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policy. The NFL asserts that the Supreme Court’s holding in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 104 S.Ct. 2731, 81 L.Ed.2d 628 (1984), controls the facts of this case and overturns prior caselaw holding that NFL clubs do not constitute a single enterprise but rather, are separate entities which were capable of conspiring with each other under § 1. See L.A. Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1387-90; NASL, 670 F.2d at 1256-58. We do not agree that Copperweld, which found a corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary to be a single enterprise for purposes of § 1, Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771, 104 S.Ct. at 2741, applies to the facts of this case or affects the prior precedent concerning the NFL. See McNeil v. National Football League, 790 F.Supp. 871, 879-80 (D.Minn.1992) (<HOLDING>). Copperweld’s holding turned on the fact that

holding that the department of the treasury and the internal revenue service are not entities subject to suit and they should be dismissed

holding that the gtla does not apply to contract claims against governmental entities

holding that a member of a golf club was charged with knowledge of an indemnity clause in the clubs membership handbook

holding that copperweld did not apply to the nfl and its member clubs and finding the clubs to be separate entities capable of conspiring together under 1

holding that notice statute applies to both municipal entities and employees of municipal entities acting within the scope of their employment

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1 (1986), this evidence is not the sort that is cognizable on collateral review. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 347, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992) (“[T]he ‘actual innocence’ requirement must focus on those elements that render a defendant eligible for the death penalty, and not on additional mitigating evidence that was prevented from being introduced as a result of a claimed constitutional error.”). This is especially true given that the evidence did not exist at the time of White’s sentencing, so there is no argument that it would have been included but for some constitutional defect. Finally, this evidence would not satisfy the elevated Schlup standard, even if it were to be admissible. See, e.g., Hughes v. State, 897 S.W.2d 285, 294 & n. 13 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, White has not made a substantial

holding that 21 years of crimefree violencefree behavior twelve years of good behavior in prison and other meaningful productive activities were not sufficient to outweigh the states evidence in support of the death penalty

holding that the good behavior requirement of a suspended sentence defined the period of suspension

holding that sentences of five years in prison followed by ten years probation were illegal sentences that exceeded the statutory maximum of five years for a thirddegree felony

holding that the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate retaliation for activities that occurred two years prior to the termination

holding sentence of thirtyfive years in prison with ten years probation for seconddegree murder is within the statutory maximum under 1997 statutes

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that the Government was relieved of honoring this forbearance if applicable laws and regulations changed. See Hometown Fin., Inc. v. United States, 409 F.3d 1360 (Fed.Cir.2005). The Federal Circuit in Hometown recognized that a similar provision in a forbearance letter “clearly sets forth the understanding of the parties that regulatory change was possible because it refers to calculating the [regulatory capital] requirement in accordance with ‘any successor regulation.’ ” Id. at 1367-68. However, a proviso excepted the five-year period following consummation of the acquisition, during which the regulatory capital requirement was required to take into account the forbearances granted. Id. at 1368; cf. Admiral Fin. Corp. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1336, 1339-43 (Fed.Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Guar. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Ryan, 928 F.2d

holding that contract uniformly placed risk of regulatory change on plaintiff

holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of contract when it alleged the government failed to purchase insurance for plaintiff as agreed by contract

holding that a breach of contract action by the department of health for the commonwealth of puerto rico did not qualify as an exercise of police or regulatory power even if related to the departments general regulatory power

holding that the plaintiff could bring an action for negligent misrepresentation although the plaintiff could not sue on the contract because the contract was void

holding that a contract must entitle the plaintiff to money damages in the event of the governments breach of that contract

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testimony from her grandparent, the impact and trauma the sexual assault had on the victim. We have already referenced the multiple crimes committed by Bain and the testimony about their impact on those victims and their families, as well as Bain’s own admissions about his actions. Although the State addressed the impact of the sexual attack on the girl, that aspect of the testimony was not emphasized in closing argument. Under these circumstances, and after our review of the entire record, we conclude the erroneous admission of brief testimony about the impact of Bain’s actions on the child was not of such a nature as to affect the jury’s assessment of punishment. See Lindsay v. State, 102 S.W.3d 223, 229 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.], 2003, pet. filed); Boston, 965 S.W.2d at 550 (<HOLDING>). We affirm the judgment. 1 . The Texas Court

holding that the admission of a family photo was harmless error in light of the overwhelming evidence in support of the conviction

holding although admission of victim impact testimony was error it was harmless in light of strong evidence against defendant

holding that in light of strong evidence of guilt tainted evidence was harmless under brecht

holding that error from the erroneous admission of evidence was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendants guilt

holding error in admission of evidence is harmless when it was merely cumulative to other evidence in the record

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regard. V. The appellant’s fifth argument is that he was denied a fair trial because several jurors failed to disclose crucial evidence and because the jury improperly considered extraneous evidence. In relation to this claim, his entire argument in his petition consisted of the following: “During voir dire, several jurors failed to disclose critical evidence, despite unambiguous questioning. Additionally, the jury looked beyond the evidence and testimony presented at trial, and thereby denied Mr. Duncan a fair trial and reliable sentence. “... It has been long-recognized that a defendant is entitled to receive truthful answers from jurors, and when a juror fails to truthfully respond during voir dire, reversible error occurs. See State v. Gilbert, 568 So.2d 876 (Ala. Crim.App.1990) (<HOLDING>); Abercrombie v. State, 574 So.2d 879

holding that because the term conviction is ambiguous to lawyers judges and laymen the claimant did not commit misconduct when she wrote she had not been convicted of felony where adjudication had been withheld

holding that where juror did not disclose that she had an interest in the conviction of the defendant probable prejudice is shown and the conviction must be reversed

holding that a venire person who knew of the defendants prior conviction of the same offense for which he was being retried could not sit as a juror

holding that remand for resentencing is appropriate when sentence for reversed conviction appears to have influenced trial courts sentence for the affirmed conviction

holding that where a juror did not disclose that she knew someone who had been sexually abused the conviction and sentence must be reversed

