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attack-pattern | attack-pattern--9fa07bef-9c81-421e-a8e5-ad4366c5a925 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2018-04-18T17:59:24.739000Z" | "2022-10-21T14:35:00.274000Z" | Trusted Relationship | Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship abuses an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network.
Organizations often grant elevated access to second or third-party external providers in order to allow them to manage internal systems as well as cloud-based environments. Some examples of these relationships include IT services contractors, managed security providers, infrastructure contractors (e.g. HVAC, elevators, physical security). The third-party provider's access may be intended to be limited to the infrastructure being maintained, but may exist on the same network as the rest of the enterprise. As such, [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) used by the other party for access to internal network systems may be compromised and used.(Citation: CISA IT Service Providers)
In Office 365 environments, organizations may grant Microsoft partners or resellers delegated administrator permissions. By compromising a partner or reseller account, an adversary may be able to leverage existing delegated administrator relationships or send new delegated administrator offers to clients in order to gain administrative control over the victim tenant.(Citation: Office 365 Delegated Administration) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "initial-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1199",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199"
},
{
"description": "CISA. (n.d.). APTs Targeting IT Service Provider Customers. Retrieved November 16, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CISA IT Service Providers",
"url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/APTs-Targeting-IT-Service-Provider-Customers"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Partners: Offer delegated administration. Retrieved May 27, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Office 365 Delegated Administration",
"url": "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/partners-offer-delegated-administration-26530dc0-ebba-415b-86b1-b55bc06b073e?ui=en-us&rs=en-us&ad=us"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Establish monitoring for activity conducted by second and third party providers and other trusted entities that may be leveraged as a means to gain access to the network. Depending on the type of relationship, an adversary may have access to significant amounts of information about the target before conducting an operation, especially if the trusted relationship is based on IT services. Adversaries may be able to act quickly towards an objective, so proper monitoring for behavior related to Credential Access, Lateral Movement, and Collection will be important to detect the intrusion. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"SaaS",
"IaaS",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Office 365"
] | 2.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--a009cb25-4801-4116-9105-80a91cf15c1b | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-29T17:32:30.711000Z" | "2024-03-28T16:14:28.678000Z" | Cloud Account | Adversaries may create a cloud account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that does not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles)(Citation: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019)(Citation: AWS Create IAM User)(Citation: GCP Create Cloud Identity Users)(Citation: Microsoft Azure AD Users)
In addition to user accounts, cloud accounts may be associated with services. Cloud providers handle the concept of service accounts in different ways. In Azure, service accounts include service principals and managed identities, which can be linked to various resources such as OAuth applications, serverless functions, and virtual machines in order to grant those resources permissions to perform various activities in the environment.(Citation: Microsoft Entra ID Service Principals) In GCP, service accounts can also be linked to specific resources, as well as be impersonated by other accounts for [Temporary Elevated Cloud Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/005).(Citation: GCP Service Accounts) While AWS has no specific concept of service accounts, resources can be directly granted permission to assume roles.(Citation: AWS Instance Profiles)(Citation: AWS Lambda Execution Role)
Adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific cloud services, which can reduce the chance of detection.
Once an adversary has created a cloud account, they can then manipulate that account to ensure persistence and allow access to additional resources - for example, by adding [Additional Cloud Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001) or assigning [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1136.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003"
},
{
"description": "Ako-Adjei, K., Dickhaus, M., Baumgartner, P., Faigel, D., et. al.. (2019, October 8). About admin roles. Retrieved October 18, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft O365 Admin Roles",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/admin/add-users/about-admin-roles?view=o365-worldwide"
},
{
"description": "AWS. (n.d.). Creating an IAM User in Your AWS Account. Retrieved January 29, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AWS Create IAM User",
"url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_users_create.html"
},
{
"description": "AWS. (n.d.). Lambda execution role. Retrieved February 28, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AWS Lambda Execution Role",
"url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/dg/lambda-intro-execution-role.html"
},
{
"description": "AWS. (n.d.). Using instance profiles. Retrieved February 28, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AWS Instance Profiles",
"url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_use_switch-role-ec2_instance-profiles.html"
},
{
"description": "Google. (n.d.). Create Cloud Identity user accounts. Retrieved January 29, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GCP Create Cloud Identity Users",
"url": "https://support.google.com/cloudidentity/answer/7332836?hl=en&ref_topic=7558554"
},
{
"description": "Google. (n.d.). Service Accounts Overview. Retrieved February 28, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GCP Service Accounts",
"url": "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/service-account-overview"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2019, November 11). Add or delete users using Azure Active Directory. Retrieved January 30, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Azure AD Users",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/add-users-azure-active-directory"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2023, December 15). Application and service principal objects in Microsoft Entra ID. Retrieved February 28, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Entra ID Service Principals",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity-platform/app-objects-and-service-principals?tabs=browser"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019",
"url": "https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Collect usage logs from cloud user and administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the creation of new accounts and assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Azure AD",
"Office 365",
"IaaS",
"Google Workspace",
"SaaS"
] | 1.5 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--a01bf75f-00b2-4568-a58f-565ff9bf202b | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-12T19:29:21.013000Z" | "2023-04-07T17:14:42.184000Z" | Local Groups | Adversaries may attempt to find local system groups and permission settings. The knowledge of local system permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as the users found within the local administrators group.
Commands such as <code>net localgroup</code> of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, <code>dscl . -list /Groups</code> on macOS, and <code>groups</code> on Linux can list local groups. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1069.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--a0e6614a-7740-4b24-bd65-f1bde09fc365 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T16:48:04.509000Z" | "2022-10-18T22:48:33.286000Z" | Search Open Websites/Domains | Adversaries may search freely available websites and/or domains for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in various online sites, such as social media, new sites, or those hosting information about business operations such as hiring or requested/rewarded contracts.(Citation: Cyware Social Media)(Citation: SecurityTrails Google Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB GoogleHacking)
Adversaries may search in different online sites depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1593",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593"
},
{
"description": "Borges, E. (2019, March 5). Exploring Google Hacking Techniques. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SecurityTrails Google Hacking",
"url": "https://securitytrails.com/blog/google-hacking-techniques"
},
{
"description": "Cyware Hacker News. (2019, October 2). How Hackers Exploit Social Media To Break Into Your Company. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cyware Social Media",
"url": "https://cyware.com/news/how-hackers-exploit-social-media-to-break-into-your-company-88e8da8e"
},
{
"description": "Offensive Security. (n.d.). Google Hacking Database. Retrieved October 23, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ExploitDB GoogleHacking",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/google-hacking-database"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:31:12.196000Z" | "2024-01-16T22:24:38.234000Z" | Account Manipulation | Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain and/or elevate access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves or modifies adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups.(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021) These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials.
In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain. However, account manipulation may also lead to privilege escalation where modifications grant access to additional roles, permissions, or higher-privileged [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1098",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098"
},
{
"description": "FireEye. (2021, June 16). Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliate’s Supply Chain Software Compromise. Retrieved September 22, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/06/darkside-affiliate-supply-chain-software-compromise.html"
},
{
"description": "Franklin Smith, R. (n.d.). Windows Security Log Event ID 4670. Retrieved November 4, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Security Event 4670",
"url": "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4670"
},
{
"description": "Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4738(S): A user account was changed. Retrieved June 30, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft User Modified Event",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4738"
},
{
"description": "Warren, J. (2017, July 11). Manipulating User Passwords with Mimikatz. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017",
"url": "https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM"
},
{
"description": "Warren, J. (2017, June 22). lsadump::changentlm and lsadump::setntlm work, but generate Windows events #92. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017",
"url": "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/issues/92"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects and/or permissions on systems and the domain, such as event IDs 4738, 4728 and 4670.(Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670) Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems. Especially flag events where the subject and target accounts differ(Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) or that include additional flags such as changing a password without knowledge of the old password.(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017)
Monitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity.
Monitor for unusual permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts. However, account manipulation may also lead to privilege escalation where modifications grant access to additional roles, permissions, or higher-privileged [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Azure AD",
"Office 365",
"IaaS",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Google Workspace",
"SaaS",
"Network",
"Containers"
] | 2.6 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:44.720000Z" | "2023-04-15T00:58:36.287000Z" | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.
Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other network protocol not being used as the main command and control channel. Adversaries may also opt to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels.
[Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048) can be done using various common operating system utilities such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039)/SMB or FTP.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) On macOS and Linux <code>curl</code> may be used to invoke protocols such as HTTP/S or FTP/S to exfiltrate data from a system.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
Many IaaS and SaaS platforms (such as Microsoft Exchange, Microsoft SharePoint, GitHub, and AWS S3) support the direct download of files, emails, source code, and other sensitive information via the web console or [Cloud API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/009). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "exfiltration"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1048",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048"
},
{
"description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Grunzweig, J. and Falcone, R.. (2016, October 4). OilRig Malware Campaign Updates Toolset and Expands Targets. Retrieved May 3, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016",
"url": "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/"
},
{
"description": "Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques",
"url": "https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Office 365",
"SaaS",
"IaaS",
"Google Workspace",
"Network"
] | 1.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--a1b52199-c8c5-438a-9ded-656f1d0888c6 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-24T17:42:23.339000Z" | "2022-04-20T18:53:39.406000Z" | Kernel Modules and Extensions | Adversaries may modify the kernel to automatically execute programs on system boot. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system.(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming)
When used maliciously, LKMs can be a type of kernel-mode [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014) that run with the highest operating system privilege (Ring 0).(Citation: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide) Common features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself, selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors, and enabling root access to non-privileged users.(Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview)
Kernel extensions, also called kext, are used in macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. Since the kernel is responsible for enforcing security and the kernel extensions run as apart of the kernel, kexts are not governed by macOS security policies. Kexts are loaded and unloaded through <code>kextload</code> and <code>kextunload</code> commands. Kexts need to be signed with a developer ID that is granted privileges by Apple allowing it to sign Kernel extensions. Developers without these privileges may still sign kexts but they will not load unless SIP is disabled. If SIP is enabled, the kext signature is verified before being added to the AuxKC.(Citation: System and kernel extensions in macOS)
Since macOS Catalina 10.15, kernel extensions have been deprecated in favor of System Extensions. However, kexts are still allowed as "Legacy System Extensions" since there is no System Extension for Kernel Programming Interfaces.(Citation: Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation)
Adversaries can use LKMs and kexts to conduct [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) and/or [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) on a system. Examples have been found in the wild, and there are some relevant open source projects as well.(Citation: Volatility Phalanx2)(Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit)(Citation: GitHub Reptile)(Citation: GitHub Diamorphine)(Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle)(Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken)(Citation: Securelist Ventir)(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1547.006",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (2019, May 3). Configuration Profile Reference. Retrieved September 23, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Apple Developer Configuration Profile",
"url": "https://developer.apple.com/business/documentation/Configuration-Profile-Reference.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (n.d.). Deprecated Kernel Extensions and System Extension Alternatives. Retrieved November 4, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation",
"url": "https://developer.apple.com/support/kernel-extensions/"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (n.d.). System and kernel extensions in macOS. Retrieved March 31, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "System and kernel extensions in macOS",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment/system-and-kernel-extensions-in-macos-depa5fb8376f/web"
},
{
"description": "Augusto, I. (2018, March 8). Reptile - LMK Linux rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GitHub Reptile",
"url": "https://github.com/f0rb1dd3n/Reptile"
},
{
"description": "Case, A. (2012, October 10). Phalanx 2 Revealed: Using Volatility to Analyze an Advanced Linux Rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Volatility Phalanx2",
"url": "https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/10/phalanx-2-revealed-using-volatility-to.html"
},
{
"description": "Chuvakin, A. (2003, February). An Overview of Rootkits. Retrieved April 6, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "iDefense Rootkit Overview",
"url": "http://www.megasecurity.org/papers/Rootkits.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Henderson, B. (2006, September 24). How To Insert And Remove LKMs. Retrieved April 9, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs",
"url": "http://tldp.org/HOWTO/Module-HOWTO/x197.html"
},
{
"description": "Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit. Retrieved December 21, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit",
"url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/"
},
{
"description": "Mello, V. (2018, March 8). Diamorphine - LMK rootkit for Linux Kernels 2.6.x/3.x/4.x (x86 and x86_64). Retrieved April 9, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GitHub Diamorphine",
"url": "https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine"
},
{
"description": "Mikhail, K. (2014, October 16). The Ventir Trojan: assemble your MacOS spy. Retrieved April 6, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Securelist Ventir",
"url": "https://securelist.com/the-ventir-trojan-assemble-your-macos-spy/67267/"
},
{
"description": "Pikeralpha. (2017, August 29). User Approved Kernel Extension Loading…. Retrieved September 23, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "User Approved Kernel Extension Pike’s",
"url": "https://pikeralpha.wordpress.com/2017/08/29/user-approved-kernel-extension-loading/"
},
{
"description": "Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P. (2003, April 4). Modules vs Programs. Retrieved April 6, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide",
"url": "http://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/html/x437.html"
},
{
"description": "Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Linux Kernel Programming",
"url": "https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Remillano, A., Urbanec, J. (2019, September 19). Skidmap Linux Malware Uses Rootkit Capabilities to Hide Cryptocurrency-Mining Payload. Retrieved June 4, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Trend Micro Skidmap",
"url": "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload/"
},
{
"description": "Richard Purves. (2017, November 9). MDM and the Kextpocalypse . Retrieved September 23, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Purves Kextpocalypse 2",
"url": "https://richard-purves.com/2017/11/09/mdm-and-the-kextpocalypse-2/"
},
{
"description": "Wardle, P. (2015, April). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved April 6, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle",
"url": "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Wardle, P. (2017, September 8). High Sierra’s ‘Secure Kernel Extension Loading’ is Broken. Retrieved April 6, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken",
"url": "https://www.synack.com/2017/09/08/high-sierras-secure-kernel-extension-loading-is-broken/"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (2018, March 17). Loadable kernel module. Retrieved April 9, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Linux"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Loading, unloading, and manipulating modules on Linux systems can be detected by monitoring for the following commands: <code>modprobe</code>, <code>insmod</code>, <code>lsmod</code>, <code>rmmod</code>, or <code>modinfo</code> (Citation: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs) LKMs are typically loaded into <code>/lib/modules</code> and have had the extension .ko ("kernel object") since version 2.6 of the Linux kernel. (Citation: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module)
Adversaries may run commands on the target system before loading a malicious module in order to ensure that it is properly compiled. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview) Adversaries may also execute commands to identify the exact version of the running Linux kernel and/or download multiple versions of the same .ko (kernel object) files to use the one appropriate for the running system.(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) Many LKMs require Linux headers (specific to the target kernel) in order to compile properly. These are typically obtained through the operating systems package manager and installed like a normal package. On Ubuntu and Debian based systems this can be accomplished by running: <code>apt-get install linux-headers-$(uname -r)</code> On RHEL and CentOS based systems this can be accomplished by running: <code>yum install kernel-devel-$(uname -r)</code>
On macOS, monitor for execution of <code>kextload</code> commands and user installed kernel extensions performing abnormal and/or potentially malicious activity (such as creating network connections). Monitor for new rows added in the <code>kext_policy</code> table. KextPolicy stores a list of user approved (non Apple) kernel extensions and a partial history of loaded kernel modules in a SQLite database, <code>/var/db/SystemPolicyConfiguration/KextPolicy</code>.(Citation: User Approved Kernel Extension Pike’s)(Citation: Purves Kextpocalypse 2)(Citation: Apple Developer Configuration Profile)
| [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS",
"Linux"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--a2029942-0a85-4947-b23c-ca434698171d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-11T18:58:45.908000Z" | "2024-04-15T23:39:31.474000Z" | GUI Input Capture | Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)).
Adversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002)(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) On Linux systems adversaries may launch dialog boxes prompting users for credentials from malicious shell scripts or the command line (i.e. [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)).(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs)
Adversaries may also mimic common software authentication requests, such as those from browsers or email clients. This may also be paired with user activity monitoring (i.e., [Browser Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1217) and/or [Application Window Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1010)) to spoof prompts when users are naturally accessing sensitive sites/data. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1056.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/002"
},
{
"description": "Foss, G. (2014, October 3). Do You Trust Your Computer?. Retrieved December 17, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014",
"url": "https://logrhythm.com/blog/do-you-trust-your-computer/"
},
{
"description": "Johann Rehberger. (2021, April 18). Spoofing credential dialogs on macOS Linux and Windows. Retrieved August 19, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Spoofing credential dialogs",
"url": "https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2021/spoofing-credential-dialogs/"
},
{
"description": "Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "OSX Keydnap malware",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/"
},
{
"description": "Nelson, M. (2015, January 21). Phishing for Credentials: If you want it, just ask!. Retrieved December 17, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015",
"url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2015/01/21/phishing-for-credentials-if-you-want-it-just-ask/"
},
{
"description": "Sergei Shevchenko. (2015, June 4). New Mac OS Malware Exploits Mackeeper. Retrieved July 3, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper",
"url": "https://baesystemsai.blogspot.com/2015/06/new-mac-os-malware-exploits-mackeeper.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) that could be used to prompt users for credentials. For example, command/script history including abnormal parameters (such as requests for credentials and/or strings related to creating password prompts) may be malicious.(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs)
Inspect and scrutinize input prompts for indicators of illegitimacy, such as non-traditional banners, text, timing, and/or sources. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Linux"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--a2fdce72-04b2-409a-ac10-cc1695f4fce0 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-01T02:08:33.977000Z" | "2021-10-17T16:17:55.499000Z" | Tool | Adversaries may buy, steal, or download software tools that can be used during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. A tool can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029)). Tool acquisition can involve the procurement of commercial software licenses, including for red teaming tools such as [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154). Commercial software may be obtained through purchase, stealing licenses (or licensed copies of the software), or cracking trial versions.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon 2019)
Adversaries may obtain tools to support their operations, including to support execution of post-compromise behaviors. In addition to freely downloading or purchasing software, adversaries may steal software and/or software licenses from third-party entities (including other adversaries). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1588.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/002"
},
{
"description": "Recorded Future. (2019, June 20). Out of the Blue: How Recorded Future Identified Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Recorded Future Beacon 2019",
"url": "https://www.recordedfuture.com/identifying-cobalt-strike-servers/"
},
{
"description": "Maynier, E. (2020, December 20). Analyzing Cobalt Strike for Fun and Profit. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Analyzing CS Dec 2020",
"url": "https://www.randhome.io/blog/2020/12/20/analyzing-cobalt-strike-for-fun-and-profit/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | In some cases, malware repositories can also be used to identify features of tool use associated with an adversary, such as watermarks in [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) payloads.(Citation: Analyzing CS Dec 2020)
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--a3e1e6c5-9c74-4fc0-a16c-a9d228c17829 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-11T13:50:11.467000Z" | "2021-10-15T22:48:29.490000Z" | Exfiltration over USB | Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a USB connected physical device. In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a USB device introduced by a user. The USB device could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "exfiltration"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1052.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1052/001"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media are mounted. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--a4657bc9-d22f-47d2-a7b7-dd6ec33f3dde | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2022-02-25T15:27:44.927000Z" | "2022-03-22T15:47:33.915000Z" | KernelCallbackTable | Adversaries may abuse the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> of a process to hijack its execution flow in order to run their own payloads.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: FinFisher exposed ) The <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> can be found in the Process Environment Block (PEB) and is initialized to an array of graphic functions available to a GUI process once <code>user32.dll</code> is loaded.(Citation: Windows Process Injection KernelCallbackTable)
An adversary may hijack the execution flow of a process using the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> by replacing an original callback function with a malicious payload. Modifying callback functions can be achieved in various ways involving related behaviors such as [Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620) or [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) into another process.
A pointer to the memory address of the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> can be obtained by locating the PEB (ex: via a call to the <code>NtQueryInformationProcess()</code> [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) function).(Citation: NtQueryInformationProcess) Once the pointer is located, the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> can be duplicated, and a function in the table (e.g., <code>fnCOPYDATA</code>) set to the address of a malicious payload (ex: via <code>WriteProcessMemory()</code>). The PEB is then updated with the new address of the table. Once the tampered function is invoked, the malicious payload will be triggered.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)
The tampered function is typically invoked using a Windows message. After the process is hijacked and malicious code is executed, the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> may also be restored to its original state by the rest of the malicious payload.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022) Use of the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> to hijack execution flow may evade detection from security products since the execution can be masked under a legitimate process. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1574.013",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/013"
},
{
"description": "Saini, A. and Hossein, J. (2022, January 27). North Korea’s Lazarus APT leverages Windows Update client, GitHub in latest campaign. Retrieved January 27, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Lazarus APT January 2022",
"url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/01/north-koreas-lazarus-apt-leverages-windows-update-client-github-in-latest-campaign/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft Defender Security Research Team. (2018, March 1). FinFisher exposed: A researcher’s tale of defeating traps, tricks, and complex virtual machines. Retrieved January 27, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FinFisher exposed ",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2018/03/01/finfisher-exposed-a-researchers-tale-of-defeating-traps-tricks-and-complex-virtual-machines/"
},
{
"description": "odzhan. (2019, May 25). Windows Process Injection: KernelCallbackTable used by FinFisher / FinSpy. Retrieved February 4, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Windows Process Injection KernelCallbackTable",
"url": "https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/05/25/windows-injection-finspy/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2021, November 23). NtQueryInformationProcess function (winternl.h). Retrieved February 4, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "NtQueryInformationProcess",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winternl/nf-winternl-ntqueryinformationprocess"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious behaviors that could relate to post-compromise behavior.
Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances. for known bad sequence of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as <code>WriteProcessMemory()</code> and <code>NtQueryInformationProcess()</code> with the parameter set to <code>ProcessBasicInformation</code> may be used for this technique.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--a51eb150-93b1-484b-a503-e51453b127a4 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T17:01:42.558000Z" | "2021-04-15T03:45:31.020000Z" | Search Closed Sources | Adversaries may search and gather information about victims from closed sources that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase from reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of technical/threat intelligence data.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data)
Adversaries may search in different closed databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1597",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597"
},
{
"description": "Banerd, W. (2019, April 30). 10 of the Best Open Source Threat Intelligence Feeds. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "D3Secutrity CTI Feeds",
"url": "https://d3security.com/blog/10-of-the-best-open-source-threat-intelligence-feeds/"
},
{
"description": "Cimpanu, C. (2020, May 9). A hacker group is selling more than 73 million user records on the dark web. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ZDNET Selling Data",
"url": "https://www.zdnet.com/article/a-hacker-group-is-selling-more-than-73-million-user-records-on-the-dark-web/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--a542bac9-7bc1-4da7-9a09-96f69e23cc21 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-12T17:50:31.584000Z" | "2023-09-08T11:56:26.862000Z" | Systemd Timers | Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension <code>.timer</code> that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020) Systemd timers may be activated remotely via the <code>systemctl</code> command line utility, which operates over [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: Systemd Remote Control)
Each <code>.timer</code> file must have a corresponding <code>.service</code> file with the same name, e.g., <code>example.timer</code> and <code>example.service</code>. <code>.service</code> files are [Systemd Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002) unit files that are managed by the systemd system and service manager.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014) Privileged timers are written to <code>/etc/systemd/system/</code> and <code>/usr/lib/systemd/system</code> while user level are written to <code>~/.config/systemd/user/</code>.
An adversary may use systemd timers to execute malicious code at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.(Citation: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citation: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018) Timers installed using privileged paths may be used to maintain root level persistence. Adversaries may also install user level timers to achieve user level persistence.(Citation: Falcon Sandbox smp: 28553b3a9d) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1053.006",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/006"
},
{
"description": "Aaron Kili. (2018, January 16). How to Control Systemd Services on Remote Linux Server. Retrieved July 26, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Systemd Remote Control",
"url": "https://www.tecmint.com/control-systemd-services-on-remote-linux-server/"
},
{
"description": "archlinux. (2020, August 11). systemd/Timers. Retrieved October 12, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020",
"url": "https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Systemd/Timers"
},
{
"description": "Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). ~x file downloaded in public Arch package compromise. Retrieved April 23, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/campuscodi/74d0d2e35d8fd9499c76333ce027345a"
},
{
"description": "Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). Malware Found in Arch Linux AUR Package Repository. Retrieved April 23, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018",
"url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/"
},
{
"description": "Eli Schwartz. (2018, June 8). acroread package compromised. Retrieved April 23, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018",
"url": "https://lists.archlinux.org/pipermail/aur-general/2018-July/034153.html"
},
{
"description": "Hybrid Analysis. (2018, July 11). HybridAnalsysis of sample 28553b3a9d2ad4361d33d29ac4bf771d008e0073cec01b5561c6348a608f8dd7. Retrieved September 8, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Falcon Sandbox smp: 28553b3a9d",
"url": "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/28553b3a9d2ad4361d33d29ac4bf771d008e0073cec01b5561c6348a608f8dd7?environmentId=300"
},
{
"description": "Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page. Retrieved April 23, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014",
"url": "http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Systemd timer unit files may be detected by auditing file creation and modification events within the <code>/etc/systemd/system</code>, <code>/usr/lib/systemd/system/</code>, and <code>~/.config/systemd/user/</code> directories, as well as associated symbolic links. Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this manner will have a parent process of ‘systemd’, a parent process ID of 1, and will usually execute as the ‘root’ user.
Suspicious systemd timers can also be identified by comparing results against a trusted system baseline. Malicious systemd timers may be detected by using the systemctl utility to examine system wide timers: <code>systemctl list-timers –all</code>. Analyze the contents of corresponding <code>.service</code> files present on the file system and ensure that they refer to legitimate, expected executables.
Audit the execution and command-line arguments of the 'systemd-run' utility as it may be used to create timers.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--a62a8db3-f23a-4d8f-afd6-9dbc77e7813b | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-02T18:45:07.892000Z" | "2024-03-01T16:56:32.245000Z" | Phishing | Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns.
Adversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source, as well as evasive techniques such as removing or manipulating emails or metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused to send messages (e.g., [Email Hiding Rules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/008)).(Citation: Microsoft OAuth Spam 2022)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 VBA Infostealer 2014) Another way to accomplish this is by forging or spoofing(Citation: Proofpoint-spoof) the identity of the sender which can be used to fool both the human recipient as well as automated security tools.(Citation: cyberproof-double-bounce)
Victims may also receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a phone number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL, download malware,(Citation: sygnia Luna Month)(Citation: CISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software) or install adversary-accessible remote management tools onto their computer (i.e., [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204)).(Citation: Unit42 Luna Moth) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "initial-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1566",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566"
},
{
"description": "Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ACSC Email Spoofing",
"url": "https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf"
},
{
"description": "CISA. (n.d.). Protecting Against Malicious Use of Remote Monitoring and Management Software. Retrieved February 2, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa23-025a"
},
{
"description": "Itkin, Liora. (2022, September 1). Double-bounced attacks with email spoofing . Retrieved February 24, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "cyberproof-double-bounce",
"url": "https://blog.cyberproof.com/blog/double-bounced-attacks-with-email-spoofing-2022-trends"
},
{
"description": "Kristopher Russo. (n.d.). Luna Moth Callback Phishing Campaign. Retrieved February 2, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Unit42 Luna Moth",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/luna-moth-callback-phishing/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Anti Spoofing",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2023, September 22). Malicious OAuth applications abuse cloud email services to spread spam. Retrieved March 13, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft OAuth Spam 2022",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/09/22/malicious-oauth-applications-used-to-compromise-email-servers-and-spread-spam/"
},
{
"description": "Oren Biderman, Tomer Lahiyani, Noam Lifshitz, Ori Porag. (n.d.). LUNA MOTH: THE THREAT ACTORS BEHIND RECENT FALSE SUBSCRIPTION SCAMS. Retrieved February 2, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "sygnia Luna Month",
"url": "https://blog.sygnia.co/luna-moth-false-subscription-scams"
},
{
"description": "Proofpoint. (n.d.). What Is Email Spoofing?. Retrieved February 24, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Proofpoint-spoof",
"url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-reference/email-spoofing"
},
{
"description": "Vicky Ray and Rob Downs. (2014, October 29). Examining a VBA-Initiated Infostealer Campaign. Retrieved March 13, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Palo Alto Unit 42 VBA Infostealer 2014",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/examining-vba-initiated-infostealer-campaign/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect phishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems.
Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)
URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link.
Because most common third-party services used for phishing via service leverage TLS encryption, SSL/TLS inspection is generally required to detect the initial communication/delivery. With SSL/TLS inspection intrusion detection signatures or other security gateway appliances may be able to detect malware.
Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded on the user's computer. Many possible detections of follow-on behavior may take place once [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"SaaS",
"Office 365",
"Google Workspace"
] | 2.5 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--a6557c75-798f-42e4-be70-ab4502e0a3bc | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-20T00:05:48.790000Z" | "2020-10-22T02:18:19.568000Z" | ROMMONkit | Adversaries may abuse the ROM Monitor (ROMMON) by loading an unauthorized firmware with adversary code to provide persistent access and manipulate device behavior that is difficult to detect. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)
ROMMON is a Cisco network device firmware that functions as a boot loader, boot image, or boot helper to initialize hardware and software when the platform is powered on or reset. Similar to [TFTP Boot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/005), an adversary may upgrade the ROMMON image locally or remotely (for example, through TFTP) with adversary code and restart the device in order to overwrite the existing ROMMON image. This provides adversaries with the means to update the ROMMON to gain persistence on a system in a way that may be difficult to detect. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1542.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004"
},
{
"description": "Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco Synful Knock Evolution",
"url": "https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices"
},
{
"description": "Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks",
"url": "https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | There are no documented means for defenders to validate the operation of the ROMMON outside of vendor support. If a network device is suspected of being compromised, contact the vendor to assist in further investigation. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Network"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--a6937325-9321-4e2e-bb2b-3ed2d40b2a9d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-23T18:53:54.377000Z" | "2023-10-18T16:31:56.936000Z" | Compiled HTML File | Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious code. CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help May 2018) CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help ActiveX) loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help Executable Program)
A custom CHM file containing embedded payloads could be delivered to a victim then triggered by [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). CHM execution may also bypass application application control on older and/or unpatched systems that do not account for execution of binaries through hh.exe. (Citation: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017) (Citation: Microsoft CVE-2017-8625 Aug 2017) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1218.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, August 8). CVE-2017-8625 - Internet Explorer Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability. Retrieved October 3, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft CVE-2017-8625 Aug 2017",
"url": "https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-8625"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 30). Microsoft HTML Help 1.4. Retrieved October 3, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft HTML Help May 2018",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/desktop/htmlhelp/microsoft-html-help-1-4-sdk"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). About the HTML Help Executable Program. Retrieved October 3, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft HTML Help Executable Program",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ms524405"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). HTML Help ActiveX Control Overview. Retrieved October 3, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft HTML Help ActiveX",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ms644670"
},
{
"description": "Moe, O. (2017, August 13). Bypassing Device guard UMCI using CHM – CVE-2017-8625. Retrieved October 3, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MsitPros CHM Aug 2017",
"url": "https://oddvar.moe/2017/08/13/bypassing-device-guard-umci-using-chm-cve-2017-8625/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor and analyze the execution and arguments of hh.exe. (Citation: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017) Compare recent invocations of hh.exe with prior history of known good arguments to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity (ex: obfuscated and/or malicious commands). Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior, such as if hh.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques.
Monitor presence and use of CHM files, especially if they are not typically used within an environment. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 2.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--a750a9f6-0bde-4bb3-9aae-1e2786e9780c | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-31T12:39:18.816000Z" | "2023-04-13T17:15:56.948000Z" | Network Share Connection Removal | Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation. Windows shared drive and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) connections can be removed when no longer needed. [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections with the <code>net use \\system\share /delete</code> command. (Citation: Technet Net Use) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1070.005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/005"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Net Use. Retrieved November 25, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Technet Net Use",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Network share connections may be common depending on how an network environment is used. Monitor command-line invocation of <code>net use</code> commands associated with establishing and removing remote shares over SMB, including following best practices for detection of [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077). SMB traffic between systems may also be captured and decoded to look for related network share session and file transfer activity. Windows authentication logs are also useful in determining when authenticated network shares are established and by which account, and can be used to correlate network share activity to other events to investigate potentially malicious activity. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--a782ebe2-daba-42c7-bc82-e8e9d923162d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-14T23:23:41.770000Z" | "2024-04-19T13:24:36.872000Z" | Multi-hop Proxy | Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.
For example, adversaries may construct or use onion routing networks – such as the publicly available [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) network – to transport encrypted C2 traffic through a compromised population, allowing communication with any device within the network.(Citation: Onion Routing)
In the case of network infrastructure, it is possible for an adversary to leverage multiple compromised devices to create a multi-hop proxy chain (i.e., [Network Devices](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/008)). By leveraging [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) on routers, adversaries can add custom code to the affected network devices that will implement onion routing between those nodes. This method is dependent upon the [Network Boundary Bridging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599) method allowing the adversaries to cross the protected network boundary of the Internet perimeter and into the organization’s Wide-Area Network (WAN). Protocols such as ICMP may be used as a transport.
Similarly, adversaries may abuse peer-to-peer (P2P) and blockchain-oriented infrastructure to implement routing between a decentralized network of peers.(Citation: NGLite Trojan) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1090.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003"
},
{
"description": "Robert Falcone, Jeff White, and Peter Renals. (2021, November 7). Targeted Attack Campaign Against ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus Delivers Godzilla Webshells, NGLite Trojan and KdcSponge Stealer. Retrieved February 8, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "NGLite Trojan",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/manageengine-godzilla-nglite-kdcsponge/"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (n.d.). Onion Routing. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Onion Routing",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | When observing use of Multi-hop proxies, network data from the actual command and control servers could allow correlating incoming and outgoing flows to trace malicious traffic back to its source. Multi-hop proxies can also be detected by alerting on traffic to known anonymity networks (such as [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183)) or known adversary infrastructure that uses this technique.
In context of network devices, monitor traffic for encrypted communications from the Internet that is addressed to border routers. Compare this traffic with the configuration to determine whether it matches with any configured site-to-site Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections the device was intended to have. Monitor traffic for encrypted communications originating from potentially breached routers that is addressed to other routers within the organization. Compare the source and destination with the configuration of the device to determine if these channels are an authorized Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections or other encrypted modes of communication. Monitor ICMP traffic from the Internet that is addressed to border routers and is encrypted. Few if any legitimate use cases exist for sending encrypted data to a network device via ICMP. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 2.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:31:22.767000Z" | "2024-01-29T18:53:26.593000Z" | Brute Force | Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained.(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020) Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018) Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes.
Brute forcing credentials may take place at various points during a breach. For example, adversaries may attempt to brute force access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) within a victim environment leveraging knowledge gathered from other post-compromise behaviors such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), [Account Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087), or [Password Policy Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201). Adversaries may also combine brute forcing activity with behaviors such as [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) as part of Initial Access. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1110",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110"
},
{
"description": "Hacquebord, F., Remorin, L. (2020, December 17). Pawn Storm’s Lack of Sophistication as a Strategy. Retrieved January 13, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020",
"url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/l/pawn-storm-lack-of-sophistication-as-a-strategy.html"
},
{
"description": "Joe Slowik. (2018, October 12). Anatomy of an Attack: Detecting and Defeating CRASHOVERRIDE. Retrieved December 18, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Dragos Crashoverride 2018",
"url": "https://www.dragos.com/wp-content/uploads/CRASHOVERRIDE2018.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials. Also monitor for many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result from password spraying attempts. It is difficult to detect when hashes are cracked, since this is generally done outside the scope of the target network. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Azure AD",
"Office 365",
"SaaS",
"IaaS",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Google Workspace",
"Containers",
"Network"
] | 2.5 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--a9d4b653-6915-42af-98b2-5758c4ceee56 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-09T14:15:05.330000Z" | "2024-04-16T12:24:40.163000Z" | Unix Shell | Adversaries may abuse Unix shell commands and scripts for execution. Unix shells are the primary command prompt on Linux and macOS systems, though many variations of the Unix shell exist (e.g. sh, bash, zsh, etc.) depending on the specific OS or distribution.(Citation: DieNet Bash)(Citation: Apple ZShell) Unix shells can control every aspect of a system, with certain commands requiring elevated privileges.
Unix shells also support scripts that enable sequential execution of commands as well as other typical programming operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of shell scripts include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems.
Adversaries may abuse Unix shells to execute various commands or payloads. Interactive shells may be accessed through command and control channels or during lateral movement such as with [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004). Adversaries may also leverage shell scripts to deliver and execute multiple commands on victims or as part of payloads used for persistence. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1059.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (2020, January 28). Use zsh as the default shell on your Mac. Retrieved June 12, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Apple ZShell",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/HT208050"
},
{
"description": "die.net. (n.d.). bash(1) - Linux man page. Retrieved June 12, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "DieNet Bash",
"url": "https://linux.die.net/man/1/bash"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Unix shell usage may be common on administrator, developer, or power user systems, depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.
Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information discovery, collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS",
"Linux",
"Network"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--a9e2cea0-c805-4bf8-9e31-f5f0513a3634 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-11-07T20:06:02.624000Z" | "2021-08-16T21:29:19.697000Z" | Outlook Forms | Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook forms to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook forms are used as templates for presentation and functionality in Outlook messages. Custom Outlook forms can be created that will execute code when a specifically crafted email is sent by an adversary utilizing the same custom Outlook form.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms)
Once malicious forms have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious forms will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1137.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/003"
},
{
"description": "Stalmans, E. (2017, April 28). Outlook Forms and Shells. Retrieved February 4, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SensePost Outlook Forms",
"url": "https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/outlook-forms-and-shells/"
},
{
"description": "Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack"
},
{
"description": "SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SensePost NotRuler",
"url": "https://github.com/sensepost/notruler"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)
Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Office 365"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--ac08589e-ee59-4935-8667-d845e38fe579 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-21T20:32:20.810000Z" | "2024-04-12T21:13:46.640000Z" | Disable or Modify Tools | Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. This may take many forms, such as killing security software processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information. Adversaries may also disable updates to prevent the latest security patches from reaching tools on victim systems.(Citation: SCADAfence_ransomware)
Adversaries may also tamper with artifacts deployed and utilized by security tools. Security tools may make dynamic changes to system components in order to maintain visibility into specific events. For example, security products may load their own modules and/or modify those loaded by processes to facilitate data collection. Similar to [Indicator Blocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006), adversaries may unhook or otherwise modify these features added by tools (especially those that exist in userland or are otherwise potentially accessible to adversaries) to avoid detection.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls)
Adversaries may also focus on specific applications such as Sysmon. For example, the “Start” and “Enable” values in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon-Operational</code> may be modified to tamper with and potentially disable Sysmon logging.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging)
On network devices, adversaries may attempt to skip digital signature verification checks by altering startup configuration files and effectively disabling firmware verification that typically occurs at boot.(Citation: Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation)(Citation: Analysis of FG-IR-22-369)
In cloud environments, tools disabled by adversaries may include cloud monitoring agents that report back to services such as AWS CloudWatch or Google Cloud Monitor.
Furthermore, although defensive tools may have anti-tampering mechanisms, adversaries may abuse tools such as legitimate rootkit removal kits to impair and/or disable these tools.(Citation: chasing_avaddon_ransomware)(Citation: dharma_ransomware)(Citation: demystifying_ryuk)(Citation: doppelpaymer_crowdstrike) For example, adversaries have used tools such as GMER to find and shut down hidden processes and antivirus software on infected systems.(Citation: demystifying_ryuk)
Additionally, adversaries may exploit legitimate drivers from anti-virus software to gain access to kernel space (i.e. [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068)), which may lead to bypassing anti-tampering features.(Citation: avoslocker_ransomware) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1562.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001"
},
{
"description": " Guillaume Lovet and Alex Kong. (2023, March 9). Analysis of FG-IR-22-369. Retrieved May 15, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Analysis of FG-IR-22-369",
"url": "https://www.fortinet.com/blog/psirt-blogs/fg-ir-22-369-psirt-analysis"
},
{
"description": "ALEXANDER MARVI, BRAD SLAYBAUGH, DAN EBREO, TUFAIL AHMED, MUHAMMAD UMAIR, TINA JOHNSON. (2023, March 16). Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation. Retrieved May 15, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fortinet-malware-ecosystem"
},
{
"description": "de Plaa, C. (2019, June 19). Red Team Tactics: Combining Direct System Calls and sRDI to bypass AV/EDR. Retrieved September 29, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "OutFlank System Calls",
"url": "https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/06/19/red-team-tactics-combining-direct-system-calls-and-srdi-to-bypass-av-edr/"
},
{
"description": "Heiligenstein, L. (n.d.). REP-25: Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved April 7, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "disable_win_evt_logging",
"url": "https://ptylu.github.io/content/report/report.html?report=25"
},
{
"description": "Hernandez, A. S. Tarter, P. Ocamp, E. J. (2022, January 19). One Source to Rule Them All: Chasing AVADDON Ransomware. Retrieved January 26, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "chasing_avaddon_ransomware",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/chasing-avaddon-ransomware"
},
{
"description": "Hurley, S. (2021, December 7). Critical Hit: How DoppelPaymer Hunts and Kills Windows Processes. Retrieved January 26, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "doppelpaymer_crowdstrike",
"url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-doppelpaymer-hunts-and-kills-windows-processes/"
},
{
"description": "Lakshmanan, R. (2022, May 2). AvosLocker Ransomware Variant Using New Trick to Disable Antivirus Protection. Retrieved May 17, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "avoslocker_ransomware",
"url": "https://thehackernews.com/2022/05/avoslocker-ransomware-variant-using-new.html"
},
{
"description": "Loui, E. Scheuerman, K. et al. (2020, April 16). Targeted Dharma Ransomware Intrusions Exhibit Consistent Techniques. Retrieved January 26, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "dharma_ransomware",
"url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/targeted-dharma-ransomware-intrusions-exhibit-consistent-techniques/"
},
{
"description": "MDSec Research. (2020, December). Bypassing User-Mode Hooks and Direct Invocation of System Calls for Red Teams. Retrieved September 29, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MDSec System Calls",
"url": "https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/12/bypassing-user-mode-hooks-and-direct-invocation-of-system-calls-for-red-teams/"
},
{
"description": "Shaked, O. (2020, January 20). Anatomy of a Targeted Ransomware Attack. Retrieved June 18, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SCADAfence_ransomware",
"url": "https://cdn.logic-control.com/docs/scadafence/Anatomy-Of-A-Targeted-Ransomware-Attack-WP.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Tran, T. (2020, November 24). Demystifying Ransomware Attacks Against Microsoft Defender Solution. Retrieved January 26, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "demystifying_ryuk",
"url": "https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/core-infrastructure-and-security/demystifying-ransomware-attacks-against-microsoft-defender/ba-p/1928947"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools/services are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Monitoring for changes to other known features used by deployed security tools may also expose malicious activity.
