs due to his handicap which made him eligible for disability benefits under the 1962 Act. As an allowance could be given retroactively only for the two years preceding the application, the applicant was granted an allowance as from October 1994." ]	[ 3 ]
[ "9. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Wrocław, Poland.", "10. On 22 February 1994 the applicant was arrested by the police.", "11. On 24 February 1994 the applicant was brought before the Wrocław District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy) who charged him with larceny and detained him on remand.", "12. On 2 July 1994 the applicant’s mother died.", "13. On 3 July 1994 the applicant made an application for leave to attend the funeral of his mother. The application was in the following terms:\n“I kindly ask you to grant me leave, on the basis of the telegram received on 3.7.94, [to attend] the funeral of my mother Płoska Stefania, address Bełchatów 67-400, Osiedle Dolnośląskie, Blok 225 – who died, which is confirmed by the telegram [informing] that her funeral will take place on 5.07.1994. \nI very kindly ask you to grant me leave – I would like to pay last respects to my mother, a beloved person whom I lost. I ask you to agree to my request – I thank you very much for that.”", "14. The application was accompanied by the statement of a prison officer who supported the applicant’s request.", "15. On 4 July 1994 the Wrocław-Śródmieście District Court refused the permission to grant the applicant leave considering that he “was a habitual offender whose return to the prison cannot be guaranteed.”", "16. On 5 July 1994 the Penitentiary Judge rejected the applicant’s application for leave to attend the funeral of his mother. The judge’s decision was worded as follows:\n“Further to the application of 3.07.1994 for compassionate leave I hereby inform you that, after analysing the case, I have not found grounds for granting such leave because there are no compassionate circumstances as referred to in Art. 59 § 1 of the Code of the Enforcement of Sentences. I should inform you that the Wrocław-Śródmieście District Court on 4.07.94 (...) refused permission to grant compassionate leave.”", "17. On 3 August 1994 the applicant’s father died.", "18. On 6 August 1994 the applicant made an application for leave to attend the funeral of his father. The application was in the following terms:\n“I kindly ask you to grant me a compassionate leave because my father Wacław Płoski has died. The funeral will take place on 8.08.1994 and I would like to attend it and to pay last respects to him. I should add that this is yet another death because in July 94 my mother died and I did not attend her funeral. Now my dad has died, so that I have been left without parents and I would like to bid farewell and attend my dad’s funeral. I declare that I will return from leave on time and I will not breach the trust. I ask you to agree to my request and I thank you for that.”", "19. The application was accompanied by the statement of a prison officer who confirmed that the applicant’s “behaviour was beyond reproach” and that he “stayed in touch with his wife and children.”", "20. On 8 August 1994 the Wrocław-Śródmieście District Court refused permission to grant the applicant leave. The court gave the following reasons for its decision:\n“The charges against the accused involve a significant danger to society. The accused Wacław Płoski is a habitual offender within the meaning of Article 60 § 2 of the Criminal Code. In the court’s view, his return to the Detention Centre cannot be guaranteed. It should be pointed out that the next hearing has been fixed for 11 August 1994. For these reasons the above decision has been made.”", "21. On 9 August 1994 the Penitentiary Judge refused the applicant’s application for leave to attend the funeral of his father. The judge’s decision was worded as follows:\n“Further to the application of 6.08.1994 for compassionate leave I hereby inform you that, after analysing the case, I have not found grounds for granting such leave because there are no compassionate circumstances as provided by Art. 59 § 1 of the Code of the Enforcement of Sentences – permission refused by the Wrocław-Śródmieście District Court”", "22. In a letter of 17 January 1995 the applicant requested the President of the Wrocław Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) to provide him with a written explanation of the reasons for which he had not been allowed to attend, either alone or under police escort, the funerals of his mother and father. On 31 January 1995 the Legal Secretary of the Wrocław Regional Court advised the applicant that his requests for leave had been rejected because he had been a recidivist posing a risk of absconding.", "23. On 26 May 1995 the applicant was convicted of larceny and received a prison term.", "24. On 27 February 1996 the applicant was released from prison." ]	[ 4 ]
[ "9. On 9 November 1994 the applicant sued the co-operative Úsvit before the Bratislava II District Court (Obvodný súd). She claimed the payment of a sum of money to which she was entitled after she had ceased to be a member of the co-operative in 1993.", "10. On 18 January 1995 the Bratislava II District Court adjourned the case as the defendant's representative did not appear.", "11. On 20 February 1995 the District Court again adjourned the hearing because of the applicant's failure to appear.", "12. A hearing scheduled for 22 March 1995 had to be adjourned due to the absence of both parties.", "13. On 24 April 1995 the District Court adjourned the case on the ground that the defendant had not been duly served with a copy of the action.", "14. On 29 May 1995 the District Court adjourned the case until 26 June 1995 as the applicant did not appear.", "15. On 26 June 1995 the District Court established that it lacked jurisdiction to deal with the case and transferred it to the Bratislava City Court (Mestský súd).", "16. On 13 October 1995 the Bratislava City Court invited the applicant to pay the court fees.", "17. On 7 November 1995 the Bratislava City Court was notified that the applicant had paid the fees.", "18. On 29 November 1995 the Bratislava City Court resolved that the applicant had to pay an additional amount in court fees.", "19. On 12 April 1996 the applicant requested the Bratislava City Court to proceed with the case.", "20. On 12 September 1996 the applicant complained about delays in the proceedings to the president of the City Court.", "21. On 24 September 1996 the latter informed the applicant that the proceedings had been stayed on 18 September 1996 and that the relevant decision would be served later.", "22. In its decision of 18 September 1996 the Bratislava City Court noted that the decision on the applicant's action depended on the assessment of the property of the co-operative concerned and that this preliminary issue was the subject matter of a different set of proceedings which were brought in 1992 and were still pending before it. The City Court therefore stayed the proceedings concerning the applicant's claim pending the outcome of the other set of proceedings.", "23. The applicant appealed on 25 September 1996. She maintained, with reference to the relevant provision of the Commercial Code as well as to the memorandum and articles of the co-operative, that the amount due to her was to be calculated on the basis of the co-operative's net business assets set out in its financial statement for the year when her membership in the co‑operative had been terminated. The applicant argued that this information was available and that the outcome of the other set of the proceedings had no bearing on the determination of her claim.", "24. On 12 December 1996 the applicant complained to the Ministry of Justice that her case was not being proceeded with.", "25. On 27 January 1997 the Ministry of Justice admitted that the applicant's complaint about delays in the proceedings was justified. The letter stated that the case had been transferred to the Bratislava City Court on 29 September 1995 and that the latter, apart from requesting the applicant to pay the court fees, had not proceeded with the case effectively until 18 September 1996.", "26. On 29 January 1997 the Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd) dismissed the applicant's appeal against the City Court's decision of 18 September 1996.", "27. On 24 March 1999 the applicant complained to the Ministry of Justice about delays in the proceedings. The complaint was forwarded to the president of the Bratislava Regional Court (Krajský súd - the former Bratislava City Court). On 22 June 1999 the president of the Regional Court informed the applicant that the case could only be proceeded with after the preliminary issue had been determined by a final decision.", "28. In 1991 a production unit of the co-operative Úsvit became an independent legal person registered as Plastobal, VDI. On 14 March 1992 the latter claimed that a part of the property of the co-operative Úsvit should be assigned to it.", "29. On 28 July 1992 the Bratislava City Court dismissed the plaintiff's request for waiver of the court fees. A hearing was held on 11 September 1992.", "30. On 21 September 1992 the Bratislava City Court discontinued the proceedings on the ground that the plaintiff had not paid the fees. The plaintiff appealed and claimed that the fees had been paid in the meantime.", "31. On 8 October 1992 the co-operative Úsvit filed an action with the Bratislava City Court claiming that Plastobal, VDI be liquidated.", "32. On 3 November 1992 the City Court quashed its decision of 21 September 1992. A hearing was held on 18 December 1992. The defendant requested that the proceedings be stayed pending a decision on its action of 8 October 1992. Another hearing was held on 27 January 1993. On 10 February 1993 the court appointed an expert and requested him to determine, within thirty days, the share of property of the co-operative Úsvit to which the plaintiff was entitled.", "33. On 25 February 1992 the defendant claimed that the proceedings be stayed. The City Court dismissed the request on 26 June 1993. On 28 July 1993 the defendant appealed. On the same day the plaintiff requested that the court issue an interim measure.", "34. In the meantime, on 17 July 1993 the Bratislava City Court appointed another expert who was to determine, within thirty days, the property share which was due to the plaintiff. On 29 September 1993 the defendant challenged the expert.", "35. On 3 November 1993 the expert submitted comments on the defendant's request for her exclusion.", "36. On 6 December 1993 the case file was submitted to the Supreme Court for a decision on the defendant's appeal against the City Court's decision of 26 June 1993. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as being inadmissible on 10 March 1994. The decision was transmitted to the City Court on 28 March 1994.", "37. On 8 February 1994 the expert informed the City Court that representatives of the defendant company had not allowed her to consult the relevant documents on 21 September 1993.", "38. On 28 June 1994 the defendant again challenged the expert. The judge heard the expert and informed the defendant, on 19 July 1994, that she had found no reason for excluding the expert. The defendant company was further informed that it could be fined under Article 53 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure should its representatives prevent the expert from carrying out her duty.", "39. On 10 August 1994 the defendant company again requested that the proceedings be stayed. On 29 September 1994 it challenged the judge dealing with the case.", "40. On 7 October 1994 the expert informed the City Court that the defendant company had not allowed her to consult the relevant documents.", "41. The case file was submitted to the Supreme Court on 11 October 1994. By a decision of 25 January 1995 the Supreme Court dismissed the defendant's request for exclusion of the City Court judge.", "42. A hearing before the City Court was held on 10 April 1995.", "43. On 19 April 1995 the judge urged the expert to submit the opinion. On 28 April 1995 the expert informed the court that she had a heavy workload. The City Court appointed a different expert on 22 May 1995 and asked him to submit his opinion within thirty days.", "44. On 4 July 1995 the defendant company requested that the proceedings be stayed.", "45. On 2 October 1995 the expert requested the City Court to order the parties to put the relevant documents at his disposal. He also requested an advance on his costs and an extension of the time-limit for submission of his opinion.", "46. On 13 October 1995 the defendant company informed the City Court that the proceedings should be stayed and that, for that reason, it was irrelevant to take any further evidence in the case.", "47. On 9 November 1995 the expert informed the Court that the representatives of the defendant company had refused him access to the relevant documents. On 16 November 1995 the City Court imposed a fine of 5,000 Slovakian korunas (SKK) on the defendant company, pursuant to Article 53 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, on the ground that it had refused to co-operate with the expert. The defendant company appealed on 28 November 1995.", "48. The representatives of the defendant company failed to appear at a meeting with the expert and the plaintiff convoked by the City Court for 7 December 1995. As a result the expert could not obtain the relevant documents.", "49. On 23 January 1996 the case file was submitted to the Supreme Court for a decision on the defendant's appeal against the procedural fine which had been imposed on it on 16 November 1995. The Supreme Court upheld the decision on the procedural fine on 28 March 1996. The case file was returned to the City Court on 7 May 1996.", "50. On 19 September 1996 and on 16 December 1996 the judge asked the expert to inform her when the opinion would be submitted. On 7 February 1997 the judge invited the expert to specify which documents were necessary for drafting the opinion. On 26 February 1997 the expert informed the Bratislava Regional Court (which took over the agenda of the former Bratislava City Court) that the defendant had repeatedly refused to submit the relevant documents.", "51. On 7 March 1997 the Regional Court requested the defendant company to submit the relevant documents. On 27 March 1997 the representative of the defendant company asked the court for further specification of the documents to be submitted. In the meantime, on 25 March 1997, the plaintiff submitted further evidence to the Regional Court. On 14 May 1997 the Regional Court received a proposal on delimitation of the property in question.", "52. A hearing before the Regional Court was held on 11 June 1997. The Regional Court dismissed the defendant company's request that the proceedings be stayed. The defendant appealed on 19 June 1997. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on 24 November 1997. The Supreme Court's decision was transmitted to the Regional Court on 5 February 1998.", "53. On 22 December 1997 the defendant company requested the court to proceed with the case and explained that the dispute affected its business activities.", "54. On 16 March 1998 the Regional Court issued an interim measure, upon the request of the plaintiff of 28 January 1998, by which it prohibited the defendant company from alienating a part of its property.", "55. A hearing before the Bratislava Regional Court was held on 25 March 1998.", "56. On 2 April 1998 the defendant company appealed against the decision on the interim measure of 16 March 1998. The case file was transmitted to the Supreme Court which quashed the decision in question on 30 July 1998. The Supreme Court's decision was transmitted to the Regional Court on 26 August 1998. In the meantime, on 16 April 1998, the plaintiff submitted further evidence to the Regional Court.", "57. On 17 September 1998 the Regional Court invited the defendant company to submit documents so that the value of the property could be determined. The defendant replied on 28 October 1998.", "58. A hearing was held on 16 November 1998. An attempt to settle the case failed. The plaintiff amended its claim and the case was adjourned with a view to obtaining an expert opinion.", "59. On 11, 15 and 26 January 1999 the defendant company submitted further evidence to the Regional Court.", "60. On 24 May 1999 the Regional Court quashed its above decisions on the appointment of experts. It held, with reference to the correspondence included in the file, that it had been impossible to obtain an expert opinion. On the same day the Regional Court further delivered a judgment in which it granted the major part of the plaintiff's claims.", "61. On 2 July 1999 the defendant appealed against the judgment. The case file was transmitted to the Supreme Court on 5 August 1999. The plaintiff submitted comments on the case on 2 September 1999. They were transmitted to the Supreme Court on 9 September 1999.", "62. A hearing before the Supreme Court was held on 18 January 2000. The appellate court dismissed the defendant's request that the proceedings be stayed.", "63. On 31 March 2000 the Supreme Court quashed the Regional Court's judgment of 24 May 1999. It noted that the assessment of the property in question on the basis of an auditor's report submitted by the defendant company was not sufficient, and instructed the first instance court to take further evidence and to appoint an expert to that effect. The decision was transmitted to the Regional Court on 23 May 2000.", "64. On 12 September 2000 the representatives of the defendant company submitted further information to the Regional Court. A hearing was held on 28 September 2000 and the case was adjourned. On 13 October 2000 the defendant company submitted its comments on the evidence before the court.", "65. On 13 June 2001 the Regional Court ordered an expert opinion on the value of the property in question to be submitted before 30 September 2001. On 25 September 2001 the expert asked for an extension of the time-limit until 30 November 2001 on the ground that the relevant documents no longer existed.", "66. On 28 September 2001 the Regional Court instructed the expert to suspend the elaboration of the opinion pending an informative hearing of the parties which was scheduled for 11 October 2001. On 15 October 2001 the Regional Court decided that the parties were to pay an advance on the expert's fees and costs. It further instructed the expert to proceed with the opinion. On 25 October 2001 the defendant company challenged both the expert and the above decision on the expert's fees an costs.", "67. On 10 January 2002 the expert informed the Regional Court that the elaboration of the opinion had been impaired by the defendant's conduct. On 16 January 2002 the Regional Court urged the expert to submit the opinion. It was submitted on 31 January 2002. On 5 and 6 February 2002 respectively the parties were invited to submit their comments on it within ten days.", "68. On 4 February 2002 the Regional Court asked the Regional archive in Bratislava for information about archiving of documents. The latter replied on 4 March 2002. In the meantime, on 21 February 2002, the defendant submitted comments on the expert opinion.", "69. On 15 April 2002 the Regional Court heard the parties. The case was adjourned until 27 May 2002 as it was necessary to obtain further evidence. In this context, thirty-one witnesses were summoned.", "70. On 19 April 2002 the Regional Court decided on the expert's fees.\nThe proceedings are pending." ]	[ 3 ]
[ "7. On 26 March 1993 the applicant claimed damages resulting from the termination of his membership of a co-operative before the Trnava District Court. On 20 September 1993 the latter allowed the applicant’s claims in part.", "8. The defendant and the applicant appealed respectively on 8 and 13 October 1993. On 13 December 1993 the applicant submitted reasons for his appeal. On 23 December 1993 the case was submitted to the Bratislava Regional Court.", "9. On 31 January 1994 the Bratislava Regional Court quashed the District Court’s judgment on the ground that the reasoning was insufficient.", "10. The District Court held hearings on 30 March, 25 April and 23 May 1994.", "11. Another hearing scheduled for 13 June 1994 had to be adjourned as the applicant’s lawyer had failed to appear. On 6 July 1994 the District Court again adjourned the case as the applicant’s lawyer had failed to submit written observations in time.", "12. On 15 July 1994 the applicant challenged the Trnava District Court judge dealing with his case. On 16 August 1994 the Bratislava Regional Court dismissed the objection.", "13. On 24 October 1994 the Trnava District Court delivered a new judgment allowing the applicant’s claim for damages in part. The parties appealed and the case was submitted to the appellate court on 12 December 1994.", "14. On 7 July 1995 the case had to be adjourned as neither the applicant nor his lawyer appeared.", "15. On 31 July 1995 the Bratislava Regional Court quashed the first instance judgment on the ground that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to deal with the case. The case was transferred to another chamber of the Regional Court on 2 October 1995.", "16. On 24 June 1996 the Ministry of Justice admitted, in reply to a complaint lodged by the applicant, that there had been undue delays in the proceedings.", "17. Between 17 July 1996 and 25 December 1996 the judge dealing with the case took several procedural steps.", "18. On 24 January 1997 the president of the Bratislava Regional Court apologised to the applicant for delays in the proceedings and informed him that a hearing was scheduled for 28 January 1997.", "19. On the latter date the court heard the defendant and adjourned the case until 25 March 1997 as it was not clear whether the applicant’s lawyer had received the summons. On 24 March 1997 the applicant’s lawyer informed the court that he no longer represented the applicant. On 25 March 1997 the Regional Court therefore adjourned the case until 22 April 1997.", "20. On 22 April 1997 the Bratislava Regional Court dismissed the action on the ground that the applicant failed to show that he had suffered damage. On 2 May 1997 the applicant appealed. The case file was transmitted to the Supreme Court on 26 May 1997. On 3 June 1997 the Supreme Court returned the case to the Regional Court and instructed the latter to decide on the fees for the appeal proceedings. The Regional Court delivered a decision on court fees on 14 June 1997 and sent the case to the Supreme Court on 1 August 1997.", "21. On 22 December 1997 the Supreme Court quashed the first instance judgment. The Supreme Court held that the Regional Court had not established the relevant facts of the case.", "22. On 4 February 1998 the applicant requested the exclusion of the Regional Court judges dealing with his case. He alleged, in particular, that the judges had decided on his claim erroneously and that they had caused delays in the proceedings. The Supreme Court dismissed the request on 24 August 1998. The case file was returned to the Regional Court on 9 October 1998.", "23. On 30 November 1998 the Bratislava Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s action of 26 March 1993. On 29 December 1998 the applicant appealed. The case was submitted to the Supreme Court on 3 February 1999.", "24. On 15 July 1999 the Supreme Court quashed the Regional Court’s judgment of 30 November 1998. The Supreme Court found that the applicant was entitled to compensation and held that it was for the first instance court to determine the amount. The case file was returned to the Regional Court on 21 July 1999.", "25. On 17 February 2000 the Supreme Court excluded the Regional Court judge dealing with the case at her own request.", "26. On 25 April 2000 the case was assigned to another judge.", "27. On 22 February 2001 the Constitutional Court found that the applicant’s constitutional right to a hearing without undue delay had been violated. The decision stated that the case was not complex and that what was at stake for the applicant called for particular diligence. The Constitutional Court found no particular delays in the proceedings which should be imputed to the applicant. As to the conduct of the general courts, the Constitutional Court pointed out, in particular, that there had been delays imputable to the Bratislava Regional Court between 12 December 1994 and 31 July 1995, between 2 October 1995 and 17 July 1996, between 25 November 1996 and 22 April 1997 and between 21 July 1999 and 4 January 2000. Those delays amounted to an overall period of twenty-five months. Furthermore, the proceedings were slowed down due to the fact that the Supreme Court had to quash repeatedly the lower court’s decisions.", "28. According to its case-law, the Constitutional Court lacked jurisdiction, at the relevant time, to draw legal consequences from its finding of a violation of a person’s right to a hearing within a reasonable time. It could neither award damages to the person concerned nor impose a sanction on the public authority liable for such a violation.", "29. On 23 February 2001 the president of the Bratislava Regional Court assigned the case to another judge as the judge appointed on 25 April 2000 had left the court.", "30. Hearings were held on 16 and 31 May 2001. On the latter date the case was adjourned, until 20 September 2001, as the applicant’s representative could not attend due to illness.", "31. On 25 September 2001 the Bratislava Regional Court allowed the applicant to extend his claims for compensation for pecuniary damage. It further decided to deal with the applicant’s claim for non-pecuniary damages in a separate set of proceedings. On 13 November 2001 the Supreme Court dismissed the defendant’s appeal against this decision.", "32. A hearing scheduled for 29 November 2001 was cancelled as the Supreme Court had not yet returned the file to the Regional Court.", "33. On 14 March 2002 the Bratislava Regional Court delivered a judgment in which it granted a part of the applicant’s claims. On 2 May 2002 the applicant appealed. The proceedings are pending." ]	[ 3 ]
[ "8. On 17 October 1994 the applicant, who was born in 1937 and had been on early retirement since 1989, applied for disability benefits under the Social Insurance Act (Lagen om allmän försäkring, 1962:381; hereinafter “the 1962 Act”). He claimed that he had extra costs following an operation on his intestines in September 1994 due to, inter alia, an increased consumption of fluids.", "9. By a decision of 28 December 1994 the Social Insurance Office (försäkringskassan; hereinafter “the Office”) of the County of Stockholm rejected the application, finding that the applicant’s costs were not such as to make him eligible for benefits.", "10. The applicant later made a new application, which was rejected by the Office on 8 February 1995.", "11. The applicant appealed to the County Administrative Court (länsrätten) of the County of Stockholm. On 16 May 1995 the court rejected his appeal. The court did not hold an oral hearing nor did the applicant request one.", "12. Following the applicant’s further appeal, the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) in Stockholm, by a decision of 17 November 1995, refused him leave to appeal.", "13. On 5 December 1995 the applicant made yet another application for disability benefits. On 3 April 1996 the application was rejected by the Office, which again found that the applicant’s costs did not attain the required level. The Office had at its disposal three medical certificates issued by different physicians. They expressed differing opinions on the applicant’s need of extra consumption of fluids, two of them considering that there was no such need and the third one stating that the applicant was recommended, from a surgical point of view, an increased consumption of, for instance, mineral water.", "14. The applicant appealed to the County Administrative Court. In a decision of 23 July 1996 the court noted that the issue in the case was whether the applicant’s extra costs attained the level required for a disability allowance under the 1962 Act. Finding that the medical evidence in the case was inconclusive and did not provide the Court with a sufficient basis for a decision, the court ordered the National Social Insurance Board (Riksförsäkringsverket; hereinafter “the Board”) to submit observations in the case. The Board answered by a letter of 13 August 1996, in which it contested the applicant’s claims. The applicant made observations in reply.", "15. On 16 October 1996 the County Administrative Court gave judgment in the applicant’s favour. Having reiterated that the medical evidence was inconclusive, the court also noted that the calculations of the applicant’s extra costs made by the Office and the applicant himself were very close on either side of the level required for entitlement to a disability allowance. In these circumstances, it gave the applicant the benefit of the doubt and granted him an allowance. An oral hearing was not requested by the applicant, nor did the court hold one of its own motion.", "16. The Board appealed against the judgment to the Administrative Court of Appeal and submitted a medical certificate from a further physician, who stated that an increased consumption of fluids was necessary due to the applicant’s handicap but that there was no particular need for mineral water. On 2 April 1997 the appellate court granted the Board leave to appeal.", "17. By a letter of 23 April 1997 the applicant requested the appellate court to hold an oral hearing in the case. He did not state any reasons for his request. On 15 May 1997 it was rejected by the court. After having restated section 9 of the Administrative Court Procedure Act (Förvaltningsprocess-lagen, 1971:291; hereinafter “the 1971 Act”; see further paragraph 25 below), the court gave the following reasons:\n“Having regard to the subject-matter at issue and the information that has come to hand in the case, [the court] finds that an oral hearing is unnecessary and rejects the request to that effect. [The applicant] is invited to state the further circumstances he wishes to invoke and submit his final written observations in the case within two weeks after having been notified of this decision.\nThe case can be determined notwithstanding a failure to submit such written observations.”", "18. The applicant reiterated his request for an oral hearing on 22 May 1997. He now stated that he wished to be heard in person about his working conditions and the costs of his consumption of fluids. Further, representatives of the Board should be heard about the applicable levels for entitlement to and calculation of disability allowances.", "19. On 24 June 1997 the Administrative Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s renewed request for an oral hearing and gave judgment in favour of the Board. Thus, it quashed the County Administrative Court’s judgment and confirmed the Office’s decision of 3 April 1996. Without giving any further reasons, it considered that the information in the case did not show that the applicant met the conditions for a disability allowance.", "20. The applicant appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten). He requested that the case be referred back to the Administrative Court of Appeal for re-examination or, alternatively, that the Supreme Administrative Court confirm the County Administrative Court’s judgment. He complained about the lack of an oral hearing in the Administrative Court of Appeal and also requested the Supreme Administrative Court to hold an oral hearing.", "21. By a letter of 28 July 1997 the Supreme Administrative Court informed the applicant that it did not normally hold oral hearings and gave him the opportunity to complete his appeal in writing.", "22. On 26 August 1997 the Supreme Administrative Court refused the applicant leave to appeal." ]	[ 3 ]
[ "9. On 20 June 1967 the applicants executed a deed of sale and gift (kupní a darovací smlouva) under which M.R., as vendor, agreed to sell them a farmhouse in Srch and to transfer the adjoining agricultural land to them without consideration. At the time, the system for transferring agricultural holdings was by a sale of the house and gift of the adjoining land that was farmed by a socialist cooperative. The approval of the cooperative and the agreement of the competent national committee were required before the deed of sale and gift could be executed. Purchasers of land were required to give an undertaking that they would work for the cooperative.\nAccording to the applicants, M.R. wished to secure his release from his obligation to work for the socialist cooperative and could only do so by transferring the land. It was he who had proposed the arrangement, as he wanted to sort out his domestic affairs. Under the statutory provisions then in force, the applicants were obliged, as a condition for purchasing the house, to give an undertaking to work for the cooperative as a replacement for M.R. They paid him 30,000 Czechoslovak korunas on top of the purchase price of the house, as compensation for the value of the transferred land.", "10. In 1991 M.R. signed a declaration that he had transferred the land of his own free will. In the applicants' submission, that declaration constituted a rider to the deed confirming M.R.'s consent.", "11. However on 1 July 1993 M.R. brought a civil action against the applicants seeking, inter alia, rescission under section 8(3) of the Land Act (Law no. 229/1991) of the part of the agreement that concerned the transfer of the agricultural land.", "12. In a judgment of 30 September 1994, the Pardubice District Court (okresní soud) found in favour of M.R., holding, inter alia:\n“[The applicants] have invited the Court to dismiss M.R.'s actions on the ground that he transferred his land of his own free will to sort out his domestic affairs and that in consideration [for that transfer] they had assumed his obligation to work for the agricultural cooperative. ...\nSection 8(3) of the Land Act (Law no. 229/1991) provides that if a landowner has donated land to a private individual under duress or transferred it without consideration under a contract for the sale of an adjoining building and at the date this Act entered into force the land was still in that person's possession, the court shall, on application by a person with standing, either (a) order rescission of that part of the sale agreement by which the land was donated or transferred without consideration, or (b) order the current owner to reimburse the price of the land. ...\nThe Court ... finds that the aforementioned conditions were satisfied in the present case and therefore finds in favour of [M.R.]. It has been established that [M.R.] is the person with standing within the meaning of Law no. 229/1991, that is to say the person who gave [the applicants] – the obligees within the meaning of that Act – the agricultural land in connection with the sale of the building ... It has also been established that [the applicants] are currently in possession of the land. Consequently, the Court ... rescinds the section of the deed of sale and gift executed by the parties on 20 June 1967 that provides for the transfer of ownership of the land in question without consideration. ... It does not consider that the 'minuted rider to the deed' dated 6 April 1991 constitutes a valid rider to the deed of sale and gift. The statement in which [M.R.] expressly confirmed that he had sold his immovable property voluntarily and at the agreed price has no ... value in law, as it was made before the amendment to the legislation on land law that enabled him to seek restitution was passed. In fact, [M.R.] denies that he intended to sell the land [to the applicants] and the intentions of both parties are set out in the notary's minutes ... The Court finds that the [applicants'] argument that a decision in favour of [M.R.] would entail a violation of Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms is unfounded, as the latter was obliged to transfer ownership of the agricultural land used by the agricultural cooperative without consideration.”", "13. In a judgment of 29 February 1996, the Hradec Králové Regional Court (krajský soud) upheld the District Court's judgment rescinding the relevant part of the deed of sale and gift. It found that M.R. had given, and thus de facto transferred without consideration, the agricultural land to the applicants as part of the agreement for the sale of the adjoining house. The Regional Court also noted that the terms “donate” and “transfer without consideration” were identical. At the same time, it dismissed an application by the applicants for leave to appeal on points of law (dovolání), holding that the request for a ruling on the construction of the words “transfer without consideration” in section 8(4) of the Land Act did not raise a question of crucial legal importance (rozhodnutí po právní stránce zásadního významu).", "14. Article 239 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that leave to appeal on points of law will be granted if the court hearing the appeal on points of law (dovolací soud) considers that the impugned decision gives rise to a question of crucial legal importance. In reliance on that provision, the applicants appealed to the Supreme Court on 14 June 1996, alleging that the ordinary courts had construed the Land Act erroneously by confusing two incompatible concepts: “donations” and “transfers without consideration”.", "15. In a judgment of 29 July 1997, the Supreme Court (Nejvyšší soud) refused the applicants leave to appeal on points of law, holding that the Regional Court's judgment did not give rise to a question of crucial legal importance. It noted that it had considered the question of the definition of the terms “donations” and “transfers without consideration” in a number of previous decisions in which it had construed the Act as not requiring duress to have been used if the agricultural land had been transferred without consideration. The Supreme Court's judgment was served on the applicants at the earliest on 11 September 1997.", "16. On 12 November 1997 the applicants lodged a constitutional appeal (ústavní stížnost) in which they alleged that the domestic courts' decisions had violated the constitutional guarantees embodied in Articles 1, 11 §§ 1 and 3 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (Listina základních práv a svobod), namely equality of rights for citizens and protection of property. They also sought an order abrogating section 8(4) of the Land Act.", "17. On 4 August 1998 the Constitutional Court (Ústavní soud) declared their appeal inadmissible as being out of time. It held, inter alia:\n“The Constitutional Court considers that litigants are not entitled to bring proceedings in the Supreme Court that do not qualify for leave under the statutory rules or to make an application in such proceedings for an order quashing decisions of the ordinary courts, unless a refusal to hear [the appeal on points of law] would constitute a denial of justice and, consequently, a breach of the right to a fair trial. The [Supreme Court's] judgment does not constitute a decision on the final statutory remedy for the protection of rights ... The constitutional appeal could only be brought against the appeal court's decision, which became enforceable on 15 May 1996. Since it was not lodged until 17 November 1997, it fails to satisfy the condition set out in section 72(2) of the Constitutional Court Act. For this reason, the Constitutional Court has no alternative but to declare the appeal inadmissible, as it was lodged after the expiry of the statutory time-limit.”" ]	[ 3, 9 ]
[ "7. The applicant claimed restitution of real property which had been expropriated from her in 1967.", "8. On 15 September 1992 the Košice-mesto Land Office (Pozemkový úrad) granted the applicant’s claim. The Land Office established, after an inspection of the land in question, that it had never served the purpose for which it had been expropriated which was a relevant reason for its restitution within the meaning of Section 6 (1) (m) of the Land Ownership Act of 1991. The educational institution which possessed the land challenged the decision.", "9. On 19 April 1993 the Košice Regional Court (Krajský súd) quashed the administrative decision as it considered the reasons for it to be insufficient. The Regional Court instructed the administrative authority to establish all relevant facts of the case and to hear the parties.", "10. On 29 December 1997 both the applicant and a representative of the institution using the land in question met with officials of the Košice 2 District Office (Okresný úrad) to which the case fell to be examined. In the course of the meeting the relevant facts of the case were examined.", "11. On 6 February 1998 the Košice 2 District Office delivered a new decision by which it dismissed the applicant’s claim. It held that the plot served the original purpose of its expropriation within the meaning of Section 6 (1) (m) of the Land Ownership Act of 1991 and that the applicant had received compensation for it. The decision was signed by the head of the land, agriculture and forest department of the District Office.", "12. On 10 March 1998 the applicant requested judicial review of this decision. She complained that the Land Office had failed to establish the relevant facts correctly, that it had decided arbitrarily and that there had been no hearing in the case.", "13. On 12 June 1998 the Košice Regional Court upheld the District Office’s decision. The court found, with reference to the documents included in the file of the District Office, that the plot in question served the purpose of its expropriation since a social institution used it as a playground for handicapped children. With reference to Article 250f of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Regional Court decided in camera." ]	[ 3 ]
[ "7. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Fougaron.", "8. On 12 June 1996 the Haute-Garonne Assize Court sentenced the applicant to fifteen years' imprisonment for armed robbery carried out as part of a gang, false imprisonment and fraud. He was detained in Lannemezan Prison (département of Hautes-Pyrénées).", "9. In late 1998 his health deteriorated.", "10. On 8 January 1999 a doctor from the Outpatient Consultation and Treatment Unit (unité de consultation et de soins ambulatoires – “the UCSA”) at Lannemezan Prison issued a medical certificate, which stated: \n“This patient has a history of serious [medical] problems ...\nHe was recently found to have B-cell chronic lymphocytic leukaemia, with some evidence of tumour ...\nThe leukaemia is currently not accompanied by any alteration of the other cell lines; in particular, there is no sign of anaemia or thrombocytopenia.\nHowever, bilateral axillary adenopathy is present, predominantly on the right-hand side.\nThis certificate has been issued at the patient's request and handed to him in connection with an application for parole on medical grounds.”", "11. On 30 September 1999 a further medical report stated:\n“This patient has chronic lymphocytic leukaemia, which has caused severe asthenia. Furthermore, there are signs of orthopaedic disorders as a result of an injury to the left knee and the left ankle causing osteoarthritis of the left patellofemoral and tibiofemoral joints and making it painful for him to remain for long periods in a seated position with his legs bent.\nIn addition, on account of the orthopaedic disorders observed in his left lower limb, the patient has to use a walking stick to move about.\nHis condition is not compatible with the use of restraints on his lower limbs.”", "12. On 6 December 1999 the UCSA doctor advised against applying restraints to the applicant's lower limbs.", "13. The applicant applied to the French President for a pardon on medical grounds, but his application was refused on 7 March 2000.", "14. On 31 March 2000 International Prison Watch (IPW) issued the following press release:\n \n“No early release for prisoners with serious illnesses\nOn 7 March 2000 the Minister of Justice refused applications for a pardon lodged on behalf of a prisoner suffering from a rapidly progressive disease.\n52-year-old Jean Mouisel is currently in Lannemezan Prison. He was diagnosed with chronic lymphocytic leukaemia in November 1998. Jean Mouisel has served two-thirds of his sentence. If remissions of sentence are taken into account, he will be due for release in 2002. On 24 February 2000 a doctor from the UCSA at Lannemezan Prison drew up a certificate attesting that the disease was transforming into lymphoma and that an extended course of cancer treatment involving chemotherapy was therefore necessary. This prisoner is taken to hospital once a week and has to endure his illness while in detention. He is allowed only one visit a week from his relatives, in accordance with the prison's rules.\nHis doctor and various associations applied for a pardon on his behalf. The Ministry of Justice, which centralises such applications and takes an initial decision, did not see fit to refer his case to the President's Private Office.\nIPW wishes to stress that 'no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment' (Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights).”", "15. On 12 May 2000 the UCSA doctor drew up a further medical certificate, which stated:\n“This patient has chronic lymphocytic leukaemia, which was diagnosed in November 1998 and is currently transforming into lymphoma.\nThe lymphoma was diagnosed in early February 2000 during a check-up at the haematology department at Purpan Hospital in Toulouse.\nMr Mouisel's condition currently requires him to undergo cancer treatment in the form of chemotherapy sessions as a hospital outpatient every three weeks.\nAt the moment, he is receiving chemotherapy at Lannemezan Hospital's medical and surgical centre. The patient's haematological condition will need to be reassessed in early August 2000 once he has finished the chemotherapy he is currently receiving.\nIt is subsequently envisaged that he will begin oral chemotherapy, depending on the reassessment to be carried out at Toulouse University Hospital.\nThe compatibility of his condition with his continued detention remains to be determined by an expert.”", "16. On 3 June 2000 the applicant wrote to tell the prison governor about a chemotherapy session that had taken place at Lannemezan Hospital on 30 May 2000:\n“... After an hour and forty-five minutes, the force of my drip was causing me too much pain. My suffering was so great that I had to lower the speed of the drip. That action was not appreciated by the warder in charge of my escort, Mr T., who came into the room red with anger, yelling and screaming. He told me that if the nurse had turned the drip on full, then I was not to touch it. As he put it, 'he and the other member of the escort were not going to spend all day at the hospital'.\nI was surprised at how aggressive they were being towards me, and I wanted to pull out the drip. The pain was too intense; it was making me suffer and was becoming unbearable ... The intervention of the doctor and nurse ... persuaded me to end the chemotherapy session. After the doctor had gone, the chief escort officer told me that the matter would be dealt with when we got back to the prison. \nAt the end of the chemotherapy session, I felt worse than ever as the injection had made me feel much weaker ... I was duly handcuffed and dragged with brute force along the hospital corridors on a chain which the warder was holding, no doubt as a form of retribution. When we got back that morning, I was handcuffed in the usual way without force.\nI am being treated for leukaemia, a cancer of the blood which is nothing like a mere case of the flu! In my case, unfortunately, there is no possible cure; the disease I have caught here at Lannemezan Prison is incurable.\nI am therefore entitled to conclude that the prison staff who escort me to the hospital regularly ask the nurses to make sure that I am injected as quickly as possible so that they do not have to spend all day waiting around for me.\nAs there is currently no way of solving the problem on an administrative level, I shall have to give up the chemotherapy sessions for the time being. I am not refusing the treatment, but the conditions in which I am receiving it are not satisfactory ... This has been going on for several months and I cannot stand it any longer. My physical condition cannot allow it and my morale is getting lower every day. I am dying, but I would like to die peacefully and not in an atmosphere of conflict.”", "17. Following a further application for a pardon on medical grounds, the Ministry of Justice instructed an expert at the Pau Court of Appeal to assess the applicant's state of health, the treatment he required and the manner in which it should be administered, the likelihood of any changes (for example, regarding life expectancy), and whether his condition and the forms of treatment in progress or envisaged were compatible with detention in a specialist unit. The expert's report, completed on 28 June 2000, read as follows:\n“... Recent developments\nAccording to the certificate of 12 May 2000, Mr Mouisel has a form of chronic leukaemia which was diagnosed in 1998 and is currently transforming into lymphoma ...\nHis condition has necessitated an intensive course of chemotherapy administered following the insertion of a 'portacath'.\nHis condition has also required him to be taken to hospital in a non-emergency ambulance for chemotherapy sessions (at the outpatient department of Lannemezan Hospital's medical and surgical centre), initially every week and subsequently every three weeks ...\nClinical condition on the date of the examination\nFunctional symptoms complained of by the patient:\n– permanent asthenia and fatigue;\n– waking up in pain during the night;\n– ...\n– muscle fatigue and breathlessness;\n– alleged psychological impact of stress on his life expectancy and deterioration of his health (this condition has led to his being prescribed a course of antidepressants, which he is currently taking) ...\nIt should be noted that these functional symptoms are to a large extent attributable to the chemotherapy he has been undergoing ...\nParticular mention should be made of a problem relating to the escort and supervision arrangements during visits to hospital for chemotherapy sessions. Indeed, since 20 June 2000 the patient has not consented to treatment.\nClinical examination\n...\nIt should be noted that, according to the documents produced, Mr Mouisel's current degree of disablement was assessed at 80% by the COTOREP [Occupational Counselling and Rehabilitation Board] in a decision of 6 April 2000, and he was awarded a disabled adult's allowance for the period from 2 February 1999 to 2 February 2001.\nConclusion \nBy the date of the examination the applicant's health had deteriorated as a result of the progression of his haematological disorder, diagnosed in November 1998 as leukaemia ...\nMr Mouisel is currently undergoing intensive chemotherapy as an outpatient at Lannemezan Hospital, where he is taken for treatment every three weeks by medical transport (a non-emergency ambulance).\nThe cancer treatment, ... which is already scarcely compatible with imprisonment, is at present causing problems as a result of the position he has adopted recently in not consenting to treatment in the conditions in which he is currently being detained (this has lasted since 20 June 2000, the date scheduled for his treatment).\nHis not consenting to treatment, in spite of all the information received from the UCSA medical team in Lannemezan, is likely to bring about the rapid progression of the disorder observed recently and a reduction in his life expectancy. \nAccordingly, he should be looked after in a specialist unit.”", "18. On 19 July 2000 the applicant was transferred as a matter of urgency to Muret Prison (so that he would be nearer to Toulouse University Hospital) and given a cell of his own.", "19. On 3 October 2000 the applicant applied to the département of Haute-Garonne's Health and Social Affairs Department for acknowledgment of a vaccination-related accident, claiming that he had contracted cancer as a result of a hepatitis-B vaccination. On 24 October 2000 he received a reply from the Ethics and Law Office of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Solidarity informing him that strict liability could not be imposed on the State except for damage sustained as a result of the compulsory vaccinations provided for in the Public Health Code. Hepatitis-B vaccinations were compulsory only for certain occupational groups exposed to a risk of contamination, and the applicant did not belong to any such group.", "20. On 14 November 2000 the applicant was notified of a reply by the Regional Director of the Prison Service to his complaints concerning the application of Article 803 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”) on the use of handcuffs or restraints (see “Relevant domestic law and practice” below):\n“... The provisions of the Article do not establish an absolute prohibition on the use of handcuffs or restraints and do not expressly refer to the detainee's health. They leave the matter to the discretion of those responsible for laying down, and enforcing, security measures: gendarmes, police officers or prison warders.\nMoreover, Article D 283 CCP provides that handcuffs or restraints are to be used solely in connection with 'precautions against absconding', except where a person is being brought before a judicial authority. Where a long sentence is being served for criminal acts causing bodily harm, the appropriate measures are applied.”", "21. On 20 November 2000 the Minister of Justice refused an application for a pardon lodged on the applicant's behalf by the Ligue des droits de l'homme (Human Rights League).", "22. On 24 November 2000 the applicant received a letter from the doctor who had treated him in Lannemezan:\n“... As regards your condition, there does seem to be a change taking place at the moment ... I think it is always worth fighting an illness, whatever it may be; even if there is no possible cure, a remission in the disease is still possible, especially as Dr N. is offering you a new course of chemotherapy, which I would strongly advise you to agree to ...”", "23. A medical certificate issued on 21 February 2001 by a doctor from the haematology department at Toulouse Hospital reads as follows:\n“Mr Mouisel has been treated by our department since February 2000 for chronic lymphocytic leukaemia, initially with tonsillar hypertrophy on both sides causing dysphagia, and substantial axillary adenopathy on the right-hand side (15 cm in diameter).\nHe was initially given chemotherapy once a week using the COP protocol, then once a month with CVP, and subsequently with chlorambucil.\nThe results obtained were satisfactory, but in November 2000 we noticed a renewed increase in the size of the right axillary adenopathy and therefore resumed monthly chemotherapy using the CVP protocol.\nA biopsy of the lymph nodes in January revealed the presence of Hodgkin's disease. Three cycles of chemotherapy using the ABVD protocol are therefore envisaged, followed by additional radiotherapy.”", "24. In an order of 22 March 2001 the judge responsible for the execution of sentences at the Toulouse tribunal de grande instance released the applicant on parole until 20 March 2005, subject to an obligation to receive medical treatment or care:\n“Admissibility\nMr Mouisel exercises parental responsibility over his daughter, born on 4 September 1993 ..., and no ancillary penalties have been imposed on him entailing the forfeiture of that right.\nArticle 729-3 CCP empowers the judge responsible for the execution of sentences to decide cases concerning prisoners who have less than four years of their sentence to serve and who exercise parental responsibility over a child under the age of 10.\nMerits\nIt appears from the medical certificates adduced in evidence (dated 7 December 2000 and 3 January and 21 February 2001) that the applicant's condition has become incompatible with his continued detention, on account of the medical care he requires during regular visits to hospital.\nIt is therefore appropriate, notwithstanding his criminal record, to release the applicant on parole, subject to his staying at his wife's home (see the declaration of 30 January 2001) and receiving treatment in accordance with a medical protocol at Purpan Hospital. ...”" ]	[ 1 ]
[ "8. The applicant was born in 1931 and lives in Milan.", "9. The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Milan, which she had let to M.A.H. on 1 March 1987.", "10. In a writ served on the tenant on 13 February 1991 the applicant informed the tenant that she intended to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Milan Magistrate.", "11. By a decision of 15 March 1991, which was made enforceable on 19 March 1991, the Milan Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises must be vacated by 30 September 1991.", "12. On 10 July 1991, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.", "13. On 18 November 1991 she served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 29 November 1991.", "14. Between 29 November 1991 and 22 January 1999 the bailiff made twenty-four attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as, under the statutory provisions providing for the staggering of evictions, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.", "15. On 22 November 1999, the applicant repossessed the premises with the assistance of the police." ]	[ 3, 9 ]