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have been imposed” standard applies to scoresheet errors on direct appeal). Under the “would have been imposed” standard, a sentence based on an erroneous scoresheet must be reversed unless “the appellate court is clearly convinced that the defendant would have received the same sentence notwithstanding the score-sheet error.” Anderson, 905 So.2d at 114 (quoting Sellers v. State, 578 So.2d 339, 341 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)). Generally, when a defendant is sentenced to state prison and “[t]he presumptive sentence under a corrected scoresheet will not involve a state prison sanction, ... it cannot be said that the same sentence would have been imposed absent the error.... ” Williams v. State, 720 So.2d 590, 591 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); see also Ray v. State, 987 So.2d 155, 156 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (<HOLDING>). Here, the trial court erroneously believed

holding that an error was not harmless when the district court chose the lowest end of the improper sentencing range after stating that even if the court isnt correct the court believes it is necessary to sentence at this very high range

holding that the sentencing courts expressions that the lowest sentence within the guidelines was too se vere was sufficient to show that the lower court would have imposed a lesser sentence if it had not felt bound by the guidelines thus satisfying plain errors third prong

holding that where a district court clearly indicates that an alternative sentence would be identical to the sentence imposed under the guidelines any error that may attach to a defendants sentence under booker is harmless

holding that the trial court may not retain jurisdiction over a sentence when the defendant is sentenced under the guidelines

holding that when the trial court sentenced the defendant to prison under the belief that the lowest permissible sentence was a prison term but the lowest permissible sentence under a corrected scoresheet would be a nonprison sanction the court could not say that the same sentence would have been imposed had the trial court had the correct information

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that the search was constitutional because the delay did not cause a lapse in probable cause, did not unfairly prejudice the defendant, and was not done in bad faith. Id., at 714. We find this reasoning to be persuasive. The record demonstrates that the search warrant for Wolfs computer was obtained on August 20, 2007. The return of search warrant was filed on August 21, 2007, and provided a list of all the items seized from Wolfs residence, including his computer. A report dated October 27, 2007, detailed the information obtained from Wolfs computer after a forensic examination was performed. As demonstrated by the return on the search warrant, the search of Wolfs residence and seizure of his computer was completed within fourteen days of the issuance of the search warran t Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hernandez, 183 F.Supp.2d

holding a fivemonth delay in searching a computer did not invalidate the search because there was no showing that the delay caused a lapse in probable cause that it created prejudice to the defendant or that officers acted in bad faith

recognizing that a fivemonth delay weighs against the defendant

holding that a fivemonth delay in filing a motion to disqualify did not bar the motion where there was a reasonable explanation for the delay

holding the search of a computer after the warrant had expired constitutional because despite the delay probable cause for the search continued to exist

holding a month delay in search of a computer constitutional because probable cause continued to exist at the time of the search and no prejudice occurred

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2001 and June 2002. None of the excerpts of the letters submitted to the Court indicate if the amounts past due are derived from lack of royalty payments by Defendants. However, this is irrelevant in that the termination provision Papa John's relies upon only states three notices of default, not necessarily three notices of default for royalty payments. 3 . Because the "Without Notice” provision is at Papa John’s discretion, Papa John's may or may not terminate the franchise agreements, and the rights pursuant to such, once three notices of default occur. Once they receive three notices of breach, even if cured,. Defendants could assume that Papa John’s will rely on this particular termination provision, that they are no longer allowed to use Papa John's trade 9428, *5 (E.D.Tex.2003) (<HOLDING>). 7 . Defendants allege that Papa John’s,

holding that the only fraud that could vitiate the contract is fraud that would invalidate the merger clause itself ie fraud relating to the merger clause or fraud that invalidates the entire contract including the merger clause quoting 3 corbin contracts 578

holding that reliance is not an element to be proven under securities fraud in indiana

holding that justifiable reliance is a jury question where the contract containing the merger clause was found invalid due to an antecedent fraud

holding that where a merger clause is included in the written contract alleged collateral promises will not be enforced through fraud because under fraud the reliance must be reasonable

holding that a fraud class action cannot be certified when individual reliance will be an issue

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was acting to obtain a benefit on behalf of a charitable ... organization.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. 8(B). As the district court saw it and as the government sees it, Webster deserves the enhancement. He pretended to “act[ ] on behalf of a charitable ... organization,” U.S.S.G. § 2Bl.l(b)(9)(A), when he solicited personal information from the victims on behalf of fake charities. As Webster sees it, the enhancement does not apply. In his view, the commentary limits the application of the charity enhancement, and he was not acting to obtain a benefit on behalf of a charitable organization (as the commentary seems to require). As a general matter, the text of a guideline trumps commentary about it. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993) (<HOLDING>). But we need not resolve whether the

recognizing the guidelines commentary is authoritative

holding that a sentencing guideline prevails over its commentary if the two are inconsistent

holding that sentencing guidelines commentary must be given controlling weight unless it violates the constitution or a federal statute or is plainly inconsistent with the guidelines itself

holding that commentary is not authoritative if it is inconsistent with or a plainly erroneous reading of the guideline it interprets or explains

holding that guidelines commentary is generally authoritative

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