Lack of expected log events may be suspicious. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"macOS",
"Linux",
"Containers",
"IaaS",
"Network"
] | 1.5 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--ac9e6b22-11bf-45d7-9181-c1cb08360931 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-02T14:19:22.609000Z" | "2024-02-02T17:18:39.004000Z" | Data Manipulation | Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data in order to influence external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data.(Citation: Sygnia Elephant Beetle Jan 2022) By manipulating data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, or decision making.
The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "impact"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1565",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565"
},
{
"description": "Sygnia Incident Response Team. (2022, January 5). TG2003: ELEPHANT BEETLE UNCOVERING AN ORGANIZED FINANCIAL-THEFT OPERATION. Retrieved February 9, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sygnia Elephant Beetle Jan 2022",
"url": "https://f.hubspotusercontent30.net/hubfs/8776530/Sygnia-%20Elephant%20Beetle_Jan2022.pdf?__hstc=147695848.3e8f1a482c8f8d4531507747318e660b.1680005306711.1680005306711.1680005306711.1&__hssc=147695848.1.1680005306711&__hsfp=3000179024&hsCtaTracking=189ec409-ae2d-4909-8bf1-62dcdd694372%7Cca91d317-8f10-4a38-9f80-367f551ad64d"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Where applicable, inspect important file hashes, locations, and modifications for suspicious/unexpected values. With some critical processes involving transmission of data, manual or out-of-band integrity checking may be useful for identifying manipulated data. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--acd0ba37-7ba9-4cc5-ac61-796586cd856d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-12T14:08:48.689000Z" | "2022-03-11T20:23:23.122000Z" | Inter-Process Communication | Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically used by processes to share data, communicate with each other, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to avoid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processes are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern.
Adversaries may abuse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanisms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a form accessible through programming languages/libraries or native interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) or [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001). Linux environments support several different IPC mechanisms, two of which being sockets and pipes.(Citation: Linux IPC) Higher level execution mediums, such as those of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. Adversaries may also use [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) to facilitate remote IPC execution.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1559",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559"
},
{
"description": "N/A. (2021, April 1). Inter Process Communication (IPC). Retrieved March 11, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Linux IPC",
"url": "https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/inter-process-communication-ipc/#:~:text=Inter%2Dprocess%20communication%20(IPC),of%20co%2Doperation%20between%20them."
},
{
"description": "Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for strings in files/commands, loaded DLLs/libraries, or spawned processes that are associated with abuse of IPC mechanisms. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"macOS",
"Linux"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:18.931000Z" | "2024-02-02T19:04:35.389000Z" | Data Obfuscation | Adversaries may obfuscate command and control traffic to make it more difficult to detect.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020) Command and control (C2) communications are hidden (but not necessarily encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult to discover or decipher and to make the communication less conspicuous and hide commands from being seen. This encompasses many methods, such as adding junk data to protocol traffic, using steganography, or impersonating legitimate protocols. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001"
},
{
"description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Vrabie, V. (2020, November). Dissecting a Chinese APT Targeting South Eastern Asian Government Institutions. Retrieved September 19, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020",
"url": "https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/379/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-Chinese-APT.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--ae676644-d2d2-41b7-af7e-9bed1b55898c | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:41.022000Z" | "2023-08-11T21:06:07.690000Z" | Data from Network Shared Drive | Adversaries may search network shares on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from remote systems via shared network drives (host shared directory, network file server, etc.) that are accessible from the current system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) may be used to gather information. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1039",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1039"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a network share. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--ae797531-3219-49a4-bccf-324ad7a4c7b2 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-01T01:01:00.176000Z" | "2023-04-12T20:19:21.620000Z" | Web Services | Adversaries may compromise access to third-party web services that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for legitimate users to register for web-based services, such as GitHub, Twitter, Dropbox, Google, SendGrid, etc. Adversaries may try to take ownership of a legitimate user's access to a web service and use that web service as infrastructure in support of cyber operations. Such web services can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)), [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567), or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Recorded Future Turla Infra 2020) Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. By utilizing a web service, particularly when access is stolen from legitimate users, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. Additionally, leveraging compromised web-based email services may allow adversaries to leverage the trust associated with legitimate domains. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1584.006",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/006"
},
{
"description": "Insikt Group. (2020, March 12). Swallowing the Snake’s Tail: Tracking Turla Infrastructure. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Recorded Future Turla Infra 2020",
"url": "https://www.recordedfuture.com/turla-apt-infrastructure/"
},
{
"description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020",
"url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Once adversaries leverage the abused web service as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--ae7f3575-0a5e-427e-991b-fe03ad44c754 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-19T19:42:19.740000Z" | "2020-10-22T17:50:47.635000Z" | Modify System Image | Adversaries may make changes to the operating system of embedded network devices to weaken defenses and provide new capabilities for themselves. On such devices, the operating systems are typically monolithic and most of the device functionality and capabilities are contained within a single file.
To change the operating system, the adversary typically only needs to affect this one file, replacing or modifying it. This can either be done live in memory during system runtime for immediate effect, or in storage to implement the change on the next boot of the network device. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1601",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Most embedded network devices provide a command to print the version of the currently running operating system. Use this command to query the operating system for its version number and compare it to what is expected for the device in question. Because this method may be used in conjunction with [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001), it may be appropriate to also verify the integrity of the vendor provided operating system image file.
Compare the checksum of the operating system file with the checksum of a known good copy from a trusted source. Some embedded network device platforms may have the capability to calculate the checksum of the file, while others may not. Even for those platforms that have the capability, it is recommended to download a copy of the file to a trusted computer to calculate the checksum with software that is not compromised. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification)
Many vendors of embedded network devices can provide advanced debugging support that will allow them to work with device owners to validate the integrity of the operating system running in memory. If a compromise of the operating system is suspected, contact the vendor technical support and seek such services for a more thorough inspection of the current running system. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Network"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--aedfca76-3b30-4866-b2aa-0f1d7fd1e4b6 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-12T20:38:12.465000Z" | "2023-11-21T20:02:33.404000Z" | Hijack Execution Flow | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution.
There are many ways an adversary may hijack the flow of execution, including by manipulating how the operating system locates programs to be executed. How the operating system locates libraries to be used by a program can also be intercepted. Locations where the operating system looks for programs/resources, such as file directories and in the case of Windows the Registry, could also be poisoned to include malicious payloads. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1574",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574"
},
{
"description": "Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96. Retrieved March 13, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Autoruns for Windows",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious.
Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data.
Monitor for changes to environment variables, as well as the commands to implement these changes.
Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so, abnormal process call trees). Track library metadata, such as a hash, and compare libraries that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.
Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: Autoruns for Windows) Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--b0533c6e-8fea-4788-874f-b799cacc4b92 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-19T21:27:32.820000Z" | "2022-04-28T16:07:48.062000Z" | Indicator Removal from Tools | Adversaries may remove indicators from tools if they believe their malicious tool was detected, quarantined, or otherwise curtailed. They can modify the tool by removing the indicator and using the updated version that is no longer detected by the target's defensive systems or subsequent targets that may use similar systems.
A good example of this is when malware is detected with a file signature and quarantined by anti-virus software. An adversary who can determine that the malware was quarantined because of its file signature may modify the file to explicitly avoid that signature, and then re-use the malware. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1027.005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/005"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | The first detection of a malicious tool may trigger an anti-virus or other security tool alert. Similar events may also occur at the boundary through network IDS, email scanning appliance, etc. The initial detection should be treated as an indication of a potentially more invasive intrusion. The alerting system should be thoroughly investigated beyond that initial alert for activity that was not detected. Adversaries may continue with an operation, assuming that individual events like an anti-virus detect will not be investigated or that an analyst will not be able to conclusively link that event to other activity occurring on the network. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--b0c74ef9-c61e-4986-88cb-78da98a355ec | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-03-30T17:20:05.789000Z" | "2021-08-26T16:42:35.318000Z" | Malicious Image | Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to facilitate execution. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be backdoored. Backdoored images may be uploaded to a public repository via [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), and users may then download and deploy an instance or container from the image without realizing the image is malicious, thus bypassing techniques that specifically achieve Initial Access. This can lead to the execution of malicious code, such as code that executes cryptocurrency mining, in the instance or container.(Citation: Summit Route Malicious AMIs)
Adversaries may also name images a certain way to increase the chance of users mistakenly deploying an instance or container from the image (ex: [Match Legitimate Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)).(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1204.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/003"
},
{
"description": "Piper, S.. (2018, September 24). Investigating Malicious AMIs. Retrieved March 30, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Summit Route Malicious AMIs",
"url": "https://summitroute.com/blog/2018/09/24/investigating_malicious_amis/"
},
{
"description": "Team Nautilus. (2021, June). Attacks in the Wild on the Container Supply Chain and Infrastructure. Retrieved August 26, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021",
"url": "https://info.aquasec.com/hubfs/Threat%20reports/AquaSecurity_Cloud_Native_Threat_Report_2021.pdf?utm_campaign=WP%20-%20Jun2021%20Nautilus%202021%20Threat%20Research%20Report&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=132931006&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_8oopT5Uhqab8B7kE0l3iFo1koirxtyfTehxF7N-EdGYrwk30gfiwp5SiNlW3G0TNKZxUcDkYOtwQ9S6nNVNyEO-Dgrw&utm_content=132931006&utm_source=hs_automation"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor the local image registry to make sure malicious images are not added. Track the deployment of new containers, especially from newly built images. Monitor the behavior of containers within the environment to detect anomalous behavior or malicious activity after users deploy from malicious images. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"IaaS",
"Containers"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--b0e54bf7-835e-4f44-bd8e-62f431b9b76a | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2024-02-15T13:41:46.784000Z" | "2024-04-16T12:35:38.832000Z" | Container Service | Adversaries may create or modify container or container cluster management tools that run as daemons, agents, or services on individual hosts. These include software for creating and managing individual containers, such as Docker and Podman, as well as container cluster node-level agents such as kubelet. By modifying these services, an adversary may be able to achieve persistence or escalate their privileges on a host.
For example, by using the `docker run` or `podman run` command with the `restart=always` directive, a container can be configured to persistently restart on the host.(Citation: AquaSec TeamTNT 2023) A user with access to the (rootful) docker command may also be able to escalate their privileges on the host.(Citation: GTFOBins Docker)
In Kubernetes environments, DaemonSets allow an adversary to persistently [Deploy Container](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610)s on all nodes, including ones added later to the cluster.(Citation: Aquasec Kubernetes Attack 2023)(Citation: Kubernetes DaemonSet) Pods can also be deployed to specific nodes using the `nodeSelector` or `nodeName` fields in the pod spec.(Citation: Kubernetes Assigning Pods to Nodes)(Citation: AppSecco Kubernetes Namespace Breakout 2020)
Note that containers can also be configured to run as [Systemd Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002)s.(Citation: Podman Systemd)(Citation: Docker Systemd) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1543.005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/005"
},
{
"description": "Abhisek Datta. (2020, March 18). Kubernetes Namespace Breakout using Insecure Host Path Volume — Part 1. Retrieved January 16, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AppSecco Kubernetes Namespace Breakout 2020",
"url": "https://blog.appsecco.com/kubernetes-namespace-breakout-using-insecure-host-path-volume-part-1-b382f2a6e216"
},
{
"description": "Docker. (n.d.). Start containers automatically. Retrieved February 15, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Docker Systemd",
"url": "https://docs.docker.com/config/containers/start-containers-automatically/"
},
{
"description": "GTFOBins. (n.d.). docker. Retrieved February 15, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GTFOBins Docker",
"url": "https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/docker/"
},
{
"description": "Kubernetes. (n.d.). Assigning Pods to Nodes. Retrieved February 15, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kubernetes Assigning Pods to Nodes",
"url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/scheduling-eviction/assign-pod-node/"
},
{
"description": "Kubernetes. (n.d.). DaemonSet. Retrieved February 15, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kubernetes DaemonSet",
"url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/daemonset/"
},
{
"description": "Michael Katchinskiy, Assaf Morag. (2023, April 21). First-Ever Attack Leveraging Kubernetes RBAC to Backdoor Clusters. Retrieved July 14, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Aquasec Kubernetes Attack 2023",
"url": "https://blog.aquasec.com/leveraging-kubernetes-rbac-to-backdoor-clusters"
},
{
"description": "Ofek Itach and Assaf Morag. (2023, July 13). TeamTNT Reemerged with New Aggressive Cloud Campaign. Retrieved February 15, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AquaSec TeamTNT 2023",
"url": "https://blog.aquasec.com/teamtnt-reemerged-with-new-aggressive-cloud-campaign"
},
{
"description": "Valentin Rothberg. (2022, March 16). How to run pods as systemd services with Podman. Retrieved February 15, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Podman Systemd",
"url": "https://www.redhat.com/sysadmin/podman-run-pods-systemd-services"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Containers"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:31:00.645000Z" | "2023-03-30T21:01:51.631000Z" | Valid Accounts | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop.(Citation: volexity_0day_sophos_FW) Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
In some cases, adversaries may abuse inactive accounts: for example, those belonging to individuals who are no longer part of an organization. Using these accounts may allow the adversary to evade detection, as the original account user will not be present to identify any anomalous activity taking place on their account.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)
The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise.(Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "initial-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1078",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078"
},
{
"description": "Adair, S., Lancaster, T., Volexity Threat Research. (2022, June 15). DriftingCloud: Zero-Day Sophos Firewall Exploitation and an Insidious Breach. Retrieved July 1, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "volexity_0day_sophos_FW",
"url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/15/driftingcloud-zero-day-sophos-firewall-exploitation-and-an-insidious-breach/"
},
{
"description": "Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2022, March 15). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Gain Network Access by Exploiting Default Multifactor Authentication Protocols and “PrintNightmare” Vulnerability. Retrieved March 16, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CISA MFA PrintNightmare",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-074a"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Credential Theft",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Audit Policy",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).
Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Azure AD",
"Office 365",
"SaaS",
"IaaS",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Google Workspace",
"Containers",
"Network"
] | 2.6 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--b18eae87-b469-4e14-b454-b171b416bc18 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-14T18:18:32.443000Z" | "2023-02-28T22:28:35.202000Z" | Non-Standard Port | Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port pairing that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088(Citation: Symantec Elfin Mar 2019) or port 587(Citation: Fortinet Agent Tesla April 2018) as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.
Adversaries may also make changes to victim systems to abuse non-standard ports. For example, Registry keys and other configuration settings can be used to modify protocol and port pairings.(Citation: change_rdp_port_conti) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1571",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1571"
},
{
"description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Security Response attack Investigation Team. (2019, March 27). Elfin: Relentless Espionage Group Targets Multiple Organizations in Saudi Arabia and U.S.. Retrieved April 10, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Symantec Elfin Mar 2019",
"url": "https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/elfin-apt33-espionage"
},
{
"description": "The DFIR Report. (2022, March 1). \"Change RDP port\" #ContiLeaks. Retrieved March 1, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "change_rdp_port_conti",
"url": "https://twitter.com/TheDFIRReport/status/1498657772254240768"
},
{
"description": "Zhang, X. (2018, April 05). Analysis of New Agent Tesla Spyware Variant. Retrieved November 5, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Fortinet Agent Tesla April 2018",
"url": "https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/analysis-of-new-agent-tesla-spyware-variant.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--b1ccd744-3f78-4a0e-9bb2-2002057f7928 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-01T01:08:41.124000Z" | "2021-10-16T17:37:34.563000Z" | Social Media Accounts | Adversaries may create and cultivate social media accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create social media accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)
For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of a persona on social media may be important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single social media site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Establishing a persona on social media may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos.
Once a persona has been developed an adversary can use it to create connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) These accounts may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1585.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001"
},
{
"description": "Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "NEWSCASTER2014",
"url": "https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation"
},
{
"description": "Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved March 6, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "BlackHatRobinSage",
"url": "http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently created/modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--b200542e-e877-4395-875b-cf1a44537ca4 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-14T17:21:54.470000Z" | "2023-08-11T21:37:00.009000Z" | Process Hollowing | Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Process hollowing is commonly performed by creating a process in a suspended state then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code. A victim process can be created with native Windows API calls such as <code>CreateProcess</code>, which includes a flag to suspend the processes primary thread. At this point the process can be unmapped using APIs calls such as <code>ZwUnmapViewOfSection</code> or <code>NtUnmapViewOfSection</code> before being written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed via <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>, <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, <code>SetThreadContext</code>, then <code>ResumeThread</code> respectively.(Citation: Leitch Hollowing)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
This is very similar to [Thread Local Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005) but creates a new process rather than targeting an existing process. This behavior will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However, execution via process hollowing may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1055.012",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012"
},
{
"description": "Daman, R. (2020, February 4). The return of the spoof part 2: Command line spoofing. Retrieved November 19, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020",
"url": "https://blog.nviso.eu/2020/02/04/the-return-of-the-spoof-part-2-command-line-spoofing/"
},
{
"description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017",
"url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
},
{
"description": "Leitch, J. (n.d.). Process Hollowing. Retrieved November 12, 2014.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Leitch Hollowing",
"url": "http://www.autosectools.com/process-hollowing.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Pena, E., Erikson, C. (2019, October 10). Staying Hidden on the Endpoint: Evading Detection with Shellcode. Retrieved November 29, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant Endpoint Evading 2019",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/staying-hidden-on-the-endpoint-evading-detection-with-shellcode"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as <code>CreateRemoteThread</code>, <code>SuspendThread</code>/<code>SetThreadContext</code>/<code>ResumeThread</code>, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>/<code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Processing hollowing commonly involves spawning an otherwise benign victim process. Consider correlating detections of processes created in a suspended state (ex: through API flags or process’ thread metadata) with other malicious activity such as attempts to modify a process' memory, especially by its parent process, or other abnormal process behavior.(Citation: Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020)(Citation: Mandiant Endpoint Evading 2019)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:55.066000Z" | "2023-04-07T17:13:54.168000Z" | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.
When initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and software commonly running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable. This could also enable an adversary to move from a virtualized environment, such as within a virtual machine or container, onto the underlying host. This may be a necessary step for an adversary compromising an endpoint system that has been properly configured and limits other privilege escalation methods.
Adversaries may bring a signed vulnerable driver onto a compromised machine so that they can exploit the vulnerability to execute code in kernel mode. This process is sometimes referred to as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD).(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020) Adversaries may include the vulnerable driver with files delivered during Initial Access or download it to a compromised system via [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) or [Lateral Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1068",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068"
},
{
"description": "Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ESET InvisiMole June 2020",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2020, October 15). Microsoft recommended driver block rules. Retrieved March 16, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Driver Block Rules",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules"
},
{
"description": "Reichel, D. and Idrizovic, E. (2020, June 17). AcidBox: Rare Malware Repurposing Turla Group Exploit Targeted Russian Organizations. Retrieved March 16, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Unit42 AcidBox June 2020",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution or evidence of Discovery. Consider monitoring for the presence or loading (ex: Sysmon Event ID 6) of known vulnerable drivers that adversaries may drop and exploit to execute code in kernel mode.(Citation: Microsoft Driver Block Rules)
Higher privileges are often necessary to perform additional actions such as some methods of [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). Look for additional activity that may indicate an adversary has gained higher privileges. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Containers"
] | 1.5 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--b22e5153-ac28-4cc6-865c-2054e36285cb | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-10-12T20:02:31.866000Z" | "2022-05-05T05:10:23.890000Z" | Resource Forking | Adversaries may abuse resource forks to hide malicious code or executables to evade detection and bypass security applications. A resource fork provides applications a structured way to store resources such as thumbnail images, menu definitions, icons, dialog boxes, and code.(Citation: macOS Hierarchical File System Overview) Usage of a resource fork is identifiable when displaying a file’s extended attributes, using <code>ls -l@</code> or <code>xattr -l</code> commands. Resource forks have been deprecated and replaced with the application bundle structure. Non-localized resources are placed at the top level directory of an application bundle, while localized resources are placed in the <code>/Resources</code> folder.(Citation: Resource and Data Forks)(Citation: ELC Extended Attributes)
Adversaries can use resource forks to hide malicious data that may otherwise be stored directly in files. Adversaries can execute content with an attached resource fork, at a specified offset, that is moved to an executable location then invoked. Resource fork content may also be obfuscated/encrypted until execution.(Citation: sentinellabs resource named fork 2020)(Citation: tau bundlore erika noerenberg 2020) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1564.009",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/009"
},
{
"description": "Erika Noerenberg. (2020, June 29). TAU Threat Analysis: Bundlore (macOS) mm-install-macos. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "tau bundlore erika noerenberg 2020",
"url": "https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2020/06/tau-threat-analysis-bundlore-macos-mm-install-macos.html"
},
{
"description": "Flylib. (n.d.). Identifying Resource and Data Forks. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Resource and Data Forks",
"url": "https://flylib.com/books/en/4.395.1.192/1/"
},
{
"description": "Howard Oakley. (2020, October 24). There's more to files than data: Extended Attributes. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ELC Extended Attributes",
"url": "https://eclecticlight.co/2020/10/24/theres-more-to-files-than-data-extended-attributes/"
},
{
"description": "Phil Stokes. (2020, November 5). Resourceful macOS Malware Hides in Named Fork. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "sentinellabs resource named fork 2020",
"url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/resourceful-macos-malware-hides-in-named-fork/"
},
{
"description": "Tenon. (n.d.). Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "macOS Hierarchical File System Overview",
"url": "http://tenon.com/products/codebuilder/User_Guide/6_File_Systems.html#anchor520553"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Identify files with the <code>com.apple.ResourceFork</code> extended attribute and large data amounts stored in resource forks.
