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merely in any one order, but absolutely. For since it is the part of a
wise man to arrange and to judge, and since lesser matters should be
judged in the light of some higher principle, he is said to be wise in
any one order who considers the highest principle in that order: thus
in the order of building, he who plans the form of the house is called
wise and architect, in opposition to the inferior laborers who trim
the wood and make ready the stones: "As a wise architect, I have laid
the foundation" (1 Cor. 3:10). Again, in the order of all human life,
the prudent man is called wise, inasmuch as he directs his acts to a
fitting end: "Wisdom is prudence to a man" (Prov. 10: 23). Therefore
he who considers absolutely the highest cause of the whole universe,
namely God, is most of all called wise. Hence wisdom is said to be the
knowledge of divine things, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14). But
sacred doctrine essentially treats of God viewed as the highest
cause--not only so far as He can be known through creatures just as
philosophers knew Him--"That which is known of God is manifest in
them" (Rom. 1:19)--but also as far as He is known to Himself alone
and revealed to others. Hence sacred doctrine is especially called
wisdom.

Reply Objection 1: Sacred doctrine derives its principles not from
any human knowledge, but from the divine knowledge, through which, as
through the highest wisdom, all our knowledge is set in order.

Reply Objection 2: The principles of other sciences either are
evident and cannot be proved, or are proved by natural reason through
some other science. But the knowledge proper to this science comes
through revelation and not through natural reason. Therefore it has no
concern to prove the principles of other sciences, but only to judge
of them. Whatsoever is found in other sciences contrary to any truth
of this science must be condemned as false: "Destroying counsels and
every height that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God" (2
Cor. 10:4, 5).

Reply Objection 3: Since judgment appertains to wisdom, the twofold
manner of judging produces a twofold wisdom. A man may judge in one
way by inclination, as whoever has the habit of a virtue judges
rightly of what concerns that virtue by his very inclination towards
it. Hence it is the virtuous man, as we read, who is the measure and
rule of human acts. In another way, by knowledge, just as a man
learned in moral science might be able to judge rightly about virtuous
acts, though he had not the virtue. The first manner of judging divine
things belongs to that wisdom which is set down among the gifts of the
Holy Ghost: "The spiritual man judgeth all things" (1 Cor. 2:15). And
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "Hierotheus is taught not by mere
learning, but by experience of divine things." The second manner of
judging belongs to this doctrine which is acquired by study, though
its principles are obtained by revelation.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 7]

Whether God Is the Object of This Science?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not the object of this science. For
in every science, the nature of its object is presupposed. But this
science cannot presuppose the essence of God, for Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. i, iv): "It is impossible to define the essence of God."
Therefore God is not the object of this science.

Objection 2: Further, whatever conclusions are reached in any science
must be comprehended under the object of the science. But in Holy Writ
we reach conclusions not only concerning God, but concerning many
other things, such as creatures and human morality. Therefore God is
not the object of this science.

Contrary: The object of the science is that of which it
principally treats. But in this science, the treatment is mainly about
God; for it is called theology, as treating of God. Therefore God is
the object of this science.

Response: God is the object of this science. The relation between
a science and its object is the same as that between a habit or
faculty and its object. Now properly speaking, the object of a faculty
or habit is the thing under the aspect of which all things are
referred to that faculty or habit, as man and stone are referred to
the faculty of sight in that they are colored. Hence colored things
are the proper objects of sight. But in sacred science, all things are
treated of under the aspect of God: either because they are God
Himself or because they refer to God as their beginning and end. Hence
it follows that God is in very truth the object of this science. This
is clear also from the principles of this science, namely, the
articles of faith, for faith is about God. The object of the
principles and of the whole science must be the same, since the whole
science is contained virtually in its principles. Some, however,
looking to what is treated of in this science, and not to the aspect
under which it is treated, have asserted the object of this science to
be something other than God--that is, either things and signs; or the
works of salvation; or the whole Christ, as the head and members. Of
all these things, in truth, we treat in this science, but so far as
they have reference to God.