[ "8. The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Milan, which he had let to S.P.", "9. In a registered letter of 28 June 1988, the applicant informed the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 1 July 1988 and asked her to vacate the premises by that date.", "10. In a writ served on the tenant on 20 February 1991, the applicant reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Milan Magistrate.", "11. By a decision of 14 March 1991, which was made enforceable on 27 March 1991, the Milan Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1992.", "12. On 30 November 1992, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises. On an unidentified date, he served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 19 February 1993.", "13. On 3 December 1993, the applicant made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for his mother.", "14. Between 19 February 1993 and 12 May 1997 the bailiff made twenty attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.", "15. On 31 August 1997, the applicant repossessed the apartment." ]	[ 9 ]
[ "8. The applicants are the owners of a flat in Milan, which they had let to G.M. and R.C.", "9. In a registered letter of 23 January 1982, the applicants informed the tenants that they intended to terminate the lease and asked them to vacate the premises by 27 July 1982.", "10. In a writ served on the tenants on an unspecified date, the applicants reiterated their intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenants to appear before the Milan Magistrate.", "11. By a decision of 4 November 1982, which was made enforceable on 15 December 1982, the Milan Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1983.", "12. By a decision of 28 June 1985, the Milan Magistrate postponed the said deadline to 18 December 1985.", "13. On 13 December 1985, the applicants served notice on the tenants requiring them to vacate the premises.", "14. On 11 February 1986, they served notice on the tenants informing them that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 25 February 1986.", "15. Between 25 February 1986 and 24 November 1986, the bailiff made six attempts to recover possession.", "16. On 14 April 1987, the applicants made a statutory declaration that they urgently required the premises as accommodation for their daughter.", "17. Between 28 April 1987 and 12 January 1999, the bailiff made fifty-one attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicants were never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.", "18. At the end of January 1999, the tenants vacated the premises." ]	[ 3, 9 ]
[ "8. The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Florence.", "9. The applicant is the owner of a flat in Florence which he had let to G.F.", "10. In a registered letter of 6 June 1989, the applicant informed the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 30 April 1992 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date.", "11. In a writ served on the tenant on 27 September 1989 the applicant reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Florence Magistrate.", "12. By a decision of 6 November 1989, which was made enforceable on 7 December 1989, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 April 1993.", "13. On 28 September 1991, the applicant made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for his daughter.", "14. On 14 May 1993, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.", "15. On 18 June 1993, he served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 23 June 1993.", "16. Between 23 June 1993 and 15 December 1998 the bailiff made 13 attempts to recover possession.", "17. On 10 September 1998, the applicant made a second statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for his daughter.", "18. Each attempt of the bailiff proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.", "19. On 25 August 1999, the applicant served notice again on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 9 November 1999.", "20. On 17 September 1999, the tenant asked the Florence District Court to set a fresh date for the enforcement of the order for possession pursuant to Section 6 of Law No. 431/98.", "21. On 9 November 1999, the bailiff attempted to recover possession of the applicant’s apartment without success due to the lack of police assistance. He adjourned the enforcement proceedings to 23 March 2000.", "22. On 26 January 2001, the applicant recovered possession of his flat." ]	[ 3, 9 ]
[ "8. The application relates to two sets of proceedings. The first concerns the divorce proceedings proper before the court of first instance and the second concerns the interim measures in respect of which Article 1280 of the Judicial Code gives the summary applications court special power and jurisdiction to hear applications for interim measures during the divorce proceedings.", "9. On 17 March 1998 the applicant's husband filed a divorce petition against her on a specified ground.", "10. After a hearing on 20 October 1998 judgment was reserved until 4 November 1998, when the Brussels Court of First Instance granted a divorce against the applicant and ordered each party to pay its own costs.", "11. On 22 December 1998 the applicant's husband appealed against the costs order.", "12. At a preliminary hearing on 26 January 1999 the parties declared that the case was ready for trial. It was immediately set down for hearing in the relevant ordinary division. On 7 May 1999, in reply to a letter from the applicant's lawyer, the registry of the Brussels Court of Appeal informed her that it would take eight months for the appeal to be heard. On 25 November 1999 the registry listed the case for hearing on 24 February 2000. At the hearing the applicant's husband stated that he was withdrawing his appeal. The court gave judgment on 16 March 2000 acknowledging that the appeal had been withdrawn.", "13. The divorce decree was registered on 24 October 2000.", "14. On 17 March 1998 the applicant was summoned before the Brussels Court of First Instance, as the court hearing summary applications, to deal with interim measures relating to the divorce petition and, more particularly, to the two children, born in 1984 and 1988, of whom the father had had custody since the couple had separated in 1995. The parties filed their main pleadings before the hearing of 17 June 1998. The applicant then filed further pleadings at the hearing. In an order of 26 June 1998 the President of the Brussels Court of First Instance provisionally granted the mother renewed contact with the children and determined the maintenance payable to the applicant by the father per child and per month.", "15. On 31 July 1998 the applicant's husband appealed against that order. Neither party appeared at a preliminary hearing on 11 August 1998 and the appeal was re-listed for hearing. On 21 October 1998 the appellant asked for the hearing date to be fixed by judicial recorded delivery. At the hearing listed for 24 November 1998 the appeal was adjourned until 12 January 1999 for the court to check that it was ready for hearing. At the hearing the parties filed their grounds of appeal and a timetable for subsequent pleadings. On 21 January 1999 the applicant filed further pleadings and a list of documents. Her ex-husband filed further pleadings on 27 January 1999. On 28 January 1999 the case, which was now ready for hearing, was set down for hearing in an ordinary division.", "16. On 6 May 1999, in reply to a letter from the applicant's lawyer, the registry of the Brussels Court of Appeal stated that the case had been set down for hearing and would take approximately eight months to come to a hearing. On 14 December 1999 the registry informed the parties that the case would be heard on 24 March 2000 but did not specify how the hearing would be conducted.", "17. On 16 May 2000 the parties filed joint pleadings with the registry of the Court of Appeal stating that they intended to withdraw from the proceedings. After a hearing on 23 June 2000 the Court of Appeal gave judgment on 27 June 2000 acknowledging their decision. In its judgment it noted that counsel for the parties had stated at the hearing that the parties would continue to comply with the interim measures set out in the order of 26 June 1998." ]	[ 3 ]
[ "8. The applicant is an Italian national, born in 1956 and living in Florence.", "9. The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Florence, which she had let to P.R. and A.R.Z.", "10. In a registered letter of 7 June 1989, the applicant informed the tenants that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 15 December 1989 and asked them to vacate the premises by that date.", "11. On 8 June 1989, she served a notice to quit on the tenants, but they refused to leave.", "12. In a writ served on the tenants on 21 October 1989, the applicant reiterated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenants to appear before the Florence Magistrate.", "13. By a decision of 20 November 1989, which was made enforceable on 27 November 1989, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 15 December 1990.", "14. On 18 December 1990, the applicant made a statutory declaration that she urgently required the premises as accommodation for herself.", "15. On 28 December 1990, the applicant served notice on the tenants requiring them to vacate the premises.", "16. On 22 January 1991, she served notice on the tenants informing them that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 6 February 1991.", "17. Between 6 February 1991 and 27 February 2000, the bailiff made twenty-one attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.", "18. On 15 March 2001, the applicant recovered possession of the apartment." ]	[ 3, 9 ]
[ "8. The applicant was born in 1914 and lives in Inzago (Milano).", "9. The applicant is usufructuary of a flat owned by her husband A.C., which had been let to G.P.", "10. In a registered letter of 28 February 1985, the applicant’s husband informed the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 30 April 1986 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date.", "11. In a writ served on the tenant on 15 April 1986, the applicant’s husband reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Milan Magistrate.", "12. By a decision of 26 April 1986, which was made enforceable on 14 May 1986, the Milan Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 April 1987.", "13. On 20 May 1987, the applicant’s husband served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.", "14. On 9 June 1987, he served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 10 July 1987.", "15. Between 10 July 1987 and 17 February 1988, the bailiff made four attempts to recover possession.", "16. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as, under the statutory provisions providing for the suspension, the applicant’s husband was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.", "17. On 4 august 1988, the applicant’s husband died and the applicant inherited the usufruct of the flat.", "18. Between 30 June 1989 and 10 December 1998, the bailiff made 30 attempts to recover possession.", "19. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as, under the statutory provisions providing for the suspension, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.", "20. On 12 May 2000, the applicant recovered possession of her flat." ]	[ 3, 9 ]
[ "8. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Florence.", "9. Mr and Mrs B. were the owners of an apartment in Florence, which they had let to M.C.B.", "10. In a registered letter of 21 February 1987, they informed the tenant that they intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1987 and asked her to vacate the premises by that date.", "11. In a writ served on the tenant on 24 April 1987, they reiterated their intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Florence Magistrate.", "12. By a decision of 11 June 1987, which was made enforceable on 23 June 1987, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1988.", "13. On 6 August 1987, the applicant became the owner of the apartment.", "14. On 11 January 1989, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises.", "15. On 9 May 1989, the applicant made a statutory declaration that she urgently required the premises as accommodation for herself.", "16. On 18 May 1989, she served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 11 July 1989.", "17. Between 11 July 1989 and 21 May 1998, the bailiff made twenty attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.", "18. On 3 July 1998, the tenant vacated the premises and the applicant recovered possession of the flat." ]	[ 3, 9 ]
[ "8. The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Florence.", "9. The applicant is the owner of a flat in Florence, which he had let to A.R.", "10. In a registered letter of 4 November 1985, the applicant informed the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 30 June 1987 and asked her to vacate the premises by that date.", "11. In a writ served on the tenant on 13 January 1987, the applicant reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Florence Magistrate.", "12. By a decision of 19 January 1987, which was made enforceable on 4 February 1987, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 June 1988.", "13. On 18 March 1989, the applicant made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for himself.", "14. On 21 June 1989, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises.", "15. On 7 August 1989 he served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 28 August 1989.", "16. Between 18 September 1989 and 4 July 1996 the bailiff made 15 attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.", "17. On 18 September 1996, the applicant recovered possession of his flat." ]	[ 3, 9 ]
[ "8. The applicant is the owner of a flat in Milan, which she had let to L.D.Z.", "9. In a registered letter of 6 June 1984, the applicant informed the tenant that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 29 December 1984 and asked her to vacate the premises by that date.", "10. On 11 February 1985, she served a notice to quit on the tenant, but she refused to leave.", "11. In a writ served on the tenant on 19 February 1985, the applicant reiterated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Milan Magistrate.", "12. By a decision of 27 February 1985, which was made enforceable on 14 March 1985, the Milan Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 27 February 1986.", "13. On 23 January 1986, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises.", "14. On 7 March 1986, she served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 18 April 1986.", "15. Between 18 April 1986 and 18 June 1992 the bailiff made 23 attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as, under the statutory provisions providing for the suspension or the staggering of evictions, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.", "16. Thereafter, the applicant decided not to pursue the enforcement proceedings, in order to avoid useless costs, given the lack of prospects of obtaining the assistance of the police.", "17. On 13 April 1996 the applicant repossessed the flat, which the tenant vacated in pursuance of an agreement reached with the applicant." ]	[ 3, 9 ]
[ "8. D.L.F. and D.E. were the owners of a flat in Florence, which they had let to F.M.", "9. In a registered letter of 30 December 1982, they informed the tenant that they intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1983 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date.", "10. In a writ served on the tenant on 8 March 1986 D.L.F and D.E. reiterated their intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Florence Magistrate.", "11. By a decision of 6 May 1986, which was made enforceable on 16 May 1986, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 June 1988.", "12. On 28 April 1988, the applicant became the owner of the apartment.", "13. On 21 December 1990, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.", "14. On 10 January 1991, she served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 18 March 1991.", "15. Between 18 March 1991 and 6 December 1991, the bailiff made three attempts to recover possession. After the third attempt, the applicant decided to discontinue the enforcement proceedings because of the lack of police assistance.", "16. On 8 February 1995, the applicant made a statutory declaration that she urgently required the premises as accommodation for her own use.", "17. On 20 February 1995, the applicant served notice again on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.", "18. On 14 March 1995, she served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 15 May 1995.", "19. Between 15 May 1995 and 14 April 1997, the bailiff made five attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as, under the statutory provisions providing for the staggering of evictions, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.", "20. Following a friendly settlement, in January 1998 the tenant vacated the premises." ]	[ 3, 9 ]
[ "8. The applicants are the owners of a flat in Ghezzano di San Giuliano Terme (Pisa) which had been let to V.F.", "9. In a registered letter of 5 December 1990, the applicants informed the tenant that they intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 30 June 1991 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date.", "10. In a writ served on the tenant on 23 December 1991, the applicants reiterated their intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Pisa Magistrate.", "11. By a decision of 31 January 1992, which was made enforceable on 6 February 1992, the Pisa Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 January 1993.", "12. On 27 January 1994, the applicants served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.", "13. On 14 February 1994, they served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 28 February 1994.", "14. Between 28 February 1994 and 25 April 1998 the bailiff made twelve attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as, under the statutory provisions providing for the staggering of evictions, the applicants were not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.", "15. In June 1998, the applicants repossessed their flat." ]	[ 3, 9 ]
[ "8. The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Torre del Greco, which he had let to A.P.", "9. In a writ served on the tenant on 24 October 1990, the applicant informed the tenant of his intention to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1991 and summoned him to appear before the Naples Magistrate.", "10. By a decision of 30 November 1990, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Naples Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1992.", "11. On 11 March 1993, the applicant made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for his daughter.", "12. On 19 March 1993, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.", "13. On 7 April 1993, he served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 26 April 1993.", "14. Between 26 April 1993 and 16 January 1997, the bailiff made nine attempts to recover possession. Each attempt of the bailiff proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.", "15. On 28 April 1997, the tenant vacated the premises." ]	[ 3, 9 ]
[ "8. The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Florence, which he had let to A.B.", "9. In a registered letter of 26 March 1984, the applicant informed the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 30 June 1986 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date.", "10. On 8 April 1986, he served a notice to quit on the tenant, but he refused to leave.", "11. In a writ served on the tenant on 22 April 1986, the applicant reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Florence Magistrate.", "12. By a decision of 2 May 1986, which was made enforceable on 7 July 1986, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 June 1988.", "13. On 13 July 1988 and again on 13 May 1989, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.", "14. On 2 May 1989 the applicant made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for himself.", "15. On 17 June 1989 he served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 7 August 1989.", "16. Between 7 August 1989 and 15 October 1996, the bailiff made fifteen attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.", "17. On 7 April 1997, the applicant repossessed the premises." ]	[]
[ "8. The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Florence, which he had let to S.S.", "9. In a writ served on the tenant on 29 March 1989, the applicant informed the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1991 and summoned him to appear before the Florence Magistrate.", "10. By a decision of 28 April 1989, which was made enforceable on 14 April 1993, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1992.", "11. On 13 April 1993, the applicant made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for his daughter.", "12. On 21 April 1993, he served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.", "13. On 9 June 1993, he served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 18 June 1993.", "14. Between 18 June 1993 and 14 May 1997, the bailiff made 10 attempts to recover possession. Each attempt of the bailiff proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.", "15. On 29 April 1997, the applicant and the tenant reached a friendly agreement and on 30 September 1998, the tenant vacated the premises." ]	[ 3, 9 ]
[ "8. On 12 January 1996 the applicant had an accident while driving a car belonging to his employer. The police found alcohol on the applicant’s breath and seized his driving licence.", "9. On 17 January 1996 the police department in Košice decided not to restore the driving licence to the applicant pending the outcome of the investigation into the accident. On 1 February 1996 the applicant appealed.", "10. On 5 March 1996 the Ministry of the Interior upheld the first instance decision.", "11. On 17 May 1996 the applicant sought a judicial review of the administrative decisions to withhold his driving licence.", "12. On 30 June 1997 the Bratislava III District Court dismissed the action. It noted that the administrative decisions in question were of a procedural nature and that it lacked jurisdiction to review them.", "13. On 19 December 1997 the applicant lodged a petition with the Constitutional Court. He alleged a violation of his constitutional right to a hearing without undue delays in the proceedings concerning the decision to withhold his driving licence. He also alleged a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in that the proceedings before the Bratislava III District Court had been unfair.", "14. On 11 February 1998 the Constitutional Court rejected the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention as it found no reason for applying an international treaty in the applicant’s case. It declared admissible the complaint about the length of the proceedings. On 31 March 1998 the Constitutional Court found that the applicant’s constitutional right to a hearing without undue delays had been violated in the proceedings before the Bratislava III District Court.", "15. On 12 April 1996 the Košice 1 District Prosecutor indicted the applicant for two offences on the ground that on 17 December 1995 and on 12 January 1996 respectively he had driven a car after having drunk alcohol and that on the latter date he had caused a road accident.", "16. On 30 April 1996 the Košice 1 District Court issued a penal order convicting the applicant on two counts of causing danger to other persons while being intoxicated and imposed a conditional six months’ prison sentence. The applicant was further disqualified from driving for two and a half years.", "17. On 15 May 1996 the applicant challenged the penal order.", "18. Hearings before the Košice 1 District Court were held on 11 June 1996, on 26 November 1996 and on 17 December 1996. On the latter date the Košice 1 District Court delivered a judgment the operative part of which was the same, in substantive terms, as that of the penal order.", "19. On 7 February 1997 the applicant appealed.", "20. On 23 April 1997 the Supreme Court transferred the case from the Košice Regional Court to the Žilina Regional Court.", "21. On 16 July 1997 the latter quashed the first instance judgment with reference to several shortcomings in the proceedings before the trial court. The decision was to be served by the Košice 1 District Court. The latter received it on 28 July 1997.", "22. On 25 March 1998 the applicant complained to the President of the Košice 1 District Court that he had not been notified of the appellate court’s decision. On 16 April 1998 the President of the Košice 1 District apologised to the applicant for delays in the proceedings.", "23. On 4 May 1998 the applicant complained to the President of the Košice Regional Court that the decision on his appeal had not been served and that the proceedings had lasted an unreasonably long time.", "24. On 12 May 1998 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court about delays in the proceedings.", "25. On 17 December 1998 the Constitutional Court found that the Košice 1 District Court was responsible for undue delays in the proceedings.", "26. In December 1998 and on 13 January 1999 the Košice 1 District Court held hearings in the case.", "27. On 12 January 2000 the Košice 1 District Court convicted the applicant on two counts of causing danger to other persons while being intoxicated and imposed a combined sentence: the applicant was fined 5,000 Slovakian korunas and disqualified from driving for five years.", "28. On 28 February 2000 the applicant appealed. The applicant’s brother and son respectively also filed an appeal.", "29. On 28 June 2000 the Žilina Regional Court dismissed the appeals.", "30. On 22 August 2000 the Košice 1 District Court decided that the five years’ prohibition to drive motor vehicles imposed in the criminal proceedings was to be counted as from 12 January 1996 when the applicant’s driving licence had been withheld by an administrative measure." ]	[ 3, 9 ]
[ "8. The applicants were both born in 1956 and they are currently living in Istanbul.", "9. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.", "10. Until 18 September 1994 the applicants lived in the Dirimpınar village of the Malazgirt district in the province of Muş.", "11. On an unspecified date, while the applicant Ramazan Kınay was serving a prison sentence in Diyarbakır prison, the mayor of the village (muhtar) told the villagers and the applicant Makbule Kınay that their houses would be burned by security forces. Following this information, some of the villagers removed their belongings from their houses.", "12. On 18 September 1995, at about 8 p.m., security forces, composed of 50-60 village guards, special team members and gendarmes, arrived in the applicants’ village. Some members of the security forces conducted a search of the applicants’ house. They seized the valuables belonging to Makbule Kınay. They manhandled and insulted her as well as her three children. Then they poured gas on the applicants’ house and set it on fire together with its contents.", "13. Makbule Kınay recognised the village guards who had burned her house as being from the Nurettin village of the Malazgirt district.", "14. Following the burning of her house, Makbule Kınay moved to her relatives’ house in the Bulanık district of Muş. She then moved to İstanbul as a result of intimidation by the security forces. She later learnt that 75 tons of barley had been collected from their fields by the village guards.", "15. On 15 March 1995 Ramazan Kınay was conditionally released. On 30 November 1995 Ramazan Kınay filed a petition with the Üsküdar Chief Public Prosecutor’s office in İstanbul for submission to the Public Prosecutor’s office in Malazgirt. In his petition, he complained about the burning of his and his relatives’ houses by village guards. He requested permission to return to his village and compensation for the losses.", "16. No investigation was carried out into the applicants’ complaints.", "17. The applicant Ramazan Kınay was convicted of membership of the PKK. He was serving a prison sentence at the time of the alleged events.", "18. The authorities carried out an investigation into the applicants’ allegations of destruction of their property and their forced eviction from the village.", "19. On 5 December 1997 the Malazgirt Gendarme Commander took statements from the mayor of the Dirimpınar village. In his statements, the latter denied the applicants’ allegations. He stated that there were families still living in the village and that the applicant Makbule Kınay moved out of the village of her own free will.", "20. According to the records of the Land Registry, the applicants are the owners of 10,56 acres of land.", "21. Subsequent to the investigation carried out by the authorities, it was understood that, at the relevant time, there were no village guards or operations being carried out in the region." ]	[ 4 ]
[ "7. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Ağrı. He is the father of the deceased Orhan Yakar, who was 16 years old at the time of the events in question.", "8. In June 1996 the applicant’s son went to Istanbul where he worked as a painter for a couple of months. In September 1996 the applicant lost contact with his son. In November 1996 the applicant went to Istanbul in order to find out his son’s whereabouts. Orhan’s neighbours told him that his son had disappeared two months earlier.", "9. On 13 November 1996 the applicant filed a petition with the office of the Istanbul Public Prosecutor. He requested that his son be found and that those responsible be punished if anything had happened to him. The applicant also filed a petition with the Istanbul Security Directorate as to the whereabouts of his son. Then, he returned to his village in Ağrı.", "10. On 17 November 1996 the security forces carried out a search in order to arrest a member of the PKK who had been located near the township of Sancak in the province of Bingöl. The security forces arrested the applicant’s son in the course of the search. In an incident report drafted by the gendarmes it was noted that the applicant’s son had been carrying a rifle and some ammunition when he was arrested. In a further incident report it was noted that Orhan Yakar had been arrested at 2.45 p.m. and that he had been subsequently transferred to the Interrogation Department in the Provincial Gendarmerie Command (İl Jandarma Komutanlığı Sorgu Kısım Amirliği) by a helicopter.", "11. Neither reports bore the signature of the applicant’s son.", "12. On 18 November 1996 the gendarmes, accompanied by the applicant’s son, carried out a search in order to find the body of a terrorist. While the gendarmes were 40 or 45 metres away from the location where the body had been left, Orhan, who was walking in front of the gendarmes, stepped on a mine placed by the PKK and died. The gendarmes continued their search and found the body of the terrorist. They also arrested a member of the PKK and seized two rifles.", "13. In the meantime, the applicant was told at the Doğubeyazıt Gendarmerie Command that his son had joined the PKK and that he had surrendered to the security forces in Bingöl where he had been held in custody.", "14. The applicant went to Bingöl in order to investigate the whereabouts of his son. He was told at the Bingöl Gendarmerie Command that his son, who had just surrendered to the security forces, had died after stepping on a mine.", "15. In a letter of 22 November 1996 the Bingöl Gendarmerie Command informed the public prosecutor in Bingöl that the applicant’s son had been arrested on 17 November 1996, at 2.30 p.m., in the township of Sancak near the village of Karapınar and had been transferred to the Interrogation Department in the Provincial Gendarmerie Command. During his interrogation the applicant’s son had stated that he knew where the body of İhsan Meriç, who had died during the clashes of 16 November 1996, was hidden. The gendarmes, accompanied by Orhan, had carried out a search in order to find out where the body was hidden. However, Orhan had died after stepping on a mine.", "16. On 23 December 1996 the applicant filed a petition with the office of the Bingöl public prosecutor. He requested that the corpse of his son be handed over to him.", "17. On 6 January 1997 the applicant requested from the Bingöl Gendarmerie Command access to all information and documents concerning the death of his son.", "18. In a letter by the Bingöl Gendarmerie Command dated 9 January 1997 the applicant was informed that the documents concerning his son’s death had been transferred to the office of the Bingöl public prosecutor and that the Command had no authority to give information to the applicant. The applicant was also informed that he could seek the relevant information from the office of the Bingöl public prosecutor or from the Ministry of Interior.", "19. On 14 March 1997 the applicant filed a petition with the Ministry of Interior. The applicant stated that he had been unable to receive any documents or information from the authorities concerning the death of his son. He requested that all relevant information and documents be transmitted to him.", "20. On 22 May 1997 the Istanbul Security Directorate transmitted the relevant information and documents provided by the Bingöl Gendarmerie Command to the applicant’s lawyer in Istanbul.", "21. On 27 May 1997 the Bingöl public prosecutor made a written request to the Bingöl Gendarmerie Command to summon the gendarmes who had witnessed the death of the applicant’s son. The prosecutor stated that he would hear them within the preliminary investigation into the death of the applicant’s son.", "22. On 10 July 1997 Major Muharrem Fındık gave a statement before the Bingöl public prosecutor. He stated that the applicant’s son had died in the course of an operation carried out in order to find the body of İhsan Meriç. Major Fındık had been walking 40 or 45 metres behind the applicant’s son when he heard an explosion. The gendarmes had been unable to collect the dismembered body owing to heavy weather conditions.", "23. The gendarmes, Gürbüz Beyiktaş, Mehmet Tutak and Niyazi Patır, who also appeared before the public prosecutor, reiterated the Major’s statement.", "24. In a letter dated 11 July 1997 the Bingöl public prosecutor reported the death of the applicant’s son to the Populations Office (Nüfus Müdürlüğü) in Bingöl.", "25. On 22 August 1997 the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court decided that no prosecution should be brought against Orhan Yakar on account of his membership of the PKK as he had died on 18 November 1996.", "26. On 23 September 1999 the applicant gave a statement to Sergeant Süleyman Üçkuyulu. He stated that he had been trying to find out the whereabouts of his son since 1996. The authorities had told him that his son had died after stepping on a mine. However, despite his requests, his corpse had not been handed over to him. He had lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights and this application was pending before the Court. He requested that his son’s corpse be handed over to him.", "27. In the course of the investigation into the death of the applicant’s son the Bingöl Provincial Administrative Council issued a decision, on 23 August 2000, stating that no prosecution should be brought against the members of the security forces. In its view, Orhan Yakar had died after stepping on a mine, which had been placed by the PKK. The security forces had been unable to collect Orhan’s body owing to heavy weather conditions and the possible existence of other mines in the region. It was concluded that the security forces had performed their duty with diligence.", "28. On 3 October 2000 the Doğubeyazıt Gendarmerie Command transmitted the Bingöl Provincial Administrative Council’s decision of 23 August 2000 to the Sarısu Gendarmerie Command. The Doğubeyazıt Gendarmerie Command requested that the applicant be notified of this decision.", "29. In a letter dated 16 October 2000 the applicant informed his lawyer that he had been forced to sign some papers at the Sarısu Gendarmerie Command without having read them. He had requested to see the papers but he had been given them after his lawyer had telephoned the Command. Then, he had been asked why he had appointed Ms Keskin as his lawyer. It had been suggested to him that he withdraw his application before the Court and he had been advised to claim compensation from the national authorities.", "30. On 16 October 2000 the applicant filed an objection with the Bingöl District Administrative Court (Bölge İdare Mahkemesi) against the decision of the Bingöl Provincial Administrative Council.", "31. The case is still pending before the Bingöl District Administrative Court." ]	[ 2 ]
[ "8. On 6 July 1990 the police investigator accused the applicant of theft and of breach of domestic privacy. On 7 July 1990 the Košice Public Prosecutor decided to remand the applicant in custody as from 5 July 1990.", "9. On 4 January 1991 the applicant was indicted for several offences.", "10. On 16 May 1991 the Supreme Court decided that the case was within the jurisdiction of the Košice Regional Court.", "11. On 3 July 1991 the Košice Regional Court sent the applicant’s criminal case back to the Public Prosecutor for further investigation.", "12. On 31 December 1991 the applicant was released from detention on remand.", "13. On 13 April 1992 a new indictment was filed with the Košice City Court. On 27 May 1992 the latter referred the case to the Košice Regional Court for reasons of jurisdiction.", "14. On 10 August 1992 the Košice Regional Court returned the case to the Public Prosecutor for further investigation.", "15. On 9 February 1993 the Košice 1 District Prosecutor filed a new indictment against the applicant to the Košice 1 District Court. On 3 March 1993 the District Court transferred the case to the Košice Regional Court for reasons of jurisdiction. On 1 June 1993 the public prosecutor withdrew the indictment.", "16. On 6 May 1994 the Košice 1 District Prosecutor again indicted the applicant before the Košice 1 District Court. On 16 May 1994 the prosecutor withdrew the indictment.", "17. On 5 October 1994 the Košice 1 District Prosecutor filed a new indictment with the Košice 1 District Court. On 30 June 1995 the latter returned the case to the public prosecutor and ordered further investigation into the case. On 9 November 1995 the Košice Regional Court ordered the District Court to decide on the case on the basis of the indictment filed on 5 October 1994.", "18. On 15 and 22 January 1996 the District Court adjourned the case after it had found that the applicant could not attend because he was detained in the context of different proceedings.", "19. Hearings before the District Court were held on 14, 26 and 29 February 1996.", "20. On 29 April 1996 the applicant requested that a different lawyer be appointed to represent him in the proceedings. His request was granted. Further hearings were held on 22 May 1996 and on 10 June 1996.", "21. On 1 July 1996 the case was adjourned as witnesses did not appear. The court proceeded with the case on 11 and 16 September 1996. On the latter date the District Court delivered a judgment in which it convicted the applicant on sixty-nine counts of theft and attempted theft, of violation of domestic privacy and of damaging other persons’ property.", "22. The Public Prosecutor appealed and claimed that the court should have imposed a consolidated sentence on the applicant.", "23. On 30 September 1997 the Košice Regional Court granted the appeal and imposed a consolidated three years’ prison sentence.", "24. In the meantime, on 5 May 1997, the applicant requested the District Court to restore his savings book which had been taken away from him at the preliminary stage of the proceedings.", "25. On 5 November 1997 the Košice 1 District Court issued a decision, in the context of the above criminal proceedings, by which it seized the savings book from the applicant. On 18 February 1998 the Košice Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint against this decision." ]	[ 2 ]
[ "7. On 26 January 1993 the applicant was arrested by police officers from the Ankara Police Headquarters on suspicion of being a member of an illegal organisation, the THKP-C (Turkish People’s Revolutionary Frontier Organisation).", "8. The applicant was placed in custody at the Ankara Security Directorate. His wife was also taken into police custody on the same date.", "9. According to the applicant, the police officers, who are known as the C-2 squad of the Anti-Terror branch, beat and hit him on the head with a nailed stick, squeezed his testicles, kept him in a cold room and did not allow him to go to the toilet. The police officers sexually harassed the applicant’s wife and attempted to rape her in his presence.", "10. On 27 January 1993 the applicant was seen by a doctor at the Ankara Forensic Medicine Institute who noted in his report the presence of scars of a brain operation on the forehead, an abrasion of 3 cm long on the right temporal part of the head, a laceration of 1 cm long over the right ear, a haematoma of 2 cm below the right eye, an ecchymosis of 1 cm and conjunctival hyperaemia on the right eyelid. It was suggested that a brain surgeon examine the applicant. The forensic doctor decided to draft his final report in the light of the findings of the brain examination.", "11. On the same date the applicant was transferred to the Numune Hospital following a letter of the Anti-Terror Branch Director addressed to the hospital.", "12. When the applicant was brought to the Numune Hospital, a doctor decided to transfer the applicant to another hospital because she was unable to carry out a brain tomogram. The applicant was brought to the İbni Sina Hospital where he was examined by a brain surgeon. The findings of the brain examination were transmitted to the forensic doctor who drafted his final report. As no pathological findings were indicated by the surgeon, it was concluded that the applicant’s injuries were not life threatening but would prevent him working for four days.", "13. A forensic doctor carried out a further medical examination on the applicant on 30 January 1993. It was concluded, with reference to the findings of the brain examination, that the applicant was in need of serious medical treatment.", "14. On 8 February 1993 the Ankara State Security Court ordered the applicant’s detention on remand.", "15. On 20 July 1993 the applicant filed a petition with the Ankara State Security Court in which he alleged that he was severely tortured while in custody by the C-2 squad of the Anti-Terror Branch. He was hit on the head with a nailed stick and that his wife was subjected to sexual harassment in his presence. He was examined by doctors at the Numune and İbni Sina Hospitals and at the Forensic Medicine Institute. The applicant alleged that he identified the C-2 squad members who were present at the hearing before the State Security Court on 11 June 1993.", "16. On 16 August 1993 the applicant gave a statement to the Ankara Public Prosecutor. He stated that his shirt had been smeared with blood as a result of torture while in custody. He had showed to the public prosecutor and to the judge when he appeared before them on 8 February 1993 his shirt and his wife’s trousers that had been torn by the police officers when they attempted to rape her.", "17. On 7 September 1993 the applicant filed a petition with the office of the Ankara Public Prosecutor. He reiterated his allegations and gave a detailed description of the police officers that tortured him in custody.", "18. On 30 December 1994 the Ankara public prosecutor decided that no prosecution should be brought against the police officers (takipsizlik kararı). The prosecutor stated that the medical reports consisted of nothing but the applicant’s subjective complaints, which might relate to his former brain operation. The prosecutor concluded that there existed no evidence to substantiate that the police officers tortured the applicant.", "19. The applicant filed an objection with the Kırıkkale Assize Court which set aside the public prosecutor’s decision of 30 December 1994.", "20. On 28 February 1995 the Ankara Public Prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Ankara Assize Court. The prosecutor charged ten police officers under Article 243 of the Turkish Criminal Code with torturing the applicant.", "21. On 13 March 1997 the Ankara Assize Court acquitted the police officers. In its decision the court referred to the statements of the accused police officers in which they stated that the applicant had been injured because he resisted the police when he was arrested. In the medical reports it was clearly indicated that the applicant had been sustaining injuries. The medical report drafted by a doctor at the Forensic Medicine Institute was issued on 27 January 1993, which was one day after the applicant had been arrested on 26 January 1993, at 17.30 hours. Having regard to the fact that the applicant had resisted when he was arrested, the findings of the medical reports were reflecting the injuries occurred at the time of arrest. Furthermore, the witnesses heard by the court stated that they had not seen applicant being tortured because they had been interrogated separately. The court concluded that there existed no evidence to substantiate that the applicant had been tortured by the accused police officers.", "22. On 21 March 1997 the Ankara Assize Court’s decision became final, as the public prosecutor did not lodge an appeal. The court’s decision was not served on the applicant." ]	[ 2 ]
[ "8. The applicants, E., H., L. and T. were born in 1960, 1961, 1963 and 1965 respectively and live in Scotland. E., L. and T. are sisters and H. is their brother.", "9. The applicants’ mother had six children by her husband. After the death of the applicants’ father in 1965, their mother cohabited with W.H. Two further children were born in that relationship.", "10. The family, living in a local authority flat in Dumfries, were known to the social services of Dumfries and Galloway Regional Council (“the local authority”). The records provided by the Government show that they were principally concerned from 1970 onwards in relation to the mother’s severe financial difficulties. The mother suffered from bad health and it was noted in 1973 that when she had a broken arm she always kept one of the children off school (presumably to help in the home) and was likely to be summoned before the Education Sub-Committee. Problems with rent and electricity arrears were noted as recurring through 1975 and 1976, as well as continuing health difficulties suffered by the mother. An entry on August 1976 noted that the eight children were all happy though overcrowded and that there were no behavioural problems.", "11. On 16 November 1976, it was recorded however that E., the first applicant, who had been causing concern as she had been staying out at night, was found semi-conscious at a nearby flat, having taken an overdose. It was noted that the mother was to take her to attend a psychiatric clinic. The medical notes recorded that E. complained that she disliked intensely her mother’s cohabitee W.H. who hit her, shouted and upset her so much that she ran away with intent to kill herself.", "12. A social work report dated 25 November 1976 noted that the family consisted of six daughters and two sons living with their mother. W.H., the father of the two youngest children, was recorded as not cohabiting and the mother had stated that she would not marry him as she would be worse off financially. The state of the home was said to fluctuate according to the mother’s health but was considered to be adequately furnished with a warm, friendly atmosphere. The mother had always demonstrated a great deal of concern for her children and had perhaps overindulged them at times. In spite of the fact that there was much juvenile delinquency in the area, this was noted as being the first time that any of her children had given cause for concern. The mother’s ambivalent attitude to school attendance was commented on.", "13. In December 1976, E. left school and the social services gave assistance in finding employment.", "14. On 7 January 1977, L., the third applicant, then aged 13, ran away from home, following an incident in which she claimed that W.H. had attempted to rape her. She was referred as an emergency by the police to the social services. The police interviewed all the family. It is not apparent that the family, in particular the children, were interviewed by social workers concerning the implications of L.’s disclosures. No steps were taken to refer them to the Reporter of the Children’s Hearing.", "15. On 7 January 1977, W.H. was arrested by the police and charged with indecently assaulting E. and L.", "16. On 8 January 1977, W.H. entered a guilty plea concerning charges involving offences of indecent behaviour against E. and L. before Dumfries Sheriff Court. The pleas were accepted by the prosecution and the case proceeded on the basis that W.H. had committed one act of indecency against E. between 20 October 1972 and 31 August 1976, and two acts of indecency against L. between 1 January 1975 and 7 January 1977. The Sheriff requested the social services to prepare social enquiry and psychiatric reports. W.H. was not detained pending sentence. According to the applicants, he returned to live at the applicants’ home.", "17. On 11 January 1977, the applicants stated that the police submitted a report to the children’s social worker, S., expressing concern that the children should be protected from further abuse. The Government have found no trace of any such report in existence.", "18. On 28 January 1977, W.H. appeared before the Sheriff for sentencing. The social enquiry report dated 18 January 1977 stated inter alia that the family lived in a four room local authority flat in an area where there was a high incidence of social problems. The home was adequately furnished and maintained to a reasonable standard. The mother was described as a caring woman who did not enjoy good health but who put her childrens’ interests first. The family was considered as appearing a happy well-adjusted group though they were well known to the social services as they had been given assistance from time to time. The children attended school regularly and appeared happily settled. W.H. was recorded as admitting the offence and as being more than ashamed of his conduct, though he could offer no explanation for these actions. It was noted that he did not appear to realise fully the serious nature of these charges. Since the alleged offence he had obtained accommodation outside the applicants’ home - it indicated an address in the same apartment block. It was further noted that the mother was not prepared to accept the charges relating to this man and stated that they had plans to marry in the Spring as they had had a close relationship for many years. It was concluded that, in view of the serious nature of the offences, it would be necessary for firm control to be exercised over the accused for a period of time.", "19. The psychiatric report found that W.H. did not show any psychiatric abnormality. His criminal record showed one prior minor offence of dishonesty.", "20. W.H. was sentenced by the Sheriff to two years’ probation. The applicants state that this was with a condition that he cease to reside at the applicants’ address. The Government have found no record of that condition attaching to the probation order and stated that the probation file cannot now be found. They accepted however that it was the social services’ responsibility to supervise W.H.’s probation. According to the recollection of Mr M., who was the supervising officer for part of that period (after June 1977), he would have made it clear to W.H. that he was not permitted to live in the family home due to the nature of the offences. He recalled visiting W.H. at a separate address in Dumfries during this period and sending mail to that address. He believed that W.H. was living there and not at the applicants’ home. In the precognition annexed to the Government’s observations, Mr M., who was also probation officer for E. and acted as replacement for the family social worker, recalled however that he did have suspicions that W.H. might still be living at the family home and that on visiting the family home two or three times unexpectedly he found W.H. “just leaving”. He did not consider that there was sufficient evidence of W.H. breaching the conditions attached to his probation order to justify taking the matter further.", "21. The social worker, Mr R., visited the home on 22 occasions between 24 January and the end of June 1977 and did not see W.H. However, his notes recorded in March 1977 a suspicion that the mother was still cohabiting with W.H. When Mr M. took over the case, he noted that W.H. was not living there (social work case notes entry of 6 August 1977) and that W.H. was not contributing financially to his children. In his later affidavit, he stated that this entry was based on information from the mother. Entries indicated concerns about school attendance and that the mother had been repeatedly told that she should not keep the girls off school. In September 1977, it was noted that the school had expressed concerns about the welfare of T., the fourth applicant, which was attended to by a senior social worker. A school meeting concerning the children’s attendance was arranged but the mother and H., the second applicant, failed to attend. In November 1997, the social worker paid an unexpected visit to the home and found that W.H. was there. Both he and the mother denied that he was living there.", "22. According to a social enquiry report of 1 June 1977 drawn up by Mr R. when E. was charged with criminal damage before the Sheriff Court, she had left home in about February 1977. No reference was made to the past history of sexual abuse in the home though it was stated that she had left home after a scene with the man who was at that time co-habiting with her mother. E. was found guilty of malicious mischief on 15 June 1997 and sentenced to two years’ probation. Social work case notes also recorded that by March 1977 she had left home. According to her claims lodged in later proceedings, E. finally left home on her 17th birthday, in October 1977.", "23. School attendance was still recorded as a problem in December 1977 for the remaining girls at home. H., the second applicant, had now left school officially. In her later statements, L. recalled that during 1977 she was on occasion taken into temporary local authority care in connection with problems of running away.", "24. In January 1978, the mother was recorded as giving her various health problems as the reason for keeping L. and T. off school. It was noted that her speech was slurring, among other symptoms, but that she had shown reluctance in going to see her doctor or in allowing the social workers to approach her doctor. In February 1978, she was keeping one or both girls off school to help her at home or to run messages.", "25. In March 1978, it was noted that the house was becoming even more disordered and the younger children and the mother were becoming more unkempt. The mother gave the impression of having given up. In June 1978, the mother was finally referred through her doctor for hospital tests, though she failed to attend the appointments set. In October 1978, it was noted that the house stank and that the carpet was matted. The mother informed the social worker that W.H., who lived in Derbyshire, had invited her to go and live with him there. She gave up that idea shortly afterwards.", "26. In January 1978, L. was referred to a Children’s Hearing for failure to attend school. In the background report drawn up by Mr M. for the hearing, explanation was given of the financial and health difficulties of the mother and it was stated that it was the mother who kept L. from school to help in the home. There was no reference to the history of sexual abuse in the home. In April 1978, L. was living temporarily in a social work establishment known as the Closeburn Assessment Centre. On 22 April 1978, she ran away from the home and was returned. At a date unspecified, she went back to live at home.", "27. H., aged 17, left the family home in or about 1978.", "28. On or about 15 January 1979, L. left home after an argument with her mother about going out at night and was brought back by the police who referred the matter to the social services. After discussion with the mother, L. was taken into care by the social services until 20 February 1979.", "29. On 16 March 1979, the school attended by L. called a multi-disciplinary meeting to discuss the problems of non-attendance of a number of the children of the family. Though a social worker was invited to attend, none was present.", "30. On 28 March 1979, L. was transferred to a residential centre but left the following day to return home. At about the same time, the applicants’ mother changed address. L. lived with her there for about a week and then left to live with a friend. She took an overdose and was admitted to hospital. A letter dated 11 April 1979 from the psychiatric registrar to L.’s G.P. noted that “... she doesn’t get on well with her mother’s cohabitee. The relationship with Mum’s cohabitee seems a bit peculiar”.", "31. After being discharged from hospital on 9 April 1979, L. went to live with a 50 year old man with whom she had a sexual relationship. On 17 April 1979, the police picked up L. who told them about the relationship. The mother agreed that L. was beyond her control and agreed that she be put in a place of safety. An order lasting one month was made to that effect. From 18 April 1979, she was made the subject of compulsory care measures by the local authority which brought her before the Children’s Hearing. In the background report drawn up by the social worker Mr E. for the hearing, details were given of the mother’s financial difficulties and ill-health and comment was made that, apart from truancy, the family had not been in any trouble. No reference was made to the past sexual abuse. The hearing extended the place of safety order. L. was sent to Closeburn Assessment Centre from 18 April to 18 June 1979. She appears to have remained there for most of the period until her 16th birthday on 28 July 1979, at which date she ceased to be subject to the legislation governing the compulsory education of children. Efforts were then made to find employment for her. Social work notes of 1 August 1979 concerning L. recorded that, when the social worker accompanied her to the mother’s home for a visit, a man described as L.’s stepfather was present in the living room.", "32. Entries in the social work notes for the family during 1979 continued to emphasise financial difficulties. An entry in February 1979 referred to problems of school attendance of ten years’ standing and the mother’s frequent summoning before the school council.", "33. On 7 April 1979, it was noted that the family had moved to a larger home, a self-contained house provided by the local authority.", "34. Through 1979-1981, financial difficulties were noted as continuing, and the mother’s health and general state deteriorating to such an extent that she rarely got out of bed.", "35. The applicants’ mother died in 1981. It appeared that she had been suffering, inter alia, from undiagnosed multiple sclerosis. The applicants’ elder sister (aged 22) took on the mothering role in the family home.", "36. T. left home in November 1984, after she had become pregnant and had a child. By January 1988, she was living at an address with her 3 year old daughter and was in contact with the social services concerning her financial problems. In February 1988, she indicated to her social worker that she had been subject to sexual abuse in the past. In April 1988, she disclosed that this had involved her step-father W.H. as well as other men, one of whom had been convicted of rape. As at the time she was in regular contact with W.H., whom she considered had reformed, she was counselled concerning the risk to her own child.", "37. Following counselling, E., L. and T. reported the history of abuse by W.H. to the police in or about November 1988. In her statement of 13 January 1989, L. stated that after W.H. had been arrested in 1977, various social workers used to come around and she and the others had had to tell them that W.H. was not living with them anymore. When they came to the house, W.H. used to hide and her mother used to keep the children out of their way if possible. She recalled wanting to tell a social worker what was happening but was so petrified of W.H. that she did not. W.H. continued to interfere with her and had sex with her a couple of times after the court case.", "38. Charges were brought against W.H. of committing sexual offences against E., L. and T.", "39. At his trial before the High Court on 20 July 1989, W.H. pleaded guilty to four charges and not guilty to two charges. The prosecution accepted his pleas. W.H. was duly convicted of serious acts of indecency against E. between 19 October 1967 and 18 October 1972 and of further such acts against her between 1 September 1976 and 18 October 1976; of serious acts of indecency against L. between 28 July 1968 and 31 December 1974; and of similar acts against T. between 28 August 1974 and 27 August 1978. Only part of the latter charge concerned the period after W.H.’s earlier conviction on 8 January 1977.", "40. The trial was adjourned for sentencing reports to be obtained. On 20 July 1989, the High Court sentenced W.H. to a two year suspended sentence of imprisonment, having regard to the reports which indicated that he now lived in Yorkshire and that most of the offences predated his earlier conviction in 1977. However, it was only at this time that the applicants alleged that they became aware that W.H. had been subject to criminal proceedings in 1977 and that he had been placed on probation on the condition that he did not reside in their home.", "41. On 18 June 1992, the four applicants brought proceedings against the local authority seeking damages on the basis that the local authority had failed to carry out its statutory duties, in particular, that W.H. had breached his probation order by residing at the family home and that the social services had, or ought to have, known this and had failed to report the breach to the court or to take the children into care.", "42. On 4 January 1996, following the decision of the House of Lords in X. and Others v. Bedfordshire County Council ([1995] 3AER 353) and in the light of counsel’s advice that their case was indistinguishable, the applicants consented to an order that their action be dismissed.", "43. In or about 1992 to 1993, the applicants applied for compensation to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme in respect of the abuse suffered. In their applications, they alleged as follows:\n(i) E. stated that from about 1967 she suffered 10 years of abuse from W.H. The first incident which she recalled was when she was 6 or 7 when he struck her, sending her flying into the wall. Soon after, he began coming into her room at night and doing things to her, requiring her to masturbate him. If she cried, he would punch her in the face. From the age of 12, he used to make the girls have a bath together and would touch them all over their bodies, inserting his finger into them. Often he would keep her off school and would abuse her sexually. He assaulted her often, coming up behind her to hit her on the back of the head. He also used to stand on her naked feet with his shoes on and twist, pinch her with his nails and punch her. This physical abuse happened on a daily basis. He would also get her and the others to strip to the waist and hit each other with dog chains. This conduct continued regularly until she left home on her 17th birthday (19 October 1977). She recalled going to the social services when she was aged 14 and telling them that W.H. was living with them when he was not supposed to. Nothing happened as a result. While the social services were coming to the house, she did not remember them talking to her. She recalled that this period was before she was 14 or 15, before 1974 or 1975. When she was 15, she started running away from home. On one occasion she took pills. When she was visited by the police in hospital, she told them that W.H. was interfering with her. She also told this to a psychiatrist whom she saw soon after. However, W.H. continued interfering with her. W.H. was only arrested after L. had run away from home in January 1977. E. had suffered serious problems since that time, having made several suicide attempts and having developed a severe drink problem. A psychiatric report of 24 April 1992 concluded that her symptoms accorded with a diagnosis of severe post traumatic stress disorder.