Monitor command-line activity leveraging the use of resource forks, especially those immediately followed by potentially malicious activity such as creating network connections. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--b24e2a20-3b3d-4bf0-823b-1ed765398fb0 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-10-09T18:48:31.906000Z" | "2023-03-22T20:39:15.680000Z" | Account Access Removal | Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: changed credentials) to remove access to accounts. Adversaries may also subsequently log off and/or perform a [System Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529) to set malicious changes into place.(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)
In Windows, [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, <code>Set-LocalUser</code> and <code>Set-ADAccountPassword</code> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets may be used by adversaries to modify user accounts. In Linux, the <code>passwd</code> utility may be used to change passwords. Accounts could also be disabled by Group Policy.
Adversaries who use ransomware or similar attacks may first perform this and other Impact behaviors, such as [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491), in order to impede incident response/recovery before completing the [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) objective. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "impact"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1531",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531"
},
{
"description": "CarbonBlack Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, March 22). TAU Threat Intelligence Notification – LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 16, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019",
"url": "https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/03/22/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-lockergoga-ransomware/"
},
{
"description": "Harbison, M. (2019, March 26). Born This Way? Origins of LockerGoga. Retrieved April 16, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Unit42 LockerGoga 2019",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/born-this-way-origins-of-lockergoga/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in deleting accounts or changing passwords, such as use of [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Windows event logs may also designate activity associated with an adversary's attempt to remove access to an account:
* Event ID 4723 - An attempt was made to change an account's password
* Event ID 4724 - An attempt was made to reset an account's password
* Event ID 4726 - A user account was deleted
* Event ID 4740 - A user account was locked out
Alerting on [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) and these Event IDs may generate a high degree of false positives, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Office 365",
"SaaS"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--b2d03cea-aec1-45ca-9744-9ee583c1e1cc | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-11T18:39:59.959000Z" | "2024-03-07T14:28:02.910000Z" | Credential Stuffing | Adversaries may use credentials obtained from breach dumps of unrelated accounts to gain access to target accounts through credential overlap. Occasionally, large numbers of username and password pairs are dumped online when a website or service is compromised and the user account credentials accessed. The information may be useful to an adversary attempting to compromise accounts by taking advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts.
Credential stuffing is a risky option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies.
Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when stuffing credentials. Commonly targeted services include the following:
* SSH (22/TCP)
* Telnet (23/TCP)
* FTP (21/TCP)
* NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP)
* LDAP (389/TCP)
* Kerberos (88/TCP)
* RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP)
* HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP)
* MSSQL (1433/TCP)
* Oracle (1521/TCP)
* MySQL (3306/TCP)
* VNC (5900/TCP)
In addition to management services, adversaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols," as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1110.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/004"
},
{
"description": "US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "US-CERT TA18-068A 2018",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Azure AD",
"Office 365",
"SaaS",
"IaaS",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Google Workspace",
"Containers",
"Network"
] | 1.5 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:32.662000Z" | "2024-04-16T12:27:18.945000Z" | Obfuscated Files or Information | Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Payloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Sometimes a user's action may be required to open and [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) for [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016) Adversaries may also use compressed or archived scripts, such as JavaScript.
Portions of files can also be encoded to hide the plain-text strings that would otherwise help defenders with discovery. (Citation: Linux/Cdorked.A We Live Security Analysis) Payloads may also be split into separate, seemingly benign files that only reveal malicious functionality when reassembled. (Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016)
Adversaries may also abuse [Command Obfuscation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/010) to obscure commands executed from payloads or directly via [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). Environment variables, aliases, characters, and other platform/language specific semantics can be used to evade signature based detections and application control mechanisms. (Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017) (Citation: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017)(Citation: PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1027",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027"
},
{
"description": "Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January 11, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Volexity PowerDuke November 2016",
"url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/"
},
{
"description": "Bohannon, D. (2017, July 27). Revoke-Obfuscation. Retrieved February 12, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GitHub Revoke-Obfuscation",
"url": "https://github.com/danielbohannon/Revoke-Obfuscation"
},
{
"description": "Bohannon, D. & Carr N. (2017, June 30). Obfuscation in the Wild: Targeted Attackers Lead the Way in Evasion Techniques. Retrieved February 12, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye Obfuscation June 2017",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20170923102302/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/obfuscation-in-the-wild.html"
},
{
"description": "Bohannon, D. & Holmes, L. (2017, July 27). Revoke-Obfuscation: PowerShell Obfuscation Detection Using Science. Retrieved February 12, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/revoke-obfuscation-report.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Carr, N. (2016, August 14). OfficeCrackros. Retrieved February 12, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GitHub Office-Crackros Aug 2016",
"url": "https://github.com/itsreallynick/office-crackros"
},
{
"description": "Pierre-Marc Bureau. (2013, April 26). Linux/Cdorked.A: New Apache backdoor being used in the wild to serve Blackhole. Retrieved September 10, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Linux/Cdorked.A We Live Security Analysis",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/04/26/linuxcdorked-new-apache-backdoor-in-the-wild-serves-blackhole/"
},
{
"description": "Tedesco, B. (2016, September 23). Security Alert Summary. Retrieved February 12, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016",
"url": "https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/"
},
{
"description": "White, J. (2017, March 10). Pulling Back the Curtains on EncodedCommand PowerShell Attacks. Retrieved February 12, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017",
"url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-pulling-back-the-curtains-on-encodedcommand-powershell-attacks/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detection of file obfuscation is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are uniquely detectable with a signature. If detection of the obfuscation itself is not possible, it may be possible to detect the malicious activity that caused the obfuscated file (for example, the method that was used to write, read, or modify the file on the file system).
Flag and analyze commands containing indicators of obfuscation and known suspicious syntax such as uninterpreted escape characters like '''^''' and '''"'''. Windows' Sysmon and Event ID 4688 displays command-line arguments for processes. Deobfuscation tools can be used to detect these indicators in files/payloads. (Citation: GitHub Revoke-Obfuscation) (Citation: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017) (Citation: GitHub Office-Crackros Aug 2016)
Obfuscation used in payloads for Initial Access can be detected at the network. Use network intrusion detection systems and email gateway filtering to identify compressed and encrypted attachments and scripts. Some email attachment detonation systems can open compressed and encrypted attachments. Payloads delivered over an encrypted connection from a website require encrypted network traffic inspection.
The first detection of a malicious tool may trigger an anti-virus or other security tool alert. Similar events may also occur at the boundary through network IDS, email scanning appliance, etc. The initial detection should be treated as an indication of a potentially more invasive intrusion. The alerting system should be thoroughly investigated beyond that initial alert for activity that was not detected. Adversaries may continue with an operation, assuming that individual events like an anti-virus detect will not be investigated or that an analyst will not be able to conclusively link that event to other activity occurring on the network. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 1.6 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--b4409cd8-0da9-46e1-a401-a241afd4d1cc | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2022-05-31T19:31:38.431000Z" | "2024-04-16T00:20:21.488000Z" | Multi-Factor Authentication | Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts.
Once adversaries have gained access to a network by either compromising an account lacking MFA or by employing an MFA bypass method such as [Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621), adversaries may leverage their access to modify or completely disable MFA defenses. This can be accomplished by abusing legitimate features, such as excluding users from Azure AD Conditional Access Policies, registering a new yet vulnerable/adversary-controlled MFA method, or by manually patching MFA programs and configuration files to bypass expected functionality.(Citation: Mandiant APT42)(Citation: Azure AD Conditional Access Exclusions)
For example, modifying the Windows hosts file (`C:\windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts`) to redirect MFA calls to localhost instead of an MFA server may cause the MFA process to fail. If a "fail open" policy is in place, any otherwise successful authentication attempt may be granted access without enforcing MFA. (Citation: Russians Exploit Default MFA Protocol - CISA March 2022)
Depending on the scope, goals, and privileges of the adversary, MFA defenses may be disabled for individual accounts or for all accounts tied to a larger group, such as all domain accounts in a victim's network environment.(Citation: Russians Exploit Default MFA Protocol - CISA March 2022) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1556.006",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006"
},
{
"description": "Cyber Security Infrastructure Agency. (2022, March 15). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Gain Network Access by Exploiting Default Multifactor Authentication Protocols and “PrintNightmare” Vulnerability. Retrieved May 31, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Russians Exploit Default MFA Protocol - CISA March 2022",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-074a"
},
{
"description": "Mandiant. (n.d.). APT42: Crooked Charms, Cons and Compromise. Retrieved September 16, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant APT42",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/media/17826"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2022, August 26). Use Azure AD access reviews to manage users excluded from Conditional Access policies. Retrieved August 30, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Azure AD Conditional Access Exclusions",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/governance/conditional-access-exclusion"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Azure AD",
"Office 365",
"SaaS",
"IaaS",
"Google Workspace",
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 1.2 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--b4694861-542c-48ea-9eb1-10d356e7140a | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-19T18:52:24.547000Z" | "2023-05-31T12:34:03.420000Z" | Remote Email Collection | Adversaries may target an Exchange server, Office 365, or Google Workspace to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network. Adversaries may also access externally facing Exchange services, Office 365, or Google Workspace to access email using credentials or access tokens. Tools such as [MailSniper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0413) can be used to automate searches for specific keywords. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1114.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/002"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for unusual login activity from unknown or abnormal locations, especially for privileged accounts (ex: Exchange administrator account). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Office 365",
"Windows",
"Google Workspace"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--b46a801b-fd98-491c-a25a-bca25d6e3001 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-06-03T18:44:29.770000Z" | "2021-10-17T15:06:24.161000Z" | IIS Components | Adversaries may install malicious components that run on Internet Information Services (IIS) web servers to establish persistence. IIS provides several mechanisms to extend the functionality of the web servers. For example, Internet Server Application Programming Interface (ISAPI) extensions and filters can be installed to examine and/or modify incoming and outgoing IIS web requests. Extensions and filters are deployed as DLL files that export three functions: <code>Get{Extension/Filter}Version</code>, <code>Http{Extension/Filter}Proc</code>, and (optionally) <code>Terminate{Extension/Filter}</code>. IIS modules may also be installed to extend IIS web servers.(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Filter Overview 2017)(Citation: IIS Backdoor 2011)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013)
Adversaries may install malicious ISAPI extensions and filters to observe and/or modify traffic, execute commands on compromised machines, or proxy command and control traffic. ISAPI extensions and filters may have access to all IIS web requests and responses. For example, an adversary may abuse these mechanisms to modify HTTP responses in order to distribute malicious commands/content to previously comprised hosts.(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Filter Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension All Incoming 2017)(Citation: Dell TG-3390)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013)(Citation: MMPC ISAPI Filter 2012)
Adversaries may also install malicious IIS modules to observe and/or modify traffic. IIS 7.0 introduced modules that provide the same unrestricted access to HTTP requests and responses as ISAPI extensions and filters. IIS modules can be written as a DLL that exports <code>RegisterModule</code>, or as a .NET application that interfaces with ASP.NET APIs to access IIS HTTP requests.(Citation: Microsoft IIS Modules Overview 2007)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013)(Citation: ESET IIS Malware 2021) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1505.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/004"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, June 16). ISAPI Extension Overview. Retrieved June 3, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft ISAPI Extension Overview 2017",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/iis/6.0-sdk/ms525172(v=vs.90)"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, June 16). ISAPI Filter Overview. Retrieved June 3, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft ISAPI Filter Overview 2017",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/iis/6.0-sdk/ms524610(v=vs.90)"
},
{
"description": "Julien. (2011, February 2). IIS Backdoor. Retrieved June 3, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "IIS Backdoor 2011",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20170106175935/http:/esec-lab.sogeti.com/posts/2011/02/02/iis-backdoor.html"
},
{
"description": "Grunzweig, J. (2013, December 9). The Curious Case of the Malicious IIS Module. Retrieved June 3, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Trustwave IIS Module 2013",
"url": "https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/the-curious-case-of-the-malicious-iis-module/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, June 16). Intercepting All Incoming IIS Requests. Retrieved June 3, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft ISAPI Extension All Incoming 2017",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/iis/6.0-sdk/ms525696(v=vs.90)"
},
{
"description": "Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved August 18, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Dell TG-3390",
"url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage"
},
{
"description": "MMPC. (2012, October 3). Malware signed with the Adobe code signing certificate. Retrieved June 3, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MMPC ISAPI Filter 2012",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20140804175025/http:/blogs.technet.com/b/mmpc/archive/2012/10/03/malware-signed-with-the-adobe-code-signing-certificate.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2007, November 24). IIS Modules Overview. Retrieved June 17, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft IIS Modules Overview 2007",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/iis/get-started/introduction-to-iis/iis-modules-overview"
},
{
"description": "Hromcová, Z., Cherepanov, A. (2021). Anatomy of Native IIS Malware. Retrieved September 9, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ESET IIS Malware 2021",
"url": "https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-Anatomy-Of-Native-Iis-Malware-wp.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Falcone, R. (2018, January 25). OilRig uses RGDoor IIS Backdoor on Targets in the Middle East. Retrieved July 6, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Unit 42 RGDoor Jan 2018",
"url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/01/unit42-oilrig-uses-rgdoor-iis-backdoor-targets-middle-east/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for creation and/or modification of files (especially DLLs on webservers) that could be abused as malicious ISAPI extensions/filters or IIS modules. Changes to <code>%windir%\system32\inetsrv\config\applicationhost.config</code> could indicate an IIS module installation.(Citation: Microsoft IIS Modules Overview 2007)(Citation: ESET IIS Malware 2021)
Monitor execution and command-line arguments of <code>AppCmd.exe</code>, which may be abused to install malicious IIS modules.(Citation: Microsoft IIS Modules Overview 2007)(Citation: Unit 42 RGDoor Jan 2018)(Citation: ESET IIS Malware 2021) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--b4b7458f-81f2-4d38-84be-1c5ba0167a52 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-10T19:49:46.752000Z" | "2020-02-10T19:52:47.724000Z" | Invalid Code Signature | Adversaries may attempt to mimic features of valid code signatures to increase the chance of deceiving a user, analyst, or tool. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. Adversaries can copy the metadata and signature information from a signed program, then use it as a template for an unsigned program. Files with invalid code signatures will fail digital signature validation checks, but they may appear more legitimate to users and security tools may improperly handle these files.(Citation: Threatexpress MetaTwin 2017)
Unlike [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), this activity will not result in a valid signature. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1036.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/001"
},
{
"description": "Vest, J. (2017, October 9). Borrowing Microsoft MetaData and Signatures to Hide Binary Payloads. Retrieved September 10, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Threatexpress MetaTwin 2017",
"url": "https://threatexpress.com/blogs/2017/metatwin-borrowing-microsoft-metadata-and-digital-signatures-to-hide-binaries/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata and check signature validity on software that executes within the environment, look for invalid signatures as well as unusual certificate characteristics and outliers. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--b5327dd1-6bf9-4785-a199-25bcbd1f4a9d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-06-29T15:36:41.535000Z" | "2021-10-14T22:21:59.708000Z" | Run Virtual Instance | Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection. A wide variety of virtualization technologies exist that allow for the emulation of a computer or computing environment. By running malicious code inside of a virtual instance, adversaries can hide artifacts associated with their behavior from security tools that are unable to monitor activity inside the virtual instance. Additionally, depending on the virtual networking implementation (ex: bridged adapter), network traffic generated by the virtual instance can be difficult to trace back to the compromised host as the IP address and hostname might not match known values.(Citation: SingHealth Breach Jan 2019)
Adversaries may utilize native support for virtualization (ex: Hyper-V) or drop the necessary files to run a virtual instance (ex: VirtualBox binaries). After running a virtual instance, adversaries may create a shared folder between the guest and host with permissions that enable the virtual instance to interact with the host file system.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1564.006",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/006"
},
{
"description": "Committee of Inquiry into the Cyber Attack on SingHealth. (2019, January 10). Public Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Cyber Attack on Singapore Health Services Private Limited's Patient Database. Retrieved June 29, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SingHealth Breach Jan 2019",
"url": "https://www.mci.gov.sg/-/media/mcicorp/doc/report-of-the-coi-into-the-cyber-attack-on-singhealth-10-jan-2019.ashx"
},
{
"description": "SophosLabs. (2020, May 21). Ragnar Locker ransomware deploys virtual machine to dodge security. Retrieved June 29, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sophos Ragnar May 2020",
"url": "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/21/ragnar-locker-ransomware-deploys-virtual-machine-to-dodge-security/"
},
{
"description": "Johann Rehberger. (2020, September 23). Beware of the Shadowbunny - Using virtual machines to persist and evade detections. Retrieved September 22, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion",
"url": "https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2020/shadowbunny-virtual-machine-red-teaming-technique/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Consider monitoring for files and processes associated with running a virtual instance, such as binary files associated with common virtualization technologies (ex: VirtualBox, VMware, QEMU, Hyper-V). Consider monitoring the size of virtual machines running on the system. Adversaries may create virtual images which are smaller than those of typical virtual machines.(Citation: Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion) Network adapter information may also be helpful in detecting the use of virtual instances.
Consider monitoring for process command-line arguments that may be atypical for benign use of virtualization software. Usage of virtualization binaries or command-line arguments associated with running a silent installation may be especially suspect (ex. <code>-silent</code>, <code>-ignore-reboot</code>), as well as those associated with running a headless (in the background with no UI) virtual instance (ex. <code>VBoxManage startvm $VM --type headless</code>).(Citation: Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion) Similarly, monitoring command line arguments which suppress notifications may highlight potentially malicious activity (ex. <code>VBoxManage.exe setextradata global GUI/SuppressMessages "all"</code>).
Monitor for commands which enable hypervisors such as Hyper-V. If virtualization software is installed by the adversary, the Registry may provide detection opportunities. Consider monitoring for [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003), with respect to virtualization software.
Benign usage of virtualization technology is common in enterprise environments, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--b6075259-dba3-44e9-87c7-e954f37ec0d5 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2018-04-18T17:59:24.739000Z" | "2022-09-06T22:01:45.067000Z" | Password Policy Discovery | Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network or cloud environment. Password policies are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). This information may help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).
Password policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such as <code>net accounts (/domain)</code>, <code>Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy</code>, <code>chage -l <username></code>, <code>cat /etc/pam.d/common-password</code>, and <code>pwpolicy getaccountpolicies</code> (Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies). Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to discover password policy information (e.g. <code>show aaa</code>, <code>show aaa common-criteria policy all</code>).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)
Password policies can be discovered in cloud environments using available APIs such as <code>GetAccountPasswordPolicy</code> in AWS (Citation: AWS GetPasswordPolicy). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1201",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201"
},
{
"description": "Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). AWS API GetAccountPasswordPolicy. Retrieved June 8, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AWS GetPasswordPolicy",
"url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_GetAccountPasswordPolicy.html"
},
{
"description": "Holland, J. (2016, January 25). User password policies on non AD machines. Retrieved April 5, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Jamf User Password Policies",
"url": "https://www.jamf.com/jamf-nation/discussions/18574/user-password-policies-on-non-ad-machines"
},
{
"description": "Matutiae, M. (2014, August 6). How to display password policy information for a user (Ubuntu)?. Retrieved April 5, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Superuser Linux Password Policies",
"url": "https://superuser.com/questions/150675/how-to-display-password-policy-information-for-a-user-ubuntu"
},
{
"description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "US-CERT-TA18-106A",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor logs and processes for tools and command line arguments that may indicate they're being used for password policy discovery. Correlate that activity with other suspicious activity from the originating system to reduce potential false positives from valid user or administrator activity. Adversaries will likely attempt to find the password policy early in an operation and the activity is likely to happen with other Discovery activity. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"IaaS",
"Network"
] | 1.5 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--b6301b64-ef57-4cce-bb0b-77026f14a8db | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-22T21:04:23.285000Z" | "2024-03-01T15:49:15.588000Z" | Event Triggered Execution | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Various operating systems have means to monitor and subscribe to events such as logons or other user activity such as running specific applications/binaries. Cloud environments may also support various functions and services that monitor and can be invoked in response to specific cloud events.(Citation: Backdooring an AWS account)(Citation: Varonis Power Automate Data Exfiltration)(Citation: Microsoft DART Case Report 001)
Adversaries may abuse these mechanisms as a means of maintaining persistent access to a victim via repeatedly executing malicious code. After gaining access to a victim system, adversaries may create/modify event triggers to point to malicious content that will be executed whenever the event trigger is invoked.(Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)(Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X)(Citation: amnesia malware)
Since the execution can be proxied by an account with higher permissions, such as SYSTEM or service accounts, an adversary may be able to abuse these triggered execution mechanisms to escalate their privileges. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1546",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546"
},
{
"description": "Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye WMI 2015",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Berk Veral. (2020, March 9). Real-life cybercrime stories from DART, the Microsoft Detection and Response Team. Retrieved May 27, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft DART Case Report 001",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/09/real-life-cybercrime-stories-dart-microsoft-detection-and-response-team"
},
{
"description": "Claud Xiao, Cong Zheng, Yanhui Jia. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux Malware Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved February 19, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "amnesia malware",
"url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/"
},
{
"description": "Daniel Grzelak. (2016, July 9). Backdooring an AWS account. Retrieved May 27, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Backdooring an AWS account",
"url": "https://medium.com/daniel-grzelak/backdooring-an-aws-account-da007d36f8f9"
},
{
"description": "Eric Saraga. (2022, February 2). Using Power Automate for Covert Data Exfiltration in Microsoft 365. Retrieved May 27, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Varonis Power Automate Data Exfiltration",
"url": "https://www.varonis.com/blog/power-automate-data-exfiltration"
},
{
"description": "Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved July 10, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Malware Persistence on OS X",
"url": "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitoring for additions or modifications of mechanisms that could be used to trigger event-based execution, especially the addition of abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network. Also look for changes that do not line up with updates, patches, or other planned administrative activity.