Reply Objection 1: Although we cannot know in what consists the
essence of God, nevertheless in this science we make use of His
effects, either of nature or of grace, in place of a definition, in
regard to whatever is treated of in this science concerning God; even
as in some philosophical sciences we demonstrate something about a
cause from its effect, by taking the effect in place of a definition
of the cause.

merely in any one order, but absolutely. For since it is the part of a

wise man to arrange and to judge, and since lesser matters should be

judged in the light of some higher principle, he is said to be wise in

any one order who considers the highest principle in that order: thus

in the order of building, he who plans the form of the house is called

wise and architect, in opposition to the inferior laborers who trim

the wood and make ready the stones: "As a wise architect, I have laid

the foundation" (1 Cor. 3:10). Again, in the order of all human life,

the prudent man is called wise, inasmuch as he directs his acts to a

fitting end: "Wisdom is prudence to a man" (Prov. 10: 23). Therefore

he who considers absolutely the highest cause of the whole universe,

namely God, is most of all called wise. Hence wisdom is said to be the

knowledge of divine things, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14). But

sacred doctrine essentially treats of God viewed as the highest

cause--not only so far as He can be known through creatures just as

philosophers knew Him--"That which is known of God is manifest in

them" (Rom. 1:19)--but also as far as He is known to Himself alone

and revealed to others. Hence sacred doctrine is especially called

wisdom.

Reply Objection 1: Sacred doctrine derives its principles not from

any human knowledge, but from the divine knowledge, through which, as

through the highest wisdom, all our knowledge is set in order.

Reply Objection 2: The principles of other sciences either are

evident and cannot be proved, or are proved by natural reason through

some other science. But the knowledge proper to this science comes

through revelation and not through natural reason. Therefore it has no

concern to prove the principles of other sciences, but only to judge

of them. Whatsoever is found in other sciences contrary to any truth

of this science must be condemned as false: "Destroying counsels and

every height that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God" (2

Cor. 10:4, 5).

Reply Objection 3: Since judgment appertains to wisdom, the twofold

manner of judging produces a twofold wisdom. A man may judge in one

way by inclination, as whoever has the habit of a virtue judges

rightly of what concerns that virtue by his very inclination towards

it. Hence it is the virtuous man, as we read, who is the measure and

rule of human acts. In another way, by knowledge, just as a man

learned in moral science might be able to judge rightly about virtuous

acts, though he had not the virtue. The first manner of judging divine

things belongs to that wisdom which is set down among the gifts of the

Holy Ghost: "The spiritual man judgeth all things" (1 Cor. 2:15). And

Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "Hierotheus is taught not by mere

learning, but by experience of divine things." The second manner of

judging belongs to this doctrine which is acquired by study, though

its principles are obtained by revelation.

_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 7]

Whether God Is the Object of This Science?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not the object of this science. For

in every science, the nature of its object is presupposed. But this

science cannot presuppose the essence of God, for Damascene says (De

Fide Orth. i, iv): "It is impossible to define the essence of God."

Therefore God is not the object of this science.

Objection 2: Further, whatever conclusions are reached in any science

must be comprehended under the object of the science. But in Holy Writ

we reach conclusions not only concerning God, but concerning many

other things, such as creatures and human morality. Therefore God is

not the object of this science.

Contrary: The object of the science is that of which it

principally treats. But in this science, the treatment is mainly about

God; for it is called theology, as treating of God. Therefore God is

the object of this science.

Response: God is the object of this science. The relation between

a science and its object is the same as that between a habit or

faculty and its object. Now properly speaking, the object of a faculty

or habit is the thing under the aspect of which all things are

referred to that faculty or habit, as man and stone are referred to

the faculty of sight in that they are colored. Hence colored things

are the proper objects of sight. But in sacred science, all things are

treated of under the aspect of God: either because they are God

Himself or because they refer to God as their beginning and end. Hence

it follows that God is in very truth the object of this science. This

is clear also from the principles of this science, namely, the

articles of faith, for faith is about God. The object of the

principles and of the whole science must be the same, since the whole

science is contained virtually in its principles. Some, however,

looking to what is treated of in this science, and not to the aspect

under which it is treated, have asserted the object of this science to

be something other than God--that is, either things and signs; or the

works of salvation; or the whole Christ, as the head and members. Of

all these things, in truth, we treat in this science, but so far as

they have reference to God.

Reply Objection 1: Although we cannot know in what consists the

essence of God, nevertheless in this science we make use of His

effects, either of nature or of grace, in place of a definition, in

regard to whatever is treated of in this science concerning God; even

as in some philosophical sciences we demonstrate something about a

cause from its effect, by taking the effect in place of a definition

of the cause.