\n(ii) H. stated that he suffered from physical abuse, assaults and threats of violence from W.H. from about 1967. From about the age of 6 or 7, W.H. used to punch him in the stomach and bash him against the wall. He also made him and the others strip to the waist and punch and hit each other with chains. These relentless assaults went on regularly until he left home during 1978. A psychiatric report of 9 June 1992 concluded that he had long term relationship problems, poor self confidence and long standing personality difficulties.\n(iii) L. stated that she had suffered sexual and physical abuse from W.H. from 1969 until she left home in about 1979 and on occasion after that. W.H. had started interfering with her when she was about 5 or 6. The first thing she remembered was him bathing her with her sister E. and rubbing her private parts. Hardly a day went past when he did not do something of a sexual nature to her (e.g. touching her breasts or private parts) or batter her. When she was older, he made her touch him on his private parts and perform oral sex. He made her and the other children hit each other with chains and whips and would sometimes join in. She was often left with bad bruises and a bleeding nose. From the age of 11 or 12, he had sexual intercourse with her several times. When she ran away in January 1977, she told the police and he was arrested. However, he returned home and started interfering with her again, having intercourse with her and punching or kicking her if she refused. She ran away again in Spring 1977 and was put into a home, first in Dumfries, then Annan and finally Closeburn, which she eventually left in 1979 when she was 16. At that point, she did not return home but went to stay with her sister and then embarked in a series of relationships. When she visited her mother on 1 January 1980, W.H. put his hands up her skirt but let her go when she threatened to tell her boyfriend. On another occasion in 1981, W.H. tried to fondle her but she got up and left. She had never been able to tell anyone about these things as she was scared of him and thought that he would severely assault her. A psychiatric report of 24 April 1992 concluded that her symptoms, including nightmares and sleep disturbance, accorded with a diagnosis of severe post traumatic stress disorder.\n(iv) T. stated that she had suffered sexual and physical abuse from W.H. from about 1971 to 1989. Though she did not remember anything specifically before the age of 9, she slept in the same bed as L. and remembered him coming naked into the bed with them. From an early age, he used to stand on her naked feet in his shoes and twirl round, nip her and punch her in the stomach. She had black eyes occasionally. When she was 9, she remembered him making her touch him and masturbate him. She had to do that to him two or three times a week when he came home from work. He then started keeping her off school and would lie down on the bed naked, making her take her clothes off and masturbate him. This occurred two or three times a week. When she was 10 or 11, he began to touch her breasts and rub his penis over her until he ejaculated. When she was 14, he forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. He did not repeat that but continued touching her and making her masturbate him or have oral sex. This continued until 1984 when she was able to leave home – she deliberately got pregnant by having sex with someone she knew, so that the local authority would provide her with accommodation away from home. In 1987, W.H. started coming to her house and would try to touch and grab her. She became very depressed and suicidal. She then told the Family Centre about the abuse. A psychiatric report of 24 April 1992 concluded that her symptoms, including low self-esteem, fear, mistrust and depression, accorded with a diagnosis of severe post traumatic stress disorder.", "44. Though the applicable provisions did not permit claims for injuries from violence arising before 1 October 1979 where the victim and assailant were in the same household, the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (“CICB”), in an apparent oversight, made an assessment awarding 25,000 pounds sterling (GBP) to E., L. and T. for general damages. They appealed against the failure to award damages for loss of earnings. As it was noted that in the proceedings for the fourth applicant T. that most of her injuries had arisen before 1979, the applicants E. and L. withdrew their appeals to prevent their awards being reconsidered altogether. In deciding T.’s appeal, the Board decided that as she had sustained some damage post-October 1979 it would not disturb the award but made no award for alleged loss of earnings or damage to employment prospects. H. did not receive any award. A letter dated 23 July 1992 from the CICB indicated that his application had been rejected in that his claim had not been made within three years of the incident giving rise to the claim and the Chairman had decided not to waive the requirement in his case.", "45. On 30 January 1996, the applicants requested the Commissioner for Local Administration in Scotland to undertake an investigation into their allegations of negligence and maladministration by the local authority. By letter dated 8 February 1996, the Ombudsman stated that he had no jurisdiction pursuant to section 24(6)c of the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1975, which precluded investigations where the complainants had a remedy by way of proceedings in a court of law, and that, even if he had jurisdiction, he would not have undertaken an investigation due to the lapse in time since the events occurred. By letter of 22 February 1996, he declined to reconsider his decision.", "46. The Government submitted two reports by Ms Black, a social work consultant who has worked for more than 30 years in the field of child care, principally in Scotland.", "47. In her first affidavit dated 26 March 2002, Ms Black stated that with the exception of cases of incest there was in the 1970s no real appreciation of the incidence of, and consequences for victims of, child sexual abuse within families. Circulars referred to non-accidental injury without specific reference to sexual abuse which was not recognised as a particular issue. It was only in the 1980s that literature began to arrive in the United Kingdom from the United States on the subject of child sex abuse and initially this was regarded as controversial. The first real recognition of the problem in the United Kingdom was a CIBA publication “Child Sexual Abuse in the Family” published in 1984. A Working Group on the topic was set up by the Social Work Services Group of the Scottish Office in which she was involved and which reported in 1985.", "48. According to her experience, during the 1970s and before, where a case of incest or sexual abuse had been identified, the focus would be on ensuring that the perpetrator was punished. Little or no attention was given to the needs of the victim and once the perpetrator was convicted that would be seen as the end of the matter. There was no real appreciation of the extent to which abusers might continue to abuse their victims over many years or of the skills of abusers in avoiding detection. Social workers were not given any specific training about child sex abuse. There was also the practice at the time of local authorities keeping their probation and child care functions separate, with social workers working separately rather than as part of a team and there was a tendency for there to be relatively little interaction between schools and social work departments.", "49. In her view, after W.H. had been convicted and sentenced to probation in January 1977, it would have been generally assumed that any continuing problem would have been resolved, particularly if a condition in his probation was that he was not allowed to live in the family home. No work would have been envisaged with the victims unless they were showing obvious distress or problems. A mere suspicion that the W.H. was in breach of the probation order, and his presence found in the house during the day, would not have been sufficient proof of breach. He was the father of two of the mother’s youngest children, contact with the family was not prohibited and his presence in the house would have even been seen as positive. Even if they had considered the possible breach of probation further, they would not have gone on to consider possible harm to the children. It would have been standard practice to make specific appointments to visit the home in order to avoid wasted time and she would not have expected the social worker to make spot checks or call at unexpected times to check on W.H.. As was the practice, social services provided support for the mother who had considerable problems in running the home, and would have had a tendency not to investigate the causes of any running away or of truancy, particularly where the child was close to school leaving age. Nor would it have been expected at the time for the social workers to make a point of talking individually to the children, unless for the purpose of a specific report.", "50. In her additional comments of 20 May 2002, added in the light of the examination of further documents, Ms Black noted that at the meeting convened by the school in March 1979 concerning L. the social work department had not sent a participant though invited to do so. The school problems drawn to the attention of the social services did not appear to have prompted the social worker to suggest a meeting to try to draw together the issues for the family and this meant that the full extent of the problems that L. and the others in the family faced were not discussed by the wider group of professionals who knew the family. By this time, the use of case conferences was well established in social work practice.", "51. She also noted that following E.’s overdose of pills in November 1976, the social services did not appear to react to E.’s dislike of W.H. and her allegations of an earlier sexual assault and his shouting and hitting. Nor was there any social work follow-up when L. ran away in January 1977, beyond a visit of the emergency social worker, or any discussion with E. and L. after W.H. had been sentenced. Even if social workers at the time were not aware of the incidence of sexual abuse, the incidents with the two girls and the evident distress shown by them should have usefully led to an attempt to discuss with them individually how things were at home, in particular to establish the severity of past incidents and whether any other children in the house were at risk of sexual or physical abuse.", "52. Further, in the light of Mr R’s report to the court which commented on the need for firm control of W.H. and the mother’s refusal to accept that he had committed the offences, this made the assurances given by W.H. and the mother that W.H. was not living in the home much less safe to rely on. Mr R. did not appear to have issued any warning to them about the consequences of breaching the probation order. When the report was made on E. in June 1977 there was no reference to the sexual abuse or home difficulties. Also the report to the Children’s Hearing on L. in January 1978 failed to give a full picture of her difficulties. Throughout the case there was an emerging pattern of different people not using the information available to assess the safety of the girls and W.H.’s adherence to the probation conditions. After the report on E. in June, it could have been expected that the workers involved in the family would have increased their scrutiny of the living arrangements in the family. The lack of detail in the reports on L. deprived the Children’s Hearing of vital information which could have led them to place L. on supervision and afforded more opportunity for her to speak about the home situation.", "53. Though by January 1977 E. was too old to be referred to the reporter of the Children’s Hearing, grounds existed for referring L. at that time. Given the abuse, her level of truancy, the poor financial and material circumstances in the family and the offence of W.H., coupled with allegations by E. as to shouting and hitting in the family home, she considered that a referral of L. ought to have been made. This would have given an opportunity for all the different agencies involved with the family to contribute to the discussion and for the Hearing to appreciate the full extent of the problems. Though L. might not have been removed in the first instances, a supervision requirement would have allowed closer contact and more individual work. The Reporter would also have had the opportunity to consider whether any other children in the household were in need of compulsory measures of care.", "54. She concluded that the failure to share significant issues with the Children’s Hearing about L., the failure to work collaboratively with the school, the lack of attention to the assessed need for firm control of the situation after W.H. was placed on probation and the lack of attention to the significance that the mother did not believe her daughters’ complaints against W.H., all contributed to a failure to help get the girls the support they were likely to need after the conviction of W.H. and disclosed a failure in the approach taken to the family by the social work department. \nReports by Mr Richard Jack submitted by the applicants", "55. The applicants provided three reports dated 20 March, 13 May and 10 June 2002 by Mr Richard Jack, a consultant in social work with experience in social work practice over 28 years.", "56. He stated that from 1975, when circular SW1/75 was issued, a mult-disciplinary approach by professionals was promoted in respect of neglect and child protection, though sexual abuse was not explicitly referred to. While public and professional acknowledgement of a significant child abuse problem did not emerge until the mid-1970’s, in this case E. and L. had made disclosures which were believed and not in doubt. Literature as to the nature of the problem was available to practitioners, in particular with Kempe and Kempe’s work published in 1978, inter alia, identifying clear indicators as to the behaviour exhibited by abused children.", "57. Despite long-term problems with the family and notes of truanting dating back to 1973, there was minimal reference to dialogue between the social services and the education authority. There was no reference in the social work records to the disclosures made by E. to medical personnel or to a visit to her in hospital by an emergency social worker, disclosing a significant breakdown in communication. The family social worker Mr E. appears to have had no clear knowledge as to the situation, while Mr M., who later supervised probation of W.H., was not a qualified social worker and did not appear to have proper knowledge of the seriousness and persistence of the offences in issue.", "58. Once disclosures had been made by E. and L. in 1977, it would have been reasonable, given the ages of the children, to discuss W.H. with them outwith the presence of the mother. A serious discussion ought to have taken place in the social services as to the potential risks to the children in the household and at the very minimum a report should have been prepared for the Reporter to the Children’s Hearing. In fact there was nothing to suggest that the social services explored W.H.’s impact on the children in the family at all.", "59. The social service records noted clear suspicions that W.H. continued to live in the household. Though it was stated in the context of the probation order that firm control was needed, no steps were taken such as further enquiries from neighbours or the local police as to W.H.’s actual place of residence. Breach of the probation order was a very serious matter and should have triggered a referral of his case back to the court and of the children to the Reporter.", "60. When L.’s truancy was referred to the Children’s Hearing in 1978, there was no reference to the background of her running away in January 1977 or to the history of neglect and turbulent dynamics in the family. It was negligent of the social services not to provide the panel with full information. Nor when there was a case study meeting at the school in March 1979 did any social worker attend. There was never any multi-disciplinary case conference which reviewed in a full, objective and accurate manner the history and circumstances of the family." ]	[ 1 ]
[ "10. The applicant association, whose members are co-proprietors and inhabitants of a large housing project in Linz, has the aim of improving communication between the inhabitants inter alia by setting up an internal cable network. In proceedings brought in 1978 and terminated in 1986, it unsuccessfully applied for an operating licence.", "11. On 24 November 1993 the European Court of Human Rights gave judgment in the case of Informationsverein Lentia and Others v. Austria (Series A no. 276), finding a violation of Article 10 of the Convention as regards inter alia the applicant's complaint that it had been unable to set up a television station due to the broadcasting monopoly of the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation.", "12. On 18 August 1994 the applicant, referring to the above judgment, filed a new request for an operating licence with the Telecommunications Office for Upper Austria and Salzburg. On 3 May 1995 the latter dismissed the request noting that no legislation allowing it to grant such a licence had been passed as regards cable broadcasting. On 9 November 1995 the Federal Ministry of Public Economy and Transport dismissed the applicant's appeal.", "13. On 1 August 1996 the Constitutional Court's judgment of 27 September 1995 took effect, according to which private broadcasters were free to create and transmit their own programmes via cable-net without any conditions being attached.", "14. On 1 July 1997 the Cable and Satellite Broadcasting Act entered into force, which lays down the conditions under which private cable broadcasting is allowed." ]	[ 3 ]
[ "10. The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Vienna.", "11. On 7 July 1997 the weekly magazine “Profil” published an article about the applicant, who had been the manager of a company working in the field of financial consulting, and the criminal proceedings against him relating to charges of aggravated fraud.", "12. Thereupon, the applicant introduced proceedings for the publication of a reply under the Media Act.", "13. On 3 September 1997, after the Vienna Regional Criminal Court had rejected his first application for publication of a reply on formal grounds, the applicant, who was then imprisoned, drafted another request for the publication of a reply and handed it over to the prison administration on 4 September 1997 indicating that the “matter was subject to a time-limit”.", "14. The request was posted on 9 September 1997 and reached the publisher of “Profil” on the following day.", "15. On 13 November 1997 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court rejected the applicant's second application for publication of a reply, on the ground that his request had not reached the publisher on 7 September 1997 at the latest, i.e. within the statutory two-months time-limit which had started running with the publication of the article at issue.", "16. On 16 March 1998 the Vienna Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal." ]	[]
[ "6. The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Rome, which she had let to M.P.", "7. In a writ served on the tenant on 18 February 1985, the applicant informed the tenant of her intention to terminate the lease and summoned him to appear before the Rome Magistrate.", "8. By a decision of 24 September 1985, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 June 1986.", "9. On 9 July 1986, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.", "10. On 4 August 1986, she served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 27 September 1986.", "11. On 16 May 1987 and on 13 May 1989, the applicant made a statutory declaration that she urgently required the premises as accommodation for herself.", "12. Between 27 September 1986 and 6 February 1990, the bailiff made twenty-four attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.", "13. On 14 March 1990, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.", "14. On 30 March 1990, she served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 10 April 1990.", "15. Between 10 April 1990 and 16 September 1993, the bailiff made thirty-six attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.", "16. On 4 March 1994, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.", "17. On 14 May 1994, she served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 19 May 1994.", "18. Between 19 May 1994 and 14 October 1999, the bailiff made twenty-seven attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.", "19. On 15 November 1999, the applicant recovered possession of the apartment." ]	[ 4 ]
[ "6. The applicant's father was the owner of an apartment in Rome, which he had let to M.G.", "7. In a writ served on the tenant on 9 March 1990, he communicated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Rome Magistrate.", "8. By a decision of 20 June 1990, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 July 1991.", "9. On 17 October 1991, the applicant's father served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.", "10. On 15 November 1991, he served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 17 December 1991.", "11. Between 17 December 1991 and 17 February 1995, the bailiff made fifteen attempts to recover possession. In the meantime, on 10 March 1992, the applicant's father died and the applicant inherited the apartment.", "12. On 6 December 1993 and 28 April 1995, the applicant made a statutory declaration that she urgently required the premises as accommodation for her daughters.", "13. Between 28 April 1995 and 15 September 1999, the bailiff made seventeen attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.", "14. On 3 April 2000, the applicant recovered the apartment because the tenant vacated the premises spontaneously." ]	[ 3 ]
[ "8. The applicants live in Frankfurt, Germany.", "9. On 2 October 1939 the applicants' mother acquired title to a property in Bucharest composed of three flats. On 30 March 1948 she sold one of the flats to L.N. In 1975 she emigrated to Germany.", "10. On 18 September 1975 the State took possession of the property pursuant to Confiscation Decree no. 223/1974. The applicants' mother was never informed of the grounds or legal basis for that confiscation.\nAction for recovery of possession", "11. On 27 July 1992 the applicants, as heirs, brought proceedings against Bucharest City Council and the managing company of State-owned housing, H., in the Court of First Instance of the first district of Bucharest to have the confiscation order against the property set aside. They argued that their mother had been the owner of the property and that the State had confiscated it pursuant to Confiscation Decree no. 223/1974, but that the deprivation of property had been unlawful because the administrative confiscation order had never been served on their mother. On 3 May 1994 the court delivered a judgement which was subsequently set aside by a decision of 19 April 1995 of the Bucharest County Court following a procedural flaw. The case was then remitted to the Court of First Instance.", "12. In a judgment of 28 January 1995 the court granted the claim on the ground that the administrative confiscation order in favour of the State had not satisfied the statutory formal conditions. Accordingly, it held that the State had not lawfully acquired title to the property and that the applicants were the lawful owners. The court ordered the confiscation order to be set aside and the property to be returned to the applicants.", "13. An appeal by Bucharest City Council was dismissed on 17 May 1996 by the Bucharest County Court on the same grounds as the Court of First Instance.", "14. The City Council appealed to the Bucharest Court of Appeal. In a judgment of 14 October 1996 the court allowed the appeal and dismissed the applicants' action for recovery of possession. It found that the property in question had become State property pursuant to a valid legal title, namely the City Council's decision of 18 September 1975, and held that in order to secure its return or, if applicable, compensation, the applicants' only remedy was under the provisions of Law no. 112/1995 on the restitution of certain nationalised property.", "15. On 20 December 1996 the State sold one of the remaining two flats to the former tenant." ]	[ 3 ]
[ "9. The applicant was born in 1922 and lives in Ploieşti.", "10. On 20 January 1944 the applicant received as a dowry from her father a house situated in Ploieşti (hereafter called “the house”), composed of two flats and a garage plus the adjoining land.", "11. In 1950 the State took possession of the property, allegedly under Decree no. 92/1950 on nationalisation. The applicant was never informed of the grounds or legal basis for that deprivation of property. She was, however, allowed to use one of the flats in the house as a tenant of the State.", "12. Between 1950 and 1955 the applicant made several complaints to the authorities, arguing that the provisions of Decree no. 92/1950 were inapplicable to her case and requesting that the house be returned to her. She did not receive any reply.", "13. In 1954 the State demolished the garage.", "14. In 1994 the applicant brought an action in the Ploieşti Court of First Instance for recovery of possession of the house. She submitted that she belonged to the category of persons whose property Decree no. 92/1950 exempted from nationalisation and requested that the State-owned company, R.P., which managed State-owned housing, be ordered to return her property. On 3 May 1994 the court dismissed her claim on the ground that she had not proved her allegations.", "15. The applicant appealed against that judgment to the Prahova County Court. In a decision of 13 January 1995 the court allowed the appeal, declared the action to recover possession admissible and ordered the house to be returned. It found that, as a nurse and a war widow since 1941, the applicant belonged to the category of persons whose property the decree exempted from nationalisation.", "16. R.P. appealed against that decision. In a judgment of 13 June 1995 the Ploieşti Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, quashed the judgment of 13 January 1995 and dismissed the applicant's claim on the ground that the house had become State property pursuant to Decree no. 92/1950 and that the courts did not have jurisdiction to review whether the decree had been properly applied to her. The court added that provision as to redress for any wrongful seizure of property by the State would have to be made in new legislation.", "17. On 26 July 1995 the applicant requested the Procurator-General of Romania to lodge an application to have that final judgment set aside, submitting that it was unfair because the court had refused to examine whether Decree no. 92/1950 was applicable to her.", "18. The Procurator-General replied on 8 August 1995, informing her that an application to have a final court judgment set aside could be made only, inter alia, where the decision was ultra vires, which had not been the case here. He added that final decisions could not be challenged on grounds of lawfulness or on the merits.", "19. On 6 March 1996 the applicant lodged an application for restitution of the house with the administrative board established to deal with applications lodged in Ploieşti pursuant to Law no. 112/1995 (“the Administrative Board”). She submitted that she had been dispossessed of her property in breach of Decree no. 92/1950 on nationalisation, and that the Ploieşti County Court, in its decision of 13 January 1995, had held that the deprivation of property had been unlawful but that the Ploieşti Court of Appeal had refused to entertain her claim and had indicated that she should bring administrative proceedings.", "20. In a decision of 17 July 1996 the Administrative Board vested ownership of the flat rented by the applicant in her and awarded her financial compensation for the rest of the house and the land. Having regard to section 12 of Law no. 112/1995, which put a ceiling on compensation, the Administrative Board awarded the applicant 11,581,867 Romanian lei (ROL) for the second flat and ROL 19,156,500 for the adjoining land that had not been returned and rejected her claim for compensation for the garage. According to the applicant, the amount she had received was substantially less than the value of the property.", "21. On an unknown date the applicant challenged that decision in the Ploieşti Court of First Instance, arguing that she was claiming restitution of the actual house.", "22. The proceedings were adjourned pending the outcome of the second action for recovery of possession, which the applicant had lodged concurrently.", "23. The proceedings were resumed on an unknown date and ended on 23 April 1999 with a judgment of the Ploieşti Court of Appeal upholding the decision of the Administrative Board.", "24. In the meantime, on 10 September 1996, the State sold one of the flats in the house to the former tenants.", "25. On an unknown date the applicant lodged a further action for recovery of possession with the Ploieşti Court of First Instance.", "26. In a judgment of 10 June 1997 the court dismissed the action on the ground that, by deciding to bring administrative proceedings, the applicant had acknowledged that the property had been nationalised with valid legal title and was consequently debarred from bringing an action for recovery of possession.", "27. The applicant appealed. She stressed that she had consistently argued before the Board that her house had been wrongfully nationalised and that she had brought administrative proceedings under Law no. 112/1995 because the Ploieşti Court of Appeal had refused to examine her first action for recovery of possession. The County Court dismissed her claim on 27 November 1997 on the same ground as the Court of First Instance.", "28. The applicant appealed. On 30 March 1998 the Ploieşti Court of Appeal dismissed her appeal in a final decision. It noted that the applicant had applied concurrently to the Board and the courts for restitution of the house and noted that the administrative proceedings had been adjourned. It concluded that the applicant, having chosen the remedy provided for in Law no. 112/1995, was now debarred from bringing an action for recovery of possession in the ordinary courts because that choice amounted to an implicit acknowledgment on her part that the nationalisation had been lawful.", "29. On an unknown date the applicant applied for the judgment of the Ploieşti Court of Appeal to be set aside on the ground that the Court of Appeal had denied her access to a tribunal for the determination of her action for recovery of possession. Her application was dismissed on 16 December 1998 by the Braşov Court of Appeal." ]	[ 3 ]
[ "9. The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Łódź, Poland.", "10. On an unspecified date the applicant inherited from her mother a 25% share in a property situated in Łódź at 6 Piotrowska Street. The property consisted of an apartment building and a plot of land. On 18 October 1990 the Łódź District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) appointed the applicant as the administrator of the property.", "11. Subsequently, the applicant requested the previous administrator of the property, the association Z.W.Z.D., to cease all of its activities relating to the administration of the property. However, the association ignored her request and continued to collect rent from tenants living in the apartment building. In addition, the applicant challenged the right of Mr H.D. to collect rent from tenants leasing business premises located in the building, claiming that his title to a part of the property had been obtained under false pretences. These challenges resulted in an on-going dispute between the applicant on the one side and the association and Mr H.D. on the other.", "12. On 8 March 1994, Mr H.D., acting through his counsel Mr L.B., brought a private prosecution against the applicant. A private bill of indictment filed by Mr H.D. alleged that the applicant was guilty of criminal libel since, on 19 January 1994, she had sent to a bank, which had made a loan to Mr H.D., a letter stating that he had obtained the loan under false pretences and had been repaying it from income obtained from her property.", "13. During the hearing before the Łódź District Court held on 12 April 1994, counsel for Mr H.D. and the applicant refused to settle the case. The applicant confirmed that on 19 January 1994 she had sent the impugned letter, which had led Mr H.D. to bring the private prosecution against her. Counsel for Mr H.D. asked the court to request the Łódź Psychiatric Clinic (Poradnia Zdrowia Psychicznego) for information on whether the applicant was a patient of that clinic and, if so, to instruct it to provide the court with her medical file. Counsel based his request on the fact that, according to his knowledge, the applicant was indeed a patient at that clinic. The applicant denied that she had ever undergone psychiatric treatment and stated that counsel's submission was slanderous. The court decided that it would consider counsel's request in camera at a later date, and that it would request information about the applicant's criminal record and background (wywiad środowiskowy).", "14. On 14 April 1994 the District Court granted the request made on 12 April 1994 and asked the Łódź Psychiatric Clinic to provide information about any medical treatment which the applicant had received there.", "15. On 19 April 1994 the Łódź Psychiatric Clinic informed the District Court, in a letter signed by Dr B.K., that on 23 October 1973 the applicant had visited the clinic and that her medical file included a reference to “suspected paranoid schizophrenia” (podejrzenie schizofrenii urojeniowej).", "16. On 6 May 1994 police constable Z.A. issued a statement concerning the outcome of the background check, which had been conducted at 4 Sienkiewicza Street where the applicant resided at that time. He concluded, inter alia, that the applicant's neighbours had a good opinion of her, that she did not drink heavily and that she was not involved in any quarrels with her neighbours.", "17. On 11 May 1994 counsel for Mr H.D. requested the Łódź District Court to order an expert opinion on the state of the applicant's mental health. He also submitted several letters written by the applicant and pointed out that they showed that the applicant had claimed rent from certain tenants occupying retail and office space located on the property, despite the fact that the association Z.W.Z.D. had been letting out those premises.", "18. On 19 May 1994 the court appointed two psychiatrists and a psychologist and instructed them to prepare a report on the applicant's condition at the time of the commission of the alleged crime. On 30 May 1994 the experts scheduled an appointment with the applicant for 10 June 1994.", "19. On 1 June 1994 the applicant asked the Łódź District Chamber of Doctors (Okręgowa Izba Lekarska) to initiate disciplinary proceedings against Dr B.K. for making a false representation in her letter of 19 April 1994. The applicant contested the contents of that letter, claiming that it had been based on fabricated medical records since she had never visited the Łódź Psychiatric Clinic. The applicant's requests for an investigation into the circumstances in which the letter had been issued were rejected by the Łódź District and Regional Prosecutors.", "20. On an unspecified date, the Łódź District Court ordered the applicant to report on 10 June 1994 for an examination in a psychiatric ward of the Babiński Hospital headed by Dr B.K. The applicant's appeals and complaints concerning that decision were rejected by the Łódź District and Regional Courts. The applicant submitted that she had asked the District Court to change the venue of her examination as she had considered that no objective opinion on her mental health could be issued after an examination in a ward headed by Dr B.K.", "21. On 10 June 1994 the applicant failed to attend the psychiatric examination.", "22. On 14 June 1994 the applicant filed an application challenging all judges of the Criminal Section of the Łódź District Court, but it was dismissed on 23 June 1994.", "23. On 13 July 1994 the Łódź District Court issued an arrest warrant in order to secure the applicant's compliance with its order concerning her psychiatric examination.", "24. The Government submitted that on 27 July 1994 the police informed the court that the applicant had refused to open the door to her flat and the police officers had therefore been unable to enforce the arrest warrant. The applicant denied that, and pointed to the fact that on 25 October 1994 she had voluntarily gone to the police station (see below).", "25. On 1 August 1994 the District Court issued an order fixing 12 August 1994 as the new date for the applicant's compulsory psychiatric examination. However, the applicant did not keep the appointment.", "26. On 1 September 1994 the District Court issued a new arrest warrant and scheduled the applicant's examination for 23 September 1994. The applicant again failed to attend the examination.", "27. On 4 October 1994 the Łódź District Court decided that the applicant should be arrested and detained on remand in order to secure her compliance with its order.", "28. On 25 October 1994 the applicant visited the Łódź-Śródmieście District Police Station (Komenda Rejonowa Policji) in order to file a complaint about a breaking and entry into one of her apartments. However, her complaint was not accepted by the police and she was arrested under the District Court's warrant. On 26 October 1994 the applicant was transferred to the Łódź Prison No. 1.", "29. On 26 October 1994 the applicant's daughter filed an appeal against the District Court's decision of 4 October 1994 ordering the applicant's arrest and detention. However, the appeal was rejected on 27 October 1994 because the court considered that the applicant's daughter was not authorised to file an appeal on behalf of her mother.", "30. On 28 October 1994 the applicant's counsel appealed the decision of 4 October 1994, but the appeal was dismissed on an unknown date.", "31. On 2 November 1994 the applicant underwent a psychiatric examination. The psychiatrists who examined the applicant concluded that they could not make a diagnosis based on a single examination, and recommended that the applicant undergo a psychiatric examination in a public hospital. They also stated that only if the applicant failed to present herself for an examination at the public hospital should she be subjected to an examination in a prison hospital. On 3 November 1994 she was released from detention.", "32. Between 25 October and 3 November 1994 the applicant's daughter applied twice to the Łódź District Court for leave to visit the applicant. Both applications were allowed.", "33. On 8 November 1994 the Łódź District Court decided that the applicant should undergo a psychiatric examination in a medical establishment (zakład leczniczy). On 23 November 1994 the Łódź Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) dismissed the applicant's appeal against that decision.", "34. On 12 December 1994 the experts appointed by the court to examine the applicant informed it that the examination could take place between 2 and 7 January 1995.", "35. On 6 January 1995 the applicant again failed to report for an examination.", "36. On 9 January 1995 the Łódź District Court issued an arrest warrant because of the applicant's failure to attend a psychiatric examination at a public hospital. The court decided that she would be detained on remand under Article 217 § 1(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It considered that the applicant had obstructed the criminal proceedings against her since she had not attended the hospital, despite being served with a summons, and because the police were unable to bring her to the hospital.", "37. On 22 February 1995 the Łódź District Court issued a search warrant, considering that the applicant was in hiding since she was not staying at her residence.", "38. On 23 March 1995 the applicant was arrested. On 24 March 1995 she was transferred to prison.", "39. On 24 March 1995 the District Court allowed an application for leave to visit the applicant filed by the applicant's daughter.", "40. On 29 March 1995 the Łódź Regional Court dismissed the applicant's appeal against the District Court's decision to arrest her. On the same day the experts advised the court that the applicant's examination could start on 19 April 1995.", "41. On 31 March 1995 the applicant's daughter, Astrid Nowicka, filed with the Łódź District Court an application for leave to visit the applicant. She asked for two separate authorisations, for herself and her sister Inez Nowicka, to visit their mother on “multiple occasions” (wielokrotne widzenia). On 4 April 1995 the judge noted the following instruction to the registry:\n“Inform A. Nowicka that the court gives 1 authorisation per month as far as meetings with a detainee are concerned, and other [authorisations] only in exceptional cases.”", "42. On 4 April 1995 the Łódź District Court dismissed the applicant's request that she be released from prison.", "43. On 10 April 1995 the District Court allowed the application for leave to visit the applicant filed by the applicant's daughter.", "44. On 19 April 1995 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant's appeal against the District Court's decision of 4 April 1995.", "45. Between 19 April and 26 May 1995 the applicant underwent a psychiatric examination in the prison hospital at the Łódź Prison No. 2. A medical opinion issued after that examination concluded that the applicant's intellectual ability was substantially above average and that she showed no signs of being either mentally ill or retarded. The opinion also stated that she had a paranoid personality and that she had understood what she was doing at the time of the commission of the alleged offence.", "46. In the meantime, on 5 May 1995 the District Court allowed the application for leave to visit the applicant filed by the applicant's daughter.", "47. In a letter of 22 May 1995 the Vice-President of the Łódź Regional Court advised the applicant that her examination in a medical establishment had been ordered by a court in response to the request by psychiatrists, who had concluded that they had been unable to draw up an expert opinion on the applicant's mental health after a single examination.", "48. On 30 May 1995 the applicant was transferred to the Łódź Prison No. 1. On 2 June 1995 the District Court allowed the application for leave to visit the applicant filed by her daughter.", "49. On 3 June 1995 the applicant was released from prison.", "50. Subsequently, the Łódź District Court discontinued the criminal proceedings against the applicant." ]	[ 2, 4 ]
[ "8. The applicant was born in 1932 and lives in Champagny-en-Vanoise (Savoie).", "9. On 30 September 1991 she signed a notarial deed by which she entered into a leasing arrangement with a limited company called SOFEBAIL for the renovation and furnishment of a holiday centre. She intended to run the business as a sole trader. As early as the end of 1991 she complained that the company had failed to complete the renovation works stipulated in the contract.", "10. On 13 June 1994 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against the company for fraud, theft and fraudulent breach of trust and sought leave to join the proceedings as a civil party seeking damages.", "11. On 5 May 1997 the investigating judge discontinued the proceedings in an order worded as follows:\n“It appears, in fact, from the evidence given by the civil parties and the head of SOFEBAIL and from the documents produced by the parties that the leasing arrangement, the mechanism of which has been described as fraudulent by the civil party, does not fall within the ambit of the criminal law. The disputes between [the applicant] and SOFEBAIL are clearly matters governed by civil or commercial law and have, moreover, given rise to various proceedings of this type in the civil or commercial courts.”", "12. On 7 May 1997 the applicant appealed against that order.", "13. On 10 July 1997 the Indictment Division of the Colmar Court of Appeal upheld the order in question. It found that the applicant's complaints were “manifestly dilatory” and that some of her allegations were “contradictory”, “purely gratuitous” or “entirely unsupported”.", "14. On 11 July 1997 the applicant appealed to the Court of Cassation. Her appeal was heard on 24 September 1998. She was represented by counsel. Both parts of the reporting judge's report (the first containing a statement of the facts, the procedure and the grounds of appeal and the second a legal analysis of the case and an opinion on the merits of the appeal) had been sent to the advocate-general prior to the hearing. However, the applicant had not been sent a copy of both parts of the reporting judge's report. In a judgment of the same date the Court of Cassation declared the appeal inadmissible on the following grounds:\n“The Court of Cassation is satisfied from the wording of the judgment appealed against that, in upholding the order discontinuing the proceedings, the Indictment Division, after examining all the facts alleged by the appellant and addressing the main arguments in her memorial, stated the reasons for its decision that there was insufficient evidence that anyone had committed the alleged offences of fraudulent breach of trust and fraud or any other offence.\nNone of the grounds of appeal, which amount to contesting the validity of the judges' findings of fact and of law, corresponds to any of the situations in which a civil party may appeal to the Court of Cassation, under Article 575 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, against a judgment of an indictment division in the absence of an appeal by the prosecution ...”\n..." ]	[ 3 ]