These mechanisms may vary by OS, but are typically stored in central repositories that store configuration information such as the Windows Registry, Common Information Model (CIM), and/or specific named files, the last of which can be hashed and compared to known good values.
Monitor for processes, API/System calls, and other common ways of manipulating these event repositories.
Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns can be used to detect changes to execution triggers that could be attempts at persistence. Also look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery actions or other techniques.
Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"SaaS",
"IaaS",
"Office 365"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--b63a34e8-0a61-4c97-a23b-bf8a2ed812e2 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-24T14:13:45.936000Z" | "2021-08-20T18:01:52.120000Z" | Unix Shell Configuration Modification | Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious commands triggered by a user’s shell. User [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)s execute several configuration scripts at different points throughout the session based on events. For example, when a user opens a command-line interface or remotely logs in (such as via SSH) a login shell is initiated. The login shell executes scripts from the system (<code>/etc</code>) and the user’s home directory (<code>~/</code>) to configure the environment. All login shells on a system use /etc/profile when initiated. These configuration scripts run at the permission level of their directory and are often used to set environment variables, create aliases, and customize the user’s environment. When the shell exits or terminates, additional shell scripts are executed to ensure the shell exits appropriately.
Adversaries may attempt to establish persistence by inserting commands into scripts automatically executed by shells. Using bash as an example, the default shell for most GNU/Linux systems, adversaries may add commands that launch malicious binaries into the <code>/etc/profile</code> and <code>/etc/profile.d</code> files.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware)(Citation: bencane blog bashrc) These files typically require root permissions to modify and are executed each time any shell on a system launches. For user level permissions, adversaries can insert malicious commands into <code>~/.bash_profile</code>, <code>~/.bash_login</code>, or <code>~/.profile</code> which are sourced when a user opens a command-line interface or connects remotely.(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: Linux manual bash invocation) Since the system only executes the first existing file in the listed order, adversaries have used <code>~/.bash_profile</code> to ensure execution. Adversaries have also leveraged the <code>~/.bashrc</code> file which is additionally executed if the connection is established remotely or an additional interactive shell is opened, such as a new tab in the command-line interface.(Citation: Tsunami)(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: anomali-linux-rabbit)(Citation: Magento) Some malware targets the termination of a program to trigger execution, adversaries can use the <code>~/.bash_logout</code> file to execute malicious commands at the end of a session.
For macOS, the functionality of this technique is similar but may leverage zsh, the default shell for macOS 10.15+. When the Terminal.app is opened, the application launches a zsh login shell and a zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the system environment using <code>/etc/profile</code>, <code>/etc/zshenv</code>, <code>/etc/zprofile</code>, and <code>/etc/zlogin</code>.(Citation: ScriptingOSX zsh)(Citation: PersistentJXA_leopitt)(Citation: code_persistence_zsh)(Citation: macOS MS office sandbox escape) The login shell then configures the user environment with <code>~/.zprofile</code> and <code>~/.zlogin</code>. The interactive shell uses the <code>~/.zshrc</code> to configure the user environment. Upon exiting, <code>/etc/zlogout</code> and <code>~/.zlogout</code> are executed. For legacy programs, macOS executes <code>/etc/bashrc</code> on startup. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1546.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004"
},
{
"description": "Paul Litvak. (2020, May 4). Kaiji: New Chinese Linux malware turning to Golang. Retrieved December 17, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "intezer-kaiji-malware",
"url": "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/"
},
{
"description": "Benjamin Cane. (2013, September 16). Understanding a little more about /etc/profile and /etc/bashrc. Retrieved February 25, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "bencane blog bashrc",
"url": "https://bencane.com/2013/09/16/understanding-a-little-more-about-etcprofile-and-etcbashrc/"
},
{
"description": "Anomali Threat Research. (2019, October 15). Illicit Cryptomining Threat Actor Rocke Changes Tactics, Now More Difficult to Detect. Retrieved December 17, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "anomali-rocke-tactics",
"url": "https://www.anomali.com/blog/illicit-cryptomining-threat-actor-rocke-changes-tactics-now-more-difficult-to-detect"
},
{
"description": "ArchWiki. (2021, January 19). Bash. Retrieved February 25, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Linux manual bash invocation",
"url": "https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Bash#Invocation"
},
{
"description": "Claud Xiao and Cong Zheng. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux Malware Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved December 17, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Tsunami",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/"
},
{
"description": "Anomali Threat Research. (2018, December 6). Pulling Linux Rabbit/Rabbot Malware Out of a Hat. Retrieved December 17, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "anomali-linux-rabbit",
"url": "https://www.anomali.com/blog/pulling-linux-rabbit-rabbot-malware-out-of-a-hat"
},
{
"description": "Cesar Anjos. (2018, May 31). Shell Logins as a Magento Reinfection Vector. Retrieved December 17, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Magento",
"url": "https://blog.sucuri.net/2018/05/shell-logins-as-a-magento-reinfection-vector.html"
},
{
"description": "Armin Briegel. (2019, June 5). Moving to zsh, part 2: Configuration Files. Retrieved February 25, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ScriptingOSX zsh",
"url": "https://scriptingosx.com/2019/06/moving-to-zsh-part-2-configuration-files/"
},
{
"description": "Leo Pitt. (2020, August 6). Persistent JXA - A poor man's Powershell for macOS. Retrieved January 11, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "PersistentJXA_leopitt",
"url": "https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5"
},
{
"description": "Leo Pitt. (2020, November 11). Github - PersistentJXA/BashProfilePersist.js. Retrieved January 11, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "code_persistence_zsh",
"url": "https://github.com/D00MFist/PersistentJXA/blob/master/BashProfilePersist.js"
},
{
"description": "Cedric Owens. (2021, May 22). macOS MS Office Sandbox Brain Dump. Retrieved August 20, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "macOS MS office sandbox escape",
"url": "https://cedowens.medium.com/macos-ms-office-sandbox-brain-dump-4509b5fed49a"
},
{
"description": "Patrick Wardle. (2019, September 17). Writing a File Monitor with Apple's Endpoint Security Framework. Retrieved December 17, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ESF_filemonitor",
"url": "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x48.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | While users may customize their shell profile files, there are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network when user profiles are loaded during the login process.
Monitor for changes to <code>/etc/profile</code> and <code>/etc/profile.d</code>, these files should only be modified by system administrators. MacOS users can leverage Endpoint Security Framework file events monitoring these specific files.(Citation: ESF_filemonitor)
For most Linux and macOS systems, a list of file paths for valid shell options available on a system are located in the <code>/etc/shells</code> file.
| [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 2.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--b77cf5f3-6060-475d-bd60-40ccbf28fdc2 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2018-01-16T16:13:52.465000Z" | "2023-08-14T19:30:45.123000Z" | Forced Authentication | Adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or forcing a user to automatically provide authentication information through a mechanism in which they can intercept.
The Server Message Block (SMB) protocol is commonly used in Windows networks for authentication and communication between systems for access to resources and file sharing. When a Windows system attempts to connect to an SMB resource it will automatically attempt to authenticate and send credential information for the current user to the remote system. (Citation: Wikipedia Server Message Block) This behavior is typical in enterprise environments so that users do not need to enter credentials to access network resources.
Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV) is also typically used by Windows systems as a backup protocol when SMB is blocked or fails. WebDAV is an extension of HTTP and will typically operate over TCP ports 80 and 443. (Citation: Didier Stevens WebDAV Traffic) (Citation: Microsoft Managing WebDAV Security)
Adversaries may take advantage of this behavior to gain access to user account hashes through forced SMB/WebDAV authentication. An adversary can send an attachment to a user through spearphishing that contains a resource link to an external server controlled by the adversary (i.e. [Template Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221)), or place a specially crafted file on navigation path for privileged accounts (e.g. .SCF file placed on desktop) or on a publicly accessible share to be accessed by victim(s). When the user's system accesses the untrusted resource it will attempt authentication and send information, including the user's hashed credentials, over SMB to the adversary controlled server. (Citation: GitHub Hashjacking) With access to the credential hash, an adversary can perform off-line [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) cracking to gain access to plaintext credentials. (Citation: Cylance Redirect to SMB)
There are several different ways this can occur. (Citation: Osanda Stealing NetNTLM Hashes) Some specifics from in-the-wild use include:
* A spearphishing attachment containing a document with a resource that is automatically loaded when the document is opened (i.e. [Template Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221)). The document can include, for example, a request similar to <code>file[:]//[remote address]/Normal.dotm</code> to trigger the SMB request. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)
* A modified .LNK or .SCF file with the icon filename pointing to an external reference such as <code>\\[remote address]\pic.png</code> that will force the system to load the resource when the icon is rendered to repeatedly gather credentials. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1187",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187"
},
{
"description": "Cylance. (2015, April 13). Redirect to SMB. Retrieved December 21, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cylance Redirect to SMB",
"url": "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/white_papers/RedirectToSMB.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Dunning, J. (2016, August 1). Hashjacking. Retrieved December 21, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GitHub Hashjacking",
"url": "https://github.com/hob0/hashjacking"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Managing WebDAV Security (IIS 6.0). Retrieved December 21, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Managing WebDAV Security",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/WindowsServer2003/Library/IIS/4beddb35-0cba-424c-8b9b-a5832ad8e208.mspx"
},
{
"description": "Osanda Malith Jayathissa. (2017, March 24). Places of Interest in Stealing NetNTLM Hashes. Retrieved January 26, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Osanda Stealing NetNTLM Hashes",
"url": "https://osandamalith.com/2017/03/24/places-of-interest-in-stealing-netntlm-hashes/"
},
{
"description": "Stevens, D. (2017, November 13). WebDAV Traffic To Malicious Sites. Retrieved December 21, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Didier Stevens WebDAV Traffic",
"url": "https://blog.didierstevens.com/2017/11/13/webdav-traffic-to-malicious-sites/"
},
{
"description": "US-CERT. (2017, October 20). Alert (TA17-293A): Advanced Persistent Threat Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved November 2, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-293A"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (2017, December 16). Server Message Block. Retrieved December 21, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wikipedia Server Message Block",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for SMB traffic on TCP ports 139, 445 and UDP port 137 and WebDAV traffic attempting to exit the network to unknown external systems. If attempts are detected, then investigate endpoint data sources to find the root cause. For internal traffic, monitor the workstation-to-workstation unusual (vs. baseline) SMB traffic. For many networks there should not be any, but it depends on how systems on the network are configured and where resources are located.
Monitor creation and modification of .LNK, .SCF, or any other files on systems and within virtual environments that contain resources that point to external network resources as these could be used to gather credentials when the files are rendered. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--b7dc639b-24cd-482d-a7f1-8897eda21023 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-18T18:34:49.414000Z" | "2021-02-09T15:49:58.414000Z" | SID-History Injection | Adversaries may use SID-History Injection to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. The Windows security identifier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security descriptors and access tokens. (Citation: Microsoft SID) An account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active Directory attribute (Citation: Microsoft SID-History Attribute), allowing inter-operable account migration between domains (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access tokens).
With Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, harvested or well-known SID values (Citation: Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017) may be inserted into SID-History to enable impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterprise Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inaccessible domains via lateral movement techniques such as [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002), or [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1134.005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Security Identifiers. Retrieved November 30, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft SID",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa379571.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Active Directory Schema - SID-History attribute. Retrieved November 30, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft SID-History Attribute",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms679833.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, June 23). Well-known security identifiers in Windows operating systems. Retrieved November 30, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017",
"url": "https://support.microsoft.com/help/243330/well-known-security-identifiers-in-windows-operating-systems"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Active Directory Cmdlets - Get-ADUser. Retrieved November 30, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Get-ADUser",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/ee617241.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, September 19). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #14: SID History. Retrieved November 30, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015",
"url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Using DsAddSidHistory. Retrieved November 30, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft DsAddSidHistory",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677982.aspx"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Examine data in user’s SID-History attributes using the PowerShell <code>Get-ADUser</code> cmdlet (Citation: Microsoft Get-ADUser), especially users who have SID-History values from the same domain. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015) Also monitor account management events on Domain Controllers for successful and failed changes to SID-History. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015) (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory)
Monitor for Windows API calls to the <code>DsAddSidHistory</code> function. (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--b8017880-4b1e-42de-ad10-ae7ac6705166 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-19T16:08:29.817000Z" | "2022-05-05T05:05:44.200000Z" | Network Boundary Bridging | Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by compromising perimeter network devices or internal devices responsible for network segmentation. Breaching these devices may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks.
Devices such as routers and firewalls can be used to create boundaries between trusted and untrusted networks. They achieve this by restricting traffic types to enforce organizational policy in an attempt to reduce the risk inherent in such connections. Restriction of traffic can be achieved by prohibiting IP addresses, layer 4 protocol ports, or through deep packet inspection to identify applications. To participate with the rest of the network, these devices can be directly addressable or transparent, but their mode of operation has no bearing on how the adversary can bypass them when compromised.
When an adversary takes control of such a boundary device, they can bypass its policy enforcement to pass normally prohibited traffic across the trust boundary between the two separated networks without hinderance. By achieving sufficient rights on the device, an adversary can reconfigure the device to allow the traffic they want, allowing them to then further achieve goals such as command and control via [Multi-hop Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003) or exfiltration of data via [Traffic Duplication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001). Adversaries may also target internal devices responsible for network segmentation and abuse these in conjunction with [Internal Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/001) to achieve the same goals.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021) In the cases where a border device separates two separate organizations, the adversary can also facilitate lateral movement into new victim environments. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1599",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599"
},
{
"description": "Vyacheslav Kopeytsev and Seongsu Park. (2021, February 25). Lazarus targets defense industry with ThreatNeedle. Retrieved October 27, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021",
"url": "https://securelist.com/lazarus-threatneedle/100803/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Consider monitoring network traffic on both interfaces of border network devices with out-of-band packet capture or network flow data, using a different device than the one in question. Look for traffic that should be prohibited by the intended network traffic policy enforcement for the border network device.
Monitor the border network device’s configuration to validate that the policy enforcement sections are what was intended. Look for rules that are less restrictive, or that allow specific traffic types that were not previously authorized. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Network"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--b80d107d-fa0d-4b60-9684-b0433e8bdba0 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-03-15T13:59:30.390000Z" | "2022-06-16T13:07:10.318000Z" | Data Encrypted for Impact | Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.(Citation: US-CERT Ransomware 2016)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: US-CERT SamSam 2018)
In the case of ransomware, it is typical that common user files like Office documents, PDFs, images, videos, audio, text, and source code files will be encrypted (and often renamed and/or tagged with specific file markers). Adversaries may need to first employ other behaviors, such as [File and Directory Permissions Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222) or [System Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529), in order to unlock and/or gain access to manipulate these files.(Citation: CarbonBlack Conti July 2020) In some cases, adversaries may encrypt critical system files, disk partitions, and the MBR.(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)
To maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for encrypting data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other attack techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) Encryption malware may also leverage [Internal Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001), such as changing victim wallpapers, or otherwise intimidate victims by sending ransom notes or other messages to connected printers (known as "print bombing").(Citation: NHS Digital Egregor Nov 2020)
In cloud environments, storage objects within compromised accounts may also be encrypted.(Citation: Rhino S3 Ransomware Part 1) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "impact"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1486",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486"
},
{
"description": "Baskin, B. (2020, July 8). TAU Threat Discovery: Conti Ransomware. Retrieved February 17, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CarbonBlack Conti July 2020",
"url": "https://www.carbonblack.com/blog/tau-threat-discovery-conti-ransomware/"
},
{
"description": "Berry, A., Homan, J., and Eitzman, R. (2017, May 23). WannaCry Malware Profile. Retrieved March 15, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye WannaCry 2017",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html"
},
{
"description": "Gietzen, S. (n.d.). S3 Ransomware Part 1: Attack Vector. Retrieved April 14, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Rhino S3 Ransomware Part 1",
"url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/"
},
{
"description": "NHS Digital. (2020, November 26). Egregor Ransomware The RaaS successor to Maze. Retrieved December 29, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "NHS Digital Egregor Nov 2020",
"url": "https://digital.nhs.uk/cyber-alerts/2020/cc-3681#summary"
},
{
"description": "US-CERT. (2016, March 31). Alert (TA16-091A): Ransomware and Recent Variants. Retrieved March 15, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "US-CERT Ransomware 2016",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA16-091A"
},
{
"description": "US-CERT. (2017, July 1). Alert (TA17-181A): Petya Ransomware. Retrieved March 15, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "US-CERT NotPetya 2017",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-181A"
},
{
"description": "US-CERT. (2018, December 3). Alert (AA18-337A): SamSam Ransomware. Retrieved March 15, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "US-CERT SamSam 2018",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/AA18-337A"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in data destruction activity, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, and bcdedit. Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories.
In some cases, monitoring for unusual kernel driver installation activity can aid in detection.
In cloud environments, monitor for events that indicate storage objects have been anomalously replaced by copies. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"IaaS"
] | 1.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--b83e166d-13d7-4b52-8677-dff90c548fd7 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-05T14:54:07.588000Z" | "2024-03-01T17:17:37.292000Z" | Subvert Trust Controls | Adversaries may undermine security controls that will either warn users of untrusted activity or prevent execution of untrusted programs. Operating systems and security products may contain mechanisms to identify programs or websites as possessing some level of trust. Examples of such features would include a program being allowed to run because it is signed by a valid code signing certificate, a program prompting the user with a warning because it has an attribute set from being downloaded from the Internet, or getting an indication that you are about to connect to an untrusted site.
Adversaries may attempt to subvert these trust mechanisms. The method adversaries use will depend on the specific mechanism they seek to subvert. Adversaries may conduct [File and Directory Permissions Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222) or [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112) in support of subverting these controls.(Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) Adversaries may also create or steal code signing certificates to acquire trust on target systems.(Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates)(Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1553",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553"
},
{
"description": "Graeber, M. (2017, December 22). Code Signing Certificate Cloning Attacks and Defenses. Retrieved April 3, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017",
"url": "https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec"
},
{
"description": "Graeber, M. (2017, September). Subverting Trust in Windows. Retrieved January 31, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017",
"url": "https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Ladikov, A. (2015, January 29). Why You Shouldn’t Completely Trust Files Signed with Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Securelist Digital Certificates",
"url": "https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/"
},
{
"description": "Shinotsuka, H. (2013, February 22). How Attackers Steal Private Keys from Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Symantec Digital Certificates",
"url": "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics and outliers. Periodically baseline registered SIPs and trust providers (Registry entries and files on disk), specifically looking for new, modified, or non-Microsoft entries. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)
Analyze Autoruns data for oddities and anomalies, specifically malicious files attempting persistent execution by hiding within auto-starting locations. Autoruns will hide entries signed by Microsoft or Windows by default, so ensure "Hide Microsoft Entries" and "Hide Windows Entries" are both deselected.(Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
Monitor and investigate attempts to modify extended file attributes with utilities such as <code>xattr</code>. Built-in system utilities may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"macOS",
"Linux"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--b84903f0-c7d5-435d-a69e-de47cc3578c0 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-30T14:40:20.187000Z" | "2022-10-19T16:35:18.492000Z" | Elevated Execution with Prompt | Adversaries may leverage the <code>AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges</code> API to escalate privileges by prompting the user for credentials.(Citation: AppleDocs AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges) The purpose of this API is to give application developers an easy way to perform operations with root privileges, such as for application installation or updating. This API does not validate that the program requesting root privileges comes from a reputable source or has been maliciously modified.
Although this API is deprecated, it still fully functions in the latest releases of macOS. When calling this API, the user will be prompted to enter their credentials but no checks on the origin or integrity of the program are made. The program calling the API may also load world writable files which can be modified to perform malicious behavior with elevated privileges.