[ "10. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Herne. In April 1990 a daughter, Svenja, was born to the applicant and his wife. In December 1992 the applicant and his wife separated. Svenja stayed with her mother. In 1994 the applicant's wife instituted divorce proceedings before the Wuppertal District Court (Amtsgericht). She requested that parental authority over Svenja be granted to her. The applicant applied for joint parental authority. Furthermore, the applicant requested that his right of access to Svenja be determined by a decision of the court. In these and the related proceedings, both spouses were represented by counsel.", "11. On 19 October 1994 the Wuppertal District Court, following hearings on 22 June and 17 October 1994, decided that, pursuant to Article 1634 of the Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) (see paragraph 31 below), the applicant was entitled to see Svenja every second Saturday as well as on St Stephens day, Easter Monday and Whit Monday.", "12. The District Court reaffirmed the principle that to maintain personal relations between a father and his child, subject to the best interests of the child, was a decisive factor when determining the right of access. Against this background, the District Court considered that the applicant's previous and extensive rights of access had, at least for the time being, to be reduced to visits once per fortnight. All the experts heard in the proceedings, i.e. the psychological expert (report of 14 June 1994), the therapeutic pedagogue and a social worker of the Barmen Diaconate Institution (Diakonisches Werk), gave evidence that the four-year old child was exposed to a conflict of loyalty, which she experienced as a strong pressure, and that she could not cope with this situation. While it was true that Svenja was fond of the applicant and would be in a position to see him without fear if her parents managed to create an atmosphere which took the pressure off her, they had not been able to do so. The frequency of visits requested by the applicant could not, for the time being, be handled by Svenja. Although the applicant was aware of his daughter's problems, he was incapable of accepting restrictions on access and did not show concern for the child's psychological health. Svenja's mother had not yet managed to give Svenja such a feeling of security as to permit her to visit the applicant without feelings of fear. Svenja therefore needed the intervals of two weeks as times of rest in her mother's household.", "13. On 4 November 1994 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht).", "14. On 24 November 1994 the Court of Appeal informed the parties of its intention to decide in a written procedure. The applicant stated his preference for an oral hearing.", "15. On 9 March 1995 the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal, after having granted the parties legal aid, amended the District Court's decision, increasing the applicant's right of access by ruling that every first visiting weekend per month the applicant was entitled to see Svenja from Saturday morning until Sunday evening. The remainder of his appeal was dismissed.", "16. The Court of Appeal confirmed the findings of the District Court according to which a regular visit every second week best suited the child's welfare. In so deciding, the Court of Appeal had particular regard to the impact of the parents' difficult relations which were in conflict with the best interests of the child; the parents were not yet in a position to have a calm and objective discussion on questions relating to the right of access. On 21 February 1995 an attempt at organising a dialogue between the parents at the Parents' Counselling Service (Elternberatungsstelle) of the local Youth Office (Jugendamt) had failed. As long as there was no agreement between the parents, any visit was an emotional strain for the child. The applicant's right of access had therefore to be assessed in the context of the continuing conflict between the parents.", "17. The Court of Appeal further found that the regular visits decided upon by the District Court best suited both the applicant's wishes and the child's welfare. The exercise of the right of access had functioned well since October 1994. In particular, the child had calmed down and her sleep was no longer troubled. The Court of Appeal, in agreement with the parties, further considered the report, dated 19 January 1995, of a social worker of the Elberfeld Diaconate Institution which had been obtained in the context of parallel proceedings concerning the exercise of parental authority. According to this report, no abnormality in Svenja's behaviour had been observed. The Court of Appeal found that this encouraging development did not yet permit a significant extension of the applicant's right of access. However, taking a cautious approach, the visit on the first weekend of every month could be extended to include one overnight stay. Having regard to the psychological expert's opinion of 14 June 1994, the objections previously raised by Svenja's mother were no longer valid. Should Svenja experience any problems, her mother would have to see to it that the child would consider the visits with an overnight stay as a usual matter. Any further contacts, such as overnight stays between every Wednesday and Thursday, routine telephone conversations and common holidays, were not yet possible, but could be envisaged in case the decision on access would prove successful.", "18. The applicant referred the case to the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht). On 13 June 1995 a panel of three judges of that Court refused to entertain the applicant's constitutional complaint (Verfassungsbeschwerde).", "19. The Federal Constitutional Court considered that the applicant's complaint did not raise any issue of fundamental importance. In accordance with the case-law of that Court, both the right of access of a parent not entitled to parental authority and the right to exercise parental authority granted to the other parent were protected by the right to respect for family life under the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). The possibility, pursuant to Article 1634 § 2 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 31 below), to limit or exclude the right of access, if it was necessary for the child's welfare, guaranteed an adequate protection of the child's constitutional rights and ensured that the courts' decisions in the matter were governed by the child's best interests.", "20. Furthermore, the Federal Constitutional Court found that the decision of the Court of Appeal did not disclose any fundamentally flawed views on parental rights. Thus, the Court of Appeal had considered the child's welfare. The reasoned decision that the visits could only gradually be extended could not be objected to from a constitutional point of view. Furthermore, there was no indication that the procedural requirements were not met. In particular, the applicant had not shown that, following the failure of a conversation between the former spouses at the Parents Counselling Service, the Court of Appeal was prevented from reaching the conclusion that a fresh hearing would not permit any new findings.", "21. On 3 April 1996 the Wuppertal District Court granted the applicant, at his request, an increased right of access in that he was now entitled to see his daughter every second weekend between Saturday morning and Sunday evening and also for a period of two weeks of summer holidays. The District Court observed that the right of access such as that presently granted to the applicant enabled him to be sufficiently informed about Svenja's well-being and to have contacts with her, and also satisfied his daughter's need to be with her father. \nOn the appeal of the child's mother, the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal amended this decision on 28 June 1996. It revoked the arrangement concerning the summer holidays but extended the applicant's visiting right to every weekend, after having heard the then six-year old Svenja, her parents and a representative of the Wuppertal Youth Office.", "22. On 24 October 1994 the Wuppertal District Court, following an oral hearing on 17 October 1994, granted the parents' divorce on the ground of the breakdown of the marriage and awarded the mother, pursuant to Article 1671 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 32 below), parental authority over Svenja.", "23. The District Court found that the issue of parental authority had been determined on the basis of what was in the best interest of the child. Having regard to the statements of the psychological expert in the proceedings concerning the applicant's right of access, the District Court noted that Svenja's mother educated and looked after her daughter in an atmosphere of love and understanding and took an intense interest in ensuring her well-being. According to the District Court, the conditions for the joint exercise of parental authority, requested by the applicant, were not met. In particular, the parents' relations with each other regarding Svenja, as well as their relations with Svenja, were not free of conflict. The applicant was not ready to accept that Svenja's living situation had changed following her parents' separation. As a four-year-old child, she needed a stable life without being torn between different apartments and different styles of education. The Court noted that, notwithstanding the applicant's interest in Svenja's well-being, he failed to see that his wishes obstructed Svenja's psychological development.", "24. On 12 December 1994 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal.", "25. On 15 December 1994 the Court of Appeal requested Svenja's mother as well as the competent Youth Office to comment on the applicant's submissions on appeal. On 19 January 1995 the Elberfeld Diaconate Institution, upon the instructions of the competent Youth Office, submitted a report. The report contained arguments in favour of granting the applicant increased access rights. The parties were given the opportunity to comment upon that report in writing. The applicant stated his preference for an oral hearing.", "26. On 9 March 1995 the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal refused to grant the applicant free legal aid and dismissed his appeal.", "27. The Court of Appeal observed that the mutual willingness of the parents to co-operate, namely to continue of their own will to bear common responsibility for their child, was an essential condition for a reasonable joint exercise of parental authority. It was obvious that the joint exercise of parental authority by disagreeing parents would be a source of ongoing litigation which, as experience had shown, was detrimental to the child. In the present case the parents, in particular the child's mother, did not accept a sharing of responsibilities. In the proceedings regarding the applicant's right of access, which had been pending since March 1993, the parents had continuously had major disagreements, and the attempt at a dialogue in the framework of the Parents' Counselling Service had finally failed in February 1995. Therefore, if parental authority could solely be exercised by one of the parents, it had to be awarded to the child's mother for the reasons set out in the District Court's judgment. The applicant had not raised any serious objections to the reasoning set out in that judgment.", "28. The Court of Appeal also considered that an oral hearing with the parties was not necessary, the relevant facts resulting clearly from the case-file.", "29. On 13 June 1995 a panel of three judges of the Federal Constitutional Court refused to entertain the applicant's constitutional complaint.", "30. The Federal Constitutional Court considered that the applicant's complaint did not raise any issue of fundamental importance. It recalled that when courts had to decide on the attribution of parental authority following the parents' divorce, they had to balance the positions of both parents without encroaching upon the parental priority in educational matters. In such cases, the courts were not, therefore, subject to the strict conditions in respect of interfering with parental rights. The legislator and, in application of the relevant legal provisions, the courts were entitled to transfer the main responsibility for the education of a child to one parent if the conditions for the joint exercise of parental authority were not met. Furthermore, according to the Federal Constitutional Court, the Court of Appeal's view that the conditions for ordering the joint exercise of parental authority were not met in the instant case could not be objected to from a constitutional point of view. Moreover, there was nothing to show that the Court of Appeal should have conducted further inquiries." ]	[]
[ "8. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Wolverhampton. In March 1995 he was a soldier in the British Army.", "9. On 3 March 1995 the Special Investigations Branch of the military police (“SIB”) began investigating charges against him in relation to the fraudulent misuse of travel warrants. He was due to be interviewed on 28 March 1995 but went missing from his unit. On 20 April 1995 he was arrested by the civilian police and returned to his unit. His commanding officer dealt with the charge of absence without leave summarily and sentenced him to, inter alia, 28 days' imprisonment. The applicant served 23 days.", "10. On 27 May 1995 the applicant was due for release, but his detention was continued because of the SIB investigation. On 1 and 2 June 1995 he was interviewed by the SIB. On 15 June 1995 he instructed his current legal representative.", "11. On 16 June 1995 he was brought before his commanding officer and a charge sheet was read out to him. It recorded one charge of obtaining property by deception (fraudulently claiming motor mileage allowance – “MMA”) contrary to section 15(1) of the Theft Act 1968. An offence contrary to section 15(1) carries a maximum penalty of ten years' imprisonment.", "12. On 4 July 1995 the SIB submitted its final report on its investigation into allegations concerning the fraudulent misuse of MMA and of railway warrants (“RW”).", "13. On 29 August 1995 a further charge sheet was read to him. It recorded eight additional charges of obtaining property by deception contrary to section 15(1) of the Theft Act 1968, charges also relating to MMA. The applicant was remanded in custody for trial by court-martial.", "14. On 15 September 1995 he applied for legal aid under the army legal aid scheme. The legal aid certificate was sent by the Director of Army Legal Services to the applicant's unit on 6 October 1995 and the legal aid certificate was received by the applicant on 6 November 1995.", "15. On 16 October 1995 the applicant requested his military medical records. The records were delivered in four batches between mid-November and 1 December 1995. The applicant's purpose in obtaining these records was the preparation of medical reports supporting his claim that he suffered from epilepsy.", "16. On 11 December 1995, the applicant was released to open arrest. The court-martial hearing, fixed for 20 November 1995, was adjourned in light of the delay in receiving the medical records. The hearing was then fixed for 5 February 1996 as the applicant indicated that he would not be ready before that date.", "17. On 5 February 1996 the hearing was adjourned at the applicant's request to allow him to undergo a brain scan. Hearing dates of 18 and 25 March 1996 were proposed but neither party could make the first date and the applicant could not make the second date. The applicant referred on both occasions to his continuing medical tests for epilepsy.", "18. Given the applicant's allegations of epilepsy, in or around mid-1996 the prosecution decided to have the applicant attend its own medical experts. The applicant did not dispute that he was uncooperative in arranging appointments and that he left certain appointments prior to the examination being completed, even when he had been escorted by colleagues to the consulting rooms. He explained that he was not told that the prosecution had wished to enquire about the existence of his epilepsy. He had also been advised by his legal representative not to attend appointments that had not first been negotiated and certain initial appointments had not been notified to that representative. His appointment of 2 September was postponed by him to 30 September 1996 and that of 25 November was postponed by him to 11 December 1996.", "19. In December 1996 the prosecution received its medical report. It found that there was sufficient doubt about the applicant's epilepsy to allow it to proceed with further charges against him. Accordingly, on 27 March 1997 the applicant was charged with 18 additional offences of obtaining property by deception contrary to section 15(1) of the Theft Act 1968 (concerning the misuse of RW).", "20. However, since the new court-martial system was coming into force on 1 April 1997 (pursuant to the Armed Forces Act 1996), it was decided to proceed against the applicant afresh under that new system.", "21. On 30 July 1997 the applicant's representative was notified that the new Army Prosecuting Authority (“APA”) was ready for trial. By 31 July 1997 the APA had referred all the charges for trial by court-martial.", "22. On 19 August 1997 the Army Criminal Legal Aid Authority (“ACLAA”) wrote to the applicant's representative referring to his letter of April 1996, confirming that legal aid on the MMA charges - which had been initially granted to the applicant's first representatives – had been transferred to the applicant's present representatives and apologising for the delay in that respect. That letter also referred to the additional RW charges and indicated that the ACLAA was currently organising legal aid for those matters also.", "23. On 12 September 1997 the applicant's unit completed the legal aid form for the RW charges, the form was signed by the applicant (by which he certified that all the information was true) and his unit submitted the form to the ACLAA.", "24. On 6 October 1997 the ACLAA requested him to submit certain information omitted from the legal aid form including his capital, his savings, details of the award of damages in his favour in October 1996 (see below) and copies of his bank statements for the last 12 months. He was asked to respond quickly in order to allow the processing of the legal aid application with the minimum of delay. The applicant maintained that he replied by letter dated 8 October 1997. In the copy of that letter submitted to the Court, the applicant stated that his application had been correct, that he had not kept his bank statements and that if they were required it would take a week or so to obtain duplicates from the bank. The ACLAA contended that it had no record of having received that letter and it was not until 21 November 1997 that it became aware that the applicant claimed to have sent a letter.", "25. On 24 November 1997 the applicant wrote to the ACLAA repeating what he had said in his letter of 8 October 1997 but still not enclosing his bank statements. On 26 November 1997 the applicant's commanding officer wrote to ACLAA enclosing the applicant's letters of 8 October and 24 November 1997 and copies of his bank statements which the applicant had collected from his bank under military escort. It was also noted that the applicant had declined to give details of the damages awarded to him in October 1996 but that he had confirmed that he had bought a house for 50,000 pounds sterling (GBP) in January 1997.", "26. On 27 November 1997 the applicant was formally referred for trial by general court-martial. A hearing had been already fixed for 1 December 1997, a date found to be suitable for the parties, including the 56 witnesses the applicant envisaged calling. However, on 1 December 1997 the applicant obtained an adjournment of the hearing because legal aid for the RW charges had been granted on that day.", "27. On 12 January 1998 the applicant wrote to the APA arguing that that his referral for court-martial was invalid as it was not in accordance with the relevant regulating provisions and that it was an abuse of process given the delay to date. A preparatory hearing fixed for 27 March 1998 was adjourned because the applicant did not appear and because the Court-Martial Administration Officer (“CMAO”) had not summoned the military witnesses.", "28. The applicant's claim that the proceedings were invalid was heard by the Judge Advocate on 22-26 June 1998 who rejected the claim. In finding that the delay did not amount to an abuse of process, the Judge Advocate stated that:\n“... there has been ... considerable delay in this matter. This has been delay which is just not acceptable. ... In my view much of this delay was caused by an unsuitable bureaucratic pre-trial process. With the benefit of hindsight, some of those responsible for working that process could have made things better by applying a greater degree of urgency whilst operating those procedures; ... One has in this situation a great deal of sympathy with the defence, although I am bound to say that the fault lies principally with the system rather than with the individuals responsible for working that slow bureaucratic process. ... there has been no significant contribution by the defence to this long and unjustifiable delay.”", "29. The CMAO then offered a court-martial hearing date in September 1998 but the applicant applied to the High Court on 14 July 1998 for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Judge Advocate. He challenged the decision (of 27 November 1997) to refer him for trial by court-martial. He further submitted that the court-martial should be stayed as an abuse of process on two grounds: that those responsible for the course of the proceedings had defaulted in their duties and because of delay.", "30. On 4 November 1998 the High Court directed that the judicial review application be made on notice to the respondent party and it was listed for hearing (for a maximum of two hours) on 26 March 1999. On that date the applicant's solicitor indicated for the first time that the judicial review hearing would probably take two days and the hearing was adjourned. It was re-fixed for 27 July 1999. Prior to the hearing of 27 July 1999 the applicant abandoned his challenge to the decision to refer him for trial by court-martial. At the hearing on that date the Court rejected both grounds for the claim of abuse of process.", "31. The court-martial hearing was then re-fixed for 15 November 1999 but the applicant did not appear.", "32. The court-martial was rescheduled for 22 November 1999 and the court-martial proceeded on that date. The applicant pleaded guilty to obtaining property by deception to the value of GBP 15,000. He was sentenced to 14 months' imprisonment, of which he was to serve a further 7 months. The Judge Advocate commented that the delay in the case had been inordinate. He noted that, while the early delays had been avoidable, the delays since 1998 were attributable to the applicant who had used every delaying tactic.", "33. The applicant did not, prior to or during the court-martial, disclose his medical reports.", "34. By letter dated 17 December 1999, the applicant was informed of the reviewing authority's decision to reduce his sentence to three months' imprisonment. On 15 January 2000 a single judge of the Courts-Martial Appeal Court rejected his application for leave to appeal to that court.", "35. In November 1995 the applicant commenced habeas corpus proceedings in the High Court requesting his release on the grounds, inter alia, that he had not been given a formal hearing at which he was informed of the case against him and afforded an opportunity to present his own case for release. In their pleadings, the army authorities admitted that due to an “administrative oversight” the applicant had not been charged until 16 June 1995. Although the army authorities initially accepted that his detention between 27 May and 16 June 1995 was therefore unlawful, they argued later in the pleadings that that detention was, despite the oversight, lawful. On 11 December 1995, further to the army authorities' undertaking to the High Court, the applicant was released to open arrest. In mid-1996 he was released from open arrest and sent on leave.", "36. On 12 February 1996 the applicant instituted further proceedings in the High Court for compensation for, inter alia, unlawful detention between 27 May and 11 December 1995. The Ministry of Defence accepted that his detention between 27 May and 16 June 1995 had been unlawful. Various other admissions were made by the army authorities as regards the failure properly to complete certain reports regarding his ongoing detention but it was denied that such omissions rendered his detention unlawful. The case was settled on 21 October 1996 when the applicant was paid a sum of money and his costs." ]	[ 3 ]
[ "8. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in London.", "9. The applicant, then aged sixteen years, was convicted of the murder of his grandmother on 12 October 1981. At his trial, he had unsuccessfully raised the defence of diminished responsibility, based on the fact that he had been addicted to glue sniffing for several years. He was sentenced to detention at Her Majesty’s Pleasure pursuant to section 53(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933. His tariff (the portion of sentence representing punishment and deterrence) was set at 10 years.", "10. On 26 January 1994, the applicant, aged 29 years, was released on life licence.", "11. No concerns arose with his supervising probation officer until in April 1997 the applicant told her that he had been having a sexual relationship with MM, a 16-year-old youth. MM was regarded as a vulnerable youth and had been provided with the support of a social worker following his involvement in a theft offence.", "12. In June 1997, the applicant was arrested on suspicion of being in possession of prohibited drugs (namely, ecstasy tablets). He was taken to a police station and released on bail. His probation officer sent him a registered letter requesting him to meet her on 20 June 1997. He did not attend the meeting or make any contact by telephone until 23 June 1997, when he agreed to meet her the next day.", "13. On 24 June 1997, however, the applicant made a suicide attempt, taking 30 paracetamol tablets. He was discharged from hospital on 25 June 1997. He met his probation officer on 26 June 1997 and agreed to meet her again on 1 July 1997. He failed to keep the appointment, telephoning to say that he had overslept.", "14. On 2 July 1997, he met with his probation officer and Mr L. from the Community Drug and Alcohol Services. During this meeting, the applicant admitted that he had been using drugs (LSD, ecstasy and cannabis) since his release from prison and that his use of ecstasy was beyond his control. He obtained the drugs from friends or acquaintances who expected him to do favours for them in return. He stated that he was no longer having a sexual relationship with MM but that MM had been staying with him at his flat. He met with his probation officer again on 4 July 1997.", "15. In her report of 4 July 1997, the probation officer stated:\n“Until October 1996 [the applicant’s] response to his Licence, in terms of reporting for appointments, had been exemplary and he appeared to have made good progress in settling into the community, via stable employment and the allocation of his own council flat. It would appear however, that his resignation from his job in September 1996 significantly impacted on the sense of structure and purpose he then had about his day to day life which he now admits he has since found difficult to attain. Until recently, his presentation during our meetings gave no cause for concern. However, he now reports that he had been less than honest about the changes in his functioning as he feared a recall to prison, particularly given his initial stability and progress. In addition to his now admitted drug use, it would appear that [the applicant’s] anxieties about his future are limited to: (a) his previous unsafe sexual practices and the possible consequences of this on his health; (b) his wish to have a long-term and supportive monogamous relationship; (c) his growing sense of loneliness and isolation despite a wide social network... and (d) a sense of stagnation about the course of his life, particularly in finding alternative employment to date, despite extensive efforts. These issues, alongside [the applicant’s] behaviour over the past month, clearly indicate that he is vulnerable and that close monitoring of his situation at this time is crucial.”", "16. She concluded that he posed a risk to himself and that there are “no indications that he is a risk to the public in terms of dangerousness”.", "17. On 4 July 1997, the Assistant Chief Probation Officer prepared a report that stated:\n“[The applicant] had demonstrated, and recently admitted, that his behaviour has been both self-destructive (through drug misuse, relationships with others and a suicide attempt) and that he posed a risk to a minor. ... The area of risk to the public stems from his relationship with a minor.”\nShe noted that there had been an openness about long-standing problems and some degree of insight coming out of the crisis of recent weeks that suggested that the applicant could work on them. She concluded that a final recommendation was difficult given the area of risk to himself and proposed that a psychiatric report be prepared concerning his current level of functioning and future prognosis and specifically an assessment of self-harm.", "18. On 11 July 1997, the Parole Board considered the applicant’s case and recommended his recall to prison.", "19. On 21 July 1997, the Secretary of State accepted the recommendation, revoked the applicant’s licence and recalled him to prison. He was informed that the reasons for his recall were\n“1. You have recently disclosed that you have been misusing drugs since your release in 1994, and following your arrest in June [1997] there is also a possibility that you will be convicted of the possession of, and intent to supply, illegal drugs. 3. You have breached your licence conditions by not maintaining contact with your supervising officer in accordance with her instructions and by not being open and honest with her. 4. You attempted suicide.\nThe Parole Board and the Secretary of State took the view that for your own safety and the safety of others it was inappropriate to allow you to remain at liberty.”", "20. On 29 July and 5 August 1997, the applicant submitted written representations to the Parole Board concerning his recall to prison. He admitted inter alia that before his arrest in June 1997 he had been taking 10 to 20 ecstasy tablets a day and that he had not been honest about his drugs abuse with his probation officer. He stated that his relationship with MM was now platonic and that he had terminated sexual contacts on discovering that he was 16. He stated that he had not been involved in drug dealing and hoped to be able to deal with his drug problem, now it was out in the open, with the assistance of the probation service within the community.", "21. On 5 September 1997, the Parole Board considered the applicant’s case. There was no oral hearing. It decided:\n“The index offence involved the brutal murder of [the applicant’s] grandmother, when he was 16. After constructive progress in prison, which included work on one of the key risk factors - drug abuse - he was released on licence in January 1994. In July 1997, [the applicant] was recalled to prison for drug misuse, including the possibility that he will be convicted of intention to supply, having a sexual association with a minor, breach of licence conditions and attempted suicide.\nThe Panel has considered all the relevant reports and taken careful note of [the applicant’s] representations... In spite of the considerable attempts by the Local Probation Service to enforce [the applicant’s] licence, his behaviour in recent months demonstrates that he is at risk not just to himself but to other members of the community. Irrespective of whether [the applicant] is convicted of an offence, he has admitted extensive illegal drug abuse and the concerns about his sexual involvement with a minor were sufficient to merit a case conference. Furthermore, the incidents of self harm indicate the need for thorough psychiatric assessment. It is in the interests of public safety and [the applicant’s] longer term well being that the recall be confirmed. A full assessment of the factors underlying the breakdown of the licence needs to be made, together with plans to tackle what appears to be deep rooted problems of drug abuse and social isolation.\nThe Panel noted that [the applicant] has shown a willingness to co-operate with Probation and has demonstrated an ability to comply with the terms of his licence. Twelve months should be sufficient time for him to be assessed to stabilise and to tackle the problems identified.”", "22. On 14 October 1997, the applicant was informed that the Parole Board had considered his recall on the papers and upheld the decision to revoke his life licence. He was told that he would be informed of the date of the next review once the Crown Prosecution Service had made a decision regarding the case against him for drugs possession.", "23. On 17 November 1997, the applicant was informed that the Crown Prosecution Service had decided not to prosecute him for the alleged drugs offence and that his case would be reviewed by the Parole Board in October 1998.", "24. A number of reports were prepared to assist the Parole Board in the coming review.", "25. In his report of 10 June 1998, Mr B., the Principal Case Officer stated:\n“[The applicant’s] misuse of illegal substances for many years remains a major risk concern. However he acknowledges this and had taken steps to challenge this issue. If he can display the same harmony in the community as he has in the custodial setting there is no purpose served by his retention in custody. However constructive supervision and support will initially be required.”", "26. His probation officer stated in a report of 29 June 1998:\n“... provided that he is given the necessary support and receives sustained input to encourage his current anti-drugs attitude and drug-free status, he can safely be released into the community.”", "27. In a report of 23 June 1998, a forensic psychologist noted that “the major risk factor contributing to his committing the original offence ... was drugs abuse”.", "28. In July 1998, the applicant received his parole dossier. On seeking legal advice prior to his Parole Board review, the applicant was advised that the Prison Service had failed to apply the procedure applicable to his recall under the interim arrangements implemented pending the entry into force of the Crime Sentences Act 1997. He should under those administrative provisions have received an oral hearing concerning his recall, though this was not a statutory entitlement.", "29. An application for legal aid for bringing judicial review proceedings was made on 16 July 1998 and legal aid granted on 7 September 1998.", "30. On 9 September 1998, the Prison Service informed the applicant:\n“We have now looked into the circumstances surrounding the revocation of [the applicant’s] life licence in July 1997. While we accept that, due to an oversight, the procedures did not follow the interim arrangements for dealing with HMP detainees, there is, in our view, no question that [the applicant’s] recall to prison was or is in any way unlawful or invalid...\nUnder the circumstances, we see no reason or justification for any declaration or order directing his release or authorising compensation.”", "31. On 30 September 1998, the applicant applied for judicial review. Leave was granted on 6 October 1998. The full hearing of his case was not scheduled to take place until 1999.", "32. An oral hearing was held by the Parole Board on 27 October 1998, at which the applicant was present and represented, following which it directed the applicant’s release. In its decision it stated:\n“In reaching its decision the panel took account of the following:\n(i) the absence of any violence or threat of violence since the index offence either in prison or when on licence for three and a half years;\n(ii) your acceptance of an inappropriate lifestyle when previously released on licence and your frank acknowledgement of your drug abuse during that time;\n(iii) the fact that since recall you have been drug free;\n(iv) reports of your increased maturity and strong motivation to keep clear of drugs and the drug scene in future;\n(v) the greater relevance of the proposed community based drugs rehabilitation and relapse prevention programme that is available through drug link;\n(vi) the agreement of the Inner London Probation Service to provide an approved probation hostel place for up to twelve weeks to assist in your reintroduction to the community and the help you will receive in obtaining employment;\n(vii) your acceptance of the need to be totally honest with your supervising probation officer in future...”", "33. The applicant was released on 17 November 1998.", "34. In advice dated 8 January 1999, counsel advised that since he had been released no further purpose could be served by continuing with the judicial review application. There was no prospect of obtaining any damages for the period spent in detention after recall.", "35. On 6 March 1999, the judicial review proceedings were ended by a consent order.", "36. On 21 December 1999, the applicant was again recalled to prison, following his arrest for possession of a Class A drug (ecstasy) and a Class B drug (cannabis). His recall was recommended by the Parole Board and he continues to be detained in prison on the recommendation of the Parole Board following periodic reviews of his case. He is currently detained in open prison and his next review is scheduled for December 2002." ]	[ 2 ]
[ "9. The first applicant was born in 1958 and the second applicant in 1948; they both live in Bad Münder (Germany).", "10. Under a purchase agreement dated 26 May 1986, the applicants purchased a dwelling house in Leipzig, on the territory of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) for 56,000 East German marks. The house was built on land belonging to the State (volkseigenes Grundstück) over which the applicants obtained a usufruct (dingliches Nutzungsrecht) under Articles 287 et seq. of the Civil Code (Zivilgesetzbuch) of the GDR.", "11. On 26 October 1989 the applicants made an official request for permission to leave the GDR, as they believed that they had been discriminated against on political grounds in their work.\nThe applicants say that they were informed by the District Internal Affairs Department (Abteilung innere Angelegenheiten des Stadtbezirks) in Leipzig that to obtain permission to leave the GDR permanently they would have to transfer (veräussern) their property by sale or gift.", "12. On 8 December 1989 the applicants purported to transfer the property to a couple, Mr and Mrs Böllmann, by a notarial deed of gift in which the dwelling house was stated to be worth 120,000 East German marks. In reality, Mr and Mrs Böllmann paid the applicants 55,000 German marks (DEM) into a Swiss bank account.", "13. The applicants say that the true value of their house and land would today be approximately DEM 600,000.", "14. That figure is disputed by the Government, who say that the applicants had possessed only a usufruct over the land.", "15. Following German reunification, the applicants attempted to recover their house and their usufruct over the land, firstly from the purchasers and subsequently in proceedings in the civil and administrative courts of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).", "16. On 21 March 1991 the applicants applied to the Leipzig Court of First Instance (Kreisgericht) for an order for restitution of their house and rectification of the entry in the land register (Grundbuch).", "17. The Leipzig Court of First Instance rejected that application on 26 June 1991.", "18. In a judgment of 5 March 1992, the Leipzig District Court (Bezirksgericht) dismissed an appeal by the applicants, holding that they had no right to restitution. It pointed out that no transfer of property had in fact taken place, as both the gift and the sale in the GDR were null and void. However, the applicants were not entitled to rely on that nullity, as they had opted for that form of contract in full knowledge of the facts and the purchasers had not taken advantage of any coercion (Zwangslage) to which the applicants may have been subject at the time. The application for restitution accordingly failed under the principle of good faith and fair dealing (Treu und Glauben).", "19. In a judgment of 19 November 1993, the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) dismissed a further appeal by the applicants. In common with the ordinary courts, it found that both the gift and the sale were null and void. However, it reiterated that in cases such as this, in which the applicants had made a sham gift in order to attenuate the effects of being forced to sell their property on leaving the GDR, the applicable legislation was the Resolution of Outstanding Property Issues Act – the Property Act – of 23 September 1990 (Gesetz zur Regelung offener Vermögensfragen – Vermögensgesetz; see “Relevant domestic law and practice” below), whose interpretation was a matter for the administrative, not the civil, courts.", "20. The applicants then lodged an administrative appeal with the Leipzig City Council requesting the restitution of their property. They relied on the Property Act.", "21. In a decision of 2 June 1994, the Leipzig City Council turned down their request on the grounds that the conditions set out in section 1(3) of the Property Act (see “Relevant domestic law and practice” below) were not satisfied, as the applicants had not shown that they had acted under duress (Nötigung). Duress linked to a departure from the GDR could only have existed prior to the opening of the border on 9 November 1989. Thereafter, it was clear that all restrictions on leaving the GDR had been lifted.", "22. The applicants appealed against that decision to the Regional Office for the Resolution of Outstanding Property Issues (Landesamt zur Regelung offener Vermögensfragen) of the Land of Saxony, which dismissed their appeal, again on the grounds that the applicants had not acted under duress following the opening of the border on 9 November 1989, and in particular following the Resolution of Property Issues Order (Anordnung zur Regelung von Vermögensfragen – see “Relevant domestic law and practice” below) of 11 November 1989 and its publication on 23 November 1989.", "23. In a judgment of 21 December 1995, the Leipzig Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht) found against the applicants following a hearing. \nIt found that they were not entitled to restitution (Rücküber-tragungsanspruch) in the absence of any unfair dealings (unlautere Machenschaften) within the meaning of section 1(3) of the Property Act. The border had been opened on 9 November 1989, with the result that all citizens of the GDR had been free to leave the country, while the Resolution of Property Issues Order of 11 November 1989 stipulated that they were no longer required to transfer their property prior to their departure. However, the deed of transfer was only executed on 8 December 1989. It added that there had not been any deception (Täuschung) within the meaning of section 1(3) of the Property Act.\nThe Administrative Court also found that even if the previous position had remained unchanged, the conditions set out in section 1(3) of Property Act would not in any event have been satisfied, as the applicants did not own the land but merely had a usufruct over it. Under GDR legislation – the State-Owned Land (Grants of Usufructs) Act of 14 December 1970 (Gesetz über die Verleihung von Nutzungsrechten an einem volkseigenen Grundstück) – persons entitled to a usufruct were required to use the land themselves. Even if the applicants had moved house within the GDR, the land would have reverted to the State and the applicants' only entitlement would have been to compensation. The applicants had been aware of that situation, which is why they had sought to transfer their property.", "24. By two decisions of 2 September and 22 October 1996, the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) declined to examine an application for review by the applicants.\nIt referred to its leading judgment of 29 February 1996 in which it had stated that instances of unfair dealings between 23 November 1989 (the date of publication of the Resolution of Property Issues Order in the Official Gazette (Gesetzblatt) of the GDR) and 31 January 1990 (when the Travel Order (Reiseverordnung) of the GDR dated 30 November 1988 was revoked) would be rare. The Leipzig Administrative Court had conducted a thorough review of the facts of the case and concluded that there had been no duress or deception within the meaning of section 1(3) of the Property Act.\nThe Federal Administrative Court also referred to its leading judgment of 29 August 1996, in which it stated that there would not be unfair dealing within the meaning of section 1(3) of the Property Act in cases in which the obligation to transfer property had arisen under the State-Owned Land (Grants of Usufructs) Act of 14 December 1970 of the GDR.", "25. In two decisions of 22 January 1997, the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) declined to hear constitutional appeals by the applicants against either the civil courts' or the administrative courts' decisions.\nIt referred, inter alia, to its leading judgment of 8 October 1996 in which it had held that it was not unconstitutional for civil rights to be supplanted (verdrängt) by the provisions of the Property Act in cases involving the departure of GDR citizens for the FRG. Accordingly, the Federal Court of Justice's interpretation in the instant case was consistent with that authority." ]	[]
[ "9. The applicants were born in 1946 and 1941 respectively and live in Kent.", "10. On 7 February 1986 the applicants granted to a company now known as Buckingham International Limited (“Buckingham”) an option to purchase 90% of the share capital in Worldwide Dryers Limited (“WWD”) for 2 pounds sterling (“GBP”) a share, with a further option to purchase the remaining 10% at a price to be fixed by an agreed formula. On 2 October 1986 the first lot of shares in WWD was purchased. Relations between Buckingham and the applicants subsequently deteriorated.", "11. On 12 February 1988 WWD and Buckingham issued High Court proceedings against the applicants claiming, inter alia, damages for breach of contract. On 27 October 1988 Buckingham exercised its call option on the remaining 10% of the shares of WWD, Buckingham alleging that no further payment was due to the applicants given its outstanding claims against them.", "12. In January 1990 the second applicant was granted legal aid.", "13. The plaintiffs finally served their statement of claim on 1 May 1990 having received numerous extensions of time (ordered by the court on the basis of the parties’ consent). The statement of claim ran to fifteen pages. It included many allegations of breaches of warranties in the option agreement and claims that the applicants owed WWD substantial sums of money which they had borrowed from WWD through directors’ loans schemes.", "14. The applicants served a short-form defence on 31 July 1990 after two extensions of the relevant time-limit granted by the High Court following contested hearings. Further particulars of the defence were requested by the plaintiffs in November 1990. At a directions hearing on 28 February 1991, a Master of the High Court, inter alia, allowed the applicants to amend their defence and to file a counterclaim, and ordered that the action be set down for hearing on or before 23 March 1991. This date was subsequently vacated by the parties’ agreement. On 23 April 1991 the applicants were accorded until 14 May 1991 to file the amended defence and counterclaim, and it was so filed. In June 1991 the first applicant was granted legal aid. The plaintiffs’ reply and defence to the counterclaim was served on 9 September 1991, after an extension of time.", "15. At the request of the applicants’ solicitors, on 23 October 1991 the High Court ordered that the plaintiffs’ claim and the applicants’ counterclaim be set down for hearing. The relevant setting down notice was filed by the plaintiffs on 31 October 1991.", "16. On 13 November and 19 December 1991 the High Court ordered the plaintiffs to file outstanding pleadings. By letter dated 7 November 1991, the applicants requested an expedited hearing from the Lord Chancellor’s office. The letter of the Administrator of the Royal Courts of Justice dated 20 November 1991, in response, explained that the applicants could apply to the High Court to advance the hearing but that the court was otherwise unable to bring the hearing date forward. It further explained that such delays often occurred given the number of cases waiting to be heard, in the light of the estimated hearing time (then ten days) and because a fixed hearing date had been requested.", "17. In late 1991 and early 1992 the applicants were advised by solicitors and by junior and Queen’s Counsel that an application for an expedited trial was unlikely to succeed as inter alia there were no grounds for granting the applicants priority over other litigants. On 9 January 1992 the plaintiffs filed outstanding pleadings (further and better particulars of the statement of claim) and in February and March 1992 discovery of documents took place in the case.", "18. On 6 February 1992 counsel for all parties submitted an increased estimated hearing time of fifteen days. On 27 February 1992 the hearing date was fixed for 7 March 1994. The High Court later confirmed in its judgment of 5 November 1997 that the two-year delay in such cases was “not untypical” and that the reason was that the Chancery lists were “extremely congested”.", "19. On 8 December 1993 WWD was ordered (on its own petition) to be wound up.", "20. On 24 February 1994, due to the late discovery of the plaintiff’s documents (some 120 boxes), the applicants applied for an adjournment of the hearing date and for an expedited hearing date thereafter. Both requests were granted and the hearing date was re-scheduled for April 1994. On 12 April 1994 the applicants served further amendments to their defence and counterclaim.", "21. The hearing began on 26 April 1994 and lasted 20 days. Since WWD was in liquidation and did not appear, the judge dismissed WWD’s action at the outset. Buckingham applied to make substantial amendments to its pleadings and its claims were adjourned. Only the applicants’ counterclaim was therefore examined. Judgment (ninety-nine pages) was delivered by Ferris J. on 18 July 1994 in favour of the applicants in the sum of GBP 3,681,143.47 plus costs.", "22. The execution of that judgment was stayed by order of the High Court on 27 July 1994 pending the lodging of a notice of appeal. On 29 July 1994 the High Court made an order for security for costs against Buckingham and on 15 August 1994 Buckingham lodged an appeal. On 12 September 1994 Buckingham’s claims were dismissed by consent and costs were awarded to the applicants. The stay was partially lifted, allowing the applicants to pursue execution of a small part of the judgment. On 20 April 1995 a High Court Master made a provisional charging order over the property of Buckingham in the sum of the judgment.", "23. On 27 April 1995 creditor banks appointed administrative receivers in respect of Buckingham. On 22 May 1995 the High Court Master confirmed the charge on Buckingham’s property in the amount of the judgment and of the interest and legal costs accrued since the judgment. On 8 June 1995 Buckingham withdrew its pending appeal since the receivers did not wish to pursue it. The appeal was therefore dismissed by the High Court on 29 June 1995 and costs were awarded to the applicants. The stay was also lifted.", "24. In March 1996 the Taxing Office assessed the applicants’ costs (including those of the appeal but less the periods for which they were legally aided) at GBP 500,000 approximately.", "25. Given the appointment of administrative receivers to Buckingham, the applicants investigated how to achieve priority for their judgment over unsecured and preferential creditors of Buckingham, and it was considered that the judgment could be enforced against the intra-group indebtedness of certain subsidiaries of Buckingham in the United States (“US”).", "26. In early 1996 the applicants therefore had the judgment registered in Florida. In May 1996 they issued proceedings in the US to garnishee funds owed to Buckingham by its US subsidiaries. On 8 May 1996 a circuit court in Florida made an order by which over 7,000,000 US dollars of those subsidiaries’ funds were held in court as security for the judgment debt in the United Kingdom.", "27. On 21 May 1996 the High Court, on the application of Buckingham’s administrative receivers for a winding up order, appointed provisional liquidators to take over its affairs. In May 1996 those provisional liquidators obtained from the US courts a provisional discharge of the order garnisheeing the subsidiaries’ funds. That provisional order was subject to the courts in the United Kingdom determining whether the latter would permit the applicants to enforce their judgment debt ahead of the existing secured and preferential creditors of Buckingham.", "28. The applicants therefore issued new proceedings (no. 2835/1996) on 11 June 1996 in the High Court in the United Kingdom to have determined the issue identified by the US courts. Pointing to the delay in the determination of their claim against Buckingham in the substantive proceedings, they requested the High Court to exercise its discretion to give them priority over the secured and preferential creditors of Buckingham.", "29. On 3 July 1996 a compulsory winding up order of Buckingham was obtained which confirmed the provisional liquidators in office.", "30. On 1 August 1996 the High Court ordered, on the basis of the parties’ consent, that the jurisdiction issue be dealt with as a preliminary matter. On 11 October 1996 the High Court found that it did not have jurisdiction. A notice of appeal was issued on 28 October 1996 and leave to appeal was granted on 14 January 1997. On 21 February 1997 the Court of Appeal found that the High Court had jurisdiction and remitted the case to it. (Mitchell and another v. Carter and another, Re Buckingham International plc [1997] 1 BCLC 681).", "31. On 12 May 1997 the applicants requested that their application be certified as fit for a speedy trial and that application was granted on 3 June 1997. The High Court heard the matter again on 9 July 1997. On 5 November 1997 Harman J. handed down the High Court’s judgment. He found that he could not prefer the judgment debt of the applicants over the secured and preferential creditors of Buckingham. He described the “lamentable history” of the proceedings and was critical of the conduct of those proceedings by Buckingham and their legal representatives, referring to their “highly successful spoiling tactics”, to the “carefully dilatory conduct of the action before mid-1992” and to their “extremely overdue” statement of claim pointing out, in this context, that “if litigation is about the obtaining of justice at a fair trial it is equally clear that that process was wholly obstructed”. A notice of appeal was filed on 5 December 1997.", "32. On 3 February 1998 the Court of Appeal heard the appeal and on 16 February 1998 it confirmed the judgment of the High Court (Mitchell and another v. Buckingham International plc (in liq) and others, Re Buckingham International plc (in liq) (no 2) [1998] 2 BCLC 383). The Court of Appeal also referred to the “delaying tactics adopted in the litigation by Buckingham and its solicitors” which “may have amounted to, or come close to, abuse of process”. It went on:\n“The civil justice system has unfortunately failed to give [the applicants] prompt relief for their complaints, and their eventual victory before Ferris J has become a very hollow victory. Nevertheless, there was in our judgment no substantial flaw in the way in which Harman J exercised his discretion.”", "33. The Court of Appeal also refused leave to appeal to the House of Lords. The application for leave to appeal to the House of Lords (filed on 16 March 1998) was rejected by that body on 29 June 1998.", "34. The applicants finally recovered from the liquidators of Buckingham approximately GBP 100,000 after payment of their costs." ]	[ 3 ]
[ "11. The applicant is a United Kingdom national, born in 1971 and living in Bristol. She lives with her two children in a house owned by the local housing association, Solon Housing Association (SHA).", "12. The SHA moved the applicant and her children to 50 Concorde Drive in 1994 following a report that she was suffering serious racial abuse at her then current address.", "13. Concorde Drive is in the parliamentary constituency of Bristol North‑West. On 17 July 1996, the member of Parliament (MP) for the Bristol North-West constituency, Mr Michael Stern, initiated a debate on the subject of municipal housing policy (and the SHA in particular) in the House of Commons. During the course of his speech, the MP referred specifically to the applicant several times, giving her name and address and referring to members of her family. He commented as follows:\n“The subject of anti-social behaviour by what newspapers frequently call 'neighbours from hell' has been a staple of social housing throughout the country for some time, and the government are, of course, in the process of taking steps to provide local authorities with the power to do something about such behaviour. Whether authorities such as Bristol will actually use the power is another matter.\nMy reason for raising the subject of 50 Concorde Drive in my constituency and the behaviour of its shifting population is not just to draw attention to another example of neighbours from hell; it is also to note that housing practices by local authorities, which it appeared had been stamped out in the 1970s, are beginning to re-emerge in the voluntary housing movement. ...\nSolon Housing Association (South-West) Ltd purchased 50 Concorde Drive in my constituency in the early 1990s ... and in early 1994 it moved in as the new tenants [the applicant] and her two children, who are now aged three and six. Her brother, currently in prison, also gives 50 Concorde Drive as his permanent address. ...\nThe Government's own Green Paper, 'Anti-Social Behaviour on Council Estates', published in April 1995, noted:\n 'Such behaviour manifests itself in many different ways and at varying levels of intensity. This can include vandalism, noise, verbal and physical abuse, threats of violence, racial harassment, damage to property, trespass, nuisance from dogs, car repairs on the street, joyriding, domestic violence, drugs and other criminal activities such as burglary.'\nInevitably, the majority – if not all – of these activities have been forced on the neighbours of 50 Concorde Drive during the tenancy of that property and the garage further up the street that goes with it, by [the applicant], her children and their juvenile visitors, who seem strangely reluctant to attend school during normal hours, and even more adult visitors who come to the house at all times of the day and night, frequently gaining entry by unorthodox means such as the bathroom window. Indeed, it is fair to say that there have been times when occupation of the house by the visitors has been more frequent than that of [the applicant].\nSo far as the garages grouped further along Concorde Drive are concerned – one of the garages automatically comes with the tenancy of No. 50 – complaints consist of numerous youths hanging around, vandalising cars, climbing on and damaging the garage roofs, under the apparent leadership, or at least the spirited concurrence of the [applicant's] family, adult and children, which makes improvement of those garages by other owners a complete waste of time. More seriously, arson inside the garage belonging to No. 50, and the regular destruction of its doors, have led other legitimate users of the garage to park their vehicles elsewhere for safety reasons.\nBut it is the conduct of [the applicant] and her circle which gives most cause for concern. Its impact on their immediate neighbours extends to perhaps a dozen houses on either side. Since the matter was first drawn to my attention in 1994, I have received reports of threats against other children; of fighting in the house, the garden and the street outside; of people coming and going 24 hours a day – in particular, a series of men late at night; of rubbish and stolen cars dumped nearby; of glass strewn in the road in the presence of [the applicant] and regular visitors; of alleged drug activity; and of all the other common regular annoyances to neighbours that are associated with a house of this type.”", "14. The applicant denies the truth of the majority of the allegations. The MP has never tried to communicate with her regarding the complaints made about her by her neighbours and has never attempted to verify the accuracy of his comments made in his speech either before or after the debate. Shortly before the debate, the MP issued a press release to several newspapers, including the Bristol-based Evening Post and the national Daily Express. The press release was subject to an embargo prohibiting disclosure until the precise time when the speech commenced. The contents of the press release were substantially the same as those of the MP's speech. The following day, both newspapers carried articles consisting of purported extracts of the speech, although these were based upon the press release. Both articles included photographs of the applicant and mentioned her name and address. The main headline in the Evening Post was:\n“MP Attacks 'Neighbours From Hell' ”\nIn the Daily Express the headline was:\n“MP names nightmare neighbour”", "15. The applicant was approached by journalists and television reporters asking for her response to the MP's allegations and her comments were summarised in each newspaper the same day, although they were not given as much prominence.", "16. The applicant subsequently received hate mail addressed to her at 50 Concorde Drive. One letter stated that she should “be in houses with your own kind, not in amongst decent owners”. Another letter stated:\n“You silly black bitch, I am just writing to let you know that if you do not stop your black nigger wogs nuisance, I will personally sort you and your smelly jungle bunny kids out.”", "17. The applicant was also stopped in the street, spat at and abused by strangers as “the neighbour from hell”.", "18. On 7 August 1996 a report was prepared for the SHA by a group which monitors racial harassment and attacks. The report found that “it has now come to the point where [the applicant] has been put in considerable danger as a result of her name being released to the public”. The report recommended that the applicant be re-housed as a matter of urgency. She was re-housed in October 1996 and her children were obliged to change schools.", "19. On 2 August 1996 the applicant wrote through her solicitors to the MP outlining her complaints and seeking his comments thereon. The letter was referred to the Office of the Parliamentary Speaker by the MP. The Speaker's representative replied to the MP on 12 August 1996 to the effect that the MP's remarks were protected by absolute parliamentary privilege:\n“Subject to the rules of order in debate, Members may state whatever they think fit in debate, however offensive it may be to the feelings or injurious to the character of individuals, and they are protected by this privilege from any action for libel, as well as from any other molestation.”\nThis letter was copied and forwarded to the applicant's solicitors in September 1996.", "20. Also on 2 August 1996, the applicant's solicitors wrote to the then Prime Minister, Mr John Major, asking that, as leader of the political party to which Mr Stern belonged, he investigate the applicant's complaints and take appropriate action. The Prime Minister's Office replied on 6 August 1996, stating that:\n“It is a matter for individual Members of Parliament to decide how they deal with their constituents and it is not for the Prime Minister to comment. There is a strict Parliamentary convention that Members of Parliament do not intervene in the affairs of other Members' constituencies and this applies equally to the Prime Minister.”" ]	[]
[ "9. The applicants, Dirk Venema, Wubbechien Venema-Huiting and Kimberly Venema, are Netherlands nationals and live in Alphen aan den Rijn, in the Netherlands.", "10. Mr Dirk Venema and Mrs Wubbechien Venema-Huiting, who were born in 1964 and 1967 respectively, are the parents of Kimberly Venema. Kimberly was born on 14 February 1994.", "11. From May 1994 onwards Mr and Mrs Venema became aware that Kimberly's breathing sometimes stopped and her heart raced. This led them to seek medical advice from, inter alios, doctors practising at Leiden University Hospital. Kimberly was taken into hospital for two periods, of fourteen days and six days respectively, in the course of July and August 1994.", "12. The doctors found nothing physically wrong with Kimberly. They began to suspect that Kimberly was healthy but that Mrs Venema might be suffering from a psychological disturbance known as the Munchausen syndrome by proxy.", "13. The Munchausen syndrome by proxy is a condition in which a parent of a young child, nearly always the mother, driven by a need of her own for attention, seeks superfluous medical assistance for her child. The parent may invent a disease or even cause the symptoms. In certain cases, for example if the child's breathing is interfered with, the child's life may be in danger.", "14. At around this time Kimberly was referred to Curium, a children's psychiatric clinic in Oegstgeest, near Leiden.", "15. In August 1994 the Leiden University Hospital doctors made their fears known to the Child Welfare Board (Raad voor de Kinderbescherming). The Government state that the identity of the applicants was not revealed to the Child Welfare Board at this time. The Child Welfare Board advised the doctors to provide adequate medical care and discuss their fears with the child's parents. The Venema family was kept under medical observation but the doctors did not discuss their suspicions with Mr and Mrs Venema.", "16. On 1 December 1994 the Child Abuse Medical Counselling Centre (Bureau Vertrouwensarts inzake Kindermishandeling) in The Hague telephoned the Child Welfare Board. A doctor connected with this centre stated – according to the Government, still without naming the applicants – that it was suspected that Mrs Venema was suffering from the Munchausen syndrome by proxy. In spite of the medical care provided, the situation had not improved. The question arose whether to intervene. It was agreed that the Child Abuse Medical Counselling Centre doctor would obtain more information with a view to informing the Child Welfare Board. It is not recorded that the doctor did so.", "17. Kimberly was again taken into hospital on 14 December 1994, following an incident two days earlier.", "18. A meeting took place on 20 December 1994 to discuss the case of Kimberly. Those taking part included the director of Curium, four doctors and two nurses connected with Leiden University Hospital, the doctor connected with the Child Abuse Medical Counselling Centre, the Venema family's general practitioner, the deputy unit head of the Child Welfare Board and a specialised family help worker (gezinsverzorger). It was decided that Leiden University Hospital and Curium would jointly submit a report to the Child Welfare Board. Mr and Mrs Venema were neither involved nor informed.", "19. It would appear that it was only during this meeting that the identity of the applicants was communicated to the Child Welfare Board.", "20. On 2 January 1995 the Child Welfare Board was provided by Curium with a first version of this report (hereinafter “the Curium/Leiden University Hospital report”). In response to questions received from the Child Welfare Board, the reporting parties made additions to it.", "21. On 3 January 1995 Curium sent the revised version of the report to the Child Welfare Board. The report stated that they believed Kimberly's life to be at risk and that urgent action was required. It expressed the opinion that it was not possible to discuss the matter with Mr and Mrs Venema, there being a danger that they might react unpredictably. According to the Government, the Child Welfare Board received the report on the following day.", "22. On 4 January 1995 the Child Welfare Board applied by fax to the juvenile judge (Kinderrechter) of the Regional Court (arrondissementsrechtbank) of The Hague for a supervision order (ondertoezichtstelling) and an order for Kimberly to be placed away from her family (uithuisplaatsing). The same day the juvenile judge issued a provisional supervision order (voorlopige ondertoezichtstelling), valid until 11 January 1995, pending a decision of a more permanent nature, at the same time ordering Kimberly to be placed away from her family. The juvenile judge did not hear Mr and Mrs Venema before coming to this decision. She scheduled a hearing for 10 January 1995.", "23. The Government state that the Child Welfare Board wrote to Mr and Mrs Venema on 5 January 1995, enclosing with their letter the application for a provisional supervision order, the Curium/Leiden University Hospital report and several articles on the Munchausen syndrome by proxy.", "24. The applicants state that they did not at any time receive either the letter of 5 January 1995 or any of the other documents mentioned. The Government appear to dispute this.", "25. On 6 January 1995 Mr and Mrs Venema arrived at Leiden University Hospital intending to collect Kimberly and take her home with them. It was then that they learnt of the juvenile judge's decisions of 4 January 1995. They were not allowed to see Kimberly.", "26. Also on 6 January 1995 the juvenile judge issued an order, again without hearing Mr and Mrs Venema, for Kimberly to be taken to a foster home, the name and address of which was withheld from Mr and Mrs Venema. This order was carried out the same day.", "27. Again on 6 January 1995 two of the doctors from Leiden University Hospital – a paediatrician and a child psychiatrist – and the investigating officer of the Child Welfare Board met with Mr and Mrs Venema to discuss the Curium/Leiden University Hospital report, the implications of a provisional supervision order and Kimberly's placement away from her family.", "28. On 10 January 1995 the juvenile judge heard Mr and Mrs Venema in camera. Mr and Mrs Venema were assisted by a lawyer. A representative of the Child Welfare Board was also present. At the close of the hearing the juvenile judge decided that, given the expert opinions to the effect that Kimberly's life appeared to be in danger, the provisional supervision order would have to remain in force but that a second opinion would be obtained as soon as possible from a psychiatrist and a child psychiatrist.", "29. It can be inferred from the case file that Mr and Mrs Venema were allowed to see Kimberly once every two weeks under an access arrangement, but no copy of the access order has been submitted.", "30. The order of 6 January 1995 was transmitted to Mr and Mrs Venema on 20 January 1995.", "31. The psychiatrist's report was dated 27 January 1995. It concluded that there were no indications that Mr and Mrs Venema posed any danger to Kimberly. However, a paragraph which the psychiatrist added to this report on 3 February 1995, after discussions by telephone with the Child Welfare Board, stated that it “[could] not be entirely ruled out” that Mrs Venema was suffering from the Munchausen syndrome by proxy, and recommended further examination.", "32. The Child Welfare Board sent the psychiatrist's report to Curium and Leiden University Hospital. Curium let it be known in response that it saw no reason to reconsider its point of view.", "33. Mr and Mrs Venema appealed to the Court of Appeal (gerechtshof) of The Hague on 9 February 1995 against the placement order.", "34. Mr and Mrs Venema submitted written statements made by their general practitioner (dated 8 February 1995) and Mrs Venema's gynaecologist (dated 9 February 1995). These criticised the quality of the reporting by Curium and the Leiden University Hospital doctors and expressed doubts as to the validity of their diagnosis. They also noted that Mrs Venema had not shown any tendency to seek superfluous or clearly unnecessary medical attention.", "35. Mr and Mrs Venema also submitted separate statements of three different psychiatrists (dated 17, 21 and 22 February 1995), including two university professors, who had examined them at their request. All were extremely critical of the diagnosis made by the Leiden University Hospital doctors. They concluded that Kimberly would be in no apparent danger if she were returned to her parents and recommended that this be done.", "36. The child psychiatrist, from whom an opinion was to be obtained pursuant to the order made by the juvenile judge on 10 January 1995, was approached by the Child Welfare Board on 16 February 1995.", "37. On 25 February 1995 the Leiden University Hospital doctors elaborated on the reasons for their suspicions as set out in their report of 3 January to the Child Welfare Board.", "38. A second child, Jonathan, was born to Mr and Mrs Venema on 28 February 1995. The Child Welfare Board, aware that Mrs Venema was due to give birth, had on 14 February 1995 applied for a provisional supervision order aimed at the protection of the second child immediately after the birth, but had withdrawn this application on 16 February 1995.", "39. The Court of Appeal held a hearing on 1 March 1995.", "40. On 15 March 1995 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It found that the Child Welfare Board had had sufficient reason to approach the juvenile judge as it had done, and that the juvenile judge had had sufficient reason to make the orders in question. It would have been preferable, even so, to have involved the parents in the decision-making process beforehand, or at least at an earlier stage. As matters stood, the experts disagreed amongst themselves. Given the likelihood that the examinations ordered by the juvenile judge would be brought to a conclusion shortly and that the juvenile judge would rescind the placement order immediately if the outcome was favourable to Mr and Mrs Venema, the Court of Appeal decided to confirm the decision of the juvenile judge.", "41. On 30 March 1995 the juvenile judge gave a decision prolonging Kimberly's placement away from her family until 6 May 1995. Mr and Mrs Venema appealed.", "42. It appears that around 10 April 1995 the access arrangement was modified in that Mr and Mrs Venema were then allowed to see Kimberly once every week instead of once a fortnight. The Government state that the initiative for this change was taken by the juvenile judge.", "43. Mr and Mrs Venema lodged an appeal on points of law (cassatieberoep) against the Court of Appeal's decision of 15 March 1995 with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) on 24 April 1995.", "44. On 2 May 1995 the juvenile judge made an order prolonging Kimberly's placement away from her family until 23 May 1995. Mr and Mrs Venema appealed, complaining among other things that the juvenile judge had not heard them before reaching this decision. On 12 May 1995, after holding a hearing, the Court of Appeal gave a decision confirming the juvenile judge's order. It held that although the juvenile judge had erred in not hearing Mr and Mrs Venema, this error was sufficiently remedied by the appeal hearing. As to the merits of the case, the Court of Appeal agreed that the opinion of the child psychiatrist appointed as an expert pursuant to the order of the juvenile judge was slow in coming but considered nonetheless that the potential danger to Kimberly's life outweighed any disadvantages of Kimberly's placement away from her family. On the same day the Court of Appeal, by a separate decision, declared Mr and Mrs Venema's appeal against the decision of 30 March 1995, which had prolonged the placement order until 6 May, inadmissible because by then it had become devoid of purpose.", "45. The child psychiatrist submitted his opinion on 19 May 1995. It contained extensive reports of medical and other examinations and discussions with the applicants, character witnesses and doctors who had treated Kimberly on several occasions after she had stopped breathing. Appended to the opinion were psychiatric reports in standard form on Mr and Mrs Venema, finding no sign of any psychiatric disorder, and a report by two Rotterdam University Hospital paediatricians finding a physical explanation for Kimberly's arrested breathing but no sign of maltreatment. The opinion noted that Kimberly's normal development had been impaired by the proceedings and that Mr and Mrs Venema had found the entire sequence of events profoundly distressing. It concluded without reservation that Kimberly should be handed back to her parents.", "46. On 22 May 1995, following a hearing in camera, the juvenile judge rescinded the provisional supervision order and the placement order, at the same time refusing to replace the provisional supervision order with a permanent one. Kimberly was handed back to Mr and Mrs Venema.", "47. The Supreme Court not yet having given judgment, Mr and Mrs Venema submitted on 29 August 1995 that they nonetheless had a continued interest in obtaining a decision of that court as to the legality of the measures in question. They stated, in particular, that a finding in their favour would provide them with some form of moral satisfaction; would enable them to take action in tort for damages against the State, Leiden University Hospital and Curium; would prevent further interference with their family life; and would obviate the need for the applicants to take further civil proceedings.", "48. The Advocate-General (advocaat-generaal) at the Supreme Court submitted an advisory opinion on 20 December 1995. He expressed the view that the appeal was inadmissible as Mr and Mrs Venema no longer had any legal interest in the outcome of the proceedings. The possible satisfaction of being found in the right was not in itself a sufficient interest. Nor was the possibility of a further civil action for damages, it being by no means obvious that such an action would in fact be made possible by a decision of the Supreme Court. The possibility of further interference with the applicants' family life in the future was not relevant to the case before the Supreme Court. The question whether the State, Leiden University Hospital or Curium had committed a tort against the applicants was outside the scope of the case before the Supreme Court, so that the need, if any, for further civil proceedings could not be considered relevant either. Turning to the merits of the case, the Advocate-General expressed the opinion that the decision of the Court of Appeal was based on adequate legal grounds and sufficiently reasoned.", "49. On 26 January 1996 the Supreme Court gave judgment declaring Mr and Mrs Venema's appeal on points of law inadmissible for lack of interest. It was held that the interests stated were insufficient.", "50. In the meantime, on 10 May 1995, a discussion took place between a representative of the Legal Proceedings Monitoring Group (Vereniging Voor Nader Onderzoek Rechtspleging – “VVNOR”), a non-governmental organisation that had taken up Mr and Mrs Venema's case, and the Director of the Child Welfare Board. It would appear that the Legal Proceedings Monitoring Group representative showed the Director documents taken from Kimberly's medical records, which had been obtained from Leiden University Hospital and which had been in Mr and Mrs Venema's possession for five weeks.", "51. On the same day, 10 May 1995, the Legal Proceedings Monitoring Group transmitted a written statement of complaint on Mr and Mrs Venema's behalf to the Child Welfare Board.", "52. On 1 June 1995 the Deputy Director of the Child Welfare Board gave a written decision declaring the complaint partly well-founded and partly ill-founded. Complaints considered well-founded related to the failure to give Mr and Mrs Venema access to certain documents – due to the absence from the file, at the relevant time, of certain meeting reports, and in the case of a list of contacts, due to an omission – and to the application for a provisional supervision order lodged on 14 February 1995 in respect of the second child Mr and Mrs Venema were then expecting. As to the latter issue, it was stated that the said application had been withdrawn on 16 February 1995 because it appeared not to be legally possible to seek a supervision order in respect of an as yet unborn child; the application had therefore been precipitate. The Deputy Director expressed regret for the lapse of time involved.", "53. The Legal Proceedings Monitoring Group, on behalf of Mr and Mrs Venema, lodged an appeal with the Child Welfare Boards Complaints Committee no. IV (Klachtencommissie IV bij de raden voor de kinderbescherming), which was received by that body on 23 June 1995.", "54. The Complaints Committee held a hearing on 22 August 1995 and gave its decision on the same day. It was considered reasonable that the Child Welfare Board had accepted the assessment of the Leiden University Hospital and Curium doctors that Kimberly's life was in danger; given the apparent urgency of the situation, the Board could not be faulted for not ensuring that the Leiden University Hospital and Curium doctors had obtained Mr and Mrs Venema's prior permission for the transmission to it of medical information. The Board ought, however, to have informed Mr and Mrs Venema in good time that it did not intend to make use of witnesses named by them but intended to rely solely on the court-appointed experts. The Complaints Committee further accepted the Board's statement that the psychiatrist had added to his report of 27 January 1995 a reservation to the effect that it could not be ruled out that Mrs Venema was suffering from the Munchausen syndrome by proxy, not at the bidding of the Child Welfare Board, but in response to a reminder that the report did not contain corroborating information from third-party sources (hetero‑anamnesis).", "55. The case received a measure of publicity. Questions in Parliament and a complaint to the Deputy Minister of Justice (Staatssecretaris van Justitie), lodged on behalf of Mr and Mrs Venema by the Legal Proceedings Monitoring Group, led the Deputy Minister to order an official inquiry into the way the Child Welfare Board had handled the affair.", "56. The report of the official inquiry was published on 25 July 1996. Its conclusions, in so far as relevant, may be summarised as follows. \n– In deciding to intervene without the prior involvement of Mr and Mrs Venema, the Child Welfare Board had no doubt sought in good faith to protect Kimberly's interests, but it might with advantage “have displayed more creativity in seeking a solution that did more justice to the parents' interests”.\n– Given the Child Welfare Board's own lack of psychiatric expertise and the fact that the Munchausen syndrome by proxy is difficult to diagnose, the use which the Child Welfare Board made of a variety of contradictory reports had not been “unacceptable” although it might have assessed them in a more critical fashion.\n– A lack of coordination within the Child Welfare Board had delayed the involvement of the child psychiatrist, who was only approached on 16 February 1995. This was regrettable because otherwise the reports might have been complete by the time of the birth of Jonathan.\n– The Child Welfare Board's advice to the juvenile judge might have been more complete. As a minimum, the Child Welfare Board could reasonably have been expected to justify the absence of any inquiry of its own and to give more extensive reasons for the choices it made.\n– The Child Welfare Board's case-file management and internal reporting were deficient: documents explaining the background to its decisions were not contained in the file.\n– The transmission of the report of the psychiatrist to the Leiden University Hospital doctors and Curium had constituted a breach of confidence vis-à-vis Mr and Mrs Venema since, after they had first reported Kimberly's case to the Child Welfare Board, their involvement had ended. Curium in particular had been treated virtually as an external expert body.\n– It appeared that Mr and Mrs Venema had not been summoned in writing to the hearing of the juvenile judge on 10 January 1995, notwithstanding the Child Welfare Board's statement to the contrary, but that this was due to a misunderstanding between the registry of the Regional Court and the Board and could not be blamed on the latter.", "57. The report went on to formulate recommendations aimed at preventing the recurrence of cases such as the present.", "58. According to the Government, the report led the Deputy Minister to conclude that the Child Welfare Board had “acted lawfully and fulfilled its statutory responsibility”, although its internal working procedures deserved some criticism. It had been right for the Board to take firm action and, in view of the nature and seriousness of the complaint, to rely on the expertise of third parties." ]	[ 4 ]
[ "11. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Velenzano (Bari). He was formerly the technical director, technical and economic adviser and special representative and agent of a company, X.", "12. On an unspecified date a preliminary investigation was opened in respect of the applicant on the suspicion of abuse of official authority and corruption, offences which he had allegedly committed in the performance of his duties in 1991.", "13. On 16 October 1993 the public prosecutor attached to the Brindisi District Court applied for the applicant to be placed either in pre-trial detention or under house arrest, or prevented from discharging his duties as a director of the X company, on the ground that five witness statements and an opinion prepared by an expert, Z, in the course of the preliminary investigation provided substantial evidence of his guilt. The content of the statements and of the expert opinion had been corroborated by other documents. The applicant appeared to have commissioned Y, the head of Brindisi District Council's town-planning department, as chief engineer for the construction of a road (“Strada dei Pittachi”) and as assistant project manager for the construction of a new detention centre in Lecce. The appointments were alleged to have been a “payment” from the X company to Y for having issued false declarations in the approval procedure relating to the plans submitted by the X company for the road project.\nThe public prosecutor further explained that, as the applicant had kept his post in the X company, there was a danger that he might commit other similar offences.", "14. On 2 November 1993 the Brindisi investigating judge (giudice per le indagini preliminari) issued a warrant for the applicant's arrest on the ground that there was substantial evidence of his guilt (gravi indizi di colpevolezza), as referred to in the public prosecutor's application of 16 October.", "15. Regarding the grounds for imposing this precautionary measure, the judge noted that the applicant had kept his post as technical director of the X company, as the public prosecutor had mentioned in his application. The judge considered, inter alia, that in order to decide which precautionary measure was most suitable in the applicant's case, he had to take into account the nature of the conduct under examination. The worst aspects of the applicant's conduct were that he had failed to observe the rules of administrative procedure, had wasted public funds and had infringed the provisions governing public tendering. The result had been a project that showed no respect for the environment – a very serious failing, as the judge explained: \n“... the chaotic and unliveable character of southern Italian cities is not caused solely by the spread of petty crime but stems primarily from the pattern of urban growth (the absence of any effective regulation, resulting in a lack of adequate public areas for parking, gardens and relief roads; this unease is tangibly felt in all parts of Brindisi). Abuses relating to the management and spending of public funds, such as those committed in the Strada dei Pittachi project, must be regarded as being just as serious as possession of a firearm with its serial number removed or the conduct of a drug addict who robs a tobacconist of several thousand lire at gunpoint or with the help of accomplices, as often happens in Brindisi. In view of the legislature's intention to counter the risk to society in such cases by the most stringent precautionary measure – detention – that measure is all the more justified in the far more serious case under investigation and must be considered appropriate and necessary, even if it is not expressly required by Article 275 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ['the CCP'] in circumstances of this kind. Otherwise, the difference in treatment would be unjustifiable, and therefore unjust.” \nThe judge concluded that in cases such as the present one, “where each act, firstly, is intended to serve reprehensible private interests and, secondly, is committed by persons who enjoy or should enjoy an excellent reputation because of the powers and/or responsibilities which they exercise, recourse must be had to the measure of detention (and not that of house arrest, which is very convenient – especially for someone like the suspect who is used to living indoors – and not sufficiently deterrent).”", "16. The applicant was arrested on 3 November 1993.", "17. On 3 November 1993 the applicant applied to the Brindisi District Court to be released or, failing that, placed under house arrest, arguing that there was not “substantial evidence of [his] guilt” within the meaning of Article 273 of the CCP and that there were no grounds whatsoever for imposing precautionary measures.", "18. On 9 November 1993 the applicant submitted to the registry of the Brindisi District Court further grounds in support of his application. He reiterated that there was neither any evidence against him, nor were there any grounds for precautionary measures: there was no need to prevent interference with the course of justice, as the investigation had almost been completed; no danger of his absconding, since he had never shown any intention of doing so but had instead been very cooperative at the time of his arrest; and, in particular, no need to prevent the commission of a criminal offence. In that connection, the applicant pointed out that Article 274 (c) of the CCP required there to be a genuine danger of reoffending, based on the particular circumstances of the case and on the suspect's character, whereas the reasons given by the investigating judge had been extremely vague and hypothetical. Furthermore, the applicant had no criminal record.", "19. Lastly, the applicant drew the court's attention, in particular, to the settled Italian case-law to the effect that, where a precautionary measure was being considered a long time after the offence had been committed, the suspect's conduct in the intervening period had to be taken into account. In his case, he had not been accused of or charged with any similar or different offence in the two years following the acts of which he was suspected.", "20. Following a hearing on 11 November 1993, the court held in a decision of 13 November 1993 that there was undoubtedly “substantial evidence” of the applicant's guilt. It further held: “There is undeniably a danger that the suspect might commit further offences within the meaning of Article 274 (c) of the CCP, seeing how he succeeded in unlawfully attaining the economic ends in question.” It therefore refused the applicant's application for release. However, since he had no criminal record, the court allowed his alternative request and placed him under house arrest.", "21. On 23 November 1993 the applicant appealed on points of law against the refusal to release him, arguing that his detention pending trial was in breach of Articles 273 and 274 (c) of the CCP. He submitted, in particular, that the Brindisi District Court had not given any reasons for its decision to apply precautionary measures for the purposes of Article 274 (c) of the CCP.", "22. On 30 November 1993 the applicant applied to the Brindisi investigating judge to have the order placing him under house arrest revoked, as he had resigned from his post as technical director of the X company.", "23. The judge refused that application on 3 December 1993. His decision was based, inter alia, on the fact that that measure had been taken only a short time ago and had, moreover, replaced a more stringent one, and on the serious nature of the accusation. He explained that the applicant might still be able to use his experience and professional skills either for his own ends or on behalf of another company.", "24. On 6 December 1993 the applicant appealed to the Brindisi District Court against that decision. He submitted that the previous decisions had been taken with a view to preventing the commission of criminal offences and, in particular, because he had kept his post in the X company. Now that he had resigned, such preventive action was no longer necessary.", "25. In a decision of 20 December 1993 the court noted that all the previous decisions concerning the applicant's deprivation of liberty had been based on Article 274 (c) of the CCP. It held that, in view of the applicant's resignation, the time that had elapsed since the measure had been imposed and the suspect's character, there were no longer any grounds for keeping him under house arrest. Accordingly, it ordered his immediate release.", "26. On 28 February 1994 the applicant withdrew his appeal on points of law of 23 November 1993, a fact that was acknowledged on 8 March 1994.", "27. In a judgment of 15 April 1999 the Brindisi District Court acquitted the applicant on the ground that the alleged facts had never occurred (perché il fatto non sussiste). That judgment became final on 14 October 1999.", "28. The court observed, in particular, that the public prosecutor's submissions had been based mainly on an expert opinion prepared by Z in the course of the preliminary investigation. Z had been examined at the trial, but the conclusions he had reached had been successfully challenged by the defence. In particular, an expert appointed by the defence, W, had put together a different version of events, which had been submitted to the court at hearings on 6 November 1996 and 5 February 1997. His version was corroborated by certain documents and witness statements. In particular, it appeared that the expert witness Z had failed to distinguish properly between two separate administrative procedures and had not taken into account a number of factors that might have explained why the X company had been chosen to carry out certain portions of the Strada dei Pittachi project. In the light of that, and even supposing that the internal administrative regulations had been contravened, it had not been established that the X company had made unjustified profits. Furthermore, at a hearing on 11 November 1997, a witness had clarified the relations between the X company and the applicant. In particular, the latter had suspended his contract of employment with the company when he had become a university lecturer; his role had subsequently been limited to that of an outside consultant. In that capacity, the applicant could not have been in charge of the operational management of a particular project, since that had been the responsibility of the manager of a subsidiary company, who had also been responsible for payments. Lastly, statements made at the hearings by other witnesses had shown that Y's appointment as chief engineer for the Strada dei Pittachi road-construction project and as assistant project manager for the construction of the new detention centre in Lecce had been based on technical considerations and grounds of suitability, and had been consistent with previous practice." ]	[]
[ "8. The applicant was born in 1928 and lives in Milan.", "9. The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Milan, which she had let to S.S.", "10. In a registered letter of 19 June 1987, the applicant informed the tenant that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1987 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date.", "11. In a writ served on the tenant on 13 October 1988, the applicant reiterated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Milan Magistrate.", "12. By a decision of 3 November 1988, which was made enforceable on 10 November 1988, the Milan Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 28 September 1989.", "13. On 22 September 1989, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.", "14. On 12 October 1989, she served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 10 November 1989.", "15. Between 10 November 1989 and 18 June 1996, the bailiff made twenty-six attempts to recover possession.", "16. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as, under the statutory provisions providing for the staggering of evictions, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.", "17. On 26 June 1996, the tenant vacated the premises." ]	[ 3, 9 ]
[ "8. The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Rome, which it had let to L.L.D.L.", "9. In a registered letter of 20 November 1984, the applicant informed the tenant that it intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1986 and asked her to vacate the premises by that date.", "10. On 5 June 1986, it served a notice to quit on the tenant, but she refused to leave.", "11. In a writ served on the tenant on 12 June 1986, the applicant reiterated its intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Rome Magistrate.", "12. By a decision of 30 June 1986, which was made enforceable on 20 November 1986, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1987.", "13. On 17 March 1990, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises.", "14. On 9 June 1990 it served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 15 June 1990.", "15. Between 15 June 1990 and 25 September 1996 the bailiff made thirty-two attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as, under the statutory provisions providing for the staggering of evictions, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.", "16. On 6 May 1997, the applicant sold the apartment." ]	[ 3, 9 ]
[ "8. The applicants were born in 1952 and 1961 respectively and live in Prato.", "9. The applicants are the owners of an apartment in Florence, which they had let to M.P.", "10. In a writ served on the tenant on 4 June 1985, the applicants communicated their intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Florence Magistrate.", "11. By a decision of 24 June 1985, which was made enforceable on 1 July 1985, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 August 1987.", "12. On 29 September 1987, the applicants served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.", "13. On 21 October 1987, they served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 27 November 1987.", "14. Between 27 November 1987 and 13 April 1989, the bailiff made four attempts to recover possession.", "15. On 29 May 1989, the applicants made a statutory declaration that they urgently required the premises as accommodation for themselves.", "16. Between 11 October 1989 and 13 February 1997, the bailiff made nineteen attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicants were never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.", "17. On 29 April 1997, the applicants repossessed the premises with the assistance of the police." ]	[ 3, 9 ]
[ "8. The applicant was born in 1927 and lives in Naples.", "9. He is the owner of a flat in Naples, which he had let to R.T.", "10. In a writ served on the tenant on 15 July 1988, the applicant communicated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Naples Magistrate.", "11. By a provisional decision of 20 January 1989, the Naples Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit, ordered that the premises be vacated by 20 January 1990 and declined jurisdiction on account of the value of the case.", "12. On 22 February 1989, the applicant resumed the proceedings before the Naples District Court. By a judgment of 14 April 1994, the court declared that the lease was terminated as of 31 December 1987 and confirmed the date of vacation indicated by the Magistrate. The judgment was made enforceable on 2 September 1994.", "13. On 1 April 1995, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.", "14. On 21 April 1995, he served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 30 May 1995.", "15. Between 30 May 1995 and 21 September 1999, the bailiff made twelve attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as, under the statutory provisions providing for staggering of evictions, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.", "16. On an unspecified date in 2000, the applicant recovered possession of his flat." ]	[ 3, 9 ]
[ "8. The applicants are the owners of a flat in S. Agnello, which they had let to A.M.", "9. In a writ served on the tenant on 30 January 1984, the applicants communicated their intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Sorrento Magistrate.", "10. By a decision of 15 March 1984, the Magistrate refused to uphold the validity of the notice to quit, declined jurisdiction on account of the value of the case and indicated that the Naples District Court had jurisdiction to hear it.", "11. On 26 March 1984, the applicants resumed the proceedings before the Naples District Court.", "12. In a judgment of 22 June 1988, which was filed with the registry on 19 October 1988, the court allowed the applicants' claim and ordered that the premises be vacated by 15 December 1989.", "13. On 16 December 1988, the tenant appealed to the Naples Court of appeal.", "14. In a judgment of 17 October 1991, which was filed with the registry on 9 November 1991, the court rejected the appeal.", "15. On 5 February 1992, the applicants served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.", "16. On 2 February 1993, they served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 15 March 1993.", "17. As from 15 March 1993 until 16 October 1997, the bailiff made several attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as, under the statutory provisions providing for the staggering of evictions, the applicants were not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.", "18. On 16 October 1997, the tenant vacated the premises." ]	[ 3, 9 ]
[ "8. The applicant is an Italian company having its registered seat in Milan.", "9. Mrs C. was the owner of an apartment in Milan, which she had let to D.S.", "10. In a registered letter of 20 January 1987, she informed the tenant that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1987 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date.", "11. In a writ served on the heirs of the tenant, who had died in the meantime, on 25 February 1988, Mrs C. reiterated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned them to appear before the Milan Magistrate.", "12. By a decision of 24 March 1988, which was made enforceable on 29 March 1988, the Milan Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 24 March 1989.", "13. On 25 July 1989, the applicant became the owner of the apartment.", "14. On 17 July 1990, the applicant served notice on the heirs, now tenants, requiring them to vacate the premises.", "15. On 5 October 1990, it served notice on the tenants informing them that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 15 October 1990.", "16. Between 15 October 1990 and 15 October 1996, the bailiff made twenty-one attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as, under the statutory provisions on the staggering of evictions, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.", "17. At the beginning of January 1997, the applicant repossessed the apartment as the tenants had spontaneously vacated the premises." ]	[ 3, 9 ]
[ "8. The applicant was born in 1913 and lives in Florence. She is the owner of three apartments in Florence, which she had let to P.U., C.G. and G.G.\n1) The proceedings against P.U.", "9. In a writ served on the tenant on 20 March 1990, the applicant informed the tenant of her intention to terminate the lease and summoned her to appear before the Florence Magistrate.", "10. By a decision of 11 April 1990, which was made enforceable on 29 May 1990, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises must be vacated by 31 December 1992.", "11. On 3 December 1992, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises.", "12. On 12 January 1993, she served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 19 February 1993.", "13. Between 19 February 1993 and 23 February 1996, the bailiff made five attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.", "14. On an unspecified date in 1996, the applicant sold the apartment.\n2) The proceedings against C.G.", "15. In a writ served on the tenant on 17 February 1990, the applicant informed the tenant of her intention to terminate the lease and summoned her to appear before the Florence Magistrate.", "16. By a decision of 7 March 1990, which was made enforceable on 23 March 1990, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises must be vacated by 31 October 1991.", "17. On 12 October 1991, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises.", "18. On 21 November 1991, she served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 15 January 1992.", "19. Between 15 January 1992 and 28 May 1996, the bailiff made seven attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.", "20. On an unspecified date in 1996, the applicant sold the apartment.\n3) The proceedings against G.G.", "21. In a writ served on the tenant on 17 February 1990, the applicant informed the tenant of her intention to terminate the lease and summoned her to appear before the Florence Magistrate.", "22. By a decision of 8 March 1990, which was made enforceable on 27 April 1990, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises must be vacated by 31 January 1993.", "23. On 3 December 1992, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.", "24. On 12 January 1993, she served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 19 February 1993.", "25. Between 19 February 1993 and 16 January 1996, the bailiff made four attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.", "26. On an unspecified date in 1996, the applicant sold the apartment." ]	[ 3, 9 ]
[ "7. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Padova.", "8. The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Padova, which she had let to F.C.", "9. In a registered letter of 4 July 1989, the applicant informed the tenant that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1991 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date.", "10. In a writ served on the tenant on 6 September 1989, the applicant reiterated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Padova Magistrate.", "11. By a decision of 19 September 1989, which was made enforceable on 26 September 1989, the Padova Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1992.", "12. On 20 April 1993, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.", "13. On 8 June 1993, she served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 17 July 1993.", "14. Between 17 July 1993 and 27 February 1995 the bailiff made five attempts to recover possession.", "15. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.", "16. Thereafter, the applicant decided not to pursue the enforcement proceedings, in order to avoid useless costs, given the lack of prospects of obtaining the assistance of the police.", "17. On 7 December 1995, the applicant made a statutory declaration that she urgently required the premises as accommodation for herself.", "18. On 23 January 1998, the tenant vacated the apartment." ]	[ 3, 9 ]
[ "7. The first and the second applicants were born in 1958 and 1959, respectively, and live in Požega. The third applicant, “Mesoprodukt”, is a meat production company.", "8. In 1991 the first and second applicants founded the company “Mesoprodukt”, a personal private company in Požega. The company is entirely owned by the first and second applicants and they are liable for the company's obligations with all their assets. The present case concerns several proceedings in respect of “Mesoprodukt”.", "9. By virtue of the Požega County Veterinary Inspection (veterinarski inspektor Ureda za gospodarstvo Županije požeško-slavonske) decision of 26 May 1994, the applicant company was prohibited from slaughtering animals and producing meat for human consumption.", "10. Upon the applicant company's appeal the Appeal Commission of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (Uprava za veterinarstvo poljoprivrede i šumarstva) quashed the first instance decision on 14 June 1994.", "11. On 14 November 1994 the applicant company filed a suit with the Požega Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Požegi) seeking payment of damages from the Požega and Slavonija County (Županija Požeško-Slavonska), due to the fact that it had been prohibited from producing meat from 26 May 1994 until 14 June 1994.", "12. Prior to 5 November 1997 the Požega Municipal Court ordered that a financial expertise be carried out and invited the applicant company to pay an advance for expenses related to the expert opinion. The applicant company paid the advance in part.", "13. On 3 April 1998 the court invited the applicant company to pay the remainder of the advance.", "14. On 4 May 1999 the appointed expert informed the court that the applicant company had not paid the remainder of the advance for the expenses.", "15. At the hearing on 7 May 1999 the court invited the Požega Tax Revenue Service to submit documentation about the applicant company's income in 1993 and 1994 in order to carry out a complete financial expertise. In January 2000 the requested documents were submitted. On 10 April 2000 the court sent this documentation to the appointed expert. The applicant company was invited to pay an advance for the expenses related to a new expertise.", "16. The next hearing scheduled for 23 January 2001 was adjourned at the request of the applicants' counsel.", "17. At the hearing on 1 March 2001 the court stayed the proceedings because the first and second applicants, although they received the notice of the hearing date, did not appear.", "18. On 12 June 2001 the applicants' counsel asked the court to resume the proceedings. The court then ordered that additional expertise be carried out and invited the defendant to pay an advance for the expenses of the expertise.", "19. On 5 December 2001 the defendant informed the court that it did not wish to pay the expenses.", "20. On 4 January 2002 the court requested the Slavonski Brod Commercial Court (Trgovački sud u Slavonskom Brodu) to provide documentation concerning the applicant company's registration.\nOn 17 January the requested documentation was submitted.", "21. At the hearing on 18 February 2002 one witness was heard and the defendant filed further written submissions. The applicants' counsel was asked to file a written reply and to specify their claim within fifteen days.", "22. It appears that the proceedings are pending before the court of first instance.", "23. On 18 March 1994 the police seized a vehicle owned by the first applicant's wife. The vehicle had been used for transportation of goods related to “Mesoprodukt”. On 21 April 1994 the vehicle was returned.", "24. On 14 November 1994 the applicant company filed a suit with the Požega Municipal Court against the Ministry of Interior (Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova) and the Ministry of Finance (Ministarstvo financija), seeking payment of damages for the profits lost due to its inability to transport goods with the vehicle.", "25. On 14 August 1996 the Požega Municipal Court pronounced judgment granting the applicant company's claim. Both parties appealed against the judgment.", "26. On 19 November 1997 the Požega County Court (Županijski sud u Požegi) quashed the first instance judgment and remitted the case for re-trial.", "27. The hearing scheduled for 16 June 1998 was adjourned due to the illness of the expert who was to be heard.", "28. The hearing scheduled for 4 June 1999 was adjourned due to the expert's absence.", "29. On 29 October 1999 the Act on Changes of the Civil Obligations Act was introduced providing that all proceedings concerning actions for damages resulting from acts of members of the Croatian army or police when acting in their official capacity during the war in Croatia were to be stayed pending the enactment of new legislation on the subject.", "30. On 22 January 2002 the proceedings were stayed pursuant to the above Act.", "31. The applicants' counsel appealed against that decision. The appeal was rejected on 27 March 2002 by the Požega County Court.", "32. The proceedings are accordingly pending before the first instance court.", "33. On 9 December 1993 the the Požega County Finance Police Office (Postaja financijske policije za Požeško-slavonsku županiju) ordered the applicant company to pay a transfer and sale of goods tax (porez na promet proizvoda i usluga) in the amount of 179,837.52 Croatian Kunas (HRK) and HRK 363,600.87 in interest. As the applicant company refused to pay those sums, its bank account was blocked.", "34. The applicant company's ensuing appeals were successful and on 13 January 1997 the Ministry re-assessed the amount of tax to be paid to HRK 64,955.00 and HRK 64,381,52 in interest. The applicant company paid those sums immediately after receiving this decision.", "35. Subsequently, on 19 November 1997 the applicant company filed a suit with the Požega Municipal Court seeking payment of damages from the Ministry of Finance due to the fact that the authorities' miscalculation of the tax had caused an unwarranted blocking of the bank account of the company.", "36. On 9 December 1997 the defendant filed its submissions objecting to the applicant company's claim.", "37. The preliminary hearing scheduled for 10 December 1997 was adjourned due to the defendant's absence.", "38. On 15 October 1998 the defendant submitted a detailed reply denying the applicant company's claim.", "39. The next hearing was held on 29 October 1998.", "40. On 15 October 1999 the court invited the applicant company to pay the court fees. The applicant company failed to do so.", "41. On 2 March 2000 the court informed the Tax Revenue Service that the applicant company had not paid the court fees.", "42. At the hearing on 17 January 2001 the defendant asked the court to stay the proceedings until the applicant company had paid the court fees. The court invited the Tax Revenue Service to inform it whether the applicant company had paid the fees. It also invited the Požega Commercial Court (Trgovački sud u Požegi) to submit documentation concerning the assets of the applicant company.", "43. On 6 March 2001 the Požega Commercial Court submitted the requested documentation.", "44. It appears that the proceedings are presently pending before the court of first instance.", "45. In respect of the above-mentioned three sets of civil proceedings the applicant company lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) complaining about the excessive length of the three above sets of proceedings and requesting the speeding up of those proceedings.", "46. By decision of 4 May 2000 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant company's complaint finding that the proceedings did not exceed the reasonable time requirement." ]	[ 3 ]
[ "9. The applicants were the owners of a flat in Milan, which they had let to M.A.", "10. In a registered letter of 16 January 1989, the applicants informed the tenant that they intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 30 June 1990 and asked her to vacate the premises by that date.", "11. In a writ served on the tenant on 28 February 1990, the applicants reiterated their intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Milan Magistrate.", "12. By a decision of 28 March 1990, which was made enforceable on 25 June 1990, the Milan Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 June 1991.", "13. On 5 June and again on 13 September 1991, the applicants served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises.", "14. On 3 July 1991, the applicants made a statutory declaration that they urgently required the premises as accommodation for themselves.", "15. On 4 December 1991, they served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 13 December 1991.", "16. Between 13 December 1991 and 7 January 1997, the bailiff made twenty-five attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicants were never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.", "17. At the end of January 1997, the tenant vacated the premises." ]	[ 3 ]
[ "6. The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Milan, which she had let to V.C.", "7. The tenant fell in rent arrears.", "8. In a writ served on the tenant on 29 May 1984, the applicant informed the tenant of her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Milan Magistrate.", "9. By a decision of 5 June 1984, which was made enforceable on 5 July 1984, the Milan Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 5 June 1985.", "10. On an unspecified date, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.", "11. On an unspecified date the applicant served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 29 July 1986.", "12. Between 29 July 1986 and 20 September 1993 the bailiff made twenty-five attempts to recover possession.", "13. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.", "14. On 25 November 1993, the applicant recovered possession of the apartment." ]	[ 4 ]