Adversaries may abuse <code>AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges</code> to obtain root privileges in order to install malicious software on victims and install persistence mechanisms.(Citation: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019)(Citation: OSX Coldroot RAT) This technique may be combined with [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to trick the user into granting escalated privileges to malicious code.(Citation: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019) This technique has also been shown to work by modifying legitimate programs present on the machine that make use of this API.(Citation: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1548.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/004"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (n.d.). Apple Developer Documentation - AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges. Retrieved August 8, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AppleDocs AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges",
"url": "https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/1540038-authorizationexecutewithprivileg"
},
{
"description": "Carbon Black Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, February 12). New macOS Malware Variant of Shlayer (OSX) Discovered. Retrieved August 8, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019",
"url": "https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2020/02/vmware-carbon-black-tau-threat-analysis-shlayer-macos.html"
},
{
"description": "Patrick Wardle. (2017). Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!. Retrieved August 8, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!",
"url": "https://speakerdeck.com/patrickwardle/defcon-2017-death-by-1000-installers-its-all-broken?slide=8"
},
{
"description": "Patrick Wardle. (2018, February 17). Tearing Apart the Undetected (OSX)Coldroot RAT. Retrieved August 8, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "OSX Coldroot RAT",
"url": "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Consider monitoring for <code>/usr/libexec/security_authtrampoline</code> executions which may indicate that <code>AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges</code> is being executed. MacOS system logs may also indicate when <code>AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges</code> is being called. Monitoring OS API callbacks for the execution can also be a way to detect this behavior but requires specialized security tooling. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--b85f6ce5-81e8-4f36-aff2-3df9d02a9c9d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T16:46:42.537000Z" | "2021-04-15T03:22:46.759000Z" | Firmware | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host firmware that can be used during targeting. Information about host firmware may include a variety of details such as type and versions on specific hosts, which may be used to infer more information about hosts in the environment (ex: configuration, purpose, age/patch level, etc.).
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about host firmware may only be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices).(Citation: ArsTechnica Intel) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1592.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/003"
},
{
"description": "Goodin, D. & Salter, J. (2020, August 6). More than 20GB of Intel source code and proprietary data dumped online. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ArsTechnica Intel",
"url": "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2020/08/intel-is-investigating-the-leak-of-20gb-of-its-source-code-and-private-data/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--b8902400-e6c5-4ba2-95aa-2d35b442b118 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-16T15:33:01.739000Z" | "2024-04-16T12:29:47.903000Z" | Encrypted Channel | Adversaries may employ an encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1573",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573"
},
{
"description": "Butler, M. (2013, November). Finding Hidden Threats by Decrypting SSL. Retrieved April 5, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SANS Decrypting SSL",
"url": "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840"
},
{
"description": "Dormann, W. (2015, March 13). The Risks of SSL Inspection. Retrieved April 5, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SEI SSL Inspection Risks",
"url": "https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html"
},
{
"description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | SSL/TLS inspection is one way of detecting command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels.(Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL) SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation.(Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks)
In general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--b8cfed42-6a8a-4989-ad72-541af74475ec | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-24T14:54:42.757000Z" | "2022-04-20T16:29:36.291000Z" | Authentication Package | Adversaries may abuse authentication packages to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows authentication package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system.(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)
Adversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA authentication packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\</code> with the key value of <code>"Authentication Packages"=<target binary></code>. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1547.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/002"
},
{
"description": "Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Graeber 2014",
"url": "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved June 24, 2015.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Configure LSA",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MSDN Authentication Packages",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor the Registry for changes to the LSA Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\LSASS.exe</code> with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--b97f1d35-4249-4486-a6b5-ee60ccf24fab | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-23T19:52:17.414000Z" | "2023-04-21T12:24:56.148000Z" | Regsvr32 | Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. The Regsvr32.exe binary may also be signed by Microsoft. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32)
Malicious usage of Regsvr32.exe may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass application control using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since Regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvr32) This variation of the technique is often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" and has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov)
Regsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish persistence via [Component Object Model Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015). (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1218.010",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010"
},
{
"description": "Anubhav, A., Kizhakkinan, D. (2017, February 22). Spear Phishing Techniques Used in Attacks Targeting the Mongolian Government. Retrieved February 24, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/02/spear_phishing_techn.html"
},
{
"description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regsvr32.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "LOLBAS Regsvr32",
"url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2015, August 14). How to use the Regsvr32 tool and troubleshoot Regsvr32 error messages. Retrieved June 22, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Regsvr32",
"url": "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/249873"
},
{
"description": "Nolen, R. et al.. (2016, April 28). Threat Advisory: “Squiblydoo” Continues Trend of Attackers Using Native OS Tools to “Live off the Land”. Retrieved April 9, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016",
"url": "https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/04/28/threat-advisory-squiblydoo-continues-trend-of-attackers-using-native-os-tools-to-live-off-the-land/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of regsvr32.exe. Compare recent invocations of regsvr32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the regsvr32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the script or DLL being loaded. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 2.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--ba04e672-da86-4e69-aa15-0eca5db25f43 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2023-02-27T22:51:27.101000Z" | "2023-05-04T18:00:33.023000Z" | Exfiltration to Text Storage Sites | Adversaries may exfiltrate data to text storage sites instead of their primary command and control channel. Text storage sites, such as <code>pastebin[.]com</code>, are commonly used by developers to share code and other information.
Text storage sites are often used to host malicious code for C2 communication (e.g., [Stage Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608)), but adversaries may also use these sites to exfiltrate collected data. Furthermore, paid features and encryption options may allow adversaries to conceal and store data more securely.(Citation: Pastebin EchoSec)
**Note:** This is distinct from [Exfiltration to Code Repository](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/001), which highlight access to code repositories via APIs. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "exfiltration"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1567.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/003"
},
{
"description": "Ciarniello, A. (2019, September 24). What is Pastebin and Why Do Hackers Love It?. Retrieved April 11, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Pastebin EchoSec",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20201107203304/https://www.echosec.net/blog/what-is-pastebin-and-why-do-hackers-love-it"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--baf60e1a-afe5-4d31-830f-1b1ba2351884 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T16:42:17.482000Z" | "2021-10-17T16:33:19.596000Z" | Software | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host software that can be used during targeting. Information about installed software may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: antivirus, SIEMs, etc.).
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the installed software may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or for initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1592.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/002"
},
{
"description": "Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ATT ScanBox",
"url": "https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks"
},
{
"description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020",
"url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host software information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:48.323000Z" | "2023-03-30T21:01:41.752000Z" | Input Capture | Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. [Credential API Hooking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004)) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. [Web Portal Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1056",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056"
},
{
"description": "Tinaztepe, E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke: An in-depth look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Adventures of a Keystroke",
"url": "http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detection may vary depending on how input is captured but may include monitoring for certain Windows API calls (e.g. `SetWindowsHook`, `GetKeyState`, and `GetAsyncKeyState`)(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke), monitoring for malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), and ensuring no unauthorized drivers or kernel modules that could indicate keylogging or API hooking are present. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--bb5e59c4-abe7-40c7-8196-e373cb1e5974 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2023-09-07T21:50:08.827000Z" | "2023-10-15T11:49:40.990000Z" | Spearphishing Voice | Adversaries may use voice communications to ultimately gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing voice is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that is employs the use of manipulating a user into providing access to systems through a phone call or other forms of voice communications. Spearphishing frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source (ex: [Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656)) and/or creating a sense of urgency or alarm for the recipient.
All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. In this scenario, adversaries are not directly sending malware to a victim vice relying on [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) for delivery and execution. For example, victims may receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a phone number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL, download malware,(Citation: sygnia Luna Month)(Citation: CISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software) or install adversary-accessible remote management tools ([Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219)) onto their computer.(Citation: Unit42 Luna Moth)
Adversaries may also combine voice phishing with [Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621) in order to trick users into divulging MFA credentials or accepting authentication prompts.(Citation: Proofpoint Vishing) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "initial-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1566.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/004"
},
{
"description": "CISA. (n.d.). Protecting Against Malicious Use of Remote Monitoring and Management Software. Retrieved February 2, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa23-025a"
},
{
"description": "Kristopher Russo. (n.d.). Luna Moth Callback Phishing Campaign. Retrieved February 2, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Unit42 Luna Moth",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/luna-moth-callback-phishing/"
},
{
"description": "Oren Biderman, Tomer Lahiyani, Noam Lifshitz, Ori Porag. (n.d.). LUNA MOTH: THE THREAT ACTORS BEHIND RECENT FALSE SUBSCRIPTION SCAMS. Retrieved February 2, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "sygnia Luna Month",
"url": "https://blog.sygnia.co/luna-moth-false-subscription-scams"
},
{
"description": "Proofpoint. (n.d.). What Is Vishing?. Retrieved September 8, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Proofpoint Vishing",
"url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-reference/vishing"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Office 365",
"SaaS",
"Google Workspace"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--bbc3cba7-84ae-410d-b18b-16750731dfa2 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-01T01:48:15.511000Z" | "2021-04-15T03:07:53.803000Z" | Exploits | Adversaries may develop exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than finding/modifying exploits from online or purchasing them from exploit vendors, an adversary may develop their own exploits.(Citation: NYTStuxnet) Adversaries may use information acquired via [Vulnerabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/006) to focus exploit development efforts. As part of the exploit development process, adversaries may uncover exploitable vulnerabilities through methods such as fuzzing and patch analysis.(Citation: Irongeek Sims BSides 2017)
As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing exploits. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's exploit development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains an initial degree of exclusivity to the exploit.
Adversaries may use exploits during various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1587.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004"
},
{
"description": "William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E. Sanger. (2011, January 15). Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay. Retrieved March 1, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "NYTStuxnet",
"url": "https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html"
},
{
"description": "Stephen Sims. (2017, April 30). Microsoft Patch Analysis for Exploitation. Retrieved October 16, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Irongeek Sims BSides 2017",
"url": "https://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/bsidescharm2017/bsidescharm-2017-t111-microsoft-patch-analysis-for-exploitation-stephen-sims"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the use of exploits (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--bbe5b322-e2af-4a5e-9625-a4e62bf84ed3 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T16:49:31.262000Z" | "2021-04-15T03:52:40.958000Z" | Social Media | Adversaries may search social media for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Social media sites may contain various information about a victim organization, such as business announcements as well as information about the roles, locations, and interests of staff.
Adversaries may search in different social media sites depending on what information they seek to gather. Threat actors may passively harvest data from these sites, as well as use information gathered to create fake profiles/groups to elicit victim’s into revealing specific information (i.e. [Spearphishing Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/001)).(Citation: Cyware Social Media) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1593.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001"
},
{
"description": "Cyware Hacker News. (2019, October 2). How Hackers Exploit Social Media To Break Into Your Company. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cyware Social Media",
"url": "https://cyware.com/news/how-hackers-exploit-social-media-to-break-into-your-company-88e8da8e"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--bc0f5e80-91c0-4e04-9fbb-e4e332c85dae | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-16T14:12:47.923000Z" | "2023-04-21T12:34:29.402000Z" | Component Object Model Hijacking | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. COM is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system.(Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) References to various COM objects are stored in the Registry.
Adversaries can use the COM system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed instead.(Citation: GDATA COM Hijacking) An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1546.015",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015"
},
{
"description": "Ewing, P. Strom, B. (2016, September 15). How to Hunt: Detecting Persistence & Evasion with the COM. Retrieved September 15, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Elastic COM Hijacking",
"url": "https://www.elastic.co/blog/how-hunt-detecting-persistence-evasion-com"
},
{
"description": "G DATA. (2014, October). COM Object hijacking: the discreet way of persistence. Retrieved August 13, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GDATA COM Hijacking",
"url": "https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). The Component Object Model. Retrieved August 18, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Component Object Model",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms694363.aspx"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | There are opportunities to detect COM hijacking by searching for Registry references that have been replaced and through Registry operations (ex: [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075)) replacing known binary paths with unknown paths or otherwise malicious content. Even though some third-party applications define user COM objects, the presence of objects within HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\ may be anomalous and should be investigated since user objects will be loaded prior to machine objects in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\.(Citation: Elastic COM Hijacking) Registry entries for existing COM objects may change infrequently. When an entry with a known good path and binary is replaced or changed to an unusual value to point to an unknown binary in a new location, then it may indicate suspicious behavior and should be investigated.
Likewise, if software DLL loads are collected and analyzed, any unusual DLL load that can be correlated with a COM object Registry modification may indicate COM hijacking has been performed. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--bc76d0a4-db11-4551-9ac4-01a469cfb161 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T14:55:43.815000Z" | "2023-04-14T23:29:10.396000Z" | Credentials | Adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during targeting. Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be those directly associated with the target victim organization or attempt to take advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts.
Adversaries may gather credentials from potential victims in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then add malicious content designed to collect website authentication cookies from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Credential information may also be exposed to adversaries via leaks to online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Engines](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002), breach dumps, code repositories, etc.).(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Adversaries may also purchase credentials from dark web or other black-markets. Finally, where multi-factor authentication (MFA) based on out-of-band communications is in use, adversaries may compromise a service provider to gain access to MFA codes and one-time passwords (OTP).(Citation: Okta Scatter Swine 2022)
Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1589.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/001"
},
{
"description": "Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ATT ScanBox",
"url": "https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks"
},
{
"description": "Detectify. (2016, April 28). Slack bot token leakage exposing business critical information. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Detectify Slack Tokens",
"url": "https://labs.detectify.com/2016/04/28/slack-bot-token-leakage-exposing-business-critical-information/"
},
{
"description": "Dylan Ayrey. (2016, December 31). truffleHog. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GitHub truffleHog",
"url": "https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog"
},
{
"description": "McCarthy, K. (2015, February 28). FORK ME! Uber hauls GitHub into court to find who hacked database of 50,000 drivers. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Register Uber",
"url": "https://www.theregister.com/2015/02/28/uber_subpoenas_github_for_hacker_details/"
},
{
"description": "Michael Henriksen. (2018, June 9). Gitrob: Putting the Open Source in OSINT. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GitHub Gitrob",
"url": "https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob"
},
{
"description": "Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CNET Leaks",
"url": "https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/"
},
{
"description": "Okta. (2022, August 25). Detecting Scatter Swine: Insights into a Relentless Phishing Campaign. Retrieved February 24, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Okta Scatter Swine 2022",
"url": "https://sec.okta.com/scatterswine"
},
{
"description": "Sandvik, R. (2014, January 14). Attackers Scrape GitHub For Cloud Service Credentials, Hijack Account To Mine Virtual Currency. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Forbes GitHub Creds",
"url": "https://www.forbes.com/sites/runasandvik/2014/01/14/attackers-scrape-github-for-cloud-service-credentials-hijack-account-to-mine-virtual-currency/#242c479d3196"
},
{
"description": "Thomson, I. (2017, September 26). Deloitte is a sitting duck: Key systems with RDP open, VPN and proxy 'login details leaked'. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Register Deloitte",
"url": "https://www.theregister.com/2017/09/26/deloitte_leak_github_and_google/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--bd369cd9-abb8-41ce-b5bb-fff23ee86c00 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-11T14:17:21.153000Z" | "2022-04-28T16:04:36.636000Z" | Compromise Software Supply Chain | Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.
Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "initial-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1195.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/002"
},
{
"description": "Avast Threat Intelligence Team. (2018, March 8). New investigations into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger capacities. Retrieved March 15, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Avast CCleaner3 2018",
"url": "https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities"
},
{
"description": "Command Five Pty Ltd. (2011, September). SK Hack by an Advanced Persistent Threat. Retrieved April 6, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Command Five SK 2011",
"url": "https://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking note of potential suspicious activity. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--bd5b58a4-a52d-4a29-bc0d-3f1d3968eb6b | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-10T20:03:11.691000Z" | "2023-09-14T21:12:48.411000Z" | Rename System Utilities | Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities. Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in place for system utilities adversaries are capable of abusing. (Citation: LOLBAS Main Site) It may be possible to bypass those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to utilization (ex: rename <code>rundll32.exe</code>). (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different directory and renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths. (Citation: F-Secure CozyDuke) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1036.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003"
},
{
"description": "Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved April 22, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update",
"url": "https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457"
},
{
"description": "Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball. Retrieved October 31, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Elastic Masquerade Ball",
"url": "https://www.elastic.co/blog/how-hunt-masquerade-ball"
},
{
"description": "F-Secure Labs. (2015, April 22). CozyDuke: Malware Analysis. Retrieved December 10, 2015.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "F-Secure CozyDuke",
"url": "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/CozyDuke"
},
{
"description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (and also Libraries). Retrieved February 10, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "LOLBAS Main Site",
"url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--be055942-6e63-49d7-9fa1-9cb7d8a8f3f4 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-14T22:34:03.024000Z" | "2020-03-26T23:15:47.861000Z" | Bidirectional Communication | Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems can then send the output from those commands back over that Web service channel. The return traffic may occur in a variety of ways, depending on the Web service being utilized. For example, the return traffic may take the form of the compromised system posting a comment on a forum, issuing a pull request to development project, updating a document hosted on a Web service, or by sending a Tweet.
Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1102.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/002"
},
{
"description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--be2dcee9-a7a7-4e38-afd6-21b31ecc3d63 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2018-04-18T17:59:24.739000Z" | "2022-04-18T18:48:06.141000Z" | Exploitation for Client Execution | Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.
Several types exist:
### Browser-based Exploitation
Web browsers are a common target through [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) and [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002). Endpoint systems may be compromised through normal web browsing or from certain users being targeted by links in spearphishing emails to adversary controlled sites used to exploit the web browser. These often do not require an action by the user for the exploit to be executed.
### Office Applications
Common office and productivity applications such as Microsoft Office are also targeted through [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Malicious files will be transmitted directly as attachments or through links to download them. These require the user to open the document or file for the exploit to run.
### Common Third-party Applications
Other applications that are commonly seen or are part of the software deployed in a target network may also be used for exploitation. Applications such as Adobe Reader and Flash, which are common in enterprise environments, have been routinely targeted by adversaries attempting to gain access to systems. Depending on the software and nature of the vulnerability, some may be exploited in the browser or require the user to open a file. For instance, some Flash exploits have been delivered as objects within Microsoft Office documents. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1203",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the browser or Office processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
] | 1.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--bed04f7d-e48a-4e76-bd0f-4c57fe31fc46 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2022-03-04T18:56:38.844000Z" | "2022-04-15T19:10:23.838000Z" | Wordlist Scanning | Adversaries may iteratively probe infrastructure using brute-forcing and crawling techniques. While this technique employs similar methods to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110), its goal is the identification of content and infrastructure rather than the discovery of valid credentials. Wordlists used in these scans may contain generic, commonly used names and file extensions or terms specific to a particular software. Adversaries may also create custom, target-specific wordlists using data gathered from other Reconnaissance techniques (ex: [Gather Victim Org Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591), or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).
For example, adversaries may use web content discovery tools such as Dirb, DirBuster, and GoBuster and generic or custom wordlists to enumerate a website’s pages and directories.(Citation: ClearSky Lebanese Cedar Jan 2021) This can help them to discover old, vulnerable pages or hidden administrative portals that could become the target of further operations (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190) or [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110)).
As cloud storage solutions typically use globally unique names, adversaries may also use target-specific wordlists and tools such as s3recon and GCPBucketBrute to enumerate public and private buckets on cloud infrastructure.(Citation: S3Recon GitHub)(Citation: GCPBucketBrute) Once storage objects are discovered, adversaries may leverage [Data from Cloud Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530) to access valuable information that can be exfiltrated or used to escalate privileges and move laterally. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1595.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/003"
},
{
"description": "ClearSky Cyber Security. (2021, January). “Lebanese Cedar” APT Global Lebanese Espionage Campaign Leveraging Web Servers. Retrieved February 10, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ClearSky Lebanese Cedar Jan 2021",
"url": "https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Lebanese-Cedar-APT.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Spencer Gietzen. (2019, February 26). Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Bucket Enumeration and Privilege Escalation. Retrieved March 4, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GCPBucketBrute",
"url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/google-cloud-platform-gcp-bucket-enumeration/"
},
{
"description": "Travis Clarke. (2020, March 21). S3Recon GitHub. Retrieved March 4, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "S3Recon GitHub",
"url": "https://github.com/clarketm/s3recon"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of scanning, such as large quantities originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Monitor for access to S3 buckets, especially those that are not intended to be publicly accessible.
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--bef8aaee-961d-4359-a308-4c2182bcedff | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2023-03-14T16:04:24.865000Z" | "2023-04-12T22:46:33.995000Z" | Spoof Security Alerting | Adversaries may spoof security alerting from tools, presenting false evidence to impair defenders’ awareness of malicious activity.(Citation: BlackBasta) Messages produced by defensive tools contain information about potential security events as well as the functioning status of security software and the system. Security reporting messages are important for monitoring the normal operation of a system and identifying important events that can signal a security incident.
Rather than or in addition to [Indicator Blocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006), an adversary can spoof positive affirmations that security tools are continuing to function even after legitimate security tools have been disabled (e.g., [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001)). An adversary can also present a “healthy” system status even after infection. This can be abused to enable further malicious activity by delaying defender responses.