[ "9. The applicant was born in 1955. He is currently serving a prison sentence.", "10. On 26 February 1996 the Regional Prosecutor remanded the applicant in custody on suspicion of drug trafficking, committed from August until November 1995 in conspiracy with other persons. In the detention order the prosecuting authorities stressed that the testimony given during the investigations by the co-suspects strongly supported the suspicion against the applicant.", "11. On 15 March 1996 the Jelenia Góra Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) dismissed the applicant's appeal against the detention order. On 25 March 1996 and on an unknown later date the applicant's requests for release were refused by the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor. On 29 March 1996 the Regional Prosecutor prolonged the applicant's detention until 30 June 1996, invoking the complexity of the case. On 2 and 22 April 1996 the applicant's appeals against these decisions were dismissed by the Appellate Prosecutor. On 16 May 1996 the Regional Court further prolonged the applicant's detention on remand until 31 August 1996. On 5 June 1996 the Wrocław Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) dismissed the applicant's appeal against this decision.", "12. On 19 June 1996 the Regional Prosecutor prolonged the investigations in the case until 30 September 1996.", "13. On 24 June 1996 the Regional Prosecutor refused the applicant's new request for release and to have the detention on remand changed for a more lenient preventive measure. On 26 August 1996 the Court of Appeal prolonged the applicant's detention until 30 September 1996.", "14. On 25 September 1996 the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor prolonged the investigations until 31 December 1996. On 30 September 1996 the Court of Appeal prolonged the applicant's detention until the same date. On 14 November 1996 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of 30 September 1996, considering, inter alia, that applicable domestic law did not require that the evidence in support of his detention was such as to allow a conviction. It was sufficient that there were strong indications that the applicant had committed the offence in question.", "15. On 19 December 1996 the Court of Appeal prolonged the applicant's detention until 24 February 1997, having regard to newly discovered circumstances of the case which would justify bringing charges of forgery against the applicant, and to the need for translating some judicial documents from Germany. The Wrocław Regional Prosecutor prolonged the investigations until 31 May 1997. On 7 February 1997 the Prosecutor General lodged a motion with the Supreme Court to have the applicant's detention prolonged until 30 April 1997.", "16. On 10 February 1997 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of 19 December 1996. On 17 February 1997 it prolonged the applicant's detention until 30 April 1997. On 25 March and 7 April 1997 the Regional Prosecutor refused the applicant's further requests for release. The applicant appealed to the higher prosecutor. On 2 and 22 April 1997 the Appellate Prosecutor upheld these decisions, relying, inter alia, on the findings of the investigations that the applicant had had a leading role in the organisation of a drug trafficking network, and to the fact that the evidence included the applicant's forged passport. This revealed a risk of absconding if the applicant were to be released.", "17. On 21 April 1997 the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor closed the investigations. On 24 April 1997 the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor submitted the bill of indictment against the applicant and nine other co-accused to the Regional Court. The indictment contained a list of twenty witnesses to be interviewed and two hundred and twenty-four items of evidence to be presented at the hearing.", "18. On 28 May 1997 the Regional Court filed a motion with the Court of Appeal, requesting that the case be taken over for consideration by the Wrocław Regional Court. It was stressed that the Regional Prosecutor and most of the witnesses to be summoned resided in Wrocław. On 4 June 1997 the Court of Appeal dismissed the motion.", "19. On 4 September 1997 the Regional Court ordered the Detention Centre in Wrocław to carry out a thorough medical examination of the applicant, including an examination by a neurologist.", "20. On 30 October 1997, at the applicant's request, the Regional Court sent the files in the case, which by then numbered twenty-one volumes, to the Wrocław prison to make them available to the applicant. From 3 until 6 November 1997 the applicant was reading the case-file. On 7 November 1997 the applicant requested again to have the access to the case-file in order to be able to study it thoroughly. He was subsequently granted such access on four occasions.", "21. The first hearing in the case was held on 17 November 1997. During the hearing the Regional Court dismissed a motion lodged by one of the co-accused to have the case returned to the prosecution to complete the investigations. The hearing was adjourned as one of the co-accused failed to comply with the summons. The court informed the applicant that it would consider his new request for release after conducting a social enquiry at his home. The court fixed dates for next hearings for 22 December 1997 and 5 January 1998. From 2 until 6 December 1997 the case-file was, at the applicant's request, sent to the prison so that the applicant could study it.", "22. On 15 December 1997 the court held a hearing at which it refused the applicant's motion for release. Due to the absence of two co-accused the court adjourned the hearing. On 22 December 1997 the same two co-accused again failed to attend the hearing. A warrant of arrest had been issued in respect of one of them, a certain D. M. The defence counsel of another co-accused, I. M., requested that experts be appointed in order to establish her state of mental health after the suicide of her brother some days earlier. The hearing was adjourned until 19 January 1998.", "23. On 31 December 1997 the Regional Court requested the Warszawa-Praga District Police to conduct an enquiry at the applicant's home as to his family situation. As the results of the enquiry showed that the situation of the applicant's family was not such as to require that he be released, on 14 January 1998 the court refused his request of 17 November 1997. On 9 and 10 January 1998 the expert reports were submitted to the court, confirming the capacity of I. M. to take part in the hearings before the court.", "24. At a hearing held on 19 January 1998 the co-accused D.M. failed to attend. The court did not allow the applicant's request for release and adjourned the hearing.", "25. On 10 February 1998 the Supreme Court prolonged the applicant's detention until 31 July 1998. On 20 February and 9 March 1998 the applicant requested to be allowed access to the case-file. On 9 March 1998 during the subsequent hearing the applicant filed a motion that the case-file be remitted to the prosecutor to supplement investigation with regard to the circumstances and conditions in which two of the witnesses had made statements in their cases before the German courts. The applicant also challenged the judges of the panel examining the case and all judges of the Regional Court. He also requested a stay on the proceedings until D. M. was arrested and that the file from Germany be sent to the Regional Court and translated. He also requested his release. During the same hearing the court rejected all the applicant's requests. The applicant immediately filed appeals against these refusals and requested an adjournment of the hearing in order to have the case-file sent to the Court of Appeal for his appeals to be considered. The court refused to do so. The cases of the two absent co-accused were separated from the applicant's case.", "26. On 20 March 1998 the applicant again requested that the proceedings be stayed. On 24 March 1998 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 9 March 1998 refusing the applicant's motion. On 23 March 1998 the applicant requested to be allowed access to the case-file and filed six new procedural motions with the court. During the next hearing held on 30 March 1998 the applicant filed five other procedural motions, including a new motion to stay the proceedings.", "27. At the beginning of April 1998 the applicant challenged the prosecutor conducting his case and requested that another one be appointed. On 6 April 1998 the applicant filed a complaint with the court, alleging inadequate access to the case-file which had not allowed him to prepare his defence properly.", "28. On 7 April 1998 the Court of Appeal upheld the refusal to stay the proceedings of 30 March 1998. On 16 April 1998 the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor dismissed the applicant's challenge to the prosecutor, finding that it did not satisfy the applicable legal requirements. On 11 May 1998 the applicant complained to the Regional Court against his allegedly insufficient access to the case-file and requested permission to consult the records of the hearings. On 21, 22, 27, 28 and 29 May 1998 the applicant had access to the case-file in the detention centre.", "29. During the hearing held on 1 June 1998 the applicant filed a motion for release and requested that the proceedings be stayed. He also requested that the case against D.M., which had been previously separated from his case, be examined together with his case. He further complained that his procedural rights had not been observed by the court, in particular that he had no proper access to all the volumes of the case-file at the same time and that he had not been given sufficient time for meetings with his defence counsel. His requests and complaints were dismissed by the court.", "30. On 17 June 1998 the Appeal Court upheld the refusal to stay the proceedings of 1 June 1998. On 22 June 1998 the hearing was adjourned until 17 August 1998 due to the illness of one of the co-accused I.M.", "31. On 30 July 1998 the Supreme Court, at the Regional Court's request of 3 July 1998, decided to prolong the applicant's detention until 31 December 1998. A hearing fixed for 17 August 1998 was adjourned due to the absence of three defendants, and the subsequent hearings were held on 24 August, 14 September, 5 and 19 October 1998. The applicant was again allowed access to the case-file from 28 September until 2 October 1998.", "32. During the hearing held on 26 October 1998, the court questioned four witnesses. Two other witnesses failed to appear. The hearing was adjourned until 9 November 1998. During that hearing five witnesses were interviewed and three other witnesses failed to comply with the summons. The hearing was adjourned until for 30 November 1998.", "33. On 30 November 1998 four witnesses were interviewed. Seven other witnesses failed to attend the hearing. The court dismissed the applicant's new request for release and decided to admit evidence from the testimony of some police officers, concerning the conduct of the investigation in the case.", "34. Next hearings were fixed for 14 December 1998 and 4 January 1999. On its session held in camera on 7 December 1998 the Regional Court decided to request the Supreme Court to prolong the applicant's detention until 30 June 1999.", "35. On 14 December 1998 next hearing was held. Three witnesses were heard and one failed to attend. On 30 December 1998 the Regional Court requested the District Police in Brzeg Dolny to establish the whereabouts of witness D. M. At the hearing held on 4 January 1999 the court questioned one witness, whereas four others were absent. The applicant submitted a request to adjourn the questioning of the witnesses, relying on the absence of his defence counsel.", "36. On 6 January 1999 the Supreme Court prolonged the applicant's detention until 30 April 1999. The Court observed that a number of hearings had been adjourned due to the failure of certain accused and of a number of witnesses to attend the hearings as summoned. It also had regard to the applicant's motions to take additional evidence. At the hearing held on 11 January 1999 witness G.D. was questioned. Three other persons summoned as witnesses failed to comply with the summonses.", "37. At a subsequent hearing held on 18 January 1999 one of the co-accused was absent following an accident. The applicant and another co-accused requested that three new defence witnesses be heard in the case. The court adjourned the hearing. The subsequent hearing in the case was held on 25 January 1999 and two witnesses were questioned.", "38. At the hearing held on 8 February 1999 the applicant requested access to the case-file, alleging that before the hearing his access had been insufficient to prepare his defence properly because he had never had access to all of the twenty volumes of the case-file at the same time. The applicant's counsel requested appointment of an expert in graphology in order to examine the authenticity of the signature of the co-accused S. P. on a certain document. The court adjourned the hearing.", "39. On 15 February 1999 the applicant requested the Regional Court to grant him access to the entire case-file. On 1 March 1999 the court continued the hearing. Two witnesses were interviewed and one was absent. The court allowed the cross-examination of three witnesses and questioned another one.", "40. At the next hearing held on 8 March 1999 one witness failed to appear. The court appointed an expert in graphology in order to examine the authenticity of the signature of the co-accused S.P. The court allowed the applicant's request that a new witness be interviewed and dismissed other requests concerning the taking of further evidence.", "41. On 15 March 1999 the hearing was continued and one witness was heard. The court decided to impose fines on two absent witnesses. It also allowed the applicant's lawyer's request to examine a file of another criminal case and adjourned the hearing. On 17 March 1999 a lawyer of one of the co-accused requested to have three new witnesses questioned and the court granted that request.", "42. At the hearing on 22 March 1999 the court heard four witnesses. On 29 March 1999 the court decided to hold the hearing despite the fact that two of the co-accused failed to comply with the summonses. The court, at the applicant's request, called two new witnesses since the applicant's lawyer had not agreed that their testimony be read out in the court. The court adjourned the hearing and fixed the dates for the next hearings.", "43. On 6 April 1999 the court held the hearing, despite the absence of the co-accused I. M. Four witnesses summoned for that date failed to comply with the summonses. The applicant and another co-accused requested to accept as disclosed the testimony of two witnesses living abroad without their being read out in court.", "44. On 12 April 1999 a next hearing was held. The court read out the testimony of the co-accused D. M, whose whereabouts remained unknown, and two further witnesses were questioned.", "45. At a next hearing, held on 13 April 1999, one witness refused to answer questions. One of the co-accused was absent, but the court decided to continue the hearing. The court dismissed a request to admit evidence from the file of another criminal case, related to the present case and terminated by the German courts. The court also refused to allow the applicant's motion for a fresh expert report on the signature of the accused S. P. and to enclose a file of another case against persons who had been witnesses in the case against the applicant and to hear two new witnesses.", "46. At the hearing held on 14 April 1999 the Regional Court requested the Supreme Court to prolong the applicant's detention until 15 June 1999 so that further witnesses could be heard. The Regional Court observed that the proceedings had essentially come to a close, but that it was impossible to hear one witness who was detained in another case, and one of the accused, who was ill.", "47. A new witness was interviewed on 19 April 1999. One co-accused, who was ill, did not attend the hearing. The court decided to summon a subsequent witness and fixed dates for the next hearings. On 26 April 1999 the court adjourned the hearing due to the absence of one of the lawyers. The presence of the lawyer was mandatory and the co-accused had not consented to the hearing being held in his absence. \nOn 29 April 1999 the Supreme Court prolonged the applicant's detention until 15 June 1999, having regard to such essential obstacles as the illness of the co-accused I. M., new circumstances which were coming to light during the court proceedings and new evidence allowed by the court.", "48. At a hearing before the Regional Court held on 30 April 1999 a new witness was present, but the hearing had to be adjourned due to the absence of the applicant's lawyer. The applicant did not agree that the hearing be continued. The court fixed dates for eight subsequent hearings until 1 June 1999.", "49. On 4 May 1999 the hearing was adjourned, due to absence of the lawyers of three of the accused, including the applicant's. On 17 May 1999 the court decided to continue the hearing despite the absence of the accused I.M. who had submitted a sick leave certificate. One witness was questioned. The court ordered I. M.'s lawyer to submit I. M. sick leave certificate issued by a physician authorised to give certificates to justify the absence before a court on medical grounds.", "50. On 20 May 1999, at the request of one of the lawyers, the court adjourned the oral pleadings of the parties until 24 May 1999. On 24 May 1999 the last hearing was held.", "51. On 31 May 1999 the court gave a judgement in the case. The applicant was convicted of drug trafficking and forgery of documents and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment and a fine of 250,000 PLN. The court prolonged the applicant's detention until 30 September 1999 and the applicant appealed against the decision.", "52. The applicant requested that written grounds for the judgment be prepared. On 2 July 1999 the Regional Court informed him that the case-file had been sent to the Court of Appeal as the complaints against the decision concerning prolongation of detention had to be considered and therefore the written grounds for the judgment could only be drawn up after the return of the case-file. On 9 July 1999 the Regional Court prolonged the time-limit for the grounds of the judgment to be prepared until 31 August 1999. The court stressed that the case was particularly complex and voluminous and that the case-file had meanwhile had to be sent to the Court of Appeal.", "53. On 28 July 1999 the court informed the applicant about the new time-limit fixed for the preparation of the written grounds of the judgment. On 31 August 1999 the Regional Court again prolonged the time-limit in respect of the written grounds of the judgment until 10 September 1999, having regard to the complexity of the case. On 21 September 1999 the reasoned judgement, numbering sixty-four pages, was served on the applicant.", "54. On 15 October 1999 the applicant lodged an appeal against the first-instance judgment with the Court of Appeal. On 16 February 2000 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal.", "55. On 28 April 2000 the applicant lodged a cassation appeal against the second-instance judgement with the Supreme Court. He argued that the appellate court had failed to rectify errors of law committed by the first-instance court. The first-instance court had in particular failed to address correctly the complaints relating to certain refusals to take evidence and to the fact that some evidence was not taken in an adversarial manner as the court had only decided to include it in the case-file. The applicant had thus been deprived of the possibility of questioning certain witnesses. On 2 April 2000 the Appellate Prosecutor in Wrocław filed his reply to the cassation appeal with the Supreme Court. On 7 June 2000 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's request to stay execution of his sentence.", "56. On 30 October 2001 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's cassation appeal and the appeals filed by the two co-accused, the applicant's brother A.S. and A.M.", "57. The letters from the applicant to the Secretariat of the European Commission of Human Rights, dated 29 April 1997, 13 May 1997, 14 May 1997 (2 letters) and 17 June 1997, were intercepted by prison guards. They opened and apparently forwarded them to the prosecuting authorities, who in turn later read and forwarded them to the addressee. The envelopes of these letters bear stamps of the Wrocław Detention Centre, together with the stamps “censored” (“ocenzurowano”)." ]	[ 2, 4 ]
[ "8. The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Leghorn.", "9. The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Leghorn, which she had let to G.T. and G.P.", "10. In a registered letter of 18 November 1987, the applicant informed the tenants that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 October 1989 and asked them to vacate the premises by that date.", "11. In a writ served on the tenants on 5 December 1987, the applicant reiterated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenants to appear before the Leghorn Magistrate.", "12. By a decision of 14 December 1987, which was made enforceable on 15 December 1987, the Leghorn Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 October 1989.", "13. On 11 May 1990, the applicant served notice on the tenants requiring them to vacate the premises.", "14. On 31 May 1990, the applicant made a statutory declaration that she urgently required the premises as accommodation for herself.", "15. On 15 June 1990, she served notice on the tenants informing them that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 10 July 1990.", "16. Between 10 July 1990 and 5 April 1996, the bailiff made thirteen attempts to recover possession.", "17. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.", "18. On 9 July 1999, the tenants asked the Leghorn District Court to postpone the execution of the order for possession, pursuant to Article 6 of Law no. 431 of 9 December 1998.", "19. On 11 August 1999, the applicant served a second notice on the tenants informing them that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 28 September 1999.", "20. On 10 November 1999, pursuant to Article 6 of Law no. 431 of 9 December 1998, the Leghorn District Court postponed the execution of the order for possession until 14 April 2000.", "21. On 25 May 2000 and on 15 July 2000, the bailiff made two attempts, which proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.", "22. In the meanwhile, on 2 July 2000, the applicant made a statutory declaration that she urgently needed the apartment for herself.", "23. On 19 October 2000, the applicant recovered possession of the apartment." ]	[ 3, 9 ]
[ "8. The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Rocca Priora (Rome).", "9. He is the owner of an apartment in Rome, which he had let to C.C.", "10. In a registered letter of 17 April 1984, the applicant informed the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 May 1986 and asked her to vacate the premises by that date.", "11. In a writ served on the tenant on 18 January 1985, the applicant reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Rome Magistrate.", "12. By a decision of 11 March 1985, which was made enforceable on 2 April 1985, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 28 February 1987.", "13. On 3 April 1987, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises.", "14. On 27 April 1987 he served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 5 June 1987.", "15. Between 5 June 1987 and 31 January 1989, the bailiff made eight attempts to recover possession.", "16. On 11 May 1989, the applicant had made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for himself. On 20 October 1993, he reiterated the declaration.", "17. Between 6 September 1989 and 22 February 1996, the bailiff made forty two attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.", "18. On 24 March 1996, the tenant vacated the premises." ]	[ 3 ]
[ "8. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Rome.", "9. The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Rome, which she had let to G.S.", "10. In a registered letter of 2 November 1983, the applicant informed the tenant that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1983 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date.", "11. In a writ served on the tenant on 11 December 1984, the applicant reiterated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Rome Magistrate.", "12. By a decision of 6 February 1985, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises must be vacated by 10 January 1986.", "13. On 19 December 1986, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.", "14. On 27 January 1987, she served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 13 March 1987.", "15. Between 13 March 1987 and 27 January 1989, the bailiff made twelve attempts to recover possession.", "16. On 12 May 1989, the applicant made a statutory declaration that she urgently required the premises as accommodation for her family.", "17. Between 19 May 1989 and 14 July 1999, the bailiff made sixty-three attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.", "18. On 25 February 2000, the tenant vacated the premises." ]	[ 3, 9 ]
[ "8. The applicant was born in 1925 and lives in Florence.", "9. The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Florence, which she had let to S.G.", "10. In a registered letter of 26 March 1983, the applicant informed the tenant that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1983 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date.", "11. In a writ served on the tenant on 12 June 1985 the applicant reiterated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Florence Magistrate.", "12. On 27 December 1985, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 28 December 1986. That decision was made enforceable on 7 April 1987.", "13. On 16 April 1987, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.", "14. On 20 May 1987, she served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 29 June 1987.", "15. Between 29 June 1987 and 17 September 1992, the bailiff made fourteen attempts to recover possession.", "16. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as, under the statutory provisions providing for the suspension or the staggering of evictions, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.", "17. On 28 September 1992, the applicant made a statutory declaration that she urgently required the premises in order to sell them at a normal market price.", "18. Between 20 January 1993 and 16 September 1998, the bailiff made thirteen attempts to recover possession.", "19. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.", "20. Following the entry into force of Law No. 431/98, the enforcement proceedings were suspended until 28 June 1999.", "21. On 29 March 2002, the Florence Magistrate ordered that the premises be vacated by 4 December 2003." ]	[ 3, 9 ]
[ "7. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Leghorn.", "8. The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Leghorn, which she had let to O.C.L.", "9. On an unidentified date, the applicant informed the tenant that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1991 and asked her to vacate the premises by that date.", "10. In a writ served on the tenant on 16 July 1991 the applicant reiterated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Leghorn Magistrate.", "11. By a decision of 29 July 1991, which was made enforceable on 17 September 1991, the Leghorn Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1992.", "12. On 29 March 1993, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises.", "13. On 15 May 1993, the applicant made a statutory declaration that she urgently required the premises as accommodation for herself.", "14. On 20 May 1993, she served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 17 June 1993.", "15. Between 17 June 1993 and 4 June 1998, the bailiff made eight attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.", "16. Following the entry into force of Law No. 431 of 1998, on 27 July 1999, the tenant asked the Leghorn District Court to set a fresh date for the enforcement of the order for possession.", "17. The applicant asked the court to reject the tenant's request.", "18. On 23 September 1999, the Leghorn Magistrate decided to postpone the enforcement proceedings until 10 February 2001. In the meantime, pursuant to Law No. 388/00 all evictions of tenants were suspended until 30 June 2001.", "19. On 2 July 2001, the applicant served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 20 July 2001.", "20. On 3 August 2001, the Leghorn Magistrate decided to postpone the enforcement proceedings first until 23 April 2002 and then until 16 May 2002.", "21. On 23 May 2002, the applicant was granted police assistance to evict the tenant only once, but to no avail, as the tenant claimed he was ill and an officially assigned doctor was available to check his allegations.", "22. On 24 May 2002 the applicant had not recovered possession of her flat." ]	[ 3, 9 ]
[ "8. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Nicosia.", "9. He was accused of rape and committed for trial before an Assize Court.", "10. At the commencement of the hearing of the case before the Assize Court, the defence requested discovery of a number of relevant documents in the prosecution’s possession. The defence further requested that a forensic examination of the complainant’s knickers be carried out and that swabs taken from her vagina be analysed. The prosecution objected. After hearing argument from both sides, the Assize Court granted the requests on 19 March 1998. This order was made pursuant to the provisions of Articles 12(5)(b), and 30.2 of the Cyprus Constitution, Articles 6 §§ 1 and 3 b) of the Convention and the notion of a fair trial as developed in the recent case-law of the English courts. The Assize Court also relied on Article 7(1) of the Cyprus Law of Criminal Procedure, Cap. 155, as amended.", "11. The Attorney General immediately applied for judicial review of the order by means of a writ of certiorari. The grounds invoked were lack of jurisdiction and error of law on the face of the record. The application was made ex parte and it came before Justice Artemides, a member of the Supreme Court. He granted leave and suspended the enforcement of the order. Thereafter, on 15 May 1998, after hearing the parties, Justice Artemides granted the application and quashed the Assize Court’s order for excess of jurisdiction.", "12. The applicant’s appeal (no. 10227) against this decision was heard by the plenary of the Supreme Court consisting of nine judges. The judges included Justice Gavrielides who, as it transpired towards the end of the subsequent trial, had been actively involved in the investigation that preceded the filing of the indictment against the applicant, in his capacity as senior attorney attached to the Legal Service of the Republic, i.e. the prosecution. However, at the time of the hearing of the certiorari appeal, the defence had been unaware of this fact and, therefore, no objection was taken to his participation in the proceedings. Neither the prosecution nor Justice Gavrielides referred to the matter.", "13. On 24 September 1998 the appeal was dismissed by a majority of 7 to 2. Justice Gavrielides was part of the majority.", "14. In the course of the subsequent proceedings before the Assize Court, the prosecution provided several of the documents which the defence had previously requested. However, it objected to the defence having an opportunity to carry out forensic tests. The applicant claims that the latter was of the utmost importance for his defence since Vaseline was found on the knickers which the prosecution and the Assize Court treated as strong corroborative evidence of his guilt.", "15. The applicant was found guilty by the Assize Court on 10 March 1999 and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. He appealed against his conviction to the Supreme Court. The appeal (no. 53/99) was referred to a division of the Supreme Court consisting of three judges. The first ground of appeal concerned Justice Gavrielides’ participation in the certiorari proceedings, in violation of the applicant’s right to a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal. The appeal was accompanied by a plea, followed by a petition, that the certiorari judgment of the Supreme Court of 24 September 1998 be vacated having regard to the principles enunciated in a recent decision of the House of Lords in the case of R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and others ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) (1999). Vacation of the said judgment was a precondition for the determination of the applicant’s first ground of appeal.", "16. At the beginning of the appeal hearing, it was pointed out to the defence that the court could not review the validity of a previous judgment of the Supreme Court in the context of an appeal. The defence then filed a separate petition to the plenary of the Supreme Court to vacate its previous judgment. The hearing of the appeal was accordingly adjourned pending the determination of the petition.", "17. The petition was examined by the plenary of the Supreme Court consisting of nine judges, including the three judges before whom the applicant’s appeal was pending. The court was presided over by Justice Artemides. An objection to the participation of Justice Artemides was taken by the defence given his previous involvement in the case. It was claimed that his participation at this stage would render him a judge in his own cause and offend against the rule of impartiality. However, the objection was rejected.", "18. The application to vacate was dismissed on 19 July 1999 by a majority decision delivered by Justice Artemides, on the ground that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to re-open the proceedings and examine the validity of its previous judgment.", "19. Following dismissal of the petition, the hearing of the appeal was resumed. The appellate division of the Supreme Court indicated to the defence that, in view of the dismissal of the application to vacate, the first ground of appeal was left in a vacuum. The defence was then left with no option but to withdraw this ground of appeal as it could no longer be determined.", "20. A hearing of the remaining grounds of appeal which the applicant had made then followed. The hearing was completed on 2 November 1999, and judgment was reserved. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on 18 January 2000, thereby re-affirming the applicant’s conviction." ]	[]
[ "8. On 20 December 1996 the applicant was accused of an offence of attempting to sell explosives.", "9. On 28 January 1997 he was arrested in the context of the criminal proceedings. On 30 January 1997 a judge ordered his release.", "10. On 3 February 1997 the Minister of the Interior dismissed the applicant from the police. The decision referred to the conclusions reached by the Police Corps Inspection Office according to which the applicant had offered to sell explosives, and that on 8 June 1996 he had driven a car in which the police later found explosives.", "11. On 26 March 1997 an expert opinion on the applicant’s mental health was submitted to the Žilina Regional Office of Investigation in the context of the criminal proceedings.", "12. On 28 May 1997 the Žilina Regional Prosecutor indicted the applicant, charging him with two offences of involvement in the unauthorised transport of explosives before the Žilina Regional Court.", "13. On 11 June 1997 the case was assigned to a different judge as the judge to whom the case had originally fallen to be examined was an acquaintance of the applicant.", "14. On 25 November 1997 the Regional Court judge requested the Prievidza District Court to submit decisions concerning one of the accused.", "15. On 16 April 1999 the Regional Court returned the case to the public prosecutor for further investigation. The prosecutor appealed on 27 April 1999. On 11 May 1999 the case was submitted to the Supreme Court. On 18 August 1999 the latter quashed the Regional Court’s decision of 16 April 1999 and ordered the first instance court to proceed with the case. The case file was returned to the Regional Court on 11 October 1999.", "16. A hearing scheduled for 12 January 2000 had to be adjourned as one of the accused persons’ lawyers was absent.", "17. Hearings were held on 17 February 2000, on 10 March 2000, on 16 June 2000 and on 27 July 2000. The case was adjourned as it was necessary to hear further witnesses.", "18. On 13 September 2000 and on 26 October 2000 the case had to be adjourned as witnesses failed to appear.", "19. On 29 November 2000 the Regional Court heard three witnesses. The case was adjourned as the court considered it necessary to hear another witness in respect of whom an arrest warrant had been issued. On 1 and 22 December 2000 and on 3 April 2001 the Regional Court asked the police to establish the whereabouts of the witness.", "20. On 14 February 2001 the president of the Žilina Regional Court informed the applicant that the case had not been proceeded with in January 2001 as the presiding judge was ill.", "21. On 10 May 2001 the Žilina Regional Court acquitted the applicant. On 17 August 2001 the public prosecutor appealed. One of the applicant’s co-accused also filed an appeal. The case file was transmitted to the Supreme Court on 27 August 2001. On 15 November 2001 one of the accused submitted observations on the public prosecutor’s appeal.", "22. A hearing before the Supreme Court scheduled for 12 December 2001 was cancelled.", "23. On 30 January 2002 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals. The decision became final on the same day." ]	[ 3 ]
[ "8. The applicants are the owners of a flat in Riano, which they had let to F.M.", "9. In a writ served on the tenant on 31 July 1986, the applicants communicated their intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Castelnuovo di Porto Magistrate.", "10. By a decision of 3 November 1987, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Castelnuovo di Porto Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises must be vacated by 30 April 1989.", "11. On 17 May 1989, the applicants served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.", "12. On 1 August 1989, they served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 11 August 1989.", "13. Between 11 August 1989 and 27 May 1996, the bailiff made thirty-seven attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as under the statutory provisions providing for the suspension or the staggering of evictions, the applicants were not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.", "14. Pursuant to Section 6 of Law no. 431/1998, the enforcement proceedings were suspended for nine months.", "15. The applicant decided, therefore, not to pursue the enforcement proceedings given the lack of prospects of obtaining the assistance of the police.", "16. According to the latest information provided by the applicants in their letter of 18 February 2002, they have not recovered possession of the flat." ]	[ 3, 9 ]
[ "8. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Rotterdam, the Netherlands.", "9. On 25 October 1998 the applicant was arrested on the strength of a provisional arrest warrant issued by a duty magistrate in connection with a request for his extradition made by the Kingdom of Morocco. The request was relayed to Malta through Interpol. The charge related to the applicant's involvement in international drug trafficking in cannabis. The information laid before the magistrate by the Attorney General referred, inter alia, to the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (“the Vienna Convention”), to Legal Notice 120 concerning designated countries and Government Notice 332 published in the Government Gazette of 24 May 1996 which reproduced the text of the Convention to which Malta acceded on 28 February 1996. Attached to the request was a Red Notice issued by Interpol bearing the applicant's description and fingerprints as well as a certificate issued by the Prime Minister under subsection (4) of section 4 of the 1996 Order on Extradition (Designated Foreign Countries).", "10. On 26 October 1998, pursuant to section 15(1) of the Extradition Act, the applicant was brought before the Magistrates' Court acting as a court of criminal inquiry in connection with extradition proceedings. A defence counsel was appointed for him. The presiding magistrate was different from the one who issued the provisional arrest warrant. The applicant did not challenge the lawfulness of his arrest and the proceedings were adjourned until 3 November 1998.", "11. On 28 October 1998 the applicant filed a judicial act with the First Hall of the Civil Court alleging that the provisional arrest warrant was unlawful because, inter alia, there were no bilateral extradition arrangements between Malta and Morocco and the Vienna Convention had not been incorporated into domestic law.", "12. On 30 October 1998 the Prime Minister as the minister responsible for justice matters replied to the act. The Prime Minister rejected the applicant's claim as frivolous and vexatious. He stressed that both Malta and Morocco were parties to the Vienna Convention even though the Convention had not been incorporated into domestic law. On the latter point, he noted that Maltese law was already sufficiently equipped and adequate to implement Malta's obligation under the Vienna Convention.", "13. At its next sitting on 3 November 1998, the applicant's lawyer pleaded that the Magistrates' Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case for extradition, that the provisional arrest warrant was therefore unlawful and that the applicant should be released. The prosecution disputed the applicant's reasoning. The case was adjourned to 13 November 1998.", "14. At the further hearing on 13 November 1998 the applicant again pleaded that the Maltese courts lacked jurisdiction to examine the extradition request as there was no extradition treaty in force between Malta and Morocco and that the Vienna Convention, although signed by Malta, had not been duly ratified in accordance with Maltese law.", "15. On 20 November 1998 the Magistrates' Court rejected the plea of lack of jurisdiction and declared that it had jurisdiction to hear the case. The Magistrates' Court took into account, in particular, the applicant's argument according to which the Vienna Convention had not been ratified as required by the Ratification of Treaties Act. It observed, however, that the said Act only provided for the ratification of certain treaties, indicated in section 3(1). The applicant argued that the Vienna Convention fell under section 3(1)(c), which imposed the ratification of any treaty affecting or concerning the relationship of Malta with any multinational organisation, agency, association or similar body. The Magistrates' Court could not accept such an interpretation, on the ground that the Vienna Convention was binding for the States which signed it, but not for the United Nations. Therefore, it could not give rise to a relationship between Malta and the United Nations. The Magistrates' Court moreover observed that the Extradition Act authorised arrest with a view to extradition of any person accused of an offence in a “designated foreign country”. As Morocco had been designated foreign country by Legal Notice 120 of 1996, the applicant's deprivation of liberty could not be regarded as unlawful.", "16. On 27 November 1998 the applicant appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal. In a judgment of 12 December 1998, the Court of Criminal Appeal found that there was no right of appeal at that stage of the proceedings under Maltese law and that an appeal was only possible when a person was subject to an order committing him to custody to await his removal. Furthermore, the applicant had filed his appeal out of time.", "17. On 23 December 1998, while the extradition proceedings were still pending, the applicant filed an application with the First Hall of the Civil Court in its constitutional jurisdiction. He alleged that his case gave rise to violations of Article 5 §§ 1(f) and 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The applicant based his claim on the words “lawful arrest or detention” of a person in connection with extradition proceedings. His main argument was that Malta had not duly ratified any international treaty giving the State “legal authority” to arrest him with a view to his extradition to Morocco. As to his plea concerning Article 5 § 4, the applicant stated that there was no possibility to have the legality of the detention for extradition examined before the case was decided and an appeal lodged.", "18. The First Hall of the Civil Court listed the case for hearing on 8 January 1999. However, the case had to be adjourned to 29 January 1999 to enable the applicant's lawyer to produce witness evidence.", "19. In the meantime, the Magistrates' Court, under whose order the applicant was kept in detention, continued to hear the case, in anticipation of obtaining the relevant evidence to support the extradition request from the Kingdom of Morocco. The court had a one-month time-limit in which to conclude the hearings and render its decision. This period could be extended by further periods of up to a maximum of three months by the President of the Republic.", "20. On 15 January 1999 the applicant was discharged on the grounds that there was no evidence to justify his extradition to Morocco. The Attorney General did not appeal against the decision. The applicant was ordered by the police, acting as the Immigration Authority, to return to the Netherlands within hours.", "21. The applicant's application to the First Hall of the Civil Court was still pending when the applicant's case was being heard by the Magistrates' Court. However, on 16 January 1999 the applicant had to leave Malta, having been refused permission to stay in Malta pending the examination of his application to the First Hall of the Civil Court. On 27 January 1999 the applicant's lawyer, who had been instructed by the applicant to file the constitutional case, requested that the Commissioner of Police, as Principal Immigration Officer, be ordered to allow the applicant to return to Malta for the hearing of the case which was pending before the First Hall of the Civil Court.", "22. On 29 January 1999 the First Hall of the Civil Court ordered that a lawyer be appointed for the applicant. According to the applicant, under domestic law any voluntary assumption of this mandate by the lawyer who filed the application to the First Hall would imply that the person assuming it would be personally responsible to the Government of Malta for all costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings. The applicant had no relatives in Malta. Furthermore, the lawyer acting on his behalf could not assume the position of a “party” in the proceedings had he applied to act as his lawyer in addition to being his legal representative since this would have raised serious issues of professional ethics. The acceptance of a voluntary mandate would make the lawyer personally involved in the proceedings as if it were his own case.", "23. In the event, the applicant never gave a power of attorney to a legal representative in Malta to enable his claim to be dealt with by the First Hall of the Civil Court. Furthermore, the applicant was never granted permission to enter Malta and the domestic court never ordered that permission be granted.", "24. On 29 January 1999 the First Hall of the Civil Court adjourned the case pending the applicant's confirmation that he intended to issue a power of attorney to a legal representative for the purposes of the proceedings.", "25. On 3 March 1999, in the absence of the parties at the resumed hearing, the First Hall adjourned the case sine die. The applicant still could not enter the country to continue the proceedings in the Maltese courts regarding the lawfulness of his detention.", "26. On 1 September 1999 the applicant's action was declared deserted and his case was struck off the list." ]	[ 2 ]
[ "6. The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Florence, which she had let to I.M.", "7. In a writ served on the tenant on 11 June 1987, the applicant communicated her intention to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 30 June 1987 and summoned the tenant to appear before the Florence Magistrate.", "8. By a decision of 29 June 1987, which was made enforceable on 7 July 1987, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 June 1988.", "9. On 4 May 1989, the applicant made a statutory declaration that she urgently required the premises as accommodation for herself.", "10. On 7 October 1989, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises.", "11. On 17 November 1989, she served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 18 December 1989.", "12. Between 18 December 1989 and 24 January 1997, the bailiff made fifteen attempts to recover possession.", "13. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.", "14. On 28 February 1997, the applicant repossessed the apartment." ]	[ 3 ]
[ "8. The applicant was born in 1912 and lives in Mercato Sanseverino.", "9. He is the owner of an apartment in Mercato Sanseverino, which he had let to M.S. in 1974. The lease was due to expire on 31 December 1983, but was extended until 31 December 1987 pursuant to Law No. 392/78.", "10. In a writ served on the tenant on 4 September 1986, the applicant communicated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Mercato Sanseverino Magistrate.", "11. By a decision of 30 September 1986, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Mercato Sanseverino Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 June 1989.", "12. On 1 August 1991, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.", "13. On 15 October 1991, he served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 28 October 1991.", "14. On 28 October 1991, the bailiff made an attempt to recover possession, which proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.", "15. On 18 November 1991, the applicant made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for his daughter.", "16. On 18 February 1992, the bailiff asked the local police to provide their assistance in enforcing the order for possession and at the same time suspended the enforcement proceedings until the assistance would be granted.", "17. At the beginning of 1998, the tenant spontaneously vacated the premises." ]	[ 3, 9 ]
[ "8. The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Naples.", "9. She is the owner of an apartment in Naples, which she had let to L.T.", "10. In a writ served on the tenant on 24 October 1986, the applicant communicated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Naples Magistrate.", "11. On 3 November 1986, the Naples Magistrate did not uphold the validity of the notice to quit and declined jurisdiction on account of the value of the case.", "12. On 11 November 1986, the applicant resumed the proceedings before the Naples District Court. In a judgment of 10 July 1987, deposited with the registry on 22 July 1987, the court declared that the lease would terminate on 4 November 1987 and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1988.", "13. On 20 February 1992, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.", "14. On 8 April 1992, she served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 29 April 1992.", "15. On 28 April 1992, the applicant made a statutory declaration that she urgently required the premises as accommodation for her daughter.", "16. On 29 April 1992 and 12 February 1993, the bailiff made two attempts to recover possession.", "17. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.", "18. Thereafter, the applicant decided not to pursue the enforcement proceedings, in order to avoid useless costs, given the lack of prospects of obtaining the assistance of the police.", "19. On 27 June 1995, the applicant served again notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.", "20. On 5 July 1995, she served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 24 July 1995.", "21. Between 24 July 1995 and 7 October 1998, the bailiff made twelve attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.", "22. On 28 October 1998, the tenant vacated the premises." ]	[ 3, 9 ]
[ "9. The applicants were born in 1967 and 1968 respectively and live in Vienna.", "10. On 8 February 1996 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court (Landesgericht für Strafsachen) convicted the first applicant under Article 209 of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) of homosexual acts with adolescents and sentenced him to one year's imprisonment suspended on probation for a period of three years. Relying mainly on the first applicant's diary, in which he had made entries about his sexual encounters, the court found it established that between 1989 and 1994 the first applicant had had, in Austria and in a number of other countries, homosexual relations either by way of oral sex or masturbation with numerous persons between 14 and 18 years of age, whose identity could not be established.", "11. On 5 November 1996 the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof), upon the first applicant's plea of nullity, quashed the judgment regarding the offences committed abroad.", "12. On 29 January 1997 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court resumed the proceedings, which had been discontinued as far as the offences committed abroad were concerned, and found the first applicant guilty under Article 209 of the Criminal Code of the offences committed in Austria, sentencing him to eleven months' imprisonment suspended on probation for a period of three years.", "13. On 27 May 1997 the Supreme Court dismissed the first applicant's plea of nullity in which he had complained that the application of Article 209 of the Criminal Code violated his right to respect for his private life and his right to non-discrimination and had suggested that the Supreme Court request the Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of that provision.", "14. On 31 July 1997 the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht), upon the first applicant's appeal, reduced the sentence to eight months' imprisonment suspended on probation for a period of three years.", "15. On 21 February 1997 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court convicted the second applicant under Article 209 of the Criminal Code of homosexual acts with adolescents, and on one minor count of misappropriation. It sentenced him to six months' imprisonment suspended on probation for a period of three years. The Court found it established that on one occasion the second applicant had had oral sex with a 15-year-old.", "16. On 22 May 1997 the Vienna Court of Appeal dismissed the second applicant's appeal on points of law, in which he had complained that Article 209 of the Criminal Code was discriminatory and violated his right to respect for his private life and had suggested that the Court of Appeal request the Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of that provision. It also dismissed his appeal against sentence. The decision was served on 3 July 1997." ]	[ 8, 4 ]