For example, adversaries may show a fake Windows Security GUI and tray icon with a “healthy” system status after Windows Defender and other system tools have been disabled.(Citation: BlackBasta) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1562.011",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/011"
},
{
"description": "Antonio Cocomazzi and Antonio Pirozzi. (2022, November 3). Black Basta Ransomware | Attacks Deploy Custom EDR Evasion Tools Tied to FIN7 Threat Actor. Retrieved March 14, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "BlackBasta",
"url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/black-basta-ransomware-attacks-deploy-custom-edr-evasion-tools-tied-to-fin7-threat-actor/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"macOS",
"Linux"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--bf147104-abf9-4221-95d1-e81585859441 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-11-07T20:09:56.536000Z" | "2021-08-16T21:30:01.743000Z" | Outlook Home Page | Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook's Home Page feature to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook Home Page is a legacy feature used to customize the presentation of Outlook folders. This feature allows for an internal or external URL to be loaded and presented whenever a folder is opened. A malicious HTML page can be crafted that will execute code when loaded by Outlook Home Page.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Home Page)
Once malicious home pages have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious Home Pages will execute when the right Outlook folder is loaded/reloaded.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Home Page)
| [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1137.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/004"
},
{
"description": "Stalmans, E. (2017, October 11). Outlook Home Page – Another Ruler Vector. Retrieved February 4, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SensePost Outlook Home Page",
"url": "https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/outlook-home-page-another-ruler-vector/"
},
{
"description": "Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack"
},
{
"description": "SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SensePost NotRuler",
"url": "https://github.com/sensepost/notruler"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)
Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Office 365"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--bf176076-b789-408e-8cba-7275e81c0ada | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-16T15:48:33.882000Z" | "2023-12-26T20:59:21.941000Z" | Asymmetric Cryptography | Adversaries may employ a known asymmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, uses a keypair per party: one public that can be freely distributed, and one private. Due to how the keys are generated, the sender encrypts data with the receiver’s public key and the receiver decrypts the data with their private key. This ensures that only the intended recipient can read the encrypted data. Common public key encryption algorithms include RSA and ElGamal.
For efficiency, many protocols (including SSL/TLS) use symmetric cryptography once a connection is established, but use asymmetric cryptography to establish or transmit a key. As such, these protocols are classified as [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1573.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002"
},
{
"description": "Butler, M. (2013, November). Finding Hidden Threats by Decrypting SSL. Retrieved April 5, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SANS Decrypting SSL",
"url": "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840"
},
{
"description": "Dormann, W. (2015, March 13). The Risks of SSL Inspection. Retrieved April 5, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SEI SSL Inspection Risks",
"url": "https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html"
},
{
"description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | SSL/TLS inspection is one way of detecting command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels.(Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL) SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation.(Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks)
In general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--bf1b6176-597c-4600-bfcd-ac989670f96b | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-09T15:04:32.767000Z" | "2023-09-15T19:11:47.547000Z" | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage | Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service rather than over their primary command and control channel. Cloud storage services allow for the storage, edit, and retrieval of data from a remote cloud storage server over the Internet.
Examples of cloud storage services include Dropbox and Google Docs. Exfiltration to these cloud storage services can provide a significant amount of cover to the adversary if hosts within the network are already communicating with the service. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "exfiltration"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1567.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server) to known cloud storage services. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--bf90d72c-c00b-45e3-b3aa-68560560d4c5 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-11T21:01:00.959000Z" | "2023-10-01T13:48:28.738000Z" | Lateral Tool Transfer | Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between systems in a compromised environment. Once brought into the victim environment (i.e., [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105)) files may then be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation.
Adversaries may copy files between internal victim systems to support lateral movement using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) to connected network shares or with authenticated connections via [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001).(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)
Files can also be transferred using native or otherwise present tools on the victim system, such as scp, rsync, curl, sftp, and [ftp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095). In some cases, adversaries may be able to leverage [Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)s such as Dropbox or OneDrive to copy files from one machine to another via shared, automatically synced folders.(Citation: Dropbox Malware Sync) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "lateral-movement"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1570",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570"
},
{
"description": "David Talbot. (2013, August 21). Dropbox and Similar Services Can Sync Malware. Retrieved May 31, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Dropbox Malware Sync",
"url": "https://www.technologyreview.com/2013/08/21/83143/dropbox-and-similar-services-can-sync-malware/"
},
{
"description": "Harbison, M. (2019, March 26). Born This Way? Origins of LockerGoga. Retrieved April 16, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Unit42 LockerGoga 2019",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/born-this-way-origins-of-lockergoga/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for file creation and files transferred within a network using protocols such as SMB or FTP. Unusual processes with internal network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Consider monitoring for abnormal usage of utilities and command-line arguments that may be used in support of remote transfer of files. Considering monitoring for alike file hashes or characteristics (ex: filename) that are created on multiple hosts. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--bf96a5a3-3bce-43b7-8597-88545984c07b | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-13T13:51:58.519000Z" | "2023-03-30T21:01:35.788000Z" | Path Interception by Unquoted Path | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking vulnerable file path references. Adversaries can take advantage of paths that lack surrounding quotations by placing an executable in a higher level directory within the path, so that Windows will choose the adversary's executable to launch.
Service paths (Citation: Microsoft CurrentControlSet Services) and shortcut paths may also be vulnerable to path interception if the path has one or more spaces and is not surrounded by quotation marks (e.g., <code>C:\unsafe path with space\program.exe</code> vs. <code>"C:\safe path with space\program.exe"</code>). (Citation: Help eliminate unquoted path) (stored in Windows Registry keys) An adversary can place an executable in a higher level directory of the path, and Windows will resolve that executable instead of the intended executable. For example, if the path in a shortcut is <code>C:\program files\myapp.exe</code>, an adversary may create a program at <code>C:\program.exe</code> that will be run instead of the intended program. (Citation: Windows Unquoted Services) (Citation: Windows Privilege Escalation Guide)
This technique can be used for persistence if executables are called on a regular basis, as well as privilege escalation if intercepted executables are started by a higher privileged process. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1574.009",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/009"
},
{
"description": "absolomb. (2018, January 26). Windows Privilege Escalation Guide. Retrieved August 10, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Windows Privilege Escalation Guide",
"url": "https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/"
},
{
"description": "HackHappy. (2018, April 23). Windows Privilege Escalation – Unquoted Services. Retrieved August 10, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Windows Unquoted Services",
"url": "https://securityboulevard.com/2018/04/windows-privilege-escalation-unquoted-services/"
},
{
"description": "Mark Baggett. (2012, November 8). Help eliminate unquoted path vulnerabilities. Retrieved November 8, 2012.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Help eliminate unquoted path",
"url": "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, April 20). HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services Registry Tree. Retrieved March 16, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft CurrentControlSet Services",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as "findstr," "net," and "python"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious.
Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--c071d8c1-3b3a-4f22-9407-ca4e96921069 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-03-17T20:32:13.793000Z" | "2021-10-16T17:47:46.409000Z" | Install Digital Certificate | Adversaries may install SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are files that can be installed on servers to enable secure communications between systems. Digital certificates include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate securely with its owner. Certificates can be uploaded to a server, then the server can be configured to use the certificate to enable encrypted communication with it.(Citation: DigiCert Install SSL Cert)
Adversaries may install SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or lending credibility to a credential harvesting site. Installation of digital certificates may take place for a number of server types, including web servers and email servers.
Adversaries can obtain digital certificates (see [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004)) or create self-signed certificates (see [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/003)). Digital certificates can then be installed on adversary controlled infrastructure that may have been acquired ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or previously compromised ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1608.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003"
},
{
"description": "DigiCert. (n.d.). How to Install an SSL Certificate. Retrieved April 19, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "DigiCert Install SSL Cert",
"url": "https://www.digicert.com/kb/ssl-certificate-installation.htm"
},
{
"description": "Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017",
"url": "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017)
Detection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001) or [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--c0dfe7b0-b873-4618-9ff8-53e31f70907f | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-15T18:00:33.603000Z" | "2022-04-20T16:43:21.560000Z" | Startup Items | Adversaries may use startup items automatically executed at boot initialization to establish persistence. Startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items.(Citation: Startup Items)
This is technically a deprecated technology (superseded by [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)), and thus the appropriate folder, <code>/Library/StartupItems</code> isn’t guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and configuration property list (plist), <code>StartupParameters.plist</code>, reside in the top-level directory.
An adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as the elevated root user. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1037.005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/005"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Startup Items",
"url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html"
},
{
"description": "Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Methods of Mac Malware Persistence",
"url": "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | The <code>/Library/StartupItems</code> folder can be monitored for changes. Similarly, the programs that are actually executed from this mechanism should be checked against a whitelist.
Monitor processes that are executed during the bootup process to check for unusual or unknown applications and behavior. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--c1b68a96-3c48-49ea-a6c0-9b27359f9c19 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-08-18T14:06:45.244000Z" | "2021-10-15T22:00:56.174000Z" | System Language Discovery | Adversaries may attempt to gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host. This information may be used to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether the adversary infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This decision may be employed by malware developers and operators to reduce their risk of attracting the attention of specific law enforcement agencies or prosecution/scrutiny from other entities.(Citation: Malware System Language Check)
There are various sources of data an adversary could use to infer system language, such as system defaults and keyboard layouts. Specific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) and calls to [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019)
For example, on a Windows system adversaries may attempt to infer the language of a system by querying the registry key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\Language</code> or parsing the outputs of Windows API functions <code>GetUserDefaultUILanguage</code>, <code>GetSystemDefaultUILanguage</code>, <code>GetKeyboardLayoutList</code> and <code>GetUserDefaultLangID</code>.(Citation: Darkside Ransomware Cybereason)(Citation: Securelist JSWorm)(Citation: SecureList SynAck Doppelgänging May 2018)
On a macOS or Linux system, adversaries may query <code>locale</code> to retrieve the value of the <code>$LANG</code> environment variable. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1614.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614/001"
},
{
"description": "Pierre-Marc Bureau. (2009, January 15). Malware Trying to Avoid Some Countries. Retrieved August 18, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Malware System Language Check",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2009/01/15/malware-trying-to-avoid-some-countries/"
},
{
"description": "Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019",
"url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/"
},
{
"description": "Cybereason Nocturnus. (2021, April 1). Cybereason vs. Darkside Ransomware. Retrieved August 18, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Darkside Ransomware Cybereason",
"url": "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/cybereason-vs-darkside-ransomware"
},
{
"description": "Fedor Sinitsyn. (2021, May 25). Evolution of JSWorm Ransomware. Retrieved August 18, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Securelist JSWorm",
"url": "https://securelist.com/evolution-of-jsworm-ransomware/102428/"
},
{
"description": "Ivanov, A. et al. (2018, May 7). SynAck targeted ransomware uses the Doppelgänging technique. Retrieved May 22, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SecureList SynAck Doppelgänging May 2018",
"url": "https://securelist.com/synack-targeted-ransomware-uses-the-doppelganging-technique/85431/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system language information. This may include calls to various API functions and interaction with system configuration settings such as the Windows Registry. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:31:10.728000Z" | "2023-09-29T21:07:31.570000Z" | Non-Application Layer Protocol | Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.(Citation: Wikipedia OSI) Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
ICMP communication between hosts is one example.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts.(Citation: Microsoft ICMP) However, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1095",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1095"
},
{
"description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco Synful Knock Evolution",
"url": "https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) Basics. Retrieved December 1, 2014.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft ICMP",
"url": "http://support.microsoft.com/KB/170292"
},
{
"description": "Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks",
"url": "https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (n.d.). List of network protocols (OSI model). Retrieved December 4, 2014.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wikipedia OSI",
"url": "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_network_protocols_%28OSI_model%29"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Analyze network traffic for ICMP messages or other protocols that contain abnormal data or are not normally seen within or exiting the network.(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)
Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Monitor and investigate API calls to functions associated with enabling and/or utilizing alternative communication channels. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Network"
] | 2.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--c2e147a9-d1a8-4074-811a-d8789202d916 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-05T14:28:16.719000Z" | "2023-03-30T21:01:48.815000Z" | Steganography | Adversaries may use steganography techniques in order to prevent the detection of hidden information. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital media such as images, audio tracks, video clips, or text files.
[Duqu](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0038) was an early example of malware that used steganography. It encrypted the gathered information from a victim's system and hid it within an image before exfiltrating the image to a C2 server.(Citation: Wikipedia Duqu)
By the end of 2017, a threat group used <code>Invoke-PSImage</code> to hide [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) commands in an image file (.png) and execute the code on a victim's system. In this particular case the [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) code downloaded another obfuscated script to gather intelligence from the victim's machine and communicate it back to the adversary.(Citation: McAfee Malicious Doc Targets Pyeongchang Olympics) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1027.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/003"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (2017, December 29). Duqu. Retrieved April 10, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wikipedia Duqu",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duqu"
},
{
"description": "Saavedra-Morales, J., Sherstobitoff, R. (2018, January 6). Malicious Document Targets Pyeongchang Olympics. Retrieved April 10, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "McAfee Malicious Doc Targets Pyeongchang Olympics",
"url": "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malicious-document-targets-pyeongchang-olympics/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detection of steganography is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are detectable with a known signature. Look for strings or other signatures left in system artifacts related to decoding steganography. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--c2f59d25-87fe-44aa-8f83-e8e59d077bf5 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-01T00:54:30.869000Z" | "2022-04-19T21:22:13.578000Z" | DNS Server | Adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of setting up their own DNS servers, adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers in support of operations.
By compromising DNS servers, adversaries can alter DNS records. Such control can allow for redirection of an organization's traffic, facilitating Collection and Credential Access efforts for the adversary.(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Additionally, adversaries may leverage such control in conjunction with [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004) to redirect traffic to adversary-controlled infrastructure, mimicking normal trusted network communications.(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNS Hijack 2019) Adversaries may also be able to silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner of the DNS server.(Citation: CiscoAngler)(Citation: Proofpoint Domain Shadowing) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1584.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/002"
},
{
"description": "Hirani, M., Jones, S., Read, B. (2019, January 10). Global DNS Hijacking Campaign: DNS Record Manipulation at Scale. Retrieved October 9, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye DNS Hijack 2019",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/global-dns-hijacking-campaign-dns-record-manipulation-at-scale.html"
},
{
"description": "Matt Dahl. (2019, January 25). Widespread DNS Hijacking Activity Targets Multiple Sectors. Retrieved February 14, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Crowdstrike DNS Hijack 2019",
"url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/widespread-dns-hijacking-activity-targets-multiple-sectors/"
},
{
"description": "Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, November 27). DNSpionage Campaign Targets Middle East. Retrieved October 9, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018",
"url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/11/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east.html"
},
{
"description": "Nick Biasini. (2015, March 3). Threat Spotlight: Angler Lurking in the Domain Shadows. Retrieved March 6, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CiscoAngler",
"url": "https://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/angler-domain-shadowing"
},
{
"description": "Proofpoint Staff. (2015, December 15). The shadow knows: Malvertising campaigns use domain shadowing to pull in Angler EK. Retrieved October 16, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Proofpoint Domain Shadowing",
"url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/The-Shadow-Knows"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Consider monitoring for anomalous resolution changes for domain addresses. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet.
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--c325b232-d5bc-4dde-a3ec-71f3db9e8adc | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-15T00:40:27.503000Z" | "2020-03-15T00:40:27.503000Z" | Protocol Impersonation | Adversaries may impersonate legitimate protocols or web service traffic to disguise command and control activity and thwart analysis efforts. By impersonating legitimate protocols or web services, adversaries can make their command and control traffic blend in with legitimate network traffic.
Adversaries may impersonate a fake SSL/TLS handshake to make it look like subsequent traffic is SSL/TLS encrypted, potentially interfering with some security tooling, or to make the traffic look like it is related with a trusted entity. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1001.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/003"
},
{
"description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:25.584000Z" | "2023-04-03T18:56:37.011000Z" | Query Registry | Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software.
The Registry contains a significant amount of information about the operating system, configuration, software, and security.(Citation: Wikipedia Windows Registry) Information can easily be queried using the [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) utility, though other means to access the Registry exist. Some of the information may help adversaries to further their operation within a network. Adversaries may use the information from [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1012",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (n.d.). Windows Registry. Retrieved February 2, 2015.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wikipedia Windows Registry",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows_Registry"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Interaction with the Windows Registry may come from the command line using utilities such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or through running malware that may interact with the Registry through an API. Command-line invocation of utilities used to query the Registry may be detected through process and command-line monitoring. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--c3888c54-775d-4b2f-b759-75a2ececcbfd | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:34.523000Z" | "2020-07-14T19:47:46.912000Z" | Data Transfer Size Limits | An adversary may exfiltrate data in fixed size chunks instead of whole files or limit packet sizes below certain thresholds. This approach may be used to avoid triggering network data transfer threshold alerts. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "exfiltration"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1030",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1030"
},
{
"description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). If a process maintains a long connection during which it consistently sends fixed size data packets or a process opens connections and sends fixed sized data packets at regular intervals, it may be performing an aggregate data transfer. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--c3c8c916-2f3c-4e71-94b2-240bdfc996f0 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-30T17:48:49.395000Z" | "2023-09-19T21:26:24.725000Z" | Web Session Cookie | Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)
Authentication cookies are commonly used in web applications, including cloud-based services, after a user has authenticated to the service so credentials are not passed and re-authentication does not need to occur as frequently. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. After the cookie is obtained through [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539) or [Web Cookies](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/001), the adversary may then import the cookie into a browser they control and is then able to use the site or application as the user for as long as the session cookie is active. Once logged into the site, an adversary can access sensitive information, read email, or perform actions that the victim account has permissions to perform.
There have been examples of malware targeting session cookies to bypass multi-factor authentication systems.(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "lateral-movement"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1550.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004"
},
{
"description": "Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/"
},
{
"description": "Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Pass The Cookie",
"url": "https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for anomalous access of websites and cloud-based applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems that do not match expected configurations. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Office 365",
"SaaS",
"Google Workspace",
"IaaS"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--c3d4bdd9-2cfe-4a80-9d0c-07a29ecdce8f | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-13T20:21:54.758000Z" | "2023-08-14T14:55:07.432000Z" | Domain Accounts | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion.(Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.(Citation: Microsoft AD Accounts)
Adversaries may compromise domain accounts, some with a high level of privileges, through various means such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or password reuse, allowing access to privileged resources of the domain. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "initial-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1078.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Credential Theft",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Audit Policy",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2019, August 23). Active Directory Accounts. Retrieved March 13, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft AD Accounts",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-accounts"
},
{
"description": "Ubuntu. (n.d.). SSSD. Retrieved September 23, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Ubuntu SSSD Docs",
"url": "https://ubuntu.com/server/docs/service-sssd"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).
On Linux, check logs and other artifacts created by use of domain authentication services, such as the System Security Services Daemon (sssd).(Citation: Ubuntu SSSD Docs)
Perform regular audits of domain accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--c48a67ee-b657-45c1-91bf-6cdbe27205f8 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-23T19:42:16.439000Z" | "2022-03-11T18:55:48.725000Z" | Regsvcs/Regasm | Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) assemblies. Both are binaries that may be digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm)
Both utilities may be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: <code>[ComRegisterFunction]</code> or <code>[ComUnregisterFunction]</code> respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvcs)(Citation: LOLBAS Regasm) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1218.009",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Regsvcs.exe (.NET Services Installation Tool). Retrieved July 1, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MSDN Regsvcs",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/04za0hca.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Regasm.exe (Assembly Registration Tool). Retrieved July 1, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MSDN Regasm",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/tzat5yw6.aspx"
},
{
"description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regsvcs.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "LOLBAS Regsvcs",
"url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/"
},
{
"description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regasm.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "LOLBAS Regasm",
"url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe. Compare recent invocations of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 2.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--c615231b-f253-4f58-9d47-d5b4cbdb6839 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-21T21:05:32.844000Z" | "2024-01-04T20:01:27.662000Z" | Install Root Certificate | Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate.(Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.
Installation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials.(Citation: Operation Emmental)
Atypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications.(Citation: Kaspersky Superfish)
Root certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)
In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses <code>/usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert</code> to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain.(Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1553.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004"
},
{
"description": "botconf eu. (2014, December 31). David Sancho - Finding Holes in Banking 2FA: Operation Emmental. Retrieved January 4, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Operation Emmental",
"url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gchKFumYHWc"
},
{
"description": "Graeber, M. (2017, December 22). Code Signing Certificate Cloning Attacks and Defenses. Retrieved April 3, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017",
"url": "https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec"
},
{
"description": "Onuma. (2015, February 24). Superfish: Adware Preinstalled on Lenovo Laptops. Retrieved February 20, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kaspersky Superfish",
"url": "https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/lenovo-pc-with-adware-superfish-preinstalled/7712/"
},
{
"description": "Patrick Wardle. (2018, January 11). Ay MaMi. Retrieved March 19, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "objective-see ay mami 2018",
"url": "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x26.html"
},
{
"description": "Russinovich, M. et al.. (2017, May 22). Sigcheck. Retrieved April 3, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sigcheck"
},
{
"description": "Smith, T. (2016, October 27). AppUNBlocker: Bypassing AppLocker. Retrieved December 19, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Tripwire AppUNBlocker",
"url": "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/off-topic/appunblocker-bypassing-applocker/"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (2016, December 6). Root certificate. Retrieved February 20, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wikipedia Root Certificate",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root_certificate"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present. Microsoft provides a list of trustworthy root certificates online and through authroot.stl.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) The Sysinternals Sigcheck utility can also be used (<code>sigcheck[64].exe -tuv</code>) to dump the contents of the certificate store and list valid certificates not rooted to the Microsoft Certificate Trust List.(Citation: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017)
Installed root certificates are located in the Registry under <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\EnterpriseCertificates\Root\Certificates\</code> and <code>[HKLM or HKCU]\Software[\Policies\]\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates\</code>. There are a subset of root certificates that are consistent across Windows systems and can be used for comparison:(Citation: Tripwire AppUNBlocker)
* 18F7C1FCC3090203FD5BAA2F861A754976C8DD25
* 245C97DF7514E7CF2DF8BE72AE957B9E04741E85
* 3B1EFD3A66EA28B16697394703A72CA340A05BD5
* 7F88CD7223F3C813818C994614A89C99FA3B5247
* 8F43288AD272F3103B6FB1428485EA3014C0BCFE
* A43489159A520F0D93D032CCAF37E7FE20A8B419
* BE36A4562FB2EE05DBB3D32323ADF445084ED656
* CDD4EEAE6000AC7F40C3802C171E30148030C072 | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--c63a348e-ffc2-486a-b9d9-d7f11ec54d99 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-10T18:01:03.666000Z" | "2020-03-24T23:45:25.625000Z" | Network Logon Script | Adversaries may use network logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence. Network logon scripts can be assigned using Active Directory or Group Policy Objects.(Citation: Petri Logon Script AD) These logon scripts run with the privileges of the user they are assigned to. Depending on the systems within the network, initializing one of these scripts could apply to more than one or potentially all systems.
Adversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a network. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1037.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/003"
},
{
"description": "Daniel Petri. (2009, January 8). Setting up a Logon Script through Active Directory Users and Computers in Windows Server 2008. Retrieved November 15, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Petri Logon Script AD",
"url": "https://www.petri.com/setting-up-logon-script-through-active-directory-users-computers-windows-server-2008"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties. Monitor running process for actions that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon logon. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--c675646d-e204-4aa8-978d-e3d6d65885c4 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-04-18T11:00:55.862000Z" | "2023-03-30T21:01:44.038000Z" | Endpoint Denial of Service | Adversaries may perform Endpoint Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of services to users. Endpoint DoS can be performed by exhausting the system resources those services are hosted on or exploiting the system to cause a persistent crash condition. Example services include websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting DoS attacks for political purposes(Citation: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016) and to support other malicious activities, including distraction(Citation: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012), hacktivism, and extortion.(Citation: Symantec DDoS October 2014)
An Endpoint DoS denies the availability of a service without saturating the network used to provide access to the service. Adversaries can target various layers of the application stack that is hosted on the system used to provide the service. These layers include the Operating Systems (OS), server applications such as web servers, DNS servers, databases, and the (typically web-based) applications that sit on top of them. Attacking each layer requires different techniques that take advantage of bottlenecks that are unique to the respective components. A DoS attack may be generated by a single system or multiple systems spread across the internet, which is commonly referred to as a distributed DoS (DDoS).
To perform DoS attacks against endpoint resources, several aspects apply to multiple methods, including IP address spoofing and botnets.
Adversaries may use the original IP address of an attacking system, or spoof the source IP address to make the attack traffic more difficult to trace back to the attacking system or to enable reflection. This can increase the difficulty defenders have in defending against the attack by reducing or eliminating the effectiveness of filtering by the source address on network defense devices.
Botnets are commonly used to conduct DDoS attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for DDoS, so many systems are used to generate requests that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to exhaust the target's resources. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016)
In cases where traffic manipulation is used, there may be points in the global network (such as high traffic gateway routers) where packets can be altered and cause legitimate clients to execute code that directs network packets toward a target in high volume. This type of capability was previously used for the purposes of web censorship where client HTTP traffic was modified to include a reference to JavaScript that generated the DDoS code to overwhelm target web servers.(Citation: ArsTechnica Great Firewall of China)
For attacks attempting to saturate the providing network, see [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498).
| [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "impact"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1499",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco DoSdetectNetflow",
"url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf"
},
{
"description": "FS-ISAC. (2012, September 17). Fraud Alert – Cyber Criminals Targeting Financial Institution Employee Credentials to Conduct Wire Transfer Fraud. Retrieved April 18, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012",
"url": "https://www.ic3.gov/media/2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Goodin, D.. (2015, March 31). Massive denial-of-service attack on GitHub tied to Chinese government. Retrieved April 19, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ArsTechnica Great Firewall of China",
"url": "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/03/massive-denial-of-service-attack-on-github-tied-to-chinese-government/"
},
{
"description": "Ned Moran, Mike Scott, Mike Oppenheim of FireEye. (2014, November 3). Operation Poisoned Handover: Unveiling Ties Between APT Activity in Hong Kong’s Pro-Democracy Movement. Retrieved April 18, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation-poisoned-handover-unveiling-ties-between-apt-activity-in-hong-kongs-pro-democracy-movement.html"
},
{
"description": "Preet Bharara, US Attorney. (2016, March 24). Retrieved April 23, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016",
"url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged"
},
{
"description": "Wueest, C.. (2014, October 21). The continued rise of DDoS attacks. Retrieved April 24, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Symantec DDoS October 2014",
"url": "https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-continued-rise-of-ddos-attacks.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts.
In addition to network level detections, endpoint logging and instrumentation can be useful for detection. Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack, possibly before the impact is felt.
Externally monitor the availability of services that may be targeted by an Endpoint DoS. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Azure AD",
"Office 365",
"SaaS",
"IaaS",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Google Workspace",
"Containers"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--c726e0a2-a57a-4b7b-a973-d0f013246617 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-16T15:30:57.711000Z" | "2020-03-29T20:59:32.293000Z" | Compile After Delivery | Adversaries may attempt to make payloads difficult to discover and analyze by delivering files to victims as uncompiled code. Text-based source code files may subvert analysis and scrutiny from protections targeting executables/binaries. These payloads will need to be compiled before execution; typically via native utilities such as csc.exe or GCC/MinGW.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)
Source code payloads may also be encrypted, encoded, and/or embedded within other files, such as those delivered as a [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Payloads may also be delivered in formats unrecognizable and inherently benign to the native OS (ex: EXEs on macOS/Linux) before later being (re)compiled into a proper executable binary with a bundled compiler and execution framework.(Citation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1027.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/004"
},
{
"description": "ClearSky Cyber Security. (2018, November). MuddyWater Operations in Lebanon and Oman: Using an Israeli compromised domain for a two-stage campaign. Retrieved November 29, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018",
"url": "https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/MuddyWater-Operations-in-Lebanon-and-Oman.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Trend Micro. (2019, February 11). Windows App Runs on Mac, Downloads Info Stealer and Adware. Retrieved April 25, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TrendMicro WindowsAppMac",
"url": "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/windows-app-runs-on-mac-downloads-info-stealer-and-adware/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor the execution file paths and command-line arguments for common compilers, such as csc.exe and GCC/MinGW, and correlate with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives from normal user and administrator behavior. The compilation of payloads may also generate file creation and/or file write events. Look for non-native binary formats and cross-platform compiler and execution frameworks like Mono and determine if they have a legitimate purpose on the system.(Citation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac) Typically these should only be used in specific and limited cases, like for software development. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--c877e33f-1df6-40d6-b1e7-ce70f16f4979 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-04-01T16:42:08.735000Z" | "2021-10-15T22:00:56.438000Z" | System Location Discovery |
Adversaries may gather information in an attempt to calculate the geographical location of a victim host. Adversaries may use the information from [System Location Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Adversaries may attempt to infer the location of a system using various system checks, such as time zone, keyboard layout, and/or language settings.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020)(Citation: Sophos Geolocation 2016)(Citation: Bleepingcomputer RAT malware 2020) Windows API functions such as <code>GetLocaleInfoW</code> can also be used to determine the locale of the host.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020) In cloud environments, an instance's availability zone may also be discovered by accessing the instance metadata service from the instance.(Citation: AWS Instance Identity Documents)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Instance Metadata 2021)
Adversaries may also attempt to infer the location of a victim host using IP addressing, such as via online geolocation IP-lookup services.(Citation: Securelist Trasparent Tribe 2020)(Citation: Sophos Geolocation 2016) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1614",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614"
},
{
"description": "FBI. (2020, November 19). Indicators of Compromise Associated with Ragnar Locker Ransomware. Retrieved April 1, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FBI Ragnar Locker 2020",
"url": "https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/20413525/fbi-flash-indicators-of-compromise-ragnar-locker-ransomware-11192020-bc.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Wisniewski, C. (2016, May 3). Location-based threats: How cybercriminals target you based on where you live. Retrieved April 1, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sophos Geolocation 2016",
"url": "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2016/05/03/location-based-ransomware-threat-research/"
},
{
"description": "Abrams, L. (2020, October 23). New RAT malware gets commands via Discord, has ransomware feature. Retrieved April 1, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Bleepingcomputer RAT malware 2020",
"url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-rat-malware-gets-commands-via-discord-has-ransomware-feature/"
},
{
"description": "Amazon. (n.d.). Instance identity documents. Retrieved April 2, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AWS Instance Identity Documents",
"url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/instance-identity-documents.html"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2021, February 21). Azure Instance Metadata Service (Windows). Retrieved April 2, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Azure Instance Metadata 2021",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/windows/instance-metadata-service?tabs=windows"
},
{
"description": "Dedola, G. (2020, August 20). Transparent Tribe: Evolution analysis, part 1. Retrieved April 1, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Securelist Trasparent Tribe 2020",
"url": "https://securelist.com/transparent-tribe-part-1/98127/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system location information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API, such as calling <code> GetLocaleInfoW</code> to gather information.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020)
Monitor traffic flows to geo-location service provider sites, such as ip-api and ipinfo. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"IaaS"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--c898c4b5-bf36-4e6e-a4ad-5b8c4c13e35b | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-09-17T12:51:40.845000Z" | "2021-10-15T14:02:07.944000Z" | VBA Stomping | Adversaries may hide malicious Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) payloads embedded within MS Office documents by replacing the VBA source code with benign data.(Citation: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020)
MS Office documents with embedded VBA content store source code inside of module streams. Each module stream has a <code>PerformanceCache</code> that stores a separate compiled version of the VBA source code known as p-code. The p-code is executed when the MS Office version specified in the <code>_VBA_PROJECT</code> stream (which contains the version-dependent description of the VBA project) matches the version of the host MS Office application.(Citation: Evil Clippy May 2019)(Citation: Microsoft _VBA_PROJECT Stream)
An adversary may hide malicious VBA code by overwriting the VBA source code location with zero’s, benign code, or random bytes while leaving the previously compiled malicious p-code. Tools that scan for malicious VBA source code may be bypassed as the unwanted code is hidden in the compiled p-code. If the VBA source code is removed, some tools might even think that there are no macros present. If there is a version match between the <code>_VBA_PROJECT</code> stream and host MS Office application, the p-code will be executed, otherwise the benign VBA source code will be decompressed and recompiled to p-code, thus removing malicious p-code and potentially bypassing dynamic analysis.(Citation: Walmart Roberts Oct 2018)(Citation: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020)(Citation: pcodedmp Bontchev) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1564.007",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/007"
},
{
"description": "Cole, R., Moore, A., Stark, G., Stancill, B. (2020, February 5). STOMP 2 DIS: Brilliance in the (Visual) Basics. Retrieved September 17, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/01/stomp-2-dis-brilliance-in-the-visual-basics.html"
},
{
"description": "Hegt, S. (2019, May 5). Evil Clippy: MS Office maldoc assistant. Retrieved September 17, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Evil Clippy May 2019",
"url": "https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/05/05/evil-clippy-ms-office-maldoc-assistant/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2020, February 19). 2.3.4.1 _VBA_PROJECT Stream: Version Dependent Project Information. Retrieved September 18, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft _VBA_PROJECT Stream",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/office_file_formats/ms-ovba/ef7087ac-3974-4452-aab2-7dba2214d239"
},
{
"description": "Sayre, K., Ogden, H., Roberts, C. (2018, October 10). VBA Stomping — Advanced Maldoc Techniques. Retrieved September 17, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Walmart Roberts Oct 2018",
"url": "https://medium.com/walmartglobaltech/vba-stomping-advanced-maldoc-techniques-612c484ab278"
},
{
"description": "Bontchev, V. (2019, July 30). pcodedmp.py - A VBA p-code disassembler. Retrieved September 17, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "pcodedmp Bontchev",
"url": "https://github.com/bontchev/pcodedmp"
},
{
"description": "decalage2. (2019, December 3). python-oletools. Retrieved September 18, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "oletools toolkit",
"url": "https://github.com/decalage2/oletools"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detection efforts should be placed finding differences between VBA source code and p-code.(Citation: Walmart Roberts Oct 2018) VBA code can be extracted from p-code before execution with tools such as the pcodedmp disassembler. The oletools toolkit leverages the pcodedmp disassembler to detect VBA stomping by comparing keywords present in the VBA source code and p-code.(Citation: pcodedmp Bontchev)(Citation: oletools toolkit)
If the document is opened with a Graphical User Interface (GUI) the malicious p-code is decompiled and may be viewed. However, if the <code>PROJECT</code> stream, which specifies the project properties, is modified in a specific way the decompiled VBA code will not be displayed. For example, adding a module name that is undefined to the <code>PROJECT</code> stream will inhibit attempts of reading the VBA source code through the GUI.(Citation: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--c8e87b83-edbb-48d4-9295-4974897525b7 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2018-04-18T17:59:24.739000Z" | "2023-04-21T12:21:40.927000Z" | BITS Jobs | Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute code and perform various background tasks. Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM).(Citation: Microsoft COM)(Citation: Microsoft BITS) BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations.
The interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) and the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool.(Citation: Microsoft BITS)(Citation: Microsoft BITSAdmin)
Adversaries may abuse BITS to download (e.g. [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105)), execute, and even clean up after running malicious code (e.g. [Indicator Removal](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070)). BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls.(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)(Citation: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007)(Citation: Symantec BITS May 2007) BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots).(Citation: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017)(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)
BITS upload functionalities can also be used to perform [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048).(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1197",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197"
},
{
"description": "Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2016, June 6). Malware Lingers with BITS. Retrieved January 12, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CTU BITS Malware June 2016",
"url": "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/malware-lingers-with-bits"
},
{
"description": "Florio, E. (2007, May 9). Malware Update with Windows Update. Retrieved January 12, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Symantec BITS May 2007",
"url": "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malware-update-windows-update"
},
{
"description": "French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft 101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved December 21, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1",
"url": "https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1"
},
{
"description": "Hayashi, K. (2017, November 28). UBoatRAT Navigates East Asia. Retrieved January 12, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017",
"url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-uboatrat-navigates-east-asia/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2011, July 19). Issues with BITS. Retrieved January 12, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd939934.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Background Intelligent Transfer Service. Retrieved January 12, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft BITS",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968799.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). BITSAdmin Tool. Retrieved January 12, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft BITSAdmin",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/aa362813.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November 22, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft COM",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Mondok, M. (2007, May 11). Malware piggybacks on Windows’ Background Intelligent Transfer Service. Retrieved January 12, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007",
"url": "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2007/05/malware-piggybacks-on-windows-background-intelligent-transfer-service/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | BITS runs as a service and its status can be checked with the Sc query utility (<code>sc query bits</code>).(Citation: Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011) Active BITS tasks can be enumerated using the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (<code>bitsadmin /list /allusers /verbose</code>).(Citation: Microsoft BITS)
Monitor usage of the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (especially the ‘Transfer’, 'Create', 'AddFile', 'SetNotifyFlags', 'SetNotifyCmdLine', 'SetMinRetryDelay', 'SetCustomHeaders', and 'Resume' command options)(Citation: Microsoft BITS) Admin logs, PowerShell logs, and the Windows Event log for BITS activity.(Citation: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1) Also consider investigating more detailed information about jobs by parsing the BITS job database.(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)
Monitor and analyze network activity generated by BITS. BITS jobs use HTTP(S) and SMB for remote connections and are tethered to the creating user and will only function when that user is logged on (this rule applies even if a user attaches the job to a service account).(Citation: Microsoft BITS) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--c92e3d68-2349-49e4-a341-7edca2deff96 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-27T21:50:26.042000Z" | "2023-08-14T19:23:58.317000Z" | MSBuild | Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild)
Adversaries can abuse MSBuild to proxy execution of malicious code. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# or Visual Basic code to be inserted into an XML project file.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild)(Citation: Microsoft MSBuild Inline Tasks 2017) MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.(Citation: LOLBAS Msbuild) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1127.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001"
},
{
"description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Msbuild.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "LOLBAS Msbuild",
"url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, September 21). MSBuild inline tasks. Retrieved March 5, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft MSBuild Inline Tasks 2017",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/visualstudio/msbuild/msbuild-inline-tasks?view=vs-2019#code-element"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). MSBuild1. Retrieved November 30, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MSDN MSBuild",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd393574.aspx"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of MSBuild.exe. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after invocation of the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--c9e0c59e-162e-40a4-b8b1-78fab4329ada | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2023-08-08T15:42:18.906000Z" | "2023-09-30T19:45:05.886000Z" | Impersonation | Adversaries may impersonate a trusted person or organization in order to persuade and trick a target into performing some action on their behalf. For example, adversaries may communicate with victims (via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), or [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)) while impersonating a known sender such as an executive, colleague, or third-party vendor. Established trust can then be leveraged to accomplish an adversary’s ultimate goals, possibly against multiple victims.
In many cases of business email compromise or email fraud campaigns, adversaries use impersonation to defraud victims -- deceiving them into sending money or divulging information that ultimately enables [Financial Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1657).
Adversaries will often also use social engineering techniques such as manipulative and persuasive language in email subject lines and body text such as `payment`, `request`, or `urgent` to push the victim to act quickly before malicious activity is detected. These campaigns are often specifically targeted against people who, due to job roles and/or accesses, can carry out the adversary’s goal.
Impersonation is typically preceded by reconnaissance techniques such as [Gather Victim Identity Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589) and [Gather Victim Org Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591) as well as acquiring infrastructure such as email domains (i.e. [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)) to substantiate their false identity.(Citation: CrowdStrike-BEC)
There is the potential for multiple victims in campaigns involving impersonation. For example, an adversary may [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586) targeting one organization which can then be used to support impersonation against other entities.(Citation: VEC) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1656",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656"
},
{
"description": "Bart Lenaerts-Bergmans. (2023, March 10). What is Business Email Compromise?. Retrieved August 8, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CrowdStrike-BEC",
"url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/cybersecurity-101/business-email-compromise-bec/"
},
{
"description": "CloudFlare. (n.d.). What is vendor email compromise (VEC)?. Retrieved September 12, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "VEC",
"url": "https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/email-security/what-is-vendor-email-compromise/#:~:text=Vendor%20email%20compromise%2C%20also%20referred,steal%20from%20that%20vendor%27s%20customers."
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Office 365",
"SaaS",
"Google Workspace"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--ca00366b-83a1-4c7b-a0ce-8ff950a7c87f | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2023-09-05T14:19:17.486000Z" | "2023-10-02T22:17:54.968000Z" | Modify Cloud Compute Configurations | Adversaries may modify settings that directly affect the size, locations, and resources available to cloud compute infrastructure in order to evade defenses. These settings may include service quotas, subscription associations, tenant-wide policies, or other configurations that impact available compute. Such modifications may allow adversaries to abuse the victim’s compute resources to achieve their goals, potentially without affecting the execution of running instances and/or revealing their activities to the victim.
For example, cloud providers often limit customer usage of compute resources via quotas. Customers may request adjustments to these quotas to support increased computing needs, though these adjustments may require approval from the cloud provider. Adversaries who compromise a cloud environment may similarly request quota adjustments in order to support their activities, such as enabling additional [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496) without raising suspicion by using up a victim’s entire quota.(Citation: Microsoft Cryptojacking 2023) Adversaries may also increase allowed resource usage by modifying any tenant-wide policies that limit the sizes of deployed virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft Azure Policy)
Adversaries may also modify settings that affect where cloud resources can be deployed, such as enabling [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535). In Azure environments, an adversary who has gained access to a Global Administrator account may create new subscriptions in which to deploy resources, or engage in subscription hijacking by transferring an existing pay-as-you-go subscription from a victim tenant to an adversary-controlled tenant.(Citation: Microsoft Peach Sandstorm 2023) This will allow the adversary to use the victim’s compute resources without generating logs on the victim tenant.(Citation: Microsoft Azure Policy) (Citation: Microsoft Subscription Hijacking 2022) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1578.005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/005"
},
{
"description": "Dor Edry. (2022, August 24). Hunt for compromised Azure subscriptions using Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps. Retrieved September 5, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Subscription Hijacking 2022",
"url": "https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-365-defender-blog/hunt-for-compromised-azure-subscriptions-using-microsoft/ba-p/3607121"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, July 25). Cryptojacking: Understanding and defending against cloud compute resource abuse. Retrieved September 5, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Cryptojacking 2023",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/07/25/cryptojacking-understanding-and-defending-against-cloud-compute-resource-abuse/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, September 14). Peach Sandstorm password spray campaigns enable intelligence collection at high-value targets. Retrieved September 18, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Peach Sandstorm 2023",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/09/14/peach-sandstorm-password-spray-campaigns-enable-intelligence-collection-at-high-value-targets/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2023, August 30). Azure Policy built-in policy definitions. Retrieved September 5, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Azure Policy",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/governance/policy/samples/built-in-policies#compute"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"IaaS"
] | 1.0 |