[ "9. The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Rakovski, in the region of Plovdiv.", "10. On 22 August 1997 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having stolen from a Ms S. gold jewellery and money worth 20,110,448 Bulgarian levs (“BGL”). In view of the value of the stolen objects and money, the offence with which the applicant was charged constituted a “serious” offence, within the meaning of the Penal Code.\nAccording to the indictment drawn up later, the applicant, who had been employed by a private security company to keep Ms S.’s house , had taken advantage of her and her family’s departure on holiday to steal the above valuables on 2 August 1997. On the same day he had taken some of the jewellery and money to his sister’s home. Approximately ten days later, having learned that Ms S. had discovered the theft, the applicant had travelled to the nearby city of Plovdiv to sell some of the jewellery before returning home. On 19 August 1997 the applicant and his family (his wife and their two month-old child) had visited the applicant’s mother in the town of Perushtiza. There the applicant had given his mother the remaining money.", "11. On the day of his arrest and on being questioned by an assistant investigator the following day, 23 August 1997, the applicant admitted the theft and directed the police to the persons who had bought some of the stolen jewellery from him. The majority of the valuables were recovered by the police the same day. The applicant’s mother returned the money she had been given by her son.", "12. The period between 23 August and 10 October 1997 was taken up by procedural acts. No new evidence was collected during that period. The applicant was not interrogated.", "13. On 26 August 1997 the assistant investigator transmitted the file to the District Prosecutor’s Office inviting it to reclassify the proceedings, which had begun as a summary investigation (дознание), into an ordinary investigation (следствие). On 5 September 1997 the District Prosecutor’s Office transmitted the case file to the Regional Prosecutor’s Office, as it considered that the proceedings came within the latter’s competence. By a decision dated 10 September 1997 a prosecutor from the Regional Prosecutor’s Office found that the case fell to be dealt with by the District Prosecutor’s Office and gave instructions for its return. On 12 September 1997 the case file was transmitted to the District Prosecutor’s Office.", "14. By a letter of 19 September 1997 the applicant’s lawyer complained to the Regional Prosecutor’s Office of the delays in the proceedings and stated that he had been unable to obtain detailed information about the accusation and had been refused access to the case file. He also requested the removal of the district prosecutor.\nOn 25 September 1997 that request was transmitted with the case file to the Regional Prosecutor’s Office. On 1 October 1997 it was dismissed and the case file was sent back to the District Prosecutor’s Office.", "15. On 6 October 1997 the District Prosecutor’s Office decided to reclassify the proceedings as an ordinary investigation and not a summary investigation. On 8 October 1997 the case was assigned to an investigator with instructions to treat it as urgent in view of the fact that the accused was remanded in custody.", "16. Between 10 October 1997 and 8 December 1997 the investigator questioned the applicant twice, summoned three witnesses, requested information from the National Bank about the exchange rates of certain currencies, appointed an expert to assess the value of the stolen objects, and brought charges against the applicant’s sister, Ms K., who had allegedly aided the applicant in selling the stolen objects.", "17. The period after 8 December 1997 was taken up by procedural steps and efforts to clarify the exact number, weight, quality and value of certain missing pieces of jewellery, the difficulty being that there were discrepancies between the descriptions given by the applicant and by the owner.", "18. On 21 January 1998 the investigator put an additional question to the expert.", "19. On 30 January 1998 the investigator reformulated the charges against the applicant, notified him accordingly and questioned him briefly. On 5 February 1998 the investigator concluded his work on the case and transmitted the file to the District Prosecutor’s Office.", "20. On 26 February 1998 the District Prosecutor’s Office referred the case back to the investigator, instructing him to appoint another expert to assess the value of the jewellery and to amend the charges. On 23 March 1998 the investigator appointed an expert. On 27 March 1998 the investigator amended the charges against the applicant and his sister, notified them accordingly and questioned them briefly.", "21. On 23 March 1998 the investigator requested an extension of time in which to complete the investigation. The request, which was submitted through the District Prosecutor’s Office, was transmitted to the Regional Prosecutor’s Office on 30 March 1998. It appears that the case file was attached. The request was granted and the case file returned on an unspecified date at the beginning of April 1998.", "22. On 14 May 1998 an indictment was submitted to the District Court. On 27 July 1998 the District Court sent the case back to the prosecutor for further investigation.\nOn 19 August 1998 the prosecutor, considering that the value of the stolen objects was lower than that initially indicated, terminated the criminal proceedings as regards the excess and lodged a fresh indictment. The District Court listed the case for hearing on 19 December 1998. The parties have not informed the Court of any further developments.", "23. The applicant was arrested on 22 August 1997. On 23 August 1997 he was brought before an assistant investigator who charged him and decided that he should be remanded in custody. The detention order, which was made on the basis that the applicant was charged with a serious offence, stated that there existed a danger of the applicant’s absconding or committing offences, without providing reasons. It was either authorised in advance or approved on the same day by a prosecutor.\nOn 25 August 1997 the applicant appointed a lawyer to represent him.", "24. On 3 September 1997 the applicant’s lawyer prepared an appeal to the Plovdiv District Court against his client’s detention pending trial. The appeal was submitted through the District Prosecutor’s Office, as required by Article 152a § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\nThere is a dispute between the parties as to the date on which the appeal was actually submitted to the District Prosecutor’s Office. The applicant maintains that the appeal was handed over to the duty prosecutor on 3 September 1997 who, in accordance with the usual practice, transmitted it to the clerical staff without registering it himself. According to the Government, the date on which the appeal was registered, 8 September 1997, should be considered as the date of its submission, there being no proof that it had been submitted earlier.", "25. On 15 September 1997, having established that his appeal against the applicant’s detention had not arrived at the District Court, the applicant’s lawyer submitted another copy thereof directly to the District Court.", "26. On 16 September 1997 the District Prosecutor’s Office transmitted the applicant’s appeal against his detention to the District Court. On the same day a judge at the District Court listed the case for hearing on 19 September 1997. The applicant’s lawyer was summoned by telephone on the same day.", "27. The District Court held a hearing on 19 September 1997 in the presence of the applicant, his lawyer and a prosecutor.\nThe prosecutor stated that the appeal should be rejected on formal grounds as it had been submitted after the expiry of the seven-day time-limit under Article 152a § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\nThe applicant’s lawyer explained that he had been refused access to the case file, which had prevented him from preparing the appeal on time.", "28. By a decision of 19 September 1997 the District Court rejected the appeal. Noting that the appeal was dated 3 September 1997 whereas the decision to detain the applicant had been taken and notified to him on 23 August 1997, and observing that the applicant had authorised a lawyer to represent him on 25 August 1997, the court found that the appeal had been submitted after the expiry of the relevant seven-day time-limit and was inadmissible.\nThe District Court further stated that there had been “no change of circumstances” within the meaning of Article 152a § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 40 below).", "29. On an unspecified date between 2 and 11 February 1998 the applicant’s lawyer submitted through the District Prosecutor’s Office a second appeal against his client’s detention pending trial. He stated inter alia that the applicant had admitted the theft, had directed the police to the stolen objects and had been co-operative. Also, there was no danger of his absconding because he had a wife and a young child, and no danger of his committing offences because he had no previous convictions and had shown remorse for his acts. The lawyer further stated that the relevant facts had already been established and that the applicant was not responsible for the prosecution’s difficulties in determining the exact value of the jewellery, such that there was no justification for his continuing detention.", "30. The lawyer, who had been appointed by the applicant in October 1997 to replace his previous lawyer, did not indicate his address and telephone number on the appeal papers. The parties have not clarified whether this information appeared on other documents in the case file.", "31. On 11 February 1998 the appeal was transmitted to the District Court. By an order made on Friday, 13 February 1998 the Court listed the matter for hearing on Monday, 16 February 1998 at 9.00 a.m., and summoned the applicant in person and the prosecutor. The applicant was summoned through the prison authorities.", "32. On 16 February 1998 the District Court heard the applicant and the prosecutor. The applicant’s lawyer was not present. The applicant stated that he had admitted the offence, he had a seven-month old child and wanted to preserve his family. He explained that at the time of the theft he had been suffering from depression due to financial problems.\nThe District Court refused to release the applicant. It noted that the charges against him concerned a serious wilful offence punishable by a period of three to fifteen years’ imprisonment and that Article 152 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Proceedings required that persons accused of offences of that category be remanded in custody. Furthermore, the investigation was still pending and there, therefore, existed a danger of his absconding or seeking to pervert the course of justice. The fact that the applicant had made a full confession did not affect in any way the question whether he should be remanded in custody. The court further stated that the applicant’s argument concerning his family could not serve as a ground for his release and added that he should have thought about his family before committing the offence.", "33. On 1 April 1998 the applicant submitted through the District Prosecutor’s Office a third appeal against his detention pending trial. On 8 April 1998 the District Prosecutor’s Office transmitted the appeal to the District Court.", "34. The District Court heard the appeal on 13 April 1998 in the presence of the applicant and his lawyer. The prosecutor stated that the applicant should be released.\nThe District Court decided to release the applicant on bail. It noted that he had a permanent address, had not obstructed the investigation, and did not have a criminal record. The District Court further stated that the investigator had expressed the opinion that the applicant’s detention pending trial “had produced its effects”. Furthermore, there was no danger of his perverting the course of justice because the investigation had been concluded and no danger of absconding in view of his family situation.", "35. The applicant gave a recognizance and was released on an unspecified date in April 1998.", "36. The applicant produced copies of correspondence in January and March 1998 from the presidents of the Plovdiv District Court and of the Plovdiv Regional Court to the local Bar Association, apparently in reaction to complaints by lawyers of an existing practice of barring access to case files in cases concerning appeals against pre-trial detention.\nThe president of the District Court acknowledged that the complaints were well-founded and stated, inter alia, that, “[r]egrettably, District Court judges rely on the hitherto prevailing practice and do not share my opinion ...”\nThe president of the Regional Court informed the Bar Association that the matter had been discussed at length and that the judges had agreed that, contrary to the opinion of the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Regional Prosecutor’s Office in Plovdiv, there were no legal grounds for refusing access to case files in appeals against detention proceedings." ]	[ 2 ]
[ "8. The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Rome, which he had let to P.D.", "9. In a writ served on the tenant on 25 May 1991, the applicant communicated his intention to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1991 and summoned the tenant to appear before the Rome Magistrate.", "10. By a decision of 21 October 1991, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 15 November 1992.", "11. On 2 December 1992, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.", "12. On 11 January 1993, he served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 16 February 1993.", "13. On 11 February 1993, the applicant made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for himself.", "14. Between 16 February 1993 and 12 May 1998, the bailiff made thirteen attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.", "15. At the end of June 1998, the tenant vacated the premises." ]	[ 3, 9 ]
[ "9. The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Istanbul.", "10. In an indictment dated 22 December 1980, the Kırklareli Public Prosecutor charged the applicant, under Article 240 of the Criminal Code, with abuse of office by assisting and protecting smugglers.", "11. On 23 February 1982 the Tekirdağ Assize Court convicted the applicant for abuse of office and sentenced him to one year and eight months' imprisonment and to a heavy fine. The applicant appealed. On 30 June 1982 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment.", "12. The Tekirdağ Assize Court subsequently joined the applicant's case with another case of collective smuggling initiated against 13 co-accused.", "13. On 12 December 1990 the Tekirdağ Assize Court convicted the applicant and the other co-accused for collective smuggling and sentenced the applicant to one year and eight months' imprisonment. On 15 April 1992 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the Tekirdağ Assize Court.", "14. On 23 September 1992 the Head Office of the Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation rejected the applicant's petition for rectification of the Court of Cassation's judgment dated 15 April 1992.", "15. On 5 November 1992 the Tekirdağ Assize Court admitted the applicant's request that his case be re-opened and initiated new proceedings. On 16 September 1993 the Tekirdağ Assize Court convicted the applicant confirming its former judgment of 12 December 1990.", "16. The applicant appealed. On 5 October 1994 the Court of Cassation upheld the Tekirdağ Assize Court's judgment of 16 September 1993.", "17. On 7 December 1994 the Head Office of the Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation rejected the applicant's petition for rectification of its decision.", "18. On 15 February 1995 the Tekirdağ Assize Court rejected the applicant's second petition that his case be re-opened." ]	[ 9 ]
[ "9. The applicant, who was born in 1942, settled in Sweden in the second half of the 1980s. His mother tongue is Finnish.", "10. On 3 December 1991 the applicant was charged before the District Court (tingsrätten) of Gothenburg with aggravated drunken driving and driving without a driver’s licence. According to the record of the police investigation, he did not request the assistance of a public defence counsel. On 9 January 1992 the District Court, apparently of its own motion, appointed the lawyer H. as public defence counsel for the applicant.", "11. On 22 April 1992 the applicant was charged with another incident of aggravated drunken driving and driving without a driver’s licence. According to the record of the police investigation, he stated that he wished the lawyer S. to be appointed as public defence counsel.", "12. On 31 August 1992 the applicant was charged with yet another incident of aggravated drunken driving and driving without a driver’s licence. According to the record of the police investigation, he did not wish to be assisted by public defence counsel.", "13. On 22 December 1992 the applicant was charged with causing a traffic accident, leaving the scene of the accident and driving without a driver’s licence. According to the record of the police investigation, he did not wish to be assisted by public defence counsel.", "14. On 21 January 1993 the applicant was charged with possessing a knife in a public place. According to the record of the police investigation, he did not wish to be assisted by public defence counsel.", "15. On 22 January 1993 the public prosecutor applied for a detention order regarding the applicant, who was suspected of attempted aggravated assault. According to the prosecutor’s application, the applicant wished to have S. as public defence counsel. At the subsequent hearing, the lawyer P.S. replaced, with the District Court’s permission, H. as public defence counsel. According to the minutes from the hearing, the applicant requested that S., a Swedish lawyer who had previously assisted him and who knew Finnish, should be appointed as his public defence counsel, whereupon the judge informed him that he should give reasons for his request in writing. The court rejected the application for a detention order and released the applicant. Subsequently he did not submit a written request for a replacement of defence counsel.", "16. On 9 February 1993 the applicant was charged with attempted aggravated assault and possessing a knife in a public place.", "17. When scheduling the main hearing, the District Court had telephone contact with the applicant who reiterated his request to have S. appointed as his public defence counsel. The court asked the applicant to contact H. in the matter.", "18. Before the District Court the applicant apparently lodged some submissions independently of counsel H. It appears that these submissions were all in Finnish, the applicant invoking his right under the Nordic Language Convention (Nordiska språkkonventionen) to submit pleadings in his mother tongue. All the written submissions were translated into Swedish and entered into the case-file.", "19. At the main hearing on 10 May 1994 the applicant was assisted by H. as public defence counsel. Neither the minutes of the hearing nor the judgment delivered in the case contains any indication that the applicant at that time expressed a wish to have his public defence counsel replaced. In addition to counsel’s oral submissions, the applicant defended himself orally in Finnish via a court-appointed interpreter. He denied some of the offences he was charged with, confessed some and declared that he neither confessed nor denied the remainder of the charges.", "20. By a judgment of 24 May 1994 the applicant was convicted on all the above-mentioned counts and sentenced to 1 year and 2 months in prison. He was also ordered to pay 450 Swedish kronor (SEK) of the total litigation costs in the case. These included H.’s fees which amounted to SEK 10,395 for, inter alia, ten hours of work. The remainder of the costs was borne by the State.", "21. The applicant appealed against the judgment in respect of the charges he had denied. The prosecution also appealed, seeking a more severe sentence. The prosecution stated that the applicant was in great need of public counsel for his defence, although he clearly did not wish to be represented by H.", "22. On 23 August 1994, in the proceedings before the Court of Appeal (hovrätten) for Western Sweden, the applicant requested that counsel H. be replaced by S. The applicant reiterated that he had previously been assisted by S. and that he was able to communicate with him in Finnish. S. had declared that he was willing to assist the applicant as public defence counsel.", "23. On 6 September 1994 the applicant’s request was refused, the appellate court considering that sufficient reasons for counsel to be replaced had not been presented. On 30 November 1994 the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen) refused the applicant leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision.", "24. As in the proceedings before the District Court, the applicant apparently lodged some submissions in Finnish before the appellate court, all of which were translated into Swedish and entered into the case-file.", "25. The Court of Appeal heard the case on 22 May 1995. H. attended the hearing as the applicant’s counsel. There is no indication in the minutes of the hearing that the applicant opposed H.’s presence. Having heard H.’s oral pleadings, the Court of Appeal gave the applicant the floor via a court-appointed interpreter.", "26. On 6 June 1995 the Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s conviction and sentence. It also decided that the litigation costs in the appeal proceedings – including H.’s fees of SEK 3,455 – should be paid by the State.", "27. On 23 August 1995 the Supreme Court refused the applicant leave to appeal." ]	[]
[ "10. The applicant and his wife S. have three children, K., born in 1980, A., born in 1981, and J., born in 1986. S. suffers from mental problems and is on early retirement. On 28 January 1992 the Social Welfare Office of the relevant city was contacted by a private individual raising a suspicion that the children were being sexually abused by their parents. The matter was considered by the child welfare support group of the local Social Welfare Board (sosiaalilautakunta, socialnämnden) on 5 February 1992. The group included Drs H.L. and U.K. of the Central Hospital located in the same city, the school welfare officer, a nurse of the child welfare clinic, the leading psychologist of the family advice centre and the director of J.’s nursery. Since no proof of incest was found, no further action was taken.", "11. From 24 to 29 February 1992 J.’s development was monitored in the children’s ward of the Central Hospital. The examination revealed no signs of sexual abuse. On 16 March 1992 his nursery notified the social welfare authorities that he had shown a strong regression after having remained at home with his mother for one week following his hospital stay, and that similar regression had appeared whenever he had been spending longer periods at home.", "12. Between 27 and 30 April 1992 the social welfare authorities were contacted on three further occasions with regard to the family. The information received again raised a suspicion that the mother was sexually abusing the children. It was alleged that the children were watching pornographic films, that the mother was walking around at home nearly naked and that she was using sexually explicit language when talking with and about the children. The parents were allegedly also consuming large quantities of beer on a daily basis.", "13. The child welfare support group again considered the matter on 29 April, discussing for the first time the possible need to place the children in public care, and on 25 May 1992. On the same day social officials, the school welfare officer and the school nurse interviewed K. and A. together with their parents. According to the social welfare officer’s entry in the Board’s records, the daughters had confirmed the suspicions of sexual abuse, whereas the parents denied it. According to the applicant, the parents did not attend this interview. Moreover, A. had denied having been sexually abused by her parents, whereas K., when prompted to discuss her breasts, had stated that the mother had touched them in the sauna.", "14. The parents consented to having the children undergo an examination in the child psychiatric department of the Central Hospital. The children were admitted to the Central Hospital on 25 May 1992 and their examination took place between 1 and 17 June 1992. Social welfare officials were in contact with the parents on 1 and 9 June 1992, raising the possibility of taking the children into public care. The parents objected to any such measure.", "15. By emergency orders of 12 June 1992 the children were placed in public care in pursuance of section 18 of the Child Welfare Act (lastensuojelulaki, barnskyddslagen 683/1983) with a view to ensuring that the incest investigation could be completed. The Court has not been provided with copies of these orders which were apparently issued by the Chairman of the Social Welfare Board on its behalf. In the care orders of 24 June 1992 the Board referred to its decision of 12 June 1992, at paragraph 24 of the minutes, to issue such orders. The social welfare office’s case reports contain no entry of that date recording the emergency care. According to the Government, the orders of 12 June were grounded on the need “to ensure the investigations concerning incest following the closing of department B 14 of the Central Hospital of S. and in order to place the children in the children’s home of [P.]”. The Government explained that as the child psychiatric examination had not been finished by that date – the day when the children’s ward was closing due to the summer holidays of the staff – it was necessary to issue emergency care orders allowing for the examination to be completed and for a final assessment of the possible need for further measures.", "16. On 15 June 1992 the parents were interviewed at the child psychiatric department by Dr H.L. The interview was followed through a one-way mirror by the two psychologists in charge of examining the children, a doctor and a nurse from the children’s ward, the children’s nurse at the children’s home, a social worker and a nurse from the child psychiatric clinic as well as the social welfare official in charge of the case. The interview was not recorded. The parents were informed that clear evidence had been found of the sexual abuse of the girls, the parents’ heavy drinking and domestic violence also directed against the children. The parents denied the sexual abuse and did not, in the opinion of the working group, realise the gravity of the situation.", "17. In letters of 22 and 23 June 1992 M. and E. informed the Social Welfare Board of their readiness to serve as lay helpers to the family, whom they had known for a long time. M., a foster parent herself, stated that the parents and, in particular, the applicant had been taking good care of the children. E., whose daughter had been looked after by S. occasionally, stated that the family was leading a settled and normal life. The applicant’s employer attested to his steady employment and the fact that he had not been unnecessarily absent during the preceding year.", "18. On 24 June 1992 the Social Welfare Board upheld the emergency orders after having heard the parents in person. The parents had also submitted written observations in which they, inter alia, rejected the allegations of sexual abuse contained in the documents to which they had had access. They also assured the Board that they had given up consuming beer. In addition to the parents’ written observations and the submissions indicated in the preceding paragraph, the Board had before it a report by the school nurse and school welfare officer dated 29 May 1992 in which they recounted their interview with A. and K. on 25 May 1992. It had also received an opinion by the director of J.’s day care centre.", "19. The Social Welfare Board reasoned as follows:\n“1. In addition to the previously appearing difficulties relating to [the parents’] mental health and financial situation, incest has been found to have been directed against the children in the family, which seriously endangers their development and health. In addition, the parents have been consuming alcohol on an everyday basis over a long period of time. In these circumstances the children are not able to receive such care and support from their parents as their age would warrant. 2. The family has been receiving assistance for domestic chores on a regular basis, in an attempt to support their survival as a family in spite of their problems. In order to support the children’s development they have been provided with day care. Subsistence allowance has been granted whenever necessary, in spite of [the parents’] income. As the incest is linked to other serious problems it is not possible to ensure the children’s development and health in their home by affording open-care assistance. 3. The public care and the children’s placement out of their home (sijaishuolto, vård utom hemmet) will enable them to grow up in secure, stable and stimulating conditions, where they can reach, as best as possible, the stage of development typical for children of their age.”", "20. The Board ordered that the public care was to be implemented as follows:\n“The children’s contact with their parents and other persons important to the children will be supported by organising meetings in the children’s home, as need be. The [children’s] need for out-of-home care is of long-term nature. Their first placement will be in the children’s home and the possibility of providing foster care will be explored at a later stage. The children are in need of special support in the form of therapy, which can be afforded on the premises of the children’s home. The overall situation of the family will be taken care of in co-operation with the child psychiatric clinic and the mental health office.”", "21. The Board decided to reconsider the care orders under section 17 of the Child Welfare Act within thirty days from the date of the emergency care orders, in pursuance of section 18, subsection 2, of the said Act.", "22. In an opinion of 25 June 1992 Dr H.L. drew the following conclusions:\n“The investigations have shown that [K. and A.] have been sexually abused by their mother apparently for several years. The father has not been able to protect his daughters, even though aware of the abuse. The family conditions seriously endanger the psychological and physical development of all of the children (the serving of alcohol, violence). The children have to use an unreasonable part of their psychological energy on being concerned about themselves, their siblings, their parents and the family situation in general. This renders the children insecure, distressed, frightened and depressed. In my opinion the parents, even if supported by open-care assistance, are not able to secure the children’s situation sufficiently and cater to their physical and psychological needs. The burden caused by the family’s situation can already be seen in the disturbed psychological development of the children. In my opinion their physical and psychological development will be seriously endangered if they are returned to their biological parents. In this situation the biological parents ... also need psychiatric help and support. To this end they have been recommended to continue making appointments at the Mental Health Office. The practical arrangements for providing psychotherapy to the children will be considered in the autumn. For now, priority must be given to taking child welfare measures.”", "23. On 6 July 1992 the parents, heard by social workers, maintained their opposition to the public care of their children. The invitation to that meeting stated that the case-file would be available to them for consultation. On 13 July 1992 the Social Welfare Board heard the parents, who denied the allegations concerning abuse and neglect of the children. They handed in written observations as well as a copy of J.’s patient records at the local Health Centre, arguing that they had regularly used its services in matters relating to the children’s health and that nothing in the records suggested that J. had been subjected to physical violence. The parents requested that the Board hear their daughter’s teachers, domestic helpers and others familiar with conditions in the family. They further requested that lay helpers or support families be appointed for the family. They objected to a categorical statement made by one social welfare official to the effect that they would not get their children back.", "24. On the same day the Board maintained the public care on the grounds relied on in its decision of 24 June 1992. The parents appealed to the competent County Administrative Court (lääninoikeus, länsrätten) without the assistance of legal counsel. In a statement to the court M. also questioned the care orders. On 19 October 1992 the County Administrative Court, without having held an oral hearing, rejected the appeal and confirmed the public care orders with the following reasoning:\n“According to the evidence transpiring from the documentation on file, the shortcomings in the children’s care and the other conditions in their home seriously jeopardise the children’s health and development. The open-care assistance has proved to be insufficient and care outside the home has been deemed to be in the children’s best interests. The Social Welfare Board has therefore been under an obligation to place [the children] in the care of [the Board].”\nThe parents appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court (korkein hallinto-oikeus, högsta förvaltningsdomstolen), requesting an oral hearing.", "25. The care plan was reviewed at a meeting on 7 December 1992 attended by the parents. The parents and the children would continue to meet three times a week and psychotherapy was to be provided to the children starting the same month. The parents objected to foster care for the children and preferred to await the outcome of the appeal proceedings. According to the Government, meetings took place four times a week from 12 June to 20 November 1992.", "26. The care plan was again reviewed on 26 February 1993 at a meeting attended by the applicant. The children and the parents had continued to meet three times a week and the children had been on three weekend leaves to visit relatives. The possibility of placing the children in foster care was again raised but the applicant remained opposed to such care, preferring to await the outcome of the appeal. He was told that the Supreme Administrative Court would not necessarily reverse previous decisions and that the foster care needed to be planned at a sufficiently early stage. Moreover, on 17 February 1993 the children themselves had been consulted about their possible foster care.", "27. On 16 March 1993 the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the parents’ appeal without holding an oral hearing and without adducing further reasons.", "28. The care plan was again reviewed on 5 April 1993 in the presence of the parents. They were told a decision now had to be made as to whether the children should remain in the children’s home or be placed in a foster family. When consulted by a social welfare official the children had preferred to be placed in a foster family, “if they could not return home”. The applicant stated he would pursue his attempts to have them returned home. Meanwhile, they should stay in the children’s home. The applicant was told that even if the children were placed in a foster family, they would continue to see their biological parents, “although naturally not as frequently”. The meeting was adjourned at the applicant’s request until 13 April 1993. At that meeting the parents were informed that a foster family had already been found and that the children had repeated their willingness to move there, “since their return to their [original] home was not possible”. The parents were informed that the Social Welfare Board would receive a proposal for transferring the children into the foster family, since such care was in many respects a better alternative than care in an institution, considering that the public care was going to continue and given the children’s best interests.", "29. At a further meeting on 31 May 1993 the parents were informed that between 1 July 1993, when the children would be transferred to the foster family, and October-November 1993 they would not be able to meet with the children. Subsequently, four meetings a year would be organised. According to the care plan of 1 June 1993, the temporary absence of meetings was aimed at ensuring a peaceful implementation of their transfer and adaptation to their new family, school and nursery. The care plan was to be reviewed at the end of 1994 or earlier, if necessary.", "30. On 16 June 1993 the Social Welfare Board decided to transfer the children into foster care and adopted the updated care plan. It noted that the family conditions had been deemed seriously to endanger the children’s development and, as the matter concerned incest, their future health and development could only be secured by long-term foster care. Placing them in a foster family was thus in their best interests. The Board had regard to a written statement by the director of the children’s home and a joint statement by the leading social welfare official, the aforesaid director and the children’s individual nurses.", "31. The applicant appealed, seeking to have the public care revoked or, in the alternative, to have meetings organised more frequently and to have the care plan reviewed at the latest in December 1993. On 12 October 1993 the County Administrative Court declined to examine the merits of the appeal, as it was not competent to examine, in the first instance, the request for termination of the care. The adoption of the care plan had not comprised any binding decision on the applicant’s right to see his children. Any access restriction had to be ordered separately by the Social Welfare Board pursuant to section 25 of the Child Welfare Act. The expected time-limit for reviewing the care plan had the character of a guideline, since under the law such a plan was to be reviewed whenever necessary. The County Administrative Court relied on sections 11, 20, 24 and 25 of the Child Welfare Act and on section 4 of the Child Welfare Decree. The applicant did not appeal further to the Supreme Administrative Court in respect of the decision to transfer the children into foster care.", "32. On 1 November 1993 the applicant requested that the public care be terminated. On 19 January 1994 the Social Welfare Board refused the request. It found that continued public care was in the best interests of the children, considering “the difficulties relating to the mental health and the use of alcohol as well as the incest directed against the children”, which had formed the background to their placement in public care. In a meeting with the leading social welfare official on 8 December 1993 and in their written statements of the same day K. and A. had stated their wish to remain in the foster family. J. had not been heard due to his young age. The Board also had regard to Dr H.L.’s opinion of 25 June 1992. Moreover, in a written statement of 30 December 1993 two teachers of J.’s nursery had attested to his gain of self-confidence. The foster parents noted that the children were adapting to the foster family. It was therefore in the children’s best interests to remain there. The Board also had regard to a one-page background summary by leading social worker P.V.", "33. In his appeal the applicant stated, inter alia, that he would move away from his wife and request sole custody of the children. In its opinion to the County Administrative Court the Social Welfare Board maintained its view that the biological parents’ living situation had not changed significantly. Terminating the public care would therefore not be in accordance with the children’s best interests.", "34. In an entry into the case-notes on 18 April 1994 social worker P.V. wrote that the divorce proposed by the applicant would change nothing, as the children had been placed in long-term care, “up to their adulthood, in my opinion”.", "35. On 6 June 1994 the County Administrative Court rejected the appeal with the following reasoning:\n“According to the evidence transpiring from the documentation on file, the County Administrative Court considers that the need for public care outside the [children’s original] home still exists. The Social Welfare Board has therefore been under an obligation to maintain the public care of the children.”", "36. On 30 November 1994 the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the applicant’s further appeal without adducing further reasons.", "37. According to the care plan adopted on 28 February 1997 the biological parents had not, at a meeting on 17 January 1997, expressed any wish to meet the children more frequently. On 10 April 1997 the leading social welfare official invited the parents to clarify their wishes in respect of meetings with the children. The parents, now represented by counsel, requested that unsupervised meetings with their children be allowed in their home every weekend during one day. They stressed that the access restrictions should be based on the circumstances at that time and not on the events and allegations described in Dr H.L.’s opinion of 1992. K. and A. wished to have at least six meetings year, whereas J. and the foster parents objected to any increase.", "38. On 6 May 1997 the local Basic Welfare Board (perusturvalautakunta, grundtrygghetsnämnden; previously the Social Welfare Board) maintained the access restriction but allowed six supervised visits a year. The restriction was to remain in force until the respective children had turned 18, i.e. until 8 May 1998, 30 May 1999 and 14 August 2004. The Board recalled the incest as established in Dr H.L.’s opinion of 1992 and also had regard to the children’s own opinions.", "39. The parents’ appeal was rejected by the County Administrative Court on 17 October 1997, except with regard to the access restriction applicable to J., which was ordered to remain in force only until 30 May 1999. The parents were refused cost-free proceedings, as domestic law did not provide for such an award in respect of access restrictions.", "40. On 8 May 1998 K. reached the age of majority and her public care ceased pursuant to section 20 of the Child Welfare Act.", "41. According to the care plan adopted on 14 January 1999, A. and J. and the biological parents would be allowed to meet three times up to the end of May 1999.", "42. According to the care plan adopted on 7 May 1999, J. and his biological parents would be allowed to meet twice a month up to the end of 1999. As from the end of August 1999 the meetings would no longer be supervised.", "43. On 30 May 1999 A. reached the age of majority and her public care ceased.", "44. According to the care plan adopted on 31 January 2000, J. and his biological parents would be meeting once a month. The plan was preceded by several consultations with the biological and foster parents. The applicant had requested that meetings be allowed with the same frequency and that every other meeting take place over a weekend in the home of the biological parents, whereas J. had favoured one meeting a month involving no overnight stay.", "45. On 28 February 2000 the biological parents again requested the Social Welfare Board to terminate J.’s public care. On 13 March 2000 S. informed a social welfare official that she was no longer in therapy. According to a case entry, she was told that J. now needed to undergo a child psychiatric examination. The request for a termination of J.’s care was apparently refused at a later date.", "46. No police investigation was conducted into the suspected incest or sexual abuse of the applicant’s children, and no request to that end was made by the social welfare authority.", "47. In support of their observations to the Court the Government have adduced extracts from the Mental Health Office’s patient records concerning the applicant and his wife. The extracts contain social welfare official P.-N.J.’s summaries of their statements during some thirty visits which they paid to the Office, either together or separately, between 17 June 1992 and 19 August 1996. One summary is written by R.L., a specialised medical doctor. The summaries also contain an evaluation of certain statements as well as of the parents’ conditions both prior to and after the taking into care of their children.", "48. The material submitted by the Government also feature extracts from A.’s patient records at the Central Hospital, dated in June and September 1993 and containing statements by her therapist P.L.", "49. The Government have also relied on notes drawn up in November 1997 by a nurse of the children’s home after she had supervised a meeting between the children and their biological parents.", "50. The Government have furthermore produced a report by Dr H.L. on 4 September 1996 according to which the out-of-home placement of the children had been successful and they were no longer in need of therapy. The circumstances were nevertheless not such as to support a termination of the public care.", "51. In a further report dated 25 October 2000 Dr T.S., a specialist in child psychiatry at the Central Hospital of S., concludes however, inter alia, that J.’s foster parents are able to see his need for therapy.", "52. Finally, the Government have also adduced information obtained from the municipal legal aid office and relating to the applicant’s contacts with that office in 1994." ]	[ 4 ]
[ "8. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Warsaw, Poland.", "9. On 18 May 1992 the applicant filed with the Warsaw District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) an action in which he sought the eviction of a tenant from an apartment situated in a house belonging to him. In addition, the applicant requested that the tenant pay overdue rent and be also evicted from the basement of the building.", "10. Having held two hearings, on 9 October 1992 and 5 February 1993, the District Court delivered its judgment on 11 February 1993. It ruled that the tenant should pay the overdue rent and be evicted from the basement, but dismissed the action for eviction from the apartment.", "11. The applicant and the defendant appealed against that judgment. A hearing scheduled for 19 October 1993 was adjourned because of an illness of the judge rapporteur.", "12. On 26 November 1993 the Warsaw Regional Court gave judgment and remitted the case for re-examination.", "13. From 26 November 1993 to 27 November 1995 no hearing was held. From 27 November 1995 to 3 June 1998 the Warsaw District Court scheduled nineteen hearings, two of which were adjourned.", "14. On 3 and 17 June 1998 respectively the court adjourned the delivery of its judgment. On 1 July 1998 the court decided to re-open the examination of the case and ordered an expert opinion.", "15. On 6 July 1998 the court rejected the applicant’s complaint against its decision of 17 June 1998.", "16. On 25 January 1999 a summons for a hearing was served on the applicant, but, as the hearing was supposed to take place on 29 January 1999, he requested that it be rescheduled.", "17. On 23 June 1999 the court adjourned the delivery of its judgment until 7 July 1999. On 2 August 1999 the court delivered a partial judgment (wyrok częściowy). It ordered the eviction of the defendant from the basement and dismissed the claim concerning the eviction from the apartment.", "18. On 23 and 26 November 1999 respectively the applicant and the defendant lodged their appeals.", "19. On 21 June 2000 the applicant informed the District Court that the defendant had died. He also requested that the defendant’s widow join the proceedings as a defendant.", "20. On 20 October 2000 the Regional Court held a hearing. No parties appeared. The court stayed the proceedings due to the defendant’s death.", "21. On 3 November 2000 the Regional Court ordered the applicant to submit information about all legal successors of the deceased defendant. On 14 November 2000 the applicant submitted the information.", "22. On 5 December 2000 the Regional Court held a hearing and resumed the proceedings. The court adjourned the hearing until 28 December 2000 at the request of the defendant’s widow.", "23. On 28 December 2000 the Regional Court held a hearing and set aside the contested partial judgment of the District Court. It discontinued the proceedings in respect of the eviction of the defendant due to his death. It also considered that the proceedings in respect of the applicant’s claim for overdue rent could be continued with the participation of the heirs of the defendant.", "24. The decision of the Regional Court was served on the applicant on 12 March 2001.", "25. On 19 March 2001 the applicant requested the District Court that the proceedings be reopened.", "26. It appears that the proceedings are pending before the District Court in respect of the claim for overdue rent." ]	[ 3 ]
[ "8. The applicant was born in 1930 and lives in Warsaw.", "9. The applicant, a professional army officer, took an early retirement in 1965.", "10. On 13 June 1994 the applicant filed a civil action against the Ministry of National Defence, claiming that he had been deprived of adequate medical treatment, to which he was entitled as a retired army officer. He maintained that numerous errors committed by military dentists and their incompetence had led to irreversible bodily harm and damage to his health.", "11. On 21 July 1994, on the Warsaw Regional Court’s order, the applicant particularised his claim. He sought a finding of the defendant’s liability, a sum of 1 PLN as compensation, and reimbursement of legal costs. On 3 August 1994 the Warsaw Regional Court gave a decision stating its lack of jurisdiction and forwarded the case to the Warsaw District Court.", "12. On 8 August 1994 the applicant extended his claim and alleged that his heart illness had been caused by the defendant ministry. On 5 September 1994 the applicant submitted, on the court’s order, a statement of his financial and family situation. On 21 September 1994 the court exempted the applicant from the court fees.", "13. On 22 September, 12 and 27 October 1994, the applicant filed his further objections as to the work and conduct of the dentists concerned. On 5 December 1994 the Ministry of National Defence sent copies of the applicant’s statement of claim to the Central Clinical Hospital at the Warsaw Medical Academy and to the court. The Ministry also declared that the hospital had been authorised to represent the State Treasury in the case. On 20 December 1994 the defendant’s counsel filed a reply to the applicant’s statement of claim with the court and requested it to summon three dentists as witnesses.", "14. The applicant submitted his further pleadings on 21 November, 27 December 1994 and 21 February 1995. The hearing scheduled for 28 February had to be adjourned due to illness of the judge rapporteur. The applicant’s further pleadings were lodged with the court on 21 March, 11 and 24 April, 7 and 31 May, 16 and 30 June, 20 July, and 1, 7 and 21 August 1995. On 28 August 1995 the court held a hearing. It heard the applicant and one witness. Subsequently the applicant filed his pleadings on 21 September, 9 and 23 October 1995.", "15. The second hearing was held by the court on 30 October 1995. The court interviewed one witness, a dentist who had treated the applicant in the defendant ministry polyclinic. The other witness, summoned for that date, failed to appear. The court accordingly adjourned the hearing.", "16. The applicant filed his pleadings on 24 November and 19 December 1995. The subsequent hearing was fixed for 21 December 1995. It had to be adjourned as the defendant’s lawyer and the witness failed to comply with the summons. The applicant was told by the judge that the next hearing would be held on 15 February 1996, at 9.15 a.m.", "17. On 15 February 1996 the applicant appeared before the court an hour after the hearing had begun. He complained to the President of the Warsaw District Court that he had not been properly informed about the time fixed for the hearing. He further complained that, after having waited several years for the trial, he had been denied the opportunity of questioning witnesses and had not been allowed to examine the minutes of the hearing. The President of the District Court was of the view that the applicant’s complaint was unfounded, explaining that the applicant himself bore the blame for having arrived late for the hearing.", "18. On the same day the court decided to appoint professor J.P. as an expert. The applicant filed his further pleadings on 1 January, 12 and 19 February, 10 and 22 April 1996. In May 1996 the expert opinion reached the court. The applicant filed his pleadings and motions, inter alia as to the expert opinion, on 15 May, 19 and 26 July, 6, 19, 20 and 26 August 1996. On 10 September 1996 the defendant’s lawyer submitted her observations as to the expert opinion.", "19. The applicant submitted his new pleadings and various motions on 19 September, 11 December 1996, 11 February, 4, 10, 12 and 24 March, 7, 17 and 21 April, 12 May, 18 and 20 August 1997. On 21 August 1997 the applicant submitted two sets of questions to the expert, altogether fifty questions. He submitted further pleadings on 4 November 1997, and 2 and 16 February 1998.", "20. In 1996 and 1997 hearings were scheduled by the Warsaw District Court on the following dates: 23 September 1996, 12 November 1996, 17 December 1996, 14 January 1997, 7 March 1997, 17 June 1997 and on two other unspecified dates. On 21 August 1997 the Warsaw District Court stated its lack of jurisdiction to entertain the case and the case was subsequently transferred to the Warsaw Regional Court. As on each occasion the court expert, professor J.P., failed to attend, the hearings were adjourned.", "21. On 18 February 1998 the Warsaw Regional Court sent letters to J.P.’s two addresses - to the hospital and to his home address - in order to set a date for the hearing. The court’s secretary also telephoned to the hospital to inform the expert about the need to achieve some progress in the proceedings, and to reiterate that a date had to be fixed so that he could finally attend the hearing. The expert informed the court that he could be present on 8, 9 and 14 July 1998, at 9 a.m.", "22. On 3, 12, 18, 30 March, 20 April and 29 June 1998 the applicant filed his further pleadings with the Regional Court. In a letter of 31 March 1998, in reply to the applicant’s earlier letter of complaint to the Ministry of Justice of 19 February 1998 about the lack of progress in the proceedings, the President of the Warsaw Regional Court admitted that the proceedings were too slow, but in his opinion the court could not be blamed for it, since the delay had mainly been caused by the persistent failure of the expert J.P. to attend hearings.", "23. During the hearing held on 14 July 1998, the court took the oral evidence of the expert J.P. On 15 July 1998 the applicant filed a list of his further claims with the court. On 17 July 1998 at a session held in camera the court decided that additional expert opinions should be prepared within thirty days. The court subsequently made a few attempts to appoint experts, but they refused to prepare their opinions for various reasons. The experts’ refusals were submitted to the court on 31 August, 20 October, 3 and 28 December 1998. On 31 July 1998 the Warsaw Regional Court answered the applicant’s question of 27 July 1998 concerning the decision of 17 July 1998 to take additional evidence.", "24. The applicant filed his new pleadings with the court on 24 September, 29 October 1998, 15 January and 19 February 1999. On 5 March 1999 the court sent to the applicant a list of experts practising in other towns and asked him if he would agree to visit one of them at his own expense. On 11 March 1999 the applicant informed the court that he had chosen the expert A.K.S. living in Kraków. The applicant filed his new pleadings on 12,13 May and 8 June 1999.", "25. On 9 June 1999 the court requested A.K.S. to submit her report. On 30 June 1999 the expert opinion prepared by professor A.K.S. was submitted to the court. On 31 June 1999 the expert explained that she had not been able to complete her opinion earlier due to serious family problems. She also informed the court that she had summoned the applicant for 22 June 1999, at 10 a.m. He had not reported for the examination and answered that he could only do so in the afternoon. Following that, the applicant formulated a list of questions addressed to the expert and submitted that list to the court. On 18 August, 2 and 27 September 1999, 6 and 28 April 2000 the applicant lodged his further pleadings with the court.", "26. On 11 May 2000 the defendant’s lawyer submitted her observations on the merits of the case and informed the court that the Ministry of National Defence had to be summoned as a party to the proceedings.", "27. On 17 May 2000 the President of the Warsaw Regional Court, in reply to the applicant’s letter of 30 March 2000 addressed to the Ministry of Justice, informed him once again that difficulties in hearing the evidence, as well as other reasons beyond the court’s control, had contributed to the excessive length of proceedings. It was true that no hearings had been held since 30 June 1999, but this was due to the fact that it was of primary importance for the court to establish which institution had assumed the obligations of the Central Clinical Hospital at the Warsaw Medical Academy after the reforms of the public system of health services, which had become effective from 1 January 1999.", "28. The applicant countered these arguments in two letters of complaint written to the Ministry of Justice of 22 and 25 May 2000. He complained inter alia that the expert had not managed to take a stand on a number of questions he had asked.", "29. On 22 May 2000 the court summoned the Ministry of National Defence as a party to the proceedings and on the same date it informed the hospital about it. On 13 June 2000 the Ministry of Justice informed the applicant that the President of the Warsaw Regional Court in his letter of 17 May 2000 had given convincing grounds as to why the proceedings were prolonged, but that the case would thereafter be placed under its administrative supervision in order to expedite the proceedings.", "30. On 3 July 2000 the applicant filed a letter with the Chancellor of the Jagiellonian University in Kraków contesting the expert opinion of 30 June 1999. On 3 October 2000 the university informed the court that the expert A.K.S. had died on 23 September 2000.", "31. On 14 September 2000 the applicant sent a letter of complaint to the Ministry of Justice, stating that he was not satisfied with the vague explanations he had obtained as to the length of the proceedings.", "32. On 5 October 2000 the defendant filed its reply to the applicant’s statement of claim. On 9 October 2000 the university answered the applicant’s letter of 3 July 2000 and informed him that professor A.K.S. had been an expert appointed in the case and the university could not interfere with her opinion. On 25 September 2000 the defendant Ministry’s lawyer submitted its reply to the statement of claim.", "33. On 18 October 2000 the court held a hearing in the case. The applicant contested the opinion prepared by A.K.S. On 27 October 2000 the court informed the Mazowsze Governor that he would be summoned as a co-defendant in the case.", "34. On 13 November 2000 the applicant was informed by the Complaints Department in the Ministry that the Warsaw Regional Court had been notified of the expert’s death and that a new expert had been appointed. The proceedings would be resumed as soon as the appropriate expert opinion was submitted.", "35. On 28 November 2000 a new expert opinion was ordered by the court. On 30 November 2000 the representative of the Mazowsze Governor stated that it was the Minister of National Defence who should be summoned as a defendant in the case. On 4, 22 and 27 December 2000 the applicant submitted his further pleadings. On 11 December 2000 the court received a letter from expert M.Z., refusing to prepare his opinion because of his heavy workload. On 14 December 2000 the expert refused the reiterated request of the court.", "36. The applicant filed his new pleadings on 23 and 30 January, 12 February, 16 and 21 March and 11 April 2001. On 24 April 2001 the court ordered expert J.P. to prepare his opinion in the case. On 30 May 2001 the expert refused to do so. The court ordered the Dental Institute of the Warsaw Medical Academy to appoint an expert in order to prepare an opinion. The expert from the institute likewise refused to prepare a report and stated that the first opinion prepared by the expert J.P. had been a professional and conclusive one. The applicant submitted his further pleadings to the court on 13 September, 2, 8 and 24 October 2001.", "37. On 1 October 2001 the Ministry of Justice answered the applicant’s letters and informed him that the length of proceedings in the present case was caused by the difficulties in obtaining an expert opinion. Answering the subsequent complaint of the applicant, the Ministry informed him that the independent court was considering the case and that no measures could be taken by the Ministry to interfere with the course of the proceedings. On 26 November 2001 the applicant submitted further pleadings to the court.", "38. The court held a hearing on 13 December 2001. On 19 December 2001 it gave judgment and dismissed the applicant’s claim. On 20 December 2001 the applicant requested to be served with the written grounds of the judgment. He was served with these on an unspecified date and in June 2002 he lodged an appeal against the first-instance judgment.", "39. The proceedings are pending." ]	[ 3 ]
[ "8. The applicant, Olubukunola Obasa, is a United Kingdom national, who was born in 1961 and lives in Wellingborough.", "9. The applicant commenced employment as a social worker with the London Borough of Islington (“the Council”) on 4 September 1989. In April 1991, she submitted a formal complaint to the Council's principal Equal Opportunities Officers alleging inter alia harassment and refusal of a promotion on grounds of race. She was interviewed by investigating officers in October 1991.", "10. On 9 December 1991, the applicant presented an originating application to the Employment Tribunal alleging that she had been discriminated against as a black woman with a disability, inter alia, due to the decision to give a promotion to another employee instead of herself, the failure to transfer her to another post and the failure to assign her to a higher grade by giving due recognition to her professional qualifications. In her application, she relied on events going back to the commencement of her employment in 1989.", "11. On 23 January 1992, one of the Council's investigating officers informed the applicant that her complaints had been found to be unsubstantiated. The applicant sought to appeal the rejection of her complaints pursuant to the Council's internal grievance procedure.", "12. The Employment Tribunal held a hearing on 9 June 1992, at which the parties agreed that under section 68(1) of the Race Relations Act 1976, which required that complaints be presented within three months of the act complained of, the applicant could not rely upon events taking place before September 1990. Determination of the merits was considered to require detailed evidence and the matter was reserved for a further hearing.", "13. On 24 June 1992, the Council made a request for further and better particulars of the originating application. The applicant replied on 24 November 1992.", "14. While in the ordinary course of events the hearing on the merits would have been listed for hearing in the first half of 1993, the Council applied to the Employment Tribunal for the merits hearing to be postponed, on the grounds that it would be preferable to await the outcome of the applicant's internal appeal. The matter was adjourned, the applicant making no objection to this adjournment.", "15. The applicant's internal appeal was heard by the Council on 28 April and 4 May 1993. By letter dated 13 May 1993, she was informed that her appeal had been rejected. However, with regard to the applicant's transfer request, the Council committee was concerned at the lack of evidence that any serious consideration was given to this matter and expressed the view that steps should be taken to find the applicant alternative work and to expedite her transfer. Pursuant to this decision, instructions were given to investigate options for a transfer. An offer of transfer was made to the applicant on 8 February 1994.", "16. Following the determination of the internal appeal, the Tribunal resumed consideration of the applicant's case, listing the case for a merits hearing on 11-13 May 1994. The case lasted longer than anticipated by the parties and it was adjourned and re-listed. The Council had indicated to the Tribunal on 13 May that it would be possible to reach a negotiated settlement. In the event a settlement was not reached and the Tribunal re-convened on 7 November 1994 for a further four days.", "17. On 20 December 1994, the Tribunal issued its decision, finding that there had been discrimination by her employer in a number of procedural aspects.", "18. The proceedings were adjourned for the parties to reach agreement as to the damages payable. The Council had already met with the applicant's trade union representatives on 6 December 1994. Negotiations culminated in a meeting of 24 March 1995, in which the Council's legal representatives agreed a settlement figure with the applicant subject to the approval of the elected members of the Council. On 3 April 1995, the Council informed the applicant that their members had rejected their officers' recommendations and that no settlement was possible on the terms discussed. The applicant broke off the negotiations entirely the next day.", "19. The Tribunal proposed listing the case in June 1995 but as these dates were not convenient for the Council and it appears that the applicant was not available in June 1995 the date was fixed for 11 September 1995. After a remedies hearing on that date, the Tribunal made the applicant an award of 24,952.51 pounds sterling (GBP), which decision issued on 9 October 1995.", "20. The Council appealed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal (“EAT”). Its notice of appeal had been lodged on 27 January 1995, as it was required to be lodged within 42 days of the merits decision.", "21. On 3 October 1995, an ex parte preliminary hearing was held by the EAT to determine whether the appeal had reasonable prospects of success. It ordered that the appeal should proceed to a full hearing and required the Employment Tribunal's notes of evidence to be disclosed. These consisted of some 50 pages. After their transcription, the EAT sent out a listing notice on 11 July 1996, giving a hearing date of 17 September 1996.", "22. After the hearing, the EAT delivered judgment on 28 October 1996. It quashed the findings of discrimination.", "23. On 12 December 1996, the applicant filed an application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. Permission was granted by the Court of Appeal on 3 February 1997. The applicant lodged her notice of appeal on 11 February 1997. The bundles of documents were filed on 21 May 1997.", "24. After a hearing, on 16 February 1998 at which the applicant was represented, the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant's appeal.", "25. The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal to the House of Lords on 19 March 1998.", "26. On 27 March 1998, the applicant sought leave to appeal to the House of Lords. In her petition, she requested exemption under House of Lords Standing Order XIII from the lodgement fee as she was no longer in receipt of legal aid. In July 1998, the Appeal Committee of the House of Lords decided to waive the fee. The petition was then formally lodged in July 1998. The applicant supplied the transcripts necessary for the application on 30 November 1998. The House of Lords refused leave on 26 April 1999." ]	[ 3 ]
[ "9. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Warsaw.\nThe facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.", "10. On 1 May 1983 the applicant, following clashes with the police during anticommunist demonstrations, was put by the police in their van and beaten. He was seriously injured. On 17 May 1983 he was discharged from hospital. A brain injury, post-traumatic epilepsy and permanent brain damage were diagnosed. Since then he has remained under permanent care in a psychiatric clinic.", "11. By a judgment of 24 June 1986, the Warsaw Regional Court granted the applicant compensation for damage to his health and held that a monthly supplementary pension be paid by the police – the State Treasury. The court observed that the applicant had lost the capacity to work and was disabled in the so-called second degree (an intermediate degree of disability).", "12. On 11 April 1990 the applicant was granted the first degree status of disability (serious disability).", "13. In 1990 the monthly supplementary pension was increased to 100 PLN as a result of a settlement between the parties.", "14. On 27 February 1993 the applicant's father lodged a claim with the Warsaw Regional Court, in which he requested an increase in his son's monthly pension. On 8 March 1993 the Warsaw Regional Court remitted the case to the Warsaw District Court. Subsequently, six hearings were held in the case. On 15 September 1993 the court held a hearing. The defendant's lawyer asked for an adjournment in order to reach a friendly settlement.", "15. On 12 November 1993 the court held a hearing. The applicant increased the amount of the claim. The court decided to request certain information from the applicant's former employer. On 19 November 1993 the court obtained the requested information.", "16. On 23 November 1993 the court held a hearing. The applicant increased the amount of the claim. The court decided to request the psychiatric clinic for some additional information on the applicant's health. On 13 December 1993 the applicant's lawyer specified the claim. He requested the court to appoint an expert to give a report on the applicant's health.", "17. On 17 December 1993 the next hearing was held. It was decided to request the psychiatric clinic to expedite the preparation of the requested documents.", "18. On 27 January 1994 the court held its next hearing and interviewed witnesses. The applicant further specified the claim.", "19. On 6 May 1994 a hearing was held. The defendant contested the amount of the applicant's claim. The court decided to request the applicant's former employer to submit certain information. On 24 May 1994 the applicant increased his claim. Taking into account the value of the claim, on 25 May 1994 the applicant requested the court to remit the case to the Regional Court. On 23 June 1994 the Warsaw District Court remitted the case to the Warsaw Regional Court, as the latter had become competent following the increase of the applicant's claim. Subsequently, on 25 November 1994 and 21 December 1994 the defendant and the applicant submitted pleadings to the court.", "20. In January 1995 the applicant requested the court not to schedule any hearings in the period from 1 until 18 March 1995. In February 1995 the applicant requested the court not to schedule any hearings from 1 until 15 April 1995. On 19 April 1995 the applicant increased the claim.", "21. On 28 April 1995 the parties asked for an adjournment in order to reach an out-of-court settlement. Their negotiations subsequently failed. By pleadings of 18 May, 20 June, 20 July, 21 August, 22 September, 10 October and 21 November 1995 the applicant further specified his claim. On 14 November 1995 the court requested the applicant's former employer to submit certain documents. The documents were submitted on 21 November 1995.", "22. On 1 December 1995 the hearing was adjourned to give the applicant two weeks to submit his comments on the documents received by the court on 21 November. On 1 December 1995, 2 January 1996 and 22 January 1996 the applicant specified his claim.\nOn 23 February 1996 the applicant complained to the Supreme Court about the length of the proceedings. On 15 April 1996 he was informed that the case had been placed under the administrative supervision of the President of the Warsaw Regional Court.", "23. On 9 September 1996 the applicant lodged a motion with the Warsaw Regional Court challenging the presiding judge for an alleged lack of impartiality. This motion was dismissed on 18 September 1996.", "24. On 29 January 1997 the court received requested information from the applicant's former employer. On 5 February 1997 the expert submitted a report ordered by the court in November 1996. On 13 February 1997 the applicant's lawyer requested the court not to schedule any hearings in March 1997.", "25. On 17 February 1997 the court requested the parties to submit their comments on the expert report within the fourteen days' time-limit. On 26 February 1997 the defendant informed the court that he agreed with the conclusions of the report. On 11 March 1997 the court once more requested the applicant to submit his comments. Apparently, further questions were put to the expert. On 7 November 1997 the expert submitted to the court the supplementary report. On 1 December 1997 the applicant lodged his objections against the report.", "26. On 9 January 1998 the court held a hearing. The applicant requested the court to appoint a new expert. He once more challenged the expert opinion. The court refused and closed the hearings in the case.", "27. On 12 January 1998 the applicant increased and modified his claim to a very significant extent.", "28. On 16 January 1998 the court accordingly re-opened the proceedings. The court also gave an interlocutory decision that a certain sum be paid monthly to the applicant in order to secure his claim.", "29. On 4 March 1998 the applicant submitted motions as to the evidence to be taken. On 24 March 1998 the applicant submitted a new proposal for calculating the amount of the pension. On 8 April the defendant opposed that new proposal. On 24 July 1998 the applicant increased his claim.", "30. On 5 August 1998 the court held a hearing.", "31. By a judgment of 14 August 1998 the applicant's claim was partly dismissed and partly allowed. The judgment was served on the applicant three months later. The applicant appealed. By an order of 2 December 1998, he was requested to submit certain copies of documents for his appeal. This order was left by the postman at the applicant's door. Later, the post office returned it to the court marked “apartment closed”.", "32. On 29 December 1998 the Warsaw Regional Court rejected the applicant' s appeal for failure to comply with its order of 2 December 1998. On 5 January 1999 the applicant complained to the Warsaw Appeal Court. On 11 January 1999 the Warsaw Court of Appeal remitted the case to the Warsaw Regional Court and ordered the court to clarify whether the applicant wished to challenge the decision of 29 December 1998, or to lodge a request in order to reinstate the time-limit for submitting the requested documents.", "33. On 14 January 1999 the applicant appealed against the decision of 29 December 1998.", "34. On 26 January 1999 the Warsaw Regional Court ordered the applicant to pay a court fee of 50 PLN for the procedural appeal, which the applicant did on the next day.", "35. On 5 February 1999 the applicant received an order dated 2 February 1999 summoning him to pay 50 PLN in court fees. The applicant requested a meeting with the President of the Civil Section on 8 February 1999 in order to clarify what the court fee was for. The meeting did not take place as the President was absent on the date which had been fixed. The President apologised in a letter of 24 February 1999.", "36. On 12 February and 29 March 1999 the applicant specified his claim.", "37. By a decision of 29 April 1999, the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal against the decision of 29 December 1998 and rejected his appeal on the merits of the case for failure to comply with the procedural requirements. The court informed the applicant that he could lodge a request to reinstate the time-limit for submitting the documents requested by the court.", "38. On 16 June 1999 the applicant requested the court to appoint a lawyer under the legal aid scheme with a view to lodging a cassation appeal against the decision of 29 April 1999. He lodged also a “personal” cassation appeal. On 22 June 1999 the Warsaw Court of Appeal allowed this request, but the lawyer was not appointed until 13 August 1999.", "39. In the meantime, on 5 August 1999 the Court of Appeal rejected the cassation appeal against the decision of 29 December 1998 for not having been presented by a lawyer as required by law.\nOn 20 August 1999 the applicant's lawyer lodged an appeal against the decision of 5 August 1999 with the Supreme Court in order to reinstate the time-limit for lodging the cassation appeal. The cassation appeal itself was submitted to the Supreme Court on 30 August 1999.", "40. By a decision of 7 December 1999, the Supreme Court quashed the decision of 5 August 1999 for having been reached without due consideration to the applicant's pending legal aid application.", "41. On 31 January, 4 and 15 May 2000 the applicant specified the claim.", "42. On 25 May 2000 the Warsaw Court of Appeal reinstated the time-limit for lodging the cassation appeal against the procedural decisions of 29 December 1998 and of 29 April 1999.", "43. On 3 October 2000 the Supreme Court quashed the decisions of 29 December 1998 and 29 April 1999 for procedural defects.", "44. On 12 January 2001 the applicant increased his claim.", "45. By a letter of 16 February 2001, the Warsaw Court of Appeal informed the applicant that the next hearing in the appellate proceedings would be held on 16 March 2001.", "46. On 29 March 2001 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal against the judgment of 14 August 1998. The judgment was served on the applicant on 8 June 2001.", "47. On 2 July 2001 the applicant's lawyer lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court. On 20 December 2001 the court rejected the cassation appeal, considering that it had not been shown that arguable grounds existed which would justify the examination of the appeal." ]	[ 3 ]
[ "8. On 19 March 1993 the applicant challenged the lawfulness of his dismissal from a job and claimed compensation before the Poprad District Court.", "9. On 15 April 1993 the District Court suspended the proceedings. The decision stated that on 5 February 1993 the applicant had been accused of an offence and that the criminal court’s decision was relevant when determining the applicant’s above civil action.", "10. On 3 May 1993 the applicant appealed against the decision to suspend the proceedings. On 31 May 1993 the case file was submitted to the Košice Regional Court for a decision on the applicant’s appeal. On 24 August 1993 the Regional Court returned the case file to the District Court. The Regional Court qualified the applicant’s submissions as a procedural motion and held that it was to be decided upon by the District Court.", "11. On 27 August 1993 the Poprad District Court invited the applicant to submit further information as regards his submission of 3 May 1993. The applicant did not reply and on 29 November 1993 the District Court again submitted the case file to the Košice Regional Court. On 23 September 1994 the Košice Regional Court returned the case to the District Court and instructed the latter to decide on the applicant’s request.", "12. On 10 October 1994 the District Court scheduled a hearing for 16 November 1994. On 2 November 1994 the applicant requested that the case be adjourned until the delivery of a decision on his petition for a complaint in the interest in the law to be lodged on his behalf in the criminal proceedings.", "13. On 9 January 1995, 2 June 1995, 2 October 1995 and on 4 January 1996 the Poprad District Court inquired whether a decision had been delivered on the above extraordinary remedy in the criminal proceedings. On 20 January 1995, 12 June 1995, 5 October 1995 and on 11 January 1996 respectively the applicant replied that the Ministry of Justice had not yet decided on his petition.", "14. On 5 March 1996 the criminal file concerning the applicant’s case was returned to the Poprad District Court. On 2 April 1996 the applicant requested the District Court to take further evidence in the proceedings concerning his action.", "15. On 17 April 1996 the Poprad District Court dismissed the action. The applicant appealed on 27 May and on 4 June 1996. On 28 June 1996 the case file was submitted to the Košice Regional Court.", "16. On 14 October 1997 the applicant was summoned to appear at a hearing before the Košice Regional Court scheduled for 31 October 1997. On the latter date the applicant and his lawyer were informed that the hearing had been held in the absence of the parties and that the appeal had been dismissed on 21 October 1997. The Regional Court’s judgment was served on 2 February 1998.", "17. In a letter of 31 March 1998 the president of the Košice Regional Court admitted that the applicant’s complaint about the length of the proceedings was partially justified. The letter further stated that the applicant had not been summoned to the hearing held on 21 October 1997 due to an administrative mistake.", "18. In the meantime, on 16 February 1998, the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court. On 26 May 1998 the latter quashed the appellate court’s judgment on the ground that the applicant had not been duly summoned to the hearing of 21 October 1997. The case file was returned to the Regional Court on 15 June 1998.", "19. A hearing before the Regional Court was scheduled for 23 November 1999. On 22 November 1999 the applicant’s lawyer informed the Regional Court that he no longer represented the applicant. As the applicant had not been notified in person of the hearing, the case was adjourned. Another hearing scheduled for 14 December 1999 had to be adjourned as the applicant was ill.", "20. On 15 February 2000 the Košice Regional Court upheld the Poprad District Court’s judgment of 17 April 1996.", "21. On 30 March 2000 the applicant filed an appeal on points of law to the Supreme Court. On 19 April 2000 the latter sent the appeal on points of law to the Poprad District Court for further action. On 28 April 2000 the District Court invited the applicant to appoint a lawyer to represent him in the proceedings before the Supreme Court within fifteen days. The applicant did not reply. The case file was submitted to the Supreme Court on 7 June 2000.", "22. On 27 June 2000 the Supreme Court discontinued the proceedings as the applicant had failed to comply with the formal requirements." ]	[]
[ "9. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Tartu (Estonia). He is the owner of a company called AS Giga and chairman of the board of directors. He is also the chairman of another company called AS Tartu Jõujaam.", "10. On 4 December 1995 the Tartu police initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant for abusing his position as company chairman.", "11. On 26 February 1996, on discovering that AS Giga had failed to pay certain mandatory taxes, the city tax authorities issued an order directing it to pay the taxes due.", "12. On 22 March 1996 the applicant was formally charged with abuse of office, tax evasion and falsification of documents. However, on 28 June 1996 the charge of abuse of office was dropped.", "13. On 1 July 1996 a further charge of fraud was added to the indictment.", "14. On 7 October 1996 the investigating officers furnished the applicant with the final version of the charges. They concerned his actions as chairman of AS Giga and AS Tartu Jõujaam and as owner of the former. Under Article 148-1 § 7 of the Criminal Code (see “Relevant domestic law and practice” below) he was accused of the intentional, continuous and large-scale concealment of taxable amounts and of submitting false information on the companies' expenditure. The charges under that Article were divided into three different counts: one relating to five instances in 1993 and 1994 of the forgery and fabrication of documents intended to show commercial dealings with a fictitious company; the second to the use at the end of 1994 and in 1995 of false documents purporting to relate to the payment of salaries to employees of AS Giga; and the third to the entry into a sham contract on 12 May 1995 in order to circumvent tax laws.", "15. On 31 October 1996, after the completion of the preliminary investigation, the applicant and his lawyer were given access to the case file.", "16. On 11 November 1996 the bill of indictment was approved by the competent prosecutor and the case referred to the Tartu City Court (Tartu Linnakohus).", "17. On 4 March 1997 the City Court committed the applicant for trial on the above charges. On 24 April 1997 he was served with a copy of the indictment as approved by the City Court.", "18. By a judgment of 13 October 1997, the City Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to three years and six months' imprisonment, suspended for two years. \nIn convicting the applicant of the charges of tax evasion under Article 148-1 § 7 of the Criminal Code, the City Court observed that the criminal acts had started in the third quarter of 1993, with the last act beginning on 12 May 1995. It considered that they constituted a continuing offence. They all contained the elements of the same offence – they were directed against the State taxation system, had the same criminal consequences, were all committed intentionally and in a similar fashion, namely by falsifying documents and presenting them to the tax authorities. The City Court held that the applicant's acts came within Article 148-1 §§ 1 to 4 of the Criminal Code. As they had caused considerable damage, they fell to be considered under paragraph 7 of that Article. The City Court pointed out that paragraph 7 was applicable irrespective of whether prior administrative penalties had been imposed on the accused and it referred to the practice of the Supreme Court in support for that view. \nIt ordered the applicant to pay the city tax authorities 853,550 Estonian kroons in outstanding taxes. No fine or tax surcharge was imposed.", "19. On 18 October 1997 the applicant lodged an appeal against that judgment with the Tartu Court of Appeal. He argued that in convicting him under Article 148-1 § 7 of the Criminal Code of offences committed in 1993 and 1994, the City Court had applied the criminal law retrospectively, as paragraph 7 had not entered into force until 13 January 1995. Prior to that date conviction under Article 148-1 could follow only if an administrative penalty had been imposed on the accused for the same act or he or she had a previous criminal conviction for a similar offence.", "20. By a judgment of 12 January 1998, the Tartu Court of Appeal upheld the applicant's conviction. It considered that after his first criminal act in 1993 he had embarked on a criminal enterprise which had lasted until 1996, when the tax authorities discovered the offences. The fact that no administrative penalty had been imposed on the applicant was not relevant for the purposes of determining the applicability of Article 148-1 § 7 of the Criminal Code, as the offending acts had been committed intentionally. A criminal intent was proved by his conscious and calculated concealment of matters giving rise to a tax liability and his failure to pay the taxes.", "21. On 17 February 1998 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Riigikohus) raising the question of the retrospective application of the relevant provision of criminal law. He also argued that the concealment of matters giving rise to a tax liability was not a continuing offence, but a series of individual acts.", "22. By a judgment of 8 April 1998, the Supreme Court, agreeing with the reasoning of the Court of Appeal, upheld the applicant's conviction. In response to the applicant's above argument, it said that a constant and continuous violation of the obligation to declare one's sources of income and to pay the taxes due created a persisting criminal state." ]	[]
[ "7. The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Gross Gerungs (Austria).", "8. The applicant is the owner of land in Loipersdorf (Styria), registered under file No. 154 of the Loipersdorf Land Register (Grundbuch). Before 23 September 1992 it comprised, inter alia, parcel No. 772/1 of 4231 square metres marked as garden (Garten) and in the middle of it parcel No. 66/2 of 401 square metres marked as building area (Baufläche). The borders of these parcels were recorded in the land tax register (Grundsteuerkataster).", "9. On 28 November 1989 the Mayor of Loipersdorf informed the applicant that a new border register (Grenzkataster) for Loipersdorf was under preparation and that on this occasion some parcels of land had to be united. As the applicant's land was affected by this measure he was invited to give his consent on 7 December 1989 at the Town Hall.", "10. On 1 December 1989 the applicant informed the Feldbach Surveyor's Office (Vermessungsamt) that he would not consent to a unification of any of the parcels belonging to him.", "11. On 18 September 1992 the Feldbach Surveyor's Office submitted a certificate (Anmeldungsbogen) to the Feldbach District Court, the competent Land Register Court (Grundbuchsgericht), in which it requested that the unification (Grundstücksvereinigung) of the applicant's parcels No. 772/1 and No. 66/2, be entered in the land register.", "12. On 23 September 1992 the District Court amended the land register as requested. It struck out parcel No. 66/2 of the land register and united the respective piece of land with parcel No. 772/1. On 29 October 1992 the applicant appealed against this decision.", "13. On 26 January 1993 the Graz Regional Court rejected the applicant's appeal. The Regional Court found that the Surveyor's Office had issued the certificate of 18 September 1992 under Section 52 § 3 of the Surveying Act (Vermessungsgesetz). Under this provision, the consent of the owner of land to a unification of parcels was not necessary. The Surveyor's Office's certificate fulfilled the requirements of Section 12 § 1 of the Surveying Act, namely that the parcels concerned had the same owner and that no different financial burdens were placed on them. The further criterion for a unification of parcels, namely that the unification was advisable for presenting in the map parcels which were put to the same use, could not be examined by the Land Register Courts. In this respect they were bound by the findings of the Surveyor's Office.", "14. The applicant lodged a further appeal on points of law (Revisionsrekurs) with the Supreme Court. He submitted that the difference in treatment between owners of land which was registered in the border register and those whose land was registered in the land tax register was unconstitutional. There was no reason why unification of parcels only with regard to land registered in the border register was subject to the consent of its owner. Furthermore, the unification of his parcels violated his right to property in that it was impossible to divide them again and sell separately the former parcels No. 772/1 and No. 66/2 because the latter parcel would not meet the criterion of having a minimum surface necessary for creating a separate parcel.", "15. On 29 June 1993 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's further appeal on points of law. This decision was served on the applicant on 5 August 1993. The Supreme Court found that the Land Register Courts had to amend the land register following a certificate of the Surveyor's Office if the land register did not disclose any elements which spoke against that measure. A certificate of a Surveyor's Office was therefore not a request to be examined by the courts but a formal statement about its official acts (Amtshandlungen). In this respect the Land Register Courts were bound by the certificate of the Surveyor's Offices. Changes made by the Surveyor's Office must lead to corresponding entries in the land register.", "16. The Supreme Court also found that the difference in treatment between owners of land registered in the border register on the one hand and the land tax register on the other hand as regards the necessity of the owner's consent to the unification of parcels of land was justified. As the border register relied on technically more advanced methods of surveying than the previous land tax register it was more reliable and merited a higher degree of protection. At present the land tax register had only a transitory function until border registers had been drawn up for all municipalities. The Supreme Court further noted that a later partition of the parcels which had been united might not be possible in view of their size. However, this effect could not constitute an interference with the applicant's right to property because it was in accordance with the intentions of the legislator who wished to avoid the creation of parcels of land which were too small.", "17. In the meantime, on 15 October 1992, the applicant had filed an appeal with the Federal Office of Weights, Measures and Surveying (Bundesamt für Eich- und Vermessungswesen) against the Feldbach Surveyor's Office's certificate (Anmeldungsbogen) and requested its annulment.", "18. Since the Federal Office did not decide on the appeal, the applicant, on 16 August 1993 filed a request for transfer of jurisdiction to the superior authority (Devolutionsantrag) with the Federal Minister for Economic Affairs (Bundesminister für wirtschaftliche Angelegenheiten). On 13 January 1994 the Minister rejected the applicant's request as he found that the six months' time-limit within which a decision has to be taken had not yet expired.", "19. The applicant also had filed, on 15 October 1992, a request for a declaratory decision with the Feldbach Surveyor's Office. He argued that the certificate had been unlawful and requested the declaration that the conditions of Section 12 § 2 of the Surveying Act had not been met since he had not given his consent. The applicant submitted that he had promised his son to give him parcel No. 772/1. Because of the unification of the parcels he could no longer keep this promise. Instead a partition map by a surveyor had to be drawn up which involved considerable expenses. Therefore he had a legal interest in the declaratory decision requested.", "20. Since the Surveyor's Office did not decide the applicant, on 22 April 1993, filed a request for transfer of jurisdiction with the Federal Office, requesting it to issue the declaratory decision. Thereupon, on 1 September 1993, the Federal Office granted the applicant's request for transfer of jurisdiction but rejected the applicant's request for a declaratory decision. The applicant filed an appeal with the Federal Minister for Economic Affairs.", "21. At an unspecified date the applicant introduced a complaint with the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) against the Minister's decision of 13 January 1994 and the Minister's inactivity in dealing with his appeal against the Federal Office's decision of 1 September 1993.", "22. On 11 August 1994 the Administrative Court decided upon the applicant's complaint. It quashed the Minister's decision of 13 January 1994 as in its view the six months' time-limit had expired. As regards the appeal against the Federal Office's decision of 1 September 1993 it decided in the place of the Minister and dismissed the applicant's appeal as unfounded. In the present case the applicant's consent to the unification of the parcels had not been necessary under Section 52 of the Surveying Act. A request for a declaratory decision could therefore not relate to this element.", "23. Meanwhile, on 1 March 1993 the applicant had also lodged a hierarchical complaint (Aufsichtsbeschwerde) against the Feldbach Surveyor's Office with the Federal Minister for Economic Affairs.", "24. On 22 July 1993 the Minister reacted to the applicant's hierarchical complaint. He found that a certificate of the Surveyor's Office was an official document (öffentliche Urkunde) and not a decision (Bescheid) so that it could not be attacked by an administrative appeal (Berufung). Furthermore, the unification of the applicant's parcels No. 772/1 and 66/2 had been necessary for technical reasons in order to ensure a clear presentation of the borders of the applicant's land and to avoid an unclear and fragmented presentation of parcels in the border register." ]	[]
[ "8. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Essex.", "9. In February 1994 Brentwood Borough Council (“the Council”) approved guidelines for the operation and management of CCTV. The CCTV tape recordings would be retained initially for ninety days, this period to be reviewed from time to time and reduced to a minimum, and the tapes would be erased on completion of the storage period. In the section headed “privacy to neighbouring properties”, it was noted that the CCTV system should ensure adequate provision for the avoidance of unwarranted intrusion in areas surrounding those under surveillance. In the event of it becoming apparent that privacy was being violated, it was foreseen that the Council would take such steps as to ensure that “either an electronic (digital) screening or physical screening is taking place”. In April 1994 the Council installed a CCTV surveillance system in Brentwood. It was fully operational by July 1994. The Council's monitoring operator had a direct visual and audio link to the police so that if it was considered that an incident warranting police intervention was taking place, the images being captured could be switched through to the police.", "10. In August 1995 the applicant was suffering from depression as a result of personal and family circumstances. On 20 August 1995 at 11.30 p.m. he walked alone down the high street towards a central junction in the centre of Brentwood with a kitchen knife in his hand and he attempted to commit suicide by cutting his wrists. He stopped at the junction and leaned over a railing facing the traffic with the knife in his hand. He was unaware that a CCTV camera, mounted on the traffic island in front of the junction, filmed his movements. The CCTV footage later disclosed did not show the applicant cutting his wrists, the operator being solely alerted to an individual in possession of a knife at the junction.", "11. The police were notified by the CCTV operator and arrived. They took the knife from the applicant, gave him medical assistance and brought him to the police station. He was detained under the Mental Health Act 1983. His custody record refers to the self-inflicted injuries to his wrists on arrival and notes that he was examined and treated by a doctor, after which he was released without charge and taken home by police officers.", "12. On 14 September 1995 the CCTV working party of the Council agreed to authorise the release of regular press features on the CCTV system. The Council also decided to cooperate with third parties in the preparation of factual programmes concerning their CCTV system.", "13. The Council's first press feature, the CCTV News, was released on 9 October 1995 and included two photographs taken from the CCTV footage of the applicant to accompany an article entitled “Defused – The partnership between CCTV and the police prevents a potentially dangerous situation”. The applicant's face was not specifically masked. The article noted that an individual had been spotted with a knife in his hand, that he was clearly unhappy but not looking for trouble, that the police had been alerted, that the individual had been disarmed and brought to the police station where he was questioned and given assistance for his problems. The article included the name of a Council employee in the event that readers wished to obtain copies of the pictures.", "14. On 12 October 1995 the Brentwood Weekly News used a photograph of the incident involving the applicant on its front page to accompany an article on the use and benefits of the CCTV system. The applicant's face was not specifically masked.", "15. On 13 October 1995 an article entitled “Gotcha” appeared in the Yellow Advertiser, a local newspaper with a circulation of approximately 24,000. The article was accompanied by a photograph of the applicant taken from the CCTV footage. The newspaper article referred to the applicant having been intercepted with a knife and a potentially dangerous situation being defused as a result of the CCTV system. It was noted that the applicant had been released without charge.", "16. As a result Anglia Television sought, and the Council provided, footage of the incident involving the applicant. On 17 October 1995 extracts from that footage were included in its news programme about the CCTV system, a local broadcast to an average audience of 350,000. The applicant's face had been masked at the Council's oral request. However, that masking was later considered inadequate by the Independent Television Commission (see below), the applicant's distinctive hairstyle and moustache making him easily recognisable to anyone who knew him.", "17. On 18 October 1995 the Chairman of the Council informed the Council Technical Services Committee that cooperation had been, and would continue to be, given in the preparation of factual documentary programmes concerning the CCTV system. He referred to the feature on CCTV which had been broadcast by Anglia Television on the previous day.", "18. In late October or November 1995 the applicant became aware that he had been filmed on CCTV and that footage had been released because a neighbour told his partner that the former had seen him on television. He did not take any action then as he was still suffering from severe depression.", "19. On 16 February 1996 a second article entitled “Eyes in the sky triumph” was published in the Yellow Advertiser outlining the benefits of CCTV in the fight against crime and was accompanied by the same photograph as had been previously used by that newspaper. It appears that a number of people recognised the applicant. A letter of 25 April 1996 from the Yellow Advertiser opined that the applicant was not identifiable. The Press Complaints Commission did not decide whether or not the applicant was identifiable from the photograph (see below).", "20. At or about that time the Council agreed to furnish CCTV footage of, inter alios, the applicant to the producers of “Crime Beat”, a series on BBC national television with an average of 9.2 million viewers. The Council imposed orally a number of conditions on the producers including that no one should be identifiable in the footage and that all faces should be masked. The BBC were also to consult with the police to ensure that they had “no objection to recordings being shown because of sub judice issues”.", "21. Around 9 to 11 March 1996 the applicant was told by friends that they had seen him on 9 March 1996 in trailers for an episode of “Crime Beat” which was to be broadcast soon. On 11 March 1996 he complained to the Council about the forthcoming programme, at which stage the Council became aware of his identity. The Council contacted the producers who confirmed that his image had been masked. That evening the CCTV footage was shown on “Crime Beat”. The applicant's image was masked in the main programme itself but the Broadcasting Standards Commission (see below) later found that masking inadequate. Many of the applicant's friends and family who saw the programme recognised the applicant.", "22. In response to the applicant's request for a copy of the Council's licence agreement with the producers of “Crime Beat”, by letter dated 21 February 1997, the Council provided an unsigned and undated agreement which did not appear to relate to the applicant but which contained a requirement to mask all faces in any copies of the relevant video. By letter dated 31 October 1997 the Council confirmed that it could not locate a signed copy of the agreement with the producers but it included an earlier draft of that agreement which had been signed by the producers, which related to the footage of the applicant but which did not include any masking requirement.", "23. The applicant made a number of media appearances thereafter to speak out against the publication of the footage and photographs. On 28 March 1996 he participated in a national radio programme (BBC Radio 4). On 31 March 1996 he spoke to a journalist who published an article in a national newspaper and this was the first time the applicant's name appeared in the media. Other newspaper articles included photographs of the applicant or quotes given by him. He also appeared on national television: on 13 April 1996 on Channel 4's “Right to Reply”, on 25 July 1996 on Channel 5's “Espresso” and on 5 August 1997 on BBC 1's “You Decide”. He also had his photograph published in the Yellow Advertiser on 25 October 1996.", "24. On 25 April 1996 the applicant lodged a complaint with the BSC in relation to, inter alia, the “Crime Beat” programme alleging an unwarranted infringement of his privacy and that he had received unjust and unfair treatment. On 13 June 1997 the BSC upheld both of his complaints.", "25. The BSC noted that the BBC had already accepted that it had meant to mask the applicant's image and that this had not been done in the trailer due to an oversight. The BSC also considered the masking during the programme inadequate as the applicant had been recognised by viewers who had not seen the trailer. It was accepted that the BBC had not intended that the applicant would be identifiable. However, the BSC found that the effect was to reveal to the applicant's family, friends and neighbours an episode which he did not wish to reveal, and that the outcome had been distressing and amounted to an unwarranted infringement of his privacy. The BSC added that the fact that the applicant later chose to speak publicly about this incident did not alter the infringement established. The BBC was directed to broadcast a summary of the adjudication of the BSC with the episode of “Crime Beat” on 12 June 1997 and a summary of the adjudication was also published in The Daily Telegraph on 12 June 1997.", "26. On 1 May 1996 the applicant complained to the ITC in respect of the broadcast by Anglia Television. The latter had already apologised to the applicant and conceded that it had breached the privacy requirements of section 2(2) and (5) of the ITC Code (sections concerning coverage of events in public and scenes of suffering and distress). The ITC noted that the implication was that a man carrying a knife was likely to be intent on a criminal act. It found that the applicant's identity was not adequately obscured and that he was readily identifiable and easily recognisable by those who knew him. It found that section 2(2) and (5) of the Code had been breached and the decision of the ITC was published in its Programme Complaints and Interventions Report of June 1996. Given the admission and apology by Anglia Television, no further action was taken by the ITC.", "27. On 17 May 1996 the applicant complained to the PCC in respect of the articles published in the Yellow Advertiser. The PCC rejected the applicant's complaint without a hearing and the decision was communicated to the applicant by letter dated 2 August 1996. The PCC considered that, whether or not the applicant was identifiable from the photographs, the events in question took place in a town high street, open to public view. It did not consider that the juxtaposition of the photographs and the articles implied that the applicant had committed a crime and it had been made clear that he was released without charge, the second article indicating that the applicant was ill at the relevant time.", "28. On 23 May 1996 the applicant applied to the High Court for leave to apply for judicial review of the Council's disclosure of the CCTV material arguing, inter alia, that that disclosure had no basis in law. On 26 June 1996 a single judge of the High Court refused leave. On 18 October 1996 the High Court granted leave on a renewed request and leave to amend the application to include a complaint that the disclosure was irrational, even if lawful.", "29. By judgment dated 25 November 1997 the High Court rejected the application for judicial review. It found that the purpose of section 163 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (“the 1994 Act”) was to empower a local authority to provide CCTV equipment in order to promote the prevention of crime or the welfare of victims of crime:\n“By publicising information about the successful operation of the CCTV, the Council was providing information about its effectiveness and thereby reinforcing the deterrent effect of its operation. The making available to the media of footage from the CCTV film to show the effectiveness of the system can properly be said ... to be incidental to and to facilitate the discharge of the Council's function under section 163 [of the 1994 Act] because it thereby increased, or tended to increase, the preventative effect of the equipment which [the Council was] providing for the purposes of the prevention of crime.”", "30. It concluded that the Council had the power to distribute the CCTV footage to the media by virtue of section 111 of the Local Government Act 1972 in the discharge of their functions under section 163 of the 1994 Act.", "31. As to the “rationality” of the Council's decision to disclose, the applicant submitted that the Council acted irrationally in disclosing the footage with the aim of crime prevention when he had not been, in fact, involved in any criminal activity. He argued that by failing to consult the police to see if he had been charged with a criminal offence and to impose sufficient restrictions as regards disclosure of his identity, the Council had facilitated an unwarranted invasion of his privacy which was contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of the Council's guidelines.", "32. The High Court judge had some sympathy with that submission but did not consider it correct in law. He went on:\n“I have some sympathy with the applicant who has suffered an invasion of his privacy, as is borne out by the findings of the Independent Television Commission and the Broadcasting Standards Commission. However, if I am right in deciding that the Council does have power to distribute the film footage from its CCTV system, there may on occasion be undesirable invasions of privacy. Unless and until there is a general right of privacy recognised by English law (and the indications are that there may soon be so by incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into our law), reliance must be placed on effective guidance being issued by Codes of practice or otherwise, in order to try and avoid such undesirable invasions of a person's privacy. \nThe evidence is that the CCTV cameras in public places play an important role in both crime prevention and crime detection. In this case, the film footage showed a man walking in the High Street carrying a large knife in his hand. It did not show him attempting to commit suicide. It was plainly a potentially dangerous situation which the Council's monitoring employee quite properly put to the police, as a result of which the man was arrested. ... It was not unreasonable for the Council to conclude that the footage was a useful example of how a potentially dangerous situation can be avoided. ... In those circumstances, it seems to me that the decision of the Council to distribute the film footage to the media could not be said to be irrational or unreasonable, bearing in mind that the film did not show an attempted suicide and that, at the time, they did not know the applicant's identity. They therefore had no reason to consult the police as to whether an offence had been committed. They did not sell the take-outs from the CCTV footage for commercial gain and, more importantly, they had imposed on the television companies a requirement that an individual's face should be masked. It is true that that was a verbal rather than a written requirement, but I am not persuaded that what happened was likely to have been different if it had been a written requirement. In the event, the fault lay with the television companies. Anglia TV failed to mask the applicant's identity adequately. The BBC failed to mask the applicant's identity at all in the trailers. As soon as the Council were notified about that by the applicant, two days before the programme went out, which was the first time they were aware of the applicant's identity, they immediately contacted the BBC and received assurances that his image had been masked in the programme. In the event, unknown to the Council, it had not been adequately masked in the programme.\nI am sure that lessons can be learnt from this unfortunate incident, and it may be that, with the benefit of hindsight, the Council will want to see if they can tighten up their guidelines to seek to avoid a similar incident in the future. I am, however, equally sure that, in the circumstances that I have described, the Council cannot be said to have acted irrationally in the sense that they had taken leave of their senses or had acted in a manner in which no reasonable local authority could sensibly have acted.”", "33. An application to the High Court for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal was rejected. The subsequent leave application to a single judge of the Court of Appeal was rejected on 21 January 1998 because\n“... the [High Court] Judge was plainly correct in his interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions and the Council was neither acting outside its statutory authority nor irrationally in making the film and photographs available to the media. The injury, of which complaint is made, arises from a failure on the part of the media to sufficiently disguise the applicant when making the film and photographs visible to the public. That is and has been the subject of complaint against the media involved but is not capable of supporting a claim for a declaration against Brentwood Borough Council”.", "34. Following an oral hearing before the full Court of Appeal, the applicant's leave application was dismissed on 19 February 1998." ]	[ 4 ]
[ "8. On 23 June 1994 the applicant's husband filed a divorce petition with the Wałbrzych Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki).", "9. On 26 August 1994 the applicant filed a pleading. On 19 October 1994 her husband requested the court to find that the applicant was responsible for the marital breakdown.", "10. On 1 September 1995 the court ordered the applicant's husband to pay 170 Polish zlotys (PLN) in family maintenance pending trial.", "11. The court held twelve hearings on the following dates: 26 August, 6 December 1994; 31 January, 21 March, 16 May, 1 September, 28 November 1995; 9 January, 13 February, 19 March, 17 April and 26 April 1996. It heard evidence from at least twelve witnesses.", "12. On 26 April 1996 the court granted a divorce decree. It considered that both spouses had been at fault in respect of the breakdown of their marriage. The court further vested custody rights over their minor child with the applicant and obliged her husband to pay maintenance for the child.", "13. On 28 May 1996 the applicant filed an appeal against the above judgment. She claimed that her husband had been exclusively responsible for the failure of their marriage and that, therefore, divorce was inadmissible in law.", "14. On 5 July 1996 the Wrocław Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case to the Wałbrzych Regional Court.", "15. On 10 October 1996 the applicant filed a request for her maintenance claims to be secured. The court considered that further evidence regarding the financial situation of both parties should be obtained.", "16. On 13 November 1996 the court held a hearing. On 9 April 1997 the court amended its decision of 1 September 1995 concerning the family maintenance pending trial, increasing it to PLN 250. It dismissed the remainder of the applicant's maintenance claims.", "17. On 6 June 1997 the Wałbrzych Regional Court ordered that evidence be obtained from experts in psychiatry, psychology and pedagogics. On 27 November 1997 experts from the Family Diagnostics Centre (Rodzinny Ośrodek Diagnostyczno-Konsultacyjny) prepared their report.", "18. Subsequently, the court held hearings on the following dates: 13 February, 16 March, 24 April 1998.", "19. On 15 May 1998 the Wałbrzych Regional Court pronounced divorce, finding that both spouses had been at fault in respect of the breakdown of their marriage.", "20. On 16 June 1998 the applicant filed an appeal with the Wrocław Court of Appeal. On 5 August 1998 it upheld the contested judgment. On the same day the applicant applied to the court to grant her legal assistance and to exempt her from court fees in cassation proceedings. On 28 September 1998 the Wrocław Court of Appeal dismissed her application.", "21. On 12 November 1998 the applicant filed a cassation appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal of 5 August 1998. On 5 January 2001 the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) held a hearing and on the same date it dismissed the applicant's cassation appeal." ]	[ 3 ]